Stalin’s Demands: Constructions of the “Soviet Other” in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1919–1945

Kivanc Coş and Pınar Bilgin

Bilkent University, Ankara

Standard accounts on Turkey’s foreign policy identify Molotov’s communication of 1945 (better known as “Stalin’s demands”) as the catalyst behind Turkey’s post-WWII decision to strain its relations with the USSR and turn to the United States (US) for defense support. The aim here is to complement these accounts which have stressed the military and ideological threat posed by the USSR as the catalyst behind Turkey’s foreign policy change, by offering an analysis that explores the conditions of possibility for such change. The aim here is not to question the seriousness of the risks involved in failing to stand firm against the USSR in the immediate post-WWII period. Nor is it to dispute the appropriateness of Turkey’s search for “Western” allies at a time when its economic, political and military vulnerabilities were acknowledged by friend and foe alike. The following mediates through accounts that stress the military threat and those that emphasize the ideological threat and presents an analysis that looks into the production of representations of the USSR as a “threat” to Turkey and the context which allowed for the production of such representations of the USSR.

On June 7, 1945, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov informed Selim Sarper, Turkey’s Ambassador to Moscow, of the need to come to a mutual agreement on the following if the Republic of Turkey was to maintain the kind of “friendly” relations it had until then enjoyed with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): (1) Kars and Ardahan provinces to be “returned” to the USSR; (2) Bases to be allocated to the USSR for the “joint defense” of Istanbul and Çanakkale Straits; (3) A bilateral agreement to be reached on the future status of the Straits and the Montreux Convention to be amended accordingly. In standard accounts on Turkey’s foreign policy (see, inter alia, Gönlüboğ 1969; Váli 1971; Ülman and Sander 1972; Sander 1998; Hale 2000; Oran et al. 2002), Molotov’s communication is identified as the catalyst behind Turkey’s post-WWII decision to strain its relations with the USSR and turn to the United States (US) for defense support. There is no denying that Molotov’s message came at a critical moment when...

1 “The Straits” refer to the international waterway connecting Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Due to their strategic importance for Turkey, Russia and other Black Sea states, “the Straits” were an issue of contention after the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. The Montreux Convention (1936) regulates “the Straits” regime.
Turkey’s policymakers considered themselves particularly vulnerable to internal and external challenges. What is more, Molotov’s message was delivered at a moment when the USSR’s behavioral record in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus gave reasons for grave concern. That said, the presence of challenges and the international record of the challenger go only so far in explaining why and how the USSR was transformed from a “friend” into a “foe.” For, this was not the first time that the USSR expressed interest in “joint defense” of the Straits. On the contrary, it had communicated interests of similar nature numerous times, including the negotiations that preceded the 1920–21 Treaty of Friendship and 1925 Treaty of Neutrality, and more noticeably in the run-up to WWII (in 1936 and 1939). Whereas previous communications of the USSR were portrayed by Turkey’s policymakers as mere bilateral exchanges that did not impair the state of “sincere friendship” between the two countries, the June 1945 message from Molotov was channeled to the public as “Stalin’s demands,” that is, a threat to Turkey’s sovereign existence and territorial integrity. The standard account which stresses the significance of the Molotov message and presents the difference in the context and ideological outlook of the two sides as supplementary evidence remains to be complemented by another account that explains the transformation in their identities and interests. Hence the puzzle of this paper: How was it that Turkey, against the background of “sincere friendship” that characterized the inter-war years, was able to reshape its stance toward the USSR in such a way that continuing with the existing policy became unthinkable and an alternative arrangement seemed inevitable?

The aim here is not to question the seriousness of the risks involved in failing to stand firm against the USSR in the immediate post-WWII period. Nor is it to dispute the appropriateness of Turkey’s search for “Western” allies at a time when its economic, political and military vulnerabilities were acknowledged by friend and foe alike (see McGhee 1990; Bağcı 1991). In the aftermath of WWII the USSR did make expansionist moves throughout Central and Eastern Europe, changing regimes and occupying territories (including Northern Iran for a brief period). Given the fragility of power balances in Turkey vis-à-vis the forces of communism and reactionarism, Turkey’s policymakers had reasons to be concerned. The aim of this paper then is to complement standard accounts on Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the USSR. Whereas standard accounts have stressed the military and ideological threat posed by the USSR as the catalyst behind Turkey’s foreign policy change, our account explores the conditions of possibility for such change. Turkey’s relationship with the USSR during the first part half of the twentieth century went through bouts of rivalry and war (until the end of WWI), “sincere friendship” and cooperation (inter-war era), and threat perception and estrangement (post-WWII period). Such policies did not emerge in a vacuum but in a (domestic and international) political context suffused with power. Competing representations of the USSR emerged through the “nested game” (Putnam 1988) of foreign policy. The following mediates through accounts that stress the military threat and those that emphasize the ideological threat and presents an analysis that looks into the production of representations of the USSR as a “threat” to Turkey and the context which allowed for the production of such representations of the USSR.

Beyond Turkey’s case, the paper joins the constructivist challenge to foreign policy analysis (see, inter alia, Doty 1993; Weldes 1996; Weldes and Saco 1996; Weldes 1999; Barnett 1999; Kubálková 2001; Telhami and Barnett 2002). Standard accounts of foreign policy, while invaluable in terms of identifying key notions such as “national interest,” “threat,” and “national security,” are nevertheless limited by the static conceptualization of these very
As such they overlook the dynamic relationship between these notions and actors' identity and vice versa. Constructivist approaches to foreign policy, in turn, problematize the “existence of subjects themselves, their positioning vis-à-vis one another, and the “reality” that made certain structures and meanings possible” (Doty 1993:305).

In what follows, the paper looks at five instances of the USSR’s communication of interest in some form of change in the Straits regime, in 1921, 1925, 1936, 1939, and 1945, with particular attention to Turkey’s policymakers’ portrayal of Turkey–USSR relations in general and the USSR’s identity in particular. Of these five instances of USSR communicating potentially revisionist interests, four were portrayed by Turkey’s policymakers as mere bilateral exchanges, whereas the 1945 communication was represented as a threat to Turkey’s sovereign existence and territorial integrity. The following sections lay out the conceptual and historical groundwork by pointing to the limits of the standard accounts, and highlighting the corresponding insights of the constructivist accounts of foreign policy analysis. Next, the paper illustrates these insights with reference to the case of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the USSR during the aforementioned instances. It is shown that whereas, during the inter-war period, Turkey’s foreign policymakers recast the identity of their northern neighbor from “imperialist” “rival” into “anti-imperialist” “friend,” thereby allowing relations of close collaboration; in the aftermath of WWII, Molotov’s communication was portrayed as signaling a return to “Tsarist penchant for imperialism” and therefore a “threat” to Turkey’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such reshaping of USSR’s identity in Turkey’s foreign policymakers’ discourse, in turn, allowed them to strain the close bilateral relations that characterized the previous years and, eventually, to ally with “the West.”

**Constructivist Complement to Foreign Policy Analysis**

Constructivist approaches view foreign policy as a social construct that is produced by, and that helps produce state identity and interests (Doty 1993; Weldes 1996, 1999; Weldes and Saco 1996; Barnett 1999; Kubálová 2001). The discursive and/or rule-oriented analyses of policy that constructivist scholars employ allow them to study the mutually constitutive relationship between state identity, interests and policy. The study of discourse, rules and norms is considered central to policy analysis because, to quote Nicholas Onuf,

> policies do not exist apart from the words that we, as agents, use to characterize them. In this respect it does not matter whether we are acting on our own behalf or on behalf of others. Policies exist only when we put our intentions into words and frame courses of action, or plans to achieve them. (Onuf 2001:77)

Such an understanding of the role policy discourse plays in world politics is warranted by a particular understanding of language as constitutive of the world in which we live. To quote Onuf again:

> In representing the way things are and how they work in relation to each other, language makes things (including ourselves as agents) what they are by making the world (any world of social relations) what it is. (Onuf 2001:77)

---

2 The empirical evidence presented below is derived from published minutes of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) of the Republic of Turkey as well as the archives of two prominent newspapers of the time, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. 
Constructivism’s interest in the constitutive relationship between policy discourse, identity and interests has significant implications for our understanding of foreign policy. Standard accounts of foreign policy typically focus on “decisions taken by human decision makers with reference to or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state” (Hudson 2007:4). As they do so, “they presuppose a particular subjectivity (i.e., a mode of being), a background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves” (Doty 1993:298). Complementing these accounts are those analyses that look at the conditions of possibility for those decisions to be made, that is, “how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others” (Doty 1993:298).

That said the benefits to be accrued from posing “how possible” questions are not limited to understanding the background to decision-making. This is because they “go to an important aspect of power that why-questions too often neglect.” Doty explains:

This is not the kind of power that works through social agents, a power that social actors possess and use. Rather, it is a kind of power that is productive of meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships, and a range of imaginable conduct...Why-questions, by taking subjects as given, as the ontological foundation of their analysis, preclude investigation into power as constitutive of subjects. (Doty 1993:299)

Discourses are structures of signification, in which a set of rules and procedures are linguistically “put into play” in the constitution of objects, speakers and themes (Shapiro 1988:330). Prevailing discourses populate the world with meaning and linguistic tools out of which representations of both the “self” and the “other” are constructed. Furthermore, dominant discourses, through representations of the “self” and the “other,” construct a “common sense” that predefines what is “intelligible” and “rational” course of action and what is not. By portraying certain actions as “intelligible” or “rational” (and others as “unintelligible” or “irrational”), “common sense,” as constructed by prevailing discourse(s), performs an enabler/limiter role for foreign policy (Doty 1993).

Representations of the subjects and objects populating the world are significant for the analysis of foreign policy in at least two ways. First, foreign policy actors make sense of the world for themselves and for others through representations (Weldes 1996:280). Second, through deploying representations that emerge out of the “common sense,” actors act upon the very “reality” that their discourses help to construct.

The enabling or constraining role of representations mainly stem from the mutually constitutive relationship between representations employed in foreign policy discourse, identity and interests. Through representing the “self” and the “other,” their identities are constructed and interests are linked to those identities. Adopting a constructivist approach, then, allows students of foreign policy to explore the inter-subjectively constituted identities and interests of states, what they allow and what they render difficult if not impossible.

Identities are always constructed in relation to some form of difference (vis-à-vis an “other”). Thus, one dimension of identity is always what one is not. State identities are no different. Yet, practitioners of foreign policy deny the very “constructedness” of their own and other states’ identities as they act upon them. When a state’s identity is constructed as “peace-loving,” its interests are also constructed in relation to that identity. That said this depiction of identity construction
oversimplifies what in essence is a complex process that often involves multiple identities and interests that are in a continual process of construction.³

Complementing Accounts on Turkey’s Foreign Policy Toward the USSR, 1919–45

Standard accounts on Turkey’s foreign policy toward the USSR have invariably stressed the “threat” posed by the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of WWII. Turkey’s move to strain its relations with the USSR and the subsequent decision to join the Western fold are explained either with reference to the military challenge posed by the Soviet Union in view of post-WWII experiences in Central and Eastern Europe or with reference to the ideological challenge of communism, which was on the rise as a rival to capitalist models of organizing world economy (see, e.g., Erkin 1968; Sezer 1981; Bilge 1992; Gürün 1997; Tellal 2001).

There is significant merit to those accounts that have emphasized the military and ideological challenge Turkey was faced with in the aftermath of WWII. While Turkey had stayed out of WWII and joined at the last moment (and then only on paper) in the attempt to become a founding member of the United Nations, it had nevertheless felt its effects. Direct effects of the War included the arrangements made by the government to prepare for a possible late entry to the War. Ensuing scarcities and shortages meant slowing down the already stunted progress in Turkey’s economic development. While significant resources were poured into military preparedness, Turkey’s policymakers did not deem their military capacity to be adequate for resisting a possible Soviet (or German) attack.

Indirect effects of the War included alienation from the Western allies who were not pleased with Turkey’s “active neutrality” (Deringil 1989), and desired active participation in the war effort. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the War, Turkey’s policymakers were made to feel they stood alone in world politics and being chastised for their wartime behavior. Alienation from the West as such had not only diplomatic but also domestic political implications for a country that had chosen to model its own modernization after that of the Western civilization (Bilgin 2009). Given the imminent challenges of communism and reactionarism, Turkey’s policymakers did not feel they could afford to be alienated from the West.

Contrasting the prevalent account that stresses Turkey’s political, economic, and military vulnerabilities in the face of Soviet military and ideological threat, is a minority account that stresses domestic political dynamics. It is argued that the civil and military bureaucracy utilized the “Soviet threat” in the attempt to shape political processes in Turkey to encourage a more cohesive society and stronger state-society relations. Identifying a “Soviet threat” as such could be viewed as having served the purpose of constructing an Other (the USSR) against which the society could be unified and internal others (communists and those of schismatic approach) marginalized. There is no denying that moving away from the USSR and toward closer relations with the West in general and the United States in particular allowed for Turkey’s political and economic

³ A crucial methodological issue concerning the construction of identities is regarding the prominent actors involved in the politics of representation. Constructivist approaches have so far been inclined to study dominant or hegemonic discourse(s). Correspondingly, constructivist studies of foreign policy have chosen to focus on the actors engaged in the politics of representation who are predominantly, but not exclusively, the officials inhabiting the offices of the state (see Weldes 1996:281; Weldes and Saco 1996:377; Huysmans 1998:233). Since the end of the Cold War, it has been argued that the impact of media in politics of representation as a counter-discursive actor has intensified (see Shapiro 1990). That said the counter-discursive impact of the media does not always materialize, especially when the issue is defined as a national security problem, and when popular mass media may still be employed to promote state discourse(s).
liberalization. It is also commonly acknowledged that standing together with the West against the Eastern Bloc allowed for the marginalization of communists in Turkey.

As such this minority account, by way of stressing domestic power politics struggles, adds to our understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the USSR as a “nested game.” What is left unaccounted for is the “interpretative labor” (Weldes 1999:8) that went into turning Molotov’s communication into “Stalin’s demands.” In other words, how was it that Turkey’s policymakers were able to transform Turkey’s and USSR’s identities that in turn allowed for this policy change. Such an analysis requires inquiring into the processes through which Turkey’s and the USSR’s identities (self/other) and interests have been transformed in and through Turkey’s foreign policy discourse. It is significant to take stock of policymakers’ “interpretative labor,” for, as will be shown below, it allowed Turkey to strain its relations with the USSR, its “sincere friend” of the inter-war years, and ally with the United States in the post-WWII era.

Turkey–USSR Relations, 1919–45

The “National Struggle” (1919–22)4 in Turkey and the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) in Russia were followed by a previously unforeseen era of collaboration between the Turkey and the USSR.5 At the time, such collaboration was represented by Turkey’s policymakers as evidentiary of the “friendship” between the two countries. To be able to understand how Turkey, against this background of “friendship,” was able to recast its stance toward the USSR in such a way that continuing with the existing policy became unthinkable, it is imperative to begin from the beginning; that is, how the USSR came to be represented as Turkey’s “friend.”

By the end of WWI, it was not obvious that Turkey and the USSR would become “friends.” Ottoman relations with Imperial Russia had been characterized by intense rivalry bracketed by moments of collaboration.6 It was against this background that leaders of the young Republic discursively constructed the relations between the two countries as one of “sincere friendship,” which, in turn, allowed for close collaboration between the two countries in the inter-war era. That said it is significant to underline the change in Russian stance toward Turkey. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the USSR renounced all secret agreements between Imperial Russia and its allies concerning Istanbul and the Straits.7 The newly created USSR constructed its own identity as an “anti-imperialist attraction centre” for the “oppressed” countries of the world. Thus, it was

---

4 The “National Struggle” (1919–22) was conducted against Greece, Armenia, Britain, France and Italy. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey convened for the first time in April 23, 1920. On October 29, 1923, the Republic of Turkey was declared.
5 The Bolshevik government in Russia was called Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was declared in December 30, 1922.
6 A major aim of Imperial Russia in its previous struggles with the Ottoman Empire had been the control of the Straits. The strategic significance of the Straits at the time cannot be underestimated. It was the only seaway through which to gain access to the Mediterranean. Second, the southern parts of Russia/USSR were vulnerable to military attacks coming through the Straits. Third, by 1919, the USSR was conducting a significant portion of its trade through the Straits.
7 The control of the Straits and Istanbul was promised by Britain and France to Imperial Russia by the secret Constantinople Agreement of March 18, 1915 (see Kernes 1920; Smith 1965). Yet, even before the Bolshevik Revolution during the provisional government, Bolsheviks were critical of the other elements of the provisional government that argued for the possession of the Straits. Furthermore, P.N. Milyukov, Foreign Minister of the provisional government and one of the leading advocates of the necessity to conquer Istanbul and the Straits, had to resign from office after the harsh criticisms of the Bolsheviks, who saw the seizure of foreign territory as an imperialist motive, and considered some members of the provisional government such as Milyukov as imperialist agents (see Kucherov 1949; Kapur 1967).
only appropriate for an “anti-imperialistic attraction centre” to cease pursuing a foreign policy that smacked of imperialism.

The memoirs of the leaders of the National Struggle reveal a choice made to reciprocate the USSR’s move—that is, recast Turkey’s policy toward the USSR. The following quotation is illustrative of how they discursively justified the new era of “friendship” between the two neighbors. The quote is from the memoirs of Ali Fuat Cebesoy, an important military and political figure of the National Struggle who later became Turkey’s Ambassador to Moscow. Following the change of regime in Turkey’s northern neighbor, wrote Cebesoy (1953:121), the leaders of the National Struggle decided to “end the enmity, which was created by the Tsars, between Turkey and Russia and establish friendly relations between the two peoples.” Cebesoy’s choice of words is indicative of how the foreign policy discourse of the leaders of the National Struggle recast the USSR’s identity as a “friend.” This was done by portraying the Russian Tsars and Ottoman Sultans as responsible for the rivalry (if not outright “enmity”) between the two countries. In the wake of the imperial era in both lands, there was no reason why the USSR and Turkey should not establish “friendly” relations. The point being such shifting of USSR’s identity from former “rival” to “friend” in Turkey’s foreign policymakers’ discourse allowed this new era of close collaboration in Turkey–USSR relations.

At this point, it is easy to fall into a causal fallacy and suggest that Turkey was merely responding to the USSR’s diplomatic oeuvres. Indeed, as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the War of Independence and Turkey’s first President reminded members of the GNA on the occasion of a question regarding the state of Turkey’s relations with its northern neighbor, the USSR had recognized Turkey’s sovereignty “at a time no one else had done” (Atatürk 1981:186). That said it is significant to consider the occasion which called for such a justification of the government’s policy toward the USSR. The occasion was one of the aforementioned five instances at which the USSR communicated its interest in gaining some sort of say over the regime of the Straits. The point being that the USSR’s policy toward Turkey was far from being as “friendly” as the discourse of Turkey’s policymakers made it out to be. In what follows, we challenge such causal fallacy by pointing to USSR moves that could potentially have been portrayed as expansionist and/or imperialist by Turkey’s policymakers—that they chose not to do so goes some way toward answering the “how possible” question. Our analysis of Turkey’s policymakers’ discourses reveal the amount of “interpretative labor” that went into portraying the USSR as a “sincere friend” in the face of moves that could potentially have been portrayed as less-than-friendly at best and threatening at worst.

1920–21, Friendship Treaty Negotiations

During the 1920–21 “Friendship Treaty” negotiations between Turkey and the USSR, differences surfaced on the issue of the Democratic Republic of Armenia (DRA). DRA was declared in 1918 after the Bolshevik Revolution. Although independent, DRA was a former territory of the Russian Empire on which the USSR had vested interests. During the Friendship Treaty negotiations USSR representatives suggested that Turkey’s eastern provinces of Muş, Bitlis and Van should be ceded to the DRA. Turkey said “no,” which brought the negotiations to a halt for 7 months. In the meantime, Turkey took military action against the DRA. It was only after the USSR intervened, invaded Armenia and an Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was declared on December 1, 1920 that the war between Turkey and Armenia came to an end.

---

8 For the full text of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship, see (Hurewitz 1975:250–53).
In the course of these 7 months, Turkey’s leaders refrained from portraying the USSR’s move as a “threat.” Instead, they portrayed the breakdown in negotiations as caused by a mere difference in opinion. What allowed such unthreatening portrayal of the USSR’s otherwise potentially threatening call for Turkey ceding some of its territory to the DRA was the newly constructed identity of the USSR as a “friend” of Turkey. The amount of “interpretative labor” that went into constructing the USSR as a friend is illustrated by the following words of Atatürk, spoken on the occasion of a question in the GNA as to whether Soviet occupied Armenia constituted a “threat” to Turkey. He said:

we want to believe in the sincerity of the Bolshevik Russian government toward us. This belief is not the product of our imagination, our perception or our deception by pleasant words. (Atatürk 1981:135)

Two points are in order: First, Atatürk’s words were spoken not before or after but during that critical 7-month period that followed the breakdown of negotiations. Second, that Atatürk was called upon by the members of the GNA to justify his government’s stance toward the USSR should be taken as indicative of the precariousness of the newly constructed identity of the USSR. The GNA clearly needed to be convinced of the appropriateness of the government’s policy toward the USSR. Atatürk justified the appropriateness of his government’s response through underscoring the identity of the USSR as a “sincere friend” of Turkey. Given the history of intense rivalry between the two countries, this was no easy task. Portraying the USSR’s move as a mere difference in opinion (as opposed to its alternative, a threat to national security) allowed the government to avert a possible corrosion of bilateral relations in a difficult period in Turkey’s history. That Turkey had its hands full elsewhere and had more “threats” to consider only affirms the broader argument that what turns problems into threats is socially constructed under circumstances shaped by social and material factors.

It is significant to note here that the literature explains the government’s seemingly moderate response to the USSR move with reference to Turkey’s desperate need for an ally. It is argued that this was a “strategic move” on the part of Turkey’s leaders to play down what could otherwise have been considered a threat to Turkey’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Indeed, at the time, the National Struggle was being waged on multiple fronts. What is more, Turkey was already impoverished by the wars that have been going on for a decade (1912–22). The USSR was the only external power Turkey could turn to for help.

The aim here is not to confirm or deny but complement the “strategic decision” account prevalent in the literature. The fact that even such an ostensibly “strategic” decision by the government needed justifying in the eyes of the GNA goes some way toward substantiating our case for analyzing the “interpretative labor” put in by Turkey’s policymakers. Indeed, however “strategic” a decision it might have been to downplay the seriousness of the USSR’s 1921 move, it would have been difficult to justify had the identity of the USSR not been discursively reshaped from “rival” to “sincere friend” by Turkey’s policymakers.

---

9 Both before and after the signing of the 1 May 1921 Treaty of Friendship, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk referred to Turkish–USSR relations as “most friendly” (Shemsutdinov 2000:11, 57).

10 At the time (March 1, 1922), Atatürk declared “friendly” relations with the USSR to be the “crux of Turkish foreign policy” (Sonyel 1986:191). Years later, he was to underscore the importance the USSR aid by saying that the war of independence “would have cost incomparably more resources, and perhaps would even not be won,” had the USSR not helped Turkey (Potshkveriya 1999:190; Shemsutdinov 2000:97).
1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression

The second occasion at which Turkey’s policymakers chose to defuse a potentially explosive communication by their northern neighbor was during the negotiations for the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression. Throughout the 1920s Turkey was mostly preoccupied with internal reconstruction. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 had addressed the problem of the Straits however unsatisfactorily. The major foreign policy objectives of Turkey during this period were resolving the unsolved territorial problems of Mosul (with Great Britain) and of the Sanjak of Alexendretta (with France), and the population exchange with Greece. During this period, the USSR actively supported Turkey against its Western counterparts on a number of issues including the Mosul dispute. Immediately after the unfavorable decision of the League of Nations regarding Mosul, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression with the Soviet Union on January 26, 1925.¹³

During the negotiations for the 1925 Treaty, USSR representatives proposed including a clause regarding the “peaceful resolution” of any conflict arising from the passage of military ships through the Straits (Kapur 1967:135–6). If it were put into practice, this would have meant Turkey siding with the USSR (and against Britain or any other Lausanne signatory) if and when the latter violated related clauses of the Lausanne Treaty. Turkey’s policymakers rejected this proposal but did not seek to portray it as an attempt by the USSR to limit Turkey’s rights over the Straits. On the occasion of the debates in the GNA, Atatürk, once again, invoked the “sincere” character of the of the “friendship” between Turkey and the USSR and his words were reported to be “continuously applauded” (Atatürk 1981:342). The GNA, once again, came to be satisfied with the appropriateness of Turkey’s policy toward its northern neighbor.

1936 Montreux Conference Negotiations

As noted above, Turkey’s leaders were not comfortable with the Straits regime introduced by the Lausanne Treaty and had made several attempts to change it during the 1930s, but with no success. Following the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, Turkey sent an official note to the League of Nations and the signatories of the Lausanne Peace Treaty¹⁴ making a case on the principle of rebus sic stantibus. Great Britain, which had blocked Turkey’s previous attempts, consented.

When the Montreux Conference met on June 22, 1936, the participants swiftly agreed to Turkey’s proposal to remilitarize the Straits. The main topics of contention were Turkey’s desire to abolish the Straits Commission and impose limits

¹¹ During the negotiations, Turkey’s position on the Straits was very similar to the USSR proposal of full sovereignty by Turkey over the Straits and the closure of the Straits to warships except those of Turkey and the USSR (Kapur 1967:124–6; Güçlü 2002:59). Yet, Turkey accepted the British proposal after some minor modifications in order to gain concessions on other issues considered to be more crucial to its concerns regarding sovereignty (Gürün 1991:97–8). The USSR was not at all satisfied with the end result.

¹² While Turkey considered Mosul to be within its national borders, Great Britain objected. In order to avoid further delay of the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Britain agreed to resolve the issue later. It was also agreed that if an agreement could not be reached through bilateral negotiations, the dispute would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. The latter resolved the dispute in favor of Britain in 1926. Similarly, the Sanjak of Alexendretta was considered by Turkey within its borders. Yet, the Lausanne Treaty had left it outside. The French mandate over Syria came to an end in 1936. In 1938, the Republic of Hatay was proclaimed, which in 1939 by popular referendum became a part of Turkey.

¹³ According to the clauses of this treaty contracting parties undertook to abstain from any aggression against the other. Furthermore, they undertook to participate in any alliance or agreement whatsoever directed against the other.

¹⁴ The signatory countries of the Lausanne Peace Treaty were Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia (then known as “The Kingdom of Serbs. Croats and Slovenes”) and Turkey.
on the number and tonnage of warships passing through the Straits. The USSR disagreed with Turkey and asked for a more restrictive policy for non-Black Sea riparian states during wartime and no limits to be imposed upon Black Sea riparian states during peacetime. The British, taking advantage of the disagreement between Turkey and the USSR, argued that the same restrictions for the non-riparian states' warships should apply to those of Black Sea states. The British were also against the abolishment of the Straits Commission. While the French supported the USSR arguments, Balkan states backed Turkey's position (see Erkin 1968).

During the bilateral negotiations that took place to settle the differences between Turkey and the USSR, Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov inquired from his Turkish counterpart Tevfik Rüştü Aras as to what his government would think of Turkey and the USSR “collaborating” in the defense of the Straits. Aras replied Turkey had no such intention and the issue was dropped (see Gürün 1991:153–6; Barlas 1998:167). “Collaboration” is a vague term, and no further clarification was offered by either side. Needless to say, it would have meant for Turkey to exercise less than full sovereign rights in the management of the Straits—exactly what it was trying to bring to an end through Montreux Treaty negotiations.

We do not know whether Ankara was informed of Litvinov’s “inquiry” or not. At the end, following Ankara’s instructions, Aras supported the USSR proposal. What we know is that no one made an issue of Litvinov’s call for joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Straits. As such, another potentially explosive communication by the USSR was prevented from turning into a threat to Turkey’s national security due to the “interpretative labor” of Turkey’s policymakers. Here is an illustration of such labor by İsmet İnönü, who was Turkey’s Prime Minister at the time. In his address to the GNA on the occasion of the signing of the Montreux Conference, Premier İnönü stressed that Turkey was very pleased to see that all parties were satisfied. He added, “our friend, the Soviet Union, which had not signed the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, signed the Montreux Convention. It gives me great pleasure to state this” (İnönü 1992:397–8).

In the same year as Montreux was signed, Litvinov called on Aras for a pact for the joint defense of the Straits (Criss 1993:335). Aras, again, declined the offer and stated (albeit not publicly) that such a pact would be a breach of Turkey’s sovereignty. Immediately afterwards, in 1937, Aras paid a visit to

---

15 According to Turkey’s plan regarding the passage of warships, during peacetime, the fleet size of non-Black Sea states passing through the Straits was limited to 14,000 tons, and the total size of the fleets of non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea was limited to 28,000 tons and their stay duration to 15 days. On the other hand, Black Sea states were allowed to send up to 25,000 tons of warships through the Straits at a time. In the event of war where Turkey was a belligerent or when Turkey perceived a threat of war, Ankara could restrict the passage of warships as it saw fit. In the event of war, where Turkey was neutral, the same restrictions of peacetime would apply. Furthermore, Turkey argued that the Straits Commission should be abolished, and that Turkey should monitor the passage through the Straits on its own (see Erkin 1968:70–73).

16 The USSR argued for the complete freedom of passage for the warships of Black Sea states during peacetime. In the event of war in which Turkey remained neutral, the USSR argued that the passage of nonriparian belligerent states’ warships should be prohibited. Furthermore, the USSR delegation maintained that passage toward the Black Sea should be totally prohibited for warships if one of the Black Sea states was at war.

17 (Bilgin and Morewood 2004:25) argue that the USSR’s calls for joint defence of the Straits started in 1934. This proposal dictated that in peacetime nonriparian states could send only light surface vessels through the Straits not exceeding 15,000 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of nonriparian states was limited to 30,000 tons and their stay in the Black Sea was limited to 3 weeks. Black Sea states were not restricted by number, type or tonnage provided that their warships passed through the Straits one at a time. In wartime, if Turkey was a belligerent or if it perceived a threat of war, Turkey was free to regulate the passage of warships as it saw fit. But, if Turkey was neutral, only neutral states’ warships were allowed navigation through the Straits according to the same limitations in times of peace. For the complete text of the Montreux Convention, see (Erkin 1968:397–410).

18 The USSR was not a party to the Lausanne Treaty.
Moscow and used the occasion to underscore the two countries’ joint interest in maintaining the excellent state of bilateral relations (Güçlü 2002:65). Similarly, İnönü delivered a speech in the GNA on the occasion of Aras’s visit to Moscow and maintained that cordial relations between Turkey and the USSR would remain to be a fundamental aspect of Turkey’s foreign policy (Inönü 1992:423). The USSR’s “friendly” identity in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse clearly allowed Turkey’s policymakers to praise the state of Turkey–USSR relations even in the immediate aftermath of a USSR call for Turkey to give up some of its sovereign rights over the Straits. Once again, Turkey’s policymakers portrayed the USSR’s oeuvre as a challenge and not a threat.

That Turkey’s policymakers could do little else but maintain “friendly” relations with the northern neighbor given the still tense relations with “the West” does not decrease the significance of the argument being offered here. Rather, it underscores our point regarding the need to complement standard accounts on Turkey’s foreign policy toward the USSR. Clearly, the USSR made its revisionist intentions known to Turkey’s policymakers on more than one occasion before 1945. That Turkey’s policymakers chose (and were able to) to resist the 1945 move by turning Molotov’s communication into “Stalin’s demands” suggests that there is more to foreign policymaking than merely assessing material interest/threats. “Strategic” decisions require a good deal of “interpretative labor” to be put in by policymakers and bureaucrats alike.

1939 Alliance Negotiations

By 1938, the German–Italian threat to security in Europe was becoming more and more clear, and Turkey increasingly felt the need for allies. Turkey’s relations with Great Britain had substantially improved after the Montreux Conference, and Turkey’s policymakers started to negotiate an alliance treaty with Great Britain and France after duly informing the USSR. At the time, Turkey’s and USSR’s Foreign Ministries were also exchanging notes toward forming an alliance between the two countries. Turkey hoped that such an alliance could be integrated to the Tripartite Alliance between Turkey, France, and Britain, as a joint front against the German–Italian coalition (Güçlü 2002:75). Yet, the USSR chose to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. Nonetheless, the invitation that was made to Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu to negotiate a treaty between Turkey and the USSR was extended once again, and Saracoğlu accepted.

During the negotiations in Moscow, the USSR made several demands on Saracoğlu. Three of these demands were of utmost significance. The USSR wanted: (1) to sign a pact of joint defense of the Straits; (2) a guarantee that warships of non-Black Sea powers would not be allowed the right of passage through the Straits; and (3) to put a reservation in favor of Germany, providing that the USSR would only honor the terms of the treaty if they would not result in a conflict with Germany. Saracoğlu rejected these demands.

What the public in Turkey was told was somewhat different. Erkin, who was a member of the Turkish delegation during the 1939 negotiations, maintained publicly that the negotiations ended in a “friendly” atmosphere. The joint official declaration also emphasized that “friendly” relations and maintaining peace were the main tenets of the foreign policies of both countries (Erkin 1968:155). President İnönü highlighted similar points during his speech at the GNA regarding the negotiations:

---

20 By that time, unbeknownst to Turkey’s policymakers, the USSR had promised Germany that they would use their influence on Turkey to guarantee its neutrality (Erkin 1968:157; Gürün 1991:205). Germany shared this policy goal of keeping Turkey neutral.
The special conditions and the limitations set by the circumstances of our time should not affect the friendship between the two countries. In the future, as it was in the past, we shall follow the natural course of a policy of friendship with the Soviets (İnönü 1993:2–3).

Clearly, maintaining the “sincere friend” identity of the USSR was increasingly demanding more and more “interpretative labor” on the part of Turkey’s policymakers. The tipping point, as it were, was reached when the secret negotiations between Hitler and Molotov were disclosed following Germany’s attack on the USSR in 1941. It was disclosed that during these negotiations Hitler had offered Molotov to replace the Montreux Convention with one more favorable to the USSR. Molotov, not satisfied by this proposal, asked for a base at the Straits as well (Lenczowski 1956:164). Although the USSR was quick to reaffirm its loyalty to the Montreux Convention, the disclosure of these secret negotiations nonetheless impaired Turkey–USSR relations, making the “sincere friendship” identity even more difficult to maintain.

Not that one could tell by Turkey’s foreign policy discourse. At the time, the likelihood of a clash between Turkey and the USSR was publicly dismissed by Turkey’s policymakers. In an interview Minister of Foreign Affairs Numan Menemencioglu portrayed the USSR as Turkey’s “sincere friend” and maintained that “centuries-old ambitions of Russians on the Straits were imaginary myths” (Türk-İngiliz ve Türk-Sovyet Münasebetleri, 1945). This was a clear attempt by Turkey’s Foreign Minister to reaffirm Turkey’s investment into the USSR’s post-WWI identity as a “friend” and not “Tsarist Russia, the rival.” Minister of Justice M. Ökmen, likewise, emphasized that Turkey–USSR “friendship” had been a fundamental aspect in the creation of the Republic of Turkey and had remained so for the last twenty-five years (T.B.M.M. Zabıt Dergisi : 128). The Justice Minister’s words, in turn, underscored how Turkey investment into the USSR’s post-WWI identity had paid off throughout the history of the Republic. Finally, Faik Öztrak, Parliamentary Group Leader of the Republican People’s Party,21 maintained that “a good relationship with the USSR was one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy” (Howard 1974:2 16). A good deal of “interpretative labor” indeed.

*Post-WWII Period: Turning Molotov’s Message Into “Stalin’s Demands”*

On March 19, 1945, Molotov informed Turkey’s Ambassador to Moscow, Sarper, that the USSR would not extend the 1925 Treaty of “Friendship and Non-aggression.” The Treaty was 20 years old, noted Molotov, and that “serious improvements” had to be made in order to reflect the conditions of the day (Howard 1974:126). When Sarper asked what he meant by “improvements,” Molotov refused to spell out the details but reaffirmed the USSR’s interest in drafting a “new” treaty (Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, 1973:250–51).

The denunciation of the 1925 Treaty by the USSR did not come as a shock to Turkey’s policymakers. Sarper had warned Ankara as early as December 1944 that the USSR would likely denounce the 1925 Treaty and propose some revisions in the Montreux Convention. Ambassador Sarper had also communicated his impression that the attitude of his Soviet counterparts toward Turkey was far from being “friendly” (Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, 1973:247–9). Following the delivery of Molotov’s March 1945 message, Sarper suggested that he

---

21 Until 1946, Turkey had a single-party regime. It was after 1946 that multiparty elections were allowed. Until 1946, many issues of importance including foreign policy were discussed both in the GNA and the Republican People’s Party parliamentary group meetings.
presumed what Molotov meant by “improvements” was revising the provisions of Montreux (Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, 1973:252; Deringil 1989; Bilge 1992).

We now know based on historical accounts of the period as well as the memoirs of key actors of the day that Turkey’s policymakers since the early years of WWII had begun to question the odds for sustaining friendly relations with the USSR in the post-WWII period. However, their policy discourse, as laid out above, did not reflect such apprehensions.

Turkey’s initial reaction to Molotov’s March 1945 message was to declare its willingness to discuss a new treaty. Accordingly, Ambassador Sarper went to Ankara in May 1945 for two “unofficial” meetings with the Soviet Ambassador, Sergei Vinogradov. In these and other follow-up meetings, Ambassador Sarper had disclosed to his USSR counterparts that Turkey would agree to some of their requests (as with the closing of the Straits to the warships of non-Black Sea states while allowing the passage of USSR warships during times of war) (Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları, 1973:258–9). Ambassador Sarper also noted that in order to share the extra burden caused by such a change in the Straits regime, the USSR would have to assure Turkey of its “support” for the security of the Straits (Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, 1973:261).

Following his return to Moscow, Ambassador Sarper requested to meet Molotov. The meeting took place on June 7, 1945, during which Molotov informed Sarper of the infamous “demands” of the USSR. These included (1) Kars and Ardahan provinces to be “returned” to the USSR; (2) Bases to be allocated to the USSR for the “joint defense” of the Istanbul and Çanakkale Straits; (3) A bilateral agreement to be reached on the future status of the Straits and the Montreux Convention to be amended accordingly.22 During a second meeting on June 18, Molotov reiterated his message and stressed that without an agreement on these issues, the USSR would not resume negotiations.

Notwithstanding ample commentary that came after the event which invariably declared Molotov’s message as the beginning of the end of the era of “sincere friendship” (Bilsel 1947; Váli 1971:35; Gürün 1983:206), Turkey’s policymakers’ discourse at the time did not indicate such drastic recasting of the USSR’s identity. The general impression in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara was one of wait and see. Still, inklings of a change in policy discourse were evident. The government response was outlined by Foreign Minister Hasan Saka who maintained that there was no question of territorial concessions and that any changes in the Montreux regime concerned all the signatory states pending an international conference (Dış Bakanlığının Yapığı Demet, 1945). Prime Minister Şükür Saracoğlu further emphasized that there was no change in Turkey’s foreign policy: “As in the past, contemporary Turkish foreign policy aims to protect Turkey’s independence and sovereignty,” he maintained (Fenik, 1945).23

Albeit far from being drastic, there was a shift in Turkey’s policymakers discourse. Whereas, in the previous cases, Turkey did not dismiss Soviet proposals for changes in the Montreux regime, this time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had publicly rejected any possible bilateral solutions to be found to address Soviet concerns. Foreign Minister’s mention of other signatories to the Montreux Treaty suggested that Turkey was seeking to internationalize the dispute between Turkey and the USSR regarding the status of the Straits. Given the fact that no mention of the other signatories were made in the past, the change in Turkey’s policy discourse was not insignificant. Prime Minister Saracoğlu’s words, too, signified a change in the portrayal of the USSR in Turkey’s foreign

---

22 For the minutes of this conversation, see (Bilge 1992:269–71).
23 We now know that they believed that territorial demands to be put forth as a negotiation tactic by the USSR in order to achieve a solution to the Straits problem more favorable to the USSR see (Bilge 1992:271). Also see (Cumhuriyet 1945c).
policy discourse. Contrary to previous USSR messages, whose potentially explosive substance was played down, Molotov’s message was represented by Turkey’s Prime Minister as impairing Turkey’s “sovereignty.”

That said, even such a minor shift in Turkey’s policymakers’ discourse was a long time in the coming. While Turkey’s policymakers were trying to decide exactly how to respond, they kept quiet for some time. General (Ret.) Kâzım Karabekir, who was a member of the GNA in 1945 and was one of the crucial actors in the formation of the Turkey–USSR friendship in 1920, sought to explain the government’s silence in a speech he delivered at the GNA. The government was keeping quiet, he said, because it wanted to avoid damaging bilateral relations. Karabekir also reiterated his wish that good relations between Turkey and the USSR could be maintained. Coming from one of the leaders of the National Struggle and a former Commander of the Turkish Army, this was no small endorsement of the “friendship.” Nevertheless, Karabekir also warned that if the USSR insisted on pursuing “Tsarist policies” and demanding territorial concessions the enmity of the nineteenth century would certainly revive (T.B.M.M. Zabt Dergisi, 1946:256–9). Here was another indicator of the shift in Turkey’s policymakers’ discourses. As with Saracoğlu’s words quoted above, Karabekir’s invoking of the metaphor of “Tsarist” policymaking in reference to the USSR signaled the potential for a return to pre-1920 representations. It was only a few months ago that the relevance of the previous identity of the USSR as “Tsarist expansionist” was rejected by Turkey’s policymakers in favor of the post-WWI identity of “sincere friend.” Now, one of the architects of the USSR’s post-WWI identity was publicly questioning the contemporary relevance of that identity and signaling a return to the previous one.

Such a shift in the representation of the USSR as a “prisoner to the imperialism of Tsarist Russia” was soon picked up by Turkey’s government-friendly media. Falih Rifki Atay, a prominent columnist and a member of the Parliament, blamed Soviet policymakers for abandoning the “sincere friendship” built during the time of Lenin and the return to “Tsarist policymaking” (Atay 1945). Nadir Nadi (1945), another leading columnist and editor-in-chief of the pro-government daily Cumhuriyet, argued that the demands of the USSR revealed that Moscow reverted to the “Tsarist policy of expansion” after 20 years (Cumhuriyet 1945a,b; Ulus 1945). Turkey’s foreign policy discourse vis-à-vis the identity of the USSR had come full circle in the course of 2 decades.

Conclusion

The paper began with a puzzle: How was it that Turkey, against the background of “sincere” Turkey–USSR “friendship” that characterized the inter-war years, recast its stance toward its northern neighbor in such a way that continuing with the existing policy became unthinkable? In setting up this puzzle, our concern was one of complementing existing accounts that explained Turkey’s “strategic decision” to turn away from the USSR in the post-WWII era. Toward this end, we set out to uncover how such a change in Turkey’s stance became possible given the following difficulties:

1. The USSR had been Turkey’s “sincere friend” since the days of the National Struggle. During the period of National Struggle and in the early years of the Republic the USSR had provided substantive and symbolic, diplomatic and material support.

2. “The West,” toward whom Turkey decided to turn to after WWII, was made up of countries against which Turkey had waged its National Struggle. While the United States had not been a party to the National Struggle in any way, it was still viewed somewhat apprehensively by many
in Turkey who blamed the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 (which was designed to dismember the Ottoman Empire) on US President Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points.

Given these two significant difficulties, how was it that Turkey turned away from the USSR toward the United States in the aftermath of WWII? The standard answer to this question underscores the material interest/threat as a function of the material power configuration of the USA and USSR vis-à-vis each other and Turkey. Be that as it may, as laid out above the USSR had expressed interest in some form of change in the Straits regime, in 1921, 1925, 1936 and 1939—that is, four times before the final communication by Molotov in 1945. Whereas the first four were downplayed by Turkey’s policymakers, the fifth was played up, turned into ‘Stalin’s demands’ and underscored to justify a change in Turkey’s foreign policy. How possible?

The material interest/threat explanation is helpful insofar as it underscores the domestic and international political context: that the young Republic of Turkey could not afford to alienate the USSR in the inter-war era when its relations with ‘the West’ were still sour. However, once the wounds of the National Struggle began to heal, Turkey could afford to stand firm against the USSR in a way it was not able to do previously.

Be that as it may, this explanation remains to be complemented. However ‘strategic’ a decision it might have been to strain relations with the USSR in the post-WWII era, it was not easy to justify to domestic audiences. That the public was not overly interested in foreign policy matters at the time and that most decisions were made within a closed circle composed of the President and his closest associates should not distract us from the fact that there was—however small—an audience which scrutinized the appropriateness of the government’s moves. Why else should Turkey’s policymakers seek to justify their moves—however belatedly at times—in front of the GNA and/or place stories in government-friendly newspapers?

Focusing on the ‘how possible’ question allows us to address this puzzle in full. Complementing the efficacy of material interest/threat explanations, we were able to show the significance of the ‘interpretative labor’ put in by policymakers in portraying events as ‘threats’ or mere ‘challenges,’ thereby justifying the appropriateness of their actions. In doing this, we identified three distinct identities as found in the discourses of Turkey’s policymakers vis-à-vis relations with the USSR. These are as follows ‘Tsarist Russia, the rival’ (until 1919); ‘USSR, the sincere friend’ (1920–45), ‘the USSR, the Tsarist expansionist’ (after 1945). We offered three interrelated arguments:

(1) What allowed Turkey to establish close relations with the USSR in the aftermath of WWI was Turkey’s policymakers’ portrayal of their northern neighbor as a ‘friend,’ thereby shifting its identity from ‘Tsarist Russia, the rival’ to ‘USSR, the sincere friend.’

(2) Throughout the inter-war era, the USSR, not once, not twice, but four times communicated its interest that Turkey change its position on numerous issues including the Straits regime (which would have meant Turkey to exercise less-than-full sovereignty) and its eastern boundaries (which would have endangered its territorial integrity). What allowed Turkey’s policymakers to portray these potentially threatening communications as mere foreign policy challenges was the newly constructed identity of their northern neighbor as a ‘sincere friend’.

(3) In the aftermath of WWII, when Turkey’s policymakers decided to strain relations with the USSR and seek security in and through
alliance “the West,” Turkey’s policymakers’ discourse recast the identity of their northern neighbor as “the USSR, the tsarist expansionist,” which, in turn, made maintaining relations of “sincere friendship” seem as impossible and break with the USSR inevitable.

It was such recasting of the identity of the USSR in Turkey's foreign policy-makers’ discourse constructed the “reality” within which specific foreign policy decisions were made—including the post-WWII turn away from the USSR and toward “the West.”

References


Atay, Fafif. (1945) Rusya ile Münasibetlerimiz Hakkında [About Our Relations with the USSR]. Uluş, December 22.


Bilsel, Cemil. (1969) “U.S. Forces in Turkey.” In Decisions were Made—including the post-WWII turn away from the USSR and toward “the West.”


Oran, Baškin, Ed. (2002) *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savasından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* [Turkish Foreign Policy: Events, Documents and Interpretations from the War of Independence to Contemporary Era]. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları


