

The Russians and the Turks: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Era of Empires

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Comparing Russia and Turkey might appear to be a far-fetched enterprise. The differences are obvious, even too obvious to be dwelt upon at any length. There is a problem as to definition—what was nationalism about—and there is a difficulty as regards effect and timing. Russian nationalism (as distinct from empire-loyalism) is a nineteenth-century creation and Turkish nationalism came into being even later. Russian nationalists did not have to create a state until very, very late in the day—the end of the twentieth century, where Lenin's body still lies in Red Square next to the symbols of imperial Russia. Turkic nationalists came into their own during the War of Independence after 1918, when, in response to Greek and other invasions, a new Turkish State was created. Its makers maybe had a long ancestry in terms of Muslims versus Christians, but their ancestry in terms of Turkish nationalism was quite short, not much longer than a single generation. In fact you can more or less date Turkish nationalism back to a conference in Paris in 1902, when various associations, broadly known as “Young Turks,” established a single “Union and Progress” association (which, like the almost contemporaneous Russian social-democratic congress, famously split).

This essay will suggest that, despite these obvious differences, when it comes to imperialism and nationalism, there are never the less tantalizing comparisons throughout. A symbol: in both, the word ‘empire’ and ‘nationalism’ had to be adapted from imports (for instance, in Turkish, *imparatorluk*). Each country had a rather similar tangential relationship with the West, and each had had its period of glory, its empire. Each had its relationship with Christianity, and with Islam. Each had a native people, who gave their name to the empire, but sometimes could feel, none the less, that it was the victim of that empire. “*Rus* was the victim of the Russian empire,” runs a well-established line.¹ Adapt that to “Turkey was the victim of the Ottomans” and you might even find that one or other of the nationalists said it. It will be this paper’s argument that in certain aspects the similarities outweigh the differences. Hosking says that “a fractured and under-developed nationhood has been (the Russians’) principal historical burden.”² This could easily be asserted to the Turks.

There is, between the two, an important counterpoint, in that much of the modern history of both countries consists of a response to some action by the other. A most significant date was October 1552 when Ivan the Terrible took Kazan from the Tatars, cousins of the Anatolian Turks.³ From then on, Russia was in a slow ascendant, which, in the reign of Catherine the Great, became a rapid one. The famous naval battle of Cesme, in 1782, saw the Ottoman fleet crushed by a Russian fleet, which had entered the Mediterranean from the west, with British connivance. Thereafter, Russia became the great enemy for the Ottoman Turks, with only brief interruptions. In the eighteenth century the long war of Ottoman succession began, with long periods of peace, which lasted until 1918 when the empire finally broke up. Russians and Turks counted almost as hereditary enemies. Two nationalisms—or perhaps, more accurately, ideologies of empire—collided, and shaped the other. Initially, there was more in common than might be supposed. In the first place, there is the semi-Asiatic, Turkish character of some of Russian history, particularly in the period of the Tatars invasion—a contentious subject. Much of the Old Russian nobility, for instance, was of Tatar origin—Yusupov from Yusuf, Saburov from *sabir*, ‘patient’,⁴ even Godunov, of which the origin may be obscene.⁵ The great Prince Igor himself was three-quarters Polovtsian (Kipchak) and spoke a Turkic mother tongue.⁶ Russian nationalists of anti-western stamp, particularly desperate xenophobic *evraziitsy* of course played up this element of their past⁷: why was Russia the only Slav country that had “succeeded”? Yet even N.M. Karamzin said, “Moscow owes its greatness to the khans” and Vernadsky noted that Muscovy’s state centralization came through “Mongol principles of administration”.⁸ There is a counterpart in Turkish historiography.

What did the Ottomans owe to Byzantium? Russia obviously owed a great deal, though this may be contested because of the echoes of Pan-Slavism which to some Russians was nonsense upon stilts, in Bentham’s useful phrase. There was an important controversy, in the first third of the twentieth century, as to the nature of the Ottoman Empire. There were, in history, several Turkish or Turkic (note on the difference) Empires, the celebrated “empires of the steppe” (Rene Grousset) or *l’empire du levant*.⁹ None lasted for more than three or four generations. The standard pattern was for Turkic nomads, good cruel horsemen, to arrive and take over; then they would themselves inter-marry and succumb to civil war. Both in India and Iran, nationalists, looking for something to blame, regarded the Turks as wreckers of what had been, potentially, civilizations with at least the beginnings of western-European promise.¹⁰ But the Ottoman Empire was different: it lasted for about seven centuries or perhaps even longer, if you count the Seljuks, who took most of Anatolia in the twelfth century, as proto-Ottoman.¹¹ Why?

In the days when historians wrote on robustly racial lines, the argu-

ment advanced was that the Ottoman Empire had a very substantial European component. The Turks were indeed nomadic—their badge was the horsetail (*tug*) and the sky (*gök*) part of their mythology—and if they conquered a place, they had to make use of the sedentary locals' more developed ways. So they did with Byzantium. A Greek historian of distinction, Dimitri Kitzikis, establishes this: a long, long list of collaborators, including the Orthodox patriarchs, who remained after 1453 among the privileged men in the empire.¹² Writers of books on the rise of the Ottoman Empire have to start with the siege of Constantinople, and they make much of the final services held in Justinian's Hagia Sophia. Indeed the fall of Constantinople, the eternal center of the Christian world, where it used to be said that only the angels in the sky knew when the city of cities would come to its end, was the tragic turning point. It echoed in Moscow, which adopted the doctrine of "The Third Rome," the new and the last stronghold of the only true faith. This messianic Russian idea was formally abandoned in the middle of the seventeenth century (and finally by Peter the Great who accepted the Roman pagan title of Emperor) and yet was later continuously reflected in different forms of Russian nationalism. Orthodoxy of course remained an extremely important feature of Russian national identity. But, for the Orthodox in Constantinople, the arrival of the Ottomans was not the ultimate end. Mehmet the Conqueror who felt attached to his Serbian stepmother displayed a significant degree of tolerance. Under the first sultans in Constantinople, the Orthodox Church preserved vast lands, and the Patriarch had the same badge of rank as the Grand Vizier, three horse-tails (the Sultan had four, and, later, six). Historians noted the importance, which later of course declined, of the Byzantine element in the first century and more of Ottoman imperial history, or even for the earlier period, when the first Osman and his descendants built up their small emirate on the borders of Bithynia in the fourteenth century.¹³

What Russia owed to Byzantium is also a good question, developed by sophisticated historians. Meyendorff asserts that "Byzantine medieval civilization was part of the very texture of Russian life," and even claims that the Byzantine influence made Moscow, rather than Vilna or Tver, the center of a new Russia, emerging from under the Mongol yoke.¹⁴ That does make for curious parallels between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, in particular as to the nature of feudalism in each. The initial argument as to the Byzantine inheritance of the Turks was no doubt racially-inspired, but sophisticated historians were involved in the debates that emerged—Paul Wittek, Mehmed Fuat Kopru lu and, latterly, Dimitri Kitzikis. The very word *efendi* came from a title the Patriarch was given, *authentes*, meaning "sovereign."¹⁵ Even the fiscal system was similar, and from the start, the Ottomans showed a concern for non-religious law, *kanun* in Turkish, to distinguish it from the Islamic *seria*, though the separation may originally be Mongol. The Byzantine *pronoia* linked cavalry with land holding, as did the Ottoman *timar* and the standard

land-measurement was exactly the same, *donum* and *stremma* (roughly 1,000 square meters). The problem was that the *timar* represented only a temporary grant: over time, it did become hereditary, but heritable property was insecure, in Turkey as, to some extent, in Russia under the *pomestie* system. It would in fact be interesting to explore the effects in both empires of the basic instability of property in land—an instability that of course set strict limits to the development of capitalism.¹⁶ It was mainly left to minorities and foreigners. One final point of comparison: Turks learned from Russians, because a considerable part of the population of western Anatolia arrived, at varying stages in the later nineteenth century, as refugees.¹⁷ In republican Turkey, they or their children made up half of the urban population. Vast numbers of them came from Russia—the Crimea or the Caucasus, as it fell under Russian rule.¹⁸ The Crimean Tatars especially had had a relatively strong state tradition¹⁹ and they learned from Russia to such an extent that their role in the Turkish higher education system was remarkable. In fact Crimean Tatars were the spearhead of “modernization” for the Muslims of Russia in general in the late nineteenth century.²⁰ The influence of Russia upon Turkey through the tsarist education system deserves some stress. Intelligent Ottomans knew that they had something to learn from Russia, however much they also feared her. So a comparison of Russian and Turkish imperialism and nationalism in the modern era is not so hopeless a task as it may first appear to be.

Nationalism of the nineteenth century came to both empires as an alien force. Initially a western European phenomenon, it originated under very different economic, social and political circumstances and generally in both places played a destructive role even when, like the Russian social right-wing nationalism, it emerged from the most “good-intentioned convictions” and formally supported the regime. For these empires nationalism became a sign of crisis and decline. Both empires were ruled by autocratic governments and, while the regimes were firmly controlling their subjects, national sentiments of any kind were not allowed. As the regimes weakened the genies of different nationalisms, both big and small, came out of the bottles. In that sense, the Poles created Russian nationalism and the Greeks (or even Armenians) Turkish.

Originally both the Russian and the Turkish States had, of course, nothing to do with the nationalisms of their major ethnic groups. “One of the decisive facts of Russian history,” as Hans Rogger in his early well-known paper pointed out, was that “the work of national territorial consolidation was completed before nationalism became a major fact of Russian life, and that this consolidation brought with it no extension of political rights, no interpenetration of state and society, no lasting accommodation between them.”²¹ The Russian monarchs derived their legitimacy from above, as God anointed, not from below, and by no means as representatives of the Russian *narod*.

In the ancient land now called Turkey, before the end of the eleventh century, there were basically no Turks (although a certain Turkic penetration had perhaps already begun) they came essentially as conquerors. Gradually, the Ottomans, originally one of the Turkish *beylikates* or emirates (principalities) in Anatolia, even less powerful and smaller than the others, transformed the *beylikate* into their great empire. Behind the conquest was the idea of *jihad*. The dynamic force that again and again led the Ottomans to dominate the others was the Islamic idea of *ghaza*²² which envisaged war against the *dari'l-harb* (abode of war) and transformed these territories into *dari'l-islam* (abode of Islam). *Ghazis* were sacred warriors who conquered and settled in *dari'l-harb* territories. So the Turks came to Anatolia as *ghazi* warriors. Since the Ottoman Empire was founded on the *ghaza* tradition as a *ghazi* state, it could easily expand at the expense of *dari'l-harb* into Byzantine territories. In addition, the Ottomans, as a *ghazi* state on the borders of *dari'l-harb* often formed an alliance with the other *beylikates*. The religious, not the ethnic factor, played a decisive role.

Ethnically and religiously the Ottoman Empire soon became extremely diverse. Loyalty of the subjects was focused on the dynasty and the Sultan who was proclaimed the shadow of God on the earth. Above all the Sultan was Muslim and represented the Muslim domination over other subjects. But since too many subjects were not Muslim a certain *modus vivendi* had to be established. As a result, the Sultan introduced the *millet* system—his subjects formed, according to their religions, Muslim, Christian and Jewish *millets*. Every *millet* had its own religious leader and each community had its own regulations. Thus religious tolerance was displayed. The Muslim element was simply described as Muslim and in some ways came off less well than Christians or Jews. The Muslims had to serve in the army whereas the Christians simply paid an extra tax. As time went by the inhabitants of Anatolia became much less privileged than those of Constantinople and the Turks hardly had any advantages—they represented a forgotten and backward ethnic element. In fact, the name “Turkey” was not used, except by foreigners, adopting the Italian Turquia (medieval Italians may even have misunderstood, that the Turks were only one tribe among others, but the misunderstanding may go back as far as ancient China). With the protection of the *millet* system, and astute bribery, some of the Greeks of Constantinople became very rich, rich enough to buy the tax-rights of the Rumanian lands (and with them, for a year, the title, “prince”; four generations on, they were often Rumanian nationalists). In 1839, and even more so in 1856, imperial decrees made all subjects equal, regardless of religion, and also to some extent secularized the *millets*. The Christians, with their western connections, thrived, and there was even Greek emigration from the drought-ridden mainland to central Anatolia, where a town such as Sinasos (today's Mustafapasha) became highly prosperous, as its surviving buildings show.

From the time of Peter the Great until the very end, the Russian Empire, despite its name, had a pre-national, *soslovnyi* character. Introducing his westernizing reforms and copying western absolutism Peter the Great treated even the most sacred true-Russian traditions with a large portion of cynicism. Even the administration of the Orthodox Church was transformed according to the Protestant models; the Russian Tsar like the English king became “*khranitel dogmatov*,” “the keeper of the dogmas”, i.e. “Defender of the Faith.”²³ The Romanov’s dynasty was ethnically largely German, the nobility included not only Orthodox brothers of the Russians, for instance Georgians, but also Catholic Poles, Lutheran Germans and even Muslim Tatars from Volga and Crimea.²⁴ If, in the nineteenth century, you walked along Nevskii prospect you would have found not only Russian but also German, Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, Polish and Armenian churches. The fact that the “Russian” peasantry belonged, literally in times of serfdom, to the Poles or the Germans for a long period simply did not matter.

For the first time the tsarist state seriously considered the Russian people after the French revolution and the Decemberists revolt. These troubles demonstrated that perhaps in the future the *narod* would play a political role and the masses would be told what to do. The state formulated a national doctrine as the vague formula “Orthodoxy–Autocracy–Nationality” (*Pravoslavie–Samoderzhavie–Narodnost*) in response to “liberté, égalité, fraternité” of the French Revolution. It had a certain anti-Western sentiment—Mikhail Pogodin, one of the main interpreters of the theory of official nationality, explained that Russia, as the heir to Byzantium, and the West, as the heir to the Roman Empire, represented two basically different civilizations.²⁵ *Narodnost* was the most enigmatic element of the “official formula.” It did not directly signify national identity but reflected the feeling of affiliation of the people to Orthodoxy and the Tsar.²⁶ Andrzej Walicki pointed out that *narodnost* rather designated “the common people” similar by emotional complexion with the German *Volkstum*.²⁷ According to the official ideologues, the specific qualities of the Russian people—submissiveness, patience, and the inclination voluntarily to give power to the beloved Tsar—made autocracy a possible and necessary condition for the existence of Russia. Regardless of that, they displayed a surprising disdain and haughty skepticism towards the Russian people. The author of the formula, Count Sergei Uvarov, at the post of Minister of Education, insisted on the necessity of maintaining serfdom and the impermissibility of the education of the lower classes.²⁸ “The Russian people are wonderful, but still only potentially. In reality it is base, horrible, like cattle,” admitted another official ideologue, S. P. Shevyrev. Pogodin suggested that “Russian peasants will not become decent people until they are forced,” and that “the Russian person is in need of rational motivation and supervision from outside.”²⁹ The central idea of the theory of official nationality was the necessity of leadership by an enlightened government and bureaucracy over an igno-

rant and savage people. In the Ottoman Empire, government was a “misterie” as with the Divine Right of Kings. The servants of the state deliberately kept it so, with an exceedingly difficult official script. One reason for the failure of the idea of an Ottoman university in 1870 was that lectures—wisdom—would have to be opened to ordinary people.³⁰ Similarly, printing, first introduced early in the eighteenth century by a converted Hungarian, was stopped when the clergy protested—perhaps simply against the growth of profane knowledge, perhaps to prevent the dissemination of possibly dissident Christian writings, though in all probability because it would put calligraphers out of lucrative business, regardless of race or creed.

With this sort of approach it is important to consider the real status of the Russians and the Turks in the empires which bore their names but where, apparently, the supposedly “dominating” ethnic majorities did not only dominate but quite the opposite, were discriminated against, particularly the Turks and, to a lesser extent, the Russians. In the Ottoman Empire the very name ‘Turk’ was even rather insulting and was used to denote backwoodsmen, bumpkins, illiterate peasants in Anatolia—‘*etraki-bi-idrak*’ in an Ottoman (Arabic) play on words ‘the stupid Turk’.³¹ Such was an expression used in court circles (the *Enderun-i Hümâyün*, itself consisting often enough of Christians or converts, who had made up “the ruling institution” of the Ottoman Empire almost as soon as the Ottomans invaded the Balkans—incidentally, at Byzantine instigation and with Genoese assistance—in the later fourteenth century).³² A Turkish sarcastic saying ran:

Şalvari şaltak Osmanlı
Eğeri kaltak Osmanlı
Ekende yok biçende yok
Yemedе ortak Osmanlı³³

(The strange Ottomans, who did not look like the Anatolian peasant Turks, never helped to work, seeding or collecting harvest, yet when it comes to eating and spending, they were always with us.)

This is a good illustration of the above statements. It is striking, how after the Empire Ataturk creating the nation tried to turn the connotation of ‘Turk’ upside down. “Happy is the man who can say I am a Turk”—stated the leader of the new nation. This slogan is still widely used to convince everyone, particularly in the eastern part of the country.

Until the end of the Ottoman Empire, the ‘Turks’ signified peasants and nomads in Anatolia or in the Balkans, where they had been compulsorily deported as a part of the Ottoman settlement policy, *surgun*, or they were used as soldiers in military campaigns.³⁴ Selahaddin Eyuboglu says, “we, the conquerors, were conquered.” This most oppressed ethnic group in the Empire was the last one, which discovered its national affiliation.³⁵

With the Russians it was different; to call anyone ‘Russian’ was never insulting in the Russian Empire, but this was due to the status of the Russian elite, nobility and later the emerging middle class but not to the position of the peasantry, the vast majority of ethnic Russians. To compare with non-Russians, the Russian peasantry normally did not enjoy any privileges but instead was deprived. The imperial government intentionally used a special tax system to keep the Russians in Russia proper materially poorer than non-Russians at the outskirts of the empire. The latter always paid smaller taxes and enjoyed various exemptions.³⁶ The logic behind it was that from the government’s point of view non-Russians could cause troubles more easily than the Russians and St. Petersburg’s priorities were stability and security of the empire, not ethnic Russians’ interests. The result was a well-known phenomenon “*oskudenie tsentra*,” “impoverishment of the core,” one of the major themes of public debates in late imperial Russia. The same pattern, discrimination of the Russian peasants, was applied sometimes in ethnically mixed areas. For example, in the eighteenth century many Russian peasants in the Volga region were the serfs of Tatar nobles (oddly enough, no Russian noble could own Muslim peasants as serfs), a notoriously harsh burden in itself, and apart from that the Russians were subjects to military service; while at the same time Tatar peasants were subordinated directly to the state, which was a much better status, and were free from military conscription.³⁷ Serfdom, particularly oppressive in Russia proper, was abolished only in 1861, and *vykupnye platezhi*, payments for the acquired lands that the peasants had to make, were the highest for the Russians,³⁸ while privileged hinterlands enjoyed freedoms granted them by the Russian emperor from the moment of their unification with the empire. After 1905, when Russian nationalists obtained the right to speak in the Duma, they strongly criticized this aspect of the imperial policy. Getting fired up at the high rostrum of Duma in Tavrida Palace, the Rightists went as far as to accuse emperors of being seemingly anti-Russian. The leader of the Union of the Russian People (SRN) N.E. Markov speaking on the Finnish question pointed out that when the Russian Tsar Alexander I granted Finland a constitution, “and quite liberal, at the same time his very native Russian subjects were still slaves, his Russian people were sold in bazaars...”³⁹ The orator of the All-Russian National Union (VNS) I.P. Sozonovich asserted that “Alexander I looked upon Russia through Polish eyes” and adopted a “Russia for Poland” ideology.⁴⁰ The last statement came as an emotional exaggeration, and yet it has been clearly demonstrated that “the quality of life of the Russians was one of the lowest in the empire.”⁴¹ The percentage of those literates was higher among Poles, Jews, Finns, Baltic peoples, and even among Volga and Crimean Tatars than among the Russians. Non-Russians were better represented among qualified educated professionals; at the beginning of the twentieth century life expectancy of the Russians, an important indication of living standard,

was lower than of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Jews, Tatars, Bashkirs.⁴² Furthermore, politically the necessity to maintain the empire undoubtedly hampered the liberalization of the Great Russian core and generally the formation of the Russian nation.⁴³

Under those circumstances the Russians did not have many reasons to feel racially or culturally superior over non-Russian subjects of the Tsar. In European Russia non-Russians were not merely white-skinned but often richer, more cultured and politically more advanced. In the East the ethnically diverse Russian imperial elite displayed a certain cultural arrogance and an idea of a civilizing mission, and yet observers noted that Russian peasants and soldiers hardly displayed any sign of a superiority complex over the natives.⁴⁴ Obviously regarding the position of the major nationality and its relations with the “subordinated” nations the Russian, like the Ottoman Empires were very different from the European colonial states. The Ottoman Empire, even formally, had no “master-race” or *Staatsvölk*.

Thus the vast majority of Russians had to carry a heavy burden to maintain their empire without receiving anything back, at least those concerned with their daily needs and not with geopolitical strategies. Nicholas II, sentimental in the Slavophiles’ way towards the Russian *narod*, once demonstrated his understanding of the backbreaking price that his favorite subjects had to pay for the imperial grandeur. When his favorite general A.N. Kuropatkin explained to the monarch the difficulties of a possible military campaign in Afghanistan, Nicholas II agreed, saying, “this means that the same Russian *muzhik* will have to pay everything.”⁴⁵ The priority, however, again remained imperial interests.

On the contrary, the Russian, *rossiiskaia* rather than *russkaia*, elite easily identified with the imperial state. The empire was built on the alliance of the imperial government and the elite, Russian and non-Russian. As long as the local upper class, from Baltic Germans to Armenians and Tatars, had the same social status as the Russian nobility and possessed lands it freely joined the imperial elite, enjoyed the same privileges and exerted influence on St. Petersburg’s policy.⁴⁶ Before “the nationalization” of the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century to join the elite was often even easier for non-Russians.⁴⁷ However, in this cosmopolitan world the Russian element was not forgotten. The sense of essential continuity between Muscovite Rus and the Russian Empire was preserved in a variety of rituals, symbols and myths, in religion and language⁴⁸ often by the same aristocratic clans who stood around Rurikids and then Romanovs. “Aristocratic families—Dominic Lieven said—found it easy to identify with a dynastic state whose history was their own.”⁴⁹ In comparison, in the Ottoman Empire the proper Turkish element among the elite barely played any role—it hardly existed at all. The leaders of the founding Turkish flocks were brutally eliminated with the rise of *devshirme* in the palace. The early Sultans recruited officials who had no loyalty beyond that to the

sovereign. Christian boys were taken from their families and received intensive training for “the governing services.” They accounted for nearly all the high dignitaries—Grand Vizier etc. Pashas then were drawn from anywhere and everywhere, especially the Levantines.

The answer to the question of why the Russian Empire was rising while the Ottomans declined at least in part lies in the quality of leadership provided by the imperial elite. As Geoffrey Hosking wrote, “there are no doubts that by the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian aristocracy was culturally the richest and the most cosmopolitan class in Europe.”⁵⁰ Golitsyns and Bagrations, Benckendorffs and Sumarokov-Elstons, Bobrinskys and Kochubeis (from Turkic Küçük-bey) celebrated and shared the glory in the enormous success of the Russian Empire. Even in the period of the revolutionary crises when, as columnist M.O. Men’shikov wrote, the representatives of the state power became somewhat smaller in scale compared with happier times,⁵¹ the Russian elite found the strength to produce a figure of the caliber of Petr Stolypin who embodied the best of the Russian nobility. Among the relatives of Stolypin’s family known since the sixteenth century were, to name a few, general Alexander Suvorov, the poet Mikhail Lermontov, the diplomat Alexander Gorchakov. Stolypins had some right to believe that the history of the Russian Empire was their own from the very beginning until the very end, and this was a destiny to be proud of. In the Ottoman Empire in the last centuries of its existence the quality of leadership became notoriously inadequate and the cultural influence of the elite was impossible to compare with their Russian peers. The Ottoman hereditary aristocracy simply never existed. There were of course grand families, such as the Karaosmanogullari who descended from emirs allied with the early Ottomans, but these were few, and the “ruling institution” of the empire came from anywhere and everywhere—the chief motivation being that they would be eternally dependent upon the Sultan. First there were the *devshirmes*. Christian boys conscripted into imperial service. With the abolition of *janissaries* and *devshirme*, local nobles known as *ayans*, who possessed lands and armed men in various parts of the empire came as a substitute. During the reign of Mahmud II, the *ayans* and the Palace even signed a document known as *sened-i ittifak* in which both sides promised to respect each other. Yet, gradually the new elite was again eliminated by the Palace. In the Palace itself the harem, with all those intrigues and routine murders of the possible successors of the Sultan, had a terrible, devastating effect.

“They were terribly far distant from the *narod*,” Lenin, himself staying in Zurich, wrote about the Decembrists. It once again reflected the *idée fixe* of the Russian intelligentsia—to bridge an enormous gap between the lower classes and the educated society. This was not of course a mere fantasy; neither the barrier between the elite and the masses was an exclusively Russian problem. In England in the nineteenth century, the question of

horizontally divided “two nations” caused an extensive public debate. Even in France, after all those social disturbances, the cultural gap was large.⁵² Yet in the Russian Empire it was far greater. Although the differences between “the state” and “the land” existed before, it was Peter the Great who within the astonishingly brief historical period created the elite which thought, behaved and even looked very differently from the *narod*.⁵³ In a sense, because the Russian elite had more in common with the French or German upper class than with their own *narod*, the gap that divided the Russians took an ethnic character. Could Orthodoxy (like Catholicism) build this missing bridge between the different strata? It could most likely play a certain role but only with difficulty. The Orthodox culture of the upper and lower classes became quite different. As N.A. Berdiaev pointed out, Russians “lived on different floors and even in different centuries... Between the upper and the ground floors of the Russian culture there was almost nothing in common, a total split.” This division signified a major obstacle for a formation of the Russian nation. However this cause was not hopeless as it was in the Ottoman Empire where the elite was not only entirely isolated from the “Turks” but literally spoke a different language.

An appeal to the peasantry, as a social class possessing “true Russian-ness,” was an essential feature of Russian nationalism from the writers of the eighteenth century to the Union of the Russian People after 1905.⁵⁴ Particularly the Russian *intelligentsia* of the nineteenth century in her search of “Russian-ness” under the influence of European Enlightenment and Romanticism turned to the peasantry and propagated various sorts of populism. This tendency even reached the occupant of the tsarist throne when Nicholas II, the greatest admirer of the Russian *narod* and all things “truly Russian,” found Rasputin and thus reestablished, as he believed, the missing link between the Tsar and the *narod* overcoming the alien bureaucratic barrier.

In fact, true-Russian or not, the peasantry, generally illiterate, in the Russian empire (and in Turkey even more so), still identified itself in pre-national categories and remained a subject of ideological manipulations of Russian, Polish and a small number of Ukrainian nationalists with their projects of ideal fatherlands and nations.⁵⁵ For the millions of the subjects of the Tsar and the Sultan various historical alternatives were opened and they could join, under this or that political and social circumstances, different forming nations.

The major theorists of nationalism emphasized the role of education. “At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor,” said Ernest Gellner.⁵⁶ It is the educational system that largely forms the national identity and it is literacy that makes possible intensive communications, a necessary precondition for nation building. In these matters the Russians of course were far ahead of the Turks. Although ethnic Russians were not among the most literate nationalities within the em-

pire, in late imperial era education was rapidly developing and in 1914 already 54% of the imperial male population could read.⁵⁷ By that time plans were in place to introduce universal compulsory elementary education and only the war postponed the joint commitment of both society and the government to set up education for all.⁵⁸ This would give a powerful tool to the government in consolidating the empire around its Russian ethnic core and would strengthen the emerging Russian nation that could quite possibly include, for instance, future Ukrainians. In 1897 among those who lived on the territory of the future Ukraine and who at that time were indisputably Russian, at least from the governmental point of view, only 19% were literate, i.e. could read Russian.⁵⁹ If in the more advanced western hinterlands, Poland and Finland, the resistance against the consolidation of the empire predictably was serious, then with a small number of the Ukrainian course activists and pre-national consciousness of the local population the chances for the success of the big Russian nation's project in Ukraine were high.⁶⁰ At the same time, particularly since the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian high culture was becoming more national. *Peredvizhniki* in fine arts or *Moguchaya Kuchka* in music are among the numerous examples illustrating this tendency.⁶¹

In the late Ottoman Empire Turkish nationalists faced a troublesome problem in promoting mass literacy. The Ottoman language was a highly stylized mixture of Turkic grammar and Arabic or Persian vocabulary. It was used by barely more than a few thousand people, the Ottoman elite, and was quite inaccessible to ordinary "Turks" who were in these matters a long way behind the non-Muslims. In 1861, non-Muslims had 571 primary and 94 secondary schools, with 140,000 pupils, a bigger number than for the many more numerous Muslims, who, as well, had to spend five-sixths of their schooling time on Arabic and study of the Koran.⁶² Some of the Young Turks simply said the peasantry would never be literate unless the alphabet was changed to Latin. In other words here is a nationalism which cannot read its grandparents tombs or understand the poetry of its ancestors—a terrible burden for any nationalism to carry.

In imperial times Russian nationalism reached its peak in times of P.A. Stolypin when the government tried to bridge the gap with the society and actively cooperated with the All-Russian National Union and the other nationalist groups on the ideological basis of complicated mixture of national liberalism and recognized necessity to maintain autocracy.⁶³ The revolution of 1917 for those nationalists became the national catastrophe, Russian nationalism was defeated by the internationalists who despised even the most innocent notions of Russian nationalism and glorified instead "proletariat that does not have its fatherland." On the contrary, nationalists won in Turkey.

Revolutionaries coming to power sometimes make for radical cultural change and so it was with the Turkish nationalists who took power in

1922–23. They changed the calendar (as did the Bolsheviks, though less drastically) and by 1928, they had altered the Arabic numerals and the alphabet. They also altered the vocabulary itself, a language commission operating in the 1930's (with the curious attendance of Ernst Reuter, the later mayor of West Berlin at the time of the Blockade in 1948–49; he had become, in exile, professor of town planning at the university of Ankara but seems, in his early youth, to have learned Kazakh while a prisoner of war in Russia, and so made himself useful when the language reformers wanted to substitute a Turkic word for an Arabic one).⁶⁴ At much the same time, western classical music was being introduced, or even enforced (the radio played nothing else) with Bartók and Hindemith at the fore. The very constitution had to be translated into modern Turkish at the end of the Second World War, because it had become incomprehensible. This has made for much confusion and controversy, because the entire corpus of Ottoman poetry now escapes nearly all Turks. But it is worth noting that, even in the nineteenth century, a problem was recognized that the mass of people could simply not become literate in the old language, far too contorted and difficult for them. In fact you could not even discuss modernization without relapsing into Arabic—*icma-i-ümmet* for “consensus of the community” or, later, *ruhsat-i seriyye* (“permission of religious law”) for “civil liberty.”⁶⁵ One strand of Turkish nationalism went back to the middle of the nineteenth century, when men who thought of themselves as liberal, empire-loyal and Muslim modernizers ran into this question. All along, at any rate since the empire had lost that element of Greco-Turkish partnership that it had had for the century and more after 1453, there was tension as regards westernization. A school of mathematics had been established, on a French expert’s advice, in 1734. The clergy disliked it: it was not for ordinary mortals to out-guess the God of Numbers, theodisy. Guns then became inaccurate. In 1759 an enlightened vizier, understanding that artilleryists needed to know something about ballistics, re-opened the school (*Hendeshane*), but had to do so semi-clandestinely. The same was true later for a school of engineering.⁶⁶

The early Turkish nationalists would not have been recognized as such. They often had a background in the imperial bureau of translators, and wanted to modernize the Ottoman Empire; they had Christian allies with the same ends in view. The aim was a constitution, a parliament, which did indeed exist until Abdülhami abolished it in 1877. In so far as they had a “nationalism” it was Islamic. Some of them were concerned to defend religious rights against the imperial prerogative (*orf*) which, as the *Tanzimat* reforms of 1839 went ahead, appeared to cause injustice: the execution of an Ottoman governor of Damascus who failed, or was wrongly accused of failing, in 1860, to prevent massacres of Maronites by Druses. Under the un-reformed *millet* system, such communities lived together though no doubt in conditions resembling apartheid. Reform led to competition, western as-

sociation with Christians, and hence Muslim resentment.⁶⁷ But to proclaim the rights of Islam was one thing, to encounter their consequence, another. The administrator-poet Ziya Pasha wrote of backwardness, as so many Muslims did:

Diyar-ı küfrü gezdim beldeler kaşaneler / Dolaştım mülk-ü İslami bütün viraneler gördüm (in effect, “Christianity equals palaces and Islam equals ruins”).⁶⁸ What was to be done about this and whose fault was it? Serif Mardin’s “Young Ottomans” (they called themselves ‘new’—*yeni*—rather than ‘young’, but ‘young’ stuck in translation because of analogies with other nations, Mazzini’s Italy especially) at once encountered a problem, that modernizing Islam was exceedingly difficult, because there was no effective central authority that might undertake this. Some stumbled towards greater emphasis on the native, i.e. properly Turkish, element. Ibrahim Şinasi Efendi (born 1826) worked towards intelligible prose and a simplified alphabet and Namık Kemal (born 1840 in Tekirdağ, on the Marmara coast) has a claim to be the first writer using Turkish rather than Arabo-Persian. The idea, throughout, was to make their prose accessible to ordinary people—we do not have to be idealistic about this, and intellectuals everywhere no doubt marveled at the money to be made by penny-a-line journalism in the western world, and especially in England, where no monkish Academy had ever been allowed to over-complicate the written language with esoteric vocabulary and cumbersome subjunctives.

But the Young Ottomans, in the next generation, became Young Turks. Here, too, was a foreign import, much like the word ‘Turkey’, though the article was genuine enough. In fact even the foundation-date was symbolic in a European sense. In 1889, the centennial of the French Revolution, the Second International was founded—delegates profited from cheap railway fares offered in Paris⁶⁹: the Italian socialist party was similarly founded in 1892, courtesy of cheap fares to Genoa for the Columbus celebrations. Ali Riza Bey then also, in Paris, established his association—“Committee for Union and Progress”, but called *Jeunes Turcs* by everyone else (including their own people—in Turkish they are known as *jöntürkler* as well). Ali Riza, a follower of Auguste Comte and hence also a strict scientific secularist, was prepared to fight with the Islamists, and he was also ready to promote Turkish-ness, despite the associations of rusticity etc. In time, ambitious women were involved, notably the novelist Halide Edip (Adıvar).⁷⁰ There was a three-cornered contest in the late Ottoman Empire, between nationalists advancing the Turkish cause as such, westernizers, and religious leaders, though there were crosscurrents, as there continued to be in the history of the later Republic. Abdülhami had tried to use religion in much the same way as the Tsars used Russian populism (or as the Prince Regent in Bavaria in the same period wore *Lederhosen*).⁷¹ Oppression had reigned at home, and problems grew, both with Armenian and Albanian nationalism. In 1908, officers of Union and Progress seized power, faced a

Muslim rebellion the following year, with another version of it in 1912, and asserted a semi-dictatorship, confining the Sultans to a largely ceremonial role. They then embarked on reforms that anticipated the later Atatürk ones, at least on a small scale—reduction of polygamy, a Turkish version of the Koran, admission of women into schools, and ideas of language reform. The chief ideologist of Turkish nationalism was Ziya Gökalp (1875–1924), himself of Kurdish origin, and a considerable student of the then new sociology. Durkheim, who gave a sociological underpinning to collectivism, was influential among the Istanbul intellectuals, and such collectivism served to reinforce nationalism. The *Türkçüler* of the immediate pre-war years set up “Turkish Hearths” (*ocak*, a rendering of the French *foyer* of which ‘hearth’ is a clumsy but inevitable equivalent). These pullulated in the 1920’s, though after 1930–31, in one of those many curious instances of Turkish republicans’ copying from Soviet practice, they then became “People’s Houses,” spreading adult secular education in the style of the Soviet *narodny dom*.⁷² By 1914, there were also calls for a latinization of the alphabet.

How far Islam was involved in Turkish nationalism is a controversial matter, accounting for the popularity of the subject in print. This is really a reflection of the divisions in the Turkey of recent times—a certain strand of nationalism claims the soul (*can*) is Islam and the blood (*kan*) Turkish; the older generation of nationalists tended to be atheist progressives. There is another side, the relationship of Turkish nationalism with the Christian minorities. To start with, there was alliance. After all, the constitution for the empire, which the Young Turks wanted, was thought to be beneficial for all of its subjects. In fact the Greeks of Istanbul and Anatolia generally did not make trouble, and a Greek even served as minister of education in 1911. However, the Christian states showed another example. Millions of Muslims had had to flee from Russian rule in the Caucasus or the Crimea.⁷³ The Balkan states, Greece in the lead, established nations on the basis of kaleidoscopic miniature Ottoman Empires—expelling Muslims in hundreds of thousands, and knocking down mosques. Did this lead some Turkish nationalists—the medical Doctor Nazım, prominent in the inner circles of Union and Progress—to assume that ethnic homogeneity was an inevitable concomitant of progress: a contentious and under-examined subject? In this, as in other matters, these nationalists followed precepts, and even provocations, from outside.⁷⁴ By 1923, after years of war, and the death of one-quarter of the Anatolian population, such ethnic homogeneity had been in the main achieved.

Various other points of comparison might be raised. Pan-Slavism came no doubt from some sort of German example—the first Pan-Slav congress in Prague, notoriously, used German and anyway had to contend with Slavs’ religious and territorial rivalries. There was a Pan-Turanian equivalent, raised particularly by the refugees from Russia; Crimean Tatars especially had expected to lead a general movement of Tatars⁷⁵ and they also took a

lead with attempts to modernize Islamic schools, as distinct from doing away with them altogether. Oddly enough, some of the inspiration, here, came from Hungarians, who from the 1820's⁷⁶ had been active in Central Asia, searching for their national roots. Pan-Turanianism was bound to emerge, once the idea of a Turkish race as basis for the new ideology came up. Attempts were made at the end of the First World War to bring it to fruition, but a combination of religious conservatism (against Hanefi Turks, later than Shafi Central Asians) and Bolshevik adroitness caused these to fail. In any case, for almost a generation, Ataturk's agreement with the Bolsheviks caused Turkey to abandon such ambitions.

It will be seen that, however forbidding the initial juxtaposition, there is sufficient common ground for comparison of Russian and Turkish nationalism to make sense. Both grew out of reaction to the nationalism of minorities. Both emanated from a supposedly "imperial" people, which turned out to be less well off than the supposedly colonized and subjected peoples. Both were in a sense a reaction to the West, and both, the Russians so far more successfully, had a cultural content of much significance. Both might also be captured by historical mythology. Allied to sociology, as it was understood in the early twentieth century (the Chair of Eugenics at University College, London was re-named Chair of Sociology in 1922, when the next incumbent was to be appointed), it was vulnerable to doctrines of ethnic homogeneity and "integral nationalism". The Russian variant only truly appeared in 1991, with the loss of the Soviet alternative. In that sense, Russian nationalism was interrupted by Communism after the First World War, whereas it was then that the Turkish variant came into its own. The recovery of modern Turkey, for all of her problems far, far ahead of where she stood in 1923, has been a remarkable story: the paradox being that she has proved to be the most successful of the Ottoman successor-states. Will the same be said for Russia?

NOTES

1 G. Hosking, *Russia. People and Empire 1552–1917* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), xix.

2 *Ibid.*, xx.

3 The authors ask for indulgence if, in the text, they simplify nomenclature at the expense of strict accuracy. They are aware that there are considerable problems as to the relationship of Mongols, Tatars, Turks, and 'Turks' themselves divide to mention only two between Kipchak and Oğuz, who went south-west—the Gagauz in today's Moldavia were originally Karaoğuz from 'kara', meaning 'black' and hence perhaps 'north', since the Turks like the Chinese used colors to denote points of the compass. There is extensive literature on such subjects, exceedingly problematical because of sources that range from old China to Byzantine Greek and Arabic. L.N. Gumilev, *Tysiachiletie vokrug Kaspiia* (Baku, 1991) and his work

- on the ‘ancient Turks’—*Drevnie Turki*—became a famous text for Russians examining their relationship with Central Asia and the Caspian.
- 4 Ch. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); N.A. Baskakov, *Russkie familiï turanskogo proiskhozhdeniya*. (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Nauka,” 1979); A.N. Kurat, *Pecenek Tarihi* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Basımevi, 1937).
- 5 N. Baskakov, *op. cit.*, 56–59: ‘bugger’.
- 6 J.-P. Roux, *Histoire des Turcs: deux mille ans du Pacifique à la Méditerranée* (Paris: Fayard, 1984), 182.
- 7 The most recent article on Russian religious philosophers’ criticism of Eurasianists: father G. Mitrofanov, “Teoreticheskii soblazn’ ili mirovozzrencheskaia mutatsiia kommunisticheskoi ideologii,” *Posev* 6 (2003): 33–36; 7 (2003): 25–30.
- 8 Cf. J. Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 261–262.
- 9 R. Grousset, *L’empire des steppes: Attila, Gengis-khan, Tamerlane* (Paris: Payot, 1952), idem, *L’empire du levant* (Paris: Payot, 1946).
- 10 J.-P. Roux, *op. cit.*
- 11 The majority of Turkish historians nowadays clearly separate the Seljukid and the Ottoman periods in Anatolian history. S. Akşin et al., *Türkiye Tarihi*, 3 vols (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988).
- 12 See also, S. Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
- 13 D. Kitzikis, *L’empire Ottoman* (1994), of which there is a Turkish translation with the significant subtitle, a Greek-Turkish condominium.
- 14 J. Meyendorff, *op. cit.*, 270
- 15 D. Kitzikis, *op. cit.*, 70
- 16 R. Pipes, *Property and Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
- 17 J. McCarthy, S. Faroqhi et al. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 793 give a figure of 800,000 from Russia.
- 18 For example, the number of Caucasian Muslims who immigrated from Russia to Turkey reached 400 thousand. *An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of the Russian and Soviet Empires* (London: Greenwood Press, 1994) 147.
- 19 A. Kappeler, *Rossiia - Mnogonatsional’naia Imperiia. Vozniknovenie, istoriia, raspad* (Moscow: Progress-Traditsia, 2000).
- 20 H. Kirimli, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905–1916*, (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1996).
- 21 H. Rogger, “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4 (April, 1962): 255
- 22 N. Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 10.
- 23 One of Peter’s most symbolic acts was making the guns for the new army from the church bells. 200 years later Nicholas II, admirer of “all things Russian,” a sort of anti-Peter in this sense, ordered the bells for St. Petersburg Peter and Paul cathedral to be made from the guns, perhaps also seeing a symbolism here. In this cathedral all Russian emperors had been buried. In 1998 the remains of Nicholas II and his family were solemnly delivered from Siberia and buried at the same place of worship. One of the authors of this paper talked to a person who rang the bells at this memorial service, the bells made by Nicholas II, as it amazingly after so many years turned out to be, for his own funeral. When the last, strongest sound went to the sky, the bell-ringer felt, he said, that the circle of history finally came to its end.

- 24 See, A. Kappeler, *op. cit.*
- 25 M. P. Pogodin, *Istoricheskie aforizmy* (Moscow, 1936), 29–30.
- 26 For more on this third element of the official formula, see N. V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967), 124–167.
- 27 A. Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 36
- 28 S. S. Uvarov, *Desiatiletie ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniya. 1833–1843* (St. Petersburg, 1864), 11–12.
- 29 A. Walicki, *op. cit.*, 36.
- 30 S. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 65.
- 31 J.-P. Roux, *op. cit.*, 369.
- 32 S. Mardin, *op. cit.*, 114.
- 33 B. Güvenç, *Türk Kimliği: Türk Kültür Tarihinin Kaynakları* (İstanbul: Remzi Yayımları, 1996), 163.
- 34 H. Inalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954): 122–29.
- 35 K. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: reconstructing identity, state, faith and community in the late Ottoman state* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 326.
- 36 B. Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii*, vol. 1, p. 33 (St. Petersburg: “Dmitri Bulanin,” 1999).
- 37 A. Kappeler, *Russlands Erste Nationalitäten: das Zarenreich und die Völker der Mitteleltern Wölge vom 16. bis 19. Jahrhundert* (Köln: Böhlau, 1982).
- 38 B. Mironov, *op. cit.*, 37.
- 39 *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Tretii sozyv. Stenograficheskie otchety*. Session 1, Part 3, Meeting 64, cols 370–371.
- 40 *Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Tretii sozyv. Stenograficheskie otchety*. Session 1, Meeting 84, cols 2875–2876.
- 41 B. Mironov, *op. cit.*, 47.
- 42 Ibid, 47, 62.
- 43 This is, again, the main theme of Geoffrey Hosking’s recent book *Russia: People and Empire*. Curiously the author here went hand in hand with the Slavophiles.
- 44 D. Lieven, “Russian, Imperial and Soviet Identities,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (1998): 262–263.
- 45 B. V. Anan’ich, R. Sh. Ganelin. *Nikolai II. Vospominaniya i dnevniki* (St. Petersburg, 1994), 62.
- 46 A. Kappeler, *op. cit.*
- 47 D. Lieven, *Russia’s Rulers under the Old Regime* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); J. Le Donne, “Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order 1689–1825,” *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovétique* XXVIII, 3–4 (1987).
- 48 R. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy*, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); M. Cherniavsky, “Russia” in O. Ranum, *National Consciousness: History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe*, (Baltimore, 1975).
- 49 D. Lieven, *Russian, Imperial and Soviet Identities*, 254.
- 50 *Rodina* 1 (1995): 41.
- 51 M.O. Men’shikov, *Pis’ma k blizhnim* (St. Petersburg, 1907), 135.
- 52 See, E. Weber, *Peasant into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
- 53 G. Hosking, *op. cit.*, 75–94.
- 54 See, L. Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995), 259–261. On the Union of the Russian people see, H. Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Berkeley, Calif.: Univer-

- sity of California Press, 1986); Don Rawson, *Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); S. A. Stepanov, *Chernaiia Sotnia v Rossii, 1905–1914*, (Moscow, 1992); Iu. I. Kir'ianov, *Pravye partii v Rossii, 1911–1917* (Moscow: Rossppen, 2001).
- 55 A. Miller, “*Ukrainskii vopros* v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (Vtoraya polovina XIX v.) (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000).
- 56 E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (New York: Ithaca, 1983), 34.
- 57 B. Mironov, *Sotsial'naia istoriia Rossii*, vol. 2, 383.
- 58 P. Alston, *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 248. See also, J. Brooks, *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861–1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
- 59 See, H. von Bauer, A. Kappeler, B. Roth, eds., *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1991).
- 60 A. Miller, *op. cit.*, 235.
- 61 See R. Ridenour, *Nationalism, Modernism and Personal Rivalry in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).
- 62 G. Augustinos, *The Greeks of Asia Minor: confession, community, and ethnicity in the nineteenth century* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1992), 254; A. Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek–Turkish Relations* (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 108.
- 63 See D. A. Kotsiubinskii, *Russkii natsionalizm v nachale XX stoletiiia* (Moscow: Rossppen, 2001).
- 64 H. Widmann, *Exil und Bildungshilfe. Die deutschsprachige akademische Emigration in der Türkei nach 1933* (Bern: Herbert Lang; Frankfurt/M: Peter Lang, 1973), 161f.
- 65 S. Mardin, *op. cit.*, 81, 284.
- 66 Ibid., 143–144.
- 67 L. T. Fawaz, *An Occasion for War. Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press Berkeley 1994), 78ff.
- 68 S. Mardin, *op. cit.*, 54.
- 69 N. Stone, *Europe Transformed 1878–1919* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 191.
- 70 K. Karpat, *op. cit.*, 18.
- 71 The most recent book on this is S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).
- 72 K. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 23ff and his remarks upon the effect of Communism in Turkey, chapter 14, 349ff.
- 73 J. McCarthy, *Death and Exile: the Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1995).
- 74 J. Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878–1896* (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1993); Y. Halacoglu, *Ermeni tehciri ve gerekler (1914–1918)* (Ankara: TTK, 2001).
- 75 H. Kirimli, *op. cit.*
- 76 T. Demirkhan, *Macar Turancilar* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yay., 2000).