

BAŐAR BAYSAL

CONSTRUCTING SECURITY IN COLOMBIA: THE CASE OF FARC

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CONSTRUCTING SECURITY IN COLOMBIA: THE CASE OF
FARC

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
BAŐAR BAYSAL

Department of
International Relations
İhsan Dođramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
June 2017

To Cihan Barış

CONSTRUCTING SECURITY IN COLOMBIA: THE CASE OF
FARC

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by


BAŞAR BAYSAL

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THE DEPARTMENT OF
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İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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
June 2017

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Assist. Prof. Dr. Onur İşçi
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Önsoy
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



Assist. Prof. Dr. Hasan Tolga Bölükbaşı
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



Assist. Prof. Dr. Berk Esen
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations.



Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Rıza Taşkale
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Halime Demirkan
Director

ABSTRACT

CONSTRUCTING SECURITY IN COLOMBIA: THE CASE OF FARC

Baysal, Başar

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Onur İşçi

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This study introduces a new framework for critical security studies to examine the production of security issues, particularly in hybrid democracies. Like the other critical security approaches, this new framework has a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology. On the other hand, this new framework addresses the critics of the already existing approaches. As novel features, the new framework, regards the process of (in)securitization as a whole process and examines it in three phases: definition, construction, and (in)securitization-in-action; it takes both bottom-up and top-down characteristics of the process of (in)securitization into consideration and examines both macro-level decision-making processes and discursive efforts and micro-level security practices; it takes rival voices into consideration and provides a dual framework for analysis which examines non-violent opposition and counter-(in)securitizations; it integrates new units like the opposition and sufferers; it examines the context of the process of (in)securitization

by particularly focusing on the historical background and the level of democracy; it divides the security professionals into three levels: strategic, operational and tactical; it examines the insecurity consequences of (in)securitization as well as its process; finally, and most importantly, it eliminates the state-centric approach and it can problematize non-state actors too. In addition to these theoretical contributions, the dissertation applies this new framework to the case of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombia state. By that way, it both present the functioning of the framework and examines one of the longest and deadliest internal conflicts of the last century through the lenses of (in)securitization framework.

Keywords: Colombian Conflict, FARC, Hybrid Democracies, (In)securitization, Securitization

ÖZET

KOLOMBİYA'DA GÜVENLİĞİN İNŞAASI: FARC MESELESİ

Baysal, Başar

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Onur İşçi

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Bu çalışma eleştirel güvenlik çalışmaları için yeni bir analiz çerçevesi önermektedir. Diğer eleştirel güvenlik yaklaşımlarında olduğu gibi bu teorik çerçeve de inşacı bir ontoloji ve yorumsamacı bir epistemolojiye sahiptir. Diğer taraftan bu analiz çerçevesi mevcut yaklaşımlara olan eleştirileri karşılayabilmektedir. Yeni özellikler olarak, bu çalışma, güvenlik(siz)leştirmeyi bütün bir süreç olarak görerek bu süreci tanımlama, inşa, güvenliksizleştirici sonuçlar olmak üzere üç safhada analiz etmekte; güvenlik(siz)leştirmenin hem yukarıdan aşağıya hem de aşağıdan yukarıya olan özelliklerini dikkate alarak hem makro seviyedeki karar alma süreçleri ve söylemsel çabaları hem de mikro seviyedeki güvenlik pratiklerini analiz etmekte; güvenlik(siz)leştirme sürecindeki karşıt görüşleri dikkate alarak, şiddet içermeyen muhalif hareketleri ve karşıt güvenlik(siz)leştirmeleri de içine alan iki taraflı bir analiz çerçevesi sunmakta; muhalefet ya da güvenliksizleşenler gibi yeni aktörler ortaya koymakta; güvenlik(siz)leştirme sürecinde, özellikle tarihi süreç ve

demokratik seviye gibi, bağlamsal faktörleri analiz çerçevesinin içerisine almakta; güvelik profesyonellerini taktik, operatif ve stratejik olmak üzere üç seviyeye bölmekte; güvenlik(siz)leştirmenin güvensizleştirici sonuçlarını da analiz çerçevesine almakta; ve son ve en önemli olarak devlet merkezli analizi kenara koyarak, devlet dışı aktörleri de sorunsallaştırabilmektedir. Bu teorik katkılara ek olarak, bu çalışma ortaya konulan bu teorik analiz çerçevesini FARC ve Kolombiya Devletinin iki taraflı güvenlik(siz)leştirilmesi meselesine uygulamaktadır. Böylece, hem teorik çerçevenin uygulanırlığı gösterilmekte hem de son yüzyılın en kanlı ve uzun iç çatışmalarından birisi güvenli(siz)leştirme çerçevesinde analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: FARC, Güvenlikleştirme, Güvenlik(siz)leştirme, Kolombiya İç Çatışması, Melez Demokrasiler

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to introduce a novel framework for critical security studies which addresses the critics of the existing critical security approaches and explains the process of (in)securitization in hybrid democracies. Therefore this study provides a novel analytical framework for analysis while addressing the gaps in the literature and shortcomings of the existing approaches like the Securitization Theory and the (In)securitization approach. Moreover, it integrates the level of democracy to its analytical framework as a crucial contextual element. Finally, this dissertation applies this new framework to the case of dual (in) securitization of FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army - *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo*) terrorist organization and the Colombian state to present its applicability and to examine one of the longest and deadliest internal conflicts of the last century.

The introduction part of the study presents the rationale, summary and the contributions of the study, the first part present the problems and the gaps in the

existing literature, asks the research questions and presents the contributions of the new theoretical framework, the second part presents the complex methodology of the new framework for critical security studies and the case study that is conducted for this dissertation. The final part gives a summary of the chapters of the dissertation.

1.1 Gaps, Research Questions and Contributions

Construction of exceptional security issues has been on the agenda of critical security studies since the emergence of the concept of securitization. Particularly, the Securitization Theory and the (In)securitization approach of International Political Sociology focus on this issue. However, both approaches have shortcomings and have been criticized in different aspects. The primary aim of this study is to introduce a novel framework for critical security studies that addresses the shortcomings of these existing approaches and broadens the literature on (in)securitization. Secondly, it aims to examine the process of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state by the help of this framework.

Securitization Theory, with its top-down framework, focuses on the discourses or speech acts of the elites for the examination of the process of constructing exceptional security issues (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998). Although this approach has been one of the most used approaches since its emergence in the 1990s, it has been criticized for certain shortcomings. These include, over emphasis on the macro-level speech acts and inadequate analysis of security practices (McDonald, 2008: 568), inadequate analysis of contextual issues (Balzacq, 2005); its elitist approach which further legitimizes existing power relations; its in-a-moment

approach which regards securitization occurs in the moment when elites declares an issue as a security issue and the audiences accepts it (Booth, 2007); and finally, its ignorance of rival voices and opposition in the process of securitization. Moreover, this framework does not examine the insecuritying consequences of the process of securitization.

On the other hand, (In)securitization approach of International Political Sociology focuses on the practices of security professionals (Peoples & Williams, 2010: 69). The scholars of International Political Sociology adopt a bottom-up approach and examine micro-level security practices for the analysis of the construction of exceptional security issues (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 5). Moreover, they also focus on the insecuritying consequences of the process of (in)securitization by asking the question of ‘what security does’ in addition to ‘what security is?’ (Bigo, 2008: 116). However, the scholars of International Political Sociology are also criticized since they overemphasize micro-level practices and ignore macro-level decision-making and discursive construction (Wæver, 2015: 125; Rothe, 2016: 22). Moreover, although this approach takes rival voices into consideration, it only focuses on the rival ideas and conflicts within the field of security professionals. Therefore it ignores the rival voices at the macro level. Finally, International Political Sociology regards security professionals as a unique body; however, different security professionals at different levels have differing roles in the process of (in)securitization. Thus, these security professionals must be categorized according to their roles.

In addition to these specific criticisms, there are general issues, which related to both approaches. Firstly, both approaches are European approaches and they are designed for liberal democracies. In their examination what is normal is regarded as liberal constitutional democracy and liberal norms. However, the world does not consist of liberal democracies and there is a need for a novel framework which functions in hybrid democracies too. Secondly, since both approaches do not have a dual approach and both aims to problematize state, non-state actors like insurgent groups or terrorist organizations, which also use violence can not be problematized by these approaches.

In addition to these theoretical issues, the case of FARC Colombia also has not been examined from the perception of (in)securitization framework although it has been one of the deadliest and longest internal conflicts in the world in the last century. I argue that for the examination of this issue there is a need for a dual framework, which will problematize both FARC and the Colombian state. Moreover, in an analysis, which focuses on the Colombian conflict, in addition to the process of securitization, the insecuritizing consequences of this process must also be examined.

In line with these gaps and problems, this dissertation asks three interrelated research questions.

1. How can we analyze the process of (in)securitization by addressing the shortcomings of the existing frameworks?
2. How can we analyze the process of (in)securitization in hybrid democracies?

3. How the Colombian state and FARC (in)securitized each other after *La Violencia* in Colombia

To be able to answer these questions and address the gaps that are explained above, this dissertation introduces a new framework for critical security studies and examines the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state by the help of this framework. By this way, the dissertation provides novel perceptions and contributions to the literature on critical security studies and Colombian conflict.

As novel features and theoretical contributions, the new framework, regards the process of (in)securitization as a whole process and examines it in three phases: the definition, the construction, and the (in)securitization-in-action; it takes both bottom-up and top-down characteristics of the process of (in)securitization into consideration and examines both macro-level decision making processes and discursive efforts and micro-level security practices; it takes rival voices into consideration in the process of (in)securitization and provides a dual framework for analysis which takes both non-violent opposition and counter-(in)securitizations into consideration; it enriches the literature on the (in)securitization by integrating new units like the opposition and sufferers; it examines the context of the process of (in)securitization by particularly focusing on the historical background and the level of democracy in the given place; it divides the security professionals into three levels: strategic, operational and tactical; it examines the insecuritizing consequences of (in)securitization as well as its process; finally, and most importantly, it eliminates the state-centric approach and it can problematize non-state actors too.

As the novel features indicate, the main contribution of this dissertation is the new theoretical framework for critical security studies to examine the construction of exceptional security issues. In addition to the Colombian case that is examined in this dissertation, this new framework will be a beneficial tool for other (in)securitization cases particularly in hybrid democracies and internal conflicts.

In addition to these theoretical contributions, the dissertation applies this new framework to the case of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombia state. I have chosen the case of FARC since it is one of the most violent and longest internal conflicts of the last century. Moreover, Colombia is a hybrid democracy and there is a clear case of dual (in)securitization. So the conflict in Colombia is an ideal case for presenting how the new framework for critical security studies is applied to empirical cases. Moreover, the case is a current case because of the solution process in the last years. The conflict started the early 1960s. Although it longed for more than half a century, in the study I have examined some periods of it. For the definition phase, I have examined the definition of security for FARC and the Colombian state in the first phase of the conflict in the 1960s. For the construction phase, I have examined the Uribe era, the era between 2002 and 2010. Finally, for the (in)securitization-in-action phase, I have examined general insecurities in the whole process.

By the examination of dual (in)securitization in Colombia, The study presents how both parties securitized each other and how the practices of the security professionals of each party lead to insecurities for ordinary people in Colombia. Therefore, this dissertation provides a contribution to the literature on the Colombian conflict by examining it through the lenses of the framework of (in)securitization. However, it

must be stated here that the main objective of this dissertation is to introduce a novel framework for critical security studies to analyze the process of (in)securitization.

Therefore, the empirical case that is analyzed here is to present how this framework functions or how it is used to examine the process of (in)securitization.

1.2 Methodology

Methodologically the new framework for critical security studies adopts a hybrid methodology, which includes both inductive and deductive perceptions. From my point of view the process of (in) securitization, in other words, construction of exceptional security issues has both bottom-up and top-down characteristics.

Definition of security and the direction of security practices and discursive persuasion by the strategic level security professionals have a top-down impact for the (in)securitization process. On the other hand, security practices of the operational and tactical level security professionals influence the process of (in)securitization in a bottom-up manner.

In line with this methodological stance, the analysis of a (in)securitization process requires mixed methods. In addition to the plurality, examination of different phases of (in)securitization will further demand differing methods. Although I have briefly stated how to examine these phases while explaining them above, I will present them here in detail and explain how I analyzed the case of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state methodologically.

Before the examination of the phases of (in)securitization, an analyst must examine the contextual issues. In this examination, the historical background of the issue, crucial events and issues that have an impact on it and the level of democracy in the given state (if the case includes a state) must be examined. The main methods for this analysis are literature review and discourse analysis. An analyst must examine and present existing academic literature, policy documents, agreements, constitutions, reports etc. to be able to present the context of the issue. One issue that must be kept in mind is, particularly for the analysis of the historical background, issues must be analyzed in relation to the case at hand. In other words, the analysis of the historical background should not be a general review, which is free from the case at hand.

In line with this explanation, I have conducted a literature review for the analysis of the context of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. In this analysis, I have examined the literature to present the historical background of the conflict between FARC and the Colombian state including the colonial era and history before *La Violencia*. In this analysis, I have also presented important issues and events like the *La Violencia*, the Cuban Revolution, and the Cold War. This examination also presented how the country emerged as a weak state. Finally, I examined the democratic level of the country.

For the new (in)securitization framework for critical security studies, the first phase of the (in)securitization process is the definition phase. In this phase, strategic level security professionals define security. For the analysis of this phase, an analyst must conduct a discourse analysis. In this analysis, policy documents, constitutions, manifestos, reports, speeches of strategic level security professionals can be

analyzed. In this analysis, in addition to the definition of security at the start of the (in)securitization process, the evolution of this definition must also be presented. This is because, the definition of security changes even after the start of security practices especially if the (in)securitization process is long like the (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, which longed for five decades. As a final note, if there is a counter-(in)securitization, security definitions of both the primary and counter-(in)securitizations must be examined via discourse analyses.

In line with this explanation, I have conducted a discourse analysis for the examination of dual (in)securitization in Colombia. In this discourse analysis, to be able to present the security definition of FARC, I have analyzed its manifestos, statements, reports and the speeches of its prominent leaders of the organization. Particularly, the founding manifesto of May 1966 and other manifestos of National Conferences of FARC were crucial to present the security definition of the organization at the start of the process. For the security definition of the Colombian state, I have analyzed the Lasso plan, which initiated the security practices by the Colombian military against the Communist formations in Colombia.

The second phase of (in)securitization process is the construction phase. In this phase, the crucial point is the persuasion of audience(s) because this persuasion gives the security definition legitimacy. In away this security claim becomes a truth by the persuasion of the audience(s). In this phase, strategic level security professionals attempt to convince the audience discursively. Moreover, they direct the security practices of the operational and tactical level security professionals. Additionally, the

practices of the low-level security professionals impact the process of construction via their normalizing and routinizing effects.

For the examination of this phase, a hybrid methodology is required. Firstly, a discourse analysis must be conducted to present the discursive efforts of the strategic level security professionals to convince the audience(s). This discourse analysis will also aim to present how strategic level security professionals direct the security practices. On the other hand, the practices of the operational and tactical level security professionals must be examined in this phase. For this examination, the best method would be ethnography. An analyst can best analyze these practices by direct contact and evaluation. However, this method is usually not possible because of the danger or other financial and material factors. In this case, the practices of these elements can be examined via discourse analysis in which newspaper articles are scanned and other reports are analyzed. Finally, to evaluate the result of these efforts to persuade the audience(s), a survey can be conducted among the audience(s). If this is not possible, already existing surveys can be utilized for this end. In the examination of this phase, dual nature of (in)securitization must be kept in mind too.

In line with this explanation, I have conducted a discourse analysis to examine the discursive efforts of the strategic level security professionals. Although this process starts from the beginning of the (in)securitization process, I focused on the era after 2002. This is because the speeches of strategic level security professionals can not be found for the first decades of the (in)securitization process and this era marks the increase of hawkish policies by the Uribe government against FARC. In this context, I have examined key speeches and statements of President Uribe. All of the speeches

of the former president are saved on the official website of the Colombian presidency. I have selected speeches (one or two speeches per year from 2002 to 2010) according to their relevance to security issues. On the other hand, I have also examined the reports, and manifestos of FARC in the same era. Additionally, I have examined newspaper and the Internet achieves to present the security practices of FARC and the Colombian state in the same era.

The last phase of a (in)securitization process is (in)securitization-in-action. In this phase, the security practices of operational and tactical level security professionals lead to insecurities at different levels. Particularly, ordinary people face these insecurities. For the analysis of these insecurities, the best method would be ethnography. By that way, an analyst can directly witness and evaluate these insecurities. However, as expressed above, in most cases this can not be possible because of danger and other material and financial issues. In these cases, a discourse analysis can be conducted. In this discourse analysis, already existing reports and media coverage must be examined. Moreover, surveys can be conducted with the sufferers of the (in)securitization process to be able to present and evaluate the insecurities.

For the examination of the insecurities that are created by the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, I have utilized already existing reports.

Particularly the report of Historical Memory Group provided detailed information about the results of the security practices of the insurgent guerrilla groups, paramilitary forces and the armed forces of the Colombian state. By this way, I presented the victims of forced migration, kidnappings, assassinations etc.

1.3 Presentation Order

To answer the research questions that are explained above and to reach the above-stated aims, this dissertation is divided into seven chapters including the introduction and conclusion. The second chapter explains critical security studies in general and examines existing approaches, which aim to analyze the production of exceptional security issues. These include Securitization Theory and the (In)securitization approach of International Political Sociology. In addition to the explanation of these approaches, main criticism and shortcomings of these approaches are also presented in this chapter to provide a basis for the new framework for critical security studies.

The third chapter focuses on the literature on democracy and hybrid democracies. I argue that level of democracy is one of the most important contextual factors of the process of (in)securitization and this issue has been ignored by the existing approaches that are stated above. In addition to the general literature on democracy and hybrid democracies, the implications of the democratic level on the process of (in)securitization are also examined in this chapter.

The fourth chapter is the main chapter of the dissertation. It introduces the new framework for critical security studies to examine the construction of exceptional security issues, particularly in hybrid democracies. In this chapter, main features of this new framework, like its dual character and its process-based approach, are examined. Moreover, the phases of (in)securitization process are explained by presenting how each phase should be examined in a (in)securitization analysis.

Finally, the units of the (in)securitization process are introduced including new units like the sufferers and the opposition.

After the introduction of the new theoretical framework, fifth and sixth chapters examine the case of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state by using the new framework that is presented in the previous chapters. For this end, the fifth chapter examines the context of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state by focusing on the historical background of the Colombian Conflict, important events and issues like the success of the Cuban Revolution and the Cold War which influences the process of (in)securitization and, most importantly, the democratic level of Colombia.

After the examination of contextual factors, the sixth chapter provides an analysis of dual (in)securitization. To this end, it firstly introduces the units of the dual (in)securitization in Colombia. After this introduction, the phases of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, including definition, construction, and (in)securitization-in-action, are examined. Finally, the conclusion part provides a brief summary of the dissertation and its contributions. Moreover, the limitations of the study and future avenues of research are also presented in the conclusion part.

CHAPTER 2

CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES: A LITERATURE REVIEW

As expressed in the introduction part, the primary aim of this dissertation is to introduce a new critical security framework to examine the construction of exceptional security issues, which addresses the shortcomings of the existing approaches. In this sense, this chapter aims to provide a literature review of the critical security studies, which provide a basis for this new theoretical framework. This new framework addresses the critics of the existing approaches and integrates novel aspects. These approaches include Securitization¹ Theory; International Political Sociology and the (in)securitization approach; and the broader literature on politics of exception.

Critical security studies consist of different theories and approaches, which have common points. Despite their differences, these approaches can communicate with each other as part of a whole. As expressed above, this chapter aims to develop a

¹ In this dissertation, the term “securitization” (lower case ‘s’) is used only to refer the construction of a security issue. For the Securitization Theory, which is introduced by Ole Wæver, and later developed, by Barry Buzan and Jaap De Wilde I used Securitization with Capital “S”. This theory has its particular framework for securitization. This problem is explained in the following sections.

framework by borrowing insights from different critical security approaches by taking their shortcomings into consideration and introducing new insights and concepts. In this regard, this chapter examines the critical security studies in general by asking: what does it mean to be critical? What are the different ways of defining it? How can we analyze cases by using critical security studies? Secondly, it analyzes the Securitization Theory and its critics. Thirdly, it examines International Political Sociology and the (in)securitization approach including poststructural perceptions of security. Finally, it gives a brief review of the literature on politics of exception.

2.1 Critical Security Studies

Security can be defined as freedom from threats (Baylis *et al.*, 2008: 229). However, despite this general definition, the term remains a disputed concept, which is hard to define (McSweeney, 1999: 13; See also: Baldwin, 1997: 10). Buzan (1991: 7) indicated this by stating: “the concept of security is essentially a contested concept like love, freedom, and power in the sense that it is inherently ambiguous which gives rise to theoretical discussions and unsolvable debates on the meaning of it”. Leaving other disciplines aside, even in the discipline of International Relations there is no consensus about the definition of the concept.

The term “critical” is also a contested concept. As Peoples and Williams (2015: 1) argue “it is difficult to imagine an approach to the study of security or any other area of intellectual inquiry, that would claim to be ‘uncritical.’” However, this chapter focuses on a precise literature and standpoint, critical security studies, which particularly uses the concept of “critical” to define itself. Rather than a clear-cut

theory, critical security studies is defined as an “orientation toward the discipline [of security studies]” (Krause & Williams, 1997: xii). Since the early 1990s, there has been an emerging literature under this title. According to this perspective, being critical requires adopting a “particular stance towards taken-for-granted assumptions and unquestioned categorizations of social reality” (C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006: 476). In line with Cox’s famous argument, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose,” (1981: 129) the members of this field remain skeptical to given definitions of security. They question these definitions to deconstruct how they came to being? What kind of consequences do they bring about? Which rival alternatives are there against these claims and practices?

Critical security studies can be explained from three different but interrelated angles. All of these explanations provide an account of the critical security studies but they look at the issue from different viewpoints. Although all of these explanations can be found elsewhere separately (C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006; Krause & Williams, 1997; Krause & Williams, 1996), I will summarize them here to be able to give a broader picture of it.² The first angle explains critical security studies by focusing on its differences from traditional security studies and the efforts to broaden it. The second angle explains the emergence and development of critical security studies in time by focusing on the impact of prominent events like the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.³ The final angle explains critical security studies by focusing on

² Peoples and Williams (2015) also explain critical security studies by utilizing three different categorizations. They refer them as different “maps” for critical security studies: an intellectual map, a temporal map, and a spatial map. I will not repeat or summarize Peoples and William’s explanations, but I will also explain the critical security studies in three different but interrelated ways.

³ This angle has overlapping points with the first one since it also touches upon traditional security studies, however, this is taken as a different explanation since it focuses on different issues.

main approaches inside it, including the Securitization Theory, (in)securitization approach, and Emancipatory security approach.

2.1.1 Traditional Security Studies and Critical Security Studies

The first route to explain the critical security studies focuses on its differences from traditional security studies and the efforts to broaden it.⁴ In addition to route, it is crucial to explain main tenets of the traditional security understandings since almost all of the theories and approaches within critical security studies develop their positions vis-à-vis the traditional security studies.

Traditional security studies have been the dominant voice within the discipline of International Relations since its emergence. It has its roots in the Realist theory of International Relations. Although Realism itself has also evolved in the course of time (Classical Realism, Neo-Realism and Neo-Classical Realism) and each version of Realism has its own distinctive structure, there are three basic and interrelated assumptions that are common in all versions: statism, survival, and self-help (Baylis *et al.*, 2008: 100). All of these assumptions are relevant for the traditional security studies. Firstly, Realism assumes that the state is the central actor in international politics, and its sovereignty is presented as the most important entity that requires protection. According to Hobbes, through the emergence of the state, “we traded our liberty in return for a guarantee of security” (Baylis *et al.*, 100). In line with this argument, Realists claim that the problem security is solved inside the state boundaries by the emergence of the state. However, anarchy and danger persist

⁴ In this study, the term broaden is used to refer both widening and deepening efforts of security.

outside these boundaries. As a result, there is a competition between states for power and security.

Secondly, in Realism, survival is considered to be the primary goal of the state.

According to Waltz (1979: 91), “beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied,” however, survival is a condition for these other aims.

Additionally, this principle provides a moral code to decision-makers of the states, which is called as *ethics of responsibility*. Decision-makers justify their decisions and practices with the help of this alternative moral code (Baylis *et al.*, 101-102). The final basic assumption of Realism is self-help. Unlike the situation inside the state borders, there is an anarchic environment in the international arena in which there is no higher authority. States can attain security only through self-help (Waltz, 1979: 111).

In line with these Realist assumptions, traditional security logic adopts a narrow definition of security in which state is the main referent object (particularly its independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) (Miller, 2001: 17), the security agent (provider of security), and the main threat (other states). Since the inside of state is considered as secure, security is only understood as international security and internal issues are left out of the scope of this field. Moreover, in this approach, security is described under military-political terms and it is achieved through the use of force. Military threats are the core threats towards the state and it protects itself by its own military forces. Stephen Walt (1991: 212) describes security as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.” Miller (2001: 16) argues that “threats

to national security are posed by other states; the nature of threats and the way to deal with them require military responses.”

In addition to these, traditional security studies have an objectivist perception of security. According to Realists, "security is a reality prior to language, it is out there" (Wæver, 1995: 1). Therefore it is not constructed via discourses or practices of people; it is there to only to be observed. A threat is not constructed in the minds of people through discourses or routinizing practices, a threat is a threat since it has the attributes of being a threat and it can only be observed. Moreover, it is material in nature. In line with this argument, "Realists maintain that there is an objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual" (Mearsheimer, 1994/95: 37-39 and 41; See also: Krause & Williams, 1996: 235). According to this objectivist understanding, the ideas and values of the analyzer do not have an impact on the analyzed issue since s/he can objectively observe analyze it. Finally, traditional perception of security regards security as an objective reality to be acquired by states. Threats (the other states), legitimate security agent (the state itself), referent objects (territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the state), and the means (military means) are given in this security understanding.

As discussed above, the first route towards explaining critical security studies focuses on how it differs from traditional security studies and the efforts to broaden it. Broadening the concept of security occurs in two axes: widening and deepening. Krause and Williams (1996: 230) discussed these in the following way:

The diverse contributions to the debates on "new thinking on security" can be classified along several axes. One... attempts to broaden the neorealist

conception of security to include a wider range of potential threats, ranging from economic and environmental issues to human rights and migration. This challenge has been accompanied by discussions intended to deepen the agenda of security studies by moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points...

New approaches to security in IR developed along two axes. "Deepeners," attempt to widen security by introducing new referents objects other than the state. They concentrate on answering the question "whose security is important?" These new referent objects range from individuals at the micro level, to the world or cosmopolitan peace at the macro level. In other words, deepeners include security analyses at different levels and scales ranging from the individual human being to the global security in addition to the state level to the security studies in the discipline of International Relations. "Wideners," concentrate on the "threat," and widen the security studies agenda by introducing threats other than the military ones. These new threats span from environmental to economic issues.

According to Tarry (1999: 1), "the wideners argue that a predominantly military definition does not acknowledge that the greatest threats to state survival may not be military, but environmental, social and economic." Although it is hard to make general categorizations on this topic since there are many studies which present overlapping analyses, it can be argued that wideners analyze new types of threats while maintaining the state as the main referent object; on the other hand, deepeners introduce referent objects other than the state and make security analysis at different levels ranging from individual human beings to global security.

Finally, let me briefly touch on the existing criticisms towards the broadening efforts of security and the debate among the wideners and the deepeners. Scholars of mainstream security studies regard widening and deepening efforts as “taking security studies away from its traditional focus and methods, and making the field intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant” (Krause & Williams, 1996: 230; Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 2). According to Mearsheimer (1995: 92), alternative approaches to security have provided neither a clear explanatory framework for analyzing security nor demonstrated their value in concrete research. Moreover, Walt (1991: 213) argues, “[t]he adoption of alternative conceptions is not only analytically mistaken but politically irresponsible.” Walt (1991: 213) explains the dangers of broadening the concept of security as follows:

Because nonmilitary phenomena can also threaten state and individuals, some writers have suggested broadening the concept of “security” to include topics such as poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, drug abuse, and the like [...] Such proposals remind us that non-military issues deserve sustained attention from scholars and policymakers and that military power does not guarantee well-being. But this prescription runs the risk of expanding “security studies” excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recession could all be viewed as threats to “security.” Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.

In addition to the criticisms from the scholars who adopt traditional security studies, there are also disputes among the members of the critical security studies about the widening-deepening debate. For example, Ole Wæver (1995: 2) criticizes deepeners since:

...[t]he security of individuals can be affected in numerous ways; indeed, economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political

rights are germane more than military issues in this respect. The major problem with such approach is deciding where to stop since the concept of security otherwise becomes a synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable.

Therefore, even within the broadeners' camp, there is no consensus among the wideners and deepeners. However, I believe this is not a caveat but an indicator of the richness of the critical security studies. As expressed above, this categorization examines critical security studies by focusing on its differences from the mainstream security understanding. Next part gives a time-based explanation of critical security studies.

2.1.2 Beginnings and Ends: A Time-Based Explanation

This angle of explanation is based on the emergence of the ideas of a critical security understanding and approaches in time. It especially focuses on crucial events in history and their impacts on the emergence of these critical security approaches. Most of the studies refer to important events, namely end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Peoples & Williams, 2010; Bilgin, 2010), however, in this part I will provide a more nuanced analysis, which also includes the emergence of new approaches to security and dissident modes of thought during the Cold War.

Security studies emerged as a subfield of International Relations after the Second World War. Although political theorists and military strategists had used the concept previously, it never emerged as an organizing concept for a field of study. The meaning and main implications of the concept of security in International Relations

have been evolving since its first emergence. Security studies, during the Cold War period, especially until the mid-1970s, were mainly about deterrence and strategic studies. In this period, the subject was mainly related to national security, which was largely defined in military-political terms (Buzan & Hansen, 2007). Nuclear weapons constituted the central position in the security studies. “Much of the literature was heavily depended on assumptions of rationality to work out the great chains of if – then propositions that characterized deterrence theory: if A attacks B in a given way, what is B’s best response, and what would A then reply, and then...” (Buzan & Hansen, 2007: xxvi).

As argued by Buzan and many others, alternative approaches to security emerged as a result of the “dissatisfaction with the narrowness of the field, which was imposed by military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War” (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 2; Bilgin, 2010). This state-centric approach, which mainly focuses on superpower confrontation, had a militarist character. Moreover, it regarded inside of the state boundaries secure and only outside insecure (Bilgin, 2010). Because of these, it could not address the whole of the insecurities faced in the world from different threats and at different levels.

From the onset of the 1970s, new answers started to emerge to the questions “what (or who) is being secured?” “From what threats?” “By what means?” (Krause & Williams, 1996: 230). In the 1970s, Peace Research emerged as a critique of mainstream strategic studies for its failure to question sufficiently the ethical implications of its state-centric focus on national security under nuclear conditions (Buzan & Hansen, 2007: xxix; Sagan, 1983; Bull, 1976). Moreover, some concerns

other than military started to take their places as issues of high politics on the agenda of international relations. Economic and environmental issues were the primary subjects that were placed as rivals to the issues of the military sector. In 1983, Richard Ullman (1983) called for an expansion of security to include environmental and economic threats in his famous article titled “Redefining Security.”

If we were to focus more on critical security studies, other issues including, “the emergence of the new social movements of the late 1970s and the 1980s, formation of an internal security field in Europe, the second cold war and détente in the late 1980s” provide a socio-historical context for the emergence of this security orientation (C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006: 446). Moreover, as an intellectual root, the dissident modes of thought that rose in the 1980s provided a conceptual background for the critical security studies (C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006: 447).

The end of the Cold War was a milestone for the emergence of the critical security studies (C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006: 446; Peoples & Williams, 2010: 7-8; Bilgin, 2010: 70). Firstly, it marked the inability of Realism and traditional approaches, since they were unable to predict the end of the Cold War (Bigo, 2008: 119). Moreover, the “strategic environment” has been changed by this event (Peoples & Williams, 2010: 7). The issues/insecurities, which could not take place in the security agenda because of the domination of nuclear issues and superpower confrontation started to be studied within this new environment. These include environmental issues, immigration, and internal conflicts/civil wars. Increasingly, scholars began to study environment, culture, identity, ethnicity, economy, and health, all of which were considered to be part of low politics previously (Buzan & Hansen, 2007: xxxiii). In

addition to these new issues and insecurities, new conceptual approaches started to develop especially after the end of the Cold War. These include new perceptions on the construction of exceptional security issues. Moreover, these approaches also include the emergence/production of insecurities, the role of security practices, emancipatory security approach, and human security. Particularly, the human security agenda which takes individual human beings as the main referent object and focus on threats to it after the UN Development Report in 1994.

The 9/11 attacks are also considered to be a major milestone for developments in critical security studies. Actually, the attacks themselves, and the 2003 Iraq War, which followed it, contributed to the emergence of the idea that new perceptions of security are useless (Bilgin, 2010: 75). It raised the idea that state-centric military perceptions dominate the security studies and new voices have no chance to find a place within this field. However, the security discourses and practices in this period helped the scholars within critical security studies to indicate the fallacies of the traditional security studies and further improve their theories (Neal, 2009). 9/11 attacks and 2003 Iraq war has been one of the most referred events/cases in the works within the critical security studies. According to Bilgin (2010: 75), 9/11 has revealed that traditional approach to security cannot even identify insecurities of the world because of its state-centric character. The traditional understanding of security could not address new type of threats, which were not states but terrorist organizations. These new threats challenged one of the most important assumptions of traditional security studies: the inside-outside dichotomy, which argued safety inside state boundaries and danger and anarchy outside. In this new environment,

new threats have both international and domestic implications and it is impossible to draw a line between them.

2.1.3 An Explanation Based On Different Approaches

The final and the most common way of examining/explaining critical security studies is based on different approaches within this wider orientation. These approaches are Securitization Theory, Emancipatory security approach, and International Political Sociology and (in)securitization approach. As expressed above these approaches have common grounds and can communicate with each other

Other studies examine this angle of explanation by focusing on three different schools. These schools include the Copenhagen School, Aberystwyth School, and the Paris School. Actually, it is easier to explain these approaches by using this framework based on three different schools since one can categorize very diverse perceptions within these schools easily. However, I believe that this is problematic since there is a diversity of ideas among the members of the same schools. Focusing on the schools makes us miss these differences among the scholars in these schools. Ideas of one scholar can be regarded as the approach of school. For example, in most instances, ideas of Ole Wæver about Securitization Theory are regarded as representing the whole Copenhagen School. However, there are differences among them. For example, while Ole Wæver regards desecuritization as the normative choice, Jaap De Wilde (2012) rejects this view. However, the idea of Wæver is regarded as the common idea of the so-called Copenhagen School. Consequently,

this study will not use the categorization based on different schools but analyze critical security studies by concentrating on main approaches within it.⁵

The first approach is the Securitization Theory. Barry Buzan introduced the term “securitization” in 1991, and it was elaborated in 1995 by Ole Wæver (1995; Buzan, 1991). Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde developed the concept later in 1998 (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). In this approach, security is described as a speech act. According to this approach, no issue is inherently a security issue; instead, securitizing actors securitize issues via speech acts. By securitizing certain issues, securitizing actors aim to convince ‘audience’ that the issue is an existential threat to a ‘referent object’ to be able to justify and take extraordinary measures (e.g. use of force) against it (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). These extraordinary measures are justified especially by the help of the already existing/constructed value of the term security. The scholars, who introduced the Securitization Theory, focus on the illocutionary force of the security agent’s speech acts. This force ontologically changes the nature of issues and justifies extreme measures against them (Wæver, 1995: 54; C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006: 448).

The second approach that is considered within the critical security studies is Emancipatory security approach. This approach also referred as the Critical Security Studies (first letters uppercase), links security with emancipation (Booth, 1991a). The most important representatives of this approach are Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones. The scholars who introduced this approach claim that greater security is provided by an emancipatory change which can be defined as providing people

⁵ These approaches are explained very shortly here since Securitization Theory and (In)securitization Approach will be analyzed widely in the following sections.

freedom from “unacknowledged constraints” which prevents them from making their future with their own will and choice (Ashley, 1981: 227. See also Booth, 1991b: 539; Bilgin, 2008; Bilgiç, 2013). Wyn Jones (1999: 126) also defines emancipation as “the absence of the threat of (involuntary) pain, fear, hunger, and poverty.” The approach rejects state as the main referent object and agent (the actor which provides security) of security. Although the approach adopts a multilevel understanding they privilege individual human being and its emancipation.

The final approach is the International Political Sociology and (in)securitization approach. This approach has introduced sociology and criminology to the security studies. It contributes to the wider critical security studies by problematizing the dichotomies and particularly indicating fallacies of the inside-outside dichotomy. The approach argues that [new] threats like global terrorism and measures against these threats lead to both international and domestic insecurities. They particularly focus on how exceptional security measures and practices create insecurities for ordinary people. Another focal point of the approach is its focus on the security professionals and their role both in the construction of exceptional security issues and creation of insecurities.

Similar to the Securitization Theory, (in)securitization approach claims that security and insecurity are constructed through an (in)securitization process. However, rather than focusing only on the process of the construction of security via speech acts, (in)securitization approach concentrates both on the process and the consequences of this construction (Bigo, 2008: 116). Moreover, it focuses on the security practices rather than securitizing speech acts (Peoples & Williams, 2010: 69). The scholars

who adopt this approach argue that the securitization of certain issues result in the (in)securitization of other issues. According to the approach, security of one issue is always provided by the sacrifice of the security of other issues (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 2). Finally, unlike the Securitization Theory, (in)securitization approach rejects the “fixed normative value of security” free from the actors and context (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 4). Although Securitization Theory argues that security issues are constructed via speech acts, it accepts that international security has a value and certain implications. (In)securitization approach argues that this value is also constructed.

Although these approaches differ since each focus on different aspects of security, they have important common points, and these common points make them grouped under the same title: critical security studies. In addition to their critical stance that is explained above, none of these approaches take security as a given. Unlike traditional understanding of security, which regards security as state/national security and focuses on military and defense; critical security studies has a constructivist approach to security. For the scholars of critical security studies, "security is not an objective condition, that threats to it do not simply matter of correct perceiving a constellation of material forces, and that the object of security is not stable or unchanging” (Krause & Williams, 1996: 242).

Rather than treating states, groups, or individuals as givens that relate objectively to an external world of threats created by the security dilemma, these approaches stress the processes through which individuals, collectivities and threats constructed as social facts and the influence of such constructions on security concerns (Krause & Williams, 1996: 242).

In sum, critical security studies is an umbrella term or general perspective towards the understanding of security and insecurity in international relations. It is a heterogeneous group of thought including different approaches. Particularly, the Securitization Theory and the (in)securitization approach are relevant for this study. This is because, the new framework for critical security studies, which is going to be introduced and utilized in this dissertation, gets insights from these two approaches. In a way, it merges them by including both discourses and practices into consideration and focusing on both the process and the insecurity consequences of securitization. These will be analyzed in the following sections in detail.

2.1.4 Insights from the General Literature on Critical Security Studies

These debates are crucial for this study since the new framework that is presented in the fourth chapter must also be considered within the critical security studies. Firstly, unlike the traditional security studies, which take security as given, this study regards security as a socially constructed phenomenon. In this construction ideas of people play a decisive role. An issue does not become a security issue since it has already given features/characteristics like the use of military force, need for a threat to state survival etc. I argue that for an issue to become a security enough number of right people (O'Reilly, 2008) must believe that it is a security issue.

Secondly, this framework also rejects the exclusive state-centric security understanding. States are not, and should not, be the only referent objects of the security. Moreover, threat can not be limited to the states too. Elements, other than the state, like individual human beings, women, minority groups etc. can also be

constructed as referent objects of security. Elements other than the state, such as terrorist groups, environmental catastrophes, and minorities can also be constructed as security threats. Finally, elements, other than the state, like clans, tribes, religious groups, interest groups etc. can also be securitizing actors.

Finally, as a related insight, this study rejects the inside-outside division in security studies, which can be seen in the traditional security studies. In this argument, while the threats, which are outside the state, are regarded as security threats but the internal issues can not be seen in this category (Walker, 1993). I believe, this kind of an objective perception disciplines us and limits out understanding and analysis. Moreover, it legitimizes states and their insecurity practices towards its population inside state boundaries.

In sum, these debates provide roots for the new framework in several ways. As a new framework within critical security studies, this new framework will have a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology. It will also reject the arguments like state is the only or primary referent object of security, and state is the only or primary security threat or the securitizing actor. Units, other than the state can be constructed as a threat or referent object and can be securitizing actors. Finally, the new framework rejects inside-outside division, which legitimizes repression of people inside the state boundaries.

2.2 Securitization Theory⁶

The concept of securitization firstly introduced to the International Relations vernacular by Barry Buzan in 1991 (Buzan, 1991). Ole Wæver developed the concept in his famous article “Securitization and Desecuritization” (Wæver, 1995; McDonald, 2008: 566). Finally, the theory was thoroughly analyzed by Buzan *et al.* (1998) in the book titled “Security; A New Framework for Analysis”. Later, Securitization Theory has become one of the most used approaches in the security studies (Bilgin, 2010: 82).

In this study Ole Wæver (1995) described security as a “speech act”, with securitization to be explained as “linguistic representation that positioned a particular issue as an *existential threat*”(McDonald, 2008: 566). The speech act approach of the Securitization Theory has its roots in John L. Austin’s “Language Theory” (Balzacq, 2005; Balzacq, 2010b). According to Austin’s (Austin, 1975; See also: Searle, 1977) perspective:

Each sentence can convey three types of acts, the combination of which constitutes the total speech act situation: (i) locutionary – the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; (ii) illocutionary – the act performed in articulating a locution. In a way, this category captures the explicit *performative* [emphasis added] class of utterances, and as a matter of fact, the concept of the ‘speech act’ is literally predicated on that sort of agency; and (iii) perlocutionary acts, which consist of the consequential effects or ‘sequels’ that are aimed to evoke the feelings, beliefs, thoughts, or actions of the target audience.

In this regard, Securitization is not based on a causal relationship in which the identification of an issue as an existential security threat causes extraordinary

⁶ Some of the analyses found under this topic can also be found in Baysal & Lüleci, 2015 (in Turkish).

measures. It is rather based on ontological categorization in which the issue ontologically gains the status of the existential and exceptional security threat by the performative effect of the illocutionary act. In his initial work, Ole Wæver (1995: 55) defined securitization as follows:

What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a “speech act.” In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign of that refers to something more real. The utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.

Although this definition was also repeated in “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 26-33), the authors also emphasized the role of audience and its consent for a successful securitization. In this work, speech acts were defined as “securitizing moves” that create securitizations through consent. So, the emphasis in the framework arguably shifted from speech act as the producer of security to speech act as one of the components of the inter-subjective construction of security (McDonald, 2008: 566). “The security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience” (Williams, 2003: 526; see also Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 27).

In the Securitization Theory, the decision of securitization is made by the securitizing actor. Although the success of securitization depends on different factors, it is only the securitizing actor who decides whether to securitize an issue or not. Bilgin (2010: 83) defines this decision as a political choice. Moreover, according

to Buzan *et al.* (1998: 29) “it is always a political choice to securitize or accept securitization.” Therefore the securitizing actor makes a political decision on whether to securitize an issue or not, according to its interests. This understanding gives the Securitization Theory a critical standpoint to analyze the production of security issues.

Although the decision of the securitization depends on only one actor – the securitizing actor, the process securitization itself is not a subjective process. Moreover, the success of the securitization process is not determined only by the securitizing actor. According to Buzan *et al.* (1998: 30), “securitization, like politicization, has to be understood as an essentially inter-subjective process.”

Although it is the securitizing actor to securitize an issue, Acceptance of the audience is the main determiner of the success of a securitization. Therefore the securitizing actor and the audience securitize an issue inter-subjectively (Williams, 2003: 523; Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 31).

In addition to this, according to Buzan *et al.*, securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking free of rules (which can take many forms) or by the declaration of the existential threats that legitimize extraordinary measures. A successful securitization has three components (or steps): (I) existential threats, (II) emergency action and (III) effects on relations by breaking free of rules. Moreover, a speech act that presents an issue as an existential threat to a referent object cannot solely create securitization. This is only the securitizing move. An issue can be only successfully securitized when the audience accepts it as such (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 25-26).

Securitization is defined as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 23). In this context, a non-politicized issue is within the private sphere and it is out of the public political sphere; by politicization, the issue becomes part of the public political discourse and take part inside the, and by securitization, it becomes an exceptional issue. Additionally, by securitization, using extraordinary measures against this issue becomes legitimate. Buzan *et al.* explain this by the help of a spectrum.



In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bound of political procedure)... Depending on the circumstances any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 23-24).

By the act of securitization, an issue is presented as an “existential threat,” so that it becomes the top priority. If an issue is labeled as a security issue, it becomes more important than the other issues. There appears the idea that if the problem is not solved, any other issue and aim will be pointless and meaningless. By that way, the actors gain legitimacy to use extraordinary measures to tackle the securitized problem (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 24). Hence, in securitization, the securitizing actors use the implications that the concept of security encompasses to use extraordinary means. By uttering “security,” the securitizing actors declare an emergency

condition, thus claiming the right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development (O'Reilly, 2008: 69).

Another concept that is crucial to the process of securitization is the “facilitating conditions.” “These are the conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused” (Austin, 1975; as cited in Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 32). According to Wæver (2000: 252–3), facilitating conditions three issues: the form of the act, position of speaker, and the historical resonance of particular threats.

In the process of securitization, the securitizing actor labels an issue as an existential security threat and demands using extraordinary means/measures to tackle this problem. However, analyzing securitization does not require assessing whether these threats are real security threats that require extraordinary measures or not. Analyzing securitization is about understanding the process of construction of a shared understanding of what is to be believed as a threat. According to Buzan *et al.* (1998: 25), the way to study securitization is to “study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument, with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure, achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?” Buzan *et al.* (1998: 32) explain the job of an analyst as follows:

Based on the clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e. what explains when securitization is successful)

Therefore, in analyzing a securitization issue, it is not the job of an analyst to determine whether threats are real security problems or not. Rather, what s/he should do is to unveil the processes and units of the securitization.

2.2.1 The Units of Securitization

The units are the elements that need to be taken into consideration in a securitization analysis. I do not call them actors since some of them (e.g. referent object) are not active elements, which influence the process. However, they also need to be analyzed because they are relevant for the process. I analyze the units of the Securitization Theory here since, in the new framework that is developed in this dissertation, I introduce new actors by referring this literature.

According to Buzan *et al.*, there are three of units involved in the securitization processes. These are referent object (things that are existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival), securitizing actor (actors who securitize issues by declaring something existentially threatened) and functional actors (actors who affect the dynamics of a sector) (Balzacq, 2005: 178, See also Buzan *et al.*, 1998).

The first unit is the referent object. The referent object is the object, “to which one can point and say, it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to...” (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 36). The size or scale of a referent object is crucial for the analysis of securitization. At the micro level, units like individuals or small groups seldom establish legitimacy for being security referent object. At the macro or systemic level, there are also problems in establishing legitimacy. Although there were

examples of nuclear annihilation or environmental issues, it is still hard to construct all humankind as a security referent. The most of the successful securitizations take place at the middle level. The referent objects at the middle level are limited collectivities like state, nation or civilization. In line with this, although the Securitization Theory accepts the possibility of securitization at every level, there is a primacy of the state. However, Emma Rothschild (1995) argues, securitizations in micro and macro levels are started to be heard more often lately. This is in line with the deepening efforts of the concept of security, which is mentioned above.

The second unit of securitization is the securitizing actor. "Securitizing actor is someone or a group, who performs the security speech act. Common players of this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobby and pressure groups" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 40). This actor presents an issue as a security threat to a referent object that deserves to survive in order to legitimize using extraordinary measures against it. However, determining the securitizing actor in a securitization process is not easy, since one can always disaggregate a collectivity into sub-units (down to individuals). Therefore, it is hard to determine whether it is the state, or government, or a department of state like the ministry of defense or individually the president is the securitizing actor. But, it is not helpful to disaggregate collectivities into individuals since "much of the life is more understandable when collectivities are more than the sum of their members" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 40). Individuals can always be seen as actors since there must be a person to perform the speech acts. However, these individuals are always part of a collectivity or an organization. argue "Focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act is probably the best way to identify who or what is the securitizing actor" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 41).

Before proceeding to the last unit, it should be noted that in many cases the securitizing actor and the referent objects are the same groups. Especially when a state is at stake, usually representatives of that state securitize an issue by presenting the issue as a threat to the state itself. This unity eases the securitization process. Moreover, in most cases, the referent object and the group that is to be convinced (audience – see next part) are the same too. This also eases the securitization process since the securitizing actor tries to convince the group that is threatened (O'Reilly, 2008: 68).

The final unit of securitization is functional actors. These actors change according to the sector in which the process of securitization is taking place. Buzan *et al.* (1998: 36) explain functional actor as: “Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security.”

2.2.2 Normative Standing of the Securitization Theory and Desecuritization

According to Wæver, security does not have a positive value. In most cases, securitization is something to be avoided (Williams, 2003: 523). They see security as a failure of normal politics. Therefore, they claim “Less Security, More Politics” (Wæver, 1995: 7). Applying security mindset to different issues may cause problematic conditions since security has its own dynamics. This mindset may lead to zero-sum understanding, friend-enemy dichotomy, undemocratic decision-making or the militarization of the issue(s). Therefore security is regarded as negative.

The normative standing of the Securitization Theory includes desecuritization, which means taking issues out of the security realm and taking them to the realm of public political discourse and normal political dispute. Matt McDonald (2008: 579) explains this orientation of the Securitization Theory by referring to its key scholars:

In this context, key proponents of the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1995; 2000: 253; 2004; Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 204–9) have argued in favor of desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. While recognizing the possibility for securitization to be progressive (Wæver, 2000: 285), the general suggestion is that ‘it is better [...] to aim for desecuritization’ (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 4).

2.2.3 Shortcomings of the Securitization Theory and Insights for a New

Framework

Securitization Theory has several shortcomings that have been criticized in several different venues. This section examines these shortcomings in order to integrate them into the new framework for critical security studies that is going to be introduced in the fourth chapter.

Firstly, the Securitization Theory's focus on "speech act" is criticized by different scholars in various ways. It is argued that the Securitization Theory over-emphasizes the speech act and neglects other processes or means in the construction of a security issue (McDonald, 2008: 568). First of all, in addition to speech acts, images, and visual representations play a major role in the securitization process. According to Möller (2007: 180), "language is only one of the (albeit the most central) means, through which meaning is communicated." Moreover, Williams argues that the

modern media is a central element of security relations. He (2003: 527) emphasizes the importance of images by stating that: "Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics." However, it should be stated here that there is a problem of intentionality in the role of images in the process of securitization. Especially in media, it is never certain that the screenings of these images are intended to securitize an issue or not.

In addition to images and visual representations, scholars who adopt International Political Sociology approach emphasize the *practices* instead of speech acts. It is the practices of security professionals, which is crucial for the construction of exceptional security issues (C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006: 448). It is not the magical power of the speech act but the institutionalizations and routinizations through repetitions of security practices that produce security issues (Balzacq, 2010: 13; See also Rothe, 2016: 21).

This focus on speech acts creates another problem. In the framework of Securitization Theory, an issue can only be constructed as a security issue via speech acts of elites. This way, using extraordinary measures becomes possible or legitimate. According to Lene Hansen (2000), in this framework the ones who do not have voice or the ones that can not speak, can never be constructed as a security issue and their security can never take its place on agenda. These silent groups include women, minorities in hybrid democracies, children etc.

Another important criticism of the Securitization Theory is about the audience. It is argued that the theory does not adequately analyze the role of the audience.

According to Thierry Balzacq (2005: 173), the role of the audience is underspecified because of Wæver's reliance on Austin's language theory. Balzacq argues that although the Securitization Theory includes the acceptance of security claims by the audience for a successful securitization, the features of the audience and their effects on the securitization process remain unaccounted for. According to Balzacq (2005: 184), "success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor's ability to identify audience's feelings, needs, and interests [...] To persuade audience the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience's experience".

Moreover, Balzacq divides the support of the audience into two: moral and formal support. For securitizing actors, it is always necessary to get the *moral* support of the public (or the audience collectivity), however, it is often not enough to take extraordinary actions against the threat. There are always *formal* institutions (parliament, congress, senate etc.) that must be convinced by the securitizing actor to take action. In line with Balzacq, O'Reilly (2008: 67) introduces the concept of "critical mass" which means *enough number of right people*, to specify the amount of support for a successful securitization. There are two pillars of this concept. These are "volume and caliber." While the first is about the simple number of the audience (usually more than half or majority), the second is about the appropriateness and relevance of the particular audience (O'Reilly, 2008: 67).

Thirdly, in the Securitization Theory, the contextual issues are inadequately analyzed. The theory touches the contextual issues by introducing sectoral

differences for securitization and the concept of facilitating conditions. However, this has clear-cut frameworks and limits the analyzer to focus on certain issues like the power of the securitizing actor or conditions of certain sectors. According to Matt McDonald (2008: 571), "in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts, the Securitization Theory ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors."

[...] those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to the social, political and historical context in which particular discourses become possible. Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening, What role do narratives of history, culture, and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization... how are some voices empowered or marginalized to define security and threat... The appeal of universalism in the development of the conceptual framework goes some way towards explaining the neglect of contextual factors, but the failure also draw out the ways in which securitizing actors and audiences interact beyond the broad and amorphous recognition of "facilitating conditions" and being "backed up" by relevant audiences is unsatisfying."(McDonald, 2008: 573)

Moreover, according to Balzacq, although the Securitization Theory claims that the speech acts and the process of securitization, in general, modify the external context, the opposite is also true: The contextual issues and features of the audience also influence the process and success of the securitization (Balzacq, 2005: 182).

In addition to these criticisms, the Securitization Theory's insufficient analysis of desecuritization is also problematic. Wæver regards security and securitization negatively and argues that issues must be taken out of security realm back to the political realm. However, although the theory provides a clear-cut framework to analyze securitization, desecuritization remains under-theorized. It can not be rejected that revealing a securitization process and presenting how it is constructed

may create awareness which may lead to desecuritization or create awareness among the audience(s) to not give support for extraordinary measures. However, this is an uncertain and secondary effect and it is naïve to expect that the knowledge gained in securitization analyses will be used for desecuritization. It can also be used for better securitizations in different issues (Neal, 2009: 106). Moreover, there remain questions such as: How we will analyze desecuritization? How can an issue be desecuritized? Does desecuritization occur by desecuritizing speech acts again or lack of securitizing speech acts? What constitutes normal politics? Although there are several works on desecuritization by different scholars, these questions remain under-analyzed (Roe, 2004, 2006; Jutila, 2006; Behnke 2006; Aradau, 2004).⁷

Fifthly, the understanding of security in the Securitization Theory is also prone to problems. The theory introduces itself as adopting a constructivist approach. In a way, Securitization Theory is a constructivist approach, which focuses on the construction of exceptional security issues through an intersubjective process. However, they take the concept of security in general as a given. According to Buzan *et al.*, international security has a distinctive agenda (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 21; Bigo, 2008: 122). In this approach, security has certain, given dynamics that are regarded to be negative. These include the focus on survival, military character, undemocratic decision-making etc. When we securitize something we attribute these given features of security to the issue but do not challenge them. The Securitization Theory misses the point that this traditional understanding of security is also constructed, and it can

⁷ Although it is under-theorized in the Securitization Theory, Desecuritization is not analyzed in this study too. This is because this study aims to introduce a new framework for critical security studies to analyze the construction of exceptional security issues rather than their deconstruction. However, this issue can be analyzed in a following study in accordance with the theoretical framework that is provided here.

be deconstructed and reconstructed in a different way. Moreover, by adopting this approach, they further strengthen and legitimize it.

Other shortcomings include the elitism of the Securitization Theory and its “in a moment” approach. The theory implicitly has an elitist approach since it puts political leaders/decision makers in a higher position and regards others as passive audience(s) who only accept the securitization. It does so by presenting securitization as a linear process and neglecting the power of the opposition and resistance (Booth, 2007: 166). This attribute of the Securitization Theory is related to its Schmittian roots and its approach to politics of exception. In addition to this, by focusing on the illocutionary act and its performative power, securitization is presented as happening in a moment rather than a process. Ole Wæver (1995: 55) argues that “the utterance itself is the act [...] by uttering security a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means to block it.” Therefore securitization occurs in the moment that the speech act is performed and the audience accepted it (Balzacq, 2010a: 3; McDonald, 2008: 576; Stritzel, 2007: 366; Rothe, 2016: 21).

Finally, not as a shortcoming but as a problem, Securitization Theory suffers from its simplified framework. As expressed above, the theory is one of the most used approaches since it was created in the mid-1990s. And the theory presents a clear-cut framework for analysis: It focuses on speech acts, different actors, limited facilitating conditions and sectoral differences, among others. Therefore, the term securitization refers to this certain framework as put by its founders. However, in most cases, the term is used only to refer to the construction of a security issue or framing an issue as

a security problem. There are many studies, which claim to pursue securitization analysis without using the framework provided by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. This may be because the term is very catchy, and scholars prefer to use it on the topics of their studies. This may not be very much problematic, and they also make very good analyses but the problem is that they are not making securitization analysis. In some instances, even the founders of the theory use the term "general securitization" to refer only to "construction of a security issue."⁸ I believe there is a need for a new term just to refer this general securitization approach. For the solution of this conceptual problem, in this dissertation, I used Securitization (with capital 'S') to indicate the Securitization theory and securitization (with lower case 's') to indicate construction of an issue as a security issue.

The New framework that is provided in the fourth chapter takes these criticisms into consideration to be able to present a better analysis of the construction of exceptional security issues and their consequences. For this end, in addition to the speech acts, it integrates practices and other means to transfer meaning to its analysis. In a way, it examines the combined impacts of practices and discourses⁹ in the construction of a security issue. It integrated the analysis of audience to its framework. It includes the analysis of contextual issues including the democratic level of the given state (in the securitization take place in a state), or the historical evolution of the issue. It regards securitization as a process rather than its in one moment approach and provides a framework to analyze the process of securitization in phases. Finally, it examines

⁸ Ole Wæver used the term in his presentation in ISA 2016 Conference in Atlanta. In Roundtable: SB02: Democracies, Security and Peace: Roundtable on Constructing National Security: US Relations with India and China.

⁹ Discourse is used in a wider sense, which not only include speech but also other forms of transferring meaning like image rhetorics etc.

how can the silent elements become security issues and take place in agenda through a complex analysis of security practices and discourses. By this way, it also overcomes the problem of elitism in the Securitization Theory.

2.3 Post-Structuralism, International Political Sociology, and the (In)securitization Approach

This part analyzes International Political Sociology and its (in)securitization approach. Since this approach has poststructural roots, the section starts with a brief examination of poststructuralism and the perceptions that are introduced to the understanding of security by it.

2.3.1 Poststructuralism and Security

To understand poststructuralism, it is better to start with explaining the structural approach of Saussure. To analyze the production of meaning, Saussure created a theory, which is based on the relationship between the sign (the idea), the signifier (the sound) and the signified (the object). According to him, there is no logical relationship between the signifier and the signified. Rather than a relationship between these elements, the meaning is created by difference. We know what something is by knowing what it is not. As an example, there is no relationship between the sound door (signifier) and the idea of it (object to enter a room or building). We know it by differences like its difference from a window. So the meaning depends on differences and the language is structured on these differences (Saussure, 1986; Peoples & Williams, 2010: 63-64).

Poststructuralism does not reject the structural approach of Saussure. Rather, it develops it by arguing that this meaning, argued in the structural approach, is not stable or secure. According to Derrida, same sentence/concept/sound/signifier may mean different things in different times and places and for different people. There are temporal and spatial differences. Derrida argues that meaning is always “slippery” and “on the move,” and it is hard to pin it down (as cited in Peoples & Williams, 2010: 78). In this regard, poststructuralists are interested in attempts to secure this unstable meaning.

Poststructuralism can be defined as “incredulity towards meta-narratives” (Lyotard, 1979). Poststructuralists are skeptical towards stabilized truth claims. According to them, reality can be made meaningful in multiple, different ways. It is discursively constructed. Knowledge cannot have a secure and extra-discursive foundation. It is always perspectival. Moreover, according to poststructuralists, power is central to the construction of knowledge. But this is a two-way relationship: power is central to the production of truth and truth empowers power itself (Edkins, 2007: 95). However, this power-knowledge relationship is not a simple linear one in which the one, which has power, determines and secures meaning and truth. There is no single actor which has the power, there are different/rival actors/groups and they have conflicting truth claims and there is a continuous competition among them.¹⁰ Therefore Foucault called this as the “relations of power” rather than only power. Moreover, contextual issues also influence this debate. In this regard, actors cannot know the results of

¹⁰ Here we can see a criticism of Securitization Theory. Securitization Theory neglects opposition and privileges elites. It is a simple linear process in which power holder/elite define what is threat and the other one only accepts or refuse.

their moves. Consequently, meaning is produced in and through linguistic or discursive practices that are embedded in power relations.

In line with the Saussure's focus on differences, Derrida argues that the meaning is mostly secured by "binary oppositions" like inside/outside, male/female, good/bad, right/wrong, public/private or civilized/barbaric. Moreover, there is a hierarchical relationship between these dichotomies in which one is always privileged over the other, and existence of one is dependent on the other one. To analyze the attempts to secure meaning, Derrida introduced deconstruction, which is a critical method of reading a text to expose the ways in which meaning is stabilized. It focuses on hierarchical binary positions and reveals how they are constructed and secured.

Foucault, another influential figure in poststructuralism, concentrates on discourses in the creation of regimes of truth through power/knowledge relations. He also concentrates on the role of power (relations of power) in the emergence of discourses and truths (Foucault, 1980a; Peoples & Williams, 2010: 65). He introduced the method of genealogy to analyze and reveal how the truth is produced and secured. It is a critical investigation of how a particular way of thinking, being, and doing in the present emerged historically not as a natural outcome, but as a product of struggles. It traces relations between power and knowledge over time and uncovers alternatives in the process.

Poststructuralists focus on the determination of the meaning of security in IR and its consequences. Determination of the meaning of security, or in other words the definition of security, means determination of what should be protected? What

deserves protection (the [legitimate] referent object)? (and what is left out of security domain?) Whose security is more important? Whose security is (or can be) sacrificed for the protection of the referent object? Who protects? Who is the legitimate security agent? What is (or can be) a threat? What is dangerous? (or more dangerous than others) (Campbell, 1998: 2; Bigo, 2008: 123; Peoples & Williams, 2010: 68). In this determination relations of power and discourse play a pivotal role. By the definition of security, some issues, like state or regime security are prioritized while other issues like human or environmental security are ignored; some threats like other states or internal insurgent groups are prioritized while others like poverty and hunger are ignored; some actors like state and their military forces are regarded as legitimate security agent while others like minority groups fighting for freedom are regarded as illegitimate. These examples are given according to traditional security approach. Opposite examples are possible depending on who is making the definition. According to Campbell (1998: 2), danger is not an objective condition. There is no issue or entity that is essentially dangerous. He argues that danger must be seen as a “category of understanding.” Moreover, determination of what is dangerous fixes who we are (Campbell, 1998: 17; Peoples & Williams, 2010: 68). Wider than these, this definition and the practices in accordance with this definition are part of governmentality.

These perceptions are crucial for this dissertation since the new framework for critical security studies, introduced in the fourth chapter borrows insights from them. Firstly, this new framework gives the security definition utmost importance. This meaning is not given or stable. Instead, it is a constructed meaning, which can be deconstructed and reconstructed in a different manner. Securitization is a process of

meaning production and making this meaning accepted by audience(s). Binary oppositions are mostly used in this persuasion period. By the acceptance of enough number of right people (O'Reilly, 2008) this meaning/definition becomes truth. And there is always interest and relations of power behind this meaning production.

Moreover, securitization does not only mean the determination of threat but also the determination of referent object(s), legitimate security agent and the ones whose security can be sacrificed. In the poststructuralist approach, it is argued that there is no objective truth and all generalizations are wrong. By analyzing securitization, the new framework aims to lay bare the process of production of meaning and the truth about security, and present how the practices, which are performed in accordance with these claims, produced insecurities for ordinary people. By that way, it creates awareness among the readers. I believe this is the most important aspect that makes the new framework critical. Additionally, examining the ones whose security is sacrificed for the security of a particular referent object even strengthens this critical stance.

2.3.2 International Political Sociology of Security and (In)securitization

Approach

International Political Sociology, is a critical security approach that focuses on the production of the security issues and their consequences. Like the other theories and approaches within the critical security studies, International Political Sociology has a constructivist understanding of security (Bigo, 2008: 116). In this regard, they see security and security issues as constructed rather than given. In their analysis, they

concentrate on the role of practices (including discursive and non-discursive) in the construction of the exceptional security issues. To add that, in addition to the process of the construction of security, the approach examines the insecuritizing consequences of this construction too. Moreover, unlike the Securitization Theory, International Political Sociology has a more context-dependent and processual securitization understanding (Balzacq, 2010a: 3).

International Political Sociology, in line with wider poststructuralism, criticizes security understanding of the discipline of International Relations, which is based on internal-external division (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 5). According to Walker (1993), this division and its related concept of sovereignty are not naturally given but historical constructs. In this construction inside of the boundaries of the sovereign state is regarded as secure while the outside is insecure and dangerous. Walker argues that this construct has emerged in the 17th century. The founders of International Political Sociology argue that the traditional inside-outside divide in Traditional Security studies has lost its validity by the developments particularly after the Cold War. Today, the external threats have implications for inside the countries and vice versa. By that way, today, the security practices have a transnational character. For example, global terrorism makes countries implement security practices inside the countries as much as outside them. Therefore these threats and the measures against them lead to both domestic and international insecurities. In this regard, International Political Sociology is more concerned in security/insecurity continuum and its connection to international security (Bigo, 2008: 126).

Bigo further criticizes the traditional security studies of the discipline of International Relations by indicating the lack of contact between the International Relations and other disciplines. Although the widening efforts of security, and particularly the sectoral understanding of Buzan *et al.* (1998) has widened the security understanding to include other issues (societal security, environmental security, human security), the understanding of security still stuck in the framework of the discipline of International Relations. In International Relations security is based on internal-external dichotomy in which external threats are considered as security threats while internal problems are regarded within law or order (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 1 and 6). International security has its own particular features and agenda. There is an understanding that security is about serious things like war or survival (Bigo, 2008: 118). However, the concept of security has different meanings in different disciplines. In most of them, it goes above the survival and expands to happiness and having a good life. For example, in economics, security is related to have a secure income and wealth while in law it is related to the free trial (Bigo, 2008: 123). In line with this, to expand the understanding of security in International Relations, International Political Sociology includes sociology, anthropology, criminology and political theory into its analysis (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 1; Bigo, 2008: 127).

In line with the Foucault's concept of *dispositif*, International Political Sociology regards discursive and non-discursive practices as a unique body. By that way, they take both types of practices into their analytical framework. The relationship between these two practices derives from the relationship between the knowledge and action and the broader relationship between the power and knowledge. In addition to these, Scholars of International Political Sociology utilize Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of

habitus and *field* in their analyses. Habitus refers to the dispositions or framework of orientation that actors are situated within (Rothe, 2016: 20; Peoples & Williams, 2010: 69; Bourdieu, 1997). These dispositions are regarded as “habits, conventions, lifestyles, taste etc., which structure the perception and behavior of actors and at the same time represent the basis for their social or cultural capital.” These attributes are not the characteristics of individual actors but features of their subject positions like soldier, politician or academician (Rothe, 2016: 24; See also: Bourdieu, 1997). Habitus impacts the practices of the actors. The field is understood as a social space in which actors that have certain subject positions (*habitus*) relate with each other. The whole social universe consists of different fields, which have their particular “functional logics, norms, rules and institutions” (Rothe, 2016: 24; See also: Bourdieu, 1997). Every actor can have different *habitus* and act in different fields simultaneously.

According to International Political Sociology, in a certain field, practices, which are mainly determined by *habitus*, creates (in)securitization. This field consists of the security professionals. These security professionals include police, military, intelligence agencies, border security units and private security companies. These security professionals, with their expert knowledge and experience, determines the truth and legitimate behavior. In this regard, the discursive and non-discursive practices of these security professionals provided the basis of the (in)securitization process

In addition to this, in line with poststructuralism, Bigo and Tsoukala (2008: 5) argue that actors can not know the results of their practices and discourses since these

results rely on the field effect and rival practices and discourses. Therefore, unlike the Securitization Theory, International Political Sociology argues that there is no linear understanding in which the securitizing actor announces an issue as a security issue and the audience only accepts (or refuses) it. There are rival security claims, resistance, and contextual issues, which influence the process of (in)securitization.

In addition to these, International Political Sociology's focus on the practices is its distinctive feature. Scholars of International Political Sociology analyze the role of practices both in the production of exceptional security issues and their insecuritizing consequences. These practices include ordinary bureaucratic decisions, Weberian routines of rationalizations, routinizations and institutionalizations, and the use of technologies related to communication and surveillance (Bigo, 2008: 126). They especially focus on the practices of security professionals and their use of communication and surveillance technologies; the conduct of policing; and the activities of private security companies (Peoples & Williams, 2010: 69). As expressed above the security professionals, in general, are regarded as a field in Bourdieuan terms. Security threats and prioritization among these threats are determined by the struggles among different network within this field (police, army, border security units, intelligence agencies, private actors, different bureaucratic units etc.). "What we call insecurity is then a field effect and not the result of a specific strategy of a dominant actor" (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 5). Here, the role of security experts, and their practices like mapping in the production of security issues, become more obvious (Bigo, 2008). Moreover, the scholars who adopt International Political Sociology approach argue that these practices as part of governmentality in

liberal regimes.¹¹ For example, Bigo and Tsoukala, (2008: 5) focus on ban-opticon dispositive (in line with the Foucauldian concept of panopticon) as a form of governmentality in which people are governed and disciplined via surveillance and other profiling technologies.

International Political Sociology does not only focus on the production/construction of exceptional security issues, but also the results of this process. Scholars, who embrace this approach like Bigo or Tsoukala, argue that securitization of certain issues, or practices that are conducted under the name of security lead to insecurities in some other issues, or for other groups. In other words, providing security in one issue area comes at a cost of creating insecurity in another. Therefore they call their approach as (in)securitization rather than securitization. According to Bigo, security and insecurity are not opposite concepts (C.a.s.e. Collective, 2006: 457); rather “security of *x* always leads to the insecurity of *y*” (Peoples & Williams, 2010: 69). Therefore security is always about a concession. This is usually the case with state policies against domestic threats; in order to provide security, states often sacrifice the basic rights of their citizens – such as the right of mobility, or the right of privacy. This can be seen as a different form of *security dilemma*. Increasing security of one actor or a group leads to insecurities for other actor(s) or group(s).

(In)securitization approach does not completely reject the assumptions of the Securitization Theory. Just like the Securitization Theory, (in)securitization approach regards (in)securitization as a political move to legitimize extraordinary practices.

¹¹ Governmentality is a concept/approach, which is developed by Michel Foucault. Foucault himself defines it as the "art of government". In this approach, he focuses on the government of population. He describes governmentality as "the *ensemble* formed by the *institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, calculations and tactics* that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population" (Foucault, 2007: 108).

However, it rejects the idea that speech acts are the only way for constructing security issues. Rather than the speech acts of the dominant actor(s), contextual issues and the practices of security professionals play the major role in (in)securitization. (In)securitization approach also rejects attributing a positive or negative value to security. It is not a common good as traditional approaches argue or it is a negative concept that should be avoided as argued by the Securitization Theory. It is just a political and social construction (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 4). Moreover, (in)securitization approach reject the elitist stance of the Securitization Theory. According to them, this elitism further strengthens the existing power relations and the positions of the power holders. Finally, unlike the Securitization Theory, which regards securitization as a linear process in which securitizing actor declares an issue as a security issue and the audience accepts or rejects it, (in)securitization approach focus on the struggle among different actors within the field of security professionals for the construction of exceptional security issues.

In their (in)securitization analysis, Securitization Theory and (in)securitization approach ask seemingly similar questions. However, they focus on different aspects while answering these questions. The key questions of the (in)securitization approach are “Who is performing an (in)securitization move or countermove, under what conditions, towards whom, and with what consequences?” (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008: 5). The first difference is that it asks, “who performs (in)securitization move” rather than “who securitizes.” This question involves practices in addition to speech acts. Secondly, the questions also involve countermoves. (In)securitization approach takes resistance and rival efforts/claims within the field of security professionals into consideration. Although under what conditions question exists in both approaches,

(in)securitization approach makes a systematic contextual analysis especially by putting habitus and field in the center of its analysis. According to this approach, security is a field effect of the field of security professionals. Finally, the last question “with what consequences” is analyzed more comprehensively in the (in)securitization approach. For this question, Securitization Theory focus only on the success of securitization: whether securitizing efforts were successful or not. On the other hand, (in)securitization approach focuses on how the securitization of one issue leads to other insecurities.

To illustrate how this approach is utilized, let me briefly give examples. There are two cases, which are analyzed comprehensively by the (in)securitization. These are global terrorism and war on terror, and immigration (especially in Europe). Both cases are situated in western liberal countries. In these analyses, the authors focus on two interrelated issues. The first one is the construction of these issues as an exceptional security issue. In this focus, they analyze the role of security professionals, their security practices, and routinizations for the construction of security. In the case of immigration, the role of border security elements, private security companies, and other bureaucratic elements, and the practices of these elements can be given as examples. In the case of war on terror, the role of FBI, Homeland Security, Ministry of Defense in the US and the practices of them can be given as examples. Both events are constructed as a security issue by the practices of these elements and their role in the routinizations and institutionalizations. The second issue, which scholars focus on, is the security practices themselves and their insecuritizing consequences. These practices include using CCTV cameras, computer systems and other surveillance and communication technologies, mapping,

conducting border patrols, detentions, and the activities of coastguards etc. These practices lead to insecurities for people living in these Western countries by limiting their liberties or people who are trying to immigrate to these countries.

2.3.3 Insights from International Political Sociology and (In)securitization

Approach

International Political Sociology and (in)securitization approach is relevant for this study since the new framework for critical security studies borrows two central aspects from this approach. Firstly, this approach also puts the insecurity consequences of securitization into its analysis. Securitization is not only mean construction of a security issue. Securitization process at the same time is an (in)securitization process in which for the security of a particular referent object the security of different groups (mostly ordinary people) are sacrificed. The new framework includes the insecurity consequences of the securitization too.

Secondly, this new framework takes practices into consideration for the securitization of an issue. However, it conceptualizes practices in a different manner. Although I do not regard practice as the only way for construction of security, practices have a central place in the process of securitization. Firstly, they help the construction of security by normalizing the security definition made by decision makers. Secondly, security practices lead to insecurities for ordinary people. Finally, practice can make the sound of the groups, which are voiceless, heard by the audience(s)¹².

¹² This issue is explained in the following chapter in detail.

In addition to the insights borrowed from International Political Sociology and (in)securitization approach, the new framework will also address the critics of this approach. As a criticism, although it is argued that International Political Sociology takes both discourses and practices into consideration, in most works/studies it only concentrates on practices and ignores the role of security discourses, particularly at the macro level. Moreover, the scholars of International Political Sociology adopt a bottom-up framework and in their works, they focus only on the micro-level practices of security professionals. They regard security as if constructed only by the practices of security professionals, conflicts between these actors, and the routinizations and institutionalizations, which are produced by these practices. In this construction, they focus on the impact of expert knowledge of these security professionals. Therefore, the approach regards security as a field effect. In a way, while focusing on the bottom-up characteristics of (in)securitization by focusing on practices at the micro level, they ignore its top-down characteristics by ignoring the role of decision and discursive definition on macro level

In line with these criticisms, Rothe (2016: 22) argues that in International Political Sociology “security theorizing is dismissed in favor of neo-empiricist analyses of security practices at the micro-level.” Moreover, according to Wæver (2015: 125), by overemphasizing practices of actors, International Political Sociology loses main theoretical focal idea as an organizing theoretical tool at the political level. The new framework addresses this problem by introducing a framework, which includes the examination of both discourses at the macro level and practices at the micro level for the analysis of a securitization process.

Finally, International Political Sociology argues that it takes opposition(s) and conflicts among these rival voices in the construction of exceptional security issues. However, their framework only focuses on the conflicts among the security professionals. By that way, it ignores the rival voices out of the field of the security professionals. It also ignores the rival voices, definitions and counter moves at the macro level. The new framework takes these rival voices by making a broader definition of security professionals and focusing on the rival voices at the macro level too.

2.4 Brief Summary of the Literature on the Politics of Exception

The literature on politics of exception focuses on the question “how are claims about exceptional events being used to give legitimate authority to exceptional practices?” (Neal, 2009: 1). Some studies focus on *who* have the authority to declare exception and concentrate on an individual or a unit like sovereign (Schmitt, 1985) while others focus on *how* exception is constructed via different practices and discourses and examine and present the process of this construction to avoid further legitimization of the sovereign (Neal, 2009). However, all of them agree on its legitimizing effects and analyze the extraordinary measures conducted under the name of exception.

Before proceeding to the different views on the politics of exception I want to touch on the relationship between law and exception. Exception is presented as an excuse for conducting unlawful practices. By constructing something as an exception, as opposed to something normal, it becomes possible to get out of law and implement

extraordinary measures. By that way, people are also subjectivized, categorized and ruled. In this regard, normal can be regarded within the sphere of law and exception as a way to break it.

Most of the literature analyzes the issue in accordance with liberty. Especially after 9/11 attacks, a broad literature has emerged about the liberty-security debate.

Scholars like Bigo and Tsoukala (2008), Neal (2009), Basaran (2011), Hudson and Ugelvik (2012), and Salter and Mutlu (2010) have been seeking answer for questions like “Should liberal states act illiberally?” “Under which conditions it is necessary and acceptable to make exceptions to the law and norm?” “Is exception natural and internal limit of liberty?” “Who has the capacity to declare an exception?” “Is it acceptable to act illiberally to protect liberty?” “What is the difference between the violence in illiberal regimes and the violence conducted for liberty by the liberal regimes themselves?” “Is it terrorism that threatens liberty or the state itself?” “How liberal political authorities make decisions about what is exceptional and require exceptional measures?” “Does liberty used as a cover for illiberal practices?”

One of the most referred authors about politics of exception is Carl Schmitt.

According to Schmitt (1985: 5), “[s]overeign is the one who decides exception.”

Political sovereign decides the time for the suspension of the existing rules and norms and the capability of making this decision makes it the sovereign (Rothe, 2016: 48; Schmitt, 1993: 6–7). Therefore, it is the sovereign who decides: Who is enemy and who is friend? What is dangerous? What should be protected? What is normal and what is exceptional? What deserves exceptional extraordinary measures? Which extraordinary measures should be taken to tackle the exceptional situation at

hand?

According to Schmitt, the one who bears the sovereignty may change but sovereignty never dies (as cited in Neal, 2009: 139). Schmitt argues that exception is the natural limit of legal order and there is a constant possibility of an exceptional event, which exceeds the limits of liberty, law or norm and gives unconstrained power to the sovereign. Rule of law can always be trumped by security claims in the name of order itself. For Schmitt exception always wins over liberty and liberal norms (as cited in Neal, 2009: 2). Neal argues that this approach is in line with Hobbesian and Kantian approaches which argue that liberty is only possible under security. So there is no liberty and security/exception dichotomy, rather exception is the natural and constitutive limit of liberalism. In this understanding, the possibility of its suspension makes liberty possible (Neal, 2009: 3). Giorgio Agamben, who follows this tradition, argues that Western Political tradition since the Greeks, has been developed by the relationship between norm and exception and this relationship is produced by the sovereign. In his study, he focuses on the emergence and development of Western subjectivity, in line with this relationship between liberty and exception (Agamben, 1998; Agamben, 2005).

Securitization Theory also follows a Schmittian approach to exception. Securitization Theory argues that security threats are constructed via speech acts. But it reaffirms the constant possibility of exception and the power of sovereign in the determination/declaration of this exception. Wæver (1995: 54) argues “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so.” By this way, Securitization Theory further legitimizes the place of sovereign just like Agamben does. Because of

the similarity between the Securitization Theory and Schmittian approach to exception, Neal uses the concept of “exceptionalization” for the term securitization.

Neal challenges Schmittian standpoint to have a critical standing and depose the sovereign from its central position. He seeks to criticize exceptionalism without reifying the exceptional sovereign power. For this aim, he borrows insights from Foucault and focuses on the construction of exception via multiple modes of practices and discourses (Neal, 2009: 4). He examines how the sovereign subjectivity constructed as the one who has the authority to declare/determine exception.

Foucault problematizes power and knowledge relationship and challenges truth claims. In line with this, Neal problematizes sovereign truth about the right of the sovereign to declare what is normal and what is exceptional. As Rob Walker argues, sovereignty is not a reality but a constructed truth about what is necessary or what must be so. It is constructed via various discourses and practices in relation to the relations of power (Walker, 1993: 4). Therefore it can be reconstructed in a different manner. Neal, by referring Foucault, argues, “[w]e need to cut off the King’s head” (Foucault, 1980b: 121).

Neal (2009: 144) problematizes sovereign claims of exception by asking how very different set of practices are articulated and legitimized under exceptionalism. He starts the analysis of this legitimization process from exceptional practices and argues that exception is constructed via exceptional practices rather than the decision of the sovereign or elites (Neal, 2009: 144 and 145; Bigo also argues that ‘decisionism is an illusion’ in Bigo, 2005: 75). Therefore he rejects decisionist

approach in which exception is produced by a top-down decision and integrates a bottom-up analysis in which exceptional practices play the major role in the construction of exceptional. This is in line with the approach of International Political Sociology approach which prioritizes the role of practices in the production of exceptional security issues. In the approach of Neal, practitioners are seen as actors who are aware of what they are doing. They are not sleepwalkers (Veyne, 1997: 158). Neal (2009: 146) does not completely reject the importance of decision but he undermines its special status and regards it only a function of practice.

Consequently, it can be argued that there are two approaches within the literature on the politics of exception. The first one is the Schmittian understanding which links exception to the sovereign decision and regards exception as a natural limit of liberty. In liberty, there is a constant possibility of exception and exception always win over norm and rule. Securitization Theory and Agamben's approaches follow this understanding which does not question but reifies the sovereign. Andrew Neal criticizes this understanding and introduces his bottom-up approach in which exceptional practices constructs the exception rather than the decisions of the sovereign.

The new framework receives insights from the literature on the politics of exception too. In a way, this new framework builds a bridge between Neal and Schmitt. As it is argued above, Schmitt argues that it is the sovereign who decides exception and exception and security is determined by the decision of the sovereign. By that way, he reifies the sovereign power. On the other hand, Neal rejects the decisionist and

top-down approach of Schmitt. He focuses on practices in the construction of exceptional issues or situations and proposes a bottom-up framework based on the analysis of the practices. However, he undermines discourse and decision and cannot give a framework, which systematically integrates both practice and discourse including the decision. From my perspective, the decision is not everything but it is something important. It should be systematically integrated into a framework, which aims to analyze production and the consequences of a security issue or exception.

I propose that both the decision and practices are important for the securitization (or exceptionalization). In a securitization process, strategic level decision makers define what is exception or in a wider manner, what is security? But this is not everything as argued by Schmitt. This is only a security/exception claim. There are rival definitions. Moreover, the audience(s) has to be convinced and this perception has to be normalized. Both discourses and practices play a crucial role in this stage in which audiences are convinced about the security definition, and this security understanding is normalized and routinized via practices. Therefore both decision and practice are crucial in the production of exception.

For the sake of clarity let me briefly sum up the situation of the role of discourses and practices in the construction of a security issue. In simple terms, the Securitization Theory focuses on the discourses (speech acts) for the securitization of an issue by adopting a top-down approach. It adopts a Schmittian, decisionist approach to the exception in which the powerful securitizing actor decides/defines exception. On the other hand, (in)securitization approach focuses on the security

practices by adopting a bottom-up approach. However, I propose that securitization has both top-down and bottom-up characteristics and both discourses and practices have to be taken into consideration for the analysis of the securitization of an issue. In line with this, the new framework for critical security studies takes both discourses and practices into consideration.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

Consequently, there have been different approaches to examine the process of constructing security issues and their consequences in a top-down manner.

Securitization Theory focuses on speech acts and the role of elites, while International Political Sociology focuses on the role of security professionals and their practices in a bottom-up manner. Both approaches have been criticized because of the defective and under-theorized parts of their framework.

This dissertation provides a novel framework for critical security studies which borrow insights from these already existing frameworks and addresses their critics. In addition to these, the new framework feeds from the literature on the politics of exception and the general literature on critical security studies too. Moreover, it also introduces novel aspects and concepts too. Before the introduction of this new framework, next chapter examines the impact of the level of democracy to the process of (in)securitization, which is related to the relationship between normal and exception.

CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY ON THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTING SECURITY

This dissertation provides a new framework for critical security studies, which is context sensitive. It aims to address the shortcomings of the existing studies and aims to take securitization studies out of Europe. In line with this aim, I argue that the level of democracy is one of the most crucial contextual issues that impact the process of (in)securitization. This issue also is under-analyzed by the already existing studies, which focus on securitization like the Securitization Theory or International Political Sociology. In this dissertation, I aim at providing a theoretical framework, which is particularly applicable to hybrid democracies. For this aim, this chapter will provide a basis for the theoretical framework that is presented in the next chapter.

In studies related to the construction of exceptional security issues and their consequences like securitization, desecuritization and (in)securitization, the question of "what is normal?" is crucial. In most studies, when analyzing exception, what is

normal is usually seen as liberal democracy and liberal norms.¹³ Security is regarded as an exception in this context. Therefore, these studies, like most other studies on the liberty-security debate are regarded as European approaches and applicable only to liberal constitutional contexts. However, the world does not only consist of constitutional liberal democracies. What may be considered as an exception in one place may be normal in another one or *vice versa*. Therefore, the level of democracy is a core contextual issue, among other issues like historical context, for the analysis of (in)securitization.

In studies related to securitization, one may talk about two exceptions. One is the issue that is being exceptionalized by the securitizing actors and the other one is the exceptional measures that are taken against this constructed threat. The exceptional measure also changes according to the contextual factors. An exceptional measure in a democratic country may be regarded as normal in hybrid democracies. Since the already existing studies are European approaches and they take Liberal Democracy as their given contexts they mostly focus on exceptions or insecurities like the limitations on the individual freedoms and rights like the freedom of transportation, freedom of expression, and right of privacy. However, once we get out of Liberal sphere there are other insecurities like forced migration, the death of civilians in combat, forced disappearances, sexual abuses etc. Therefore this study aims to take securitization studies out of the liberal sphere.

¹³ Actually in International Political Sociology what is normal is regarded as liberal democratic norms. However, in Securitization Theory the issue is under-analyzed. It is only called as normal politics. They do not define what is normal politics, although what is normal is at the heart of their analysis since they stand for desecuritization, which is defined as taking issues out of security realm back to normal political dispute by the founders of the Securitization Theory.

So, the approaches within the critical security studies neglect the differences between the liberal democracies and others (autocracies, illiberal or developing democracies, and liberal autocracies) in their framework to analyze the securitization processes. Moreover, there are relatively few and limited studies which focus on these differences and their impacts on the securitization process. These studies (Wilkinson, 2007; Hansen, 2000), elaborate on case studies and only criticize the Securitization Theory by arguing that its framework is not a universal one, but they do not provide an alternative framework to overcome this problem.

This chapter examines the differences between the liberal democracies and others particularly focusing on the hybrid democracies and presents their implication on the (in)securitization process. For this aim, it firstly examines the literature on democracy. Secondly, it explains what is meant by hybrid regimes by referring to certain academic works. Finally, it presents the implications of hybrid democracy on the process of (in)securitization.

3.1 Democracies and Others

According to Gallie (1956), democracy is an ‘essentially contested’ concept.

Although there are thin and thick definitions of democracy, there is no one unique description that everyone agrees on (Bollen, 1993, 5). Literally, democracy means the rule of the people. The word coming from Greek *dēmokratiā*, the combination of *dēmos* (people) and *kratos* (rule). Basically, it refers to governance "based on some degree of *popular sovereignty* and *collective decision-making*" (Landman, 2007: 2). However, the additional features that a democracy should possess are contentious.

In broad terms, there are two ways of defining a democracy (Mair, 2008: 113). The first is a narrower one: the procedural definition. The second and wider one is called as the substantive or liberal definition (Mair, 2008; Landman, 2007). Procedural definition focuses on contestation and the legitimacy of a government by concentrating particularly on the procedures such as free and fair elections with a universal suffrage. Liberal definition introduces additional features by making references to the protection of human rights, constraint of leaders, and "civil, political, property and minority rights" (Landman, 2007: 3).

One of the most referred procedural definitions of democracy has been proposed by Joseph Schumpeter (1947). In this minimalist definition, he argues that "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1947: 269). Schumpeter regards democracy as a method for choosing the rulers instead of particular values that are provided by democracy (Saffon & Urbinati, 2013: 455). Schumpeter even simplifies his definition by arguing that democracy is "free competition for a free vote" (as cited in Mair, 2008: 113).

Another procedural definition of democracy has been proposed by Robert A. Dahl (1971) in his famous book "Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition." Instead of Schumpeter's minimalist definition, Dahl provides a maximalist or thicker definition. According to him, a democracy requires features like "uncertain and peaceful competition" for the rule, the legitimacy of opposition, protection of freedoms of expression and association, free and fair elections and universal suffrage (Dahl,

1971, as cited in Landman, 2007: 3). In a following study, he defines several institutions, which are required for a country to be regarded as a democracy. These include rule by elected representatives, free and fair elections, active suffrage, right to vote and to be elected, freedom of expression and association and different sources of information” (Dahl, 1989: 221).

Unlike these definitions, which focus on procedures, liberal definitions add more features in its description of democracy. Although there are many studies, which explain liberal democracy, I will focus on the comprehensive study of Wolfgang Merkel (2004) in which he introduces five regimes that an embedded democracy should possess. These regimes are a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives (2004: 36). According to the author, a simple electoral regime is not enough to be regarded as a liberal democracy. Other four “regimes guarantee that not only the procedural aspects but also the goals behind democratic elections are fulfilled” (2004: 37). In this study, he divides democracies into two: embedded/liberal democracies, which possess these five regimes, and defective democracies. Moreover, he argues there are four types of defective democracies namely, exclusive democracy, illiberal democracy, delegative democracy and tutelary democracy (Merkel, 2004: 33).

The first regime for a liberal democracy is a democratic electoral regime (Merkel, 2004: 38). By the help of this regime, ruling positions are filled by free and fair elections. This minimal and basic regime is at the center of other four regimes. For a

functioning electoral regime, elections must be held periodically and on a regular basis and there must be equal and universal suffrage. By that way, the will of citizens can be represented in the government and the voters can punish or reward their representatives in the following elections based on their performance (Merkel, 2004: 38; Dahl, 1989: 221).

The second regime is political rights (Merkel, 2004: 38). These rights are the prerequisite for a democratic election. However, according to Merkel (2004: 38) political rights “go beyond the right to vote.” In democracies, collective ideas of voters determine the rulers. Political rights provide a free environment to create, share, strengthen and present these collective ideas. These rights include freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of demonstration, right of political organization, and right of petition. This regime also requires private media to have a significant impact alongside public media, which will guarantee that distribution of news is not determined by particular political motivations (Merkel, 2004: 39). These rights guarantee the freedom of forming interest groups, political parties and other political associations for the formulation and presentation of collective political views. According to Merkel (2004: 39), these first two regimes only consist of functional elements and they can not provide liberal democratic standards.

The third regime is civil rights (Merkel, 2004: 39). This regime guarantees the protection of basic rights of citizens. In other words, these rights protect the individuals from the state apparatus. These rights include protection of life, protection of freedom and property, “as well as protection against illegitimate arrest,

exile, terror, torture or unjustifiable intervention into personal life, both on behalf of the state and on behalf of private or anti-establishment forces and individual actors” (Merkel, 2004: 40). Civil rights also include the equality of citizens before the law. This equality also brings protection of minority rights by providing that minorities are not discriminated before the law and not restricted to practice their own culture, religion or culture. The protection in this regime is a legal protection and it is based on the principle of the rule of law. This principle requires a state to act in line with predetermined legal standards. Another related requirement of civil rights regime is independent courts, which will implement these laws.

The fourth regime is horizontal accountability (Merkel, 2004: 40). This regime is based on the separation of powers. The first two regimes provide a periodical vertical control to the executive and legislature branches of state. Separation of powers provides a horizontal check on the same institutions to prevent the misuse or exploitation of power by the elected rulers. In contrast to the periodical vertical control, separation of powers provide a constant surveillance and control of the elected power holders. In this system executive, legislative and judicial branches of state constantly check and balance each other. The most important component of this system of separation of powers is a judicial branch, which is free from other two branches. This is very crucial for the control of executive and legislative branches. Legislature control of executive is more influential in presidential systems than parliamentary ones. In parliamentary systems, the control of the legislature is replaced by the control of the opposition (Merkel, 2004: 41).

The final regime is the effective power to govern (Merkel, 2004: 41). This regime

guarantees that the democratically elected rulers have enough power to govern and there are no other elements, which have a say in the governing process. In other words, no extra-constitutional elements that are not democratically and constitutionally accountable have an influence on the decisions of the government (Merkel, 2004: 41). These elements may be military, religious groups or other powerful bodies. This regime is crucial in analyzing the hybrid democracies in which military or other powerful elements still have an influence in the important decisions of the legislature and executive. However, this regime should not be misunderstood and important constitutional elements like constitutional court (a main actor for the horizontal check on the executive and legislature) should not be seen as an obstacle for effective governing.

There are many other descriptions of liberal democracy and different classifications of the features of this democratic rule (Levitsky & Collier, 1997; Coppedge & Gerring, 2011; Lijphart, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Tilly, 2007). However, I preferred to use Merkel's (2004) description since his formulation takes every aspect into consideration in a systemic manner. In addition to these regimes, there are other elements, which influence the emergence of a liberal/embedded democracy. The first one of these is the social and economic context (Merkel, 2004: 44). Economic development positively influences the emergence of liberal democracy (Lipset, 1959; Lipset, 1981: 31). In addition to the high level of economic development, this feature includes eradication of poverty, proper dissemination of wealth. The second element is the existence of civil society in which independent and developed civil society support the existence of liberal democracy. Finally, the last element is the regional and international integration

(Merkel, 2004).

In addition to these, I argue, already existing norms and the social capital¹⁴ are also crucial for the emergence of liberal democracy. In most of the liberal democracies, liberal norms preceded the emergence of procedural democratic institutions. For the emergence of the liberal democracy, a social capital with norms like respect for different cultures and secularism are crucial. On the other hand, if the social capital is based on ethnic, religious, ideological or other socioeconomic fractures, it is harder to form a liberal democracy. In these cases, rather than liberal democracies, hybrid democracies, which only possess only procedural democratic features, emerge. The next part evaluates these hybrid democracies.

3.2 The Hybrids Democracies

Since this dissertation aims to provide a framework to analyze the process of (in)securitization in hybrid democracies, I will explain what is meant by hybrid democracy in this part. There are differing concepts used for the hybrid regimes that are located between the liberal democracies and full autocracies. There are also different classifications and adjectives for these regimes. Levitsky and Collier (1997: 431) claim that the proliferation of novel conceptions of democracy has reached to the point that there are 550 different adjectives for democracy including illiberal democracy, democratic authoritarianism, authoritarian democracy, defective democracy, neopatrimonial democracy, semi-democracy, tutelary democracy, Electoral Authoritarianism, military- dominated democracy, limited-suffrage

¹⁴ Social capital refers to “connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.” (Putnam, 2000, 19)

democracy, protodemocracy, domain democracy, competitive authoritarianism, and delegative democracy (Levitsky & Collier, 1997; Schedler, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Merkel 2004; Davenport; 2000; Zakaria, 1997). Schedler even describes this situation as a chaos (Schedler, 1998: 92). According to Levitsky and Collier (1997), this variation helps us to “capture diverse forms of democracy that have emerged” (1997: 430). In its basic sense, hybrid democracies are political systems, which includes some of the democratic regimes but other regimes are either lacked or problematic. However, as Levitsky and Collier (1997: 430) argues, an analyst must specifically explain his/her definition of democracy in the given study because of the magnitude of concepts and approaches about democracy.

Levitsky and Collier (1997) classify these hybrid regimes according to their features. The authors name these hybrid regimes as partial democracies. In their classification, they focus on the missing attributes of the given regime. These missing attributes include full suffrage, full contestation, civil liberties and lack of effective power to govern. The following table summarizes this classification (Levitsky & Collier, 1997: 439):

Diminished from Procedural Minimum Definition		
Missing Attribute: Full Suffrage Limited democracy Male Democracy Oligarchical Democracy	Missing Attribute: Full Contestation Controlled democracy De facto one-party Democracy Restrictive Democracy	Missing Attribute: Civil Liberties Electoral Democracy Hard Democracy Illiberal Democracy
Diminished from Extended Procedural Minimum Definition		
Missing Attribute: Elected Government Has Effective Power to Govern Guarded Democracy Protected Democracy Tutelary Democracy		

Table 1. Democracy Classification of Levitsky and Collier

As seen in the table, the authors base their classification of two definitions. According to the authors, the procedural minimum definition of democracy “presumes fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association” (Levitsky & Collier, 1997: 434). Expanded procedural minimum definition adds the feature of effective power to govern to the features of procedural minimum definition (Levitsky & Collier, 1997: 434).

In addition to this classification, Levitsky and Way (2002) introduced the term competitive authoritarianism. According to the authors, the end of the Cold War marked the end of many authoritarian regimes and led to the emergence of novel regimes with electoral competition and varying degrees of authoritarianism. The authors name this new type of hybrid democracy as competitive authoritarianism. In

line with this new concept, Schender (2006) introduced the concept of electoral authoritarianism. The concept referred the regimes, which use set of democratic attributes like multiparty elections to conceal their authoritarian governance.

Merkel (2004: 49-52) names these hybrid regimes as defective democracies and divides them into four categories. The first one is domain democracy in which there are undemocratic/unconstitutional elements, which have an influence on the decisions of the legislature and executive like the military or strong landlords. The second one is illiberal democracy in which judicial control over the executive and legislature is limited. Moreover, the constitutional limits are not fully binding for the ruling powers. The third one is delegative democracy in which check and balance system of separation of powers is deteriorated in favor of the executive. This system is mostly seen in places where there is a strong and charismatic leader. The final type of defective democracy is exclusive democracy where there is no universal equal suffrage and one segment of citizens avoided from voting in elections. Merkel (2004: 48) argues that these regimes are not temporary. There are different factors, which create these regimes (like the social capital or civil society) and they are not transit regimes where their destination is the liberal democracy or full autocracy.

In addition to these scholars, Christian Davenport (2000) divides political systems into four. The first two are liberal democracies and illiberal autocracies. Between these two poles, there are two hybrid regimes, namely liberal autocracies and illiberal democracies. Illiberal democracies carry some of the (mostly procedural) features of liberal democracies but they lack other elements. For example, citizens can vote. However, they can not get unbiased information about the candidates since there is

no free press. Liberal autocracies do not have structural democratic institutions, but, they provide some rights and liberties to their citizens that are associated with liberal democracy. For example, there is no meaningful election but people have the freedom of association. Unlike Merkel (2004), Davenport (2000) argues that the hybrid regimes are temporary and are tend to become either liberal democracy or illiberal autocracy.

Fareed Zakaria (1997), who introduced the term illiberal democracy, focuses more on the problems of this hybrid regime. He has a wider description of illiberal democracy, which encompasses all types of hybrid democracies. In his study, he compares constitutional liberal democracies and illiberal democracies. According to Zakaria, democracy and constitutional liberalism are interrelated but separate things. Democracy is a method for the determination of rulers while constitutional liberalism is about individual liberties and rule of law (Zakaria, 1997: 26).

The dangers of democracy without constitutional liberal norms have been stated by different thinkers. For example, James Madison and Alexis Tocqueville warned of the dangers of the oppression of the majority in democracies (as cited in Zakaria, 1997: 30). In these regimes elected popular leaders go beyond their constitutional limits, elected governments limit individual liberties like freedom of speech, freedom of assembly or religious freedom, elected rulers hinder citizens right to get unbiased information by oppressing free press or the rulers elected by majority oppress religious or ethnic minorities. According to Zakaria, illiberal democracy is by no means a temporary or transit regime rather “many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial

degree of illiberalism” (1997: 24).

As expressed above, this dissertation aims to provide a framework to analyze the process of (in)securitization particularly in hybrid democracies. This part provided the literature about the regimes, which take part in between the constitutional liberal democracies and full autocracies. As a general term, I prefer using ‘hybrid regimes’ to refer these semi-democracies since it encompasses all of its differing variations.

3.3 Implications for Security and (In)securitization

Much has been already said about the Democratic Peace (Doyle, 1986). In this part, I will say a few words about the general security implications without delving into the massive literature on the Democratic Peace theory. Later, I will focus on how the status of democracy impacts the (in)securitization process, particularly in the hybrid democracies.

Democratic Peace Theory depends on three explanations. The first is a normative one based on culture based on compromise (Doyle, 1986; Maoz & Russett, 1993). By the help of this culture, problems are solved by non-violent methods between democracies. The second one is based on constraints on rulers in democracies (Hegre, 2014: 161). In democracies, the decision makers who decide on the use of force are constrained by legislative and judicial branches. Finally, the risk of not being elected in the next elections increases the cost of conflict for the decision makers in the democratic countries. It is easy to see that all of these explanations are valid for full/constitutional/liberal democracies. For the hybrid democracies, it is

hard to argue that democracy will bring peace.

When it comes to domestic peace, the situation is even worse for the hybrid democracies. Although internal democratic peace arguments also depend on the previous explanations (Hegre, 2014), several studies show that semi-democracies are tended to internal conflict even more than autocracies (Hegre, 2014; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Muller & Weede, 1990; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). According to Buhaug (2006; see also: Hegre, 2014: 163), there is a higher possibility of violent conflict for government in semi-democracies.

Zakaria brings a new point of view to the Democratic Peace theory. According to him, "forces of democracy are not the forces of ethnic harmony and peace" (1997: 35). This perception derives from the above-mentioned divide between democracy and liberal values. Countries with liberal norms and constitutional background can make room for ethnic divisions and we can talk about peace among constitutional liberal democracies. However, without liberal norms, without liberal social capital or in hybrid democracies, democracy may lead to internal conflicts and war. Therefore, according to Zakaria (1997: 34), in essence, it is liberal peace rather than democratic peace.

When we come to our main topic, the democratic level of states also has several implications on the process of (in)securitization. Firstly, the above literature on the hybrid democracies takes us to the conclusion that it is easier to securitize an issue in hybrid democracies than liberal constitutional democracies, and there is a higher possibility of (in)securitization in these hybrid regimes. This is mainly because the

cost of conflict is lower in hybrid democracies than in liberal constitutional democracies, and the limitations on decision makers are less binding.

When it comes to internal issues, this possibility even increases. In hybrid democracies, where social capital is based on ethnic and religious divides or other conflict-prone issues, it is easier to convince people to use extraordinary measures. In hybrid democracies where liberal norms like tolerance, respect for differences and peaceful coexistence are not existent in a society, strategic level security professionals can easily find support to (in)securitize internal issues from a certain segment of the society. These supporters may be both majority and minority. It is easy to get the support if one group to securitize another one in these type of societies. In addition to these, unlike liberal democracies, in hybrid democracies there is no free media, courts are politicized and the check and balance system does not function. Therefore, the executive is not adequately limited and this makes security policies easier.

In these hybrid democracies, the rulers may even find (in)securitization of such issues advantageous to get more support (and vote). In a full democracy, it is harder to convince the society to use violence for an internal issue because of liberal culture. Moreover, even there is support, there are civil rights to protect all citizens and constitutional constraints on the rulers against the repression of different groups. On the contrary, in hybrid democracies, in addition to ease of convincing people, constitutional constraints to avoid repression are less effective and binding, and the civil rights are either lacked or less effective. Cut to the bone, (in)securitization of internal issues is easier, and sometimes advantageous, for the rulers in hybrid

democracies.

The second implication is related to the extraordinary measures and securitizing consequences. In constitutional liberal democracies, since there is a high level of democracy and respect for human rights, the measures taken against the threat are less harsh. This is particularly true for the internal issues. In a liberal constitutional democracy internal measures are usually putting more cctv cameras, more inspections in airports, monitoring of Internet actions of people etc. Therefore, the insecurities that are emerged in line with these extraordinary measures are more related to limitation of individual freedoms and rights like the right of privacy and freedom of expression.

On the other hand, in hybrid democracies, the extraordinary measures are a lot harsher. Even in hybrid democracies, the above-mentioned measures can be regarded as normal. These measures include forced migration, death of civilians by land mines or other conflict-related issues, forced disappearances, sexual abuses. However, it should be kept in mind that these insecurities are not only created by the state. As expressed in the introduction part this framework rejects the problematization of only one side. The practices of other groups like insurgents or terrorists, which chooses violent conflict also lead to these insecurities.

The third implication is based on the lack of civil liberties in hybrid democracies. There are different groups with different interests in all states including liberal democracies and hybrid democracies. These groups include religious, ethnic, or other political and economic interest groups. In liberal democracies, these groups have a

say and they can make their sound heard. Moreover, they can defend their rights on democratic grounds. However, in hybrid democracies, this is not the case. These groups lack basic individual rights and minority rights in hybrid democracies. Moreover, they do not have a right to speak out or have a chance to seek rights on non-violent democratic grounds like establishing an opposition party or interest group. Therefore, they may start (in)securitization for these aims or they may react by counter-(in)securitization against the (in)securitization moves of the dominant power. Therefore, in hybrid democracies there emerges two (in)securitization rather than a non-violent opposition like in the constitutional liberal democracies.

This issue requires modifications to the (in)securitization analysis. Firstly, Securitization Theory proposes a linear process of securitization and it ignores rival voices. The securitizer presents an issue and the audience accepts (or refuses) it. However, as I expressed in the previous chapter, there is a need for a dual analysis since there are always rival voices in the process of (in)securitization. This dual process may take different forms according to the level of democracy in the given place. In liberal constitutional democracies, since all groups can express their ideas without any limitations on democratic grounds, each rival group can form a non-violent opposition and defend their ideas in a non-violent way.

On the other hand, in hybrid democracies, which lack civil rights like freedom of expression or freedom of demonstration or free media, there may be groups, which can not express their ideas on non-violent democratic grounds. These rival groups can not form a democratic opposition. Therefore, in these hybrid regimes there may emerge counter-(in)securitizations. As a result, in these cases there are two

(in)securitizations rather than one. This requires a dual framework, which will take both (in)securitizations into consideration.¹⁵ The actors, discourses, and practices of both (in)securitization processes must be analyzed in the examination of such cases. However, it must be kept in mind that emergence of counter-(in)securitization is not a certain obstacle for the emergence of non-violent opposition. There may be issues where emerges both a non-violent opposition and a counter-(in)securitization.

Although I use sharp arguments to express the main idea here, this does not mean that all (in)securitizations will be responded by counter-(in)securitization in hybrid democracies. It is not true to propose deterministic arguments like in hybrid regimes there emerges counter-(in)securitization and in constitutional liberal democracies there emerges non-violent opposition. This also contradicts with the constructivist stance of the framework that is given in this dissertation. However, I argue that the level of democracy is an important contextual factor and it influences the process of (in)securitization in line with the implications given here. Moreover, as it will be presented in Chapter 5, the level of democracy is not the only contextual element, which influences the (in)securitization process. However, it is a core element, particularly in internal issues.

Secondly, in hybrid democracies, since civil rights and liberties are either lacked or limited, certain groups can not make their voice heard. They can not make their discourse heard because they do not have a chance and power to speak. Therefore,

¹⁵ Actually, this dual Approach is required to analyze the (in)securitization processes in liberal democracies too. Although there are no counter-(in)securitizations because the citizens have the ability to form opposition by non-violent ways, there is always opposition counter discourses (which is neglected by the Securitization Theory). Therefore (in)securitization is not a linear process in liberal democracies too and the opposition and the counter-discourses have to be analyzed too. However, in hybrid democracies, there are counter-(in)securitizations and this requires a special analysis of two (in)securitizations.

their only mean for defending their ideas may be (in)securitization. In these cases, these groups may use extraordinary measures to make their voice heard. In this case, the starter of (in)securitization may be these groups rather than the state itself.

Therefore, the state may be the one, which is responding by counter-securitization.

The third modification is related to the second one and it is about practices. The Securitization Theory is based on discourse. The securitizers securitize an issue by speech acts first and this legitimizes extraordinary practices. Therefore the practices come after the securitization of the issue. However, as expressed above, some groups do not have a voice in hybrid democracies. According to the framework of Securitization Theory, these groups can not play the role of securitizer or their ideas can not take place on the agenda. However, I argue that since these groups can not express their ideas discursively in democratic grounds in hybrid democracies, they may use direct action to make their voice heard.¹⁶ According to Wilkinson (2007), in these cases, practice precedes discourse. I argue that this is not the case. Even it is not heard, these groups also have a security definition and discourse. In their security definition, the security threat and referent object are already determined (this definition may be a rough one at the start). However, they can not make their security definition and discourse heard. Therefore they use action to make their sound heard.

¹⁶ This problem has already been problematized by Lene Hansen. In her article titled "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," she criticized Securitization Theory for its lack of focus on the people who do not have a voice. This problem is also valid for all of the groups whose voice can not be heard in all regime types. However, in this study, I focus the groups in hybrid democracies.

In line with this argument, there is a need for another modification for the (in)securitization analysis. As stated in the previous chapter, the Securitization Theory only focuses on discourse and International Political Sociology only focuses on practices. For the analysis of a (in)securitization, in addition to other factors that are mentioned in the next chapter, this implication requires a complex analysis of both the discourses and practices. This is because the examination must present the implications of both discourses and practices. The new framework for critical security studies to analyze the production of security issues that is presented in the next chapter provides this framework by examining (in)securitization in three phases.

As it will be examined in the fifth chapter, Colombia has been a hybrid democracy. In the emergence of FARC during the National Front era in the 1960s, there was no chance for alternative voices to be represented in democratic ground. This was even true for the 1980s, when FARC tried to found a political party, which was closed after the attacks against its members. There was also no free media and freedom of speech was limited. Many journalists and NGO members are still being killed every year. These features made the process of (in)securitization a lot more easier in Colombia in which the state initiated (in)securitization by the (in)securitization of Communists and they responded by counter-(in)securitization by founding FARC. Moreover, since Colombia is a hybrid democracy, the security practices of both groups were so harsh and the insecurities created by these practices were also so harsh too.

3.4 Concluding Remarks

The level of democracy is one of the most important core contextual factors that has an impact on the process of (in)securitization. Since the world does not only consist of liberal constitutional democracies, these issues must be examined in a (in)securitization analysis, which aims to take securitization analysis outside Europe. These factors affect the possibility and easiness of (in)securitization, emergence of non-violent opposition or counter-(in)securitization and the measures that are taken against the constructed threat and their insecuritizing consequences. These impacts are summarized in the table below:

IMPLICATION	IMPACT
Lack of civil rights like freedom of expression, freedom of demonstration, and liberal norms like tolerance in hybrid democracies	Possibility of (in)securitization is higher and (in)securitization is easier
	The internal measures/practices are harsher
	The insecuritizing consequences are harsher
	Emergence of counter-(in)securitization rather than opposition (or both)
	Groups other than the state may start (in)securitization
	Need for a dual framework
	Need for a complex analysis of discourses and practices
	Securitization process may start by direct action rather than discourse

Table 2. Implications of Democracy for the process of (in)securitization

As a final note, it must be stated that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between the level of democracy and (in)securitization. As expressed above, low level of democracy increases the possibility of (in)securitization by providing an available context. On the other hand, (in)securitization and the security practices, further deteriorate democracy too. Emerging violent groups deteriorate democracy by preventing the implementation of healthy elections and further diminish the basic freedoms and rights like the freedom of speech and freedom of transportation. In addition to these, (in)securitization also hardens democratization. When violence starts, there emerge groups, which feeds from the violence and these groups block the democratizing moves.

CHAPTER 4

THE NEW FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES

This dissertation aims to introduce a novel framework for critical security studies to examine the process of (in)securitization. Moreover, it aims to apply this framework to the case of FARC in Colombia. In this regard, it firstly aims to address the shortcomings of the existing frameworks including the Securitization Theory and International Political Sociology that are explained in chapter 2. Moreover, it is also aimed that this framework be particularly applicable for hybrid democracies and internal issues. The implications of the level of democracy for the process of (in)securitization also given in the third chapter. After explaining the gaps, needs and shortcomings of the existing frameworks in the previous chapters, this chapter provides this new framework.

So, this chapter provides the new framework for critical security studies to analyze the production of security issues, especially in hybrid democracies. It both addresses the shortcomings of the existing approaches like the Securitization Theory and International Political Sociology and feeds from them; borrows insights from

poststructural approach to security, the literature on the debate between traditional security studies and new security approaches, and the literature on the politics of exception; and brings new insight like the impact of the level of democracy on the process of (in)securitization¹⁷ by focusing on the situation in the hybrid democracies.

For these aims, the framework takes both discourses and practices¹⁸ of security into consideration and examines their roles in different phases of the (in)securitization process. Moreover, it also integrates a contextual analysis, which includes historical background of the given issue and the level of democracy in the place where the (in)securitization takes place. It also eliminates the state as the primary referent object and securitizer and examines how other units become securitizers or referent objects.

Furthermore, the framework adds novel aspect about the role security professionals in a (in)securitization process and provides a broader perception of the security professionals by analyzing them in three different levels. Additionally, the insecuritizing consequences of the process are also included in the analysis. The framework also divides the (in)securitization process into three phases and present which factors play a role in each phase. Finally, the framework examines the rival voices and counter moves in the (in)securitization process.

¹⁷ I prefer using the term (in)securitization rather than securitization since this new framework focus also on the insecuritizing consequences of the process.

¹⁸ In this framework, for the sake of clarity, I have used discourse for the discursive practices and practice for the non-discursive practices. The relationship between them is analyzed below.

4.1 The Dual Nature of (In)securitization

(In)Securitization is not a linear process as opposed to the framework of the Securitization Theory (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). It is not like the sovereign determines security, and the issue becomes an exceptional security issue. The process does not occur like the securitizer defines the threat and the audience(s) only accepts (or rejects) it. There are always rival voices and resistant stances, which constitute the other side of the coin. There is a constant debate among these rival voices. In a (in)securitization analysis, these rival stances should also be taken into consideration. As expressed in the previous chapters, IPS (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008) also focuses on the rival voices but they only focus on the oppositions and conflicts within the field of security professionals and they ignore high-level rivalries and politics.

As I expressed in the previous chapter, these rival definitions can take two different forms according to the context. In liberal democratic countries, there may emerge opposition. This opposition may have a rival security definition or may only be rejecting the security definition, which is proposed by the strategic level decision makers. They take action within the democratic environment of the given context. In hybrid democracies, these rival voices can take the form of counter (in)securitization since the opposing group does not have a chance to act in a democratic ground.¹⁹ These rival voices including both the opposition and counter (in)securitization must be examined in the analysis of (in) securitization.²⁰ In addition to these, it should be noted that the process does not have to occur in which there emerges one security

¹⁹ Although I present the general situation here about the liberal democracies and hybrid democracies, there also may emerge counter securitizations in liberal democracies and opposition in hybrid democracies according to the issue at hand and the contextual factors.

²⁰ It should be argued that it might not be the state, which initiates the (in)securitization process. In such instances, the state may be responding by counter-(in)securitization.

claim and the rival claim emerges as a reaction to this afterward. These definitions may emerge simultaneously and not as rivals too.

As a consequence, the (in)securitization analysis must be conducted in a dual manner, which will take both sides into consideration. If there is only opposition and no counter (in)securitization the efforts and impact of this opposition must be examined in the (in)securitization process. However, if there is a counter-(in)securitization, both (in)securitization processes (the primary and the counter-(in)securitization) must be examined according to the framework given in this chapter.²¹ It should also be kept in mind that the main purpose of this dual framework is to present how different views conflict for their truth claim and how these clashes impact the construction of this truth (i.e. security definition).

4.2 The Security Professionals

Security professionals are the actors that constitute and work in the security field (Peoples & Williams, 2010: 69; Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008). Scholars of International Political Sociology, who focus on micro-level practices, introduce a narrow definition of security professionals. They ignore the role of high-level decision makers in the process of (in)securitization. They argue that issues are securitized by the practices of these security professionals within the field of security in a bottom-up manner. I argue that considering the security professionals in this manner is problematic. Different security professionals at different levels play differing roles in the different phases of the process of producing security issues. For example, a high-

²¹ In the examination of the process of (in)securitization I used the term primary (in)securitization to refer the (in)securitization process that emerged first. To refer the (in)securitization process that emerged as a reaction to primary (in)securitization I used the term counter-(in)securitization.

level decision maker plays a discursive role in the construction of security while low-level security professionals impact the process through their practices. To overcome this problem, I introduce a novel and broader conceptualization of security professionals which include security professionals ranging from high-level decision makers like the head of state, chief of general staff, intelligence chiefs or ethnic group leaders to lowest level security practitioners like police officers, soldiers or militants.

In line with this stance, the new framework divides the security professionals into three levels to be able to analyze their roles clearly in the process of (in)securitization. These levels are strategic level, operational level, and tactical level. Although I will examine their roles while explaining the phases of (in)securitization, I will describe them here to be able to reflect the reason for dividing them into different levels. Although the roles of tactical and operational level security professionals are different in security operations, their roles in a (in)securitization process are similar. Therefore, I will examine them as a unique body within the security field.

The first level of the security professionals is the strategic level. If we refer to the framework of the Securitization Theory, they can be identified as high-level securitizing actors. In a state, this level includes (it changes according to the organization of state and other contextual issues) high-level decision makers like the head of the executive, chief of staff or other high-ranking generals and several ministers like the minister of defense, minister of interior, and minister of foreign affairs. In units other than the state, this level may include high-level decision

makers like ethnic or religious group leaders, terrorist group leaders, or tribe leaders. These strategic level security professionals play a crucial role in decision-making processes. Therefore they have a crucial role in the definition security. Moreover, since these strategic level security professionals have a voice, they also have a discursive impact. In other words, these security professionals have the opportunity to reach audience since they have power and by that way, they can convince audience(s) via discourses.²² Finally, these strategic level security professionals, with the help of their power positions, directs the security practices of low-level security professionals.

The low-level security professionals include the operational and tactical level security professionals.²³ I argue that these security professionals do not have an impact on the definition of security and other high-level decisions. I agree that security professionals are not sleepwalkers. They even may be aware of what they are doing. But do they have a chance to decide on their actions? How much initiative can they take? They obey the rules and orders and implement the decisions taken in the upper strategic levels. In other words, they only act within the borders of the security definition decided by the strategic level decision makers. This is more meaningful when one considers the norms like unconditional obedience and compulsory duties in security organizations of states and non-state actors. For example, in the official website of FARC it is written that “The subordination to the

²² I do not reject that the power of these high-level decision maker(s) is also constructed. But this constructed power has a role in the (in)securitization process and it should be taken into consideration. Moreover, by analyzing the debate between rival and resistant discourses and contextual issues, the analyzer presents how this power functioned in the process and reified by the (in)securitization.

²³ Actually, the framework divides the security professionals into two levels. These are high-level (strategic level) security professionals and low-level (operational and tactical level) security professionals. However, I use the categorization of strategic, operational and tactical levels since there is an already existing literature on this issue and these concepts better explain the groups, which I intend to indicate.

orders and determinations of the higher organisms and the Commander-in Chief is a mandatory norm for all combatants” (What is the National Conference of Guerrillas?, FARC official Website)

In operations, rules of engagement are always pre-determined. Low-level security professionals often do not even have a chance to reject the orders because of compulsory services or strict punishments for disobedience. They may even get killed for disobedience in non-state actors like terrorist organizations. Therefore, while implementing security practices they may be acting without their consent. In other words, the ideas of low-level security professionals do not have a decisive impact on the security definition and policies. Consequently, the operational and tactical level practitioners do not play a role in the definition of security or decision on the exception.

Yet, these low-level security professionals still have an impact on the (in)securitization process. Their impact comes from their security practices. The practices of these security professionals help the routinization of the security definition that is determined at the strategic level. Moreover, these practices lead to insecurities for groups other than the referent object of the security. Finally, these practices can also play a role in the initialization of the (in)securitization process for the groups, which do not have a voice.

It also must be stated here that the line between tactical/operational and strategic security professionals is hard to determine and it is contextual. According to the structure and culture of the given organization (state, ethnic insurgent group etc.), the

line between these levels changes. In some organization, there may be a group of people who make decisions and in some others, there may be only one person who makes the last decision. For example, in some countries, military chiefs play a direct role in the decisions about security, in some others, they only play an advisory role. These issues generally are not determined by written rules too.

4.3 The Processes and the Phases of (In)securitization

This part examines the phases of (in)securitization. This analysis focuses on both the discourses and practices and show how they are interrelated. (In)securitization represents a process rather than a moment (Salter & Mutlu, 2013). I reject the argument of Securitization Theory (Buzan *et al.*, 1998), which argues that securitization ends when the discourse (speech acts) becomes successful (the audience is convinced) and the security practices come afterward. The clashes between the rival voices do not end when the enough number of audiences once convinced. The efforts of both sides continue during the whole process. Moreover, the ideas of the audience(s) do not stay fixed. Audience(s) may change their stance during the process too. For example, the process of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state starts by the securitization of Communist in early 1960s by the Colombian state. However, this process does not end after the violent practices start in the same decade. It continues as the security practices continue and included the insecuritizing consequences of these practices. During this process, the efforts of both sides to convince the audience(s) also continue.

As a result, from my perception, (in)securitization process initiates by the definition of security and it includes the whole process including the clashes between rival definitions and counter moves, violent conflicts, security practices, discursive efforts to convince the audiences, routinizations and normalizations by the security practices, and the insecurity consequences. As a consequence, an analyzer should examine this whole process in a (in)securitization analysis.²⁴ As an example, the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state started in 1964 when the Colombian state (in)securitized Communists and it ended in 2017 with the approval of the peace agreement. Therefore in the examination of this issue whole of the five-decade period examined.

For the sake of clarity, I divide this process into three phases. This way, the role of practices and discourses and their relationship in a (in)securitization process can be analyzed clearly. These phases are: (1) the decision/definition phase, (2) the construction phase, and (3) the (in)securitization in-action phase. However, before passing to these phases, I briefly present how this new framework conceptualizes the relationship between the practices and discourses in the next part.

4.3.1 The Relationship Between the Practices and Discourses

In line with the Foucauldian concept of *dispositif*, I regard that discursive and non-discursive practices are inseparable. Moreover, as I stated in the second chapter this

²⁴ It must be stated that this perception does not mean that partial analyses can not be made. I mean that the (in)securitization process is a whole and in includes security definition, security discourse, security practices and insecurity consequences. However, there may be studies, which particularly focus on one of the phases/components of the whole process like the insecurity consequences.

unity derives from the relationship between the knowledge and action and on a higher scale, the relationship between the power and knowledge. In this framework, I aim to present how these two types of practices interact in the process of (in)securitization.

Moreover, my main theme is not micro-level practices like in the International Political Sociology and I do not see (in)securitization only as a field effect. I do not ignore the role of these practices and I do focus on them to present their role in the routinization and the normalization of the security definition and their insecurity consequences. However, I argue that they do not constitute the whole process. The role of strategic level decisions and the definitions must be taken into consideration.

Although the relationship between discourses and practices or the relationship between knowledge and action is described below in detail while explaining the phases of (in)securitization, let me briefly explain this relationship here. From my perception, macro or strategic level security professionals (with the help of their already constructed power) define the security and they discursively construct this definition (convince the audience(s)). However, this definition is not a final one that has to be accepted. Rival groups define security in a different manner. These definitions shape the practices of the low-level security professionals. Finally, these practices result in insecurity consequences for ordinary people. Additionally, this situation further legitimizes and strengthens the already existing power relations at the macro level.

4.3.2 The Decision/Definition Phase

The first phase is the definition/decision phase. As I stated above, the decision is not everything for the construction of exception or security as argued by Schmitt or Securitization Theory. However, it is an important component of a (in)securitization process. Nothing starts without a definition. In this phase, strategic level security professionals define security and decide on exception. Their resources, power, expert knowledge, popularity, and experience give these strategic level security professionals ability to make this definition.

(In)securitization is not only about determining something as an existential threat and convincing the audience(s) about it. Accordingly, this definition does not only include the determination of threat. It includes the whole definition of security and in (in)securitization audiences are convinced that it is the legitimate and true way of defining security. Accordingly, this definition includes answering the questions: what is threat? What is dangerous? What should be protected? Which measures should be used against this threat? Who is the legitimate protector? What can be sacrificed (Campbell, 1998: 2; Bigo, 2008: 123; Peoples & Williams, 2010: 68)? In other words, the definition includes the determination of threat, referent object, the security agent (the legitimate security provider), the means that can be used against the threat and the ones that can be sacrificed. In sum, in this phase, the strategic level security professionals define security. Although there may emerge changes in this definition during the process of (in)securitization, a definition is a precondition for starting the (in)securitization.

Although I argue that security definition is made by strategic level security professionals, I do not argue that this definition is not affected from below. In different contexts, different factors have an impact on this definition. In democratic environments, this impact may be bigger than in hierarchical environments. These factors should be examined in context part, which will be analyzed below.

Although I give importance to decision and definition my approach is not a decisionist one which reifies political sovereign or already existing power relations. Firstly, I accept the role of resistance and rival definitions. As expressed above, the framework that is proposed here has a dual nature, which examines both sides. So, since this framework will examine the security definitions of all sides, the definition here is regarded only as a truth claim. So the definition at this first phase is not a final decision where there are rival claims by different prominent actors like opposition parties, minority groups or other rival elements.²⁵

Secondly, this framework is not a decisionist one since it accepts that the decision maker(s) cannot know the results of their decisions since contextual factors also affect the (in)securitization process. This is because the contextual factors and the clashes between different security claims affect the (in)securitization process.

Finally, this new framework is not decisionist since the (in)securitization process does not end here. The (in)securitization does not happen at the moment in which the sovereign decides on the exception. This only starts the process and it is followed by the construction phase.

²⁵ It should be noted that in these rival elements, the decisions/definitions are also made by strategic level decision makers.

Finally, the analysis of this phase requires a discourse analysis. The decision maker(s) discursively define what is threat, what is dangerous, what should be protected or what deserves protection, what is the legitimate protector and what can be sacrificed for its protection. Therefore, the analyzer should look into discourses to understand how the security is defined. These may include speeches, policy documents, laws, constitutions, and decisions of government or units like National Security Council. Additionally, the analyzer must analyze the rival voices and rival security definitions to examine the other side of the dual (in)securitization.

To illustrate this phase it is appropriate to give an example. In a very simple sense, in the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian, the Colombian Governments had a definition of security. Before the foundation of FARC, communist groups were presented as a threat in this definition. After the foundation of FARC in 1966, the threat became the FARC. As the organization gained strength in the 1990s it became the most important existential threat in security definition of Colombia. The referent object was the Colombian state itself and the Colombian people also presented as the referent object. The legitimate security agents were the military and police forces of the Colombian state. And what can be sacrificed were the lives of Colombian people, their right for transportation etc. Millions of Colombians faced forced migration.

On the other hand, FARC also had its own security definition. In this definition The Colombian state and rich bourgeois class in the country was presented as the threat. Referent object was the poor Colombians (peasants and working class) and Communist groups. Legitimate security agents were the guerrilla forces of FARC. Finally, what can be sacrificed was the same: lives and the freedoms of ordinary

Colombian people. Many Colombians were killed or captured for ransom by the organization.

4.3.3 The Construction Phase

The second phase is called as the construction. In this phase, the issue becomes constructed as an exceptional security problem. For this end, the audience(s) is convinced about the security definition made in the first phase and this security understanding is normalized and routinized via security practices. Therefore, in this phase, both discourses and practices are crucial including the practices of operational and tactical level actors.

As I expressed above, an issue cannot become a security issue by only declaring so. The audience has to be convinced. In this phase, the strategic level security professionals attempt to convince the audience about the given security definition by discursive efforts. Here, I do not have a narrow perception of discourse like Securitization Theory's (Buzan *et al.*, 1998) speech act approach. I believe non-lingual representations like mapping or other visual representations should also be considered within the scope of discourse.

In addition to discourses of the strategic level security professionals, the practices of operational and tactical level security professionals are also crucial in this phase. Their actions help the routinization and normalization of the issue. The practices, which are witnessed by the audience, or affect the audience, have particular importance in this phase. The audience who witnesses the security practices starts to

think that the given issue is a security issue. The expert status of these low-level security professionals and the repetitions of security practices are crucial in this phase since these help the routinization and normalization of the (in)securitized issue. The role of functional actors like the media and academicians must also be considered in this phase. By this routinization, the security definition is normalized. However, one should keep in mind that these practices are not free from the security definition made by strategic level security professionals in the previous phase.

There is no certain order of the discourses and practices of security at this phase. I reject the claim of the Securitization Theory (Buzan *et al.*, 1998), which argues that the audiences are convinced by speech acts (discourses) first and the security practices come later. The discursive persuasion may occur first or discourses and practices may occur simultaneously. At some instance, particularly in hybrid democracies and autocracies, practice may also precede discourse. In these situations, the groups, which do not have a voice, start with security practices rather than discourses. As argued in the previous chapter, in this kind of occasions, the whole process of (in)securitization may seem like starting by security practices rather than definition. However, this is not the case. There is already a security definition, but the group does not have a voice to make this definition heart and convince the audience. For this reason, they start by action to get attention and make their voice heard.

The analyzer has to keep the dual nature of the (in)securitization process in this phase too. In this phase, the rival discourses and practices clash with each other. The opposition(s) resist to the claims of security made by strategic level decision makers.

If there is a counter (in)securitization the discourses and practices of both sides clash and race to convince the audiences. Moreover, in most instances, there are common audiences like the international society or a common nation. In these cases, both sides try to convince the same groups to make their security definitions and actions legitimate.

For the analysis of this phase, the analyzer should examine both the practices and discourses. The discourses should be analyzed to present the discursive efforts to convince the audiences. The analyzer should examine them to see their impact on the ideas of the audience. These discourses may be based on several reference points and the analyzer should present these reference points in her/his analysis. Secondly, the analyzer should examine the security practices of security professionals to show their effect on the construction of the exceptional security issue. Another job of the analyzer is to show the relationship between the definition in the first phase and the practices in the second phase to present the unity of the discourses and the practices.

To illustrate this phase I will provide an example in line with the case study of this dissertation. In the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, after the definition of security, both the Colombian government leaders and FARC leaders attempted to convince the Colombian people and the international community (particularly the neighboring countries) by discourses. Both sides presented the other side as a security threat by certain arguments. Colombian state presented FARC as a threat by arguing that it is a threat to the Colombian state and regional peace, and it may lead to the emergence of Communism in the region. FARC also presented Colombian state as a threat to poor Colombians. The strategic level security

professionals of both sides directed their low-level security professionals and the practices of these operational and tactical security professionals played a crucial role in the normalization of the threat. Forced migrations, road blockages, kidnappings can be regarded as examples of these practices.

4.3.4 (In)securitization-in-action Phase

The final phase is the (in)securitization-in-action. This phase focuses on how the (in)securitization of one issue for a particular referent object leads to insecurities for other issues or groups. As argued in the (in)securitization approach, security is about sacrifice and providing security to something always lead to insecurity of some others. From my point of view, in a (in)securitization analysis, the efforts to securitize an issue and its insecuritizing consequences can not be separated. Focusing only on one part makes the analysis to miss other factors and implications. Therefore this new framework does not neglect any of these elements in its (in)securitization analysis.

These insecurities, led by the (in)securitization, do not only include state level issues. A (in)securitization may lead to insecurities in different levels. It may lead to insecurities for ordinary people like poverty, immigration, lack of education, the death of individual human beings, and deterioration of individual freedoms like freedom of transportation, property rights or the right of privacy. It may also lead to other security problems in higher levels like the creation of new security problems for states. I believe that there is no need for a fetishism of individual or state level

insecurities. In some cases, there may only be individual level insecurities in some other there may emerge insecurities at all levels.

In this phase, practices rather than discourses are crucial. The security practices, which are performed in line with the security definition made in the first phase, lead to insecurities for other groups, especially ordinary people. This is valid both for the primary and rival security claims (the counter (in)securitization). Both the practices of primary securitizer and the practices in the counter (in)securitization result in insecurities for ordinary people. The practices, which play a role in the construction of exceptional security issue in the second phase, also lead to insecurities for other groups. So the analyzer should focus on the examination of practices for this phase.

For the analysis of the securitizing consequences of the securitization, both the securitizing practices and their consequences must be analyzed. For this analysis of the securitizing consequences, an analyzer may facilitate already existing reports and studies. The academic studies and reports of national and international governmental and non-governmental organizations would be beneficial for this analysis. However, if possible, the best way to present these insecurities is making a field analysis. The analyzer may directly witness these consequences by conducting an ethnographic research. Alternatively, S/he may acquire this information by conducting interviews or a survey with the people who faced or witnessed the securitizing consequences of a particular (in)securitization.

I will provide the same example for this last phase too. In the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, the practices of both sides created insecurities

particularly for the Colombian people. Many civilians killed by the FARC's bombings or the attacks of the military forces and military related paramilitary groups. Many more of them had to leave their homes because of forced migration. Many innocent people were kidnapped for ransom or political gains. Many children lost their chance for education. These insecurities are analyzed in the sixth chapter in detail.

As a final note, although these phases are given in an order, there is no certain order among them. It is the same discourses that define the security in the first phase and constructs it in the second phase. It is also the same practices, which convince the audiences by routinization and normalization in the second phase and leads to insecurities in the final phase. However, I used phases to be able to analyze the process of (in)securitization in a systematic manner.

4.4 Analysis of Context

After giving the three basic phases of a (in)securitization process, let me proceed to other issues that are crucial for the analysis of the process. The context is one of the most important issues that have to be taken into consideration for the analysis of a (in)securitization process. The Securitization Theory has been criticized for its lack of emphasis on the context (Balzacq, 2005; McDonald, 2008). Although I will not delve into how to analyze contextual issues here since it has already been mentioned above while explaining different critical security approaches, let me briefly summarize what is crucial in the analysis of contextual issues.

First of all the context includes the historical analysis of the issue. How the issue is being perceived now and how this perception constructed in time? The analyzer must examine the historical background of the issue to be able to present the (in)securitization process clearly. S/he must examine how the issue was regarded before the (in)securitization. For the analysis of historical background, the analyzer may conduct a literature review to present the how this background affects the process of (in)securitization.

In addition to historical background, the features of the audience should also be regarded within context too. (In)securitization is mostly about the persuasion of audience(s). As expressed above, ideas matter in the social world. It is the ideas of people, which make something right or wrong, or legitimate or illegitimate. Although the audience is a unit in the process of constructing security that will be examined below, the features of the audience must be presented in the contextual analysis too. Their experiences and already existing perceptions are crucial for the (in)securitization process. The analyzer may facilitate already existing surveys and researches for the analysis of the features of the audience(s)

Thirdly, in addition to general historical background and features of the audience, certain significant events must also be taken into consideration for the contextual analysis of the (in)securitization process. In most cases, there are crucial events, which have an impact on the (in)securitization processes. The securitizers usually facilitate these events to convince the audience(s). A major terrorist attack or an economic crisis may be seen in this category.

Contextual analysis is also important for the determination of what is normal and what is exceptional in the given place and time. What is normal and what is exception has temporal, spatial and case sensitive dimensions. As expressed above, in the existing frameworks to analyze the (in)securitization what is normal is regarded as liberal democratic norms. However, in a universal framework, which can also function in hybrid democracies, an analyzer must examine these issues too.

In a (in)securitization process, we can talk about two type exceptions. The first one is the issue that is being exceptionalized. The second one is the exceptional measures that are legitimized to use this exceptionalized issue. Both exceptionalization and legitimization depend on what is already considered as normal and exception in the given context. What can be regarded as exceptional in one place and time may be regarded as normal (or less striking exception) in a different time and place?

I propose that for this analysis, an analyst must examine the level of democracy in the given place. As expressed in the previous chapter, what is normal and exception changes according to the level of democracy (constitutional liberal democracy, hybrid democracy, and autocracy). This factor hardens or simplifies the process of (in)securitization, and increases or decreases the possibility of (in)securitization. In addition to this, the decision-making procedures of the given actors (the securitizer may be a state or another organization or a group like a separatist/insurgent group or minority) must also be examined in this part too.

I will continue with the same case to illustrate the context too. For the analysis of the context of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, the analyst

must firstly examine the historical background of the issue and ask how was the situation in the country before the (in)securitization process and what brought the issue to this level? This analysis may focus on crucial events and issues for the (in)securitization process like the success of the Cuban Revolution, impact of the Cold War and *La Violencia*. In addition to these, the level of democracy in Colombia must be examined and its impacts on the process of (in)securitization must be presented.

4.5 Units of the (In)securitization Process

Finally, let me briefly talk about the units of the (in)securitization process. I believe a modification of units that are proposed in the framework of the Securitization Theory (Buzan *et al.*, 1998) is required for this new framework. These actors must be examined by the securitizer before the analysis of the process of producing a security issue. I particularly use the term “units” rather than actors since some of these elements do not carry the features of being an actor like the referent object.

The first unit is the referent object. Referent object is the unit that is presented as threatened by the securitized thread in a (in)securitization process. It is presented as threatened and must be protected. As argued by Buzan *et al.* (1998) this unit may be individual human beings at the micro level, a state or tribe or ethnic/religious minority at the middle level and it can be regional or global peace at the macro level.

The second unit is the audience. The audience is the unit that must be convinced to be able to securitize an issue. Although this unit is not included in the framework of

Securitization Theory, it is a vital element of a (in)securitization process (Balzacq, 2005: 173), the persuasion of which determined what is right and legitimate. Audience(s) changes according to the context. Moreover, according to Balzacq (2005), there are two types of audiences. These are formal and moral ones. The formal audience is the one, which has to be convinced to take action. It gives formal support to the action, and without this support no action can be taken. Although it changes according to the context (particularly the level of democracy) the legislatures can be seen as formal audiences since without their approval governments can not use military forces. The second form of the audience is the moral one. These audience(s) provides moral support for the (in)securitization and their ideas determine what is the right and legitimate definition of security.

In addition to these units, rather than the securitizing actor in the Securitization Theory, I introduce strategic-level security professionals. These decision makers make claims about the security definitions. These definitions are crucial since these start the production of exceptional security issue. The practices of tactical and operational level security professionals are shaped by these definitions. In different organizations and groups, there can be seen different strategic level decision makers. For example, in a state the government may make this definition, other actors like the chief of general staff or ministry of defense can also be influential in the definition of security. In a separatist minority group, this definition is made by the insurgent leaders.

In addition to these strategic level security professionals, tactical and operational level security professionals should also be regarded as an element for the

(in)securitization process. These practitioners and their actions are crucial for the construction of exceptional security issues since they play the major role in the routinization and normalization of the claimed security issue. These actors may include soldiers (including non-commissioned officers and lower level officer), militants, police officers, intelligence agents etc. Here, by introducing these two actors I divide the security professionals that are introduced by the International Political Sociology approach into two. This is required since some of them play a discursive role in the definition/decision phase and others play a role in the construction phase by their actions.

In addition to these, since this framework analyzes the insecurity consequences of the (in)securitization process, the ones whose security is sacrificed by the (in)securitization process should be regarded as a unit. I introduce the term “sufferers” for this unit. Sufferers are crucial for the analysis of a (in)securitization process since we also aim to present what is sacrificed. Since (in)securitization may lead to insecurities at different levels, this unit may be individuals, groups or states. In addition to these, the tactical and operational level security professionals can also be regarded as sufferers too. This is because their ideas do not affect the definition of security at the macro level and they can not influence the processes at this level while they do suffer during the (in)securitization process (They die, leave families etc.)

The opposition must also be regarded as a unit of (in)securitization. The opposition is the element, which rejects the security definition of the strategic level security professionals in a non-violent way and without a counter-(in)securitization act.

Although this actor is particularly seen in democratic countries, it can be seen in hybrid regimes too. In some cases there may even be a non-violent opposition and a counter-(in)securitization. In these cases the relationship between these two units must be examined too. An opposition party, interest group or a non-governmental organization can take the role of opposition. This actor is crucial to show that (in)securitization is not a linear process in which only the strategic level decision makers have a voice. Moreover, it is important to present the dual character of the (in)securitization process. In environments where there is no possibility to offer opposition in democratic grounds there usually emerges counter (in)securitization. In this case, the units of this (in)securitization must also be taken into consideration by the analyzer. In many cases there are both the opposition and counter (in)securitization.

In line with the Securitization Theory, the final unit of a (in)securitization process is the functional actor(s). The functional actor is the one, which affects the (in)securitization process without being a unit that is mentioned above. This has two crucial functions for the analysis of a (in)securitization process. First of all the units, which have an impact on the process of (in)securitization without being a securitizing actor (strategic, operational or tactical level security professional) can be analyzed in this category. For example, media or academia or other units, which play a role in the process of convincing the audiences can be seen in this category.

Secondly, this unit is crucial to limit the study at hand. By taking other actors as functional actors an analyst can focus only on a specific issue and examine the impacts of these functional actors to this issue at hand. For example, when analyzing the securitization of FARC in Colombia, an analyzer may take other elements like

drug traffickers, other insurgent guerrilla groups, and paramilitary elements as functional actors to limit his/her study to the FARC. By that way, s/he can focus on the (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state and take examine these functional actors by presenting their impact on the main issue at hand.

To illustrate the units of (in)securitization, I will continue with the same example. In the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, the strategic level decision makers include the presidents of Colombia and the leaders of FARC (Actually founding leader of FARC, Manuel Marulanda was its leader until 2008). Other crucial members of the governments and army chiefs, and high-ranking FARC members like military and political chiefs and block leaders can also be regarded as strategic level security professionals. Tactical and operational level security professionals were the Colombian police and military forces and FARC militants. For the primary (in)securitization the referent object was the Colombian state, for the counter-(in)securitization it was the poor peasants and the working class in Colombia. The audiences were Colombian people and the international society for both of the primary and counter-(in)securitizations. The sufferers included the ordinary Colombian people from all segments of the society. Low-level security professionals including the FARC militants and security personnel of the Colombian state can also be regarded in this category. The opposition included the groups or institutions inside and outside Colombia (NGOs, other states etc.), which rejected the security definition without a counter-(in)securitization. Finally, the functional actors included drug traffickers, paramilitary forces, and media, which played an important role in the process of dual (in)securitization without being a unit that is explained above.

4.6. Philosophical Background

As briefly expressed above, normatively, this approach does make judgments about what is the true, right or the legitimate security claim. It only aims to present how they are constructed and what are their insecuritizing consequences. In a way, it only deconstructs already constructed security claims. Therefore it only aims to create awareness among the readers. I believe this awareness is very crucial for change in the world.

Ontologically, the framework has a constructivist ontology. I believe ideas matter in social world. There is no unique truth in social issues and the ideas of people determine the so-called unique truth and reality. It is the ideas of people, which determine what is true and what is wrong, what is real and what is not, what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. Therefore truth is socially constructed and it can be deconstructed and reconstructed in a different manner. In line with this, the most important aspect of a (in)securitization process is the persuasion audience(s). By the consent and approval of enough number of right people (O'Reilly, 2008) an issue becomes true or legitimate. Therefore, the ideas of people make an issue a security issue. However, it must be kept in mind that power is the most important factor that affects this process of persuasion. The power of the strategic level security professionals is crucial in the process of (in)securitization. Therefore, there is an unbreakable linkage between power and truth/knowledge.

In accordance with this ontological stance, the framework adopts an interpretivist epistemology. The researcher can not be separated from the research at hand. Even

the selection of a case is influenced from the ideas, beliefs and the experiences of the researcher. This researcher aims to lay bare what is perceived as truth in a certain context. How this perceived truth is constructed and what are their consequences? In line with this, by examining the process of (in)securitization, the analyst presents how an issue is constructed as a security issue and what are its consequences.

4.7 Concluding Remarks

This chapter presented the new framework for critical security studies. This new framework addresses the shortcomings of the existing frameworks, which focus on the construction of exceptional security issues like the Securitization Theory and International Political Sociology. Moreover, it provides a framework, which can be applied to the hybrid democracies. The novel features of this new framework for critical security studies are expressed in the table below:

No	Explanation
1.	The new framework regards the process of (in)securitization as a whole process and examines it in three phases: definition, construction, (in)securitization-in-action.
2.	The new framework takes rival voices into consideration in its examination of (in)securitization process. Therefore, it provides a dual framework to analyze the opposition and counter-(in)securitization.
3.	The framework takes argues that (in)securitization has both bottom-up and top-down characteristics. Therefore it analyzed the role of macro-level decision-making and discursive construction, and micro-level practices.
4.	In line with the previous feature, the new framework takes both discourses and practices into consideration and examines them in a complex manner in three phases.
5.	The new framework divides security professionals into three levels (strategic, operational and tactical) and examines their differing roles in the process of (in)securitization.
6.	The new framework focuses on the impact of contextual issues on the process of (in)securitization. It particularly examines the impact of the level of democracy to the process to be able to examine the process of (in)securitization in hybrid democracies.
7.	The new framework eliminates the state-centric approach by explaining and analyzing how non-state actors can become securitizing actors.
8.	In line with the previous feature, the new framework can problematize non-state actors like insurgent groups by presenting the securitizing actors too.
9.	The new framework introduces novel units for the process of (in)securitization like sufferers, opposition and strategic level security professionals.
10	The new framework analyzes the insecuritizing consequences of the process of (in)securitization

Table 3. Novel Features of the New Framework for Critical Security Studies

Unlike Securitization Theory, the new framework regards (in)securitization as a process and examines it in three phases. These phases are summarized in the table below:

Name of the Phase	Who plays Role	What Happens	How to Analyze
Decision/Definition Phase	Strategic Level Security Professionals	Strategic Level Decision Makers Define Security and determine the threat, the referent object, legitimate security agent, security measures, and the ones that can be sacrificed for the security of the referent object.	A discourse analysis is required to examine and present the security definition.
Construction Phase	Strategic, Operational and Tactical Level Security Professionals	The audiences are convinced about the given security definition via discourses of strategic level security professionals, and the definition routinized and normalized by the practices of the tactical and operational level security professionals. Efforts of the opposition also influential in this phase. There is a debate between the opposition and the securitizer in this phase.	The analyzer must conduct an discourse analysis to present the discursive efforts of the securitizers to convince the audience(s). Moreover, an analysis of practices is required to examine the impact of security practices.
(In)securitization-in-action Phase	Operational and Tactical Level Security Professionals	The security practices of the tactical operational level security professionals lead to insecurities for other groups and issues, particularly the ordinary people.	The analyzer must examine the security practices. Additionally, S/he must examine the insecuritizing consequences of these security practices via field research or by facilitating already existing reports

Table 4. Phases of Constructing Security

Finally, the chapter presented the units of (in)securitization. The new framework modified some of the units that are introduced by the Securitization Theory and introduced novel units. Instead of the securitizing actor, the new framework introduces strategic level security professionals. It also introduces novel units like sufferers, opposition, and audience(s). Following table summarizes the units of (in)securitization for the new framework for critical security studies.

Unit	Explanation
Referent Object	This is the unit that is presented as if threatened and that must be protected. This unit may be a state, nation, a minority group, a tribe or, international or regional peace
Audience(s)	This is the unit that must be convinced about the security definition. The unit may include all citizens, members of a minority group or a tribe/clan, the international community, the international society, members of the legislative branch.
Strategic Level Security Professionals	This is the unit, which makes the security definition. It directs the security practices of operational and tactical level security professionals. It also discursively convinces the audiences. This unit may include the head of the executive, prime ministers, chief of general staff, tribe leaders, and Minority group leaders.
Tactical and Operational Level Security Professionals	This is the unit, which implements the security measures. These practices normalize and routinize the security definition and lead to insecurities. It consists of low-level security professionals like officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, police officers, militants, and intelligence agents.
Sufferers	This is the group that is securitized through the security practices of the security professionals and it mostly includes ordinary people.
Opposition	This is the group, which opposes the security definition of the strategic level security professionals without going violent and without a counter securitization.
Functional Actors	Units which affect the securitization process without being a securitizer, audience or referent object

Table 5. Units of the Process of Constructing Security

CHAPTER 5

THE CONTEXT OF THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

The theoretical framework to analyze the dual (in)securitization processes in hybrid democracies and their insecuritizing consequences have been explained in the previous chapters. Fifth and sixth chapters will further elaborate this theoretical framework by applying it to the case of FARC in Colombia. In this regard, the empirical part of this dissertation aims at analyzing the dual (in)securitization of the Colombian state and FARC. This chapter provides the contextual framework of the Colombian conflict according to the framework given in the previous chapter.

As I expressed in the theoretical part, contextual factors play a crucial role in the process of (in)securitization. These contextual factors include historical context, crucial events that impact the process of (in)securitization and the level of democracy in the given place. Therefore this chapter will examine these issues for the case of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state.

Colombian Conflict has been one of the longest internal conflicts in the world. Although the roots of the conflict can be traced back to the Spanish colonial era in the 19th century, it has taken its current form by the foundation of FARC in the 1960s. FARC emerged as an armed insurgent guerrilla group with its communist ideology to overcome the Colombian state. Factors like the Cold War, the success of the Cuban Revolution, existing tensions in the Colombian society and the violent period in the mid-20th century influenced the emergence of this group. Moreover, FARC was not the only communist insurgent guerrilla group that emerged in this period. There were other organizations like ELN. The conflict has become more complex and fierce by the emergence of drug production and trade, and the far-right paramilitary groups in the last three decades.

According to the report of The National Centre of Historical Memory²⁶, a government-created commission, at least 220.000 people lost their lives because of the conflict since 1958. 80 Percent of these people are non-combatants (2016: 15). Only between 1993 and 2003 2,5 Million People fled their homes (Legrand, 2003: 166). However, a final solution initiative, which aims to end the conflict, has been initiated by the Colombian state and the FARC in 2012. The process ended with success in 2017.

As stated above, this study aims to analyze the dual (in)securitization process of FARC and the Colombian state. However, the Colombian conflict is more than these two. It is more complex than two sides being in conflict. The roots of the conflict go beyond the foundation of FARC and there are other major units in the conflict

²⁶ The First Version of the report was published in 2013, the English version was published in 2016.

including the army, paramilitary forces, and drug traffickers. Therefore, this chapter makes a wider contextual analysis to be able to provide a wider background analysis for the case. Moreover, the new framework for critical security studies that is presented in the previous chapter provides us tools to limit our study to the FARC and the Colombian state by regarding other units as functional elements.

The first part of this chapter explains the background of the Colombian conflict. This includes the historical background and a brief geographical analysis. The second Part examines the level of democracy in Colombia and explains its impact on the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state.

5.1 Background of the Colombian Conflict (And Crucial Events that affect the (In)securitization Process)

This part provides a general contextual analysis for the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. For this aim, it analyzes the background of the Colombian conflict by providing a historical background. It also examines the crucial events like *La Violencia* and the Cuban Revolution, which affected the (in)securitization. Finally, this part analyses the main events in the process of (in)securitization, which took place after the 1960s.

Although it is explained in detail in the following parts, let me briefly explain the foundation of FARC before the examination of historical background because there are references to this process in this part. FARC was established in 1966 in the second national conference of the South Communist Block as the armed wing of

Communist Party in Colombia (FARC Manifesto, 1966). At that time, Colombia was living the National Front era after the end of *La Violencia*. The insurgent organization was founded as a reaction to the attack of the Colombian state to the Communist formations in the rural parts of the country (Legrand, 2003: 175). These attacks were part of the Lasso plan that is supported by the US (Rempe, 2002: 15).

5.1.1 History Before the *La Violencia*

In the colonial era, Spanish colonizers first settled to mountainous areas in the eastern Colombia where the temperature is lower compared to the western lowlands. They established the city of Bogotá (The Capital of Colombia) and Medellin in the Andean region (Legrand, 2003: 168). The colonizers established the Viceroyalty of New Granada under the jurisdiction of Spain in 1717. This Viceroyalty included the territories of Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guyana, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. The viceroyalty gained independence from Spain in 1819 and established Gran Colombia Federation. In 1830 the new federation broke down and the Republic of New Granada was established in the territories of Colombia and Panama. Venezuela and Ecuador also emerged as new states after the dissolution of Gran Colombia Federation. The Republic New Granada evolved firstly into the Grenadine Confederation in 1858, later the United States of Colombia in 1863. Finally, the Republic of Colombia was established in 1886. In 1903 Panama declared independence and split from the Republic by the influence of the Unites States of America for the construction of Panama Canal.

Related to Economics, the newly independent country lived poverty until the 1870s

since the lack of exportable goods. In this period, since the population had been concentrated in the higher eastern parts, middle attitudes and lowlands were not privately owned. After 1870s new agricultural products started to be produced in Colombia. Coffee became the leading export product in the last part of the 19th century and coffee economy developed in the 20th century (LeGrand, 2003: 169; (Palacios, 1980; Bergquist, 1978). Moreover, animal husbandry became one of the most important economic activities. Large farms, called as Hacienda, became the center for production (LeGrand, 2003: 169). These big farms owned by hacendados, which can be considered as landlords who employs many peasants. This can be regarded as the roots of the economic split between rich landowners and poor peasants, one of the most important reasons for the internal conflict in Colombia.

As a result of new economic activities, and by the help of new transportation means like railroads, peasants started to migrate to lower lands and opened fields to make agriculture in these public lands (LeGrand, 2003: 169). These movements regarded as the first internal colonization activity in the country and these new settlers are called as colonos (LeGrand, 2003: 169; González, 2004: 12). In the following decades, however, landowners, who already have power and richness, took these lands from the hands of poor peasants to establish more haciendas. This led to the start of the clash between the farmers and landlords for the unowned lands in the last decades of the 19th century (LeGrand, 2003: 169). This rivalry among the poor peasants and rich landowners have been the main pattern of rural conflict in Colombia since the government could not introduce a land reform (LeGrand, 1985). It also facilitated the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state since these poor peasants became enemies of the state, which could not protect them from the rich landowners

or took side with them. FARC emerged by claiming that it defends the rights of the peasants and by challenging the state (FARC Manifesto, 1966).

Most of the territories, particularly the lowlands in Colombia were not inhabited in the first decades of the independence. People started to settle these places as part of the internal colonization in the first decades of the 20th century. These places had always been out of the touch of the state apparatus and “the organization of social relations was left to individuals and social groups, and state lacked the monopoly on justice and the legitimate use of force” (González, 2004: 12). The elements of central state followed the settlements but it was never possible for the state to control all parts of the country. Colombia had a dual political structure in which local rulers are more powerful in the countryside (González, 2004: 12). Even in the last decades of the 20th century, state didn’t have presence in these lands (LeGrand, 2003: 173; Hartlyn, 1985). According to Roldan (2002: 296), “for most Colombians the central state was an abstract concept and power was largely exercised and determined locally or regionally, not in Bogota.” Moreover, different geographical and social conditions divided the country into sub-regions. In these places, local rulers had autonomy. LeGrand (2003: 169-170 and 173) explains this situation as follows:

Colombia’s vast areas of public lands, its mountainous terrains, variety of altitudes, climates, ecosystems, and peoples, and ongoing transport and communication difficulties produced a country of many regions and sub-regions, a profusion of central areas and wild hinterlands. From colonial to contemporary times, according to historians Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia has been marked by “spatial fragmentation, ... economic atomization, and cultural differentiation” (Safford & Palacios, 2002: ix). The sense of nation remained tenuous, regional and local struggles for power were endemic, and the institutionalization of effective central state proved difficult indeed. (LeGrand, 2003: 169-170 and 173)

Politically, Colombia has been a democracy since its independence. Two traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, were formally founded in 1849 and they had been influential in the political landscape of the country since their foundation, until the end of 20th century (González, 2004: 12). Almost everyone had been attached one of these parties and this strong affiliation inherited from generation to generation within families (LeGrand, 2003: 171). Both parties incorporated different classes ranging from poor peasants to rich landowners and had supporters both from urban and rural parts of the country (LeGrand, 2003: 170). Fernan E. González summarizes the main lines of conflict between the Liberals and Conservatives as follows:

These Partisan confrontations revolved around the extent and pace of economic and social modernization and the role of Catholic Church. They also often served as channels for expression of conflicts of a more social nature, such as struggles over land, rivalries between different regions and population centers, racial conflicts and confrontations between families or groups of families. (González, 2004: 12)

In the 1800s, violent conflicts between these parties had taken place permanently in different places of Colombia. In 1863 gained the rule and established a federal state (Sanín, Acevdeo, & Viatela, 2007: 8). Federal states had their own armed forces, electoral regimes and currencies (Colmenares, 1968; Safford, 1977, as cited in Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 8). In 1886 Conservatives gained the rule and started the period of La Regeneracion (Regeneration) in which they re-centralized the state (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 8). However, the efforts of the Conservatives to keep the Liberals out of the political contestation led to a massive internal conflict in 1899 (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 8; Bergquist, 1978). The conflict was called as the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902). It influenced the whole country and took the lives of 100000 People (LeGrand, 2003: 171; Bergquist, 1978).

It is appropriate to briefly explain the situation of traditional party affiliation and its consequences here. Until the end of the 20th century, strong party affiliations provided the link between the central state and local authorities in Colombia (González, 2004: 12). For people living in rural parts of the country, these two parties constituted only supra-local institutions (Legrand, 2003: 171). However, these parties also had an adverse effect to the weakness of the state too. The strength of these parties prevented the emergence of middle working class as a political actor. According to Braun (1985), these strong party affiliations inhibited the emergence of popular parties in Colombia and prevented the rise of the middle class (and other social elements) as a political element (Palacios, 1998; Hoskin 1998). “In the 1930s and 1940s, Colombia did not give birth to an important populist party like APRA in Peru, the Peronists of Argentina, or even the Mexican PRI” (Legrand, 2003: 171). Clientelist nature of this system undermined the state itself and strong party apparatus further weakened the state apparatus (Legrand, 2003: 171). In this clientelist system, rich people, with strong lobby groups directed the policy formations (Legrand, 2003: 173).

After the end of the War of a Thousand Days in 1902 and as a side product of this conflict Panama seceded from Colombia in 1903 (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 8). After that date, the country lived a relatively stable and peaceful period until the 1940s despite the great depression in 1930 (LeGrand, 2003: 171-172). Conservatives, which defeated the Liberals in the conflict, initiated the period of Conservative Hegemony (*La Hegemonía Conservadora*) after the secession of Panama (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 8). The experience of the Panama thought both parties to limit their political passions

and the Liberals adopted the idea that the only way to gain power was elections (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 8).

Economic growth in the first decades of the 20th century led to the emergence and strengthening of working class. However, Conservatives could not introduce a social reform in addition to their economic achievements (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 9). This led to the lost of 1930 elections by the Conservatives and start of Liberal rule in the country again. Liberals tried to introduce social reforms with the support of trade unions but they could not conduct a trenchout reform because of corruptions and attacks of the Conservatives (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 9). Toward the mid-1940s there emerged a new leader named Jorge Eliécer Gaitán who left Liberal Party for an alternative movement (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 9). As an innovative leaders, Gaitán gained support from the public by claiming that “The 'political country' and the 'real country' [...] were at odds” and “hunger was neither red nor blue” (Sanín *et al.*, 2007: 9; Braun, 1985). Conservatives defeated Liberals in 1946 elections. This led to the emergence of destabilization in the country. The assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 further increased the tensions and led to the emergence of *La Violencia* in 1946, which killed 200000 people (Legrand, 2003: 172).

5.1.2 *La Violencia* and the Roots the Conflict between FARC and the Colombian State

The violence in Colombia restarted after 1946 elections when Conservatives ended Liberal presidency after sixteen years. The assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 triggered a large riot called as the Bogotazo in Bogotá

(González, 2004: 12). After the riot of the Liberals, Conservatives responded by a counter-attack. The conflicts in city centers later triggered the clashes between liberal and peasants in rural parts and violence encompassed the whole country (Legrand, 2003: 172). State apparatus lost its function particularly during the first years of the conflict (Oquist, 1980). Through the end of 1940s Conservatives gained the command of the government and army. They later created paramilitary forces in rural parts of the country by giving weapons to civilians (Legrand, 2003: 172). As a reaction, Liberals and Communists established guerrilla forces to defend themselves. As a result, 200.000 people, mostly poor peasants, died during the clashes between the Liberals and Conservatives in this period.

Different scholars portray *La Violencia* in differing ways. LeGrand summarizes these different perceptions as follows (2003: 172; see also: Sanchez Gómez, 1985; Peñaranda, 1992):

Some see it [*La Violencia*] as a renewal of the nineteenth-century civil wars between Liberals and Conservatives, while others interpret it as a Conservative offensive against the followers of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Still, others say the breakdown of the state released a multitude of local conflicts, some political and others socioeconomic. Yet others see *La Violencia* as an abortive social revolution or, alternatively, as an offensive of landlords and business people against peasants and their allies who had begun to push for land redistribution.

The Violence relatively decreased in Colombia by the military coup in 1953 (González, 2004: 12). General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government and started a military rule, which lasted for four years. The amnesty of Liberal guerrillas enhanced the stabilization in the country. However, the military rule's exclusion of Communists paved a way towards a novel conflict. It also banned and illegalized the

Communist Party in Colombia (Lee, 2012: 30). The efforts of Rojas to dismiss the Liberal and Conservative parties and diminish their powers led to the cooperation between these two long-established parties (González, 2004: 12). In 1957 Liberals and Conservatives overthrew the military rule and established the National Front (González, 2004: 12).

La Violencia is an important event for the emergence of FARC and the dual (in)securitization of the Colombian state and FARC itself. However, I believe, it can not be regarded as the start of this dual (in)securitization. It is important because it paved the way for the creation of guerrillas, particularly Communist guerrillas in Colombia. Civil population was armed during the *La Violencia* and they formed armed groups to fight against each other in the rural parts of the country (LeGrand, 2003: 172). Particularly the exclusion of communist during the military rule, and the anti-Communist stance in the following National Front era influenced the dual (in)securitization (González, 2004: 12; Rempe, 2002: 15). On the other hand, it can not be seen as the start of the conflict between FARC and the Colombian state because *La Violencia* was mainly the conflict between the supporters of two traditional parties in Colombia, none of which were Communists. In the following decades, when the dual (in)securitization and conflict emerged and escalated, this conflict between Liberals and Conservatives lost its significance.

Moreover, the conflict between the Liberals and the Conservatives during the *La Violencia* and the conflict between the Colombian state and FARC have differing characters. Above all, the sides of the conflicts are different. Communists play a very limited role during the *La Violencia* and in the dual (in)securitization the sides are

FARC and the Colombian state, which includes both Liberals and Conservatives (particularly during the National Front era which followed *La Violencia* Liberals and Conservatives were mutually representing the state). As a result, *La Violencia* is an important contextual factor like the success of the Cuban Revolution for the dual (in)securitization but it does not mark the start of (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state.

5.1.3 The National Front and the Emergence of Communist Insurgent Groups

As expressed above, the National Front government was established in 1957. It was actually a contract between two traditional parties of the Liberals and the Conservatives. According to this pact, the presidency was to be passed through the Conservatives and Liberals until 1974 (LeGrand, 2003: 173; Braun, 1985). Moreover, governmental posts were to be allocated among the members of these parties. The elections were not abolished but they became non-functional since the voters had already known who was to become president before the elections (Hartlyn 1988).

The new elitist system was closed to change and in time it "became increasingly bogged down in bureaucracy, clientelism, and corruption" (LeGrand, 2003: 173). At the same time, Colombia faced a rapid social change after the 1960s. People left the countryside for big cities and a working middle class started to emerge there. Education level was also increased by the development of higher education (Pardo, 2000: 13). By the impact of these social changes, the hybrid democracy in Colombia became impotent to represent the political views of the population. The National

Front Governments also criminalized social protests. According to most of the scholars, the most important problem was the lack of freedom and the possibility of political expression during this era (Ramírez Tobón 1988; Restrepo & Alberto, 1988; Archila N., 1997; Chernick & Jimenez 1993, as cited in Legrand, 2003: 173). This problem is very important since this era also marks the start of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. As analyzed below, the problems in the democracy played an important role in the start of the (in)securitization.

This period also marked the weakening of the linkages between the traditional parties and the rural population. By that way, the function of the parties, which provide a bridge between the center and local society decreased. This contributed to the weakening of the state, which became less influential in the rural parts of the country where local authorities were much more influential (Hartlyn, 1985; Roldan, 2002; LeGrand, 2003). There also emerged a split between labor unions and the traditional political parties (Pardo, 2000: 13). By that way, strong lobby groups, which consist of rich landlords and businesspersons, became more and more influential in the Liberal and Conservative parties and state policies (Pardo, 2000). The National Front governments also could not conduct the agrarian Reform and land distribution. This issue also crucially affected the (in)securitization since by the help of this FARC easily gained support from the poor in the rural parts of the country (González, 2004: 13).

The conflict in *La Violencia* was an important contextual factor, which had an impact on the emergence of this dual (in)securitization. The know-how for armed conflict

was inherited to these guerrillas from *La Violencia*. However, there is another important event, which impacted the emergence of insurgent guerrillas and the (in)securitization: The success of the Cuban Revolution. The revolution in Cuba started in 1953 and ended with success in 1959 (Chomsky, 2011). During the Cuban Revolution, revolutionary forces defeated dictatorship of Cuban President Fulgencio Batista by using guerrilla tactics (Chomsky, 2011). This external example provided a model for the emerging insurgent guerrilla groups in Colombia (Wright, 2001). The Cuban Revolution could not become influential before the 1960s because the country was overwhelmed by the Liberal-Conservative conflict and because of the military rule of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (Wright, 2001). However, later in the 1960s, there emerged the idea that rural popular forces can beat conventional armies by using unconventional tactics learned from the Cuban Revolution (Lee, 2012: 30). The impact of the Cuban Revolution also influenced the situation in Colombia in other aspects too. Firstly, similar to the Cuban Revolution, the guerrilla movements started in rural parts of the country. Secondly, armed combat became the largest part of the movement instead of political efforts (Lee, 2012: 30).

Another crucial contextual factor was the Cold War. The dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state started after the era of *La Violencia*, in the 1960s. The cold war played a crucial role in the start of this issue. In the start of 1960s, the US initiated “Alliance for Progress” program, which aimed to stop the spread of Communism in Latin America (Rempe, 2002). As part of this program, the US applied a “dual-track model” for Colombia (Rampe, 2002: 11). In this model, it provided both socioeconomic aid and military support to Colombia. By the help of this support, Colombian government initiated plan Lasso (Rempe, 2002: 15). The

army started to attack these communist formations in 1962. This marked the start of the half a century long conflict in Colombia. Conclusively, Cold War in general and the US support to the Colombian Government against communists influenced the (in)securitization process crucially. These events can be regarded as the start of the dual (in)securitization in Colombia. Under these circumstances and as a reaction to these developments, new armed insurgent guerrilla groups, which confront the political monopoly of the National Front, started to emerge in the rural parts of Colombia in the 1960s.

Before the examination of the emergence of the guerrilla groups, let me briefly explain the geography and settlement patterns of Colombia. Colombia has a diverse geography and includes different qualities of climates, and products. The climate is tropical in lowlands and cooler in highlands. The three ranges of Andes Mountains where the greater part of the general population lives, divide the western part of the country. Between the western blocks, there is the Magdalena River Valley. These mountain ranges block circulation of everything including people, goods, ideas, and services.



Figure 1. Map of Colombia

The eastern part of the Andean mountains constitutes the two third of the country and there is a geographical uniformity. This part consists of Amazonian Rainforests and broad steppes called as Eastern Plains (Encyclopædia Britannica).

Colombia consists of five diverse areas according to settlement patterns (Encyclopædia Britannica). The first one is Atlantic Lowlands, which is located in the north of the country between Andean Mountains and the Caribbean Sea. Approximately twenty percent of the population lives in this region. Animal husbandry and farming constitute main production activities. The second Region is Pacific coast. This region is located in the western part of the country, between Andean Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. Afro-Colombians, whose ancestors brought to the country as slaves, constitutes the most of the population in this region.

The main economic activity in the region is agriculture. The third region is Andean Region. This part of the country includes the most of the population and the biggest urban centers like Bogotá and Medellín are in the region. Final two regions are Llanos and the Amazonian rainforest. Llanos is located in the northern part of the eastern steppes and Amazonian Rainforests extends in its south. Although this part constitutes more than half of the country, few farmers and Indians sparsely populate it. Drug producers and insurgent guerrillas have been included in this population in the final decades of the 20th century (LeGrand, 2003: 168; Encyclopædia Britannica).

As the first large insurgent guerrilla group, National Liberation Army (ELN) was founded 1964. The Cuban-inspired group was mostly consisting of "middle-class students and intellectuals, trade unionists and former liberal guerrilla members" (González, 2004: 13). According to LeGrand (2003: 174), ELN was established by the university students who went to Cuba. He also argues that "ELN strongholds are in the valley of the Magdalena River between Santander and Boyacá on the east bank and Antioquia on the west (Magdalena Medio) and in northeastern Colombia, near Venezuela (the Catatumbo and Sarare)" (LeGrand, 2003:174)

Unlike ELN, FARC was founded by the Communist Party supporters and extremist liberals²⁷ of *La Violencia*, in the peripheral parts of peasant colonization in Colombia (LeGrand, 2003: 175). It was also founded as a reaction to the attacks (particularly aerial bombings) of these peasant colonizers in the 1960s (LeGrand, 2003: 175). In the 1960s several independent republics had been founded in the south of the country near the central Magdalena River valley by Communists. These places included

²⁷ In addition to Communists, some of the liberals of the *La Violencia* era also attended FARC.

“Western Cundinamarca, eastern and southern Tolima, Huila, and Cauca” (González Arias, 1992, as cited in LeGrand, 2003: 175). These formations were founded by the members of the Colombian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Colombiano*, PCC), which was founded in the late 1920s (LeGrand, 2003: 175). The party was supported by workers and particularly by poor peasants since it was struggling for rights of tenant farmers and their public land demands (LeGrand, 2003: 175). So, the communists already had support from peasants in these rural parts of the country. Manuel Marulanda Vélez, the founder of FARC, declared one of these Communist formations in the area of Marquetalia.

However, the government banned these communist formations and started to attack them in the mid-1960s as part of Plan Lasso (Rempe, 2002: 15). This marks the start of (in)securitization process in Colombia by the Colombian state.²⁸ With the support of the US, Colombian state started harsh security policies including aerial bombings against communists (LeGrand, 2003: 175). Marquetalia formation was attacked in June 1964 but Marulanda could escape from the attack. These government attacks relocated these people towards the eastern plains. By this way, a new armed colonization emerged in Colombia in which the migrants regarded the state as a foe (LeGrand, 2003: 175-176). These people settled to the public land in the eastern plains and started doing agriculture there (LeGrand, 2003: 175-176). In this environment, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, alias *Tirofijo* or “Sureshot,” founded FARC as a rural movement and a reaction to the state violence. Therefore, these newly

²⁸ As I stated in the theoretical chapter, I reject the argument of Securitization Theory, which argues that (in)securitization ends when the discourse (speech acts) becomes successful and the security practices afterward. I regard (in)securitization as a process, which encompasses all phases of the process including definition, construction, and (in)securitization in action. Discourses and Practices as influential in different phases of this process together. Therefore this event, does only mark the start of the (in)securitization process.

colonized areas constituted the power bases of FARC (LeGrand, 2003: 176). The foundation of FARC marks the start of counter-(in)securitization in Colombia by FARC. The argument in the foundation of FARC was that "the political situation in Colombia had deteriorated under the false democracy of Rojas's National Front and pointed to the highly polarized distribution of wealth" (Lee, 2012: 30; Rochin, 2003).

5.1.4 After the 1960s: Insurgent Guerrillas, Paramilitary Groups, and Drugs

During the 1960s and 1970s, FARC was a distributed organization, which functioned in different regions of Colombia where state authority was weak or non-existent (LeGrand, 2003: 176). The Colombian state's inability to introduce land distribution further strengthened FARC during this period. However, until the mid-1980s the organization's primary objective was its survival and it did not pose a serious threat to the Colombian state (Longhurst & Lopez, 2005: 9). Later, after the emergence of Drug economy, it became apparent that the areas where FARC members were functioning were convenient for raising coca leaves (Molano Bravo, 1987, 1990; Jaramillo, Mora, & Cubides, 1986, as cited in LeGrand, 2003: 176). By this way, FARC involved in cocaine production and trade. By the help of this, it increased its strength rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s.

Drugs, particularly cocaine, are an important factor for the conflict in Colombia. Although it was not the starter of the conflict, it played an important role in the escalation of it. Firstly, in the 1970s, Marijuana production became an important economic activity in Colombia because of the increasing consumption, particularly in the US (LeGrand, 2003: 180). However, the economic production of Marijuana

decreased in the 1980s. In the 1980s cocaine production became an increasing economic activity as the demand for this drug has increased (Pardo, 2000: 67). Colombian drug barons first involved in cocaine trade. Later, in the mid-1980s, cocaine leaves started to be produced in Colombia particularly in the Northern part of Amazonian jungles (LeGrand, 2003: 181).²⁹ As stated above, these places were already under the control FARC. The organization started taxing the producers and traffickers.

The production and trafficking of cocaine also created rich drug barons in Colombia. To get more money, FARC started kidnapping the family members of these barons particularly in Medellin and Cali (LeGrand, 2003: 181). Moreover, the lands that are owned by these rich landowners and barons were contested old public lands. The insurgent guerrillas were also challenging the claims of these barons on these lands (LeGrand, 2003 182). As a response, drug barons started to establish paramilitary groups to protect themselves from the guerrillas. The first paramilitary group formed in 1982 as “Death to Kidnappers” (Muerte a Secuestradores) (Lee, 2012: 13). Later the number of these paramilitary groups increased in number. Rich landowners, local elites, and drug barons formed more and more civilian armed groups against the insurgent guerrillas both to protect themselves (from kidnapping and taxation) and to grasp the lands of poor peasants (LeGrand, 2003: 182).

In time, the common enemy (guerrillas) created collaboration among the Army and the paramilitary forces. This cooperation sometimes included the rich landowners too. Often, retired soldiers or police officers joined the paramilitary groups after they

²⁹ According to CIA Factbook, currently, Colombia is the largest coca producer in the world.

leave their formal duties (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001, 2003). Despite this collaboration, it is not true to regard paramilitary forces as a group, which is controlled by the state or cocaine barons or rich landowners. They have an independent character and have income from different elements including cocaine barons, local elites, and politicians (Romero, 2000).

In the 1990s these paramilitary groups increased in number and they formed a nationwide organization called United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC) (González, 2004: 13). This strengthening organization even conducted aerial operations and massacred many peasants in the areas, which were under the control of guerrillas (LeGrand, 2003: 183). It also killed human rights observers, labor union members, press representatives and even teachers in Colombia. These paramilitary groups have conducted the most of the massacres in the rural areas of Colombia (LeGrand, 2003: 184). It is also claimed that 75 percent of the displacements were resulted from the actions of these paramilitary forces (LeGrand, 2003: 184). Later, in the 1990s, paramilitary groups demanded political representation in Colombia. Although this was not given to paramilitaries formally, after 2002 elections AUC claimed that 35 percent of the members of parliament (both the senate and congress) are close to paramilitaries and present their ideas (*El Tiempo*, 13-14 March 2002, as cited in LeGrand, 2003: 183).

In 1982, Conservative President Belisario Betancur initiated a peace process and started negotiations with the guerrillas (LeGrand, 2003: 176). This process promised a ceasefire and amnesty for the guerrillas (Lee, 2012: 30). FARC responded by an effort to join democratic politics and it founded new political party as Patriotic Union

Union Patriótica) in 1985 (Rochin, 2003). One year after its foundation, the presidential candidate of the party won 4,6 of the votes. Moreover, the party “gained 350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions in departmental assemblies, 9 seats in the House, 6 seats in the Senate” in the same elections (Freeman, 2014). However, in the following years, members of this political party were killed by the assassins hired by paramilitary groups, Army members and local elites (Mendez, 1990; Dudley, 2004; Rochin, 2003). Approximately 2000-4000 people, who were related to the Patriotic Union, lost their lives by the assassinations until the mid-1990s (Lee, 2012: 31; Legrand, 2003: 176). This was an important lesson for FARC, which became more unwilling to participate in peace talks and integrate into democratic politics. Moreover, it proved the correctness of its stance for a military struggle against the state (Rochin, 2003: 132). This event is also important for the analysis of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state since it indicates that there was no place for democratic opposition in Colombia in this period. This may be the result of the impotence or reluctance (or both) of the Colombian state.

To increase the political participation and develop the level of democracy, Colombian government introduced decentralization and changed the constitution in 1991 (González, 2004: 13). Until that date, local rulers (local governors and municipal mayors) had been determined by the central government. After the constitutional change, these local rulers started to be elected by people living in these areas. The constitutional change also included the "ethnic, religious, cultural and regional and pluralism of the country" (González, 2004: 13):

Colombia is a social state under the rule of law, organized in the form of a unitary republic, decentralized, with autonomy of its territorial units,

democratic, participatory, and pluralistic, based on the respect of human dignity, the work and solidarity of the individuals who belong to it, and the prevalence of the general interest. (Article one of Colombian Constitution of 1991)

However, this reform could not be fully implemented because of the political culture and subsequent acts of the government. It also resulted in unexpected outcomes. It increased local conflicts for the rule in the rural parts of the country. In addition to traditional conservative and liberal parties, new social groups and parties (like the Patriotic Union) started to offer candidates for the local posts. In many instances, the conflict turned violent and this contributed to the increase in the general violence in the country (LeGrand, 2003: 179; Romero, 2000).

In the 1990s FARC's strength increased enormously with the help of the income from drug economy and the ransoms from kidnappings (LeGrand, 2003: 176; Lee, 2012: 31; González, 2004: 14). It also started to establish roadblocks and attack to infrastructure in urban centers. In the late 1990s, FARC demanded autonomous territories from the government as part of peace negotiations. Conservative President Pastrana accepted this request and declared a demilitarized zone for FARC in the southeastern part of Colombia (Lee, 2012: 31).



Figure 2. FARC Demilitarized Zone

However, this effort did not give anticipated results and did not contribute to peace (Lee, 2012: 31). It only provided more freedom to FARC in these areas and

completely diminished the state presence there. There emerged a virtual state controlled by FARC. According to Freedom House 2001 report, FARC was controlling more than 50 percent of the whole country. Moreover, this act is regarded as a victory against the Colombian state by FARC and provided more motivation to completely defeat the government. 2005 Freedom House Report explains this situation as follows:

In 2001, it became clear that the FARC's "demilitarized zone" was actually a state within a state that the guerrillas used as a sanctuary for coordinating military operations, as a rest area for battle-weary insurgents, and as a base for criminal activities such as drug trafficking and the warehousing of hostages.

In this period, FARC also tried to increase coordination with other insurgent guerrilla groups including ELN and Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion - EPL) (Lee, 2012: 33). Although these groups were not attacking each other, they were not conducting combined actions too. The first attempt occurred in 1985 to establish a coordination council (Lee, 2012: 33). However, this attempt did not work and completely failed in a short period of time. As a second effort, in 1987, FARC, ELN and EPL, formed Simon Bolivar National Guerrilla Board (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar - CGSB) (Lee, 2012: 33). Although this attempt presented some degree of success in coordination, it also failed because of the conflict between the FARC and ELN. According to Rochin (2003: 143), these attempts did not work since FARC not only aims to delegitimize the Colombian state but also eliminate its rivals. It does not accept negotiating with the state together with other leftist organizations. It also rejects combined actions with these groups.

As expressed above both guerrilla and paramilitary violence peaked in the 1990s.

Many people, who were not taking sides between these two groups, faced violence (LeGrand, 2003: 184). In urban parts of the country the insurgent guerrillas conducted violent action including kidnappings, bombings, and attacks on the infrastructure. On the other hand, in the rural parts, paramilitaries (sometimes together with the Colombian Army), attacked villages conducted massacres. However, in the late 1990s, things started to change in Colombia. In the late 1990s state started an offensive against the drug cartels in Colombia with the support of the US (González, 2004: 13). During this period, the US, under Clinton Administration, initiated Plan Colombia, which focused on the fight against drug production and trafficking in Colombia (LeGrand, 2003: 166). As a result, large drug barons lost their power. Although they started to form smaller organizations to continue their activities, their strength decreased by these attacks (González, 2004: 13).

FARC also started to lose its legitimacy and social support in the last part of the 1990s and in the 21st century. Firstly, FARC started to lose its social legitimacy as it engaged in drug production and trafficking more and more in the 1990s (LeGrand, 2003: 179). While arguing that it is fighting against a corrupt state and government, it involved in drug cocaine production and trafficking. According to Howe (2001), it is contradictory for FARC to engage in this infamous criminal activity while being committed to social justice. By these activities, FARC started to lose its stance as a representative of poor peasants against the rich landowners and state for social justice. LeGrand (2003: 180) summarizes this situation as follows:

FARC does support the survival of peasant farms against the encroachment of landlords. Beyond this, most knowledgeable observers say that FARC does not represent “el pueblo” [society]. Rather the guerrillas and the paramilitaries are engaged in a power struggle over control of territory as a

way to control people and resources. Where there are guerrillas and where there is retaliatory violence from paramilitaries or the Colombian Army, there autonomous social movements find it very difficult to survive.

Beside its activities related to drugs, the abductions and blackmailing activities also created frustration against FARC. FARC used these methods to raise money from rich people and use kidnapped people as leverage in the negotiations with the Colombian state. However, it did not act in accordance with its ideological stance in these actions too. Insurgent guerrillas of FARC started to kidnap people from all political viewpoints to raise money (LeGrand, 2003: 177-178). As a result, this created insecurity for all people living in Colombia. Another source of criticism towards FARC has derived from its use of children in combat. According to Freedom House 2005 report, 60 percent of FARC fighters were under the age of 15 in 2004. Children are used in most violent actions in the combat. A number of scholars pointed this issue and its adverse effects (Berkeley, 2001; Hoffmann & Weiss, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2005). Although FARC argues that these children join FARC voluntarily and studies on this issue the opposite (Lee, 2012: 36).

In sum, the activities, which strengthened FARC in the past, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, started to impact the organization adversely. By these activities, FARC gained economic income. However, they made the organization leave its founding principles and lose its legitimacy. While warring against the corrupt state apparatus, it became part of criminal activities and corruptness. Most people in Colombia do not regard themselves as part of FARC or paramilitary groups. Therefore this is not a civil war anymore (LeGrand, 2003: 184). Rather it is regarded as a conflict over territory, power, and money. In addition to these developments, the organization started to lose its strength in the early period of the first decade of the

21st century. The Colombian government took the control of demilitarized zones in 2002. By the effect of these, a good solution process and integration to democratic politics started to become the best option for FARC in this period.

5.1.5 Recent Developments and the Peace Process

Efforts to solve the conflict through negotiations failed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. People who supported peace talks in the late 1990s frustrated by the increasing violence and started to support an offensive against the guerrillas. According to Lee (2012: 31), “FARC’s use of demilitarized zone gave the Colombian government justification to initiate a devastating offensive and take back the territory in 2002.” Only “in 2002, in the wake of the breakdown of peace negotiations, 412,550 people (or an average of 1,144 per day) were displaced in Colombia” (Legrand, 2003: 191). As a result, this increasing violence and disillusion among people led to the election of aggressive president Álvaro Uribe in 2002. In line with these concerns among the society, he initiated a program called democratic security (*seguridad democrática*) to provide a legal background for the offensive against FARC.

Later, President Uribe initiated a massive offensive against the insurgent guerrillas. The offensive drastically diminished the power of guerrillas although it also led to human rights violations. As expressed above, state regained control over the demilitarized zones in 2002, which were under the control of FARC since the late 1990s. Despite the human rights violations, the successes against FARC increased the popularity of Uribe and he won the following elections in 2006. Although FARC

was cleaned from the areas where it expanded during the 1980s and 1990s, the organization did not fully demobilize. Moreover, conditions even worsened in some areas where paramilitaries took control after the withdrawal of FARC (Freedom House Report, 2012). AUC also formally demobilized in 2006. The 2005 Justice and Peace Law provided limited amnesty to the members of paramilitary groups. However, successor groups formed smaller organizations and continued their activities.

During this period, a few peace initiatives started (most of which were secret) but none of these succeeded. In 2008 Raul Reyes, important FARC commander, was killed by the Colombian Armed Forces. In the same year FARC's leader Manuel Marulanda also died. Alfonso Cano became the new leader of the organization. Alfonso Cano was also killed by the Colombian military in 2011 and Timoleon Jimenez, alias Timochenko, became the new leader of FARC. The number of militants of FARC decreased dramatically in the first decade of the 21st century (20700 in 2002 - 8000 in 2010) (OECD, 2016).

In 2010 election, Juan Manuel Santos, a former member of Uribe administration, elected as the president. Unlike Uribe, the new president has been more open to peace negotiations. He formed good relations with Hugo Chaves. In line with Cuba, Venezuela also started supporting a peace between the Colombian state and FARC (Colombia Peace Timeline). By that way, FARC lost its international support. In 2011, secret talks started between FARC and the Colombian government. First secret meetings took place in Venezuela and Cuba (Colombia peace timeline). In 2012, Colombian government introduced "Peace Framework Law" which will facilitate the

demobilization of armed guerrilla members. Finally, in August 2012 FARC and the Colombian Government signed an agreement to start formal peace negotiations despite the criticisms of former president Alvaro Uribe (Colombia peace timeline, 2012). Most of the population also supported the peace process (Ipsos Public Affairs, 2012-13). The talks start in the same year in Havana. During the talks, in November 2012, FARC declared a temporary ceasefire for two months. During the ceasefire of FARC, Colombian army continued its attack (Colombia peace timeline). After the end of two months FARC responded to the attacks by kidnappings and ambushes (Colombia peace timeline).

Despite these developments, peace talks continued in 2013. During the talks, FARC insisted on the constituent assembly for the ratification of the agreement but the government rejected this proposal and insisted on a referendum. In 2014 peace process slowed by the congressional and presidential elections in Colombia (Colombia peace timeline). In the elections, former President Uribe, who opposed the peace talks, established a new party and gained 20 seats in the Congress. Santos won the presidential elections by gaining the 51 percent of the votes against Uribe's candidate. During the elections, FARC declared a temporary ceasefire (Colombia peace timeline). With ups and downs, the talks continued in 2014 too. In December 2014, FARC declared a permanent ceasefire under the condition that the Colombian Army would not attack its fronts. However, the armed conflict escalated in April 2015 (Colombia peace timeline). The opposition gained strength by the escalation and the public support for peace talks decreased. By the help of Norway and Cuba, the guarantor countries, the efforts to decrease tensions started by both sides (Colombia peace timeline). In September 2015, parties reached an agreement about

transitional justice, which arranged the temporary rules for the people responsible for crimes, including amnesty (Colombia peace timeline). In January 2016, a final agreement signed between FARC and the Colombian government, which included the disarmament of FARC under UN observation. Additionally, FARC agreed to a referendum for the ratification of the agreement.

The referendum conducted on October 2, 2016. However, the public did not accept the agreement. In the referendum, 50,2 percent rejected the agreement while 49,8 percent accepted it. On November 24, 2016, parties signed a revised agreement and it was ratified in the both houses of the parliament. Although this ratification gave legitimacy to the agreement, this legitimacy is not so strong since it was not ratified by a referendum.

This part of the chapter provided a country profile and examined the historical background of the Colombian conflict to be able to provide a contextual analysis of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. In this analysis, *La Violencia*, the Cuban Revolution and the Cold War constitute important elements since they impacted the process as significantly as facilitators. In addition to these events, the geography of Colombia, which provided safe havens for the insurgent guerrillas out of the touch of the state, the settlement patterns of the population and uneven distribution of lands and wealth in the history of the country notably affected the process of (in)securitization. Moreover, the emergence of drug economy and drug trafficking influenced the already securitized issue dramatically. After this general contextual analysis, the next part examines the level of democracy in Colombia.

5.2 Colombia as a Hybrid Democracy

The Republic of Colombia has a presidential system in which the cabinet is determined by the president. It has a bicameral parliament, which includes senate and chamber of representatives. Both presidential and parliament (both houses) elections are held in every four years. 100 representatives are selected for the Senate by using a closed-list system. In addition to these, two more seats are left for indigenous people. The Chamber of representatives includes 166 representatives (Freedom House Report, 2016). Unlike the senate, the members of the Chamber are selected by using a closed list system with proportional representation in multimember provinces (Freedom House Report, 2016). Regional rulers are also selected by local elections since the introduction of 1991 Constitution.

Unlike other Latin American Nations, Colombia has been an electoral democracy since its establishment in the 19th century. However, the democracy in the country is a hybrid one. As expressed above, traditional two-party system, with Liberal and Conservative parties, dominated the political landscape of the country until the last decades of the 20th century. There had been a very high degree of partisanship among all segments of the society until the end of 20th century. Despite these, there emerged only three military coups in the history of Colombia, only one of which happened after the 19th century during the *La Violencia*.

During the first phase of *La Violencia* (1948-1953) the state apparatus almost lost its functioning (LeGrand, 2003). According to polity IV reports, which concentrate on procedural elements of democracy, after this violent period, the democratic level of

the country declined during the military rule of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Colombia). However, the reports indicate that the democratic level of the country increased again during the National Front era (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Colombia). In this period, although the procedural elements of democracy were existent, the status of democracy was actually lower since there was no chance for alternative voices. Two parties fully dominated the rule of the country in which they alternated the presidency and allocated governmental post among their members.

This era of National Front officially finished in 1978 and the country returned its two-party dominated system (LeGrand, 2003). However, the partisanship decreased and novel political parties and regional movements started to emerge in the last decades of the 20th century. In 2002, Alvaro Uribe Velez was elected as president from the Colombia First Movement, ending the Liberal-Conservative cycle. The election was affected by increasing the violent guerrilla and paramilitary activities in the country and Uribe was elected by promising harsh measures against insurgent guerrillas and drug traffickers (Lee, 2012).

Constitutionally, the executive is constitutionally powerful in Colombia. As expressed above, there is a presidential system and the president directly determines the cabinet. However, the government effectiveness is hindered by the high degree of corruption and multidimensional violence in the country. The recent history of the country is full of corruption scandals (Freedom House Report, 2016). Colombia was ranked 94 out of 175 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index (Freedom House Report, 2015). It

was considered within the three most corrupt countries in 2000 (Pardo, 2000: 67).

According to Freedom House 2005 report, the annual cost of corruption is more than 2.2 billion US dollars. "Political violence, corruption, and crime have all worked to undermine the authority of the central government" (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Colombia). In the country, there is a body to fight against corruption, which is headed by the inspector general. However, like other issues, most of the corruption affairs remain unsolved because of the high degree of impunity in the country.

With regard to executive constraints, constitutionally there is an effective separation of powers in Colombia. Until 2006, presidents only had a chance to be elected only for one term (four years). In 2006 this increased to two terms. With the constitutional change in 1991, local governors and municipal leaders are elected by local elections. The same constitution also limited the powers of the president and increased legislative control over the executive. Constitutionally, the legislature has the power to check the executive. However, like other government officials, they face violent threats from armed groups such as the insurgent guerrillas and paramilitaries (Freedom House Report, 2015). Additionally, the high degree of corruption and clientelist nature of politics decreases the effectiveness of this check over the executive.

Just like the legislature check over the executive, the judiciary is ineffective in Colombia. Although constitutionally strong, its power has been impaired by coercion of violent actors like the insurgent guerrillas and paramilitaries and the high degree of corruption and extortion (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Colombia; Freedom House Report, 2016, 2013). "Impunity for crime in general is rampant, with

convictions achieved in only 10 percent of murders. Most massacres during the conflict have gone unpunished” (Freedom House Report, 2005, 2016).

Ministry of Defense oversees both military and police forces in Colombia. However, civilian control of the military is limited in the Country (Freedom House Report, 2005, 2016). Colombian military forces had been inefficient until the end of the 1990s. By the support of the US (particularly Plan Colombia) and the hawkish policies of Uribe, the military gained strength in the first decade of the 21st century. Particularly, until the demobilization of AUC in 2006, the cooperation between the Colombian military and illegal paramilitaries and tolerance to the activities of these groups were widespread (LeGrand, 2003). Involvement of military personnel to illegal affairs like drug trafficking and massacres has also been common in the country. Approximately 2000 civilians have been directly killed by the security forces of the Colombian state (Freedom House Report, 2016). However, in recent years, human rights training of military personnel increased and many soldiers have been sentenced and fired from their post for killing civilians and presenting these murders as part of the fight against the armed guerrilla groups. Despite these developments, it is claimed that many high-ranking security personnel still remains unpunished because of the ongoing high degree of impunity in Colombia (Freedom House Report, 2015).

Political violence is one of the most important issues in the country. Parliament members, local and central officials, members of judicial authorities and civilians face kidnappings and assassinations. Only between 1997 and 2000 34 mayors had been killed and 100 mayors were kidnapped. “Political violence in Colombia

continues to take more lives than in any other country in the western hemisphere, and civilians are prime victims” (Freedom House Report, 2001). Only in the 1990s, 35000 people have been killed and 1,5 million people faced forced migration (Freedom House Report, 2001).

When it comes to political participation, there had been a factional competition in Colombia until the 21st century. This factionalism had been based on Liberal and Conservative parties. This factionalism also has a hereditary nature. Clientelism is evident in the politics of the country. Along the history, the supporters of each party, gained direct benefits from the rulers, if they are elected. “Vote buying and opaque financing” are general trends in Colombian elections (Freedom House Report, 2012). Elections campaigns and candidates are also financed by illegal organizations like drug traffickers. The high degree of corruption and other pre-mentioned issues makes the elections meaningless and decreases the participation of Colombians to the elections (Freedom House Report, 2002). “Opposition voices outside the two dominant parties are subject to political harassment and intimidation by Colombian security forces” (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Colombia). Political competition has been violent by the involvement of other entities like the leftist insurgent guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries.

Freedom of expression and free media has been protected by the constitution in Colombia. However, the high degree of violence prevents the efficiency of the press. In the last decades, hundreds of journalists suffered from this violence and faced fatal threats and kidnappings (Freedom House Report, 2016). Tens of journalists have been murdered since the 1990s since they report corruption and drug trafficking

affairs (three murders in 2015). Colombia was considered to be the second most dangerous country for the journalists in 2004 (Freedom House Report, 2005). These issues also not resolved because of the high degree impunity expressed above. Moreover, most of the biggest media companies are owned by rich families and these are not politically neutral (Freedom House Report, 2005). Additionally, although there is no official limitation to press or the Internet, journalists mostly apply self-censorship because of these violent pressures and constraints (Freedom House Report, 2016). In addition to media, there is no limitation to academic studies in the country too. However, armed groups, which also exist in universities, also limits the academic works (Freedom House Report, 2016).

Similar to freedom of expression, rights of association and other organizational rights are protected by the constitution in Colombia. However, the existing violence limits these rights too. The government uses violent methods against demonstrators. Other violent groups like the insurgent guerrillas and paramilitaries kidnap or murder the members of groups, which are established against their activities. Forming political parties or non-governmental organization is restrained by the violent groups (Freedom House Report, 2005). Many human rights groups' and land rights groups' members have been murdered by paramilitaries (only in the first six months of 2015, 34 human rights activists are murdered) (paramilitary forces are demobilized in 2006 but their remains, which formed small groups are still active) in the recent decades (Freedom House Report, 2016). Labor union activists also face the same violence. In the last 20 years, 2600 unionist have been murdered. Like other issues, most of these murders and other crimes like kidnappings remain unsolved. "Colombia is considered the world's most dangerous country for organized labor" (Freedom

House Report, 2012).

Individual rights are also limited because of the violence in the country. Freedom of movement and choice of residence has been hindered by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. Illegal road blockages, particularly in the countryside, limit the rights of transportation (Freedom House Report 2016). Indigenous communities³⁰ face violence from all groups since they reside in resource-rich areas and regions of cocoa production. Even some groups face extinction according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Freedom House Report 2014). The forced migration that results from the activities of all sides, is a major issue in Colombia. Particularly, the Afro-Colombians constitutes the biggest part of the total displaced population, which includes approximately 4 million people (Freedom House Report 2014).

Following two charts present the results of two most used democracy indexes: Freedom House and Polity IV. According to Polity IV index, which focuses on the procedural elements of democracy, the Country has been regarded as a simple democracy. Only during the military rule, between 1953 and 1957, it is ranked as a closed anocracy with the score of -5, but after then its score increased above 6 and regarded as a simple democracy. After the introduction of 1991 constitution, its score even increased to 9 but after the amendments to this constitution its level fallen to 7 in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. The following chart presents the result of Polity IV index after 1946 (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Colombia).

³⁰ According to Freedom House 2005 report, there are 800.000 indigenous people living in Colombia and there are 80 different ethnic groups within these indigenous people. These people face forced recruitment by the insurgent guerrilla groups and are murdered by paramilitary forces (Freedom House Report, 2005).




Figure 3. Polity IV Index Results: Colombia

According to the Freedom House index, which focuses on liberal characteristics of the democracy as well as its procedural elements, Colombia is regarded as partly free. Its scores change from 3 to 4 in the last two decades (highest rank being 1 and the lowest being 7). As the chart below presents, there is a trend towards freedom in the democracy of Colombia but it is still regarded as partly free. In 2017, as a result of the peace process the combined freedom score increased to 3. In 2009, civil liberties declined from 3 to 4 because of the increase in forced migration. In 2006, both scores increased from 4 to 3 as a result of decreasing violence against journalist and lower corruption.

YEARS	FREEDOM RATING	POLITICAL RIGHTS	CIVIL LIBERTIES
1998	4	4	4
1999	4	4	4
2001	4	4	4
2002	4	4	4
2003	4	4	4
2004	4	4	4
2005	4	4	4
2006	3	3	3
2007	3	3	3
2008	3	3	3
2009	3,5	3	4
2010	3,5	3	4
2011	3,5	3	4
2012	3,5	3	4
2013	3,5	3	4
2014	3,5	3	4
2015	3,5	3	4
2016	3,5	3	4
2017	3	3	3

Table 6. Freedom House Index Results: Colombia

If we examine the impact of the democratic level on the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, we see a mutually constitutive relationship between the level of democracy and (in)securitization. In Colombia, chances of political representation for alternative voices had always been low particularly because of the domination of two traditional parties. Especially after *La Violencia*, during the National Front era, this possibility even diminished and it became impossible for alternative voices to be heard and represented. In the same period, the hybrid democracy in Colombia could not address the emerging new political ideas after the social change in Colombia (expressed above). Among other things, this democratic deficit led the Leftist/Communists to securitize the Colombian state. State also securitized these alternative voices and used force against them. Therefore, we can

regard that democratic problems led to (in)securitization in the country. During first phase in the 1960s and 1970s this democratic deficit also led to the escalation of violence. Even in the 1980s, there was no place for alternative voices in democratic grounds. The efforts of FARC integrate into normal politics by establishing a political party was hindered by political violence in which thousands of Patriotic Party members were assassinated in the 1980s. This event marks the lack of opportunities for alternative voices in Colombia in this period of time.

After the issue fully securitized and violence embraced the country, it also hindered the democratization efforts. Once securitized, issues become hard to solve. Democracy further deteriorates within the spiral of violence. What we see in Colombia is an example of this situation. There emerged groups, who are fed from the violence like paramilitaries or drug traffickers. FARC also involved in illegal activities and gained strength by these activities. There were attempts to improve the level of democracy in Colombia. The 1991 constitution represents the strongest attempt. However, violence, which is brought by (in)securitization, makes it very hard to develop the democracy. It was also seen in the Pastrana era that a strong violent group can not be convinced for peace.

The mutually constitutive relationship between the level of democracy and (in)securitization can also be seen in the peace process, which happened in the last years. With the peace process and the desecuritization efforts, democratization gained pace. The corruption levels decreased and impunity started to diminish in Colombia although there is a long way to go (Freedom House Report, 2016, 2017).

In addition to this mutually constituting relationship the level of democracy in Colombia has direct consequences for the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. First of all, there emerged a counter-(in)securitization rather than a non-violent opposition. The experience of Patriotic Union proved the impossibility of a non-violent opposition. In addition to this the security practices and their consequences were harsh. As it will be examined in the next chapter, hundreds of thousands of people died in the conflict and millions of people faced forced migration. Other insecurities included forced disappearance, sexual abuse, child soldiers in addition to the limitation of basic freedoms and rights like freedom of expression.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

As expressed in the previous chapter, the new (in)securitization framework for critical security studies gives utmost importance to contextual factors. These contextual factors include historical background of the issue, important events and issues that have negative or positive impact on the (in)securitization process, level of democracy in the given state.

For the examination of the context of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state all of these issues have been examined in this chapter. Firstly, by providing a country profile and examination of historical background, the historical, geographical and sociological roots of the conflict have been presented. Moreover, important events, which have a major impact on the (in)securitization process, like the success of the Cuban Revolution and *La Violencia* have been examined in this

part. Finally, the level of democracy in Colombia has been examined by referring to certain issues and the impact of the democratic level of the country to the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state has been analyzed. After the examination of context, the next part examines the process of the dual (in)securitization.

CHAPTER 6

DUAL (IN)SECURITIZATION OF FARC AND THE COLOMBIAN STATE

This chapter examines the dual (in)securitization of the Colombian state and FARC. As expressed in the theoretical part, in this chapter, the whole process of (in)securitization will be examined without focusing only on one phase or era. Therefore, the analysis includes all three phases of (in)securitization including definition, construction, and (in)securitization-in-action. This process of (in)securitization started in 1964 by the (in)securitization of communists by the Colombian state and ended in 2017 with the approval of the peace agreement between the Colombian state and FARC. Since there has been a dual (in)securitization in Colombia, all phases are examined for both primary and counter-(in)securitizations.³¹

³¹ Before the analysis of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and Colombian state, it must be stated here that the main objective of this dissertation is to introduce a novel critical security framework to analyze the process of (in)securitization. Therefore, the empirical case that is analyzed here is to present how this framework functions or how it is used to examine the process of (in)securitization.

In line with the new theoretical framework for critical security studies, the chapter firstly examines the units of the (in)securitization process before the analysis of the dual (in)securitization. These include strategic level security professionals, operational and tactical level security professionals, reference object, audiences, opposition, sufferers and the functional actors. The second part of the chapter focuses on the definition of security by the Colombian state and FARC and the evolution of this security definition in time. The third part focuses on the construction phase of the (in)securitization process and it concentrated on the Uribe era after 2002. In this analysis, the discursive efforts of FARC and the Colombian government to convince the audience are analyzed. The final part of the chapter focuses on the insecurities that were created by the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. These insecurities include selective assassinations, massacres, sexual abuses, forced displacements, forced disappearances and deterioration of democracy and basic freedoms and rights.

6.1 Units of the Dual Securitization of FARC and the Colombian State

First of all, although these will be analyzed in detail in the following parts of this chapter, I will give a brief overview of the (in)securitization process in Colombia. The (in)securitization process started when Conservative government, in line with the support of the US and the Lasso Plan, banned communist formations (independent republics) in the early 1960s (during the National Front era) and started to attack communists (Rempe, 2002). This is the start of the primary (in)securitization in Colombia.³² As a result of the attacks, these leftist people moved

³² As expressed in the theoretical part (Chapter 4), in the examination of the process of (in)securitization I used the term primary (in)securitization to refer the (in)securitization process that

to eastern plains of the country. A group of them, under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda Vélez, founded FARC in the second conference of Southern Communist Block in 1966 (FARC Manifesto, 1966). This event marks the start of Counter-(in)securitization by FARC. I particularly determined the efforts of the Colombian state as the primary (in)securitization and the efforts of FARC as the counter-(in)securitization since the main idea in the foundation of FARC was defense from the government attacks. However, this stance can be criticized from a different perception, since the communist formations were already threat to the Colombian state too. I believe this is a valid criticism. However, it is not required to delve into a political debate about the starter of the process of (in)securitization in this study since the framework aims to present security issues are constructed and it has a dual nature. Moreover, a counter-(in)securitization does not have to start by a threat perception from the primary (in)securitization.

As explained in the theoretical part, the units of (in)securitization must be introduced and examined for a (in)securitization analysis. Accordingly, this part will briefly examine the units of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. These units include the referent object, strategic level security professionals, tactical and operational level security professionals, audience(s), opposition, sufferers and the functional actors. In the Colombian conflict, both sides, the Colombian state, and FARC, (in)securitized each other. Therefore, the units of both primary and counter-(in)securitizations are examined in this part.

emerged first. To refer the (in)securitization process that emerged as a reaction to primary (in)securitization I used the term counter-(in)securitization. In this context, the (in)securitization by the Colombian state is regarded as primary (in)securitization and the (in)securitization of FARC can be considered as counter-(in)securitization.

The first unit of the (in)securitization process is the referent object. As expressed in the theoretical part this unit is the one, which is presented as threatened by the element, which is constructed as a threat. It can be argued that for the primary (in)securitization, the Colombian state itself is the referent object. FARC is regarded as threatening the survival of the Colombian state. It is presented as it aims to overthrow the Colombian state in order to establish a communist one. Moreover, Colombian people also presented as referent objects, which are threatened by the atrocities of FARC and other rebel organizations. For the counter-(in)securitization, people in Colombia (particularly the poor peasants and working class, and ordinary people) can be regarded as the referent object (FARC Manifesto, 1966). In essence, FARC emerged as an organization by claiming to protect poor peasant and working class, which are suppressed by the Colombian state and rich bourgeoisie class in Colombia. Moreover, Colombia as a country is presented by FARC as a referent object, which is threatened by the US and its puppet governments in Colombia.

The second unit of a (in)securitization process is the strategic level security professionals (or high-level securitizing actors). Since I regard (in)securitization as a whole process and the framework that I presented in this dissertation takes this whole process of (in)securitization into consideration, I can not name a unique set of strategic level security professionals for the half a century long (in)securitization process in Colombia. As the time passed different actors adopted these roles.

Therefore it is more appropriate to give some subject positions for strategic level security professionals. In Colombia, for the Colombian state, presidents have been strong since the foundation of the country in the 19th century. However, other high-ranking officials like ministers and army chiefs should also be regarded within the

strategic level security professionals too. These actors, with their power and means, played a crucial role in the definition of security (or redesigning the security definition), the direction of security practices, and they played a discursive role in the process of convincing the audiences.

In the start of the (in)securitization process Guillermo León Valencia Muñoz, who was from the Conservative Party, was the president of Colombia. The government securitized the communists which formed formations called as republics in the rural parts of the country and started an attack on them (during the National Front era) under plan Lasso (Rempe, 2002: 15; Legrand, 2003: 175). This led to the counter-(in)securitization and foundation of FARC in 1966 (FARC Manifesto, 1966).

However, this does not mean that Guillermo León Valencia was the only strategic level security professionals because (in)securitization does not end when the violent practices started. Some of the other presidents and important governmental figures must also be regarded as strategic level security professionals. For example, Alvaro Uribe Velez, who was the president of Colombia from 2002 to 2010, can be regarded within this category as a hawkish leader against FARC and other rebel groups. During his presidency, Uribe conducted novel harsh security measures against the insurgent guerrillas.

On the other side, for the counter-(in)securitization by FARC, FARC leaders, and important high-ranking FARC members can be considered within the category of strategic level security professionals. Manuel Marulanda Vélez, alias *Tirofijo* (sure-shot), can be considered as the most prominent strategic level security professional since he founded FARC in 1966 in the second Southern Block guerrilla conference

and he was the leader of the organization until his death in 2008. However, as expressed above, he can not be regarded as the only high-level securitizer since there have been other prominent actors within the organization of FARC (block leaders, political chief or military chief) and the (in)securitization process continued after his leadership too.

The third unit of the (in)securitization process is the tactical and operational level security professionals. This unit mainly consists of security practitioners who implement security measures but do not play a role in the definition of security. For the Colombian state, security forces of Colombia including police and military can be regarded within this category. On the other hand, for FARC, the militants of the organization can be regarded as the operational and tactical level security professionals.

The fourth unit of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state is the audience(s). This is the unit, which must be convinced about the security definition for the (in)securitization of the issue. By this persuasion (enough number of right people) the definition gains legitimacy and by that way, it becomes a true definition. For both primary and counter-(in)securitizations Colombian people must be regarded as an audience. For the primary (in)securitization, governments have to get the support of Colombian people for their activities including security measures. This support provides legitimacy to their actions. Moreover, if they can not convince the Colombian people, they can not be elected in the following elections. FARC also needed to convince Colombian people to gain legitimacy.³³ In the eighth national

³³ Although the primary audiences of both sides can be differentiated (like poor peasant and workers for FARC), the whole population must be taken as the audience since both parties aimed convincing

conference of FARC audience is presented as follows:

In our fundamental goal of seizing power, we must win the conscience and heart of the population. Therefore all our military, political, organizational and propaganda actions must be directed to the masses of the countryside and the city, feel that we fight, defend and represent their interests, their needs and their ideals. (Manifesto of 8th National Conference of FARC, 1993)

In addition to these, the international society, particularly neighboring states, can also be regarded as an audience too. This is because by convincing other states both organizations gain international support and legitimacy.

The fifth unit of the (in)securitization process is the sufferers. The members of this unit face insecurity consequences of the security practices. In the case of Colombia, ordinary Colombian people from all segments of the society, including poor and rich, urban and rural falls in this category. Many peasants were killed or immigrated because of the security measures of the state, FARC killed many civilians in bombings or attacks. It also kidnapped many others for ransom or political gains. From my point of view, operational and tactical level security professionals also fall into this category too. This is because they do not play a role in the determination of the security definition but they face the insecurity consequences of it. In practice, they may be creating these insecurities for others but they do not have initiative and a say in the strategic planning. They have to obey the rules and orders.

The final unit of a (in)securitization process is functional actors. These actors

as much people as they can to legitimize their security definitions. Moreover, the audiences can also be separated as moral and formal audiences or according to their impacts in a study, which only focus on the audience(s). However, this study does not categorize them since the study aims to present the whole process and the function of the audience is unique.

influence the process of (in)securitization without being one of the units that are examined above. This category is particularly important since it helps an analyst to limit his/her study. In the case of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, by determining the functional actors, I can focus on FARC and the Colombian state within the wider conflict in Colombia. In this regard, drug traffickers, paramilitary forces, media and other insurgent guerrilla forces like the ELN can be considered within this category for the case of this dissertation. These units influenced the process of (in)securitization but they can not be regarded as fully sided one of the conflicting parts.

Drug traffickers were rich outlawed groups, which both produce, process and transport illicit drugs, particularly cocaine. To protect themselves both from the Colombian state, and FARC and other insurgent guerrilla groups they created paramilitary groups together with the rich landowners who played a role in the emergence of paramilitaries for their protection from guerrillas. The situation of paramilitary forces is more problematic. They have conducted many coordinated operations with the forces of the Colombian state. Moreover, as expressed above, most of the atrocities were conducted by these paramilitary groups. However, they can not be regarded as part of Colombian forces since they had their own organization, agenda, and goals (Pardo, 2000: 70).

When it comes to media, as expressed in the context chapter (Chapter 5), it is hard to argue that there are free media in Colombia. However, even under these conditions, it is not true to put media on the side of one of the conflicting groups. This is because, there are other motives for media to make certain news and programs:

ratings, getting more advertisement and gaining more money. Finally, ELN is also another leftist insurgent guerrilla organization fighting against the Colombian state for similar goals like FARC. However, as expressed in the previous chapter, ELN is a different organization. Although ELN and FARC had never fought against each other, they also did not cooperate in their actions too. Conclusively, these elements influenced the process of the dual (in)securitization and they played important roles in the conflict in Colombia. However, since the case of this study is limited to the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state, they are regarded as functional actors. The following table summarizes the units of the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state.

Unit	Primary (in)securitization	Counter-(in)securitization
Referent Object	Colombian State	Colombian People (Particularly poor peasants and working class)
Audience(s)	Colombian People and the international society	Colombian People and the international society
Strategic Level Security Professionals	Presidents, other high-ranking officials like ministry of defense and military chiefs	Leader of FARC, other high-ranking leaders like the block leaders or political and military chiefs
Tactical and Operational Level Security Professionals	Military and police forces	Militias /Insurgent guerrillas
Sufferers	Colombian people from all segments of the society	Colombian people from all segments of the society
Opposition	There emerged a counter (in)securitization instead of non-violent opposition	
Functional Actors	Paramilitary forces, media, drug traffickers, and other insurgent guerrilla organizations like ELN	Paramilitary forces, media, drug traffickers, and other insurgent guerrilla organizations like ELN

Table 7. Units of the Dual (In)Securitization of FARC and the Colombian State

6.2 Definition Phase

As expressed in the fourth chapter, in the definition phase, strategic level security professionals define security. This definition is not a narrow one, which only determines an existential threat. In this definition, the strategic level security professionals answer the questions of What is the threat? What should be protected? (or what deserves protection?) What is legitimate security provider? Whose security can be sacrificed?

In addition to these, is not true to argue that once defined this definition does not change. As the strategies, goals, actors and context change answers of some of the above-mentioned questions also evolve. In the half a century long conflict between FARC and the Colombian state this definition also evolved in time. Therefore, this evolution will be examined here too. Moreover, since the framework has a dual approach and there is a counter-(in)securitization in the Colombian case, security definitions of both the Colombian state and FARC will be examined here.

6.2.1 Definition of Security by the Colombian State

The primary (in)securitization was initiated by the Colombian state by the (in)securitization of communists after *La Violencia* during the National Front era. Within the environment of Cold War, the spread of communism was the primary threat to the US. Because of this, in addition to Marshall Plan in Europe, it started 'Alliance for Progress' program in Latin America (Rempe, 2002). In line with this program, Colombian state, initiated Plan Lasso to destroy communist formations in the country. In 1962 Colombian Military started to attack communists and started the 50 years long conflict in Colombia. As a reaction to these attacks, in 1966, FARC was established.

The earliest form of the security definition of the primary-(in)securitization can be inferred from the implementation of the Lasso Plan.³⁴ In this definition, the threat was the communist formations in the country. This threat was in line with the aims of the US (Rempe, 2002; Rempe, 1996), which aimed the stop the spread of

³⁴ Although I have examined news about the Lasso plan I could not reach the original documents about it. Therefore, I analyzed the security definition of the Colombian state by the implementation of this plan.

communism in Latin America and in the World. In accordance with this definition of the threat, the referent object was the Colombian state. Communists were threatening the very existence and the legitimacy of the Colombian state because they were aiming to establish a proletarian communist state in Colombia. In a wider sense, these communist elements were also threat to the Western block within the context of the Cold War. Finally, in this definition, the legitimate security provider was the armed forces of the Colombia.

In the following decades, FARC and the other insurgent guerrilla groups started to be defined as threats instead of communist formations. Particularly after September 11 terrorist attacks in the US and the start of War on Terror, these elements started to be called as terrorists. In the following statement Uribe refers to FARC as a terrorist organization:

Our security forces never have the slightest inclination to be equated with terrorists in their disregard for human rights. So while the FARC and terrorism that accompanies it, while the terrorist organization daily violates human rights, that political field of human rights is out to defend the FARC on the pretext of defending human rights. (Speech of former President Uribe, October 09, 2003)

6.2.2 Definition of Security by FARC

In order to examine the definition of security by FARC and the evolution of this definition, I have examined the manifestos of National Conferences of FARC. So far FARC has conducted ten conferences, the last one being in 2016. In the first conference, in 1965, FARC was non-existent and the movement was called as Southern Block. FARC was founded in the second national conference (1966) of this

block. Because of this, the most important document for the examination of FARC's security definition is its 1966 Manifesto. This is also the founding manifesto of FARC.

In the manifesto of 1966, the threat is presented as the "Yankee imperialism" and the puppet government in Colombia which acts in alliance with these Yankees and which implements Lasso plan against communist in the country (FARC Manifesto, 1966). After the analysis of the manifesto of 1966, it is easy to regard that this concept of Yankee imperialism refers to the US with its 'alliance for progress' policy towards Latin American countries. As the ones who must be protected (or the referent object), FARC presents ordinary Colombian people, particularly peasants and workers. It is argued in the manifesto of 1966 that these Yankee imperialists are smashing "workers of the city and the field" under their boots (FARC Manifesto, 1966). Moreover, although it is not directly expressed, it can be understood from the national conference manifestos that the FARC itself is also a referent object since it is also threatened by the threat and the primary goal of the organization was its survival. The threat and the referent objects were stated in the 1966 manifesto as follows:

In the country, the oligarchy [Colombian government] and Yankee imperialism are unleashing a vast reactionary offensive against our people, against all workers' organizations, against public and private employees, against teachers, students, transporters, small industrialists and merchants, against peasant producers, against artisans, against independent newspapers and journalists, against progressive writers, artists and intellectuals, against the men and women of Colombia who do not want to die of hunger. (FARC Manifesto, 1966)

As seen in the statement, Colombian state (Oligarchy-what is meant here is the National Front government) and the US (Yankee imperialism) are presented as a threat. In the following parts of the manifesto the threat is explained as: “in Colombian camps, the imperialists and reactionaries unleash a dirty war of extermination against the peasantry. It is called counter-revolutionary preventive warfare under the Lasso plan” (FARC Manifesto, 1966).

To fight against these threats, the manifesto determines guerrillas and guerrilla warfare as legitimate security agents and tactics. In the security definition, this legitimate security agent was presented as the guerrillas of FARC. It directly states that the way to defeat this threat is guerrilla tactics and guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the manifesto announces the foundation of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC.

In the face of all the above, the guerrilla detachments of South block, we have united in this conference and formed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This will begin a new stage of struggle and unity with all revolutionaries of our country, with all the workers, peasants, students, and intellectuals, with all our people, to promote the struggle of great masses towards popular insurrection and seizure of power for the people. (FARC Manifesto, 1966)

The final element of the definition is the ones that are sacrificed. However, although these sufferers are determined in the minds of the decision makers while defining the security they are hardly stated in public. Therefore, these can only be determined by the security practices. Until the mid-1980s the FARC’s primary goal was its survival (Longhurst & Lopez, 2005: 9). Therefore, its practices were conducted within this framework. However, if we examine its security practices especially after this date,

we can see that sufferers include Colombian people from all segments of society. FARC conducted roadblocks, kidnappings, and bombings in city centers in which many ordinary people died. Moreover, by these actions, basic freedoms of these people are limited.

For the examination of the evolution of the definition, it can be argued that following conferences of FARC focused more on the guerrilla tactics that must be implemented. However, it can be argued that the references towards Yankee imperialism diminished in time and the Colombian state and its security forces are presented as the threat (What is the National Conference of Guerrillas?, Official FARC Website). However, after Plan Colombia, The US restarted to emerge as a threat in the security definition of FARC (Ninth National Conference of FARC, FARC official website). Additionally, after the end of Cold War, the references towards the proletariat as the referent object of security diminished and ordinary people of Colombia started to be presented as the one, which is threatened.

6.3 Construction Phase

The construction phase is the one in which security practices are implemented and the audiences are convinced via discursive efforts. In this phase, strategic level security professionals attempt to persuade the audience(s) discursively and they direct the operational and tactical level security professionals. On the other hand, operational and tactical level security professionals implement security practices. These security practices also lead to normalization and routinization of security and this helps the construction of it too. In line with this explanation, in this part I

examine 2 issues. The first one is the discursive efforts of the strategic level security professionals and their direction of security practices. The second one is the practices of the operational and tactical level security practices.

Although I regard (in)securitization as a whole process, in these discourse analyses I have focused on different eras of the 50 years long (in)securitization process. This is particularly because it is impossible to analyze all of the discourses and practices of both sides in one chapter. Moreover, it is impossible to collect data for the discourses in the first decades of the conflict, both for the Colombian state and FARC.

6.3.1 Efforts of the Colombian State for the Construction of Security

For the primary (in)securitization I have analyzed the discourses of President Alvaro Uribe. President Uribe was an important figure since he broke the traditional liberal-conservative cycle in 2002. When he was elected as the president, FARC was living its strongest period since its foundation in 1966. The previous president Andres Pastrana attempted to conduct a peace process but FARC emerged stronger after this attempt. President Uribe, whose father was also killed by FARC in a kidnapping attempt in 1983, elected as a president by claiming that he is going to implement harsh security policies against insurgent guerrillas including FARC within his program of ‘democratic security’.

I have analyzed the speeches of President Uribe to present his efforts to convince the audiences and show the reference points that he referred for the (in)securitization of FARC. As expressed in the methodology, I have analyzed one or two speeches per

year from 2002 to 2010 which are available in presidential website and press achieves.³⁵ I have selected the speeches according to their relevance to security issues. In these speeches, the former president attempts to persuade the audience(s) that the security policies against guerrillas are right and for this aim, he usually refers to the atrocities linked to these insurgent guerrilla groups including FARC. In this part, I will give some selected statements from the speeches of President Uribe to present the efforts of the former president. For example, in his inauguration speech in 2002 he stated the followings:

One murder is serious enough, [...] but we have 34,000. In kidnaps, of which between 3,000 and 3,600 are reported, we account for 60% of all such crimes in the world. And each kidnap means suffering, the flight of capital, and unemployment. We didn't come to complain, we got here to work.

...

Our concept of democratic security demands giving ourselves to seek an effective protection of citizens regardless of their political beliefs or level of wealth. [...] No crime can have justification. No crime can be justified, directly or otherwise. No kidnap can be explained away by political doctrine. I understand the grief of the mother, the orphan and the displaced.

...

When a democratic state provides effective guarantees, even if it comes to do so gradually, any violence against it is terrorism. We do not accept violence as a means of attack on the government, or as a means of defense. Both are terrorism. The only mission of the legitimate force of the state is to defend the community, and that force cannot be used to silence its critics. (Uribe Velez, 2002a)

As seen in the statement, Uribe attempts to convince the audience(s) that the insurgents are security threats by referring to their actions like kidnappings. The following quotation is another example from a 2003 speech. In this speech, Uribe continues to focus on the activities of insurgents. He also argues that despite the

³⁵ The speeches of President Uribe are achieved in the website of the presidency (Spanish).

human rights violations of these groups, the forces of the Colombian state respects these rights in their operations:

This week is Human Rights Week. Of course, this policy of Democratic Security is a human rights policy [...] we did it for a commitment to pluralism, with all our compatriots, without looking at their political ideas, religious beliefs, in their economic or social status.

...

This policy is to defend all Colombians, to defend the peasant, the agricultural employer, the industrialist, the worker, the union leader. This policy is to protect those, for example, are candidates [for political positions]

...

No country in the world is confronting the terrorist challenges that Colombia faces, and guaranteeing full freedom like Colombia. Countries with fewer terrorist challenges, located in small and easily controllable areas, have canceled press freedom. (Uribe Velez, 2003)

The following statements are also from Uribe's 2002 speech in General Army

Promotion:

The challenge of democracies today is the defeat of the enemy of society. The enemy of society is terrorism and organized crime, whatever their ideological trappings. In this battle, all democracies in the world are natural allies.

...

Break the power of this diabolical mix of terrorists, drug traffickers and gangs of vulgar robbers, it is a challenge that the whole world should applaud and support. It is a sacrifice offered by the soldiers of Colombia in defense of humanity. (Uribe Velez, 2002b)

The number of these examples can be increased. However, in general, President Uribe refers to the atrocities of the insurgents to (in)securitize them. Moreover, he highlights that the official security forces of the Colombian state respect the human rights despite these atrocities of the insurgents. Even the name of the security program was 'Democratic Peace' in which the emphasis on democracy aims to gain support and legitimacy.

In line with these speeches of Uribe, Security forces of the Colombian state conducted security operations against FARC and the other insurgent guerrilla groups. In a short period of time, Security forces cleared demilitarized zones where were granted to FARC during Pastrana Presidency. Moreover, the number of FARC fighters fallen from 20000 in 2002 to 8000 in 2010. These practices also normalized the idea among people that FARC and other insurgents are security threats. Moreover, as it will be examined in the next part, they resulted in insecurities for other people.

Although there are no surveys, which examine the support of Colombian people to the President Uribe's policy of democratic security, the elections of 2002, 2006 and 2010 show that people supported these policies. In his two-term presidency, the main argument and policy of President Uribe were his security policy towards the insurgents and he gained support in all of these elections.³⁶ In 2002 Uribe was elected as a president by promising harsh measures against insurgents and he gained % 52.7 of the votes. In 2006, after the implementation of these policies, he was re-elected by getting %62 of the votes. Finally, in 2010, after he finished his two terms, Juan Manuel Santos, who was Uribe's Minister of Defense and supported by President Uribe in the election period, gained the % 69 of votes. In the election period, President Santos also argued that he would continue hardline security policies during his term. As these results indicate, the efforts of Uribe and the security practices of the Colombian security forces worked to persuade the Colombian people.

³⁶ I am aware that other issues may be influencing the voting behavior of the Colombian people. However, I the situation of Uribe is different since the primary argument and the policy of the former president were his security policies towards the insurgents.

6.3.2 Efforts of FARC for the Construction of Security

For the examination of the construction phase for the counter-(in)securitization, I have also conducted a discourse analysis. In this discourse analysis, I have examined the manifesto of the ninth national conference of FARC and Manifesto of Secretariat of FARC General Staff (2007). This is because, Manuel Marulanda, was the leader of FARC at the period of President Uribe (until 2008) and he did not make public speeches. Moreover, the ninth national conference (2007) was the only conference that took place in this period. I have examined them to present which reference points did FARC used to (in)securitize the Colombian state and the US. I have also elected some of the statements and quoted them here to present these reference points.

In the manifesto of the ninth conference, the main focus is on the atrocities that are conducted by the Colombian military while implementing the program of 'Democratic Security'. By focusing on these atrocities, FARC leaders aims to delegitimize the Colombian state. Moreover, since the Colombian security forces conducted coordinated attacks with paramilitary groups in this period, the manifesto criticizes the unlawful activities of these groups too. In the following examples, the manifesto presents Colombian government as a puppet of the US and it presents the policies of the US and the Colombian state as a threat to the people of Colombia.

[...]actions of the foreign troops in the national territory and of the operations of Plan Colombia are directed against the civilian population. We conclude

that today, as in the last century, the White House decides the essential policies of our country, imposes its conception of the state, elaborates, designs and directs the strategies and plans of the public force as well as the fundamental rules for finances, industry and commerce of Colombia, in front of which the different governments have remained to kneel and the presidents behaved like real sepoys.

...
the crisis will persist and expand as long as the mercenary American troops and their generals are the ones who support Colombian institutions; while the paramilitary strategy is the backbone of the state and imposes guidelines in the three branches of public power through their puppets

...
Plan Colombia [...] failed and have only served to facilitate the greater interference and presence of the foreign government in our country to increase repression and terror to the civilian people [...] to feed more corrupt administration, [...] and militarize national life. (Manifesto of 9th National Conference of FARC, 2007)

As seen in the statements, FARC presents the US policies towards Colombia, particularly Plan Colombia, and the policies of the Uribe administration as a threat to Colombian people and Colombia. Moreover, the manifesto indicates the linkages between the state and the illegal paramilitary groups to further delegitimize its enemy. By that way, FARC (in)securitizes the Colombian state. In the following examples, the manifesto criticizes the government and present it as a threat to Colombian people and the country.

Today, in the 20th century, the country is going through a deep crisis whose effects hit not the rich but the ordinary people, through the daily life of economic, social, military and moral violence as a result of a corrupt political order, only justified by a cheating electoral system[...].

...
[...]the illegitimacy of the regime and the terror of the state give effect to the popular uprising and validate, before the world, the sacred right of the Colombian people to rebellion. (Manifesto of 9th National Conference of FARC, 2007)

In the following statements, FARC presents paramilitary forces, which are linked to the government as a threat to Colombian people to (in)securitize the Colombian

government. Moreover, by claiming a linkage between the government and drug traffickers, FARC further delegitimizes its enemy:

Today, as it has been for half a century, the owners of power, haciendas, and money organize criminal gangs charged with assaulting the people and sowing terror [...] to perpetuate themselves as rulers, nourished with the inexhaustible finances of the drug trade; and conforming thus a paramilitary and mafia state with fascist characteristics.

...

The so-called political process that is currently underway is demonstrating the deep and solid links between political power, militarism, administrative corruption and drug trafficking.

...

the oligarchy wanted to hide the increased power of the mafias entrenched in the state apparatus, to flood narco dollars to the national market and to achieve impunity for some capos protected by a law approved by the paramilitaries themselves in the parliament with the keen and invaluable help of the national government of Uribe. (Manifesto of 9th National Conference of FARC, 2007)

As seen in the statements, FARC (in)securitizes the Colombian government by referring to its linkages to drug traffickers, paramilitaries, and atrocities towards civilians and by presenting it as a puppet of the US. In another manifesto (Manifesto of Secretariat of FARC General Staff, 2007) in the same period, FARC (in)securitizes the State and the US as follows:

We cannot tolerate any more of this paramilitary drug trafficking mafia of estate owners and stockbrokers, drug traffickers and businessmen backed with the military support of the United States` government and media dictatorship, which turned Colombia into a hell of war, massacres, massive detentions of citizens, disappearances, misery and plundering, and of all the excesses of State terrorism.

...

The government of Uribe follows the guidelines of Washington and the requirements of powerful paramilitary bosses like Salvatore Mancuso, Jorge 40, Castaño, Cuco Vanoy, Isaza, Báez, Macaco, Don Berna, El Aleman, Giraldo, El Tuso, Gordo Lindo and other sinister personages of saw and cocaine, who are partners of the President. This mafia-financed Uribe`s two presidential campaigns with bags full of dollars.

...

This government is established on thousands of mass graves and massacres; on deprived lands and millions of people displaced; on tears and mourning... Nothing was done without the approval or participation of the official armed forces.

...

This right-wing, fascist government took the budget of the nation and used it for war and the result is a social disaster. Children die of hunger, growing poverty and marginalization, entire construction projects of popular housing are abandoned; most of the population are without water, light and sewerage services. (Manifesto of Secretariat of FARC General Staff, 2007)

As the statements indicate, FARC (in)securitizes Colombian state by referring to its atrocities towards Colombian people, its linkages with drug traffickers and paramilitaries. In addition to these FARC implemented many security practices, which supported these discourses for (in)securitization of the Colombian state. As a concluding remark, both parties aim to (in)securitize the other side and present it as a threat to Colombia and its people by referring to the atrocities, its linkage with drug traffickers and other unlawful activities.

6.4 (In)securitization-in-action Phase

(In)securitization-in-action phase focuses on the insecurity consequences of the process of (in)securitization. As expressed in Chapter 4, security practices of the operational and tactical level security professionals lead to insecurities for ordinary people. These insecurities range from the death of individuals and their forced displacement to the deterioration of their basic freedoms and rights.

The conflict in Colombia has been ongoing for more than half a century. Colombian forces and paramilitaries have been fighting against FARC and other insurgent guerrillas for decades. However, the real victims of this conflict are the Colombian

people. Both sides (in)securitizes each other and implements security practices. These security practices lead to insecurities for ordinary people of Colombia from all segments of the society. In this part, I examined these insecurities one by one. These include the death of civilians, forced immigration, kidnappings, disappearances, attacks on infrastructure, and other crimes.

Firs of all, the conflict led to the death of thousands of Colombians. The security practices of both sides played a role in these deaths. According to the study, which was conducted by Colombia’s National Center of Historic Memory, the total number of conflict-related death between 1958 and 2012 had reached to 220.000 (Historical Memory Group, 2016: 38). More than %81,5 of those killed people are civilians. These numbers exclude the deaths by the drug cartels. The following chart shows the number of the deaths according to years(Historical memory group, 2016: 38):




Figure 4. Evolution of the number of civilians and combatants killed in the armed conflict in Colombia

As the figure presents, the number of deaths starts to increase as the FARC gets

stronger on the late 1980s and early 1990s. The number peaks in when the FARC reaches its strongest position in the end of the 1990s. The high numbers continue after 2002 during the first years of the harsh military policies of President Uribe against FARC and other insurgencies. This era is also the time when the paramilitary forces were strongest. AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), the organization of the paramilitary forces was demobilized in 2006 and, as LeGrand argues, most of the massacres were conducted by these paramilitary forces (LeGrand, 2003: 184).

These deaths have mostly resulted from massacres, bombings (including aerial bombings of the Colombian state and FARC bombings in city centers), land mines and assassination. Between 1982 and 2012 10,189 people died because of anti-personnel mines (Historical memory group, 2016: 39). In the period between 1995 and 2005 one civilian or soldier stepped on a mine every day (Historical memory group, 2016: 40). These numbers are second highest in the World after Afghanistan.

When it comes to massacres, totally, 11982 massacres took place in Colombia between 1980 and 2012 (Historical memory group, 2016: 42). Distribution of these massacres according to the armed groups are as follows (20 massacres that are not indicated in the figure were conducted by the security forces and the paramilitary groups collectively) (Historical memory group, 2016: 42):




Figure 5. Distribution of the number of massacres in the armed conflict by armed group

FARC is responsible for the 238 of the 343 massacres that are conducted by all of the insurgent guerrilla groups. This constitutes %70 of the total massacres that are conducted by the guerrillas. The following figure presents the number of massacres by different armed groups according to years (Historical memory group, 2016: 54):




Figure 6. Evolution of cases of massacres in the armed conflict in Colombia by alleged perpetrator

Just like the total number of deaths, the number of massacres also peaks in the period between the late 1990s and early 2000s. As result of these massacres 11,751 people died. Paramilitary groups are responsible for 61.8% of these killed people. Guerrillas are responsible for 17.6% and security forces are responsible for 7.4% of the total.

In Colombia, between 1981 and 2012, 16,346 conflict-related selective assassinations happened and 23,161 people killed in these assassinations. These include 1,227 community leaders 1,495 political activists, 685 members of trade unions and 74 human rights defenders. The total number of the victims of selective assassinations reaches to 150,000 (Historical memory group, 2016: 49 and 51) if we include the assassinations of organized crime like drug traffickers. Ratios of selective assassinations are similar to the ratios of massacres (Paramilitary groups - 38.4%; unidentified armed groups - 27.7%; 3,899; guerrilla groups 16.8%; Security Forces -

10.1% unidentified persons - 6.5%; joint actions by paramilitary groups and members of the Security Forces - 0.4%) (Historical memory group, 2016: 42-43).

The high number of unidentified assassinations shows the strategy of the armed groups to conceal their activities.

In addition to these issues, which are related to the death of people, many people disappeared because of the conflict-related reasons (apart from abductions and kidnappings). The armed groups particularly prefer forced disappearance since these events hardly took place in media coverage. Moreover, acceptance of this action as a crime by the public is lower than other actions like assassinations and massacres. By the help of these, the groups could conceal their crimes more easily. Approximately 16,000 to 26,000 forced disappearance events took place in Colombia until November 2011 (Historical memory group, 2016: 64). Between 1985 and 2012, 26 persons were displaced in the country in every hour as a consequence of the armed conflict (Historical memory group, 2016: 40). According to the general report of Historical Memory Group, most of these disappeared people are killed and their bodies are buried in mass graves or thrown into rivers. Only by the confessions of the paramilitaries during the Justice and Peace Process 4,809 corpses exhumed from mass graves until 2012 (Historical memory group, 2016: 66).

When it comes to abductions and hostage-taking, 27,023 conflict-related abductions happened in Colombia between 1970 and 2010 (Historical memory group, 2016: 70).

The numbers of abductions peaked in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Most of these abductions (90,6%) were conducted by insurgent guerrilla groups. Remaining 9,4% of the abductions were conducted by paramilitary groups. Most of the abductions

were conducted for political gains (like the exchange of prisoners) or for money. People spent years in jungles as a hostage under harsh conditions. According to the report of Historical Memory Group, “between 1985 and 2012 one person was kidnapped every 12 hours. The 1996-2005 period was the most critical: one person was kidnapped every eight hours” (Historical memory group, 2016: 40). According to the report, 318 mayors, 332 councilmen, 52 representatives, and 54 congressmen were abducted between 1970 and 2010. The following figure shows the number of abductions by armed groups according to years (Historical Memory Group, 2016: 73):




Figure 7. Evolution of the abductions in the armed conflict in Colombia by perpetrator

Another insecurity created for the Colombians was forced displacements. Approximately, 5,700,000 people were displaced because of the conflict in Colombia until 2013. According to these numbers, %15 of all Colombians are internally displaced (Historical memory group, 2016: 40). This makes Colombia the second country after Syria (6,500,000), which has the highest number of internally displaced

persons. According to the numbers of International Displacement Monitoring Center, the number reached to 6,360,000 in 2016. The following figure presents the total number of displaced persons according to the years (Internally Displaced Monitoring Center (IDMC), 2015)




Figure 8. Total Number of Displaced Persons in Colombia according to the Years

The numbers include both the individual and massive displacements. According to the report of Historical Memory Group, %73 of these displaced persons was individual displacements. The following figure shows the evolution of the major insecurities caused by the conflict in Colombia according to the years (Historical Memory Group, 2016: 70):




Figure 9. Evolution of the major insecurities caused by the conflict in Colombia

As the figure shows, all of the insecurities peaked in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

This corresponds to the time when the intensity of conflict also peaked in Colombia.

Other crimes include physical abuses and torture (588 events), sexual violence (1,754 victims until March 2013), plundering and extortion (mostly by paramilitary groups), damage to civilian properties, victimization of civilians during the acts of war (like direct armed conflict between armed groups), and recruitment of children to armed groups. In addition to these, the attacks of insurgent guerrilla groups that aimed the infrastructure caused suffering for people and environmental disasters (attack to pipelines).³⁷

As I expressed in the theoretical framework, tactical and operational level security professionals can also be regarded as sufferers too. Because of this, I particularly gave the total numbers of victims including civilians and combatants. The

³⁷ Since 1986, guerrillas bombed the oil pipelines hundreds of times in Colombia. For example, on June 22, 2015, FARC attacked the Tansandio oil pipeline. 10,000 barrels of oil poured to waterways. As a result of the contamination of water, 150,000 people lost access to water. (Colombia president raps rebels for attacking oil pipeline., 2015)

(in)securitization process also led to insecurities for these people too. Although they implement the security practices, they do not have a chance to change the decisions at the macro level. Many security agents, including soldiers or guerrillas, died in the conflicts and they had to live in heavy conditions in jungles or camps.

In addition to these, there are specific insecurities that were faced by the operational and tactical level security professionals. Forced recruitment and the recruitment of children can be regarded in this category. According to the study of The Politecnico Grancolombiano, FARC and other rebel groups have recruited more than 16000 children as fighters in insurgent guerrilla forces (The Human Toll Of Colombia's 51-Year War, 2015). %80 of the total number of child combatants were conscripted by rebel groups including FARC and ELN. Moreover, according to the 2012 report of the UN, %50,14 of adult combatants of FARC had conscripted as minors. According to the report of Human Rights Watch, in 2005 at least %25 of combatants in Colombia were under the age of 18. The children who were conscripted by FARC are subjected to strict indoctrination and the punishment for escape from FARC is death (Human Rights Watch, 2005).³⁸

In addition to child combatants and forced recruitment, female combatants also face specific insecurities. Approximately %40-50 of the combatants of FARC were female (Foreign Policy, 2015). In addition to sexual abuses of armed groups towards the civilians, women combatants also faced sexual abuses including rape and forced abortion. According to Colombian Newspaper, Judicial, each year 1000 forced abortions occurred only in FARC (Palma, 2013). According to the investigation of

³⁸ For more information and personal experiences of some of the child combatants, see the report of Historical Memory Group (Historical memory group, 2016).

Colombian police department, % 80 of demobilized women who were FARC rebels forced to abortion at least one time (Lima, 2011). The lucky ones who could give birth to their children had to leave them to local people in villages (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

As expressed in Chapter 3, while the level of democracy influences the possibility of (in)securitization, (in)securitization also further deteriorated democracy. Moreover, once the violence starts, democratization also gets harder since there emerge groups who are fed from violence. In Colombia (in)securitization deeply deteriorated democracy. Local elites, by the help of armed groups, silenced or exterminated alternative voices that are considered dangerous to their interests (Historical memory group, 2016: 287). Since there were armed groups both for rebels and state, people who worked to defend their ideas on political ground faced violence (The number of assassinations of political activists is given above). By selective assassinations, disappearances and abductions, people were suppressed to not to defend or express their ideas publicly. According to Sucre, a peasant-farmer leader in Ovejas, there had been major protests in Colombia until the early 1980s. However, the last one of these was conducted in 1990 (Historical memory group, 2016: 287).

As a democratization effort, 1991 constitution introduced decentralization and recognition of minority groups. This was mainly due to the demand from the Colombian society because of social changes like urbanization and increasing level of education and emergence of the middle class (see Chapter 5). By the help of this constitution and the social changes, novel movements and parties started to emerge. However, armed groups targeted the leaders of these groups by selective

assassinations or forced disappearances and this led to the disappearance of the movements.

Although the political party of FARC, UP, also faced this violence in the 1980s, which led to the total disappearance of the party, FARC and other insurgent guerrilla groups also conducted such activities. The report of Historical Memory Group explains the issue as follows:

These actions were the work of the regional or local powers that felt their interests were threatened. Guerrilla groups also did this when they thought that these new movements might challenge their determination to delegitimize the State by aggravating the crises its institutions were in and weakening their power by abstaining from and sabotaging electoral processes. The Security Forces also participated in these illegal acts, since they perceived any social or political change as an advance of the communist threat that likewise favored the interests of the guerrilla, as did the paramilitary groups, who felt that such reforms hindered their control of certain regions and hindered their expansion. On many occasions the paramilitary forces joined with and interchanged favors with the military and political figures in order to secure their interests. (Historical memory group, 2016: 290)

This violence led to the emergence of fear among people. People even frightened to be members of community boards or local cooperatives let alone political movements or labor organizations. Therefore by the direct violence and the fear of it, basic rights and freedoms of people are limited. These include the right to protest, denounce, participate and oppose, freedom of expression, and right to organize and associate (Historical memory group, 2016: 292). People even could not use their basic democratic rights like voting in elections. For example, in the 1998 elections in San Carlos, 231 of 12,832 eligible voters used their right to vote. This was mainly because in 1998 violence increased sharply in the municipality. The turnout in 1995

elections was %45.7 in the same place. Consequently, (in)securitization further deteriorated democracy in Colombia and led to the decline of basic rights and freedoms.

6.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter examined the dual (in)securitization of the Colombian state and FARC according to the new framework for the critical security studies that is introduced in this dissertation. In line with this framework, the chapter firstly presented the units of the (in)securitization process both for the primary and counter-(in)securitizations. These units include strategic level security professionals, operational and tactical level security professionals, reference object, audiences, opposition, sufferers and the functional actors. The second part of the chapter focused on the definition of security by the Colombian state and FARC and the evolution of this security definition in time. The third part examined the construction phase of the (in)securitization process, which focused on the era between 2002 and 2010. In this analysis the discursive efforts of FARC and the Colombian government to convince the audience have been analyzed. The final part analyzed the (in)securitization-in-action phase and examined the insecurities that were the result of the conflict in Colombia. These insecurities include selective assassinations, massacres, sexual abuses, forced displacements, forced disappearances and deterioration of democracy and basic freedoms and rights.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed to introduce a new framework for critical security studies to examine the process of constructing exceptional security issues, particularly in the hybrid democracies. Moreover, it also aimed to address the shortcomings of already existing approaches, namely the Securitization Theory and the (In)securitization approach. Finally, it aimed to examine the process of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state in order to present the applicability of the new framework and examine one of the longest and deadliest internal conflicts of the last century. For these aims the dissertation asked three interrelated research questions:

1. How can we analyze the process of (in)securitization by addressing the shortcomings of the existing frameworks?
2. How can we analyze the process of (in)securitization in hybrid democracies?
3. How the Colombian state and FARC (in)securitized each other after *La Violencia* in Colombia

To answer these questions, the second chapter provided a literature review of the existing literature on the construction of exceptional security issues. Moreover, it also presented the shortcomings of already existing approaches to provide a basis for the new theoretical framework. The third chapter provided a brief literature review of the literature on democracy since it is considered that the level of democracy is one of the most important contextual factors for the process of (in)securitization. The implications of the level of democracy on the process of (in)securitization are also presented in this chapter.

The fourth chapter introduced the new theoretical framework for critical security studies. This framework addresses the shortcomings of the existing approaches by regarding the process of (in)securitization as a whole process and examining it in three phases: the definition, the construction, and the (in)securitization-in-action; taking both bottom-up and top-down characteristics of the process of (in)securitization into consideration and examining both macro-level decision making processes and discursive efforts and micro-level security practices; taking rival voices into consideration in the process of (in)securitization and providing a dual framework for analysis which takes both non-violent opposition and counter-(in)securitizations into consideration; enriching the literature on the (in)securitization by integrating new units like the opposition and sufferers; examining the context of the process of (in)securitization by particularly focusing on the historical background and the level of democracy in the given place; dividing the security professionals into three levels: strategic, operational and tactical; examining the insecurity consequences of (in)securitization as well as its process; and finally, and most

importantly, eliminating the state-centric approach and problematizing non-state actors too.

After introducing the theoretical framework, fifth and sixth chapter examined the dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state. To this end, the fifth chapter explained the context of the Colombian conflict including its historical background, important issues and events like the Cuban Revolution and the Cold War, and the democratic level of Colombia. Finally, the sixth chapter examined the process of dual (in)securitization of FARC and the Colombian state in which definition, construction and the insecurity consequences of the process are presented.

The main contribution of this dissertation is the new framework for critical security studies to examine the construction of exceptional security issues particularly in hybrid democracies. It fills a gap in the literature on the critical security studies by focusing on the level of democracy and addressing the limitations of existing studies like the Securitization Theory and (In)securitization approach. This new framework will be a beneficial tool for analyzing cases of (in)securitization particularly in hybrid democracies and internal conflicts. In addition to these theoretical contributions, the dissertation contributes to the literature on the Colombian conflict by examining it through the lenses of (in)securitization framework

The study has two important limitations. First of all the routinizing and normalizing impacts of the security practices of operational and tactical level security professionals could not be analyzed in the study. This is mainly because there was no

possibility to make a field analysis in Colombia. So this impact could not be presented in the dissertation. The second limitation of the dissertation is about its theoretical contribution. Although the new framework for critical security studies that is introduced in this dissertation addresses most of the shortcomings of the existing approaches, it does not provides a framework for desecuritization. Desecuritization is also an under-analyzed concept for the critical security studies. Because of this limitation, some of the eras the Colombian conflict when there were desecuritizing efforts, could not be examined. These include the desecuritizing efforts in the Pastrana presidency in the last years of the 1990s and the early years on 2000s.

In line with these limitations, it is appropriate to state future avenues of research that this study opened paths. Firstly, a study that focuses on the role of security professionals at different levels in the process of constructing security issues would support the arguments in this study and provide a contribution to the literature on the critical security studies. Secondly, a study, which focuses on the mutually constitutive relationship between (in)securitization and democracy also would contribute both the literature of (in)securitization and democracy. As presented in this dissertation, while the level of democracy impacts the process of (in)securitization, (in)securitization also deteriorates the level of democracy and hardens the efforts for democratization

Thirdly, in line with the above-stated limitation, a theoretical framework for desecuritization, which is parallel with the new framework for critical security studies that is introduced in this dissertation, would address the gap in the critical

security studies literature about desecuritization. Finally, to further examine the dual (in)securitization in Colombia, a study, which conducts a field analysis would contribute to the literature on the Colombian conflict and address the limitation of this dissertation.

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