

RECONSIDERING HYBRIDITY:
THE SELECTIVE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN TURKEY'S
RESOLUTION/PEACE PROCESS

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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Ankara
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The Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by


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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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
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
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
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Prof. Dr. Halime Demirkan
Director

To my family and friends

ABSTRACT

RECONSIDERING HYBRIDITY: THE SELECTIVE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN TURKEY’S RESOLUTION/PEACE PROCESS

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This study examines the diffusion of international peacebuilding norms in the case of Turkey’s resolution/peace process for solving the Kurdish issue (2009-2015) as a case of peace process in the absence of top-down design through a third party. The study builds on the limitations of current research on hybridity that focuses on the interaction of international and local norms and practices in peace processes designed and implemented by international actors such as the United Nations and donor organizations. The study calls for broadening and deepening the hybridity debate by investigating the dynamics of local agency in a case where the top-down design of the peace process is absent. Drawing on 34 in-depth open-ended interviews with high and middle level actors in the peace process in Turkey and data collected through the media statements of

primary actors, this study argues that in the absence of top-down design of the peace process, the dynamics of hybridization are different, as, actors have greater freedom for promoting their own perspectives on peace process design. This study finds that in the Turkish case we discern ‘hybridity *by design*’, defined as *the strategies used by local actors to support and promote peace process perspectives by selectively adopting and/or rejecting international norms, ideas, and practices to legitimize their own position in the absence of top-down design of the peace process*. The Turkish case points to further findings on conflict resolution expertise sharing and its impact on the diffusion of norms and practices in peace processes in the absence of top-down imposition.

Keywords: Hybridity, Kurdish Issue, Norm Diffusion, Peace Process Design, Turkey

ÖZET

HİBRİTLEŞMEYİ YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ ÇÖZÜM/BARIŞ SÜRECİNDE ULUSLARARASI NORMLARIN SEÇİCİ KULLANIMI

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Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Çerağ Esra Çuhadar

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Bu çalışma, normların yayılması ve hibritleşme literatürlerini temel alarak uluslararası barış normlarının yayılmasını Türkiye'deki çözüm/barış süreci (2009-2015) üzerinden incelemekte. Bu doğrultuda, Birleşmiş Milletler ve başka uluslararası organizasyonlar tarafından tasarlanan uluslararası barış normlarının ve yerel normların etkileşimine odaklanan halihazırdaki hibritleşme literatürünün eksikliklerini temel almakta. Bu çalışma, tepeden inme barış süreci tasarımının olmadığı bir örneği inceleyerek hibritleşme tartışmasını genişletmeyi ve derinleştirmeyi amaçlamakta. Türkiye'deki barış sürecinde yer almış üst ve orta düzey aktörlerle yapılmış olan 34 derinlemesine ve

açık uçlu görüşme ve üst düzey aktörlerin medya açıklamalarından toplanan verileri temel alarak, bu çalışma tepeden inme barış süreci tasarımının olmadığı örneklerde hibritleşme dinamiklerinin farklı olduğunu tartışmakta. Bu durum, tepeden inme barış tasarımının yokluğunda yerel aktörlerin barış tasarımı ile ilgili fikirlerini daha özgür ifade edebilmelerinden kaynaklanmakta. Bu çalışma, Türkiye örneğinde *tasarlanmış hibritleşme*'nin varlığına işaret etmekte. *Tasarlanmış hibritleşme, tepeden inme barış süreci tasarımının olmadığı örneklerde, yerel aktörlerin belli barış inşası norm, fikir ve pratiklerini benimseyerek ve veya reddederek kendi görüşlerini meşrulaştırma stratejisi* olarak tanımlanıyor. Ayrıca, Türkiye örneğinden elde edilen bulgular çatışma çözümü uzmanlığının paylaşılması ve bunun uluslararası norm ve pratiklerin yayılması ile ilgili sonuçlara da işaret etmekte

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış Süreci Tasarımı, Hibritleşme, Kürt Meselesi, Normların Yayılması, Türkiye

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANC	African National Congress
BDP	Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
BİKG	Barış İçin Kadın Girişimi (Women's Initiative for Peace)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DDR	Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration
DEP	Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party)
DPI	Democratic Progress Institute
DTK	Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (Democratic Society Congress)
DTP	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)
ECLSG	European Charter on Local Self Government
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union

FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GAP	Guneydođu Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolia Project)
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party)
HEP	Halkların Emek Partisi (People’s Labor Party)
HÜDAPAR	Hür Dava Partisi (Free Cause Party)
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Analysis Framework
ICG	International Contact Group (Philippines)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KCK	Kurdistan Communities Union
KDGM	Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliđi Musteşarlıđı (Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security)
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Force
NSC	National Security Council (Turkey)

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Turkey)
PYD	Democratic Union Party (Syria)
SHP	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly)
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNPC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
WPC	Wise People Commission (Akil İnsanlar Heyeti)
YPG	People's Protection Units (Syria)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of the Study

This study focuses on the “politics of the *local*¹” in peace processes for the purposes of understanding the way norms and ideas regarding peacebuilding diffuse to domestic contexts and the way they are adopted, adapted, rejected, and renegotiated by local actors. Building on recent theoretical interest in “local agency” in both international norm diffusion and critical peace studies research, this study attempts to deepen and broaden our understanding of the local through the recognition of the agency of local actors in respect to their diverse expectations from peace process design. The study aims to offer new theoretical insights into the understanding of *hybridity*, a

¹ The “local” in this study is used in its broad sense, referring to the domestic actors (including high-level decision makers and middle-level influentials) and their relations in the peace negotiation context. The interest in the ‘local’ in peacebuilding can be distinguished in two waves. The first wave is early peace scholars such as Lederach’s (1999) focus on the empowerment of local actors as a key for peacebuilding. The second wave of interest in the local emerged out of the critique of top-down peacebuilding. Scholarship focusing on international peacebuilding has conventionally understood the ‘local’ in its opposition to the ‘international’ actors and practices in peacebuilding. For a critical reappraisal on what the ‘local’ refers to in the context of international peacebuilding, see, for example, Paffenholz (2015b) and Mac Ginty (2015).

concept used increasingly in critical peace studies capturing the interaction between international and local norms and the way local actors adopt, reject, and renegotiate these norms in cases of international peacebuilding in the post-Cold War period.

The study is based on the investigation of the case of Turkey's peace process for solving the Kurdish issue (2009-2015)² as a case of a peace process in the absence of a top-down design by an external third-party. Externally-led top-down design in this study refers to the design of the peace process by an external third-party. In the post-Cold War period examples of externally-led top-down design of peace processes are numerous. The degree of external involvement in the design of the peace process can be regarded as a continuum ranging maximalist institutional design (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) to low levels of involvement (e.g. South Africa). This study examines Turkey's peace/Resolution Process as a case where such externally-led top-down design was absent.

Two caveats are at place. First, it should be noted that the peace process in Turkey was designed in top-down manner through decisions taken by primary actors such as political leaders. Both in the initial phase including the Kurdish/Democratic Opening and the Unity and Fraternity Project (2009-2011) and during the Resolution Process (2012-2015) primary decision makers from the Turkish and Kurdish sides negotiated and decided on issues about what, when, how, and what to negotiate. Such top-down design is a common feature of peace processes around the world. However,

² This study acknowledges that the peace process in Turkey for solving the Kurdish conflict encompasses two distinct periods that are separated by a period of conflict escalation from 2011 to 2012. The first period from 2009 to 2011 includes the Kurdish/Democratic Opening and Unity and Fraternity processes. The second period from 2012-2015 is commonly referred to as the Resolution Process. Each period is extensively analyzed in later chapters of the dissertation. For convenience purposes, this study refers to the case under investigation as "Turkey's peace/resolution process for solving the Kurdish conflict, 2009-2015".

the Turkish case is investigated in this study as a case where decisions on peace process design were taken by national parties and not external third-parties. In addition, this study examines Turkey's peace process as a case where *direct* design is absent. While some foreign parties might have played a role in the process at varying degrees, this role was limited to facilitation (e.g. the role of Norway and Great Britain during the Oslo process). Therefore, direct design of the peace process by third parties was absent. Based on these considerations, this study focuses on Turkey's peace/Resolution Process as a process that proceeded as a national effort to promote political solution to the conflict (moving beyond military solutions that dominated the efforts to solve the conflict since the late 1980s).

This study's theoretical interest in Turkey's peace process originated with an empirical observation: the use in domestic political discourse in the peace process in Turkey of international norms and practices that are part of the liberal peacebuilding framework mainly projected and adopted by international organizations and donor agencies in externally designed top-down peace processes. High- and middle-level actors in Turkey made references to the norms and practices that form part of international peace processes. Actors made references to normative and practical standards such as Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration and transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions in addition to their selective references to experiences from other peace processes. Accordingly, primary actors' references to the manner in which the Irish Republican Army (IRA) decommissioned its weapons and the method whereby South Africans came to terms with past injustices through restorative justice mechanisms and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)

revealed the need for understanding the dynamics of how such ideas diffused to the local context in Turkey.

Peace negotiations are essentially political processes whereby actors from different sides of a conflict negotiate a possible solution to the conflict. Generally, opposing sides maintain differing opinions on the characterization of the conflict and its development over time. Accordingly, negotiations towards the establishment of a peace settlement are generally marked by a meta conflict over what the conflict is about and over how to address it. This meta conflict is marked by the agency of local actors ranging from political decision makers to midlevel influentials. In the process of negotiating peace, actors support specific positions and seek to legitimize these positions to different audiences. Furthermore, different sides of the conflict in the negotiation process and different levels of actors are also divided regarding their opinion on how to achieve a peaceful settlement. Accordingly, political and armed fractions are divided regarding their expectations. Also, political fractions in themselves might have diverging opinions on their expected outcomes from a peace process. Therefore, understanding these different dynamics of local agency is crucial for understanding the dynamics of the peace process as a whole.

Peace processes that are initiated by an external third-party differ from those that develop in the absence of such third party involvement on several grounds. Power asymmetries between third parties and local actors especially in cases of “peace operations”³ to end conflict have a great impact on the agency of local actors. In such cases, the design of the process (i.e. decisions on the issues of when, with whom, what,

³ Referring to the post-Cold War international peacebuilding operations by international agencies and mainly the United Nations (UN). For an extensive analysis and critical perspectives of post-Cold War peacebuilding, see Paris and Sisk (2009).

and how to negotiate) is primarily defined in a top-down manner by international actors such as the United Nations (UN) and donor agencies. This top-down design has been the center of an increasing critique whereby international domination and local subordination (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2015, p. 268) are seen as creating a problematic structure.

Another central difference between these kinds of peace processes is related to the dynamics of norm diffusion. Scholarship on peacebuilding has debated how third party interventions during the post-Cold War period formed a “channel” through which specific principles organizing social and political life were channelled to post-conflict societies (Paris, 2002). Therefore, the activities of third parties form a platform through which liberal principles such as democracy, human rights, market economics, and judicial structures of a specific kind are projected onto populations. In the absence of such a channel, the question of through what kind of mechanisms such norms and practices might diffuse to the local context remains crucial.

Based on the above, the purpose of this study is to investigate the role of local agency in peace processes with a focus on the diffusion of international norms of peacebuilding and the way they are received by local actors. More specifically, this study focuses on the interaction of international and local norms and practices captured by the hybridity debates in critical peacebuilding research within the last decade. However, the study moves beyond these debates by concentrating on these dynamics in a case where the externally-led top-down design of the peace process is absent with the purpose of understanding how the processes of diffusion and hybridization unfold in contexts that have remained outside of the research interest of critical peace scholars in the past decade.

1.2 Research Questions and Focus

This study seeks to answer the following research questions:

- How do international norms used in peace processes diffuse in the absence of externally-led top-down design of the peace process? How are these norms received (i.e. adopted, adapted, rejected, negotiated) by local actors?
- What are the dynamics of local agency and hybridization in the absence of externally-led top-down design of the peace process?

This study builds on the need to bridge two research strands, international norm diffusion and critical peace research, with the purpose of capturing the dynamics of the diffusion of peace process norms and the reception of these norms by local actors. Over the last two decades an increasing concern with the local emerged in both norm diffusion research and the critical strand of peace research. This interest is a product of critical reappraisals of early research in both strands addressing the limitations of the theoretical perspectives.

In the past decade, research on norm diffusion became increasingly concerned with the role of local agency in the norm diffusion process. During the 1990s, the “first wave” of research of norm diffusion focused primarily on the diffusion of international norms of human rights and the mechanisms of their adoption by states (T. Risse, 1999;

Risse-Kappen, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Sikkink, 1993). This scholarship was followed by an increasing interest in domestic structures during the diffusion process (Cortell & Davis, 1996; Legro, 1997). However, the norm diffusion research of the 1990s became the center of criticism for several aspects including its assumptions on “good international norms versus bad local norms and agency” (Acharya, 2004). Also, this strand of research was criticized for not considering the role of local agency in both the diffusion and the contestation of norms (Acharya, 2009). Scholars debated whether it is necessary to consider not only how international norms diffuse but also how they are perceived in the local context and the way they are contested by local actors.

Similarly, critical peace research started debating the role of local agency as a site of resistance to externally-led top-down peacebuilding. Based on the critique of liberal peacebuilding which refers to a dominant version of international peacebuilding in the post-Cold War period (Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009), critical scholarship debated how international peacebuilding creates a structure of subordination directly through institutional design and indirectly through “pathologizing” (Donais, 2009) the local in addition to creating an image of the local as in need for outside help . In response to the “liberal peacebuilding consensus”⁴ of the last two decades and its top-down design of peace processes across cases, scholars debated how bottom-up peace can be achieved. The *hybridity* debate is part of the multidimensional critique of top-down peacebuilding. It has been applied as an empirical, theoretical, and normative critique. Within this strand of research, hybridity has been used both as a concept descriptively

⁴ The “liberal peacebuilding consensus” refers to the post-Cold War consensus on international peacebuilding whereby international organizations and agencies seek to respond to conflict through the reconstruction of liberal democracy and economy (Richmond, 2004b). The ideological underpinnings and its critique are more extensively discussed in *Chapter 2*.

capturing the “coexistence of old and new ideas and structures” (Belloni, 2012; Jarstad & Belloni, 2012) and also as a concept for understanding how local actors respond to the top-down design of structures based on a specific liberal agenda (Mac Ginty, 2010). Hybridity has furthermore been regarded as having an emancipatory potential for post-conflict societies (Richmond, 2009a; Richmond, 2014).

This dissertation argues that the theoretical discussions on the diffusion of international norms and the critical peacebuilding scholarship regarding how peacebuilding norms are contested, adopted, rejected, and renegotiated in context have adopted a narrow scope in understanding these processes. Hybridity research has been limited to understanding local responses to international norms and practices imposed in different ways. While adopting a critical stance towards the top-down aspect of peacebuilding, research on hybridity has limited itself to externally-led peacebuilding processes mainly by the UN, international organizations, donor agencies, and individual states of the west. It has sought to reveal the “frictions” (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2015) that arise from this kind of imposition. However, while trying to move beyond binaries, it has remained confined to those binaries. Furthermore, being confined to the top-down versus bottom-up perspective, hybridity debates do not consider how international norms might proceed *multiple* ways and how local actors in one setting may choose to appropriate a standard of appropriate behaviour (i.e. a norm, idea, practice) from another setting.

Accordingly, I argue that we need to broaden and deepen the scope of hybridity research in order to increase the analytical potential of the concept. By investigating the processes of diffusion and reception of norms outside of an imposition framework, we will be better able to understand how local agency is expressed beyond reaction to

whatever is imposed. Moreover, this will also enable us to move beyond perceptions of the local as homogenous, and to clarify the various divisions that might characterize the local in different ways.

Based on the above, this study proposes *hybridity by design* as a new way of understanding hybridization processes in the absence of top-down design of the peace process. Hybridity by design is defined as *the strategies used by local actors to support and promote peace process perspectives by selectively adopting and/or rejecting international norms, ideas, and practices in order to legitimize their own position in the absence of externally-led top-down design of the peace process*. In the absence of top-down design, local actors still engage in hybridization by selectively adopting international norms and practical frameworks while maintaining a reference to the previous experiences of peace processes. Consequently, hybridity is used as a purposeful strategy with the aim of supporting different perspectives on peace process design. The concept is developed in light of the analysis made through the case of Turkey's peace process for solving the Kurdish issue (2009-2015).

1.3 The Case of Turkey's Peace Process for Solving the Kurdish Issue (2009-2015)

Turkey entered a period of transformation regarding the Kurdish issue in the second half of the 2000s. Signals for this transformation were given by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan in a speech he delivered in Diyarbakır in August of 2005 (BBC Türkçe, 2005). This speech was preceded by a call in June of 2005 by a group of 130 intellectuals including writers, journalists, business persons, and artists made to the armed insurgency to end its armed activities and to government officials to realize legal

arrangements that would secure a peaceful participation to politics (CNN Türk, 2005). In his speech, Erdoğan acknowledged past wrongdoings of the Turkish state towards part of its citizens. Signalling a move away from such wrong doings, Erdoğan stated that the Kurdish problem would be solved through democratization, giving the signals for moving beyond military solutions to the conflict. Both Erdoğan's speech and the intellectuals' call signalled their expectations for moving towards a political solution regarding the conflict through a negotiation framework.

Turkey's peace process was initiated in 2009 as a national policy for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. The process started with the Kurdish Opening in 2009, later named as the Democratic Opening and finally titled the Unity and Fraternity Project in 2010. This initial period focused on addressing long-voiced democratic demands of the Kurdish population. These demands involved calls for recognition of Kurdish identity, cultural rights and decentralization in an effort to strengthen local government. Simultaneously, secret negotiations were ongoing between 2008 and 2011 which were leaked to the media in 2011. This initial process was interrupted with the escalation of the conflict in 2011 and 2012 and the return to a security discourse.

The second phase of the peace process resulted in peace talks that commenced in January 2013 after the first visit of a group of Kurdish politicians to the prisoned leader of the Kurdish insurgency. The 2013-2015 process was the first time that an open dialogue channel was created between the different sides of the conflict. During this process, the group made regular visits to the imprisoned Kurdish leader and to the armed leadership. Additionally, several mechanisms were established. One such mechanism was the formation of the Wise People Commission (WPC) in 2013 with the purpose of understanding societal expectations from the peace process. Another significant

development was the formation of the Resolution Process Commission in the Parliament. Legal developments such as the Law on the Termination of Terror and the Strengthening of Societal Cohesion (TBMM Official Gazette, 2014a) and the Rules and Procedures Regarding the Law on the Termination of Terror and Strengthening Societal Cohesion (TBMM Official Gazette, 2014b) took place during the second half of 2014 as well.

The peace process stalled in mid-2015 after disagreements over issues such as the timing of the DDR process, possible third-party roles, issues pertaining to power-sharing (e.g. the question of local government), and the question of how and when to address transitional justice. During the process, a clear negotiation framework was not set up. Furthermore, the impact of internal and external political developments revealed the vulnerability of the process in terms of responding to stressors.

Turkey's peace process for solving the Kurdish conflict is crucial on several grounds. First of all, this was the first instance when a Turkish government decided to address the conflict openly in non-military terms. This signalled a partial move away from the previously applied traditional securitized approach (Çandar, 2009; Yıldız, 2012) that has dominated the official approach towards the conflict, especially since the formation of the Kurdish insurgency in the early 1980s. By deciding to initiate open talks for solving the conflict, the government for the first time accepted different actors from the pro-Kurdish side as interlocutors for addressing the conflict. For the first time in the history of Turkey, a solution outside of a military approach was discussed and the possibility for a negotiated peace became a reality.

Secondly, the peace process revealed the diversity of perspectives on expectations of peace. By moving to publicly discussing possible pathways for solving

the conflict in the framework of negotiations, perspectives that could not previously be expressed became visible. Different actors expressed their expectations on disarmament and demobilization, democratization and human rights, justice mechanisms for addressing past violations, and power-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, statements by primary actors including political and armed actors revealed how different sides to the conflict are divided amongst themselves and might express varying opinions on their expectations from peace. Accordingly, instances of diverse opinions were voiced frequently in the media.

Thirdly, the peace process in Turkey gave signals for an interest in adopting international perspectives and also “learning” from the experiences of negotiated settlements and mechanisms used around the world. The call for a Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration framework is an example. The formation of the Wise People Commission with the purpose of increasing inclusivity and public buy-in is another case in point. Similarly, discussions on transitional justice mechanisms such as the call of pro-Kurdish side for the formation of a truth and reconciliation commission is another instance revealing the process of adopting ideas and practices from elsewhere. Furthermore, discussions on a “third eye” (i.e. the call for a third-party role in the peace process) were partially made through references to the experiences of negotiated settlements outside of Turkey. The foremost discussions on different areas can be seen in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Areas of Peacebuilding, International Normative Framework, and Norms and Practices on the Ground in the Turkish Case

Areas of Peacebuilding	International Normative Framework	Practices and Discussions on the Ground⁵
Peace Process Design	Inclusivity/National Ownership Third-party roles Gender Equality Norm- Gender Mainstreaming	Wise People Commission Monitoring Committee (“Third Eye”- “Üçüncü Göz”) Women Participation (BİKG)
Political Reform	Democracy as a Norm Human Rights Norms Power-sharing	Constitutional Reforms- New Constitution Human Rights Arrangements (cultural Rights: language reforms) Democratic Self-Governance
Security	Security Governance	DDR (Demilitarization, Demobilization, Reintegration) SSR (Police Reform, Village Guards)
Justice	Retributive justice (norms against impunity) Restorative Justice (“right to truth”)	Trials and amnesties Truth and reconciliation Commission

⁵ Some of these were realized (e.g. the Wise People Commission) and some were discussed extensively and became part of the negotiation process but were not implemented (e.g. monitoring committee).

Considering these dynamics, Turkey's peace process for solving the Kurdish issue is analyzed in this dissertation as a case for understanding the mechanisms of norm diffusion and the role of local agency in peace processes in the absence of top-down design of the peace process. As an example of a negotiated solution to an intrastate conflict, the Turkish case offers the opportunity to investigate the dynamics of local agency. With the purpose of answering theoretical questions posed above, this study emphasizes the perspectives of local actors, including high-level decision makers and middle-level influentials in the peace process, based on data collected through open-ended interviews and media statements.

1.4 Dissertation Plan

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. *Chapter 2* introduces the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework rests on norm diffusion and hybridity research and the need for bridging two research strands in order to better understand the diffusion of international norms of peacebuilding and the role of local agency in the "reception" of these norms. The analysis suggests a reappraisal of the hybridity debates in two ways. By considering a case where third-party roles are missing, this examination suggests that it is possible to broaden the theoretical scope. At the same time, this study deepens the theoretical scope by engaging with the "local" in a deeper manner and moving beyond the "top-down versus bottom-up" and "international versus local" dichotomies that the hybridity debate has been confined to.

In *Chapter 3*, the methodological framework of the dissertation is provided. This dissertation adopts a single case study design and the grounded theory methodology. The

case of Turkey's peace process for solving the Kurdish issue is selected to deepen our understanding of peace processes in the absence of a third-party with a focus on the agency of local actors. Single case studies allow for the use of multiple data sources and meaningful engagement with a process that has not been adequately addressed in theoretical and empirical discussions hitherto.

Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey based on a conflict analysis framework. The conflict analysis framework rests on the analysis of a conflict in its different dimensions, including the context of the conflict, the main dividers and connectors, the main actors and their positions and interests, and the drivers of conflict and peace. Through the analysis of the conflict along its different dimensions, this chapter provides the contextual background upon which the peace process was built.

Chapters 5 and 6 constitute the empirical chapters of the dissertation. *Chapter 5* provides an analysis of Turkey's peace negotiation process through four main questions that address different aspects of negotiation: when to negotiate, with whom to negotiate, how to negotiate, and what to negotiate. Here, the purpose of this analysis is to understand how primary actors approached different aspects of the peace process design. The analysis rests on data collected through media statements of primary actors and is supported by reports and legal documents produced during the peace process.

Chapter 6 rests on two main parts. The chapter initially provides an analysis of the interview data considering the theoretical questions posed in *Chapter 2*. Based on insights from interviews with high- and middle-level actors in the peace process in Turkey, I discuss how high- and middle-level actors situated their perspectives on peace process design within international experiences of peace processes. This chapter further investigates how these perspectives "reached" the domestic context in Turkey, and

focuses on the role of conflict resolution initiatives in the process. The first half of the chapter concludes that conflict resolution initiatives formed the platform for expertise and experience sharing, a process that proved crucial for the dissemination of normative and practical frameworks in the Turkish case. In the second section of the chapter, I situate these findings within the hybridization debate in peacebuilding. Chapter 6 also introduces the concept of *hybridity by design* as a novel approach to the understanding of hybridity in peace processes.

Chapter 7 concludes this examination with an overview of the main findings of the empirical chapters and a discussion of contributions to theory and to practice. Offering new theoretical insights on the hybridity debate and the diffusion of international peacebuilding norms in the absence of top-down design of the peace process, this study provides a broadened and deepened understanding of local agency in peace processes and seeks to add to both the theoretical and empirical discussions on the “local” in peace processes. The chapter further provides possible directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the theoretical framework of the dissertation that is based on norm diffusion and hybridity debates in peacebuilding. The theoretical framework builds upon and extends recent theoretical developments apropos of the need to reconsider the role of local agency in the diffusion of international norms and the manner wherein international and local norms and practices interact within the peacebuilding context. Hybridity is regarded as an analytical lens for understanding the dynamics of this interaction especially in cases of externally designed and top-down peacebuilding. This study endeavours to fill a gap in hybridity research by examining the dynamics of international norm diffusion in a case where externally-designed and top-down peacebuilding is absent. By analyzing Turkey's peace process regarding the Kurdish conflict in light of the hybridity lens, this dissertation seeks to add to the theoretical developments on how local actors select specific norms over others and whether and how local actors renegotiate these norms at the domestic level.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, I provide a discussion on the definition of international norms and then I review the literature on norm diffusion research. In the second part, I discuss how recent scholarship on critical peacebuilding engaged with the question of how international and local norms interact and the hybridity debates that this scholarship has produced. In this part, I argue for the need to extend the theoretical debates around hybridity to include cases where top-down design of the peace process is absent and investigate how international norms diffuse and are perceived outside of this framework. The chapter concludes with an overview of the theoretical argument.

2.2 Defining International Norms

Previous research provides different perspectives on the definition of international norms. In general terms, previous scholarly research distinguished among three types of norms: constraining, regulative, and constitutive norms (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996, p. 54). The principal differentiation is whether norms constrain, regulate, or constitute behavior and actors. While rationalist perspectives are mainly interested in the constraining and regulating aspects of norms, constructivist perspectives focus on their constitutive aspects. Moreover, in their efforts to define norms, scholars have also debated the normative aspect of norms, i.e. whether norms by definition involve ethical and moral statements.

From a rationalist perspective, norms are conceptualized as standards of behavior based on compliance and are regarded as constraining and regulating behavior. Based on this perspective, norms may take the form of being prescriptive (i.e. obligating

actors to behave in certain ways); proscriptive (i.e. forbidding various actions); permissive (i.e. allowing for certain actions) (Cortell & Davis, 1996; J. Duffield, 2007, p. 14)⁶. From this standpoint, states comply with international norms due to considerations of punishment and sanctions in case of non-compliance (see for example Goertz & Diehl, 1992). Furthermore, in the international arena, norms define rights and obligations in addition to regulating intentions of states (Mearsheimer, 1994).

The constructivist perspective is interested in the constitutive aspect of norms (i.e. in how norms create new actors and interests, determine their capabilities of action and other endowments such as rights) (J. Duffield, 2007; Finnemore, 1996; see also Wendt, 1999). The constructivist approach regards norms as intersubjective understandings, meaning that they are socially shared understandings and collective expectations about appropriate behavior, and emphasizes the constitutive role of norms and how they create expectations for behavior. Norms as standards of behavior are intersubjective understandings that involve a sense of “oughtness” (Florini, 1996, p. 364). The sense of “oughtness” is closely related to the issue of legitimacy. According to Florini (1996), a norm is considered as a legitimate behavioral claim. Norms are behaved not because they are enforced but because they are regarded as legitimate.

Norms have also been understood in terms of customary and usual practices.

⁶ This distinction (i.e. constructivism’s focus on constitutive norms and rationalism’s focus on regulative norms) is not strict. Duffield (2007) for example, while distinguishing between constitutive and regulative functions of institutions, he argues that there are no clear boundaries between them and scholars from different traditions may appeal to both functions in their analyses. Actually, several seminal studies argue for the need for building bridges between the two logics and the mechanisms of norm diffusion that are associated with them (Zurn and Checkel 2005; Checkel 1997). Checkel argues that both logics should be considered in research on norms; norms sometimes constrain and sometimes constitute (1997, 474). Checkel (2001) also argues for the importance of social learning as a mechanism of norm compliance where both rationalist and constructivist mechanisms of compliance are at place. Finnemore and Sikkink have also noted that there is an “intimate relationship between norms and rationality” (1998, 909) and that, constructivist research on norms cannot fully develop without considering the role of rationality in the process of norm adoption.

From this perspective, norms “result from common practices of states” (Björkdahl, 2002, p. 14; Gurowitz, 1999, p. 417) and are therefore the product of regularity and consistency. They reflect patterns of behavior and give rise to expectations of what will be done in a particular situation (Hurrell, 2002, p. 143).

One of the most widely discussed conceptualizations of norms includes concerns with normativity. The normative perspective views norms as moral (normative) prescriptions, stressing the importance of concerns with normative issues related to issues such as justice and rights in ethical terms. However, this view has been contested by the argument that not all norms involve normative aspects. For example, Klotz notes that “standards can have functional and non-ethical origins and purposes” (Klotz, 1996, p. 14). Acharya (2009) also argues that norms do not necessitate a ‘moral’ connotation or purpose. As Acharya notes, some norms, such as human rights norms, have undoubtedly moral character. However, other norms can be, in Acharya’s terms, “amoral” or “morally neutral” (2009, p. 171).

Here, following the constructivist perspective, I adopt the definition provided by Finnemore and Sikkink of norms as “standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). In the way used in this study, norms involve both ideas and practices⁷. As will be explained in more detail in the following sections of this chapter, for example the Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR) framework is considered as a standard of appropriate behavior and practice and therefore as a norm given that it is a standard promoted by the UN as an

⁷ Risse et al. distinguish between ideas and norms by arguing that while ideas refer to “beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals”, norms are intersubjective and collective expectations that make behavioral claims on individuals (Risse-Kappen et al., 1999, p. 7). Florini also notes that “norms are about behavior, not directly about ideas” (Florini, 1996, p. 364). Here, norms and ideas are used interchangeably referring to standards of appropriate behavior.

indispensable part of peacebuilding. Similarly, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is also emerging as a norm in peace processes. Other norms that have been categorized as fundamental norms by some scholars, including human rights norms and democratic principles such as good governance and the rule of law, are also considered here as part of the normative framework of peacebuilding.

Here, I follow the categorization by Wiener who distinguishes between fundamental norms and organizing principles⁸ (2009, pp. 183-186). According to this categorization, fundamental norms refer to basic procedural norms that are commonly accepted in international relations theory. Fundamental norms include norms such as sovereignty, human rights, the rule of law, and non-intervention, amid others. The second category, organizing principles, is linked to processes of policy and politics. This category involves norms such as accountability, responsibility, gender mainstreaming, and election monitoring. While the distinction between the two categories is not strict (e.g. norms may be classified in both categories or may shift between categories) this distinction is useful in the differentiation between content-related norms and process-related norms that is further adopted in this dissertation.

This study further distinguishes between process-related norms and content-related norms, following Hellmüller et al. (2015). Focusing on their conception of the growing normative framework in peace mediation, Hellmüller et al. provide a novel typology based on three main distinctions: content-related and process-related norms, settled and unsettled norms, and definitional and non-definitional norms (2015, p. 5).

Process-related norms address issues related to the question of how. Norms related to the

⁸ Wiener (2009) adds a third category called “standardized procedures”. Standardized procedures are defined as rules and regulations that are least likely to be contested on moral and ethical grounds. Electoral rules such as qualified majority voting are part of this category.

design of a peace process, such as inclusivity and local ownership, are included in this category. Content-related norms address the question of what, referring to the content of a peace negotiation. For example, human rights norms, the right to truth, the reintegration of former combatants as part of the DDR process are all categorized as content-related norms.

Table 2: Different Perspectives on the Categorization of Norms

Types of norms	Definition	Examples
Fundamental norms	Basic procedural norms commonly accepted in international relations theory	Human rights The rule of law
Organizing principles	Principles on how to organize policy and politics	Accountability Gender mainstreaming
Content-related	Addressing the question of what is being negotiated	DDR
Process-related	Addressing the question of how to negotiate	Inclusivity

To the question of how do we recognize a norm when we see it, Finnemore and Sikkink answer that we can only have indirect evidence of norms but “because norms by definition embody a quality of oughtness and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study” (1998, p. 892). For example, as will be analyzed below, the UN’s concern with local ownership in peacebuilding reveals that it recognizes the participation of local actors to the peace process as a norm. Similarly, concerns with transitional justice in peacebuilding reveal that coming to terms with justice violations of the past is regarded as a norm in peace processes. Furthermore, the concern with the reintegration of previously fighting groups into the society as an integral part of DDR reveals that reintegrating former fighting factions to society is regarded as a norm.

According to Kratochwil, “norms are not only guidance devices, but also the means which allow people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions” (1989, p. 11). In the context of peace negotiations, it is expected that domestic actors appeal to norms, ideas, and practices with the purpose of supporting their own view of peace based on their own view of the conflict. In addition, domestic actors also find themselves in specific “cognitive priors”, referring to “an existing set of ideas, belief systems, and norms, which determine and condition an individual or social group’s receptivity to new norms” (Acharya, 2009, p. 21). The next section provides a review of norm diffusion research and then progresses to a discussion on the perspectives on norms in the peacebuilding context.

2.3 Global Norm Diffusion: Review of the Literature

Norm diffusion widely refers to the process of dissemination and the geographical spread of norms and ideas and the subsequent process of adaptation by regional, national, and local level actors. Research on norm diffusion has been interested in explaining through what kind of mechanisms international norms diffuse to different contexts and how international norms are adopted, appropriated, and localized in different settings (Amitav Acharya, 2004; Cortell & Davis, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Furthermore, research on norm diffusion addresses questions including what is the role of domestic structures in the diffusion process (Checkel, 1999; Cortell & Davis, 1996), and, more recently, how norms are renegotiated and reinterpreted by local actors at the domestic level (Zimmermann, 2014; Zwingel, 2012).

We can distinguish three research strands in norm diffusion research since the early 1990s. The first wave of research on norms was interested in the question of the emergence of norms, their adoption by states, and their influence on state behavior. This wave established some of the most influential studies on norm diffusion in the 1990s, especially with its focus on the diffusion of international human rights norms (T. Risse, 1999; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999; Sikkink, 1993). Main models established in the 1990s analyzed the stages composing of the processes of norm emergence, diffusion, and internalization in addition to the main actors involved with them. The most well-known models include the “life cycle model” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), the “spiral model” (Risse-Kappen et al., 1999) and the “boomerang effects” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). According to the “life cycle” model, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that norm influence may be understood as a three-stage process involving norm emergence, norm cascade, and ultimately, norm internalization. This model is characterized by a tipping

point between the first two stages which is the instance where the cascade or diffusion process begins after a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm.

The second model introduced in the first wave is the “spiral model” of human rights diffusion (Thomas Risse & Sikkink, 1999). The model is composed of five stages: repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior. According to this model, the diffusion of human rights norms begins when the repressive politics of a state attract international attention and then continues with the denial by the state that is put on the international agenda for its repressive politics. The ‘spiral model’ encompasses actors from various levels including transnational advocacy networks, domestic norm-violating governments, and domestic opposition, and considers links among these groups as crucial for the diffusion process. The third model, the “boomerang effects” model by Keck and Sikkink (1998), is a model where domestic groups appeal to transnational advocacy networks in order to advocate for the adoption of a norm in a domestic setting. According to this model, domestic groups in repressive states appeal to international allies in order to pressure their own government for change.

This first wave of norm research has been labeled as “moral cosmopolitanism” and has been criticized for distinguishing between “good cosmopolitan norms” versus “bad local ideas and practices” (Amitav Acharya, 2004, p. 242; 2013, p. 468). According to this view, international norms that are propagated are “cosmopolitan/ universal” such as the promotion of human rights, campaigns against land mines (Price, 1998), campaigns against racism (Klotz, 1996), and environmental issues (Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 2001). These norms are implicitly assigned primacy vis-à-vis regional, national, and sub-national normative orders that are generally disregarded by this strand of research. Another criticism is that the agents that spread these norms are transnational

agents such as “moral entrepreneurs” and they focus on “moral proselytism” concerned with conversion and not contestation at the domestic level (Acharya, 2004, p. 242). Relatedly, another major criticism is that this strand of norm research disregards the agency of the actors (states and/or non-state actors) that adopt the norm and fails to capture the complex and multifaceted nature of the actor agency (Acharya, 2013, p. 468). Furthermore, these models have been criticized based on their main concentration on successful cases of diffusion, failing thus to consider “the dog who didn’t bark” (Checkel, 1999, p. 86).

Building on these criticisms, the second wave of norms research focuses on the importance of domestic political and cultural variables that affect the diffusion of international norms (Cortell & Davis, 1996; Legro, 1997). The issue of domestic structures and the importance of domestic normative orders have been discussed in terms such as “cultural match” (Checkel, 1999), “domestic salience” (Cortell & Davis, 2000) and “social fitness” (Bernstein, 2000). Cultural match is defined as “a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system, and bureaucratic agencies” (Checkel, 1999, p. 87). One of the main arguments regarding cultural match is that it helps reintegrate the domestic context and agency into social constructivist analyses of norm diffusion. According to Cortell and Davis, cultural match is a crucial part of a norm’s domestic salience, which refers to “the durable set of attitudes toward a norm’s legitimacy” (1996; 2000, p. 69). Cortell and Davis also note that domestic discourse is the most important measure of norm salience (the other measures being domestic institutional change and state policies) (2000, p. 71). Similarly, the “social fitness”

argument refers to the compatibility of a norm with an already institutionalized norm and is regarded as crucial for domestic “acceptance” of a new norm (Bernstein, 2000).

Other discussions on the importance of domestic structure include Legro (1997), who argues that organizational cultures mediate between norms and domestic policy preferences, and Farrell (2001), who argues that local culture is definitive in the way diffusion proceeds.

More recently, a “third wave” in research on norms emerged. This critical approach to norm diffusion started the debate regarding the “contestedness” of norms at the domestic level. From this viewpoint, local actors are not perceived as simply receivers but also as contesters of norms (Acharya, 2013). In a similar vein, other scholars have adopted a dialectical perspective arguing that norms evolve through practice and interpretation in context (Wiener, 2009; Wiener & Puetter, 2009). Scholars have debated how the “meeting” of global norms and local agency may lead to frictions in peacebuilding contexts (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2015) and how the complexity of the “local” in peacebuilding may lead to both contestation and cooperation depending on how local actors ‘respond’ to international ideas and practices of peacebuilding (Björkdahl, Kristine, Gearoid, van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2016).

The most recent critical wave includes critiques that address the way research on norms approach norms themselves. Criticisms have concentrated on how this strand of research treats norms as stable with clear content and categories (Zimmermann, 2014). Some scholars have argued the need to accept that norms as “vague and fluid” rather than static (Joachim & Schneiker, 2012; see also Wiener, 2004). From this perspective, norms are regarded as having evolutionary character (Zwingel, 2012) and the process of

diffusion involves appropriation and translation into domestic contexts where norms may acquire new meanings depending on how local actors adopt, adapt, and renegotiate them.

This dissertation builds on these recent debates concerning norm diffusion with special focus on the need to (re)consider local agency in norm diffusion research. More specifically, this research focuses on the question of how international norms related to peacebuilding diffuse and are perceived at the domestic level and the way they find resonance vis-à-vis local norms and understandings. As Donais and McCandless also note, scholarly discussions on the mechanisms of norm diffusion “have all too often fallen back on privileging either top-down or (less typically) bottom-up narratives” (2017, p. 195). As the authors note, we need to consider the complex interactions of different actors at different levels in order to understand the dynamics of norm diffusion and the role of local agency in the diffusion process.

2.4 Global versus Local Norms: Critical Debates in Peacebuilding

The concern with how global norms and practices find resonance in the local context in peacebuilding processes recently developed into a central debate in critical peacebuilding studies. Before discussing how these debates have been framed within the concept of *hybridity*, the next section of this chapter offers a brief background of international (primarily UN) peacebuilding and then provides a review of critical approaches to liberal peacebuilding. Then, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the concept of *hybridity* as an idea borrowed from post-colonial studies with the purpose of capturing the manner in which local actors renegotiate international norms in context.

2.4.1 Liberal Peacebuilding

This dissertation is interested in understanding the diffusion of norms (including practical standards and ideas) that are associated with peacebuilding processes. Before determining what kind of international peacebuilding norms we can discern in the recent decades, here, I will first provide a brief discussion of the definition of peacebuilding and how it evolved as a concept and practice. The objective of this section is to provide the background of international peacebuilding followed by a discussion of critical perspectives on peacebuilding.

The concept of peacebuilding emerged initially through Johan Galtung's pioneering work in the 1970s. In his work, Galtung distinguished between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding by noting that peacebuilding addresses the structural root causes of the conflict with the aim of promoting sustainable peace (1976). This pointed to the need to reconsider the causes of conflict and offer alternatives to conflict in cases where conflicts might occur. Galtung's work is regarded as innovative and ground-breaking as it paved the way for moving beyond institutional concerns regarding how peace can be established and drew attention to the need to address underlying conflict dynamics with the purpose of securing sustainable peace.

Following Galtung, other scholars proposed different perspectives on peacebuilding and its meaning. Scholars have pointed to both a broad and a narrow understanding of peacebuilding depending on the range and focus of activities and on the actors that are involved. In its broad form, peacebuilding refers to fundamental economic, political, and social development effort that fosters equity, justice and

freedom. Fisher (1993) notes that international aid and development, the work of the UN and its agencies, and democratization efforts are all part of this broad definition. In the narrower viewpoint, peacebuilding refers to interactions between people with a concentration on increasing understanding and cooperation. From a narrow perspective, peacebuilding focuses on activities aiming at re-building relationships and trust in post-conflict societies. Fisher thus offers the following definition of peacebuilding as “developmental and interactive activities, often facilitated by a third party, which are directed toward meeting the basic needs, de-escalating the hostility, and improving the relationship of parties engaged in protracted social conflict” (Fisher, 1993, p. 252). Fisher offers a contingency model to peacebuilding whereby different stages of escalation of conflict are addressed through different strategies of intervention (Fisher, 1993, pp. 253-254).

Another prominent approach is Lederach’s integrated framework for peacebuilding. This framework addresses both the structure (i.e. the need to think comprehensively about the population and systematically about the issues) and process (i.e. the need to think creatively about the progression of the conflict and the sustainability of its transformation) (Lederach, 1999, p. 79). Lederach notes that “the process of building peace must rely on and operate within a framework and a timeframe defined by sustainable transformation. In practical terms, this necessitates distinguishing between the more immediate needs of crisis-oriented disaster management in a given setting and the longer-term needs of constructively transforming the conflict” (Lederach, 1999, p. 75). Lederach also distinguishes between different approaches to peacebuilding based on the level of leadership that is active in the peacebuilding process (Lederach, 1999, pp. 44-55). Accordingly, the author distinguishes among ‘top-down’ (negotiated

settlement between principal leaders), ‘middle-range’ (efforts such as problem-solving workshops and conflict resolution training), and ‘grassroots’ approaches (pressure for change coming from the grassroots)⁹.

In the UN context, the concept of peacebuilding became prominent after the publication of the widely-cited document written by the UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The document defines peacebuilding as “efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people”. In this document, peacebuilding is seen as a crucial part of peacemaking and peace-keeping operations that is necessary for the success of these operations and to establish sustainable peace in the societies subject to such operations. A second document that helped popularize the concept of peacebuilding in the UN context is the Brahimi Report that was published in 2000. According to this report (Brahimi, 2000), peacebuilding includes, although it is not limited to, reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights, providing technical assistance for democratic development, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.

UN peacebuilding in the post-Cold War has gone through a process of transformation. The failure of several peacebuilding operations in the first half of 1990s and the resurrection of conflict in cases such as Rwanda, Angola, Somalia, and Bosnia, led to the restructuring of subsequent operations in a more expansive way. This meant the inclusion of good governance on the agenda, with extensive economic, political, and legal reform directed to post-conflict societies, amongst others. The expansion of the UN

⁹ Lederach’s (1997) widely used “Levels of Leadership” triangle is further discussed in *Chapter 3*.

agenda to include good governance and increasing engagement with transitional administration meant that institutions and entities beyond the UN, including financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and entities such as the European Union became actively included in the process¹⁰.

The practice of peacebuilding in the post-Cold War period in various areas of the world¹¹ and the policy discourse established as part of it set the standards for how peacebuilding should be organized. Through its preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, and peacebuilding activities, the UN has acted as a third-party in various capacities during the past three decades with the intent of ending intrastate conflict in different parts of the world. More recently, peacebuilding was institutionalized in the UN context with the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPC) in 2005. The UNPC was established as “an intergovernmental advisory body that supports peace efforts in conflict-affected countries”¹² and has acquired a core role in the dissemination of norms related to peacebuilding, such as local ownership (Jenkins, 2008).

Pertaining to the multiplicity of actors involved in peacebuilding and its multidimensional character, the concept of peacebuilding has not been understood and applied in a commonly agreed manner. Different organizations and actors use differing understandings of the concept, ranging from post-conflict peacebuilding to conflict

¹⁰ For an extensive review of this process, see Meera Sabaratnam (2011).

¹¹ Since the early 1990s, the UN has engaged in several peacebuilding operations. For a list of UN peacebuilding operations in the post-Cold War period, see Paris (2004) and Paris and Sisk (2009).

¹² As noted on the official website of the commission, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/> (last accessed 22 April 2018).

prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, conflict management, and stabilization (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell, & Sitea, 2007). Furthermore, different organizations prioritize different practices of peacebuilding and different dimensions of it. Barnett et al. (2007) distinguish among different categories and dimensions of peacebuilding. According to their categorization, four main categories of peacebuilding include security and military; social, economic, developmental, humanitarian; political and diplomatic; justice and reconciliation. Three main dimensions of peacebuilding include stability creation, referring to reinforcing stability and preventing recurrence to war; the restoration of state institutions with main focus on the generation of public goods; and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of conflict which includes strengthening civil society, justice, and reconciliation. Depending on the prioritization of different areas and practices, peacebuilding actors may engage in democracy oriented, economy-oriented, and security-oriented peacebuilding activities.

Further, debates on the different dimensions of peacebuilding have added to the vagueness of the concept and practice of peacebuilding. These include, but are not limited to, whether the aim of peacebuilding is to address root causes or to find ways to resolve conflicts, whether peacebuilding entails primarily security, humanitarian, economic, or political interventions, whether the primary actors are the “internationals” or the “locals”, and whether peacebuilding should be a top-down or a bottom-up process have been some of the issues under debate (Haugerudbraaten, 1998). Also, scholars have debated what consists a “peacebuilding success”. Call (2008) identifies and critically examines four standards of peacebuilding success that have been established in relation to peacebuilding, including the “no war recurrence” standard; root causes standard; legitimate regimes and effective states standards; and the economic recovery standard.

These debates reveal a multidimensional character of peacebuilding that has also informed scholarly work over the past three decades.

Starting from the late 1990s, substantial critiques of the UN peacebuilding emerged, focusing initially on the aspect of economic and political liberalization (M. Duffield, 2001; Paris, 1997, 2004). Some critiques have adopted a problem solving approach which focus on issues such as the efficiency of institutions, the reform process, and the use of resources (Chandler, 2010; Paris, 2010; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Other scholars have adopted a legitimacy-based critique of liberal peace (Pugh, 2013; Tadjbakhsh, 2011). This strand of critique, considered a part of the “meta critique” of the liberal peace debate (Meera Sabaratnam, 2011, pp. 25-26), has focused excessively on the liberal aspects of peacebuilding, distancing itself from the policy practices of peacebuilding (Campbell, Chandler, & Sabaratnam, 2011).

Substantive critiques of peacebuilding have rested on the main assumptions guiding peacebuilding in the recent decades. International peacebuilding in the post-Cold War period has hinged on a general strategy of rapid democratization and marketization for the promotion of peace thus resting on the idea of promoting liberalization as a remedy for civil conflict (Paris, 2004, p. 19). As Richmond notes, “the liberal rhetoric strengthened after the end of the Cold War, through international organizations such as the UN, institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, agencies such as UNDP and UNHCR, and many thousands different types of NGOs, which for various and complex reasons, adopted aspects of the liberal agenda” (2005, p. 57). Mac Ginty defines the liberal peace promoted by the UN as “the dominant form of internationally-supported peacemaking and peacebuilding that is promoted by leading states, leading international organizations and international financial institutions” (2010,

p. 393). From this perspective, UN peacebuilding is the form of peace favoured by powerful actors from the global north.

The current study builds on the critical literature that has debated the ideological and practical underpinnings of liberal peacebuilding in the recent decades. However, it should be noted that this study focuses on the Turkish case as a *peace process* in the absence of externally-led top-down design. Peace negotiations narrowly refer to the process of negotiating. On the other hand, peace process has a broader meaning which also encompasses negotiations, but it includes pre-negotiation, peace agreement, and implementation phases. The peace process in Turkey included a number of phases, including a back-channel process (2008-2009), a pre-negotiation phase (2009-2011), and a public negotiation phase (2013-2015). While the Turkish case did not proceed to the implementation phase, norms and practices regarding implementation were widely discussed by high- and middle-level actors in the peace process.

Moreover, the peace process in Turkey included mechanisms that can be considered as being outside of a negotiation process, such as the Wise People Commission and the Constitutional Commission for the formation of a new constitution. Therefore, the Turkish case is not classified in this study as a peace negotiation process but as a peace process. Also, in this study the Turkish case is not classified as peacebuilding in its broad or narrow terms. This is because, as explained earlier, peacebuilding as a concept is primarily used to refer to the substantive political, economic, and social effort to foster equity and to promote interactions in order to build understanding between people. Based on the above, the next part of this chapter provides the main critical perspectives developed in the context of international peacebuilding.

2.4.2 Critical Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding

International peacebuilding, along with peacekeeping and state-building in the recent years has been widely criticized in scholarly research from different perspectives. These criticisms have centered on how peacebuilding supports a liberal agenda and seeks to promote a specific liberal normative and practical framework that advances the interests of the West. These criticisms have focused on the ideological underpinnings of peacebuilding operations. Furthermore, criticisms have also centered on the top-down design of peacebuilding processes based on liberal principles that in many cases do not fit local realities and do not let for bottom-up expectations to be met. Here, a review of these critical perspectives is provided.

According to Newman et al., contemporary peacebuilding approaches reflect a liberal project as they aim at building peace within and between states on the basis of liberal democracy and market economics (2009, p. 7). Accordingly, liberal peacebuilding refers to “the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with ‘modern’ states as a driving force for building ‘peace’” (Newman et al., 2009, p. 3). From this perspective, all UN peacebuilding operations established in the post-Cold War period are instances of liberal peacebuilding, as they aim at the “formation of specific social, political, economic, and judicial structures based on liberal prescriptions including democratization, human rights, civil society, the rule of law and economic liberalization in the form of free-market reform and development” (Richmond & Franks, 2009, p. 3). This has also been called as the “peacebuilding consensus” that refers to the peaceful strategies (e.g. mediation and humanitarian assistance) to respond to conflict through international

organizations with the outcome being the reconstruction of liberal democracy and economy (Richmond, 2004a, pp. 131-132).

Richmond underlines that “the peacebuilding consensus depends on third parties imposing on all disputants the choice of integration into the global arena via very specific qualifying moves” (Richmond, 2004b, p. 94) such as the adoption of free markets, the conduct of elections, and the adoption of human rights principles. This reveals that the peacebuilding operations form the channel for the diffusion of a specific set of norms that are part of the liberal peace (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2015). In a parallel direction, Paris notes that through peacebuilding, standards of appropriate behaviour are transmitted from the Western-liberal core to failed states of the periphery and this “resembles an updated (and more benign version of the *mission civilisatrice*, the colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to “civilize” dependent populations and their territories” (2002, p. 637). Paris’s analysis refers exclusively to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts by the UN directed towards states that have been seriously damaged as a result of internal conflict. However, the most crucial part of his analysis is that, in his words, “today’s peacebuilding operations convey norms of acceptable or civilized behaviour into the domestic affairs of less-developed states” (Paris, 2002, p. 638). Accordingly, Paris defines four mechanisms through which international peacebuilders have promoted liberal market democracy and norms: shaping the content of peace agreements, through “expert” advice to local parties during the implementation of these agreements, through imposing conditionalities for undertaking economic and political reforms in exchange of economic aid, and, lastly, performing quasi-governmental functions by undertaking administrative tasks that the locals are not able or willing to perform (Paris, 2002, pp. 642-645).

These discussions have been accompanied by criticisms on the lack of contextual understanding of peacebuilding and the need for ‘local ownership’ of peace processes. From this viewpoint, liberal peacebuilding processes that are designed in a top-down manner promote standardized processes (i.e. following set templates that fail to consider alternative forms of peacebuilding in the local context). Mac Ginty notes that such set templates involve ceasefire monitoring, formalized peace negotiations, Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), civil society capacity building, good governance, and economic restructuring among other components (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 145). These templates are used across cases that vary highly from each other¹³ leading to the disregard of locally driven peacebuilding practices.

The critique on the lack of contextual understanding also involves critical discussions on the romanticization (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009b) and the pathologization (Donais, 2009) of the local that refer to a view of the local as uncivilized and of post-conflict societies as hapless victims in need for outside help. This assessment of the local involves assumptions on local agency. Richmond notes that one major assumption in liberal peacebuilding has been good international agency versus problematic local agencies or the “passive local” (2010, p. 17). From this viewpoint, the local is regarded as having “nascent agency” that is in the process of formation but not fully formed and independent. Furthermore, technocracy (i.e. the bureaucratic imperative that rests on neutrality and efficiency in peacebuilding), has been another factor on the lack of contextual understanding. From a critical perspective, technocracy

¹³ Mac Ginty gives the examples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka and criticizes how these templates acquire the form of “peace from IKEA” (2008, p. 145).

has become a major factor determining responses to conflict, favoring solutions that originate from specific ideological standpoints (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 288). Technocratic peacebuilding, the pathologization of post-conflict societies, and time frame considerations (i.e. the confinement of such operations within specific timeframes), are seen as main obstacles to local ownership in externally-led peacebuilding (Donais, 2009).

The recourse to local ownership is seen at the same time as a part of the design of the peacebuilding process (i.e. as purposefully nurtured by international actors as part of liberal peacebuilding). For example, Mac Ginty and Richmond note that “the recourse to the local is not a new departure for international intervention. Local actors and norms have been harnessed by colonial interventions for many centuries” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 771). In the same direction, Pugh argues that “in common with colonial power, international actors and agencies in peacebuilding disavow their impositions with discourses of good governance, law and order, stakeholding, participation, local ownership, empowerment, and trouncing spoilers” (Pugh, 2013, p. 21)¹⁴.

The imposition of specific norms and practices pertaining to the liberal peacebuilding framework and the related critique regarding the lack of local ownership in the peacebuilding process have led scholars to debate how global norms and practices interact with local norms, ideas, and practices. The next section provides the hybridity debates that this literature has produced.

¹⁴ However, Paris offers a different perspective in this debate by noting that “Without clear alternatives, some version of liberalism therefore remains the most sensible foundation for post-conflict peacebuilding. The overarching goal of such missions should be to create the conditions for representative self-government, not only because such an outcome is the least morally objectionable goal for peacebuilding, but also for the practical purpose of facilitating the eventual departure of peacebuilders through the restoration of domestic sovereignty over the territory” (Paris, 2011, p. 166).

2.5 Between the ‘Global’ and the ‘Local’: The *Hybridity* Debate in Peacebuilding

The concept of hybridity gained increasing significance in peace studies within the discussions about the need for a more contextualized analysis of peacebuilding processes and the need for understanding interaction processes rather than merely focusing on the institutional aspects of peacebuilding. Although lacking a clear definition, hybridity is increasingly used in peacebuilding research as a concept capturing the interaction between external ideas, norms and practices and local normative orders, understandings and practices.

The hybridity concept has its origins in biology and botanical studies¹⁵. In application to peace research, the concept is primarily associated with the work of post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha and his seminal work *The Location of Culture* (1994). Peacebuilding scholars have adopted Bhabha’s concept of hybridity by creating parallels between colonial power orders imposing colonial structures on colonized populations and liberal peacebuilding structures imposing and nurturing the liberal peacebuilding model on local populations. Scholars have also drawn attention to the ways external norms, ideas, and practices have been channeled to post-conflict states both through direct imposition by institutional design and through indirect imposition by ‘pathologizing’ the local and creating an image of local societies in need for assistance.

Bhabha’s (1985) notion of “third space” is central in understanding how his work is used in critical peacebuilding research. Bhabha’s “third space” is a space of dialectic that involves (mis)appropriation of the “non-local” depending on its “fit” with local

¹⁵ For a discussion on the different areas that hybridity has been applied as a concept, including agriculture, genetics, and anthropology, see Pieterse (2001, pp. 220-223).

realities and positions. In his article “Signs Taken for Wonders” published originally in 1985 (Bhabha, 1985), Bhabha interprets the early 19th century Hindu peasants’ encounter with Christianity. The peasants were approached by native catechists and while they embraced the new religion conveyed to them through their European masters (the colonizers), they resisted being baptized because they thought that God could not give them the Bible through the Europeans as they are not vegetarians. So, the Hindu natives negotiated with the authority on a “vegetarian Bible” (Bhabha, 1995), one that fits with the native Hindu reality. The demand for a vegetarian Bible challenged the boundaries of colonial discourse and the peasants, using the power of hybrid intercultural demands, subverted and appropriated colonial power while also resisted it¹⁶.

Parallel to the way native Hindus negotiated for a hybrid intercultural demand, hybridity is used in the peacebuilding context as a concept to capture how local populations negotiate for a peace that is suitable for local norms and practices. The “third space” in the peacebuilding context arises from the meeting of the normative ‘package’ that international organizations bring with themselves and the local expectations for peace. Creating parallels with Bhabha’s (1994) work on how hybridity reflects how the modification of existing power imbalances between the colonizer and the subaltern is limited, the critical perspective has argued that the international community’s engagement with societies in the liberal peacebuilding framework should be seen as a form of domination and that local societies find themselves in ‘limited’ social and political structures. As Richmond notes, “modernization and development,

¹⁶ On this, see also Kapoor (2003, p. 566).

peacebuilding and state-building praxis maintain similar patterns of structural engagement with their subjects as did colonialism” (2014, p. 2).

It has been acknowledged that debates about hybridity reveal the gap between the international and the local (Belloni, 2012) and the need to understand more deeply how peacebuilding norms and practices find resonance in domestic local contexts and how this affects the peace process as a whole. Other concepts such as non-linearity (Chandler, 2013b) and friction (Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013) have been used for capturing the uneasy process between liberal notions of statehood and local forms of social structure.

However, the use of the concept of hybridity reflects the power dynamics inherent in the process of peacebuilding. Hybridity is about managing power relations. In the context of peacebuilding, it is about how to manage the power imbalances between international and local actors. Hybridity thus becomes part of strategic interactions that are defined by the dynamics of the power structure and imbalance between those who design top-down structures for societies in a peace process and those who renegotiate those structures. This study adopts this view of hybridity emerging out of power imbalances.

In this framework, hybridity is seen as a useful concept both as a process and as an analytical lens. Scholars have noted that hybridity as a lens helps scholars move beyond boundaries such as the international versus the local/domestic and the Western versus the non-Western and helps the researcher to provide more detailed accounts of what is ongoing in-between those binaries (Peterson, 2012, p. 12). Hybridity has also been understood as a process (Mac Ginty, 2010). Emerging from this point, scholars have produced differing understandings of the concept, including “hybrid nouns

(institutions and actors) and hybrid verbs (behaviours)” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016, p. 223). The next section provides the main conceptual discussions that this literature has produced.

2.5.1 Conceptualization(s) of Hybridity

Hybridity has acquired increasing usage in peace studies. However, as a concept it remains vague and therefore difficult to conceptualize clearly. Statements that hybridity refers to the “interfaces between international and domestic actors” (Peterson, 2012) and that hybridity is understood as “composite forms of practice, norms and thinking that emerge from the interaction of different groups, worldviews and activity” (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012, p. 3) reveal the ambiguity of the concept. Here, a review of varying approaches to the conceptualization of hybridity is provided.

In peace studies, hybridity has been used with reference to various areas that are crucial in peacebuilding, such as hybrid peace governance (Belloni, 2012; Jarstad & Belloni, 2012), hybrid political orders (Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2008), hybrid economy¹⁷ (Pugh, 2011), hybrid courts/justice system (Dickinson, 2003), and hybrid security¹⁸ (Schroeder, Chappuis, & Kocak, 2014). Within these perspectives, hybridity refers to the coexistence of the “old” and “new” ideas, practices, institutions, and actors. These studies have provided both descriptive accounts, such as the inevitable coexistence of old and new structures in the context of rebuilding “fragile states” or in

¹⁷ By focusing on the political economy of peacebuilding, Pugh argues that the liberal peacebuilding paradigm is based on assumptions of the superiority of neoliberal capitalist prescriptions that largely ignore the local (2011, 310).

¹⁸ Focusing on Security Sector Reform (SSR), Schroeder et al. (2014) argue that SSR operations are highly prescriptive with specific normative and organizational outlook on security governance. SSR initiatives result in partial diffusion of security norms where domestic actors selectively borrow from external models leading to hybrid security governance.

the context of the coexistence of local justice practices and international justice systems, in addition to critical accounts of how, for example, financial agencies impose economic governance models that seek to repress local customs.

Some scholars have sought to provide specific analytical models for the purpose of conceptualizing hybridity as a process. Analyzing hybridity as a complex process involving different actors at various levels, Mac Ginty (2011) argues that we may conceive of hybridity as a product of interaction that involves processes of compliance, incentivization, resistance, and the provision of alternatives. According to this perspective, hybridization is understood as a four-part model which is the product of the interaction between the compliance and incentivizing power of international peace actors, and the ability of local actors to resist and provide alternatives to the liberal peace model (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 77). Therefore, hybridity is found in the space where constant forms of interaction between resistance and acceptance among different actors take place in externally-led peacebuilding processes.

In a parallel vein, hybridity has been understood as a process that emerges when liberal peacebuilding frameworks collide with the everyday agencies of local actors (Richmond & Mitchell, 2012). The process of hybridization includes plural forms of acceptance, appropriation, resistance, and exertion of autonomy and refers to the ways in which local actors attempt to respond, resist, and ultimately reshape peace initiatives through interaction with international actors and institutions (Richmond & Mitchell, 2012, p. 7).

Hybridity has also been applied as a normative concept having “emancipatory potential” for local societies (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016). Richmond calls for post-liberal peace as a liberal-local hybrid form of peace based on contextual understanding

and enablement of grassroots agency, based on the everyday and empathy, and based on communication (Richmond, 2009a). Richmond also distinguishes between negative and positive hybrid peace. According to his conceptualization, negative hybrid peace refers to the “outsourcing of power and norms from the international to the state” (2014, p. 2). On the other hand, positive hybrid peace arises when legitimacy is simultaneously local and international. Positive hybrid peace is emancipatory and socially just and therefore it is desirable for the formation of sustainable peace.

From a parallel viewpoint, Richmond and Mitchell analyze hybridity focusing on the notion of “everyday” where the liberal and local engage in a mutual “remediation of political space” (2012, p. 14). Central to this conception is local agency and the question of to what extent local agents are able to resist and contest externally imposed institutional and ideational structures (Richmond & Mitchell, 2012, pp. 25-26). Hybridity emerges at these points where local agency can exert “tactics of autonomy” from the externally imposed social and political environment.

Some scholars have approached the call for hybridity’s emancipatory potential with relation to local ownership from a critical standpoint. Prescriptive accounts such as Richmond’s “positive hybrid peace” model and also international organizations’ design of hybrid models of peacebuilding as leading to sustainable peace have been criticized on several grounds.

Scholars have responded to the prescriptive literature on hybridity by pointing to the difficulty in accounting for the results of hybrid processes. Millar (2014), for example, argues that prescriptive accounts on hybridity are not able to lead to predictable results. The author distinguishes between institutional, practical, ritual, and conceptual hybridity (Millar, 2014), depending on how international practices and norms

interact with institutional, national, and local level practices and understandings. In Millar's (2014) categorization, institutional hybridity refers to the mixing or combination of different institutional forms in the context of peacebuilding. Institutional hybridity is most open to international influence because this is the level where political influence and technical knowledge customarily play a role. Practical hybridity refers to processes of hybridization as a result of negotiation and appropriation of externally imposed practices by local actors. Millar's categorization reveals that hybridity can be regarded on a spectrum ranging from institutional to ideational where institutional hybridity is the most open to international influence while conceptual hybridity is the least open. Ritual and conceptual hybridity take place at the individual level and refer to individual-level perceptions of external ideas.

In an effort to respond to the challenges of the prescriptive use of the concept and to refine the concept, other scholars have distinguished among various levels of hybridity and various forms of it. An example is Visoka's (2012) distinction between institutional, public, or hidden (private/personal) hybridity. According to this categorization, institutional hybridity occurs at the political decision-making level and generally refers to issues of power-sharing and constitutional arrangements that involve extensive international engagement and also participation of local actors. The public and hidden practices of hybridization involve collective and individual resistance respectively to the adoption and implementation of externally imposed practices. Visoka further notes that hybridization process and its outcomes "could be easily conceptualized as unintended and unanticipated consequences of agents' interactions and interdependencies which facilitate structural conditioning and elaboration of future practices" (Visoka, 2012, p. 25).

At the same time, what might be called a “critique of the critique” emerged in recent debates on hybridity in peacebuilding research. One major critique is based on the contention that the scholarship on hybridity has tended, both conceptually and analytically, to reproduce the Eurocentrism underpinning the liberal peace. Sabaratnam (2013) points to methodological, analytical, and ontological assumptions that have guided critical perspectives on liberal peace that have led to the development of a paradoxical situation where liberal peace is seen oppressive but at the same time the source for the emancipation of local populations. In a similar direction, Nadarajah and Rampton (2015) criticize the liberal peace critics arguing that hybrid peace reproduces the inclusion and exclusion logic of the liberal peace. Also, the authors argue that the hybridity debates tend to obscure the role of the local in the reproduction of oppression, contestation, and violence.

In addition, some studies have focused on the deficiencies of the “hyper-critical” critique of liberal peacebuilding that the hybridity debate is part of, arguing that the critique of the liberal peace has “shifted from empirical analyses of interventions to debate over the imputed ‘liberalism’ of intervening actors” (Campbell et al., 2011, p. 3). The argument follows that these approaches are based on epistemological considerations and disregard or are minimally concerned with the analysis of external interventions *per se*.

The conceptualizations provided above reveal critical peacebuilding scholars’ concerns with understanding how hybridity unfolds as a process at different levels. All accounts provided above point to the need for moving beyond binaries between the “international” and the “local” and looking at interactions. However, at the same time, hybridity scholars have been confined to the “liberal international” and “local

indigenous” dichotomy (Heathershaw, 2013, p. 280; Sara Hellmüller, 2018, p. 11). The hybridity debate has assumed a hierarchical relationship between the external/international actors and local actors and has based the critique of the liberal peacebuilding on this hierarchy. The next part of this chapter first focuses on the limitations of hybridity research and then proposes a framework for moving beyond these limitations.

2.6 Limitations of the Hybridity Research in Peacebuilding: Towards a New Framework

While being a useful analytical lens in understanding interactions at different levels in peacebuilding, hybridity research has been confined to externally-led (primarily UN) peacebuilding processes. This is related to the foundation of the research on hybridity in peacebuilding, which creates parallels between the colonial structure of imperial domination and the liberal peacebuilding structure where external organizations and agencies dominate societies in peacebuilding. This point of departure limits the norms and practices to the liberal peacebuilding framework. Since the hybridity debate is based on the critique of liberal peacebuilding, analyses have almost exclusively focused on how the liberal agenda of specific organizations, donors, and states have promoted their own version of peace based on a liberal understanding.

In this way, inevitably, hybridity is framed primarily as resistance to domination in various ways, involving practical and ideational resistance. The framing of local agency (primarily) in terms of resistance limits the theoretical and analytical potential of the concept. We need to consider the different forms of local agency by taking into consideration the different levels of local actors and the importance of the different

“sides to the conflict” in peace processes (as further explained in *Chapter 3*). This would enable us to consider the different dynamics of local agency, including its role in the reproduction of oppression, contestation, and violence, as recent critics have also acknowledged (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015).

Based on the above, this study seeks to widen and deepen the theoretical scope of the hybridity debate in two ways. By examining a case where the top-down design of the peace process is absent, this study seeks to widen the theoretical scope. The examination of the case of Turkey’s peace process regarding the Kurdish conflict is part of the effort to provide new theoretical insights on the discussions on how global norms and practices interact with local norms and practices.

Secondly, this study seeks to deepen the hybridity framework through the analysis of the “local” not only as a site of resistance but also as a site for renegotiation that is affected by different parameters such as different perspectives on the conflict and different “levels” of actors, ranging from high-level decision-making actors to middle-level influentials. Scholarship on hybridity has mostly focused on what happens between the local and the international with the aim of moving beyond binaries. However, scholars have only narrowly engaged with the “politics of the local”, referring to the local dynamics as sites of contention and renegotiation of the political space.

One study focusing on the differing perceptions on the meaning of conflict and peace is Hellmuller’s study on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Hellmuller, 2013). The author points to the gap between the international peacebuilding actors’ concern with restoring local authority versus the local peacebuilding actors’ concern with ensuring reconciliation between antagonistic communities. However, Hellmuller emphasizes the “gap” between the internationals and the locals. We also need

to take into account the gap among the different parties in the conflict and the peace process. This research focuses on the local in a deeper manner by trying to understand whether and how domestic divisions have an impact in the process of adopting, rejecting, renegotiating international norms and practices related to peacebuilding. Local approaches to conflict and peace are essential as they are expected to have an impact on the process under analysis.

Some studies have offered perspectives on hybridity outside the liberal peacebuilding framework (such as Rumelili, 2012). However, these studies do not fill the gap regarding the question of what happens outside the “black box” of top-down peace process design (or externally-induced change as is the case with EU conditionality). How are norms related to peacebuilding diffused in the absence of external imposition of norms, ideas, and practices? How can we situate the hybridity debates in such contexts? How is local agency “expressed” beyond the framework of resistance? This research argues that there is need for considering what happens outside the externally-led framework as we can see that peacebuilding norms diffuse and are renegotiated also in the absence of a top-down design of the peace process.

Accordingly, there is a need for bridging the research on the diffusion of international norms and the hybridity debates in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding research has not engaged with the scholarship on norm diffusion but rather has focused on the imposition of norms and practices and sought to analyze the results of such imposition.

Building on the gap in research on hybridity discussed above, this study adopts a theoretical framework that is based on the bridging of the two research strands of international norm diffusion and critical peace studies in a case where the top-down design of the peace process is absent. Norm diffusion research has been increasingly

interested in local agency and how local actors reinterpret and contest global norms. Some scholars have used the wider framework of “contestation” of liberal norms (Wolff & Zimmermann, 2016)¹⁹, incorporating the hybridity debate within this wider framework. However, this area of scholarship is recent and significantly limited. This study seeks to support the reconsideration of the hybridity debate in the framework of norm diffusion and investigate the diffusion of peacebuilding norms in the absence of top-down design. This enables researchers to move beyond the strict focus of liberal peacebuilding interventions and investigate the applicability of the hybridity framework within the wider debates on liberal norms and their resonance in domestic contexts.

In general terms, the peace negotiation context offers an interesting area for investigating the diffusion of norms. This is because in the process of negotiating peace, local agency is highly interwoven with the position of the local actors both vis-à-vis the conflict and in regards to the peace process. Divisions on the reasons and the background of the conflict and on how the conflict can be resolved mark the agency of local actors in peace negotiation processes. Both high- and middle-level actors are not only divided in terms of their approach to and interpretation of the conflict, but also in terms of their approach to and interpretation of how a peace process should proceed. Furthermore, peace processes are also generally marked by power asymmetry between the parties, and different sides to the peace process are in need of legitimizing their demands regarding the peace process to internal and external audiences. This need of

¹⁹ Wolff and Zimmermann (2016) analyze the work of four scholars- Acharya’s work on contestation and localization, Kurki’s work on the contestation of democracy promotion, Wiener’s work on norm contestation, and Richmond’s work on hybridity as a contestation framework of liberal peacebuilding.

legitimization has an impact on whether and how local actors make use of international norms.

Hybridity research has sought to move beyond the binary between the “global” and the “local”. This has been an effective way of understanding the dynamics of peacebuilding. However, in the effort to move beyond this binary, hybridity debates have remained confined to the main division between the “local” and the “external” and have defined peacebuilding as a mutual remediation between the two camps. The current research argues that while moving beyond this binary, we need to consider that the “local” is itself divided along different lines. The most important division is between those who hold differing positions on the conflict. It is expected that these divisions over the conflict would translate into divisions on how a peace process should proceed. Furthermore, it is expected that different levels of actors would engage in differing practices of appropriation at the local context. For example, middle-level actors such as intellectuals, academicians, civil society actors, and actors from the media would be expected to be more open to international perspectives on peacebuilding.

2.7 Determining Peacebuilding Norms


This study is interested in the diffusion of norms related to peacebuilding in the domestic context in the absence of an external intervener such as the UN. Based on the conceptual discussions on the definition of norms that was provided in the first part of this chapter, this study defines peacebuilding norms as standards of appropriate behaviour that have been established with relation to peacebuilding. This study uses the concept of peacebuilding in its broad sense, referring to the process through which

parties to a conflict engage in the process of building peace with the purpose of overcoming past divisions. Peacebuilding involves the set of activities undertaken to address issues such as the design of peace negotiation process, political and security issues, and the justice mechanisms that would address conflict-period abuses and deficiencies.

The peacebuilding norms that are addressed in this study include both norms and practices that have long become part of the UN peacebuilding framework and also norms and practices that are increasingly seen as part of a peace negotiation processes. There is no exhaustive list of peacebuilding norms. As Jabri notes, “there are different practices seen to constitute peacebuilding: the demobilization of militias, the reintegration of child soldiers into their families and neighbourhoods, the setting up of truth and reconciliation commissions, the trials of war criminals, compensation measures for victims, the reform of security sectors, gender and human rights awareness training, the reinstatement of industries and the monitoring of elections” (Jabri, 2013, p. 8). Liberal thought and practice on peacebuilding come to constitute what might be labelled as international normative consensus on how a peace process should proceed, what kind of standards should be included and also what kind of principles should be considered.

Based on the above, I compiled the following list of norms and practices related to peacebuilding:

Figure 1: Peacebuilding Norms and Practices



Based on the distinction provided in the first part of the chapter between fundamental norms and organizing principles and between content-related norms and process-related norms, this study provides a typology that distinguishes between four main areas of peacebuilding and two primary types of norms that are relevant in the

peacebuilding context. The four areas of peacebuilding are peace process design, politics, justice, and security. The two types of norms are process-related and content-related norms. Looking at the distinction between content and process related norms, content related norms refer to *what* is negotiated while process related norms refer to the design of the negotiation process, i.e. *how* to negotiate. The design of the peace process involves questions such as when the negotiation should start, with whom to negotiate (i.e. who will be included in the negotiation table), the question of what to negotiate, and the question of how to negotiate. The way these four questions were addressed in the peace process in Turkey (2009-2015) is mainly discussed in *Chapter 5*.

2.7.1 Norms Regarding Peace Process Design

Inclusivity

Inclusivity refers to the extent and manner the views and needs of conflict parties are represented in the peace process (UN Guidance for Effective Mediation 2012, p. 11). This definition indicates that inclusivity is both a process-related and content-related norm (Sara Hellmüller, Palmiano Federer, & Pring, 2017, p. 16), as, in a peace negotiation process inclusivity might both be a subject of negotiation and also part of the question of how to negotiate (i.e. the way the negotiation process would proceed).

Inclusivity is listed as a peace process norm in this study in that it is accepted as a principle in peace processes. The content of inclusivity involves several issues including the question of whom to include in the peace negotiation process (i.e. the actors to be included), the question of how to include (i.e. the mechanisms of inclusion,

such as consultative mechanisms as opposed to elite focus), and the question of the purpose of the inclusion (e.g. the issue of public buy-in, i.e. the inclusion of actors with the purpose of increasing public support to the process). Inclusivity increases the legitimacy of the peace process and reduces the chances of excluded actors to undermine the process. This occurs because, by definition, inclusivity is understood as a concept referring to “the carving out of space within which a broad cross-section of the conflict-affected community, from community-based organizations to ordinary citizens to potential spoilers, can exercise meaningful voice and agency in the design and implementation of peace processes” (Donais & McCandless, 2017, p. 293).

Actor-centered perspectives on inclusivity have focused on the inclusion/exclusion of different actors in the peace process and its impact on the success of the process and the sustainability of peace. One of the most central debates revolves around the question of including armed fractions in the peace negotiation process²⁰. One main argument in favour of including armed fractions in the negotiation process is that their inclusion is crucial for preventing violence (Blaydes & De Maio, 2010; Call, 2012). Other studies, in contrast, have shown that leaving out some actors does not affect the commitment to peace from the part of those signing a peace agreement (Nilsson, 2008).

From an actor-centered perspective, the question of inclusivity in negotiations is hard to address due to an inherent dilemma. This dilemma rests on the need to include as many actors as possible so that no stakeholder feels excluded and seeks to “spoil” the peace process. However, including too many stakeholders may prove inefficient due to conflicting agendas that are hard to address simultaneously. Additionally, including

²⁰ For a range of options for including armed fractions in peacebuilding and state-building processes, see (Hofmann & Schneckener, 2011).

stakeholders who are not close to moderation, especially extremist groups, may spoil the process as a whole. At the same time, excluding extremists might mean that they act as “outsider spoilers” according to the categorization provided by Stedman (1999). As Zahar notes, warring fractions that are left out of the negotiation process may see peace as a threat for their survival (2008, p. 161). Thus, excluding some actors and/or major issues might lead to an agreement but not a solution (Zartman, 1989, pp. 248-249).

Another dimension of the actor-centered perspective on inclusivity in peace negotiations is related to the role of actors beyond the principle conflict parties, notably civil society. In general terms, scholars and practitioners favouring the participation of civil society argue that wide participation may increase the public buy-in of the peace process (Paffenholz, Hirblinger, Landau, Fritsch, & Dijkstra, 2017). Similarly, research has indicated that civil society inclusion in a peace process increases the legitimacy of the process and strengthens the sustainability of peace (Nilsson, 2012). Scholars favouring the participation of civil society have pointed to the variety of ways that this participation may occur, such as through Track II mechanisms, undertaking the role of temporary intermediaries, participation through membership in an official delegation, and the inclusion of civil society-led delegations to the Track I level (as was the case with the Democratic Republic of Congo’s peace agreement in 2000) (Wanis- St. John & Kew, 2008). Other scholars have established specific models of civil society inclusion in the peace negotiation process, including direct representation at the negotiation table, observer status, official consultative forums that run parallel to official negotiations, and inclusive post-agreement mechanisms among others (Paffenholz, 2014, pp. 76-77).

Regarding the participation of actors beyond the primary parties in the negotiation process, particular attention has been paid on the role of women’s inclusion.

The participation of women in the peace process is viewed as crucial for the formation of positive peace beyond short-term stabilization after conflict (O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, & Paffenholz, 2015, p. 5). Furthermore, women are regarded as experiencing conflict differently, including being subject to sexual violence and domestic abuse in periods of conflict, and thus their inclusion in peace processes brings a wider perspective for addressing security issues (O'Reilly et al., 2015, p. 6; Porter, 2003)²¹.

Broadening participation through the inclusion of parties beyond the main stakeholders may complicate the process of reaching an agreement, as it leads to the increase of the number of positions, thus rendering less effective communication and trust-building (Paffenholz, 2014, p. 72). Furthermore, stakeholders themselves might be unwilling to let actors beyond the primary stakeholders in the process of negotiation, due to the fear that their participation would lead to sharing of power with other groups. A third point related to the question of representativeness as in many post-conflict context is that it is hard to determine which civil society representatives to include (Paffenholz, 2014, p. 73).

More recently, a move away from the “actor-centered” understanding of inclusivity pointed to the need to investigate different “modalities of inclusivity” and the way different modalities might contribute to the prevention of violence and sustainable peace (Paffenholz et al., 2017). These modalities include direct representation at the negotiation table, observer status, consultations, inclusive commissions, and high-level problem-solving workshops among others (Paffenholz et al., 2017, p. 11).

²¹ For a critical view on the claim that women are more vulnerable than men in conflict and also the claim that women are more peaceful than men, see Charlesworth (2008).

Recent research has debated the “quality of inclusion” and its impact on the sustainability of a peace agreement. These debates focus on the way actors are included and have an impact in the process rather than the extent of their inclusion in numbers. The quality of inclusion refers to the extent local actors are able to influence the quality of agreements (i.e. the extent an agreement addresses the causes and effects of conflicts), the implementation of the issues under negotiation, and the push for starting negotiations or signing an agreement (Paffenholz, 2015a). Inclusion does not mean that all included actors might have the power to influence the process in a meaningful way (Barnes, 2017, p. 36). For example, research has shown that the inclusion of women does not per se mean that a peace agreement will be signed and implemented, but rather, the way women participate and the extent of their influence is important (Paffenholz, Ross, Dixon, Schluchter, & True, 2016). Strong influence over the negotiation process and not the number of women in the negotiation process is what matters.

Donais and McCandless further note that the content of inclusivity varies from context to context as “various actors compete to frame the concept either expansively or restrictively, deploy a range of resistance and/or enabling strategies, and locate it within a hierarchy of competing (local and international) norms” (Donais & McCandless, 2017, p. 295). The question of inclusion can become intensely political as “most groups will work hard to frame the process in ways which are consistent with their own perception of what the conflict is about and push for a process they perceive to be beneficial to their interests and aspirations” (Barnes, 2017, pp. 21-22).

Local Ownership

Local ownership can be defined as “the extent to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation of political processes; in peace processes, the term conveys the common-sense wisdom that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail” (Donais, 2009, p. 3). Within the UN framework, local ownership has been grounded on the premise that “peacebuilding cannot be a solely outside-in activity”²². Local ownership widely refers to the active involvement of local actors at various levels to the peace process. In the UN peacebuilding context, national ownership as a norm has been regarded as crucial due to the nature of UN peacebuilding as a process initiated and directed by international actors. In cases of UN peacebuilding, the question of “who owns what” becomes important especially for the sustainability of the peace process. Peacebuilding is regarded as a national challenge and responsibility and as it is widely accepted that only national actors can address their society’s needs and goals²³.

Local ownership has different meanings ranging from responsiveness, consultation, participation, accountability, control, to sovereignty (Chesterman, 2007, p. 10). From this perspective, ownership may refer to, on the one hand, how the local population regards peacebuilding policies as their own, and, on the other hand, to the extent to which the local population participates in decision-making processes and how these structures are accountable. Obstacles to local ownership have been discussed within the critical perspective on liberal peacebuilding, including the increasing

²² Workshop report “From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalizing National Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”, June 2011, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/national_ownership_report.pdf (last accessed 3 December 2015).

²³ Noted in the Report of the Secretary-General On Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (2009). Available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/s2009304.pdf> (last accessed 29 December 2015).

bureaucratization of UN peacebuilding and the pathologization of the “local” (Donais, 2009). From this perspective, the bureaucratic-institutional logic of peacebuilding that focuses on policy-implementation and the view of the local as traumatized and dysfunctional limit the prospects for local ownership.

In scholarly research, local ownership has been approached generally in two ways. First, from a problem-solving perspective, local ownership is considered as a tool for peacebuilding success and sustainability (Narten, 2008). Secondly, from a critical perspective, local ownership is regarded as a strategic tool applied by international actors to enhance their legitimacy (Richmond, 2012) and tends to preserve and disguise power relations in externally-led peacebuilding contexts (Wilén, 2009). Moreover, local ownership is hampered by the focus of international actors on the principles of liberal peacebuilding (e.g. democracy, governance, liberal market economy) and their acceptance of those as “non-negotiable principles that, in a sense, stand outside history and above politics” (Sending, 2009, p. 5)²⁴.

More recently, scholars debated how local ownership should be considered in terms of both its material and normative aspects, referring to the material incentives (e.g. funding resources) and normative-ethical incentives (i.e. shared values such as good governance, human security) that drive the local actors’ ownership of the peacebuilding process (Lemay-Hebert & Kappler, 2016). Deriving from this distinction, Lemay-Hebert and Kappler (2016) introduce different peacebuilding scenarios including deep versus superficial material ownership and deep versus superficial normative ownership revealing the diverse forms of local ownership that might result within the various forms of peace transitions.

²⁴ These points are extensively discussed in previous parts of this chapter.

In this study, local ownership is understood as the principle adopted in peace processes whereby local actors “own” the peace process in terms of deciding the peace process design and implementation.

Resilience

The concept of resilience has been extensively used in the recent decades in varying areas relevant to peacebuilding including international development and humanitarian aid, terrorism and counterterrorism, and global governance (Bourbeau, 2015). Resilience in peacebuilding has been generally understood as referring to the capacity of societies to self-organize so that they maintain and increase their ability to adapt to stress and risk (de Coning, 2016, p. 173). It refers to “the capacity of a social system to mitigate or recover from a violent shock or long-term stressors to maintain peaceful function” (Van Metre & Calder, 2016, p. 7). Resilience is understood as an inherently dynamic and complex process of “patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the phase of endogenous and exogenous shocks” (Bourbeau, 2015, p. 375). In the UN framework, resilience includes building capacities for collaborative relationships among political and local leaders, building capacities for appropriate interventions on divisive issues (e.g. the formation of peace councils and commissions), and civil society capacity building as peacebuilding actors (Ryan, 2012).

In peace research, resilience has shifted the focus from top-down peacebuilding to the community itself. It rests on the contention that resilience cannot be “given” or “produced” by outside actors but instead, it can be facilitated through understanding the mechanisms that reproduce problematic social practices within the society itself (Chandler, 2013a). It also points to the shift from state-based to society-based

understanding of security practices whereby the priority is given to the empowerment and capacity-building of the individual (Chandler, 2012).

Some scholars have pointed to an inherent normative bias in the application of the resilience approach, arguing that studies on resilience start with the premise that adaptation to an external shock (i.e. resilience) is inherently good and thus must be promoted (Bourbeau, 2015, p. 377). Moreover, some researchers have distinguished between positive and negative resilience. According to this distinction, negative resilience refers to the type that resists adaptation to a new peace process setting and thus does not allow for sustainable peace to take place. Positive resilience, on the other hand, is the type that allows communities to undertake confidence-building measures and build new structures over those that form the basis of the conflict at first place (Menkaus, 2013, p. 5).

Critical scholarship regards the resilience framework from a governmentality perspective arguing that resilience should be analyzed as a way of intervening with the purpose of shaping societal practices in order to lead to cognitive and ideational change (Chandler, 2013a, p. 280). In this regard, Chandler for example regards resilience as an ideology and as an “art of governing”, wherein international statebuilding has shifted the attention from institutional top-down change to society-centered change, constituting the society as the locus of the problem and the solution.

Resilience in this study is used as a framework capturing the shift from the top-down to a society-centered perspective in peacebuilding with the purpose of increasing the capacity of a society for coping with stresses referring to periods of violence. Resilience here is understood in its wide sense, referring to both societal resilience and also to the resilience of the peace negotiation process itself. The resilience of the peace

negotiation process is crucial as deadlocked negotiations may lead to worsening hostilities and insecurities (Spector, 2006). Spector defines negotiation resilience as “the capacity of negotiating parties to recover from actual or anticipated setbacks, stalemates and deadlocks experienced in the negotiation process by finding ways to restart the process” (Spector, 2006, p. 276). Negotiation resilience can be enhanced through support from domestic sources such as supportive public opinion and from international sources such as international organizations.

Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding is a strategy derived from the gender equality norm that encompasses equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for women and men. It means that “both women’s and men’s voices are heard in all decision-making processes at all levels” (Sandole-Staroste, 2011, p. 226). Gender mainstreaming is widely adopted by the UN which acknowledges that “mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities including policy development, research, and implementation of programs”²⁵. It is accepted that gender equality brings to peacebuilding democratic inclusiveness, more durable economic growth, and faster and more durable recovery in terms of social and human capital²⁶.

The UN played a primary role in setting the agenda for women’s rights, including

²⁵ United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, “Gender Mainstreaming: Strategy for Promoting Gender Equality”, August 2001, available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/factsheet1.pdf> (last accessed 3 December 2015).

²⁶ The details of this point can be found at The Independent Expert Paper Commissioned by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO): Women and Peacebuilding, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_backgroundpaper_29_01_08.pdf (last accessed 29 December 2015).

implementing two major principles that are also relevant with regards to the role of women in peacebuilding: gender-balanced decision-making (namely the equal participation of women in policy-making), and gender mainstreaming (referring to the need for a gender perspective in all phases of policy-making) (Krook & True, 2010). The landmark document on gender equality and peace is the Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security adopted in 2000 (United Nations, 2000)²⁷. This document reaffirmed the critical role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and all activities related to peace including peacebuilding. Also, Resolution 1325 called for both the participation of women in peace processes and the incorporation of gender perspective in all efforts related to peace. From this viewpoint, Resolution 1325 provided the normative framework for women's inclusion to issues related to peace (Tryggestad, 2010).

Since the issuance of Security Council Resolution 1325, the reach of the gender balance norm expanded “beyond the equitable division of political positions: women's presence is now seen to serve a range of purposes such as promoting democracy, getting rid of corruption and healing societies torn apart by war and natural disaster” (Krook & True, 2010, p. 119). In the peacebuilding context, together with the inclusivity norm, gender mainstreaming and gender balance in decision-making call for strengthening the role played by women in peace processes.

Gender mainstreaming is understood in this study as the concern with including gender perspective in policy-making relevant to the peace process. Gender

²⁷ The UNSC 1325 was preceded by two landmark documents on women's rights and gender equality: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) that was adopted in 1979 by the UN Assembly (United Nations, 1979), and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action adopted unanimously in 1995 (United Nations, 1995).

mainstreaming is an essential part of women's rights because, as a principle, it empowers women in policy making by promoting an equal perspective towards men and women in policy decisions.

2.7.2 Norms Regarding Political Restructuring

Human Rights Norms

Human rights are “internationally agreed values, standards or rules regulating the conduct of states towards their own citizens and towards non-citizens” (Baehr, 1999, p. 1). At the international level, human rights norms have a “special status because they both prescribe rules for appropriate behaviour and help define identities of liberal states” (Thomas Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 8). Donnelly notes that in the post-World War II period a “normatively robust global human rights regime has developed” (2013, p. 14). This has been achieved through the signing of international human rights treaties including the Human Rights Covenants of 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment signed in 1984. Human rights define what states may not do and what they are supposed to do, thus prohibiting and obligating action. However, the implementation of these rights has remained a responsibility and sovereign right of individual states.

In peace processes, the importance of human rights stems from several points. First, the history of conflict is generally marred with differing extents of human rights violations that can be regarded as both causes and consequences of violent conflict (Parlevliet, 2009) and thus addresses those violations as a crucial part of peacebuilding

processes. For example, denial of human rights such as the social and political exclusion of a minority, unequal access to economic resources, and non-recognition of cultural rights might be considered as a cause of conflict because one side may feed symptoms of human rights violations such as banning of the public meetings, detentions without trial, and arbitrary arrests. These violations are addressed through transitional justice mechanisms including different types of initiatives such as trials, vetting, and restorative justice mechanisms. Secondly, human rights form principal topics of contestation in divided societies. While the universality of basic human rights such as the right to life, equality of rights without discrimination, and protection against torture²⁸ are widely accepted, rights pertaining to the identity of specific groups in a society might be contested from majority groups. This is particularly relevant in cases for collective rights in ethno-nationalist and identity-based conflicts. Human rights from this perspective function as empowerment mechanisms for specific groups and relate to challenging the status quo for protecting oneself or a group from what they see as unjust (Parlevliet, 2017, p. 341). From this viewpoint, the political nature of human rights is at the core of peacebuilding.

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are the two pertinent international legal regimes in peacebuilding (Bell, 2013). Humanitarian law applies only once a certain threshold is met particularly with respect to the treatment of people not involved in the conflict. International law has emerged as a mechanism for regulation, as it creates minimum standards for the political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights of individuals and groups and thus provides the basis for international

²⁸ For a list of internationally recognized human rights enumerated in the different documents that form the International Bill of Human Rights, see Donnelly (2013, p. 7).

involvement in internal arrangements including in cases of civil conflict (Bell, 2000, p. 3). More recently, the establishment of International Criminal Court with the signing of the Rome statute in 1998 and its coming to full effect in 2003 added a new dimension. Also, increased international involvement in peacebuilding in the recent decades has complicated the process. For example, the establishment of international administrations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan has brought to the forefront questions of the role of international law frameworks in the context of international involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding.

Human rights are also relevant with regards to the “peace versus justice dilemma” in peacebuilding. While human rights activists generally prioritize addressing human rights violations and therefore justice in a peace process, conflict resolution practitioners prioritize the “peace first” approach (i.e. securing peace). However, this tension between practitioners and activists has gradually moved to a complementary rather than contradictory approach (Lutz, Babbitt, & Hannum, 2003; Michelle Parlevliet, 2009). Scholars advocating the “peace first approach” argue that the prioritization of the normative considerations over the political considerations on the ground. Considering the need to immediately end atrocities on the ground, the establishment of political order is seen as priority and norm-governed political order regarded as the result of political bargain, not the precursor to it (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003/04, p. 6). Snyder and Vinjamuri are critical of the assumptions made by constructivist approaches to norm cascades in the area of human rights (e.g. the spread of norms of criminal accountability would strengthen the notion of individual responsibility, or that legal institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia would have a deterrent effect in terms of war crimes). Instead,

the authors point to the need to adopt a logic of consequences whereby “actors will follow rules and promote new norms only insofar as they are likely to be effective in achieving substantive ends, such as the reduction in the incidence of atrocities” (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003/04, p. 13).

As Bell notes “although neutral in coverage, human rights provisions, at their heart, touch on how power is allocated and exercised between the protagonists to the conflict” (2013, p. 249). This is fundamental in peacebuilding contexts where issues related to human rights, including transitional justice mechanisms and governance, become points of high contestation among different actors.

The Rule of Law

Rule of law and good governance are accepted as indispensable part of peace processes as their absence will generate grievances that contribute to conflict and undermine state legitimacy (Sriram, 2017, p. 55). The rule of law can be understood from either a narrow or from a broad perspective. From a narrow and process-oriented perspective, it refers to the prevention of arbitrary governmental action and the protection of individual rights. From a broader and content-oriented perspective, the concept involves values of liberal democracy such as rights and justice (Rose, 2004, pp. 459-461). In the context of peacebuilding, the rule of law is regarded as central to establishing order and promoting justice, two chief tenets of peacebuilding. In the absence of the rule of law, the aims of order and justice are not possible to attend and therefore peacebuilding cannot lead to a sustainable peace.

The UN has placed increasing importance on the rule of law for its peacebuilding activities. The organization adopted an understanding of the rule of law in terms of

accountability to laws that are in accordance with international human rights norms and standards and requires “measures to ensure adherence to the principles of the supremacy of law, equality before the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency” (United Nations Security Council, 2004, p. 4). Based primarily on this understanding, the UN assumed multiple rule of law activities ranging from law enforcement role (e.g. in Kosovo and East Timor) to law reform and capacity building (e.g. in Bosnia and Liberia) (O'connor, 2006, p. 521). The UN also sought to engage with activities for strengthening rule of law by considering contextual needs. For example, a Security Council report published in 2004 underlines that “we must learn to eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base our support on national assessments, national participation and national needs and aspirations. [...] The United Nations must therefore support domestic reform constituencies, help build the capacity of national justice sector reform and transitional justice and help fill the rule of law vacuum evident in so many post-conflict societies.” (United Nations Security Council, 2004, p. 1)

Critiques have pointed to the rendering of the ideal of the rule of law as an instrument of liberal peacebuilding (Peterson, 2010) and its prioritization over political processes (Chandler, 2004). Peterson discusses how rule of law is presented as an apolitical project where “images of blind, neutral, and objective justice based on rational, democratically formulated codes present an alternative to the seemingly biased, subjective, and irrational decisions made by actors in times of conflict” (Peterson, 2010, p. 20).

Power-Sharing

Power sharing mechanisms have become a standard in negotiated peacebuilding in the post-Cold War period. They are crucial for addressing the question of how belligerents and potential spoilers can be convinced to lay down arms by reassuring them in terms of future security, political power, and economic resources (Vandeginste & Sriram, 2011, p. 492). In the context of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, power-sharing is discussed both in terms of “appeasing” warlords and also in terms of securing minority inclusion (Binningsbo, 2013, p. 99).

Power sharing institutions are seen as crucial in the peace process as they may guarantee representation and establish a stable balance of power (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Some scholars argue that power sharing should be seen as a continuum spanning from political to security, economy, and territory. Studies have found that power sharing decreases the likelihood of returning to war and that the presence of a third-part enforcer has been found to have a positive effect in this regard (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003).

All four areas of power-sharing are crucial for both securing of the peace deal in the short-term and for longer-term peace and stability. Power-sharing in the security sector is central to the disarmament process and crucial for addressing the security concerns of groups that are expected to disarm and demobilize. Power-sharing in the economic sphere defines the share of wealth that in many instances is a source for conflict. Territorial power-sharing is also crucial in instances where territorial demands are at place. Together with inclusivity, power-sharing has been a crucial factor affecting war recurrence and the stability of peace in post-Cold War peacebuilding processes (Call, 2012, pp. 190-192). However, power-sharing has also been considered in terms of the risks it entails in terms of including spoilers in power-sharing arrangements, the

uncertain relations of power-sharing to inter-group trust, and the possibility of destabilization in case where power-sharing institutionalizes divisions and consequently conflict (Sriram, 2008, p. 43).

Political power-sharing is generally addressed in the process of constitution making as part of peace process. As Samuels notes “constitution building can be seen as a process and a forum for negotiation in environments of conflict, and can play a role in constructing the political transition, as well as shaping the institutions of the state” (2009, p. 174). Constitution making processes in contexts of political transitions such as peace processes may take the form of participatory and inclusive as it is related to concerns of legitimacy. Also, it might be included as part of the inclusivity debate along with the spoilers debate.

Political power-sharing options for negotiated settlements to intrastate conflicts may take different forms. Sisk (2008) distinguishes among autonomy, the building-block approach, and the integrative approach. Autonomy may take the form of symmetrical versus asymmetrical federation based on whether it foresees the enhancement of the posers of a particular region. The building-block approach to power-sharing is based on the consociational model developed initially by Lijphart (1977). The model is designed to secure the democratic representation of ethnic and religious groups. The most well-known example is Bosnia after the Dayton Accords. The consociational model has been criticized on the basis that it reinforces ethnic differences because the veto component is susceptible to deadlocks. The integrative approach, on the other hand, seeks to integrate the society along the lines of ethnic and/or religious divisions. South Africa’s 1993 constitution is an example of the integrative approach. The advantage of the approach is the formation of multiethnic coalitions that might foster cooperation among different

groups. However, the approach is criticized on the basis that deep-rooted hostilities are not possible to be overcome. Most power-sharing models, in effect, integrate elements of the building-block, consociational, and integrative approaches (Samuels, 2009).

Some scholars have proposed an additional area of power sharing with reference to the cultural domination of one group and the divisive effects of such domination in divided societies. O'Leary notes that 'cultural protectionism' "works not through the wholesale freezing of certain practices but through empowering specified groups to control their own cultural evolution- both autonomously and jointly" (O'Leary, 2013, p. 5). Culture here refers to the languages, traditions, religions, philosophies of life, customs of a particular group.

2.7.3 Norms Regarding Transitional Justice

Transitional justice mechanisms involve different types of initiatives including trials, commissions of inquiry, amnesties, vetting, restorative justice, and traditional justice (Sriram, 2017). Transitional justice as a field first emerged during the 1980s and 1990s in response to the political transitions that took place in Latin America and Eastern Europe in that period (see O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). These transitions brought to the forefront questions regarding how to address past human rights violations committed by authoritarian and/or military regimes. During this period, the first Truth Commissions were formed in Argentina (i.e. the national Commission on the Disappearance of People in 1983) and in Chile (i.e. the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1990). In late 1990s and early 2000s, transitional justice became crucial for peace processes after intrastate conflict. Scholars have pointed to the normative

dimension of transitional justice since these developments by debating its status as a “global project” resting on customary international law and normative standards (Nagy, 2008).

The International Court for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines transitional justice as “an approach to achieving justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. By trying to achieve accountability and redressing victims, transitional justice provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and strengthens the democratic rule of law”²⁹. The ICTJ defines four elements of a comprehensive transitional justice policy: criminal prosecutions, reparations, institutional reform, and truth commissions. Transitional justice initiatives are crucial for peace processes as they “promote accountability, reinforce human rights and are critical for fostering civic trust”³⁰.

The field of transitional justice³¹ is marked by a political, moral, and legal dilemma because calls for justice in a post-authoritarian or post-conflict setting consistently have the potential of undermining the transition and peacebuilding process as a whole (Sriram, 2009, p. 115). This dilemma is based on concerns regarding whether the call for justice may lead to tension and lead to renewed conflict, thus undermining the purpose of peacebuilding. This “justice versus peace dilemma” stems from the diverse views of human rights advocates and conflict resolution practitioners regarding

²⁹ ICTJ website, available at <https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice> (last accessed 25 December 2015).

³⁰ The normative aspect of transitional justice for post-conflict societies is underlined in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616.

³¹ Critical approaches to transitional justice have also emerged. The argument is that transitional justice processes and mechanisms may, like liberal peacebuilding, destabilize post-conflict countries and may also be externally imposed and inappropriate for the political and legal cultures in which they are set up (Sriram 2009, 112).

peacebuilding. While advocates of human rights and justice support the position that addressing justice should be a priority in the peacebuilding process, conflict resolution practitioners support the view that securing a negotiated settlement should be the foremost priority. Furthermore, conflict resolution practitioners endorse the standpoint that all main stakeholders in the conflict need to be part of the negotiation process because their exclusion from the process would undermine commitments to peace. The question of amnesty is a crucial part of the “peace versus justice debate”. The view supporting amnesty provisions suggests that amnesties are a key for convincing parties to be part of a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Human rights advocates who desire to see human rights violators subjected to transitional justice mechanisms oppose this view. Licklider further notes that part of the tension results from whether peace agreements that do not materially strengthen human rights and those that do not provide some form of transitional justice should be supported by outsiders if they are supported by locals (2008, p. 377).

The “peace versus justice dilemma” has also been debated in terms of the “pragmatist versus legalist approach” to transitional justice (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004). The pragmatist approach focuses on the consequences of the justice process and the political considerations of trials and other accountability mechanisms. This view conforms to the “peace first approach” in peacebuilding (i.e. prioritizing the securing of peace vis-à-vis justice in the peace process). The legalist approach, alternatively, is based on the normative value of the importance of the promotion of universal standards of justice. It prioritizes accountability and opposes the grant of amnesties as a way to achieve peace. Vinjamuri and Snyder categorize a third “emotional and psychology” approach in their analysis of transitional justice (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004, p. 357).

This approach rests on a conception of justice that is centered on victims instead of perpetrators and it calls for the need for “emotional catharsis” for both reconciliation and sustainable peace. Advocates of truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism tend to promote the emotional psychology approach.

Some scholars have noted that the governance approach to peacebuilding that foresaw longer engagement with societies with the purpose of establishing structural components for sustainable peace, the debate about “peace versus justice” gradually switched to a complementary approach that combines the two elements and also between restorative and retributive justice mechanisms (Roht-Arriaza, 2006). As Roht-Arriaza observed, this “new landscape” of transitional justice is also marked by an increasingly interconnected set of relationships between the local, national, and international levels (2006, p. 12), with one clear indicator being the formation of hybrid courts and truth commissions as opposed to purely domestic ones such as the South African TRC (see for example Dickinson, 2003).

Retributive Justice: Norms against Impunity

Retributive justice mechanisms include criminal prosecution through national and international tribunals with the purpose of promoting accountability for those who committed human rights violations and crimes against humanity in periods of conflict. These mechanisms are seen as contributing to peacebuilding by individualizing guilt, protecting the return to power of perpetrators, and fulfilling an obligation to the victims (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003, p. 98). The retributive approach to justice is based on international law norms against impunity for the punishment of crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

International legal norms play an important role as an “antidote to impunity” especially in cases where local norms are not supportive (due to considerations of securing peace in the short-term) for retributive justice addressing those who have committed gross atrocities (Orentlicher, 2007, p. 22). As Akhavan notes, both the actual threat of punishment and “unconscious inhibitions” to norms against impunity in the international society is expected to have a deterrent impact on human rights violations (Akhavan, 2001, pp. 11-12). However, retributive justice mechanisms at the same time risk undermining and destabilizing peace in contexts of fragility that mark transitional periods (Bloomfield et al., 2003, p. 101).

Restorative Justice: Truth Commissions

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) are the most central components of the restorative approach to justice³² and have emerged in recent decades as an international standard in transitional justice processes. TRC’s are part of restorative justice mechanisms that aim to restore relations and work through the full participation of the victim and the community (Bloomfield et al., 2003, p. 111). Compared to retributive justice, restorative justice is more communitarian and focuses on transforming relationships with the objective of promoting reconciliation. It has been argued that TRCs shifted from being seen part of political compromise and “weak alternative” compared to formal justice mechanisms towards being a part of a “holistic approach” to justice (Hirsch, 2014, p. 812; Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010).

³² There is an emerging view discussing the need for a “syncretic” and “hybrid” approach in transitional justice combining retributive and restorative justice. See for example Lambourne (2009).

A truth commission can be defined as “an official body, often created by a national government, to investigate, document, and report upon human rights abuses within a country over a specified period of time” (Teitel, 2003, p. 78). Truth commissions offer a wider historical perspective as opposed to how individual trials focus on judgements in isolated cases. TRCs engage directly and broadly with the population that has been affected by conflict with the purpose of collecting information on their experiences (Hayner, 2011, pp. 12-13). According to Teitel, the primary aim of truth commissions has been peace rather than justice (Teitel, 2003, p. 79). Truth commissions may function as a way out of the dilemma of promoting transitional justice through trials and avoiding retribution versus securing peace through a negotiation process involving all main stakeholders (including potential spoilers).

Critics of truth commissions have questioned the various assumptions that guide the idea that truth-telling is essential part of peacebuilding. Mendeloff (2004) for example critiques the many core assumptions including psychological suppositions (e.g. that individual healing promote national healing), identity assumptions (e.g. that shared and collective identities are peace promoting), and institutional and normative assumptions (e.g. that truth-telling promotes respect for human rights and the rule of law). Despite the critics, truth commissions are increasingly applied in peacebuilding contexts and are seen as mechanisms for achieving communitarian justice that is regarded as crucial for reconciliation.

2.7.4 Norms Regarding Security Reform

In terms of the reform of the security sector, Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are part of the “normative package” of liberal peacebuilding. DDR and SSR can be regarded as frameworks addressing the various dimensions of security in peacebuilding. In this study, DDR and SSR are considered as standards of practices that have been established as part of the peacebuilding agenda during the post-Cold War period.

Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration

DDR is a central element in negotiated transitions to peace. It is a comprehensive process that aims at contributing both to immediate security needs and also more generally to stability by engaging with the longer term social, economic, and political integration of ex-combatants. As its name signifies, DDR is composed of three elements: disarmament (i.e. the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of light and heavy weapons from combatants and even from civilian population); demobilization (i.e. the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces); and reintegration (namely the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status)³³. Ex-combatants may include government forces, opposition rebel groups and irregular armed groups.

The UN developed Integrated DDR (IDDR) standards in the early 2000s with the purpose of bringing together “knowledge, lessons and good practice on a wide range of issues from concepts, policies and strategies to program planning, design, management, monitoring and evaluation” outlining each phase of the DDR and in addition to

³³ Derived from United Nations Peacekeeping page: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml> (last accessed 3 December 2015).

providing guidance on issues involving information, sensitization, food security, women and gender (United Nations, 2014, p. 13). The document defines five overarching principles of DDR: people-centered; flexible, transparent and accountable; nationally owned; integrated; and well-planned.

In general terms, DDR programs promoted by the UN and other agencies (e.g. the World Bank) are considered to fall within a continuum from minimalist to maximalist focus. Minimalist focus refers to strictly improving the security of the post-conflict state. Maximalist focus refers to the engagement with a development agenda along with the effort to strengthen security. Under the maximalist or “second generation” DDR, there is an emphasis on community-based incentives with the objective of addressing societal level needs (Munive & Jakobsen, 2012). Paralleling this point, Özerdem (2013) distinguishes between two schools of thought for DDR: the security-minimalist approach and the development-maximalist approach. The security approach regards ex-combatants as a security risk since lack of their social and economic integration would mean that they engage in criminal activities. The development approach, on the other hand, adopts a view of ex-combatants as a human resource and workforce that have the potential to contribute to the socioeconomic development of societies.

Security Sector Reform

SSR involves the strengthening of democratic control over security institutions (e.g. the police, the military, and other security forces and intelligence services) and strengthening the rule of law among other aims (Hanggi 2003). Thus, in essence, SSR refers to the reform of the security sector through principles of democratic governance

and to the condition that the security sector is subject to civilian, democratic control within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights (Schroeder et al., 2014, p. 214). It also seeks an operationally effective and efficient security sector, a crucial issue in the peace process. SSR is crucial for peacebuilding as it can help answer the questions of “who primarily benefits from existing security arrangements, what makes people insecure and what changes are necessary to deliver broad based security” (Ball, 2014, p. 283).

Andersen notes that “the liberal underpinnings of SSR are evident in the emphasis placed on curbing or controlling the powers of the state through the promotion of the rule of law, good governance, and democratic oversight” (2011, p. 9). Recent analyses of SSR have pointed to several dilemmas in SSR policy and practices in the past few decades, including the dilemma of creating structures that conform to the liberal democratic model while recipient states generally lack those structures in addition to the difficulty of encouraging local ownership considering the focus on like-minded local elites (Sedra, 2013).

One main point of divergence on approaches to SSR is the “monopoly versus the hybrid model” of SSR (Andersen, 2011). The monopoly model is based on the assumption that the Weberian state is the only form that can secure principles such as good governance and democratic oversight. The hybrid model, on the other hand, points to the need to build the SSR model by considering and involving existing forms of security and justice at the local level. Furthermore, second-generation security promotion approaches have been developed in the recent years as alternatives to conventional DDR and SSR. These approaches seek to shift the emphasis from

conventional top-down security reform to community-based approaches focusing on the situation on the ground (Colletta & Muggah, 2009).

2.7.5 Norms Regarding Economy/Development

The area of economy is regarded as central to peacebuilding from different aspects, pertaining to issues of economic causes of war, the economic agendas of state and non-state actors, and economic measures for reconstruction (in cases of peacebuilding) (Boon, 2008). In international peacebuilding, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide the institutional basis for economic transformation towards market economies. Below, three main norms/practices in the area of economy are briefly presented: economic liberalization/free market economy, war economy transformation, and resource governance³⁴.

Economic liberalization/Free Market Economy

The establishment of liberal market economy forms one central pillar in international peacebuilding along with the formation of liberal democracy (M. Duffield, 2001; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2005). Economic liberalization as part of international peacebuilding includes privatization of state-owned enterprises, lifting barriers to foreign goods and investment, and undertaking market-oriented economic reforms that lowers state control in the economy (Paris, 2002). The idea that economic liberalization

³⁴ This list is not exhaustive and different scholars prioritize different aspects in terms of the area of economy/development in international peacebuilding. For a multidimensional overview see, for example, Pugh, Cooper, and Turner (2008) and Peterson (2014).

is beneficial for peace rests on the contention that it “reduces barriers to the movement of goods and capital, increases levels of international trade and investment, deepens global interdependencies, and, in turn, inspires a transformation of state and societal interests away from war towards commerce and peace” (Selby, 2008, p. 14).

Accordingly, economic liberalization and interdependence are regarded as encouraging peaceful coexistence both at the global and at the national level.³⁵

With regards to international peacebuilding, economic liberalization and the establishment of free market economy are criticized from different perspectives. One critique draws attention to the negative consequences of marketization for the welfare of post-conflict societies. Pugh, for example, notes that market liberalism as part of liberal peacebuilding ignores socio-economic problems of war-torn societies, increases vulnerability to poverty, and does little to engage the society at large in economic reconstruction (2005, p. 25). In addition, economic liberalization through adjustment programs promoted by financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF has been criticized for not leading to tangible economic growth (Paris, 2004, p. 166).

Another critique is related to the top-down design of economic marketization. Scholars have argued how this type of design might be conducive to the resilience of “extralegal”, i.e. informal and criminal economies (Strazzari & Kamphuis, 2012). According to this perspective, the imposition of economic models through third parties such as the UN, and monetary agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, lead to the coexistence of old and new structures and the continuation of war-time economic structures within the peacebuilding environment. This coexistence often means that

³⁵ For a detailed examination of different perspectives on the positive link between liberal economics and peace, see Selby (2008, pp. 14-17).

illiberal economic structures of the conflict period might continue to flourish at the local level despite the top-down liberalization process at the level of institutions and formal economy.

War Economy Transformation

The transformation of war economy is a second principle that forms part of the peacebuilding agenda in terms of economy/development. War economies widely refer to the illicit and illegal economic activities that often support and feed off violence (Peterson, 2014, p. 4). War economies develop as a result of economic malfunctioning during conflict periods. War economies form the basis of the political economy of conflict as they rest on and flourish through political interests of different conflict parties that continue also in the process of peacebuilding (Newman & Keller, 2007). As Newman and Keller (2007) note, this is because in many cases the top-down efforts to transform war economies do not address the underlying social and economic processes that continue to feed war economies after a peace process has begun.

War economy transformation requires measures that are beyond standard economic reform for addressing economic backwardness or inequality. Accordingly, war economy transformation includes efforts for addressing both possible incentives that motivate actors to participate in violence and prolong conflict and also addressing the structures such as illicit trade that are used as a resource for conflict (e.g. drug trade and resources such as oil and diamonds) (Peterson, 2014). Addressing both possible incentives and already existing structures is seen as crucial for the formation of peace economies. Peace economies, as Peterson (2014) notes, require the transformation of both structural (e.g. inequalities that facilitate war economies) and physical (e.g. the

physical exchange of illicit goods that sustain war economies) facets of war economies for the formation of sustainable peace.

Resource Governance

Resource governance refers to the adoption of governance principles such as transparency and accountability in the management of resources with the purpose of promoting equitable distribution. Resource governance is a crucial part of war economy transformation. The importance of this principle lies in that the non-equitable allocation of resources and the concentration of resources in the hands of one political fraction might fuel or prolong conflict.

Transparency and accountability form basic principles for the equitable allocation of resource revenues. Lack of transparency and accountability is expected to have negative effects on institutions, including corruption, authoritarianism, and the domination of vested interests in policy making (Le Billon, 2006). Therefore, resource governance can be seen as a significant extension of democratic governance to the area of economy with the purpose of reducing the negative potentialities of war economies.

Part of resource governance in post-Cold War international peacebuilding is the promotion of privatization as a principle. Effective privatization, as Peterson notes, “attempts to further regulate the industry by trying to increase levels of transparency and perceived fairness in terms of who is eligible to participate in the privatized industry and to where/whom the accrued profits flow” (Peterson, 2014, p. 17). Privatization is seen as a way to minimize the possibility for political abuse of resources that potentially would lead to conflict.

2.8 Conclusion: Overview of the Theoretical Argument

The theoretical framework presented in this chapter rests on the need to bridge two research strands, international norm diffusion and critical peace studies, with the purpose of investigating the way international norms, ideas, and practices are diffused in the domestic context in cases where the top-down design of the peace process is absent. The theoretical argument of this study rests mainly on the theoretical limitations of the hybridity research in peacebuilding which has sought to provide a critical perspective on how international norms and practices “meet” in contexts of top-down peacebuilding and the way local agency is expressed in these contexts.

This chapter first provided different perspectives on the definition of international norms including rationalist and constructivist perspectives that focus on the regulating and constitutive aspects of norms respectively. Furthermore, debates on the conceptualization of norms have also debated whether norms are inherently “normative”, i.e. whether by definition they include concerns with ethical issues. This study adopts the definition of norms as “standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”. Discussions on the conceptualization of norms were followed by a review of the literature on international norm diffusion focusing on recent theoretical scholarship regarding the need for better capturing the way local agency has an impact on the diffusion process. Recent research on norm diffusion has been interested on how norms are renegotiated in the domestic context.

In the second part of the chapter, a review of the research on liberal peacebuilding with focus on critical scholarship was provided. Critical scholarship argues that the peacebuilding interventions have formed a channel through which international norms and practices specific to the liberal agenda have been diffused into

societies. According to this perspective, this process resembles colonial-era structures. Therefore, borrowing the *hybridity* concept from post-colonial scholarship, critical researchers on peacebuilding have sought to explain how global norms “meet” local norms and practices through the top-down design of peace process.

In the third part, this chapter presented the limitations of the hybridity research and the need for extending the theoretical scope of the research on norm diffusion in peace processes where the top-down design of the peace process is absent. The theoretical framework presented here builds on the need for extending theoretical discussions on how global norms are diffused to domestic contexts and what is the role of local agency in this process. Accordingly, this study points to the need for broadening and deepening the theoretical scope of hybridity research. This study calls for broadening the hybridity research by moving beyond top-down peacebuilding processes and assessing the way hybridity works in the absence of top-down design of the peace process. Also, the framework presented here calls for the deepening of the hybridity framework by focusing on local agency in a deeper manner, including examining the different sides to the conflict and the different levels of actors (high- and middle-level actors). In this manner, this study seeks to offer new theoretical insights on the “meeting” of global and local norms in peacebuilding moving beyond the framework of “imposition and resistance” that has dominated norm diffusion and hybridity research in the recent decades.

Following this framework, *Chapter 3* discusses the methodological framework of the study.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to present issues regarding the methodology that is utilized in this study. Two main methods are used: the qualitative case study and grounded theory. Both methods allow for inductive research design and are chosen for answering the theoretical questions posed in *Chapter 2*. The dissertation is based on the investigation of a single case study, the case of Turkey's peace process for solving the Kurdish conflict (2009-2015), and aims at employing an qualitative methodology that would lead to the advancement of theoretical insights on the dissemination of peacebuilding norms and their interaction with local norms and ideas.

This chapter is composed of the following parts: First, I introduce the primary methods of inquiry that is the qualitative case study and the grounded theory methodology. After introducing the two methods and explaining the rationale for their use in the current research, I move to discuss the main issues regarding methodology. First, I elaborate on data collection with main focus on in-depth interviews. Then, I

discuss the sampling strategy that was applied. In the next section, I provide a discussion on interviewing in peace research and on the timing of the current research vis-à-vis the peace process in Turkey. In the last part, I conclude.

3.2 Methodological Basis: Qualitative Case Study and Grounded Theory

This study is based on a combination of qualitative case study methodology and grounded theory methodology, both methods resting on an inductive approach. The rationale for combining the two methods is related to the research question at hand and the starting point that guided this research at first place. The main research question of the study is “how do peacebuilding norms diffuse in cases where the top-down design of the peace process is absent?”. This study was initiated after preliminary empirical observation on the use, in domestic political discourse in Turkey, of peacebuilding norms and practices that form the basis of the “liberal peacebuilding agenda” in the post-Cold War period. Thus, this research started with an interest in understanding an empirical puzzle informed by preliminary theoretical considerations. The following sections introduce the two methodologies and discuss their application in the current research.

3.2.1 Qualitative Case Study Methodology

Case study methodology is appropriate for inductive research and is one of the main methods used in qualitative research. It is defined as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). The case study methodology allows researchers to study complex phenomena

within their contexts through using a variety of data sources (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Determining what the “case” is can be challenging for researchers (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In general terms, a case is defined as an instance of a class of events, where “class of events” refer to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of governmental regimes, and kind of economic systems (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 17). For the current study, the case under examination is Turkey’s peace process for solving the Kurdish conflict (2009-2015) as a case of peace negotiations in the absence of top-down design of the peace process.

As opposed to history, case study relies on examining contemporary events and employs observation of the events under study and interviews with persons involved in the events (Yin, 2003, p. 8). Yin notes that the strength of the case study is that it can rely on a variety of sources including documents, interviews, and observations, among others. Case study research also benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions that guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003, p. 14). In general terms, case studies allow for conceptual refinements, for the formation of new hypotheses, and for exploring complex causal relations (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 19-21; McKeown, 2004, p. 153; Munck, 2004, p. 119). Case studies are also useful in identifying new or alternative explanatory factors and therefore help refining existing theories (Munck, 2004, p. 109).

The choice of case study as primary method of inquiry is appropriate when “a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 2003, p. 9). This study focuses on a set of questions including the question of how peacebuilding norms diffuse in a case where the top-down peace process design is absent and the question of why local actors “choose”

to adopt specific norms and reject and/or renegotiate others. With the purpose of answering these questions, this study is designed as a single case study.

Single case study designs have been regarded with scepticism due to concerns that they are not suitable for generalization and for theory development and have been regarded as lacking theoretical rigour (Yin, 2003, p. 10). However, this scepticism has been widely addressed (for a review of misunderstandings on case study research, see Flyvbjerg, 2006) and the potential of single case study designs for theory development has been acknowledged (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 33).

Scholars have distinguished between *theory centered* and *case centered* case studies (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 1), depending on whether they aim at contributing at the advancement of a theory or at a comprehensive explanation of the case through the instrumental use of theory respectively. Theory centered case studies contribute to the advancement of theory and are instrumental in producing theoretical statements that extend beyond the case itself (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 2). This study focuses on Turkey's peace process for solving the Kurdish conflict (2009-2015) as a case of peace negotiations in the absence of external third party. The main theoretical interest lies in the question of how peacebuilding norms diffuse in the absence of top-down design, how they are 'perceived' by local actors, and which norms are "selected" over others and why.

Scholarship on case study research has produced different typologies of case study designs. Yin (2003) distinguishes among explanatory, exploratory, descriptive, and multiple case study designs. Explanatory case studies are mainly interested in questions of "why" and "how" and they seek to explain a process under investigation. Stake (1995) distinguishes among intrinsic, instrumental, and collective case study

designs. Instrumental case study designs aim at better understanding a theoretical question or problem. Therefore, the focus is not on the case itself but on the theoretical question at hand. Scholars of case studies have also produced different typologies of case studies that are mainly based on the initial categorizations provided by Lijphart (1971) and Eckstein (1975). Scholars have produced different typologies of case studies by distinguishing such as among typical, diverse, and deviant cases (Rohlfing, 2012) and among idiographic, hypothesis generating, hypothesis testing case studies, and plausibility probes (Levy, 2008).

Based on the above, this study is designed as a *theory centered single case study*. The current study can be categorized under instrumental and explanatory case study design. The case of the peace process in Turkey regarding the Kurdish conflict (2009-2015) is selected on the basis that it provides an “odd” case for the diffusion of international peacebuilding norms. This is because these norms have been conventionally used within the framework of UN peacebuilding processes where the UN and other international agencies have acquired various roles in different cases, ranging from short-term security roles to longer-term engagement with the aim of restoring social, political, and economic structures. Therefore, the peace process in Turkey is an interesting case for investigating the diffusion of peacebuilding norms in the absence of a third party. The question of why and how local actors in Turkey adopt wholly or partially such norms and how they understand them is important for understanding how international norms travel to local settings and the way they are understood by local actors.

3.2.2 Grounded Theory Methodology

This study also applies the grounded theory methodology, an inductive method for theory development. Charmaz defines grounded theory method as “a set of flexible analytic guidelines that enable researchers to focus their data collection and to build inductive middle-range theories through successive levels of data analysis and conceptual development” (Charmaz, 2005, p. 507). Grounded theory method is essentially inductive and it implies “moving up from the detailed descriptive to the more abstract, conceptual level” (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, p. 15).

Grounded theory is appropriate to use when a theory is not available to explain a process. As Creswell notes, this is the case when “the literature may have models available, but they were developed and tested on samples and populations other than those of interest to the qualitative researcher” (Creswell, 2007, p. 66). Also, it might be the case that while theories are available, they do not address the variables of interest to the researcher. The current research is such an example, where the theoretical insights on peacebuilding and hybridity do not address a case that is outside the ‘conventional’ peacebuilding framework of top-down peace process design.

The essence of grounded theory lies in “wrestling with data, making comparisons, developing categories, engaging in theoretical sampling, and integrating an analysis” (Charmaz, 2005, p. 510). The main aim is to develop a set of concepts that provide a thorough theoretical explanation of social phenomena under study (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 5). For this purpose, as in other qualitative studies, and especially the case study method discussed in the previous section, the data for grounded theory can come from various sources, including interviews, observations, government documents, video tapes, newspapers, letters and books (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 5).

The gist of the grounded theory lies in the simultaneous data collection and analysis, with “each informing and focusing the other throughout the research process” (Charmaz, 2005, p. 508). In grounded theory, data collection and analysis are interrelated processes (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 6) and proceed simultaneously, informing each other (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). This means that the analysis begins with the collection of data, and not after the completion of the data collection process. As Corbin and Strauss (1990) note, analysis is necessary from the start because it is used to direct the next interview and questions.

In line with the above, the data collection process for this study proceeded simultaneously with the building of the analytical framework. The initial interview questions were modified, new questions added and some questions dropped, as some issues emerged as non-significant in the interviews (e.g. women’s participation in the peace process) while other issues emerged more significant than what was expected (such as the ‘approach to the conflict’). This “add and drop” process was definitive for the analytical framework as it revealed which issues became prominent in the peace process and which issues were framed in the context of international experiences, thus pointing to the diffusion of ideas from those experiences to the Turkish context. Furthermore, the analytical framework was supported by further data collection from media statements and official documents, thus helping both at the triangulation of the data and the refinement of the analytical framework.

Charmaz notes that “grounded theorists stop and write whenever ideas occur to them. Some of our best ideas may occur to us late in the process and may lure us back to the field to gain deeper interview” (2006, p. 10). In the current research, such a moment emerged after the transcription and coding of a large part of the interview data. The need

for accounting for the alternative ‘channels’ of norm diffusion led me to interview middle-level actors that were part of a conflict resolution initiative in the Turkish case (further discussed in *Chapter 6*).

3.3 Data Collection

For the current research, multiple data sources were used. Primary data came from two main sources. First, primary data was collected through open-ended in-depth interviews with local actors such as political elites, bureaucratic elites, civil society actors, actors from the media (such as journalists), and intellectuals/academics. A total of thirty-four interviews with high and middle level actors were conducted. The sampling strategy for the interviews is discussed in the next section.

Another major source of primary data came from media statements of top-level actors negotiating the process (i.e. the head of the government Recep T. Erdoğan, HDP party members and especially the party leadership, Kurdish imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, and the PKK leadership). Media statements of primary actors in the peace process provided the data needed for defining the positions of the primary actors, the issues they prioritized in the peace process and their expectations from peace. Media statements were collected through two main sources: first, through statements that appeared in newspapers. Second, video recordings of statements were also accessed and transcribed. The transcription of the video records was followed by their coding as part of developing the analytical framework.

Parliamentary meeting minutes, various reports and legal documents were also used as primary data sources to support the analytical framework of the study.

Parliamentary meetings on periods of primary interest (such as the official presentation of the start of the Democratic Opening in September 2009) were carefully examined. Reports such as those produced by the Wise People Commission groups in May 2013 and the two separate reports of the Parliamentary Commission on the Resolution Process published in November 2013 were used as data sources. Also, legal documents that were established during the peace process, such as the Law on the Resolution Process (TBMM Official Gazette, 2014a) and various legislative proposals especially by the pro-Kurdish party BDP/HDP were used as data sources.

In-depth interviews are crucial for this research for understanding how local actors perceive peacebuilding norms. In general terms, in-depth interviews give the researcher the opportunity to learn what a theoretical concept (such as peacebuilding, disarmament, transitional justice) actually means for those experiencing it (Brouneus, 2011, p. 131). Also, in-depth interviews are crucial in that they provide multifaceted information as interviewees do not answer only the specific questions that the researcher poses but they provide their own insights about the process under investigation (Munck, 2004, p. 116). Such interviews are mainly based on open-ended questions where the interviewer tries to minimize his/her control over the response of the interviewee. In in-depth interviews, open-ended questions are appropriate for maximizing response validity because respondents organize their responses in their own framework (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). However, while open-ended interviewing is best appropriate for in-depth and exploratory work, it makes coding difficult.

Previous studies on interviewing as a research technique have provided insights about the details of the technique and areas that should be of concern to the researcher. Issues related to pre-interview preparation (Richards, 1996, p. 201), sampling issues

(Goldstein, 2002), establishing access to interviewees and also establishing rapport and trust with them (Mikecz, 2012, p. 483; Seidman, 2006), and issues regarding the flow of questions in an interview (Harvey, 2011, pp. 437-438; Leech, 2002, p. 667) have all been discussed in previous research. One of the most important issues is the question of how to decide whom to interview. Three requirements are regarded as essential in selecting the interviewees (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 66): They should be knowledgeable about the issue under investigation; they should be willing to talk; and they should represent the range of different viewpoints regarding the issue under investigation. For the current research, local actors in the peace process in Turkey were selected for in-depth interviews. As it is discussed in more detail in the next section, these actors were selected both across the two “sides” to the peace process (i.e. the pro-government and pro-Kurdish sides) and also across different “levels” (i.e. top level actors such as political elites, bureaucratic elites, and also middle-level actors such as actors from the civil society, the media, and the academia who may commonly be labeled as intellectual elites³⁶).

Elite interviews are useful to confirm information collected from other sources (i.e. to corroborate information) and to help reconstruct an event by getting information regarding the decisions and actions that led to an event or a series of events (Tansey, 2007, p. 766). One of the strongest advantages of elite interviews is that the researcher interviews first-hand participants to a process who generally are first-hand witness of the

³⁶ There is not a commonly agreed-on definition of an elite. Here I adopt the definition provided by Richards that “the notion of elite implies a group of individuals who hold, or have held, a privileged position in a society and as such are more likely to have an influence on political outcomes than general members of the public” (1996, p. 199). Elite interviews provide an insight in the mindset of actors who are close to decision-making or who have a say about a political process.

events in a process (Tansey, 2007, p. 767). Political elites are also important because they are close to the decision-making process and may provide valuable information on how decisions were taken at specific points in a process. However, there are also some drawbacks. It has been acknowledged that elites “do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions”, but rather, they prefer to articulate their own views (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). Also, there are issues of power in elite interviews. A common view is that the elite interviewee has a power privilege vis-à-vis the interviewer and thus, there is a status imbalance that many times is disadvantageous for the interviewer since the interviewee may regard the interview as a ‘favour’ (Mikecz, 2012, p. 484).

One important issue especially in qualitative research is data triangulation³⁷, i.e. the use of multiple data sources in order to get a more complete and valid account of the data. Data should be triangulated through both primary (documents, reports) and secondary (articles, books) sources and also through other interviews (Davies, 2001, p. 78). The current study acknowledges the importance of data triangulation across different sources and adopts it in its research strategy. However, triangulation may still leave a degree of uncertainty as to which facts are accurate and reliable (Lilleker, 2003, p. 212). Still, contrasts in interviewees’ perceptions may reveal alternative perceptions and therefore may prove important in a different way. For the current research, the variance of perceptions of international norms is of high theoretical interest, as my aim is to understand this variance in order to make sense of possible *hybridization* processes.

³⁷ To be distinguished from methodological triangulation that widely refers to the use of mixed methods approach, i.e. the use of both quantitative and qualitative methodology in a single research.

One of the main advantages of the case study methodology is the use of multiple data sources. However, it has been acknowledged that the use of multiple data sources might lead to the collection of overwhelming amounts of data that might be difficult to organize and analyze effectively (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The use of a database is regarded as an effective strategy to deal with multiple data sources while also organizing data into coding categories is line with the research question that the study seeks to answer (on electronic coding, see for example Basit, 2003). The current study uses the NVivo (QSR International, 2016) software for qualitative data analysis. Through the use of a computer-assisted software, I was able to gradually develop coding categories, merge and split categories while also refine and develop new coding categories as the data coding and analysis process progressed. The coding categories were developed throughout the data collection process simultaneously with the collection and analysis of the data. The empirical findings of the NVivo coding are mainly discussed in *Chapter 6*.

3.4 Sampling


Both purposeful and snowball sampling techniques were used for defining the sample of interviewees. This is because the aim of the current study is not to draw a representative sample of a larger population of political actors but rather, to draw a sample that includes the political actors that have (or had) a role in the event or process under investigation (Tansey, 2007, p. 765).

With this aim in mind, for this research I defined a list of actors that played a role in the Resolution Process in Turkey (more detail about the actors is given below). However, not all actors in the process can be clearly known from the beginning. While

main actors such as party members that participate to the peace negotiation process are well known through the media, other actors “behind the scenes” often do not make any appearance in the media. Many times it may also be difficult to track those actors in the reports and other documents published regarding the process under investigation. For this reason, the snowball technique is also used as a second strategy in getting the names of such actors. The snowball technique is very useful in getting access to ‘behind the scenes’ actors, as interviewees are often willing to share the contact information of other potential actors to talk with. This is an important issue especially in cases where people to be contacted are retired professionals whose contact information is not available any more. Considering that personal contacts can be kept long after the end of professional relationships, the snowball technique offers the best means for access.

Figure 2: Focus of the Study with Regards to Actors in Turkey³⁸

³⁸ Building on Lederach’s (1997, p. 39) triangle on actors and approaches to peacebuilding. Here, I modified the triangle by adding the ‘sides to the conflict’ aspect, that is, the pro-government and pro-Kurdish sides for the Turkish case.



As already stated, the fieldwork of this research is based on in-depth semi-structured interviews with local actors related to the peace process in Turkey. There are several issues that need to be considered at this point. The first issue is related to the essence of any peace process that is, the existence of at least two opposing sides to the conflict. Since there are two sides to the conflict, actors will expectedly have a specific

understanding of the peace process and the norms and practices attached to it depending on whether they are pro-government or pro-Kurdish. Therefore, the first variation is based on the ‘side to the conflict’ effect that is taken into consideration in the analysis of the interview data.

Second, there are different “levels” of actors. Here, a distinction is made between top-level vs. middle-level actors based on their “proximity” to the decision-making process. Top-level actors are those actors who are closer to the decision making process. For the current research, this category is composed of two groups: political elites and bureaucrats. Political elites are the deputies of two parties, the AKP and the HDP. In the domain of bureaucracy, the main actors come from the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security (Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı) that was established in 2011 as a main body of coordination in the field of counterterrorism. Middle-level actors are those who do not hold political power but maintain relationships –professional, institutional, or personal- with actors at the top-level (Lederach, 1997, p. 41). These actors are generally in a position that they are likely to know and be known by top-level actors and have significant horizontal (among themselves) and vertical (with top-level actors) connections. For this study, this category is divided into three groups: The media, the civil society, and academia. Of course these categorizations are not absolute. Several academics are also active in local civil society. Also, some of the actors that are categorized as actors from the media have also academic backgrounds. Also, many political elites have academic background, i.e. they were university professors before running in the elections.

A third sub-issue is closely related to the “levels of actors”. Among these actors, it can be expected that some will have an impact on the “adoption” of international

norms in the domestic setting and therefore may acquire the role of “norm setter”. Here I mean that expectedly, some actors, and especially political leaders, will set the agenda for which norms are adopted by leading their articulation in first place. Other actors will then follow the adoption of a norm and the non-adoption/rejection of another following the leader. Here some examples are the usage of DDR by the then Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan and the call for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Abdullah Öcalan and the top leadership of HDP.

3.4.1 A Note on the Profile of Interviewees

The primary data for this study rests on semi-structured in-depth interviews with high- and middle-level actors in the peace process in Turkey. The selection of the sample was made in a two-step way. First, main actors were defined at both levels. In terms of the high level, these included actors who are primarily at the decision making level and who have high visibility in the media. For the middle level, the primary list was formed based on the actors that participated at the Wise People Commission (WPC). Then, the snowball sampling technique was adopted for contacting further middle level actors.

As my meetings with these actors progressed, many interviewees increasingly made references to a network of conflict resolution initiatives that had developed since 2011. This network referred mainly to the work of an NGO active in the area of conflict resolution, the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI). Interviewees made these references either in an open way (in the form of “during our meeting at [...]”) or, in an indirect way, by making references to “lessons learnt” from study visits. Retrospectively, I

determined that nineteen out of 33 interviewees have participated to the events organized by the DPI, including study trips abroad and also roundtables both abroad and in different cities in Turkey. Out of the nineteen interviewees, four are members of DPI's Council of Experts, a group of Turkish and foreign specialists that support the work of the DPI on a regular basis. The remaining fifteen interviewees have actively participated in study trips abroad and to roundtables and other meetings in different cities in Turkey and abroad. After realizing the centrality of the work of the DPI, I also interviewed the Turkey coordinator of the organization with the purpose of further understanding the way this initiative formed a platform for exchanging experiences and forming a "learning process" for Turkish and Kurdish actors participating at different events and activities.

3.5 Interviewing in Peace Research

Societies going through a peace process have the common characteristic of being divided on issues that have formed the basis for conflict at first place. This division is crucial for interview research for several reasons. First of all, the issue of access to the interviewees is more prominent in peace research. Issues such as political instability, personal power struggles among the political elites, and electoral processes may form an obstacle in terms of access to the interviewees and may lead to selection bias where the researcher selects easily accessed interviewees and leaves others aside (Brouneus, 2011, p. 135).

Secondly, while access is an issue for elite interviewing in general (Richards, 1996, p. 200), in peace research it becomes a greater concern since it is the case that

interviewees may be unwilling to talk about “sensitive” issues. In periods of peace negotiations, all issues related to the conflict period, the essence of the conflict, and expectations of different parties for the solution of the conflict can be regarded as “sensitive”. In the Turkish context, these issues ranged from identity issues to cultural rights, issues related to power sharing to any aspect of the DDR process and also issues related to the economy.

Also, doing research during peace processes is difficult as political actors are generally unwilling to spare time to an interview while a very important process is ongoing. The priorities in such processes are different, as many high and lower level meetings with various actors are taking place and expectedly, they form a priority for political actors in their daily schedules. Furthermore, interviews with non-elite people face an extra challenge that is, there is a need to contact “gatekeepers” in order to gain access to a community. Gatekeepers are people in a state, bureaucracy or organization who decide who can have access to a specific community (Brouneus, 2011, p. 134). Accessing gatekeepers may be difficult due to considerations of mistrust or security.

Another crucial point is related to the importance of identity. In cases where the conflict is based on identity issues (such as ethnic identity or religious identity), the researcher has to be more sensitive. Identity issues are crucial both from the viewpoint of the identity of the interviewee and of the interviewer/researcher (McEvoy, 2006) (McEvoy, 2006). While the researcher may have an implicit bias, the interviewee may also make assumptions about the identity of the researcher and answer the questions accordingly. Also, the polarized positions within a divided society may have an impact in the interview research process. This is because especially political elites will refrain

from getting beyond party positions due to mutual mistrust and will tend to repeat official party views during the interview.

Interviewing during a peace negotiation process has its own specificities since peace processes generally encompass also political transitions of various kinds. While in cases where a peacebuilding operation is at place political transition may be a core issue (such as in Bosnia and in Kosovo), in other cases, political transition may be a secondary issue. However, since conflict periods generally encompass violations of the rule of law and human rights violations, and many times a shift in political power relations occurs, it is inevitable that the peace process goes hand in hand with some sort of political transition. Under such circumstances, interviewing political elites during a peace process becomes very demanding, due to multiple considerations that these actors face.

Similar to other peace processes, the peace process in Turkey encompasses two processes at once: It is both a process of peace negotiations, i.e. negotiations of the terms of the peace to be established, and a process of political transition. Peace negotiations refer to the negotiation process between representatives of the Turkish government and of the pro-Kurdish side. Main issues under negotiation are DDR, SSR, and more generally, issues related to security. Here an important issue is that there is no agreement on the essence of the conflict. Governments in Turkey have traditionally framed the issue as 'terrorism' while the pro-Kurdish political actors have framed it as an issue of human rights and as a denial of ethnic identity. The political transition refers to the wider democratization process. The drafting of a new constitution is the most significant part of this process. The two processes are intrinsically intertwined. The Kurdish issue is at the heart of drafting a new constitution, as the most debated issues encompass the definition of citizenship and associated rights and the issue of cultural rights for Kurds

such as education in mother tongue. All these contested political and societal issues have had an impact in the fieldwork of this study in terms of access to the interviewees and in terms of their willingness to talk about the process.

3.6 A Note on the Timing of the Research

“Timing” at this point refers to the timing of the current research vis-à-vis the peace process in Turkey. The fieldwork for this research started in mid-September 2015 when the peace negotiations were already at an impasse since May 2015. The issue of timing is important in two ways: First, since the research is being conducted at a time of impasse, actors will be affected by the current situation in evaluating the past. Secondly, not only actors’ perceptions but also the prominence of issues has changed. Issues that were seen as paramount in the past, such as SSR, later moved to the background while other issues, such as the discussion on the need for a monitoring committee, came at the forefront.

At the stage that the fieldwork for this research started, the peace talks were at an impasse and conflict at the eastern part of Turkey between the Turkish Government and Kurdish groups had resumed. The process already came at an impasse in February 2015, after a high-level meeting between government representative and Kurdish representatives that came to be known as the “Dolmabahce Agreement” (*Dolmabahçe Mutabakatı*) in the media. After the meeting, President Erdoğan made a declaration not recognizing the issues that seem to have been agreed on at the meeting. The situation worsened gradually with the elections in June and then the process found itself at an impasse since July 2015, when terrorist attacks and conflict between the Turkish armed

forces and Kurdish insurgents incrementally increased in provinces such as Diyarbakır, Mardin, and Şırnak. The important issue in terms of the current research is that the situation of the process after stalling expectedly affected the perceptions of the actors regarding the peace negotiation process that took place during 2013-2015. A second point is that issues that were not prominent at earlier points in the Resolution Process, such as the establishment of a monitoring committee, became hot topic at later parts, especially when problems between the parties arose. This means that a variation in terms of how specific practices are understood, and more importantly how these practices are prioritized or not will be the case. Therefore, the timing dimension should be considered in the analysis in terms of the prominence of different norms in different time frames.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter provided the methodology utilized in this study that combines the case study method and grounded theory. The chapter first introduced the two methods and discussed the rationales for their use in the current study. Both case study and grounded theory are used with the purpose of providing theoretical insights with focus on a case that has not been considered in the framework of critical peacebuilding studies.

After introducing the methodology, the chapter proceeded with data collection and sampling. The data for the study came from multiple sources including open-ended in-depth interviews with high and middle-level actors, statements of primary actors collected through the media, parliamentary minutes, official documents, and reports that were produced as part of the process. The sampling for the interviews was made in two stages, first purposive sampling and then through snowball sampling, with the purpose

of reaching as many local actors as possible, including those who do not have public visibility.

The third part of the chapter provided a discussion on the limitations of doing fieldwork and especially conducting interviews in peace research. During peace processes, access to potential interviewees and especially high level actors can be challenging due to the unwillingness of these actors to talk about ‘sensitive’ issues and also due to the unwillingness of the actors to spare time at a period of political turmoil. Furthermore, in the last part a discussion on the timing of the field research vis-à-vis the peace process was provided and its possible impact on the findings discussed.

Having considered the theoretical and methodological considerations in *Chapter 2* and *Chapter 3* respectively, the next chapter provides the analysis of Turkey’s Kurdish conflict with focus on the contextual conditions and the main actors involved.

CHAPTER 4

THE KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY: CONFLICT ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the background and context to the Kurdish issue in Turkey by using a conflict analysis framework. Conflict analysis frameworks move beyond the historical overview of a conflict and are helpful in understanding and analyzing a conflict along different dimensions. Here, three dimensions are taken into consideration: the dividers and connectors, the actors, and the drivers for conflict and peace. Each of these dimensions is crucial for understanding the main drivers of conflict and peace in the case of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

The chapter is organized as follows: In the first part, I provide a brief historical overview of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey in two sections. First, I provide an overview of the conflict since the initiation of PKK insurgency in 1984 until the official start of the Democratic Opening process in 2009. This period is discussed in three phases: the period from the initiation of insurgency until the capture of the PKK leader (1984 to 1999); the period from PKK's retreat and ceasefire until the return to conflict (1999 to 2004); and the period of EU-induced transformation (2004 to 2009). I then provide a detailed overview of the 2009-2015 process. This period is discussed under four sub-periods: the Kurdish/Democratic Opening (2009-2010), the backchannel Oslo process

(2009-2011), the escalation of the conflict (2011-2012), and finally, the Resolution Process (2012-2015).

Then, I proceed to the analysis of the conflict along three main categories: dividers and connectors, actors, and drivers of conflict and peace. Dividers and connectors involve contextual factors that create vulnerabilities to conflict and opportunities for peace. Conflict dividers can be described as “cracks” that already exist in the society and may easily escalate into conflict. The analysis regarding the dividers and connectors is made along five dimensions: strategic, political, socioeconomic, psychological, and cultural. In the following part, I provide the analysis of the stakeholders, including both main actors and secondary actors. The analysis of the actors focuses on their positions, interests, means of power/influence, and willingness for negotiation. Third, I analyze the drivers of conflict and peace that refer to the main issues around which leaders mobilize their constituencies. Drivers of conflict and peace refer to the way dividers and connectors are used to escalate and de-escalate conflict, and the motivations and the resources possessed to achieve objectives. The last part of the chapter concludes by reiterating the importance of considering the conflict dynamics for the better understanding of the 2009-2015 peace process.

4.2 The Kurdish Issue: Chronological Overview

Conflict processes are dynamic, as, both the actors themselves, and their positions, interests, needs, and relative power change over time. As is the case with

every intrastate conflict, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey has been dynamic throughout the years. A short chronological overview is needed in order to understand the changing historical context, the transformation of the main stakeholders and their positions in the conflict in Turkey.

The Kurdish issue emanates from the repressive approach that the Turkish state adopted towards its Kurdish population in the process of nation-building³⁹. The roots of the problem can be found at the effort to establish unity out of diversity emanating from the Ottoman past and the creation of a standardized Turkish identity for all citizens of Turkey (Ergil, 2000; İmset, 1996). With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish state started the process of centralizing power with the purpose of governing its territory. In the initial decades, Kurdish resistance to centralization and the extension of the newly established Turkish state's political, economic, social, and cultural role manifested through various rebellions in the eastern part of the country (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 10). In retrospect, these rebellions became crucial in shaping Kurdish nationalist imagining in the 1970s and 1980s and occupy a central place in Kurdish nationalist imagination (M. v. Bruinessen, 1992).

The most recent phase of the conflict started with the establishment of the PKK in late 1970s and the initiation of the insurgency in 1984. The period after 1984 can be divided into four phases.

The first period runs from the initiation of PKK's⁴⁰ armed insurgency in 1984 to the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan in 1999. In this period, the Turkish Armed Forces engaged in full warfare to end the Kurdish insurgency and terminate any kind of struggle

³⁹ For a concise analysis of the origins of the Kurdish question in the late Ottoman through early Republican period see Kirişçi and Winrow (1997, pp. 67-85).

⁴⁰ For a detailed history of the PKK and Öcalan see Marcus (2007).

that would jeopardize the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic. This first period is crucial as it shaped the state's main approach to the Kurdish issue in military and anti-terror terms.

In the process leading to its establishment, the PKK managed to marginalize moderate Kurdish nationalist organizations (Tezcür, 2015) and targeted⁴¹ local leaders and civilians including people from Kurdish descent (Criss, 1995, p. 19; McDowall, 2007). Since the initial years of the insurgency, PKK's main targets have been state actors such as members of the Turkish armed forces, the police, and other state authorities. This armed struggle was accompanied by political struggle starting in 1990. The political side of the conflict was crucial in promoting the social and political aspects of the Kurdish issue by making claims on Kurds' oppressed ethnic and cultural identity and the need for strengthening democratic rights for the resolution of the issue and for Turkey's democratic development (Watts, 2010). While a gradual move from armed struggle to unarmed struggle and move from separatist aspirations to democratic confederalism took place after 1999 (Yeğen, 2016), the PKK remained as an organization associated with terrorism and separatism in the eyes of the Turkish establishment because of its continued use of violence. This has been accompanied with the suppression of pro-Kurdish political parties and their closure by the Constitutional Court since the early 1990s⁴².

Emanating from the PKK's violent strategy especially in the initial years of its insurgency, the official state approach to the Kurdish issue has been framed by security

⁴¹ For details on the PKK tactics in the first years of its establishment whereby the group targeted civilians and local clan leaders, see (Bal & Laçiner, 2004, pp. 24-25).

⁴² Since the early 1990s, five pro-Kurdish political parties were closed by the Constitutional Court on accusations that these parties were directly involved in separatist activities and were charged of affinities with the PKK or its leader Abdullah Öcalan (Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011, p. 72). The parties and the dates of their closures are: HEP (1993), OZDEP (1994), HADEP (2003), DEHAP (2005), DTP (2009).

concerns defined narrowly as the protection of the territorial integrity of the state. Throughout the 1990s, the security framing of the issue was accompanied by the Turkish Armed Forces' (TAF) continuous operations to the PKK bases in eastern Turkey and the establishment of the village guards system as a military strategy to organize local clan groups into local militias (Belge, 2011, p. 105). This has meant neglecting the human dimension of the issue with regards to issues of social justice, human rights, and pluralism (Ergil, 2000, p. 125). The securitized approach to the issue has been accompanied by economic underdevelopment of the areas where the conflict was intense and lack of access to decent education and healthcare. This has added to a cycle of underdevelopment of the eastern regions and increased immigration to the western parts of the country or migration abroad, especially to European countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

The second period started with PKK's declaration of ceasefire in 1999 and lasted until the restart of armed conflict in 2004. After the capture of its leader, the PKK withdrew to mountainous areas and to neighbouring countries such as Syria and northern Iraq. During his trial after his capture, Öcalan made a clear call to the PKK for embracing the idea of political struggle in the notion of Democratic Republic and giving up the idea of independence (Yeğen, 2016, p. 13). In this period, the PKK abandoned its agenda of separatism and declared its aim as democratic confederalism with focus on the collective rights of the Kurds, respect for Kurdish identity, and the right for self-determination of the Kurds. The PKK adopted Öcalan's call in its seventh congress in January 2000. These demands are still valid today and form PKK's declared goals.

In this period, while the PKK ceased its armed struggle, Turkey entered a phase of political and social transformation with the advent of the AKP to government and the

democratic reform process that accelerated after Turkey's candidacy to the EU in 1999. During this period, the PKK remained dormant while the Turkish government started engaging with a reform process addressing also Kurdish grievances.

Several developments since the 2000s led to change both in the framing of the Kurdish issue and the manifestation of the conflict itself. The EU accession negotiation process that started in 1999, and accelerated under the AKP government since 2002, led to a period of intense reforms that also affected the Kurdish issue. Reforms such as lifting the emergency rule for all provinces, the abolition of State Security Courts, reforms paving the way for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish and lifting the ban on Kurdish names were crucial both practically and symbolically for the Kurdish issue⁴³. These reforms enabled the AKP government to frame the issue in terms of lack of democratization and the need to solve the grievances of the Kurds. Another important development in 1999, the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan, led the PKK to declare ceasefire that lasted until 2004. The capture of Öcalan was the biggest blow to the PKK insurgency. However, PKK reorganized itself and became active again in 2004.

The third period runs from 2004 to the initiation of the Democratic Opening in 2009. During this period, the TAF's power position shifted as a result of intense democratization reforms directed to change the military's power in civilian politics. With these changes, the military's image and capacity as the main decision-maker in state politics along with the bureaucracy changed. Furthermore, in this period, the AKP emerged as the main political actor driving the democratization process while at the same time pro-Kurdish political parties became more active in domestic politics.

⁴³ However, the EU's positive impact did not continue at the same strength especially after 2005 (Kirişçi, 2011).

At the same time, during the second half of 2000s the participation of pro-Kurdish parties into politics gained prominence. The DTP's success in gaining 20 seats in the parliament through independent candidates in the 2007 elections is regarded as a turning point for pro-Kurdish politics⁴⁴ since it was the first time since the 1990s that a pro-Kurdish political party succeeded in gaining representation in the parliament. However, after PKK's announcement for the unilateral end to the ceasefire, conflict was revived in 2004 and continued in varying intensity in the eastern regions of the country.

The fourth period, which is the main focus of this dissertation, is the period including the Democratic Opening process that started in 2009 and the Resolution Process that started in 2013 until the resurgence of the conflict in July 2015. The next part provides a detailed overview of this period.

4.3 The Chronology of the Peace Process (2009-2015)

The Resolution Process was the first instance of direct peace talks between the Turkish government and actors from the Kurdish armed insurgency (Öcalan and PKK members) and pro-Kurdish political actors. Starting from the Democratic Opening process in 2009, the government openly shifted the Turkish state's position from the military framing of the Kurdish issue to a human rights-based framing. At the same time, the pro-Kurdish actors found the space to negotiate for a political solution to the

⁴⁴ The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi- DTP) for the first time in 2007 decided to enter the elections through independent candidates in order to overcome the high electoral threshold (10 percent). This strategy was followed again in the 2011 elections and the successor Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi- BDP) gained 36 seats in the parliament.

conflict while the PKK declared that it would act in accordance with its leader Öcalan's call for move from armed to political struggle. However, the process was marked by ups and downs including a period of conflict escalation during 2011-2012. The next parts provide a detailed account of the process and then proceeds to the conflict analysis framework.

4.3.1 The Kurdish Opening, the Democratic Opening, and the Unity and Fraternity Project (2009-2010)

The first signs for openly addressing the Kurdish issue were given in July 2009 by the Prime Minister Erdoğan. The PM announced in July 2009 that his party is working on a policy of Kurdish opening by declaring that the Kurdish issue has been on the agenda of the AKP since the establishment of the party in 2001 (Hürriyet, 2009b). A month later, the policy of “opening” was introduced to the media by the Minister of Interior Beşir Atalay in August 2009.

However, this initial policy of “opening” entered a period of deadlock after what came to be known as the “Habur incident”. As part of the “opening” process and after the call by Abdullah Öcalan for “leaving the arms”, a group of PKK members entered Turkey through the Habur entry point on the border between Turkey and Iraq. The group was composed of eight members from Qandil and twenty-two members from the Mahmur Camp. The members of the group did not have a record of participation to any armed attack and were released after short interrogation by the district attorney.

The DTP named the group as “peace group” and welcomed the return of the PKK members to Turkey. In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Erdoğan commented on the return of the PKK members as a “sign of hope” for the future of the

opening process and called for the continuation of the repatriation of other members from Qandil and from Europe (Radikal, 2009). However, the entry through Habur soon turned into a crisis after extended media coverage on the welcoming of the PKK members in a festive atmosphere by locals and by political representatives of the pro-Kurdish party DTP. Media coverage led to strong criticisms and accusations by opposition political parties that the AKP implements the road map provided by Öcalan. In this manner, the Habur incident revealed the difficulty of overcoming nationalist backlash. Also, the incident revealed the lack of thorough planning of the process and acted as a window of vulnerability.

Despite this disappointment with the Habur incident and subsequent crisis after a PKK attack in December 2009 in Reşadiye, Tokat, the peace process was continued under a new name. In 2010, the National Unity and Fraternity Project was presented to the public as a government project addressing mainly the grievances of the Kurds. The AKP's brochure introducing the National Unity and Fraternity Project was published in January 2010 (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2010). According to the brochure, the project aimed at solving the problems of all ethnic and minority groups, including the problem of terror and other problems related to the economy and other areas. The brochure emphasized the importance of strengthening individual rights and freedoms so that not any individual in Turkey would feel as "the other" and thus excluded from the society. The brochure underlined that "By differentiating between the terror problem and the Kurdish issue, the AKP chose more democracy as the solution to the problem. [...]" There are economic, social, cultural, psychological, and sociological aspects/means in the fight against terror. Unfortunately, past governments regarded the problem strictly in

terms of security” (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2010, p. 29) revealing the partial break with the official military approach to the Kurdish issue.

Following the official announcement of the Unity and Fraternity Project, the Minister of the Interior Beşir Atalay introduced the first “package” of the Democratic Opening process to the public on 15 January 2010 (Milliyet, 2010a). In his speech, Atalay noted that the process has two main aims, one being ending the terror problem and the other raising the democratic standard of the country. The package involved short and medium term legal and institutional changes addressing the Kurdish opening. Institutional changes for the medium term involved the signing of the UN Convention Against Torture and the establishment of related human rights mechanisms (signed in 2011), the establishment of a Human Rights Institution (established in 2016), the establishment of an Independent Commission on Police Oversight (the law was accepted on May 2016), and the establishment of the Commission for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality (no information on its establishment). In his speech Atalay noted that the human rights mechanisms that were under preparation constituted the most central gains of the Democratic Opening process.

4.3.2 The Oslo Process

The recordings that were leaked to the media in September 2011 revealed that a secret process was ongoing between the PKK and the intelligence agency since 2008⁴⁵. As it is understood from the audio records, the meetings in Oslo involved a third-party

⁴⁵ The discussion in this part is based on the audio records that were leaked to the Internet in September 2011. Although the records are highly contested and do not come from any ‘official’ source, the author uses these records along with news pieces from various newspapers as sources for the discussion made in this section.

facilitator but the identity and affiliation of the third party is uncertain. In a later interview, a PKK commander Mustafa Karasu confirmed the participation of third parties and revealed that they functioned as intermediaries between the imprisoned leader and the PKK representatives as they conveyed messages from each side to the other as part of the process. The commander also revealed that the process was under preparation since 2006 (Akşam, 2013). The leaked audio record further reveals that the meetings involved the exchange of messages between the PKK commanders and the imprisoned leader Öcalan through the Intelligence Agency of Turkey. From this point we can understand that the Oslo process took the form of initial negotiations between the state and the PKK. The process came to an end with the start of the PKK insurgency (devrimci halk savaşı) in May 2010 and was fully abandoned after the 2011 elections when, according to Karasu, the AKP did not want to get back to the meetings.

Later, in September 2012, another document regarding the Oslo process was disclosed to the press by a CHP deputy (Al Jazeera Türk, 2012a). The document involved a ten-point agreement between the PKK and the Turkish state involving a plan about how the process would proceed at the next stage. The most significant point of the document is that it foresees the establishment of a Constitutional Council, a Peace Council, and a Truth and Justice Council as part of the process.

4.3.3 Escalation of the Conflict in 2011

A series of events in 2011 signified the end of the process of “opening” and the escalation of the conflict. Several attacks by the PKK, some of them involving civilian casualties, took place in the period between June-September 2011. Two of the most

deadly attacks took place in July and in October 2011, in Silvan and in Çukurca respectively. In the Silvan attack in July thirteen soldiers were killed and seven soldiers were injured. In the Çukurca attack in October twenty-four soldiers were killed by PKK members. The escalation period also included attacks with civilian casualties. These include the attack to a police station that killed four women. These were civilians who were on their way from a nearby wedding ceremony. Also, an attack to a soccer game killed a policeman and his wife. Both attacks took place in September 2011.

Another event that added to the escalation of the conflict and to societal tension is Uludere (Roboski) deadly incident that took place on 28 December 2011. The incident refers to the killing of thirty-four villagers who were smuggling products across the Turkish-Iraqi border. The villagers were killed accidentally as they were mistaken for terrorists. The incident led to increased tension and protests. A further sign for escalation was given during the Newroz celebrations in March 2012. The celebrations were only allowed to take place on the day of Newroz (21 March) and pre-organized celebrations on the 18th of March were banned. Despite the ban, crowds especially in cities such as Diyarbakır and Istanbul gathered for the celebrations, leading to clashes with the security forces (CNN Türk, 2011).

At the politico-legal front, the KCK trials continued on the grounds of affiliation with terrorist activities. The KCK investigations had already started before the official start of the Kurdish Opening. The first wave of the KCK operations was initiated shortly after the 2009 local elections. In this wave three vice chairmen and seven city mayors were arrested. Within five years, the number of arrests reached several thousands. Coupled with the strained environment due to the escalation of the conflict especially in southeastern Turkey, the trials constituted a point of tension regarding the peace process

and the sincerity of the Kurdish opening process. The BDP criticized the trials on the grounds that they aim to silence the voices of those who support a non-military Kurdish fight (Alp, 2014).

Under conditions of escalated conflict and increased political and societal tension, the KCK prisoners initiated a hunger strike on 12 October 2012 that was ended after Abdullah Öcalan's call in December 2012. This signified the start of a new process with changing dynamics.

4.3.4 The Resolution Process (2012-2015)

The Resolution Process refers to the peace talks that were initiated in 2012 with the purpose of finding a political solution to the Kurdish conflict. The process was a dual process of peace talks between pro-Kurdish and pro-government actors and of democratization process mainly based on the reform process started as part of EU negotiations. The process was officially announced on 21 March 2013. Signals for the start of the process were given in December 2012 when Erdoğan declared that meetings with the PKK leader Öcalan were taking place. During January 2013- April 2015, a group of HDP members⁴⁶ known as the “İmralı group” visited the prisoned PKK leader in İmralı for at least 25 times⁴⁷. These visits were crucial in disseminating Öcalan's messages to the PKK and to the public. In April 2013, a Wise People Commission composed of 63 intellectuals, NGO leaders, academicians, and professionals was formed

⁴⁶ The size (2-5 members) and the composition of the group changed several times. BDP/HDP members Pervin Buldan, Selahattin Demirtaş, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, Altan Tan, İdris Baluken, Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana, and Ceylan Bağrıyanık participated at varying times to the group.

⁴⁷ The number of the visits was calculated by the author based on the chronology of the Resolution Process by the civil society organization Truth, Justice, Memory Center (Hakikat, Adalet, Hafıza Merkezi), available at <http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/baris-sureci-kronolojisi/>. The chronology runs from January 2013 to July 2016 (last accessed 2 October 2016).

with the purpose of keeping track of public attitudes towards the process. Divided to seven groups for each of the seven geographical regions of Turkey, the commission members organized meetings with the public and discussed societal concerns and expectations from the process.

The Resolution Process was the first instance of publicly known direct talks between the main parties to the conflict (i.e. the Turkish state, pro-Kurdish political actors, Öcalan, and PKK members). Previously, efforts at approaching the Kurdish issue through political means led to failure⁴⁸ or governments in general refrained from approaching politically the issue with the fear of evoking nationalist sentiments that would lead to loss of political support. Thus, the Resolution Process itself acted as a window of opportunity for the resolution of the conflict as it ended the decades-long denial of the problem and addressed, even though partially, the grievances of the Kurds⁴⁹.

Traditionally, electoral periods have functioned as windows of uncertainty in Turkish politics and they were so for the peace process, too. In the context of the Resolution Process, elections are considered as windows of uncertainty as they led to both vulnerability and opportunity vis-à-vis the peace process. For example, the 2009 local elections are frequently cited as crucial for the start of the peace process. This is because the success of the pro-Kurdish party BDP and AKP's loss of votes in eastern parts of Turkey is regarded as the main engine for why the AKP leadership initiated the Democratic Opening process later in 2009 (Çandar, 2009). Another crucial example is

⁴⁸ Due to mainly staunch opposition assaulting any initiative as a concession to separatism and terror. This was the case with Turgut Özal's attempts during his presidency (1989-1993). See Gunter (2011).

⁴⁹ Developments related to the Syrian civil war that started in 2011 and more specifically the Kobane incidents of 2014 formed a major turning point in the Resolution Process. This turning point is explained under "strategic dividers" in the following sections.

the June 2015 elections. The elections resulted with the AKP losing its parliamentary majority and a period of instability for politics as negotiations for coalition building strained the political atmosphere. At the same time, negotiations on the Kurdish issue became stalled⁵⁰ and this resulted with the resurgence of conflict in July 2015. Elections have therefore been central points of uncertainty functioning both as doors of opportunity and of vulnerability with regards to the Kurdish conflict.

As of 2018, the prospects for return to a political process are extremely weak. This is related to both developments within the last stages during the process (mainly the first half of 2015) and wider developments in Turkish politics. The leadership of the pro-Kurdish party HDP and thousands of its members are now imprisoned. At the same time, Öcalan's meetings with his lawyers are suspended. Accordingly, any drivers for peace are absent while the dividers between Kurds and Turks are gaining prominence as mutual distrust has increased, the Kurdish political movement has been suppressed and silenced, and the EU process that would pave the way for further democratization reforms has been suspended.

4.4 Conflict Analysis

Having provided the context of the conflict, this part provides the analysis of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey under three subsections: the dividers and connectors, actors, and drivers of conflict and peace. Information for the assessment of the Kurdish conflict

⁵⁰ The peace talks were already at a stage of deadlock since at least the controversial 'Dolmabahçe meeting' between government representatives and deputies from the pro-Kurdish party HDP in 15 February 2015 that resulted with an agreement on main issues about the peace process. The Dolmabahçe agreement turned into a crisis after Erdoğan's statements in March 2015 criticizing the agreement and accusing the HDP that the call for a monitoring committee is a step for giving legitimacy to the 'Island' referring to Öcalan (Özkan, 2015) and in July refusing the agreement as a whole (BBC Türkçe, 2015).

was gathered from news accounts, scholarly publications, and reports. Also, interviews conducted with high- and middle-level actors involved in the Resolution Process for the purpose of this dissertation were used as sources for the conflict analysis made in the following parts. The conflict analysis provided below mainly follows Levinger's (Levinger, 2013) conflict assessment framework and the Interagency Conflict Analysis Framework (ICAF)⁵¹.

4.4.1 Dividers and Connectors

In conflict analysis, a divider is a potential source of polarization within or between groups while a connector is a potential source of cohesion within or between groups (Levinger, 2013, p. 95). Dividers are like fault lines, cracks that already exist in the society and with a trigger can easily escalate, cause earthquake. Here, following Levinger (2013), an analysis of dividers and connectors on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict case is provided along five dimensions: strategic, political, socioeconomic, psychological, and cultural.

Before proceeding to the analysis on the dividers and connectors, it should be noted that dividers and connectors might include both subjective perceptions and objective conditions. Accordingly, a divider may be regarded as a connector by different actors and visa versa. The most prominent example is the state-led economic development projects in southeast Turkey. The multidam projects known as GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi- Southeast Anatolia Project) started in the late 1980s with the purpose of promoting economic development in southeast Turkey. According to the

⁵¹ The document is available at <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf> (last accessed on 29 March 2017).

state policies of the 1990s, the promotion of socioeconomic development was seen as key for the solution of the Kurdish problem (Jongerden, 2010, p. 141). However, pro-Kurdish actors regard the dams built in the framework of GAP as a state strategy to prevent the PKK movement in the area. So, what is perceived as a connector by one side is seen as a divider by another side. Also, dividers and connectors are dynamic in themselves and a divider might become a connector at different periods during a conflict process. For example, the importance of common religion, Islam, as a bond between Kurds and Turks was not regarded as a cultural connector until the AKP government. However, the conservative AKP government as well as other Islamist parties⁵² promote Islam as a connector and based its policies towards the Kurdish issue on this bond. Similarly, the connector role of the EU became prominent only after 2002 and especially in the period 2004-2007, when democratization reforms addressed the grievances of the Kurds.

Table 3: Dividers and Connectors in the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey

	Dividers	Connectors
Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraq war and KRG autonomy • Developments in Syria after 2011 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU and democratization reforms
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political exclusion of the Kurdish political movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History of democratic party politics despite interruptions

⁵² Including Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) and the Free Cause Party (HÜDAPAR).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 % electoral threshold • Centralized political structure • Absence of power-sharing arrangements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent reforms for democratization addressing the Kurdish issue
Socioeconomic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic underdevelopment of the Kurdish majority regions in eastern and southeastern Turkey • Socioeconomic marginalization of Kurds in big cities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic cooperation across groups • State-led economic development projects in the area (e.g. GAP)
Psychological	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual distrust emanating from the security framing of the conflict/issue • Prejudice and discrimination • Group hierarchy • Chosen traumas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of perceived common ground emanating from common history
Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History of discrimination against the Kurds • Cultural assimilation practices in the past 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common religion (Islam as a bond) • Inter marriages

- *Strategic Dividers and Connectors*

The strategic dimension involves issues of security and power at the international or regional levels (Levinger, 2013, p. 35). Although the strategic dimension is most salient in interstate conflicts, i.e. conflicts that take place between states, it might serve

as a divider and connector at intrastate conflicts, too. For the Turkish-Kurdish context, two strategic dividers- the 2003 Iraqi war and the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and one strategic connector- the EU candidacy status in 1999 and subsequent democratization reforms- can be identified.

The KRG was founded in 2005 following the Iraq war of 2003 after USA invasion. Traditionally, and especially following the Gulf War in 1990, the Kurdish population in northern Iraq has been an issue of strategic concern for Turkish governments due to fear of increasing ethnic awakening that would incite separatist tendencies in Turkey (Barkey, 2011). As Benli Altunışık notes “the Iraqi issue has been fundamentally linked with the national-identity debate in Turkey, with respect to the acknowledgement of Kurdish identity” (Benli Altunışık, 2009, p. 174). Due to concerns with Kurdish ethnic awakening, Turkish governments until the early 2000s held negative relations with Iraq. As opposed to previous governments’ negative relations with northern Iraq, the AKP has pursued a policy of peaceful engagement and dialogue with the KRG especially since 2007 (Müftüler-Baç, 2014).

The Syrian civil war that started in 2011 is another strategic divider. The political destabilization of its border neighbour and the Kurdish population on the border formed a “crack” for Turkey’s internal relations with its Kurdish population. Especially, developments in 2014 when warfare between the ISIS and YPG escalated over the Kobane area close to Syria’s border with Turkey revealed the strategic impact of the Syrian civil war. Turkey sought to contain the YPG activities on its borders due to fear of increased activism of the PKK.

Both the establishment of the KRG in northern Iraq and developments in Syria since 2011 form strategic dividers in terms of the security dilemma. The security

dilemma refers to a situation when actions taken by a party will necessarily decrease the security of other parties and end up in a situation where, while acting to defend itself, a party may provoke aggressive reactions that diminish its own security (Posen, 1993). Thus, the formation of the KRG and the effort of Kurds in northern Syria to establish an autonomous region in the area increased the security concerns of the Turkish government that in turn led to increasing security concerns of the Kurds in Turkey.

The main strategic connector is the EU accession negotiation process since the early 2000s. As Levinger (2013, p. 37) also notes, according to the neoliberal perspective, international organizations are accepted as facilitating cooperation and mitigate the risks of disruptive action. In the context of Turkey's Kurdish question, the EU can be regarded as a strategic connector with regards to the impact of the conditionality and the democratization steps named as the Copenhagen Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria for democratization have pushed Turkey to undertake a series of democratic reforms that had a positive impact on the Kurdish issue and were perceived positively by the Kurds. However, the EU impact as a connector has diminished since especially after 2007 when the pace of accession negotiations slowed down and the EU leverage weakened.

The EU's impact as a connector can be traced back to 1999 after Turkey was officially declared as a candidate country. After the announcement of candidacy, the government of Bülent Ecevit was able to push for critical constitutional reforms and harmonization packages in 2001 and 2002. Later, under AKP rule, the EU acted as a connector as democratization reforms played down the role of traditional veto players in domestic politics regarding the Kurdish issue such as the military. The military declared its support to the EU membership negotiation process in 2005 (Kirişçi, 2011, p. 339).

Later, reforms addressing the need for civilianization of civil-military relations also practically diminished the power of veto players and opened the room for reforms partially addressing the cultural demands of the Kurds

It can be argued that EU conditionality had a positive impact on decreasing the security dilemma in the Turkish-Kurdish relations. The perceived importance of EU accession negotiations triggered reform willingness among the Turkish government especially during the first half of 2000s. Kurds have also expressed high support as they saw it as an opportunity for triggering peaceful relations between Turks and Kurds⁵³ (Tocci, 2006, p. 131).

- *Political Dividers and Connectors*

The political dimension refers to issues of competition over power and performance of institutions at the national and subnational level (Levinger, 2013, p. 38). As Levinger notes, the political dimension is particularly relevant in intrastate conflicts. This is because democratic political institutions can serve as powerful connectors within a country because they provide established and legitimate procedures for balancing competing interests and managing dissent (Levinger, 2013, p. 38). In the opposite direction, non-democratic political institutions such as those in authoritarian regimes can serve as dividers by suppressing opposition and maintaining a patronage system for supporters. Power-sharing arrangements are regarded as crucial connectors in this regard, as they prevent one group from dominating the other through the sharing of

⁵³ As expressed in a public manifesto signed by two-hundred Kurdish politicians and intellectuals. Cited in Tocci (2006, p. 131).

political, economic, security, and territorial power. Conversely, ethnic favouritism and weak institutional capacity are regarded as dividers.

In the Turkish-Kurdish context, several political dividers can be discerned. First, the political exclusion of Kurdish parties is one major divider. The closure of pro-Kurdish political parties by the Constitutional Court in Turkey was intense especially during the 1990s⁵⁴. The latest development in terms of political party closures was the DTP's closure in 2009 by the Constitutional Court. Political exclusion has also been supported by institutional arrangements regarding the electoral system. In this regard, the existence of the 10% electoral threshold is the most controversial arrangement. This extremely high electoral threshold has practically deterred pro-Kurdish parties from gaining seats in the parliament as political parties. In order to overcome this obstacle, pro-Kurdish parties promoted independent candidates rather than party list in the 2007 and 2011 general elections.

Turkey's centralized political structure and the absence of power-sharing mechanisms is another political divider. Decentralization and the strengthening of local governance has long been a central demand by Kurdish political actors (Ergil, 2000, p. 130). They have pointed to the need for strengthening of local governance and criticized the centralized structure of the state whereby local needs cannot be expressed⁵⁵.

The main political connector is the existence of a history of democratic party-politics in Turkey despite interruptions by military interventions (see for example Erişen & Kubicek, 2016). Turkey has been regularly conducting fair and free elections since the

⁵⁴ More details on Kurdish political parties and their closure are given in the next section under actor analysis.

⁵⁵ One major criticism and demand is related to language. Kurdish actors have demanded local services in Kurdish language as a democratic need (Radikal, 2012).

end of military rule in 1983. However, it should be noted that Turkey's democracy indices have been decreasing the past decade. According to Freedom House, Turkey's freedom score was 4.5 in 2017 (1 rating as 'best' and 7 as 'worst') as opposed to 3.0 in 2007 (Freedom House, 2015). Transparency International ranks Turkey 81st out of 180 countries in 2017 (Transparency International, 2017). However, despite these negative trends, pro-Kurdish political parties regularly participate into elections and have been continuously represented in the parliament since 2007.

Also, state-led democratization reforms since the last decade can be regarded as a connector since many of the reforms addressed grievances of the Kurds. These involved the abolishment of the state of emergency in the Kurdish populated areas and positive developments on the use of Kurdish language, such as education in private schools and the abandonment of restrictions in the use of Kurdish language in the court system.

- *Conflict Framing*

One main driver of conflict is the diverse framing of the Kurdish issue and the conflict by its different actors. While pro-Kurdish actors frame the problem in terms of the right for the recognition of the Kurdish identity and the right for self-determination, the official state view has been to approach the issue in terms of security and terror. The official security frame has its roots in the warfare between the TAF and the PKK in the late 1980s and the 1990s and the official state discourse that was adopted during those years and was kept until at least the early 2000s. This frame was combined with non-recognition of Kurdish identity ("there are no Kurds"), a view that was mainly kept in the 1990s.

During the AKP period, this security framing was relaxed but never abandoned. With the start of the policy of opening in 2009, the AKP sought to frame the Kurdish issue as being a problem of lack of democracy and also as impeding the further development of democracy in Turkey. As explained earlier, this facilitated the start of the peace process in 2013. However, the AKP also maintained the traditional security frame by making references on the need to fight terrorism and the PKK and that combating the PKK would solve the Kurdish problem since the Kurdish citizens are not discriminated in any manner. For example, president Erdoğan's claims such as "We do not negotiate with terrorists" (AKP Newsdesk, 2013) and "terror cannot define our policies" (Habertürk, 2015b) led to frictions and deadlocks during the peace talks. The security framing of the issue meant that non-Kurdish citizens perceived the conflict as threatening their security and that terror should be ended through military means.

The Kurdish leadership has framed the issue as lack of rights and especially lack of cultural rights and the right to self-determination. This frame has functioned as a driver for conflict as it has mobilized the Kurdish constituency around the fear of oppression of the Kurdish culture and rights. The political leadership has since long time disseminated the view that the Kurdish issue emanates from the oppression against the Kurds who could not express their culture and identity freely. However, acts of violence by the PKK have impeded the political leadership from responding to accusations on having organic ties with the PKK as a terrorist organization.

The difference in the framing of the conflict continues to be a potential source of conflict. After the stalling of the Resolution Process, the pro-government leader Erdoğan turned back to the securitized understanding of the Kurdish issue and made statements on the PKK as a terrorist organization that is not possible to negotiate with (Al Jazeera

Türk, 2016). This silenced the pro-Kurdish political voices that seek to promote a negotiated political solution to the conflict.

- *Socioeconomic Dividers and Connectors*

The socioeconomic dimension refers to the role of economic and social variables causing or mitigating conflict at the national level (Levinger, 2013, p. 40). Economic resentments of groups may provide motivation for conflict. Similarly, social exclusion and marginalization can be sources of resentment and thus may trigger conflict.

The main socioeconomic divider for the Kurdish conflict is the economic underdevelopment of the Kurdish populated areas (İçduygu, Romano, & Sirkeci, 1999). Economic underdevelopment feeds discontent with the state and is regarded as a purposeful strategy that the state employs in order to marginalize its citizens from Kurdish origin. According to a recent report, socioeconomic underdevelopment is perceived among Kurds as the major problem feeding the Kurdish issue (Konda, 2011). A related socioeconomic divider is the economic marginalization of the Kurds migrating to big cities and especially Istanbul. Various studies point to economic and social marginalization of the Kurdish population in big cities (Çelik, 2005; Keyder, 2005).

The main socioeconomic connector is economic cooperation across groups. Another connector is the state-led projects for the economic development of the eastern regions. The most prominent example is the Southeast Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi- GAP), a multidam project to harness the waters of Euphrates and Tigris to promote economic development in southeast Turkey. However, the dam projects have been repeatedly criticized by pro-Kurdish actors as being purposefully

developed by the Turkish state for controlling the movement of the PKK in the region (Bozarslan, 2015).

- *Psychological Dividers and Connectors*

The psychological dimension refers to mutual perceptions that may escalate or de-escalate conflict among rival groups. These include factors such as leaders' personal characteristics, perceptions of counterparts, communication patterns, and status competition (Levinger, 2013, p. 43).

One main psychological divider in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict is mutual distrust between the two groups. Various surveys have indicated that Turkey ranks among the countries with the lowest societal trust levels. Studies have shown that out-group distrust is high among both Turks and Kurds (Çelebi, Verkuyten, Köse, & Maliepaard, 2014; Çelik, Bilali, & Iqbal, 2016) while interethnic (in)tolerance is higher among Turks compared to Kurds (Sarigil & Karakoc, 2016). Another psychological divider is prejudice and discrimination. Studies have pointed to high levels of anti-Kurdish beliefs (Dixon & Ergin, 2010), prejudice against Kurdish ethnicity (Aytaç & Çarkoğlu, 2017) and “racialization” of Kurdish identity (Ergin, 2014). Another recent study has pointed to how ethnic identification for both Turks and Kurds is associated with opposing conflict frames that help maintain the conflict (Bilali, 2014).

Group hierarchy is another psychological divider. Group hierarchy in Turkey was institutionalized through citizenship practices. Citizenship practice since the establishment of the Turkish republic can be traced to have “ethnicist logic” (Yeğen, 2004, p. 58). Perceptions of group hierarchy thus are embedded in the practice of citizenship.

A further divider is ‘chosen traumas’, a concept introduced by Vamik Volkan. Chosen traumas refer to “mental representation of a traumatic past event during which the large group suffered loss and/or experienced helplessness, shame and humiliation in a conflict with another large group” (Volkan, 2001, p. 87). Chosen traumas are transmitted across generations and while each individual has his/her own reaction to the historical trauma, “all members share the mental representations of the tragedies that have befallen the group” (Volkan, 2001, p. 88). In the Turkish context, we might discern chosen traumas of both Turks and Kurds that have an impact on the conflict. For Kurds, chosen historical traumas can be traced back to the early republican period. One major chosen trauma for Turks is the “Sevres syndrome”, named after the Sevres Treaty that partitioned the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Sevres syndrome, also called the “national security syndrome”, can be seen as a main divider that functions as a trauma and prolongs Turkey’s fears of partition and territorial loss. Due to the obsession, Turkish governments have oscillated between security concerns and liberalization as part of the EU process (Göçek, 2008). While the Sevres syndrome has been particularly relevant for Turkey’s foreign policy and relations with its neighbours, it is also relevant for the state’s relations with its Kurdish population due to the past separatist agenda of the PKK.

The main psychological connector is the existence of a perceived common ground emanating from common history. Cohabitation in the same geography has meant that Turks and Kurds share a common history in the geography they live. This is especially relevant as a connector considering the role of Turks and Kurds in the nation-building process. References to common history with regards to the War of

Independence that paved the way for the foundation of the Turkish Republic reveal the role of common history as a psychological connector⁵⁶.

- *Cultural Dividers and Connectors*

The cultural dimension involves issues of ideology, group identity, and religion (Levinger, 2013, p. 49). Group identities do not necessarily result in violent conflict. In circumstances when individuals and groups feel that their group identity is threatened, they may resort to violence. As Levinger notes “if parties perceive that their rivals are imposing demands that threaten their core identities, the conflict might escalate or become locked into an enduring stalemate” (Levinger, 2013, p. 49).

The main cultural divider is the history of discrimination and assimilation policies against the Kurds, dating back to the early republican period. The history of discrimination has been coupled with the repression of the cultural identity of the Kurds by banning the Kurdish language, suppressing demands for education and broadcasting in native language, forbidding Kurdish names for persons and for places, among others.

Accordingly, another main cultural divider is language as a dimension of group identity. The use of Kurdish language has formed a point of high controversy. For example, a recent study shows that ethnic identification is associated with lower level of support for Kurdish language rights among Turks, revealing the divisive aspect of language as a group identity trait (Çelebi, Verkuyten, & Smyrnioti, 2016) in the Turkish context. However, it should be noted that with the establishment of the Turkish republic, language was used as a unifying factor for constructing the Turkish nation-state (M. H.

⁵⁶ References to ‘common history’ are common in political talk. For examples during the peace process, see (Cumhuriyet Newsdesk, 2015) and (Erdoğan, 2015c).

Yavuz, 1998, p. 11) (as opposed to religion in the Ottoman period). Especially since the early 1980s, language formed a basis for the formation of Kurdish identity and “served as a rallying point of Kurdish ethno-nationalism” (M. H. Yavuz, 1998, p. 14).

On the other hand, the main cultural connector is common religion (for Muslim Kurds). The AKP’s approach to the Kurdish issue on the basis of Islam as a bond can be regarded as a crucial connector between the two groups (see for example Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018). Also, another cultural connector is the intermarriages between the two groups. Inter-ethnic intermarriages have been in rise in recent decades (Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2002) (however, see also Koç, Hancıoğlu, & Cavlin, 2008). Family unification can be seen a crucial source of cohesion between the two groups.

4.4.2 Actors

Actors are crucial drivers of conflict and peace as their interests and power positions can be regarded as main factors shaping the relationships between groups. In conflict analysis, the analysis of main stakeholders involves several dimensions: parties, positions, interests, issues/problems, means of influence/power, willingness to negotiate. *Table 4* provides the main actors in the Turkish context and their positions on the conflict.

Table 4: Actors and Positions in Turkey's Kurdish Conflict

People/Parties	Positions	Interests	Issues/Problems	Means of Influence/Power	Willingness to Negotiate
The Turkish State- Turkish Armed Forces	Military end to insurgency/terror	Protection of the integrity of the state	Terrorist attacks and ethnic separatism	Control of military force	Framing of the conflict in security terms keeps the willingness to negotiate low
AKP	End of Kurdish insurgency since it does not represent the grievances of the Kurds	Maintain and increase electoral support from the Kurdish population	Ethnic polarization	Control of the government	Depending on political opportunity structure
A. Öcalan	Recognition of the right to self-determination for the Kurds	Maintenance of personal authority over the Kurdish movement Be the primary negotiator	Historical assimilation and discrimination against Kurds	Charismatic authority over Kurdish population that supports the insurgency	High willingness only if chief negotiator representing the Kurdish side
The PKK	Separatism (initial years) Recognition of the right to self	Maintain military/armed influence	Historical oppression of Kurds, statelessness	Armed violence, terror as a means for realising the agenda	Depending on Öcalan's position

	determination				
People/Parties	Positions	Interests	Issues/Problems	Means of Influence/Power	Willingness to Negotiate
Pro-Kurdish Opposition Political Parties (HDP)	Recognition of identity of Kurds Cultural rights Local governance	Promote political solution to the conflict	Discrimination and assimilation of Kurds	Political influence, opposition party to the government	High willingness for political solution to the conflict
Other Opposition Political Parties: CHP MHP	End of insurgency CHP- (post- 2011) the Kurdish issue as a problem of democratization MHP- there is no Kurdish issue since all citizens of Turkey are Turks	Electoral survival by taking into account their constituencies' sensitivities	CHP: (post- 2011) recognition of Kurdish grievances as a step for further democratization MHP: maintenance of Turkish identity as overarching	Political opposition in the parliament	CHP: depending on political opportunity structure MHP: categorically rejecting negotiation
Kurdish Diaspora	Recognition of Kurdish identity and rights, political status to Kurds	Maintain and support the Kurdish movement and the political struggle	Oppression and discrimination of Kurds	Economic assets, recruitment support, influence over public opinion in host countries	Willingness as support to the decision of Öcalan and the PKK

People/Parties⁵⁷	Positions	Interests	Issues/Problems	Means of Influence/Power	Willingness to Negotiate
HÜDAPAR	Recognition of Kurdish identity, political status to Kurds	Promotion of Kurdish identity and Islam as a bond between Kurds and Turks	Historical oppression of Kurds and their identity	Party politics, armed violence (Hezbollah)	High on the precondition that the PKK is excluded
Syrian PYD and YPG	Support the Kurdish movement and the PKK in its cause	The right of Syrian Kurds to self-determination	Historical oppression of Kurds	Militant power, armed struggle against Syrian government and ISIS	Support to PKK's cause, high only if it helps to advance the interests of the Kurdish movement
Iraqi Kurdistan-the KRG	Support the Turkish government for stability in the region	Stability in the KRG region	Historical oppression of the Kurds	Diplomacy-relations with the Turkish government Military power-peshmerga	High with the purpose of maintaining stability in the region

⁵⁷ The Iran-based PJAK (Kurdistan Free Life Party) is excluded from the analysis because its impact on the developments regarding the peace process in Turkey is negligible.

The Turkish State- The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri- TSK)

The Turkish Armed Forces is one of the primary actors in the conflict. Since the emergence of the Kurdish insurgency in 1984, the TAF has been tasked with militarily defeating the insurgency⁵⁸. The TAF's role has fed the state discourse framing the issue in terms of terror and security especially in the 1990s. This official state view gradually changed after the democratization reforms in the 2000s and the subsequent change in the civil-military relations (Aydınlı, Özcan, & Akyaz, 2006, p. 87). However, the TAF continues to be the primary actor in feeding the discourse on the fight against terrorism and defending the nation's integrity⁵⁹.

Based on the securitized framing of the Kurdish issue, the TAF's main position is to end the Kurdish insurgency through military means. The TAF's main interest is the protection of the territorial integrity of the Turkish state and its main needs is to maintain the strength of the Turkish state and its institutions. With the central aim of protecting territorial integrity, the TAF led a full-scale warfare against the PKK in eastern and southeastern Turkey especially in the 1990s and employed different tactics including the establishment of the village guards system to track and fight the PKK.

In terms of willingness to negotiation, the security framing of the Kurdish issue and the designation of the PKK as a terrorist organization keeps the willingness to negotiate low. Indeed, during 1984-2000, the main discourse of the TAF and political

⁵⁸ Managing the terror problem and also dealing with Islamic groups were the two main security objectives of the TAF especially in the 1990s. In Cizre's terms: "In Turkey, managing PKK terrorism and the activities of Islamic groups in society have been turned into a 'natural' function of the TAF" (Cizre, 2003, p. 218). For an overview of the TAF in the 1990s, see

⁵⁹ For example, in a newspaper interview answering questions on his thoughts about the peace process, TAF General Necdet Özel stated "We are ready to do what is needed in case the red line is crossed. It is us who tackle with this issue since thirty years" (Milliyet, 2014d), pointing to TAF's continuing securitized perspective on the Kurdish issue.

leadership is summarized as “the state does not negotiate with terrorists”⁶⁰. This has meant that a negotiated solution to the issue was regarded as unacceptable according to the official Turkish state discourse.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP’s approach to the Kurdish issue has ranged from refraining from taking any serious steps towards the resolution of the issue (especially during 2002-2005) to starting a policy of democratization in 2009 with the purpose of addressing Kurdish grievances and later leading the peace talks with the armed Kurdish insurgency during 2013-2015. Therefore, as with every primary actor in the Kurdish conflict, the AKP’s approach to the issue has varied in different periods.

The AKP’s main position on the conflict is to end the Kurdish insurgency since they thought the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement does not represent the grievances of the Kurdish people. This position is closely related to the party’s conservative background and its approach to the Kurdish issue by using religion as a bond between Turks and Kurds (Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2013, pp. 560-561). As a political party, the AKP is mainly interested in maintaining and increasing its electoral support from Kurdish voters with the purpose of maintaining its electoral majority in the parliament. Ruling as a single party since 2002, the AKP’s main means vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue is its control of the government.

While the party’s main position on the conflict has not changed (i.e. its position that the PKK does not represent the Kurds and thus the insurgency should be ended), the AKP’s willingness to negotiate has been dependent on political opportunity structures.

⁶⁰ “Devlet teröristle masaya oturmaz”, cited in Bacık and Coşkun (2011, p. 255).

The AKP did not lose majority in the parliament since 2002 (with the exception of the June 2015 elections that were “repeated” in November 2015) and this has helped the leadership to initiate a policy of Democratic Opening with the purpose of resolving the Kurdish issue with low political cost (compared to previous governments). However, incidents such as the Gezi protests in May-June 2013, the 17-25 December 2014 corruption allegations, and the Kobani protests in October 2014 strained the peace process. During the Gezi protests and the 17-25 corruption allegations the AKP sought to continue the peace process despite the political climate⁶¹. However, after the Kobani protests, the AKP adopted a negative stance (TRT News, 2015) on the Resolution Process and its leader Erdoğan made repeated statements refusing the existence of a ‘Kurdish problem’ in the country.

Abdullah Öcalan

Öcalan is a primary figure in the Kurdish insurgency since the 1970s. He is the founder of the PKK and serves a life sentence at the İmralı Island since his capture in Kenya in February 1999. While still imprisoned, Öcalan continues to be the leader of the insurgency and has charismatic authority over the PKK and its supporters.

Öcalan’s main objective is the resolution of the Kurdish issue through the recognition of the right to self-determination and the collective rights of the Kurdish people. One major demand is justice among the various ethnic and religious communities of Turkey and neighbouring countries (Euronews Newsdesk, 2013). Since the 1990s, he declared the Kurdish movement’s main demand as social, political, and

⁶¹ During the Gezi protests, Erdoğan criticized the protesters for seeking to sabotage the Resolution Process (Milliyet, 2013a). In the aftermath of the corruption allegations, the AKP adopted a similar stance by criticizing the Gulen movement [explain] for trying to sabotage the process (Hürriyet, 2014).

economic justice and equality between the Turks and Kurds (Birand, 1992, pp. 212-213; M. v. Bruinessen, 2000). In terms of means and resources, since his capture in 1999, Öcalan's main resource derives from his charismatic authority over the insurgency. Since his imprisonment he has communicated his ideas through his meetings with his lawyers and immediate relatives and more recently his meetings with HDP deputies during the Resolution Process. Öcalan still exerts great influence on the PKK and on the Kurdish political movement (T 24, 2012). The most recent indicator for his undisputed authority was Öcalan's call to end the hunger strike of thousands of imprisoned PKK supporters, pro-Kurdish activists, and some BDP parliamentarians in 2012. The hunger strike called for home imprisonment of Öcalan and for the right to education in native language, among other demands (Al Jazeera Türk, 2012b). Öcalan's call ended the 68 days long strike in November 2012 and this paved the way for the start of the Resolution Process later the same year.

Öcalan's willingness for negotiation is contingent on him being the main negotiator representing the Kurds. In his books he has extensively stated his personal efforts for starting peace negotiations with the Turkish government since the very first day of his capture (Kapmaz, 2011; Öcalan, 2015). In his own view, he is the only person capable of solving the decades-long Kurdish issue because he is the only leader capturing the essence of the problem and because he has the authority and influence to succeed in solving the problem. Öcalan uses his charismatic authority as a power means for managing the PKK and its political offshoots such as the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) that were formed after Öcalan's call in 2002 (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011, p. 149). The PKK has acted in accordance with Öcalan's call for ceasefire for example in 2004 and, more recently, in 2013.

The PKK Military Wing - Qandil

The PKK has its roots within the leftist, Marxist movement that had formed in the 1960s and the Kurdish nationalist movement (Gunter, 1997, p. 23). The insurgency was initiated with the ultimate goal of creating an independent Kurdish state and the promotion of social revolution to transform the Kurdish society's feudal structure (Barkey & Fuller, 1998, p. 23).

While using violence as a means, the PKK is a political organization⁶² with the main agenda to advance the rights of the Kurds and reach political equality and recognition of their collective rights. The PKK's official program ranged from separatism in the initial years⁶³ (PKK program in the 1970s) to democratic federation more recently. Öcalan continues to be the leader of the PKK, while since his capture and imprisonment several figures have been acting as military leaders and have appeared in the media as such. Most prominent members are Murat Karayılan and Cemil Bayık.

The PKK's main objectives have transformed from separatism in the initial years of its formation to political demands (especially after 1999) such as "political status" for the Kurds and collective and cultural rights. As of 2017, the PKK still employs armed insurgency in order to advance its agenda. However, non-military strategies are also employed and since the 2000s, the PKK encompasses a variety of entities including a "Kurdish Parliament in Exile", the popular front "Kurdistan People's Congress" (KONGRA-GEL) and sister parties in Syria (YPG) and Iran (PJAK), all brought together under the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) (Kayhan-Pusane, 2015, p.

⁶² See Ismet İmset's interview with Öcalan in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, in November 1991 (İmset, 1992, pp. 335-347).

⁶³ The PKK programs of 1978 and 1995 can be found at Özcan (1999, pp. 350-397).

731). Its main means and resources are rooted in its capacity for violence and armed insurgency.

PKK's willingness to negotiate depends highly on Öcalan's position. However, it should be noted that disagreements over Öcalan's views have also been expressed. During the Resolution Process, the PKK Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan People's Congress) leaders such as Murat Karayılan and Cemil Bayık expressed diverse views on the negotiation process. Karayılan, the KCK leader in 2013, expressed full support to Öcalan's call for ending the armed insurgency for the start of the peace negotiations in march 2013 (Al Jazeera Türk, 2013). On the other hand, Bayık in November 2015 stated that Öcalan is not in charge to decide for demobilization of the PKK (Hamsici, 2015).

Pro-Kurdish Political Parties

Pro-Kurdish political parties have been major actors in the Kurdish conflict since they have acted as a means to disseminate the political ideas of the Kurdish insurgency. The participation of pro-Kurdish political parties in political life in Turkey dates back to the year 1990. The first pro-Kurdish political party, the HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi- People's Labor Party), was established by Kurdish and pro-Kurdish members of the Parliament who were expelled from or left the leftist SHP (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti- Social Democratic Populist Party). The establishment of HEP was the first instance of concrete political action with the purpose to alter the premises of the form of Turkish nationalism that had been promoted since the establishment of the Republic (Watts, 1999, p. 636). HEP members entered the parliament as a result of cooperation with SHP in the general elections in 1991. Eighteen of these parliamentarians, after being expelled from SHP in 1993, joined the DEP (Demokrasi Partisi- Democracy Party) that was mainly a

continuation of HEP in terms of its members and its pro-Kurdish agenda. More recently, the pro-Kurdish party BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi- Peace and Democracy Party) that was established in 2008 and then merged with the HDP (Halkların Demokrasi Partisi- People's Democracy Party) in 2014 have been active in Turkish politics. The BDP entered the 2011 general elections through independent candidates and gained 35 seats in the parliament. In the June 2015 general elections, the HDP as a party gained 80 seats in the parliament and in the November 2015 elections it gained 59 seats. This marked an unprecedented success for pro-Kurdish political parties since they became active in 1990.

Pro-Kurdish political parties have faced serious limitations since their involvement in competitive politics. One major limitation has been the party closures by the Constitutional Court on the ground of ties with the PKK. Since the early 1990s, five pro-Kurdish political parties were closed by the Constitutional Court⁶⁴ on accusations that these parties were directly involved in separatist activities and were charged of affinities with the PKK or its leader Abdullah Öcalan (Ersanlı & Özdoğan, 2011, p. 72). The Constitutional Court's decision was highly affected by adversarial statements by pro-Kurdish political actors⁶⁵. Both HEP and DEP, and then in a lesser manner HADEP acted in an adversarial manner and did not show sensitivity towards mainstream Turkish public opinion (Güney, 2002). Another limitation is the 10 percent electoral threshold that has practically deterred pro-Kurdish political parties from gaining seats in the

⁶⁴ The parties and the dates of their closures are: HEP (1993), OZDEP (1994), HADEP (2003), DEHAP (2005), and most recently, DTP (2009).

⁶⁵ Güney provides several of the adversarial statements by pro-Kurdish political actors including Hatip Dicle's statement in February 1994 that "In war, everyone in uniform is a target" and, later the same year, that "the PKK is a political, not a terrorist organization" (2002, p. 125).

parliament. The parties have sought to bypass the threshold by promoting independent candidates in the elections.

The pro-Kurdish parties' main objective has been the attainment of political goals such as the recognition of Kurdish identity, attainment of cultural rights, political decentralization and the strengthening of local governance, through electoral politics. The parties' main interest is to promote political solution to the conflict although their members have traditionally had organic ties with the PKK. Pro-Kurdish political parties have shown high willingness for negotiations for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. During the Resolution Process, from January 2013 to April 2015, a group of HDP members⁶⁶ known as the "İmralı group" visited the prisoned PKK leader in İmralı for at least 25 times⁶⁷. These visits were crucial in disseminating Öcalan's messages to the PKK and to the public and thus were crucial for the negotiation process.

Opposition Parties CHP and MHP⁶⁸

Since the 2002 elections, main opposition parties in the parliament have been the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- People's Republican Party) and the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- Nationalist Action Party)⁶⁹. The CHP is a center-left party that represents mainly

⁶⁶ The size (2-5 members) and composition of the group changed several times. BDP/HDP members Pervin Buldan, Selahattin Demirtaş, Sırrı Sureyya Onder, Altan Tan, Idris Baluken, Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana, and Ceylan Bağrıyanık participated at varying times to the group.

⁶⁷ The number of the visits was calculated by the author based on the chronology of the Resolution Process by the civil society organization Truth, Justice, Memory Center (Hakikat, Adalet, Hafıza Merkezi), available at <http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/baris-sureci-kronolojisi/>. The chronology runs from January 2013 to July 2016 (last accessed 2 October 2016).

⁶⁸ This study focuses mainly on the latest period of the Kurdish issue (i.e. after the mid-2000s) and therefore the analysis of opposition parties excludes the political parties of the 1990s. For an analysis of the actors in the 1990s period, see Beriker- Atiyas (1997).

⁶⁹ In the 2002 general elections the MHP did not pass the 10 percent electoral threshold and therefore was not an opposition party in the parliament during 2002-2007. It became so after the 2007 general elections.

the secular, Kemalist constituency in Turkey (Ciddi, 2009). The MHP as the ultranationalist party represents the far-right nationalist constituency (Öniş, 2003). These two parties are actors in the Kurdish conflict in that they are both opposition parties in the parliament and have affected in different extents developments regarding the Kurdish issue in Turkey. For example, the CHP managed to delay democratization reforms on issues related to the Kurdish problem during 2002-2007. The reforms induced by the EU included associational and individual rights and the right to publish and broadcast in languages other than Turkish (Ciddi, 2008)⁷⁰. Similarly, the MHP has opposed any policy to open the prospects for negotiation on the Kurdish issue by framing the problem in security terms. During the 2011 elections, the MHP built its election strategy on accusing the ruling AKP with ethnic separatism and for nurturing threats to national unity by engaging with the PKK (Bacık, 2011).

The CHP's position on the Kurdish issue changed dramatically after the change in party leadership in June 2011. While during Deniz Baykal's leadership the party was fierce defender of Atatürkist principles and supported the military's role in ending the Kurdish insurgency through warfare, under the new leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the party approached the Kurdish issue from the view of democratization, advocating an end to the conflict and the support for the cultural rights of the Kurds (Ciddi & Esen, 2014, p. 424). As a political party, the CHP aims to maintain its electoral support and derives its main power on the conflict from being the main opposition party in the parliament. The CHP's willingness to negotiate on the Kurdish issue has been dependent on political opportunity structures. The CHP has mainly focused on opposing the AKP

⁷⁰ For a detailed analysis of the democratization reforms in the 1993-2004 period in Turkey, see (Özbudun, 2007).

policies and therefore in general terms has not been supportive to the policies of opening towards the Kurdish actors in the beginning. While the party has opposed the Kurdish-later renamed to democratic- opening process that started in 2009, it later supported the Resolution Process that started in January 2013. However, at the same time, the party has been critical of the method adopted by the AKP for resolving the conflict, which is, by not engaging the parliament in the process (Tosun, 2014; Yeğen, 2015)

The second main opposition party in the parliament since 2007, the MHP, represents the far-right nationalist party. The party has built its nationalist strategy as in opposition to Kurdish nationalism and since the 1990s has mobilized its voters against imagined enemies, the primary enemy being the PKK and its supporters (H. M. Yavuz, 2002). The MHP's position on the Kurdish issue derives from this ultra-nationalist stance. The party rejects the existence of a separate Kurdish identity and frames the Kurdish issue strictly in terms of terror and ethnic separatism. The party's main interest lies in the maintenance of Turkish identity as the overarching identity and the fight against any development that would undermine it. The MHP has been categorically against any negotiation for the political settlement of the Kurdish conflict.

Kurdish Diaspora

Another stakeholder in the conflict is the Kurdish diaspora in European countries, mainly in Germany, France, the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium and the Netherlands⁷¹. The Kurdish diaspora in these countries is not homogenous and comprises of economic migrants, political asylum seekers, and exiled intellectuals, among others. The diaspora

⁷¹ The Kurdish diaspora in neighboring countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria are excluded from the analysis because their position as a stakeholder in the conflict since the 1990s is limited compared to that of the European diaspora.

has been effective in providing political and economic support to the insurgency and in keeping the Kurdish issue on the agenda of European countries. One major contribution of the diaspora has been cultural, since, especially in the oppressed environment of the 1990s, the diaspora in Europe was able to undertake cultural activities and promote the development of the Kurdish language (Ayata, 2008; M. Bruinessen, 1998). Also, the Kurdish diaspora used media outlets such as Med TV in the UK and Belgium (banned in 1999) and Roj TV in Denmark as a means to support the Kurdish movement. The Europe-based media outlets were crucial especially in the 1990s when Turkey had banned broadcasting in Kurdish. The media outlets broadcasted the work of the National Congress of Kurdistan (previously the Kurdish Parliament-in-Exile) that itself has been active in promoting Kurdish nationalism (Hassanpour & Mojab, 2005).

During the Resolution Process, one main point of discussion was the issue of the return of exiled Kurdish activists and intellectuals. One of the most prominent Kurdish activists in the diaspora, Kemal Burkay, returned to Turkey after living in exile in Sweden for 40 years. Another example is the concert that was organized in Diyarbakır in November 2013 by Sivan Perwer, a Kurdish musician who lived in exile for 37 years. Prime Minister Erdoğan was present on the stage at the concert along with another Turkish musician of Kurdish origin, Ibrahim Tatlıses. These symbolic moves had a central impact on the support to the Resolution Process by the Kurdish community in Turkey. Also, well-known Kurds in diaspora such as the KCK (Union of Communities in Kurdistan) president Zubeyir Aydar and the co-chair of KONGRA-GEL Remzi Kartal actively expressed the views of the Kurdish diaspora during the Resolution Process.

The main position of the Kurdish diaspora supporting the Kurdish movement in Turkey is the recognition of the collective rights of the Kurds and the end of repression

practices by the Turkish state. The main need of the Kurdish diaspora is the ability to act in a democratic environment, which is provided by the European countries that they are situated. Beyond using the media as a source of support, the diaspora's means of influence is the financial support to the insurgency and also recruitment support mainly from Germany. The diaspora's willingness to negotiate depends on the decisions by the leader Öcalan, the PKK actors in Qandil, and the leadership of the pro-Kurdish party.

HÜDAPAR (Hür Dava Partisi- Free Cause Party)

HÜDAPAR was established as a far-right Sunni Islamist party in 2013 as the political offshoot of the Turkish Hezbollah, a radical Islamist group with Kurdish origins and appeal. Hezbollah has been in a competitive relationship with the PKK since its establishment in 1983. HÜDAPAR is a stakeholder in the Kurdish conflict as it receives electoral support from the Sunni Kurdish population in eastern and southeastern Turkey. As the political offshoot of Hezbollah, HÜDAPAR has been competing with the pro-Kurdish parties close to the PKK (such as the HDP) in eastern and southeastern provinces. However, the party's appeal to the Kurdish population in the area remains low.

HÜDAPAR's position on the Kurdish conflict is that the PKK insurgency emerged from the two-centuries old Kurdish issue due to suppression of Kurdish identity and rights. Main demands have been the constitutional recognition of the Kurds and the recognition of the right to education in native language⁷². The party's main interest lies in the recognition of Kurdish identity and its main need is to maintain political support

⁷² As declared in HÜDAPAR party program, available at <http://hudapar.org/Detay/Sayfalar/205/parti-programi.aspx>.

from the Kurdish population in eastern and southeastern Turkey. Main issue/problem is the historical oppression of the Kurds. HÜDAPAR's main means of influence is party politics and armed violence (through Hezbollah). Its willingness to negotiate is high only if the PKK and related political actors are excluded from the negotiation process.

Syrian PYD (Democratic Union Party) and YPG (People's Protection Units)

The Syrian Kurdish groups can be considered another influential stakeholder in the peace process in Turkey especially after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Syrian Kurds are mainly concentrated in the de facto autonomous region of northern Syria called Rojava that declared its autonomy in November 2013. Rojava is in itself a federation and it is comprised of three self-governing cantons: Afrin, Jazira, and Kobani.

The Syrian PYD and its armed counterpart YPG are stakeholders in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey in that they have close ties with the PKK in Turkey. Indeed, the PYD had been encamped with the PKK in northern Iraq (ICG, 2013) while the ties of its leadership with the PKK date back to the pre-1999 period when the PKK had its basis within Syria (Tastekin, 2016). However, the PYD leader Salih Muslim has declared that the PYD does not have organic ties with the PKK but that they only support the insurgency in ideational terms by endorsing the ideas of Öcalan (Tanış, 2016).

Main position of the Syrian stakeholders is to support the PKK in its cause to fight for the rights of the Kurds. As with the PKK in Turkey, the PYD/YPG's main interest is the right to self-determination of the Kurds. The PYD's main need is to maintain the de facto autonomous federation in northern Syria. The main issue is the historical oppression of the Kurds and the main means of power is armed struggle. The Syrian PYD's willingness to negotiate for the status of Kurds should be considered

within the framework of the civil war in Syria. The PYD supports any political negotiation process that would help advance the Kurds' right to self-determination and their rights in their respective countries.

Iraqi KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government)

Another stakeholder in the Kurdish peace process is the Iraqi KRG leadership. The Iraqi Kurdistan was established as a de facto autonomous region in 1992 and is the only autonomous region in Iraq. Since 2005, the leader of the KRG is Massoud Barzani. Iraqi Kurdistan is crucial in that it is the only region where Kurds have achieved an autonomous government in the four areas they are spread in (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey). This is especially crucial for the PKK and its political counterpart HDP that aspire to establish local governance structures especially in the Kurdish-populated areas in eastern Turkey.

Since 2008, the KRG has close relationships with the Turkish government (Larrabee & Tol, 2011). During the Kobane battle in 2014, the PKK and the Iraqi peshmerga collaborated in defeating ISIS. However, this ended up being a short-term collaboration as the competitive relationship between the two groups resurged after the defeat of ISIS in Rojava. During the Resolution Process the KRG stated its support to the process and followed closely the developments in Turkey. One major indication of the KRG leadership's support to the Resolution Process was the KRG leader Masoud Barzani's visit to Diyarbakır in November 2013, a critical and symbolical move to revive the then stalled peace process (Çandar, 2013a). After the end of the peace talks in June 2015, Barzani continued his call for the restart of the negotiations and the end to the political assault of the HDP members, including the party leaders.

The KRG's main position on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is to support the Turkish government on the effort for a political solution. The KRG is in a competitive relationship with the PKK and thus its position on the armed conflict in Turkey is rather negative. The KRG's main interest is the stability of the Northern Iraqi Kurdistan and its main need is its ability to maintain the stability of the region. Its main issue of concern is the historical oppression of the Kurds. The main means of influence is both diplomacy and military power (the peshmerga). The KRG's willingness to negotiate is high for a political solution to the conflict that would limit the power of the PKK (BBC Türkçe, 2016).

4.4.3 Drivers of Conflict and Peace

In conflict analysis, the drivers of conflict and peace refer to the questions of how do actors use dividers to promote conflict and how do actors use connectors to promote peace, respectively. Thus, this part of the analysis focuses on the dynamic situation resulting from key actors' mobilization of social groups around core grievances, i.e. the perception that a group's security is threatened, and institutional resilience, i.e. the perception that social structures and processes are in place for conflict resolution (ICAF 2008). The analysis of the drivers of conflict and peace is based on the analysis of the positions and interests of main actors that was made in the previous section. In this section, I mainly describe 'why' and 'how' key actors mobilize constituencies around grievances and resiliencies for peaceful resolution of the conflict by focusing on main themes. Thus, below I analyze three drivers of conflict (diverse expectations, absence of third-party involvement, Kobane incidents) and four drivers of

peace (democratization packages and the EU factor, Erdoğan's 2005 Diyarbakır speech, Öcalan's Newroz letter, and the work of the Wise People Commission) with main focus on the period between 2009-2015.

Drivers of Conflict

- *Diverse Expectations from the Peace Process*

Throughout the Resolution Process, the two parties emphasized different agendas for the process. The government side expected that the DDR process and especially disarmament would take place in the short term. Thus, Erdoğan mobilized its constituency along with this expectation. This led to a deadlock when the PKK did not accept to fully disarm before other political steps had taken place. The pro-Kurdish actors expected that issues related to rights such as education in native language and local governance would be negotiated before or simultaneously with the DDR process. Therefore, pro-Kurdish actors made statements on the need that the state should take some steps that would provide guarantees for the disarmament process to begin. Here, main demand was to follow Öcalan's 10-point roadmap that involved issues on democratization and citizenship⁷³.

The difference in the expectations on how the process should proceed functioned as a driver for conflict since the start of the negotiations. Main deadlocks in the process were the result of this gap in the expectations between the two parties to negotiation.

⁷³ Besides democratic demands, the ten points involved demands on a variety of issues including disarmament, reintegration, and constitutional changes. See (CNN Türk, 2015b).

- *Absence of Third-Party Involvement*

The absence of a third-party mediator/facilitator/monitor was one of the main issues of contention during the peace process, which facilitated the escalation of crises as a driver for conflict. Pro-Kurdish actors called for the need for a third party in order to monitor whether the parties keep up with the promised steps. Third party involvement was also considered as needed for mediating at stages when the parties would not be able to negotiate by themselves due to conflicting interests and agendas. However, the AKP gradually moved to framing the Kurdish issue as “local and national” (*yerli ve milli*) and rejected categorically the involvement of a third party to the process⁷⁴. For this, AKP actors made references to the need to solve the Kurdish issue without any foreign engagement. This was against the expectations of pro-Kurdish actors.

Here, the absence of a third-party monitor is considered as a driver for conflict because it was used as a point of accusation on that the parties did not fulfill the agreed upon expectations from each other. The actors mobilized their constituencies by accusing the other side for not fulfilling the agreed upon agenda and for threatening their vital interests. The issue of third party involvement was one of the major points of crisis after the Dolmabahçe meeting in February 2015.

- *Kobane Incidents*

Another driver for conflict is the Kobane incidents of October 2014. The crisis in Turkey erupted after the Turkish government did not let border crossings of PYD militants and volunteers that wanted to pass to Kobane in help of the Kurdish population

⁷⁴ A detailed account of the discourse on ‘local and national’ is given in Chapter 6.

against its capture by ISIS (Islam State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant) militants (BBC Türkçe, 2014a). This led to clashes between the Turkish security forces and those demanding the crossing towards northern Syria. The crisis took place in the midst of the Resolution Process and it is accepted as one of the main blows to the process.

Some commentators have talked about “Kobane effect”, arguing that “the Kobane assault of ISIS triggered the transmission of Syrian civil war in Turkey as an example of ethnic tie-based spillovers” (Parlar Dal, 2016, p. 1411). Other analysts have underlined that the Kobane incidents have been a major point of friction during the peace talks (Bayramoğlu, 2015; Coskun, 2015).

Drivers of Peace

- *Democratization packages and EU Reforms*

The argument on the need for solving the conflict with the purpose of having a more democratic country united the constituencies of both pro-Kurdish and pro-government actors on a common ground. The EU negotiation process provided the basis for this framing for the AKP side. The AKP used the EU process to diminish the role of actors blocking the move towards negotiations (especially the TAF) and utilized a discourse for democratization and prosperity.

Turkey adopted eight harmonization packages in the period 2001-2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Many of these reforms (such as those related to freedom of expression and rights of associations) had direct impact on the Kurdish issue. The first package was prepared and adopted by the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government in August 2002. This package included provisions on the abolishment of death penalty,

revision of Anti-Terror Law, broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, extending freedom of associations repealing the ban on the use of languages other than Turkish. Another package was adopted in January 2004 (under AKP) and foresaw the repeal of Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law. The article was controversial and had been used for the imprisonment of journalists and publishers for crimes against the indivisible unity of the state (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p. 25). Following these packages, the AKP government oversaw the ending of emergency rule that was at place for more than 15 years. The AKP was able to break the resistance to the implementation of reforms initiated by the previous coalition government especially in the area of cultural rights (Kirişçi, 2011, p. 340). Broadcasting in ethnic minority languages at state channel Turkish Radyo and Television Broadcasting Corporation (TRT- Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu) started in June 2004, though in a limited manner. This was supported by the change in civil military relations as a result of a series of reform steps regarding the military. These included, for example, the adjustment package that was put into force in July 2003 and that foresaw the increase in the civilian members of the National Security Council (NSC- Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) (from five to nine) and switch to civilian Secretary General. Also the abolishment of State Security Courts in May 2004 was a further crucial step.

- *Erdoğan's 2005 Diyarbakır Speech*

One main driver for peace came with Erdoğan's speech in Diyarbakır in 2005. The speech was the first instance in the history of the Turkish republic that the head of the government accepted past-wrongdoings of the state towards part of its population. Erdoğan in his speech underlined that "Turkey will not retreat from the democratic

process. All of our citizens will feel the positive impact of the democratization process” (BBC Türkçe, 2005). This again revealed the role of the EU process as a connector that was used by a primary political actor to promote peace. The Diyarbakır speech is accepted as the first signal of the peace process that was initiated later in 2009.

- *Öcalan’s Newroz Letter*

On 21 March 2013 Öcalan’s letter was read to the public in the Newroz gathering in Diyarbakır. This was unimaginable considering the designation of Öcalan as the head of terrorist organization and as responsible for the death of thousands of people especially in eastern Turkey during the 1990s. The letter functioned as a crucial driver for peace mobilizing both sceptical Turks and especially Kurds who received their leaders message as a great opportunity for change in the Kurdish struggle.

- *Wise People Commission’s Work*

The Wise People Commission was the main mechanism used for engaging the society to the process. Although the commission’s work was short (two months), it was able to reach out to thousands of citizens and engage them in talking about their expectations from the peace process, acting as a driver for peace.

Engaging the society to the process increased support for the process and thus acted as a crucial driver for peace. Both the pro-government and the pro-Kurdish leadership mobilized their constituencies by making public statements on how the process is proceeding. Furthermore, the establishment of the WPC was a demand by both actors, so the demands of both sides and their constituencies were fulfilled.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided the analysis of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey along several dimensions based on a conflict analysis framework. By analyzing the Kurdish-Turkish conflict with regards to its context, the dividers and connectors, the actors that are main stakeholders, and the drivers of peace and conflict, the chapter sought to provide a wide picture of the conflict.

The chapter first provided a short chronological overview of the Kurdish issue in Turkey by focusing on how the different aspects of conflict were transformed since the start of armed insurgency in 1984. Then, the chapter moved to a chronological overview of the peace process that was initiated by the AKP government in 2009 with the purpose of addressing the Kurdish issue. This chronological overview considered the main changes from the start of the process with the Kurdish opening in 2009 until its end in 2015, including a period of escalation in 2011-2012 and a period of secret talks in 2008-2010.

The second part of the chapter moved on the analysis of the Kurdish conflict based on a conflict analysis framework. The conflict analysis framework provided an analysis of the conflict based mainly on three dimensions: the dividers and connectors, the actors, and the drivers of conflict and peace. This type of analysis is crucial for understanding not only the conditions that enable conflict but also the parameters and conditions that promote peace. The analysis in this chapter considered the dividers and connectors in Turkey's Kurdish conflict along different dimensions including political, cultural, and psychological. In terms of actors, the analysis provided the positions,

interests of different actors in the conflict and discussed their willingness to negotiate. The analysis in this part included all major actors including primary parties such as the state, Kurdish parties, and the armed leadership, and also external parties such as the KRG in Iraq and the parties in neighbouring Syria. As a third dimension in the conflict analysis, the last part of the chapter analyzed the drivers of conflict and peace. Here, diverse expectations from the peace process, the absence of third party monitoring, and the Kobane incidents of 2014 were considered as drivers of conflict. As drivers of peace, democratization packages as part of EU reforms, Erdoğan's Diyarbakır speech in 2005, Öcalan's Newroz letter in 2013, and the Wise People Commission's work during April-May 2013 were considered as drivers of peace.

Having analyzed the conflict along different dimensions, the next chapter proceeds on analyzing the 2009-2015 peace process regarding the Kurdish conflict with focus on the issues that emerged in the negotiation process with regards to the 'when, with whom, how, and what' questions in the negotiation process.

CHAPTER 5

TURKEY'S PEACE PROCESS FOR SOLVING THE KURDISH CONFLICT (2009-2015): DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING PEACE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is based on a descriptive and analytical account of the 2009-2015 peace process in Turkey. The chapter provides the analysis of the peace process with focus mainly on the domestic political discourse. The analysis is made based on four analytical questions addressing different dimensions of the peace negotiation process: The question of when to negotiate, the question of whom to negotiate with, the question of how to negotiate, and the question of what to negotiate. By analyzing how these four questions were addressed during the peace process, this chapter seeks to understand the issues that became prominent in terms of process, i.e. the design of the process itself, and in terms of content, i.e. the issues that formed the content of the peace talks. The analysis in this part is primarily made based on media statements of primary actors.

Based on the above, the chapter is organized as follows: First, I discuss the two divergent approaches to conflict, the “military approach” and the “rights and recognition approach” with focus on changes and continuities in the two approaches during the 2009-2015 process. As it is elaborated in this part, the government oscillated between the military approach and a democratic rights approach while the Kurdish actors have promoted the rights and recognition approach throughout the process. In the second part, the chapter proceeds with the analysis of the 2009-2015 process based on the four main analytical questions. Here, I investigate the main themes that appeared in the political discourse during the peace process and trace references to international norms and practices. This part of the analysis aims mainly at uncovering the extent to which issues related to the process and issues related to the content of the negotiation were defined by domestic considerations and whether domestic actors sought to make use of international experiences of peacebuilding. In the third part of the chapter I discuss the findings from the analytical part. In the last part, I provide an overview of the findings and conclude.

5.2 Main Approaches In the Peace Process

There are two dominant approaches with regards to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. The first approach is based on a military understanding of the Kurdish problem and regards the peace process as a process of disarmament and reintegration to solve the security aspect of the Kurdish issue mainly defined in terms of terror and insurgency. The second approach adopts a socio-political understanding of the problem and approaches the peace process as a democratic solution process to solve the democratic deficits that have both led to the problem and have also prolonged it. The roots behind

the divergence in the two approaches and the way it has been constructed by the different actors related to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey can be found in the historical context of the Kurdish issue and the positions of the two sides vis-à-vis the conflict period (mainly explained in *Chapter 4* of the dissertation).

The military and the rights and recognition approaches accordingly have defined not only the way the causes of the conflict and its continuation are understood and constructed, but, most importantly, the expectations of what a possible solution to the conflict is. Below, I discuss the two approaches with focus on the peace process (2009-2015).

5.2.1 The Military Approach

Throughout the decades, the Turkish state traditionally adopted a policy of denial and non-recognition towards its Kurdish citizens. Under the AKP rule, the Kurdish issue entered a period of change with the partial transformation of the official policy of denial to a democratic rights framing that was enabled by the EU reform period. However, the official state approach in military terms was not abandoned as a whole and the AKP oscillated between the military approach and the rights and recognition approach during the official policies of “opening” that started in 2009 with the “Kurdish Opening”, later renamed to “Democratic Opening” and in 2010 to the Unity and Fraternity Project and continued with the Resolution Process in 2013. Based on this background, pro-government actors define the problem in terms of the need to solve the security vacuum created by the existence of the PKK as a terrorist organization. This approach is in line with the traditional state approach to the Kurdish issue in security terms.

With the start of the policies of “opening”, the official military approach to the Kurdish issue entered a period of transformation. The policies of opening can be regarded as a first instance when a government in Turkey moved in a public manner beyond the military approach and sought to provide an alternative official framing.

Empirically, this approach is discerned in the official statements of the main government actors in the peace process. For example, Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay’s parliamentary speech on 10 November 2009 (TBMM, 2009a) introducing the Democratic Opening policy reveals the effort to create a balance between the military and the democracy/rights understanding of the problem:

The Democratic Opening process that we initiated handles terror in its different dimensions and as a whole. Therefore, the ‘opening’ process is not the result of weakness in the fight against terror. On the contrary, it is the result of decisive and determined struggle against terror. [...] We [the AKP] especially think that the solution to the terror problem that rests on ethnic nationalism is to be found in further democratization. Democracy is a regime type that requires freedom and security, values that are in need for each other. These two values are not contrary to each other. Freedom is only achievable in places where security is ensured. [...] So, with the Democratic Opening we seek to enhance freedom and security and their harmony. Our aim is to build a country where everyone will feel safe, free, happy, and peaceful in a geography that is clear of terror and violence. [...] In the Democratic Opening process we aim to achieve two interrelated targets: First, to end (or minimize) terror, and second, to develop our democracy and raise its standards. (TBMM, 2009a)

A similar effort of creating a balance between the two approaches is evident in the official documents regarding the National Unity and Fraternity Project that the AKP launched 2010. The brochure introducing the project was published in January 2010 (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2010). According to the brochure, the project aimed at solving the problems of all ethnic and minority groups, including the problem of terror and other problems such as those related to the economy. The brochure emphasized the

importance of strengthening individual rights and freedoms so that any individual in Turkey would not feel as “the other” and thus excluded from the society. So, the process aimed, on the one hand, to end the problem of terror, and on the other, to eliminate the setting that nurtures terror. The leaflet further underlined that “By differentiating between the terror problem and the Kurdish issue, the AKP chose more democracy as the solution to the problem. [...] There are economic, social, cultural, psychological, and sociological aspects/means in the fight against terror. Unfortunately, past governments regarded the problem strictly in terms of security” (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2010, p. 29).

Another development during the 2009-2011 period revealing the effort to maintain the military approach while introducing a more rights-oriented approach is the establishment of the KDGM (Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı- Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security) in 2010. While the undersecretariat does not have operational authority (i.e. it is not authorized to coordinate military operations), the main motivation behind its creation is fight against terror. In a statement in 2009, Atalay underlined that the main function of the KDGM is to coordinate among security institutions and to contribute to research, analysis, and evaluation and provide strategic information support for these institutions (Bianet, 2009a). The establishment of the KDGM revealed that the concern with the military-security aspect of the Kurdish issue was still high on the agenda at the time of its creation.

This initial transformation process in terms of the official approach was interrupted with the escalation of the conflict and also increasing societal and political tension in the period between 2011-2012 (explained in more detail in *Chapter 4*). Later,

with the launch of the Resolution Process in December 2012, a return to the ‘balancing approach’ can be discerned in the speeches of the main actors.

In the early phases of the Resolution Process, state actors announced the start of the process by referring to the talks between the state intelligence agency and the imprisoned PKK leader. The Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan’s announcement in January 2013 that meetings with Öcalan were taking place was made within the framework of ending the terror problem in Turkey. Akdoğan underlined that the meetings with Öcalan focused on ending the problem of terror and he emphasized that issues related to the Kurdish problem have the Kurdish people as their interlocutor (Al Jazeera Türk, 2013). This statement in the early phase of the Resolution Process revealed the focus of the pro-government actors on ending the security problem through a communication and negotiation process. This view was also underlined by the then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speech at the ceremony for the inauguration of the Wise People’s Commission work in April 2013: “The Resolution Process is the process of inserting ideas and politics instead of arms. It is not a process of concessions to terror and bargaining. [...] Our only aim is to strengthen our fraternity and our people, there is no other target beyond that. [...] This is a process for ending terror which has led to blood shedding and tears” (Haberler Newsdesk, 2013a).

The Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speech in the Parliament for the formation of the 62nd government on 1 September 2014 (Davutoğlu, 2014a) revealed the balancing approach:

The Resolution Process that was initiated by the 61st government has vital importance for the future of Turkey. With the framework law on the Resolution Process that was adopted by our previous government, the Resolution Process

became a state policy and we will continue to coordinate the related state institutions, to initiate all needed new methods, and to work to secure the support of all segments of the society for the process. As the 62nd government we set the goals of the new road map of the Resolution Process as the end of the problem of terror, disarmament, reintegration to social life, and to clear the way for participation to democratic politics. [...] Through the Resolution Process we sought to break away from ‘acceptable citizenship’ to ‘equal citizenship’. This process will restore the society in psychological terms and will reveal and strengthen a new consciousness of belonging. So, as the 62nd government, we will stick heart and soul to the Fraternity Project.⁷⁵ (Davutoğlu, 2014a)

Personal interviews also confirmed the view that the peace process revealed an effort to create a balance between the military and the rights-based approach without abandoning the former. For example, a former AKP deputy underlined that “The Resolution Process was the latest part of a wider democratization process initiated under the AKP rule since 2002 and it was the process for the preparation of the needed infrastructure so that the PKK would disarm”⁷⁶. The PKK was taken as an interlocutor only because the process aimed at the disarmament of the PKK.

Similarly, several interviewees defined the process as one of disarmament and reintegration in the context of DDR. An AKP deputy and a former senior consultant to the Ministry of Justice stated “[In the design of the Resolution Process] we separated the Kurdish issue from the Resolution Process. The Kurdish issue in general terms has to do with the democratic transformation of the state [...] while the Resolution Process is the process that will lead the armed groups to leave arms and return to politics”⁷⁷. Another high-level government actor in the process defined the aim of the process as “The primary aim of the Resolution Process is this: to end terror and violence, to leave arms, and to enable those terrorist fractions in the mountains to return home, to the society, to

⁷⁵ In its original: “Kardeşlik projesine dört elle sarılacağız”.

⁷⁶ Interview number 24.

⁷⁷ Interview number 16.

life”⁷⁸. A member of the AKP board of directors and a WPC member pointed to the same view by stating that “The Resolution Process was the process for the disarmament of the (Kurdish) insurgency and paving the way for their participation into politics”⁷⁹.

The military approach is also evident in the naming of the process. An interviewee from the security bureaucracy expressed this view by stating that the process was named as “Resolution Process” and not “peace process” because there was no war so that to have peace⁸⁰. Refraining from naming the process as a “peace process” is justified on the grounds that the Resolution Process did not aim to end war because such war is non-existent for the Turkish case. The argument follows that the process aimed at ending the PKK insurgency that is employing the means of terror for continuing its existence. Terror, according also to the official state view, is damaging Turkey as a whole, i.e. both the Turks and the Kurds. Thus, by initiating the Resolution Process, the Turkish state sought to protect all of its citizens against terror and end insurgency.

5.2.2 The Rights and Recognition Approach

The other approach to the Kurdish problem is based on a “rights and recognition” framework. Proponents of this view define the problem in terms of lack of rights and deficiencies of democratization. The Kurdish problem from this viewpoint is regarded as a historical and sociological one along with a political one. From this viewpoint, the PKK insurgency should be regarded not as the cause of the conflict but as the result of

⁷⁸ Interview number 23.

⁷⁹ Interview number 26.

⁸⁰ Interview number 33.

the repression and assimilation policies that the Turkish state adopted towards its Kurdish population.

The pro-Kurdish side has been consistent on the “rights and recognition” approach since the start of the process in 2009. In the initial public statements after the official announcement of the Kurdish/ Democratic Opening, the DTP leader Demirtaş stated in a newspaper interview as a response to Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay’s briefing [where Atalay introduced the policy of ‘opening’ to the media in August 2009]:

The DTP will not support any project that does not consider the expectations of the [Kurdish] society. If the constitution is not going to change, and if you are going to promote a policy of ‘opening’ without even using the word ‘Kurd’, this is inconceivable. [...] Nowadays, the largest consensus that exists in the society is on the formation of a new constitution. [...] The current constitution is based on ethnicity. It is directed towards only part of the society. Turkey needs a new constitution and if the government does not have the courage for it, the process cannot develop. (NTV, 2009b)

In the parliamentary meeting on 13 November 2009, Ahmet Turk’s speech as the representative of the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi- Democratic Society Party) (TBMM, 2009b) revealed the welcoming by the Kurdish side of the government’s effort to move beyond the traditional militarist approach to the problem. In his speech Turk underlined that:

In the past, they [the past governments] chose to respond to the problems through violence. They did not try democratic solutions. [...] At this point, I underline that the PKK is the result of these policies and not the cause of them. It is the result of the state policies and politics. And because the state chose to erase this result [terror] through ‘solution policies’, it never addressed the causes of the problem. (TBMM, 2009b)

Furthermore, Turk underlined the need for recognition of all cultures and identities as part of the ‘opening’ process. In his words:

It is undisputable that the Turkish people have their own history, culture, civilization and that it is their basic right to protect and feel honoured by it. But in the same manner, it is undeniable that the Kurds have their own history, literature, and art. All cultures should approach each other with respect and flourish together. [...] All people in this country are victims of lack of democracy so the Democratic Opening seeks to promote democracy as a whole in the country and to move democracy closer to the people of the Republic of Turkey. [...] So the political will should secure not only the democratic rights of the Kurds but of all the different cultures and identities. (TBMM, 2009b)

This has meant that the pro-Kurdish side’s expectations from the peace process are centered on democratic development with special focus on the demands and rights of the Kurdish people. This view is based on the contention that while disarmament is one of the aims of the Resolution Process, democratization is the only way to solve the problem in its entirety.

With the escalation of the conflict during 2010-2011, the BDP’s discourse on the democratic needs of the Kurds continued. The BDP revealed to the media a Protocol On Solution Proposals in September 2011 (T 24, 2011). The protocol involved the main principles for a “democratic constitutional solution” and reiterated demands on constitutional changes in terms of the redefinition of citizenship, the right to receive education in native language, and the establishment of democratic constitutional commission with the participation of civil society actors and intellectuals. The pro-Kurdish side kept its emphasis on the rights and recognition approach throughout the Resolution Process that started in late 2012.

The perspective on the rights and recognition approach to the peace process was dominant among pro-Kurdish interviewees including HDP deputies and civil society actors. For example, an HDP deputy stated that “The period between 2012-2015 is the first instance the state decided to solve the problems through negotiation. [...] The Dolmabahçe declaration is historically very significant, it is the first instance that the state decided to solve the problems through democratic means”⁸¹. Most of the pro-Kurdish interviewees criticized the government for not realizing the “real” basis of the problem (i.e. the sociological and political dimension) and thus not acting accordingly. In the words of an HDP deputy:

The Kurdish issue emanates from the anti-democratic stance of the state deriving from a monist constitution and a (societal and political) structure based on a single identity. [...] The President aimed at the demobilization of the PKK through Öcalan and this is why the process came to an end. [...] You cannot expect to disarm first, you need to first address the democratization demands.⁸²

The rights and recognition approach is also discerned in the naming of the process as the “Democratic Resolution Process” by BDP/HDP leaders (Haberler Newsdesk, 2013c). This is also evident in Öcalan’s calls that he communicated from prison through the BDP/HDP members. Six points out of his “ten-point draft” that was communicated to the public through the HDP in February 2015 on how the process should proceed refer to “democratic political solutions” (Al Jazeera Türk, 2015). Furthermore, the pro-Kurdish side has preferred to use the terms “peace process” rather than Resolution Process while referring to the 2013-2015 talks.

⁸¹ Interview number 32.

⁸² Interview number 32.

Many of the interviewees acknowledged that a “gap in perceptions” exists between the two main sides to the peace process. An AKP deputy (and former Minister of Justice) pointed to this gap in perceptions and expectations by stating that “the fact the same concept means different things for different parties increased the vulnerability of the process [...] when we say democratic arrangements, for those who represent the state and the government it refers to EU standards and related human rights arrangements [...] but the interlocutors (*muhataplar*) refer to the implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, autonomy, democratic self-rule”⁸³. Also, a pro-Kurdish human rights activist and civil society actor underlined this gap in perceptions:

First of all the two parties differ greatly in terms of how they perceive (the process). [...] The state says that ‘the Kurds should first leave the arms, bury them, clear themselves of the arms, and then we will take the steps for rights’. So, those governing the state perceive the issue as shallow, lacking an understanding of the historical context, and lacking a sociological understanding of the problem. The Kurds, on the other hand, perceive the issue as a historical one, as the division of the Kurds in four separate geographical areas and their lack of identity and collective rights.⁸⁴

Similarly, a WPC member pointed to the paradigmatic difference in perceptions: “The state defined the process as a kind of disarmament and reintegration, not a democratization process through negotiation with the Kurdish side but as a Resolution Process, a political decision [...] this is a solution process but I am not sure whether this is a peace process”⁸⁵.

Having considered the different perspectives on the peace process (2009-2015), the next parts provide the analysis of the process in terms of its different dimensions,

⁸³ Interview number 30.

⁸⁴ Interview number 4.

⁸⁵ Interview number 20

including the issues of timing of when to negotiate (timing of negotiations), whom to negotiate with (interlocutors in the negotiation process), how to negotiate (the design of the negotiation process), and what to negotiate (the content of the negotiations).

5.3 Designing Peace: Main Issues in the Peace Process (2009-2015)

This part rests on the analysis of the 2009-2015 process with focus on the main concerns that have been expressed by primary actors regarding the design of the process. The main concerns are categorized here under four questions: when to negotiate, who to negotiate with, how to negotiate, and what to negotiate⁸⁶. All four questions are part of peace process design and have been highly controversial in the peace process in Turkey. This part rests mainly on the review of media statements of primary actors during the process between 2009-2015 and partially on interviews with high and middle level actors. The aim is to assess how the parties to the peace process have approached the four main issues and to investigate the extent at which the parties adopted international perspectives.

5.3.1 When to Negotiate?

Peace negotiations are generally regarded as taking place along a continuum from pre-negotiation to negotiation leading to a settlement and implementation in successful cases. The stage between pre-negotiation and negotiation is usually marked by secret talks that might be initiated when the parties are concerned about reactions

⁸⁶ This framework builds on Zartman (2008), Chapter 11.

from supporters or do not want to accord legitimacy to the other side (as is generally the case with insurgent groups using terrorist tactics) (Guelke, 2008). In the Turkish context, the secret talks took place in Oslo and preceded the public peace process that started in 2013.

Zartman defines pre-negotiation as a phase that “begins when one or more parties consider negotiation as a policy option and communicate this intention to other parties. It ends when parties agree to formal negotiations or when a party abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option” (Zartman, 1989, p. 240). Pre-negotiation is crucial as it enables exchange of information and thus lowers the risk of conflict, enables the parties to consider the benefit of agreement and the cost of non-agreement, increases the belief of reciprocity of the other side, allows to estimate the internal support of each party to the negotiation process, allows for alternatives to be discussed, and is an opportunity to talk to moderates (Zartman, 2008, pp. 120-125).

To the question of “when to start negotiations?” one of the most widely considered frameworks is Zartman’s theory of “ripeness” (Zartman, 2000) (see also Zartman, 1986). The theory of ripeness seeks to explain when- and relatedly why- parties to a conflict decide to resolve the conflict through negotiation. The ripeness theory is based on two main components: the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and the perception of the parties for “a way out” which refers to a negotiated solution to the conflict. As Zartman notes “when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them, they seek a way out” (2000, p. 228). MHS is the moment that the parties to a conflict perceive that the pain can be sharply increased in case nothing is done at that particular

moment. This does not mean that parties have to be able to identify a specific solution to the conflict but, rather, that they realize that a negotiated solution is possible.

The gist of the ripeness theory lies in that the ripe moment is a “perceptual event”, which means that it is not objectively defined but is based on the subjective perceptions of the parties to the conflict. However, this does not mean that the MHS is detached from objective reality. Objective referents are important, since, the greater the objective evidence is, the greater the subjective perception of a stalemate will be. Furthermore, since the MHS is subjective, it can be perceived at any point in the conflict. As Zartman notes “nothing in the definition of an MHS requires it to take place at the height of the conflict or at a high level of violence” (Zartman, 2000, p. 230). For example, the South African negotiations in 1990 were initiated as a result of a perceived MHS and not of increasing casualties (Sisk, 1995, pp. 56, 87). Also, Zartman notes that ripeness, being a perceptual event, can be highlighted by the mediator or by an opposing party if the parties themselves do not recognize it (Zartman, 2008).

Other scholars have tried to provide explanations on the question of timing of peace negotiations by providing alternatives to the ripeness theory. Pruitt (2005) put forward “readiness theory” as an explanatory perspective for the timing of peace negotiations. According to the theory, two “states of mind” contribute to readiness: the motivation to escape from conflict and the optimism for mutual agreement (Pruitt, 2005). The motivation to escape from conflict derives from the hurting stalemate that a party to the conflict finds itself in. The main difference with the ripeness theory is that readiness theory regards readiness as pertaining to a single party, i.e. not being mutual.

In the Turkish-Kurdish context, the timing of the peace talks became a point of controversy among political actors. This controversy is related to the fact that the AKP government initiated the Kurdish opening as a government-led policy in 2009 and this led to nationalist backlash by opposition parties who criticized the decision to initiate a process that could eventually lead to peace talks.

Initially, the first signals for the change of the state's engagement with the Kurdish issue was given in a speech given by Erdoğan in Diyarbakır in August 2005. This speech was the first time a prime minister acknowledged past wrongdoings of the state towards part of its population. The speech came a day after Erdoğan's meeting with Turkish intellectuals that had signed a petition addressing the PKK and calling for its disarmament. The intellectuals called for a policy of "opening" regarding the Kurdish issue. This call came as a response to the PKK's increased activism in 2004-2005 and pointed to the need to address the Kurdish issue in political terms. Erdoğan's meeting with intellectuals in 2005 was regarded as a step forward for addressing the Kurdish issue through democratic means rather than through military solutions.

These developments notwithstanding, immediately after the first signals of its announcement, the Kurdish opening became a topic of increased controversy in domestic politics between the government, the opposition party leaders, and the pro-Kurdish DTP. The official announcement of the Kurdish opening in August 2009 was followed by a series of statements by government actors indicating that the time is "ripe" for political engagement with the Kurdish issue. In this initial phase before the official announcement of the policy of opening in August 2009, the then president Abdullah Gül announced in May 2009 the start of the process as "a historical chance regarding the

Kurdish problem”⁸⁷. This was accompanied by opposition parties’ reactions on what “historical chance” refers to and on why this specific historical juncture was appropriate for addressing such a long-term problem. As a response, in his statements Gül made references to internal and external conditions that pointed to the need for addressing the Kurdish issue in political terms at this particular moment.

An important development regarding the timing of the peace process took place in 2011 with the leaking of the Oslo meetings to the media. This revealed that a secret negotiation process had already started before the establishment of the policies of opening and had been ongoing at least until 2010. As expressed later by the PKK leadership in Qandil, the Oslo process was at place since 2006.

With the start of the Resolution Process in late 2012, the question of when to negotiate acquired a new character. The new process started after the realization that the policies of “opening” were not sufficient for a sustainable solution. In various TV and news statements, the Minister of the Interior Beşir Atalay announced that the “new” process would proceed in a different manner compared to the previous one. The main change, as discussed in the next section in detail, was related to the question of ‘who to talk to’ in the negotiation process.

The pro-Kurdish side repeatedly called for the transition to negotiation by labelling the process as “dialogue”. After a meeting with the İmralı group in September 2013, Demirtaş conveyed in a newspaper interview Öcalan’s call for transition from dialogue to negotiation (T 24, 2013b) thus making clear this expectation. In the same interview, Demirtaş conveyed Öcalan’s road map for the continuation of the Resolution Process. Öcalan’s plan was composed of three interrelated stages: First, institutional and

⁸⁷ In its original: “Kürt sorununda tarihi fırsat”.

societal steps that would help end violence should be taken. Second, all channels for democratic politics should be opened for those who will demobilize. The first two steps should go hand in hand, i.e. they should progress at the same time and help each other. As a third step, Öcalan proposed a commission that would follow the Resolution Process as a ‘third eye’ and help in periods of deadlock.

One important development regarding the timing of negotiation took place in September 2013 with the launch of a “package” of democratization by the government. The democratization package partially addressed Kurdish side’s expectations as it paved the way for education in native language in private schools and also lifted limitations on the use of the Kurdish language in judicial matters. However, the package did not fulfill the expectations. On this, Demirtaş noted that the democratization packages that the government launched are welcome but are not regarded as sufficient within a negotiation framework (DHA Newsdesk, 2013). He conveyed Öcalan’s thoughts that such ‘packages’ are not sufficient for sustainable and lasting peace, there needs to be an approach based on negotiation, i.e. an approach that would require the exchange of ideas between the interlocutors. The same call came from Qandil in October 2013 (Hürriyet, 2013).

Overall, domestic political considerations defined the question of “when to negotiate”. This was based on primary actors’ consideration that the time is “ripe” for initiating a peace process based on domestic political developments. Furthermore, the secret talks of 2010-2011 revealed concerns with legitimacy in the process. These concerns are related to the issue of whom to negotiate with, discussed in the next section.

5.3.2 Whom to Negotiate With?

The question of “whom to negotiate with” touches upon several issues that have been addressed by previous research from different perspectives. These include issues of inclusion/exclusion, representativeness, legitimacy (especially when negotiating with fractions that have employed terrorist tactics), and the question of how to deal with “spoilers”.

One central issue with regards to “whom to talk to” in the negotiation framework has to do with the question of inclusion/exclusion, i.e. the issue of who will be included in the negotiation process and, accordingly, who will remain outside of the negotiations. With regards to inclusion, both horizontal and vertical inclusivity have been extensively debated. Also, inclusivity, as discussed in *Chapter 2*, has increasingly acquired the form of a principle or a “norm” in peace negotiations designed by external actors such as the UN.

Oftentimes the issue of “whom to negotiate with” is defined during the pre-negotiation phase through back-channel negotiations. This is related to multiple considerations. This is many times due to the demonization of the other side, especially in cases where the insurgent party has used terrorist/violent tactics to advance its agenda (Guelke, 2008). There are also factors that are “pushing away” from negotiating with terrorists (Pruitt, 2006). Among such factors is the fear that political opponents will view negotiation as a sign of weakness. Also, a concern that a valid representative cannot be found in cases where multiple terrorist organizations are at place is also a factor. A further consideration is related to normative concerns especially in cases where a third party mediator is active in the process. The normative dimension refers to the issue of

whether the inclusion of a given actor is consistent with the values of the mediator (Lanz, 2011).

Scholars have debated how the inclusion of factions that are accepted as terrorists would be conducive to non-violent solution to the conflict (Toros, 2008). Negotiation may offer an alternative path, give the chance for transforming into non-violent actors, and strengthen the moderate factions among such groups. The inclusion of the IRA in the negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement is a common example given in favour of inclusion of such groups.

The question of whether terrorist groups will be regarded as interlocutors and whether they will get a seat at the negotiation table is closely related to concerns with legitimacy. The main argument rejecting the inclusion of terrorist groups in negotiations rests on the contention that this would legitimize the actions of these groups. In many instances, the naming of a group as “terrorist” is itself a move to delegitimize that group (Toros, 2008). Another argument is that negotiating with terrorists would undermine the norms of non-violence, as it would legitimize the use of violence as a means to further an agenda that is based on the tactic of violence.

The decision to negotiate with terrorists might be the result of multiple considerations by governments. Governments might negotiate with terrorists when they have to end violence, when there is a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and the suffering cannot be prolonged, and when the terrorists revise their goals (Zartman, 2008, pp. 251-255). Also, one trigger for initiating negotiation is change in government, as incumbents might be open to admit negotiation as a strategy and the public might be more supportive in light of government change.

Another issue with regards to “whom to talk to” is, for governments, whether to negotiate with moderates or extremists. This is, in essence, a “tactical question” (Zartman & Alfredson, 2010). Talking with moderates might strengthen the political fraction of the group, might split the group, and might prevent the formation of a “spoiler” group by including the group to the negotiation process.

Spoilers refer to “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman, 1999, p. 5). According to the typology provided by Stedman, spoilers may be insiders, i.e. inside a peace process, and outsiders, i.e. those excluded from the peace process. While insider spoilers may use the strategy of stealth, outsider spoilers may use the strategy of violence to spoil the peace process. Stedman’s typology of insider versus outsider spoilers is important regarding the question of inclusivity in the peace negotiation process.

Including stakeholders in the negotiation process might have positive impact on managing spoilers. Insiders might become “trapped” in the politics of moderation and gradually shift their extremist positions to more moderate ones. Also, the use of violence by insiders is expected to be more costly than the use of violence by outsiders (Zahar, 2008). On the other hand, excluding stakeholders would have the parallel effect of pushing away from moderation. For outsiders, the cost of peace is high while the benefits are low.

The management of spoilers might take different forms. Stedman (1999) offers several strategies for the management of spoilers such as inducement- referring to addressing demands of security, benefits, and justice-, socialization- referring to establishing norms of acceptable behaviour-, and coercion, i.e. the use or threat of

punishment to deter unacceptable behaviour. According to Stedman, these are strategies that can be adopted by “custodians of peace processes”, referring to international actors overseeing the implementation of the peace process (such as the UN). Other scholars have also pointed to the role of third parties in the management of spoilers. Zahar (2008) for example notes both non-military and military options. Military options refer to deterring the use of violence through the use of force. Non-military options include securing the loyalty of “insiders” in the negotiation process. Also, the author notes that the long-term management of spoilers is possible through incentives and institutionalized channels of voice, referring to power-sharing arrangements that would enable both insider and outsider actors to share power in the long term.

In the Turkish-Kurdish context, the question of who to negotiate with (*muhataphk*) has been a point of controversy due to the essence of the conflict as one between a legitimate state and an insurgent organization that is widely regarded as illegitimate and accepted as a terrorist armed group by various states and organizations. Due to the decades-long political discourse on the PKK leadership and its members as a brutal organization based on terrorist tactics and having cost the lives of thousands of innocent people especially in eastern Turkey, the decision to start negotiations with the imprisoned leader Öcalan was regarded as controversial from different fractions of the society. Under concerns of nationalist backlash and also related to the decades-long rhetoric that “the state does not negotiate with terrorists”, the peace process was initiated in 2009 as a state policy framed widely as part of the wider democratization process.

In the 2009-2010 process, the PKK leadership and Öcalan were not considered as interlocutors. President Gül’s statements in August 2009 that Öcalan or the PKK will not

be considered as interlocutors (Gazete Vatan, 2009) were the first clear indicators for the exclusion of the PKK leadership. In the same way, the AKP deputy chairman Bekir Bozdağ stated that Öcalan and the PKK are not going to be interlocutors in any phase of the process but rather, the interlocutor in this process is the society itself and that the solution to the Kurdish problem will be found within the Turkish Parliament itself (NTV News, 2009). However, the leaking of the Oslo records revealed that an opposite approach was taken at the backchannel. This revealed the concerns with legitimacy in the initial phases of the process. It also revealed concerns with “spoilers” and especially the possible negative impact of domestic political opposition.

Initially, the AKP sought to adopt a vague approach to the issue of interlocutors. The Minister of the Interior Beşir Atalay declared the policy of “opening” to the media in August 2009. In this initial briefing on the issue, Atalay underlined that:

The basic components of the Democratic Opening will be formed upon a negotiation process with a wide basis⁸⁸. This is why we have not promoted a package or an action plan yet. We are still working on the process and we are in search for a ‘shared wisdom/ common sense’⁸⁹ that will bring the process to maturity. [...] We need to get rid of the ‘partition syndrome’. No one is able to separate our society that lives together since a thousand years. This is because our society is based upon fraternity⁹⁰. [...] This project aims at reinforcing our fraternity bonds. Our only interlocutor in this project is the society. (NTV, 2009a)

These statements reveal the AKP’s initial tendency to frame the process in terms of societal consensus. The vagueness in terms of the question of who to talk to is related to the fact that during the 2009-2010 Democratic Opening process, an open negotiation framework was not set up. This might be explained by the high political cost of

⁸⁸ In its original: “geniş bir müzakere sonucu”.

⁸⁹ In its original: “ortak akıl”.

⁹⁰ In its original: “Milletimizin hamuru kardeşlik mayasıyla yoğrulmuştur”.

undertaking the policies of opening. Also, this first phase can be regarded as pre-negotiation and therefore expectedly, controversial issues were not being addressed yet.

In a different direction, the political representatives of the Kurdish side tried to include all main actors to the talks. This is related with the asymmetric position of the Kurdish side and the PKK leadership's quest to be a negotiating actor in the process. Accordingly, early official statements by primary Kurdish actors were based on a call for including the PKK and its leadership especially in the negotiation of the issues related to arms. Ahmet Türk's statements in August 2009 (Milliyet, 2009) after the initial announcement of the Democratic Opening policy reveal this call. In Türk's words:

They say that the PKK must leave the arms. You need to negotiate with them, to persuade them. I do not hold the arms. How is it possible to achieve societal consensus without persuading and negotiating with those who hold the arms? So, you both say to the PKK 'you have to leave the arms' but you also tell them that they are not included in the [negotiation] process. (Milliyet, 2009)

In a similar vein, Öcalan pointed to the need to have the DTP at the table as the primary negotiating party. On the Democratic Opening process, Öcalan noted that⁹¹:

If the democratic negotiation process develops, this will be around DTP. Of course, Qandil and I will participate to the process indirectly. I do not call this 'indirect negotiation'; I call it 'democratic negotiation'. The DTP needs to undertake important role with regards the democratic negotiation process. The party needs to be prepared for that. There needs to be established a commission within the DTP that would be composed of members who are knowledgeable about processes of diplomacy and negotiation and who would put forward strong proposals on the negotiation process. This commission should propose the formation of another commission within the parliament that would

⁹¹ Öcalan's statements on the process are retrieved from news pieces. The statements reach the media through Öcalan's lawyers. The lawyers are allowed to take notes during meetings but they are required to hand over their notes to the prison administration that may or may not give back the notes later (generally within several months after the meeting). The lawyers convey Öcalan's ideas to the media after memorizing them during the meetings. The ideas are generally conveyed through the ANF (Firat Haber Ajansı, Firat News Agency), a Europe-based Kurdish news agency. At the time of the writing of this dissertation, access to the ANF website from Turkey was blocked (since 2015).

specialize on the democratic negotiation process. [...] This parliamentary commission would be composed of intellectuals, writers, academics, civil society representatives along with parliamentarians. This commission would meet all fractions including the General Staff, the DTP, and the MHP. This will pave the way for the democratic process. (Bianet, 2009b).

Öcalan's call for a "democratic negotiation process" with the DTP being primary party in the negotiation process reveals the PKK leader's concern with negotiation as a process addressing the political demands of the parties. Furthermore, Öcalan's statements reveal his support for an inclusive political negotiation process that would promote a democratic solution.

One main controversy on the notion of "interlocutors" emerged in 2010. During the Kurdish/Democratic Opening process, the AKP leader Erdoğan stated in TV and news briefings that it is the state and its institutions such as the intelligence agency that can meet (and thus negotiate) with the armed group, not the government (Radikal, 2010). He further underlined that the political leadership is in no position of engaging in talks with the armed group. This revealed the concerns with the political cost of the policies of opening by distinguishing between the political and the security/military aspects of the process. Erdoğan further accused the leadership in Qandil for seeking to legitimize their position and to present themselves as a 'side across the table' by engaging in such discussions.

Erdoğan's statements revealed the concern with balancing the military and the rights and recognition approaches through an effort to differentiate between the democratization process (through the Democratic Opening policy) and the military aspect of the process (i.e. how to handle the process through talks with the armed group reveals this concern). Furthermore, the government's stance should be evaluated within its contextual conditions. In this early phase of the peace process, the government was in

need for considering the political cost for undertaking such a peace process after decades of fighting with the armed group. This is closely related to the issue of public buy-in. Erdoğan's statements reveal the effort to "depoliticize" the issue, fitting the peace process in the framework of a state policy. In a balancing act, by projecting the Democratic Opening as a state policy initiated by the AKP government, the AKP sought to project itself as the "owner" of the process (T 24, 2009).

As a response to these statements, the BDP criticized the government for "criminalizing" the process and for trying to move it outside of the realm of politics. The BDP leadership called for undertaking the political courage to continue the peace process. The BDP leader Demirtaş stated that (Milliyet, 2010b): "The government needs to show political courage instead of saying that only the intelligence agency can meet and thus criminalize the meetings. They need to say 'we, as politicians, may meet.'" In order to support his position Demirtaş also stated:

There are examples of such meetings in the world. Both in the IRA process and in the process in South Africa it was the politicians that undertook and conducted the meetings. This is not something that intelligence agencies by themselves can conduct. This is not a criminal issue. This is a historical and political problem. Political problems are solved by politicians themselves. (Milliyet, 2010b)

This statement reveals that in his effort to support his position that peace negotiations need to be conducted primarily by political actors, Demirtaş made references to how negotiations were realized in the Northern Irish and South African negotiation processes⁹².

⁹² Referring to the negotiations in Northern Ireland and in South Africa. The Northern Irish peace negotiations between the Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland led to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998 after the inclusion of Sinn Fein, the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) political wing into the negotiations. The South African negotiations between the apartheid

With the start of the Resolution Process in late 2012, the issue of interlocutors gained a new character. The new process was highly different from the previous period mainly because it was partially transparent and also because Öcalan and Kurdish political actors were openly accepted as interlocutors. In an interview in early January 2013, Yalçın Akdoğan openly underlined that Turkey's interlocutor in the new process is Öcalan (Al Jazeera Türk, 2013). In the same interview, Akdoğan also noted that the aim of the process is “get the arms abandoned” (*amaç silah bıraktırmak*). However, Akdoğan further noted that:

In the talks, not everything regarding the Kurdish issue is addressed. On the Kurdish issue, we accept our Kurdish brothers and sisters as interlocutors... The terror problem today poisons the Kurdish problem and complicates a democratic solution, so we cannot ignore it. We need to cut out [the problem of terror]. (Al Jazeera Türk, 2013)

One major development regarding the issue of interlocutors is the formation of the Wise People Commission in March 2013. The WPC functioned as an intermediary commission between the state and the society with the purpose of understanding societal expectations and concerns on the process. The WPC can be seen as a mechanism of societal inclusion to the process. The groups organized meetings with the public and also with representatives from the local media, business groups, and local leaders. From this viewpoint, the WPC added a new dimension to the question of interlocutors and functioned as a public relations component.

Another development took place with the formation of the “İmralı group” as a group of HDP members tasked with visiting Öcalan in prison and conveying his messages to Qandil. The establishment of the İmralı group through the first visit on 3

government and the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) refer to the negotiation process that led to the end of apartheid regime and transition to democracy in 1994.

January 2013 revealed that the government transitioned to an approach that sought to include the Kurdish political side more openly to the talks. The İmralı group visits to Öcalan revealed for the first time a clear move from a security dimension to a political one and the first time such meeting became public without disclosing the content of the meetings (Çandar, 2013b). On the role of the İmralı group, Atalay stated at an interview in May 2013:

The meetings with İmralı were realized only by the intelligence agency, we [the government] did not participate in any of the meetings. But, in order to include a political aspect to this process we included the BDP in the new process [i.e. after 2012], so the BDP conducted meetings with both İmralı and the other side (Qandil) and in this way we gave the message that Turkey handles all its problems within the framework of politics. Terror and conflict should end and every issue should be discussed as part of the political process. (Habertürk TV, 2013)

Beşir Atalay's statements reveal that in the Resolution Process, the government transformed its previous strategy by giving the BDP a functional role. However, this was limited to a 'communicator' role and did not foresee the inclusion of the BDP as a negotiating partner.

The position of the İmralı group as an interlocutor in the process remained contested. Statements by group members at different times revealed that a clear role was missing. For example, in an interview in 2013 Ayla Akat who was part of the first group that went to see Öcalan in İmralı regarding the process stated that they were not informed about any details in their first visit, they learned the details from Öcalan himself (Asan, 2013). Later, at an interview he gave to a foreign newspaper, the HDP deputy Altan Tan self-criticized the position of the group by stating that "we should

have avoided becoming post carriers” (CNN Türk, 2015a) and “we found ourselves caught between Öcalan and Qandil” (Star, 2014).

The position of the BDP/HDP should be considered also from the perspective of how the group positioned itself within the process. The BDP/HDP repeatedly pointed to Öcalan as the sole interlocutor. This view was expressed repeatedly by the BDP/HDP leadership who called for a legal arrangement that would secure Öcalan’s position as the chief negotiator in the process stating that such an arrangement is crucial for opening the channels for democratic politics after the ‘silencing of the arms’ (Aslan, 2013). This view was also expressed by the DTK in its general conference declaration (Star, 2013a).

On the issue of interlocutors, conflicting views emerged within the sides themselves. For example, Sabri Ok’s briefings on the process after HDP’s statement on the disarmament of the PKK revealed such tensions:

Nobody is allowed to talk about disarmament on behalf of us who hold the arms- the will to hold the arms belongs to us. [...] We stated this earlier too, unless serious steps are taken for the solution of the Kurdish problem, unless our leader is freed and he meets with the insurgency by himself, there can be no discussion on disarmament. (T 24, 2014b)

As the representative of the armed wing of the Kurdish side to the negotiations, PKK members have sought to promote themselves as interlocutors on issues regarding the arms. Furthermore, the PKK leadership has also been critical of the representativeness of the HDP. On this Ok stated that: “The HDP needs to be more prudential, critical, and political. They need to project the stance of both the Kurdish society and our leadership to the Turkish people in a stronger and more correct way. This means that they need to be discussing in a stronger way against the state and the AKP” (T 24, 2014b).

Addressing the issue of interlocutors, Demirtaş provided information on how the negotiation table would be structured:

According to the agreement reached between Hakan Fidan⁹³ and Abdullah Öcalan, the [negotiation] table will be composed of a state delegation- they will compose an enlarged board that would be organized as needed- and we will have our own board at the table, along with Abdullah Öcalan, and a monitoring committee, and all these actors will sit at the same table at the same time. The sides to the negotiation will present each its own road map. Social, economic, security issues and also issues related to women and the environment will all be discussed at the table. The monitoring committee will follow all discussions and will contribute and/or criticize when needed. This process will evolve within the knowledge of the public. [...] The results reached at the table would be disseminated to Qandil and Ankara and then put into action if they also agree. [...] Qandil might participate to the process of negotiation at a later stage. (LICALI, 2014)

Demirtaş in the same statement underlined that Qandil supports this plan since they see Öcalan as their representative. However, later statements by PKK commanders revealed that criticisms arose on that issue.

Yet another issue on the question of representativeness refers to whether the PKK and its associated political representatives are representing all fractions of the Kurdish society. The issue of “whom to negotiate with” became a central debate among different Kurdish organizations (such as Huda-Par, the Freedom and Socialism Party (Özgürlük ve Sosyalizm Partisi- ÖSP), Rights and Freedoms Party (Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi- Hak-Par), too. In an interview made by Irfan Aktan and published online by the Heinrich Boell Stiftung Foundation, representatives of different Kurdish parties expressed their criticisms on PKK being projected as the only interlocutor regarding the Kurdish issue (Aktan, 24 March 2015). Also, in the same interview, representatives from the different Kurdish organizations expressed their concern that in the peace process, the

⁹³ Referring to the head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency who was one of the primary negotiators from the government side.

“Kurdish problem” is intermingled with the “PKK problem”. The meaning of this is that the peace process is narrowly focused upon the PKK and the issue of arms, rather than the problems of the Kurdish people. A common theme of the various organizations is that the Kurdish problem can be solved only with the granting of the cultural rights to the Kurds and giving political status that will pave the way for local self-government.

Overall, in terms of the question of “whom to talk to”, we see two main points: First, the 2009-2010 and the 2012-2013 processes were highly different from each other as in the Resolution Process Kurdish political actors and PKK actors including the leader of the insurgency were publicly accepted as interlocutors. Secondly, both sides to the process did not produce single views on the issue of interlocutors and representativeness. For example, the government was not clear on the role of the intelligence agency. On the other hand, the Kurdish actors expressed differing views on who should represent the Kurdish side and who should negotiate what issue in the process.

5.3.3 How to Negotiate?

The question of how to negotiate includes two main considerations. First is the issue of whether the negotiation will proceed in a transparent “front channel” manner or whether it will be based on the “back channel”. Secret negotiations often take place between negotiating parties with the purpose of exploring the interests and expectations of the other party without commitments, and also due to concerns with legitimacy especially at instances where the other party has been delegitimized. A second consideration is related to the role of third parties. Here, the main issue is whether external or internal third parties will undertake official and/or non-official roles.

The question of transparency is generally considered in the pre-negotiation phase. The desire not to accord legitimacy to the other side and concerns with reaction from supporters are seen as two main reasons for why secret talks might be preferred at the initial stage of the negotiation process (Guelke, 2008, p. 70). At instances when a government is in a dilemma of negotiations, i.e. when the government is willing to negotiate but is concerned about issues of legitimacy, backchannel talks are seen as a useful way to overcome this dilemma (Pruitt, 2006). Also, secret talks have generally exploratory nature and this is one of the reasons for secrecy, they allow for communication without commitment for a negotiated settlement.

Back-channel negotiations are official negotiations that are conducted in secret and are often regarded as appropriate for managing the uncertainties of the peace process. They have been characterized as “‘black markets’ of negotiations in the shadows” (Wanis- St. John, 2006, p. 120) as they provide bargaining spaces behind the front-channel negotiations. Secret back-channel negotiations are helpful when the costs for initiating a public negotiation process are high, when parties foresee that spoilers might harm the process, when parties seek to understand better underlying interests and priorities of the other side, and when they are unsure about the outcome of formal negotiations (Wanis- St. John, 2006). At the same time, peace negotiations might proceed in public and secret way simultaneously. One such example is the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in the 1990s.

The issue of transparency and the preference for back-channel negotiations is explained with the “audience effect” (Wanis- St. John, 2006, p. 124). This refers to the capacity of audiences such as constituents, the general parties, and even the members of a negotiating party to undermine a peace process due to gaps between their expectations

from the process and what can the primary actors achieve. Primary actors in the negotiation process might seek to engage in back-channel negotiations in order to communicate with the opposing party while at the same time protecting themselves from the negative impact that audiences might have upon the process. The secret Oslo talks in the Turkish-Kurdish context can be seen as part of this concern.

A second issue regarding the question of how to negotiate is third party participation in the negotiation process and the role that third parties might undertake. Fisher (2001, p. 11) provides a six-fold typology of third party intervention including conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration, and peacekeeping. This typology ranges in a scale from non-coercive (conciliation) to highly coercive (peacekeeping) roles for third parties. One main distinction is between official and unofficial interventions. Unofficial third party consultation focuses on perceptual, attitudinal, and relationship aspects of the conflict as opposed to mediation that is based on reasoning, persuasion, and the suggestion of alternatives (Fisher, 2007, p. 312). These involve problem-solving workshops (see for example Kelman, 1995) as part of Track II diplomacy with the purpose of opening up unofficial communication and dialogue.

An official form of third party involvement into a conflict is mediation. Mediation can be defined as “the intervention of a skilled and impartial intermediary working to facilitate a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement on the issues that are the substance of the dispute between the parties” (Fisher, 2001, p. 4). Mediators may take the form of a communicator, formulator, and/or manipulator depending on the extent of its leverage over the process and the extent the conflict parties seek mediation from third parties (Zartman, 2008). Mediation might be undertaken by states and international organizations such as the UN. In general terms, mediators are motivated by

the benefits of their role, either through the process (e.g. improved status) or through the outcomes (e.g. advancement of security interests) (Fisher, 2001, p. 7)

The parties' motives in accepting mediation might have to do with their expectation on lowering the risks of concession and the expectation that the third party would guarantee the implementation of the terms of the agreement. This also touches upon the question of third party impartiality. On this, Zartman and Touval note that the impartiality of third parties is not as important as the negotiating parties' consideration of the consequences of accepting or rejecting mediation (2008, p. 443). At this point, the pro-Kurdish side's call for a third party as part of the effort to guarantee a negotiated agreement can be seen as indicative for the Turkish case.

In the Turkish-Kurdish context on the question of "how to negotiate", the issue of transparency emerged as a central theme. The process itself involved a non-transparent phase that was leaked later to the media and dubbed as the Oslo process that is thought to have taken place during 2010 through 2011. This non-transparent phase included a third party (primarily Norway and possibly representatives from the United Kingdom) and the talks took place in Oslo, Norway among PKK representatives and the intelligence agency. The leaking of the meetings to the media raised controversy over the legitimacy of secret talks and also controversy over the state's meeting with "terrorists".

Later, in the Resolution Process (2012-2015), the talks were relatively transparent as meetings were to a degree followed by the media, at an extent that had no precedent. From this point, the Resolution Process can be seen as a move for continuing the peace process in a non-secret way. While not all the details regarding the process

were shared with the public, the post-2012 process evolved as a public process since the İmralı group meetings were followed by the media and group members made frequent statements about their visits and about the topics addressed during the meetings.

On the issue of how to negotiate, one of the most contested issues has been the question of whether the negotiations will include a third party in a mediating or monitoring capacity. During the Democratic Opening process (2009-2011) the issue did not become a priority. However, with the start of the Resolution Process the issue of third party involvement became a topic of controversy due to conflicting positions by different sides in the process.

As it is understood from the audio records, the meetings in Oslo involved a third-party mediator, but the identity and affiliation of the third party is uncertain. In a later interview, a PKK commander Mustafa Karasu confirmed the participation of third parties and revealed that they functioned as intermediaries between the imprisoned leader and the PKK representatives as they conveyed messages from each side to the other as part of the process. Karasu also revealed that the process was under preparation since 2006 (Akşam, 2013). Later statements revealed that the failure of the Oslo process after the media leaks functioned as a catalyst for change regarding how the peace process should proceed. In a statement in 2014 Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu, 2014b) underlined that the main “lesson” learnt from the Oslo process is the need to exclude external third parties from the process and the move to a “local and national” [*yerli ve milli*] process (the use of the notion of “local and national” is discussed extensively in *Chapter 6*).

Main controversies about third party involvement to the process include the composition of the group (i.e. whether it will be internal or external, whether it will

involve international organizations such as the UN or states such as the USA, what kind of internal actors would participate), and what role would it undertake (i.e. whether it would have monitoring or mediating capacity). In general terms, during the Resolution Process the government side rejected the participation of an external third party at any capacity. The government also rejected the formation of a national monitoring committee. In the opposite direction, the Kurdish side called for the establishment of a commission that would monitor the process. The composition of the commission did not become a point of high controversy. The main concern of the Kurdish side has been the need for a commission that would “keep the process on track” especially in periods of strained relationships and also would control whether parties keep up with their promises.

Öcalan called for the establishment of various commissions that would undertake different roles in the process, including monitoring the progress of the process. However, from Öcalan’s statements conveyed to the media through the İmralı group and his lawyers, it seems that Öcalan did not call for an external third party monitor but for an internal one. Öcalan made calls for an internal third-party, i.e. a commission that would be composed of individuals who would be acceptable and respected by all sides and who are accepted as trustful.

The issue of an external third-party was most openly supported by the leadership in Qandil. Some PKK commanders openly called for the USA to take a third party role (Star, 2013b). Also, news referring that international negotiator Martti Ahtisaari⁹⁴ might

⁹⁴ Martti Ahtisaari is a Finnish politician, international mediator, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2008). He was a key figure in the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace talks during 1992-93 and undertook diplomatic roles in the conflicts in Kosovo (1998-99), Northern Ireland (1996-98), and Indonesia (2004-2005), among others.

take a role in the process appeared in the media (Gönültaş, 2010). Some HDP deputies also made occasional statements about the benefits of an external third party.

Discussions for a monitoring committee gained impetus in 2014. In December 2014, news pieces appeared that pointed to ongoing developments in the parliament for the legal basis of the monitoring committee and the expectation that legal steps on the Resolution Process (that Öcalan had called for in his meeting with the İmralı group in November 2014) would be included in the forthcoming democratization package (Lıcalı, 2014). News pieces providing the names of the committee members involving the names of the members of the WPC were circulated in the media. Also, HDP members' statements pointed that decisions (at least in an unofficial manner) had been taken with regards to the issue of a commission. For example, the HDP MP and prominent Kurdish politician Mithat Sancar's⁹⁵ statements in November 2014 for the establishment of a monitoring committee (Söylemez, 2014) revealed that the negotiating sides in Turkey had reached a consensus on the establishment of a committee that is "national", i.e. composed by members from within Turkey, such as intellectuals, former bureaucrats, and activists. Sancar noted that the function of such a committee would be mainly to help solve crises that might emerge at different stages of the process, by determining the reasons and the ways out of the crises.

In a similar vein, the HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş's statements at a newspaper in November 2014 (Lıcalı, 2014) after the meeting of HDP members with Yalçın Akdoğan pointed to the same direction:

⁹⁵ Mithat Sancar is a Turkish politician and MP for the pro-Kurdish party HDP since June 2015. He is also a professor of public and constitutional law.

The monitoring committee will side with freedom, peace and democracy. It will be straightforward in pointing out the mistakes it identifies [in the process]. The committee will reveal to the public opinion those who act in an unfair manner, what they do not accept, and those who act unconscientiously. [...] When it is the case, it will reveal whether Öcalan or the government is acting in an unjust manner. It will also reveal who is responsible when the ceasefire is broken. The members of such a committee should in no way have a political identity because this will damage trust to them. The committee should be composed of people who represent the public conscience.⁹⁶

Similarly, in later phases of the Resolution Process, Demirtaş underlined that the monitoring committee is the “red line” of the process itself, not of the party or Öcalan (Şenay, 2015). In the words of Demirtaş: “The monitoring committee is a *sine qua non* of the negotiation processes. It is not only something the HDP demands. It needs to be realized because it is in the nature of the process”. However, shortly after the appearance of the statements in the media, the government criticized statements by Demirtaş. Davutoğlu stated that there is no need for a “foreign eye” as a third party and that the failure at Oslo revealed that a foreign third party is not needed (T 24, 2014a).

Later statements by HDP members revealed that Öcalan also pointed to the need for a “national” monitoring committee during his meetings with the İmralı group. In a statement in November 2014, a prominent HDP MP and politician Sırrı Süreyya Önder noted that Öcalan did not reject the option for the formation of a committee with members from outside of Turkey. Öcalan at this point proposed a committee in the form of a union of international monitors that would include members from other countries that have gone through conflict processes. However, Önder noted that Öcalan is not insisting on such an international committee but that his preference is for a local one, one “that would be under the control of our own people” (Milliyet, 2014b).

⁹⁶ In its original: “kamu vicdanı”.

In a media statement after meeting with Öcalan, the İmralı group conveyed Öcalan's message (Milliyet, 2014c) for the establishment of a secretariat that would help his work in prison. The secretariat was established in March 2015 after five prisoners and former PKK members were transferred from other prisons to the İmralı prison to work with Öcalan (Habertürk, 2015a). In a statement regarding Öcalan's call for the establishment of a secretariat, the Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç noted that the secretariat is distinguished from the İmralı group that visits Öcalan in prison, and underlined that a secretariat would only help Öcalan in matters related to taking notes and tracking the progress in the talks (CNN Türk, 2014). This revealed, once again, the government's effort to reject the idea of a monitoring committee. Similarly, Erdoğan's statements (Hürriyet, 2015) in March 2015 that he does not support the establishment of a monitoring committee in any format [neither external or internal, nor composed of previous members of the WPC] was part of the effort to reject the idea. This was accompanied by the move to a "national and local" peace process that is further discussed in *Chapter 6*.

Overall, transparency and third-party involvement discussions were highly confined to the positions of the parties. While the pro-government side was strict on the view that a third party is not needed, Kurdish actors expressed varying views commonly pointing to the need for a third party in principle. Armed fractions pointed to external actors such as states [the USA] and also international mediators to take part in the monitoring committee.

5.3.4 What to Negotiate?

The question of what to negotiate is closely related to the asymmetric nature of conflicts between states and insurgencies. Pertaining to their differing perceptions of the causes of the conflict, it is common that the different sides would have differing expectations from peace. Thus, negotiations for peace also involve a bargain over what the conflict was about. The peace negotiation process itself is part of what has been called as a “meta bargain” as to the causes of and solutions to the conflicts (Bell, 2008, p. 213). This is also the case with Turkey’s peace process for solving the Kurdish issue, whereby different sides had differing expectations in terms of prioritizing different aspects in the peace process.

The way the actors approach the conflict is definitive for which issues they seek to include in the negotiation process, which issues they seek to exclude and also which issues to prioritize over others within the process. The government, oscillating between the military and the democratic rights understanding, prioritized different issues at different periods. During the Democratic Opening process and the Unity and Fraternity Project, the government sought to primarily address basic democratization demands of the Kurds. Thus, in this period, partial measures addressing the democratic demands of the Kurds, including broadcasting in Kurdish and the change of village names to the original Kurdish names, were taken. In later phases of the Resolution Process, especially after late 2014, the military approach prioritizing disarmament became a priority. This brought together a discourse on “locality” further discussed in the next chapter.

In the Turkish-Kurdish context, Kurdish actors were in search for guarantees both regarding disarmament and demobilization and regarding institutional power-sharing through decentralization and the strengthening of local governance. In general

terms, the issue of guarantees is central both in terms of security guarantees and in terms of power-sharing guarantees and institutional arrangements. Some studies argue that resolving underlying issues in a conflict is not enough to convince fighting fractions to accept and implement a peace settlement. Rather, there is need for credible guarantees on the terms of the agreement (Walter, 1999). A major aspect of the terms of a peace agreement is the DDR process.

Security guarantees are crucial for the DDR process. The peace process is marked by a security dilemma whereby disarming fractions feel increasingly vulnerable while they demobilize (Walter, 1999, p. 134). This vulnerability may lead to the failure of the DDR process in cases where credible guarantees are not provided to disarming fractions. In the Turkish case, several PKK commanders pointed to the absence of security guarantees as a reason why the process of “leaving the mountains” was ceased in 2015 (BirGün, 2015). This pointed to a security dilemma in the process of disarmament and demobilization. At this point, it should be noted that the security dilemma was felt by all parties in a negotiation process. In the Turkish-Kurdish context, while the pro-Kurdish fractions felt vulnerability and insecurity in the process of disarmament, the government felt the same insecurity due to domestic political developments such as the Gezi protests in May 2013 and the Kobane incidents in October 2014 (on this, see Çiçek, 2018, pp. 192-194).

As evident from the government’s stance oscillating between the military and the democratic rights approach to the process, addressing the “problem of terror” remained on the agenda both during the opening process and the Resolution Process. Disarmament became a high priority in the Resolution Process especially after 2014. On the other hand, the Kurdish side to the negotiations has prioritized political demands including the

necessary constitutional changes for providing a political status to the Kurds, and also the establishment of various commissions including a monitoring commission and a truth commission. Based on the above, the issue of what to negotiate is examined below under three main headings: security, politics, and transitional justice.

Security: Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration

Due to the essence of the Kurdish problem involving an armed group that used violent tactics as a means to advance its agenda, the question of security and more specifically the issue of arms has been central to the negotiation process.

In both the Democratic Opening and later in the Resolution Process, the government set the agenda of the peace process as “to make the arms be left” [*amaç silah bıraktırmak*]. Therefore, the government has prioritized “leaving of arms” for the negotiation of security issues while at the same time carried on short to medium term democratic progress through democratization reforms during 2009-2010 and the “democratization package” introduced in 2013.

In the first period (2009-2011), Beşir Atalay’s parliamentary speech on 10 November 2009 (TBMM, 2009a) revealed the emphasis on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration:

In the Democratic Opening process we aim to achieve two interrelated targets: First, to end (or minimize) terror, and second, to develop our democracy and raise its standards. The experiences of countries that have gone through similar problems have shown that in order to end the problem of terror, the terrorist organization should [first] leave its arms. This is the essential part of ‘leaving the mountain’ (i.e. demobilization of the PKK). If armed groups leave their arms and

come back to the country [Turkey], this is the fulfilment of one of the targets of the fight against terror.⁹⁷

In the Resolution Process, the issue of disarmament was openly addressed with the letter of Öcalan that was read to the public on the day of Newroz on 21 March 2013. Through his letter, Öcalan called for the transition from armed to political struggle. The PKK leadership in Qandil accepted Öcalan's call and started the withdrawal of armed groups on 8 May 2013. However, this phase of the withdrawal came to an end within several months. The PKK announced that it ceased the withdrawal in September 2013 (BBC Türkçe, 2013) on the grounds that the AKP did not take the steps that were expected.

Upon criticisms by the government that only twenty percent of PKK militias withdrew and those who left included only elder members and female PKK members, PKK commander Cemil Bayık responded that the first phase of the withdrawal process required the start of withdrawal and not its completion. This revealed an ambiguity in the way the two sides understood and interpreted the steps and also it revealed that the steps were not clearly defined. After the PKK's announcement, Öcalan (T 24, 2013b) called for the transition from dialogue to negotiation format (a.k.a. from pre-negotiation to negotiation). He asked three main points: enabling/empowering actors and institutions that would support the end of violence, opening the channels for democratic politics, and enabling the establishment of a commission that will investigate the truth and monitor the process.

The position of the government has been that issues related to arms are not open to negotiation and that arms should be abandoned without any preconditions. This has

⁹⁷ This is a reference to the Habur incident (explain).

been apparent from repeated statements by government actors that the process cannot evolve if the PKK does not disarm first. Therefore, in the Resolution Process (2012-2015), disarmament was set as a precondition for the continuation of talks.

However, this is also related to how the two sides defined disarmament at first place. The government perceived disarmament not as a process but as a practice of leaving the arms that needs to be done as a precondition for negotiation. On the other hand, the Kurdish side understood ceasefire (and not disarmament) as the precondition for the talks. As part of this understanding, disarmament is regarded as a long-term process that needs to be situated within a framework that would include clear agreement on how the steps of demobilization and reintegration would take place after disarmament. From this viewpoint, one of the tenets of the disarmament process is the need for legal measures that would address each step in the process and would provide security guarantees to those who disarm. Based on the above and with the benefit of hindsight, the two sides seem to have approached the issue of disarmament from different angles and pushed for mutually incompatible processes. The main divergence lies in the difference between non-confrontation (çatışmasızlık) and disarmament (silahsızlanma).

During the Resolution Process, one of the main disagreements regarding the disarmament process emerged from the Kurdish side's call for security guarantees in the form of legal measures that would address issues of repatriation and the status of the demobilized groups. The PKK leadership, Öcalan and the political leadership of the BDP/HDP voiced the call for legal measures and security guarantees repeatedly.

As a response to the call for a legal basis for the Resolution Process (i.e. legal guarantees), the then Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinç stated that:

Did they ask for a legal basis when they came to the country? So, is this why they ask for a legal basis while they are leaving? - No. The fact that they are asking for a legal basis means that they ask to become political actors. They seek to gain legitimacy, to be a political actor as part of the law. And then they are going to use their legitimacy both within Turkey and abroad at the international arena. (Haberler Newsdesk, 2013b)

Regarding the issue of guarantees, in an interview in December 2014, member of the PKK top leadership Cemil Bayık noted that:

Since 1993 we declared ceasefire unilaterally nine times. [In the Resolution Process] We unilaterally released the captives, we declared ceasefire, we stopped the war, and we relocated the guerrillas from their positions to the south. No power in the world would take these steps unilaterally. They would discuss it under the supervision of a third party, sign [an agreement] and then put it into practice. We did none of these. (Milliyet, 2014a)

This statement reveals the PKK leadership's expectation that a third party with monitoring capacity should be present during the disarmament process.

Within the Resolution Process, the issue of homecoming (*eve dönüş*) was addressed through the Law on the Resolution Process that was accepted in the Parliament in July 2014 (Official Gazette, 2014). Indeed, legal measures regarding reintegration date back to early 2000s. An early law titled Law on the Reintegration to the Society [Topluma Kazandırma Kanunu] was accepted in July 2003 (Official Gazette, 2003) [Penal Code number 221]. The purpose of the law was to reintegrate to the society persons who have been part of terrorist organizations. The law foresaw impunity for those who surrender without having committed crimes and reduced sentence for those

who committed. The top leadership was exempt from the law for homecoming and reintegration. Later, in 2007 Erdoğan gave the signals for the extension of the 2003 law (CNN Türk, 2007). However, due to wide scale criticism by the opposition parties Erdoğan retreated from his call and no steps were taken. By April 2008 the number of PKK members who benefited from the law totalled three hundred (Hürriyet, 2008). Two-hundred ninety-one of those who benefitted from the law were already in prisons and only nine non-imprisoned PKK members gave themselves in (Radikal, 2008). During this period, the impact of the law remained below the expectations. Also, the enforcement of the law faced some problems in practice. One main problem was the definition of “those who have not engaged in crime”. This category included those who have been subject of legal prosecution. Those members who were included in intelligence reports were not able to benefit from the law. During the Resolution Process, with a legal change in June 2013 the law was expanded to include those PKK members who have not been subject to prosecution (Milliyet, 2013b).

With the restart of the conflict after the June 2015 elections, a new discussion started regarding the disarmament process. In this period the Kurdish side called for “strengthened ceasefire” [*tahkim edilmiş ateşkes*] that would enable the return to the talks. ‘Strengthened ceasefire’ was first mentioned after the İmralı group’s meeting with Öcalan in November 2014. Öcalan conveyed his call for strengthened ceasefire that would be supervised by a monitoring committee. Furthermore, Öcalan declared that no step would be taken without legal guarantees (BBC Türkçe, 2014b). The notion of strengthened ceasefire gained prominence with the call by the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and Kurdish political leadership to return to the peace process after the escalation of the conflict after the June 2015 elections. However, as further discussed in

Chapter 6, the AKP in the period after the June 2015 elections had already returned to military measures emphasizing the call for disarmament.

Erdoğan's statements at his meeting with headmen [muhtarlar toplantısı] is indicative of this turn:

You need to first leave the arms- look at IRA in Northern Ireland, they buried their arms in concrete⁹⁸ and they showed this as evidence to the whole world. Did you [the PKK] do anything similar? No. You need to leave the arms, also leave the discourse that supports discord and then, if you have something to say, you will say it in politics, within the limits of constitutional democracy. In case you do not want a resolution, this is your choice. We trust our own people, both Turks and Kurds for resolving this problem. We are able to resolve the problem despite those who do politics in the shadow of arms. (Erdoğan, 2015c)

Erdoğan's reference to an international experience, the Northern Irish case, with focus on how disarmament evolved there reveals an effort to support a specific position on disarmament. The reference is made with the purpose of supporting the idea that disarmament is the "act" of leaving the arms and destroying them (by burying them in concrete). Through this reference it becomes clear that from a pro-government view, disarmament is not subject to negotiation but it is a practical matter that needs to be fulfilled.

Political Reforms: Political Status, Local Governance, Cultural Rights

In the area of politics, the main topics regarding what to negotiate involve the demand for political status for the Kurds, the strengthening of local governance, and the recognition of the cultural rights of Kurds (including language rights). These demands

⁹⁸ In its original: "betona gömdüler".

can be commonly considered as part of constitutional demands that address the expectations of the Kurdish side for official recognition of the identity of the Kurds and their rights. From this viewpoint, the three issues are all part of the rights and recognition approach. The government addressed the political demands of the Kurds in the form of democratization steps.

One major topic considered central for negotiation is the “political status” of the Kurds. Although it has been used frequently in media statements of main actors, this is a vague concept involving demands for the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity and democratic self-governance. As Çandar (2011) also notes, while there is a consensus for the necessity of political status for the Kurds, there is lack of consensus on what this status involves. Views on the content of the status range from democratic self-governance, to empowering local governments, and decentralization. In the same report, Çandar notes that one common understanding of the notion of political status for the Kurds is their full democratic participation to political life and having the ability to govern themselves within the Republic of Turkey.

The formation of a new constitution and the abolition of the 1982 constitution that is currently at place have been expressed as a priority by both the government and the Kurdish side. Kurdish actors have voiced repeatedly the need for a new constitution that would introduce a new understanding of citizenship that would end discrimination against non-Turkish identities. The government has criticized the current constitution as being unfit for the democratic regime in Turkey.

The need for the formation of a new constitution has also been voiced by the Minister of the Interior Beşir Atalay in his speech in the Grand National Assembly on 13 November 2009:

A democratic and civilian constitution is the real key for raising Turkey's democratic standards. [...] Our people do not deserve the current constitution that does not fulfill the needs of the Turkish people. We need to create a new constitution with the highest possible level of societal participation and consensus. [...] We have repeatedly underlined that in no way the first three points of the constitution- those regarding the unitary structure of the Turkish Republic, the flag, the national anthem, and the official language- will be changed. [...] The Democratic Opening will in no way harm our unitary structure, and our national unity. In contrast, it supports our national unity and will continue doing so. (TBMM, 2009b)

As part of the constitution making process, a Constitution Conciliation Commission [Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu] was established in October 2011. The commission was composed of three representatives from each of the four political parties that are represented in the parliament. The commission met three times during the period 2011-2016 and was dissolved after its third meeting on 16 February 2016. The commission's dissolution came after controversies over the presidency system (Hürriyet, 2016) that was introduced later in April 2017 through a public referendum.

The constitutional commission became a point of criticism since the beginning of its formation. For example, a well-known constitutional legal expert and member of the constitution commission, Ergun Özbudun stated to the media that the commission is a "stillborn baby" because of arrangements such as the need for unanimity vote for any decision and the clause that foresees the dissolution of the commission in case a political party withdraws its members (NTV, 2011).

While the formation of a new constitution that would replace the current one should be considered with regards to the wider democratization needs of the country, constitution-making is at the basis of the Kurdish issue. This is related to the way the current constitution defines citizenship, minority rights, and language issues, among

other issues⁹⁹. The first three clauses that define the main characteristics of the Turkish republic are the most controversial ones. One of the most controversial points refers to the ideological definition of the state, embracing the Atatürkist ideology. This is regarded as controversial as it excludes those who do not adopt the ideology and also prioritizes ideology over universal values (such as democracy and universal human rights). During the work of the Constitutional Commission, the AKP and the HDP supported the change of the first clauses while the CHP and the MHP opposed any such change. The third clause of the constitution is that “The language of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish”—this clause was proposed to be reformulated as “The Official language of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish” with the purpose of leaving room for languages other than Turkish to be recognized (Karabağlı, 2013). Another controversial point is the clause number 66 that defines citizenship. According to the clause, “Each person who is attached to the Republic of Turkey through citizenship is a Turk”. This clause excludes identities other than Turkishness and had been a point of crisis throughout the commission’s work (T 24, 2013a).

Furthermore, beyond the constitutional clauses per se, Turkey’s reservations as a signatory in many international documents are also problematic with regards to the Kurdish issue (Kurban & Ensaroğlu, 2010). Turkey has made reservations on several points of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Convention on Social and Political Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Each reservation is related to minority rights, especially cultural rights including right to education in native language.

⁹⁹ For a detailed account, see Kurban and Ensaroğlu (2010).

Another main political demand by the Kurdish side is the strengthening of local governance and decentralization. Turkey has signed the European Charter on Local Government (ECLG); however, it has not adopted the legal reforms for transforming its highly centralized government structure. Kurdish actors have made the claim that as part of the demand for strengthening local self-government Turkey needs to change its position on the reservation it has put on the Charter. As it is further discussed in *Chapter 6*, the issue of local governance and the position of Turkey vis-à-vis the ECLG has led to conflicting interpretations of the notion of local governance by the government and the Kurdish actors.

Transitional Justice: Truth Commission, Amnesty

A third topic on what to negotiate is related to the area of transitional justice. Two main issues is the issue of the establishment of a truth commission and the question of whether amnesty provisions would be provided to PKK members.

The Kurdish side has been consistent on the call for the establishment of a truth commission as a crucial part of the peace process since the initial phase of the Kurdish opening in 2009. This call is based on the contention that the society (especially the part of the society that lives in the western parts of the country) needs to know the truth about past wrongdoings of the state towards its citizens.

Ahmet Türk called for the establishment of a commission in the parliamentary meeting on 13 November 2009:

A commission should be established that would investigate the wrong-sided understanding of history and uncover the truth. It should investigate the truth and reveal who and when did mistakes, what these mistakes are. [...] This

should be based on a transparent process and should proceed under the supervision of the parliament and in a manner open to the public. [...] The Turkish community has the right to know all the truth about the Kurdish problem. We cannot expect that the public will support the process without knowing all the truth. (TBMM, 2009b)

Öcalan's "road map" that he wrote in 2009 and was seized by the prison administration and that was later passed from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to Öcalan's lawyers in 2011, includes Öcalan's plan for gradual solution to the Kurdish problem¹⁰⁰. The "Democratic Solution Plan" involves three phases: First, the PKK's announcement of armistice; second, the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission¹⁰¹ through the government's initiative and the Parliament's approval that would work on issues including the move of the PKK to the bases outside Turkey and the process of granting amnesty to political prisoners; thirdly, with the progress on democratic reforms, the gradual repatriation of those who live in exile, those who have been expatriated, and those living as refugees in other countries. This three-point plan reveals the call by the PKK leader for the formation of a TRC at the very beginning of the peace process in 2009.

The issue of truth commission also became a topic of discussion during the secret Oslo talks. In September 2012, a document regarding the Oslo process was disclosed to the press by a CHP deputy (Al Jazeera Türk, 2012a). The document involved a ten-point agreement between the PKK and the Turkish state involving a plan about how the process would proceed at the next stage. The most significant point of the document is

¹⁰⁰ The full text of the document is not available to the public. The part of the text on an 'Action Plan' is available at the appendix of Cengiz Çandar's 2011 report titled "Leaving the Mountain: How may the PKK Lay Down Arms? Freeing the Kurdish Question from Violence" written for TESEV (Çandar, 2011).

¹⁰¹ The earliest reference to a Truth Commission by Öcalan conveyed to the media by his lawyers is found in 2006 (Sol Gazete, 2006) where he called for the establishment of a commission that would help solve the Kurdish problem that would be composed of experts in the area of law, medicine, and professors that would be chosen by the government.

that it foresees the establishment of a Constitutional Council, a Peace Council, and a Truth and Justice Council as part of the process. This reveals again, along with the speech of Ahmet Türk in 2009, that some kind of Truth Commission was on the agenda of the pro-Kurdish side since the beginning of the process.

During the Resolution Process, the call for a truth commission was included in the report prepared by the BDP/HDP on the Resolution Process (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, 2013). The report called for the establishment of a truth commission through parliamentary decision that will help get to terms with the past. Also, Öcalan's third letter that was read to the public on 21 March 2015 in Diyarbakır made a clear call for the establishment of a truth commission:

We are in need of starting a new process that will build upon the Dolmabahçe declaration. [...] I find it vital to invite the PKK to organize a congress that will designate the political and social strategy and tactics that the PKK will undertake with the purpose of fulfilling its decision to end its armed struggle against the Turkish Republic. I hope that we will reach agreement on the main principles as soon as possible and form a Truth and Confrontation Commission (Hakikat ve Yüzleşme Komisyonu) that will be composed of Parliamentarians and members of a Monitoring Committee. We are now entering a new period. In this new period we are going to live peacefully and brotherly [*kardeşçe*] under equal constitutional citizenship, as a democratic society with a democratic identity. (Al Jazeera, 2015a)

After Öcalan's letter, the HDP leadership announced that the PKK Congress that Öcalan called to be gathered in order to take decisions about the process of disarmament will not be convened until a truth commission is established (T 24, 2015a).

The most decisive call for the establishment of a truth commission came with HDP's legislative proposal in February 2015 titled "Law on the Establishment of the Commission on Historical Truth and Confrontation" (HDP Group Presidency, 14 February 2015). The proposal preamble underlined the need for confronting the past

with the purpose of building a peaceful future. The proposal further designated the parliament as the authorized body for the establishment of the commission. Regarding its composition, the law proposal foresaw the formation of a commission where political party representatives would cooperate with civil society representatives, academicians and specialists who would help with their work the aim of uncovering historical truths. The law further foresaw that the focus of the commission would be the recent history of Turkey and especially the period after the 1980 coup d'état.

A second major topic under transitional justice is the issue of amnesty. The question of amnesty has been a controversial topic during the peace process. The PKK members called for absolute amnesty since the start of the Kurdish opening in 2009. Both political actors and PKK members have voiced their demands for a general amnesty as a crucial part of the process. In a statement in November 2013, BDP's deputy chairman Pervin Buldan expressed this view by stating "I think that general amnesty is crucial for the process. Not in terms of who will be freed and who will not, but in terms of achieving societal reconciliation and union. So, this has to be realized in a way that will not bring harm to anyone, and I think that Mr. Öcalan should be included" (Al Jazeera, 2013).

5.4 Conclusion: Between the 'Local' and the 'International' In the Peace Process

This chapter provided an analytical account of the 2009-2015 peace process in Turkey with focus on the issues that became prominent during the different phases of the process and the perspectives of primary actors. The chapter first provided a discussion on how the two main approaches to the Kurdish conflict and the peace process- the

military approach and the rights and recognition approach- were transformed during different periods in the Resolution Process. This part of the chapter argued that while the government oscillated between the military and the rights and recognition approaches, the pro-Kurdish side adopted the rights and recognition approach throughout the process from 2009 to 2015.

In the second part, the chapter provided an analysis of the peace process based on four main questions: the question of when to negotiate, the question of who to negotiate with, the question of how to negotiate, and the question of what to negotiate. This analysis was based on primarily the political discourse of the main actors during the peace process. The analysis in this part revealed the issues that emerged as prominent for each aspect of peace process design and the differing views supported by different actors on both sides to the negotiations.

The perspectives on the “when, with whom, how, and what” questions provided above reveal that some issues that were addressed during the peace process were confined to the domestic context while others were considered within international perspectives. One main observation is that primary actors made occasional references to international experiences of peacebuilding in their discourse. One example is the Kurdish party leader Demirtaş’s reference to the IRA experience with the purpose of supporting the idea that all fractions need to be included in the negotiation process. Another example is the government leader Erdoğan’s perspective on the disarmament process in the case of Northern Ireland. Erdoğan expressed the view that arms need to be abandoned and destroyed the same way as this process took place in Northern Ireland. Both examples reveal the main actors’ use of international experiences in a strategic

manner, with the purpose of supporting their own perspective on how a peace process should proceed.

Different actors prioritized different issues in their perspectives on how a peace process should proceed. On this, the analysis above considered the temporal changes throughout the peace process (2009-2015). For example, during the Democratic Opening process (2009-2010) government actors expressed concerns with both democratization and also with disarmament. In the Resolution Process (2012-2015) and especially after the gradual straining of relationships, government actors expressed disarmament as a clear priority. On the other hand, Kurdish actors expressed varying views on what to prioritize. While political actors prioritized issues on democratic rights, representatives of the armed fraction prioritized issues related to representativeness and also the question of monitoring committee.

The question of which issues/ideas are selected over others is crucial as it reveals what kind of peace process design and relatedly what kind of peace do domestic actors expect to be achieved. The selection process is the result of both domestic political considerations and of considerations of internal and external legitimacy. In selecting which ideas to adopt from international experiences to the domestic context, actors defined the parameters of the peace process in Turkey. Actors are not passive receivers of international ideas and norms but they engage in a selection process to fit their domestic agenda. This means that actors do not abandon in total their domestic positions nor do they stay firmly attached to them: while different actors engage at different levels with ideas outside the local and the domestic, they find the space to negotiate peace. There is interplay between firm positions on the conflict and the “ideas from outside”.

The peace negotiation process itself is a space of contestation among actors that negotiate the terms of the peace.

Having considered how primarily the main actors approached main issues on how the peace process would be designed, the next chapter provides the perspectives of high and middle level actors. The empirical discussion in the next chapter is derived from in-depth open-ended interviews with those actors. Also, the next chapter situates the findings within the theoretical discussions on international norm diffusion and hybridity discussed in the Theoretical Framework provided in *Chapter 2*.

CHAPTER 6

RECONSIDERING THE HYBRIDIZATION DEBATE: THE SELECTIVE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND PRACTICES IN TURKEY’S KURDISH PEACE PROCESS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the diffusion of international norms and practices in the case of Turkey’s peace process regarding the Kurdish conflict focusing on interviews with high- and middle-level actors in the process. Extending the empirical analysis of *Chapter 5*, this chapter aims to deepen our understanding of how norms and practices that constitute part of the international peacebuilding framework discussed in *Chapter 2* became part of the peace process in Turkey. With this purpose, this chapter provides a thematic analysis of the norms and practices that were adopted by local actors with reference to other cases of negotiated peace settlements and how followed by a discussion of how this “meeting” between global and local norms and practices can be situated within the hybridity debates in peacebuilding.

The meeting of international and local norms and practices is discussed through the notion of *hybridity by design*, a concept proposed in this dissertation as a novel approach to the hybridity debate by focusing on local agency in peace processes in a deeper manner. Hybridity by design is defined in this study as *the strategies used by local actors to support and promote peace process perspectives by selectively adopting and/or rejecting international norms, ideas, and practices to legitimize their own position in the absence of top-down design of the peace process*. Hybridity by design emerges from the actors' effort to legitimize their perspectives on peace process design by making selective references to international norms, ideas, and practices.

This perspective on hybridity offers a new dimension to our understanding of hybridity moving beyond the focus on "imposition and resistance" that has dominated critical peace research in the recent decade. It also provides a deeper understanding of local agency by regarding local actors as capable of promoting their own version of peace process by *selectively* "learning" from other experiences of negotiated settlements within the limits defined by internal and external power dynamics. Furthermore, it offers a view of international norms going multiple ways, as opposed to the view that norms only travel top-down or bottom-up. Turkish and Kurdish actors' strategic adoption of specific norms and practices over others through a platform of expertise and experience sharing by other actors reveals horizontal diffusion of these ideas in the absence of top-down imposition.

The chapter is organized into two main sections. In the first part, I investigate how local actors situated discussions on peace process design in the context of the peace process in Turkey by making references to international peace processes found around the world. The majority of interviewees referred to the Northern Irish and South African

peace processes from different perspectives. Following this section, I focus on the question of why these two cases of negotiated peace settlements emerged as primary cases of reference for Turkish and Kurdish actors. In this part, I analyze the role of conflict resolution initiatives that emerged in the Turkish case as crucial to providing a platform for the dissemination of norms, principles, and practices. Here, the role of the Democratic Progress Institute's (DPI) Turkey Program and its activities in terms of organizing study trips and conflict analysis workshops in addition to providing a platform for expertise sharing is analyzed.

The second part of this chapter situates the findings from the Turkish case within the hybridization debate. The hybridity debate in peacebuilding research aims to understand how international ideas and practices of peacebuilding are adopted, rejected, and renegotiated in context by local actors. The chapter provides a reappraisal of the hybridity debate and argues that the analysis of the Turkish case points to *hybridity by design*. Hybridity by design moves beyond the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy that has haunted the norm diffusion and hybridity literatures respectively and allows for a new perspective where a deeper understanding of local agency in the absence of top-down imposition of the peace process becomes possible. An analysis of the strategies adopted by actors from the two sides to the negotiations reveals this point. This argument is further supported by the government's move to "local and national" [*milli ve yerli*] peace process and the Kurdish side's move to "strengthened ceasefire" [*tahkim edilmiş ateşkes*] in the process of stalling after 2015. The concluding part overviews the chapter.

6.2 High- and Middle-Level Actors' Perspectives on Peace Process Design

Ideational diffusion is closely related to the actors' effort to situate the peace process in Turkey within international ideas and practices contextualized through references to other cases of peace processes. Almost all interviewees (31 out of 34 interviews) made some kind of reference to other cases of negotiated solutions to peace processes. This means that nearly all interviewees made references to experiences from other cases of negotiated peace settlement and sought to situate part of the ideas and practices they discussed in light of these experiences. The purpose of this section is to analyze which issues were referred to in relation to international examples and discuss the reasons for it. Furthermore, this part also analyzes the question of how the specific ideas that the interviewees situated within international experiences of negotiated peace processes were received (i.e. the mechanisms through which these ideas reached the domestic context in Turkey).

In terms of references to other cases, two cases of conflict resolution and negotiated peace processes emerged as prominent: the case of Northern Ireland and the case of South Africa. References to other cases such as the Philippines, Colombia, and the Basque Country, were made at a minimal level. The table below gives the number of references coded for each case through NVivo.

Table 5: Number of References to Other Cases and Sources Coded

Cases	Number of references coded	Number of sources coded ¹⁰²
Northern Ireland	30	13
South Africa	17	13
The Philippines	6	5
Colombia	2	2
Basque Country	1	1

Table 5 shows that out of 34 interviewees, 13 made references to the Northern Irish peace process and 13 to the South African peace process, five interviewees referred to the peace process in the Philippines, two to the Colombian peace process and one interviewee referred to the Basque country. In terms of the number of references coded, most references were made to the Northern Ireland process with a total of 30 references coded. For the South African case, 17 references were coded. The remaining international experiences- the Philippines, Colombia, and the Basque Country were referred to significantly less.

Northern Ireland and South Africa emerged as the two main cases referred to in the discussions on process issues regarding the peace process in Turkey. During the fieldwork research for this study, local actors discussed other cases of conflict resolution minimally. For example, the Colombian peace process was referred to in terms of third-party involvement (of Cuba and Norway) and the Philippines case was discussed in

¹⁰² Referring to the number of interviewees that made references to the case.

terms of Turkey's third-party role as part of the International Contact Group. Both the Colombian peace talks between the government of Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the most recent peace process in the Philippines between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) started in 2012 and were still ongoing during the fieldwork of this study.

Other sources such as official reports and the minutes of the meetings of the Commission on the Resolution Process reveal that multiple cases of peace processes and negotiated conflict resolution have been under investigation by various parties and actors in the Resolution Process in Turkey. For example, the official report of the Commission on the Resolution Process (TBMM, 2013) published in November of 2013 and the separate report published by HDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, 2013) in November of 2013 both devoted a section on international experiences including Colombia, the Aceh conflict in Indonesia, and the Basque conflict in Spain among others. Similarly, the meeting minutes of the Commission on the Resolution Process reveal that information sharing from other cases¹⁰³ was on the agenda of the commission during its meetings in 2013.

Several possible explanations can be considered with regards to the selection of Northern Ireland and South Africa as primary cases of reference. One point is related to the perception of success of the two cases of negotiation. When asked about their selection of cases, interviewees pointed to their perceptions of success of the negotiations in those cases. As a WPC member and former HDP deputy put it:

¹⁰³ The purpose of the meetings that took place from May to July 2013 was to discuss the Kurdish conflict and possible pathways for the Resolution Process. Each meeting hosted a speech from academics, civil society actors, international practitioners, and victims. Academics and practitioners working on conflict resolution provided comparative accounts of peace processes framing lessons that could be learned from other cases.

Because Northern Ireland is the most successful case and also because it is in Europe it is the case most discussed about but, indeed, it is truly a successful example, it is the most important case to look at while trying to answer the question of how a conflict can be resolved, there is an agreement and also a negotiation process that was initiated by the parties themselves, there are intermediary actors and very well known actors such as Clinton became part of the process. Also, Northern Ireland was the problem of Great Britain, one of the greatest countries in the world. Undoubtedly Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and also South Africa are also important cases but you should consider that the problems of the states or areas that play a critical role in the world system always emerge as crucial problems.¹⁰⁴

The Northern Ireland and South African peace processes were perceived as successful peace processes despite the fact that in both countries divisions were not overcome and positive peace did not occur. In the case of Northern Ireland, the existence of “peace walls” separating the two communities in Belfast is frequently referenced as the indicator that the peace process has not been successful in promoting reconciliation between the two communities (Bleakley, 2011; Wilson, 2016). Similarly, in the case of South Africa, while widespread conflict did not reoccur, social tension emanating from the legacy of the apartheid continues (Goodman, 2017; Smith, 2012).

Another point that emerged from the interviews on the perception of success is related to a more general standing on Northern Ireland and South Africa as successful cases. In response to the question of why Northern Ireland and South Africa emerged as primary cases of reference, an interviewee professionally active in the area of conflict resolution noted that this is related to the way these cases are promoted as examples to be taken into consideration in the design of peace processes around the world. According to this view, peacebuilding is a business in itself and both individual actors

¹⁰⁴ Interview number 22.

(e.g. Gerry Adams from the Northern Irish peace process and Roelf Meyer from the South African negotiations) and NGOs become active in designing peace processes in collaboration with other NGOs and governments. Furthermore, the interviewee also noted that:

South Africa is still the major reference source for many peace processes in the world; this is the case that Northern Ireland, Colombia, and the Philippines mostly took as a point of reference [...] and you should also not forget that those involved in the peace processes in Northern Ireland, Colombia, the Philippines, politicians, NGOs, and academics all provide consultation services to different conflict resolution cases [so this is a market in itself].¹⁰⁵

This view on the promotion of the South African and Northern Ireland processes as successful cases has also been a point of discussion in previous research. Studies have pointed to the emergence of South Africa as a case of “borrowing” for Northern Ireland and then for other subsequent peace processes (Darby, 2003; Guelke, 2004).

Yet another point that emerged from the interviews is that adopting perspectives from completed processes is viewed as more secure in terms of drawing lessons, compared to ongoing processes. The cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland are accepted as having completed the transition from war to peace (in addition to democracy in the case of South Africa) and these transitions are regarded as being successful from different perspectives. South Africa transitioned to democracy in 1994 and the African National Congress (ANC) has been the ruling party since the initial transition. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland was signed in 1998 and established a new constitutional status for Northern Ireland that has remained intact until today. Interviewees discussing lessons to be learnt from these two cases have explicitly and

¹⁰⁵ Interview number 34.

implicitly argued on the idea of “completeness” (i.e. that these two examples of peace negotiation processes have reached an end, independently of whether this end promoted the desirable level of intergroup reconciliation). It should be noted that the idea of “completeness” refers to how the interviewees perceive this idea, rather than referencing an objective argument that the peace processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa have been completed.

This is in direct contrast with the cases of Colombia and the Philippines that were still ongoing during the field research of this study. Colombia became a prominent case internationally with the start of the most recent rounds of peace talks that took place in Havana, Cuba in 2012. As part of the negotiation process, the parties drafted a final peace agreement in 2016 which was put on a plebiscite in November of 2016. The agreement was rejected by a very low margin. However, the plebiscite results did not put an end to the peace talks and an updated version of the agreement was signed between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in November 2016 (International Crisis Group, 2017). The case of the Philippines, on the other hand, attracted attention with the latest part of the negotiations that lasted for 17 years (1997-2014) which was initially conducted without third-party mediation. As a third-party body, the International Contact Group (ICG) was established in 2009 and is composed of four states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Japan) and three international NGOs with the purpose of facilitating the talks. The greatest achievement of the process is the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro in March of 2014. The agreement calls for the establishment of a self-governing area in the southern Philippines populated by a majority of Muslims and involves provisions for the decommissioning of weapons by the MILF. Several incidents in 2015 led the peace

process to stalemate (International Crisis Group, 2016) but the process is still ongoing as of 2017.

However, other cases of negotiated peace settlements have been successfully completed and implemented since the 1990s. The Chapultepec Peace Accords in El Salvador signed in 1992 and the Guatemalan peace process (1994-1996) that led to the signing of the Guatemalan Peace Accords in 1996 are two examples of successful peace processes that did not emerge as cases of reference during the interviews. This reveals that the selection of the lessons to be considered for the peace process in Turkey was made haphazardly rather than in a more rational or fully informed way. At the same time, this points to the need to investigate in a deep manner the dynamics of local actors' selectivity in terms of their perspectives derived from other cases of peace negotiations.

Considering these points, in the following parts of this chapter, I will focus on two main questions: First, in their references to international peacebuilding processes, which issues did the interviewees refer to? Secondly, why did interviewees select Northern Ireland and South Africa as primary cases of reference?

6.3 Main Issues

The majority of interviewees adopted ideas about how a peace process should be designed with reference to the international context. Four main themes emerged in terms of peace process design discussed with reference to experiences of peace negotiations elsewhere: continuity/resilience of the peace process, inclusivity, Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR), and transitional justice focusing on the question of amnesties and the formation of a truth and reconciliation commission. As a fifth

theme, issues related to political restructuring, including perspectives on power-sharing and constitutional changes, were discussed in respect to internal political dynamics in Turkey with a combination of references to wider international normative perspectives (e.g. human rights and democracy). Below, a discussion for each issue is provided.

These themes were determined after a two-stage coding process through NVivo. First, all points involving references to other cases of peacebuilding were coded under the cases in which they belong. From this process, two main (i.e. Northern Ireland and South Africa) and two secondary (i.e. Colombia and the Philippines) cases were coded. At the second stage, the four main themes mentioned above were identified as recurring in conjunction with the cases. The sixth theme was identified as recurring in the interviews.

6.3.1 Continuity of the Negotiations (Resilience)

During the field research of this study, resilience emerged as an issue in discussions on the continuity of the negotiation process. In a parallel way that the resilience framework has been adopted in peacebuilding referring to the adaptability of social systems to stressors and the risk of conflict, resilience of the peace negotiation process refers to the capacity of the process to bounce back from stressors and risks. The centrality of the resilience approach in the Turkish context is related to the characteristics of the negotiation process itself. Between 2009 and 2015, the peace process underwent major setbacks and a clear negotiation framework was not set up. Under these conditions, Turkish and Kurdish actors were concerned with maintaining the negotiation framework despite setbacks. As such, they sought to make references to

experiences of adaptability in the cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa in terms of how the processes in both countries continued despite major setbacks, including major events of violence.

Multiple interviewees referred to different aspects of the Northern Irish and South African peace negotiation processes by pointing to the importance of being resilient despite risks and uncertainties that might come up during the negotiation process. This revealed the concern with sticking with the peace negotiation framework over other alternatives (such as the continuation of war). Many of the interviewees underlined the importance of being resilient in the peace negotiation process despite interruptions. In the words of an HDP deputy:

There are two main examples, the South African and the Northern Irish, when you think in abstract and logical terms they both have produced the desired results. The case of Northern Ireland is more similar to the Turkish case because those who seek rights are a minority in terms of numbers, but in South Africa they are the majority. They still have a common ground which is continuity- both processes are the product of almost ten years- and also, despite all negative factors, actors and institutions in both cases remained loyal to the aims and the methodology of the peace process.¹⁰⁶

The same interviewee further underlined that

I can say this for the process in South Africa, we were invited there by the DPI we saw that similar processes took place there too, and that we cannot just accept that Oslo was over and so the process is over. There needs to be the continuation of the negotiation process.¹⁰⁷

This reveals a concern with the idea of continuing the negotiation process despite setbacks. The interviewee supported the pro-Kurdish position by “learning lessons” and creating parallels with how the process of negotiation has unfolded in Northern Ireland and South Africa. In the first excerpt, an effort is discerned to consider the

¹⁰⁶ Interview number 31.

¹⁰⁷ Interview number 31.

characteristics of the conflict in the process of creating parallels with the Turkish case. The interviewee points to a basic characteristic, referring to minority-majority relations but underlines that any parallelism regarding the background and characteristics of the conflict is not necessary for adopting perspectives and drawing lessons.

In the same direction, another interviewee, a journalist and member of the WPC, pointed to the issue of continuity by arguing how in the South African case the process of dialogue continued despite major tragic incidents. In his words:

For example the South African Minister of Defense who was one of the primary actors who was in charge of the meetings [during the peace process] was here and during our conversation with him he said that after a great massacre- I think it was the Soweto massacre¹⁰⁸- Mandela interrupted the contacts but we continued the dialogue and did not detach.¹⁰⁹

Another interviewee, an academic and member of the WPC, referred to the Colombian peace process that was ongoing at the time of the fieldwork of this study with regards to the continuity of the negotiations. In his words:

The peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC became stalled six times, the ceasefire was repeatedly broken, but each time they sat again at the table and eventually a peace agreement was signed. I think that this will happen now [for the Turkish case].¹¹⁰

The perspectives above reveal the local actors' effort to support the idea of being resilient despite setbacks that might lead the process to stalemate. Interviewees discussing this perspective generally pointed to the adaptability of the processes at question despite destabilizing events. A parallel perspective is related the duration of the

¹⁰⁸ Referring to the Soweto uprisings that took place in 1976, 14 years before the formal start of the negotiation process in South Africa to end the apartheid regime.

¹⁰⁹ Interview number 18.

¹¹⁰ Interview number 5.

peace process. Regarding the duration of the process, a recurrent theme has been that peace processes last long, and therefore, the sides should not be impatient for reaching an agreement. For example, as an interviewee put it:

You see in Northern Ireland and South Africa they¹¹¹ refer to ten years [of peace efforts]; in Northern Ireland they sign an agreement and then for seven years they think about how to implement it, they wait and then they implement.¹¹²

This view, expressed by a WPC member, points to the idea that even after signing of an agreement, the implementation of the process might take long. Therefore, parties need to be aware of the need for resilience even in the post-agreement phase.

Two further issues were discussed in relation to the issue of the continuity of negotiations despite setbacks: the role of third parties in the negotiation process and the question of transparency. Several interviewees noted that third-party involvement is crucial for the continuation of the process at times of deadlock. A WPC member and journalist described the following:

From time to time these processes enter in deadlock and this is when you need a third eye, for example in Northern Ireland and South Africa when the process stifled, when they were confused on what to do they let a third actor to engage.¹¹³

Regarding third-party roles, paralleling the general political discourse on the issue, interviewees closer to the military approach (i.e. mainly pro-government actors) discussed the issue of third-party involvement in a way to support the idea for the exclusion of external parties from the process. Actors supporting the rights and recognition approach supported the idea of a third-party in monitoring capacity that would monitor the progress and also put the process back on track during periods of

¹¹¹ Referring to speakers at DPI meetings.

¹¹² Interview number 16.

¹¹³ Interview number 18.

deadlock. Thus, the Kurdish side supported the engagement of third-party actors in the process, by adopting the same aspect of peace process that was rejected by the other side to the negotiations. For example, an HDP deputy argued that:

We think that a monitoring committee would help the process. It is not that this is our red line. This is the way it has happened in other experiences (of peace processes) in the world. [...] Beyond being our red line, this [the monitoring committee] is the red line of peace processes in general.¹¹⁴

Another theme related to the issue of continuity of negotiations/resilience is transparency. Interviewees discussed the issue of transparency from different aspects with reference to the experiences of Northern Ireland and South Africa by pointing to instances whereby the question of transparency/secretcy of the negotiations was tied to the continuation of the process. For example, a WPC member referring to the issue of transparency stated the following:

Tony Blair in his memoirs on resolving the IRA issue says this to his party ‘If I can save the life of just one more citizen of Britain I can even negotiate with the devil’ - this is how he defended himself when secret talks with the IRA were publicized, because they, too, had secret talks.¹¹⁵

From a parallel viewpoint, an AKP deputy and member of the WPC noted that:

The then minister in charge (in Northern Ireland) told me in a meeting in Istanbul that ‘if we had decided to proceed in transparent manner from the beginning [of the negotiations], we would have lost government power. [...] The South African minister said the same thing. This is the nature (of a peace process).¹¹⁶

In general terms, the question of transparency versus secretcy was discussed in relation to the needs of the peace process. This means that actors did not express categorical claims

¹¹⁴ Interview number 15.

¹¹⁵ Interview number 28.

¹¹⁶ Interview number 16.

in the form of “processes need to be transparent” or “confidentiality is a must for the success of the process”. However, at the same time, those who expressed perspectives on transparency sought to fit their views on the issue by making reference to the international experience.

Overall, Turkish and Kurdish actors pointed to perspectives on the continuity of negotiations despite risks and stressors (i.e. resilience) by adopting perspectives and drawing lessons from the two main cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa in addition to one reference to the Colombian process. The concern with continuity revealed the actors’ support for a negotiated settlement over alternative solutions to the conflict such as the continuation of war and military victory. High- and middle-level actors from all sides sought to fit experiences by selectively ‘learning’ from how negotiations continued despite setbacks and risks.

6.3.2 With Whom to Negotiate: The Debate for Inclusivity

Inclusivity is another major issue that was discussed in the framework of negotiation processes elsewhere. Both Turkish and Kurdish actors discussed inclusivity with reference primarily to the inclusion of different actors in the cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa. The perspectives on inclusivity were closely related to the position of the interviewee. As expected, pro-Kurdish actors supported the inclusion of fighting fractions in the negotiation process by referring to how such inclusivity was realized in other cases.

With regards to the inclusivity debate, Ahmet Turk, a prominent Kurdish politician, made statements in a speech organized by DTP on September 1, 2009 which are indicative:

In England, when the Ireland problem came at the country's agenda, the IRA organized the "back of the house"¹¹⁷. After meetings with both the government and the IRA, a report was produced, which stated that "if you exclude the IRA from the process, this process cannot continue, it cannot be transformed into peace". Tony Blair said that "if it is to achieve peace, I can even negotiate with the devil". They gave the title of "Lord" to Lord John, the person who achieved peace. In the same manner, Mandela, who is in the memory of every people, was exiled to an island. Mandela wrote letters to the President and the Prime Minister in order to stop the bloodshed. However, the white racist government did not reply to Mandela. But after some time, this person, the representative of the black people, said that "I have to meet as a free person with the representatives of South Africa, my friends" (Hürriyet, 2009a).

Ahmet Turk's speech at the early phase of the peace process revealed the effort to promote the idea of inclusivity as a principle that needs to be adopted in the peace process in Turkey. The statement reveals the effort to draw on the experiences of Northern Ireland and South Africa in terms of how actors that were once excluded from the negotiation table were later accepted as interlocutors and became primary parties to the process.

Interviews with Turkish and Kurdish actors point to a similar effort of discussing inclusivity as a principle that needs to be considered in the peace process in Turkey. Indeed, an interviewee who is journalist and member of the WPC used the exact same idea that was discussed by Turk in the excerpt above. In the words of the interviewee: "for example, we see this in the memoirs of Tony Blair, when they criticize him, he says 'if I am going to save the life of even one single English person, I can even negotiate

¹¹⁷ In its original: "işin mutfağı".

with the devil”¹¹⁸. This quote points to the concern with including the armed fractions in the negotiations in order to achieve success in the negotiation process.

Multiple interviewees made references to different aspects of inclusivity by referring to the Northern Irish peace process. These references included common themes in the inclusivity debate in terms of the actors that should be included in the negotiation process. This involved discussions regarding the inclusion/exclusion of some fractions (e.g. combatant groups) from the negotiation process, and the question of whether and how to include actors outside of the primary parties to the conflict such as the civil society.

One common argument regarding inclusivity is that all major political fractions should be included in the negotiation process with the purpose of securing a more inclusive and henceforth successful process where the concerns of all parties are addressed. For example, a WPC member stated “we see that in the case of Northern Ireland, too, you need to consider other groups, too while you try to solve the problems of one group. Otherwise you might create new problems.”¹¹⁹ This view emerged in several interviews as prominent for the success of the negotiation process. Many interviewees underlined the need for including not only armed group representatives but also all major political fractions in the process so that to achieve a commonly agreed upon framework.

Another common issue that emerged with regards to inclusivity is the inclusion of societal segments beyond the primary decision makers to the process. For example, an HDP deputy expressed this view by stating, “I believe that the Irish example is very

¹¹⁸ Interview number 28.

¹¹⁹ Interview number 6.

important especially in terms of the civil society's inclusion to the process, so the participation of actors such as the Church and sports clubs is important"¹²⁰. From this viewpoint, inclusivity means engaging actors below the formal decision-making level to the process as this will help address the concerns of the society at wide.

Another WPC member and journalist noted that:

Negotiations are inevitably processes that expand in circles. For example the WPC was the outer circle that was the closest to the society. The first circle was the meetings between the Intelligence Agency and Öcalan. I of course think that this will expand more. As we see that similar processes took place in other countries too, such as Northern Ireland and the Philippines, there is need for (involving) other circles, there need to be concurrent circles.¹²¹

Another point regarding inclusivity is related to how the negotiating parties themselves approach the notion of inclusivity itself. For example, an AKP deputy pointed to the importance of leaders in adopting the notion of inclusivity as a principle. In his words, "the Irish Prime Minister said this and it is very nicely put, he said that for example 'Ms. Esra, your chair at the table is ready, you may come whenever you want'"¹²². This points to the importance of including all parties to the negotiation table in principle, even if some parties are not willing to negotiate at first place. The argument follows that adopting this principle is essential in establishing the feeling of trust for later phases of the process.

Similar to the resilience debate, inclusivity was also discussed with reference to other experiences with the purpose of supporting specific perspectives over others. Both high and middle-level Turkish and Kurdish actors supported their ideas on the inclusion and/or exclusion of specific groups, such as the armed fractions, with reference to how

¹²⁰ Interview number 15.

¹²¹ Interview number 9. In its original: "kesişen kümeler olması gerekiyor".

¹²² Interview number 16.

these processes unfolded in the two primary experiences of Northern Ireland and South Africa.

6.3.3 Perspectives on Disarmament-Demobilization-Reintegration (DDR)

Regarding DDR, one major perspective is to situate the issue of disarmament as a process issue and discuss the importance of its timing vis-à-vis the peace process as a whole. The timing of the DDR has been a controversial issue in the Turkish case due to conflicting expectations from the disarmament process. During the peace process, while government actors prioritized disarmament as a condition for the continuation of the peace talks, pro-Kurdish actors pointed to the need to address democratic and legal guarantees as a precondition for disarmament.

This controversy was reflected in the perspectives expressed by the interviewees. For example, an HDP deputy stated that, “the Irish case is generally given as an example, there, the reason why the process could not begin earlier is that the Major government had posed disarmament as a prerequisite for the process”¹²³. The interviewee expressed this view with the purpose of supporting the pro-Kurdish view that disarmament should itself be a point of negotiation and not a precondition for it. This parallels the official approach of the Kurdish side towards the negotiation process.

From a similar perspective, another interviewee, WPC member and human rights activist stated that

Disarmament is the final stage of a process, not the first one. For example in the case of the IRA, disarmament was completed at the end of 10 years. [...] The

¹²³ Interview number 22.

HDP tried to solve the issue starting from the basis of the problem. This is why it demanded justice first.¹²⁴

The same interviewee further noted the following:

Of course the process should have as its final aim the disarmament however, we need first to heal the genetic deficiencies of the patient [referring to the Kurdish problem]. [...] There is a long road that would lead to final disarmament.¹²⁵

Discussions on DDR are highly embedded with the positions of the actors regarding the conflict in Turkey. Paralleling the views of primary actors in the negotiation process, interviewees that are closer to the military approach to the conflict supported the prioritization of the DDR in the Resolution Process. In the opposite direction, actors closer to the rights and recognition approach supported the view that DDR should come later by making references mainly to the case of Northern Ireland.

From the opposite perspective, an AKP deputy referred to the DDR process in IRA stating that:

So what was the main issue while the IRA laid down its arms, what was the relation between the armed groups¹²⁶ and the political groups? There are so many positive aspects, why do you [i.e. Kurdish actors] not take these as example? So, the HDP members shall first take these as an example, did the political groups behave as an extension of those holding the arms? They always say ‘the state should take example by this and that’, the state does not have to take any example, there are certain steps that the state may take.¹²⁷

In terms of the timing of the DDR process vis-à-vis the peace process, a former AKP deputy from Kurdish origin who is a civil society actor active in the area of human rights argued the following:

¹²⁴ Interview number 2.

¹²⁵ Interview number 2.

¹²⁶ In its original: “[...] silahlı unsurlar ve siyasi unsurlar arasındaki ilişki neydi?”.

¹²⁷ Interview number 26.

When we got engaged in the case¹²⁸ we saw that the process of laying down the arms takes 10 years and this is the final stage of the process, not the first one, and embedding the arms in concrete¹²⁹ is the utmost. So, if you now say that arms will be buried, how are you going to manage the process? If you say that you can manage the process in one day, of course disarmament will be achieved, but this is not possible, both in terms of convincing the society and in terms of realizing political, administrative, and partially economic reforms to solve a problem that dates back to a hundred years.¹³⁰

The last statement reveals the interviewee's critique of the government's position on prioritizing disarmament in the peace process. As these perspectives reveal, actors adopted ideas on DDR from international experiences by fitting them to their own positions on the issue under discussion.

6.3.4 Perspectives on Transitional Justice

Regarding transitional justice, two main issues were considered in terms of how these processes have evolved elsewhere: the issue of amnesty and the issue of the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. Paralleling the perspectives on DDR, perspectives on transitional justice were also highly confined to the approach of the actors towards the peace process. For example, actors closer to the military approach discussed how Northern Ireland "chose" not to engage with truth-telling processes. On the other hand, actors closer to the rights and recognition approach discussed how the TRC of South Africa is a successful case to examine.

In the peace process in Turkey, transitional justice emerged as a primary demand by the pro-Kurdish side to the process. The reason for the prominence of transitional

¹²⁸ Referring to participating to DPI meetings on the Northern Irish process.

¹²⁹ In its original: "betona gömmek".

¹³⁰ Interview number 1.

justice and especially of the issue of amnesty and of a truth commission is related to the asymmetric position of the Kurdish side and the position of the Kurdish insurgency. As expected, pro-Kurdish actors demand a transitional justice mechanism that would promote restorative justice beyond retribution and punishment. In the words of an interviewee, an HDP deputy:

It will be good to have a commission that will have the authority to amnesty, similar to that in South Africa, one that would be authorized to listen to everyone, to have access to all information and in return to have the authority to forgive the wrongdoer.¹³¹

On the other hand, the Northern Irish case was referred to support the opposite idea of excluding any kind of truth seeking as part of transitional justice. In the words of a journalist and WPC member, “I think it was in [Northern] Ireland, they gave up on this idea. They said ‘if we attempt to face [the truth]¹³² we will revive all the pain we went through and our wounds will relapse.’”¹³³ In the same direction, another journalist and WPC member stated that:

Of course such [truth] commissions might be established but what I saw in Northern Ireland is that, there were difficulties in terms of evidence and in terms of creating links between perpetrators and evidence, so there were problems as there was lack of clear and just account of the crimes committed.¹³⁴

As a third example, a civil society actor and WPC member explained that:

We examined the Irish case and there you know the issue of truth was left to the end and currently still the process related to the 2014 agreement is continuing and there are still walls, still neighbourhoods are divided, people have doubts towards each other, and the families of the victims still have problems.¹³⁵

¹³¹ Interview number 22.

¹³² In its original: “yüzleşmeye kalkarsak”.

¹³³ Interview number 18.

¹³⁴ Interview number 9.

¹³⁵ Interview number 4.

As these interview excerpts reveal, interviewees supported their view on rejecting the idea for a truth commission in the Turkish case by making selective references to the Northern Irish experience.

The case of Northern Ireland emerged as a point of reference also in terms of discussions on amnesty. The transitional justice process in Northern Ireland in terms of the formula of amnesty that was used was widely discussed as a point of success. As a journalist long active in the area of Kurdish politics put it:

For example you know the IRA case is the most successful one, there are these famous letters sent to the leaders of the armed group that gave written guarantees to them, this is one of the most striking examples regarding transitional justice.¹³⁶

From a parallel viewpoint, another interviewee, a journalist and member of the WPC stated “you know, in Britain [case of Northern Ireland] they did not consider the intensity of criminal acts, they decided that everyone would be imprisoned for two years.”¹³⁷ Yet again from a similar perspective, a journalist and WPC member stated: “For example this is what they did in Northern Ireland- amnesty- we absolutely need to have this in Turkey, too, and this needs to involve both the state and the PKK”¹³⁸.

Therefore, perspectives on amnesty have sought to situate the Northern Irish example as a successful case to “look at”. This was made with the purpose of legitimizing the view that amnesties are needed for overcoming the past.

¹³⁶ Interview number 25.

¹³⁷ Interview number 28.

¹³⁸ Interview number 18.

6.3.5 Perspectives on Political Restructuring

Having considered the ideas and practices on peace process design that were adopted by domestic actors with reference to mainly the experiences of Northern Ireland and South Africa, this section discusses the issues that remained outside of this framework in the interviews. Issues related to constitutional arrangements and issues related to power-sharing, including self-government and decentralization, were discussed widely with reference to domestic conditions in Turkey, the background of the conflict, and the essence of the Kurdish issue. However, at the same time, these issues were also put in the context of global normative frameworks with the purpose of supporting a specific position. This means that rather than references to specific contexts and processes, actors sought to support their positions by referring to universal normative frames such as democracy and human rights.

Perspectives on constitution making were discussed in terms of the conditions in Turkey and the needs of the parties. The majority of the interviewees expressed the view that democratization and constitution making is a wider topic that is not confined to the peace process. A WPC member and academic explained the following:

For example, we, as professors, said that before initiating constitution-making, there needs to be a facilitating societal and political atmosphere, trust-building steps need to be taken, there need to be steps for eradicating societal tensions and political polarization. Only after this we can start forming a new constitution.¹³⁹

Similarly, the issue of self-government is also evaluated within the dynamics of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. An HDP deputy noted that:

¹³⁹ Interview number 3.

We need to evaluate the issue [of local self-government] not in terms of a partition syndrome but from the perspective of reforming the basis of coexistence- the more the people participate to the political system the more they will internalize it. Each system that impedes participation leads to feelings of exclusion and discrimination and this brings together reaction and conflict.¹⁴⁰

With regards to power-sharing, and more specifically to territorial power-sharing, several interviewees pointed to how they need to be considered in terms of the contextual conditions in Turkey. From a critical perspective, a journalist argued that:

There are two issues, first, the nature of the ‘self-government’ is contested and secondly, the way it is sought to be realized is problematic¹⁴¹. The proclamation of self-government as they did it is not compatible with democratic politics, you cannot just proclaim that an area is part of self-government out of nowhere.¹⁴²

Furthermore, issues related to constitution-making and democratic arrangements, including discussions on local governance, have been framed with references to western values and democratic ideals. Pro-government actors have mainly expressed this view. For example, the chief government actor in charge of the Resolution Process from 2012 until 2014 expressed this view:

There is a trend in the world in general, the transfer of some of the central government’s competences to the local, i.e. the encouragement of localization¹⁴³, and this is also one of the central characteristics of western democracies. So, the era when everything was decided by the center is coming to an end.¹⁴⁴

Similarly, another former AKP deputy and key figure in the Resolution Process expressed this view:

When we talk about democratic arrangements, we derive diverse meanings from these concepts. What I am trying to say is that actors who represent the

¹⁴⁰ Interview number 15.

¹⁴¹ Referring to the declarations of self-governance convened to the media first in 2011 by the DTK member Aysel Tuğluk and later in 2015 by the KCK (Kasapoğlu, 2015).

¹⁴² Interview number 25.

¹⁴³ In its original: “yerelleşmenin teşviki”.

¹⁴⁴ Interview number 23.

government refer to the democratization of Turkey within the framework of EU standards and the basic parameters of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, this is not only related to the Kurdish issue. [...] In this manner, the AKP's view of the issue is on the basis of humanity, on the basis of international standards, and on ethical basis.¹⁴⁵

Another interviewee, AKP deputy and later key advisor to the Prime Minister expressed the following view:

Decentralization, local governance, local councils etc. these are the basis of developed societies in the world and also of the 21st century Turkey. So, I perceive the issue not in terms of the 'old way' of understanding it such as federation, self-government, but in terms of re-establishing the relation between the state and the society.¹⁴⁶

Overall, interviewees sought to discuss issues on political restructuring, including power-sharing mechanisms such as local government, and also constitution-making and democracy, with reference to the internal conditions and also by fitting these issues in the international normative context. Here again local actors made references to normative frameworks with the purpose of fitting their own position, as it is revealed especially by the last two statements by AKP members. This is in line with the use of international normative frames in domestic discourse that was discussed in more detail in *Chapter 5*.

6.4 Explaining Case Selection

Having considered which issues the interviewees discussed with reference to other peace negotiation processes, I now discuss the reasons for the selection of the two

¹⁴⁵ Interview number 30.

¹⁴⁶ Interview number 21.

cases, Northern Ireland and South Africa, as primary cases of reference by Turkish and Kurdish actors.

However, before examining the rationale behind case selection, the following two tables provide the summary of NVivo coding by distinguishing the interviewees as participants and non-participants in meetings organized by a conflict resolution initiative, the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI) Turkey program. This distinction emerged as central during the analysis of the interviews that were conducted for the current research. The DPI and its activities are analyzed in detail in the following sections.

Table 6 References to Other Cases by DPI Participants and Non-participants-Thematic¹⁴⁷

	Continuity of negotiations (resilience)	Inclusivity	Security (DDR_)	Transitional Justice_
Interviewees: DPI = Participant	9	4	2	11
Interviewees: DPI = Non-participant	0	0	1	6

Table 6 shows the number of references made by DPI participants and non-participants in other cases of peace processes with regards to the four main themes that

¹⁴⁷ This table includes four main themes that emerged in interviewees’ discussions on peace processes with reference to other cases. Thus, the fifth theme of “political restructuring” analyzed in the previous section is not included, as, interviewees made references regarding political restructuring by considering more general international normative frames such as democracy and human rights rather than specific peace processes.

emerged as prominent. As the table shows, references to other peace processes with regards to resilience and inclusivity were only made by DPI participants. Interviewees that did not participate in DPI meetings did not discuss the continuity of the negotiations and the issue of inclusivity with reference to other cases of peace processes. Similarly, DPI participants discussed issues regarding DDR and justice with reference to other peace processes while non-participants did so at a much lesser extent.

Table 7 References to Other Peace Processes- DPI Participants and Non-Participants

	Other cases¹⁴⁸
Interviewees: DPI = Participant	101
Interviewees: DPI = Non-participant	35

Table 7 shows that DPI participants made three times more references to international experiences and called for looking at how peace processes evolved in other parts of the world. This reveals the interest in adopting perspectives on peace process design from elsewhere. Non-participants, on the other hand, were more inclined to discuss issues of peace process design with reference to the specificities of the Turkish context with regards to the background of the conflict and the evolution of societal dynamics in Turkey.

¹⁴⁸ The code “other cases” is a parent NVivo node where all references to international peace process experiences were coded. This node includes both specific references in the form “for example, in Northern Ireland [...]” and also general references in the form “we need to look at how such processes evolved in other experiences [...]”.

Table 8 References to Other Cases by DPI Participants and Non-participants

	Process Design¹⁴⁹	Colombia	N. Ireland	Philippines	S. Africa
Interviewees: DPI = Participant	27	2	18	5	8
Interviewees: DPI = Non- participant	2	0	1	1	0

Table 8 shows the number of references to other cases of peace processes with regards to peace process design coded. As the table shows, out of 29 total references to other cases in terms of peace process design, 27 references were made by DPI participants and only two references by non-participants. Based on this finding, it is safe to argue that the DPI provided a platform for participants to get acquainted with other peace processes and draw lessons on different perspectives on the design of peace processes. The table further shows that within DPI participants, most references in terms of peace process design were made to Northern Irish and South African processes.

The selection of the cases was mainly based on information acquired through contact with actors from the cases of reference. Contact with actors from other peace processes and mainly from the Northern Irish and the South African processes was realized through the work of the Democratic Progress Institute (DPI), an NGO active in

¹⁴⁹ The code “peace process design” here includes general references by interviewees to how processes were designed in the cases of reference, including who were the primary negotiating parties, third-party roles, what topics were addressed and what was their sequence, issues of timing, and the question of secrecy versus transparency in the negotiation process. Security and justice issues are not included under this code.

the area of conflict resolution and democratic progress. Group study visits to Northern Ireland and South Africa and meetings in Turkey formed the basis for the interviewees' understanding of these conflicts and their references to experiences of peacebuilding processes outside Turkey. These study visits and meetings provided the platform for sharing experiences between actors from other processes and actors in the Turkish-Kurdish peace process.

When asked for their opinion on how “lessons” can be considered in the Turkish-Kurdish context, the majority of interviewees underlined that no model can be transferred in its totality from any context considering the uniqueness of each conflict in terms of the historical evolution of the conflict and the dynamics special to each context. A common theme that emerged from the interviews is that other examples can provide “learned experiences” that can be considered as points of reference for other cases. Furthermore, other cases can serve as lessons learnt not only in terms of what proved to be a successful idea and/or practice, but most importantly what proved to be unsuccessful so that “not to make the same mistakes” (multiple interviews). In the words of a DPI coordinator:

In the world there are different countries that have gone through conflict Resolution Processes, some successful and others unsuccessful, and there are models used in each experience and of course you cannot implement a model from one case to another, this issue is like a fingerprint- none of the models from one case fits another. But each model- especially in terms of the errors- provides knowledge accumulation, we might say that it gives you more tools for your toolbox.¹⁵⁰

However, the question of which “tools” are selected and out of which experiences remains crucial for understanding the role of local agency in the peacebuilding process.

¹⁵⁰ Interview number 34.

Moreover, the question of why local actors sought to refer to international experiences is also crucial for understanding the dynamics of local agency. The following part provides an overview of the DPI structure and work and discusses the impact of its work on the Turkish context by focusing on the dynamics of expertise and experience sharing in the area of conflict resolution.

6.4.1 The Role of Conflict Resolution Initiatives: The Democratic Progress Institute (DPI) Turkey Program and Conflict Resolution Expertise Sharing

The DPI is a London-based NGO that was established in 2011 by a Turkish conflict resolution and peacebuilding expert who has done previous work on the Kurdish issue with focus on the area of human rights.¹⁵¹ Since its establishment, the DPI Turkey Program has engaged with dense activities in the form of study visits, meetings, reports and research papers on conflict resolution and peace processes with the participation of high- and middle-level actors from Turkey. *Table 6* shows the number of events (comparative study visits) organized and the number of publications (reports and research papers) produced by the DPI from 2011 to 2017.

Table 9: DPI Turkey Program Events and Publications¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Information on DPI's work structure and activities is derived from <http://www.democraticprogress.org/our-focus-areas/> (last accessed 24 October 2017).

¹⁵² The table was prepared based on information collected from the official website of the DPI. The number of comparative study visits and roundtables were calculated by the author by considering the meeting reports and the news pieces available on the website.

Years	Events		Publications	
	Comparative Study Visit	Roundtable	Report	Research Paper
2011	1	1	0	0
2012	1	3	7	13
2013	4	4	6	10
2014	4	5	5	9
2015	3	4	5	13
2016	3	4	7	19
2017	1	6	5	5

As *Table 9* shows, the DPI activities were dense especially in the period from 2012 to 2015 (i.e. during the Resolution Process in Turkey). During this period, the organization was active both in terms of the events organized and in terms of the research papers and reports that were produced regarding different aspects of conflict resolution and peace. The number of events reached its peak in 2014 while publications in terms of reports and research papers were mostly produced in 2016. We can see that the organization's activities in terms of its Turkey program lowered significantly in 2017, paralleling the complete abandonment of the process in domestic politics (having been already stalled since mid-to-late 2015).

Information sharing through the work of the DPI was mainly realized through the study visits and roundtables. The DPI has organized study visits to five countries since its establishment in 2011: Northern Ireland, South Africa, Colombia, the Philippines,

and Germany.¹⁵³ Each study visit lasted several days and encompassed an intensive program including roundtable meetings, seminars, private tours, receptions, and meals with participants from Turkey and from the country of visit. Involving both formal meetings and informal gatherings, the study visits provided the platform for socialization among participants.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the study visits have generally been hosted by the government officials of the country. Embassy representatives have also been present.

Each study trip involved 15 to 22 participants from Turkey while the number of participants to roundtables that were organized in different cities in Turkey reached 50¹⁵⁵ at times. Participants from Turkey included both high-level (i.e. party members, deputies) and middle-level (e.g. civil society actors, academics, journalists, and other influentials) actors. Also, participants of the events (especially middle-level actors from the media) shared the perspectives discussed at the events through media outlets and opinion pieces,¹⁵⁶ adding to the knowledge sharing process. This means that the organization's work was shared with a wide number of individuals who were interested in understanding conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.

Furthermore, experiences of the study trips were also shared with the institutions with whom the participants were affiliated. Especially high-level participants such as party deputies and advisors to the PM shared these perspectives with the parties and related state institutions. The DPI Turkey coordinator noted the following:¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Information on the study visits and summary reports of the meetings are available on DPI's website at <http://www.democraticprogress.org/category/publications/reports/> (last accessed 23 October 2017).

¹⁵⁴ This view was expressed by several interviewees and by the DPI Turkey program coordinator.

¹⁵⁵ Most of the reports of study trips and roundtables include the list of the participants to the event. This information is based on the overview of the reports on the website of the organization.

¹⁵⁶ Participants can to share the views discussed in the meetings under Chatham House Rule, i.e. without citing the person who expressed the view.

¹⁵⁷ Interview number 34.

We know that top institutions of the state obtained our reports and they read them because this is how it works. Eventually, each deputy coming from a political party prepares a report to his/her party regarding the trip that he/she participated, so it is not that we just visit a place, observe it, and have some meals there. First of all, each participant has a responsibility and this is not something that we expect but when you go somewhere your party expect this from you and thankfully all participants behaved responsibly and they conveyed very detailed reports to their parties. They also provided copies of these reports to us- these are in our archives- so, these became part of institutional memory.¹⁵⁸

Therefore, the “learned experiences” from other cases were further disseminated to higher levels with the purpose of sharing insights on peace process design.

Regarding the organization of the study visits, the DPI Turkey program coordinator noted¹⁵⁹ that the selection of Northern Ireland served practical purposes as the DPI is a London-based institution and therefore most visits were made to Northern Ireland and England. The rest of the visits were limited in number due to logistical concerns and expenses. Trips to South Africa, Colombia, and the Philippines were constrained by the expenses and the larger amount of time needed to organize and coordinate these trips. As a result, both the number of the visits to these countries and the number of actors that participated in the visits were limited compared to the visits to Northern Ireland and the roundtable meetings that took place in Turkey, including Ankara, Istanbul and smaller cities such as Urfa and Van.

Roundtables in Turkey focused on specific issue areas with regards to peace processes, including the role of civil society, the role of the media, and the role of women in conflict resolution. Also, several roundtables on how to “get a process back on track” were organized during 2015, the year when the peace process in Turkey entered the period of stalling.

¹⁵⁸ The interviewee informed the author that these reports are not available for public use.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with DPI coordinator, number 34.

Both the study trips and the roundtable meetings have been crucial in the sharing of ideas, experiences, and practical matters related to the process of negotiations and peacebuilding. As it is noted in the foreword of the reports:

We focus on providing expertise and practical frameworks to encourage stronger public debates and involvements in promoting peace and democracy building internationally. [...] DPI also aims to support and strengthen collaboration between academics, civil society, and policy-makers through its projects and output. Comparative studies of relevant situations are seen as an effective tool for ensuring that the mistakes of others are not repeated or perpetuated. Therefore, we see comparative models of peace and democracy building to be central to the aim of our achievements and objectives. (Democratic Progress Institute, 2012).

The DPI's working principles are central to understanding the diffusion of ideas and practices in the Turkish case. The organization's work is divided into different focus areas of activity including facilitating collaborative expertise sharing, building capacity through mentoring, and strengthening knowledge through assessment and analysis¹⁶⁰. These focus areas are crucial with regards to the role of the organization as a platform for experience and expertise sharing. As it is noted on its website, the DPI seeks to achieve collaborative expertise sharing through a model whereby:

The participants are encouraged to focus their attention on commonalities with other conflicts, rather than their own differences. This unique model helps establish an environment in which potential solutions can be explored with conflict transformation experts who have practical experience of relevant subjects, and in which bridges are built between different sides of a conflict. (Democratic Progress Institute, 2018).

¹⁶⁰ Information available at <http://www.democraticprogress.org/our-focus-areas/> (last accessed 11 September 2018).

The DPI Turkey program coordinator also highlighted this point in a personal communication. The interviewee noted that “our main trade mark¹⁶¹ is this, we never talk about Turkey [in our meetings]. The best way to think about Turkey is to discuss other cases.”¹⁶² This strategy proved crucial in opening up space for discussing issues related to peace process design and peacebuilding in general and moving beyond divisive boundaries among actors that come from different positions and viewpoints on the conflict in Turkey. The interviewee further noted that during study trips and meetings, participants were asked not to express their opinions on the Turkish case and to discuss, communicate, and ask about the case/process that was under investigation at those particular meetings.

The DPI activities aimed both the Track 1.5 and the Track 2 levels with the purpose of engaging both the high and middle level actors and institutions in conflict resolution perspectives and provide advice. As it is noted on the website, the DPI seeks to build capacity through mentoring by: “carrying out private diplomacy activities, providing targeted advice and by creating safe spaces for key actors and institutions to engage in learning opportunities relating to conflict transformation, including governance issues and human rights” (Democratic Progress Institute, 2018).

The organization became the meeting point for middle and high-level actors from all political sides in Turkey, including the AKP, the CHP, and the HDP. The MHP political actors, while being invited to the meetings and activities organized by DPI, have never participated. In the words of an interviewee who is responsible for the work of the DPI in Turkey:

¹⁶¹ In its original: “*alamet-i farika*”.

¹⁶² Interview number 34.

We used to call persons with strong disagreements on purpose, because we have this principle, to talk on the issue with people who are most far to the issue, those who would not speak to each other on other occasions, in order to break down the prejudices if possible, and more importantly, to get them into dialogue with each other with the expectation that communication would help break prejudices by itself.¹⁶³

In general terms, the organization seeks to promote potential solutions that would involve the main stakeholders and also the public at wide. As it is noted on its website, the organization seeks to: “strengthen knowledge through assessment and analysis of the complex dynamics at work in the conflict and share potential solutions with stakeholders and the broader public with the aim that it will contribute to a long-lasting political resolution to conflict” (Democratic Progress Institute, 2018).

The DPI’s work is supported by a Council of Experts composed of experts from Turkey and other countries. The Council of Experts includes academics, journalists, independent experts, NGO leaders, and professionals. Regarding the profile of the experts, out of thirteen experts from Turkey, six have been members of the Wise People Commission that was formed in April of 2013. Other WPC members regularly attended and contributed to roundtables and study visits in Turkey and abroad. Foreign experts include some well-known conflict resolution practitioners such as Jonathan Powell who was British Government’s chief negotiator on Northern Ireland from 1997 to 2007, and Roelf Meyer who was the South African government’s chief negotiator in constitutional negotiations in 1993.

The profile of the DPI’s Council of Experts reveals the importance devoted to professional experience as a source of expertise. Beyond Jonathan Powell and Roelf

¹⁶³ Interview with DPI coordinator, number 34.

Meyer, foreign experts supporting the activities of the organization include former politicians and diplomats including Bertie Ahern, the former Prime Minister of Northern Ireland; Dermot Ahern, former government minister of the Northern Irish Parliament; and other former EU and British diplomats. This structure is crucial for the expertise and experience sharing process that emerged as prominent in the interview research of this study. Furthermore, this structure is crucial as it reveals the importance devoted to expertise of a certain kind, referring to expertise derived from persons of authority, mainly professionals and practitioners of a certain kind (i.e. professionals coming from Western countries).

As Leander and Weaver note, “professional experience is often considered as valuable as science, if not more” (Leander & Weaver, 2018, p. 3). The centrality of professional experience in conflict resolution derives from the status of the discipline as both a research/ journal-based and as a practice-based discipline, what Autesserre (2014) refers to as “thematic” versus “local knowledge” in externally-led peacebuilding. Autesserre (2014) points how in externally-led top-down designed peace processes professionalism in terms of “foreign peacebuilders” is valued over local knowledge. As Autesserre notes, “today, the most valued expertise is that of foreign interveners who are trained in peacebuilding techniques and who have extensive experience in a variety of conflict zones” (2017, p. 125). In the context of the DPI, expertise based on practical knowledge of “professionals” emerged as crucial for “lesson-learning” processes. On this issue, Autesserre further notes:

International peacebuilders can provide local stakeholders with an understanding of how individuals in other countries at other times have responded to similar situations. Expatriates with thematic expertise can also contribute different

perspectives on the situation and help insiders gain critical distance while analyzing problems and developing solutions. (Autesserre, 2014, p. 71).

A similar process of expertise-sharing in the form of promoting perspectives on how political actors in other countries have responded to similar situations was realized through the work of DPI's Turkey Program. Main difference is that this expertise-sharing was not realized as part of top-down design but through a platform that its aim was the practice of 'sharing' at first place. At the same time, the structure of the platform (i.e. directed towards the sharing of experiences of "others" without involving perspectives on the Turkish case) offered the space for local agency to express itself. Turkish and Kurdish actors were able to selectively "learn" from other experiences, by adopting specific perspectives while rejecting others. In this process, they valued information provided by persons of "authority" and they made use of their expertise.

The DPI's focus on the provision of expertise sharing through meetings as an instrument for promoting conflict resolution perspectives is crucial for understanding the selective use of international perspectives by Turkish and Kurdish actors. Personal contact emerged as a crucial factor in the expertise and experience sharing from other cases. Many interviewees mentioned personal communication with actors from other cases while discussing a specific issue or process within the peacebuilding process. For example, a former AKP deputy stated that:

The then minister in charge (in Northern Ireland) told me in a meeting in Istanbul that 'if we had decided to proceed in transparent manner from the beginning [of the negotiations], we would have lost government power. [...] The South African minister said the same thing. This is the nature [of a peace process].¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Interview number 16.

Several other quotes also reveal Turkish and Kurdish actors' valuing of personal contact in the process of lesson learning. For example, a WPC member and former advisor to the PM stated that:

I asked this issue to Mitchell -he was the negotiator in Northern Ireland- in a personal discussion with him "would you be able to be the negotiator if you weren't an American?" and he said "no" but he also said that- let's suppose that there were five persons from each side [to the negotiation] at the table, he said that they were never able to have all ten people together but they still continued the negotiation with six or eight people. So, the negotiator is crucial for the continuation of the negotiation process.¹⁶⁵

Similarly, another WPC member and journalist noted that: "the South African Minister of Defense was here [in Istanbul] and he said: 'during a massacre- the Soweto massacre, I think- Mandela interrupted the contacts but we continued the dialogue and did not detach'"¹⁶⁶.

While referring to different process issues related to peacebuilding, these quotations reveal the importance of personal contact as a mechanism of idea diffusion. In this context, personal contact emerged as crucial because a first-hand view of a peace negotiation process was shared among actors. This first-hand experience-sharing and expertise derived from professional experience proved crucial for Turkish and Kurdish actors' selective adoption of perspectives from the Northern Irish and South African peace processes.

Another quote by an HDP deputy support this point on personal contact as crucial in experience and expertise sharing:

Jonathan Powell was the key advisor to Tony Blair during the negotiations with IRA, in our meetings with him he said 'when you look at other cases and for

¹⁶⁵ Interview number 11.

¹⁶⁶ Interview number 18.

example when you examine our case, focus on our mistakes rather than on our successes’ - I think this is very important.¹⁶⁷

The quotations above reveal that thematic conflict resolution expertise drawn from its own context (e.g. Mitchell and Powell on Northern Ireland and Meyer on South Africa) had a crucial impact in the selective “learning” of Turkish and Kurdish local actors in Turkey. High- and middle-level actors selectively adopted perspectives and ideas by drawing on knowledge disseminated by persons of “authority”. Therefore, local actors in Turkey selectively “chose” but this process of choosing and learning took place in the contextual conditions available (i.e. within the structure provided by the DPI).

So, where does this leave us with regards to norm diffusion and local agency? What is the impact of expertise sharing? What is the relation between power and expertise? To what extent local actors can express their agency in their selection of perspectives on peace process design?

Leander and Weaver define conflict resolution expertise as “authoritative knowledge related to specific conflict, and experts are those who/ that which communicate this knowledge” (2018, p. 2). The authors further maintain that:

Science is not designated as expertise- it is science. It becomes expertise when it is made authoritative in relation to a problem. The ‘expert’ is the person/object making the link who/that communicates, presents, packages and conveys relevant knowledge (that is, produces ‘expertise’) to others who don’t have the same conditions of knowing. (Leander & Weaver, 2018, p. 2)

Turkish and Kurdish actors’ references to knowledge acquired through contact with professionals and influential actors from the Northern Irish and South African processes reveals that the process of experience sharing from “persons of authority” had

¹⁶⁷ Interview number 22.

a crucial impact on their understanding of peace process design. Turkish and Kurdish actors did not have the same conditions of knowing, as they had never been part of a “successful” process for negotiated solution to a conflict. They sought to learn from persons of “authority” whose insights they perceived as crucial in terms of designing a peace process. The profile of those persons thus emerged as crucial. The structure of the meetings had also an impact on the selective adoption of insights. The purpose of the meetings was not to discuss the Turkish case but rather to learn and make sense of other experiences with negotiated settlements. Turkish and Kurdish actors who participated in the meetings were constrained but also empowered by the structure of the meetings. They were constrained because of the inevitably “limited” structure of experts and cases under investigation. At the same time, they were empowered because they were encouraged to move beyond their domestic political positions by discussing processes outside of Turkey.

At the same time, expertise is bound up with mechanisms of power as it creates hierarchies of superiority and inferiority between experts and non-experts (Barnett, 2012, p. 509). From this point, the profile of “experts” is also crucial. The DPI’s Council of Experts is composed of primarily Europe-based experts, including primarily experts from the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland in addition to other European countries such as Switzerland and Belgium. Among the foreign experts, only one is from Sri Lanka while a second “non-European” expert is from California, USA. At the same time, the group includes policy experts working with international organizations have experience in countries around the world including Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Therefore, the profile of the “experts” point to a combination of thematic

and “local knowledge” expertise in Autesserre’s (2014) terms with the difference that this knowledge was not “imposed” but rather “shared”.

Thus, the sharing of expertise and experiences points to a “horizontal” diffusion process in the Turkish case. Turkish and Kurdish actors who participated to meetings “learned” from other actors in the absence of imposition of peace process design. This provides a different perspective to the discussions on norm diffusion and hybridity presented in *Chapter 2*. Both the literature on norm diffusion and the literature on hybridity look at norms going in specific directions. Norm diffusion literature regards norms as diffusing “top-down” from the “international” to the “local”. Especially early studies on the diffusion of human rights are indicative of this top-down diffusion process. The hybridity literature argues for bottom-up “responses” in the form of resisting and renegotiating international norms and practices in order to fit them to local expectations. The findings discussed here suggest that norms may go multiple ways, including “horizontal” sharing of experience and expertise. The agency of local actors is crucial in this regard.

Furthermore, the cases that the interviewees “chose” to learn from are the ones where top-down imposition of the peace process is absent. Both Northern Ireland and South Africa started peace negotiations in the absence of a third-party intervention or power mediation. The hybridity literature assumes hierarchical relationship between the liberal peacebuilding model imposed by international actors and the “local”. This hierarchy draws from the liberal prescriptions of the peacebuilding model promoted since the 1990s whereby liberal norms are regarded essential for building peace vis-à-vis local norms and practices that considered the source of problematic social structures that caused conflict at first place. This literature regards the “top-down” in a negative sense

including criticisms that it is not sensitive to local context, applies standardized processes and practices, it is not contextualized (i.e. does not consider contextual conditions in an extensive way), and it does not allow for local expectations to be expressed and met. These hierarchies are absent in the two cases that middle- and high-level actors ‘chose’ to consider in their perspectives on peace process design. In both cases there is no imposition and no resistance to a liberal peacebuilding model.

However, at the same time, there is a different kind of hierarchy, referring what can be considered as “hierarchy of expertise” between foreign “experts” and local actors. This hierarchy can be discerned from local actors’ references to personal contacts that offered “expert knowledge” on peacebuilding matters—mainly technical knowledge on how the process should proceed. The actors’ reference to this kind of knowledge revealed their concern with selectively adopting “expert insights” and fit them to their own perspectives. However, this process of “fitting” did not proceed in a clear and uniform manner. In the process of selectively “learning” from other experiences, Turkish and Kurdish actors made haphazard references to what they thought as important points to be considered.

Based on the above, it can be argued that in the absence of imposition, local actors have greater freedom in the process of selectively learning from the non-local in addition to defining their own design of peacebuilding. This process of definition is in its turn defined by local political considerations and power asymmetries. While some actors select “lessons to be learned” in order to support their expectations from peacebuilding (as is the case with pro-Kurdish actors selecting positive lessons from the South African TRC, timing of DDR in Northern Ireland) other actors reject the same lessons in order to support their own version of peace (DDR in Northern Ireland and pro-government high

level actors' references to bury the arms). Thus, we discern 'hybridity *by design*', referring to the local actors' use of hybrid perspectives as a strategy to promote their own version of peacebuilding. Hybridity thus becomes an issue about managing power relations, related to the authority of expertise and access to it. Hybridity furthermore becomes a strategy for supporting one peacebuilding perspective over another. I develop this argument further in the following section.

6.5 Hybridity *by Design* In the Absence of Imposition and Resistance

In his speech at a meeting with the WPC members in October 2014, the then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that:

We, throughout the government of the AKP, tried, on the one hand, to promote our reformist and revolutionary quality and to act through our universal language against oppression and monist ideologies, and, on the other hand, we tried to preserve the factors that emanate from our ancient¹⁶⁸ culture and to protect them. Within this historical base, Turkey's uniqueness is this, and this is where the Resolution Process is built upon. [...] We find ourselves in nested sociocultural structures [which we need to protect]. (Davutoğlu, 2014b)

This statement reveals the AKP's effort to synthesize reformism, that is widely understood in terms of the modern structures that the West has produced, and historicity, widely understood as keeping the historical social and cultural structures that are part of the geography that Turkey finds herself in. As Davutoğlu underlines in his speech, this is also where the AKP built its policy on peacebuilding. Therefore, we discern an effort to promote a hybrid approach based on purposeful selectivity of ideas and practices that are outside of the "local". Davutoğlu's remarks point to an effort to selectively (and

¹⁶⁸ In its original: "kadim".

strategically, as it is discussed below) situate the Resolution Process on a hybrid base, formed both by universal principles and “local” culture and understandings.

This effort for selectivity is further discerned in various instances in the Resolution Process. For example, in the reports produced by the AKP and the HDP in 2013 at the end of the work of the parliamentary group on the Resolution Process we see a similar effort. Both reports make selective references to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, signed by Turkey with reservations in 1988. The HDP’s report criticizes the government for not adhering to the provisions of the Charter by framing the idea of self-government in a democratic frame:

In democratic states, public services are provided effectively by local authorities/administrations. The importance of local governance for democracy has been underlined in the European Charter on Local Self-Government (ECLSG), which Turkey has signed. The Charter emphasizes the principle on the provision of public services by authorities that are most close to the local residents and the participation of the locals to the decision making process. The prohibition of locals’ participation to public services and the obstacles on benefitting from these services is against the provisions of the ECLG. (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, 2013, p. 194)

In the opposite direction, the official report of the Commission on the Resolution Process (to which the pro-Kurdish party did not contribute) provides a different view on the ECLSG. The report first lists the points that Turkey has made reservation in the ECLG. For each point the reasons for the reservation and the possibility of changing the reservation is discussed. The report then “corrects” the misunderstanding on the ‘concept of self-rule’ that is promoted in the ECLG document. According to the report, the Charter does not refer to the notion of political self-governance, which falls within the jurisdiction of central authority in Turkey. Rather, the Charter only refers to services

such as infrastructure (such as roads, sewage, landscaping) and not to the areas of health, education, defense, and security that fall absolutely within the jurisdiction of central authority.

There is great difference between the notion of self-government accepted by the Council of Europe and the notion of self-government that is desired or understood in Turkey. In places where ethnic problems exist, the status and authority of self-government are seen as a first step to secession. The ECLG does not involve political autonomy but rather administrative and financial autonomy/self-rule. (TBMM, 2013)

The importance of the ECLG lies in that local self-government constitutes one main demand by the Kurdish side for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. It is part of the power-sharing demands of the Kurdish side in the negotiation process. Thus, selective references to the ECLG point to an effort to promote a specific view on local self-government, in line with the position of the party that promotes the view.

Another example is the selective use of other experiences of negotiated settlements to conflict, extensively made by local actors as discussed in the previous section. Selective references in this regard are related to the way actors situate their positions on the conflict vis-à-vis international experiences. For example, the use of Northern Ireland and South Africa as cases of comparison in HDP's legislative proposal on "Negotiation for the Construction of Societal Peace" [Toplumsal Barışın İnşası İçin Müzakere] (HDP, 2015) reveals the effort to promote a symmetric and inclusive approach to negotiation. As it is evident in the legislative proposal, the HDP focuses on the way the insurgent group- i.e. the ANC in South Africa and its head Nelson Mandela and the Sinn Fein/IRA in Northern Ireland and its leaders- were incorporated in the negotiation process. This

selectivity vis-à-vis the position of the actor was also discussed earlier especially in terms of the perspectives of local actors on DDR and the design of transitional justice.

A similar selectivity is discerned in a speech in September of 2012 where Erdoğan gave the signals for the restart of a national unity and fraternity process with emphasis on anti-terror approach. In his words:

Regarding terror, we started the process during our government. This took the name of ‘national unity and fraternity’. The fight against terror cannot be based only on the efforts of the governing party. In all places around the world, including Spain and the Great Britain, the Prime Ministers have expressed this view: ‘we never distinguished between the governing party and the opposition, we collaborated and joined our hands in our fight, together with the society and the media. As a result we reached a specific point in our fight against ETA (in Spain) and IRA (in Great Britain)’. Unfortunately, in Turkey we could not join our hands with the opposition and the media in our fight against terror. (Hürriyet, 2012)

Erdoğan’s references to the Spanish and Northern Irish cases is made in his effort to promote the idea of the need for united political support for fight against terror.

The hybridity debate in peacebuilding rests on the imposition of ideas and practices through top-down and externally-designed peacebuilding processes and investigates the strategies of subversion and appropriation by local actors. Hybridization involves both active and selective use of frames and a rejection of international templates depending on the fit with the positions of the domestic actors. Therefore, hybridization involves appropriation and subversion (Rumelili, 2012) and occurs in the third space where meanings and symbols are not fixed, and “even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized, and read anew” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 37) . Bhabha in this way underlines the centrality of agency in this “third space” where differences between the local and the “imperial” resurface (i.e. colonial in Bhabha’s work).

One main concern of this research strand on hybridity is the question of how top-down peacebuilding interacts with bottom up approaches to peace. This concern rests on the recognition that external peacebuilding bodies such as the UN do not engage in post-conflict societies as a “clean slate” but that already existing practices and ideas related to societal coexistence and inter-communal relations are at place. Also, local actors are not passively accepting top-down design but they engage in appropriation and negotiation practices with the purpose of “fitting” imposed ideas to the local context. In this way, international ideas that are now widely recognized and discussed as being part of the normative and practical basis of peacebuilding, such as DDR mechanisms, local ownership, inclusivity in peace negotiations, monitoring committees, and truth commissions, are both embraced by local actors and renegotiated. This process of renegotiation is made as a “response” to top-down imposition, both through institutional design and through nurturing the idea that local actors are in need for outside help.

However, this study argues that what seems to be hybridization for the case of Turkey’s Kurdish peace process can be more accurately discussed as hybridity *by design* that rests on the selective adoption of international norms and practices by local actors in the absence of top-down design of the peace process. I define hybridity *by design* as *the strategies used by local actors to support and promote peace process perspectives by selectively adopting and/or rejecting international norms and ideas to legitimize their own position in the absence of top-down design of the peace process*. In this definition, I maintain that the positions of the actors are shaped by power asymmetries both at the “local” and the “international” level and that these power asymmetries have an impact on actors’ strategies. At the same time, the absence of top-down imposition of the peace process leaves the room to local actors to exercise their agency by selectively “learning”

and promoting their own perspectives shaped by norms, ideas, experiences, and practices of both the “local” and the “non-local”.

The hybridity framework has its roots in post-colonial research and tends to create parallels with the colonial framework. In the absence of such power structure, the dynamics of the process of selecting certain ideas and practices over others is highly defined by the already existing positions of the different parties to the conflict in terms of their needs and expectations from the process. Turkish and Kurdish actors recognized the need for embracing international peacebuilding ideas and practices in the peace process in Turkey and made them part of the negotiation process at different stages and to varying extents. This is related to the domestic dynamics and the need for legitimizing positions in the peace processes pertaining from local and international level power asymmetries.

Local level power asymmetries are common to conflict situations involving insurgencies against states. Intrastate conflicts resting on demands by insurgent groups against the state are marked by asymmetry between a legitimate state and an organization lacking legitimacy. However, at the same time, all sides to a conflict find themselves in need for legitimizing their positions to different audiences and at differing extents. Under conditions of power asymmetry, the various sides to the conflict are in search for legitimacy for gaining support on their cause.

For the government side, the need for legitimacy is related to the political cost of undertaking the solution of a conflict that dates to three decades in its most recent form. The AKP is concerned with nationalist backlash and high audience cost, both political issues that need the back up of legitimacy. This concern has been addressed by combining the Resolution Process with a frame on democratization and rights. At the

same time, the AKP, being the ruling party since 2002, had to consider the audience cost for undertaking the task of solving the Kurdish issue. Retrospectively, this became apparent in the June 2015 elections when the pro-Kurdish party HDP increased its vote share and thus leading to the AKP losing its majority in the parliament. This process resulted in a crisis and the elections were eventually “repeated” in November of 2015.

For Kurdish actors, legitimacy involves the asymmetric position of the Kurdish side in the process. The pro-Kurdish side is concerned with legitimizing demands in order to achieve the fulfilment of expectations from peace. Expectations mainly involve the call for justice (e.g. transitional justice mechanisms) and the call for identity recognition, collective and cultural rights (mainly language rights), and power-sharing in the form of local government. The pro-Kurdish side’s concerns relate to both internal and external legitimacy. Due to the insurgency and terrorist tactics that the PKK employed throughout the decades, the pro-Kurdish side to the conflict is in need for legitimizing their position in the peace process as being a necessary step for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem. Equally important for the pro-Kurdish side is external legitimacy (i.e. legitimacy in the international arena). This is closely related to the position of the (pro)Kurdish movement as being intertwined with the PKK insurgency. External legitimacy is related to the pressure that might be exerted for the continuation of the process and the call of the pro-Kurdish side for a third-party involvement to the process in Turkey in monitoring capacity.

At the international level, asymmetries deriving from the international positioning of the state at question are also present. Asymmetries pertaining to the international structuring of “Europe and the rest” (Bilgin, 2009) and the division of labour that this structuring has created has an impact on peacebuilding processes that

countries belonging to “the rest” are going through. In critical peacebuilding studies, this asymmetry has been expressed in terms of the “liberal peacebuilding project” that has tended to “pathologize” societies of the “Global South” receiving international “aid” for peacebuilding. Power asymmetries at the international level relevant to the concept of hybridity are also related to the information “available” to local actors in terms of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. More specifically, what is relevant to this study is the asymmetry in terms of conflict resolution knowledge and expertise addressed in the previous parts.

Considering these dynamics, the Turkish case provides new insights on the hybridity debate as it reveals that hybridity is used as a strategy by local actors who engage in purposeful hybridization with the purpose of promoting their own perspectives on peacebuilding. Rather than hybrid forms of politics and peace that emerge from actions of resistance and appropriation by local actors as argued by scholars such as Richmond and Mac Ginty, strategic and selective adoption emerges out of the positions of local actors in the peace process. This strategic adoption is further confined to power dynamics, both at the international and at the local level.

Hybridity is adopted as a purposeful strategy with the purpose of legitimizing positions. Therefore, hybridity *by design* becomes a way for local actors to promote their own version of peace process design ‘aided’ by universal knowledge (e.g. democracy, human rights) and authoritative expertise (e.g. technical knowledge on peace process design). Furthermore, in the absence of top-down design, norms are not imposed and resisted. They rather might follow multiple paths through exchange of knowledge amongst different actors.

The adoption of hybridity by design as a purposeful strategy rather than as an act of “resistance against imposition” is further discerned in changes in the political discourse of the two sides to the negotiations with the transition to a period of deadlock by the end of 2014 and especially during 2015. The first change is the government’s move to characterize the process as “local and national” [yerli ve milli]. The second change is the Kurdish actors’ move to the discourse on “strengthened ceasefire” [tahkim edilmiş ateşkes]. These perspectives and their meaning in terms of the discussions on ‘selectivity’ are discussed in the next sections.

6.7.1 Move to “Local and National” Process [*Yerli ve Milli Süreç*]

The notion of “local and national” [‘yerli ve milli’] entered the political discourse of the government in 2014. One turning point in this regard is the then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speech after his meeting with the WPC members on October 20, 2014. In his speech, Davutoğlu noted that the Resolution Process is “local, authentic, and national” [*yerli, özgün, ve milli*] (Al Jazeera, 2014). This indicated a new direction in the process since it was the first time that a clear indicator was used showing that the process proceeds as a national effort. This also revealed the effort to detach the process from outside influence and opened the space for discussing the process in an inward-looking manner, at least for pro-government actors.

The reasons for the move to a local and national peace process should first be considered within the domestic and regional political context. It is noteworthy that Davutoğlu’s speech came only a few weeks after what has been commonly called as the “6-7 October incidents”. The incidents refer to a series of protests against the Turkish

government's stance towards the siege of a Kurdish populated town at the border between Turkey and Syria. The protests are regarded as a turning point for the peace process as the relations between the negotiation parties became strained after the death of approximately 40 protesters as a result of the clash with security forces in the effort to suppress the protests.

The incidents took place just days after the publication in the official gazette of the cabinet decree on the Procedures Regarding the Law on the Resolution Process and Strengthening Societal Cohesion (TBMM Official Gazette, 2014b).¹⁶⁹ This legal document was prepared as complementary to the Law on the Resolution Process that was enacted in July of 2014 (TBMM Official Gazette, 2014a). The decree foresaw the initiation of work on areas including political, legal, social, economic, cultural, security and disarmament, "homecoming" and reintegration, and psychological support and rehabilitation among others. With the cabinet decree a Resolution Process Commission was established with the purpose of forming the strategies and policies on the Resolution Process. While the process entered a period of tensions towards the end of 2014, meetings continued between the government and members of the İmralı group in November of 2014 and in January of 2015 two meetings took place. After the meeting in November 2014 media statements pointed to the formation of a monitoring committee. However, discussions on the formation of committees were gradually abandoned through the first half of 2015. One turning point in this regard is the Dolmabahçe Declaration of 28 February 2015.

Erdoğan in his meeting with headmen in March 2015 noted:

¹⁶⁹ Terörün Sona Erdirilmesi ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun Kapsamında Yürütülecek Çalışmalara İlişkin Esaslar.

Those who start from imported concepts, those who call for imported solutions, will face incompatibility [...] Both the terrorist organization and the political party by seeking to impose their own worldviews and their own concepts try to distort my Kurdish brothers' soul and essence, they try to ruin them. Their worldviews, their lifestyles do not belong to this geography and to this nation.¹⁷⁰ (Erdoğan, 2015c)

Here, Erdoğan criticized the HDP's call for local governance and third-party monitoring in the peace process. This pointed to an effort to define the boundaries of the local and the non-local in a selective and strategic way. In this process of definition, the top leadership sought to draw a clear line between "imported concepts" and the "local" ones in the effort to reject issues of power sharing and third-party roles as part of the peace process.

As the peace process was gradually abandoned after the June 2015 elections, the discourse on "local and national" gained prominence. This was accompanied by a clear return to the military approach. For example, Erdoğan's speech at his meeting with headmen in August 2015 is indicative:

Those who say 'the terrorist organization must silence its arms', what do you mean to 'silence'? They must leave their arms, burry them into concrete. [...] All the terrorists will either quit our country or will burry their arms into concrete and it is us who is going to determine the place where the arms will beburied" (Erdoğan, 2015b)

In the same speech, Erdoğan continued:

Unless the terrorist organization leaves its arms and unless it moves its members outside of the country, all state institutions will do whatever they need to do. We will engage with every activity against the terrorists. [...] I refuse the statements that Turkey has returned to the 1990s. Those who were part of the 1990s are mostly in the parliament today, how can they say that Turkey has returned to the 1990s? Turkey will not retrogress not even slightly from its progress it made in

¹⁷⁰ In its original: "İthal kavramlarla yola çıkanlar, ithal çözümler önerenler, doku uyumsuzluğu yaşarlar".

the past twelve years in the areas of democracy, rights and freedoms, and development.

With clear move to the official military approach to the Kurdish conflict, the notion of local and national gained increased usage in political talk. At the same time, this involved the effort to define the boundaries of the notion. Erdoğan's speech at his meeting with headmen in September of 2015 revealed this effort:

As each and every citizen who lives in the [eastern] area and also elsewhere in this country, my Kurdish and my Zaza brothers, they are all local and national, they are all genuine children of this country¹⁷¹. Exactly the same way as my Turk, Turkmen, Arab, Bosniac, Laz, and Roma brothers are. There are great differences with the terrorist organization. This is because these citizens are integrated with the values of our country. They say 'I am Kurdish and I love my nation, my flag, and my state.' But the terrorist organization is not local/native, it is not part of this nation. Those who harm the achievements of our country do not belong here. Even if they might be in the parliament. (Radikal, 2015)

Erdoğan continued his speech by trying to define who is "local and national":

Those who try to hide criminals cannot be local and national, no matter their identity. [...] Those media organizations that support the terrorist organization also reveal that they are not nationals. Owning a holding company does not make you local and national. There are still millions of our brothers who live outside of this country who are locals and nationals. At the same time, no matter where he or she is born, we cannot accept as locals and nationals those who have broken off from this nation through their behaviour, and most importantly, through their heart. They belong to wherever they serve and wherever their soul belongs to. [...] The notion of 'local and national' is beyond origins, dispositions, and political boundaries.¹⁷²

As a further step, Erdoğan changed the name of the Resolution Process to National Unity and Fraternity Process. The new process is marked by clear return to the military position. In his speech at a rally against terror Erdoğan noted that:

¹⁷¹ In its original: "[...] bu ülkenin öz evladıdır".

¹⁷² In its original: "Yerlilik ve millilik köken ötesi, meşrep ötesi, siyasi sınırlar ötesi bir anlayıştır".

We are going to be irritable and pitiless towards the terrorists, affectionate and voluntary towards our brothers. We trust our security personnel. [...] We are not going to let the Unity and Fraternity Process to retreat. We are decisive in our effort to strengthen our democracy and protect rights and freedoms. (Erdoğan, 2015a)

While the details for this new process remained unclear, several news pieces revealed backchannel discussions on changes in terms of the issue of interlocutors.

While the HDP would be excluded from the negotiation process, the new process would take the Kurdish society at large as interlocutor and that an extended WPC commission would be formed (Gökdağ, 2015).

Overall, the move to a “local and national” process can be viewed as part of the effort to legitimate the return to the initial military approach position. The importance of this lies in that it is based on a concern to exclude any consideration that would link the new process with experiences with peacebuilding elsewhere. This can be regarded as a strategic move for defining the parameters of the peace process based on domestic positions and considerations¹⁷³. Furthermore, the effort to define the boundaries of a local and national peace process can be regarded as the effort to point to a new process that is as legitimate as the previous one. By declaring those outside of the “local and national” framework as being ‘foreign’ to the needs and expectations of the country, government actors sought to promote the idea of a peace process that emerges out of the needs that are “local” to the Turkish case.

¹⁷³ This point is also underlined by Çiçek (2018, pp. 200-201) who regards the discourse on ‘local and national’ peace process as an effort to build an *alla turca* model of peacebuilding.

6.7.2 Move to “Strengthened Ceasefire” [*Tahkim Edilmiş Ateşkes*]

In what can be considered as the opposite direction, the Kurdish side moved to a call for “strengthened ceasefire”. “Strengthened ceasefire” was first mentioned after the İmralı group’s meeting with Öcalan in November of 2014. Öcalan conveyed his call for strengthened ceasefire that would be supervised by a monitoring committee.

Furthermore, Öcalan declared that no step would be taken without legal guarantees (BBC Türkçe, 2014b). Later, the notion of strengthened ceasefire gained prominence with the call by the KCK and Kurdish political leadership to return to the peace process with the escalation of the conflict after the June 2015 elections.

While the content of “strengthened ceasefire” remained unclear, the notion seems to be based on the need for a legal framework regarding non-confrontation. In later phases of the process, Öcalan made repeated statements that he made mistakes by accepting to continue without legal guarantees. With the stalling of the process in 2015, statements by KCK members pointed to a kind of ceasefire that would revive mutual return to the peace negotiations. In the words of KCK members, it is “a ceasefire where there are no arrests, the state would stop building police stations and dams with military purposes, the state would not prohibit organizing for democratic purpose and struggle” (Diken, 2015).

The Dolmabahçe meeting formed a turning point for the move to strengthened ceasefire. Öcalan’s call to the PKK was read to the media after the Dolmabahçe meeting on February 28, 2015. The call was for convening a special congress for disarmament. As a response, the KCK later released a media statement on March 1, 2015:

In order to achieve a well-functioning process, the government needs to take upon responsibility in this new direction and behave accordingly. We also declare that we will fulfil our responsibility to render the ceasefire that we have continued until today as strengthened. Strengthened ceasefire is by itself a crucial basis and opportunity to take steps towards solution. (Al Jazeera, 2015c).

While unclear, it seems that the reason why it is called “strengthened” ceasefire is that it would be backed up with a third party monitor and would enable public order.

KCK’s statements in August of 2015 on strengthened ceasefire are indicative of this:

All political detainees that have been arrested since 2013 Newroz should be freed and strengthened ceasefire should be established. There needs to be a ‘third eye’ that will monitor the negotiation process. Also, another monitoring committee that will monitor the strengthened ceasefire process and that will uncover the practices and manners that do not conform to non-confrontation should be established. If such non-confrontation method and negotiation procedure is not put forward, the expectations for peace and non-confrontation will not be fulfilled. Those who do not fulfil the expectations of our people will nurture disappointment and will lead to burst of anger that will pave the way for greater conflict. (Al Jazeera, 2015b).

After repeating its call for strengthened ceasefire in September 2015, the KCK also called for Öcalan being the chief negotiator:

The necessary conditions need to be established for our leader Öcalan to be able to negotiate under conditions of freedom, able to meet with all political fractions, civil society organizations, and intellectuals. As it is seen in all successful negotiation experiences around the world, there needs to be a monitoring committee that will monitor the actions of both parties to the negotiation. (T 24, 2015b)

The move to strengthened ceasefire by the side of the Kurdish actors revealed the need to secure the continuity of negotiations despite setbacks. While the government sought to redefine the parameters of a “new” process by returning to the military approach, the Kurdish primary actors sought to keep the initial negotiation framework by coming closer to the expectation on non-confrontation. Moreover, the Kurdish side

sought to add legitimacy to the strengthened ceasefire framework through reiterating the demands for a monitoring committee that, according to the Kurdish actors, is characteristic of successful negotiation experiences elsewhere in the world.

In terms of the hybridization debate, the move to strengthened ceasefire reveals Kurdish actors' effort to continue the peace process by reframing their position on in a way that fits the context. This means that this is a strategic move trying to both preserve the main position on the need for a monitoring committee and for legal guarantees but also trying to continue the negotiation process making a call for ceasefire.

6.8 Conclusion: Whither Hybridization?

This chapter sought to first examine empirical findings considering perspectives from interviews with high and middle level actors in the peace process in Turkey and, secondly, to situate the findings within the hybridization debate. Interview findings pointed to the Turkish and Kurdish local actors' selective use of international experiences in the context of the peace process in Turkey. This selectivity is based on the position of the local actors on the conflict and on the peace process. Specific references to lessons to be learnt from other cases revealed that the process of selection was defined through the agency of local actors. More precisely, actors selected specific experiences over others as part of their effort to promote perspectives on peace process design that fit with their positions on the conflict and the peace process. The chapter thus discussed that the selectivity in terms of adopting and "learning" from international experiences can be considered as "hybridity *by design*" defined as the strategies used by local actors for selectively "learning" from other experiences with the purpose of

supporting their own perspectives in the absence of the top-down design of the peace process.

Accordingly, the first part of this chapter discussed which perspectives became prominent in terms of local actors' references to international experiences of peacebuilding. Four main perspectives were identified: inclusivity, continuity of the negotiations (resilience), perspectives on DDR, and perspectives on transitional justice. A fifth perspective on political restructuring, including issues of power-sharing and democratic rights emerged as defined by local considerations together with international normative perspectives such as democracy and human rights. After discussing how local actors situated these perspectives into their own understandings of peace process design, this part further discussed the international experiences that interviewees mostly referred to Northern Ireland and South Africa, and the reason why these two experiences emerged as prominent in the process of "selecting".

While a top-down channel for the diffusion of international ideas and practices in the Turkish case was absent, other channels worked towards the diffusion of these ideas and practices. The work of conflict resolution initiatives proved crucial in the Turkish context. As a conflict resolution initiative, the work of the Democratic Progress Institute's Turkish Program formed the channel through which middle and high level actors engaged in experience sharing through meetings, comparative study visits, and roundtables in addition to through reports and research papers. While the conflict resolution initiatives involved a limited number of participants, they provided the platform for experience sharing and socialization among participants. This formed a basis for adopting perspectives on peace process design from other experiences. Likewise, a deeper view of DPI structure and activities, in tandem with the local actors'

discussions on the lessons they learned through their participation revealed the centrality of expertise sharing in the diffusion process. Accordingly, the role of expertise of certain kind (i.e. authoritative knowledge provided by professionals coming from predominantly western countries), was considered in the analysis made in this chapter.

The second part of this chapter focused on a reappraisal of the hybridity debate in peacebuilding considering the findings from the Turkish case. This part proposed *hybridity by design* as a concept capturing the strategic use of international perspectives to legitimize local positions in the absence of top-down imposition. The absence of external imposition of ideas and of top-down design of the process enabled local actors in Turkey to “act selectively” regarding which ideas to adopt in the domestic political discourse. The strategic use of hybridity is also discerned from the different directions that the main political discourse took after the stalling of the negotiation process in late 2014. The government moved to a discourse on “local and national” [*yerli ve milli*] peace process in 2014 that rejected any external influence upon the process and sought to redefine the process in domestic terms. The Kurdish actors, in contrast, moved to a discourse on “strengthened ceasefire” [*tahkim edilmiş ateşkes*], referring to a ceasefire backed by legal guarantees and a third-party monitoring role, revealing the effort to continue the negotiation framework despite setbacks.

Overall, *hybridity by design*, as proposed here, offers a new perspective to the hybridity debate in critical peace studies by moving beyond the ‘imposition and resistance’ framework that has dominated this strand of research. This creates opportunities for seeing the dynamics at play in terms of local agency in the absence of imposition of top-down design of the peace process. Turkish and Kurdish actors’ perspectives revealed that in the need of legitimizing their positions, they selectively and

strategically included references to other cases of negotiated settlements and to international normative frameworks. This need for legitimization worked differently for distinct actors, pertaining to the power asymmetries both at the local and the non-local levels.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

This study began with an interest in understanding the dynamics of the diffusion of peacebuilding norms and the role of local agency in a case where the top-down design of the peace process is absent. The analysis built on insights from two research strands, international norm diffusion research and the hybridity debates from critical peace studies. By identifying the limitations of *hybridity* research in peacebuilding, this study argued that we need to broaden and deepen our understanding of local agency by moving beyond the framework that has dominated critical peace research previously. Accordingly, this research pointed to the need to consider how local agency is “expressed” beyond “imposition and resistance” in cases where the top-down design of the peace process is absent.

The interest in the manner in which norms that are considered as part of the liberal peacebuilding framework diffused in the context of Turkey’s peace process for

solving the Kurdish issue (2009-2015) commenced with empirical observations of the use, in domestic political discourse of international peacebuilding norms and practices. Based on insights gained through primary and secondary data, the main argument posed in this dissertation is that the dynamics of hybridization are different in cases where the top-down design of the peace processes is absent due to variances in power dynamics that have an impact on local agency. In the case of Turkey's peace process regarding the Kurdish conflict, local actors engaged in *hybridity by design* with the purpose of legitimizing their own perspectives on peace process design. This finding offers a new perspective on the understanding of hybridity, by pointing to the selective use of international peacebuilding norms and experiences by local actors with the purpose of fitting their positions in the absence of top-down peace process design.

This final chapter provides the main conclusions reached in previous chapters arranged in three sections. First, it presents an overview of the main findings including conclusions based on theoretical and empirical insights. The second part discusses the study's contributions to the theory and practice of peacebuilding. The third section considers and proposes future research directions.

7.2 Overview of Findings

The theoretical framework of this dissertation, proposed in *Chapter 2*, built on theoretical insights in two strands of research, international norm diffusion literature and critical peace research literature. The framework expanded the need to bridge insights from the two strands of research with the purpose of better understanding the diffusion of peacebuilding norms and practices in the absence of top-down design. In the last

decade, both strands of research became progressively interested in the role of local agency. Based on critiques of norm diffusion research of mainly the 1990s, norm diffusion research increasingly engaged with the question of the role of local agency in the diffusion process. Major critiques were directed towards assumptions of “good international norms versus bad local agency”, and the view of norm entrepreneurs as actors engaging in “moral proselytism” was concerned with conversion and not contestation at the local level (Amitav Acharya, 2004, 2013). Building on these critical insights, scholars have debated how local actors may contest global norms (Acharya, 2013) and engage in different tactics of resistance and compliance (Zimmermann, 2014).

In a parallel approach, critical peace research became more interested in the question of local agency. Building on the critique of the dominant form of peacebuilding (i.e. liberal peacebuilding) that rests on the imposition of liberal principles such as democracy, human rights, good governance, market economics, and judicial structures based on liberal prescriptions, scholars debated how liberal principles are imposed upon post-conflict societies (Paris, 2002; Richmond, 2004b). Furthermore, the critique argued that such imposition tends to romanticize (Donais, 2009) or pathologize (Mac Ginty, 2008) the local, creating an image of the local as in need for outside help and of local agency as not fully developed. Based on these insights, recent research has sought to understand how international norms and practices find resonance in the domestic context, focusing on how norms are adopted, resisted, and renegotiated at the local level. In order to capture the processes of interaction, this strand of research has adopted the *hybridity* concept from post-colonial studies, and mainly the work of post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha.

Building on these theoretical developments, *Chapter 2* assessed the limitations of the hybridity research in peacebuilding. These limitations are related to the starting point of discussions on hybridity. Scholars interested in understanding how global norms and practices interact in local contexts focused primarily to how these processes unfold in externally-led peacebuilding processes (i.e. through international organizations such as the UN and donor agencies) and limited their analyses to primarily how local actors “resisted” peacebuilding processes. This is related to the point of departure of this strand of research, which is the critique of the liberal peacebuilding framework, referring to the dominant form of peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era. Thus, this study pointed to the need to broaden and deepen the critical peace research agenda with regards to hybridity, by focusing on a case where the top-down design of the peace process is absent and by engaging with the *politics of the local* in a deeper manner, considering local level divisions and power dynamics in a more extensive way.

Following discussions on the theoretical background, *Chapter 3* proposed a methodological framework that combines case study research and grounded theory. Both case study research and grounded theory offer the possibility of engaging with a case in a deep manner in order to capture the different dimensions. Here, using Lederach’s (1999) conflict triangle, the chapter discussed the research design focusing on two levels of actors, the high-level decision makers and middle-level influentials, and the two main sides to the conflict, the pro-government and the pro-Kurdish side. The chapter further provided insights on conducting interview research during peace processes and distinguished specific conditions in the peace process in Turkey during the field research of the current dissertation, from September 2015 to March 2016.

Chapter 4 initially provided a chronological overview of the Kurdish issue (i.e. 1920s-2000s) and of the peace process (i.e. 2009-2015) and then moved to the analysis of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey through a conflict assessment framework (Levinger, 2013; United States Government Interagency Working Group, 2008). The conflict assessment framework was based on the analysis of the dividers and connectors, the actors, and the drivers of conflict and peace. The analysis in this chapter considered the different dividers and connectors in the Turkish-Kurdish case including political, strategic, cultural, psychological, and cultural. The chapter further analyzed the main stakeholders in the conflict with regards their positions, interests, and willingness to negotiate. This chapter further discussed drivers of peace and conflict, referring to how key connectors and dividers were used to de-escalate and escalate conflict in the peace process.

Chapter 5 focused on the main issues that became prominent in domestic political discourse in terms of peace process design during the peace process in Turkey (2009-2015). The chapter first discussed two main approaches to the Kurdish issue in Turkey, the military approach and the rights and recognition approach followed by an examination of major shifts in the two approaches during the peace process (2009-2015). Following this section, the chapter analyzed the main issues that were discussed during the peace process with focus on the different sides to the conflict concentrating on four main questions regarding when to negotiate, who to negotiate with, what to negotiate, and how to negotiate. This part revealed that at the high level (i.e. at the decision making level) different actors pointed to different considerations and expectations. It further showed that political actors made selective references to international experiences of peacebuilding in order to support their positions. This finding constituted the basis of the

analysis made in the following chapter based on further data collected through personal interviews with high and middle level actors in the peace process.

Chapter 6 extended the empirical findings for the Turkish case in two parts. First, by analyzing primary data collected through interviews with high- and middle-level actors in Turkey's peace process, I examined the main perspectives that the interviewees situated within international experiences of peacebuilding. This part showed that in their discussions on peace process design, Turkish and Kurdish actors situated four main themes in light of international experiences: continuity of the negotiations (resilience), inclusivity, DDR, and transitional justice. A fifth theme regarding political restructuring, including questions of power sharing and democratic rights, was discussed with reference to international normative frames. Furthermore, interviews revealed that high- and middle-level Turkish and Kurdish actors primarily adopted perspectives from two main peacebuilding experiences, the Northern Irish peace process that led to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and the South African peace process that led to the transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994. Following this finding, the chapter further investigated the reasons for the "selection" of the Northern Irish and South African experiences by local actors in Turkey.

Accordingly, the role of a conflict resolution initiative, the Democratic Progress Institute's (DPI) Turkey Program emerged as prominent in local actors' references to international experiences of peacebuilding. The DPI provided local actors from Turkey with a platform for experience and expertise sharing through study trips and roundtables. The structure of the program further enabled Turkish and Kurdish actors to selectively "learn" from other experiences. In the absence of imposition, high and middle level actors from Turkey were able to adopt insights from "experts" who shared both thematic

knowledge and their own experiences as actors in negotiation processes. Turkish and Kurdish actors “learned” from other experiences and sought to fit these experiences in their own perspectives. For example, actors supporting the inclusion of armed fractions in the negotiation process referred to the inclusion of the Irish Republican Army in the negotiation process in Northern Ireland. From a different perspective, actors supporting the formation of restorative justice mechanisms such as truth commissions pointed to how the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission had a positive impact on the peace process. Furthermore, actors supporting the need to be resilient in the negotiation process adopted insights from both cases on how the processes continued despite setbacks and major occurrences of violence.

Another main finding is related to the diffusion of peacebuilding norms. Scholarship on norm diffusion and hybridity has focused almost exclusively on norms going top-down and bottom-up respectively. The analysis made particularly in *Chapter 6* of this dissertation pointed to norms diffusing horizontally, as part of “exchange” of conflict resolution expertise. High- and middle-level Turkish and Kurdish actors who participated in conflict resolution initiatives adopted perspectives that they acquired through contact with actors from other experiences of negotiated peace settlements (mainly from Northern Ireland and South Africa).

Chapter 6 also showed that this selectivity is discerned in the political discourse of main actors and in the official documents concerning the peace process. The central finding of this research is that hybridity might be used as a strategy by local actors who are in favour of legitimizing their positions in the absence of externally-led top-down design of the peace process. This moves beyond previous research’s focus on how hybrid “responses” to internationally-led and externally-designed peacebuilding

processes where actors engage with renegotiation and appropriation of imposed norms and practices. It thus moves beyond the “imposition versus resistance” framework offered by critical peacebuilding scholars (Mac Ginty, 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009a; Richmond, 2010) by offering an understanding of local “perspectives” on international norms and practices in the absence of imposition.

More generally, this finding provides a major shift in our understanding of local agency in peacebuilding. It reveals that local agency might engage in creative ways of dealing with internal and external power asymmetries. Furthermore, it reveals that different actors seek to legitimize their perspectives to different audiences. Therefore, not only the pro-Kurdish side sought not only to legitimize its expectations from the peace process, but also pro-government actors made references to international norms, practices, and experiences in other peace processes to support their expectations from the peace process.

At the same time, further findings pointed to power dynamics at play in the absence of an external third party in the peace process. The examination of Turkey’s peace process for solving the Kurdish issue (2009-2015) revealed that despite the absence of ‘imposition’ by external actors, still power dynamics at the local and the international levels continued to impact on the way in which local agency is “expressed”.

7.3 Contributions to Theory and Practice

This study provides significant contributions to norm diffusion research and to critical peace research in theoretical terms. With regards to practice, the study provides

crucial insights on the understanding of local agency in peace processes. In addition, the study offers practical contributions with regards to “lesson-learning” and the role of conflict resolution expertise in peace processes. Each of these contributions is discussed below.

This study broadens and deepens the theoretical debate on hybridity in peacebuilding. By investigating the dynamics of norm diffusion and local agency in a case outside of the “liberal peacebuilding framework”, the study broadened the theoretical debates of critical peace studies. In previous research, these debates were primarily confined to the critique of the “liberal peacebuilding consensus” (i.e. the type of peacebuilding that is projected by international organizations such as the UN and various donor agencies and international NGOs) (Newman et al., 2009) (Richmond & Franks, 2009). With the analysis of a case outside of this framework, this study revealed new insights on the process of hybridization. Furthermore, this study deepened the hybridity framework by showing the importance of considering the “local” in terms of different levels of actors and distinctive sides of the conflict. By engaging with the power dynamics at the local level, this study contributes to the understanding of hybridity as being closely related to these local dynamics. In this way, the analytical potential of the hybridity concept increased.

The study’s main contribution is the development of a new theoretical perspective on hybridity in peace research. In theoretical terms, the major contribution of the study is the concept of *hybridity by design*, defined as *the strategies used by local actors to support and promote peace process perspectives by selectively adopting and/or rejecting international norms, ideas, and practices to legitimize their own position in the absence of top-down design of the peace process*. Hybridity by design refers to the use

of hybrid perspectives as a strategy by local actors with the purpose of legitimizing their positions in the absence of the top-down design of the peace process.

Practical contributions of this dissertation include insights regarding the way local agency in peacebuilding is understood. The tendency to understand local agency as inherently good and as a critique of previous research depiction of local agency as inherently bad runs the risk of romanticizing the local, despite critical scholars' interest in avoiding this action. One practical contribution of this research is to show that the local should be seen as itself divided across different levels and sides with multiple perspectives on the reasons and background of conflict and expectations from peace. Therefore, in negotiated settlements to intrastate conflicts, we need to consider these multiple dynamics of the local actors and understand the multiplicity of expectations from how a peace process should be designed and what issues need to be addressed.

Furthermore, this study aligns with recent "critiques of the critiques" that point to the need to consider that the local might itself be a source of oppression and violence. Local dynamics are marred with power struggles that generally form the basis of the conflict in the first place. The decision to engage in a negotiated solution does not obscure these power dynamics and does not necessitate that the local's role in oppression would be overcome. Therefore, the initial practical implications to consider are the different dimensions of power, strategic action, and speech in peacebuilding.

The second practical contribution relates to expertise sharing and its impact on local agency. This study has shown that the work of conflict resolution initiatives might have great impact on the perspectives of local actors. The importance of this lies in that actors in a conflict context can get acquainted with new perspectives, learn about different ways of dealing with issues within the peace process, and gain more knowledge

about technical matters. However, the question of how this expertise-sharing should be organized and which issues should be included (i.e. process issues or content issues) is open to debate. Also discussed in *Chapter 6*, expertise sharing is itself interlinked with questions of power. The sharing of expertise creates power asymmetries between those who possess the authority and knowledge and those who do not. Another dimension is that the expertise provided by persons of authority will inevitably be biased towards specific perspectives. The definition of “expert” and the content of “expertise” is itself contested (Leander, 2014). Furthermore, which experiences can be considered as “useful” to share or how “unsuccessful” experiences can be shared are all points that need to be considered. Therefore, the question of “who will learn from whom and how” remains crucial and open to debate.

7.4 Future Research Directions

Considering the main insights reached in this dissertation, several future research directions can be assessed for extending research and knowledge on the theory and practice of peace processes with a focus on the role and effects of the “local”.

One area to investigate is the “hybridity by design” framework in other cases of negotiated settlements. Ongoing negotiations to end intrastate conflicts, such as the Colombian peace talks between the government of Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the most recent peace process in the Philippines between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that started in 2012 might offer interesting insights on this debate. Examining the way various sides to the conflict and different levels of actors respond to the need to legitimize their

demands, whether they adopt, adapt, and renegotiate international norms, and whether they “fit” other experiences of conflict resolution into their own perspectives would provide comparative insights on the processes of norm diffusion in peacebuilding.

Related to the first point, investigating the applicability of the framework offered in this dissertation not only in ongoing process but also in peace processes in other regions of the world with varying background characteristics would be an interesting direction. For instance, peace processes in El Salvador (1990-1992), Myanmar (since 2011), Mozambique (1990-1992, with conflict recurrence since 2013), and Nepal (2003-2006) offer interesting insights into investigating the politics of the local in terms of the use of international norms and practices in the absence or presence of externally-led top-down design of the peace processes at varying extents. Pertaining to varying degrees of international involvement and varying results with regards to the peace processes, comparative assessments of peace processes in terms of the “politics of the local” will provide further insights into our understanding of hybridity developed in this dissertation.

Another direction is to extend the research within the Turkish case itself. This study considered the perspectives of the main negotiating actors in the peace process (i.e. the pro-government and the pro-Kurdish side in the conflict). The fieldwork of the study is based on interviews with Turkish and Kurdish actors that were part of the peace process. Most middle-level actors were part of the Wise People Commission which was formed in 2013. High-level actors included the main decision makers in the process from both sides. Additionally, the study considered political discourse and media statements of the primary actors in the process (i.e. government actors, political actors from the Kurdish side, and actors from the armed fraction). Extending the research to

other actors in Turkish politics, including opposition parties such as the CHP and the MHP would provide new insights on the hybridization process. For example, investigating whether other actors also apply purposeful hybridization with the purpose of supporting opposing views would be an innovative and potentially fruitful research area. However, considering the domestic political dynamics in Turkey and the changes since the fieldwork of this study took place from September of 2015 until March of 2016, extending the research might not be possible. A major limitation is that the political context is not permissible for discussions on the peace process.

Another exciting research direction is related to the dynamics of expertise in the field of conflict resolution. This study found that expertise sharing had a high impact on local actors' perspectives on peace process design. References by local actors in Turkey to insights by experts from Northern Ireland and South Africa and their effort to consider these perspectives with reference to the peace process in Turkey revealed this impact. However, a closer investigation of the dynamics of this expertise sharing revealed that its dynamics are confined to hierarchies that delimit the process of "learning". Turkish and Kurdish actors "learned" from experts coming mainly from the "West". Also, they constructed their perceptions of success and failure in peacebuilding through this process of learning. Indeed, the literature on expertise in the field of International Relations has been going through similar "waves" of new research whereby previous insights are reconsidered through a critical lens (Bueger, 2014). With regards to the area of conflict resolution, recent research points to the need to consider both the hierarchical and contested nature of expertise in the field of conflict resolution (Leander & Weaver, 2018). Therefore, further research for understanding these hierarchies and their impact on "borrowing and lending" in peace processes (Darby,

2003) and also “the politics of imitation” and comparison in peace processes (Guelke, 2004) would be an interesting direction.

Overall, this dissertation provided insights and findings that hopefully will pave the way for further research in different directions. It showed that understanding the “politics of the local” as being divided along distinctive perspectives is crucial in capturing the expectations from peace and how they are expressed and reconsidered in light of experiences of peacebuilding elsewhere. Considering the increasing effort for addressing intrastate conflicts through negotiated settlements, understanding these dynamics is crucial for capturing prospects for peace in numerous parts of the world.

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APPENDICES

A.1 Interview Protocol

- General Questions:

What is/was the resolution/peace process in your opinion?

[Sizce çözüm/barış süreci nedir/neydi?]

What kind of principles were taken into consideration in the design of the process?

[Sürecin tasarlanmasında ne gibi prensipler göz önüne alındı?]

In the design of the process, were other peace processes taken into consideration? Why?

[Sürecin tasarlanmasında ve sonrasında başka örneklere bakıldı mı? Neden?]

- Regarding the design of the process:

In the design of a peace process, what main principles do you think should be included?

Why?

[Barış süreçlerinin tasarlanmasında sizce ne gibi prensipler göz önünde bulundurulmalı?

Neden?]

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What is your opinion on the following topics that were realized and/or discussed during the resolution/peace process?

[Aşağıdaki konularla ilgili ne düşünüyorsunuz?]

-The Wise People Commission

[Akil İnsanlar Heyeti]

-The monitoring committee

[İzleme heyeti/ üçüncü göz tartışmaları]

-Women's participation in the peace process
[Kadınların sürece katılımı]

- Regarding security:

Regarding security, what main issues do you think should be addressed in a peace process?

[Güvenlik alanıyla ilgili sizce barış sürecinde ne gibi konular ele alınmalı?]

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How do you think issues of disarmament should be addressed in a peace process?

[Silahsızlanma konusu ile ilgili fikriniz nedir? Nasıl ele alınmalı sizce?]

What is your opinion on the reform of the security sector?

[Güvenlik sektörünün reformu ile ilgili ne düşünüyorsunuz?]

- Regarding political restructuring:

In terms of political restructuring, what, in your opinion, needs to be included in a peace process?

[Siyasi yeniden yapılanma açısından sizce ne gibi konular ele alınmalı?]

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What is your opinion regarding the following topics?

[Aşağıdaki konular ile ilgili ne düşünüyorsunuz?]

-Developments regarding language rights (e.g. legal developments regarding pleadings in languages other than Turkish, developments regarding education in native language in private schools, the restoration of village names)

[Dil hakları konusundaki gelişmeler (örneğin anadilde savunmanın yasallaşması, özel okullarda anadilde eğitim düzenlemesi, köylere isim iadesi)]

-The debate over self-government/ democratic government?

[Özyönetim/yerinden yönetim/demokratik yerel yönetim tartışmaları?]

- Regarding justice:

What principles do you think we should consider in terms of justice in the design of a peace process?

[Barış sürecinin tasarlanmasında sizce adalet ile ilgili ne gibi prensipler göz önünde bulundurulmalı?]

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What is your opinion on the following topics?

[Aşağıdaki konular ile ilgili ne düşünüyorsunuz?]

-The debates over a new constitution

[Yeni anayasa tartışmaları]

-The debates over a truth commission

[Hakikat komisyonu tartışmaları]

- Intervening questions:

In case there is reference to other examples of peace processes:

Why did you pick that example?

[Türkiye dışından bir barış sürecine atıfta bulunulması durumunda: Neden bu örneğe referans verdiniz?]

How do you think that Turkey might benefit from peace process experiences in other parts of the world?

[Sizce Türkiye başka ülkelerdeki barış süreci deneyimlerinden ne şekilde faydalanabilir?]

A.2 List of Interviews

Index	Position of the Interviewee	Date of Interview	Location of Interview
1	WPC Member	1 October 2015	Istanbul
2	WPC Member, President of MAZLUMDER, Former AKP MP	7 October 2015	Ankara
3	WPC Member, Professor of Constitutional Law	14 October 2015	Ankara
4	WPC Member, President of Human Rights Association Organization	16 October	Ankara
5	WPC Member, Professor of Law	28 October 2015	Ankara
6	WPC Member, Former AKP MP	30 October 2015	Ankara
7	Journalist	5 November 2015	Istanbul
8	Former TESEV Policy Analyst	6 November 2015	Istanbul
9	WPC Member, Journalist	6 November 2015	Istanbul
10	WPC Member	11 November 2015	Ankara
11	WPC Member, Journalist, Former TESEV Executive Board Member	16 November 2015	Istanbul
12	WPC Member, Journalist	17 November 2015	Istanbul
13	WPC Member, Professor of Law	17 November 2015	Istanbul
14	WPC Member, Professor	24 November 2015	Ankara

15	HDP MP	30 November 2015	Ankara
16	AKP MP	1 December 2015	Ankara
17	WPC Member, Professor	2 December 2015	Ankara
18	WPC Member, Journalist	9 December 2015	Istanbul
19	WPC Member, Journalist	9 December 2015	Istanbul
20	WPC Member, Professor, Journalist	11 December 2015	Istanbul
21	WPC Member, Former AKP MP, Advisor to the Prime Minister	11 December 2015	Istanbul
22	WPC Member, HDP MP	14 December 2015	Ankara
23	AKP MP, Former Deputy Prime Minister	6 January 2016	Ankara
24	WPC Member, Former AKP MP	18 January 2016	Istanbul
25	WPC Member, Journalist	19 January 2016	Istanbul
26	WPC Member, Civil Society Actor	19 January 2016	Istanbul
27	WPC Member, Professor	19 January 2016	Istanbul
28	WPC Member, Journalist	20 January 2016	Istanbul
29	WPC Member, Former AKP MP	20 January 2016	Istanbul
30	Former Minister of Justice	29 January 2016	Ankara
31	HDP MP	2 February 2016	Ankara
32	HDP MP	11 February 2016	Ankara
33	KDGM Deputy Secretary	6 June 2017	Ankara
34	DPI Turkey Program Coordinator	2 August 2017	Skype interview