Turkey & The EU:
Yesterday’s Answers to Tomorrow’s Security Problems?

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Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has become rather commonplace among EU policymakers to present Turkey as a ‘consumer’ and not a ‘producer’ of security in Europe. In the absence of a Soviet threat to contain which Turkish policymakers had, in the aftermath of the Cold War, adopted the role of a ‘staunch ally’, Turkey’s geopolitical location no longer seems to justify the kind of military as well as economic and political support it received during the Cold War. Second, the Turkish military capability, which was considered an asset at a time when NATO strategy assigned a significant deterrent value to ground forces, has lost its centrality to Western strategy. Third, its proximity to unstable regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East means Turkey is faced with military threats and could embroil the EU in its own problems.

Given such prevalent representations of Turkey as a ‘burden,’ and not an ‘asset’ for building security in Europe, Turkish policymakers spent the 1990s trying to find Turkey a niche in the evolving post-Cold War environment. With the European Union’s move to become a ‘military power’ in its own right, they seem to have finally found that niche. The EU’s 1999 decision to recognize Turkey as a candidate country is viewed by some as an evidence of its recognition of Turkey’s value as a producer of security in Europe. It has been suggested, for instance, that an important reason behind the European Council decision to elevate Turkey’s status to that of candidate country is the EU’s evolving security role. In other words, the estimates of the potential benefits of Turkey’s inclusion into the EU’s Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU’s policies towards Turkey.

The fact that the EU decision on Turkey’s candidacy and the constitution of a European military force for crisis management purposes were both declared at the Helsinki summit seems to have reinforced this reasoning. The EU’s move to transform itself from a purely ‘civilian power’ to a ‘military power’ has raised hopes in Turkey that the change in EU’s security policies may be the opportunity Turkey has been waiting for since the end of the Cold War.

This paper aims to discuss Turkey’s role in the evolving European security architecture with special reference to the debates on the recent EU move to develop military capabilities for crisis management purposes. Towards this end, Part I of the paper will present a brief overview of the role(s) Turkey has played as a part of European security order during the Cold War. Part II will turn to look at post-Cold War developments in Turkey-EU relations. It will be argued that the interest both Turkey and the EU have shown in the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes constitute yesterday’s answers to tomorrow’s
problems - which are likely to be radically different from those of the past. The conclusion will dwell upon the potential implications of these developments for security in Europe with special reference to the Turkish case.

**Turkey & ‘Security In Europe’ During The Cold War**

It is indeed possible to view Turkey as having become more of a consumer and less of a producer of security in Europe depending on what is meant by ‘security in Europe’ - whether a military or non-military focused conception of security is adopted and how ‘Europe’ is defined. During the Cold War, when geopolitical imagination was centred around two alternative models of political-economic organisation - the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ - the definition of Europe was confined to the ‘Free World’ to which Turkey also belonged by virtue of its pro-Western orientation. The Cold War era was also characterised by the prevalence of military-focused understandings and practices of security. Turkey was viewed as a producer as well as consumer of security in Europe during this period.

Throughout the Cold War years, Turkey produced military security thanks to its strategically significant geographical location, the size of its army and the pro-Western orientation of the Turkish regime that enabled its allies to make use of NATO facilities when needed. As the Cold War waxed and waned, Turkey's value as a producer of security came to be questioned by its Western European allies whereas the strategic relationship between the United States and Turkey remained relatively stable. Notwithstanding certain periods - such as the 1970s when the US-Turkish relationship came to be labelled as a ‘troubled alliance’ - the United States continued to view Turkey as an asset in this strategically important part of the world. On the whole, then, Turkey's geopolitical significance rendered it difficult for the United States to leave it on its own to solve its domestic economic and political problems.

Turkey also consumed security as a result of the collective security guarantee provided by NATO as well as the US aid which was vitally needed for domestic and external security purposes. In one sense, this was nothing special to Turkey's case. The European Community also emerged as a consumer of security in that it benefited from a US military security guarantee as well as economic aid in the immediate post-war period. When Turkey was initially admitted to NATO, it was clear that the country was going to be a consumer of security until it gradually stabilised its domestic system to contribute fully to the production of security in Europe. However, whilst Turkey remained a consumer of security throughout the Cold War, the European Community gradually evolved into the European Union thereby becoming a producer of security (conceived broadly). In this sense, the point about Turkey having become more a consumer than producer of security in Europe has to do with not only Turkey's own dynamics (ie relative lack of progress in becoming a developed country) but also the evolution of the European Community/Union during the 1980s and 1990s.

During the Cold War, even after the Soviet Union changed its policy towards Turkey thereby ceasing the immediacy of the military threat, Turkey continued to consume security by using its relationship with the United States for regime and state security purposes. The Turkish-US alliance during this period was quite typical for a relationship between a semi-periphery country and its core ally. Turkey received produced materials (such as high-tech weaponry) as well as development aid in exchange for letting its core ally benefit from its geopolitical location (its most strategic ‘primary product’).
Viewed as such, Turkey in the post-Cold War era has become a rather typical developing country that has lost some of its significance for its superpower ally now that the Cold War rivalry to win the hearts and minds of peoples in the Third World has come to an end. However, such reasoning would be faulty not only because Turkey remains a significant ally for the United States, but also because Turkey’s contribution to the maintenance of security in Europe during the Cold War was not confined to the production of military security. The point here is that when security is understood in broader terms, taking into account the relationship between security policy-making and identity construction, a different picture emerges - a picture in which Turkey’s contribution to the production of security in Europe becomes more apparent.

Indeed, Turkey had things other than its geographical location to contribute in helping produce security in Europe during the Cold War. Turkey served as a producer of security especially during the early years of the Cold War because it helped to secure the collective identity of the ‘West’ as a ‘security community’ and to attract other developing countries to join the ‘Free World as a Western-led alliance system’. Turkey’s declared choice to become a ‘Western’ country and a member of the ‘Free World’ was significant for what Turkey was: a secular country with 98% Muslim population located on the periphery of ‘Europe’ and the ‘Middle East’. Turkey’s character as a country ‘Western’ in orientation but not in terms of its background made it a role model used by the US policymakers to encourage other non-Western countries to join the ‘Free World’.

During the 1950s, Turkey embraced its role as a model to be emulated by the group of non-aligned states - at times to the dismay of US policymakers who warned their Turkish counterparts against alienating Arab countries. Turkish foreign policy discourse during this period constituted Turkey as a ‘secular democratic nation-state’, a bulwark of the ‘Free World’ that was cognisant of the need to choose sides in the East-West conflict. Turkey’s enthusiastic adoption of a ‘Western’ orientation, then, helped to produce and secure a Western identity that was rather fragile in the immediate post-war era.

Turkey’s participation in the US-led effort to intervene in the conflict in Korea could be viewed as an instance of Turkey’s contribution as a producer of security in both narrow and broad senses of the term. The military dimension of the Turkish contribution is rather well known and praised. However, what the US needed in Korea was not mere manpower but the constitution of an international force to signal ‘Western’ solidarity in the face of communist expansionism. As Jennifer Milliken has argued,

To answer the Soviet challenge in Korea, it was not enough for US policymakers that the United States alone intervene. The test to UN collective security promises - and the charges of US imperialism - required that the intervention be backed by UN decree and involve Western and Free World states.

Turkish policymakers accepted outright the US representation of the need for the constitution of a multilateral force for intervention. They were interested in proving the United States that they were ‘reliable’ allies who were ready to commit troops where and when needed. This was not only because US policymakers viewed their European allies as rather ‘fragile and uncertain’ and therefore not too ‘dependable’, but also because Turkey’s so-called ‘active neutrality’ during the Second World War was not appreciated by its allies (Britain in particular) and had caused it to be
represented as an ‘uncertain’ ally with a tendency to appease. Turkey’s enthusiastic participation in the Korean intervention could therefore be viewed as intended by Turkish policymakers to represent Turkey as a ‘dependable’ ally and a crucial part of the US-led collective security effort. The ultimate aim was to bolster Turkey’s chances of being accepted as a NATO member.

To summarise, although it is possible to view Turkey as having been more of a consumer than a producer of security during the Cold War, when security is viewed in broader terms taking into account its non-military dimensions (and in particular the relationship between security policy-making and identity construction) Turkey did play a significant role as a producer of security in Europe. Admittedly, this role was more crucial in the early years of the Cold War, especially during the 1950s and 1960s compared to later years when the character of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand, and with Western Europe on the other hand, began to change. The point here is that it is significant to understand fully the nature of Turkey’s contribution to the maintenance of security in Europe during the Cold War, for this would help policymakers on both sides to shape the future of Turkey-EU relations as well as security in Europe.

**Turkey & ‘Security In Europe’ In The Post-Cold War Era**

The end of the Cold War brought out into the open the already existing gap between US and EU perceptions of Turkey’s contribution to security–building in Europe. The United States is a superpower with a global vision and has continued, even in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to give importance to Turkey as a significant asset in projecting military power. The Gulf War (1990-1991) served to reinforce US perception of Turkey as a core ally in this strategically important part of the world.

The same war highlighted the divisions inside the European Union regarding not only Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but also Turkey’s (post-Cold War) value in the eyes of EU policymakers. Turkey’s request for the deployment of Allied Mobile Force (AMF) in December 1990 caused an internal debate in Germany as to whether Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty should be invoked or not. Eventually AMF was deployed in Turkey in early 1991. But the fact that putting Article V into practice did not turn out to be a ‘smooth and automatic’ process led some Turkish policymakers to perceive this hesitance as indicative of the EU’s perception of Turkey as a ‘burden’ and not an ‘asset’ for building security in Europe. As suggested in the introduction, such perceptions still prevail; Turkey’s military security concerns continue to colour Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Note, for instance, the following words by a Turkish foreign ministry official:

> Some European countries, in search of an excuse for their refusal to agree on satisfactory and inclusive arrangements for Turkey’s participation in military and non-military crisis management operations, assert that the contribution of Turkey to such operations would be welcomed. Seen from a Turkish perspective, such an attitude amounts to confining Turkey’s contribution to that of a sub-contractor.

Turkey evidently has legitimate security concerns that should be taken into consideration by its EU counterparts when shaping the institutions that will undertake military crisis management operations. However, a more constructive approach - more constructive than criticising the EU for ‘excluding Turkey from
European crisis management would have been to seek new ways of reinstating Turkey’s value for building security in Europe. Arguably, this could take the form of more stress being put on non-military tools of security policy making, such as ‘second-track diplomacy’, ‘international mediation’, ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘conflict resolution’. Such an approach that is cognisant of the non-military dimensions of security could also strengthen Turkey’s status as an EU candidate.

Such a constructive approach by Turkish policymakers is needed because, in the midst of the current debate on ESDP and the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes, it is easily forgotten that the EU also practices ‘soft governance’ by putting stress on the non-military dimensions and practices of security. This is why during the 1990s it has become increasingly difficult to present Turkey as an ‘asset’ to this ‘civilian power’ EU. The reasons are twofold. First, the EU does not need the kind of military security Turkey knows how to produce - or at least it did not, until very recently. Second, Turkey has failed to become a producer of economic and political security as a result of various stalls in the democratization process and its underdeveloped economy that has caused some of Turkey’s problems (such as the Kurdish issue) to become European problems. This is why some EU policymakers think that Turkey produces ‘insecurity’ by exporting its domestic problems via the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe.

An important evidence for EU policymakers’ view of Turkey as a ‘burden’ rather than a strategic ‘asset’ could be found in their rejection of Turkish application for membership in 1989 and the 1997 decision to leave Turkey out of Agenda 2000. However, with the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision to recognise Turkey’s candidate status, the EU’s approach to Turkey took a different turn. As noted in the introduction, some in Turkey view this change as driven by the EU’s interest in giving a military backbone to its crisis management capability. It is argued, for instance, that ‘as the European Union is increasingly involved in the broader security issues of Europe together with NATO, it will be more difficult to overlook Turkey’s role in the security field’ (understood in narrow military terms) and it was based on this understanding that there has evolved ‘a more inclusive attitude towards Turkey’. Accordingly, it is suggested that the EU’s growing interest in the constitution of a European military crisis management capability has created an opportunity for Turkey to prove itself useful as a producer of security in Europe. The argument of this paper is that both the EU’s move to become a ‘military power’ and Turkey’s attempt to strengthen its candidacy by stressing its military capability, constitute yesterday’s answers to tomorrow’s security problems.

Why would focusing on the development of a military crisis management capability constitute ‘yesterday’s answer’ for the European Union?

‘Yesterday’s answer’ could be defined as military-focused understandings and practices of security - the kind of practices the EU until very recently, did not have to adopt thanks to the military guarantee provided by NATO under US leadership. The European Union’s move to become a ‘military power’ constitutes yesterday’s answer in the sense that the Cold War success of the EU in building security in Europe was rooted in its management of the non-military dimensions of security. As Bill McSweeney has maintained, the project of European integration has, from its very inception, been a ‘security policy in response to a non-specific and non-military security problem’. In this sense, the European Union itself is the best evidence in support of the argument for the need to use non-military means to solve security problems.
Over the years, the EU has developed its ‘edge’ in practising ‘soft governance’ and adopting a comprehensive approach to security. As Adrian Hyde-Price has argued, EU policymakers have resisted the temptation to simplify complex conflicts into ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys,’ therefore becoming better able to develop a more comprehensive understanding of security than USA. The EU is thus well placed to address many of the broader, non-military dimensions of security, which figure so prominently on the contemporary European security agenda.

Indeed, the kinds of problems the EU is likely to face in the future are likely to be problems that have socio-economic and environmental roots. In this sense, a case could be made for the EU to concentrate on its strengths and focus on the use of non-military instruments as it has done in the past in approaching its domestic as well as external security problems. The EU’s security relations with its southern periphery (see below) are a good example for the latter.

Admittedly, the case for addressing the problem of the EU’s inability to back its economic and political power with the military means ‘now rather than later’ is strong. The Kosovo air war brought out into the open the need for the EU to become more effective in military crisis management ‘in and around Europe’. It could also plausibly be argued that ‘the risk that a new European military force might undermine NATO is less than the threat posed by the status quo.’ However, what is often forgotten is that although the risk of undermining NATO could be one worth taking, the repercussions the development of a European military force are likely to cause in its relations with the southern periphery should lead EU policymakers to rethink their policies. For it was the EU’s character as a ‘civilian power’ that gave it an edge in building security in the Mediterranean – the reason why it was able to bring together the policymakers of countries such as Syria and Israel under the roof of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership scheme. If the EU moves to become a ‘military power’ in its own right, it is likely to lose this edge.

Indeed, even before the Helsinki 1999 decision was taken, the kind of discourse that was employed when discussing the need for developing military crisis management capabilities (in particular EU policymakers’ adoption of different discourses when talking about the eastern and the southern peripheries) had already begun to alienate EU’s southern neighbours. The fact that the need for the constitution of a European military force is justified with reference to security threats stemming from instability in the south, in the eyes of some Mediterranean policymakers, seems to have begun to blur the distinction between ‘military power’ NATO and ‘civilian power’ EU. Also, it could not have escaped Arab policymakers that Britain, which has been acting together with the United States in the recent bombings of Iraq, is also one of the major proponents of the development of a European military capability. When the Helsinki decision is interpreted within the context provided by the aforementioned change in the EU security discourse, it becomes relatively easier to understand Libyan President Qaddafi’s 1996 statement that ‘the establishment of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR is a declaration of war on Arab states.’ While Qaddafi’s statement is clearly an exaggerated response, it is indicative of growing resentment in the south against the EU’s differentiated approach to security in its peripheries. This last point begs further elaboration.

In the post-Cold War era, the European Union has embarked upon a two-fold strategy to enhance security in Europe. The first part of this strategy has been that of deepening the relations among its existing members whilst expanding to the East. EU expansion entails the export of the EU’s own security-building model to former Warsaw Pact members as well as Malta and Cyprus (and Turkey since December
In other words, the project of EU expansion is a non-military security policy adopted to maintain ‘security in Europe’.

The second part of the EU strategy (which will be analysed in more detail) has been the setting up of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in an attempt to encourage inter-state cooperation and increase regional interdependence as a way of maintaining stability in the Mediterranean - the southern periphery. The EMP is the latest in a series of attempts made by the EC/EU since the 1970s to increase dialogue with Middle Eastern countries (especially those in the geographically closer North Africa). The Gulf War of 1990-1991 only helped to reinforce the already existing view among EU policymakers that ‘regional economic solidarity among the peoples of the region’ is a ‘cornerstone for peace, stability, and development in the Middle East,’ which, in turn, is viewed as a necessary component of ‘security in Europe’.

The EMP scheme took shape at the Barcelona conference (November 25-26 1995) with the participation of Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Turkey. At the end of the conference, the Barcelona Declaration was signed to establish a partnership in three core areas: political and security relations, economic and financial relations, and social, cultural and human relations. The cornerstone of the EMP is viewed as the creation of a free-trade zone in industrial goods and services over a 12-year period. The idea behind this formulation is stated as not only one of creating an expanded trading bloc, but also to provide incentives for sound economic and financial decision-making by Middle Eastern participants, to create a framework for labour-intensive European-funded development projects, and even to reduce intra-Middle Eastern conflicts by providing a non-threatening forum for participation across divides.

Thus, the European Union’s approach to security on its southern periphery is non-military in the sense that it has sought to contribute to building security in the Mediterranean through the use of various non-military instruments. The EU has so far almost single-handedly (with some backing from Egypt) shaped the Mediterranean as a region to meet its own security interests.

The EU’s security policies towards the Mediterranean have been shaped around three major concerns: energy security (understood as the sustained flow of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices), regional stability (especially in the geographically closer North Africa) and the cessation of conflict in Israel/Palestine. In the 1980s, changes in the societies of EU member states as a result of the growth of the North African diaspora in Western Europe led EU policymakers to re-think their priorities and come to consider stability in the Mediterranean as an integral part of ‘security in Europe’. The shift in the EU’s priorities towards the Mediterranean (rather than other parts of the ‘Middle East’ which the United States has traditionally been more interested in) should be understood within the context created, over the years, by the convergence of domestic societal as well as economic concerns. The presence of a large and growing North African diaspora in Western Europe has meant that the destabilization of Mediterranean societies could be detrimental to security and stability in the European Union. In short, the EU’s turn towards a more Mediterranean-centred approach has its roots in the domestic societal concerns of EU member states and a re-thinking of security in the EU against the backdrop of migration from North Africa, the increasing restlessness within the North African diaspora in the European Union and the civil war in Algeria that has accelerated these two processes.
In line with the EU policymakers’ conviction that the threat and use of force as an instrument of security policy would not solve those problems that are non-military in character, the EU, throughout the 1990s, emphasised democratisation and economic development as the means to establish security in the Mediterranean. However, notwithstanding such high expectations, the EMP has so far not made any significant impact largely due to the momentum created by the Middle East Peace Process (and lately the difficulties it has run into). Still, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is considered to be the institution best equipped to develop a regional security regime for the Mediterranean: not only does it bring together more regional countries than any of the other initiatives, but, more importantly, it is the only forum in which the security needs of [non-European Mediterranean countries] are approached comprehensively through economic, political and security cooperation.

Indeed, between 1995-2000, substantial progress has been achieved in negotiation and signature of association agreements, and EU funding has been mobilised for the region under the MEDA programme, the most important financial tool of the Barcelona Process.

One major problem with the EMP is that it is a non-military security policy adopted by the EU to serve its own security needs and interests. In other words, the referent for the EU’s Mediterranean security discourse is the EU itself. Southern Mediterranean states, on their part, have participated in these schemes largely in return for EU economic and technical/technological support, which they hope to use for domestic and regime security purposes. The point here is that it would be difficult for the EMP to contribute to building security in the Mediterranean until an attempt is made to bridge the gap between the security needs and interests as well as expectations of the EU and non-EU members of the EMP.

On the other hand, it should be emphasised that the EU, true to its form as a ‘civilian power’, has proven itself to be the best-endowed and most competent actor in conducting people-to-people diplomacy; this, in turn, has bolstered its position vis-à-vis a significant portion of NGOs in the Arab world (especially in north Africa) and helped to strengthen Mediterranean regionalism. The EU has also made a significant contribution to the Middle East Peace Process by providing funding to the Palestinian National Authority in the hope that building the economy and civil society would strengthen the hand of the Palestinian side at the negotiation table. By this way, the EU has shown interest in playing the role of a ‘cosmopolitan mediator’ that seeks to redress the imbalance between the disputing parties rather than perpetuating it. Indeed, as Deiniol Jones has argued, the EU is in a unique position to stress the need for ‘cosmopolitan mediation’ as an alternative to the power politics or facilitative approaches to mediation that currently prevail in world politics. To reiterate, what has so far enabled the EU to have an edge in building security through ‘soft governance’ was not merely its socio-economic power but also the fact that it was not a ‘military power’. Greater stress on the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes, on the other hand, might cause the EU to lose this edge.

**Why would Turkey’s stress on contributing to an emerging European military crisis management capability constitute ‘yesterday’s answer’?**

The enthusiasm Turkish policymakers have shown in contributing to EU efforts in the development of a military crisis management capability constitutes ‘yesterday’s answer’ because, by way of trying to strengthen Turkey’s profile in Europe through stressing its geographical position and military capability, Turkish policymakers are
drawing lessons from the Cold War past - in particular the process through which Turkey became a NATO member. In doing this, they are operating with a military-focused conception of security. Accordingly, they view Turkey’s military capability and geopolitical location as the most significant assets that helped the country to join NATO. Building upon such reasoning they seem to think that as the EU is becoming more interested in the military dimension of security, Turkey’s relations with the EU would improve.

It is true that Turkey’s contribution to EU military crisis management efforts would be significant. Furthermore, Turkey’s potential contribution to the constitution of a European military force seems to have strengthened its standing vis-à-vis the other candidates. A European Union which is interested in developing its own military crisis management capability would need Turkey because Turkey has become a large, effective and modern military power both in its own region and in NATO. Furthermore, it has a well-trained army experienced in low-intensity warfare. This factor is particularly important for contributing to Petersberg type operations.

Turkey’s geographical location is adjacent to regions of critical importance to the EU’s interests. Turkey’s location, NATO-class military infrastructure and logistical means constitute an indispensable environment for EU military power projection. Given the difficulties the EU is likely to encounter when projecting and sustaining military power outside EU territory, Turkey’s military capabilities as well as geographical position would become significant assets. However, should Turkish policymakers try to take a ‘short-cut’ to EU membership by relying on emphasising Turkey’s potential contribution to the production of military security, this is unlikely to be to the country’s benefit in the long term. For, as noted above, the main reason why the EU policymakers view Turkey as a consumer of security is because it has failed to learn how to produce the kind of security the project of European integration has thrived upon. An attempt to play the ‘military card’ is unlikely to reinforce Turkey’s candidacy in the long run if it continues to lag behind in the production of non-military security whilst producing ‘insecurity’ by exporting some of its domestic problems through the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe.

To summarise, the context in which Turkey became a NATO member is significantly different from the environment that Turkey today finds itself in. Hence the need to be cautious when drawing lessons from past experience. Having said that, it is also important for Turkish policymakers to make sure that the factors that enabled Turkey’s NATO membership are well understood. As suggested above, a different lesson that could be drawn from Turkey’s Cold War past - a lesson Turkish policymakers seem to remain oblivious to - could be found in the way that Turkey helped to secure the ‘Western’ identity through its security policies. The point here is that Turkish policymakers could choose to present Turkey as an asset in the EU’s relations with its southern periphery. For, if it was Turkey’s contribution to the constitution and securing of a ‘Western’ identity that enabled its membership of an institution to which it was initially considered as an unlikely member (ie NATO), Turkish policymakers would do well to try and find Turkey a similar edge in strengthening their profile vis-à-vis the European Union - that is, by stressing the role Turkey could play in constituting a multi-cultural ‘European’ identity that is not anti-Muslim. If such a move could be coupled by stress being put on the use of non-military tools of security policy-making Turkey would become able to generate answers for tomorrow’s security problems.
Conclusion

It is indeed possible that EU and Turkish policymakers may succeed in constructing a truly multi-cultural ‘European’ identity by re-imagining the contours of the ‘European civilisation’, which, in turn, may help the EU to alleviate the worries of its southern neighbours. For the reasons why the non-EU Mediterranean countries have recently begun to show uneasiness towards EU’s security policies are rooted in the differences between the approaches adopted by the EU towards its eastern and southern neighbours. Arguably, this difference indicates a shift from the discourse of ‘ideological geopolitics’ to ‘civilisational geopolitics’ through the adoption of which EU policymakers have sought to build a ‘European’ identity through security policy-making.

‘Civilisational geopolitics’ was the prevalent discourse when ‘Europe’ was first invented as a ‘continent’. Ancient Greek mariners identified three continents: Europe, Asia and Libya (Africa). The lands on either side of the Aegean Sea, which was at the heart of the Greek conception of the globe, were given the names ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’. ‘Libya’ denoted the lands to the south of the Aegean Sea. As geographical knowledge accumulated and the authority of Greek mariners decreased, the absence of a clear demarcation line dividing ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’ - such as the Red Sea that divides ‘Asia’ and ‘Africa’ - was pointed to by scholars to question the status of ‘Europe’ as a continent given the fact that it was not a ‘discernible landmass’. ‘Europe’ nevertheless became a continent in the mental maps of ‘Europeans’ who, ‘by positing a continental division between Europe and Asia ... were able to reinforce the notion of a cultural dichotomy between these two areas - a dichotomy that was essential to modern Europe’s identity as a civilisation’.

The difference between the EU’s approaches to its eastern and southern periphery could indeed be viewed as indicative of a return to ‘civilisational geopolitics’ in an attempt to secure a ‘European’ identity. In the EU discourse the Eastern European countries are presented as ‘returning to Europe’ whereas questions are increasingly being asked as to whether Turkey ‘belongs’ to Europe. This difference in discourse, when coupled with the European Union’s mid-1990s attempt to move relations with Turkey from the basket of security in Europe into that of the Mediterranean has caused some in Turkey to wonder whether in the minds of EU policymakers the contours of Europe are being drawn along civilisational lines. It is plausible that Turkey may be destined to contribute to the making of a ‘European’ identity by serving as the ‘other’ against which Europe’s identity will be reinscribed through security policy-making. After all, the ‘Turk’ served as one of the ‘others’ of Europe throughout history. If this were to become the case, it would have implications for the EU’s relations with its southern periphery.

An alternative scenario suggests that Turkey becoming an EU member may enable the Union to present itself to its southern periphery as a truly multi-cultural entity that is not anti-Muslim. However, given Turkey’s background as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire and its unwillingness to get involved in Middle Eastern affairs during most of the republican era, it is not clear what shape Turkey’s contribution may take. A Turkey that is keen on stressing its military crisis management capability is unlikely to be helpful in alleviating the fears of the southern neighbours. Furthermore, Turkish policymakers have so far proven hesitant to participate fully in the EMP. Claiming that Turkey is not just another Mediterranean country, Turkish policymakers made clear their resentment towards their EU counterparts’ approach to Turkey within the EMP framework. Following the 1999 decision of the EU, this resentful attitude could be expected to change. However, given the non-EU
Mediterranean countries’ primary interest, the development of bilateral relations with the European Union, it is questionable to what extent Turkey can contribute to the EMP unless it reconstructs itself as an actor competent in using non-military tools of security policy-making.

Turkish policymakers have so far proven themselves uninterested in the non-military dimensions of security. During the 1990s, Turkey not only failed to adopt broad conceptions of security, but it also experienced a securitisation of its foreign policy whereby certain issues were pulled out of the realm of open debate and discussion by way of declaring them ‘national security’ issues. The debate on Turkey’s potential contribution is conducted in such an environment shaped by the prevalence of military-focused understandings of security and security policy-making. Hence Turkish policymakers’ welcoming attitude to the development of a European military capability for crisis management purposes. Indeed, the EU decision is considered by Turkish policymakers as indicative of the EU finally becoming a “normal” power as opposed to merely “civilian” power. It comes across as somewhat paradoxical that Turkey is playing the ‘military security card’ to join an institution that has proved itself a success story in building security through the use of non-military instruments. It is no less paradoxical than the EU aspiration to become a ‘military power’ after having proven itself a success story as a ‘civilian power’ that managed to build ‘security in Europe’ through the use of non-military instruments.

Endnotes

1 ‘Turkey is not producing the [sic] security but rather consuming security and producing insecurity,’ German minister Hans-Ulrich Klose is reported to have said at a conference organized by the Körber Foundation in Istanbul in 1997. See Hüseyin Bağcı, ‘Changing Security Perspective of Turkey,’ in Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and vs Regional Alternatives, Mustafa Aydın, ed (Ankara: International Relations Foundation, 1998), p81.


3 This is not to deny the disagreements among the members of the European Union regarding Turkey’s value for security-building in Europe. On the differences within the EU regarding Turkish membership, see Pia Christina Wood, ‘Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire,’ Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1999), p95-115.


9 Jennifer Miliken, Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in Korea,’ in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, Jutta Weldes,
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Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson & Raymond Duvall, eds (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p96.

13 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
25 Quoted in Guazzone, ‘Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?’ 88. Libya is the only north African country that has remained outside the EMP.
26 The recent EU endeavour to create a ‘Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe’ is beyond the confines of this study. See Bodo Hombach, ‘Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe: A New Perspective for the Region,’ Perceptions, 3, (September-November 2000), p5-21.
31 François Heisbourg, The United States, Europe and Military Force Projection,’ in Allies Divided, Blackwill & Stürmer, eds, p284-285. On the issue of security in the Gulf, however, EU policymakers followed the US lead and did not rule out the threat and use of force as an instrument of foreign and security policy as was the case with the Gulf war and recent
bombings of Iraq. Although the EU remains divided on the later issue, EU policymakers to a large extent share US conceptions of security in the Gulf, which prioritises military stability over democratisation and development.


33 Under MEDA I, the EU has allocated in the form of grants nearly EUR 1 billion per year. In addition, the European Investment Bank provides complementary financial support in the form of repayable loans. Under MEDA II, EUR 5,350 billion is reserved for the Mediterranean partners of the EMP. See The Barcelona Process, Five Years On: 1995-2000 (Luxembourg: Office For Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000).

34 This achievement has partly to do with the economic as well as technical assistance the EU has provided to Middle Eastern NGOs. Between 1995-99, the EU set aside $5.528 billion to be granted to regional NGOs. See ‘European Union Funding for the Middle East NGOs,’ Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East, 7:4, (Winter 1998/99), p15.


38 It is worth noting here that Turkey, like some EU members, has a conscript military. Although the Turkish military is experienced in low-intensity warfare and has proven itself valuable in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations, for Turkey to develop an ‘edge’ over other EU candidates, its military would need to be trained for crisis management or peacemaking operations in ‘foreign’ locations. Nevertheless, considering the fact that many of the EU’s crisis hotspots are located around Turkey’s borders, Turkish forces would be operating in venues less ‘foreign’ to them than to their EU counterparts.


43 A second question that also begs for an answer is whether they view the borders of European civilisation as stable as Samuel Huntington presents them to be. See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Touchstone, 1998).


45 They have been more enthusiastic participants in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC), which they themselves helped found. Nevertheless, time has proven that both the EMP and BSEC are viewed by Turkish policymakers as assets that could substantiate Turkey’s EU candidacy. For a comparative analysis of Turkey’s approach to the EMP and BSEC, see Fatih Tayfur, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis,’ in Dış Politika - Foreign Policy, 1-2-3-4, (1999), p75-100.

46 Gencer Özcan, ‘Doksanlarda Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi,’ (The Increasing Influence of the Military Structure on Turkey’s National Security and Foreign Policy during the Nineties) in En Üzün Onyıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksan Yıllar (The Longest Decade: Turkey’s National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda During the Nineties) (İstanbul: Boyut, 1998), p67-100.

47 Orhun, ‘European Security and Defence Identity’, p118.