Europe’s Geopolitical Parameters

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The Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) of February 1992 states that one of the objectives of the EU is ‘to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy which shall include the eventual framing of a common defence policy’. This provision points to a target far beyond the coordination and co-operation of national policies. The objective is the denationalisation of the foreign and security policies of the EU members. Moreover, the aims of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty, go beyond the traditional conception of foreign and security policy. They emphasise safeguarding the values and interests and strengthening the security of the EU, consolidating democracy, and maintaining respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The treaty declares that the CFSP ‘shall include all questions related to the security of the EU, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. These provisions were the outcome of a compromise between those states – particularly France and Germany – which were pressing for EU defence policy, and those – led by the United Kingdom – which wished to maintain NATO as the main defence organisation in Europe. However, if this provision is interpreted in the light of other relevant articles of the treaty and subsequent practice, one arrives at the conclusion that the outcome was in favour of the British view, advocating the maintenance of NATO as the main defence instrument and the Western European Union (WEU) as a link between the EU and NATO.

Although the EU and the WEU are separate bodies with their own decision-making organs, at Maastricht, the member states issued a declaration affirming that the WEU would be developed as the defence arm of the EU on the one hand, and as the European pillar of NATO on the other. In terms of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU may request the WEU to elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions that have defence implications. Although that provision was not immediately applied, a strengthened relationship between the EU and WEU was one of the discussion topics on the agenda of the intergovernmental conference of the EU members on 29 March, 1996.
NATO summits adopted a very similar approach. On the one hand, they clearly supported the development of a European security and defence identity and reinforcement of the role of the WEU as a defence component of the process of European integration, and on the other hand, they emphasised the necessity of transparency and complementarity between the WEU and NATO. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy’. Moreover, NATO supported the idea of ‘separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security’, and accepted making ‘collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy'.

At the same time the WEU serves, in the post-Cold War era, as a convenient forum for security debates and for political cooperation with the Central and Eastern European countries. Associate partnership status has been recognised for the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland), the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria. As associate partners, these states attend WEU Council meetings but they are not allowed to participate in the Council’s work when it relates to the WEU’s internal affairs, the WEU’s relations with the EU and NATO, or collective defence matters under Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty. Most significantly, however, associate partnership status provides to the Central and Eastern European countries neither security guarantees under Article V nor any prospect of full membership. Despite the fact that they are not covered by Article V of the revised treaty, these states may contribute to WEU operations and may be asked by the WEU members to participate in such operations with ‘forces answerable to the WEU’. Although the Central and Eastern European countries are suffering from the pains of transition their prime objective is to return to the European system. Therefore, their leaders regard the WEU as one of the – if not the main – instruments to realise this objective. At the same time they consider the WEU insufficient to respond to their security needs. The WEU does not ensure the Atlantic linkage. Its military capabilities are limited. Though all the Central and Eastern European leaders view associate partnership as a step in the right direction, the Visegrad countries do not see the present arrangement as meeting all their expectations. The EU’s lack of purpose and impotence in the Yugoslav conflict, induced the Central and Eastern European countries to view NATO more seriously than ever as the most appropriate collective defence arrangement for their security needs. At the same time, through the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP), NATO provided these states with an institutional framework for politico-military consultation and cooperation. Furthermore, NATO members began to consider and discuss the future membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

As for Turkey, it has been an ally of the West since the beginning of the Cold War and a NATO member since 1952. Given its longstanding objective of economic and political integration with Western Europe, Turkey favours the
strengthening of the European pillar of NATO and the development of a joint European foreign and security policy, in which it expects to take part. However, at the same time Ankara believes that the process of European political and security integration should not overlook the indivisibility of defence and the strategic unity of NATO. Its Atlanticist approach to European affairs brings Turkey closer to the United States and Britain than to France or Germany. The Turks emphasise their contribution to West European security through NATO and tend to view the country’s prospective EU membership and its role in NATO as two complementary and interdependent dimensions. Apart from this, Turkey’s relations with Western Europe are, to a certain extent, similar to the relations of the Central and Eastern European countries with Western Europe. Like many of those states, Turkey is not content with its status of associate member of the WEU, although it does occupy a slightly better position in the WEU than the Central and Eastern European countries. It is a full member of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and is represented in the ‘Planning Cell’ by three officers. The Turkish leaders are worried that their country’s exclusion from the guarantee of Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty might undermine the commitment of NATO’s European members to Turkey’s security. They also complain that while the EU has demonstrated its unwillingness to admit Turkey as a member of the EU they have promised the Central and Eastern European countries full membership, albeit without clarifying the exact date of that membership. 8 Nevertheless, Prime Minister Ciller hailed Turkey’s joining the European Customs Union in December 1995 as the first step toward full membership of the EU. 9

Are the aspirations of the Central and Eastern European states and Turkey to take part in the European security and defence identity realistic? The purpose of this chapter is to look at the prospects of a security relationship between these countries and Western Europe. The chapter will also attempt to extrapolate the trends that might encourage or discourage the assumption of common security responsibilities. The major contention is that the answer to the above question depends not only on the ability of the Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey to fulfil the Western European standards but also, and above all, on the Western Europeans themselves. In dealing with European security, it is of utmost importance to question how the European identity will evolve and what the prospects of the transatlantic relationship are. This chapter’s approach, therefore, is not institutional.

The major issue of uncertainty, apart from Russia’s future, is whether the EU will have to display the required political will to decide and act according to the geopolitical imperatives of the post-Cold War era. Another discussion topic is the problem of compatibility between the security interests of Western Europe, the Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey. The present geopolitical conditions are radically different from those of the Cold War. The basis for security co-operation in Europe has fundamentally changed. We
therefore need to re-examine security interests and the perceived threats to
them, as well as to discuss the feasibility of integrating the Central and Eastern
European states and Turkey into a common European security identity.

13.1 NATO enlargement: does it enhance security?

The NATO study of 28 September, 1995 on enlargement reaffirmed that the
general allied opinion continued to be in favour of seriously considering the
Central and Eastern European states (especially Poland, the Czech Republic
and Hungary) for full membership. The question had long been a hotly
debated issue in the diplomatic and strategic communities of the allied
countries. The rise of the extreme Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky
and his remarks about Russia recovering the former Soviet and Tsarist
territories, combined with Russia’s activities in Chechnya, had introduced
into the NATO-enlargement debate an alarming tone and had increased
political pressure to expand NATO faster, despite strong Russian objections.

Nevertheless, the NATO study also suggests a certain degree of realism.
Although it tries to reconcile Russia’s concerns with the wish to expand NATO
it fails to put forward a convincing argument about how NATO expansion
could enhance security in Europe. A noteworthy aspect of the document is
that it underlines prospective members’ rights and obligations under the
Washington Treaty and urges them to ‘accept and conform with the
principles, policies, and procedures adopted by all members of the alliance
at the time that new members join’.10 Furthermore, the study sets out in some
detail the prospective members’ obligations in the field of collective defence,
crisis management, peacekeeping, command and force structures, nuclear
forces, intelligence, finance and interoperability, as well as in political
matters.11

The NATO study changed the focus of the debate by emphasising the
responsibilities of membership. Opinion polls conducted for the United States
Information Agency (USIA) and made public in September 1995 showed that
many Central Europeans – with the possible exception of the Poles – were not
willing to live up to their obligations arising from NATO membership. The
polls thus revealed the precariousness of the present support given to NATO
membership in Central and Eastern Europe.12 It should also be noted that the
return of the left to power in many of these countries further dimmed the
prospect of their being willing to assume alliance responsibilities.

Various arguments have been put forward in favour of enlargement. It
would enhance the security of the Central and Eastern European states in the
face of a possible future threat emanating either from an unstable situation in
the former Soviet Union or directly from Russia. It would contribute to
regional stability by easing ethnic tensions and disputes among the countries
of the region. It would create the stable and secure environment that is
necessary for the development of democracy and a market economy in those
countries. Thus it would generally be an important factor in bringing the Central and Eastern European countries into the European (or Western) system. Transcending these arguments is ‘the psychological assurance this membership would give, an assurance that might also have a calming impact on the domestic as well as foreign affairs of the countries concerned. In short, NATO membership would be Eastern Europe’s multipurpose stabilizer.’

None of these arguments, however, are supported by solid evidence, and by inviting easy counterarguments they reflect the dilemmas that the enlargement policy faces. It may be redundant to go through all of them in this chapter. Instead, from the perspective of regional security, it seems to be important to deal with two sets of interrelated questions urging caution about expansion. First, should enlargement take place country by country or should several countries join at once? Should certain countries be given priority? Are there limits to NATO enlargement? Are there countries that can never realistically expect to join? Second, is it possible to ensure that enlargement will not reduce the security of certain states but will contribute, as part of a broad European security architecture, to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area and support the objective of an undivided Europe?

First, if enlargement occurs it will take place gradually and on a case-by-case basis, with some nations attaining membership before others. The Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia) will be given priority over the other Eastern European states. The selection will, *inter alia*, be based on criteria such as ‘commitment to democratic rule, civil-military reform, renunciation of all territorial claims, respect for rights of minorities.’ It is argued that, ‘by conditioning membership on these criteria, NATO can help solidify a zone of stability in Central Europe without undue risk of embroiling NATO’s existing members in new ethnic or intra-regional conflicts’.

Selective expansion is the easy option. Despite the possibility of growing Russian influence in the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union, none of the Visegrad countries have reason to feel militarily threatened by Moscow. If Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had perceived a threat from Russia they would have taken measures to build up their armed forces, but they have done the reverse by reducing the number of their troops and refraining from acquiring new equipment to modernise their military forces.

Advocates of NATO enlargement also emphasise the stabilising effect of the expansion. Even if there is no Russian military threat, NATO enlargement would contribute to stability in the region. This argument is equally refutable. The Visegrad countries are the most stable countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The Baltic states, Ukraine and Moldova have greater cause for worry. They suffer from acute ethnic problems and feel Russian pressure much more heavily than the Visegrad countries. The Balkan peninsula is undoubtedly the most unstable region in Europe. Actual and potential conflicts may easily spread to countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania. This is
not to suggest that NATO should extend membership to the Balkan states in the near future. It is, however, to argue that, under the present circumstances, some of the Balkan countries need NATO protection much more than any Central European country where ethnic violence is virtually non-existent and interstate conflict is a highly remote possibility. If the process of expansion were to cease upon the admission of the Visegrad countries it would do little (or nothing) to reassure other parts of Europe that are potentially more conflict-prone. The enlargement would then be viewed ‘as a means of providing Germany with a *cordon sanitaire*.’¹⁹ Thus a selective approach, recognising priority to the Visegrad states, would upset the north–south equilibrium in NATO at the expense of its southern members. Increasing the focus on Central Europe with little recognition of the risks in the southern region would create the impression that NATO is beginning to indulge in a new central front bias, as it did in the Cold War years.

On the other hand, if an initial selective expansion were to be regarded as the beginning of a long process of NATO enlargement, it would be very difficult, indeed impossible, to set limits on where the process should end.²⁰ Should Ukraine and the Caucasian states be included? What about Russia? Should NATO’s recent Mediterranean initiative lead to the membership of a number of Arab states and Israel? Should the NATO guarantee be extended to the Gulf, an area of vital interest to the West? A negative answer to these questions would reflect the logical incoherence of NATO’s selective enlargement, whereas a positive answer would be totally unrealistic.

As for the second question, Russian officials and politicians have on many occasions stated that Moscow would view an expansion of NATO membership as a threat and would take countermeasures.²¹ Instability would then be very likely to increase in the broader European security environment, including the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. Many in Russia would consider NATO expansion as the division of Europe into two spheres of influence. Moscow, under the pressure of domestic factors as well, would seek to reassert control particularly over the Baltic states, Ukraine and the Caucasus. Moscow’s increasingly assertive and intrusive policies in its ‘near abroad’ would hinder the newly independent states’ consolidation of independence and would possibly intensify the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and other states in the region such as Turkey and Iran. Russia’s growing assertiveness in the Caucasus and Central Asia would probably have no direct security impact on the West, but its indirect effects would damage Western economic and political interests by retarding transition to market economy and democracy and preventing Western companies from having access to those economies.

Ukraine is strategically of utmost importance not only for the security of the southern region but also for that of Central Europe. An independent Ukraine acts as a geostrategic counterweight between Russia and smaller states of the region. If Ukraine were to lose its independence or be forced to accept a Russian *droit de regard*, Moscow would be able to pursue a much more vigorous
‘near abroad’ policy and increase its pressure even further afield. Ukraine has so far opposed closer integration of the CIS. However if NATO were to expand, Moscow would become less tolerant of that independent policy and would probably put additional pressure on Kiev to integrate militarily and politically with the CIS (or a new alliance) in order to balance NATO. Ukraine has several weak points exposed to Russian pressure: Russia’s oil and gas supplies, and Russian claims over Sevastopol and the Russian minority in Crimea are critical in this respect. Moreover, there are, in Ukraine, influential pro-Russian elements. Moscow’s exploitation of these weaknesses might have highly destabilising consequences for Ukraine, and the Western powers could hardly prevent them.

The new members’ assumption of military responsibilities according to NATO’s strategic plans would certainly induce Moscow to react by making new military arrangements and adjusting its own military doctrine to the new circumstances. A first measure to be taken by Moscow would be the non-application of the CFE Treaty. The strategic balance established by the CFE Treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has already been upset to a certain extent as a result of the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. The balance would change even further at the expense of Russia if Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, together with their CFE quotas, were to join NATO. That would give Moscow ‘the perfect excuse to tear up the CFE Treaty and embark on a rearmament program’. Another consequence of the extinction of the CFE Treaty would be the disappearance of its elaborate provisions for inspection. Those confidence-building measures greatly contribute to stability in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus as well as in Central Europe. Their loss would be highly damaging not only to regional stability but also to Western security interests as a whole.

Russia, because of its economic problems, would have enormous difficulty countering the conventional military power of the enlarged alliance directly by increasing and upgrading its conventional forces. Instead it would tend to opt for the cheapest way of deterring a possible NATO attack through increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons. This shift in the military doctrine would be implemented by the forward deployment of additional tactical nuclear weapons in areas near NATO countries.

All these developments would imply a return to a divided Europe, but this time with an unstable and humiliated Russia seeking strategic partners not only in the CIS but also among the rogue states of the Third World. Such a Russia would certainly act much more freely in transferring nuclear and advanced missile technologies to other states. Unlike in the Cold War, in such an international environment the strategic decision models of mutual rationality would hardly be relevant, making the entire system extremely flexible and highly unpredictable.

The declared aim of NATO enlargement is the enhancement of security and stability in the broader European strategic environment. This purpose,
however, cannot be achieved by including more or less stable countries and avoiding the unstable parts of Europe. In any case an enlargement without provoking an inimicable Russian reaction and or causing a new division of Europe seems unlikely under the present circumstances. The possible harmful effects of enlargement are increasingly debated in Western capitals. The national legislatures of the NATO member countries are becoming aware of the problematic aspects of the enlargement policy. Their refusal to approve new memberships would have a highly demoralising effect on the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and act as a destabilising factor in those countries.

On the other hand, it is argued that it would be a mistake to alienate the new democracies from the rest of Europe. As a matter of fact, there is a broad consensus among the NATO members that the Central and Eastern European countries should return to the European fold. These countries clearly have a European vocation and they all aspire to be part of the Western world. NATO is one of the fundamental institutions of the West and European security depends on the Atlantic Alliance. In this sense, the issue of enlargement should be considered on its own merits and independent of Russia.

13.2 Turkey and Western Europe: shared security interests?

Even if we put aside the Russian factor, how can we ignore Turkey, a NATO member country that would directly feel the negative effects of enlargement? In the event of enlargement Turkey, like the other European allies, would have to assume a security commitment to the new members, going far beyond the original commitment of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This would in turn require a better European security guarantee to Turkey. Otherwise it would be difficult, indeed impossible, to convince the Turkish public and parliament that enlargement would be worth the risk.

In Maastricht, a formal link was established between the EU and WEU members, but in practice the WEU also has an indispensable link with NATO through Article 5. Turkey is currently a member of NATO but has been denied membership of the WEU. This not only leaves Ankara out of the transatlantic bargain but also makes the European defence commitment to Turkey highly uncertain. Therefore the negative effects of NATO enlargement could only be alleviated by linking Turkey’s security firmly to that of the EU countries through Turkey’s full participation in the Brussels Treaty and in the decision-making organs of the EU in respect of security issues as an equal member.

In the Cold War, the NATO focused on the central front as the main area of the Soviet–Warsaw Pact threat, putting overwhelming emphasis on the contingency of a massive attack through Germany into Western Europe. NATO’s strategic calculations were based on this and Turkey’s contribution was considered a function of such a contingency. In other words, NATO’s southern flank in general and Turkey in particular had a secondary but complementary strategic role.
posture contributed to the security of Western Europe in a number of ways. Firstly, without Turkish alignment the Soviets would be able to concentrate more massively against the centre. The Turkish army, the largest in NATO after that of the United States, with its well-trained and disciplined soldiers, tied down more than thirty Warsaw Pact divisions. Secondly, Turkish membership of NATO complicated Soviet defences and strategy by exposing some large, important industrial regions, energy resources and military areas in the USSR to Western monitoring in times of peace and to Western arms in times of war. The Black Sea and the Caucasus were important strategic avenues to the Soviet homeland. As long as Turkey remained a NATO ally the latter had a means of checking the advance of the Red Army westward into Central and Western Europe. Thirdly, the Turkish Straits were important to the Soviet Union not only for trade but also for the deployment and logistical support of its Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean. Turkey’s neutralisation (followed by that of Greece) would shift NATO’s defensive line on the Mediterranean back to Italy and to the line from Sicily to Cape Bon, further complicating the western defence posture in Europe.

In effect, this meant that Turkey put itself at risk of devastation and invasion, to help Western Europe in time of war and exposed itself to the pressures and animosity of a neighbouring superpower to contribute to the European balance of military forces in time of peace. In return, Ankara enjoyed a more or less unequivocal security commitment by NATO – including the Western European allies – and received peacetime military and economic assistance, primarily from the United States and, to a much lesser extent, from Western Europe, mainly Germany.

After the Cold War, this bargain ceased to satisfy the strategic requirements of the new era. The disappearance of the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat considerably weakened the west’s security commitments and the centre of gravity of security challenges shifted from the central front to NATO’s southern region. Regional instabilities as well as opportunities led to a new perspective in Ankara’s foreign and security policy, encouraging it to assume an active role in the Balkans, the Black Sea basin, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Paradoxically, however, Turkey’s new centrality in all those unstable regions underlined its distinctiveness in Europe and induced many Europeans to perceive Turkey as an additional security burden. The European unease became palpable during the Gulf War. Germany’s reluctance to send the air element of the ACE Mobile Force to south-east Turkey to defend it against a possible Iraqi attack weakened, in the eyes of many Turks, the reliability of NATO’s commitment under Article 5. However, the damage was partially repaired by allied foreign ministers, who pledged on 10 August 1990 to defend Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraqi forces. Eventually the air units of the ACE Mobile Force were dispatched to Turkey.

Although the Turkish government makes an effort to accommodate the country’s security interests to those of Western Europe, the present trend in
Turkey is towards the renationalisation of foreign policy. This implies a clearer comprehension of the fact that Turkish security interests do not necessarily coincide with those of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{27} This thinking is not confined to the extreme nationalist or radical Islamist political parties. Even in the centre-right and centre-left parties there is increasing frustration with the EU’s and individual European governments’ lack of appreciation of Turkey’s vital interests in regional conflicts such as the Aegean and Cyprus disputes and the Kurdish problem.

The Greek–Turkish dispute continues to complicate Turkey’s relations with Western Europe. It would be unrealistic to argue that this problem is irrelevant to relations between Turkey and the EU. On the contrary, it is a problem that could possibly affect the security of Europe. Therefore, it is obvious that the EU should try to find ways of helping to settle the conflict. However, it seems that Greece’s membership of the EU serves to bias the EU members’ attitude in respect of the Greek–Turkish differences. The EU has ruled that settlement of these differences is a precondition for the commencement of negotiations on Turkey’s membership of the EU. This was confirmed by the Dublin declaration of the EC Council of Ministers in late May 1990, establishing a direct and unequivocal correlation between the Cyprus problem and Turkish–EU relations. Ankara’s view of this declaration was that the EC/EU had made itself a party to the Cyprus dispute. Again, by displaying clear partiality towards Greece during the February 1996 crisis over the rocky islets off the Turkish coast, the European Parliament and the Commission played into the hands of the anti-European (indeed anti-Western) lobby in Turkey.\textsuperscript{28}

The Turks believe that this European attitude will contribute neither to the solution of the Cyprus problem nor to the settlement of the Aegean dispute. Ankara will not retract its policy towards Cyprus or the Aegean because the national consensus on Turkey’s commitment to Cyprus and the Aegean is stronger than that on EU membership. The EU could play a more positive role by adopting an unbiased policy. EU membership or setting a preaccession strategy and timetable for Turkey’s future membership would probably not guarantee the settlement of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, but it would provide a suitable framework for their negotiation and eventual solution by creating a shared environment of security and mutual responsibility. Ankara would have to accept the internationalisation of the Greek–Turkish issues within the framework of the political co-operation process. As active participants in the European integration movement both nations would feel European pressures much more heavily than they would as outsiders.

Another mistaken view that seems to have been adopted by the EU is that resolution of the Cyprus question is the key to resolving the other disputes between the two nations. This is erroneous because the reverse could be equally valid. The Cyprus dispute involves the two Cypriot communities more directly than it does Turkey and Greece. The intercommunal conflict, however, takes place within the larger framework of Greek–Turkish relations.
because the two Cypriot communities regard themselves as ‘extensions’ of their respective peoples in Turkey and Greece. For this reason, the settlement of the Aegean dispute would lead to an easing of the present tension between the two nations and would contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence in Cyprus, which in turn could facilitate a compromise between the two communities.

The Yugoslav crisis has shown that the problem of creating and maintaining a secure environment in Europe cannot be dealt with if the Balkans are ignored. So, Balkan stability and co-operation should be considered within the broader European context and as an objective whose achievement will contribute to overall European security. Both Turkey and Greece are potentially in a position to contribute to stability and cooperation in the Balkans. However, their freedom of action is limited by their rivalry. Settlement of their disputes would encourage both nations to play a constructive role in the region.

Human rights violations in general and the Kurdish problem in particular constitute another serious wedge between Western Europe and Turkey. Maintenance of a democratic and secular regime in Turkey and its support of Western ideas would greatly contribute to stability and security in Eurasia. On the other hand, failure in this respect would considerably increase regional instability and affect West European security. It is to be noted that the Turkish political system still lacks certain aspects of Western liberal democracy. Furthermore, the government has been unable to solve the Kurdish problem and has had no success in developing an effective policy against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), based on a combination of anti-terrorist measures and protection of human rights. The government has been criticised for putting emphasis on purely military measures instead of political and social measures.

As for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, the policies and attitudes of the allies are of importance too. Western Europe played a certain role in Turkey’s return to democracy and the improvement of its human rights record after the military takeover of 1980. European interventions aimed at protecting human rights, however, have not always been appropriate or free of contradictions. The tolerance shown to PKK elements resident in European countries has caused indignation among the Turkish public. Paradoxically, political organisations that reject democracy and spread anti-Western propaganda in Turkey have maintained very good connections with Western Europe. They have actively and effectively utilised their connections not to further democracy, but to alienate Turkey from the West in general and from Western Europe in particular. Such attitudes have considerably reduced the credibility of Western European human rights interventions and rendered them much less influential.29

Turkey’s membership of the coalition against the Saddam regime underlined its importance in the maintenance of regional security. After the Gulf War, however, Turkey faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the re-establishment
of Saddam’s authority north of the thirty-sixth parallel might result in further oppression of the Kurds in Iraq and cause a mass Kurdish exodus to Turkey. On the other hand, the absence of a central authority in the north could pave the way for the emergence of an independent Kurdish state, which in turn would boost the secessionist movement in south-eastern Turkey. In fact, a certain degree of decentralisation in Iraq, if not its total disintegration, seemed inevitable. Moreover after the Gulf War PKK elements were deployed in northern Iraq and used the area as an operational base against Turkey. Although Ankara maintained correct relations with the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq, its policy was to favour Iraq’s territorial integrity and oppose the creation of an autonomous Kurdish territory in the region.

In the meantime, Turkish public opinion became increasingly sensitive about the fate of the Turkoman minority in northern Iraq (more than one and half million according to a conservative estimate). In March 1995 the Turkish armed forces launched a large-scale military operation against the bases and logistic lines of the PKK in northern Iraq. About 35 000 troops penetrated up to 40 km into Iraq on a front that stretched along the Turkish–Iraqi border. So long as the local forces and the Baghdad government are unable to maintain control over PKK activities, Ankara may be tempted to intervene again. The repetition of Turkish incursions into northern Iraq would probably complicate the already difficult relations with the EU. It is also to be noted that the Turkish national interest lies in the lifting of the UN economic sanctions on Iraq. Turkey has so far supported the sanctions but this has cost it US$27 billion since the Gulf War. Turkey has huge economic problems and the sanctions have particularly affected the south-eastern region of the country. Increasing poverty and unemployment have added to the situation of instability and terrorism.

As for the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey and Western Europe do not seem to have conflicting security interests in concrete terms. For Ankara, maintenance and consolidation of the independence of Central Asian and Caucasian countries is of great importance, whereas this is not among the primary concerns of the Western European countries. But apart from this there has been no serious rift between Turkey and Western Europe in dealing with regional conflicts. Despite Ankara’s rivalry with Moscow and its unequivocal support of Azerbaijan in the Karabag conflict and of Bosnia in the Yugoslav crisis, Turkey has always taken utmost care to cooperate with the allies and international organisations. In the post-Cold War period, regional co-operation and interdependence has become one of Turkey’s primary foreign policy objectives and its conception of regional co-operation has explicitly included participation in the EU as a contributor to economic progress and stability. This West-European-oriented policy was evident in the Black Sea Economic Co-operation scheme initiated by Ankara. The scheme was envisaged as an agent of globalisation and complementary to the project of European integration.
Turkey continues to share a number of vital security interests with Western Europe and the United States, even though the Cold War is over, the Soviet military threat has disappeared and Turkey now harbours certain other regional interests that do not necessarily coincide with those of Western Europe.

First, Turkey and Western Europe share an interest in preventing a renewed hegemonic Russian threat to Europe. In this context, they have a strong interest in the preservation of an independent Ukraine. In the event of such a renewed threat, Turkey would strongly support the extension of NATO membership to Central and Eastern Europe. Even today, regardless of its possible adverse consequences, Ankara does not oppose NATO expansion.31

Second, the resources of the Gulf area, which contains two thirds of the world’s known oil reserves, are of vital importance for the well-being of Europe in general and Turkey in particular. Turkey has to import around 80 per cent of its annual oil requirement. Therefore, it has great interest in the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. Oil crises would be highly detrimental to the Turkish economy, which is increasingly integrated into the Western economic system. Clear evidence of this common interest was Turkey’s prompt alignment with the coalition of nations ranged against Iraq in 1990.

Third, Turkey is increasingly a ‘trading state’. Therefore, it has a special interest in the maintenance of open sea lanes in the Mediterranean. Here lies another shared interest that is considered an indispensable condition of open and safe international trade with Europe, which provides nearly 60 per cent of Turkey’s total trade volume.

Finally, a major concern of Turkey is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile systems in the Middle East. Some of Turkey’s population centres, dams, power stations and airbases are within range of these systems. Although their degree of precision may not yet be sufficient to hit point targets, it is known that they have been used against civilian targets on various occasions. The mere existence of these weapons in the region constitutes an element of pressure that affects the foreign policy decision-making process of states that are vulnerable to them. The states possessing these weapons are working to improve their precision and range. It is very likely that most of the Southern European cities will be within range of ballistic missiles deployed in North Africa or the Middle East. So, Western Europe and Turkey share a major interest in containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

A new security partnership between Turkey and Western Europe would require a certain reharmonisation of the Turkish and West European perceptions of some security interests and threats to those interests. A number of their interests already converge to a considerable extent. However, despite this partial convergence it may be that neither side will view its own strategic priorities as sufficiently and clearly accommodated to secure Turkey’s full participation in a European security and defence identity. This will depend on
internal developments in Turkey and Western Europe’s readiness to consider European security in its wider geopolitical context.

13.3 Perspectives on the future

The expansion of NATO to include Central and Eastern Europe is not an urgent factor in determining the region’s return to the European system, nor is it vital to securing a stable international order in Europe. The NATO enlargement debate has overshadowed more urgent policy issues such as reconstruction of the Central and Eastern European economies, NATO’s role in out-of-area conflicts, Western Europe’s readiness to contribute to security and stability abroad and task-sharing in a new transatlantic security bargain.

Russia does not pose an actual threat to European security, including the security of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. The Western challenge is to help Russia consolidate its democracy and market economy, and, to make sure that Russia uses its potentialities in favour of European security. A premature enlargement of NATO might prejudice this aim. If Russia embarks on expansionist, aggressive policies, becoming threat to the independence and territorial integrity of its neighbours, the West will have to contain it and NATO enlargement will then become a viable policy option. In the meantime NATO should continue, through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and other multilateral and bilateral arrangements, to take measures to improve the readiness of the military forces, politicians and political decision-making processes of NATO and non-NATO countries for such an eventuality. NATO’s more active and broader involvement in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe, as has been the case in former Yugoslavia, would restore confidence in the new democracies of Europe. NATO may be useful in managing ethnic crises and conflicts, there as in former Yugoslavia. However, for this type of a mission, prior security guarantees under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would be redundant. Crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions could always be undertaken by NATO through the consultation mechanism of Article 4.

On the other hand, the EU is much better positioned to deal with the political and economic roots of ethnic tensions and their adverse consequences, such as migration and refugee problems. First of all, the EU should induce potential members to observe human rights (including minority rights) and consolidate democratic practices. Moreover, gradual economic integration with the EU could stimulate economic and social reconstruction as well as economic growth, thereby alleviating ethnic tensions in Central and Eastern Europe. This would also give the EU the necessary leverage to contribute to stability in the region. When the Central and Eastern European countries become ready to join the EU they could also opt for membership of the WEU. Russia would hardly regard such a process as a threat to its security and would have little difficulty agreeing that the primary purpose of EU/WEU enlargement would be to ensure stability in the region. At the same time, the
intensifying economic, societal, political and military links would in practice extend the European security zone to Central and Eastern Europe, and would be perceived as amounting to an implicit commitment on the part of Western Europe and the United States to the security and defence of that zone.\textsuperscript{34}

The outlook of Western Europeans has greatly changed since the end of the Second World War. They have no interest in territorial expansion or exploiting the weaknesses of Russia to increase their influence in the former Soviet Union. This is undoubtedly a very fortunate development for international peace and security. However, the problem is now the lack of geopolitical consciousness, the obscuration of the problems of international security by a growing emphasis on personal and social security\textsuperscript{35} and economic self-absorption.\textsuperscript{36} This has led to extreme caution, even reluctance, in dealing with the Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of Bulgaria, complained about this Western European attitude in the following terms:

Western democracies have succumbed to an unhealthy populism and have given up fighting for European integration .... Instead of being associated with European structures, in the eyes of the average Belgian and German, Eastern Europe is beginning to be associated with thousands of emigrants, cheap goods, nationalism and instability. The integration of Europe is increasingly being restricted to the integration of Western Europe. Inside Eastern Europe itself, Visegrad and the rest are already apart in terms of speed of integration.\textsuperscript{37}

If Turkey and the Central and Eastern European countries want to share the common European destiny, they should not hesitate to show their readiness to contribute to the protection of common European interests. On the other hand, if Western Europe is claiming a significant role in the emerging international system, it cannot play it properly by confining itself to a very limited geographical area. The reconventionalisation of military strategy, the growing importance of crisis management, peacekeeping, peacemaking and regional balances of power are adding to the weight of such factors as geostrategic location, manpower, regional influence and economic potential. Turkey and the Central and Eastern European countries are in a position to enrich Western Europe in all these respects. Their full participation in a European security identity would strengthen Europe’s hand \textit{vis-à-vis} the United States in a new transatlantic bargain.

The Europeans, however, have not yet formed a common opinion on what efforts and sacrifices they should make to erect the kind of Europe they want in the future.\textsuperscript{38} Consequently, they have not yet assessed how to benefit from the Central and Eastern European potentialities. Another major reason for Western Europe’s slowness to assume formal responsibilities in other areas may be the US readiness to carry the main burden of protecting Western
interests there. Similarly, the reason for its inadequate interest in Turkey may be the belief that as long as Turkey remains a NATO member and an ally of the United States it will continue to contribute to European security in any case. In other words, it seems to think that Turkey’s being in or out of Europe will make no difference in this respect. At present in Turkey, there is a broad consensus that Turkey should take part in all aspects of the European integration movement, including defence. On the other hand, the interrelatedness of Turkey’s prospective EU membership and its contribution to the security of Western Europe within NATO is being increasingly emphasised by decision makers and the media in Turkey.

Neither economic interdependence nor the dissolving of East–West tension is enough to ensure security in Europe. Diverse challenges are emerging, ranging from Middle Eastern instability and the increasing importance of oil to the requirements of a well-managed transformation in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The most important challenge, however, is determining how to influence the formation of the emerging international system and defining the role that Europe should assume within it. It is already, evident that the new power configurations in the Middle East–Gulf area, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Caucasus have made them important subsystems whose stability directly affects Europe’s peace and welfare. Moreover, stability in these regions is of utmost importance for Western Europe’s continual and effective contribution to the process of transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.

The future of Europe will depend on its ability to formulate new policies to meet emerging challenges. Western Europe will not be able to ensure peace and stability on the continent by limiting itself to just one part of the continent. If Western Europe assumes wider responsibilities, this will help harmonise European developments with global trends and co-ordinate American and European roles in regional crises. Furthermore it will considerably enhance the Europe’s part in the decision-making process of the West while paving the way for more satisfactory burden-sharing between the United States and Europe. Not only the Americans, but also the Europeans should have an unequivocal commitment to the maintenance of stability in the Middle East and the Gulf area and in Central and Eastern Europe.

If Western Europe proves unable to develop a viable security policy commensurate with its real potentialities, it will not be able to contribute to a smooth transformation in Eastern Europe or to prevent an eventual weakening of the US security commitment. This will, in turn, result in NATO’s gradual dissolution and even the reversal of the process of integration, leading to a weak ‘fortress Europe’. Such a development would offer no hope to the Central and Eastern European countries. It would lead to a multipolar system with shifting alliances, regional counterweights and increased tensions. In Turkey, it would encourage anti-Western political movements and lead to the further nationalisation of foreign and security policy.
Notes
4. See, for example, the Rome Declaration of the North Atlantic Council (7–8 November 1991), paras 6–7.
7. Ibid., pp. 35–6.
12. For details of the opinion polls, see Mihalka (1995), pp. 15–18.
23. Russian experts have unequivocally put this forward. For the views of Pavel Felgengauer and Aleksandr Konovalov, see ibid., p. 13.
24. Ibid., p. 14. It is to be noted that the official military doctrine published in 1993 provides for first use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions.
26. The ‘central front bias’ was criticised by a few Western strategists during the Cold War years. See, for example, Wohlstetter (1981); Snyder (1985); Karaosmanoğlu (1986).
27. For an accurate European observation of this change, see Wyllie (1995), pp. 74–5.
28. The Turkish media criticised the European attitude from this angle too. See, inter alia, Çevik (1996).
31. Various interviews with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials.
33. In ‘Russia Council’s NATO Report’ the enlargement of the WEU is put forward as a ‘mutually acceptable constructive alternative’ to NATO enlargement See Transition, 15 December 1995, p. 32.
References


