6 Ontological (in)security of ‘included’ citizens

The case of early Republican Turkey (1923–1946)

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Introduction

When considered from today’s vantage point, attempts to create cohesive nation-states through forced migration and/or assimilation of peoples come across as sources of insecurity for all those affected (Krishna 1999). However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both forced migration and assimilation were adopted as conflict-regulation measures. The assumption was that ‘cohesive’ nation-states would be less conflict-prone than others (see Joenniemi Chapter 7). Authors of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) between Turkey and the European great powers adopted such an understanding of conflict regulation when they agreed on exchanging population between Greece and Turkey. In the following years Turkey’s Republican leaders engaged in various spatial, economic and cultural practices in the attempt to create a ‘cohesive’ body politic. In this chapter, we highlight multiple in/securities experienced by myriad peoples in Turkey – including those who were forced to migrate and others who were encouraged to assimilate in the early Republican period. Different from other accounts that have focused on insecurities of those who were forced to immigrate or those who were encouraged to assimilate (see Çelik Chapter 3), we also look at the experiences of ‘model citizens’ of the Republic, those who were fully integrated (and/or assimilated). We utilize the concept of ‘ontological (in)security’ in accounting for the experiences of this latter group who, we argue, were also in/secured as they became less able to live with ‘difference’.

We differ from the literature in another, equally important, sense. Different from those who look at this period in black-and-white terms (i.e. some were secured while others were insecure), we highlight in various shades grey, i.e. multiple in/securities experienced by myriad peoples. In offering this argument, we draw on critical approaches to security that understand the term ‘(in)securing’ to invoke a reflexive notion of security, cognizant of the ways in which our security practices produce insecurity as well as security, for ourselves and for others (Booth 1997; Bigo 2008; Burgess 2011). Through offering a reading of Turkey’s early Republican (1923–1946) citizenship practices as (in)securing peoples, we explore how becoming citizens of a modern nation-state generates both security and insecurity for individuals and social groups – albeit in different
ways. As such, our analysis of the consequences of the Treaty of Lausanne and the new Republic’s citizenship regime highlights their implications in terms of both securing and insecuring.

In offering this argument, we introduce a threefold categorization that distinguishes between those who were not a part of the citizenship regime (those who were ‘excluded’ via Lausanne); those who were (in)secured as they approximated the citizen imaginary of the nation-state (the ‘included’); and those who were a part of the citizenship regime but were (in)secured by virtue of late(r) or limited access to full citizenship rights and/or lack of sense of empowerment to or experience in exercising those rights (‘the included/excluded’; i.e. those whose insecurities the literature has focused upon). In considering the ‘included’, we highlight how it was not only governmental practices per se but also the limits of recognition and respect for ‘difference’ in Turkey’s citizen imaginary that constituted the bounds of their (in)security (as well as the ‘included/excluded’ and the ‘excluded’). While it may come across as counterintuitive to consider the ‘included’ as insecure, they, too, have experienced ontological (in)security in unexpected (and heretofore unacknowledged) ways.

Section I introduces the argument and elaborates on the notions of inclusion and exclusion beyond their customary understandings. Section II analyses governmental practices of citizenship during the early Republican period by looking at the spatial, economic and cultural aspects of a body of practices that sought to create a modern nation-state and a unified body of citizens to populate this state. These practices have secured all citizens through the building of a modern nation-state amidst the ruins of a fallen empire. Myriad citizens were insecured as these very measures narrowed the limits of recognition of and respect for ‘difference’. Insecurities of the included/excluded are widely recognized in the literature (see also Çelik Chapter 3), whereas two aspects remain underemphasized: that the same peoples were both secured and insecured (although in different ways); and that the ‘included’ were also in/secured – not in material but ontological terms. Section III highlights ontological (in)security of the ‘included’. Here we also point to the agency of the ‘included’ to highlight how they played a role in insecuring fellow citizens as they became less able to live with ‘difference’.

From subjection to citizenship: a process of (in)securing

The institution of citizenship regimes against the background of decaying empires or colonial regimes is invariably celebrated as a moment of security. Be that as it may, such periods of transition from subjection to citizenship are riddled with insecurities. Writing about post-colonial contexts, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has argued that the transition from colonial subjects to citizens of newly established nation-states has, on the one hand, allowed recognition of individual rights and liberties while, on the other hand, circumscribed those rights through categories and institutions that were remnants of the colonial machinery. Turkey’s citizens, too, were (in)secured as part of the transition from subjection to citizenship. The new Republic’s citizen imaginary secured peoples as citizens of an independent
and sovereign nation-state. No longer were they subjects of an empire; nor did they face the danger of being subjected to the indirect rule or mandate regimes of European great powers. The Republic’s citizen imaginary also insecured peoples by limiting recognition and respect for difference.

Different from those post-colonial contexts that Mamdani has focused upon, what subverted peoples’ citizenship rights in Turkey during the period under consideration was the Republican leaders’ sense of insecurity vis-à-vis international society. The Republic of Turkey was established on 29 October 1923 against the background of the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1919) and the ‘war of national liberation’ (1919–1922) waged against the European great powers that sought to incorporate Ottoman territories into their own domains following World War I (WWI). Accordingly, a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the international society was not unfounded in that Turkey had just come out of a destructive war of liberation fought against European great powers and their regional proxies. Seeking solace in independence and development, they sought to strengthen the newly founded nation-state both as an idea and as an institution, internally and internationally. On 20 April 1924, the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey (GNA) adopted its first constitution. Governing citizenship was Article No.88: ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish in terms of citizenship’. Sloganized as ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, the citizen imaginary of this period glossed over ethnic and/or religious differences in the hope that virtuous citizens of the Republic would be inspired to unify.

Put differently, what (in)secured Turkey’s citizens at the time was the perceived need to seek security through producing a cohesive body of citizens modelled on the other nation-states of the time. Indeed, Turkey’s citizenship practices in the early Republican era cannot be understood in isolation from the international and historical context. They were not uncharacteristic of the time in that other emerging nation-states engaged in similar practices during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The basis of Turkey’s citizenship regime, i.e. seeking to establish a nation-state on the basis of exclusive notions of religious, ethnic and/or national identity was also shared by international society and not merely newly established states (as with India, see Krishna 1999).

The state-directed movement of ethnic groups was employed at the time as a form of conflict regulation (McGarry & O’Leary 1994). One of the most important techniques for regulating conflict was to move ethnic groups. Treaties ending the wars of this era invariably included clauses governing population exchanges. Groups that were considered to be (potentially) disloyal were relocated from one part of the state to another or were expelled from the state altogether (McGarry 1998, p.613). Those who were not forced to emigrate fled soon after. During 1918–1923, the Ottoman Empire received refugees arriving from the Balkan and Caucasian states and Russia (Shaw 1998). Most immigrants Turkey received between and 1923 and 1950 were objects of demographic engineering practices of the Balkan states (Tekeli 1990).

The Lausanne Treaty was designed with the same rationale in mind. The population exchange between Greece and Turkey (the so-called Mübadele) was
approved by the European international society as a breakthrough attempt at conflict regulation (Beeley 1978; McGarry 1998; McGarry & O’Leary 1994). The point being that we do not mean to judge the early Republican citizenship regime for its imperfect politics of difference. Rather we insist that the Republican leaders’ choice for this particular citizen imaginary over other possibilities should be considered in the context of the notions and practices of citizenship, security and conflict regulation that prevailed at the time. As will be seen below, various insecurities that unfolded since then have laid bare the poverty of searching for security based on pre-given and exclusive notions of identity as such.

Prevailing accounts look at Turkey’s early citizenship regime in one of two ways: by focusing on the founding texts such as the 1924 Constitution, or by focusing on identity politics. Those who focus on founding texts of the Republic point to the 1924 Constitution as marking a moment of security on account of having transformed subject peoples (of the Ottoman Empire) into citizens (of the Republic of Turkey) (Kili & Gözübüyük 2000; Kili 1969; cf. Bayır 2010). Indeed, Article No.88 of the 1924 Constitution made a break with the Ottoman past and laid the foundations of a citizenship regime. While a significant number of non-Muslims had, by then, left for Greece as part of the Mübadele, the remaining Greek Orthodox, Jewish and Armenian Orthodox peoples were formally included in the new citizenship regime as ‘minority’ citizens with equal rights. As such, the citizenship regime of the Republic included all those who lived within its territorial boundaries (with the exception of foreign nationals). Article No.88 was almost entirely adopted from the 1876 Constitution of the Ottoman Empire that read ‘People of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of their religion and race, are Ottoman tebaa [subjects]’. The difference between the two constitutions was unmistakable. The qualifier ‘in terms of citizenship’ was absent from the 1876 Constitution.

Those accounts that focus on founding texts of the Republic acknowledge that there emerged a gap between what the 1924 Constitution laid down on paper and citizenship practices of this era. They nevertheless explain this gap as having been caused by the aberrations of some policy-makers, that is, exceptions to an otherwise inclusive citizenship regime (Kili 1984; Kili 2003; Kili & Gözübüyük 2000).

Those accounts that focus on identity politics have, in turn, maintained that there is an exclusionary pattern to the above-mentioned practices (Yumul 1998; Caymaz 2007; Yeğen 2009). Accordingly they have viewed the early Republican period as a process of insecuring of some. Such practices included the withholding of women’s political rights until 1934; barring of non-Turkish speakers from government and private sector employment for many years; subjecting minority citizens to discriminatory treatment in war-time taxation and conscription; (re)settling immigrants and citizens in line with statist security concerns.

As such, those accounts focusing on identity politics have considered insecurities of some but not all citizens. Furthermore, they viewed these practices as products of demographic engineering practices of successive governments but not as outcomes of a process of state-building and development whereby all citizens were secured and insecured in myriad ways.
In an attempt to go beyond the prevailing accounts that explain the citizens’ predicament as mere aberrations of some policy-makers or demographic engineering, we offer a framework that focuses on the citizenship practices of state and non-state actors and highlights the multiple ways in which Turkey’s peoples were (in)secured. The argument here is that the citizenship regime of the period should be analysed not as a moment of security for all citizens (as accounts that focus on the founding texts argue) or as a process of insecuring of some (as argued by those accounts that focus on identity politics) but a process of (in) securing for all citizens.

In considering myriad insecurities experienced by Turkey’s citizens, we draw upon Étienne Balibar’s (2005, 2008) elaboration on the notions of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, offered against the background of the French banlieue riots in 2005. Dismissing media representation of rioters, who were mostly of North African immigrant origin, as ‘excluded’, Balibar emphasized that the rioters were not excluded insofar as their political and social rights were defined on paper. They were nonetheless excluded from the public sphere by virtue of a lack of sense of empowerment and/or experience in exercising those rights.

In the specific context of Turkey, the best-known instance of ‘exclusion’ is the Mübadele (population exchange) treaty between Turkey and Greece in 1923 whereby Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey left for Greece, and Muslims from Greece arrived in Anatolia. While the literature has emphasized the predicament of those who were ‘excluded’, the experiences of citizens who were (in)secured as they were included have largely gone under-examined. Drawing upon Balibar, the chapter offers a threefold categorization that distinguishes between those who were excepted through the Mübadele of 1923 and not accorded citizenship (‘the excluded’); those citizens who approximated the citizen imaginary by learning to check their differences at the door but in the process were (in)secured as they became unable to live with difference (‘the included’); and those citizens who were (in)secured through late(r) access to various rights and/or lack of sense of empowerment or experience in exercising such rights (‘the included/excluded’). This more nuanced categorization allows us to analyse the ways in which Turkey’s peoples were (in)secured, in different ways, as they sought to approximate or resist the citizen imaginary of the early Republican period. As will be discussed in Section II, insecurities of the ‘included/excluded’ were caused by economic, spatial and societal practices of successive governments. Insecurities of the ‘included’, in turn, could be better understood as ontological (in)security. The latter have been (in)secured as they became less-than-able to live with difference and, in some cases, (in)secured their fellow citizens.

In/securing the included/excluded: governmental practices

In Turkey, the process of (re)territorialization of identity began with the declaration of Misak-ı Milli (National Covenant) in 1920, was sealed into law with the 1924 constitution, and written into space during early years of the
Republic. A key spatial practice of this period is invariably considered to be the Mübadele (population exchange) agreement with Greece. Whereas the Mübadele did not constitute a moment of security for those who were not excluded – as those accounts focusing on the inclusion/exclusion binary assume. Rather, the Mübadele marked the beginning of a process of (in)securing, which included the passing of various laws governing who would be allowed to emigrate to Turkey and where citizens would (re)settle; erasing remnants of past inhabitants through settling the muhacir (immigrants) in places vacated by the Armenian and Greek Orthodox subjects of the former Ottoman Empire; and the changing of place names throughout Anatolia.

To start with the Mübadele, the population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey was concluded on 30 January 1923, six months prior to the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. Article No.1 of the agreement stipulated that the Greek Orthodox Christians living in Turkey would be exchanged with the Muslims living in Greece starting from May 1923. A further provision was that neither group would be allowed to return to their former places of residence without the permission of the respective governments. The agreement specifically exempted from the exchange those Greek Orthodox Christians living in Istanbul and Muslims living in Western Thrace. As a result of the Mübadele, the percentage of non-Muslims to the rest of the population shrank from 20 per cent (before WWI) to 2.5 per cent in 1924 (Keyder 1989). Non-Muslim subjects of the former Ottoman Empire who stayed within the territorial boundaries of the new Republic were included in the new citizenship regime.

Subjecting citizens to state-directed movement and (re)settlement measures was by far the most far-reaching aspect of spatial practices of this era. During this period, Ankara governments passed two settlement laws governing who can immigrate to Turkey and become a citizen, and where citizens were allowed to (re)settle. In 1926, Law on Settlement No. 885 was adopted (Düstur, Tertip. 3, Cilt. 7, pp. 1441–1443). This law remained in effect until the more extensive Law on Settlement No. 2510 was codified in 1934 (Düstur, Tertip.3, Cilt.15, pp. 1156–1175).

Article No. 2 of the 1926 Law of Settlement addressed the newly arriving immigrants. The law stated that people who did not belong to the ‘Turkish culture’ could not be admitted as immigrants or refugees. The centrality of concerns with language was due to the linguistic make-up of Turkey’s citizenry at the time. Not all immigrants arriving between 1923 and 1950 were Turkish speakers. In an attempt to create a unified body politic, Turkish-speaking immigrants were directed to settle in places where they were expected to help with diluting the non-Turkish speaking population. Non-Turkish-speaking immigrants, in turn, were settled in places that would help with their integration. The only exception to this practice was the settlement of Turkish-speaking immigrants in ‘security-sensitive’ areas (as with Eastern Thrace, on the border of Greece and Bulgaria). Turkey’s leaders clearly considered being a Turkish-speaker a central aspect of the Republic’s citizen imaginary. Those who did not fit or approximate this aspect of the imaginary were viewed as less trustworthy than those who did.
The Law on Settlement No. 2510 was less about settling the newly arrived immigrants as it was about (re)settling non-Turkish speaking and non-Muslim citizens of the Republic. Article No. 2 of the 1934 law read:

Turkey is divided into three settlement zones: zone 1 are the areas deemed to be where the population of Turkish culture is dense … zone 2 are the areas separated for the migration and settlement of the population deemed to be assimilated into Turkish culture … zone 3 are the areas where settlement is prohibited owing to reasons related to health, economy, culture, politics, the military and security.

(Düstur, Tertip.3, Cilt.15, pp. 1156)

By way of dividing the country into three zones and (re)settling citizens based on their proximity to ‘Turkish culture’, the 1934 law sought, to quote GNA lawmakers, to ‘create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment’ (Ülker 2008).

Whereas the Turkish language constituted the key component of the ‘Turkish culture’ as operationalized by the 1926 law, the 1934 law put emphasis on ‘lifestyle’. Article No.10 targeted the lifestyle of non-Turkish speaking nomads in general and the Kurds in particular and abolished all previously documented and recognized rights of tribal chiefdoms and sheikhdoms. Between 1934 and 1947, 25,831 people in 5,074 households from Tunceli, Erzincan, Bitlis, Siirt, Van, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Muş, Erzurum, Elazığ, Kars, Malatya, Mardin and Çoruh (Artvin) were resettled in other parts of Anatolia. Of these towns, only Çoruh is on the Black Sea coast and was home to Hemshins, a Muslim nomadic community of Armenian-speakers. The Hemshins were transferred from Çoruh into internal regions. All of the other towns are located in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, and were, at the time, home to mostly Kurdish-speakers.10

Accompanying the two settlement laws were practices that sought to (re)territorialize identity by allowing the newly settled citizens to convert material culture. The Republican leaders had chosen to settle the muhacir in places vacated by the Armenian and Greek Orthodox subjects of the former Ottoman Empire, and gave these re-populated places a makeover. In the process, the remnants of past inhabitants were erased and the memories of those who were left behind were hurt.

Another aspect of spatial practices adopted during this period was the changing of place names. During the War of National Liberation, place names were changed mostly for emotive reasons, as with newly liberated towns wishing to (re)claim space (Öktem 2008). The changing of place names became a feature of Republican leaders’ practices only after the break-up of Kurdish rebellions in southeastern Anatolia. During this period, renaming of places was not limited to Greek or Armenian place names but also encompassed those in Arabic and Kurdish as well. These changes were followed by further rebellions and eventually resulted in a major military operation in 1937, which left thousands dead and wounded. Hundreds of others were relocated to the Elazığ plain, a region that was considered easier to ‘control’.11
To recapitulate, spatial practices of citizenship adopted during this period were ultimately designed to (re)territorialize identity in Turkey. The desire to create a unified body politic through managing immigrant flows and their areas of settlement was unmistakable. However, (re)settlement of peoples were not isolated to immigrants but all those who had thus far failed to approximate the citizen imaginary. Indeed, the citizen imaginary of the Republic was forcibly imposed on peoples who were brought up in a nomadic lifestyle. Such imposition of a settled lifestyle, while allowing for the provisioning of peoples in terms of access to health services and education, at the same time rendered apparent the limits of recognition of and respect for (linguistic and lifestyle) difference in the new Republic’s citizen imaginary.12

Another significant body of practices was adopted in the realm of economy and targeted mostly ‘minority’ citizens. By the time the Republic of Turkey was founded, most of capital and business (including strategic industry and transportation networks) was in the hands of international capital and minority citizens (Keyder 1989). The muhacir, some of whom had been affluent at home, had not always been able to bring their capital with them and thus had to start their businesses from scratch (Tekeli 1990). During this period, the Republican leaders scrambled to generate job opportunities for the muhacir while seeking to transfer the control of the economy into the hands of the state and the newly emerging bourgeoisie.

The context to these practices was set by the destructive effects of successive wars; lingering memories of the final years of the Empire and the Capitulations; the 1929 Great Depression; the onset of World War II (WWII) and measures adopted towards mobilization for the war. There were three main aspects to economic practices of citizenship during 1923–1946: the barring of minority citizens from civil service positions and various private sector jobs; encouraging (if not obliging) private business owners (minority and international capital) to employ Turkish speakers; and the ‘Wealth Tax’ (Varlık Vergisi) of 1942.

We start with the barring of minority citizens from civil service positions and some private sector jobs: before 1926, minority citizens were only de facto barred from civil service positions; in 1926 their disbarment became de jure. On 18 March 1926, with Article No. 4 of the Civil Service Law No. 788 it was decreed that all civil servants must be ‘Turkish’ (Düstur, Tertip. 3, Cilt. 7, p. 669). In the early 1930s, a group of private sector jobs were also declared to be off limits to non-Turkish speakers (many of whom were minority citizens).

Another aspect of economic practices addressed the private sector. On 10 April 1926, the GNA passed a law stipulating that all companies must keep their records in Turkish. On 22 April 1926, another law was passed, stating that ‘businesses should use the Turkish language’ (Aktar 2002, p.117). In so doing, the government was obligating private businesses owned by minority citizens and international capital to replace the non-Turkish speakers with Turkish speakers. Taken together these two sets of practices aimed at transferring private sector jobs away from non-Turkish speakers while at the same time barring them from civil service jobs.

Third, the so-called Wealth Tax was introduced on 11 November 1942 (Resmi Gazete 1942, pp. 3965–3968). At the time of its introduction, the Wealth Tax
was offered as an instrument of ‘social justice’, adopted to transfer wealth away from ‘war profiteers’ and help the poor by bringing inflation down. While Turkey had remained neutral during WWII, in 1939 approximately 1 million peasants and agricultural workers were called up for military service. This resulted in the rocketing of agricultural prices throughout the country, but overwhelmingly in the cities. In 1942 alone prices increased by approximately 350 per cent. While a great majority of Turkey’s citizens’ standard of living dropped dramatically, the thriving black market economy benefited some business owners, causing resentment against those who were portrayed as ‘war profiteers’. While not all ‘war profiteers’ were minority business owners, one could not always tell by government or media rhetoric (Akan 2011).

In İstanbul, where a majority of the minority citizens lived, taxpayers were divided into two separate lists: the ‘M’ list for Muslim citizens, and the ‘G’ list for non-Muslim citizens (Gayrimüslim). Later, two more categories were added: ‘E’ for non-citizens (Ecnebi) and ‘D’ for converts (Dönmne). This last category comprised members of the Sabetaist sect of Jews who had converted to Islam during Ottoman times. Citizens who were categorized as ‘converts’ paid about twice as much as Muslim citizens, while non-Muslim citizens paid up to ten times as much. ‘E’ category taxpayers, on the other hand, were expected to pay on a scale close to ‘M’ category for fear of alienating international capital (Akar 1992; Aktar 2002).

The way in which the Wealth Tax was put into practice became a disgrace for all those concerned. Tax assessments were made by local committees that consisted of local government officials, representatives of the local councils and of the chambers of commerce. No fixed rate was set. As a result, the tax burden was allowed to be borne almost wholly by business owners in the big cities, notably İstanbul, with 55 per cent of the total bill falling on minority citizens (Aktar 2002).

To add to outrage, taxpayers were required to pay their taxes in cash and within 15 days of receiving their assessments. This often meant that in order to cover the bill, they had to sell their businesses and/or property under their market value. Those who were unable to pay had to work off their debt in a labour camp set up in Aşkale, Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia. Out of 40,000 tax debtors across Turkey, about 1,400, all of whom were minority citizens, ended up in labour camps ((Akar 2006; Akan 2011) cf. (Bali 2003)). The Wealth Tax was withdrawn in March 1944.

The combined effect of the economic practices of citizenship of this period was far reaching. As capital was transferred away from the minorities to the state and the newly emerging bourgeoisie, and jobs were secured for non-minority workers, minority citizens were insecured as they were discouraged from imagining their future in Turkey. Those who had other opportunities chose to leave.

Non-minority citizens also drew their lessons from the economic practices of the state: those who approximated the citizen imaginary were secured as they were rewarded economically via the transfer of jobs and capital. However, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens were also insecured as they became unable to live with difference (see below, Section III).

While spatial and economic practices were concentrated in the earlier years of the Republic and were gradually phased out from the late 1950s onwards, in the realm
of ‘culture’ successive governments adopted wide-ranging reforms some of which have found their way into the current (1980) constitution. In the 1920s, the new Republic’s cultural practices of citizenship had multiple components including the Turkish History thesis that sought to (re)claim space by writing it back into history and give a boost to citizens’ sense of ‘Turkeyness’; language reform that involved the transition from the Arabic to the Roman alphabet and ridding Turkish of Arabic and Persian words; and changing peoples’ surnames into Turkish (Aytürk 2004). Most emblematic of them all for the purpose of this chapter is the introduction of a compulsory civic education course in primary and secondary schools. Since this course served the purpose of introducing, justifying and cementing all other cultural practices, this section of the chapter will focus on the civic education course.

The name of the civic education course was *Yurt Bilgisi* (Homeland Knowledge). The title of the course itself constituted an instance of claiming space for Turkey’s citizens. The course textbook was entitled *Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler* (Civic Information for the Citizen) and was authored by Afet İnan, a historian and adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (İnan 1931). At the time, İnan was teaching *Yurt Bilgisi* as well as history courses at secondary-school level. It is reported that Mustafa Kemal, upon seeing the *Yurt Bilgisi* textbook she was using, did not find it sufficient and asked her to write a new one. In the process, Mustafa Kemal ordered translations of French and German textbooks to be made, personally read them and gave dictation to İnan, thereby authoring significant portions of the book based on the synthesis he reached. Other textbooks were also produced during this period. In what follows, we focus on the İnan textbook, for its history as well as substance helps illustrate cultural citizenship practices of this period.

The 1931 textbook’s notion of citizenship was a ‘civic republican’ one, defining citizenship within the parameters of solidarism and community. Whereas the ‘liberal’ definition of citizenship casts citizenship as a status involving rights accorded to citizens, the ‘civic republican’ definition casts it as a practice involving responsibilities to the wider society (Taylor 1989). Indeed, Mustafa Kemal had elsewhere explained the rationale for the civic education course as one of educating citizens about ‘the current duties and rights in their conduct of affairs among themselves and between them and the state, as well as general information on the organization of the state’ (İnan 1969, p. 7).

Given the course’s objective of fashioning ‘civilized’ and ‘modern’ citizens, who would be ‘obedient’ to the Republic (İnan 1931, p. 7), the textbook put more emphasis on the duties and obligations of citizens towards the state and less on citizens’ rights. İnan later explained such de-emphasis on rights with reference to Mustafa Kemal’s thinking that every right should be complemented by a duty (İnan 1969, p. 8). Such emphasis on duty was expressed best by Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), the foremost public intellectual of the late Ottoman era as follows: ‘Do not say ‘I have rights’; there is only duty, not right’ (Parla 1985, p. 68). Suitably, the book listed the most important duties of the citizens: paying taxes, participating in elections, and performing military service (for men). The demands of solidarism and community meant the right to vote and get elected were represented as duties and not rights. The 1931 textbook reminded the students that since citizens live in
a community where solidarity is crucial, they should take utmost care in making decisions that concerned common interests (İnan 1931, p. 128). At the time Turkey still had a single party system, but the students were being advised to vote in a virtuous manner.

The Republican motto of this era, ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, was inscribed into students’ worldview through the civic education textbook. The text’s emphasis on ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’ translated into a less than accepting attitude towards all those who failed to approximate the Republic’s citizen imaginary. Regarding the non-Turkish speakers, the textbook said:

In the current political and social unity of the Turkish nation, some of our citizens are being encouraged to adopt a Kurdish, Circassian, Laz or Bosnian identity, but these misnomers, which are remnants of an autocratic period from the past, have caused nothing but misery among these individuals, with the exception of a backwards and brainless few. For these members of the nation also share the same common past, history, ethics and law.

(İnan 1931, p. 16)

Here is what the book said about the minority citizens:

Under the noble ethics of the Turkish nation, who could expect these citizens of christian [sic] and jewish [sic] origin to be looked down upon as ‘foreigner’ as long as they have willingly tied themselves to the Turkish nation?

(İnan 1931, p. 16)

That the nature of the relations with the minorities was described in terms of tolerance and hospitality but not recognition or equality gave away the textbook’s limitations in recognizing and/or respecting difference. Peoples of myriad religious and/or ethnic origins could become ‘included’. The ticket of entry was willingness to approximate the Republic’s citizen imaginary. Such willingness was to be exhibited through checking one’s ‘differences’ at the door. As such, besides serving an educational purpose, the textbook also constituted an instance of the Republican leadership’s stratagem for bolstering the new state and creating a ‘cohesive’ body of citizens.

To recapitulate, the citizen imaginary of the Republic was written in the civic education textbook more by his/her duties than his/her rights. Emphasis was placed on solidarity and community but not individual rights and liberties. As with other newly founded nation-states, in Turkey, too, the citizen was ‘regarded as, at best, an eventually educable ward and, at worst, someone prone to derail the national journey with his irrational and provincial proclivities’ (Krishna 1999, p.15).

The foregoing outlined the predicament of Turkey’s ‘included/excluded’ citizens who were (in)secured as a consequence of spatial, economic and cultural practices of successive Ankara governments. Different from the prevailing accounts, we pointed to the ways in which same practices have secured and insecured the same body of citizens, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. What often goes
unacknowledged is that the practices that (in)secured Turkey’s citizens were not always governmental but also practices adopted by the ‘included’. In Section III, we highlight another overlooked aspect of Turkey’s citizens’ experiences, the ‘included’ who experienced ontological (in)security. That some ‘included’ citizens also participated in activities that insecured their fellow citizens further complicates the already complex (in)securing predicament of Turkey’s citizens.

**Ontological (in)security of ‘the included’**

Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens, as products of the citizen imaginary of the Republic, were (in)secured as they became unable to address difference without turning it into otherness – to paraphrase William Connolly (1991). This section focuses upon the ways in which ‘the included’ were (in)secured as some of them evolved into agents of (in)security towards the ‘included/excluded’ while others were complicit in their silence. What follows outlines the so-called ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaign. The campaign was particularly significant in that it was not the Ankara government, but citizens’ groups who organized the campaign. While social groups (including NGOs) got involved in the economic practices directed against minorities (as with the petition of the Waiters’ Association, or the newly created bourgeoisie’s connivance in the making of the Wealth Tax, see above) a wider group of individuals and social groups were involved in the case of the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns.

It may come across as counterintuitive to consider ‘the included’ as anything other than ‘secure’, chiefly in view of how some of them emerged as agents of insecurity vis-à-vis fellow citizens. Be that as it may, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ rigid responses to expressions of ‘difference’ could be viewed as an instance of their ontological (in)security. The notion of ‘ontological security’ refers to security of an individual’s identity; his/her drive to maintain who s/he is when faced with challenges (McSweeney 1999; Mitzen 2006b; Mitzen 2006a; Steele 2005; Steele 2008). In the face of challenges, individuals routinize their behaviour. They do this in an attempt to avoid questioning their sense of self each and every time such a challenge occurs. In maintaining their routines, some individuals are more rigid/flexible than others. While those who are more ‘rigid’ remain attached to their routines regardless of the challenges they are facing, those who are more ‘flexible’ are able to question their routines and adapt as necessary.

Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ rigid responses to expressions of ‘difference’ (as evinced by individuals’ and social groups’ active participation in the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns, or their silence about insecurities experienced by minority citizens during the so-called ‘Wealth Tax’ incident of 1942) could be viewed as an instance of their ontological (in)security. Since Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ sense of self was a product of a social imaginary that is not accepting of ‘difference’, they came to view expressions of resistance to the citizen imaginary as a challenge to their sense of self. Accordingly, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ indifference towards (if not agency in the production of) insecurities of fellow citizens, as will be illustrated below, could be viewed as an instance of their ontological (in)security.
The ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns emerged in a context shaped by cultural practices of the Republican leadership. That the campaigns were designed and executed by non-governmental actors highlighted the limits of recognition of and respect for difference among ‘the included’. The first step in the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns was taken by the Students’ Association of the Faculty of Law in İstanbul. On 13 January 1928, the Students’ Association organized a campaign aimed at preventing the use of languages other than Turkish in public places (Bali 2003, p. 135). The students put up signs and accosted people speaking foreign languages in public places. The signs read: ‘We cannot say Turk to people who do not speak Turkish’ (Bali 2003, p. 270). The campaign led to tension and conflict, as it did not merely suggest that everyone in Turkey should speak Turkish, but it actually threatened non-Muslims in an attempt to make them speak Turkish. Some activists instigated court cases against non-Muslims who spoke languages other than Turkish, citing Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code about ‘insulting Turkishness’ as their legal justification (Orhon 1941, pp. 1–3). Some went insofar as to call for, ‘Either speak Turkish or leave the country’.

While the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns were entirely in line with what the Republican leaders encouraged under the slogan ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, the forceful methods utilized by the youth was disapproved by Ankara as voiced in the media. As the campaigns turned violent, the government intervened and called for a halt (Aslan 2007). Still, various non-governmental actors throughout the country revived these campaigns well until the 1940s.

By the end of the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns, Jewish communities in Bursa, Edirne and Kırklareli adopted Turkish as their ‘native tongue’ (Orhon 1941, p.107). The Christian community followed suit and, in 1935, Monsignor Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, then the Catholic Church’s apostolic delegate in İstanbul and later the reformist Pope John XXIII, preached sermons in Turkish for the first time (Bali 2003, p. 273). During the 1940s, the number of citizens who could be spotted by the language they spoke was decreasing sharply (Bali 2003, p. 140).

What was significant about these campaigns for the purposes of this chapter is the way it revealed the (active) agency as well as (passive) complicity of individuals and social groups in (in)securing fellow citizens. It was not only the Students’ Association or Turkish Hearths but also people in the street who were a party to the campaigns.

To recapitulate, early Republican citizen imaginary sought to produce a body of citizens that subscribed to ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’. What we call Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens are peoples of myriad origins who learnt to check their ‘difference’ at the door as they entered the public realm and be ‘successfully’ moulded into the citizen imaginary of the Republic. In the process, however, ‘the included’ adopted rigid responses to expressions of ‘difference’ as evinced by individuals’ and social groups’ active participation in the ‘Citizen! Speak Turkish!’ campaigns or their complicity in silence about insecurities experienced by minority citizens during the so-called ‘Wealth Tax’ incident of 1942. That said, such participation (be it active or passive) in (in)securing fellow citizens could be read as an instance of ‘included’ citizens’ ontological (in)security. As such, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens emerged as both agents and referents of in/security in the early Republican period.
Conclusion

Our everyday notions of security and citizenship rest on a binary that defines lack of access to citizenship as insecurity. Be that as it may, it is possible for peoples to be (in)secured as they become citizens. This is not to underestimate the significance of Turkey’s Republican transformation. Nor is it to overlook the ways in which citizenship allowed betterment to the lives of Turkey’s peoples. Rather, what the chapter has sought to highlight is the ways in which the transition from subjecthood to citizenship is less a moment of security than a process of (in)securing through which citizens experience security as well as insecurity.

In Turkey’s context, what subverted citizens’ rights was Republican leaders’ remembrance of the Capitulations and the post-WWI attempts by European great powers to break up the Ottoman Empire warranted by their claim to ‘better’ rule. In the attempt to create a strong, independent sovereign nation-state and thereby removing the grounds for external intervention, Republican leaders utilized citizenship as an idea, as an institution and as a discourse. While doing so, they adopted policies that did not always treat people as citizens with rights who participate in their own governance but as populations who are the subject of policy (Chatterjee 2004), hence our preference for a threefold categorization of ‘excluded’, ‘included/excluded’ and ‘included’ in understanding early Republican citizenship practices. This categorization, and the notion of ‘included/excluded’ in particular, allows us to understand the ways in which myriad peoples were (in)secured in the transition from subjecthood to citizenship.

In offering this argument, we differ from the prevailing accounts in two ways. First, we analyse early Republican practices as in/securing of Turkey’s citizens, i.e. considering multiple ways in which the same body of citizens were secured and insecure. Second, we look at the ontological (in)security of a body of citizens who are assumed to be secure and therefore explained away. Indeed, it is often the predicament of the minorities that is examined by prevailing accounts (by virtue of the gap between what the 1924 Constitution provided and what actual practices resulted in). However, it was not only minority citizens who were (in)secured but also those who sought to approximate the citizen imaginary, the ‘included’. The latter experienced ontological (in)security in that they had to check their differences at the door as the price for entry into the public realm to exercise their citizenship rights, thereby becoming less-than-able to live with ‘difference’.

Notes

1 Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the Workshop on ‘Ontological Security and Conflict Resolution’, Koç University, March 2013 and CRASSH Conference on ‘Dismantling Security’, University of Cambridge, June 2012. The authors would like to thank conference/workshop organizers and participants for their comments and advice.

2 We have chosen to limit our analysis to the single party period (1923–1946) not because we consider the transition to multi-party regime (in 1946) to have brought about significant changes in Turkey’s citizenship regime. Rather, focusing on this early period allows dissecting (in)securities tied up with this process of transition.
3 Compare Indian (Krishna 1999), Turkish and Finnish experiences (Joenniemi Chapter 7) in terms of conjectural similarities and ‘cultural’ differences.
4 The Treaty of Lausanne accorded juridical ‘minority’ status to Armenian and Jewish peoples as well as Greek Orthodox Christians some of whom were exempted from the population exchange. No other peoples were recognized as minorities by law. For example, Antioch Rum Orthodox Christians and Syrian Orthodox Christians (Süryanî peoples) were not accorded minority status.
5 The emerging literature on Kurds in Turkey may be considered an exception to this generalization. The following understand their predicament as an aspect of (in)securing citizens in the early Republican era.
6 Issued on 17 February 1920 by the last Ottoman Chamber of deputies meeting secretly in Istanbul, which was then under allied occupation, Misak-ı Millî (National Pact) is a document expressing the nation’s will to (re)gain sovereignty and independence.
7 Article 1 of the agreement read: ‘Turkish citizens living in Turkish territories would be exchanged with Muslim Greek citizens living in Greek territories starting from May 1923, and that none of them could return to the places they formerly lived without the permission of the respective governments’. The agreement specifically exempted from the exchange Greeks living Istanbul (about 100,000) and Muslims in Western Thrace (Hirschon 2005, p. 3).
8 ‘According to the national census of 1927, Turkish was not the native language of around 28 percent of the city’s [İstanbul] population’ (Aslan 2007, p. 250).
9 While the Republic embraced secularism early on, Islam continued to play a role if not overtly, in defining the citizen body. An instance of the centrality of Muslimhood to the Republican leadership’s concept of ‘Turkishness’ was observed when the Turkish-speaking Gagauz requested to emigrate to Turkey from Russia. They were not allowed in by virtue of their Christianity, for the Republican leaders believed that it would be difficult to ‘assimilate’ them (Somel 1997, p.91).
10 In the case of those who were forced to resettle for security reasons following uprisings in 1925 and 1937, their lands in zone 3 were confiscated and were directed to resettle in zone 2. Following the transition to a multi-party regime in 1946, those who were forced to migrate in the 1930s were allowed to return with a law passed in late 1940s (Tekeli 1990).
11 During the 1940s, preparations began to be made for a large-scale name change action throughout the country. With Law No. 5542 passed in 1949, such changes were given a legal basis in national legislation (Öktem 2008).
12 Mesut Yeğen (1999) reads the term lifestyle as a code word for Kurdish in the official lexicon. That said, such an unaccepting attitude towards different lifestyles constitutes an instance of (in)securing for all nomads. While (re)settlement allowed access to education and healthcare, at the same time it erased nomadic aspects of culture.
13 Equally significant is the so-called 6–7 September riots against non-Muslims in 1955.

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