

CONCEPTIONS OF MODERNITY IN SECURITY STUDIES:
THE STUDY OF SECURITY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

A Ph.D. Dissertation

By

NESLİHAN DİKMEN ALSANCAK

Department of International Relations
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
July 2019

NESLİHAN DİKMEN ALSANCAK

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Bilkent University 2019

To my mother

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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent Üniversitesi

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ANKARA

July 2019

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



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
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
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
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgür Özdamar
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



Assist. Prof. Dr. Aslı Çalkıvık
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Halime Demirkan
Director V.

ABSTRACT

CONCEPTIONS OF MODERNITY IN SECURITY STUDIES: THE STUDY OF SECURITY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Dikmen Alsancak, Neslihan

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hatice Pınar Bilgin

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Security Studies has portrayed states in the Global South as a threat to international security and overlooked insecurities experienced by people and social groups in the Global South. In security studies, security in the Global South has been explained in terms of incompleteness of states in the Global South. The dissertation questions how it is possible that security studies has accounted for security in the Global South in terms of a lack. The argument of dissertation is that the study of security in the Global South is related to the conception of modernity shaping security studies, which locates the Global South outside of world politics. This dissertation builds its argument in four steps. First, it identifies three dimensions of modernity, namely, time, ontology and sociality of world politics. These dimensions help to unpack conceptions of modernity in security studies, which vary across these three dimensions. Second, the dissertation unpacks conception of modernity shaping realist approaches to security

and Third World security scholars' analyses in order to examine their respective understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations. Third, it asks how those, who are critical of these approaches, namely, critical and postcolonial approaches to security have understood the relationship. Fourth, the dissertation shows its argument by illustrating from studies on nuclear non-proliferation in the Global South.

Keywords: Global South, Modernity, Security Studies, Third World, World Politics

ÖZET

GÜVENLİK ÇALIŞMALARINDA MODERNİTE KAVRAYIŞLARI: KÜRESEL GÜNEY'DE GÜVENLİĞİN ÇALIŞILMASI

Dikmen Alsancak, Neslihan

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Hatice Pınar Bilgin

Temmuz 2019

Güvenlik çalışmaları Küresel Güney'deki devletleri uluslararası güvenliğe tehdit olarak görmekte ve Küresel Güney'deki insanların ve toplumsal grupların deneyimledikleri güvensizlikleri göz ardı etmektedir. Güvenlik çalışmaları, Küresel Güney'de güvenliği Küresel Güney'deki devletlerin eksikliği üzerinden açıklar. Bu tez, güvenlik çalışmalarında Küresel Güney'in güvenliğinin bir eksiklik üzerinden açıklanmasının nasıl mümkün olduğunu sormaktadır. Tez, Küresel Güney'de güvenliğin çalışılmasının, güvenlik çalışmalarının Küresel Güney'i dünya siyaseti dışında bırakan bir modernite anlayışı üzerinden şekillenmesi ile ilgili olduğunu savunmaktadır. Tez argümanını dört aşamada kurar. İlk olarak bu tez modernitenin üç boyutu olarak dünya siyasetinin zamanı, ontolojisi ve sosyalliğini tanımlar. Bu üç boyut, güvenlik kuramlarında birbirinden bu boyutlar üzerinden farklılaşan modernite anlayışlarını ortaya çıkartmak için kullanılacaktır. İkinci olarak, tez, dünya siyasetinde Küresel Kuzey ve Küresel Güney arasındaki güvenlik ilişkilerini nasıl

gördüklerini tartışmak için, sırasıyla realist yaklaşımlarının ve Üçüncü Dünya güvenlik akademisyenlerinin güvenlik analizlerinin modernite anlayışlarını ortaya koyacaktır. Üçüncü olarak, tezde bu yaklaşımları eleştiren eleştirel ve postkolonyal güvenlik yaklaşımlarının bu ilişkiyi nasıl anladıkları sorulacaktır. Dördüncü olarak, tez argümanını Küresel Güney’de nükleer silahsızlanma çalışmaları örneği üzerinden gösterecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dünya Siyaseti, Güvenlik Çalışmaları, Küresel Güney, Modernite, Üçüncü Dünya

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Since my years as an undergraduate student of Political Science, I have an interest in Global North-Global South relations in different issue areas, although I mostly focused on comparative politics and political economy of development. Searching for the missing link of the international, I decided to pursue a graduate degree on International Relations. However, it was only when I took a course about Critical Security Studies during my 2nd year Ph.D. studies, I came up with an understanding of the international that not only made me curious about a different aspect of the Global North-Global South relations, but also reshaped my perspective to it at all. It is my keen interest in the Global North-Global South relations enriched with my journey as a graduate student of International Relations that led me to embark on a research project the end result of which is this dissertation.

During my journey, I am so lucky that I had the chance to meet and study with my supervisor Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin. I would like to thank a lot for her inspiration and encouragement over the years. The times I lost myself in abstract thinking, she was always there to put me in the right direction as being more concrete and organized, it is when I have learned most. I think I could not write this dissertation without her guidance. I would also like to thank a lot to her for encouraging me to develop myself in all aspects of the academic life. She will always be my teacher.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In literature on security, security in the Third World¹ get studied in particular ways. Third World security scholars², who are critical of security studies, argued that security in the Third World has focused on insecurities as experienced by the great powers. The Third World only appears within the analysis of great powers as the Third World states were appeared as “the junior partners in the power game” if they were taken into consideration, otherwise, as Korany noted, “they are ‘trouble-makers’, thriving on ‘nuisance power’, fit for the exercise of techniques of ‘counter-insurgency’” (Korany, 1986: 549). As an illustration, the analysis of the Cuban missiles crisis as an over-researched conflict in Security Studies, said it about the Soviet-American relations or deterrence theory rather than its Cuban element. Security Studies has portrayed states in the Global South as a threat to international security and overlooked insecurities experienced by people and social groups in the Global South.

¹ The terms ‘Third World’ and ‘Global South’ are contested in IR as well as in Security Studies. Some scholars use these terms interchangeably (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Bilgin, 2017). Throughout the dissertation, I use the term ‘Global South’ in my analyses of the study of security in the Global South, except my analysis of Third World security scholars. I use the term ‘Third World’ in my analyses of the latter.

² Third World security scholarship is self-identified as such defined in terms of those scholars who pointed to the limitation of the realist approaches in studying security in the Third World (Bilgin, Booth & Wyn Jones, 1998; Bilgin, 2005; Bilgin, 2017).

In security studies, there is the tendency to read history of the Global South in terms of a lack. It may be about 'nuclear proliferation', or 'state failure' through which security in the Global South has been explained in terms of an incompleteness of states in the Global South that translates into inadequacy of its agency. Thus, states in the Global South have not enjoyed privilege of providing narratives of world politics and security, because understanding of world politics in security studies has not identified the states in the Global South inside of world politics. Thus, the problem of its incompleteness is not about the Global South, but understanding of world politics in security studies. The dissertation questions how it is possible that security studies has accounted for security in the Global South in terms of a lack. The argument of dissertation is that the study of security in the Global South is related to the conception of modernity shaping security studies, which locates the Global South outside of world politics.

The dissertation addresses this question by looking at the conception of modernity shaping security studies. This dissertation builds its argument in four steps. First, it develops three dimensions of modernity, namely, time, ontology and sociality of world politics. It shows how different IR theories operate with different conceptions of modernity, thus understand the relationship between world politics and the Global South. Understandings of time, ontology, and sociality of world politics vary across these three dimensions. Second, the dissertation highlights the conception of modernity shaping realist approaches to security studies, as realist approaches are the main target of Third World security scholars in their analyses of limitations of security studies. The dissertation then asks whether Third World security scholars have addressed the limitations that they have highlighted in their critiques of realist

approaches and in what terms. Third, the dissertation looks at conceptions of modernity shaping critical approaches³ and postcolonial approaches to security, and the ways of studying security in the Global South. Fourth, the dissertation illustrates its argument by elaborating on studies on nuclear non-proliferation in the Global South.

The following section introduces the key themes of this dissertation. These are namely, modernity as constitutive of IR; three dimensions of modernity; security as social construction; and the Global South. These themes are central to building the argument of the dissertation.

1.1. Four Key Themes

1.1.1. Modernity as Constitutive of IR

Following Walker (1993), theories of international relations shape our “assumptions about the ‘realities’ of modern political life,” defining the contours of what is (not) possible (Walker, 1993: foreword). This means that concepts and theories of IR shape a particular political imagination, and therefore draw the boundaries of our imagination and understanding world politics. In IR, understandings of world politics have been characterized by a particular conception of modernity that has naturalized what it means to be modern (Halperin, 2006). This particular conception of modernity has been drawn from experiences of Western Europe and North America. The

³ Critical Security Studies here refers to a collection of critical approaches to security, three European schools. In C.A.S.E. collective (2006), three are identified, namely, the Aberystwyth school, the Copenhagen school and the Paris School.

dissertation argues that this particular conception of modernity has been constitutive of security studies. This particular conception of modern has shaped the imagination and understanding of modern world politics in a way that defines the Global South distinct from its connections with the Global North. Thus, this particular conception has overlooked the historical connections between the Global North and Global South from shaping what counts as world politics as well as security and what doesn't.

Following Halperin, concepts and “theories about the structures, processes, and events that define and recur within the international realm” are based, to a large extent on myths of modernity (Halperin, 2006: 43). One of these myths, Halperin argues, is ‘the rise of Europe,’ through which it is Europe’s representation of itself and its definition of the modern world that the system rests on. For example, “the term ‘European Revolutions’ was used to describe processes of change that were not really European, sudden or explosive or really discontinuous with the past” (Halperin, 2006: 50). Contra the myths of modernity, these processes are connected between past and present of world politics, the Global North and the Global South.

The ways through which IR scholars understand modern world politics are shaped by their understandings of modernity as abstractions from historical connections between the Global North and the Global South. This is connection to those approaches that understand modernity with “multiple beginnings” (Said, 1985), “connected histories” (Subrahmanyam, 1997; Bhambra, 2007), “connected sociologies” (Bhambra, 2014) or intertwined histories of social, political and international thought between the Global North and the Global South (Buck-Morss, 2009; Shilliam, 2011). For latter understanding, there is “the constitutive relation between ‘Europe’ and ‘non-

Europeans,' ” and the beginnings of ideas and institutions of humankind are located within that co-constitutive relationship (Bilgin, 2017: 29). Locating ‘beginnings’ rather than ‘origins’ of modern ideas and institutions has led to rethinking modernity with reference to historical connections. The idea that there are not any ‘origins’ of ideas and institutions means that the point of consideration is not whether they have ‘Western’ or ‘non-Western’ origins, but they are mutually constitutive in world politics (Bilgin, 2017). Here, it is not a problematization of universality, but thinking about that it has an origin in world politics. Studying modernity in terms of historical connections between the Global North and the Global South has three ramifications for studying world politics and security.

First, starting with ‘beginnings’ of the ideas, practices and institutions in histories in world politics allows us to see their mutually constitutive relationship in connected histories. Thus, these ideas and institutions in world politics are not originated from a one place or history in world politics, but they are developed by intertwined (or connected) histories of modern world politics. Second, these connected histories between the Global North and the Global South always include questions, negotiations and contestations about world politics since there is always encounter between the Global North and the Global South. Third, these ideas and institutions that have been developed to answer these questions have been re-shaped through connections and have led to the emergence of new ‘beginnings’ in world politics. Following studies of postcolonial insights to world politics and IR, this dissertation shows how the conception of modernity that has prevailed in security studies has failed to account for historical connections between the Global North and the Global South.

1.1.2. Three Dimensions of Modernity

Three dimensions⁴ of modernity are time, ontology, and sociality of world politics. In the literature, previous discussions on conceptions of modernity have focused primarily on temporality and ontology of world politics (see, for example Walker, 1993; Halperin, 2006). Scholars with postcolonial insights to world politics have recently brought sociality of world politics as a dimension of modernity (Barkawi & Stanski, 2012; Jabri, 2013; Bilgin, 2017). Accordingly, IR literature has not yet discussed how all these three work together to shape understandings of world politics in IR. The dissertation shows how these three dimensions work together in identifying the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in IR. It defines three dimensions of modernity using the literature on postcolonial insights to world politics.

First, time of world politics, here, refers to IR theories' understanding of when world politics takes place. There are two understandings of time in IR theories, in singular terms and not in singular terms. Understanding the time of world politics in singular terms means that most of IR literature read narratives of world politics with an understanding of time of world politics in singular terms originated from one place or history in world politics. Postcolonial approaches to IR, however, argue that time of world politics is not singular but always multiply with the colonial histories in the Global South. Thus, this latter understanding also helps to see connections between histories in world politics as coeval and equal (Fabian, 1983).

⁴ For unpacking conceptions of modernity, I use 'dimensions' of conceptions of modernity. I call them dimensions drawn from Hobson's work (2012). Hobson unpacks variants of Orientalism/Eurocentrism in international theory by identifying four dimensions, these are "the particularity of the standard of civilisation deployed, the degree of agency it ascribes to East and West, its position with respect to imperialism or anti-imperialism, and its particular sensibility"(Hobson, 2012: 3) These dimensions help Hobson "to reveal the specific meta-narrative that underpins each international theory"(Hobson, 2012: 3).

Second, ontology of world politics refers to IR theories' understandings of what world politics is. There are four understandings, these are understandings ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, in terms of dialectical, *differance*, and dialogical. Understanding the ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between the domestic hierarchy and international anarchy means that while domestic hierarchy characterizes inside the state, international anarchy characterizes outside the state, and these two realms are pre-given and mutually exclusive. Understanding the ontology of world politics in terms of dialectical means that there is always a (re)-construction of the state as the political. Understanding ontology of world politics in terms of *differance* means that there is re-constitution of state as the sovereign, but it is not be decidable, rather continuation of politics depends on continuous questioning of the political in itself, rather than for decisions about what the political is. Last, understanding ontology of world politics in terms of dialogical means there is always re-construction of the political for the discovery of other that may be in form of contestation, negotiations or negation of world politics.

Third, sociality of world politics refers to IR theories' understandings of how world politics takes shape. In IR, there are two kinds of sociality in world politics, namely, causality and constitution. Understanding sociality of world politics in terms of causality means that the structure of international politics comes before its forms such as ideas, institutions, thus forms of international politics do not shape the structure of international politics. International sociality is understood in terms of state-to-state interaction since the international is conceived only as a realm of foreign policy and forms of international politics only as state behaviors. Understanding sociality of

world politics in terms of constitution means that the structures of world politics and their forms shape and re-shape each other. Since the international is understood as a realm of social relations, international sociality, here, refers to interaction between units, processes, and structures in world politics.

To sum up, using these three dimensions of modernity, and aforementioned understandings of time, ontology, and sociality of world politics in IR theories, I will show not only conceptions of modernity in IR, but also how these conceptions locate the Global South in world politics, whether distinct or in connection with the Global North.

1.1.3. Security as Social Construction

The second theme is security as social construction. This is in contrast to taking the meaning of security as given. Understanding security as a social construction represents a convergence of numerous trends, which have emerged since the 1990s. This definition embraces insights produced by scholars of critical security studies. One of these scholars, Jef Huysmans (1998a), points to security as a thick signifier that brings “us to an understanding of how category ‘security’ articulates a particular way of organizing form of life” (Huysmans, 1998a: 231). Another critical security studies scholar, Bill McSweeney (1998), highlights that it is not only the concept of security that is essentially contested, but also all other concepts of social order. Both scholars and practitioners conceptualize security as such for their particular interests “in modeling and practicing international relations” (McSweeney, 1998:1).

Informed by the insights of another foremost critical security studies scholar, Ken Booth, this dissertation understands security not only as a socially constructed but also

as a derivative concept. Booth (2007) argues that “security in world politics is essentially a derivative concept” in the sense that “how one conceives security is constructed out of the assumptions that make up one’s theory of world politics,” assumptions regarding units, structures and processes (Booth, 2007: 150). Security as social construction points to the relationship between security and politics. Thus, this dissertation shows how assumptions about security are constructed out of particular understandings of world politics.

1.1.4. The Global South

Within IR theory and Security Studies, during the Cold War, the term of the Third World was mostly used to distinguish newly emerged and non-industrialized countries from the industrialized West and planned economies of the East (see David, 1993). Some scholars emphasize positive connotations of the term and highlight the Third World as a new object of analysis in IR theory (see Neuman, 1998). Others argue that in the system of thought during the Cold War, the very idea of an independent Third World was problematic, wherein IR literature the Third World “states were usually portrayed as being part of one sphere of influence or the other” (Thomas & Wilkin, 2004: 243).

In their use of the term the Third World, some IR scholars conceive the Third World not as a place or an economic condition (Neuman, 1998). Rather, for those scholars, it is a state of mind, a perspective, and an attitude, since these scholars argue that the Third World exists in New York, in Paris, as it does in Mexico City (Neuman, 1998: 18). Such an understanding indicates a difference when compared with the ‘Western’ view of the notion of the Third World. Accordingly, for the Cold War ‘Western’

perspective, the socialist world is *raison d'être* of the very invention of the idea of three worlds as the 'other' of the First World (Pletsch, 1981: 576). From this perspective, then, the Third World indicates a binary view of the world: modern (capitalist or socialist world) and traditional (the 'Third World'). On the other hand, for some IR scholars, the term itself is a social criticism against inequality in world politics and in IR (Ayoob, 2002), and it has a "heuristic value that warrants its usage as a label for common political resistance to dependence" (Tickner, 2003: 256).

Behind using the concept of the Third World as a social criticism, there are both analytical and political concerns. Thomas and Wilkin (2004) highlight both objective and subjective criteria to explore its usefulness. The objective criteria—including the low level of socio-economic development, postcolonial states, unstable political structure, technological dependency as characteristics shared by a large amount of countries—made this grouping analytically useful. Nevertheless, the political-normative commitment of using the concept of the Third World has been much related to subjective criteria. As Thomas and Wilkin (Thomas & Wilkin, 2004) point out, the concept of the Third World was used "in the immediate post-colonial period as a form of identity for a self-defining group of mostly post-colonial states" with the Non-Aligned Movement, which also transferred to international economic platforms as the establishment of UNCTAD and G-77 (Thomas & Wilkin, 2004: 242). For the members of the Third World, it had a positive meaning in defining their 'equal' role and place in international politics (Thomas & Wilkin, 2004: 242). As such, these scholars understand world politics in terms of 'three worlds' and favor the autonomy (and equality) of the Third World from the two other worlds of world politics.

With the end of the Cold War, the utility of the concept of the Third World has been questioned in both analytical and political terms in IR as well. Rising differentiation within the Third World, as well as emergence of others, such as the post-Communist world, stimulated the emergence of new concepts such as the Global South. Different from their earlier works, some scholars began to use these new terms interchangeably (Thomas, 1991). Though, they still use them with the same analytical and political-normative commitment “to refer to those that share the common problem of lack of voice or say in global affairs” (Thomas & Wilkin, 2004: 243). In this way, the Third World, or other terms that are utilized interchangeably with it, such as the South or the Global South, “reflect a common unifying experience shared by the majority of countries and people: a lack of voice or say in global affairs, a vulnerability to external forces beyond their control and human insecurity which characterizes the lives of their citizens” (Thomas & Wilkin, 2004: 243).

However, while Third World security scholars address the binary of the First World and the Second World by indicating that there is a third option, they end up with another a binary between the developed and the undeveloped world. This is because Third World security scholars do not question the particularity of the Third World and universality of the First World as the underlying discourse in IR.⁵ Rather, these scholars only underscore inequalities between the First World and the Third World, and the ‘secondary’ role or place attributed to the Third World states as well as societies in world politics.

⁵ This will be taken up later, and examined extensively in Chapter 4, since it is an instance of Third World security scholars’ conception of modernity.

IR scholars with postcolonial insights into world politics and IR open new avenues for thinking about history and locality of world politics by focusing on the encounters and historical connections between the Global North and the Global South. Postcolonial insights to world politics and IR point to the mutual constitution between the Global North and the Global South. Thus, the use of these terms is about going beyond mere pointing to different conditions these worlds existing out there; instead it questions how a set of problems that are tied with these binaries of ‘First/Third World’, the ‘Global North’/the ‘Global South’ are constituted by their encounters (Doty, 1996) that are inclusive of but not limited to the colonial encounters (Hobson, 2004) between the Global North and the Global South in world politics. The reason to use the term the Global South and to address the relationship between the Global North and the Global South, rather than, between the West and the non-West is related not to make only a cultural reading of this relationship, as scholars focusing on civilizational and cultural analyses of the relationship mainly use the terms of the West and the non-West (or East) (see Hobson, 2004).

The dissertation acknowledges that there are limitations of using the term of Global South. Although the problem cannot be solved in this study, the dissertation addresses the relationship between understanding the Global South as a ‘constructed category’ and ‘real’ treatment of the Global South. Here, the epistemological argument is that reality of the Global South is not captured, but reality is constructed through these theories, and empirical studies on the Global South.

1.2. Aim

The aim of this dissertation is to provide an account of how a particular conception of

modernity has been constitutive of Security Studies. This dissertation has four specific aims that correspond to the task. First, it aims to explore whether Third World security scholars have gone beyond the limitations that they addressed with respect to understanding the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security studies. Second, the dissertation seeks to explore what critical and postcolonial approaches to security have brought to the study of security in the Global South, and understanding the relationship in security relations. Third, the dissertation aims to bring taxonomy of various conceptions of modernity shaping security approaches and understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. Fourth, it aims to open space for a dialogue between critical approaches to security and postcolonial insights for the study of security in the Global South.

1.3. Structure

The dissertation is composed of two main parts. The first part is composed of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The second part is composed of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The first part provides an overview of the literature on the study of security in the Global South and identifies three dimensions of modernity in IR.

Chapter 2 elaborates the literature on the study of security in the Global South composed of realist approaches and their critiques, namely Third World security approaches, critical security approaches, and the postcolonial approaches. The chapter is structured around four main sections. The first section starts with realist approaches. The second section focuses on Third World security scholars' critique of realist approaches and the remedies Third World security scholars have offered. The third section continues with critical approaches, which is critical of both realist approaches and Third World security scholars. This chapter ends with the fourth section, which

looks at the postcolonial approaches and their insights into the limitations of realist, Third World and critical approaches to security. Building on these insights, the chapter, points to the necessity for inquiring into the limitations of security studies in terms of understanding the relationship between modernity and studying security in the Global South.

Chapter 3 identifies three dimensions of modernity in IR. These are time, ontology, and sociality of world politics. The chapter is composed of four main sections. The first section offers the identification of these three dimensions of modernity. The latter three sections develop each of these three dimensions. These three sections discuss them in greater detail, focusing on particular understandings of time (singular, not in singular time), ontology (binary, dialectical, *differance*, dialogical), and sociality (causation, constitution) of world politics in IR theories. These three dimensions of modernity help me to unpack various conceptions of modernity in security approaches.

After overviewed the literature on the study of security in the Global South and identifies three dimensions of modernity in the first part of the dissertation, the second part lays out in detail the ways in which a particular conception of modernity has been constitutive of security studies. This part is composed of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Chapter 4 looks at realist approaches to security studies, and Third World security scholars who are critical of realist approaches to security. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section elaborates on the definition, key literature and the notion of security ISS is built upon. The second section unpacks the conception of modernity shaping realist approaches to security by looking at which understandings of time, ontology, and sociality of world politics have shaped realist approaches in three respective sub-sections. The third section looks at the debate on the ‘failed

states' in realist approaches and shows how realist approaches have understood the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. The fourth section elaborates on the ways in which Third World security scholars address the limitations of understanding the relationship between the First World and the Third World in realist approaches, and what their critiques offer for understanding this relationship in studying security in the Third World.

Chapter 5 looks at both critical security studies and postcolonial approaches to security. This chapter analyzes a particular conception of modernity as constitutive of critical approaches to security (the Aberystwyth School, the Copenhagen School and the Paris School). The first section elaborates on the definition, key literature and the notion of security underlining critical security studies. The second section unpacks three dimensions of modernity, namely, time, ontology, and sociality of world politics that have shaped critical approaches to security in three respective sub-sections. The third section looks at the study of security in the Global South in each school of thought, and analyzes how critical approaches to security have understood the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations. The fourth section focuses on the postcolonial approaches to security, and question what they offer for the study of the relationship in security relations.

The concluding chapter, Chapter 6, shows the findings of the dissertation. The chapter highlights the taxonomy of three conceptions of modernity and understandings the relationship between the Global North and the Global South found in security approaches. The chapter also illustrates the argument of the dissertation through analyses from studies on nuclear non-proliferation in the Global South.

CHAPTER 2

THE STUDY OF SECURITY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The chapter provides an overview of the literature on the study of security in the Global South. The chapter is structured into four sections. The first section starts with realist approaches. The second section focuses on Third World Security scholars' critique of realist approaches in studying security in the Third World. The third section looks at critical approaches and their critiques of both realist and Third World security approaches. The fourth section looks at the postcolonial approaches and their critiques of the realist, Third World security, and critical approaches. Building these insights, the chapter points to the necessity for inquiring into the limitations of security studies in terms of understanding of the relationship between modernity and the study of security in the Global South.

2.1. Realist Approaches

During the Cold War, realist approaches have studied security of the Global South from the perspectives of the great powers and their security concerns. In their introduction to the edited book, *Superpower Competition and Security in the Third*

World, Litwak and Wells (1988) have noted that East-West rivalry in the Third World was not only a factor which complicated great power relations, but it was also a danger for international stability, since Litwak and Wells argue “there is also the real danger that the superpowers might be drawn into these conflicts in support of local clients through inadvertent escalation or policy miscalculation”(Litwak & Wells, 1988: ix). Accordingly, the edited volume focused on the process of East-West rivalry in the Third World based on regional case studies about Near East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, and Central America.

Michael Desch’s (1989) article on the grand strategy of great powers in the periphery is another illustrative study. Desch’s central focus is on the prioritization of the great powers’ security concerns. According to Desch, the role of regimes of the Global South could be defined with respect to answering the question of whether these regimes affect the balance between the great powers or not, and to what degree (Desch, 1989: 120). Desch maintained that a great power must protect its interests in particular peripheral areas, since the latter contribute to the strength of a great power, and determine the balance of power.

Desch’s article is one among many where the Global South is introduced in security studies literature as only the locales where the great power interests rested during and after the Cold War. Other studies on the Middle East, the Latin America and the East Asia (Walt, 1987; Schoultz, 1987) also illustrate, albeit in different ways, why and how the states of the Global South matters for the great power concerns of the superpower conflict. In their studies, these scholars do not refrain from giving specific

role definitions to regimes and states of the Global South in order to promote the great power security interests.

The end of the Cold War has not altered studying security of the Global South with respect to security concerns of the great powers. Steven David's article entitled 'Why the Third World still matters' illustrates this. David (1993: 127) writes in introducing his article:

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have not ended the importance of the Third World to American interests and worldwide stability, nor have they ushered in a new era of peace. Because war will not become obsolete in the Third World, and because many Third World states are becoming increasingly powerful, the threat that Third World states pose to themselves and non-Third World countries will persist. Preparing to address these threats must be a central component of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world.

David explains why the states of the Global South still matter in reference to great power security concerns after the Cold War for regional and international stability. Security of the Global South is still defined with respect to the great powers' security perspectives. The post-Cold War literature (Betts, 1994; Goldgeier & McFaul, 1992; Sorensen, 2005) also illustrates how security studies continue to consider mainly "threat perceptions and interest calculations of the West" (Bilgin, 2005: 11).

2.2. Third World Security Scholars

Third World security scholars were the earliest to highlight that studying security in the Third World only from the perspectives of great powers prevents us from understanding security in the Third World. Third World security scholars maintained that security concerns of Third World states and societies were not studied from their

own perspectives. In particular, they note that the prevalence of superpower conflict perspective shaped security studies during the Cold War. Third World security scholars pointed to the implications of this in terms of the misfit between security studies concepts and categories and experiences of security in the Third World. The first sub-section looks at Third World security scholars' critique of realism, and continues with their questioning of security studies concepts and categories, focusing on the category of the state and the concept of security.

2.2.1. Third World as Peripheral to Superpower Conflict

Bahgat Korany, an Egyptian scholar, is a Third World security scholar who initially pointed to the prevalence of superpower conflict perspective in security studies. In his seminal article 'Strategic Studies and the Third World: a critical evaluation' (1986), Korany asked why strategic studies during the Cold War treated the Third World as peripheral to "the phenomenon of global conflict", despite the most of the conflicts in the world took place in the Third World countries (Korany, 1986: 547). For Korany, the limitations of security studies in accounting for global conflict beyond the superpower conflict stemmed from "the lopsided association" of studying security with the power paradigm – *interstate struggle for power* because there was "the growing diffusion of the ideas of power paradigm as the established truth"(Korany, 1986: 548). In the dominant paradigm, not only the major actor of international politics is defined as the state, but also the primary focus was on the analysis of great powers or what Korany states, on "the powers of the 'centre' " among the interstate relations (Korany, 1986: 549).

The central focus of Korany was on the crucial question of whether our existing frames of analysis – our paradigms - explain or distort the ‘reality’ out there (Korany, 1986: 547). As a result, Korany noted that states in the Third World were only considered within the established paradigm as “the junior partners in the power game” if they were taken into consideration at all. Otherwise, as Korany noted, “they are ‘trouble-makers’, thriving on ‘nuisance power’, fit for the exercise of techniques of ‘counter-insurgency’” (Korany, 1986: 549).

Another Third World security scholar, Mohammed Ayoob also underscored the limitations of the prevalence of superpower conflict perspective on studying security in the Third World. In a review article ‘The Security Problematic of the Third World’ (1991), Ayoob noted that a great amount of the literature on the Third World was written from the superpowers’ perspectives with respective superpower concerns of influence and power over the strategic regions of the Third World. Thus, there was little written “about the interaction of Third World states with the international system”, particularly about “their overriding concern with security in terms of reducing the vulnerabilities of their structures, institutions, and regimes” (Ayoob, 1991: 258).

Similarly, Azar and Chung-In-Moon, in *National Security in the Third World*, underlined that most of the literature on security in the Third World was written in terms of “threat perceptions, strategic interactions and regional and superpower alignment and realignment” (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988a: 4). The analysis of security in the Third World was based on exploring the impact of superpower policy

on the security context in the Third World. Thereby, problems of security in the Third World were treated as a mere extension of the system-level dynamics.

According to Azar and Chung-In-Moon, the emphasis on the system-level analysis on security in the Third World were mainly stemmed from the imposition of superpower conflict framework on the Cold War security thinking. Accordingly, there was the perception that most Third World states “are clients and proxies of big powers and ‘system-influential’ states” and they do not act alone and impact on the system (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988a: 5). The agenda of international issues as well as the parameters of the international interactions among states are established by the superpowers and the medium-sized powers. For these reasons, the Third World “is simply the backdrop for the competition of the superpowers and medium-sized powers and is relegated to the status of clients who benefit or suffer commensurately with their protectors” (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988a: 5).

Security thinking during the Cold War approached the phenomenon of global conflict as the superpower conflict, which marginalized the majority of the conflicts experienced in the world for these Third World security scholars. While Korany (1986) problematized the superpower conflict as the main component of international politics, Ayoob (1991) and Azar and Chung-In-Moon (1988a) conceived the international dimension of security within the superpower conflict framework.

Third World security scholars argue that the role and place of the Third World in world politics has been relatively unexplored due to the prevalence of mainly superpower conflict perspective in definition of security studies. Diagnosis of the

limitation leads to exploring its implications for studying security in the Third World. Third World security scholars note that concepts and categories of security studies do not fit into the Third World context, and are not adequate for understanding the majority of threats, conflicts and violence experienced in the Third World. Respectively, in their amendments on the category of the state and the concept of security, Third World security scholars point to “different” characteristics of state-making processes in the Third World from its Western counterparts (Bilgin, 2015). In the following two sub-sections, the chapter looks at their critiques about the category of the state and the concept of security.

2.2.2. Misfit between Realist Studies and Third World Experience: The State

Third World security scholars have argued that realist approaches is based on a particular definition of the state that has been derived from a particular understanding of European experiences. In their comparison of Third World states with their European counterparts, they have focused on different historical and social aspects of state formation in the Third World. The category of the state is central in analyses of Mohammed Ayoob (1983; 1995; 1998) and Caroline Thomas (1989) and their critics of realist approaches to security. I will examine these two works. Before doing so, I will introduce Barry Buzan’s classification of strong and weak states, since his classification is central to analyses of both Ayoob and Thomas. Buzan is one of the first to notice that a simple conception of state is not enough in understanding its relation to security. There is a reason why he is doing this. He is doing to address some limitations of realism.

In *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Buzan (1983) proposed an ideal-type to explore the nature of state in relation to security. The author identified three elements of the state that are interlinked though distinguishable from each other. These components of the states are: the idea of the state, the physical base of the state (territory), and the institutional expression of the state (Buzan, 1983: 40). Among these components, Buzan underlined that the idea of the state is the most central one.

In a book chapter, 'People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World' (1988), Buzan highlighted that the international system is not only composed of states with different power capabilities, but also in terms of different types of states (in terms of the socio-political cohesiveness). The primary variable used by Buzan to differentiate the nature of states is the degree of socio-political cohesiveness. Using the variable, Buzan qualifies states as ranging on a spectrum from the weak states (low socio-political cohesion) to strong states (high socio-political cohesion). This qualification is related to "the strength or weakness of a country as state" rather than to "its strength or weaknesses as a power" regarding the capabilities and resources it commands (Buzan, 1988: 18).

Buzan, therefore, distinguished the "weak" and "strong" states in reference to "the status of the unit concerned as a member of the class of states" (Buzan, 1983: 66). These two features of the stateness are the 'idea of the state' in terms of coherent and widely held by the population, and the legitimate 'state institutions'. States vary "in respect of their weakness or strength as members of the category of states" (Buzan, 1983: 66). Buzan argued that weak states fail to create a domestic political and social

consensus on both the idea of the state and its institutions that have sufficient strength to “eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation” (Buzan, 1983: 67). I elaborated on Buzan because he made up for some limitations of realism, and that Ayoob and others built on his contribution.

In his study ‘Security in the Third World: The Worm about to Turn?’ (1983), Ayoob also uses Buzan’s idea of weak/strong states distinction with a new type of classification, as he adds new attributes to the stateness. In addition to strong (cohesive) state-structures, Ayoob also defines the ‘unconditional legitimacy’ of state-structures as an attribute of the stateness. In contrast to the European states that reached an unconditional legitimacy of state-structures and that have cohesive state structures, for Ayoob, “state structures in the Third World in the present form do not enjoy ‘unconditional legitimacy’ and are weak as states (once again one must be careful to distinguish weak states from weak powers)” (Ayoob, 1983: 44).

Different from Buzan’s analyses, Ayoob highlighted that these two attributes, namely, ‘sovereignty as unconditional legitimacy’ and ‘cohesive structure’, complement each other due to the evolution of the states-system in Europe. In this way, Ayoob’s study adds a historical dimension on the socio-political difference explored by Buzan.

Accordingly, Ayoob explored the reasons for the major difference with respect to two accounts, the time factor and the colonial legacy. As will be argued later, this is a particular understanding of history and state. This point will be developed in Chapter 4.

First, Ayoob argued that most states in the Third World were latecomers to the modern system of states, which was European in origin. Therefore, there is a huge gap between states in the Third World and their European counterparts in terms of the development of modern state structures. Ayoob noted that the gap reflected capacity of state to act effectively in the system of states and subsequently leads to “two types of actors in the international system: the *primary* actors (the original European members of the system and their offshoots in North America and Australasia) and the *secondary* actors (the late-comers, the bulk of the third world)” (emphasis in original, Ayoob, 1983: 45).

Second, according to Ayoob, state structures in the Third World lack legitimacy due to the late development of modern state structures and the boundaries drawn by the colonial powers. Ayoob emphasized that states structures in the Third World have not yet developed the capacity “to ensure the habitual identification of their populations with their respective states and their regimes that preside over these post-colonial structures within colonially-dictated boundaries” (Ayoob, 1983: 45). There is no consensus on fundamental social and political issues mainly the social and political organization within societies in the Third World. This is the reason, why Third World states are mainly ruled by the regimes with narrow political and social bases argued Ayoob.

In his book, *The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and International system* (1995), Ayoob explored further what he meant by the strong (cohesive) state structure as the central attribute of the stateness. In this study, Ayoob highlighted three attributes of stateness, namely, coercive capability (central state

power accumulation), political capacity (integration and legitimacy), and policy capacity (institutional coherence).

In his analysis of state-making process in the Third World, Ayoob highlighted an inherent similarity in the logic of the state making process in terms of primitive central state power accumulation as in the case of European state-making process. However, there is also the divergence in other dimensions from the European experience (Ayoob, 1995: 23). The following quote from Ayoob (1995: 32) captures the reasons for that divergence between Third World state-making and European state-making process.

The Third World is attempting to replicate this largely unpremeditated and uncoordinated evolutionary process but on a ridiculously short timetable and with a predetermined set of goals. The existence of a model to emulate, and the pressures generated by international and domestic elite demands make the task of state makers in the third world so difficult...Fitting an evolutionary historical process into a series of deadlines is difficult and dangerous exercise since it distorts the process of natural evolution and led to disequilibrium, which lies at the root of the chronic political instability in the third world.

For Ayoob, the degree of stateness is a function of state elite's success in state making process (Ayoob, 1995: 21). By using Tilly's distinction between national state and nation-state, Ayoob stated that there has been very close resemblance in the establishment of national state and the evolution of nationalism to that of early modern Europe. Although Third World states elites also use the rhetoric of nation-state, what "they are principally committed to the construction of national states along the lines of the states of Western Europe of 17th and 19th century" wrote Ayoob (Ayoob, 1995: 26). The priority has been given by states elites in the Third World to "the primitive accumulation of power in the hands of the state over the creation of popular consensus about the content and parameters of nationalism in fragmented

societies” (Ayoob, 1995: 26). In other words, for Ayoob, there is a twin process of state making and nation building. State building process, if successful, promotes the establishment of national state, but only with an additional sequence of time that the nation-state can be built, according to Ayoob.

Another Third World security scholar, Thomas in the concluding chapter to her edited volume, ‘Southern Instability, Security and Western concepts- On an unhappy marriage and the need for a divorce’ (1989) found the category of the state used in strong/weak state debates to be problematic. Thomas argued that Buzan used the European nation-state as the model, where state and nation coincide, and social cohesiveness becomes a character of a state. Under Buzan’s classification, most of states in the Third World are weak states, since they fail to provide domestic cohesion noted Thomas (Thomas, 1989: 184). Rather, Thomas suggested an alternative category of the state. To do this, the author used Mann’s classification of strong and weak states, which separate the state from society. Thomas argued that Mann conceives social cohesiveness as a character of a strong society, whereas despotic power and infrastructural power are characters of a strong state. This alternative classification says that social cohesiveness may increase or decrease by state power. The level of social cohesiveness makes exercise of power easier or more difficult (Thomas, 1989: 182).

Using Mann’s classification, Thomas argued that strong states in the Third World are possible, since most of them have despotic power and societies in the Third World are weak due to low level of social cohesiveness. Using Mann’s classification, she argued, “helps minimize the Western liberal bias apparent in so much the discussion

of strong and weak states, thus making room for the requirements indigenous to Third World states” (Thomas, 1989: 184). In her understanding, it is only through the development of the infrastructural power that social consensus will be increased in the long run for the establishment of social cohesion (building a nation-state) in the Third World.

To reiterate, building on Buzan’s classification but also giving in a historical perspective, Ayooob pointed to the interrelated nature of the attributes of ‘unconditional’ legitimacy and cohesive state structure. In contrast, Thomas argued that using Buzan’s concepts of strong and weak states reproduces the European state-centered bias. Rather, Thomas used the strong and weak society classification when considering the historical evolution of state making process in the Third World. Viewed together, Ayooob and Thomas have criticized realist approaches and its category of the state because it is based on conflation of state with nation. Rather, they point to how these two processes of state making and nation making take place within a historical and an international dimension in the Third World.

2.2.3. Misfit between Realist Studies and Third World Experience: Security

Third World security scholars’ analyses of state and nation making processes in the Third World have also shaped their analyses of security. In edited volume, *The Many faces of National Security in the Arab World*, Korany with Brynen and Noble (1993) investigate the link between specificities of states in the Arab world and security problems existing in the region. In the book, their objective in reformulating the concept of national security “is not only to widen the national security concept, but

also potentially to add to the explanation of the various inter-state wars that plague the region” (Korany, Brynen & Noble, 1993: xix). Korany, Brynen and Noble reformulated the concept of security by examining how state-society relations affect a country’s security. They did not deny the relevance of the realist paradigm for understanding of the security problems of the Arab states in terms of the inter-state conflict. Rather, their aim of broadening the concept of national security was to take into account the full range of threats to basic interests as well as values of the Arab states and societies. For this end, they pursued “a two-track approach to national security in the Arab world” (Korany, Brynen & Noble, 1993: 19). On the one hand, the approach dealt with the nature of regional and global politics as well as the problems of high politics. On the other hand, this approach studied “the characteristics of the contemporary Arab state, with its fragility and vulnerabilities and the ensuing pressures and threats which these generate” (Korany, Brynen & Noble, 1993: 19).

Korany, Brynen and Noble’s work argued that states in the Third World are characterized by “protracted social conflict”, which indicates the multi-dimensionality of the security concerns of these states. Characteristics of the ‘protracted social conflict’ are function of the specificities of the Arab states namely, internal fragility and external vulnerability. The internal fragility as the main source of national insecurity is due to the historical pattern of state formation in the Arab world particularly and in the Third World generally according to Korany, Brynen and Noble. The historical pattern of state formation caused the sources of internal fragility namely praetorian society, premature national identity, and development deficit. Put differently, they explained the reason for the internal fragility in terms of “the imposition of an (alien)

state structure on a (forged) nation” during decolonization (Korany, Brynen & Noble, 1993: 12).

Compared to the European nation-states, the internal fragility of Third World states increased with modernization, since modernization in terms of its impact on social mobility put pressure on states in the Third World, according to Korany, Brynen and Noble. With modernization, there was the widening of the gap between socio-economic demands of the mass society such as food insecurity and water shortage, and the capacity of the political system to cope with them, and they called it the development deficit (Korany, Brynen & Noble, 1993: 15). Thus, the multi-dimensionality (socio-economic, religious, ethnic issues) of security concerns is inherent in the socio-historical (structural) context of states in the Third World in the international periphery argued Korany, Brynen and Noble. For this reason, the internal sources of conflict are inextricable from inter-state ones, they argued. There is interconnectedness of internal and international politics (Korany, Brynen & Noble, 1993: 10-11), which requires a multi-level analysis and interdisciplinary approach to security, according to Korany, Brynen and Noble.

Thomas, in ‘New Directions in thinking about security in the Third World’ (1991) argued that what Third World state elites understand from the concept of national security has been mainly regime security, where “security policies were formulated by an elite with the express intention of satisfying those sections of the population whose support is needed to maintain itself in power” (Thomas, 1991: 272). According to Thomas, the use of the concept of national security by Third World state elites was

for ideological and practical reasons in the attempt to legitimize a particular model of state.

Rather than using the concept of 'security' that requires the identification of nation with state (social and cultural cohesion), Thomas preferred to use the concept of state security, which is based on the domestic political consensus on the idea of 'national security'. States in the Third World cannot pursue state security due to the lack of social consensus on the idea of 'national security' argued Thomas. It was because of the failure of the domestic legitimacy, which is the result of the social interaction of state and society in the Third World according to Thomas. For her, the problem of internal insecurity makes the problem of external insecurity (structural vulnerability to international economy and politics) more acute and vice versa.

In the Third World, Thomas (1987) points to two dynamics that condition the limits of domestic legitimacy. First, states in the Third World face difficulties stemmed from international economic structure in terms of the development deficit, which prevents these states from the provision of basic needs and services to their population. Second, the juridical international legitimacy given to most of states in the Third World under the international norms of non-intervention and sovereignty led to lack of domestic legitimacy. It is because, according to Thomas, in the European experience, "the hostility of international environment had been a motor for integration and development" (Thomas, 1991: 270). Whereas, the protection given by the juridical legitimacy to Third World states prevents them from such imperatives. Furthermore, according to Thomas, superpower competition also contributed to the

benign international environment through establishing client states in the Third World.

For Thomas, pursuing security in the Third World requires consensus building, greater social and economic mobilization and political inclusion. State security in the context of the Third World refers not simply to the military dimension, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state's existence. Thus, state security is defined by Thomas as "security in a state which incorporated both provision of basic needs of population and political participation" (Thomas, 1991: 267). Accordingly, being a strong state via nation building is fundamental to state security in terms of the internal development and international interaction of states in the Third World as viable political units.

In another important collection, *National Security in the Third World*, Azar and Chung-In-Moon (1998a) note that "national security" is a Western, and largely an American concept that emerged in the post World War II period. Therefore, for the authors, the limited numbers of works that studied national security in the Third World mainly relied on "the Western experience to understand and apply national security and policy" (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988a: 1) that has focused on the military dimension and external threats to the state.

In a chapter entitled 'Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The Software Side of Third World National Security', Azar and Chung-In-Moon (1988b) question this understanding of national security. The conception of security in the Third World has traditionally been framed around two variables. These are the "security environment

and the availability and readiness of hardware” in terms of military capability. To study security in the Third World, Azar and Chung-In-Moon broaden the analysis with adding a new variable, the “*software* side of security management” (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988b: 77, emphasis in original).

The idea of the “software side of security management” was originated from the classical realist premises on national will, national morale, regime type, and government structure. Azar and Chung-In-Moon define the “software side of security management” in terms of “the conversion mechanism linking security environment and hardware to the final policy outcomes and the overall security performance” (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988b: 78). Accordingly, the items of the “software side of security management are legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity” according to Azar and Chung-In-Moon (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988b: 78).

In their analysis of the each item, they define that legitimacy shapes the macro-political context of national security management, which determines “to a large extent the national will, morale and character, and conditions all levels of security management ranging from threat environment to policy capacity” (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988b: 78). The level of legitimacy enjoyed by the regime in power, conditions “the effective leadership strength, the people’s perceived relevance of national strategy, and social and cultural integration” (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988b: 81). The high level of legitimacy helps the regimes to establish national consensus on ends and means of national security management.

In the Third World, however, there is the legitimacy crisis Azar and Chung-In-Moon argued. The people did not always accept the authority of the state and conceive its institutions functionally competent and legally right. The reason for the legitimacy crisis was that regimes in the Third World still appealed to traditional values and norms. Due to the structural economic rigidity in terms of economic backwardness as well as resource scarcity, Azar and Chung-In-Moon emphasized that regimes in the Third World cannot enjoy functional competence and legal appropriateness. It is because regimes could not provide the basic needs of the people and their demands for participation, jobs, and justice with rising modernization and social mobility (Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988b: 81).

All three groups of Third World security scholars argue for broadening the concept of security suited to the social, economic and political conditions in the Third World. Korany, Brynen and Noble (1993) used the concept of “national security”, but they emphasize its nature of the interconnectedness of internal and international politics in states in the Arab world specifically, and in the Third World generally. Thomas (1991) rather argued for using an alternative concept: state security. Thomas formulated the concept of state security as “security in a state”. These two works considered the state including its society and it has external security concerns other than military terms such as development, foreign aid. Therefore, security should be broadened to encompass non-military security concerns of states and societies in the Third World according to Korany, Brynen and Noble as well as Thomas. Finally, Azar and Chung-In-Moon (1988b) added a new dimension to the analysis of security management, which is the “software side”. It is the state/ regime as the main referent

of security for them. Since it has also internal security concerns, security should be broadened to include these internal concerns according to Azar and Chung-In-Moon.

Third World security scholarship is not the only school of thought that points to the limitations of realist approaches in studying security in the Third World. Critical approaches to security also offered their critiques of both realist approaches to security studies as well as Third World security scholars' analyses.

2.3. Critical Approaches

For the critical approaches⁶, security is a derivative concept, and reflects a particular understanding of what politics is. There is an inescapable relationship between politics and security, and this relationship is constructed differently in historical contexts. Analyzing the social and historical construction of security and the political by critical approaches is to offer a critique of contemporary structures of power, knowledge as well as practices that reproduce hierarchies of power and the possibility of alternatives (Fierke, 2007: 9).

Pointing to the fundamental questions of the security problematic such as “what is security?”, “whose security?” at different levels and dimensions, critical approaches have not only explored the limitations of realist approaches to security studies, but also Third World security approaches. Put differently, for those scholars, to broaden

⁶ As in the late 1980s, during 1990s, there were also approaches to security that were critical of the definition of security limited to military-oriented concerns. They respectively propose to broaden the definition of security including non-military concerns of states. However, this debate also brings another debate (which is called broadening and deepening debate) in security studies. This debate mainly focuses on the implications of broadening security not only for security relations in world politics, but also in security studies.

the concept of security as some of Third World security scholars do, is not enough but to question the relationship between the political and security in different contexts, and conditions of politics is also required. After initially examining their critiques of realist approaches, this section will focus on their critiques of Third World security scholars.

2.3.1. Realism Misses the Relationship between Security and Politics in the Global South

Critical approaches have argued that the interpretation of the world as “it is”, which is understanding security in military and external-terms taken for granted in security studies, is already embedded in a particular understanding of what politics is. Critical approaches explore this relationship between security and politics in particular historical and political context.

For instance, Booth and Vale’s two works, ‘Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, beyond Realism’ (1995) and ‘Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity’ (1997) highlight that the security framework in South Africa prevents formulations of the kind of questions that create alternative interpretations of “reality”, and thus, a new critical security discourse in the region. Accordingly, for the authors, structures such as nationhood, sovereignty, and apartheid are mainly theories or ideas, which have concrete manifestations on our lives. Since they are ideas, they and their concrete manifestations can be changed. Our representations of the world as “it is” have been shaped by a distinct idea of the world, which in turn have produce particular practices. Booth and Vale (1995: 291) write,

These points highlight why in southern Africa-and elsewhere, too-we need to be very self-conscious about attempts to define the 'real world'. Whose 'real world' are we purporting to discuss? Why are some facts given more weight than others? Who controls or shapes the dominating 'facts'? Who and what is doing the theoretical and political work in bringing some facts to the surface and not others? In short, what do we-what should we-mean when we are talking about 'security in southern Africa'? And what are the possibilities for developing a shared view of the 'real world' among the key actors in the region?

Put differently, Booth and Vale have argued that representing the world as “it is” is always a political act. Therefore, security is always a derivative concept. It means that our conceptions of security depend on the particular political view we have, and its manifested practices (also see Booth, 2007). The case of the Southern Africa is also an instance of how the apartheid, resting on the limited understanding of facts and political conditions in the Southern Africa shape its approach to the region and cause the government to destabilize the region through its campaign of ‘destabilization’.

Booth and Vale explore that the national security discourse articulated by the white minority and its political-economic elite is based on destabilization. It meant nothing to the South Africa’s majority, which was excluded from the policy decision-making process. Indeed, Booth and Vale note, “for that majority it was the insecurity of the Pretoria government and its apartheid state that represented the hope of improved security, a security to be gained not by increases in the state's military strength but by their goal of a non-racial and democratic polity” (Booth & Vale, 1995: 287). As

Booth and Vale also pointed out,

The states of the region do not constitute the textbook entities much loved by political science; they are for the most part juridical rather than social entities. Additionally, they have not stood as reliable watch-keepers over the interests of all their populations. As we have seen, in apartheid South Africa state security was hostile to human security; 'national security' was a code-word for the security of the regime and its social elite. Although colonialism and the apartheid state offer the best-almost the quintessential-examples of this

restricted view of security, post-colonial African states have not been friendly to the security interests of their peoples either (Booth and Vale, 1995: 293).

Another analysis by Vale with another co-author also looked at security in the South Africa, but now at the regional level. In their article ‘Why Democracy is not enough: Southern Africa and Human Security in the Twentieth First Century’, Swatuk and Vale (1999) pointed out that the creation and the defense of the Westphalian state is at the heart of regional insecurity. Sovereignty, which is granted to the postcolonial state with the international principles of non-intervention, is the source and site of insecurity in the South Africa. Rather than taking the Westphalian state as a given, the authors problematize it (Swatuk & Vale, 1999: 365). Accordingly, Swatuk and Vale argued that the colonial powers disregarded the historical regional relations and region’s people sense of community with the imposition of the Westphalian states to the region. The acceptance of these states by the postcolonial elites reinforced the incompatibility of the states’ regional policies with the necessities of the regional people (Swatuk & Vale, 1999: 368). Pursuing the discourse of national security (with particularistic ethnic and political interests) reinforced the interstate rivalries and regional insecurities according to Swatuk and Vale. Not only the creation of the Westphalian states in the region but also its defense by the regional elites (through the discourse of national security) reinforced the fragmentation in the region (and new identifications of the regional people with religious movements, renewed tribal relations, warlords, family relations) (Swatuk & Vale, 1999: 373).

Pinar Bilgin with her book, *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective* (2005) has focused on the prevailing approaches to regional security in the Middle East. According to Bilgin, realist approaches to security understand

regional security from a top-down, outward-oriented, and military-focused perspective. First, realist approaches to security have used a top-down perspective from which “threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional states or peoples” (Bilgin, 2005: 1-2). Second, this top-down perspective is also compounded by an outward-oriented perspective of regional security “that is, threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the region whereas inside was viewed as a realm of security” (Bilgin, 2005: 3). Third, according to Bilgin, in realist approaches to security, there has been the military priority of security thinking, that addresses security problems in the region by “external (as well as regional) actors’ reliance on practices such as heavy defence outlays, concern with orders-of-battle, joint military exercises and defence pacts” (Bilgin, 2005: 3).

According to Bilgin, thus, regional actors’ understandings of “threats, and how they sought to achieve security in this part of the world” were missing in realist approaches to security (Bilgin, 2005: 4). For instance, Bilgin argued that Stephan Walt has tried to bring “regional actors’ perspective into his analysis of alliance formation in the Middle East – by way of failing to move away from a mainstream (top-down, outward-directed and military- focused) conception of security, he ended up neglecting the security concerns of regional actors” (Bilgin, 2005: 4). These were security concerns of people and social groups in the Middle East, and realist approaches, which conceive security from the perspectives of outside states, have failed to analyze these security perspectives (Bilgin, 2005: 5).

In this way, critical approaches have criticized realist approaches for taking security (what security is) granted, and pointed to the historical relationship between security

and politics. Exploring the relationship in different contexts indicate that it is a social construction, and includes regimes of exclusion and inclusion. The failure to see that relationship also underlines their respective critiques of Third World security scholars' study of security in the Global South

2.3.2. Third World Security Scholars Adopt Realism's Focus on the State

Critical approaches to security noted that Third World security approaches privilege the state as the primary referent as well as the agent of security (as in realist approaches to security studies). For them, the works of Third World security scholars (most but not all) are characterized by a "statist" approach to politics and security (Booth, 1995). Within the limits of the "statist" framework, Third World security scholars fail to see the relationship between security and the political.

Bilgin's study 'Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East' (2002) distinguishes statism from state-centrism. Statism is defined by Bilgin as a normative choice, "the concentration of all loyalty and decision-making power at the level of the sovereign state" (Bilgin, 2002: 102). Bilgin defines state-centrism as a methodological choice, "focusing on states as referents and agents without necessarily giving primacy to their well-being" (Bilgin, 2002: 102). In security studies, Bilgin argues that the primary referent and agent of security is conceived as the state. However, the point that is highlighted is that "this methodological choice has had normative implications that remain unrecognized in established ways of thinking about security" since "the difference between statism and state-centrism is often blurred" (Bilgin, 2002: 102). Bilgin (2002: 102) adds,

(A)ccording to primacy to states in our analyses does not just reflect a ‘reality’ out there, or make the conduct of ‘scientific’ analyses of world politics much neater, but also helps reinforce statism in security studies by making it difficult to move away from the state as the dominant referent and agent where all loyalty and decision-making is concentrated.

Booth (1995) in his review of the book of Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, noted that Ayoob “offers a narrow and statist view of what constitutes politics, and assumes what is asserted to be political to be unproblematical” (Booth, 1995: 603). Although the book claims to explore the multifaced security predicament in the Third World, argued Booth, Ayoob’s “statism” leads to failure to look at the security predicament from the perspective of the people rather than the states. Thus, Ayoob equates Third World security with state security mainly conceived in terms of security of the regimes in power.

According to Booth, the statism is not only the result of the book’s state-centric methodology, but also its appreciation of the centrality of Third World regimes, and their respective claims of insecurity in explaining the Third World security predicament. Booth noted that the book failed to ask important questions such as “security for whom?” and “from what political theory do particular concepts of security derive?”.

Keith Krause (1998), in ‘Theorizing security, state formation, and the ‘Third World’ in the post-Cold War world’, also criticized Ayoob’s book. Krause’s critiques are framed around the notion of “the political” and use of the term, “Third World”. First, Krause questioned Ayoob’s attempt expansion of the security concept without questioning what the political is. Krause argued that “Ayoob’s understanding of

security rests on a narrow conception of the political that privileges the state without even rising the question whether or not it should be the proper *subject* of security” (Krause, 1998: 129, emphasis in original). Krause noted that the choice of narrow conception of the political is not surprising, because Ayoob conceives a particular state (the nation state) as the subject of security.

Second, Krause argued that Ayoob’s use of the term Third World is also problematic. Krause underscored that Ayoob’s generic use of the term do not allow him to understand divergences among different parts of the world such as Africa, Latin America, and East Asia. His overreliance on the term also reified the category and “to do so risks encouraging Western tendencies to see these regions as undifferentiated zone of turmoil” according to Krause (Krause, 1998, 133). Another problem with the term Third World according to Krause is “the ghettoization of his argument by confining his analysis of state making to the Third World and accepting that state making has a definable end point” (Krause, 1998:133). Since state-making is a historically changing phenomenon, the focus on the comparison between the Third World and the First World prevents Ayoob from conceiving different trajectories of state-society formations in the different parts of the world and to analyze how the continuous process of state-making lead to insecurities according to Krause (Krause, 1998:134). In this dissertation, I also take the Global South as a whole. It is not to totalize the Global South as a realm of decay or insecurity as Ayoob did, but to understand how the relationship between the Global North and the Global South have been accounted in the study of security in the Global South.

According to Bilgin (2002), thus, Ayooob explicitly uses a state-centred definition of security in his book “on the grounds that the state is the provider of security” (Bilgin, 2002: 107). In such, Ayooob takes into consideration other referents and dimensions of security, only if they acquire political dimension in Ayooob’s terms, becoming threats to state security (threat to its institutions, boundaries and regimes). Ayooob mainly focuses on the lack of “adequate stateness” of Third World states as the reason for the Third World security predicament and explains it in terms of the incapacity of the state imposing political order at home and of participating in the international system. Due to statism, according to Bilgin, Ayooob marginalizes other referents and the security concerns of individuals and social groups (Bilgin, 2002: 107). According to Bilgin, Ayooob does not conceive how insecurities in the both worlds were results of the international political and economic structure and its effects on social, economic and political marginalisation (Bilgin, 2002: 107). Bilgin in her book (2005: 18) has argued,

Even some students of Third World security, who were otherwise critical of the Cold War security discourse, produced state-centric analyses (see, for example, Ayooob 1986; Azar and Moon 1988). However, despite this focus on states, state building was under-theorized; states were taken to be ‘black boxes’, the internal components of which were not considered worth investigating.

To reiterate, critical approaches criticize the statist framework of politics, and the notion of the political used in realist approaches to security studies and some of Third World security scholars (mainly Ayooob). These scholars mostly highlighted the common elements of the limitations of studying security in the Global South with respect to the state-centrism in Third World security scholars, while they underline historical, political and social conditions of the relationship between security and politics.

2.4. Postcolonial Approaches

Postcolonial approaches also offer their critiques of the realist approaches, Third World security approaches, and critical approaches. In these works, critiques of postcolonial approaches are framed in three central themes. First, postcolonial approaches point to how realism misses analyses of postcolonial insecurities. Second, postcolonial approaches address how Third World security scholars also produce weak/strong state distinctions in studying security in the Global South. Third, postcolonial approaches highlight that even categories and concepts used by critical approaches miss the experiences of security in the Global South. In following of this section, I will look at these three critiques in turn.

2.4.1. Realism Misses Analyses of Postcolonial Insecurities

Postcolonial approaches to security have argued that realist approaches have missed analyses of postcolonial insecurities (Krishna, 1999; Abraham, 2006; Biswas, 2001; Ling, 2002). According to postcolonial approaches to security, realism could not offer an explanation for postcolonial insecurities because of state-centrism and statism in their analysis of security (as critical approaches to security also highlight).

Postcolonial studies have offered a reflexive engagement with the experience of colonization and its power to shape past and current realities at the local, national and international level. Put differently, according to postcolonial approaches to security, realist approaches to security studies could not account for others' insecurities because they have not addressed how a state in the Global South has been constructed in terms of considering its postcolonial histories and experiences.

The scholar, who has initially pointed to this limitation, is Sankaran Krishna with his study *Postcolonial Insecurities India, Sri Lanka and the Question of Nationhood* (1999). In his study, Krishna has noted that it is “an entity called ‘India’ is coeval with a discourse of Indian foreign policy as an important and constitutive moment in the emergence of India itself” (Krishna, 1999: 15). According to Krishna, the political elites in India has produced and reproduced the narratives of us/them, domestic/foreign, self/other that is critical to create an identity of ‘India’ itself. This identity creation of ‘India’ “empowers state elites in specific ways, how it positions state above civil society, and how it makes certain practices, skills, and resources indispensable and others marginal” (Krishna, 1999: 15).

There are two processes in ‘India’ identity construction according to Krishna. First, there is the process of decolonization that resists Western hegemony in making ‘India’. However, Krishna argued, imaginaries of ‘India’ are “coincided with the administrative boundaries of the British Indian empire” (Krishna, 1999: 7), while at the same time, political elites in India try “to provide its unity by seeing the west as the source of redemption without failing into imitation” (Krishna, 1999: 10) through the processes of scientific development, economic planning and national citizenship. Second, this process of nationalism in India created another form of repression and hierarchy among ethnicities in the region, and the Indian union, because there is what Krishna (1999: 15) has called,

(T)he imbrication of power and knowledge in a realist logic of statecraft: how the certain spatialization of the world and of ‘us’ empowers the state elites in specific ways, how its positions state above civil society, and how it makes certain practices, skills and recourses indispensable, and others marginal.

Through these two processes, Krishna showed that the content of 'India' was always influenced by what was happening at the outside world, and in history. For this reason, Krishna argued, "the very act of building a nation is intimately an act of foreign policy"(Krishna, 1999: 17) in India.

Itty Abraham's 'The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories' (2006) has also questioned Indian's security concerns, focusing on its decision for going nuclear. For Abraham, explaining India's nuclear dynamics with reference to realist strategic reasoning or Area Studies' answers on domestic 'particularities' have not accounted for why India goes nuclear (develop national nuclear programs) in the first place. Realist approaches to security have failed to do so, because these studies only focused on nuclear proliferation and US anti-proliferation policies, and thus, a single techno-political event, which is nuclear explosion.

The study on political and historical contexts within which national nuclear programs are developed, according to Abraham, help us for understanding how decision to develop nuclear programs (going nuclear) is taken by a state to signify a broader project of technology development rather than defensive weapons. Studying the political and historical contexts has allowed us to highlight multiple meanings of nuclear practices. The last point, Abraham argued, is also necessary to reveal to "get closer to understanding the desire for, likelihood of potential use of, and possibility of international control of nuclear weapons" (Abraham, 2006: 51).

On the side of India, according to Abraham, there were simultaneous demands for international control over nuclear weapons and domestic sovereignty over India's

nuclear development (right to go nuclear) (Abraham, 2006: 62). For Indian elite, Abraham argued, the central political problem “was to create a new basis for Indian nationalism, to project India’s strength, and to be taken seriously on the international stage: to create political legitimacy for the postcolonial state” (Abraham, 2006:62). Thus, according to Abraham, state power and legitimacy were expressed with the techno-political artifacts (as expressions of a new form of secular reason, dedicated to change) in India.

Another study, which has also focused on India’s nuclear history is Shamba Biswas’ article ‘ “Nuclear Apartheid”: as a Political Position: Race as a Postcolonial Resource?’ According to Biswas, realist approaches to security have privileged external security threats to explain “foreign/security policy decision-making”. As with Krishna’s analysis of India and its identity construction, Biswas has also stated that the politics of Hindu nationalism had a certain effect on the Indian decision to nuclearize. According to Biswas, Hindu nationalism was based on a particular racial politics shaped by India’s colonial histories, as well as postcolonial concerns for becoming a strong nation-state in its region.

The historical and political analyses of Hindu nationalism, according to Biswas, led her to understand that there is no singular racism but historical racisms. In addition to the construction of racialized Third World in nuclear proliferation discourses, Hindu (Indian) nationalism discourses used the racialisations of religious and other minorities. On the one hand, the nuclear-apartheid argument made the Indians imagined themselves as a community of resistance against the racialized hierarchy among nations. On the other hand, the position created another form of racialized

hierarchy and made India oppressive and exclusionary. Thus, Biswas argued, analyses of the politics of Hindu nationalism within its historical contexts, helped to understand multiple insecurity concerns in India, not only the state but also social groups in India.

All these three works (Biswas, 2006; Abraham, 2006; Krishna, 1999) have mainly focused on security policies of Indian state to construct itself as a nation-state in international politics. In his article, 'Postcoloniality and the Production of International Insecurity: The persistent puzzle of US-Indian relations' (1999), Himadeep Muppidi, has also looked at the case of India, and questioned security concerns of the Indian state from its perspective. Muppidi looked at many accounts of Indian foreign policy and argued that alternative social realities (such as the ones in the Global South) do not exist within the framework of security in realist approaches. According to Muppidi, narratives that structure many accounts of the Indian foreign policy in international relations are mainly the US-centric ones.

The puzzle that Muppidi has sought to solve was that although India had cooperative and conflictual relations with both of superpowers, it was only the US taken as the threat to the Indian national security. Realist approaches to security, argued Muppidi, have failed to understand "the self-understandings of the actors involved", the author had suggested a "interpretative reconceptualization of Indian security understandings"(Muppidi, 1999: 123). Thus, for Muppidi, 'security imaginary' is a field of social meanings and social power. It "provides an organized set of interpretations for making sense of a complex international system", and produces

“social relations of power through the production of distinct social identities”

(Muppidi, 1999: 124).

According to Muppidi, postcoloniality was the structuring principle of the Indian security imaginary in the sense that postcolonial meanings, identities and practices were productive of the Indian state, the self-understandings associated with the Indian nationalism. Muppidi questioned how each superpower represented itself and India, and how the Indian self-understandings relate to those generated by other security imaginaries (Muppidi, 1999: 131). His study has showed that in the US security imaginary’s articulatory processes toward India, there was appeal to its democratic identity as well as “an unequivocal hailing of India as a colonized subject” (Muppidi, 1999: 142). However, compared to the Soviet imaginary that “persistently privileged the anticolonial moment as the moment of Indo-Soviet identity” (Muppidi, 1999:142). Thus, for Muppidi, the US security imaginary never “privileged the postcolonial self as the moment of identity between the two states” (Muppidi, 1999: 142). These different articulatory processes generate security or insecurity in India according to Muppidi. In particular, the disjuncture between US imaginaries and the ones of India failed to generate a set of mutually shared social meanings and relations, thus generated insecurity, since every interaction is an uncertain event whose social reproduction could not be taken for granted (Muppidi, 1999:143).

To reiterate, postcolonial approaches to security criticize both statism and state-centrism in realist approaches. These studies underline particular historical, social and political conditions of postcolonial insecurities, and look at both historical and recent dynamics that shape security practices of the state inside and outside.

2.4.2. Third World Security Scholars Reproduce Security Studies' Binaries of Strong/Weak State

Postcolonial approaches questioned the identification of the state by Third World security approaches. Accordingly, postcolonial approaches argue that Third World security scholars have reproduced security studies' binaries of strong and weak state in world politics.

In their article, 'Historicising Representations of "Failed States": Beyond the Cold War annexation of the Social Sciences' (2002), Bilgin and Morton examined the rise of various representations of the postcolonial states, 'failed', 'weak', 'rogue', 'quasi', 'weak' states across social sciences (in and beyond the context of the Cold War).

Bilgin and Morton have explored the relationship between knowledge production and policy-making in making the 'Third World' through historicising these various representations of the states in the Global South.

According to Bilgin and Morton, in security studies literature and IR, the representations of "postcolonial states" as 'failed' ones "imply that these failure were caused by intrinsic characteristics of these states, without reflecting upon their colonial background and/or their peripheral position in global-economic structures" (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 66). These studies do not reflect these process, and they argued that it is not only about exploring the material processes of this constitution, but also its ideational processes in terms of questioning "why such representations still prevail in the post-cold war era and what can be done to move beyond them in our thinking and practice" (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 68).

This question led Bilgin and Morton to historicize the knowledge production, and establishment of disciplines in social sciences. They note that the study of the Global South organized in disciplines of anthropology as well as the Oriental studies during the 19th and 20th century “was intellectually backing the Western domination of these lands” (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 58). In reference to Said’s seminal study of ‘Orientalism’, Bilgin and Morton argued that while the production of knowledge about these lands “helped keep the distance and further reinforce inequalities between two”, the knowledge production foreshadowed the international constitution of the colonial lands, and later the ‘Third World’ as “inferior” (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 58).

The international constitution of the ‘Third World’ gained momentum with the Cold War. Bilgin and Morton underscored the emergence of Areas Studies programs and the discourses of modernization and development by the mid 1950s in making the ‘Third World’ (Bilgin & Morton, 2002:59). The unquestioned categories of ‘strong’ states became the landmark of the development and the process of democratization by the 1980s and embedded in the representations of the states in the Global South, as the ‘weak’ ones (although they were not all built on the Huntington formula of societal control, such as, Buzan, 1983 and Thomas, 1987) (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 65). Representations of these states as ‘failed’ ones reproduce the unequal structural relationships between the Global North and the Global South (Bilgin & Morton, 2002: 69).

Mustapha Kamal Pasha with his article ‘Security as Hegemony’ (1996) has also argued that Third World security scholars have also reproduced a particular understanding of the state in their analyses. In the article, Pasha highlights the

problematic nature of the category of civil society used in security studies, and argues that the category (even used by Third World security scholars) fail to reflect on the specific relationship between security and civil society in the Global South.

The problem Pasha underlines with this idea is that the assumptions underpinning the possibility of civil society, in terms of its autonomous terrain from the state, is problematic when thinking about the Global South. The author highlights that in the Third World, “not only does the state cast a long shadow on civil society, but civil society is itself is the site of reproduction of statist projects” (Pasha, 1996: 284), since in the Global South the state constructs both the social world and the nature of civil society. Therefore, in the Global South, civil society is also the site of security dilemma, as the state is.

This has significant implications for studying security in the Global South according to Pasha. First, the notion of security community is based on the features of the Western security community. It is the political cohesion in terms of a stable civil society and a mature state that its logic is rested on. Civil society has been conceived as a realm from which authenticity could be recovered for more humane forms of governance through overcoming the security dilemma.

Second, Third World security scholars also use this understanding of the political space, though they could not escape from the security dilemma. These scholars offer a solution to solve this dilemma, which is the expansion of “the concept of security to address the specificity of the Third World security predicament”, and inclusion of other concerns such as regime security (Pasha, 1996: 286-287). Thus, Pasha argued, Third

World security scholars have proposed ensuring the political cohesion via the pursuit of national security proposed as the pre-condition for solving the security dilemma in the Global South. However, for Pasha, it is problematic because civil society cannot escape from fetters of “national security”, due to mutually constitutive relationship between state and civil society in the Global South, and Pasha (1996: 287-288) argued,

(I)n the act of marking off the boundaries of international anarchy from domestic community, national security domesticates civil society in its grand design, imbricating the two spheres. In this mutually reinforcing interaction, inscription of danger becomes a distinct motif of civil society and its agents: the intended fortification of the state from outside condition the character of civil society. But once implicated in the project of national security, civil society becomes the sites of provisioning the necessary material and symbolic resources.

Pasha gives the case of South Asia for illustrating this specific relationship between state and civil society, and points to its implications for rearticulating the political space in studying security in the Global South that is based on an understanding of a political imaginary that includes not only the state but also civil society. Pasha, thus, underscored that while the project of the nation-building is drive for homogenization and silence difference (domestic order) from external anarchy, in the states in the Global South, the site of security dilemma (in South Asia) “is not confined to the state but is a generative feature of civil society itself”, since the civil society has never experienced autonomy from the state (Pasha, 1996: 289).

In both cases of India and Pakistan, according to Pasha, the site of the political imaginary is both state and civil society, and there is indivisibility of security and civil society (Pasha, 1996: 292). Without rethinking about the site of political imaginary, broadening security would lead to marginalization of alternative imaginations for

Pasha. Thus, Pasha points to the mutually constitutive relationship between civil society and security in the Global South and argues that broadening security would lead to marginalization of alternative imaginations without rethinking about the site of political imaginary as both civil society and the state in the Global South

To reiterate, postcolonial approaches criticize Third World security scholars' use of category of the state in their security analyses. Postcolonial approaches argue that Third World security scholars also use binaries of strong/weak states not only because of the impact of modernization theory but also their conflation of state and civil society.

2.4.3. Concepts and Categories also used by Critical Approaches to Security Miss Experiences and Understandings of World Politics in the Global South

According to postcolonial approaches, concepts and categories also used by critical approaches to security have failed to account for experiences and understandings of world politics in the Global South. It is because of the process of knowledge production in IR and security studies and thus, postcolonial approaches have problematized this process of knowledge production in IR.

Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (2006) in their article 'Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies' discussed process of knowledge production in security studies. Barkawi and Laffey argued that security studies failed to account for the place and role of 'the Global South' since it "derives its core categories and assumptions about world politics from a particular understanding of European experience" (Barkawi &

Laffey, 2006: 330). What Barkawi and Laffey focused on was the Euro-centric character of security studies, and for them, it is the “Eurocentric historical geographies” underpinning security studies “systematically understate and misrepresent the role of what we now call the global South in security relations” (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006: 330). As evidenced in the common narratives of world history (such as, the Concert of Europe, origins of World War I, appeasement of Nazi Germany), according to Barkawi and Laffey, these representations presuppose particular historical periodisations and spatial assumptions in security studies, and conceive Europe as separate (from the rest of the world) and central to the world history (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006: 331).

For Barkawi and Laffey, Eurocentrism generates difficulties for the analysis of security relations in two accounts. First, Barkawi and Laffey argued that security studies shaped by Eurocentric historical geographies “provides few categories for making sense of the historical experiences of the weak and the powerless” and these experiences have been conceived by the categories derived from particular understanding of European experience such as great power politics. Second, if security studies address these experiences at all, according to Barkawi and Laffey, they were conceived as marginal elements of world politics (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006: 332), either represented as deficiencies in world politics or threat to international security.

According to Barkawi and Laffey, representation of states, societies and social groups in the Global South as ‘inferior’ is broadly related to understanding of world politics and security relations with the Eurocentric understanding of world politics. Barkawi

and Laffey argued that through representation the Global North separate from other parts of the world, insecurities experienced in the Global South are accounted as disparate from the global power structures, and hierarchical relations in world politics. For Barkawi and Laffey, critical approaches have also suffered from this limitation, as these approaches have mostly conceive the Global North and the Global South separate, thus overlooked their historical connections. While Barkawi and Laffey focuses on an aspect of Eurocentrism shaping security studies, which is the Eurocentric historical geographies as they called, thus, they have problematized that critical approaches have also failed to account for others' experiences of world politics.

In his book, *Politics of the Global* (2004), Himadeep Muppidi questioned why we failed to recognize other's self-understandings and imaginaries of the global. In reference to an author's efforts to make sense of the lack of knowledge on brutal killings of the African people under European colonization, Muppidi noted, "it was not knowledge that was lacking as much as the appropriate imaginary within which such knowledge would have made sense"(Muppidi, 2004: 2). In other words, according to Muppidi, it was not the knowledge that was lacking (as silence of Africa), but what is lacking "was knowing how to read that knowledge, knowing how to go beyond the self in understanding the world", and the lacking was global literacy in Spivak's words (Muppidi, 2004: 3). Muppidi underscored that the dominant narratives of international relations are also provincial and "relatively illiterate in their attempts to read the global" (Muppidi, 2004: 3).

In showing the limitations of perspectives in international relations, namely, the rationalist, constructivist and historical-materialist perspectives, Muppidi noted that they have failed to explore the intersubjective and co-constitutive nature of the global and are unable to explore different understandings of the global, or to inquire “if that particular global was understood the same way across the world” (Muppidi, 2004: 4). Muppidi in reference to Spivak, thus, argued that thinking globality is to think the politics of thinking globality. The conventional thinking of globality, for Muppidi, is mainly operating through the categories and frameworks drawn by the provincial experience of Europe and its modernity. Muppidi added that globality we experience do not allow us to articulate a pure non-European positions from which to engage with this enterprise, but requires to acknowledge a framework within which Europe is both inadequate and indispensable (Muppidi, 2004:19).

Here, Muppidi mainly criticizes the narratives of international relations which fail to conceive the nation-state as a global political space that impede us to understand what forms of globality historically connect and separate us. When mutual connections could not be hidden, then narratives of international relations only conceived them as source of instability rather than the nature of globality according to Muppidi. It is the form of transnational illiteracy “about the multiple connections that already exist, about the globalities that link Self and Other” (Muppidi, 2004: 76). Thereby, Muppidi argued, the narratives of international relations have been reflections of reconfiguration of early globalities and politically neglected “an understanding of ourselves as the products of overlapping territories and intertwined histories” (Muppidi, 2004: 76). It is the specific production of the global which empowers a particular politics in international relations (Muppidi, 2004: 77). The process is

always embedded rearticulation of language of prevailing globality in politically creative ways, and Muppidi gave an illustration of them.

The illustration is based on ‘Western’ reactions against the spread of ILOVEYOU computer virus initiated by a Filipino student. From colonial social imagination of the global, according to Muppidi, the non-Western actor’s action is seen as a crime and a source of insecurity to global integration and harmony. Muppidi argued that while it is defined as a threat under colonial global imaginary, many Filipinos people were celebrating the computer virus. The author said that taking into account the Other with its historical and geographical differences, would lead to see the virus as an act in terms of the Filipinos’ securing a job in the global IT market for its fellows as well (Muppidi, 2004: 86-87). However, ignorance of the Other under colonial global imaginary ironically cause to specify productive and transformative agency of “non-West” as reaction against the globality and the threat to ‘global’ economy Muppidi argued. Muppidi, thus, showed multiple social imaginaries as products of overlapping geographies and intertwined histories, which in turn condition actions in world politics. However, for Muppidi, even critical security approaches have overlooked these social imaginaries because they also use a particular understanding of the global in their studies that separate the Global North from the Global South.

Postcolonial approaches, thus, focused on the international used by critical approaches to security, and argued that these critical approaches have also missed experiences of world politics in the Global South, and their role in shaping world politics. Vivienne Jabri (2013), in her study, *The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity* (2013) has argued that most of works in critical approaches have not considered the role of the Global South in shaping of the

international, “but rather, as the recipients of its rules and normative structures”(Jabri, 2013: 9). In her book, Jabri has showed that the conceptions of the international developed in the Middle East have been shaped by the resistance of states in the Middle East to violence that the international states system had imposed on them for centuries. Thus, the Arab Spring indicates not only the resistance of the people to despotic regimes in the Middle East, but also to their place and role in world politics, as the people in the region claims for the political in world politics Jabri argued.

To reiterate, for postcolonial approaches, not only realist approaches but also critical approaches have suffered from some limitations of theorizing in IR. Therefore, for them, concepts and categories also used by critical approaches have failed to account for experiences of world politics in the Global South, as well as the role of actors in the Global South for shaping world politics.

2.5. Conclusion

The chapter has looked at the literature on the study of security in the Global South going through realist, Third World security, critical security, and postcolonial approaches in four sections. In their critiques of security studies, postcolonial approaches to security have highlighted three points. First, according to postcolonial approaches to security, realist approaches to security did not account for insecurities experienced in the Global South because state-centrism and statism in their analyses prevent them from understanding the relationship between security and politics in the Global South. Second, postcolonial approaches have also showed that Third World security scholars also could not go beyond binaries between weak and strong state. Rather, their analyses of security in the Third World use the same

categories with realist approaches to security studies. Third, for postcolonial approaches, even critical approaches have failed to account for experiences of world politics in the Global South, and its role in shaping world politics.

These three points of critiques raised by postcolonial approaches is related to conceptions of modernity that has shaped approaches in security studies. This overview, thus, has pointed to the avenues for the necessity of understanding the relationship between modernity and studying security in the Global South. More specifically, this chapter has highlighted a point that needs further study in relation to understanding the limitations of security studies, which is: how a particular conception of modernity has shaped studying security in the Global South? This question is the focus of the dissertation.

CHAPTER 3

UNPACKING CONCEPTIONS OF MODERNITY IN IR

The chapter identifies three key dimensions of modernity in IR. These are time, ontology, and sociality of world politics. I identify them because I need to show how different IR theories operate with different conceptions of modernity. They vary across these three dimensions. Before introducing these three dimensions in detail, I discuss the two ways through which conceptions of modernity have been problematized in the field of IR so far. In line with these important works, I argue that we could develop these three dimensions of modernity anew with the help of postcolonial insights to world politics and IR.

The aim of the chapter is to show particular understandings of time, ontology and sociality of world politics underlying IR theories. With these insights, the dissertation is able to show that a particular conception of modernity shapes the study of security thereby revealing the horizons of security studies. The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section identifies three dimensions of modernity in IR. The following three sections discuss them in greater detail, focusing on particular understandings of time, ontology, and sociality of world politics in IR theories.

3.1. Identification of Three Dimensions of Modernity

The section identifies three dimensions of modernity drawing on the literature on postcolonial approaches to historical sociology in IR (Halperin, 2006). For this literature, there is nothing neutral and natural about identifying something as ‘modern’ in the social sciences, because ‘modern’ is associated with particular social and political forms leaving others outside ‘modernity’.

The first way through which ‘modernity’ has been problematized in IR investigates how this particular conception of modernity has naturalized, through identification of what it implies to be modern in theories about world politics, the centrality of Europe and its agency in understandings of world politics in IR (Halperin, 2006). For Halperin, concepts and “theories about the structures, processes, and events that define and recur within the international realm” are based to a large extent on the myths concerning modernity (Halperin, 2006: 43; also see Seth, 2013). One of these is ‘the rise of Europe’. Halperin notes that “the term ‘European Revolutions’ was used to describe processes of change that were not really European, sudden or explosive or really discontinuous with the past” (Halperin, 2006: 50). In IR theories, thus, Europe’s representation accompanies a particular conception of being focused on whole nations and societies rather than networks and processes that are intermingled with past and present, the Global South and the Global North. Yet, for Halperin, critical approaches to IR have not addressed how Europe’s representation of itself, which the definition of the modern world system rests on, is entangled with particular understandings of history and ontology of world politics. Therefore, they conceive not only past and present but also the Global North and the Global South as separate.

The second way ‘modernity’ has been problematized in IR underlines the role of the particular conception of modernity in the development of IR as discipline (Walker, 1993). The particularity of this conception of modernity, according to Walker, rooted in notions of state sovereignty drawn from a particular narrative of European history (Walker, 1993: 42). Walker demonstrates the ways in which this specific reading of European history has shaped the development of IR theories. For Walker, accounts of historicized modern world politics have also limited themselves not only by perpetuating the very same conception of modernity, thereby, failing to problematize the particularity of this conception of modernity (Chamon & Lage, 2015: 62). For Walker, critical approaches to IR do not reflect upon how modernity is entangled with particular understandings of political life and world politics based on a particular notion of state sovereignty.

For these two ways of problematization of a particular conception of modernity in IR literature, two dimensions, which are time and ontology of world politics, have central place. The third dimension, that I also add, is sociality of world politics, has been discussed by some scholars with postcolonial insights to world politics (Barkawi & Stanski, 2012; Jabri, 2013; Bilgin, 2017). For these insights, it is through understandings of sociality of world politics, which came prior to thicker (the global) histories and connections between ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ experiences (Barkawi, 2006) that others’ role in shaping world politics has been overlooked. These understandings of sociality of world politics, rather, naturalize social and political forms of modern world politics—its practices, ideas, institutions originated in ‘Europe’ (Bilgin, 2017) but not historical connections between the Global North and the Global South. Indeed, as Bilgin notes, “even notions that are developed in and

through colonial encounters are portrayed as having developed autonomously without input by others- be it in the form of contribution or contestation” (Bilgin, 2017: 179).

IR literature has not yet discussed how all these three work together to shape understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in IR. Following three sections address understandings of time, ontology, and sociality of world politics. In this way, these three sections will show which/what understandings of time, ontology and sociality of world politics have shaped IR theories.

3.2. Time of World Politics

What is meant by time of world politics is *IR theory's understanding of when world politics takes place*. IR as a discipline is built on mainly spatial metaphors rather than temporal ones, and approaches to international politics mainly adopt synchronic rather than diachronic accounts. The claim here is not to suggest that IR is lacking in a diachronic analysis. Especially at the end of the Cold War, in the debates about history in IR, the relevance of history to IR was questioned (see Bell 2001; Smith, 1999; Lawson, 2010), while some also problematize the concept of history (Vaughan-Williams, 2005; Walker, 1989). A few scholars study the relevance of time to International Relations (Walker, 1989; 1993, Hutchings, 2007; 2008, Lundborg, 2012; Hom, Mcintoch, McKay & Stockdale, 2016; Agathangelou & Killian, 2016). Among these, looking at Walker (1993) and Hutchings (2008) is helpful for understanding ‘time of world politics’.

In his book, *Inside/Outside*, Walker (1993) focuses on understanding temporality of the political life in IR. Walker particularly reveals the particular conception of political temporality that shaped the development of IR as a modern discipline. He compares this conception with Machievalli's understanding of political temporality as 'politics in time'. According to Walker, in Machiavelli, the notion of political temporality as 'politics in time' depends on a conception of time, which is the cyclical view of time against the Christian medieval view of time. With the rise of historicism and change in the conception of time, Walker argues, 'politics in time' was abolished in favor of 'politics in space', i.e. the modern state (Walker, 1993: 42). Consequently, politics was limited within the borders of the state.

Another prominent IR scholar, Kimberly Hutchings (2008), different from Walker, offers a reading of the traditions of thought that shape certain understandings of time on contemporary thoughts on world (or international) politics. According to Hutchings, theories of world politics draw assumptions of time from certain philosophical accounts of political time in Western political thought. All these accounts is based on a pre-dominant conception of 'political time', which is "unitary, and in contrast to natural and sacred time, is constructed through the control and direction of other forms of temporality" (Hutchings, 2008: 4).

This pre-dominant conception of political time, according to Hutchings, is the result of changes in the conception of time with the scientific revolution as well as the rise of historicism, which gave rise to a modern conception of world-political time. That was related to new assumptions about the relationship between politics and time. For

Hutchings, in Western political thought, two prominent historical junctures shaped contemporary conceptions of political time.

First, the idea of Enlightenment and its central claim that “the political present is somehow qualitatively demarcated from the past” brought new ways of thinking about the relation between time and politics in terms of “the detachment of human from natural temporality” (Hutchings, 2008: 35). Second, “the identification of time as a problem for the analysis and judgment of politics is at the heart of the temporal distinction between modernity and postmodernity” (Hutchings, 2008: 15). Originating from Lyotard’s *Postmodern Condition*, the postmodern thought challenges the idea that a singular clock time of modernity applies to the world according to Hutchings. Since in the postmodern condition, we are now living in a world of plural temporalities, “the stable context for clock time to coordinate and unify social life has disappeared” (Hutchings, 2008: 19).

As with Walker (see above), the aim of Hutchings’s study is to analyze how intersubjective conceptions of time as well as conceptions of political time influence our thoughts about contemporary world politics, our analysis and judgment about what is happening and what will happen in world politics. In this section, I focus on time of world politics and not just time. For considering this, I use postcolonial IR literature and its insights to question understanding time of world politics in IR. Postcolonial literature notes that the present is not separate from the past. While poststructuralist insights to time focus on the separation of the present from the past as a totalizing image of modernity, for postcolonial insights this separation is rooted in a colonial image of world politics, which should be problematized in order to reveal colonial

violence. Thus, for postcolonial insights, the present is always “defined primarily in relation to colonised and subjugated pasts”(Hutchings, 2008: 166).

The one way of looking at this distinction, according to Chakrabarty (2000), is to underline the ways in which the distinction between past and present has been naturalized through reading modernity in singular terms (rather than heterotemporality), which locates Europe as separate from its imperial, and racial history. It locates Europe in the present (absent its imperial histories). Chakrabarty’s reading of modernity is different from Hutchings. For Hutchings (2008: 166),

The challenge of thinking the present of world politics is the challenge of thinking heterotemporality, ultimately neither one present nor many presents but a mutual contamination of ‘nows’ that participate in a variety of temporal trajectories, and which do not derive their significance from one meta-narrative about how they all fit together.

According to Hutchings, critical IR theories and their assumptions about time and temporality of world politics are inadequate because “whether critical or not of western modernity, they are profoundly blinkered by their attachment to the idea that we can use western modernity as the key to make sense of the past, present and future of world as such” (Hutchings, 2008: 160). For the author, thus, it is not only about western modernity, but its reading as the single (meta)-narrative of world politics.

As in Chakrabarty’s account (2000), what is represented as problematic here is reading time of world politics in singular terms rather than single terms. With insights of the literature on the connected histories (Said, 1985; Buck-Morss, 2009), thus, I focus on problematizing of locating ‘origins’ in world politics. Since understandings of time of world politics in singular terms read narratives of world politics through ‘origins’ rather than ‘beginnings’, they prevent us from seeing historical connections

between the Global North and the Global South. It is historical connections of ideas, practices, institutions within colonial/imperial modernity (Pasha, 2016) or colonial modern (Bhabra, 2007), and global modernity (Shilliam, 2011) that unite them rather than any origin such as, the idea of progress, or its critique outside (or inside) the historical time since historical time is not integral in itself as Chakrabarty also notes.

3.2.1. Understanding Time of World Politics in Singular Terms

Understanding time of world politics in singular terms means that the narrative of world politics is originated from a particular place and history in world politics. Thus, all of the past is posited uniformly as the precondition for the development of history (Hardt, 2001: 247), whereas “the present modern condition is universal, as the future is unfolding the principles that make it happen” (Chamon & Lage, 2015: 63). As will be seen below, realist and liberal approaches to international relations and the English School share this understanding of time of world politics. What is more, critical IR theories and poststructuralist theories to IR also share this understanding of time of world politics in singular terms, albeit in different ways.

Starting with the mainstream theories of IR, I look at one seminal representative of the Liberal IR theory (Michael Doyle, 1983) and one from the English School (Hedley Bull, 1995).⁷ Representatives of the realist IR theories (Hans Morgenthau,

⁷ The chapter acknowledges that there is very recent literature on both the liberal IR theories and the English School approaches to international relations. Since the focus of the chapter here is limited to draw a frame for analyzing particular understandings of time, ontology, and sociality of world politics in various IR theories, it does not look at the recent literature.

Stephen Walt, Mearsheimer, and Kenneth Waltz) will be elaborated in detail in realist approaches to security studies in the following chapter, Chapter 4.

The liberal perspectives of international relations draw on the notion of progress. Although there are many variants of liberal IR theory, all share the idea that international politics is gradually progressing through providing greater human freedom via the establishment of conditions of peace, prosperity, and justice. All liberal variants have faith in the possibility of progress in human affairs. In the following, I look at Michael Doyle's work (1983), which underscores the notion that human capacity to reason could uncover the barriers towards the collective action and obtain their resolutions. His work, too, originated from the Enlightenment idea of progress and Kant's seminal work, *Perpetual Peace*.

In search for trying to understand rarity of war among democratic states, Doyle explores underlying mechanisms directing international politics towards a peaceful world. Doyle underscores the idea that the more democracies in the world make possible international politics more peaceful in the future. Accordingly, he argues that structural and cultural aspects of human condition propel history in the direction of progress.

Doyle understands the trajectory of world politics in singular terms. This means that Doyle understands narratives of world politics with an understanding of time in singular terms, as these narratives have originated from one place or history in world politics. All of the past (since 18th century) is posited uniformly as a pre-condition for the emergence of liberal peace in Europe. The future of world politics is understood

unfolding its moral principles. It is because of not only the nature of human beings that tends to evolve towards republican governments as a sources of the liberal peace, but also because of international law as a source of the guarantee of respect. As Doyle (1983: 230) writes,

As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace.

In this way, “the effects of international anarchy have been tamed in the relation among states of a similarly liberal character” (Doyle, 1983: 232). There is the hope for a global peace, even though it is not a steady progress.

Doyle, thus, understands historical time as a measure of cultural difference between the liberal and illiberal states. According to Doyle, there is the expansion of the liberal peace towards other states outside Europe, since they are considered as incomplete in terms of their regimes. In Doyle’s understanding of progress in international politics, there is no role of states and societies outside Europe. This progress depends on the expansion of liberal peace from Europe, and there is no reference to the Global South in this narrative.

Second strand of the mainstream theory that I look at here is the English School.

Despite differences among alternative interpretations of the English School, they largely share the view that the character of the relations among states has changed in cyclical patterns since the establishment of modern states system. The foremost representative of the English School is Hedley Bull. In his work *The Anarchical Society* (1995), Bull elaborates on what order is in international politics and how it is

maintained. In search for understanding establishment of order in international politics, Bull explores it in terms of an anarchical international society, and understands the time of world politics in singular terms that narrative of world politics is originated in the European states system.

In Bull's account, all of the past is posited uniformly as the pre-condition for the emergence of the anarchical international society since the 17th century. Throughout the evolution of European modern states system, there has always been interaction between its three components: a state of war, transnational solidarity and conflict, and international society. As Bull (1995: 49) writes,

International society is no more than one of the basic elements at work in modern international politics and is always in competition with the elements of a state of war and of transnational solidarity or conflict, it is always erroneous to interpret international events as if international society were the sole or the dominant element.

In this way, the order provided within the modern international society is always imperfect. However, the future is holding its founding principles in terms of the common interests in “the elementary goals of social life, rules prescribing behaviors that sustains these goals, institutions that help to make these rules effective such as, states” (Bull, 1995: 63) and common culture of modernity. The international society has naturally developing among the modern states system in Europe, and then expanded to other parts of the world. This expansion happened because others are lack of culture of modernity, as Bull states, “in the 20th century, international society ceased to be regarded as specifically European and considered as global or world wide” (Bull, 1995: 36). The expansion of international society is conceived as such because time of world politics is understood in singular terms. Yet, Bull's narrative

does not account for the Global South in both the emergence and expansion of international society.

For instance, as Seth (2013) explains, “the events and processes privileged in the conventional account of IR- the Peace of Augsburg and the settlement of Westphalia- roughly coincide with the subjugation and settlement of the Americas, and the rise of the slave trade” (Seth, 2013: 19). Thus, at the same time of the establishment of the Westphalian system of equally and mutually independent sovereign states, there were also colonial and imperial systems established outside of Europe. All these events shaped the development of international order (Seth, 2013: 19).

Through understanding the time of world politics in singular terms, both representatives of the liberal perspectives of international relations and the English School analyzed here, however, do not account for the Global South in narratives of world politics.

Regarding time in critical IR theories, I study one seminal representative of Gramscian approach to IR (Cox, 1986). The foremost representatives of the Frankfurt School inspired approaches to IR (Ken Booth) will be elaborated in detail in critical approaches to security in Chapter 5. Critical IR theory was initially introduced to international relations by Robert Cox’s pioneer article, ‘Social Forces, State and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’ (1986) in which Cox differentiates critical theory from problem-solving theory.⁸ In Cox’s definition of critical theory, there are three axes. First, critical theory does not take the world as it

⁸ The study was originally published in 1981 in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*. Here, I also use its version published as a chapter in R. Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics* (1986). See also his book, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (1987).

is, but “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about” (Cox, 1986: 208). Second, critical theory is not only concerned with the past, but “with a continuing process of historical change” (Cox, 1986: 209). Third, critical theory is “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (Cox, 1986: 210).

In his studies, Cox (1986) notes that critical theory approaches to international relations offer a perspective that transcends that of the existing order. In its approaches to the world, critical theory “allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order different from the prevailing order”, however, transformations of the existing world limit the ranges of choice to alternative orders (Cox, 1986: 210). The central objective of critical theory is to highlight this range of possible alternatives immanent within the historical-political transformation of world politics. In rejecting improbable alternatives, as well as the existing order as it is, critical theory guides tactical actions for further practices.

Informed by Vico, Cox proposed method of the historical structures. Accordingly, in his study, Cox denaturalizes historical time of the rise and fall of great powers or cycles of wars in world politics that realist approaches to international relations take as given. For Cox, the nature of human or its institutions are not unchanging but as a continuing creation of new forms by human itself. Definition of their substances a priori to history is not possible, as history is itself “the record of interactions of manifestations of these substances” (Cox, 1981: 132). In his account, there is always a succession of historical structures characterized by minds and ideas of different ages and processes. Therefore, historical time of world politics is characterized by cycles

of hegemony, when three dimensions namely, material power, ideas, and institutions “fitting together in certain times and place and coming apart in others” (Cox, 1981: 141). In his later study on civilizations (both as an ontology of world politics and a method for historical analysis in terms of diachronic accounts for world politics), Cox (2002) also adheres to this understanding of the historical time.

According to Cox, in narratives of world politics, there are periods of *virtue*, when there is the condition of “correspondence between material conditions of existence and inter-subjective meanings” (Cox, 2002: 161), and periods of *fortuna* when material conditions of existence and inter-subjective meanings are set apart. During these later periods, although “different civilisations do coexists, the problem of mutual comprehension becomes paramount for the maintenance of world politics” (Cox, 2002: 177). Put differently, it is “an ability to enter into the mental framework of the Other becomes an essential ingredient in peaceful coexistence” (Cox, 2002: 177). As civilizations encounter and people migrate, different peoples in different parts of the world come to understand reality differently. However, there is always the possibility of reaching a common ground for dialogue. In this way, Cox understands time of world politics with respect to historical structure (internal contradictions within and from encounters with other civilizations).

Cox, in his account, understands time of world politics in singular terms and narrative of world politics is originated in Europe. Cox posits all of the past uniformly for the pre-condition of the present modern condition, which is globalization originated in Europe. Accordingly, the present modern condition is understood as endogenously developing within the geo-cultural sphere of European-American civilizations rooted

mainly in the United States (Cox, 2002: 179) in terms of “the vision of the inevitable homogenization of economy and cultural practices driven by competitiveness in a global market and by new technologies of communication” (Cox, 2002: 157). Its different forms are understood as experienced across different geo-cultural spheres such as, Asia, China, and Russia etc.

In his account, similar to liberal approaches and the English School, Cox also naturalizes historical time as a measure of the cultural difference between the Global North and the Global South. For instance, in Cox’s account, if these counter-hegemonic movements exist, they are only appeared within the geo-cultural sphere of Europe, and others are always emulating economic and social institutions of global hegemon in the form of national hegemon (Hobson, 2012: 250). Counter-hegemonic structures in the Global South would be expected to arise only as a form of a “state class” that is materialized in the development of state structures in response to the expansion of international production (Cox, 1981: 151). According to Cox (1996: 137),

Such an expansive hegemony impinges on the more peripheral countries as a passive revolution. These countries have not undergone the same thorough [hegemonic] social revolution, nor have their economies developed in the same way, but they try to incorporate elements from the hegemonic model without disturbing old power structures.

In his account, Cox has understood world politics in terms of expansion of global hegemony through reading the time of world politics in singular terms originated in Europe, and has not given reference to the Global South.

In poststructuralist insights to IR, I study one of the seminal representatives of the approach (Rob Walker, 1993; 2010). Poststructuralist insights to IR “offer an

explanation for their dissatisfaction with what the constitution Enlightenment project has brought about”, Western rationalism and positivism and questions how knowledge, truth, and meaning are constituted (Gregory, 1989: xiiiv). In one of the seminal works from poststructuralist approaches to IR, *Inside/Outside* (1993), R.B.J. Walker underscores that his work is based on an understanding of time of world politics that counter the Western philosophy of history and its central idea of progress. It is, therefore, different from earlier works of critical theorists such as Robert Cox that rely on the idea of underlying causes and forces giving an intelligible shape to historical time of world politics which then be grasped and acted on by revolutionary subjects.

Rather, in Walker’s accounts of time, the notion of ‘untimely’ is central. In Walker’s understanding, it is a mistake to assume that the future can be shaped according to a particular end or pattern. Walker emphasizes the openness and indeterminacy of the future, since he understands time in terms of contingency and plurality from which a unifying principle for the idea of revolutionary action could not be derived. However, this does not mean that human being all together undermine the possibility of critical theory and its commitment to political progress, according to Walker. Walker’s work is significant in showing how poststructuralist approaches to IR are different from Gramscian critical IR theory in terms of their understanding of the possibility of progress. However, as in critical theories of IR (see above), Walker still understands time of world politics in singular terms.

In his account for ‘untimely’ in world politics with respect to sovereign, no representation of the present can be adequate and is inherently unpredictable. For

Walker, all of pasts are uniformly posited as the precondition of this ambiguity, routines of a history of sovereignty. In his words, “they affirm the codes of nationalism and patriotism,...the implausibility of strangers in a world of friend and foe” (Walker, 1993: 174). Moreover, the present modern condition of this ambiguity is in the historical process with temporal and spatial demarcations of modernity at large. The future is still holding its underlying principles with respect to “the difficulty of imagining a politics beyond the horizons of a sovereign space” (Walker, 1993: 175). As such, Walker (1993: 169) writes,

Attempts to construct a history of sovereignty have varied according to whether it is examined from the perspective of life within states, or of relations between states, or in terms of some broader enterprise in which the distinction between inside and outside is subsumed as one- highly problematic- aspect of the dynamics of some more inclusive form of world politics and humanity.

This ambiguity that conditions our inability or ability to think about struggles about who “we” (as human) are is itself forms the beginning point where Walker is able to understand history of sovereignty. However, unknown to Walker, this beginning is also includes participation of the Global South. Considering one forms of this beginning, for instance, Howell and Richter-Montpetit argue that the object of biopolitical liberal rule is not an unspecified human, but there is constitutive role of settler colonisers in the production of modernity, and in the ontological consolidation of man and the human necessary for biopower in terms of ranking of life (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2018: 5). Thus, the connected histories between the Global North and the Global South is constitutive of struggles about who “we” are as human, hierarchies among humans, and so history of sovereign.

To sum up, this section shows that understandings of time of world politics in singular terms have read narratives of world politics originated from one place and history in

world politics mainly Europe, thus, have not given reference to the Global South in the narratives of world politics in IR.

3.2.2. Understanding Time of World Politics not in Singular Terms

Postcolonial approaches to IR and world politics are the one example of understanding time of world politics not in singular terms. The postcolonial IR literature addresses “what is missing in temporal framings of world politics” (Hutchings, 2008: 166). For them, European imperialism and colonialism has multiple-narratives of world politics. For instance, according to Weheliye, there is racial assemblage in world politics that “construes race not as a biological and cultural classification but as a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full human, not quite-humans and non-humans” (Weheliye, 2014: 4). That is to underline the ways through which the distinction between past and present has multiplied and made voiceless the Global South in world politics (Krishna, 1999) because the present is subjugated from colonial pasts.

Postcolonial approaches to IR mainly point to what is missing (multiple temporalities) in predominant temporal framings of international politics. The reading is based on a substantial critique of colonial modernity. That is done in two interrelated ways. First, through understanding world history in linear terms, IR has naturalized a distinction between colonized pasts, and presents. It makes the Global South voiceless because it is presumed that colonialism was only belonged to the past, and has not have influence on the present of world politics (Krishna, 1999). Second, as time is understood in linear terms, all belonged to the same present where only the agency of

Europe is located; the Global South and its experiences of the present are located in the past (Hindess, 2007: 326), thus, it is presumed that these experiences are not related with its experience of modernity but traditional way of life.

Informed with postcolonial insights, the ones who focused on the recent debate on connected histories (Bilgin, 2017; Barkawi, 2013), most of IR literature read narratives of world politics without accounting for what narratives of world politics are actually beginning with the connected histories between the Global North and the Global South (Buck-Morss, 2009). The reading of narratives of world politics in singular terms (originated in one place of world politics) always misses different beginnings in other places and histories in world politics. Thus, looking at these beginnings is important because they show us how ideas, practices, institutions in world politics appeared that are separate are historically connected. Thus, time of world politics is not singular but narratives of world politics are always beginning with multiple histories and locations in world politics.

Robbie Shilliam is one of the postcolonial IR scholars, who pointed to this understanding of connected histories in his article, 'What the Haitian Revolution Might Tell Us about Development, Security, and the Politics of Race' (2008). In his article, Shilliam has showed that analyses of neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist approaches of historical sociology miss the contribution of the Haitian Revolution into shaping the dynamics of security, development and modernity in world politics since these accounts read narratives of world politics originated in Europe. According to Shilliam, "interpolating the Haitian Revolution within the start of the grand narrative therefore brings to the fore the contentious, often ignored, and generally

under-theorized relationship between slavery, race and modernity” (Shilliam, 2008: 780).

Shilliam’s analyses of histories between Haiti and Europe highlighted that there was always “a struggle between First and Third Worlds over development and security, a struggle foundationally constituted (though not, of course, exclusively so) through the politics of race” (Shilliam, 2008: 802). The politics of race, according to Shilliam, does not only shape transformation of world order, but also it has been shaped by these transformations. This article has argued that studying various historical accounts of the Haitian Revolution, and their connectedness showed the constitutive role of politics of race in security-development nexus, and its discourse of the ‘failed states’, and others’ experiences of world politics.

To summarize, this section has showed that there are two understandings of time of world politics in IR namely, understanding of time of world politics in singular terms, and not in singular terms. Understanding time of world politics in singular terms matters because reading narratives of world politics with origins have overlooked multiple beginnings and connected histories of ideas and experiences between the Global North and the Global South.

3.3. Ontology of World Politics

What is meant by ontology of world politics is IR theory’s understanding of what the nature of world politics is. Before examining particular understandings of ontology of

world politics in IR theories, this section shows how it thinks about understanding ontology of world politics as the second dimension of modernity in IR.

Understanding ontology of world politics becomes both a problem for analysis and judgment of world politics in terms of accounting for possibilities of political life and change in IR. In his seminal work, *Inside/Outside*, Walker (1993) focuses on the conception of being. For him, conceptions of world politics and conceptualization of change could be framed “around the underlying metaphysical principles of being and becoming from which our conceptions of history and structure are derived” (Walker, 1993: 113). As such, conceptions of world politics depend on a view of the world and the nature of being, either essentially changing and becoming or constructed around metaphysics of being. According to Walker, IR as a discipline is built on the particular conception of being that brought the idea of the distinction between the possibility of (progress) inside the state and the permanent struggle for power outside the state. This particular conception is derived from a historically specific reading by the political realist tradition in IR.

This reading of IR is shaped by assumptions about change in world politics that presume an answer to the primary ontological question between universality and particularity. This primary ontological question asks how to reconcile universality and particularity as the essence of all politics. In the political realist tradition in IR, this question is answered by an interpretation of reification of the contingency of the ‘modern state’ as political space (the political), and time turns to space, and ‘political space’ conflates with contingent nature of the ‘modern-state’ (Walker, 1993: 60). For this reading of Hobbes in particular, temporal contingency of the struggle between

particularity and universality is resolved and embodied by a sovereign and geometrical reason, Leviathan (Walker, 1993: 112). In IR theory, thus, the political is associated with the sovereign state.

While IR discipline is mainly built on the binary between inside and outside that presumes the idea that the possibility of progress inside and power struggle outside, Walker underscores that even the realist IR scholars who are “against a view of history as qualitative progression also claim that the ‘realities’ of international politics are enduring, and are consequently to be distinguished sharply from the politics of state and civil society” (Walker, 1993: 104). In this way, there is still a notion of continuity as well as change of international politics in the realist IR theories.

However, Walker adds, “the character of this enduring, of this sense of continuity that is also a form of change through time, remains highly problematic” (Walker, 1993: 104). This is problematic because this change is distinguished from the one of struggle between universality and particularity (that is located only inside the state).

According to Walker, thus, this binary of inside/outside limits our political imagination in the sense that we thought that the possibility of progress could only be established with a particular sovereign, the sovereign state. In his book, Walker points to understanding of ontology of world politics (in terms of binary of inside/outside) both a problem for analysis of world politics with respect to IR’s imagination of the political, wherein possibilities of political life and change are debated.

In this section, I also focus on ontology of world politics as a problem for analyses of world politics in terms of accounting the political. In considering this, I draw on

postcolonial IR literature and its insights. The postcolonial literature notes that here (political space where progress and change is possible) is not separated from there (outside the political). It is different from postmodern critique of spatial difference in the sense that while postmodern insights to being (reconciliation of the universal and the particular) understand this spatial difference as a totalizing image of modernity (and its expression in state sovereignty), for postcolonial insights this difference inherits a colonial image and violence in world politics. Thus, for them, the political is always defined in relation to colonized places, and this separation between here and there cover colonial practices on articulation of the political as the modern state. Unexamined assumptions about the state (and state sovereignty) help secure the core construct of IR: not only the modern state but also the European state (Seth, 2013). Therefore, postcolonial literature problematizes this spatial difference.

The one way of looking at this spatial difference between here and there is to underline the ways in which the distinction between ‘here’ and ‘there’ is naturalized through separateness between the Global North and the Global South. In particular, these representations therefore associate the Global South with ‘there’, whereas ‘here’ is associated with ‘Europe’. Postcolonial approaches to world politics have argued that this distinction between ‘here’ and ‘there’ is naturalized through nation-state ontology of the world (rather than relational ontology).

For this way, the understanding of world politics divided into discrete and bounded units (nation-state ontology) prevents to see imperial and colonial encounters, how the coloniser and colonised each shaped the other, since this ontology has not accounted for contestations of the political in the encounters between the Global North and the

Global South (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Barkawi, 2013). Rather, relational ontology is “at the heart of the postcolonial, which envisions a world jointly produced out of the experience of imperialism and colonialism” (Barkawi, 2013: 87), thus the modern state is emerged jointly. For postcolonial approaches to world politics understanding of world politics divided into discrete and bounded units (nation-state ontology) prevents to see historical encounters between the Global North and the Global South. The literature on connected histories have also argued that units of world politics is not given beforehand, rather they are relationally constructed and re-constructed with encounters, questions and negotiations in world politics.

Informed by both these postcolonial critiques of nation-state ontology, and the literature on connected histories, here, this section problematizes particular understandings of ontology of world politics. In the following sub-sections, I outline understandings of the ontology of world politics in IR theories, namely, a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, dialectical, *differance*, and dialogical in theories of IR.

3.3.1. Understanding Ontology of World Politics in terms of a Binary between Domestic Hierarchy and International Anarchy

Understanding ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy is originated from postcolonial critics of nation-state ontology of the world in IR. According to Barkawi, “nation-state ontology of the world is a world composed of discrete units” (Barkawi, 2013: 87). For instance,

liberal approaches to IR and the English School is underlined by this understanding of ontology of world politics.

In liberal theories of IR, ontology of world politics is understood in terms of a binary of domestic hierarchy and international anarchy and expressed with respect to a world composed of discrete units between the zone of peace and zone of war/conflict (Doyle, 1983; Russett, 1993). The zone of peace is characterized by the democratic states /regimes which do not fight with each other. If there is a conflict in the world, it is either between an authoritarian state and a democratic one or within authoritarian states. In liberal IR theories, there is conflation of the political with the liberal state. The liberal state is distinct from the international anarchy between the zone of peace and the zone of war.

For Doyle (1983), the liberal state is the political. The liberal state is derived from the political evolution of humankind and the cultural and historical structures of liberal states and societies set the guidelines of international politics in terms of its institutions, norms as well as principles. While naturalizing the liberal state, Doyle fails to acknowledge that the liberal state, and its articulation as the political is also a joint experience between the Global North and the Global South.

In the English School, ontology of world politics is also understood in terms nation-states. This school understands discrete units of world with respect to two ideal cases: a state of war and a state of global humanity. In between of these two ideal cases what has actually occurred is an anarchical international society. For Hedley Bull, the Westphalian state as the political is pre-given in international politics. It has been

derived from the historical evolution of the modern states system and sets the guidelines of modern international politics in terms of its institutions of international diplomacy, the balance of power, modern war, the managerial system of the great powers (Bull, 1995: 71). In the English School, thus, since the political has already been taken as the Westphalian state, the political has not open to negotiations about its articulation as a distinct domain of human interaction between the Global North and the Global South.

To sum up, both liberal IR perspectives and the English School understand ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between a domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. Since the international politics is understood in terms of international anarchy, these approaches read the units separate from the processes of world politics in terms of its questions, negotiations and encounters between units.

3.3.2. Understanding Ontology of World Politics in terms of Dialectical

Understanding ontology of world politics in terms of dialectical means that there is always a (re)-construction of the sovereign state the political by local and global actors. It is necessary for the negotiations between the particular (local) and the universal (global) with respect to understanding of world politics. It is this reconstruction of the political that “the actualization of human thought through sublation of contradictions of social order” (Brincat, 2014: 596) becomes possible.

Critical IR theory shares this understanding of ontology of world politics. Against the naturalization of the territorial state in terms of functionally identical units in the

realist IR theories, Cox (1986) historicizes the state while pointing to its changing and re-shaping nature. In his account, Cox uses historical materialism (in the thought of Gramsci) and defines it as foremost source of critical theory. For him, at the level of real history, there is the potential of transformation of world politics, as “alternative forms of development arising from the confrontation of opposed social forces in any concrete historical situation” (Cox, 1986: 215). In this sense, Cox directs attention to conflict in which it sees the process of continual creation of social relations that change the rules of the game and out of which new aspects of conflict among social forces may arise. This dialectical understanding of world politics, which is the dialectical of the predominant social forces and alternative ones, understand the reconstruction of the political in world politics.

According to Cox, throughout modern states system, the dialectical between various social forces has led to the emergence of the international state. The international state, Cox argues, thus, has been historically shaped by dialectical relationship of various social forces (capital and labor), and it blurs the distinction between the domestic and the international. On the one hand, it has not a fixed nature, since the international state is also in the process of changing in response to capitalism’s global needs via its internationalization. On the other hand, this internationalization forms a global historic bloc. This historic bloc sustains hegemony, since it reproduces global power relations through various domestic and international institutions. Cox also argues that there is inherent possibility of transformation brought by social forces of counter-hegemonies.

To sum up, different from both liberal IR perspectives and the English School, for Gramscian critical IR theory, the state and its different forms are not naturally given, but they are always in the historical process of changing and reshaping due to the struggles among social forces within world politics.

3.3.3. Understanding Ontology of World Politics in terms of *Differance*

Understanding ontology of world politics in terms of *differance* means that there is re-constitution of the political for the negotiations between the particular and the universal, but they are not decidable. In this respect, continuation of politics depends on continuous re-construction of the space of politics in itself, rather than for decisions about what the universal is.

In poststructuralist IR theories, this idea of limit of representation has originated from Derrida's "undecidable", "that which can no longer be contained within the binary opposition but which however inhabits it without ever constituting a third term" (Vaughan-Williams, 2005: 126). In this way, "undecidable" denies any possibility of binary oppositions, since it is inherent "qualities of resistance and disorganization" (Vaughan-Williams, 2005: 126). In this respect, while Western metaphysics presumes a fixed notion of difference, Derrida's critique via *differance*, "literally neither a word nor a concept", refers to "the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing of means of which elements are related to each other" (Vaughan-Williams, 2005: 127). In the poststructuralist IR theories, thus, the inside/outside binary does not show the representation of the sovereign, but the undecidable binary

points to the limits of politics. In this sense, *differance* of the inside/outside marks the limits of representation and closure of historical meaning of the sovereign state.

According to Krishna, *differance* is underlined by the notion of differentiation-deferral in the sense that “social meaning arises from the simultaneous act of differentiating thing from other(s) and endlessly deferring the very possibility of comprehending its presence in any final sense, outside the chain of signifiers of which it is part” (Krishna, 1999: 17). Here, *differance* is used in terms of Krishna’s use of the notion of differentiation-deferral. For instance, it is reaching of universality for the Western state as something that is ever in making but never quite reached. This logic of deference secures the Western state and continuation of politics as Krishna (1999: 18) writes,

(T)he extension of *communitas* beyond the borderlines always has a limit that tends to infinity: it is a task that can never be completed because its completion can only imply the negation of the state itself and with it the entire hegemonic discourse of an insecurity-centered statist international relations. In other words, the discursive universe of international relations is built upon the endless reproduction of the inside/outside antinomy.

In critique of naturalization of the modern state as the sovereign, it is *differance* of the inside/outside that marks the limits of representation and closure of historical meaning of the sovereign state and international politics.

Ashley and Walker, in ‘Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies’ (1990), exemplify *differance* with respect to the notion of marginal sites that points to the limits of representation of the sovereign state, as Ashley and Walker (1990: 260) one of such sites:

the Chinese businessman in Malaysia who must bear witness to Malay narratives in which he and other Chinese are described as "stingy" and "materialistic" even as he must encourage his children to learn "Bahasa Melayu" (officially, "Bahasa Malaysia"), the language in which the business of the state is conducted and the insults are spoken.

Ashley and Walker argue that the resources of the exiles are ambiguity, uncertainty, and the ceaseless questioning of identity since living and moving at the margins requires resisting disciplining knowledge practices. At these sites, for these authors, "it becomes possible to explore, generate, and circulate new, often distinctly joyful, but always dissident ways of thinking, doing, and being political" (Ashley & Walker, 1990: 263). This particular understanding of ontology of world politics in terms of *differance* points to unclosure of historical meaning and the idea of limit of representation of the sovereign state.

This understanding of ontology of world politics in terms of *differance* is exemplified in Walker's study with respect to sovereignty and the idea of being "sovereign".

Accordingly, for Walker, "the principle of state sovereignty expresses an historically specific articulation of the relationship between universality and particularity in space and time" with respect to the ability and inability to the limits of understanding who "we" are (Walker, 1993: 176). According to Walker (1993: 179),

we claim autonomy and identity as particulars- individuals and nations- ever in search for reconciliation with the universal, or ever resigned to the unhappy condition in which reconciliation is known to be impossible. Though many complaints have been issued about the impossibility of this rendition of the available alternatives, the silent reifications of the principle of state sovereignty testify to its hegemony both over what it means to aspire to some other identity and to resist the identities constructed by hegemonic powers.

In this sense, the sovereign marks the limits of representation, now in form of sovereign state, its inadequacy as well as unpredictability. The articulation of the

political is continuously changing because the particular and the universal are not fixed, but there is always a struggle between them.

To sum, for poststructuralist IR theories, the sovereign is not naturally given in terms of the modern state, but its construction in terms of the political is the result of world politics itself. For their understanding, the binary of inside/outside of state has contributed to naturalization of the modern state as the sovereign and the political.

3.3.4. Understanding Ontology of World Politics in terms of Dialogical

Understanding ontology of world politics in terms of dialogical means that there is always re-construction of the political for the discovery of other (particular and universal).⁹ This may be in form of contestation, negotiations or negation of world politics. The articulation of the political, in this sense, changes with respect to the experience of world politics in the world. Thus, the political is not articulated before interaction, and its articulation always includes the questions and contestations about world politics that are shaped by relations and dialogues.

Different from other IR theories, postcolonial approaches share this understanding of ontology of world politics. World politics is characterized by the encounters between the Global North and the Global South. Thus, the political, wherever it is located, is the location of multiple ‘nows’, which include “relationships within, through the constitution of forms of political community suggestive of a space of hybridity,

⁹ Chris Brown in his seminal work, ‘Turtles all the ways down’ (1994) initially introduced the notion of dialogism in critical insights on international relations through his reading of Bakhtin and Todorov. Brown states that it is an understanding, which allows for the category of difference and equals (Brown, 1994: 1668). His study focuses on a normative claim of dialogism rather than an examination of the political.

negotiation and articulation” (Jabri, 2013: 12). The political is not only located in the state, but also in the international because it is also a realm of questions and negotiations of world politics. Thus, there is intermingled between the domestic and the international. Jabri analyses the postcolonial subject in relation to its encounters with the political in world politics and notes,

This is a subject whose articulation of the political is constitutively dependent on the modern international as a distinct location of politics that historically confers legitimacy to the limits of the national state as political community. To understand the postcolonial subject of politics is hence to unravel the temporal and spatial constitution of the subject and this subject’s struggle for access to the political and the international (Jabri, 2013: 11).

Thus, encounters with the political in world politics, always include “relationships within, through the constitution of forms of political community suggestive of a space of hybridity, negotiation and articulation” (Jabri, 2013: 12).

Inayatullah and Blaney’s *International Relations: the Problem of Difference* (2004), exemplifies the notion of dialogical with the notion of contact zone between the Global North and the Global South. Following Pratt, Inayatullah and Blaney use the notion of contact zone to “identify the space of the discovery of other” (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004: 9). The contact zone is identified by Pratt, as “the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect” (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004: 9). However, what Pratt says, the authors add, “the contact zone has generally been a space of colonial encounters” infused with inequalities of power. Accordingly, through their reading of Pratt, Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 9) note,

Within this space of colonial encounters, colonizer and colonized cannot be conceived as radically separable, rather, they are subjects only as constituted in and by their relation to each other. Though these relations are certainly defined by conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict, this does

not require diffusionist accounts of conquest and domination that obscure the interactive and improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters.

While the colonial encounter is the dynamic of the contact zone, Inayatullah and Blaney refer to Todorov's and Nandy's writings which give sense to various responses of the self to the discovery of the other. Todorov's double movement (inferiority of difference and assimilation as equals) precludes understanding of difference as equals. In this sense, Inayatullah and Blaney state that double movement leads to a form of splitting, the breakdown of mutual constitution between self and other, which turns the relation into the one of domination (master/slave). While this is "the pattern for every form of domination", for the authors, there are always other possibilities (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004: 10). Although multiple voices are juxtaposed, they are only involved in the process of critical self-reflection by an ethnological stance where "the other becomes a resource for a self-examination that might substantially alter not only how the self sees the other, but also how the self views its own culture and traditions" (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004: 11). For this end, ambiguities generated in the contact zone are to be treated as resources.

This is not only an ethical concern; it is also necessary for recognizing other potentialities as well as more creative responses immanent within the contact zone. In reference to Nandy, Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 12) state,

The cultural spaces revealed and constructed by these intersecting trajectories are complex and overlapping. Cultures and traditions face each other not as homogeneous and fixed entities. Through shared in important respects, cultures are more like an open-ended text than a closed book, traditions are layered, comprising different levels or parts, or perhaps dominant and recessive moments. And no matter how different, the subjects of cultural encounters can find connections and overlaps between their own values and visions and the various levels and parts and dominant and recessive moments of cultural practices and traditions of the other.

More creative responses are also enabled by the intersecting trajectories of the contact zone. Inayatullah and Blaney give an illustration how Gandhi challenged colonial imperative to boundary self and other “through creating alliances between recessive traditions in the West and themes in India’s cultures that offer of liberation from colonialism –for both Indians and British” (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004: 12). In the process, Inayatullah and Blaney highlight two steps of interaction.

First one is the recognition that the other is not simply external but also exists within the self. Second one is the more creative, the capacity to uncover the other within as a source of critical self-reflection and cultural transformation. In other words, Inayatullah and Blaney note, “establishing dialogue in a world of inequalities and oppressions depends centrally on the capacity to draw connections between various traditions’ and cultures’ understandings and responses to oppression” (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004: 13). Here, main logic of the contact zone is to recognize various historical connections between self and other.

To summarize, this section has showed that there are four understandings of ontology of world politics in IR namely, understanding of ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, dialectical, *differance* and dialogical. Questioning IR theories’ understanding of ontology of world politics is necessary to see the link between nature of world politics and the political.

3.4. Sociality of World Politics

What is meant by sociality of world politics is IR theory's understanding of how world politics takes shape. Different from two dimensions of modernity, Walker (1993) does not conceptualize sociality of world politics as a dimension of modernity. Before examining particular understandings of sociality of world politics in the theories of IR, this section underlines how it thinks about sociality of world politics as a problem for analysis of world politics. In considering this dimension, I draw from postcolonial insights to world politics and IR.

In prevalent IR theories, state behavior is mainly understood as a function of the given structure of the external world. The structure of international system and condition of international anarchy forces states to behave in a self-help world in particular ways. For instance, for Mearsheimer, the structures of international system "leave state little choice but to compete aggressively with each other" (Mearsheimer, 1994: 40). The structure of the international system shapes the state behaviors via state-to-state interactions, and is the key factor for understanding sociality of international politics.

McSweeney in his book, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (2004) argued that in prevalent IR theories, international structure shapes forms of world politics such as, ideas, and institutions. Since the international is characterized by anarchy as given, forms do not shape the structure. According to McSweeney, this understanding of the relationship between structure and forms of world politics does not include 'social', since forms could not shaped the international structure. Rather, for McSweeney, this understanding is the one applicable to natural

order as billiard-balls since “structure has an independent existence; it makes things happen, makes states conform to its laws” (McSweeney, 2004: 102).

For McSweeney, social constructionist approach offers “another interpretation of pattern and sameness in human behavior which makes the actor co-author of regularity and denies the need to postulate an external and independent causal force” (McSweeney, 2004: 103). Accordingly, McSweeney says, pattern and sameness in human behavior, the construction of routine, is a condition of being to act rather than an effect of an independent force. In other words, for McSweeney, “the analysis of agency reveals the cause of sameness within action itself” (McSweeney, 2004:103), since there is “cognitive content of structure” and the role of human agent (McSweeney, 2004: 104).

Constructivist IR literature, albeit in different ways, points to the missing of ‘social’ in this understanding of sociality of world politics in terms of causality. Constructivist IR theories have questioned the transformation of both the states’ actions and the character of relations between states, and understand that states actions are historically constituted and always subject to change (Wendt, 1999). Although they also see international politics in terms of international anarchy, the international is not only limited to foreign policy behaviors of states, but is composed of their norms, ideas, cultures. For the poststructuralist insights to IR, historical practices through which structural forms are constructed also reflected on the architecture of structure. In this sense, they question how one understands the distinction between parts and the emerging properties that arise (Walker, 1993: 95). That is not only questioning the analysis of the nature of parts and wholes but also the relationship between them in

terms of raising how structural forms should be understood, either enabling or constraining historical practices (Walker, 1993: 96).

The postcolonial literature also problematizes the separation between forms and structures of world politics. For postcolonial insights to world politics, this separation between forms and structures prevents to see constitutive relationship between various forms and structures in world politics.

Tarak Barkawi, in his works, 'Connection and constitution: locating war and culture in globalization studies' (2004), and *Globalization and War* (2006) offer a new way of understanding war in world politics. What is at stake in his analysis of war is the relation of war to politics and society around the world (Barkawi, 2006: 57), and Barkawi problematizes the notion of globalization as used in globalization studies. For Barkawi, globalization as a thick social relations and connections around the world does not a new phenomena. Addressing the relationship between imperialism, colonialism and production of states, entities, and colonies throughout history shows that entities such as nation-states, or colonies are produced and transformed within "the 'thick' set of mutually constitutive international relations" (Barkawi, 2004: 157).

For Barkawi, this relations of connection and constitution is generative and transformative not only forms of world politics but also structures of world politics, and Barkawi points to two stages of this connection. The first is a bilateral connection between entities such as how war and Indian army has shaped India, and the United Kingdom, as war provides its social and cultural processes of the mutual constitution between India and the United Kingdom. Second, connections between entities also

change and transform social and cultural processes of world politics such as Orientalism.

For postcolonial and critical IR scholars, thus, what is at stake in analysis of world politics is relation of entities/forms to politics around the world. Informed by these insights, this section focuses on particular understandings of sociality of world politics in IR theories: understanding of sociality of world politics in terms of causality and in terms of constitution.

3.4.1. Understanding Sociality of World Politics in terms of Causality

Understanding sociality of world politics in terms of causality means that structure of world politics comes before its forms, since the international is taken as anarchy given. Since the international is understood as a realm of foreign policy, they look at only state behaviors as forms of world politics, and state behaviors' do not shape world politics. Liberal IR theories and the English School share this understanding of sociality of world politics in terms of causality.

In his study, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", Doyle understands world politics in terms of "an international society of independent states" (Doyle, 1983) that is composed of two realms, one is transnational and the other is international. For Doyle, the expansion of the pacific union has been a complex and inseparable combination of effects of both tracks. On the one hand, one dynamic is a path toward peace "operates through ties of trade, cultural exchange and political understanding" at transnational level (Doyle, 1983: 351). On the other hand, it "operates through the

pressure of insecurity and of actual war that together engender republican governments” (Doyle, 1983: 351). According to Doyle, considering these two contradictory tracks are important not to reduce the widening of the pacific union into one cause, rather they are interrelated. Interrelated dynamics of these two tracks condition structural and historical conditions for this widening in terms of shaping state behaviors.

In this account for understanding processes towards widening of the pacific union, sociality of the liberal states in world politics, is already taken for granted in terms of state-to-state interactions in terms of war since the international is only conceived as a realm of foreign policy. In Doyle’ account, states in the zones of peace and war only interact with each when liberal states are pursuing their foreign policy interests such as negotiations with the powerful illiberal states on issues about arms resolution and control or creation of stable clients among the weak illiberal ones through various forms of interventions, and aid (Doyle, 1983: 323). In this way, the international is not only limited to state behaviors and their particular interstate relations in international anarchy. For instance, it is assumed that international trade creates “ties of mutual advantage that would help make republics pacific” (Doyle, 1983: 350), although there are setbacks in terms of uneven development of technologically advancement among these states. As in this case, the inequalities and hierarchies between states stemmed from functioning of the international trade are not shaping the international, and its forms behaviors of liberal and illiberal states. Rather, there is already underlying mechanism of the expansion of the liberal peace, which is ‘a liberal culture’ that shapes states’ behaviors and reproduces the liberal states as the agents of world politics.

Hedley Bull, in his work *The Anarchical Society* (1995) also understands sociality of world politics in terms of causality. In familiar with the above insights, he also considers world politics as being one of international society composed of independent states, though it is an anarchical international society. It is composed of two realms, the one is at the international level, and the other is at the world level. By the international level, Bull understands “patterns of activity that sustains elementary or primary goals of international society” such as institution of the balance of power (Bull, 1995: 8). By the world level, he understands “patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary and primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole” (Bull, 1995: 19) such as international law. Interrelated dynamics of these two tracks condition the order in world politics in terms of determining state behavior in the modern states system.

In Bull’s account as well, the international as anarchy has taken for granted, thus, state behaviors do not shape world politics. For instance, Bull mainly derives the ideal type of the balance of power from the 19th century European balance of power and its international order, and compares the present one with it. For this argument, the main functions of the balance of power are still there, but “there is no equivalent of the bonds of common culture among European powers in earlier centuries” (Bull, 1995: 111). In the 19th century, there is the aristocratic culture of diplomacy among core European powers. In the 20th century of global international system, international society is shaped by a common culture of ‘modernity’, which conditions a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life in terms of preservation of modern state, rules and institutions, among others.

In his account, while the processes and patterns of this realm have changed from 19th century towards 20th century due to the expansion of a common culture of ‘modernity’ in terms of the development of European states system, state behaviors as forms of international politics do not shape this process. Rather, for Bull, the balance of power provides “the conditions in which other institutions on which international order depends (diplomacy, war, international law, great power management) have been able to operate” (Bull, 1995: 102). Thus, the international structure shapes state behaviors, and the balance of power reproduces the European states as the agents of world politics.

While naturalizing the international as a realm of foreign policy, Bull (1995: 199) also recognizes inequalities among great and small powers in provision of the order in international politics.

Because states are grossly unequal in power, certain international issues are as a consequence settled, the demands of certain states (weak ones) can in practice be left out of account, the demands of certain other states (strong ones) recognised to be the only ones relevant to the issue in hand.

In his account, these two groups of states only interact within the given rules and conduct of anarchical international society, and hierarchies and inequalities are not considered as constitutive of forms of international politics such as the Westphalian state but the feature of world politics (in terms of its power capabilities). Put differently, inequalities among great and small powers are taken into account in order to understand how order is maintained, rather than human interaction in world politics is built upon as the first value in the first hand. For instance, Bull notes that great powers should “seek to satisfy some of the demands” such as demands from poor

countries for economic justice, from non-nuclear states for nuclear justice (Bull, 1995: 222).

To sum up, both liberal IR theories and English School understand that structure of international politics comes before its forms. In both, forms of international politics are identified as state behaviors since the international is considered as a realm of foreign policy rather than a realm of social relations. Therefore, they have missed that forms and structures in world politics constitute each other, and inequalities between them appeared with the social and political process.

3.4.2. Understanding Sociality of World Politics in terms of Constitution

Understanding sociality of world politics in terms of constitution means that structure of world politics and its forms are re-shaping each other. This is also what is meant by social construction of reality. For this understanding, world politics is a realm of social relations. Critical IR theory, poststructuralist approaches to IR, and postcolonial approach share this understanding of sociality in terms of constitution, albeit in different ways in relation to their understandings of ontology of world politics.

For Cox (1986), critical theory stands apart from the prevailing order of the world, and asks how that order came about. Cox argues that IR critical theory studies “social and political complex as a whole rather than to separate parts” (Cox, 1986: 208) in order to comprehend processes of change. Cox’s seminal work (1986) is an example of an understanding of sociality of world politics in terms of *constitution*. Cox starts his article with a notion of social reality that is “seamless web of the social world”. In

this way, Cox proposes a method for understanding global power relations in order to “look at the problem of world order in the whole” without reifying a world system (Cox, 1986: 206). Since critical theory deals with transformation of social reality, Cox develops the method of historical structures in order to uncover the social practices from which certain institutions and concepts derived their apparent objectivity that are objectified by lay actors through social practices. Historical structure, as a notion, “is a picture of a particular configuration of forces” (Cox, 1986: 217) and Cox adds “historical structures does not represent the whole world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality” (Cox, 1986: 220).

Cox uses the method of historical structures for a particular end: defining present world order as hegemonic and to reveal counter-hegemonic forces and capabilities within it. For this end, Cox analyses the relationship between material capabilities, institutions and ideas (emergence of world orders) in the continuous re-shaping of the social forces, state formations and world orders. According to Cox, material capabilities, ideas and institutions are re-shaped by global production relations are enabling the social forces that re-shaping state formations and world orders.

This understanding of sociality of world politics in terms of constitution also shapes poststructuralist insights to world politics. In *Inside/Outside*, for Walker (1993), state sovereignty came to formation with respect to rearticulation of political space and time. The patterns of inclusion and exclusions are all historical innovations rather than taken for granted. The fixing between inside and outside, space and time are not natural or inevitable either. Rather, they are contingencies of modern political life, and there is always the possibilities and impossibilities for sustaining a sense of

national identity and integrity. The practices through which these lines are drawn, it has become possible to posit highly controversial issues as unproblematic.

Furthermore, through these practices, Walker notes, “it has been possible to stop thinking about other claims to political identity” (Walker, 1993: 180) such as culture.

Given rearticulation of political space and time (via the discipline of IR as well), Walker (2010) also argues that it is unlikely that our categories and concepts that deny the possibility of a world politics correspond/affirm emerging forms of world politics that exist. In this way, Walker points to a crucial point in the sense that for him, understandings of international sociality via categories and concepts come prior to sociality of these entities and life-worlds (within postmodern conditions and its compression of time and space). One effect of this is understandings of world politics always remain ‘modernist’.

As with both Gramscian critical IR theory, and poststructuralist approaches, postcolonial approaches to world politics also understand sociality of world politics in terms of constitution. However, what makes postcolonial approaches different from other two is that since postcolonial approaches understand ontology of world politics in terms of international hierarchy, and thus, the international as a distinct location of politics is shaped by the connected histories of hierarchical forms of world politics. Thus, how postcolonial approaches to world politics conceive this constitution relationship between forms and structures in world politics change.

For those scholars, historical encounters between the Global North and the Global South shape and reshape not only individual societies and politics in the Global South

but also structures of world politics itself. Therefore, they develop a genuinely global image of the world to understand both local and global processes that constitute intertwined histories within which the encounters between the Global North and the Global South take place, and shape world politics. How these connections shape and reshape world politics is highlighted in terms of the international as generative of meanings and practices in world politics.

Since these historical connections are emerged within a hierarchical world politics, constitution between entities always includes silencing of others' ideas, or concepts. Scholars with postcolonial insights, thus, use history as a resource to identify how others' ideas, concepts, categories are silenced in understandings of world politics (Shilliam, 2011). In addition, these postcolonial insights have enabled us to rethink history, to understand there are other ways of shaping the international "because the latter is not necessarily linked, as a historical object, to inter-state relations (in terms of war or diplomacy) or to an historical sociology of the state"(Guillaume, 2013).

To summarize, this section has showed that there are two understandings of sociality of world politics in IR, namely, in terms of causality and in terms of constitution. It has indicated the ways through which understandings of sociality of world politics point to who agents are in world politics in terms of identifying what/which its processes and structures of world politics.

3.5. Conclusion

The chapter has identified three dimensions of modernity. These three dimensions are time, ontology, and sociality of world politics. These three dimensions all together have showed how they have built IR's imagination in terms of understanding modern world politics. First, time of world politics indicates that understanding time in singular terms read narratives of world politics originated from one place or history in world politics. Rather, postcolonial approaches to world politics have shown that starting with beginnings rather than origins is possible by understanding time of world politics not in singular terms, but by looking at multiply histories between the Global North and the Global South.

Second, considering ontology, there are four understandings appeared in IR theories. In accounts of the liberal IR theories and English School, the binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy has naturalized the liberal state and the Westphalian state as the political respectively. Different from these two schools, Gramscian critical IR theory, poststructuralist, and postcolonial approaches to world politics problematize the pre-given understanding of the political, albeit in different ways, and show the relationship between the political and the international in modern world politics.

Third, the chapter has shown that there are two understandings of sociality of world politics in IR theories. Both liberal IR perspectives and the English School understand sociality in terms of causality, since they conceive the structure of world politics comes before its forms. Critical IR theories and poststructuralist insights to world

politics examined in the chapter, share understanding sociality of world politics in terms of constitution between forms and structures in world politics. However, since postcolonial insights to world politics understand ontology of world politics in terms of international hierarchy, the constitutive relationship occurs within a colonial and hierarchical world politics.

CHAPTER 4

A PARTICULAR CONCEPTION OF MODERNITY AS CONSTITUTIVE OF (INTERNATIONAL) SECURITY STUDIES

The chapter examines realist approaches to security studies, and Third World security approaches that were critical of realist approaches in the study security in the Third World. The aim of the chapter is to explore how a particular conception of modernity (which is composed of understanding time of world politics in singular terms, ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, and an understanding sociality of world politics in terms causality) has shaped international security studies.

The chapter is composed of four sections. The first section provides the definition, key literature and the notion of security that (International) Security Studies is built upon. The second section unpacks three dimensions of conception of modernity shaping realist approaches to security: time, ontology, and sociality of world politics in three respective sub-sections. The third section focuses on the study of security of the Global South in realist approaches through illustrations from debate on the ‘failed states’. The fourth section looks at Third World security scholars, and asks to what extent their works go beyond the limitations of the particular conception of modernity

in terms of understanding the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations.

4.1. Key Literature and the Notion of Security in (International) Security Studies

(International) Security Studies (ISS) emerged as a distinct field of study in the Anglo-American world by the end of post-War II. It was named Strategic Studies in the UK and National Security Studies in the US (Bilgin, Booth & Wyn Jones, 1998: 134). The field started out as a distinct specialty much shaped by the new conditions of the 1940s set by the nuclear revolution and the beginning of the Cold War (Booth & Herring, 1993: 3).

Security scholars (Bull, 1968; Booth & Herring, 1993; Buzan & Hansen, 2007; 2009) have identified three main features of this field of study during the Cold War years. First, the field of study was distinct because its main concepts and central themes emerged with the conditions of the Cold War, and the invention of nuclear weapons. The invention of the nuclear weapons altered the view of the relationship between strategy and war from the earlier Clausewitzian legacy, which understands war as an instrument of policy. With the nuclear weapons, strategists began to question the instrumentality of war given the risk of nuclear holocaust (Klein, 1994). Second, the field was a much more of a civilian enterprise than most earlier strategic and military works. Theorizing became systematic, academic, and was overwhelmingly practiced by civilians (Booth & Herring, 1993: 8). Third, central concept of the field was security and strategy, rather than defense and war (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 1-2). After

the definition of the field, this section follows with the key literature and the notion of security shaping the literature.

Notwithstanding its Cold War origins in the US that unified International Security Studies (ISS), the field evolved into a diverse works of studies since then.

International Security Studies is not universally used as “the designator for the sub-field” as Buzan and Hansen note (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 1, footnote 1). Rather, textbooks¹⁰ as well as course syllabuses¹¹ “use it as an umbrella label to include the work of scholars who might refer to themselves as being in ‘international security’, or ‘security studies’, or ‘strategic studies’ or ‘peace research’ or various other more specialized labels” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 1, footnote 1). The chapter also uses it as an umbrella label recognizing that “the name international security scholars give to their field reflects their conception of its scope, approach and method” (Crawford, 1991: 285).

In this chapter, I focus on the definition of the field by realist approaches. It is because realist approaches to security are main targets of Third World security scholars in their analyses of limitations of security studies. Stephen Walt defines ISS “the study of the threat, use and control of military force” (Walt, 1991: 212). More specifically, it includes the analysis of “the conditions that make the use of force more likely” as well as “the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for,

¹⁰ Patrick M. Morgan, *International Security: Problems and Solutions*, 2006; Edward A. Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations*, 2005

¹¹ University of California, San Diego, Department of Political Science, Summer, 2013 http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/rnmehta/documents/POL142I-Syllabus_000.pdf ; Columbia University, Department of Political Science, Summer, 2011 <http://sarabjergmoller.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Moller-Introduction-to-International-Security-Syllabus.pdf>; Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Autumn 2015-2016, <http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/cours2015-2016/syllabi/SP044.pdf>

prevent, or engage in war” (Walt, 1991: 212). The focus of security studies prioritizes the causes of war and of alliances and policy-relevant research such as military and other threats a particular country is faced with. Causes, dynamics, and outcomes of conflict in the international system, the nature and perception of threats, the ways to ameliorate the conflicts caused by threats are major themes of theoretical works of the field (Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988: 6-7). The relation between statecraft and military force and acquiring security by and for the state through military means are prioritized in both definitions (Fierke, 2007: 13).

The narrow definition of the field has focused on the relation between the statecraft and military force. That was underpinned by the realist assumptions about international politics. When security studies emerged as a sub-field of IR after World War II, along with a desire to make IR into a science, realism took the center stage as a framework for explaining international politics (Fierke, 2007: 17; Crawford, 1991: 293).

Although realism was acknowledged as the central paradigm of international security studies, its concepts, categories and its evolution have not been straightforward (Fierke, 2007: 16). The narrow definition of the field associated with the realist paradigm was mostly relevant to two brief periods of the Cold War, namely, the Golden Age and the Renaissance of security studies, “when security scholars were preoccupied with the logic of nuclear weapons and deterrence” (Fierke, 2007: 22).

Remind of this section briefly provides the historical and political context of the evolution of security studies and its notion of security in these two periods.¹²

Gray (1984) called the period of 1955-65 as the Golden Age of security studies (Booth & Herring, 1993: 4). The period is identified by security scholars as one of the distinct periods when core works were published in security studies (Booth, 1987; Baldwin, 1995; Buzan & Hansen, 2009). During this period, central question was the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction as an instrument of policy given the risk of nuclear war (Baldwin, 1995: 123). Studying strategy in terms of studies of actual violence gave place to “analyses of deterrence, crisis management, as well as the manipulation of risk” (Bull, 2007: 106). Much of these works were devoted to civilian and interdisciplinary analysis of nuclear war and related works on the nuclear deterrence, arms control, crisis management, and limited war (Booth & Herring, 1993: 8).

The premier figures of the Golden Age of security studies and respective works were namely, Kaufmann, ed. *Military Policy and National Security*, 1956; H.A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 1957; A. Wohlstetter, *The Delicate Balance of Terror*, 1959; H. Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, 1960; T.C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 1960; H. Bull, *The Control of Arms Race*, 1961; G. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defence: Toward a Theory of National Security*, 1961; T.C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 1966 (Booth, 1987: 49; Baldwin, 1995: 123; Buzan & Lansen, 2009: 67-

¹² There are various sources about the periodization of Security Studies (Bilgin, Booth & Wyn Jones, 1998; Booth, 1987; Booth & Herring, 1993; Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Buzan & Waever, 2010; Collins, 2010; Garnett, 1987; Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988; Kolodziej, 1992; Walt, 1991). These studies elaborate on different issues of concern related to the evolution of Security Studies literature, expanding from the object of study, the methodology, and normative arguments to policy issues.

68). In these works, the classical approach to realism and its assumptions about the prevalence of pursuit of power in international relations provided the larger context in which the problem of the Cold War and nuclear weapons were defined.

During the Golden Age of security studies, questions about the threat definition and the potential utility of nuclear weapons were central in the literature (Fierke, 2007: 23). Methods of these works ranged from analysis on military and strategic history, as well as a variety of analysis encompassing game theory, systems analysis and other novel techniques (Booth, 1987: 49). Many of the concepts of strategy¹³ such as concept of deterrence, concept of limited war were developed during this period (Crawford, 1991: 289).

During this period, many strategic analyses did not question the relationship between military means and political ends. The political end of national security was emerged in the context of the emergence of the national security doctrine in the US by the mid-1940s. The National Security Act of 1947 was implicated with the shift from defense to security. The shift to security was linked to “the concept of ‘national interest’ and to the perception of its content in relation to the new idea and doctrine of national security” (McSweeney, 1998: 19). It was a doctrine “designed to bridge the interests of the state abroad and those of states at home and to merge the culture of everyday life with that of the defense of the national interest” (McSweeney, 1998: 20).

Therefore, not only ‘national security’ is used for stronger connotations than national

¹³ Buzan (1983) also highlighted the centrality of ‘strategy’ rather than security during the Cold War Security Studies, as the author stated that security was ‘underdeveloped concept’ (Buzan, 1983: 3). Even the ones who challenged the Strategic Studies, the concept of ‘security’ was not problematized and under the jurisdiction of the Realist, strategic, military side of the political and academic debate (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:13).

interest, but also the content of national interest had changed from the one of welfare to “one practically synonymous with the formula of national security” (McSweeney, 1998: 21).¹⁴ Security began to belong primarily to the state and the politics of national interest of the time attached it to the state (McSweeney, 1998: 21).¹⁵

In between the periods of the Golden Age and renaissance of security studies, there were also works other than shaped by the realist paradigm. They were Cold War critics of security thinking. This security thinking is composed of “three main strands of criticism brought against the mainstream thinking by students of Alternative Security, Peace Research and Third World Security” (Bilgin, 2005: 20).

From the end of the Golden Age of security studies to the Renaissance, the détente of 1970s and lessening tension between East and West led to decline in interest in security studies. It is because threats to national security come not only military sources but also non-military ones (Baldwin, 1995: 124). The renewal of the Cold War tensions such as revival of the nuclear arms race in the early 1980s stimulated renewed interest in security studies (see Jervis, 1989). That was corresponded with a so-called Renaissance in security studies. Security studies was preoccupied again by the use of military means to meet military threats (Baldwin, 1995: 125). That said, there were new insights to international security during this period.

Stephan Walt, a prominent security scholar, declared the Renaissance of security studies in his well-known article ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’ published in

¹⁴ Also see Neocleous (2006). From Social to national Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order. *Security Dialogue*, 37(3): 363-384.

¹⁵ See Wolfers (1952), National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Studies Quarterly*, 67(4): 481-501.

1991. According to Walt, since the mid-1970s, the field of security studies had entered a new period with dramatic increase in professional activity and scholarly published works.¹⁶ It became more methodologically sophisticated and theory-inclined, which led to a rise in systematic social scientific research as well as the empirical-historical analyses that rely “on concrete historical events/cases as a means of generating, testing and refining theories” and develops methods for policy-relevant theory (Walt, 1991: 219). Walt identifies these changes in the field as the origin of ‘the renaissance’ of International Security Studies (Walt, 1991: 211-212; also see Baldwin, 1995: 125; Booth & Herring, 1993; Buzan & Waever, 2010).

For some, this was mainly related to the definition of politics in these works (Walt, 1991; Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988). The works during the Golden Age of security studies employed a rather narrow definition of politics and there was a neglect of non-military sources of international tension and a focus on military balances (Walt, 1991: 215). As an illustration, Walt notes that the deterrence theory assumes the existence of an aggressor (the Soviet Union) without asking why an opponent began to challenge the status quo in the first place (Walt, 1991: 215). While there was an overemphasis on the military aspect of national security during the Golden Age of security studies, with the ‘renaissance’ of security studies, the emphasis was on the international scope and sources of international conflict.

¹⁶ Due to the dramatic increase in professional activity and scholarly works published since the 1980s, the literature of the period (since the 1980s) is composed of works with different ranges of issues. Some of the key works studying the general question of international security are identified as follow, D. S. Geller & D. J. Singer *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict* (1998); K. Holsti *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (1991); P. D. Senese & J. A. Vasquez *The Steps to War: An Empirical Study* (2008); S. Van Evera *Causes of War: Power and Roots of Conflict* (1999); G. Snyder *Alliance Politics* (1997); R. Jervis *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (1989); S. Walt *Revolution and the War* (1996); S. Walt *Origins of Alliances* (1987).

In terms of the definition of politics, Walt emphasizes the central place of international politics, while defining security studies with the realist assumptions and its particular understanding of politics. He underscores the study of the conditions of international politics as the framework of 'national security' policy (Walt, 1991: 222). Thus, although the definition of politics has altered, national security is still the central tenet of Walt's definition of the field (Walt, 1991: 222).

For some, studying the conditions of international politics as new framework also give rise to the notion of 'international security' in response to 'national security thinking'. Nye and Lynn-Jones in their article entitled 'International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field' (1988), highlighted 'international' nature of the issue of security. Emphasizing the phenomena of war (international conflict), they pointed to the international nature of threats to the security of the state as well as conditions of security in terms of security interdependence (security dilemma or the mutuality of nuclear deterrence). Thus, the field was previously called ISS but the international security was not in its scope.

These emphases on the international scope of politics were compatible with the prominence of neorealism in International Security Studies during this period, which supplanted realism as the dominant theory (Fierke, 2007: 25). The foremost representatives are, Waltz with *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Walt with *Origins of Alliances* (1987), and Mearsheimer with *The Tragedy of Great Powers* (2001).¹⁷

¹⁷ As mentioned in Introduction, realist approaches are the main target of Third World security scholars in their analyses of limitations of security studies. Although, I acknowledge that there is significant literature on neo-classical realism, since Third World security scholars have focused on classical realist

4.2. Unpacking Conception of Modernity in Realist Approaches to Security Studies

This section explores which/what conception of modernity has shaped realist approaches to security studies. Here, I unpack three dimensions of modernity I laid out in Chapter 3, and I look at which understandings of time, ontology, and sociality of world politics have shaped International Security Studies.

4.2.1. Time of World Politics in Realist Approaches to Security Studies

Despite differences among realist approaches, they largely share the view that the character of the relations among states has not been fundamentally altered, because there is always a struggle for power. Where there is change, it tends to occur in repetitive patterns in the sense that state behavior is driven by the imperatives of anarchic international system. In realist approaches to security studies, the time of world politics is understood in singular terms. All states, either great or small powers universally share this narrative of world politics, while the narrative of world politics is originated from analyses of great powers' experiences of world politics.

For example, in his study, *Politics among Nations*, Hans Morgenthau (1948) notes that human capacity to reason could uncover underlying forces of world politics and implement realpolitik. Morgenthau underscores the idea that the necessity of power politics is stemmed from impossibility of a world state or of a permanent peace in world politics. In searching for the impossibility of a world state, Morgenthau

and neorealist approaches in their critiques, I limit my analyses the foremost representatives of these two approaches in realist IR theories.

explores underlying mechanisms of world politics, and he notes, “international politics, like all politics, is struggle for power” (Morgenthau, 1948: 13). Morgenthau understands that “the struggle for power is universal in time and space” (Morgenthau, 1948: 17), and naturally developing among states.

In his account of cycles of struggles of power among nations, all of the past is uniformly posited as a pre-condition for the permanent struggle for power in world politics in the present, which is assumed as universal. This is because of the nature of human beings underlined by the desire to dominate as a constitutive element of all social associations (Morgenthau, 1948: 17). Like domestic politics, international politics is also a power politics, although there have been different manifestations because of the prevalence of different moral, political, and social conditions in each sphere.

Thus, the balance of power emerges in world politics in a transhistorical manner, and great and small powers all naturally respond to imperatives of the balance of power. Historical time is naturalized in terms of a presumed underlying force of the balance of power. The future of international politics is also understood as unfolding its universal principles with respect to a policy that seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power. Each of these policies, according to Morgenthau, is “trying either to maintain or to overthrow the status-quo, leads of necessity to a constellation which is called the balance of power and to policies which aim at preserving it” (Morgenthau, 1948: 125). For Morgenthau, thus, it is possible and necessary to find out main patterns of the balance of power, and he looks at the European diplomatic history throughout his book. In Morgenthau’s account, balance

of power among the European great powers has not only an underlying force of international politics, but also was realpolitik.

Another foremost author of the realist tradition in IR is Kenneth Waltz. Different from Morgenthau who brought the political realist tradition to (international) politics, Waltz in his book, *Man, the State and War* (1959) raised the philosophical underpinnings of his approach to international politics, which was termed neorealism. In his book that follows, *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz developed his approach.

While Morgenthau posits the necessity of (power) politics from the impossibility of permanent peace or world government, Waltz understands the necessity of (power) politics with respect to the impossibility of *earthly* perfection of 'man' and the state in his account for the recurrence of war, in his book, *Man, the State and War* (1959). In searching for the impossibility of earthly perfection of 'man' and the state, Waltz (1979) explores underlying mechanisms of world politics with respect to its structure of anarchy, and looks at only the great powers in world politics.

As with Morgenthau, Waltz understands time of world politics in singular terms since Waltz's narrative of international politics is also originated from experiences of great powers in world politics. Moreover, all states share this narrative of world politics. Thus, in his account, Waltz posited all of the past uniformly as the pre-condition for the permanent struggle for power in world politics in the present, which is assumed as universal. This is not because of the nature of units such as 'men' or the state as Morgenthau argued, but because of the political structure that underlines the recurrent

patterns and features of the international-political life (Waltz, 1979: 70), which is international anarchy, argued Waltz.

Thus, the balance of power emerges in world politics in a transhistorical manner, and all states naturally respond to imperatives of the international anarchy according to Waltz. Historical time is naturalized in terms of a presumed underlying force of international anarchy. In Waltz's account, therefore, the future of international politics is unfolding its universal principles with respect to forming the balance of power as consequence of all policies whether it is intended or not. Accordingly, for Waltz, it is not possible to control particular behaviors of states or statesmen such as policies of realpolitik. Rather, it is possible to focus on the regularities of state behaviors as consequences of state behaviors for discovering law-like regularities of international politics (Waltz, 1979: 68). Balance of power among great powers explains structural constraints and why methods of realpolitik are repeatedly used by these states (Waltz, 1979: 117).

John J. Mearsheimer is the other foremost neorealist IR scholar that I look at. In his book *the Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), Mearsheimer underscores that the necessity of power politics is its historical-empirical reality of the great power politics. For Mearsheimer, searching for the (im)possibility of peace is not related to its realization in the present in terms of contingent on the impossibility of the earthly perfection of units such as man, or state as Waltz argues. Rather, it is related to its explanation in the past and prediction in the future, whether the peace is a historical-empirical fact or not in international politics. Thereby, he explains what is the fact of

international politics as the recurrence of great power competition, the tragedy of great power politics.

In Mearsheimer's account, all of the past is uniformly posited as a pre-condition for the permanent struggle for power among great powers in world politics in the present. For his argument, it is because of not only the nature of human beings that tends to be power-maximizers, but also because of the anarchical international system as a source of the security dilemma. As Mearsheimer notes, this competition for power among great powers is inevitable, since great powers "seek to maximize their share of world power" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 29). Why it is that great powers want to maximize power relates to the fact that the urge for survival mandates aggressive behavior by states.

In Mearsheimer's account, therefore, historical time is naturalized in terms of maximizing power relations among great powers as underlying force of international politics. On the one hand, the underlying forces of international politics bring the recurrence of great power competition. On the other hand, necessity of (power) politics among great powers, the struggle for power, is stemmed from the underlying forces of international politics. Therefore, for Mearsheimer, the future of international politics is unfolding its universal principles in the sense that "the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is *the optimal way* to maximize their security" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 21, emphasis in original).

Fourth scholar I look at here, Stephen Walt accounts for the recurrence of the problem of national security in his book *Origins of Alliances* (1987). Different from Waltz and

Mearsheimer who draw the principle of political necessity from the universal structure of the international system, Walt in his book also draws the principle from his hypothesis on the statesmen as representatives of the national interest.

As in other realist IR scholars, in his account, Walt also understands time of world politics in singular terms, and great powers experiences are origins of the narrative of international politics. Walt, thus, uniformly posits all of the past as a pre-condition for the permanent struggle for power among major powers in world politics, which is assumed as universal. In this respect, Walt assumes the state as a unitary actor, adopting a grand strategy for providing security for itself (Walt, 1987: 2). For Walt's argument, the grand strategy of a state is a particular kind of theory that states have adopted. Furthermore, in his account, the future is unfolding its universal principles as national security depends on the accurateness of statesmen's hypotheses about international politics.

To recapitulate, this section looked at four realist scholars. These scholars identify the narrative of world politics in terms of the fall and rise of the great powers, or the cycles of wars among them. Realist scholars understand time of world politics in singular terms. All states, either great or small power shares this universal narrative of anarchical international system, although the narrative is originated from experiences of the great powers (mainly in European diplomatic history) among themselves.

4.2.2. Ontology of World Politics in Realist Approaches to Security Studies

In realist approaches to security studies, ontology of world politics is understood in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. This means that they understood “anarchy and hierarchy are mutually exclusive in world politics” (Hobson, 2012: 205). This understanding of ontology of world politics naturalizes the state as the political.

In Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* (1948), there is a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. For Morgenthau, domestic and international politics are “the different manifestations of the same phenomenon: the struggle for power”, and the reasons for this difference is stemmed from different social conditions prevail in each sphere. In the domestic realm, state as the sovereign builds authority over the people and the society. Morgenthau says, in addition to social conditions such as cultural uniformity, “a hierarchical political organization cooperate in making the national society an integrated whole set apart from other national societies” (Morgenthau, 1948: 21). Thus, because of this hierarchical organization, for Morgenthau, the modern state, which has been built upon principles of discussions about the national interest, is the location of the political. Hierarchy only shapes world politics in terms of its presence in domestic politics, and implications for the conduct of foreign policy of nations. Thus, Morgenthau (1952: 38) in his article, ‘Another Great Debate: the National Interest of the United States’ demonstrates,

(T)he concept of national interest contains a residual meaning which is inherent in the concept itself, but beyond these minimum requirements its content can run the whole gamut of meanings which are logically compatible with it. That

content is determined by the political tradition, and the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. The concept of national interest, then contains two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances.

According to Morgenthau, international politics has also certain logics, but “what factor making for peace and order exists within national societies, which is lacking on the international scene? The answer seems to be obvious: it is the state itself” (Morgenthau, 1948: 391). While naturalizing the modern state as the political, Morgenthau has considered states as functionally undifferentiated units.

As with Morgenthau’s view of international politics, Waltz accounts for an understanding of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. In Waltz’s account, in international politics, the principle of political necessity is coming from the nature of social activity of the state in international politics not from a pre-determined value or good, such as security, freedom or liberty (Waltz, 1959: 171). Rather, for Waltz, international system is one of anarchy what makes international politics different from domestic politics, and it makes states to exist as independent units. For Waltz, international system as one of anarchy composed of units wishing to survive. It is the international that is composed of like-units, which means that states “are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform” (Waltz, 1979: 93). Waltz argued that since anarchy prevails in the international system, “states remain like units” (Waltz, 1979: 93).

While naturalizing the political as the sovereign state, Waltz has distinguished between great and small powers according to their power capabilities. According to Waltz, great powers matter in international politics. For Waltz, the one factor that

determines differences among international-political systems (such as bipolar or multipolar), and says that “students of international politics make distinctions between international-political systems only according to the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units” (Waltz, 1979: 97), and internationally, like units sometimes perform different tasks related to their capabilities. Thus, there are great powers and small powers. However, for Waltz, small powers do not matter for change in the international political systems, but international political systems change in relation to the number of great powers. Waltz argues “the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce” (Waltz, 1979: 97).

As in Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s views, other realist IR scholars namely, Mearsheimer and Walt also understand ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. In Mearsheimer’s account, the state behaviors and motives under the conditions of international politics are taken for granted. For Mearsheimer, since international politics is characterized by “the absence of a central authority that sits above the states and can protect them from each other” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 3), there is always the condition of self-help, and states do not trust with each other.

Naturalizing the articulation of the political as the state and functionally undifferentiated unit, Mearsheimer has also distinguished between great and small powers in international politics. For Mearsheimer, ceaseless security competition results in accumulation of power and the ones who accumulate power more,

automatically great powers are the main actors of the international politics. As Mearsheimer notes, “the fortunes of all states – great powers and smaller powers alike- are determined by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 5). For Mearsheimer, thus, great powers have largely shaped events of international politics.

In his book *Origins of Alliances*, Walt (1987) also accounts for the world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. In Walt’s account, it is because of the underlying assumption about the state and its ultimate reason in practicing of world politics, international behaviors of sovereign states are coming from grand strategies of the states, and their relevant hypotheses about others’ behaviors.

While naturalizing the state as the political and functionally undifferentiated unit, Walt has also seen differences between great and small powers. Walt starts developing his theory of the balance of threat from Waltz’ account of the underlying principle of the international system. Different from Waltz, however, Walt asks, “if balance of power theory is a theory primarily about great powers then how do we explain the alliance preferences of lesser states?” (Waltz, 1987: x) Walt’s focus on small powers’ behaviors in international politics, however, has not changed Waltz’s argument that small powers do not matter, since small powers have no impact on the change in the international-political system (for instance changing from a bipolar system to a multipolar one). Besides, for Walt, the ones who initially respond to a threat in world politics, and form alliances due to their relative capabilities are mainly aggregate power. As Walt (1987: 149) writes,

In the most typical form, states seek to counter threats by adding the power of another state to their own. Thus the superpowers have sought allies to counter threats from each other (e.g., by acquiring bases or other useful military assets) or to prevent the other from expanding its influence. The regional states, in turn, have sought external assistance, most often from one of the superpowers but occasionally from other local actors, when they have been engaged in an intense rival or an active military conflict.

This section looked at four realist scholars. They understand ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. It means that this binary takes for granted the political as the state, and functionally undifferentiated units. In all these works, while there are naturalizing the political as such, they have distinguished between small and great powers in world politics according to their power capabilities. According to these IR scholars, great powers matter in international politics, and now I turn how these scholars understand sociality of world politics.

4.2.3. Sociality of World Politics in Realist Approaches to Security Studies

According to realist approaches, the international structure shapes forms of international politics; state behaviors but state behaviors do not shape the international structure. Thus, realist approaches understand sociality of world politics in terms of causality. These approaches understand forms of international politics in terms of state behaviors because in realist accounts, the international is only a realm of foreign policy. In realist approaches, the international as a realm of foreign policy may be a cultural-normative society (Morgenthau, 1948), a mechanical society (Waltz, 1979), a competitive system (Mearsheimer, 2001), or a society of norms of international behaviours (Walt, 1987). While realist approaches to security understand the

international as a realm of foreign policy, as will be elaborated in detail, they mostly consider the international as composed of two realms: the one is at the inter-state level (balance of power as underlying force) and the other at the international level (institutional limitations such as the practice of balance of power). The international structure determines behaviors of states while naturalizing the anarchical international system.

In *Politics Among Nations* (1948), Morgenthau understands sociality of world politics in terms of causality, and argues that the international structure shapes state behaviors. For Morgenthau, there are two devices for maintenance of international order (or peace). The one is “the self-regulatory mechanism of the social forces which manifests itself in the struggle for power on the international scene, that is the balance of power” (Morgenthau, 1948: 9). The other is the normative limitation upon the struggle such as international law, or institutions among others. The one is not predominant in determining the other, but these two tracks determine state behaviors’ in international politics.

In his account, for instance, Morgenthau points to the states’ behaviors of the balance of power in (European) diplomatic history, and this is important for his understanding of sociality of world politics. In Morgenthau’s account, the balance of power in international affairs, is not only inevitable but also “an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations” (Morgenthau, 1948: 125), since the balance of power as the equilibrium provides “precarious stability” of the international system, and “insures the freedom of one nation from domination by the other” (Morgenthau, 1948: 131) Morgenthau says. As Morgenthau notes, “small nations have always owed their

independence either to the balance of power, or to the preponderance of one protecting power, or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations” (Morgenthau, 1948: 133). Given that the great and small powers only interact within the given rules and conduct of the balance of power, inequalities among them are not considered as constitutive of world politics, but they are outcome of the international politics.

For instance, in Morgenthau’s account, it is only some limited periods of history (from 1648 to 1772 and from 1815 to 1933) when the balance of power was actually practiced. Functioning of the balance of power as the condition for a permanent peace or stability in international politics depends on some requirements. In reference to European aristocratic diplomacy, Morgenthau highlights that international stability requires a moral consensus among the great powers and standards “upon which both the balance of power and the stability of the modern state system repose” (Morgenthau, 1948: 162-163).

Contingency in international politics limits the efficacy of the practice of balance of power (means-ends calculation) in actuality for Morgenthau’s argument. As in European diplomacy, the artful application of the principles of the balance of power always requires a certain cultural-normative context. With his portraying of the ‘ideal’ cultural-normative context in terms of the 19th century European diplomacy, Morgenthau demonstrates that it is always likely that statesmen will orient states’ behaviors according to normative expectations. Thus, the balance of power as a practice depends on certain normative-context for its implementation by the political elites to maintain order. In Morgenthau’s account, thus, the international structure

shapes states behaviors' either great or small powers within a cultural-normative context. However, these state behaviors do not shape the international structure, and its normative-cultural context. Thus, representation of the international only as a realm of foreign policy naturalizes great powers in Europe as the agents (who provides this cultural-normative context).

As Morgenthau does, Waltz, in his book, *Theory of International Politics* (1979), also understands sociality in terms of causality, and formulates the social imaginary of the international that is composed of two realms, one is at the international, and the other is inter-state level. These two realms and their interaction determine state behaviors.

According to Waltz, structure of international politics, thus, the power capabilities of states in the system condition how great or small powers behave and respond to the international system. For Waltz, the higher the inequality among states as well as within great powers, the better national security policies will be pursued. The inequality of states in capabilities makes peace and stability possible (Waltz, 1979: 132). It is because understanding the international as a mechanical society conceives inequalities among states necessary for the maintenance of the international system, which resulted in the balance of power. In Waltz's account, the smaller the level of interdependence among units, the more likely the two great powers "act for the sake of the system and to participate in the management of, or interfere in the affairs of lesser states" (Waltz, 1979: 198). Increase in interdependence and integration leads to mismanagement of world affairs for Waltz.

Thus, the balance of power depends on relative power capabilities among states in world politics. However, state behaviors do not shape the international structure, and its changing power capabilities among and between states. As Jahn also says, while the logic of uniformity treats the particularistic political communities as like and formally equal units, the differences just revealed during the social process of self-help are separated from the social process but explained in terms of natural differences as logically prior to and separable from the social process (Jahn, 1999). Understanding the international as realm of foreign policy, thus, naturalizes the great powers as the agents.

In *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), Mearsheimer also understands sociality of world politics in terms of causality. The international structure comes before its forms in terms of state behaviors in the international as a realm of foreign policy.

Accordingly Mearsheimer distinguishes between two realms of the international. At the international level, there is the balance of power, and at the inter-state level, security dilemma conditions state behaviors. These two realms condition state behaviors.

Accordingly, for Mearsheimer, there is no any dependent relation between states. States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest (Mearsheimer, 2001: 33), and states cannot depend on others for their own security. For Mearsheimer, “apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system”, to be the most powerful state in the system is understood by the state as the best way to ensure their survival, whereas the ideal situation for this end is to be hegemon in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001: 34).

According to Mearsheimer, thus, structure of international politics condition how great powers behave and respond to the international system. It is because understanding the international as a competitive system conceives inequalities among power capabilities of states necessary for the maintenance of the international system in terms of maximization of power. Maximization of power among great powers depend on absolute power capabilities of states, and state behaviors do not shape absolute power capabilities of states in turn. In Mearsheimer's account, understanding the international as realm of foreign policy, thus, naturalizes the great powers as the agents.

In *Origins of Alliances*, Walt also understands that the international structure comes before its forms. According to Walt, the international structure shapes norms of foreign policy behaviors and states' interests, and thus state behaviors. For instance, for Walt, international structure shape norms of foreign policy behaviors either small or great powers such as their choices of balancing or bandwagoning (Walt, 1987: 27).

According to Walt, we should expect balancing behaviour to be much more common than bandwagoning in the diplomatic history (Walt, 1987: 28), since the hypotheses drawing from this norm is more accurate in international politics and the relations among European powers, and provides international security. Put differently, for Walt, throughout European diplomatic history, the international structure shapes norms of foreign policy behaviors in terms of balancing behavior. As in other realist scholars' account, however, state behaviors either bandwoning or balancing do not shape the structure of international politics. Thus, understanding the international only as a realm of foreign policy naturalizes the great powers agency, because the great

powers are seen necessary for the maintenance of the international system in terms of providing its norms of foreign policy behaviors throughout history in Walt's account.

This section looked at four realist scholars. They understand sociality of world politics in terms of causality. It means that the international structure comes before its forms in terms of state behaviors of either small or great powers, and the differences between them have not shape the structure of international politics. Since the international is understood in terms of a realm of foreign policy, albeit in different ways, realist scholars naturalize the great powers agency in the maintenance of the international system.

This section shows that four representatives of realist IR theory share a conception of modernity composed of time in singular terms, ontology in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, and sociality in terms of causality. In the conception of modernity, there is no reference to the Global South. The following section looks at those who study security of the Global South in realist approaches to security, and investigates the understanding of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in these studies.

4.3. Realist Approaches to Security and the Study of Security in the Global South

This section looks at the debate on the 'failed states' in realist approaches to security (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2002; Jones, 2008; Boas & Jennings, 2007). Through illustrations from this debate, it shows how realist approaches to security have

understood the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations.

As Miliken and Krause argued, “although its incidence seems to be increasing, the scope of the phenomenon of state collapse depends in large part on how one defines it” (Miliken & Krause, 2002: 754). Some of the listed ‘failed states’ in these works are: Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Congo, Lebanon, South Sudan, Yemen. There are not only different definitions of the ‘failed states’, but also critiques of these definitions (Miliken & Krause, 2002) as well as identifications of these states as ‘failed states’ (Bilgin & Morton, 2002). To analyze the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in these studies, I look at the subject of security.

In his study, ‘Failed States in a War of Terror’, Rotberg (2002) have listed Afghanistan, Somalia and Sierra Leone failed states in international system. For Rotberg, these states are unable to preserve order and assert authority within their borders, and the author (2002: 128) adds,

This outcome is troubling to world order, especially to an international system that demands-indeed, counts on-a state's capacity to govern its space. Failed states have come to be feared as "breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder" (in the words of political scientist Stephen Walt), as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror.

In the literature on the failed states (see Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2002; Jones, 2008), the US is mainly the subject of security, who defines what international security is. The ‘failed states’ do not appear as the subject of security in these analyses. Rather, the literature understands the ‘failed states’ in terms of a decay of the present condition, which is the international system composed of sovereign states and portrays them as a threat to international security. In some accounts of the ‘failed

states' (see for example, Jones, 2008), the US is not only the one who defines what security is, but also the one who is secured. Thus, 'failed states' have been considered not only a threat to a great power and its interests, but also to international security depending on how the US has been narrated as both the subject and the object of security. Put differently, the analyses of the 'failed states' are not different from the ones made during and after the Cold War about Third World states and insurgencies in the region (Desch, 1989; David, 1993). The latter also frame Third World states as being a threat to international security and as potential destabilizers of the international system during and after the Cold War.

Studying the 'failed states' as potential destabilizers of the international system is based on the idea that the distinction between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy provides international stability since states are considered as functionally undifferentiated units. In realist accounts of 'failed states', there is a definition of what domestic hierarchy is, and how it is a precondition for international order and security. Jones (2008: 8) writes,

In domestic systems, there are governmental institutions that establish law and order. The international system is characterized as anarchic because there is no higher authority to protect states from external aggression. But this dichotomy is not always appropriate. States are sometimes weak and unable to provide basic services to their populations or to establish order. In this environment, domestic politics begin to resemble international politics, and insurgencies become more likely.

The collapse of domestic authority in some states in the international system has changed the dynamics of international politics, because with the 'failed states', there are new actors entered into the international system, non-state actors such as terrorists groups in Afghanistan, or pirates in Somalia.

Not only decay of the nature of international politics that is composed of so-called functionally undifferentiated units, but also unpredictability of their behaviors (which led to some question how to locate non-state actors in the balance of power theory such as asymmetric balancing, see Lieber & Alexander, 2005) is also a threat to international security. Put differently, a potential participant from outside the international system is also a threat to the international security in the sense that it may change dynamics of the balance of power among great powers.

Accordingly, in the 'failed states' debate, states are distinguished between the ones which perform its functionally undifferentiated state behaviors (either being a great or small power) and which do not. Relatedly, the 'failed states' even do not correspond to what are expected from small powers in terms of state behaviors'. Thus, their behaviors could not be changed, but what needs to be changed is their capability of being 'appropriate' state. In these analyses, the sources of threats to international security are recognized at the domestic level (the state failure). Thus, state-building efforts in the 'failed states' are instruments for solving this security problem. In their policy recommendations, thus, both Jones (2008) and Rotberg (2002) have suggested for helping the build-up of local police and security forces, their education and transfer of technology.

As during the Cold War, this outward oriented approach to security which consider threats in the Global South from the perspective of great/outside powers has not changed, but its definition of threat to international security. During the Cold War, in addition to building strong states for the maintenance of the international system, the deterrence strategy as well as theory provided the transfer for national security

thinking from the US. Klein (1994) has pointed to how deterrence strategy with a transfer of certain technologies and deterrence theory with a transfer of a vision of nuclear weapons became an indispensable part of building 'strong' states via transfer of national security thinking to the Third World.

Considering the 'failed states', for this understanding, building strong states and transfer of technologies and anti-insurgency techniques could provide order and authority in domestic realm, and thus maintain order of the international system. It is because state building efforts help 'failed states' remain as functionally undifferentiated units of international politics. Since the international structure conditions hierarchies between states in functioning of international politics and maintenance of its order, great powers have capabilities for state building in 'failed states'.

This analysis of the debate on 'failed states' has shown that these analyses understand a causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South. The great powers have capability to shape states in the Global South as 'appropriate' ones, and thus their state behaviors', but the 'failed states' and security concerns of people and social groups living in these states have not a role in shaping security relations in international politics.

4.4. Third World Security Scholars' Conception of Modernity

This last section looks at Third World security scholars, which were critical of realist approaches to security studies in terms of their limited insights to studying security in

the Third World (Chapter 2). This section asks to what extent Third World security scholars go beyond the limitations of the particular conception of modernity as constitutive of security studies, and its understanding of the causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South.

Third World security scholars (Korany, 1986; Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988a) have pointed to two main limitations of realist approaches to security studies as discussed in the Chapter 2. The first one is the military-centered analysis of realist approaches to security. The second one is the external-oriented definition of security. Third World security scholars highlight that this security conception is inadequate to address “the multi-faced and multi-dimensional nature of the problem of security” faced by states in the Third World (Ayoob, 1997: 121). In questioning the lack of correspondence between the prevalent theories and concepts used in security studies and the problems experienced in the Third World, Third World security scholars’ historicize the development of modern states system and point to the relationship between the development of First World states as ‘primary’ and Third World states as ‘secondary’ actors of international politics.¹⁸

However Third World security scholars’ engagement with realist approaches to security studies remains limited (Korany, Brynen & Noble, 1993; Korany, 1986; Azar & Chung-In-Moon, 1988a; Thomas, 1987; Ayoob, 1995). It is because they do not only leave intact the underlying assumptions about the relationship between security and state (which is the main concern of critical approaches to security that will be

¹⁸ To develop the relationship between ‘secondary’ position of Third World states in international politics and Third World security predicament, Ayoob develops the approach of ‘subaltern realism’. However, while all Third World security scholars have also highlighted the impact of this secondary role in security in the Third World, they do not use ‘subaltern realism’ as the perspective for their analyses (see Korany, 1986; Thomas, 1987).

dealt in the next chapter), but also have not adequately addressed the particular conception of modernity underlying realist approaches to security studies, and its implications for understanding a causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations.

To begin with time, Third World security scholars read narratives of international politics through the development of the modern states system. Third World security scholars have similarities with realist approaches to security studies with respect to understanding this narrative in cyclical and repetitive patterns. They understand these repetitive patterns in terms of cycles of stability (in the core) and instability (in the periphery) (Acharya, 1997; 1998). Despite differences among alternative interpretations of Third World security scholars, these scholars largely share the view that the character of the relations among states has not been fundamentally altered since the development of the modern states system in Europe. Where there is a change, it tends to occur in repetitive patterns in the sense that state behavior in core and in periphery is driven by the imperatives of anarchical international society composed of the core actors and the latecomers or peripheral actors (Thomas, 1989; Ayoob, 1983). Their unequal structural relationships lead to perpetuation of the vulnerabilities and insecurities of the latter, and stability for the former.

In their accounts, Third World security scholars understand time of world politics in singular terms. The development of the modern states system is originated in one place and history in world politics, which is European states system. Thus, in their accounts, all of the past is posited uniformly as the pre-condition for the emergence of the modern states system in the present. Throughout the evolution of modern states

system first in Europe, there has always been the interaction between two components of stateness, namely, 'unconditional legitimacy' of state-structures and strong (cohesive) state-structures. Ayooob (1983; 1995) and Thomas (1989), albeit in different ways, highlight that these two attributes, sovereignty as unconditional legitimacy and cohesive state structure, complement each other in the evolution of the modern states-system. However, the order provided within the international society is imperfect in the sense that there is a huge gap between states in the Third World and their counterparts in Europe in terms of the development of modern state structures.

According to Third World security scholars, the modern states system was expanding to the Third World with the dual processes of colonization and decolonization (Ayooob, 1995: 71). The future is also holding its founding principles in terms of the gap between the two groups of states that reflects on each capacity to act effectively in the system of states, and subsequently leads to "two types of actors in the international system: the *primary* actors (the original European members of the system and their offshoots in North America and Australasia) and the *secondary* actors (the late-comers, the bulk of the third world)" (Ayooob, 1983: 45, emphasis in original).

Regarding ontology, Third World security scholars understand ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between the First World states and the Third World states. This binary has stemmed from the historical evolution of the modern states system, lead to the distinction between strong and weak states in the modern states system. Thus, states in world politics are functionally differentiated units. Third World security scholars have studied security in the Third World in terms of a

problem that is stemmed from their incomplete processes in state building, as latecomers to the modern states system. Third World security scholars argue that security in the Third World depends on whether state-making processes in these countries are developed in accordance with the evolution of the modern states system in Western Europe, although there is always perpetuation of the gap between these two worlds in world politics, and structural inheritance of the inequalities between two groups of states.

According to Third World security scholars, thus, vulnerability of the Third World to the international system stems from its 'secondary' position in the modern states system. The international system ordered and regulated by the few great powers has shaped security relations in the Third World states. This in turn led to international inequalities by producing different vulnerabilities and insecurities for states and societies in the Third World in addition to their late entrance to the society of states, such as "the lack of room for manoeuvre" (Thomas 1987: 4). The one source of this position that they could manage is the lack of cohesive state structures. For instance, considering the 'failed states' of Lebanon and Somalia, Afghanistan, and Liberia, Ayooob underscores the idea that it is "the combination of juridically sovereign but empirically nonfunctioning central authority, for which the term failed state is used as shorthand, could well be the major source of suffering and disorder in the Third World, and possibility in the entire international system" (Ayooob, 1995: 173).

For Third World security scholars, approaching towards the Westphalian statehood is necessary development for overcoming insecurities experienced in the Third World. However, since states have not developed evenly towards the realization of the

Westphalian statehood due to the presence of inequalities in the international system, for them, the world politics remains as two groups of states: First World (strong) states and Third World (weak) states.

Finally, with regarding to sociality, as with realism, Third World security scholars also understand sociality of world politics in terms of causality. In this understanding, the structure of world politics comes before its forms, state behaviors as well as security relations in international politics. For Third World security scholars, world politics is also characterized as an international anarchy as realist IR scholars argue, but different from realist approaches, in the international system there are two groups of states: the First World states and the Third World states (related to both power capabilities of states as with realist scholars and their stateness different from realist scholars) (Thomas, 1987; Ayoob, 1995). Thus, the international structure conditions forms of international politics, thus security relations differently.

Order of the international system depends on two tracks of developments and international sociality in the two realms: the one is at the inter-state level, and the other is at the international one. By the inter-state level, Third World security scholars understand patterns and processes of political and economic power inequalities among great and small powers such as the practice of the balance of power and alliance formations, or economic dependency or obligations (Korany et. al., 1993; Ayoob, 1995; Thomas, 1987). By the international level, they understand patterns of being member of international society such as rules of sovereignty or legitimacy (Ayoob, 1995; Thomas, 1989). Structure of international politics shapes security relations in the Third World, but security relations in the Third World do not shape

international politics. This section now turns to the debate on the weak and the strong states distinction. Through illustrations from this debate, it shows how Third World security scholars have also understood a causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations.

Third World security scholars study security in the Third World with respect to their analyses of the 'stateness' in the Third World. Different from realist analyses of the 'failed states', for Third World security scholars since states are functionally differentiated units; their 'stateness' has shaped their security relations differently. Thus, most of Third World security scholars have used categories of weak/strong state-society (Ayoob, 1983; 1995; Thomas, 1989) as given in Chapter 2 in order to explore security relations experienced in the Third World. These analyses, thus, attribute insecurities experienced by states in the Third World to their late state-making processes, which determine their place (core and peripheral) in the society of states. By identifying states in the Third World as "weak states"(Buzan, 1983; Ayoob, 1983; 1995), or "weak societies" (Thomas, 1989) the scholars underscore "different" characteristics of Third World state-making processes when compared with their "European" counterparts.

In order to analyze 'stateness' in the Third World, Third World security scholars have made the distinction between analysis of the international system and the society of states. In these analyses, Third World security scholars have questioned the unitary nature of the international system. Such a view on world politics, which is composed of two distinct logics of the international system and the society of states leads to a space of social criticism on the part of these scholars. Thus, Third World security

scholars ask whether there are only one, two, or more worlds of international politics that follow different political norms and practices. This question is also central to their analyses of security relations in the Third World.

Against the notion of the unitary nature of the international system (that does not include Third World states) and separateness between core and periphery, Third World security scholars point to the relationship between First World and Third World through highlighting two contradictory logics of world politics. These scholars note that “external variables such as the operation of international norms and interventionary policies espoused by the major powers”(Ayoob, 1998: 38) also affect the processes of state-building and security relations in the Third World since logic of the international functions differently for states in the Third World.

However, these state-building processes and insecurities experienced by the people and social groups in the Third World have not shaped world politics, its forms such as security policies and behaviours of states. Rather, there is a causal relationship between First World and Third World and this relationship has been identified in terms of two zones of stability and instability. For instance, in Ayoob’s account, ever increasing interdependence of the globe is the condition that the zone of peace (First World) cannot insulate itself completely, even in large measure from the zone of conflict (Third World) (Ayoob, 1998: 33). In the study of Acharya (1998; 1997), the author also notes that stability (order) in the core during the Cold War was achieved at the expense of instability in the periphery. As Acharya (1997: 169) argues,

The stability supposed to accrue from the simplicity and predictability of bipolar interactions was more true of Europe than of the Third World. The superpowers’ capacity for self-regulation was in limited display and did not

prevent a high incidence of conflict and violence in the Third World. Finally, security regimes in the Third World were short-lived and largely ineffectual.

Through understanding a causal relationship between First World and Third World and identifying two zones of stability and instability, Third World security scholars naturalize the Westphalian states and their security relations as distinct from the evolution of modern states structure and security relations in the Third World.

As with realist security scholars, thus, security in the Third World is understood only in terms of building a strong state (first state building and later nation building). Even as Third World security scholars question the Western-liberal bias in development and modernization processes (see Thomas, 1989), for them, it is only through the development of the infrastructural power that social consensus will be increased in the long run for the establishment of social cohesion (building a nation-state) in the Third World as in the image of Europe. If state elites in the Third World implement ‘appropriate’ state-making policies in line with evolution of modern states system, security in the Third World would be established for Third World security scholars. Therefore, they mainly underscore that state-making process has not been completed in the Third World, and the expected outcome of nation-state has not been reached yet. Thus, Third World states have to ‘catch up’ with the ‘Westphalian ideal type’ of state and modern states system that institutions of security are also built upon.

4.4. Conclusion

The chapter has showed that realist approaches to security studies have shared a particular conception of modernity, as these approaches understand time of world

politics in singular terms, ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, and sociality of world politics in terms of causality. The analysis of the debate on 'failed states' has shown that realist studies understand a causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South. The great powers have capability to shape states in the Global South as 'appropriate' ones, and thus their state behaviors', but the 'failed states' and security concerns of people and social groups living in these states have not a role in shaping security relations in international politics.

The chapter has also shown that Third World security scholars have shared the particular conception of modernity albeit in different ways. Different from realist approaches to security, Third World security scholars focused on the evolution of modern states system originated in Europe. Third World security scholars understand ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between the First World states, and the Third World states. Since there are two groups of states, inequalities between them in terms of management of rules, norms of international politics led to vulnerabilities for Third World states. As with realist scholars, for Third World security scholars, structure of world politics comes before its forms in terms of state behaviors as well as security relations. Thus, this experience of vulnerabilities has not shaped world politics.

As the analysis of the debate on distinction between weak and strong states has shown, Third World security scholars also understand a causal relationship between First World and Third World. Two zones of world politics, which are the zone of stability and the zone of conflict, share a distinct logic of international politics. Third

World security scholars, thus, naturalize the First World as distinct from the evolution of modern states structure and security relations in the Third World.

CHAPTER 5

A PARTICULAR CONCEPTION OF MODERNITY AS CONSTITUTIVE OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES

Critical Security Studies has emerged as a critique of realist approaches to security studies. Chapter 5 considers to what extent critical approaches to security have gone beyond the limitations of conception of modernity, which is constitutive of realist approaches to security studies. As laid out in Chapter 4, that conception understands time of world politics in singular terms, ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, and sociality of world politics in terms causality. This chapter by unpacking three dimensions of modernity as laid out in Chapter 3 will analyze how a particular conception of modernity has been constitutive of Critical Security Studies.

The chapter is composed of four sections. The first section provides the key literature and introduces the schools of thought in critical security studies. The section two unpacks three dimensions of modernity, namely, time, ontology, and sociality of world politics that have shaped critical approaches to security in three respective sub-sections. The section three analyses the study of security in the Global South in three-fold manner: subject of security, relationship between politics and security, and

relationship between security and insecurity in each schools of thought in order to examine the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in these studies. The section four looks at postcolonial approaches, and question how they understand the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations.

5.1. Key Literature and the Notion of Security in Critical Security Studies

Critical security studies emerged against the backdrop of a series of fundamental debates about the study of security with the end of the Cold War. CSS belongs to a broader and diverse intellectual map. Informed with Robert Cox's formulation of the distinction between problem-solving and critical theory, critical security studies points to the meta-theoretical assumptions of international security studies (Bilgin, Booth & Wyn Jones, 1998; Booth, 2005).

For critical approaches to security, there is an inescapable relationship between politics and security. It is viewed that politics is an open-ended process of contestation over the meaning of security. Critical approaches to security analyze the construction of the relationship between politics and security in particular historical contexts. They emphasize the social construction of security and the political, although each has different focus of critical intervention (Fierke, 2007: 4).

What is at stake in analyzing security as a social construction is to go beyond theoretical critique, and to shift attention to the problem of practice in terms of both a critique of contemporary structures of power, knowledge as well as practices that reproduce hierarchies of power and the possibility of alternatives (Fierke, 2007: 9).

Some such as the Paris School focuses on the process by which security practices and war eliminate the contestation of politics. Within the perspective, it is argued that practices as well as articulations of security are “a part of disciplining power that constitutes a separation between security and the political, which severely constraints and limits the space of political contestation” (Fierke, 2007: 5). Some such as the Aberystwyth School focuses on the possibility of emancipation from practices, institution, and ideas of power and knowledge in order to open the space for alternative practices (Fierke, 2007: 5). This chapter focuses on critical approaches to security in terms of three schools of thought. Let me first offer reasons for the selection of these schools.

These schools of thought are defined in C.A.S.E. collective (2006),¹⁹ and commonly referred as critical approaches to security in the relevant textbooks²⁰ and syllabus of relevant courses about critical security studies.²¹ These schools of thoughts are namely, the Aberystwyth School (the Frankfurt School inspired approaches to

¹⁹ I also acknowledge that the CASE collective has been criticized for not including other critical and marginalized voices see for example, D. Mutimer, ‘My Critique is Bigger than Yours: Constituting Exclusions in Critical Security Studies’, *Studies in Social Justice*, 3:1 (2009): 9-22; A. Behnke, ‘Presence and creation: A few (meta-) critical comments on the C.A.S.E manifesto’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:1 (2007): 105-111; M. Salter, ‘On exactitude in disciplinary science: A response to the networked manifesto’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:1 (2007): 113-122; C. Slyvester, ‘Anatomy of a footnote’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:4 (2007): 547-558. For C.A.S.E Collectives response to the criticism see CASE Collective, ‘Europe, knowledge, politics: Engaging the limits: The CASE Collective responds’, *Security Dialogue*, 38:4 (2007): 559-576.

²⁰ K. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security* (2007); Paul Williams ed. *Security Studies: An Introduction* (2008); C. Peoples and N. Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction* (2010); L. J. Shepherd, *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods* (2013).

²¹ Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, Spring: 2014-2015 (M.A/PhD Level) https://www.academia.edu/10503474/New_Directions_in_Security_Studies_-_MA_PhD_level_2014-15; University of Bristol, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, Second Semester: 2014-2015, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/medialibrary/sites/spais/documents/POLI31384%20Critical%20Security%20Studies%20%202014_2015%20KT-FINAL.pdf; SciencesPo: Paris School of International Affairs, Semester 1: 2015/2016 <http://formation.sciences-po.fr/enseignement/2015/KINT/4430>; Central European University, Department of International Relations (M.A Level) Winter: 2014-2015 <http://ires.ceu.edu/courses/critical-security-studies>

security), the Copenhagen school, and the Paris School.²² I engage with the key works that give the intellectual origins and developments of each school of thought in the following section.²³

This section is organized around three schools of thought in critical security studies, namely, the Aberystwyth School, the Copenhagen School, and the Paris School. This section introduces each school of thought in two terms: their key works, and their intellectual origins.

5.1.1. The Aberystwyth School

The Frankfurt School Critical Theory inspires the Aberystwyth School. Ken Booth is the founding member of the School. In his prominent article, ‘Security and Emancipation’ (1991), Booth introduces the emancipation-oriented approach to security. Another leading scholar of the school and one of the students of Booth, Wyn Jones sets the intellectual origins of the emancipation-oriented approach to security with his book, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (1999). Booth’s further publications have mainly oriented the intellectual development of the school of

²² Feminist and gender perspectives to security are also commonly referred on relevant textbooks and syllabus on courses about critical security studies. Rather than constituting a ‘school’ of thought, diverse feminist and gender perspectives have offered a range of critiques of both International Security Studies and critical security studies. One of the earlier studies, see for instance, S. Peterson, (1992). *Security and Sovereign States: What is at stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?* These perspectives have pointed to the gendered politics of security that has marginalized women and gendered structures. For the debate on Feminist Security Studies see, special issue in the journal *Politics and Gender* (issue 4, 2011) as well as Shepherd’s calls for conversation ‘The state of Feminist Security Studies: Continuing the conversation’ (2013). Stern and Wibben’s contribution ‘A Decade of feminist security studied revisited’ (2014) as a special virtual issue on *Security Dialogue* explores the evolution of feminist works in issues of war, security, peace, conflict towards feminist security studies as a distinct field of study.

²³ Rather than treating as a separate school of thought, this chapter also includes various works of women as well as the ones who do not only question the place of women and/or gender structures within associated schools of thought, but also contribute to development of the theory.

thought. Among these publications, his book, *Theory of World Security* (2007) is a prominent study by the author.

Informed by insights of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, Booth (1991) defines security as emancipation. Booth notes that security “means absence of threats” and emancipation as “freeing of people from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (Booth, 1991: 319). Not only war and the threat of war, but also poverty, poor education as well as political oppression are among these constraints. Thus, Booth argues, “emancipation and security are two sides of the same coin” (Booth, 1991: 319). Security allows the conditions for maximizing the life choices of human beings according to Booth. Studying security should be oriented towards learning how human beings can maximize their freedom from threats.

To do so requires being reflexive on the practical relevance of critical theory.

Accordingly, Wyn Jones (1999) points to the theory-practice nexus, and argues that theory and practice should be informed and reformed by each other. In this context, two issues are highlighted. First, it is noted that the central focus of security studies should be the corporeal and material existence of human beings. The central concern should be the world security of human beings. Studying security should illuminate a wide range of constraints on human well-being in many parts of the world, and reveal security knowledge as well as practices that perpetuate these constraints. Second, emancipatory theory links to the emancipatory practice through offering general principles rather than a set of framework for action, since Wyn Jones (1999)

emphasizes that emancipation is a process rather than an end in itself, where a variety of constraints and insecurities could be witnessed during the process.

To this end, Booth further develops the idea of emancipation as a process in his later book, *Theory of World Security* (2007). Booth conceives security as derivative of political theory, and he notes, “the politically relevant meaning of security is neither conservative nor neutral but simply derivative of different political theories” (Booth, 2007: 110). Security reflects particular assumptions about world politics (its units, structures, processes). Emancipatory politics, thus, is built upon the idea of opening the space for alternatives (Booth, 2007: 109). In Booth’s own words, it is “the search for security through emancipatory politics- lifting people as individuals and groups out of structural and contingent oppressions such as war and poverty” (Booth, 2007: 110). That contributes to the project of emancipation that is a “project of inventing humanity” (Booth, 2007: 110). This has paved a way for a politics of security that is inclusive of the oppressed. Booth questions how overlapping forms of political community constitute ‘who we are’ and ‘what we want to be secured from’ (Booth, 2007: 278). That is necessary to reveal ideas, structures and processes of current security politics and understandings. For Booth, a ‘global-we’ as global humanity should be the subject of security. There is the need of replacement of oppressive structures and processes with the ones that promote the notion of a ‘global-we’.

5.1.2. The Copenhagen School

The group of scholars commonly referred as the Copenhagen school consists of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde.²⁴ Their collective authored works are: *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (1993) and *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998). Their individual works are: Buzan's book, *People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War era* (1991); Waever's book chapter, 'Securitization and Desecuritization' (1995). The school of thought has been associated with the Centre of Peace and Conflict Research (COPRI) based in Copenhagen

For the Copenhagen School, security is a discursive construct rather than something out there to be explored. The School deconstructs security by drawing the particular role discourse plays in security politics. Security is about survival and "it is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object" and extraordinary measures to handle it are taken (Buzan et. al, 1998: 21). By saying 'security', a state representative declares an emergency condition. To draw what the emergency conditions as well as extraordinary measures mean, the proponents of the School develops the concept of securitization. Accordingly, they argue, " 'security' is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either a special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan et al, 1998: 23). Thus, the concept of securitization explores "the meaning of 'security' in its usage, how people use the concept in some ways and not others" (Buzan et. al, 1998: 24). For the school, security is "self-referential practice" in the sense that "it is in this

²⁴ McSweeney (1996) is the one who initially defines these authors as the Copenhagen School.

practice the issue becomes a security issue” rather than it is because of the existence of a real existential threat (Buzan et. al, 1998: 24).

To explore the process of securitization, the School develops the speech act theory. The School calls the form of the process of securitization as a speech act to grasp the act of labeling an issue as security. Accordingly, Buzan et. al. (1998) analyze who can speak security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects. The theory of a speech act is a tool for finding security actors and phenomenon at different levels, namely, national, regional and global levels or in different sectors of security namely, military, political, economic, social and environmental sectors (Buzan et al. 1998).

5.1.3. The Paris School

Didier Bigo (2000), the founding member of the School, argued that in security practices, there is an increasing entanglement of internal and external security since the 1970s especially in the EU.²⁵ The Paris school, different from earlier poststructuralist works, focuses on security practices. Didier Bigo has developed the sociological approach to security practices. For this approach, security is not a concept, which can capture a coherent set of practices. Rather, it is the result of a process of (in)securitization. The process of (in)securitization is central to the understandings of those discursive and non-discursive practices that draw the lines between what is security, what is fear by distinguishing themselves from other practices. The key works of the author is ‘When Two Becomes One: Internal and

²⁵ Jef Huysmans’ study on migration and the EU is one of earlier works that have contributed to the development of the School (Huysmans, 1998b).

External Securitisations in Europe' (2000) and 'The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)' (2001). Due to the focus on practices, the school pursues a more sociologically oriented approach.²⁶ These works deconstruct the meaning of 'security' in a particular way.

The Paris School deconstructs the notion of 'security' through the insights mainly informed by Foucault's analytics of power and Bourdieu's notion of the field. The Paris School develops the concept of power for understanding security as a technique of government and focuses on securitisation/insecuritisation practices of the security professionals.

A Foucauldian insight is central to the notion of (in)securitization used by the Paris School. The Paris school refrains from using "a fixed normative value of security independently of the actors enouncing the claim and independently of the context" (Bigo, 2008: 123-124). It is in this context that the Paris School argues that the maximization of security may lead to negative effects on politics. In particular, the Paris School is associated with the sociological approach to emergence of political construction of danger and security practices that constrain contestation of politics.

For Bigo, the boundaries between internal and external fields of security have been blurred between the enemy and the criminal, between civil protection in the case of an emergency and civil defense in the case of a threat. In other words, it is characterized

²⁶ Later, Didier Bigo in collaboration with R.B.J. Walker has established International Political Sociology as a new school of thought and founded the journal of *International Political Sociology* (Bigo & Walker, 2007). While Walker has also works related to security, 'Subject of security' (1997); 'Lines of Insecurity: International, Imperial and Exceptional' (2006), Bigo is the founder member of the Paris School.

with an ambiguity of who/what is inside and outside the borders. Therefore, to think the boundaries of security, Bigo draws a new topology of security to chart the relationship between different forms of security and insecurity. For tracing this “new topology of security” (Bigo, 2001: 95), Bigo uses the metaphor of the Mobius Ribbon,²⁷ as “the multiplicity of possible spaces” (Bigo, 2001: 97). The metaphor helps for merging the inside and outside as well as putting limits on the process of securitization (Bigo, 2001: 96).

To explore a process of (in)securitization, the School develops the field of security from Pierre Bourdieu’s thought and notion of the field. The field of security offers to be attentive to practices of security professionals. That includes analysis of both non-discursive and discursive practices of (in)securitization that are imposed by the configuration of the balance of social forces in the specific field of security (Bigo, 2001: 99). Using Bourdieu’s notion of the field, then, the Paris School makes a horizontal differentiation of the social, and distinguishes the field of security from other fields emerged in the social context. Security field is also a ‘field of domination’ in relation to other social fields, because the field monopolizes legitimate definition of insecurities in terms of the ability to authorize what is insecurity, and excludes other actors who cannot claim for technocratic or expertise knowledge of security (Bigo, 2000: 350). In the field, thus, there is only one source of authority; this is special knowledge and expertise of security professionals. There are also power struggles among competing security agents that reflect on security routines and practices.

²⁷ Bigo and Walker develop the metaphor of Mobius Ribbon from a specific topology of the Mobius strip. As the authors note, “the Mobius strip always has the border as an horizon, but for the person moving on the Mobius strip it is impossible to know on which face of the strip one is located, so he or she sees him -or herself as an insider and the outside is always the horizon” (Bigo & Walker, 2007: 737).

What Bigo brings with the idea of the field of security is to see how the actors within the field are constrained and constructs security practices (Bigo, 2001). The conditions of the possibility of the performativity of these security narratives and everyday practices of social agents are “rooted in a certain form of governmentality” which is routinized practices of everyday politics, in calling for freedom and democracy. (In)securitization processes as techniques of government are forms of governing life include liberal and illiberal security practices.

The following section of Chapter 5 analyzes the three schools of critical security studies with reference to the three dimensions of modernity outlaid in Chapter 3. Here, I rely on the authors introduced here, but also elaborates on the recent works, which use these critical approaches to security.

5.2. Unpacking Conception of Modernity in Critical Approaches to Security

This section unpacks conception of modernity shaping critical approaches to security. It is done with analyzing three dimensions of modernity: time, ontology and sociality of world politics. Each sub-section analyzes a dimension of modernity in three schools of thought in critical security studies.

5.2.1. Time of World Politics in Critical Approaches to Security

In the Aberystwyth School, Ken Booth describes the present modern condition anew in terms of the possibilities and impossibilities of a coherent understanding of security. In Booth’s account, time of world politics is understood in singular terms.

This means that the School read histories of insecurities with a narrative of world politics, originated from one place and history in world politics mainly from Europe. There is no reference to the role of the Global South in these narratives, but inequalities between the Global North and the Global South have been acknowledged as part of bounded nature of humanity. This narrative of world politics has shaped Booth's understanding of past, present and future of world politics.

In Booth's account, all of the past insecurities are uniformly understood as the conflation of means and ends in which insecurities experienced in world politics emphasized in terms of particularities of capitalism, racism, and patriarchy. There is incapability of the present condition to comprehensibly make sense of the understanding of security, namely, 'world security' "that conceives security as an instrumental value concerned to promote security reciprocally, as part of the invention of a more inclusive humanity" (Booth, 2007: 2). This is the outcome of contradictions of modernity and its entanglements with the concept of security in practice and in theory. For Booth, the notion of the 'global-we' as the basis of our conception of security that is conceived, is overshadowed by particularities revolving around the bounded nature of humanity - namely class, gender, nation, and regime (Hutchings, 2011: 211).

This understanding of time of world politics in singular terms also shapes Booth's account for the future of world politics. According to Booth, the present modern condition is in the historical process. Thus, there is always the possibility that the international public sphere is expanding towards a cosmopolitan world politics. This vision, according to Booth, "looks to the building of world security on a platform of

growing world community organized through a pattern of global governance made up of a network of emancipatory communities, including cosmopolitan states” (Booth, 2007: 148). On the one hand, emancipatory/security politics provides the condition of the possibilities of world security in terms of the emergence of cosmopolitan states worldwide. On the other hand, cosmopolitan states are the places of where negotiations between different particularities stemmed from gender, class, and identity become possible. Thus, the politics of security as emancipation occurs.

The Copenhagen School also understands time of world politics in singular terms, as with the Aberystwyth School, however, with a particular focus on the EU as the narrative has been originated. This understanding appears in Waever’s account of past and future of world politics. According the Copenhagen School, we have lost the capacity to think about security as a good or a bad thing because the intersubjective understanding of ‘survival’, as the basis of our conception of security, has been replaced with objective or subjective/particularistic understandings of urgency and survival. In Waever’s account of time, all of the past insecurities are uniformly defined. These insecurities, for Waever, were formed with particularistic understandings of survival by states, which each has emphasized survival of the nation against threats to national security. For Waever, since in the present, the international public sphere (the EU) keeps the conditions for intersubjective understanding of ‘survival’ (for the European member states), security has been articulated in the sovereign state and setting of the public realm

Thus, the Copenhagen School, as with the Aberystwyth School is critical of understanding of a pre-given or fixed meaning of security. Different from the

Aberystwyth School, however, the Copenhagen School does not conceive that security has a positive meaning if politics of its meaning is addressed. According to Waever, security does not have any meaning, in positive or negative terms in itself, but it is always related to politics. Understanding security as a speech act is a condition for redemption of its meaning- meaning of security- open. Waever (1995: 76) writes,

To act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact, for forcing things in one direction instead of another. Whether such an act is 'good' or 'bad' is not defined by any inner qualities of the act or its premises, but its effects (which depends on actions of others, interaction and therefore, an element of coincidence).

For Waever, thus, acting politically does not guarantee "progressiveness". In some cases, "politics can involve prevention and limitation and, at times, the tool of securitization may seem necessary" (Waever, 1995: 76). Though, the Copenhagen School opens up the possibility of doing politics of security through desecuritization. This means that desecuritization provides the future conditions for the space to negotiate whether an issue should be securitized or not. Desecuritization in terms of "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998: 4) contributes to doing politics of security. Thus, desecuritization provides the condition for doing politics of security. As with Booth's, the Copenhagen School have not referred to the Global South in its narrative of world politics.

As with the Copenhagen School, the Paris School also understands time of world politics in singular terms, and read histories of insecurities with a narrative of world politics, originated from one place and history in world politics from the EU. In Bigo's account, it is not possible to think about 'security communities' in the EU,

because there is the rationalization of the concept and practices of security through new forms of governmentality and (in)securitization practices. Contemporary security practices such as surveillance indicate that sovereignty is no longer defining sovereign borders. This is because there is no clear boundary or understanding about what security entails, since the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ is not a fixed concept (Bigo, 2001: 113). In Bigo’s account, all of the past insecurities are uniformly posited with respect to the sovereign reason and its trajectory experienced in Europe.

The trajectory shows that the territorial state, and its inside/outside clear distinction was replaced with more fluid distinctions between inside and outside due to the new forms of governmentality of the population state. Accordingly, internal and external security is merging and de-differentiating due to undergoing social transformations with the rise of new forms of governmentality (Bigo, 2000: 171). Bigo notes that internal and external security are traditionally two separate domains, is now “converging regarding border, order and the possible threats to identity, linked to (im)migration” (Bigo, 2001: 91).

The present condition of blurring of inside/outside is in the historical process since there is always a conflicting discourses as well as security practices on the limits of politics and political life among the field of politics and the field of security.

According to Bigo, the temporal-spatial locale of security practices in terms of the security field accounts for transformations of world politics with respect to (in)securitization as a technique of government. However, there is always indeterminacy of future of world politics. Since the indeterminacy and contingency

condition the possibility of co-constitution of ‘the international’ and security- (in)securitization- it has no positive or negative value as having a future direction. To reiterate, while critical approaches to security have denaturalized the historical time in accounts of realist approaches to security which understand repetitive patterns of war and great power politics, they also understand time of world politics in singular terms as with realist approaches. This means that each of these schools of thought read histories of security relations in world politics with a narrative originated from one place and history of world politics mainly Europe.

5.2.2. Ontology of World Politics in Critical Approaches to Security

Critical approaches to security have problematized realist approaches’ understanding of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. These approaches have problematized this binary in terms of their critiques of the state as the political, which is taken for granted in realist approaches to security studies.

The Aberystwyth School criticizes realist understanding of ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. According to Ken Booth, this understanding of world politics gave way to states’ exclusionary security practices and reproduce domestic hierarchies. When the international public sphere predominantly shares these exclusionary structures and processes of such as statism, patriarchy, and racism, the state reproduces these exclusionary structures through its security policies. Thus, for the School, the domestic hierarchy is not only related to state’s authority over society as the realist takes for granted, but hierarchies

between social groups such as the hegemony of the minority regime over the majority in South Africa.

For Booth, however, the international public sphere is not only constructed by exclusionary structures, but also universal/cosmopolitan ones. Since Booth argues, there is always a possibility of help of “bridge-builders” as defined in terms of cosmopolitan intellectuals, activists, civil society groups and individuals (Booth, 2007: 451, 459) to promote cosmopolitan structures and processes such as struggle for freedom of speech, and open up the space to discuss various particularities in the state. The relationship between two is always in a struggle. Thus, there is always the dialectical of these two structures and processes of exclusion and inclusion. States are the places where this dialectical relationship has reproduced, because state is the political where the synthesis between two occurs.

This synthesis, thus, always occurs in a process of negotiation.²⁸ According to Booth, the ones who involved in these negotiations should be inclusive as much as possible, and this is what Booth called, cosmopolitan states. Accordingly, cosmopolitan states as the political connects the international to the national that “committed to emphasizing solidarity with foreigners both inside and outside of national borders” (Booth, 2007: 191). Cosmopolitan states are places where emancipatory (security) politics would take place (Booth, 2007: 443).

Thus, Booth points to re-construction of the (cosmopolitan) state as the political. The political provides a space for negotiation between beliefs and norms among “bridge-

²⁸ Shepherd (2005) shows how the international as a spatial domain is a realm of collaboration between states and non-state actors.

builders” as defined in terms of cosmopolitan intellectuals, activists, civil society groups, and individuals (Booth, 2007: 451, 459). These are practices of global relevance that include the critiques of the international politics, and its particularities stemmed from inequalities, hierarchies and insecurities experienced in world politics.

As the Aberystwyth School, the Copenhagen School is critical of realist understanding of world politics as a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. For the Copenhagen School, understanding of world politics in terms of international anarchy construct subjective/particularistic notions of survival by each state in the international system, thus, enhance insecurities. In critique of this particularistic conception of survival, Waever accounts for an intersubjective setting of norms and principles of international security, as the author has analyzed in the EU. In relation to his study in the EU, Waever also accounts for the domestic hierarchy with a particular understanding state and society relationship, it is the liberal rule of domestic politics.²⁹ In the Copenhagen School, the politics of security takes place in between these two realms of politics.

The intersubjective setting of the international public realm provides conditions of fixing the meaning of international security with survival. The international public realm is *the differance* of that provides the signifier of the politics of security. The international public realm provides the indicator for talking about security in the sense that it identifies who speaks about ‘security’, speaking about a condition that needs of

²⁹ Doty (1998) points to how statist understanding of security has constructed national and societal security the same thing in everyday usage.

extraordinary measures.³⁰ Thus, the meaning of security is open and its meaning (a condition that needs of extraordinary measures) depends on the action: the speech act. Informed with Arendt's notion of politics, in Waever's account, action makes politics and it is an action in the public realm. In this sense, security as a speech act is a political action and it has to take place in a political arena. As such, security as a speech act depends on political space as well as how political space is created and maintained. Therefore, it is necessary to set up the political space in such a way that renewal is built into its constitution (Hutchings, 2008: 61) as Waever also notes that the theory of securitization insists on responsibility to protect politics (Waever, 2011: 468).

In the Copenhagen School, thus, desecuritization has the role of protecting the space of doing politics of security, since desecuritization preserves the public space that negotiations of normal/and exceptional politics will be handled. Security as a speech act gains its political relevance only in relation to a condition of normal politics, and if there is normal politics, the meaning of 'security' kept open to the relevant audience, the public.

As with two others schools of thought in critical approaches to security, the Paris School is critical of realist understanding of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. The Mobius Ribbon of the international is where multiplicity of the spaces of politics is pre-conceived, that in turn, conditions the possibility of continuous discussion on the limits of security. The Mobius Ribbon of the international is *differance*, because it has no fixed boundaries of inside and outside,

³⁰ Hansen (2000) points to the limitations of the speech act framework of securitization theory, which only includes only the subjects who speak security.

but is a signifier for the rule of the population state. In exploring Mobius Ribbon of the international, thus, Bigo argues that with the change of practices of security and of form of security, the contemporary security practices such as (in)securitization practices of surveillance indicate that sovereignty no longer defines sovereign borders. Rather, “the agencies of security have expanded into a space that no longer respect sovereign borders” (Bigo, 2001: 115). The feeling of what a security community, as such, is less about only national security that is drawn from an understanding of the international as the physical boundaries of the state. In this sense, there is no clear belief what security is or is not since - inside as well as outside could not be drawn as fixed, though intimately connected (Bigo, 2001: 113).

Rather, (in)security practices provides continuous discussion on limits of politics and the limits of coexistence with Others as Bigo notes, “the identity of what is security is in a process of externalization of the inside and internalization of the outside” (Bigo, 2001: 113), thereby re-drawing our political imagination. As such, the Mobius Ribbon provides the deconstruction of the essentialisms and the forms of dualisms that structure the contemporary political and security practice such as, the dualism between state/society, the border between internal order/external anarchy, the opposition of friend/enemy, and us/them distinction. Accordingly, Mobius Ribbon of security, merging internal and external security “is lowering of the level of the acceptability of the other” through insecuritization of daily life as a form of management of life and people (Bigo, 2001: 111). In this respect, the other, immigrant or the asylum-seeker become a common enemy within not because of the global definition of her, but because of the convergence of different insecuritizations on her

such as, the police with crime, terrorism, the military with subversion (Bigo, 2000: 196).

Thus, for the School, it is possible to criticize illiberal security practices from the perspectives of migrants against sovereign reason. In this account, migrants and asylum-seekers are expected to contribute to re-drawing the political imagination in terms of conceiving the plurality of boundaries and discussion on limits for opening other spaces of thought (Bigo, 2001: 97) through discussion on the limits of co-existence with 'others'.

To reiterate, different from realist approaches to security, critical approaches to security problematize understanding of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy in realist approaches to security. In the accounts of critical approaches, understanding ontology of world politics either in terms of dialectical or *differance* point to re-construction and de-construction of the political, since the political is not taken for granted, but it is always in relation to security practices, discourses, and policies in world politics.

5.2.3. Sociality of World Politics in Critical Approaches to Security

While realist approaches to security understands sociality of world politics with respect to state-to-state interaction, critical approaches to security understand sociality of world politics with respect to social relations between various actors. Accordingly, for critical approaches to security, the international is not only a realm of foreign policy where only states interact with each other, but the international is a space of

social relations, including relations of oppression, domination, or exclusion. Critical approaches to security address the realist notion of security as a property of the state, since they emphasize that security is a relationship (McSweeney, 1998). The politics of security takes shape through social relations that structures and forms of world politics are reshaping each other, thus, critical approaches to security understand sociality of world politics in terms of constitution. In these approaches, forms of world politics include ideas, subjectivities, practices, discourses, and structures in world politics.

Ken Booth understands sociality of world politics with the notion of “cosmopolitan sociality”. For Booth, cosmopolitan sociality is “necessary to generate sufficient global we-ness to ensure sustainable world security on a planet on which divisions of tribe, nation, class, gender, religion and race have so far prevailed” (Booth, 2007: 215). However, Booth also notes that it “yet remains to be told whether reason and desire can together produce the cosmopolitan sociality” (Booth, 2007: 215). In Booth’s account, cosmopolitan states come to formation if the intersubjective setting of norms and principles of world security could be extended in terms of the building of the international as a world public realm.

To this end, Booth highlights the general principles for emancipatory politics in terms of cosmopolitan democracy, and freedom of speech. Becoming ‘cosmopolitan states’, in this sense, is constituted by global structures that build up the notion of global-we (ideas that make ‘global-we’ such as, politics is a realm of freedom) Booth argues. Put differently, local structures provide the conditions for development of ‘global’ ideas for world security or not. In the cosmopolitan sociality, the international as a

world public realm, in turn, constitutes local ideas, structures and processes of global humanity in terms of opening space for negotiations between security and insecurity. In these approaches, sociality of world politics is understood in terms of constitution between security and insecurity, and sociality of entities is already implicated with an understanding of the international as a world public realm.

In the Copenhagen School, the international is not only a realm of foreign policy that states interacts, but the international is also the site of intersubjective meanings of norms and principles of international politics conducted. While securitization starts with the speech act, securitization process is built on the image of 'international security' and invokes a particular form of politics, the politics of exceptionalism, Wæver argues (Wæver, 2011: 470).

The distinguishing feature of securitization is its certain rhetorical structure and that is survival (Buzan et. al, 1998: 26). The international public sphere provides this distinct feature of securitization. The intersubjective meaning of what internal and external legitimacy mean always constitutes the securitization process. Put differently, there is an agreement on the meaning of political action (the politics of exceptionalism) that cannot be understood in any other terms (Buzan et. al, 1998: 23) due to the international public realm. Thus, the international public realm also put limits to conduct of securitization, its implementation by actors in world politics.

Not only the international constitutes securitization process, but desecuritization also provides the politics of securitization in the sense that desecuritization also makes the intersubjective setting of principles of international politics possible. It is because

d securitization preserves the debate on normal/and exceptional politics, thus, limits rhetoric structure of the politics of security to the international security and ‘survival’. As with the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, it is through the relations of exclusion, whether in the form of practical or discursive conduct, that the politics of security takes shape. Accordingly, in the Paris School, the Mobius Ribbon provides the politics of security as (in)securitization and functioning of the population state. The Mobius Ribbon as a metaphor used by Bigo helps to understand a more open topography where the population state functions, compared to the territorial state and its functions limited to inside state borders. For the School, different from the territorial state, the population state is mixed of different fields of rule and government. There is a heterogeneous relationship between these fields, especially Bigo looks at the relationship between the field of politics, and of security. Each field, with claims of expertise knowledge has tried to monopolize the regime of rule, however, there are always conflictual interests and concerns between these fields. The reason of this struggle is not stemmed from a pre-given identification of their interests such as capital, but the struggle is inherent in functioning of the Population State.

Understanding functioning of the population state, for the Paris School, requires seeing its rationality of rule.³¹ While traditional security practices are responding to a rationality of the territorial state in terms of viewing “the practices that it orders or forbids, of the way in which it problematizes its objects” (Bigo, 2000: 178), the rationality of the population state urges professionals of security to manage and control life through the organizations such as the army, the school. According to

³¹ For Jabri (2007), Foucault’s analysis of the power has failed to account the place of the international in its formation.

Bigo, this transformation from a territorial State to a population State and technology of surveillance drives “day-to day living is securitized” (Bigo, 2001: 100). The open and infinite typology of the international enables (in)securitization practices of coercion, protection, and so forth, through the subjectivities that emerge from these practices. The subjectivities emerge from these practices have also shaped the process of (in)securitization in the sense that the transformation from the territorial state to the population states was only possible with changing forms of subjectivities.

To sum, different from realist approaches to security studies, which understand the international only as a realm of foreign policy, critical approaches to security conceive the international as a realm of social relations. For critical approaches to security, social relations in world politics have shaped forms of world politics, and these forms also shape these social relations with their security practices, policies and discourses.

5.3. Critical Approaches to Security and the Study of Security in the Global South

The previous section unpacks conception of modernity shaping critical approaches to security. This section looks at the study of security in the Global South in each school of thought in three-fold manner: the subject of security, the relationship between politics and security, and the relationship between security and insecurity. This section shows the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in the study of security in the Global South.

5.3.1. The Aberystwyth School and the Study of Security in the Global South

Compared to others' schools of thought in critical approaches to security, as the section will show, the Aberystwyth School is the foremost school, which has studied security in the Global South, and actors in the Global South mainly the people and social groups appeared as subjects of security. In very general terms, the School's understanding of security as emancipation that takes the human as the referent has impacted on their focus on security in the Global South. In this sub-section, I will show this link on their analyses of security in the Global South with respect to their understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South.

One of these studies is Stamnes and Wyn Jones's co-authored article 'Burundi: A Critical Security Perspective' (2000). Stamnes and Wyn Jones have studied actors in the Global South subjects of security, and these actors are: the Burundian individual (the Murundi), and refugees fleeing from its neighbors to Burundi. This definition is not based on an ethnic identification but those people living in Burundi, for Stamnes and Wyn Jones, refugees who were fleeing to Burundi were also part of the Burundian population.

Stamnes and Wyn Jones, thus, show that various actors who do not bound with state borders in the region have shaped the relationship between security and politics in world politics. There is always reconstruction of the state with its security practices Stamnes and Wyn Jones argue. The authors write, "who does a state consist of when as in the case of Burundi, 'its' inhabitants are regularly forced to flee the country in their tens and hundreds of thousands?" (Stamnes & Wyn Jones, 2000: 46) Security

policies of the state in Burundi, favoring Tutsi over Hutu in the society, had an exclusionary impact on the political as most of the Burundi population had lived under repression and they could not find a space in the domestic public realm.

Security policies of the state led to insecurities of the people and social groups not only in terms of their limited representation in the public sphere, but also in terms of having basic needs such as housing or poverty Stamnes and Wyn Jones argue. For instance, the authors gave the illustration of how the civil war had devastated the national economy, which was also very disadvantaged by inequalities in the world economy. What is point here is that there are constraints of international economy on well-being of the people, which led to insecurities of the people in Burundi.

Paul Williams's article, 'Thinking about security in Africa' has also studied the actors in the Global South as subjects of security. Specifically, the subject of security is the "African people have long victims of a powerful but warped version of regime security" (Williams, 2007: 1023). In the case of Africa, Williams argues that the regime security had affected on civil society and struggle for individual and social rights and freedom on the continent, and constraint the processes of politics in Africa. To reveal these constraints requires a more inclusive security approach that addresses particular insecurities stemmed from identity politics, African environmental problems or economic and political inequalities as ends of politics for Williams. In Williams' account, as with Booth's theory says, thus, there is need of civil society and transnational actors that would struggle to world security and to inequalities in the region, as Williams writes, international actors should help "create an international environment that is supportive of local struggles" such as regional institutions to have

“a degree of autonomy from the state” (Williams, 2007: 1036). According to Williams, the interrelationship between the global processes related to urbanization, the environment and “local contexts including inhospitable political geography and religious ideas, practices, organization and experiences” cause to insecurity for African people (Williams, 2007: 1027).

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe’s article ‘Whose security? State-building and emancipation of Women in Central Asia’ (2004) also sees actors in the Global South, in particular women as subjects of security. Through questioning how lives of women were affected by the Soviet security strategies in Central Asia, Kennedy-Pipe shows how the politics of security has shaped security relations in Central Asia. According to Kennedy-Pipe, there were contradictions inherent in dominant conception of security, which is state security. On the one hand, for Kennedy-Pipe, Kremlin proclaimed emancipation for women in Central Asia. It is emancipation from traditional ways of life mainly Islam and patriarchy that is central to the Soviet state security and the Soviet model of development. On the other hand, Kennedy-Pipe has highlighted that during the state building of the Soviet regime in Central Asia, women carried a triple burden in terms of “forming part of the workforce, bearing and rearing children and being carriers of local identity in their role of maintaining Islam” (Kennedy-Pipe, 2004: 105). In this sense, Kennedy-Pipe points to the necessity of questioning contradictory outcomes of emancipatory politics in Central Asia.

Looking at these studies about the Global South, it is shown that actors in the Global South mainly the people and social groups are subjects of security, thus, these studies indicate that there are various beginnings of the experiences of the politics of security

as highlighted by Booth in his theory. Accordingly, albeit in different ways, the politics of security has shaped security relations in the Global South. It may be in the form of the place of women in both the public/private realms, or Burundi people in the public space. Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between world politics and the Global South in the sense that immanent contradictions in world politics (its particular structures) have shaped security relations in the Global South in a contradictory ways. However, in these studies, we could not see how these actors have contributed to the politics of security (either contribution to or contestation with 'particular' structures of world politics).

Pinar Bilgin's study on *Regional Security in the Middle East* (2005) is important to point to this missing relationship between the Global North and the Global South. Bilgin, in her book, also understands the people and social groups in the Middle East as subjects of security. Bilgin has extensively studied how the politics of security (intermingled of historical and social practices of outside powers such as the US in the region, and regional states' security policies) has led to insecurities experienced by people and social groups in the region. In particular, her analyses of the politics of security in the Middle East, have pointed to how Western conception of security, which is top-down, outward-oriented and military-based has an impact on regional politics, and insecurities of the people in the Middle East. Bilgin showed that regional insecurities and security conceptions in the region are shaped by the (spatial) representation of the region and the politics behind the invention of this part of the world 'Middle East'. In Western conception of security in the region, the representation of the 'Middle East' has informed security practices (Bilgin, 2005:13). Bilgin argues that the definition of the region such as the 'Middle East' is geopolitical

inventions rooted in security thinking and practices of their inventors. The politics of security has shaped security practices of regional states and these security practices, thus, have reproduced inequalities between the West and the Middle East.

Different from above scholars, however, Bilgin has also showed that the people and social groups in the Middle East have also shaped the politics of security in terms of inventing geographical representations of the region. Through inventing geographical representations, they locate the region into world politics. Thus, their understandings of world politics have also shaped the relationship between politics and security in terms of contributions to regional insecurities. For instance, in her study, Bilgin has focused on how myriad actors in the region used Arab Regional System as the spatial representation of the region during the Cold War. This spatial representation has located the regional people not only in relation to regional states' relations to two superpowers, but also in relation to its imperial histories with Ottoman, and later British and French domination. This spatial representation includes not only Cold War hierarchies between small and great powers, but also historical hierarchies between Arab and non-Arab states and people in the region. According to Bilgin, the spatial representation has shaped the relationship between politics and security in the region, as she (2005: 86) argues,

While this notion of a shared Arab identity helped organise resistance at the state and sub-state level against external actors, it, at the same time, restrained their actions in that demands made in line with the precepts of Arab national security often clashed with that of state security.

Accordingly, the tension between demands between state and societal security has contributed the state-centric and outward-directed security conception of the region,

which “assumed threats to Arab national security to stem from outside the Arab Regional System, that is, from non-Arabs”(Bilgin, 2005: 87).

To reiterate, this sub-section has showed that first, in Booth’s account, inequalities between the Global North and the Global South are also part of world politics.

However, there is no reference to the Global South in narratives of world politics, and narratives of world politics are originated from one place or history in world politics.

However, in all empirical works analyzed here showed that these analyses understand the people and social groups in the Global South subjects of security. These analyses

are important to indicate that there are multiple beginnings of the politics of security in other parts of the world. Second, thus, the empirical analyses have also shown that

the politics of security has shaped security relations in the Global South, and

insecurities experienced by the people and social groups. Third, however, it is only in

Bilgin’s study that the people and social groups in the Global South are shaping the relationship between politics and security in terms of inventing the geographical

representation of the region. Thus, in the studies in the school of thought except

Bilgin (2005), there is a constitutive relationship between the Global North and the

Global South but not each part has shaped the politics of security in equal terms.

5.3.2. The Copenhagen School and the Study of Security in the Global South

The securitization theory is the one that are increasingly applied to the Global South, mainly the East Asia and Turkey (Bilgin, 2011). Different from other two schools of

thought, there is a debate on application of the securitization theory in the Global

South, which points to its limitations (Bilgin, 2007). The debate mainly focuses on

“non-liberal political settings” in the Global South, and highlights that the different political and social conditions in the states in the Global South experience different securitization or desecuritization processes from those that have experienced in the EU. Taking into account this debate as well, in this sub-section, I will look at the securitization theory in East Asia and analyze empirical studies of the theory in the Global South by focusing on the subject of security, the relationship between politics and security, and the relationship between security and insecurity. It is to understand how they see the relationship between the Global North and the Global South.

According to Caballero-Anthony and Cook, in East Asia, there are various non-military security challenges including “the spread of infectious diseases like Dengue Fever, H5N1 (the “bird u”) or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”), managing the aftermath of natural disasters like the 2004 and 2011 tsunamis, trans-border pollution which has caused “the haze” over Southeast Asia, as well as problems of irregular migration and transnational crime” (Caballero-Anthony & Cook, 2013: 1). The studies I analyze in this section have touched upon one these non-military security challenges. In these analyses of security in the Global South, the subject of security is the public audience in East Asia. They are the main actors, who decide an issue is a security problem or not. The people and social groups living in the region includes illegal and stateless migrants such as Indonesian illegal migrants in Malaysia (Liow, 2006) or undocumented and stateless migrants from Bangladesh who are living inside the Indian borders (Ubadhyaya, 2006) are not seen as part of the public. Rather, state discourse represents these people as a threat to the public. In Malaysia, Indonesian illegal migrant workers “have been portrayed as an ‘existential threat’ of sorts Malaysian lifestyles and social order” according to Liow (Liow, 2006:

55). For Upadhyaya, in India, Bangladesian illegal migrants are portrayed threats to cultural and religious grounds of India, and religious identities are politicized with the discourse of the Islamization of India and Hindu nationalism (Upadhyaya, 2006). These analyses show that many of states in East Asia do not have liberal political structures, and these states are mostly ruled by authoritarian regimes (Upadhaya, 2006; Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010; Liow, 2006). For these scholars, the securitization theory that assumes a liberal political structure does not fit to these states. Thus, state practices have also constrained the public audience. Different from Waever's understanding of domestic hierarchy that is ruled by a liberal regime, in East Asia, thus, there is much more a complex relationship between state and society. Yuk-ping and Thomas, for instance, argue that, "such authoritarian systems or political figures may prevent or corrupt the securitization process, subverting its urgency for their own political agendas" (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010, 450).

This relationship is mainly stemmed from a rigid market-state relation as well as relatively autonomous civil society emerged in regional states for these analyses. In Yung-ping and Thomas' account (2010), they show that there is not an autonomous public space from the state. It means not only having a civil society, but more importantly having a civil society that are not socialized by state security discourses. According to Liow, in the case of Malaysia as well, there is no a clear distinction between politics and security, and Liow (2006: 57) writes,

(T)he distinction between politicization and securitization presupposes the existence of public discursive space. Yet this consideration for discursive space and a 'relevant audience' generates problems in the context of the security challenges of Indonesian illegals to Malaysia. Central to this problematique is the question of whether the securitizing process is defined by consultation and a public debate that generates broad coherence and acceptance by the 'audience', or whether the securitizer can in effect 'bull-

doze' its way through this process altogether.

Put differently, it is not 'a relevant audience' of the public but the state who determines securitization process. Therefore, it is unknown whether this audience accepted securitization of Indonesian migrants in Malaysia or not, because "the discursive political realm in Malaysia is not open to contestation in the first place" (Liow, 2006: 58). This is one of the reasons for failed desecuritization of immigrants in the region. Thus, the politics of securitization has shaped security relations in East Asia different from the case of the EU.

The politics of security has also shaped security relations in East Asia. As in noted about Waever's account, the author gave a role to the international as an intersubjective setting of rules and norms of 'survival'. In the case of East Asia, there is a different impact of the international on the provision of conditions of the decisions of states about their 'survival'. This becomes more explicit in analysis looking at regional security dynamics.

In their Yuk-ping and Thomas' analysis of securitization of health issues in East Asia, the authors show that the international is not a neutral space, but it is "itself the subject of capture by multiple (and possibly competing) state agendas" (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010: 450). Accordingly, regional and international organizations which attempt to securitize the issue, their audience, the member states of these institutions "whose interests are the ones being infringed—only further complicates the 'acceptance' stage of securitization" (Yuk-ping and Thomas, 2010: 450). This complicates the securitization because, Yuk-ping and Thomas (2010: 451) writes,

Overriding both countries strategies was a concern that securitizing a health threat was tantamount to acknowledging an inability to safeguard the well-being of their respective peoples. Such an acknowledgement could only call into question the legitimacy of the state in systems where there are no avenues for such questions to be raised.

This is not only related with acceptance stage of securitization by international/regional organization, but in the implementation stage of securitization, these states are not bind by the international norms and principles. Upadhyaya (2006) shows that in Satgashi crisis (213 immigrants were left high and dry on the land between Bangladesh and India at Satgachi in February 2013), “international obligations and regimes are set aside by the national state” (Upadhyaya, 2006: 30).

These empirical studies show that these states are socialized into the international that is composed of two realms: post-Westphalian world order and Westphalian order. These two realms and their interrelations constitute states in the region, and the politics of securitization. In the region, sovereignty is mostly conflated with security since these states do not experience an unconditional legitimacy in the international system (as states in the EU do). Due to their socialization into the international, the international has not a positive but a negative impact on the politics of securitization at home, which gave the regimes in the region to determine what sovereignty is means to these states, and the people.

To reiterate, the empirical studies of the securitization theory in East Asia shows that first, while in theory of the Copenhagen School, the narrative is originated from one place and history in world politics, the EU, these empirical works, which consider the public in the Global South as subject of security, have shown that there are various beginnings of the politics of security as securitization. Second, the empirical analyses,

thus, have shown that the politics of securitization has shaped the relationship between security and politics in the Global South albeit in different ways. Here, it is important to note that these analyses have pointed to the more complex relationship between the state and the public realm experienced in East Asia other than experienced in the EU. Moreover, since state representatives in the East Asia understand the international in terms of Westphalian and post-Westphalian orders, the politics of securitization has resulted in failed desecuritization. However, these analyses have not shown how the people and social groups (in/outside the public) have shaped the relationship between politics and security. Thus, as with previous school of thought, the Copenhagen School has also seen a constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South, however it is not a mutual one since they have failed to account for how the people and social groups in the Global South in this case the public, are also constitutive of world politics.

5.3.3. The Paris School and the Study of Security in the Global South

Compared to others' schools of thought in critical approaches to security, the Paris School has not studied security in the Global South. Didier Bigo has also noted that he developed the approach for understanding security relations in the EU. Though claiming that their works are limited to the study of security in the EU does not mean that they have no reference to the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in these works. Looking at how they consider the relationship in these works has also implications for their understanding of security and modernity. The works I look at here are the ones of which has focused on the "criminalization of immigrants", and there are three which I analyze in this sub-section: Bigo's book

chapter, 'Criminalisation of migrants: the side effect of the will to control the frontiers and the sovereign illusion' (2004), Liempt and Sersli's co-authored article, 'State Responses and Migrant Experiences with Human Smuggling: A Reality Check' (2013), and Duffield's article, 'Racism, migration and development: the foundations of planetary order' (2006).

In these works, the subject of security (who inherits the culture of free world) is the idea of Europe as the place to be free of illiberal security practices. The Global South is not only appeared as a source of problem to Europe but also as an opportunity for developing its idea of free and liberal world because movements from the Global South have impacted on (in)security practices in the EU as well as on the management of life inside. Thus, the Global South is other side of the EU where people left for living a better life in the EU. Developments outside the EU borders and in the Global South such as, poverty, corrupted governments, and (civil) wars all have impacted on the (in)security regimes in the EU according to Duffield (2006). One effect is the criminalization of immigrants.

For instance, in his analysis of the criminalization of immigrants, argued Duffield (2006), the idea of Europe is threatened by increasing racial discourse in the EU. The rise of domestic racial discourse led to new (in)security practices, such as new surveillance measures which in turn, affected to liberties of the people in the EU. In his study about criminalization of immigrants, Bigo (2004) have also said, "as long as the problem is viewed at European level as a problem of immigration control, and analyzed almost exclusively on the basis of the notion of 'control', this prevents a

wider economic, social or cultural understanding of the issues. No overall response to immigration can emerge”(Bigo, 2004: 82-83).

These studies have not mostly understood the people and social groups in the Global South (that are potential migrants) as subjects of security (for exceptions see Huysmans et. al., 2006) who also deserves liberal practices. Rather, these analyses locate them in the frontier of the EU (shaping the Mobius Ribbon and the politics of (in)securitization). Bigo (2004: 83) writes,

Immigration control in Europe cannot continue as if it were possible to prevent those people (not as many as commonly supposed) who are ready to uproot themselves from trying their luck elsewhere. Controls can only be effective if they are based on an accurate understanding of realities, and when policy is adjusted to these realities by devices such as targeted help to some countries of the Third World, allowing legal immigration (with or without quotas) and repression of illegal employment.

According to Bigo, security practices should be extended to outside the Mobius Ribbon, the frontiers of the EU. For instance, he insisted on training local police and officials in order to check these illegal immigrants to the EU.

Liempt and Sersli’s article on human smuggling have also shown how the people has shaped the Mobius Ribbon of the international as human smugglers in the Global South. In their article, Liempt and Sersli (2013) focus on how popular discourses on boat arrivals have impacted on criminalization of human smuggling. According to Liempt and Sersli, the EU authorities could not manage human smuggling; it is because the smugglers have always found alternative routes as well as methods to make the people enter the borders. Thus, the relationship between smugglers and border controllers have shaped and reshaped who is legal and illegal migrants, and people’s identifications as such.

According to these studies, the people and social groups located at the border of the EU have shaped changing management of life in the EU. According to Bigo, on the one hand, since it is not possible to control borders, discourses of governments such as ‘Fortress Europe’ caused to “immediate economic damage, tensions between social groups and almost a zero effect on illegal immigration” (Bigo, 2004: 85), and this “government action is therefore limited to statements giving a ‘feeling of security” (Bigo, 2004: 83). On the other hand, the security field via its social practices has tried to control not borders, but movement of the people with defining these people as threats, or potential criminals. These are, for Bigo, “the examples of practices having an arbitrary character which is not often seen by those who advocate the ‘Fortress Europe’ discourse because they fail to look in such specific places and remain focused on borders and public discourses” (Bigo, 2004: 89).

Undefined borders reproduce this complex relationship between the discourse of the political field and social practices of the security field. Thus, focusing on borders is an error that was made by political analysis of Sieve Europe or Fortress Europe Bigo argues. Thus, the international (its contingency in terms of borders of inside/outside) shaped the relationship between security and insecurity in the EU. According to Bigo, “the uncertainty quality of frontier controls” has enhanced total security practices in the EU such as control regimes, surveillance practices, border controls and threatened its free society, and individual liberties.

To reiterate, the empirical studies about ‘criminalization of migrants’ shows that first, the people and social groups in the Global South are not considered as subjects of security, but are portrayed as source of a problem/or opportunity to the EU for

developing its liberal practices of politics. Second, empirical analyses have located the people and social groups in the Global South at the frontier of the EU. Thus, they have shaped the politics of (in)securitization. Third, however, these analyses have failed to account for how the politics of (in)securitization at the frontier of the EU has shaped security relations in the Global South. For instance, how the management of EU borders has shaped the relationship between politics and security in border-states in the Global South. As with other two schools of thought, thus, there is also a constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South. However, it is not a mutual (equal) one, since these analyses have failed to account for how subjectivities emerged in the Global South due to security practices shape the politics of security.

To sum, this section has shown that analyses of empirical studies of security in the Global South indicate a different insight to understand not only these schools of thought, but also the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations. This section has shown that critical approaches to security have gone beyond most of the limitations of realist approaches to security, and its understanding of a causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South. Empirical studies in each school see a constitutive relationship between two albeit in different ways. Both the Aberyswyth School and the Copenhagen School have shown how the politics of security has shaped security relations and insecurities experienced in the Global South. However, they have failed to account for how articulations of security by the people and social groups in the Global South have also shaped the relationship between politics and security. The Paris School is differed from these two schools in two respects. In the Paris School, the people and social

groups in the Global South is not seen as subjects of security. Second, they have only focused on how actors located in the frontier of the EU has shaped the politics of (in)securitization in the EU but not others way around (how the EU practices has shaped the politics of (in)securitization in border states).

5.4. Postcolonial Approaches' Conception of Modernity

Postcolonial critique to security studies has been developed since the end of 1990s.³² I will look at Sankaran Krishna's *Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka and the Question of Nationhood* (1999), Himadeep Muppidi's *The Politics of the Global* (2004) and Itty Abraham's works on the postcolonial state and the nuclear options, 'The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories' (2006), *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State* (1998). These are key works of postcolonial approaches to security, and have focused on analyses of postcolonial insecurities in the Global South. This section unpacks conception of modernity shaping postcolonial approaches to security in three dimensions, namely, time, ontology and sociality of world politics, and points to how these approaches understand the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations.

Starting with time, postcolonial approaches to security challenge understandings of time of world politics in singular terms through pointing to multiply temporality of world politics in narratives of imperialism and colonialism. For instance, in his study

³² For a significant postcolonial critique to IR, see Agathangelou, A. M. and Ling, L. H. M. (2004a) "The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism," *International Studies Review*, 6/4: 21-49.

Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka and the Question of Nationhood (1999), Krishna notes that our present inability to make sense of the postcolonial insecurities is the outcome of the representation of the Global South in these narratives of world politics as absence.

Through this process of global colonial imaginary, the West is universalizing itself in the historical process with respect to enabling colonial subjectivities. In theory, there is representation of postcolonial insecurities in terms of narratives of the world historical process (Abraham, 2006). Accordingly, Krishna underlines, “the story of ‘how the West was one’ has always been inextricable from the story of how the rest were rendered both multiple and voiceless” (Krishna, 1999: xxi). Thus, the present is already implicated with colonial pasts within the present modern condition, as spaces such as east-west, orient-occident, first-third worlds “are non-foundational and constantly reproduced in relational terms” (Krishna, 1999: xxi). However, for them, the present is already implicated with colonial pasts within the present modern form of politics, sovereign state and its discussions for imaginaries of the nation (Krishna, 1999). What they point to is that the historical process and imaginaries of the sovereign state and nation are already implicated with colonial histories. For Krishna, one of the present modern conditions that reproduce such spaces in world politics is narrative of sovereign state and nationalism as in the case of South Asia.

As such, postcolonial approaches to security help to challenge narratives of imperialism and colonialism in IR.³³ In this sense, Krishna has showed that nationalism in India has always been shaped by a hierarchical and colonial world

³³ See also Agathangelou and Ling (2004b) who offer a framework for understanding “power relations and identities within historical constructions of race, gender, class and culture” that is implicated mainly with Western colonialism and imperialism (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004b: 518).

order, and also contributes to this world order. In particular, through showing multiple narratives of modern world politics such as national histories in the South Asia, Krishna has focused on both the colonizer and the colonized as constitutive actors of modern world politics. Postcolonial approaches to security, thus, argue that narratives of world politics also include colonial histories, the encounters between the Global North and the Global South.

Considering ontology, postcolonial approaches to security understand ontology of world politics in terms of dialogical. Thus, different from critical approaches to security, they do not only criticize the international anarchy, but also identify world politics in terms of a colonial world politics. This understanding has implications for the relationship between domestic and international. Here, they point to an intermingling of the international and the national in the encounters between the Global North and the Global South.

For instance, in Abraham's study, the case of India demonstrates how nuclear programs are taken to signify a broader project of technological development, rather than defensive weaponry (Abraham, 2006). For Indian elite, Abraham argues, the central political problem "was to create a new basis for Indian nationalism, to project India's strength, and to be taken seriously on the international stage: to create political legitimacy for the postcolonial state" (Abraham, 2006: 62). Abraham's analysis demonstrates that it becomes a discourse of political elites in India with its encounters with the Global North as an ex-colonial state. On the side of India, in this sense, there were simultaneous demands for international control over nuclear weapons and domestic sovereignty over India's nuclear development since "framing the decision

behind the May 1998 tests was the desire to reduce the multiple meanings of a ‘peaceful’ nuclear program, to force nuclear ambivalence into a more familiar register” Abraham argues (Abraham, 2006: 55). In this case, Indian ambivalence would be resolved by a discursive shift in meaning of nuclear energy, aligning it with technological development and India’s colonial past rather than destruction (Abraham, 2006: 62). Thus, for Abraham, ‘going nuclear’ manifested in the Indian decision of the May 1998 tests is the product of its understandings of world politics, implicated with its colonial histories and encounters with the Global North.

Lastly, postcolonial approaches to security understand sociality of world politics in terms of constitution. As with critical approaches to security, they also consider the co-constitutive relationship between forms and structures in world politics. However, since postcolonial approaches to security understand world politics in terms of international hierarchy, these approaches conceive the international is not only a realm of domination or exclusion but also a realm of hierarchies of colonialism. Here, they look at how relations between the strong and the weak, the Global North and the Global South connect the world through racialised as well as gendered international and domestic orders (Biswas, 2001; Ling, 2002). On the one hand, there is the resistance of the Global South against the racialised, and gendered hierarchies among nations through using various discourses of modernity such as national security, development, and technological advancement (Ling, 2002; Biswas, 2001). On the other hand, this has created another form of hierarchy based on insights toward modernity with respect to national politics at home.

For instance, in Biswas' study of India's nuclear apartheid (Biswas, 2001), on the one hand, there was the perception that India was community of resistance against the racialised hierarchy among nations, through using the discourse of the nuclear-apartheid. Actors in the Global South, therefore, participate in the development of international institutions in response to its institutions "that rely on presuppositions of the irrationality of 'others' drawn on racist discourses that deny a degree of humanity to 'others' in the very constitution of the 'self' as human" (Biswas, 2001:508). On the other hand, this created another form of racialised hierarchy based on insights toward Indian nationalism, and exclusionary security practices in India towards the people based on discriminating Hindu and the others. Thus, according to postcolonial approaches, postcoloniality is not only a condition of engagement within and/or against modernity, but it is also a political act as well as a structure of meaning (Krishna 1999; Abraham 2001; Biswas, 2006).

Considering the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations, there are three points that needs to be raised. First, in postcolonial approaches to security, the people and social groups in the Global South are subjects of security. It refers to the capacity of the subject of security to sustain a story about its place and role in world politics. It is also related to the way of connecting with the narrative of world politics sustained either in terms of contribution to or contestation with the colonial world politics. Second, prevalent security practices and discourses in the colonial world politics have shaped security relations in the Global South. Thus, states in the Global South have contributed to exclusionary security practices such as discriminating some social groups and people in response to insecurities that these states experienced in the colonial world politics. Third, while people and social

groups are subjects of security; postcolonial approaches mainly focuses on how security relations in the colonial world politics have constrained the political subjectivity of the people and social groups in the Global South. Thus, their analyses of articulations, practices, and ideas of the people and social groups in the Global South are considered in terms of their resistance or the defiance to the prevalent colonial order (Hobson & Sajed, 2017). Put differently, while postcolonial approaches have understood a mutually constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations, this mutual relationship is only appeared in the case of the resistance of the people and social groups in the Global South.

This does not mean that articulations of security by the people and social groups in the Global South are not located within discursive and institutional relations of power that limit the terms of discourse through which the lived experiences of the individuals are situated and constituted within power and knowledge relationship. Rather, this has pointed to the question of the capacity of these security articulations in the Global South to sustain or redefine the sphere of world politics (the global) in line with opening up the space for contestations or contribution to world politics (the international). As such, depending on the situatedness of the subject of security in world politics, its ways of experiencing and understanding of world politics have been changed, thus its articulations of insecurities.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has showed that a particular conception of modernity, which is composed of time in singular terms, ontology in terms of dialectical or *differance*, and

sociality in terms of constitution has shaped critical approaches to security. Critical approaches to security have gone beyond the limitations of realist approaches to security in terms of understanding a constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South. In both the Aberystwyth School and the Copenhagen School, the politics of security has shaped security relations in the Global South. However, their analyses (with one exception) have failed to account for how security relations in the Global South have shaped the politics of security in turn. Thus, the role of social groups and the people as constitutive of world politics has not appeared in these analyses. The Paris School also understands a constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South. It is differed from these two schools in two respects. In the Paris School, the people and social groups in the Global South are not subjects of security. Moreover, they are located at the frontier of the EU have contributed to the politics of (in)securitization, but these analyses have failed to account for how security practices in the Mobius Ribbon has shaped security relations at border states in the Global South.

The chapter has also indicated that postcolonial approaches to security understand time of world politics not in singular terms, ontology of world politics in terms of dialogical, and sociality of world politics in terms of constitution. Postcolonial approaches have pointed to a mutually constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South. However, this mutual relationship occurs only if the people and social groups in the Global South are resisting to the colonial world politics.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The dissertation aims to understand how a particular conception of modernity has been constitutive of security studies. It has investigated the relationship between modernity and the study of security in the Global South in three steps.

First, it has identified three dimensions of modernity, namely, time, ontology, and sociality of world politics. With the help of these three dimensions, it unpacks conceptions of modernity shaping security studies literature. Second, it has looked at first realist approaches to security and then Third World security scholars, and has showed that Third World security scholars have also produced an understanding of the causal relationship between the First World and the Third World in security relations. Third, the dissertation has looked at both critical and postcolonial approaches to security, and investigated their understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. The dissertation, thus, has showed how different security theories, which operate with different conceptions of modernity understand the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations. It has found three conceptions of modernity for identifying the

relationship, and has drawn taxonomy of understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security approaches.

The following three sections highlight these three conceptions of modernity and respective understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations. The last section illustrates the argument of the dissertation about its analysis through illustrations from studies on nuclear non-proliferation in the Global South.

6.1. Modernity 1 and the Causal Relationship between the Global North and the Global South

This conception of modernity is composed of an understanding of time of world politics in singular terms, ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, and sociality of world politics in terms of causality. This conception has produced a causal understanding of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations. Both realist approaches to security, and Third World security scholars share this conception of modernity, and understanding the relationship albeit in different ways.

Realist scholars understand time of world politics in singular terms. Realist approaches identify narrative of world politics in terms of the fall and rise of the great powers or the cycles of wars originated from experiences of great powers while they universalize the narrative as experienced by both small and great powers alike. Realist approaches understand ontology in terms of a binary between domestic hierarchy and

international anarchy. This means that they conceive world politics in terms of functionally undifferentiated like units, and the state as the political given. In all these works, while there are naturalizing the political as such, they have distinguished between small and great powers in world politics according to their power capabilities. Realist approaches to security understand sociality of world politics in terms of causality. It means that structure of international politics comes before its forms. Since the international is understood in terms of a realm of foreign policy, international sociality is explained via state behaviors of either small or great powers, and the differences between them have not shape the structure of international politics. In the conception of modernity, there is no reference to the Global South.

The conception of modernity shared by realist IR scholars has implications for the study of security in the Global South in the debate on the ‘failed states’ and understanding the relationship between the Global North and the Global South. This analysis of the debate on ‘failed states’ has shown that these analyses understand a causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South. Since the international structure conditions hierarchies between states in functioning of international politics and maintenance of its order, great powers have capabilities for state building in the ‘failed states’. The great powers have capability to shape states in the Global South as ‘appropriate’ ones, and thus their state behaviors’, but the ‘failed states’ and security concerns of people and social groups living in these states have not a role in shaping security relations in international politics.

This dissertation has also shown that Third World security scholars, who are critical of realist approaches to security studies, have not gone beyond the limitations of

realist scholars in terms of understanding of the relationship between the First World and the Third World in causal terms. Third World security scholars have also understood a causal relationship between two, albeit in different ways.

Third World security scholars' conception of modernity understands time of world politics in singular terms, ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between First World states and Third World states, and sociality of world politics in terms of causality. Third World security scholars understand time of world politics in singular terms. The development of the modern states system is originated in one place and history in world politics, which is European states system. Third World security scholars understand ontology of world politics in terms of a binary between the First World states and the Third World states. This binary has stemmed from the historical evolution of the modern states system, and led to the functionally differentiated units in modern states system. Since there are two groups of states, inequalities between them in terms of management of rules, norms of international politics led to vulnerabilities for Third World states. As with realist scholars, for Third World security scholars, structure of world politics comes before its forms in terms of state behaviors in the Third World. Thus, articulations of insecurities by people and social groups in the Third World have not shaped world politics.

As with realist analyses on the 'failed states', the conception of modernity shared by Third World security scholars has implications for the study of security in the Third World in the debates on the distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' states. This analysis of the debate on 'failed states' has shown that Third World security scholars also understand a causal relationship between the First World and the Third World in

security relations. Since the international structure conditions inequalities between states in terms of not only the functioning of international politics but also their 'stateness', it has shaped the Third World as the zone of conflict. However, weak states and insecurities experienced by people in the Third World have not shaped security relations in world politics. Rather, for Third World security scholars, there is a causal relationship between the zone of stability (First World) and the zone of conflict (Third World).

6.2. Modernity 2 and the Constitutive Relationship between the Global North and the Global South

This conception of modernity is composed of understanding time of world politics in singular terms, understanding ontology of world politics either in terms of dialectical or *differance*, and understanding sociality of world politics in terms of constitution. Different from both realist and Third World security scholars, critical approaches to security share this particular conception of modernity, and the understanding of a constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations.

According to this conception, whether critical of modernity or not, there is an understanding of time of world politics in singular terms. This means that each of these schools of thought understand narratives of world politics originated from one place or history in world politics, mainly Europe. Critical approaches to security problematize a binary understanding of world politics in realist approaches to security, and the political as the state given. In their accounts, understanding ontology

of world politics either in terms of dialectical or *differance* point to re-construction and de-construction of the political. These understandings have understood the relationship between politics and security with respect to limits of a binary understanding of domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. Different from realist approaches to security, which understand the international only as a realm of foreign policy and naturalize the international anarchy as given, critical approaches to security conceive the international as a realm of social relations. For critical approaches to security, security relations in world politics have shaped world politics, and the structure of world politics also shape security relations.

There are differences in their studies of security in the Global South, and their identification of the constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South in world politics. In the Aberystwth School, while Booth's account has pointed to how inequalities between the Global North and the Global South are also part of world politics, there is no reference to the Global South in narratives of world politics. Rather, narratives of world politics are originated from one place or history in world politics. In all empirical works analyzed here, have shown that the people and social groups are subjects of security. Thus, their analyses indicate that there are various beginnings of the politics of security as emancipation in world politics. Second, these studies have shown that the politics of security and its dialectical relationship between the particular and the universal structures of world politics have shaped security relations and insecurities experienced in the Global South. However, with one exception (Bilgin, 2005), these studies could not account for how the people and social groups in the Global South have shaped the politics of security. Put differently, these analyses have failed to account for how ideas, articulations and practices of

security by the people and social groups in the Global South are also contributing to or contesting with 'global' ideas, structures, and processes of world security.

Therefore, these analyses have mostly failed to understand the constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South in a mutual way, since each part does not shape the relationship between politics and security in equal terms.

Studies in the Copenhagen School have also shown that while in theory of the Copenhagen School, the narrative is originated from one place and history in world politics, which is the EU, these empirical works consider the public in the Global South as subject of security. Their analyses indicate that there are various beginnings of the politics of securitization in world politics. Second, these studies have also shown that the international appears as *the differance* has also shaped the politics of securitization in the Global South albeit in different ways. It is important to note two points here. First, these analyses have shown a more complex relationship between the state and the public realm in East Asia compared to the EU. Second, they have pointed to that state representatives in the East Asia understand the international in terms of Westphalian and post-Westphalian orders, and thus, the relationship between politics and security has resulted in failed desecuritization. Third, these analyses have failed to account for how the public in East Asia has shaped the politics of securitization in world politics through contributing to or contesting with the notion of the international as an intersubjective realm of norms and principles of world politics. As with most of studies in the Aberystwth School, thus, these analyses have failed to understand the constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South in a mutual way.

In the Paris School, empirical studies about ‘criminalization of migrants’ have shown that people and social groups in the Global South are not subjects of security. In these works, rather, the subject of security is the idea of Europe as the place to be free of illiberal political practices. The Global South is not only appeared as a source of problem to Europe but also as an opportunity for developing its idea of free world. These analyses have located the people and social groups in the Global South at the frontier of the EU. Thus, they have shaped the politics of (in)securitization in the EU. The people and social groups located at the frontier provides the continuation of the questioning of the relationship between politics and security in terms of the limits of security practices and borders in the EU. Different from both the Aberystwth School and the Copenhagen School, thus, in the Paris School’s analyses, we have seen how the people and social groups in the Global South (the ones just located at the frontier) has shaped the politics of (in)securitisation by contributing to or contesting with borders of the EU. However, as with two other schools of thought, the Paris School also conceives the constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South not a mutual way. These analyses have failed to account for how the politics of (in)securitization at the frontier of the EU such as the various techniques of management of EU borders, has shaped subjectivities and insecurities experienced by the people and social groups in border-states in the Global South.

6.3. Modernity 3 and the Mutually Constitutive Relationship between the Global North and the Global South

This conception of modernity is composed of an understanding of time of world politics not in singular terms, ontology of world politics in terms of dialogical, and

sociality of world politics in terms of constitution. Postcolonial approaches to security share this particular conception of modernity, and understand a mutually constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South.

Postcolonial approaches to security have problematized colonial narratives of world politics, and pointed to how the narratives of world politics is implicated with the colonial histories, and thus encounters between the Global North and the Global South. Different from critical approaches to security, in their critique of the binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy, these scholars understand world politics in terms of a colonial world politics. Thus, the political has been constructed in the intermingled of domestic and international with encounters between the Global North and the Global South. As with critical approaches to security, postcolonial approaches also understand sociality of world politics in terms of constitution. However, since postcolonial approaches to security understand world politics in terms of a colonial world politics, these approaches conceive the international not only a realm of domination or exclusion but also a realm of hierarchies that are reproduced in between the domestic and the international levels.

In the postcolonial approaches, the people and social groups in the Global South are subjects of security. Their analyses have shown that prevalent security practices and discourses in the colonial world politics have shaped security relations in the Global South. Thus, states in the Global South have contributed to exclusionary security practices such as discriminating some social groups and people in response to insecurities that these states experienced in the colonial world politics. In their analyses, while people and social groups are subjects of security, postcolonial

approaches mainly focuses on how a colonial world politics have constrained the political subjectivity of the people and social groups in the Global South. Thus, their analyses of how articulations, practices, and ideas of the people and social groups in the Global South has shaped the relationship between politics and security are considered in terms of their resistance to the prevalent colonial order. Put differently, while postcolonial approaches have understood a mutually constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations, this mutual relationship is only appeared if there is a resistance of the people and social groups to the colonial world politics. This point has implications for the need of opening space for a dialogue between critical approaches to security and postcolonial insights to world politics.

As with Hobson and Sajed (2017) also note with respect to the postcolonial IR literature, postcolonial approaches mostly conceive the role of actors in the Global South in terms of their resistance or defiance to the colonial world politics. However, the literature on historical connections between the Global North and the Global South also indicates that the role of the people and social groups in the Global South are intermingled with multiple forms of understanding and practicing of world politics rather than just a colonial world politics. Thus, their roles of shaping world politics do not limited to the resistance to the colonial world politics, but include their negotiations and contestations with various experiences of unequal and hierarchical world politics. Here, the reading of postcolonial approaches to security, and their understanding of the mutually constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South have just opened a thinking space in terms of understanding the constitutive relationship in mutual terms. For bringing the role of the people and

social actors in the Global South in terms of shaping the relationship between politics and security in world politics, there is need for a dialogue between critical approaches to security and postcolonial insights to world politics.

The table below shows the taxonomy of understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security approaches. Then, this chapter turns to the illustrations of the argument in the debate on the nuclear non-proliferation in the Global South.

Table 1: The taxonomy of conceptions of modernity and understandings of the relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security approaches

		Three Dimensions of Modernity			Understanding the relationship between the Global North-the Global South in security relations
		Time	Ontology	Sociality	
Security Approaches	Realist approaches	Singular	Binary	Causality	Causal
	Third World security scholars	Singular	Binary	Causality	Causal
	The Aberystwth School	Singular	Dialectical	Constitution	Constitutive
	The Copenhagen School	Singular	<i>Differance</i>	Constitution	Constitutive
	The Paris School	Singular	<i>Differance</i>	Constitution	Constitutive
	Postcolonial security approaches	Not singular	Dialogical	Constitution	Mutually constitutive

6.4. The Study of Security in the Global South: Illustration of the Debate on Nuclear Non-proliferation

This section looks at the study of security in the Global South through illustrations from studies on nuclear non-proliferation. The following sub-sections also address the subject of security, the relationship between security and politics, and the relationship between security and insecurity in these studies. First, it will show how ‘going nuclear’ remains one of the prevalent discourses of states in the Global South. Second, it explores how the relationship between politics and security in world politics has shaped security in the Global South. Third, it shows how articulations of insecurities in the Global South have influenced the politics of security in world politics.

6.4.1. The Subject of Security

In the literature on nuclear non-proliferation, postcolonial approaches to security (Abraham, 2006; Biswas, 2001; Chacko, 2011) have analyzed social groups and people in the Global South as subjects of security. In these analyses, ‘going nuclear’ has been studied with respect to the location of subject of security within temporal and spatial locales of a colonial world politics. Thus, narrative of ‘going nuclear’ does not only provide us with an understanding the engagement within/against colonial modernity in the Global South, but also the immediate present of any ‘going nuclear’ is a temporal locale containing its past and future of the subject of security.

For instance, in Biswas's study, the people and social groups appear as subjects of security in the sense that those are who speak for security in her analyses, though the political subjectivity of them has been constrained by security practices and articulations in the colonial world politics. In Biswas's analysis, the discourses on international security and its regime have enabled and continue to enable 'colonizing' practices and production of hierarchies in world politics. For Biswas, there is the construction of a racialized 'Third World' in nuclear proliferation discourses. Thus, states in the Global South participate in the development of international institutions in response to these institutions "that rely on presuppositions of the irrationality of 'others' drawn on racist discourses that deny a degree of humanity to 'others' in the very constitution of the 'self' as human" Biswas argued (Biswas, 2001: 508). Concomitantly, these states also participate in development of modernity and its contradictions, as Biswas argues that Hindu nationalism discourses used the racializations of religious and other minorities at home (Biswas, 2001). Thus, Biswas have shown that articulation of these insecurities such as through discourse of nuclear apartheid at the international and Hindu nationalism at home contest hierarchies between First World states and Third World states, but also contribute to hierarchies of race and ethnicity through discourse of Hindu nationalism at home. Therefore, a colonial world politics have constrained on the political subjectivity of the people and social groups in India to speak for security.

In security analysis, security scholars with realist approaches analyze nuclear proliferation with a narrative of world politics originated from experiences among great powers (Sagan & Waltz, 1995; Sagan, Waltz & Betts 2007; Waltz 2012; Waltz, 1981; Edelman, Krepinevich & Montgomery, 2011). This is articulated in a variety of

ways: ‘steady proliferation of nuclear weapons is key to tranquil future’ (Waltz, 1981; Waltz, 2012); and ‘proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the propensity of conflict in international politics’ (Sagan & Waltz, 1995). In these accounts, nuclear deterrence is endogenously developing within great powers and it constrains war and prevents the deterioration of the balance of power (Sagan & Waltz, 1995). In these realist analyses, thus, the subjects of security are the great powers, mainly the US. They have identified nuclear proliferation in the Global South in terms of a possibility of decay of the nuclear deterrence and a threat to the US/or its regional politics in the Middle East, or its preservation of these interests of the US and international security. For the latter, for instance, Waltz argues that nuclear-armed Iran is the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East and the international system as well (Waltz, 2012: 4).

One of the representatives of Third World security scholars, Ayoob (1995) in his book has also touched on the nuclear non-proliferation in the Third World (in addition to arms and missiles transfers to the Third World states). In his analyses, Third World states such as India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and Israel are subjects of security. Ayoob understands the refusal of these states to sign NPT within a narrative of world politics that naturally leads to “a highly unequal nuclear nonproliferation regime”, and the result of insecurities Third World states experienced are stemmed from their secondary place in the global order (Ayoob, 1995: 105). According to Ayoob, thus, insecurities are not only stemmed from possible regional threats, but also the secondary position of these states in world politics since there are superpowers’ “perceptions of a close connection between nuclear capability and international status”(Ayoob, 1995: 106). States in the Third World try to make their states “to

graduate to the status of a primary actor in the international system” by not “giving up its nuclear option” Ayooob argues (Ayooob, 1995: 106).

For critical approaches to security, the representation of the nuclear proliferation as either a threat or not to international security is the result of statism, strategy and stability underlying the nuclear strategy and the logic of nuclear deterrence that contradicts with security of societies and people in the world (Peoples, 2007: 279; see also Booth, 1999; Burke, 2009; Wheeler, 2009; Wyn Jones, 1995). In their critiques of realist approaches to security, thus, critical approaches indicate that ‘going nuclear’ is not a universal fact of world politics as the end of power politics and international anarchy. Rather, it is an instance of conflation of means and ends of politics, and a consequence of the lack of a holistic understanding of security in world politics.

According to Booth, ‘going nuclear’ relies on the clash between two distinct cultures, namely the threat of nuclear weapons and the promise of human rights, regarding construction of security (Booth, 1999). For the kind of moral learning through which political progress may be guaranteed, Booth notes, “a human rights culture must be intrinsic to any comprehensive notion of security” (Booth, 1999: 2). Thus, critical approaches to security have also studied nuclear proliferation with a narrative of world politics, and argued, “nobody should acquire nuclear weapons” (Booth, 1999; Burke, 2009; Peoples, 2007; Wheeler, 2009).

In these studies of critical approaches to security, as with postcolonial approaches, social groups and the people in the Global South have appeared as subjects of security. For instance, Booth “endorses an Iraqi demonstrator’s perspective as the most strategic approach to achieving the conditions of security in the region” while

discussing the Iraqi crisis in 1998 (Booth, 1999: 7). According to Booth, the Iraqi demonstrator's perspective is significant to understand the clash between human rights culture and national security culture. From this perspective, Booth argues, Saddam Hussein can be seen as a symptom of a wider set of regional problems, values, and practices, and strategic thinking should give human rights culture an important role to develop a comprehensive approach to regional and global security building that calls for a nuclear free world. This example is significant to see a beginning of the relationship between security and politics in the Global South.

This section has shown that realist approaches to security could not account for how 'going nuclear' remains one of the statist discourses in the Global South, because the US is the subject of security in these analyses. For Third World security scholars, Third World states are subjects of security who speak for security in the unequal non-proliferation regime of global order. In both critical and postcolonial approach to security, social groups and the people in the Global South are subjects of security and their analyses have pointed to multiple beginnings of the relationship between politics and security in the Global South.

6.4.2. The Relationship between Security and Politics

In the literature on nuclear non-proliferation, for postcolonial approaches to security, the relationship between politics and security in the colonial world politics has shaped security relations in the Global South by the intermingled of the domestic and the international (Abraham, 2006; Biswas, 2001; Chacko, 2011).

For instance, in Abraham's study, the case of India demonstrates how nuclear programs are taken to signify a broader project of technological development, rather than defensive weaponry (Abraham, 2006). For Indian elite, Abraham argues, the central political problem "was to create a new basis for Indian nationalism, to project India's strength, and to be taken seriously on the international stage: to create political legitimacy for the postcolonial state" (Abraham, 2006: 62). Abraham's analysis demonstrates that it becomes a discourse of political elites in India with its encounters with the Global North as an ex-colonial state.

Thus, for Abraham, Indian decision for going nuclear could be evaluated from the point of view of its situatedness in the colonial world politics. Put differently, the relationship between politics and security in the colonial world politics has shaped India's decision for 'going nuclear'. On the side of India, in this sense, there were simultaneous demands for international control over nuclear weapons and domestic sovereignty over India's nuclear development. As Abraham succinctly puts, "framing the decision behind the May 1998 tests was the desire to reduce the multiple meanings of a 'peaceful' nuclear program, to force nuclear ambivalence into a more familiar register" (Abraham, 2006: 55). In this case, for Abraham, 'going nuclear' manifested in the Indian decision of the May 1998 tests is not only the product of its 'different' understandings of world politics, but Indian ambivalence is also implicated with the colonial world politics, and its relationship between politics and security. The decision is indicative of India's encounters with the Global North, as an ex-colonial state demanding to the inclusion as a member into international society.

In the literature, for realist approaches to security (Sagan & Waltz, 1995; Sagan, Waltz & Betts 2007; Waltz 2012; Waltz, 1981; Edelman, Krepinevich & Montgomery, 2011), the necessity of power politics is given in understanding of world politics in terms a binary between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy. The structure of the international system, thus, conditions means-ends relations in the sense that there is the possibility of the slow spread of nuclear weapons to other parts of the world in the image of the West (Waltz, 2012). Therefore, the spread of nuclear weapons is indispensable, as the gradual spread of nuclear weapons will promote peace and reinforce international stability (Waltz, 1981). According to Waltz, continued nuclear deterrence is identified as the outcome of rational policy-making given in the anarchical international system (Waltz, 2012), and it is also expected in the Global South, as these states are also constrained by the international system.

For Ayoob, it is not because of an anarchical system, but also hierarchies among small and great powers in world politics in the management of international regimes that make Third World states 'going nuclear'. According to Ayoob, Third World states are keen on developing their nuclear powers because of regional insecurities that they have faced to as well as experiences of injustice in their foreign policies. Third World states' security policies have been shaped by inequalities in regimes of international politics in terms of having nuclear power.

In the literature, critical approaches to security criticize the relationship between the pre-given understanding of the state as the political, and point to its implications for the relationship between security and politics (Peoples, 2007; Booth, 1999; Burke,

2009; Wheeler, 2009; Wyn Jones, 1995). For Peoples, in realist approaches to security, there is the belief that strategic and political considerations could be discussed independent of technology, as there is a “technologically determined security environment ‘out there’ that has to be responded” to (Peoples, 2007: 277). These scholars in turn, offer critical insights to understand the relationship between technology, politics and security. As Wyn Jones (1995: 99) wrote,

Technology does have a logic in that it simultaneously creates and constrains the choices available to society, yet technology does not predetermine which one of those particular choices is made. That decision is a social one, and as such reflects a whole series of social, cultural and power relations. The fact that these relations are contestable leads to the argument that technology is a scene of struggle.

Accordingly, there are always contradictions experienced in policies of states in the Global South as well. For instance, Burke understands the incoherent project of nuclear strategy with non-proliferation regime in terms of conflation of state and cosmopolitan forms of reason, as there is the power play and unhappy compromise inherent in the NPT regime (Burke, 2009). For Burke, developing cosmopolitan reason and dialogue on nuclear weapons is based on “attempts to viable nuclear strategies, though beset by contradictions and dangers,” such as the enormous destructive power of the bomb that each approaches failed to solve (Burke, 2009: 514). Rather, the prevailing understanding of rational reason has constrained security of the people and social groups for speaking for security, thus cosmopolitan reason.

This section has shown that for realist approaches to security nuclear deterrence has shaped decisions of going nuclear in states in the Global South. For Ayoob, it is not only nuclear deterrence but also inequalities experienced by Third World states’

foreign policies in the management of nuclear regime have shaped security in Third World states. In both critical and postcolonial approaches to security, the relationship between politics and security has shaped security relations in the Global South in terms of constraining the political subjectivity of the people and social groups for speak security.

6.4.3. The Relationship between Security and Insecurity

Postcolonial approaches to security argue that the colonial world politics do not only led to insecurities of the people and social groups in the Global South, but also articulations, practices and ideas of security by states in Global South have shaped the colonial world politics. For these studies, thus, the security relations in the Global South have shaped the relationship between politics and security in world politics.

For instance, in Chacko's (2011) analysis, India's nuclear policy has pointed to the security relations that are stemmed from encounters between the Global North and the Global South. What is significant in this study is that Chacko has shown that the security relations has also shaped the relationship between politics and security in world politics by pointing to the impact of racially gendered construction of state's identity and its foreign policy in the case of India to the colonial world politics. Chacko's analysis has indicated how hypermasculinity embedded in the British colonial discourse and India's resistance to this discourse has contributed to the contradictory understandings between the 'rational' desire for acquiring nuclear technology for weapons and the 'ethical' one for nuclear energy in world politics.

In the realist analysis of nuclear proliferation, such as Waltz's account, the continued nuclear deterrence condition state behaviors. For some, the possibility of a descent into irrationality if the nuclear weapons are spread outside the Western context has been raised (Waltz, 2012), as the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to these states. Consequently, for this account, a nuclear arms race in the region may occur and lead to an uncontrolled and rapid nuclear proliferation due to the rise in security dilemma. Accordingly, 'inappropriate' behaviors of states in the Global South were called decay from the logic of nuclear deterrence as seen in the case of the discourse of robustness of the nuclear deterrent (Roth, 2007: 369). Thus, states in the Global South (depending on their reliance on the logic of the nuclear deterrence and interests of US) are portrayed with 'irrational' state elites, and rogue states, or a 'possible' deterrent (Waltz, 2012). These states have no impact on the nuclear deterrence, but only have appeared as a 'possible' deterrent thus provides the continuation of great powers' agency in international politics.

As one of the representatives of Third World security scholars, for Ayoob, international regimes such as NPT have constrained on agency of Third World states to acquire nuclear power. It is because, for Ayoob, "nuclear-capable countries in the Third World can, in theory, target the forces and even the population centers of the major industrialized states" and this great powers' concerns may alter the power balance between great powers and these states (Ayoob, 1995: 149). According to Ayoob, the unequal power structure is the reason of the "deliberate ambiguity" in policies of Third World states on the acquisition of nuclear power capability. Ayoob argues that this ambiguity is to "keep in suspense both regional adversaries and the

international nuclear establishment and to prevent technological and economic retribution by that establishment”(Ayoob, 1995: 150).

In their critiques of realist approaches to security, critical approaches to security problematize the pre-given understanding of the international in terms of international anarchy, and sociality of states (form of being rational) and its (instrumental and substantive) rationality (Peoples, 2007; Booth, 1999; Burke, 2009; Wheeler, 2009; Wyn Jones, 1995). For instance, for Wheeler (2009), the fear of nuclear destruction could not be a permanent basis of an international order and security, which is underlined by an anarchical international system. Rather, for Wheeler, there is always a relationship between security and international order. Thus, world security depends on building trust between nuclear-armed and arming powers. In his article, Wheeler discusses nuclear trust building in the instance of the security community developed between Argentina and Brazil during the 1980s. According to Wheeler, trust-building community between Argentina and Brazil that “promote each other’s interests and values”have shaped security policies of states in the Global South, since there was a security dilemma sensibility between two states (Wheeler, 2009: 428) institutions can manage the security competition, and give space to actors for interpretation of whether others’ motives are offensive or defensive.

This section shows that for realist approaches to security, states in the Global South have not impacted on the nuclear deterrence. For Ayoob, while inequalities in nuclear regime have shaped the nuclear policies in the Third World, the ‘deliberate ambiguity’ in these policies have not impact on the nuclear deterrence in world politics. In critical approaches to security, we could not see how security relations and

insecurities experienced in the Global South are shaping the prevailing understanding of world politics and its logic of security dilemma. In postcolonial approaches to security, the resistance of the people and social groups is shaping the relationship between politics and security in the colonial world politics.

These three sub-sections do not offer an alternative understanding of security; rather, they illustrate that both realist approaches to security and Third World security scholars cannot account for how 'going nuclear' remaining one of the statist discourses of security in the Global South. It is because they understand a causal relationship between the Global North and the Global South. The nuclear proliferation debate also shows that social groups and people are subjects of security in both critical and postcolonial approaches. However, for the latter, we only see their role in shaping the relationship between politics and security with respect to the resistance to the colonial world politics in analyses of postcolonial approaches to security.

This dissertation, thus, has showed that for the study of security in the Global South, there is need for a dialogue between critical approaches to security and postcolonial insights to world politics in terms of understanding the mutually constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South in security relations. On the one hand, critical approaches to security, in various ways, provide the ways of understanding the people and social groups as both subjects and agents of security in real places. On the other hand, postcolonial insights to world politics offer an understanding of the mutually constitutive relationship between the Global North and the Global South (but limited to the analysis of the resistance of the people and social groups to the colonial world politics). There is need of further analyses of how social

groups and the people in the Global South are shaping the relationship between politics and security beyond the analyses of their resistance to the colonial world politics, so that articulations of insecurities experienced by people and social groups in the Global South can be all-encompassing and adequately addressed.

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