

STRATEGIZING CITIZENSHIP: TURKISH
IMMIGRANTS IN AMSTERDAM

A Master's Thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

STRATEGIZING CITIZENSHIP: TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN AMSTERDAM

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This thesis aims to reveal the perspectives of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam on the issue of citizenship, asking about their positions regarding Dutch and Turkish citizenship. The concepts of substantive citizenship and formal citizenship are used to frame the discussions. The study is based on the data collected by face to face interviews with 15 immigrants living in Amsterdam. They are categorized in four different groups, namely, a mosque community (Ayasofya/Westermoskee mosque), an Alevi community (Alevi Cultural Center), attendees of a traditional Turkish cafe (*kahvehane*) (Stichting Kızılırmak), and those active in running their own businesses. I found out that, in terms of the perspectives of substantive and formal citizenship, most of the Turkish immigrants in my study approach Dutch citizenship not with the qualities of the substantive or thick conception of citizenship, but based on individual benefits. They strategize their position to Dutch citizenship based on personal advantages and employ pragmatist approach, with some exceptions.

Keywords: Amsterdam, Formal Citizenship, Strategizing, Substantive Citizenship, Turkish Immigrants

ÖZET

VATANDAŞLIK STRATEJİLERİ OLUŞTURMAK: AMSTERDAM'DAKİ TÜRK GÖÇMENLER

Özkepir, Ömer Görkem

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

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Bu tez, Amsterdam'daki Türk göçmenlerin vatandaşlık konusuna olan bakış açılarını Türk ve Hollanda vatandaşlıklarına karşı olan tutumları hakkında sorular sorarak ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. İlgili konu, somut ve şekilsel vatandaşlık kavramları bağlamında tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışma Amsterdam'da yaşayan 15 farklı göçmen kişi ile yapılan yüz yüze görüşmelerin sonucunda ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu kişiler cami cemaati (Ayasofya/Westermoskee Camii), Alevi topluluğu (Alevi Kültür Merkezi), geleneksel Türk kahvehanesi müdavimleri (Stichting Kızılırmak) ve aktif olarak kendi işlerini yapan kişiler olarak 4 farklı grup şeklinde kategorize edilebilir. Somut ve şekilsel vatandaşlık perspektiflerinden bakıldığında araştırmadaki Türk göçmenlerin birçoğunun Hollanda vatandaşlığına somut vatandaşlık nitelikleri bağlamında değil, bireysel faydalara dayalı olarak yaklaştığı sonucuna ulaştım. Türk göçmenler Hollanda vatandaşlığına yönelik stratejileri, kişisel avantajlar temelinde, bazı istisnalar olsa da pragmatist bir yaklaşımla oluşturmaktadırlar.

Anahtar kelimeler: Amsterdam, Somut Vatandaşlık, Stratejiler Oluşturmak, Şekilsel Vatandaşlık, Türk Göçmenler

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the perspectives of Turkish immigrants¹ in Amsterdam with respect to their strategies and negotiations based on Dutch citizenship policies. I started the study by asking the question of how Turkish immigrants negotiate their citizenship status towards Turkey and the Netherlands. It is important to investigate this question because citizenship theories have become more significant in the politics of modern democracies to stabilize state- society relations (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Thus, as one of the largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, it is important to understand Turkish immigrants' view of citizenship in this dynamic society. Classical view of citizenship has been formal, defined as political and legal rights in a nation-state. By the 1990s, new concepts like transnational, post-national, multicultural, differentiated and substantive citizenship became popular with the increasing number of immigrants and their status in receiving states. Together with the new regional and supranational organizations such as the European Union, urban cultures differentiating citizenship relations across national, subnational and supranational territories emerged as the realms for political identity (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Therefore, states' policies towards immigrants and their citizenship status were transformed interdependently. In this work, by focusing on immigrants' negotiations with the citizenship regime in the Netherlands, I intend to bring a more

¹ I use the term "immigrant" in a practical sense. I am aware of the fact that those who have lived in the Netherlands for years and/or obtained Dutch citizenship and those who were born in the Netherlands do no longer qualify as immigrant.

dynamic understanding of Turkish immigrants' engagement with the Dutch citizenship.

The thesis is built on the discussions of substantive citizenship and formal citizenship, immigration and naturalization, and its effects on integration. I also provide information on the changing policies of citizenship in the Netherlands. I focus on the urban scale. Although in the citizenship theories from the postwar political theories of T.H. Marshall nation-states as territories governing citizenship have been taken for granted, as Rogers (2008) noted, cities are becoming new sources of citizenship in some European countries. Therefore, citizens' negotiations of their citizenships may differ based on their cities. Favell (2001) also points to the reorientation of migration studies away from nation-states to metropolitan areas. Although I still focus on the nation-state as the most important political unit for citizenship and immigration, this research might also be used further in urban studies concerning migration and urban citizenship. Cities are the sites of most profound questions of belonging and identity with respect to citizenship (Rogers, 2008). Seen as challenges from below, they are also the most productive sites of alternative citizenships (Holston & Appadurai, 1996). Therefore, Amsterdam was selected as the research area with its high Turkish immigrant population and their existence in this productive and dynamic city for more than a half century. Since the 1960s, generations following the first guest workers have been part of this multicultural city. Although the subject of urban citizenship is not the main focus of this research, my data analysis also can contribute to this field by its geographical scale.

My thesis advisor currently continues her research in the University of Amsterdam, and her network within Turkish communities in Amsterdam facilitated reaching a diverse group of respondents in the city. Informal conversations at the beginning of the research revealed such themes as economic relations/investments, political participation, the sense of belonging and group interests as the main topics. The thesis is organized around these themes to understand diverse negotiations of immigrants from Turkey with their citizenship status in Amsterdam.

I conducted field research in Amsterdam during which I carried out in-depth interviews with 15 residents with different residential rights and conditions from different ages and socio-economic backgrounds. With over 20 semi-structured questions, respondents were asked to explain their situation and engagement with the Dutch citizenship. This qualitative data forms the basis of the main argument of this thesis. In the sections below, four different groups of individuals and the themes affecting their points of view are examined.

The interviews I conducted can be organized to cover four different groups of Turkish immigrants (and descendants of immigrants) to understand different perspectives. The mosque community as a traditional religious Sunni Muslim group in a quite closed network brings about some ideas regarding the results of pillarization policies of the Netherlands,² together with their views about the emerging anti-Islamism in the Netherlands, the sense of belonging to Dutch society and their political participation in it. The Alevi community, one of the largest religious minority groups of Turkey, holds a different perspective towards the Dutch

² See p. 21 for the definition of pillarization.

citizenship and immigration as a different and alternative cultural and religious group. A traditional Turkish cafe (kahvehane) community as an assembly point for retired or unemployed indicates the perspectives of inactive participants of the economy. They reflect the views of another social and economic community that has minimal participation in the Dutch economy. Finally, the active labor force and merchants with ambitions to produce more for the economy become the fourth category in this study.

Although it is not the main subject of this research, Turkish political history and its effects on different social, political and religious groups in the Netherlands have an important place regarding the perspectives of those different groups. Citizenship agenda and its education in Turkey are also quite important for understanding the set of beliefs of respondents in this research. After the dissolution of The Ottoman Empire, the founders of modern Republic of Turkey aimed a homogenous nation state in contrast to multi-ethnic and religious social structure of the Empire (Kirişci, 2000). The founders of modern Turkey believed that a multi-ethnic society could dissolve just as The Ottoman Empire and they conceptualized a homogenous nation state with the primary element of Turkishness. With a strong emphasis on French civic nationalism, citizenship of the republic was defined in the 1924 constitution. As a political term, Turk was named for everyone in respect to citizenship regardless of their race and religion. Although there were several other discussions behind this definition, it was initially aimed to provide a homogeneity and national solidarity based on civic nationalism. However, in the substantive manner, citizenship practices of the republic included many ethnic elements in defining the ideal citizen. Many argued that, by using the name “Turk”, they did not mean the ethnic identity but a

constitutional and political status, however, many practices of the modern Turkish state favored most of the cultural elements of the ethnic Turkishness and Sunni Islam compared to other ethnicities and religious groups. This could be seen in the citizenship education of Turkey throughout its modern history. As Ince (2012) revealed, “the ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’ slogan was heavily emphasized” in the citizenship education of the modern republic. In creation of a new Turkish identity that would unite the citizens of the nation state, citizenship education often exaggerated the qualities of being Turkish and this caused a distinction of “Turks” and “others” in the minds of the young generations (Ince, 2012). As a result of this intense Turkish citizenship agenda, still many Turks inside or outside of Turkey, have a strong substantive loyalty and belonging to its nationhood. For many, Turkishness is not only a constitutional citizenship status, but a substantive ethnic and cultural identity. While this kind of citizenship policies strengthen the Turkish identity of immigrants from Balkans with Turkish origin and culture, or native Turks in Anatolia, it also alienated other ethnic and cultural groups in the country such as Kurds and Alevis (Kirişci, 2000). Especially the strong emphasis on the doctrines of Sunni Islam in the official religious education was one of the most controversial topics of secularism in Turkey. With this regard, rise of political Islam and conservative values in recent Turkish politics with the governments of Justice and Development Party brought about further alienation of some Alevi and secular Turks against Turkish citizenship in a substantive manner. In this research, perspectives of Alevi community and the mosque community should be read with this recent change in Turkish politics. The modern Republic of Turkey has a controversial past about its interpretation of the citizenship. In comparison to the culture and citizenship policies of the Netherlands, Turkey has a very strong substantive citizenship agenda since the

foundation of the republic. Therefore, except some alienated groups of Kurds or Alevis, nationalism and national identity of the Turks abroad are quite significant. This citizenship policies of Turkey and its effects on Turkish emigrants abroad could be examined in further research.

Among different modern and postmodern citizenship concepts, substantive citizenship and formal citizenship are taken into account to understand these immigrants' relationship with citizenship policies. During my field research, immigrants' calculations over social benefits and public assistance programs attracted my attention considerably. There is a tendency among the Turkish immigrants to prefer getting social support from the state and focus on their rights in the welfare state while not giving too much attention to participation of political and economic domain of the country. Thus, I argue that Turkish immigrant groups in the Netherlands see citizenship as a tool to strategize their personal benefits and aims such as access to public assistance programs, visa-free travel, social security assurance and higher pensions in the Netherlands. They approach Dutch citizenship with respect to their pragmatic cost-benefit calculations, and they strategize their decision about dual citizenship, naturalization or renouncing the Dutch nationality for remigration based on these calculations. Although similar strategies are observed regarding their Turkish citizenship, most of them still see Turkish citizenship in a much more substantive manner, and their strategies are affected from this sense of belonging.

The relations of the respondents with citizenship in terms of social support are analyzed in the sections below after I summarize the theoretical background of

citizenship studies and demonstrate immigrant and citizenship policies of the Netherlands.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP

In the literature, citizenship is discussed in a differentiating manner by time. T.H. Marshall's (1964) ideas refer to the notion that citizenship is about possessing a full membership to society by going beyond to economic relations in order to balance inequalities and contradictions based on class relations. Citizenship was first a supporting element of the market system and the propertied class. It was about legal or political rights in relation with individual freedom, the rule of law, freedom of speech and religion, fair court system, and the right to own property or engage in an enforceable contractual relationship. That would have later been entitled as formal (Núñez, 2016) or thin citizenship (Bubeck, 1995). This scope of citizenship is managed by law and determined by politics. It is the thin conception of citizenship as status. Beginning with the legal to political rights, this membership to society reached to the level of welfare state and social rights (Marshall, 1965). Especially in the 20th century, membership in the community in European states became increasingly related with the access to common welfare. In the beginning, the civil and political elements of citizenship were coherent with the benefits of increasing capitalist class against the aristocracy. However, unlike Marx, Marshall argued that the concept of citizenship evolved into a system of rights of the working classes as opposed to the capitalist class with its social element. While the institutions of the political elements of citizenship were parliament or courts of justice, those related to social elements were the educational system and social services (Marshall, 1964).

Marshall's development to the literature brought about new concepts considering citizenship with its transformation towards anti-market approaches and backing working classes. This evaluation can also be applied to immigrants. In a broader perspective, citizenship rights gradually relocated rights of privileged class of the society to previously ignored or excluded groups. However, the orthodox view about the concept of citizenship was often conceived as passive and private as it was not obligatory but ensured rights and entitlements (Rogers, 2008). Lazar (2013, p. 2) argues that an anthropological focus on lived experience points to an understanding of citizenship as "a mechanism for making claims on different political communities, of which the state is just one."

2.1. Classical Liberal Perspective on Citizenship

In the classical liberal perspective, a liberal democracy could be sustainable even in the absence of personal civic virtue or any kind of generosity for the sake of the public. Even if all individuals are "evil" or directed by self-interest, institutions that create balance of powers and competition of evils that restrain one to become oppressor among others (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). However, some challenged that idea of balance of self-interest is enough. There must be some level of virtuous citizen, and public sense of justice (Rawls, 1999) and public-spiritedness is needed (Galston, 1991, pp. 217, 244; Macedo, 1990, pp. 138-39). Therefore, there should be some level of individual responsibility to sustain democracy. Participation in the decision-making process by the people was proposed as a solution to increase and responsibilities of the citizen (Held, 1991, p. 23; cf. Pierson, 1991, p. 202). Not only rights in legal meaning of formal citizenship, but the concept of substantive

citizenship emerged accordingly. From Rousseau's conceptualization of civic republicanism, the emphasis on the value of political participation was on the participant itself. "In order to explain the modern indifference to political participation, civic republicans often argue that political life today has become impoverished compared to the active citizenship of for example ancient Greece. Political debate is no longer meaningful and people lack access to effective participation" (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 362). In liberal virtue theory Galston (1991) examines the virtues of substantive citizenship in four groups: general virtues, social virtues, economic virtues and political virtues. General virtues are courage, to comply with the law and loyalty. Social virtues arise out of independence and open-mindedness. Economic virtues entail work ethic, adaptability to economic and technological change. Political virtues are the capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, and willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston, 1991, pp. 221-24). Where we learn about these virtues, according to many liberal virtue theorists, is in the system of education. Schools must teach children how to engage in the kind of critical reasoning and moral perspective that defines public reasonableness (Gutmann, 1987, p. 51).

Thus, the citizenship agenda emerges. When states teach its citizens what is good citizen, they promote configuration of values, beliefs and thoughts (Foucault, 1991; Rose, 2000). Citizenship agendas are the relations between citizens and normative rules of the society that generate behaviors and values appropriate for the membership of a society (Koning, Jaffe & Koster, 2015). The citizenship agenda determines the substantive form of citizenship differentiated from formal legal

citizenship. It puts forward a virtuous citizen. According to Koning et al. (2015) by means of citizenship education, immigrant integration policies promote assimilation and they often target only some groups. As opposed to formal citizenship, this occurs less explicitly by political rhetoric or government policies. In common they all emerge in complex interplays between state and non-state actors. According to Isin and Turner (2007) citizenship agenda includes an education of civic culture, that within the connection of “effort, reward and virtue” and the citizens participating these activities to defend and sustain democratic institutions which they possess. “Therefore citizenship is essential for cultivating civic virtuous and democratic values” (Isin & Turner, 2007).

2.2. New Concepts of Citizenship

In recent studies, there have been some limitations found in Marshall’s explanation and traditional liberal perspective. The questions like the spheres of citizenship, cultural rights and the recognition of individual’s own identity when it contradicts with the countries’ own identity come under question. Citizenship in the beginning was a formal issue that relates to the membership of a nation-state. But by the time it evolved to more substantial one with political, social, economic, and cultural rights (Garcia, 1996; Holston & Appadurai, 1996). It extended from being only a legal attachment to a nation-state. Redefined as a thick conception of citizenship as activity, or substantive citizenship, this new concept asserted that the “quality of one’s citizenship is a function of one’s participation in that community” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 353). Citizenship that evolves into a more substantive, including notions of belonging, sharing identities and involvement beyond that former conception of citizenship as legal status and possession of equal rights. Bubeck

(1995) in “Thin, Thick and Feminist Conception of Citizenship” defines substantive citizenship as “thick” citizenship meaning active engagement in the community and political life. According to civil society theorists, neither market, nor political participation is enough for fulfilling the virtues of civility and modern citizenship. We need civil society associational networks (Walzer, 1991). For substantive citizenship, political participation or economic integration could not be enough to meet the requirements of being a good citizen. “Walzer (1991) calls his view ‘critical associationalism’ to signify that the associations of civil society may need to be reformed in the light of principles of citizenship” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 364). Therefore, the use of civil society instruments within the society and its evaluation by immigrants will be evaluated as the part of substantive citizenship. Kymlicka and Norman (1994) ask the question, “do we want governments to reconstruct churches, for example, to make them more internally democratic, or to make sure that their members learn to be independent rather than deferential?” This is a good example of how citizenship is not linear and progressive throughout its history. Today political participation in some modern societies is very limited. The postwar orthodoxy of T.H. Marshall’s citizenship theory enables everyone in the society treated equally as a full member of society. In this regard, Marshall’s formulation explains the history of citizenship as cumulative and progressive. However, although its evolutionary nature is obvious whether it is always progressive or not is also a question. With some 20th century examples, some may argue that citizenship progress had some reversals in its evolution.

In the last decade of 20th century, the concept of citizenship has also begun to be reassessed by political scientists. The revival of nationalism in East Europe,

multicultural and multinational stresses arising in Western Europe, Thatcher's fight against the welfare state in the UK and environmental problems that could not be solved by voluntary cooperation were among these incidents leading to reassessment (Rogers, 2008). In order to find new equilibrium between justice and democracy, political scientists rake up the past of citizenship theories. This means, societies are no longer only a justice of Rawls' "basic structure"³ but also the state-citizenship relations (Rawls, 1999).

As Habermas noted, "the institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of them" (Habermas 1992, p. 7). Therefore, in order to make modern democracies sustainable, the concept of good citizenship has been debated by analyzing the qualities of citizens. Sense of identity, the view of other identities (national, regional, religious, ethnic), ability to tolerate others, desire to participate in political processes, working for public good and held accountable by public authorities, personal responsibilities in economic demands, choices for health and environment were the subjects defined to determine the qualities of citizenship (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). As Parekh noted, citizenship "is a much more differentiated and far less homogeneous concept than has been presupposed by political theorists" (Parekh 1990, p. 702). And through three decades after his statement, this condition is still valid.

³ "Very briefly, the first fundamental case is the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure of society by the exercise of citizens' sense of justice." Rawls, J. (1999). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

2.3. Neoliberalism, Post-National and Transnational Citizenship

When citizenship is taken into account, not only the conception of citizenship as status but the conception of citizenship as activity with obligations asserted by some theorists. According to the conservative theory, citizenship rights should match with obligations. The New Right's attack on the idea of social rights and welfare system was a revolutionary development in the conservative thinking in the 1980s with its eagerness to challenge the subject of social citizenship. According to the New Right, social citizenship causes individuals to become inefficient and passive since there is no need to struggle for better life conditions. As Norman Barry argues (1990), there is no evidence that welfare programs promoted active and responsible citizenship. Even further, neo-republican theory asserts that the participation to citizenship obligations is the purpose of citizenship itself. However as Plant (1991) argued, on the contrary "instead of accepting citizenship as a political and social status, modern conservatives have sought to reassert the role of the market and have rejected the idea that citizenship confers a status independent of economic standing" (Plant, 1991, p. 52; King, 1987, pp. 196-98).

Although there were many criticisms on these New Right narratives of new active citizenship, it was nonetheless agreed upon that citizenship theories should be revisited. More active participation of groups to political and economic spheres of the public domain was supported by different political scientists. Workfare programs instead of welfare programs were proposed. The language of groups being as passive recipients of rights given by state authorities and existing institutions of the welfare state also lost its popularity. They seem to promote passivity and dependence, and to "facilitate a privatist retreat from citizenship and a particular 'clientalization' of the

citizen's role" (Habermas, 1992, pp. 10-11; cf. King 1987, pp. 45-46). However, it is also noted that New Right's reforms of the 1980s did not conclude with more responsible citizenship. It could also be argued that, to the contrary, new policies increased the existence of the underclass (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). However, it was agreed by both the New Right and Left that citizenship should involve more activity, and both responsibility and the power to use it (Mulgan, 1991, p. 46). The reason behind existing passivity was seen as individual and personal lack of participation in citizenship responsibilities by some, while others conceived this as the result of group disadvantages of unequal conditions of capitalist society. Some groups within the society were excluded from economic and political participation not because their personal passivity. Although citizenship includes both rights and obligations, the variety within the Left and in between Left and Right emerged at the point where obligations precede rights or vice versa.

The Left argued that responsibilities of citizens are also important, but instead of imposing work as obligation, they supported work training programs. Yet, instead of criticizing social programs developed for dependent citizens, the Left suggested democratizing and decentralizing social welfare programs as a method to change the system (Pierson, 1991, pp. 200-207). The Left believes that the equilibrium on the welfare dependency problem of the citizenship could be solved with the increasing democratic participation and accountability by giving local agencies, regional assemblies and clients more power.

On the other hand, there have been other debates concerning new ideas such as universal post-national citizenship regarding human rights (Soysal, 1994). In contrast

to Marshall's assumption of high degree of cultural homogeneity, the cultural plurality of some countries has emerged as a falsifying example. Liberals and postmodernists assert a plurality of cultural complexities while nationalists resist the idea of multiculturalism. In the midst of these arguments, the benefits of having a citizenship is also discussed. Does it only stem from the membership and commitment of being part of national identity, or are there kinds of egalitarian universal benefits that make citizenship possible?

The condition of minorities and oppressed groups is also another important sphere of the subject of citizenship. Kymlicka (1995) discussed the special group rights that states allow for minorities in the liberal perspective. Furthermore, to what degree differentiated rights for special representation of oppressed groups can also be evaluated is part of this discussion (Young, 2011). In the section that follows, I present literature on the issue of citizenship of immigrants.

CHAPTER 3

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANTS

In Europe, citizenship theories were initially developed in the liberal nation-state system that has relatively homogenous societies in terms of ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. Increasing immigration to European countries in the second half of 20th century brought new challenges to citizenship theories. Those who have not native-born citizens of a country but immigrant residents' and their status in the countries they immigrated have always been a controversial issue. T.H. Marshall's theorizing of citizenship as response to inequalities stemming from class differences is not enough to explain immigrants' rights or legal status. Early post-WW2 studies approached immigrants in class-based explanations and they mainly highlighted social inequalities (e.g., Castles, 1986; Castles & Kosack, 1973; Portes & Bach, 1985). However today, these immigrants and their descendants are identified mainly with their ethnic, cultural and religious differences (Alba, 2005).

Citizenship as one of the most important indicators of immigrants' integration in receiving societies has some main dimensions: legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation and sense of belonging (Bloemraad, 2000; Bosniak, 2000). Based on these dimensions, citizenship is the membership of a particular political and geographical society. Different status of immigrants also influences their rights and participation in the host countries' social, cultural and economic life profoundly.

The status of guest worker, asylum seeker, refugee, and undocumented immigrant are all different standings and they all have different outcomes (Morris, 2002). Legal residence is also as important as the citizen/noncitizen debate. “Lack of legal documentation undermines feelings of security and belonging, the ability to participate fully in the political system, and the ability to negotiate with citizen employers over work conditions” (Menjivar, 2006; Stasiulis & Bakan, 2003). Liberal democracies have countless undocumented immigrants within their borders whom live under the fear of deportation. This indicates how the states are important actors in determining the conditions, security, the sense of belonging and participation in social and political life of immigrants (Bloemraad, 2000).

First of all, considering legal rights, foundations of citizenship were state-centric and based on national belonging. The classical liberal understanding of this relationship as a contract between individuals and state in which both sides have rights and obligations still underlies much of the legal base of citizenship in Europe. Although it is challenged by globalization, states still use institutional configurations to control citizenship rules concerning immigrants. In order to acquire rights or access to participation and belongings, states are determinative. In order to sustain the contract of citizenship, the state guarantees basic rights to the people, while each individual has some obligations such as to pay taxes, complete compulsory education, and obey the laws of the country (Janoski, 1998). Nonetheless, this concept of citizenship within the borders of nation-states can be framed with two different approaches. Civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism underlie much of background of current citizenship policies of countries. Civic nationhood brings about the “Jus soli” notion that gives birthright as a condition to be citizen and generally comes with easier

processes for naturalization. Countries like USA, Canada or the Netherlands embrace this kind of civic citizenship in their citizenship laws. This is more universalist and inclusionary perspective of citizenship for immigrants (Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008). On the other hand, difficult and assimilationist policies often invoke “jus sanguinis,” meaning that both parents should be the citizens of the country in order to determine citizenship. Thus, this is more ethnic and strict interpretation of modern nation-state citizenship. Civic citizenship provides easier conditions for immigrants who are willing to naturalize to their host countries. It does not have an ethnic element, nonetheless, civic nationalism also marks out the meaning of its civic identity. This may also cause some challenges for the different civic paradigms such as the beliefs and practices of Muslim groups (Entzinger, 2003; Joppke & Morawska, 2002). According to Koopmans and his colleagues (2005), states can be classified with regard to their cultural monism to pluralism. As a result of their analysis, from the 1980s to 2002, European countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland gravitated towards a more civic orientation and treatment with regard to immigrants. However, although the shift towards civic citizenship was theoretically common, for example, civic multiculturalism of the Netherlands was not same with civic republican universalism of France. There are different interpretations of modern citizenship and naturalization processes in different countries even though they share some common policies. In the sections below, I discuss different models/policies about immigrants in their receiving countries.

3.1. Multiculturalism and Its Critique

Historically, group rights and celebration of diverse ethnic, racial and cultural belongings exist in some countries. For example, the Netherlands' policies for immigrants and their integration were mainly multiculturalist until 2000's. Especially communitarian multiculturalism places the group interest ahead of the individual interest since individuals engaging in particular social and cultural activities have a meaning beyond their individual interest (Miller, 2000; Taylor, 1994). Parekh (2006) also questioned liberalism as cultural construct by the Western societies that challenges diverse cultures from different regions. It was also argued that countries put minority groups or immigrants in a disadvantaged position against the dominance of majority culture (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Schachar, 2000, 2001). Although classical liberalism asserts state concept of equal to all individuals independent of their ethnic, cultural, religious or any kind of group elements, it was also criticized by many to create inequality between advantageous and disadvantageous groups. Although there are some counter arguments, many critics believe liberals with their commitment to individuality and liberty, can never understand the concept of civic virtue (Mouffe, 1992). Thus, theories of multiculturalism persistently defend recognition and reinforcement of minorities with cultural, ethnic, religious or gender related groups with special laws to protect their rights and participation in society (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Parekh, 2006; Taylor, 1994). Kymlicka attempts to incorporate multiculturalism within liberal's individualistic framework. Cultural membership is part of individual freedom and self-respect; therefore, minorities' language and culture should be protected in a liberal society to let immigrants freely engage with civic nationhood. Although in 1990s many European countries shifted to more multiculturalist policies, this situation changed in

the end of the decade (Brubaker, 2001; Entzinger, 2003; Joppke, 2004; Korteweg, 2006). After a decade of multiculturalism supported in many countries there were some critics emerged. Multiple loyalties, fragmentation in civic, moral and political community, lack of interest in political participation highlighted and stressed cultural distinctions lied behind as reasons of critics (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Koopmans and his colleagues (2005) argued that, spatial distinction created by multiculturalist policies is also leading to a fragmentation in employment and education related issues, and responsible from inequality.

People's capacity as citizens can be measured in participation to politics, economic welfare and social integration. Formal citizenship takes account of the legal status of the citizen does not bring about equal participation. Even in the absence of legal status, an immigrant who fully participates in formal education, business relations, labor market, civil society and any forms of participatory citizenship might be more integrated into the country then without even having the legal status of citizenship (Carens, 1987; Coll, 2004; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2003; Rosaldo, 1997). Political participation can help immigrants and their descendants' if they use political power to remove inequalities for them in social and economic terms. There should be further research over how political participation affects other forms of participation. Therefore, assimilation and integration supporters consider that the level of participation over different aspects of social, political and economic life should be replaced instead of multiculturalist policies that is not integrative and fragmenting the society. However, multiculturalists argue that absence of minority rights would eventually create fragmentation in civic solidarity. They also found out that there is a positive correlation with state multiculturalism and legal citizenship

status obtained through naturalization process (Bloemraad, 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005).

3.2. Post-National and Transnational Citizenship and Immigration

After the 1990s increasing outcomes of globalization as well as political unions such as European Union brought about new perspectives on citizenship. Some scholars evaluated these new concepts of citizenship together with the decreasing importance of nation-states. Cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism generated the two poles of the debates (Vertovec & Cohen, 2002). Immigrants were capable of implementing cross-country relations along with new ideas, commodities, and cultures due to the development in international transportation and communication technologies (Portes, Guarnizo, & Landolt, 1999; Levitt, 2001; Smith, 2003). This was followed by normative abstract political theories of transnational concept of citizenship. Institutions like EHRC (European Human Rights Court) facilitated these theoreticians to argue universal values as a basis of transnational citizenship. Transnational institutions and their constraint over nation-states were the driving force for these cosmopolitan ideas (Brysk & Shafir, 2004; Soysal, 1994). Cosmopolitan and transnational ideas stated that humanity needs further political institutions that would provide collective actors in society balancing economic actors (Habermas, 2003). These institutions could promote universal values with respect to cultural differentiations (Beck & Grande, 2007). Post national citizenship also put personhood as the central unit for immigrants with respect to universal human rights in contrast to membership to the nation-state (Baubock, 1994; Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994).

Soysal (1994) argued that although immigrants resided in six different European countries for years, the citizenship status and given civil, social and political rights of Turkish immigrants were similar. Actually, those new concepts of transnational and post national citizenship emerged as a result of studies concerning immigration in Europe. Therefore, it is not surprising that the new concepts are coherent with immigration studies. Although there were reversals in state policies concerning multiculturalism and strengthening position of nation-states, Soysal argues there is a long-term tendency from national citizenship to more transnational one (Soysal, 2012). Also, the identity that European Union tries to create can also be evaluated within the context of national and local descriptions of citizenship (Lahav, 2004).

Although throughout the 1990s these new concepts were discussed, there were some critics of post national citizenship made afterwards. Faist (2000) argued that the idea of post-national citizenship lacks extensive empirical support. Another criticism was about the level of mobilization and action of political participation of immigrants. It was argued that this did not happen at the transnational level, but at the state level (Bloemraad et al., 2008). In addition, post national arguments were backing the idea of protecting the immigrant's rights towards nation-states with universal values for good. However, on the contrary some argued that globalization with neoliberal policies would result in not only immigrants but all citizens vulnerable against the global market, in which nation-states can protect them from this threat (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Together with these post-national and transnational concepts of citizenship, the terms multiple and dual citizenship have also been discussed by citizens, policy makers, and scholars.

3.3. Dual Citizenship

Citizens might create transnational life practices. With local associations, business relations, investments, religious groups, and political ties, immigrants build transnational networks and spaces. Sending countries can benefit from these transnational relations for their own interests as well, and promote these kinds of policies (Itzigsohn, 2007). Therefore, dual citizenship should also take into consideration within the new concepts of citizenship. As means of personal benefits or even as commodity, passports of more than one country are popular among many immigrants. As Faist (2000) argues, what post-nationalists miss is the possibility of possessing multiple citizenships of countries within the current sovereign state system. Although this deterritorialized concept of citizenship transcends the boundaries of geographically defined legal entities, nonetheless sovereign states determine the conditions of citizenship rules with particular policies. Although further research should be made on transnationalism and the number of immigrants having a transnational life, there are some other arguments about this subject that merit discussion. It was suggested by some researchers that immigrants might face struggle in mobility since this could be assessed as losing status in the country of origin (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo, 2005; Jones-Correa, 1998). There are also some arguments that receiving states may succeed to alter personal belongings of immigrants and limit this transnational citizenship (Waldinger, 2007). However, such findings would not mean that immigrants could not continue their relations and belongings while they also participate in activity with the sending state. Although there are exceptions, dual citizenship is becoming more accepted by many nation-states. This does not stem from single-sided decisions of states but as a result of

international agreements and increasing number of emigrants and their organized struggle for dual citizenship (Spiro, 2004). In Sweden, dual-citizenship is seen as a human right (Spang, 2007). Some research indicated that allowance of dual citizenship brings more political participation of immigrants in receiving country and hence encourages them to be naturalized and indirectly train to integration (Jones-Correa, 2001). “We need to know more about people who choose or reject dual citizenship to understand better the reasons for their choices” (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Transnational citizenship ensures people engage in multiple territorial political units and potentially their belonging. This also challenges the traditional idea that citizenship is linked with a single nation-state. Bloemraad et al. (2008) argues that there is a gap between abstract political theory and empirical social science. Therefore, he recommends greater focus on immigrants’ agency.

In this literature review, particularly transnational citizenship and dual citizenship emerge as relevant frameworks to discuss the empirical data of my research. Many studies focus on state’s policies, citizenship laws and their implications, but not immigrants’ negotiations. Whether immigrants’ conditions are same with native born non-immigrants, immigrants’ participation to politics, and how social, political and economic participation are connected to belonging all need further research.

Integration of Muslim communities should be considered carefully and not to become judging based on different ethnic and religious groups. Good citizen and “Europeanization” is often understood as assimilation and therefore it is important to not fall into this bias. It is also needed to classify immigrant’s adaptation based on their generations. Is the first generation enough to measure integration, or should we consider second or third generations? When doing research on immigrants,

comparisons should also be made carefully. Immigrants should be compared with similar counterparts such as ethnic minorities or disadvantaged groups, but not with native-born citizens (Alba & Nee, 2003; Bean & Stevens, 2003).

CHAPTER 4

IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE NETHERLANDS

If we count at least one of the parents of foreign-born persons with part of immigrant background, one in every six persons in the Netherlands are in this group. This demonstrates how immigration and integration policies are critical in this country. The Netherlands has been seen as one of the most successful countries in which multicultural policies are implemented. Beginning with the former colonies' immigration and increasing number after Indonesia's and Surinam's independence, immigration is not a new trend in the Netherlands. Migrants are mostly settled in big metropolitan areas, especially in the West. Amsterdam with its dense population accounts for one-third of foreign-born residents; three of every five children in schools have immigrant background in this city (Entzinger, 2003).

4.1. The Netherlands' Immigration Policy

Historically, the Netherlands' attitude towards immigrants were consistent with the policies of successful welfare state of the time (De Hart, 2016). Government targeted as a duty to take care of every person in the country. Before the 1980s immigrants were seen as "temporary," and it was targeted to make sure that they can receive similar unemployment benefits, social support, housing and healthcare subsidies just as native-born citizens have. It was the common view that temporary workers should protect their cultural identity and the state policies were coherent with this view.

Mother tongue language in public schools were allowed and supported. This protection of cultural identity was also evaluated to help new generation's return ticket to their country of origin.

It was not until the 1980s that immigrants began to be perceived as permanent residents. In 1979 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) announced its wide-ranging report over the immigrants called "Ethnic Minorities." In this influential report, it was accepted that immigrants and guest workers would not go to return their countries for good. It was suggested by the council that new policies considering the integration of immigrants should be developed (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1979).

Instead of German "auslander" or France's "immigres," the term "etnische minderheden" (ethnic minorities) was used from a different perspective (Entzinger, 2003). The Netherlands approached immigrants not on an individual basis but on a group-basis stemming from ethnic differences. Ethnic or national origin was evaluated as the dominant and fundamental characteristic of membership in immigrant groups (Hughes, 1994). Celebrating immigration as part of a cultural diversity was one of the pillars of the Dutch society. Prior to 1980, promoting retention of cultural identity was seen as means of easy return to the home country. However, similar policies were implemented for another reason: to increase the multicultural structure of the country. Pluralist tradition of the Netherlands together with its historical political consensus over "pillarization," meaning that each and every distinct group in society can enjoy emancipation with mutual respect to each other and construct its own structure for community membership, belonging and

institutional arrangements. In order to restrain tensions among these groups, minimum inter-community contact was enough for the general politics of harmony and emancipation. Although individualization and modernization decreased the influence over these communities at the societal level, at the institutional level, traditional pillarization policies of the country are still influential. In media, education and civil society organizations, this institutional configurations of pluralism and mutual respect still dominate much of group organizations. This institutional tradition was invariably implemented for the minority policies. It was enabled for minorities to emancipate their culture and ideology freely and even with generous public support. Subsidies for ethno-cultural organizations, media, and community needs. The needs of multicultural society were fulfilled by both local and state level institutions. Although doing so faced some controversies, Muslim schools were allowed to open. "These schools function on the same conditions as Protestant, Roman Catholic or Jewish schools" (Dwyer & Meyer, 1995). Experience from these schools indicates that it had little influence over students. State support towards immigrants and their identical, cultural emancipation were mostly proposed by the state authorities contrary to what is expected as immigrant demands (Enzinger, 2003).

Minority policies of the Netherlands were implemented essentially at the local level. In 1983, the Ministry of Interior became responsible for the minority issues since the same ministry was also coordinating the local governments. In the same year, a memorandum (Minderhedennota) was presented by the government on minority policy that emphasized the cultural differences of minorities and their disadvantages position in the society as a result of these differences. Cultural pluralism designated

to provide immigrants emancipation and integration were behind this pragmatic approach, later entitled multiculturalism. In the 1980s, the legal position of the immigrants was discussed in a pragmatic manner aiming further integration (De Hart, 2016). Minority policy of the country grounded on the acceptance of new multi-ethnic presence of the society. Equal opportunities should have been granted for all in order to live in harmony with people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds together. This public policy explicitly was announced in Minderhedennota in 1983: “Achieving a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development” (Minderhedennota, 1983, p. 10). Especially guest workers who immigrated to the country from 1960s to 1980s were seen as the groups that Dutch society owed much of its wealth. Post-war economic expansion was only possible with the guest workers’ robust labor force, and this economic expansion sustained until the 1980s. The government felt a special responsibility for these groups and their cultural identities supported to be protected by the state. Emancipation in a multicultural society, equality before the law, and promotion of equal opportunity for immigrants were the main elements of the minority policy of the Netherlands.

The Netherlands’ policy of multiculturalism brought about very convenient citizenship implementation before the law. Firstly, the government decided to not force any immigrants to citizenship and instead endeavored to establish equal rights for both citizens and non-citizen residents. Except for some insignificant differences, long term residents were allowed to benefit from almost all social and public services just as formal citizens. In order to increase political participation and abandon any

kind of discrimination, voting and candidacy rights in local elections were granted in 1985. However, election results indicate that participation levels of immigrants in elections as voters are quite low compared to Dutch average. One exception to this was Turkish immigrants. Their participation to elections was comparatively higher than the other immigrant groups (Tillie, 2000). Interestingly, while these rights were being debated, there was no such demand from the immigrants for more political participation. After granting suffrage rights, political participation and influence of immigrants' votes in Dutch political life increased. Acquiring citizenship became important for national elections. As a result of simplified naturalization processes, many of immigrants also possessed Dutch citizenship. But nonetheless, for example among Turks, the percentage of Dutch citizenship owners was %67 in 1999 (Seifert, 2000). Although many initiatives urged immigrants to take dual citizenship in the 1990s, political participation and ownership of Dutch citizenship did not draw the attention of many Turkish residents. This also reveals the influence of egalitarian policies of the Netherlands towards citizens and non-citizen residents.

Another element of Dutch minority policy was the promotion of equal opportunity. The term "proportionality" is the key to understand the State's means for the equal redistribution of resources. First, every minority should benefit from housing, healthcare, education, and other social support proportionally. They participate the institutions of welfare state system in order to provide equal opportunity and accessibility for immigrants. Research indicates that these policies succeeded. For example, housing conditions among the Dutch and Turkish origin residents are very similar in the same economic status groups (Tesser, Dugteren, & Merens, 1996). Educational policies also were affected from the multicultural paradigm of the

Netherlands. In order to balance disadvantageous situations in schools, students with immigrant origin were enabled to get different curricula and additional lessons. Mother tongue education was also supported as well as remedial teaching. Although the results of these educational policies helped immigrant children, they did not succeed entirely as minority children continued to have worse results on average than their Dutch classmates. Employment of ethnic minorities was also another pillar of multiculturalism, however, due to neoliberal policies and decreasing influence of the State over the private sector and business life. Distribution mechanisms were determined based on market rules, and employers chose the most skillful workers for their job offers. The state's support could emerge in special training courses, but changing technologies for production and need for unskilled labor was limited after the 1980s. Not only the first generation of immigrants but also the second generation suffered from high unemployment (Tesser et al., 1999).

In 1989, The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), in its report "Allochtonenbeleid," recommended an allowance for dual citizenship (Immigrant Policy, 1989, pp. 93-96). The council advised considering emotional attachments of some immigrants to their country of origin in stipulating renunciation of their initial citizenship. This report induced many debates in between the following governments of the Netherlands. The CDA and PvdA government initially did not agree with the recommendation but after a while they revised their position. The Christian Democrats were quite suspicious and were divided from the beginning. That party switched its position several times as a result of divergent ideas within the party during these years. While declaring their understanding of the problems that the immigrants face emotionally due to renunciation requirement, they were suspicious

about the concern of loyalty stem from dual citizenship. On the other hand, PvdA argued that globalization and migration make multiple loyalties possible. As a result, a consensus was built among PvdA and CDA as well as D88 and Green Left on the subject of abolishment of the renunciation requirement. The Dutch Citizenship Law repealed with immediate effect the requirement for renunciation for the dual citizenship from 1st January 1992. This legislation had quite significant impact especially for Turkish immigrants (De Hart, 2016). As one of two largest minority groups in the Netherlands, unlike Moroccans, Turkish immigrants had no exception for the renunciation requirement until that legislation was passed.

The legislation was justified by the government with a citizenship concept that is built on connection, rather than integration or undivided loyalty: “The question whether and to what extent the existence of these relationships is required cannot be answered in general terms. Which rights and obligations should be connected to the possession of Dutch citizenship cannot be answered either” (Tweede Kamer, 1992-1993, 23 029, no.6, p.5). The Scientific Council’s recommendation and the government’s position were dealt with in a highly pragmatic and instrumental manner to initiate immigrants’ integration in the Netherlands.

On the other hand, the new report from the Scientific Council released in 1989 stated excessive emphasis on multiculturalism as responsible for these outcomes and suggested the promotion of better participation of immigrants in society. It also argued that more efficient educational and employment programs should be implemented by the State to increase the integration capacity of minorities (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1989). A series of debates between multiculturalists

and supporters of change in minority policies in 1994, “Contourennota Integratiebeleid Etnische Minderheden”⁴ was published by the government to replace the multiculturalist report from 1983 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1994). The new report reflected the new consensus concerning minority policies with a focus on integration and active participation in Dutch society, and the emphasis over cultural identity and its protection substantially abandoned. Integration was defined as “a process leading to the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society, for which mutual respect for identity is seen as a necessary condition” (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1994, p. 24). This indicated that multiculturalist position of the Netherlands was no longer supported at the state level.

By the 1990s several new conditions emerged to challenge the minority policies of the Netherlands. First existing minority population increased due to family reunions and high birth rates. The number of immigrants migrating to the country accelerated in the second half of 1980’s and peaked after the unification of Berlin wall. The numbers of new types of immigrants such as asylum seekers and refugees increased. As a result, the total number of minorities doubled from half a million to one million. There were other reasons that challenged the existing minority policies. The second generation of minority population integrated more to the society due to their education acquired in Dutch system. Also, unfavorable economic conditions for ethnic minorities remained while the number of immigrants increased. This led many of them to become dependent on welfare support. Some critics began to question the effectiveness of ongoing immigrant and minority policies, especially the general frame of creating separate provisions for different groups (De Jong, 1997).

⁴ Also published in English: Outline Policy Document on the Integration of Ethnic Minorities (1994).

In a 1991 speech to the Liberal International, Frits Bolkestein indicated the first signals of changing perspectives of the Dutch society and politics towards immigration politics. He stated that 'Islam' and 'Western values' cannot coexist. He singled out polygamy with regard to contradictions between the dominant culture's values and the immigrants' ethnic or religious norms (Bolkestein, 1991). Although this met with strong opposition from multiculturalists, it was seen in the following elections that these ideas resonated in Dutch society too.

As opposed to this pragmatic approach on dual citizenship, as of 1992, minority policy of the Netherlands began changing in an opposite direction. Instead of approaching minorities as disadvantaged groups, reactionary politicians argued that immigrants are treated too liberally, and more individualistic approach was promoted. The former rights and opportunities provided to the minorities to allow their own emancipation, became seen as obstacles to integration for Dutch policy makers. Citizenship was no longer a right but a duty. This new trend was related to changing understanding of nationhood in the Netherlands. More ethnic conception of nationhood instead of republican understanding begun to be influential in Dutch politics. Dutch nationality has no name but it exists in the expression of denial (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, 2003). Especially the ethnic conception of nationhood including the elements such as common culture, shared language and descent did not play an important role in Dutch politics until the late 1990s (De Hart, 2016). Nationhood and citizenship were based on shared civic mindedness, a sense of belonging to the nation, political participation and equal opportunities to individuals and groups in the Netherlands. However, as of 1992 legislation, the CDA

and VVD evaluated the increasing numbers of dual citizenship not as a sign of success, but as a result of making naturalization a ‘paper’ formality. The VVD was suspicious about the outcomes of new policy to transform Dutch citizenship to an asset such as diplomas or credit cards (De Hart, 2016). The question towards a new legislation arise when immigrants with very low connection with the substantive form of Dutch citizenship naturalized. From this perspective, naturalization should not be the tool for the integration process, but should be the result of successful integration. As a result of these objections against the complete abolishment of renunciation requirement, in 1997, the renunciation requirement was reinstated. Nonetheless, this new legislation opened a place for even more exceptions for dual citizenship than before 1992, yet Turkish immigrants’ naturalization rates dropped. Ethnic minorities were renamed as non-western allochtones in 1998 (De Hart, 2016).

In 2000, a new Dutch citizenship law made the dual citizenship more difficult. The trend towards limiting dual citizenship and approaching citizenship as a more assimilationist manner with individual obligations was apparent. The pragmatic pluralist approach of the late 1980s was no longer popular in the Dutch political scene. In contrast to former formal and thin conception of the citizenship, substantial and thick conception of citizenship with higher degrees of cultural adaptation, political participation, sense of belonging and loyalty started to be expected from the immigrants. The altering conception on nationhood and citizenship became explicit politically under the Purple government of PvdA, VVD and D66 coalition. In this period stronger ethno-cultural arguments were echoed in the mainstream politics of the Netherlands. Following 9/11 attacks and assassination of the Pim Fortyn, Dutch politician who is known for his criticism of Islam (Fortyn, 2002) brought about the

arguments that integration policies had failed. Instead of immigrants or non-western allochtones, these minority groups were renamed as “Muslims” and their integration was no longer encouraged, but demanded (De Hart, 2016). Culture continued to be seen as the source of problems but instead of specific policies to abandon disadvantages of different culture, immigrants were obliged to integrate themselves with Dutch culture individually. In 2000s, integration became a pre-condition for naturalization and citizenship. Standardized exams (Inburgeringsexamen) testing the immigrant’s adaptation of Dutch cultural norms and language proficiency were introduced. Together with these qualities of citizenship, expectation of loyalty to the Netherlands and its constitution indicates how both formal and substantive conceptions of citizenship became influential for the integration policy.

This new concept of citizenship and nationhood could be evaluated as republican nationhood, and more substantive citizenship elements could be seen in the 2001 Government Memorandum of the Netherlands:

“Citizenship means having a part and participating in Dutch society as an autonomous person. Immigrants are offered sufficient possibilities to use their rights and to fulfil their social obligations, but they have to prove themselves. They have sufficient room to develop their identity and to express their religious beliefs and convictions about life, within the framework of our country. It can be expected of them to contribute actively to this modern, open and dynamic society. ... Every resident of the country has to respect the fundamental values of society, as laid down in the constitution, laws and rules and the generally accepted opinions of society. The values are carried by all citizens and codified again and again in democratic decision-making

processes” (Government Memorandum Integration in the perspective of Immigration, 2001, p. 55, 60).

The Dutch philosopher Baukje Prins (2002) called this new perspective on immigrants “the new realism.” According to her, after decades of political correctness in the Dutch political scene, it was time to have courage to face the facts about immigrants. Her frankness was also exemplified as typical Dutch characteristic and criticized the Left for its political correctness and ignorance towards the problems arise out of immigrants. Actually, this term was not invented by Prins. Pim Fortuyn’s political discourse used the term “regenten politiek” meaning new realism. He also criticized the ignorance of the politicians on immigration problems and Islam’s place in the Dutch society. Parties from across the spectrum in Dutch politics were affected by this concept of “new realism,” and this term brought about the more assimilationist policies in which Islam’s place in society was viewed suspiciously.

When Dutch policies from 1980s to 2000s are analyzed, the change in the concepts of nationhood and citizenship is apparent. Due to new understanding of the nationhood, and aggregated problems, Dutch integration policy evolved from a pragmatic, pluralist and culturalist approach to a more assimilationist understanding. Nonetheless, since almost every legislation includes many exceptions, the influence of this policy change was not very significant for immigrants. The historical pillarization tradition and the Left’s quite empathetic and politically correct discourse on immigration policies are still fresh in the minds of the immigrants and government practices. Therefore, although there is a trend towards more assimilationist arguments, Dutch immigration policy is still quite republican and pragmatic fundamentally. In the next chapter, I shall review the current legal

institutional framework of Dutch citizenship laws to understand the effects of changing policies in the Netherlands.

4.2. The Legal-Institutional Context and Citizenship in the Netherlands

The terms of legal status are important to understand the rights and obligations of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Immigrants' statuses constitute the context in which they negotiate the Dutch citizenship regime. In this part, legal conditions for permanent residence permit, naturalization, dual citizenship, and their relation with social benefits, particularly the unemployment benefit, pensions, retirement and other kind of social and political rights in the Netherlands will be examined based on the information I collected using the websites of the Dutch authorities, namely, the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service - (IND), the Social Insurance Bank (SVB), the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV), and the Government of the Netherlands.

There are different type of residence permits in the Netherlands based on the reason of residence or duration of validity. The ordinary temporary residence permit is Type I. This residence permit is issued to the temporary residents who are in the Netherlands for study, paid employment, or family reunification. The subject of the residence is stated on the identity document and is the most common temporary residence permit. Since it is temporary, the social and political rights are quite limited for the holders of this residence permit. The other common residence permit is ordinary permanent residence permit, also known as Type II (referred to as Oturum by Turkish immigrants). Type II is issued to the residents of the Netherlands

for an indefinite period. This residence permit is given at least for 5 years of residency in the country. Employment is permitted with the document issued, and every five years, the document owner should renew her/his document. Type III and Type IV are issued on the grounds of asylum residence permit and while Type III is issued for the asylum temporary residence, the latter is issued for permanent asylum residence. There is also Type V and Type EU/EER residence permit for the long-term residents in the Netherlands from other European community member states. Among these residence permits Type II, Type IV, Type V and Type EU/EER are permanent and holders of one of these residence permits have nearly the same rights as someone with Dutch nationality. The only difference arises in the right to work in special governmental areas such as the police and the army, and the right to vote in national elections.

The main condition to get permanent residence permit from the Dutch state is to live in the country at least for 5 years with a valid residence permit. But there are some exemptions to the 5-year condition, such as being a Belgian or Luxembourg citizen, to apply for the permanent residence permit after withdrawing it to live in another country and apply for reacquisition in a specific time, to be a former Dutch citizen and had lived in the Netherlands for at least 5 years at the time of receiving the citizenship, or before 18 years old lived in the Netherlands for at least 5 years with a valid residence permit. In addition, these 5 years are counted after age of 8.

Therefore, before 13, one cannot get a permanent residence permit with the 5-year rule. During these 5 years, if an immigrant stays outside of the country for more than 6 consecutive months, or 3 years in a row for more than 4 consecutive months, s/he cannot apply for the permanent residence permit. During the time of the application,

the valid residence permit for a non-temporary purpose must be submitted. For a permanent residence permit, one should also prove sufficient, sustainable, and independent income personally or together with her/his family or partner. The final condition for the permanent residence permit is the civic integration diploma indicating that the immigrant can read, write, speak, and understand the Dutch language. Before January 1, 2013, municipalities were responsible for the Civic Integration Act; as of January 1, 2013, the Education Executive Agency of the Netherlands (DUO) has become the institution that ensures its implementation. In this regulatory framework, in order to get a permanent residence permit in the Netherlands, a civic integration diploma is necessary. But there are some exemptions to this integration exam. For example, the minors who are younger than 18 years old or retirees reached to AOW pension age and EU, Swiss, and Turkish nationals are exempt from the civic integration examination. The exemption for Turkish nationals emerged as a result of court decision with reference to Ankara Agreement on Creating an Association Between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community signed in 1963. However, this exemption is still a controversial topic in the Netherlands since Turks are the largest minority population in the country.

Once a person acquires a permanent residence permit in the Netherlands, just as citizenship, it is not easy to annul it. Therefore, permanent residence permit is seen as a very secure document for immigrants. They are able to benefit from public funds without any limitation. The Participation Act (former Work and Social Assistance Act) that provides income support for people who reached the state pension age (AIO), the Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons (Wajong),

the Social Assistance Decree (Bbz), the Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Unemployed Persons (IOAW), the Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled Formerly Self-employed Persons (IOAZ), the Supplementary Benefits Act (TW) controlled by UWV, and the Interim Invalidation Criteria (Impact on Income) Act (WBIA) are some of the laws regarding social benefits. According to the Dutch Export Restrictions on Benefits Act, the pensions and other kinds of benefits are paid to the residents of European countries, or the countries which signed a social security agreement with the Netherlands. But based on each agreement, those rights abroad are different. For example, some additional benefits like the ones related to small disability pension can no longer be paid in Turkey. On the other hand, applying for one of these social benefits with temporary residence permit may cause an immigrant to lose his/her residence permit because the level of income is the determining factor for the continuity of temporary residence permit. Nonetheless, social benefits such as housing benefit and health-care allowance, childcare, and supplementary child benefit are also given to residents with temporary residence permit.

Unemployment benefit (UWV) and general/social assistance benefit⁵ (known as Sosyal among Turkish immigrants) are important. In the Netherlands, even workers without permanent residence permit or citizenship are able to take advantage of the unemployment benefit. This unemployment system provides 75% of the average income of the last 12 months of the unemployed person for the first two months. After two months, this benefit decreases to 70% depending on circumstances. However, this unemployment benefit is not a welfare payment and it is limited for 3

⁵ The two terms are used interchangeably.

to 24 months based on the duration of former work. There is a general rule of working 26 weeks out of 36 weeks before unemployment period starts in order to get the unemployment benefit. During the unemployment period, UWV also supports the person to find a new job. After this unemployment benefit, if a person is not able to find a job and has insufficient income or savings, then s/he can apply for the general assistance benefit (Bijstandsuitkering) or benefit for the older unemployed (IOAW, IOW and IOAZ). One prior criterion to apply for the general assistance is to be not entitled to another public benefit. When applied for a general assistance benefit, one should look for work or training for 28 days. General assistance benefit can be applied via municipalities. Following the application, municipalities determine whether one is eligible for general assistance and the amount of assistance if eligible. In Amsterdam, to be able to apply for this benefit, one must hold Dutch citizenship or the citizenship of a country in the European Union, or a valid residence permit, and live in Amsterdam, be older than 18, not have state pension and not entitled to any other benefits, have very limited capital or savings, and not be in prison or in a detention center. Municipalities count all the capital and income of the applicant to make sure that the person needs this social assistance. Therefore, related to my study about Turkish immigrants, information on assets, funds and income in Turkey is important for municipalities to make the right decision.

The social assistance benefit also brings some obligations. Persons must register with an employment agency and accept and keep the offered work. One must do everything possible to get a job, including retaining related knowledge, relocating and active seeking of a job. Even the clothing of a person is important to indicate his/her intention to get employed. Full cooperation with the municipality, sharing all

related information about financial status and identity are also among the obligations. Therefore, in the matter of general assistance, government aims to prevent passive benefits, and instead, it urges those who are getting assistance to be active and self-sufficient. To provide this benefit at the local level with the organization of municipalities also indicates how social assistance is given specifically to reintegrate the disadvantaged into society. As part of the Participation Act, the language requirement is also valid for the beneficiaries. In order to get social assistance, one must have sufficient proficiency in Dutch. If one does not meet this requirement, the social assistance is reduced up to 100% gradually in a year. Also, as an important obligation for immigrants, while a person gets social assistance, s/he can go on holiday only for 28 days per year including weekends, and s/he must first discuss his/her holiday plan with the contact person at the municipality. Municipality has a right to disagree with the proposed holiday plan. All these rights and obligations of social benefits are directly related to the subject of this study because the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands form their strategies regarding the citizenship status based on these rights and obligations.

In this context, the process of naturalization is also quite important for these strategies. There are different ways of being a Dutch citizen. In addition to by birth or acknowledgement, and “option,” naturalization is a way to get citizenship in the Netherlands. General conditions for naturalization are to be 18 years or older, to live in the Netherlands for at least 5 years with a valid residence permit, and renew this residence permit on time during the residence in the Netherlands. There are also some exceptions for the 5 years rule, such as naturalization as a result of marriage, being a former Dutch citizen, being stateless or some other conditions, which shorten

this period to three years. Also, if a person lives in the Netherlands for 10 years with a valid residence permit and in the last two years stayed in the country uninterruptedly, s/he can acquire citizenship in two years. Although there are some other exceptions or special ways to become a Dutch citizen, I examined the most significant ones in this study. Another important requirement for naturalization is to be sufficiently integrated to Dutch society. This means one must get the civic integration diploma and be able speak, write, and understand Dutch sufficiently and pass the exam that is prepared with respect to the Civic Integration Act. During the naturalization process, there must be no criminal record for the applicant and from the last five years prior to the naturalization decision, there must be no conviction or sentence to a conditional discharge as a result of crime in the Netherlands or abroad. In order to naturalize, the renunciation of the other nationality is a must. Therefore, in current law, Turkish citizens who want to get a Dutch citizenship must renounce their Turkish citizenship. Nonetheless, there are also some exceptions for this renunciation, which make dual citizenship possible. If a naturalizing Turkish immigrant is married to or registered as a partner of a Dutch citizen, or a minor who is younger than 18, or living in the Netherlands during the application and was born in the Netherlands, s/he is not obliged to renounce his/her Turkish citizenship. Therefore, there are still many Turkish immigrants who hold dual citizenship in the Netherlands.

In addition to the rights and conditions for those who live in the Netherlands, negotiating their citizenship or residence status with regard to social benefits, rights and obligations, there is an option for those who want to return to their country of origin. The Remigration Benefit is designated for those immigrants who want to go

back their country of origin. It is also known as 45-55 law (45-55 yasası) among Turkish people in the Netherlands getting this name because of the change in the minimum age required to get the benefit. The main conditions to apply for this benefit are to live in the Netherlands, to be 55 years old or over, were older than 18 when immigrated to the Netherlands and born in the country of origin and hold its nationality. The applicants who get benefit from the Netherlands for more than 12 continuous months and agree to give up the Dutch nationality and residence permit, can get this remigration benefit. This benefit is targeting those immigrants who cannot integrate to Dutch society and are willing to return to their country of origin. The remigration act targets to encourage immigrants to not only return to their home country, but also to stay there permanently: after one year of remigration, former immigrants in the Netherlands must fulfil the standard immigration procedure just as any other Turkish citizen. Compared to the nominal income of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, the remigration benefit is quite low. However, since the purchasing power of Euro is very high relative to the Turkish lira, this benefit is enough for many immigrants who are not willing or able to integrate into Dutch society and have insufficient income in the Netherlands. During my field research, I heard from many Turkish immigrants about this remigration benefit. Therefore, the rights, obligations, and conditions for the remigration benefit is also related to my study.

CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS

Individual and community negotiations of Turkish immigrants with citizenship regime in the Netherlands vary based on their wide range of different backgrounds, socio-economic status, education, religion, gender and duration of their residence in the country. In my field research conducted in Amsterdam, I conducted face-to-face in-depth interviews with Turkish immigrants from different backgrounds. They or their parents came to the Netherlands as unskilled blue-collar workers. Therefore, this research does not include an analysis of current increasing numbers of skilled expatriates or immigrants who went to the Netherlands with comparatively higher socio-economic and educational background. Beginning with the first guest-workers in the 1960s, there are over three generations of immigrants from Turkey in the Netherlands. The first generation of workers mainly came here as temporary workers. Their initial target was to save money and return. Also, the Dutch government shared a similar perspective, the guest workers were all invited temporarily. However, this has not come true. Following the first generation, with family unions or positive narratives made by the antecedents, many others immigrated to the country and the numbers of immigrants to return to their home country never passed the numbers of new immigrants. Among these first-generation guest workers, today many of them are not alive. But their children, or followers of initial guest workers who immigrated to the Netherlands were among my respondents.

Table 1: Respondent's Information

| Name ⁶ | Gen ⁷ | Age | Gender | Immigration Status / Reason | Current Status | Emp Status ⁸ | Year of Immigration | Community |
|-------------------|------------------|-----|--------|-----------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Murat | 1 | 63 | M | Tourist | Dual Citizen | Unemp. | 1979 | Mosque |
| Ekmel | 1 | 50 | M | Tourist | Dual Citizen | Unemp. | 1979 | Mosque |
| Tahsin | 2 | 55 | M | Tourist | Dual Citizen | Empl. | 1974 | Mosque |
| Fadime | 1 | 46 | F | Marriage | Dual Citizen | Unemp. | 1993 | Mosque |
| Ender | 3 | 24 | M | Born in NL | Dual Citizen | Empl. | - | Active in Economy |
| Yasin | 1 | 45 | M | Marriage | Resident | Empl. | 2008 | Active in Economy |
| Şefik | 1 | 43 | M | Marriage | Dual Citizen | Empl. | 1999 | Active in Economy |
| Fazıl | 2 | 57 | M | Family Union | Dual Citizen | Empl. | 1977 | Active in Economy |
| Mecit | 1 | 42 | M | Tourist | Resident | Empl. | 2004 | Active in Economy |
| İbrahim | 1 | 74 | M | Guest Worker | Dual Citizen | Retired | 1968 | Alevi Culture |
| Haydar | 1 | 59 | M | Undocumented | Dutch Citizen | Empl. | 1986 | Alevi Culture |
| Ahsen | 1 | 51 | F | Marriage | Dual Citizen | Unemp. | 1972 | Alevi Culture |
| Osman | 2 | 38 | M | Born in NL | Dual Citizen | Empl. | - | Active in Economy |
| Mahmut | 2 | 47 | M | Born in NL | Dual Citizen | Unemp. | - | Stichting Kızılırmak |
| Hilmi | 2 | 56 | M | Tourist | Resident | Empl. | 1989 | Stichting Kızılırmak |

⁶ Instead of their real names, pseudonyms are used in this study for personal confidentiality.

⁷ Generation

⁸ Employment Status

5.1. The Ayasofya (Westermoskee) Mosque Community

I made my first interviews with the members of the community in the Ayasofya Mosque. The Ayasofya Mosque located in Oud-West area is a recently opened mosque whose construction was highly contested during its 24 years long history. It is the mosque of the Islamist political organization in Turkey called “Milli Görüş Hareketi” (National Vision Movement). The story of the mosque is quite complicated. When the land in the De Baarsjes neighborhood was purchased by the Ayasofya Mosque Association, it was an unused former garage. A group of Milli Görüş members donated their personal savings, properties or even take out loans to purchase this facility (Rijken, 2014). The land was 8000 square meter size and there was no approved project by the municipality to build a mosque at the time they purchased the property. The former garage building started to be used as prayer rooms. However, this was just the beginning of a long conflict with the neighboring community and the district administration. The district chairman of the PvdA of the time contested the mosque association since this was against the zoning plans, and he had doubts about the political Islamist ideology of Milli Görüş. That same year several thousand Milli Görüş supporters organized a demonstration to build a grandiose mosque to their land. Although the initial zoning plans stipulated a garage on the land, the practical situation of its usage as a large Islamic prayer facility had been tolerated and thereafter a 1000 square meter Mosque plan was accepted by the district administration. The Mosque community contested the local administration and got a favorable result. New plans included religion, housing and business facilities on the land, and they were prepared with the cooperation of the district administration, a housing company and the Mosque association (Rijken, 2014).

Although some neighbors objected to the project because of the future impact of the Mosque on their lives, it is important to note that they did not object to the Mosque itself. They challenged the size of the Mosque, the length of the minaret and architecture that would affect the view of their homes. Henk van Waveren, the former district mayor of the local labor party claimed that he saw no harm for the call for Friday prayers known as “ezan” in Turkish, from the Mosque. Nonetheless, the Mosque administration decided not to call for prayer. The construction of the Mosque took a very long and hard journey not only because it was against initial zoning plans, but also internal fights and alleged fraud in the deals of the Mosque Association with the contractor housing company. Nonetheless, the process of construction of Ayasofya Mosque in Amsterdam shows how urban management mechanisms finally found a consensus among the neighbors, the Mosque community, the district administration and housing company (Rijken, 2014).

When I entered the mosque, I noticed the Turkish national TV on in the little cafeteria inside the building. Newspapers, the Turkish tea and all other cultural objects reminded me of Turkey. After I introduced myself as a researcher coming from Turkey, they were quite open and friendly. I made several interviews with the members of mosque community. Most of them were in their 60s. They migrated to the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s as followers of the first-generation guest workers. These people are among the longest residents of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam. They are all regular members of the mosque community. Although there were some personal problems, they were happy to be part of this mosque community. To protect their heritage and culture was very important to them, and they seemed quite successful to overcome this in the Netherlands through their

membership in the mosque community. Regarding the citizenship, I learnt that most of them were holding Dutch citizenship together with Turkish citizenship. Since they have been in the Netherlands for over 40 years, they had witnessed many different citizenship policies. Most of the mosque community are comfortable with their dual citizenship. This enables them not to lose their emotional attachment with Turkey and their Turkish passports, which have a symbolic meaning for many. They feel Turkish, and some of them think if they leave Turkish citizenship, they will leave their identity, culture and religion. This indicates how they feel attached to their Turkish origin. Responses to the questions regarding social integration to the Netherlands also indicates variations. Most of them are grateful to Dutch society, to provide the freedom to build their own mosque and practice their religion. “Look at how Turks behave to Syrians, people do not want them in Turkey, if you look at this, Dutch people are angels,” one old man told me. When I asked the question “What if I ask you whether you choose the Dutch citizenship or Turkish, how would you reply?” one middle-aged man replied with raising his voice: “You cannot ask a question like this. Nobody has a right to ask such questions.”

But another old man defended my question against him by saying, “There is freedom of speech, he can ask any question and we reply.” Before I said anything to the middle-aged man, old people supported me and appeased him. But they also could not answer my question. It is obvious that this topic is sensitive. Because they emotionally belong to Turkey and Turkish citizenship is a symbol of this attachment. On the other hand, their lives and their families are here in the Netherlands. They have direct interest in holding Dutch citizenship. Therefore, they do not want to answer this question, because they do not want to make a choice between the two.

Nonetheless, one respondent from the community, Ekmel came up with an interesting answer:

“I would ask to the President of Turkey. If he advises to me to leave Turkish citizenship but hold Dutch citizenship, I believe he says this for the sake of me and my countries’ benefit. So, I follow him.”

These all indicate how the first-generation Turkish immigrants in the mosque community politically, emotionally and culturally remain attached to Turkey. Their Dutch citizenship is only in the way of formal citizenship. Their substantive citizenship and loyalty belong to Turkey. They believe in any case, if they have some trouble with dual citizenship, Turkey will find a solution to prevent potential disadvantage. For example, the “Blue Card Act” of Turkey is designed for the immigrants who have to leave their Turkish citizenship in order to get the citizenship from their receiving countries. With the Blue Card, officially denaturalized Turkish citizen can acquire almost all rights in Turkey as a citizen. Since the Turkish government tries to build more substantive and cultural links with its Turkish diaspora, it promotes all kinds of support for the emigrants. Therefore, this also indicates how Turkish government strategizes citizenship for emigrants from Turkey. Instead of a formal citizenship, Turkey promotes thick concept of citizenship to her nationals abroad and also urges them to feel responsible for Turkey. However, I observed the positive result of multiculturalist policies of the Netherlands in the mosque community. Although they were anxious about some anti-Islamic tendency in Dutch politics, they believed that the majority of the population will continue to support them. Therefore, I argue that although they are not substantively embracing the Dutch image from an ethnic perspective, they reflect the multiculturalist and comparatively liberal discourse against the radical discourse of some other Islamist

groups. They also think of themselves as “tamed” and be moderate within Dutch culture, which is illustrated in the following quotations: “We cannot go back to Turkey, because we get used to the rules of the Netherlands. We can’t feel comfortable in Turkey anymore”; “Even if we want to go, our wives do not let us go, they cannot give up their grandchildren”; “There is no “gurbet” anymore, we can go visit Turkey whenever we want.”

These all indicate how the “religious community” even for the standards of Turkey feel comfortable in the center of Amsterdam. Freedom to practice their religion, group identity and comparatively better income and life conditions lead these people to be part of the Dutch community in their own ways. This is integration via the mosque community. I think the pillarization heritage of the Dutch policy can be observed in this community as a successful outcome, which is challenged today in various ways under the impact of the rise of the populist right politicians.

I met a few who did not hold dual citizenship; they strategized their citizenship in their desire to return to Turkey for good. One of them, Ekmel, a 50-year-old man with respectively modern looking compared to other bearded members began to speak during group discussion about the advantages of Dutch citizenship. “I personally researched this issue regarding the 45-55 law (Geri-dönüş Yasası - Remigratie-Uitkering). “If you only hold residence permit, after a month in Turkey, you can’t get social payment from the Dutch government, and there is the possibility of losing your residence permit too.” He planned to go back to Turkey by using remigration benefit. As a result, he learnt that it was impossible with dual citizenship. He has to leave his Dutch citizenship in order to benefit from his remigration. This

was one of the first impressions of mine about how they strategically calculate their relation with citizenship. Ekmel is quite a religious man. He is feeling Turkish and planning to return to his home country. But he wants to use the advantage of the Dutch social system too. So, he is making some negotiations about citizenship.

Murat is another case which demonstrates the role of the mosque community in coping with his longing for Turkey. I met him when I started my interviews at the entrance of the mosque. This 63-year-old man was waiting for the Friday prayer in front of the mosque. When I first asked him about how does he feel as a person who lives in Amsterdam he replied without emotion: “There is “gurbet” there is suffering. Nothing is exempt from suffering. Our aim to overcome these sufferings.”

In contrast to his emotionless voice, the first word he used, “gurbet” is very loaded and emotive word in Turkish. It originated from the Arabic word root of “ğrb,” and the Arabic origin of this Turkish word is “ğurbat” meaning that “being far from the motherland, to be abroad, to be on exile.” In Turkish, the word “Gurbetçi” is also very popular word to describe those who immigrated to Europe as workers. This emotive meaning of the word “gurbet” was used by Murat, in order to express his “foreignness” in the country. He had immigrated to the Netherlands in 1980s. He thinks it is really hard to raise a child here, because it is hard to raise according to his religion and tradition. He lives in Amsterdam for 40 years, he has children and grandchildren here, but he still feels very attached to Turkey. On the other hand, although he wants to return to Turkey, he tells he can’t do this because of his family. “If someone says he’ll return, he’s lying. Everybody here has some children, grandchildren. How can they go back to Turkey permanently?” He is quite

traditional and religious man. Turkish conservatism is seen in his political tendency. Also, he does not believe that there is democracy in the Netherlands. Instead there is a “some kind of communism” here, and he believes that “the government elite controls everything,” so he feels powerless. As a result, he is not politically active. But he follows Turkish politics as part of the mosque community, has its own conservative political organization in Turkey called Milli Görüş. Not only him but the entire mosque community follows Turkish politics closely. Murat sometimes feels anxious to come to the mosque because there might be an attack. “It is not like in Turkey. You can go to the church without such worry in Turkey,” he told me. He is afraid of the rise of the populist Right in the Netherlands. People like Murat are afraid of the emerging anti-Islamic discourse; they miss the past when Dutch society was more tolerant. “Cafeterias were not this much divided in the past, we could stay together with the Dutch natives, but discrimination increased by time.” His sense of discrimination is related to what new Islamophobic politicians announce publicly.

Murat’s case demonstrates the role of the mosque community in coping with his feelings of gurbet as well as protecting his children from the alienating effects of growing up in Dutch society. Integrated into the mosque community, he does not take any initiative to strategize about his individual citizenship.

Another observation I made during my research was the importance of welfare support. Within the mosque community, the main difference between Murat’s and Ekmel’s answers was their economic situation. Murat is dependent on social aid from the state and he does not feel comfortable with his economic condition.

Therefore, he cannot travel to Turkey as others do and feels homesick more. This observation is seen in other individuals. Economically dependent and distressed immigrants tend to yearn for Turkey while well-situated individuals do not feel homeland nostalgia so much given their network of relationships between their country of origin and the Netherlands. In order to understand their negotiations with citizenship, I also addressed some questions considering their personal savings and investments. Since the mosque community is composed of first-generation laborers who earn well in difficult jobs, they were able to make significant savings. Most of them directed these savings to Turkey and bought properties and now they regard this as one of their biggest mistakes in their lives. Because of the high inflation rates in Turkey and many economic crises in the last 40 years, their savings have shrunk exceedingly. One of the reasons behind these investments are low tax rates and ability to hide their properties and deposits from the Netherlands. As dual citizens, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands were able to enjoy low tax rates together with social support from the Netherlands by hiding their income levels from the public authorities. However, in 2018, the Turkish parliament ratified a new legislation to be part of “the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Information.” This multilateral agreement enabled signatory countries to sign bilateral agreements to start information sharing about their nationals. This became very controversial topic among all immigrants, especially the ones who hold some deposits in Turkish banks and do not declare the deposit to the Netherlands’ tax authorities. Therefore, I again observe that their relationship with the citizenship is closely related to their personal benefits.

5.2. The Community of the Alevi Cultural Center (Alevitische Culturele Centrum)

After the mosque community I made interviews in another community, namely, the Turkish Alevi community in Amsterdam, “Alevitische Culturele Centrum (ACC).” Alevism is a sect of Islam, and Alevis are a socio-religious minority in Turkey (Dressler, 2008). Alevism is different from Sunni Islam in many aspects. For example, instead of mosques, they pray in Cemevi. Beginning with this spatial differentiation, Alevis have a different stance in interpreting the Quran and they have their collective identity built in secular Turkey.

When we entered the ACC with my thesis advisor, several women welcomed us. They were sitting around a table, waiting for others to join them for a Sunday breakfast. I noticed some men playing cards in another room next to the entrance. I started asking questions to a woman in her 50s. She had a quite modern looking with her dyed blonde hair, wearing jeans and having a light makeup. She has been a resident of Amsterdam for 30 years. Her father-in-law was the first family member to immigrate to the Netherlands in 1972. Following him, her husband migrated in 1978 at the age of 13, and she migrated by following him. She and her husband now have dual citizenship. When we started our discussion, she first mentioned how she became a Dutch citizen: “When I first came here, I was excited. I registered to a language course to learn Dutch. I was attending courses 5 days in a week.” From this comment, we can understand how she is different from most of other Turkish immigrants here. She applied for the Dutch citizenship even before she completed the duration of residence necessary in the Netherlands, because she wanted to travel with her family. Again, here I notice some personal benefit approach in her strategy

towards Dutch citizenship. Although she is quite comfortable in the Netherlands, she defines herself as Turkish and Alevi. She is aware of Dutch citizenship policies. After the Dutch government's decision to prevent dual citizenship, she thinks their identity could evolve to "Dutch Alevis" in the future, not for her, but for the newcomers and future generations. As an Alevi, she gives importance to religious practices. When I asked about her children, she told me how they were well integrated into Dutch society. They were socially and economically in good positions. She also thinks that they would define themselves as Turks. Therefore, this ethnic and religious identity is apparent in her case too. She thinks Alevism is open-minded sect of Islam and Alevi people question everything before acceptance. She puts this argument against the closed communities of mosques. Although she does not share all the values of the native Dutch society, she is aware of them, and acts accordingly. She noted that during her naturalization process, a Dutch officer asked her if she sends birthday cards to her parents in Turkey. Normally she did not do this, but she was aware that it was important for native Dutch people, so during the naturalization interview she responded, "of course I send every year." This explains how they are aware of not only the formal scope of the citizenship, but also its culturalization. The Alevi community supports social democratic parties in Turkey (Konda, 2010). This Center of Alevi Culture was also reflecting the Ataturkist and social democratic political tendencies seen from the posters of Ataturk near their religious leader Ali. They also support leftist parties in the Dutch politics. Although there are some individual interests, as a community they are not into Dutch politics either. Compared to the mosque community, Alevi culture is quite compatible with the Dutch culture in terms of social and gender equality. In Alevism, the position of women in the community is much stronger than the Sunni Islam. Therefore, I

observed more integrated community and although they are also not active part of Dutch politics, the level of substantive citizenship is comparatively higher in terms of emotional attachments and social integration. The fact that Alevis suffered from discrimination in Turkish society, especially by the conservative Sunni Muslims, the open and free public environment in the Netherlands inspired them to create their own community.

During my visit to the Center for Alevi Culture, I also met with spiritual leader, “dede.” Dedes “have the only authority to conduct ‘cem’ rituals” (Zirh, 2017, p. 162) and they are responsible for being a model during the “ayin-i cem,” the central ritual in Alevism. The dede’s name is Haydar, and he immigrated to the Netherlands in 1987 as an undocumented worker. He was employed in the Netherlands for 15 years without a residence permit, and any employment permission and visa. When I asked how he defined his identity, he said, as a Dutch citizen. Thus, he has an exceptional position among the respondents in my field research. He feels very close to the native Dutch culture, and when he visits Turkey, he feels alienated. “When I go to Turkey, I feel suffocated, I want to return to Amsterdam as soon as possible. I have integration problem with Turkey, people and their ideas.” When he first came to the Netherlands as an undocumented worker, he felt that something was different, people were very warm and friendly compared to his hometown. Although he could not speak Dutch, native speakers were trying to help him whenever he needed. He felt that these people are harmless. The first image he constructed was so positive that it affected his view on the Dutch culture. “Tolerance influenced me so much,” he said. Not only for cultural but also for economic reasons, he decided to live his life in this country. When other Turkish parents collected signatures for Turkish language

education for their kids, he did not participate: “I am against their vision of protecting their own culture and try to propagate their religion towards others [...] Many of the Turks here try to make the Netherlands just as Turkey. I do not want this to happen.” He also reflects this perspective in politics. He strongly criticized the new political party “DENK.” DENK is founded by two Turkish-Dutch politicians aspiring the votes of Turks and other immigrant groups in the Netherlands: “DENK is trying to do same thing what current government of Turkey does. You are living in the Netherlands but try to practice same policies as Turkish conservative party. They (the founders of DENK) used to be the members of the Labor Party, but I no longer support them.”

These words explicitly reflect how he is against political differentiation as a minority group. He feels and defines himself as a citizen of the Netherlands, and he participates the politics in order to solve the problems of the Netherlands. He praises other native Dutch people to support the social rights or union rights while criticizing the many of the Turkish people here because they never supported their political actions and meetings in the past. “The same people who vote for the social democratic parties here, votes in an opposite direction to conservative parties in Turkey. I can’t understand this,” he said. Although he is very positive to any kinds of integration, since he was an undocumented worker, it took a long journey for him to get his Dutch citizenship. After two rejections by the court, finally he was able to prove his will to integrate into the country. He got his residence permit in 2001 and became a Dutch citizen in 2002: “They asked me whether I am coherent with this society or not? What did I provide to this society, why should they let me be a citizen?”

He does not hold Turkish citizenship anymore. Since he stayed in the country without any visa for 15 years, he gives a high value to his Dutch citizenship. When he had his children come to a school age, he felt very anxious since he had no residence permit. "If we had to return to Turkey, their education would be a failure." He notes. Here, I also observe the importance of personal and parental interest as one of the reasons behind the need of citizenship. Nonetheless, although he is a religious leader of the Alevi community, his political and cultural attachment to Dutch society indicates how he holds his citizenship in a quite substantive manner too. This is also seen in his savings. He did not invest in Turkey, but owns an apartment in Amsterdam with credit. He also agrees with the Dutch policy of investigating the investments of Turkish immigrants in order to prevent tax fraud. He believes these policies are not exclusive to the immigrants, also the native Dutch people have to declare their savings abroad, why should immigrants have an exception? Again, this indicates how he evaluates the citizenship relations not based on ethnic or cultural differences but in terms of equality before the law. Instead of solely depending on his personal benefit, he approaches to the investments by evaluating the rule with respect to civic virtue. Therefore, this man demonstrates an example of how some Turkish immigrants converge to the "thick" conception of citizenship in some aspects.

When I was interviewing Haydar, another person, İbrahim, was with us. He took a very different stance towards citizenship. İbrahim is a 74-year-old retired person who immigrated to the Netherlands in 1968. He was among the first guest-workers who immigrated with a formal invitation. He worked in social assistance institution for 48 years. Therefore, he is very knowledgeable in many issues considering immigrant problems. Among all the people with whom I had face to face interviews, he was the

one with the most formal information about the subject. From the history of post-war economy of the Netherlands to guest-workers' social conditions, he gave considerable information to me. However, here I emphasize only his personal views about his own experience: "I am one of the architects of dual citizenship project. Dutch citizenship right was given in the late 1980s. Then in 1990s we developed project for dual citizenship. But now I am regretful."

Before he immigrated to the Netherlands, he had some political activity in Turkey. He is a Social Democratic activist. He was a union steward and worker's representative in Turkey. He was among the founders of Union of Turkish Democrats in the Netherlands founded in 1975. Ever since then he played an active part of the citizenship debates for the immigrants. He remembers the first right of Dutch citizenship was given in the late 1980s. Together with other worker unions and the participation of the Dutch social democrats they worked for dual citizenship rights. Not only dual citizenship but also rights of undocumented workers, residence permit and education in the mother tongue, were among their demands. They were quite active in this respect. He noted that in 1992 dual citizenship became possible. Despite most of the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands non-participation in political activism from the 1980s to the 1990s, they benefited from that outcomes: "When we were protesting for our rights, the mosque community of the time were labelling us as communists, irreligious traitors. However, they became the primary beneficiaries of those rights we obtained."

He defines himself as a social democrat. His perspective towards the personal identity is not ethnic or religious but ideological. He is strongly opposed to the idea

of immigrant minority party of DENK. He comments on the foundation of DENK. “We are social democrats, why do we separate as Turks.” He believes that, you should concern the issues of the country you reside first, therefore he opposes to the Turkish-Dutch politicians who carry politics of Turkey to the Netherlands. He supports nation-wide ideological parties, not the parties who would cause polarization in society. He is also worried about increasing nationalism in Europe. Regarding emotional attachments, he feels attached to the both cultures and societies. In the Netherlands freedom lets him to practice his religion without any discrimination.

“When I first saw Amsterdam after detrainning in the train station, I felt the freedom here. Man and woman were in close embrace. I said by myself I found peace here, this is my nation. Turkey is my nation too, but when I go there, I do not feel relaxed. The society is very strained. I miss the Netherlands while I am in Turkey.”

His emotional attachments are also related to his ideological position. He has a personality beyond borders. However, he is concerned about his investments in Turkey. He is regretful of his dual citizenship after the multilateral agreement signed by Turkey to share deposit and similar kinds of financial information with the signatory countries. If he had known that, he would not have got dual citizenship. Yet, the personal benefit is above all other concerns about citizenship for him. He meets most of the requirements to be substantive citizen of the Netherlands, however he negotiates his citizenship status with regard to his personal benefits when this status influence his direct investments and cause potential extra taxation.

“If they investigate our financial situation abroad in order to prevent the ones who get social aid from the government while possessing properties and incomes in Turkey, It’s fine. But if this is for extra taxation, this is not true.”

In many aspects he is not just a formal citizen, but he embraces the citizenship in a substantive manner. He feels responsible for the politics of the Netherlands. He is quite active in politics and political participation. Nonetheless he negotiates his dual citizenship from his personal direct interest. A different standpoint I observe here is that, the legal immigrants who came to the Netherlands either with invitation or formal ways, gives less attention to Dutch citizenship. The reason behind is that they think Turkish citizenship is enough for them to have most of the formal citizenship rights. Therefore, Dutch citizenship does not include much importance or benefit for them. With a residence permit, they can take advantage of almost all social benefits in the Netherlands. If they both have residence permit and Turkish citizenship, Dutch citizenship means only a symbolic extra benefit for them. This is the outcome of Dutch policies that equalize the rights of long-term residents with the formal citizens.

5.3. Stichting Kızılırmak Attendees

During my field research, my professor and I visited a neighborhood in Nieuw West, Plein 40-45, which is famous for its Turkish identity. This neighborhood is one of the places where Turkish immigrant population concentrates in Amsterdam. It is located in the Sloterveer district, where there are many Turkish restaurants, cafés, clothing shops, and other kinds of ethnic shops. Just as the stores lining up through the street, people are also Turkish and women with headscarves are quite common in the neighborhood. Someone could easily feel s/he is in one of the conservative neighbors

of Istanbul if s/he spends some time in this neighborhood. In Plein 40-45, while strolling through the farmers market in the area, we met with Hilmi. He is 56 years old, residing in Amsterdam for almost 30 years. In my professor's interest in finding a café house of Turkish people, he suggested we walk to the Kızılırmak Foundation together to introduce us to Turkish migrants there. Kızılırmak Foundation is a cafeteria-like organization in which Turkish men meet and socialize. They drink Turkish tea, watch Turkish football league, and play card games there. This place also looks very like to traditional cafe (kahvehane) in Turkey. During our conversation, he told that although he's been in Amsterdam for over 30 years, he did not apply for Dutch citizenship. When I asked the reason, he replied "I did not find it necessary." He was the first person who told me that he will return to Turkey, and he is in Amsterdam only temporarily. In the beginning I did not question this idea, but after I met many other people using the same discourse and never actualizing this "return" or remigration for over 30-40 years, I realized this as something like a "dream" in which many people want, but cannot achieve. Especially the unemployed or "socially dependent immigrants" with very limited income and having paid by the social welfare programs have this paper dream of remigration. In the cafeteria of Kızılırmak foundation, every person I met was getting some social benefit payment from the government. Mahmut is one of them. Although he is in his late 40s, he has grandchildren. He was unemployed during the interview and he was getting unemployment payment from the government. He holds both Turkish and Dutch passports, therefore enjoy dual citizenship. However, he does not give any importance to his Dutch citizenship: "It is not important whether I have Dutch citizenship or not. I am here temporarily. I am Turkish." When I address the questions regarding political participation, he said that he is following Turkish

politics closely. Although he is physically in the Netherlands, his mind and his soul are in Turkey. Although, he was born and raised in the Netherlands, he never thought of living here until the end of his life. His father immigrated to the Netherlands in the 1980s as a first-generation immigrant. Although he is quite uninterested in the politics of the Netherlands since he does not feel attached here, he voted for DENK in the last elections. “They came here to introduce themselves. I gave them my vote this time; I’ll check whether they’ll keep their promises or not. Nonetheless politics here is not very important, my political party is in Turkey.” He is politically and emotionally attached to Turkey. However, when I address a question of his social integration with the native Dutch, he mentions how all of his former colleagues were Dutch. Also, he mentions his nine Dutch neighbors in his apartment as part of this integration to Dutch society. Since he was born and grew up in the Netherlands, he can speak fluent Dutch. This was another case in my interviews: Although he is part of the second generation who passed through the education system of the Netherlands, he still strongly loyal to his origin and Turkey. He believes he is a temporary resident in the Netherlands, the place he spent all of his life. Although he holds dual citizenship, his Dutch citizenship is only on paper. In terms of substantive citizenship, there is almost no indication of how he is politically part of this country. I observed similar situation in many other immigrants that were economically dependent on the Dutch state. They became passive beneficiaries of the welfare system. Some believe there is no need to work since the social benefits they are getting from the state are enough for them to live without working. When the rent benefits, child benefits, healthcare allowance and social assistance payment (WWB) is considered, many see there will be very little difference in their income even if they work in jobs with minimum wage. These socially dependent people make use of

social payments of the Netherlands; however, they also feel quite alienated in society. Therefore, they embrace the nostalgia of their homeland and dream about “returning home.”

In the Kızılırmak foundation, I heard the remigration act mentioned by many people. This act is about government support about remigration. However, although they mention this, the numbers who return are very small. They are emotionally attached to Turkey; they are the ones who had difficulty in integration to the Netherlands. However, they are also fully dependent on the social welfare benefits of the Netherlands. Therefore, their relation with the citizenship issue is also related to its advantages. Since there is no additional social benefit stemming from the Dutch citizenship, residence permit is quite sufficient for them. In terms of formal and substantive aspects of citizenship, they possess neither of the qualities for citizenship in the Netherlands. I observed this situation in many unemployed Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam, some homeless and on drugs.

5.4. Active Participants in the Economy

In this section of the data analysis, I will examine the individuals who are an active part of the Dutch economy: the individuals who are not directly part of some specific community but follow their individual objectives. In the Plein 40-45 neighbor I met with Fazıl in the Turkish Kebap restaurant. He is 57 years old and has been resident of Amsterdam for 42 years. His father immigrated to the Netherlands in 1973, when Fazıl was 15 years old, and for family union, he immigrated to the Amsterdam in 1977. Emotionally he feels attached to both countries: “For 42 years, we are planning

to return to Turkey permanently. But we can't. I tried many times. However, we can't give up here. We are also attached to the Netherlands.”

He had a quite successful business career in the Netherlands. Although he closed all of his businesses in 2011, he had a lot of investments and properties in Turkey. Also, he has an apartment in the Netherlands. Therefore, he travels to Turkey so often. Nonetheless, during his visits he experiences adaptation problems. Therefore, he plans his family's future in the Netherlands. He is planning to open a new kebab restaurant with his sister's husband. His sister's husband immigrated to the Netherlands 11 years ago following his marriage. Yasin is his early 40s. He is working in the kebab restaurant. Not formally, but he is like the manager of the restaurant, because the actual owner does not know this business as much as he does. He is one of the first-generation immigrants. We had a very long face to face interview with him in the kitchen of the kebab restaurant. While he was skewering the meats, he discussed his opinions about citizenship and immigration. He is so excited to live in the Netherlands, and he criticizes other Turkish immigrants here not to become part of society. “The first 5 years I was like them too. My body was in here but my soul was in Turkey. But then I bring my soul here too.” Due to the better life conditions, he is now very happy to live in the Netherlands. When I asked him how he defines his identity, he replied Turkish but also a Dutch citizen. He emphasized his Dutch citizenship in order to express how he enjoys the quality of life here. He also believes there is no “gurbet” anymore, because there are flights to Turkey every day. His emotional attachment to the Turkey is not great. He holds dual citizenship. Although he immigrated to the Netherlands in the 2000s, he managed to get the dual citizenship: “Me and my child have Dutch passports, so he can study in

everywhere in Europe, I have no fear about the future of my child here. The government protects them until 18 years old here.”

Considering his negotiation with citizenship, we again observe some calculations of benefits. He thinks none of the immigrants here would give up their Dutch citizenship if the dual citizenship is proscribed, because the benefits stemming from the Dutch citizenship is too much, he said. Considering the formal and substantive citizenship aspects, he embraces his rights stemming from formal citizenship. He appreciates equality before the law in the Netherlands. Actually, he admires the system of the Netherlands, and he wants to be part of this system. Therefore, he emphasized his Dutch citizenship consciously. On the other hand, he is politically very inactive and uninterested in Dutch politics. He thinks that is a good thing, because there is no problem with the government here: “I even do not know the name of Prime Minister here. I do not mind.”

When I addressed questions about “DENK” and his political opinion about Dutch politics, he repeated his indifference toward politics. As a result, Yasin also cannot be seen as possessing the competence for substantive citizenship. At the same restaurant, there was also another immigrant from Turkey. His name is Mecit, in his 40s and immigrated to the Netherlands 15 years ago. He lived in the country for 11 years undocumented. He acquired a residence permit 4 years ago. He says he is a “Dutch,” not Turkish anymore. He stays with Dutch people and tries to adopt his life accordingly. “I try to hold on to this country. I do not want to return to Turkey.” He is one of the underclass immigrants in the Netherlands. However, unlike the ones in the Kızılırmak cafeteria, he wants to succeed. He has hope for his future in this

society, therefore he gave up his past in Turkey. Although he does not hold Dutch citizenship yet, he is ready to give up his Turkish passport and apply for Dutch citizenship. Although he is not emotionally attached to Turkey, he is economically because he sends money to his family in Turkey in order to take care of them. “There is social state here. Therefore, instead of Turkish citizenship I choose Dutch citizenship if I have a chance.” He does not pay attention to politics of Turkey and the Netherlands. But he wants to be part of this society. According to him, acquiring Dutch citizenship is a sign of adaptation to the country. Since he worked for 11 years without any documentation, he gives high value to the Dutch citizenship. During my field research, I found out that the first generation who immigrated to the Netherlands in order to start a new life strove for integration to the society. Therefore, the initial motivation behind the immigration is very influential in their relation with citizenship. If they immigrate without thinking of permanent return, they are more likely to be in a struggle for Dutch citizenship. These people who emotionally and culturally feel attached to the Netherlands, in the long term, possess more substantive qualities of citizenship.

My last respondent is a third generation Turkish-Dutch living in the Amsterdam. His grandfather immigrated to the Netherlands as a first-generation guest-worker. Following him, his father came as a child and in 1993 his mother got residence in the Netherlands upon marriage. Ender, as a 25-year-old system engineer, also helps in his family business, a bicycle shop. When I met with him in his shop, the famous Turkish-Arabesque music played. As a member of the third generation, Ender was born and grew up in Amsterdam. However, he can speak Turkish quite well. He thinks young Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands speak their native language

better than in other European countries. This is because the Netherlands supported their native language in primary education. As a member of the third generation, his whole life was in Amsterdam, but nonetheless he is really interested in Turkey. He visits Istanbul often, and last year he worked there as part of EU's Erasmus program. Compared to other respondents, he is approaching the issues with an individualistic perspective. He holds dual citizenship, but he has not got a Turkish passport since it is expensive. "Instead of Turkish passport we use Dutch passport and Turkish identity card when we travel." When I asked which of the citizenships he would prefer if he had to choose, he frankly replied:

"If you directly ask which citizenship you will choose it is hard to get an answer from the Turkish immigrants. Because they think they give up their culture when they leave Turkish citizenship. But this is not the case. If this day comes, they would choose Dutch citizenship. We live in here; we make our lives here. We can't give up these and return."

He also thinks it is easier to travel with the Dutch passport. Also, he thinks the identity is not dependent on what is written on a paper. "It is about how you feel." He tells. "Government expects us to cut our ties with Turkey when we have the Dutch citizenship. Turkish immigrants don't do this. Our life is here, but part of our souls also in Turkey." His evaluation of the citizenship is quite thoughtful. He also defines his strategies in declaring his identity in different spaces. "If you work in a Dutch company, you cannot say I am Turkish, none of the Turks would say this. But in my personal life, I say I am Turkish, but I do not say this in the company." Therefore, how they strategize their discourse also reflects their perspective on citizenship:

“If all your investments and savings are in Turkey, you should choose Turkish citizenship only. Because the Netherlands is number one in the world on tax rates. My father’s savings and investments are all in Turkey. So, we should analyze which citizenship is the most advantageous”

This again explains how he evaluates citizenship status with regard to its advantages and disadvantages. Citizenship is independent of identity or culture for him, rather it is a commodity. He wants to buy a home in both Turkey and the Netherlands. His aim is to increase its personal income and create a life in between. Therefore, he makes calculations about his investments and potential profit. When I address his political participation in the Netherlands, he replied that he closely follows both countries’ politics to see what might affect them. “We have to think of our interest; therefore, we should be aware of the politics of both countries we hold citizenship.” He takes his position in politics based on this personal interest. He evaluates what parties proposes for the people like him. He finds the party of “DENK” a bit radical, but beneficial because he thinks they can balance other radical anti-Islamic parties. Ender represents the individualist perspective of the new generation in the Netherlands. This could not be exclusive for the immigrants, but for most of the young population. “If you look at the native Dutch people, it does not matter who you are, Islamic, Christian, or Atheist, they look consider their own pocket: the money.” So, I understand his interest-directed rationalization as a result of his interpretation of the neoliberal norms around him. He thinks that personal income is more important than what is written on paper as citizenship, or how he defines his identity. This perspective is also supporting my argument of citizenship negotiations that are not relevant to substantive aspects in theory, but more about self-interest.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I explored recent trends related to the new conceptions of citizenship among Turkish citizens concerning their relations with citizenship policies. Based on the data collected by face to face interviews, I aimed to understand the approach to the question of dual citizenship of different groups of Turkish immigrants living in Amsterdam, namely, a mosque community, an Alevi community, attendees of a traditional Turkish cafe (kahvehane), and those active in running their own businesses. I found out that, in terms of the perspectives of substantive and formal citizenship, most of the Turkish immigrants in my study in Amsterdam approach Dutch citizenship not with the qualities of the substantive, or thick conception of the citizenship, but based on individual benefits. They strategize their position to Dutch citizenship based on personal advantages and employ pragmatist approach, with some exceptions. Although different community members or individuals have some different perspectives on their relationship with citizenship, most of them lack the substantive qualities of citizenship.

Taking the mosque community into consideration, I observed a socially and culturally isolated community that has a strong loyalty to Turkey. In terms of political participation, they closely participate in Turkish politics and their relationship with Dutch politics only emerges if they have particular interest. On the other hand, from the perspective of multiculturalism and pillarization tradition of the

Netherlands, they feel secure and emancipated, yet only within their own community. To the extent that they relate this freedom to the political culture of the Netherlands and Dutch multiculturalism, they are also part of this society to some degree. Nonetheless, from a recent literature about active citizenship, their political and social activity is very isolated inside their own community. Therefore, while having formal citizenship status of the Netherlands, they are the substantive citizens of Turkey. Their participation in the Dutch politics or any kind of civil society activity emerges only in the cases of direct impact to their community. For example, during the construction of the Ayasofya Mosque, they held public demonstrations. However, with regard to common public issues of the Netherlands and the city of Amsterdam, their political and civil activity is very limited.

Unlike the mosque community, the Alevi community poses a contrasting stance towards Turkish citizenship. Although they also negotiate their citizenship relations in terms of cost-benefit calculations, their sense of belonging to Dutch culture is greater. Again, the pillarization tradition of the Netherlands allowed them to feel quite comfortable as immigrants. Politically they engage with politics in an ideological way (as Leftists) and they are interested with the politics of the Netherlands as well as of Turkey. In addition, they culturally feel closer to Dutch identity and instead of emphasizing Turkishness, and they identify themselves as Alevis and members of Dutch society. The only people indicating more substantive qualities of citizenship to the Netherlands were in the Alevi community. Compared to the mosque community, Alevis correspond more to the qualities of substantive citizenship regarding Dutch citizenship. Nonetheless, Alevis also consider their

personal economic interest in negotiating their citizenship status. Therefore, to some degree, they also do not fulfil all the qualities of thick conception of citizenship.

During my field research, immigrants in the Kızılırmak Foundation's cafeteria also revealed very similar indicators with my argument in this thesis. Duality in the literature explains the existing passivity of some citizens as a result of group disadvantages and class conditions in capitalist society, or individual lack of participation. Although there are many policies for persuading economically disadvantaged individuals to become active laborers and to integrate them to society, the Kızılırmak cafeteria interviews indicated that there are still many Turkish immigrants who lack active participation to the economy, politics and activities of the Dutch community. While they physically live in Amsterdam, they feel they are citizens of Turkey. They approach Dutch citizenship only in terms of social benefits and public assistance. This indicates how citizenship policies of the Netherlands have a very limited influence on these people.

At this point, what I observed is that these economically dependent Turkish immigrants who have very limited loyalty to the Netherlands are all ones who gained a legal permanent residence permit or Dutch citizenship in comparatively easier ways. While these immigrants hold very limited sense of belonging to the Netherlands, the ones who had difficulties to get formal citizenship or permanent residency in the past have much substantive sense of belonging to the Netherlands. Therefore, I suggest that the changing policies of the Netherlands since the late 1990s that made naturalization harder had a positive effect in terms of the qualities of citizenship of new immigrants. These new immigrants are trying to take an active

part in the Dutch economy since they immigrated to the country with dreams. Active participants in the economy also have a higher tendency to show stronger loyalty to Dutch society. Instead of limiting themselves to being part of their own community, these immigrants try to be part of Dutch community with individual efforts.

Not only the new immigrants or active participants of the economy, but the youth of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam also have a more individualistic view about citizenship. In my field research, I observed that some of the new generations of Turkish immigrants, as a result of globalization and neoliberal policies, have a tendency to regard the qualities of citizenship in terms of individual responsibilities. They approach Turkish citizenship not with an emotional perspective but more like a commodity. They create multiple loyalties in two countries and their citizenship status is important for them only in the cases of differentiating interests. From this perspective, they fit more into transnational citizenship theories.

In a broader sense, for Turkish immigrants, although there are many reasons and strategies behind the acquisition of the Dutch citizenship, none of these ideologically embraces citizenship with regard to the qualities such as the rights and obligations of citizenship, the sense of belonging, perspective towards cultural diversity, and integration to society and participation in civil associations. Since they do not approach citizenship from a substantive point of view, they do not demand civic participation in politics for the sake of Dutch society as a whole, but only for their own interests. In general, the Turkish immigrants in this study indicate a quite pragmatist perspective towards citizenship issues. For most, Dutch citizenship has a meaning only on paper, and they do not feel they belong to Dutch society. One of the

reasons for this situation is that they are the emigrants of a country that retains a strong ethnic conception of citizenship. Even though they legally become Dutch citizens, they continue to live as Turkish citizens in many respects. Since the multiculturalist tradition in the Netherlands enabled the first generation of guest workers and immigrants to live their own culture independently, there is a quite comfortable minority with much gratitude towards Dutch society; on the other hand, they could not embrace Dutch citizenship in a substantive manner. Therefore, these Turkish immigrants and their descendants continue to determine their citizenship status related to their identity, which is Turkish. My data analysis indicates that this situation is observed clearly for the first generation, and for the following generations, it also exists but in a decreasing scale. I observed that the multicultural tradition and historical pillarization structure of Dutch society brought about a Turkish minority which is comfortable in its own community but is having some difficulties in living as part of Dutch society and culture. For the immigrants with permanent residence permit in the Netherlands, the rights are determined in terms of egalitarian policies that would provide almost the same rights given to the legal immigrants with citizenship, and this might also be behind the reason of why Turkish immigrants do not give much importance to the substantive aspects of Dutch citizenship. In other words, while having a Turkish citizenship induces no disadvantage for them, since it is the society that they feel they belong, this is also the status that they define themselves constitutively.

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