Transformations in security and identity after the cold war

Turkey's problematic relationship with Europe

INTRODUCTION

Turkey's relationship with the European Union (EU) is a particularly difficult one. The 1990s witnessed the transformation of the European Community into the EU and its subsequent enlargement. When Turkey was not included in the enlargement process, even though the EU opened accession negotiations with all the countries of central and eastern Europe and with Malta and Cyprus, Turkey's relations with the EU deteriorated. The situation was unsettling for Turkey, which wanted to be part of Europe and a member of the EU. At its Helsinki summit in December 1999, the Council of the European Union elevated Turkey's status from that of an applicant to that of a candidate. Nevertheless, Turkey remained the only candidate country with which the EU did not open accession negotiations.

It is our contention that the ambivalence in Turkey's relations with the EU is a result of transformations in European security and identity since the end of the cold war, a transition period in which the changing systemic parameters challenged Turkey's position in Europe and...
This article attempts to answer the following questions: what impact does the reformulation of European security have on Turkey? Is European identity being redefined in such a way that Turkey is excluded? Do reformulations of security and identity in Europe further complicate the difficult relationship between Turkey and the EU?

Our approach is, of course, only one way of looking at Turkish-EU relations. One could argue that Turkey’s inclusion in the EU is problematic not only because of the factors analyzed in this article, but also because of Turkey’s economic problems, its shortcomings in upholding democratic principles, the Kurdish issue, the Cyprus problem, or the size of its population. These factors all pose serious obstacles to Turkey’s integration into the EU. However, since some of the other countries with which the EU is currently negotiating have serious economic and political problems of their own, one must conclude that there is another variable in the equation in the case of Turkey. Because Turkey is not even in the same basket as Romania or Bulgaria, it is our contention that that variable is the reformulation of European identity in the post–cold war era. We acknowledge that the EU may have taken other factors into consideration in its expansion talks, such as stabilizing the fragile political environment in the prospective member countries and the fact that it is easier to absorb some of them because of their size. Nonetheless, we believe that the perspective in this article sheds new light on Turkey’s relations with the EU.

Post-cold war Europe has witnessed two parallel developments in security and identity. The first is the transformation in European security that is the result of a re-projection of the ‘Western security community’ inherited from the cold war. A cold war collective defence system has been transformed into a system of collective security. But the tools used to build this new structure — a European Security Architecture1 — come from the old cold war institutions. Collective security is carried out by this new structure through the wider promotion of the Western values of democracy and free markets in the belief

1 The European Security Architecture encompasses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The role of the EU within this architecture is through the developing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which is to become the defence arm of the EU when the WEU is absorbed into the EU.
that the spread of these values and the acceptance of the institutions that guard them will yield stability in Europe's peripheral regions.

During the cold war, Turkey belonged to the 'Western security community.' Thus, its identity as part of Europe in that period centred on the issue of security. In the post-cold war era, Turkey is still considered a component of the European Security Architecture. At the same time, its Europeanness is increasingly questioned. Indeed, it is the only country within the European Security Architecture that is challenged on this issue. The paradox is that, although Turkey fully participates in the European Security Architecture, even here it encounters problems because it is excluded from the EU's evolving defence arm - CESDP (Common European Security and Defence Policy) - which is part of this architecture. This is an interesting point because security was one of the strongest links tying Turkey to Europe and vice versa.

The second development is the idea of Europe constructed along historical and cultural lines, that is, an attempt to redefine Europe in terms of Christianity, ethnicity, and race - at least in certain quarters. In this process, Turkey's Europeanness becomes questionable because of the resurfacing of perceptions of the 'Turk' as the 'other' of European identity. For example, at a meeting in Brussels on 4 March 1997, the European People's party - an alliance of European Christian Democratic parties - declared that 'the European Union is a civilization project and within this civilization project, Turkey has no place.' To understand this declaration, one has to look at the historical building blocs of European identity.

The Idea of 'Europe' and the 'Other'

Since the end of the cold war, 'European identity' has become a focal point for the analysis of European politics. Because it is almost impossible to define 'European identity,' who is and who is not European tends to turn on ethnocultural factors. Since identity is a concept based on differences, the borders between 'self' and 'other' become impor-

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3 Chris Nuttall and Ian Traynor, 'Kohl tries to cool row with Ankara,' *Guardian* (Manchester), 7 March 1997.
tant. In fact, almost every intellectual effort at creating an idea of 'Europe' through European unity and integration rests on singling out the 'other': 'the very idea of what Europe was from the beginning was defined partly in terms of what it was not. In other words, the “other,” i.e. the non-European barbarian or savage played a decisive role in the evolution of the European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states.'\(^4\) Therefore, in the formulation of European identity, what is European is clarified by what is non-European.

The collapse of the cold war order eroded the line of demarcation between the non-communist (‘self’) and the communist (‘other’) in European identity. Because of Europe’s uncertain boundaries, historical, racial, ethnic, and cultural factors become more important as criteria for inclusion. This is to be expected because at the core of ‘European chauvinism was a racist doctrine.’\(^5\) In the post-1989 definition of European identity, the Turkish position in Europe became harder to justify. ‘The replacement of the ideological East-West conflict with ethnic, religious and historical conflicts presented Turkey to the rest of Europe as a non-European - i.e., non-Christian - state.’\(^6\) Hence, in the construction of post-cold war Europe, religion becomes an invisible variable. ‘Western fears of Islam are making it difficult for Muslims to be accepted in Europe. That fear is partly the result of a media-driven Islamophobia that links Islam to terrorism and fundamentalism.’\(^7\)

The idea of European unity was used as early as the Middle Ages in relation to the rise of the Ottomans and the threat they posed to Christianity. In early medieval writers such as Pierre Dubois and Marcilius of Padua,\(^8\) one sees this purpose of unity in the resurrection


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of the crusades. Religion thus became the main differentiator of identity. ‘It is no doubt true that during the period from the 13th to 16th centuries, the concepts of Christendom and Europe tended to coincide.’ What is important for the purposes of this article is that ‘The question of Islam was already raising the problem of European identity even in those days; since Christian faith is most often presented as one of the cornerstones of all that Europe stands for, Islam automatically became a non-European phenomenon.’

By the mid-15th and 16th centuries, reviving the crusades was replaced by defending against the ‘Turk.’ In 1458, for example, George Podiebrand presented the king of France with his plan for a League of Perpetual Union of Christian Princes, in which defence against the Turks was singled out as one of the main purposes for creating a joint ‘European’ army and a federal parliament. Similar plans for a European League against ‘the Turk’ continued with Antoine Marini (1464), François de la Noue (1587), the Greek Minotto (1609), and persisted even to the early 17th century with the Duc de Sully’s ‘Grand Design’ (1611-17). Sully’s design defended the idea of French hegemony in Europe with the weakening of the Habsburgs and possibly a war against the Turks and Russians. In this case, Russia was singled out, alongside the Ottoman Empire, as the ‘other.’

In the 17th century the necessity of preserving a lasting order for the sake of peace and prosperity to serve all mankind gradually began to replace the ‘other’ in European ideas on unity and integration. Here we see the origins of expanding and promoting European ideas, institutions, and practices for the good of all. This is similar to the expansion of ‘Western,’ essentially European, institutions for the same purpose in the post-cold war era. One of the 17th century writers formulating these ideas was Emeric Cruce, whose ‘Nouveau Cynee’ (1624) advocated an international organization of peace to encompass not only Europe but also the Ottoman Empire, Persia, China, Ethiopia, and the East and West Indies, almost like a United Nations of its day. Like the modern-day expansion of Western institutions and practices for the sake of maintaining stability, Cruce’s scheme would bring such politi-

9 M.E. Yapp, ‘Europe in the Turkish mirror,’ Past and Present 137 (November 1992), 138.
10 Heikki Mikkeli, Europe as an Idea and an Identity (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998), 34-5.
11 Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, 22-5.
cal advantages as religious tolerance, expansion of world trade, and reduction of poverty. The Abbé de Saint Pierre’s ‘Project for a Perpetual Peace’ (1712) was of a similar nature and included both Russia and Turkey in the construction of a European league.\(^\text{12}\)

The expansion of European ideas and practices on an altruistic basis - but ultimately for the political advantage of stability and better trade, and therefore prosperity - is another building block of European identity. Once the ‘other’ is identified as an enemy and threat, a fortress has to be built to keep the ‘other’ out. And when the fortress is built, the idea of the ‘other’ has to be maintained. Whereas the expansion of European ideas and institutions to safeguard stability and prosperity also depends on singling out the ‘other,’ here the ‘other’ must be *absorbed* into Western practices instead of being kept out, as witness the post-communist states subsumed into Western European and transatlantic institutions and practices. European institutional overtures have even been made to southern Mediterranean.\(^\text{13}\)

The expansion of Western labels, ideas, institutions, and practices beyond ‘Western’ Europe in the post-cold war era has found expression in what Michael Ignatieff calls ‘zones of danger’ and ‘zones of safety,’ which he argues have replaced the distinct East and West blocs of the post–Second World War. ‘Zones of danger’ are those spaces devoid of the Western values of democracy and free markets, where there is turmoil, possibly ethnic conflict, poverty, low subsistence, and lack of infrastructures. ‘Zones of safety’ are those spaces in which cold war ‘Western’ practices prevailed, which are now being projected to the ‘zones of danger’ through international organizations and non-governmental organizations, ranging from aid workers to direct military intervention.\(^\text{14}\) Geospatially, Turkey is in the midst of several ‘zones of danger,’ but participates and functions through the institutions and

\(^{12}\) In later editions, St Pierre left Turkey out of the scheme, not because it signified the ‘other’ but for practical reasons. He believed that the scheme would be ineffective if covering such a vast area and membership. See Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, 40.

\(^{13}\) For example, NATO’s Partnership for Peace is open to association by all OSCE states, the ‘Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’ involves all the former Warsaw Pact states, the ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ includes the north African states. There are similar initiatives in the WEU and the EU - most notably the PHARE, TACIS programmes and the Barcelona Process.

practices of the 'zones of safety.' Its participation in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, for example, can be seen as a continuation of its cold war place amongst Western institutions and practices.

But to really understand Turkey's role in post-cold war European security, we must go back to the post-1945 European order when 'Western' Europe was reorganized in terms of a political, moral, infra-structural, economic, and social transformation. A massive process of institution building and integration began. Nineteen eighty-nine marked the beginning of a similar process of institution building. It is interesting to note that the institutions and patterns of co-operation that emerged after 1945 became the building blocks for the post-1989 reconstruction of Europe.

From 1945 onwards, previous notions of European identity were jettisoned in favour of a new Europe - a 'Western' Europe that was part of the Western bloc. Not only were the institutions and practices accumulated during the cold war of paramount importance in rebuilding a new Europe in the post-cold war era, but also the various conceptions of what constituted a European identity that had emerged during the cold war were not so easily jettisoned. However, the purpose of the post-cold war security co-operation arrangements was not just to secure borders but also to secure a newly defined European identity, or, more accurately, a return to the distant past to rediscover the notions of 'Europeanness' that were repressed at the start of the cold war and the founding of the postwar order. One could argue that the preservation of this identity supersedes the traditional preservation of borders. The European Union, for example, undermines the concept of borders because many groups in nation-states have direct links with the centre in Brussels that bypass national capitals. It can, therefore, be argued that motivations of security have changed from securing borders to securing the idea of Europe and the values of Europe. There are, of course, claims that such a European identity has yet to emerge. Nevertheless, in certain quarters there is a tendency to refer to a 'European identity' as the cement that will hold Europe together.

The dismantling of cold war structures led to a search not only for new patterns of co-operation, but also for the raison d'etre of the institutions inherited from the cold war and the patterns of identity they created. This has given rise to debates about the search paths for redefining concepts of identity. One debate has centred round the need for 'more Europe,' for speeding up European integration. Here
the purpose of European security is to protect European civilization or European ideas and values embedded in historical evolution. This 'security of identity,' which has received so much emphasis in the post-cold war period, refers to the protection of identity based on historical and cultural foundations and the use of institutional channels and the practices of the states system to preserve it. There is a new interest in the idea of a 'wider Europe' and its relationship to national identities because for the first time in history a European identity has become a distinct possibility because of European integration through the EU.¹⁵

One aspect of the new Europe-in-the-making is a common cultural heritage, with its foundations claimed to be in ancient Greece, Christianity, and the Europe of Enlightenment. What is more alarming is that, in the post-cold war era, 'identity becomes a security question, it becomes high politics.'¹⁶ Therefore, security is increasingly interpreted as the survival of the 'self.' But there is as yet no way to differentiate the 'other' because for some it is Russia, for some it is Islam, and for a third group it is Europe's own anarchical past.

It can be argued that, on the other hand, security during the cold war also had an indirect bearing on the security of identity. However, unlike the post-1989 period, the objective of security during the cold war was not to preserve the definition of the 'self'; it was rather to preserve one 'way of life' against another 'way of life.' Thus, the objective of security was to meet an explicit military threat from an adversary directed against the economic and political infrastructures of society itself. This led indirectly to the security of identity after identity became a side product of this process. Identity was only possible through association for this purpose - that is, preserving a 'way of life' - within a certain bloc. Identification with a bloc - whether East, West, or non-aligned - also became the definition of identity. Therefore, as the 'way of life' was militarily preserved in the bloc system, so was the identity that had come to depend on 'belonging' to a bloc.

European security, therefore, came to reflect a common understanding of 'Western' European security interests, which were inextricably linked to the security interests and security provisions of the United States. The cornerstone of this arrangement was extended deterrence,

¹⁵ Anthony Smith, 'National identity and the idea of European unity,' International Affairs 68(January 1992), 55.
which yielded a 'Western security community' that functioned as a collective defence system based on the imperative of 'us against them' or the preservation of a 'way of life' against another way of life.\(^{17}\)

This 'Western security community' promoted its own particular 'culture,' what Bradley Klein calls a 'strategic culture': 'it is here, between state and civil society, that a political body reserves for itself the right and the ability to rely upon force and defence - and in pursuit of that which is construed to be vital for the social reproduction of its domestic way of life.'\(^{18}\) Strategic culture is defined in terms of defence and security provided by a military structure, which acquires legitimacy as the provider of a 'way of life.' Therefore, 'high politics' goes beyond the confined tools of the state to become the provider of a way of life for the society it seeks to defend. Culture is thus distinctly placed within a militarily maintained identity against the adversarial 'other,' also defined in terms of a military threat. The social, historical, religious, and civilization-oriented definitions of culture are not included in the making of strategic culture.

Western Europe during the cold war era was part of this Western strategic culture, on which its identity was based. Turkey, as the southeast bastion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was part of this system and also found its identity in Europe within the context of this strategic culture. However, in the post-cold war era, European identity is no longer defined solely in terms of strategic culture and where Turkey fits becomes dubious - as does the whole question of what exactly constitutes Europe.

Hence, the purpose of European security has changed from the preservation of a 'way of life' to the promotion beyond its borders of the very values it upholds: democracy, human rights, free markets, liberalism. Values and practices now have to be transported from the 'zones of safety' to the 'zones of danger.'

Those who live in the 'zones of safety' seem to have taken upon themselves a moral mission and obligation to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to those in the 'zones of danger' by absorbing them into essentially 'Western'/'European' institutions and practices: the moni-

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Monitoring missions of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the SFOR (Stabilization Force) and the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia, the United Nations inspectors in Baghdad systematically disarming Iraq's capability to produce weapons of mass destruction, the Kosovo Verification Mission and the KFOR peacekeeping force. Turkey sided with the European states in all of these crises, and its participation was crucial for the missions' success. But here is the dilemma: even as Turkey participates in these operations as an equal partner in 'zones of safety,' it is criticized for its lack of openness in certain issues and for its treatment of its Kurdish population.

As the definition of the cold war 'West' erodes, the concept of the post-cold war 'West' becomes increasingly blurred. Klein puts it this way: 'the unravelling of cold war representations raises for the first time the fundamental issue of western identity. It is no longer clear who is to be legitimately incorporated within the space of modern western culture.'19 Yet, modern Western culture is undeniably an accumulation of the strategic culture of the cold war and its institutions. Although the collective defence basis of this strategic culture is no longer relevant, a new European Security Architecture is being built upon the very institutions of the cold war strategic culture, namely, NATO, the WEU (Western European Union), and the EU. One could argue that if Turkey belonged to the cold war strategic culture, it also belongs to the post-cold war European Security Architecture.

But post-cold war definitions of security and identity are, alas, not so straightforward. Whereas cold war strategic culture preserved the economic and political structures that safeguarded a 'way of life' - in the 'West' these were free market economies and democratic institutions - the notion of security in the post-cold war period aims at securing ideas, identity, and the 'self.' Singling out the 'other' in order to define Europe is aimed at ensuring the survival of the 'self.' What is being preserved then is identity, defined in terms of historical, religious, cultural, and civilization-oriented affiliations. Thus the problem of identity and security are interlocked in post-1989 politics.

Post-cold war European politics reveal a crisis of identity for almost all states in the region, which 'manifests itself both in a widespread if elusive European consciousness and in a strengthening of national identity.'

19 Bradley Klein, 'How the West was one: representational politics of NATO,' International Studies Quarterly 34 (September 1990), 314.
identity.\textsuperscript{20} Such a state of disorder, in return, leads many countries to redefine their own cultural boundaries and to develop new criteria to protect their culture. This explains, in part, the wave of opposition to foreigners and immigrants in such European states as Germany and Belgium. The most visible ‘other’ in the Europe of today is the foreigner, that is, the non-Christian, ‘non-European’ migrant. The security of identity is an attempt to protect the boundaries of European identity against the ‘other.’ Therefore, the culture of the ‘self’ supersedes the wider notion of ‘strategic culture.’

A new form of consensus is emerging that links the ‘elusive’ European identity and national identities. Co-operative patterns that emerge in post–cold war European politics attempt to protect both European and national identities. Societal security concerns the situations in which a society perceives a threat to its identity.\textsuperscript{21} For societal security, identity is at the crux of survival, and it is here that the construction of identity becomes important in analytical terms.

Protection of the ‘European’ identity first requires a clarification of the identity and then a differentiation of those who belong and those who do not. It is interesting that in both the construction and the clarification of European identity, problems arise from the process of differentiation. Such difficulties make the Turkish case analytically interesting as an investigation of both politics of identity and politics of security in Europe.

A HISTORY OF TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Turkey has a peculiar history of partnership with the European Union that is an extension of its position within the larger context of the European system of states. Turkey became a member of the OECD in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO in 1952. It has been associated with the EU since it signed the Association Agreement with the European Community in 1963 and has striven for full membership ever since. Article 28 of the agreement explicitly stated that when the parties were able to fulfil the obligations of membership, Turkey would become a member of the EC/EU. When Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, the European Commission\textsuperscript{22} recommended a

\textsuperscript{20} Hugh Miall, Redefining Europe (London: Pinter 1994), 2.
\textsuperscript{21} Waever, ‘European security identities,’ 113.
\textsuperscript{22} The Commission is the executive body of the European Communities that commences Community legislation by its proposals.
customs union instead of accession. On 6 March 1995, a Customs Union Agreement - as envisaged by the Ankara Treaty and the 1970 Additional Protocol - was signed and came into effect on 1 January 1996. When the Commission put forward its proposal for enlargement in 1997 in its Agenda 2000, it did not include Turkey among the countries with which it intended to open accession negotiations even though the EU had on many occasions confirmed Turkey's eligibility.

When the European Council decided in December 1997 not to include Turkey in the enlargement process, it nonetheless confirmed 'Turkey's eligibility for accession to the EU.' After the Luxembourg summit, the Turkish prime minister at the time, Mesut Yilmaz, accused the EU of erecting 'a new, cultural Berlin wall' to exclude Turkey and of discriminating against Turkey on religious grounds. A common slogan in the Turkish media was 'Go to hell, Europe.' Officially, the Turkish government broke off all political dialogue with the EU. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the European Council elevated Turkey's position from an applicant country to a candidate country in an attempt to mend its relations with Turkey. The Presidency Conclusions of the summit state that: 'Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the "other" candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like "other" candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.'

At the root of Turkey's problematic relationship with the EU is the dichotomy of Turkey's place in Europe before and after the cold war. When Europe was reorganized at the end of World War II, Turkey's participation in the new European order was crucial for maintaining stability in southeast Europe and for marking Europe's boundaries as set against the communist 'other.' During the cold war, Turkey's position was relatively secure despite various ups and downs in Turkish-European relations. The benefits for Turkey were considerable. By tying itself tightly to the Western alliance, it was able to establish its 'Europeanness.'

However, that process did not begin until after the Second World War. Before the First World War, the Ottoman Empire was a major power on the periphery of a Europe that was defined geographically.

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Although one could argue that many Ottoman provinces constituted a ‘zone of safety’ in contrast to some ‘zones of danger’ in Europe, in ‘European eyes,’ Turkey was perceived as being in the ‘zones of danger’ simply because culturally it was the ‘other.’

The reasons are to be found in 19th century Europe, in other words in the traditional Europe of ideas, culture, and common historical heritage. The ‘zones of danger’ in those days were any areas outside the cultural civilization and state system practices of Europe. ‘Ever since Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, travelers returning from the zones of danger have used their experiences to castigate the liberal illusions of those who live in the zones of safety.’ However, as far as the institutional practice and participation and procedures in the post–cold war environment are concerned, Turkey is in the ‘zones of safety.’ It is not in the ‘zone of danger’ because it does not need to be assimilated into Western practices; it already functions as part of these. But Turkey’s absorption into Western practices was never quite complete, and herein lies the problem.

The most solid example is Turkey’s long-standing wait for full membership in the EU. The visions of a wider Europe automatically triggered discussions as to what Europe is and who the Europeans are. The distinction between those who are in and those who are out is not easy to make. Turkey’s cultural differences and divergent patterns of social norms and attitudes make it easy to label it non-European. It does not fit into either Christian Europe or the Islamic Middle East. But its identity crisis goes beyond this simple geographical differentiation. What is most problematic for Turkey’s identity is the transformation in European identity from dependence upon membership in the ‘Western alliance to a re-discovered cultural, historical, and religious bonding in the post–cold war era.

As European identity has gone through this transformation, Turkey’s ‘Western’ identity as part of cold war Europe has been replaced with a perception of Turkey that is now almost that of the ‘other.’ In the absence of the cold war security parameters, the surfacing of this dormant perception had an impact on EU policies towards Turkey. Is it any wonder, therefore, that when the European Council decided at its Luxembourg summit in December 1997 to open accession negotiations with the central and eastern European countries and Cyprus but not with Turkey, the Turks felt betrayed by Europe? ‘Twas

ever thus. In the dictionary of quotations from Shakespeare to Mozart, Dickens to Gladstone and Lloyd George, the Turks get insulting citations.25 The perceptions of the ‘Turk’ as the ‘other’ of the European identity, deeply embedded in the European consciousness, resurfaced at the end of the cold war when the new European order was formulated along the dimensions of Europeanness, despite the fact that Turkey was among the ‘European countries’ of the cold war era.

Because Turkey’s association with the EU was a by-product of its inclusion in the ‘Western security community,’ when the Soviet threat disappeared, Turkey’s relations with the EU worsened. Even though Turkey still acts as an island of stability, especially in the uncertain environment of the Middle East and the Caucasus, the EU lacks the political will to accept Turkey into its ranks on equal terms. One should note that for the United States, Turkey still holds a central place in global and regional balances. That is why the United States supports closer ties between Turkey and the EU. (One should acknowledge, however, that unlike EU member states the United States has no need to carve a new identity for itself.) For the United States, Turkey’s geostrategic position is primary; for the EU, other factors come into play, ranging from doubts surrounding Turkey’s Europeanness to its economic and political performance.

The Helsinki summit brought a breakthrough in Turkey’s battle to be included in the European Union when the EU officially acknowledged that Turkey was a candidate country for full membership.26 Certain quarters in Turkey claim that the Helsinki decision was a strategic move by the EU, which still does not have the political will to incorporate Turkey. Since rejecting Turkey outright is too costly in security terms, the EU found a perfect middle ground by neither completely closing the door on Turkey nor opening accession negotiations. Despite the positive developments in Helsinki, Turkey still is far behind other candidate countries, and the prospects for opening negotiations with the EU in the near future are slim.

25 Stephen Bates and Martin Walker, ‘Analysis: Turkey: Bridge over troubled waters: The Bosphorus crossing links Europe and Asia, yet despite their geopolitical importance and long membership of Nato, the Turks batter in vain on Europe’s door,’ Guardian (Manchester), 2 December 1998.

26 However, one should note that the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions imply that Turkey’s accession is conditional upon the improvement of Turkish human rights and democracy as well as resolution of the Cyprus problem and the conflicts of interests between Turkey and Greece.
The EU may have doubts about Turkey's inclusion, but Turkey is, nonetheless, too important to discard completely. It is still part and parcel of the European Security Architecture, which continues to preserve and promote the ‘way of life’ of modern Western culture. However, even within the European Security Architecture Turkey has run into problems. A recent example is what will happen to Turkey's associate membership in the WEU when the EU fully absorbs the WEU. Turkey's concern over this issue intensified after the Cologne summit of the EU in June 1999 when the WEU's absorption into the EU was officially acknowledged. When this occurs, the WEU Council, in which Turkey participates, will cease to exist. It will be replaced by the EU's Common European Security and Defence Policy as part of the second pillar of the EU, that is, the Intergovernmental Council structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, under the aegis of the EU Council, in which Turkey does not participate. The EU's summit in Feira in June 2000 confirmed the decision-making mechanisms of the evolving CESDP. There can be no doubt about the erosion of Turkey's contribution to decision-making at this level. Debate is already engaged in Brussels over this dilemma, but no one is under any doubt that any future European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), whether the WEU folds into the EU or not, could undertake operations in the future without at least consulting Turkey, and even more possibly without the co-operation and contribution of Turkey. At least in terms of security, Turkey becomes the informal, proxy, European 'partner' - a role which does not satisfy Turkish policy-makers, given Turkey's contribution to European security for over forty years.

Despite the question marks surrounding its Europeanness, Turkey's continued inclusion in the European order, that is, the 'zones of safety,' carries significant weight for European security and stability, and that seems to be behind the EU's decision to elevate Turkey to the status of a candidate country at the Helsinki summit. The EU seems to have found the least costly way of keeping Turkey in its orbit.

CONCLUSION

In the post–cold war era, Turkey is at the periphery of the new European order, but simultaneously it is still regarded as an integral

28 Interviews with WEU officials, 22 March 1999.
part of European security. Turkey is pushed to the end of the waiting list, behind the former countries of the Warsaw Pact, all of whom are negotiating with the EU. On the other hand, Turkish policy-makers still tend to regard the EU as the utmost manifestation of European identity, and, therefore, increased ties with the EU are perceived to be a stamp of approval for Turkey's Europeanness.

One should note that the acceptance of Turkey into Europe as part of its political system after World War II does not necessitate its acceptance into the European cultural system. Thus, whenever the postwar European political order is challenged, so too is Turkey's place in it. Had Turkey's place been historically embedded and, therefore, secure within the European cultural order, the post–cold war reformulations of the politics of security and identity would not have had such an impact on Turkey. The move in European politics towards more Eurocentric, identity-based politics translates into Turkey's increased isolation from the European ranks. Yet, this reflects the security of identity, that is, the preservation of the 'self.' But, in terms of the preservation of a 'way of life' through a system of security - or a 'strategic culture' - as was the case during the cold war, Turkey is still fully involved in the process through its participation in a European Security Architecture. What is awkward for Turkey in the post–cold war era is that the preservation and promotion of the 'Western security community' and the preservation of the 'self' are two parallel processes. While Turkey is part of the former, its place in the latter - in terms of 'European' identity - is questionable.

Can a middle way be found for Turkey between these two parallel processes that will determine its place in Europe? Perhaps that question has already been answered. Today Turkey co-operates, participates, and functions within all European institutions, in some as a full member and in others as an associate. What is important is that Turkey participates in the international system through the accustomed channels of Western co-operation and refrains from irresponsible unilateral action during times of crisis. And since this co-operation has accumulated since the cold war era, one can assume, that as a state in the international system, Turkey is the unofficial European, and in terms of cultural identity is not so much part of Europe's newly defined 'self,' but, on the other hand, nor is it Europe's 'other.'