1 Introduction

Urban space and ethnicity

Freek Colombijn and Aygen Erdentug

If we accept the arbitrary, yet widely accepted, claim that the Chicago School is the progenitor of urban sociology (Hannerz 1980: 20), then ‘ethnic diversity’ can be seen to have been an important component of urban studies since its conception. About eighty years ago, Robert Ezra Park and his colleagues at the University of Chicago published their pioneering studies on the city. In their view, the city was made up of different groups of people, defined in terms of social class and ethnic background, with each group finding a niche in the city in which to work, to live or to spend their leisure time. Ethnic groups tended to live in certain quarters and economic functions were clustered in certain areas. Expanding ethnic groups or booming economic functions invaded the territory of other groups or functions, as well as succeeding each other in one particular spot. Different groups competed for space – for instance, street gangs (mostly originating from specific ethnic groups) were organized territorially – but also established symbiotic relationships to share certain spots in town (Park, Burgess and McKenzie 1967 [1925]; cf. Eriksen 1993: 18–20; Hannerz 1980: 19–58). Louis Wirth, another Chicagoan, asserted that the city has historically been a ‘melting-pot’, which ‘has brought together people from the ends of the earth because they are different and thus useful to one another’ (Wirth 1938: 10). Hence, inter-ethnic relations are more likely to develop in cities than in villages, because the diversity of services and opportunities offered by cities attracts a larger variety of people than a village economy. Moreover, statistics suggest the probability that the bigger the population, the higher the number of different ethnic groups. Wirth was pessimistic about the superficial, anonymous and transitory nature of urban relationships. However, later research – by Herbert Gans (1982 [1962]) on the Italians in Boston’s West End – showed that friendly, closely knit communities developed in immigrant neighbourhoods, partly because communal life mostly took place on the street. These neighbourhoods showed considerable residential stability.

Chicago remains as one of the cities where ethnic (‘racial’) segregation has persisted, if not increased, in the course of the twentieth century (McCarthy 1999). Meanwhile, a number of cities like Jerusalem, Beirut, Belfast, as well as Cape Town, Johannesburg and other South African cities – perhaps also Berlin, before the unification of Germany – have become deeply divided with ethnic
borders, or are struggling to overcome the former internal ethnic demarcations of urban living. Other cities in North America and throughout the world lack total ethnic segregation, but are identified by spatial–ethnic mosaics. Envy, mistrust, avoidance and violence characterize the ongoing inter-ethnic relationships. However, extending Jane Jacobs’ argument (1964 [1961]) that diversity gives life to cities, from the built-up environment to the social structure, we believe that inter-ethnic encounters in cities are, on the whole, potentially enriching experiences. Since Park’s time, the relationship between space and ethnicity has become all the more important, due to a number of developments in both global space and the global migration of ethnic groups.

All cities have now become part of the global network society, which is dominated by flows of information, images, people, capital, technology and goods. Nodes in the network develop where a large number of flows converge (in what Manuel Castells calls the ‘space of flows’). Places that are not suitable or not connected to the network are bypassed, being left to live their own unobtrusive lives in the ‘space of places’. The division between ‘space of flows’ and ‘space of places’ cuts across the former demarcation of the First World and the Third World. For example, stock exchanges, internet cafes and arms markets in less developed countries are nodes in the network, while a ghetto in New York can be disconnected from it (Appadurai 1996a; Castells 1996; Nas and Houweling 1998).

One result of the rise of the network society has been the polarization seen among the social classes of the cities. The upper class, consisting of businessmen, managers, professionals and information technology people, has swollen up, while the section of the middle class working in the manufacturing sector has decreased and the lower class that supports the upper class by cleaning, catering and personal services has increased. The non-skilled and low-paid lower-class jobs have been consigned, predominantly, to the new immigrant labour force. This polarization in the social structure, however, is still being contested and it is, at least, not encountered in all global cities. One spatial result has been the gentrification of dilapidated old neighbourhoods, opening them up for use by the new upper classes (Hamnett 2001; Phillips 1996: 422–3; Sassen 1991). A more recent morphological trend in urbanization is cities growing and blending together into mega-urban regions (e.g. Lo and Yeung 1996; McGee and Robinson 1995).

Since the first half of the twentieth century, new flows of migration or ‘ethnoscapes’ (Appadurai 1996a: 33) have emerged, complementary to the American Dream that drew migrants to North America. The Third World has gone through a process of decolonization that is changing the ethnic balance of power in these countries. Most communist states have collapsed and, with those regimes becoming defunct, the policy of keeping firm control over the movement of people from various ethnic backgrounds has also been abandoned. In the meantime, the nation-states in the West have experienced massive immigration from all over the world. In the case of Europe, this was initially due to the subjects of former colonies seeking a better life in the homeland of their
previous rulers. More recently, the influx to the West has been in the form of ‘guest workers’ from economically disadvantaged countries and refugees seeking asylum from political unrest and oppression, if not genocide or ethno- 
cide. Citizens of developing countries such as the Philippines, Pakistan and Bangladesh have consented to working as contract labourers in countries like Japan, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia which are experiencing a labour shortage. Most of these immigrants have settled in the more cosmopolitan cities of the world. With globalization and the transnational movement of people, foreign tourists have also had a growing impact on city life (Appadurai 1996a; Castels 2000; Eriksen 1993: 1–3).

The main changes with regard to migration, over the course of the twentieth century, have been in the nature of the relationships between the migrants and their respective regions or countries of origin, replacing the situation where immigrants were cut off from their home town or country with each shift in the waves of migration. Time–space compression by technological innovations in transportation and communication has made it much easier for migrants to maintain contact with their respective places of origin. The repeated exposure to and remembrance of their homes, by air travel and through the mass media, has made migrants more aware of their ethnic identity. They can remain emotion-
ally and politically more involved with their place of origin than with their new place of residence, even to the point that a Punjabi living in Toronto and holding a Canadian passport sends money and weapons for armed resistance in Khalistan. This ‘long-distance nationalism’ must have, to put it mildly, an impact on that person’s integration process in Toronto. Nation-states can no longer assimilate within their national boundaries communities experiencing a diaspora as easily as they used to do at the beginning of the twentieth century (Anderson 1992; Hannerz 1996; Harvey 1990: 240–59, 302–7; Tajbakhsh 2001: 5, 8).

The variations in urban development and the new flows of migration with the concomitant new ethnic composition of cities have created ample reasons to revive the old subject of the relationship between urban space and ethnicity. People from various ethnic backgrounds do not spread out in cities at random; they create a patterned spatial distribution. It is this topical issue – namely, the spatial consequences of urban ethnic diversity – that this book aspires to explore. It deals with the mutually interactive relationship between ethnicity and urban space in several countries. In other words, the relationship between ethnicity and urban space is a two-way process. To begin with, space has an impact on how people from different ethnic groups (besides being of a certain class, age and gender) lead their lives. Conversely, since the members of the ethnic groups have, by definition, a different cultural background and develop dissimilar economic activities, they tend to utilize the urban environment in diverse ways, having a different impact on the transformation of urban space. As Winston Churchill said when he re-opened the House of Commons after World War II: ‘We shape our buildings and then they shape us’ (quoted in Phillips 1996: 462). The well-known statesman, as usual, probably oversimplified to
popularize an issue, giving the erroneous impression that the impact of the environment on people is deterministic. In reality, buildings (and, for that matter, urban space) cannot be solely accepted as agents producing a result. There is a multiplicity of interactive factors that determine what we build or set aside as space. In return, while these maintain certain livelihoods and beliefs, they can also either force – again under the influence of certain factors – people to be creative or frustrate them, thus altering their ways of life.

Therefore, two main questions determine the orientation and the scope of this volume: How do members of ethnic groups adjust their lives to the existing urban space and, conversely, how does ethnic diversity contribute to creating the shape of urban space? The authors elaborate these central questions through a range of more particular questions, such as: Why do some ethnic groups feel the need to be segregated, while others manage to blend into the ‘melting pot’? Is spatial allocation spontaneous or enforced? Where and how do segregated ethnic groups have the opportunity for interaction? Are there any sections of the city that they claim exclusively for themselves? Which quarters are forbidden, if not dangerous, zones for other ethnic groups?

This book attempts to fill a gap in this field of interest. Studies of ethnicity in general (e.g. Barth 1969; Dekker, Helsloot and Wijers 2000; Eriksen 1993; Jenkins 1996, 1997) or urban ethnicity in particular (Cohen 1974; Eriksen 1993: 131–9; Guldin 1985; Hannerz 1980; Rogers and Vertovec 1995) disregard spatial aspects completely or almost completely. The ethnic encounters seem to take place in a void. Studies of urban morphology and urban social structure have done better in this respect and have paid much attention to ethnicity. However, even these urban studies tend to take ethnic groups as fixed and permanent categories, thus ignoring a whole body of anthropological and theoretical literature on the subject (see, however, Tajbakhsh 2001). Moreover, most urban studies are heavily ‘skewed’ to present the English-speaking world, especially the United States and the United Kingdom (e.g. Gottdiener 1985; Paddison 2001; Phillips 1996). Such studies run the risk of making unjustified generalizations based, most often, on specific American circumstances. The authors ‘forget’ to inform the readers that their conclusions apply to the United States only, probably because they tend to take it for granted that readers are only interested in the United States. Worse than that, they miss the point that these allegedly idiosyncratic urban American problems are widely encountered in the world. One example of American bias is the exaggerated concern about ‘race’, which is central to the discourse in US society but, more often than not, not so much of an issue elsewhere. British scholars do not fare any better in this respect, preferring to look at urban realities through the ‘windows’ of colonialism and post-colonialism.

This volume attempts to break with this tendency through global comparisons, presenting cases from three different continents. These global comparisons enhance the applicability of the findings, which can contribute to a better understanding of the integration of ethnic groups in urban settings. In the concluding chapter, we use the main findings to make a comparison of the
cases presented. Given the limited number of studies, these findings should be seen as initial conclusions or hypotheses to be elaborated and tested through further research. Since the two key concepts in this book are ‘urban space’ and ‘ethnicity’, we will discuss them first, before presenting the cases from different countries.

Urban space

The starting point of our theoretical excursion into the debate on ‘space’ is the human ecology approach of the Chicago School that has continued to inspire scholars for decades. In the seminal article from 1925, Ernest Burgess discussed, as a whole, the ethnic–spatial relationships at the macro-level of a city. Burgess argued that the ideal type of city developed, roughly, in concentric circles. In other words, the central business district was at the heart of the city, surrounded by a so-called ‘zone in transition’ that was invaded from the centre outwards. Then there was the second outward zone of immigrants, along with a residential area of single-family dwellings. Residents of parts of the transitional zone that had deteriorated would move out to the various residential shells further away from the centre. The competition over space was mediated through the price for land or, as suggested by Goldberg and Chinloy (1984: 103–10), through higher rents. Since people from various ethnic groups could afford to pay different prices – that is, they had different buying power – to occupy the most favourable spaces, ethnic groups tended to cluster in different circles of the city (Burgess 1967 [1925]). Variations on the model of development in concentric circles were put forward by Hoyt, Harris and Ullman (Phillips 1996: 423–7) and, for Southeast Asia, by Terry McGee (1967).

Other work from the Chicago School supported the macro-analysis of Burgess at the neighbourhood level (Park 1967 [1925]: 7–12). Louis Wirth, for instance, described in The Ghetto (1928), after a long introduction on the emergence of the ghetto in Europe, how a Jewish neighbourhood gradually developed in Chicago as more and more such immigrants settled in one particular area of the city. Community life was organized through synagogues, burial societies, religious schools and other institutions. The price to be paid for neglecting the relationships between Jews and outsiders and focusing instead on the community life within this ethnic quarter was impeding the integration process into the greater society. At the initial stage of the migration history of an individual, it was instrumental to seek protection in the ghetto – that is, within a particular ethnic group. Yet at the next stage – during integration and later assimilation into the cultural mainstream, along with the attainment of some prosperity – the ghetto lost its purpose. Successful residents left the ghetto and moved to more affluent neighbourhoods. The ghetto remained intact, however, because new immigrants succeeded those who moved out.

Through micro-level analysis of a bounded space (that is, the street, square or market), the ethnographer can study face-to-face social interaction between people of various ethnic backgrounds. A fine, classic example from Chicago at
this level is Paul G. Cressey’s *The Taxi-Dance Hall* (1932). The taxi-dance hall was a kind of dancing school, where customers paid girls, known as “taxi-dancers”, to dance with them. Cressey focused on the rules of conduct and the economic dynamics at work in this setting. In the most popular halls, the most attractive girls were willing to dance with men from those ethnic groups that they considered appealing. Men from the less appealing ethnic groups – in the perception of the girls, Filipinos in particular – had to make do with the less attractive girls, or frequent the less popular dance halls. Not unlike Burgess’ city of concentric circles based on the price of land, the spatial pattern of where men of various ethnic groups could be found was mediated through the market, in this case through the price of the girls and the amount that the men could afford to pay. An important theme throughout Cressey’s study is how ethnic groups are categorized and how they are ascribed certain values by outsiders. The latter theme is important because Cressey transcends the naive, essentialist image of an ethnic identity being a fixed identity. Insights of the Chicago School, such as the idea of competition for land, mediated by the land price, between ethnic groups as a mechanism in organizing space and the migration history of neighbourhoods are still very useful today. When Burgess’ model is tested outside America, one point of criticism that comes up is that he has incorrectly assumed that land is always a commodity (Hannerz 1980: 28). Other weaknesses of the Chicago School were its atomistic view of society and its one-dimensional view of space as simply the physical and built environment.

A breakthrough, overcoming the weak points of the Chicago School, came from Henri Lefebvre in his *La production de l’espace*, originally published in 1974. His work is referred to by many, but read by few. This is because of Lefebvre’s highly abstract thinking, his tiringly mystifying style of writing (with flowery, but imprecise expressions, rhetorical questions and exclamations like ‘L’espace!’ – with which he begins his book) and the lack of concrete examples and references to other authors. Even as ardent an admirer as Gottdiener admits that he ‘is never quite sure how to replicate his [Lefebvre’s] reasoning’ (Gottdiener 1985: 157). Lefebvre’s main postulate is that ‘space’ is not an empty, meaningless, geometrical container to be filled in by human activities, but a social product in itself. In other words, space is produced by the social relations of production and reproduction, while space itself produces social relations. It is simultaneously a product, a means of production, a part of the social forces of production and an object for consumption. Space has a strong symbolic value and is ‘inscribed’ with meaning. Lefebvre distinguishes between *espace perçu*, *espace conçu* and *espace vécu*: The ‘perceived space’ (*espace perçu*) is the spatial reality (*la pratique spatiale*) of a materially constructed environment. The ‘conceived space’ (*espace conçu*) consists of what is represented (*les représentations de l’espace*) by planners, administrators, scientists and technocrats. The ‘experienced space’ (*espace vécu*) is formed when the space is supplied with images and symbols (*les espaces de représentations*) by the ordinary users of urban space (Lefebvre 1986 [1974]). Lebevre’s claim that ‘space is a social product’ has been adopted by scholars from various backgrounds (e.g.
Boyer 1983; Castells 1975; Colombijn 1994; Gottdiener 1985; Gottdiener and Feagin 1988; Kilian 1998; Öncü and Weyland 1997; Philips 1996: 416). The positive elements in Lefebvre’s work are his unfailing focus on space as an object of study and his attention on the non-physical and symbolic aspect of space. The morally weighted distinction between *espace conçu* and *espace vécu* is, in our view, less useful. Both concepts are concerned with the meaning people attach to physical space. Whether this meaning comes from professionals (‘baneful’ according to Lefebvre) or from ordinary people (‘artful’) does not matter much.

The atomistic view of society that formed the backbone of the Chicago School became the main focus of attack for the ‘new urban sociology’ (Gottdiener and Feagin 1988; Phillips 1996: 432–4), which stressed the role of power in the allocation of urban space. Marxist scholars (including Lefebvre) have mostly been associated with this new urban paradigm. They noticed that the human ecology approach failed to provide explanations for urban riots and the explosion of racial violence. The capitalist mode of production and the inevitable conflicts between social classes seemed to be at the root of such urban tensions. A theoretical problem for the Marxist scholars was generated from the fact that the urban grassroots movements were not concerned with the means of production, but fought over issues related to consumption. These consisted of problems such as affordable housing, participation in neighbourhood decision-making, the fate of housing blocks facing demolition and the distribution of municipal facilities. Hence, class did not create a rallying point for social action in the city. The Marxian urbanists tried to close the gap between the presumed class source of existing social contradictions and the empirically observable non-class basis of urban movements by insisting on a separation of the spaces for urban workplaces and for community residences (Tajbakhsh 2001: 2, 13–20).

In our view, the attempt to explain urban conflict in a Marxist framework is a bit forced: empirical facts are subjugated by theoretical rigidity, when it should be the other way round – that is, empirical tests should be the master in theory formation. A strict Marxist view is, in particular, no longer tenable in the present post-industrial economy of the Western countries. It is also not fully adequate for many non-Western societies, where many of the premises of a capitalist economy would not find support. For instance, there are situations in which land is not a commodity, because tradition prescribes that landownership is to be regulated by kinship rules and that land should not be for sale (Colombijn 1992).

A corollary of the Marxist view was the reductionist view of the state as being a continuation of the capitalist class (Tajbakhsh 2001: 19). This view also seems to be rather forced and depends on institutional arrangements. For example, landownership forms a very powerful resource in the United States, where the landowners hold a key position in negotiations about the use of urban space. In states with a weak judiciary, such as Indonesia, the value of land is eroded by the insecurity associated with legal titles. In such places decisions
taken by landowners can be overruled by a coalition of the state and military which, to a considerable extent, is at liberty to act arbitrarily. We therefore prefer to consider the state as a *strategische Gruppe* (strategic group) with its own financial interests and political agenda, and its own peculiar means of planning, surveillance and bureaucratic rationalization. The state is not a unified entity, but is itself divided into competing interest groups (Evers and Schiel 1988; Tajbakhsh 2001: 20).

Another frontal attack on the atomistic view of the Chicago School came from the humanistic planners. Herbert Gans (1982 [1962]) argued that urban neighbourhoods could develop into tightly bound communities. But this had already been maintained by Louis Wirth in his study of the ghetto, a view that preceded his later notion of the city-dweller as leading an isolated way of life (Wirth 1928, 1938). Burgess’ descriptive model of the city made up of concentric zones was also elaborated and transformed into a prescriptive model, with zoning as a planning technique to reduce urban chaos. This idea of zoning was detested and contested by Jane Jacobs (1964 [1961]) in her well-known plea for diversity (that is, mixed functions, short blocks, the mingling of old and new buildings and a dense concentration of people) as an indispensable condition for liveable cities. Urban planning, according to Jacobs, must prevent the winners in the competition for urban space casting out the losers (see also Appleyard 1981). The plea for diversity can be rephrased as the notion that ethnic diversity can, *in principle*, increase the quality of urban life, provided that social conflicts between ethnic groups can be resolved.

The post-modernist critique of Marxist urban studies is concerned with the semiotics of space. Space is imbedded in cultural values. Space is no longer seen as bounded, but is considered to be ambiguous with undecidable, indeterminable boundaries. Each person has her or his own perception of urban space and these spaces, in plural, overlap. Space is also gendered. Cultural representations (such as museums, imaginary architecture, Disney-like public spaces) are important elements in cities that may attract foreign investors. Kian Tajbakhsh suggests using the word ‘spacing’ instead of ‘space’, in order to express better the fluidity of space. Spacing, in other words, ‘points to a space of becoming, rather than being’ (Tajbakhsh 2001: 20–1, 28). The post-modernist view supersedes the older tradition of cognitive maps (Gould and White 1992; Lynch 1960; Phillips 1996: 477), with post-modernist criticism not only enriching but also elaborating Lefebvre’s notion of *espace vécu*. However, we prefer to think in terms of one physical space (and not ‘spaces’ or ‘spacing’ and multiple representations.

Recapitulating our discussion of space so far, it is clear that we have preferred an eclectic approach in the theoretical basis of the volume. The starting point for producing this book had been an empirical curiosity (what are the spatial consequences of urban ethnic diversity today?) and not a theoretical position. Thus, each chapter leans more towards one or the other of the possible theoretical orientations, depending on the specific issue concerned and the disciplinary background of the author. What is common throughout the book, however, is the treatment of space as ‘a social product’ of the interaction between numerous
actors who are, to a considerable extent, formally organized as groups and institutions. These actors – such as administrators, landowners, urban planners, owners or tenants of shops and office space, residents, grassroot action groups and squatters – have different relationships with any given space. There are multiple, fluid and overlapping representations of space, but there is only one physical space. The balance of power between the actors determines which party, or coalition of parties, potentially has the most impact on the production of space. The power of each actor depends on the resources at their disposal, while the strength of a certain resource depends on the institutional arrangements current locally. Given the fact that ethnic groups have often, although not necessarily, a different power base, their impact on the urban space tends to be unequal.

**Ethnicity**

Existing studies on the concept of ‘ethnicity’ suggest a triple mode of analysis – that is, the adoption of either a ‘primordialist’, an ‘instrumentalist’ or a ‘constructivist’ approach to examining its dimensions (Banks 1996; de Vos 1996: 15–20).

In the ‘primordialist’ approach (Geertz 1973), ethnic identity markers such as descent, language or religion are treated as ‘given’, deeply rooted and almost insusceptible to change; ethnicity mainly satisfies the individual’s psychological need for self-identification. In urban studies, this idea of an essential core was reflected in Robert Park’s image of the city as a ‘mosaic of little worlds which touch but do not interpenetrate’ (quoted in Tajbakhsh 2001: 9). In Geertz’s view, primordialist sentiments formed an obstacle to state formation and modernity. Arjun Appadurai has pointed out that ethnicity, in the primordialist view, connotes ‘backwardness’. More importantly, he argues convincingly that primordial attachments do not precede formation of a state, but emerge as a result of state formation and the local interpretation of national and global developments (Appadurai 1996b; see also Verdery 1994: 44–6).

In reaction to the rather static primordialist approach, the ‘instrumentalist’ approach focuses on the questions of why and under what conditions ethnicity becomes a means to an end. It pays to play the trump card of ethnicity when access to certain rights or quotas provided by affirmative action policies – such as the allocation of jobs and housing, reserved seats in parliament or tuition waivers at school – are linked to ethnic affiliation. Ethnic identity formation is the result of the dynamics of elite competition. While some elite groups find it instrumental to formulate an ethnic identity, other elite groups have an interest in downplaying ethnic distinctions. Therefore ethnic identity formation is reversible. Some latent ethnic groups never make the transition to a subjectively perceived ethnic community (Brass 1991: 13–40). In the worst case, however, the construction of ethnicity may result in ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the total segregation of ethnic groups that used to be intermingled (Oberschall 2000).

An example of instrumentalist studies *avant la lettre* is the series of studies undertaken in the Copperbelt towns of Zambia in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.
These studies suggest that the people became more aware of their ethnic roots because of the high frequency of inter-ethnic encounters in towns and cities. The outcome of this realization had been the endeavours of the more recent migrants to the cities to ‘retribalize’ and to ‘overcommunicate’ their ethnic identity (Eriksen 1993: 20–2; Hannerz 1980: 119–62). It follows that not only are ethnic relationships more complicated in cities, but that the spatial consequences of inter-ethnic relations also tend to be more important in such a habitat since land in cities is scarce and the stakes in urban space are higher than in rural space.

The instrumentalist approach may explain why ethnicity comes into play, but cannot explain how ethnic boundaries are formed. The ‘constructivist’ approach, instigated by Fredrik Barth (1969) in his seminal collection entitled Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, fills this void. Ethnic boundaries are the outcome of social interaction between groups. Groups identify themselves vis-à-vis other groups and need the contrast, or mirror, of other groups to point out their own particular qualities and those of others. The criteria that are used to categorize ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ are not objective differences, but features that the actors themselves regard as significant. Ethnic boundaries in this view are not given, but constructed, manipulated, subject to change and situational. Various groups can interpret boundaries differently.

Barth did away with the content of ethnicity – the criteria that marked the boundaries – as ‘cultural stuff’ (Barth 1969: 15). In a revision of his own work two decades later, Barth admitted that the symbolic signs used to set the boundaries are chosen less haphazardly than he had assumed. But he reiterates his point that the focus must be on the boundaries and not on cultural content (Barth 1994: 16). But then he ‘threw out the baby with the bath water’, for if only the boundaries and not the content were to be taken into account, it would be difficult to explain why ethnicity can invoke such potent and stubborn emotions. This brings us back to the primordial attachments. Part of the ‘cultural stuff’ is actually a new invention of tradition. The three approaches are complementary, rather than contradictory, and ideally should be integrated (Appadurai 1996b; Cohen 1974; Eriksen 1993: 3–12, 18–35, 92–6; Jenkins 1996: 90–103; Jenkins 1997; Schefold 1998).

In his 1994 re-evaluation of his earlier work, Fredrik Barth suggests distinguishing between three different levels of analysis in dealing with ethnicity. The macro-level deals with how state policies influence the making of ethnic boundaries; the meso-level deals with leadership and rhetoric that creates collectivities; and the micro-level focuses on the role of interpersonal interaction in ethnicity. This demarcation is meant to be a heuristic tool (Barth 1994: 20–31), assisting one in further discoveries.

Like Barth, we believe that this three-level analysis is an effective tool, but it must be modified somewhat to meet the requirements of studying urban space. At the macro-level of analysis, the spatial consequences of ethnic diversity have to be examined for the whole of the city or region. Residential segregation and ethnic enclaves can only become visible at this level. The meso-level should focus on the life of ethnic neighbourhoods, while the micro-level undertakes
the analysis of bounded space – that is, the street, the square or the market. The study of each level assumes the existence of the other levels as well. So, when exploring at the micro-level, one should be aware of the overall pattern of the city. Conversely, when taking a bird’s-eye view of the macro-level one should keep it in mind that inter-ethnic encounters look different on the ground.

The case of Kota Ambon: revealing the fluidity of spatial and ethnic boundaries

Ambon City (Kota Ambon) lies on the island of Ambon and is the capital of the Indonesian province of the Moluccas (Maluku), an archipelago. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Moluccas were famous for the trade in spices. Traders from the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, Portugal and the Netherlands introduced Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism to Ambon. After the spice trade declined, the island had little to offer in economic terms, so government service became the most important and reliable source of income. Recruitment to the army, civil service, business, universities, professions and criminal networks was based on religious affiliation. Villages were either Muslim or Christian, en masse, with inter-village peace being maintained by a ritual alliance called pela, which had developed between specific villages of different religions (Mearns 1999; Sidel 2001).

Spatial divisions in Ambon City overlapped and its residents had multiple identities. However, the connection between one’s place of residence and one’s identity was nonetheless weak. Since the wards were, as a rule, either Muslim or Christian, the overall spatial pattern of Ambon City reflected a religious mosaic. During most of the 1990s, the only noteworthy difference that existed was the one between the original Ambonese – whether Christian or Muslim – and recent immigrants. The newcomers had come from various regions of Indonesia, but were locally known by a generic name – the ‘Butonese’ – as if they had all come from the island of Buton. The ‘Butonese’ were Muslims and they slowly tipped the religious balance on the island to the Islamic side.

In the view of the original population, as was also the case with many of the immigrants, Ambon City was a place full of supernatural forces that deserved respect. (The belief in spirits is not seen as conflicting with the beliefs of the monotheist world religions.) For instance, when the government encountered difficulties during the development of the roads – neglected local spirits could seriously hamper road construction – this was immediately taken as a failure to pay due respect to the local spirits. Only the descendants of the people that used to dwell in the rural princely domains that preceded the foundation of Ambon City had the ritual knowledge necessary to deal with the local spirits. The original population can therefore be divided into two: the descendants of the former inhabitants and the later settlers from surrounding villages. The government does not acknowledge any oral claims for land ownership from the first inhabitants and only accepts the title deeds given by the Land Registry. This historical spatial division of former princely domains – supernatural places – along with Muslim and
Christian neighbourhoods, has also been overlaid with an administrative territorial division (Mearns 1999: 28–30). In short, in Ambon City both spatial boundaries and the boundaries of ethnic identity were complex and fluid.

The 1997 economic crisis in eastern Asia made the situation in and throughout the Moluccas tense. The demand for new jobs increased while the government, the main employer, became hesitant to fill any vacancies. At the same time the established route to office jobs – through patronage – was blocked, or at least constricted, because – after the fall of the long-standing Indonesian dictator, President Suharto, in May 1998 – there were attempts to prevent nepotism. The new route to the bureaucracy was to be through electoral success in the parliamentary elections of 1999, the first free elections in more than four decades. Local elites, who thought ethnicity would be instrumental in mobilizing a following, promoted the existing religious sentiments (Sidel 2001; Van Klinken 2001).

Against this backdrop, it is useful to turn to the national capital, Jakarta, where gangs of thugs dominated the streets. Most gangs were recruited on the basis of ethnicity and each gang occupied and defended their own turf (Melongok 1997). Muslim and Christian Ambonese gangs, along with many other gangs of varied ethnic composition, were hired by politicians in Jakarta in order to stage demonstrations or intimidate opponents. On 22 November 1998, fighting broke out between rival Ambonese gangs outside a gambling den in Jakarta. Rumours were spread that a mosque in a nearby Muslim neighbourhood had gone up in flames. The fights in Jakarta between the rival gangs escalated, resulting in several deaths and seven churches being burned to the ground. There were persistent but unproven rumours that the riots had been instigated on purpose and that the rival gangs were connected to one or the other of former president Suharto’s two children, who were themselves rivals. The Jakarta city administration ‘solved’ this problem by expulsion, transferring dozens of Ambonese thugs from the capital back to Ambon (Aditjondro 2001).

The returning thugs accelerated competition in Ambon over resources, ranging from fluctuating boundaries of power to local protection rackets, at precisely the time that mobilization for the elections was under way. The possible decisive margin between Christian and Muslim voters made the political competition fierce. Fighting broke out on 19 January 1999 in Ambon City over a minor incident at a bus terminal, a public space that is divided in Indonesia between ethnic groups engaged in turf wars. News of the violence spread, getting coupled with rumours that led to a ripple of violence throughout Ambon, creating a climate of fear, mounting mutual suspicion and vengefulness. At first, the description of these skirmishes was limited to ‘Ambonese Protestants fighting against the “Butonese” immigrants’. However, they quickly turned into a battle between Muslims and Protestants, regardless of place of origin (Sidel 2001; Van Klinken 2001).

Fire was a major weapon and literally hundreds of houses, mosques and churches were destroyed. Children aged between seven and twelve were given jerry cans full of petrol and induced to act as arson squads, backed by men
armed with machetes and homemade guns. In July 1999, the fighting in Ambon City resumed. This time the Chinese-owned business district was also devastated, for reasons that remain rather unclear. As had been the case in January, each of the rival groups tried in vain to reach and destroy ‘the heart’ of the other’s turf – that is, the Al Fatah mosque or the Maranatha church, both physically separated by just 300 metres. Catholics, who had until then stayed aloof, also became Muslim targets in this second riot.

Meanwhile, at the national level, both the Muslim and the secular (anti-Muslim) political parties pressed on with the exploitation of religious sentiments. The militant Muslim politicians in Jakarta called for a jihad (holy war fought by Muslims as a religious duty) in Ambon, blaming the present violence in the country on the Christian community. The jihad forces were connected to army units who were able to foresee that they would be called in to restore order. Christians mobilized similar support in Europe and North America through their church networks (Sidel 2001).

These manifestations of violence left Ambon City (and the Moluccas as a whole) more deeply segregated than it had ever been before. Muslim forces now occupy about 40 per cent of Ambon City and the Protestants 60 per cent. Barricades of oil drums mark the boundaries between them, criss-crossing the city. Subsequent fighting did not change the size of territories, but did eradicate enclaves. The city, in so far as it is not already razed to the ground, has been divided into two chunks: ‘Muslim’ and ‘Protestant’ territories. Even the state shipping line, which connects Ambon with the rest of Indonesia, got involved; it now either carries only Muslims or only Christians, after a series of furtive stabbings on board. With Muslim passengers the ship docks in the city harbour whereas, with Christians on board, the same ship moors at the naval base (Van Klinken 2001). It is estimated that between 4,000 to 10,000 people died in the fighting in Ambon and the rest of the Moluccas, in addition to the hundreds of thousands who were displaced (Aditjondro 2001: 100).

The outcome so far is that the once fluid, multiple and disunited spatial and ethnic boundaries have become fixed, one-dimensional and totally coextensive. One is either Muslim and living in the Muslim half of Ambon City or Christian and living in the Christian half. It is worth noting that the road dividing the two contesting sectors has been dubbed Jalan Gaza (Gaza Road). This partial misnomer, for in all likelihood the Ambonese have Jerusalem and not the Gaza Strip in mind, shows that the representation of an ethnic–spatial boundary from one place can also be used in another place. The symbolic meaning of Jerusalem is also well known in Ambon.

### On the other cases presented in this volume

In the rest of this introduction, the remaining chapters will be briefly presented, beginning with the macro-, passing on to the meso- and finally looking at the micro-level of analysis of urban ethnic encounters. The cases in this book have been lumped together according to one of the three levels of analysis. This has
been a difficult task since the authors have adopted perspectives at different levels and have integrated different approaches to ethnicity. We believe that such a combination of different levels of analysis and different approaches is invariably fruitful, creating a pool from which important conclusions can be drawn.

In Chapter 2, Joe Darden explicitly adopts the human ecology approach in his analysis of Toronto, Canada. He uses the 1996 census data to estimate the degree of residential segregation of Southeast Asians in Toronto. He provides a simple formula to calculate the degree of residential ethnic segregation, measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Though his formula requires a reliable census, even mathematical illiterates can easily understand it. The smaller the census tracts and the closer in size they are, the more precise is the outcome. At the top end of his scale there is total segregation, where ethnic groups do not mix at all. At the bottom of the scale, there is total integration and the ethnic composition in every census tract is equal to the ethnic composition of the city as a whole. Another methodological tool provided by Darden is a composite index for neighbourhood quality. The final step in Darden’s analysis is comparing the findings of these two variables. He concludes that there is a high degree of dissimilarity, to the extent that more than half of the Southeast Asians in Toronto would have to change places of residence with whites – who form the majority population in Toronto – in order to become totally integrated. The neighbourhoods where Southeast Asians tend to cluster are, on average, of a lower socioeconomic quality than the white neighbourhoods.

In Chapter 3, another case from Toronto, Chandrakant Shah starts from the innovative and provocative premise that religious individuals or those who consider spirituality important have better quality of health and life expectancy. After providing ample evidence for this perhaps controversial premise, Shah continues his analysis by arguing that religious activity – in particular, attendance at a place of worship – has a beneficial impact on people’s health. Implicit in his hypothesis is the assumption that ethnic groups will seek out houses of worship when taking up residence in a city or get organized to construct them. He elaborates this argument through a case study involving four religious minorities, with each religion associated with either one ethnic group or a combination of ethnic groups living in Toronto. Maps show the spatial distribution of places of worship and the respective followers of these denominations. In other words, certain ethnic groups are plotted on a map of Toronto together with their places of worship. These maps indicate a reciprocal relationship between the places of worship and the ethnic groups populating particular neighbourhoods. For instance, the Buddhist community is concentrated in the southern part of Toronto where there are also a fair number of Buddhist temples; by contrast, Buddhists in the northwest and east of the city are not so well served. One inference that can be made from Shah’s hypothesis and analysis, with potentially wide-ranging consequences for public health policy, is that due to reduced access to these temples the Buddhists in the northwest and east of Toronto tend to be, on average, less healthy than the Buddhists in south
Toronto. Unfortunately, there is no data with which to substantiate or reject this hypothesis. This argument could *mutatis mutandis* be extended to every religious community in any city.

Religion is a concern of supreme importance in what is possibly the best known ethnically divided city in the world: Jerusalem. This holy city hosts people from three religions: Muslims, Jews and Christians. It is also a ‘liberated’ capital for the Israelis but an ‘occupied’ one for the Palestinians. Roadblocks here and there demarcate religious and ethnic divisions. Primordial sentiments run high. The question of what is to be done with Jerusalem is the most mind-boggling issue in the peace arrangements for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, which is one of the most protracted political conflicts since World War II (Friedland and Hecht 1996). For most Arab and Jewish inhabitants of Israel, daily life involves the issues sketched by Thabet Abu Rass in Chapter 4, a crucial contribution to the theme of this volume. Abu Rass focuses on a number of small towns in Israel that together form an extended urban agglomeration known as the ‘Little Triangle’. Fully in line with Ernest Burgess’ model, the competition between the two contesting groups – the Arabs and the Israelis – has mainly been over the control of land. However, in contradiction of the basic assumption of Burgess, both groups value land not merely in economic terms but, first and foremost, as the basis of national existence. Moreover, state regulations have interfered in the land market. The state policy in Israel has contributed to the loss of land to the Arabs, as well as Jewish migrants invading formerly exclusively Arab land. The building of Jewish towns, the enlargement of existing Jewish towns and the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway have fragmented the originally uniform Arab region. Local Arab leaders feel that the development of the Arab towns has been restricted by the state policy of Israel.

Strategic considerations completely overruled the market for land in Beirut at the time of the civil war in Lebanon. Militias carved out sectors of the city in which to build their respective strongholds and forced an ethnic segregation upon the once prosperous city. Samir Khalaf dubbed this turf war ‘the territorialization of identities’ (Khalaf 1993: 28). In certain quarters, unearthing the slogans chalked on walls reveals the history of control of particular areas by successive militias. According to Daniel Genberg in Chapter 5, the inhabitants did not want their city to be divided into Muslim and Christian zones. Genberg gives an account of how people in Beirut experience and perceive the ethnically and religiously segregated urban space. Although the war has been over for a decade, on the mental map of the residents there are still places to be avoided or to which they simply never want to go. Part of the reconstruction work consists of creating neutral meeting places for Muslims and Christians. The fact that the city administration has left the urban planning to a French real estate company, SOLIDERE – an outsider unrelated to any of the former contestants – is of some significance. This chapter, apart from the fact that it deals with one of the political hotspots in the world, is highly relevant to our theme in that it provides a rare analysis of a process, however painful, of ethnic integration, starting from a state of total segregation.
In the colonial cities in Southeast Asia, Western capitalism existed side by side with a pre-industrial bazaar economy. According to T.G. McGee, the result was a mosaic consisting of the port, the western commercial district, a number of indigenous local markets scattered throughout the cities, several quarters dominated respectively by Chinese, Arab or Indian merchants, and indigenous neighbourhoods with a rural appearance. After Independence, the residential pattern based on ethnicity was replaced by a pattern based on social strata, because the elite of each ethnic group, including the Chinese, moved into the affluent neighbourhoods abandoned by Western colonials (McGee 1967: 126–41; see also Wertheim 1956). In Chapter 6, Harald Leisch takes McGee’s well-known analysis further in his study on the Chinese in Jakarta, Indonesia. The spatial reflection of the special status granted to the Chinese in Jakarta is most visible in Glodok, the Chinese quarter of the old city, even though the Indonesian state has forbidden the display of any Chinese characters or any other exhibition of Chinese culture. During the last two decades, the post-war trend of the Chinese moving out to formerly elite colonial quarters has been reinforced by the development of luxurious new towns on the outskirts of the metropolitan region. These elite residential complexes have come to be predominantly, but not exclusively, inhabited by the Chinese. It is interesting that, unlike the immigrant Chinese architecture specific to Glodok and present in the idiosyncratic colonial atmosphere of the former elite neighbourhoods, the new towns do not exhibit any signs of Chinese identity. On the contrary, these residential complexes are under the strong influence of American architecture and design, as well as the American way of life more generally – including shopping malls and jogging tracks.

A remarkably similar spatial organization of isolated elite zones is found in a completely different setting – namely, the large Brazilian cities. As analysed by Carmen Rial and Miriam Grossi in Chapter 7, a discourse of violence in the public media has helped to create a ‘culture of fear’ amounting to paranoia. The response of the social elite to their own fears has been to claim part of the public space as private space and fence it off from the commoners. The elite live in guarded condominiums and drive in cars with smoked-glass windows, finding entertainment in guarded social clubs and shopping malls. The bipolar existence of the elite shuttling between residential areas and places of entertainment has created a mosaic pattern in Brazilian cities that consists of elite-class domains interspersed with lower-class zones. Despite the geographical proximity of the areas claimed respectively by the elite and the lower-class groups, the two worlds are almost completely separated, as if they were adversaries. The security industry has not only built a defence around elite residences, but has sometimes also constricted the lower-class neighbourhoods. For instance, one favela (squatter area) in Salvador is surrounded by a four-kilometre wall; most of its 10,000 residents have to make a long detour to go to other parts of the city. In reality, the level of violence in the lower-class neighbourhoods is actually much higher than in the elite neighbourhoods. Computer maps of the São Paulo police, with ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ zones, instantly register the location of each...
reported crime. The spots notorious for violence are ‘no-go zones’ even for the official enforcers of the law. Clearly, the clash of interests and mutual recriminations between social classes in Brazil carries ethnic undertones, because the upper-class/middle-class/working-class distinctions in the country roughly correspond with the white/mulatto/black continuum of the population. In this respect, the Brazilian case confirms the notion that ethnicity is constructed and not given or self-evident. The fact that, for instance, Japanese and Koreans – seen as non-white in northern America – are considered blanco (white) in Brazil is a case in point.

At a meso-level of analysis, the chapters on Brazil and Jakarta focus on the level of the individual neighbourhood. Just as Wirth described in The Ghetto (1928) how a Jewish neighbourhood gradually developed in Chicago, Jian Guan depicts, in Chapter 8, how a Chinatown developed in Philadelphia, USA, during the course of the nineteenth century. The Chinese immigrants have settled in this city at the expense of the older settlers from Britain, Germany and Ireland. She documents how the new immigrants founded typically ‘Chinese businesses’, such as laundries and restaurants. At present, non-Chinese residents still account for only a quarter of the population of Chinatown. Nonetheless, a considerable number of the residents of Chinatown have moved out, so the majority of the Chinese in Philadelphia live elsewhere in the city. In Chinatown, bilingual street signs, phone booths decorated with pagodas, the Chinese character for long life (shou) on the sidewalks and other ethnic symbols add to the Chinese flavour. The value of this chapter lies in the fact that Guan shows the interplay between the neighbourhood, with its physical setting and network of social relationships, and the encroaching urban renewal projects, such as an expressway, a convention centre and a proposed stadium. Guan maintains that Philadelphia Chinatown has become a victim of ethnic insensitivity, since two blocks of housing were demolished without any regard to the needs of the community or its right to self-determination. The Chinese response has been an increased ethnic awareness on the part of the residents and a mobilization of Chinese support throughout the country. A giant mural depicts the history of the resistance of the residents of Chinatown.

In Chapter 9, Shenglin Chang presents a completely different type of Chinese neighbourhood, an affluent one, in a pioneering study that is an important contribution to the growing literature on Chinese settlements and the transnational way of life. Her chapter, in a way, reverses the topic of this volume. Instead of discussing how several ethnic groups live together in one spot, she analyses how one ethnic group lives in two different settlements. Taiwanese high-tech families show a pattern of circular, transnational migration, moving back and forth between Silicon Valley in California and Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park (HSIP) in Taiwan. Bamboo Village – the residential section of HSIP favoured by these families, which displays typical American suburban standards (such as a low residential density, green spaces, homogeneity of social class and so on) – has distanced itself socially and economically from its surroundings. When the same Taiwanese elite live in California, they
spend a considerable part of the time available for social activities at the *Ranch 99* megastores, a chain that offers services to predominantly Asian customers. This again isolates them to a certain degree from the other ethnic groups known to be existing in the vicinity. These high-tech immigrants rarely visit the Chinatown in San Francisco, which they consider a backward enclave of poor immigrants from the People's Republic of China. The result of this ongoing trans-Pacific movement between Taiwan and Silicon Valley has been a transcultural lifestyle with many common features.

In contrast to HSIP, which materialized according to an architectural blueprint, the neighbourhood in Tehran, Iran, described with a keen eye for detail by Soheila Shahshahani in Chapter 10, has developed gradually. Its crooked streets give away its rural origins. The neighbourhood is rich in history, starting with its name – derived from the neighbourhood's pioneer settler in the nineteenth century. Other families who once owned land there also have streets named after them. These peculiarities probably escaped the Kurd and Afghani newcomers. The various ethnic groups in the neighbourhood correlate, roughly, with particular socioeconomic levels. There is little inter-ethnic contact between the male residents, who mostly work in another zone of Tehran. Such contacts are reserved for special occasions and usually limited to the doorstep – when, for instance, practising the Islamic custom of taking over a dish of food on the occasion of a neighbour's bereavement. The womenfolk cross the ethnic boundaries more easily and visit each other, their kitchens being the centres of this conviviality. However, the children refrain from going to the houses of acquaintances and friends from other ethnic groups or classes, and prefer only to play together on a certain plot on a local boulevard. Hence, they somewhat reflect their parents' concern about their level of amicability with neighbours.

The example of the Tehran neighbourhood again shows that the borderlines between the macro-, meso- and micro-levels are blurred. At the micro-level, the scholar focuses on face-to-face contacts, which automatically restricts the study to limited spaces – that is, to a street or a square. Several chapters in this book are also partly devoted to a micro-level analysis, focusing on how and where people from different ethnic groups interact. For example, in Chapter 3, Chandrakant Shah describes how the construction of a Hindu temple met with opposition from non-Hindu neighbours and how a mosque in the outskirts of Toronto became the pivot of a newly mushrooming Islamic neighbourhood. In Chapter 10, people in a Tehran neighbourhood come together to rejoice in the streets during special occasions, such as after an important football victory. The local boulevard is also the place where the residents gather for an annual ritual feast, during which they jump over a fire. Likewise in Beirut (Chapter 5), the boulevard is a meeting place, where people of different denominations and from different ethnic groups love to stroll.

Chapter 11, by Jeffry Hester, focuses on one single shopping street in Osaka, Japan. The Koreans who sell ethnic Korean goods, such as ingredients for Korean dishes, own half of the shops in this street. When the shopping street began to suffer from increasing competition from the shopping malls nearby,
the association of merchants started to think about ways to boost the appeal of the street to customers. One result has been the redecoration of the street with idiosyncratic Korean street lamps, coloured paving stones and archways at the entrance, changing it into a ‘Korea Town’. By focusing his magnifying lens on a restricted space, Hester is able to show in detail how people were concerned about and behaved in relation to this street. But the special quality of this chapter lies in the fact that he does not lose sight of the developments in the wider, even national society. The Korean refurbishing of this particular shopping street was, in fact, the product of extended negotiations between shop owners, the local government and investors. The attraction of the idiosyncratic Korean design is a valuable marketing asset, perhaps also a means of production, for the retailers. At the same time, Korea Town is an object and milieu for consumption for the customers who come to shop, to hang around, to meet friends, to show off the fashion expressive of their personal lifestyles and so on. Korea Town has multiple symbolic meanings, depending on whose perspective is taken into account. One such meaning is the expression of a new and national civic ideology of multi-ethnic existence – ‘living together’ (with difference) – which is a substitute for the former and tacit expectation that foreigners should completely assimilate with Japanese society. Some Japanese shop owners in the street, however, oppose this new interpretation. Their opposition is visible in the inconsistency in design – due to their insistence on the Japanese way – of the street furniture used in Korea Town.

Chapter 12, by Heidi Dumreicher, analyses a street festival in a square in Vienna, Austria. She is able to provide a unique insight, owing to her being both observer and participant, taking roles not readily available to most anthropologists. That is, she is an organizer of the festival – instigated by the Oikodrom Forum, an NGO founded by herself – and, when she refers to a woman serving tea during the festival, that woman is actually herself. The aim of this activity, dubbed ‘the Waterworld Festival’, was to breathe life into a vast square that people usually wanted to leave behind them as quickly as possible. The festival deliberately strove not only to attract people, but also to bring different ethnic groups together. The square became a stage where, for example, a Turkish storyteller, young children jumping about on an inflated ‘bouncy castle’, breakdancing adolescents and others could perform or entertain side by side.

In contrast to the example from Vienna, in Chapter 13, Eveline Dürr analyses two cases of how different ethnic groups can be in competition over the control of public space in the old city centre of Albuquerque, USA. The main attraction of her study is that she shows how Anglo-Americans, Hispanics and American Indians not only contested the space physically, but also sought to represent their roots through it. In the first case she recounts, the itinerant Indian vendors were initially banned from the streets after a court case. Then the Anglo-American shop owners decided to have the American Indians back on the street, selling their ethnic goods from colourful blankets in front of their shops. The Indians had given Albuquerque a mystical and traditional appeal
that attracted tourists. It is worth noting, though, that selling off blankets was not in fact the authentic Indian way of doing business, but a recent invention in keeping with the romanticized representation of the primitive but charming native. In the other case taken from Albuquerque, the Anglo-Americans were the adversaries of the Hispanics. The conflict between them was about whether the city centre had a predominantly economic function, as claimed by the Anglo-American shop owners, or a cultural and religious meaning, as the Hispanics believed it did.

With this last chapter, the trip around the globe comes to an end. The variety in the content of the chapters, ranging from the macro- to the micro-level of analysis and covering three different continents, provides a unique opportunity for cross-cultural comparative analysis across the globe. The comparison between these cases enables us, to a certain extent, to probe answers to the questions of how inter-ethnic relations can create and pattern urban space and how inter-ethnic relations are organized in urban spaces. Such an examination invariably results in a number of theoretical observations. They are presented in our conclusion (Chapter 14), where we refer also to other pertinent studies in order to expand the empirical basis of the comparative analysis. Taking into account the limited number of cases presented here, it is clear that the theoretical remarks do not claim general validity. They must be considered as hypotheses to be elaborated and refined through further research.

References


