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State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey

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Turkey is one of the more fortunate countries in the Third World in terms of the quantity and quality of data on its elites. Following the monumental work of Frederick W. Frey on Turkish parliamentary elites that covered the entire 1920-1957 period in great detail,¹ other researchers have continued the same line of work and brought the political elite data up to date.² There are also a number of studies on bureaucratic and, to a much lesser extent, military elites. Most of these studies, however, have concentrated on the social background characteristics of particular elite groups, not as a rule on their attitudes and values. Because this chapter intends to focus on the state elites' attitudes and values on democracy, it will be necessary to supplement whatever empirical data exists with historical and necessarily more impressionistic evidence.

It has been argued, correctly, that

until quite recently, Turkish politics have been, for all major purposes, *elite* politics. As in most other developing societies, the political drama was limited to elite actors, elite institutions, and elite urban settings. Mass elements were excluded by the nature of the culture, the distribution of resources, and the design of the rulers. . . . It . . . is still possible to analyze much of the thrust of Turkish politics by focusing on the political elite—although this perspective will probably become increasingly inadequate in the future.³

State Elites in the Ottoman-Turkish Political Tradition

The salience of elite politics in Turkey stems largely from its history and culture. It has been pointed out by virtually every observer of Turkish politics that the Ottoman Empire was almost a textbook example of a patrimonial state. Authority was concentrated in the hands of an absolute monarch (*sultan*) who wielded it with the aid of a vast bureaucratic-military apparatus. Members of the apparatus, namely, officers of the court and the army, civil

servants, and *ulema* (Islamic scholars) constituted the ruling class; the rest of society, Muslim and non-Muslim subjects (*reaya*), had no part in the government. To this rigid dichotomy between the ruling class and the ruled were added other features which made the Sultan the undisputed master over the ruling class itself. One such feature was the recruitment (*devsirme*) system, which was a periodic levy of the male children of Christian subjects. They were reduced to the status of slaves and trained for the service of the state. Because these slaves legally became the sultan's property—as he could take their lives and confiscate their wealth without legal process—they were in no position to challenge his authority. Furthermore, their removal from their former social environments prevented the development of locally entrenched, semiautonomous elements in the provinces.

A second feature, also instrumental in maintaining a strong central authority over the large territories of the empire, was the Ottoman land tenure system. The system vested in the state the original ownership of all the land, and limited the rights of fief holders (*sipahi*) to the collection of taxes and the supervision of peasants under their jurisdiction. In return for the land grant, the fief holder was expected to recruit, train, and support a local contingent of soldiers to join the army in time of war. The fiefs were granted by the central government and, if necessary, could be taken away by it. Furthermore, the largest fiefs were the perquisites of office and consequently held only temporarily. Thus, fief holders were members of a state service class rather than of a hereditary aristocracy with independent bases of power in the provinces.

In short, with no feudalism comparable to that of Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no autonomous church organization, no strong merchant class or artisan guilds, no self-governing cities, and with a ruling class staffed with slaves, the Ottoman Empire represented a close approximation of an Oriental despotism.⁴ What kind of political culture did such a structure produce? Perhaps its most important element was the respect for and the exaltation of political authority. Since the Ottoman state was largely autonomous of societal forces in the sense that political power was divorced from economically defined class relations, a corollary of the respect for authority was that members of the ruling class were supposed to serve “the state” rather than any particular social group. A third element was that the social order was of divine origin and, hence, immutable. It was the sultan's duty to maintain this order by keeping people in their appropriate social positions. Finally, political power, absolute though it was, was to be exercised with justice and with the aim of promoting public welfare. This last notion gave the Ottoman-Turkish state its paternalistic character, if more in theory than in practice. Interestingly, not only the ruling class but also the subject masses seemed to share this belief in the paternalistic nature of the state, as evidenced by the popular expression of “father-state” (*devlet*

baba).⁵

Given the highly centralized structure of the Ottoman state, the powerful socializing mechanisms provided by the palace schools that trained the recruited military and administrative officials, and the ever-present influence of Islam, it is not surprising that a remarkably high degree of unity in elite outlook was obtained. Indeed, this unity and the strong tradition of serving the state seem to have played a major role in the rapid rise of the Ottoman Empire. In the eighteenth century, concomitant with the gradual decay of the land tenure system and the weakening of the central government, some local notables were able to hold a measure of de facto autonomy in their areas. The influence of local notables seems to have reached its peak in the early nineteenth century, when they forced Sultan Mahmud II to sign a charter in 1808 that gave "formal recognition to feudal rights and autonomies in the Ottoman Empire."⁶ However, the concept of power sharing between the central government and local forces was extremely alien to Ottoman political thought. Indeed, Mahmud II had signed the charter very reluctantly, and did not hesitate to suppress the autonomy of notables as soon as he restored central authority. From that time until the 1950s, local notables remained clearly subordinate in political influence to the central state elites.

More important for our purposes is the fracturing of the old elite unity, also starting from the early nineteenth century concomitant with the reform or modernization movement in the empire. Continued defeats at the hands of European powers convinced the sultans that the only way to save the state was to introduce modernizing reforms, first in the military field and later on in other fields as well. Reforming sultans were supported in this endeavor by a small number of officials who had been exposed to European ideas. This understandably caused a reaction by the more traditionalist elements of the state elites. Such opposition was motivated not only on religious grounds but also by the fear that reforms would undermine the bases of their power and status in the society. Indeed, much of nineteenth-century Ottoman history can be written in terms of the intralite conflict between the reformist and conservative wings of the state elites. Gradually, the reforming bureaucrats and military officers established their domination over the state apparatus. While doing so, they also increasingly asserted their own authority vis-à-vis the sultans. In the Young Turk era (1908-1918) "they came to wield power themselves behind something of a smokescreen of constitutional reforms. The Young Turk revolution was in part a victory for the modern bureaucratic intelligentsia over the palace."⁷

Thus, politics was clearly elite politics during the last century of the Ottoman Empire, although the first signs of mass involvement in politics, such as political party activity, election campaigns, and mass rallies, could be observed in the Young Turk period. Elite domination was so strong, however, that Bernard Lewis succinctly states that

the government of Turkey was still the accepted and recognized prerogative of an elite of professionals, who retained all the rights and duties of politics, including that of opposition. It was, therefore, among the servants of the state that the pioneers of revolutionary change emerged; it was in the schools—those nurseries of the civil and military elite, so carefully tended by the Sultan himself—that the seeds of a revolution were sown.⁸

In the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, there appeared a new division within the official elite, in addition to the one between the reformers and the conservatives. This one pitted the liberals or the constitutionalists against the supporters of authoritarian reform from above. Although both sides were committed to modernization and thus differed from the traditionalists, the liberals soon found themselves with a dilemma that was to be faced by many generations of future modernizers: the liberals wanted to have a parliament as an alternative and modern source of legitimacy. They soon realized, however, that an alliance between the traditionalist elements within the old center and the local forces in the periphery could easily threaten the reform movement under a system of free, competitive elections. There lies one of the main sources of paradoxes and ambiguities in the Young Turks' views on democracy. Such ambiguities were inherited by the Kemalist Republic, as will be spelled out below.

State Elites in the Kemalist Period (1920-1950)

Although the Kemalist Republic is often seen as a radical departure from the Ottoman past, a more careful examination reveals many important continuities. Rustow insightfully argues, for example, that

a transformation in cultural content of such scope and speed was made possible through a remarkable degree of continuity in political leadership and political method. It has been characteristic of Turkey's gradualist pattern of political development that its political elite changed most drastically at times when political institutions underwent little change (e.g., 1908-18 and since 1950), and that its political institutions were extensively recast (in 1919-1925) when the composition of the elite remained essentially unchanged.⁹

Perhaps the most important element of continuity was the continued domination of the state elites. Rustow notes that fully 93 percent of the empire's general staff officers and 85 percent of its civil servants continued their service in Turkey after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ Just as the Young Turk movement was dominated by the officials (bureaucrats and the military officers), so were the single-party Assemblies of the Republic. Frey has shown that officials constituted about half of all members of Parliament in all single-party Assemblies from 1920 up to 1947 (Table 7.1)

Table 7.1 Occupations of Deputies and Deputies Born in Region of Constituency Represented, National Assembly, Turkey, 1920–1954 (in percentages)

Occupation	Assembly									
	I 1920	II 1923	III 1927	IV 1931	V 1935	VI 1939	VII 1943	VIII 1946	IX 1950	X 1954
Officials ^a	43	54	54	45	48	47	47	36	22	21
Professionals	18	20	22	22	24	27	31	35	45	44
Economic ^b	19	14	16	22	19	19	16	24	29	29
Religion	17	7	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1
Other ^c	4	4	5	7	5	5	4	3	4	5
Deputies born in region of constituency represented	72	64	55	56	41	47	49	66	68	71

Source: Adapted from Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 181, 190.

^aIncludes government officials, military officers, and educators.

^bIncludes persons in trade, agriculture, and banking.

^cIncludes journalists.

The first Assembly elected in 1920 is a partial exception because the exigencies of the War of Liberation forced the Kemalists to co-opt a relatively large number of local notables and religious leaders. With the victory in the war, however, the Kemalists consolidated their position and the official representation in the Assembly reached its peak in the 1923 and 1927 elections, while the religious contingent dwindled rapidly.

The next major change was in 1946, when multiparty competition was introduced. Although the People's Republican Party (RPP) won the 1946 elections, there was a noticeable decline in the representation of officials and a corresponding increase in the percentage of deputies with a professional or economic background. This tendency became even more marked in the Ninth Assembly, when the opposition Democratic Party (DP) came to power with an electoral landslide in 1950 and the Republicans were turned out of office after almost three decades in power. Parallel to these changes in the occupational structure of the Assembly, one can also discern an interesting change in the degree of localism of parliamentarians (as measured by the percentage of deputies born in region of constituency represented). From a relatively high level in 1920, localism declines sharply in the single-party years and rises again with the introduction of multiparty politics. "Changes in the character of the People's Party itself in the last years of the single party era," Frey observes, "heralded further changes when the Democratic Party took over in the Ninth Assembly of 1950. One gains the impression from these data of mounting pressures gradually eroding a structure, which first shows relatively slight strains and cracks, is shored up, and then succumbs entirely with a startling and resounding crash."¹¹

Going back to the single-party years, the elite background data cited above clearly demonstrate the ascendancy of the official elites in the period. In addition to the continuity of the social background characteristics of the political elites, the Republic also inherited from the Ottoman times an exceedingly elitist outlook. In this "bureaucratic ruling tradition," the official elites saw themselves as the true servants of a state above and autonomous from society, the sole guardians of public interest, and the chief agents of modernization. The Kemalist principle of revolutionism (*inkilapçılık*) means, among other things, that revolutionary cadres (in the Turkish case, the modernizing officials) had the right and duty to carry out a complete transformation of society. In Kemal Atatürk's view, "every society has a collective idea. If it is not always expressed or explained, it should not be concluded that it does not exist. In actuality, it always exists. . . . True revolutionaries are those who know how to discover the real preferences in the spirits and consciences of people whom they want to lead into a revolution of progress and renovation."¹² Thus, the function of the revolutionary cadres was to discover this "collective idea" of the society, express it, and illuminate the people on the road to progress. In this perspective, politics was seen not as a process of accommodating and aggregating diverse demands and interests of social

groups but of discovering what is right for the entire society.¹³

At this point, it can legitimately be asked how this elitist outlook can be reconciled with other Kemalist principles such as populism and national sovereignty. Indeed, populism was constantly emphasized throughout the Kemalist period, and the principle of national sovereignty was given a lofty place in the constitutions of 1921 and 1924. No easy answer is possible for this question. It will be argued here that such contradictions are inherent in the Kemalist views on democracy and that they go a long way in explaining many apparent paradoxes in Turkish politics, both in the Kemalist period and after.

Populism was used in three different senses by the Kemalists, often simultaneously. One was popular sovereignty or rule by the people. The second was equality before the law and a rejection of group and family privileges. The third was a solidarist view of society that held that the Turkish nation was "constituted not of classes but of solidary, closely interdependent occupational groups. It was a Turkish version of the solidarist ideas outlined by the French radical politician Leon Bourgeois and the sociologist Emile Durkheim."¹⁴ Populism in this sense had strong antecedents in the Young Turk era, particularly in the thoughts of Ziya Gökalp, the leading ideologue of the Young Turks. Gökalp, a disciple of Durkheim's, defined populism as follows: "If a society comprises a certain number of strata or classes, this means that it is not egalitarian. The aim of populism is to suppress the class or strata differences and to replace them with a social structure composed of occupational groups solidary with each other. In other words, we can summarize populism by saying: there are no classes, there are occupations."¹⁵ Similarly, Atatürk often expressed the view that Turkish society was not composed of antagonistic social classes with conflicting interests but of occupational groups that needed one another and whose interests were in harmony. He further argued that the Republican People's Party was the representative not of any particular social class but of the entire Turkish people.¹⁶ The ambiguity of the notion of populism and its simultaneous use in different senses can perhaps be best seen in its definition provided by the RPP program adopted at the Fourth Party Congress in May 1935:

The source of will and sovereignty is the nation. The Party considers it an important principle that this will and sovereignty be used to regulate the proper fulfillment of the mutual duties of the citizen to the State and of the State to the citizen. We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the law, and who recognize no privileges for any individual family, class, or community to be . . . populist. It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labor for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. The farmers, handcraftsmen, laborers and workmen, people exercising free professions, industrialists, merchants, and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish com-

munity. The aims of our Party . . . are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict and to establish harmony of interests.¹⁷

Thus, populism in the sense of solidarism and corporatism was not compatible with liberal and pluralistic democracy, but populism in the sense of popular sovereignty and popular rule provided a democratic impulse. Although commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty did not prevent the establishment of a single-party regime, it remains a fact that no component of the RPP doctrine provided a permanent justification for such a regime. As Duverger points out, "The Turkish single-party system was never based upon the doctrine of a single party. It gave no official recognition to the monopoly, made no attempts to justify it by the existence of a classless society or the desire to do away with parliamentary strife and liberal democracy. It was always embarrassed and almost ashamed of the monopoly. The Turkish single party had a bad conscience."¹⁸ The single-party system was advocated as a temporary measure to protect the revolution, not as a permanent or ideal system befitting the Turkish nation. Two attempts were made (in 1924 and 1930) to experiment with opposition parties. Although both experiments were short-lived, that such attempts were made at all remains highly significant.¹⁹ Finally, it is impossible to understand the peaceful transition in 1945-1950 to a multi-party system without bearing in mind the "democratic impulse" of the Kemalist regime.²⁰

The Kemalist period was one not only of undisputed domination of the state elites and of an elitist point of view but also of a very high degree of elite unity. The intraelite conflict between the more radical and the more conservative elements among the revolutionary officials, witnessed during and immediately after the War of Liberation, was decisively resolved in favor of the radicals by the mid-1920s.²¹ Thereafter, various subgroups of the official elites (the military, bureaucrats, intellectuals, parliamentary and party elites) were effectively united under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, imbued with a sense of mission of transforming and modernizing Turkish society. An elitist and bureaucratic outlook permeated the entire state apparatus. As one observer noted, "Until 1950, there existed a sort of closed corporation of professional public servants who, acting as politicians, passed laws which they and their colleagues administered as bureaucrats."²² Two other students of Turkish bureaucracy argued similarly that "under the Kemalists, the official elite grew accustomed to almost unchallenged power and to the social prestige which accompanied such power. The Republican People's Party was bureaucratized; bureaucratic and political power was largely fused to create an apparatus to impose the officials' will on the public."²³

However, the very success of the Kemalist efforts at modernization and the consequent differentiation of society in time created an alternative or counterelite. This elite was composed of businessmen, merchants, profes-

sionals, and local notables. Although they were also committed to modernization, they differed from the official Kemalist elites both in their social background characteristics and in their nonofficial, nontutclary view of state and society. With the introduction of free electoral competition in 1950, this new alternative political elite, organized in the Democratic Party (DP), came to power, easily mobilizing the peripheral forces such as peasants and urban lower classes. Thus, the 1950 elections can be described as a victory of the periphery over the center, that is, the world of officialdom. Frey succinctly summarized the meaning and implications of this change for Turkish politics:

Much of the political history of the era is wrapped up in the decline of the officials and the rise of the professional and economic contingents in the Grand National Assembly. The new man in Turkish politics is the lawyer and the merchant, replacing the soldier and the bureaucrat at the pinnacle of formal power. . . . The deputies have changed from being primarily a national elite group, oriented toward the tutelary development of the country, to being primarily an assemblage of local politicians, oriented toward more immediate local and political advantages. . . . The key conflict of contemporary Turkish politics . . . is the conflict between the residual national elite, basically found within or in support of the People's Party (perhaps until recently), and the new breed of local politicians, basically found in the Democratic Party and its successor. The local politicians, however, now have obtained strong representation, even dominance, in all political parties. The nationalist politicians, with strong external support from some of the military, the bureaucracy and generally from intellectuals, want to continue intensive Turkish development under as strong central surveillance as seems politically feasible. They favor major sacrifices of present consumption and satisfaction so as to invest in creating a stronger industrialized nation in the future. They tend to be, like their Kemalist forebearers, intellectual and official in their approach to politics even if they are no longer so overwhelmingly official in vocation. The localists, on the contrary, are much more closely attuned to the immediate satisfaction of local expectations, both as a device for obtaining political power and from conviction. They tend to emphasize local initiative, free enterprise, a relaxation of religious restrictions, and an interpretation of democracy that caters to local interests.²⁴

Tension Between State Elites and Political Elites

One immediate outcome of the transition to a multiparty system in Turkey was the fracturing of the Kemalist unity within the elite and "the resurrection of severe intraelite conflict."²⁵ One could no longer speak of the unity between political elites, as represented by the DP, and the official elites with strong ideological and emotional ties to the RPP. The DP government attempted to "debureaucratize" the society consistent with its program, the official elites strongly resisted it. In the eyes of the DP leaders, this amount-

ed to an unwarranted obstruction of the "national will." The bureaucrats, on the other hand, saw it as their duty to protect "public interest" against "incompetent and unprincipled" politicians elected by an "ignorant" majority. They viewed the use of state funds for political patronage purposes as an unforgivable squandering of the public treasury. They were also deeply troubled by the DP government's careless attitude toward the "rule of law," as well as by its more permissive policies toward religious activities, which they considered a betrayal of the Kemalist legacy of secularism. They resented political pressures by local party organizations, which they had not been accustomed to in the single-party period.

The DP era (1950-1960) can be described as one of the "debureaucratization" of Turkish society. Not only did official elites lose their once preeminent representation in parliament and their strong ties with political elites but their overall influence, status, prestige, security, and income declined sharply as well. The decline in prestige of bureaucratic careers is vividly demonstrated by a survey of high school students conducted in 1959. About half of the students ranked free professions as the vocation most respected, but only 12 percent thought so about the combined category of government and politics, and another 10 percent for the military. The percentage of those who expected to enter into a bureaucratic or military career was even lower: 7 percent each.²⁶ A 1956 survey found job satisfaction lowest in the Ministry of Interior (only 32 percent satisfied) compared with the Ministry of Finance (55 percent), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (89 percent), and the new, non-central government organizations (91 percent). An obvious explanation is that officials in the Ministry of Interior (governors and district governors) are in closest contact with voters and therefore subject to much stronger political pressures than other bureaucrats. In fact, in the same survey, district governors were asked if they came across political interference that could be considered harmful to the conduct of public affairs. The distribution of answers was as follows: 14 percent replied "often;" 38 percent, "sometimes;" 40 percent, "seldom;" and 8 percent left the answer blank.²⁷ A similar decline could also be observed in the incomes of bureaucrats and army officers. A study showed that between 1952 and 1957, the purchasing power of civil servants fell by 43 to 69 percent.²⁸ Finally, the DP-dominated Assembly passed laws enabling the government to force higher civil servants (including judges) into early retirement and even precluded the judicial review of such acts, thus severely curtailing job security for the bureaucrats.

Against this background of constant tension, it is easy to understand the extent and intensity of negative feelings among bureaucrats towards the DP government. In fact, the 1960 military coup that toppled the Menderes government can be seen as a reaction of the official elites, military and civilian alike, against the decline of their power, status, and prestige in Turkish society. It is difficult to explain, without bearing in mind the intensity of such feelings, the ease with which a small group of relatively junior officers was

able to carry out the coup. A few quotations from interviews with the instigators of the coup, who later organized themselves into the National Unity Committee, suggest the political atmosphere that prevailed in 1960: "I am convinced that the [Atatürk] reforms retrogressed during the period now behind us. In fact this was the greatest evil" (General Gürsel). "The 27 May Revolution was a rising-up of the present generation trained by the revolutionary spirit of Atatürk with a view to protecting and rescuing the revolution of the great Atatürk from those who, during the last ten years, wanted to upset and destroy it out of a thirst for power" (Lieutenant Colonel Kabibay). "After 1950 I saw with regret that they [the DP leaders] were leaving the civilized road Atatürk had outlined for the improvement of the Turkish nation, that the nation was being dragged backwards . . . in every field" (Colonel Yurdakuler). Atatürk's reforms "were betrayed" (Captain Solmaz). The Democrats "dragged the country into disaster in the economic and social fields. . . . An unreasonable consumption began. In 10 years we became one of the poorest nations in the world" (Major Erkanli). "The corruption in the country and the social decay which was going on at great speed were veiled and concealed by a policy of greed based on group domination under the guise of economic development" (Lieutenant Colonel M. Kaplan).²⁹

In the 1960 coup and its immediate aftermath, a very substantial degree of unity could be observed among various sections of the state elites that had been downgraded during the DP period. The coup was carried out, as was pointed out above, by a small group of middle-ranking army officers, but it found widespread and enthusiastic support within the military in general, the civilian bureaucracy, and among intellectuals. It is symbolically significant that in the wake of the coup, the task of drafting a new and democratic constitution was entrusted to a committee of university professors. Only when it was perceived many months later that such a group would not be sufficiently representative of public opinion did the National Unity Committee decide on 6 January 1961 to establish a Constituent Assembly for the task.

The Constituent Assembly was not, however, a popularly elected body. The National Unity Committee acted as one of the chambers of this bicameral assembly. The other chamber, the House of Representatives, was composed partly by members elected indirectly and partly by representatives of various institutions such as the two existing political parties (the DP had already been dissolved), the judiciary, universities, bar associations, labor unions, chambers of commerce and industry, farmers' associations, the press, and the like. The House of Representatives was effectively dominated by the members and sympathizers of the RPP, while the DP supporters were by and large excluded from the constitution-making process.

The product of the Constituent Assembly, the 1961 Constitution of Turkey, ratified by popular vote on 9 July 1961, reflected the basic political values and interests of the state elites. Thus, on the one hand, the constitu-

tion greatly expanded civil liberties and granted extensive social rights. On the other hand, it reflected a certain distrust of politicians and elected assemblies by creating an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of such elected organs. These checks included the introduction of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws; the strengthening of the administrative courts with review powers over the acts of all executive agencies; independence for the judiciary; the creation of a second chamber of the legislative assembly; improvement of job security for civil servants and especially judges; and the granting of substantial administrative autonomy to certain public agencies such as the universities and the Radio and Television Corporation. It was hoped that the power of the elected assemblies would be effectively balanced by judicial and other bureaucratic agencies, and that the newly expanded civil liberties and social rights would ensure the gradual development of a genuinely pluralistic and democratic society.

Toward an Accommodation

Tensions between state elites and elected politicians did not disappear with the making of the 1961 constitution. In fact, the 1961 elections gave a majority to the three parties (Justice Party, New Turkey Party, and the Republican Peasants Nation Party) that competed for the support of the former Democratic voters. The RPP, the party of the state elites, ended up with only 36.7 percent of the vote. Following a period of unstable coalition governments, the Justice Party (JP) gradually established itself as the principal heir to the DP. In the 1965 elections it gained about 53 percent of the popular vote and of the National Assembly seats. The JP repeated its success in 1969, when it won an absolute majority of the Assembly seats with a somewhat reduced percentage of the popular vote (46.5). Thus, Turkey appeared to have achieved, once again, a popularly elected and stable government.

Tensions continued to exist, however, on both sides in this period. The more radical elements in the armed forces were disappointed by the results of the 1961 elections. The two coup attempts in 1962 and 1963 led by Colonel Talat Aydemir, the commandant of the War College, were narrowly averted, mainly thanks to Ismet İnönü's presence at the head of the government, which was reassuring to most officers. Even after the failure of the Aydemir attempts, political activity by army leaders continued and eventually led to the "coup by memorandum" on 12 March 1971, as will be explained below.

The JP, in turn, was ambivalent in its attitude toward the 1961 constitution. It took care to operate clearly within the limits of the constitution, it criticized those aspects of it that, in its view, gave excessive powers to bureaucratic and judicial agencies. The JP also demanded a stronger executive. The views of Celal Bayar, the deposed president of the Republic under

the DP regime, were both more systematic and more extreme on this matter. Bayar argued that the 1924 constitution was more in accordance with the Kemalist notion of unconditional sovereignty of the nation, because it concentrated all power in the National Assembly as the sole representative of the Turkish nation. The 1961 constitution, on the other hand, introduced new partners into the exercise of national sovereignty: the army and the intellectuals. Thus, it reflected a distrust of elected assemblies and represented a return to the Ottoman notion of tripartite (palace, army, and religious scholars) government.³⁰ No doubt, such negative views of the 1961 constitution were partly motivated by the fact that the old Democrats had been almost totally excluded from its making, and partly by their being the "natural" majority party in the 1950s and 1960s and therefore resentful of bureaucratic limitations upon the power of elected assemblies.

There are strong indications, however, that tensions between state elites and the JP as the majority party tended to decrease in the 1960s. The JP government treated the military with much greater care and respect than the DP government had. The National Security Council, an advisory body created by the 1961 constitution and composed of certain ministers and the highest commanders of the armed forces, gave the military a legitimate voice in the formulation of national security policies. The election of former military commanders as president of the Republic (General Gürsel in 1961 and General Sunay in 1966) was also a reassuring factor for most officers. Finally, salaries and other side benefits for officers were greatly improved in the 1960s. Although a strong radical faction within the armed forces was still quite unhappy with the JP government and its basically conservative policies, its conspiratorial activities failed to gain the support of the top military leadership. These radical officers, frustrated by the successive electoral victories of the JP, aimed at establishing a longer-term military regime to carry out radical social reforms. In fact, the military memorandum of 12 March 1971, which forced the JP government to resign, was a last-minute move by the top military commanders to forestall a radical coup. In the days following the memorandum, most of the radical officers were summarily retired or dismissed, thereby strengthening the position of the more conservative leadership of the military. The so-called 12 March Regime did not go as far as dissolving the parliament and assuming power directly. Instead, it urged the formation of an "above-party" or technocratic government under a veteran RPP politician, Professor Nihat Erim. The policies of the nonparty government, with strong behind-the-scenes support from the military, were more in line with the JP's conservative philosophy. The constitutional amendments adopted in 1971 and 1973 especially reflected the JP's desire to strengthen the executive authority and to restrict certain civil liberties that were seen as responsible for the emergence of political extremism and violence.

Signs of accommodation between political elites and bureaucratic elites were even clearer. Leslie Roos and Noralou Roos, who interviewed a sample

of Turkish administrative elites in 1956 and 1965, observed significant differences between the findings of the two surveys. Thus, as opposed to 40 percent of the 1949-1952 graduates of the Political Science Faculty who reported satisfaction with their jobs in 1956, 60 percent of the same respondents reported satisfaction in 1965. Similarly, 61 percent of the younger officials (1958-1961 graduates who had not been interviewed in 1956) said that they were satisfied with their jobs.

The Roos and Roos findings also indicated a marked decline in the perceived political interference. For example, of the district governors who were dissatisfied with their jobs, 49 percent complained about too much political interference in 1956 and only 34 percent in 1965. Among those who were given major promotions in the meantime, the level of job satisfaction was much higher (63 percent) and perceived political interference much lower (22 percent) than described by those who remained in the job of district governor.

Significantly, the respondents in the 1965 survey also showed little hostility toward politicians and businessmen. Thus, the largest percentage (46 percent) thought that a citizen could best benefit his country by being a businessman and another 20 percent by holding political office. Roos and Roos conclude that "businessmen and politicians—the groups which most successfully challenged the traditional power and prestige of the Turkish official class—were the two groups seen as making the biggest contribution to the development of the Turkish state. Government administrators were ranked a poor third, and almost no one had a kind word to say for the military."³¹

Such change should not be attributed to an improvement in the status, prestige, influence, or pay of civil servants in the 1960s. On the contrary, more recent data show that government service remains, on the whole, a poorly paid and low-prestige occupation to this day. In Ömer Bozkurt's 1978 survey of a representative sample of Turkey's civil servants, the largest group (42 percent) cited unavailability of other jobs as the reason for their choice of a government service career. Another 40.6 percent mentioned job security, and only 6.2 percent job prestige. Satisfaction with authority or pay, or the attractiveness of the job were hardly mentioned at all. Also, 52.8 percent had negative job evaluations; 28.8 percent had positive evaluations, and 18.4 percent were indifferent. Only 28.5 percent of the respondents thought that a civil service career had greater respectability than other occupations; however, 71 percent thought that civil servants ought to enjoy such a special respectability.³²

If there has been no improvement in the overall status of civil servants since 1960, then lessening of the tensions between them and political elites has to be explained by systemic factors. Roos and Roos have argued that

several factors appear to have acted to diminish bureaucrat-politician conflict between 1956 and 1965. The politicians' experience with military

intervention might have been expected to lessen local interference in administrative matters. The psychological shock associated with the end of bureaucratic dominance would seem to have passed by 1965. Bureaucrats may have been more used to the ways of local leadership in 1965 than in 1956. . . . An increase in mutual understanding between politician and bureaucrat may have occurred. A recognition of the importance of working together may have replaced some of the antagonism at the local level. . . . Given the central role of bureaucrat-politician conflict in recent formulations of Turkish politics, this finding may have major significance for the political system."³³

If one important trend in the post-1960 period was a gradual accommodation between political and bureaucratic elites, another was the decline in the unity of outlook of official elites. It must be remembered that the military, the bureaucrats, and the intellectuals retained such unity in the 1950s and collaborated closely in the 1960 coup. With the more liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 constitution, however, intellectuals and bureaucrats have been increasingly exposed to and influenced by various political ideologies. Kemalism, although still a powerful intellectual legacy, ceased to be the unifying factor among official elites, particularly because it was open to various and conflicting interpretations. Furthermore, ties among the military, bureaucrats, and intellectuals seem to have been eroded by social change, as evidenced by the findings of the 1965 administrative elite survey mentioned above; when respondents were asked, "In which of the following ways can a citizen best benefit his country?" only one person noted serving in the military.³⁴ Similarly, the military's harsh treatment of intellectuals (professors, writers, journalists, and others) in the 1971 and 1980 interventions was a far cry from the cordial collaboration between the two groups in 1960.

Among sectors of the state elite, only the military seems to have retained its internal unity throughout the entire period, although some signs of factionalism and politicization were observed even within its own ranks in the 1960s and the 1970s.³⁵ The military's relative insulation from the political polarization and fragmentation of the period seems to be due to extraordinarily strong socializing influences within the Turkish military. Such socializing mechanisms and the resulting "military mind" have been aptly analyzed by a leading Turkish research journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand. Birand observes that for a majority of officers, politicians in general give precedence to personal or partisan-ideological interests over national interest. The armed forces should not get involved in partisan politics, but if the country or the Kemalist principles are endangered, it is their duty to intervene. Turkey owes its existence and independence to Atatürk and his revolution. It is the duty of the armed forces to protect Atatürk's principles. Turkey is located in a hostile international environment and, therefore, is constantly exposed to external and internal threats. A majority of the population is ignorant; they can be misguided or deceived by ambitious politicians.

Democracy, as Atatürk stated, is the best form of government for Turkey, provided that democratic competition does not endanger Atatürk's principles, in which case the army has not only the right but also the duty to intervene.³⁶ Certain corroborating evidence was provided by an officially conducted survey of the War College students. In this 1983 survey, 60.6 percent of the students thought that the most important reason for the failure of governmental institutions was the absence of "honest and hard working" ruling cadres, which indicated a certain distrust of politicians. For a majority of them (55 percent), the most important problem to be solved is education, and education must be based on Atatürk's principles.³⁷

Thus, while Turkey went some way in bringing about an accommodation between political and state elites in the 1960s, this did not lead to a healthy balance between the expertise of an impartial and competent bureaucracy and the political control exercised by elected politicians. As of the mid-1970s, Heper observed, "the Turkish bureaucratic elite's longing for a tutelary bureaucracy" still continued, and it was still in a position to affect the parameters of the political stratification in Turkey.³⁸ The coalition governments of the mid and late 1970s, however, did much to destroy the professional competence, unity of outlook, and esprit de corps of civil bureaucracy. As one observer of the period succinctly summarizes,

The coalition members were each heavily engaged in unrestrained patronage and nepotism. Never before in Turkish political development had the civil servants been reshuffled in such an arbitrary fashion. Governments, or rather political parties making up the coalition, did not confine themselves to bringing their own teams to the upper ranks of the civil service. The reshuffling involved all ranks. In addition, thousands of new civil service posts were created. Each ministry was brought under the complete jurisdiction of a political party as if each ministry had been "appropriated" by a political party. The more critical posts were usually filled by ideologically committed militants or by outright partisan roughnecks. Even the most sensitive agencies like the police and security services were not immune from this ideological and physical penetration of the civil bureaucracy by the political parties.³⁹

Thus, when the military intervention of 12 September 1980 took place, the military was about the only bureaucratic institution that was by and large able to insulate itself from such fragmentation, infiltration, and colonization by political parties. With the military in power, tutelary bureaucratic values were again in ascendancy, and were strongly embodied in the 1982 constitution.

The 1982 constitution was even less trustful than its predecessor of the "national will," elected assemblies, political parties, politicians, and all other civil society institutions such as trade unions, professional organizations, and voluntary associations. If the 1982 constitution somewhat curbed the review powers of the judiciary and the autonomy of the universities, this was not

intended as a measure to strengthen the hands of elected assemblies and responsible governments at the expense of bureaucratic agencies. Rather, the intention was to create a strong presidency, which the makers of the 1982 constitution (themselves almost all military officers and civilian bureaucrats) assumed would be controlled by the military for a long time to come (indeed, General Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup, served as the president of the Republic until November 1989). A major difference between the makings of the 1961 and the 1982 constitutions is that, in the latter case, the military no longer had much trust in civilian bureaucratic agencies, which it perceived as already highly fragmented and infiltrated by political parties and vulnerable to various kinds of radical political ideas. Therefore, the president of the Republic was given important substantive powers in the appointment of high-court judges and university administrators, the two areas considered particularly sensitive by the military. In short, the 1982 constitution was designed to maintain the military as the ultimate guardian and arbiter in the political system through a strengthened presidency and a strengthened National Security Council.⁴⁰

Post-1983 Developments

The Motherland Party (MP) government that came to power in the November 1983 elections, ending the three-year period of military government, continued essentially the anticenter, antibureaucratic line of its predecessors, the Democratic Party and the Justice Party. The MP's approach to the state bureaucracy, however, was simultaneously more ideological and more pragmatic compared to its predecessors'. More ideological in that for the first time in Turkish politics, smaller government, less governmental involvement in the economy, greater reliance on market forces, privatization of public economic enterprises, and an overall reduction of state activities became consciously articulated policy goals. More pragmatic in that the MP governments attempted to debureaucratize the political system through indirect methods (of which more to be said below) rather than by way of sweeping purges, as had been done in the 1970s, or by engaging in virulent anti-state rhetoric, as had been done by the Democratic Party leaders in the 1950s.

A reduction of bureaucratic red tape was one of the six major planks of the MP in its 1983 election platform, and it seems to have found a sympathetic response in public opinion. Prime Minister Özal, in the program of his first government emphasized this theme by saying that "public services should be saved from excessive formalities and the morass of details." He further argued that trust, instead of suspicion, should be the guiding principle in the relationships between individuals and state agencies.⁴¹ Indeed, many such formalities were simplified or eliminated by the MP governments in the

following years.⁴²

Much more important than the reduction of bureaucratic red tape were the indirect ways in which the MP government reduced the overall level of influence of the state bureaucracy in Turkish politics. These methods can be summarized as follows:

- The ideological fragmentation of the civilian bureaucracy, which had started in the 1970s, was allowed to continue. Partly as a result of the coalitional character of the MP, certain ministries, especially those of Interior and National Education, became the strongholds of the religious, conservative, and/or ultranationalist wing of the MP. The unity of outlook within the bureaucratic elite; the reformist, secularist, and tutelary *weltanschauung* of the old bureaucratic center was further weakened and fragmented.

- The overall status and income of civil servants were allowed to decline even further, to such an extent that the prestige of a civil service job can no longer compete with that of a business or professional career.

- New public agencies were created, subject to more flexible rules and easier political manipulation (the typical examples are the Undersecretariat for Treasury and Foreign Trade, and the Board of Housing and Public Partnership Fund).

- A large number of “extra-budgetary funds” were established that are subject neither to the approval of the Parliament nor to the supervision of the Court of Accounts.

- Many bureaucratic posts were filled on a contractual basis, which offered much less job security but higher salaries.

- Instead of relying on the seniority rule, the MP governments appointed a large number of young, bright, U.S.-educated managers with no previous public bureaucratic experience (jokingly referred to as Özal’s princes) as the heads of some of the most important governmental agencies (including the Central Bank) and public economic enterprises.

- The reduction of government controls over economic affairs led to a decline in the overall influence of public bureaucracy.

- In the same vein, the devolution of some powers to elected local governments meant a decline in the influence of the central bureaucracy.⁴³

Furthermore, the general political atmosphere in the country in the post-1983 period has not been conducive to a tutelary bureaucratic mentality. With the transition back to democratic politics in 1983, there has been a sudden surge of interest in liberal values and an increasing emphasis on civil society institutions. There seems to be a much stronger consensus now among political parties and in the society at large on the preservation and consolidation of the newly reestablished democratic regime. Consequently, the tendency to see the state bureaucracy as the sole guardian of public interest is much less evident today compared to earlier periods. A parallel and

related development is the greater legitimation of a free market economy and private sector activities. This is in marked contrast to the earlier negative attitude toward business groups, as summarized by a student of these groups as late as the mid-1960s:

In Turkey, the notion of business is misunderstood. Often, the businessman is viewed as a speculator, if not a thief. Business in general and retailing and wholesaling in particular, were for a long time downgraded and looked upon as occupations which no respectable Turk would enter. . . . No great business heroes have emerged in Turkey, no entrepreneur has gained social recognition, and no business leader has ever held public office.⁴⁴

These developments, helpful though they are in a broad sense to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, have not resulted in a clear delineation of roles between elected politicians and a stable, competent bureaucracy with a procedural (not substantive) rationality and an instrumental attitude. Rather, the result has been a chaotic situation characterized by the personalistic style of government of Özal and his entourage, frequent disregard for the rules and regulations, conflicts of jurisdiction among various public agencies, and a general decline in the quality and effectiveness of the state bureaucracy. Such a combination of a still high degree of "stateness" and a virtually complete debureaucratization of government is a potentially unstable mixture and "may portend an even more volatile political institutionalization pattern in future."⁴⁵

Notes

1. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).

2. For the National Assemblies of 1961, 1965, 1969, and 1973, see Frank Tachau, "Parliamentary Elites: Turkey," in Jacob M. Landau, Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, eds., *Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites* (London: Croom Helm; Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), pp. 205-242. Tachau also gives the occupational breakdown for the 1977 legislature, although he does not include it in his more detailed analyses. For the 1983 legislature, see Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Elites, Political Culture and the Political Regime in Turkey" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle Eastern Studies Association, San Francisco, 28 November-1 December, 1984), p. 6.

3. Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," in George Lenczowski, ed., *Political Elites in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 42.

4. The last two paragraphs draw from Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, vol. 3, *Asia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988); and Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 25-29. See also the sources cited therein.

5. Andrew Mango observes that "experience in statecraft, respect for the state, the importance of the state in Turkish culture, have all been specific steadying factors in the history of the Turkish Republic, endowing it with a degree of political gravitas, absent from most new countries." "The State of Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13 (May 1977): 265. On the traditional Ottoman political culture, see also Frank Tachau, "The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey," in Jacob Landau, ed., *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 58-62; C. H. Dodd, *Democracy and Development in Turkey* (North Humberston, U.K.: Eothen Press, 1979), pp. 34-40.

6. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 448.

7. Dodd, *Democracy and Development*, p. 43.

8. Lewis, *The Emergence*, pp. 194-195.

9. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State," in *Professor Dr. Yavuz Abadan'a Armağan* (Ankara: A. U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1969), pp. 567-568. See also Rustow, "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 197-198. An excellent article that stresses the elements of continuity with the late Ottoman period is Paul Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology," in Landau, ed., *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, pp. 25-44. On the continuity between the late Ottoman and early Republican elites, see also Joseph S. Syliowicz, "Elites and Modernization in Turkey," in Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* (New York: Schenkman, 1975), pp. 30-31. He observes, however, that there was an evolutionary broadening of the pool of recruitment to bureaucratic elites, as measured by the increase in the number of students of nonelite and nonofficial backgrounds attending the Civil Service School (Mulkiye, the main source of bureaucratic elites) during the Atatürk era (pp. 31-32).

10. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military: Turkey," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 388.

11. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, pp. 180-182.

12. *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk İnkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1959), pp. 197, 214.

13. Metin Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düstüncesi," in *Çagdas Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk* (Istanbul: Dr. Nejat F. Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1983), pp. 221-227. See also Heper, *Bürokratik Yönetim Gelenegi* (Ankara: O.D.T.U. Yayınları, 1974); also İlter Turan, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After," in Landau, ed., *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, pp. 103-112.

14. Dumont, "The Origins," p. 31.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33; Ergun Özbudun, "Atatürk ve Devlet Hayati," in *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkilap Tarihi II, Atatürkcülük: Atatürkcü Düşünce Sisteminin Temelleri* (Ankara: Yükseköğretim Kurulu Yayınları, 1986), pp. 66-68.

17. Official translation quoted by Suna Kili, *Kemalizm* (Istanbul: Robert College Publications, 1969), p. 78.

18. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 277. See also Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime," in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London: C. Hurst, 1981), pp. 79-102.

19. For the Free Party episode of 1930, see Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973).

20. For details, see Özbudun, "Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in Turkey, 1945-1950" (Paper presented at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Paris, 15-20 July 1985).
21. For interesting comparative insights, see Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, pp. 410-413.
22. Richard L. Chambers, "Bureaucracy: Turkey," in Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization*, p. 326.
23. Leslie L. Roos, Jr., and Noralou P. Roos, *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969)* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 31-32.
24. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, pp. 195-197.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
26. Quoted by Roos and Roos, *Managers of Modernization*, pp. 83-84.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 45, 89.
28. C. H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 53.
29. These interviews were published by the Turkish daily, *Cumhuriyet*, between 16 July and 23 August 1960. An English translation is also available: Cevat F. Baskut, Yasar Kemal, and Ecvel Guresin, *Interviews with Members of Turkey's National Unity Committee* (Washington, DC, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1960). See also Ergun Özbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics*, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 14, (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1966), pp. 15-21.
30. Quoted by Bulent Tanor, *İki Anayasa, 1961-1982* (Istanbul: Beta, 1986), pp. 29-37, 61-67.
31. Roos and Roos, *Managers of Modernization*, pp. 95-98, 131-134, 160-165; the quotation is from p. 161.
32. Ömer Bozkurt, *Memurlar: Türkiye'de Kamu Bürokrasisinin Sosyolojik Görünümü* (Ankara: TODAİE, 1980), pp. 100-153.
33. Roos and Roos, *Managers of Modernization*, pp. 95, 221.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
35. For some useful insights on the recent role of the military in Turkey, see Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 137-158; William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective," *ibid.*, pp. 159-175; George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?" *ibid.*, pp. 177-200.
36. Mehmet Ali Birand, *Enwet Komutanım* (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1986), esp. pp. 114-154.
37. Osman Metin Öztürk, "Türkiye'de Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Siyaset" (Ph.D. diss., Ankara University, 1987), pp. 126-130.
38. Metin Heper, "The Recalcitrance of the Turkish Public Bureaucracy to 'Bourgeois Politics': A Multi-Factor Political Stratification Analysis," *Middle East Journal* 30 (Autumn 1976): 499-500.
39. Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Wilmington, U.K.: Eothen Press, 1985), pp. 114.
40. For a radically different interpretation of the 1980 military intervention and the 1982 constitution, see *ibid.*, especially chap. 6. Heper, in fact, argues that now the state elites (including the military) do not presume that they are the sole possessors of truth, that they use Atatürkist thought as a technique and not as a source of substantive public policies, and that they aim at the creation of a political environment in which, through multiple confrontations of civil societal groups, a dynamic consensus

may be possible.

41. Nuran Dagi-Belma Aktürk, *Hükümetler ve Programları, vol. 3, 1980-1987* (Ankara: TBMM Kütüphane-Dokümantasyon ve Tercüme Müdürlüğü, 1988), p. 64.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 104, as stated in the program of the second government of Özal read in the National Assembly on 25 December 1987.

43. For these trends, see Metin Heper, "The State and Debureaucratization: The Turkish Case," *International Social Science Journal* (forthcoming); and Heper, "The State, Political Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey," *Government and Opposition* 25 (1990): 1-13.

44. Quoted by Heper, "The Recalcitrance," p. 491. Also interestingly, in the 1950s the Chamber of Commerce in Istanbul demanded that the bureaucrats be respectful to businessmen, and not to see them as "thieves with ties" (Heper, *The State Tradition*, p. 103).

45. Heper, "The State and Debureaucratization."