The relationship between globalization and in/security remains relatively untouched in the literature. In the 1990s, as the literature on globalization rapidly grew (Held and McGrew 1998; Scholte 2000), its relationship to in/security received scant attention (Clark 1997; Leander 2001). This began to change with the 9/11 attacks, which were followed by a surge of interest in the globalization-in/security relationship. Yet the persistent prevalence of military-focused notions of security and ahistorical approaches to globalization has so far not allowed for a fuller understanding of the dynamic relationship between globalization and in/security.

This chapter explores the relationship between globalization and in/security in the Middle East by adopting a broadened notion of security and a historical understanding of globalization building on the theory of International Society (Bull 1977), as developed in the so-called English School in International Relations (IR). Broad notions of security do not reduce security to its military indicators; they are cognizant of its multiple dimensions as experienced by myriad referents (Booth 2008). Historical notions of globalization consider it a process of increase in the extensity and intensity of relations between peoples, social groups, organizations, and institutions that has been leading toward a global interpenetration of the political and social as well as the economic and military (Barkawi 2006; Hobson 2004; Scholte 2000). Adopting a broad notion of security and a historical understanding of
globalization avoids viewing Middle Eastern insecurities merely as a function of colonization followed by encounters with neoliberal globalization (e.g., Henry and Springborg 2001), the region falling behind in terms of integration into world markets, or a political culture rooted in authoritarianism and/or Islam (e.g., Bellin 2004). Rather, it allows for exploring the disappearance, emergence, and persistence of Middle Eastern insecurities as part of a historical process—a process through which “traditional” societies of the Middle East were transformed into “modern” (nation) states. As this chapter shows, this process attests to the notion of a “fractured world society” (see also Stetter in this volume). Thus dynamics of political globalization, such as the emergence of modern nation-states in the Middle East, contributed to the consolidation of globally shared forms of organizing political communities in what is often referred to in IR as International Society (Bull 1977)—in this case, the global spread of like units such as nation-states. However, as this chapter also shows, this process is to this day accompanied by the subtle persistence of power inequalities and hegemonies in the global political system contributing to Middle Eastern insecurities.

While the role played by the globalization of material forces and structures in the production of (under)development as a source of insecurity has been investigated (Frank 1966; Thomas 2001), the role the globalization of ideas (and ideas about globalization) have had in this process is yet to be fully explored (but see Barkawi 2006; Krishna 1999; Muppidi 2004). This chapter is particularly interested in such ideational structures of security that have allowed for the acceptance of certain notions of statehood as the norm and the myriad insecurities involved. In doing so, it builds on the insights of postcolonial studies (Grovogui 2006, 2007) and seeks to underscore the effects interactions with International Society have had on “traditional” societies of the Middle East. Here, the focus would not be on the legacy of colonialism for such insecurities, which is fairly well documented, but those notions of adequately “civilized” (and modern) statehood produced, disseminated, and sustained by International Society in an environment beset with myriad insecurities.

During the nineteenth century, these insecure conditions were beset by the so-called standards of civilization laid out by International Society. For postcolonial states, insecurities were embedded in prevailing notions of “statehood,” which brought about “security dilemmas” of their own. During the twentieth century, the “standards of civilization” were replaced by notions of “modern” and “adequate” statehood drawn from the self-understandings of the trajectory that state development took in the West. In view of that, this chapter locates some (but not all) of the factors that have allowed for some insecurities to persist in the Middle East in the spatio-temporal realm of the globalization of world politics and the transformation
of “traditional” societies through interaction with International Society conditioned by various insecurities of material (military, economic, and environmental) and nonmaterial (political and societal) kind.

The first section of this chapter presents a critical overview of existing approaches to the relationship between globalization and in/security with a view to their explanatory capacity vis-à-vis the Middle East. The second section clarifies the approach adopted here when studying the relationship between globalization and in/security. The third section compares and contrasts the insights of the mainstream approach and the one adopted here vis-à-vis the Middle East. The fourth section is illustrative. It looks at the case of Turkey’s interactions with International Society in the early republican era. The concluding section highlights the implications of adopting this approach for capturing in/security dynamics in Turkey, the Middle East, and beyond.

**Globalization and In/Security: Mainstream Approaches**

In the 1990s, it became commonplace to present the future of world politics as one of increasing globalization, with the term itself becoming a “buzzword” (Scholte 2000)—often invoked but rarely defined. That existing definitions often contradicted each other only added to the confusion. Yet, as Jens Bartelson (2000, 180) has also underscored, “while there is no agreement about what globalization is, the entire discourse on globalization is founded on a quite solid agreement that globalization is.”

Globalization is widely considered to have gained pace in the twentieth century through the mutual transformation of states and their environment (Clark 1998; Hurrell and Woods 1995; Mann 1997). Although it is often the economic factors, in particular the global integration of production and finance, that are viewed as the driving forces behind globalization, the impact made by the revolution in communications and information technologies (especially the expansion of the World Wide Web) in increasing peoples’ awareness of one another while diminishing the significance of the physical distance separating them (time-space compression) is also recognized as a crucial factor in accelerating this process, including in the Middle East (see also Murphy in this volume).

Mainstream approaches view globalization as a set of dynamics that has developed as an extension of neoliberal economic policymaking. Some even go so far as to represent globalization as something that happens to states—a phenomenon that calls for preparedness and resistance (e.g., Ripsman and Paul 2005). However, while globalization is a “process,” it is not without agency. On the contrary, it has been shaped by the processes of the internationalization of the state and production set in motion during the post–World
War II era. The understanding of globalization adopted for the purposes of this chapter dates the process to earlier periods, based on the understanding that it is a process of interconnection and mutual constitution in world politics. Accordingly, it becomes possible to talk about globalization as a “historical process” of “transformation” that for centuries has been leading toward a global interpenetration of the political and social as well as economic and military sectors. When understood as such, globalization, in Bartelson’s (2000, 189) words, is “neither inside out nor outside in but rather a process that dissolves the divide between inside and outside.” This understanding of globalization as mutual transformation of agents and structure allows for recognizing the agency of multiple actors. Thus unlike mainstream accounts that portray globalization as a process without agency or those that delimit the process to neoliberal globalization, this understanding allows studying both the agency of the West in entrenching neoliberal globalization and that of the East in bringing about what John Hobson (2004, 31) refers to as “Oriental globalization.”

The role played by the West (states and transnational corporations) in rendering markets “free” through waging wars is by now well documented. Indeed, the creation of free markets and free trade, far from being a process without agency, has been “a political policy, and war is one instrument of such a policy” (Barkawi 2006, 32). Over the years, analyzing the agency of the state in the globalization of world politics has helped to uncover the extent to which state power was mobilized in the process (Hobson and Ramesh 2002).

The role played by the East in the process of globalization is not equally well-known. As Hobson writes, while the current stage of globalization is not the same as its predecessors, globalization can nevertheless “be said to exist prior to (and indeed after) 1500 insofar as significant flows of goods, resources, currencies, capital, institutions, ideas, technologies and peoples flowed across regions to such an extent that they impacted upon, and led to the transformation of, societies across much of the globe” (Hobson 2004, 34).

Hobson’s broader and most significant point is that “the West and East have been fundamentally and consistently linked through globalization ever since 500 CE” and that the myth of autonomous preconstituted civilizations of “East” and “West,” with the latter having an impact on the former only in the modern era, is exactly that—a “myth” (Hobson 2004, 1–2). Viewed as such, globalization is a process that has had many agents and structures existing in relations of mutual constitution.

As regards the relationship between globalization and in/security, mainstream approaches can be grouped into two categories. On the one hand are those who remain skeptical about regarding the “positive” impact made by the global integration of production and finance on the peripheries of the
world (e.g., Hurrell and Woods 1995). On the other hand are those who firmly believe in its virtues and maintain that increasing globalization fosters economic efficiency and helps provide a remedy to the “negativities” it perpetuates. In this new world united in its search for new markets and higher profits, markets would demand and help produce common ways of thinking or even a new global culture—the latter group’s argument goes—and peoples’ identities as producers and consumers would overshadow most, if not all, other interests and identities. In such a world, myriad actors are expected to solve their conflicts via nonmilitary means, not only because they would achieve common ways of thinking, but also because a breakdown in business relations would simply be regarded as too costly (Friedman 2000). Hence the expectation of global security as a side effect of further globalization.

One problem with the perspective that underscores the virtues of globalization is that it overlooks the concerns of those who highlight the ways in which increasing globalization also leads to a perpetuation of inequalities worldwide. Indeed, the proponents of increasing globalization do not account for the processes of “structural violence” perpetuated by the globalizing forces so far as the implications of structural violence do not disrupt the course of globalization. In this sense, what they mean by the attainment of global security is the creation of some form of “macro peace” based on the maintenance of the status quo by way of exercising social control through the global communication and information networks and the entertainment industry. The kind of security that could be achieved as such would at best amount to an absence of war—“negative peace” in Johan Galtung’s (1996) terms—but not security as understood by human beings as individuals and social groups.

As such, mainstream approaches to the relationship between globalization and in/security are often based on narrow notions of security and ahistorical understandings of globalization. Indeed the literature treats globalization as something threatening that happens to the state (outside in), as opposed to recognizing it as a “process” that has transformed states and has, in turn, been shaped by them. As Tarak Barkawi (2006, 24) has underscored, on the one hand, war is sometimes “necessary” to initiate. On the other hand, “free trade and free markets can be productive of war and other political violence.” Second, threats to security are viewed from the perspective of national states in terms of the absence of war. As such, multiple insecurities tied up with globalization as a historical process are often overlooked.

Building on a broad notion of security and a historical understanding of globalization, however, it is possible to analyze the relationship between globalization and in/security in the Middle East (as elsewhere) as the latest stage of a historical process—the globalization of world politics and the transformation of “traditional” societies into “modern” states. This may, at the first
instance, come across as counterintuitive. After all, colonial powers, while usurping the raw materials of the colonized lands, also brought “civilization” with them. Non-Western societies were introduced to the products of Western advances in medicine, agriculture, and mechanics as part of the colonial experience. Needless to say, the colonists were often unaware that those very fruits of “civilization” had been previously produced in different forms in the Middle East and elsewhere (Hobson 2004; Sen 2005). Yet, at the same time, the colonized peoples were also introduced to political and market forces, which allowed famines to occur and populations to be wiped away in different parts of the world (see, for example, Davis 2001). The impacts the introduction of such political and market forces have had on different parts of the non-Western world have yet to be fully documented. While some progress has been made in uncovering the effects market forces have had in terms of what Andre Gunder Frank (1966) refers to as the “development of underdevelopment” (also see Escobar 1995), our understanding of the ideational structures that have allowed for some insecurities to persist remain rather limited.

On this issue, two accounts prevail in the literature. On the one hand are those accounts informed by the “modernization theory” that explains the transformation of “traditional” societies as a much-needed response to the requirements of a changing world (Huntington 1971; for a critique, see Gendzier 1985, 1995). On the other hand are political-economy accounts that point to the roles played by states and transnational actors in the opening up of “traditional” societies to the “free play” of market forces (see, for example, Mitchell 1988). The argument here does not contest the insights of these two accounts. On the contrary, it seeks to complement them by building on the insights of post-colonial studies. Here, the focus is not on the legacy of colonialism—which is, as already pointed out, well documented (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Grovogui 2006; Ling 2002; Slater 2004)—but those notions of “civilized,” “modern,” or “adequate” statehood produced, disseminated, and sustained by International Society and the insecurities involved.

Encounters with International Society and In/Security: Postcolonial Insights

International Society as an institution originated in the practices of European states. These practices were initially designed to regulate affairs among the Christian states of Europe so as to minimize friction and violence. In time, religious concerns gave way to secular ones in the attempt to remove religious arguments from the realm of politics (Williams 1998), and Christianity disappeared as a marker of the identity of International Society to be replaced by “civilization.” The need for regulating relations with non-Europeans led to the emergence of a set of criteria referred to as the “standards of civilization”
detailing what Europeans expected from non-Europeans if the latter wished to be a part of and benefit from the privileges that membership accrued (Bull and Watson 1984; Gong 1984).

In International Society terms, “standards of civilization” refer to “the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to distinguish those that belong to a particular society (by definition the ‘civilized’)” (Gong 1984). Initially formulated to overcome the obstacles European actors encountered in their dealings with the non-European “other” (as with China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire), the “standards of civilization” also proved instrumental for some in their colonial dealings. After all, “non-Western” others were not always more tolerant toward “difference” or accepting of equality in treatment of “us” and “them” (Bull 1984). Whereas those who were altogether outside International Society were considered as not deserving of self-governance (as with parts of Asia and Africa), others in the process of meeting the standards with a view to joining endured intervention of one form or another (such as China and Japan).

A growing body of postcolonial studies accounts have looked, among other things, at Europe’s encounter with non-Europeans and their mutual transformation. Particularly insightful are recent contributions that provide a critical analysis of the period during which the Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman Empires sought membership in International Society (see Gong 1984; Mazower 2006; Suzuki 2005). In contrast to mainstream accounts of the expansion of International Society as characterized by a benevolent Europe exporting its values and institutions of “civilized statecraft” (Bull 1977; Bull and Watson 1984) or non-Europeans “adhering to the common interests and values, binding rules and institutions of the nineteenth-century International Society which self-consciously characterized itself as ‘civilized’” (Gong 1984, 172), critical accounts have begged to differ. Consider, for example, Shogo Suzuki’s critique: “Many non-European states which were incorporated into European International Society in the course of European imperialism did not only witness the norms of ‘toleration’ and ‘coexistence.’ They also witnessed the European International Society which often aggressively intervened in their land in order to bring them closer to ‘civilisation’” (Suzuki 2005, 147). Among others, Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman encounters with European International Society were suffused with such insecurities through and through (Bilgin 2008, 2009a; Zhang 1991).

Indeed, throughout the colonial era (which lasted well into the mid-twentieth century for some), peoples of “traditional” societies had to fight not only the military forces but also the culture forces of imperialism, for the latter had allowed the former to occur (Said 1993). The culture of imperialism, coupled with an Orientalist mind-set (Said 1978), had provided the grounds for claiming the “right” to “better” rule. The Ottoman Empire
had experienced such treatment first hand when Britain took over Cyprus and sought to legitimize its continued occupation of the island by invoking the superiority of the enlightenment and postenlightenment ideas that it introduced to replace what was portrayed as the “useless” and “impractical” education systems of the Greeks and Ottoman Turks (Bryant 2001). This experience did not always take the crude form of indoctrination but rather the dissemination of a “system of ideas” through the new forms of novel and historical narrative, as pointed to by Edward W. Said: “Most historians of empire speak of the ‘age of empire’ as formally beginning around 1878, with the ‘scramble for Africa.’ A closer look at the cultural actuality reveals a much earlier, more deeply and stubbornly held view about overseas European hegemony . . . There is first the authority of the European observer—traveller, merchant, scholar, historian, novelist. Then there is the hierarchy of spaces by which the metropolitan economy are seen as dependent upon an overseas system of territorial control, economic exploitation, and a socio-cultural vision; without these stability and prosperity as home . . . would not be possible” (Said 1995, 36).

Elsewhere, reactions to such portrayal of the non-European as not deserving to rule (by virtue of not being “civilized”) and the interlinked European claim to “better” rule took various form of resistance. Postcolonial reactions to such claims to “better” rule in other parts of the world included efforts to remove the grounds for the claim to such superiority. Indeed, in an unequal setting where the hierarchical binaries of Western/Eastern or civilized/uncivilized were defined by the “powerful,” feigning “similarity”—that is, being and/or seemingly becoming “modern,” “civilized,” and “Western”—emerged as a survival strategy. The colonized feigned similarity, because it was based on a hierarchical classification of peoples (“civilized” v. the “rest”) that colonialism had, for years, justified (Bhabha 1994).

In a context where the recognition of one’s sovereignty was “granted” based on one’s success in fulfilling the requirements of the “standards of civilization,” prevalent notions of “statehood” were embraced—for want of a better term—by non-European societies as part of the attempt to prove their adequacy in self-governance. Whereas China and Japan emulated members of International Society and sought to achieve great power status by increasing their military might and acquiring colonies, Ottoman statesmen—who were unable to undertake such a military leap—took to using a race-based discourse in discussing the status of those lands in North Africa they had previously taken possession of (Deringil 2003). In all three cases, there was an attempt by a non-European other to follow the European “model” in the attempt to pass as “similar,” thereby avoiding being labeled as “uncivilized” and/or deserving of less than full sovereignty. At the time, even as all three empires were recognized by International Society to have passed the test of the “standards of
civilization,” they experienced the fragility of such recognition. While China had to insist on “the set of rules declared by the West to be universally binding in international relations” to include itself as well (Zhang 1991, 15), the Japanese experience with European International Society “was not one of stability and order, but of insecurity” (Suzuki 2005, 149).

The adoption of models of “adequate” statehood, then, should not be understood devoid of the context of anticolonial struggle by some and struggle for “full sovereignty” by others. This struggle took place in a world shaped by the hegemony of ideational forces disseminated by International Society—ideas that imposed certain ways of “being a state” as acceptable. In time, “[t]he modern bureaucratic state has become the sole legitimate form of political organization in the world; virtually all others have been eliminated. Empires, colonies, feudal arrangements, and a variety of other forms have become extinct and, perhaps more important, unimaginable in contemporary politics” (Finnemore 1996, 332).

Building on the insights of sociological institutionalism, Martha Finnemore identifies two problematic consequences of the proliferation of notions of “adequate statehood.” First, “[e]xtreme valuation on statehood as the only legitimate form of organization makes many kinds of political conflict difficult to resolve.” Second, “this valuation on statehood has created many ineffective, even failed, states” (Finnemore 1996, 332). In the post–World War II era, the model to be emulated became the model of the “modern nation-state.” “From the 1950s onwards notions of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ came to be more closely associated with the portrayal of West/non-West encounters, whereas representations of civilization and order, although still present . . . became less prominent they were no longer the master signifiers they had been before 1940. At the same time, democracy and order were resituated in a discursive context organized around the new signifiers of modernization and development” (Slater 2004).

While valuable in terms of underscoring the fact that “states exist in many places not because they are good at what they are supposed to do (provide security and economic growth, promote equality) but because a larger world culture supports them” (Finnemore 1996), such accounts often fail to identify the hierarchical environment within which they refer to as the “world culture” allowed such insecurities to emerge and persist. After all, notions of “civilized,” “modern,” or “adequate” statehood were disseminated in an environment characterized by multiple hierarchies, such as civilized/uncivilized, rich/poor, European/non-European, and Western/non-Western.

In accounting for such nonmaterial aspects of insecurity, postcolonial scholars have offered rich case studies, including L. H. M. Ling’s (2002) account of the relationship between Asia and the West as one of “conquest and desire”; Sankaran Krishna’s (1999) reading of India and Sri Lanka’s
search for “nation-statehood” as “postcolonial anxiety”; Himadeep Muppidi’s (1999) analysis of India’s relations with the two superpowers during the Cold War as a “puzzle” (why did India lean closer to the Soviet Union than the United States with which it shared “democratic” credentials?); and Mustapha Kamal Pasha’s (1996) critique of the emphasis put on civil society as an alternative agent for security, which he considered as problematic by virtue of civil society being a product of the “national security project” of the state. Such critical accounts guide us in decoding the survival tactics adopted to escape colonization and/or sustain sovereign existence. They also highlight the transformation non-European societies underwent throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they struggled to pass the test of the “standards of civilization” (read notions of “modern” and “adequate” statehood for the post–World War II era) laid out by International Society.

Particularly useful for the purposes of this chapter is the notion of “post-colonial anxiety,” which Krishna defines as the concerns of developing world elites regarding their own status vis-à-vis the supposed experiences of others—that is, “the West”: “The story of what once happened in Europe constitutes the knowledge that empowers state elites as they attempt to fashion their nations in the image of what are considered successful nation-states . . . Premised on this narrative of what once happened ‘out there,’ postcolonial elites attempt to remake the recalcitrant clay of plural civilizations into lean, hyper-masculine, and disciplined nation-states. I consider postcolonial anxiety to be this attempt at replicating historical originals that are ersatz to begin with” (Krishna 1999, xix).

Without wanting to downplay the significance of Krishna’s questioning of the relevance of stories about what once happened “out there” to what should happen “in here”—or underplay the need for questioning the accuracy of our stories about what once happened “out there” (Halperin 1997, 2006)—even in those parts of the world that did not live through the experience of being de/colonized, thinking postcolonially is relevant for understanding those insecurities produced in and through the processes of domination and resistance between the colonized and the colonizer. This amounts to extending the meaning of postcolonial in a manner somewhat different from those who extend it vertically to include the period “after” the end of the age of colonialism (Loomba 2005; Slater 2004). This amounts to a horizontal extension that underscores the relevance of the insights of postcolonial studies in understanding the insecurities of those who were colonized and others who were indirectly caught within those material and nonmaterial structures produced in and through the processes of domination and resistance—that is, “imagined post-coloniality” (Bilgin 2009b).
Globalization, In/Security, and the Middle East

When the Middle East is viewed through the lenses of mainstream approaches, it is considered to have had an uneven balance sheet vis-à-vis globalization. On the one hand, it is closely linked to world markets via oil sales, financial flows, and arms purchases. The Gulf being the hub of world oil production means it is fully integrated into the world economy. On the other hand, the level of integration of the Middle East in general is still below the expectations of the proponents of increasing globalization. This being the case despite the increase in the density of financial and trade connections between the Middle East and world markets especially since the 1970s boom in oil prices suggests that the region has had very little to offer with the exception of oil. Yet, at the same time, writings on globalization and in/security deem the Middle East to be fully integrated into the rest of the world via arms sales, financial flows that feed al Qaida, and ideas and individuals that sustain resistance to the US presence in Saudi Arabia, the US-led war in Afghanistan, the US-led war in Iraq, and the rise of anti-Americanism elsewhere. As such, the literature portrays the Middle East as a region that tries to resist globalization in some ways, thereby losing out on peace as a by-product of doing business, but at the same time is fully integrated into those flows and networks that endanger peace in other parts of the world.

What is left out of analyses are the reasons behind some Middle Eastern actors’ resistance to globalization, which some view as “colonization of the future” (Sardar 1985, 10). Likewise, the satellite networks and other information technologies that underpin the communications revolution have been dubbed by one author as “cybernetic colonialism” (Miskin 1995, 28). Egyptian scholar Hasan Hanafi (1998) expressed his frustration as follows: “There are only two alternatives: to compete or to retreat, to produce or to consume, to create or to imitate, to invent or to assimilate, to give or to take, to export or to import, to be in the center or to be in the periphery.” While such a reserved attitude toward globalization is not isolated to the Middle East (also see Europe-wide debates on globalization as the latest stage of US imperialism), such misgivings here are framed in terms of “colonization”—that is, through invoking memories of the colonial era.

As such, the literature considers the relationship between globalization and in/security in the Middle Eastern context in narrow terms—as with the threat of terrorism—and not in terms of the dynamic relationship between the region’s insecurities and its encounters with the global. But even when a broad agenda is put into place—as with the UN’s human security agenda—the persistence of human insecurities are viewed in terms of low levels of development in the region without due regard to the production
of underdevelopment (see also Hatem in this volume). The persistence of human insecurities is not considered in terms of the prevalence of certain notions of “modern” statehood, which disallows other forms of political and economic organization. Nor are the traumas of transition into modern statehood considered in terms of the persistence of statist practices of security (as opposed to human-centered ones).

Illustrative of regional actors’ embrace of statist notions of security are the debates that surround human security in the Middle East. In response to their critics, which berate local actors for their inattentiveness to human insecurities, Middle Eastern leaders invariably play the “time” card: their argument being that developing states need the time to develop their share in the world economy in terms of production and exports. They often consider the adoption of what they represent as “Western” notions of “human rights,” “women’s rights,” and “children’s rights” as impediments to economic development and transition to “modern” or “adequate” statehood.

By way of justifying their relative lack of attention to human insecurities as such, Middle Eastern leaders exhibit the kind of statism prevalent in the literature on security. Consider the argument of one prominent contributor to the field, Mohammed Ayoob (1995). Arguing against calls for reorienting security efforts toward addressing human insecurities, Ayoob reminds his readers that developing states, as opposed to states in the developed world, are still busy with state building and therefore in need of being given the time and space to construct “credible and legitimate political apparatuses with the capacity to provide order—in many respects, the foremost social value—within the territories under their juridical control” (Ayoob 1997, 131). Consequently, Ayoob emphasizes the need for adopting an “explicitly state-centric” approach to security in the developing world on the grounds that the state is the provider, and therefore its concerns should come first. While Ayoob does not overlook other dimensions of security such as the economic or environmental, he maintains that they should be taken into consideration only if they “become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival” (Ayoob 1995, 9).

Not writing specifically about the Middle Eastern context, Ayoob’s ideas encapsulate a statist approach to security prevalent among regional actors as evinced by the policymaking (and to a certain extent scholarly) discourse on “failed states.” Through disseminating notions of “adequate” statehood, which are then used to “measure” the “adequate stateness” of non-Western states, the “failed states” discourse constitutes prime evidence of the prevalence of statism in thinking about and acting for security in the non-West in general and the Middle East in particular. Nonmaterial insecurities such as the fear of marginalization, alienation, and/or recolonization are viewed as inconsequential
given the power of the forces of globalization. Yet, as argued above, such insecurities are not inconsequential—far from it. They have implications for the persistence of insecurities across the Middle East and elsewhere.

The point is, such “postcolonial anxiety” as experienced by Middle Eastern leaders prioritizes the security needs and interests of states and either denies or postpones acknowledging the need to address the insecurities of individuals and social groups—that is, until that point in history when the “state” is secure(d). Leaving aside the problems involved in such hierarchies being created between the security concerns of different referents without considering the specificities of different settings, one cannot but ask: when is a state secure?

The foregoing outlined the problems with the mainstream perspective. Providing a full account of the insights of the postcolonial critique vis-à-vis globalization and in/security in the Middle East is beyond the mandate of this chapter. However, the main insights to be generated by such a critical reading of Middle Eastern insecurities in the era of globalization can be well illustrated by looking at the case of Turkey and its encounters with International Society.

**Globalization, In/Security, and Republican Turkey**

In what follows, this chapter thus seeks to point to the persistence of human insecurities in Republican Turkey as a byproduct of the struggle against the threat of colonization in the final years of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Republic of Turkey. In particular, it will suggest that the ways in which Turkey has excelled in providing military security vis-à-vis external threats (outside), but has so far hesitated in strengthening its democracy and human rights record to the detriment of the security of individuals and social groups (inside), can be viewed as an instance of the persistence of “postcolonial anxiety in never-colonized society.” Perhaps because the Ottoman Empire was able to avoid being colonized and join the International Society of states as an equal member (Naff 1984), insights gleaned from postcolonial studies are rarely applied to the dynamics of its international relations. Yet they prove useful in understanding the trials and travails of those who sought to locate themselves in the “West.”

A significant component of Turkey’s security policy in the republican period has been the founding leaders’ answer to the identity question: “who are we?” (Weldes 1999). “Western” was the answer the founders of the republic offered. During the interwar period, they sought to write Turkey’s “Westernness” into its “race” and “language,” tapping then prevalent theories of identity. Later, during the Cold War, the ideological stances of
anticommunism and NATO membership were thought to serve as markers of Turkey’s “Westernness” (Yılmaz and Bilgin 2005–6).

The significance of the symbolic importance of Turkey’s “Westernness” cannot be underestimated. Contrary to popular representations, Turkey’s Westernization was always much more than a mere lifestyle choice. As well as being a sign of commitment to ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment, being part of the West was also a strategy to avoid being on the margins of the world political and economic system. Such concerns are rooted in a particular memory of the final days of the Ottoman Empire that traumatized Turkey’s elite: the memory of Anatolia turned into a backwater of the world economic system and pushed to the brink of dismemberment. These concerns have been a driving force behind the project of Westernization throughout the republican era (Bilgin 2009a).

As such, as well as being grounded in its founding leaders’ belief in the ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment, Turkey’s search for locating itself in the “West” was also a response to nonmilitary and nonspecific insecurities of the early republican era. The threat to the Republic of Turkey was nonmilitary in that the gains of the National Struggle had been sealed through the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Yet, while Lausanne had reaffirmed Turkey’s hard-won sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, the founding leaders were nevertheless concerned about the fragility of such recognition given International Society’s ambivalence toward Turkey’s “Otherness.” The threat they sought to respond to was nonspecific in that they were not targeting a specific act of a specific counterpart. Rather, their policies were designed to respond to what the future may bring, based on their particular remembrances of the past and interpretations of the present. The point is that Turkey’s policies came to rest on the “West”/“non-West” divide in the attempt to respond to nonmaterial and nonspecific insecurities vis-à-vis International Society—this, in addition to other domestic and international insecurities (Bilgin 2009a).

Whereas the literature notes the year 1856 as the date when the Ottoman Empire was recognized as having passed the test of the “standards of civilization” and gained entry into International Society (Naff 1984), the fact that capitulations remained in place suggests that the empire was still considered less than a full member. The Republic of Turkey inherited some of these concerns by virtue of being a successor to the Ottoman Empire and its founding leaders’ formative years having been shaped by the Ottoman ordeal (Frey 1965).

The initial encounters of Turkey’s founding leaders with International Society’s ambivalence toward their “difference” occurred during the National Struggle when, in the words of Enver Ziya Karal, “the Allies did not hesitate to use civilisation themselves as a propaganda instrument to divide Turkey. They claimed that the Turks in history had never been the creators of any masterpieces of civilisation. Furthermore, they claimed that the Turks had always
been strangers to Western civilisation and had even attempted to destroy it. This propaganda resulted in the claim that Turks did not deserve to survive as an independent nation” (Karal 1981). European actors’ propaganda during the National Struggle and the difficulties encountered during the Treaty of Lausanne negotiations seem to have driven home the lesson that winning the war on the battlefield and the negotiating table were not enough unless the grounds for International Society’s claim to better rule were removed.

Some critical scholars underscore the importance of battlefield gains when they note that it was not Ottoman efforts to meet the “standards of civilization” but the military successes of the National Struggle that allowed Turkey to be eventually recognized as fully sovereign (Zhang 1991). Yet, even as the National Struggle was won and formal recognition of Turkey as an independent and sovereign state was achieved with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey’s founding leaders remained apprehensive regarding the ambivalence in International Society’s treatment of the young republic. Consider the following quote by one of Atatürk’s closest friends, Fалиh Rifki Atay, who put the choices facing Turkey at the time in dramatic terms when he wrote, “We were either going to become European or . . . the seven-fanged imperialist beast called Düveli Muazzama (great powers of Europe) was going to break us up and turn us into Asian hordes” (Atay 1980 [1961]). The national anthem of Turkey, which was adopted during the National Struggle, expressed similar sentiments in equally dramatic terms when it referred to Düveli Muazzama as “that one-fanged beast that you call civilization.”

The ambivalence in International Society’s treatment of Turkey’s “Otherness” was matched by the ambivalence in the republican leaders’ approach to International Society. The “West” was a source of both inspiration and insecurity. Turkey’s founding leaders considered themselves as facing a predicament similar to the one faced by postcolonial peoples in some other parts of the world: feign “similarity” or risk the loss of full sovereignty and independence. Needless to say, this is not to reduce Turkey’s modernization and/or Westernization to seeking “similarity” (understood in the everyday sense of the term), but to underscore the parallels in the experiences of various peoples in their encounters with International Society.

In present day Turkey, debates on EU membership tap into the same themes. Not unlike postcolonial contexts that view the kind of penetration brought about by the forces of globalization as “interference” in “domestic” affairs, some among Turkey’s elite view the European project with suspicion. In the attempt to resist the kind of transformation of Turkey’s polity and politics through Europeanization, they have invoked the fears of the early republican period—with a difference. Different from the Eurosceptics in some other member or candidate states, who mostly worry about the restrictions over sovereignty imposed by membership, Turkey’s Eurosceptics have revved
up fears of a return to the past of dismemberment and near-colonization. As such, whereas the European project was previously portrayed as a solution to Turkey’s insecurities (security was sought through “similarity”), currently it is painted by the Eurosceptics as a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity (security being sought through recognition of Turkey’s difference if not “uniqueness”). Amid such statist anxieties and fears, calls for deepening democracy, strengthening the rule of law and human rights, and practicing security with a human focus get suppressed.

**Conclusion**

The dissemination of notions of “adequate” (read “civilized” and/or “modern”) statehood has had numerous implications vis-à-vis human insecurities. On the one hand there are the benefits of “individualism and expanding notions of individual rights of all sorts—human rights, citizen rights, women’s rights, children’s rights” (Finnemore 1996, 332). The very notion of individuals as a referent of security has its roots in the dissemination of enlightenment ideas of individualism and individual rights. As such, the relationship between globalization and in/security has had “positive” outcomes. On the other hand, there are human insecurities in the Middle East as elsewhere in the developing world, which persist notwithstanding the efforts of myriad actors to address them. This chapter suggested that such persistence could be understood partly as a consequence of the insecure conditions (as laid out previously) within which “traditional” societies have transformed themselves into “adequate” states—a “negative” outcome of the globalization-in/security relationship reflecting the manifold fractures in world society (see Stetter’s introduction to this volume).

The approach chosen here, which adopts a broad notion of security and a historical understanding of globalization, moves beyond categorizing such insecurities as “negative” or “positive” and views them as products of a mutually constitutive relationship between people, social groups, organizations, and institutions, whereby the Middle East emerges to have had an uneven record—but in a different way.

- Adopting a historical understanding of globalization allows recognizing the agency of Middle Eastern (non-Western) actors in the production of not only ideas about violent jihadism (as frequently highlighted in the literature) but also ideas about democracy and human rights. Presenting globalization as a process of give-and-take and mutual constitution, as opposed to a one-way flow of “good” or “bad” ideas, allows regional actors to anchor their practices in their own “authentic” tradition, thus
removing the grounds for their rejection of them for reasons of being “imported” or “alien.”

- Adopting a broad notion of security allows recognizing insecurities of multiple referents that take material and nonmaterial forms. As such, it becomes possible to go beyond viewing the Middle East as purely a victim of globalization-as-colonization or the culprit behind globalization as violent anti-Americanism to viewing it as one realm where the dynamics of globalization and in/security play out, resulting in the disappearance of some insecurities, the emergence of others, and the persistence of some others.

Myriad insecurities have resulted from the attempt to build “adequate” states modeled after their developed “Western” counterparts, and the case of Turkey presented in this chapter bears evidence to this. The limited nature of our understanding of statehood and global encounters through which such notions of “adequate” statehood were produced by some and adopted by others has had implications for human security. As this chapter has argued, a critical globalization perspective, drawing from postcolonial studies and historically informed notions of how International Society developed, can generate new insights into how such dynamics are to this day shaping politics and society in the Middle East.