

DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING: BULGARIAN MIGRATIONS
FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO RUSSIA IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

A Master's Thesis

by
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Ankara
September 2015

To my family and my grandmother

DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING: BULGARIAN MIGRATIONS FROM THE
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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
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by

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in

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ABSTRACT

DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING: BULGARIAN MIGRATIONS FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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September 2015

This thesis focuses on the Bulgarian immigrations to Russia and return of many of them to the Ottoman Empire in 19th century. The stimuli which drag them to the lands far away from home, and reasons which draw them to Rumelia back again are the subject of this thesis. Through this research, it is intended to shed light on a subject which is well-known as a phenomenon by historians, yet not researched as an historical event with its reasons and results, thus becomes a tool of nationalist discourse.

Keywords: Bulgarians, migration, Ottoman Empire, Russia, Balkans, Crimea, Caucasia, Tatars, Circassians, demographic engineering.

ÖZET

NÜFUS MÜHENDİSLİĞİ: ONDOKUZUNCU YÜZYILDA OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞUNDAN RUSYA'YA BULGAR GÖÇLERİ

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Bu tez, 19. yüzyılda Bulgarların Rusya'ya göçünü ve pek çoğunun tekrar Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna geri dönmesi üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Onları yurtlarından çok uzak topraklara sürükleyen gerekçeler ve tekrar Rumeli'ye döndüren nedenler bu tezin konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Bu araştırmayla, tarihçiler arasında bir hadise olarak iyi bilinen fakat tarihsel bir olay olarak araştırılmamış ve bu nedenle de milliyetçi söylemin aracı olmuş bir konuya ışık tutmak amaçlanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bulgarlar, göç, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Rusya, Balkanlar, Kırım, Kafkasya, Tatarlar, Çerkezler, nüfus mühendisliği.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA: Bařbakanlık Osmanlı Arřivi

A.} MKT. MVL.: Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Meclis-i Vâlâ

A.} MKT. MHM.: Sadaret Mühimme Kalemi Evrakı

A.} MKT. NZD.: Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Nezaret ve Devâir Evrakı

A.} MKT. UM.: Sadaret Umum Vilayat Evrakı

İ..DH.: İradeler Dahiliye

İ. MVL.: İradeler-Meclis-i Vâlâ

MVL.: Meclis-i Vâlâ Riyâseti Belgeleri

HAT.: Hatt-ı Hümayun

İ..MTZ.(04): İradeler-Bulgaristan

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Subject and Sources

Today approximately 315.000 Bulgarians in total live in Romania, Moldavia, Ukraine and Russia. It is interesting that there are so many Bulgarians who live in places far away from their homelands. The Balkans is one of the most diverse regions in Europe in terms of ethnic variety, religion and culture, as a result of its geographical position. It has been one of the most dynamic places in Europe throughout its history because of numerous migrations to or from the peninsula. The reasons which led them to those places can be traced back in history in the context of relationships between the Russian and the Ottoman empires. The motives and scales of these early migrations cannot be traced in history in detailed because of a lack of sufficient historical data. However, getting closer to today the sources about the problem proliferated dramatically which makes things easier for historians. These movement coincided with increasing rate of demographic mobilization throughout Europe in the 19th century,

thus it is a part of this larger context which makes the subject interesting for migration studies.

Bulgarians were the first people conquered in the Balkans by the Ottomans in the late fourteenth century. They were also the last (except the Albanians) to become independent. It means that the Ottomans had a very long history with Bulgarians. In the long run, some of those people migrated from the Ottoman Empire, sometimes to Serbia, or to the Habsburg Empire or Russia. As the Russian concerns on this region escalated, the emigrations accordingly increased. After each war between the Ottomans and the Russians in the second half of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a significant amount of Bulgarians immigrated to Russia, sometimes joining the withdrawing Russian army or sometimes with the assistance of Russian officials. The reason why they left their homeland was that they sometimes helped the Russian army during the war and disturbed their Muslim and Bulgarian neighbors. For this reason, they feared Ottoman retaliation. Additionally, they believed the Russians, who advised them that the Ottomans would seek revenge for their deeds during the war, and promised them security and fertile lands.

The Ottoman archives have many documents to shed light on these problem, but for early movements in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century they are not sufficient. The existing materials are used in this thesis for 1828-29 and 1854-62 migrations. Archives in Odessa are quite rich in the context of this problem, and Russian archives as well. However, those documents could not be used in this thesis since time and circumstances are limited for an M.A. thesis. Nevertheless, Russian and Bulgarian secondary sources in which materials from those archives are used plentifully.

1.2. Historiography

There are many migrations from and to the Balkans during the nineteenth century that changed in scale. The most well-known of them is the exodus of Crimean Tatars and the people from the Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire, particularly to the Balkans. There are many studies about this phenomenon that are evaluated in many aspects. On the other hand, despite the fact that the Bulgarian emigrations from the empire are known by historians and there are plenty of archival resources, very few researches about the problem have been done. The main tendency in the academic studies is the Tatar and Circassian immigration to the Balkans, the governorship of Mithad Pasha in Danube Vilayet, and the most popular one is the nationalist movements in the Balkans in the nineteenth century.

Historiographies in the Balkans with national sentiments use the emigration phenomenon with prejudices, often without any methodological approach. Thus, the topic is generally subject to abuse by this kind of rhetoric. Besides, the case is mentioned in just a couple of paragraphs in many studies about the Balkans or Bulgarians to explain how the Ottoman oppression was unbearable and therefore resulted in mass emigrations.¹ Even if the situation is partially correct about the oppression, it did not derive from the central government, but from the local notables to whom the Sublime Porte could not manage to subdue. The primary reason that the Porte could not rule them was that the political condition of the capital was not stable. The Janissaries' rebellions and abdication of the sultans prevented the central government to concern with the provincial problems. The whole nineteenth century

¹ I. Mitev, "Раковски и емигрирането на българи в Русия през 1861 г. [Georgi Rakovski and emigration of Bulgarians to Russia in 1861], *Voенно-istoricheski Sbornik* 39, (1970), 10.

would also be subject to efforts of the government to maintain its authority in provinces which was rarely successful and would always pose a very important challenge. Thus, this challenge was always among the main reasons of the emigrations that will be discussed shortly.

The subject of Bulgarian emigration, however, attracted some scholars, especially Russian historians, to study this topic. Firstly, the pioneering research was made by Nikolai Sevastyanovich Derzhavin, who was a descendant of Bulgarian émigrés in the last days of the Romanov Empire.² He stated that the resettlement of Bulgarians to the Crimea was not an act of mercy towards their coreligionists, rather as a result of necessity to develop those lands. I am also of the same opinion because of the reasons I will present in this thesis. His other reseaches mainly focused on ethnographic and linguistic studies on those Bulgarians' situation under the Russian rule.³ Nevertheless, he made great contributions to this area with his works.

During the Soviet period, existence of huge amount of Bulgarian population raised concerns among scholars. The specialists in that period usually devoted their attention to ethnographic, linguistic and anthropological studies following Derzhavin's path. The most notable of these kinds of studies was that of Samuel Borisovich Bernstein, who was a linguist specialized in the Bulgarian language. He set the stages of the Bulgarian immigration to the Bessarabia and the Southern Russia in 18th and 19th centuries.⁴ In his study, Bernstein evaluated those movements except the

² Nikolai Sevastyanovich Derzhavin, *О болгарях и болгарском переселении в Россию (On Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Migration to Russia)*, *Краткий Исторический Очерк Для Народного Чтения*, (Berdians'k: D. Kocherova, 1912), 23.

³ N. S. Derzhavin, *Болгарскія Колоніи въ Россіи (The Bulgarian Colonies in Russia)*, (Sofia: Martilen, 1914).

⁴ Samuel Borisovich Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России в XVIII-XIX веках (Main Stages of the Migration of the Bulgarians in Russia in 18-19. Centuries)”, *Sovetskoye Slavyanovedeniye* 1, (1980), 46-52.

migrations after the Crimean War, and determined that all of them happened during the Russo-Ottoman wars in the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. In subsequent events, although the flow of people continued during the wars, the majority took place after conclusion of the treaties; especially in the Crimean example, it happened 4 years after the signing of the agreement. Besides, Bernstein shared the same idea that the Russian government benefited economically from the migrations. In addition to that research, Bernstein discussed the migrations in 1828-29 in which argued that the main reason of this movement was Vorontsov's desire to acquire sailors and shipbuilders whom Russia desperately needed.⁵ With all of those researches, Bernstein provided a great contribution to this problem.

Additionally, I. I. Meshcheryuk was another scholar who endeavored on the Bulgarian immigrations to the Bessarabia and to the Southern Russia.⁶ The professor clearly presented that different ideas on the Bulgarian immigration among Russian officials, three actors of the movement who had distinct motives from each other – namely Vorontsov, Dibich and Ivan Seliminiski – three stages of the migration, the problem that the immigrants and the Russian government faced with, and lastly attempts of the Porte to convince the Bulgarians in Russia to return. Since the professor evaluated the problem within different perspectives, Meshcheryuk is worth mentioning in parallel with the context of this thesis.

Above all those Russian historians mentioned that the Russian population policy had an important pulling effect on the Bulgarian migrations, yet O. V.

⁵ S. V. Bernstein, "Страница из Истории Болгарской Иммиграции в Россию во время Русско-Турецкой Войны 1828-1829 гг. [A Page from the History of the Bulgarian Immigration to Russia during the Russian-Turkish War of 1828-1829]", *Ученые Записки Института Славяноведения*, Том 1, (Moscow: Akademiya Nauk SSSR, 1949), 330-39.

⁶ I. Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг. [The resettlement of the Bulgarians in Southern Bessarabia in 1828-1834]*, (Chisinau: Kartya Moldovenyaske, 1965).

Medvedeva had a different stance.⁷ She did not even mention about the Russian policy to populate the southern lands, and mainly focused on the negative factors in the Ottoman Empire which pushed the Bulgarians out of their homelands. This thought was a clear example of how the problem was expressed in biased historiographies.

In English literature, Mark Pinson is worth to be mentioned in the context of this issue.⁸ In his PhD dissertation, Pinson generally focused on population transfer namely Tatars and Circassians from Russia, Bulgarians from the Ottoman Empire, after the Crimean War, yet also mentioned earlier migrations. Pinson is the only one who compares the characteristics of the early immigrations to the Russia with the later ones. He made some references to the Bulgarian intelligentsias' ideas on the migration, notably Georgi Rakovski. However, he did not mention about effects of the Tanzimat on these emigrations since the main driving force of the Edict of Tanzimat was the Bulgarian question. He claimed that an agreement between two empires on population exchange was highly possible. By asserting that the Porte wanted to decrease revolutionist movements in Rumelia, Bulgarians' emigration was a preferable solution.⁹ However, attitude of the Porte towards the would-be emigrants and returnees disproves his assertion according to the Ottoman documents.

In Turkish literature, Mahir Aydın is worth mentioning since he is the first historian who introduced the problem into Turkish historiography.¹⁰ His short article was focused on the Bulgarian migration after the Crimean War referring Ottoman

⁷ Medvedeva, O. V. "Российская дипломатия и эмиграция болгарского населения в 1830-е годы (по неопубликованным документам Архива внешней политики России)", *Sovetskoye Slavyanovedeniye* 4, (1988), 24-33.

⁸ Mark Pinson, "Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy 1854-1866", (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1970).

⁹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 158.

¹⁰ Mahir Aydın, "Vidin Bulgarlarının Rusya'ya Göç Ettirilmeleri", *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 53, (April 1988), 67-79.

archival documents. He did not mention about the Russian population policy, thus he concluded that Russia intended to make propagandas against the Ottoman government in the European newspapers as Bulgarians were escaping from the Turkish oppression and Russia provided them shelter. However, the Crimean Tatars deportation posed labor deficit in the peninsula, and thus desperately needed population to recover the loss. For this reason, the Russian government turned their attention to the Bulgarians. It is more plausible that Russia wanted to compensate it's lost by replacing the Tatars with the Bulgarians, rather than to launch an anti-campaign in the European press against the Porte for ambiguous gains. Probably, they used this against the Porte, yet it was not the primary concern. Nevertheless, Mahir Aydın paved the way for next historians.

A short time later, in 1992, a much more comprehensive book about the problem was written by Hüdai Şentürk.¹¹ He focused generally on the rebellions and social reforms in Bulgarian lands, but also paid attention to the migrations of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries very shortly. He divided the topic of Bulgarian migration into two titles which were “Bulgarian Migrations in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century” and “Bulgarian Migrations in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century”. On the other hand, I prefer the migrations before the *Tanzimat* and the after the *Tanzimat* considering its effects on the Bulgarians. Although, Şentürk uses many archival sources, more is presented in this thesis.

Another important contribution to this subject is made by Ufuk Gülsoy.¹² Contrary to Hüdai Şentürk, Gülsoy's main concern was the migrations in 1828-29.

¹¹ Hüdai Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992).

¹² Ufuk Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reâyâ [The Rayah who were migrated to Russia from Rumelia during the Russo-Ottoman War in 1828-1829]*, (İstanbul: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1993).

This case study is the only book written in Turkish focusing only on Bulgarian immigrations to Russia in every aspect. Also, the author tried to examine the internal and the external reasons for the migration, the reaction and the attempts of the Sublime Porte to stop it, and to return them to the Empire. In this thesis, all of the migration in the 19th century will be evaluated to comprehend the phenomenon as a whole.

The common drawback of these studies is their characteristic of being descriptive rather than analytical. They are based on archival sources, and referring to them they stated reasons and results of the events, but they did not set the issue in the general context of the nineteenth century when horizontal demographic mobilization was higher than ever before. Another drawback which derives from archival sources themselves which tended to show the Russian provocation as a main motive on this emigration¹³ despite the fact that they referred to corruption of local officials and malpractices.

In Turkish literature, the phenomenon of Bulgarian emigration is not evaluated in the context of the Tanzimat as in the case of other studies. The effects of the Tanzimat cannot be ignored in any sociological studies in the nineteenth century. Therefore, the Tanzimat can be a very significant point to compare the emigrations before and after it. How did the Edict affect the Bulgarian's ideas on the emigration, were they satisfied with it and thus did not migrated anymore or did it failed to materialized what was expected from it? A decade after the declaration of the Edict there was rebellion broke out in Vidin and after the Crimean War many Bulgarians in this region immigrated to Russia. Therefore, the policy makers of the *Tanzimat* could

¹³ Aydın, "Vidin Bulgarlarının Rusya'ya Göç Ettirilmeleri", 69-70; Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi*, 153; Ufuk Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reâyâ*, 29.

not manage the crisis effectively and failed to satisfy the Bulgarian peasants. For this reason, it is worth to be mentioned in this context.

The relationship between the Bulgarian question and the Tanzimat in sociological context was first raised by Halil İnalcık in his PhD thesis.¹⁴ According to his statement, the real motive behind the *Tanzimat* was the desire of the Porte to put an end to the Bulgarian rebellions. The professor evidently pointed out the sociological problems, particularly the land issue, behind the Vidin rebellion which was very significant in the context of relationship between the *Tanzimat* and Bulgarian emigration after the Crimean War. He also mentioned Russian incitement in the incident. Four years after the conclusion of the treaty when the Russian government called for immigrants, the majority of them were from the Vidin region which proved the sociological background of the unrest among the Bulgarians. Therefore, its effects on the movement are worth examining.

None of those researchers paid enough attention to the ideas of the contemporary Bulgarian intelligentsia, namely Georgi Rakovski who was rigorously against the Bulgarian emigration.¹⁵ In his booklet, Rakovski accused the Russian government of deceiving them, and benefiting from Bulgarians' hard situation. However, his ideas also subjected to misuse of some historians with romantic sentiments, namely Mitev. In his article, Mitev spent too much effort to romanticize the Russian support to the Bulgarians, and to vindicate the opposite ideas of Georgi Rakovski about the Russian agitation as if he was not biased against the Russians. He referred to the fact that his relatives had had high positions in the Tsar's court like his uncle Georgi Mamarchev. Interestingly, he missed to mention that Mamarchev was

¹⁴ Halil İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, (İstanbul: Eren, 1992).

¹⁵ Georgi S. Rakovski, *Преселение в Русия, или руската убийствена политика за българите* [*Migration to Russia or Russian deadly policy towards Bulgarians*], (Sofia, 1886).

arrested by the Russian army after he tried unsuccessfully to raise a revolution among the Bulgarians against the Ottoman Empire. This selectivity which is the common point of all kind of ideological historiography defiled the case and blurred our perspective. This sort of narrative based on historical myths is evaluated by Bernard Lory in his work.¹⁶ In his article giving the example of *Kircali* Period roughly between the end of eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, Lory revealed how misplaced memories in a limited time period turned into a national slogan covering centuries-long torture. As a result, the problem was evaluated by a couple of historians many years ago, but needs to be updated.

1.3. Objectives

The main purpose of this dissertation is to refute the nationalist discourse on the question of the Bulgarian migrations from the Ottoman Empire to Russia in which the Ottomans were displayed as the tyrant and the Russians as the savior of the Orthodox people who had suffered for “centuries” from the Turkish “yoke”. I try to reveal how sympathy of the Russian government evolved into the pragmatic attitude towards the Bulgarian immigrants, and how the tsarist regime tried to use bad conditions for both Bulgarians and the Sublime Porte for its own uses as an opportunity to repopulate newly conquered lands in the southern shores.

Ottoman perspective on this problem also deserves attention. I briefly explain the classical institutions of the Ottoman Empire and how they changed in the upcoming

¹⁶ Bernard Lory, “Разсъждения Върху Историческия Мит ‘Пет Века Ни Клаха’ [Reflections on the Historical Myth ‘For Five Centuries We’ve been butchered’]”, Paris, (December, 2006)

years in Chapter II. Discontent among the Bulgarians increased at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of nineteenth centuries as a result of that transformation. The Porte's attempts to remove the unrest in Rumelia, and to what degree it became successful on those matters are also evaluated in this chapter.

In Chapter III, Russian population policy, the main stimuli behind the migrations, is explained to indicate Russia's need to increase economic function of the southern lands by introducing foreign colonists. In addition, a sociological framework on the dynamics of migrations is settled to evaluate the problem in this context. Besides, the migrations before the Russo-Ottoman War in 1806-12 are mentioned in brief because of a lack of sufficient information. Later on, the movement during the war of 1806-12 which led to the first of many remarkable migrations during the nineteenth century. The Russian government was busy after the war to correct the drawback of the movement. This is the first experiment for Russia on how to deal the Bulgarian migrations. Then, the migrations during 1828-29 war and after the conclusion of Treaty of Edirne, the largest of these migrations will be discussed. The different ideas among the Russian government, including these three actors who were in the migration process – Vorontsov, Dibich and Ivan Seliminiski – and the return of many of those migrants to their homelands are mentioned in this chapter.

Lastly, in Chapter IV, the most talked about of these Bulgarian migrations after the Crimean War is discussed. The *Tanzimat* and its effects on the Bulgarians, the Vidin rebellion are evaluated. The population traffic between the Ottomans and the Russians after the conclusion of the treaty is also mentioned, and in connection with that, the existence of an agreement between two governments on the exchange of Crimean Tatars and Bulgarians is discussed. Additionally, attitudes of the Russian authorities towards the Muslim Crimean Tatars and the people from the Caucasus, and

of the Porte towards the non-Muslim Bulgarians in the context of emigration are another point which deserves attention. Furthermore, the ideas of contemporary Bulgarian intelligentsia, namely Rakovski is worth to be mentioned in parallel with the subject of this thesis. My last purpose in this thesis is to combine the studies about the Bulgarian migrations which focus on different periods and aspects of them.

CHAPTER II

GLIMPSES OF THE BALKANS TOWARDS THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

2.1. Socio-Administrative Changes

2.1.1. Classical Institutions and Ideology

The Ottoman Empire stretched out from the Tatars' steps in the north to the deep deserts of Africa in the south, from the mountainous borders of the Safavids in the east, to the edge of the Balkan Mountains in the west, including numerous kinds of religions, people and cultures. This vast empire stood on two pillars, one lied on the east of the capital, Anatolia, and the other on the west, Rumelia. These two lands gave life to the empire via *timars*.

The basic social and administrative philosophy of Ottoman Empire was based on the idea of four estates, or *erkan-i erbaa* (four pillars) which are the men of the pen (*ehl-i kalem*), the men of the sword (*ehl-i seyf*), merchants and craftsmen, and finally

the food producers and husbandmen.¹⁷ In Ottoman context, the society simply divided into two; *askeri* whose duty was to fulfill the will of the Sultan and to rule the *reaya* with the authority of the Sultan in strictly defined limits, and *reaya* whose responsibility was to produce, to pay taxes and to obey the Sultan and his agents.

In this system, the duties and the rights of every stratum were well defined. The power of the officials originated directly from the Sultan. They were slaves – *kuls* – of him and not know any other authority except him as “shadow of God on earth”. Their limits of power were explicitly defined in the diploma – *berat* – and, in theory, they could not violate this borders which might be resulted in death penalty. For their services, they had no obligation of paying taxes. Many of them maintained their lives with the taxes of a defined area which was called *dirlik*. The relationships between the *dirlik* holder and the tax-payers were also strictly defined in the *kanunnames*. The law was ideally formed to hinder the *dirlik* holder to exploit peasant labor.¹⁸ On the other hand, *reaya* was a common term to refer to all people in Sultan’s domain, no matter of their religious and ethnic identities, whose responsibility was to pay taxes according to the religious and Sultanic law. In other words, the term united all differences. And the subjects regarded the Sultan as their impartial ruler.¹⁹ The peasants used the lands for life long and hereditarily which belonged to the state itself. The size of the land was workable with two pairs of oxen. This was known as *çift-hane* system, basic peasant family production unit in the Ottoman Empire.²⁰ In this system, the status of

¹⁷ Kemal Karpat, “The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire”, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 330-31.

¹⁸ Halil İnalçık, “Village, Peasant and Empire”, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*, ed. Halil İnalçık, (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies Dept., 1993), 143.

¹⁹ Kemal Karpat, “Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683”, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 394.

²⁰ For further reading on *çift-hane* system Halil İnalçık, “The Çift-hane System: The Organization of Ottoman Rural Society”, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, ed. Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 143-154; Halil İnalçık,

peasants in law were considered freemen.²¹ Even if the land's property belonged to the state, right to use of the land belonged to the peasants. No one could seize his lands, and the right was inherited from father to son. However, he linked some restrictions: he could not sell and divide his lands, could not leave land uncultivated more than 3 years, and could not leave his lands without permission of the *timar* holder; if he did, he became *çift-bozan* and the *timarlı sipahi* had right to bring him back to his land within a period of 10 to 15 years and to demand the tax of *çift-bozan*.²² The reason of that was in a time of shortage of labor, the income of the *timar* holder could be decreased.

The ideal picture of relationship between peasants and *timar* holders, however, became subject of violation by the latter. Some incidences about usurpations of timariots went back as early as 15th century.²³ However, deterioration in peasant's status was regarded as a corruption by the Ottoman central authorities. The *reaya* who suffered from usurpations of the *timar* holder had right to sue him in the local *cadi* court. Moreover, the *reaya* could petition to the Sultan himself about this kind of malpractices.²⁴ From that point, the *reaya* of the Ottoman Empire was in a better

"The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftlik: State, Landlords and Tenants", *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire Ottoman*, ed. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Paul Dumont, (Leuven, Belgique: Editions Peeters, 1983), 105-125.

²¹ Suraiya N. Faroqhi, "Rural life", *The Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, Vol. 3, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 383; İnalçık, "Village, Peasant and Empire", 143.

²² İnalçık, "Village, Peasant and Empire", 150.

²³ Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*, (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), 112.

²⁴ It is important to note that one of the Divan-ı Hümayun functioned as Supreme Court and the petitions which was sent to the Porte was recorded to registers of petitions – Şikâyet Defteri. Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for their Existence", *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, ed. Hans Georg Majer, (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1986), 24–33; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanate Legitimation (1570-1650)", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 35, (1992), 1-39; Halil İnalçık, "Şikâyet Hakkı: Arz-ı Hal ve Arz-ı Mahzarlar", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları VII-VIII – The Journal of Ottoman Studies VII-VIII*, (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1988), 33-54.

position than the serfs of the Medieval Europe.²⁵ However, this right was not always applicable for ordinary peasants since long road to the capital was too costly and intimidating for individuals. But, if a problem was common for a group of people, they selected a representative to send to Istanbul maintaining his travel expenses collectively.²⁶ When news of abuses reached to the ears of the Sultan, the government sent *adaletnames* – edicts of justice – to suppress these kind of malpractices to the provincial authorities to warn them about misuses. When the Sultan could not protect his subjects from encroachments of bandits and the tax-collectors, the people of villages abandoned their lands for cities, or mountainous places or other provinces²⁷ as in the example of *Celali* revolts.

Since the state constructed every institution around the tax system, it tried to control everything which could threaten it. To control the taxes, the state implemented land regime – *timar* – which was an old way to collect and spend the taxes. Through this system, the government registered every taxable resource and tax-payer into *defters*. Thus, through the land system, the government could manage the peasants and their economic activities around land cultivation.²⁸

What were the advantages of the *timar* system for the government? The most important need to implement the system was inadequacy to gather all taxes at the center which forced all ancient and medieval empires to spend money where it was collected. Therefore, the government appointed a state servant to a defined place and gave the right to collect taxes there as his income according to the tradition and law. In return, they had to collect taxes in their regions by themselves in harvest time, to

²⁵ İncalcık, *The Classical Age*, 112.

²⁶ Abdullah Saydam, *Osmanlı Medeniyeti Tarihi*, (Trabzon: Derya Kitabevi, 1999), 160-61.

²⁷ Faroqhi, “Rural life”, 383.

²⁸ Karpat, “The Land Regime”, 329.

govern the people, to secure the peace and to raise soldiers to fight in the battlefield and to go to the war with his soldiers when he was called. Even if the Janissaries were the best known military group of the Ottoman classical era, the backbone of the army was the *timarlı sipahis*, provincial cavalrymen. Janissaries had been very few comparing to the provincial army, and had been paid directly by the central treasury, also their small number had not posed a serious problem for the Porte. These obligations, however, bound the *timar* holders to their lands, and they had to return their homes before the harvest in order to get their share from the products; they were seasonal soldiers. Nevertheless, the central treasury had no economic burden of an army while the state had an enormous army. Moreover, the country was ruled by those people again without payment directly from the central treasury. Consequently, the government collected taxes, had an army, ruled the country and secured the peace; whole in whole *timar* system meant a lot for the Ottoman Empire.

The *timar* system was based on registration. Since in conditions at that time mobilization of the masses was impossible to follow, vertical and horizontal mobilization of population were the least desired things from part of the Sultan. Additionally, in a typical medieval society, mobilization was not a trend of people as well. Ordinary people could pass to the upper class only through the *devshirme* system or fulfilling a service of state as long as he performed the duty. This quotation “Son of *reaya* is *reaya*, son of slave is slave (Reaya oğlu reaya, kul oğlu kuldur.)” is very important in the aspect of showing desire of the state. As a result, the *timar* system was implemented to control the activities of the tax-payers and, as long as it managed to control, the system benefited from its success. The system showed its usefulness in

the 15th and 16th centuries in the Balkans and Anatolia which led an increase in number of the population and accordingly of the cities.²⁹

2.1.2. Age of Devolution and Transformation

By the end of sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman government faced with serious problems.³⁰ The most apparent indication of them can be seen in the increase of the *lahiyas* – reports – in the mentioned century.³¹ The change attracted attention of contemporary Ottomans who defined it as *ihtilal* – devolution. The common point that they shared was corruption of the *timar* system. They complained about increase of Janissaries at the expense of provincial cavalrymen and sale of the *timars* with bribes. Since the era of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent embellished their dreams, the proposed solution was to return to the practices of that time which once made the empire live its golden ages. The reason of their insistence on the old practices and revitalization of *timar* system was that the land regime was the reason of perfection of the state and the society, and danger came out of its corruption according to their ideas. The thing what was happening was not transformation to be shaped but corruption to be corrected for them. It is obvious that

²⁹ Ömer Lütfi Barkan and Nikolai Todorov reveal that there was an increase in the population and in the number of the cities in the Balkans. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Tarihi Demografi Araştırmaları ve Osmanlı Tarihi”, *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 10, (1953), 1-26; Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City: 1400-1900*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983).

³⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908”, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 27.

³¹ The most famous among them *Risale* of Koçi Bey – Yılmaz Kurt, *Koçi Bey Risalesi*, (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2000); and anonymous ones *Kitâbu Mesâlih-i Müslimîn*, *Kitâb-ı Müstetâb*, *Hırzu'l-Mülûk – Yaşar Yücel*, *Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatına Dair Kaynaklar: Kitâb-ı Müstetâb*, *Kitâbu Mesâlih-i Müslimîn ve Menâfi'i'l-Mü'minîn*, *Hırzu'l-Mülûk*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988).

the contemporary Ottoman policymakers were well aware that the time had changed but their solutions did not consist of accommodating to the changing time.

The success of the *timar* system was challenged by a couple of changes relatively at the same time.³² As Braudel indicated, there was an increase in population in the Mediterranean basin which also affected the Ottomans in the sixteenth century, and it started a chain reaction which would deeply influence the Ottoman society and the state as well.³³ This sharp increase shook the empire's structure at its core. The cultivable lands did not rise at the same rate as the population growth, which eventually concluded with the most feared effect of the Ottomans – that was mobilization of masses. This caused increase in number of unregistered people whom the government could not manage to control. The people who could not afford themselves in villages migrated to cities, some became servants of governors and, some became bandits and plundered villages. The crisis was so intense, especially in Anatolia that many villages disappeared from the end of the sixteenth to the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. The contemporaries defined the event as “*büyük kaçgun*” – the great flight.³⁴

The population growth accompanied with inflation. The government responded it with its insistence on fixed low prices which was a sign that the government ignored the change, and debasement of coinage causing more chronic problems which remained an economic panorama from the fifteenth century until the end of the empire.³⁵ The inflation which was accompanied with disintegration of *narh* –

³² Halil İnalçık, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey”, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 42-63.

³³ Halil İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6, (1980), 285.

³⁴ Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c. 1550-1700”, *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead, (London-New York: Routledge, 2011), 184-202.

³⁵ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 40.

officially fixed price – affected incomes of officials and military members which led them to seek new sources of income.³⁶ In addition to inflation, flight of peasants from their villages to cities, mountainous places or distant provinces eventually deteriorated income of the timariots. To compensate their loss, the *timar* holders abused the fines and taxes.

The outside developments did not evolve for the favor of the *timar* system either. The changes in military arena required regular infantry rather than seasonal medieval cavalry, and the soldiers must have been professional, having no other occupations unlike the Ottomans. In order to adapt the changing needs, the Porte obliged to increase number of the infantry, which was the Janissaries at that time, at the expense of the *timarlı sipahis* since they lost their functions. Therefore, the expenditures of the treasury increased as well, this led the state to find more resources. As a result of this need, the Porte had to transform one of its most fundamental institutions to accommodate the changing time. This transformation, however, did not proceeded premeditatedly. The urgent needs forced the Ottoman policy-makers to take some precautions, and their long-term results were not expected by them.

2.1.2.1. Transformation of Land Regime

The flight of peasants from their villages left land of the *timar* holder vacant which became no longer a resource of income. Since the timariots lost their importance in the battlefield and now they lost their incomes, the state began to gather lands of those

³⁶ Karpat, “Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683”, 396.

timar holders in its hands and gave them who were willing to turn the empty land into a source of taxable income. According to a justice decree dated in 1609, influential people among the military class were granted to own vacant lands as a result of *Celali* disorders, and eventually those lands turned into private estates of those individuals.³⁷ Additionally, since the expenditures of the treasury increased, the state needed more resources. Thus, it heavily espoused another old way to collect taxes which was *iltizam* – tax-farming – through which the state gave the right of collecting taxes in certain areas in a certain period of time, usually for 3 years, to the individuals, *mültezims*, in auctions.³⁸

Generally, the *mültezims* were among members of the high class who had enough capital to invest. Even if they had right to collect taxes, they were not obliged to present where they had right to collect. They appointed someone among the local people who could manage the duty on behalf of him. At that point, the *ayans* came into scene. Therefore, dissolution of *timar* system resulted in a new tax system and, accordingly, with the rise of *ayan*, or local lords.³⁹ Originally, their power was rooted in local people's recognition independently of their relationship with the state.⁴⁰ They functioned as mediators between the state and the local subjects, and helped the government in local affairs such as determination of taxes and their collection.⁴¹ Consequently, they improved their positions by taking advantages of changing structure in the Ottoman society.⁴²

³⁷ İnalçık, "The Emergence of Big Farms", 111.

³⁸ İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation", 327.

³⁹ Karpaz, "The Land Regime", 330.

⁴⁰ Halil İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization in the Ottoman Administration", *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 47-48.

⁴¹ İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation", 327-37.

⁴² Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 245.

In time, the *ayans* were getting powerful in their locality by acquiring the privilege of collecting taxes, and they passed to the *askerî* class. Their strength was rising as they were expanding their taxation area and accordingly increasing their military power. Eventually, they surpassed status of mere local recognition, and became local lords who fulfilled services of administration, tax collection, security and military. Therefore, they formed a layer between the government and common people which was adverse picture of the classical Ottoman structure. The weakness of the sultans who were under pressure of the Janissaries and anti-reformers from various groups, like *ulema* and officials. This gave a favorable opportunity to these local notables and estate owners to consolidate their powers in the region and in the eyes of the central government by offering soldiers in the battlefield which was more urgent priority beyond anything in times of war. It is interesting to note in terms of showing how the capital was in turmoil that from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century eight out of fifteen sultans were abdicated. The local notables became so strong to challenge to will of the Sultan when they felt that their interests were under danger, such as the opposition of Tirsiniklioglu to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army of Sultan Selim III; and that much powerful to abdicate one sultan and to enthrone the other, like the Alemdar Mustafa Pasha's abdication of Sultan Mustafa IV and the enthronization of young Sultan Mahmut II.

Even if the central authority whose main priority was to abolish local powers depicted them as usurpers upon poor ordinary subjects, they actually were not dreadful as that much. Those estate owners and notables provided shelter to those people in the reign of brigandage⁴³ and securing their properties and lives against them when the

⁴³ Michael Palaret, *The Balkan Economies c.1800-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37.

central authority failed to maintain these services. They also invested large amount of money for public structures in their regions where the Porte forgot, and even some of them were known as fathers of the locals, namely, Karaosmanoğlu, Tuzcuoğlu, Köse Pasha.⁴⁴ As long as they were not threatened, they paid attention to continuity of productivity, and provided reasonably good rule compared to the regular Ottoman officials.⁴⁵ The problem arose when rivalry among the notables did not ended up with a stronger one to terminate the conflict. The antagonism between Tirsiniklioğlu İsmail, the notable of Rusçuk (Ruse), and Yılıkoğlu Süleyman, the notable of Silistre, was an example of this kind of competition.⁴⁶ In such cases, the local notables' priority was imposing their rule upon those people resulting with increase in oppression.⁴⁷

The *ayans* did not always rise to power through the legitimate ways. There were some usurpers who became rebels against the central authority but then were promoted to vizierate by the Sultan when his army could not manage to suppress. The most prominent example of this kind was Osman Pazvandoğlu⁴⁸ who controlled the Vidin region with help of an army consisting of irregular soldiers and bandits. By force, he, first, became tax-farmer on lands, and then, seized the title of *ayan* of Vidin.⁴⁹ His revolt began in 1797 disturbed the Bulgarian villages. His father had been

⁴⁴ Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 261; Yuzo Nagata, "The Role of Ayans in Regional Development during the Pre-Tanzimat Period in Turkey: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoglu Family", *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire*, (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995), 119-133; Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1984).

⁴⁵ Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*, Vol. 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 283.

⁴⁶ Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Dağlı İsyancıları, 1791-1808*, (Ankara: Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Basımevi, 1983), 16.

⁴⁷ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 283.

⁴⁸ Kemal Çiçek, "Pazvandoğlu Osman: Vidin ve Kuzey Bulgaristan Bölgesinin Asi Ayanı", Cilt 34, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 208-210.

⁴⁹ Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 248-49.

executed by Yusuf Pasha. From then on, his journey had begun as a *yamak*⁵⁰ and gained popularity among Janissaries in Vidin. Even, he had some sympathizers among Janissaries in Istanbul. His power had further increased when Janissary corps who had been forced to leave Belgrade had participated to his forces.⁵¹ At the height of his power, Pazvandoğlu's control covered the lands from Vidin to Lom to Nikopol, Plevne, and Tırnova down to Tatarpazarcığı, Sofia, and Nish in the south.⁵² His administration policy was far from talents of a capable governor, his basis of rule was force. He attacked with his irregular army to Serbian and Bulgarian peasants, seizing their land and imposing upon them a variety of new taxes.⁵³ These encroachments, however, cannot be regarded as assaults of the ruling Muslims towards the ruled non-Muslims. A remarkable number of Christian forces served in his army. There were some Christian spies, agents and advisors in his service.⁵⁴ By the beginning of the new war with France in 1798, which forced Selim III to make peace with the notables, and sacrificed power to them in return to gain their military support.⁵⁵ He succeeded to remain in power until his death in 1807.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Yamak literally means assistant, apprentice. It was an important step for promoting to the Janissary corps, *yamaks* were Janissary candidates who fulfilled some functions in different posts in the army. For further reading Feridun Emecen, "Yamak", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Cilt 43, (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2013), 310-11.

⁵¹ Karpat, "Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683", 427.

⁵² Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 248-49.

⁵³ Karpat, "Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683", 423.

⁵⁴ Rossitsa Gradeva, "Osman Pazvantoğlu", *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, (New York: Facts On File, 2009), 448.

⁵⁵ Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 267.

⁵⁶ Gradeva, "Osman Pazvantoğlu", 448-49.

2.1.2.2. Reign of Banditry

Beside the autocephalous attitude of the *ayans* in provinces, widespread banditry in Rumelia posed another vital problem for social stability. As mentioned above, the population growth resulted in migration of young people to cities in order to find new job opportunities. However, many of them could not find what they sought, but they were employed in the retinues of the *ayans* or governors. This is how the *ayans* became so strong to contest the authority of the central government.

Another occupation was created by the government itself which was a part-time military service. The changing needs of battlefield in favor of the infantry forced the Porte to increase number of its infantry units, and the large reserve of young people who were seeking an occupation became perfect candidates to fulfill this need. The state began to hire those people who were known as *levends* in times of war and paid only in the duration of that war. After the fight ended, the *levends* were not employed in the army but were disbanded. Therefore, a group of people who previously had no specific qualifications was released who now knew how to use firearms. When they could not find a place in the retinue of an *ayan*, there was only one option left to them which was banditry. The political, military, and economic instability of the empire aided spread of brigandage throughout its domains.

In times of crisis, many of those *levends* was inclined to brigandage, and terrified Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in Anatolia and Rumelia.⁵⁷ It reached its peak in 1791-1808 shortly after the end of long Russo-Turkish War in 1768-1774

⁵⁷ Şükrü Hanioglu, *Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 26.

which resulted in loss of the Crimea and a huge financial burden.⁵⁸ As mentioned above, unfair actions of *ayans* to the locals and continuous conflicts among them deeply disturbed order of Bulgarian peasants at the turn of the 18th century. Moreover, the Crimean princes who were settled in the Balkans after Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 deteriorated their situation. Besides those factors, Bulgarian villagers suffered the most from the *Kirjali* revolts which began in the 1780's.⁵⁹ The social upheaval caused by *Kirjali* period resulted in far-flung banditry and small-scale local warfare, and weakened the Ottoman authority in Rumelia.⁶⁰ When the Sultan was convinced that he could not defend his subjects let them take some precautions to preserve their own security such as permitting them to migrate to towns and to raise fortifications.⁶¹ Notwithstanding, the turmoil was resulted in depopulation of Rhodope and Balkan Mountains areas.⁶²

The intensity of the social unrest was so high and deeply affected the memory of the *reaya* in the area, especially among the non-Muslims. The nationalist rhetoric of “For five centuries, they have been butchering us” reflects this perception of the Ottoman rulership among the Bulgarians. As Bernard Lory indicates, approximately thirty years of intense disturbance in the Rumelian lands which covers the *Kirjali* period causes formation of the “five century” myth.⁶³ The impact of the chaotic period was a thick and dense curtain between past and present which does not mean that the whole period of Ottoman domination was like that since the Bulgarian lands

⁵⁸ Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Dağlı İsyanları*, 7.

⁵⁹ Karpát, “Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683”, 427.

⁶⁰ Mark Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period, The Revolts in Nish (1841) and Vidin (1850)”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 11, (May, 1975), 104.

⁶¹ Karpát, “Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683”, 427.

⁶² Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant”, *The Journal of Economic History* 20, (June, 1960), 281.

⁶³ Bernard Lory, “Разсъждения Върху Историческия Мит ‘Пет Века Ни Клаха’”, Paris, (December, 2006).

<http://tr.scribd.com/doc/57282853/%D0%91%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%9B%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8>

experienced neither the devastation of long Austrian-Turkish War like Serbs in the end of the seventeenth century, nor the “unpleasant” Latin rule as in the Morean Peninsula, nor the oppression of Phanariots as in Walachia.⁶⁴ However, during this time, the Bulgarians began to emigrate from Rumelia in small groups and generally deserted the plains where were easy to control by the oppressors to the mountainous places.⁶⁵

As a result, the gradual collapse of the *timar* system which had once maintained order and stability distorted that order, and exacerbated situation of the subjects.⁶⁶ The dissolution of the *timar* system, the increase of banditry of those who were disbanded after the war seeking for an occupation, and the need of cash money of the central government led the rise of *ayans* who took the responsibility to collect taxes, to raise soldiers to the Porte in times of war, to secure the local peace and to protect the people from brigandage. Their rise eventually made them come against each other which disturbed the stability of the area. Under such conditions, the sultans were not eligible to reform the empire’s institutions because of the oppositions, first in the center, of Janissaries and other anti-reformist people in the palace who profited from the corruption, and, second in the provinces, of the *ayans* who felt their interests and the status of autonomy under threat with the reforms which strengthened the authority of the central government.

⁶⁴ Lory, “Разсъждения Върху Историческия Мит”, 2-5.

⁶⁵ Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, “Ecology of the Ottoman Lands”, *The Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*, Vol. 3, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 32.

⁶⁶ Karpat, “The Land Regime”, 334.

2.2. Socio-Economic Changes

The time when the basic structures of the Ottoman classical age began to be shaken coincided with the dawn of globalization of trade and with increase in relationship between Europe and the Balkans and the other western parts of the empire respectively in commercial activities. It was a result of European demand for food and raw materials in southern European lands and Mediterranean basin. The effects of development of commercial relationships were firstly felt in Serbia and Walachia where were closer to the Habsburg Empire. One of the main reasons of that was the articles which was put into the treaties of Karlowitz in 1699 and Passarowitz in 1718 by the Habsburgs which included freedom of trade, especially between the Balkan provinces and the Habsburg Empire.⁶⁷

The development of trade with the West resulted in commercialization of agriculture in some parts of the empire. That is why *ayans* found grounds among social, political and commercial arena in places where integration with European trade was succeeded.⁶⁸ The scale of the trade with the western countries dramatically increased from 17th century onwards. If we take a glance to the numbers Karpát gives, the total European trade with the Ottoman Empire in 1783 was around 4.4 million; in 1829 it fell to 2.9 million (because of the Greek independence war), but rose to 12.2 in 1845, to 54 in 1876, and to 69.4 million in 1911.⁶⁹ As the European commercial activities penetrated into the empire, it gradually turned into importer. Its exports consisting of manufactured items, gradually limited with agricultural commodities by the second half of the nineteenth century. From then on, the capitulations which were

⁶⁷ Karpát, "Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683", 395.

⁶⁸ Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 252.

⁶⁹ Karpát, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State", 31.

granted to the western states by the Sultan to allow them free trade in his realm began to pose a serious problem which resulted in weakening of the local craftsmen.

Another important result was increase of the non-Muslim's power in the empire as a consequence of their interaction with westerners. The proximity to European culture and expertise in European languages gave Ottoman non-Muslim subjects to serve in European commercial activities and in consulates as translators.⁷⁰ Since the western merchants did not know local languages and their cultures in the Balkans, they depended on local agents among them for their own economic activities.⁷¹ As the number of the western embassies increased in the Ottoman territories, the number of the Ottoman subjects who were employed in these embassies also increased since they knew both the European and Ottoman languages which made them intermediators between two of them. The employment in European service brought two significant privileges to the Ottoman non-Muslim subjects:⁷² First, they were exempted from paying the poll tax (*cizye*)⁷³ since they were not protected by the Sultan anymore. Second, they acquired same trade privileges of the foreign merchants granted by the Porte paying lower trade duties than the Ottoman merchants, thereby it was the most important privilege entering the European service.

Beyond the language capabilities of the non-Muslims, the Europeans regarded them as their co-religionists which was an important element of the westerners' preferences.⁷⁴ On the one hand, language and religious advantageous of the non-

⁷⁰ Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 93.

⁷¹ Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", 260; Palaret, *The Balkan Economies*, 42.

⁷² Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 93.

⁷³ Cizye was a kind of tax which was collected from non-Muslim subjects in a Muslim country for protection of their lives and properties by the Muslim ruler.

⁷⁴ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 96.

Muslims motivated the Europeans to collaborate with them. On the other hand, some drawbacks of being in a cooperation with the Muslims posed problems from part of the westerners which eventually discouraged them not to collaborate with them. Any contract or deal between a Muslim and a European merchant was subject to a Muslim court which led westerners to incline for non-Muslims.⁷⁵ From part of the Muslims, however, they were not willing to enter the European protection⁷⁶ whom they considered as infidels.

The impacts of development of the western trade with the Ottomans in favor of the non-Muslims led to a division in Ottoman merchants' trade activities. From the eighteenth century onward, while the Muslim merchants were restricted in domestic trade, the non-Muslims concentrated on western trade.⁷⁷ Therefore, non-Muslims had a much wider worldview having far-reaching networks thanks to far-reaching commerce, and began to consolidate their identities and self-awareness.⁷⁸ The Muslims, on the other hand, were well aware that their positions were in decline against the non-Muslims who were backed by their new associates, the Europeans. Once enjoying with the power of their empire and belonging to the ruling religion, Muslims were, now, witnessing to gradual loss in favor of the non-Muslims who were, in theory, inferior.

The relationship between the non-Muslims and the Sultan was further deepened as they were becoming powerful with the backing of the Europeans. Differences of religion, language and culture became very important elements identifying groups with the development of commercial activities. Accordingly,

⁷⁵ Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism, and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750*, (New York: NYU Press, 1988), 102.

⁷⁶ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 97.

⁷⁷ Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East*, 33.

⁷⁸ Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, 279.

Christian merchants and intellectuals transformed their religious and cultural traditions into a political dimension excluding anything Ottoman.⁷⁹ As the non-Muslims interacted with the Europeans, their allegiance to the Ottoman sultan began to diminish.⁸⁰ Unlike the Christians who had no problem to enter the western citizenship acquiring its privileges, the Muslims began to stress their religious identity and their relationships with the Ottoman State since they had no other option. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these tendencies mostly belonged to the members of the upper structures of the bourgeoisie, especially to those who lived not in the Ottoman Empire rather abroad. Common people still looked upon the Sultan as their worldly ruler until the mid-nineteenth century. Anti-Ottoman attitude gradually spread to them after failure of the Sultan to fulfil his duty to protect his subjects from the encroachments of his officials and soldiers, as well as from the outside enemies, and to maintain peace among his subjects.

Lastly, Karpát mentioned a very interesting subject on changing tendency of the Porte on referential point of self-definition. Almost at the same time with the intensification of trade with the West, bureaucracy gradually identified themselves with religion practically rather than in theory.⁸¹ As mentioned above, the term *reaya* had been used to unify all kind of subjects from different religion, culture and language in the eyes of the Sultan. However, the meaning of the *reaya* shifted from a common name for all of his subjects into a term to define only non-Muslims.

To sum up, free market economy deeply affected the basic structures of the Ottoman classical age. It changed the relationship between non-Muslims and the West, the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, and both of them with the Porte itself. On the

⁷⁹ Karpát, "Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683", 400.

⁸⁰ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie*, 93.

⁸¹ Karpát, "Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683", 394.

one hand, the non-Muslims who were getting powerful with their relations with the West eventually their association with the Europe. On the other hand, the Muslims who were aware their positions in decline had the tendency to link themselves more and more with the state since it was out of question to enter the protection of the infidels. The separation of their commercial activities – the non-Muslims with international trade thanks to their long range connections, and the Muslims who were locked in the empire with the internal trade – led to the formation of non-Muslim middle class and their intelligentsia, and oppositely lack of a middle class of the latter. The traditional social and the political system of the Ottoman Empire became inoperative with the free trade economy and the collapse of traditional land system. The story of the Ottomans in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century was the efforts to keep pace with the changing time and to accommodate the needs of the changing conditions. This mission was getting much tougher for the Porte when the commercial influence of the European powers turned into the political interference into its internal problems. Accordingly, the mutual partnership in trade between the non-Muslims of the empire with Europe also gradually resulted in being subject of the former to the latter's political agenda.

CHAPTER III

BULGARIAN MIGRATIONS BEFORE THE *TANZIMAT*

3.1. Population Policy of the Russian Empire

The stimuli behind the Bulgarian emigration from Rumelia were explained in Chapter II in the Ottoman context. However, the motives pointed out were not sufficient in their own to explain direction of the emigrations. As it has been seen in the previous chapter, in times of trouble and turmoil, tendency of the rural population was to move to further provinces or mountainous places from plains where they could find shelter from encroachments of rebels, abuse of local governors and devastation of wars.⁸² Intensification of the migrations interestingly coincided with implementation of the Russian population policy.

The Russian expansion to the south posed two serious challenges to St. Petersburg administration. At first, the Russian borders were gradually getting closer

⁸² Hütteroth, "Ecology of the Ottoman Lands", 32; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Rural Life", 383.

to bee hive, the territories of Nogai and the Crimean Tatars alike. Thus, Russians regarded them as a severe threat to their land's security, and planned to form a military zone for protection from their incursions. Russian commanders spread manifestos on behalf of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna in order to populate the southern regions with anti-Turkish elements, which invited Christians to settle in Russia.⁸³ Therefore, Elizabeth issued a decree on 24 December 1751 on admission of the Serbs who wanted to settle in Russia and to serve as a paid regiment, appointment of them to suitable places on the borders with the Ottomans, and determination of their salaries.⁸⁴ It is interesting that the Habsburg's formation of *Militär Grenze* (military frontier) with Serbian immigrants who were led by Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević in 1690 during the Great Ottoman-Habsburg War resembled the same venture of the Russian Tsarina.

The need for people to settle in the military zones began to evolve in the reign of Catherine the Great. The mission of guarding the borders from the invaders was gradually losing its importance as the power of the Russian Empire grew. The necessity to populate those southern regions in order to manipulate their economic efficiency became a new requirement. As Shishmarev indicated, industrial development and accordingly increase in population of cities pushed grain producing areas to much southern territories.⁸⁵ However, the population growth could not reach expansion of the Russian borders, and majority of the Russian people settled in heart of the Russian lands. The problem of rebalancing connection between population and territory was chronic issue of the Russian Empire for many years because the serfdom

⁸³ I.V. Semenova, "Участие Болгар в Русско-Турецких Войнах XVIII в.", *Balkanskiy Istoricheskiy Sbornik* 2, (1970), 324.

⁸⁴ Aleksey Leont'yevich Narochnitskiy, Nikola Petrović, *Политические и Культурные Отношения России с Югославянскими Землями в XVIII в: Документы*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 149-151.

⁸⁵ Vladimir Fedorovich Shishmarev, *Романские Поселения на Юге России: Научное Наследие*, (Leningrad: Nauka, 1975), 29-30.

was Empire's basic institution.⁸⁶ Since it made mobilization of the peasants impossible in the north and the center, this led Russian policy-makers to seek foreign people to colonize the area.⁸⁷ The Russian's needs coincided with increasing rate of mobility in Europe ever before.⁸⁸ Correspondingly, in a manifest dated on 4 December 1762, every foreigner not only military was invited to immigrate to Russia, but the expected population influx did not realize.⁸⁹ The immigrants were subjects to the rules established by a decree of 22 July 1763 "On the permission to all foreigners entering to Russia, to settle in the provinces where they wish and to grant them rights" and with this decree the Empress established the Bureau for the Sponsorship of Foreign Colonists (*Opekunstvo Inostrannykh Poselentsev*).⁹⁰ The decree gave immigrants some privileges: those who settled on vacant lands were exempt from taxes for 30 years; in provincial cities for 10 years; in Moscow, Petersburg and western lands for 5 years.⁹¹ It obviously showed that Petersburg's main concern was to populate the southern lands where the population was scarce. Eventually, the Novorossiya (New Russia) became primary laboratory of the Russian population policy and colonization.⁹²

The decrees of 4 December 1762 and 22 July 1763 were published in the Netherlands, Denmark, England, and free cities of Germany; additionally the decree

⁸⁶ Willard Sunderland, "Catherine's Dilemma: Resettlement and Power in Russia, 1500s-1914", *Globalizing the Migration History: The Eurasian Experience (16th-21st centuries)*, ed. Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 55.

⁸⁷ Shishmarev, *Романские Поселения на Юге России*, 30; The Catherine's government loosened the restrictions of serfdom and made peasants moved to the south, but it was a limited venture that only state peasants were allowed to settle in south. (Sunderland, "Catherine's Dilemma", 55).

⁸⁸ Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, "The mobility transition revisited, 1500-1900: What the Case of Europe can Offer to Global History", *The Journal of Global History* 4, (2009), 370.

⁸⁹ E. V. Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи и Переселение Болгар в Новороссийский Край и Бессарабию: 1751-1871 гг.*, (Moscow: Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyy Otkrytyy Tekhnicheskiiy Universitet Putey Soobshcheniya Ministerstva Putey Soobshcheniya, 2004), 57.

⁹⁰ Mark Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 6.

⁹¹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 58.

⁹² Sunderland, "Catherine's Dilemma", 66.

of 1762 was published in Swedish and Austrian newspapers.⁹³ However, as early in the seventeenth century, there were strict rules to prevent emigration in European states. That was why western governments expressed their dissatisfaction from the vigorous activities of Russian agents in their realms. In the Ottoman Empire, the invitation was proceeded in secrecy. A Russian agent in Constantinople, A. M. Obreskov, was ordered not to publish the decree of 4 December 1762 to avoid conflict with the Porte, but as possible as in secret manner to bring it to the attention of people who would like to move into Russia.⁹⁴ It is interesting while Russian government published invitations on newspapers in the European kingdoms, it took place in secrecy in the Ottoman lands. Of course, there was not any newspaper to publish the appeals in the empire at that time, nevertheless, there was not an official call for immigrants.

The demand for population was getting stronger after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-92 and eventually the annexation of Crimean Peninsula by the Russian armies. Catherine's government intended to shift the demographic balance in the region at the expense of the Muslims not only by settling Christian colonists, but also by deporting the Tatars.⁹⁵ For example, during the war of 1768-74, when the southern part of Bessarabia, Budjak, came under the Russian control, the authorities moved several thousands Nogais there eastward. Presumably, the Russians aimed to facilitate military operations by removing the Nogais from the conflicting territories to areas where they could cause no harm.⁹⁶ Moreover, immediately after the annexation of the Peninsula, around 100.000 Crimean Tatars left their homes as a result of Russian resettlement

⁹³ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 58-59.

⁹⁴ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 60.

⁹⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 5.

⁹⁶ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 5.

policies;⁹⁷ the attitude of the Russian officials towards this migration was either not to stop the movement or actively stimulate them to emigrate.⁹⁸ Even if a large scale Tatar emigration happened after the Crimean War, the number was sufficient to make a labor deficit, but it opened a way to colonize the vacant land without significant resistance. Likewise, in a globalizing commercial world and increasing economic importance of exportation, men-power meant a lot. As a rising power of Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, Russia needed to expand its population equally with the expansion of its lands. Appropriately, in 1797 Bureau for the Affairs of Foreign Colonists in Novorossiysk (*Kontora opekunstva novorossiiskikh inostrannykh poselentsev*) was created to deal with colonization of the southern regions more effectively, and it was brought under the Ministry of Interior in 1803.⁹⁹

Initially, the primary target of Russian government was not the Balkan nations who were far away from their borders, but it was the Germans who were known skillful in vine production, arable farming and horticulture. Even, the Russians did not trust the Bulgarian immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, who moved to Russia before the 19th century in small groups, and settled them far from the borders while the Germans were settled near the port cities where they could sell their products.¹⁰⁰ However, there was a disadvantage to bring German immigrants – it was quite expensive to settle them for the state’s treasury. For instance, the government spent 1.100 rubles for a German family to settle in Kherson province,¹⁰¹ while it spent 440 rubles for a Bulgarian family in the same region.¹⁰² This led the Russian policy-makers to suspend the

⁹⁷ Milen V. Petrov, “Tanzimat for the Countryside: Midhat Paşa and the Vilayet of Danube, 1864-1868”, (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2006), 347; Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 6-7.

⁹⁸ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 7.

⁹⁹ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 81.

¹⁰¹ Kherson covers the lands between the Dnieper and Dniester rivers, northwest of the Crimean Peninsula, on the shores of Black Sea.

¹⁰² Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 92.

encouragement for colonization in favor of the cheaper one when it needed to reduce the costs of foreign colonization. By a decree of 10 February 1810, Russian government allowed only to those who immigrated to Russian lands with their own expense.¹⁰³

The government took a different position to the Bulgarians. To increase the Orthodox population of the southern lands, the Chief of the Moldavian army M. I. Kutuzov invited Transdanubian settlers to immigrate to the Russian lands. He expressed that their only desire was to free all of their co-religionists from “Turkish yoke”¹⁰⁴ and to do that he allowed them to pass freely to left bank of the Danube, and he granted three-year exemption from all taxes and duties to whom did so, also they would be allocated free lands where they chose to live.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, St. Petersburg did not stop to attract the Germans to immigrate when it saw an opportunity. In 1817, Alexander I asked the German pietists to settle in Russia where thousands of Germans lived.¹⁰⁶ In a time of great famine swaying central Europe from which the southern Germany suffered the most, Alexander might try to use the occasion for his own benefit.

¹⁰³ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 92.

¹⁰⁴ It is a term to explain the Ottoman rule in the Bulgarian land as a dark period for five centuries. The idea is coined in the late nineteenth century, and become the main element of the Bulgarian nationalist discourse.

¹⁰⁵ Iurii Grigorevich Ivanov, *История Молдавии: Документы и Материалы [Istoriya Moldavii. Dokumenty i materialy]*, Vol. 2, (Chisinau: Akademiya nauk Moldavskoi SSR, 1957), 1.

¹⁰⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 94.

3.2. Bulgarian Migrations from the Ottoman Empire to the Russian

Lands before the *Tanzimat*

3.2.1. A Sociological Approach

The migration studies is a quite popular research area especially for people from sociology and then for historians. In the field of history, there are not many researchers who have a sociological background to evaluate the problem on the basis of both disciplines. Since migration is a sociological phenomenon, a sociological approach is a prerequisite attempt to evaluate the Bulgarian migrations in the nineteenth century.

There are two main dimensions of which characteristics decide direction of the movement. One dimension is the “migrant-sending” community or a region, and the other is the “migrant receiver” community or a region. The flow of the people happens from one point to the other, like in teeterboard example. Advantages of one point and disadvantages of the other increase the weight of that side and the other way around. Therefore, masses move towards that direction but that does not explain the phenomenon completely. Furthermore, it is important which group is attracted by those advantages. Given the fact that migration is a very costly and risky enterprise, Douglas Massey and his colleagues conclude that first migrants are from lower middle class who have enough resources to absorb the costs and risks of the trip while rich people do not have much incentive to move.¹⁰⁷ This point is very crucial to

¹⁰⁷ Douglas S. Massey and others, “Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities”, *American Journal of Sociology* 99, (May, 1994), 1497.

comprehend the Bulgarian immigration to Russia in the context of this thesis which will be evaluated later.

The first thing that comes to mind about advantages which can be called as “pull factor” is generally the economic welfare and high amount of income.¹⁰⁸ The economic factor generally pulls the people from lower middle class from the migrant-sending community because of the mentioned reasons. However, if the pull factor of the migrant-receiver society is sponsored by a migrant-claimer government like in the example of Russian population policy which encourages the foreign immigration¹⁰⁹, the scale of migrants can be expected to extend to the members of the lower class.

The other advantages pulling migrants are stability and security of the receiver community which means also the “push” factor of the sending society. In the context of the Bulgarian emigration from Rumelia, this “push” effect is exceedingly stressed by many historians. This is partially true in times of troubles like *Kirjali* period, during the reign of *ayans* like Pazvandoglu and their clashes with each other at the end of the 18th century, and in times of Russo-Ottoman wars when the Rumelian lands turned into main battle scenes. These reasons could have been quite convincing, if most of the Bulgarian migrants had not returned to the Ottoman Empire in a short time after they immigrated to Russia, especially in later occasions. This situation casts doubt on the previous assumption. Additionally, direction of the migrants headed towards to the

¹⁰⁸ The factor of high income does not always have an effect on the flow of people. According to the theory of new economics of migration of Oded Stark and David Bloom, even if the wage difference between the migrant-sending region and the migrant-receiver is same or higher in favor of the former, the flow of migrants will continue to the developed country unless uncertainties and risks in the developing country is terminated. (Oded Stark, David E. Bloom, “The New Economics of Labor Migration”, *The American Economic Review* 75, (May, 1985), 173-178; Douglas S. Massey and others, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal”, *Population and Development Review* 19, (Sept., 1993), 436).

¹⁰⁹ The solicitation of German government after the World War II for workers which attracted thousands of Turkish citizens to immigrate to Germany is another example of this kind of pull factor for lower class.

Russian lands by passing the whole lands of Principalities, where was the least known place for the Bulgarians, to migrate unless they were informed with good opportunities. If the reason for emigration was that their lives and properties were under heavy threat of the Ottoman administration, then why did they migrate until the designated destination ignoring other possible secure places, and why did many of them decide to return back to where their lives were threatened? Therefore, we can conclude that the push-factor is not biggest “pushing” factor for the movement rather they decided to use the opportunity which was offered by the migrant-receiver state, Russia. When many of them could not realize their expectations or disappointed by the promises which were not fulfilled, they sought ways to back home. This picture makes much more sense than the general assumption, and it is tried to be revealed in the following.

3.2.2. Migrations before the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-12

Despite the official encouragement of the Petersburg government for foreign immigration to the Russian territories in mid-18th century, it found little ground among Bulgarians, therefore migrations were very weak.¹¹⁰ In fact, they were not the main subject of this process since at the beginning the primary audience were the Germans. They were known better than the Bulgarians of the Ottoman Empire who were very far away from the heart of Russia. There was a German quarter (*Nemetskaya sloboda*) in Moscow from the mid-16th century whose residents were engaged in handicraft and

¹¹⁰ Samuel Borisovich Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России в XVIII-XIX веках [The Main Stages of the Bulgarian Immigration to Russia in 18th and 19th centuries]”, *Sovetskoye Slavyanovedeniye* 1, (1980), 46-47.

flour-grinding businesses. Nevertheless, small packages of Bulgarian immigrants moved to Russia.

First Bulgarian group numbering 620 families were settled in Novomirgorod (Kherson province, Elizavetgrad district) in the mid-1750s where previously Serbs from the Habsburg Empire were colonized for military concerns.¹¹¹ It should be noted that one of the most important characteristics of the Bulgarian migrations is that many of them happened during and after an Ottoman-Russian war. For instance, during the Russo-Turkish wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792, 4-5.000 Bulgarians immigrated to Russia, in some cases along with the Russian army, and settled in Novorossiysk, the Chersonese or Bessarabia.¹¹² It is very interesting that the latter war and the migrations coincided with the *Kirjali* period which was indicated as the main reason of Bulgarian emigration, but scale of the movement was very small compared to the latter movements. Additionally, some part of Bulgarians returned to Rumelia after the conclusion of Treaty of Jassy.¹¹³ This event casts doubt on the assumption that the *Kirjalis* were the main reason of Bulgarian emigration from the Ottoman Empire.

Apart from that, at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the organization of Bulgarians who wished to immigrate to Russia was entrusted to Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Vasilii Stepanovich Tomara who instructed to investigate the interest of Bulgarians in emigration, and he transferred them secretly through the port of Sozopol.¹¹⁴ The most reasonable explanation of need for secrecy was desire of Petersburg to maintain further peace at the dawn of Napoleonic Wars

¹¹¹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 5.

¹¹² Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 6; Bernstein, "Osnovnyye Etapy Pereseleniya Bolgar v Rossii", 47.

¹¹³ Bernstein, "Оснoвные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 48.

¹¹⁴ Bernstein, "Оснoвные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 48; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 8.

and to hinder the French attempts to regain its influence on the Porte after the fail Egyptian campaign of Napoleon.

The next wave of migrations happened in 1801-1806. On 23 October 1801, the governor of Novorossiysk, Mikhail Miklashevsky, reported to newly crowned Tsar Alexander I that 19 families of Bulgarians and Greeks totaling 148 people arrived in a private ship to Odessa.¹¹⁵ Alexander replied him on 25 October 1801 to accept Bulgarians who voluntarily arrived but warned him not to call them officially.¹¹⁶ Those immigrants were settled abandoned Tatar lands near Odessa and named their village as “Malyy Buyalyk”¹¹⁷ which was the name of their native village.¹¹⁸ However, by June 1802, the attitude of Tsar has dramatically changed. He wrote to Russian ambassador, V. S. Tomara, in Istanbul that he approved his actions about the Bulgarian immigrations to Russia, and advised him not to miss the circumstances for a resettlement which enabled “possibly the greatest number of inhabitants” for Russia.¹¹⁹ The reason for the change in Russian policy was that the Russo-Ottoman alliance was over after the French threat was removed, and they separated their paths. Accordingly, Tsar allocated funds and ordered I. I. Michelson, the Governor-General of Novorossiysk, to take measures to accommodate Bulgarians in a convenient location.¹²⁰

The Russian foreign colonization coincided with instability and turmoil in the Ottoman Empire. As the Emperor expressed, Petersburg did not want to miss the

¹¹⁵ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 78; Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России”, 48; Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 7.

¹¹⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 78; Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России”, 48.

¹¹⁷ Bol'shoi Buyalyk and Malyu Buyalyk were villages approximately 70 km distant from Edirne (Adrianople).

¹¹⁸ Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России”, 48.

¹¹⁹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 78.

¹²⁰ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 78.

opportunity. By doing so, Russian Empire succeeded both to colonize its southern lands, and at the same time, to manifest itself as the savior of the Balkan peoples from the “encroachment of Turks”, like Pazvandoglu and *Kirjali* rebels. Russian administration used them as a “humane” reason to pull people from the area. For example, on 15 March 1805, A. R. Vorontsov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, considered the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans which he regarded as a clear threat to the locals, and he recommended A. A. Zherve, Consul-General of Iasi, to attract Bulgarians to immigrate to Novorossiysk region. Moreover, he wrote that all those who wish to use that proposal would find safe shelter in Russia and would receive lands in the Crimea and in the steppes between Bug and Dniester rivers, also they would be delivered all necessary benefits and allowance for their economic recover.¹²¹

On 20 February 1804, a new decree was issued which was “On rules for admission and placement of foreign colonists.” In this decree, it was noted that upon the decree of 1763 a lot of “bad” and “poor” hosts came to Russia from whom the state benefited little.¹²² According to the edict, resettlement would be allowed to those who had tendency to engage in viticulture and cultivation of mulberry trees. The immigrants would be granted concessions of taxes for ten years and be allocated 60 *desyatin*¹²³ lands to each family. Also, they would be given right of freedom of religion¹²⁴, to own factories, to join guilds and workshops, to engage in commercial activities, and be exempted from military service.

¹²¹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 79.

¹²² Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 80.

¹²³ *Desyatina* (десятина) is a Russian measure of land equals to 2.7 acres or 1.1 hectare. Thus, 60 *desyatin* equals to approximately 160 acres or 66 hectares of land.

¹²⁴ This article was put because of the expectation of German immigrants. According to decree, for the next year around 200 families of immigrants were awaited and 100-150 of them German.

The Bulgarian immigration continued until 1807. In 1804, from Vilayet of Edirne (Adrianople) 320 Bulgar families immigrated to Odessa and settled in Kubanka and Parkany. On 5 August 1804, 11 families or 50 people came to Odessa who were colonized in Bol'shoy Buyalyk. According to Bernstein, by 12 October 1804, 320 families – 896 adults and 535 children – came to Novorossiysk region.¹²⁵ During this period, by the flow of small immigrant groups, Bulgarian colonies began to emerge: Malyy Buyalyk or Andzhelyk in the Odessa district (1804), Bol'shoy Buyalyk or Koshkovo in the same district (1802), Ternivka in Kherson district (1802), Old Crimea in Feodosia district (1802), or Kashlou or Kishlav in the same district (1803), Kubanka in the Odessa district (1804), or Katardzhi or Katarzyna in Tiraspol district (1806), Parkany in the same district (1806), Baltic-Chokrak in Simferopol district (1806).¹²⁶ Eventually, Russian government yielded positive results of this population policy. In 1804-05 with the effect of good harvest of those years, Russia could export wheat at a price three times the market value of the home.¹²⁷

3.2.3. Migrations during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-12

In November 1806, another Russo-Ottoman war broke up during which the northern Rumelian lands became battle scene between two armies until the war ended in 1812 with the Treaty of Bucharest. Many Bulgarian families moved to the territories occupied by Russian armies.¹²⁸ During the period of this war, the replacement policy

¹²⁵ Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России”, 48.

¹²⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 79.

¹²⁷ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 84-85.

¹²⁸ Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России”, 50.

was planned and tried to be carried out under the leadership of E. O. Richelieu the Governor-General of Novorossiysk. He was very devoted about populating the region indeed. Kochubei, the Minister of Interior, wrote him in 1803 that Tatars who wished to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire would be beneficial, and it would be more profitable to settle the area with elements favorable to Russia. Additionally, he mentioned that the Tatars leaving at that time would be doing so on the basis of an agreement¹²⁹ with the Ottoman government.¹³⁰ However, he thought that exodus of Tatars would have terrible consequences for the territory after his inspection tour to the area, and accordingly, passports were recalled.¹³¹

After capture of Bender by the Russian army, Richelieu began resettlement of Bulgarian immigrants to Novorossiysk region. For this purpose, he sent his protégé, P.S. Meshcherskiy to Moldavia and Walachia in spring of 1807 to investigate for resettlement. He was supposed to bring 400 Bulgarian families and offered them to settle in the Dniester region.¹³² However, Richelieu couldn't accomplish his plans, just a small group of immigrant came.¹³³ Nevertheless, flow of immigrants continued in small groups from Rumelian lands, particularly from Vidin district. From the beginning of 1807 to 29 May 1807, according to official data 166 families of Bulgarians and Greeks, 754 people, came to Odessa.¹³⁴ On 1 November 1807, Kishlav, Bol'shoy Buyalyk, Malyy Buyalyke, Kuban, Katarzyna, Ternovca and Ingul village Ternovskaya colony lived 906 families or 4,246 people consisting of Bulgarians,

¹²⁹ The mentioning of agreement for the departure of Tatars is very interesting since the mass exodus of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire after the Crimean War and the Bulgarian immigration to Russia in return in 1856-62 prompt many historians, like E. Khadzhinikolova, I. Todev, and Kemal Karpat, to think about the existence of an agreement on the mutual exchange of these two peoples.

¹³⁰ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 23.

¹³¹ G. P. Levitskiy, "Переселение татар из Крыма в Турцию", *Vestnik Evropy* 5, (October, 1882), 619.

¹³² Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 88.

¹³³ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 88.

¹³⁴ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 88.

Greeks, Serbs, Moldovans from which the Bulgarians were predominate, 821 family or 3.873 people.¹³⁵ During this period, the migrants mainly came from the northern lands of today's Bulgaria, such as Vidin, Razgrad (Hezargrad), and Pleven (Plevne). In those years, German colonists were not expected anymore since the Bulgarian immigration was more promising. However, the flow of people dramatically declined in August 1807, and did not increase until 1809.¹³⁶

Towards the end of the war, General Kutuzov on 26 April 1811 granted to immigrants exemption from all taxes and duties for three years.¹³⁷ Eventually, the 1806-12 Russo-Ottoman war ended with the Treaty of Bucharest on 28 May 1812 by which the Russian Empire acquired Bessarabia. Budjak in Bessarabia was a critical place in the context of Bulgarian immigration to Russia or particularly to Bessarabia. It was more advantageous over Novorossiysk since it was closer to home. After the departure of Nogai Tatars, main theatre of Bulgarian resettlement during and after the war was this land. Soon enough, the number of Bulgarian immigrants surpassed the number of Tatar emigrants. The Bulgarian residents in Bessarabia increased from around 4.000 in 1809 to 25.000 in 1812 and majority of them, 2.800 families, lived in Budjak; and according to census in 1816, there were 20.500 Bulgarians in Bessarabia, nearly all of whom lived in Budjak.¹³⁸

During the war, however, the process of replacement was chaotic; besides, many of the immigrants who ran away from destructions of battles believed that their stay was temporary, and would return their homes when the war ended.¹³⁹ For this

¹³⁵ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 88.

¹³⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 90.

¹³⁷ Iurii Grigorevich Ivanov, *История Молдавии: Документы и Материалы*, 1; Bernstein, "Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 50.

¹³⁸ I. I. Meshcheryuk, *Антикрепостническая борьба гагаузов и болгар Бессарабии в 1812 - 1820 гг.*, (Chisinau: Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo Moldavii, 1957), 57.

¹³⁹ Bernstein, "Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 50.

reason, after the war, Russian government was busy to correct those drawbacks of the war-time immigration. The primary problem was Moldavian boyars whose lands were occupied by the fugitives, and they had a tempting desire to enserf them. Some fugitives lived under the state rulership whose problem was the fulfillment of promised security and lands, but they relatively were in a good position compared to the former ones. Desertion and resistance of some colonists led the Russian officials to accept that it was impossible to allow some of the immigrants to live under the land lords' rule while the others were under central authority.¹⁴⁰ Eventually, the problem was solved by a decree of 22 March 1818 by which the immigrants were put under administration of the central authority.¹⁴¹ Then, it came to their rights: the immigrants were given the same rights with the colonists of Novorossiysk province¹⁴² but those who settled in cities were not granted with the same rights.¹⁴³ On 12 March 1820, each family was given 60 *desyatin* (66 hectares) of land in perpetual hereditary possession without the right to sell.¹⁴⁴

By 1819, the Bulgarian resettlement might have satisfied Russian government that migration flow of foreigners was suspended in connection with the arrival of Bulgarians.¹⁴⁵ Since western part of Budjak was heavily populated by Bulgarian fugitives, the region was officially known as "New Bulgaria".¹⁴⁶ According to local statistics, there were 32.000 Bulgarians and Gagauz in Bessarabia in 1821, and the

¹⁴⁰ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 10.

¹⁴¹ Bernstein, "Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 51; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 2.

¹⁴² Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 95-96; Bernstein, "Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 51.

¹⁴³ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 98.

¹⁴⁴ I. I. Meshcheryuk, *Социально-Экономическое Развитие Болгарских и Гагаузских Сел в Южной Бессарабии, 1808-1856 гг.*, (Chisinau: Redaktsionno-Izdatel'skiy Otdel Akademii Nauk Moldavskoy SSR, 1970), 32; Bernstein, "Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 51.

¹⁴⁵ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 98.

¹⁴⁶ Bernstein, "Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России", 53.

total number of them in Bessarabia, Kherson and Taurida province was 46.598 in the same year.¹⁴⁷

Consequently, the migration of 1806-12 has some very crucial characteristics compared to the previous ones. Firstly, one criteria of Russian population policy towards the Bulgarians began to evolve within these years that was seeking colonists for particular skills, which would be much prominent later. For example, Russian authorities searched for Bulgarian colonists experienced in silk-working and plantation of mulberry trees to settle them in the Tiraspol district.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, this period witnessed the first implementation of demographic engineering which was uttered by Kochubei, the Minister of Internal Affairs, in 1803 but not materialized at that time. According to Article 7 of the Bucharest Treaty, those of the Yedisian (Budjak) horde who wished to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire were allowed to do so.¹⁴⁹ Accordingly, in the winter of 1812-13, 3.200¹⁵⁰ Tatars immigrated to the Ottoman territory.¹⁵¹ Thereby, a “mutual population trade” became a specialty of the nineteenth century migrations whether it found place in the treaties or not. The Russians took Bulgarians from the south, and in return the Ottomans got the Tatars from the north. However, as will be seen, while Russia was eager to emigrate its subjects for the new ones, the Porte was not so willing to do even if it did not reject the Tatars. Istanbul tried to attract and to dissuade Bulgarians, who were emigrating on the way or were planning to do soon. This tendency can be easily observed in subsequent events. This

¹⁴⁷ Bernstein, “Основные Этапы Переселения Болгар в России”, 53.

¹⁴⁸ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 8.

¹⁴⁹ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 13.

¹⁵⁰ Pinson uses the numbers given by Skal’kovskii who indicated that at the beginning of the war some 5.000 Tatars moved to the south in the Ottoman Empire. Even if Pinson finds the numbers reasonable, he states that he does not provide any explicit documentation.

¹⁵¹ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 13.

migration was the beginning of a series of Bulgarian movements after the Russo-Ottoman wars in 19th century, and they became the chronical issue of these battles.

3.2.4. Migrations during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-29

3.2.4.1. Bulgarians during the War and Different Perspectives of Russian administration to the Immigration

The war of 1828-29 between Russian and Ottoman empires was the most crucial one of the series of these conflicts. The Russian army had chance to reach to the heart of the Ottomans for the first time which threatened the Porte more than ever before since the previous fights happened very far away from Istanbul.

The reason of the war actually took place long before the war began. In 1821, the Sultan's subjects, the Greeks rebelled to their ruler with inspiration of the ideas of French Revolution. Their rebellion did not concern Petersburg as it was. On the other hand, the population policy of the Russian authorities gave its fruits, and it began to export cereals to Europe from the port of Odessa through the Straits with the Greek ships. When they revolted to the Sultan, Mahmut II closed the Straits to the foreign ships by which he aimed to weaken the Greek trade and eventually their resistance. At that point, the Russian's involvement came into being since its grain exportation fell to 633.000 *chetvert*¹⁵² in 1822 from 1.410.000 *chetvert* in 1819.¹⁵³

¹⁵² An obsolete Russian measure of grain equal to 209.91 liters.

¹⁵³ Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*, (London: Macmillan, 1966), 60.

Alexander I was not willing to declare war to the Ottoman Empire for such an occasion in which a group of subjects rebelled to their legitimate ruler. The Concert of Europe by which it was aimed to preserve the existing monarchies from the ideas of the French Revolution was in a delicate situation, and he did not want to ruin it. On August 1821, he wrote to Ioannis Antonios Kapodistrias, the Russian Foreign Minister at that time, “If we reply to the Turks with war, Paris directing committee will triumph and no government will be left standing. I do not intend to leave a free field to the enemies of order. At all costs means must be found to avoid war with Turkey.”¹⁵⁴ For this reason, he tried to use the diplomatic channels to overcome the issue. On 7 September 1826, the Porte and the Russian Empire reached an agreement in Akkerman. According to the agreement, the situation of the Principalities and Serbia, as indicated in the Bucharest Treaty, would be improved, and the commercial vessels which carried Russian flag would have freedom of navigation on all domestic waterways of the Ottoman Empire,¹⁵⁵ but there was not much about the Greeks. However, the Porte had a much urgent thing to concern about, and this was an act of delay maneuver. In June 1826, the Sultan abolished the Janissary corps, thus he was in a very weak position to content with the wills of Russia. Therefore, he accepted all terms they offered in order to gain time. Additionally, Russia was busy with an ongoing war with Iran until the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828. To sum up, after the long diplomatic contacts among the European powers, they managed to agree, and the joint fleet of Britain, France and Russia destroyed the Ottoman fleet in Navarin 20 October 1827, thus the Sultan entered to the war against the Tsar with a newly formed army and a burnt navy.

¹⁵⁴ Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, 61.

¹⁵⁵ Anderson, *The Eastern Question*, 65.

As mentioned above, one of the main features of the Bulgarian immigration to Russia was that it generally happened during and after a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This war was no exception. Before explaining the exodus, we should deal with the Russian attitude towards the Bulgarians during the war which is very important to comprehend main stimulus of the movement. The War of 1828-29 had very great paradox in itself since at the end an independent state was established by subjects of a legitimate ruler revolting against his authority, with the help of the Great Powers. However, the same powers tried everything to crush the ideas of French Revolution. Correspondingly, Alexander I did not support Alexander Ypsilanti's activities in 1821 against the Ottoman Empire and denounced him for his deeds. Even, his attitude towards the Greek rebellion was negative at the beginning. His primary concern was the Ottoman embargo to Greeks who transported the Russian grain to Europe. The Great Powers did not even think to establish an independent Greek state but an autonomous one would be sufficient. Nevertheless, the war was resulted in a free Greek state ruled by a German king. On the other hand, Russian attitude towards the Bulgarians during the war bore the traces of counter French ideas.

At first, the Russian administration thought to form Bulgarian voluntary regiments against the Ottomans but Nikolai advocated himself to the principles of Holy Alliance and was an ardent antagonist to the revolutionary acts. Additionally, the Bulgarian involvement in military actions and the extermination of Sultan's regime could have an impact on the Russian soldiers and peasants to overthrow the "yoke" of their own feudal lords in their homelands.¹⁵⁶ Consequently, they left the idea because of a possible widespread national liberation movement. Accordingly, Russian headquarter did not evaluate an offer of a monk Trifon Nedelkovich in summer 1829

¹⁵⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 53.

to rise up of the south-eastern Bulgarian population against the Turks.¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, in the spring of 1828, shortly after the entrance of the Russian troops into the Principalities, some Bulgarians had already begun to form guerilla groups without the consent of the Russian command.¹⁵⁸ However, we shouldn't take that the Bulgarians were fiercely willing to fight against Turks for granted, as will be seen below in the example of Mamarchev.

Nonetheless, Russian commanders did not put aside using them for background services. General Wittgenstein, who was the Chief Commander of the Russian army at that time, appealed to the Bulgarians to stay their locations and only to maintain the army with provision and forage.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, they helped the Russian army as translators and guides. As Admiral Adolphus Slade, known as *Müşavir* Pasha to the Ottomans, indicated that the people of Sliven were arteries of the Russian expeditions.¹⁶⁰ Later, Ivan Dibich, the Commander of the Russian troops,¹⁶¹ armed a small group of Bulgarians for garrison services in key strategic locations in July 1829 but not allowed them to participate the operations with the Russian army.¹⁶²

The immigration to Walachia and Russia with the connection of 1828-29 War was carried out in three stage.¹⁶³ The first stage happened during the war in which only a small number of immigrants came to the Principalities and even lesser to Russia. They mainly consisted of refugees seeking temporary shelter from devastation of the war. In the second stage, main stimulus of the movement was 13th article of the Treaty

¹⁵⁷ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 53.

¹⁵⁸ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 46.

¹⁵⁹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 103.

¹⁶⁰ S. Tabakov, *Опытъ за история на градъ Сливенъ [Essays on History of Sliven]*, Vol. II, (Sofia: S. M. Staikov, 1924), 118, 119, 121, 122 cited in Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 39.

¹⁶¹ His real name was Hans Karl von Diebitsch who was a German but served to Russian Emperor as Field Marshall. In this thesis, his Russian version of his name is used in general.

¹⁶² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 54.

¹⁶³ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 65.

of Adrianople by which anyone could immigrate to the other empire with their families for eighteen months after the conclusion of the treaty. Therefore, the movement took place from September 1829 to March 1831. The last stage was the reverse migration, happened in 1833-34, for some reasons almost half of the Bulgarians who moved to Russia and Bessarabia, returned to their homeland.¹⁶⁴

The exodus of 1828-29 was actually a consequence of Vorontsov's desires who required a number of skilled sailors and shipbuilders as Bernstein indicates.¹⁶⁵ Another actor of the immigration was Supreme Commander of Russian forces during the campaign in the Ottoman Empire, Dibich. He was mainly concerned about the fate of the Bulgarians who helped themselves during the war, and was willing to settle them in Russia but not more than that.¹⁶⁶ The last actor who manage to organize a mass exodus to Russia was Ivan Seliminski, an influential public figure, known as a doctor and a teacher. The 1828-29 immigrations should be analyzed in the context of these three dimensions. However, advent of the event proceeded neither Vorontsov wished nor Dibich nor Seliminski.

There was no consensus in the Russian administration whether the Bulgarian immigration should have been encouraged. For example, Kankrin, the Minister of Finance, thought that the resettlement was not beneficial for Russia anymore since many of them were poor people who required state's funding, and it cost approximately 150.000 rubles every year.¹⁶⁷ Chernyshev, the manager of General

¹⁶⁴ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 65.

¹⁶⁵ Bernstein, "Страница из Истории Болгарской Иммиграции в Россию во время Русско-Турецкой Войны 1828-1829 гг. [A Page from the History of the Bulgarian Immigration to Russia during the Russian-Turkish War of 1828-1829]", *Ученые Записки Института Славяноведения [Studies of the Institute of Slavic]*, Том 1, (Moscow: Akademiya Nauk SSSR, 1949), 328.

¹⁶⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 82.

¹⁶⁷ Bernstein, "Страница из Истории Болгарской Иммиграции в Россию во время Русско-Турецкой Войны 1828-1829 гг.", 333-37.

Staff, also shared the same idea with the minister of Finance, and there were many people who were opponents of Bulgarian immigration.¹⁶⁸ In addition, Vorontsov believed that the resettlement was expensive. Beyond that, there was not enough land in Novorossiysk territory, and the government of the region did not have such amount of money and food for a large scale resettlement.¹⁶⁹ But Russia desperately needed for sailors and dock workers; for this reason he wanted to limit the movement according to the need of Russia. To this end, Vorontsov, the governor-general of Novorossiysk, in 20 February 1829 submitted a report to Nicholas I, in which he wrote:

“Knowing how much your Majesty pay attention to improving our navigation and feeling every step of the great shortage of Russian free sailors to merchant ships, I dare to make a proposal to your highness that can significantly increase on the shores of the Black Sea still necessary and useful class of people, and so reduce the dependence of our trade is from foreign seafarers.”¹⁷⁰

Accordingly, he offered great incentives to sailors and alike; they were provided free homes and were exempted from all taxes and services for 25 years.¹⁷¹ His main priority was resettlement of sailors and shipbuilders whom intended to be settled near Odessa, Feodosia, Kerch, Yalta, Taganrog; but he refused to invite other categories of the population.¹⁷² For this reason, on 23 March 1829 he sent three merchants in Odessa, Alexander Kumbaro, Antonio Feognost and Constantine Kokinas, to Rumelia to convince the people to immigrate to the Crimea.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 73.

¹⁶⁹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 106.

¹⁷⁰ Bernstein, “Страница из Истории Болгарской Иммиграции в Россию во время Русско-Турецкой Войны 1828-1829 гг.”, 328.

¹⁷¹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 106, 115; I. Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 151.

¹⁷² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 69.

¹⁷³ Bernstein, “Страница из Истории Болгарской Иммиграции в Россию во время Русско-Турецкой Войны 1828-1829 гг.”, 328-29.

On the other hand, the Crimean landlords were also in need of experienced workers in viticulture, winemaking and horticulture, and thus they asked Vorontsov for this kind of immigrants.¹⁷⁴ For this reason, he asked Inzov, the governor of Bessarabia, whether he could conclude an appropriate agreement with the immigrants. In this way, the need of landlords would be fulfilled, and the treasury would get rid of costs of the resettlement.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, he was very concerned about hardships of transportation of the immigrants from Odessa through Bessarabia to the Crimea, and he tried to avoid difficulties of the movement.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, he was conservative on their status who worked for the landlords; he thought to use them almost as serfs.¹⁷⁷

From the Russian attitude of selectivity in that case, we can clearly understand that Petersburg appeased its demand of population with the previous immigrations in which Russians did not hesitate to invite everyone to settle in Russia. Now, it became a grain exporter by opening the southern fertile lands for peasants, and fulfilled the primary purpose. Obviously it was not Russia's main concern on the immigrations to protect their co-religionists from "Turkish tyranny" as some Soviet and Bulgarian historians claimed, unless the sailors were the only group subjected to that tyranny. That is why Soviet historian V. D. Konobeyev, claims that Russia pursued "selfish goals" and was interested in development of vast southern steppe region.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, the most of the Bulgarians' return to the homeland, as it will be seen, casts doubt on the assertion of "tyranny" of the Ottoman rule.

¹⁷⁴ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 71.

¹⁷⁵ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 71.

¹⁷⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 71.

¹⁷⁷ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 72.

¹⁷⁸ V. D. Konobeyev, "Русско-болгарские отношения в 1806–1812 гг. [Russian-Bulgarian Relations in 1806-1812]", *Истории русско-болгарских отношений [History of Russian-Bulgarian Relations]*, L. B. Valev, (Moscow: Akademiya nauk SSSR, 1958), 201 cited in Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 22.

There were, however, some who carried the old idea of mass immigration without distinction. One of them was Admiral Aleksey Greig who advised to go beyond only the sailors and to attract experienced farmers, herdsmen, and winemakers.¹⁷⁹ In addition to him, Ivan Inzov completely disagreed with Vorontsov in every point of the immigration. Unlike Vorontsov, Inzov was proponent of mass immigration not just sailors but agricultural population as well.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, he thought that the immigrants should have settled in Budjak and Bessarabia, not in Crimea as Vorontsov planned.¹⁸¹ However, the Trusteeship Committee decided that the Crimea was the destination of the resettlement.¹⁸² Inzov shared the same belief with Vorontsov that the resettlement would be costly, but the loss would be quickly recovered when vacant lands were populated by the hardworking Bulgarians, eventually the state would benefit from the consequences.¹⁸³ The other point, Inzov was very liberal about the status of the colonists unlike Vorontsov. He upheld that they should have paid for their labor, and they could have changed their residence after they finished the job.¹⁸⁴

Beside the proponents and opponents of the immigration and the pragmatic perspective of Vorontsov, there was another point of view on the resettlement which emerged after the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople on 14 September 1829. The war ended, but there was a question emerged about the situation of the Bulgarians who helped the Russian army during the campaign. The Russians and those Bulgarians were worried because the Ottoman government might seek revenge for their deeds. If Petersburg did not do something for them, it would be disastrous for those people and

¹⁷⁹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 68.

¹⁸⁰ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 69.

¹⁸¹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 71.

¹⁸² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 72.

¹⁸³ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 71.

¹⁸⁴ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 72.

for the Russian prestige among them. The prominent defender of this idea was the Commander of the Russian armies in the Balkans, Ivan Dibich. He also thought that the influx of poor people was not beneficial for Russia. In addition, the decrease in the number of Cristian population in the Balkans contributed to the weakening of Russia's position in the region.¹⁸⁵ It could be a good reserve for the Russian troops in Eastern Rumelia to assist them in course of new wars. Otherwise, the deserted territories could be settled by the Turkish population, which would create additional difficulties for Russia during her military campaigns.¹⁸⁶ For this reason, he thought that the immigration had to be limited with those who actively showed their commitment to Russia, and thus put their properties and lives under danger; the Russian Empire should have provided shelter for them.¹⁸⁷ The idea was also accepted by the Tsar.

To this respect, an article was included into the treaty according to which general amnesty and forgiveness were provided to all who, during the war, took part in hostilities or expressed commitment to any of the contracting parties with their behavior and opinions.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, an inclusion was put into this article which allowed any one to sell their properties and to immigrate freely to another empire with their families for eighteen months after the conclusion of the treaty.¹⁸⁹ This is very interesting that Russia which did not want non-sailor immigrants any more added such an inclusion that could encourage mass immigration. Probably, it was added for sailors of Vorontsov and Bulgarians of Dibich who felt themselves under threat.

¹⁸⁵ O. V. Medvedeva, "Российская дипломатия и эмиграция болгарского населения в 1830-е годы (по неопубликованным документам Архива внешней политики России) [Russian diplomacy and the emigration of the Bulgarian population in the 1830s (unpublished archive documents to Russia's foreign policy)]", *Sovetskoye Slavyanovedeniye* 4, (1988), 26; Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 112.

¹⁸⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 82.

¹⁸⁷ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 82; Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 112.

¹⁸⁸ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 77.

¹⁸⁹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 77.

10 May 1829, Chernyshev gave instructions to Vorontsov to restrict the call for immigration to Russia with only those people who were capable of seaworthy since the government was concerned about the costs of transportation and maintaining the colonists.¹⁹⁰ This preference meant that the Russia did not care about the Bulgarians who greatly helped them during the war. Since it would be deadly mistake to desert them, he agreed with Dibich about limitation of the immigration. Accordingly, Dibich tried to dissuade the Bulgarians who wanted to immigrate to Russia.

The main policy of Dibich was, on the one hand, not to offend the people who want to immigrate by saying that they had right to move according to the treaty but Russia did not invite any one; on the other, to take every measure to limit the movement. Dibich tried to calm down the people who wanted to immigrate with an edict of the Sultan issued in November 1829 which gave general amnesty guaranteeing their lives and properties and assuring their security. However, the answer of the Bulgarians to Dibich was interesting: “What kind of amnesty do you talk about? The Turks did not listen to their Sultan!”¹⁹¹ Additionally, Dibich tried to convince them through the metropolitan of Edirne.¹⁹²

The metropolitan, however, is the most complicated figure in the context of this problem. According to an Ottoman document on 16 February 1830, Yerasimos, the metropolitan of Edirne, seemed to be loyal to the Sultan, and requested permission from *Sadrizam* to take a tour among the people who planned to emigrate in order to convince them to stay.¹⁹³ But then, he deserted Edirne with his two brothers and an

¹⁹⁰ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 72, 81-82; Medvedeva, “Российская дипломатия и эмиграция болгарского населения в 1830-е годы”, 26.

¹⁹¹ Medvedeva, “Российская дипломатия”, 26.

¹⁹² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 82; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1077, Gömlek 43950-F, 25 March 1830.

¹⁹³ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1027, Gömlek 42792, 22 Şevval 1245 (16 April 1830).

old aunt for Russia,¹⁹⁴ also he provoked people to move to Russia on his path.¹⁹⁵ According to the investigations of the Ottoman authorities on his flight, Yerasimos paid too much money to the Patriarchate for his appointment to this position. For this reason, he might run away because of his very high debt.¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless, it was still obscure why he helped to the Ottoman authorities at first, and later changed radically his mind since he had an option to flee at the beginning without venture such a mission.

Another very complicated problem was the appointment of Vashenko as a consul of Sliven. He was instructed to take all measures to stop the immigration movement.¹⁹⁷ Additionally, Dibich asked Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send a few temporary agents to Rumelia. Vashenko and those agents toured among the Bulgarians to dissuade them and to convince them to obey the Sultan's decree of amnesty.¹⁹⁸ This caused a diplomatic crisis between the Porte and Petersburg. The Ottoman Empire accused Russia of provoking the people to move to Russia with her agents which was against the agreement, and gave protests to A. V. Orlov, Russian ambassador in Istanbul and to Dibich for their acts.¹⁹⁹ In his response, Orlov explained mission of Vashenko "truly" to stop the immigration and not to complicate their relations.²⁰⁰

In addition, Dibich answered to the letter of protest²⁰¹ of the *Sadrizam* that Russia did not have any benefit from the Bulgarian immigration but the Ottoman Empire would greatly suffered. He wrote that he did not stimulate the movement,

¹⁹⁴ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1034, Gömlek 42915, 29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830).

¹⁹⁵ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1085, Gömlek 44180, 14 Zilkade 1245 (7 May 1830).

¹⁹⁶ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1034, Gömlek 42915; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1085, Gömlek 44180; BOA. HAT. Dosya 841, Gömlek 37866-B, 8 Zilkade 1245 (1 May 1830).

¹⁹⁷ Medvedeva, "Российская дипломатия", 27; Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 113.

¹⁹⁸ Medvedeva, "Российская дипломатия", 27-28.

¹⁹⁹ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1034, Gömlek 42915; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1077, Gömlek 43950-F, 25 March 1830; Medvedeva, "Российская дипломатия", 28; Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reâyâ*, 29.

²⁰⁰ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 114.

²⁰¹ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1077, Gömlek 43950-F, 25 March 1830.

instead he tried to persuade them to stay and talking about the difficulties waiting them, but some had to be immigrated because of fear of their lives. The apprehension originated from the usurpations of the local governors, namely Elhac Yusuf Pasha, and some rumors about Muslim retaliation from non-Muslims. In that case, it was not appropriate not to accept them; additionally, it was a lie that Russia deceived them by offering lands and encouraged them to emigrate, according to the explanation of the general.²⁰² However, the Porte believed that it was a trick.²⁰³ In a conversation between Said Efendi, who brought some gifts to the General, and Hançerlioğlu, a translator for Russians, Said Efendi said that since a peace treaty had been concluded between two empires, it was wrong that Russia accepted the Bulgarians who chose to leave with their own will. Furthermore, the people claimed that they suffered from Yusuf Pasha, and some Bulgarians left their homes in Sliven (İslimye) and Kazan. However, those regions were outside of the Pasha's authority, it was limited only in Edirne.²⁰⁴ For this reason, the Porte did not believe Bulgarians' willingness to emigrate. According to conversations of Gedikli Şakir Aga with people in some villages of Bergos, they expressed that Russians offered 100.000 *guruş* to whom left their homes with the Russian army, and offered them 20 years of exemption from all kinds of taxes. Accordingly, some Bulgarians emigrated with their own will, yet some of them who did not accepted were forced to leave by the Cossacks.²⁰⁵ That's why the Ottoman authorities were not convinced with the Russian explanations.

As mentioned above, Russia did not want any national movement in the region.

However, there were some to use the presence of Russian troops as an opportunity to

²⁰² Medvedeva, "Российская дипломатия", 28; E. V. Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 113; Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reâyâ*, 29-30; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1077, Gömlek 43950-B, 16 Şevval 1245 (10 April 1830).

²⁰³ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1077, Gömlek 43950-B.

²⁰⁴ BOA. HAT. Dosya 610, Gömlek 29972, 15 Şevval 1245 (9 April 1830).

²⁰⁵ BOA. HAT. Dosya 610, Gömlek 29972.

get rid of the Ottoman rule. Georgi Mamarchev who was a relative of Georgi Rakovski, a prominent figure of Bulgarian national movement, was a Bulgar officer who served in the Russian army. He attempted to organize a rebellion in Sliven and Kotel to put an end to the Turkish rule while the Russian troops were still in the region. However, their existence had an opposite impact on what Mamarchev expected. Dibich was worried with the insurgence and sent 200 Cossacks to suppress it and arrested him.²⁰⁶ This is a subject that was not spoken of by those who show the Ottoman Empire as an oppressor to the Balkan nations and the Russia as the liberator of those poor people. This is a basic way of biased historiography displaying one place as heaven and the other as hell. Those historians were probably well aware of bad situation of the Russian peasants groaning under rule of landlords who were the same religion and ethnicity with them. Therefore, there is no meaning to seek such a religious or ethnic conflict between ruler and the ruled.

3.2.4.2. Bulgarian Immigrations to Russia and Their Return to the Homeland

During the war, scale of the immigration was small. A few hundred Bulgar families moved to Bessarabia and other parts of Russia.²⁰⁷ There were two dimensions of the movement during the war; the desire of Vorontsov as mentioned above, and the other, the people who tried to keep out of the battle zones. The flow of immigrants interrupted in June 1829 during the war and did not begin until the conclusion of the treaty.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 79; Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 111.

²⁰⁷ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 76.

²⁰⁸ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 384.

From 16 September 1829 to 13 March 1830, the number of tickets which were given to the people who were settled in Bessarabia was 280 families. Many of them were settled in Odessa, Ekaterinoslav (today Dnipropetrovsk), Crimea and southern Bessarabia.²⁰⁹ The immigration process began shortly after the conclusion of the treaty but did not reach massive scale until April 1830. The table given below shows the places where immigrants come from and their numbers:²¹⁰

Name of settlements whose inhabitants immigrated to Bessarabia	Dates of immigrations	Number of immigrants	
		Family	Person
	<u>1829</u>		
Büyük Buyalık	September	40	No detail
Küçük Buyalık		10	No detail
Edirne	October	14	21
Küçük Buyalık		10	No detail
Büyük Buyalık	November	4	No detail
Sliven	December	52	No detail
	<u>1830</u>		
Sliven	January	42	No detail
Tırnova	February	32	160
Edirne	March	2	No detail
Ahtopol		2	No detail
Burgas		No detail	5100
Edige		53	244

Table 1: The number and the origins of the immigrants from September 1829 to March 1830.

The reason why the immigration increased in April was Ivan Seliminski, the organizer of mass exodus to Russia. He was a known figure among his people, he was a doctor and a teacher. According to his observations, the Bulgarians were not unanimous about

²⁰⁹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 76, 86-87.

²¹⁰ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 86.

the immigration. The residents of Sliven divided into three parties on the problem. The first group as he called was “the Greek class” which consisted of rich Greeks and Hellenized wealthy Bulgarians. They hoped to restore their shattered positions and to achieve forgiveness from the Sultan for their deeds during the war. The party invited Yerasimos the Metropolitan of Edirne to persuade them to refrain from immigration. However, it caused a great dissatisfaction among Bulgarians and during disturbance even he was shot, and barely managed to escape to Yambol.²¹¹ The second party was proponents of the immigration which composed of wealthy merchants and artisans who were under pressure of high taxes. They hoped that they found tranquility and security of life and property in Russia. Moreover, peasants wanted land for farming.²¹² As we can understand from these two groups, the people who had too much thing to lose from immigration were opposed to it while people who saw it as an opportunity were proponent. Lastly, the third party was formed by some inexperienced, young and impetuous people. They were mainly poor townspeople and peasants. They gathered around Mamarchev and sought liberation from the Ottoman rule but their venture ended with an unsuccessful rebellion.²¹³

The first group was eliminated with the expulsion of Metropolitan Yerasimos. The third group also ended in failure which eventually gave rise to the second party. Therefore, shortly after the rebellion, Seliminski organized a mass immigration to Russia in mid-April. The Russian army dealt with registering and provisioning them.²¹⁴ The following charts shows the number of people who immigrated to Bessarabia in four months:²¹⁵

²¹¹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 87-88.

²¹² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 88.

²¹³ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 89.

²¹⁴ Medvedeva, “Российская дипломатия”, 27.

²¹⁵ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 91-92.

Places whose residents resettled in Bessarabia	The number of immigrants		Places whose residents resettled in Bessarabia	The number of immigrants	
	Family	People		Family	People
April			May		
Edirne	3	3	Aydos	26	184
Agalar	49	249	Belmeyim	37	229
Agachi	2	7	Vasiliko	13	No detail
Anhialo	45	260	Yeniköy	58	280
Başkaliya	21	100	Esirli	47	253
Burguci	84	264	İçmili	25	117
Vaysal	206	1001	Kadıköy	10	51
Gacilar (Hacılar?)	17	74	Keleşköy	2	9
Devlet Ağaç	106	405	Matey	22	158
Yeniköy	28	177	Muradanlı	11	70
Karabunar	110	352	Novo Celo	54	252
Karmazı	3	21	Opaçlı	11	61
Konarı	11	43	Osmanköy	20	89
Krakçalı	15	56	Petri	87	522
Kocatorlı	39	143	Rumeliköy	34	226
Muradanlı	11	70	Skupelo	112	598
Yeni Zağra	175	2376	Sliven (İslimye)	92	548
Peyçu Mahalle	46	136	Sozopol	24	103
Sarmatin	5	20	Stantohari	52	250
Seğmen	8	35	Stroça	34	182
Sliven (İslimye)	57	327	Taşpete	29	150
Sozopol	14	54	Çankoci	25	140
Stantohari	53	250	Yambol (Yanbol)	2	20
Tatarlar	70	348	Total in May	828	4492
Chegalık	21	163			
Yanya	17	88			
Total in April	1221	7248			

Places whose residents resettled in Bessarabia	The number of immigrants		Places whose residents resettled in Bessarabia	The number of immigrants	
	Family	People		Family	People
June			July		
Anhialo	3	15	Ayçi Mihali	9	48
Balçik	7	28	Edirne	1	2
Burguci	22	151	Pazarcık	3	3
Büyük Buyalık	100	772	Bey Mahalle	2	7
Dereköy	81	518	Buyocik	95	588
Cevizli	30	80	Gerdeme	24	132
Ceferli	31	167	Dedeköy	124	700
Elicik	22	142	Dervent	110	522
Yeniköy	1	4	Dereköy	131	718
Kadıköy	13	75	Cinala	39	255
Kışlıkköy	57	303	Dyuyuklen	19	75
Küçükakalı	1	3	Yeni Mahalle	27	186
Küçük Buyalık	31	254	Esirli	36	200
Mangalya	3	10	İnceköy	17	90
Novo Celo	44	195	Kavlaklı	64	421
Ruslar	37	189	Kazan	31	125
Sliven (İslimye)	90	550	Kapaci	75	298
Sozopol	40	117	Karakurt	28	154
Tomarovo	1	6	Karasarlı	25	120
From difr. places	55	518	Karaorman	3	11
Total in June	669	4097	Kayalı	15	27
			Küçük Manastır	52	274
			Megalı Manastır	101	564
			Yeni Zağra	34	209
			Papazköy	13	76
			Samokov	8	16
			Sliven (İslimye)	608	2799
			Sozopol	10	49
			Urumçayırılık	6	31
			Filibe (Plovdiv)	1	1
			Total in July	1700	8691

Table 2: The number of people and their origins who immigrated to Bessarabia in four months.

According to the data, in four months 4.418 families or 24.523 people moved to Bessarabia. In addition, when we put total numbers of the immigrants, the scale of the exodus can be understood in a much larger context. In compliance with the following table, in total 86.700 people received tickets to cross beyond the Danube from September 1829 to July 1830.²¹⁶ This was the official records, but when undocumented people were added, the amount was around 100.000.²¹⁷ Even, some Bulgarian historians claim that 130-140.000 Bulgarians emigrated from Rumelia.²¹⁸

Time of issuing the tickets	The number of Bulgarians who received tickets for immigration					
	To Bessarabia	To Odessa	To Crimea	To Moldavia	To Walachia	Total
16 Sept. 1829 – 14 Mar. 1830	3.099	324	309	3.093	1.547	8.372
14 Mar. – 6 Apr. 1830	4.881	577	372	7.361	2.564	15.755
6 Apr. – 5 May 1830	35.693	1.071	381	2.442	838	40.425
5 May – 14 June 1830	17.165	113	864	1.817	272	20.231
14 June – 17 July 1830	742	660	221	-	294	1.917
Total	61.580	2.745	2.147	14.713	5.515	86.700

Table 3: The number of Bulgarians who received tickets for immigration.

As it is seen from the table, the majority of them chose to settle in Russia, 66.472 which was equal to 76.66 % of total. In particular, they generally preferred to move to Bessarabia consisting of 92.64 % of the people who want to settle in Russia. However, that amount of people was beyond the Russian authorities expected.

²¹⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 94.

²¹⁷ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 95.

²¹⁸ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 115; Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 95.

According to Vorontsov's correspondence with representatives of High Command of the 2nd army in February 1830, it was expected 32.000 people would have arrived from the Balkans.²¹⁹ For this reason, obviously there would be serious problems in terms of settling and maintaining them.

This enormous burden, however, was relatively eased with the fact that all of the people who had tickets actually did not reach their destination. The number who came to Bessarabia was around 50.000 while the amount of the registered people was 61.000.²²⁰ Additionally, on 22 July 1836, Nesselrode asked the Muracheev, the Adjutant General of 5th Infantry Corps, to learn how many people wanted to move to Russia while the Russian army was about to leave Silistre. 3.124 people expressed their desire to move to Russia. However, 2.388 people left Silistre for Russia, most of whom Bulgarians, 1.346. Only 640 persons arrived to Russia, 11 stopped in Moldavia and majority of them, 1.213 settled in Walachia.²²¹ The reason why they did not arrive to the designated destination, might be that they found much more favorable conditions during their journey. In addition, many of them could not receive assistance from Russian authorities, and in such a difficult situation they interrupted their voyage and settled in North East Rumelia and the Danubian Principalities.²²²

What are the reasons which manipulated those masses to leave their homelands for unknown places? The main point of the Russian historians was unbearable life in their lands, the Turkish oppression or rather local governors' usurpations to those people and Ottoman taxation policy²²³ which eventually led them to seek a shelter in

²¹⁹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 91.

²²⁰ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 91.

²²¹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 119.

²²² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 97.

²²³ According to the Dibich's letter to the *Sadrazam*, some of wealthy Bulgarians claimed that they were forced to pay taxes of whom could not pay, and used it as a cause of emigration. BOA. HAT. Dosya 1077, Gömlek 43950-F, 25 March 1830.

Russia.²²⁴ Additionally, the Turkish soldiers seized products of the local people by leaving them in starvation, expelled them from their houses and burned them.²²⁵ In those ideas, the basic reasons of migrations were indicated as being the “push factors” in the homeland which triggered the migrations. Furthermore, the attitude of Petersburg was presented as being the provider of shelter and savior of their oppressed co-religionists. However, some other Russian historians thought that Russia was not innocent as that much. As it is mentioned above, Konobeyev regarded that Russia used the Bulgarians for her own selfish goals.²²⁶ Moreover, Stefan Doynov believed that the Russian penetration to Rumelia was not a random strategy but a well-organized policy for Eastern Question and used all its advantages – religion, language and geography – for this purpose.²²⁷ It meant that Bulgarians were a part of a larger plan.

On the other hand, from the Ottoman point of view, the main tendency was to impute Russia while investigating the other impulses. According to the sources, the Russians frightened the Bulgarian subjects with the fear of the Ottoman retaliation because of their deeds during the war.²²⁸ With this fear, the Russian officials encouraged them to immigrate to Russia.²²⁹ Additionally, they made propaganda about

²²⁴ Especially, Medvedeva does not even mention about the Russian population policy while she gives the negative motivations in the Ottoman Empire to justify the immigrations. V. P. Grachev, I. Titorov and Hristo Hristov also share the same idea that the main reason of the immigration to Russia was the Turkish oppression. BOA. HAT. Dosya 1077, Gömlek 43950-F, 25 March 1830.

²²⁵ Hristo Hristov, “Северовосточная Болгария во время русско-турецкой войны. 1828-1829 гг. [Northeastern Bulgaria during the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829]”, *Voyenno-istoricheski sbornik* 4, (1980), 40-43 cited in Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 104; V. G. Terljakov, *Письма из Болгарии (Писаны во время кампании 1829 г.) [Letters from Bulgaria (this was written during the campaign 1829)]*, (Moscow, 1833), 206-07 cited in Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 104.

²²⁶ Konobeyev, “Русско-болгарские отношения в 1806–1812 гг. [Russian-Bulgarian Relations in 1806-1812]”, 201.

²²⁷ Stefan Doynov, *Българите и Руско-Турските войни: 1774 - 1856 [The Bulgarians and the Russo-Turkish Wars: 1774-1856]*, (Sofia: Narodna Prosveta, 1987), 222-23 cited in Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 120.

²²⁸ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1052, Gömlek 43332, 9 Cemaziyelevvel 1245 (6 November 1829); BOA. HAT. Dosya 1079, Gömlek 43962, 25 Rebiülevvel 1245 (24 September 1829).

²²⁹ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1039, Gömlek 43027, 17 Zilkade 1245 (10 May 1830).

the exodus and offered one gold for a year to whom moved to Russia.²³⁰ Furthermore, they forced those who did not wish to immigrate with the menace of *Velenter* bandits²³¹ and Cossacks, and began to register those people in the list of immigrants.²³² Some residents of Bergos fled to the mountains and forests shortly before the departure of the Russian army.²³³ Moreover, some of the Yambol people escaped during their journey to Russia and hid in the forests.²³⁴ Nevertheless, *Sadrazam* investigated the reasons of discontent among the subjects which manipulated them to move to Russia. The prominent causes were malpractices of some officials²³⁵ and the cruelty of *cizye* collectors. In order to soothe Bulgarians who intend to emigrate, *Sadrazam* promised that the *cizye* documents would be rearranged according to the economic situation of the individuals, the tax would not be collected from kids, the collectors would not demand illegal taxes, and other kinds of malpractices in tax collection would be corrected.²³⁶ Additionally, the government attempted some ventures to please the people, and thus dissuaded them from emigration. For instance, some certain taxes of the residents in Yambol (Yanbol) and İslimye (Sliven) were split into reasonable installments, and some others were excused for once by the Porte.²³⁷ In Sozopol

²³⁰ BOA. HAT. Dosya 610, Gömlek 29972; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1022, Gömlek 42687-D, 29 Muharrem 1245 (31 July 1829).

²³¹ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1027, Gömlek 42792, 22 Şevval 1245 (16 April 1830): According to the report of Metropolitan Yerasimos reported that he was contented by a couple of *Velenter* bandits on his way to convince the people from emigration. BOA. HAT. Dosya 1028, Gömlek 42806, 6 Zilkade 1245 (29 April 1830): When the Metropolitan returned to Edirne, he gave a report to *Sadrazam* on the reasons of the emigration in which he claimed that the majority of the people were forced to emigrate rather than with their own will.

²³² BOA. HAT. Dosya 610, Gömlek 29972; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1068, Gömlek 43742, 4 Şevval 1245 (29 March 1830).

²³³ BOA. HAT. Dosya 610, Gömlek 29972.

²³⁴ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1042, Gömlek 43120, 9 Zilkade 1245 (2 May 1830).

²³⁵ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1068, Gömlek 43746, 22 Şevval 1245 (16 April 1830): Some Rum subjects in Edirne complained that the *mutasarrıf* of Çirmen, Salih Paşa without reason borrowed 81.000 *guruş* from *Rum Milleti Sandığı*; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1044, Gömlek 43169, 7 Muharrem 1246 (28 June 1830): the people from Ahyolu, Misevri, Süzebolu and Bergos, where were mainly along the coast of the Black Sea, complained about the misgovernment of timber officials.

²³⁶ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1027, Gömlek 42792.

²³⁷ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1068, Gömlek 43742: The people of Yambol asked forgiveness from the government for their *cizye* debt of the previous year which was around 6.500 *guruş*. The residents of Sliven asked the government that their debt of *zecriyye* tax (tax taken from alcohol) of the previous year

(Süzebolu) and its environs, the government increased the price of transportation of woods to the ports from 35 *pâre* to 85 *pâre* per one *çeki*.²³⁸

The immigration of large groups to distant places has naturally some difficulties in itself which negatively affected the psychology of the people. In addition, the failure of the Russian organization contributed to discontent among the immigrants. Lack of food, funds and long quarantines increased displeasure, and district officials did not pay enough attention to their situation.²³⁹ In mid-May 1830 due to the lack of availability in quarantine, 626 immigrants were not even allowed to go ashore and offered to stay on the ships that brought them to the port.²⁴⁰ In Bessarabia, bad harvest in 1830 caused insufficient food, and the late arrival of the immigrants worsened the conditions.²⁴¹ Moreover, the lack of flour, as Tarashkevich indicated, was a result calm summer weather which did not allow to work windmills.²⁴² Additionally, the local shops did not accepted their money, even half of its value.²⁴³ Actually, that was not a big problem as that much, since the majority of them were poor people. In the previous immigrations, there was a mandatory property qualification (300 silver rubles per household).²⁴⁴ Yet, in the turmoil of the war, the evacuation of the army and the high amount of requests of immigration obstructed to fulfill the precondition. On 1 June 1830, Inzov wrote that the majority of the immigrants were poor since they left their possessions at home but just with a couple of stolen cattle.²⁴⁵ However, there was a misconception in Inzov's idea. It is much

which was in total around 300-400 *kise* was collected in reasonable installments. The Porte grated their wishes. Therefore, 8.000 household in Sliven decided to stay in their lands.

²³⁸ BOA. HAT. Dosya 739, Gömlek 35041, 29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830); *çeki* is a kind of weight measurement, generally for wood, which equals 250 kg.

²³⁹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 116.

²⁴⁰ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 109.

²⁴¹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 110, 126.

²⁴² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 116.

²⁴³ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 116.

²⁴⁴ Bernstein, "Страница из Истории Болгарской Иммиграции", 338.

²⁴⁵ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 178.

probable that majority was poor in their home too, because they had 18 months to sell their properties according to the treaty. If they arrived there without sufficient money, it meant that they had not enough property to sell. Thus, they were desperately needed Russian assistance and provision, yet they could not.

Consequently, shortly after the arrival of the immigrants, there were some cases of flight because of malnutrition and lack of medical help. Moreover, there were other realities which caused restlessness among the Bulgarians. There was lack of timber and other construction matters. Beyond that, there was shortage of fresh water for people and for their flocks. Also, climate was harsh for them since there were not mountains to block the cold wind in winter.²⁴⁶

The biggest problem was the allocation of lands since the majority of the immigrants were peasants, and only 5% of them were merchants and traders.²⁴⁷ As mentioned, Bessarabia had not enough lands for so many immigrants. The old settlers agreed to give 10 *desyatin* from their 60 *desyatin* holdings to their new compatriots according to suggestion of Inzov.²⁴⁸ Even this sacrifice was not sufficient enough, and the authorities thought to reduce the allocated lands to 30 *desyatin* but it did not materialize since it was far beyond the people would accept.²⁴⁹ Then, on 28 July Lieutenant Boldyrev was sent to Budjak to investigate the availability of the state lands for settlement. According to his report, the water in the region was bitterly and salty, yet it could be used for drinking and household needs.²⁵⁰ Nonetheless, as Yov Titorov expressed, accustomed to use clean and cold water at home, they could not adapt to

²⁴⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 115-16.

²⁴⁷ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 175.

²⁴⁸ Meshcheryuk, *Социально-Экономическое Развитие Болгарских и Гагаузских Сел в Южной Бессарабии, 1808-1856 гг.*, 24.

²⁴⁹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 137.

²⁵⁰ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 134.

the tasteless water in Budjak.²⁵¹ The state began to distribute lands to the immigrants. However, they did not like where they were shown to settle. In Galileshtah (near to Tatarbunari), the elders of the Bulgarians thought that only cattle could be raised in that region, and expressed their dissatisfaction with the condition. The same example happened in Nerushai (also near to Tatarbunari); when an officer, named Grigoryev, showed the people their permanent place, they began to cry that they preferred to “jump into sea rather than go to Nerushai.”²⁵²

Also, there was displeasure among the people who were given relatively good land. They were not given the same size of the previous immigrants, and the allotment of lands dragged on. The inequality was revealed in terms of taxation and obligations as well. For the first decade of their settlement, they were exempted from taxes and duties; but for the second decade they had to pay 15-20 kopek²⁵³ to the treasury for every *desyatin* which was given them.²⁵⁴ As a result, all of these reasons, lack of sufficient provision, dissatisfaction with the lands and the climate, ill-treatment of some local officials and epidemic disease and plague, convinced them to return their homelands. Their native arable lands and gardens were much more preferable than that semi-desert place left them from Germans, Russians, and land owners who already had the good part of the region.²⁵⁵

When the unrest became so strong among the people who now expressed their desire to go home, Russian authorities formed a commission to oversee the immigrants. It was founded to learn about their needs and to convince them that

²⁵¹ Yov Titorov, *Българите в Бесарабия [Bŭlgarite v Besarabiya]*, (Sofia, 1903), 29 cited in Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар*, 190.

²⁵² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 115.

²⁵³ Kopek or kopeyek was an old Russian monetary unit which equals to one hundredth of a ruble.

²⁵⁴ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 185.

²⁵⁵ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 115.

government would take care of providing their welfare.²⁵⁶ However, it took too much time to start its function which made little contribution to change their ideas.

Many of the Russian historians complained about the costs of such a massive immigration. According to the report of Vorontsov, an amount of 95.754 rubles was spent to 51.150 immigrants who came to Bessarabia from 10 June 1829 to 29 September 1830. According to the General Staff, by the end of September 1830 it was spent 164.279 rubles. Over all the total amount of expenditure was not less than 265.000 rubles.²⁵⁷ However, this was a very obvious expectation since the previous colonizations proved that it was a costly venture. The government invested money for long run expectancies. Moreover, the war was ended up with clear-cut Russian victory, and the reparations that Petersburg demanded from the Porte were absurdly high. The Ottoman Empire had to pay 11.500.000 ducats, 10.000.000 as war and 1.500.000 ducats as commercial reparations to the Russian Empire. This amount of money was sixteen times greater than the annual income of *Hazine-i Âmiri*.²⁵⁸ Therefore, it seems the Russian Empire was not in economic trouble because of the war. This indicates that the main reason of the drawbacks of the immigration was disorganization because of its massive scale.

The journey to the Rumelia began even before the conclusion of the treaty, since they did not seek for a permanent place, rather temporary shelter from the effects of the war.²⁵⁹ Many wealthy families who fled during the siege of Varna to Braila, Galati, Odessa and Izmail returned home because of the desire to restore their rights

²⁵⁶ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 118.

²⁵⁷ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 127.

²⁵⁸ Selim Arslantaş, "1829 Edirne Andlaşması'ndaki Tazminat Meselesi [The Issue of Reparations in the Treaty of Adrianople 1829]", *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17, (2012), 47.

²⁵⁹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 180.

and possessions there.²⁶⁰ Additionally, once the Bulgarians were convinced that the conditions of Bessarabia were far more inferior to their homes, and Russian government did not meet their needs what they expected at the beginning, the reverse influx of masses began. In 1833-34, the immigration to the Ottoman Empire reached to a large scale. The emigration from the region stimulated by the explained reasons; beside that, bad harvest in 1832 and subsequent years which Skalkosky regarded as the main reason of Bulgarian emigration gave impetus to this trend.²⁶¹ Not only the new immigrants began to leave but also the old immigrants returned to Rumelia.²⁶² To give an impression, almost half of the fugitives in Bessarabia, approximately 47% of the total immigrants, moved either to the Principalities or to the Ottoman Empire.²⁶³

In addition to unsatisfactory situation the immigrants faced which contributed to the emigration from the Russian lands, the Sultan's promises and incentives to persuade them to come back eventually encouraged them to immigrate to the Balkans. The Porte still continued to promise that the government would not seek revenge for the Bulgarian deeds during the war. Moreover, Istanbul pledged that they would be provided with seed and animals and anything that they needed if they returned to their lands.²⁶⁴ In addition, they would not be abused just because they left their lands, and the government assured them they would be treated as the same manner with those who did not emigrate.²⁶⁵ When some Bulgarians asked the *çarbacıs* about the situation of their properties they left behind,²⁶⁶ the officials replied them that the vineyards,

²⁶⁰ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 184.

²⁶¹ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 188, 197.

²⁶² Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 191.

²⁶³ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение Болгар в Южную Бессарабию 1828-1834 гг.*, 199.

²⁶⁴ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1068, Gömlek 43745-C, 29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830).

²⁶⁵ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1044, Gömlek 43169.

²⁶⁶ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1044, Gömlek 43169; The Porte protected those lands of the emigrants via *kocabaşıs* and *despots* (BOA. HAT. Dosya 1047, Gömlek 43226, 13 Rebiülahir 1246 (1 October 1830) and BOA. HAT. Dosya 1068, Gömlek 43745, 3 Zilhicce 1245 (26 May 1830)). Those protectors would give the vacant lands to the individuals via custodial way. When the owner of the land came, the land

gardens and farms would be given to them if they returned their homelands in 5-6 months.²⁶⁷ However, the government extended the time limit²⁶⁸ in order to make usable the vacant lands.²⁶⁹ The Porte also used some mediators to encourage them to return.²⁷⁰ For instance, a person, who was the leader of Bulgarian subjects in Walachia and tried to persuade the Bulgarians to come back their lands, was hosted in Istanbul, and later were given 1.500 *kuruş* as travel allowance to continue to convince them.²⁷¹ It is interesting to note that Jorjlegare, an officer in the Russian army, paid too much effort and money for Bulgarians to return to their homelands. Eventually, he was getting poor and requested financial assistance from the Porte to go to his homeland in Corfu.²⁷² The encouragements of the Ottoman government availed, and the Bulgarians asked the administration to return their homes.²⁷³ Since the requests of the people who came to İbrail (Braila) and İsmail (Izmail) to move to Rumelia could be interpreted as the violation of the 13th article of the Treaty of Adrianople because the time limit of 18 months had passed, *Sadrazam* notified the Sultan that this was not a violation since the territory of Walachia still belonged to the Porte. Correspondingly, the *voyvoda* of Walachia was sent a letter in which the Sultan demanded the fulfillment of the requests of the Bulgarians.²⁷⁴

and net of costs would be given to him. (BOA. HAT. Dosya 1067, Gömlek 43728, 8 Zilhicce 1245 (31 May 1830))

²⁶⁷ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1067, Gömlek 43728; For example, the people of Misevri and Papaslı were given everything they left behind when they returned their lands. BOA. HAT. Dosya 776, Gömlek 36417, 25 Rebiülevvel 1246 (13 September 1830); BOA. HAT. Dosya 739, Gömlek 35041.

²⁶⁸ BOA. HAT. Dosya 778, Gömlek 36459-A, 19 Cemaziyelevvel 1249 (4 October 1833).

²⁶⁹ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1047, Gömlek 43226.

²⁷⁰ Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reâyâ*, 73.

²⁷¹ Gülsoy, *1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı'nda Rumeli'den Rusya'ya Göçürülen Reâyâ*, 73.

²⁷² BOA. HAT. Dosya 1166, Gömlek 46140-C, 3 Zilkade 1253 (29 January 1838).

²⁷³ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1042, Gömlek 43129, 15 Rebiülevvel 1246 (3 September 1830); A group of people numbering 200 families from Karinabad (Karnobat) and Yambol ask permission to return. BOA. HAT. Dosya 1294, Gömlek 50270, 29 Zilhicce 1250 (28 April 1835).

²⁷⁴ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1144, Gömlek 45469, 19 Cemaziyelahir 1254 (9 September 1838).

The people who returned was exempted from the *cizye* and some other taxes for a certain period of time. For example, the residents of İslimye (Sliven) who returned to their lands in June 1833 were given exemption from *cizye* for two years and from *tekâlif* for one year.²⁷⁵ The people of Sliven and Yambol who returned in 1835 from Bessarabia were exempted from *cizye* and all other taxes for two years, and the government provided transportation units and helped them for travel expenses²⁷⁶ and provided vessels for them.²⁷⁷ The subjects of Ahyolu and Begoslu were exempted from *tekâlif* for one year and from *cizye* for two years, and the people of Edirne from *tekâlif* for two years.²⁷⁸

To sum up, the long journey of the Bulgarians after the war ended with the return of the majority to their homelands. The Russian side accused the Ottoman rulership, on the contrary the Ottomans blamed the Russian propaganda and threat as reasons of the Bulgarian migration. The main flow of the people moved to Russia under the leadership of Ivan Seliminski, and many of them saw the movement as an opportunity and tried to use their chance. They knew that the previous encouragements of Russian government to those who settled in the southern lands which motivated them in this case. However, beside the traditional recrimination to find a guilty, the Russian tendency to seek for sailors and the malpractices of the Ottoman local officials also had some contributions to the trend. There were some also who sought temporary shelter during the war and they passed beyond the Danube where they found tranquility, but they eventually returned to their lands after the war ended. The migration was doomed in failure because of the disorganization of Russian

²⁷⁵ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1042, Gömlek 43136, 11 Safer 1249 (30 June 1833).

²⁷⁶ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1294, Gömlek 50270; BOA. HAT. Dosya 1294, Gömlek 50263, 29 Zilhicce 1250 (28 April 1835).

²⁷⁷ BOA. HAT. Dosya 1086, Gömlek 44199, 19 Zilhicce 1246 (31 May 1831).

²⁷⁸ BOA. HAT. Dosya 747, Gömlek 35272, 29 Zilhicce 1250 (28 April 1835).

government which did not expected so many people and could not reject them too. Some of the immigrants were lucky to find a good place what they expected at the beginning, but the losers of this movement were those who were perished in their way to Russia and in the way back home. At least others, who were less fortunate than the former and more fortunate than the latter, acquired what they belonged before. Many historians seek the reason of the exodus in the context of the recrimination and ignored the main subject of the issue, the Bulgarians. In fact, if we consider them as third factor of the problem with their desires and their wishes, it would be much easier to complete the context of the event.

CHAPTER IV

BULGARIAN MIGRATIONS AFTER THE *TANZIMAT*

4.1. *Tanzimat*, It's Perception, and Reaction

The key word of the nineteenth century Ottoman history, the *Tanzimat* was the beginning of an epoch in which the Porte officially declared its insistence to renew its institutions and to terminate corruptions. It was the name of consistent state-guided reformation unlike the previous indecisive attempts. Even if the era's start is known with the declaration of the Edict of Gülhane in 1839, the seeds were planted during the reign of Mahmut II. It was an outpouring of a desire to modernize the state according to European model. Beyond the general belief of modernization as a stimulus, Halil İnalçık regards its reason is much more pragmatist. From his perspective, the main motive behind the *Tanzimat* was the desire to end Bulgarian peasant rebellions.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 13.

There is no doubt that social unrests, insurrections and defeats lead to the reformation. However, there were two crucial problems on the Porte's path to the modernization which would remain main drawbacks of the whole *Tanzimat* period.

Janissaries had long been a prominent obstacle to reformation attempts of the Sultans and their attendants. Moreover, they lost their efficiency and functions both in battlefield to fight and in local to obtain security a long time ago. This trouble was eliminated by Mahmut II on 15 June 1826 which was known as Auspicious Incident (*Vaka-i Hayriyye*). Beyond any doubt, disbandment of Janissary corps facilitated the Porte's modernization venture. On the other hand, the empire could not recover their absence with new recruited soldiers, and obliged to found on irregular forces (*başıbozuk*) in times of wars and insurrections throughout the end of the empire. It became the new bane of the Porte which intensified social unrests, and weakened the position of the state in international arena. For instance, a rebellion broke out in Nish in 1841, shortly after the declaration because of some misuse and misunderstanding of the *Tanzimat*.²⁸⁰ To suppress the revolt, Sabri Pasha, the governor of Nish, called a group of Albanian warriors. Even if the governor requested pledge from them not to plunder the subjects, they broke their oath. There were casualties, and 250 burnt houses; moreover, 28 families or 9.460 people fled to Serbia because of the *başıbozüks'* turmoil.²⁸¹ The Porte faced with protests of the European Powers because of the incident. Russia declared her wish to send an official for investigation. French government also sent an attendant whose name was J. A. Blanqui for examination.

²⁸⁰ For further reading Halil İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, ed. Mehmet Seyyitdanlıoğlu, Halil İnalçık, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 187-191; İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 28-33.

²⁸¹ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 190; Mark Pinson, "Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period: The Revolts in Nish (1841) and Vidin (1850)", *Middle Eastern Studies* 11, (May, 1975), 107. Those fugitives turned back their homes when regular army arrived, and secured peace.

Metternich claimed that such incidents put those who wanted to protect the empire in a hard position in the international arena.²⁸² Another example was Vidin revolt in 1850.²⁸³ The uprising was a result of tensed relationship between landlords, so called *agas*,²⁸⁴ who were getting stronger in the city assembly and on their lands after the *Tanzimat* and the Christian peasants who were mere tenants. When the mutiny broke out, the solution of the *agas* were same with the previous one. They formed *başıbozuk* bands to suppress the movement before the central government interfered the event with regular army.²⁸⁵ Consequently, the lack of a regular army was a main drawback of the *Tanzimat* period which affected its efficiency on implementation of the principles, and its prestige among the Sultan's subjects and in international arena.

The second issue was the lack of sufficient qualified officials to implement the reforms of the *Tanzimat* in the provinces. Governors of the previous period continued to exist in the new epoch. The local assemblies had been founded in the reign of Mahmut II, and the *ayans* whom the Sultan tried to crush dominated those assemblies. For instance, after the Vidin Revolt in 1850, the government investigation showed that *agas* who controlled the local assembly made the local *kadı* and *mufti* agree with their will, and minimized the authority of the *vali*.²⁸⁶ Ziya Pasha claimed that the *Tanzimat* supposedly abolished the cruelty of Janissaries, *ayans* and *mütesellims*, but those usurpers still continued to exist, yet with different names; members of assemblies (*âzâ-yı meclis*), notables (*muteberân*) and dignitaries (*vücûh-ı belde*) who had fortune and

²⁸² İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 190.

²⁸³ For further reading İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 193-95; İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 45-73

²⁸⁴ *Agas* were generally from Janissary origin; when they were dismissed from military positions, they sprang out as land lords in some places, and Vidin was one of them.

²⁸⁵ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 54-55; İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 192-94.

²⁸⁶ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 76.

power.²⁸⁷ Moreover, beyond their hegemony in assemblies, the lower official posts were also captured by them. The *vali* of a province chose one of the notables there for a certain office, and the Porte approved the appointment, since it did not have qualified personnel to nominate.²⁸⁸

In connection with officialdom, there was another problem in provinces. Mahmut II's primary purpose was to eliminate the local notables and strong governors who challenged his authority. After he defeated many of them, officials were appointed to administration of a province for a short time period in order not to let them stay in one place to set ground and to grow their power. Rapid alteration of officials prevented them to penetrate to real reasons of problems, and to provide them long run solutions.²⁸⁹ Therefore, these factors did not allow the Ottoman policy-makers to reach their goals of the *Tanzimat*.

Non-Muslims welcomed the principles of the edict and entertained great hopes while Muslims were not happy with it.²⁹⁰ Cyrus Hamlin who witnessed the event depicted this duality; "Muslims cursed it because they were degraded with non-Muslims which meant violation of sacred law. On the other hand, Christians regarded it as a beginning of a new era."²⁹¹ For example, Ziya Pasha accused Âli Pasha that he promoted pashas among the Christians and put them in *Şûra-yı Devlet*²⁹² and *Divân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye* as members.²⁹³ For example, in Plovdiv (Filibe), the abolishment of

²⁸⁷ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 183.

²⁸⁸ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 183.

²⁸⁹ Pinson, "Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period", 103.

²⁹⁰ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 172.

²⁹¹ Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, (New York: American Tract Society, 1877), 55.

²⁹² *Şûra-yı Devlet* is formed in 1868 to prepare draft laws and to solve administrative controversies, like today *Danıştay*. *Divân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye* is also formed in 1868 to function as a Supreme Court, like today *Yargıtay*.

²⁹³ Halil İnalçık, "Tanzimat Nedir?", *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Mehmet Seyyitdanlıoğlu, Halil İnalçık, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), 52.

servage excited the people.²⁹⁴ Even before the *Tanzimat*, in August 1838, the Sultan sent instructions to governors in the Balkans that servage which led the subjects to rebel was banned, and those who did not obey would be punished.²⁹⁵ However, as we will see, in the Vidin disturbance in 1840 which would result later in 1850 with a rebellion, soon after the declaration of the decree, the abrogation was not so simple, and the real problem of land and peasant was untouched. This is the first paradox of the *Tanzimat*, none of the religious groups were satisfied with it; neither, Muslims who were against it from the beginning, nor non-Muslims who were disappointed with the failure of its implementation.

The mentality of *Tanzimat* politicians was carved with the principles of liberalism. Thus, it promised security of life and property. They believed that *çiftlik* holders' rights should have been protected on *mîrî* (state) lands. Accordingly, by a communique on 23 April 1847 (7 Cemaziyelevvel 1263) daughters were granted with hereditary right. Gradually *de facto* control of land holders²⁹⁶ turned into *de jure* character. This led to further weakening of the position of the weak against the strengthening of the strong.²⁹⁷ When servage was abolished with the edict, peasants in Vidin rejected to fulfil their corvée labor to their *agas*. Then, those land lords claimed their right on the land. The dispute transferred to the Porte. The government stressed that corvée was abolished. However, the assembly of Vidin was dominated by the land lords, and they objected to the decision since the possessor freely owned and used his/her property and land, and no one could use his/her estate gratuitously according to the principles of *Tanzimat*. Thereupon, the Porte did not interfere anymore, and

²⁹⁴ Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, 266.

²⁹⁵ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 178.

²⁹⁶ Since land belonged to the state, thus to the Sultan, they were only the users of these lands, no matter how long and how powerful they used the land.

²⁹⁷ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 98; İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 195.

expressed that the problem was a matter of owner and tenant, and it should have been compromised between them. Accordingly, the representatives of peasants and the *agas* agreed on that the peasants confirmed the *agas* rights on land, and determined the amount of *agas*' shares in production. The agreement was approved by the Porte in 1841.²⁹⁸ On the other hand, the real problem endured until the Vidin revolt in 1850. Therefore, the second dilemma of the *Tanzimat* was that even the edict was a venture to satisfy Christian subjects, especially peasants, and thus to prevent their rebellions; at the end the liberal doctrines sided with the land lords. It failed to gain support of peasants because the land problem was not solved in favor of them.²⁹⁹

Even if the security of property pleased notables whether Muslim or non-Muslim, nullification of tax privileges of those groups and the duty that everyone paid taxes at the rate of his/her property made them try everything not to lose this benefit.³⁰⁰ As in the case of Nish revolt, those groups were prominent figures in the incident. Nevertheless, they found a way to soften the tax obligation by showing their properties low while the commoners' much higher.³⁰¹ According to the investigations, on the one side *çorbacıs* and *kocabaşıs* who provoked the Christian subjects and hoped to replace the Muslim *agas* with their departure from the region, and on the other side the *agas* who suppressed the movement fiercely did not consent to lose their privileges.³⁰² Thereby, *Tanzimat* policy-makers set off on their journey without sufficient qualified officials to implement the principles and to solve the problems efficiently, and enough regular military power to assure security. Taken into consideration of these drawbacks, the *Tanzimat* could not completely satisfy any group of society, neither Christian

²⁹⁸ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 194.

²⁹⁹ İnalçık, "Tanzimat Nedir?", 44.

³⁰⁰ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 180.

³⁰¹ Pinson, "Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period", 106.

³⁰² İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 187-88, 192.

peasants nor Christian notables, nor Muslims nor Muslim notables. Some part of them wanted to benefit from the *Tanzimat* by which they believed it would cure all their problems, and others opposed it since it would nullify their privileges. Moreover, the Porte always felt the foreign intervention as the sword of Damocles upon their heads.

4.2. Vidin Rebellion in 1850

After the declaration of *Tanzimat*, there were two great rebellion in Rumelia; Nish revolt in 1841 and Vidin in 1850. In the context of this thesis, the latter is very important to understand the Bulgarian emigrations after the Crimean War. Within period of 10 years between Nish and Vidin revolts, the Porte carried out a couple of important reforms for provincial administration. The establishment of provincial assemblies consisting of local officials, Muslim and non-Muslim notables, generally religious leaders, sending inspection commissions to provinces.³⁰³ However, they did not come up with expected results since the Muslim *agas* ruled the assemblies.

For strategic purposes, the Christians were not allowed to get state lands on borders.³⁰⁴ Therefore, the Muslims were prominent in Vidin as large land holders known as *agas*, and the regime of *gospodarlık* emerged. However, those *agas* could not be compared to the large land lords in Austria, Hungary and Russia at that time in terms of the scale of their possessions since the Muslim *agas*' lands did not exceed 200-250 hectares.³⁰⁵ The Christians farmed their lands, and they paid taxes to the state

³⁰³ Pinson, "Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period", 113.

³⁰⁴ Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875*, 94.

³⁰⁵ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Türk toprak hukuku tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi", *Tanzimat I*, (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940), 412.

and to the landlords along with corveé labor. They worked for their *agas* for two months in a year in remuneration for land leasing. They had to bring one cart of wood or 12 *para*, each family gave 25 *okka* for each cereal which was called *hirizma zahiresi*, additionally 30-40 *okka* corn for each cart of corn which named as *budarlík*, and other kinds of taxes.³⁰⁶ In total, the taxes for the *agas* were equivalent to total amount of *aşar* and *cizye* to the state. Since the *agas* collected those taxes with *subaşıs*, the peasants also had to feed them as well. Through the end of 1848, French officials who made tours in Rumelia referred that the main problem was tax affair.³⁰⁷ As mentioned above, the first disagreement between the *agas* and the subjects in 1841 was resolved, at least it seemed to be resolved. However, *agas*' power grew stronger after that date, and they became to dominate the city assembly. Thus, they performed the instructions of the Porte as they willed.³⁰⁸ Furthermore, the lower provincial officials were also showed as a reason of the rebellion by the residents.³⁰⁹

On the other hand, the Porte could not fulfill what it promised with the edict. It couldn't manage to correct the taxes and abuse of officials, and to eliminate the brigandage.³¹⁰ For instance, in one petition of Vidin residents to the Sultan, they said that despite the fact that the *Tanzimat* was declared, it was never implemented in their region.³¹¹ Additionally, religious motives contributed to the Bulgarian unrest. The Ottoman Empire had given a great power to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul than ever before. Along with Patriarchate, the Greek notables who known as Phanariotes became prominent over all other Orthodox peoples since they were sophisticated indeed and skilled with European languages. With the Greek

³⁰⁶ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 194.

³⁰⁷ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 36-37.

³⁰⁸ İnalçık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri", 195.

³⁰⁹ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 69-70.

³¹⁰ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 44.

³¹¹ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 37.

Enlightenment through Western ideas and this language skill, the Patriarchy tried to Hellenize Balkan Orthodox Christians. And their first target was Bulgarians who were least aware of their self-consciousness. Last remnant of Bulgarian Exarchate in Ohrid was abolished by the Greek Patriarchate in 1767. Patriarch ordered all bishops to teach and to use only Greek language and books. Hilarion, Metropolitan of Tırnova, burnt books in Church Slavonic which were hidden in Tırnova Cathedral belonged to old Bulgarian metropolitans in 1825.³¹² Greeks dominated trade and religion in Bulgarian lands. They proved them successful to Hellenize a part of local Bulgarian elites. Besides Greek cultural pressure, Greek clergy was an economic burden on the Bulgarian subjects of the Sultan. Clerics were appointed to ecclesiastical posts by offering great bribes to the Patriarchy. Once they appointed, they tried to recover the loss from their Bulgarian community.³¹³ For example, Phanariot Hilarion of Crete was appointed as metropolitan of Varna in 1821. After his death in 1838, two million golden *gurus* were found in his office by the authorities.³¹⁴

Even though the internal effects of the incident was sufficient for a rebellion, the external influence also had a contribution. The date of the outbreak was very close to the revolutions of 1848 in Europe. Serbs under the Habsburg rule revolted against the Hungarians for autonomy during that revolutionary period. This had an effect on some Bulgarian revolutionists, and motivated them to work for an autonomy as in the Serbian example.³¹⁵ As it was seen, common people motivated by more pragmatist factors while the revolutionists inspired with idealist goals. The rebels requested help from the Serbian government according to a report of an Austrian representative in

³¹² Josef Konstantin Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren*, (Prag: F. Tempsky, 1876), 515-16.

³¹³ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 19.

³¹⁴ Meshcheryuk, *Переселение болгар в южную Бессарабию в 1828-1834*, 26.

³¹⁵ BOA. A.} MKT. MVL. Dosya 29, Gömlek 81, 16 Ramazan 1266 (26 July 1850); İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 11, 14, 66.

Belgrade.³¹⁶ One year before in mid-April 1849, there was a small scale insurrection in Boynitza and its surrounding villages in Vidin district. The agitators came from Serbia as indicated in the Ottoman documents.³¹⁷ Puyo who was once responsible of tobacco affairs (*duhancıbaşı*) of Milosh Obrenovich, the Prince of Serbia is mentioned as a Serbian instigator in Ottoman sources.³¹⁸ The Serbian government did not officially support the insurrection, but individually Serbs participated it.³¹⁹ In addition, Halil İnalçık expresses that existence of Russian army in Wallachia had direct effect on the incident.³²⁰ The Russian agents disguised themselves with Bulgarian clothes, crossed the Danube, and went to Nish, Sofia, and Tırnova.³²¹ Nevertheless, İnalçık states that to accuse Russia as an agitator of Balkan rebellions was easiest way to explain stimuli behind movements among Ottoman officials.³²² On the other hand, according to a study of Nadia Manolova-Nikolova, “Russia and the Bulgarian uprising in 1850 [Rusiya i bŭlgarskoto vŭstanie ot 1850 g.]” for which she used the reports of Gerardo Sousa, the Spanish ambassador in Istanbul, she claims that the Russian interference is obvious for a couple of reasons. The Ottoman forces captured three Russian officers with guns in Belgradcık after the rebellion was suppressed. Ziya

³¹⁶ Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period”, 121.

³¹⁷ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 45.

³¹⁸ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 45; The Serbian policy during the reign of Milosh Obrenovich with the Ottoman Empire was to avoid aggressive attitude since it could cause further dependence to Russia. During various revolts, he refused to assist rebels, and helped the Ottoman government returning fugitives. On the other hand, he made contributions to Bulgarian national revival. In 1839, his son, Mihailo succeeded to the throne. He was also against revolutionist movement, and tried to restrain its people from active support to any movement. The people under the Ottoman rule regarded Serbian prince as a mediator who conveyed their complaints to the Porte, thus they sent him petitions. For instance, one year before the Nish revolt, the peasants sent a petition to the Prince in which they said that the Sultan did not know what his governors did there, and there was no one to inform him. In another petition in April 1841, the people in Nish and Leskovats wrote that they did not revolt against their legitimate ruler but they just wanted implementation of the Edict of *Tanzimat*. As it can be seen, the Serbian princes did not want to put themselves in open conflict with the Porte, and functioned as an intermediary between Christian subjects and the Porte. Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period”, 108-9.

³¹⁹ Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period”, 121.

³²⁰ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 69; During the revolt, 3 battalions of Russian army moved to Calafat, across Vidin which panicked Ottoman authorities.

³²¹ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 70-71.

³²² İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 70 in 3rd footnote.

Pasha, the governor of Vidin did not complicate the relationships between two empires because of this scandal, and probably released them for this purpose as if they managed to escape.³²³ Since the suspects “escaped”, the Russian diplomacy was in a much better position to deny the interference. Titov, the Russian ambassador, claimed that they were deserters from Russian army, therefore there was no connection between their deeds and the Russian policy. Sousa proposes an explanation to the Russian incitement that Russia tried to continue her presence in Wallachia by creating social disturbance which would be used as a reason to extend her existence as a factor.³²⁴

Eventually, because of these reasons, a wide scale rebellion broke out in Vidin in 13 May 1850. Around 10.000 Bulgarian rebels firstly killed some of *agas* and *subaşı*s. When Ziya Pasha, the governor of Vidin, heard the incident, he sent a delegation to communicate with them, however the rebels expressed that they would not parley with anyone but an official who were sent directly from Istanbul.³²⁵ Before the arrival of Rıza Pasha who were sent for investigation and to appease the movement without bloodshed with regular army by the Porte, the *agas* suppressed the insurrection with *başıbozüks*, as in the case of Nish revolt, in a manner which the government did not want.³²⁶ As a result of his investigation for the causes of the mutiny, he concluded that suppression and malpractices of the *agas* were the main stimuli.³²⁷

³²³ Nadia Manolova-Nikolova, “Русия и българското въстание от 1850 г. [Russia and the Bulgarian uprising in 1850]”, *Istoriyata, istinata, istorikūt [History, Truth, Historian]*, ed. Nadia Manolova-Nikolova, Georgi Valchev, (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Okhridski, 2012), 132-144.

³²⁴ Russian army occupied the Principalities along with the Ottoman Empire after the 1848 rebellions to hinder any revolution in the region. However, the Russian presence was limited for a period of time, and therefore Russian government sought ways to extend that duration. Nadia Manolova-Nikolova, “Russia and the Bulgarian uprising in 1850”, 138-39.

³²⁵ İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 50-51.

³²⁶ İ.MTZ.(04) Dosya 2, Gömlek 28, 23 Ramazan 1266 (2 August 1850); İnalçık, “Tanzimat’ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri”, 192.

³²⁷ İnalçık, “Tanzimat Nedir?”, 45.

The Porte was strongly convinced that an extensive reform which terminated the reasons of unrest had to be done. Since the problem arose from land issue, the government determined to remove the last remnants of old regime, and formed a commission to abolish *gospodarlık*. In the commission, there were two points of view on how it would be abrogated.³²⁸ The government wanted to acquire all those lands into its own hand as state lands (*mîrî arazi*) as in the past, and let peasants use them freely. The illegal taxes that the peasants gave to the *agas* would be nullified, and half of the income from those lands would be given to the *agas* not to cause damage to them. The other half would go to the state treasury for expenditures of new administration. The second way was that the peasants would be granted lands with deeds but they would have to pay compensation to the *agas*, like in the Russian example when they abolished the serfdom 10 years later. The government of *Sadrâzam* Mustafa Reşit Paşa adopted the first way.³²⁹

On the other hand, the Porte sent Nail Bey to investigate the region for the problem. He faced with great expectations of Bulgarians and insistence on their hopes, otherwise, they threatened them with rebellion.³³⁰ Surprised with the situation, Nail Bey desperately wrote that Bulgaria would be lost.³³¹ Therefore, the government decided to choose the second solution. The lands would be sold out to the peasants, and the *agas* would be compensated with this income. However, the state did not completely give up its right on the land. If the land became vacant, the state could sell it to another person. Consequently, a decree was issued in January 1851 (Rebiülevvel 1257) which allowed sale of *agas*' lands to the subjects.

³²⁸ İncalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 102-4.

³²⁹ İncalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 103.

³³⁰ İncalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 103-4.

³³¹ İncalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 104.

Nevertheless, the Bulgarians were not satisfied with the situation. They expected that the Sultan would have granted them lands without remuneration. Besides, the appointment of Zarif Mustafa Pasha to the governorship of Vidin instead of Rıza Pasha further complicated the issue since he was opponent of that bargain. He clearly expressed that he followed the old way of *gosopodars*. The solution was stuck by those, on the one hand Bulgarians who resented to the solution, and on the other, the *agas* who still tried not to lose their rights.³³² Two years later, when the Crimean War broke out, the residents in Vidin requested help from the Russians because the problem did not settled. However, this time, the war ended with Russian defeat with the help of European Powers on the Ottoman side. As a result, immigration to Russia seemed to them as a best solution.

4.3. Population Traffic after the Crimean War

4.3.1. Tatar Immigration to the Ottoman Empire

The Tatar emigration from Russia had a very long history since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 1783. From that time on, bigger and smaller contingents of Tatar immigrants moved to the Ottoman territories. However, migration in larger scale came subsequently after the Crimean War. This war was different from the previous Russo-Ottoman conflicts for two reasons: First, it was not only between Ottomans and Russians, in this case European powers took part on the Porte's side.

³³² İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 106.

Second, the main battle theater was not in the Ottoman lands but in the Russian controlled territories.

The Russian army benefited from the Balkan Christians because of religious proximity during their campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. This time, they were in a reverse situation. The Ottomans were on the Tatars territories who were considered as fifth column of the Sultan because of religious and cultural closeness. As a result of their own experiences, they extremely suspected Tatars of treason.³³³ Russian distrust to the Muslims did not originated just in this war, it had always a ground in the Russian authorities. Accordingly, in times of wars with the Ottomans, Russian government often pre-emptively resettled them at least six miles from the shores to prevent any possible collaboration.³³⁴ Shortly before the Ally troops' landing on the Peninsula, Prince Aleksandr Sergeevich Menshikov, the Russian General of the Crimean front, proposed the evacuation of Tatars from the south as precautionary measure. Furthermore, the renowned scholar Peter Koppen suggested the government to force them to move Semipalatinsk in Eastern Siberia.³³⁵

When the war broke out but before it reached to the Crimean lands for one year, the traditional Russian distrust against the Tatars rose up again. There was a rumor spreading around about a possible rebellion of Tatars which could put Christians' life and properties in danger. Lieutenant-General Vladimir Ivanovich Pestel, the Civil Governor of Tauride province, did not agree with the beliefs of central government on Tatar's treachery. In a report on 29 November 1853, he expressed that in his nine-year

³³³ Brian Glyn Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration from Nineteenth-century Russia to the Ottoman Empire: A Critical Analysis of the Great Tatar Emigration of 1860-1861", *Cahiers du monde russe* 41, (2000), 80; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 4.

³³⁴ Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 82.

³³⁵ Hakan Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War", *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, (September, 2008), 754; Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 86.

service in Crimea, he did not witness the indicated character of Muslims. Also, he stated that their attitude might change in case of Ottoman appearance on the Russian shores, which was a very unlikely for him.³³⁶ Nevertheless, he took some precautions against a possible disorder. However, Russian suspicions did not materialize as expected. When the Ally forces landed on Crimea, there was not malevolence among the Tatars against the Russians except of a couple of incidents against some oppressive *pomeshchiki*³³⁷ in Evpatoriya and Yalta.³³⁸ For this reason, General Menshikov, still distrustful against them, ordered a Cossack regiment to control the Tatars activities in the region in June 1854. In accordance with this order, an officer named Maksimovich with a Cossack troop, who resembled the *başibozuks* in the Ottoman Empire, raided Tatar villages to warn them.³³⁹ Furthermore, many Tatars who were accused of treason jailed and exiled to other provinces. For these reasons, they began to migrate to the lands under the Ally occupation.³⁴⁰ The returnees from the Ally camps did not welcomed. Lieutenant General Baron Korff ordered that they would be whipped and evacuated to the north. Even some Cossacks shot the returning refugees.³⁴¹ All those events paved the way for immigration to the Ottoman Empire.

The Crimean Tatars' immigration to the Ottoman territories began shortly after the Ally's campaign in the Peninsula started. The first wave was a result of evacuation of suffering and starving refugees in Kezlev (Gözleve known in Ottomans, Evpatoriya in Russian).³⁴² Thus, small contingents of Tatar immigrants came to the Ottoman

³³⁶ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 752.

³³⁷ *Pomeshchiki* means land lords in Russian.

³³⁸ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 753-54; Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 86; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 30.

³³⁹ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 752-53; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 30; Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 86-87.

³⁴⁰ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 754-55.

³⁴¹ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 755.

³⁴² Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 756.

Empire. It is interesting to note that the Tatars were not the only group, there were Jews and Poles among immigrants.³⁴³ However, shortly before the end of the war, some immigrants who were dissatisfied with the conditions in the Ottoman territories requested repatriation from the government. The Porte allowed them to return their homes since it considered them as temporary refugees who would leave after a peace treaty was concluded.³⁴⁴ During the war and just after the war (1855-57), the number of Crimean Tatars' immigrants were not clear, and it varied between 20.000-25.000³⁴⁵, and 30.000-40.000.³⁴⁶ According to article V of the Treaty of Paris in 30 March 1856, it said:

“Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of all the Russias, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan, grant a full and entire amnesty to those of their subjects who may have been compromised by any participation whatsoever in the events of the war in favor of the cause of the enemy. It is expressly understood that such amnesty shall extend to the subjects of each of the belligerent parties who may have continued, during the war, to be employed in the service of one of the other belligerents.”³⁴⁷

The article was not only for the Crimean Tatars but also for Bulgarians who acted in support to Russians during the war. After the conclusion of the treaty, rumors were spreading in Kezlev (Gözleve, Evpatoriya) that the Russian government would resettle the Tatars in Kazan after the Ally forces left. Probably, they did not believe that the 5th article was applicable once the Ally army departed from the Crimea. Therefore, they expressed their desire to the Ottoman authorities to immigrate to Dobruca.³⁴⁸ The Porte accepted their appeal because it was an Islamic duty to provide shelter to the Muslims and it was an old tradition to grant asylum to anyone who desired without religious

³⁴³ Kırımlı, “Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire”, 757.

³⁴⁴ Kırımlı, “Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire”, 757-58.

³⁴⁵ Kırımlı, “Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire”, 767.

³⁴⁶ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 31.

³⁴⁷ Sir Augustus Oakes, R. B. Mowat, *The Great European Treaties on the Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918), 176-177.

³⁴⁸ Kırımlı, “Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire”, 758.

distinction.³⁴⁹ However, the government avoided to encourage immigration among the Tatars.³⁵⁰ Correspondingly, 7.582 Crimean Tatars moved to Balçık from Kezlev and its surroundings and 4.469 people left Baydar region by the first week of June 1856.³⁵¹ The Tatar immigration continued as the Ally forces withdrew from the peninsula using their vessels for transportation. Nevertheless, the Porte tried to eschew the impression that it organized the emigration as Russia previously done in the Balkans, thereby two-thirds of the vessels were allocated to the refugees and the rest one-third was for troops.³⁵²

The Russian officials who did not know how to react to Tatars' emigration informed the Emperor about the issue. He stated that voluntary emigration was advantageous to get rid of this harmful people.³⁵³ And these words spread among Tatars when it reached to the governor of the Crimea. A. G. Stroganov, the Governor-General of Novorossiya, who previously thought that the expulsion of Tatars was desirable, now believed that it was a necessity.³⁵⁴ Accordingly, the local officials were ordered in short terms to issue passports for the Tatars. Local officials who were benefited from the emigration stimulated the movement further. It was the fact that the Tatars emigrated from their homelands since its annexation but had never reached to that scale. However, Petersburg, which continuously changed the demography in the region by immigrations, now proceeded it by official encouragement of Tatars'

³⁴⁹ Kemal Karpat, "The Hijra from Russia and the Balkans: The Process of Self-Definition in the Late Ottoman State", *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 696.

³⁵⁰ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 759.

³⁵¹ BOA. A. } MKT. NZD. Dosya 186, Gömlek 58 cited in Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 760.

³⁵² Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 759; Kemal Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the Founding Of Mecidiye, 1856-1878", *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 211.

³⁵³ Mara Kozelsky, "Casualties of Conflict: Crimean Tatars during the Crimean War", *Slavic Review* 67, (Winter, 2008), 885; Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 759; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 32.

³⁵⁴ Kozelsky, "Casualties of Conflict", 885.

emigration. It seemed that Tatars were the scapegoat of the Crimean defeat in the eyes of Russian government. On the other hand, there were some officials like General Totleben who believed that there was little effect of Tatars' treason, if any, on Russian defeat on the Crimean lands, and the Russian officials exaggerated it.³⁵⁵ Besides, some contemporaries thought that the government overreacted to the disloyalty.³⁵⁶

Another reason why the Russian government did not hinder the movement was economic as some Russian historians utter. Because of their nomadic life, the lands were uncultivated and thus loss of income for the government.³⁵⁷ However, this explanation is a little superficial since their expulsion is much more economic devastation for the Russian government. As we will see in the Bulgarian case, many of them did not satisfied with the land they offered in the Crimea which means the land is not "arable land" as that much. And if we consider that Tatars who immigrated to the Ottoman territories did not hesitate to cultivate lands, this assertion is not enough to legitimize Tatars' deportation.

Unlike the Ottoman attitude towards the Bulgarians in the case of emigration, the Russian government expressed exactly the opposite attitude towards its subjects from different religion. On the contrary, the Porte did not officially put obstacles to those wished to emigrate on the one hand; and on the other, it officially dissuade them from their ideas. In the context of attitudes of Russian and the Porte towards their subjects who had an idea of emigration, the main difference between them was that while the Porte tried to dissuade its Christian Bulgarian subjects from their decision, the Russian authorities officially encouraged Muslim Tatars to emigrate at all cost.

³⁵⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 30.

³⁵⁶ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 30.

³⁵⁷ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 177.

One may say that of Ottoman concerns were economic; if so, Russia is supposed to have the same interests, yet it behaved adversely.

The main problem was not religion the Russian government in the context of emigration. If it was, Petersburg would not desired to settle the Protestant Germans more than Bulgarians in the southern lands. It is obvious that as being among the European Great Powers, Russia was much more flexible about its population policy – replacement of Muslim Tatars with new immigrants whom it wished to settle. On the other hand, as a “sick man of Europe”, Ottoman Empire couldn’t dare such a venture for its Christian subjects even if it wanted to do so because particularly Russia and other European Powers would immediately interfere. From my point of view, the real reason laid in historical relationship between Russians and Crimean Tatars. Russians and Tatars lived as enemies next to each other for centuries. Additionally, the notion of “other” had an important impact on their self-definition. The rivalry between Russians and Tatars ended in favor of the former not too long before the Crimean War, a half and a quarter century ago. Thus, their antagonism was still in memories as seen in the Russian attitudes towards them from the beginning. However, such animosity between Russians and the Kazan Tatars did not happen because the latter was conquered by the Tsar much ealier than the Crimean Tatars. On the other hand, the Ottoman rule was set upon the Christian peoples of the Balkans for centuries ago. By the 19th century, there was not a problem at least from the Sultan’s point of view. The relationship between the Sultan and his Christian subjects was arranged long time ago, thereby the Sultans did not adopt a policy that the Russians expressed towards the Crimean Tatars. Russian historians who regarded this attitude as normal in their subconsciousness evaluated the relationship between the Porte and its Christian subjects in this context. Therefore, they showed the Bulgarian immigration to Russia

as a result of “Turkish oppression” rather than Russian propaganda with tempting promises. All in all, these are the real reasons of the problem.

The Russian government faced with a serious problem shortly after the conclusion of the treaty which was how to treat the returnees. It clearly expressed that the returnees would be punished with imprisonment or exile to Siberia and confiscation of their properties since it treated them as traitors and lawbreakers who emigrated without proper passports.³⁵⁸ Later on, Prince Gorchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that this attitude might give reason to the Porte to treat in the same manner to the Bulgarians and the Greeks who took Russian citizenship but now return their homes.³⁵⁹ Accordingly, Gorchakov asked Russian authorities to let the Tatars return home under heavy surveillance.

The greater wave of mass Crimean Tatar exodus took place half a decade later. After the Crimean defeat, the Russian army intensified its operations in Caucasus. Kuban Nogais who were transported to the Crimean ports of Feodosia and Kerch for their final destination to the Ottoman territories by vessels in 1859. It was like a falling of a small stone which caused an avalanche. The Crimean Tatars who were very anxious for their delicate situation in subsequent years of the war were deeply affected by this movement. They were convinced that their turn for displacement would also come soon. There were some indications which made their concerns reasonable. First of all, the Tsar’s words on their harmful existence in the region and his desire to see them leave were heard by the Tatars. When the government distributed compensation the Crimean people because of their losses during the war, the Tatars were given the lowest portion.³⁶⁰ The Tatars were faced with a threat of Russification when new

³⁵⁸ Kozelsky, “Casualties of Conflict”, 886.

³⁵⁹ Kozelsky, “Casualties of Conflict”, 886.

³⁶⁰ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 32.

promulgations in schools to spread Russian language in 1858-59.³⁶¹ In June 1859, the government offered lands to Tatars in Orenburg (northwest of today's Kazakhstan, beyond Volga River).³⁶² Some of them interpreted that the Russian government would resettle them in near future. In addition, General Totleben complained about some swindlers who benefited from Tatars' emigration spread false rumors on their departure to inner territories, and conversion to Christianity with force and etc.³⁶³ Some officials, who made profits from the emigrants by demanding large amount of money for documentation of their passports, and for taxes of several years, also spread false hearsays about deportation to the north.³⁶⁴

The other most complicated reason of Tatar emigration was related with religion and, regarding this, with the Ottoman agitation. Just before the movement in 1860, there was another rumor spreading around that the Qur'an called all Muslims united under the Caliph's banner. The Russian authorities strongly believed that religious motives were very effective on the emigration. For this reason, they searched such a call in the Qur'an, but did not find anything.³⁶⁵ The religious stimulus probably had an effect on the movement. However, those people were not converted into Islam recently. Additionally, it doesn't make sense that a large group of Muslims decided to leave their homelands just because of a vague verse in the Qur'an which did not found until that time. If a group who belonged a different religion from their sovereign state were deeply unrest and thus decided to emigrate, the most plausible destination would be the lands where their religion ruled on. Therefore, from my point of view, the religion did not decided to emigration rather its destination which was for them the

³⁶¹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 32.

³⁶² Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 33.

³⁶³ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire War", 759.

³⁶⁴ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 38-39.

³⁶⁵ Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 101; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 52.

Ottoman Empire where the Caliph ruled. That is why Totleben, Alan Fisher³⁶⁶, Mark Pinson, Haji Murat Ibrahimbeili – a contemporary³⁶⁷ – and many others believed that the religious fanaticism had little ground compared to the Russian encouragement.³⁶⁸

When it comes to Ottoman agitation, there is no a consensus among Russian contemporaries: Goldenberg, Shcherban and Totleben did not even mention about the matter and Levitskii presumed it was unlikely.³⁶⁹ However, Arsenii Markevich believed that there was a strong Turkish agitation.³⁷⁰ Actually, there were some indications to suspect possible Ottoman encouragement. On 9 March 1857, the Porte issued a decree which invited every foreigner who accepted to obey the Sultan and his laws to settle his realm offering freedom of religion, free arable lands, exemption of taxes and conscription for 6 years in Rumelia and 12 years in Anatolia. The decree was published in European newspapers.³⁷¹ By this time, the Ottomans had been aware of manpower for economy and military strength. It had a serious scarcity of population problem, especially in Dobruca. There was not any geographic obstacle and was low rate of population in the region which eventually best route for Russian campaigns from Bessarabia to Istanbul without any hindrance. This was a geographical weak point of the Ottoman Empire, and led the Porte took some precautions. Accordingly, the government focused on populating the region with people who would not help Russians during the war, unlike the Bulgarians. This resembled the earlier Russian population policy against the Ottomans.

³⁶⁶ Alan W. Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years After the Crimean War", *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 35/3, (1987), 361.

³⁶⁷ Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 103.

³⁶⁸ Mark Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862", *Güney-Dogu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1, (1972), 106; Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 103.

³⁶⁹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 53.

³⁷⁰ Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 102-3.

³⁷¹ Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism", 205-206; Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 766.

About the mullahs' provocations, the situation is complicated. While one source claimed that they encouraged the people to immigrate to the Caliph's lands, another source stated that they did not want to emigrate but the Russian government's desire to see them leave was obvious, thus they did not call them to stay.³⁷² Their active role in the emigration is reasonable, yet its reality is not certain. Another Ottoman part of the story was mentioned in a Russian source that some Tatar elders came to Istanbul, and agreed on resettlement of 300.000 Tatars.³⁷³ In addition to mullahs and elders, a person who claimed that he was descended from the Khan, thus respected by the Tatars stimulated them to move the Ottoman Empire.³⁷⁴

Pinson states that the Ottomans probably organized the movement. Most of 310 vessels which transported the Tatars to the Ottoman Empire carried the Ottoman flag, and the Porte paid transportation costs. As he claims, the one who arranged shipping was the organizer of the emigration, and came into contact with those who willing to emigrate.³⁷⁵ In theory, it makes sense but it was not a general rule since he admitted that the Circassian migration did not fit to this theory. Nevertheless, the bargain was a win-win venture from the Russian and the Ottoman parts since the Porte needed population, preferably Muslim, and the Russians got rid of "harmful" people. The only victims were the Tatars in this deal.

When the Tatar emigration gradually increased, the Russian government brought some regulations to fulfill it in a much more controlled manner but not tried to halt the emigration. The passport process was done in a proper way in detail, and

³⁷² Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 53.

³⁷³ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 53.

³⁷⁴ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 53.

³⁷⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 53-54.

the emigration was restricted only by sea and indicated ports in passports.³⁷⁶ The passports were given them to immigrate to Ottoman lands never to return.

By summer in 1860, the emigration reached critical proportions to worry local authorities about labor shortage. In early August, the local nobility gathered to discuss the emigration. There were points of view among them: to terminate the movement any further or to let it continue but heavy colonization policy should be implemented. The meeting was resulted in the second view, and sent a report to Petersburg to populate the region from people in more crowded places in Russia and from abroad as well.³⁷⁷ However, the serfdom was still in practice, thus not allowed the inner movement as desired, only state peasants could be resettled there but they did not want to change their status of state peasants into *pomeshchiki* peasants.³⁷⁸ This made foreign immigration more plausible and opened the way of future Bulgarian immigration.

Short time later, Gerngross, a high ranking official from the Ministry of State Domains who previously expressed his ideas about Tatars' worthlessness changed his opinion after a short tour in the peninsula in 26 August, and called the Tatars to remain.³⁷⁹ Correspondingly, both governor-general of Novorossiia and governor of Tauride province tried to dissuade the Tatars from emigration by promising they were not resettled inner provinces, yet it was too late.³⁸⁰ In addition to official persuasion, instructions sent to punish the officials who were spreading rumors.³⁸¹

The Russian government was very firm about its attitude toward the returnees despite requests of the emigrants were limited. Some of them were not satisfied with

³⁷⁶ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 38.

³⁷⁷ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 39.

³⁷⁸ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 44-45.

³⁷⁹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 40.

³⁸⁰ Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 761.

³⁸¹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 41.

their new homes, and some did not endure to turmoil of the resettlement process and desired to repatriation. Another reason was the problem between Nogais and Crimean Tatars who regarded the former inferior. The Porte escalated the event further by granting salaries and gifts to Crimean Tatar elders. The Nogais protested the attitude of the Ottoman government, and some of them returned to Russia for this purpose. Then on, the Porte recognized their equality by granting salaries and medals.³⁸² However, the scale of the returnees were very low since they decided to emigrate from their lands not by “pull effects” of the immigrant receiver community rather “push effects” in their homes. Nevertheless, the Russian government should have handled with the returnees unwillingly. Tatarophobe tendency was still prominent in the minds of Russian authorities despite the apparent devastation of the emigration on economy in the region. The government sent instructions to its consulates in the Balkans to issue passports only to those who agreed with a Crimean landlord to settle his land or who were called by their family members stayed in the Crimea.³⁸³ Obviously, the Russians did not want them to return at all cost unless they fulfilled less desired positions in the economy since the Russian state peasants rejected to settle in *pomeshchiki* lands. Moreover, in June 1861, the Crimean governor gave instructions to the local authorities to dissuade from emigration by using those returnees as an example who did not satisfied what they were faced with in the Ottoman Empire.³⁸⁴ In the years of 1861-63, 10.648 passports were given to the emigrants from more than 200.000 Tatars who requested to return home.³⁸⁵

³⁸² Karpat, “The Hijra from Russia and the Balkans”, 699.

³⁸³ Pinson, “Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars”, 103.

³⁸⁴ Pinson, “Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars”, 102-3.

³⁸⁵ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 55.

It is not clear whether this dissuasion worked or other dynamics dramatically reduced the scale but from the beginning of 1861, the movement lost its temper but continued in small groups. Yet, the consequences were very serious. The Crimean region lost % 40 of former population in 1850s in total, and the Tatar population lost more than % 50.³⁸⁶ The exodus cost two-thirds of the Tatar population in pre-war period in Tauride province.³⁸⁷ The number of Crimean Tatars' emigrants diverges but it is around 200.000-250.000 according to Russian sources.³⁸⁸ However, Kemal Karpat found the figures given by the Russian sources dubious since they were based on numbers of issued passports, but there were many emigrants who did not have them, especially in 1856.³⁸⁹ According to Turkish sources, in years between 1856 and 1860, 141.667 people left the Crimea; between 1860 and 1862, 227.627 people came to the Ottoman territories; lastly, the Ottoman Empire accepted 595.000 refugees mostly from the Crimea and few from Kazan by 1864.³⁹⁰ As a result, the peninsula had a problem of labor shortage for two decades.³⁹¹

From the Ottoman point of view, the Tatar immigration was a desirable development since it desperately needed population. In addition to economic contributions, it brought demographic balance in terms of religion in the empire.³⁹² The Porte founded a new city for the immigrants which was named as Mecidiye in Dobruca.³⁹³ As mentioned above, Dobruca was needed to be repopulated, thereby this region greatly enjoyed with the influx of people. 120.000 immigrants were settled in

³⁸⁶ Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars", 109.

³⁸⁷ Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 101.

³⁸⁸ Williams, "Hijra and Forced Migration", 79; Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862", 109; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 56; Kozelsky, "Casualties of Conflict", 866.

³⁸⁹ Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism", 212.

³⁹⁰ Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism", 212.

³⁹¹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 57.

³⁹² Kırımlı, "Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire", 768.

³⁹³ For further reading about Mecidiye, Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism", 202-234.

Dobruca.³⁹⁴ The majority of the emigrants were settled in the Balkans and the other were allocated in Anatolia.³⁹⁵ The following table shows the numbers of emigrants and where they were settled:³⁹⁶

RUMELI	<u>Persons</u>	<u>Families</u>
Tune Sevâhili (The banks of Danube: this probably meant Dobruca and Danubian Bulgaria)	142.852	34.344
Edirne Province	10.289	2.445
Salonika Province	4.421	768
<u>Total for Rumeli</u>	157.562	37.557
Anatolia	94.505	14.346
<u>Principal Sum</u>	252.067	51.903

Table 4: The number of Tatar immigrants and where they were settled.

As stream of the immigrants continued, the treasury could not fulfil the necessary assistance to the new comers by 1860. If we consider that the Porte took foreign debt for the first time after the Crimean War and printed large amount of paper money, acute economic problem of the state can be understood better.

The Ottoman government was not as experienced as its Russian counterpart. While the Russian special bureau for resettlement was active for a long time since the Russian population policy had a long history, the Ottoman *Muhacirin Komisyonu* (Refugee Commission) was founded newly and more likely had an *ad hoc* nature.³⁹⁷ Because of the economic bottleneck, daily portion (*yevmiye*) which was allocated to the immigrants gradually became insufficient.³⁹⁸ Accordingly, the government limited to give *yevmiyes* only to those who carried document of poverty.³⁹⁹ Moreover, the

³⁹⁴ Karpat, "Ottoman Urbanism", 212.

³⁹⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 72.

³⁹⁶ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 74.

³⁹⁷ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 83-84.

³⁹⁸ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 75-76.

³⁹⁹ BOA. A.} MKT. MHM. Dosya 195, Gömlek 81, 3 Rebiülevvel 1277 (19 September 1860); BOA. A.} MKT. NZD. Dosya 325, Gömlek 56, 7 Rebiülevvel 1277 (23 September 1860).

Porte requested help from the local people. For instance, 3.000 carts from Şumnu (Shumen) and Silistre districts, and 1.000 from Rusçuk (Ruse) were demanded by the local authorities to transport Tatar immigrants from Dobruca to Vidin area which probably irritated the peasants.⁴⁰⁰

Transportation was not the only kind of help that the government demanded from locals. Late arrival of Tatars for planting led the central government to request assistance for provision and shelter, as guests, from the local people.⁴⁰¹ The government promised them for compensation and tried to keep them calm; nevertheless, this discontent was one of the main reasons of Bulgarian migration from Vidin and its surroundings to Russia as will be seen. On the other hand, there were some incidents that local people helped the immigrants without charge, and many others gave away their assets to the state.⁴⁰² For example, people of Tarnovo (Tırnova) informed the government that they built 1.100 houses for Tatar immigrants.⁴⁰³ Additionally, the Bulgarians in Sevlievo, Etropol and Lovech supplied with 3.995 the immigrants as an expression of their gratitude from November when they arrived to the end of August.⁴⁰⁴ Because of their gratitude, the governor of Vidin thanked them and publicized the event.

There were many casualties because of weather conditions, long journey, famine and epidemics; there were also some to return their homes because these reasons. Yet the majority managed to found a new life. How much did the Porte make use of them? Mark Pinson claims that intention of the government to settle them in

⁴⁰⁰ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 78.

⁴⁰¹ BOA. A. } MKT. MHM. Dosya 203, Gömlek 1, 1 Cemaziyelahir 1277 (15 December 1860), In Vidin, the immigrants were hosted as guests in local people's homes.

⁴⁰² İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Yerel Yönetim Geleneği*, (İstanbul: Hil Yayın, 1985), 83-84.

⁴⁰³ Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875*, 99.

⁴⁰⁴ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 80.

the Balkans, especially in Bulgarian lands was to check revolutionist movement of the Bulgarians and to sustain a demographic balance in the region.⁴⁰⁵ At first glance, Pinson's assertion seems plausible. However, there are some doubts for this assertion. For example, in a decree of 1857 which encouraged immigrants to settle in the Ottoman territories, the tax exemption for Anatolia was 12 years long while it was 6 years for the Balkans, which indicated the government tried to populate the former than the latter. Moreover, as mentioned above, Dobruca suffered a scarcity of population. Since the geography of its southern lands was more suitable for husbandry, Tatars were settled in this territory. The government founded a city there for immigrants, and first waves were directed to this area. Besides Dobruca, the Ottoman Empire had no choice to settle the Tatars in the Balkans but Rumelia where the Bulgarians lived in general. The Greek lands were not suitable for agriculture, Serbia was an autonomous state like the Principalities. Thereby, only Rumelia and Anatolia left to resettlement, and the Porte used both of them, but favored the former more than latter.

Another reason was, as Pinson indicates, to balance demography, and some places needed to be populated. Yet, he states that the Porte could not manage to change the demographic structure of the region.⁴⁰⁶ The only one who succeeded to change demography in this event was not the Ottoman Empire in Rumelia but the Russians in the Crimea. It is also noteworthy that approximately twenty years later with the Ottoman defeat in 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War, the Porte lost majority of its lands in the Balkans, and many of those Tatars would have to migrate to their new homes.

⁴⁰⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 4.

⁴⁰⁶ Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars", 114.

4.3.2. Circassian Immigration to the Ottoman Empire

Fifties and sixties of the nineteenth century was the “golden age” of immigration to the Ottoman Empire. Shortly after the Tatars, another population wave came from the Caucasus, in a much bigger scale than the former. After the Crimean War, the Russian government focused its military operations on that region which resulted in an emigration of over a million Circassian population⁴⁰⁷ from their homelands which can be defined as “ethnic cleansing”.

Russians had long been captured the Caucasus from the Ottoman Empire, yet they could not put their full control over those lands because of the local people’s resistance. Determined to eliminate them, the Russian troops managed to capture Sheikh Shamil, the leader of the Circassian movement, in 1859. Thus, some plans were proposed on what happened to the Circassians. Dmitry Milyutin, the great military reformer of the Russian Empire, advised resettlement of indigenous population to inner provinces of the Empire. However, Resettlement Commission found it impossible because of its economic burden. In the summer of 1858 Prince Baryatinsky, Governor of the Caucasus, proposed alternatively that their deportation to the Ottoman Empire was a less devastating solution for both parties.⁴⁰⁸ Accordingly, next sixteen years from the beginning of autumn 1858 onwards, and with its peak in 1862, the Circassians immigrated to the Ottoman territories.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁷ Williams, “Hijra and Forced Migration”, 93-94.

⁴⁰⁸ Margarita Dobрева, “Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet and Social Integration (Preliminary Notes)”, *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 33, (2013), 4-5.

⁴⁰⁹ Dobрева, “Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet”, 5.

Between 1858 and 1866, the number of immigrants from the Caucasus was around 470.000 people, and 320-330.000 of them moved to the Ottoman Empire in 1863-64.⁴¹⁰ The immigrants were transported by vessels to the ports Constanta (Köstence) and Varna, and from there distributed to inner places.⁴¹¹ In the first half of the 1860s, 6.000 families moved to Edirne, 13.000 to Silistre and Vidin, 12.000 to Nish and Sofia, 10.000 to Svishtov, Nikopol, Ruse and Dobruca where Bulgarians were mostly lived.⁴¹² Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire organized shipping of the Circassians which gave an impression of bilateral agreement on the issue.⁴¹³ Accordingly, Kemal Karpat claims that the Circassian movement to the Ottoman territories was a result of memorandum.⁴¹⁴

Although the Porte desperately needed population and welcomed everyone, the Circassian immigration put the government in a very hard situation since it happened just after the great Tatar resettlement. For this reason, the Porte obliged to depend on locals more than before about providing provision for Muslim immigrants. The Porte did not force the local people to help the immigrants⁴¹⁵ but demanded provisions and other kinds of assistance in return some deduction on taxes.⁴¹⁶ The local people both Muslim and non-Muslims were requested to give provisions to poor Circassians until they harvested their own products.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁰ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 122.

⁴¹¹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 128.

⁴¹² Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 131.

⁴¹³ Dobрева, "Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet", 7-8.

⁴¹⁴ Kemal Karpat, "The Status of the Muslims under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Çerkes", *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 653.

⁴¹⁵ BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 390, Gömlek 1, 17 Cemaziyelahir 1276 (31 December 1860); BOA. A. } MKT. MHM. Dosya 189, Gömlek 4, 5 Muharrem 1277 (24 July 1860); BOA. A. } MKT. MHM. Dosya 205, Gömlek 46, 27 Cemaziyelahir 1277 (10 January 1861).

⁴¹⁶ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 134.

⁴¹⁷ Dobрева, "Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet", 12.

The Circassian immigration caused headaches to the Ottoman officials. Their nature who were harsh and warlike people was different from the Crimean Tatars who were much calm and amiable. Plunder and slave trade was common and legal way of mainstay among them, and they tried to continue their lifestyles in their new homes. Moreover, they were not accustomed with agricultural life; thus, they did even eat the provision given them as seed.⁴¹⁸ The immigration brought social disorder while the previous Tatar movement did not.⁴¹⁹ The government did take some precautions to prevent their offensive actions against non-Muslims, such as forbidding them to carry arms⁴²⁰ and to sale slaves.⁴²¹

The purpose of the Porte on Circassian immigration, as Pinson states, seems to increase its military strength by taking advantage of their warlike nature.⁴²² Despite they were exempted from conscription for twenty years, they voluntarily joined the army since they were provided provision and money.⁴²³ The Porte was also willing to balance demographic structure of the Balkans with the Circassians.⁴²⁴ All in all, the Circassian immigration was not as fruitful as the Tatarian one. Since the Circassians' life style was not appropriate to the Balkan locals, there were widespread local

⁴¹⁸ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 137.

⁴¹⁹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 136.

⁴²⁰ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 46, 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (8 November 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 518, Gömlek 3, 16 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (16 November 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. NZD. Dosya 382, Gömlek 36, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (2 December 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 525, Gömlek 44, 13 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (16 December 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 528, Gömlek 75, 28 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (31 December 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 529, Gömlek 33, 29 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (1 January 1862); BOA. A.} MKT. MVL. Dosya 644, Gömlek 4, 29 Şaban 1279 (19 February 1863).

⁴²¹ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 542, Gömlek 26, 19 Şaban 1278 (19 February 1862); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 542, Gömlek 97, 23 Şaban 1278 (23 February 1862); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 551, Gömlek 23, 3 Şevval 1278 (3 April 1862).

⁴²² Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 140.

⁴²³ BOA. A.} MKT. NZD., Dosya 329, Gömlek 21, 14 Rebiülahir 1277 (30 October 1860); BOA. A.} MKT. MHM., Dosya 225, Gömlek 32, 2 Muharrem 1278 (10 July 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. NZD., Dosya 289, Gömlek 35, 28 Muharrem 1276 (27 August 1859); BOA. İ..DH., Dosya 455, Gömlek 30174, 19 Şevval 1276 (10 May 1860); BOA. A.} MKT. MHM., Dosya 183, Gömlek 37, 29 Şevval 1276 (20 May 1860).

⁴²⁴ Karpat, "The Status of the Muslims under European Rule", 653.

conflicts between them. This occasion paved way to Bulgarian rebellions in 1870s, and Bulgarian historiography accused the Ottoman government of being responsible of this turmoil. In addition, it undermined the policy of *Tanzimat* to gain support of common people in the Balkans.

4.4. Bulgarian Migrations after the Crimean War

When Russia appeared in the Balkans as a political factor, the Bulgarian immigrations emerged as phenomena as well. Same event also revealed itself in the Crimean War. In 1854, some Bulgarians from Silistre district immigrated to Russia when Austrian army forced the Russians to retreat from that territory.⁴²⁵ The movement was actually as a result of the change in Russian policy towards the Ottoman Christians. Nicholas I, who was known by his firm position against the popular movements opposite to legitimate rulers, now changed his mind. The Emperor expressed his desire that he did not want any territorial gains from the Ottomans rather to restore liberty of Christians lost to the Turks a few centuries ago from the “yoke of the Ottomans”.⁴²⁶ Correspondingly, in 1853, Russian headquarter decided to take some 3.000 Bulgarians under arms.⁴²⁷ During the war in Silistre, the Russian Command continued the same policy. Therefore, when the Russian army retreated, numbering 6.617 people or 900 families, who fought on the Russian side, immigrated

⁴²⁵ Mark Pinson, “From the Danube to the Crimea and Back: The Bulgarian Migration of 1861-1862 in Recent Bulgarian Historiography”, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies Eucharisterion*, Vol. III/IV, Part 2, 1979-80, 665.

⁴²⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 126.

⁴²⁷ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 125.

to Bessarabia in June 1854.⁴²⁸ The number of people who were distributed to new places was as follows; 2.955 persons to Izmail, 1.787 to Gornobudzhak, 1.369 to Dal'nobudzhak. However, they were not given lands, and it was postponed after the war since there was not enough land for allocation.⁴²⁹ That was why almost all of them, except 5-10% of total, accepted the Sultan's amnesty and returned to their homelands in 1856.⁴³⁰ In the spring, Tsar Alexander II ordered P. D. Kisilev to take measures to accommodate the rest of the newcomers. However, in his report, Kisilev expressed his doubt whether they could be peaceful villagers.⁴³¹ According to an official document on 14 July 1856, approximately 5.000 people or 900 families arrived but around 800 families requested repatriation for the autumn of the same year or for the spring of the next year.⁴³² Between 6 and 25 September 1856, around 4.000 Bulgarians who had moved to Russia in 1854, returned to the Balkans.⁴³³

The reason of that reverse migration of the Bulgarians to the Ottoman confines was probably their revolutionist character which did not give confidence to the Russian authorities to stay in peace in their new homes, as Kisilev concerned. Additionally, the Crimean Tatar emigration was not reached large scale to generate considerable labor shortage yet. In addition to these Russian attitudes, a big crop failure happened in the autumn 1856, which triggered the re-immigration.⁴³⁴

⁴²⁸ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 127; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 20-21.

⁴²⁹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 127.

⁴³⁰ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 20-21.

⁴³¹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 131.

⁴³² Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 133, According to the exact numbers, 928 families or 4.626 people immigrated to Russia but 799 families of them decided to return home.

⁴³³ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 133, 4.030 persons or 777 families along with 3.244 cattle, 1.047 horses and 22.153 sheep went back to the Ottoman Empire.

⁴³⁴ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 133.

Besides these migratory movements during and just after the war, the Bulgarian immigration to Russia in post war period is divided into two parts which are independent from each other: Firstly, the migration from Bessarabia, which entered to Moldavian authority under the Ottoman suzerainty, to the Russian Empire; and secondly the migration from the Ottoman Bulgaria to Russia.

4.4.1. Bulgarian Migration from Bessarabia to the Russian Empire

The Bulgarian migration from Bessarabia to Russia was actually originated from the 21st article of the Treaty of Paris. It says:

“The Territory ceded by Russia shall be annexed to the Principality of Moldavia, under the Suzerainty of the Sublime Porte. The Inhabitants of that Territory shall enjoy the Rights and Privileges secured to the Principalities; and during the space of 3 years, they shall be permitted to transfer their domicile elsewhere, disposing freely of their Property.”⁴³⁵

The Moldavian government expressed its willingness to respect the enactments of the treaty which guaranteed the Bulgarian privileges. Therefore, the Russian call for Bulgarians to immigrate did not found any ground among them. However, the Moldavian government began to change their attitude towards them in 1860 when the 3 year allowance was over. The Prime Minister Mihail Kogalniceanu demanded conscription among the Bulgarians in the summer 1860; furthermore, he ignored their right of tax exemptions and collected them fully in October.⁴³⁶ In April 1861,

⁴³⁵ Oakes, *The Great European Treaties on the Nineteenth Century*, 181.

⁴³⁶ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 151.

Kogalniceanu announced that the government would carry out some reforms in local administration, with the promise that Bulgarians' privileges would be protected according to the treaty, but those who wanted to emigrate could do as they wished.⁴³⁷ This is a clear indication for the Bulgarians that they should immigrate to Russia one more time in 1860-62.

The number of these immigrants was estimated 4.300 families or 21.000-30.000 persons from Budjak, and they were settled on vacant Tatar lands.⁴³⁸ According to Turkov's figures, their numbers were 23.000 who founded 36 colonies.⁴³⁹ The Bulgarian immigrants from Bessarabia adapted to new conditions much easier than the ones from Rumelia. Bessarabia's proximity to the Crimea caused less trouble for the immigrants. Furthermore, they survived of one immigration, not too long time ago, thus were more experienced than the Rumelian compatriots.⁴⁴⁰ Lastly, "push factor" was much more impellent than the Bulgarians from the Balkans; while the former faced with a threat to lose their rights, the only reason why they resettled there, the latter generally tried to use an opportunity to find enough lands.

This movement was just a result of change on borders between two empires. Therefore, the event was regarded as in the subject of Bulgarian migrations from the Ottoman Empire to Russia. Consequently, the main stimuli of the movement was firstly, that they lost Russian hegemony after the war since the borders changed; secondly, the new government violated their rights which was given them by another state, despite their privileges were guaranteed by the treaty.

⁴³⁷ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 152-53.

⁴³⁸ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 154.

⁴³⁹ V. V. Turkov, "Хозяйственное обустройство бессарабских болгар в Приазовье (60-е - начало 70-х годов XIX ст.) [The Economic improvement of Bessarabian Bulgarians in the Sea of Azov (60th - the beginning of the 70s of XIX. century)", *Drynov'skyu zbirnyk* 3, (2009), 269.

⁴⁴⁰ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 224.

4.4.2. Bulgarian Migration from Rumelia to the Russian Empire

The migration of Rumelian Bulgarians to Russia was very interesting part of the long history of Bulgarian movements compared to the previous ones since it happened four years after the conclusion of the peace treaty. Even if its scale is not as large as the former ones, it is the most speculated case on its motives because it coincided with the Crimean Tatar and Circassian immigrations. Indeed, it was a consequence of complicated dynamics, generally, independent from each other.

Russian propaganda revealed itself one more time in this event. Apparently, Tatar emigration from the Crimean peninsula led Russian authorities to seek for taxable populace to cover the loss. It was a clear expression of purely economic concerns as Russian policy of looking for people with special skills like able to produce tobacco, silk and grapes appeared in late February in 1861.⁴⁴¹ As the lack of labor made itself apparent, the Russian government turned its attention to the Ottoman Balkans as a possible source of population.⁴⁴² At that time, Russian sympathy towards Bulgarians who suffered from devastation of the wars revealed itself less than the previous ones.⁴⁴³ Russian economic purposes in earlier migrations has been explained; however, Russian paternal attitude can be still traced since they happened during and just after the war. However, in this case, it has been 5 years after the war. As stated in “Vidin Rebellion”, the land problem did not solve in accordance with the people’s expectation, and was not settled because of the Crimean War. That is why the

⁴⁴¹ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 156.

⁴⁴² Nikolay Vasil'yevich Shcherban', “Переселение Крымскихъ Татаръ [The Resettlement of Crimean Tatars]”, *Russkiy Vestnik* 12, (1860), 219; Shcherban' was a landholder in the Crimean Peninsula.

⁴⁴³ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 156.

Vidin Bulgarians would respond to the call when Russia launched a propaganda campaign for migration in spring 1861.

On the other hand, Russian government rejected all claims that they benefited from the Bulgarians for their economic reasons, and asserted they provided shelter to their co-religionists who suffered under Ottoman rule. On 10 November and 7 December 1860, Russian consulates were sent a note in which was written: “the Russian government is guided by ‘only sympathy’ for disaster of our co-religionists in Turkey, for whom resettlement in Russia would be the only way to address their plight and would offer many apparent benefits for the people of the region.”⁴⁴⁴ Meanwhile, E. P. Kovalevsky, director of the Asian Department, sent a circular to the consulates in the Balkans in which said:

“The resettlement of the Bulgarians in our fatherland given rise to some misunderstandings and unfavorable interpretations... The cries and pleas to let them immigrate was more common since 1858 when their conditions were aggravated by resettlement of the Tatars and Nogais in Bulgarian villages... Our intention is quite unselfish: Russia provides shelter for their co-religionists who need to find new homes... In many places, the belief is trying to be spread as if we want to populate our deserts at the expense of Slavs in Turkey, as if we want to weaken the Slavic population there, as if we deliberately remove the Tatars to reward ourselves with hardworking Bulgarians...”⁴⁴⁵

Russian sources do not deny Petersburg’s call Bulgarians for migration. M. A. Baikov, the Consul of Vidin, was instructed to launch a migration propaganda among Bulgarians with the help of his personal secretary G. Yoshev. There were also some Bulgarians took place in this venture: merchant G. Krivobarsky, priests Michail and Agapia (Agapius) from Lom district; priest D. Ivanov from village of Vasilovtsi; priest

⁴⁴⁴ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 184.

⁴⁴⁵ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 186-87.

Nedelko from Belgradcık.⁴⁴⁶ As far as determined from the Ottoman documents, the names of instigators were as follows: priest Pop Mihail from the viilage of Lom-ı Zîr from Belgradcık district, Papazoğlu Mihalaki, Bakkal Çeko Ayfer, Bakkal Tudor from Vidin, Pop Sava from the village of Kosticofca, and Pop Mihail from the village of Replan.⁴⁴⁷ Ottoman sources, on their part, proved that the Bulgarian priests involved in migration propaganda as well.⁴⁴⁸ They promised enough land to the common people, some amount of money in cash when they arrived to Russia, and the value of their properties left behind to be paid in their new places.⁴⁴⁹ It is woth mentioning here that some agents of registration people misused their duties and threatened the people for emigration. For instance, the villagers in Sahra changed their minds and strongly demanded their names erased from migration lists, but a certain Petko intimidated the villagers that their houses would be burnt if they insisted on their decision.⁴⁵⁰

The Russian propaganda, of course, wouldn't have found a solid ground among the Bulgarians unless they had internal reasons motivating them to emigrate. The main reason was that the solution of *Tanzimat* reforms didn't solve the land problem which was evident in Vidin Uprising. Additionally, that's why one may say that the *Tanzimat* proved itself unsuccessful promising to secure peace for all and to end of corruption. For example, when Mithat Pasha got his appointment to Nish, the most serious problem for him as governor was internal insecurity. That's why he took prompt actions to eliminate banditry and disorder which eventually would increase people's

⁴⁴⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 188.

⁴⁴⁷ Aydın, "Vidin Bulgarlarının Rusya'ya Göç Ettirilmeleri", 69.

⁴⁴⁸ For example, even during the return of Bulgarians to their homelands waiting for transportation, some priests tried to deceive them not to follow the Ottoman authorities since they were allegedly not resettled to their old homes rather vacant lands in Deliorman, and those who were sent there were perished during their journey because of bandit attacks and dehydration. BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 574, Gömlek 86, 24 Zilkade 1278 (23 May 1862).

⁴⁴⁹ Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi*, 153.

⁴⁵⁰ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 216.

confidence. Encroachments of Albanian *başıbozüks* to the people of Vidin led them to immigrate to Serbia where was much safer.⁴⁵¹ Greek religious propaganda and attempts of Greek clergy to Hellenize Bulgarians also played role motivating them to immigrate to where they would find Orthodox Slavs very similar to them. *Sadrizam* Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Paşa during his inspection in Rumelia in summer 1860 also witnessed similar events.⁴⁵²

As the Russian government used the Tatars migration as a cause of Bulgarian disturbance, their migration caused a general discomfort because of its scale. Nevertheless, the Tatars were not aggressive towards the locals when they settled in Rumelia unlike Belova indicates.⁴⁵³ Especially, the Circassians were depicted as peace-disturber and as main problem of social unrest from immigrants rather than Tatars, as stated in Circassian resettlement. However, Milen Petrov, who studies crimes committed in 1865-68 in the Danube Vilayet, states that the offence mostly committed amid the same ethno-religious groups rather than against the “other”.⁴⁵⁴

Perpetrator	Victim	Incidents in Sample	Remarks
Muslim	Muslim	23	
	Christian	8	
	Immigrant	4	2 victims Tatar; 1 Circassian; 1 unspecified
	Roma	-	
	Other	-	

⁴⁵¹ Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet’inde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875*, 149; Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 82-83.

⁴⁵² Compare to Yonca Köksal, “Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Paşa’nın Rumeli Teftişi”, *Toplumsal Tarih* 131, (Kasım 2004).

⁴⁵³ She states that Tatars were quite peaceful when they were in the Crimea, but they became aggressive once they were resettled in the Balkans. Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 178.

⁴⁵⁴ Petrov, *Tanzimat for the Countryside, 1864-1868*, 382.

Christian	Muslim	2	
	Christian	24	
	Immigrant	5	1 victim Tatar; 4 Circassian
	Roma	-	
	Other	-	
Immigrant	Muslim	1	perpetrator unspecified immigrant
	Christian	1	perpetrator Circassian
	Immigrant	3	1 victim Tatar; 1 Circassian; 1 unspecified
	Roma	-	
	Other	1	Circassians against British subjects
Roma	Muslim	2	
	Christian	1	
	Immigrant	-	
	Roma	3	
	Other	-	
Other	Muslim	-	
	Christian	1	perpetrator Austrian subject
	Immigrant	-	
	Roma	-	
	Other	-	

Crimes committed by Muslims	44 %
Crimes committed by Christians	40 %
Crimes committed by Immigrants	8 %
Crimes committed by Roma	8 %
Crimes committed against Muslims	35 %
Crimes committed against Christians	45 %
Crimes committed against Immigrants	15 %
Crimes committed against Roma	5 %

Crimes committed within same group	67 %
Crimes committed between different groups	33 %

Table 5: Data of crimes committed to and by etho-religious groups in 1865-68 in Danube Vilayet.

Another reason which led the Bulgarians to emigrate was the fact that they supplied provisions for the Tatars in winter.⁴⁵⁵ The Ottomans, on their part, were not experienced and prepared to deal with such a huge amount of new-comers. That's why Bulgarians used this situation as a motive to explain why they left their lands. They also complained about that the government requested carts for transportation of the Tatars.⁴⁵⁶ Nevertheless, feeding a group of immigrants for a period of time or providing transportation were not sufficient reasons to leave completely their homelands and to take a journey to unknown places. It probably caused general unrest among the Bulgars, yet they were not sufficient *per se*.

It is noteworthy that, Mitev claimed that many male Bulgarians left behind their wives and children, and immigrated to Russia as an expression of Turkish persecution by referring to a part of a letter sent by Hristo Georgiev to Georgi Rakovski; despite the fact that, the letter did not refer any persecution at all.⁴⁵⁷ There can be no logical explanation to justify the idea that they fled from Turkish oppression while they left their families behind. The most plausible reason of their attitude was they went there to investigate their would-be lands.⁴⁵⁸ Moreover, they probably immigrate to Russia temporarily to make money and return to their homelands. That is why A. M. Fadeev, one of the administrators of the Trusteeship Committee, wrote: "They (Bulgarians) produced a lot of wheat, but either bury the money or go back to Turkey."⁴⁵⁹ Besides, there were some political and economic reasons such as, taxation issue, bad harvest for a couple of years, inflation caused by printing paper money

⁴⁵⁵ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 179; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 154; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20, 3 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (6 November 1861).

⁴⁵⁶ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20.

⁴⁵⁷ Mitev, "Раковски и емигрането", 10.

⁴⁵⁸ Pinson, "From the Danube to the Crimea and Back", 669.

⁴⁵⁹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 76.

(*kaime*), financial crisis in 1860-61, hunger for land and lack of public security, all had an effect on emigration.⁴⁶⁰

Scholars speculated that an agreement between Russia and the Porte on population exchange led Bulgarian immigration to Russia. Tatar and Circassian migrations coincided with the Bulgarian movement to Russia which led historians to consider such an agreement. In the previous migrations, the Russian army stayed behind the events, and as victors, Russians, added an article in peace treaties which allowed immigration to Russia. However, when Russia lost the Crimean War, the immigration opportunities was limited just in Budjak. The Bulgarian movement from the Balkans took place four years after the treaty. Therefore, while in the previous examples the Russian army catalyzed the migration process, an agreement between two governments would explain the Bulgarian movements.⁴⁶¹ Besides Pinson, some other historians share this opinion, namely Elena V. Hadzhinikolova and I. Todev.⁴⁶²

In February 1861, A. B. Lobanov-Rostovsky discussed with *Sadrizam* Âli Pasha on the Ottoman attitude towards Bulgarian emigration. He informed the Russian ambassador that according to the law it was natural right of every individual to emigrate, and their leave would not be hindered if it was done properly. They were free to sell their homes and other properties which were not belong to the state.⁴⁶³ Accordingly, he sent instructions in that direction to the local governors not to hamper

⁴⁶⁰ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 157.

⁴⁶¹ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 154-55.

⁴⁶² Elena V. Hadzhinikolova, "Pereseleniye bolgarskogo naseleniya iz Moldavskogo knyazhestva v Rossiya 1860–1861 gg [The relocation of the Bulgarian population of the Moldavian principality to Russia 1860-1861]", *Bulgarian Historical Review* 3, (1986); Hadzhinikolova, *Bŭlgarskite preselnitsi v yuzhnite oblasti na Rusiya 1856-77 [Bulgarian migrants in the southern regions of Russia 1856-77]*, (*Nauka i Izkustvo*, 1987); I. Todev, "O balkanskoj politike Rossii v nachale 60-kh godov XIX v. [About Balkan policy of Russia in the early 60-ies of the nineteenth century]", *Bulgarian Historical Review* 3, (1988), 42-57 cited in Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Росийской Империи*, 31.

⁴⁶³ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 468, G mlek 89, 19 Şevval 1277 (30 April 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 474, G mlek 12, 15 Zilkade 1277 (25 May 1861).

the movement.⁴⁶⁴ This event is the mainstay of the proponents who consider that there was an agreement. However, in the previous events, the Porte did not prevent Bulgarians intention to emigrate rather tried to convince them by privileges and removing reasons of discontent which led them to emigrate. Therefore, the Porte's expression of non-interference was not more than a manifestation of that policy.

Pinson argues that the Porte, in that way, tried to reduce the revolutionary incidents by decreasing the Bulgarians' numbers, especially after the revolts in Nish and Vidin this intention was allegedly more escalated.⁴⁶⁵ This assumption seems logical, but subsequent circumstances cast doubt on its validity as we will see below. Firstly, there is no any document to reveal an agreement; secondly, the Ottoman authorities officially rejected existence of such an agreement with the Russian government; thirdly, the Porte took measures to stop the emigration by persuasion and welcomed the returnees. In the light of these facts, the theory is not convincing.

On the other hand, there is a document which raises a question mark concerning the problem. According to it, Bulgarians who wished to immigrate to Russia were allowed to do so but those who wanted to immigrate to Serbia were not.⁴⁶⁶ Also, Russian consuls' propaganda in public drew attention of Ottoman local officials.⁴⁶⁷ Nevertheless, non-existence of an agreement was much plausible according to the course of the events.

The active endeavors of Russian agents brought positive results for themselves. After long conversations and convictions, many Bulgarians were registered in the lists

⁴⁶⁴ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 155-56; Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 191.

⁴⁶⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 158.

⁴⁶⁶ BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 468, Gömlek 89.

⁴⁶⁷ BOA. İ. MVL. Dosya 492, Gömlek 22288, 8 Rebiülevvel 1280 (23 August 1863).

of immigration. However, Russian sources exaggerate the scale of the movement. For example, in mid-January 1861, not even a month earlier than Lobanov-Rostovsky and Âli Pasha's meeting, A. M. Gorchakov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked Lobanov-Rostovsky to warn the Porte about Bulgarians' wish to emigrate in large scale.⁴⁶⁸ However, we know that one month later Rostovsky discussed the case with Ottoman authorities not in the manner of Gorchakov's intention; rather, he tried to convince Âli Pasha not to hamper the emigration. According to a consular report in summer and autumn of 1861, 1.024 families from Varna district, 980 families from Provadia (Pravadi) and 6.000 from Tarnovo (Tirnova) where a new consulate was opened.⁴⁶⁹ Even some contemporary Russian officials claimed that the number who wished to immigrate to Russia reached half a million.⁴⁷⁰ However, the figure of approximately 12-16.000 Bulgarians was a much reliable information. According to the data Belova gives, 16.400 Bulgarians moved to Russia and 12.500 of them returned to their native lands.⁴⁷¹

Intense activities of Russian consuls, especially in Vidin, Varna and Edirne, began in the spring of 1861. M. A. Baikov offered the Bulgarians to choose attorneys to explore the lands they would be settled in Russia. Yet, Said Pasha, the Governor of Vidin, did not allow to issue passports for short term travel to Russia.⁴⁷² Nevertheless, 2-3 men had managed to go to Russia for this purpose.⁴⁷³ The first immigrant group arrived to the Crimean Peninsula towards the end of summer in 1861. They were from

⁴⁶⁸ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 189.

⁴⁶⁹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 200.

⁴⁷⁰ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 195.

⁴⁷¹ Abdullah Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri, 1856-1876*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 80; Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 164; Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 216.

⁴⁷² Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 189.

⁴⁷³ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 511, Gömlek 73, 19 Rebiülahir 1278 (24 October 1861).

Sahra, Belgradcık, Lom, Jan districts in Vidin area.⁴⁷⁴ The Russian government had planned to distribute 40 *desyatin* lands to the immigrants.⁴⁷⁵ According to investigations of the Russian authorities on the availability of vacant lands in Novorossiysk region, the amount was sufficient to resettlement for more than 14.600 families, yet the government budgeted 2.19 million rubles to the settlers which barely covered 11.000 families.⁴⁷⁶ From that data, land was not problem for the Russian government, but money was not enough to fill those vacant lands. However, the scale of allocated lands to the Bulgarians who came in October 1861 decreased 36 *desyatin* which was quite lesser than what was planned.⁴⁷⁷

According to a Russian statement dated on 29 October 1861, the overall number of the immigrants was 10.990 persons or 1.560 families;⁴⁷⁸ while an Ottoman document dated on 11 Rebiülahir 1278 (16 October 1861), showed that the figure of migrants was 3.961 from Belgradcık, 6.644 from Lom, and 1.432 from Sahra in total 12.037.⁴⁷⁹ Gradually, the Russian government accepted immigrants more than it could carry; and on 30 December 1861, the Minister of Finance wrote Gorchakov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the costs were becoming a heavy burden to carry, and advised to suspend immigration.⁴⁸⁰ Consequently, on 4 January 1862, the government sent a circular to all consulates in European Turkey not to issue passports for immigrants.⁴⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Russian government continue to accept settlers in 1862.⁴⁸² It is interesting to note that despite the central government sent instructions

⁴⁷⁴ Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875*, 154-55.

⁴⁷⁵ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 185.

⁴⁷⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 207.

⁴⁷⁷ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 209.

⁴⁷⁸ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 209.

⁴⁷⁹ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 513, Gömlek 91, 11 Rebiülahir 1278 (16 October 1861).

⁴⁸⁰ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 213.

⁴⁸¹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 213.

⁴⁸² Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 214-15.

to the consulates on termination of the movement, some consuls, namely consuls in Vidin and Edirne, continue their activities without consent of the Asian Department.⁴⁸³ By February 1862, Petersburg allowed 16.533 families including Bulgarians from Moldova and Ottoman Empire, Russians, Ukrainians and some Greeks from Dobruca.⁴⁸⁴

How did the Ottoman authorities reacted to the Bulgarian emigration from their lands? Pinson claims that the Porte reacted it slowly and uncertainly in April and May 1861.⁴⁸⁵ Additionally, he states that the Ottoman irresoluteness was a result of mutual consensus in benefits between Russia and the Porte since the latter reinforced its position with the Tatars and the former reinforced theirs with the Bulgarians.⁴⁸⁶ However, the period of Ottoman inaction was a very short since the meeting of Lobanov-Rostovsky and Âli Pasha took place in February, approximately two months earlier than April and May when Ottomans reacted the movement. Because there would not be any migration in winter, there was not a reason to take action. This is the first factor which casts doubt on Pinson's assumption that the Porte wanted to shrink the revolutionist movements in the region by decreasing the number of the Bulgarians, and thus did not took measures to hinder it. Yet, it was not the case.

According to the Ottoman sources, the main stimulus behind the emigration was the rumor that the Bulgarians were exchanged by the Tatars by a secret agreement with Russia.⁴⁸⁷ For this reason, the Porte denied the existence of the agreement in

⁴⁸³ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 207-08.

⁴⁸⁴ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 214.

⁴⁸⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 159-60.

⁴⁸⁶ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 13-14.

⁴⁸⁷ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 465, Gömlek 92, 14 Ramazan 1277 (26 March 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 474, Gömlek 35, 3 Zilkade 1277 (13 May 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 513, Gömlek 88, 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (5 November 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 544, Gömlek 25, 12 Şaban 1278 (12 February 1862); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 571, Gömlek 86, 15 Zilhicce 1278 (13 June 1862).

autumn 1861, and sent instructions to local governors to terminate administrative abuses which led emigration.⁴⁸⁸ The rumor had originated from Russian consuls to convince the Bulgarians for resettlement⁴⁸⁹ and from Tatar immigrants.⁴⁹⁰ In March 1861, the Porte issued orders to the governors of Vidin and Rusçuk, and to the *kaymakams* of Tulça, Varna, Hezargrad (Razgrad), Köstence and Şumnu about the issue.⁴⁹¹ It was stated in it that the Tatars and Circassians were settled all around the empire, therefore the Bulgarians should not emigrate because of this reason.⁴⁹² In a telegraph on 5 November 1861, *Sadrızam* Kıbrıslı Mehmet Emin Paşa wrote the governor of Filibe (Plovdiv) that there was not an agreement on mutual population exchange, and the Tatars by their own will and with permission of the Russian government, immigrated not in accordance with the Ottoman call.⁴⁹³ Ömer Pasha⁴⁹⁴ who made a tour in Rumelia told the Bulgarians that the administration would pay attention to abuses, but would not decrease taxes.⁴⁹⁵ In addition, on 14 November 1861, Aşir Bey, the governor of Varna, gathered Bulgarian elders to read an order of the Sultan concerning the emigration. It said:

“Those Bulgarians who wish to emigrate are free to do so and will not face with any hindrance and harassment. If the movement will not decrease and spread around, then all members of the assembly and officials from lowest up to the *vali* will be impeached with accusation of being instigator of the emigration who abused power and oppressed the subjects, thus leading them to leave their homelands.”⁴⁹⁶

After the reading ended, he asked them through translator:

⁴⁸⁸ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 160-61; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 513, Gömlek 88; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 571, Gömlek 86.

⁴⁸⁹ BOA, MVL. Dosya 937, Gömlek 85, 28 Rebiülahir 1278 (2 November 1861).

⁴⁹⁰ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20.

⁴⁹¹ Margarita, “Circassian Colonization in the Danube Vilayet”, 7.

⁴⁹² BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 459, Gömlek 3, 20 Şaban 1277 (3 March 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 474, Gömlek 35.

⁴⁹³ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 513, Gömlek 88, 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (5 November 1861).

⁴⁹⁴ He was a Serbian in origin, born in Austria, and served as a soldier in the Austrian army, but then he fled to Ottoman Empire in 1823, and continued his career in the Ottoman service.

⁴⁹⁵ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 159-60.

⁴⁹⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 212.

“That is how the Sultan loves you. Do not worry. If you have a complaint from anyone, give us without fear and we will sent him to the *Padişah*. We heard rumors that the Sublime Porte and Russia agreed to accept Tatars in place of you. Do not believe it. If the Tatars tell you again, I will notify the local police who will punish them severely. Now go to your fields and farm them. Do not believe them who talk about emigration.”⁴⁹⁷

As approved from the Russian sources, the Ottoman Empire did not want to discard from the Bulgarians.

The Ottoman attempt to stop the emigration was not limited with the rejection of a possible agreement, the authorities took some measures by eliminating the stimuli after investigations. As mentioned above, the increase of Tatars in some places in a greater scale was a source of disturbance, and their resettlement was done in much carefully.⁴⁹⁸ The government had usually applied assistance of local peoples in means of provision and transportation, this was also tried to be lessened.⁴⁹⁹ Additionally, the locals were displeased with intense implementation of deed regulations (*tapu nizamı*), and the authorities decided to ease it for 2-3 years until the Tatar immigrants were settled.⁵⁰⁰ To terminate rumors Tatar immigrants spread that they would be departed from their homelands, the Porte published a declaration in Bulgarian language not to believe the words of those provocateurs.⁵⁰¹ Moreover, the local governors were ordered to dissuade the Bulgarians from emigration by assuring about their concerns, namely in the example of Ashir Bey’s declaration, with the help of Bulgarian notables such as priests and *çorbacı*.⁵⁰² Nevertheless, some of them insisted on their decision, and sold their livestock and other properties. However, the Russian consul in Edirne

⁴⁹⁷ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 212.

⁴⁹⁸ BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20.

⁴⁹⁹ BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20.

⁵⁰⁰ BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20.

⁵⁰¹ BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 514, Gömlek 20; BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 474, Gömlek 35; BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 522, Gömlek 48, 14 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (17 November 1861).

⁵⁰² BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 511, Gömlek 20, 4 Rebiülahir 1278 (9 October 1861); BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 528, Gömlek 13, 26 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (29 December 1861); BOA. A. } MKT. UM. Dosya 465, Gömlek 92.

postponed their departure to the next spring because winter was approaching which led Bulgarian hesitation towards the movement. The Ottoman authorities used that opportunity in their favor, and proposed them that the properties they had sold would be bought back from the new owners by a commission which was formed for this purpose, and the commodities and livestock would be given back to old owners. In return, they would not leave their homelands which was accepted by them.⁵⁰³ Even, some of the returnees were also entitled with the same right and their properties that they sold were bought back and given them away.⁵⁰⁴

The conditions were not very satisfying for Bulgarians whom resettled in the Crimean Peninsula. When some immigrants were settled in Feodosia, they found the weather cold, and they refused the land they were offered since there was not mountains and forests like in their homelands.⁵⁰⁵ They convinced that there were much better lands, but the Russian government did not give them⁵⁰⁶ which was the end of Russian resettlement policy concerning Bulgarians from Rumelia. The last group of Vidin Bulgarians consisting of 200 people arrived to Russia in December 1861, and immediately requested repatriation.⁵⁰⁷ The authorities paid effort to dissuade their decision, yet they failed.⁵⁰⁸ In fact, the last contingent of Vidin immigrants sought for good lands, and when they did not satisfied with it, they return their homes soon,⁵⁰⁹ actually many of them moved for lands which they could not find in their homes in Vidin.

⁵⁰³ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 511, Gömlek 20.

⁵⁰⁴ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 528, Gömlek 30, 26 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (29 December 1861).

⁵⁰⁵ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 202.

⁵⁰⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 205.

⁵⁰⁷ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 210.

⁵⁰⁸ Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875*, 156; Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 210.

⁵⁰⁹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 212.

In addition to cold weather, a severe drought covered region of Sea Azov in 1862-63. Along with crop failures, there were not enough pastures for grazing their flocks. In parallel with drought, the rent of pastures became so high that the Bulgarians could not pay this amount of money, and preferred to slaughter their livestock.⁵¹⁰ Russian government could not invest enough money to them since Petersburg began to carry out great reforms, such as abolition of serfdom, which costed too much.⁵¹¹ From another perspective, Pinson argues that this was an expression of Russian apathetic policy on the Bulgarian immigration. He states: “Bulgarians be enabled to come and settle with a minimal expenditure on the part of the Russian government, after which, those Bulgarians who elected to stay, either because they found satisfactory land or because they considered that the political gains overweighed the economic hardship, would represent a colonial gain at a bargain price, and those who returned would represent a minimal loss.”⁵¹² Additionally, the attitude of Russian local authorities towards the Bulgarian immigrants caused another dissatisfaction among them, and thus motivated to them to return.⁵¹³ Naiden Gerov, who was a Bulgarian consul of Russia in Filibe (Plovdiv) and did not support the Bulgarian resettlement, wrote that in such a tense condition, every effort that the Russian officials made for Bulgarian immigrants without sympathy only contributed to turn the Bulgarians against the Russians.⁵¹⁴ He also wrote in November 1861 to Lobanov-Rostovsky that Bulgarians regarded that emigration was a magical and immediate solution for their problems.⁵¹⁵ Another reason of Bulgaria resettlement failure was their over expectation from the movement which furnished the “pull factor” of the emigration.

⁵¹⁰ Turkov, “Хозяйственное обустройство бессарабских болгар в Приазовье”, 269-270.

⁵¹¹ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 219.

⁵¹² Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 18.

⁵¹³ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 161.

⁵¹⁴ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 166.

⁵¹⁵ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 166.

Lastly, the “push effect” of the movement which was allegedly Tatar resettlement was not powerful impact on consistency of the resettlement. Since they were under less pressure than the effects of previous wars, they had a luxury to pursue their high expectations.

The discontent among Bulgarian immigrants was notified to the Ottoman authorities in Odessa by some intellectual Bulgarians, students, merchants and journalists. Those people, on one hand, sent petitions to Refail Hava Efendi, the Ottoman consul in Odessa for their repatriation, and on the other, they arranged their return in Russian bureaucracy.⁵¹⁶ That is why Kovalevsky, Director of the Asian Department, thought that reason of the failure was a result of merchants and journalists’ propaganda, namely Rakovski, against the resettlement.⁵¹⁷

The Porte decided to accept and welcome the returnees when first petitions began to come towards the end of November 1861. The government notified that since those Bulgarians who immigrated to Russia with their own will and had not been dismissed by the Porte, now decided to return back with their free decision without an official invitation. Therefore, the government had no obligation to pay them compensation. Nevertheless, they would be provided assistance.⁵¹⁸ In March 1862, Âli Pasha gave orders to the consul in Odessa to arrange shipping, and corresponded with Russian authorities not to hinder their return.⁵¹⁹ Accordingly, the governor of Vidin was instructed to accommodate those Bulgarians and to transport them to their native lands.⁵²⁰ Hava Efendi paid effort to organize their return⁵²¹ and assured their safety in

⁵¹⁶ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 161-62.

⁵¹⁷ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 210-11.

⁵¹⁸ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 522, Gömlek 30, 30 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (3 December 1861).

⁵¹⁹ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 164.

⁵²⁰ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 162-63.

⁵²¹ For further reading for activities of Hava Efendi, Aydın, “Vidin Bulgarlarının Rusya’ya Göç Ettirilmeleri”, 73-76.

their homes. It is interesting to note that when Hava Efendi tried to convince the Bulgarians that they would not be mistreated for their leave, they asked for a guarantee not to get harmed by *kocabaşıs* in their villages. It is obvious that they feared from rulers from their own kind rather than the Turkish one.⁵²² Some Bulgarians had sold their flocks and properties to return to a Russian merchant whom called as Zaharof in low price. He had given them bills to be paid in cash when they arrived to Rumelia, but he disappeared. The Porte notified the Russian embassy about the event, and requested those properties or cash of their value.⁵²³ However, its result is unknown. Furthermore, the Ottoman government paid debts of the Bulgarians who wished to return but could not because of their debts there.⁵²⁴

According to the report of Hava Efendi in June, 10.327 persons immigrated to Russia, 1820 of those had died, 500 stayed there and 8.129 returned to Rumelia.⁵²⁵ Their return caused some problems for them and for the government as well. Since many of them sold their lands and houses to emigrate, those places were settled with Tatars or the Bulgarians who remained bought them.⁵²⁶ The government took care of them by giving their lands if it passed to the state itself, or by resettling them to new places.⁵²⁷ In some cases, the vacant villages had been settled by Tatar immigrants,⁵²⁸ but they were resettled when the previous owners returned;⁵²⁹ while in other cases, Bulgars were provided another suitable places if their lands were occupied by the Tatar

⁵²² Aydın, "Vidin Bulgarlarının Rusya'ya Göç Ettirilmeleri", 76.

⁵²³ Şentürk, *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875*, 160.

⁵²⁴ BOA. A.} MKT. NZD. Dosya 383, Gömlek 95, 7 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (10 December 1861).

⁵²⁵ Pinson, "Demographic Warfare", 164.

⁵²⁶ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 217; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 511, Gömlek 20,; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 522, Gömlek 47, 27 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (30 December 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 521, Gömlek 89, 28 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (1 December 1861).

⁵²⁷ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 522, Gömlek 47; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 437, Gömlek 25, 5 Cemaziyelevvel 1277 (19 November 1860).

⁵²⁸ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 502, Gömlek 83, 3 Rebiülevvel 1278 (8 September 1861); BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 522, Gömlek 47.

⁵²⁹ BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 522, Gömlek 47; BOA. A.} MKT. UM. Dosya 522, Gömlek 30.

immigrants.⁵³⁰ For this reason, those people needed accommodation. Their own kind and Muslim people as well hosted them in their own homes.⁵³¹ For instance, Hâfiz Süleyman Efendi, the *Müfti* of Vidin and some other Muslim notables appeal to the governor of Vidin and informed them that they could provide accommodation for Bulgarian returnees.⁵³² Consequently, the Porte did not hesitate to accept the Bulgarians, and tried to make them comfortable. Therefore, this is the second factor which casts shadow on Pinson's assumption which the Ottoman government was abstain to take measures against the emigration since their departure would weaken the revolutionist movement and rebellions in the region. If the Porte had had such an intention, why would it have done so many things to recover Bulgarians' losses?

As a result of this event, there were some significant changes in the Russian and the Bulgarian concepts of migration. From the Russian part, Petersburg did not depend on foreign colonists to populate a region anymore. For instance, the Kuban and Caucasian regions were not populated with foreign colonists despite the government desperately needed. The primary reason was the abolition of serfdom which enabled mobilization of peasants. Another factor was that Russia was disappointed with the failure of the last resettlement. From then on, Russia did not accept any immigrants from those who were among the people participated in the 1861-62 movement, and accept only those who were wealthy.⁵³³

From the Bulgarian part, they gave up from their belief on emigration as a solution for their problems. They ventured more zealous attempts to improve their

⁵³⁰ BOA. İ. MVL. Dosya 492, Gömlek 22288.

⁵³¹ BOA. A.) MKT. UM. Dosya 521, Gömlek 89: The Bulgarians who had emigrated from Belgradcık and returned to Vidin were hosted in Bulgarian villages if they had sold their homes.

⁵³² Aydın, "Vidin Bulgarlarının Rusya'ya Göç Ettirilmeleri", 72.

⁵³³ Belova, *Миграционная Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 219.

conditions in their homelands, and increased revolutionist activities which would grant them freedom.⁵³⁴

4.5. Ideas of Bulgarian Intelligentsia about the Bulgarian Migrations to the Russian Empire

The Bulgarian intelligentsias and revolutionists were strongly opposed to the Bulgarian immigration to Russia, and blamed the Russians as the main instigator of this movement. G. Rakovski, L. Karavelov, B. Levski, Hristo Botev, A. Kanchev, P. Volov, G. Benkovski and Zahari Stoyanov were all against the Russian Empire.⁵³⁵ The main reason of their adverseness was that Russia was pretending to be their “big brother” to instruct them everything. In the case of emigration, the cause is relevant with their nationalist ideas. The emigration decreased the number of the Bulgarians which eventually weakened national strength and population in their would-be fatherland. Correspondingly, Russia who were the main organizer of those mass deportations did not concern with the Bulgarian interests rather benefited from Bulgarians for their own selfish goals.⁵³⁶ Particularly, Georgi Sava Rakovski,⁵³⁷ took an active opposition on the emigration and criticized the Russian government not taking a passive stance towards the movement rather encouraging them with false

⁵³⁴ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 169.

⁵³⁵ Zahari Stoyanov, “Предисловие [Preface]”, 1 March 1886, Rusçuk in *Преселение в Русия, или руската убийствена политика за българите [Migration to Russia or Russian deadly policy towards Bulgarians]*, Georgi S. Rakovski, (Sofia, 1886), 4, the booklet was first published in 1859 when Vidin deportation began according to Stoyanov. However, Belova states that it was written in spring of 1861. <http://www.otizvora.com/files2014/prosvetni//Rakovski%20-%20Preselenie%20v%20Russia.pdf>

⁵³⁶ Belova, *Миграционна Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 203.

⁵³⁷ Georgi Rakovski was the most famous revolutionary and journalist among Bulgarians in the 19th century.

promises in his journal *Dunavski Lebed*.⁵³⁸ Furthermore, he claimed that Russia opened an office for registration affairs for emigration, those who registered their names were given some amount of money, and frightened them with false rumors that if they did not move to Russia, the Porte would resettle them in Anatolia.⁵³⁹ Rakovski wrote a pamphlet to criticize the emigration, “Migration to Russia or Russian deadly policy towards Bulgarians [Preselenie v Rusiya, ili ruskata ubiistvena politika za bulgarite].” Almost all of the copies were destroyed by a Russophile Hristo Georgiev.⁵⁴⁰ In his pamphlet, he severely assaulted the Russian policy, and claimed that Russia deceived the Bulgarians wanted to destroy their fatherlands.⁵⁴¹

Before referring to the last emigration after the Crimean War, he mentioned about the earlier emigrations. According to his ideas, the Russian army, on the one hand, provoked the Bulgarians to fight against Turks, and on the other, burned Bulgarian villages and houses to force them to move to Russia in 1812. In 1828, they continued to incite the Bulgarians against the Turks and caused a mutual hatred between two people, they plundered the Bulgarian lands like “locusts” and forced them to leave their homes.⁵⁴²

Another point that Rakovski pointed out was that Russia managed to take a *ferman* from the Porte which allowed it to resettle the Bulgarians in its desert lands.⁵⁴³ He was clearly convinced with that the exchange of Tatars and Bulgarians was agreed between two governments. For this reason, Bulgarian emigration which caused erosion of national population in the homeland, and Circassian and Tatar resettlement in their

⁵³⁸ Pinson, “From the Danube to the Crimea and Back”, 667-68.

⁵³⁹ Georgi S. Rakovski, *Преселение в Русия, или руската убийствена политика за българите* [*Migration to Russia or Russian deadly policy towards Bulgarians*], (Sofia, 1886), 6.

⁵⁴⁰ Belova, *Миграционна Политика на Юге Российской Империи*, 203 footnote 756.

⁵⁴¹ Rakovski, *Преселение в Русия, или руската убийствена политика за българите*, 6.

⁵⁴² Rakovski, *Преселение в Русия, или руската убийствена политика за българите*, 8.

⁵⁴³ Rakovski, *Преселение в Русия, или руската убийствена политика за българите*, 6.

homelands led Rakovski to increase bitterness of the pamphlet. It is interesting to note that, he asked the people why they wanted to emigrate, and whether their conditions were better than the past in the reign of Abdulmecit, and he answered his own question that it did and it would get better. He continued: “If the problem is the usurpation of local officials, it is not the will of the *Padişah*. Is there any place where is not local usurpation in this world? You will understand what barbarism and abusiveness is from the Russian officials.”⁵⁴⁴

He consumed too much effort, on the one hand, to hinder the Tatar and Circassian resettlement in Rumelia by pressing brochures in French to attract European public opinion,⁵⁴⁵ and on the other, to dissuade Bulgarians from emigration by intense propaganda activities in press. Since his main concern was not to let population of the Bulgarian nation decrease in the fatherland, he had tendency to exaggerate the events and incidences, his journalist career also had an impact on this tendency. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Rakovski being in the first place, Bulgarian intelligentsia strongly opposed the emigration and criticized the Russian stance as being primary instigator.

⁵⁴⁴ Rakovski, *Преселение в Русия, или руската убийствена политика за българите*, 12.

⁵⁴⁵ Pinson, “Demographic Warfare”, 83.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The migration is a sociological phenomenon; therefore, the Bulgarian migrations are also needed to be evaluated in this context. In a migration, there are two dimensions, “migrant-sending-community” and “migrant-receiver-community”. Their relationship is determined with a “push factor” of the migrant-sender, and “pull factor” of the receiver. The advantages of “pull factor” and the disadvantages of “push factor” designate direction of the movement. The most possible example of “pull factor” is economic welfare and high amount of income in receiver society. Accordingly, migration is limited with members of lower middle class who has enough money to risk for such a venture. The rich do not have enough reason for migration, and the poor do not have that amount of money. On the other hand, if a migrant-claimer government sponsors to costs of the migration, like in the example of the Russian Empire, the range expands towards much lower classes.

Another important “pull factor” is stability and security in migrant-receiver which means “push factor” of the sender at the same time. In the context of the Bulgarian migrations, the *Kirjali* period, the clashes of *ayans* and wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire can be shown as examples of this kind of “push factor” for the migrations at the end of 18th and beginning of 19th centuries. However, this “push factor” is generally exaggerated by many historians, especially Bulgarian and Soviet scholars. For later movements, the “pull factor” seems to outweigh the “push factor.” It is right that pushing reasons resulted in migration, but the pulling factors determines direction of the movement. In this case, Russia which is far away from the Bulgarian homeland is a destination of that movement because of her encouragements and incentives as explained above. In addition, if it is the case that Bulgarians were worried about their lives and properties under the Ottoman rule, there can be no logical explanation for the many of the migrants in 1828-29 and after the Crimean War returned their homes. Therefore, we can conclude that the Bulgarians tried to use an opportunity which was offered by the Russian government, and when they failed to materialize their expectations, they returned to their homelands. Nevertheless, this sociological pattern brings the most appropriate explanation to the Bulgarian migrations in the 19th century.

The Bulgarian immigrations to Russia are strongly interlinked with the Russian population policy in the eighteenth century. Gradual expansion of Russian borders towards the south paved the way towards that phenomenon. Russian territories did not grow at the same rate of natural population increase, particularly the new lands were not that much populated. For this reason, in order to populate the southern lands, so as to make them a source of income, became the main issue of Petersburg’s political agenda because in a globalizing commercial world exportation and men-power were

crucial elements. However, serfdom did not allow the Russian authorities to move people from much crowded places to less populated areas. Therefore, foreign colonization left as an only solution. Correspondingly, in 1762 and 1763, decrees which invited every foreigner to immigrate to Russia with serious encouragements and incentives like free lands, exemption of taxes and military service, and freedom of religion were published in European newspapers. Catherine the Great also intended to shift demographic structure of the southern regions in favor of Christians, where Muslims were prominent elements, not only by introducing Christian population but also by displacing Muslim Tatars from the area. This desire of demographic engineering resulted in mutual population trade between Russian and the Ottoman empires.

At the beginning, Russian call of immigrants did not find any ground among the Bulgarians in the eighteenth century. Actually they were not the main audiences from the Russian perspective, but they were the Germans who were better known by the Russians than the Bulgarians who were far away. Nevertheless, there were small groups of Bulgarians who settled in Russia in the eighteenth century. In the events during that and the subsequent century, the main characteristic of the Bulgarian immigrations to Russia was that they happened during and just after a war between Russia and the Porte. During the wars of 1768-74 and 1787-92, approximately 4-5.000 Bulgarians moved to Russia. This feature also revealed itself in the nineteenth century, such as in the wars of 1806-12, 1828-29, and during and after the Crimean War until 1861-62. The scale of Bulgarian migration depended on the scale of the Russian military's penetration into Ottoman lands. Since the route of the Russian troops passed through the Bulgarian lands, they were the main subjects of this phenomenon.

The course of Bulgarian immigrations to Russia in the nineteenth century begins with the war of 1806-12. Just before the beginning of the war, Russia declared her new criteria for immigrants being experienced in viticulture and cultivation of mulberry, since a lot of “bad hosts” had come upon the decree of 1763. This is another characteristic of Bulgarian immigration from the Russian part, to seek for immigrants with a particular skill. Apart from that, the immigration in this period coincided with *Kirjali* turmoil and the rebellion of Pazvandoğlu by which Russia depicted herself as a savior of Christian people who provided them shelter from encroachments of “Turks”. Additionally, the Russian incentives of free lands and tax exemptions also contributed to the immigration. However, scale of this immigration was small compared to the later movements.

E. O. Richelieu, the governor-general of Novorossiysk, had planned to populate the region with the Bulgarian immigrants. However, he failed to attract them to settle in the Crimean territories. Nevertheless, Bessarabia, especially Budjak, where Russia captured with the Treaty of Bucharest was more attractive for Bulgarians to settle. The immigrants came from northern borders of today’s Bulgaria; Vidin, Razgrad (Hezargrad), Plevne (Pleven) where were main battle scenes between two armies. Many of them sought for temporary shelters from the devastation of war, and moved to territories under the Russian control. When they were offered with Russian incentives, they decided to settle. In Ottoman documents, there is no information on the figures of the immigrants. According to Russian sources, the number of Bulgarians in Bessarabia increased from 4.000 in 1809 to 25.000 in 1812, but decreased to 20.500 in 1816.

The immigration of 1806-12 was the first experiment of the Russian government. After the war, Petersburg was busy to correct drawbacks of the

movement. To terminate complications and Moldavian boyars' attempt to enserf those Bulgarians, all of them were brought under the central government's control. Moreover, they were given 66 hectares of lands, exemptions of taxes and military service for ten years. From then on, a series of Bulgarian immigrations in varying intensity to Russia commenced, which extended up to the Russo-Ottoman War in 1877-78.

The migration of 1828-29 is the largest one in scale. The movement has three stages: First, the people who sought for temporary shelter from the war immigrated to Russia. Second, the biggest wave of immigration happened from September 1829 to March 1831, using the 13th article which allowed those who wished to immigrate to other countries to do so in eighteen months. Lastly, almost half of the immigrants returned to the Ottoman Empire in 1833-34. It has also three different figures independent from each other motivating the migrations. The first actor was Vorontsov, the Governor-General of Novorossiysk region, who wished to settle sailors and shipbuilders in the Crimean ports and some peasants experienced in viticulture, winemaking and horticulture upon requests of the Crimean landlords. According to him, Russia desperately needed those sailors to be prominent in the Black Sea. The other figure was General Dibich, the Supreme Commander of the Russian forces during the war, who was not proponent of mass immigration for a couple of reasons. First, the influx of poor and huge amount of immigrants was not beneficial for Russia. Second, decrease in Bulgarian population in the Balkans had very negative consequences for later Russian military expeditions since they provided Russian army assistance and provisions in such events. On the other hand, the people who helped Russians actively during the war, thus put their lives and properties under threat of possible Ottoman retaliation had to be evacuated not to harm Russian prestige among

them. To protect those Bulgarians, Russia put an article in the Treaty of Edirne for general amnesty and forgiveness to those who took active part in hostilities. Nevertheless, Dibich could not refuse to those who concerned about their lives, but tried to dissuade others from migration.

The last actor was not among Russians, but from Bulgarians, Ivan Seliminsky who was an influential public figure. According to his observations, there were three groups in Sliven on the migration issue. The first group which consisted of Greeks and Hellenized wealthy Bulgarians, upheld the idea to stay and to ask forgiveness from the Sultan under the leadership of Yerasimos, the Metropolitan of Edirne. It seems that they had more things to lose from emigration. However, he was dismissed from the meeting by the second group which consisted of merchants and artisans who complained about heavy taxes and peasants who desired lands. They were the majority and proponents of the emigration. The third party was very small and radical in their ambitions consisting of young and inexperienced people from poor townsmen and peasants. Their leader was Mamarchev who attempted a rebellion against the Ottoman rule which failed with measures taken by General Dibich. Therefore, the second group prevailed, and they decided to immigrate to Russia. In mid-April, Ivan Seliminsky organized a mass immigration. They used the 13th article of the treaty which was probably included for sailors of Vorontsov and the Bulgarians of Dibich who actively participated to the war. Consequently, 86.700 people according to the numbers of issued passports and possibly reaching 100.000 Bulgarians immigrated to Russia from September 1829 to July 1830. However, almost half of them, 47% of total immigrants, returned their homelands because of harsh climate, unaccustomed geography, lack of food and fresh water, long quarantines and ill-treatment of some local officials.

On the reasons of failure in the migrations, the Russian sources claimed insufficient funds to maintain such a big wave of immigrants. However, the war ended with Russian victory and high amount of war compensation. The Porte had to pay an amount of 11.500.000 ducats which was sixteen times greater than the annual income of state treasury. Therefore, Russia was not in a weak economic situation. Nevertheless, the scale of the movement was too big to cope with at once. Consequently, we can conclude that the failure was a result of Russian disorganization because of its magnitude.

From the Ottoman part, the reason of the movement arose from Russian propaganda and incentives, thus some of them emigrated with their own will. However, in some cases, Russian officials frightened the Bulgarians about Ottoman retaliation, and sometimes the Cossacks threatened them for emigration from their homelands. According to Ottoman documents, some of the Bulgarians hid in forests and ran away to the mountains from those Cossacks. The first thing to stop the movement, the Porte declared a general amnesty and promised not to seek revenge. After investigation of reasons for the emigration, some usurpations of local officials showed as a reason by the subjects, especially *cizye* collectors were a common subject of complains. Accordingly, the government assured them to correct those malpractices. The taxes of some villages were forgiven or split into reasonable installments to dissuade them from emigration. Additionally, the Porte declared that the properties left by those who immigrated to Russia would be given to them if they returned in 5 months. Also, they would be provided with seed and livestock, and offered exemption of taxes for a certain period of time. As a result, the migration of 1828-29 ended up with failure because of disorganization of Russian government,

dissatisfaction of Bulgarians from geography and climate, and Ottoman attempts to attract them.

Before mentioning the migrations after the Crimean War, *Tanzimat* should be evaluated in terms of what it promised and succeeded. The policy-makers of *Tanzimat* began their projects with two significant drawbacks: lack of sufficient military power and qualified official staff to implement the principles of *Tanzimat* firmly. The former led the local governors to apply help of *başıközuks* who plundered the villagers to suppress a rebellion which resulted in undesired consequences and foreign intervention. The latter caused survival of members in administration and city assemblies who carried the old ideas of the previous regime. Therefore, the Porte failed to materialize what was promised to the non-Muslim subjects in taxation, security and official corruption, at least partially. Besides, the Porte declared the edict to please peasants, but its liberal doctrines sided with the land lords. Therefore, the old supremacy of Muslim *agas*, known as *gospodarlık*, in Vidin where non-Muslims were not allowed to buy lands for strategic purposes continued in the city assembly until the Vidin rebellion. When the government decided to abolish it by selling the lands belonging to the *agas* to the common people, they were not pleased what they were offered since peasants hoped that the land would be granted to them without remuneration. At the end, the case was not closed, and the Crimean War broke out. That is why the majority of the Bulgarians who immigrated to Russia when she called for immigrants were from Vidin region.

The war was different from the previous ones, since the war was not just between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the European powers were also involved; and Russia was on the defeated side. Because the Russians were well aware that they had enjoyed with assistance of their coreligionists, Bulgarians, during the campaigns

in the Balkans, they strongly believed that same happened in a reverse situation in the Crimean Peninsula when the Ottoman forces landed. Therefore, at the end of the battle resulted in defeat, the Tatars became the scapegoat of that defeat in the Russians' minds. The Emperor himself regarded them as harmful people to get rid of. It was the opposite attitude of the Ottomans towards its non-Muslim Bulgarian subjects. While the Russian government encouraged Muslim Tatars' emigration, the Porte did not put obstacles to those wished to emigrate but tried to dissuade them from their decision by assuring them. Obviously, as being one of European Great Powers, Russia was more flexible on her policy of demographic engineering, while "sick man of Europe" could not have dare such a venture even if the Porte had wanted to do so. Nevertheless, the Ottoman attempts to stop the emigration and its behavior towards the returnees promotes the idea that the Porte did not want to get rid of its non-Muslim subjects. Apart from that, the difference in attitudes of Russia and the Porte was deeply rooted in their relationships with their subjects in history. Russians and the Crimean Tatars lived side by side as enemies for centuries unlike the Tatars in Kazan. The notion of "other" had a great impact on their self-definition. At the end, the conflict was ended in favor of the Russians not too long before the Crimean War. Thus, the antipathy was still fresh in their memories. On the other hand, there was not such an antagonism between Russians and the Kazan Tatars as that much in the case of the Crimean Tatars, who were put under Tsar's rule in sixteenth century. On the other hand, the problem between the Balkan peoples and the Ottoman Sultan was settled centuries ago. Accordingly, the Porte did not adopt a policy towards its non-Muslim subjects as in the manner of the Russians, at least until the very end of the empire.

A couple of years later, the Crimean Tatars began to immigrate to the Caliph's lands in masses. It happened in a time when the Ottoman government desperately

needed population for the Balkans, in particular for Dobruca, and Anatolia. Around 200-250.000 the Crimean and the Nogai Tatars settled in the Ottoman territories. Since the Ottoman Empire was not as experienced as the Russian government in managing the resettlement of the immigrants, and economic bottleneck that the Empire suffered after the war, the government obliged to apply assistance of local peoples for provision, accommodation and transportation. Moreover, another wave of immigrants in a much bigger scale came from the Caucasus putting the Porte in a very hard situation. This led the government to rely on the locals more than before. Consequently, discontent among people where the number of Muslim immigrants increased rose at the same rate.

The Bulgarian immigration to Russia after the Crimean War has two sources: from Bessarabia and from Rumelia. Since Russia lost Bessarabia where many Bulgarians lived, the new Moldavian government began to violate those Bulgarians' rights. For this reason, this immigration was a result of "push factor" since they faced with the threat of losing their rights. Eventually, numbering 21-30.000 individuals immigrated to Russia one more time. Their resettlement was more successful compared to the Rumelian one, since the distance was shorter and they were more experienced in migration.

When the Tatar emigration resulted in a catastrophic labor deficit, the Russian government turned to the Ottoman Empire as a source of foreign colonization. Thus, the Russian consuls in the Balkans launched an immigration propaganda among the Bulgarians five years later from conclusion of the treaty. Since the Bulgarian emigration from the Ottoman Empire coincided with the Tatar and Circassian emigration from Russia, many historians claim that there was an agreement between two governments. However, chronological correlation does not necessarily imply

causation. The proponents of the theory use the meeting of Lobanov-Rostovsky and Âli Pasha on Bulgarian emigration. After that meeting, the Pasha promised that the Porte would not hinder the movement since every citizen had natural right to leave a country for another one. This attitude of non-interference is the main point of this idea. However, in previous examples, the Ottoman government had not banished its citizens from emigration, but had tried to dissuade them by assuring. In this case, the government applied the same policy to convince them to stay, and rejected existence of an agreement. The Ottoman approach to the would-be emigrants and returnees discredits the theory. However, there are some doubts since the Porte did not allow those who immigrated to Serbia, and Russian consuls openly made propagandas for emigration. Nonetheless, they are not sufficient to prove the existence of an agreement.

About the reasons of the Bulgarian migration except Russian propaganda and “pull factor”, the land issue was one of the most important factors since the majority of the migrants were from Vidin region, which can be regarded as a “push factor”. Besides, the government’s request of assistance for Muslim immigrants, official corruption and insecurity, problems in taxation and inflation caused by paper money (*kaima*) contributed to their leave. Hunger for land furnished with the Russian incentives had the biggest “pulling effect” on the migration since there were many male migrants leaving their families behind. Approximately, 12-16.000 Bulgarians, move to the Russian territories.

The last episode of the Bulgarian immigrations to Russia ended with another failure. The Russian government could invest too much money since the new reform attempts, especially abolition of serfdom, required serious amount of money. In addition, the significant reason did not originated from Russians but from themselves. The geography, climate and land did not satisfy them, nor were they motivated

sufficient reasons to emigrate, rather to find better lands. In fact, the high expectations of “pull factors” outweighed the “pushing factors” but they were not materialized.

The Ottoman government did not hesitate to accept those returnees and gave them their properties back. The Porte had paid efforts to dissuade would-be immigrants by assuring them to eliminate their complaints, it also organized the return of those who wanted. Therefore, the Porte was busy to cope with three immigrations in ten years.

Apart from the reasons and the results of the migrations, the contemporary Bulgarian intelligentsia strongly opposed to the Bulgarian immigration to Russia. The most prominent figure among them, Georgi Rakovski wrote a pamphlet named “Migration to Russia or Russian deadly policy towards Bulgarians” in which he accused Russia of benefiting from Bulgarian weak situation for her own selfish goals. Since their main concern was national liberation, the erosion of their nation in their homelands naturally raised such an opposition. Nevertheless, their thought on the issue is worth considering.

Overall, Bulgarian migration to Russia coincided with increasing rate of mobilization in Europe which peaked in the nineteenth century. The Huguenot immigration to America, Canada and other parts of Europe, the Irish immigration to America, the German migration again to America and to Russian Empire, all of them examples of that migration trend, and therefore the Bulgarian migrations should be evaluated in this context. The main factor on their migration is the population requirement of the Russian Empire to populate its southern lands. There are, of course, some reasons to push them from their homelands. However, they are not so strong to prevent them to return their homes when they were not satisfied with the

circumstances. Ottoman accusation to Russia as instigator and Russian accusation to Ottomans as oppressor are the traditional reactions of the policy-makers at that time. The historians also followed the same path ignoring the main subject of the issue who were Bulgarians. Many of them tried to use an opportunity to find a better life. Some of them were lucky enough to find a good place, some others were less fortunate than the formers who acquired what they had in previous at least. The losers of that bargain were those who perished on their way to Russia and on their way back home. The Bulgarians with their desires and expectations who ventured to migrate are the third dimension of these migration movements between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

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BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 489, Gömlek 48, 28 Muharrem 1278 (5 August 1861).

BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 502, Gömlek 83, 3 Rebiülevvel 1278 (8 September 1861).

BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 503, Gömlek 87, 30 Rebiülevvel 1278 (5 October 1861).

BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 511, Gömlek 20, 4 Rebiülahir 1278 (9 October 1861).

BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 511, Gömlek 73, 19 Rebiülahir 1278 (24 October 1861).

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BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 513, Gömlek 88, 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (5 November 1861).

BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 513, Gömlek 91, 11 Rebiülahir 1278 (16 October 1861).

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BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 522, Gömlek 48, 14 Cemaziyelevvel 1278 (17 November 1861).

BOA. A.} MKT. UM., Dosya 525, Gömlek 26, 13 Cemaziyelahir 1278 (16 December 1861).

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BOA. HAT. Dosya 1027, Gmlek 42792, 22 Őevval 1245 (16 April 1830).

BOA. HAT. Dosya 1028, Gmlek 42806, 6 Zilkade 1245 (29 April 1830).

BOA. HAT. Dosya 1034, Gmlek 42915, 29 Zilhicce 1245 (21 June 1830).

BOA. HAT. Dosya 1039, Gmlek 43027, 17 Zilkade 1245 (10 May 1830).

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BOA. HAT. Dosya 1068, Gmlek 43742, 4 Őevval 1245 (29 March 1830).

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Samples of Ottoman Documents




Figure 1: A.}MKT.UM. Dosya 468, Gömlek 89, 19 Şevval 1277: Bulgarians who wanted to immigrate to Russia were allowed, while those who wanted to immigrate to Serbia were not.

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صحة ولفزار صوم و لوم قضا الرنديه روسيه جانبه عن محمد ابراهيم بلغرادك
خانه و تقوسا رنديه بوسيله سيد ساسا رسيد اولدولاش

بلغراد صوم		
نفس	تذکره	صحة
۱۱۷	۰۴۶	۰۱۸
۱۰۵	۰۴۹	۰۱۴
۱۰۶	۰۴۸	۰۱۴
۰۴۴	۰۱۱	۰۰۶
۰۵۴	۰۱۴	۰۰۷
۲۴۴	۱۱۸	۰۵۸
۱۹۴	۰۵۰	۰۴۷
۴۵۸	۰۴۹	۰۷۴
۰۷۶	۰۴۱	۰۱۴
۰۴۹	۰۱۷	۰۰۸
۰۰۶	۰۰۴	۰۰۰
۱۴۰۴	۴۰۷	۱۸۰
۰۱۰۰	۰۴۴	۰۱۰
۰۰۸۷	۰۴۶	۰۱۰
۰۰۹۴	۰۴۷	۰۱۴
۰۰۴۱	۰۰۷	۰۰۴
۰۰۵۴	۰۱۴	۰۰۸
۱۵۵۸	۴۱۱	۴۴۷
۰۰۰۴	۰۰۴	۰۰۱
۰۰۰۱	۰۰۴	۰۰۱
۰۰۸۴	۰۴۶	۰۱۱
۰۰۴۹	۰۱۵	۰۰۷
۰۰۴۱	۰۰۷	۰۰۶
۰۰۹۴	۹۵	۰۴۹
۴۰۰۸	۵۷۸	۴۹۴

صحة		
نفس	تذکره	صحة
۴۶۰	۰۱۴	۰۲۴
۴۴۶	۰۸۱	۰۶۴
۰۵۴	۰۱۷	۰۰۹
۰۱۹	۰۴۴	۰۱۴
۰۴۸	۰۴۸	۰۱۴
۰۵۹	۰۵۹	۰۴۷
۴۰۴	۰۶۶	۰۴۷
۱۵۴۴	۴۷۸	۴۰۶

لوم

لوم		
نفس	تذکره	صحة
۴۷۶	۰۲۴	۰۴۸
۰۴۵	۰۰۴	۰۰۴
۴۴۱	۰۹۹	۰۴۹
۰۴۷	۰۱۴	۰۱۱
۱۸۹	۰۲۷	۰۴۴
۱۷۵	۰۴۰	۱۴۵
۰۱۴	۰۰۴	۰۰۴
۰۱۹	۰۰۷	۰۰۴
۱۱۹	۰۴۷	۰۴۰
۱۴۹	۰۴۷	۰۱۶
۰۱۱	۰۰۴	۰۰۴
۱۱۶۶	۴۴۶	۱۶۸
۰۴۹۴	۰۸۱	۰۴۷
۰۱۱۵	۰۰۴	۰۰۴
۰۰۰۹	۰۰۴	۰۰۱
۰۵۴۴	۱۶۴	۰۷۷
۰۰۵۷	۰۴۴	۰۴۵
۴۱۶۴	۶۴۵	۴۴۸
۰۰۱۰	۰۰۴	۰۰۴
۰۵۹۸	۱۶۴	۰۸۰
۰۰۴۸	۰۰۹	۰۰۵
۰۰۷۵	۰۴۹	۰۱۴
۰۰۷۸	۰۴۸	۰۱۱
۴۹۶۴	۱۷۸	۴۴۹
۰۴۴۵	۱۴۶	۰۵۰
۰۰۴۴	۰۱۰	۰۰۶
۰۰۱۶	۰۰۴	۰۰۴
۴۴۵۸	۱۰۱۸	۴۸۸

نفس	تذکره	صحة
۱۵۴۴	۰۴۷۸	۰۰۶
۴۰۰۹	۰۵۷۸	۴۹۴
۴۴۵۱	۱۰۱۸	۴۹۸
۶۴۹۹	۱۹۷۴	۴۹۷

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Figure 4: A.)MKT.UM. Dosya 503, Gömlek 87, 1, 10 Rebiülevvel 1278: The numbers of Bulgarian emigrants and their places. 6.999 people, 997 households from Sahra, Lom and Belgradcık.

Appendix II: Maps




Figure 6: Important cities and towns in Rumelia in the context of Bulgarian emigration.



Figure 7: Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Tauride provinces and Budjak in Bessarabia.