Introduction

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We live in a time of enormous contradictions, of dualities that are moving people and societies in opposite directions. Some paradigms are coming undone and yet others are as fixed as ever. Changes and transformations are pervasive and yet constancies persist. Globalizing processes are accelerating and yet localizing processes remain powerful. Many nations and states are weakening and yet others are undiminished in their competence. Wealth is expanding and yet poverty is omnipresent. New technologies are adding to the pleasures and comforts of daily life and yet insecurities are ubiquitous. Regions are unifying and yet others are mired in conflict and war. People are becoming ever more skillful and yet they are marked by a sense of losing control over their lives. The world’s prime superpower is flexing its muscles and yet it is forced to seek assistance from the United Nations.

Tensions and ambiguities are prime consequences of these contradictions, and some of the main ones constitute the focus of the following chapters. We collectively seek to comprehend the changing paradigms that are altering the structures of world politics and adding new issues to the global agenda. More specifically, we are concerned with the impact of globalization on the conduct of international affairs, on the capacities of states, and on the security of both peoples and their collectivities. The various authors do not share similar perspectives on such matters, but the differences among them make for lively writing and provocative ideas that are bound to be clarifying for the reader.

More specifically, differences can be discerned over whether the course of events are overtaking nations and their states and leading to some of their competencies being superseded by activist nongovernmental organizations and local authorities. Some of the contributors argue that world affairs continue to be a state-dominated system, but others highlight ways in which the system has been undermined by the dynamics that have unfolded since the end of the Cold War and that, in effect, have led to a bifurcation of global structures into state-centric and multicentric worlds. One focus in this regard is the impact of global terrorism on the so-called security dilemma of states. None of the authors denies that the advent of terrorism on a global scale constitutes a major
alteration of international structures that calls into question the nature of individual and collective security. But they differ over whether this and the military responses it has evoked are the only major sources of pervasive insecurity, with some contending that widespread poverty and discrepancies between the developed and developing worlds are no less significant as dynamics that underlie the insecurities now intruding on individual, national, and global well-being. And throughout this book there is a preoccupation with the extent to which globalization has served as a source of terrorism and insecurity.

Inasmuch as the dynamics of globalization continue to unfold at a rapid rate, estimating the ways in which it has fomented positive and negative transformations is not a simple matter. Much depends on how globalization is conceptualized. For some it is seen as primarily a set of economic processes, a paradigmatic transformation that, in turn, has fostered social, political, and cultural changes. Others perceive a more complex paradigmatic shift in which no single dynamic is perceived as the prime source of change. Rather, causal dynamics are conceived as overlapping and mutually reinforcing, with the social, political, and cultural dynamics interacting with and shaping economic processes as much as they are shaped by these processes.

A brief review of the thrusts of the various chapters serves to highlight these various themes and the different approaches to them. The book is divided into four sections that focus, respectively, on reconceptualizing security, state transformations, regional reflections, and emerging international patterns. The chapters were papers first delivered at an international Conference on Globalization and National Security convened in Ankara, Turkey, late in June 2002 and sponsored by the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) and its director, Dr. Ümit Özdağ. All the papers were subsequently revised in response to suggestions made during the conference deliberations and subsequently by the editors.

**RECONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY?**

The three chapters in Part I offer different perspectives on modern-day security. The chapter by Mohammed Ayoob, “Security in the Age of Globalization: Separating Appearance from Reality,” argues that globalization is overestimated. He views globalization rhetoric as a deliberate attempt by the realist northern world to disguise a still realist world and at the same time further its dominance over the South. Ayoob’s analysis springs from a state-centric perspective in the sense that he believes in the resilience of the state and that it remains as the primary starting point for International Relations (IR) paradigms. New security concepts such as human, societal, and environmental security are seen as secondary to state security.
Assuming a very different perspective, Ken Booth’s chapter, “Two Terrors, One Problem,” presents globalization as a real, transformative phenomenon with concrete consequences. He sees the interaction between the state-centric and multicentric worlds as producing largely negative consequences. In so doing, he disavows state-centrism and embraces the new era of globalization. Booth believes that the state has to share its space with increasingly powerful and numerous other types of actors. Thus, the state is likely to be challenged in its relations with society, which is being empowered by globalization. Even though his analysis reveals a conflicting relationship between the security outcomes of the state-centric world (state security) and those of globalization (human security), Booth warns us to avoid either/or thinking (e.g., security vs. ethics, us vs. them, politics vs. economics).

T.V. Paul’s chapter, “The National Security State and Global Terrorism: Why the State Is Not Prepared for the New Kind of War,” treats global terrorism as a key manifestation of a transformed, globalized, and insecure environment. While he asserts that the traditional threats and responses within the state-centric system remain intact, he also sees these same mechanisms as being challenged by an outside threat. He portrays 9/11 as part of an asymmetric strategy; a new level of threat is seen as emerging from the multicentric world and striking at the state-centric world, which is unprepared to respond to such a “nonfrontal” hit. Accordingly, Paul proposes revisions of four foundations of military strategy: offense, defense, deterrence, and compellence. Globalization in this chapter is seen as having given new impetus to certain old security threats. By affecting their formats and magnitudes, globalization turns the old threats into new ones capable of threatening the old, state-centric system. He perceives the multicentric world as having produced a threat capable of shaking the state-centric, “Clausewitzian” understanding of world affairs.

**STATE TRANSFORMATIONS**

Part II focuses particularly on the state itself and its responses to globalization. Mark Brawley’s chapter, “The Rise of the Trading State Revisited,” examines a question posed by Richard Rosecrance in the mid-1980s. In considering state choices between trading strategies and strategies of conquest, Brawley proposes that dramatic changes in military technology, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, should cause us to reconsider the findings of Rosecrance’s earlier work. Interestingly, he argues that the state’s traditional security orientations and aggressiveness, rather than being called into question by and whittled down by globalization’s effects, may in some ways be increased.

Georg Sørensen’s chapter, “State Transformation and New Security Dilemmas,” begins with the basic argument that the classical security dilemma
argument that Herz described as a “vicious circle of security and power accumulation” is no longer appropriate or adequate to explain every state's security dilemmas because of subsequent changes in the nature of states. With the transformation of states, new security dilemmas emerge. Sørensen proceeds to identify three different state types and the corresponding shifts in economic, political, and “nationhood” security dilemmas that states encounter as they undergo transformations from “modern” states to “postmodern” ones. He focuses his analysis particularly on two of the three state types outlined, the postmodern state and the weak postcolonial state.

Ersel Aydınli’s chapter, “Anarchy Meets Globalization: A New Security Dilemma for the Modernizing State,” follows up on Sorensen’s discussion by looking in depth at the dynamics of the modern state’s transformation in response to the pressures posed by political globalization and the security dilemma. His particular focus is the modern state of the developing world, which he identifies as the “second” or “modernizing” world. His model postulates that these modern state structures, pressured simultaneously by the power-diffusing effects of globalization and power-centralizing demands of security agendas, frame a dual agenda of securitization and desecuritization that develops into an institutionalization of hard and soft state structures—a state-level adaptation to the tensions between state and multicentric worlds. States seek to centralize their power to better manage the transformation, but this tendency conflicts with the power diffusion agenda of societal actors. Thus, the model also suggests that the new security dilemma for transforming modern states is about the management and safety of power diffusion.

REGIONAL REFLECTIONS

Part III consists of three regional case studies. The first is Alexander Sergounin’s chapter entitled “Global Challenges to Russia’s National Security: Any Chance for Resisting/Bandwagoning/Adapting/Contributing to an Emerging World Order?” What comes through in this chapter is a clear reflection of the distinction between the state-centric and multicentric perspectives or, as Sergounin calls them, “hard” and “soft” agendas. These two perspectives are viewed as being competitive, if not conflictual. They highlight tensions between the old and new worlds that mark Russia’s security concepts—at least at the level of discourse. By analyzing and comparing security documents from the Yeltsin and Putin eras, Sergounin traces the swing between a more multicentric security conceptualization in 1997 (human, environmental security) and a sharp reversal toward state security in 2000.

The second of the regional cases is Bahgat Korany’s chapter on the Arab Middle East and North Africa (AMENA), “Globalization and (In)security in AMENA: A Contextual Double-Pronged Analysis.” Korany analyzes regional
security questions in a balanced manner, giving due consideration to traditional security issues and new security agendas such as societal security and desertification. He offers the interesting observation that the new security challenges, although highly acute and threatening, have been overshadowed by traditional ones such as the Arab–Israeli conflict. The two are presented as being in a dichotomous relationship, though when traditional security issues cool off for brief periods, the new issues spring to the fore. He also touches on the uneven distribution of globalization benefits as a source of a number of new insecurities at the domestic level.

The last of the regional studies is Ole Wæver’s “The Constellation of Securities in Europe.” In this chapter, Wæver explains the dynamics of the EU-centered European Security Complex by applying securitization and regional security theories. He argues that moving away from a state-centric security understanding does not necessarily mean that a state or community has abandoned security and become desecuritized. Europe may be desecuritized in terms of state security, but it is still highly securitized in terms of other forms of security—as he puts it, Europe is “in the grip of security, even if in unusual forms.” One of those forms, interestingly, may be Europe’s own past. Wæver is in this sense skeptical about the extent to which globalization has actually changed traditional security concepts in Europe, given the region’s continued preoccupation with its past as a security challenge.

**EMERGING INTERNATIONAL PATTERNS**

Part IV draws on various aspects and perspectives of the themes of globalization, security, and the state, and explores various implications for emerging international patterns in world affairs. The section leads off with a chapter by Barry Buzan entitled “The Security Dynamics of a 1 + 4 World.” Buzan sets out to understand the security dynamics of the post–Cold War world. He first presents various possible scenarios involving the distribution of superpower(s), great power(s), and regional powers, and asserts that the most likely outcome is one of continued “1 + 4,” in which the United States remains as the sole superpower, with China, Russia, Japan, and the EU classified as great powers. Although he does not directly focus on globalization processes or other challenges to the state-centric system, his analysis nevertheless indirectly suggests several ways in which an emergent multicentric world is competing with its state-centric counterpart.

David Goldfischer’s chapter, “Prospects for a New World Order,” develops a very different perspective. In light of the post-9/11 war on terrorism, he reconsiders E. H. Carr’s 1940s inquiry into the combining of power and morality to create a peaceful world order. In so doing, Goldfischer focuses on the “capitalist security community” (CSC), generally composed of businessmen,
scholars, state leaders, and their supporters, whose interests and security lie in the continuing spread of a free market economic system and Western values. On the one hand, he reveals the tremendous power of these actors in the multicentric world. On the other hand, the state-centric system and the processes of globalization are posited as inextricably linked, since for most of the world the ideological, economic, and security interests of both converge and are supported by the CSC.

The final chapter is James N. Rosenau's introspection on the relevance of the post-9/11 world for his turbulence model. Entitled "Turbulence and Terrorism: Reframing or Readjusting the Model?," he starts by pointing out that the events and subsequent effects of 9/11 require us to question existing theories of world politics. In particular, the nature of those events highlights a need to reconsider how we should think about security. Rosenau's model is founded on an understanding of change at the macro, micro, and micro/macro levels of aggregation. Change at the macro level refers to what Rosenau calls a "bifurcation of global structures" that differentiates the state-centric and multicentric worlds. The micro level refers generally to the individual, and the micro/macro level to links and interactions between individuals and their collectivities. The model presumes constant change sustained through interaction among the levels. Rosenau concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks are consistent with the premises of the turbulence model, that they are expressive of a war between a hegemon and actors in the multicentric world, thus revealing the disaggregated and bifurcated global structures at the core of the turbulence model. Even the one point that seemed early on to run counter to the model, the united surge of post-9/11 support in the United States for the state, has faded in the years since the attacks. An increasing questioning of authority, consistent with the model, has become ever more prominent today.

In sum, the reader is embarking on an exciting journey through the concepts, ideas, and processes that lie at the heart of world politics in the present era. It is an intellectual journey with twists and turns that mirror the course of events and lead one to pondering the best way to assess how they unfold.