

ORHUN BAYRAKTAR CAPITALIZING ON THE COLD WAR: TURKEY, GREECE AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, 1963-1974 Bilkent University 2018

CAPITALIZING ON THE COLD WAR:
TURKEY, GREECE AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, 1963-1974

A Master's Thesis

by
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July 2018

To my family

CAPITALIZING ON THE COLD WAR:
TURKEY, GREECE AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, 1963-1974

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by


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
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
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ABSTRACT

CAPITALIZING ON THE COLD WAR: TURKEY, GREECE AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, 1963-1974

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The Cold War brought about not only a superpower rivalry in a bipolar world but also an environment from which relatively small and weak states could benefit. Taking into account the very existence and significance of the superpowers in the Cold War atmosphere, this thesis examines the Cyprus policies of Turkey and Greece between the years 1963-1974. I have sought to answer to what degree these two states have struggled to exploit the superpowers, namely the US and the USSR, in their own interests, and how successful they have been. In the light of the findings obtained, it has been seen that both Turkey and Greece did their best to win the superpowers over during all of the major crises (1964, 1967, and 1974), and accordingly, managed from time to time to capitalize on the cold war, in particular *détente*. That is to say, in a period when the superpowers went into the effort of de-escalating tension, especially between themselves, the two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, began to rub shoulders with the USSR when necessary, and the Soviets remained an unignorable option for these two countries as long as the US did not

meet their expectations. Crucial primarily due to its geographical location, Cyprus attracted the attention of the US and USSR as well, and the superpowers did not hesitate to side with any of the parties in accordance with their regional interests.

Keywords: Cold War, Cyprus, Détente, NATO, Superpower Rivalry

ÖZET

SOĞUK SAVAŞ'TAN FAYDALANMAK:
TÜRKİYE, YUNANİSTAN VE KIBRIS MESELESİ, 1963-1974

Bayraktar, Orhun

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Onur İşçi

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Soğuk Savaş yalnızca iki kutuplu dünyada süper güç mücadelesini değil aynı zamanda nispeten küçük ve güçsüz devletlerin yararlanabileceği bir çevreyi de beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu tez 1963-1974 yılları arasında Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın Soğuk Savaş atmosferinde süper güçleri hesaba katarak geliştirdikleri Kıbrıs politikalarını inceliyor. Bu iki devlet kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda süper güçlerden ne derece faydalanmaya çalışmışlar ve ne kadar başarılı olmuşlar, bunun cevabını aradık. Elde edilen bulgular ışığında gerek Türkiye'nin gerekse Yunanistan'ın üç ana krizin (1964, 1967, 1974) gerçekleştiği söz konusu süreçte büyük güçleri olabildiğince yanlarına çekmeye çalıştıkları, bu doğrultuda Soğuk Savaş'tan ve özellikle de detanttan fazlaca yararlandıkları görülmektedir. Bir diğer ifadeyle, iki kutuplu dünyanın liderlerinin özellikle kendi aralarındaki tansiyonu düşürme çabası içine girdiği bir süreçte NATO müttefikleri olan Türkiye ve Yunanistan gerekli gördükleri ölçüde SSCB ile dirsek temasına geçmiş ve Sovyetler bu iki ülke için ABD'den bekledikleri desteği alamadıklarında başvuracakları göz ardı edilemez bir

seçenek olmuştur. Coğrafi konumu itibariyle büyük öneme sahip Kıbrıs, süper güçlerin de ilgisini çekmiş ve onlar da kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda Türkiye veya Yunanistan'ın yanında yer almaktan çekinmemişlerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Detant, Kıbrıs, NATO, Süper Güç Mücadelesi, Soğuk Savaş

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People
CHP	Republican People's Party
CPC	Communist Party of Cyprus
EDEK	United Democratic Union of Centre
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Prologue

The Cold War was a critical conjuncture not only for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but also for the relatively smaller states that allied themselves with either one of the two super-powers in accordance with their interests and priorities. The latter half of the 20th Century was marked by incidents that entrenched smaller states and their concerned leaders, who sought alternative routes within and beyond their respective blocs. In Odd Arne Westad's words, the Cold War was a global struggle and played a major role in shaping the relations between these smaller states as well as the structure of the international system. Decolonization was perhaps the most crucial aspect of the Cold War, which in turn determined the operational basis of the 20th Century inter-state relations. Formerly colonized nations declared their independence from their imperialist exploiters on the basis of self-determination. The struggle for independence and self-determination that gained momentum day by day across the globe following the World War II affected both internal affairs of the states and the course of their foreign policies.

At the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean theatre, Cyprus was a microcosm of the global Cold War, briefly described above. In existing scholarship, the period of crisis that determined the fate of Greek and Turkish Cypriots has mostly been analyzed through a strictly nationalistic framework. There is something telling about this framework of competing nationalisms and the purpose of this thesis is not to challenge it. Instead, this thesis seeks to re-contextualize the Cyprus problem within its broader Cold War background by looking at the relations between its dramatic personae, particularly Turkey and Greece.

As far as territorial disputes are concerned, the Cyprus problem predates the Cold War. But it was during the Cold War's polarizing political climate that the Cyprus problem metamorphosed into a hotbed, where competing claims of territoriality between Greece and Turkey collided against each other. As the global moment of decolonization reached its climax, by the early détente period, both Greek and Turkish claims over the island were meant to go beyond the tacit, effecting super-power politics. As colonies in different corners of the world began to gain their independence on the basis of self-determination, Greece-Turkey relations were naturally overshadowed by geopolitical considerations in the Mediterranean. Although some form of a crisis had been brewing in the island since the early 1950s, the two states, which concurrently became new members of the North Atlantic alliance sought to maintain the friendship they had enjoyed since the Atatürk-Venizelos rapprochement. The Cyprus issue, which was initially and deliberately kept at bay in the early 1950s by Turkey and Greece, was meant to jeopardize the fragile unity in the western world. The exacerbation of the super-power rivalry in the 1950s and the domestic upsurge between the two communities on the island came together at a critical juncture and in turn prompted the third parties (Turkey and

Greece) to stiffen their discourses and politics, increasing the level of US concern and involvement.

The United States became a party to this conflict mainly because a potential war would have caused further loss of power in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East at a time when the Soviets were gaining more and more prestige and influence in that region. Thus, the issue gradually became an agenda item for NATO as well, which had to handle the crisis within the organization, instead of leaving it to bilateral initiatives where Soviet involvement was very likely. In fact, the Cyprus problem was temporarily and partially resolved in 1960 with the independence declaration of the Republic of Cyprus, thanks to the tripartite efforts of the UK, Turkey and Greece under American supervision. Yet, it did not take too long before rivalling Greek-Turkish national interests over the island re-emerged and pushed NATO into a challenging period until 1974.

Even though NATO's own interests continued to be troubled by the Turkish-Greek conflict after 1974, the present work aims to focus on the 1960s and early 1970s, from the declaration of independence of the Republic of Cyprus until the Turkish intervention in 1974, when the Ankara government put into motion Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) which gives contracting parties the right to intervene only for re-establishing the status-quo.

But rather than simply focusing on rivaling Turkish and Greek narratives over Cyprus, this thesis aims to examine how both states sought to capitalize on the Cold War and how the US-led North Atlantic community sought to handle the discord in order to prevent a possible Soviet involvement. It also seeks to understand how the three leading parties (Turkey, Greece and the UK) reacted to the crisis on different

levels. Looking at how the Cyprus issue could be conceptualized within a broader Cold War context, this thesis seeks to reveal the ways in which the Cyprus problem became a can of worms in the 1960s and 1970s, when the period of Cold War détente was changing the international system.

All three main chapters of my thesis pursue a chronological and thematic order. Chapter II deals with the historical background of the Cyprus dispute until the early 1960s and offers a comprehensive literature survey. This chapter also includes an overview of exiting literature on the 1963-1974 period. The main purpose is to show existing perspectives on the subject and the degree to which previous authors have employed a limited Cold War context. Historical literature on the subject almost exclusively portrayed how Turks and Greeks found themselves in a collision course, emphasizing mutually prosecutorial narratives. Despite their contribution to our understanding of the Cyprus problem, by focusing merely on clashing national interests these works have fallen back on mono-causal explanations, overlooking the crucial the Cold War context. This is, of course, not to suggest that literature is entirely devoid of studies that factor in the Cold War environment. There are a number of studies that successfully drew our attention to Turkish and Greek attempts to capitalize on superpower politics. Expanding the American and Soviet ranges of motion, this chapter demonstrates how I seek to fill the gap and make a contribution to the literature.

Chapter III centers around the Turkish perspective on Cyprus, corresponding to the 1963-1974 period, including the first few years of the détente period. Here, I seek to evaluate the importance of this period and the effects of the Cold War on Turkish diplomacy towards the crisis. I analyze the underlying principles that guided Turkish

policy makers as the US-Soviet rivalry took on a different dimension towards the mid-1960s.

In a similar vein, Chapter IV reflects on the Greek perspective and examines Greek foreign policy towards Cyprus and its attempts to gauge western allies over time under a carefully crafted Cold War framework. The fourth chapter, along with the second, offers a substantial amount of primary sources, as well as secondary, to fully demonstrate the connections between the conflict over Cyprus and the Cold War context that exacerbated existing tensions.

In its conclusion, rather than simply reiterating my findings on the 1963-1975 period, I will look at the aftermath of the Turkish Intervention in July 1974, as well as the early 1990s when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, marking the end of the Cold War. In that sense, I illustrate how in fact both Greek and Turkish governments pursued similar policies beyond 1974, capitalizing on superpower politics in the final years of the Cold War.

1.2. Methodology

In terms of its methodology, I have drawn upon archival records mostly in Turkish and English, but tried to compensate for the absence of Greek primary sources by offering a coherent narrative based on secondary sources. Among the primary sources that are accessible in Ankara, newspaper depositories have a crucial role and those that are at researchers' disposal have been exhausted. Turkish newspapers covering a period from 1963 through 1974 are available in digital form at the Turkish National Library and I have relied extensively on their collection. Online archives of several English language newspapers, including the New York Times for instance, have been quite helpful to reflect on third party perspectives. Apart from newspapers,

memoirs come to the forefront as another instrument of primary sources. Nihat Erim, who served briefly as Prime Minister and a leading member of the Turkish delegation, left behind intriguing vignettes of his personal observations on the 1964 crisis. Likewise, George W. Ball, who served as the US Undersecretary of State, wrote equally valuable memoirs on this period, providing my thesis with hindsight. Despite their colorful content, I did not limit myself to only primary sources, and utilized numerous secondary sources on the subject. These sources were of great importance as they provided background information and crucial findings.

CHAPTER II

EXISTING LITERATURE ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

2.1. Origins of the Cyprus Dispute

Cyprus has always been at the core of several commercial hubs for thousands of years, converging various powerful actors in the region. The "foreign factor" that can be seen almost in every period of the Cypriot history began in the Bronze Age (ca. 2300-1050 B.C.) when copper production turned the island into a crucial trade center in the eastern Mediterranean (Camp, 1980, p.43). By the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1600 B.C.), Cyprus had evolved into a focus of global politics. Assyrians and Egyptians ruled the island for almost 250 years from 800 to 550 B.C.; Persians for about 200 years from 500 to 322 B.C.; and then reached the Hellenistic era on Cyprus in 322, lasting for more than 250 years (Camp, 1980, p.43). The Romans seized control of the island in 58 BC.¹ Under Roman rule, the Cypriots became Christian and under the Byzantine Roman, the 'Orthodox' church gained independence, and was accorded self-governing (autocephalous) status by the Council of Ephesus, in 431 AD (Dodd, 2015, p.1). The church and the state gradually became closely mingled. Even though a number of Arab raids jeopardized Byzantine rule in Cyprus, the island

¹ In *the History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*, Clement Dodd argues that Cyprus was first peopled around 1400 BC by Greeks from Asia Minor and the Aegean. By the ninth century BC the island was Greek speaking.

was generally under East Roman control for many centuries onwards. The Byzantine Empire's sovereignty was crudely wiped out by the arrival of the Crusaders. The island changed hands in 1192 and the Roman Catholic Lusignan dynasty of French lineage exercised influence over Cyprus, which lasted for almost 300 years. The Genoese and then the Venetians respectively became succeeding rulers for a short period after the Lusignan rule. It was in 1571 that the island came under Ottoman rule, when the Venetians were vanquished by the Turks (Dodd, 2015, p.1).

Cyprus became an Ottoman province in 1571 and remained under the Ottoman rule until 1878. In his *A History of Cyprus*, George Hill states that in the wake of their conquest, the Ottomans took the usual step and carried out a settlement policy, effectively changing the island's demography (Hill, 2010, p.18). The existing Ottoman policy of settlement made the following impression on England: "Commandment has been given throughout Anatolia three households in every street shall go to people Cyprus, where there are few Turks and many Christians" (Hill, 2010, p.20). Following the dispersal of Ottoman troops that fought for the conquest of the island, the Turkish population in the island along with those who were recently settled was about 20,000.

Cyprus also served as a crucial military base for the Ottomans for more than 300 years. By the early 19th century, when the Ottoman rule in the island was coming to an end, several historical records demonstrate that Britain began to realize the island's strategic importance. With respect to the potential importance of the island for Great Britain, Captain J. M. Kinneir (1818) from the East India Company who visited Cyprus in 1814 wrote: "The possession of Cyprus would give England a preponderating influence in the Mediterranean, and place at her disposal the future destinies of the Levant. Egypt and Syria would soon become her tributaries, and she

would acquire an overawing position in respect to Asia Minor, by which the port might at all times be kept in check, and the encroachments of Russia, in this quarter, be retarded, if not prevented” (p.185).

Towards the latter half of the 19th century, Britain decided to hamper the increasing Russian activities in the Mediterranean and the right moment presented itself during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, when British troops were stationed in Cyprus. The Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878, marked the Ottoman defeat, and brought about an immediate British reaction, which could not remain indifferent to the said development for its regional and global interests. Ultimately, British involvement during the Russo-Turkish peace negotiations first led to a defensive alliance between Britain and Turkey on June 4, 1878 and later resulted in the modification of San Stefano in Berlin on July 13, 1878. While the Russian gains were remarkably reversed in the Treaty of Berlin, the British gained the control of Cyprus after its request from the Ottomans to use the island as a military base in the face of a future Russian aggressiveness against the Ottomans. On June 4, 1878, in a troublesome position against the Tsarist Russia, Sultan Abdulhamid II responded positively to the British request "with the condition that the Ottoman sovereignty rights are reserved" (Shaw & Shaw, 2005, p.190). With the outbreak of the World War I in 1914, and the Ottoman alliance with Germany, Great Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus on November 5, 1914.

In his article entitled “*Greece and the American Embrace*” Christos Kassimeris (2014) asserts that in the early period of World War I, Great Britain endeavored to pull Greece in the war by offering Cyprus to it in return. Yet, Greece rejected the offer twice, first by Venizelos and, then by Zaimis in 1914 and 1915 respectively. In a similar vein, Hill (2010) sheds light on the Greek rejection of Britain’s offer in

October 1915, arguing that Britain made the Cyprus offer conditional upon Greece's fulfillment of her treaty obligations stemming from the 1913 Greco-Serbian Alliance and assistance to Serbia urgently and at full strength.

The Turks who sustained a defeat in the Great War ultimately defeated Greek armies in the Independence War. The resulting Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, stipulated in its Article 20 that Cyprus belonged to Great Britain (*Laws regarding the Acceptance of Lausanne*, n.d.). The first major development that took place following the island's legal transfer to the British administration took place on October 20, 1931, when the Greeks held a public demonstration in Limassol. As a result of the events that soon turned into revolt against the British administration, 10 people died and 68 wounded, among whom 23 were Turkish Cypriots (Onalp, 2007, p.48). In the wake of the 1931 uprising, the British introduced a harsher governing policy and kept a firm grip on the Cypriots until the early 1940s.

Starting with the Second World War in 1939, a substantial degree of dynamism came into being in Cypriot politics. During the war, Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Korizis asked for the transfer of Cyprus to Greece (a plan that came to be known as Enosis) with a formal application to the British Government (Onalp, 2007, p.49). Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister at the time, Winston Churchill, who was at pains to bring Turkey into the war on the side of the Allied powers, turned down this request in order not to cause any discontent amongst the Turks. The Second World War period is also crucial for understanding the circumstances under which the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) was founded. In fact, AKEL was established earlier, in 1926, under a different name: the Communist Party of Cyprus (CPC). Yet, the party was turned into an illegal organization in 1931 when the colonial government dictated restraints in civil rights in the wake of the anti-

colonial protests in Limassol. Nevertheless, leading members of the underground communist party as well as other prominent Greek communists established AKEL in 1941 (*The pioneers and the first struggles*, n.d.).

When the war came to an end, the transfer of the Dodecanese from Italy to Greece refueled popular enosis claims over Cyprus amongst the Greeks. In *the Cyprus Dispute and the UN: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1954 and 1996* Süha Bölükbaşı (1998) argues that although Britain was not prepared to dispose of Cyprus, it proposed a "home rule" plan which would have given the right of self-government to the island (p.413). Nonetheless, neither the Greek side nor Turkish Cypriots accepted this proposition. What is stunning at this point is that the two Cypriot communities rejected it for paradoxical reasons. The Turkish Cypriots feared that it could make enosis gain momentum in the long run while the Greek Cypriots precipitated that the British plan was designed to avert enosis.

The enosis campaign of the Greek Cypriots was led by two groups: AKEL and the Church. On November 21, 1949 the former signed an appeal to the UN to accuse Britain of denying the people of Cyprus their right to self-determination under the UN Charter (Oran, 2015, p.596). AKEL's initiative in the presence of the UN mobilized the Church, and the Etnarchy Council announced that the Church would organize a plebiscite on January 15, 1950. The referendum of 1950 demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots (95.7 %) apparently sided with the union of Cyprus with mainland Greece (Kassimeris, 2014, p.77). The result of the plebiscite convinced Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader, that enosis was unavoidable, especially since the British had earlier proposals for the union of Cyprus to Greece in 1914 and 1915. While the plebiscite decision was cheered by most enosis supporters across the island, it also caused uneasiness amongst the

Turkish-Cypriot community and Britain since both parties would all have to abdicate substantial privileges should Cyprus unite with Greece.

The tension increasing in Cyprus prompted the mainland Turkish media to pay attention to what was going on in the island. Although the news regarding Cyprus in the newspapers gained traction across the country, Turkey, unwilling to worsen relations with Britain and Greece in the Cold War atmosphere, tried to remain as distant and cautious to the issue as it had been up until then. On January 23, 1950, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak (as cited in Oran, 2015) tried to ease the public opinion by saying: "There is no such thing as the Cyprus issue... The British government will not leave the island to another state. Hence, Turkish youngsters vainly get excited" (p.598).

Upon consecutive visits of delegations from Cyprus to Ankara, the government had to deal with the issue, and in March 1950, Sadak began to give verbal assurances to the Turkish Cypriots, declaring that any possible assistance would be made to the Turkish Cypriots. Fuad Köprülü (as cited in Albayrak, 2004), Foreign Minister of the Menderes Administration, which came to power on May 14, 1950 elections, maintained his predecessor's policy and stated in his speech to the DP Parliamentary group that "to the best of our knowledge, the Cyprus issue is not an official issue for us at the moment. The Greek government is not officially engaged with the Cyprus issue either. Consequently, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not officially aware of the existence of such a phenomenon" (p.425). In the early 1950s, Turkey sided with the protection of the status quo in Cyprus since Ankara's main assumption was that Britain would never leave the island, and as for Turkey's own security was concerned, British presence in the island stood as a promotive measure before a possible Soviet incursion. The Turkish Cypriots opted for the maintenance of the

status quo as well, and if there was no way to continue the status quo, then they preferred the unification of the island with Turkey, who had ruled it before the British arrived.

In their *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig (2009) argue that, at that point, most Greeks were supporting the Greek-Cypriot ambition for enosis, and in November 1951 Evangelos Averoff, Foreign Minister of Greece, put forward a proposal of four bases in Greece and facilities in Cyprus to the British in exchange for the British approval for the transfer of the island to Greece (2009). However, the British turned down the offer as the Greek government was too weak to be entrusted with Britain's long-term defense. Kassimeris (2014), on the other hand, asserts that the main motive behind this British rejection was that Cyprus provided access to the Middle East region and was thus strategically priceless to the British (p.78). Cyprus was also crucial to the 1950 Tripartite declaration to which Britain, France and the United States agreed to maintain an arms balance between Arabs and Israelis. Agreeing with Kassimeris upon the arms balance, Avi Shalim (2004) argues that the given tripartite declaration was fundamentally an effort by the Western powers, in the Cold War years to monopolize the supply of arms to the Middle East and to limit the Soviet room for maneuver to get a foothold in the region (p.660).

Even though the early 1950s witnessed increasing tensions between Greece and Turkey, the two got closer in 1952. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes accompanied by Foreign Minister Köprülü and Chief of General Staff Kanatlı visited Athens on April 26, 1952. The rapprochement between the two countries peaked when Pavlos, King of Greece, visited Turkey with Queen Frederika two months later on June 8, 1952 (Oran, 2015, p.587). By this visit, for the first time, a Greek King was visiting

Turkey. Meanwhile, even though the Cyprus issue was still on the agenda of both countries' public opinions, the governments were refraining from openly discussing it, fearing that it would damage to the bilateral relations.

Nevertheless, the situation quickly turned sour. The Cyprus issue was rekindled with the support Greece gave to the Greek Cypriots. However, the British attitude remained the same in the face of Greek and Greek Cypriot demands and actions. On July 28, 1954, Deputy Minister of State for the Colonies Henry Hopkinson (as cited in Oran, 2015) explained in the House of Commons: "... there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent" (p.597). According to Oran (2015), Hopkinson had Cyprus in his mind while saying this. At the same time, it became certain that Great Britain was going to withdraw its military presence in Egypt as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1954 (Kontos, Theodoulou, Panayiotides & Alexandrou, 2014, p.13). It is clear that recent developments increased the significance of Cyprus in the eyes of the British, making the island the mere means for the British to be effective in the eastern Mediterranean.

Back to the revitalization of the Cyprus issue and the support of Greece to the Greek Cypriots, Greece in fact managed to resist Makarios's insistence on discussing the issue at the United Nations until the end of 1954. Kyriakos C. Markides shares a useful anecdote that took place between Makarios and Prime Minister Venizelos in his *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic: When Makarios intimidated Venizelos*, Greek Prime Minister, with inciting the Greek people against him in 1952, Venizelos (as cited in Markides, 1977) responded: "You may do whatever you wish ... but you shall not be allowed to dictate the foreign policy of Greece" (p.85-88). The change of government in Greece in the same year brought about a change in Greek foreign

policy towards Cyprus. Greece tried to convince the British and the Americans that the principle of self-determination and continued support of Greece for the Western alliance required respect for the wishes of the peoples in Greece and Cyprus, meaning *enosis*. The British, however, were adamantly opposed to the idea. Dimitri S. Bitsios (1975) in *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic* states that when Greek Prime Minister Marshal Papagos proposed the Cyprus issue for the agenda in a meeting with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Eden declined the offer and said that there existed no Cyprus problem for the British (p.40).

Thereupon, by the end of 1954, Athens caved in and sponsored a draft resolution calling for international support for Cypriot self-determination as Greeks understood that it would prove to be difficult to achieve their goals in Cyprus through mere bilateral talks with Britain. Hence, the Cyprus issue was eventually internationalized (Gürel, 1984, p.71). With NATO members opposing Greece's move, Greece could not achieve her goal. Selim Sarper, the then Turkish Representative to the UN objected to the Greek draft, alleging the Cyprus issue was an internal affair of Britain and the UN Charter inhibited the organization from interfering in the internal affairs of any state (United Nations, 1954, p.544). Briefly, Turkey was still insistent on her Cyprus policy: Cyprus was a British territory and neither Greece nor Turkey had to do anything with it. In the meantime, the United States gave support to the British in the 1954 vote. Stephen G. Xydis (1967) in his *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958* argues that the US promoted talks among the concerned parties, fearing that any decision taken in the UN could damage to the solidarity of the Western bloc and the unity of NATO (p.599). As a result, the worst scenario for the Turks, transfer of the island to Greece, did not come true. And instead of a Turkish effort, this was due to the British and American rejection to the Greek draft; but still, the

internationalization of the issue prompted Turks to rework their Cyprus strategy. In short, 1954 marks the year when the Turkish government began to take a closer look in the issue, as well as the period when the Cyprus issue made an appearance on the international stage.

Stephen Xydis (1967) argues that Makarios was of the opinion that the UN would eventually recognize the right to self-determination of Cyprus and persuaded his community to delay an armed revolt against the colonial rule in the island till the mid-1950s (p.8). But still, the Greek Cypriots started mobilizing over time. It was no other than Grivas, the retired Greek Cypriot Colonel, who organized the mobilization in the island. Grivas acted together with Makarios in his activities, and founded the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters-*Ethiopian Organism Kipriaku Agonos* (EOKA) in 1955 (French, 2015, p.51).

That no satisfactory outcome for the Greeks appeared in the UN did accelerate and encourage the armed struggle of the Greek Cypriots with the support of the mainland Greece. EOKA, which was established with the sole purpose of achieving enosis, carried out their first attack on April 1, 1955. Dimitrakis (2008) states that EOKA attacks were focused on British civilian and military installations, without targeting military personnel (p.378). However, over time the attacks targeted British officers, police and government officials as well. David French (2015) claims that they were also directed against the Greek Cypriots who were AKEL members (p.114). The rise of violence on the island was essentially putting more pressure on Britain.

Likewise, Bölükbaşı (1998) claims that, seen from the Western perspective, an independent Cyprus would have jeopardized their interests in the area, and that NATO therefore exerted pressure on both Greece and Turkey to urge each

community in the island to oppose independence. NATO's strategy proved successful and Cyprus's attempt for independence failed. Nonetheless, the demand for self-determination of the Greek Cypriot community remained strong (p.414). Under these circumstances, Britain invited Greece and Turkey to London for a tripartite international conference to discuss upon the topic. The London Conference, which was to be held in 1955, seemed at first sight to handle the general security issues in the eastern Mediterranean. However, the official statement delivered by the then British defense minister, Selwyn Lloyd, on the eve of the conference revealed the British aim of focusing primarily on the Cyprus issue and of strengthening its position: "Throughout the negotiations our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept enosis and so condition them to accept a solution which would leave sovereignty in our hands" (Ellis, 2010). On August 19, 1955, almost two weeks before the London Conference, *The Spectator* wrote that while there was no way for the Government to welcome enosis, working on some plans accompanied by a compromise principle for both sides, meaning the British and the Greek, could bear fruit for a peaceful settlement in the island. In his telegram from Geneva to the Foreign Office, Harold Macmillan, British Foreign Secretary, (as cited in Holland, 1994) expressed his opinion as follows: "The stronger position the Turks take at the start (of the Conference), the better will be the result for us and for them" (p.333). The invitation sent to Turkey was in an attempt to pull Turkey into the issue and make her a part along with Britain and Greece. In other words, taking steps in the direction of the three in London, Oran (2015) asserts that the British were building their new policy upon the involvement of Turkey into the Cyprus issue (p.600).

While the Greeks put forward their claims for local autonomy and self-determination, Turkey's views were expressed by Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, the Turkish foreign minister. Stressing the presence of Turkish community as an intrinsic part of the island and pointing out to the historical, economic and cultural ties of the island with his country, Zorlu explained the importance of Cyprus in the eyes of Turkey. If a state that keeps the islands in the west of Turkey also gains the control of Cyprus, he argued, that would mean that Turkey would be besieged by that state, and no matter how friendly relations they may have, no country could completely leave its security to another. Moreover, Zorlu (as cited in Oran, 2015) concluded his speech by stating that: “Turkey stands up for the maintenance of the status quo; however, in case of a change in the status quo, the right way is to return the island should be transferred back to its former owner, Turkey” (p.602). Thus, following its “no Cyprus problem” approach in the early 1950s, Turkey adopted for the first time a solid policy towards the island in London, facing the risk of dispute with Greece. However, the argument that Cyprus should be given to Turkey if the status quo changes did not last long. In a report delivered by Nihat Erim to Prime Minister Menderes in 1956, the new Cyprus policy of Turkey was based on the partition of the island. The following year the Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, offered the partition of Cyprus which matches up to the final line of the 1974 Turkish Intervention (Oran, 2015, p.604).

In the meantime, following the London Conference, with a view to settling to the Cyprus issue the British proposed several plans such as the Radcliffe Proposal and the Foot Plan respectively in 1956 and 1957, which were succeeded by the Macmillan Plan in 1958. The Macmillan Plan provided for a trilateral rule in the island. Greece responded negatively to the plan backing up the Cypriot leader’s idea

of full independence to the island. Makarios' desire was ultimately met through the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959. While the Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus marked the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee signed by Britain, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus assured that Britain, Greece and Turkey were accountable for security and stability of the island, as well as its independence.

It was clear that a disorder in the southeastern flank of NATO would serve the interests of Moscow that clearly expressed its support for Makarios who was then pursuing a non-alignment policy and had a direct connection to AKEL. At this point, the US, taking advantage of its influence over Menderes and Karamanlis governments, insisted on the solution. While it proved to be difficult to find a solution that would satisfy both the Greeks and the Turks at the same time, these two countries which were financially and militarily dependent on the US did not have that much chance to resist this big power in an international system where bipolarity prevailed.

In his *Cyprus: Britain's Security Role*, Anthony Verrier (1964) assesses the meaning of the Treaty of Establishment and states that it was for protecting the military bases, and illustrates it as an exceptional document (p.136). The privileges of the guaranteeing powers, in particular of Britain, had the characteristics of prejudicing the sovereignty of Cyprus. In fact, the British Government, according to Verrier, provided Cyprus with independence in 1960 on the condition that Britain's strategic interests in the island would not be damaged. Even though the independence of Cyprus might have generated a feeling that the significance of the island for the British decreased, it was not the reality. Britain still gave so much importance to the island and the Treaty of Establishment proves it very much. In terms of its interests

in and around the island, many points were at stake for the UK. The idea of having a remarkable military power in the vicinity of the Middle East and the Suez Canal, allowed let the British gain leverage in regional politics. Besides, Verrier states that the distance from Cyprus to the Persian Gulf is quite short, allowing a swift interference in the Gulf area if needed. Thus, beyond any doubt the island has strategic importance, especially due to its military advantages.

In light of the advantages that Cyprus offered, first and foremost in militaristic terms, Britain desired to maintain its privileges in the island; and this was to some extent understandable. Nevertheless, the existing circumstances in the 1950s did not give enough legitimacy to the British presence on the island even after the independence of Republic of Cyprus. That is why the British, being a leading member of the Transatlantic community, argued that their presence in the island with the military bases empower the NATO; accordingly, the US, leader of the West in the face of the Soviet threat, they claimed, should back up the British bases in the island. No radical change in the US opinion regarding the British military presence in the island gives the impression that the US already had the intention of letting the British stay there to have a reliable and strong ally against the Soviet, or the British managed to persuade the Americans of their argument.

Although independence was initially welcomed by all parties to the conflict, soon it became clear that an independence of this sort was not the solution to the dispute but yielded to more structural problems. In the wake of the independence, President Makarios made his dissatisfaction plain and clear, criticizing the establishing treaties as unfair and the current political structure in Cyprus as maleficent for a newly independent state. These complaints by Makarios brought about great disturbance and anxiety among the Turkish Cypriot community, which was localized by Dr.

Küçük, the vice president of the Republic. In consequence, when violence broke out between the communities, the inter-communal relations worsened gradually but steadily over time.

Makarios, on the other hand, carried on with his provocative speeches that reflected the Greek Cypriots' resilience in materializing the enosis (Stavrinides, 1999, p.62.). On November 30, 1963, Makarios offered an amendment to Vice-President Küçük regarding the constitution. The adoption of the "Proposals to Amend the Constitution" would have brought very new articles in contradiction with the main principles of the founding constitution, such as nullifying the veto power of the Turkish vice president. Briefly, the proposals would have effectively ended the federal structure of the island. Thus, given the new scope of things, the vice president turned down the constitutional amendment package, increasing the tension on the island. In the face of the impending unrest, Turkey expressed its concern for the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and emphasized that it was one of the guarantors with legal rights to intervene in case of a breach of law in Cyprus.

Proving impotent to deal with the tension between the two communities, the British called for a help from the United States. President Lyndon Johnson offered deployment of a NATO force in Cyprus in order to put an end to the intercommunal dispute that reached a disturbing level of violence. Even though neither Greece nor Turkey rejected the plan, the Greek Cypriot leader resolutely opposed it. Siding with Makarios, the USSR also took a firm stand against a possible NATO presence in the island. The Soviets proposed deployment of UN forces and rejected NATO presence. The outcome was the formation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (Kassimeris, 2014, p.82).

The US had struggled to stay out of Cyprus in the given period and encouraged the British to take leading responsibility in the island (Brands, 1987, p.349). Yet, in the end, the US found itself quite engaged in the issue. Henry William Brands (1987) explains how the US getting ahead of the British becomes so involved in the issue in 1964, contradicting with its previous policies over Cyprus (p.349). Nevertheless, US President Kennedy (as cited in Brands, 1987) already brought forward the idea of more US involvement in the island by saying “if the situation is as desperate are we hear it is, we cannot continue to rely upon our policy of hoping that the guarantor powers will shoulder the principal share of the Western burden” (p.350). Besides, Brands sorts the reasons why the US opposed the referral of the dispute to the UN in the 1964 dispute: Firstly, and perhaps more importantly, claims Brands, the UN provided a stage to the Soviets where they could have a say on the issue. Secondly, for the US the organization performed very slowly. In urgency to solve the problem, the US could not wait for such a long time while the Turks and Greeks were on the brink of war.

The Soviet stance throughout all these incidents stood as an important factor to be taken into account by the concerned parties. Following the outbreak of violence, as noted above, Turkey warned the Greek Cypriots and Greece of an intervention; notwithstanding, at any given opportunity, the USSR expressed their disdain for the insolence of the Turks. In late 1963, through Yermosin, Soviet ambassador to Cyprus, the USSR sent a message to the Greek Cypriot leader signifying the total Soviet support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus (Bölükbaşı, 1998, p.417). To limit the NATO’s elbow room and to increase the role of the UN on the island was the primary goal of the Soviets. For by means of the UN

they could have a say over the conflict. And Makarios, considering Moscow as a deterrent ally against big NATO brothers, knew that.

This is exactly why and how the UN landed troops on the island. Yet, contrary to most expectations, the UN also experienced a direct failure in the face of rising tensions. Before the summer of 1964, Greece and Turkey once again found themselves on the brink of war. Turkey was bearing a military option in mind and was not refraining from doing so in public. In the face of a conflict between two NATO allies in its southern flank, the US undertook the leading responsibility of Cyprus from the UK less than half a year ago went for a firmer option and delivered the reputed Johnson Letter to Turkey. In the short run, the US achieved its goal and prevented a very potential clash between these two countries. However successful in the short run, existing US strategy of deterring Turkey from intervening in the island was to bear some adverse consequences regarding the US-Turkey bilateral relations.

Following the crisis of 1964, the next major development that brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war occurred in 1967 when Greek Cypriot forces advanced into two Turkish Cypriot villages in order to put an end to the Turkish resistance and cut the line between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Upon receiving the news from the island, Demirel, the Turkish Prime Minister who succeeded Ismet İnönü, threatened to resort to military operation unless some essential demands were not met. These demands were basically the withdrawal by Athens of the 10,000 Greek army troops who had been introduced illegally into Cyprus in 1964, and the disbandment by Makarios of the 20,000 Greek Cypriot National Guards (Bölükbası, 1998, p.419). The Americans, faced with another concern in terms of the unity of the NATO, got involved in the matter for the purpose of mediation and with a softer

attitude towards the conflicting parties this time compared to 1964, another threat was eluded.

The Greek junta that had ruled the country for about seven years starting with 1967 regarded Makarios over time as an impediment before enosis, union of Cyprus with the Greek mainland. And the plans of the Greek/Greek Cypriot leaderships differed from one another. Thus, with a view to ripping themselves off the said obstacle, the junta decided to overthrow Makarios by a coup and replace him with Nicos Sampson (Dodd, 2015, p.108). In the wake of the coup, Turkey, putting her rights arising from the founding treaties of the Republic of Cyprus forth, tried to lay the groundwork for a bilateral action with the UK. However, the UK proved to be reluctant to be part of such a common step. Hence, Ankara made use of its right as a guaranteeing power of the Cypriot state and militarily intervened in the island. The Turkish military operation followed a two-step process, first on July 20, and then on August 14, both lasting for two days, ultimately dividing Cyprus into two, demarcated by the Attila Line as the Turks called it (Fouskas, 2005, p.57).

2.2. Literature Review

The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure? by Aylin Güney (2004) tries to evaluate the US role for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem and divides the article into two chronological halves: the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. The first part concerning the Cold War years, according to Güney, was dominated by superpower politics and the broader containment strategy. In the first part, Güney pays specific attention to the 1963, 1967 and 1974 crises, and assesses all three of these crises and their consequences from the US perspective in accordance with their interests. In this regard, the infamous Johnson letter that was sent to İnönü with a view of stopping a potential

Turkish intervention plan is regarded successful as the Turks had to give up on their military plan (Güney, 2004, p.31). Ball, on the other hand, describes this letter as “the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen” (Ball, 1982, p.350).

Back to the assessment of success or failure in respect to the US initiatives in Cyprus, the 1967 crisis, Güney (2004) supposes, ended in success as a terrifying clash between Greece and Turkey was prevented from exploding (p.32). However the US means to dissuade the parties, especially the Turkish part, from resorting to an armed operation proved to be different than the one used three years ago. And it pursued such a policy not to worsen its relations with Turkey, fearing that she could get much closer towards the USSR (Adams & Cotrell, 1968, p.72).

Glen D. Camp (1980) enumerates Western concerns over Cyprus and states that the western perspective over the island is based on the Cold War conjuncture, fearing that the island would be controlled by the Soviet Union in case of a power vacuum in the island (p.52). And to a certain extent, the blame is put upon the West due to its adoption of such an attitude for the failure of figuring a permanent solution out. In his research, Camp also evaluates existing options on the table, if any, in front of Makarios in the détente years of the Cold War period, and claims that the relations of the President of the Republic of Cyprus with the communist AKEL and EDEK which favored non-alignment prompted the president to follow his policies the way he did under the effect of the US-USSR rivalry. Due to its focus on the Cypriot domestic politics and power relations within the island, the article differentiates itself from many of other studies on the subject. Plus, under the subtitle of “Greek and Turkish Cypriot Policy”, it looks at several significant developments that took place within these two communities. In this part, the article does not put so much focus on super powers’ roles over the island. All the changes and developments are handled as if

they occurred on their own hook. As for big powers, Camp gives the motives behind the Western policies towards Cyprus. According to him, the Western policy toward Cyprus is predicated on three main concerns in the Cold War atmosphere. First, the British were worried over their shrinking empire and hence, their exigency to defend the British position in the eastern Mediterranean with Cypriot bases. Second, the Greek and Greek Cypriot concerns about the entrance of NATO into the issue as the Organization, according to them, could discipline them, not the Turks due to the Turkish overriding military capacity than that of the mainland Greece. Third, the United States, Western leader, worried about a decline of NATO power in the south-eastern flank.

Whereas Glen D. Camp (1980) blames the West for the deadlock over the Cyprus issue, in the Cyprus part of *A Comparative Analysis of the Origin and Resolution of Local Conflicts*, Mohapatra and Baral (1987) demonstrate the American efforts made with a view to redressing the balance between the conflicting parties and finding a solution (p.65). For the American, it was clear that any wrong step to take can put the US interests at very stake as affronting one of its allies in the southern flank could bear irrecoverable results. While giving place to the suspicious claims by Greece and the Greek Cypriot community over the US contributing role in the 1974 Turkish Intervention, the author considers the Soviet role in the conflict quite limited.

W. M. Dobell, on the other hand, examines the division of Cyprus through internal political developments of the concerned actors, in particular Greece and Turkey, and the effect of the given developments in these two countries upon the course of the conflict till 1966. However, it should not mean that the issue has been dealt with in the absence of any big power politics. The US and Soviet policy-makers' stances over the issue and their relations with Greece and Turkey are obvious. Siding with

Mohapatra and Baral in regard to the security concerns of the NATO, Dobell (1967) handles the Soviet posture in the first half of the 1960s and states that Moscow was against the 1960 Agreements and Acheson Plans together with enosis (p.286-287).

Compared to the above-mentioned studies, John C. Campbell has an article with a more pronounced emphasis upon Soviet strategies in the Mediterranean involving Cyprus as part of a bigger plan. *The Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East* examines the military bases in the Mediterranean and the presence of Soviet squadron in the area, and the role of the Sixth Fleet and its usage by the US as a means to boost its policies on the Mediterranean, with a particular attention on its eastern coastal basin and those of the Middle East littoral states (Campbell, 1972, p.128-129). The article states that in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, ending up with a failure for the USSR, the USSR made the decision to redress the balance. The mobility of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean was essential, John C. Campbell thinks, for the achievement of the given strategy as an initial step since the sea gives access to the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans through respectively Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. For a long time the Sixth Fleet had been useful in a kind of aircraft-carrier diplomacy. Therefore, the existence of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean signifies that it is no longer a US lake, which once again puts an emphasis upon the geostrategic importance of Cyprus. Moreover, that the Soviets adopted a strategy aimed not at communist revolution, but at finding common ground with the Middle Eastern countries paved the way for a detente in its relations with the regional countries (Campbell, 1972, p.129-130).

Current Soviet Maritime Strategy and NATO written by Martin Edmons and John Skitt also touches upon the new Soviet policy of extending influence on other countries with the support of the naval power. The meaning for Greece and Turkey

of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean is centered on two points: Turco-Soviet relations that started to develop in the post-Johnson letter period and the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Edmons and Skitt evaluate the course of the bilateral relations, examining the impacts of the Turkish domestic and foreign policies on the rapprochement of the two countries. The change of the Soviet propaganda against Turkey, the 1965-66 trading agreements signed between the two, the Soviet financial aid granted to Turkey for the purpose of building an oil refinery near Izmir are given in the article as proofs of the rapprochement (Edmons & Skitt, 1969, p. 41). The given rapprochement even brought forward the possibility of Turkish withdrawal from NATO if the two points band together in convenient conditions. In this respect, policies to be pursued by the Soviet Union towards the Cyprus issue are regarded quite crucial. Letting Turkey take a harder line over the Cyprus issue, the article suggests, might advance the détente process between the two and encourage Turkey to re-evaluate its NATO membership. The Greek coup of 1967 remarkably led the Soviet to make more calculations on Turkey as Greece left them almost no room to move by the latest developments in the country.

For more information about the events peculiar to 1967 and their effects for the future of Turkish and Greek foreign policies along with the British and American, Göktepe's *the Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations* can form a tangible groundwork. Göktepe (2005) includes a statement by Dean Acheson delivered in 1965 which displays that in the eyes of the US Secretary of State the Turkish confidence towards the West, especially the US, decreased (p.433).

As seen (in Odd Arne Westad's *Global Cold War*), the roles and interests of the US and USSR that globally competed with one another were not glossed over and furthermore represented in many studies as vital elements for the issue to be

comprehended. Vassilis K. Fouskas's *Uncomfortable Questions: Cyprus, October 1973-August 1974* is yet another study with a similar approach to the issue. Fouskas (2005) justifies his approach by arguing that the Cyprus conflict could not be analyzed and comprehended thoroughly unless the underlying political impact of foreign powers on Cyprus are taken acutely into consideration (p.49). Upon the 1974 Turkish Intervention, saying that the Turks received the support of Washington and Moscow, Fouskas concentrates on Kissinger's meeting with his Russian colleague Gromyko, and later on, the separate meetings of each minister with Makarios before the intervention. Therefore, instead of allocating the responsibility for the crisis to Turkey and to Greece, the US and the Soviet are favored as the main game players. The rationale behind the controversial US support for the Turkish intervention is explained by the author to be the Kissinger doctrine which wishes to see a weak and not independent Cyprus for NATO's and the United States' policy planning in the eastern Mediterranean.

William Mallinson (2007) states that the US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Kissinger, was blamed both for not preventing and more importantly for giving a green light to the Turks (p.495). And there exist many studies in the literature which accuse Kissinger of the 1974 Turkish Intervention. Referring to Coufoudakis's "Theory of Continuity," for instance, Camp argues that Washington pursued a prearranged and decisive policy favoring Turks from the Acheson-Ball Plan of 1964 to Kissinger's tilt toward Ankara in 1974.

The US has not been the only superpower which is linked to the Turkish Intervention in 1974. John Sakkas and Nataliya Zhukova (2013) suggest that the Soviet Union recognized the forthcoming intervention but did not prevent it (p.131). Olav Fagelund Knudsen (1992), focusing more on the rapprochement between

Turkey and the Soviet Union before 1980, argues that Turkey's relations with the Soviets reinforced on the occasion of the Turkish Intervention in Cyprus and the subsequent US arms embargo imposed on Turkey (p.56). Likewise, Robert M. Cutler's *Domestic and Foreign Influences on Policy Making: The Soviet Union in the 1974 Cyprus Conflict* provides quite good information on the Soviet reaction to the 1974 Turkish Intervention on the island and its policy changes within a very short period of time. The statements included in the article demonstrate how and why Cyprus proved to be of great significance to the Soviet Union. Moreover, instead of international situation, Cutler (1985) focuses on the reflection of Cyprus on the Soviet press and radio, and to what extent it overlaps with the foreign policy steps taken by the Soviets is well examined in the article (p.60-89).

While Kissinger is the main target of those blaming the US for giving a green light to Turkey for the intervention, some scholars such as Michael Stephen state that the British should be equally blamed for the intervention. In the *Journal of International Affairs*, Stephen (1999) puts the blame on the British, and states that three times, being in 1963, 1967 and 1974, the Turkish Cypriots called upon the British to take an action and protect them since it was one of the guarantor powers under Article 4 of the 1960 Cyprus Treaty, but the British failed in all three occasions (p.3-4). About British reluctance to act in the 1974 crisis, Meltem Müftüleri and Aylin Güney (2005) in their co-authored study *the European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003* argue that this reluctance of the British fits well with the thesis that the division of the island was a desired option for the UK during the Cold War and that is partly why they did not want to become involved particularly in the post-63 period (p.285).

J. A. Naik's *Russia's Policies towards Neighbours* sheds light to the Soviet wish for friendly or less aggressive relations with its neighbors including Turkey. According

to Naik (1968), during Ürgüplü's visit to Moscow in 1965, the parties touched upon Turkish membership of NATO and the Soviet stand on Cyprus. In the communiqué issued at the end of the discussions, Kosygin, contrary to the previous Soviet stance against Turkey over Cyprus, showed a remarkable change of Soviet policy (p.1905). Stating that Cyprus problem should be based on respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, which has been the main aim of the Soviet Union, he recognized and endorsed the lawful rights of both national communities, meaning Turkish rights on the island should be respected. The visits paid by Kosygin and Demirel respectively to Ankara and Moscow a year later reassured the Turks about the Soviet position and boosted this friendship. Likewise, Campbell (1972) states that the Soviets without abandoning their support of the independence of Cyprus, developed a strategy with reference to the Turkish Cypriot rights in the island that Turkey considered agreeable to its cause (p.131-132).

Roger E. Kanet's *the Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies* supports the idea that the efforts of the Soviet Union to play a role in the 1974 Turkish Intervention also indicate a serious Soviet interest in developments in the eastern Mediterranean. The Soviet acquiescence to the Turkish intervention, says Kanet (1975), has helped to improve ties with Turkey, and the Greek decision to leave active participation in NATO is clearly favorable to the Soviet goal of limiting the US military presence along its southern flank (p.341). While observing the Soviet influence upon the NATO allies, the study also displays the impact of the given allies over the Soviet policies.

Olav Fagelund Knudsen (1992) in his article entitled *Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors 1964-88* discusses the relationship between a big power and a contiguous small state. The article deals with the Norwegian and Turkish cases and

the relations of the USSR with these two. A different perspective is provided to analyze the relations of the USSR with Turkey. The article raises the question of the optimal strategy for ensuring the long-term security of small, contiguous neighbors of great powers; and offers two options to the small state for its relations with its powerful neighbor: Accommodation or intransigence. Associating accommodation and intransigence respectively with soft line and hard line, Knudsen signifies that the soft line seeks to create confidence on the other side whereas the hard line stresses military defense, inducing great power to leave its neighbor alone. After a brief introduction to the terms, the author regards the Turco-Soviet relations initially as intransigence between 1945 and early 60s, and then as accommodation from 1964 to 1980. The shift from one option to another that takes place in 1964 is said not to be a coincidence (Knudsen, 1992, p.54). That is the year when Turkey received the blunt letter written at the behest of the then US President Lyndon B. Johnson to prevent the Turks from a military operation on Cyprus.

The Johnson letter prompted the Turkey to question the value of siding with the West and thus, encouraged it to develop relations with the Soviet Union. *The View from Ankara* by George S. Harris deals with the changing perceptions of the Turkish foreign policy and touches upon the worsening relations between Turkey and the USA. For these changing perceptions starting with the early 1960s, he spells out several incidents playing a part. Firstly, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Harris (1982) says, made Turkey realize that NATO may, under some circumstances, jeopardize Turkish interests rather than backing them up; Turkey also felt disappointed when the Jupiter missiles were taken back from her as part of the US bargaining with the USSR for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba

(p.132). Soon after, US President Johnson's letter to the İnönü administration during the 1964 Cyprus crisis impaired even more rigorously the US-Turkey relations.

Having a great disappointment with the Western attitude, Turkey eventually began to improve relations with the Soviet Union. As for the Soviets, they were to welcome the given rapprochement. For, "in the Soviet eyes", argues Fred Halliday (1987), "dangers may arise in situations when the United States takes advantage of a civil war or power vacuum to gain ground, at the expense of the Soviet Union" (p.419). Improving relations with conflicting parties, therefore, would restrict the room available for US plans. Furthermore, the Soviet Union did not want any clashes over Cyprus and opposed to any potentiality. For, it thought that the US would exactly do what it fears.

Quoting from *Pravda*, Robert M. Cutler (1985) shows that for the Soviets the clashes on the island between the communities in 1963 were a 'provocation [designed] . . . to create a crisis situation [to be taken advantage of] as a pretext for intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus, under the mask of 'mediation' to puzzle the Cyprus question out (p.63). The main motive behind such an act is claimed by the Soviets to render NATO presence in the island possible (Cutler, 1985, p.63). That is why the first statement made by the Soviet government, in *Pravda*, also accused NATO of not tolerating an independent Cyprus with a non-aligned foreign policy. In the study, the Soviet goals in different terms are explained as follows: Wrecking the potential menace from the southeastern flank of NATO by neutralizing Greece and Turkey in the long run, and expanding Soviet political and military influence, counterbalancing the West in the region to increase Soviet influence into the Middle East and beyond in the short run (Cutler, 1985, p.81).

Likewise, in her *Peaceful Existence: Turkey and the near East in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Duygu B. Sezer (1985) assesses the Soviet policy towards Cyprus between 1965 and 1985 and examines how the Soviet Union acted Greece and Turkey in the context of its rivalry against the US. Under a particular subtitle entitled *Cyprus*, Sezer briefly but effectively evaluates the Soviet relations with these two NATO countries specifically shaped around the Cyprus issue. Regarding the Soviet approach towards the Turks, Sezer claims that the Soviet Union modified its behavior towards Turkey in the post-64 period. With the Jupiter missiles gone as a result of the Cuban missile crisis, the Turkish threat against the USSR started decreasing in the eyes of the Soviets. The Soviet leaders in the Kremlin benefited from US-Turkey tension to advance relations with Turkey, moving toward a more even-handed stand on the Cyprus conflict and providing more financial help in several development projects (Sezer, 1985, p.121). Indeed, Turco-Soviet relations developed in the very near future. Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin was in Moscow in October 1964, and six months after that, Gromyko spent five days in Ankara. *Izvestia* quoted Gromyko on January 15, 1965, speaking of a possible federated state option in Cyprus. Urgüplü's visit to Moscow produced a communiqué advocating both communities' rights in Cyprus and the independence of Cyprus (Oran, 2015, p.776-777).

In her *Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis*, Fiona B. Adamson claims that a great attention is attached to the role of press and its effect on the public opinion, and thus, the public pressure upon the concerned governments in the context of the Cyprus issue. Adamson thoroughly details the internal political situation in the Turkish mainland, and does so by referring to the declarations and statements of Turkish policymakers, ever so slightly

touching on the foreign policy. The close look at the Turkish politics and what is going on inside provides an unusual perspective upon the issue, with inspiring details for the next chapter on the Turkish perspective. In a struggle to find the reason behind the intervention, Adamson (2001) gives competing explanations for the Turkish action, summarizing the course of the Turkish foreign policy mainly with the US and the Soviet Union from early 1960s to 1974 (p.277-303).

Correspondingly, upon the Turkish reaction to the coup in Cyprus, Bölükbaşı (1998) not wholly backing up a mere argument, distributes an equal responsibility upon two options with respect to the driving force behind the Turkish Intervention: “Partly to take advantage of this great opportunity which Athens had presented to Ankara, and partly fearing that inactivity would lead to enosis, Ankara made use of its right as a guaranteeing power of the Cypriot state” (p.420). Laurence Stern’s (1975) quotation from an unnamed senior Turkish official is telling and makes the latter outweigh in the discussion about the real Turkish motive behind the intervention: “The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson [as president of the Republic of Cyprus], giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. Unlike 1964 and 1967 the United States leverage on us in 1974 was minimal. We could no longer be scared off by threats that the Soviet Union would intercede” (p.63). Gilliam W. White (1981) in *the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus: A Lawyer’s View*, on the other hand, dwells on the Turkish legitimacy and states that Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee gives the Turks a legal basis for their use of force (p.137). The governmental statements correspondingly maintained that Turkey had intervened only when the very life of the Turkish Cypriot community and the independence of Cyprus were under risk (White, 1981, p.137).

There is no doubt that Greece's role in the development of events is irrefutable and should be very carefully examined to put forward a credible work. In this respect, Laurence Stern's *Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus* pays great attention to the mainland Greek politics and its reaction to the 1974 Turkish Intervention as well as its focus on the Cypriot leadership. Allegations regarding the US role upon the assassination plans conducted against Makarios are also a part of the study and the author unfolds the way how Makarios, Greek Cypriot leader, turned into a *Castro of the Mediterranean* in the eyes of the US. Moreover, with the aim of showing various interests of different actors, Stern(1975) defines Cyprus as "a crucible for the contending influences of Turkish insecurities and territorial ambitions, Hellenic irredentism, and Eastern and Western bloc strategic war-gaming" (p.38).

Analyzing the failure to find a common way out for the Cyprus issue, *the Enduring Conflict* by George Kaloudis (1999) looks at the responsibilities of almost all actors from Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to the UN and US, with a remarkable exception of the Soviet Union. By its partial focus on the island communities, the article suggests that the smallest actors of the conflict among much bigger ones have impact on the course of the events (Caloudis, 1999, p.6-9). Likewise, Süha Bölükbaşı's *the Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations* puts forward the influence of the relatively smaller powers on bigger ones. At some point in the article, Bölükbaşı (1998) characterizes the island communities quite strong to manipulate any peace process unlike the 1959-60 period when the islanders did not have so much impact on the public opinion on mainland Turkey and Greece (p.430).

The repressive stance of bigger powers in the face of relatively weaker actors may be considered as an unexceptional circumstance. In this context, the US may be expected to put pressure on Turkey and Greece just as these latter countries did the

same for the communities on the island. Warner Geoffrey's *the United States and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974* sheds light to the diplomatic efforts of the US Secretary of State Kissinger with a view to protecting the US interests on the island. Struggling for the protection of the US interests in the region, the Secretary of State takes almost every element into account. Assessing, for instance, Makarios' escape from Cyprus and any potentiality to bring him back to the island, "My analysis is" he (as cited in Geoffrey, 2009) said, "if he is brought back this way, he will have to kick the Greek officers off the island and then the Communists will be the dominant force and to balance the Turks he will have to rely on the Eastern bloc. So the coup will have shifted the balance to the left" (p.134). Camp (1980) justifies the western suspicion about Makarios' return. He argues that Makarios' anti-Communist posture was not publicized for domestic political reasons but his anti-NATO posture was (p.52).

Ergün Olgun's (1999) *A New and Realistic Approach* focuses on the Soviet role upon Cyprus and the Soviet-Makarios relations, shedding a clear and sharp light on the Western reaction to the given relations. Olgun argues that following the operation of the Turkish air force in the summer of 1964, the Soviet Union announced on 15 August that it was prepared to help Cyprus in the event of "a foreign invasion". Almost three weeks later, the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson got together with the British Foreign Secretary Butler to work towards a common strategy. The conclusion of the meeting was that "there is no alternative to Papandreou's idea of a Greek coup d'état, if a Mediterranean Cuba is to be avoided..." (Olgun, 1999, p.4). Thus, for those arguing that the West is behind the coup, the plans to get rid of Makarios had already been on the agenda for 10 years till he was overthrown. Glen D. Camp's (2004) *Cyprus and East Mediterranean Security Problems* is to support the given statement. It is argued that Acheson I and II, Ball, the NATO Plan, and

other policies pursued by the US were clearly intended to achieve “double enosis” with consequent partition of Cyprus.

Leaving the controversial US or Soviet involvement aside, the 1974 Turkish Intervention in Cyprus is said to have worsen the US position in the region. In a meeting with the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt, on November 12, 1974, Kissinger expressed concern about the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and the “relative decline of Western influence”. He was therefore “strongly opposed to the withdrawal of the British presence in Cyprus”. The unwillingness of the US Secretary of State about the British permanent departure from the island can also be found in William Mallinson’s (2009) *Cyprus, Britain, the USA, Turkey and Greece in 1977*. Benefiting from the FCO archives, Mallinson provides secret papers and sheds light to the US-UK correspondence regarding the American effort to assure that the UK would remain on the island (p. 737).

Even though most of the studies touch upon the security dimension of the Cyprus issue for various actors in different periods of time, some particularly evaluates it with a specific emphasis on the security. Almost all actors involved in the issue tried to show their legitimacy by several claims about security; and this approach of the parties brought about many academic studies focusing on the security dimension of the problem. One of them is A. Kyriakides Klearchos’s *The 1960 Treaties and the search for security in Cyprus*. The article outlines the origins, nature and effects of the apparent divergence over security, and here, the 1960 Treaties, as seen in the title, are presented as crucial factors for the given divergence at any point of the conflict.

Specifically upon the US, how the Cyprus policy of the US evolved over time under the influence of the local, regional and global events, and what factors the US took into account in its policy making process regarding Cyprus can be clearly observed in Thomas W. Adams's *The American Concern in Cyprus*. The study is based on the US-NATO interests and strategies in and around Cyprus, not giving that much attention to the roles of other concerned parties. James Ker-Lindsay's *the Security Dimensions of a Cyprus Solution*, on the other hand, takes the roles of almost all actors that became a part of the conflict into account and evaluates the issue with a specific focus on security. But Ker-Lindsay does it in the contemporary conjuncture after giving the historical background starting with the 1960 Agreements. That is to say, he considers any potential future role of the given actors included in the article such as United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union and seeks to foresee reactions from each concerned actor such as Turkey, Greece, the US and the Soviet Union. And at this point, past experience helps the author speculate on any future course of action.

Here it is important to note that the demand for independence in the second half of the 1950s soon brought Cyprus to the foreground of the Greek-Turkish rivalry and, apart from becoming the apple of discord between the two eastern Mediterranean states, it also attracted attention from the international environment. In a nutshell, the Western alliance aimed at settling the conflict and avoiding any Soviet interference, since Cyprus was too valuable to become the subject of conflict between the two superpowers. However, the very nature of the Cyprus issue, concerning the frequent clashes between its two communities and the non-alignment policy adopted by the Cypriot leadership, was highly threatening the interests of the West. Therefore, the need to resolve the conflict before it pushed Greece and Turkey into a full-scale war

became imminent, consequently leading to the Treaty of Guarantee. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Guarantee did not reflect any real attempts by the Western alliance to bring about a lasting settlement with stability, peace and order. On the contrary, the Treaty of Guarantee was only expected to preserve the interests of the West for a certain period of time, after which further intervention in Cyprus would be needed. In a sense, the purpose of the Treaty in question and the independence of Cyprus was to ease temporarily the situation in the region, meaning the potentiality of a war between Greece and Turkey, satisfy Cyprus' demand for independence to a limited extent and prevent Soviet penetration in a rather sensitive area.

For a short period of time the incipient goals seemed to have been achieved. However, as demonstrated above, the role of Cyprus upon the relations of the superpowers, the US and the USSR, with remarkably smaller powers, Greece and Turkey, gradually increased. Many studies conducted upon Cyprus have already dealt with the issue focusing on the policies and efforts made by the US or the Soviet Union and their power on directing Greece and Turkey toward their own interests. Yet, no analysis of the role and impact of these smaller powers on the policy-making of the US and the USSR concerning the Cyprus conflict has been presented in its proper Cold War context. The following two chapters of the present work will demonstrate the ways in which the Greek and Turkish counterparts sought to capitalize on the rivalry between the super powers and the meaning of these efforts and strategies on decades to follow.

CHAPTER III

THE TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

3.1. 1964-1967: Turmoil and Crisis

Since December 1963, the Greek Cypriot attacks against the Turks gained momentum as they did not want to implement the provisions of the 1960 Constitution in Cyprus. After the attack on December 21, 1963, referred to by Turks as “Bloody Christmas”, on December 25, the President of the Republic of Turkey, Cemal Gürsel sent a letter to the US President Lyndon Johnson asking him to put pressure on the Greek Cypriot side to stop immediately the massacre on the island.

In answer to the Turkish President’s letter, Johnson stated that he was “very concerned about the tragic events” that occurred in the island...”. Furthermore, he sent a letter to President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük with the aim of strengthening peace (Armaoğlu, 2017, p.264-265). However, the American President did not exert his authority as much as the Turks had expected. Johnson’s lack of proactivity was motivated by both a reluctance to get involved in the conflict and, in all likelihood, a fear of losing the votes of three million Americans of Greek descent in the presidential election at the end of 1964.

To prevent an escalation of events, Turkey made a warning flight on December 25 over the island. This flight showed its effect immediately. A conference was held in London, the British, to address the fact that the events that had broken out in Cyprus were becoming more severe. Being afraid to intervene in the early days of the events, just like the US, Britain took action upon watching the Turkish jet flying over the island and the parties met on January 15, 1964 in London.

At the same time, the Soviet Union saw the conflict on the island as part of a NATO plan and felt uncomfortable. Allowing three NATO states to intervene in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960 during the establishment phase of the Republic of Cyprus would be an acceptance of weakness the Soviets did not want to show. According to the Pravda newspaper published in December 28, 1963 (as cited in Firat, 1997):

The reason for the Cyprus incidents derives from the London and Zurich agreements imposed by the administrators of imperialist NATO to the Cypriot in February 1959. The idea was to confiscate a part of the Cypriot territory in order to obtain military bases, to reinforce the artificial distinction between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in order to force Cyprus into a military cooperation by means of “guarantee” or the rights of intervention and not to allow them pursue an independent foreign policy... This was encroaching the sovereign right of Cyprus.

The parties that came together at the London Conference paused their work on January 21 as a result of deep disagreements among them. However, since the Turks continued losing their lives, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu mentioned that “Turkey is determined to protect its compatriots’ rights”, and this brought the continuation of the negotiations which were interrupted in London. On the second round of the talks, Britain proposed forming a peacekeeping force of NATO member states to establish peace and security in the island. The proposal was aimed at sharing the responsibility of Cyprus’s security with the United States, a measure suggested in response to

Britain's long term failure to stabilize the Island (Sönmezoğlu, 1995, p.144). The British priority was its own military bases in the country and they did not want to be stuck in the subject if it was not going to hurt them. These attitudes would later be expressed clearly to Turkey in the months following January 1964 (Erim, 1975, p.337).

The lack of a solution in London created an opportunity for Britain to jettison their responsibility for Cyprus. In talks with the United States, the deployment of a 10,000-strong force to Cyprus, consisting of soldiers from NATO member states, was offered by Britain. The main objective of the British proposal was to make the US a part of the problem by expanding the resources available to provide peace in Cyprus (Sönmezoğlu, 1995, p.144). In fact, the US, which was going to accept the proposal, would become one of the important actors of the Cyprus Issue.

The US Deputy Secretary of State George Ball, after receiving Britain's NATO proposal, said that the Turks would not wait for the United Nations to continue negotiations. Tired of these heavy treatments against the Turkish Cypriots, he maintained, the Turks would occupy the island and eventually a full-scale war would start between the two NATO allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, reports from Ankara demonstrated that Turkey was ready for what they perceived as the inevitable situation of military intervention (Ball, 1983, p.340). On January 28, 1964, Prime Minister of Turkey Ismet Inonu told US Ambassador to Turkey Raymond Hare that the Turks would intervene if the Americans did not give them an answer by the following morning (Ball, 1983, p.341). For the United States, stuck in a stalemate, the Turkish message created a substantial pressure on them, while at the same time "dampened somewhat the Greek Cypriot inclination to renew fighting..." (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964, January 22, p.3)

Observing the issue from the NATO perspective in the context of the Cold War, the US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed that a ready-to-exploit Cyprus would not only put the United States in danger in the Mediterranean, but could also dismantle the entire southeast wing of NATO (Ball, 1983, p.341). Until then, the US had not proved to be willing to take on the problem directly, and thus had relied on the active role of Britain. In addition, it had regarded “the presence of British troops ... vital to the maintenance of even the present tenuous ceasefire” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964, January 22, p.2). Since there was no doubt that the impact of NATO would grow in this very important region, the United States had to approach to the proposal positively. However, President Makarios opposed it and stated that the solution of the Cyprus Issue should be sought in the UN. Another actor just as uncomfortable with the proposal as Makarios was the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union closely followed the developments in and about Cyprus with a view to taking advantage of the conflict created by NATO. Concordantly, Moscow can be suggested to be following two major objectives in its policies towards Cyprus. The first is not to leave it and its surrounding area to the absolute control of NATO, which was possible by supporting Makarios, who had the courage to challenge NATO policies in Eastern Mediterranean. The second is to take advantage of the situation by improving relations with Turkey and Greece, and to obtain more flexibility in the region (Firat, 1997, p.142).

For the first goal in particular, the Soviet Union had pursued a policy of close relations with the Republic of Cyprus since the day it was established. From the 1950s, Makarios took responsibility for leading the anti-colonial struggle against the British and became an important figure among Third World leaders. Even when he approved the settlement of the independent Republic of Cyprus, he opposed the

British bases on the island and claimed that he would follow an independent foreign policy from the moment he was elected as President.

Repeatedly stating that his country would not enter NATO, he maintained relations with the Eastern bloc. The presence of independent Republic of Cyprus near the two NATO member states in the Eastern Mediterranean, namely Turkey and Greece, represented a significant potential ally for Moscow within the region. Moreover, AKEL, the communist party with the most members in the Eastern Mediterranean, was operating freely in the political life of the country, and had a close relationship with Moscow (Adams & Cotrell, 1966, p.22-30). It was therefore unthinkable that the Soviet Union would have remained silent in the face of events in Cyprus and the likelihood of a NATO intervention.

While all these were happening, the conflicts triggered by the Greek Cypriot attacks recommenced. On February 11 and 13, there were very fierce clashes between the two sides in Limassol. Rauf Denktash told reporters on February 14 that if Turkey had not stepped into the island immediately, then the Greek Cypriots would have conducted a massacre of the Turks (Armaoğlu, 2017, p.285). Subsequently, on February 14 and 15 the Turkish Naval and Air Forces started maneuvering offshore from Iskenderun. This mobilization is reflected Nihat Erim's (1975) diary entry for February 16, which is as follows:

The Navy has returned before it made a landing. I believe that Inonu will not land the troops on Cyprus unless the US government officially shows consent. He could have done this as soon as the first Greek movement began on December 20-21. [But] he did not (p. 243).

At this time, the Cyprus issue was handled by the UN since it could not be dealt within NATO due to the objection from Makarios and the Soviet Union. After days of controversy, a decision was made on March 4, 1964, the Security Council finally

set up the "UN Peacekeeping Force" which has continued to the present day (Yearbook of the UN, 1964, p.165). Turkey at this point had achieved a great extent of its desires, because the Turkish Government managed to preserve the security of the Turks without any military intervention to Cyprus. It would have been, the Turks supposed, very difficult, if not impossible, for Makarios to get rid of the Turks in front of the eyes of the Peace Force (Erim, 1975, p.255).

The Peace force, however, was late in arriving to the island. And the tension seemed to be increasing during the days following March 4. Faced with these events, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu acted with the aim of taking more concrete steps on the Cyprus issue and decided to give an ultimatum to the Greek Cypriots at the National Security Council meeting held on March 12, 1964 (Historical Office Bureau, 1967, p.569). By this ultimatum, he declared that "Turkey did not see a similar good faith by the Greeks upon the Cyprus issue", and demanded a stop of the killings directed against Turkish societies, immediate termination of the siege of Turkish villages, and compliance with the ceasefire. Prime Minister made an explanation of the same nature to the relevant states and gave them 24 hours to reply (Ball, 1982, p.349). If the attacks against the Turks would not stop, the right to intervene would be used by Turkey alone or with the guarantor states. The government gave "48 hours" to the Greek Cypriots too, to emphasize that they would be responsible for provoking Turkish action if they continued the conflict ("Müdahale için 48", 1964).

Having demonstrated its commitment through a diplomatic note to other relevant states, Turkey placed battle-ready Turkish Land Forces at the troop transportation services in Iskenderun. Among the countries who received the ultimatum, the US warned the Greek Cypriots and Greece, who supported them. that it would be very difficult to resist a possible intervention. Against Turkey's threat of intervention, the

Security Council made a quick decision on March 13 and established the Peace Force consisting of troops from Canada, Ireland and Sweden (Yearbook of the UN, 1964, p.165-166). At this point, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk played a crucial role in asking some countries that were to send troops to be quick. As a result, on March 14, 1964, the first UN force of 296 Canadian soldiers arrived in Cyprus (“296 kişilik bir Kanada”, 1964).

In this process, Prime Minister Inonu had demonstrated Turkey ready for intervention and (in doing this) reached his target in the short-term, which was getting the UN peacekeeping force to the island. However, the expected pressure from the United States against Greece and the Greek Cypriots did not occur to the degree that Turkey required, and this pushed the Inonu Government to display its point more clearly and take a new step. Based on Article 66 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister was authorized by the Parliament to send troops to Cyprus “when necessary” (Armaoğlu, 2017, p.288). In a secret session held in the Parliament with the participation of 491 members of parliament on March 16, 487 votes were held for the right to intervene in Cyprus in any case (“Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti”, 1964).

As for the incident that was taking place in Cyprus since December 1963, Turkey was not achieving the support it had wanted. The US was on the one hand, not putting the necessary pressure on the Greeks, and, on the other hand, inspiring Turkey not to intervene in the situation. Inonu did not neglect to meet with the commanders and he was performing situation assessments almost every day. However, the situation was not very bright in the military sense (Erim, 1975, p.259). The military did not have sufficient time to prepare nor the requisite capacity for an operation of this

magnitude. This situation was creating difficulty for Inonu, who did not want to “leave the army with a chance of failure” (Erim, 1975, p.264).

However, the events in the Island were gradually putting the government amid criticism on domestic politics. Inonu began to sharpen his discourse in order to appease the public. On April 16, 1964, in a statement to *Time* magazine, he gave this speech which would later take its place in Turkish political literature:

If the allies do not change their attitudes, the Western alliance will collapse... A new world would be established under new conditions and Turkey would also find its place in this world (“İnönü, Amerikanın tutumunu”, 1964).

It is also important that in his interview to *Time*, Inonu targeted the US and said he believed in the leadership of the US, which was responsible for the alliance, and that now he was suffering the consequences. While admitting that he was clearly wrong in the past about the US, the Prime Minister began to engage in public debate about the possibility of “axis shift” in the Turkish Foreign Policy. Thus, a message was given to the Western bloc countries including the US that Turkey might go for alternative foreign policies if necessary. Considering the fact that the Soviet Union had been attempting to develop its relations with Turkey since 1960, especially in the economic field, it is unthinkable that the warning speech by Inonu was mostly directed to the internal policy and would not result in repercussions for the West (*Kıbrıs Sorunu ve İnönü*, n.d.).

Inonu was seeking support for his case, as well as trying not to allow the events to get out of control. However, another power that would affect the reaction of the public, as much as Inonu did, was the press, and the press was reflecting the thoughts and events more heavily than Inonu. New York Times columnist Jay Walz (1964) sums up this situation with the following sentences:

Mr. Inonu is supported by the Army, and the martial law in Ankara and Istanbul that effectively prevents demonstrations, meetings and other public manifestations of anti-Makarios sentiment. But the Turkish press is far from quiet. At this moment newspapers are making United States “dilatoriness” and Greek “intransigence” the scapegoats for Turkey's frustrations (p.E5).

The tension was not over in Cyprus. Conversely, it revived in June. The military cadres were pushing for a military operation. The Turkish press and the public opinion was championing these military men. Inonu, who had refrained from taking such an offensive stance from the very beginning of the conflict, decided to intervene (Coulombis, 1983, p.61). Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin (as cited in Oran, 2015) said in a statement on June 5 that “if the Greek Cypriots continue their movements, it might become inevitable for us to go to Cyprus one day” (p.397). At the meeting of the National Security Council, it was decided to land on Cyprus (Ball, 1982, p.350).

Since the UN Peacekeeping Force could not prevent the events, the Turkish Cypriots faced the Greek Cypriots all alone, which was a greater burden than they could afford to handle. Erim (1975) explains that the UN Peace Force, which the Inonu government initially regarded as a success, had turned out to be an ineffective element:

According to the attitude of the UN in the previous international crises, it was necessary for the UN forces to make a decision in the UNSC so that they could use and fire weapons anywhere. But it was obvious that Soviet Russia would not pass such a decision and did not pass it (p.418).

At this time, the US sent NATO Commander-in-chief Lyman Lemnitzer immediately to Ankara to stop the Turkish operation. Another attempt by the United States to prevent landing was to deploy a special force attached to the Sixth Fleet, consisting of an aircraft carrier, a cruiser and four destroyers, to a location few hours from Cyprus (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.124).

Prime Minister Inonu decided to inform the United States on 4 June, despite the opposition of Foreign Minister Erkin. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs (as cited in Arcayürek, 1985) stated that Inonu's was determined in making this decision:

How could a decision to intervene be reported to anyone, especially to the US, before its implementation?" I asked the Pasha. He did not listen. Ismet Pasha resisted against me... I saw that Ismet Pasha was not affected by my sayings. He was the Premier, and there was nothing else to do. I called the American ambassador to say that the Turkish government decided to send troops to the island based on the Treaty (p.274).

Aware of the fragility of the situation, Washington acted immediately. On June 5, a letter from the US President Johnson to Inonu fell into the middle of Turkish political life like a bomb (Toker, 1993, p.205-206). Although the political responsibility belonged to President Johnson, the letter was prepared along with Foreign Minister Dean Rusk, President's consultant Harlan Cleveland and his deputy Joseph Sisco (Sahin, 1987, p.13). When the letter was given to George Ball to let him see, it caused him great confusion. Regarding the letter, the Deputy Secretary (as cited in Ball, 1982) said: "This is the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen in my life," and said that Harlan Cleveland and Joseph Sisco had "manufactured a diplomatic equivalent of the atomic bomb" (p.350).

The letter, written in heavy and tough language, did not approve any possible Turkish intervention and, citing several reasons, tried to dissuade the Turks from this decision. The most striking of these reasons was that if there was a Turkish intervention then the Soviet Union could intervene against Turkey as well. Furthermore, the letter stated that, in the face of these interventions, the US had not yet made a decision of whether to protect Turkey against the Soviets or not; and in the case of the possible Soviet intervention, Turkey would not be able to use the weapons given as part of an aid by the US. Stating that he was closely following the

situation regarding the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the US President invited Inonu to the United States to discuss the details of the issue, saying he was not able to leave the US himself.

With many other factors, Johnson's letter influenced Inonu's decision to intervene in Cyprus. Inonu took into account not only America's objections, but also other geopolitical and functional factors. He believed that the geopolitical circumstances were unfavorable. Turkey and the Soviet Union had not yet normalized relations, and the U.S.S.R. publicly announced that it would assist Makarios if an intervention took place. Furthermore, Greece had made it known that it would aid Makarios as well. Inonu believed that Turkey could not afford to deal with Turco-Soviet or Turco-Greek confrontations. He also took into account that the Armed Forces were not prepared to undertake a landing on the island. With the arrival of 20,000 mainland Greek troops in Cyprus in the spring of 1964, the possibility that a Turkish intervention would lead to an exhaustive war between the two countries grew (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.93).

The reasons why this intervention cannot be carried out, and the fact that they were expressed by the US in a harsh manner disturbed Turkish diplomacy. If Turkey, which believed itself to be right in its cause, could not get the US support against the Soviet Union, then they would have to reconsider not only the relations with the US, but the whole concept of NATO.

Johnson's letter, which had a terrific importance for the Turkish literature regarding the relations with the US, resulted in a political debate in Turkey. There were two basic views in the background of the Johnson letter. As mentioned above, the first one was that the Turkish government's determination to intervene was confounded

by the stubborn attitude of the US. The second view argues that the Johnson letter was deliberately provoked by Ismet Inonu. According to this view, the reason why Inonu informed the US was to make them prevent the operation, knowing that the army lacked the power and ability to technically land on the island. Thus, operations would not take place, the seriousness and decisiveness of Turkey would be explained to Greece and the obstacle of the repressive Turkish public opinion would be removed by referring to the US opposition. But what was expected did not happen.

Inönü (as cited in Erim, 1975), the cautious Turkish leader, would later say that “in terms of the army, we were not prepared for the armed forces” and that he “did not want to take an unprepared action” (p.218). In short, although he seemed to be serious about intervention, the Johnson Letter was used as a pretext to not carry out the military landing (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.94). However, Prime Minister’s win-win policy for both the country and the party failed, because it both stimulated the US to send an ‘atomic bomb’, and it paved the way for an argument that he never calculated in foreign politics. After this letter, the US relations and NATO membership would become the target of criticism in Turkey.

Whether Turkey really intended to intervene can be put aside, the US President Johnson’s main purpose in sending letters regarding the Cyprus problem was to resolve the disagreement between Turkey and Greece through a US initiative just like in 1959. For the Americans, if the US had not acted in the way it did, the dispute could have triggered a war between two NATO nations, brought about the collapse of the southeast wing of NATO, and heightened the possibility of the Soviets intervening directly in Cyprus by giving the excuse of a possible war or conflict. At this point, the pressure of the United States was regarded as a necessity by Americans. Especially due to “the 39th division in Iskenderun... and given Turkish

air superiority in the Cyprus area”; a Turkish intervention “could not be stopped by either Cypriot or Greek forces” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964, January 22, p.4). The US had to do something serious. The political situation of both countries and their failure to work at full capacity compelled the United States to take action. For the Americans:

... both (Turkish and Greek) governments have limited freedom of maneuver: Ankara because of military and political pressures on Inonu’s minority government, Athens because for domestic political reasons Papandreou is reluctant to exercise leadership... An agreed settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result at least for a time in damage to US relations with Greece, or Turkey, or both (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964, June 19, p.2).

For this reason, the US President invited the Turkish Prime Minister Inonu to Washington together with the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou. The United States, which perceived the pressure as an imperative in the circumstances of the period, was also aware that their pressure to both sides would not be welcomed by the Turkish and Greek leaders. Nevertheless, he was trying his best not to take a side or to pretend as such. In a WSAG (Washington Special Actions Group) meeting, several names, such as Henry Kissinger and Sisco, who led the Cyprus policy of the US came to an agreement that they “should say nothing... but that we support the territorial integrity of Cyprus” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, June 16, p.6). Henry Kissinger, who would later be blamed by Greece for his “wait and see” policy in 1974, had in fact a similar frame of mind in 1964. His focus was for the US to “keep ... the Soviets out of this [the Cyprus problem]” and see how the internal situation on Cyprus would evolve (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, June 16, p.8).

In the mid-1960s, however, Johnson ignored the fact that the conditions had changed. The Cold War was giving way to détente, and the Soviet threat was no longer bringing the two neighboring countries of Turkey and Greece together under

the Western alliance. On the contrary, against the oppression of the West, the support of the Soviet Union could be a viable option for them. In addition, because of the unstable political life in both Turkey and Greece's coalition governments, these two countries were not in a position to compromise on issues such as the Cyprus case which had been adopted as the national struggle by the public. Therefore, the US did not get what it expected during Turkish and Greek prime ministers' visit to Washington on 22-23 June 1964. From the Turkish perspective, the most positive point in terms of negotiations in Washington was that the US Administration accepted the binding nature of Cyprus treaties (Erim, 1975, p.329).

Johnson also wanted Inonu to meet with Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou at a summit in Camp David during the talks. Inonu, who responded positively to the proposal (Toker, 1993, p.209), was willing to compromise, but at the same time he continued to constantly bring up the resentment in Turkish-American relations due to Johnson's letter and that it would not be something easy to repair (Sahin, 1987, p.89-90). Erim (1975), who was in Washington with Inonu, noted Inonu's dissatisfaction and reaction to Time magazine on June 25 with these words:

We Turks are in close proximity to the country we are connected to until our faith is destroyed. But once our faith is destroyed, it is not easy to win our trust again... today we believe in the US in this way. But the attitude of the United States in the case of Cyprus caused us to worry and doubt. If our faith is completely destroyed, it will not be easy and quick to rebuild it (p.330-331).

Inonu continued to talk about the relations with the Soviets. He explained that the Turco-Soviet relations that had been established in the first years of the Republic of Turkey had been going very well. Nevertheless, they were reversed in the next decades, especially during the early Cold War period. In short, Turkey showed that it would not hesitate to break ties with the US if national interests were concerned.

The Johnson letter, which succeeded in preventing Turkish intervention in the short term, greatly influenced Turkish foreign policy in general, and Turkish-American relations in particular, for many years. The letter implied the NATO may not defend Turkey from a Soviet attack, which led the public to question the security of Turkey and further resulted in an large-scale intensive discussion. The idea of Turkey leaving NATO was gaining more support than it had been in the earlier periods. Yet Johnson's letter was explaining that NATO would run its security and defense system only in cases where the interests of the US as an ally were damaged. Therefore, the letter was a very important milestone in the transition of Turkish foreign policy to multipolarity. Following the letter, Turkey started looking for ways to improve economic and political relations which were kept at a minimum level for years, particularly those with the USSR and the Third World countries. It was clearly understood that depending on the support of the Western alliance alone was inadequate. Moreover, Turkey stopped ignoring the initiatives of the US in the international arena, and began to question whether the purposes and principles of these initiatives complied with the Turkish foreign policy. As part of this attitude, the US policy of Vietnam was not supported. At the UN General Assembly in September 1965, Turkey opposed the use of force, for instance, by the US in Vietnam. The public opposition against the United States and its military presence in Turkey became even stronger (Oran, 2015, p.689-690).

After the Washington negotiations, the former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson was assigned as the mediator for the Cyprus Issue. Thanks to Acheson's mediation, the delegation of Turkey, Greece, and the UK came together under the auspices of the UN mediator Tuomioja at the Geneva Conference on July 9, 1964. The Greek Cypriot leader was also invited to the talks, but refused to attend. At the talks, where

the two delegations did not meet at the table due to Greece's opposition, Acheson separately negotiated with the parties and communicated the proposal mutually. Finally, a solution called the "Acheson Plan" was presented to the parties on 14 July 1964. The plan contained proposals for "taksim" (partition of the island between the two communities) and "enosis" (union of the island with Greece) requests, resolved Turkey's security concerns, put the island indirectly under NATO control, and made the Eastern Mediterranean safe for "Western" interests. However, the plan ignored the fact that while Greece was no longer a decision-making element on Cyprus, Cyprus was transformed into an influential player on Greece, and that Makarios, whose national and international power had been increasing, would not accept a solution other than his own. Makarios thought that the plan was a secret "partition". Thus, he officially rejected the plan on August 12, 1964, so the response of Greece to the plan was also negative (Firat, 2001, p.727).

On the other hand, as the Geneva Conference continued, the conflicts in Cyprus moved to a new dimension. On August 6, 1964, Greek Cypriot soldiers under General Grivas attacked the Erenköy-Mansura region under the control of the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) with heavy weapons and tried to control the road that linked Erenköy to the port, the port serving as a lifeblood for the Turkish Cypriots as that was the only way left to communicate with and contact Turkey. Hence, a conflict broke out. As the TMT forces had to withdraw to Erenköy, the region was blockaded by the Greek Cypriot National Guard forces and the lives of the TMT combatants were put in serious danger.

Nihat Erim, who represented Turkey at the Geneva Conference, returned to Ankara on August 7. Thinking about what he would do about the rise of tension in the island, Inonu asked for Erim's opinion. In answer to Inonu's question, Erim said that an

actual intervention in order to give a lesson to the Archbishop in Cyprus would be tolerated by the US according to the impressions he received from his meetings with Mr. Acheson (Erim, 1975, p.381). However, Erim would not welcome a military intervention because the bombing of the Greeks would encourage them to exterminate the Turks in revenge. This situation herewith could bring greater danger. Erim's (1975) final proposal was as follows:

...it seems like there is no longer a chance to resolve the Cyprus issue with military intervention. The best thing is to work with the US again. The foreign minister or prime minister should go to Washington again. German Prime Minister Erhard went three times in a year. The US is like a mother with many children, pays more attention to whichever screams more (p.382).

After these developments, while Turkey was making initiatives at the UN and NATO, Turkish warplanes did a caveat flight over the island, in accordance with the Government's decision on August 7. The Turkish warplanes started bombing the positions of "Greek National Guard" commanded by General Grivas on August 8 and 9, since the Turkish initiatives to stop the Greek Cypriots were not effective at removing the blockade and ending the conflict (Firat, 2001, p.729). Turkish jets flew 34 times and bombed the Greek-owned Phaethon patrol ship. In these bombardments, six Greek Cypriots died and six others were injured ("Yunan eski Savunma", 1974). On August 9, Turkish jets began to bomb the island substantially. This bombardment, although it was on a limited scale, was the first Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. Following the intervention, some military officials stated and even insisted that a limited movement had taken place and that it had to continue. However, Prime Minister Inonu said "We will be regarded as creating an unfair situation" (Erim, 1975, p.393), and after it was reported that Makarios ordered to stop the attacks, the Turkish premier stopped the bombings as of 14:00 on August 9 as well.

For the Soviet Union, the August conflict and Turkey's military campaign were evaluated as the implementation of the partition plan as in December 1963. According to this plan, the island would be divided into two so that it will be under Turkish and Greek sovereignty; the Republic of Cyprus would disappear and the region would enter under NATO control. Therefore, on August 9, Khrushchev sent a message to Prime Minister Inonu and called out to Turkey to stop the military action and to give the chance to the Greek Cypriot people of Cyprus, as well as to the Turkish Cypriots to resolve their problem without being influenced from outside. The Soviet leader (as cited in Erim, 1975) also reminded Inonu of how much responsibility he was shouldering with his actions (p.386). Prime Minister Inonu, in his response on August 13, expressed his hopes that the USSR would understand the situation and use their influence on the Greeks appropriately by disapproving of the Greek people's inhuman and immoral activities. In the meantime, the bombings had an impact on Greece, and messages were relayed between Athens and Ankara on this issue (Erim, 1975, p.385-392).

The United Nations Security Council, through its resolution 193, asked the parties to obey the ceasefire (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964, p.165). After Makarios declared that he would lift the blockade, Turkey also accepted the ceasefire, and a "hot war" was avoided (Firat, 2001, p.729). After the conflict was over, the interrupted Geneva Conference resumed on August 15, 1964, and a new version of the "Acheson Plan" was introduced on 20 August with some amendments made on the first draft. According to this, the Karpaz Peninsula, which was left under Turkey's sovereignty during the first plan, would now be rented to Turkey for a period of fifty years, with permission for a Turkish military base. Turkey rejected this change, which was closer to the thesis of Greece, and the conference ended

without any results on August 31, 1964 (Bölükbaşı, 2001, p.130). Because of these developments, the conflict in Cyprus gave way to the economic embargo and blockade that the Greek Cypriots put into practice against the Turkish Cypriots (Erim, 1975, p.783).

The events which took place in the first half of 1964, especially the Johnson Letter, were significant in terms of relations with Turkey for a US government attempting to prevent the occurring cracks in NATO. Since the US, which tried to prevent the crack with political pressure, adopted a very harsh attitude against Turkey, then the situation prompted Turkey to revise its foreign policy. Turkey, with its unresolved national issues, had its hands tied and found itself isolated. According to Americans:

The failure of the Geneva talks to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute has heightened the Turkish sense of diplomatic isolation. US pressure on Turkey to desist in military action against Greek Cypriot President Makarios, despite the latter's intransigence and aggressiveness toward the Turkish Cypriots, has also added to this feeling of isolation. By now, Turkey has almost certainly lost much of its original hope that the US would by some miracle move to produce a tolerable Cyprus settlement -- i.e. one giving Turkey sovereignty over at least a man part of Cyprus. Thus the Turks have emerged from events of past weeks with a belief that only through their own actions will a satisfactory settlement of the Cyprus Issue be reached (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964, September 17, p.2).

After the 1964 Cyprus crisis, Turkish policymakers and the public began a thorough examination of the overall Turkish foreign policy in order to find the reasons for Turkey's failure to intervene. The consensus reached by most political parties and the public, in general, was that Turkey's political dependency on the US and its isolation in the international community were the cause of the Cyprus debacle. They concluded that Turkey needed to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.115).

Brezhnev's coming to power after Khrushchev, who supported the Greeks' thesis, played a major part in improving relations between the two countries. Indeed, Prime Minister Inonu, against the will of the US and the West, claimed that Turkey would not become an enemy of the Soviet Union and Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin was sent to Moscow. Erkin, who arrived in the USSR on October 30, became the first Foreign Minister to set foot on Soviet soil after 25 years (Oran, 2015, p.775). As a result of the negotiations between the Turkish and Soviet authorities, a joint declaration on November 6, 1964, concerning Cyprus, stated that "the two sides were supporters of finding a solution to and respecting the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and adhere to the rights of both communities and recognize the existence of two national communities in Cyprus" ("Rusya, Kıbrıs görüşümüzü", 1964).

The statements in the joint declaration revealed a changing attitude of the Soviets towards the Cyprus problem. Having initially focused on the independence of the Republic of Cyprus under the leadership of Makarios without regard to the rights of the Turkish community living on the island, the Soviets showed with this declaration that they recognized the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus as well as the legal rights of both communities (Sönmezoğlu, 1995, p.133). After the US acceptance of the legal validity of the 1959 Treaties during the visit to Washington in June, Turkey gained assurances from the Soviet Union regarding the existence and rights of the Turkish community, which was a very important diplomatic achievement.

The Turco-Soviet rapprochement continued in full course. On January 4-13, 1965, Podgorny, a member of the Presidium, came to Turkey on an official visit. The return visit by Soviet officials after Erkin's visit constitutes the second phase of the change

in Soviet policy upon Cyprus. The Soviet delegation, accepted by Inonu in Ankara, invited the Prime Minister to the USSR. Podgorny, the head of the Russian delegation, made a speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and talked about the Cyprus issue. Podgorny emphasized in the Assembly that they respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Referring to the need to take measures to ensure that both communities live peacefully on the island, Podgorny said that the Soviets “are in favor of resolving the issue by recognizing both communities in Cyprus” (“Kıbrıs’ta iki milli”, 1965). Furthermore, Gromyko (as cited in Erim, 1975), in a report to the *Izvestiya* Newspaper on January 21, 1965, said that the Soviet Union was against enosis, and that Cyprus could take federation as a solution (p.439). In May 1965, Gromyko came to Ankara and made a press conference at the end of his visit. He said this about Cyprus:

The Soviet Union has always defended Cyprus’s independence and territorial integrity. It is against the use of Cyprus as a position of military blocs. It also does not approve any intervention from outside into the internal affairs of Cyprus. As we always mention, we must find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. This solution must be based on the principles of independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, the actual existence of the two communities in the island, and the observance of their legitimate rights. In summary, we want Cyprus to remain as an independent state (Erim, 1975, p.440).

Following these steps, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that the USSR supported the “federation” thesis on Cyprus issue in the speech he issued to the *Izvestia* Newspaper. This statement made it clear that the Soviet politics regarding Cyprus had changed (Oran, 2015, p.776). Likewise, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu stated that the Soviet support for a solution based on federation was the most important step towards the settlement of the Cyprus case (“Gromiko’nun Demeci”, 1965). Indeed, rapprochement in relations with the Soviet Union first began for Turkey in 1963. The relationship between the two countries developed quickly starting from 1963 aided by the fact that Prime Minister Inonu and the Soviet

ambassador Nikita Rjov had known each other for a long time, since the ambassador had come to Turkey as an engineer in his thirties (Kaynar, 2017, p.241). From June 29 to July 3, 1963, the visit of a Turkish delegation headed by Suat Hayri Ürgüplü to the USSR opened the closed doors slightly. Khrushchev (as cited in Caglayangil, 1990) proposed to the delegation the use of non-political areas for the first steps of rapprochement, saying, “If you can’t leave NATO, do not be so close to us like this; let’s have a transaction in culture and economy, and increase the trade” (p.314). But the events that occurred in Cyprus prevented the improvement of relations. Therefore, it was one and a half years later that the rapprochement process recommenced. This period, in which Turco-Soviet relations developed rapidly, attracted the attention of the US as well. The document, which entered to the CIA archives under the heading of *Soviet Policy and Tactics in the Cyprus Dispute*, deals with the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement as follows:

The USSR has skillfully exploited the Cyprus crisis to further a number of its policy objectives in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of the West. It has been able to pursue its major goal of weakening the NATO alliance by playing upon the ambitions and animosities of Greek and Turk without, thus far at least, committing itself to any specific course of action. In recent months Moscow has taken a position more favorable to that of Turkey as the new Soviet leadership has vigorously pursued a policy of rapprochement with Ankara (Central Intelligence Agency, 1965, February 12, p.1).

While the rapprochement during 1965 disturbed the US, Turkish officials were not afraid to inform the American authorities about their incorrect attitude toward Cyprus. The conversations that took place during a dinner on November 7, 1965, in honor of NATO Secretary General Brozoy, at the Russian Embassy, clearly showed at which point were the Turco-Soviet and Turco-American relations:

... Feridun Cemal Erkin said that if the Americans cut the aid we (the Soviets) would give it to you. After the dinner, we spoke to the American Ambassador Hare on one side. I paid attention to the harm their (Americans’) wrong attitudes upon Cyprus caused. “You’re right, but we tried to reconcile Greece with Turkey

as both are friends,” he said. I responded, “Well, this is wrong; because you treated the friend who was wrong the same as the one who was right” (Erim, 1975, p.440).

The rapprochement was so strong that the Soviets offered assistance to Turkey despite a possible American reaction, revealing a determination to continue the relationship. Left alone by the Western alliance on the Cyprus Issue, Turkey had started developing relations with the USSR, despite having a conflict with them since World War II and although they had originally supported Enosis, and succeeded in convincing the USSR of Turkey’s cause in Cyprus. However, the Cyprus issue that had become Turkey’s “No.1 Issue” since 1964 resulted in wearing out the third Coalition Government headed by Inonu. As he spent his life in wars, Inonu tried to solve the problem with peaceful methods with all his experience and this resulted in an adverse reaction in both the opposition and the public. With the elections on October 10, 1965 the power changed hands, and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was replaced by the Justice Party (AP) led by Demirel.

Demirel maintained the Inonu government’s policy of rapprochement with the Soviets, and saw it as an opportunity to overcome the problems he faced (Kaynar, 2017, p.237). Maintaining good relations with the USSR would provide access to the resources needed for growth, create stability on a regional scale, lead to a regional détente, and moreover Turkey would get a matchless support for the Cyprus issue from a great state – the state that according to the Johnson letter was the biggest threat facing Turkey. In the election declaration of the first AP government to be established after the elections of 1965, the signs that Demirel will benefit from this opportunity are quite obvious:

Turkey will continue to tighten relations and to cooperate with Western allies and friends, but in the same time friendship relations would be developed with the

neighbors in the principles of mutual respect and trust, and commercial relations would be increased (Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi, 1965, p.31).

The Turkish initiative to multiply its foreign policy elements did not remain limited to the U.S.S.R. The Third World countries, namely the supporters of the non-alignment, were also among those whose confidence mattered a lot for Turkey in its Cyprus case. The non-aligned countries' Cyprus policy up to and during the 1964 crisis was a source of disappointment for Turkey. These countries mainly had diverse ethnic and religious populations, and were thus disturbed by the Turkish notion that there existed two different peoples in the island. They had the belief that if Cyprus was separated between the two communities, then it would set a precedent for themselves.

Turkey's role should also be emphasized in its failure to receive support from the third-world countries. In the Bandung Conference of 1955, Turkey made it clear that it opposed non-aligned policies on the grounds that the non-alignment best served the Soviet interests. This Turkish position made her, in the eyes of the attending countries, a spokesman of the West. Even though this Turkish stance softened as of 1960, Turkey did not adjust its specific policy towards non-aligned countries. On the other hand, since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios presented himself as a follower of the non-alignment and utilized its principles in his own foreign policy, which let him gain the support and confidence of the whole non-aligned movement. At the Second Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo following the 1964 Cyprus conflict, the member countries declared that the territorial integrity of Cyprus should be respected, internal affairs should not be externally interfered, and that the Cypriot people had the right to determine their own destiny (United Nations General Assembly, 1964, p.18). These decisions were important because when the Cyprus issue came to the UN General

Assembly the non-aligned states had an effective voting presence. Indeed, in voting at the UN General Assembly, the non-aligned countries continuously voted against Turkey for a remarkable period.

The position taken by the non-aligned countries during the 1964 Cyprus crisis encouraged Turkey to follow a new path in its relations with the Third World. To start and develop relations with these countries, exceeding the limit set by NATO, was seen by Turkey as obligatory. The concrete steps of this understanding started to be taken as of 1965. Special attention was paid to the development of relations with the Arab countries that acted together with the non-aligned countries. As the first Foreign Minister to visit Egypt on January 15, 1967, Çaglayangil (as cited in Kaynar, 2017), in his speech at a dinner in Cairo, given in his honor by the foreign minister of the Egyptian government, highlighted that he gave “special importance to tighten the relations with all Arab countries”. He mentioned that Arab countries could rely on the understanding and support of Turkey in their rightful fights in the region.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War opened a window of opportunity for Turkey to show that Turkey’s policy towards the Arab countries had changed. During the pre-war tensions, the AP government announced that the military bases in Turkey would not be allowed to be used for supporting Israel. After the war began on June 5, Ankara kept its promise and this was appreciated by the Arabs. Thus, a great distance was covered by 1967 in the transition to a multi-faceted foreign policy that was deemed mandatory in light of the Johnson Letter.

3.2. 1967-1974: Rules of the Game Shift

On April 21, 1967, the army took over in Greece. The Greek military coup had strong repercussions in Turkey. The military administration, lacking public support,

could embark on unexpected moves in Cyprus, which had remained relatively stable after the 1964 crisis, to increase its legitimacy and popular support. Indeed, the Demirel Government, like its predecessors, perceived the Cyprus crisis as a bilateral problem between Greece and Turkey and believed that the Republic of Cyprus could not be a part of it (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.123). Turkey wanted to solve the Cyprus problem through bilateral negotiations with Greece and by doing this prevent the trouble-making Makarios from exerting his influence. Athens, as will be seen in the next chapter, had a very similar political conjuncture and atmosphere. That is why the leaders of the two countries' premiers decided to meet to discuss the Cyprus problem, which prevented them from carrying out harmonious foreign policies within NATO.

Demirel and his Greek counterpart Kollias met first on September 9 in Keshan, and then on September 10 in Alexandroupolis (Dedeğaç). In the Keshan meeting, Kollias enumerated Greek views and said that it was possible to achieve enosis in a manner that would not violate the strategic requirements of Turkey. If this could be achieved, the Turkish Cypriots would be provided full equality within the Greek state, especially in terms of religion, language and culture. The lifestyle of the Western Thrace Turks was a guarantee in the eyes of the Greeks. After these explanations, as if a consensus had been reached, Kollias asked these two questions to Demirel: Would Turkey accept enosis if a sovereignty right was given to Turkey with the symbolic participation of NATO? What assurances would Turkey give to the Greeks not to use the Dhekelia base against Cyprus? Stunned by the unexpected offer, Demirel stated that Turkey would not discuss enosis as a solution, and could not respond to the second question. Stating that there should be a solution aside from Enosis, Demirel listed Turkey's conditions regarding a solution in the island as

follows: Cyprus cannot be annexed to one side; treaties cannot be changed unilaterally; the two communities in the island cannot be under the domination of one another; and the Lausanne balance cannot be broken. İltiz Türkmen, present at the summit, summarized the given meeting with the following words:

Before the Turkish-Greek Summit (1967) a number of secret negotiations were conducted between the parties. The Greeks wanted to achieve enosis by giving a base to Turkey in the island. We, on the other hand, were looking for a solution that would provide more autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots in the island as well as a base to be given to Turkey. The Greeks confronted us in Keshan with the thesis that we had green-lighted enosis in return for a military base. Of course, Demirel turned down this suggestion (Birand, 1999).

The two Prime Ministers and delegations met in Alexandroupolis a day later. At this meeting, Demirel listed some principles for an alternative solution. The crucial point in the list was that the Turkish security requirements were to be met. In addition, the balance between the two countries and the two communities must be preserved; special guarantees must be given to the Turkish community; Turkish Cypriot society must be allowed to participate on equal terms in the governance; and the economic future of the Turkish society in the island had to be secured. Nevertheless, differences of opinion between the parties hindered the emergence of any solution.

By the end of the talks, it became clear that the parties could not reach a settlement. A joint declaration was published, demonstrating that there was a consensus between the parties to continue the efforts to bring their views closer and to take measures to prevent the re-escalation of tension in Cyprus. The failure of the talks galvanized the hawks in both parties into action. Rauf Denktas, who had been banned from the island since the 1964 London Conference, wanted to return secretly to the island, but was caught by the Greek Cypriot police on October 31 upon arrival to the Cypriot coasts (Oran, 2015, p.736). This incident quickly led to a diplomatic crisis. The crisis

was resolved only when Clerides, Denktas' Greek Cypriot friend, intervened in the dispute. With his mediation, Denktas was able to leave the island for Turkey, having spent 13 days in captivity.

However, on November 15, 1967, Greek Cypriot Guards led by Yorgo Grivas, who had secretly infiltrated the island, began attacking the Geçitkale and Boğaziçi villages. A total of 22 people, most of whom were Turkish, were killed, 9 injured, and the villagers suffered remarkable financial damage (Kaynar, 2017, p.245). The same night, the Council of Ministers convened in Ankara. The decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) letting the Government intervene in Cyprus was still in force and the intervention was evaluated at great length. During the meeting suitable landing spots were discussed; however, the Chief of the Navy, Necdet Uran could not ascertain the water level at Kyrenia (Arcayürek, 1992, p.118). What's more, Chief of the Army Refik Yılmaz (as cited in Arcayürek, 1992) said that a successful operation in Cyprus required at least fifty tanks and the fielding of a corps, but Turkey had merely two landing craft, which was not enough to carry the troops ashore (p.119). The air force's situation was similar: it had six helicopters and 150 parachutes, again, not enough to carry out a successful operation (Arcayürek, 1985, p.282). In brief, a landing on Cyprus would be risky. It became so clear that Turkey was as caught short for an operation as it was in 1964. Nevertheless, Demirel wanted the generals to do their best in case a landing proved to be irremissible (Arcayürek, 1992, p.119).

In the meantime, the US concern of 1964 was undiminished in the 67 crisis. The US was uneasy about a potential war to be fought between two NATO allies. To minimize the terrible possibility, it deployed a task force of the Sixth Fleet close to the shores of Cyprus on November 16, 1967. It is clear that the Johnson

Administration assumed that “fleet movements would be observed by the participants in the crisis and evaluated in light of previous US behavior and current policy statements” (Blechman & Kaplan, 1978, p.73).

After a seven hour-discussion, the TBMM gave the Government the right to send Turkish armed forces abroad for operations (Armaoğlu, 2017, p.299). The atmosphere on the island was so severe that British forces began to move the 2400 Britons on Cyprus into the Dhekelia sovereign base, and 600 Americans were flown to Beirut, though around 100 remained in the Embassy and at US spying and communications stations (O’Malley & Craig, 2009, p.128).

Along with showing its determination to intervene militarily, Turkey did not give up working on diplomatic means. The Demirel administration, which saw the Cyprus problem as an issue between Turkey and Greece, gave a diplomatic note to Greece on November 17th through Caglayangil. By this very note, Turkey demanded the withdrawal of Greek troops, Grivas’ dismissal from the island, the dispersal of the National Guard forces, recognition of the Turkish community's right to establish local authorities and police forces in its own territory; and payment for the damages to Turkish Cypriots in recent events. Although Turkey delivered its note to Greece on November 17, 1967, Greece failed to respond until November 22. In the meantime, military preparations for a landing continued (Bölükbaşı, 1988, 138). The Turkish air force conducted daily reconnaissance flights over Cyprus, and a large portion of the Turkish fleet was sent to Mersin harbor, the closest major harbor to Cyprus (“Jetlerin uçuşu”, 1967). The Turkish military preparation was not only directed towards Cyprus. The Turkish border with Greece also witnessed some quite alarming moments. The Turkish forces in the region were: “at a high state of combat readiness, and are relatively heavy in armor, for which the local terrain is well suited.

Turkish armored and infantry elements ... reportedly assembled in the Corlu area are in a position to launch a drive along the coastal road into Greece through Alexandropolis and Kavalla toward Thessaloniki” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1967, November 20, p.1).

Taking a crucial step to provide a solution to the problem, the US Administration charged Cyrus Vance, former deputy minister of defense, to deal with Cyprus. Vance “was told that Turkish troops were already at the embarkation port and were expected, according to [US] intelligence, to invade Cyprus the next morning. This would mean war between Greece and Turkey” (Vance, 1983, p.144). With no option but to stop the catastrophic series of events taking place in the south-eastern flank of NATO, US efforts on the Turkish side gathered momentum. US Ambassador Hart told Caglayangil that President Johnson opposed an intervention, as he did in 1964, but this time chose not to send a written message, and instead an oral message through the US Embassy. This was, bluntly, due to Turkish public’s reaction to the Johnson Letter of 1964 (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.137). The US did not want to estrange the Turks further from itself. However, Demirel responded to Johnson’s message with a letter demanding the withdrawal of Greek troops (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.137).

Perhaps the most crucial development that changed the balance of this crisis took place with the Soviets. The USSR, which opposed İnönü in the 1964 crisis, avoided putting Demirel into trouble. On the contrary, they put the blame on the Greeks for the events in the island. On 23 November 1967, one day before the rumored landing of Turkish forces in Cyprus, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov met with Demirel. After the meeting Smirnov told reporters that he conferred with Demirel about the "policies of Greek fascists." Smirnov added that “it [was] the Greek junta's actions" which caused Turkish Cypriot casualties” (“Moskova CUNTA’nın”, 1967). A

respected deputy of the National Assembly, Coskun Kırca (as cited in Sarıca, Eskiuyurt, & Teziç, 1975), later revealed that the Soviet Ambassador had assured Turkey that the U.S.S.R. did not oppose a Turkish landing in Cyprus (p.156). Considering Khrushchev's attitude towards Turkey in the 1963-64 crisis, the change in the Soviet policy becomes clear. After almost three years, Turkey finally started reaping the fruits of its multipolar foreign policy.

Back to Vance's mission: following his initiatives of the three countries, namely Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, reconciliations emerged on several points. Accordingly, Turkey and Greece were obliged to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to gradually withdraw their forces in the island within one and a half months. The Greeks were first to withdraw their forces, and to do it as soon as possible. These withdrawals would be under the supervision of the UN Peacekeeping Force in the island. After the given Greek steps, Turkey would remove the measures it took in the face of a potential war. In addition, Grivas would not be able to return to the island for any reason (Oran, 2015, p.738).

The US attached so much importance to the withdrawal of armed forces, instruments of potential hot clashes, from the island. The CIA confirmed the withdrawal of these forces with the following statements:

Troops from both Greece and Turkey were introduced into Cyprus prior to the 1967 clash in numbers beyond the terms of the London-Zurich agreements. After the 1967 clash most of the illegal troops were removed (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, September 24, p.1).

As a result, Vance's mediation was completed on December 3, 1967. Both Greece and Turkey announced that they would abide by the appeal of the U.N. Secretary-General, who called for the withdrawal of foreign troops illegally introduced into

Cyprus and the disbandment of paramilitary forces on the island (“Askerlerini çekmek üzere”, 1967).

Several factors played a role in ending the crisis. First of all, the United States put pressure on Greece, on behalf of Turkey, because the Greek Junta lacked the public support to resist Washington. At the same time, however, the increasing opposition to US in the Turkish public had a large influence. For example, some Turkish university students lay down on the airstrip of Esenboga airport and prevented the plane carrying Cyrus Vance from landing. Any harsh position the US could take against Turkey would badly damage its relations with Turkey. What is more, the USSR adopted a softer position than in 1964. All they cared about was the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, and in particular the non-alignment of this small but precious island. Hence, Turkey did not have to be afraid of a catastrophic Soviet reaction in the face of any Turkish aggression. In fact, the Soviets did not allow the events in the island to overshadow their relations with either the Turks or the Greeks, and these policies attracted the attention of the US:

Moscow is careful to ensure that the Cyprus issue does not disturb its relations with Greece or Turkey, but applauds Makarios for the discomfort the causes NATO. The Soviets have consistently supported Makarios at the UN, but have refused to contribute to the maintenance of the UN force on Cyprus (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, September 24, p.1).

It can, without any doubt, be argued that Demirel refrained from increasing tensions that could lead to military intervention during the 1967 crisis. And he had valid grounds for the way he acted. Firstly, Demirel was in favor of resolving the problem through negotiations. He was very aware of the fact that a landing on Cyprus or a military offensive on the Thracian border would require high military spending, which would strike a blow to the Turkish economy. Demirel, with his focus on the economic development of the country, did not want this. Moreover, Demirel realized

that the army lacked the capability to maintain a long-lasting war, especially without the support of the United States. At this point, the American opinion was not that different. According to American intelligence reports:

Turkey has improved its amphibious capability significantly since the 1964 crisis, but even though it might be able to land a sizeable force (elements, and perhaps all of the 39th Division, minus some heavy equipment within a few days) it would experience difficulties in maintaining this size force on Cyprus for an extended period, even if Greek action against its supply lines were ineffective (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964, September 24, p.2).

Following the emergence of the November crisis, Prime Minister Demirel (as cited in Birand, 1999), evaluating a possible Turkish-Greek war with the commanders, expressed the reason for not carrying out a military operation:

Turkey had only 6 helicopters and 157 parachutes. There were 2 layter-branded vessels. However, we had been beforehand told that at least 48 tanks were required to be successful here. Let me tell you frankly, nobody had given a chance for a landing. They had thought like this issue could be solved without a landing.

As a result, the likelihood of failure in an overseas operation against Cyprus was high. Indeed, the discussion that Demirel initiated with his question to the commanders (of whether they were ready or not) while the politicians were taking the political decision on November 15, revealed starkly that a military option could not be easily enacted (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.150). Despite private and official efforts to build a landing force in the previous three years, the armed forces in 1967 still lacked the necessary equipment to land troops and armored vehicles in Cyprus (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.150). Demirel would play a big role in solving this problem. After the crisis, the premier (as cited in Birand, 1999) met with the commanders and asked, “What do you want?” From that day on, the military shortage was started to be reduced. As an example, *Cumhuriyet* started a fund-raising campaign to strengthen the Turkish navy (“Cumhuriyet’in Büyük”, 1965). Within days the Government joined in the activity and announced on 4 May 1965 the establishment of the Donanma Cemiyeti, or the

Navy Association, which would organize the official fund-raising efforts. Demirel, then Deputy Premier, stated that Turkey would invest 450 million Turkish liras in the manufacturing of landing craft (“Hükümet Teşebbüsümüzü”, 1965). All of these efforts would be factors that facilitated and strengthened the Turkish position in the 1974 phase.

The changing course of relations with the US, which started in 1964, continued to influence Turkish policies in the following years. By Turkey's request, bilateral agreements between the two countries were revised and gathered under the roof of the Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1969. Moreover, Turkey began to approach the new military structures within NATO, set up under the leadership of the United States, cautiously. Turkey's non-participation in the Multilateral Force (MLF) is a concrete example of this. However, it is important to keep in mind that it was not only the US's loss of credibility in Turkey but also an offer made by the Russians, who embraced the concept of rapprochement with the Turks as much as the Turks did, that Turks did not immediately decline:

The Russians have suggested to him [Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin] that we [Turkey] should not enter it. In Moscow, they said they would accept the federation formula in Cyprus if we did not enter (Erim, 1975, p.442).

Following the Johnson letter, only slight changes occurred in the amount of US military aid to Turkey. However, the US strongly suggested to Turkey which fields the aid should be used in. In 1966, the US recommended Turkey to use the aid it received for the modernization of land forces. The air and maritime security of NATO's southern flank was guaranteed by the US air force deployed in Turkey and by the 6th fleet ready to move at any time in the Mediterranean (Oran, 2015, p.701). However, this US recommendation might have been architected to obviate a future Turkish landing on Cyprus. The Turkish Government and the Chief of Staff thought

the proposal was unacceptable. Thus, the commander of the naval forces went to Washington in September 1966 to discuss the modernization of naval forces. The US was forced to give up in the face of Turkey's reaction its proposal. In fact, in 1969 it even agreed to sell 5 destroyers to Turkey. This was followed by the decision to sell a new submarine to Turkey in October 1970.

Turkey, which went through a great shock in 1964, encountered a softer US position in 1967. The 1967 events were far from being a crisis in terms of Turkey's relations with the superpowers. Managing to draw lessons from the former crisis, in 1967 President Johnson avoided publicly humiliating the Turkish Government in the eyes of its people. Instead, Johnson sent Cyrus Vance to deal with the problem. Some regarded Vance as a 'living Johnson Letter' (Hart, 1990, p. 69). His mediation effort, nevertheless, succeeded in preventing a possible war between Greece and Turkey without bringing about results similar to those of the Johnson Letter (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.150). The US-mediated settlement between Greece and Turkey did not contain a long-lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, but its terms favored Turkey. Thus, Turks did not accuse the US Administration of being pro-Greek, as they had in 1964.

Furthermore, the very potential Soviet opposition to a Turkish military operation in Cyprus was not apparent this time. In 1967, Soviet leaders carefully avoided criticizing Turkey's preparations for a landing. There were reports that the U.S.S.R. even consented to Turkey's use of force in Cyprus (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.150). Whether these reports were correct or not, it is fair to assume that Demirel had less reason than Inonu to be concerned about a hostile Soviet reaction. Turkey also was less isolated internationally than it had been three years earlier. Apart from the Soviet Union, Turkey had made efforts, as mentioned earlier, to develop its relations with

the Third World countries. Even though Turkey's Cyprus policy still found few supporters among these countries, the hostility towards Turkey upon the Cyprus issue was not as pronounced as in 1964. Egypt, which in 1964 had threatened to aid Makarios, for instance, remained silent in November 1967. Hence, Demirel also had fewer reasons than Inonu to be concerned about a Third World reaction regarding an intervention.

By the end of 1967 the Turks had gained the withdrawal from Cyprus of the Greek regular forces, but they still had to try to bring about the disarmament and disbandment of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, and the substitution of adequate security arrangements to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot community. Hence, the danger of confrontation between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot administration over the still unresolved issues remained at the close of the year. But still, after the 1967 events, Turkish and Greek relations became relatively calm. Neither government wanted the Cyprus problem to further damage their relationship and exhaust their energy. To this end, the mainland Turks and Greeks encouraged their younger brothers in the island for managing to live together in silence, if not in peace. The CIA described the Turkish and Greek attitudes towards one another as well as their own communities on the island as follows:

To prevent any misunderstanding over Cyprus, there is now a "hotline" between Athens and Ankara and foreign ministers of the two countries meet periodically. Efforts are being made to separate problems Greece has with its Turkish minority and Turkey with its Greeks from the Cypriot communal problem. Both nations have urged their respective communities on the island to resolve their differences and return to some degree of harmony (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, September 24, p.4).

However, this silence was a kind of calm before the storm. To the CIA, the situation in Cyprus was not much changed and maintained its fragility. It recognized potential danger lying on the island. It knew that the basis for peace was yet to come and that a

violent eruption is possible at any time (Central Intelligence Agency, June 16, p.8). Despite the relaxation of tensions in Cyprus after 1967, the de facto division of the island continued to risk a hot conflict at any time. Makarios' lifting of the blockade around Turkish enclaves and the commencement of intercommunal negotiations suggested that normalcy was returning to the island. Makarios continued, however, stressing his allegiance to the goal of enosis. On March 14, 1971, he (as cited in Stavrinides, 1976) stated:

Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of her history, and will remain Greek; Greek and undivided we have taken her over; Greek and undivided we shall preserve her; Greek and undivided we shall deliver her to Greece...
(p.71-72)

In the meantime, the tension was rising in the Middle East. In the wake of the Six-day war between Israel and the Arabs in 1967, the region started to be considered as an unstable region in a world dominated by two blocs. This situation ultimately limited the free movement of the Sixth Fleet. Even its visits to the Turkish ports caused serious demonstrations and crises. However, the activity of the USSR increased in the region as of 1967. The Soviets enjoyed access to the Syrian ports, and had similar arrangements with Egypt, Iraq and South Yemen. Gaddafi came to power in Libya (Oran, 2015, p.739). All these developments increased the importance of Turkey and Greece in the eyes of the Americans. However, the disputes between the two NATO countries over Cyprus weakened the southeast flank of the Organization.

Besides, US-Turkey relations, which had been shaped by the Cyprus issue since 1964, encountered a new challenge following the 1967 crisis. That was the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey and the American reaction to it. American pressures, which caused the Erim Administration to ban poppy cultivation in 1971,

contributed to anti-American sentiment and a decrease in American prestige in Turkey (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.173). The ban remained active until the Republican People's Party(CHP)-National Salvation Party (MSP) Coalition Government led by CHP Chairman Ecevit revoked it on July 1, 1974 (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.174).

Turkey drew a lesson from the 1967 crisis. It lacked enough power to land on the island. That is why it had launched a process of completing the required military preparations for any conflict in the future. The aim was to eliminate lack of knowledge and material for a landing, in case any crisis burst out in the future. In his term, Demirel kept on emphasizing the significance of a “multi-faceted” foreign policy. Correspondingly, Turkey participated in the first Islamic Summit Conference held in Rabat, Morocco in 1969, as well as joining other Islamic states in condemning Israel's occupation of Jerusalem and other Palestinian territories in the June 1967 war. These developments had parallels with the main Turkish goal of finding companions in the international arena for the Cyprus issue.

Meanwhile, on March 12, 1971, a memorandum given by the soldiers to the government brought about Demirel's resignation, causing an interim regime that would last for 2,5 years. However, this regime continued paying attention to the Cyprus issue. Reacting against the incidents on the island, Turkey went on meeting and having discussions with its western neighbor. In these talks, it argued that the solution lay behind the resignation of the Greek Cypriot leader. That is why it insisted that “Makarios should go” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1972, February 10, p.3).

Normalization in Turkish political life came with the October 1973 elections. The CHP-MSP coalition adopted new approaches to the Cyprus policy of Turkey. Bülent

Ecevit, the new Premier, both backed up the federation thesis in the island and had the support of anti-imperialist and anti-US circles (Oran, 2015, p.740). At the same time, Ecevit, who had replaced Inonu as RPP chairman in May 1972, believed that Turkey could afford to adopt an assertive foreign policy. In contrast to Inonu's policies of caution vis-a-vis the superpowers, Ecevit (1975) maintained in 1972 that:

...small and weak states can successfully challenge the strongest states. The Turkish nation [proved this in 1920s] ... when it had lost all of its economic power, and when its state apparatus was in shambles, and its territories were partitioned. Especially in today's conditions [smaller states] stand more favorable chances. Because ... under certain conditions superpowers realize that their extraordinary powers prove to be a liability for them... Turkey could continue its alliance relations with stronger states without losing its freedom of action ... if it kept the conditions of our age in perspective ... (p.18)

Ecevit's argument that smaller allies did not need to submit, in foreign policy, to the US' will, reflected the widely shared belief within the RPP, and to a lesser extent in Turkey proper, that more equality should exist in US-Turkey relations. Necmettin Erbakan's MSP had also adopted anti-imperialist and anti-US stance. Thus, in 1974 Turkey was ready for an intervention, not only physically, but also mentally. For, the military preparation commenced by Demirel in 1967 was to yield its results in 1974 and the leaders of the coalition government were determined to follow more aggressive policies than in the past. In fact, about 10 years ago Prime Minister Ecevit penned an article on the US' policy toward the Cyprus issue and listed the main pillars of that policy as follows:

Cyprus should not remain independent. If it remained independent, it could become a communist base in the Mediterranean. It should not be divided because a partition would ... only worsen the crisis. Turkey should refrain from [intervening in the island] because this would lead to a Greco-Turkish war and to the dismemberment of NATO (Ecevit, 1965, p.1).

Hence, Ecevit had analyzed the unchanging priorities of the US on Cyprus almost a decade ago, which would allow him to form his own principles and plan of action in the upcoming crisis.

3.3. July 1974: The Point of No Return

On Monday July 15, 1974, the ruling military junta in Greece staged a bloody coup in Cyprus with the collaboration of its supporters with the aim of achieving immediate enosis. Makarios, whose aim was to achieve Enosis in the long term, was overthrown. The putschists proclaimed the establishment of “The Hellenic Republic of Cyprus” and installed Nicos Sampson, who was responsible for murders of many British and Turkish Cypriots in the 50s and 60s, as their president. The establishment of the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus and Sampson’s announcement as the new leader of the island caused worry among the Turkish Cypriots and in Turkey. In the meantime, Turkish newspapers reported that Makarios’ fate was uncertain: it was not known whether he was alive or not (“Kıbrıs’ta darbe”, 1974). However, it was later understood that, with the help of Britain, Makarios first escaped to Malta and then to London (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 16, p.3).

On July 15, 1974, while the coup against Makarios was being organized in Cyprus, Prime Minister Ecevit was on his way to Afyon, a province in western Turkey, to explain his decision to lift the ban on opium poppies despite the pressure of Washington. That same day, Ecevit returned to Ankara and attended an emergency session of the National Security Council. During the meeting Finance Minister Deniz Baykal, in a speech that closely adhered to Ecevit's world view, suggested that a military intervention in Cyprus had become inevitable. Baykal (as cited in Birand, 1976) said:

... Détente that showed up as a result of the balance of nuclear weapons has also changed reactions (of the superpowers) to international crises. Henceforth, it is the period of stopping the crises instead of direct intervention, and of calming the region's crises instead of looking for which party is right or not. Therefore, the country that starts the crisis is always in an advantageous position. There are many examples of this. The Greek Cypriots have always taken steps further through this policy. The coup in Cyprus is also a very new example of this. There are two ways. Those are either to tolerate the crisis, in other words the fait accompli, and to content ourselves by both giving harsh statements and resorting to diplomatic ways thereafter (which has never seemed to yield any results), or to answer the crisis by another crisis (p.21).

Concluding his speech, Baykal stated that the crucial feature of the coup was not that Sampson came to power but that Greece had become Turkey's southern neighbor. The final statement made by the National Security Council was that it was "a Greek intervention. The constitutional order in the island has collapsed, an illegitimate military government has been established. Turkey regards this as a violation of the agreements and guarantees" (Sarıca et al., 1975, p.180). The Prime Minister commanded the Turkish Armed Forces to make necessary preparations for a military intervention in Cyprus.

The coup in Cyprus became the focus of the world public opinion. The European countries, especially the United Kingdom, admitted that the constitutional order had collapsed and condemned the Greek government. The only attitude that differed came from the United States. While Washington acknowledged that the constitutional order collapsed and the status quo was destroyed, it at first refrained from condemning the Greek government and from announcing that it would not recognize the Sampson government. It seemed that the US had something different in mind. After all, Makarios, who was troublesome if not communist, was eliminated, and Turkey would also be happy about this. Thus, instead of pressuring Greece to bring the status quo back, Turkey could be persuaded about the advantage of the current situation:

Best hope we see of avoiding war is not to try to persuade Greek Junta to undo what it has done, but rather to encourage Turkey to come to believe that its interests are better served by dealing with a weak and compliant Sampson regime than by going to war to restore a constitutional order which includes restoration of their arch-enemy Makarios (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 16).

The US goal in the long-run was “to avoid intra-Greek civil war on island with likelihood that USSR would become increasingly involved in support of left” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 16). However, the Soviet and Third world reaction to the coup was tenser than expected. They clearly blamed Greece (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 17). Bulgaria and Yugoslavia moved troops to their borders with Greece. A Soviet fleet was observed in Cypriot waters. The Turks readied their navy and let some of it sail offshore (O’Malley & Craig, 2009, p.174). Turkey appeared to be in a righteous position, and the world public opinion turned against Greece and the Sampson government it backed up.

Having replaced Inonu as party chairman in May 1972, Ecevit believed that Turkey could afford to adopt an aggressive, contrary to Inonu’s circumspect, foreign policy in the face of the superpowers. There was no question of Turkey abandoning its alliances, such as NATO and CENTO, but within those alliances Turkey would pursue a policy designed to serve its national interests (Ecevit, 1975, p.18). That Turkey was militarily stronger than in the past played a substantial part in prompting Ecevit’s remarks. Turkey was ready this time to meet the challenge. Whereas it had only 6 helicopters, 2 landing craft and 150 parachutes in 1967, in 1974 it had 100 landing craft, built at Turkish ship yards, and 15,000 parachutes. Turkey had also bought 100 helicopters from France and Italy (Arcayürek, 1985, p.283). What is more, the detente period of the Cold War was among the determining factors in the attitude adopted by Turkey in the 1974 crisis. Regarding NATO, Ecevit said that Turkey saw it not only as a collective defense body, but also as a constructive

element for détente (Cem, 1974, p.64). He simply indicated that Turkey preferred detente as a part of NATO to counting upon the organization totally.

As a result of détente, the superpowers changed the way they reacted to the regional crises. Rather than interfering, they began to appease the parties. Hence, to take the initiative and create a *fait accompli* became more desirable. And Ecevit (as cited in Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013) regarded the coup in Cyprus as a *fait accompli* by the Greeks:

The most important aspect of today's coup is not the installation [to power] of Sampson, the murderer of Turks and British, but the inevitability that Greece would soon be our southern neighbor. Greece is about to take this last step. This should be prevented (p.130).

While the Turks were puzzling over the ways out, Kissinger was making efforts to eliminate the Soviet suspicion that NATO, and thereby the US, were behind the coup. He had two telephone conversations with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Kissinger struggled to appease the Ambassador and asked for coordinated actions with the Soviets. He let the Soviets know that the US was in favor of the status quo in Cyprus (Aslım, 2016, p.257-258). The 1974 Cyprus crisis showed up as a clear test of the detente for the superpowers. James Reston (1974, July 21), in his article entitled "Test of Détente", reported:

In the Moscow summit meeting of May, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to work together to reduce tension and prevent wars in critical areas of the world and they perfected a system of instantaneous communications for this purpose... Putting these principles together with the Nixon-Brezhnev summit agreement to cooperate for peace, however, will not be easy. Here are two members of the NATO alliance, which the Soviet Union has consistently tried to weaken, mobilizing for war, and Moscow is being asked to cooperate in stopping it... Presumably, Moscow would not like to see a full-scale Greek-Turkish war, but if instability in the eastern Mediterranean weakens NATO and hampers Washington's lines of Communication from Europe to the Middle East, no doubt there would be people around Leonid Brezhnev who would favor that prospect...

The Cyprus conflict had a great potential to serve the Soviet interests on and around the Island. The instability would first of all decrease the NATO threat in the Eastern Mediterranean and leave some room for the Soviets to move around. The Americans, however, were making efforts to get the situation under the control. They thought the US had to “keep ... the Soviets out of this (the Cyprus problem)” and see how the internal situation on Cyprus would evolve (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 16, p.8).

Ecevit, who was then in Ankara, invited Turkish political leaders to the Prime Ministry to gauge the attitude of the opposition and receive their opinion on the morning of 16th of July. Nihat Erim, present in the meeting and quite experienced in the Cyprus issue, said his feeling was that even though it was not certain yet, the US could have performed the coup backstage and that Washington liked Sampson. He (as cited in Birand, 1976) also warned the government: “The attitudes of the Soviet Union and the US need to be determined” (p.32-34). Erim's skepticism and prudence were, without any doubt, due to his close familiarity with the issue. In 1964, Erim was with İnönü when the latter stood with folded arms in the face of Soviet and American opposition.

Faced with a crisis, Ecevit immediately went to London, capital of one of the guarantor states, with a view to fulfilling the requirements of the Treaty of Guarantee and using diplomatic means before making any military actions. Meeting there with Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Minister James Callaghan on July 17, 1974, Ecevit could not come to terms with the British. Wilson rejected Ecevit's offer of joint military intervention by suggesting that peaceful alternatives had not been exhausted (“Ordu Hazır”, 1975). The then British Secretary of State Lord

Callaghan (as cited in Birand, 1999) expresses different reasons for the British refusal:

It was a good offer for Ecevit, it was reasonable, but it did not work for us. (In case we accepted it) We would both deteriorate our relations with Greek and Cypriot governments and be faced with the Russian propaganda that the imperialist West was colonizing Cyprus. We rejected the offer.

During the meeting Ecevit learned that Kissinger was sending Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco to join the Turco-British talks. Ecevit rejected the offer of trilateral talks by arguing that the US was not a guarantor power. He suggested, however, that he was ready to meet separately with Sisco to discuss the crisis. Ecevit later acknowledged that he refused a trilateral meeting because he did not want the Soviets to think that a NATO-plan was being hatched (“Ordu Hazır”, 1975). And yet, on 18 July, Ecevit agreed to delay his return to Ankara so that he could consult with Sisco, but would only do so privately at the Turkish Embassy. When Wilson pressed Ecevit to say whether Turkey would take military action, all Ecevit would say was that the Turks would do all they could to 'restore the equilibrium' on the island, and that they would safeguard the security of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.175). American papers reported that the Turkish navy had moved into the waters between Turkey and Cyprus, that landing craft were being moved to Mersin and Iskenderun, that an armored division was making its way towards the ports from its base in Adana, and that around 90,000 troops were on the move (Middleton, 1974).

The goal of Ecevit's visit to London was to gain their cooperation in a probable military operation. However, the British rejection was not enough to dissuade Ecevit from taking military action. By Ecevit's return to Ankara on July 19, deprived of British support, military preparations had been completed. Failing to get a positive

result from Athens, Undersecretary of State Sisco met Ecevit in Ankara and asked for an extra 48 hours. In this period of time he was planning to bring an ultimate US formula that would satisfy the Turks. However, Ecevit did not accept it. He (as cited in Birand, 1976) said:

No, Mr. Sisco. It is too late... 10 years ago there was a meeting like this in the same room. Then you and we both made mistakes. Your mistake was to stop us by tying our hands. Our mistake, on the other hand, was to listen to you. History can recur, but there is no obligation to repeat the faults in history. We will not repeat the same mistake that occurred 10 years ago. We will not listen to you. I hope you won't repeat your mistake you had made 10 years ago (p.64).

On July 20, 1974, the international community learned from Ecevit's statement of the planned Turkish military landing on the island. The Prime Minister claimed that Turkish troops went to the island not for war but for peace and that peace was to be provided not only for Turks but for Greeks too (Birand, 1976, p.70).

After the first sign of military intervention, the Americans and the Soviets rushed warships into the area. Henry Kissinger hastily contacted Moscow to ward off a superpower conflict. He announced that neither power would intervene militarily in the Cyprus dispute, and neither Greece nor Turkey would get fresh American arms (Binder, 1974).

A major factor that contributed to Ecevit's assertiveness was the Soviet acquiescence to, if not support of, a military intervention. After the establishment of the military regime in Athens, the Soviets had felt that the threat to their interests in Cyprus came more from Greece than Turkey (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013, p.131). The Soviet leaders knew that the Sampson coup would not only eliminate the Cypriot non-alignment, but pursue enosis, which would bring Cyprus under the firm control of Greece, and thus, NATO. For the Soviets, as Brovne (1974, July 18) puts it, "the conspiracy in Cyprus was staged by the Greek officers stationed there, who were

directed by the Greek Government and who follow(ed) orders from Athens” and certain NATO circles backed that up (*Podgorny Sees Cyprus Coup*, n.d.).

Meanwhile, the Soviets were informed that the Turks were preparing for a military intervention. The then Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Gromyko, took the news from his adviser Albert Chernyshev. Chernyshev (as cited in Birand, 1999) explained Gromyko's reaction when he received the news as follows:

Gromyko was a magnificent statesman and as he had been the foreign ministry for a long time, he did not get excited. He listened to what I told, and the first question he asked was how we should react. For us, Turkey's intervention was not an unexpected event. We had monitored your troops gathered in a specific region. A reaction we would give was supposed to be in such a way to prevent the situation from worsening. What was important for us was the integrity, independence and the non-alignment of the island. We had never considered to give a military reaction.

Even though the Soviets did not have a military plan, the Turks could not be sure about their intentions. Hence, they wanted to convince the Soviets of the necessity of a Turkish intervention. Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş undertook the responsibility by explaining to Grubyakov in detail the reasons of the intervention on July 20.

Güneş (as cited in Birand, 1976) tried to comfort the Soviets about the possibility of a Turkish intervention and pointed out that the operation would also serve the Soviet interests:

Your Excellency, you (the Soviet Union) and the United States wish Cyprus to enter into your own spheres of influence. If you cannot achieve this, you would struggle not to let it move towards the other. Your government attaches importance to Makarios and AKEL... Makarios is mortal. One day he will disappear. As for AKEL, it will survive; nevertheless, it will constitute the minority in case a referendum on enosis is held. What would you do if the majority of the Greek Cypriots decides to unite with Greece? would you send troops? No. Therefore, you would not be able to prevent the island from entering US' sphere of influence. Turkey that assumes responsibility for the security of the Turkish Cypriots is the only power that can categorically intercept enosis. This can be avoided as long as the Turkish society is there and there exists a Turkish existence on the island (p.72).

Both Güneş and Ecevit managed to carefully exploit the Soviet opposition to enosis. They stressed that Turkey “did not intend to annex or partition Cyprus and ... will respect not only the independence of the [island], but also its nonalignment” (Ecevit, 1976, p.97). They relieved the Soviets who were worried about Cyprus’ being brought under NATO control. The Soviet reaction to the Turkish military operation was much less tough than one might have expected considering the events of 1964. There is no doubt that the close ties they had developed in the last decade had a great impact on the Soviet approach to Turkey and the Cyprus Issue in 1974. Economic considerations, for instance, played a substantial part. From the early seventies onwards, Turkey had been receiving the equivalent of over a billion dollars annually (Stergiou, 2007, p.99).

Throughout the week following the July 15, 1974 coup, Turco-Soviet dialogue continued. The Soviets consistently indicated that they were ready to accept limited Turkish action provided that Cyprus' international status was preserved (Birand, 1976, p.140). They made no significant comment on the Turkish intervention of Cyprus beyond the official government statement on July 20, which denied that all Soviet forces had been put on alert (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 21).

The United States remained silent on the coup led by the Greek Junta against Makarios, and was also reluctant to react harshly to the Turkish operation. At this point, it ought to be pointed out that the US government had to pay attention to its internal affairs, namely, the Watergate scandal. The main US concern regarding possible consequences of any Turkish aggressiveness was the possibility of a Turco-Greek war breaking out. In such a case, the US might receive a severe blow and lose both of its NATO allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the words of Drew Middleton (1974), New York Times correspondent:

A prolonged confrontation or a war between the two member nations would push NATO's main sea frontier 1,000 miles westward to Malta... The immediate consequence would be that the United States Sixth Fleet could not operate with its present freedom in the Eastern Mediterranean. It would lose its naval port facilities in Greece, and the Air Force would be denied use of its present repair and maintenance base in Turkey... Because of the potentially explosive situation in the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean is one of the world's most strategically important sea areas, and anything that reduces American or NATO strength there would shift the balance of power (p.9).

Hence, the US was doing its best to stop a potential confusion. To minimize the possibility of a war, Kissinger sent Sisco to Athens. He was to persuade the Greek colonels that Turkey was stronger than them and that to attack would have catastrophic consequences for Greece. There is no doubt that this aimed to hinder the fall of the southeast flank of NATO by a Turco-Greek war, not only to protect the Greeks from the Turks. Sisco, who could not prevent the Turks from landing on the island, succeeded in his second mission and the biggest American worry would be eliminated.

The American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was reluctant to antagonize Turkey, an ally with a major strategic importance for the USA. He adopted a “wait and see” approach and throughout the crisis remained strongly opposed to a military action intended to avert the Turkish intervention. By giving the green light to Turkey to handle Cyprus in its own way Kissinger hoped to restore the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and to appease the Turks (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013, p.131). According to Joseph Sisco, Turkey's reaction to the coup was just and understandable. At the same time, however, there was the possibility of the Turks engaging in a conflict with Greece, which bothered the US government. This was because a clash of the two allies would help Moscow gain the upper hand in the Mediterranean (Birand, 1999).

Upon the Turkish military landing on the island on July 20, the UN Security Council convened and adopted the Resolution 353. The resolution which calls upon all states to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, called upon all parties to the present fighting to accept a ceasefire and requested all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation. It also demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the republic of Cyprus. For the UN, the Guarantor Powers had to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace in the area without delay (*UNHCR*, n.d.).

Not opposing harshly to the Turkish military operation in the first place, Kissinger frequently spoke with Ecevit via telephone to ensure a ceasefire from the very first day (Birand, 1976, p.132). During the first day of the intervention, Ecevit told Kissinger that Turkey would accept a ceasefire as soon as it captured a viable bridgehead in northern Cyprus, but it needed some time to accomplish this (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.199). For the same reason, Foreign Minister Gunes refused Sisco's cease-fire offer on 21 July 1974 (Birand, 1976, p.171). During the night of July 21, 1974, the Chief of the General Staff told Ecevit that by the evening of July 22, Turkey would be in a position to accept a cease-fire (“Atina kendi”, 1975). On July 22, Ecevit accepted the ceasefire.

Kissinger comprehended Turkey's insistence for ensuring the safety of its troops on the island, and even said, in order to convince the Turks of the ceasefire, that they could keep on sending reinforcements to the island after the announcement of the ceasefire. Kissinger's positive attitude was not to be ignored by the Turks. Indeed, Turkey planned its military operation in two phases. It was a technical necessity for the Turks to wait and reinforce its troops in between. Both to follow the plan and to

comply with the UN's call for a ceasefire, Turkey took a pause (Birand, 1976, p.140). It had achieved most of its targets for the first operation. So, it ordered its troops to stay inactive and focused on expanding the area it already controlled through political and diplomatic means. In the wake of its positive response to the ceasefire call on July 22, Turkey decided to participate in the Geneva Conference. And the US was able to breathe again, for a short while.

The first landing, which took place on July 20-22, was not militarily a failure for the Turks. However, there were still problems for the Turkish military. The Turkish military was stuck in a narrow space, and its operational capability was extremely limited. In American eyes, 'the Turkish failure to render their corridor to Nicosia enclave means that they lack the easily defensible core area they would need to establish partition' (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 22, p.4). That is exactly why the Turks would resume the offensive on the island.

The United Kingdom had a more severe reaction to the Turkish operation compared to the USSR and the US. The British believed that the Turks would act again if the Geneva Conference failed, and were trying to take measures against this scenario. The most effective strategy at this point would be to surround the Turkish soldiers in the island. According to Callaghan, if peace forces containing US soldiers were to surround the Turks it would be a very effective warning to the Turks. Besides, the Americans had an aircraft carrier nearby. Even if the Turks did not care about the British, they might give up on their new operation when they saw the Americans. But the British could not persuade the Americans. To Sisco, the reason is clear:

It was not even a matter of discussion for the US to engage in military action against Turkey. Moreover, the Greek army was in turmoil. It could neither reorganize a coup nor attack Turkey. We saw more clearly in the first offensive

that they would not be able to attack Turkey. That is to say, a second operation by Turkey would not lead to a very big problem (Birand, 1999).

Ecevit, who agreed to the ceasefire, had thought over a crazy Greek reaction to the Turkish operation, such as declaring war on Turkey, until the very last minute.

Although he knew Greece did not have the strength to do it, he still anxiously waited for news to come from the Greeks (Birand, 1976, p.144). However, the news from Greece was unexpected. The junta could not resist the recent developments and had fallen apart. Karamanlis had been invited to rule the country by democratic means. Therefore, the talks in Geneva were postponed to July 25 to allow Karamanlis enough time to form the government (Birand, 1976, p.147).

Turkey went to Geneva as its troops got stuck in a small area and had almost no room to maneuver. Even though the physical conditions were not favorable for the Turks, their presence on the island could be used as a trump card in the talks. Moreover, Greece was left alone in the international arena because it was perceived to have conducted itself unfairly. This could be an opportunity for the US to find a solution. The Americans thought:

If the Turks are wise in the exploitation of their huge military advantage there is no reason to suppose that the United States, awakening at last to its responsibility, will not be able to bring Athens to heel (Cyprus realities of settlement, n.d.).

On July 25, the Geneva Conference finally commenced. Ecevit was confronted with a choice. He could either expand the territory controlled by his troops or achieve his targets on the conference table (Birand, 1976, p.162). The biggest issue for Ecevit was the creation of a cordon sanitaire for the Turkish troops and society on the island. If this was achieved, then he could sit at the table for longer. The main purpose of not leaving the table was to agree on a solution while Turkey's position was strong. However, Greece didn't think in the same way because Karamanlis, who

had just formed the government, was trying to grasp the issue and its details, and his main aim was to stop the march of the Turks not an ultimate solution. For the Greeks, the main pillars of the problem could be later discussed at length (Birand, 1976, p.162).

At the same time, ceasefire violations and Turkish military progress led to the emergence of different voices in Geneva. Overall, the atmosphere was slowly starting to turn against Turkey. The intervention was made and the international community appreciated it. But now, especially when the parties were in Geneva to discuss, any offensive action would not be so tolerated. The Swiss radio on July 26, interpreted Turkey's mobility on the island as follows:

Turkey is pushing Karamanlis who is in an extremely difficult situation to the corner ... The expansion of the Turkish-controlled area would be to challenge the world public opinion... that the Greeks are manipulated in this way would result in the return of dictatorship... " (Birand, 1976, p.170).

On July 30, the First Geneva Conference was over, and the parties were returning home to assess the situation. Although an agreement was reached following the first conference, the atmosphere was getting increasingly tense with each passing day towards the Second Geneva conference. Greece was hardening its stance, and Turkey was calculating what to do in case the conference fails to bring about any concrete consequence. The Turkish army was poised for battle in the island. Turkey proposed either a single large piece of land or five different pieces of land, one of which was to be relatively larger than the rest, for the Turkish society in the conference held from August 8 to 14. This would take up 34 percent of the island's territory, including the Turkish sector of Famagusta and Nicosia. Otherwise the talks would be terminated (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.213). However, no positive answer was received from

the Greeks. Thereupon, Turkey launched the second operation on August 14 (Oran, 2015, p.748).

A factor which led Ecevit to conclude that the second offensive would be a low-risk operation was the continued Soviet silence concerning Turkish demands. Ecevit was encouraged by the fact that despite several Greek Cypriot appeals for military assistance, the Soviets had refused to even give a response (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p.210). The last Greek Cypriot appeal came on August 9, 1974 when Clerides told the Soviet observer at the Geneva Conference, Victor Menin, that the Greek Cypriots would welcome Soviet military assistance if Turkey resumed its offensive. Menin promised to inform his superiors in Moscow, but the Soviets once again failed to respond (Polyviou, 1976, p.327).

The Soviet support can be seen in the official Soviet announcements concerning the events in Cyprus. Even after the second Turkish operation (August 14, 1974), the U.S.S.R. continued to blame the Greek junta, NATO and the US for what had happened in Cyprus. The international conjuncture appeared amenable for Turkey to begin the second operation. Geopolitically, Turkey's sense of security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and other regional states enabled the Ecevit Government to ignore the usual American intimidations claiming that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would provoke a hostile Soviet reaction. As Ecevit expected, the U.S.S.R. did not oppose Turkey's Cyprus landing, and even continued its silence after the first 220 offensive, thus fostering Ecevit's conviction that a second offensive would also be a low-risk venture (Bölükbaşı, 1988, p. 219).

This very conviction led Ecevit to start the second operation on August 14. It lasted for two days and the Turkish Armed Forces reached the target named as the Attila

Line on August 16. Turkey declared a ceasefire and halted its military actions within the new boundaries, which would remain unchanged to the present day. The second Cyprus Operation was carried out more carefully in terms of the military, and the goal was achieved. Nevertheless, reactions in the international public opinion were much stronger than with the first operation. While the first operation was found just and legitimate as a response to the coup by the Greek Junta towards Makarios and its efforts to realize enosis, the second was considered an occupation. The island was de facto divided into two as a result of the operation, and the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus announced in 1960 was destroyed. Even though Turkey based its operation on the Treaty of Guarantee, those who blamed Turkey for its determined military actions also referred to the given Treaty. Article 4 of the Treaty states that "...each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs..." (*Treaty of Guarantee*, n.d.). According to them, Turkey created a new order and did not re-establish the state of affairs (Oran, 2015, p.748). The international community now regarded Greece as a democratic state, stood by the Karamanlis Government and blamed Turkey for its offensive military action.

Turkey, on the other hand, responded these complaints by saying that the parties had signed the Geneva Declaration dated July 30, 1974 and thereby accepted Cyprus as an island with two communities and noted the existence, in practice, of a the Republic of Cyprus with two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community (*Text of Declaration on Cyprus*, n.d.). Thus, the current situation was not a result of a unilateral action, it argued.

Following the military inaction in both 1964 and 1967, in 1974 Turkey made a surprising move and landed on the island. In previous crises the Turkish governments

knew very well that the matter could be solved by a military action, or that at least the lives of the Turks in Cyprus could be secured in this way. However, military incompetence and regional/national conjuncture had tied the hands of Turkey, especially in the first crisis. The US did not take a stand to make the Turks happy in 1964 and, on the contrary, shocked them through the Johnson letter. This led to frustration in Turkey, and Turkish politicians decided on revising their foreign policy which before was basically confined to the US. This encouraged Turkey to go beyond the scope of NATO and improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World countries.

The November 1967 events are important in terms of showing that the Turkish foreign policy pursued for the last 3 years began to bear finally its fruit. The Soviet Union that did not hesitate to threaten Turkey with military action in case of a Turkish landing on the island in 1964, adopted a remarkable and comparatively much better attitude towards its southern neighbor, enabling Turkey to negotiate freely. The US also refrained from taking a tough stance towards Turkey in 1967. It realized that the American policy during the 1964 events had proven ill-advised and deeply offended Turkey, enough to let the Soviets win the NATO ally over. And this very awareness strengthened Turkey's hand in the negotiations. Even though the 1967 crisis came to an end for the good of Turkey, Turkey saw once again its military incompetence. Diplomacy, instead of a military action, was again compulsory. Therefore, the importance of the military to Turkey increased following the end of the crisis and military deficiencies began to be overcome.

As to 1974, Turkey, ready to land on the island in military terms, was far from feeling obliged to be limited by the diplomatic measures, and did not abstain from being militarily involved in the crisis. Of course, military competence was not the

only factor that brought about the Turkish military operation. Relations with the Soviets had been continuing at full steam, and an independent path had been followed in foreign policy, even though the alliance with the US had not been broken. At the same time, the “wait and see” policy of the then architect of US foreign policy Kissinger created a favorable atmosphere for a Turkish intervention. The Turkish balance policy between the US and the U.S.S.R. and the clear explanations of the reasons for intervening in the island to the parties undoubtedly strengthened the Turks' position. However, it should not be forgotten that all these developments took place under the détente umbrella. The relative decrease in tensions provided by détente was greatly felt in a number of matters such as Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union, its impact on the Third World countries, and the US attitude towards the changing Turkish foreign policy. The American and Soviet reluctance to encounter one another in relatively small issues provided Turkey with the conditions it wanted to make an effective military landing on Cyprus.

CHAPTER IV

GREEK DIPLOMACY AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

4.1. Origins and Course of the Crisis in 1964

In late 1963, the steps that Archbishop Makarios took to dismantle the Founding Treaties, and the ways in which Turkey subsequently reacted against the Greek Cypriot leader brought Cyprus to the epicenter of the Cold War. In November 1963, Makarios, the first president of Cyprus, proposed a constitutional revision (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.131). Clearly, the Greek Cypriot leader sought to consolidate his peoples' political strength. The ensuing conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities, during Christmas, resulted in more than three hundred casualties (Ball, 1983, p.338). Commenting on what the Turks referred to as the "Bloody Christmas," Glafcos Clerides (as cited in Birand, 1999), speaker of the Cypriot House of Representatives, said that "the biggest mistake the president and the vice-president made was not to talk to each other explicitly and in good faith... While the Turks abused their constitutional rights by constantly blocking motions, Makarios tried to revise the constitution in a too hastened fashion."

The previous chapter looked at Turkey's apprehension and grasps at straws in the face of growing tensions. This chapter is a probe into the Greek foreign policy

towards Cyprus, and builds upon a similar Cold War narrative as seen in the Turkish case. Focusing on Greek relations with the superpowers as well as Turkey, the chapter also examines the problematic relationship between Greek and Greek Cypriot leaderships which is to contribute very much to the emergence of the crises, especially to that of 1974. In that sense, Turkey was not the only state that watched the events with trepidation as the crisis quickly unfolded. When Turkish fighter jets were sighted above the island, Makarios swiftly urged Greece to send reinforcements. Nevertheless, Greek Foreign Minister Sophoklis Venizelos rejected this request. He even blamed the Greek Cypriot leader for acting irresponsibly and for putting Greece in an unwarranted situation (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.132). Although Venizelos towed a reasonable diplomatic line, Greece would soon face predicaments over Cyprus and its leader. Ultimately, this chapter is the story of Greece at a critical juncture, when the Cyprus problem and conflict with the Greek Cypriot leadership compelled Athens to make difficult choices.

As the inter-communal skirmish exacerbated on the island, alarm bells began to toll for Great Britain, who had hoped to jettison the island, thereby deterring the impending crisis by granting its independence. Growing tension on the island, now in this Turkish village then in another enclave, compelled them to act with an imperial responsibility towards its former colony and to reconcile two seemingly irreconcilable parties. At the time, a mediation conference amongst all conflicting states seemed like the only viable solution. The peace conference in London thus began on January 15, 1964. Meanwhile, the Turkish Navy initiated a new round of maneuvers on the Mediterranean, and Greece responded by amassing ships off the island Crete (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.94). In London, Clerides expressed the need for a new parliamentary system which would safeguard the minority rights of the

Turks. But, representing the Greek Cypriots, he also found the Turkish rights arising from the 1960 treaties to be quite far-fetched. In the end, negotiations ended in a deadlock as Greeks and Turks drifted apart without a consensus.

Meanwhile, Makarios repeatedly called for Soviet military involvement in the event of a Turkish intervention. This propelled the US government's anxiety, gradually creating an image of Cyprus in American eyes as "the Cuba of the Mediterranean" (Güney, 2004, p.30). Receiving Makarios' call for help, the Soviets were only too willing to proclaim their full support behind the sovereignty of Cyprus. For the Soviets, Cyprus was the pillar of non-alignment in eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and must remain as such in accordance with Soviet interests. The Americans were discernably very concerned and even frustrated by the rapprochement between Greek Cypriot leadership and the Bolsheviks. Seen from Washington D.C., Cold War neutrality, even with the approaching détente spirit, was not innocent. On the contrary, neutrality was nothing less than immorality in the struggle between absolute good against absolute evil, and was tantamount to immorality (Stergiou, 2007, p.93).

In fact, the US government was struggling to deal with Vietnam, Panama, Congo and Berlin at the same time, and, at least initially, did not want to get bogged down in the Cyprus dispute. As George Ball (1982) later put it, "we already had far too much on our plate" (p.340). And yet, İnönü's new strategy would change the US policy of non-intervention. On January 28, the Turkish Premier urged the US government to intervene and prevent further casualties. Otherwise, İnönü argued, the Turkish troops would be left with no other option. Greek policy makers, despite their acute awareness of the problematic military conjuncture, were prompted to respond to İnönü's innuendo by proclaiming that they would not hesitate to respond and

withstand any hostile Turkish undertaking. At this point, Greek leadership was more reactive and the rhetoric about willingness to engage in a standoff with Turkey was more in line with the purpose of deterring the Turks (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.128).

Desperate to prevent further escalation of hostilities between the island's two communities and between two NATO allies, the US and British governments came up with an idea of sending NATO troops to the island for the provision of stability. Yet, Makarios firmly rejected the idea, his refusal to accept NATO had more to do with his suspicions of an American fait accompli to partition the island. Instead, Makarios proposed a UN force to be stationed, which would cajole the Soviets and secure the Kremlin's support behind the Greek Cypriots against any schemes of partitioning. Through Soviet interference, its satellites could also be embroiled in the decisions over the fate of the island. Naturally, Moscow was not happy with a NATO-led solution. Clearly, the US was very much alive to Makarios's game and his pro-Soviet leanings. In fact, looking at US Under Secretary of State George W. Ball's telegram to President Lyndon Johnson on February 15, it would be fair to suggest that the Archbishop had already fallen from favor. According to US Undersecretary of State, Makarios would never take kindly to a peace-keeping force, especially before the Security Council deprived Turkey of the right to intervene. Ball (1982) informed Johnson that "the Greek Cypriots do not want a peace-keeping force; they just want to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots" (p.347).

Ball's telegram illustrates that the US government at this point decided that a peace-keeping force should be imposed without Greek Cypriot leadership's consent. Since, however, such a move would almost certainly attract the displeasure of Makarios and would be met with Soviet resistance, President Johnson instructed the demarche to be left to the UN (Ball, 1982, p. 348). In the meantime, Greece was shaken up by the

news of Foreign Minister Sophoklis Venizelos's death on December 24, 1963 ("Venizelos dead", 1964). He was succeeded by Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas under Georgios Papandreou, the leader of the Centre Union. What was perhaps more disturbing during this frantic diplomatic transition was the news of Turkish warships, which steamed towards the island. Fortunately, they were soon called back to their ports, preventing another heated encounter with the Greek navy (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.100). Despite recalling its ships, Turkey continued massing troops on the southern Anatolian seaboard. Turkey's message was such that it was ready to put into motion the necessary measures to secure the Turkish Cypriots based on contractual rights arising from the founding treaties.

In the face of growing instability and such threats to regional peace, the UN Security Council convened and passed the resolution that recommended the creation of a UN Peace-keeping Force on March 4, 1964 (*General Assembly Resolution 186*, n.d.). This was precisely what Makarios aimed at achieving. He proclaimed that Greek Cypriots would comply with the resolution. Another consequence of the February 1964 crisis was that Athens realized Turkey's geographical proximity to the island and the unfavorable consequences Greeks would face in case of a renewed Turkish military operation. Bearing in mind the fact that dispatching aid to Greek Cypriots would be rendered impossible because of its distance, Athens decided to send troops to the island to overcome this imbalance. Accordingly, in April, the Greek Government deployed 2000 troops in Cyprus. Another 6,000 were sent in June when the Turkish threat became imminent (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.129).

The UN Resolution of 4 March 1964 would be soon tested by the Turkish government. On March 12, 1964, İnönü levied accusations against the Greek Cypriots for preparing for a massacre, and informed concerned parties by a

diplomatic note that it would intervene unless a peace-keeping force was directly sent to the island and the Greek Cypriots took their hands off the Turks (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.103). Makarios sent a snappy response to Turkey's accusations as claimed that this was a closet strategy to interfere in Cypriot affairs. Any Turkish action towards Cyprus, he added, would worsen the situation in the island. Athens, on the other hand, warned the Turks to refrain from any military undertaking and affirmed that any aggression would be met with armed resistance by the mainland Greek troops (Historical Office Bureau, p.571). To make matters worse, Greek Cypriot troops started gathering around the Turkish-Cypriot quarter in Nicosia that evening. In the face of increasing tension on the island the UN peace-keeping force officially started their service at the end of March (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.104).

The UN Peacekeeping Force proved not to be as effective as anticipated. In early April, conflicts resumed and seven Turkish Cypriots and one Greek Cypriot died in a skirmish near Ghaziveran on the strategically important coastal road (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.105). Makarios asked Papandreou, the Greek Premier, for reinforcements for his National Guard, but tried to dissuade his old political rival, Grivas, from offering his services as its head. For, he knew how hard it would be to control the general. Still, Grivas had already made his mind. He would be back in the island as soon as the Turkish threat became imminent (Mayes, 2014, p.174).

Meanwhile, the US government pressed Greece to curb Makarios's excesses, and Johnson personally urged Papandreou to be cautious. In May, NATO announced that in a conflict between the two parties, it would remain neutral and cut off the aid to both countries (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.146). NATO was indubitably aware of the military capabilities of its own members and feared most a possible conflict between the parties. The threat to cut off aid was meant to discourage the NATO allies from

embarking on such an adventure. Turkey was in a position to exert more effective control given its proximity to the island, and the reason for having a problem with Greece over the island was mainly because of the explicit support by Greece to the Archbishop. Hence the US government urged Greece to adopt a more collaborative attitude and rein back on Makarios. The Americans substantiated their message by dispatching part of the Sixth fleet into Greek waters (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p. 106).

Nonetheless, this did not stop Makarios from implementing compulsory military service (Coulombis, 1983, p.62). Faced with increasing number of Greek troops, to Turkish eyes, this was the last straw. In the early hours of June 3, 1964, while US Secretary of State Dean Rusk was attending the funeral of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Acting Secretary of State George W. Ball (1982) received crucial information from the US Ambassador in Ankara, which demonstrated that “the Turkish Security Council had decided to invade Cyprus” (p.350). The US acted quickly and discouraged the Turks from a military operation through the famous Johnson Letter.

While impeding a possible Turkish intervention, the US did realize that more concrete steps were necessary to decrease the tension on the island. Otherwise, an open conflict was imminent, which could ignite a disastrous war between two NATO allies, seriously damaging the organization's prestige. Seen from Washington DC, Makarios had become a dangerous threat in already fragile Cold War atmosphere. His rapprochement with the communist world, and his failure to undermine support for AKEL meant that a truly independent Cyprus would now be a strategic liability to the West (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.109). The case against the Greek Cypriots hardened with the disappearance that same day of a British UN liaison officer in

Cyprus. Moreover, Papandreou and İnönü were invited to Washington DC for exploratory talks by the US President. At the White House, Johnson reiterated the American warning. He told the Greek Ambassador, Alexander Matsas, that “if I can't get you to talk, I can't keep the Turks from moving.” He added that Greece must avoid at all costs humiliating its NATO ally, Turkey. “Even in the Cuban missile crisis, we always left the enemy a way out. With an ally it is even more important,” he said (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.111). The elimination of Makarios was possible only by putting more pressure on him by Grivas and driving him into a corner. Grivas arrived in Cyprus on June 21 (Szulc, 1964). Ostensibly, his role was to put the said pressure on the Greek Cypriot leader. He was regarded as the only potential rival to Makarios who could command widespread support, and therefore weaken the Archbishop's leadership. Ball (1982), in his memoirs, revealed that the return of Grivas attracted the attention of the US. To Ball, “he might be easier to work with than Makarios” and thus “we established an underground contact with Socrates Iliades, who was Grivas's lieutenant and director of the defense of Cyprus” (p.357).

In the meantime, Papandreou and İnönü arrived in Washington. In his meeting with the Greek Premier, Johnson developed an attitude almost as harsh as in his letter to the Turks. He insinuated that NATO aid could be permanently withdrawn from Greece if they insisted on their current position, and that the United States might not defend Greece from the Turks in case of an open conflict. The Greek Premier responded that, Athens would then reconsider the value of being a NATO member, to which Johnson reacted strongly and said that maybe then Greece had better rethink the value of having a parliament that could not take the right decision (Hitchens, 2002, p.61). This was a stunning way for the US President to address the leader of an

allied country. However, an even harsher, and possibly more inappropriate language was yet to be used by Johnson, who told the Greek Ambassador, Alexander Matsas:

Fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good. . . If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution may not last very long (Wittner, 1982, p.303).

Johnson clearly outperformed himself, bearing in mind Turkey's frustration over what was clearly a much lighter discourse in his letter to İnönü. In the joint declaration issued after the meeting carried out in the shadow of a hard debate, it was accepted that a new solution to the problem was affirmed to be found. Greece, by this declaration, argued that the binding characteristics of the 1959 Treaties died out in contrast to the Turkish-American joint declaration (Firat, 2001, p.727). Following separate talks in Washington in June 1964, İnönü and Papandreu agreed to formal negotiations at Geneva. The talks were to be the first steps taken by the Americans to carve up the island between Greeks and Turks. The negotiations began on July 8, 1964 (Uslu, 2003, p.61). Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State, brought with him an American plan to split the island between Greece and Turkey. The plan was essentially a synthesis of enosis and partition. Most of Cyprus was to be united with Greece; in return, Turkey was to receive a sector in the north. In addition, there would be autonomous Turkish Cypriot cantons within the Greek area (Slengesol, 2000, p.99). The plan was built on the creeping separatism of the Turkish Cypriots, and reflected American military thinking. If the Cyprus Republic was dismantled, and the island split between Greece and Turkey, there would be no power to support the Soviets, and no more appeals would be done to the non-aligned countries. Furthermore, there was a crucial military advantage in this. By partitioning the island, Cyprus would be totally controlled by NATO countries, once more making

the whole island available for Western defense purposes, as it had been under British rule. Nevertheless, the initiative died with the Greek Cypriot and mainland Greek rejection of the plan because within the framework of a possible agreement the Turks would be given a base in the island with a small piece of land. However, Papandreou would concede only a NATO base, not a Turkish one, and opposed the Acheson plan.

The Soviet Union was naturally alarmed by NATO's active intervention in the Cyprus question, and by the lingering Turkish threat. Khrushchev also likened the situation to the Cuban crisis, and warned that the Soviet superpower was ready to back up liberation wars against colonizers and imperialists (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.115). He called on Britain and all other countries to pull their troops off the island and let the Cypriots sort out their own problems. He said that if Ankara attempted to move in, it could start a dangerous chain reaction and trigger a world war. Khrushchev's backing gave Makarios renewed hope for his quest to achieve self-determination through the UN. The Cypriots were not represented at the Geneva talks, but Makarios had made it known that he wanted a unitary state with government by a simple elected majority and communal rights protected by the constitution.

In the meantime, on August 6, another round of fighting took place in the north-west of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots struggled to capture the Turkish Cypriot coastline that was used to receive reinforcements from Turkey. Ball blamed the Archbishop for doing his best to aggravate the problem (Ball, 1982, p.357). Turkish jets flew over the island and bombarded Greek-Cypriot targets. Makarios found the solution in asking the Soviets for help. Khrushchev took sides with the Greek Cypriot leader and demanded the Turks to cease their aggressive stance towards

Cyprus at once (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.116). Makarios' appeal to the Soviet Union can be regarded as a success for various reasons. Primarily, the Soviet Union was strong enough to make the Turks step back. Indeed, the Soviets would not need to take military action to deter the Turks. The involvement of the Soviet Union in a NATO-weighted issue would definitely prompt US to give advice to the Turks, which could ultimately discourage them from going on an adventure. Furthermore, Makarios must have been au fait with the military weakness and incapability of the motherland Greece, mainly caused by the distance.

On August 9, diplomats from all involved parties to the conflict labored hard at the United Nations to ensure that an Anglo-American resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire was adopted in the Security Council. Nine voted in favor, none against. Communist Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union abstained (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.117). That day, the parties ultimately agreed on a UN cease-fire. Ball argues that Grivas's arrival on the island diminished Archbishop's power and therefore facilitated the end of the crisis (Ball, 1982, p.358). The Geneva talks were revitalized and in its second round, the US delegation led by Acheson brought forward a new set of offers that would have the ear of the Greeks. At the first round, for instance, the Greeks had opposed a sovereign Turkish area. Now, according to the new proposals, the Turks would not get such a territory. Instead, they would have the right to use it for a number of years, perhaps 50 (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.117). Turkey was naturally more favorably disposed to welcome the former set of proposals and refused to accept the latter. Greece, on the other hand, displayed its willingness to oppose the previous and comply with the second set of proposals. On August 18, Acheson telexed Ball that the talks did not seem promising and finding a solution to the problem in the ongoing talks would be very difficult (Ball, 1982, p.358). Acheson

was right in his prognosis. The talks came to an end with no solutions and the parties left the table with a relative silence for a few years on the island.

It is possible to argue that the 1964 crisis ended with success for the Greeks. In the aftermath of the 1964 crisis and the Lyndon Johnson letter that was credited with preventing a Turkish landing on Cyprus, Greek and Greek Cypriot political circles appear to have taken the position that enosis was obtainable (Hart, 1990, p.15-16). The US, by deterring a Turkish landing, demonstrated that they would do it again if necessary. Besides, in their eyes, the conflict between the communities rendered the 1960 Constitution unworkable. Thus, any *fait accompli* they would make could bring about a new status quo in the island. The 1964 crisis was also effective in terms of Greek and Greek Cypriot attitudes towards the superpowers. The West proved unwilling to please the Greek goals over Cyprus, which infuriated day by day the public opinion. In the spring of 1964, the Greeks organized demonstrations against the Cyprus policy of the US, more precisely the lack of American support for the Greek cause on the island. The Greek public's negative stance towards the US even uncovered concerns that Greece could disassociate herself from the West (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.156). On the other hand, pro-non-alignment and pro-Soviet demonstrations stood out in relief. Each passing day more and more people considered the US and NATO to put a reign on Greek national interests (Stefanidis, 2001, p.30).

4.2. Aftermath of the 1964 Crisis

The 1964 crisis was ultimately checked and, despite the absence of a sustainable solution, full-blown warfare was averted. The damage inflicted upon NATO's prestige seemed collateral, and Papandreou probably decided to live with the unusual expressions his ambassador in Washington received from Johnson. In the end, a

viable solution in Cyprus would also comfort Greece's apprehension. The real problem was Makarios, who had developed closer relations with the Soviets, securing their support, which greatly disturbed the NATO command. Heartened by the role of a non-aligned leader, Makarios was convinced to maintain the Soviet connection and Greece seemed far from able to convince the Cypriot leader to take its advice. After the 1964 crisis, the political cleavage between Makarios and Grivas deepened. The Greek general blamed the Archbishop for not pursuing enosis anymore and even suggested that the mainland Greek troops in Cyprus would be enough to take decisive steps (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.139). There is no need, on the other hand, to restate that Makarios thought of him as a plague-spot for the implementation of his future Cypriot plans.

What is more, Makarios' efforts to sabotage the Geneva talks and his determination to develop more intimate relationships with the USSR brought him into conflict with the Papandreou government. Papandreou held by making small concessions to the Turks to appease them. Makarios, however, decided to look the other way and Athens' pleas fell on deaf ears. Though Papandreou had about 10,000 regular Greek army troops on the island to put pressure on Makarios, he was not yet willing to risk making an all-out attempt either to keep Makarios in line or to eliminate him from the scene. And with Greek public opinion in its aroused state, it would probably be even more difficult for Papandreou to force a showdown with Makarios (Central Intelligence Agency, 1964, September 17). After about a month in the wake of the August crisis, the Soviet Union, signed a military aid agreement with Makarios (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013, p.125-126). According to the agreement, the Soviet Union would provide the necessary equipment for the modernization of the Cypriot army. However, Moscow did not provide the same convenience for the

implementation of the agreement as circumstances would soon turn to Makarios's disadvantage.

After the 1964 crisis, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Turkey too initiated a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The Johnson Letter had heightened Turkey's feelings of isolation, and had encouraged her to mend fences with the Soviet Union and the Balkan states (Dodd, 1999, p.35). The rapprochement triggered by the Cyprus issue would again have great impact on Cyprus. This is because the Soviets that had developed relations with the Turks, and began talking about the legitimate rights of both communities in Cyprus (Sönmezoğlu, 1995, p.133). The visit of the Turkish delegation to Moscow at the end of October 1964 had great repercussions in Athens. The Soviet authorities' refusal to Enosis was interpreted as a serious blow to Prime Minister Papandreou. The main opposition leader, Kanallepulos, blamed the ruling party for taking Greece to the brink of collapse ("Ruslar'ın Enosis'e", 1964). The change in Soviet rhetoric toward Cyprus brought about the end of the pro-Soviet sentiment in Greece (Stefanidis, 2001, p.30).

Meanwhile, 47 non-aligned nations met in Cairo on October 5-10, 1964. In its final declaration, the conference called out to all countries to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The concerned parties were asked to restrain themselves and refrain from insisting on unfair and inadmissible solutions (Cairo Conference, 1965, p.1069). By this very declaration, Makarios freshened the support he received from the non-aligned countries. In addition to diplomatic support, the non-aligned countries, along with the Soviet Union, displayed their support for the Greek Cypriot leader in military terms. On March 1965, Greek ships that were carrying military equipment from the United Arab Republic to Cyprus were detected and forced to turn back after a diplomatic

intervention. A few months later, the Soviets were reported to be sending anti-aircraft missiles to Cyprus, which caused another crisis. Upon hearing of the delivery of the missiles, the Turks put their forces on alert (O'Malley and Craig, 2009, p.121). Clerides explained the Greek Cypriot request for arms from these countries and said (as cited in O'Malley and Craig, 2009) that "the reason we bought these arms from the Eastern Bloc was because the Western countries refused to sell them. They didn't want to strengthen us against Turkey and they didn't want us to have an army or weapons. They thought that by starving us of weapons we would be more susceptible to solutions they might recommend" (p.121).

Another important development that took place over Cyprus was the Galo Plaza report of March 26, 1965, when Plaza, the UN mediator in Cyprus, submitted a report to the Secretary-General. The report was of vital importance as Plaza proposed an amendment in the founding treaties (*Report of the United Nations Security, n.d.*). The Cyprus government and the Greeks both welcomed the report. In just a few months, the Archbishop's policy towards the Turkish Cypriot community deteriorated the situation on the island. He reprimanded several laws pertaining to the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots and removed Turkish electoral rolls, which had enabled Turkish Cypriots to vote for Turkish-Cypriot candidates under separate list. He also aimed to block the delivery of several goods to Turkish Cypriot villages (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.121). In late 1965, General Kodandera Thimayya, who was appointed Commander of the United Nations troops in Cyprus, visited the island, and notified that circumstances would worsen swiftly if the Turkish Cypriots were not provided with required goods. Even though the UN convinced the Archbishop to loosen the blockade, the Turkish community's conditions did not ameliorate quickly. A year later the UN reported that a considerable part of the

Turkish-Cypriot population was still in need for some form of relief (Oberling, 1982, p.130).

The following months radically impeded relations between Greece and the Greek Cypriots. Makarios became frustrated as an investigation for conspiracy claims revealed a letter in which Grivas proposed that he would make efforts to topple the Archbishop. Grivas denied these charges and claimed that he did not write the letter (Stern, 1977, p.33). Nevertheless, Makarios dismissed government officials who were implicated in the scheme that supported the General. The way Makarios planned the future of Cyprus was very different from Grivas's machinations. Makarios's priority was to secure his leading status in the island. On the other hand, Grivas intended to eliminate all hurdles standing in front of enosis and felt prepared to fulfill this objective. All three sides, namely Makarios, Greece-backed militias and Turkish Cypriots were armed; yet, among the three, the General had the stronger hand. In other respects, Makarios was advantageous since he had a stronger stance vis-a-vis the politically instable governments in Greece. Indeed, Makarios can be listed as one of the most impressive and strong Hellenic leaders of our recent past (Hart, 1990, p.37).

Makarios attempted to reduce the strength of the National Guard, and instead empowered the Greek-Cypriot police. He was, as the American diplomat Parker T. Hart reported, struggling to create a force that could resist Grivas (Hart, 1990, p.29). Accordingly, he purchased a considerable amount of weaponry from the Czechs. That Cyprus imported arms from the Eastern Bloc received negative reaction from the West. Greece did not have difficulty in understanding the reason behind the transaction. Turks, on the other hand, feared that the arms could be directed toward the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, due to the pressure from Greece and Turkey, Makarios

had to surrender the Czech arms to the UN. However, this was not a simple task and certainly not an overnight business. Makarios did not to give up so easily. Following the crisis, the Archbishop set out on a journey to African and South American countries to increase the strength of the Greek-Cypriots in UN (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.122). In that regard, Hart states Makarios imported Czech arms with the intent of strengthening his own defense position in case of a potential Coup organized by Grivas (Hart, 1990, p.29). In mainland Greece, public reaction to the purchase of Czech arms and their pressure on the Cypriot leader to wipe off those weapons worsened the relations between Greece and Makarios. Makarios' suspicion regarding the Greece-backed militia in the island increased even further.

The situation was further hampered by Greek politics, which was going through a difficult period. After many years of conservative rule, Georgios Papandreou, the leader of Center Union, had been elected new Prime minister of Greece, marking a radical development in Greek domestic politics ("Papandreou Party", 1964). However, only a very short period of time proved that the Papandreou government was not in the best interests of the army and the King. The investigation of the so-called Pericles plan by the new government, for instance, caused the latter two inconvenience (Keeley, R. V., 2010, p.XXIV). The internal competition between Papandreou and King led in time to a crisis and the King removed Papandreou from power, further exacerbating the political instability in Greece.

Following some efforts to form governments, King Constantine appointed an interim government under Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, and announced that new elections were to be held on May 28, 1967 (Kassimeris, 2010, p.46). It was, nevertheless, almost certain that Papandreou and his Centre Union would come out as the winner in the elections (Keeley, 2010, p.39). This was something the King

would be happy about. In his telegram to the Department of State, Phillips Talbot, who had serving as the US ambassador to Greece since the fall of 1965 (Keeley, R. V., 2010, p.4), informed Washington about King's possible-to-change attitude towards the forthcoming elections:

Key and still uncertain element in current picture, however, is attitude of King. We know that King was initially pleased by smooth transition from Stephanopoulos to Paraskevopoulos and by prospect of extricating himself, through elections, from vulnerable position in which he found himself after July 1965. Recently, however, the King has reportedly been dismayed by George Papandreou's failure to control his son and King has begun to have second thoughts on wisdom of holding elections in May and of permitting EK, and, particularly, Andreas Papandreou to emerge as leading political force. King has undoubtedly been under strong pressure from rightists, including possibly his mother, to alter his stand towards present transitional government and elections ("Telegram from the Embassy", 1967).

The Americans believed a Centre Union victory in the elections would critically undermine the US interests and aggravate the already volatile situation between Greece and Turkey. Eventually, amongst the existing crucible, the military junta staged a coup on April 21, 1967 and took political control (Stern, 1977, p.36-40). Such a coup in the midst of the cold war led to an outstanding question mark in the minds. To what degree the US was involved in the coup cannot be exactly determined. However, the American attitude in the post-coup period increases suspicion about a potential US role.

In the wake of the military coup, the US not only remained inactive but also watched over its interests and was favorably disposed to the colonels (Hatzivassiliou, 2011, p.159). No matter whether Washington backed up the military coup or not, the junta, as Americans thought, would be welcomed as a tool to decrease the influence of the communists in Greece (Woodhouse, 1983, p.185). Following the coup, NATO affirmed that its priority was to defend the Western bloc, not to intervene in internal affairs of member states. NATO's main expectation from the junta-controlled Greece

was to remain loyal to the to the alliance. That the putschists proved to be NATO supporters left no room for doubt (Pedaliu, 2011, p.102).

The Soviets, on the other hand, felt that Greece, and not Turkey, constituted the main threat to their interests in Cyprus (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013, p.126). From Moscow's point of view, Greek colonels were backed up by the US and that was sufficient grounds to keep Greece and its desires at arm's length. The Soviets were also aware that Greece, whose relations with the Greek Cypriot leader were not good, would put pressure on Cyprus in the following period. That is why on several occasions they expressed concern about or issued warnings against foreign interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. And they continued to regard Makarios as a legitimate ruler. The junta in Athens took an aggressive turn as the Soviets had anticipated on the Cyprus issue, seeking to secure a settlement based on a favorable version of the Acheson proposals. The Greek leadership had views closer to Grivas's than the Archbishop's on the Cyprus issue.

In the meantime, the Greeks received Turkish inquiries whether the junta government was willing to resume the talks that they had left off in December 1966. To the Greeks, this meant a Turkish submittance. They thought the Turks were now prepared to accept a type of enosis. The parties, hence, started the talks without losing time (Hart, 1990, p.24). The talks continued till the summer of 1967. By August 1967, Greek Prime Minister Kollias called out to Ankara to meet in a conference at the prime ministerial level on the frontier to sort the controversial points out. The main problem was surely Cyprus. The parties met on September 9-10, 1967, respectively in Kesan (Turkish side) and Alexandroupolis (Greek side) (Hart, 1990, p.31). The opening speech delivered by Kollias was unsettling. The Greek Premier complained of rough Turkish treatment of ethnic Greeks on the north

Aegean Turkish islands of Imros (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos). Turning to Cyprus, he declared that the only solution to the Cyprus problem was enosis, and enosis, he argued, was good for the Turks. The main point, the Premier went on, was what it would take to get the Turks to agree to enosis.

The statements of the Greek Premier very much irritated the Turks and even some Greek diplomats. The Turkish desk chief of the Greek Foreign Ministry, V. Theodoropoulos, (as cited in Birand, 1999) expressed his profound regret regarding Kollias's attitude and said:

This is the most painful period of my diplomatic life. The soldiers did not trust us [diplomats]. I learned from the first undersecretary that a meeting was going to take place. I was held responsible to make translation in the meeting. Our Prime Minister went on to say 'why you [the Turks] do not give us Cyprus, if you insist, we can even give you a base in return.

The Turks were not satisfied with the talks and Papadopoulos was very much aware of this situation. Hence, he warned the Greek Premier that unless his rhetoric changes, negotiations would possibly fail. Meeting the Greeks, the Turkish delegation guessed that the junta leaders would discern the necessity to partition the island with the aim of preventing the communists from taking further initiatives on Cyprus. The Greeks, however, were more optimistic. They considered enosis a feasible option on condition that a base was given to the Turks. Nevertheless, the Turkish Premier, Süleyman Demirel, demanded both two bases and 10 percent of the island's territory. The parties had to leave the table empty-handed. The Junta failed in its aim to declare enosis with a minimum concession.

4.3. Into the Cold War Vortex

On October 31, 1967, Raul Denктаş, the President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, who had been banned by Makarios from returning to Cyprus,

landed on the island and was arrested on the spot. Following a period of vigorous diplomatic pressure by the Ankara Government he was released, and returned to Turkey on November 12 (Oran, 2015, p.736). Three days later, General George Grivas launched an attack on the Turkish villages of Köfünye (Kophinou) and Aytodro (Ayios Theodoros). The operation was so ferocious that the UN Secretary-General, in his special report dated December 8, 1967, recorded that the Kophinou operation had caused heavy loss of life and had grave repercussions (Dodd, 2015, p. 43). To make the blunder worse, Grivas showed up in the village with photographers and announced his success. Vyron Theodoropoulos, the head of the Cyprus desk of the Foreign Ministry of Greece in 1965-66, later reported: “Grivas caused the crisis. After the 1963-64 conflicts, there were still a few Turkish villages in the south. The UN wanted these settlements to be left alone. Grivas acted on his own. Without notifying anyone, he sent his gunmen to provoke the fight” (Birand, 1999).

This incident immediately provoked a very strong reaction from Turkey. An ultimatum delivered to Greece demanded that the attack should cease immediately, and a task force was held in readiness to proceed to Cyprus in case hostilities continued. Turkey and Greece thus came to the brink of war once again (Dodd,2015, p.43). Grivas had made a dangerous error in judgment. Turkey threatened to bomb his forces if the action did not stop, and warned the UN that if its troops did not drive the Greek and Greek-Cypriot troops out of the area immediately, the crisis would go beyond the borders of the island. The violence ceased within hours. But when press photographs the next morning revealed the extent of the action against the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the Government to take military action at will (O’Malley & Craig, 2009, p.128). Perturbed by the events, Demirel (as cited in O’Malley & Craig, 2009) pledged to stop the ongoing

aggression against the Turkish Cypriots and “everything possible and necessary” (p.128).

Facing a more serious armed conflict with Turkey, Greece mobilized the Hellenic Air Force for one-way missions against Turkish vessels carrying troops (Hart, 1990, p.67). CIA reports illustrate the graveness of the crisis: “Available information suggests that the opposing Greek forces are deployed [on the Thracian border] defensively... Turkish and Greek naval forces are roughly comparable in combat readiness, with perhaps a slight edge to the Greek Navy. Turkey has improved its amphibious capability significantly since the 1964 crisis” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1967, November 20). With hindsight, Athens swiftly intervened to calm the tensions and ordered Grivas to cease all hostilities, withdraw his forces from the two villages, and to restore status quo ante bellum. On November 17, Grivas was recalled to Athens and left Nicosia on a commercial flight two days later (Hart, 1990, p.54). Despite the Greek government’s attempts to level down the crisis, it was too late for the Turkish parliamentary and public opinion. Ankara now held Greece primarily responsible. The new Turkish position was such that all Greek forces that had been stationed there since 1964 must be withdrawn.

Just when open hostility between the Greeks and the Turks reached its climax, President Johnson's special envoy, Cyrus Vance, was commissioned with arbitration to prevent a conflict that would jeopardize NATO’s regional capabilities and destroy its prestige. After inquiring what exactly the Turkish government demanded from Greece in return for putting aside its revanchism, Vance began probing scenarios in Athens. He informed Foreign Minister Pipinelis of his talks with the Turkish Premier. Pipinelis's reaction was at first very negative, but gradually he became more accommodating and saw the necessity of providing Vance with something he could

carry back to Ankara (Hart, 1990, p.75). Ultimately, Athens sought to save face by appearing conciliatory abroad while doing everything short of that for domestic political consumption at home.

Indeed, to bring the crisis to naught, Greece needed an arrangement that would not be misconstrued as a surrender. The military junta did not want its prestige to be damaged. The US government also wished to end the crisis in a way that would not humiliate Greece, especially in the eyes of its own people. An important US consideration was to curb a potential anti-American public reaction in internal Greek politics for the existing situation was already troublesome. As a result, with considerable US guidance, Greece accepted the Turkish demands and pledged to withdraw all excess Greek troops above the limits established in the 1960 Treaty of Alliance. In order not to give room for rumors and further misunderstandings, it was agreed to set a ceiling for both Greek and Turkish troops that had been stationed in Cyprus prior to the 1967 crisis, based on the terms of the London-Zurich agreements. After the 1967 crisis most of these illegal troops were subsequently removed (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, September, 24, p.1). According to Theodoropoulos, the 1967 crisis was “a complete fiasco [for Greece]...the junta had to withdraw 10 thousand troops, which they had brought to the island with great pride. They undertook a demarche that they could not accomplish. The Junta should have known that it could not keep his jets over the island for more than 5 minutes and acted accordingly” (Birand, 1999).

The withdrawal of 10,000 surplus Greek troops from Cyprus became a source of relief for Makarios (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.129). It dramatically reduced the internal threat to his position, especially as Grivas was forced to remain in Athens and surrender his Cyprus command. The attitude of the Soviet government from the

very onset of the 1967 crisis was radically different from that of 1964. Considering Greece to be the main threat to its interests in and around Cyprus, the Soviets did not refrain from taking a tough stance against Athens. Furthermore, the budding Soviet-Turkish cooperation and the presence of the Greek junta created a discernably reserved relationship between Greece and the Soviet Union. Moscow enjoyed better relations with Ankara and refrained from developing a harsh attitude towards Turkey, which fell in sharp contrast to the situation in 1964. The fact that Greece now had less concrete US support in case of a Turkish military operation, the Junta had no option but to pull through the crisis with the least loss possible. And they managed to do it to a certain extent with American mediation. The US could have resorted to more serious means to deter the parties from getting involved in a conflict with one another. Nonetheless, as it had interfered quite sharply against Turkey in the 1964 crisis and witnessed its results, this time, it opted to avoid doing anything that might worsen its relations with the Turkish or Greek governments (Adams & Cotrell, 1968, p.72).

4.4. Greece and Cyprus on the Eve of the 1974 Crisis

The 1967 crisis paved the way for a different set of dynamics. First of all, relations between Makarios and the Greek government were irrepealably damaged. With the removal of the Greek military presence from the island, Makarios was freed from a force acting beyond his authority. With the absence of Greek troops, however, Athens would try every possible way, including assassination, to increase secret activities to remove Makarios from the political scene.

On the eve of his re-election campaign, Makarios, softened his position on enosis. He appealed to Greek Cypriots to make a courageous compromise and accept a feasible solution, which might fall short of some of their expectations. He had little

enthusiasm for seeking political union with a military dictatorship. He won the elections in February 1968, gaining 95.45 percent of the votes against the newly found Enosis Front, with a voter turnout of over 90 percent. As a token of goodwill, he ordered Greek-Cypriot forces to pull down their fortifications and abandon their roadblocks around the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.130). Despite the lingering problem of the island's de-facto division, the lifting of the blockade around Turkish enclaves and the commencement of intercommunal negotiations suggested that a return normalcy was in the offing.

The gulf between Athens and Nicosia became unbridgeable in October 1968 when a foiled plot to blow up junta leader Colonel Papadopoulos was attributed to, among others, Makarios's Interior and Defense Minister, Georghadhis. Beginning with 1968, relations between Greek and Greek Cypriot leaderships deteriorated to an all-time low. The alleged plot was only the beginning; speaking of the post-1967 period, Clerides said that it "the worsening of affairs was unprecedented...Papadopoulos began to form his own units in the National Guard, which were deployed in a way to surround the Presidential Palace. Makarios feared that the Junta would even stage an assassination" (Birand, 1999). For the Junta leaders, Makarios became a source of trepidation mainly because they feared he could surrender the island to a communist rule. What was worse, the Greeks anticipated that Makarios could turn Cyprus into a base of junta opponents and dissidents. Hence, Makarios had to be eliminated, which would both relieve the junta and facilitate the union of the island with the mainland.

Beginning with 1970, Greece launched a vigorous campaign against Makarios and the news of an assassination attempt marked the downswing in Greek-Cypriot diplomacy. In March 1970, a helicopter carrying Makarios was shot down and the Junta appeared to be the main culprit behind the affair. Although the pilot was badly

injured, Makarios survived the crash. Intensifying their efforts to eliminate the Archbishop, the Junta unleashed Grivas and sent him back to the island, in violation of the 1967 agreement with Turkey (Hitchens, 2002, p.70). Deteriorating Greek-Greek Cypriot relations understandably had a positive impact on the Turkish Cypriots. In fact, relations between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots showed a discernible improvement; such that when a tornado struck the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol, Makarios inspected the damage and promised the victims that his government would dispatch aid and help them rebuild their homes (Hitchens, 2002, p.86).

Despite the fact that intercommunal relations showed signs of normalcy, in which deteriorating affairs between the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots played a crucial role, Makarios did not completely abandon the enosis vision. Partly to maintain some level of connection with Greece, and partly to consolidate his constituency, Makarios intermittently referred to his desire for enosis. On March 14, 1971, for instance, he stated that “Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of her history, and will remain Greek; Greek and undivided we have taken her over; Greek and undivided we shall preserve her; Greek and undivided we shall deliver her to Greece” (Stavrinides, 1999, p.71-72). Meanwhile, the relations with the Soviet Union were picking up. In July 1970, AKEL and the socialists achieved a substantial success (O’Malley and Craig, 2009, p.134). At this point, Makarios’s pro-enosis statement might have been not more than a gesture to the good, but helped eased the anxiety in Athens, and relieved the US government, with which Cypriot diplomacy had been divided by a cul-de-sac.

Still, when Makarios paid an eight-day visit to Moscow in June 1971 and plead for assistance, the Soviets took the opportunity to reaffirm its full support for Cyprus

against any foreign interference. The communiqué resulting from the visit called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus (O'Malley and Craig, 2009, p.135). Makarios believed that the support of Eastern bloc countries together with those in the non-aligned movement could defuse actions which threatened himself, along with the territorial integrity and independence of his country. The timing of the Moscow visit was not coincidental. Makarios had learned that when a strategically-placed country, however small, becomes the subject of interest of two opposing superpowers it can play one off against the other to its own advantage. He was confident that his small and weak country could gain leverage by placing itself in a line of dispute between opposing imperial powers (Coufoudakis, 2006, p.81).

In the meantime, Cyprus became a subject of heated discussions among NATO allies and, as a solution, Papadopoulos urged Makarios to offer some concessions to the Turkish Cypriots. When Makarios proved unwilling and firmly refused the advice from Athens, Grivas was suddenly allowed to leave house arrest in Athens, and returned to Cyprus to stir up the opposition against Makarios (O'Malley and Craig, 2009, p.135). In January 1972, as Greek colonels' earlier pledges for a swift transition to democratic parliamentary system turned out to be bogus, the United States secured an agreement to home-port a carrier taskforce at Piraeus. This made it easier for the United States to project its naval power throughout the Eastern Mediterranean since the US Air Force was now granted rights to keep bases at the Suda Bay. One of the critics of Makarios's policy towards Greece later proposed that the militarization of US relations with the Greeks blinded the US blind to the political conjuncture within Greece (Slengesol, 2000, p.103).

Makarios watched with trepidation as the Grivas threat came home, and the Cypriot government decided to enlarge its military capabilities with arms from

Czechoslovakia in 1972 (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013, p.126). This caused a fierce reaction in Greece and in the United States. Makarios was, however, convinced that he would be toppled. Thus, he wanted to strengthen his police and security forces. George Papadopoulos sent a harsh letter to the Archbishop and demanded the surrender of the weapons to the National Guard. In the meantime, military units loyal to the Junta administration in the island were put on stand-by in case Makarios rejected the demand (Hitchens, 2002, p.72). For the Americans, the Greeks appeared to be using the Czech arms issue as an excuse to reassert their influence over Makarios, something they had lacked for some time (Central Intelligence Agency, 1972, February, 14, p.2). Makarios publicly rejected the Greek demarche as “a completely unacceptable and humiliating ultimatum.” The Archbishop, however, hinted that a compromise was possible if General Grivas was withdrawn from the island (Central Intelligence Agency, 1972, February, 14, p.1).

In military terms, Greece held the upper hand in Cyprus, and Makarios’s challenging attitude was unacceptable. Moreover, Greece had enough assets on the island to put up a strong resistance. Makarios, who was very much aware of the Greek power on the island, had gone through several assassination attempts, and therefore, wanted to empower his position by declaring another elections in January 1973. He was re-elected. However, Grivas warned that he would face the same terror experienced by Britain in Cyprus if he betrayed enosis. Grivas stood by his word. The CIA reported that Grivas's forces were demoralizing the police and embarrassing the government with well-coordinated raids and bombings of police stations and other public buildings (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, September, 24, p.2). Tension in Cyprus, namely the Greek-Greek Cypriot rivalry, prompted the US to

focus more on the issue. Another CIA report, dated September 24, 1973, was yet drawing a similar picture, which succinctly summed up the situation in Cyprus:

Cyprus has been relatively quiet since 1968, but trouble has been brewing since late last year. This time the threat lies within the Greek Cypriot community... The aging guerrilla leader [Grivas] has always been a fierce champion of enosis-union of Cyprus with Greece- and he is now a bitter foe of Makarios, who favors enosis in theory but not in practice. Grivas has carried out a series of terrorist acts against the Makarios government, and there is a danger that violence could eventually spill over into the Turkish Cypriot community (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, September 24, p.ii).

On October 7, there was yet another assassination attempt on Makarios. Four mines were detonated on a road, just minutes before the Archbishop was scheduled to pass in his car, on his way to conduct a service in a village near Famagusta. Much to Athens's dismay, the Archbishop managed to survive this attack as well (O'Malley & Craig, 2009, p.139). The US could hardly be bothered with dissuading the Greek junta from such assassination plans. While other Western countries were distancing themselves from the junta which had promised to restore democracy, the United States maintained its bonds with Greece. The ruling colonels were strongly anticommunist, but as it was with Cyprus, the overriding US interest was strategic; after all, Greece, along with Turkey, constituted NATO's southern flank. The American stakes grew in the early seventies as the navy began to guarantee homeporting for the Sixth Fleet in Greece (Slengesol, 2000, p.101).

At the same time, Colonel Papadopoulos's power began to slip. A rival faction led by Brigadier General Ioannides seized its opportunity when numerous young members of the working class and the unemployed rose against the Papadopoulos regime in November 1973, and overthrew the ruling colonels (Slengesol, 2000, p.102). Ultimately, Papadopoulos never got his man. It was he, not Makarios, who

was thrown out of power, amid growing civil unrest in Athens and calls for the return of Karamanlis.

4.5. The 1974 Crisis

Time, reportedly healing all wounds, was not healing the Junta-Makarios relations. Since the mid-1960s, both sides had been towing a tough stance against one another. In late 1973, the CIA reported that although Makarios appeared to be winning the last round “whether the general [Grivas] is ready to give up the battle,” remained questionable” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973, September, 24, p.3). A few months later, in January 1974, General Grivas died. New York Times reported that “his death of a heart attack at 75 removes a significant obstacle to peace and stability on the Mediterranean island” (“General Grivas”, 1974). And yet, the developments leading to the 1974 Crisis showed that this was not the case. In the wake of the general’s death, a pro-enosis underground movement with close ties to the Athens junta became more visible in Cyprus. It turned out that the military leadership in Athens, hoping that the realization of enosis would bolster its increasingly weak position at home, had increased its support for the Greek Cypriot rejectionist forces (Slengesol, 2000, p.100).

The Soviet Union was disturbed by the Greek-led operations in Cyprus. A US-backed junta was in power and campaigns against Makarios, whom the Soviets regarded as the insurance of the non-alignment in eastern Mediterranean, was incessantly threatening their interests. The Soviet red line was the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus. To that end, they had been contributing for a long time to develop a collective defense mechanism (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013, p.126). The loss of the non-aligned island in this crucial region was unacceptable. Therefore, the Soviets did not hesitate to warn the Americans with what might be considered as

amicable diplomatic notes (Hitchens, 2002, p.88-89). The Soviet warning to the US, instead of an immediate military undertaking, which might have led to another proxy war, can be assessed within the broader context of détente. Both superpowers knew that they had different orbits (Stergiou, 2007, p.98). Thus, they refrained from undermining the carefully constructed détente environment over a small island.

In the meantime, the already heightened crisis between the island and mainland Greece had become a deadlock. On July 3, 1974, Makarios sent an open letter to Greece, condemning the Junta policies against himself and the security of the island. In his letter, he complained that “the cadres of the military regime of Greece supports and directs the activities of the EOKA-B terrorists. . . It is also known that the so-called opposition papers among the Cyprus press, which support the criminal activities of EOKA-B and which are financed by Athens, receive guidance from those in charge of the General Staff office and the branch of the Greek Central Intelligence Agency in Cyprus (Hitchens, 2002, p.81). Blaming the military junta for the instability in Cyprus, Makarios stated that he was not keen to cut off all ties with Athens, but that he was not a puppet governor appointed by Greece. He was, Makarios claimed, a Hellenic leader recognized by a great part of Hellenic world.

With increasing rumors of a Junta-led coup against Makarios, the American station chief in Athens met with Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides on July 10, 1974, when the Junta leader assured the American intelligence officer that they had no such intentions. Nevertheless, despite all warnings, Ioannides responded to Makarios’s letter by staging a coup on July 15 (Slengesol, 2000, p.109). Makarios was replaced by Nicos Sampson. Sampson was not a good choice. The Americans defined him as an “irrational, psychopathic, and dangerous opportunist whom even Ioannides describes as crazy” (Kissinger, 2012, p.207). Clerides, who was going to replace

Sampson, was also surprised by the decision. He uttered his astonishment by saying that “they could not have found someone worse than him... They were inviting Turkey to intervene, so to speak” (Birand, 1999). Following the coup, Greek Cypriot troops launched a pointblank manhunt for left-wing and pro-Makarios supporters. According to newspaper accounts, more than 1,000 people were arrested (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July, 18). The developments on the island greatly disturbed the Ankara government, and the resulting measures, such as mobilization of troops ready for deployment, became more threatening.

Meanwhile, Makarios, who had been reportedly assassinated, managed to flee Cyprus with the help of the British. The US Embassy in London reported that Makarios was on his way to Malta (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July, 16). Ten years ago, when the tensions had increased again, the British had offered the Archbishop protection and evacuation to any place he wanted to go (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July, 16, p.2). At the time, he had decided to remain on the island and simply asked for UN protection. Walking a tight rope between life and death, this was certainly not a simple political choice for Makarios. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot leader went to London through Malta and then to New York. The coup against Makarios in July 1974 convinced the Soviet leaders that the military regime in Athens aimed at enosis, which would bring Cyprus under the firm control of Greece and thus NATO (Sakkas & Zhukova, 2013, p.132). Clerides’s remarks (as cited in Stavrinides, 1976) have the characteristics to justify the Soviet concern:

In my view [the coup] was carried out because the [Greek] military Government, known as the Junta, believed that it would be possible, after the coup , to proclaim enosis , and that Turkey would be prevented by the allies of Greece from carrying out an invasion... One of the reasons we have failed [to reach a settlement with the Turkish Cypriots] was that the Greek Government-Junta was not sincere. While publicly declaring that they desired an agreement through the intercommunal talks, they in fact had other aims and objectives... The Junta and their leader Mr.

Ioannides were not sincere as regards their intentions concerning a settlement...(p.72)

The initial Soviet reaction and official statement after the coup, which was published on July 17, openly blamed NATO. However, the main culprit, in Soviet eyes, was Greece. The official statement of the Soviet government published in TASS proclaimed:

Attempts of the Greek government to conceal its involvement with this criminal act by picturing up the current events in Cyprus as a result of the internal struggle cannot delude anyone, despite the fact that some people in the West caught up this false version. The whole world is aware that the conspiracy in Cyprus was staged by the Greek officers staying there who were directed there by the Greek government shall not dodge away from the responsibility for its actions (1974, July, p.2).

Here, Zenon Stavrinides argues that the change in leadership in the Greek junta accelerated the implementation of coup against Makarios. According to him, whereas Colonel Papadopoulos, who ruled Greece from April 1967 to November 1973, was very keen to see some sort of a compromise settlement in Cyprus, his successor Brigadier Ioannides focused on bringing about enosis (Stavrinides, 1976, p.72).

There are competing views regarding the US position for the implementation of the coup in Cyprus. "The actual coup took us by surprise," Under Secretary Sisco (as cited in Slengesol, 2000) later said "it was certainly a surprise to me, and I have every indication that it was a surprise to Kissinger" (p.109). Hearing of the coup in Cyprus, Kissinger sent Sisco to see the Greeks and the Turks, and to prevent a conflict. The main American concern at that point was a conflict between its NATO allies. In such a scenario, the US feared, the Soviets could take the advantage of the crack in the south-eastern flank of NATO and gain the military advantage in the region (Middleton, 1974). Sisco was thus commissioned with a difficult task. The Under Secretary was aware of it. "You're sending me on a Mission Impossible," he (as cited in Slengesol, 2000, p.116) told Kissinger before leaving. After a brief

stopover in London to discuss with Bülent Ecevit, he arrived in Greece on July 19. On the very same day, Sisco met the Greek junta leader. He said that the Turks were so determined this time that Greece should bring Makarios back. Furthermore, he also brought some demands of the Turkish Premier whom he had met in London. These were the immediate return of Makarios, a buildup of Turkish armed forces in Cyprus to match that of the Greeks, and the prompt start of negotiations between the two Cypriot communities to create a federal system of government (Kissinger, 2012, p.217).

The Turkish demands incensed Ioannides, who rejected them in fury. He wanted Sisco to stop the Turks; otherwise, he argued, NATO would collapse (Birand, 1976, p.58). Eventually, Sisco could not get what he wanted and went back to Ankara empty-handed, which would further temper the Turkish stance. The night before the Turkish intervention, the junta still believed the Turks would think that the coup in Cyprus was a domestic struggle between the Greeks on the island, and would not intervene (Roberts, 1974). In the meantime, former Greek Premier Karamanlis, in a public statement from his exile in Paris, called on the Greek armed forces to restore Archbishop Makarios to power in Cyprus. He also urged a return to democracy and offered to lead a return to democracy in Greece (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July, p.2).

The UN Security Council finally met on July 19 and agreed to receive Makarios in his official capacity as President of Cyprus. Putting the blame on the Greek junta, the Archbishop accepted a partial responsibility for the eruption of the crisis in this manner and argued:

... it may be said that it was the Cyprus government which invited the Greek officers to staff the national guard. I regret to say that it was a mistake on my part to bestow upon them so much trust and confidence. They abused that trust and confidence and, instead of helping in the defense of the Island's independence,

sovereignty and territorial integrity, they themselves became the aggressors... the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus (Speech delivered by Makarios, n.d.).

In his speech, the Archbishop drew attention to the significance and the state of insecurity on the island. He said “the Turks of Cyprus are also affected” and urged the UN to “call upon the military regime of Greece to withdraw from Cyprus ... and to put an end to its invasion of Cyprus...” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July, p.2)

Overall, the British were in favor of preventing the escalation of tension in the island and sought particularly to deter any military operation by the Turkish government. They knew that with sufficient US backing, they would be able to prevent the Turks from landing on the island. Unlike the US, Britain wanted to hinder the Ankara government not because of the concerns regarding the unity of NATO but because of the security of their military bases in Cyprus. Thus, Callaghan sent a detailed message to Kissinger calling for a joint British-US action. His plan included Makarios’s return. However, Kissinger did not agree with the British plan (Callaghan, 2006, p.341-342). Turkey, on the other hand, had long passed the point of no return, and launched the operation while Sisco was still trying to dissuade Ecevit. Thus, Sisco shouldered a new responsibility and went to Athens. The aim was simple: Discourage the Greeks from embarking on an adventure, which could lead to open warfare with Turkey.

The members of the Greek Government were shocked to hear a report from a BBC correspondent in Athens that five Turkish destroyers and 31 landing crafts had been deployed. Subsequent press reports indicated 20 medium-sized landing-crafts, carrying more than 30 tanks, five smaller landing crafts, accompanied by five more warships and two large troop transports filled with soldiers were heading for

Cyprus.²As the Turkish fleet sailed towards Cyprus, Sisco flew back to Athens. He provided the Greek government with a net assessment, and warned the Greeks about Turkey's military superiority. Even threatening to cut off military aid, the undersecretary also demanded a strong commitment to refrain from resorting to military action (Slengesol, 2000, p.117).

While Sisco displayed the US government's objection to a Greek military reaction, it was still debatable whether and how Greece would respond to the Turkish operation. Despite its lack of popular support, the military was in power and it was quite likely that they would resort to harsh and offensive measures. In the face of the Turkish intervention, the Greek Government ordered general mobilization on July 20 and pledged to meet "expansionist Turkish acts" at any cost (*Reserve call-up could*, n.d.). To Theodoropoulos, the junta:

made the very opposite of what it should have done. It almost destroyed the armed forces. It declared mobilization. It was pure chaos, we went through a disaster. It was inexplicable. However, they were professional soldiers. They should have known how to deal with such things. To my surprise, they proved to be worse than an amateur (Birand, 1999).

In 1964 the US had been concerned about the possibility of a Soviet intervention against Turkey. Ten years later, there was no such concern for the Ankara government kept Moscow in the loop (Hitchens, 2002, p.90). The Soviet statement portrayed the landing of Turkish troops as a means to enable the legitimate government of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios (Cutler, 1985, p.65). In other words, Greece was supported neither by the US nor by the USSR. In Ecevit's words, "the whole world, with the sole exception of Greece, has conceded the rightfulness of Turkey's position" (Cutler, 1985, p.66).

² The Times, 20 July 74.

The Turkish intervention was unanticipated and forced Greece to devise a national security plan from scratch. The pace in which the crisis unfolded caught everyone by surprise and most of all threatened the junta's legitimacy. Athens fell through a period of confusion and uncertainty. The Greek administration seemed "to have drawn back from extreme military moves- such as an attack across the Evros" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 21, p.5). This news relieved both the Turks and the Americans because there would be then no war between the two NATO members. Unlike Britain, however, the US feared a crack in NATO more than just a war between NATO members. The main goal was to preserve the concert of the union. On July 21 reports of further Turkish reinforcements and air attacks on Cyprus brought Greece to the verge of withdrawal from NATO – something that the US government had to foil.

As the Greek junta began to fall apart, for the next couple of days there was a prevailing sense of confusion in Athens regarding whom was in charge. A power struggle was raging between an increasingly desperate Ioannides, who wanted to attack the Turks on all fronts, and other generals who took a more rational stance (Coulombis, 1983, p.94). On July 22, one of the Junta admirals, claiming to speak in the name of Greece, told Sisco that Greece was ready to accept a cease-fire. The cease-fire was put into practice on July 22. Meanwhile, Turkey's initial operational goals fell short of expectations, although the landing was brought to a successful conclusion. Athens was "pleased that the Greek Cypriot forces were able to contain the Turkish regular forces. Elsewhere on the island, the Greek Cypriot forces ... gained the upper hand in intercommunal fighting" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974, July 22, p.2).

On July 23, the junta surrendered government control to civilian leaders, who called Constantinos Karamanlis back from his exile in France to form the government. The fall of the Junta in Athens also had repercussions in Nicosia. On July 24, Sampson was replaced by Clerides (Slengesol, 2000, p.117). A civilian rule in Greece did not obviate military measures. Shortly after Karamanlis had come to power, he was still concerned whether the island could be saved. He wanted to learn whether Greece could afford to recover from the junta's folly. Evangelos Averoff advised against this move, mainly because of Turkey's air superiority (Hitchens, 2002, p.95). Hence, following the cease-fire a conference was summoned in Geneva. All concerned parties to the conflict came together at the first Geneva Conference between July 25 and 30, 1974. The conference determined that the ceasefire should be observed, that negotiations should be carried on, and that both Greek and Turkish forces should refrain from moving any further. Ultimately, a consensus was reached on another meeting, in which Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives would be present as well (Hitchens, 2002, p.98).

The second meeting was scheduled for 8 August. In between the two conferences, the Turks brought reinforcements to the island. In the second Geneva conference, the Turks insisted on the foundation of a Turkish region in northern Cyprus. The region was to account for almost 34 percent of the whole territory. The provision of this Turkish demand constituted their red line. The Greeks, however, rejected the Turkish proposal. According to Evangelos Averof, the Minister for National Defense:

The suggestion in our opinion was a pretext [for the Turks] to start a second operation. It was envisaged to say that here we offered, but because you did not accept it, we had to take the action. It was an ultimatum rather than a proposal... Moreover, Athens was in crisis. We had just come to power, we could not control the situation, and the military could take control again at any time. We were weak. Putting signature under such an agreement would be a political suicide (Birand, 1999).

The Soviet inaction vis-a-vis the Turkish military operation in June encouraged the Turks to get prepared for a second offensive. Greece on the other hand could not receive enough support from the Soviets. During the second Geneva conference the new President of Cyprus asked the Soviets for help in case of a renewed tension in the island. The Soviets, however, only slid over the Greek request (Polyviou, 1976, p.327).

What the Greeks deemed as a nightmare came true on August 14, when the second Turkish military operation was launched. The immediate Greek reaction was to withdraw from the NATO military structure (Stergiou, 2007, p.98). Karamanlis would later even go further and legalize the Communist Party, which had been outlawed since the end of the Civil War (Stergiou, 2007, p.98). The withdrawal was a direct reaction to the West for not being able to stop the Turks. Giving ear to the Greek public opinion and appeasing them was also another factor in the decision making process.

Although the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus would seem to lead to partition of the island, against Moscow's interests, the Soviets remained silent, putting the whole blame on NATO. The main Soviet policy at this point was to keep an equidistance to both Ankara and Athens, and alienate neither. Soon thereafter, Greek Foreign Minister Mavros told the Soviet Ambassador Ezhov that Greece was prepared to withdraw its troops from Cyprus before Turkey did if the USSR could guarantee the latter would then follow suit. Mavros also told the Yugoslavs that the Cyprus discussion could be continued in another meeting with the participation of non-NATO nations. Desperate to receive US support, Greece was trying to play its Soviet card, which did not seem too promising (Cutler, 1985, p.75).

The 1974 transition triggered a crisis in relations between Greece and the United States and with regard to NATO. Clearly hinting at the Greek–Turkish conflict in a letter dated August 25, 1974, Kissinger warned Karamanlis that the experience of the Arab world between 1967 and 1973 had demonstrated that the surge of anti-Americanism and its dependence on the Soviet Union made it impossible for the United States to play a positive role in the search for peace. In response to Turkey’s intervention of Cyprus, however, Karamanlis re-militarized the Eastern Aegean islands in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne, and declared that Greece’s main security threat since then came from Turkey and not from the Communist Northern Balkans (Stergiou, 2007, p.93).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1. Epilogue

Winston Churchill once said; “history with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past trying to reconstruct its success to revive the echoes and kindle with pale gleams the passions of former days” (*Neville Chamberlain*, n.d.). Churchill’s dictum is telling for historical research, as in the present work, which sought to illuminate the past by resurrecting echoes of historical actors. In Chapter I, I argued that Cyprus is crucial not simply for understanding past conflicts or present ones between its inhabitants but also for making better sense of the Cold War. It is possible to see a corresponding timespan of growing violence in Cyprus and elsewhere in the world, as one moves along the Cold War chronology from the heated 1950s to the détente period of the 1960s and 1970s. The island’s relative peace restored in the wake of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, quickly faded, paving the way for larger waves of conflicts between various involved parties, most of whom sought to gain the support of either one of the superpowers, sometimes both.

In the handling of the Cyprus issue, particular emphasis was attached to the Turkish and Greek policies regarding the island between the years 1963-1974. In a process where the Cold War radiated its influence in every direction, I looked at the extent to which these two states tried to take advantage of the Cold War atmosphere in line with their interests and how they sought to gain support from both the Soviet and American governments. The history of Cold War Cyprus yields more questions than answers. In that sense, this thesis is a probe into the processes in which the two superpowers responded to the Turkish and Greek officials in the Cold War conjuncture. Engaging with a challenging and multifaceted subject, such as Cyprus, necessitates a concurrent chronological and overlapping thematic focus.

Chapter II could be considered as a second introduction with its emphasis on historical background as well as the literature survey that it offers. The main objective of overviewing the literature in the given period was to demonstrate existing perspectives on the subject and the ways in which the Cold War was taken into account. Nearly all of the existing sources display Cyprus as an apple of discord between two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, and introduce the subject in a bilateral fashion, overlooking its Cold War context, which was radically different seen from Moscow or Washington DC – thousands of miles and a mental world away from the Mediterranean island. Although there are numerous good studies that links the relationship between the Cold War and the Cyprus problem, only few academic works have so far dealt with the issue with a specific focus upon the role of Turkey and Greece as small powers, trying to capitalize on superpower politics. Expanding the American and Soviet ranges of motion, this chapter tried to demonstrate how this thesis would fill that gap.

Chapter III concentrated on the Turkish perspective regarding Cyprus, corresponding to the 1963-1974 period, including the very first years of the détente period. In this chapter, I examined how Turkey's foreign policy makers underwent a period of transformation with the impact of détente. By contrast, Chapter IV looked at the Greek side of the story and illustrated how Greek foreign policy makers approached the Cyprus issue and gauged, sometimes in vain, western allies over time under a carefully crafted Cold War framework. Chapter four, along with the three, offered a great deal of primary sources, as well as secondary, to entirely display the connections to the Cold War.

In light of the findings in the third and fourth chapters, I argued that both Turkey and Greece regarded the Cyprus issue within the confines of their respective national interests. At the same time, however, there is a discernible recognition in both states for the need to address the problem bearing in mind the realities of the Cold War. They had no doubt that the policies they would adopt towards Cyprus were to affect not only Cyprus, but also their homelands. Inonu's reluctance to risk the lives of "30 million Turks for 120 thousands Turkish Cypriots" is a clear proof of it (Erim, 1975, p.383). Likewise, Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos's refusal to be manipulated by Makarios in respect of Cyprus; should be evaluated in the same vein.

In these chapters that explore the Turkish and Greek perspectives in details, both American and Soviet policies were of great importance, and thus, examined as comprehensively as possible. Westad (2007) asserts that "the most crucial aspects of the Cold War were neither military nor strategic, nor Europe-centered, but connected to political and social development in the Third World" (p.396). In the leadership of its first President Makarios, the Republic of Cyprus became an ardent supporter of the non-alignment movement. For these two superpowers that assessed the Cyprus

issue from the Cold War perspective and developed policies in this manner, Cyprus remained a key aspect to the power balance in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A potential vacuum in this region could have had dire consequences on a global scale. Nonetheless, as long as their interests were not too much at stake, both superpowers refrained from undermining détente over smaller incident that fell within a “grey area” compared to more vital priorities. In this case, that grey area was Cyprus (Stergiou, 2007, p.98).

The US initially refused to be part of the Cyprus problem, but even when it did, preventing further Soviet influence on the island sufficed. UN internal discussions over Cyprus point to a considerable shortcoming in American diplomacy. But the main US concern about Cyprus at this point was simply to prevent Turkey and Greece from waging war against one another, and for this purpose, the United States did not hesitate to take steps as high as the presidential level. In this sense, the crises of 1964 and 1967 could be seen as a success for American diplomacy because both crises were ultimately averted.

American achievements do not necessarily follow the conclusion that the Soviets were at a loss. While the United States did not want a war between its two allies, the Soviets struggled to take advantage of a turmoil that would emerge in the Southeastern flank of NATO, and to improve its relations with Turkey and Greece. Given the Soviet aim, the remarkable effect of the détente period cannot be underestimated. It would not be surprising to argue that the bipolarity of the Cold War international system provided the Third World countries always with an opportunity of gaining the backing of a superpower (Westad, 2007, p.399).

Accordingly, Cyprus, under Makarios’s leadership never ceased to take advantage of this very fact. Likewise, the beginning of the period of détente enabled the Western

or Eastern bloc countries to reach out to one another or even the bloc leaders. At this very point constituted the Soviets a critical trump card for Turkey and Greece with respect to the Cyprus dispute which had been earlier regarded as an intra-NATO problem.

Connected tightly to their national causes, Turkey and Greece wanted to see the United States unconditionally side with themselves. However, instead of taking sides with a party, the Cyprus policy of the US was based on conflict prevention, which caused considerable discomfort to its NATO allies. The slackening of Cold War tension in the process of détente turned this discomfort into the development of relations with the Soviets. From that time on, the Soviet Union remained an unignorable option for these two countries, especially when Americans failed to fulfill the wishes of one or the other. Turco-Soviet rapprochement following the 1964 crisis and the acceleration of anti-American attitude in Greece, which did not receive full support from the US in the 1964 crisis, are concrete examples of this evaluation. However, it would fair to suggest that, in the end, Greece took better advantage of the crisis compared to Turkey.

The coup d'état in Greece in 1967 stroke a major blow to the Greek relations with the Soviet Union and made the US the only power to gain support. Turkey, on the other hand, continued its relations with the Soviets at full steam. Furthermore, it took diplomatic steps towards the Third World countries and tried to strengthen the Turkish position in the UN. The deterioration of the relations between Greece and the Soviet Union can be claimed to strengthen the Turkish position in Cyprus. For, it was very difficult for Moscow to rely on the Greek junta that they were sure to receive American support. At this point, the value of Turkey after the loss of Greece

further increased in the eyes of the Soviets, which Turkey was to expertly capitalize on in the years ahead.

The 1974 crisis is full of differences in every sense. Firstly, the Greek-Greek Cypriot relations, which retained close ties in the pre-1967 period, have come to a standstill. Especially in the early 1970s, the Greek junta attempted several times to assassinate Makarios, and the Archbishop managed to survive each time. In its fight against Makarios, the Greek junta did not hesitate to take advantage of the Cold War atmosphere, and labelled the Greek Cypriot leader as a communist in order not to ward off an American reaction and even to gain its support. The Junta regime was losing its domestic and international legitimacy each passing day. In such circumstances, Greece, which organized a coup in the island in order to get rid of Makarios permanently and increase its credibility through enosis, lit the fuse of a greater crisis. Covering up its military and diplomatic deficiency that it suffered greatly in the previous crises, Turkey informed the Soviets of its intention on the island. As discussed in Chapter Three, the Soviets refrained from targeting Turkey, either militarily or diplomatically, following the Turkish military operations, and blamed NATO for the incidents.

Turkey was well ahead in 1974 compared to the 1964 crisis. Considering the diplomatic reactions of the superpowers as well as across the globe, it achieved a greater success in eliminating all obstacles to land on Cyprus. As may be recalled, in 1964, the Soviets threatened to use force in case the Turks intervened in the island. What is worse, the US gave the impression that it would leave its NATO ally alone in the face of a Soviet aggression. Feeling of isolation and disappointment caused by the American lack of support had prompted the Turks to improve their relations with the Soviets, which in turn helped provide the favorable conditions for a Turkish

military operation. On the other hand, Greece, which had explicit Soviet and indirect American support in 1964, was left with no Soviet backing a decade later. Its dependence on the US, the only supporter it had, restricted the Greek range of motion in 1974. Therefore, Greece lacked the means to pursue the very policy of minimizing its relative military weakness against Turkey through the support it received from the superpowers.

The post-intervention period did not put an end to Cold War power politics in terms of Turkey's or Greece's attitudes towards the island. They continued to seek support from the superpowers for their own interests when needed. Likewise, their motives behind attracting the superpowers to Cyprus, through using its geopolitical importance in the Mediterranean and proximity to the Middle East, lingered on in the years after 1974. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 only increased the vital regional importance of the island (Müftüleri-Bac, 1999, p.567).

There is no doubt that the breakup of the Soviet Union and consequently, the end of the Cold War led to crucial changes in the international relations. The United States came out as the winner of the superpower rivalry and had no Soviet adversary to fight against any longer. The communist threat faded away and the containment policy was therefore irrelevant. Despite the lack of another superpower to counterbalance in the region, the United States, as Müftüleri-Bac (1999) puts it in *The Cyprus Debacle: What the Future Holds*, considered Cyprus crucial this time for its new containment policy towards well-armed, aggressive Middle Eastern countries, for the safe transfer of oil, and the stability of the region (p.567).

Hence, small power diplomacy, in other respects, did not break with its routine. Greece and Turkey still sought ways to capitalize on the United States and newfound Russian Federation. On January 4, 1997, the Greek-Cypriot government announced that it would buy S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia (Güney, 2004, p.35). The reason for the purchase was reportedly a possible Turkish threat and expansion on the island. Turkey declared that it would not let the deployment of the missiles, threatening to take military action if required. Anxious in the face of the developments, the United States stated that the purchase may inflame tensions and risk a conflict on the island. The Russians thought that they were not to be blamed for the longstanding discomfort on the island (Güney, 2004, p.36). The purchase of the missiles was indeed preceded by the 1993 Greek-Greek Cypriot Joint Defense Doctrine, which points to Greece's continued interest beyond the Cold War (Müftüler-Bac, 1999, p.566). In consequence, despite major changes in global affairs in the 1990s, conflicting parties of the 1964, 1967 and 1974 crises remained the same, maintaining their underlying objectives.

5.2. Contribution

Existing scholarship has a plethora of serious historical research on Cyprus, covering almost any part of the island's history. This thesis sought to bridge only a small but crucial part of our recent history. In that sense, the purpose of this thesis was not to challenge existing interpretations but to re-contextualize the Cyprus problem within its broader Cold War background by looking at the relations between the *dramatis personae*, particularly Turkey and Greece. There is no doubt that future studies would seek to do the same by looking at a larger archival database as they become available. Limitations of archival work in Russia and the absence (rather, closure of Soviet archival holdings) still prevents a much fuller understanding of

Moscow's intentions. But even without the Russian or Greek language sources, what this thesis essentially illustrated would hopefully inspire more research on the Cold War, particularly in relatively more peripheral regions like Cyprus.

The emergence of détente, as Westad (2007) puts it in *The Global Cold War*, encouraged the superpowers to reduce their direct intervention in the Third World, in particular in cases where they would have to face one another (p.197). This superpower policy may explain to some extent why the US, as well as the Soviet Union, kept from getting more – that is, militarily – involved in the Cyprus crises. Stimulating an unprecedented tension on the island vis-à-vis the previous disputes, the 1974 crisis was a spectacular test of détente. The big two, ultimately, managed to pass the test and proved their loyalty to détente. In other words, perhaps, they then demonstrated their reluctance to annihilate the prevailing state of affairs.

Cyprus, nevertheless, was not the only testing ground for détente. The Cold War global affairs were full of many disputes among various nations. Geographically close to Cyprus, the Arab-Israeli conflict posed a substantial danger to détente and brought the superpowers several times to the brink of war. The improving Soviet relations with the Arab states put Israel in a special position in the eyes of the Americans. Israel was backed up to stop and contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East (Fouskas, 2005, p.52). Establishing a relationship between Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Vassilis K. Fouskas (2005) asserts that Cyprus had to remain within the Western orbit so as to make the defense of Israel easier (p.56). Indeed, it would not be very difficult to relate a Cold War event to another. In this respect, a comparative research to be conducted in the future connecting Cyprus to any other Cold War dispute may result in an intriguing and important contribution to the literature. That is to say that the US refrained from directly intervening in the Middle

East; instead, it chose to engage in a cold war through Israel. The Soviet Union followed a very similar path and sought to increase its influence in the region under the cover of military assistance to Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria. The wars of 1967 and 1973, respectively called the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, indicated two fragile moments in the period of détente. Willing to expand their spheres of influence, the superpowers kept up their commitment to the rules of détente in both cases.

Furthermore, what this thesis demonstrates is a good case study for the roles of small states in the Cold War era. As stated several times in the previous chapters, Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus policies of which have been examined in this thesis under the influence of the superpower rivalry, always bore in mind the very realities of the Cold War atmosphere. However, these small states somehow managed to force the US and the USSR to adopt new tactics on and around the Cyprus dispute as well. Therefore, the two former were not only the affected but also affecting actors, illustrating the importance of the role of small states in the Cold War period. In this respect, it would be fair enough to argue that the conduct of similar, small-power-based researches in the future would considerably contribute to the small state literature.

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