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Ukraine, Turkey, and the Black Sea Region

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Ukrainian-Turkish relations today are a by-product of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. An understanding of the regional context is therefore essential to a study of Ukrainian-Turkish relations.

The Black Sea has become one of the most dynamic, new regions in the world in the post-Soviet era. This is a vast region stretching from the Balkans in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east, that is home to almost a dozen countries, big and small. Because the region sits at the eastern and southeastern-most fringes of Europe on the one hand, and the western and southern borders of Russia on the other, the character of the dominant relationships and issues in the region will inevitably have important implications for European security.

For the last two centuries the Black Sea region lacked an autonomous personality: it was basically a Russian (and later Soviet) domain. The emergence of Ukraine in 1991 as an independent state on the northern shores of the Black Sea is the key development that has overturned the centuries-old order. Today there are three major actors in the region: Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey. In other words, the retrenchment of Russian/Soviet power has by default contributed to the emergence of Ukraine and Turkey as regional powers, introducing a nascent three-power trilateral relationship. Given this new configuration of power, Black Sea politics today is closely affected by the nature and issues of two sets of diadic relationships: Ukrainian-Russian and Turkish-Russian. It is too early still to view budding Ukrainian-Turkish relations as a defining force.

This survey examines the evolving Ukrainian-Turkish relationship against the background of the shifts in the geopolitical configuration in the Black Sea region brought about by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Because Ukrainian-Turkish bilateral relations have been energized only in the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR it will be important to see, first, how the Black Sea region is being reshaped in terms of major new forces, influences, and issues in the wake of the retreat of Russian/Soviet power. It is primarily against this context, in particular Russia's redefined regional role, that Ukrainian-Turkish relations possess significance from the perspective of international politics and European security.

The Black Sea: A New Playing Field for New Public and Private Actors

Broadly speaking, the following developments have ushered in an entirely new geopolitical environment in the Black Sea region: the end of Russian hegemony and the concomitant progression toward a pluralist regional system; increasing openness to the West; the eruption of local conflicts; the potential emergence of the Black Sea region as a major trading hub; and timid steps toward regional institution-building.

Taken together, these developments have galvanized a complex web of forces for discord and cooperation, but the former have so far prevailed. In other words, the process of adjustment to the post-Soviet status quo has bred powerful conflicts and tensions. More significantly, from the perspective of Black Sea politics Moscow's relations with Ukraine and Turkey have come under new strains and stresses. Generally speaking, Russia has reacted to the post-Soviet developments in the Black Sea region in a spirit of frustration, as they cumulatively have represented part of Russia's global retreat. In contrast, Ukraine and Turkey have welcomed the general outlines of the new order, as they are perceived to be serving each country's national interests. Implicitly, if not explicitly, Ukraine and Turkey have displayed identical positions toward many of the controversial issues in which Russia has been involved, or possibly been the driving force, as shall be seen in the discussion of Ukrainian-Turkish bilateral relations below.

From Hegemony to Pluralism

The most profound change in the Black Sea region has come about by the collapse of the *ancien régime*, leading to a thorough reconfiguration of the "correlation of forces" of the last several centuries. The fundamental element of that order had been Russian-Soviet hegemony and dominance over the entire stretch of the area, except on the southern shores of the Black Sea, controlled by Turkey since the conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

Russia's advance to and eventual control over the Black Sea had represented the culmination of a long and persistent drive by Muscovy since the mid-sixteenth century to establish itself in the lands occupied earlier by the Golden Horde in Eastern Europe. The Russian conquests of the Khanates of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1554 at the lower Volga basin first opened the way for Russian advances into the eastern domains of their former Mongol-Tatar masters.[1] In its gradual push southward Russia made its biggest gains when Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the leader of the Cossack insurrection against Poland, turned for support to Muscovy—an act that eventually brought Ukraine under Russian rule after 1654. The final victory in the "opening" of the Black Sea to Russia came in 1774 with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which ended the dominance maintained by the Ottoman Empire in the area since 1487 when the Khanate of Crimea entered Turkish protection.[2] The Russian navy, built at the Baltic

shipyards by Catherine II to force entry into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean, defeated the Ottoman navy at the battle of Çeşme on the Aegean. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca thus marks, among other things, the beginning of the rise of Russia as the dominant naval power in the Black Sea. By its terms Crimea was made independent—only to be annexed by Russia later, in 1783.

Ukraine's decision in 1991 to choose independence and opt out of the Soviet Union has been the defining event that has reversed the direction of this history. Russia suffered an enormous political-territorial retreat in Eastern Europe, including 2,782 kilometers of coastline in the northern Black Sea. This also included Crimea, one of the most important strategic spots in the world. The loss of this massive territory, with a huge advanced military industrial complex on it,[3] and the loss of the corresponding Black Sea coastline have threatened Russia's position as a European as well as a Mediterranean power.

The declaration of independence by Georgia on the eastern Black Sea contributed to Russia's loss of control over further territory and coastline with strategic importance to the security and defense of the Caucasus. This loss has largely remained theoretical, however, as Moscow has regained effective political influence and military presence in the war-torn southern Caucasus through its role as the ultimate mediator and "peacekeeper" or, in some views, instigator in most of the conflicts in the former Soviet space.

These losses cumulatively have reduced Russia's position in the Black Sea region to that of a medium power by regional and global power calculations—with the qualification, of course, that it continues to be one of the world's two nuclear superpowers.

Opening to the West

From Bulgaria to Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, the countries around the Black Sea are redefining their international identities and affiliations in the direction of the West. Bulgaria and Romania have explicitly proclaimed their desire for political, economic and military integration with the West. At the Madrid NATO Summit in June 1997, Romania barely missed an invitation to join the Atlantic Alliance along with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Ukraine has declared neutrality in its world orientation but with a decidedly pro-Western, pro-integrationist thrust.

In contrast, Russia's westward turn is qualified. Caught for years now between Euro-Atlanticist and Eurasianist sentiments, and in a debate over the true Russian identity that has nurtured those sentiments, Russia's assessments and calculations concerning the aim and nature of its relations with the West are ambivalent at best.

Georgia and Armenia are the only states in the region who have retained a significant role for Russia in their security policies, the former because of Russia's role in Abkhazia and the latter because it views Moscow as its ultimate protector against external threats. The nature of the relationship be-

tween Moscow and the two small states in the south was one of dependence by two weak and troubled client states on a powerful patron. Georgia has lately signaled serious second thoughts, however, about the effectiveness of Russia as a security provider. Since 1997, President Edvard Shevardnadze has been increasingly more critical of Russia's peacekeeping/peacemaking role in secessionist Abkhazia, threatening to evict Russia from four military bases it has operated unless it ensures the country's territorial integrity.[4] Incidentally, Ukraine has been one among several CIS countries in the region which have offered to help with peacekeeping in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict.

Georgia's evolving independence from Moscow has had implications on another level, too. It has enlarged an informal grouping of countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which are opposed to deep integration under the roof of the CIS. This group now includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova and is known by the acronym GUAM.

In the military arena, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has effectively extended the political-military influence of the West across the Black Sea and its hinterland.[5] During the Soviet era, the entire Black Sea region formed the territory of the Warsaw Pact except in the south, where Turkey stood as the single NATO ally. Today, all former Warsaw Pact members and the Newly Independent States (NIS) have joined the PfP and signed individual partnership programs. Joint ground and naval exercises have been held among NATO and PfP partners, with Moscow largely viewing NATO's new role in the Black Sea with skepticism.[6] In 1996, Russia refrained from taking part in the Cooperative Partner '96 exercises held in Romania on 22–28 July and the Black Sea Partnership '96 exercises held off the coast of Turkey on 9–14 September.[7] The Russian Foreign Ministry lodged a strong protest with NATO against Sea Breeze '97 naval exercises conducted on 22–29 August 1997 in Odesa and the Donuzlav peninsula in Crimea.[8] In the end, NATO had to soften the initial scenario in which a hypothetical ethnic uprising against the government in Kyiv was aided by a foreign power!

Proliferation of Local Conflicts

The Black Sea region ranks first among the regions of the post-Soviet space in the number of local conflicts that have turned into armed fighting. Secessionist armed conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Chechnya have generated, separately through cross-fertilization, a chain of destabilizing turbulences across the entire Caspian, Caucasus, and Black Sea axis.

The prospects for the future of regional stability look bleak despite the apparent lull in all the conflicts in the last few years. On the positive side, normalization in Russian-Ukrainian relations began with the signing of the long-delayed state treaty in May 1997. The agreement on the division of the Black Sea Fleet further contributed to the normalization. Cease-fire agreements have held between Tbilisi and Abkhaz and Ossetian secessionists, and between

Baku and the Armenian secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia and the Ichkerian Republic of Chechnya signed a peace treaty in summer 1997.

On the negative side, negotiated settlement has evaded all conflicts. Mutual mistrust and hardened positions have been sustained. Talks on the future status of the so-called Transdniester republic in Moldova has dragged on for years. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, former president of Armenia, lost his office in elections in February 1998 to a hard-liner, Robert Kocharian, because he was receptive to an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-sponsored plan on Nagorno-Karabakh which was conciliatory. Russian-Chechen relations continue to be gravely troubled. These and the dormant secessionism in Crimea are powerful reminders that the post-Soviet regional status quo is yet to attain peace, stability and permanence.

The negative reverberations of the secessionist conflicts have gone beyond national boundaries to affect, among others, Russia's relations with Ukraine and Turkey. Despite the current tranquility over the Crimean question at the official level, the ability of nationalists in Crimea and Russia in the long-term to destabilize Ukrainian-Russian relations cannot be ignored. On the eastern flank of the Black Sea, the conflicts in the Caucasus have cast dark clouds on Russian-Turkish relations. The longer these negative dynamics fester in the region, the less likely it seems that initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project will acquire real substance and swift results.

The Black Sea as a Trading Hub

The Black Sea region has emerged as a major potential venue for the movement of goods, more specifically fossil fuels, from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to the west. As these resource-rich but land-locked former Soviet republics have opened up to the world, they have discovered that they depend on transit through neighboring countries in order for their goods to reach world markets. The Black Sea region thus is one of the most attractive venues for the transport of Caspian Sea oil.

The sudden transformation of the region into a potential major trading hub between Central Asia and Azerbaijan on the one hand and Europe on the other has injected a new element of rivalry into regional relations. The race has been over the main pipeline to be built to transport Caspian Sea oil to Europe. The Russian-Turkish competition to get the main pipeline to pass through their respective territories has been the most aggressive one in this multi-player regional power game.[9] Bulgaria and Georgia, since 1995, and Romania and Ukraine, more recently, have joined the bandwagon to claim a stake in the prospective wealth expected to flow from Caspian Sea oil. The visit by President Emil Constantinescu of Romania to Azerbaijan and Georgia in July 1998, to lobby for a Baku-Supsa-Constanţa pipeline is one example of the intense diplomatic activity by Black Sea littoral countries in order to get a big slice of the energy pie.[10] In its part, Ukraine has been lobbying for a pipeline from

Supsa to Iuzhne (on the Adzhailiikskyi Estuary, northeast of Odesa) presumably to take the oil to central and northern Europe.[11]

The prospect of exporting millions of tons of Caspian Sea oil through the Black Sea has also raised concern about the possible negative environmental impact of such trade. This concern was most acutely felt in Turkey, which fears that the expected manifold increase in the tanker traffic through the Turkish Straits would pose grave environmental and security hazards to Istanbul, a city of over ten million inhabitants.[12] Accordingly, in summer 1994 Turkey began to impose stricter controls on the traffic of merchant shipping. On the other hand, the Montreux Convention of 1936, which defines the international regime of the Straits, mandates the freedom of navigation for merchant vessels. Russia, the principal user of the Turkish Straits, views the Turkish move as a hostile act designed to undercut Russia's regional influence as the principal exporter of Caspian Sea oil from the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. The Turkish reluctance to see the Straits be put in jeopardy by super tankers carrying Caspian Sea oil offered Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Rumania the opportunity to exploit their geographical location for the passage of pipelines to Europe.

Steps Towards Regional Institution-Building

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project, which was agreed upon in June 1992 by eleven states (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) in response to a Turkish initiative, represents the only all-inclusive effort to promote regional cooperation.

Foreseeing some of the radical changes, and the attendant problems, in store for Europe in general and for the Black Sea region in particular, Turkey's President Turgut Ozal in 1990–91 came up with this vision of Black Sea cooperation for long-term prosperity and peace in a volatile region. If realized, BSEC would serve, in particular, as a vehicle for the promotion of private-sector cooperation in such non-political areas as trade, communications, transportation and the environment. The short-term goal of the Turkish architects of this arrangement was to create a regional outlet for the goods and services of the economies in transition. In the long term, they hoped that habits of cooperation that would be acquired along the way in these limited areas would spill over into political relations.[13]

The BSEC initiative has eventually attained a highly developed institutional structure.[14] At the summit meeting in Yalta on 5–6 June 1998, leaders signed a charter formally establishing BSEC as a regional organization. However, its record of success as an engine of regional cooperation has remained marginal primarily because of the constraints imposed: a) by the ongoing political and military tensions among many of the participating states; and, b) by the structural weaknesses of the economies of the NIS and the former socialist countries

in the Balkans participating in the project. Aware of the gloomy future that awaits the region in the event that business would be conducted as usual, ten presidents and Russian Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko ended the Yalta summit with a unanimous warning that war threatened the troubled region's prosperity.[15]

The environment is one of the few areas where the political will to develop a coordinated intergovernmental approach seems to have become the strongest. The Black Sea is known as the world's largest anoxic water mass.[16] The degradation of its ecosystem and the unsustainable use of its natural resources are explained by a variety of factors such as high pollution loads from the rivers it receives and inadequate development and management policies of the coastal countries. The Danube River introduces over half of the nutrient input into the Black Sea.

In April 1992, the six littoral states adopted the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, known as the Bucharest Convention, which came into force in spring 1994. In April 1993, they adopted the Odesa Declaration to encourage a common policy framework and to determine policy priorities in order to promote the rehabilitation, protection and preservation of the seriously deteriorated marine environment within specific environmental goals and time-frames. The environment ministers met in Istanbul on 30–31 October 1996 to adopt the Strategic Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and Protection of the Black Sea.

Clearly, the will to attack the common environmental problems in the Black Sea seems to be gaining momentum. The European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank have, with their various projects, encouraged the littorals to be more caring towards the Black Sea. Yet, intergovernmental cooperation and coordination still remain an extremely limited, though by no means not an insignificant process. The adoption of the Strategic Action Plan, followed later by the adoption of national action plans, are the most promising signs of future progress. Otherwise the occasionally heard polemical question of "who pollutes the most?" could result in the irreversible ecological death of the Black Sea.

Is a New Black Sea Being Born?

The Black Sea region is thus being transformed into the playing field of multiple actors and forces from within and without the region. New and old actors, influences and issues have been reacting and interacting to ultimately "open" the Black Sea once again, but in contrast to 1774, this time in a reverse process in which Russia has been forced to yield to the entry of new local, regional and international private and public actors into what was a former Russian/Soviet domain.

Will Russia Accept the New Status Quo?

It is too early, however, to conclude that Russia has conceded the loss of strategic control in the Black Sea. Even if the independence of Ukraine seems irreversible, Ukraine's territorial integrity remains vulnerable to pressures from Russia and the Russian diaspora in Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine and Crimea remain a bone of contention for Russian nationalists even though Moscow's official line respects Ukraine's borders. It is significant that for years Russia had used the Black Sea Fleet dispute to stall the conclusion of a treaty of friendship which would endorse the current Russian-Ukrainian borders: the treaty was finally signed in 1997, but has yet to be ratified by the Russian Parliament (Duma). The following statement, made in spring 1998 by Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, is indicative of the mood at least among the nationalists and communists concerning the future of Ukraine: "The Sevastopol issue cannot be resolved separately from the issue of the union of the three Slavic states (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus)."[17]

Russia's love affair with Crimea in general and its ports at Sevastopol in particular, and the Russian military's insistence on maintaining a strong presence in Georgia are the most meaningful indications of the consensus among the Russian political class to retain a position of strength in the Black Sea. Russia's strategic interests in the Black Sea have two interrelated but geographically disparate focal points: Crimea and the Caucasus. Russia would need to anchor its navy in Sevastopol in order to recapture at least part of its maritime dominance. "A powerful Black Sea fleet in the Crimea would serve as an instrument to keep Kyiv under political pressure, to encourage centrifugal trends in Crimea, and to give Russia a lever over the strategic calculations of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova."[18]

In addition, a powerful Russian fleet in the Black Sea would serve as an instrument of control in the Caucasus, both south and north. President Yeltsin elaborated this thinking during a visit to Krasnodar Krai on the Black Sea in mid-April 1996, about the time of his unrealized visit to Kyiv, with the following:

> "Russia will not be Russia without the Black Sea . . . This is not only a matter of history, not only national feelings and prestige. Russia needs to have a fleet in the Black Sea in order to protect reliably its Black Sea lands and the Northern Caucasus."[19]

In a pronouncement issued on 9 September 1996, the Russian Security Council underscored the strategic complementarity between the Black Sea and the Caucasus. According to the Security Council, the purpose of the Black Sea Fleet was, "the protection of the legitimate interests of Russia in the Caspian-Black Sea region."[20]

In short, therefore, the post-Soviet order is one of fluidity and uncertainty in the Black Sea region, marked by deeper tensions. The fundamental reason is the Russian inability yet to fully come to terms with the loss of empire.

Ukrainian-Turkish Relations

As was stated earlier, Ukrainian-Turkish relations are a post-Soviet phenomenon. This is true, of course, for the modern times. However, if one turns the pages of history to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one comes across prolonged encounters between Ottoman Turks and Ukrainians due to the former's imperial extension deep into eastern Europe and the northern Black Sea littoral. Often hostile, these relations included periods of political and military cooperation. Hetman Khmelnytskyi, for example, concluded a short-lived alliance with the Ottoman Empire in 1648, as did Hetman Petro Doroshenko in 1669.[21] As President Leonid Kuchma recognized in one of his speeches during his official visit to Turkey on 26–27 November 1996, the Ottoman Turks at various times and in various ways lent support to the idea of an independent Ukraine. In fact, the Ottoman Empire refused to recognize the union of 1654 with Moscow until about a century later when its power in the northern Black Sea was receding.[22] There is a modern episode of Turkish support for moves for Ukrainian independence as well. In 1918, Turkey was in the forefront of the countries who swiftly extended diplomatic recognition to the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic.

Broadly speaking, Ukrainian-Turkish relations in the post-Soviet era have gone through two phases. The first phase was one of high optimism on both sides in the early years of independence. The second phase has been one of cautious, controlled relations on the part of Kyiv, as the West moved to extend strong support to Ukrainian independence. The first phase roughly coincides with the tenure of President Leonid Kravchuk, the second—with that of his successor, Leonid Kuchma.

President Kravchuk's Search for a Regional Partner

The period between 1991 and 1994 was marked by numerous signs both in Kyiv and Ankara of a mutual desire to cultivate extensive, multidimensional relations of friendship and cooperation—and that at as quick a pace as feasible.

The basic rationale behind this mutual attraction was geopolitical: the wish to reinforce the post-Soviet order in the Black Sea through bilateral and regional cooperation. However, it would be inadequate to maintain that it was merely the weight of the prevailing geopolitical circumstances that pulled the two sides together. President Kravchuk's deeper interest in and understanding of modern Turkey contributed to his ability to evaluate it in a more positive way than would be the case among other former Communist leaders whose view of Turkey were shaped purely by the seventy-year old anti-Turkish Soviet indoctrination.[23] President Kravchuk became a strong supporter of the idea that Turkey was in a position to play a positive role of leadership in the region.[24]

The external influences that mobilized Kyiv's interest in Turkey as a potential regional partner were powerful in the early years of independence. Even

though Ukrainian independence was formally recognized by Russia with the Belavezha agreements of 8 December 1991, many in the Russian political elite contested the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. This debate was focused above all else on Crimea, with Russian nationalists and the Crimean Russians appealing to regional sentiments and challenging Ukrainian sovereignty over the peninsula.

Second, the West was initially cool to Ukraine. The fundamental element in the Western, and more specifically the American, approach to newly independent Ukraine was the severe concern over nuclear weapons proliferation by inheritance. The longer President Kravchuk's Ukraine delayed denuclearization, the greater the frustration felt in the United States, and Russia, with Kyiv. It was only after President Kravchuk signed the Trilateral Statement at the Moscow summit on 14 January 1994, pledging Ukraine to a non-nuclear-weapons status by June 1996, that an entirely new page in the West's attitude began to unfold. The victory of Zhirinovsky's ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party and the communists at the national elections to the State Duma in December 1993 had already made a dent in the West's evaluation of Ukraine. The West literally offered to become Kyiv's protector politically and economically—and was accepted as such—only after these developments.

In other words, friendship and cooperation with Turkey, one of the three most powerful neighbors in the Black Sea region, emerged as a convenient geopolitical alternative to Ukraine's almost total isolation in the early years of independence. From the Turkish perspective, relations with Ukraine also seemed to address an important geopolitical concern: the desire for the preservation of the post-Soviet status quo in the Black Sea region. The independence of Ukraine was essential to the fulfillment of this goal. Hence the decision of Turkey to extend unequivocal support to Kyiv in its post-1991 struggle with Moscow for full sovereignty and independence.

This fundamental thinking in the Turkish approach to the post-Soviet order in Eurasia has been the motive force behind Turkey's active diplomatic initiatives with the NIS and the former Warsaw Pact countries in East and Central Europe. While Turkey's interest in the Turkic states of Central Asia has been widely publicized, however, this aspect of its new diplomacy has received little, if any, attention. Diplomatic contacts have intensified with the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Moldova through exchanges of high-level exchanges of official visits and the signing of numerous economic and cultural cooperation agreements. Most recently, for example, President Suleyman Demirel of Turkey paid an official visit to Moldova on 25–26 July 1998.

Against the background of the mutual awareness by Ukraine and Turkey of the complementarity of their geopolitical interests—and the sense of urgency galvanized not only by the tensions surrounding Ukrainian-Russian relations but by the civil wars in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—Ukraine under President Kravchuk and Turkey engaged in a highly active bilateral diplomacy, reinforced by regional initiatives.

President Kravchuk's visit to Ankara on 3–4 May 1992, became the first official visit to Turkey by a Ukrainian head of state.[25] The treaty of friendship and cooperation signed during this visit constitutes the fundamental political and legal instrument in which the parties affirm their mutual respect for each other's independence and territorial integrity. Politically, this pledge translates into Turkish support for Ukraine in its quest for full independence from Russia and sovereignty over Crimea. President Suleyman Demirel of Turkey paid an official visit to Ukraine on 30 May–1 June 1994. The highlights of the visit were the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the treaty of friendship signed in 1992, and President Demirel's promise of Turkish assistance in the repatriation of Crimean Tatars to their homeland by constructing 1,000 homes.

Numerous projects for economic, commercial and defense cooperation were taken up in this period, some of which found their way into agreements. In January 1994, an oil pipeline agreement was signed, envisaging the transport of Middle Eastern oil through Turkey to Odesa. The project has been resisted by the authorities in Odesa, on environmental grounds. Meanwhile, the so-called "luggage trade" flourished, as returning Ukrainian visitors to Istanbul flooded the Ukrainian markets with inexpensive Turkish consumer goods—which incidentally, became a convenient form of trade between Turkey, a haven for such goods, and the neighboring CIS states.

On regional and international security issues as well, including the controversial issue of Russian versus multinational peacekeeping in the Southern Caucasus, Ankara and Kyiv took similar positions. Turkey viewed as legitimate Ukraine's demands for security guarantees as a precondition for giving up the Soviet-era nuclear weapons on its soil. On its part, Kyiv largely kept a low profile on Turkish moves to bring new regulations to commercial traffic in the Straits for the protection of the environment and the security of Istanbul—a position that has hardened under the Kuchma regime.

The Turkish initiative on BSEC tabled in 1991 offered a new opportunity to President Kravchuk to press for regional cooperation. He and President Edvard Shevardnadze of Georgia became the most outspoken proponents of regionalism in its broadest sense. At the founding conference held in Istanbul on 25 July 1992, they advocated that the new initiative take on a security dimension as well. For both leaders, Turkey seemed to be well-placed to take on the leadership role—a position not shared by Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

As was already intimated, the initial euphoria and momentum in Ukrainian-Turkish relations has dissipated since late 1994 for one basic reason: the West has embraced Ukraine. With this newfound reassurance and prestige Kyiv no longer felt the urgency in seeking regional partners and allies in its struggle with Moscow to maintain its preferred world outlook. It is possible that President Kravchuk, with his keener sense of the power of regional relationships, might have pursued a more nuanced course. After two years of inertia between 1994 and 1996, however, relations have been revitalized by presidential diplomacy. Ukraine's diplomatic activism since 1996 in the Black Sea region, Israel,

and Turkey suggest that Ukraine is reconsidering the value of regional relationships to supplant its westward turn.

President Kuchma: From Balance and Caution to Self-Confidence

President Kuchma paid an official visit to Turkey on 26–27 November 1996. Originally scheduled to take place in early July, the visit was postponed due to the Russian presidential elections. He arrived in Ankara at the end of an official visit to Israel.

President Kuchma's policy toward Turkey appears to have evolved within the framework of two overriding though somewhat contradictory, foreign policy considerations: first, the need to normalize relations with Russia; and second, the need to expand and diversify the bases of international support for Ukrainian independence.

The first element had been apparent as far back as 1994, during the presidential elections, when Kuchma campaigned for a pro-Russian foreign policy. Ukrainian-Russian relations have indeed moved in the direction of normalization since 1994—even if the real momentum had started with President Kravchuk's pledge to give up nuclear weapons. The Russian-Ukrainian treaty of friendship and cooperation, finally signed in May 1997 after much foot-dragging by Moscow, is the most obvious evidence of the rapprochement under way between the two countries.

The policy of seeking normalized relations with Russia called for correct behavior not only in Kyiv's relations with Moscow, but also with third parties, too, such as Turkey, for Russia was clearly restive about Turkey's presumed aggressive ambitions in the post-Soviet Black Sea. Thus, Russia accused Turkey of plotting to fill the "vacuum of power" created in the Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus by the breakup of the Soviet Union. These messages apparently were not lost on the Ukrainian leader. Unlike President Kravchuk, who did not refrain from an open confrontation with Moscow in the most difficult years of independence, President Kuchma did not seem willing to risk Moscow's anger by overtly playing up the importance of Turkey as a friend and a potential ally of Ukraine.

The second element in President Kuchma's thinking—the need to expand and diversify the bases of international support for Ukrainian independence—appears to have evolved as a clear foreign policy objective largely after he assumed office. The most outstanding policy outcome of this consideration has been Kyiv's increasingly more determined turn to the West. President Kuchma and high-ranking officials have since 1995 defined "integration with the West" as the country's strategic goal, while placing relations with the East merely in the category of "cooperation."[26]

In this grand balancing act by Ukraine between the West and the East, relatively low-key, controlled, though still friendly, relations with Turkey should prove to be a valuable source of strength for Ukrainian diplomacy, not

only in regional affairs but in European affairs as well. The advantages to Kyiv of reviving the momentum in Ukrainian-Turkish relations came to the fore in the Joint Communiqué issued at the end of President Kuchma's visit to Turkey. Behind the routine calls for friendship and respect for the principles of international law on matters of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, there was a blunt reminder that Ukraine and Turkey

> expressed their concern at attempts by certain political circles to return to a former state structure in the region of the former Soviet Union in defiance of the historic choice of the concerned peoples to set up their own independent and sovereign states. The President of the Republic of Turkey stressed in the same perspective the prime importance Turkey attaches to Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity as well as to the success of its on-going political and economic reforms as one of the key elements of stability and security in Europe.[27]

The visit of President Kuchma breathed new life into initiatives to increase the volume of bilateral trade; to accelerate scientific, technological and cultural exchanges; and to invigorate the slackening momentum to strengthen regional cooperation. Ten new agreements in these fields were signed during the president's visit. The Joint Communiqué called for the enhancement of efforts to protection the environment of the Black Sea. The "Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation" and the "Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments" were designed to stimulate greater interest in the private sector to undertake joint projects in each other's countries.

The year 1998 witnessed intensification of diplomatic contacts between the two countries. On 12–13 February 1998, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, and on 21–23 May, President Suleyman Demirel paid official visits to Kyiv. Both leaders also made a point of visiting Simferopol and Bakhchesarai on the final day of their visit.

The Joint Communiqué signed by Demirel and Kuchma expressed, among other things, the hope that mutual relations would reach a level of "constructive partnership"; that the two countries would examine the possibility of concluding a free trade agreement; that they were ready to further develop dialogue and collaboration on energy with particular emphasis on oil and natural gas transportation, oil refining and electric power; and that they agreed to deepen their dialogue on defense matters and to continue their cooperation in the military field at the bilateral level as well as within the framework of the successfully developing relations between NATO and Ukraine.

A total of eight agreements and protocols were signed to promote cooperation in health and medical sciences, education (several hundred Turkish students are studying at Ukrainian universities where tuition is low and admission requirements less demanding), environmental protection, finance, consular relations and arms industry. The agreement on arms production is classified.[28]

Armaments trade and perhaps co-production seem to be among the most promising areas of potential cooperation in the military field. Ukraine is hoping to sell 1,000 T-84 tanks Turkey in a deal estimated to be worth around 2 billion dollars. It faces strong competition from Russia and others also keenly interested in taking part in this and future tenders by Turkey for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. The military agreement signed in May has raised eyebrows in Moscow, as this comment in Moscow-based *Segodnia* indicates: "The recent visit to Kyiv by Turkish President Suleiman Demirel . . . shows that Ukraine is ready to make friends with a NATO member against Russia . . . Moscow should give special attention to Demirel's emphasis on the need for 'multilateral cooperation with Ukraine within NATO's framework;' . . . Local observers interpreted this remark as a response to the intended delivery of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Greece [and Cyprus—DS]. This is quite consonant with Kyiv's foreign policy conception—'to make friends against Russia.'"[29]

Trade continues to be the most advanced aspect of Turkish-Ukrainian relations. The volume of official trade in 1997 stood at $1.2 billion. The balance heavily tilts in favor of Ukraine as Ukrainian exports of machinery and steel products make up roughly four-fifths of this trade. According to figures provided by the State Customs Service of Ukraine for the first six months of 1998, Turkey comes third in Ukraine's foreign trade after Russia and China. The volume of trade for that period stood at $361.3 million. The unofficial shuttle trade, which in 1997 stood around $1 billion, is where Turkey is at an advantage. That trade, however, might be on a downward trend.

The regional competition over prospective pipelines for the transportation of the Caspian Sea basin fossil fuels has introduced a new element of tension into Turkish-Ukrainian relations. However, kept low-key, it has been better managed than the open Turkish-Russian struggle on the same issue. The May summit in Kyiv gave President Kuchma the opportunity to reiterate the importance that his country attached to obtaining alternative sources of oil supplies and its resolve to work to secure participation in the transport of Caspian oil. While it was announced that the two presidents reached agreement on Ukraine's participation in talks on Caspian oil, President Demirel sounded a word of caution: "But it is important to remember the owners of oil are not Ukraine or Turkey."[30] It seems clear that Turkey views the Ukrainian alternative not as a viable one because of the strategic (reliance on the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline) and commercial challenges (the need for bigger investments for new pipelines in Ukraine as opposed to the Baku-Çeyhan pipeline) that it appears to entail.

Crimea

Clearly Crimea is potentially the most critical topic in Ukrainian-Turkish relations, because of the special ties between Turks and Crimean Tatars for

centuries.[31] It is an issue that has the potential to unite or divide the two countries. However, to all appearances it seems to have had a unifying impact so far—unifying because Turkey has chosen to support Ukrainian claims of sovereignty over Crimea, by implication rejecting Russian claims to it either on historical or legal grounds, or both.

The original Kravchuk-Demirel commitment to mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity, reiterated at successive meetings, has served as a solid, stabilizing factor in the relations. Equally importantly, Turkey has repeatedly stated that it views the Crimean Tatars as a bridge between the two countries. In May 1998, President Demirel deliberately underlined this once again, adding that: "Our relations with the Crimea are part of our relations with Ukraine." In other words, Ankara has no political or territorial ambitions in Crimea. It feels that Turkey's national interests are best served under the present status quo. Obviously, some within the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey might be expected to take exception to the official position.

Kyiv seems to welcome Turkish interest in the Crimean Tatars as a source of funding for the resettlement of the returning Tatars. The Joint Communiqué of May 1998 refers to Ukraine's "deep satisfaction with Turkey's increasing contribution in the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars in their ancestral lands, within the framework of the recently launched 1000-unit housing project." Turkey several years ago had undertaken to finance the construction of these houses as an act of humanitarian assistance. The financing of 140 houses have already been completed. Turkey further promised to extend Eximbank credits to projects in Crimea that would create jobs for the unemployed Tatar population.[32]

It is not only Kyiv which welcomes Turkish credits and investments in Crimea. The Crimean Prime Minister Arkadiy Demydenko who visited Turkey in March 1996, also expressed hope for the speedy realization of this project.[33] Crimean officials and businessmen who greeted Demirel in Simferopol repeatedly invited Turkish participation in the development of Crimean economy. There is quite an active Turkish business community in Crimea.[34]

The visit of President Demirel, and Prime Minister Yilmaz before him, to Bakhchesarai was the occasion of much emotion among Crimean Tatars. Mustafa Cemilev, head of the Crimean Tatar *Mejlis* and deputy in the Ukrainian parliament, said Demirel's visit was of historic importance because it was the first visit by a Turkish head of state to Crimea since the peninsula was attached to Russia.

It is important to note in this connection that an estimated five-million strong Crimean Tatar diaspora lives in Turkey. Volga-Tatars and Bashkirs are estimated to number around two million. Another eight-to-ten million Turks claim Caucasian ethnic origin. In other words, Turkey is the land of a large diaspora from the former Russian/Soviet empire who emigrated to Turkey in the peak years of Russian expansion and Russian/Soviet repression.[35] Each one of these groups are represented in the cross-section of the Turkish society and

have powerful lobbies. The demographic composition of Turkey's population makes Russia especially uncomfortable, as it serves as a reminder of the potential links between its own ethnic Turkic and the Caucasian populations and their cousins in Turkey. It is partly from this larger perspective that Moscow follows with discomfort the Turkish interest in the welfare of the Crimean Tatars. In a sense, therefore, Crimean Tatars sit at the center of the Ukrainian-Russian-Turkish trilateral relationship.

Needless to say, the Crimean Tatars take their own independent positions not only on issues of local significance but on more fundamental issues such as the territorial integrity of Ukraine. From the first day of Ukrainian independence, they have been staunchly in favor of the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The *Mejlis* refuted nationalist claims by Russia's State Duma to Sevastopol, arguing that such a position amounted to claims on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and urging President Kuchma to implement Article 17 of the constitution, which bans deployment of foreign military bases on Ukrainian territory.[36]

As for the prospects for peace and stability in Crimea, they appear gloomy from several angles. The economy is depressed. Political relations with Kyiv are not optimal. Nor are ethnic relations among the peninsula's three dominant nationalities. The situation of the Crimean Tatars is especially unsatisfactory both economically and politically. The unemployment rate is extremely high. The Turkish offer of help in providing funds for housing and investments will definitely fall short of alleviating their problems. Crimean Tatar leaders voice their frustration with what they say is Kyiv's 'open neglect' of their problems, especially that of citizenship involving nearly 120,000 of the returnees.[37] Over the last several years international and regional organizations have tried to draw the attention of the international community by reporting on the depressive local circumstances but no improvement has been obtained. In 1996 the United Nations and OSCE observers reported that more than half of the 250,000 Tatars who returned survived in such abysmal conditions that violence could erupt easily.[38]

Crimean Tatars feel frustrated because despite personal pledges, President Kuchma seems unable to offer solutions to critical issues that would affect the Tatar community's long term political, social, and economic well-being as a viable element of a multi-ethnic society. The truth of the matter is that the difficulty in acquiring Ukrainian citizenship by the repatriates and socio-economic deprivation, together, help create a deprived underclass.

President Kuchma is perceived as a leader who has failed to carry though his promises. Writing in summer 1998 on the occasion of Kuchma's vacation in Crimea, the Tatar press reminded its readers that a year ago the president had asked *Mejlis* Deputy Chairman Refat Chubarov to draw up suggestions on how to facilitate the procedures for obtaining citizenship. While visiting some Tatar villages, he had pledged two million hrivnas from the national budget to help

revitalize the local economy. Chubarov submitted his report but nothing has come out of it or of the promised funds until summer 1998.[39]

The lack of improvement in the economic and political conditions of Crimean Tatars bring to mind a fundamental question, of course: How seriously is Kyiv committed to the cause of the healthy repatriation of Crimean Tatars in their ancestral homeland?

Conclusion

Ukrainian-Turkish relations are still evolving. The experience of the last seven years leads us to conclude that the direction of bilateral relations between the two neighboring countries across the Black Sea have been, and will continue to be, closely influenced by Ukraine's relations with Russia and the West.

For a variety of reasons—historical, cultural and economic—the two countries are only just beginning to discover each other as potential partners, but the process of that discovery is beset by several disadvantages. The fundamental disadvantage is what has brought them together in the first place: fear of the revival of the Russian Empire—even though the rationale and intensity of their shared apprehensions vary significantly between the two. On the other hand, neither country is capable of offering credible reassurance against such an eventuality. Operating under this essential constraint, Ukrainian-Turkish bilateral relations were bound to suffer in the event that either one of the two countries felt that an alternative and stronger source of protection could be cultivated somewhere else. This is exactly what has happened in the case of Ukraine which has come to look to the West in its search for security against Russia. For Ukraine, bilateral relations with Turkey and within the regional framework of the BSEC can only be supplementary to its developing fundamental relationship with the West.

One should also remember that the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism in the 1990s in Christian countries located on the frontier of the Christian and Islamic civilizations would need to be taken into account when considering the future prospects of Ukrainian-Turkish relations. A predominantly Moslem country, modern Turkey's secular political system has been a source of reassurance to its neighbors as a buffer against Islamic radicalism. Yet, the domestic balance within Turkey itself has been changing, with the Islamist Welfare Party[40] having gained sufficient electoral power to preside over a coalition government for about a year in 1996–97. The record of the Welfare Party on foreign policy was definitely not one that strived to export Islamic fundamentalism to Muslim minorities in the neighboring countries like Greece, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Moldova.

Whether they are inching or galloping, the generally positive nature of Ukrainian-Turkish relations is an important factor of peace and stability in the Black Sea region and in Europe. Ukrainian Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko reflected a keen awareness of this positive force for regional

stability when he said on the occasion of President Demirel's visit to Kyiv in May 1998, that "the development and deepening of Ukrainian-Turkish relations was the most important factor for safeguarding regional stability and creation of a new architecture of European security."[41]

It seems highly likely that enhanced NATO-Ukrainian relations since mid-1997 has contributed to a new awareness in Kyiv that cooperation with Turkey, the only NATO ally in the Black Sea basin, can only be a positive contribution to Ukraine's westward foreign policy.

NOTES

1. Halil Inalcik, "Struggle for East-European Empire, 1440–1700: The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire," *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 21 (1982–1991), 1–17. This recent article is a useful guide to the history of prolonged Turkish presence in northern Black Sea between 1473–1774. For Ukrainian perspectives on the same topic and the Russian, Polish, and Turkish rivalry in the region, see, Danylo Husar Struk, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5 (Toronto, 1993), 319–21.
2. Alexander Halenko, an Ottomanist at the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, challenges the traditional view that the Black Sea had been "closed" by the Ottomans before its "opening" by the Russian Empire in 1774. See Halenko, "Was the Black Sea 'closed' before its opening by the Russians?" from the abstract of the paper presented at the conference of "The Ottomans and the Sea" organized by the Skilliter Centre for Ottoman Studies, Newnham College, Cambridge, UK, 29–30 March 1996, 2.
3. Ustina Markus, "An Ailing Military Industrial Complex" *Transition* 2(4) 23 February 1996: 52.
4. "Russia Awaits Official Georgian Stance on Peacekeepers," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (henceforth, FBIS) FBIS-SOV-98-220, 8 August 1998.
5. In May 1997, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Sintra, Portugal, and decided, among other things, to enhance the PfP program. The primary objective of the heightened importance attached to the PfP by NATO member countries was to involve partners more deeply in planning and carrying out PfP exercises. See, Sergio Blanzino (Deputy Secretary General of NATO), "A Year after Sintra: Achieving Cooperative Security through the EPAC and PfP," *NATO Review* 46(3) Autumn 1998: 4.
6. Some Russian analysts argue that these activities represent the intention of NATO to shift its southern flank from the eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea, see, Nicolai A. Kusnetzky, "Geopolitical Aspects of Russian Politics in the Black Sea Region," in Nicolai A. Kovalsky, ed., *Russia: The Mediterranean and the Black Sea Region* (Moscow, 1997), 205.
7. "Russia Eyes Naval Exercise," *Monitor* 2(143) 23 July 1996 [Jamestown Foundation, brdcast@jamestown.org].
8. For protestations in the Russian press against PfP exercises in the Black Sea, see, "Which Way is Sea Breeze Blowing?"*Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* (henceforth, CDPSP) 49(17) 28 May 1997: 19.
9. For Russian views on the competition on the oil pipelines, see, "Compromise Struck on Caspian Oil Pipeline Routes," *CDPSP* 47(41) 8 Novem-

ber 1995: 8; for Turkish views, see, Temel Iskit, "Turkey: A New Actor in the Field of Energy," *Perceptions* (a quarterly journal of the Turkish Foreign Ministry) 1(1) March–May 1996: 58–82.

10. "Georgia Romania July 2, 1998," TURKISTAN-Newsletter (BUSINESS) 98(107-07-1998) 6 July 1998 [kryopak@WORLDNET.ATT.NET].

11. For Ukrainian views on the advantages of using Ukrainian territory for the transport of Caspian Sea oil, see, State Committee of Oil, Gas and Oil Refining Industry of Ukraine, *Eurasian Oil Transport Corridor: Caspian Oil to European Markets through Ukraine, Project Presentation*, (Kyiv, January 1998).

12. Turkish official statistics show that in 1994, a total of 19,630 merchant vessels passed through the Straits. With 5,114 vessels, Russia was the biggest user of the Straits followed by Ukraine, Malta, Syria and Greece. See, Republique de Turquie, Ministere des Affaires Etrangres, *Rapport Annuel Sur Le Mouvement Des Navires À Travers Les Detroits Turcs, 1994, 58-ème année* (Ankara, 1995), 46–48. According to Turkish press reports, the Turkish Foreign Ministry believes that there has been a 500 percent increase in the total number of vessels transiting the Turkish Straits, from 9,144 in 1960, to 46,914 in 1995. "Moskova Ankara'ya karsi sertlelsiyor," (Moscow hardens toward Ankara) *Posta*, 31 Temmuz (July) 1997. For Russian views on the Turkish position, see, "We Cannot Consider It Lawful," *CDPSP* 46(13) 27 April 1994: 26.

13. The historical record shows that Turkey was the original source of inspiration and the singular force that pushed forth the idea of a Black Sea cooperation scheme among regional countries in the wake of the end of the Cold War. This point is important not simply to get the historical record right but also as a clue to those who wish to understand the true founding ideas behind the project. Today, when the BSEC has been recognized as a positive sub-regional organization, there are some attempts, at least at the intellectual level, at redefining and/or ill-defining the original purposes of the project. Needless to say, these efforts would fail the test of historical evidence. For the original concepts that went into the creation of the BSEC, see, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: Anarchy, the Demise of Bipolarity, and the Turkish Call on the Regional Players to Cooperate rather than Defect," United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Conference on European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe,* Conference Proceedings (Geneva, 1992), 153–63.

14. For general information see, BSEC Permanent International Secretariat, *The BSEC: The Present and the Future* (Istanbul, 1994), and *Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Handbook of Documents* (Istanbul, 1995).

15. Pavel Polityuk, "Ukraine: Black Sea States Say War Clouds Region's Prospects," Reuters, 5 June 1998.

16. The information in this paragraph has been obtained at the Global Environment Facility/Black Sea Environmental Programme, sponsored by the World Bank, Dolmabahçe Sarayi, Istanbul, November 1996.

17. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC/SWB)* 25 March 1998: B/16.

18. "Struggle for the Heart of Europe," *The Fortnight in Review* (1)9 [Jamestown Foundation brdcast@jamestwon.org].

19. "Russia: Yeltsin: Black Sea Fleet Part of 'Strategic Security," FBIS-SOV-96-075: 11.

20. "Russia: Security Council to Take Control of Black Sea Fleet Issue," FBIS-SOV-96-175, 9 September 1996: 11.

21. Inalcik, 7; Volodymyr Kubijovyč, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine,* vol. 2 (Toronto, 1988), 170. See also, A. Zhukovsky, "Turkey," in Danylo Husar Struk, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5 (Toronto, 1993), 319–21. In interviews with the author in August 1996, some Ukrainian intellectuals have argued that Khymelnytsky should have joined the Ottoman Empire, for that would have meant that Ukrainian independence would have come much sooner, in the pattern of the Balkan peoples.

22. Inalcik, 12–13.

23. There is an unwritten theory among Turkish and Ukrainian scholars which argues that the systematic anti-Turkish Soviet indoctrination in Ukraine was designed to inhibit the interest of Ukrainian scholars in conducting research on the history of Ukrainian-Turkish relations in order to uncover portions of their history.

24. Interview with former President Leonid Kravchuk, Kyiv, 20 August 1996.

25. For an excellent survey of Ukrainian-Turkish relations during the Kravchuk era, see, Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukrainian-Turkish Relations," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 51(1) Spring 1995: 5–34, from which I have benefited greatly.

26. "Ukraine: Kuchma Stresses Stability in Relations with Russia," FBIS-SOV-96-137, 16 July 1996: 44; "Ukraine: Kuchma Seeks Further Integration Into Europe," FBIS-SOV-96-110, 6 June 1996: 44. For statements by members of the establishment, see, Oleksandr Moroz, "The Path to Europe," *Politics and the Times* (a quarterly journal of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, in English) 1 (October–December 1995): 6–9; Volodymyr Horbulin, "Ukraine's Place in Today's Europe," *Politics and the Times* 1 (October–December 1995): 10–15; Henadiy Udovenko, "An

Open, Predictable and Pragmatic Foreign Policy," *Politics and the Times* 1 (October–December 1995): 16–24.

27. *Turkish-Ukrainian Joint Communiqué,* Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 27 November 1996, 3.

28. Chris Bird, "Tanks, Oil To Dominate Turkish Leaders's Ukraine Trip," Reuter's News Service 20 May 1998; Pavel Polityuk, "Ukrainian, Turkish Leaders Mull Oil Transport," Reuters, 21 May 1998; Alexander Yegorov, "Russia: Tank War Between Russia and Ukraine," *Kommersant* 29/05/1998 [retrieved from Reuters News Agency].

29. Viktor Yadukha, Viktor Lugovik, "Ukraine: Kiev is Ready to Make Friends with Turkey, Against Russia," *Segodnia* 26 May 1998 [retrieved from Reuters News Service].

30. Mikhail Melnik, "Ukraine: Kuchma Says Ukraine Wants to Take Part in Caspian Oil Project," Itar-Tass World Service, 22 May 1998 [retrieved from Reuters News Service].

31. Clearly the revival of interest in ethnic kin living as minorities in other countries has been a universal phenomenon in the post-Cold War and post-Soviet era. This has been equally true for Turkey, especially with regard to the more isolated Turkic communities in the former Soviet Union like the Gagauz Turks in Moldova. Since 1991 Turkey has not only cultivated cultural relations with the 200,000-strong Gagauz community but actively encouraged them in the early years of independence to reach an accommodation with Chişinaŭ on the understanding that Moldova would not integrate with Romania.

32. For a recent study on "deported peoples" in the former Soviet Union, see the article by Vladimir I. Mukomel and Emil A. Pain in Vitaly Naumkin, ed., *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia: A Post-Soviet Critique* (Reading, 1993), 144–61.

33. "Ukraine: Crimea: OSCE Mission Not Needed," FBIS-SOV-96-100, 22 May 1996: 45.

34 The author was a member in the delegation that accompanied President Demirel to Ukraine.

35. For a brief treatment of the exodus of Tatars and Caucasians to Turkey to escape Russian repression, see, Paul B. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Monica, CA, 1992), 29.

36. "Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet," *OMRI Daily Digest* 2(210) October 30, 1996 [omripub@omri.cz].

37. "Ukraine: Tatar Leaders Voice Resentment at Kyiv's 'Open Neglect,'" FBIS-SOV-96-130, 5 July 1996: 48.

38. James Rupert, "Tatars Return to an Inhospitable Home in Crimea," *International Herald Tribune* 11 January 1996: 2; Matthew Brzezinski, "For Tatars, Coming Home to Crimea Brings Yet More Dislocation," *The Wall Street Journal* 14 August 1996: l.

39. *Avdet* 5 August 1998, in *Digest of Crimena Press,* in *Turkistan Newsletter, Crimea Bulletin/Kirim Bulteni* 98-2(141-26) August 1998.

40. The Welfare Party was banned by the courts in early 1998 on charges of having violated the constitution.

41. "Ukraine: Pustovoytenko Meets Turkish President Demirel," *BBC/SWB/FORMER USSR,* 25 May 98 [retrieved from Reuters News Service].