

Introduction

The European Economic Community (EEC) officially came into being on 1 January 1958. Founded by the Treaty of Rome, the EEC envisioned the creation of a European common market with a single external customs regime and free movement of services, goods, and labor among its member states. A year and a half later, in the summer of 1959, Turkey applied to join this nascent European organization, thus beginning a journey that has carried on for more than a half-century to the present day.

From the outset, Turks perceived their integration into the EEC in more than economic terms. In fact, the most salient feature of Turkey's long-standing membership bid has been the striking incongruity between the subject matter – the integration of the Turkish economy into the European common market – and the language used to speak about this integration. Over the course of the last fifty years, integration into the EEC has sparked the imaginations of a broad range of Turks, made zealots out of technocrats and statesmen, and led to best sellers, theater productions, and arson. It has been alternately embraced as the crowning symbol of Turkey's accomplishments and disavowed as the recolonization of the country. Rarely has it been grasped without passion, neutrally, as something in between.

This book examines how Turks spoke about their integration into the predecessor of the European Union (EU) during the twenty-one years between their initial application in 1959 and the 1980 military coup. During this period, I argue, the horizon on which Turkish elites understood themselves, their people, their state, and their culture was to a large degree framed by and through a vast multifaceted conversation about joining the EEC. How the prospect and process of membership in a relatively minor organization of western European states could come to have such a defining, if not existential, grip on Turkey's imagination is one of the central questions this book seeks to answer.

But first, some details. The Turkish application to the European Common Market on 31 July 1959 presented the EEC with a problem. Although the EEC welcomed the Turkish application as adding legitimacy to the fledgling organization, it was apparent that the Turkish economy was by no measure ready to withstand the competition that immediate accession would bring. This was a dilemma the drafters of the Treaty of Rome had not foreseen. To solve this dilemma, negotiators on both sides settled on a gradual process of integration with the goal of full Turkish membership at some future date. The process was laid out four years later, in a treaty that established an *Association* between Turkey and EEC. The treaty, known as the Ankara Agreement, formed the fundamental framework on which Turkish integration into the EEC has been, and currently is, based.

The Ankara Agreement laid out a three-phase plan at the conclusion of which Turkey was to accede fully to the EEC.¹ The *preparatory stage*, to last five to ten years, was designed to allow Turkey's relatively underdeveloped economy to prepare for integration. In this first phase, Turkey remained free of any obligations while the EEC agreed to annul tariffs on certain Turkish exports and to provide financial assistance to the Turkish economy. The *transitional stage*, to last a minimum of twelve years, would be entered into only when both sides agreed to an Additional Protocol; this stage entailed a gradual and mutual reduction of tariffs as well as the easing of restrictions on the movement of peoples and capital. It was in this last aspect that the Ankara Agreement planned beyond a simple customs union and hinted at the possibility of full membership in a future European Common Market. The third and final phase, to begin sometime between 1981 and 1986, called for the elimination of all tariffs and the gradual harmonization of economic policies between Turkey and the European Community.

THE CIVILIZATIONAL AND NATIONALIST LOGICS

The Ankara Agreement implied that, structurally, Turkish integration would be protracted and, as it stands today, incomplete. These two qualities have fertilized the rich gray zone between inclusion and exclusion in which republican Turkey has dwelt for almost two-thirds of its existence. The framework of this relationship, Turkish perceptions of the EEC, and, through these, the ways Turkey has come to understand itself have undergone dramatic shifts since Turkey's initial application in 1959. To account for and understand the effects of these shifts, we need first to identify who in Turkey was concerned about Turkish involvement in the project for European unification, whether they perceived it in a favorable or critical light, and why.

¹ For a full text of the Ankara Agreement, see Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) No. C113/2.24.12/1973.

At the birth of Turkish-EEC relations, there was near unanimous support for Turkish membership. Led by state elites in the Turkish Foreign Service and Armed Forces, members of both political parties and the media jostled with business associations and trade unions to proclaim their enthusiasm. Over the next twenty years, some of these groups would retract or dilute their positions, to be replaced by others. The reasons why various Turks supported integration were as variable as the groups themselves. Fear of the Soviet Union, the need to secure western financial aid, and the strategic rationale to not be left out of any organization solicited by Greece were motivations that, to varying degrees, informed Turkish support among different groups. To a lesser extent, economic calculation galvanized the few sectors of the Turkish economy (such as export/import, textiles, dried fruits, and later tourism) that stood to profit from a European common market.

Yet, remarkably, few of these considerations factored into the way Turks vocalized their support. Instead, Turkish advocates of the EEC, with few exceptions, spoke of it in *civilizational* terms, as the consummation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's vision to "raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization."² For the Turkish elite, joining the European Common Market was seamlessly incorporated into, and quickly became the benchmark and beacon for, this civilizational project. This book is in a sense framed by the question of why this occurred as well as the consequences of this marriage.

The broad consensus that lent an almost festival-like quality to the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 was challenged soon after by the rise of a radically new way of speaking about the EEC, one that viewed integration into the European Common Market as fundamentally at odds with Turkey's national interests. The analysis of Turkish anti-EEC groups between 1959 and 1980 presents a series of problems. First, these groups have generally been lumped together as radical, anti-western, and oppositional.³ Yet, critics of Turkish integration neither politically nor rhetorically constituted a unified front, for the

² "To reach the standards of contemporary civilization" was an oft-quoted line that came to serve as the unofficial mantra of the Turkish revolution. It was used to justify many of the radical reforms that transformed Turkish society in the initial years of the Republic, and it has come to represent Atatürk's vision of the Turkish project. The term "contemporary civilization" was generally taken to refer to Europe and has been extended to the "West" following World War II. Yet as Nilüfer Göle has pointed out, the Kemalist notion of Civilization implied more than a particular sociohistorical and thus concrete civilization. In fact, it was diametrically opposed to the German notion of Kultur. "For the Kemalist elite, civilization was intimately tied up with modernity, and as such was both universal (exportable) but more importantly, was constantly changing, moving forward, encapsulating the idea of progress. It went beyond describing an extant level of development to symbolizing an ideal that must be reached." Nilüfer Göle, "Modernleşme Bağlamında İslami Kimlik Arayışı," in *Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, eds. Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 75.

³ Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası 1959-1985* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1986); Mehmet Ali Birand, *Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası 1959-2004* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2005); İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* (Ankara: Ümit

most part being – outside of their opposition to the EEC – bitterly opposed to one another. Anti-EEC groups also elude the category “radical” because they included institutions and political parties central to the Turkish Republic. The term “anti-western” is similarly ill-suited, as most anti-EEC elements within party politics, the bureaucracy, or civil society did not reject the west, either ideologically or strategically. A second difficulty in conceptualizing Turkish opposition to the EEC during this period lies in the internal inconsistency of the groups themselves. The history of Turkish-EEC relations between 1959 and 1980 is rife with examples of political parties switching position on the Common Market either because of external developments or simply to draw political capital within the capricious economy of Turkish politics. Finally, the sheer variety of Turkish opposition resists attempts to derive a common political-ideological basis. Political Islam’s characterization of the EEC as an invidious Christian-Zionist enterprise out to eradicate Muslim culture had little apparent overlap with, say, leftist concerns over the penetration of western imperialism.

How then, if at all, should we talk about them? The more we ask who supported or opposed the Common Market and why, the more incoherent our picture becomes – as if we were forcing labels onto a motley crew of shifting interests and people, yet always leaving a remainder. Rather than focusing in on the *who* or *why*, this book asks the question *how*. How did various Turks speak about integration with the EEC? How did they construct their arguments? How did they understand the EEC, Turkey, and their integration? To address these questions, I introduce two historically defined categories to differentiate two distinct postures or worldviews that Turks adopted toward Turko-European relations during this period.

From factual statistical observations to the hyperboles of ideological politics, Turkish statements regarding integration into the EEC fell into and were conditioned by two historical-conceptual categories I term the *Civilizational* and *Nationalist* logics. In using the term “logic” I refer to a certain mode of being that underlay a way Turks imagined themselves and their country. It describes a peculiar subjectivity, a particular way of thinking about Turkey – of giving meaning to and ordering how Turks understood and experienced themselves and the world. Each logic, I claim, is based on a distinct self/other relation that framed the terrain through which Turkish-EEC relations were signified. The logics structured the statements Turks made about the EEC during this period; more precisely, they were what made these statements possible in the first place.

The Civilizational logic predominantly, but not exclusively, ordered Turkish voices sympathetic to integration. Its structuring principle was one of invitation, predicated on an initial gesture of hospitality or welcoming of the other

Yayıncılık, 1993); Şaban Çaliş, *Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri* (Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2001); and Yıldırım Keskin, *Avrupa Yollarında Türkiye* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2001).

(European civilization) into the self (Turkey). The Civilizational logic shares a close affinity with what the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas referred to as an *ethical* relation, whereby the European other (hypostasized through the EEC) was invited in to preside over the Turkish project. An asymmetrical relation, not unlike that of the master and pupil, the Civilizational logic ordained Turkey's European other to stand in judgment: positioned to assess, endorse, or censure the Turkish project.⁴

By contrast, the various currents and movements opposing Turkey's integration with the EEC all shared a common worldview that I call the logic of "national interest" or the Nationalist logic. The term "national interest" was first introduced into Turkey's political lexicon by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in the mid-1950s to refer to his democratically given mandate against a state bureaucracy that Menderes felt was undermining his reform policies. From this specific tradition onward, with the exception of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the term "national interest" has been utilized much more effectively as an oppositional or critical concept rather than a unifying rallying point for those in power. In Turkish politics, the accusation of ignoring, opposing, and, in the last instance, betraying the national interest has had far greater political currency than protecting or guarding it.

I mention this because I wish to focus neither on the content nor meaning of the term "national interest" (which has varied depending on the speaker and his/her time), but rather on its formal structure – that is, one based on antagonism. In this manner the logic of national interest, or what from this point on will be referred to as the Nationalist logic, can be taken as an instance of what Ernesto Laclau called antagonistic (or *populist*) politics.⁵ For Laclau, antagonistic politics referred to a particular type of terrain through which social identification occurred. The self of antagonism is based on an ontological relation wherein the being of the other is defined as what prevents me from being totally myself. It erects a discursive frontier (in this instance, between Turkey and the EEC) simultaneously positing an enemy (EEC) and a threatened self-identity (Turkey), which, though allegedly present beforehand, only takes shape retroactively through the encounter. In this way, the Nationalist logic refers to a particular way of constituting the self and makes possible a specific discourse of nationalism based on an antagonistic self/other ontology.

The Civilizational and Nationalist logics are historical-conceptual categories in that they have their origin and provenance in Turkey's past. In this sense they are immanent to Turkish history.⁶ This book is an intellectual and political

⁴ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity* (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

⁵ Ernesto Laclau, "Populism, What's in a Name?" University of Essex Centre for Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences: Online Paper Collection. <http://www.essex.ac.uk/centres/theostud/onlinepapers.asp> (last accessed 17 May 2013).

⁶ To the extent that their theoretical basis comes through the western philosophical tradition, the logics stand as interventions into this history that mandate justification, which the final section of this introduction attempts to provide.

history of these logics as they came to inform Turkish stances toward the EEC. It is a historical work in two respects. First, it details the history of Turkish responses to the Common Market as the interplay of these logics by examining how various groups within Turkey spoke about the EEC and how these voices were structured. It is my claim that because these logics oriented and made possible the specific political content that was expressed through them, the history of their interplay provides a more telling analysis of the Turkish social-imaginary than the study of the particular ideologies of individuals or groups that came to weigh in on Turkish-EEC relations. Second, the book examines the historical roots of these logics within the broader histories of Turkish-European relations and the internal dynamics of the Turkish Republic. The Civilizational and Nationalist logics, while most clearly and explicitly manifest through Turkish-EEC relations, did not originate within them. To understand the emergence of these logics, it becomes necessary to step beyond the immediate history of these relations. In doing so, the book dips quite often into the history of Turkey's interwar period. Its aim is not to trace out an objective history of the emergence of these logics (which could not help but be teleological), but rather to carry out a hermeneutic project. To do so, it looks back at this history as it was resurrected by various actors engaging in Turkish debates over the EEC between 1959 and 1980. More than any other association, the EEC occasioned in Turks a profound reengagement with their own past. How various strains of this history were appropriated by Turkish interlocutors is of central concern to this book. Its most significant consequence is to tie the history of Turkish-EEC relations to the broader themes and registers of Turkish history.⁷

In the most general terms, the book traces how the Civilizational logic, near-ubiquitous in the initial period of Turkish integration, soon came into question by the emergence of a radically different way of speaking about and understanding the EEC. The middle years, in the decade between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, witnessed an intense struggle between the two logics over how integration was proclaimed. The final period traces the circumstances and avenues through which the Nationalist logic moved from the periphery to the core of Turkish political culture, becoming, by the late 1970s, the predominant way through which Turkish-EEC relations were signified within Turkey.

In this context, the history of Turkish-EEC relations from 1959 to 1980 can be understood as a revolutionary period for Turkey, not in the sense of political power (or even the potential for its transition) but in the more fundamental sense of how Turks imagined themselves. This period marked a time when one reigning logic had been or was in the process of being discredited and a new

⁷ Here I am explicitly rejecting the view that Turkish postures toward membership in the EEC were in some way a direct product of, or can be wholly explained by, an analysis of Turkish intellectual/political traditions. Rather I claim that Turkish-EEC relations became the site through which these traditions were resurrected and redeployed.

one (albeit internally divided) had not achieved dominance over its rival. This struggle did not occur at the level of actual politics (either between Turkey and the EEC or as a struggle between various domestic groups); it was, rather, a struggle over the terrain on which politics took place.

It is important to note, however, that the Civilizational and Nationalist logics, while conceptually delineated from one another, did not remain unchanged by their interaction. The task is to trace, in their mutually conditioned historicities, the specific forms they have taken throughout their hegemonic struggle to signify Turkish-EEC integration and, through this, Turkey itself.

MATTERS OF TIME AND SPACE: WHY 1959–1980? WHY THE EEC?

This book narrates a history of Turkey's integration into the European Economic Community from Turkey's initial application in 1959 through the 12 September coup. Turkish-EEC relations did not, of course, end in 1980 but rather remain open-ended to this day. Why then 1980? The most obvious answer would be that the 1980 coup stands as a point of radical rupture within Turkish history, a date, much like 1789 for France or 1933 for Germany, that forms a nodal point of periodization for cultural, economic, political, and social analysis of modern Turkey. Regarding Turkish-EEC relations, however, this answer could not be more wrong. The principle aim of this book is to investigate the role of Turkish-EEC relations on the Turkish social-imaginary. To this end, it traces the evolution of Turkish responses to integration and highlights how these responses were central in forming the ways Turks conceived of themselves and the world around them. Our story ends in 1980 for the simple reason that 1980 marks the end of ideological innovation in Turkish responses to the Common Market. Though Turkish-EU relations took many dramatic twists and turns following the coup, the ways Turks approached, understood, and articulated their integration remained the same – rehashing, albeit in very different contexts, arguments that were developed between 1959 and 1980. Rather than demarcate a point of radical difference, 1980, as far as Turkish interpretations of the EU are concerned, marked the end of an evolutionary era.

Domestic Context

Domestically, this period coincides with the birth and death of ideological multiparty politics.⁸ These two decades were, in a very real sense, bounded by

⁸ Outside of a few controlled and short-lived experiments, Turkey's engagement in multiparty politics dates to the immediate postwar years, consummated by the ruling Republican Peoples Party's peaceful transfer of power to the Democrat Party following the 1950 elections. Yet, owing to the extreme similarities of the political platforms between the two parties during the 1950s, one could equally argue that only in the aftermath of the 1960 liberalization did a true multiparty political system that expressed ideological differences come into existence.

two military coups: the first in 1960, which created the sociopolitical framework for Turkey's first experiment as a truly open society, and the second, in 1980, which brought this experiment to an abrupt end. As a consequence of these ideological politics, Turkish society became less insular, increasingly aware, throughout the period, of the history and current state of the world around it. From 1945 until the early 1960s, few Turks beyond those in the Foreign Service were knowledgeable or concerned themselves with developments in Asia, Africa, or the Middle East. Even the west, which they interacted with and aspired to, was, by and large, perceived in monolithic terms. Yet, by the late 1950s, the Turkish elite had clearly begun to distinguish the United States from Western Europe, and by the 1970s, differentiated the latter into distinct regions, if not individual countries. Through the increasing popularity of socialist and Islamic ideas, Turkey also became aware of, and began to think of itself in relation to, the decolonization and nonaligned movements taking shape in the non-western world.⁹

Beginning in 1964, this heightened awareness of the outside world came to impact domestic politics, which, until that point, had consisted mainly of vying policies of development toward a shared goal. Once the barrier of questioning Turkey's foreign policy and direction was broken, the more fundamental question of where Turkey was, or should be, headed replaced the earlier and largely instrumental debates over how best to achieve an agreed-on outcome. As this trend accelerated in the 1970s, more and more issues – including the development of the Turkish economy, debates over Turkish culture, international alignments, and even the meaning and continuation of the Atatürkist revolution – were discussed through the prism of Turkey's integration into the EEC. In this way, the EEC served as a concrete platform anchoring the often abstract and ideological debates over the future of the Turkish nation to Turkey's integration into the Common Market.¹⁰

The increasing importance of the EEC within the Turkish social-imaginary is confirmed by the rising number of participants or interlocutors in Turkish integration. Down to the signing ceremony of the Ankara Agreement in September 1963, few outside of the technocratic and diplomatic elites and a handful of businessmen were concerned with Turkish involvement in the project for European unification. By contrast, after the Cyprus crisis of 1974, Turkish-EEC relations developed into an obsession, the cause of institutional and street battles, parliamentary interpellations, and angry youth campaigns, becoming, as Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit remarked in 1975, a “National Problem.”

⁹ See Duygu Sezer, *Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika* (Ankara: A.Ü.S.B.F, 1972) and Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 139.

¹⁰ Tellingly, among the first actions of the leftist the WPT and the Islamic Milli Selamet Partisi after winning seats in the National Assembly was adamant criticism of the government's pro-EEC stance.

International Context: The EEC, Greece, and NATO

Further west, the beginning of this period saw the postwar project of European unification in its infancy. When Turkey first applied to the Common Market in July 1959, the EEC itself was less than two years old. It was the end result of a broad agreement among European statesmen that the twin problematic of reviving the German economy while allaying (mostly French) fears of a third catastrophe could only be resolved through the integration of France and Germany under some larger European structure. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, was in effect a compromise between various groups over what precisely this structure would be.¹¹ The Treaty established the European Economic Community with the aim of creating a common market between the signatory states. The six original members (France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux Countries) agreed to gradually remove internal barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and people and to erect a unified supranational customs regime with respect to other, “third” countries.

Within Turkey’s wider international context, the EEC was just one of Turkey’s many postwar engagements, sharing attention with Turkish-American relations, NATO, and conflicts with Greece. Yet, despite the Cold War and regional disputes, the EEC remained the central symbolic nexus of the Turkish social-imaginary, resonating with and amplified by the Atatürkist project and Turkey’s Ottoman past. This is not to imply that Turkey’s relations with Greece or the United States should be ignored, just that their influence on the Turkish social-imaginary paled in comparison to the EEC.

Greece, in particular, has figured large in scholarly studies of Turkish-EEC relations. These studies assert that Turkish motives behind, or perceptions of, Turkey’s integration cannot be understood outside of the Greek context. The Treaty of Rome extended an offer of membership to any European nation with a market economy. Greece was the first to take up this offer, and its application, in the summer of 1959, was a major catalyst and factor in Turkey’s decision to apply several weeks later.¹² This initial impetus has led many scholars to overstate the importance of the Greek role in Turkish-EEC relations and in Turkey’s understandings of itself through Europe more generally. Yet, as others have argued, Turkey had independently and closely followed the EEC since the Treaty of Rome, and the Greek application at most affected the timing of the Turkish decision to apply to the Common Market.¹³

¹¹ The essential fault line was drawn between the federalists, who favored a more supranational framework, and those who foresaw the European Community as a forum where leaders of nation-states could gather to discuss and enact mutually beneficial policies.

¹² See Umut Karabulut, “Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinin Başlangıcı: Türkiye’nin Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu’na (AET) Üyelik Başvurusu,” *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 8/16 (2012): 19–32.

¹³ Çalış, *Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, 41.

Over the years, an implicit understanding was reached within the EEC that the Turkish and Greek associations should progress in parallel, and Turkish fears of unilateral Greek accession (and with it a Greek veto) propelled Turkish integration on more than one occasion. On the cultural level, the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 produced a European backlash against Turkey, reintroducing old stereotypes of the “Barbaric Turk” out to ravage the “cradle of European civilization.”¹⁴ Yet, aside from questions of timing and Europe’s Lord Byronesque reaction to Cyprus, which went all but unnoticed within Turkey, Greece figured little into Turkish-EEC relations during this period.

Turkish relations with the United States, especially its membership in NATO, were a different matter. Although Turkey solicited and joined a number of post-war Western organizations, including the Council of Europe and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Atlantic Alliance was the only one that rivaled the EEC in strategic and symbolic terms. During World War II, Turkey had successfully managed to remain on the sidelines. Even before the war’s conclusion, however, it became clear that the prospects for Turkish neutrality in the upcoming global struggle were dim and quickly diminishing. Stalin’s aggressive and often boorish attempts to block western vessels from entering the Black Sea through the Dardanelles set a threatening tone in Turko-Soviet relations, pushing Turkey and the United States (who had recently replaced British interests in the region) into a mutually beneficial strategic partnership. When it became clear that the Western security framework against the Soviet Union would take the form of a mutual assistance pact headed by the United States, Turkey immediately and actively solicited the alliance, effectively buying membership in NATO by committing its armed forces in Korea.¹⁵

Undoubtedly, Turko-American relations, especially Turkish membership in the Atlantic Alliance, occupied a privileged place in Turkey’s postwar project. In the immediate postwar period, the Truman doctrine, U.S. military power against the perceived Soviet threat, and the simple fascination with a novel and thriving culture all served to propel the United States as the new symbol of the west. Compared to the Europeans, the United States also had a much greater physical presence within Turkey in the first two decades after the war. American bazaars, American military bases, American nuclear missiles, American technicians and American style highway construction funded by American

¹⁴ See Faruk Logoğlu, “Turkey’s Image Abroad,” *Journal of the Foreign Affairs Academy* (May 1973): 104–13; Bernard Burrows, “Turkey in Europe?” *The World Today* (June 1980), 266–71, and Mehmet Ali Birand, *Diyet: Türkiye ve Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar, 1974–1980* (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1987), 24–54.

¹⁵ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey, Anglo-American Security Interests 1945–1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Routledge, 1999); and George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–71* (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1972).

credit were turning Turkey into what the then-Turkish prime minister Adnan Menderes gleefully termed a “little America.”

The United States and NATO also figured prominently in Turkish anti-western sentiment that began in the mid-1960s and continued off and on through 1980. The “Yankee Go Home!” mentality that manifested itself in protests against the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the torching of the U.S. ambassador’s car, and demands for the closure of U.S. bases or the re-legalization of opium banned as a result of U.S. pressure certainly echoed throughout Turkish society.

Yet, I argue, the overall impact of Turkish membership in NATO on the Turkish social-imaginary paled in comparison to that of the EEC. There were a number of reasons for this, and a brief outline of the major differences will serve to underscore the import of the EEC during the period. First, by the time Turkey came to question and thus imagine itself through its foreign policy, Turkish integration into the Atlantic Alliance was a *fait accompli*. This significantly altered the positionality of Turkish supporters and detractors of NATO, forcing the latter to justify the much more radical move of renouncing the alliance. Given Turkey’s geographic vulnerability and strategic import, the Gaullist gesture of withdrawing from NATO was not a viable option. By contrast, Turkish integration into the EEC was an ongoing and incomplete process, the very framework of which was negotiated in the midst of a charged domestic debate.

Second, the instrumental reality of Turkish membership in NATO served to dampen its impact on Turkish self-understandings. Turkey had historically been included into the western system for strategic reasons. In this sense NATO was the continuation of Turkey’s strategic inclusion into the west that began at the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In both instances the threat of Russian influence confirmed Turkish membership into the western system of states.¹⁶ Ironically, membership in NATO actually served to underscore the distinction between inclusion in the Western strategic orbit, to which Turkey belonged, and being accepted as a member of the European “Club” or “Community” from which Turkey had historically been excluded. By contrast, integration into the European project, the Turks believed, would mark the end of their historical exclusion.

Third, Cold War delineations of east and west were based either on economic distinctions between capitalist and communist modes of production or on the politico-ideological struggle over the meaning and substance of democracy. Neither had much in common with Turkey’s historical understanding of the terms east and west, an understanding ultimately derived from the nineteenth-century European dichotomy between an advanced European civilization and its oriental and backward counterpart. Turkish integration into

¹⁶ See Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, *Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 1997), 3.

the EEC, by contrast, resonated much more forcibly with Atatürk's project to transform Turkey from a traditional to a modern society.

Finally, the scope of Turkish membership in NATO was much narrower than Turkish association with the EEC. This difference was especially significant for Turkish opposition to both organizations. Turkish opposition to NATO was limited to arguments of territorial sovereignty, such as the presence of U.S. bases or the legality of opium production. By contrast, the EEC invoked the very real possibility, welcomed or not, of economic, political, and social union with Europe, resonating with and resurrecting debates over nationalism, modernity, and westernization that lay at the core of the modern Turkish project.

The EEC and the Battle over Turkey's Past

Integration into the EEC spurred a deep interrogation of Turkey's past relations with Europe, an interrogation that called into question the ideological foundation of the Turkish Republic. For its supporters, Turkish membership in the EEC stood as the culmination of the processional westward march of Turkish society, a march begun slowly in the eighteenth century, accelerating dramatically with the accession of Atatürk as its leader. This reading traced a linear and teleological narrative of Turkish history that steamrolled over the numerous turns, tensions, and ambivalences within the near-history of Turkish-European relations. Against this reading, detractors of Turkish integration underscored the darker history of these relations, positioning Turkey's present attempt to join the EEC in constellation with Turkey's Ottoman past. These historical resonances occurred in a number of areas.

First, detractors often pointed out how Turkey's integration into the EEC and the story of Ottoman capitulations shared a similar historical trajectory. Both began as bilateral agreements between Turkey and Europe initially thought to bring reciprocal advantages to both sides, but later leading to the erosion of Turkey's advantage as European (or EEC) power increased. The Ankara Agreement, which went into force on 1 January 1964, removed European tariffs on a number of Turkish exports. At first this arrangement conferred unique advantages on Turkey. Yet as member state economies continued to grow, the EEC began to expand outward, signing multiple trade agreements with developing and ex-colonial nations over the coming years. Given that these countries exported many of the same goods as Turkey, Turkey's initial advantages began to erode at the same time as her obligations (under the second phase of the Ankara Agreement) began to increase markedly.

Second, Turks drew parallels between the ongoing negotiations for the Additional Protocol and several seminal moments in the history of Ottoman capitulations. The 1838 Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention, which abolished state monopolies, reduced external tariffs to 3 percent, and was broadly regarded as the death knell for Ottoman industry; the law of 7 Safer 1284 (9 June 1867), which allowed foreigners (non-Muslims) to purchase land; and

Kamil Paşa's invitation to the British to assume indirect control of the Ottoman empire as they had in Egypt following the 1913 Unionist coup, were widely referenced as historical lessons during the negotiation period.

Third, the nationalist anti-EEC movements drew parallels between the post-war Turkish elite and the mentality of the Tanzimat statesmen who had preceded them. According to the anti-EEC movements, both had bought the "western lie" that open-door liberal economic policies would benefit the Ottoman/Turkish economy through integration into the world economy, a belief that had consequently led to concessions over Turkey's sovereign right to raise tariffs or regulate the ownership of its land and resources. By contrast, the EEC opposition drew inspiration from various Turkish movements (from the Young Turks to Republican *Étatisme*) who had introduced the protectionist ideas of the German economist Friedrich List as the only path to national economic development.¹⁷

Finally, Turkish recognition of the non-western world, particularly Japan, also prompted parallels between the EEC and the Ottoman capitulations. Much as Ziya Gökalp had argued following Japan's first economic miracle at the turn of the twentieth century, "A nation condemned to every political interference by capitulations is meant to be a nation outside European civilization. [This is why] Japan is accepted as a European power, but we are still regarded as an Asiatic nation," so Turkish nationalists turned their eyes once again to the Japan's second economic miracle as an alternative to the Western path of development. In 1970, the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers remarked on the irony inherent in the Civilizational logic that structured support for Turkish integration:

If the issue is one of getting the Europeans to respect you, the Turkish elite, by abandoning their essence, only draw scorn from Europe – who have no respect for those that don't respect themselves – on the other hand, the completely eastern Japan, not having sacrificed one iota of its national culture, is tremendously respected by the Europeans who cannot stop talking about the Japanese miracle.¹⁸

Much as commentators in the Istanbul press had suggested inviting Japanese advisers to oversee Ottoman modernization, believing that they would be less inclined to assert an imperial agenda, Turkish nationalists in the 1970s explored the possibility of technology transfer and planning models from the non-western world.¹⁹

By drawing such historical constellations, Turkish opposition to the EEC cast it as the latest and most invidious vehicle of a centuries-long European imperial project to colonize Turkey. In this way, opposition to the EEC allowed

¹⁷ Feroz Ahmad, "Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations, 1800–1914," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11/1 (2000): 14.

¹⁸ Makina Mühendisleri Odası, *Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye* (Ankara: MMO, 1970), 248.

¹⁹ Ahmad, "Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations, 1800–1914," 14.

various Turkish political currents to understand themselves within the broader history of European colonialism – linking their struggles to others in the colonial world.²⁰ This is not to suggest that the anti-EEC opposition invented the memories of the visceral and physical brutality of colonial rule, experiences that informed the day-to-day existence of many colonial subjects. What it does claim, however, is that opposition to the EEC recaptured the shame of the Ottoman administration over the capitulations and the loss of sovereignty that they represented. This difference, while a major one for scholars of postcolonial studies, mattered much less to a Turkish audience receptive to identifying their War of Independence as inaugurating the worldwide anticolonial struggle coming to its global close by the late 1960s. Drawing historical constellations between the EEC and the Ottoman capitulations also, as we shall see, helped bridge the intellectual gap between resistance to colonial rule and the emerging critiques of neocolonialism and third-world dependency.

The rewriting of Turkish history through the lens of contemporary Turkish-EEC relations formed a constant and unique feature of Turkish debates, one not replicated in discussions concerning any other association. Perhaps more than any other factor, the constant referencing of these historical resonances imparted to the EEC an unrivaled gravity and significance.

European Identity and the “Turkish Question”

Turkey was of course not alone in debating the symbolic significance of its membership to the EEC. As the last few decades have shown, Turkish-EEC/EU relations have become an equally stirring issue for European identity as the “European question” has been for Turks. The prospect of Turkish accession has led to vocal popular debates across Europe on the meaning of “Europeanness” defined either as the shared cultural and historical heritage of Greco-Christian civilization (from which Turks are excluded) or an ongoing and open project of modernity (enriched by Turkish membership). Picking up on these popular debates, scholars of European history or those engaged with the broader issue

²⁰ Meltem Akhisa, in a theoretical paper on Turkish nationalism, argues that although Turkey does not really fit into a postcolonial model because it was never overtly colonized, and also because of the complications of its own colonial past, it is still possible to argue that it is more or less a proper object of study for postcolonial criticism. Meltem Akhisa, “Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102/2 (2003): 351–79. This view is substantiated by Bart Moore-Gilbert’s broad definition of the postcolonial, “In my view, postcolonial criticism can still be seen as a more or less distinct set of reading practices, if it is understood as preoccupied principally with analysis of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reflect upon the relations of domination and subordination – economic, cultural and political – between (and often within) nations, races or cultures, which characteristically have their roots in the history of modern European colonialism and imperialism and which, equally, characteristically, continue to be apparent in the present era of neo-liberalism.” Bart Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics* (London: Verso, 1997), 13.

of European identity have written extensively on the role of Turkey in European identity formation.²¹ Following a similar line of reasoning as this book, Paul Levin's outstanding monograph, *Turkey and the European Union*, traces the historical evolution of the concept of Europe through its centuries-long encounter with the Muslim Turk, seeing the recent European debates as the latest manifestation of earlier discursive attempts to construct Christendom and Europe in opposition to Islam and Turkey.²² In fact, Levin's contention that the question of Turkey's position in the EU, a question that goes to core of the definition of Europe, is contingent on this longer history mirrors my claim as to the resonance of the EEC within the larger Turkish project. Others, including Bahar Rumelili, have argued that Turkish-EU debates carry an idiosyncratic symbolic weight, "constituting a primary site for the representation, validation, and performance of European identity."²³

Although this book does not explicitly engage with how Turkish-EEC/EU relations have affected European self-understandings, two points are worth noting about the ongoing European debates. First, European concerns over the meaning of Europe surrounding Turkish membership are of relatively recent mint, coinciding with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent search for a post-Cold War European identity. Not only did Turks engage in a broad and existential debate over the significance of joining the European project well before Turkey's application for full membership in 1987, but Turkish debates on the "European question" predated their European counterparts by at least two decades. Second, and perhaps more important for the purposes of this book, is that Europeans have and continue to debate who they are vis-à-vis Turkey's inclusion into the EU. The last impression this book seeks to give is that of a schizophrenic Turkish society caught between embracing or rejecting a universal, unified, and static Europeaness (thereby providing further fuel to Europe's Turkey-skeptics over Turkey's true European credentials). The very partial list of works cited earlier highlights the basic fact that Turkey has

²¹ For the groundbreaking work in International Relations see Iver Neumann and Jennifer Welsh, "The Other in European Self-definition," *Review of International Studies* 17/4: 327–48. For an impressive historical overview, see Paul Levin, *Turkey and the European Union: Christian and Secular Images of Islam* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Other notable studies in this very extensive literature include: Angelos Giannakopoulos, "What Is to Become of Turkey in Europe?: European Identity and Turkey's EU Accession," *Perceptions*, 9/3 (2004): 58–72; Jochen Walter and Mathias Albert, "Turkey on the European Doorstep: British and German Debates about Turkey in the European Communities," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 12/3 (2009): 223–50; Åsa Lundgren, "The Case of Turkey: Are Some Candidates More 'European' Than Others?" in *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity*, eds. Helene Sjørusen (London, Routledge: 2006), 121–41; Hasan Kosebalaban, "The Permanent 'other?' Turkey and the Question of European Identity," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 18/4 (2007): 87–111.

²² Paul Levin, *Turkey and the European Union*, 164–65.

²³ Bahar Rumelili, "Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in a Post-Enlargement Europe," *Journal of European Intergration*, 33/2 (2011) 238–19.

figured just as much into Europe's self-definition as the reverse. While the book approaches the dialectical construction of Turkey and Europe from the Turkish angle, it does so with the assumption that Turkey and Europe have, in this sense, made each other.

SITUATING THE HISTORY OF TURKISH-EEC RELATIONS

This book operates on, engages with, and is a product of three platforms of historical inquiry that can be reservedly termed the *material*, *symbolic*, and *theoretical*. On the most immediate level, the book offers a *material* history of Turkish-EEC relations from 1959 to 1980. By material, I refer to the analysis of Turkish integration into the EEC as a concrete and specific historical relation.

In the fifty-two years since the Turkish application, Turkey's membership in the EU has occasioned a prolific body of scholarly work. While every branch of the humanities and social sciences has weighed in on the subject, two disciplines in particular, international relations and political science, dominate the current literature.²⁴ This has created a double bias. First, it has led to an extensive focus on the instrumental questions of how Turkey is to become a member or why it is still at the gates. Second, it has favored analysis of contemporary developments, consigning the rich history of Turkish-EU relations before the end of the Cold War to a prelude of current events. Although these commentators invariably highlight the exceptional longevity of Turkish-EU relations, this history is by and large referenced to lend a certain gravity to contemporary debates, to point out that Turkey's membership bid has been an intractable, vital, and persistent issue for both sides. In fact, outside of underscoring its length, very little is made of this history: the usual accounts brush over the 1963 Ankara Agreement with a few introductory strokes, skip completely the ensuing three decades as a time of paralysis, and take up discussion of their chosen topic somewhere in the mid-1990s.

The dearth of scholarly work on this period stems almost exclusively from the fact that, following the Ankara Agreement in 1963, Turkish-EEC relations entered a period of relative stagnation, marked by a mutual souring, that only escalated following the invasion of Cyprus and the continental economic downturn in 1974. While the Common Market became one of the most discussed and polarizing issues in Turkey between 1963 and 1980, very little was actually accomplished in advancing Turkish integration itself. Despite – or more accurately, because of – this functional paralysis, Turkish-EEC relations during these years held great sway over the Turkish social-imaginary. The impasse in relations created a clearing where the merits of Turkish integration were discussed in a broad scope, enabling new conceptualizations of

²⁴ While the most exhaustive bibliography of Turkish-EEC/EU relations stretches three volumes and more than 4,000 pages, the number of full-length historical works on the subject totals five.

the Turkish project. One aim of this book, then, is to revive these discussions in order to juxtapose them with more recent and familiar accounts of Turkish-EU relations. In doing so, it aims to draw out the continuities and differences in Turkish approaches to the EEC: How did Turks frame their integration? What were the central questions being discussed, then and now? From where, both geographically and epistemologically, do these questions originate? Only by comparing the last two decades of Turkish approaches to its first two can we see what endured and what is contingent. Doing so is an act of defamiliarization, allowing us to question the assumptions on which our present interpretations of Turkey, the EU, and their relation are based. The epilogue to the book, which examines the changing dynamics in these relations from 1980 to the present day, is a preliminary, if incomplete, exercise in drawing out some of these implications.

The initial period of Turkish relations (1959–80) itself has two histories. The first is the history of the negotiations themselves; the at times political, more often technocratic, history of offers, deliberations, and counteroffers between the various branches of the EEC and the Turkish government. The few full-length historical accounts of Turkish integration largely fall into this category, favoring sources directly involved in, or closely circling, the official and largely closed-door diplomatic process.²⁵ Their task has been to trace the trajectory of Turkey's relations with the EEC, describing its twists and turns through the interests, concerns, and mentalities of those involved in negotiating it. It is a history of goods like raisins, and the endless wrangling over the quotas for their importation, but it is also the story of two inexperienced actors (the EEC and Turkey) laying out the rules as they went along.²⁶

The second history is the story of the effects and reception of these negotiations. It asks how the negotiation process was structured, interpreted, and talked about in Turkey. What were the effects of this public reception on how Turkey understood itself? Who in Turkey was talking about the EEC and how did they speak about it? This approach, the one taken by this book, is less concerned with developments within Turkish-EEC relations than with their effect on Turkey's self-understanding. While taking official or diplomatic sources as a starting point, this second history encompasses the wider debate around

²⁵ The one exception is Şaban Çaliş' work, *Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*, which touches on the intersection of Turkish-EEC relations and questions of Turkish identity. His work has been invaluable to this study, particularly as a starting point for many of my own investigations. While Şaban Çaliş and I occupy this same intersection, the aims of our works are diametrically opposed. His follows a constructivist approach, asking how the cultural and symbolic significance of joining the EEC impacted the course of these relations, whereas this book does the exact opposite, inquiring into how debates on joining the Common Market informed the cultural and symbolic imaginations of Turks.

²⁶ See Saraçoğlu. *Türkiye Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu Ortaklığı*; Birand, *Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası 1959–1985*; Birand, *Türkiye'nin büyük Avrupa kavgası 1959–2004*; Tekeli and İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu*; and Çaliş, *Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*.

the negotiations, selecting materials based on the strength of their reverberation throughout Turkish society. It is a history of the evolving and dynamic mentalities with which Turks have understood their relationship with the EEC.

Because of this approach, the book also operates on a *symbolic* level, engaging with a set of historical categories that stretches beyond the immediate context of Turkish integration. An analysis of Turkish-EEC relations as the interplay of the Civilizational and Nationalist logics resonates with and is informed by issues of westernization, nationalism, and bifurcated identity – themes central to the study of modern Turkey. This platform of historical analysis positions Turkish-EEC relations between 1959 and 1980 within the broader area of Turkish studies, a cross-disciplinary field constructed around the problematic of the modern Turkish project.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, through the east-west debates at the founding of the Republic, and continuing to the Islamic resurgence at the turn of the twenty-first century, the categories of westernization, nationalism (whether Ottoman or Turkish), and the resultant problematic of Turkish identity have framed Turkey's successive forays to modernize its society. These meta-categories have been duly taken up by foreign and Turkish scholars of modern Turkey, and today serve as the premier framework through which the study of Turkey is approached. Against this trend stands the historiography of the two decades between 1960 and 1980. This is particularly the case for the intellectual history of political ideas during this period, often written in piecemeal and fragmentary fashion.

The overwhelming reason for this fragmentation lies in the ideological polarization of Turkish society into explicitly antithetical projects, each referenced by their own domestic or global historical traditions. The historiography of these two decades has, for the most part, respected these divisions, opting for vertical histories of their provenance. Scholars have focused on a particular political ideology that (re)surfaced during these years and have traced its origins to domestic predecessors or placed it within a wider global movement. Hence, for example, commentators have looked for the intellectual roots of state planning in the *Kadro* movement of the early 1930s, or traced the birth of a socially conservative yet economically liberal Turkish populism to Adnan Menderes and the Democratic Party of the 1950s. Numerous other histories have outlined the origins and development of political Islam, the Turkish left, and ultranationalist right in much the same manner.²⁷ While these efforts have

²⁷ For an excellent analysis of the ideological underpinnings of the *Kadro* movement, see Mustafa Turkeş, "The Ideology of the *Kadro* [Cadre] Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey," in *Turkey Before and After Atatürk*, ed. Sylvia Kedorie (London: Routledge, 1999), 92–120. For an early yet challenging history of the origins of political Islam in the 1970s, see Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill Academic Pub, 1981). For an introduction to the intellectual origins of the Turkish nationalist right, see Burak Arıkan, "The Programme of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey: An Iron Hand in a Velvet Glove?" in *Turkey Before and After Atatürk*, 120–35. For a theoretical and illuminating analysis of

produced some excellent intellectual insights and have contributed immensely to an understanding of political ideology and its development within Turkey, they have tended to treat their subjects in isolation. Consequently, these studies fail to account for the remarkable discursive overlap between disparate political ideologies of the period – an overlap that was so prevalent as to occlude the possibilities of coincidence or political expediency.

A history of Turkish-EEC relations as the interplay of the Civilizational and Nationalist logics offers a holistic perspective of Turkish political and intellectual trends between 1959 and 1980. The Civilizational and Nationalist logics cut across the various distinct groups that either supported or opposed the EEC as well as the categories used to differentiate their support or opposition in either cultural, economic, or religious terms. The logics represent a cross-section of Turkish society, underscoring connections outside of the left/right, religious/secular, or statist/populist binaries that pervade understandings of this period. As such, these logics stand as an intervention into Turkish history. Their history positions the debates over Turkish integration between 1959 and 1980 as the continuation of a problematic that has informed the Turkish project since the mid-nineteenth century. It demonstrates how the struggle between the logics was an instance and arguably the most nuanced and complex manifestation of a nearly two-centuries-long discussion around the historical categories of westernization and Turkish nationalism, terms that have always been defined through one another.

For cultural scholars of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, the worldviews of the Civilizational and Nationalist logics will be all too familiar. The twin impulses of invitation and antagonism at heart of these logics formed a constant theme in Ottoman and Turkish approaches to Europe. Many of these scholars have pointed out how Ottoman and Turkish reformers harbored deeply ambivalent stances toward the west, simultaneously viewing Europe as Turkey's salvation and its greatest threat.²⁸ As Orhan Koçak and others have argued, the persistent feeling of danger inherent in engaging with western civilization as a grudgingly admired enemy, a model to be cautiously emulated, had been an integral part of the Ottoman and early Republican imaginaries. Ziya

various leftist Turkish populist movements in the 1970s, see Necmi Erdoğan, "Demokratik Soldan Devrimci Yol'a: 1970'lerde Sol Popülizm Üzerine Notlar," *Toplum ve Bilim*, 78 (1998): 22–37.

²⁸ Cemil Aydın convincingly traces the evolution of this antagonistic impulse in the late Ottoman Empire. Aydın claims that the Ottoman Empire's liminal position vis-a-vis Europe (included into the European system of states yet excluded on religious or racial grounds) led intellectuals in the late Ottoman period to explicitly formulate a nationalist anti-imperial discourse against the European notions of race, civilization, nationalism, and progress. This discourse, Aydın claims, was put in service of saving the Ottoman state, most notably during the Pan-Islamist campaign against the British during World War I. See Cemil Aydın, "Emperyalizm Karşısı Bir İmparatorluk: Osmanlı Tecrübesi Işığında 19 Yüzyıl Dünya Düzeni," *Divan*, 12/22 (2007): 39–85 and Cemil Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

Gökalp, often cited as the first theoretician of Turkish nationalism, believed the only path to defending Turkish culture was to engage with, while surviving the influence of, European civilization. In his oft-quoted dictum, “Either we master Western Civilization, or become subjugated by Western States,” the sense of the imminent danger hanging over the Ottoman Empire is evident.²⁹ The ambivalence of Ottoman/Turkish attitudes toward Europe was even more poetically articulated by Enver Paşa, the future leader of the wartime empire, who wrote in a 1911 letter to a European lady friend, “Your civilization, it is poison, but a poison which awakens, and one cannot, one does not want to sleep anymore. One feels that if one were to close one’s eyes, it would be for dying.”³⁰ The trope of danger that accompanied the necessary engagement with the west persisted well into the Republican period, perhaps best exemplified by Kemal Atatürk himself, who in a 1925 speech exclaimed, “Civilization is a fire, a fire that burns and devours all who are indifferent to it.”³¹ Such statements all attest to a profound tension in Turkish attitudes toward Europe, an uneasy synthesis of invitation and antagonism, of the antimony between the benefits of a necessary Europeanization and its dangers.

The contradictory impulses that coexisted within the Turkish elite during the late Ottoman and early Republican periods were disassociated from one another after World War II. In this disassociation lay the historical origins of the Civilizational and Nationalist logics. The Civilizational logic that informed Turkey’s initial response to the Common Market explicitly disavowed the antimonies between antagonism and invitation that had informed Turkish nationalism’s view of the west. Or, more precisely, it deproblematized the antimony by dismissing its antagonistic elements. To signify membership in the EEC as the culmination of a singular and centuries-old ambition to join the west required a very selective reading of Turkish history – one accomplished by the forced reconciliation of Turkish nationalist thought with the project of Europeanization.

In this context, the new nationalist currents that sprouted across the socio-political spectrum in the 1960s can be viewed as a response to this disavowal, as the reemergence of the antagonistic elements formulated at the turn of the century but subsequently erased and abandoned. Much like the famous lines of the Turkish National Anthem, which spoke of civilization as a “monster” out to slay the Turkish nation, the new nationalisms of the 1960s approached the EEC in an antagonistic light, staging a rearguard action to thwart an impending demise.

²⁹ Ziya Gökalp, *Makaleler IX* (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, İstanbul, 1980), 42.

³⁰ Orhan Koçak, “Westernisation against the West: Cultural Politics in the Early Turkish Republic” in *Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the 20th Century*, eds. C. Kerslake, K. Öktem, and P. Robbins (New York: Palgrave, 2010), 310.

³¹ Selim İmece, *Atatürk’ün Şapka Devriminde Kastamonu ve Inebolu Seyahatleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959), 18.

The Nationalist logic, insofar as it structured Turkish reservations to the EEC, was both ideationally and historically a product of the Civilizational logic's unidimensional reading of Turkish history; it occupied, through hermeneutic revival, ways of relating to Europe that had been silenced by the Civilizational worldview. This, in theoretical terms, is a directional reversal of the Hegelian dialectic, where a previously unified synthesis is broken down into its antithetical parts. Turkish debates over joining the Common Market were, I claim, central to this process. Turkish-EEC relations between 1959 and 1980 became the site through which the ambivalent and contradictory foundations of Turkey's relationship to the west were first dissected, polarized into competing visions, and finally, as we shall see, reassembled.

Lastly, this book offers a reading of Turkish-EEC relations as a case-instance in the methods of historical inquiry. This third, *theoretical* level, which extends beyond the Turkish-EEC context and its symbolic implications, engages with and is informed by the theorization of collective identity formation within history. Here, I am especially concerned with the use and abuse of the concepts of the "self" and "other" in historical analysis.³²

Until quite recently, popular debates over Turkey's identity and the west tended to start from the premise that Turkish identity is a *problem* or in *crisis*. Whatever their differences, and they were many, these interpretations all situated contemporary Turkish identity as the child of contradictory impulses between east and west, between modernity and its discontents, between state paternalism and democracy, between Islam and secularism. The list goes on and on.

Turkey's economic and political resurgence over the last decade has done much to dismiss these views. Despite the unease felt among certain segments of the Turkish elite, there is an undeniable and collective swell of Turkish confidence; a security in the sense of self that is natural to those who actively engage with, rather than passively resign themselves to, the world around them. The old dichotomies that informed both domestic and foreign analyses of Turkey have disappeared not so much because they were resolved, but because Turkey's recent rise as a formidable regional power has made them obsolete. The fact that most twenty-first-century Turks do not approach Turkish identity as a problem has had a little-noticed, but nonetheless emancipatory, effect on Turkish scholarship. Modern Turkish studies, especially its cultural

³² There are a number of theoretical works written by Turks that address the theorization of the self/other within other fields such as international relations and international political economy. I mention Fuat Keyman and Bahar Rumelili specifically because they both directly address this problematic in relation to the EU and have published extensively on Turkish-EU relations. Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's mode of Differentiation," *Review of International Studies*, 30 (2004): 27-47; and Fuat Keyman, "Articulating Difference: The Problem of the Other in International Political Economy," *Review of International Political Economy* 2/1 (1995): 70-95.

arm, was a product of this crisis in Turkish identity, its research parameters conditioned by the need to explicate the symbolic tension and unease felt by many Turks from 1980 to the turn of the century. The crisis over, the field of Turkish studies is no longer straightjacketed to confronting Turkish identity as a problem. Silently liberated, recent scholars have begun to engage with more complex and nuanced conceptualizations of the self/other problematic. This book hopes to contribute to this vibrant and much needed impulse taking place within Turkey today. To do so within the confines of this historical project, we must ask what theorizations of the self and other are best suited to an understanding of Turkish perceptions of Turkey's integration with Europe.

The intellectual history of self/other theorizations can be roughly separated into two trajectories.³³ The first, and most prominent, is the "dialectical" tradition in modern European thought, beginning with Hegel and extending through Marx to Habermas. This tradition posits the self and the other as raw materials for a future dialectical *Aufhebung* (sublation or elevation) to or in a new self. Whether in the name of reason or progress, the self and the other are always already encountered and bounded within a process of integration. Even for Habermas, who explicitly attempted to overcome this tendency, an insistence on consensus as the driving goal of communication belies an underlying impulse toward assimilation.³⁴

The second, obverse trajectory has insisted on the immutable otherness of the other. Though this trajectory has been taken up in a number of disparate contexts, from the work of western Marxist Theodor Adorno to that of the French post-structuralist Jacques Derrida, all situate the other, either ontologically or epistemologically, as fundamentally alterior to the self. For this strain, the other exists as the incommensurable, whose slippery historical contingency stands as a thorny injunction against the totalizing and identitarian proclivities of the modern self.

Neither of these trajectories applies to the present historical examination. The very material reality of Turkey's protracted and incomplete integration situates it in a grey zone between inclusion and exclusion vis-à-vis its European other. This position demands a self/other theorization that embraces liminality; one that informs and underscores a world of interstices. To do so we must shift our focus away from the terms "self"/"other" and toward the theorization of the boundary between the two; a theorization of the *slash*, or what Fredrik Barth referred to as "diacritica."³⁵ An emphasis on dialogue, as set forth by the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, as the basis of the self/other nexus

³³ I am not suggesting that the intellectual history of theorizations of the self and other can be subsumed or reduced to this dichotomy. This binary categorization stands simply as a useful framework to introduce the subject.

³⁴ See Iver Nuemann, *Uses of the Other* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) for an interesting discussion of Habermas regarding this point.

³⁵ Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969).

offers such a path. Bakhtin's notion of dialogism distances itself from both the dialectical tradition with its insistence on transcendence as well as from the fetishism of a theoretically inviolable yet politically always-already violated alterity.

The invitational and antagonistic gestures at the core of the Civilizational and Nationalist logics offer dialogical yet nonetheless obverse constructions of the "slash." In each case, the self is always-already split by the presence of the other. In the former, the self is created through an initial gesture of hospitality, a welcoming of the other to preside over the self. For the latter, by contrast, the self comes into being through invasion by the other, defined as that which is prohibited from actualization because of the very presence of the other.

Yet, to not make the mistake of many dialecticians, we must be careful not to see in antithetical opposition the presence of totality. It is important to note the historical specificity of Turkey's self/other constructions. Far from being universal, they are only made possible by, and must be seen as responses to, the historically conditioned unequal geographies of Turkey and Europe. Underlying and uniting both the antagonistic and invitational gestures is a shared construction of the Turkish self as a "lack" vis-à-vis its European other. An obsessively comparativist stance – where the Turkish self is regarded as missing something that someone else (Europe) has – informed both the supporters and detractors of Turkish integration with the EEC. It was evident in arguments to adopt practices and norms present in the west but lacking in Turkey as well as antithetical claims that this westernization was preventing Turkey from developing its own national forms (be they cultural, political, literary, or statistical); an argument which only makes sense relationally, ironically in reference to forms individual European nations 'have'. The index of lack forms the common historical specificity of both the Civilizational and Nationalist logics, and underscores a fundamental asymmetry with its European counterpart (imagine a France or Germany wishing to emulate a Turkish model, or even more absurdly, viewing relations with Turkey as inhibiting their own realization of Turkish forms).

The sense of lack imparts to the Turkish project two specific qualities. First, it construes the Turkish project as one of mimetic desire in the Girardian sense, where the object of desire is not approached directly, but is rather mediated by the model which possesses it: whether this be contemporary civilization, a set of ever-changing attributes and configurations possessed by European society (the Civilizational logic), or the already developed national economic, social, and cultural forms of European states (which, though seldom acknowledged, often served as models for the Nationalist logic).³⁶ Second, it fosters a tendency to keep the European other as a point of comparison, at a distance – to not

³⁶ This view of non-western societies appropriating, for themselves, the same formal categories used to describe European society (nation, culture, state, liberty, etc.) in their struggle against European colonialism has been criticized by postcolonial theorists. See Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University

scrutinize it too closely – lest this complicate the opposition between Europe’s haves and Turkey’s have nots.³⁷

This mediated nature of desire, where the Turkish project was referenced not to a static set of attributes but rather indexed, either positively or negatively, with the changing face or threat posed by the European other, is precisely what enables its plasticity. For both the Civilizational and Nationalist logics, the particular characteristics of the self and other remained dynamic and open to contingency. They were, as we shall see during the course of this book, redefined as much by slippages in the self’s definition of the other as by the historical exertion of the other onto the self.

Where the second symbolic level concerned itself with the *what* of Turkey, of the different problematics and frames through which Turkey was imagined, this outermost level of analysis delves into the *how* of Turkey – the conditions for the possibility of conceiving (and reconceiving) Turkey in the first place. That these conditions were intimately bound to Turkey’s dialogue with Europe will, I hope, become evident through the course of this book.

But enough talk of “what is it,” as T.S. Eliot once put it, “let us go and make our visit.”

Press, 2000). Applying Chakrabarty’s ideas to a reading of Ziya Gökalp, Andrew Davison brilliantly unearths a quasi-hermeneutic element in his thought, showing how Gökalp distinguished between the positivistic understanding of European “forms” such as culture and nation, and the differences that arise in their “meaning” as they are translated by the intimate and localized contexts which adopt them. See Andrew Davison, “Ziya Gökalp and Provincializing Europe,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, 26/3 (2006): 377–90.

³⁷ An explanation, perhaps, for why the Civilizational logic turned a blind eye to the descent of European civilization into war, authoritarianism, and genocide when reconciling the Europe of Atatürk with its record after his death.