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## Diplomacy and Politics

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### Introduction

For much of history the terms ‘diplomacy’ and ‘politics’ have been intimate, as diplomacy regulates and mediates politics between sovereign entities, which have principally meant nation-states and their governments. The diplomatic record includes episodes of rupture, namely wars. Military history, strictly speaking, is a subcategory of diplomatic history, which was once among the most prestigious of fields for professional historians.

This is no longer the case and has not been for some time. Diplomacy has not really recovered its prestige since the cataclysm of 1914. Some scholars, reacting to Woodrow Wilson’s promotion during and after the war of what he called the “New Diplomacy,” invented something ‘new’ of their own called the discipline of international relations. That some of these scholars sought to repudiate Wilsonianism—the ideology of the New Diplomacy—was beside the point. Its basis was not historical in the traditional sense outlined by Leopold von Ranke, in that it did not seek to uncover and reconstruct the past for its own sake, but rather to draw lessons about the ways statesmen *ought* to act. In this respect, international relations was not that much different from Wilsonianism: that is, it was a normative, programmatic discipline that derived from general laws of human behavior.

This trend continued into and well beyond the Second World War, and was buoyed by the popularity around the world of Anglo-American social science, where international relations resided. As late as the 2000s, students in introductory “IR” courses were assigned E.H. Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* and Kenneth Waltz’s *Man, the State, and War*, first published in 1939 and 1959 respectively, as the foundational texts of their discipline. The first was a

bitter critique of Wilson and Wilsonianism; the latter a theoretical exercise in the behavioral interplay of individuals, states, and societies. Although the first was an historical essay and the second a work of political science, both were didactic, and both equated a counter-ideology with an empirical analysis of interstate relations. This analysis held many historical ‘variables’ constant, relying on a synchronic elaboration of the “international system.” International relations has since blossomed into many schools and approaches—too numerous to recount here—but much of its underlying basis remains true to its quasi-scientific origin.

However, politics is an art not a science; so too is diplomacy. Thus, both may also be treated as a craft. This traditional, almost quaint, view is not extinct in the twenty-first century, if only because many, perhaps even a majority, of diplomats still subscribe to it. Yet the lines between politics and diplomacy have blurred considerably. Today, in the most general sense, diplomacy has a mainly functional definition. Americans, for example, like to call it ‘just one tool in the toolbox,’ the toolbox being something larger called ‘foreign policy.’ There are also military tools, cultural tools, economic tools, and so on. The diplomatic tool is associated with negotiations, usually after a war has broken out or ended, or, in rarer cases, before it has broken out. This is a departure from the classic definition of diplomacy, which, in its combination of the means and ends of power, was closer to statecraft, with diplomats serving, according to one of their promoters, the historian Sasson Sofer, as “... the courtiers of civilization. They are the counselors and priests of peaceful relations; they hover above the conclusion of truces, cease-fires, and peace treaties. It is platitudinous to suggest that diplomats represent the best that is found in human nature. They are, however, the custodians of the idea of international society, and the guardians of international virtues” (Sofer, 2013, 67).

Since the advent of the academic discipline of international relations, diplomacy’s definition has narrowed. This has, in effect, divorced diplomacy from politics. Some other chapters in this volume show this definition, which corresponds in caricature to official communications between foreign ministries, to be unsuitable to the contemporary world. Many organizations besides foreign ministries are engaged in the business of diplomacy; many people besides official envoys and bureaucrats participate in it.

If the contemporary definition of diplomacy is to return to being more or less synonymous with international relations rather than understood as a mere procedural component of it, what effect would this have on politics? That is, where do politics fit in a broader definition of diplomacy and of the diplomatic craft, in the twenty-first century?

## A Broader Definition

Diplomacy encompasses the entirety of relationships between sovereign entities, their representatives, and their inhabitants in the sovereign interest, and in the general cause of peace. Diplomatic activity may also take place between sovereign entities and transnational groups or private entities that do not have 'official' status, or among such groups themselves, although they ought to have a measure of cohesion and a collective identity to qualify as diplomatic actors. Diplomacy, then, is the act of one actor relating to the other in order to devise a workable relationship across a border; or, in the case of a failure, to do so, and in the event of a rupture of the peace, to maneuver and manipulate one another's political assets and relationships in order to gain a strategic or tactical advantage. It encompasses both policy and practice, that is to say, negotiations as well as the axioms and decisions taken that produce and accompany the negotiations.

In truth, the divergence of definitions between a narrow and broad concept of diplomacy is longstanding. Both in theory and in practice, diplomacy and policy have been treated distinctively as well as with more fluid gradations (Nicolson, 1977, 3–5). Before the advent of the telegraph, there may have been more of the latter than the former, with ambassadors in far-flung posts interpreting their instructions loosely, if not making them up outright. Later—certainly by the beginning of the twentieth century with the popularity of conference diplomacy—policy-making became almost coterminous with negotiation. Incidentally, this diplomatic vehicle, in the later incarnation of the 'summit,' has proved too popular to discard, although most professional diplomats regard it as less than an ideal forum for negotiation. Not only do they expose leaders to the whims of personality, but they also are nearly impossible to conduct with discretion; and therefore are usually less likely to succeed than quiet talks among diplomatic professionals, that is, unless the latter have already taken place with the summit or conference results 'cooked.' Here, superficiality is the price states pay for effectiveness. This counts politics as an intrusion, which now include efforts by amateurs of an even lower rank: for example, legislators, mayors, or private citizens, such as celebrities, acting in the name of the public will.

Because there is not, and probably will never be, a perfectly equal or just world, there will be, for the foreseeable future, nation-states of varying size and power; there will be alliances of the same; there will be jealousies, rivalries, and ruptures; and there will be some manner of hierarchy in the ordering of international relationships. Someday, perhaps, there may be a viable body like a more powerful United Nations that replaces 'international' politics with

something else akin to a world parliament. Nations could remain sovereign, but would come to resemble constituencies more than autonomous political agents. If such a body ever succeeds, it will not have done away with traditional politics, or with diplomacy in the service of politics. It would merely offer an alternative setting and language for negotiating interests among its members. Put another way, it is not the structure of political systems that dictates the role for diplomacy; structures condition, but do not directly determine, let alone predetermine, it.

This is the starting point for understanding the inter-relationship of politics and diplomacy today. They have their root in the quantity and the quality of power in the world. The first relates how power rises and falls, who wields it, and how; the second relates how the powerful deal with one another and with the less powerful, and, occasionally, with the least powerful. Each has a normative aspect. Politics, by its association with government, is, on occasion, occupied with dispensing justice. Diplomacy, by its contraposition to war, is occupied with preserving peace. Good politics tend to be perceived as being just. Good diplomacy tends to be peaceful and, we could add, to the mutual advantage of the parties involved, however powerful they may be. That is to say, both good politics and good diplomacy extend beyond *raison d'état* or 'reason of state,' even though the latter remains an important element of world order.

Diplomats are subservient to the state. Where politicians obstruct the interests of the state, diplomats are called in to show a way ahead. Where politics compel an aggressive policy, diplomats are charged with softening its edges. Where politicians suggest a reactive, or passive, policy, diplomats are meant to explore alternatives, usually indirect ones, to achieve the aims that a more direct, but impractical policy, would not achieve. All this is not to say that diplomacy is entirely auxiliary to politics. Wise diplomats learn how to determine the 'facts on the ground' through the purveyance of information, advice, and authority. Nevertheless, without a direct role in politics, diplomacy is weak given that its value and strength derive primarily from its capacity to enhance political leverage in the interests of the state, however indirect and intricate some of its methods can appear. There is rarely a use for diplomacy conducted for its own sake, divorced from politics. Yet, at the same time, politics without diplomacy would not always be viable. "As long as the state remains at the center of international relations," Sofer has written, "diplomacy will be anchored in the political domain, aspiring to relations without resorting to force. There is no adequate alternative for diplomatic practice as the most prudent method for reconciling contradictory interests, or for other parties to agree to an accepted resolution" (Sofer, 2013, 14). The claim is emphatic, but also true.

It has been said that diplomacy is useless without the latent (or sometimes blatant) threat of force. That underscores the above claim that neither diplomacy nor politics are ever isolated or separate. To borrow the famous line of Carl von Clausewitz, if war is politics (or policy) by other means, then diplomacy is war by other means, as well as its occasional ally or its antidote. All really are inseparable from power, a point associated not only with Clausewitz, but more commonly with a founder of modern politics, Niccolò Machiavelli. This may be ironic, for, as Sofer has noted,

Diplomats are particularly vulnerable in their clash with sovereigns, where the aura of privilege and proximity to power often prove to be a double-edged sword. In the extreme case of a struggle between a virtuous prince and an ideal diplomat, the latter is merely a hunter with feeble arrows, or in Machiavellian terms, a fox of the second order. The diplomat is almost inevitably the civil servant chosen, by his manners, image, and practices, to serve as a scapegoat (Sofer, 2013, 58–59).

Not all diplomats are ‘scapegoats,’ and those who are so cast may not be as weak as they appear, for scapegoats, among other things, serve a necessary political function in preserving the appearance of public virtue. Put another way, although the ends of diplomacy may be public, the means are, by necessity, private, even if that means on occasion sacrificing a public reputation.

## Transformations

The relationship between diplomacy and politics is essential, but it has also evolved unevenly. Its evolution, Harold Nicolson has written, is not uniform or necessarily progressive: “international intercourse has always been subject to strange retrogressions” (Nicolson, 1954, 1–2). Today, this is a minority view.

The adjective ‘transformational’ is now popular in many fields, including diplomacy. What does it mean? There are actually two meanings, one directed outward, the other inward. The first refers to statecraft: the ways by which diplomacy transforms particular places, problems, and relationships from one condition to another. The second refers to diplomacy itself and its methods.

The best-known example of the latter is the aforementioned ‘New Diplomacy.’ As a term of art it refers to the diplomacy made popular by Woodrow Wilson a century ago, but it has been used at other times as well, including today (for example, by Shaun Riordan) to describe the role of social networks, digital media, and their effects on the diplomatic profession. Wilson’s New

Diplomacy was inspired similarly, for its most basic premise—open covenants openly arrived at—was, at root, a change in diplomatic method. However, the New Diplomacy then went much further because its aim was to govern a new world of imperial successor states that all adhered to the same liberal principles. The New Diplomacy took the Westphalian order a step further: no longer was state sovereignty enough; public opinion now counted, or was said to count, a great deal more than it had before, for the general public was much more interested, it was also said, in foreign affairs. The citizens of these states also had to be sovereign; they had to select and determine their own governments; they had to combine together to govern the world in a way that set their mutual interest over particular interests; and they had to choose and enforce a just world order.

None of this was new. Rules of conduct, including principles of universal character, date back, at least in the Western tradition, to the ancient Greeks and Romans. Among other things, the Greeks developed the concept of the collective will, and the cultivation of it through negotiation, cooperation, precedent, rules, and norms. So were certain familiar impediments to sound diplomacy, as Nicolson has noted them: a tendency to prize the clever over the reliable; the interference of legislatures in external affairs; and the proliferation of political quarrels (Nicolson, 1954, 10–11). Yet the Greeks also employed the basic article of diplomacy—the treaty—to settle disputes and preserve peace; they established the viability of leagues and alliances; the ‘Amphictyony,’ or ancient league of Greek tribes, for all its faults, was a worthy institution that was among the first successful attempts to stabilize and civilize the exercise of politics across borders; indeed, this early diplomatic institution became almost a spiritual buttress to politics by enshrining the league as a sacred body. The effect was to combine politics and culture—or, to be more precise, to couch a divisive politics within a common culture—so as to regulate the former and promote the latter. As such institutions later formed the basis of empires, they would see the subordination of power to law, or rather, the exercise of power through law, which diplomacy served.

This was the political tradition to which Wilson and his New Diplomacy adhered. By Wilson’s time, there had begun “a shift in the centre of power” from monarchies and aristocracies to cabinets to citizenries (Nicolson, 1977, 30). Yet Wilson’s proposed vehicle for collective security—the multilateral congress to be known as the League of Nations—was not too different, at least in spirit, from the many congresses and conferences that had come before. Even what we now call public opinion, so championed by Wilson, had had an important influence on diplomacy going back at least to the time of

Cardinal Richelieu. Diplomacy adapted from being the handmaiden of politics to its operative, engineer, and moral judge.

Perhaps this was the reason that the aforementioned ‘realist’ critics took so violently to Wilson’s self-willed transformation. Diplomacy, they claimed, could not do or be all these things at once. Diplomats are servants, not masters, of the State, let alone of universal morality; they are not equally the enforcers and revelatory agents of just and desirable universal norms. Hence, the principled stand against the subordination of power to justice. For all that the latter may have been (and still may be) a desired end in the world, there are those who claim that pursuing it at all costs goes against human nature. The pursuit of justice first requires peace. Ignoring this particular natural law, realists say, results in the spread of neither peace nor justice.

Wilson’s defenders have also claimed that national interests are served better in combination than in competition. He and his ideology were not idealist in the philosophical sense, they wrote, but rather a form of “higher realism” in the political sense. The New Diplomacy, and collective security, especially—described by Wilson as a community of power—are alternative sources of international order that he renewed with a more democratic form of politics for the twentieth century. His critics make a good point in highlighting their shortcomings, but fail to explain how a destroyed world was otherwise meant to rebuild and govern itself when so many traditional structures and ways had gone. It had been Wilson’s view that a New Diplomacy and a new politics would offer a different, better future. It was also his view that the world did not really have a fair choice: it could embrace modernity—including a modern diplomacy—and survive, or it could resist, and die. In the event it embraced the new diplomacy, Wilson probably assumed the modern world would be more peaceful because human institutions had progressed to the point where they were better matched to the democratic will of the people, who, if properly taught, would choose peace and justice over rivalry and oppression.

To dwell upon Wilson is not to suggest that he was solely responsible for the transformation of diplomacy at the turn of the previous century, but instead to emphasize the durability of his concept of international relations, in spite of its having been followed by some terrible wars. He typified an understanding of both the theory and the practice of diplomacy which granted it an organic association with the specific nature of the international political system—and with the distinct political systems and forms of government in each nation-state. So a politically attenuated manner of diplomacy could both bring about and sustain such a system. Whether or not this belief represented a lower or a higher form of realism is beside the point. Wilson and his supporters regarded it as a more pragmatic response to the world’s ills than

the only other popular alternative then on offer: ‘Bolshevism.’ History would appear to have worked in their favor. One of Wilson’s bitterest critics—his fellow American, the diplomat George Kennan—admitted many decades later, just before the Berlin Wall had fallen, that Wilson had been far ahead of his time. In other words, the international system had reached a point where the world itself had become too small for interstate rivalry to flourish. The world’s politics was on the path to becoming, to use a phrase known to political scientists, fully ‘interdependent.’ Politics were transformed; so too was diplomacy. The choice facing statesmen and diplomats was not whether or not such transformations could be halted or perhaps hijacked; rather, it was how best to adapt official structures and both official and unofficial relationships to the ‘new’ circumstances; that is, to master rather than fight a political transformation as it was widely understood.

### Order and Governance

To the diplomat, ‘order,’ however durable, is negotiable and temporary and requires frequent tending and cultivation, as would a garden. Since the late Renaissance, order has been measured by standards of external behavior irrespective, in principle, of internal politics. That is to say, states ought to be judged by their actions toward other states, less by how they treat their own people or how they otherwise govern their own affairs. The peak of this separation in practice was the period of “Old Diplomacy,” during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. In general, according to Nicolson, it was the

...method... that best adapted to the conduct of relations between civilised States. It was courteous and dignified; it was continuous and gradual; it attached importance to knowledge and experience; it took account of the realities of existing power; and it defined good faith, lucidity and precision as the qualities essential to any sound negotiation. The mistakes, the follies and the crimes that during those three hundred years accumulated to the discredit of the old diplomacy can, when examined at their sources, be traced to evil foreign policy rather than to faulty methods of negotiation. It is regrettable that the bad things they did should have dishonoured the excellent manner in which they did them (Nicolson, 1954, 72–73).

This division of official action—between internal and external—was eroded by the failures leading up to the First World War and by Wilson’s

innovation that followed it. The tone, character, and dimensions of domestic politics all have become difficult to separate from their international effects, and vice versa. The domestic and the foreign realms in many countries today are interpenetrated and even interdependent. They are also rather disordered. When politicians and diplomats speak of order, the term carries a whiff of reaction. Old Diplomacy did rely on a hierarchy of powers; the more powerful—which fashioned themselves as the Great Powers—certainly held sway over weaker ones. However, the Great Powers also bore the greatest responsibility for maintaining peace, or what they liked to call ‘equilibrium.’ This demanded as much, or even more, restraint and good sense than more overt forms of political interference meant to impress or compel obedience.

The popular word today for the ways of responsibility is ‘governance.’ How does it differ from order? Less than we might think. Both terms connote stability, peace, and regularity, or at least some insulation from drastic political and social change. But they differ in their relation to politics. Order rests on the line drawn between the domestic and the foreign. Governance erodes this line by promoting a normative measurement of political rule both within and among states. Whereas, in theory, order is more or less stable, governance is rated as more or less ‘good.’ Good governance is judged, in other words, less by its political viability or longevity at particular junctures than by its adherence to certain standards and values in perpetuity.

These differences may blur in practice. A stable order may cloak forces of instability, many deriving from bad governance. A good system of governance may cloak resentments that lead to social and political disorder. Yet with both conditions there is a dependency similar to the one between peace and justice. It is hard to imagine the promotion of good governance in the absence of a peaceful order. Put more prosaically, one must survive in order to thrive. For all that the proponents of good governance tout its superiority on moral and political grounds, it may be that they take the latter too often for granted. Few states at war find it easy to be well governed.

Nevertheless, there is no desirable alternative to good governance, just as there is none for justice. Few responsible societies would advocate one. Nevertheless, for diplomats, many of whom have not disavowed the pursuit of order, the diplomacy of governance can pose difficulties. Such diplomacy can degenerate to what former British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli once dismissed as a “policy of scold.” There are other names for it: the “diplomacy of insult” or “megaphone diplomacy.” Most are variations on one of the more ineffective modes of politics, that of name-calling. The diplomat in such cases is converted into a cheerleader or taskmaster, passing and pushing judgments on the actions of foreign governments. Too often this merges with

accusations of hypocrisy, and with blind interference. The diplomatic task is thereby inverted: diplomats are meant to persuade others to do what is, ideally, in their mutual interest—or, as it has been said by cynics, to do what is in the diplomat's interest while thinking it is in their own. Now, diplomats are meant to persuade others that they are acting against their own interests, and what ought to be their own values, because they do not comply with particular standards.

It would be difficult not to apportion some of the blame to Wilson. Politics, in his progressive tradition, ought to be overtaken by superior administration. Interests and passions were no longer political subjects, but rather technocratic objects. Diplomacy, accordingly, has become the exercise of 'ensuring compliance,' to use another popular Americanism. In such a world, diplomats are again mere political auxiliaries.

This depiction of governance is not meant as a caricature. The ideology of good governance is a fact. So too have been many positive results. However, what role is there for diplomats in a world ruled by legal regimes, norms, and institutions? Diplomats do not eliminate politics from human affairs, but their political methods resemble bureaucratic or legislative logrolling more than diplomacy. The most familiar case of this is the European Union, whose origins were in a diplomatic agreement between France and Germany over their respective steel and coal industries. The development of the European Communities, and eventually the European Union, became an exercise in multilateral diplomacy of the first order, featuring a series of negotiations, summits, and treaties. Yet now that the EU and its many institutions exist, where do the diplomats fit? One place is in the new European External Action Service, a *de facto* EU foreign ministry. Most of its officers come from national foreign ministries. Yet within the EU itself, there is little for national diplomats to do; most decisions are left to politicians and bureaucrats.

This again is consistent with the Wilsonian vision. Its governing body was meant to be the League of Nations, which would not have been so much a league or an alliance, but rather a supranational organ that would have eliminated the need for traditional diplomacy. So much for the theory. Yet even the broadest sketch of contemporary international relations would show that they have much more in common with the Wilsonian legal-moral-institutional tradition than with any alternative, the persistence of *realpolitik* notwithstanding. Today's diplomats find themselves less occupied in resisting the obsolescence of their profession than, at least in principle, in devising more adaptations to an ever more complicated world. The intricate inter-state negotiations of the past now join other negotiations among states and other entities, and even among parties within states. Diplomacy has not seen so

much a blurring as a multiplication of political lines during the past few generations. If the defeat and dismantling of the European empires in the twentieth century and the emergence of new nations as well as supranational institutions in their place has led to anything, it has been to the further convergence of politics and diplomacy. As more states grow more disinclined to wage war, diplomacy has also grown more coterminous with statecraft. The diplomat's traditional assets of adaptability to circumstances, empathy, and intuition are needed as much as they ever have been.

## **The Shape of Diplomacy**

Knowing how adaptable and innovative diplomacy has been historically, it is striking that no 'new' diplomacy has emerged in nearly a century. It may be possible, as the aforementioned remarks by George Kennan suggest, that Wilson was so far ahead of his time, politics have merely caught up with the theory, ideology, and principles he espoused. Indeed, it is hard to contemplate a greater standard for statecraft than universal virtue; there is, by definition, no larger canvas on which to paint a desirable world order. Yet, this is a relative judgment. A verdict on the Old Diplomacy—and here we speak, again, narrowly of only European diplomacy during that period—may have been roughly equivalent in novelty. Just as we cannot know the precise future evolution of global politics, we cannot know how precisely diplomats will adapt to it. We may insist, however, that adaptation shall happen somehow or, if not, politics and diplomacy will just cease to progress.

One of the advantages of diplomatic tradition comes from this paradox: it is always adjusting to the world around it, yet it does so slowly, almost imperceptibly. Aspects of diplomacy that are now taken for granted—the summit, for example—have evolved accordingly. Whereas, during the Cold War they scaled up, as the name suggests, to the level of heads of state, in the past couple of decades they have scaled back down, so that it is not uncommon to see 'summits' of interior or environmental ministers, or even without any ministers at all, as the large number of non-governmental organization conferences, nearly all professing to influence or even make policy, probably would attest.

Whether or not such activity rises to the level of statecraft, or even produces the political change it seeks, is open to question. What is less in doubt is the disorder that has accompanied it. Disorder is not just the result of greater numbers of people trying to do more things at once; it is also the result of another paradox. Popular summits in lieu of traditional diplomacy are, on the surface, apolitical, or sometimes proto-political. Their organizers seek to supplant the roles of diplomats and other state actors in the name of transcending

politics as usual. So far the record has been mixed—for example, in the declining utility of the summits of developed nations (G-7, etc.), which began in the 1970s as a small, informal collective meeting of finance ministers, have since devolved into a global circus at which neither state nor non-state actors achieve much of a concrete nature besides their own self-promotion. Some theorists of governance would call this evidence of ‘empowerment,’ but from the traditional diplomatic point of view, it is the opposite. Diplomacy is measured by its tangible results, however continuous the process of reaching them may be. Yet, at the same time, who can say that global governance does not require regular public affirmation? Diplomacy, after all, is both representative and representational. Diplomats represent their leaders and fellow citizens; they also represent an idea or concept of international society, and, again, of civilization. If the standards of representation change alongside society, so too should the shape of their expression, whether they come in summits (G-7, G-20, and the like) or some other forum yet to be invented.

Geopolitics has not stood still either. In the middle-twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson’s concept of the universal community of power was replaced, partially, by a narrower concept: the regional security community. The most familiar example is the North Atlantic, later called the Euro-Atlantic. On the one hand, such a community was based on the rule of law and all the norms that Wilson espoused, with the partial exception of free trade, which took some time to negotiate. Wilson imagined that his international community would supplant forever the concept of the balance of power. In fact, such regional communities did the opposite: they supplanted Wilson’s universalism with smaller entities that took into account the realities—that is to say, the balances and imbalances—of power, including military power. A North Atlantic regional community probably never would have succeeded without NATO, for example; although, to be fair, the formal definition of NATO was never exclusively military.

Such communities are nevertheless diplomatic inventions. They formed around treaties, understandings, and arrangements in the classic, Old Diplomatic fashion, but with the aim of furthering, piece by piece, a world order that was more Wilsonian than not.

The final point is instructive for understanding today’s relationship between politics and diplomacy. Postwar regional communities were not fixed. They were, as the saying went, ‘organic.’ There had been a few diplomats and statesmen—notably the American diplomat Sumner Welles and the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who each imagined a world of sovereign regions in concert as larger versions of nineteenth-century European nation-states. This vision did not prevail because it was not consistent with the politics of the time. Both the Soviet Union and the United States would

proceed to create spheres of influence, some of which had a regional character, and others which did not. Regional spheres in both Europe and Asia were expansive vis-à-vis one another. Borders were drawn but many proved to be temporary. After the end of the Cold War, the borders were even more expansive, and even more temporary. Even an entity as rule-bound and complex as the European Union has invited new members, based not on ethnicity or any other historically fixed criteria, but on a nation's willingness to abide by various norms and standards, and, secondarily, on other factors like geography and demography. This may change, of course, but, until now, regional integration on a functional basis has been the dominant, or at least the most promising, guide to contemporary diplomacy, and geopolitics.

This is the legacy that twentieth-century diplomats, politicians, and statesmen have left their successors in the twenty-first century. Regionalism has so far been well-suited to an interdependent world. Yet, regional bodies also may prove easier to destroy than to build, just as empires once were. The facility of destruction was a lesson of August 1914 as countries began to declare war in what became World War I; and the diplomats, by most accounts, were just as culpable as the politicians in bringing that about. Perhaps, in addition to all the other familiar failures of decision and action they committed, each had taken the stability of several generations for granted. If so, their example reminds us that diplomacy is as much the art of the possible as is politics, to include possible disaster when their agents work at cross-purposes.

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## CHAPTER REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How does Weisbrode define diplomacy?
2. What was the Wilsonian view of Old Diplomacy?
3. How does Weisbrode distinguish 'governance' from 'order'?
4. What is 'transformational diplomacy'?
5. What is the relationship between power and diplomacy?

## SEMINAR/ESSAY QUESTIONS

1. Why does Weisbrode suggest the evolution of diplomacy is a paradox?
2. Can diplomacy exist without the state?
3. Regional and functional diplomacy are the trends of the future for diplomacy. Discuss.
4. Explain what Weisbrode means when he says diplomacy is both representational and representative?
5. What is the relationship between diplomacy and politics for Weisbrode?

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