

9

Cultural Globalization in Turkey

ACTORS, DISCOURSES, STRATEGIES

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As we enter the new millennium, the rapid pace and the unpredictable direction of social and political changes in the world seem to be forcefully undermining “the established contours and the terms of politics.” It is now increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to think of politics by situating it solely at the “national context,” as the increasing interconnectedness of societies is making this realm increasingly vulnerable to both global/regional forces and local pressures. As a result, modern political referents such as the nation-state, national identity, and national economy have been losing their explanatory power for the analysis of social and political change.¹

While economic globalization (that is, the globalization of capital as a powerful global force) is undermining the authority of nation-states by creating “a borderless global marketplace,” cultural globalization is rendering the idea of national development problematic by giving rise to local reactions that pave the way for the emergence of “alternative modernities” and cultural identity claims. Thus it is not interstate relations or the national unit of analysis alone, but the interactions between universal Western values and the particular/local claims to authenticity

that are framing the content and the direction of social change in our globalizing world.²

In this context it is necessary, if not imperative, to analyze critically and empirically the historically constituted interactions between the global and the local, not only to understand social change, but to imagine a democratic world vision as a foundation for a better world.

Turkey is no exception to this. On the contrary, during the last decade, Turkish society has undergone rapid social, cultural, economic, and political change, the manifestations of which have been felt in every sphere of social life.

We would like to offer three generally accepted points to make this suggestion more concrete: first, one of the sites at which such change has manifested itself is the resurgence of Islam; second, this resurgence has taken different forms, discourses, clashes, and attitudes; and third, the processes of globalization have, to a large extent, framed the way in which Islam has begun to play an important role in Turkey's political, economic, and cultural affairs.

In Turkey's political landscape, radical change has occurred as Islamic discourse was politicized and "political Islam" became one of the defining elements and powerful actors of Turkish politics.³ This was also the beginning of the period characterized by polarization between secularism and Islamic traditionalism. In the economic sphere, we have witnessed the increasing role of Islamic discourse and values in economic organizations and the emergence of "economic Islam," with its actors, discourses, and strategies. Likewise, intellectual life, the activities of civil society organizations, and popular culture and consumption patterns have all been exposed to Islamic symbols and religious-identity claims to tradition and authenticity. Thus "cultural Islam" has also entered into and begun to characterize the formation of Turkish social and cultural life.

Globalization processes have played important roles in each sphere and have been "integral" to the operation of Islam's political, economic, and cultural discourses.⁴ However, on the basis of our research, we argue that the impacts of globalization on the formation of economic and cultural life in Turkey, especially over the last decade, as well as the role of Islam in it, should not be understood as a cause and effect relationship in a linear causality. Instead, globalization's impacts vary and create different consequences, depending on which sphere of social life is being

analyzed. In other words, polarization between secularism and Islamic traditionalism in political life does not directly reflect on economic life, where Islamic actors attribute a positive quality to cultural globalization and articulate it in their discourses as the necessary and indispensable element for new economic life.

Therefore, it is not polarization but coexistence between globalization and Islam that frames economic life. However, two additional points are worth making here. First, cultural globalization in economic and social life creates multidimensional impacts in the form of the coexistence between Western values and religious identity-claims to tradition and authenticity. Second, coexistence comes into being in different degrees and with different meanings, generating different discourses, strategies, and clashes, and thereby creating peculiarities in each sphere of social life. In this sense, we argue that cultural globalization is not a unitary but a multidimensional process that generates different impacts and consequences and makes possible the coexistence of modern values with Islamic traditional norms, symbols, and discourses.

We shall substantiate these arguments by documenting the findings of our research. We proceed from the commonalties that can be found among economic, civil society, and cultural actors, to specific characteristics, perceptions, and approaches that differentiate these actors in terms of their conceptions of globalization and its impacts on societal affairs in Turkey. In general, however, the ideas and arguments shared by almost all actors in economic life and civil society can be described as (1) the changing meaning of modernity, (2) the crisis of Turkey's strong-state tradition, (3) the end of the Cold War, and (4) the process of globalization.

SITUATING THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN TURKISH MODERNIZATION

All the economic and civil society actors we interviewed agreed that the 1980s and 1990s have brought about fundamental changes in Turkish modernization. They also agree that this has created a paradox in Turkish society that can be found in the "increasing dominance of economic liberalization" in economic life, whose laws of motion are to a great extent dictated by economic globalization (i.e., the economic logic of Western modernity) and the concurrent resurgence of Islam as a power-

ful political and cultural force in Turkish social and political life. In other words, Turkish modernization since the 1980s has been increasingly marked by the coexistence of economic liberalization and the resurgence of traditionalism and its appeal to a “return to authenticity.”⁵

This indicates that globalization is not confined to economic space and that cultural globalization is operating hand in hand with economic globalization, though it has different impacts on, and produces different results in, social and political life. This also indicates that in order to understand Turkish modernization, cultural globalization should not be taken as a reflection of the economic base, but as an object of analysis with its own peculiarities and specificities.

All the actors we interviewed also suggested that the historical context in which this resurgence of Islam has occurred is not only national, but global in nature. They also suggest that, since the 1980s, four distinct, but nevertheless interrelated processes have dictated the path and the direction of Turkish modernization.

The first process is “the changing meaning of modernity,” or “the emergence of alternative modernities.” Economic actors, civil society organizations, and intellectuals agree that the process of Turkish modernization has involved new actors, new mentalities of development, and new identity claims. These in turn point to:

- the emergence of the critique of secular-rational thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey;
- the increasing strength of Islamic discourse both as a “political actor” and a “symbolic foundation” for identity formation; and
- the need to think of modernity in terms of democracy has created a context for the upsurge of interest in civil society, citizenship, and the democratic self.

The second process is related to a “crisis in the legitimacy of the strong-state tradition.” Our actors also agreed that since the beginning of the Turkish republic (1923), modernization has been characterized by and has given rise to a “strong-state tradition” in which the state has assumed the capacity of acting almost completely independently from civil society; it is the state, not government, that has constituted “the primary

context of politics.” This tradition functioned as the organizing “internal variable” of Turkish politics until the 1980s. Since then, however, the emergence of new actors, new mentalities, and the new language of modernization, as well as democracy as a global point of reference in politics, has made culture and cultural factors an important variable in understanding political activities. Thus the state now has a legitimacy problem in maintaining its position as the primary context for politics.

In order to understand these two processes, our actors all argued that we also have to refer to both “the end of the Cold War” and “the process of globalization” as constraining factors that have had important short- and long-term impacts on the interaction of politics, polity and policy in the Turkish politics of the 1990s. This suggests that the end of the Cold War has generated important consequences for Turkey in terms of its foreign and domestic policy initiatives. While Turkey’s geopolitical and historical significance in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia has become increasingly apparent since 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union has drastically changed its role as a buffer state in East–West relations. More importantly, the end of the Cold War created important changes in political culture and the sense of nationalism, so that the Turkish people “may now come to see themselves once again at the center of a world emerging around them, rather than at the tail end of a European world that is increasingly uncertain about whether or not it sees Turkey as part of itself.”⁶

Our actors also agreed that, since 1980, Turkish society has been subject to “significant change” in which the processes of globalization operate and generate impacts on societal affairs. For them, globalization in general refers to the increasing interconnectedness between societies, so that events in one part of the world are increasingly having greater economic, cultural, and political effects on distant peoples and societies.

This understanding of globalization implies that in a globalizing world it is no longer possible to understand “change” only with reference to the national unit, since global/local forces have become as important as national actors. It also implies that culture can no longer be taken as secondary to politics and economics, for it is culture that makes it possible for new actors to emerge, for us to think about politics and political actors outside of the strong-state tradition, and for hitherto silenced identities to change the meaning of modernity.

According to our actors, however, the way in which culture becomes a main point of reference for the analysis of change does not constitute a single process but manifests itself differently in different spheres of social life. Cultural globalization creates both the universalization of Western values and cultural patterns and at the same time the revitalization of local values and traditions. While it brings about McWorld, in the sense of the worldwide standardization of consumption patterns and lifestyles in economic life, cultural globalization also provides a platform for the revitalization of tradition, the emergence of local identities, and the popularization of the discourse of authenticity.⁷ To put it another way, cultural globalization is the process in which we can observe both the universalization of Western modernity and the emergence of alternative modernities—the clearest example of this in Turkey being the resurgence of Islam.

THE VARYING IMPACTS OF CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION ON TURKISH SOCIETY

The above four points regarding the role played by cultural globalization in the formation of Turkish modernization since the 1980s, to which all our actors concurred, should not blind us to the fact that cultural globalization is not a unitary process, but rather something that is “carried out by different institutions and processes that interact with each other.” In order to understand the impacts of cultural globalization on Turkish society, therefore, we have to move to a more concrete level of analysis and explore the various ways (or various faces) in which globalization has brought about a number of coexisting cultures and alternative modernities in Turkish sociopolitical life.

Following Peter Berger’s analysis of globalization’s different faces,⁸ our study has examined how it has played a constitutive role in the following:

- *The formation of economic life*, or the increasing importance of the global market and capital accumulation, and its articulation by both secular and Islamic industrialists. The main question we investigated in this context was the extent to which the logic of the global market creates the possibility for the emergence of Islamic capital and the coexistence of secular and Islamic cultures.

- *The formation of civil society and democracy*, or the impact of cultural globalization on the emergence of new discourses of identity, politics, and democracy, as well as its impact on the clash between modern and traditional values, which pronounces itself in the debates on both European integration and Islam.
- *The formation of cultural life*, or the extent to which Islamic identity, presenting itself sociologically and politically as anti-modern, is embedded in, and operates within, globalization's consumer culture.

CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC LIFE

One of the sites of the greatest impacts of cultural globalization on Turkish society is economic life, whose scope, discourse, and actors have been enlarging since the 1980s. Its organizational structures are increasingly being extended beyond national and territorial borders.

Since the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, the Turkish economy has been exposed to the globalization of capital and trade and has been reorganized on the basis of the primacy of the global market over the domestic one. This in turn has led economic actors to realize that market relations require rational and long-term strategies, and that in order to be secure and successful in (globalized) economic life, it is imperative to gain organizational capabilities to produce and/or maintain technological improvement and strategic planning for production and investment. As a result, in the last decade, we have seen the increasing importance of free market discourse, the multiplication and the dissemination of economic actors, and the pluralization of economic organizations in Turkish society.

Until the mid-1980s, economic life in Turkey was mainly organized around national industries with no particular cultural identity. However, the 1990s witnessed the rise of what is called "Islamic capital" as a powerful economic actor,⁹ and this has given rise to the introduction of Islam to the political economy of Turkish capitalist development, both discursively and organizationally. During this period, Islam began to operate as an economic code open to free market ideology and also created its own economic organization founded on the (Weberian) principles of rational, technical knowledge and expertise.

The establishment of the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MUSIAD, in the Turkish acronym) was a clear sign of the articulation and coexistence of Islam with free market ideology. It should be noted here that the qualification of MUSIAD as “Islamic” is due to the fact that “a) it is affiliated with religious sects and communities; b) Islam appears as a significant point of reference in its activities; and c) it has close ties with political Islam mainly represented in Turkey” since the 1980s by the Welfare Party and then the Virtue Party.¹⁰ MUSIAD’s success lies in its ability to “bring together a large number of enterprises of different sizes located in different geographical regions of Turkey,” and “to create a network within economic life on the basis of relations of trust among believers.” It can therefore be considered an indicator of Islam’s possible coexistence with the Western-rational model of organizational behavior.¹¹ Thus economic Islam, in addition to political Islam, has also put its stamp on Turkish modernity over the last decade.

Furthermore, the establishment of MUSIAD and the dissemination of its subunits throughout the country has ended the dominance of the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSIAD), which had been the country’s primary economic actor of capitalist development since the mid-1970s. In this it is simply no longer possible to analyze the globalization of Turkish economic life without reference to MUSIAD, which has created a strong economic base for Islamic discourse. In this sense, we have seen not only the introduction of an Islamic imprint on economic life, but the pluralization of economic actors with different discourses and strategies.¹²

In addition to these two groups, since the early 1990s a third type of economic organization has emerged as a significant point of reference in understanding the formation of economic life and the impact of cultural globalization on it. This is the Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (SIAD), which gains its concrete institutional quality through its members’ association with different cities and provinces in the Anatolian region. SIADs have been included in our research because they are important economic actors and contribute to advancing our understanding of the changing nature of Turkish economic, political, and cultural life. In addition, some cities in Anatolia, such as Gaziantep, Konya, Denizli, Çorum, Kayseri, and Eskişehir, have provided us with interesting economic success stories and exemplify an atypical model of

what can be called “morally and culturally loaded economic modernization.”¹³ We shall now examine these three organizations.

TUSIAD

TUSIAD has undergone great transformation since its founding in 1971–1973. At one time known as “the biggest and most powerful business organization and pressure group in Turkey” and “the club of the rich,” TUSIAD once viewed the 1961 constitution as too democratic and supported the 1980 military coup.¹⁴ Now, however, it is the strongest voice in the call for the democratization of Turkey in accordance with European standards of democracy and argues for the need to protect civil rights and liberalization.

TUSIAD presents itself as an organization that “has changed over time.” According to its president, Erkut Yücaoğlu, the changes the organization has gone through in the last two decades have to a large extent been framed by globalization: the changing nature of world economic and political affairs have not only made democracy necessary, but it is the required condition for modernization and development.

Three points emerged during the course of our investigation and our interviews with TUSIAD members. First, TUSIAD perceives globalization as a process that operates beyond the borders of national societies and is mainly concerned with the globalization of the market and the emergence of interconnectedness between countries, especially with respect to movements of capital, finance, and trade. Globalization is regarded as an “objective reality,” a “social fact,” that should be neither resisted nor celebrated, but viewed as the new context of economic development, as well as the historical context for national politics. Instead of the import-substitution industrialization practiced during the 1960s and 1970s, in which the nation-state was the major actor for national development, this is seen as a time when the globalization of market relations, which takes place beyond the reach of the nation-states, is the main point of reference for economic life and its actors.

Second, in their view, globalization brings about a new set of relations that are novel in context. These include the emergence of new trade relations that compress geographical distances; the increasing importance of supranational relations (with, for instance, the European

Union), which create new regulations beyond nation-state borders; and the fragmentation of domestic market relations into regions with their own transnational economic relations (e.g., the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact; trade relations with the new Turkish republics, such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan; tourism for Turkey's southern and western regions).

Third, globalization brings about a new culture in economic life in that it forces economic actors to acquire a new economic rationality, in accordance with which they need to prepare economic strategies, take decisions, and act. Globalization therefore creates a new discourse on economic life that cognitively frames economic actors' strategies and decisions. This implies that the possibility of economic success lies in economic actors' mind-set, their ability to understand and articulate the new economic rationality, and their capacity to make long-term strategies to secure their position in global markets, which can only be possible by focusing on technological innovation and quality assurance.

Two points can be extrapolated from the above. First, according to one TUSIAD member, this new economic rationality also creates changes in the mind-set of economic actors whose identity formation now involves new values, such as technological orientation, the promotion of knowledge and information over tradition, the adaptation of a global network society, and the preference for long-term strategies over short-term gains.

Second, the adaptation to the new economic rationality brings about a new cultural platform for the creation of a cultural identity based on "a set of symbols" by which economic actors differentiate themselves from one another, as well as from earlier-generation industrialists and businessmen. In this sense, one of the impacts of globalization in economic life has been the creation of "symbolic capital" internal to economic actors' identity formation, involving postmodern references to lifestyles, tastes, outlook, consumption patterns, and the human body. This breaks with tradition and locality by privileging McWorld over the national culture of the past. Economic globalization therefore generates changes not only in economic organization but in the identity formation of the economic actors themselves.

TUSIAD members believe that globalization processes have given rise to two interrelated facts at the social level: cultural identity, which has

taken the forms of the resurgence of Islam and the “Kurdish problem,” and the need to protect civil rights, both of which require the democratic organization of state-society relations. They also think that Turkey’s exposure to the globalizing world has two dimensions: (1) the problem of integration into the European Union and (2) Turkey’s status and location in world politics.

Although they believe that Turkey has the potential to become what they call “a country that belongs to the first league,” they also believe that to achieve its ends, Turkey has to solve the problems stemming from its lack of democratization and political liberalism: the violation of human rights, the protection of civil rights, and acceptance of the rule of law as the fundamental basis of state power. Globalization in this sense appears both as the process related to the emergence of the problems confronting the Turkish state and the primary point of reference for their solution through democratization.

For TUSIAD, therefore, the possibility of the realization of its economic interests embedded in the global market is directly linked to the democratization of Turkey—a clear indication of how much the organization has changed since the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s in particular, TUSIAD assumed a “democratic identity” with a vision of making Turkey a liberal, plural democratic society, proceeding not only as an economic actor but as a civil society organization that strove for what is good for Turkey as a whole and for democratization, the necessary precondition for the country’s elevation to the first rank in world affairs.

In its social vision for a democratic Turkey, TUSIAD regards cultural globalization as creating both the universalization of democracy and the revitalization of traditional values and norms. However, while members value the rise of cultural Islam as a powerful symbol of identity to the extent that it functions within pluralistic and multicultural social formation, they are hesitant about the politicization of Islam with respect to democracy. In this context, coexistence between Western values and cultural Islam is possible as far as cultural life in Turkey is concerned, but this does not alter the clash between secularism and political Islam insofar as the latter remains both in discourse and in practice a “threat to liberal democracy.”

In conclusion, the changing nature of TUSIAD during the 1990s cannot be understood without reference to cultural globalization, which functions as an integral element of the organization’s discourse, strategy

and activities, and in TUSIAD's identity formation as both an economic actor and a democratic civil-society organization. Globalization has also contributed to the enlargement of the scope and content of all TUSIAD activities, from an economic self-interested pressure group, to a collective identity striving for the realization of its vision of a democratic Turkey.

MUSIAD

There is no doubt that MUSIAD is the most important business organization claiming to carry an Islamic identity. Since its inception, it has played a crucial role in linking business organizations with the rise of Islam; supporting, promoting, and protecting their economic interests; and developing a societal vision on the basis of Islamic principles. By creating a "powerful network based upon trust relations" among Islamic economic actors, MUSIAD has become as significant and powerful as TUSIAD, even challenging the latter's dominance in Turkish economic life.

With MUSIAD, Turkey has seen the emergence of economic Islam with its actors, strategies, and discourses. We have also seen that a link between Islam and Western rationality is possible, and that the embeddedness of Islamic discourse in economic and cultural globalization can bring about coexistence between Islamic identity and free market ideology. Furthermore, *Homo islamicus*, which Islamic discourse derives from "Mohammed's rules to guide the exchange activity in the Medina market," defines Islam as compatible with exchange relations resting on market competition and a minimal state.

The following general account of MUSIAD has been extrapolated from our research of this organization. MUSIAD also views globalization as a process whereby exchange activities go beyond the nation-state's borders and operate within a global market. For its members, globalization creates interconnectedness among societies, economies, and cultures, and it sets "the rules of the game," which require rational thinking, long-term strategies, and organizational capacities. In this sense, globalization becomes the new historical context for economic development. MUSIAD also attributes a positive quality to globalization because it is as a result of the globalization of market relations that a suitable ground was created for the rise and the success of economic Islam.

However, MUSIAD is founded on Islamic principles, which include feelings of trust and solidarity, the primacy of community over the

individual, the discourse of the just self over the self-interested actor, and the privileged status of ethical codes over individual morality. It argues that Islamic discourse is far more compatible with globalized market relations than the existing state-supported bourgeois class in Turkey, insofar as it creates relations of trust and solidarity.

In explaining the compatibility of Islam with the free market, MUSIAD cites the Asian model of development, in which it is believed success comes from “the strategic fit between the traditional institutions that regulate social relations and the requirements of global markets.” MUSIAD’s first (and former) president, Erol Yarar, explains the importance of the East Asian model with respect to Turkish economic development in the following way: “At the threshold of the twenty-first century, once again the western side of the Pacific—that is, the east of China—is becoming the dominant center of the world economy.”

The crucial point here is that as opposed to the Western industrial model, this new model is based on the link between “small or medium-sized enterprises” and “the culture of traditional values” embedded in family and/or religion. The East Asian model’s success relies on its commitment to cultural identity and its break with Western civilization, which gave primacy to secularism over religious morality and values. By following this model, MUSIAD presents itself as an alternative to nonviable capitalist development and centers its activities on *Homo islamicus*, which is the proper ethical basis for economic development, rather than *Homo economicus*, which has given rise to a self-centered individualistic morality.

In this context, MUSIAD argues that its discourses, strategies and actors create what is called the “proper Islamic discourse,” which is neither backward, mystical nor solely traditional, but progressive, open to economic and technological innovation, compatible with free trade and capitalism, and able to create sources of wealth. This means that MUSIAD, like TUSIAD, promotes technology and quality assurance. Its actors prefer long-term, rational strategies over short-term interests to secure their success, and their entrepreneurial activities are embedded in capitalism and the economic rules of capitalist rationality.

Economic Islam, then, promotes capitalism as economic globalization but situates it in Islamic discourse as its cultural basis. As the representative of economic Islam, MUSIAD articulates Islamic religion with economic globalization, but at the same time creates a societal vision

based on the primacy of cultural/communitarian identity over individualistic morality. In other words, it represents a vision for Turkish sociopolitical life founded on *Homo islamicus* rather than *Homo economicus*, which promotes self-interest over what is good for society.

This vision is directly derived from MUSIAD's positive view of globalization, which provides a basis both for the challenge that the organization has initiated against the existing political-economic order (i.e., statism and secularism) and for its promotion of *Homo islamicus*. Thus MUSIAD sees globalization as a factor contributing to the development of pluralism and multiculturalism, thereby creating a platform for democratization in Turkey. In this context, globalization is seen in relation to the integration process in Europe, where Turkey wants to be a full member of the European Union. It functions as both a conditioning and an enabling factor: "conditioning" in the sense that it requires, and even forces, the Turkish state to be open to democracy, creating a legitimate ground for Islamic discourse as an element of pluralism and multiculturalism; and "enabling" in the sense that it facilitates the operation of economic Islam beyond the borders of the nation-state.

Two points should be made here. First, MUSIAD's view of pluralism and multiculturalism is not liberal, insofar as it accords primacy to the community over the individual. For them, self-identity is discursively constructed and defined not in individuality but in community. Based on Islamic discourse, community comes before individual preferences and morality, so that the references to democracy, freedom, and morality, and in this sense pluralism and multiculturalism, are situated in and framed by communitarian ideology, rather than liberalism.

Second, this communitarian ideology, which also explains the link between economic Islam and its aspiration to the East Asian model of economic development, gives a clear expression of MUSIAD's view of community-based economic organizations founded on an articulation of Islamic cultural/moral identity and free trade that overrides difference of class, power, and wealth between capital and labor. This means that Islam defines the identity of both the owner and the producer, makes them part of the economic community, and masks the inequality, the unevenness, and the differences between them in terms of power and wealth.

For example, the discourse of justice and fairness that economic Islam uses never involves references to the organizational rights of producers

for unionization, the right to strike, security, health, or welfare. In fact, the communitarian ideology promoted by economic Islam acts against the principles of the welfare state and distributive justice in general and the organizational rights of the producers in particular.

Here, however, we can see that MUSIAD is in fact a class-based organization that uses Islamic discourse to “justify” its communitarian ideology and to “mobilize” its economic activities. We can see also that at the ideological level, MUSIAD and its Islamic economic identity differ radically from TUSIAD and its economic identity, which places a special emphasis on the language of civil rights as a basis for the process of democratization in Turkey.

SIADs

In recent years, Turkey has also witnessed the increasing importance (both qualitatively and quantitatively) in the province (city)-based and regional-based industrialist and business organizations known as SIADs, which have their own discourse and strategies. Even though they are not as strong or as influential as TUSIAD and MUSIAD, they deserve our attention for the following reasons: (1) they have created a dynamic economic life in Anatolia, especially with the emergence of the economically successful cities known as “Anatolian Tigers”; (2) because of their economic success, they have played an important role in changing our “orientalist vision” of Anatolia as an agriculture-based, underdeveloped, and traditional social totality; and (3) they have therefore shown us that there are different ways in which the global can be articulated with the local, creating different social forms and social visions.

In terms of their positive view of economic globalization, their adherence to free trade ideology, and their critique of the existing politico-economic order that privileges the strong-state tradition over economic and cultural activities, SAIDs appear similar to TUSIAD and MUSIAD. In terms of the scale and the scope of their economic organization, they represent (as in the case of MUSIAD) small and medium-scale enterprises located in different regions of Anatolia. They also promote a model of economic development in which the link between free trade and traditional/communitarian cultural identity defines the very basis of economic life. In fact their *raison d'être* and *modus vivendi* are

founded on the promotion of community ties over individuality as the precondition for economic success.

However, SIADs differ from TUSIAD and MUSIAD in three fundamental ways. First, SIADs operate without state support and represent local development that depends exclusively on trade beyond the borders of the nation-state. In fact, SAIDs represent the clearest case in which the globalization of the local can be observed. SIADs therefore view economic and cultural globalization as “internal” to their emergence and development and as processes making a positive and valuable contribution to the protection of their local cultures.

Second, all SIADs give primacy to community over individuality, and they define community as an “organic social and cultural unity.” In this sense, they prefer homogeneity, commonality, and sameness to pluralism and difference, and they promote conservative and communitarian societal visions over liberal individualism. SAID members maintain that success in economic life derives from the protection and the organization of cultural life as an “organic unity.” However, their view of what constitutes organic unity differs from that of MUSIAD, in that Islamic discourse is not the exclusive source of cultural identity for SIADs: nationalism, family ties, traditional norms, ethnicity, and primordialism also play significant roles in creating the communitarian ties that make social and cultural life an organic unity.

Successful SIADs—Gaziantep, Konya, Kayseri, Çorum, Denizli, Aydın, Adana, and Antalya, for example—explain their economic development by emphasizing the importance of establishing organic organizational and cultural ties among powerful actors in their communities. In fact, our research found that one of the ideas commonly shared by SIADs is that the extent to which organic unity is produced and reproduced in a given community determines the degree of success in economic life. Therefore, while the success stories in Anatolia point out the value of organic unity in successfully linking the local and the global, in the provinces where underdevelopment remains, economic actors complain about the lack of community spirit necessary to creating this organic unity.

Third, this emphasis on organic unity explains the overarching power of nationalism and conservatism at the political level in most of the provinces and regions of Anatolia, where moral and ethical community as organic unity are seen as the unquestioned basis for the development of economic

and cultural life. Therefore, while SIADs promote linkages between the local and the global, they also function as the “bearers of conservatism and nationalism” in their societal visions, which are limited in content, scope, and scale to the provinces in which they operate. SIADs therefore remain small-scale organizations both discursively and functionally, while the visions of both TUSIAD and MUSIAD address Turkish society at large.

Having outlined the main findings of our research concerning the linkage between cultural globalization and economic life in Turkey, we can conclude that this linkage takes the form of coexistence between the global and the local. However, the meaning that economic actors attribute to the impacts of cultural globalization vary in accordance with their economic discourses and strategies. While all of them see globalization as an internal element of the changing nature of economic and cultural life in Turkey, they differ in terms of their social visions. This manifests itself in the simultaneous promotion of both the universal language of civil rights and individuality and the protection of cultural/moral identity and the creation of a community as an organic unity. In sum, the ideology of free trade as an expression of economic globalization coexists with both liberalism and communitarianism in Turkish economic life.

CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

The 1980s and especially the 1990s saw an upsurge of interest in exploring alternative ways in which sociopolitical change in Turkey could be freed from the strong-state tradition. It is in this context that civil society organizations emerged and became important actors in Turkish politics. The sources of this interest in civil society are located not only in the general dissatisfaction with the strong-state tradition, not least because of its increasing independence from society and its concomitant failure to respond to social and cultural demands and to cope with social problems. Our research indicates that interest in civil society is also “global” in nature, as the emergence of a so-called global civil society has provided both a normative and an institutional basis for the call for a more participatory culture in Turkey. Thus civil society organizations value cultural globalization to the extent that it contributes to “the creation of the language of politics which is not associated exclusively with the state.”¹⁵

During the 1990s, both the crisis of the strong-state tradition and the process of cultural globalization brought about a significant increase in the quantity and quality of civil society organizations. They were considered (1) an “indispensable element” of the democratization process; (2) a “necessary factor” in creating stability in the relations between Turkey and the European Union; and (3) an “important element” in the modernization and liberalization of the Turkish state, so that it can transform itself into a political organization whose power and activities are “accountable” to society.

The civil society discourse has been normatively supported and actively promoted in Turkish academic and public life, and civil society organizations have gained a “[political] actor-like quality” with normative and discursive power, which, through the globalized language of civil rights, has influenced the rethinking of state-society/individual relations beyond the strong-state tradition.

Furthermore, the tragic and devastating events of 1999—the Marmara earthquake on 17 August, which destroyed a large portion of the most industrial region of Turkey, causing almost twenty thousand deaths, and the Düzce earthquake of 12 November—have led many Turks to think about civil society organizations more seriously. These two disasters made it very clear that the strong state was in fact quite weak in its ability to respond to and cope with serious problems. Its failure to respond quickly and effectively to crisis situations has given rise to the belief that civil society organizations and a more participatory political culture are necessary for the efficient and effective solution to the problems confronting Turkish society.

At the same time, the role of foreign search and rescue teams and the global outpouring of help to those who lost their homes and families in these disasters have created a point of articulation between globalization and Turkish civil society. The large amounts of financial and moral help that came from various societies, institutions, and individuals has created a significant shift in Turkish attitudes and behavior patterns, from a more nationalistic view of the world to a more transnationalist and universalistic approach to social relations. As a result, the normative value of civil society organizations and their call for the global acceptance of the language of civil rights and participatory democracy has increased immensely in Turkey.

It should be pointed out, however, that our research indicates something of a paradox, in that most civil society organizations in Turkey

actually view globalization as “a process to be resisted in the long run” or as “a problem to be seriously dealt with, in order to make its impacts positive for Turkish society.” In other words, the general intellectual discourse of civil society, which sees globalization as one of the contributory factors for the development of civil society organizations in Turkey, does not correspond to the way in which civil society organizations themselves speak about the utility of globalization. Most appear to be “quite skeptical” in terms of how they consider the question of cultural globalization’s long-term impacts.

This skepticism is sometimes quite strong, to the extent that globalization is seen as a new form of imperialism creating undemocratic power relations on behalf of rich countries. At other times, however, it can take the form of viewing globalization as an objective reality that produces both positive and negative impacts: *positive* in the sense of confronting the power of the strong-state and creating a platform for the protection of civil rights; *negative* in the sense of supporting the liberal hegemonic vision of the world, based on free market ideology.¹⁶

We think that looking at three effective human rights organizations will provide illustrative examples of this context. The Turkish Human Rights Association, which receives global support for its activities, takes a strong, skeptical position on globalization, arguing that although it supports the existing global discourse on the protection of human rights, globalization in the long run serves the interests of economically powerful countries. Globalization over the long term should thus be resisted in order to create democratic global governance.

The second organization, Mazlum-Der, which is associated with Islamic discourse, presents a softer skepticism, arguing that cultural globalization provides a platform suitable for its activities, although the liberal discourse on human rights it promotes is problematic in how it deals with cultural rights.

The third human rights organization, Helsinki Vatandaşlar Derneği (Helsinki Citizens Association), which was founded in Europe and operates in Turkey, views cultural globalization as generating both positive and negative impacts for both the nation-state and civil society. That is, cultural globalization cannot be rejected or celebrated but should be dealt with seriously, in order to take advantage of its positive qualities, such as its support for the universalization of the discourse of civil rights.

It is important to examine the differences between these three organizations, because they also illuminate a general problem that confronts all civil society organizations in Turkey and which determines, to a large extent, their approach to the question of cultural globalization. This can be called the “boundary problem”; in other words, the extent to which civil society organizations in Turkey actually operate as “civil society organizations” in terms of their relation to the state, the scope and content of their activities, and their normative and ideological formations.

The general definitional discourse on civil society in Turkey finds the institutional distinction between the state and society a “sufficient condition” for thinking of organizations taking place outside the boundaries of the state as civil society organizations. In fact, a large number of civil society organizations make use of this definition in describing themselves. However, this definition does not involve two important criteria used in the literature to define civil society organizations; namely, that they are issue-specific organizations that are *not* interested in creating or supporting ideological social visions.

But when we approach civil society organizations in Turkey on the basis of these two criteria, we see that the activities of most of them are in fact embedded in large social visions. These include Kemalism, the protection of contemporary civilized life, a secular-democratic Turkey, Islamic order, a modern Turkey, Islamic life, a socialist Turkey, and Kemalist Woman, to name but a few. Second, although some civil society organizations are institutionally outside the state, they can still have strong normative and ideological ties with state power. An example of this was the banning of the Welfare Party, in which strong ties had been established between some in the military, the state, and civil society organizations. In this case, we witnessed how the search for what is good for society at large could be a mission around which civil society organizations center their activities.¹⁷

Our research indicates that the way in which civil society organizations think of globalization is based on how normative their discourses and strategies are. Skepticism about the impacts of cultural globalization on societal relations in Turkey increases in those organizations whose activities are not issue specific but are closely tied with general ideological and normative social visions. On the other hand, this skepticism decreases in issue-specific civil society organizations, which conceive of globalization as creating a historical context for their activities.

In conclusion, we argue that there are differences between the intellectual discourse about civil society and the way civil society organizations perceive the impacts of globalization. The intellectual discourse locates civil society in a space that has occurred between the legitimacy/governability problem of the strong-state tradition and the changing nature of societal relations, partly because of the processes of globalization; it therefore views civil society as a necessary condition for democratization, pluralism, and multiculturalism. However, with their ideologically and normatively loaded discourses and strategies, most civil society organizations take a contrary view. So, even though their numbers are increasing and they are becoming important actors, how “civil” Turkish civil society organizations actually are remains uncertain.

CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION AND POPULAR CULTURE/CONSUMPTION PATTERNS

In addition to its impacts on economic life, civil society, and intellectual life, cultural globalization has also involved popular culture and consumption patterns in Turkey, where significant changes have occurred in recent years.¹⁸ These changes have created two interrelated trends, the postmodernization of values and the globalization of the local, which have manifested themselves in our identities, lifestyle preferences, and consumption patterns. In French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology, these two trends have also functioned as “the cultural/symbolic capital” of the 1990s. Their role in creating and mobilizing identities has been as important as that of economic capital.

Thus, as opposed to the political arena, which has been characterized by the polarization of secularism and Islamic traditionalism, in the popular culture of the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of “calls for pluralism, the multiplicity of identities, the value of the local, increases in traditional symbols, and the emergence of consumerist culture.” Cultural capital, therefore, has performed a double role: as a factor of differentiation, by giving meaning to the creation and the mobilization of different identities, and as an element of commonality among different identities, in terms of their tendency toward consumerism.

In the realm of popular culture, cultural globalization is seen as a process that enables coexistence, rather than clashes, between the global and the local. Three points are worth making here.

First, we found that coexistence appears to be most visible in the consumption patterns of different identities that have different political preferences, different economic status, and/or levels of well-being. This means that although the differences between these identities in terms of their choice of newspapers, magazines, and TV channels is noticeable and perhaps sometimes even significant, they vanish when it comes to their approach to consumption. In other words, while the choice of the newspaper or TV channels is still based on political or cultural identity codes, the significant increase in consumption patterns of different identities has brought about the “McDonalization of [Turkish] society.” For example, whereas those who locate themselves in or near Islamic discourse usually prefer newspapers and TV channels associated with the Islamic movement, they nevertheless very much accept the universalization of Western consumer culture and its symbols. The same is true for those who define themselves as “Western” or “secular.”

Second, cultural globalization can at the same time be seen as creating a suitable platform for the revitalization of tradition, not only as a political or economic movement but as a cultural movement with its actors and its discourses. As a result of globalization, therefore, Islamic identity no longer represents a backward self closed to change. On the contrary, we have seen the emergence of cultural capital used by Islamic identity in terms of fashion, music, art, and tourism, as well as an emergence of a consumerist Islamic identity acting as an economic citizen, integrated to shopping mall culture, making use of technology, and understanding the symbolic power of money. In this sense, Islamic identity is as much a part of the new consumerist culture as secular identity: it views this culture not as an evil emanating from the West but as a basis of social status and power.

Third, in this context, cultural globalization is viewed as a positive element for the revitalization of local art forms, cultural objects, and signs, thereby creating a cultural life that is more plural, democratic, and multicultural. Globalization ends the hegemony of secular culture, which aims at producing and maintaining a homogeneous cultural life by creating a platform on which marginalized and silenced cultural forms and objects can become both visible and marketable. At the same

time, it makes an important contribution to the expression of differences through the discourse of tradition, locality, and authenticity, as it is through the globalization of the local that a more pluralistic and multicultural life has come into existence—a necessary condition for the process of democratization in Turkey.

In light of the above discussion and our exposition of the different impacts of cultural globalization on life in Turkey, we conclude that co-existence rather than clash is the form that delineates the interactions between the global and the local. We believe that coming to terms with this fact is of the utmost importance not only for understanding the changing nature of Turkish modernity but, more importantly, for establishing democracy in Turkey.

NOTES

1. A comprehensive analysis of globalization and its political impact on the national context can be found in D. Archibugi, D. Held, and M. Köhler, eds., *Re-imagining Political Community* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 1998).

2. See M. A. Bamyeh, *The Ends of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

3. For a more detailed explanation, see E. Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

4. Z. Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of Welfare Party in Perspective," *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1997): 743–766.

5. This point has also been made by Heinz Kramer in his recent book, *A Changing Turkey* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000).

6. G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics* (Boulder: Westview, 1993).

7. For an important source, see P. Berger, "Four Faces of Globalization," *National Interest* 49 (1997).

8. Berger, "Four Faces," 24.

9. The term "Islamic capital" is also used interchangeably with "green capital" and "Anatolian capital."

10. See also A. Buğra, *Islam in Economic Organizations* (Istanbul: TESEV, 1999).

11. Buğra, *Islam*, 11–12.

12. In our research, we extensively investigated MUSIAD and TUSIAD by conducting in-depth interviews, mapping their publications, and collecting data from the related literature on these organizations. Whereas TUSIAD and its members are mainly located in Istanbul, the organizational scope of MUSIAD extends toward Anatolia, so our in-depth MUSIAD interviews involved trips to Anatolian cities, where there is a strong tie be-

tween the development of export-oriented economic activities and MUSIAD organizational activities.

13. That is why these cities are sometimes characterized as “Anatolian tigers,” referring to the East Asian model of economic development. Understanding the process that this model has put into practice in these cities gave us crucial insights that could help clarify the varying impacts of cultural globalization in Turkey.

14. Unless otherwise indicated, quoted material from this section on is taken from our research.

15. For details, see A. N. Yücekök, İ. Turan, and M. Ö. Alkan, *Civil Society Organizations in Istanbul* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998); A. Gönel, *Primary Civil Society Organizations* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998); and Turkish Economy and Social History Foundation, *Civil Society Organizations* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998). All these publications are in Turkish.

16. On the other hand, the leaders of some civil society organizations, such as citizenship initiatives, environmental organizations, and organizations that deal directly with the problems of urban life, think positively of cultural globalization as a process “internal” to their activities.

17. E. F. Keyman, “Globalization, Civil Society, and Democracy in Turkey,” in D. Durst, ed., *Civil Society in South Eastern Europe* (London: Vertigo, forthcoming).

18. This part of our research was based on in-depth interviews and the reports of the DAP marketing research company, *Life Standards, Values, and Preferences in Turkey* for 1998 and 1999. We thank Akın Alyanak and Erkanı Keyman for their time and suggestions.