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
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Anarchy Meets Globalization

A New Security Dilemma for the Modernizing State

Ersel Aydinli

The mainstream of globalization and the state literature theorizes that state capacity is undergoing a transformation; however, it has been unable to operationalize the dynamics of the change. This chapter attempts to address that gap by exploring how states, which have been designed in reaction to the state-centric system and its primary demand of survival at home and abroad, respond to the pressures of globalization and localization.¹ The conflictual core of the transformation, therefore, is understood as occurring between the forces of power maximization and centralization, and the accelerating forces for power diffusion. To understand the transformation, we must ask: how is national power/capacity reconfigured when faced with the power diffusion impact of globalization and the power maximization demands of internal and external security dilemmas?²

The primary determinants of the traditional state-centric international system have been security concerns, both external and internal. These concerns kept states largely occupied with geopolitics and anarchic conditions in their immediate environments, as well as in the global system. In order to curb security threats and maintain a constant position of readiness, the national forces of a state had to be kept centralized and concentrated—though, of course, the degree to which this was true varied according to the acuteness of the nation's conceptualization of security threats. To achieve centralized and thus maximized power, a ruling elite not only had to keep security issues and rhetoric prominent on the public agenda, but it also had to seek to enhance the existing institutionalization of the security establishment. This process, which could be labeled as securitization, is one through which everything becomes linked to the idea of national security. National security becomes the primary directive when assessing the feasibility of any major political project requiring power reallocation at the national level. Ultimately, this led to the creation of

security-oriented nation-states and, in extreme examples, to garrison states. The power pattern, securitization process, and resulting state type are shown in the first row of Figure 6.1.

The third row of Figure 6.1 outlines the new epoch of globalization. This new epoch has enabled a mobility of resources, ideas, and individuals, and thus empowered new actors above and below the state level. These new actors, with their varied agendas, produce demands for a sharing of national power and a consequent pressure for decentralization. The implication of this process in terms of security, can be labeled as desecuritization. This term should not imply an automatic minimizing of security issues, but rather a lowering of the 'prime directive' status of security over all other issues, and a reconsidering of security as one of several major needs to be satisfied by national governance. Achieving this involves increasing the transparency of and civilian control over the determining of threats and the implementing of national security policies. States that seem to be successfully managing this process can be identified as Western or globalized states, such as those of Western Europe and North America.

Many modernizing states³ in particular, however, seem to fall somewhere in between these two worlds, as expressed by the middle row of the diagram. As such, these states are forced to try and balance contradicting patterns of power. The resulting conflictive process of power reconfiguration needs to be further explored theoretically in order to project its possible implications.

THE GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE DEBATE

Hyperglobalists and Rejectionists

A first group of scholars, "hyperglobalists," claim that globalization represents a new epoch of human history in which traditional nation-states have become unnatural or even impossible business units in the new global economy (Albrow, 1997; Cox, 1997; Guéhenno, 1995; Luard, 1990; Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996; Wriston, 1992). Based mostly on economic globalization, this strand of the debate stresses the "denationalization" of national economics by the powerful transnational networks of production, trade, and finance.

As opposed to the champions of globalization, its skeptics (e.g., Hall, 1996; Hirst, 1997; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1998) first make their argument that globalization is not new by drawing on statistical findings on world trade and on the level of economic interdependence in the nineteenth century. They imply that state capacity survived those periods and was perhaps even strengthened. They see intensification of interconnectedness as heightened levels of internationalization, which again emphasizes the key role of national capacities. This line of argument essentially rejects the popular under-

| | Pattern of Power | Resulting State Power Agenda | State Type |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| State-Centric world/security dilemmas | Power maximization centralization | Securitization | Security-oriented nation-state |
| Modernizing world | Turbulent balancing of the two | Conflictive power reconfiguration | Torn state |
| Multicentric world globalization | Power diffusion/ decentralization | Desecuritization | Western/globalized |

FIGURE 6.1. A Taxonomy of State Power Configurations in the Modernizing World

standing that the power of national governments is being undermined in the current era by economic internationalization and global interconnectedness (Krasner, 1993; 1995).

The Transformationalists

In between the total erosionist and statist arguments lies the transformationalist strand of thought regarding the fate of state capacity when confronted with globalization. The transformationalist approach is by nature closer to that of the hyperglobalizers than the rejectionists since it subscribes to the starting conviction that in the new epoch globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political, and economic changes that are reshaping states, societies, and the world order (Giddens, 1990). According to this group of scholars, globalization dynamics may not be new, but they are certainly existing at unprecedented levels, and are creating a world of affairs in which no clear distinction exists between international and domestic lines to which every actor in world affairs feels the need to adopt and adjust (Cammilleri & Falk, 1992; Rosenau, 1990; Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996).

While the direction of the globalization impact is not fixed within the transformationalist approach (Mann, 1997) and, therefore it does not include claims about future trajectories of globalization and its impact, these scholars' core emphasis is that globalization is a powerful transformative force that introduces a "massive shake-out" for the subjects—including the states.

The transformationalists' main argument regarding state capacity is that contemporary globalization is reconstituting and reengineering the nature and

configurations of national governments. This argument does not claim that the territorial frontiers have no political or military significance, but rather it accepts that these issues have become increasingly challenged in an era of intensified globalization. The major basis for this conviction is that the world is not just state-centric or only state governed. Rather, as authority becomes diffused among public and private agencies at the local, national, regional, and global levels, nation-states are not the principal form of authority in the world (Rosenau, 1997).

States and national governments, being subject to these pressures, devise strategies to adapt to the new conditions. Distinctive strategies lead to different forms of states—from the neoliberal minimal state to varying types of developmental states to the “catalytic” state, in which the government is a facilitator of coordinated and collective action. What is proposed here, therefore, is that states adapt and transform to become more activist in determining their destinies (Rosenau, 1997).

There are several arguments why the transformationalist approach is the most appropriate to explain the dynamics of current world affairs. First, the hyperglobalist argument that a perfectly competitive global economy is emerging (or has already emerged) is an unlikely assumption since we have yet to achieve perfect national economies. In other words, a fully integrated global market with a minimized, if not completely diminished role for states, does not represent the true nature of the new epoch.

The rejectionist approach also has shortcomings. The empirical evidence on which this approach relies can easily be interpreted differently. For example, even if the trade/GDP ratios in the 1890s were higher than the ones in the 1990s, this reveals little about the social and political transformations to which this trade led. To draw an analogy, Chinese speakers may constitute a larger number worldwide than English speakers, but this does not make Chinese a global language (Held & McGrew, 1993). It is clear that the expanding liberal economy is also attached to the expansion of liberal democracy, which implies that the qualitative implications of these transformations must be studied in order to understand the phenomenon better.

As opposed to these two approaches, the transformationalist understanding does not see any fixed future in the globalization debate. There is neither a perfect global economy nor state-system dominated global changes. Moreover, contrary to the hyperglobalists and rejectionists, the transformationalists do not see globalization as a singular process (economic or cultural) or as a linear movement to a known destiny. The dynamics of globalization may include progress as well as retreat and reversals, and they can happen in very different ways in all major areas of life, including political, military, environmental, or public policy. Most important, integration and fragmentation, convergence and divergence, can all occur simultaneously in a highly intercon-

nected manner, so that states, in particular, will have to find their way in adapting not only to globalization but to “framegration.”

In addition to the previous arguments, the diversity of state types and of capacity levels in current world affairs requires a flexible approach, one that emphasizes the differentiated processes that are also influenced by other realities of life, such as security. The transformationalist approach is particularly suited for a study that is concerned with states of the modernizing world since the states and national capacities in this realm seem to be the most in transformation and also the most entrapped between the new world and the traditional one. The vast spectrum of the degree of development in these states is also an indication of transformation and of being subject to framegration.

Has the transformationalist approach achieved all that it could to explain the transformation of the state within framegration/globalization? The answer, quite simply, is no. Perhaps because they have been occupied within the debate by establishing their strand of the argument, but most scholars have tried to establish the approach in their work rather than to operationalize it. We are left still not knowing how the transformation actually occurs. We now know that there are different types of states—for example, neoliberal or developmental—we now know even that we can label different nation-states as security states, sovereign states, or democratic states, which are most of the time intertwined and overlapped (Clark, 1999). What we do not know is how these different characteristics of state identity and capacity coexist or compete and, most important, how they transform from one to the other. This leads to the core inquiry of this chapter: the dynamics of the transformation of the state capacity and identity at the domestic level.

What, then, are these important transnational phenomena that are subjecting state power to both integration and fragmentation and therefore imposing a need to transform its structure in order to better adapt? In the current age and for most modernizing world states, these phenomena are political globalization’s reforming impact and the resilient forces of traditional security dilemmas. These two elements are particularly crucial to analyze since their ultimate impact is about national power—whether they are forcing it to diffuse or to maximize, to decentralize or centralize. Once the national power configurations and the nature of a state have been changed, one can then truly talk about a transformation of state identity and capacity and of global transformation.

The Modernizing World

The so-called modernizing world is considered here as largely synonymous with the democratizing world since political globalization (i.e., pressure for democratization and liberalization) is one of the starting points for my

arguments. The idea of a “democratizing world” stems from the postulation that the world political system can be divided into two or more spheres in which the rules of the game as well as the types and natures of the actors may differ from each other. By making such categorizations, we not only can present a more accurate picture of reality but can also provide a more convenient base for intellectual exercise to describe, explain, and possibly predict the external and domestic dynamics within these spheres (for similar views, see Ayoob, 1995, and Buzan, 1998).

A further and equally important advantage of such a classification is to help tackle better the problem of broad but unjustified definitions of the developing world. Since the end of the Cold War, the Second World is considered to have disappeared. Its subsequent incorporation into the traditional Third World exacerbated the problem of definition by widening the already existing degree of variation and diversity.

One common concept in the classifications of world political systems is the type and nature of the unit actor: the state. The concept of the state warrants further elaboration since a state-based classification scheme is another starting point of this inquiry. Since democratization as a way of responding to political globalization is another variable, not only the type of the state but the degree of its political development is also important for this research. This means determining how the relationship between the state and the society is structured; in other words, how are “power” and “consent” mixed? This question is significant because this domestic characteristic, which was emphasized by Hobbes and Machiavelli, has a strong role in the interrelationships between unit level factors and global processes (William, 1996). This link is also important when categorizing world spheres according to the type of the states because the management of power without the exercise of force has become the true measure of states’ political capacity (Jackman, 1996).

The assumption here is that modernizing world states are not fundamentally different from Western ones (since we at least know that they want to progress into a similar ‘successful’ structure—the common nation-state) rather, they are located at different stages of a developmental process (Buzan, 1991). The criteria, therefore, for the differentiation is the level of development toward modern statehood. In terms of this research, the measurement of these criteria could be seen as the degree of ability to balance the needs of effectiveness (power) and consent (legitimacy).

Within this measurement, one could conceive of the world political system as follows: in the first sphere, also known as the core, the state is powerful enough to exercise force to gain consent, but does not and can not, due to the level of accountability it is subject to from society. What we have is a state that is weak in terms of accountability to society, and a society strong enough to exercise considerable power over its state. This category is similar to what Buzan and Segal (1996, 1998) or Sørensen (this volume) label the post-

modern state, which has a much more tolerant attitude toward cultural, economic, and political interaction, and define[s] a much narrower range of things as threats to national security. In the postmodern state 'civil society' has, in a sense, more influence than the government—fitting with the criterion of high degree of accountability of the state to society.

This categorization also resembles somewhat Holm and Sørensen's (1995) "operational sovereignty," which refers to limits on sovereignty that states choose to place on themselves. In other words, state control over institutional or issue domains that they are willing to give up or trade in return for greater influence at the system level. If a state is currently in a strong position or if it carefully uses its bargaining power, it may be able to influence decisions/changes/trends at the system level.

At the opposite end of the spectrum it is difficult to speak of any type of accountability due to the poorly developed political entities and incoherent (sociologically and politically) societies. In these units, the state is so premature that, even if it wanted, it would not be able to use force to gain consent. This is also due to the level of fragmentation in the society. What we have in this sphere is a weak state and fragmented society (Ayoob, 1995). This is similar to what Buzan calls a premodern state, or what Holm and Sørensen refer to as negative sovereignty. While such a state may aspire to becoming a modern state, it is prevented by the weakness at both the political and societal levels. With essentially no room for a wide sense of accountability, there is more of an anarchy than a hierarchy within the state. Some examples of such states are located primarily in Africa and Central Asia (e.g., Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire; Buzan, 1998).

In between these two groups is the third type of state in which the balance between effectiveness and consent/legitimacy is still biased toward effectiveness/power. In other words, the state and the representative governments continue to enjoy strong prerogatives, either constitutionally or not, and are able to use force to gain the necessary consent from society—a strong state and weak/fragmented society in which the state and power-holders are not highly accountable to society. Although there is some accountability, it is between weak political figures—for example, the products of imperfect elections—and society. The state itself is not accountable in a number of domains.

This is similar to what Buzan labels a modern state, or Holm and Sørensen categorize as a positive sovereignty. Such a state desires to become a postmodern one, but has not yet been able to overcome the improper accountability problem. According to Buzan, the major characteristics of this type of state is the "strong government control over society" (1998: 221). He adds that these modern states typically define a wide range of military, political, economic, and cultural factors as threats to national security. The aspirations of these states are not only to become postmodern states but also, and more important, to become great powers, or at least regional hegemony. Some

examples he cites are Iran, Iraq, Russia, China, India, Turkey, and the two Koreas. These status-related intentions, combined with other unit and system-level sources, increase a high degree of vulnerability and pressure for the unit actors and their policies. Basically, in the regions in which these states are located, and the international relations in which they take part, classical realist rules remain valid since armed conflicts are still applicable as policy options.

DYNAMICS OF THE TRANSFORMATION

The nature of power in security-oriented nation-states has been based on the idea of power maximization through power centralization. State security bureaucracies grew ever larger during the centralization process, primarily at the expense of a societal role or input. The primacy of state interests and national security reached such a level in some cases that these states can be argued to have become in fact giant security apparatuses, which possessed nations and societies. Thus, a model of a strong state and correspondingly weak society emerged. Global democratization and liberalization waves have targeted this particular state/society relationship by promoting, if not provoking, more societal input in the national governance. Nevertheless, the primacy of national security and the consequent steady securitization of the public agenda by these security apparatuses have been trying to resist against these powerful global liberalizing dynamics.

Due in part to its own internal inefficiencies and as well to the increasingly irresistible attractiveness of global liberalization dynamics, the lowering of the perceived levels of international anarchy and its accompanying vulnerability put the strong state/suppressed society structure to a serious test. Securitization of the public agenda has become much more difficult in these governance structures.

As long as securitization of the public agenda and the consequent allocation of material and psychological national resources remained relatively unquestioned, strong states were able to keep the society and its potential hazards under control. The primacy of national security and the exaggerated characterization of vaguely defined internal and external enemies and threats rendered the fragmented societal structure and its potential demands less relevant and urgent. Therefore, a strong state-fragmented society relationship was able to endure.

One of the major problems of the seeming resistance of the strong state-fragmented society model was that the fragmented nature of the society and its potential demands were only curtailed, but did not necessarily transform in a manner the state elite would like to portray to the outside world or even to their own domestic public opinion. The state elite, and in particular the giant security apparatuses, knew of the potential societal threats, and calculated for

them as a part of the larger security dilemmas they perceived for their states. These considerations, however, viewed these domestic vulnerabilities as potential weak points that might be manipulated by others during the anarchic geopolitical atmosphere between nation-states. Such an understanding provided not only additional bases for the primacy of national security over other domestic public agendas, but also further provoked power centralization at the national level in order to weaken those fragmented societal elements deemed threatening. Most states with such governance structures appeared on the surface as relatively stable nation-states who were prepared to play by the rules of the realist anarchic world. In these states, certain types of gradual and carefully supervised modernization projects were implemented, also in an effort to minimize outside impact and thereby remaining national and protectionist.

In this overall picture, the strong state (centralized power) was the best possible response not only to handle external threats and security dilemmas, but also to cope with potential problems stemming from the fragmented nature of the societies. Relentless securitization was the order of the day.

SECURITY VERSUS LIBERALIZATION

The emergence of the multicentric world, the significant rise in global liberalization (hereafter, political globalization) forces, and most important, the end of the Cold War and the impact this had on reducing the perception of external threats, have led to an environment in which, for many of the modernizing world states, the primary security agendas of the previous world order have become less able to function as determining instruments of public life. First, a general need for some kind of change—most often toward a more democratic form of state/society relations—now appears inevitable and unavoidable. Second, the capacity of security apparatuses to use external threat calculations for domestic securitization has shrunk. Large, strong security apparatuses no longer seem to have a definitive mission, and, moreover, societal interpretations of Western liberal democracies do not look favorably on large roles for states and security apparatuses. The strong state, therefore, is feeling not only systematic pressure from the external and internal environment to downsize and share some of its power or halt some of its functions, but is also facing a society that is more actively demanding a share from the centralized power structure. The weakening process of the strong centralized state has been put into action. Fragmented societal elements can no longer be considered merely potential challenges to national security; these potential threats are already politicized and empowered by economic globalization and are beginning to corner the state power structure.

What does a centralized state structure do to respond to such power demands? One can anticipate first an immediate reflexive move by elites to try




FIGURE 6.2. Locating the Torn States Along the Power Configuration Line

and hold on to their already established prerogatives in the name of stability and the survival of the state. Although this point is important since it can freeze or delay the budding power struggle for an uncertain period, it can ultimately be overcome when the sitting elites or administrators are replaced. Thus, some form of inevitable transformation will occur.

There is more to the story, however, than just power-holding elites resisting domestic power reconfiguration. Though designed to in fact overreact to security issues, the existing state structure now must find a way to, at minimum, preserve its centralized/maximized power structure in order to cope with the combined remaining amount of perceived external threats and the resurfacing of formerly suppressed domestic threats, such as power demands and potentially even secessionist efforts of segments of their fragmented societies.

Ideally, a centralized domestic governance structure should adapt to a decentralized power structure, perhaps even taking on a managerial or supervisory role in the transition process. However, most developing world state security apparatuses do not know how to adapt due to their inherent nature of overreacting to frightening situations of instability. Rather than an ideal response of decentralizing and downsizing while simultaneously maximizing its effectiveness for meeting new security challenges, the strong state structure reacts in its traditional manner of trying to even further maximize and centralize the power configuration at the national level. It is difficult to find an example of an old-world state structure (i.e., garrison states or a variant thereof) with the potential for such a rapid adaptation and transformation process. This is especially true because this new threat demands an immediate securing of the conflictive transformation process to avoid dangerous domestic instability.

There is not sufficient time, therefore, for the nation-state as a whole to produce a new, sophisticated functioning power structure to meet this new challenge.

Thus, security versus liberalization becomes the primary impasse faced by the national governance structure. The state is pressured by power diffusion dynamics that cannot be dismissed, yet there remains the need to preserve if not maximize its power at a time of (over)perceived insecurities. The position of such torn states is expressed in Figure 6.2, which is, in a sense, a dynamic representation of the middle row of the taxonomy in Figure 6.1. Can the necessary transformation for these states occur in a peaceful manner? In the course of such a transformation over issues of power, and in the absence of an overarching agency to manage this tumultuous process, the answer seems to be no. The dynamics of this new security dilemma will be even more acute in those countries in which societal fragmentation levels need significant time to develop cohesive national understandings and structures.

HYPOTHESIZING ON TORN STATE TRANSFORMATIONS

Bifurcation of the National Agenda

The taxonomy and discussion in this chapter suggest certain outcomes that we might expect of such a torn state structure, both at the macro and micro levels, and which can now be used to project certain implications. If power maximization leads to an agenda of securitization, and power diffusion leads to one of desecuritization, then the existence of both forces could lead to a bifurcation of the national agenda into two parts—one belonging to a relatively closed realm that might be labeled as hard politics and include issues such as state unity, sovereignty, geopolitical concerns, foreign policy, and domestic and external security issues. This realm would presumably be controlled by conservative security elite/bureaucrats, and nationalists among the public officials. The second half of the agenda, belonging to a relatively more open realm, might be labeled soft politics, and may include issues such as economic and political liberalization, and domestic links to global elements such as civil society and human rights groups. This realm would likely be run by, for example, political parties, the liberal elite, intellectuals, and the newly emerging, globally linked NGOs.

Duality in Governance

A bifurcation of the national agenda, depending on the context, that is, the level and length of exposure to either or both of the external pressures, the particular qualities of the leadership, or the possible existence and strength of

coalitions, may lead over time to a dual institutionalization of the two political realms. Since the powerful security-minded elite cannot ignore the political globalization impact due to international legitimacy needs and other factors such as IMF financial aid and often embedded modernization drives from within, they can be expected to allow the soft politics realm of civilian governments and political parties to expand—as long as it does not intervene in the hard politics realm. In the extreme case this might be anticipated to lead to a duality in the domestic governance structure that could be deconstructed as an inner state and an apparent state. While the former would remain to respond to the state-centric world demands, the latter would exist to meet increasing globalization pressures.

Increasing State/Society Conflict and Resulting Chronic Governance Crises

One might anticipate certain implications of such a state structure on the level of stability at both the domestic and regional levels. With power relocation and resistance to it remaining the main ingredient of the domestic level agenda, repression and counterinsurgencies would be expected to occur, leading to bumpy transitions to democracy and conflictual domestic settings.

One of globalization's indirect pressures on the modernizing state comes about with the empowering of society in the sense that deepening political globalization can be considered as greater democratization and thus more input from society. Given that in the modernizing countries relevant to this discussion, the state is the existing power center, any empowerment of some other element logically means a reduction or compromising of the state's power—a situation bound to lead to conflict between the two. This confrontational positioning of the state and the societal masses may mean a base for indefinite domestic instability and authority crises in political affairs.

Reemphasizing the Primacy of Internal Threats

An additional projection that can emerge from this research is evidence reemphasizing the primacy of internal security over external security in parts of the modernizing world. This does not mean that these countries are no longer concerned with external security threats. It also does not deny that internal threats are still partly of concern due to their external connections, that is, such threats cause instability and weakness that can be taken advantage of by external rivals and thereby weaken the country within the regional balance of power. However, the research does suggest that internal threat perceptions themselves are becoming more salient in provoking power centralization

needs. In other words, the safety of the inevitable transformation is viewed as being most vulnerable to domestic challenges. As such, survival at home can be seen as almost a prerequisite even for just being an actor in the international system, let alone for playing power politics at the international level.

The New Security Dilemma

Research projects that transformation from more centralized to more diffused state structures is inevitable in the new era. If it is inevitable, it must therefore be managed. Maintaining the stability of this unavoidable transformation when there is a simultaneous combining of power centralization and power diffusion demands can be considered as the source for a new security dilemma facing the state types under discussion in this chapter. In the process of managing this transformation, states must find a balance between the two pressures in which, first, neither influence is excluded to a point that it jeopardizes the stable transformation, and, second, the balance is maintained at a level at which the dynamism of the progress continues.

Once the powerful elite feels that the process of desecuritization has the potential of allowing instability to rise, the basic instinct remains to centralize power in order to most efficiently face these possible challenges. These elite's past practices and experiences of anarchical world understandings, along with existing 'realities' of geopolitical calculations, further facilitate power centralization instincts. If these instincts are materialized, however, the result is bound to clash with the power diffusion requirements of the current era. This clash, therefore, constitutes the new security dilemma with which modernizing world states must cope.

Since the power-holding elite in these states traditionally know how to manage power centralization, the emphasis in dealing with this transformation is understandably on how to manage the power decentralization/diffusion that the new epoch requires. Since power centralization in these countries was traditionally carried out through a securitization process—relying on security's primary role in public life—decentralization can generally be equated with desecuritization. The challenge becomes one of managing and stabilizing the desecuritization process without damaging the traditional mechanisms of power centralization and thus one's sense of national security in a particular country's context.

Conclusion

The preceding theoretical analysis and implications suggest that the dualistic (state-centric and multicentric) structure of the international system generates

certain inevitable transformations between the major forces of these world perspectives. It also suggests that these transformations lead to a type of torn governance structure at the national level. Such potentially unstable yet inevitable transformative processes appear as the major source for the new security dilemmas that these modernizing states face, due to the contradictory instincts of power centralization and power diffusion.

Providing concrete evidence of such turbulent transformations and dualities out of real-life experiences was beyond the scope of this chapter. Future case studies must therefore be conducted to explore in depth the internal nature of this new security dilemma and resulting institutional responses to it. Several countries appear to be facing this dilemma of conflicting globalization and security pressures, such as Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran. To accomplish this task effectively, and reveal the secrets of the black box of the state in transformation, any research of this type must cross disciplinary boundaries between, at minimum, international and comparative politics. At a time when physical borders are reputedly becoming more transient, conceptual boundaries must be at least equally so for a fair reflection of reality.

NOTES

1. These two forces and their corresponding pressures of fragmentation and integration have been suggested to express the transformative dynamics of a new era in world politics—one labeled *fragnetration* (Rosenau, 1997). This chapter focuses on pressures of globalization since they promote the potential for power diffusion and relocation. Localization pressures such as ethnic or nationalist unrest, on the other hand, may actually increase a state's security relevance, and not disturb the accordingly designed state power structure.

2. While various forms of globalization have been identified (Held et al., 1999), this research refers primarily to globalization in its political form. Political globalization is understood here as a consensus on the combined ideas of economic liberalism and liberal democracy and the pressure this creates on states for further democratization and liberalization, which in turn necessitate a diffusion of national power. Focusing on this aspect of globalization is crucial because it is the liberalization impact of political globalization in particular that leads to a reconfiguration of state power structures. Power maximization and centralization may, at least initially, coexist with, for example, economic globalization and liberalization—as evidenced by existing nondemocratic regimes with relatively liberal economies—but is incompatible with political globalization and liberalization pressure. Security dilemmas in the modernizing world are seen as based not only on external vulnerabilities, but also on domestic ones such as regime insecurity issues. This means that traditional states of the modernizing world have to protect themselves from both an external anarchy and an increasing internal one.

3. The modernizing world of Figure 6.1 refers here to those states of the developing world that have long-standing strong state traditions, a history of aspiring to modernize, and are highly concerned with traditional security dilemmas. Examples of such states can be as diverse as China, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Iran, to name a few. The definition is discussed in more detail in the next section.

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