

## CHAPTER FOUR

### SHADES OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION: AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS WITH TURKEY (1923–1937)

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Scholars dwell more on explaining the origins and conduct of wars than how they end, though it is the latter that shapes the lives of future generations. Peace treaties, whether dictated or negotiated, and recognition of new states *de facto* or *de jure* resonate on future relations. The way in which dialogue is carried out by representatives, until and even after formal diplomatic relations are established, can make or break relations. This study addresses the end of the First World War and the interwar years when diplomatic relations were restored between Turkey and the United States. Diplomatic recognition is identified as an act by which one state acknowledges the legitimacy of another, thereby expressing its intent to bring into force the legal consequences of recognition. An important component of diplomatic recognition is reciprocity. Although ambassadors were exchanged in 1927, a missing component of reciprocity was that an American ambassador did not take up full time residence in Turkey's capital, Ankara until 1937. Therefore this study secondly accounts for the conjuncture, processes as well as stages, until Washington accorded diplomatic reciprocity to Turkey. Diaries, official correspondence, and biographies of U.S. representatives who are better known, such as Admiral Mark L. Bristol, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and lesser known diplomats such as Robert Skinner, John Van A. Mac Murray, Howland Shaw, Wallace Murray, and Jefferson Patterson, who served in Turkey, enable us to draw a reasonably coherent picture. A glimpse at the domestic situation in Turkey of the 1930s through U.S. records and the eventual full time residence of the American Ambassador in Ankara by 1937 reveal how shades of recognition were transformed into full diplomatic reciprocity.

October 29, 1923 marks the declaration of the Republic of Turkey, three months after the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed between the former Allies of the First World War and the Government of the National Assembly of Turkey. Since the United States and Ottoman

Empire had not declared war on each other and that the former had chosen to be an “associated” and not an “allied” power,<sup>1</sup> there was no peace to be made between them. However, a formal relationship had to be resumed after the Ottoman government had severed diplomatic relations with the United States in April 1917. The interregnum from 1919 to 1923 did not allow an official diplomatic relationship to resume because a state of war and foreign occupation of Turkey continued. Only after the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed between the Allies and the Government of the National Assembly of Turkey on July 24, 1923, did the United States attempt to resume ties by treaty with the new political body in Turkey. Hence, on August 6, 1923 a “General Treaty” or the “Treaty of Amity and Commerce” as it is generally referred to was signed in Lausanne by Joseph C. Grew, then U.S. Minister in Switzerland, bearing the signatures of İsmet Pasha (İnönü), Dr. Rıza Nur and Hasan (Saka) on Turkey’s part.<sup>2</sup> But by 1927 the U.S. Senate had denied ratification of the treaty. Nonetheless, after an exchange of notes for a *modus vivendi*, ambassadors were exchanged the same year, and slightly reworded treaties of “Commerce and Navigation” and “Establishment” were ratified respectively in 1930 and 1932. It was not until 1937 that an American ambassador, John Van A. Mac Murray, took up full time residence in Turkey’s capital Ankara, although all other major countries had established embassies and ambassadors in Ankara by 1931. An exception was Italy, which moved its embassy permanently to Ankara in 1941. However symbolic the American move may have been, it sanctioned complete diplomatic recognition after a fifteen year interval. These shades of recognition then turned into a fully fledged relationship with complete official reciprocity.

This study initially explores the diplomatic conduct of two significant personae who helped shape the future relations between Turkey and the United States; High Commissioner Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol (served in İstanbul, 1919–1927), and a career diplomat Joseph

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<sup>1</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri (Açıklamalı)*, (An Annotated Documentary Record of Turkish-American Relations); (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 89–109; See “Proces Verbal of the American-Turkish Commercial and Consular Convention” The Papers of Mark Lambert Bristol (1868–1939) (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Manuscript Division) “General Correspondence” Box 61, August 6, 1923, (Henceforth, Bristol Papers); “America To Sign Separate Treaty with Kemal Pasha,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 27, 1923.

C. Grew, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (served also in İstanbul, 1927–1932). These two representatives are important for having initiated a favorable relationship between the two countries against many odds. Bristol definitely held an intermediate status. Ambassador Grew, having been originally commissioned during a recess of the Senate in May 1927, was subject to confirmation by the Senate in April 1928. It was widely believed that he was given the Turkish assignment to get him out of town.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, after almost one year Grew would still face a somewhat uncertain confirmation process to extend his term as ambassador. That gave his initial year as ambassador a somewhat ambivalent atmosphere.

The paper also probes the oft spoken American isolationism for the purpose of aligning political rhetoric with reality. By the turn of the 20th century, the United States was a world power; not only did Washington dominate its own hemisphere, but it was accepted as a Great Power by the Old World. Inspection of the U.S. State Department's Chiefs of Mission List shows that although ministers and envoys had been routinely assigned to major countries until the 1890s, subsequent chiefs of mission in the most important countries held the title of ambassador.<sup>4</sup> Other powers accepted American representation at the ambassadorial level, a privilege which was not necessarily granted to just any sovereign country. Joining the First World War, albeit for reasons of its own, also brought the United States into the affairs of Europe. Moreover, we see that neither the State Department nor the American business world was isolationist during the interwar period. In regard to the aftermath of war, Ambrosius wrote, "At the same time interdependence among nations precluded the United States from maintaining its traditional isolation from the Old World."<sup>5</sup> The victorious European Allies grudgingly allowed each other spheres of mandate and influence as was the case with Britain and France in the Near East. The United States had to push its way to take a position in the same territories in the name of Open Door policy, an abstract principle of international conduct at that time. In essence:

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<sup>3</sup> Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 109–125.

<sup>4</sup> In 1893 ambassadors were sent to London, Paris, and Berlin.

<sup>5</sup> Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition; the Treaty Fight in Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 290.

American interests [in the Near East] were too extensive to permit indifference to the actions of the European Powers. Near East Relief was still active; American missions faced a period of reconstruction and adjustment to Turkish, Persian, and Arab nationalism; commercial interests anticipated lucrative developments in the area; and above all, the United States had become vitally interested in Middle Eastern oil to protect and foster these interests the government had to devise an effective policy.<sup>6</sup>

By 1921, according to a Department of Commerce report, American oil company holdings in Asia Minor (Standard Oil Company of New York) amounted to 2,000 square kilometers.<sup>7</sup> This concession had been extended to Standard Oil in 1914 and because of the war a caveat was added that the company would be allowed to hold on to their rights until a full year after the war ended.<sup>8</sup> That date would have officially expired at the end of 1919. But even by 1921 the Commerce Department upheld these rights, at least on paper.

Further, during and after the First World War, the United States had become a creditor nation in regard to Europe. Measures also were envisaged for German economic recovery so that it could start paying annuities against reparations. In 1924, an international commission headed by an American banker, Charles G. Dawes, recommended the solution that large loans should be made to the German government. Short-term loans raised in the United States were of particular help. “In 1929 the solution of the reparations question was taken a stage further with a second expert plan, drawn up by a committee under the American Owen D. Young, which finally envisaged an eventual end to the reparations—though not until 1988.”<sup>9</sup>

Consequently, the United States secured itself an international position with a say so over foreign affairs, even though it was not a member of the League of Nations. Private companies and private persons were involved outside direct U.S. governmental representation in these endeavors, but diplomatic representatives were always there to help, although they were careful to ensure the soundness and credibility of the

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<sup>6</sup> John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900–1939* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 127.

<sup>7</sup> Stephen J. Randall, *United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I, For Profits and Security*, 2nd ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), pp. 24–25.

<sup>8</sup> Hikmet Uluğbay, *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik* (Oil Politics from Empire to Republic) (Ankara: Ayraç Yayinevi, 2003), pp. 225–226.

<sup>9</sup> James Joll, *Europe since 1870, an International History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 288–289.

American firms. One repeatedly encounters the statement that the United States had no political interests in Europe or the Near East. This may be true only to the extent that one looks at isolationism as being diametrically opposed to political/military intervention. "While it is true that isolationism as a doctrine was born with our eye on Europe [it] did not have the same connotation for Asia or Latin America" the diplomat, Charles Bohlen, recounted.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, there are other venues of involvement and government/business relations are political by nature. Therefore, to categorically label the United States as isolationist may be a misnomer. Whether Turkey fell within the sphere of Europe or Asia at this point in time is debatable, because geographical depictions are usually determined by the powers that be. In all likelihood Turkey remained in the twilight of geography in the 1930s. Turkey belonged to Eurasia in terms of German geopolitical understanding, but the U.S. Department of State classified it within the Near East.

Another point this essay emphasizes is an insight into Turkey during the interwar years through American diplomatic records. Turkish historiography takes it for granted that the republican regime, once promulgated, was also established. Ankara then began progressive modernizing reforms. Domestically speaking this was true enough. But, there were also three major Kurdish insurgencies between 1924 and 1938 which upset stability.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, outside Turkey's borders there was ambivalence toward Ankara. As Barlas observed,

During the meeting between Mussolini and Chamberlain in September 1926, they agreed on the probable eventual collapse of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and Italian intervention in Anatolia. But the British Foreign Secretary would tolerate Italian intervention in Asia Minor only after the collapse came about.<sup>12</sup>

Mussolini believed that the Mosul issue<sup>13</sup> between Ankara and London would lead to war between the two and then to Turkey's collapse; this would then provide Rome with the excuse to colonize Anatolia from

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<sup>10</sup> Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1973), p. 33.

<sup>11</sup> *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları* (Kurdish Insurrections from the Records of the General Staff) 2 vols. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1972).

<sup>12</sup> Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929–1939* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), p. 140, fn. 79.

<sup>13</sup> Mosul, the oil rich area of Iraq-under-British mandate remained a contested issue and was not solved at Lausanne. The parties, Turkey and Britain, either had to negotiate a solution or bring the problem to the League of Nations. Since negotiations led

the staging point of the Dodecanese Islands.<sup>14</sup> Italy had occupied those Aegean islands during the 1912 Libyan war with the Ottoman Empire. Rome began militarizing the islands as of 1923 for an eventual invasion of Anatolia which Mussolini regarded only as a geographical area. It was in this precarious atmosphere that American encounters with Turkey began anew.

### *Historical Background*

Ottoman-U.S. relations date from the 1830s. Relations were based on trade and the American Protestant missionary presence in the fields of health and education in the Empire. The Ottoman Empire and the United States became virtual adversaries after the latter joined the First World War, but they did not declare war on each other. Although there are multifarious reasons why the Ottomans entered the Great War, a major reason was to abrogate the capitulations, extraterritorial economic, financial, trade and judiciary privileges granted to foreigners<sup>15</sup> since the 15th century. These privileges, once granted from a position of strength, had become a burden as well as liability by the 19th century. Consequently, war presented an opportunity to abrogate them. The Ottomans expected this conflict to be of short duration just like everyone else did in Europe.

In 1740, in return for French mediation during a two front war with Russia and Austria, the Ottomans had to assent to a provision that no changes in capitulatory treaties could be made without French consent.

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nowhere, the second option came into play and the League awarded Mosul to Iraq in 1926.

<sup>14</sup> Dilek Barlas, "Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923–36." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36 (2004), pp. 231–252; 232–233; Yücel Güçlü, "Fascist Italy's 'Mare Nostrum' Policy and Turkey." *Bellekten* LXIII: 238 (December 1999), pp. 813–845.

<sup>15</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 83–84. "The modern connotation of this term is capitulation in the sense of 'surrender,' and the capitulations are seen as an example of the unequal treaties imposed by stronger on weaker powers during the imperial expansion of Europe. The origin of the Middle Eastern capitulations is, however, quite different. The term had nothing to do with surrender, but derives from the Latin *capitula*, referring to the chapter headings into which the texts of these agreements were divided. They date from the time, not of European, but of Muslim predominance, when the Islamic states were at the height of their power, and European merchants and their diplomatic representatives came as humble suppliants." The Ottomans referred to these contracts as *imtiyazat-ı ecnebiyye* (privileges extended to foreigners).

This rule carried over to capitulatory treaties with new powers when initiated or renewed with the old ones.<sup>16</sup> In the 19th century the Ottomans were diplomatically rebuffed every time they tried to change the capitulations.

Unilateral abrogation of the capitulations came as early as September 10, 1914, nearly a month before the Empire became militarily involved in the war. This caused much concern to the Americans in Turkey. An editorial in *The Outlook* read, “Americans have in Turkey several hundred educational and philanthropic institutions, including ten colleges, twenty high schools, and twelve hospitals.”<sup>17</sup> Though the article conceded that abrogation of capitulatory treaties was the sovereign right of the Ottomans, it suggested that a new treaty should be concluded with Constantinople to protect U.S. citizens who worked in those institutions. “The United States from time to time voluntarily yielded some of these extra-territorial rights at the request of Turkey and as a matter of fairness; but the European countries, as a rule, have been loth [sic] to release Turkey from any of her engagements without a substantial quid pro quo” wrote an American missionary.<sup>18</sup> “American business firms did not take the news so calmly; MacAndrews and Forbes and Standard Oil cabled in frantically that customs duties would certainly go up. And on October 1, customs duties did indeed go up—from eleven percent to fifteen percent.”<sup>19</sup> The U.S., along with the other powers, protested the decision.

While the Empire was still officially neutral in early October 1914, Reverend Herrick observed, “Meanwhile the Turks are asking one another if the present clash in Europe is not the very opportunity they have been waiting for to free themselves from the domination of foreign powers...” In an effort to reassure his compatriots, he added, “I unhesitatingly reply that Americans in their persons and as regards their institutions in that country are not endangered. Americans are no strangers

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<sup>16</sup> Reşat Arım, *Foreign Policy Concepts: Conjunction, Freedom of Action, Equality* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2001), pp. 11–12.

<sup>17</sup> “The Turkish Question,” *The Outlook*, vol. 108:4, (September 23, 1914), pp. 157–159.

<sup>18</sup> Frederick D. Greene, “Turkey’s Declaration of Independence,” *The Outlook*, vol. 108:4 (September 23, 1914), pp. 161–163.

<sup>19</sup> Howard Morley Sachar, “The United States and Turkey, 1914–1927: the Origins of Near Eastern Policy” (Unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 1953), p. 47.

in Turkey... They know we have no designs against their country.”<sup>20</sup> Accordingly, the European crisis presented the United States with the opportunity for capital investment in the Near East, but this was not meant to be.

İstanbul severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 20, 1917, presumably under German pressure. The Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmet Nesimi Bey (Sayman) apologized for this act, and promised that the American schools and other institutions in Anatolia would remain undisturbed. The last American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Abram I. Elkus transferred all business with Americans to the neutral, Swedish Minister in İstanbul before his departure. There was a resolution put forward in the U.S. Senate in support of a declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire. However, President Wilson and his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, with cooperation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, managed to block such resolutions from reaching the floor. Lansing’s apparent argument was that since the Armenian and Syrian refugees received supplies worth one or two million dollars per month which were distributed by the American missionaries, this line of supply would be lost if a state of war existed between the United States and Turkey.<sup>21</sup>

Two months after the Mudros Armistice Treaty was signed (October 30, 1918) on the British destroyer *Agamemnon*, the U.S. administration sent Lewis Heck as Commissioner, followed by George Bie Ravndal in February 1919, and restored commercial relations with the Ottoman Near East. Both gentlemen were subsequently appointed as members of the Turkish-American Trade Commission. The Ottoman parliament and other institutions remained intact, however weakened, until April 1920.

On March 16, 1920, the Allies occupied Istanbul *de jure* under the auspices of Britain. The city had been occupied *de facto* two weeks after the Mudros armistice was signed in November 1918. Prior to the second occupation, the Ottoman parliament was comprised of Nationalist deputies from Anatolia who adhered to the National Oath (Misak-ı Milli)<sup>22</sup> drawn up by consensus at the Sivas Congress in 1919. The Oath

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<sup>20</sup> George F. Herrick, “The Turkish Crisis and American Interests,” *American Review of Reviews*, vol. 50 (October 1914), pp. 475–476.

<sup>21</sup> Sachar, p. 58.

<sup>22</sup> It is also called the “National Pact.”

did not draw specific boundaries but claimed that territories which had a majority of Turks and Kurds should be independent and sovereign. The Oath also vouched for a struggle for independence. Passage of this Oath was instigated by the rising star of Turkey's war of independence (1919–1922), Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

The British had no intention of closing down the Ottoman parliament, but a single act resulted in self-abrogation of the parliament. British soldiers walked into the parliament and arrested two deputies, Rauf Bey (Orbay), Mustafa Kemal's representative, and Kara Vasıf Bey, leader of the first underground resistance group in Istanbul, *Karakol*. This action took place after the Edirne deputy Şeref Bey (Aykut) read the National Oath in the parliament and the resolution was accepted by majority vote. Şeref Bey was also arrested, among others, and sent to exile in Malta. The parliament took a decision to close in protest.<sup>23</sup>

This act provided legitimate and legal grounds for Mustafa Kemal Pasha to promulgate the National Assembly in Ankara on April 23, 1920. From then on, this Assembly would be the parliament which spoke on behalf of the nation, and one under whose auspices the command of the Turkish military forces was bestowed upon Mustafa Kemal. He was to win the war against Greek invaders by 1922. The conflict with Greece was actually Britain's proxy war against the Nationalist movement and forces.

### *Political/Diplomatic Relations (1919–1932)*

In January 1919, Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol was appointed as Senior Representative of the United States to İstanbul under Allied occupation. "In dealing with the representatives of the Allies in Constantinople Admiral Bristol soon found that he was placed at a disadvantage because his position as Senior United States Representative was not as exalted as that of High Commissioner which was held by them."<sup>24</sup> Bristol requested to assume the same title from the State Department, which was granted. His instructions from then on were to be communicated from the State

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<sup>23</sup> Nur Bilge Criss, *Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918–1923* (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 1999).

<sup>24</sup> Henry P. Beers, "United States Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters, 1919–24," *Military Affairs*, vol. 7:4 (Winter 1943), pp. 209–220; 213.

Department through the Navy Department. Bristol's earlier career in Turkey has been studied by other scholars.<sup>25</sup> Both Trask and Bryson agreed that the goodwill and fairness that Bristol exhibited towards the Turkish Nationalists laid the foundations for sound relations between the two countries.

Aside from academic studies about him, there is an essay among the Bristol Papers, written by Walter S. Hiatt upon the termination of Bristol's duties in Turkey and his assignment as Commander of the Asiatic Fleet. "Bristol-Sailor Diplomat" renders a telling account perhaps for all time. "The great lesson of the East is patience, the realization that if you plan carefully and wait long enough you will get what you are planning for" said Bristol. "If world peace is to be maintained, if we are to avoid suicidal wars, there must be a keener consciousness of the fact that people are just people the world around, and stick closer to the old international conception of a family of nations. As Americans we have the great duty to continue actively to exercise our moral credit and character." Hiatt added ironically, "A queer lot, these men who go to sea in the Navy. It must be the sea and the distance from home that keeps their ideals and their patriotism at high pitch, seasoned out of theory by the constant presence of fact."<sup>26</sup> In other words, the admiral remained above armistice politics. The mariner diplomat did not approve of what he termed 'European intrigues' over the Near East nor did he join the British in deploring the Turkish nationalists.

As early as August 1919, Bristol wrote,

The reports of disturbances in Asia Minor are being exaggerated. I hardly believe the Turks are planning any immediate outbreak but are organizing for a defensive action against the partitioning of Turkey... I have a feeling that in the Greek, Armenian and certain foreign quarters, there is a tendency to expose the organization in Asia Minor as evidence that massacres are about to take place. It is not conceivable that the Turks would be so foolish. The present Turkish [Ottoman] government is opposed to this organization and there is some belief that the opposition is directed

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<sup>25</sup> Sachar, p. 58; Peter Michael Buzanski, "Admiral Mark L. Bristol and Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922" (Unpublished dissertation, University of California, 1960), Courtesy of Dr. George Harris; Roger Trask, "The United States and Turkish Nationalism: Investments and Technical Aid during the Atatürk Era," *Business History Review* vol. 38 (Spring 1964), pp. 58-77; Thomas A. Bryson, "Admiral Mark L. Bristol, An Open Door Diplomat in Turkey" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 5 (1974), pp. 450-467.

<sup>26</sup> Walter S. Hiatt, "Bristol-Sailor Diplomat," Bristol Papers, General Correspondence Box 61, n.d.

or at least encouraged by foreign interests, also it is thought that the government is sympathizing with the organization secretly, and outwardly pretending to suppress it.<sup>27</sup>

Bristol's outlook regarding the Nationalists varied from the other Allies more often than not, because he saw them as patriots,<sup>28</sup> instead of as Bolsheviks, Unionists (members of the Committee of Union and Progress who ruled from 1913 to 1918), or as enemies of the West. The following excerpt from an American popular magazine, on the other hand drew an exotic picture of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

A Spanish Jew by ancestry, an orthodox Moslem by birth and breeding, trained in a German war college, a patriot, a student of the campaigns of the world's greatest generals, including Napoleon, Grant and Lee—these are said to be a few outstanding characteristics in the personality of the new "Man on Horseback" who has appeared in the Near East.<sup>29</sup>

Journalistic speculation made Mustafa Kemal Pasha a "Spanish Jew by ancestry" because he was born in Salonica (Thessaloniki) which was the largest Jewish metropolis in Europe between 1492 and 1913 until the city fell to the Greeks in the Balkan Wars. He was never trained in a German War College except that cadets at the İstanbul War Academy where he studied had Prussian instructors. However, he was presented as an enigma simply because nobody in the West expected Turkey to survive let alone produce a leader like Mustafa Kemal. In a letter to Sir Cecil Crowe, the British Ambassador in Paris, Admiral Richard Webb, Assistant High Commissioner in 1919, had written "The situation in the interior, due practically entirely to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, is getting more hazy and unsettled. Were this anywhere but Turkey, I should say we were on the eve of a tremendous upheaval."<sup>30</sup>

At the Conference on Near Eastern Affairs (The Lausanne Peace Conference) of 1922–1923, a significant issue was the abrogation of the capitulatory rights. The Turkish delegation at the conference was so adamant about abrogation that the conference broke up once over the issue, but reconvened. So great was the burden of judiciary, financial and

<sup>27</sup> Bristol Papers, "War Diary," August 17, 1919.

<sup>28</sup> Nur Bilge Criss, "Images of the Early Turkish National Movement (1919–1921)" in *Historical Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th Century to the Present*, ed. Mustafa Soykut (İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 2003), pp. 259–285.

<sup>29</sup> "The Sort of Man Mustafa Kemal Is" *Literary Digest* (October 14, 1922), pp. 50–53.

<sup>30</sup> E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy (1919–1939)* Series I, IV (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 733.

economic capitulations that the issue was non-negotiable for the Turks. Evidence has only recently been coming to light about the opportunity for unilateral abrogation as a major factor in explaining perhaps the major reason why the Empire joined the “Great War”<sup>31</sup> in the first place. “The price of Turkish assistance on the side of the Central Powers was their consent to the abrogation of the capitulations.”<sup>32</sup> Consequently, however late in coming, Germany honored its commitment on January 11, 1917, followed by Austria on March 12, 1918. Bolshevik Russia was to repudiate the Ottoman capitulations in the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed with the Ankara government in 1921.<sup>33</sup> However, interpretations of international law were not clear about abrogation of capitulatory rights. Where did the United States stand on this issue?

A legal opinion forwarded by Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, early in 1923, was that “Economic freedom is essential to the progress of any nation; and in view of modern conditions there seems to be no good reason to further insist upon privileges, originally necessary for the very existence of trade, which have now become particularly offensive as an instrument of economic enslavement.” The author, however, stated “Whether any of the judicial privileges may be safely surrendered, is very questionable.” Thayer recommended that foreign jurists remain at Turkish courts at least during the transitional period culminating in total judiciary reform.<sup>34</sup> At first, Ankara would have none of this during the Lausanne negotiations. However, İsmet Pasha gradually consented to legal counselors from countries which remained neutral in the First World War. These counselors would reside in İzmir and İstanbul to consult on commercial cases for a period of five years. Although few and far between, criminal court cases of U.S. citizens in Turkey became an issue in relations.<sup>35</sup> Judicial concerns were obviously not forsaken lightly,

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<sup>31</sup> Mustafa Aksakal, “Defending the Nation: The German-Ottoman Alliance and the Ottoman Decision for War” (Unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 2003); Mehmet Emin Elmacı, *İttihat-Terakki ve Kapitülasyonlar* (The Committee for Union and Progress and Capitulations) (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2005).

<sup>32</sup> Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, “The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their Abrogation as it Affects the United States,” *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 17:2 (April 1923), pp. 207–233; Alfred L. P. Dennis, “The United States and the New Turkey” *North American Review* (June 1923), pp. 721–731.

<sup>33</sup> Thayer, p. 228.

<sup>34</sup> Thayer, p. 231.

<sup>35</sup> Orhan Duru, *Amerikan Gizli Belgeleriyle Türkiye’nin Kurtuluş Yılları* 4th ed. (Turkey’s War of Independence in American Documents) (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası

especially in the absence of treaties. American missionary schools were another issue.

James Levi Barton, the Secretary of the American Board, was sent to the Lausanne Conference to lobby against any abandonment of the special privileges which Americans hitherto had enjoyed in Turkey. But he came away convinced that the only alternative to abandoning mission property and work in Turkey was to accept the new order. Upon his return to the United States, Barton became a leading advocate of Kemal's Republic. He exposed the myths and exaggerations of earlier anti-Turkish propaganda; he heralded the reforms instituted by the Kemalists; and he mobilized leaders of missionary, church, philanthropic and educational organizations to support ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.<sup>36</sup>

Only after the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed by other powers did the Americans assent to sign the "other" Lausanne Treaty.<sup>37</sup> Ratification of the treaty in the U.S. Senate was another matter. According to a message from Ankara forwarded by the American Embassy, Constantinople to the State Department, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) had "intimated... that they would not present our treaties to Assembly for ratification until our Senate had ratified or at least [sic] seemed to be on the point of ratifying them."<sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, a fierce debate erupted in the United States for and against ratification. Edward M. Earle addressed the American liberals, stating:

If the Turks achieved a victory over Allied and American diplomacy at Lausanne, it was partly because they had a case which merited more respect. The Lausanne peace is a severe blow to Western imperialism in the Near East and as such should be welcomed by liberals everywhere.<sup>39</sup>

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Kültür Yayınları, 2006), pp. 188–190; Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945*, 2 vols. (London: Hammond, Hammond and Co. Ltd., 1953) vol. 2, pp. 754–763.

<sup>36</sup> Robert L. Daniel, "The United States and the Turkish Republic before World War II: The Cultural Dimension" *Middle East Journal* 21:1 (Winter 1967), pp. 52–63; 54–55.

<sup>37</sup> John M. Vander Lippe, "Öteki Lozan Antlaşması: Amerikan Kamuoyunda ve Resmi Çevrelerinde Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri Tartışması" (The 'Other' Lausanne Treaty: Public and Official Debates over Turkish-American Relations), in *70. Yılında Lozan Barış Antlaşması* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994), pp. 61–92.

<sup>38</sup> Bristol Papers, Official Correspondence, Box 61, From: Shaw To: the Department of State, December 12, 1924.

<sup>39</sup> Edward Meade Earle, "Ratify the Turkish Treaty!" *The Nation*, vol. 118: 3055 (January 23, 1924), pp. 86–87.

A group of prominent Americans residing in Turkey sent a letter to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, urging ratification. The letter was signed by Gates (Robert College); Adams (Constantinople Girls' College); Fowle (American Mission Board); Bergeron (American Express); Baker (YMCA); Woodsmall (YWCA); Correa (Standard Oil); Damon (Vacuum Oil); Heck, Edgar Howard; Nelson (American Hospital); Stem (Gary Tobacco); Johnstone (Alston Tobacco); Day (Standard Commercial); and Hare (Secretary, Chamber of Commerce).<sup>40</sup> Ratification did not take place mainly because of a purely religious reading of the Armenian-Ottoman conflict between 1915 and 1917. This issue will be addressed subsequently when the debate over ratification in the United States is discussed.

The Nationalists' success, however, caused concern about the future status of the 'West' in the 'East'. "The return of the Turk to Europe—the pivotal fact in all the Near-Eastern muddle—came about very simply. It was the old story of a group of strong men defying their fate" wrote an observer.<sup>41</sup>

The settlements following that war [Turkey's War of Independence] awakened the East to the full realization of Western weakness and folly. Rejuvenated Turkey is the result, and the inspiration to further revolt. One cannot, therefore, see bright prospects for the West if the Turkish experiment succeeds... Western prosperity (and perhaps much of what we call Western civilization) has been built up largely on two things, the development of the New World and the exploitation of the Old. If, instead of continued control in the East, the West must face a series of successful revolts; if it must readjust itself to trade with many countries puffed up with pride... And yet, if the Turkish experiment does not succeed, the West must bear the subsequent strain... Let the West look to itself if the prizes of Turkey are again to be had for the taking!<sup>42</sup>

The Eastern Question had not yet been settled in the anonymous author's mind, because the new republic was considered an experiment in nation building, and not a very promising one at that. Ankara thought differently.

On October 29, 1923 when the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed, Adnan Bey (Adıvar), Representative of Ankara's Foreign Ministry in

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<sup>40</sup> Bristol Papers, Official Correspondence, Box 61, January 8, 1927. Raymond Hare would eventually return as American ambassador.

<sup>41</sup> "Turkey and the East" by an Observer, *Atlantic Monthly* 132 (October 1923), pp. 546–555.

<sup>42</sup> "Turkey and the East," *Ibid.*, p. 555.

İstanbul, discussed the title of High Commissioner (HC) with Bristol. The Admiral argued that HC was a legal title. Adnan Bey stated that HC was not a diplomatic title. Bristol said he was not there in a formal diplomatic position and that diplomatic relations did not exist between the two governments. Adnan Bey asked why Bristol could not be called “representative” and the High Commission the “American Embassy”. Bristol maintained that he had been commissioned by the President. Bristol was already using Embassy stationery in communications with Adnan Bey and was signing his name only,<sup>43</sup> but he did not bring this point up and Adnan Bey also avoided it.

On November 19, 1923, Adnan Bey brought up the title HC again on the premise that the Acting British HC, Henderson, had told him that he and other HCs were willing to change their titles if Bristol agreed to change his. Bristol jokingly said, “Why yes, they are willing enough to throw it all off on me.” Bristol argued that it was impossible to change his title because it was recognized as such by the U.S. government as well as the President for his representative in Turkey. Bristol added in his diary, “I did not point out to him that I was no longer using any title in communicating with him. I do know that Henderson signs himself as Acting High Commissioner, though the Turks address him as Representative of Great Britain.”<sup>44</sup>

Less than a month later Adnan Bey once again brought up the subject stating that the British, French and Italian HCs had agreed to change their titles to Representative, which was the case. The Prime Minister, İsmet Pasha continuously asked Adnan Bey what Bristol was going to do in regard to this change. Ankara was very sensitive about the issue. Bristol once again referred to American Law.<sup>45</sup>

In the meantime, problems with diplomatic recognition continued. In a report marked “confidential” dated March 28, 1924, Bristol referred to this ambiguous issue over Giulio Montagna’s status. Montagna was the Italian Ambassador as well as Diplomatic Representative of Italy in Turkey. Ronald Lindsay was simply “His Britannic Majesty’s Representative” without the word “diplomatic” attached to it. “The Italian government hoped that it would be possible to arrange for the diplomatic Mission to Turkey to remain in Constantinople and if it did, he,

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<sup>43</sup> Bristol Papers, “War Diary,” October 29, 1923.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, November 19, 1923.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, December 5, 1923.

Montagna, would be accredited as Ambassador. If however, it was necessary for the Mission to be located in Angora, he would be recalled and a Minister or a diplomatic official of lower rank than Ambassador would be sent.<sup>46</sup>

Bristol sounded out Rauf Bey (Orbay) by asking, "Why are the Allies holding back from appointing Ambassadors or Ministers and resuming regular diplomatic relations with Turkey? ... Rauf Bey replied, "I think the reason is this, France and Great Britain expect something to happen in Turkey, that is, some reaction to take place, and they are waiting to see what is going to happen before they commit themselves."<sup>47</sup>

Diplomatic ambivalence continued through 1925 and 1926. A message from the State Department to the American Embassy, Constantinople informed, "British representative at Constantinople to inform Turkish Government March 1st, provided Italian and French representatives receive similar instructions, that these three governments will appoint ambassadors to Turkey."<sup>48</sup> By April 1925, the State Department instructed the "undesirability of suggesting resumption of diplomatic relations at present time... President requests that Admiral Bristol remains in Turkey as High Commissioner."<sup>49</sup> Nonetheless, Bristol was addressed as "Mr. Representative" every time he held a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister. In regard to his request about purchasing a building in Ankara, Bristol was informed "The Department regrets to inform you that it has not been possible to secure an appropriation for the acquisition of a house at Angora."<sup>50</sup>

In September 1925, after seven and a half years of absence Bristol visited the U.S.A. He spoke favorably about Turkey's progress, advised ratification of the treaty as well as advising that representatives of foreign trade from the U.S. should equip themselves with information of foreign lands.<sup>51</sup>

Against the letter of support for the treaty written by Mary Mills Patrick, President Emeritus of Constantinople Girls' College, David H. Miller (Chair, American Committee Opposed to the Ratification of the Lausanne Treaty) asked why the U.S.A. should be bound by what the

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, March 28, 1924.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, December 10, 1924.

<sup>48</sup> Bristol Papers, Official Correspondence, Box 61, February 22, 1925.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, April 3, 1925.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, March 12, 1925.

<sup>51</sup> "Admiral Bristol Says Turkey is Advancing," *New York Times*, September 13, 1925, p. XX8.

Allies acceded to at Lausanne while America was not a part of the conference. The most favored nation clause in the treaty was of no consequence since the U.S.A. had such a small volume of trade with Turkey. Moreover, the Lausanne Treaty (with the Allies) repudiated the Wilson award to Armenia, therefore the U.S.A. should not be an “accessory” to what the writer called “the Kemalist junta.”<sup>52</sup> “If there was ever a psychological moment not to sign a treaty of amity and commerce with Turkey, it is now” wrote a missionary medical doctor, who had served in Turkey before. He invited the European nations to unite and reverse their Lausanne Treaty and settle “the status of the Near East once and for all.”<sup>53</sup> He may have had personal reasons to object. “Mission medical work was crippled when all foreign doctors who had not practiced in Turkey prior to 1914 were denied licenses.”<sup>54</sup> The Foreign Policy Association, while having reported favorably for ratification of the treaty, claimed to have represented both favorable and unfavorable views, and denied interference in the controversy.<sup>55</sup>

At issue was the forced relocation of the Armenian population from northeast, east and central Anatolia to the Syrian province in 1915 because of the revolts instigated by Dashnak militia (Dashnaksutiun, the Armenian revolutionary federation) who infiltrated Turkey in 1914 before the Russian army’s advance and occupation of the eastern provinces during the war. Revolts ensued in 1915. The CUP government decided to relocate the Armenian population, a centuries old Ottoman practice applied to populations perceived to partake in revolt against the central government. Relocation on foot resulted in the deaths and murder of still very controversial numbers of people. The idea was to deter further revolts, but the state either did not or could not provide for the safety of its subjects at a time when the Empire was fighting a war on multiple fronts. This was a mutually destructive episode as well as a horrid case of rebellion, retaliation, retribution, and falling prey

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<sup>52</sup> David Hunter Miller, “Against Lausanne Treaty,” *New York Times*, November 3, 1925, p. 24.

<sup>53</sup> Wilfred M. Post, “The Treaty of Lausanne,” *New York Times*, December 18, 1925, p. 22.

<sup>54</sup> Daniel, p. 55.

<sup>55</sup> James G. McDonald, “Treaty with Turkey,” *New York Times*, May 28, 1926, p. 20; “The Lausanne Treaty; Should the United States Ratify It?,” [Discussed by Hon. James W. Gerard, Prof. Edward M. Earle, Rev. Albert W. Staub, Prof. A. D. F. Hamlin, Dr. James L. Barton, Henry W. Jessup et al.] (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1924), pp. 1–31.

to marauders. On the one hand was the moral obligation and responsibility of the Ottoman government for the safety of all its subjects. Conversely, there was the moral irresponsibility of a non-state actor, the radical Armenian Dashnak party and its militants. Juxtapositions involved in the matter would later prove irreconcilable.

After the war, accounts were settled immediately with those who were held responsible for the decision to relocate the Armenians. In 1921, Talât Pasha, the former Minister of the Interior was assassinated in Berlin, followed by the assassination of Said Halim Pasha, the former grand vizier. Cemal Pasha, the third of the CUP triumvirs, was assassinated in Tiflis in 1922. Dr. Azmi and Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, from the inner circle of the Committee for Union and Progress were also killed by Armenian gunmen in Germany. In Turkey, Dr. Reşid, the governor of Diyarbakır, held responsible for the massacres in his district, committed suicide before he was apprehended in 1919. Among hundreds of district administrators accused of criminal negligence under custody in İstanbul under Allied occupation, the district administrator of Boğazlıyan, Yozgat (Kemal Bey) and Urfa (Nusret Bey) were tried in an Ottoman military court, and executed. The Sèvres Treaty of 1920 which remained unratified, nonetheless stipulated in Article 230 that the Ottoman state had to turn over persons who were accused of having committed collective murder to the Allied courts.<sup>56</sup> In contrast, there was only one reference to this issue in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923; persons accused of upsetting the peace in eastern Turkey were to be included in a general amnesty.<sup>57</sup> Signatories to the Hague peace conference of 1907 had agreed on inserting the category of war crimes into the agreement, and the Ottoman Empire was a signatory. However, at the time trying people for war crimes was still accepted as the sovereign right of a country where such crimes were committed. Crimes against a country's own subjects or citizens did not come under the jurisdiction of international law, nor was there a mechanism to enforce it. Consequently, the moral dimension of the tragedy was the only venue left to the anti-Turkish lobby in the U.S.A. to put pressure on the Congress against ratification of the treaties. Additionally, "though American missionary and educa-

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<sup>56</sup> *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Çöküş Belgeleri (Mondros Bırakışması ve Sevr Andlaşması, İlgili Belgeler)*, comp. Seha L. Meray and Osman Olcay (Documentation of the Mudros Armistice and the Sèvres Treaty) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1977), pp. 113–114.

<sup>57</sup> Levent Yılmaz, "Akıl Tutulması-1-2," *Radikal*, January 30 and 31, 2007.

tional activity in the Ottoman Empire continued to expand, American influence in the late 19th century was overshadowed by the inflow of British, French, and eventually German capital for major investments in [the] development of transport and industry. The US avoided political investment in the 'Eastern Question' and American popular attitudes became increasingly colored by missionary orientation to the Christian minorities, especially the Armenians."<sup>58</sup>

The Armenians were a special case for the American missionaries, because it was among this community that they had been most successful in managing conversions from the ancient Gregorian faith to Protestantism. In the 19th century, the Sublime Porte (Ottoman government) had recognized the Protestant Armenian *millet* (Ottoman categorization of peoples according to congregations) along with the Catholic and Gregorian Armenian *millet*. Hence, the construction of the mutual massacres of 1915–1917 for the Americans was one of a Muslim-Christian conflict, while the Ottoman government regarded it as treason because of Armenian insurgency and collaboration with the Russians with whom the Empire was at war.<sup>59</sup> At first, the Ottoman government exempted Catholic and Protestant Armenian communities, families of artisans, along with families whose male members were serving in the Ottoman army, and those who converted to Islam, from forced resettlements. However, with ensuing panic in the government when Russian armies were fast approaching its borders, collective punishment was meted out to the Armenian population by forcing them to relocate in the prohibitive climate of the Deir ez-Zor desert lands. A disproportionate number of these people either died or were massacred on route. This was not only a matter which scandalized the Americans,

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<sup>58</sup> Paul Henze, "Turkey, the Alliance and the Middle East, Problems and Opportunities in Historical Perspective" Working Paper No. 36, International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Center (December 1981), p. 4; Robert L. Daniel, "The Armenian Question and American-Turkish Relations, 1914–1927," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (September 1959), pp. 252–275; George A. Plimpton, "The United States and Lausanne Treaty," *New Orient*, July 1926, pp. 20–24; Robert F. Zeidner, "Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7 (1976), pp. 465–483; Mark Malkasian, "The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause in the United States, 1918–1927" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16 (1984), pp. 349–365; Levon Maraşlyan, *Ermeni Sorunu ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, 1919–1923* (Originally entitled Economic Influences on U.S. Policies Toward Turkey and Armenians, 1919–1923) (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2000), courtesy of the Author.

<sup>59</sup> Tevfik Çavdar, *Talât Paşa* (Talât Pasha, a Biography) (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 1984), pp. 371–378.

but many Turks who turned against the Committee for Union and Progress government.

There was another party, according to Admiral Bristol, who clandestinely lobbied against ratification of the treaties: the British, but for a different purpose.

When Negley Farson, representative of the *Chicago Daily News* visited Bristol, the Admiral gave him an article from the *New York Herald*, that he stated “was an evidence of the propaganda which the English foreign office is putting into the American Press... There are quotations in this article said to have come from English diplomats. It is a very clever quotation as it is sure to appeal to the American public and in the second place by using the words ‘mad dog’ carries the gravest kind of insult to the Turks.”<sup>60</sup> According to the Admiral, Britain was trying to influence American public opinion to destroy any sympathy there might be in the U.S. in case the League of Nations delivered an unfavorable decision regarding Turkey’s claims on Mosul. London might also have found it expedient to block any official treaty between Turkey and the U.S.A., to keep the latter outside that geography.

Despite rejection by the U.S. Senate of the treaty, the American Embassy in Constantinople found it beneficial to publicize favorable criticism that appeared in the American press, with examples from *New York Times*, *New York World*, *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, *Baltimore Sun*, *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, and *New York Herald Tribune*.<sup>61</sup> The *New York Herald Tribune* wrote “Seldom has a decision in foreign affairs been taken with more emotions and greater disregard for realities” which reflected the views of the other papers above. On January 20, 1927 Bristol visited Ankara, apprehensively at first, because of non-ratification. Before he met with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü Bey [Aras], he was conveyed a message through Reşit Bey, owner of *L’Echo de Turquie* that all Americans, official as well as private persons would “receive the same courtesy and consideration which had been accorded to us in the past.”<sup>62</sup>

However, resumption of diplomatic relations could not be delayed any longer as far as the Secretary of State was concerned. He instructed Bristol to sound out the Turks about the resumption of diplomatic and

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<sup>60</sup> Bristol Papers, “War Diary,” January 26, 1926.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, January 22, 1926.

<sup>62</sup> Bristol Papers, “Confidential Diary,” January 20, 1927.

consular relations on the basis of an exchange of notes. He added, "If the Government of Turkey fears that the Government of the United States at some future time might endeavor to revive the capitulations, you should inquire very discreetly whether that fear might not be allayed by including an understanding on the above exchange of notes."<sup>63</sup> By February 1927, notes were signed and exchanged. These notes did not have to be acted upon by either legislature. Accordingly, "Turkey and the United States of America are agreed to establish between themselves diplomatic and consular relations, based upon the principles of international law, and to proceed to appointment of Ambassadors as soon as possible."<sup>64</sup> *L'Echo de Turquie* wrote,

Mr. Coolidge, a clear sighted and experienced statesman, took the initiative to renew with us relations in spite of the vote of the Senate... Our Minister of Foreign Affairs has fulfilled all our expectations, he knew what line of conduct he should take in order to change failure into success... While speaking of the last phase of Turco-American relations it is impossible not to mention Admiral Bristol. It must be recognized that a part in the honor is due to the Honorable Admiral Bristol who has won the respect and affection of all those who have come in touch with him in Turkey.<sup>65</sup>

At the end of March, Bristol was assigned as Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station following Admiral Williams' retirement. In April, Joseph C. Grew, a prominent diplomat who had served as Undersecretary of State was assigned as Ambassador to Turkey. Why was Turkey being honored by a first rate diplomat? There were multiple reasons for this assignment.

Grew was appointed Undersecretary of the State Department after the Rogers Act established the Foreign Service in 1924. Integration of the former Consular and Diplomatic Services raised difficult issues. Within three years there was serious debate over career diplomats who were promoted twice as fast as consular members while Grew served as chairman of the Personnel Committee. Bureaucratic infighting boiled over into the press. According to Grew's biographer, "a news service

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<sup>63</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, (1927) Vol. III (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), From: The Secretary of State To: High Commissioner in Turkey, January 27, 1927, 711.672/550.

<sup>64</sup> Armaoğlu, pp. 110–112.

<sup>65</sup> Bristol Papers, Miscellany, Box 91, Transl. *L'Echo de Turquie*, "Turkey and America" March 19, 1927.

feature writer directed public attention to Grew. He pictured Kellogg (Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg) and Grew feuding and Grew “doggedly fighting appointment as Ambassador to Turkey.” Grew and Wilson [another colleague] were accused of being heads of an inner circle of social diplomats which has set the well-to-do diplomats over the hard working consuls.<sup>66</sup> Consequently, though Grew’s appointment as Ambassador to Turkey was perceived as yet another self-promotion by some in the Congress, it was “time for him to leave,” and “Kellogg, who was glad to see him go, to be sure, but loyal and kindly too, was undeterred.”<sup>67</sup>

Another plausible reason why Grew was chosen to fill the post of Ambassador in Turkey was because he had been the U.S. Minister in Switzerland who negotiated the American version of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 with İsmet Pasha, now Prime Minister in Ankara. Secretary of State Kellogg remarked at Grew’s farewell luncheon, “It is appropriate that he should represent this country in Constantinople, the gateway to the East.”<sup>68</sup> While the statement pointed to the fact that the Administration and the Department were far from being isolationist, Kellogg still had Constantinople in mind, and thus stood short of fully recognizing the new capital of Turkey. The Turkish-American relationship, however, had come a long way from U.S. representation by a High Commissioner to Ambassador. Taking up residence in Constantinople did not seem peculiar to Grew while he kept on referring to the rented building in Ankara as the “American Embassy.”<sup>69</sup>

Meanwhile, Grew waited anxiously for eleven months for confirmation of his Ambassadorship by the Senate, where there was opposition to his appointment. “I did not wish to be withdrawn from Turkey,” he noted in his diary.<sup>70</sup> Confirmation at long last came in April 1928. But this was a re-confirmation following the first one, because one motion and a resolution had been submitted to prevent it.

“In time, living away from the capital became embarrassing... The government badly wanted Ankara accorded the prestige of ambassadors in residence, and İsmet himself inquired when the United States

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<sup>66</sup> Heinrichs, p. 122.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>68</sup> “Mr. Grew’s Speech at the Farewell Luncheon” *The American Foreign Service Journal* (April 1927), p. 239.

<sup>69</sup> Grew, *Turbulent Era*, pp. 718–719.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 744.

would build a permanent Embassy there.”<sup>71</sup> By 1931, the American and Italian Ambassadors were the only ones left residing in Constantinople. There is no indication from his official correspondence or diary that he asked the State Department to initiate appropriations to purchase or erect a permanent building in Ankara. He may have had his own reasons. Ankara’s altitude was not favorable to Mrs. Grew’s health. He had access to the business world in Constantinople, which was lacking in Ankara. Keeping his distance from Ankara seemed more expedient. But, more than everything else, the family loved Constantinople. Though a personal and not a professional choice, official premises in Palazzo di Corpi in Pera and a home on the Bosphorus at Yeniköy were incomparable in beauty to the unattractive Ankara. That said Grew probably did not want to take another risk of being turned down this time by the Senate Appropriations Committee.

The Ambassador worked to reconcile missionary schools with the cultural nationalism of new Turkey. He was successful in this endeavor by convincing the few remaining missionary schools to cancel religious instruction and remain as an educational model to be emulated. Sensing that the Turkish Government valued American education, he did not try to overplay his hand about the schools.

Meanwhile, signing Treaties of Arbitration and Conciliation became a trend in international affairs. Although Turkey signed such treaties with a number of countries, including Italy, Ankara became immediately suspicious when Washington proposed such a treaty. The pro-Armenian platform in the Democratic Party in the United States caused Turkey to be leery of a treaty, because it feared that Washington just might use it on behalf of the Armenian-Americans. There was considerable property in Turkey, taken over from Armenian ownership after a certain period of time under the Abandoned Properties Law. Ankara found the “domestic jurisdiction” term in the draft treaty proposal ambiguous as to whether or not this term might allow American or Turkish jurisdiction to handle potential claims from U.S. citizens. Howland Shaw, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs told the Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Muhtar Bey that the Department could not possibly change the language of the proposed treaty, because all these treaties had to be uniform in order that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should not take the Department of State to task as to why the treaty with Turkey

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<sup>71</sup> Heinrichs, pp. 152–153.

was differently worded.<sup>72</sup> Ankara complied, and the treaty was signed on March 23, 1928. Claims based on the treaty followed after it was signed in December 1928. Although the treaty is not recorded in the series on Turkey's Treaties, it shows up in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, it seems that the agreement never reached the point of ratification. The claims issue dated back to the U.S.-Turkish negotiations in Lausanne where Grew was unable to extract a commitment from İsmet Pasha for compensation regarding damage and loss to American-owned property during the war. The issue was left outside the treaties signed in 1923, to be negotiated at a later date.

In 1934 the Turkish Government agreed to pay to the American Government the sum of \$1,300,000 covering claims of American citizens arising during the World War and in the years immediately following. During 1937, the United States Government came to the conclusion, after exhaustive examination, that no more than \$900,000 in legitimate American claims had been clearly established. As a voluntary act, the American Government released Turkey from its obligation to pay approximately \$400,000 of the sum agreed. The Turkish Ambassador, in expressing deep appreciation for this generous act, stated that it was 'unprecedented' in international relations.<sup>74</sup>

It is not clear how these claims were managed by the U.S. government domestically, but the general principle being that American businesses abroad were there on their own cognizance, the chances are that the administration was only a facilitator and not a party to the claims. And, given Ankara's stance it is doubtful that any claims by Armenian-Americans would be allowed in the diplomatic negotiations traffic. Hence, claims died a natural death.

Grew displayed overt support to Atatürk's reforms. On September 13, 1928, he reported, "We are the first Embassy to use the Latin characters on our automobile tags; as soon as the Ghazi's fiat went forth to the country, I promptly gave orders to have all the Embassy tags brightly painted: 'U.S.A.-Amerika Sefâreti-359...' and took particular pleasure in pointing them out to Rouschen Eshref so that the Ghazi might

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<sup>72</sup> National Archives, State Department Records, Decimal File 711.6712A/36, Memorandum of Conversation with Ahmed Mouhtar Bey, Turkish Ambassador, July 21, 1928.

<sup>73</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States* [henceforth FRUS] (1934), vol. II, pp. 940-950.

<sup>74</sup> State Department Records, Report from the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Decimal File (illegible), April 5, 1938.

promptly learn of it.”<sup>75</sup> There were also a number of American advisors invited to Turkey and employed to report on agricultural methods and the economy.<sup>76</sup> Another area of mutual interest was aviation.

In March 1929, a representative of the Curtiss-Wright Aeroplane Company, Mario Calderera arrived in Ankara. Turkey’s contract with the German Junkers Company to build motors and airplanes had come to a halt, but it needed to be officially annulled before any other contract could be made.<sup>77</sup> Calderera inquired of the Turks if the Aero-Expresso Italiano could service flights between İstanbul and İzmir, but was told that since the latter was in a military zone, this would not be possible. The Aviation League spokesman, however, contended that should an American company obtain such a contract to establish airlines in Turkey, the rules regarding military zones would not count. “In view of this attitude... I am inclined to question the advisability of the Curtiss Company’s being represented in Turkey by a former Italian navy officer, who, himself, stated to me that he was not averse from assisting Italian interests in Turkey as well as American interests, since he believed that no conflict could arise between the two”<sup>78</sup> wrote the second secretary of the American legation, Jefferson Patterson, in Ankara. Patterson reminded Calderera that the Turkish officials obviously wanted American rather than European enterprise (like Aero-Expresso Italiano) to develop Turkey’s civil and military aerial establishment. Patterson also thought that Calderera’s citizenship and past affiliations as a naval intelligence officer prejudiced the Turks against the Curtiss Company.

In his meeting with the President of the Aviation League Fuad Bey (Bulca), Calderera suggested that a Turkish military commission visit the United States at the expense of the Curtiss Company to view their resources. On March 21, 1929, Calderera met with the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Fevzi Pasha (Çakmak), who was interested in establishing a modern aviation school and air station near Eskişehir. While Patterson accompanied Calderera during his visit to the General Staff, he was instructed by his ambassador to “make it clear to Fevzi Pasha that Mr. Calderera represented a private American concern, in

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<sup>75</sup> Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p. 790.

<sup>76</sup> Trask, “The United States and Turkish Nationalism: Investments and Technical Aid during the Atatürk Era.”

<sup>77</sup> Jefferson Patterson, “Diaries,” (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress Manuscript Division) Box 1, Folder 1, pp. 170–171.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 171–184.

the negotiations of which the American Government had no special interest.”<sup>79</sup>

In 1929, a Turkish aeronautical mission went to the United States to study American aviation and report on the possibility of purchasing equipment.<sup>80</sup> The following year a team from the Curtiss-Wright Export Company made aerial demonstrations in Turkey for the military market.<sup>81</sup>

The Turkish Aviation League representative Ahmet Emin Bey, however, “urged the Company [Curtiss-Wright] to send a properly qualified representative to Turkey, in order to institute direct negotiations with the authorities.”<sup>82</sup> Obviously, Calderera who was an Italian citizen and a former officer, introduced to Turkey through the Paris branch of the American company, was not deemed trustworthy either by the Turkish authorities or the American diplomat.

German companies which relied on government subsidies could no longer compete effectively in the face of government cuts because of the world economic crisis. However, the French were not affected by the crisis and attempted to consolidate strategic air routes. A representative of the Compagnie Internationale de Navigation Aeirene asked Ankara for permit to have the airplanes service between İstanbul and Paris, renew flights between İstanbul and Ankara, and extend its service to Aleppo in Syria-under-French-mandate. However, “the Turkish military authorities had expressed themselves unwilling to have any foreign aerial service [read European] prolong its activities either to Ankara or across the country. Accordingly, it would seem that the Curtiss Company had a better chance of invading this hitherto reserved field than any of its European competitors.”<sup>83</sup>

In March 1931, two American civilian aviators, Russell Boardman and John Polando set a world record which would stand for eighteen months, by flying non-stop from New York to İstanbul. In practice, the pilots served as goodwill ambassadors when Grew received and publicized the flight, while Mustafa Kemal Pasha honored them with an invitation. During the 1930s, there was increasing interest in Ankara

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<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.

<sup>80</sup> Stuart Kline et al. (comp.), *A Chronicle of Turkish Aviation*, (Istanbul: Havas, 2002), p. 162.

<sup>81</sup> Patterson, p. 165.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, Box 1, Folder 2, p. 331.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 338.

about modern aviation, and consultants were invited from the United States to make feasibility studies on suitable airports and to map air routes. The Vice President of Curtiss-Wright Company reported that Turkey was on its way to build its air transportation according to American standards.<sup>84</sup> The development of commercial and military aviation subsequently began by initiating contracts between the Government of Turkey and Curtiss-Wright Company.

In December 1929, Grew reported to the Secretary of State about the protocol signed between Ankara and Moscow to extend for two years the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara made a declaration to the United States that:

In the protocol which we have just signed with Mr. Karakhan containing provisions as to securing the consent of the other party before concluding political arrangements which go beyond normal agreements, we have only Europe and Asia in view and we have been influenced by geographical position... In any case, the negotiations which have taken place, with our neighbors, the Soviets are limited to the relations of our two countries and in the protocol which has been signed no country has been particularly envisaged and it in no way applies to America.<sup>85</sup>

Grew advised that this declaration should be accepted in good faith, and his counterpart in Washington, D.C. Ahmet Muhtar Bey reiterated the same points to the Secretary of State.<sup>86</sup> The intent was to reassert that this treaty did not present any obstacles to developing sound relations with the United States which did not recognize the Soviet Union at the time.

During Grew's tenure, a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce in 1930 and another of Establishment and Residence in 1932 were ratified. In January 1932, he received word that he was appointed to Japan.

Meanwhile, Grew's daughter Anita was to wed the diplomat, Robert McCalla English. The civil ceremony took place at the Pera Municipality where the governor of Istanbul, Muhiddin Bey (Üstündağ) and the British Ambassador were witnesses. The church wedding was performed by

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<sup>84</sup> Kline et al., p. 180.

<sup>85</sup> *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. III, 1929 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1944), From: Grew To: the Secretary of State, December 20, 1929, p. 843.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, Declaration Made by the Turkish Ambassador (Ahmet Muhtar) to the Secretary of State on January 2, 1930, p. 845.

Dr. Caleb Gates, the President of Robert College. Since Embassy regulations required that weddings in the Embassy had to be held in accordance with the local laws Grew thought that the governor of İstanbul exaggerated when he interpreted this as a friendly gesture by the U.S. Ambassador.<sup>87</sup> But this obviously meant something more than just complying with the law of the land. One would seriously doubt that double wedding performances would have taken place in the Old Turkey, but now this occasion was a gesture respecting the Republican Civil Law by the American Ambassador. The marriage called for an enthusiastic reception in more ways than one. These may have been symbolic gestures but they meant a lot. Other American records of the 1930s permit a recapture of the mood and attitude of the Turkish people as well as the domestic situation interpreted by the American representatives.

*Turkey in the 1930s through the Eyes of American Officials*

From April through July 1930, the İstanbul Embassy reported on the arrest and trial of spies and communists. These observers were not sure, however, whether these alleged communists were genuine or just ordinary people who dared criticize the dire economic situation and unemployment. Given the attitude of the authorities that only spies and communists would say things like that, and coupled with secret trials, consular members had a point in questioning the nature of these arrests.<sup>88</sup>

Regarding the closure of Fethi Bey's (Okyar) Liberal Republican Party on November 17, 1930 which Grew defined as an experiment with a little bit of democracy, he reported "The Ghazi, Fethi and even İsmet did not know the state of opinion in Turkey, had no idea apparently of the strength of resentment which was gathering momentum underneath... The new Party had become a clinical thermometer for taking the political temperature of the country and there could be no doubt of the fever which it registered."<sup>89</sup> Mustafa Kemal, after a three-month

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<sup>87</sup> Grew, *Turbulent Era*, pp. 911–913.

<sup>88</sup> Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1930–1944 (American Library Microfilm Collection, Ankara), (henceforth, State Department Records) Decimal File 867.9111/272/274/275/280, April 22, May 6, May 20 and July 14, 1930.

<sup>89</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.00/2049, From: Grew To: the Secretary of State, December 3, 1930.

long tour of the country, saw that reform in the Republican People's Party was necessary. But his solution was to reshuffle people who held positions in the Party and the Parliament through new appointments and elections.

In March 1931, a report from the American Consulate in İzmir was entitled, "Is Turkey Threatened with Bolshevism?" A Turk had informed the government that given desperation stemming from unemployment, starvation and opposition to the tax collectors, a Bolshevik revolt only awaited its leaders in İzmir. The leading dailies in the city, *Yeni Asır* and *Hizmet* also carried editorial comments about the Bolshevik danger. According to the American Consul, there was no discernible unrest or mass demonstrations. Instead he pointed to external conditions which might push Turkey to "succumb to the wiles of the Siren of the Steppes." One would be deliberate Soviet expansionism. Secondly, because Turkey was isolated as a result of the recent rapprochement between France, Italy, and Great Britain, there were rumors that all three had agreed to a re-partition of Turkey. If that was the case, Ankara would probably seek support from the Soviet Union and thus adopt Bolshevism. Lastly, if the "Turkish experiment" failed and disorder along with the threat of foreign intervention ensued, Turkey just might join the Bolsheviks.<sup>90</sup>

The Ankara Government, however, had been sensitive to communist infiltration ever since 1919. In January 1928, an American diplomat in Ankara, reported that

More than 100 Hungarians (some 50 of them having been employed on various construction projects in and about Angora) belonging to the so-called Angora Guild of the Hungarian Communist Party, were arrested by the Angora authorities. Of these all but 30 have been released and it is thought that those still in the custody of the police will be deported from Turkey... The Hungarian Minister, Hertelendy confirmed the case and said that those 30 men were members of a communistic organization formed under the direction of a Bolshevik agent operating from Vienna, and that of these nine would almost certainly be obliged to go to Soviet Russia, since his own Government was not likely to admit them to Hungarian territory.<sup>91</sup>

According to the Hungarian Minister, the Soviet Embassy in Ankara was not involved in this affair, because Moscow had chosen Vienna as

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<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, Decimal File 867.00/2060, From: Herbert S. Bursley To: the Secretary of State, March 23, 1931.

<sup>91</sup> Patterson, "Diaries," Box 1, Folder 75, pp. 82-83.

the center for propaganda among the Balkan states, including Turkey. Consequently, Ankara remained vigilant towards any kind of communist propaganda by foreign or native elements, though sometimes it was difficult to distinguish between genuine communists and those who were openly critical of the government.

On January 16, 1932, Grew reported:

On New Year's Eve Ismet Pasha gave to Miss Ring, the correspondent of the ASSOCIATED PRESS, the enclosed message of greeting to the American people which was no doubt published in the United States, although possibly in abridged form. So far as I am aware, this is the first time that the Prime Minister has ever given such a message to any foreign press agency, unless in connection with some international event such as the signing of a treaty or on the occasion of the visit of some foreign statesman.

Signals of friendship and good neighborly relations signified Turkey's foreign policy in the 1930s. At a press conference upon his return to the United States, Grew emphasized this point. He said that:

One of the greatest and most moving things he ever saw was the change from Lausanne with Venizelos on one side and Ismet Pasha on the other side of the table belaboring each other with angry words. Then, after centuries of intermittent warfare, the Turks and Greeks decided to patch up the old quarrels, an agreement was arrived at, and Venizelos had the courage to pay a visit of courtesy to Angora. When he arrived he met a genuine welcome. There were Greek flags about the town and a triumphal arch bearing the word 'Welcome' in Greek—something incredible three or four years ago.

The American diplomat did not refer to the fact that behind the Greco-Turkish rapprochement lurked the common perception of threat from Italy. Above and beyond altruism and noble intent was Mussolini's shadow. The Ambassador added that while Turkey received much criticism about the Greek-Turkish population exchange in 1925, it was seldom known or acknowledged that this was not a Turkish idea, but that it was initiated by Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees.<sup>92</sup> This was not entirely correct. Nansen was only a facilitator for the mutual Greek and Turkish intent to exchange populations.<sup>93</sup> Thus Grew's era of U.S. diplomacy in Turkey ended.

<sup>92</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 711.67/79, January 16, 1932, From: Grew To: the Secretary of State.

<sup>93</sup> Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomasi ve Göç; Türk-Yunan Mübadelesinin Öteki Yüzü* (Diplomacy and Emigration; the Other Face of Turkish-Greek Population Exchange) (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), pp. 75–93.

A very bizarre encounter, this time instigated by a Turk with Wallace Murray of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, took place in March 1932. A former Turkish Army Captain, who had previously served as Secretary of Legation and Military Attaché in 1930 in Vienna, called on Murray in Washington, D.C. He initially requested an appointment with the Secretary of State, but was intercepted by the chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs. The visitor's message went as follows:

The Turkish people are in the grip of a merciless dictatorship which is slowly bringing the country to ruin... Although Kemal government would not voluntarily throw itself into the arms of Russia, the eventual Sovietization of Turkey is inevitable unless the present leaders of the country are overthrown and a new regime established capable of saving the country from political and economic disaster... A fantastic feature of his plan is the admission into the United States of some fifty to sixty thousand Turks who may become organized into a conquering host to overwhelm the present dictators of Turkey. More fantastic still is the idea of this person that after the overthrow occurs, an American should be elected President of Turkey.<sup>94</sup>

The informant added that he was not betraying his country and was not out for any personal gain. His closing remarks were that he would like to see Abdülmecid Efendi, the former caliph-in-exile to become Honorary President of the Republic, with an American in actual presidential authority. Murray at first thought that the man was insane, but gradually was convinced that he was very serious.

One week later Murray informed G. Howland Shaw, American Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in İstanbul about the visit and conversation. Murray jested "If of the two of us he turns out to be the rational one and I the irrational one, and if his plans materialize, I warn you in advance that I intend to propose your name as the first American president of Turkey."<sup>95</sup> The Turk would return to Vienna and pretend he was studying there before going home so that Ankara would be under the impression that he had been in Vienna all along. It was not lost on Murray that this person may be financed by the former caliph Abdülmecid to take upon such an expensive journey to the U.S.A. "Be that as it may, I should not like to be in his boots if the Turks ever find out about it" he concluded.

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<sup>94</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.00/2064 ½, From: Wallace Murray To: the Secretary of State, March 10, 1932.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

On the one hand, a number of opportunistic people claimed money, property or other privileges in the name of one or the other member of the dynasty in exile and this may have been just a much more ambitious attempt of the same sort. In essence, several Muslim Congresses met outside Turkey in 1924, 1926, 1931, and 1935 in search of a new caliph, but could not agree on a candidate. Therefore, the issue became moot.<sup>96</sup> On the other hand, there are some clues from the British archives that indicate demarches from the former caliph Abdülmecid exploring whether he could be reinstated as sultan/caliph especially as Atatürk's health deteriorated in 1938. Abdülmecid himself and a nephew of the last sultan Vahideddin, Prince Sami (Mediha sultan's son, Vahideddin's sister) directly sought British help to have the dynasty reinstated. Consequently, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the former anonymous Turkish officer who traveled from Vienna to Washington, D.C. in 1932 was on Abdülmecid's pay. That seems not only possible but even plausible given the following reports.

Prince Sami who resided in France requested that he and his family be given asylum in England (provided that the British government would underwrite their expenses) in a letter to a member of the British Foreign Office. He also stated that the Germans backed the former caliph Abdülmecid. Moreover, he claimed that Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, and Turkey's ambassador to London, Fethi Okyar were pro-German, the last two supported the Islamic movement, and were prepared to restore Abdülmecid (presumably when Atatürk died) under Germany's protection. However, many officers in the army were pro-British, happened to be friends of Sami's father (actually his step father, Damad Ferid Pasha), and were working to establish a political party in Turkey. Sami, therefore, could be of service to Britain. This demarche was not received favorably either at the Foreign Office or by Britain's ambassador in Ankara, Sir Percy Loraine.<sup>97</sup> There was no love lost between

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<sup>96</sup> Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled, the Advent of Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Mim Kemal Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri* (Movements for the Restoration of Caliphate) (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1991).

<sup>97</sup> PRO, FO 371/21934, April 4, 1938, in Erdoğan Karakuş, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Öncesi İngiliz Belgelerinde Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri (1938-1939)* (Turkey's Relations with Britain in British Records on the Eve of World War II) (İstanbul: İQ Kültür ve Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006), pp. 238-240.

the families of Abdülmecid and Vahideddin and this rivalry continued even in exile.<sup>98</sup>

The other demarche came through somewhat circumstantial evidence, but it is on record nonetheless. In 1938, the British Prime Minister's Office requested an opinion from the Foreign Office about a letter received from Abdülmecid who resided in France. The letter was not available in the archives. However, the reply to the Prime Ministry referred to the claims of the former dynast on the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate and advised against establishing an official tie with the claimant especially at a time when the President of Turkey was seriously ill. The Foreign Office advised to treat the reply letter as a matter of courtesy and thank its author for his expressions of goodwill.<sup>99</sup> Abdülmecid returned to his favorite occupation which was painting and today he is only remembered as one of the pioneers of European-style painting, as well as a composer of classical music and a poet.<sup>100</sup> Ankara must have had reason not to trust the former caliph because as soon as Abdülmecid took up residence in Nice, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened a consulate in the city whose only mission was to watch him.<sup>101</sup> While the nascent Republic tried to consolidate its authority at home and deter threats from all venues, an unlikely U.S. Ambassador attracted American military attention to Turkey.

The new non-career American Ambassador and former general, Charles H. Sherrill replaced Grew, but he was to spend only one year in Turkey, "ignorant of his post" as he admitted in January 1933.<sup>102</sup> But he had able assistants to brief him. Before Sherrill left Washington for Turkey, he suggested to the U.S. Army Chief of the Staff, General Douglas MacArthur that he might be interested to include Turkey on his agenda while visiting Prague, Vienna and Budapest. Sherrill cleared the potential visit with Ankara and was told that President Mustafa Kemal would receive MacArthur at his summer residence in Yalova, near Istanbul.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Murat Bardakçı, *Son Osmanlılar* (The Last of the Ottomans) 6th ed. (İstanbul: Gri Yayınları, 2004), pp. 117–122.

<sup>99</sup> PRO, FO 371.21935, October 7, 1938, in Karakuş, p. 256.

<sup>100</sup> Günsel Renda et al., *Hanedandan bir Ressam, Abdülmecid Efendi* (Abdülmecid Efendi, A Painter from the Dynasty) (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2004).

<sup>101</sup> Bardakçı, p. 126.

<sup>102</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.00/2099, December 27, 1932.

<sup>103</sup> From: Sherrill To: The Secretary of State, July 1, 1932, *Ibid*, Decimal File 867.2257–22–164.

Arriving in Turkey on September 25, 1932, MacArthur was cordially received by his Turkish interlocutors both in Istanbul and Ankara. On September 27, Mustafa Kemal received the American general not in his summer residence, but at the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul with due honors. The next day MacArthur laid a wreath at the Monument of the Republic in Taksim which bore the inscription “In token of the admiration and high esteem of the American Forces for Gazi Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish Army.”<sup>104</sup> MacArthur was on a fact finding mission in Central Europe and the Balkans where he carried out military diplomacy as well.

Upon further communist arrests in 1933, the Istanbul Consulate/Embassy reported “Today a communist sentiment is any sentiment Main Street disapproves or even does not understand... A government possessing the authority to punish communist sentiments after trials in secret enjoys a dangerously wide authority to repress criticism by labeling as communistic anything which it deems unpleasant.”<sup>105</sup>

In June 1933, the romantic communist poet Nazım Hikmet (Ran) was arrested for alleged communist sentiment because of a book of verses entitled “Telegrams Coming during the Night.”<sup>106</sup> This was not the first, nor the last time Nazım Hikmet would be arrested.

In fact, there was ideological communist agitation by members of the illegal Turkish Communist Party (TCP), especially for the purpose of infiltrating the Turkish Armed Forces to prepare the young cadets for a future revolution. Poetry and literary circles fed seemingly symbolic but very tangible ideological dissention in tandem with directives from the Komintern. TCP members were also active among the workforce in the cities.<sup>107</sup>

While communist activism<sup>108</sup> remained an abstraction for American observers, aggressive Italian intentions remained a fact. Howland Shaw

<sup>104</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.20111/8 From: Shaw To: the Secretary of State enclosing the Account of General MacArthur’s visit, September 29, 1932.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, Decimal File 867.9111/398, May 3, 1933.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, Decimal File 867.00B/81, June 14, 1933.

<sup>107</sup> “Tek Parti Döneminde Toplumsal Mücadeleler” (Social Movements during the One Party Regime) *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi* (The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Social Movements), Fascicle No. 26 (December 25, 1989) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları).

<sup>108</sup> Aclan Sayılğan, *Solun 94 Yılı, 1871–1965* (A history of the Left 1871–1965) (Ankara: Mars Matbaası, 1968); Saim Göksoy and Edward Timms, *Romantic Communist, the Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet* (London: Hurst and Company, 1999); George Harris, *The Communists and the Kadro Movement; Shaping Ideology in Atatürk’s Turkey*

reported from İstanbul on September 1, 1934 that a certain Hüseyin Hüsnü Pasha, Commander of the İzmir province had sold the military plans of that area to the Italians and at once fled to Rhodes. The Pasha, as a working member of the Turkish General Staff, was privy to the military operational plans.<sup>109</sup> Later, he was assassinated for high treason by two Turkish cadets sent to Rome under the guise of learning Italian to attend the law school there.

Meanwhile, Mussolini sent agents to Marmaris (a coastal town in southwest Turkey) to study the geographical layout for a potential invasion. His fiery speeches about Italy's "historic objectives," meaning the resurrection of the Roman Empire and reference to the Mediterranean as "mare nostrum" generated a formal note of protest from Ankara.

On another occasion, when Italy's ambassador mentioned Italy's claim to Antalya, Atatürk rose, excused himself, left the room and returned shortly thereafter in the uniform of a Turkish marshal. 'Now please continue', he invited the startled ambassador.<sup>110</sup>

There was another reason why Atatürk disliked the fascists who transformed a democratic nation into bullies. "The victorious Pasha, he had become the civilian President. Mussolini, a political agitator, had put on the uniform and airs of a generalissimo."<sup>111</sup> Mussolini emerged as a threat to world peace as of the 1920s.

This became particularly obvious in the eastern Mediterranean where encouragement was given by Mussolini to anti-democratic forces in Egypt and anti-French rebels in Syria and the Lebanon. Moreover, he was still hoping to establish an Italian settlement on the mainland of Asia Minor. He admired the Turkish ruler Kemal Pasha—an admiration not reciprocated—but was ready to stake a claim if Kemal fell from power, and in the meantime proceeded to fortify the islands of Rhodes and Leros off the Turkish coast.<sup>112</sup>

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(İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 2002); *Türkiye Komünist Partisi Merkez Kurulu 1920–1921 Dönüş Belgeleri—1*, Osmanlıca'dan çeviren Yücel Demirel (The Central Committee of the Turkish Communist Party) (İstanbul: TÜTSAV Yayınları, 2004).

<sup>109</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.000/3006, From: Howland Shaw To: the Secretary of State, "Strictly Confidential" September 1, 1934.

<sup>110</sup> Brock Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934–42," *Middle Eastern Studies* 31:3 (July 1995), pp. 483–508, esp. 486.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini*, 5th ed. (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd, 1998), p. 153.

In 1933, a Foreign Service officer, Robert P. Skinner, was appointed ambassador to Turkey. He reported favorably on the patriotic spirit of the Turkish Government, especially its efforts “to lift up the masses” so that future generations may take over and operate in a truly democratic spirit. Skinner found this to be “the most interesting aspect of Turkish political life.” Howland Shaw wrote, “It is easy enough to say that in Turkey the government is a dictatorship and that its fundamental policy is nationalism, but these simple generalizations fail to give an accurate picture of the complex reality.”<sup>113</sup> After a promising start with liberal parliamentarianism, Kurdish rebellions and domestic reactions to the regime forced the government to adopt heavy-handed means. But the modernizing reforms continued. Shaw concluded that “The Turkish Revolution has shown characteristics differing widely from those to which other recent revolutions have accustomed us. A very practical genius with a very marked ability to develop has evidently been at work. That is why Kemal Atatürk’s place in history is secure.”<sup>114</sup> According to one scholar:

The new Turkey is the work of Mustafa Kemal. But that he was able to achieve it is due entirely to the fact that he knew how to give concrete shape to forces and tendencies which for a quarter of a century had been striving to manifest themselves in the life of the east, and that without pause or hesitation or scruples he pressed them forward to fulfillment.<sup>115</sup>

These assessments made in 1935 obviously compared Turkey’s government and leaders with the totalitarian and aggressive foreign policies of many a European country and Stalin’s Soviet Union.

However, the Turkish government was not entirely successful when it came to purchasing war matériel from the United States. By 1935 Washington had developed a policy not to encourage American firms to sell arms and ammunitions to foreign countries. U.S. records reveal that machine tools for repair, tractors, and army trucks were also considered as war matériel. The U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s response to Ambassador Skinner who cabled that the Turkish Government wished to purchase Sperry anti-aircraft searchlights worth \$700,000 “provided Export-Import Bank will grant credit” was negative. Hull did not look

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<sup>113</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.01/204, From: Robert Skinner To: the Secretary of State, enclosing Shaw’s memorandum, July 13, 1935.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Hans Kohn, “Ten Years of the Turkish Republic,” *Foreign Affairs* 12 (October 1933), pp. 141–155.

favorably upon any agency of the government which would finance the sale of arms or any other item that had to do with war on behalf of a foreign government.<sup>116</sup>

On another occasion, Turkey's Prime Minister İnönü requested Skinner to urge his government to authorize an American manufacturer to deliver two Martin bombers a month (of the 16 to be purchased) to Turkey. The U.S. War Department had ordered the manufacturer that out of four bombers produced in one month, only one bomber could be made available to Turkey.<sup>117</sup> The Acting Secretary of State replied: "Decisions in regard to the manufacture of military equipment manufactured according to specifications under the control of the War Department is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of War. I cannot with propriety volunteer advice to the Secretary of War in such a matter."<sup>118</sup> It appears that the U.S. administration did not totally cut off orders contracted prior to 1935, but would not allow initiation of new purchases or increase the volume of former purchases. The Acting Secretary of State reminded Skinner in no uncertain terms about the broader policy involved in prohibiting the sale of arms to foreign countries lest, in case of war, the United States would be criticized for assisting in military preparations of the one side or the other.<sup>119</sup>

In May 1935, Henry S. Villard of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs stated in a memorandum that the Secretary of the Turkish Embassy expressed the desire of his government to purchase a number of B10B Martin bombers from the Glenn L. Martin Company. According to the Turkish diplomat, the U.S. War Department had initially authorized the sale of these planes, "but it now appeared that the War Department was purchasing so many of the planes in question that deliveries could not begin." The Turkish diplomat urged the State Department to use its "good offices" with the War Department to authorize the firm to export the planes. However, the company could only export surplus planes, and there were none left. The State Department could not possibly impose on the Department of War to release the company from

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<sup>116</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, [henceforth, *FRUS*], Vol. I, 1935 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), From: Skinner To: the Secretary of State, January 14, 1935, and Hull's reply, January 15, 1935, p. 1049.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, From: Skinner To: the Secretary of State, February 21, 1935, p. 1049.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, From: William Phillips To: Skinner, February 23, 1935, p. 1050.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, From: William Phillips To: Skinner, March 18, 1935, p. 1050.

its obligation to service the United States.<sup>120</sup> The Turkish Embassy was duly informed.

In June 1935, the Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C. informed the State Department that the Turkish General Staff wanted to invite an experienced American General Staff officer to serve as an instructor to the Army Air School and teach tactics and organization in the Air Force.<sup>121</sup> Wallace Murray, then Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, wrote to the Turkish Ambassador, Münir Erteğün that the State Department had been informed by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff that “there is, unfortunately, no legal authority for compliance with such a request.”<sup>122</sup> This request from Turkey was a sign that Atatürk and his Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak had decided to steer away from the Prussian/German military officers re-employed in the Turkish War Academy or at least balance the presence of those instructors with American officers.

Turkish-German relations had been restored in 1924. Concomitantly, many officers of the German Army were relieved of duty in compliance with the Versailles Treaty. Many had joined the *Freikorps* (the militia which suppressed the attempted socialist revolutions of 1918–1919). Others such as the former Colonel Hans Rohde sought and found employment at the Turkish War Academy on a contractual basis. Having served in Turkey during the First World War, Rohde and his colleagues spoke fluent Turkish, and had many personal contacts among Turkey’s military establishment. The Turkish Army was still being trained according to Prussian formation and tactics, a process which would continue until after the Second World War. Hence, it is plausible that Atatürk and Çakmak wished to change this trend as a deterrent against German influence. Turkey’s President had already expressed his views about a resurgent Germany to General MacArthur in 1932. It was, therefore, only natural for him to reach out to the United States in this matter because the latter was a politically disinterested country. On the other hand, by requesting only one American General Staff officer, Turkey would keep the United States politically disinterested, unlike in

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<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, Memorandum by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, May 20, 1935, p. 1051.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, From: the Turkish Embassy To: the Department of State, June 6, 1935, p. 1052.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, From: Wallace Murray To: the Turkish Ambassador (Munir), June 24, 1936, p. 1053.

Latin America and the Philippines where the U.S. Army had authorization to send military instructors and advisers.

The same year, Ambassador Skinner advised his government to initiate discussion with Ankara about mining and purchasing chrome “before the Turkish authorities have come to the conclusions themselves or have committed themselves even tentatively to foreign interests.”<sup>123</sup> Skinner stated that chrome was indispensable for steel production, the known sources of supply were few, and were mainly in British hands. In the recent past, the British sought to tie Turkish production in a world cartel and may renew their efforts while the Turkish government was trying to cancel leases held by foreign companies. Skinner advised the Department that should chrome mining become totally nationalized, the U.S. could work through the state-owned *Etibank*.

Chrome was listed by the U.S. War Department as a strategic asset and “as one of the four mineral commodities constituting the first priority class for stock-pile reserves.”<sup>124</sup> In 1934, of the 119,844 metric tons of chrome mined in Turkey, 28,730 tons were sold to the U.S.A.; followed by 16,060 tons of the 150,472 production figure in 1935; 19,400 of the 163,880 tons produced in 1936; and 29,391 tons out of 192,508 tons produced in 1937. The estimated figure for 1938 purchase by the U.S. was 205,000 tons.<sup>125</sup> Although the worldwide production of chrome declined in 1938, production in Turkey continued to increase.

The principal producers of chromite in Turkey are the Société Anonyme Turque des Chromes de l'Est à Guleman [Elazığ] (State), Société Minière de Fethiye (French), Société Turque de Minerais (Swiss-German), and Société Anonyme Turque de Chrome (Turkish).<sup>126</sup>

Trade in chrome was later to assume an important dimension in Turkish, German, and Allied country relations during the Second World War.

In 1936, a professional documentary film photographer, Julien Bryan, who later gained fame as a filmmaker for the “March of Time” project, filmed Atatürk in Ankara and in İstanbul in a domestic setting

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<sup>123</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.6359, CHROME/1, From: Skinner To: the Secretary of State, July 25, 1935.

<sup>124</sup> Robert H. Ridgway, “Chromite” (Washington, D.C.: US Bureau of Mines and Minerals Yearbook, 1939), p. 594.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 597, 599.

<sup>126</sup> Ridgway, *Ibid.*, pp. 601–602.

where the President played with his adopted daughter, Ülkü.<sup>127</sup> Bryan “visited and photographed peoples in the Orient, Siberia, Soviet Russia, and every part of Europe. He showed these films in theatres throughout the United States. while lecturing on such topics as ‘Turkey Reborn,’ ‘Poland Today,’ ‘Modern Finland,’ and ‘Inside Nazi Germany.’”<sup>128</sup> In April 1937, Atatürk received a letter from President Roosevelt who expressed his delight at the Turkish President’s achievements after having watched Bryan’s documentary film at the White House.<sup>129</sup>

In March 1936, a new American Ambassador, John Van A. Mac Murray was appointed to Turkey, where he served until 1941. His tenure marked the end of shaded recognition when in 1937 he took up full time residence in Ankara. By 1936–1937 both Roosevelt and the State Department must have realized that it was no longer expedient that the American Ambassador should remain in İstanbul. Maintaining two embassies in Turkey gradually became a problem. Beginning with Ambassador Skinner, American diplomats felt that the situation caused inefficient use of personnel. Skinner was also disturbed “because the United States looked less responsive to Turkish nationalism than most other nations.”<sup>130</sup> The American ambassadors could not even host their guests in style when compared to their colleagues from other nations. Mac Murray urged the State Department to build a new building in Ankara and even wrote a personal letter to President Roosevelt about this matter. He referred to the İstanbul Embassy as “the most blatantly un-American residence in which a representative of the U.S.A. ever had to live.”<sup>131</sup> Indeed, the building was a charming replica of an Italian palazzo but there was nothing American about it. However, the political conjunctures of the times plausibly had much to do with the move.

In the first place, the Republican regime was entrenched. Secondly, clouds of war were gathering in Europe with the first display of international groupings formed during the Spanish civil war (1936–1939).

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<sup>127</sup> Haldun Derin, *Çankaya Özel Kalemini Anımsarken, 1933–1951* (Memoirs from the Presidential Secretariat, 1933–1951) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), pp. 111–112.

<sup>128</sup> Jane M. Loy, “The Present as Past: Assessing the Value of Julien Bryan’s Films as Historical Evidence,” *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 12:3 (1977), pp. 103–128, esp. 106.

<sup>129</sup> Yurdağül Yüksel, “Atatürk ve Roosevelt” (Atatürk and Roosevelt), *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol. 44, 1999, pp. 1–6; Derin, *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>130</sup> Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism*, p. 81.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

And, perhaps more importantly the Fascist and Nazi leaders made no secret of their intentions. Even though the liberal leaders in Western Europe did not take them seriously enough and tried to appease the Italian and German dictators, Americans may have had a different reading of the times.

When Mustafa Kemal held an interview with the American general, Douglas Mac Arthur in 1932, he had stated that Germany was likely to start a war that would engulf Europe and probably draw the Soviet Union and United States into war. It was not difficult to see the revisionist aura in Germany even before Hitler's advent to power. In 1922, Germany and the Soviet Union had signed the Rapallo Treaty during the conference on the European economy in Genoa which contained a secret clause that German soldiers and officers could train in the Soviet Union. German engineers could build weapons there under cover. Even if Mustafa Kemal may not have been privy to this information, he sensed that Germany would not stand the *diktat* of the Versailles Treaty much longer. "By 1938, Germany was overtaking Italy as first among Turkey's potential enemies. The watershed event was the anschluss of Austria-noted in Turkey as 'une sorte de boulevard des États danubiens et balkaniques'"<sup>132</sup> Ambassador Mac Murray's reports to the State Department between 1936-1942 dwelled mostly on Turkish-German relations, the Soviet Union, and on Turkey's probable position in the Second World War.<sup>133</sup>

In summer 1936, the US Ambassador reported on Nazi activities in Turkey in a "Confidential" dispatch to the State Department. Accordingly, the Nazis held a plebiscite on a German vessel which hosted 500 of the 1,000 adult Germans residing in Turkey. The outcome was questionable. However, because "the Nazi Party Chiefs completely dominate the Colony... 99 per cent of the Germans in Turkey have officially adhered to the Nazi Party or to other Nazi organizations (minus the German Jewish academicians in exile who were hosted at the universities of Ankara and Istanbul)."<sup>134</sup> The German Cultural Associations, the *Teutonia* and *Ausflugsverein* became all-German associations with no foreign participation. Only the German High School remained international.

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<sup>132</sup> Millman, p. 487, fn. 27.

<sup>133</sup> Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

<sup>134</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File 867.00 NAZI/1, From: J. V. A. Mac Murray, To: the Secretary of State, July 14, 1936.

Ironically 30 per cent of its students were made up of Turkish Jews. The local Turkish branch of the Gestapo was headed by the German Consul General, Dr. Axel Toepke. Military training of German males of the colony continued in the *Teutonia* Club as well as in the former German Embassy in Istanbul. The Gestapo branch collected funds from German businesses in Istanbul under threat of unfolding their firms by reporting to the Turkish Government of their unreliability. So far Nazi activities focused on the German colony. Nazi propaganda would later reach out to former pan-Turkists, some journalists and even military officers.<sup>135</sup> These people were mostly Turkic émigrés from Russia/Soviet Union, remnants of the Committee for Union and Progress of World War I, and Germanophiles.

As early as 1934, “A Treatise on German Propaganda in the Near East” defined the Balkans as a bridge to Anatolia and the latter as a highway to the entire Near East, including Egypt. Moreover, this geography was depicted as part of the German *Lebensraum* (living space). Accordingly, cultural propaganda, specifically through education would prove lasting as opposed to economic incentives, which may be temporary.<sup>136</sup> Promotion of pan-Turkism under the aegis of Germany was to follow. However, pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism was totally rejected in Atatürk’s Turkey and its proponents were extradited, settled in Germany and waited for a return. That opportunity came in 1941, but that saga remains outside the confines of this study. Meanwhile, Hitler’s Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels and his staff were going to extremes in identifying both Atatürk and Hitler as national heroes,

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<sup>135</sup> Günay Göksu Özdoğan, “II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarındaki Türk-Alman İlişkilerinde İç ve Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Pan-Türkizm” (Pan-Turkism as a Domestic and Foreign Policy Tool in German-Turkish Relations during World War II) in Faruk Sönmezoglu ed., *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), pp. 131-147; Emrullah Tekin, *Alman Gizli Operasyonları ve Türkler* (German Secret Operations and the Turks), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2002); *Hitler’in Türk Dostları: II. Dünya Savaşındaki Gizli Belgeler ve Yazışmalar* (Hitler’s Turkish Friends) (İstanbul: Düş Yayınları, 2006); Jacob Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981); Cemil Koçak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri, 1923-1939* (Turkish-German Relations, 1923-1939) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991).

<sup>136</sup> Mithat Atabay, *II. Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Akımları* (Nationalist Movements in Turkey during WWII) (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005), pp. 247-252, quoting from Herbert Melzig, *Yakın Şarkta Alman Propagandası Hakkında bir Muhtıra* (A Treatise on German Propaganda in the Near East) (Ankara: Alaeddin Kiral Basımevi, 1940).

thus equating them.<sup>137</sup> There were frequent references in the Nazi dominated news media in Germany to the solidarity and brotherhood in arms between the Germans and Turks in the First World War. This was a myth, because most, if not all Turkish officers resented being under German command in that war. Mustafa Kemal was foremost among them. Germans at the time also complained that Turkish staff officers did not share information with them, thus making collaborative planning difficult. In 1937, highly sanitized memoirs of General Hans Guhr were published in Breslau which not only overemphasized the smooth relations between the Turkish and German military officers. The book also reads as if there was not a single speck of dust in the air during war.<sup>138</sup>

In 1933, numerous German professors among whom were scientists, doctors, attorneys, philologists, composers, dramaturgists, architects, city planners, and economists took refuge in Turkey. All were accommodated in the newly forming or reforming Turkish universities, conservatories and performing arts. Some were German Jews others were not Jewish. They had either lost their jobs because they had not become Nazis or in the case of the Jewish scholars they were treated as outcasts.

Starting in 1937 German propaganda activities in Turkey increased considerably, with emphasis on anti-Semitism, as was the case with similar German propaganda efforts, but with much less success due to strong opposition on the part of the Turkish public and government. The German Information Office was opened in the center of old Istanbul, on the Divanyolu near the Aya Sofya and Sultan Ahmed mosque and the city's publication center at Cağaloğlu. Nazi propaganda also was published in the subsidized German-language daily newspaper *Türkische Post* as well as in pro-Nazi daily *Cumhuriyet*, owned and edited by Yunus Nadi, who was provided special business concessions in Germany to secure his editorial support for Turkish cooperation with the Axis.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası* (German Fascist Propaganda in Turkey) translated from the German by Arif Gelen (Ankara: Onur Yayınları [1966], n.d.), p. 15; Wolfgang G. Schwantz, ed. *Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004).

<sup>138</sup> Hans Guhr, *Anadolu'dan Filistin'e Türklerle Omuz Omuza* (Als Türkischer Divisionskommandeur In Kleinasien Und Palastina [Breslau, 1937]), translated from the German by Eşref Özbilen (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007).

<sup>139</sup> Stanford J. Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust, Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1993), p. 21.

According to a report from the U.S. Embassy in İstanbul, this connection of Yunus Nadi had resulted in nicknaming him as ‘Yunus Nazi’ among many Turks.<sup>140</sup>

The State Department may have been urged to follow Nazi activity as well as the Turkish Government’s attitude straight from Ankara at the ambassadorial level. Whether because of the need to gather better intelligence and/or to elevate the American Ambassador from his isolated residence in Istanbul, Mac Murray took up full time residence in Ankara. This move culminated in full reciprocity with Turkey after two decades of ambiguity.

A report from the Division of Near Eastern Affairs in April 1938 informed that Atatürk wanted to purchase a private American yacht, *Savarona* that was for sale, which the German government was also interested in buying. It said:

When the German authorities learned that Ataturk was contemplating the purchase, the Germans made an immediate bid for the vessel, Kemal learned of this bid and is reported to have expressed in strong terms to the German Ambassador in Ankara his resentment against the German action. The United States Maritime Commission refused to sanction the transfer of the vessel to German registry, for the unexpressed reason that the vessel would not be used for war purposes, and subsequently sanctioned its transfer to Turkey.<sup>141</sup>

Atatürk was happy to acknowledge the goodwill shown by the United States. After his death, the yacht served the next President, İnönü, and in 1951 *Savarona* was turned over to the Turkish Naval Academy and served as a school ship as well as the symbol of goodwill embassy of the navy cadets when they called on foreign ports.

In conclusion, American encounters with Turkey passed through various stages of recognition coupled with ambivalence and ambiguity to diplomatic reciprocity. Diplomats of both countries displayed much goodwill and effort to this end.

The United States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt “decided to end the sixteen years of estrangement-an ‘anomaly’ he termed it-between the two countries and extend

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<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22, quoting from Wallace Murray’s report.

<sup>141</sup> State Department Records, Decimal File (illegible), Report by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, April 5, 1938.

diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union.”<sup>142</sup> The American Ambassador took up residence in Moscow, not in the former imperial capital, St. Petersburg, by then named Leningrad. There was an added incentive for this recognition. The export vector of ‘Red Oil’ as it was termed by a Russian expert recently<sup>143</sup> was one factor and the Pacific issues another. Washington had kept the idea of most favored nation near and dear instead of reciprocity in trade because the U.S. overproduced commodities except for oil.<sup>144</sup> In the aftermath of the Great Depression, however the Roosevelt administration reversed its commercial policy and adopted reciprocity in 1934.<sup>145</sup> The force of diplomatic reciprocity also began to prevail over its foreign relations during the interwar period. United States’ encounters with Turkey were not an exception in its overt manifestation of totally breaking away from rhetorical isolationism.

In Turkey’s case, full reciprocity was extended not by the lure of a precious commodity like oil, but the Nazi threat, as well as a change in the outlook of U.S. foreign policy makers and diplomats to exert U.S. prestige and influence abroad, hold Ankara’s pulse, use the personnel efficiently, and enhance economic interests.

In the first place, global economic conditions as well as incremental change in U.S. foreign policy during the interwar years present a larger picture as to why Washington became more serious in according diplomatic recognition in this case to the Soviet Union and full diplomatic reciprocity to Turkey in 1937. Alongside the political conjuncture of the 1930s were considerations about political economy.

Before it was disrupted by the 1929 world economic crisis, the new world order was in a transition from the imperial system of Britain to the corporate power of the United States.

In contrast to the pre-war period, the British share of the world export value was continuously declining, whereas the United States became a net creditor and possessed a large share of the world’s gold. Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board in Washington D.C. and the Federal Reserve Bank in New York wielded enough power to intervene effectively in the international financial market. By the mid 1920s, New York surpassed London

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<sup>142</sup> Bohlen, p. 12.

<sup>143</sup> Vladimir Kostornichenko, “The Export Vector of ‘Red’ Oil” *Oil of Russia* (International Quarterly Edition) 2 (2006); <http://www.oilru.com>, accessed October 18, 2006.

<sup>144</sup> Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The United States as a World Power* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936), p. 266.

<sup>145</sup> Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), 3rd ed., pp. 740–742.

as a source of funds invested abroad. The United States had already begun to control markets overseas, from Latin America to Europe.<sup>146</sup>

The “conservative internationalism’ or “independent internationalism” of the 1920s began to change as of 1933 with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. “When Roosevelt took office, however, conditions had changed. Depression caused business to look at every country of the world, no matter how unlikely, as a possible outlet for American goods.”<sup>147</sup>

Secondly, Europe was mired in crisis caused by the Fascist and Nazi dictators, and a new war loomed. The U.S.A. had to devise a new outlook on world politics as well as define its place in it. This meant to become more active in the foreign policy sphere. Since the 1980s, American historiography no longer depicts the interwar period as one of isolationism; there was too much human energy, productivity, and entrepreneurship in the United States even in the shadow of the Great Depression to abandon worldwide interests. In fact, the Great Depression may have been a catalyst to explore markets abroad for the products that the American people could not afford to purchase at home.

Thirdly, American diplomacy became more professionalized during the era under discussion. “Lausanne was a major event in Grew’s career” wrote his biographer. “The first phase introduced him to the broader aspects of European diplomacy. At the same time it widened his diplomatic horizon to include hitherto ‘backward’ people who were insisting on being treated as players rather than pawns in the game.”<sup>148</sup> If there was one criticism to be made about his diplomatic style, Grew was not interested in intelligence. He reported on domestic political issues, but stayed away from gathering intelligence, because “He did not see the United States as an integral element of international politics.”<sup>149</sup> Another American diplomat, Howland Shaw, in contrast to Grew, encouraged the Embassy to gather, analyze, and interpret intelligence when he served as Chief of the Near Eastern Division at the State Department. During his assignment to Turkey as Counselor of the Embassy, Shaw studied almost all aspects of the Turkish system and enlarged his contacts. “Shaw represented the trend in the Department of State toward a more scholarly formulation of foreign policy, based

<sup>146</sup> Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey*, pp. 3–4.

<sup>147</sup> Robert D. Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy since 1900*, 5th ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 156.

<sup>148</sup> Heinrichs, p. 62.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.

on intensive training of Foreign Service Officers in the languages and cultures of exotic but important countries.” According to him, “the best way to determine political trends and policies was to analyze the underlying social, intellectual, and economic currents.”<sup>150</sup> This proved not only useful to the United States, but to future researchers when such documentation became declassified.

A fourth and a major reason why America’s foreign relations had to rely on gathering intelligence was the perception of threats emanating from Europe which would soon upset world peace. Diplomacy could no longer only rely on information received from governments nor could it remain an intellectual exercise. In the late 1930s as well as during the Second World War Turkey was depicted as a ‘listening post’ in U.S. diplomatic parlance on account of its proximity to the Soviet Union as well as Germany.

Concomitantly, upholding and enhancing American national prestige through representation in style was an underlying factor in promoting recognition or reciprocity. Behind that was the unexpressed drive to assert America’s place in world affairs and be informed about other countries’ position on the eve of another world war.

Starting with the mariner diplomat Admiral Bristol, diplomacy was not only carried out by professionals, but between the Presidents of Turkey and the United States. Congratulatory correspondence between Atatürk and Roosevelt abounded on every occasion possible.

Historical coincidences with reference to leadership profiles also played a tacit, but strong role in the evolution of Turkish-American relations. Although the mood of the country was an important component in American foreign policy making, “So far as individuals make policy, the balance of influence in the United States is always tipping, now this way or that, now to the executive, now to the legislature, and rarely to the professional diplomat.”<sup>151</sup> During the timeframe covered in this study, Presidents Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover had chosen to delegate authority in foreign policy making largely to their Secretaries of State; Charles Evans Hughes (1921–1925), Frank B. Kellogg (1925–1929), and Henry L. Stimson (1929–1933). Franklin D. Roosevelt, on the other hand, exercised personal influence

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<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>151</sup> Dexter Perkins, “The Department of State and American Public Opinion” in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats 1919–1939* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press [1953] 1981), pp. 282–308, 283.

on U.S. foreign policy. This is not to say that these American statesmen ignored the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the legislature, but they influenced the course of U.S. foreign policy making. This factor, coupled with the credible and respectable figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey contributed to cultivate the relationship.

Turkish-American relations had come a long way from the tobacco, raisin, wool, and opium merchants as well as Protestant missionaries of the 19th century to being virtual adversaries in the First World War, until full diplomatic reciprocity was established in 1937. Even though Atatürk never visited the United States, the very thought of friendship with a powerful nation who did not bear the stigma of imperialistic designs in past history must have been welcome to him as far as Turkey's national interests were concerned. In retrospect, balancing its Euro-Atlantic relations has been a constant in Turkish foreign policy, but this fact has not been so far acknowledged for having been initiated in Atatürk's Turkey.

Palazzo di Corpi remained as the residence of the U.S. Consul General in İstanbul, while an ordinary looking chancery on its grounds processed visas in the former capital city. The American Embassy was housed in center city Ankara, Kızılay, in a building which later accommodated the U.S. Information Service until 1975. In 1954, a new embassy building was erected on Atatürk Boulevard in the Kavaklıdere district on land donated by the Democratic Party government. It faced the Soviet Embassy across the street throughout the Cold War. Whether spatial accommodation of both embassies was symbolic of according a somewhat equal acknowledgement of Turkey's contemporary and former ally is an academic question, however interesting.