Conclusion

Nations, unlike dreams, die when they cannot successfully interpret themselves.
– Stathis Gourgouris

From now on, change in Turkey will be mandated by foreign pressure. However you choose to look at it, a new period has dawned on Turkey and from now on, nothing will ever be the same.

(Reaction to the official EU recognition of Turkey as a candidate for full membership, 1999)

– Ş. Kanber

SYNTHESIS BY CASTRATION: ATATÜRKISM AND THE 1980 MILITARY COUP

For more than three years, the generals of the 12 September coup d’état ruled Turkey through the National Security Council (NSC). During this time, 650,000 people were detained and questioned, 250,000 were arrested, and countless others tortured, executed, or disappeared. The mass political persecution of the Turkish population was the most visible dimension of a broader project to eradicate the sociopolitical structure of the second republic (1961–80). The NSC ensured that there would be no possibility of returning to the past. It criminalized all existing political parties, banished their leaders from

1 Gourgouris, Dream Nation, 1.
3 With the election of 6 November 1983, Turkish society began a gradual task of civilianization. This process would last approximately another six years.
political life, dismantled civil institutions including the unions, student groups, and the press, and cleansed the universities and bureaucracy of “radicals,” paying particular attention to the left.

Amid this brutality the military government, as in 1960 and 1971, remained mindful of European responses. One of the first acts of the NSC was to reassure Europe of its commitment to put Turkey back on the course sketched out by Foreign Minister Erkmen before his removal by interpellation. Such assurances, it turned out, were completely unnecessary. The initial reaction of the west to the military coup was strategic and reprehensible. The United States, NATO, and the IMF were “thrilled” with the developments, while the EEC reaffirmed its continued commitment to the Association Agreement, saying that it “understood the situation.”

Within Turkey, the military government faced a more daunting problem. Overcoming the radicalization of the second Turkish Republic required more than the temporary suffocation of its political and civil organs. Erkmen’s downfall, though politically induced, had made one thing crystal clear: the Civilization logic that had structured the official ideology of the post–World War II Turkish Republic was no longer capable of absorbing, explaining, or orienting the society it claimed to represent. The invitational gesture, one that pegged the Turkish project to validation by an external authority, had shown itself to be politically impotent against a discourse that antagonized this same authority as a threat to the nation. That oppositional and increasingly radical voices were able to attack the government and even the state through a nationalist discourse was unacceptable to the military establishment. As long as the official ideology of the Republic (its re-articulation now incumbent on the NSC) remained open to charges of treason (this is, in the end, what the Nationalist logic implied), the legitimacy of the Turkish state would continue to be undermined.

To address this ideological shortcoming, the NSC complimented the corporatist restructuring of Turkey’s sociopolitical institutions with its own interpretation of the Turkish social-imaginary, one it referred to as Atatürkism. As in 1960, albeit in a drastically different political climate, the generals once again turned to Turkish intellectuals and academics in their reformulation of the Turkish project. The newly promoted professors, who owed their positions to the military purge of the university system, were only too happy to assist. Their efforts culminated in a conference organized by Professor Halil Cin, titled Unity with Atatürkism, held in 1981. A right-wing thinker, Cin had, following the coup, been offered the post of Rector at Selçuk University in Konya, the

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6 For Carter’s message to the Turkish NSC leader Kennan Evren, see Kenan Evren, Anılar – Vol 2 (Istanbul: 1991), 94. For the EEC’s reaction, see Bulletin of the European Community, September 1980, 52. By acknowledging the failure of democracy in Turkey, the reaction of the west legitimized the military coup in the eyes of the generals, especially given the contrast with 1967 Greece when the EEC came down hard on the junta, immediately severing relations.
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conservative heartland of Turkey. Together with a few associates, Cin became the semiofficial ideologue of the military dictatorship, supplying the theoretical basis and justification for the restructuring of Turkish society.

Cin and his associates’ reformulations of the Turkish project were subsequently enshrined in the new Turkish constitution of 1982 and reprinted in simplified form in school and military textbooks throughout the 1980s. In effect, they express the forced synthesis of the Civilizational and Nationalist logics. Atatürkism was founded on two concepts said to form the core of the Turkish people, nation, and state: contemporary civilization on the one hand and the independence, unity, and togetherness of the nation on the other. As such, Atatürkism was seen as a “pragmatic, rational, scientific, democratic, realistic, and consequently, dynamic ideology” – the Enlightenment writ large by a brutal military dictatorship. The dynamic aspect of Atatürkism was particularly stressed and often contrasted with the static “dogmatic-totalitarian” ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and National Socialism.

In its adoption of a modern western discourse and its stress on dynamism, Atatürkism presented itself as an ideology willing and capable of adapting to the changing requirements of contemporary civilization: a clear revival of the Civilizational logic, albeit in modified form. In its stress on national independence, unity, and wholeness in the face of antagonized external threats we see the continuation of the Nationalist logic, particularly the third essentialist appeal, whose two political-ideological wings had been brought together in the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and subsequently adopted by the NSC. As Hilal Cin stated in his 1983 work, Atatürkism: A Dynamic Doctrine, “Atatürk realized that a nation can adapt to novelty and change only if they are not at odds with the nation’s own history, traditions, and soul.” This seemingly contradictory, if not nonsensical, claim is expressive of the military dictatorship’s attempt to synthesize the invitational and antagonistic strains of the Turkish project.

Yet to speak of Atatürkism as a true synthesis in the Hegelian sense is somewhat misleading. In Atatürkism, the Turkish project was recast as the conjunction of two impulses; impulses not to be subsumed and elevated into a new thesis, but instead maintained in a reinforcing tension. This tension was evident in Cin’s redefinition of Atatürk’s legacy. Cin claimed that while Atatürk had set reaching the level of civilized nations as the fundamental aim of the Turkish people, he also understood that every nation had a particular existing tradition and inclination all its own. “To simply mimic the accomplishments of others without regard to this basic fact would,” according to Cin, “end in both a failure to match the nations copied and the loss of one’s own nationality.” “Yet,” he concluded, “Civilization cannot be neglected, for peoples that are not civilized are thrust beneath the feet of those who are.” As these remarks suggest, the essentialist solution to the Nationalist logic (that Turkey was comprised

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7 Halil Cin, Atatürkçülük: Dinamik Bir Doktrin (Istanbul: 1984), 14.
of a racially Turkish and culturally Islamic people with essential attributes not
existent in the west) was adjoined to the Civilizational logic to form the new
official discourse of the modern Turkish state.

Several remarks can be made about this thesis. In one sense the tension in
Atatürkism shared similarities with late Ottoman and early Republican think-
ing, where the governing elite had also grappled with the coexistence of invita-
tional and antagonistic impulses toward the west. Those beautifully telling lines
in Enver Paşa’s letter, “Your civilization, it is poison, but a poison which awak-
ens, and one cannot, one does not want to sleep anymore. One feels that if one
were to close one’s eyes, it would be for the dying,” quoted in the introduction
to this book, vividly attest to this coexistence. Yet for these men of the early
twentieth century, as well as the few personalities like Bülent Ecevit who had
been likewise torn by contradiction in our period of study, this tension consti-
tuted an existential question, in fact the existential question of the Turkish
project. By contrast, the tension between the invitational and antagonistic
impulses, while maintained in Atatürkism, was utterly devoid of ambivalence
or even presented as a problem. Atatürkism was, in fact, offered as the solu-
tion to the political and social strife within the second Republic caused by
the polarization of this very contradiction.

Such a solution required the castration of the essential structure of both the
Civilizational and Nationalist logics. The much discussed appropriation of the
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis by the TAF has to be seen in this context. To be sure,
the explicit incorporation of Islam into the official ideology of the Turkish
state was a departure from previous positions. Yet a closer look at how this
synthesis was incorporated into Atatürkism reveals a fundamental caveat in
its translation. The original formulation of the TIS, interweaving Islamic and
Nationalist currents in Turkish political thought, was a profoundly antagonistic
ideology. Structured by the Nationalist logic, it identified the Turkish self as
that which had been prohibited from realization because of the presence (within
itself) of an alien other. This antagonistic structure predicated the identification
of a whole host of domestic traitors and foreign enemies that were inhibiting
the actualization of the true Turkish self. Yet it was precisely this bifurcation
of Turkish society that the military junta, in its corporatist reunification of
Turkey, was bent on overcoming. Accordingly, while Islam and an essentialized
Turkishness were promoted within the new official social-imaginary, they were
also stripped of the antagonistic impulse that had structured their original
articulations. As Yıldız Atasoy has remarked regarding the appropriation of
Islam by the TAF, “To the extent that Islam was promoted by the state, it was
done so entirely for the interests of the state and to create a homogeneous bond
that would cause society to cohere and foster moral and obedient citizens.”

8 Yıldız Atasoy, Islam’s Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 94.
For its part, the Civilizational logic was domesticated in a similar way. While Atatürkism asserted its dynamic openness to contemporary civilization, this openness was strictly bounded, allowed to the extent that it did not impinge, politically or socially, on the unity, oneness, and integrity of the Turkish state. As such, the radical gesture welcoming the European other to preside over the Turkish project was explicitly cordoned, barred from intruding on the core of the Turkish nation. In both instances, Atatürkism appropriated the “content” of the Nationalist and Civilizational logics while castrating them of their antagonistic or invitational form.

The repercussions of this ideological reformulation of the Turkish state between 1980 and 1983 were immediate and long-lasting. The forced and truncated synthesis of the two logics animated (and continues to structure) the approach that the military establishment has taken toward Turkish-European relations since. In fact, the fundamental contradiction in the TAF’s post-1980 attitude to Turkey’s membership bid is a direct product of this synthesis. In the thirty-plus years since the military coup, the TAF has in principle supported Turkey’s accession to the European Union, viewing EU membership as the culmination of Atatürk’s project to elevate Turkey to its rightful place within contemporary civilization. Yet, to the extent that this contemporary civilization (through the EU accession process) has demanded a restructuring of Turkish society, especially as regards Kurdish rights or the TAF’s own influence on Turkish politics (i.e., when the EU has impinged on the “independence, unity, and togetherness of the nation”), the military establishment has stonewalled “Europeanization.” Speaking only of the Turkish side, the “thorny issues” that have dogged Turkish-EU relations since Turkey’s application for full membership can all be traced to the contradictions unresolved by the forced synthesis of the Civilizational and Nationalist logics within Atatürkism.

THE STIPULATORY LOGIC AND THE ERASURE OF HISTORY

This book has presented a history of how Turks understood and gave meaning to their integration into the European Economic Community between 1959 and 1980. My purpose in writing it was twofold. First, I sought to situate this encounter as a continuation of a much broader historical debate over the foundations and orientation of the Turkish project. Second, by doing so, I have tried to show how and why the prospect of joining a rather minor economic organization came to have an existential grip on the nation and became the site where Turks reformulated ideas of where they came from, who they were, and where they were going.

That Turks between 1959 and 1980 equated the EEC with “Europe” has been a key assumption of this book. While it would take the end of the Cold War and the formation of the EU in 1992 to have the wider European public slowly come around to this conflation, Turks, I argued, had conceptually married the EEC to Europe from its inception. This is a somewhat contentious point that
challenges the accepted scholarly narrative of Turkish-EEC/EU relations in particular and Turkish postwar history more generally. Given this, it is helpful to revisit some of the arguments for why Turkish supporters and detractors of the EEC were united in viewing it as the hypostatization of the idea of Europe. The book has approached this issue from four interrelated angles, offering historical, positional, processional, and source-based arguments as to why this was so.

Historically, the book revisited two developments in Turkish-European relations in the late Ottoman period. The first traced how nineteenth-century Turkey was simultaneously included into the European system of states while being excluded from the European “club” or “community.” This liminal geography of the Turk in Europe animated Atatürk’s aim to raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization and informed how Turks approached the possible alliances and organizations of Europe following World War II. In this light, the book argued that Turks saw membership in NATO as simply a reaffirmation of Turkey’s strategic value for Europe in warding off the new Russian threat. By contrast, in the minds of Turks, membership in the European Community was equated with joining the civilized nations of the world from which Turkey had been historically denied. This was the main reason why Turks, well before their European counterparts, understood the infant EEC as a long project leading to the eventual economic, political, and social union of Europe. Second, and more important for the many Turkish detractors of the EEC, was the historical resonance between the liberalization of Turkey’s trade regime as it integrated into the Common Market and the bitter memories of Ottoman capitulations to the European powers throughout the nineteenth century. This rewriting and re-remembering of Turkish history through the lens of contemporary Turkish-EEC relations formed a constant and unique feature of Turkish debates, one not replicated in discussions concerning any other European association. Perhaps more than any other factor, the constant referencing of these historical resonances imparted to the EEC an unrivaled gravity and significance.

Second, the book put forward a positional argument related to the timing of Turkey’s application to the EEC vis-à-vis other European organizations. By the time Turks began to discuss openly their foreign policy (1964), Turkey’s membership in NATO, OECD, and the Council of Europe were faits accomplis. Detractors were faced with the much more difficult maneuver of withdrawing Turkey from these organizations. NATO posed particular difficulties in this regard, where a gesture similar to that made by the French President Charles de Gaulle was strategically infeasible. By contrast, when Turks began to openly discuss the direction of their foreign relations, Turkish integration into the EEC was an ongoing and incomplete process, the very framework of which was negotiated in the midst of a charged domestic debate. The open-ended nature of the EEC-Turkish associations created a grey zone where Turks were able to debate an ongoing process rather than retroactively comment on past engagements. This was another reason for why the EEC played such a momentous role within Turkish political culture.
Third, the book put forward a processional argument that examined a temporal affinity between Turkey’s long membership bid to the EEC and the open-ended nature of the Turkish project itself. Exploring this affinity, it tried to give an explanation to the puzzling question of why the EEC, among all the postwar western organizations Turkey solicited, became the focal point of the Civilizational logic. Turkey’s memberships in NATO, OECD, and the Council of Europe were all marked by relatively short, if not instantaneous, periods of integration. As bounded events, however momentous, they were at odds with the Civilizational logic’s predication of the Turkish project as a process. When the Civilizational logic was used to describe them, Turkish membership in NATO, OECD, and the Council of Europe were noted as individual milestones within a larger project. By contrast, both the Treaty of Rome, which had established the EEC, and the Ankara Agreement, which had associated Turkey to it, were essentially the formal blueprints for elongated processes of integration. As such, they shared a deep resonance with the processional logic underlying the Turkish project.9

Finally, it must be mentioned that all of these arguments are ultimately reflected in, and have been constructed to explain, the sources themselves. Membership in the EEC, as page after page of this book illustrates, occasioned a prolific, constant, and vital debate within Turkey. Politicians, technocrats, playwrights, lawyers, intellectuals, columnists, think tanks, street thugs, and business and union leaders took a stand on Turkish-EEC relations and defined themselves through this stand. After having perused thousands of journals, newspapers, party programs, memoirs, trade magazines, and other sources published between 1959 and 1980, I can say with confidence that other organizations such as NATO, OECD, or the Council of Europe were marginal if not insignificant sites of reference and debate by comparison.

In the final pages of this conclusion, I would like to situate Turkey’s initial encounter with the EEC in relation to the subsequent developments in Turkish-EU relations. No easy task, it is one made even more difficult by the dramatic shifts that have occurred both within the EU and Turkey, not to mention the wider world around them. Since 1980, Turkish-EU relations, and how Turks have approached them, have been profoundly impacted by geostrategic earthquakes, most notably the dissolution of the USSR (1991) and 9/11 (2001), or for that matter actual earthquakes (1999) or economic ones (2001), closer to home. This same period has witnessed a renaissance of the European project from the Single European Act (1985) to the Treaty of European Union (1993), marked a threefold increase in its membership (from nine to twenty-seven), and watched its descent into political (2005) and monetary (2011) crises.

At the cost of eschewing these external or circumstantial developments, one possible option would be to address the political and economic changes that informed Turkish attitudes toward European integration since 1980. On the political level, one could speak to the profound shift in the sites of Turkish

9 Pages 48–49 provide a more detailed discussion of this rather complex argument.
support and opposition toward the EU, one conditioned by the active presence of the military within Turkish politics. There is a clear history to be traced here, one where post-coup popularly elected governments have advocated Turkish integration into the EU as a means to ensure and consolidate civilian power against a military establishment that has become increasingly wary of European-style “democratization.” Though taking many turns, this dynamic was manifest in Turgut Özal’s initial application for full membership to the EC in 1987, informed the abrupt shift from a radically anti- to pro-EU stance of the Refah (Welfare) Party upon entering government in 1996, and has animated the pro-EU platform of the AKP government since 2003.

The analysis of Turkey’s pre- and post-1980 political economy unearths an equally seismic shift, one that has its roots in the economic policies enacted eight months before the coup. The 24 January 1980 reforms, in a single stroke, reversed the economic principle that had oriented Turkey since 1960, bringing the era of import substitution industrialization (ISI) to an end by opening Turkey up as an export economy. In doing so, they effectively removed the economic rationale for Turkish opposition to the EEC. These reforms were wholeheartedly embraced by the NSC government and the liberal economic policies of its civilian successors. Tracing the repercussions of this shift, one could examine the peculiar circumstances that led Turkey from the 24 January reforms to membership in the European Customs Union some fifteen years later, placing Turkey in the unique category of being the only non-city-state country to have joined the European customs union without the benefits of full EU membership.

Yet another option would be to bypass these histories altogether and speak of twenty-first-century developments. This vector would focus on how the meteoric rise in Turkey’s economic and regional geopolitical influence, coupled with an existential fatigue over a seemingly interminable accession process, has, for the first time in centuries, dampened the import of the “European question” within the Turkish imaginary. But all of these approaches, precisely because they address major themes and milestones in the history of Turkish-EU relations, have been covered extensively.

Instead, I want to focus on a structural change in the epistemological framing of Turkish-EU relations, one that has gone largely unnoticed by the interlocutors and scholars of these relations alike. Gone unnoticed, I argue, because this epistemic shift has, quite purposefully, erased the history of prior Turkish attitudes by deeming them obsolescent. The explication of this claim, made possible by contrasting prevalent approaches to Turkish accession with the history detailed in this book, will, on a political level, justify its writing. But let us start at the beginning.

The Hegemony of Stipulation

Looked at from a fifty-year perspective, the most striking aspect of Turkish-EEC/EU relations is the exponential increase in the number of conditions an
applicant must meet to become a member. In 1959, when Turkey (and Greece) first applied to the EEC, there were two criteria for joining the Common Market: the applicant had to have a market economy and be a European state. By contrast, today, there are more than 30,000 legally binding verdicts, directives, regulations, or acts with which Turkey must comply, totaling 100,000-plus pages in the official journal. The accession process has categorized these criteria into thirty-five “chapters,” each with numerous subheadings. The criteria themselves range from the heights of state policies like capital punishment and minority rights to regulations dictating the placement of windows in barber shops.

There are a number of historical explanations for the logarithmic rise in membership criteria. One can see it as the natural outgrowth of the deepening integration between member states, a product of the increasing bureaucratic regulation of social life in postindustrial societies, or as a response to a historical contingency—the fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent enlargement of the EU into the Eastern bloc. All these explanations are to some extent undeniable. Yet, what is of concern to us is not naturalizing this expansion, but assessing the effects of these criteria on Turkish attitudes to the EU. Here, in their reception, is where the numerical increase in EU conditionality was translated into a qualitative shift in the framework of Turkish-EU relations itself.

To explain this shift, it is necessary to introduce a new logic. Like the Civilizational and Nationalist logics, this new logic is also based on a self/other relation, although its origin and subjectivity is European, not Turkish. The logic itself is not particular to Turkish-EEC/EU relations but rather forms the framework of post-1993 EU Enlargement. Its aim is, quite simply, to bring the other into the same. It does this through a twofold process. First, it nominates the “otherness” of the other, identifying those elements within a candidate country that are lacking or insufficient with respect to EU norms and regulations. Second, it creates a process by which these lacks or deficiencies can be overcome to merge the other with the self. This process of identification and erasure of the “otherness” of the other I call the Stipulatory logic.

The Hungarian foreign minister László Kovács perfectly encapsulated the structure of this logic when asked what would change in his country on 1 May 2004, the day Hungary officially joined the European Union. His reply: “Nothing at all. It is for this nothing that we have been working since [our application in] 1998.”

Even though the stipulatory logic is, in principle, as old as enlargement itself, it only came to dominate the framework of enlargement following the ratification of the Copenhagen Criteria. Named after the 1993 European Union in the Danish capital, the Copenhagen Criteria laid down the universal requirements necessary for an applicant country to join the EU. The criteria were divided into three areas: political, economic, and legislative, prescribing specific and

10 Taken from a talk given by László Kovács at Columbia University in 2004.
detailed conditions for accession. Broadly, these stipulated that a candidate country achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. These conditions were further refined by the Madrid Council (1995) and the Agenda 2000 report issued in 1997. Turkey’s first encounter with the new framework of Enlargement came one year later, in the form of a Regular Report prepared by the European Commission. This report, to be reissued on a yearly basis, gave the Commission’s assessment of Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the criteria for membership. From this moment on, Turkish debates on joining the EU would be structured by the logic of stipulation.

The Regular Report, in contrast to previous assessments on Turkey issued by various branches of the EU, is striking in its invasiveness. It is a surgical document reaching into and assessing the very fabric of Turkish society, covering everything from Turkey’s tax structure to the hygiene and safety regulations in its fisheries. In its very detail, it constructs a blueprint for the reconfiguration of Turkey’s social, economic, cultural, and political practices in line with existing EU ones. The net effect of its stipulations has been the violent recalibration of Turkish society into elements and sectors that are commensurate with EU criteria and “problem areas” that are found lacking.\footnote{In this they share a close affinity with the westernizing impulse of the interwar period, where the Kemalist elite similarly delineated every facet of Turkish life into a European “a la franga” (French) way, deemed appropriate and possessing value, and its “a la turka” (Turkish) counterpart, considered negative and condescended to – with the important caveat that the full \textit{acquis}, as the end-product of a long process of technocratic harmonization, was something that could never be dreamt up by a revolutionary regime. The former operated at the level of the social-symbolic, the destruction of traditions and habits of the Ottoman old regime, whereas the latter was totally bereft of symbolic gestures.} Its violence lies precisely in its universality. The stipulations are indifferent to, and through indifference erase, the historical specificity of Turkey (or, for that matter, any applicant country). More precisely, they interpret this specificity as an anachronistic vestige that must now be overcome (lingering authoritarian impulses of the Ottoman and Kemalist eras or their relations with minorities come to mind). In an illuminating study of the Hungarian Enlargement, Jozeph Borocz offers a discursive analysis of the Regular Reports, highlighting how the they “deny subjectivity” to the applicant, “through a veritable grammar of exclusion, creating an imaginary world where the partner is distant, inferior, and disposable.”\footnote{Jozeph Borocz, “The Fox and the Raven,” in \textit{Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement}, ed. Jozeph Borocz. http://aei.pitt.edu/144/1/Empire.pdf (last accessed 10 October 2011).}

Once introduced, the Stipulatory logic, in its sheer volume and capillary detail, quickly permeated Turkish debates on the EU. It did not eclipse the Civilizational and Nationalist logics that had structured Turkish perceptions of the EEC, but rather circumscribed them, determining what these logics could
address. Since 1998, whether objecting to the abolition of capital punishment or the right of Kurds to broadcast in their own language, the Nationalist logic has almost exclusively focused on, and thus been bounded by, the stipulations set by the EU.\textsuperscript{13} Turkish understandings of national sovereignty and culture have suffered greatly as a result of this, forced into defensive, chauvinistic, and statist postures. More inconspicuous and elusive has been the effect of the Stipulatory logic on the very attributes and characteristics of Turkishness itself.

To give an example, one of the countless regulations of the Acquis is a ban on the sale of food cooked in open areas. Among other things, its adoption in Turkey meant the temporary dismantling of the boats that sold balık ekmek (fish and bread), lining the banks of the Bosphorus: a popular image of Istanbul no doubt, but by no means a historical symbol of Turkey. Almost overnight, however, these boats became a national tradition, recognized as such at – and through – the moment of their disappearance. In theoretical terms, the “otherness” of the other, nominated by the Stipulatory logic, was adopted as a unique and essential Turkish custom because of its externally mandated erasure. This development is not peculiar to Turkey, but it underscores the totalizing hegemony of the Stipulatory logic, one that not only reconfigures the practices of a society but also dictates the content (fishing boats) and form (nostalgia) of its possible resistance.

The logic of stipulation has had a similarly alienating impact on the Civilizational logic. By mandating certain, especially political, reforms, the EU has effectively annulled the active agency of those Turks who strove to elevate their country to the level of contemporary civilization. An integral part of European civilization, as understood by Turks, was the sense of empowerment it imparted to transform their own society. The invitational gesture at the heart of the Civilizational logic welcomed the European other as the beacon and judge of the Turkish project, but crucially maintained Turks as the historical subjects of that project. Those committed to this ideal have had a difficult time reconciling it with civilization by diktat. Several Turkish prime ministers have been forced to navigate that delicate boundary separating doing something “for oneself” and doing it “because of and for another.” The repeated and pathetic plea of Turkish leaders that “We are not carrying out these reforms because the EU has asked us to, but because they are ones that we as Turks have desired for a long time” captures this difficulty vividly. Ironically enough, PM Recip Erdoğan’s recent remark that Turkey would continue its transformation process by renaming the Copenhagen and Maastrict Criterias as the Ankara and Istanbul Criterias is just the latest in long list of comments by Turkish leaders trying to circumvent this paradox.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} Outside of a few intellectuals and, by 1960s standards, extremely small radical leftist groups, the only major exception to this trend has been the Welfare Party before their abrupt pro-EU shift upon assuming power.

The Stipulatory Logic and the Academic Study of Turkish-EU Relations

In addition to permeating Turkish political debates, the Stipulatory logic has exercised an equally profound influence over academic inquiry. Much as the Civilizational and Nationalist logics before it, the logic of stipulation has birthed its own epistemology, its own way of understanding and analyzing Turkish-EU relations. The final pages of this book describe the emergence of this new site of knowledge production, detail how it has transformed the terrain on which recent academic analyses of Turkish accession are conducted, and finally situate the initial history of Turkish approaches toward the EEC (1959–80) within this new field.

The Copenhagen Criteria and the Emergence of an Objective Social-Scientific Literature

The Copenhagen Criteria established a uniform set of guidelines regulating the process by which an applicant state would join the EU. Before these criteria, EU Enlargements, though occurring in waves, had largely been conducted on a case-by-case basis. To understand the epistemological shift in academic studies of Turkish-EU relations, it is important to situate it within a wider historiographical turn from the national to the universal in the study of European Enlargement. This universalization, made possible by the common blueprint outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria, is marked by the growing tendency to view each specific national encounter between the EU and an applicant state as a case study of an abstract and model accession process. In fact, the interdisciplinary field of Enlargement Studies and the meteoric rise of the conceptual category of “Europeanization” owe their existence to the establishment of these universal criteria. The universalization of membership criteria has likewise given birth to a shared international lexicon, utilizing terms such as convergence, adaptation, harmonization, and norm diffusion by which discrete accession processes can be evaluated and discussed.

Over the past fifteen years this new international framework has come to govern the academic study of Turkish-EU relations. The great majority of analyses of Turkey’s membership bid have become comparative – whether explicitly, wherein the Turkish case is measured against the accession processes of other applicant states, or implicitly, where Turkey is approached and assessed by its deviations from a mythologized, perfectly compliant, and seamless harmonization. This comparative framework, I argue, underlies and

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16 The list of works taking an implicit comparative approach is nearly as long as the complete bibliography of Turkish-EU relations since 1993. Among the significant works that have drawn...
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has made possible two interrelated approaches to understanding Turkish-EU relations that have dominated the scholarly literature over the past two decades. The first and most prominent branch of inquiry born of this comparativism are those studies that question Turkey’s relatively slower progress in joining the EU. After all, the question of when and how Turkey will join the EU, or why it is still at the gates, is informed by the successful accession of the CEEC states. Academic work has been conducted on almost every possible aspect of this issue, from detailed studies on areas where Turkey has failed to adapt to EU norms to more analytical interpretations exploring Turkish institutional inertia, Turkish populism, or Turkey’s strong state tradition as explanations for Turkish shortcomings.\(^{17}\) Whatever their particular issue, all such inquiries are animated by the need to explicate Turkey’s relatively tortuous progress toward accession.

The second branch of academic inquiry into Turkish-EU relations is comprised of studies that examine the effects of EU conditionality on Turkish modernization, again with an implicit comparison to similar processes of “Europeanization” in eastern and central European states. These studies have detailed how the stipulatory logic has aided (or failed to benefit) Turkey’s democratization, legal structure, civil society and business organizations, and market or minority reforms.\(^{18}\) These studies focus not so much on why Turkey has still to explicit attention to this comparativist stance, especially with regard to the CEEC states, are: Harun Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003); Ziya Öniş, “An Awkward Partnership: Turkey’s Relations with the EU in Comparative-Historical Perspective,” *Journal of European Integration History*, 7/1 (2001): 105–19; S. Togan and T. S. Balasubramanayam, *Turkey and Central and Eastern European Countries in Transition* (New York: St. Martin’s Press: 2001); and the introduction by M. Uğur and N. Canefe in *Turkey and the European Union: Accession Prospects and Issues* (London: Routledge, 2004), 1–15.


\(^{18}\) Significant studies within this genre include: Meltem Müftüler Bac, “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union,” *South European Society and Politics*, 10/1 (2005): 17–31; S. Aydın and F. Keyman, “European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy,” *Centre for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey Working Papers* No 2 (August 2004); Serap Atan, “Europeanization of Turkish Peak Business Organizations and Turkish-EU
gain admittance to the EU, but rather how the accession process has impacted the transformation of Turkish society.

Regardless of their emphasis, both branches of the new social-scientific literature on Turkish-EU relations take their starting point from the “problem areas” identified by the Stipulatory logic as outlined in the yearly EU Reports regarding Turkish accession. Collectively, their aim has been to shed light on these problem areas – namely, the issues of constitutional reform, Turkey’s democratic deficit and economic preparedness, as well as the rights of minorities, journalists, and humans – inquiring either into the reasons behind Turkey’s failure to harmonize with EU standards or how EU conditionality has affected the modernization of Turkey.

In doing so, these studies implicitly take a normative approach to Turkish shortcomings, judging them through the economically liberal, politically multiculturalist modernity of the EU (even in the glaring absence of this modernity among many of its member-states). By and large they assume the putative validity of EU norms and assess Turkish society as to its compliance or resistance to an EU prescribed modernization. Rarely are these norms questioned, or seen as having a contingent and specific history of their own. More often, they are placed outside of history as timeless and universal. This dehistoricization of EU norms and standards shares much in common with the modernization theories of the 1950s. Much like the works of Bernard Lewis and Daniel Lerner written at the birth of Turkish-EEC relations fifty years ago, recent analyses of Turkey’s membership bid exhibit a similar, if inadvertent, teleology – one that fosters the hierarchical relations of an advanced European core directing/dictating the modernization of its developing Turkish periphery.

The implicit normative character of the new social-scientific literature is most evident in the semantic conflation of the terms modernity, modernization, Europeanization, and liberalization (whether political or economic), used interchangeably in recent analyses of Turkish-EU relations. Through this conflation, these studies seamlessly equate positive transformations of Turkish society with Turkey’s harmonization to EU standards and negatively label all protractions or acts away from this convergence as stasis or regression.

Exceptions to this trend include Ziya Öniş, “Luxembourg, Helsinki, and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations,” Government and Opposition, 35/4 (2000): 463–83 and Paul Levin, Turkey and the European Union. Both works make explicit mention of the historical contingency of contemporary EU norms, Levin’s study going so far as to argue, in brilliant dialectical fashion, that these norms are in fact produced through the EU’s own assessments of their lack within applicant states such as Turkey.

Debating Turkish Modernity

The binding of Turkish modernization with Europeanization (understood as EU convergence) has persisted even after the waning of mutual enthusiasm and commitment to Turkish membership that marked the opening accession negotiations in 2005. Fuat Keyman’s argument that, despite reservations by many Europeans toward Turkey’s Islamicist government, Turkish modernity has become essentially “locked” to European liberal democracy by the “certainty” of its EU candidacy is a case in point.\(^{20}\) Going even further, H. Tarik Oğuzlu’s 2012 article, “Europeanization without Membership,” argues that “Turkey’s European transformation” will continue in spite of the enervation of EU conditionality – in other words, that Turkey will continue to converge with EU standards even in the absence of the Stipulatory logic.\(^{21}\)

The rise of this new “objective” social-scientific literature is particularly noteworthy given its concurrence with the growing worldwide popularity of South Asian postcolonial theory and critiques of developmentalism originating in Latin American and African studies.\(^ {22}\) While these fields have developed critical methodologies challenging the unquestioned universality of western/northern social forms, norms, and practices, academic inquiry into Turkish-EU relations seems to have moved in the opposite direction. A telling example of this trend can be found in two articles, written almost a decade apart by a leading scholar of Turkish-EU relations, Fuat Keyman. The first is a theoretical piece written in 1995 (three years before the first Regular Report) titled “Articulating Difference: The Problem of the Other in International Political Economy.” The article criticizes the western rationalistic premises of the field for reducing “the ethical space for the Other(s) to represent themselves independent of western universalism, in their own cultural specificity and with ownership of their history.” The second article, written in 2004 and titled, “European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy,” inquires into the leveraging effects of the Copenhagen Criteria on Turkish democracy and explores four “problem areas” (the role of the military, the judicial system, and human and minority rights) where further EU conditionality is needed. Here Keyman acknowledges the EU stipulations as a universally valid register by which to approach Turkish society and modernization, despite his earlier claims that


this western universalism denies the other a space to present itself, reducing its ownerness to exogenously defined problem areas that must be overcome.\(^\text{23}\)

**Toward a Depoliticized Anthropology: Purging Past and Present Voices**

Of course there are many recent studies that continue to be highly critical of the EU, the accession process, and Turkey’s involvement in it. In fact Turkey’s inclusion into the European Customs Union (1995) became the target of a broad range of critical works on Turkish-EU relations. These studies consistently centered on Turkey’s unique status as the first and only major country to enter into a customs union without the rights and privileges of full EU membership, underscoring how the regulation of Turkey’s external trade regime had been handed over to a supranational body over which Turkey had no voice or control. Leading the attack was Erol Manisalı’s 2002 work, *The Silent Coup in Turkish-EU Relations*, arguing that the “1995 Customs Union amounted to nothing less than the colonization of the country.”\(^\text{24}\)

Manisalı’s revival of an anti-imperialist discourse was soon taken up by number of prominent intellectuals including the politician Mumtaz Soysal, the poet/journalist Atila Ilhan, Ali Ulvi Özdemir, and Yılmaz Dikbaş, among others.\(^\text{25}\) The re-emergence of an anti-imperial critique, on both the Turkish left and nationalist right, during the first decade of the twenty-first century was, to a certain extent, a reaction to the ruling AK party’s embrace of the EU. Yet more significant than the reemergence of these critical studies after a twenty-year hiatus has been the total denial of their existence by the new social-scientific literature being produced contemporaneously. An English-speaking reader perusing the international journals publishing the IR and political science studies detailed above would be hard-pressed to find even a footnote referencing these critical interpretations. The reasons behind this ostracization stem from an epistemological divide pervading interpretations of Turkish-EU relations. From the perspective of the new internationalized field of knowledge production, intellectuals such as Manisalı, Soysal, Özdemir, and Dikbaş are not regarded as legitimate interlocutors within the social scientific debate. Their methodologies are rejected as ideologically motivated and their subject positions dismissed for being too (existentially) immersed in their subject of inquiry. The arguments of these critical scholars are seen as being incommensurate with a de-politicized and de-historicized anthropology that

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\(^{24}\) Erol Manisalı, *Türkiye- Avrupa İlişkilerinde Sessiz Darbe* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2002).

stands at a disinterested and objective distance from its subject. As a consequence, their interpretations are removed from the realm of legitimate scholarly work and marginalized to the realm of primary documents that—much like the statements of political parties or civil society organizations—may one day serve as archival objects of social-scientific research.

This lack of engagement with approaches, methodologies, and questions deemed invalid by the new field of knowledge production has radically altered the terrain of the scholarly Turkish debate on the EU. Above all, it has bifurcated this terrain, drawing a rigid line between what are now seen as ideologically charged arguments for or against Turkish membership and interpretations of Turkish-EU relations that bear the internationally recognized stamp of “objectivity.” My aim in drawing attention to this bifurcation is not to bring attention to more critical interpretations ignored by the English-language literature. I wish, rather, to underscore how a certain way of thinking about and assessing Turkish-EU relations has become hegemonic, thereby epistemically marginalizing other ways of imagining and understanding these relations.

This marginalization has also beset past interpretations of Turkey’s membership bid. To give but one example, consider Bülent Ecevit’s claim that Turkish-EEC relations are the product of an inherent contradiction between the ideological and material relationships the west has fostered with the rest of the world. The nuanced argument that democratic and socially just European societies are forced, from an economic standpoint, to deny these privileges to the developing world, is totally at odds with the questions asked by and methods that govern the new social-scientific literature. This incommensurability accounts for why our same English speaking reader perusing internationally recognized journals over the past two decades will find only passing mention of the countless interlocutors that have filled the pages of this study. In fact, s/he would be left with the impression that the rich debates over Turkey’s membership bid between 1959 and 1980 detailed herein had simply not occurred.26

**Recovering a Past Modernity**

I have tried to show that things were not always this way. In marked difference to the amnesia of the present, Turkish commentators, politicians, and scholars in the initial decades of Turkey’s membership bid incessantly invoked the past. By connecting the Common Market with the longer histories of Turkey, Europe, and their relations, Turks were able to interpret and understand them on their own terms. Exogenous, ahistorical and depoliticized concepts such as economic restructuring or norm diffusion so en vogue today were described in a completely different register, one blasted through with historical and political resonance. The former likened to Ottoman capitulations and understood

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26 It could well be argued that this history is irrelevant to the questions they are concerned with. True enough, but this same history also, by virtue of its irrelevance, forces the issue as to why they are asking these particular questions in the first place.
through a discourse of neocolonialism, the latter either praised as the propagation of Atatürk’s civilizational mission or critiqued as yet another instance of European cultural imperialism.

This book has detailed the initial history of the intense and shifting Turkish debate over the material and symbolic significance of its inclusion into the European project. Looking back on this period, the existential arguments rested in history, culture, and political economy seem abstract and ideological when compared to the dominant way of understanding and assessing Turkish-EU relations that reigns today. Yet it was precisely this existential interrogation of Turkey and Europe’s past, coupled with the protracted and incomplete question of the Turkish and European projects, that allowed Turks to ask and answer a set of fundamental questions about themselves, questions that modernization theory has denied them from asking before and since. What kind of society have we formed? Where did this society come from? In what direction is this society headed? Is this something that we, as society, want? In so asking, Turks were, however briefly, able to take stock of their own history and set out to imagine, if not determine, their own future. More than a half century after Turkey applied to join the then-nascent EEC, the debate over Turkey’s place in Europe continues. This book has sought the answer to this question not through geographic or cultural arguments or analyses of Turkey’s political structure, but by looking into how Turks understood themselves through their existential engagement with the European project. It has underscored how Turkish debates over joining the EEC between 1959 and 1980 became a critical site where Turks inquired into who they were and where they were going. To the extent that this active, self-reflexive and self-defining experience of modernity is historically of European origin – and, to this author, its most profound legacy – Turkey had, during these years, become fully European.