THE CONTINUING OTTOMAN LEGACY AND
THE STATE TRADITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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One of the most important legacies of the Ottoman Empire is a "state tradition." By this I mean a strong and centralized state, reasonably effective by the standards of its day, highly autonomous of societal forces, and occupying a central and highly valued place in Ottoman political culture. This tradition, we argue, continues to affect politics in Turkey and in the other successor states, albeit in modified form.

The first section elucidates the key concepts related to state autonomy and state capabilities. In the second section, the politicocultural conditions that created a distinctive Ottoman state tradition are briefly set our. The third section discusses specifics resulting from the Ottoman state tradition and shared by the contemporary successor states. In the fourth and fifth sections, respectively, two dimensions of state strength, autonomy and capabilities, are discussed with reference to the successor states, with particular emphasis on Turkey, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In the concluding section, prospects for the development of democratic government in the region are examined.

Beyond the scope of this essay but of particular interest to comparativists would be to study the Ottoman impact on the contemporary Balkan states. The different trajectories of democratic development in the formerly Ottoman Balkan countries as opposed to other East European states that had never been under Ottoman occupation, or only briefly as with Hungary, suggest that this would be a fruitful line of research.

State Autonomy and Capabilities

State autonomy refers to the insulation of the state from societal pressures and to its freedom to make important policy decisions. Autonomy should not be confused with state strength or capabilities. Strong states are those with high capabilities "to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways."[1] A state that is nonautonomous in the sense of being the instrument of a particular social class or group may be quite strong in terms of these capabilities. Conversely, an autonomous state may be quite weak in such capabilities.[2] Furthermore, states may be strong in some capacities but weak in others. For example, the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi states have been impressively strong in terms of penetration into society and mobilization of human resources, but failed conspicuously in extracting financial resources from their societies, regulating social relationships, and appropriating resources in ways determined by their top leaderships.[3] State capabilities, in turn, depend among other things, on stable administrativemilitary control over the territory, loyal and competent officials, and plentiful financial resources.[4]

Another confusion surrounding the notion of autonomy derives from the difference between its minimalist and maximalist definitions. The former posits that autonomy requires only that state leaders follow their own preferences rather than responding to societal pressures. If, however, the state is the instrument of a particular social force leading to an identity of preferences between the two, it is meaningless to talk about state autonomy. The maximalist definition sees the test of autonomy as "the willingness of the state to impose policies against the resistance of the dominant social class." In fact, this is a rare case. The notion of autonomy does not preclude alliances between the state apparatus and other social groups or the pursuit of policies by the state that objectively serve the interests of such groups.[5] "It is, of course, one thing to argue that the state is an autonomous, non-class, actor. It is quite another thing to argue that it is the only actor."[6]

A further point sometimes neglected in state autonomy discussions is the cultural dimension. State autonomy is not simply hegemony of an omnipotent state over a weak, obedient, and unincorporated society. The state is not only a matter of certain specialized political structures, but also one of beliefs, values, and attitudes. An autonomous state is one that is central to the thinking of members of its society and also is cherished and valued by them for its own sake as an independent entity.

The term "state autonomy" is not always used in a value-free fashion. "The autonomy of the state," Binder notes, "is ambiguous depending upon whether we are considering Western, 'developed' states, or 'underdeveloped'

stares. In the case of advanced capitalist stares, the autonomy of the state is employed to explain and to justify the resistance to pluralist demands." State institutions "represent a public interest and an historical-cultural consensus which lend stability and continuity" to the system. "In contrast, the autonomy of the state, when applied to developing systems, is used to explain the arbitrariness of government, the apparent absence of a ruling class, the irrelevance of social structure, or even culture, to the explanation of politics."[7]

Autonomy will be used here as a strictly empirical variable with neither positive nor negative connotations, equated with neither the public interest nor arbitrary autocracy. State autonomy is compatible with a great variety of political regimes.

The Ottoman Political Legacy

The Ottoman state tradition might be characterized as follows: the state possessed a high degree of autonomy. Status-oriented values, rather than market-oriented values, were dominant. The relationship between economic and political power was the reverse of its equivalent in Western Europe. Instead of economic power (ownership of the means of production) leading to political power, political power (high position in the state bureaucracy) gave access to material wealth. The wealth thus accumulated, however, could not be converted into more permanent economic assets because it was liable, both in theory and practice, to confiscation by the state.

The Ottoman state, unlike its Western European counterparts, did not favor the emergence of a powerful merchant class. The much-referred to "ethnic division of labor" meant that international trade was dominated by non-Muslim minorities, but such economic power could not be converted into a significant political role because of the Islamic nature of the state.

As regards land ownership as another potential source of economic power, the state retained the theoretical ownership of all cultivable land and, until the decline of central authority, its effective control as well. The fief-holders (*sipahi*) were not a land-based aristocracy, but a military service gentry who were paid by the state in the form of a portion of taxes they collected from peasants. Their titles could always be revoked by the central authority. The rise of a class of local notables (*ayan*) in the eighteenth century, who often combined local social and military power with connections to central government and tax-farming privileges, did not fundamentally alter this state of affairs. The status of the *ayan* can in no way be compared to that of feudal aristocracy in Western Europe, since it remained essentially a de facto situation lacking the legal basis and political legitimacy of the latter. Besides, the effective centralization drive under Mahmud II (1808–1839) deprived the *ayan* of much of their political influence.

In short, the power of the state elites in the Ottoman Empire was not seriously threatened. Neither the mercantile bourgeoisie nor the landowners developed into a class that could effectively control and limit, much less capture, the state. Thus, the fundamental social cleavage in the Ottoman Empire was based on a strictly political criterion. On the one hand, there was the ruling military (*askeri*) class, which "included those to whom the Sultan delegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namely, officers of the court and the army, civil servants, and ulema." On the other hand, there was the ruled (*reaya*) who comprised "all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government. It was a fundamental rule of the empire to exclude its subjects from the privileges of the military."[8]

Accompanying the excessive centralization of state authority and its concentration in the hands of the state elites was civil society's weakness. This means the fragility or absence of corporate, autonomous, intermediary social structures that, in the West, operated independently of the government and played a cushioning role between the state and the individual.

In Europe, the church was the foremost of these corporate structures, and it may have provided a model of organization for other corporate structures such as the guilds, autonomous cities, and the like. These had no parallels in the Islamic Middle East. Islamic law does not, as a rule, recognize corporate identities. For all the theoretical supremacy of the shari'ah, the religious class does not have a corporate identity, but depends on the state (i.e., secular authority) for its appointments, promotions, and salaries.

Similarly, neither the cities nor the artisan guilds played an autonomous role comparable to their counterparts in Western Europe. The *ahi* guilds (artisan organizations with a strong religious coloring), which played some role in the formative years of the empire, were later deprived of their corporate privileges and put under strict government controls.[9]

In short, no autonomous structure stood between the political authority and the community of believers. It is in this sense that Moore characterizes Egypt as an "unincorporated" society.[10] In fact, the same adjective holds true for all Islamic Middle Eastern societies, past and present. This does not mean, of course, that the premodern Islamic Middle Eastern society was totally undifferentiated, atomized, or regimented. One can speak of a high degree of pluralism of craft guilds, the clergy, religious brotherhoods, endowments, mutual aid groups, religious organizations of non-Muslim communities, nationalities, sects, tribes, clans, extended families, etc.[11] The penetrative capabilities of the Ottoman Empire, although quite high by the standards of its day, were still too limited to allow it to regulate the whole range of social relationships. Moreover, the strict separation between the rulers and the ruled,

and the absence of a representative system, did not permit this traditional plu-
ralism to evolve into the pluralistic infrastructure of a modern democratic
state. Furthermore, the nineteenth-century drive of the centralized state to
reaffirm its corporate exclusivity in response to European challenges further
weakened traditional pluralism. Thus, "today a good number of the early
modern corporate and moral communities are gone, and among the new ones
those of medium size are still thinly represented."[12]

This absence of powerful economic interests that use the state to serve its
own interests, plus the absence or weakness of corporate intermediary bodies,
produced a high degree of state autonomy. Not the captive of any particular
social class, the state could make decisions that would change, eliminate, or
create class relationships.

As for the cultural dimension of state autonomy, it has often been observed
that the state is given a salient role in both Ottoman-Turkish political thought
and in the perceptions of the people. The state is valued in its own right, is rel-
atively autonomous from the society, and plays a tutelary and paternalistic
role. This paternalistic image is reflected in the popular expression of "father
state" (*devlet baba*). Another interesting popular saying is "May God preserve
the State and the Nation" (*Allah Devlete, Millete zeval vermesin*). Ottoman
writings on politics and government are replete with such terms as "the Sub-
lime State" (*Devlet-i Aliye*), "raison d'état" (*hikmet-i hükümet*), or "the sublime
interests of the State" (*Devletin ali menfaatleri*). Such notions readily found
their place in the political discourse of the Turkish republic. Indeed the Pre-
amble of the 1982 Turkish constitution described the State (always spelled
with a capital S) as "sacred" (*kutsal Türk Devleti*), adding that no thoughts or
opinions could find protection against "Turkish national interests," presum-
ably meaning state interests as defined by the state apparatus.

This exaltation of the state has been consistently fostered through the edu-
cational system and the military.[13] Indeed, the military and (at least until
quite recently) the civilian bureaucracy have traditionally seen themselves as
the guardians of the state and the protectors of public interest. Consequently,
they have viewed with suspicion all particularistic interests and political par-
ties which represented them.[14]

With respect to the cultural dimension of state autonomy, there seems to
be a significant difference between Turkey and the Arab successor states. It has
often been observed that the state does not occupy such a lofty place in Ara-
bic political thought. Morroe Berger, in his analysis of Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon, and Jordan found "no agencies to inculcate a civic spirit in the Near
East. . . . Between fidelity to family and Islam there appeared to be no room
for loyalty to a body, the city, or state, which was neither a kinship nor a reli-
gious group. Indeed, through most of Arab history the city or state has not

been sufficiently differentiated from the religious community to permit the growth of civic or secular loyalty."[15]

Ben-Dor blames many of the ills in the region (conflict, instability, lack of legitimacy, despotic governments) on the absence of a "state logic" or "raison d'état," which he defines as "a filter through which interests related to social, national, or particularistic ideologies and interests are sifted, refined, aggregated, and perhaps moderated. . . . The very stateness of a country and particularly its political elites create the basic condition for a conception of common interest." Ben-Dor, however, distinguishes Turkey (and Egypt) from the rest of the Arab world. "The Egyptian case is unique, perhaps comparable among the Islamic countries of the Middle East only to Turkey, not only in its strength of statehood but even in the resemblance to a Western-type nation-state."[16]

Just as Turkish popular sayings reflect a feeling of respect for a strong but benevolent state, a recent study on Arab popular sayings or proverbs indicated a sense of helplessness, submission, self-abasement, cynicism, and mistrust.[17]

Such submissive attitudes toward political authority in the contemporary Middle East cannot be explained only by the legacy of the Ottoman state tradition. Closely intermingled with that centuries-old tradition is the Islamic legacy that exhorts believers to obey earthly authority. Here one is faced with two different points of view. The first holds that:

> In the traditional Islamic society, the power of the state was in both theory and practice limited. . . . The traditional Islamic state may be autocratic; it is not despotic. The power of the sovereign is limited by a number of factors, some legal, some social. It is limited in principle by the holy law, which, being of divine origin, precedes the state. The state and the sovereign are subject to the law and are in a sense created and authorized by law and not, as in Western systems, the other way around. In addition to this theoretical restraint, there were also practical restraints. In traditional Islamic societies, there were many well-entrenched interests and intermediate powers that imposed effective limits on the ability of the state to control its subjects.[18]

On the other side of the coin, however, is the tradition of unquestioned obedience and submission to political authority justified, among others, by the famous dictum of Ibn Taymiyya: "Sixty years under an unjust imam are better than a single night without a ruler,"[19] or that of Ibn Jama'a of Damascus who said that "the sovereign has a right to govern until another and stronger one shall oust him from power and rule in his stead. The latter will rule by the same title and will have to be acknowledged on the same grounds; for a government, however objectionable, is better than none at all, and between two evils we must choose the lesser."[20] Vatikiotis maintains that "since the eleventh

century, the only political theory of Islam has been that of passive obedience to any de facto authority, government by consent remains an unknown concept; autocracy has been the real and, in the main, the only experience."[21]

One way to reconcile these two opposing views is to distinguish between the ideal Islamic state and the reality of the state in different Muslim communities. It should be added, however, that the weight of the historical evidence favors the pessimistic point of view.

The Specificity of the Ottoman State and Its Implications for Contemporary Middle Eastern States

The fundamental difference between the Ottoman state system and the states of Western Europe has been remarked on by a host of classical political theorists including Machiavelli, Bodin, Bacon, Harrington, Bernier, Montesquieu, and Karl Marx, as well as by contemporary authors.[22] Two extreme positions should be avoided. One is insistence on the uniqueness of the Ottoman or Islamic experience, a position advocated interestingly both by Orientalist scholars and fundamentalist Muslim thinkers.[23] The second is to engage in sweeping universal generalizations on political development. A more middle-of-the-road approach allows us to take into account historical specificities, while making meaningful comparisons with other world regions, especially those with a strong state tradition such as Latin America, Russia, and East Asia.

Three components of the Ottoman state tradition seem to have influenced the structure and behavior of the successor states: the absence of a nation-state tradition; the capacity of the state to accumulate and use political power; and the absence of a representative tradition.

THE ABSENCE OF A NATION-STATE TRADITION

The Ottoman Empire was anything but a nation-state. It was a multinational, multiethnic, multireligious, multisectarian state. What has to be explained, therefore, is the surprising resilience of Ottoman successor states in the absence of a nation-state tradition.

Again, there seems to be a significant difference between Turkey and the Arab states, with Egypt occupying a middle position somewhat closer to Turkey. While Turkish nationalism was a relative latecomer,[24] the Young Turks first (1908–1918) and then the Kemalists were successful in building a new collective identity around Turkish nationalism to replace the Ottoman-Islamic identity. This was helped by the loss of Arabic-speaking lands of the empire at the end of World War I, the traumatic experience of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), the religious and linguistic homogeneity of the new

Turkish republic, the charisma and the prestige of Kemal Atatürk, and per-
haps the strong sense of statehood in Turkish political culture alluded to
above. Of all the successor states, Turkey has made the easiest transition to a
nation-state.

The picture is considerably different in the Arab successor states. There is
an interesting debate among Arab scholars on whether Arab nation- (or terri-
torial) states represent a historical reality or are alien translations to the Arab
world. Bahgat Korany, for example, argues the second view:

> External factors predominated in the territorial definition of Arab states. . . .
> The present Middle Eastern borders and thus the whole of the modern Middle
> Eastern state system are products of this mandate period. Because of its "alien"
> origins, the implementing of the inter-state system was to face two pressures:
> internal strains within the polity at the time of the system's institutionalisation,
> and territorial disputes once the inter-state system was established.[25]

Naff agrees that the "post-medieval European idea of the state—a territorial-
ly defined entity apart from ruler or dynasty organised in accordance with
man-made rules—was alien to Muslim political theory."[26]

Iliya Harik argues, on the other hand, that Arab countries are not only old
societies, "but also old states. Except for three of them—Iraq, Syria, and Jor-
dan—they all go back to the nineteenth century or a much earlier period."
Arab nationalist belittling of the state system as a creation of colonialism is a
"historical misperception. . . . Fifteen of the contemporary Arab states are the
product of indigenous and regional forces mostly unrelated to European colo-
nialism, and in most cases predate it."[27]

The contradiction between these two views may not be as great as it seems,
however, since Harik admits that hardly any of the Arab states "uncondition-
ally accepts the legitimacy of its own statehood" and that the crisis of legiti-
macy is particularly acute in the Fertile Crescent,[28] while Korany concedes
that the Arab territorial state, despite its alien origins, "is becoming increas-
ingly implanted and naturalized. It is not an indigenous phenomenon," he
argues, "yet it no longer seems a foreign import. It is thus a hybrid product
. . . People have become accustomed to its presence, it is now the order of the
day, the standard frame of reference." And this is largely a victory by default,
due to the inability of Islamists and Arab nationalists to elaborate an alterna-
tive operational formula of a "pan" state.[29]

Still the nation-state has never been as fully legitimized anywhere in the
Arab world as it has been in Turkey. The nation-state in the Arab world has
been under a three-pronged attack from Arab nationalism, Islam, and the sub-
state ethnic and sectarian divisions. Harik notes that Arab states "have been
caught up in the pull and push of conflicting forces, some coming from

domestic centrifugal sources such as ethnic and sectarian divisions and some from the universal forces of pan-Arabism and pan-Islam, both of which draw away from the legitimacy of statehood enjoyed by these countries. Arab nationalism, more so than Islam, denies legitimacy to the state system."[30]

The idea of one Arab nation, from Morocco to the Gulf, is a powerful force in the minds of Arab intellectuals and masses. It is particularly strong in the Fertile Crescent countries where, interestingly, the legitimacy of the territorial state is weakest. A relatively recent large-scale survey of 6,000 persons in ten Arab countries indicated that 78.5 percent of the respondents believed in the existence of an Arab entity, and 77.9 percent believed that this Arab entity constitutes a nation (of which 53 percent believing that this nation is divided at present by artificial boundaries); 69.1 percent thought that Arab unity would be beneficial for them as individuals, and 81.7 percent beneficial for their children.[31]

Arab nationalism is not only the dream of a handful of intellectuals but an ideal valued among the masses. Even the different words in Arabic used to distinguish Arab nationalism from territorial state nationalism suggest that the former is valued more highly. Thus, "nation-station nationalism was often disparagingly described as *qutriyya*, or regionalism. . . . The more prestigious, resonant and historical meaningful term *qawmiyya* was reserved for Arab nationalism."[32]

A second challenge to the Arab territorial-nation states comes from Islam. Vatikiotis argues, for example, that "Islam and nationalism are mutually exclusive terms. As a constructive loyalty to a territorially defined national group, nationalism has been incompatible with Islam in which the state is not ethnically or territorially defined, but is itself ideological and religious."[33]

Moreover, Islam is supposed to guide and regulate not only the spiritual lives of the believers, but their total social and political lives as well. If the differentiation of the state from society (autonomy) is an important element of stateness, can an Islamic state be autonomous? In an Islamic society, "the very idea of the separation of church and state is meaningless, since there are no two entities to be separated."[34] Therefore, those authors who link the emergence of the modern state in Western Europe to the increasing differentiation of the state from society would understandably be skeptical about the possibility of the emergence of a true state in the Islamic world. Badie and Birnbaum argue, for example, that "as the product of a culture based largely on the principle of differentiation, the state has not been able to achieve institutional form in societies dominated by 'organic religions' such as Islam or Hinduism, which reject the idea of a temporal or secular domain distinct from the spiritual."[35]

One should distinguish, however, between the theory of the ideal Islamic

state and the practical accommodations between temporal authority and the religious establishment in the past and present Middle Eastern societies. In many Islamic societies the secular authority has been sufficiently differentiated from the religious sphere. A good example would be the Ottoman state where the temporal authority dominated religion rather than the other way around. Ottoman sultans asserted from the outset their right to enact legislation, sometimes even in conflict with the express commands of Islamic law. One has only to remember that one of the greatest Ottoman sultans, Suleiman I, the Magnificent to Westerners, was called "Kanuni" (the law-giver or legislator) in Turkish. This notion of the autonomy and superiority of temporal authority helps explain the ease with which the *Tanzimat* reformers and then the Young Turks were able to regulate large areas of social life by secular legislation.[36]

As for fundamentalist Islamic rejection of the nation-state, again the practice is different from the theory. In many Arab countries as well as in Turkey, state and religion coexist in a more or less cooperative relationship. The state's incorporation of the religious establishment into its own structure enhances its power and legitimacy. Only in cases where the official religious establishment is unable to control the religious forces in the society does the universalism of the Islamic theory of state become a threat to the nation-state.[37]

The third challenge to the Arab territorial state comes not from such supranational ideologies as Arab nationalism and Islam, but from the substrate level, namely ethnic and sectarian divisions. Lebanon is the archetypical example of this so-called "mosaic" model, with Maronite Christians, Druze, Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, various other Christian Arab communities as well as non-Arab Armenians. Syria is divided along religious and sectarian lines among the Sunni, Shiite (themselves divided among the Alawites and Ismailis), Druze, and Christian Arabs, not to mention smaller Kurdish, Turkish, and Armenian communities. Iraq is divided linguistically into Arabs, Kurds, and Turks, and religiously between the Sunnis and the Shiites, with a small Christian minority. Even the relatively more homogeneous countries of the region have significant ethnic or religious minorities (Kurds in Turkey, Copts in Egypt, and Berbers in the Maghrib). Ethnic and sectarian loyalties are strong, and to the extent that modernization effects social cleavages and political loyalties, one observes a movement from local, family, or clan-based allegiances to larger sectarian allegiances, but not necessarily toward an overarching national identity.

In terms of the relative strength of nation-state identity vis-à-vis the competing loyalties of pan-nationalism, Islamic universalism, and substate group identities, Turkey is clearly the closest approximation of the Western-type nation-state model. In the Arab world, Egypt is the closest parallel to Turkey, with a socially homogeneous population produced by the ecological homo-

geneity of the Nile valley, its strong sense of Egyptianness, and a historical continuity extending over millennia.

Other Arab states with a long history of separate identity and reinforcing specificities are Morocco, Tunisia, and Oman, the first two of which have already approximated the nation-state model.[38] By the same criteria, the countries where the legitimacy of the nation-state is weakest are those of the Fertile Crescent: Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. The extent to which the nation-state has become legitimate has important implications for democratic development, as will be argued in the final section.

THE CAPACITY TO CONCENTRATE AND TO EXPAND POLITICAL POWER

As opposed to feudal systems where the amount of political power is small and dispersed, in bureaucratic empires like the Ottoman state, power is concentrated even though its total amount (i.e., the state's penetrative, extractive, and regulative capabilities) may be small. If, following Huntington, we identify the first stage of political modernization as the concentration of power and the second stage as the expansion of power,[39] the autonomous state apparatuses of bureaucratic empires have a greater capacity than feudal systems to concentrate and expand political power, unhampered by established class interests, and to use such power for the economic and social modernization of their countries.

· The two reformist regimes in the nineteenth century (Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II and Muhammad Ali in Egypt) did so with relative ease and considerable success. The *Tanzimat* reformers and the Young Turks followed the path of reform while further expanding political power. Their twentieth-century counterparts were Kemalism, Nasserism, Bourguibism, and Baathism. All were able to carry out far-reaching changes in their societies without much effective opposition, and to expand power beyond the wildest dreams of the Ottoman sultans, penetrating into every remote corner of their countries and involving an ever-growing number of their people in the regulative network of the state.

THE ABSENCE OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

The combination of factors that made the concentration and expansion of political power possible in the Ottoman Empire and its successor states makes its dispersal (i.e., the growth of democratic institutions) difficult. The case is often made that the development of modern democracy in Western Europe had its roots in the medieval feudal traditions. Western European feudalism implied a legally defined and mutually binding division of powers between a relatively weak central authority and well-entrenched local centers of power. It also implied some idea of representation in the form of estates, regardless of

how frequently or infrequently assemblies of estates were in fact called. To this was added the corporate autonomy of the church, the cities, and the guilds. From this medieval social and political pluralism, Europe evolved toward constitutionalism, the rule of law, and modern representative institutions with only a relatively short interruption represented by the age of royal absolutism.

Bureaucratic empires may lack such facilitating preconditions for democratic development. The Ottoman Empire had no representative tradition until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Although it was an established custom for the Ottoman government to convene an assembly of leading civil, military, and religious officials to discuss important matters of policy, especially in times of stress, this body, called the "general assembly" (*meclis-i umumi*) or the consultative assembly (*meclis-i mesveret*), had no representative character. Nor did the Grand Council of Justice (*meclis-i vala-yi ahkam-i adliye*), which was created by Mahmud II in 1838 and functioned as a de facto, but appointed, legislature in the *Tanzimat* period. The elective principle was first introduced into local government by the provincial law of 1864.[40] "While [Ottoman] central government had various means at its disposal for gathering information, opinion, and counsel, none of these ways seem to have been, even in embryo, a form of the principle of representative government."[41]

The first Ottoman constitution of 1876 was an important step in the development of representative institutions. It extended the representative-elective principle to the level of central government, even though it left some crucial powers in the hands of the monarch and remained in force for barely one year, to be followed by thirty years of absolutist rule by Abdulhamid II.[42] Reference should also be made in this connection to the Tunisian constitution of 1860, and to the efforts to develop a representational system in Egypt under the khedives Ismail and Tawfiq. Like the Ottoman experience, however, both proved to be shortlived.

The early twentieth-century experiments with constitutional and representative government were no more successful. Although the second constitutionalist period (1908–1913) in the [Ottoman] empire proved to be somewhat longer-lived and provided the first experience with organized political parties and competitive elections, it quickly degenerated into the single-party dictatorship of the Union and Progress Party. The Egyptian constitution of 1923 had no greater success. The "liberal experiment" in Egypt was neither truly liberal nor truly democratic. Effective political power remained in the hands of the king and the British authorities, and was exercised in a heavily authoritarian manner.[43] Kedourie describes the 1923 Egyptian constitution as:

> A model, a text-book constitution . . . full of checks and of balances, an ordered and intricate toyland in which everything was calm and beauty. Its radical fail-

ing . . . was that it assumed and took it for granted that elections in Egypt could possibly elicit . . . the will of the electorate. As the sequel, from 1923 to 1952, showed, they did nothing of the kind; Egyptian elections, rather, proved to be ratifications by the masses of decisions taken by the king, or else by the Cairo politicians, depending on which side had, for the time being, the upper hand.[44]

Among all the successor states to the Ottoman Empire, only three (Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon) have been able to maintain a competitive democratic system for any length of time. The Israeli democracy, created in large part by Jewish settlers from Europe, is necessarily less linked to an Ottoman past. The Lebanese democracy was even at its best highly "precarious" and oligarchical. Destroyed by the brutal civil war beginning in 1975, its recovery is by no means assured.[45] Turkey's relatively successful democratic record in the last forty-five years has been marred by three military interventions.

The Continuing Ottoman Legacy: State Autonomy

The autonomy of the state means the autonomy of the officials, bureaucrats, and military officers who occupy high posts in the state. Who are they in the contemporary Middle East? Do they come from a particular class background? Do they represent the interests and aspirations of a particular social class?. Or do they themselves create or develop into a new class?

Manfred Halpern was one of the first to stress the rise of a new salaried middle class as the key to an understanding of modern Middle East politics. In his view, this class "constitutes the most active political, social, and economic factor from Morocco to Pakistan. Leadership in all areas of Middle Eastern life is increasingly being seized by a class of men inspired by nontraditional knowledge, and it is being clustered around a core of salaried civilian and military politicians, organizers, administrators, and experts." Unlike its counterpart in the industrialized states, this class

> uses its power not to defend order or property but to create them—a revolutionary task that is being undertaken so far without any final commitment to any particular system of institutions. . . . At this extraordinary moment when the traditional ruling class has been defeated and the peasants and workers have not yet organized themselves to make their own demands, politics has become a game played almost entirely within the new middle class.[46]

Whether this new middle class is as socially and politically homogeneous as the term "class" implies and whether being "salaried" is one of their defining characteristics is debatable.[47] Most probably, it displays greater cohesion prior to its seizure of power, but soon thereafter important policy differences with-

in the leading cadres of the new regime become visible. Examples abound: divisions among the Young Turks after the constitutionalist revolution of 1908, among Kemalists after the victory of the War of Independence, among the Free officers in Egypt, within the Syrian Ba'th which were reflected in the coups of 1966 and 1970, in Iraq, Algeria, etc. The central fact for our purposes is that these new middle-class men, mostly with careers in government service, have come to political power in most of the Ottoman successor states, as political elite studies have convincingly shown.[48]

Despite the amorphous character of this "new middle class," several generalizations can be made about it. First, they owe their status to their training and modern skills, nor to their wealth. Second, they are mostly, especially until quire recently, in government careers. Third, they are most likely the off-spring of urban petite bourgeoisie or the rural middle class. The military in particular and to a lesser extent the civilian bureaucracy provided a channel of upward mobility to the sons of such modest families. This does nor make them, however, an instrument or representative of petite bourgeoisie or of the rural middle class.

> The leaders of these alleged perit bourgeois regimes have often displayed considerable hostility toward the commercial and trading sectors of their society. . . . They reached accommodations with the petite bourgeoisie only because the state was incapable of nationalizing their activities with any reasonable degree of efficiency. [Although] many regimes in the Middle East in the 1960s were indeed of petit bourgeois origin . . . their leaders had, by and large, an antibourgeois (whether petit or grand) mentality. They were not the creatures of their class.[49]

A counter argument is that the Egyptian military elite taking power after 1952 had its roots in the rural middle class of rich peasants who owned between 10 and 50 *feddans*; that this rural bourgeoisie, unaffected by the land reforms and helped by the elimination of the largest landowners, became the new rural upper class; that they were the real beneficiaries of the policies of the revolutionary regime; that they were mobilized and participant, and constituted the "second stratum" in Egypt from among whom many important officials were chosen; that the "second stratum does not rule but is the stratum without which the rulers cannot rule"; and that, in this sense, the rural middle class embodied the Egyptian revolution.[50] On balance, however, the view that the rural middle class "never embodied the Egyptian revolution" and "official attitudes toward the rural middle class ranged from hostile to tolerant, bur they were never supportive" seems sounder.[51]

The relationship between the post-1952 Egyptian state elites and the rural middle class resembles the post-1920 situation in Turkey, where rhe Kemalist state elites found it convenient to ally themselves with rural notables, keeping

them as a junior and nor very influential partner. Perhaps the price of this alliance was the absence of a far-reaching land reform in Turkey.[52]

Contemporary Middle Eastern states provide "extreme instances of autonomous state action—historical situations in which strategic elites use military force to take control of an entire national state and then employ bureaucratic means to enforce reformist or revolutionary changes from above."[53] The precondition for this "revolution from above" model is a relatively autonomous state apparatus where the bureaucrats "are not recruited from the dominant landed, commercial, and industrial classes; and they do not form close personal and economic ties with these classes after their elevation to high office. Relatively autonomous bureaucrats are thus independent of those classes which control the means of production." And the characteristics of the revolutionary process are:

> [a] the extralegal takeover of political power and the initiation of economic, social, and political change is organized and led by some of the highest military and often civil bureaucrats in the old regime. [b] there is little or no mass participation in the revolutionary takeover or in the initiation of change. Mass movements and uprisings may precede and accompany the revolution from above, but military bureaucrats who take revolutionary action do so independently from, and often in opposition to, such movements. [c] the extralegal takeover of power and the initiation of change is accompanied by very little violence, execution, emigration, or counterrevolution. [d] the initiation of change is undertaken in a pragmatic, step-at-a-time manner with little appeal to radical ideology. [e] military bureaucrats who lead a revolution from above—as opposed to a coup d'etat - destroy the economic and political base of the aristocracy or upper class. The destructive process is basic to both revolution from above and from below.[54]

Kemalist Turkey, for example, did not have to destroy powerful economic interests, because there were no such interests in Turkey of the 1920s, but it did attack and subdue a strong Islamic opposition even at the risk of breaking an alliance forged during the war of independence. As for the other successor states, "one cannot but be surprised at the ease with which the independent states of the Middle East contained or broke the power of significant economic interests in their societies." The only entrenched indigenous class in the region has been the landowners, and even if we grant that their historical roots are fairly shallow, it still remains interesting that they have "given up without a fight" in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The same is true for the relatively strong business interests in Syria.[55]

The Ottoman tradition of the benevolent father state with a strong concern for equity may well reinforce state autonomy.[56] This has created a polit-

ical culture accepting the legitimacy of an interventionist state. "It is conceded in the abstract that the state and its leaders have a right and an obligation to set a course for society and to use public resources to pursue that course." Moreover, "the emphasis is on the ends of state intervention, and checks and balances are not seen as preventing abuse of power but rather as impeding the state's course toward its goal. Therefore, to some extent, there has been an acceptance of a high concentration of power —economic, administrative, and military." Nowhere in the region, save Lebanon and perhaps the present-day Turkey, do private sectors enjoy full legitimacy.[57]

The legitimacy of state interventionism is as much a cause of state autonomy as its result. The powerful role of the state as the initiator of industrialization, manager of state economic enterprises, purveyor of employment, holder of oil (and other) rent, instrument of investment, consumption, and distribution of revenue gives it strong leverage against all social groups.[58]

The phenomenon of the "rentier state," although quite unrelated to the Ottoman legacy, also contributes to state autonomy, by putting immense amounts of revenue at the service of the state since oil rents accrue directly to the state. Although not all Arab states are oil-rich states, it has been argued that a rentier mentality prevails in all of them.[59] For example, Syria is described as "an oil state by transference." Indeed, foreign grants and loans covered more than 50 percent of its budget in the late 1970s and only slightly less than 50 percent in the mid-1980s.[60]

The Continuing Ottoman Legacy: State Capabilities

The Ottoman Empire had an extensive and elaborate civil and military bureaucracy, highly developed by the standards of its day and certainly by those of most of the third world countries. This was the most direct legacy of the Ottoman state to the Turkish republic. Rustow has calculated that 93 percent of the empire's general staff officers and 85 percent of its civil servants continued their service in Turkey.[61] To a lesser extent some of the other successor states also inherited this legacy. Particularly in Iraq, ex-Ottoman soldiers and administrators constituted the first generation of ministers, politicians, and high administrators.

In the Arab states bureaucratization, in the sense of an increase in the number of administrative units and personnel, a rise in wages and salaries, and "an orientation whereby the administrative and technical dominate the social," has grown substantially in the last thirty years. In Egypt, at the beginning of 1978, the public sector was employing about 3.2 million officials and workers (i.e., a third of the total workforce and over half of the nonagricultural workforce). Total public expenditures in 1980 represented 60 percent of GDP, and

total government revenues 40 percent of GDP.[62] In Iraq, total government employment in 1977 reached 410,000, or nearly half of Iraq's organized workforce.[63] Between 1976 and 1980, out of a total of 13,460 million Iraqi dinars of allocated investments 12,000 million (some 88 percent) were public investments.[64] In Syria, combined public sector and civil service employment (not including some 230,000 Syrians in uniform) totaled 350,000 out of a total workforce of 2.1 million.[65] Bureaucratic growth is just as marked in conservative Gulf states and in Jordan as in the self-proclaimed socialist states.[66]

> [Bureaucracy's] elaborate hierarchy and strict chain of command is . . . an invaluable instrument of control . . . Arab rulers appear to prefer a system of administrative authority in which all power emanates from a single political leader and where the influence of others is derivative in rough proportion to their perceived access to him or their share in his largesse. . . . To ensure competition among a leader's subordinates, they are endowed with roughly equal power and given overlapping areas of authority.[67]

Together with the growth of public bureaucracy and rise in government expenditures came an impressive growth in state capabilities, particularly in the areas of defense and internal security, but also in health, education, welfare, and public works.[68] Egypt, Iraq, and Syria "have managed to build some of the most formidable manpower mobilization systems for war of any states in the world . . . And these abilities have not been limited exclusively to the military sphere. These states also have placed other state personnel into even the most remote corners of their societies. For example, all have achieved some notable successes in fielding teachers in villages and towns."[69]

State capability, however, is not a unidimensional phenomenon. A state may be strong in some areas, but weak in others. Certain Middle Eastern states have shown impressive coercive, mobilizational, and penetrative capabilities, but have remained weak in regulating social relationships and using resources in determined ways. One good example is the thwarting of Nasser's goal to create a more egalitarian rural society where "the sum of social control local strongmen have exercised has prevented state leaders from developing the state's own mobilizational capabilities."[70]

Future Prospects: Retreating States and Expanding Societies?

The theme "retreating states and expanding societies" has recently become popular in Middle Eastern studies. Do these presumed trends represent a reduction in the age-old autonomy of the Middle Eastern state? Do they signify a meaningful step toward democracy? Two trends are unmistakably clear.

The first is increased emphasis on the private sector, greater reliance on

market forces, a lessening of government controls over the economy, and opening to international markets. These shifts in economic policy have brought the rise of the big bourgeoisie in many Middle Eastern states. Even though it is questionable whether the bourgeoisie "dominates" or holds "hegemonic" power in any Middle Eastern Muslim country, "some of those regimes may be fairly described as 'bourgeois states' or at least emergent or embryonic bourgeois states."[71] Turkey under Özal has gone farthest in this direction toward full legitimation of the private sector. The Turkish entrepreneurial bourgeoisie "may now be ready, if the international economy is at all hospitable, to consolidate Turkey in the ranks of the NIC's (newly industrialized countries) and to make the Turkish state its instrument."[72] The Turkish version of *infitah* has been followed somewhat more timidly and cautiously by Egypt and Tunisia, and even by such "radical states" as Syria, Iraq, and Algeria to a lesser but still significant extent."[73]

The growth of the private sector and the rise of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie can certainly be considered a reduction of state autonomy. This does not mean, however, that rising bourgeoisie will be in conflict with the state apparatus or able to establish hegemony over it. The state, even in Turkey, still has powerful leverage over the business community. A symbiotic and cooperative relationship between the two can benefit both. "The private sector growing up in the shadow of the state (and thanks to the public sector) certainly has an interest in gaining freedom of economic action, more access to credit, fiscal facilities, the freedom of cross-border traffic, but why should it have to undertake open political action when it can try to obtain all this at less cost to itself by remaining entrenched in bureaucratic or palace politics where the informal network of family, regional and factional solidarity is at the heart of the game."[74] It does not appear that the emergent big bourgeoisie can yet dispense with the protective domination of a very powerful state apparatus. The Lebanese and the Iranian cases suggest "that the failure of the two to cooperate may bring about a consequence which is far worse for both than the alternatives of mutual cooperation or the acquiescence in the domination of either."[75]

These observations indicate "what *infitah* does *not* mean. It does not mean that the state sector is about to be dismantled, even in Turkey. It does not mean that the state is ceding to 'civil society'. This may happen, to some extent, in Turkey and Egypt; it is much less likely in Iraq or Algeria. Rather than a *retreat* of the state, *infitah* is better conceived as a *restructuring* of state activity, always mediating between society and international actors, still responsible for the basic welfare of the population, and continuing to formulate the goals and strategy of economic development and structural change."[76]

The second clear tendency observed in the entire region, including offi-

cially secular Turkey, is the resurgence of political (often fundamentalist) Islamic movements. Their growing power has forced many states to a more accommodationist policy.[77] Since such movements are an outgrowth of civil society, as opposed to the official religious establishments, they can be considered yet another aspect of the retreat of the state and the expansion of the society, or a further reason for the weakening of the state autonomy. Granting that there are many variations in the Islamic camp, any movement intent on establishing an "Islamic state" cannot be said to constitute a fertile ground for the development of genuine liberal and pluralist democracy in the region. For the Islamic radicals are intent on taking over the "modern state and use its own tools in order to Islamize society; there is no sense in dismantling this state" or dispensing with the modern technology it utilizes. "The liquidation of basic democratic liberties in the name of the *Shari'ah* follows necessarily. And that entails a restriction of civil society's sphere (even compared with the present situation)."[78]

Thus, the convergence of the two recent tendencies, the rise of the big bourgeoisie and the resurgence of political Islam, although leading to a less autonomous state, does not justify much optimism for the development of liberal democracy in the region. The rise of the bourgeoisie in itself is no guarantee for the installation of democracy since, as the experience has shown elsewhere, a bourgeois state can also be authoritarian or antidemocratic.[79] Since the bourgeoisie is not strong enough to create a liberal-democratic state alone, it needs political allies.

Two possible allies are the petite bourgeoisie (bureaucrats, small traders, shopkeepers, etc.) and the Islamic fundamentalists. Neither provides a fertile ground for democratic development.[80] Although Binder finds a common interest between the bourgeoisie and the fundamentalists in reducing the power of the autonomous state and some ground for convergence between Islamic fundamentalists and Islamic liberals (those who advocate the comparibility of Islam and political liberalism), he finds that "the liberal Islamic paradigm can hardly be said to be dominant in the Middle East at the present time . . . It is enormously difficult to develop liberalism outside of a sustaining bourgeois culture in which a high value is placed upon liberal education, individual dignity, the rule of law, freedom of the press, freedom of artistic expression and criticism . . . Until the circumstances render the concept self-evidently meaningful to mass and elite alike, the prospects for Islamic liberalism will remain dim."[81]

Similarly, Ben-Dor argues that "a golden path must be found in which *raison d'état* reigns supreme, but is tempered and refined by Islamic ethics. Islam does not invade, subvert, overwhelm, or capture the state; it accepts its supremacy (in its proper sphere) so long as the logic of state takes into con-

sideration the ethical constraints of Islam . . . In his pursuit of the interests of the state, Christianity, Judaism, or Islam cannot tell him [the ruler] what to do, but they can tell him what not to do. Their ethics cannot dictate *raison d'état*, but they can restrict the means employed to pursue *raison d'état*."[82] This golden path seems to be even farther away today than it was in the Ottoman days.

On most issues touched upon in this chapter, Turkey's role has been emphasized. On the question of the relationship between the state and religion, however, Turkey's secularist model is not likely to be followed by any Arab country in the foreseeable future. In Turkey, however, despite certain encroachments by religious forces the essentials of the secular state have remained intact even after 50 years of multi-party politics. Secularism has never become an unacceptable idiom; on the contrary, it has completely dominated the political discourse. A variety of Islamic organizations, associations, parties, and brotherhoods, ranging from liberal-accommodationist to radical revolutionary, represent only a minority of Turkish public opinion.

Perhaps one of the reasons for this difference between Turkey and the Arab world is that Islam, while constituting an important element in Turkish identity, is a much more essential part of Arab identity. A pertinent testimony is the following words by Michel Aflaq, himself a Christian and the ideological father of one of the most secularist political movements in the Arab world, the *Ba'th*: "Islam in its pure truth sprang up in the heart of Arabism and it gave the finest expression of the genius of [Arabism], and it marched with its history and it mixed with Arabism in its most glorious roles, so it is impossible for there to be a clash between them."[83] On the contrary, it has been possible to build a secular nationalism in Turkey, based on the separate identity of Turks, without rejecting the ethical implications and cultural norms of Islam.

A final variable that will determine the prospects for democratic development in the Middle East is the degree to which the nation-state is accepted and legitimized. Those countries where the nation-state is most firmly established, have the best chance to create or maintain a democratic regime. National unity is a "background condition" for transition to democracy. This "means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which community they belong to. . . . Democracy is a system of rule by temporary majorities. In order that rulers and policies may freely change, the boundaries must endure, the composition of the citizenry be continuous."[84] As Ivor Jennings puts it, "the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people."[85]

Judged by these three criteria (the rise of the bourgeoisie, the tameness and accommodationism of the Islamic groups, and the legitimacy of the nation-state) the countries with the strongest potential for democracy are Turkey,

Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. Turkey once more leads the field with its half-century-old experiment with genuine multiparty politics. Having gone through a number of crises and military interruptions, Turkish democracy finally seems to have entered into a phase of consolidation. The most likely medium-term scenario for the other three countries seems to be a continuation of the present experiments with limited pluralism: the "controlled pluralism" in Egypt, the "manipulated pluralism" in Morocco, and the "emergent pluralism" in Tunisia.[86] Among the three, Egypt is the most genuinely pluralistic, with its somewhat marginal but true opposition parties and its hybrid, eclectic, unruly but still vibrant system of interest representation.[87]

In conclusion, the most important political legacy of the Ottoman Empire to its successor states is state autonomy. A combination of political, social, economic, cultural, and historical factors has produced a particularly strong and autonomous state tradition in this region. Since achieving independence, almost all successor states have retained this tradition. In certain areas, they have even strengthened it, due to oil rents and the growth of bureaucratic and coercive apparatus. The more recent countertrends—toward a market economy and the rise of Islamic groups—are working in the opposite direction, forcing the state to retreat to some extent. It is too early to say, however, that these trends are likely to lead to a major transformation of the Middle Eastern state in the near future.

NOTES

1. Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 4–5

2. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Authoritarian Power Under Pressure: Comparative Patterns of Persistence and Change in 'Post-Populist' Egypt and Syria," paper presented at the Conference on "Retreating States and Expanding Societies: The State Autonomy/Informal Society Dialectic in the Middle East and North Africa," Aix-en-Provence, France, March 25–27, 1988. Hereafter cited as "Retreating States."

3. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States,* passim, "The Transmission of the State to Society," "Retreating States." See also Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 58.

4. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 15–17.

5. Hinnebusch, "Authoritarian Power Under Pressure," pp. 30–31, n. 1, 2.

6. Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 78.

7. Binder, *Islamic Liberalism,* p. 41.

8. Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 44. For a good comparison of the Ottoman land tenure system with Western European

feudalism, see Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 361–394.

9. Serif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11 (June 1969): 265–66.

10. Clement Henry Moore, "Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser's Egypt," *Comparative Politics* 6 (January 1974): 195, 207.

11. Peter Von Sivers, "Retreating States and Expanding Societies: The State Autonomy/Informal Civil Society Dialectic in the Middle East and North Africa," in "Retreating States," p 3.

12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. On the centrality of the state in Turkish political culture, see especially, Engin Deniz Akarli, "The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey," in Akarli and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems* (Istanbul: Bogaziçi University Publications, 1975), pp. 135–38.

14. Ergun Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey," in Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1993), pp. 247–68.. See also Mehmet Ali Birand, *Emret Komutanim* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1986), for a perceptive analysis of the military's attitudes toward civilian authority, the Kemalist legacy, and their perceptions of public interest.

15. Morroe Berger, *The Arab World Today* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1964), pp. 272–73.

16. Gabriel Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Postcolonial State* (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 18–20, 57.

17. Afaf Lutfi al Sayyid Marsot, "Popular Attitudes Towards Authority in Egypt," in "Retreating States."

18. Bernard Lewis, "Loyalty to Community, Nation and State," in George S. Wise and Charles Issawi, eds. *Middle East Perspectives: The New Twenty Years* (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1981), pp. 15–16.

19. Cited in Charles E. Butterworth, "State and Authority in Arabic Political Thought," in Ghassan Salame, ed., *The Foundations of the Arab State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 98. Hereafter cited as Salame, ed., *Arab State.*

20. Cited in Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict*, p. vi.

21. P. J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 22.

22. Anderson, *Absolutist State*, pp. 397-400, 462–549.

23. Salame, "Introduction," in Salame, ed., *Arab State*, pp. 9–10. For the fundamentalist Muslim position on the uniqueness of the Islamic state, see Fehmi Jadaane, "Notions of the State in Contemporary Arab-Islamic Writings," Salame, ed., *Arab State*, pp. 124-25.

24. See David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

25. Bahgat Korany, "Alien and Besieged Yet Here to Stay: The Contradictions of the Arab Territorial State," in Salame, ed., *Arab State*, pp. 48, 62.

26. Thomas Naff, "The Ottoman Empire and the European State System," in H. Bull and A. Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 143.

27. Iliya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," in Salame, ed., *Arab State*, pp. 21–22, 35. Rashid Khalidi concurs that "the nation-state in the Arab world often has deeper roots than many of its critics are willing to grant. In the case of Morocco and Oman, these roots go back to true world empires with all the attributes of sovereignty, and with reinforcing religious and social factors which guaranteed their specifity . . . (T)hey have become nation-states with little apparent difficulty . . . In Tunisia and Egypt there was a sufficient historical sense of an independent identity for these entities to make an easy transition to the status of nation-states": "Prospects for Nation-State and Trans-National Arab Nationalism," in "Retreating States," p. 14.

28. Harik, "Origins of the Arab State System," pp. 20, 38–39.

29. Korany, "Alien and Besieged," pp. 72, 74.

30. Harik, "Origins of the Arab State System," p. 20.

31. Korany, "Alien and Besieged," p. 54.

32. Khalidi, "Prospects for Nation-State," p. 2. See also Ghassan Salame, " 'Strong' and 'Weak' States, a Qualified Return to the *Muqaddimah*," in Salame, ed., *Arab State*, pp. 226-227.

33. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State*, pp. 10-11, 42-43, and ch. 2 *passim*. Khalidi similarly observes that for the Islamists, "Arab nationalism is a snare and a delusion, and indeed only communism draws more hostility from these movements" ("Prospects for Nation-State" p. 9). Interestingly, Mehmet Akif, a great Turkish poet and the author of the Turkish national anthem, wrote that "O, the community of Muslims, you are neither Arabs, nor Turks, nor Albanians, nor Kurds, nor Laz, nor Circassians. You are members of only one nation, and that is the great nation of Islam. You cannot pursue the cause of nationalism unless you give up Islam; and you cease to be Muslims, as long as you pursue the cause of nationalism," quoted by Tarik Z. Tunaya, *Islamcilik Cereyani* (Istanbul: Baka, 1962), p. 80, n. 1.

34. Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," *Commentary* 61, no. 51 (January 1976), p. 40.

35. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 101.

36. Ergun Özbudun, "Antecedents of Kemalist Secularism: Some Thoughts on the Young Turk Period," in Ahmet Evin, ed., *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change* (Opladen: Leske, 1984), pp. 25-44.

37. For the three types of relationship between state and religion, see Sadok Belaid, "Role of Religious Institutions in Support of the State," in Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman, eds., *Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State* (London: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 147-63.

38. Harik, "Origins of the Arab State System," pp. 25-31. Hermassi argues that "attitudes to, and relations with, the state differ somewhat from the Maghreb to the Mashreg . . . Contrary to the Mashreg where the unionist ideology prevailed, the Maghreb saw the rise of the national state and of territorial nationalism . . . (N)ot a single liberation party in the Maghreb took up the motto of Arab Union": Elbaki Hermassi, "State-building and Regime Performance in the Greater Maghreb," in Salame, ed. *Arab State*, pp. 76-77.

39. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 144-46.

40. Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute/Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 329-32.

41. Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 95 and passim.

42. Özbudun, "Turkey," pp. 332-34. Also Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963).

43. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment, 1922-1936* (Berkeley/ Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).

44. Elie Kedourie, "The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923," in *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1984), pp. 168-69.

45. See Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968), and the chapters by Ralph E. Crow, Iliya Harik, and Samir G. Khalaf in Jacob M. Landau, Ergun Özbudun, and Frank Tachau, eds., *Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters, and Elites* (London: Croom Helm, 1980).

46. Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 52, 59, 74.

47. For this debate, see especially Amos Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 10 (October 1967), pp. 46-65, and Halpern's response, "Egypt and the New Middle Class: Reaffirmations and New Explorations," ibid., 11 (January 1969), pp. 97–108; see also James A. Bill and Carl Leiden. *The Middle East: Politics and Power* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), pp. 84–88; Jean Leca, "Social Structure and Political Stability: Comparative Evidence from the Algerian, Syrian, and Iraqi Cases," in Dawisha and Zartman, *Beyond Coercion*, pp. 166–169.

48. See, among others, Fredrick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965); Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* (New York: Schenkman, 1975); George Lenczowski, ed., *Political Elites in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975); Landau, Özbudun, Tachau, *Electoral Politics in the Middle East*, Part 3; R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971); also his *Patterns of Political Leadership: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975); Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

49. Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and Economic Development* (Boulder: Westview Pres, 1990), pp. 415-16.

50. Leonard Binder, *In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 26, 28-29, and passim.

51. John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 303, 277, and ch. 12 passim. For a discussion of Binder's second stratum notion vis-a-vis the elite-mass (or state autonomy) model, see Hamid Ansari, "Limits of Ruling Elites: Autonomy in Comparative Perspective," in Dawisha and Zartman, eds., *Beyond Coercion*, pp. 220–38.

52. Ergun Özbudun, "Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 380-405. Richards and Waterbury argue that the Turkish and Tunisian examples may "tell us that commercial farmers who perform vital functions in agricultural production, who live in the countryside, and who often help organize the countryside politically for the regime, can better defend their interests than the older landlord class," *Political Economy of the Middle East* p. 402.

53. Skocpol, "Introduction," in Evans and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, p. 9.

54. Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 3–4.

55. Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, pp. 401–3.

56. Serif Mardin, "Turkey: The Transformation of an Economic Code," in Ergun Özbudun and Aydin Ulusan, eds., *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), pp. 25-53.

57. Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, pp. 184-87.

58. Leca, "Social Structure and Political Stability," in Dawisha and Zartman, *Beyond Coercion*, p. 165.

59. For a thorough discussion of the rentier state, see Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, eds., *The Rentier State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

60. Leca, "Social Structure and Political Stability," p. 184.

61. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military: Turkey," Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, p. 388.

62. Nazih Ayubi, "Arab Bureaucracies: Expanding Size and Changing Roles," in Dawisha and Zartman, eds., *Beyond Coercion*, pp. 14–16; Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, p. 197.

63. Ibid., p. 201. Joe Stork gives the 1977 government personnel figure as 580,132, and this does not

include the armed forces, an estimated 230,000 at that time, or nearly 200,000 pensioners directly dependent on the state for their livelihood. The number of government personnel in Iraq was only 9,740 in 1938, 20,031 in 1958, which means that in twenty years public bureaucracy grew some thirty times: "State Power and Economic Structure: Class Determination and State Formation in Contemporary Iraq," in Tim Niblock, ed., *Iraq: The Contemporary State* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 39.

64. Rodney Wilson, "Western, Soviet and Egyptian Influences on Iraq's Development Planning," in Tim Niblock, ed., *Iraq: The Contemporary State*, p. 237.

65. Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, p. 202.

66. Ayubi, "Arab Bureaucracies," pp. 16–18.

67. Ibid., pp. 26–27.

68. Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 154-61.

69. Migdal, "The Transmission of the State to Society," Conference on "Retreating States," pp. 1–2.

70. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, pp. 8–9, 37–40, and ch. 5.

71. Binder, *Islamic Liberalism*, pp. 13–14.

72. Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, p. 50.

73. Ibid., ch. 9.

74. Leca, "Social Structure and Political Stability," pp. 197–198.

75. Binder, *Islamic Liberalism*, pp. 14–15.

76. Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, p. 261.

77. See, for example, Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 178–204.

78. Emmanuel Sivan, "The Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back," "Retreating States," pp. 12–13, 15.

79. Binder, *Islamic Liberalism*, p. 12; Shaul Bakhash, "Islamic Liberalism," *Journal of Democracy* 1:2 (Spring 1990): 118.

80. Binder, *Islamic Liberalism*, pp. 337,358; Bakhash, "Islamic Liberalism," p. 117.

81. Binder, *Islamic Liberalism*, pp. 10, 357–59; Bakhash, "Islamic Liberalism," pp. 119-20.

82. Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict*, pp. 253–54.

83. Michel Aflaq, *Fi Sabil al Ba'th* (Beirut: Dar al Tali'a, 1963), pp. 43, 46, quoted by Hudson, *Arab Politics*, p. 264. Albert Hourani notes that according to the Ba'th ideology, "Islam was the 'national culture' of the Arabs; it was a veritable image and a perfect eternal symbol of the nature of the Arab self.' Muhammad was 'all the Arabs', and it would be dangerous for Arabs to separate religion from nationality as the European had done," *Arab Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 357.

84. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2:3 (April 1970): 350–51.

85. Cited ibid., p. 351.

86. I. William Zartman, "Opposition as Support of the State," in Dawisha and Zartman, eds., *Beyond Coercion*, pp. 61-87.

87. Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism*. For a review of Bianchi's book, see Daniel Brumberg, "An Arab Path to Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 120-25. See also Mustapha K. El Sayed, "Professional Associations and National Integration in the Arab World, with Special Reference to Lawyers Associations," in Dawisha and Zartman, eds., *Beyond Coercion*, pp. 88-115. For Egyptian political parties, see Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State* (Cambridge: New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Hinnebusch, "Political Parties in the Arab State: Libya, Syria, Egypt," in Dawisha and Zartman, eds., *Beyond Coercion*, pp. 35–60.