COLUMNISTS AS IDEA ENTREPRENEURS IN TURKEY, 1983-2007: CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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of
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İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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

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

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

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

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ABSTRACT

COLUMNISTS AS IDEA ENTREPRENEURS IN TURKEY, 1983-2007:
CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE

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The omnipotence of the state has been a dominant theme of discussions in Turkey for a long time. Though they have been a major party to these discussions due the fact that it was newspapers and periodicals that filled the large crevice left by the late development and dissemination of scholarly books in Turkey, columnists have been sorely understudied. In an attempt to help fill this void, this study discusses ten eminent Turkish columnists' conceptions of the state over a time period stretching from 1983 to 2007. Assuming columnists as 'idea entrepreneurs', who, create a sphere of influence with their ideas, and use this sphere to further create new ideas or transform existing ones thanks to networks provided by this sphere, this dissertation brings together three seemingly separate literatures on media, state and entrepreneurship. Data acquired from analysis of considerable number of columns and semi-structured elite interviews has been processed by using qualitative content analysis and archival document analysis. The data has been coded in reference to five themes: national security and survival of the state, order and stability, economy, the

shrinking state, and the rule of law. This study contributes to the literature by bringing to the fore the following results: notwithstanding intensified emphasis on liberalizing state-society relations in that time period, it first shows that the state-centered ideas set the language of politics; the press deems itself as part of this state-centered language; considerable amount of columns still teetered between transcendentalism and instrumentalism in terms of their state perceptions.

ÖZET

FİKİR MÜTEŞEBBİSLERİ OLARAK TÜRKİYE'DE KÖŞE YAZARLARI, 1983-2007: DEVLET TANIMLAMALARI

Kılıç Aslan, Ayşenur

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

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Türkiye'de devletin kadiri mutlak olma durumu en fazla tartışılan konuların başında gelmektedir. Köşe yazarları, kitap basımı ve dağıtımı konusundaki geri kalmışlığı gazetelerin ve mecmuaların doldurmuş olmasına bağlı olarak devlet tartışmalarının en önemli aktörlerinden biri olmalarına rağmen akademik anlamda en az çalışılan konuların başında gelmektedir. Bu konuda mevcut boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlayan bu çalışma, 1983-2007 döneminde yazan önde gelen on köşe yazarının devlet tanımlamalarını ele almaktadır. Bu çalışmada köşe yazarları, sıradan entelektüellerden farklı olarak fikirleriyle bir etki alanı yaratan ve bu etki alanını yeni fikirler yaratmak veya mevcut fikirleri ellerindeki etki alanlarının sağladığı ağ sayesinde dönüştürmek için kullanan 'fikir müteşebbisleri' olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Birbirlerinden ayrı üç alan gibi gözüken medya, devlet ve müteşebbislik literatürlerini birlikte ele alan bu çalışmada, çok sayıda köşe yazısından ve yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlardan elde edilen veriler, nitel içerik analizi ve arşiv belge

analizi yöntemleriyle incelenmektedir. Elde edilen veriler beş ana tema göz önünde bulundurularak kodlanmaktadır: milli güvenlik ve devletin bekası; düzen ve istikrar; ekonomi; küçülen devlet ve hukukun üstünlüğü. Bu çalışma mevcut literatüre şu sonuçlarla katkılarda bulunmaktadır: giderek liberalleşen devlet-toplum ilişkileri söylemine rağmen bu çalışma, devlet odaklı düşüncenin halen mevcut siyasetin dilini kurduğunu göstermektedir. Basın ise kendisini bu devlet odaklı dilin bir parçası olarak görmektedir. Son olarak, bu çalışmada incelenen köşe yazılarının çoğunluğunun, devlet perspektifi bakımından aşkıncılık ve araçsallık arasında kaldığı görülmektedir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: A THEORETICAL ATTEMPT FOR A NEW
CONCEPT, *IDEA ENTREPRENEUR*

1.1. Purpose of the Study

Would political analyses on international relations, American politics, on myriad of

countries, on political economy, and policy analyses be different if Walter Lippmann

–the doyen American journalist and syndicated columnist- had not coined the idea of

"*Cold War*"?[1] Would scholarship be different if Lippmann had not formulated

President Wilson's famous 'Fourteen Points' (Ritchie, 1997: 247; Meyer, 1990: xii;

Lippmann, 1998: xii) or had not mentored Lyndon Johnson on the Vietnam War?

(McPherson, 1980: 163) What if George Kennan, a former American ambassador,

did not formulate and announce the idea of containment policy[2] against Soviet

Russia in his *Foreign Affairs* article,[3] entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in

1947? (McGhee, 1990: 31) Would the course of events in the 'Cold War' era and

following political relations be different in the absence of this idea? Or what was the

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[1] It was Lippmann who first coined the statement of 'cold war' and the concept 'Atlanticist doctrine'. (Meyer, 1990: xii; LaRouche, 1977: 11)

[2] It was the idea to 'contain' Soviet expansion.

[3] Kennan wrote the article with the nickname 'Mr. X'. (McGhee, 1990: 31)

Washington Post columnists and the "debates over the cessation of the nuclear weapons tests" nexus in the 1950s? (Rosi, 1967) Would the ideational development of the notion of '*vatan*' (homeland) be different in Turkish political culture without the ideas of Namık Kemal, the Ottoman intellectual and the Reforms (*Tanzimat*) era columnist? (Özkan, 2012: 40-43)

The above-mentioned questions are asked to highlight some examples of -what I intend to claim in this study as- *idea entrepreneurs*.[4] An 'idea entrepreneur' is someone who initiates new ideas and/or reframes/reproduces existing ideas and disseminates them. The significance of an idea entrepreneur does not only underlie in initiating new ideas, reframing existing ones, and spreading them; but also in their impact on the course of events and in shaping/influencing the way we think about, understand and change the world. Therefore, idea entrepreneurs create a sphere of influence with their ideas, and use this sphere to further create new ideas or transform existing ones thanks to the networks provided by this sphere. In this sense, idea entrepreneurs have transformative effects. In this study, I attempt to focus on journalists –more specifically on newspaper columnists- among various groups of idea entrepreneurs because they form an understudied group in social sciences in general and political communication in particular.[5] The notion of *idea entrepreneur*, therefore, constitutes the theoretical frame of this research used to explain why studies in social sciences take ideas into consideration and how diffusion of ideas is significant in this field.

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[4] A detailed explanation of *idea entrepreneur* is available in Chapter 2.
[5] The inadequacies and weaknesses in existing studies on columnists will be elaborated on the section titled *Studying the Significance of Columnists* in the following chapter.

The notion of *idea entrepreneur* which is used to identify the importance of newspaper columnists has explanatory power in the Turkish context. The columnists have had an influential place in setting the political agenda, and formation of public opinion. They are not merely 'journalists' who happen to function as mediators between the state and society, but as the actors of change in processes of societal transformation. A former İstanbul correspondent of the *New York Times* newspaper, Stephen Kinzer, briefly presented the difference between a journalist and a columnist in the Turkish context: "Being a correspondent carries no value in this country [Turkey]! You are nothing until you have a column." Kinzer continues by comparing the structural differences between Turkey and the Western countries in that regard:

> Politicians do not make statements [in Turkey] as in other countries. They do not make public statements by calling a press conference. Instead they call one or two favorite columnists. They even have them come to their office or house and give them the message they wish to be disseminated. The readers get accustomed to this method. (...) When columnists change newspapers they work for, so will their readers. " (Pulur, February 19, 1998 as cited in Bali, 1999: 56)

The explanations of Ergun Göze are also significant in understanding why columnists in Turkey are more than 'being a journalist'. In his memoirs about journalism profession, he explains the significance of the columnists for a newspaper in the era of transition to free-market economy (1980s) and in the marketization of the media as a result. He expresses how well-known columnists received high transfer fees from the 'generous' media patrons: "Hasan Pulur [a Turkish columnist] narrated the transfer offer and his hesitation in this way: They approached me and left me a paper bag full of money, and my immediate thought was if they [the *Tercüman* newspaper owners] intended to hurt me." (Göze, 2007: 111) A similar example is Oktay Ekşi, who transferred from the *Hürriyet* newspaper with high amounts of transfer fees in the same years as Pulur. (Göze, 2007: 111)

Coşkun (2004) also reveals the stark difference between a correspondent (or a journalist) and a columnist based on accounts provided by Ertan Karasu, Tahir Zengingönül, and Ümit Gürtuna –experienced journalists or columnists. "While some columnists and television managers were paid exorbitant sums, the young correspondents used to work under poor conditions on low payments and no union rights." (Coşkun, 2004: 168) These accounts also illustrate how a central and vital role is ascribed to the columnist. "Reporting is the essence of journalism. Correspondents are like the capillaries of the body. They carry oxygen. The heart [on the other hand] is the columnist." (Coşkun, 2004: 334)

Beside purely professional interest media owners had in columnists, the latter has been important in the Turkish context due to peculiar socio-political developments. One of these developments is the late development of press (printing houses) and therefore of scientific understanding in the Ottoman-Turkish society compared to the Western societies.[6] (Koloğlu, 1987: 257-258; Akyol, August 16, 2004) The intellectual gap stimulated certain actors to lead the ideational transformation in the society. Not only in the Ottoman society but also in the early Turkish Republican era, the columnists have represented this transformative role as 'teachers' and new 'models' of the newly established regime and for the newly 'modernizing' ('Westernizing') Turkish society.

Bali (2013) explains the contextual difference between the West and Turkey in terms of the agents of opinion formation and of change by referring to the transformation

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[6] The late development of press in the Ottoman society will be elaborated on later in this chapter.

of media especially in 1990s in Turkey. He pinpoints that as a result of the economic regime changes with the free market economy starting with Turgut Özal in 1980s, the Turkish society has started to experience a new form of lifestyle which was promoting consumption and a consumer society. The columnists in this time period have adopted the role of transformative actors in society. They appeared as the models of this particular lifestyle, and as the 'teachers' or 'leaders' to show the Turkish society 'how to be one of the new (American) type of (consumer) citizen'. Bali expresses this new role columnists acquired by addressing them '*the new aristocrats*' since they have started to feel themselves as the new elite class of the society with their new lifestyle (of consumption) and making the society follow.

Not only economic developments but also socio-political contextual differences among Anglo-Saxon, continental European, and Turkish societies are also influential in locating the significance and functions of media actors differently. These differences also result in the settlement of different models in these countries. As will be discussed in the following chapter, three main media models (Anglo-American/liberal and information-based, continental European/democratic corporatist and commentary-based, and Mediterranean European/polarized pluralist and mostly commentary-based) pave the way for different media practices, and diverge standing points of the newspaper columnists in each model. Overall, due to economic, sociological, and political developments in the Turkish case, the columnists have acquired a *sui generis* position in opinion formation, in influencing the society, and setting the political language and mentality to a certain extent, and this position can be an issue of comparison for some groups –such as think tanks and

intellectuals- in other societies who/which act significantly in the ideational transformation of the society.

Though the research framework was set through the single case of Turkish newspaper columnists as idea entrepreneurs, the theoretical tool of idea entrepreneurial activity is not restricted with the single case. Instead, it paves the way for a comparative analysis in different contexts and among different groups. The functions and impact of newspaper columnists in Turkey might be comparable to think tanks, experts, and public intellectuals in the West because in their particular contexts, all of them have a certain influence and active roles in the formation of public opinion, in spreading various ideas in the society, and in forming the political discourse. The reason why the influence and role of newspaper columnists seem to be equivalent to different actors such as think tanks and intellectuals in the West can be explained in historical and sociological grounds as discussed before. The long-winded echoes of Francis Fukuyama's post-Cold War thesis about the 'end of history' in the Western societies are an illustrating example for a comparative analysis of different groups of idea entrepreneurs in diverse contexts in setting the discourse and mentality of politics.

As seen in the examples and discussions above, the columnists in Turkey occupy a considerable place not only in the media sector, but also in economy, society, and overall politics. Different from 'ordinary' journalists, reporters, and correspondents, columnists have a notable function in steering the public debates, and influencing the politics and society with their ideas presented via their newspaper columns.

In revisiting the notion of idea entrepreneur, however, one may pose the criticism that columnists can be spin-doctors but not idea entrepreneurs. *Spin doctoring* basically refers to public opinion formation role of media or of political actors; however, as Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey, and Richardson cite (2005: 252) spin doctoring has a "strongly pejorative implication" in the sense of not only managing but also manipulating the news agenda. A spin-doctor, thus, is described as someone "who tries to influence public opinion by putting a favourable bias on information presented to the public or to the media." (Franklin et al., 2005: 252) Therefore one can argue that the newspaper columnists as spin-doctors may manipulate public opinion –generally in favour of politicians or of media owners- instead of initiating and spreading ideas in the public as argued earlier.

The widely known 'spin doctors of Tony Blair' may illustrate this argument better. Alastair Campbell, Blair's press secretary and 'political aide' in 1997-2003, provides an apt example of spin doctoring in this sense. Campbell was accused of being a 'monstrous hypocrite' and 'Blair's-liar-in-chief' (Adams, 2016, July 8), especially considering his function in the reports on the Iraq war in 2003. Benjamin Wegg-Prosser was another spin-doctor for Blair. The recent columns have indicated that his 'impact' (or spin doctoring to a relative extent) on politics still continues. It is claimed that the new anti-Corbyn group is funded by him. (Syal, September 21, 2016) These might be interpreted as the countering examples of taking columnists as idea entrepreneurs, because they display how journalists may be instrumentally used by politicians to 'falsify', 'change', or sometimes 'distort' the public agenda. However, spin doctoring can also be assessed as a powerful example of idea entrepreneurial activity.

The term 'spin doctor' as an idea or a concept initially appeared in some newspaper columns. In other words, the idea of a spin doctor itself illustrates dissemination of new ideas and concepts via the press. The term 'spin' initially appeared in a *Guardian Weekly* article in January 22, 1979; and the phrase of 'spin doctor' first appeared in a *New York Times* editorial commenting in October 21, 1984. (Esser, 2008: 4783) Yet the term is also used by the media to criticize journalists for having inappropriately close and partial relations with politicians.

This study acknowledges the critical approach toward the journalists' roles and functions in which the 'agency' of the journalist might be questionable in some cases - spin doctoring is one of them. The influence of media on politics and society has not always been in the affirmative. Similarly, with the idea of idea entrepreneur, this study does not attribute an always-positive function to the media. The idea entrepreneurial activity is not independent from the socio-political context either. Nonetheless, the context-dependency of idea entrepreneurs –columnists in this case-does not trivialize the significance and impact of them in socio-political milieu. It is possible to see this significance in the counter examples.

Although spin doctoring is a critical example for the main argument of this study, spin doctoring also illustrates that it is the media actors' themselves who made the spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, resign in July 2003. His resignation in 29 July 29, 2003 followed "a very public row with the BBC about the Corporations reporting of the Iraq, the death of scientist Dr. David Kelly and the establishment of the Hutton Inquiry". (Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey, & Richardson, 2005: 199) To put it

differently, though the spin doctoring might be considered as an example contradicting the role attributed to columnists as idea entrepreneurs on the one hand, the Campbell case shows that even the act of spin doctoring can be thwarted by the critical role of media. In this sense, it is possible to argue that media function in public opinion formation in either negative or constructive ways. Yet, this study does not seek to identify which idea entrepreneurial activities function contructively or negatively. Instead, this study claims and tries to analyze the entrepreneurial activities of newspaper columnists, and public opinion formation is among the issues discussed throughout the research.

Several examples can be given to the latter role underlined in this research. For instance, the famous *Zincirbozan Mektupları* [Zincirbozan Letters][7] presents a good example. In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, Süleyman Demirel –a politician and former president of Turkey- was politically banned, and he was sent to prison in *Zincirbozan*, a district of *Çanakkale* city in Turkey. It was Nazlı Ilıcak, who corresponded with Demirel, and penned/transferred Demirel's claims to the public via her columns. She did not publish Demirel's name in the texts, but became the invisible 'tool', 'bridge,' or 'mediator' for Demirel to reach the public. The example is open for discussions in terms of the flow of influence in the interaction of media-politics and the society.

A critical stance would criticize Ilıcak as functioning as the (invisible) spin-doctor of Demirel to a certain extent, and as distorting –or at least, not being explicit enough-

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[7] The letters were later collected and published into a book. Please see: Ilıcak, N. (1990). *Zincirbozan Mektupları: Demirel'den Nazlı Ilıcak'a, Nazlı Ilıcak'tan Demirel'e*. [Zincirbozan Letters: From Demirel to Nazlı Ilıcak, from Nazlı Ilıcak to Demirel]. İstanbul: Dem.
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the information provided for the public. Most probably Ilıcak herself was feeling that

she was achieving a democratic task by eluding the harsh restrictions of the post-

coup era on politicians, and transmitting the necessary messages to the public. It is

possible to derive this conclusion from the interview with Ilıcak:

> Süleyman Demirel was sent to Zincibozan and we were corresponding. The letters
> were being delivered by hand. At that time he [Demirel] was dealing with
> establishing the Doğruyol Party [the Truepath Party]. He was giving some
> messages and I was penning these messages in my column. Of course, I could not
> have written them by giving the name of Demirel because there was the martial
> law and its' prohibitions at that time. Well, I was publishing the messages
> without giving a name, and sharing them with the public in plain language so that
> the public could understand. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 17,
> 2013)

The example above indicates that Ilıcak as a columnist disseminates the ideas of an

influential politician, Demirel, in order to set the public forum eligible for the

establishment of a new political party. Different interpretations of this case leave the

way for diverge discussions in analyzing media-politics-society interaction. This

study starts without degrading the other possibilities in terms of media influence, but

it does not claim to 'measure' the complex nature, flow, and degree of this

interaction. Therefore, neither spin doctoring nor idea entrepreneurship proposes a

homogeneous example in understanding the flow of influence in the sophisticated

picture of political communication. Nonetheless, both spin doctoring and idea

entrepreneurial activities set the language of politics in different ways. The

boundaries of spin doctoring and idea entrepreneurship overlap in setting the

language of politics; but the critical stance appears when the media actors themselves

become an embedded part of this already set language. As a result, the agency of

idea entrepreneurs turns into an issue of inquiry.

Within the scope of the given theoretical concept, idea entrepreneur, my main research question is how idea entrepreneurs conceive the state in Turkey. The focus of this study consists of ten leading newspaper columnists in Turkey who have penned for different national newspapers, which represent a sample of diverse political affiliations or cliques in Turkish politics. Their newspaper columns in the 1983-2007 era constitute the basic research material. These 'texts' were analysed through qualitative content analysis technique and the results were cross-checked by the semi-structured in-depth interviews with the columnists. The following table illustrates the research material in detail.

Table 1. Information on the research material.

Analyzed Newspaper Columnists	Analyzed Texts (Newspapers & Magazines)	Critical Junctures in 1983-2007 (7 General Elections + 2 critical events)
• Taka Akyol • Şahin Alpay • Ahmet Altan* • Cüneyt Arcayürek* • Mehmet Barlas • Hasan Cemal* • Cengiz Çandar • Emin Çölaşan • Fehmi Koru • Nazlı Ilıcak *no interview	• Akşam • Cumhuriyet • Sabah • Hürriyet • Milliyet • Tercüman • Yeni Yüzyıl • Güneş • Yeni Şafak • Radikal • Referans • Star • Zaman • Türkiye • Yeni Gündem** • Yankı** **Magazine	• 1983, November 6 • 1987, November 29 • 1991, October 20 • 1995, December 24 • 1999, April 18 • 2002, November 3 • 2007, July 22 • 1996, November 3 (The Susurluk Incident) • 1997, February 28 (The 'post-modern coup')

The sample is presumed representative enough in meeting the criteria of 'being an idea entrepreneur'. At the beginning of this chapter, I have noted the basic characteristics of an idea entrepreneur. To repeat, an idea entrepreneur initiates new ideas, reproduces the existing ideas in different ways, and disseminates these in order to create a sphere of influence. An idea entrepreneur benefits from this chamber he himself helped to create to reproduce ideas by means of the networks s/he has. All in all, an idea entrepreneur should introduce new or alternative ideas, spread them in the society, acquire networks, and use these networks in disseminating ideas and in influencing the public. Before I elaborate on conducting the coding process used in this research, I would like to give some explanation why the selected columnists were assumed as meeting entrepreneurship criteria at the beginning of this research. [8]

Three of the selected columnists functioned as 'pundits' of two former presidents of Turkey. Cengiz Çandar, Mehmet Barlas, and Cüneyt Arcayürek were the advisors to Turgut Özal, when he was Prime Minister and later President, and Süleyman Demirel. Thus these columnists had the chance to set the political agenda of these political actors. The close relations between Nazlı Ilıcak and Demirel have already been discussed. Ilıcak was also benefitting from the networks of Kemal Ilıcak, her husband and former owner of Tercüman newspaper in 1970s and 80s, in influencing and shaping the public, politicians, and the media. Barlas' influential networks are explained by himself in a Parlimanetary Inquiry Commission report. When asked by a parliamentarian during his interview in the commission who he was to be able to

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[8] Further elaboration and some other criteria for the case selection are discussed in Chapter 3, methodology section.

take Ecevit to Demirel to facilitate their dialogue amid chaos before 1980 coup,

Barlas said:

> When İsmet İnönü was still the president, he used to play marbles with my younger brother in our house. Turgut Özal was my friend even before he became an undersecretary [in the State Planning Organization] and later prime minister. Ecevit [Bülent] was working in my father's newspaper as far back as in 1954. Meaning that, if you had these relations, you would also call Ecevit and say 'let's go!' or wind your arms around Özal's shoulders while walking. All of them were my friends, do you see? Just before a week, Süleyman Demirel called me just last week and asked how I was. (October 4, 2012: 13-14)[9]

Fehmi Koru sets an interesting example of being an idea entrepreneur. Throughout

his professional career, he penned some columns by using some 'nicknames',

starting with the name of 'Bülent Şirin', then 'Taha Kıvanç'. For him, these were the

initial attempts of a new style of column writing, which he addresses as 'kulis

gazeteciliği' (backstage journalism). (Kalyoncu, March 11, 2000) He claims that this

new style was introduced by him in the Turkish press. Besides, it is worthy of asking

that would Fehmi Koru make such efforts and pen two columns concurrently if being

a newspaper columnists were not so influential in Turkish society? In the same

Parliamentary Inquiry Report, a parliamentarian sitting in the commission

commented to Hasan Cemal's face that 'his [Cemal's] past writings in the

Revolution magazine [*Devrim Dergisi*] influenced a generation', albeit adds that he

himself read Cemal's pieces in that journal without agreeing with Cemal's thinking.

(October 8, 2012: 7-8)[10] It may be assumed that someone who was reportedly able to

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[9] TBMM Araştırma komisyonu raporları [The reports of inquiry of the Turkish Grand National Assembly]. (2012, May 2- November 28). Retrieved from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/04.10.2012/Mehmet-Canan%20Barlas-04.10.2012.pdf

[10] TBMM Araştırma komisyonu raporları [The reports of inquiry of the Turkish Grand National Assembly]. (2012, May 2- November 28). Retrieved from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/08.10.2012/Hasan%20Cemal-08.10.2012.pdf

influence a generation with his ideas would have more chance than anybody else to continue to create an area of influence when he turned a regular columnist.

The selected columnists display the significant networks they had in relation to major political actors. These columnists have benefitted from these networks to further and spread their ideas, thoughts, and tendencies. In other words, the group of columnists selected for this study do not consist of 'fringe journalists' but those at the epicenter of Turkey's power relations, which in corollary strengthened the impact of their columns. Çölaşan was among the few columnists who were able to get acquaintance with powerful generals of the late 1990s and stir and contribute to ongoing political debates of the time. (October 3, 2012: 24-25)[11]. This shows that these columnists' spaces in their newspapers were accentuated not only thanks to their possible relationship with politicians but also due to their connections to other political actors, most prominently the military. Others, however, too were at the centre of political developments in the same decade and after as well, though on the other end of spectrum drawing the generals' ire. For instance, a newspaper editor described the Altan family, Cengiz Çandar, Mehmet Barlas among others (Gülay Göktürk, Mehmet Ali Birand, and Can Ataklı) as the "famous infidels" of the era in the eyes of the military, a powerful political actor. (October 5, 2012: 18)[12] I In an indication of recognition of this role possessed by these columnists that the American Embassy

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[11] TBMM Araştırma komisyonu raporları [The reports of inquiry of the Turkish Grand National Assembly]. (2012, May 2- November 28). Retrieved from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/03.10.2012/Ertu%C4%9Frul%20%C3%96zk%C3%B6k-03.10.2012.pdf

[12] TBMM Araştırma komisyonu raporları [The reports of inquiry of the Turkish Grand National Assembly]. (2012, May 2- November 28). Retrieved from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/28_subat_alt_komisyonu/05.10.2012/Zafer%20Mutlu-05.10.2012.pdf

was in contact with ""Tercüman" columnist Cengiz Çandar" (in addition to Akif Beki, Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, Cüneyt Ülsever) to be better informed about army and politics relations in Turkey in 2003.[13] The explanations indicate that the sample columnists befit with my description of idea entrepreneurship.

1.2. The Scope of the Study

The coding process conducted in this research accentuated five basic themes according to which data are analysed. These themes are some of the most emphasized issues appearing in columns as these ten columnists were defining or portraying the state in Turkey in a particular manner. These five themes are: national security and survival of the state; order and stability; economy; the rule of law; and the shrinkage of the state. I try to elaborate on these themes by digging for their political-historical explanations. I argue that among many alternatives, three analytical tools (or legacies) are worthy of consideration in order to elaborate on the five themes: first, *how to save the state* that originates from the Ottoman era and passes into the Turkish Republic; second, modernization in the form of *Westernization*; and third, the omnipresence and overweight of the state sphere over the political sphere, which again emanates from the Ottoman state legacy for the Turkish state.

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[13] TBMM Araştırma komisyonu raporları [The reports of inquiry of the Turkish Grand National Assembly]. (2012, May 2- November 28). Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03ANKARA2521_a.html

Based on the historical and theoretical explanations on Westernization, protecting the state, and the state's omnipresence in the political sphere, the results make a significant contribution to the scholarship. The prior themes appear in the columns indicate that the media (press) considers itself as a part of this central role assigned to the state. The criticisms remain restricted mostly to criticisms of particular governments' policies or specific political actors, whereas the locus of the state remains almost untouched –except a few criticisms in a limited number of columns. In this sense, the columns seem to be the appendages to the body of the state-centered discourse, and nourish the dominant place/status and boundaries of the state. To put it differently, although the media's impact and functions in Turkey are similar to those in other democratic regimes in terms of its agenda-setting role, and acting as a watchdog over governmental power, its influence remains restriced when the issue is the state. Moreover, the newspaper columns do not reflect a linear change in terms of advance of liberal ideas. Especially in 2000s, the last decade examined in the research, even though the columnists have started to beam a liberal outlook in state-society relations (e.g. 'the state is not a 'father' anymore' but it is in the service of the people'), they continued to oscillate between transcendentalism and instrumentalism. Although the emphasis on the state as 'apparatus' in the service of the people is available in the texts, considerable number of columns either focus on collective interests rather than individual priorities or their emphases remain only rhetorical tools without internal consistency or devoid of theoretical depth. Fourth, the state-individual interaction mostly remains as an overlooked issue in the columns as it has been in Turkish political life.

The significance of media in general and newspaper columnists in particular does not only underlie in their theoretical position as idea entrepreneurs. In everyday politics, and in any sort of political regime and/or country, media do function in several distinct ways. This paper attempts to accentuate this significance by proposing the following functions of media in socio-political environments. In democracies, media provides the mediating tools between the government and the society/public. The watch-dog role is therefore appraised for the media in order to provide control mechanisms over the potential misuse or abuse of political power. This explains why media are generally addressed as the 'fourth power' behind the three branches of government- executive, legislature, and judiciary. More generally, in a democratic regime, some of the functions of the press can be listed as having a watchdog role, guard dog role, guide dog role, and lap dog role. (Gunther & Mughan, 2000: 273) These three analogies –guard dog, guide dog, and lap dog- made by Gunther and Mughan underline alternative perspectives to the role of the media in different political regimes. They provide an alternative understanding to the frequently referenced term –the watchdog role of the media. For example, guard dog role refers to the media model that exists in authoritarian regimes wherein journalists may be "guarding" the rulers' policies as opposed to the watch dog role found in democracies, where media functions to check government policies to inform the public and safeguard rights. In other words, watch dog role renders a social responsibility position for the media and it generally exists in democratic countries.[14]

The abovementioned characteristics, criticisms, and different approaches to media have already been comprehensively discussed in different fields (Esser and Pfetsch,

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[14] For further information on the variety of roles of the media in a democratic regime, please see: Hallin & Mancini, 2004, and theories of media section in this paper.

2004; Craig, 2004; Boltanski, 2004; Axford and Huggins, 2001; Bayram, 2010; Couldry and Curran, 2003; Curran and Seaton, 1997). However, there is almost no focused study on columnists. In 1990s, Meyer pointed out that studies on columnists are too scarce. He could find only two relevant books: Charles Fisher's *The Columnists* (New York, 1944), and Neil A. Grauer's *Wits and Sages* (Baltimore, 1984). (Meyer, 1990: 450) Little to none has changed in almost three decades after Meyer's study. One may find plenty of sources on journalists or on media in general; but very few on columnists. Those sources that exist, however, remain extensively biographical studies about eminent columnists in different countries. (Coşkun, 2003; Coşkun, 2004; Coşkun, 2005; Esendir, 2007; LaRouche, 1977; Alsop and Platt, 2009; Steel, 1981) Some others are not studies on columnists per se either; they just allocated very limited space to this group as opinion makers, pundits, journalists, or persuaders within their books. This study does not intend to duplicate the results of already-existing studies on media, but to draw attention to this inadequately studied group within media.

The present study suggests that it would have been incomplete if researchers discuss media in general and columnists in particular only for the influence of mass media, public opinion formation, and their impact on electoral campaigns. There is already a vast and noteworthy literature on mass media and political communication, as listed in previous sections; however, an individual level of scholarly analysis focusing merely on columnists is too scarce. Most studies that exist evaluate columnists as "journalists" and continue their assessments in this limited niche. However, even relatively older studies (Katz; 1989; Bourdieu, 1998a: 73-77) showed that a columnist is more than 'a journalist'. In the literature, there is a wide range of

evaluations of columnists as "pundits" (Ritchie, 1997: 243-247; Meyer, 1990; Alterman, 1999; Besteman and Gusterson, 2005: 3), "new aristocrats" (Bali, 2013: 202; Bali, 1999), "non-governmental individual elites" (Rosi, 1967), "reference individuals" (Rosi, 1967), "persuaders" (Ghiglione, 1990), "doxosophers" (Bourdieu, 1998a), 'semi-official public philosophers'[15], and capitalistic entrepreneurs (Bourdieu, 1998b: 5, 68). However, this gamut of references to columnists remains very limited within corresponding texts. In addition, columnists are opinion makers, opinion leaders[16] -but most importantly- *idea entrepreneurs*, as this study puts forward. This study intends to delve into this particular group amongst influential actors in politics (and in society) –columnists. One of the main arguments of this study is that columnists are not merely journalists, but they are *idea entrepreneurs* because they 'innovate' new ideas and spread them.[17] It is for this reason that they deserve particular interest in the field of academia.

1.3. Significance of the Study

Having said that, what is the significance of studying columnists? What can be its theoretical contribution to scholarship? To start with, studying columnists may make a theoretical contribution if they are handled as idea entrepreneurs. Through this concept and by benefiting from the new institutionalist perspectives on the

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[15] It was used to address Walter Lippmann in Alterman (1999: 22).

[16] Paul Lazarsfeld is acknowledged as the first person who used the term 'opinion leader' in his book *The People's Choice* in 1944. (Katz, 2015: 1023)

[17] Not only innovation of new ideas or their dissemination but also further characteristics and significance of idea entrepreneurs that will be elaborated on later in Chapter 2.

importance of ideas, I will present my supplementary arguments that: a) idea and dissemination of an idea is a value; b) since columnists are innovators of new ideas and they diffuse them, they should be evaluated as the entrepreneurs of the idea.

The second reason for the significance of this research is related to the single-case that is tackled in this research –the columnists in Turkey. As I have previously introduced his explanations, Koloğlu pinpointed that in comparison to the European societies, the development of scholarly books was late -at the societal level- in the Eastern and Ottoman societies (In the Ottoman Empire, this development was also strongly related with the late emergence of publishing houses.) It was periodicals and newspapers that mitigated this intellectual gap inherited due to absence of scientific publications. Due to the lack of scholarly publications (books and encyclopedias), in Eastern and Ottoman societies all of the similar functions of books -such as development of science and the adoption of a scientific approach within the society- were replaced by newspapers and periodicals (Koloğlu, 1987: 257-258).[18] Therefore, it is fair to argue that this legacy from Ottoman societies to Turkish Republic has kept its significance in the sense that columnists (and newspapers) have gained additional functions (and ensuing influence in return) when compared with Europe.

Not only in terms of flourishing scientific approach among the people, but also for enhancing a 'civil societal' environment –not in a European sense though- and providing a platform for forming public opinion, coffeehouses were complementary to the media (newspapers) in Ottoman societies. In other words, many different actors –media, intellectuals, and coffeehouses- have supplementary functions in

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[18] Similarly, Orlin Sabev also talks about this gap. "Given such a reading public and taste in books, İbrahim Müteferrika definitely filled a gap by printing dictionaries first." (2007: 77)

these societies when compared with Europe. Coffeehouses appear and function as the space of public communication and the link between the political and the sociocultural. (Yaşar, 2009: 41, 42; Kömeçoğlu, 2009: 69) The downstairs of *Sarafim Efendi Kıraathanesi* [The Coffeehouse of Sarafim Efendi] –which opened in 1857- for example was operating as a publishing house. (Kömeçoğlu, 2009: 70) In these kinds of coffeehouses (and 'publishing houses' at the same time), newspapers and other periodicals were accessible for the public and the intellectuals. (Kömeçoğlu, 2009: 70) In brief, both coffeehouses (as a space) and columnists (as an actor) function as the public reason, rationality, and catalysts of socialization in mass communication in Ottoman and Eastern societies.

This research stands in the intersection of two important elements in Turkish politics: media and the state. Media as a group of idea entrepreneurs and the state as a 'conceptual variable' (Nettl, 1968) constitute two main axes of this study. The role of media has already been briefly introduced. Beside media, the state in Turkey deserves particular attention since it has been not the sole but a recurrent factor in influencing and shaping the ideas and behaviours of the corresponding actants. Yet, this process of effecting and shaping has not been a one-way flow dictated by the state toward the actants, but a complex one in which various actants also play roles in perpetuating the state's power and influence in politics.

In 2011, then-Minister of the Interior, İdris Naim Şahin stated that "the state is order, the state is law, the state is hierarchy, the state is property, the state is honour,

education, health, overall the state is the life itself."[19] (*Radikal*, December 26, 2011)

The 'correct' and 'clarify' his argument, "We do not adopt an idea that exalts or enshrine the state vis-à-vis the citizen" Şahin later stated in an interview. "But" he continued, "We oppose the efforts which tries to trample on and devalue the state. Above all, we are against the efforts which try to destroy the notion of the state." And "Let the people live, so that the state lives. If you tumble the state, who will guarantee freedoms" he concludes. (S. Şimşek, personal communication, January 9, 2012)[20] In a film (also known as one of the most watched TV series in Turkey), *Kurtlar Vadisi: Pusu*, the leading character in a courtroom scene says, "If the fatherland is in jeopardy, the rest is trivial."[21]

What is the nexus between the two examples above? These are not randomly selected popular culture products, but the examples of centrality of the state in the everyday language of the society. The state-centered approaches form the daily language in socio-political milieu. Both the minister's statements which assign a central and dominating role for the state in the entire 'life' of the citizens, and the films that highlight the secondary significance (actually, 'insignificance') of citizens in the face of the state and the 'homeland' point at a particular relationship between the state and the society. In this interaction, the exaltedness of the state has the

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[19] Let me note the original quotation to highlight the lingual and contextual emphasis. "Devlet düzendir, devlet hukutur, devlet hiyerarşidir, devlet mülkiyettir, devlet namustur, devlet özgürlüktür, eğitimdir, sağlıktır, devlet hayatın ta kendisidir."

[20] The interview is available in www.t24.com.tr/haber/idris-naim-sahin-fasist-iddialarını-yanitladi,190754

[21] The information on the film is accessible through www.imdb.com

utmost importance while significance and priority of 'the rest' (including citizens,

institutions, non-state actors, so on and so forth) depend on the circumstances.[22]

As the examples illustrate, the state-oriented ideas set the frames of political

language in Turkey. This language shows itself in its embeddedness and

omnipresence of the state in the daily rhetoric and mentality of the people. The

construction and maintenance of these frames are by dint of several factors, and

actors. Politicians, state institutions, non-state organizations, and media adopt

influential roles in framing and maintaining the state-centered discourses.

Among the various actants which/who have played influential roles in Turkish

society, I focused on the particular group of newspaper columnists as idea

entrepreneurs. The underlying reasons of this sample selection are many and some of

them have already been discussed above. The sophisticated nature of media-politics

interplay, the inadequacy of studies on columnists in the fields of either political

science or communication, scant assessment of ideational analysis on this particular

group, and a lack of an ideational-analytical perspective on the state from the lenses

of an interdisciplinary research can be cited as some of the further reasons.

The contribution of this research rests on its tripartite analysis of three separate but

interconnecting theories: theories of media, theories of state, and theories of

entrepreneurship. Although these appear to be separate literatures, this paper

attempts to reveal their interconnection with specific emphasis on the conceptual tool

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[22] This argument will be elaborated on via the term *procrastination* in Chapter 4, Theme 1&2.

of idea entrepreneurship. Therefore the thesis asks the already noted research question: how do newspaper columnists as idea entrepreneurs conceive the state in Turkey?

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework that guided this study. Since this research consists of three separate but interacting theories, this chapter is organized in three sub-sections. First, existing discussions on state in Turkey are overviewed within the framework of theories of state. Therefore, an overview of the theoretical framework of state tradition in general and state-society relations in particular in Turkey is presented. Turkey experienced a *sui generis* state formation process in comparison to European states. This chapter tries to review its *sui generis* feature derived from the Ottoman state legacy. The cleavages between the state and the society constitute the core of this overview. The transcendentalist state conception in Turkey has made some political concepts more apparent in discussions: the continuity of the state, the supreme interests of the state, and the exalted state, and stateness. Secondly, in this chapter, theories of media are reviewed via different models of media. Three basic models come to the fore in these discussions: Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean, and continental European. Different journalistic practices such as information-based journalism, and commentary-based journalism are examined in accordance with these models. The chapter ends up with important evaluations of the media in Turkey.

Chapter 3 details methodological considerations and clarifies how the research was conducted. Adopting a qualitative ecole attitude, the single case study of Turkish press is analysed with a triangular method of qualitative content analysis, archival

document analysis, and semi-structured elite interviews. Subsequent to the rationale of case selection and coding frames, the chapter elaborates on the logic of time frame selection and the historical luggage of this time period in Turkish political life. Therefore, the 1983-2007 time period is examined as three decades -1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and in line with nine critical junctures. This part finally discusses some limitations and potential criticisms the researcher encountered during the conduct of the study.

Chapter 4 analyses data in five main themes derived out of data: national security and survival of the state, order and stability, economy, the shrinking state, and the rule of law. These themes are discussed in a consecutive order of 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Starting from economic liberalization initiated in 1980s, the results try to show which factors are more explicatory in answering the main research questions. Based on the theoretical grounds pointed out in previous two chapters, this part figures out the evidence from the texts (newspaper columns and interviews). 1980s are analyzed basically in terms of new economic model and the reactions to statism. The main reference for the debates in the 1990s is shaped by arguments such as 'deep state' and 'rottenness' of the state. Changing characteristics of state understanding and evolving state-society relations mark the decade of the 2000s. The final part of the chapter discusses issues of change, rupture, and/or continuity in the state understandings of the columnists.

Concluding chapter reviews the research outputs and evaluates the theoretical tool of idea entrepreneur in Turkish context. Therefore, the five main themes of data are reviewed. The results are also discussed in terms of the questionable strength of

agency the idea entrepreneurs propose in the single case study. It also raises some questions for future studies and makes some suggestions for comparative work that can utilize the concept of idea entrepreneur. It propounds some prospects for future research not only in terms of political communication and media studies but also for evaluating changing dynamics of state-society relations in Turkey. These dynamics are assessed in line with recent socio-political events and political actors in Turkey.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The tripartite analysis used in this study necessitates clarifying three theoretical backgrounds as in the following. The first part explains the theoretical grounds of media-politics interaction. Second subsection proposes the prominence of studying ideas, and reviews overlooked points in the literature on ideational analysis. Then it proposes main arguments of this research within the framework of idea entrepreneurship. Third, theories of state are scrutinized as they provide necessary grounds for data analysis. Each theoretical explanation concludes with assessments on the Turkish case.

2.1. Theories (Models) of Media

2.1.1. The Role of Media and Significance of Columnists

From introductory textbooks to extensive communication studies (including the sub-field of political communication), one of the basic functions assigned to media in a democratic regime is having a watchdog role, that is to surveil the government for

the 'good' of the society and to prevent misuse of political power.[23] Burke's

reference to the media ('printing') as the 'fourth estate' also refers to this watchdog

role over the other three branches of government and the power/influence of media

that is almost equal to the other branches of political power. (Carlyle, 2001:189)[24]

The characteristic example of the watchdog role is the Watergate scandal revealed by

two journalists – Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward- that resulted with the

resignation of President Nixon in 1974 due to his corruption allegations.[25]

Another ideal role assigned to media is to educate the people in –especially new-

democracies by providing information and a civic platform (the 'teacher' role of

media may not always contribute to so-called democratic ends though). It is fair to

argue that beside these two positions, media (may) have numerous functions and

roles that are not always serving democratic practices. Yet, a total media-dubious

attitude while analysing media's influence on democracy would not be a fair

evaluation. This dichotomous situation about the role of media in a democracy leads

us to the argument that different interpretations of media result in diverge appraisal

of media-politics relations. In this regard, various models or approaches of media

bring different arguments about the relationship between media and politics in

general; and media and people in particular. For example, according to pluralistic

models, media are an area in which different ideas and ideologies are represented,

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[23] For other functions of media in democratic regimes, please see: Gunther & Mughan, 2000: 273; Hallin &Mancini, 2004; and the introduction part in this paper.

[24] Although Burke referred to three socio-political groups in the Parliament, namely 'the lords, scholars and the clergy' (Talhami, 2010: 2) and then printing as the fourth power, in the original 'Fourth estate' quotation; his statement was later interpreted that following from the three juridical powers (branches) of government (legislature, executive, judiciary), media constitute the fourth power which is able to surveil the other three.

[25] For the details of the incident, please see: Woodward and Bernstein, 2006, and Stacks, 2005.

and the public may adopt whatever they feel themselves closer to. In this sense, media *per se* do not shape people's mind; but they just represent/reflect what already exists in the society. (Heywood, 2013: 181; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Curran and Seaton, 2003: 323-325) Hence it is possible to argue that pluralistic models attribute a positive role of media to the media-democracy relationship. (Norris, 2004: 115; Heywood, 2013: 179) On the contrary, for critical mass media theorists, media are the 'tools of control and mass obedience' (Taylor and Harris, 2008: 93). There are some other models that assess media by different criteria such as location (geographical structural differences in media models), political regime, political economic structure (whether the media are state-driven or market-led), media effects, so on and so forth. Siebert et al.'s (1956) study is a seminal example that classifies media as 'authoritarian', 'libertarian', 'communist', and 'social responsibility' models. (Kleinsteuber, 2004: 66; Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 6)[26] In the light of different interpretations of media (media in a democracy, as a case in point here), I can very briefly argue that, media may function in both ways in terms of democratic means and ends. The effects such as framing, priming, agenda-setting (Weaver, 2007); electoral support for politicians on the stump; manipulation of the consent (of people); and providing propaganda may function bilaterally (either for or against) in a democratic regime.

Before I discuss particular significance of studying columnists, it is better first to provide the panorama of different approaches to media in varying contexts. There are

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[26] Not only these main theoretical approaches, but also the socio-political context that a particular media model flourishes in can explain this diversity in evaluating media. Within the context, there might be different practices of professionalization of journalism, varying degrees of freedom of press, and organic connections between media and politicians which can be some of the variables explaining different models of media. For a well-detailed study on the issue: Hallin, Daniel C., and Mancini, Paolo. 2004. *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. It will be revised in the following sub-section, too.

as many countries in the world as the media models. Changing dynamics –both indigenous and exogenous- in a country might bring forward a *sui generis* type of media. The relations between political actors and media actors; cross-ownership of media patrons; the linkages between media actants and economic actants; the relationship between the sender (channels of media) and the receiver (audience/public/people); and the perception of the receiver though the lenses of political and media actants are nothing scant examples of factors that frame the prevailing media model in a country. Different theories of media take different and varying criteria into consideration. For example, normative theories of media are basically framed through the relationship between media and the government. Therefore, they juxtapose liberal, authoritarian, and socialist theories of media. (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, 1956) On the contrary, a different categorization of media models appears if –for instance- professionalization of journalism, journalistic autonomy, and political culture account for the factors shaping media models. (Hallins and Mancini, 2004)

In the following sections, I will discuss theories of media in three main groups. It needs to be reminded that these three imaginary categories are meant to make the explanations easier to follow for the reader; however, some approaches are also available in the literature that contain all of the three categories -which have blurry distinctions. First group examines general theories of communication that include normative theories and the theories of geo-political classifications. With normative theories, alleged 'positions and responsibilities' of media are discussed. This group is mainly based on the propositions of *Four Theories of the Press* that is put forward by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm in 1956. Considering media-politics and society

relations, they juxtapose four models as authoritarian, libertarian, socialist/communist, and social responsibility. Since the normative theories are apt to inquire the ideal position of media in the society, they bring forward fruitful discussions in terms of media-politics relationship in different contexts; however they remain normative instead of analytical. Through overviewing these debates, it is possible to grasp the interplay of media, political actors/regimes and society. One of the main conclusions derived from the first group theories is that there is an overwhelming liberal democratic discourse dominant in normative theories. Because of this domination in the corresponding literature, the other models of media (except Marxist theories) are prone to describe roles, effects, and functions of media via obtaining these liberal-democratic drives as their reference point. Henceforth, the second-group models of media attempt to discuss this dominant issue in the literature: the roles and functions of media in democracies. Third, the relations of media and people (or very simply, of the 'transmitter' and the 'receiver') is discussed in order to understand the transformation in the understanding of the 'addressees' of the media messages. This part mainly stresses upon the non-linear evolution of 'audience'. Last but not least, the public opinion formation role of media is examined.

Altogether, I will examine theories of media under three headings: first, models of media which mainly focus on the relations between media-politics and in different countries –that are initially normative theories; second, models of media which specifically stress upon media's roles and functions in democracies; and third, theories of media which have particular emphasis on media-people relations.

2.1.2. Models of Media: The Relations of Media-Politics

2.1.2.1. Models of Media: The Relations of Media-Politics and Normative Theories

The main concern of normative theories is the ideal functions of media. In other words, they examine what the media should be and do. The answer of this question varies under different conditions/systems/structures. One of the pioneering, often-cited, and highly criticized studies that treat the normative theories of media (*press*, in this case) is the *Four Theories of the Press* by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956). Their categories of press in different systems are mainly based on an authoritarian-liberal scale. These are authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet/communist press types. It is better not to call what Siebert and collaborates did as 'four theories', since it "does not offer four theories," but "one theory with four examples," as Nerone (1995, 18) rightly put it. (Christians et al., 2009: 4)

In authoritarian press theory, the main argument is that press should be under the control of the sovereign authority. It should behave 'appropriately' and in line with the policies of the government. In this regard, the news should support state policies, and they should not clash with or contradict the interests of the state. In authoritarian models, media are heavily controlled by the state. According to Siebert (1963), the main 'duty' expected from the press in an authoritarian regime is to transfer thoughts, actions, and demands of the sovereign power from the state to the society; and to provide 'consent' of the people. (İrvan, 2002: 64) Therefore, in authoritarian

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systems, freedom of press is shadowed by state censorship over press. In these systems, heavy sanctions, taxing, and even encountering the risk of ban (newspaper closures) restrict journalists and/or media companies. For example in 1960s and 1980s in Turkey, the press take a very supportive stand toward the military interventions. (İrvan, 2002: 63) In these periods, the state was controlling the media, and Turkish press had not been privatized and conglomerated by media companies yet.

It is possible to interpret authoritarian press theory through the lenses of Marxist paradigms in the sense that the rulers are able to dictate their sovereign ideology over the people via controlling the media. In this regard, some commonalities between the authoritarian press theory and the Soviet/socialist theory can be found. Not only between these two types, but also with other types, authoritarian model tends to be the 'prototype' as Siebert (1956) referred. By this, he means that even if a state is officially not 'authoritarian' but subscribes to another system, it still attempts to manage and maintain its power structure in accordance with its own favour. (Ostini and Fung, 2002: 42) Therefore, in changing degrees, every state is inclined to control the media in line with its own interests and power structure. Despite the authoritarian type's 'pervasiveness' (Ostini and Fung, 2002: 42) in practice, it is possible to argue that the liberal model is considered the 'ideal' one -at least theoretically. As a matter of fact, the scholarship's dominant emphasis on media's affirmative role in democracies projects that the anchor of the scholars in evaluating other systems or models is Western-liberal democracies.

Libertarian press theory supports the idea of free market and it argues that the press should be free from the interference of state. Contrary to authoritarian (or totalitarian) models, censorship over the press or closure of media outlets is unacceptable in libertarian systems since it deprives the press off guaranteeing its public-friendly role. It has an approach of Berlinian *negative* freedom by emphasizing the *absence* of state intervention because the state is considered the most powerful 'threat' (not the only one though) vis-à-vis the flow of information. The flow of information should be free from any restrictions by the state because only in this way, people acquire the access for checks and balances apparatus towards governmental power. This ideal model presumes that the free press will represent diverse voices and interests of the society, and ensure governmental accountability. (Benson, 2008: 2593) The issues of free flow of information and overseeing governmental accountability are strongly correlated with 'Fourth Estate' discussions that -broadly speaking- consider the media as the fourth power pursuing the three branches of government.[27]

Liberal press theory is criticized that the press as a free enterprise may not always ensure its watchdog role since –not surprisingly- it might seek its own interest as a free market sector. Not only economic concerns, but also symbiotic relations between media owners and political/state actors may also curtain a liberal model which guarantees 'public interest'.[28] Overall, the lack of state intervention per se is not enough to provide representation of plural interests and voices in the society.

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[27] Originally, the 'fourth estate' does not refer to the three branches of government (legislative, executive, judiciary) as we understand it today. The development of the idea of Fourth Estate will be discussed in part *ii. Models of Media: The Role of Media in Democracies.*

[28] A more detailed discussion on watchdog role, accountability, and 'public interest' is provided in the two succeeding sub-sections.

Social responsibility theory of the press dates back to 1947 Hutchins Report on the freedom and responsibilities of Press held by the US Commission. The responsibilities were defined as "factual accuracy, promotion of open debate, representation of diverse views, and protection of individual rights by serving as a watchdog that guards against government abuses of power." (Benson, 2008: 2593) Similar to libertarian model, the social responsibility also highlights the importance of press in representing plurality of voices of the people. Likewise, there are some similarities considering media's potential constructive functions in a democracy. (In general in social responsibility model, the 'responsibility' of media are defined through 'democratic responsibilities'.) Different from liberal models, the social responsibility model casts an active role for the state in providing and guaranteeing freedom of press. To put it differently, liberal models foresee a *laissez-faire* media while social responsibility models are sceptical of market models of them.[29] In social responsibility models, media are responsible toward the society. The state should also be held responsible in ensuring that media companies are not misusing their power, not serving their own interests rather than the public interests, functioning informatively in society's advantage.

Soviet/communist press theory refers press as an instrument that serves the dominating/ruling class' interests in capitalist societies. Media are under the monopoly of ruling elite, but –this ideal model proposes that- they should adopt the

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[29] Even though social responsibility model is 'accused' of lacking "any systematic critique of capitalist media ownership and funding (Baker 2002; cf. McQuail 2005)" (Benson, 2008: 2593), it is possible to argue that media ownership (especially concentration of it in the form of media conglomerates) may lean on marketization of media, and the priorities of media change in accordance with market concerns. Thus the definition of the 'responsibilities' of media eventually changes.

mission of mobilizing the working class. Considering their approaches to censorship and restrictions over press, authoritarian models and Soviet models are alike. According to the latter one, counter-revolutionist press should be restricted. With the collapse of Soviet Union, communist model of media –in the way Siebert et al. had put it- disappeared.

The *Four Theories of Press* (1956) paved the way for myriad of other normative theories (Lowenstein, 1971; Hachten, 1981; Picard, 1985, and Althschull, 1995)[30], however, they have not brought substantially different visions from Siebert et al., except little variations. In this sense, the *Four Theories* was a considerable piece in pioneering the studies illuminating the relations of journalism and politics, but its typologies have been criticized as reflecting the polarized vision of Cold War era from a Western-standing point, and oversimplifying history. (Christians et al., 2009: 4; Kleinsteuber, 2008: 986) This is why Hallin and Mancini argue, "it is time to give it a decent burial and move on to the development of more sophisticated models based on real comparative analysis. (2004: 10)." (Christians et al., 2009: 4) There are also other studies which not only revise the Four Theories but also make some contributions. Denis McQuail's *Mass Communication Theory* (1983) is a case in point here. Beside four models, McQuail adds *development* and *democratic-participant* models. Among the variety of these revisions and 'beyond' of normative theories and of geo-political based analyses (Siebert et al. 1956; McQuail, 1992; Bennett, 1982; Altschull, 1984; Martin and Chaudhary, 1983; Hallins and Mancini, 2004), I will only be able to focus on a contemporary work –Hallin and Mancini's- since it is not the main curiosity of my research.

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[30] Please find a review of these studies in Ostini and Fung, 2002.

A geo-political analysis belongs to Hallin and Mancini (2004), entitled *Comparing Three Models of Media*. In their comparative study, which adheres only to the developed capitalist Western democracies, they put forward three main typologies – not entirely distinct but three co-existent categories: polarized pluralist (Mediterranean European), liberal (Anglo-American), and democratic corporatist (North/Central European) models.[31] They account for four main variables: journalistic professionalism, political parallelism (links between the media and political parties), the development of media markets (e.g. press circulation, public or private broadcasting), and nature of state intervention in the media system (including political culture and history). (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 21) Some of the characteristic examples the authors present are: France, Italy, and Greece (polarized pluralist); the US, Canada, and the UK (liberal); Germany, Denmark, and Finland (democratic corporatist). Broadly speaking, the liberal model represents market-driven media, the polarized pluralist represents state/party-driven media, and the democratic corporatist represents a model where there is limited state-intervention, but the state's existence is still there despite media entrepreneurs.

The polarized pluralist system mostly projects the European partisan journalistic tradition; Europe itself is not a homogeneity in this tradition though. As Mancini put it, European model of journalism is much more partisan in comparison to the Anglo-American one. (2005: 78) A high degree of political parallelism signifies this model. In authoritarian or fascist regimes, the media were state-controlled and therefore they were used as '*guard dog*' (Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 273) by the state to

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[31] For the relation of individual cases (countries) to the three models, please see Hallin and Mancini's triangular explanation. (2004: 70)

consolidate and legitimize its power. Not only in authoritarian regimes, but also under democratic regimes, instrumental use of media endured and they served the ends of the state "in the form of promoting national culture, reinforcing state authority in a climate of polarized politics … or promoting political pluralism and compromise" (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 114) In state-led or state-owned media systems (e.g. public broadcasting), the instrumental use might be foreseeable. However in commercialized media, too, in polarized pluralist models, instrumentalization proceeds in the hands of media owners.

One of the important factors that lead to instrumental use of media is the late development of journalism as a profession. In polarized pluralist models, journalism was initially not a profession before the late 19th century. (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 110) It was not a profession, but a secondary (and mostly 'elitist') 'occupation' before. Although the development of journalistic professionalization is similar in three models (Mediterranean, North-Central Europe, and North-Atlantic), it has not proceeded in an equally efficient way in Mediterranean polarized pluralistic model. The first reason is the late development of formal education in the field of journalism. Second, the newspapers were smaller and less likely to be self-sustaining, and therefore, they were dependent on the state subsidies and intervention. Especially under dictatorships, the intervention of the state over the press was intense. Third, the ways of collecting information, and confidentiality of journalists in providing information were not protected professionally. Last but not least, neither accountability nor consensus on ethical standards in the media existed in polarized pluralist models, and these legacies prevailed during the development of journalistic professionalization. (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 110-112)

In short, with the prevailing influence of former institutions over their systems, the Southern European late democracies -Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy-[32] share similar characteristics and legacies in reflecting high degree of political parallelism, patronage relations between media and politicians, late or weak development of journalistic professionalism, an apparent role of clientalism (both due to economic reasons, and political culture), weak development of commercial media markets, state-dependent media (because of strong role of the state both in economic and social life), a commentary-based discourse rather than information-based news, and overall, instrumental use of media by different actors in polarized pluralist model of media. (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 89-142)

Democratic corporatist (North/Central European) model embodies similar features both with liberal and polarized pluralist models. In terms of strongly developed mass-circulation press, strong commercial media markets, and high levels of newspaper circulation; it is comparable to liberal models. Considering high level of political parallelism, and active state intervention; there are parallel lines with polarized pluralist tradition. While journalism was mostly an elite activity in polarized pluralist model before 19th century, it is tied to a literate middle class in democratic corporatist model. (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 146) In polarized pluralist model, it was the state which dominated in social and economic life. Whereas in democratic corporatist models, this domination in structuring social, political, and cultural life was shared amongst the state and organized social groups. (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 153)

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[32] Although France is not a late democracy, it is also included in this category.

Another characteristic of the liberal approach is the idea of independence of media from state-intervention. Midst of basic debates whether the media should be state-driven or market-driven, liberal model favors the latter in order to dispose of state pressure over media. It is the main presumption in liberal models that if media become free (both politically and economically) from state intervention, they will be able to serve fact-based journalistic practices. Even though this presumption is agreeable when considered with partisan polarized pluralist systems, I find the liberal argument overly optimistic. Today, the state intervention is replaced by market priorities, which initially and mostly look after the interests of the media companies/owners. Especially if media patrons have pragmatic ties and mutual relations with governmental power, an instrumental use of media becomes predictable. All in all, it is possible to claim that even in globalized world, state priorities are –to a great extent- replaced by market priorities and particular concerns of media companies.

In brief, some of the basic characteristics of liberal model are: i. limited state intervention on media; ii. the well-developed journalism as a profession; iii. objectivity and 'facts' as the central principles of journalistic profession; iv. market-driven (commercialized) media. With regard to the last feature, Hallin and Mancini argue that there is a convergence among different media models in contemporary world toward the triumph of liberal model due to the effects of globalization and commercialization of media. This convergence is leading to a more homogenization and less differentiation amongst different media models. (2004: 12, 66, 251-295) In contemporary world, it is no more political ideologies or political partisanship that

shape and structure the media system, but the market as the new 'ideology' in the globalized *mediasphere*[33]. The existence of 'new media' (I use it to refer to the Internet and social media, here) has also capable of consolidating this convergence and homogeneity since societies have a more direct and swift access to information, and more enhanced crosscheck mechanisms of the information they acquired.[34]

Alternatively, it is possible to review the three models of Hallin and Mancini via the approach of each model toward practising journalism. To begin with, liberal model is known for information/fact-based journalism understanding; polarized pluralist model has a legacy of commentary/interpretation-based journalism; and the democratic corporatist model has a hybrid journalism tradition that is a combination "of a new form of partisan media power associated with broadcast entrepreneurs" (Nerone, 2008: 2584). The liberal model has a pioneering role in introducing a journalism practice based on facts, objectivity, and information. It refers to the position of 'mirroring' the events without any partisanship and by separating facts from opinions (Djerf-Pierre, 2008: 567) and it claims to provide politically neutral sources of information. (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 57-58) The development of the idea of objectivity in journalism is due to some historical practices in liberal countries (Anglo-American) such as the earlier emergence of a mass daily press, relatively high rates of newspaper circulation, avoidance of censorship or putting "taxes on knowledge, as well as due to positive Federal postal policies and a national commitment to create a media system that would allow for the representation of a

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[33] The term originates from John Hartley (1996) –media and cultural theorist- "as a way of describing all of the output of media, whether fictional (popular media) or factual (journalism)". (Bainbridge, 2008: 5)
[34] For sure, one cannot talk about obtaining completely value-free, objective, and politically neutral information despite the crosscheck mechanisms derived from the Internet; but in comparison to the conditions of the past, the 'audience' have at least a chance to find their own way of interpretation (or of interpretation of interpretations) to a relative extent.

dispersed and diverse citizenry as a unified public". (Nerone, 2008: 2581) The
expectation behind these policies was a well-informed citizenry. The "shift in the
meaning of journalism from opinion to fact" has led a clear separation between a
reporter, a correspondent, and a columnist. Therefore, in the fact-based model,
"objective journalists are expert professionals, who are always aware of their own
subjectivity – like the correspondent – but police it, separating their own values from
impersonal reports." (Nerone, 2008: 2581- 2582) Today, there is more or less a
global journalism understanding in all around the world which converges to the
liberal model to a great extent; but commentary is now an integral part of journalism
worldwide. (Djerf-Pierre, 2008: 568)

In interpretive journalism (also known as commentary-based or advocacy or
interpretative journalism), the journalists challenge the idea of neutrality because
they argue that informational/neutral model is not able to provide citizens with well-
understanding of events. (Houston, 2008: 2502). Therefore, in interpretative type, the
journalist should be a correspondent, a reporter, and a commentator –all at the same
time- since the public is not 'informed' well and aware enough to interpret what they
get from the media. The lack of information and knowledge on the public side is
because of pressuring political regime characteristics as well as the changing
practices in the evolution of journalism. The countries which have had an
authoritarian past, for instance, have experienced high stamp taxes on newspapers,
low level of press circulation, late development of daily mass press, and low level of
sustainability of state-dependent press. Therefore in those countries, the emergence
of a mass daily press was relatively late in comparison to Anglo-American models.
Due to all these factors, the authoritarian regimes were capable of using the

journalists in forming and shaping the public opinion.

All in all, beside different historical journalistic practices of individual nation-states, in the kernel of the distinction between factual traditions and interpretive traditions, there lies a very basic consideration: how to transmit the 'message' (in the process of 'communication') since this act (of communication) is -first and foremost- a representation of 'what happened'. Generally speaking, there are two basic ways to represent: to report by 'mirroring' the events, or to 'interpret' as the transmitter (journalist, here) sees it. Mirroring the events stands for information-based reporting in journalism and its key norm is to be objective and to reflect 'facts'. Interpreting the events, however, reflects the standing point of the transmitter, and the audience see the 'angle of sight' of him/her. Then does it really matter in what ways the message is represented? The answer is yes. It is a big deal since it is a matter of influence by the media over the interlocutors of the message. One of the important debates in terms of this influence of media is opinion formation. It is argued that commentary-based (or advocacy) journalism is more eligible to form public opinion in parallel with into where the journalist directs the audience.[35] Here, the issue has two dimensions: first, normative theories propose that ideally in democratic regimes, the media should have a watchdog role and this role includes the representation of public opinion to politicians. Second, in authoritarian and/or state-led media, however, the flow or direction (of communication) is from politics toward the society. In these models, the media represent hegemonic interests of governmental power to the society and they form/shape/influence the public opinion accordingly.

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[35] A more detailed discussion on public opinion and the media is available in part iii.

As widely observed in the abovementioned literature on media, the common denominator that is found in the overwhelming part of the theories is democracy. Not only normative theories, but others, too, consider media's role and function in a democratic system. To put it differently, 'media in a democracy' is taken as the ideal form and a reference point. Due to this specific and dominating emphasis on democracy in the scholarship, it is necessary to delve into this point in the following part.

2.1.2.2. Models of Media: The Role of Media[36] in Democracies

As discussed above, a rich part of the literature on media is focused on media-democracy relations, and media's functions in a democratic regime. Since there is a limited space for a long discussion in this paper, I would like to pick up some salient issues and debates considering the interaction of media and democracy. First, I will discuss different understandings of democracy since each brings forward a particular approach to the functions of media in democracies. Second, I will unravel related discussions on media in democracies in the framework of fourth estate, watchdog role, and public opinion formation. In this regard, I will refer to the alleged functions of media in democracies by different theories of media.

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[36] This section particularly emphasizes the role of *press* in democracies in accordance with the main interest of this research. Thus the term 'media' will refer to *press* instead.

To begin with, media and democracy the relations of are not homogeneous and unique not only because of different models of media, but also due to different understandings and practices of 'democracy'. Different practices of democracy lead to different roles imagined for media. Among different democracy approaches, I will try to discuss two of them and their relations to the media: liberal democracy and republican democracy. One of the main distinctions between the two schools is about what they understand from 'liberty'. Isaiah Berlin separates positive liberty from negative liberty since the former one is described via the *presence* of the mechanisms/conditions to provide freedom; while in the latter one freedom is delineated by the *absence* of external restrictions. (Berlin, 1969) Liberal democracy[37] is grounded upon an approach of negative liberty since it depicts freedom as the absence of any interference or challenge. Their diverging understandings in defining liberty leads to –again- diverging depictions of 'public sphere/private sphere', 'common good', and individual liberties. In liberal democracy approach, the distinction between public and private spheres are made via the individual. All spheres in which individual exists are private spheres. Thus, both liberties and the boundaries of public sphere are defined through the boundaries of private sphere.[38] The negative liberty understanding appears at this point. According to liberal approach, individual liberties are described with the absence of any restrictions in the private sphere. As a frequently used example in Turkish politics, wearing headscarf seems a fruitful discussion to point out the main difference between liberal and republican democracy approaches. If, for instance, a person wants to wear headscarf,

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[37] 'Liberal' itself is an overloaded term in the sense that there is not a single liberalism, but liberalisms. In this respect, it is a difficult task to try to review liberal democracy with a few sentences. Nevertheless, the discussion on liberal democracy will not be a fruitful one here since it is out of the scope of this paper. Well-detailed analyses on the matter are available in Gaus, 1983a; Gaus, 1983b; and Hayek, 1978.

[38] Again, for more sophisticated discussions on public-private spheres, please see: Habermas, 1989; Çınar, 2005: 33-52.

it is her liberty to wear it wherever she wants, in the liberal point of view. Here, the liberty underlies in the absence of restricting the person of wearing headscarf. Republican democratic view, however, portray public-private spheres and liberties via –let's say- the 'doctrine' of 'common good'[39]. The boundaries of practising the individual liberties are defined through the common good of the society. In practising liberties, there is the core distinction of public sphere from the private sphere, and liberties are defined over this distinction. Turning back to the headscarf example, if the person wants to wear headscarf which is banned in the public sphere for the common good, then the boundaries of her liberty is drawn through the boundaries of her private life. As a consequence, republican democracy approach envisions individual liberties with the *presence* (refers to 'positive liberty') of some constraints -for the common good- when necessary. In short, in liberal democracy perspective, raison d'être of the state is based on the idea to protect individual (private) liberties; while republican democracy grounds it on overseeing and guaranteeing public interests. [40]

The simplified discussion above on different understandings of democracy lead us to claim that various portrayals of democracy bring forward diverge forms of media-democracy relations. Even though it is argued that in contemporary world a shift toward a liberal model of media appears due to the dominant role of liberal democracies in world politics and of liberal economic policies; it is better to keep in mind that national differences continue to exist in the interactions of media and democracy.

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[39] There are so many concepts such as 'national interest', 'raison d'état that result from 'common good' perspective.

[40] For the overview of liberal and republican democracy approaches, I benefitted from Çakmak, 2010: 37-48.

The second point of discussion is the functions of media in a democracy. Generally speaking, the prominent functions of media in democracies are: surveillance of governmental power on behalf of the society, providing the flow of information for a well-educated and well-informed citizenry, and the articulation of public opinion. (Curran and Seaton, 1997: 287) Simply put, the claim is that for democracies to function, media have a role of constituting a civic platform by providing information for civil society. The media therefore are considered as "a vital conduit of relations between the state and the society." (O'Neil, 1998: 1) Although the roles appointed to the press for democratic processes is frequently emphasised in liberal approaches of media in the Western countries; authoritarian models may also claim these roles for their media systems in order to gain public legitimacy for governmental policies. That is one of the reasons why in their discourses, it might be difficult to detach liberal media models' arguments that of with authoritarian ones.

Whatever the media model is, it is a general assumption that ideally, the media need to be free from any control or dependency. This assumption requires two basic independencies in the advantage of media: independency from, first, political and second, financial control of the state. To put it differently, for a media system to function well and democratically, they need to be both politically and economically free of interference. A media structure which is independent from the pressures/control of "government, business, or dominant social groups … is better able to maintain and support the competitive and participative elements that define the concept of democracy and the related process of democratization." (Price, Rozumilowicz, Verhulst, 2002: 12) Complementary with this argument, it is also

considered that media (press) in a democracy is ideally functioning as an independent branch of government, next to the three powers –legislative, executive, and judiciary. (Nordenstreng, 2008: 809) This is the underlying idea of 'media as fourth estate' approaches and it basically reflects liberal perspectives to media. As McQuail pinpointed, "the characterization of journalism as a social 'watchdog' springs from a classical liberal conception of the power relationship between government and society within a democratic state. The watchdog theory of journalism is based on a pluralistic view of social power and can be seen as 'a simple extension to the (newspaper) press of the fundamental individual rights to freedom of opinion, speech, religion and assembly' (1994: 128)." (Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey, & Richardson, 2005: 273)

It is possible to interpret the Forth Estate theory of media with either the claims of liberal democracy or of republican democracy perspectives even though it is said that 'media as fourth estate' is a "liberal-pluralist tradition" (Bennett, 1982: 31). With a liberal point of view, one can argue that in the Fourth Estate theory, the main emphasis is on the individuals. Liberals claim that media institutions "are supposed to serve as instruments of the people for an open and unhindered exchange rather than become a commercial marketplace by themselves". (Nordenstreng, 2008: 809) It is also argued that the clash and diversity of the perspectives within the media contribute to the free and open circulation of ideas, and thus it enables "them to play the role of a forth estate through which governing elites could be pressurized and reminded of their dependency on majority opinion." (Bennett, 1982: 40) Liberal claims of the Fourth estate theories are criticized[41] for neglecting the market

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[41] Dominant-ideology (mostly Marxist) models are among these groups which criticize the optimism of liberal-pluralist approaches.

pressures over the media. Even if the media achieve to be free from the state control, there are market mechanisms which can effect the democratic functioning of media either in adverse or constructive ways. [42]

Through the lenses of republican democracy, however, the Fourth Estate theory stresses not upon the individuals, but on public. Therefore, it highlights the significance of free press in counterbalancing the three branches of government, in watchdog guarding the public interest, and in providing a platform for public debate. (Thussu, 2008: 1858) At this point, the fourth estate approach underpins overseeing 'public interest' vis-à-vis the 'individual interest' emphasis of liberal democrats. [43]

Putting the discussions on liberal-republican democracy differences aside, the most noticeable claim of fourth estate approach is that the press is called the fourth branch of the governmental power because of its "critical-investigative" (watchdog) (Thussu, 2008: 1860) role. In my view, the watchdog attribution to media is more than 'overseeing the governmental power in the advantage of the society' because it paves the way for visualizing different portrayals of 'public'. How public is depicted is a vital issue since it elucidates diverse interpretations of media in the literature. The following part focuses on different perceptions of media-society and media-

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[42] Media may function in destructive as well as constructive ways in a democracy. The nineteenth century print media in cases of war propaganda and Dreyfus affair is a case in point here. Hearst (American newspaper) "propagated war against Spain, and the French newspapers assisted in dividing the country during the Dreyfus affair, some of them relying heavily on anti-Semitic imagery." (Carpentier, 2008: 825)

[43] As argued before, 'liberalism' per se is not unique. There are some liberals who have similar arguments with republican democrats. John Stuart Mill, for example, in *On liberty*, argued that "a liberal press was necessary for "the public good". (Thussu, 2008: 1858)

politics relations via these different portrayals of 'public'[44]. These debates are deemed important since, in conjunction with them, public opinion formation impact is handled as one of the alleged democratic functions of media.

2.1.2.3. Models of Media: The Relations of Media-People, and Formation of Public Opinion

So far, I have tried to provide a comprehensive overview of media theories in terms of the relation of media-politics. Further approaches are available, not entirely separate from the previous ones though. This part focuses on the theories not specifically on media-politics, but on media-people within the framework of media effects.

In understanding interpretations of media effects in different contexts, *public* is a significant issue because it is the eligible area where the meaning is created, recreated, manipulated, and maintained –generally- by means of media actors. As Bainbridge argued, the public sphere became a conceptual tool and "a way of theorizing about the relationship between media (and communication practices more generally), politics and society." (2008, 11) In this section, I try to figure out the interplay of media, audience, and representation[45]. In lieu of outline, first I will highlight the evolution of the interlocutors of media messages –namely 'audience'.

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[44] In the next section, I attempt to reveal different understandings of 'public', not through the classical dichotomy of public-private spheres; but through the evolution in the understanding of 'audience' – and 'public' is one of the forms in this evolution.

[45] It is the *representation* of truth, of facts, of 'public opinion', and of any other messages addressed to the audience by the media. Overall, it is the "representation of the world" (Bainbridge, 2008: 155).

The evolving nature of how people are perceived by media actors (and by political actors as well) is significant in analyzing effects and functions of media, and in distinguishing different media models. In conjunction with the discussions on the evolution, second, I will try to pinpoint the effects of media particularly under the umbrella of public opinion formation. Among numerous effects, I will address priming, framing, and agenda-setting.[46]

I depict four main typologies of audience that are the most apparent ones in the literature on -what I call- the evolution in the perceptions of 'audience'. These are -not chronically juxtaposed- 'receiver', 'passive-audience', 'active-audience', and 'consumer'. Intersections among the typologies are possible. 'Receiver' understanding of the audience arises from the earlier –and superannuated - communication studies which present a linear model of communication in which there are basically a message, a sender of it, and a receiver. 'Receiver' of the communication message is rather a passive object in this interaction. That is a reason why 'receiver' is different from 'audience'.[47] Although some scholars (e.g. McLuhan, and Lasswell) appraise a linear model in terms of the role of media in which there is a message extracting from the sender towards the receiver; the case is not so simplistic because in the process of communication, there are further interplay of diversifying factors effecting each other such as the form of the media text, social context, actors, and so on. (Furthermore, it is either not fair to evaluate the receiver as a passive and homogeneous object of this interaction.) Especially if it is political communication, it is not a uni-dimensional process as Lasswell's approach of *who,*

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[46] Infotainment, mobilization of the masses, public education, political persuasion, and propaganda are some other example of media effects which are not included in the discussions.

[47] Even though in 'audience' approach, both passive and active roles are available for the people; 'audience' is more active in comparison to the 'receiver'.

says what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect (Richardson, 2007: 20) but rather, it is a complex interaction of actors, structures, and associations included in the communication process.

In 'audience' typology, the receiver of media messages can be either passive objects that takes whatever comes from the media without any objection or active subjects that are selective, reflective, and analytical. As Branston and Stafford argue, a key development in communication studies "was to stop talking of 'audience' and use the term 'audiences' to suggest that many varied engagements might take place with the same mass-distributed text, such a blockbuster film." However, there are still some evaluations of the audiences as if "they were still a doped, duped 'mass'." (2010: 379) A considerable part of 'mass communication' theories (such as the 'mass culture' theory of the Frankfurt School) is a fair example of the approaches that take the audience as a passive mass. These theories tend to emphasize, "what the media do *to* their audiences". (Branston & Stafford, 2010: 382) Audience-as-mass understanding can also be assessed under this category. Dohle points out that audience-as-a-mass models regard "the media users as a large group being acted upon by media messages. … The most prominent scientific term for this perception is the stimulus– response model, which failed to prove tenable." (2008: 253)

In *audience-as-active subjects* models, however, there is the awareness that the media may not be as influential as they were considered before. These models render rather a limited role for the media effects on audiences. Lazarsfeld et al. study (1944) highlights this limited role of American media in influencing voter behavior. They conclude that "voters were resistant to media influence, since individual

predispositions or political preference influenced which media they consulted.” (Branston, 2010: 389) The *two-step flow model* is a consequence of this study, which mainly argues that media have a limited capacity in influencing people's behavior because it is not only the media but “local networks and opinion leaders, whose views often mediated those offered by the media.” Therefore, the general understanding of media's effects have shifted from being understood as “brainwashing” into “influence”. (Branston, 2010: 389)

Audience-as-consumer typology basically refers to the marketization of media. In state-led media systems, audiences are –either passive or active- just ‘audiences’. With the development of market-driven media systems, ‘audiences’ turn into ‘consumers’ since the news are now a commodity –a consumable, and merchantable being. The latter systems are mostly free of state interference, however, tied with market demands and pressures. Thus audience transforms into consumers in the eyes of media companies. As an example, Wuthrich explains well how Turkish citizens have been ‘consumerized’ with the entrance of commercialized media into the society. (2010, 225) With this catalyst, the society have become ‘consumers’ - starting in Özal's period with economic liberalizations in 1980s and continued (with private TV channels) in 1990s- in the sense that their understanding and awareness of itself have changed. Comparing to the state-driven period of media, it was now no more easier to control and manipulate the information ‘behind the curtain’. (Wuthrich, 2010: 225)

The intention behind discussing the evolution of audience is to indicate that there is a variety among scholars in interpreting the effects of media on people. (Curran and

Seaton, 2003: 326-339) Some studies conclude that media are not capable of changing people's minds and attitudes (e.g. Lazarsfeld, 1944) while other studies argue that, speaking of political communication for instance, media are influential (at varying levels) on people's preferences, behaviours, on their interpretations of what they see, and on persuading them. (Curran and Seaton, 2003: 324-326) The audience typologies also indicate that media benefit from a sphere in which the meaning is created, recreated, and manipulated through the representations of 'truth' by the media. This is the sphere of the public. The following discussions try to dig into the issue of public by examining one of the effects of media –that is public opinion formation.[48]

Initially, Walter Lippmann (1922) argued that "media might determine what the public takes to be important." (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder, 1982: 848) Today, this is known as *agenda setting*. "The mass media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but the media are stunningly successful in telling their audience what to think about." (Cohen, 1962:16 cited in Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder, 1982: 848) Agenda-setting is different from framing effect though. *Framing* stands for "the selection and rejection of information in the construction of a media text by replacing emphasis on a particular aspect or angle. " (Bainbridge, 2008: 159) Through different forms of media effects such as these two, media attempt to influence public in order to: i. gain the consent of the public, ii. to represent the social realities as the media themselves desire to reflect, ii. to form a common opinion in the society by creating and recreating the meaning of the world to the audience. Formation of public opinion is strongly related with framing because "a

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[48] Other effects of media such as agenda-setting, priming, framing, and persuasion will not be discussed separately. The effects will be touched upon when necessary in the opinion formation part.

central organizing idea or story line may provide meaning –thanks to media frames- to an unfolding strip of events." (Gamson & Modigliani 1987: 143). As Scheufele pointed out, framing is an important tool for journalists: to reduce complexity and convey complex issues, to direct audiences to make sense of the world in certain ways, to make sense of the presented information, and to make the audience integrate the given information into their existing cognitive schema. That is why some people interpret news frames as "tools of spin and manipulation." (2008: 1862-1863)

One of the significant theories that explain the interaction of media with public opinion is that of Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann's theory of *spiral of silence* (1974). Spiral of silence theory is based on the claim that ideas of individuals are dependent upon what others think (about it). If one's view does not gain acceptance in the society (public opinion), the person prefers to be 'silent' in order not to be excluded from the society. (Noelle-Neumann,1997: 226 as cited in İrvan, 2002) "But to the extent that many accept this view and to the extent that it is perceived as the current trend in opinion, it influences and constrains public dialogue and mass opinion (Noelle- Neumann, 1974, 1984)." (Bobo, 1988: 90)

Noelle-Neumann's theory seems to propose a homogeneous public/society. Nevertheless, in the process of spiral of silence, media have a huge impact. . (Noelle-Neumann, 1997: 228 as cited in İrvan, 2002) Complementary to Noelle-Neumann's theory, Öncü's definition of public opinion might be helpful at this point. She points out that "the notion of public opinion presumes the existence of a shared frame such that audiences can be arrayed along a pro-con dimension on fixed

categories." (Öncü, 1994:16) Not only a shared frame, but the public is the area that represents consent and legitimacy which are the keys in opinion formation.

Gaining consent of the public is a difficult but important task for the media to achieve because society [public] is an entity which is more than the sum of its constituting members. (Akal, 2013: 148) It is difficult because public is not homogeneous. Neither do the public response to the media. (Curran and Seaton, 2003: 326) Public space is the forum where there is a continuous contestation for power and obligatory negotiations to acquire the share of political power. Press is one of these actors which tries to have its share from political power through using public forum as a site where it can form or recreate the public opinion in favour of the interests of the press (media). Yet in the contemporary world, it is now getting more complex for the media to consider the public as a mass which can be manipulated; or as ignorant community to be educated in line with media's own interests.

2.1.3. Media in Turkey

With regard to the discussions in previous two sections, it is possible to derive some conclusions on behalf of the media in Turkey. The political history and culture of Turkey has a certain influence in media structure of the country. Turkey has experienced several military coups and interventions. As a legacy of these interventions, media system in Turkey in 1960s and 80s overlaps with authoritarian

model of Siebert (İrvan, 2002).[49] From a different point of view, however, Turkey approaches to polarized pluralist model of Hallin and Mancini with its high degree of political parallelism in the same period. This parallelism is not peculiar to this period, but there is a permanent existence of political parallelism and symbiotic relations between media actors and political actors in journalistic practices in Turkish media.[50] Again, it has historical roots.

Until late 1980s, media in Turkey were not commercialized; it was state-monopolised. Turkey in the 1990s witnessed intensification of media conglomerates.[51] Wuthrich (2010: 219) cogently encapsulates the state of the art of media and its implications on society in that decade

> When media broadcasting to the Turkish masses went from being state-controlled and monolithic to privately run and pluralistic, it transitioned from a tool of the state or military (when necessary) to inform and convey to a contested arena in which they became one voice that had to compete with others for social consent. Its advent also became a prime catalyst for a new type of citizen, one that was increasingly aware of her/his role as consumer—one who is provided with and actively makes choices and takes ownership of various objects.

Nonetheless, the media in this period converges more to the liberal models, in which the state control over media is appeased –not totally disappear though. All in all,

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[49] It would be oversimplistic if military interventions are considered the mere reason of authoritarian media system in the political past of Turkey. The intervention of military is only a limited -but influential- part in the overall picture.

[50] Today (especially in the second and third terms of the JDP government) this parallelism between media and governmental power in Turkey is referred as 'Italianization' of media -borrowing the terms of Slavko Splichal (1994). It implies that there is an overwhelming politicization of media in Turkey. In Turkish public forum, the Turkish alias of Italianization is '*yandaş medya*' (partisan media). (Kaymas, 2011: 41)

[51] Please find more elaborated explanations on the process of marketization of media in Turkey in Chapter 2, the part on time frame of the research.

Turkey is not free from general trends and tendencies appear in models of Western media.

The common characteristics among different periods of development of press in Turkey is that press has been an influential actor in representing (and reconstructing) the world into Turkish society. Among different actors of media, columnists have a particular importance as 'agents of change'. Turkish society has not had a long history with printed press as pointed out before. Late development of printing houses in the Ottoman era rendered a *sui generis* role for columnists in comparison to the Western societies. This role also paved the way for interpretive journalism practices in which the columnist is not only a mediator between the state and society, but a 'teacher' of the 'uneducated public'.

The spearheading role of the columnists for the Turkish society has made this group 'opinion leaders', but -more importantly- *agents of change,* borrowing the terms of Elizabeth Eisenstein (1979).[52] Similar to what Müteferrika did to Turkish society as discussed earlier, columnists also change the society with disseminating new ideas. From the point of idea entrepreneurship, it is not a matter of 'success' or 'failure' of the new ideas. With their pioneering roles in modernization, in political liberalization, and in opinion formation; columnists are idea entrepreneurs, and agents of change; but maybe not –with Sabev's (2007: 80) terms- "agents of immediate change".

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[52] In her book *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*, Eisenstein pointed out that "the printing press was an 'agent of change' that resulted in a 'communications revolution' in which the print culture replaced the traditional scribal culture." (Eisenstein, 1979 as cited in Sabev, 2007: 79)

Having said that, media models in Turkey and in other countries have several similarities as well as differences. Media influence in terms of public opinion formation, agenda setting, and framing are some of the similarities in the functions of media in Turkey and other democracies. However, the functions and models of media's location in Turkey also differ both from Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries'. The underlying factors of these differences are, for sure, plenty and complex; but one of them originates from the differences in social formations together with the state tradition peculiar to the country. The following section attempts to provide a comparative analysis of state traditions and social formations in between Turkey and other countries.

2.2. Theories of Entreprenurship

The theoretical tool idea entrepreneur can be benefitted to explain global associations with local examples of press in Turkey. In other words, a widely and globally known idea might be surprisingly traced back to local cases. Before I analyse the main argument of the paper, I would like to continue with some striking examples of idea entrepreneurs in order to provide some familiarity with the theoretical framework and with the data analysis processes.

Would Turkish political analyses be in a different form than today if Cengiz Çandar and Cüneyt Arcayürek –widely known Turkish columnists- were not the 'advisors' – respectively- of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, the eighth and ninth presidents of Turkish Republic? What about the idea of 'post-modern coup' that was in fact

used first by an un-authored the *Economist*'s article on February 15, 1997 to describe an intervention in Ecuador? The term would have most probably faded into oblivion if it were not cited and effectively used by many different columnists later all around the world in different contexts.[53] Why is it newsworthy that the photograph of Obama that he is holding Fareed Zakaria's book –*The Post-American World*- in his hand appears in the *New York Times* and entitled as "What Obama is Reading?"[54] Is it the importance of Zakaria's – a political analyst in a think tank, policy advisor, and opinion journalist- ideas that mean for a President? Would it not make many things different if Gamal Abd-el Nasser consulted Mohamed Hassanein Heikal –an *al-Ahram* columnist- in the 1950s? (Talhami, 2010: 341) It is hard to know then-foresights of these actors about the potential impact of their policies/ideas/actions; however, these questions listed above should be in the affirmative. The absence of these ideas would have made a difference. Two of the examples above, the ideas of 'cold war' and 'containment policy', vividly indicate how influential new ideas are in world politics.[55] For the varying fields of analyses in social sciences, these actors make a difference –first- with their ideas and –second- with the dissemination of these ideas. The above-mentioned people are among those who made a difference

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[53] To give some examples, Jonathan Steele –the Guardian columnist- in November 26, 2004 used the concept to signify the coup in Ukraine; and Türker Alkan and Cengiz Çandar –Turkish columnists- used it to address February 28, 1997 coup in Turkey.

[54] Dwight, Garner. May 21, 2008. "What Obama is Reading?." Retrieved from: http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/what-obama-is-reading/

[55] 'The Cold War' was a new idea "that caused leaders to act in distinct ways and created expectations about how other leaders would act." The ideational analysis therefore brings these 'shared' ideas of the actors into the attention of the scholarship since the significance of ideas is due to not only the circumstances the actors face, but also the actors themselves and their interpretive frameworks. (Béland and Cox, 2011:8)

with their ideas. I argue that they are *idea entrepreneurs*[56] not only through creating

or innovating new ideas, but also through disseminating them.

Take the idea of *glasnost ('openness')*, for instance. It is an idea initiated by

Gorbachev - the last secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union- to reform

the Soviet economy and policies. An idea is not independent from the context and

from the era it flourishes in; but its impacts or repercussions are not within the

boundaries of the country it rises from. In 1980s, it is possible to experience the

impacts of the idea of glasnost not only in USSR, but also in other countries via

public debates. As a case in point here, if Turkish columnists would not disseminate

the idea of glasnost by bringing it into the public debate of Turkish society –either in

a constructive or critical manner- through their columns, how would the transition

into liberal economic model differ? Before the Soviet influence, it is difficult to

come up with a settled discussion on social (in)justice, liberalism (economic),

privatization of state economic enterprises, so on and so forth in public debates that

the columnists construct or reconstruct. With the influence of Gorbachev's ideas, the

late 1980s saw intense debates on whether Turkey would prefer a socialist or a

liberal economic model. These debates appear –with diverging perspectives in it- in

the columns of Mehmet Barlas (November 21, 1983; December 1, 1987; December

5, 1987), Taha Akyol (November 7, 1987), Hasan Cemal (October 30, 1987;

November 9, 1987), and Cüneyt Arcayürek (December 1, 1983). Despite their

diverging political outlooks, these columnists function in a similar way in bringing a

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[56] I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Zeki Sarıgil who in our productive conversations in the very early stages of this dissertation led me to this concept through his fruitful advice on some international relations readings and specifically on some readings of Mark Blyth and Marta Finnemore.

new idea into circulation in the public agenda and in bringing it into the attention of political actors.

The prominence of glasnost underlies in the results it contributed to after the collapse of Soviet Union. First, the policy of openness (glasnost) contributed to the process of political liberalization in post-Soviet countries because it paved the way for public discussions on the demands for political liberalization. The success of glasnost –as an idea- is a controversial issue. On the one hand, glasnost is considered as a failed idea since it did not resulted in 'tangible' solutions to the problems and Soviet Union collapsed afterwards. On the other hand, with glasnost, the overwhelming suppress over the media systems of Soviet countries started to dissolve. The idea paved the way for a more open public debate in which (former) Soviet-nation-states started to make claims of autonomy. In their studies Kabirov and Smith illustrate how the environment of media in Uzbekistan (a former Soviet country) started to transform with the declining pressures over media thanks to the public forum the glasnost policy brings into the Soviet society. In the early 1980s, they argue, media within the boundaries of USSR experienced different levels of freedom. With the process of glasnost, organization of public demonstrations became available, and "opposition newspapers printed opinions not passed down from controlling government organs. But most outstanding was the change in public attitude; people were not afraid openly to express their thoughts, as would previously have been considered dangerous." (Kabirov and Smith, 2002: 50)

İbrahim Müteferrika is another example to indicate the role of idea entrepreneurs in dissemination of new ideas. Müteferrika is the first entrepreneur of printing in the

Ottoman state. Even though his commercial success is a controversial issue, he is considered as an idea entrepreneur thanks to the innovations he brought into the Ottoman society. One of the innovations he provided is the publication of books. At societal level, it is a remarkable change because "those who owned such printed and expensive books were not only Ottoman military and bureaucratic officials but also religious functionaries." (Sabev, 2007: 76-77) It is important because it has been alleged that religious functionaries (*ulema*) were opposing the printing press. (Sabev, 2007: 77; Mardin, 2015: 152) The other contribution Müteferrika did to the Ottoman society was translation of alternative sources and print them. It was important because at that time, public broadcasting and daily newspapers did not exist in the society. Enterprising a printing house therefore was the catalyst of a changing society. As these scant examples indicate, the scope of the ideational analysis studies remains limited, and amongst different groups of idea entrepreneurs, columnists are the group that was not adequately studied in the literature.[57]

This study attempts to shed a light on this group –columnists. The significance of the research does not only lie in the new concept of idea entrepreneur, but also in its role as bridging various theoretical grounds such as media and communication theories, state theories, and entrepreneurship theories. In this sense, it is an interdisciplinary research. Starting from the new institutionalist approach –in order to explain the prominence of ideas in scientific research- I try to discuss why ideas and their diffusion should be considered as 'value'. This argument will bring us to the second point that thanks to the idea-as-value, the entrepreneurs of new ideas should be evaluated within the boundaries of entrepreneurship studies.

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[57] For a detailed discussion on the adequacy of the studies on columnists, please see: *Studying the Significance of Columnists* in this paper.

In the following parts, first I will introduce the significance of studying columnists; second, I will try to explain the importance of studying ideas in social sciences by benefitting generally from new institutionalist approaches; and third, I will explain the concept *idea entrepreneur* by benefitting from entrepreneurship literature (basically via the fields of management, economics, and political science). After theoretical discussions, in the following chapter I will present the data of my research on the single case study on Turkish columnists. The research embodies in the research question that how do the columnists –idea entrepreneurs- conceive the state in Turkey? The research is framed with the time period 1983-2007 and with ten leading newspaper columnists in Turkey.

2.2.1. The Importance of Ideas in Political Science: Studying Columnists as Idea Entrepreneurs

2.2.1.1. How Ideas are Treated and Neglected in Social Sciences: Sociology of Knowledge, and History of Ideas

One of the essential theories that take ideas into the consideration of their analyses is the new-institutionalist theory. It will be discussed in the next part. Beside new institutionalists, there are two other fields that study ideas: one of them is the studies

of the *history of ideas* and the area of *sociology of knowledge*.[58] Even though these

two areas study ideas, neither of them proposes that 'ideas matter'. Instead, they take

ideas as given, and then they focus on the sociological foundations of the given idea.

In contrast, in this study I attempt to bring an alternative view on ideas by having a

different account of 'ideas'. In this study, ideas are not accounted 'given'.

Nonetheless, it is possible to have some commonalities among this study and the

other two areas. This study benefits from neo-institutionalist approaches to 'idea'.

Having said that, there are some commonalities between the latter one and the

historical institutionalist approach to ideas. In some significant studies of the history

of ideas –such as Skinner and Pocock- we come up with a historical institutionalist

approach. (Schulz and Weiss, 2010: 287) It is better to denote here that the studies of

history of ideas do not have a homogeneous approach in evaluating idea/concept.

Likewise, Bevir (2004:81) called Skinner as 'conventionalist', Pocock as

contextualist, and diverged Schulz and Weiss from the other two.

In history of ideas and the studies on the sociology of knowledge, idea is 'given' or

taken for granted. Very basically, the history of ideas "attempts (among other things)

to trace the birth and development of some of the ruling concepts of a civilisation or

culture through long periods of mental change" (Berlin,1980: xvii) To put it

differently, these studies take –first- ideas as 'given' and then trace the birth of it.

The subfield of sociology of knowledge adopts a similar approach to 'idea'. In his

Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim takes 'thought' and 'idea' alike and he considers

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[58] The conceptual history studies can also be added in these areas that take ideas as the tool of analysis, however, there is a sharp distinction between conceptual historians and historians of ideas. According to the former group, 'idea' is too vague as a unit of analysis. The conceptualization and operationalization of ideas might be problematic. Concepts, as more 'concrete' and definable units of inquiry, are the research frames of this group. For a well-detailed explanation on these differences, please see: Richter, 1995.

thought as a collective activity that is context-specific and given. (Mannheim, 1979: 2, 3, 7, 9)

Similarly, Cangül Örnek (2015: 36) characterizes her study as adhered to the field of conceptual history. She argues that there are different approaches within the studies of history of concepts. Some of them analyse the history of *action* and some focuses on the history of *idea*. She claims that methodologically, her study is in the latter group among the studies of history of ideas. The present research detaches from Örnek's approach of ideas in the sense that while analysing idea entrepreneurs, I do not make clear-cut divisions between ideas and actions since idea is conceptualized in this study as 'cluster' and 'catch-all' concept (Blyth, 2003; Blyth, 1997) that are in interaction with people's preferences, actions, behaviors and interests. (Ruschemeyer, 2006; Blyth, 2011; Blyth 2003; Béland and Cox, 2011; Rodrik, 2014)[59]

Considering the studies on Turkey, Koloğlu identifies the inadequacy in ideational analysis. With specific reference to *Takvim-i Vekayi* newspaper[60] Koloğlu (1981: vii) compares Western societies with Ottoman-Turkish society in the sense that how changes in economic structure influences the tools of opinion formations. While doing this, the author proposes that in the Ottoman state –different from the developments in the West- the structural change in opinion formation is prior to the structural changes in economic system. He pinpoints that, interestingly enough, there is not adequate studies on this issue. The existing research on press history of Turkey

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[59] Conceptualization and operationalization of idea will be available in this chapter.

[60] See: Koloğlu, Orhan (1981) *Takvim-i Vekayi: Türk Basınında 150 Yıl 1831-1981*. Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği Yayınları.

has handled the topic as a matter of development versus underdevelopment or in terms of the relations between rulers and the press; but how press impacted on the society ideationally has remained neglected. The existing studies on press evaluated the events chronologically or from a limited perspective. Did everything come to an end when a newspaper was closed down, Koloğlu asks. Or did the influence of his ideas terminate when Namık Kemal –an intellectual and Ottoman journalist- was in exile? Koloğlu (1981: vii) notifies that even if an institution does not continue to exist, its mentality (ideas) endures. The explanations pinpoint the significance and negligent parts of ideational analysis research.

2.2.1.2. Ideas are 'Honored' in Social Sciences: New Institutionalism and the Development of Ideational Analysis

What was distinctive about Lippmann, for example, that he was called "a one-man State Department" (Ghiglione, 1990: 33)? Or was it that he was so 'privileged' to be invited with his wife, Helen, by Nikita Khrushchev "to a hunting lodge in the Soviet Urals to discuss ways of thawing the *cold war* (the phrase was introduced by Lippmann)" in the tense years of the US-Soviet relations? (Meyer, 1990: xii)[61] Why was it that it was Lippmann to receive the invitation, but not a top-level American politician since the issue on the agenda was high politics? How could a columnist – again Lippmann- 'dare' to declare opinion on the Mediterranean Pact in order to 'persuade' then-US-government to renounce from this Mediterranean policy not to 'piss off' Soviet Russia? (Erkin, 1986: 57) Speaking of 'persuasion', how then did

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[61] Emphases are mine.

Horace Greeley -the editor of the New York Tribune, 1862- 'persuade' Lincoln administration to pass a law of emancipation of the slaves (namely, confiscation law) through his editorial open letter on freeing the slaves? (Ghiglione, 1990, 29-30) Was it solely the effect –of the editorial column- 'of nudging the president' as Ghiglione argued (1990: 29) or is there something more than that?

The examples above indicate that ideas can be powerful in the formulation of foreign policy, in nation-wide policy changes, and in international relations, albeit the influence of ideas is not limited to only these areas. This study asserts that what is more than 'persuasion' and what is more distinctive about these actors is not only their international (or national) fame but their ideas and the impact of the diffusion of these ideas because: i.) these agents create a sphere of influence thanks to their ideas, and ii.) they use this sphere to create new ideas owing to the networks provided by this sphere of influence. However, the prominence of ideas is mostly neglected by the related studies as I pointed out. The following paragraphs will discuss first a conceptualization of 'idea', second, why and how ideas matter in social sciences, and third, why and how diffusion of ideas is important. Before I start, in terms of the development of ideational analysis, it is useful to remember that "this is still an emerging field, and offering firm conclusions at this point would be premature." (Mehta, 2011: 26)

A clarification of *idea* is a difficult task because it involves different elements in it and distinguishing the boundaries of these elements might be demanding. Yet what is acknowledged as a common characteristic of ideas in ideational studies is that ideas matter and they shape people's preferences, actions, behaviors and interests.

(Rueschemeyer, 2006; Blyth, 2011; Blyth 2003; Béland and Cox, 2011; Rodrik, 2014) Rueschemeyer distinguishes three elements in clarification of ideas: the *cognitive* characteristic of ideas, *normative* nature of ideas, and the third category points to *tastes and desires*. The cognitive character refers to "descriptions of what is the case and tools for understanding how things work"; while normative ideas include "ideals, values, and norms [that] define what is good and bad". All of these characteristics of ideas shape people's preferences. (Rueschemeyer, 2006: 228) Similarly, Blyth (2003) defines ideas as cluster concepts. "As clusters, ideas embrace thoughts, emotions, and desires, as well as interests, all in delicate and fluid balance with one another." (Béland and Cox, 2011: 11) In addition to these characteristics, Blyth (2003) argues that ideas also refer to *beliefs*.[62] In the light of all these descriptions, I will tackle ideas as a broad conceptual scheme that involves all of these categories: cognitive structures, tastes and desires, normative values, and beliefs.[63] These characteristics may be found –either hidden or explicitly- in the agent's discources, preferences, interests, and/or actions.[64]

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[62] There is a link between ideas, interests, and beliefs. For Blyth, "ideas matter because they can actually alter people's conception of their own self-interest. ... So if being believed is functionally equivalent to being true, then belief itself becomes politically and economically efficacious. Ideas therefore do not "really" need to correspond to the "real" world in order to be important in that world." (Blyth, 2003: vii)

[63] Even though I am concerned with the interaction of all three features of ideas, I attempt to distinguish them -to a possible extent- in my coding categories in the content analysis. For example, in the first group among the four main coding themes, I look for the direct definition of the state, executed by the columnists. However, the pilot application of codes indicated that this theme should distinguish different levels/types of the columnist's ideas. As a result, coding categories distinguish a *normative* description of state ('what the state should be' code) from a *cognitive* definition ('what the state is?' code), and from a *desired* definition ('what the society expects from the columnist while approaching to the state?' or 'Is it the columnists' own definition or is it the society's/a scholar's definition of the state that the columnist lives in or inspired from).

[64] This is one of the reasons in the selection of my methodological techniques –interviews, and qualitative content analysis. Necessary details on the conduct of the research are provided in the methodology chapter.

The studies that portray the importance of ideas in scientific research correspond to rather a late era. In a relatively more systematic manner, ideas were initially studied by the new institutionalist paradigms in 1970s and 1980s.[65] Following these decades, the increasing interest in ideas can be found in different fields of social sciences such as political economy, comparative politics, sociology, international relations, and history.[66] With the stimulations of the new institutionalists, varying disciplines in social sciences now acknowledge that ideas play a central role in shaping political behavior and political outcomes and that is why studying ideas provides richer explanations of politics (Béland and Cox, 2011: 4-5) because "ideas came to be seen as the crucial variable in understanding both the path of institutional change and the origins of change itself." (Blyth, 1997: 230) In this way, I can suggest, ideas -as a variable and 'important explanatory concept' (Blyth, 1997: 230)- help social sciences not to explain social phenomena through solely causal or linear relationships. Based on this 'ideational turn' by the new institutionalist approaches "ideas become desiderata, catch-all concepts to explain variance." (Blyth, 1997: 231)

Béland and Cox draw attention to six factors to explain how ideas become important in political analysis. (2011: 6- 8) First, in the 1970s and 1980s behaviourism and system theoretical explanations per se were found not satisfactory enough to explain socio-political phenomena. Likewise, new institutionalism emerged and brought ideational analysis as a factor to explain political phenomena. Three main schools developed within new institutionalism: cultural (sociological), historical, and rational choice institutionalisms. Along with the development of new institutional

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[65] Different paradigms of the new institutionalism include historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and cultural/sociological institutionalism.

[66] For a list of these fields focusing on ideas, please see: Blyth, 1997; and Béland and Cox, 2011: 4, 6-8.

approaches, "a number of scholars associated with these approaches gradually turned to ideas to explain specific phenomena that such approaches could not explain alone." (Béland and Cox, 2011: 6) The fruitful discussions have bridged interdisciplinary fields –such as political economy and comparative politics- with ideational research thanks to the leading efforts of some scholars such as Mark Blyth, John L. Campbell, and Peter Hall. (Béland and Cox, 2011: 6-7)

The second factor in the advance of ideas in social sciences is related to the sociological field. With the impact of ideational analysis, the role of culture in politics has been reevaluated and therefore, the importance of frames and discursive approaches has gained prominence. (Béland and Cox, 2011: 7) Together with this ideational turn in sociology, social movements started to break from materialist approaches and evolve into ideational assessments in which the key role of ideologies and discursive frames were newly emphasized. (Béland and Cox, 2011: 7) The rethinking of culture in politics illustrated the impact of cultural categories on policy development. (Brian Steensland, 2006 cited in Béland and Cox, 2011: 7) The enhancing role of interpretative frames with ideational analysis leads us to another factor that influences historical paradigms.

Therefore, thirdly, the ideational turn has also influenced historical approaches in political science. The previously simplistic and materialist view of the concept of ideology has a new take with ideational analysis in which the concept is reclaimed by a new generation of political theorists and detached from solely dichotomous Marxist tradition that prescribes ideology in the frame of infrastructure and superstructure. (Béland and Cox, 2011: 8)

The fourth factor is related to the field of policy analysis which "witnessed the development of new scholarship on issues such as agenda setting and problem definition, which helped move ideational analysis back to the center of policy studies." (Béland and Cox, 2011: 7) As the examples (see: pages 15-16) also displayed, ideas play a crucial role in policy analysis. Walter Lippmann's dominating role in agenda setting, policymaking, and in the formulation of foreign policy sets a good example in this interacting position of ideational analysis and interdisciplinary fields of social sciences.

The fifth factor in the development of ideational analysis points to the field of international relations. With the increasing impact of constructivist school, the field has experienced the stress upon the structuring role of ideas, discourse, and culture in foreign policy. (Béland and Cox, 2011: 8) This new emphasis also points to the significance of actors, not only circumstances. A particular example is the idea of the Cold War. It was an idea that "caused leaders to act in distinct ways and created expectations about how other leaders would act. The study of these shared ideas, therefore, requires attention to the interpretive frameworks held by actors, not only to the circumstances they face." (Béland and Cox, 2011: 8) This is also one of the significances of the present study that focuses on the columnists as actors of spreading new ideas.

Finally, scholars of identity and inequality politics also contributed to ideational analysis.[67] These scholars "demonstrate how ideas and discourse are embedded in

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[67] Béland and Cox (2011: 8) lists these scholars as: Bleich 2003; Jenson 1989; Lieberman 2002;

gendered beliefs and inequalities" (Béland and Cox, 2011: 8). To conclude all of

these factors above, ideas have gained importance through ideational analysis, which

is mainly introduced by new institutionalism. These factors can be summarized as:

the dissatisfaction with behaviorism and system theory and the decline of them; the

emergence of new institutionalism; the reevaluation of 'culture' in political

sociology; increasing emphasis on the role of ideas in the field of policy analysis; the

constructivist school's (in the field of international relations) highlight on the role of

ideas and interpretive frameworks; reevaluation of the concept of ideology by new

generation of political scientists and theorists, and demonstration of the

embeddedness of ideas and discourse in identity politics. All of the factors indicate

how ideas are reclaimed and used as explanatory variables in empirical research in

different fields of social sciences.

In what ways do ideas become explanatory variables in social sciences? Andrew

Rich's research on American knowledge regime is a befitting example to see the

significance of ideas in politics.[68] In his study, Rich examines "the production and

dissemination of policy expertise and ideas within the American knowledge regime

—and, in particular, what accounts for the success of conservative ideas relative to

those of political liberals during the past four decades." (2011: 191) Using public

policy think tanks in his case study, Rich attempts to understand "the organizational

infrastructure for conservative and liberal ideas in American policy making" (2011:

191) and he concludes that "ideas have power both in policy making and in the

organization of policy making" (2011: 192) because they "drive political change",

Lieberman, 2011 in Béland and Cox (eds); Mahon 2006; Padamsee 2009; White 2002.

[68] For further research on independent force of ideas on institutions and policy decisions, please see:
Derthick and Quirk (1985), Goldstein and Keohane (1993). (Rich, 2011: 193)

and "inform and constrain political preferences and institutional arrangements" (2011: 193). He also denotes that the importance of ideas is "independent from the material positions of actors in politics and policy making" (Rich, 2011: 193).

As a result of his study, Rich raises an essential question: what accounts for the success of some ideas over the others? (2011: 191) Similarly, Mehta asked, "what differentiates victorious ideas from their rivals?" (2011: 26) For example, was the first Ottoman printing press pioneered by İbrahim Müteferrika a success or failure, considering the thousands of unsold copies of books he had printed?[69] These questions will lead us to one of the methodological limitations –if not a 'problem'- encountered in ideational analysis: tracing ideas.[70]

Tracing ideas is a difficult task because ideas diffuse but they may either fail and disappear, or alter, finally appear in a different form, and become successful in the process of diffusion. In my view, this –both methodological and practical- consideration on process-tracing in ideational analysis is one of the reasons why academic interest on idea has not consolidated yet. Nevertheless, it has been a burgeoning field despite the practical limitations.[71] That is why emphasizing the question above in ideational analysis might propose an alternative in future studies, therefore the methodological considerations on failed ideas or on tracing ideas might be clarified.

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[69] Although Müteferrika's printing enterprise is discussed as a failure by some historical readings, he is considered as the first person who paved the way for and/or contributed to the development of scientific thought in Ottoman society thanks to the printing houses that initiated in a relatively late period. (Sabev, 2007: 78)

[70] Further discussions on tracing ideas will be provided in the conclusion chapter.

[71] For a list of the studies signifying this enhancing interest in ideational analysis, please see: Mehta, 2011: 23.

Another study that underscores the importance of ideas as a variable belongs to

Jeffrey Chwieroth (2007) "who tested the role of neoliberal ideas in the changing

policy priorities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)." (Béland and Cox, 2011:

17) In his study, Chwieroth examined "the educational backgrounds of key staff of

the IMF." He hypothesized that the neoliberal ideas of these people "would be

formed during their years of university education" and these ideas "can be traced

back to departments of economics at eight universities whose professors were the

architects of neoliberalism." (Béland and Cox, 2011: 17) This example also points to

the problem of tracing the ideas in ideational analysis. Tracing the ideas which

succeeded may not pose a problem, but what about the ones which failed? This is

one of the empirical difficulties in ideational research and that is the reason there is a

scarcity on failed ideas.[72]

To sum up, ideas are important and powerful in many ways such that they *matter*

(influence/shape/change) in policy formulations, in determining people's beliefs and

interests, and in making institutional changes. In this study, considering this

comprehensive role of ideas, I endeavour to focus on columnists as the initiators and

disseminators of new ideas. Now, I will attempt to figure out why and how diffusion

of ideas is important. Later on, I will use the following explanations in the part on

Entrepreneurship to signify why ideas and diffusion of them renders a 'value' which

leads us to the notion of 'idea entrepreneur'.

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[72] For an example of a failed idea, see: Rogers, 2003: 1-5. Not on 'failed' ideas but on 'mistaken ideas', you can find striking examples –such as nuclear weapons policies- in Clarke, 2006.

2.2.1.3. Diffusion of Ideas

Diffusion is seen as a special type of communication. (Rogers, 2003: 5) It is defined as a "process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system." And it is special because "the messages are concerned with new ideas" (Rogers, 2003: 5) Not only communication, but diffusion is also defined as a kind of *social change* because through the 'invention' of new ideas –that is either adopted or rejected- it leads to certain social consequences. (Rogers, 2003: 6) Generally in the literature, the studies on diffusion (of innovations or of ideas) use the term 'diffusion' or 'dissemination' for the spread of 'inventions'. As Rogers argued, "some authors restrict the term "diffusion" to the spontaneous, unplanned spread of new ideas and use the concept of "dissemination" for diffusion that is directed and managed." (Rogers, 2003: 6) In the present study, *diffusion*, *dissemination*, and *spread* (of ideas) will be used interchangeably with no regard to whether the spread is spontaneous or planned.

Diffusion of ideas is a complex issue because first, generally it does not seem possible to find a *linear* dissemination of a specific idea because ideas are 'context-specific' (Mehta, 2011: 30). That is why a causal approach in examining the diffusion of an idea may not be a productive effort. Second, tracing ideas itself is a difficult task as I pointed before. In the process of diffusion, ideas may fail (adopted or rejected), they may transform or during the process their actors (executers) may

vary, or they may change the context they exist in.[73] So it is difficult to track these changing agents and structures. Nonetheless, diffusion of ideas deserves particular attention because -as this study assumes- it is a *sui generis* form of 'capital' -that will be explained in the following parts. Despite this particular significance, the diffusion of ideas does not take enough academic curiosity that it deserves.

Sarafoglou and Paelinck (2008: 477) pinpoint that "the quantitative diffusion of industrial innovations has been studied extensively in the last fifty years (see Griliches 1957; Hagerstrand 1967; Haynes et al. 1977; Geroski 2000; Mansfield 2002; Rogers 2003)"; however the diffusion of *ideational* innovations is a newly developing field and there is still a scarcity of comprehensive research. (For some exceptions please see: Rueschemeyer, 2006; Goodin & Tilly, 2006). "Many scientists have advocated that the diffusion of innovations is of great importance, because innovations generate productivity increases of production processes. On the contrary, the diffusion of ideas in Academia is a subject with very limited references (Reisman 1992; Forsund and Sarafoglou 2002, 2005; Gattoufi et al. 2004; Heap and Parikh 2005)." (Sarafoglou and Paelinck, 2008: 477) One of the outstanding reasons of this famine of interest on the diffusion of ideas might be the fact that "in scientific inquiry, ideas are underrated vis-à-vis material interests as motives for political and social action." In other words, "as objects of scientific inquiry, ideas have held a

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[73] There are further factors that influence the diffusion of ideas. For example, Rueschemeyer argues that "one of the conditions shaping the efficacy of ideas is almost certainly how new ideas articulate with various bodies of prevailing ideas. In turn, new ideas may exert very forceful influence if they succeed in shaping these taken-for-granted understandings." (2006: 228) Economic, political, and social viabilities of an idea may also influence the diffusion. (Rueschemeyer, 2006: 241) Different 'types' of ideas may also exert different degrees of influence of ideas (and of diffusion). (Rueschemeyer, 2006: 241) For example, cognitive ideas may relate to established ideas in an easier way in comparison to normative ideas (vice versa is possible). (For different 'types' of ideas, please see the clarification of ideas previously in this chapter. Briefly, ideas, their diffusion, and their efficacy are not independent from the conditions and the context.

beleaguered status, often derided as imprecise or placed lower in status than material interests as motives for political and social action." (Beland and Cox, 2011: 6) However, since "people produce them, develop them, disseminate them, and consume them" (Beland and Cox, 2011: 6) this study suggests that dissemination of ideas should be a concern in evaluating new forms of 'capital'. Based on this hypothesis, I will introduce the theoretical frame of idea entrepreneur in the following part.

To begin with, can ideas be capital? According to Baetjer and Lewin, yes, ideas can be capital especially in the post-industrial information age and digitally-based world. (2007: 3) Not only scarcity in academic interest, but also the relation between diffusion of ideas and technological development can be another factor that urges the researcher to focus on dissemination of ideas as providing alternative understandings of *value* and *capital*. Even though the interest on diffusion is not only limited with the contemporary era in which technological developments –such as the Internet-influence the means and scope of the diffusion of ideas; pre-industrial and post-industrial tools -for diffusion- change and they reflect some differences. For example in pre-industrial or newly industrialized societies, access to information and the speed of this access are not equally important in comparison to the post-industrial societies. Today, in post-industrial era, the core concern is not only to have access to information, but also to have the 'quickest' access as possible because this velocity to knowledge may alter the ingredients of information. As a result, the more the speed of the diffusion gains importance, the more diffusion of ideas also becomes important in contemporary knowledge regime.

Not only the accumulation of knowledge thanks to technological developments but also how we understand it also changes in post-industrial era, compared to industrial or pre- industrial era. That is one of the arguments of this study that in post-industrial era, not only ideas but also the ways to diffuse them also matter. Some examples of this speed of dissemination of ideas can be found in contemporary social movements such as Arab Spring in 2010s, and the Gezi Park Protests in Turkey in 2013. As an example, these events indicated the transforming means of social movements.

2.2.2. Entrepreneurship

So far, I have discussed why ideas are important and how they matter in social sciences as an alternative variable explaining political and social change. I have also made some introductory statements on why and how diffusion of ideas matters. In this part, first, based on some theoretical discussions on entrepreneurship, I will try to describe what an entrepreneur is, and what the characteristics of an entrepreneur are. Second, I will try to compare and contrast various types of entrepreneur -namely political entrepreneur, policy entrepreneur, and social entrepreneur. The comparison will lead us to the new concept of idea entrepreneur. Finally, in this part, I will display the nexus between idea entrepreneur and the single case study on columnists.

Entrepreneurship is a fertile concept that is used by many different disciplines such as economics, political science, and management. The dense literature of the concept

is laden with numerous definitions of 'entrepreneur', yet there is no consensus for a unique description among the different group of scholars. Commercial/financial/business entrepreneur, political entrepreneur, social entrepreneur, policy entrepreneur are just some examples of this variance. This study does not intend to add another delineation to this already intense concept, but it attempts to draw attention into the growing importance of 'idea' as a value. New institutionalists have pioneered to emphasize the importance of ideas to explain socio-political phenomenon, but the literature has not been mature enough to focus on ideas as they are, as discussed before. Through this concept *idea entrepreneur*, I attempt to bring the importance of ideas-as-value into the agenda.

In initiating the concept *idea entrepreneur*, Joseph Schumpeter's term *political entrepreneur* was inspirational.[74] A dominating part of the studies on entrepreneurship belongs to the field of economics, but this study suggests that this concept can be borrowed from this domain into the field of political science as Schumpeter did before, by bringing up the concept of political entrepreneur through which he opened the path for a new understanding of 'capital' (Wunder, 2015: 513). Beside its economical connotation, entrepreneur is referred to as the individual who changes the direction and flow of politics. (Schneider and Teske, 1992: 737; Schneider and Eric; 1995) In fact, the concept has already been used in different areas, and in diverse forms such as political entrepreneur, policy entrepreneur, public entrepreneur, managerial entrepreneur, bureaucratic entrepreneur, institutional entrepreneur (Schneider and Teske, 1992; Hederer, 2007; Lowe and Marriott, 2006) and social entrepreneur (Bornstein, 2007; Santos, 2012) These are just to indicate the

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[74] Although the term "political entrepreneur" originated with Schumpeter, the term "entrepreneur" in political science can be traced back to Robert Dahl. (Sheingate, 2003: 187)

variance in the use of the concept, entrepreneur, nearby its economical reference. Before I compare and contrast different types of entrepreneurs, I will try to clarify who an entrepreneur is by providing some basic characteristics based on entrepreneurship theories.

In reviewing the literature on entrepreneurship, Sheingate (2003: 188) identifies three general attributes. These are: first, "entrepreneurs shape the terms of political debate: they frame issues, define problems, and influence agendas." Second, "entrepreneurs are a source of innovation: they invest resources in the creation of a new policy, a new agency, or new forms of collective action. … Policy entrepreneurs also occupy a critical interface in the process of innovation by "joining problems, policies, and politics"; third, "entrepreneurs somehow consolidate innovations into lasting change: entrepreneurs have transformative effects on politics, policies, and institutions".

Regarding the fact that *entrepreneurial characteristic* is not something fixed since it depends on the person and contextual circumstances (Lowe and Marriott, 2006: 40), Lowe and Marriott (2006, 39-40) defines some characteristics of entrepreneurial personality: need for achievement, high locus of control, ability to influence events rather than passively accepting them, and behaving in a proactive way, taking initiative. Likewise, Meredith, Nelson and Neck (1982 cited in Lowe and Marriott, 2006: 40) list some of these characteristics as: self-confidence, risk-taking activity, flexibility, and strong desire to be independent. Bolton and Thomson (2003: 213-219) suggest ten factors characterising entrepreneurs. First and foremost, entrepreneurs make a significant difference. They are able to do this because they:

are creative and innovative, spot and exploit opportunities, find the resources required to exploit opportunities, are good networks, are determined in the face of adversity, handle risk, have control of business, create capital (which can be aesthetic or social as well as economic).

In the light of these personality traits, this study presumes that the columnists - as agents of change, agenda-setters, informants of the public, risk-takers, innovators, and sometimes having a watch-dog role for the government policies- are idea entrepreneurs who contribute to change and to the initiation, circulation, and dissemination of ideas to have influence in politics and in the society together with their wide networks as their capitalistic resources. Initiating new ideas or contributing to the circulation of the existing ones is prominent because ideas and their diffusion constitute *value* and *capital* in the post-industrial knowledge regime, as discussed above. The following part will compare and contrast different types of entrepreneur in order to reveal who an idea entrepreneur is. It is better to denote that it is generally different to distinguish amongst several types of entrepreneurs because they have many characteristics in common that will be discussed in the coming part.

2.2.2.1. Different Types of Entrepreneurs: Political Entrepreneur, Policy Entrepreneur, and Social Entrepreneur

The notion of idea entrepreneur began with the concept *political entrepreneur* of Schumpeter. As both an economist and a political scientist, he put forward the idea of political entrepreneur in the intersection of his ideas on democracy and political

elites. He depicted democracy "as a system of contested leadership, with political

elites being able to influence and mold public opinion. Building on this line of

thought, the concept of political entrepreneurship was initiated in the 1960s (see for a

seminal contribution Dahl 1961) and subsequently gained prominence in the political

and administrative sciences." (Hederer 2007: 3) Schumpeter's idea of political

entrepreneur was path breaking. He associated entrepreneur with the concepts of

change and *innovation*; but the entrepreneur, for Schumpeter, has no role in

implementing this invented idea by himself (Hederer, 2007: 2). The innovative

concept *political entrepreneur* can be assumed as the origins of *policy entrepreneur*.

A policy entrepreneur is very similar to a political entrepreneur in influencing and

constructing public opinion; however, policy entrepreneurship is more specific with

policy formulation and policy changes.[75] In this regard, policy entrepreneurs are

more result-oriented in which they have the approach of problem-definition and

problem-solving particular to every single policy. As a result of policy

entrepreneurship activity, the capital is either an economic capital –depends on the

policy- or social capital, or both. Even though previously, Schumpeter stated that an

entrepreneur has no role in the implementation of the idea initiated by him/herself;

policy entrepreneurs generally bring policy solutions to implement.[76]

It might be difficult to distinguish different types of entrepreneur because they have a

lot in common. For example, there is a policy entrepreneur and social entrepreneur

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[75] Rodrik (2014), and Leighton and Lopez (2013) tend to associate political entrepreneur with policy innovations/solutions; and they reduce policy ideas into interests.

[76] For a seminal piece on how policy ideas can be interpreted as 'problem-definition' and 'problem-solving', please see: Mehta, 2006: 27.

distinction in the existing literature, however, if the issue is a social policy, how can we distinguish between policy entrepreneurship with social entrepreneurship? Similarly, differentiating between a commercial entrepreneur and social entrepreneur is difficult and they might have opaque boundaries. As Mueller et al. (2013: 305) put it, while commercial/financial entrepreneurs look for entrepreneurial opportunities "that will potentially allow the entrepreneur to generate and maximize *profits*, social entrepreneurs seek opportunities that allow them to generate *social value*."[77] And they add that "commercial entrepreneurs can also generate social value and social entrepreneurs will need to generate economic value in order to operate in a sustainable manner, however the primary focus differs."

2.2.2.2. Idea Entrepreneur

Before elaborating on how I conceptualize and operationalize the term 'idea entrepreneur' in this study, I would like to overview the existing literature on the term. The term 'idea entrepreneur' is used by John Butman (2013) and Köstem (2016) contemporaneously with this study. Butman's book remains a 'business/management' book for entrepreneurs which shows the ways to initiate ideas and succeed them. In other words, Butman shows how to put new ideas into action. However, this study treats the same concept very differently –as will be discussed subsequent to this review. The nomenclature is coincidental. Butman's

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[77] Emphases are mine.

'purpose' in his book as he pointed out is that "What is needed to take an idea public?" (2013: 5) With more broad terms, the subject of his book is "how the idea entrepreneur goes public, breaks out, and achieves influence" (Butman, 2013: 4) Butman is trying to propose a 'recipe' for the entrepreneurs (or the candidate entrepreneurs) to describe how to make ideas successful and to become an entrepreneur. In other words, even though he claims not to give 'tactical aspects of breaking out' through ideas; his book has mostly goal-oriented 'tactical' approach (Butman, 2013: 4) and he cannot get rid of this success-oriented approach throughout his book. Beside that, while evaluating/examining 'idea', Butman has a too result-oriented approach in which he matches ideas with 'success', and with the ideas which create change in behaviour. (Butman, 2013: 3) However, as I try to denote in this study, what about 'failed' ideas? Or how to call an idea a failed or successful one? Should we evaluate an idea only through its final results? In sum, Butman gives a recipe hereabout the 'practical use' of ideas instead of a methodological or philosophical approach on ideas.

Köstem's article reflects a purely international relations' perspective of ideational analysis in that he evaluates ideas in the scope of policy-making processes. In his policy-oriented explanations, Köstem (2016: 2) refers to idea entrepreneur as ''nonstate actors who advocate the entry into and subsequent institutionalization of an ideational cause in foreign policy'' and by this term, he aims to focus on foreign policy-making proposals. (2016: 15) Though considerable enough in terms of ideational analysis, how he distinguished the idea entrepreneur from norm or policy entrepreneurs as previously studied by various scholars remains obscure (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Köstem (2016: 2) converts the term 'norm

entrepreneur' to the term 'idea entrepreneur' by arguing that idea entrepreneurs ''differ from norm and policy entrepreneurs as the ideas that they advocate include a broad set of norms and policies rather than a single norm or policy. In other words, from Köstem's perspective, norm, policy, and idea entrepreneurs set the norms to influence foreign policy making. In his view, differences among these types of enrepreneurship pertain only to whether the change is about a single norm or a set of norms. Besides, in his article Köstem does not provide any answer how his conceptualization of 'idea entrepreneur' differs from Owen's (2010) depiction of *transnational networks*. He rather explains how a transnational network of pan-Turkist activists contributed to policy-making processes. (Köstem, 2016: 15) In a similar vein, while saying that 'ideas can constitute national interests and influence foreign policy making', Köstem (2016: 3) reduces 'idea' into interest or policy outcome as several other international relations studies did. This approach has already been criticized not only due to its reductionist understanding of an idea, but also because of the problematic nature of tracking ideas (to decide whether an idea has 'successful outcomes' or it 'failed').

Throughout my study, I also realized that the term idea entrepreneur was used previously but still in a restricted manner in some studies in the literature. (Owen, 2010; Sjöstedt 2013 as cited in Köstem, 2016; Leighton & López, 2013) In his book entitled *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States and Regime Change*, in which Owen (2010) proposes the importance of ideas in transnational networks, he also loosely mentions the term 'idea entrepreneur'. However he never conceptualizes what idea entrepreneur is throughout the book.[78]

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[78] Once he states that ''In chapter 5 we saw that ideas entrepreneurs challenged the predominant regime of absolute monarchy in the early and middle eighteenth century, but it was only when

He uses the term 'ideas entrepreneurs' (Owen, 2010: 76, 250), but never operationalizes the term throughout the book (he thoroughly provides the importance of ideas though). His scattered references to the concept do not provide the adequate/necessary sense how idea entrepreneurs redound to ideational analysis theory. Owen uses the term just as an expression rather than a theoretical tool. Instead, he grounds his theoretical discussions on Sikkink's *norm entrepreneur* concept.[79] Overall, Owen's use of 'ideas entrepreneur' does not reflect a full-fledged operationalization of the concept.

Leighton and López (2013) also use the concept 'idea entrepreneur' in their book *Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers: The Economic Engine of Political Change*. Since all (types of) entrepreneurs are, by nature, idea entrepreneurs, as I argue in the following section (*Idea Entrepreneur*), the use of the concept 'idea entrepreneur' without theoretical or conceptual elaboration is actually the result of this nature of any sort of entrepreneurial activity. For example, Leighton and López (2013: 51) restrictedly use the term in order to characterize 'political entrepreneur'. However in this study, the conceptual-analytical tool of *idea entrepreneur* is different from –yet complementary to- other forms or classifications of entrepreneurial activities. By this nature, coming across the use of idea entrepreneur (without adequately and theoretically elaboration on the term itself) in the related literature on entrepreneurship is not a coincidence. Every entrepreneur (political, social, economic, or other types) is innately an idea entrepreneur since each of them

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France's exemplary regime began to totter near bankruptcy that challengers gained many elite converts." (Owen, 2010: 250). Nevertheless, he never defines the term in the given chapter.

[79] However, I have already put the distinction between an idea and a norm in the part where I have conceptualized 'idea' as a cluster concept. Since ideas are acknowledged as cluster concepts, every norm is an idea whereas every idea may not necessarily be a norm.

''notice loose spots in the structure of ideas, institutions, and incentives and then find ways of implementing these new ideas into society's shared institutions'' (Leighton and López, 2013: 11); yet there is very limited space and studies in the literature that whose focal point is particularly on ideas themselves. In this regard, my research is not saving the world with the concept of idea entrepreneur, but trying to contribute to the neglected part in the literature.

Hitherto, scholars have a relatively limited but still considerable appraisal of the theoretical tool of idea entrepreneur. But how do I conceptualize 'idea entrepreneur' differently in this study? In the light of above explanations on entrepreneur, political entrepreneur, and social entrepreneur, this study claims that idea entrepreneur can be characterised as: initiating new and/or alternative ideas; contributing to form, alter, and transform ideas within society; introducing new combinations (of ideas); leading circulation of ideas; having accessibility of information; having initiative to share or not to share the information s/he has; having a relatively extended social network and using this network to access information; and agenda setter to a relative extent.

Complementary and very similar to the characteristics above, this study basically takes Bolton and Thompson's (2004:16) definition of entrepreneur into account while describing idea entrepreneur. They define entrepreneur as someone who habitually creates and innovates to build something of recognised value around perceived opportunities. This portrayal of entrepreneur provides significant keywords like 'habitually', 'innovate', 'recognised value', and 'perceived opportunities'. My formulation of Bolton and Thompson's statement for the case of columnists is as follows: the word 'habitually' refers to journalistic characteristics in

the sense that the columnists have investigative features due to their profession. 'Innovation' refers to the fact that the columnists innovate new ideas through their columns. By 'something of recognised value', it is possible to talk about ideas and their dissemination because in the present study, idea is considered as a value especially in the post-industrial information societies where ideas and their dissemination are *sine qua non* of the knowledge regime. (Baetjer and Lewin, 2007: 3) 'Perceived opportunities' in the definition will refer to the potential networks and sources of the columnists through which they turn a crisis into an opportunity.[80] This definition of Bolton and Thompson also indicates that there is not only one type of (commercial) entrepreneur since *value* is not only defined via financial capital, but there might be many different criteria of defining it.

One of the basic claims of entrepreneurship theories is that an entrepreneur creates value as a result of her/his entrepreneurial activity. Different types of entrepreneurs can create different types of value and capital. The specific value might be evaluated in terms of social and aesthetic capital as well as economic capital -even though the literature focuses predominantly on economic capital (which may also encapsulate 'interests'). In other words, it is the general tendency in the corresponding scholarship that financial entrepreneurs provide material capital –basically money- that is able to earn profit; while social and policy entrepreneurs generally create policy solutions –which can be assessed as 'social capital'.

In contrast to mainstream economics paradigms, this study suggests that while studying entrepreneurship, value and capital should not solely be described over

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[80] For example, Lippmann's interview with Khruschev was done in a crisis time- the Cold war- but it provided a leap for his own career.

material outputs. In these paradigms, capital is defined as "the ownership of productive property," but "what exactly is owned when there is no physical property?" (Wunder, 2015: 514) *Social capital* is a suitable example and may provide an alternative answer for this question because in various definitions of the term[81] the common feature of social capital is that it –generally- does not/may not provide physical property. Social networks, norms, trust, opportunities, cooperation for mutual benefit are some examples that indicate different sources of capital.

Considering alternative forms of value and capital, this study argues that ideas can provide value as a result of entrepreneurial activity. However, up to now, ideas were not thought as a value mostly because of the 'beleaguered status of ideas'[82]. This study argues that the value that the idea entrepreneur creates as a result of entrepreneurial activity is *ideas*. At this point, someone may critique this argument by saying that: all entrepreneurs are actually idea entrepreneurs because each type starts with an idea first. Though this is true, it is also the case that other types of entrepreneurs are result-oriented, and the idea is not a main concern/focus as the output of the entrepreneurial activity. However, in idea entrepreneurship, the idea itself proposes a value; and the dissemination of ideas constructs capital. To put it differently, the result of idea entrepreneurial activity may not be a material product, a policy solution, or a problem-definition, but a plain idea. Thus the main focus of an idea entrepreneur is the idea itself. Henceforth for an idea entrepreneur, not only the result but also the process is important (because the result might be eventually a

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[81] The literature on social capital is too extensive to examine here. It is not in the scope of this paper either. Please see: Coleman (1990: 302), Putnam (1995: 67), Fukuyama (1995: 10), Bourdieu (1985: 243).
[82] The impact of failed ideas on the accumulation of scientific knowledge in the field of medicine, physics, and other positive sciences are accepted as given; any mention of failed ideas in social sciences, however, is like looking for a needle in haystack.

'failed idea' as well). In conclusion, all types of entrepreneurs are idea entrepreneurs by nature, but their main focus might diverge during the entrepreneurial activity and this may result in the diversity in entrepreneurship typology.

To sum up, there are plenty of entrepreneurs in terms of their activities, the outcome of these activities, and the value they create as a result of entrepreneurial activity. The commonality among different types of entrepreneurs is that they "see something others miss or only see in retrospect" (Bolton and Thompson, 2004: 17). This retrospection can be considered one of the reasons why in ideational analysis tracking an idea is a difficult vocation, as discussed before.

So far, I have tried to provide the basic tenets of entrepreneurship. One of these tenets is that an entrepreneur has 'transformative effects on politics, policies, and institutions' (Sheingate, 2003: 188). An entrepreneur is able to change the society through his/her innovations, new ideas, and his/her *sui generis* foresight that 'others miss or only see in retrospect'. The transformative influence/force of entrepreneurs over society also brings another dimension into the broad debates on 'agent-structure' in social sciences. Through the notion of idea entrepreneur, I attempt to bring another emphasis in this debate. Prior to this study, I was on the 'actor' side of the discussion. In my conclusion chapter, I will present further remarks upon this discussion in the light of my research findings.

The present research focuses on columnists in Turkey as one of the salient transformative forces in the society. The influence of columnists in Turkey should not merely be evaluated within the general framework of 'media effects'. As Gabriel

Tarde announced "an item in the newspaper has no influence unless it becomes the subject of conversation" (Katz, 2015: 1023) and it is the columnists as one of these actors who make the items the subject of conversation, and therefore, gain influence in the society. Based on the theoretical attempt, *idea entrepreneur*, this research analyzes columnists' ideas on the state in Turkey.

2.3. Theories of State: Evaluation of the State in Turkey from a Comparative and Historical Perspective

2.3.1. Research Puzzle and The State Approaches in Turkey: From 'Father State' to 'Servant State'?

In the last decade in Turkey, the debates and hypotheses on state have been rekindled by several socio-political events since 2007 such as controversial Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, Gezi Park Protests, the few recent rifts between the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Gülen Movement, the new law that increased the power of Turkish National Intelligence Service (2014), and corruption allegations and finally the repercussions of a coup attempt in July 15, 2016 as the boiling point of Gülen-JDP rift . These recent events have launched an intense public debate on whether the state in Turkey is in the process to evolve from its conventional transcendental phase to a more obscure yet earthly representation. The notion of 'deep state', the reason of state, and the boundaries of the state authority in the 21st century have been opened for new discussions. Curiously enough, in this

new form, contemporary political elites seem to be highlighting 'administration' and 'governance' instead of a 'Weberian-Hegelian state'.[83]

The key events happened in the 2007-2016 period and subsequent debates on the state may point to a new era that may necessitate clarifying existing state theories, the (new) sphere of influence of state tradition in Turkey, and responding whether or not the state/state elites/political elites in Turkey are evolving into a new phase. Yet, conducting an academic research on these issues can only be the second step. The initial step should be to focus on the recent political history of Turkey. Only then, the researcher may have a chance to explain further developments and change –if any- in the state phenomenon in Turkey. This thesis addresses itself to the issue of state in Turkey as the printed press has portrayed it. It tackles with 1983-2007 period and ergo this research can be considered as the initial pillar of a long-winded study. The second pillar in this regard should be about the issue of state in Turkey in the post-2007 era. Last but not least the prospective comparison of the two time slots (1983-2007 and post-2007) will be considered as a significant contribution shedding light on the issue of state-society relations in Turkey.

The interest on the state in Turkey has always been alive not only among scholars but also among different groups/actors active in Turkish politics. This study takes the print media –specifically the columnists- among these numerous groups, as its focus group. By analyzing this socio-politically influential group, it attempts to find out how a carefully selected group of columnists conceive the state in Turkey.

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[83] This terminology refers to different state formations and traditions while comparing Turkey and Anglo-Saxon countries. A detailed analysis and comparison of different state traditions (in France, Germany, England, and Turkey) is available in: Heper, 2010: 22-42; and Heper, 2011: 239-241 and also this paper, Chapter 2.

The main curiosity of this research is to see how an idea entrepreneurial group –

columnists- portray the state in Turkey. The sophisticated relations of media and

politics have led the researcher to a straightforward research question: How do the

columnists conceive the notion of state in Turkey? The following concomitant, but

by no means secondary, questions arise from the overall research agenda: What are

the predominant conceptions of state for and among these columnists? If there are

differences among them, why do these differences exist? What account(s) for the

distribution of these difference(s) among them? Are these state understanding(s) of

the columnists fixed or have they evolved over time? In which periods do they shift

and why? Do these understandings coincide with the existing literature on the state in

Turkey? Eventually, what sorts of clues for future research on the state may these

perceptions of the columnists provide for researchers in terms of state-society

relations in Turkey?

In order to respond to these research questions in a single-case study, the researcher

analyzes ten leading columnists' newspaper columns in the 1983-2007 period via

nine critical junctures. In addition to qualitative content analysis, the data is

supported with semi-structured interviews conducted with these columnists from

May to September 2013.

All in all, this research may help us grasp the notion of state and political

environment in Turkey through the views of the print media and with special

reference to the state-society relations in the supposed economic and political

liberalization processes. To understand the state through the lenses of the print media

is deemed important because, first, as opposed to the existing studies on these columnists that remain extensively biographical or only reflect a journalistic approach, this research considers them as 'opinion makers' and 'idea entrepreneurs' to express their influence on politics and society. This gap in the literature makes the research question more important. Naturally, a single and homogeneous understanding of state for and among this group of columnists does not exist. Columnists' political views and their relations to state actors may not remain stable throughout the 1983-2007 period. Different decades may involve widely different processes and events that may lead to ruptures and shifts to varying degrees. Continuity in columnists' ideas, as an equally possible consequence, is of course not ruled out.

2.3.2. The Rationale of the Study and Background Information on The State in Turkey

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkish political life has been discussed on various dimensions. The constitutions in which democratic characteristics were dominating were made –such as 1924 Constitution. However, under the same constitution, Turkey also experienced a single-party period and the regime acquired a more authoritarian rather than a democratic tone. As a result, after the transition to the multi-party period in the 1950s, there have been considerable debates between the Republican People's Party and the Democrat Party (DP). The DP had come to government with a claim to develop Turkey's democracy but instead

showed authoritarian inclinations in its second term in government after 1954 elections. The 1961 Constitution was designed to remedy for this trajectory, but it reflected mostly liberal characteristics rather than being a democratic one, and the authority of Parliament was constricted by different institutions in practice. The development of political liberalism as a result has facilitated ethnic and religious groups in Turkey to be apparent. And the Turkish military, which considered that Atatürkism was in danger and the armed conflict among these ethnic and religious groups would lead the country on a disaster, interfered with politics second time.[84] After the intervention and with the new constitution in 1982, both the boundaries of liberalism and democracy were narrowed down.

After the 1980s, religion has come into play a role in different forms, and it was thrown into the forefront of Turkish political agenda in addition to the debates on Atatürkism and democracy. And this situation continued by this time. Occasionally, the state phenomenon, its conceptualization, normative (ought-to-be) views of its role appeared as the main axis of these debates among different groups. For example, the day after 1980 military intervention, Kenan Evren –the leader of the junta regime- referred to the collapse of the state and talked about the necessity of reconstructing it. (Heper, 1985) Afterwards, Turgut Özal brought forward the idea that term "the state for the nation" should be used in lieu of "the nation for the state". With Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "service to the people (*halka hizmet*)" and "public will" has become the leading emphases, and therefore, there were efforts to

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[84] During the continuing violence among different groups in 1970s and 80s, the military first intervened in politics first through the 1971 memorandum and -second time- more extensively in 1980.

remove different forms of tutelage over politics. Overall, through different political leaders, Turkey has proceeded to different types of state-society relations.[85]

Another issue that retained its seminal importance in Turkish studies is political culture and state tradition. Turkey's political culture reflects and is mostly shaped by a *strong state tradition* arising from the Ottoman period and continues to maintain its significance today (Heper, 1985; Heper and Keyman, 1998; Heper and Yıldırım, 2011; Kalaycıoğlu, 2012: 171) notwithstanding changing characteristics of state-society relations. This state tradition includes a continual and insistent understanding that emphasizes "how can the state be maintained?" (Heper, 2000: 66; Heper and Keyman, 1998) by the state elite. The impact of this understanding was not just limited to the state apparatus though; it widely influenced opinion makers and intellectuals as well. The main concern of this study is, therefore, to delve into this critical area of interaction between opinion makers (columnists) and the state through the lenses of the former, the columnists.

Although there are numerous studies on the state and state tradition in Turkey, the interdisciplinary studies on media-politics relationship are scarce. Especially the studies on how the media understand important political concepts are neglected. The studies on journalists- for instance- generally focus either on their professional careers or their reflections on daily politics.[86] These studies regretfully remain restricted to a rather narrow journalistic/communication studies perspective.

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[85] For a detailed analysis of these relations led by different political leaders in Turkey, please see: Heper and Sayarı, 2002.
[86] For some of these studies, see: Esendir, 2007; Coşkun, 2003; Coşkun, 2004; Coşkun, 2005; Besen, 1997.

To overcome the abovementioned absence in the literature, this study adopts a hybrid point of view because as McCargo pinpoints, "those who study politics generally have a limited understanding of media, and political scientists are mainly interested in 'political communication' issues such as election coverage and campaigning—what Cook (1998) calls 'the voter persuasion paradigm'. Those who study media generally have a weak understanding of politics, often espousing far-fetched and overly sympathetic interpretations of media." (2003: 1) In other words, in stark contrast to the existing literature that often handled this topic either with a communication/journalism perspective or from a pure political scientific angle, this research attempts to synthesise both points of views in its analyses of the collected data. This synthesis is made out of three separate but interconnecting theories: theories of state, theories of media, and theories of entrepreneurship.

2.3.3. The State Legacy and Turkish Political Life: Continuities of and Ruptures from the Past

State as an actor has been in the kernel of academic debates in Turkish studies. The state-society relations have generally been evaluated in the frame of a *transcendental state legacy* (Heper, 1985; Berki, 1979) inherited from the Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic wherein the state was always supreme and came prior to the society. However state-society relations –such as the state itself- are not inert. Currently, these relations might be an issue for different assessments. Likewise, recent political developments such as Gezi Protests, July 15, 2016 coup attempt, Gülen-JDP government rift in Turkey give the initial signals of 'bringing the state

back in' the agenda. This research does not propose an alternative evaluation of existing state theories in Turkey. Instead, it attempts to analyze the conceptualization of the state as portrayed by columnists. Before this analysis, it will be handy to overview the existing scholarly discussions on the state in Turkey.

Studying the state has never been an easy task. With Mann's words, "the state is undeniably a messy concept." (1986: 112) One of the reasons of this difficulty is defining the notion of the state. In this sense, the state is a 'problem solving and problem creating concept' (Dyson, 2009: vii) Several accounts on the different approaches to the state are available and have already been studied on various grounds. System-dominant structuralist theories, culturalist, rationalist and historical institutionalist views are nothing but a limited part of the vast literature. (Migdal, 2004: 236-262) An organizational approach of the state appears in some studies. (Skocpol, 1979) Alternatively, socio-political, legal, and philosophical (critical) stances to the state are discussed. (Dyson, 2009: 101) State-centric or statist views are also available. These views present the state as an autonomous entity (autonomous from society) (Migdal, 2004: 82) and a conceptual variable. (Nettle, 1968: 81) This paper will adopt the state-centric view while explaining the notion of the state in Turkey in general, and portraying the newspaper columnists' conceptualizations of the state in particular. The state in Turkey is a test case example of the state-centric approach in which the disintegration of the state from the society is apparent enough in the historical explanations of state-society relations.

There is a considerable literature which argues that in Turkey, there is a strong state tradition. Different interpretations and criticisms of this literature are also available.

Some scholars make a relatively superficial reading and reduce the strong state argument to the 'efficiency of the state'. This study will not lean on the latter literature which discusses whether the state in Turkey is efficient or not. Here, I will try to discuss what we can derive from the strong (transcendental) state argument in terms of the current state-media relations. Having said that, I attempt to overwiew the literature on Turkish state by comparing it with different social formations in the European polities.

The characteristics of the state building and the social formation in Turkey differ from the European states' on several accounts. Similarly the state-society relations have been shaped and survived around this difference. The European states and Turkish state derived different conclusions from modernization, civil society, the rule of law, liberalism, and such triangulation points in their political histories.

Mardin (1973) and Heper (1985) are two prominent scholars who ascertain the differences between the European and Ottoman-Turkish state formations. One of these differences portrayed is that the feudal practices of European history do not exist in the Ottoman social formations. The class-oriented confrontations and compromise between social groups and the state have not found eligible grounds in Turkish historical context. In terms of center-periphery approach (Shils, 1961; Mardin, 1973), the Ottoman-Turkish polity indicates a stronger center and a deeper cleavage between the center and periphery, in comparison to the European states. Therefore, another point to review is the issue of centralization of state power before and with modernization processes. Therefore Anglo-Saxon social formation reflects an 'adiminstrative state' tradition as a result of the centralized feudalism in its

political history, and continental European countries (France) have a tradition of strong state with decentralized feudalism; while in the Ottoman-Turkish state, a transcendental (strong) state tradition with centralized bureaucratization is observed. (Heper, 2011: 244; Heper, 1985: 14) Overall, these varying state traditions illustrate that these states have had different processes of modernization and nation-state building. I will try to discuss these differences through two basic arguments from the literature: i. the center-periphery debate Mardin (1973) proposed, and ii. the strong state tradition Heper (1985) asserted.

Although the strong state axis in explaining the state phenomenon in Turkey has been criticized by some scholars as being 'Orientalist', 'exceptionalist' (Güngen & Erten, 2005), or providing a 'metaphysical space' for the state/statists to 'legitimate and justify any sort of state activities and state power (Aydın, 2009: 17), this study will use the state tradition approach since both this approach and data results point at similar historical-political features of social formation, modernization, and state-society relations.

Mardin (1973) argues that the relations between the state and society in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic differ from the European states in several respects. In comparison to the Western equivalents, the Ottoman Empire had a stronger and lasting center that was supported by a sophisticated network of institutions. (Mardin, 1973: 169) The strong center and weak periphery in the Ottoman state led to particular characteristics and results in assigning the locus of the state in politics. Not only the earlier Empire before the modernization efforts in 18th and 19th centuries, but also the 'modernized/Westernized' form of the Empire sustained the center-

periphery cleavage in politics. Likewise, the cleavage did not remain peculiar to the

Empire, but its effects continued in the nation-state, the Turkish Republic in 20th and

21st centuries. In his historical and sociological appraisal, Mardin (1973: 169) starts

to explain this cleavage by comparing and contrasting it with the nation-state

building in the 17th century in Europe:

> Both "Leviathan" the form of government which emerged in the West in the middle of the seventeenth century, and the later nation-state had a role to play in the development of Ottoman institutions. … during the process of modernization, the Ottomans looked to these new forms of the state as models for reform in their own government.

To Mardin (1973: 170), Leviathan and nation-state are significant in interpreting the

social formation in Turkey because while on the one hand they initially represented

structural contrast to the existing Ottoman institutions, on the other, they were also

the models of modernization for the Ottoman and Turkish state reformers. In this

process of transition from Leviathan to modern nation state, the Ottoman Empire

reveals a *sui generis* example:

> The forces that shaped the state in the West seem to vary significantly from those that shaped the Ottoman state before modernization set in. Because of its feudal antecedents, the process of centralization that created the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to compromises with what maybe called the forces of the periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor. The consequence of these compromises was that Leviathan and the nation-state wererelatively well-articulated structures. Each time a compromise –or even a one-sided victory- was obtained, some integration of the peripheral force into the center was achieved.

To put it differently, the cleavage between the center and the periphery in the

Ottoman Empire was perpetuated during modernization. Broadly speaking, the

Ottoman Empire -at the time of passing from the 'Leviathan' into the 'nation-state'

with modernization- sustained the sharp division between the state and society. However in the Western Europe in the seventeenth century onwards multiple confrontations and integration characterizes the relations between the center and the periphery in politics and these relations have provided proper spaces both for the center and the peripheral forces in the nineteenth century onwards. (Mardin, 1973: 170) In the Ottoman-Turkish state, the cleavages between center and periphery did not bring in confrontations and compromise either in earlier seventeenth century or after nineteenth century.

One of the important components of these relations between the center and the periphery in the Ottoman Empire was an attitude of suspicion of former towards the latter. (Mardin, 1973: 171) This attitude survived and crystallized in the Turkish Republican state elites' attitudes towards the political elites. Neither the intense efforts of modernization in 18th and 19th centuries with –for example- Tanzimat (Reforms) era, nor the Turkish Republican elites' revolutionary endeavors to create a contemporary civilization have sufficed to form center-periphery relations in which the power was dispersed and the 'political' found competent space vis-à-vis the state.

The lacking of social class cleavages and perpetual relations of center-periphery in determining the locus of the state inherited a Hegelian transcendental state tradition to the Turkish state. Historical class-cleavages in the Western European countries' paved the way for a more instrumentalist understanding of the state that stands at the opposite side of the state-prioritized view of transcendentalism.

Transcendentalism is thought as the opposite of instrumentalism understanding of the state's role in a society. Because of their opposite interpretations of 'man in the society', transcendentalism highlights the significance of a moral community for man while instrumentalism makes an interest-based explanation. In conclusion, transcendentalism prioritizes the state over the individual or over the society while instrumentalism breeds an individual-oriented and a more limited, liberal and minimal (referee) state. (Berki, 1979 as cited in Grigoriadis, 2009: 66) In a more detailed explanation, Heper describes transcendentalism and instumentalism in detail in the following way:

> Transcendentalism refers to the belief that man primarily belongs to a *moral* community, whereas instrumentalism embodies the belief that man primarily belongs to an *interest* community. In the former, the community is 'prior' to its members; its 'interest' expresses more than the aggregate of the interests of its members; the association is taken to be uniformity; the law is seen as the expression of the collective reason and will of the membership; politics is understood primarily or exclusively in terms of leadership and education. Transcendentalism connotes the high ideals of duty, service, and the sublimation of energies. … In instrumentalism, the group's existence and functions are external to individuals, and are not directly related to their moral feelings and aims; association has no moral responsibility; law is conceived in terms of rational agreement among the membership; politics is seen in terms of 'business', that is, the adjustment of private pursuits and the reconciliation of various interests. Instrumentalism connotes freedom, diversity, and plurality. (Heper, 1985: 7-8)

In the light of these explanations, the Ottoman-Turkish state has a transcendental state tradition in which the state has always been prior to the society, and genuinely liberal relations between the state and society could not find proper space to flourish in despite some efforts of reform and modernization. The transcendentalism has not changed in transition from the Empire to the nation-state. Although Atatürk thought

the new nation-state as a 'transcient[87] transcendental' one (Heper, 1985: 66), his

reforms resulted in further centralization of state bureaucracy. Atatürk visioned to

create a nation 'which could by itself resolve conflicts about fundamental claims'[88]

(Heper, 1985: 65) but this vision led a top-down and non-gradual way of societal

change, and it further deepened the cleavage between the state and society by making

the state furtherly centralized and the periphery more 'peripheral'. The deepened

cleavage between the state and society has disseminated to the contemporary Turkey

and its repercussions and impacts can be observable at times today.

Let me summarize the basic arguments in the reviewed literature on diverse social

formations and state traditions. England is considered the key example of the state

tradition where the role assigned for the state is minimal since historically the

"political function of the state has been based on an old tradition of safeguarding

individual and collective liberties". (Heper, 1985: 14) Even some scholars claim the

absence of state and existence of 'administration' in England. (Dyson, 2009: 41) In

this regard, traditionally the distinction between 'government' and 'state' is not clear,

but rather are they embedded and entangled in the form of administration in England

state tradition. (Dyson, 2009: 44) Therefore, England and Ottoman-Turkish polities

stand at two opposite poles with, respectively, minimal, and transcendental state

traditions. (Heper, 1985: 14) With its *Reichstaat* tradition of 18th century Germany,

on the other hand, is the case of a bureaucratic state. In this rationalist understanding

of bureaucracy, legitimacy is defined by the legal status of the officials (Dyson,

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[87] It was transient because when the 'progress' was achieved, the transcendentalism was going to be left aside.

[88] Atatürk desired to make the Turkish reach the '*level of contemporary civilizations*' which eventually paved the way for a linear and reductionist understanding of modernization (Westernization).

2009: 108; Poggi, 2011: 252-253). France also exemplifies a strong state with its a decentralized feudalism tradition. The strong state in France has been thought as at time same time a social state in which -in contrast to the minimal role casted for the state in England- the state's role is to provide public services.   All in all, the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition diverges from the European states and it portrays a patrimonial, transcendental, and centralized bureaucratic model of state. This model has shaped the state-society relations accordingly, and the sharp division between the state and the society has perpetuated.

The example of the Ottoman local notables contitutes a good overwiew of the discussions we have made so far. The Ottoman local notables could not develop a class-based confrontational power vis-a-vis the state's centralization and power. "Rather than rise to form a countervailing force, even at the peak of their power, they were willing to fill the slots that the centre saw appropriate for them." (Heper, 1985: 33) The state had already enchained the notables to the state authority through giving them some official posts. Therefore the local notables were serving the state by collecting tax, acting as governors, or being members of governors' councils, and, later, of local 'representative' councils. (Heper, 1985: 33) In the meantime, the local notables became one of the symbols of state power and legitimacy, and in response to this, they could not utter –they had never intended to do it previously though- limiting the locus of the state in politics. "The tension between the centre and periphery which thus developed was never resolved by means of a compromise. If there was an agreement at all, it was an implicit alliance of the local notables and some members of the bureaucracy to exploit the resources of the state." (Heper, 1985: 33) As seen in the example, alternative potential sources to limit the state

power could not pop up in the Ottoman and Turkish societies. The periphery has preferred *appendaging to the central body* to proposing possible challenges to the state's omnipotence. It is difficult to tell if the attitude of the periphery was a deliberative choice or because of the psychology of 'fear' and 'security' the centre continuously created on them. Nevertheless, the attitude of the periphery or of the societal forces fed on the state's omnipresence in the political sphere.

Amongst several factors explaining the complex phenomenon of the state and of the state-society relations in Turkey, I will benefit from three analytical tools to elaborate on my data analysis: i. saving the state; ii. modernization in the form of Westernization, and iii. omnipresence of the state sphere over the political sphere or the center over the periphery, and in turn, the periphery's penetration into the central power (of the state)[89]. In the complex nature of Turkish politics, of course, the data can be explained though different factors such as religion, secularism, and civil-military relations; but the analytical tools I use adequately comply with the columnists' perspectives of the state. In the following, I attempt to elaborate on these analytical tools in accordance with some discussions in the literature about the social formation and state legacy in Turkey.

'*How can the state be maintained*' is not independent from the process of Westernization because one of the main characteristics of Westernization is '*protecting and guarding the state*'. Therefore, the policies of modernization have concentrated on the aims of 'saving the state' and 'reconstructing the state power'.

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[89] I address the third analytical tool as the *appendage to the state*. It basically refers to the omnipresence of the state not only in everyday lives of the people, but also in people's minds and the order of their preferences which the people's themselves reproduce and replicate the power of the state.

Actually, this was not peculiar to the Turkish Republic, but an Ottoman modernization legacy to the nation-state. For example, in the Young Turk era, "an impersonal concern with the welfare of people began to complement the older motive of saving the state." (Heper, 1985: 46) All in all, modernization resulted in a situation where the state elite attempted to protect/reproduce 'old values' with 'new institutions'. (Toker &Tekin, 2007: 82-83)

The reformists both in the Ottoman and Turkish states have characteristics in common in interpreting and practicing Westernization. Both the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire, and Kemalists in the Turkish Republican period were different from the traditional Ottoman bureaucrats. Despite both groups' secular educational backgrounds, which made them 'adepts of Western ideas and European-style of patriotism', they "were the heirs to the old patrimonial tradition, which assumed the dominance of the state over civil society and reserved the monopoly of legitimacy and authority to state elites, at the expense of social and economic elites." (Kazancıgil, 1981 as cited in Heper, 1985: 17)

Both Ottoman and Turkish modernizations were "seen to be succeeding as an elite-driven, consensus-based, institution-building process that took its inspiration exclusively from the West." (Bozdogan & Kasaba, 1997: 3-4) However, neither of them could interpret and practice the Western modernization as it was intended in the West. To put it differently, Western Enlightenment ideals were twisted with top-down social engineering projects in which the state-centric mode of modernization and the modern state building process "have constituted the very foundation on

which nationalism has acquired its dominant ideological status and its transformative power." (Keyman, 2011: 12) Therefore, neither of the Ottoman and Turkish modernization efforts resulted in the development of rationality and liberal values. In contrast, it paved the way for further centralization of state power. For example, considering the ideational baggage of Ziya Gökalp, an ideologue of the Republic, Turkish modernization has gone hand in hand with a nationalist discourse. The Kemalist modernization project aimed at Turkification which at the same time envisioned a homogeneous society –and in conjunction with that, nationalism. (Çiğdem, 2007: 72, 81) Prior to the Republican nationalist modernization, the Ottoman Empire's modernization efforts in 19th century did not change the centre's conception of the state and its attitude towards the periphery because "the modernization efforts that the bureaucratic strata undertook were motivated by the desire to strengthen the centre itself." (Heper, 1985: 37)

The project of modernization is also correlated with the phenomenon of 'civilization' (*medeniyet*) since for the reformers of both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, modernization was associated with and reduced to Westernization and, in conjunction with it, the West was understood as the source of civilization. As Turan (1984: 93) rightly argued, the goal of Westernization in the Republican period was "to make the society attain the "level of contemporary civilization." Since it was recognized that contemporary civilization was defined by Europe, the direction of change was "Westernization."'" However, civilization (or Westernization) was not experienced as a gradual process. It rather resulted in further centralization and consolidation of the state power. Not only as a non-gradual process, but also as a state-led experience, the notion of civilization ended up with the omnipresence of the

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state. It was a state-led non-gradual experience because no alternative social groups other than the state itself appeared to conduct or challenge the process. As Karpat (2001: 11) stated, in the 19th century,

> the idea of *medeniyet* created overnight a new way for the Ottoman bureaucracy-intelligentsia to measure their society's achievements and devise an identity accordingly. Because no other institution or group yet aspired to achieve its own civilization, the state appeared to be the only instrument capable of such achievement. Consequently, assuring the survival and supremacy of *devlet baba* (the father or mother state) acquired undisputed priority and legitimacy as the instrument of civilization (that is, modernization) and the bureaucracy-intelligentsia—included the military—became its supreme and exclusive agent and used it to legitimize their political supremacy and absolutism. They could thus label their opponents "reactionary" and neutralize them on behalf of their new religion, civilization, or modernization.

As scholars point at, the project and process of Westernization empowered the hand of the state vis-à-vis the society, and it further widened the existing cleavage between the state and society. Thus the state acquired the eligible setting to eliminate the opposition (of any sort coming from the society/periphery) by 'accusing' them of being 'reactionary' and of damaging the legitimate boundaries of the 'civilized' state. As a result, any sort of opposition was purported to be 'threats', 'enemies', 'traitors' against the survival of the civilized or civilizing state. This reflex of marking the opponents as the 'pests' of civilization has breeded a national security understanding which has been used instrumentally not only by the state actors, but also by societal actors such as the media. In the data analysis chapter (4), the theme 'national security and survival of the state' elaborates on how the national security discourse is used instrumentally in the examined newspaper columns.

Considering with its historical luggage, Westernization has been a "legitimate tool" to perpetrate the state existence and power for Turkey. Westernization has played a constituent role in producing and reproducing national identities because it has been used instrumentally by the state actors to maintain the conventional form of the state. Therefore not surprisingly yet paradoxically, Turkey has reproduced its 'traditions' as long as they have been 'Westernized'. (Çiğdem, 2007: 69) Westernization has not achieved a 'vertical' transformation that could change the traditional roles and influence of the state; but a 'horizontal' change, which turned into politicization of the movement more than a transformation. (Çiğdem, 2007: 72)

To conclude, 'reason' –as an Enlightenment ideal- was reduced to positivism in Turkey's interpretation of Westernization. (Toker&Tekin, 2007: 84) In contrast to the Enlightenment and Western modernity, Westernization in Turkey did not resulted in liberation, critical thinking, and emphasis on individualism because Westernization project in Turkey was led 'by the state for the state'. (Toker &Tekin, 2007: 84, 92) Therefore, Enlightenment ideals turned into a 'distorted' and reductionist form in these Westernization efforts in Turkish nation-building process. This understanding of positivism paved the way for a positivist-authoritarian state ideology. This positivist reductionist understanding interpreted 'politics' as a 'social technique' that is used to produce and control a certain social order. This ideology was central in the single party (RPP) period and its repercussions last in different forms today. (Toker &Tekin, 2007: 84) The positivist-liberal state ideology therefore narrowed the sphere of the society in the disadvantage of liberties and individual-citizen; while enhancing the state's sphere in dominating the 'political'.

2.3.2. Some Analytical Tools to Explain The Social Formation of Turkey: Saving the State, Westernization, and the Omnipresence of the State in the Minds of the People

The nation-building process in Turkish Republic has *continuities* as well as *ruptures* with the mentalities and practices of the Ottoman state. (Kazancıgil, 1982; Turan, 1984: 105; Quataert, 2005: 199; Jung & Piccoli, 2001: 198-210; Benli Altunışık & Tür, 2005:1, Heper, 2006; Kalaycıoğlu, 2012: 171; Karpat: 2002: 1) The three analytical tools clarified below reflect both these continuities and ruptures. They reflect continuities because both Ottoman and Turkish states have a state-led and state-dominant politics in the context of state-society relations. Both Ottoman and Turkish states carried out modernization programs and both took the West as a model (Çınar, 2012: 30) which has shaped or influenced their ideational worlds.[90] These analytical tools also reflect ruptures from the past since the Turkish Republic is a nation-state with which came the desire for further homogenization and nationalistic tendencies.[91] By these explanations below I try to explain the relations between Ottoman state and Turkish state, and between state and society as well.

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[90] In the Ottoman state, the process of modernization became apparent in Tanzimat which later turned into 'Westernization' more than 'modernization'. Turkish Republic followed a similar roadmap in its nation-building process which considered the West as the ultimate goal in reaching 'the level of contemporary civilizations' (*muasır medeniyetler seviyesi*).

[91] This does not necessarily mean that there were no nationalist movements or tendencies in the Ottoman era, but this goes beyond the scope of the discussion here.

To begin with, Turkey has grappled with the issue of '*how to save the state*' for –at least- the last two centuries. (Heper, 2014: 245; Tunaya, 1988: 9; Hanioğlu, 2001: 314) As discussed above, Turkey's political culture reflects and is mostly shaped by a *strong state tradition* that is inherited from the Ottoman period and continues to conserve its significance today. (Heper, 1985; Heper and Keyman, 1998; Heper and Yıldırım, 2011). This crystallized psychology of 'saving the state' is at the same time one of the typical characteristics that fosters and feeds a Hegelian type of strong and dignified state[92] structure in Turkish political thought.

'*How to save the state*' dates back to the earlier centuries of the Ottoman era, but here, I will discuss it starting from the late Ottoman era. In the 19th century Ottoman Empire, the leading bureaucratic intellectuals (Young Ottomans and Young Turks[93]) attempted to reform the state by modernization in order not to 'change' the state but to find alternative ways to 'save' it from decline. Especially starting with *Tanzimat* (Reforms) era, these intellectuals looked for a remedy to save the supreme state (*devlet-i âli*) and ensure that it lived on. The remedy they -who had been taking a Western higher education- came up with was modernization, thereby making the West the role model to be emulated. With the influence of the educational atmosphere on their mental worlds, these intellectuals interpreted the newly initiated modernization project broadly in line with Westernization.[94]

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[92] In his highly referenced work, *Philosophy of Right,* Hegel characterises the state as the march of God in this world, which is the embodiment of reason, reality, and concrete freedom. (Hegel, 2001: 196-198)

[93] Even though the tools they suggested and ideals they espoused to save the state differed homogeneous, both groups' –Young Ottomans' and Young Turks'- principal ideal was to save and strengthen the Ottoman state.

[94] Later on, fractions in different interpretations of this Westernization project came to the surface. To give an example, Young Ottomans did not have the same interpretation of Westernization as Young Turks adopted later. Yet these differentiations are beyond the scope of this paper.

The idea of '*saving*' inherently brings the idea of a '*guardianship*'. The actors or groups those who claimed guardianship over the country have been diverse throughout Turkish political history. Bureaucratic intellectuals in Ottoman era, and the military, and the founding Republican elite (and later the Kemalist elite) then are three of those actors who proposed guardianship against the 'enemies' of or 'threats' against the state. While Jung and Piccoli explain Kemalists' attitude of saving the state with their ideal of a unitary society and the Sèvres syndrome (2001: 117); it is also argued why military had been the prominent player of saving the state through the ideational transformation they had experienced in the process of Westernization.

The idea of modernization in Turkey did not result in the same transformative effects that Enlightenment had done in Europe. In Turkey, the state "is viewed as the main or indeed sole actor in a process aiming to bring about the 'modernisation' and 'westernisation' of society." (Gourisse, 2015: 1) While Enlightenment paved the way for modernization with its emphasis on reason and rationality (which is also the result of secularisation process) in European societies, Ottoman and Turkish states adopted a reductionist interpretation of modernization in the forms of pure positivism, further patriarchy, and concentration of authority. In other words, modernization in the form of Westernization for Turkish case has made the ideational environment eligible for the state to concentrate its power and authority through further centralization and homogenization.[95]

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[95] Eventually, concentrating on further centralization and authoritarianism has led to top-down practices to modernize the society.

After the initiation of Westernization attempts by Young Turks, in time, the torch of '*how to save the state*' passed from the intellectuals to the military. The pursuit ofimmediate and practical cures for saving the state started to require to process in a more organized way. It was the military at that time that satisfied these requirements. The military cadets met the requirements of saving the state not only in terms of organization but ideationally because saving the state demanded a homogenous society and their ideals on nationalism were corresponding. The military in the Ottoman era was among the most salient groups who embraced the ideals of Westernization and positivism the most. (It was actually a misinterpreted representation of Western ideals in Turkish history.) Eventually, positivistic ideas spread especially among military students concomitantly with the mission of saving the state. Therefore, the military took over the role to become the new 'guards' to save the state. (Mahçupyan, 1998: 121)

The reductionist version of Enlightenment ideals did not exactly bring an ideational change to Turkish society. On the contrary, it continued to perpetuate the former practices of the strong state and its legacies. One of these legacies is the linear understanding in interpreting social facts. Earlier, this linear line of thought in Ottoman Empire appears in the form of '*nizam-ı alem*'[96] (the order of the universe) approach. In Turkish Republic, it pops up in the form of positivism. In a reductionist form of positivism, Turkish reformers acquired a linear understanding of history and used it to assess social facts in a linear way of thinking. All in all, both *nizam-ı alem* of earlier Ottoman era, and positivistic understanding of Turkish Republicans

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[96] Nizam-ı alem will be elaborated in Category 2 in data chapter (4).

propunded a single truth. The single truth could only be achieved by the single authority –the state.

The question of 'how to save the state' and Westernization paved the way for a particular line of thought consolidated the authority of the state further. Another way of contributing to this concentration is to identify an alleged 'enemy' along with a perceived 'threat' which have legitimized the concentration of power in the hands of the state. Therefore, enemy and threat have been used to justify the narrowing boundaries of the public sphere and the postponement of the steps that would have expanded societal and individual rights and liberties. The policies to narrow the public sphere have been present both in Ottoman and Turkish states. In the nation-state (Turkish Republic), this appeared in the form of a rhetoric which starts with '*It is okay to have democracy but…*'. These never-ending '*but*'s remained down and became permanent in the actions and reactions of leading political actors. [97]

The other dynamic within the discourse of saving the state is *crisis*. The moments of crises provide legit tools for the state to interfere with politics –by having the 'consent' of people. According to Weber, state is the only actor that has the monopoly of the use of legitimate force. (Weber, 1969: 342) It is possible to further argue that, notwithstanding this monopoly, the state continuously seeks for the ways to execute its power and, therefore, it produces (and reproduces) legitimate tools while using its power. Times of crises is no exception in this regard in the circle of creating sustainable tools of keeping the state power and continuity. The moments of crises are the windows of opportunity for the state to interfere with politics with the

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[97] The tendency to postpone democracy on every occasion will be elaborated on in the first category with the term *procrastination.*

consent of society. In Turkey, together with the 'long live our strong state!' wishes of society, crises are the times that provide consolidation and reproduction of state power by the same actors.[98] The intensification of state power, however, is not found odd or unfair by the Turkish society due to the lack of opposition tradition in cases of manipulation of state power. Over and above, this intensification and consolidation of state power is a captivating point for the side of the political/societal actors – which are coming from a collectivist background thanks to '*millet system*' tradition. To put it differently, the societal groups (including political actors) are more concerned with 'how to adhere to the body of the superior state' so that they will have their share from the sphere of influence of the state instead of thinking how to prevent manipulative state power. (Mahçupyan, 1998: 178-179) Adherence to state power will be discussed in detail via the characterisation of '*being appendages to the state apparatus*' in *Category 1*.

Schmittean arguments on *exceptional case* corroborate the argument on the relationship between crises and the power of state. For Schmitt, in cases of crises[99] or extraordinary situations, it is understandable for the state to get rid of the 'baggage of law' in order to sustain its continuity because as the legislator of law, the state[100] is above and beyond the province of the law. In other words, the state and the homogeneous society (that constitute the state) have priority and superiority vis-à-vis the individual rights and liberties. But how does Schmitt describe the cases of exception (or crisis)? Since his political theory is based on the well-known

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[98] 'Crises as providers and perpetuators of state power' is not exceptional for the Turkish case. The notion of *rallying around the flag* in American politics may illustrate the same thing.

[99] Instead of 'crisis', Schmitt uses 'exception'. A crisis therefore can be one of the exceptional cases.

[100] Actually, Schmittean political theory does not define 'state' or 'politics', but the 'political'. For discussion: Schmitt, C. (2007). *The Concept of The Political*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

dichotomy of friend-foe distinction, he projects this central idea of *exception* in this context. According to Schmitt, exception is the situation where 'foe' as a political being appears to threaten the (survival of the) state. And it is the sovereign that decides on where a situation constitutes the situation of exception. (Schmitt, 1985:5) Schmitt's position here can be distinguished from Weber's since he argues that the particularity of state sovereignty does not underlie being the monopoly of using legitimate force; but being the monopoly of adjudication. The adjudication on 'exception' can authorize the state to suspend the law -if 'necessary'. Every state develops its *sui generis* formulation of declaring an enemy, Schmitt continues. (Schmitt, 1976: 46 as cited in Arslan, 2000-2001: 76)

The state has been dominant and omnipresent in Turkish politics. The fact that the foregoing pages emphasized how strong state tradition has shaped the ideational world of Turkey should not be taken to mean that it was only the state, state elites, and their top-down ideas shaped the society. Although it may appear from what has just been said that the state shaped and dominated the passive society in a uni-dimensional process and some observers may be inclined to think this way, it should be noted that at the ideational levels it was also the society and people who contributed to the survival of the idea of the state. In other words, it has been the people who have made the state power to last. With 'the omnipresence of state', I argue that the interaction of the state and society in Turkey should not be examined only by supreme state-submissive society dichotomy because –as will be seen in the related data below- at times ordinary people or different political groups have drawn water to the state's mill by knowingly incorporating themselves into the state power at a certain point.

In terms of idea entrepreneurs, at times, the data here certify that even those actors who claim to be leading and disseminating new ideas project some statements that bolster the state-prioritized views. This bolstering mechanism by some columnists' discourses is not a deviant case when the political and societal actors' attitude in Turkish political environment is considered. To conclude, I try to explore the issue of consolidation of state power through the acts and ideas of the media.

Despite such significant watershed moments[101] as passing into a liberal economic model and a relatively more liberal political discourse, the idea of the state has always been on the agenda in Turkish politics. This idea of state has not only been in the minds and practices of the state elite, but it is also embedded in the mentality of ordinary people. (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 134-135; Çağla, 2012: 571) Therefore, throughout the Turkish Republican history the idea of state has been produced and reproduced in everyday lives of the people. After all, a situation emerges in which

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[101] The time period I analysed (1983-2007) witnesses a transitional era in many respects. First, it is the transition from military government to civilian administration after 1980's military coup. Therefore the beginning of the 1980s echoes typical post-coup atmosphere such as restricted rights and liberties (both of individual and of social/group), exclusion of political parties and politicians from political sphere, and domination of media. Second, it is also the commencement of economic liberal policies with the trigger of Turgut Özal. Newborn economic liberalism did not only change policies, but mentalities. Yet, for decades and still, the transforming mentalities have gone hand in hand with the Ottoman state legacy. Therefore, the data results generally portray a blend of (Ottoman) past and a 'learned' liberalization/liberalism. Instead of a gradual development of a settled liberal thought, the data portrays a complicated and sometimes volatile understanding of liberalism in Turkey. (An example of this volatility in 'learned liberalism' is present in Nazlı Ilıcak's discourse in 1980s and 1990s. Not only Ilıcak but also Akyol's writings have some confusion in settling liberal terminology. Please see: Göktaş and Çakır, 1991: 200. The reasons underlying the volatility in interpreting liberalism in Turkey cannot be reduced to a 'learned liberalism' by Turkish political actors or to the Ottoman past. The political environment that was dominantly shaped by the Cold War atmosphere first, and then with the collapse of Soviet regime in 1990s has had a considerable influence on the mentalities of these actors. (For a fruitful discussion on the Cold-war impact on Turkish political mind, please see: Örnek, C. (2015). *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı*. İstanbul: Can Sanat Yayınları. Also in Category 1 –*National Security and Survival of the State* in this chapter, you can also find a very limited discussion on the influence of the Cold War atmosphere upon the alleged idea of 'threat and enemy' (namely 'communism') in 1980s Turkey.

the people start to 'think like the state' (*devlet gibi düşünmek*). (Aydın, 2009: 9) In other words, the idea of state gets fixated in the minds of the people as well.

It is fair to argue that in Turkish political culture, the state-society relations can be framed around a particular 'father state - devoted society' dichotomy. Yet, the state-society relations have a more sophisticated nature than the 'superior state - obedient society' argument projects because the associations among political actants are ample and diverse. To give an example, 'superior state-obedient society' claim *per se* cannot explain why the society which has been/is seen *passive* and *subordinate* reproduces the statist discourse again and again in different eras. In order to explain this complexity of state-society relations to a possible extent, I tried to narrow the focus on above-mentioned analytical tools of Westernization, saving the state, and omnipresence of the state that last in the Turkish political environment and that have been influential in different periods and upon different political actants.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE CONDUCT OF THE STUDY

3.1. Methodological Considerations

3.1.1. Research Methodology and Data Collection Techniques

This research blends different data collection and analysis techniques. Therefore, a methodological triangulation is used to check the data not only for reliability but also for grabbing better further potential qualitative details. This single-case study applies qualitative content analysis (QCA) to ten leading columnists' newspaper columns –as the unit of analysis- and makes use of semi-structured in-depth elite interviews conducted with these opinion writers in Turkish press.[102] Within the main

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[102] The researcher interviewed the following seven columnists: Taha Akyol, Şahin Alpay, Mehmet Barlas, Cengiz Çandar, Emin Çölaşan, Fehmi Koru, and Nazlı Ilıcak. Three columnists –Ahmet Altan, Hasan Cemal, and Cüneyt Arcayürek- could not be reached despite all efforts. Altan and Cemal did

framework of QCA; archival analysis, interviews, and a limited dictionary analysis are carried out as the research techniques in the present study. These research techniques seem most appropriate "if you have to engage in some degree of interpretation to arrive at the meaning of your data." (Schreier, 2012: 2) Quantitative *manifest content* analysis[103] is ruled out because since there is always the risk of missing important details that does not exist in concrete words, but are hidden in the interpretation/meaning of the text. The interpretation as a research philosophy in this study is specifically important because the object of this study –finding out the conceptualizations of the state- sometimes is not explicit in the text. For instance, the columnist might be revealing his/her understanding of state without using the word 'state'.

In comparison to quantitative content analyses, QCA adopts a different approach to the issues of reliability and validity. Thus, this study considers different concerns on these issues. The first concern is mutual exclusivity. And the second one is reliability –in conjunction with validity.

The principle of mutual exclusivity is that all coding categories should be mutually exclusive. (Wimmer and Dominick, 2010: 166) In other words, potential repetitions and embeddedness among and within coding categories should be prevented. Mutual exclusivity is considered as a must and also an advantage for content analysis research. It is fair to argue in this way for most of the quantitative studies in which repetition or inclusivity of categories might bring completely different results. On the

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not return our requests for interview, and Arcayürek was reluctant to give interviews as his assistant in Cumhuriyet newspaper in Ankara office told long before he passed away.
[103] For a detailed discussion on the problems of studying 'content', please see: Richardson, 2007: 15-17.

other hand, in QCA, mutual exclusivity in all coding process is neither a must nor an advantage. On the contrary, "mutual inclusivity" among codes in QCA techniques can provide for the researcher a conceptual map. If the coder takes this inclusivity into account, she can find out which coding category is mostly used with which category, and this can lead the researcher to a conceptual schema that provides a network of overall categories/codes.[104] Instead of 'mutual exclusivity', *mutual embeddedness* or *interconnectivity[105]* of codes are prominent for this study in order to reach a conceptual map.

The second methodological concern is about reliability and validity. Even though these two are *sine qua non* of quantitative studies, it is possible to reach different evaluations of these principles in qualitative approaches for two reasons: different practices of qualitative and quantitative techniques, and varying research priorities.[106] In this study, *expertise* is taken as an important factor while considering reliability and validity in QCA. To give an example, a person who does not have expertise in or is familiar nough with the field of Turkish studies may not know the meaning of some connotations attributed to some words that are vital for Turkish political life and known by Turkish politics experts. Therefore, to provide reliability to some extent in QCA, the researcher or intercoders should know the peculiarities, connotations, sensitivities, or –even- sarcasms used in Turkish political culture. To

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[104] For instance, Ahmet Altan uses the word 'state' generally together with the adjectives or nouns that he attributes to it a negative connotation. *Organization* (Altan, December 28, 2011), *blood* (Altan, November 5, 1996), *collapse* (Altan, November 5, 1996), *the lords of the state* (Altan, November 5, 1996) are some of the words he used to qualify the state in Turkey in a pejorative way. In the conceptual map of Arcayürek's columns however, there is a different portrayal of the state through the words emphasizing 'exaltedness' of state. *Huge* (Arcayürek, November 8, 1996), *possessor* (Arcayürek, December 8, 1983), *perpetuity* (Arcayürek, November 9, 1996) are some examples.
[105] Emphases are the researcher's entitlements.

[106] The researcher would like to thank Matthias Hastall for fruitfull discussions and stimulating perspective in evaluating reliability and validity in QCA during the methodology course in METU Summer School, 2014.

put it differently, the research context[107] is vital for secondary reading of research results and expertise is one of the remedies to provide replicability. In conjunction with expertise, *consistency* during coding is prominent in reliability in QCA. (Schreier, 2012: 6)

Single case study seems also a reasonable choice in order to be able to see individual differences and peculiarities of the Turkish case because the system of media-politics interaction is firmly dependent upon particular historical and political processes in every single country. On the other hand, with the influence of secularization, modernization and finally globalization, *convergence of media systems* (Hallins and Mancini, 2004: 17; Esser, Franks, and Pfetsch,2004: 25) comes to the agenda. Therefore, single case study can also allow the researcher to see this convergence with other media systems -and therefore with political processes?- for future comparative analysis.

To conclude, by conducting an in-depth single case study, this research intends to pinpoint basic characteristics and (possible) patterns of media-politics relationship in Turkey while aiming at further analysis on its position within comparative studies. The method of single case study allows the researcher to see individual peculiarities of Turkish press and to be able to make preliminary propositions about comparative research. The following part explains the details on how QCA is applied through coding frames.

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[107] Meaning is context-dependent. (Schreier, 2012: 13)

3.1.2. Case Selection and Sampling

This study intends to analyze the research question at the individual level by focusing on selected columnists. The sample of this research is assumed to be representative of the columnists in Turkish print media, as they reflect diverse viewpoints available in the main-stream Turkish media. Most of them come from different newspapers and have worked in different newspapers throughout the 1980-2007 period. These newspapers represent different perspectives in Turkish socio-political life. The following criteria were applied while selecting the columnists studied: first, they all write in a nation-wide newspaper throughout the 1983-2007 period (without very long interruptions[108] in the given time period). They are reputable journalists, comfortably occupying the role of an agenda-setter or opinion maker. They have all been leading columnists in Turkey in this particular period under study and they have widely written on the subject of politics. Some concerns that may be raised on the representativeness of this sample and further justifications with regards to their selection will be discussed in a more detail in "Self Critiques and Limitations" section at the end of this chapter.

3.1.3. Content Analysis and Coding Frames

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[108] Especially after military interventions, almost all of these columnists were sent to prison and therefore, they were unable to write. This is why it is almost impossible to find a columnist in such a long time period who were able to write uninterruptedly for twenty-four years.

This research consists of two-stage coding process. In the first coding stage, a panorama of data was obtained in order to understand basic patterns and frameworks of Turkish political life. In this regard, first stage was coded via a priori codes as will be explained in the following paragraph. The results of the first-stage coding pointed at four fundamental issues which were amongst the most highlighted subject matters in the examined columns. Therefore, the second step in coding rendered the results of the research visible and concluded with some basic conceptualization of the state as portrayed by the idea entrepreneurs. National security, order and stability, economy, individual-oriented explanations, and the rule of law and state's shrinkage (in other words, neo-liberal assessments) construct the final categories.

In the first stage, four main themes were constructed as coding frames in line with the existing literature on state. These are Conceptions of State, State Tradition and Political Culture in Turkey, State-Society Relations, Longitudinal Change in Columnists' Thoughts. Although there are mostly a priori codes, both a priori and emergent codes were used to construct categories.[109] QCA is flexible enough to allow the researcher to include additional coding frames. (Schreier, 2012: 4, 7)

In the content analysis, the reflections of the columnists on democracy, civil-military relations, civil society, economy, political leader, government, elections, ideology, democracy, Atatürkism, secret of state, state interventionism in economy, and so on are analyzed. These are vehemently debated topics throughout the Turkish political

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[109] For the distinction on emergent and a priori coding, please see: Wimmer and Dominick, 2010: 165-166. The emergent codes also occupy a considerable place in Turkish political life that the researcher overlooked to place among a priori codes.

history and also some of the basic codes that will be used in the content analysis. In addition to these variables, the *media* will be the kernel of coding process in this research. Therefore, it is proposed in this study that the content of the columns and the agenda of the columnists have been shaped by these hotly debated topics and issues in Turkish political history. These will also be the indicators of coding in the content analysis. Second step of coding disclosed five themes derived out of the first stage coding results.

3.1.4. The Logic of Time Frame and Critical Junctures' Selection

3.1.4.1. Time Frame

The research covers the 1983-2007 period. It starts just after 1983 general elections and terminates with 2007 general elections. As a research technique, the study uses nine critical junctures in order not to miss qualitative details but to render the inquiry into a feasible scope. Otherwise, it could have been impossible to cover twenty-four-year-period in this limited research timetable. The critical junctures consist of seven general elections held in this period, in addition to Susurluk Incident (1996) and the February 28th confrontation (1997). One month before and one month after of each juncture were analyzed. That means for each critical juncture, there are approximately sixty columns for each columnist. [110]

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[110] Two things are worthy of noting at this point. The approximate number of columns changes considering the specific days (either week days or weekends) the columnists write. Therefore, if the columnist does not write either during weekends or on a regular basis, this number might vary. Secondly, if there is an interruption in the columnist's career specific to one of these periods, the sum

The nine critical junctures cover almost three decades in Turkish politics. General election periods (both pre and post election) constitute time periods that respective incumbent government, political actors, parties, their policies and –in parallel with all those- the state and society are evaluated and reviewed intensely. Although Turkey is a country where the agenda changes are excessively pacey, the pre and post-election times are those that these discussions on the state in general and the government in particular are intensified. Even time-to-time, it is possible to observe that 'state' is confused with or considered inseparable from 'government' during these evaluations. On the eve of elections, then-government is assessed while the possibilities about 'what is the best for the society/state' are discussed for the estimated results. Consequently, this research deals with seven general electoral periods that make the researcher able to extract several different issues and details salient in Turkish political life.

The main reason for periodization preferred in this research is to avoid the risk of being *entrapped in an endless descriptive account* as a result of the content analysis. (Öncü, 2010: 389) To overcome this danger to some extent, time period selection helps organize the data analysis. In other words, the data collected is organized around this periodization and around the key themes –as included in coding frames- in Turkish politics. It is expected that this method will provide a convenient effort, which allows the researcher "to dwell upon the distinctive aspects of the Turkish media scene, without losing sight of 'world-wide' trends." (Öncü, 2010: 389) The

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of columns varies. All in all, there are ten columnists and nine critical junctures; and two-month-analysis for each critical juncture.

following explanations reflect these trends such as economic liberalization in Turkey concurrently with the Western world.

3.1.4.2. 1980s: Economic Liberalization and Transformation of the Media

The study starts with shortly after 1983 elections, which hold particular importance in terms of the transition from an interregnum to a civilian government. First, it is the first civilian governmental period after 1980 military intervention. In comparison to previous interventions (1960 intervention and 1971 memorandum), the 1980 military intervention had far-reaching implications to frame Turkish political environment in the long haul. One of the prominent reasons of this continuing influence is the 1982 Turkish Constitution written under the military regime. The Constitution curbed civilian rights and liberties in contrast to its predecessor 1961 Constitution. (Dağı, 1996: 125) Despite several changes in its provisions over the years, the 1982 Constitution still survives and shapes the political life in Turkey.

Secondly, the 1980s derive its significance from the economic liberalization process that Turkey first experienced under Turgut Özal government. Not surprisingly, economic liberalization is one of the turning points shaping the state-society relations due to its impact on political liberalization processes. Therefore, it is possible to discuss four interacting spheres of influence of economic liberalization process: its impact on political discourse, on the state-society relations, on the media in the form of conglomeration, and on the political culture.

With economic liberalization, the discourse on the state started to change. Previously "father state" started to be addressed as "*garçon* state."[111] In comparison to the previous relations of the state and society in which the state was superior, now the emphasis started to be on the individual, the citizen. Therefore, starting with Turgut Özal (1980s) and continuing with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2000s), the state as the 'servant of the individual' understanding came to the agenda. [112]

Economic liberalization has impacted not only the scope of the activities of the state vis-à-vis the citizen but also the media. Starting with privatization and conglomeration in the media sector, the characteristics of the journalism as a profession have changed; so did the relations between the political actors and the media. In this decade, with the rise of private televisions and radios and with the cross-ownership of media patrons, commercialization and conglomeration in the media reached its zenith. As Öncü said, it is fair to argue this decade as *a fin de siècle* due to this prominent transformation in the media.[113] (2010: 388)

The most prominent reason to start this study with the 1980s is the vital impact of economic liberalization over not only politics but also the field of media. With the emergence of growing media companies and with the accelerating economic power and networks of media owners; the understanding of journalism, content and the form of the news, and the interplay of media and politics altered. These changing

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[111] The changes in the 'adjectives' of the state are discussed in data analysis.
[112] Data analysis will dig into this claim further. As data illustrate, despite the emphasis on society (actually, not necessarily on 'individual'), economic liberalization does not necessarily lead to political liberalization. Although neoliberal policies may help bring the individual into limelight, in Turkish political environment, this is not a linear development in which political actors' emphases on individual (rights and liberties) in their discourses result in liberal policies that favour the individual.
[113] Thorough discussions on the transformation of media will be presented in Chapter 3.

dynamics in media ownership have acquired great importance not only for the actors in Turkish media (such as journalists, editors, and media owners) but also for the state and the political actors in the regard of media as the *fourth power* influencing politics, public opinion, and power-holders (Demir, 2007: 16).

Similar to the Western countries –gaining momentum with 1980s' economic liberalisation waves- there is a visible tendency of 'conservatisation'. Not only in Western Europe and the United States, but also in Turkey, "voter preferences, and the political dialogue have swing somewhat toward the right of the ideological spectrum." (Ethridge and Handelman, 2008: 143) Therefore, the 1983-93 decade in Turkey –shaped by economic transformation led by Turgut Özal- presents a parallel with the developments in the West in this regard.

As Nilüfer Göle pointed out, after the 1980s, political culture in Turkey has changed. The change in political culture cannot only be explained through the influence of the limitations and restraints brought into the political life. (Göle, 2014: 559) The changes in political culture should be understood through not only absolute conflicts among political parties, but also the new relations in societal actors [in our case, the media]. Political discursive change at an observable level, and the relations' change in between the state and societal actors are two key characteristics in the 1980 period. (Göle, 2014: 559-560) With these changes in perceptions, the values of market economy were highly adopted by the majority (of political and societal actors). The transition from the Jacobin statist tradition to the '*homo economicus*' profile has reflected on the political culture in which pragmatic values now gained importance. (Göle, 2014: 564) All in all, the 1980s and onwards keep an important

place in Turkish studies due to the dynamics and changes it imported Turkish political understanding.

3.1. 4. 3. 1990s: Regime Issues: Threat to Secular State?

The second decade this study focuses on is the 1990s. Coalition governments, everlasting debates on the issue of 'deep state' or 'the state within the state', discussions on the alleged threat to the political regime –in other words, the perception of religious reactionism as a threat against the secular regime- can be considered as the salient topics peculiar to this period.

Based on specific incidents triggering the debates on the deep state, the general issue dominating this decade was whether or not the state was 'rotting' or 'vanishing'. In the previous decade, an opening in the form of economic liberalization had been a catalyst for new forms of state-society relations in Turkey. On the contrary, in this new form of relations in the 1990s, the former transcendental state started to be 'reified'.

Two dominant marks of 1990s have been fierce discussions first on the concept of 'deep state' and secondly, on 'threat to the secular regime'. This period witnessed two important incidents that ignited these controveries: Susurluk Incident (November 3, 1996) and February 28, 1997 indirect military intervention (or the 'post-modern'

or 'soft coup'[114]). Refahyol coalition government, the first time an Islamist political party occupied the government's seat, formed the other part of the background to the threat perceived against secularism principle of Turkish Republic. In some columns, it is possible to find this sense of *threat*. [115]

 "By the mid-1980s governments were beginning to fundamentally alter the terrain of national communications policy. Though the rhythm, degree and precise nature of these processes of deregulation and commercialization varied, by the mid-1990s the general trend everywhere involved a recasting of the communications sector ever more as a private market, ever less as a public service domain." (Axford and Huggins, 2001: 32-33) Likewise in Turkey in this period, concentration of media ownership and conglomeration in the media has kept its importance. Beside this, politically critical developments such as the emergence of political Islam, Refahyol government, the February 28, 1997 military interference, and changing military-civil society relations are the main themes signifying this period.

3.1. 4. 4. 2000s: JDP period: A New Phase in State-Society Relations?

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[114] Naming February 28, 1997 incident varies in accordance with how it is perceived by the subject. Some of the varying addresses are: process, post-modern coup, soft coup, indirect intervention, a balance for democracy. In this paper, generally 'post-modern coup' is preferred. A discussion on the issue is available in: Mehran Kamrava "Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey's Refah Party", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 25 (2), (Nov., 1998): 275-301.
[115] Data results acknowledge this perception of threat in some columns. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, especially in the mid-1990s the columns of Cüneyt Arcayürek, Hasan Cemal, and Emin Çölaşan for instance, reflect these alleged threats to the secular regime; while Fehmi Koru, Taha Akyol, Ahmet Altan, Nazlı Ilıcak, Cengiz Çandar, and –occasionally- Mehmet Barlas do not find the 'threat' argument persuasive.

The last decade the research covers is 2000s –until the post-2007 general elections[116]. This decade is included for particular research purposes. Although the previous two decades would be sufficient to make some generalizations on the understandings of the state, a study on Turkish politics could not have been complete without examining the Justice and Development Party (hereafter JDP) period. Even though this study does not focus particularly on the political parties, the JDP deserves special attention due to not only its long-lasting influence in domestic politics but also its frame-breaking perspectives[117] that it has carried and implemented in Turkish political life. The first JDP government (2002-2007) is known for its pro-EU and pro-Western discourse. One of the typical characteristics of this period is that an Islamic-oriented political party formed the single-party government with a considerable majority in the Parliament. For some people, due to its founders' past in 'National Outlook' movement[118], this party (JDP) had a secret agenda (*takiyye*) that aims at bringing the Sharia law. Especially for the state elite, this was considered a threat for the secular regime in Turkey. These issues are also evaluated and counted significant in terms of changing dynamics of center-periphery while the influence of political elite gaining momentum vis-à-vis the state elites.

Another significance of this decade is that –especially together with 2002 general elections- there was a convergence of political party ideologies. To put it differently,

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[116] The columns dating back to one month-after the 2007 elections are also included in this research.

[117] It is argued that thanks to its majoritarian power, the JDP government achieved to overthrow the political tutelage of the military and of the state elite. For a fruitful discussion on the possible origins of this 'victory', see: Nilüfer Göle, Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites. *Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1* (Winter, 1997), pp. 46-58.

[118] A fruitful discussion on the National Outlook past of the JDP, please see: Coşar, S. & Özman, A. (2004). Centre-right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Election: Neo-Liberalism with a Muslim Face. *Contemporary Politics*. 10 (1): 57-74.

ideological distinctions among political parties blurred in this period. Most of the previously large centre-right political parties (Motherland Party, Nationalist Action Party, and Democratic Left Party) could not pass the 10% threshold in 2002 elections. The second reason of this evaporation can be the ideological hollowness of JDP. (Bora 2002; Tepe 2006) In sum, the overall trend of accumulation of political parties at the center and convergence of ideologies remain in the agenda in this period as well as 1990s.

This paper does not cover the 2007-2015 period due to some foreseeable research limitations. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that with the considerable information on the changing perspectives of the state, this thesis is eligible for comparison in terms of pre and post-2007 periods. The last two governmental periods of JDP (2007-2015) have paved the way for ever ending discussions –and sometimes some speculations on the evolving relations between the government (JDP) and the media, government and the state, political elites and the state elite, political elites and the military, and between the state and the society. Therefore, future studies might benefit from this paper for purposes of comparison.

In brief, this study examines the 1983-2007 time period. The almost-three decade is considered to be a prominent time frame that contains essential factors, actors, and themes for Turkish studies such as liberalization, democratization, changing state-society relations, varying degrees of influence of the military, frequently debated issues of 'deep state', the reflex -and sometimes- the 'threat to the regime' syndrome, changing dynamics between the state elite and political elite, and evolving roles of

the media. These elements exist in the nexus of Turkish political environment and the phenomenon of the state in Turkey.

3.1.4.5. Critical Junctures (continued): Susurluk Incident (November 1996) and February 28, 1997.

In addition to seven general elections, two specific junctures are opted for their implications on the state discussions: Susurluk Incident 'accidentally' exposed dubious relations between politicians, mafia, and some networks of gangland. These shady relations and unsatisfying statements of the political leaders caused fierce discussions on the deep state and dark relations between the 'state' and other non-state actors.

In the shade of these discussions on 'deep state', Turkey has experienced new phases for the state-society relations through these two critical junctures period. These discussions paved the way for the questioning of some concepts such as secret of state, the boundaries of the state activities, the legitimacy of these activities, and civil societal relations.

Finally, the February 28th process is a significant critical juncture in order to understand Turkish political life since it reveals some interactions which have been in the kernel of debates of Turkish political life. In this respect, February 28, 1997 reflects relatively tense relations between the political elite and the military, between secularist segments and religiously oriented fractions, and between the government

on the one hand and main-stream media, civil society organizations, and interest groups on the other hand. Therefore, discussions on the interplay of state and society appear in columns in this critical period.

3.1.5. Self Critiques and Limitations of the Study

Some critiques and concerns -which I have also kept in my agenda during the research- may be counted as follows. The first point of concern may be the length of time period that I tackle in this research. The excessively detailed qualitative content analysis adds another issue, albeit it brings about a limitation at the same time to this study. [119] Approximately five thousand texts (newspaper columns) were coded, and they brought numerous qualitative details to the researchers agenda.[120] However, a considerable amount of these qualitative details had to be excluded from the study due to practical reasons. Nonetheless, it is exactly these details that led this study to acquire alternative angles while evaluating different understandings of the state. These details will be in the agenda for future research.

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[119] It is a limitation because generally for qualitative content analyses, this number is considered overabundant that creates some methodological concerns. However, the researcher tried to overcome these concerns by spending one year in archive analysis and 2 years in coding phase of the research.

[120] There are approximately 60 texts for each critical juncture per columnist. In sum, there are 10 columnists and 9 critical junctures. However, there are also some interruptions in some of the columnists' texts. That is why the number of texts is approximately calculated.

Secondly, the question of how accurately the sample of columnists studied in this research represents the Turkish media may be another criticism directed to this study. To cope with this problem, nonetheless, the journalists were selected in reference to plurality of their worldviews and political thoughts. The variety in the number and perspectives of the newspapers that these journalists have worked for also indicate the attention the researcher paid to make the sample representative. The columns come from thirteen different nation-wide newspapers (Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Akşam, Güneş, Yeni Yüzyıl, Yeni Şafak, Radikal, Bugün, Tercüman, Referans, and Zaman). Beside the newspapers, two magazines –Yankı (1980s) and Yeni Gündem (1980s)- were used to supplement a few columns. Nonetheless, the concern of representativeness of the sample has been on the researcher's agenda due to two other potential critiques: these columnists reflect the *mainstream* print media, which reduces their representativenesss to some extent; and these journalists can be considered as somehow like-minded people who share a similar socio-economic background or environment.

Are the sample columnists like-minded? First, despite the variety of their political and social point of views, as belonging to an elite cadre, how indeed do these journalists' perspectives differ from each other? It is possible to argue that opinion makers are already like-minded people. "This had two important consequences. One is that opinion leaders almost invariably were similar in background and outlook to those to whom they passed on their impressions of the content of the media. The other is that they almost invariably coalesced with those to whom they passed on these impressions in the norms to which they adhered." (Comstock and Scharrer, 2005: 29)

On the other hand, it is also possible to claim, "Opinion leaders were found in all social strata and groups (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955 cited in Comstock and Scharrer, 2005: 29). To overcome the critique (about like-mindedness of columnists) at least to a promising degree, different and diverging political views and tendencies were taken into consideration while selecting the sample from columnists. Also the variety of the newspapers that these columnists have worked or recently work for is provided. In this research, there are thirteen different national newspapers that are already included in the sample. Despite some commonalities, these newspapers present a varying degree of political affinities and inclinations. Nonetheless, it is still possible to argue that these people represent an elite "cadre" or "cream layer"[121] which makes their perspectives like-minded. Hence this situation might be counted as one of the handicaps of this study.

Having said that, the elimination of alternative media newspapers might be the other criticism. Although there is the claim of variety among the selected newspapers and the journalists, it is already acknowledged that all of them represent the mainstream Turkish press, but not the minority or marginalized segments.[122] One of the possible presumptions rising from this selection is that the mainstream media is most of the times in the same line with the state/state elite. One of the feasible explanations of this might be the state tradition in Turkey. Then why is the mainstream media preferred for this study? Considering the state tradition and political culture of

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[121] Nazlı Ilıcak, for instance, criticizes journalists as being hand in glove with 'cream layer' –by which she refers to the economically privileged class. (Esendir, 2007: 244-245).

[122] In advance to this critique, we should first pose the question that if there is an 'alternative press' in Turkish print media in the first place. It is an issue that needs further research and inquiry, and of course beyond the scope of this paper.

Turkey, the influence of mainstream media is greater on both the people and the political actors. As Gürkan rightly put, during its democratic progress, the Turkish press adopted a distant attitude toward extremist (marginal) movements/ideas and carried the belief that political stability can be possible within certain limits. (1997: 409)

The other criticism might be about the scarcity of women journalists in the sample. The first reason is due to the status quo of the media sector in terms of recruiting women columnists and consider them as 'well-known columnists'. Most of the well-known columnists in this period (1983-2007) are male. This indicates that in this period (perhaps in the later periods as well), there is a male-domination in the media sector in Turkey.[123] The other reason is that although there are considerably successful women journalists in this period[124], either most of them have been writing columns on different topics other than politics or they were not columnists but correspondents at that time. Therefore, Nazlı Ilıcak is the only female columnist included in this study since she is one of the rare names that satisfied the four criteria used here to select columnists for study. It needs to be said that the gender-imbalance is not only peculiar to this sample, but the status quo of the media sector. Therefore, the gender-imbalance in our sample captures very well the gender-disparity in the Turkish media sector during the time period studied in this research.

Last but not least, the interviews conducted in this study cannot escape being anachronical since the columnists answer the questions -not surprisingly- from

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[123] For exemplary discussions on male-dominance in media sector, please see: Coşkun (ed.) 2003: 111; and Esendir, 2007: 64-65.

[124] Yasemin Çongar, Nuray Mert, Perihan Mağden, Gülay Öztürk, in 1980s and 1990s; and before this period, Nilüfer Yalçın, and Emel Aktuğ were some of the rare women journalists.

today's point of view and in relatively more 'liberal', globalized, and 'capitalist' ways. [125] They are 'liberal, globalized, and capitalist' in the sense that all now have experienced the values of globalization far more in comparison to the 1980s. Therefore, their answers are necessarily products of this experience. Nevertheless, it is exactly this inevitability that allowed the researcher further opportunity to compare and contrast their answers during interviews with their columns from the 1980s' or 1990s'.

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[125] The researcher conducted the interviews in 2013.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS: FIVE PRIOR THEMES IN TURKISH STATE LEGACY IN EXPLAINING DATA, 1983-2007

In 1937, Atatürk penned columns in the newspaper *Vakit* for five days (January 22-26, 1937) in lieu of Asım Us, a journalist, by 'borrowing' Asım Us's name. (Topuz, 1973: 158 as cited in Gürkan, 1997: 76) What encourages the founder of a nation-state –who already has in his disposal enough political power and charismatic leadership traits to influence the masses anyway- to *pretend* to be a columnist? Before this question, it is more important to raise this one: How powerful is the social impact of a columnist that the founder of a state and soldier-politician with considerable degree of political power feels the need to act as a columnist? This cannot just be explained by the pressure domestic politics puts on press/media because the issue here is not exerting pressure. Rather, it seems to be more the pragmatic employment of the power of the press/media to underwrite a dramatic social transformation. This single example shows the impact of the media in general and columnists in particular on social change in Turkish society.

In this chapter, I analyse the data that illuminate the 1983-2007 era through the columns of ten leading newspaper columnists in Turkey. I seek an answer to the following question addressed here: How do *idea entrepreneurs* (columnists) conceive the state in Turkey? The analysis is done via the analytical tools discussed in the literature on the state tradition that have assumably dominated the Turkish political milieu, in conjunction with five categories of data that I construct based on content analysis research. The relation between the analytical tools and these categories are neither causal nor linear, but associational[126]. In other words, the data are organized and provided via the ideational and conceptual map of the continuities of the state legacy and five leading themes. Before I explain these themes, I would like to start by discussing two potential issues regarding the data-processing at the outset.

In a country such as Turkey, where the sphere of the state overweighs the sphere of the political or politics[127], studying the state is a difficult task because everything can in some way or another be connected to the notion of state. Therefore organization of the paper and of thoughts derived from the data analysis requires remarkable effort by the researcher especially if qualitative details are provided for the reader.

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[126] *Associational* in (Bruno) Latourian sense.

[127] Despite the variety of claims in the addressed literature, it is argued in some discussions that the sphere of state overweighs the sphere of politics or of political in Turkey. In this sense, there is no politics but the state in Turkey. Aydın underpins the existence of a clear-cut distinction between the sphere of state and the sphere of the political. (2009: 11) Likewise Mitchell stands on the side of a distinction between private and public spheres –which is ultimately due to the distinction of 'state' and 'politics'. (Mitchell, 1991 as cited in Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 135) Similarly, Yayla argues that in contrast to ordinary democratic systems, the state is affected by the political system and social structure. However in Turkey the state sphere is not a sub-component of the political system, but the political system is a device of the state. (Yayla, 2016: 364) On the other side of the discussion, however, Navaro-Yashin pinpoints the difficulty in distinguishing the boundaries of societal/political sphere and state sphere. (2002: 134-135)

The second difficulty in data analysis is the columns themselves –taken as the unit of analysis. One of the most challenging parts in analysing newspaper columns is to seek for *internal consistency* amongst the columns of the same columnist. Beside their changing ideas longitudinally, columnists sometimes write in line with everyday politics or with whatever occupies the columnist's mind those days. As an American diplomat alluded to this issue of internal consistency in columns in his report in the 1960s, "The majority [of columnists], however, discuss whatever happens to interest them, and to their readers the columnist's personality and prejudices take on more importance than his knowledge of what he is talking about." (Bali, 2011: 170)

To cope with these two difficulties –omnipresence of the state in politics, and a frequent lack of internal consistency together with changing ideas of newspaper columnists- data are analysed in five main categories: national security and survival of state, order and stability, economy, the rule of law and the shrinkage of state. These categories were constructed in line with the spearheading issues within the columns examined, as well as the corresponding literature on the main discussions[128] about Turkish political history.

To begin with, considering the columnists' understanding(s) or conceptions of the state (in Turkey), five priorities come to the fore in their columns: 1. National security and survival of the state, 2. Order and stability, 3. Economy, 4. The rule of

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[128] I endeavour to frame these general discussions through some influential *ideas* that have been longwinded in Turkish political life and over the political actants. (Throughout the text, I occasionally refer to these '*ideas*' as '*reflexes*' of Turkish socio-political milieu.) These ideas are: '*how to save the state?*', *Westernization*, and the idea of *supremacy of the state* over politics. These are the ideas which most of the idea entrepreneurs have been engulfed by. Not surprisingly, in the theoretical chapter (1) and in the conclusion parts, I argue that idea entrepreneurs are not context-free beings.

law and 5. Shrinkage of the State. Since some of these categories overlap with one another in terms of coinciding data quotations, I examine them under three subheadings in order to provide organizational simplicity: I combine: category 1 (National Security and Survival of the State) with Category 2 (Order and Stability); and category 4 (The Rule of Law) with category 5 (The Shrinkage of State). I examine Economy separately as the third category. These are not the mere categories explaining the data, but the most common themes appear in columns. This is why these are not separate and rigid classifications but inclusive and complementary frames. The categories are not the same with the *codes* of content analysis, but they are constructed in line with the results distilled from these codes. Each categorical explanation follows a chronological trajectory that includes three decades: 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.

Throughout the analysis and discussions in each category, I provide corresponding data from the texts (newspaper columns), however, reference to a columnist in any category does not necessarily mean that s/he is supportive of the particular category as an idea. To put it differently, these categories were constructed not in a 'pro-against' frame, but in line with the most salient topics lodged in the texts while the columnists are writing about the state.[129] Thus, two columnists uttering two opposite views on the same issue are cited in the same section.

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[129] The nature of this study does not allow the researcher to easily classify columnists as 'pro' or 'against' in toto on a particular topic, or to evaluate them in ideological grounds as 'rightist'/'leftist' or liberal/authoritarian for several reasons. To give some: First there is the issue of internal consistency within the columns. A columnist might have contradictory ideas or discussions among his/her columns in different terms, or even in the same column. Just as the political conjuncture, ideas of the columnist do not remain stable. A Maoist columnist in 1980s (Şahin Alpay) might evolve into a social democrat when we come to the 2000s. A second reason is the unit of analysis of the research which is not columnists, but columns. Accordingly, a columnist might be in Category 1 with one of his texts, and in Category 3 with the other. The focus is entirely on the text.

Moreover, considering the categorization of data, four methodological distinctions were made not only during the content analysis research, but also in the evaluation of face-to-face interviews with the columnists: 1. *What is the state?* (columnist's own thought), 2. *What should be the state?* (Normative idea), 3. *What is the state as it is portrayed by Turkish society and/or by the literature on Turkey?*, 4. *What should the state be in the eyes of others (of society, scholars, or someone else) as reported by the columnist?* As seen, these four questions refer to methodologically different dimensions. This research tried to be vigilant on these distinctions. Therefore, the differences in the perspectives are provided to the reader in the course of the text in this chapter.

The logic behind constructing five main categories originates from perceived associations between the literature on Turkish political life and the data results. The reappraisal of the literature on Turkey and also the first-phase of coding portrayed some particular ideas that have been vested in Turkish political milieu. Some of these ideas can be treated in terms of Ottoman legacy, and some appear with regard to nation-state characteristics and policies of Turkish Republic. These particularities of Ottoman-Turkish politics are: *i*. the riveted psychology of '*how to save the state*'; *ii.* the idea of modernization mainly in the form of Westernization (including mental transformation derived out of the modernization projects); *iii*. The adherence of societal actors to the state power. After providing a brief introduction, I will elaborate on the ways these particularities intermingle with the *Five Categories* and what kind of links and analytical tools these ideas contribute to the discussions about Turkish political life.

The particularities of Turkish politics which are constructed and reconstructed by diverse actants in different periods lead us to five main subjects as outlined in the following. The first category entitled as *National Security and Survival of the State* mainly reflects the Ottoman state legacy that brings a strong state tradition. Very broadly speaking, this tradition is more prone more to be on the side of authoritarian state approaches (and practices) in the sketchy scale of liberal-authoritarian dichotomy. In terms of state-society relations, Ottoman tradition portrays an unquestionable and superior state vis-à-vis the society. In addition, the Ottoman state was patriarchal and centralized[130]. For sure, it would not be fair to argue that Turkish Republic adopted an entirely Ottoman state tradition since this tradition has evolved with the nation-state building process(es). Even though initial tendencies of the nation-state mentality –at ideational level first- had started with Tanzimat (*Reforms*) era by the Ottoman intellectuals in the late Ottoman; the new republic (of Turkey) has had some continuities together with ruptures of the former tradition as discussed before. This transformation will be discussed in detail in *Category 1*. All in all, Category 1 mainly reflects the mental (and also practical) historical customs and reflexes that Turkish state and society embody/carry/change/transform –all at the same time.

Second category, *Order and Stability* can actually be considered as a branch of Category 1 since they share a lot in common. Especially in terms of the addressed debates on crisis situation, order and stability approach stands in the opposite side. In

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[130] Even though there was a highly centralized bureaucracy in Ottoman state, it is fair to argue that different periods in the Ottoman era manifest different degrees of centralization. Changing levels of centralization is linked with the function of local elites in diverse communities, and with the processes of modernization (Westernization).

other words, in order to refrain from crisis and stability, the national security understanding proposes order and stability as being the ways of eliminating threats and enemies even though this order is provided through restrictions of rights and liberties. Only through promising for political stability and order as a result, political actants could 'achieve' to prevail against the 'threats' and 'enemies' of the state. But Order and Stability category has another particular importance as well. The widespread use of order and stability does not limited with the promise of national security. The specific idea and emphasis of 'nizam' (which literally means 'order' but has further baggage in Turkish political context) discloses a continuity coming from the Ottoman state tradition into the Turkish state which will be explained in the corresponding section.

As portrayed in the newspaper columns, the third category, *Economy*, reveals changing dynamics between state and society as a result of economic liberalisation. Through this dynamic, the columnists depict original and interesting conceptualizations of the state such as 'nursing state', 'commanding state', 'bully state', and 'state as a refuge.'

The final section (categories 4 and 5) reflects how the rule of law becomes significant in columns as a result of shrinking state of economically liberal system. With this impact of liberalisation, the focus has started to shift from the state to the society in the texts. Former 'father state' now turns into a 'servant state'. The stress upon societal rights and liberties, and the scope of state activities are some of the most apparent issues in these categories. However, despite the idea of political liberalisation, the particular emphasis on *individual* remains limited. The Individual

is overshadowed by a relatively more strong emphasis on society, and on the rights

and liberties of the people. In other words, individual is melted in the same pot with

the society. The *sui generis* position of individual in Turkish context will be

discussed at the end of this section.

Returning to the main question of the research, how do the columnists conceive the

state in Turkey? The following part provides the links between particular ideas and

the examined columns.

4.1.Five Themes in Categorizing the Columnists' Priorities While Conceptualizing the State in Turkey

Keyman juxtoposes two main groups in evaluating the state discussions in Turkey.

(2000-2001: 141-154) The first group includes those who have a statist discourse,

which Keyman addresses as the '*strong state myth*'. The second group adopts a neo-

liberal discourse (the '*democracy myth*') with their key emphasis on minimal-

technical state. In their arguments which mostly include nationalistic components[131],

the first group -*statists*- envisage a homogeneous society because homogeneity in

society brings stability and 'normalization' which are two of the necessary

conditions for the survival of a strong state. Therefore, this group is more inclined to

'sacrifice' individual/societal rights and liberties for the sake of 'political stability'

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[131] Such as a unique Turkish identity, a 'national cause' emphasis (*milli dava*), and the equation of *state interest* with *national interest*.

and of the well-being of the state. In that vein, the bottom-up desire for change, for

plurality and diversity would not be appreciated by this approach. The neo-liberal

approach, however, favours to minimize the role of state and its intervention not only

in economics but also in societal sphere in which civil society should function as a

sphere of negative liberty[132]. Despite their separate tenets in terms of state-society

relations, both statists and neo-liberals appear to care for democracy in their

discourses in order to garner public legitimacy. (Keyman, 2000-2001: 143) This

explains why so-called 'neo-liberal' and/or 'social democratic' elements are

prevalent in their rhetoric.

Data results from my research propose a complementary explanation to Keyman's

analysis. The conceptual tools I use in order to clarify my first two categories

('*National Security and Survival of the State*' and '*Order and Stability*') can also be

explanatory for Keyman's first group (or vice versa). National interest, state interest,

raison d'état, national security, stability, and order (in the form of '*nizam*') as some

of these concepts lend support to Keyman's *strong state myth*. Both studies indicate

that neither among statist myth and democracy myth groups, nor among five

categories I suggest, are there neat boundaries. Nonetheless, this study attempts to

take Keyman's analysis one step forward thanks to the qualitative details derived

from the longitidunal research on the 1983-2007 period. In difference from

Keyman's approach however, this thesis endeavours to explain them not through

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[132] Further elaboration on different 'types' of liberty is available in: Berlin, Isaiah (1969) 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, London: Oxford University Press. New ed. in Berlin 2002.

actors who belong to diverse political standpoints, but *ideas* that are deemed

significant and influential[133] on these actors in Turkish political culture.

4.1.1. Themes 1, and 2: National Security and Survival of State, and Order and Stability

In this category, I argue that (national) *security* -which is used by different actants in

their discourses as the corresponding data will illustrate below- mostly represents the

ideas of 'how to save the state', modernization (Westernization), the Ottoman state

tradition (in the form of a transcendental state), and as well as the reflexes this

tradition has brought and embedded in Turkish political culture. To put it differently,

despite lately-developed but continuing discourses on liberalism, and on rights and

liberties on the one hand; the state legacy and its implications are reproduced by

Turkish political actants in the form/disguise of 'security', on the other hand.

Therefore, the use of conceptual proxies such as 'national security', 'survival of the

state' (*devletin bekası*), 'father state', state interest, the supreme interests of the state

(*devletin âli menfaatleri*), national will (*milli irade*), and common good basically

mirror a particular understanding that I address as 'security understanding'. In terms

of columnists, this state-centric approach is one of the most salient elements in their

conceptions of the state – as independent from their negative or positive manner

toward authoritarian state practices. Having said that, the critiques made by the

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[133] It needs to be noted that this research does not measure the *degree* of this influence.

columnists to frown upon the 'national security and survival of the state' approach are also included in Category 1.

The reproduction process of the state legacy and practices shows itself in various forms in the examined texts. Among many, I will attempt to pinpoint the most visible forms that lead us to the security approach. The first form that embodies security approach is *hikmet-i hükümet* doctrine[134] even though the phrase '*hikmet-i hükümet*' or '*devlet aklı*' is rarely found within the texts.[135] Both raison d'état and *hikmet-i hükümet* doctrines prioritize the state vis-à-vis the society; broaden the sphere of state actions and activities at the expense of the societal sphere; and legitimize these activities through multiple conditions that the state itself creates and recreates.

The second appearance of security is in the form of "*procrastination attitude" when the issue is* about democracy. It is one of the common manners which asserts that human rights and liberties are good for the society but they can be postponed at times of crises.[136] The use of crises might be tactical since they present windows of

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[134] Generally speaking, *hikmet-i hükümet* corresponds to the doctrine of raison d'état of the European political history. In mot-à-mot translations, some scholars called reason of state 'devlet aklı', which was later found problematic in projecting the phrase in Turkish milieu. (Sancar, 2014) The word 'reason' ('akıl' according to Sancar's translation), does not represent the situation in Ottoman state well since in the Ottoman Empire up until late 19th century, it was not possible to talk about a Western-sense rationality. In order to talk about a Western 'reason', we should focus on the processes of Enlightenment and secularization. Also with Weber's analysis, patrimonial authority is distinct from rational authority. The patrimonial authority the Ottoman state had is therefore different from estate-type domination that existed in the mediaval west. (Weber's Economy and Society; and Machiavelli, Prince as both cited in İnalcık, H., Comments on ''Sultanism": Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity, 1992: 508) In that vein, 'hikmet' and 'reason' does not match exactly. Despite the problematic equation of *raison d'état* and *hikmeti hükümet*, I will use them interchangeably throughout the text, when necessary.

[135] Even though the researcher rarely came across these words, some statements included in this category reflect a Machiavellian-type of raison d'état doctrine by prioritizing the state interests.

[136] This 'postponement' is not only restricted with individual rights and liberties. Actually, it is the issue of clashing boundaries of the state sphere and the societal (political, in this case) sphere. If it is presumed that the political sphere 'starts' to squeeze the sphere of the state, then the boundaries should be redrawn (either with a coup, a state interference, or anything that is deemed to be a

opportunity for state actors to provide legitimate tools of consolidating state power and of continuity of the state. As will be seen throughout the paper, there is a wide range of approaches in which actants declare some statements to portray that democracy in Turkey is/should be postponed with the excuses of 'this' or 'that'. The projected reasons for postponing democracy might be 'threats', 'national security at stake', or anything else depending on the situation. In general in the rhetoric of this sort of excuses, the subjects choose the words '*but*' or '*however*' just after they sing praises for democracy in order to indicate that there should be some 'precautions' or 'preliminaries' before Turkish society practice a 'full-fledged' democracy. In the nomenclature of this endemic attitude, I preferred '*procrastination* about democracy' instead of '*postponement*' because in justifications of different actants, there is the impression that almost all of these excuses (or reasons) are not actually to 'postpone' democracy. They rather indicate reluctance to portray further rights and liberties for (some groups in) the society –and most important of all these justifications generally favour the side of the state. I argue that this reluctance can be explained with the term 'procrastination'.

Last but not least, order and stability is another condition to provide national security and the continuity of the state. The central point among these factors is that all of them have been used in the reproduction process of state power and statist discourse for decades even if some columnists personally criticize the state power. The analysis indicates that order and stability approach is strongly correlated with two conditions: i. Order is envisaged as the opposite of 'crisis situation' -or of the 'exceptional situation'- as portrayed by Schmittean political theory. In the absence of

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precaution to prevent alleged threats against the state) in favour of the state, according to the security approach.

order, the exceptional situation is inevitable. ii. Order is also used in the form of '*nizam*' which is associated with a particular type of freedom understanding. In both factors, the absence of order and stability brings the exceptional case in which the sovereign (the state) has to limit or reframe the boundaries of rights and liberties. In terms of their common emphasis on 'order vs. crisis', Category 1 (National Security and Survival of the State) and Category 2 (Order and Stability) are not separate, but complementary frames.

The approach that favours *order* may have numerous underpinnings that arise from Turkish political culture. I point out two of them which I claim that the most explanative factors in order to explain the mental frames of order approach. The first one is the long wielded process of modernization that intensifies during Tanzimat and continues in Turkish Republic. The second one is related to *nizam* understanding before modernization. At the junction point of both factors, there lies a particular understanding of a 'single truth'. Both modernization and nizam have brought certain mind schemes in their own ways. Nizam understading dates back to pre-modernization era of the Ottoman Empire in which the state or sultan's authority was attributed to God. Thus there was only *one truth* which was God himself. This line of thought intensified the claims for the necessity of order. And the state was considered as the mere authority to provide the order. With modernization, simply put, positivism has changed the alleged 'single truth'. With the impact of secularisation, it was no more the way of God, but instead the way of the state.

The link between 'single truth' understanding and order approach is that a uniform understanding of social facts brings inertia (stability or *durağanlık*). Since stability -

in the form of 'inertia' (as the negative connotation of stability)- has been praised in Ottoman times, every desire for change coming from the society (as an opposite dynamic of inertia) was labelled as being 'harmful' to nizam and thus to the state. That is why the stable understanding of 'how to preserve the state' supports the idea of nizam. Even though we see some reforms (changes) in the Ottoman past, these reforms were actually instrumental to preserve the existing nizam (*nizam-ı alem*). (Kadıoğlu, 2008: 284) Those demands for change those are considered beyond accepted borders of the 'steady' have therefore been characterised as 'enemy', 'threat', 'traitor' and alike by the statist actors.

Nizam understanding is strongly associated with the issue of liberty. In case of Turkey, pro-nizam approaches generally propose an understanding of liberty in which rights, liberties, and societal demands are welcomed as long as they are respectful for the order –the order of the state. Otherwise, the efforts are labelled as threatening the continuity of the state and the well being of the society. Before I present corresponding data on the intersection of national security and order, I will denote an example in order display the association between *nizam* and liberty.

The early Turkish Republican period is an example that indicates how order and liberties interrelate. Ahmet Ağaoğlu in his column in June 5, 1933 coins the concept of 'liberty with discipline' (*nizamlı hürriyet*) by elaborating on some statements from Recep Peker's article published in the same name (*disiplinli hürriyet*) in *Ülkü* journal (a Turkish biweekly) in 1930s. *Nizamlı* or *disiplinli hürriyet* (liberty with discipline) refers to a certain perception of liberty in which liberties are supposed to proceed as long as it goes hand in hand with a disciplined society. Constituting this discipline is

possible through a community which is obedient to the state authorities and the provisions of 'national chefs'. (Ağaoğlu, 2011: 226-227) For Peker and Ağaoğlu, liberty functions to provide order in society. But liberty here is a pragmatic tool for Peker and Ağaoğlu to form a *disciplined* (in other words, a steady) community. Individuals are allowed to have liberties only if these liberties do not lead to anarchy and catastrophe of the homeland. That is exactly why individuals can be vested with liberties under the condition of keeping stability of the country. (Ağaoğlu, 2011: 226)

Although Ağaoğlu and Peker are not representative of diverse understandings of liberty in Turkish political milieu, their explanations reflect a considerable part of these approaches. Even though early Republican political actors attempt to cut ties from the Ottoman past and build an entirely new, secular, and rational nation, they still shared a similar approach in terms of their emphases on *order*. In this regard, the data category on order and stability reflect not only Turkish Republican history, but also the legacy of the Ottoman past. The general tendency toward the concept of liberty in Turkish political history -where there is a lack of a full-fledged liberal tradition (Göle, 2012: 566; Coşar, 2004: 72)- is that liberties are vital for a well-functioning democracy. However, they can only be 'granted' to the people as far as they do not threaten *national unity and solidarity* (*milli birlik ve beraberlik*). In this category, I also analyse the data which point at national unity and solidarity together with *order* and *stability*.

All in all, the order approach can be assessed under the heading of 'how to save the state' because almost all of the efforts aimed to provide and maintain uniformity and steadiness of the society. Alternative movements or ideas have generally been

accounted as a threat against order both by the Ottoman and the Republican states because those ideas might have endangered the order in the society. These suspicions towards alternatives has praised 'stability' (or 'inertia') and the understanding of how to save the state (or how to sustain stability). Therefore, the discussions about saving the state should be considered accordingly with the understanding of order as well.

To sum up, national security and order are the tools to reproduce legitimate ways of sustaining the idea of state. Among numerous factors that lead to and impact upon this reproduction process of state power, the *dissemination* (or '*contagion*' in some cases) of three main ideas seem to be influential in Turkish political culture: the idea of saving the state, the idea of Westernization, and the idea of adhering to the superior state. Therefore the forms that the security approach is embodied in are not independent from the discussions of these three pillars of Turkish political thought. Yet it is worthy of reminding that the interaction between the forms of national security approach and the three pillars are neither causal nor relational, but associational.

Considering the main sub-sections (different forms of the security approach) of Category 1, we can argue that among fruitful theoretical discussions, Schmittean, Machievellian, and Hegelian arguments would help to clarify the data on Turkey. These theories on state provide philosophical grounds especially for the first two categories (*National Security and Survival of the State*, and *Stability and Order*). Their principal arguments render the connections between Turkish political tradition,

and the salient concepts[137] of Turkish politics –as research tools used in this study- more apparent. Having said that, Schmitt's 'friend-foe' distinction, Hegel's portrayal of a God-like state, and Machiavellian discussion on raison d'état doctrine construct the theoretical elaborations used in this part to explain specific concepts such as 'threat', 'fear', 'enemy', and state interest.

In the following parts in this category, I will first provide the data that have direct reference to 'security', 'national security', and 'survival/continuity of state'. Then in conjunction with the reviewed theoretical discussions, I will analyse data that indicate different forms of security approach as I address in the following: threat-enemy perception, raison d'état doctrine in the form of postponing democracy, crisis situation vs. order and stability, and emphasis on national unity and solidarity. [138]

While explaining the influence of ideas on columnists' understandings of the state in Turkey, I argued that the analytical tool of *saving the state* has been prominent and one of the explanative elements. For instance, Taha Akyol indicated in our interview the impact of state tradition upon his own understanding of the state by reference to

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[137] Such as national security, stability, threat, enemy, national unity and solidarity, survival of the state (*devletin bekası*), the sublime interests of the state (*devletin ali menfaatleri*), and raison d'état.

[138] Before I start data analysis, it is better to note that it is not surprising to have limited quantity of data quotes in 1980s (for all data categories) in comparison to the succeeding two decades. The first reason is the post-coup atmosphere in which the continuing restrictions were not only inclusive of politicians or political parties, but also media actors. Taha Akyol, for example, was on trial with death sentence and in this period (1983-1986), he 'anonymously' penned the editorials in *Yankı* journal. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, September 5, 2013) Post-coup restrictions were not the sole reason of the limited number of data quotations. The second reason is a more structural one. Since the time period studied in this research is relatively longwinded –that contain almost 24 years- it is not surprising to coincide with some ruptures in the careers of the examined columnists either due to external factors like the political environment, or because of professional motivations of the journalists –such as making TV programs instead of penning newspaper columns. Finally, alongside with their individual professional preferences or the measures of junta regimes, columns' perpetuity might be interrupted because of restrictions by the political power. Journalists are amongst the groups who encounter ideational conflict with political power the most. At times when political power decides to be 'less tolerant' toward opposition, journalists might find themselves in prison and they are banned to pen in the corresponding intervals.

the pre-1980s and 1980s. He said that "the way Turkey thought about the state had reflected upon me, as it did upon other people. At the beginning, the state was *divine* [for me]. Especially since I was initially coming from the [Turkish] nationalist tradition and I respected a lot for the Ottoman tradition, the state appeared so *metaphysical*, *superior* and *supreme* to me. When I was a reserve officer at military, I had been on duty from time to time as a sentinel and if there was a malfunctioning, I used to warn soldiers by saying that "how could you be so negligent for the *duty* that the state bestowed upon you?", thereby demonstrating how supreme and divine the state was for me. The state was an *uppermost symbol* both in terms of religious-traditional assets and nationalist values. The Ottoman concept of '*din-u devlet mülk-ü millet*' [for example]... It was [Turgut] Özal who first broke the taboo of the state. Before Özal –let say it before 1980s- the '*exaltedness of the state*' is explicit in my writings." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, September 5, 2013)

While revisiting the evolvement of his way of thinking about the state, Akyol starts with how the Ottoman tradition of supreme and superior state influenced his ideas especially in 1980s and before. His specific reference to '*duty*' reflects one of the common tenets of nationalist approaches in which the *duty* given by the authority (the state, in this case) takes precedence over individual preferences, rights and liberties as long as the security of the state is 'at stake'. As Kadıoğlu propounds, [the concept of] *duties* are generally brought to the fore with the concern of creating a nation. And these *duties*, she continues, proposed a challenge against the flourishing of individualism in a rationalist sense in Turkey. (Kadıoğlu, 2008: 288, emphases added) In the following sections, we will see how Akyol's priorities in his columns transform in the 2000s that his emphases shift toward more societal rights and

liberties.[139] Also his statement reveals how economic liberalization that started with Özal is one of the turning points in shaping his thoughts about the state in Turkey.[140]

Akyol also argued how the state was used as an *uppermost symbol* as representing all values such as religion and nationalism. In terms of the common use of 'symbol's, Mardin pinpoints that if there is an absence in the structure, the use of symbol in lieu of structure is a date-back invention. (2015: 356) In terms of Turkish Republican state, the myth of the state has strengthened due to the lack in the institutions. The symbols of the state started to be used to create respect and fear in the new system of the republic. The core feature of this newly established state was that it was taking power from the 'mythos of the state' (through the 'symbols' of state) when and where the authority of the state was at stake because of the absence of the needed state structures. (Mardin, 2015: 356) For instance, in Akyol's statement above, the 'military service' symbolizes the state because military is a state institution and in the absence of the state itself, it is the military (or another institution) or a member of the military that/who acts on the state's behalf. Mardin's explanation is supportive of this claim.

As Mardin argued, the newly established Turkish Republican state used to have some deficiencies about state organization and structure. In places or corners where usual state services failed to or did not reach, the state resorted to or tapped into the mere existence of its colossal structure in order to cover up the deficiencies in the

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[139] We will also see that despite some degree of change in his thoughts, Akyol keeps referring back to '*loyalty to the state*' and to '*duties to the state*'. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, September 5, 2013)

[140] Further discussion on how economic views impacted upon state conceptualizations is available in the third category, *Economy*.

organizational structure (2015: 356) Considering Akyol's statement, before 1980s, the military was a symbol of the state in the eyes of 'Turkish-nationalist Akyol'.[141] In this context, Akyol's statements above mirror the Ottoman state tradition in which the state is always prior vis-à-vis the individual or societal rights and responsibilities. This priority of the state, according to this tradition, is incontestable since the state is not an 'earthly' being but something '*metaphysical*'. The metaphysical and exalted status accorded or attributed to the state was far more visible until the process of economic liberalization initiated by Özal in the 1980s. In the following data examples, we will occasionally see how these paternalistic and 'supreme' characteristics of Turkish state lingered on in the 1990s and afterwards, but before, we will continue to discuss different forms of security approach.

Ideationally, the claims of 'security' require a presence of 'threat' and 'enemy' since security would only be possible if X is '*secure from*' Y. In that vein, the survival of the state would only be feasible in the absence of any threats or enemies. The 'enemies and threats against the Turkish state and its national security' have been ample and diverse. Different political atmospheres have encapsulated different conceptualizations of threat and enemy. Roughly speaking, in the Cold-War era for instance, communism was allegedly the principal threat to Turkey. This made the Soviet Russia the enemy. (i.e. Tekeli, 1984: 22; A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 17, 2013). In the 1990s, the enemy came this time in the guise of 'religious reactionism and hidden political Islamist agenda against the secular Turkish state'. (i.e. Arcayürek, November 4, 1996; Arcayürek November 11, 1996;

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[141] When it comes to the 2000s, Fehmi Koru makes (and then questions) a similar 'symbolization' between the judiciary and the state. While reporting a personal anecdote, Koru states that during a judicial case he was sued, he considered the judge as the state itself. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 14, 2013) Here there is again the use of symbol on behalf of the myth of the state.

Arcayürek, November 22, 1996; Çölaşan, October 19, 1996; Cemal, February 23, 1997) Embedded in these claims of threat and security is the understanding of democracy, which has been influential in defining the respective roles of the state and of the society. The most visible form of democracy understanding in the 1980s is that if the security of nation is 'at stake' –according to the columnist at hand- democracy is nothing more than a tool that can be put aside, disregarded, neglected, or postponed to even an uncertain future.

Nazlı Ilıcak suggested a few arguments alleging the perils that the Turkish state encounters with.

> Turkish Constitution [in 1984] counts communism, fascism, and the approaches that go against the principle of secularism as a crime. And it also considers working in favour of dictatorship as a crime… Is propagandizing for communism a crime of thought? I personally believe that two of the most important threats for Turkey are *communism* and the *behaviours that are antithetical to secularism*. . . . . Meaning that, in the mind of the people who embrace either communism or fascism or anti-secular thoughts, there is the idea of subverting this order [system/the state/regime]. And here it is an action, not merely a thought. (Tekeli, 1984: 22)

As seen in Ilıcak's statements, she defines the *threats* against Turkish state (and against the order) as they were defined in the 1982 Constitution. Furthermore, she proposes that if the thoughts in question are pro-communism, fascism or anti-secularism then they cannot be underrated as just 'thoughts'; they are actions, and as such must be considered a crime. Ilıcak argues in the same text that communism as an idea that must be prohibited because when this idea is 'verbalized' it turns into propaganda and then into action. The interesting point in Ilıcak's discussion is that she does not make the same argument for fascism in the course of the text. She says,

In September 12 [1980, military coup] era, Turkey might have drifted toward fascism. If an extensive terror incident had continued, fascism would have settled truly in Turkey. I mean if the right-wing had triumphed... In that regard, it is not possible to prevent fascism through forbidding it because their ideas are homeland, nation, flag, Turkish ancestry, the past of the Turk, etc. And these ideas cannot be prohibited. (Tekeli, 1984: 22-23)

Again in the same text (Tekeli, 1984: 22-23), Ilıcak asserts that she considers not fascism but communism as a threat against the order because fascism could have only been possible through the military, however, 'our military' cannot have this sort of route since Atatürk directed the military into the Western democracy, not into fascism. The statement can be interpreted in an alternative way that the columnist conceives the Western democracy –as she understands it- as a magical cure for potential problems such as fascism –even though Ilıcak's herself is not prone to identify fascism as a problem in her statements. Differently put, Ilıcak suggests that once the state elite selected the way of Westernization in democracy, this selection would -all of a sudden- prevent the country from the perils of fascism.

As seen in the statements, Ilıcak projects a particular way in defining 'threats' against the Turkish state and these threats are mostly described via communism in the 1980s. Although it is difficult to assign theoretical or practical reasons backing Ilıcak's ideas, we can at least argue in terms of the particular era and ideas that her thoughts cannot be taken independently from the Cold War conditions in which Turkey chose the Western-block; so did Ilıcak. We also see that Ilıcak's ideas reflect her ideational affiliation. In pre-1980s, 1980s and 1990s, she identified herself as rightist. (Göktaş and Çakır, 1991: 105) While drawing the distinctions between communism and fascism, communism overweighs fascism in being 'more minacious' against Turkey, according to her assessments. These assessments are

also determinative of Ilıcak's views about democracy and freedom of thought (or of speech).

Ilıcak's views on democracy in 1980s can be described through what I earlier called the attitude of *procrastination*. In other words, her identification of 'threat' and 'enemy' portrays a *sui generis* (and inconsistent, from time to time) understanding of democracy in which some rights and liberties –such as freedom of thought- can be restricted up until Turkish democracy becomes 'mature enough' to proceed. Therefore, she states,

> "Now, if Turkey were [like] Canada, I might have not dwelt upon the issue of crime of thought so much. I, too, would have said that 'we shall be much more tolerant, and let everyone think and act as s/he wishes to do'. . . . . As you know, there is no crime which is called 'separatism' in England. Liberation movements are not counted as separatism there. You can hold a referendum on whether Scotland becomes independent or not… Our body (*bizim bünyemiz*) cannot accept this sort of thing. [In the Turkish case, you cannot conduct a referendum on] 'Should the East [Eastern Anatolia] be independent?' Can Turkey propose this in a referendum? The country would have been torn into pieces [in that case]. We were not even able to get a functioning democracy despite our sub-standards for the last thirty years. In that regard, *above all, our priority must be to see to it that this democracy functions first (Önce hele şu democracy bir yürüsün…)*." (Tekeli, 1984: 23, *emphases added*)

Considering the context, it is fair to claim that according to Ilıcak's statements on democracy, rights and liberties can be secondary when the stability and order of the country is of concern. If necessary, rights and liberties (both at individual and societal levels) can be postponed until the survival of Turkish state is 'secure enough' to proceed.

But when will be those problems that 'threaten' the security of the Turkish state be solved and when will the state 'settle down' to proceed in a democratic way? The answer to this question remains enigmatic especially when the various experiences of

Turkish political life in the context of 'threat' are taken into account. This question has been answered generally by referring either to 'crisis time' or to a 'transition period'. For Ilıcak as a case in point here, freedom of thought and of speech in Turkish democracy can be viable only if the crises that pose a threat against the state's survival –at least- appease and –finally- disappear. However, threats never die down; new threats continue to emerge. Each period brings its own enemies and threats, and these alleged threats continue to be reproduced by different political actants.

Emre Kongar's column sheds a light on 'threat and crisis production' processes. He argues that the claims of necessity to postpone democracy for the sake of security reasons have been a *permanent characteristic* embedded in Turkish Republican history. "While in the past [before 1980s] there was only the mention of 'communist' threat or of 'fifth columns' ('*ihanet şebekeleri*') constituted by 'Turanists' or 'Fascists'; now [1980s] even the 'Western Europe' -'the most innocent' on these issues- together with its organization, the Council of Europe, started to be counted amongst the 'traitor foreign powers' ('*hain dış mihraklar*')," he says. (Kongar, 1984: 20) "Here it is: Both the issues of thoughts and actions -that are deemed to be restricted and limited- have now become further widespread by saying that "its time is yet to come" ('*şimdi sırası değil*') or "it will serve the external enemies". If the 'crisis situation' (*kritik durum*), 'the most devastating depression of history' (*tarihin en büyük bunalımı*), or 'transition period' (*geçiş dönemi*) all of which have been used to justify all these restrictions and restraints, then they [these appellations] are now the permanent characteristics of our Republican history." (Kongar, 1984: 20) All in all, the 'crisis situation' (*kritik durum*) or with Schmittean terms '*the state of*

exception'[142] are just the excuses used in the discourses of different political actants

to legitimize not only their discourses but also their restrictive activities/policies.

Mehmet Barlas's argument on democracy is another example that reflects how

'national security and unity' is of primary importance in his portrayal of democracy

in 1980s.

> If we do not want Turkish democracy to be interrupted again [referring to then-final interruption of civilian politics by the military coup], we should assign the necessities of '*consensus*' and we should obey them. Besides, we should also deeply accept that consensus and looking for the least common denominator (*asgari müşterek*) do not mean servility but being rationalistic and realistic. Democracy is not the regime of robustness, of fait accompli, or of show of strength; but it is the regime of *consensus*, *dialogue*, and *common grounds*. . . . . The general framework of consensus and finding common grounds can be drawn by some principles. Some of these [principles] are: not supporting sectarianism, racism, or class antagonism; but treasuring the country's *security and unity* the most, respecting national will and the parliament, not preventing the people's participation to governing the country in a democratic way, being adhered to the constitutional rule of law, and so on and so forth." (Barlas, November 29, 1983, *emphasis added*)

Interestingly enough, Barlas further explains that "the spirit of consensus includes

the necessity that to-be-established-government should be embraced by the

President." ("*uzlaşmanın ruhunda, kurulacak hükümetin Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından*

benimsenmesi de vardır.'') (Barlas, November 29, 1983) As seen, every person

attaches a different constituent into the description of 'national security', 'unity',

'national will', 'democracy' and these sorts of null concepts. Nonetheless, this

situation cannot only explained by their null contents. Nilüfer Göle (2014) provides

an alternative explanation while analysing 1980s' politics. She argues that in 1980s

onwards, Turkish politics experiences a political cultural change. One of the

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[142] *Emergency* or *extraordinary situation* can also count as *exception*. Schmitt's depiction of exceptional case has already been discussed.

implications of this change is the one in the political discourses of the actors. In the observable change in 1980s' onwards' political discourses, the stress upon pre-1980s' rhetoric on ideologies and ideological discussions were now replaced with new concepts such as 'détente' (or 'appeasement'), 'tolerance', and 'consensus'. (Göle, 2014: 559-560)

For Barlas here, democracy requires having consensus on 'least common denominators' and this consensus should be embraced by then-President. Considering the political environment at that time, Barlas adds that 'being adopted' by the junta leader (Kenan Evren, who became the President in 1982 following the coup he led) should be among the criteria or preconditions of democracy in order to have *national security and unity*. It indicates that the definitions of 'null concepts' such as democracy, national security, and national will that are used by the columnists are not context-free. Particularly in terms of the security approach, it is not possible to have a unique definition. As Gray argued, the culture of national security is not static, but it can "change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded and culturally translated." (1999: 131 as cited in Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 200) In Barlas example, the 1980 military coup had already passed and his statements seem to be influenced by it. But it is difficult to conclude that Barlas's definition of national security is only shaped by military influence of the era. Karaosmanoğlu also warns us not come up with hasty conclusions about the settings of national security culture by remarking "contrary to the general view, Turkey's security culture is not completely influenced by the military. The civilian elites have also played an

important part in its formation." (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 200)[143] In the course of the text, I also argue that neither national security nor the other data categories are only constructed and influenced by a uni-dimensional effect such as military, founding elites, economy, or ideological affiliation. This is why I repeatedly propose that the state power (and the tools to create state power) is (are) produced and reproduced by different actants in different political environments throughout Turkish political life.

As introduced earlier, according to the order and stability approach, order is of top priority. Political order is considered more important than and prior to democracy when it is 'necessary'. Democratic mechanisms can be suspended on the grounds that 'order and political stability' is at stake. Accordingly, order can be provided by various means, and *procrastination* attitude on democracy is one of them.

The attitude of procrastination -when democracy is the issue- is not limited to ideational levels of discussions. It is also 'practiced' in different ways. In Turkish political life, one of the most common activities to 'provide order' has been military interventions. Generally speaking, the interference of military with civilian politics contradicts and undermines democracy since coups restrict individual rights and liberties. However, in Turkey, in the 'order and stability'-prioritized approach, these military interventions have been found 'appropriate', and they have been supported on the alleged ground that military coups 'contribute to democracy'. While evaluating the 1980 coup Mehmet Barlas, for example, claimed that Turkish Armed Forces "had to" carry out the military intervention:

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[143] Not only 'civilian elites' but also ordinary citizens contribute to the idea of 'strong state' by practicing and reproducing it everyday. (Çınar, 2005; Çağla, 2012: 571; Yavaro-Nashin, 2002: 134-135; Aydın, 2009)

In the editorial article we wrote in September 14, 1980, we said that "the success of the September 12 will lean on the triumph of democracy". … It is because we knew that in a country on the edge of civil war, it was not possible to keep neither democratic nor economic development movements alive. … Similarly, we knew that Turkish Armed Forces did the September 12 because they had to do it. . . . While Kenan Evren [the Chief of General Staff] was writing his feelings to the official Anıtkabir memorial book on November 10, he gave the good news to our Atatürk that 'we had achieved to pass onto parliamentary democracy.' Unless a person felt so deeply, could he state them in this way?" (Barlas, November 14, 1983)

In another column, Barlas adds, "We believe that Mr. Evren is the warrant of our democracy." (Barlas, November 30, 1983)

When it comes to the 1990s, the 'national security' approach comes to the picture in the disguise of 'threat to the regime' in the columns. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, 'communism' was barely seen as a threat anymore in the examined columns. The alleged threat turned out to be those against the 'secular Turkish state'. The main debate was, broadly speaking, that political Islamist actors had a hidden agenda (*takiyye*) to seize the secular state and replace it with a Sharia regime. The general discussions in the columns in this period were predominantly about whether or not there was a hidden plan of these actors, first and foremost the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) led by Necmettin Erbakan, which had been an extension of several political parties in the National Outlook Movement line, and if yes, how to cope with this situation for the sake of *saving the state security*.

Not only Islamic-oriented political parties, but also the military involvement with politics in the same decade paved the way for further discussions on national security. The February 28[144] 1997 military intervention (which later recalled as

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[144] It is a long-lasting debate whether February 28, 1997 incident is a military intervention or not. However, there is also a frequent naming for this incident as a 'post-modern coup'. These debates however are not among the concerns of this paper.

February 28 process due to its echoing effects in Turkish politics), in a sense,

provided necessary tools for the state elites (including the military) to call the

military for duty of 'protecting the secular state'. As the former 'guardians of the

regime', the military returned to the political picture. Henceforth, this decade became

an era in which the idea of saving the state and the claims of national security had

gone hand in hand.

The other seminal issue in that decade related to fierce discussions on state-illegal

gangs relations as a result of the interesting *Susurluk* Incident[145] in November 1996.

These discussions have been one of the milestones in Turkish political life in the

sense that by questioning of state-mafia connections, society started to become

disillusioned about the state's 'exaltedness', 'strength', and –the most important of

all- its 'sacredness'. In other words, alongside with security issues, 1990s are the

years that state-society relations were intensely discussed. The Susurluk Incident is

one of the crossroads that state-society relations came to and occupied the agenda for

a long time in Turkish politics. The degree of that change and the amount of

discussions it created can be seen in several columnists' takes.

Hasan Cemal, for instance, states that Turkey is experiencing a '*critical time*'. "In

terms of the regime, our country has arrived at a crossroads" he argues. (Cemal,

February 23, 1997, Sabah) In another column, he suggests that the Welfare Party

(one of the coalition partners at that time) should be in opposition, not at the

governmental power. Cemal (February 7, 1997) proposes:

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[145] It is an interesting coincidence of the gathering of state actors, secret state actors, and mafia-like actors in a car accident in Susurluk district of Anatolia. With Jung and Piccoli's statements "the composition of its passengers stirred a major state crises, disclosing the involvement of politicians and security forces in the mafia-like web of Turkey's organised crime." (2001: 111)

> Saying that the Welfare Party should not be in the government is seen as antidemocratic! Emitting the discontent about the Welfare Party is also seen a democracy-opponent manner! Why? Democracies consist of government and opposition. The place of the Welfare Party is in the opposition. . . . It is more benevolent (*daha hayırlı*) that Hodja [Erbakan] and the Welfare [Party] should be in the opposition. This is not contrary to the democracy. What is more, it relieves the regime in Turkey.

He assigns a place for the Welfare Party which was elected for the governmental power by the people, and he argues that this assigned role for the Welfare Party in the opposition is not anti-democratic, but good for the regime. Cemal's portrayal of a 'critical time' due to the presence of an Islamic-oriented political party in the governmental power refers to a potential 'crisis' and 'threat' against the regime in case of a continuity of this presence.

Cemal's columns in this period (mid-1990s) heavily emphasize secularism and possible threats against the secular regime. While commenting on an interview done with Ahmet Taşgetiren, an Islamic-oriented columnist and then-chief editor of *Yeni Şafak* newspaper, Cemal interprets Taşgetiren's answers as appealing to a sharia regime.

> What do the [interview] questions and answers reveal? The desire for a Sharia State…   It is demanded that state-society and interpersonal relations are entirely arranged in accordance with the laws of Quran. In other words, there is no secularism in this demand, nor there is democracy. Instead, there is Quran and Sharia order. It says: The basic rules are determined in accordance with the religious principles exist in Quran, but not with decisions of assemblies which came to power through the votes of people. Now if you ask these questions to Erbakan Hodja and his close circle, you will see they do not think in a different way. They may not reply as frankly as it was answered above. They may appeal to word plays and hypocrisy (*takiyye*). Nevertheless for them, too, in governing state and society, Quran is essential, and Sharia is valid. (Cemal, February 13,1997)

The perception of threat against secular regime leads Cemal to what I previously

called 'democracy procrastination' attitude. For him, democracy is subsidiary to the

secular system. "I also take a stand with those who say 'democracy no matter what'.

However, there is always a 'however' in this kind of thought!" and he continues:

> It is because while continuously saying that 'in democracies solutions are
> endless', and 'paths never erode by walking' (*yollar yürümekle aşınmaz*), we have
> made democracy hit the wall several times in this country. And then what
> happened? Could the military coups, and junta regimes become a remedy? No,
> they could not do." (Cemal, February 16, 1997)

Considering Cemal's statements, it is clear that although military interventions in a

democracy cannot be approved, the existence of democracy is of secondary

importance vis-à-vis the primacy of the secular state since he seems to 'warn' that

'there is always a '*but* in our democracy'.

Cemal continues his 'warnings' issued to civilian politicians and keep resorting to

'democracy procrastination' attitude in another column. A quick 'but' follow his

opposition against military intervention and interruptions of democracy, which

reflects the typical 'national security-first' approach alluded to earlier. To put it

differently, Cemal is inclined to acknowledge as legitimate the presence of military

in times of '*crisis*' that put at risk the secular state system.[146] "Consequently, it is

useful to come back to the issue of 'democratic patience' (*demokratik sabır*)." Cemal

believes that "the cure can be best found within the rules of democracy, namely

under the roof of the Assembly and through the ballot box." He says that "the bitter

experiences of the past show that military interventions are not a remedy. And the

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[146] This argument is valid for the mid-1990s, especially for the February 28, 1997 process. Before and after this critical juncture, Cemal's views shift toward the side of 'civilian' and 'democratic' politics. In other words, except this critical juncture, Cemal has little to none '*but*'s in terms of democratic practices. For a better comparison, please find his other statements in 2000s in the following sections.

soldier [the military] knows it, too. *But* the habit of looking back at the barracks is a fact in our country.[147] Cemal continues (January 28, 1997):

> People (*halk*) expect the remedies from the military more than they do it from the Assembly when they are in trouble. In public opinion surveys about the most reliable [state] institutions, there is a yawning gap between the military and the institution of politics. Our civilian politicians should also bear this fact in mind. The responsibility of keeping the soldiers in their barracks is theirs [politicians] before anyone else's.

In this period, it is not certain from Cemal's statements if he is 'justifying' the necessity of military interventions through the '*but*'s and '*warnings*' of the political elite.

A critical nuance in the text above should not be allowed to go without further discussion. Cemal claimed above that people (*halk*) expect the solutions from nobody but the military when they are in trouble. (Cemal, January 28, 1997; Cemal, February 28, 1997) But who is this 'people'? How is it defined? It is probable that Cemal's '*halk*' is not the same as Nazlı Ilıcak's or Fehmi Koru's or another columnist's '*halk*'. In this text for instance, Cemal talks about how military is the most reliable state institution for the people. However, in one of his columns in the same period, Koru approaches to the issue from a different angle by saying that "What could be more natural than people's trust for the military [in a country]? What else a nation would do if it did not trust its military?" (Koru, n.d, 1997)

It is striking to note that none of the columnists analysed in this thesis defined the *people*. This leaves the 'people' ('*halk*') as an overrepresented and loaded term that is used by different columnists in different ways to justify their own claims.

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[147] Emphasis is mine.

People's trust for the military is approached from totally different angles by the two columnists above. The *empty content* of 'halk' becomes a sphere of contestation by diverse political actants. When viewed from this particular angle, is it possible to argue that, similar to '*halk*', columnists' conceptions of 'state' are different and diverse as well? This question will keep its importance throughout the paper.

Coming back to our main discussion on security, on February 14, 1997 – ten days after military tanks marched towards Sincan, a district of Ankara, to 'hector' the *Refahyol* government (the Welfare Party- True Path Party coalition government) due to an alleged potentiality of the government to threaten the secular state - Cemal (February 14, 1997) 'gloated' in his column that he opposes military interventions, but this time, he supports it because of regime concerns. He fleshes this view out by quoting 'a woman lawyer' who says:

> You know, I always used to hate junta regimes. And you know that every time, I used to advocate in the courts those who are the victims of military coups and those who were imprisoned. Briefly, I do not like the voice of tanks! But now maybe I am uncomfortable to confess, but you should know: The next day of the incidents [tanks marching in the streets of Sincan as the military's show of strength towards the civilian politics], when I saw the tanks touring around the streets of Sincan on the TV screen, I felt a sigh of relief and thought that they deserved this (*içimi şöyle bir oh olsun duygusu sarmadı değil*).

It is still vague if Cemal projects his own feelings through citing this unnamed woman, but he interprets her by stating that this feeling of relief as a result of military intervention is common especially among women because they hear "the march of Sharia" (*Şeriat'ın ayak sesleri*) more than the "voice of tanks". (Cemal, February 14, 1997) He continues by arguing that women are being threatened more since in case of a Sharia law, Turkish women will suffer more from an Iran-like totalitarian regime which veils women with burqa (*kara çarşaf),* and sentence them

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to serfdom and to be second-class people. Cemal asserts that he does not support

military interventions and that he is just against the Sharia law. And he continues by

posing the following question: "Now tell me, will you be able to acknowledge that

Islam and democracy reconcile or can reconcile? Will you practice religion in your

own private life or will you dictate it to me? . . . . Will you subject the state to

religion?" (Cemal, February 14, 1997) As seen in the statements, Cemal considers

the Refahyol coalition government as a threat against secularism and therefore

against the state. At times of threats against the state therefore, military interventions

can be overlooked.[148]

A Schmittean approach of 'the state of exception' can also be found in Cemal's

views in 1990s. For Cemal, if there is a threat against the secular state, it is possible

for Turkey to have some 'formal exceptions and restrictions' in its practices of

secularism and religion. While talking about the possibilities of some restrictions,

Cemal omits the ban on wearing headscarf in public areas. Instead, he says, in terms

of headscarf, "there is a complete freedom" and everyone can wear headscarf.[149] But

then he continues: "There are some restrictions even though these restrictions are

limited with the public sphere. *But* every country can have some *exceptions* that arise

from its own political, cultural characteristics." (Cemal, February 16, 1997) For

Schmitt, it is the sovereign who decides on the state of exception. Cemal does not

assign this 'sovereign power to decide on the exceptional case' as the governmental

power since he insists upon the necessity of the resignation of the government to

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[148] Cemal's views on military intervention is totally different in 2007 in comparison to 1997. In 1997, Cemal's threat perceptions (or definitions) influence his statements about democracy and politics.

[149] However at that time, women who work in public institutions (including university students) were banned from wearing headscarf.

'defuse the tension' of the military (and of the state elite) and to be more

'consensual' (Cemal, February 16, 1997)

Despite Cemal's Schmittean approach to democracy in some of his columns in the

1990s, he had different arguments in favor democracy in the late 1980s.

> There is a retroactive official point of view about democracy in our country. According to this view which is recognized by the upper layers of the state (*devlet katında*), Turkey now has to confine itself to the 'second class' democracy because both its geography and its developmental stage hamper a 'fully-fledged democracy' (*tam demokrasi*). If, under the current conditions, we imagine a fully-fledged democracy as it is in the West, I mean imagine it with an unrestricted freedom of thought, and if we consider to perform it through communist and religious [political] parties, we cannot deal with it… The formal perspective of democracy in Turkey can be summarized as such. . . . . But [the statists say] the time has not come yet; otherwise, the struggle against "communism", "reactionism", and "separatism" is lost; this is why prohibitions should carry on. This is the official ['statist' –not in economic, but in political sense] viewpoint. It is possible to say that this [statist] point of view underlies both March 12, 1971 and September 12, 1980 military coups. Beside it, generally the right-wing political leaders have adopted this point of view for years. There are two basic reasons of it. First, their democracy understanding is limited; second, in our country, the 'anti-communism' propaganda scores in the ballot box. (Cemal, November 22, 1987)

Cemal's definitions of 'threat' seem to be more 'critical' (vis-à-vis the statist

definitions of it) in those years. By the same token, his 'democracy-sceptical'

approach in 1997 –as previously defined as 'procrastination' approach- does not

explain his statements in 1980s which criticizes the official language of postponing

the democracy.

The threat perception varies in different columns. For most of Cemal's columns in

mid-1990s, the 'threat' was Sharia. Emin Çölaşan proposes a different portrayal of

threat in some of his columns in this period. For him, the actual threat is not 'bigots'

[who want to bring Sharia], but the 'team of intelligents-'libosh's ['liberal' in a

pejorative sense] and renegades' (*entel-liboş-dönek takımı*) (Çölaşan, November 25, 1995) According to this view, in the society there is a perception that religion is under threat, but this perception has no grounds. "While Mustapha Kemal Pasha and his fellows were saving the homeland, there also used to be some people bemoaning that "Religion is being lost, we are getting infidels" (*'din elden gidiyor, kafir olduk'*) and they do still exist." And to Çölaşan, the same exploitation of religious feelings of the society is not done by zealots but by the *entel-liboş-dönek* team. Nevertheless, in some columns, Çölaşan cannot desist himself from accusing the Refahyol government of threatening the state. To Çölaşan, these politicians are "religion mongers" (*din tüccarı*) who are "trying to *siege* the state" (October 19, 1996, *emphasis added*)

The distinctions made by the columnists while defining the 'threat' are numerous. In their interpretations of these 'threats' and of the actors who pose these threats also vary. Ilıcak for example, does not share Cemal's and Çölaşan's assumptions that Refahyol government threatens the secular state. Instead she makes a distinction between the political actors who pose and who do not pose a threat against the state: "Erbakan is trying to advance Turkey, but [Tansu] Çiller [the leader of the coalition partner] is making a "reverse deception" (*ters takiyye*)." She explains what she means by a reverse deception: "Çiller is legitimating the claims that secularism is being lost while she is creating anxiety." (Ilıcak, October 30, 1996)

Interestingly enough, in spite of the fact that February 28, 1997 is only a few month-after from Susurluk Incident (November 3, 1996), data that belong to each critical juncture propose different priorities of columnists' state conceptualizations. In the

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light of the data, I elaborated 1997 via the national security approach while Susurluk

Incident addressed the categorical theme of *The Rule of Law* the most in this chapter.

Actually, it is also expected that the rule of law category is being more explanative

for 1996 because with this incident, the previously 'exalted' and 'metaphysical' state

was started to be more an 'earthly being' since all columns in this period argue about

'the rottenness of the state' (*devletin çürümüşlüğü, kokuşmuşluğu*). (Arcayürek,

November 9, 1996; Altan, November 15, 1996; Çölaşan, November 6, 1996) That is

the reason why I leave the discussions on the 1996 critical juncture into the other

category. It is fair to argue that this new questioning of the state with Susurluk

Incident has genereted further questioning of the existing state-society relations and

the presence of the rule of law.

Before I discuss 'national security approach' in 2000s, I would like to present some

data signifying the exaltedness of the state as some columns portray before Susurluk

and February 28 incidents. Up until 1996 – till the fierce critiques of the state's

legitimacy and legality as a result of Susurluk Accident's 'accidental' disclosure of

'state within the state' to the public- dignifying the state was more 'tangible' in some

columns. While Koru was pointing that "Turkey was born out of the ashes from the

Ottoman state" (October 30, 1991), Ilıcak was praising the state by talking about its

'mercifulness'. (October 29, 1991) This feature of 'mercifulness' of the state

provides an important clue in understanding state-society relations as pictured by

Ilıcak. In this hierarchical understanding of state-society relations, the state is imaged

as a patriarchal '*father state*' which is '*merciful*' towards its citizens, and its citizens

in return are expected not to be separatist against the unitary state order. A similar

argument to that of Ilıcak's '*merciful state*' argument is also proposed by Süleyman

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Demirel at the beginning of 1990s. He asserts that they (Demirel himself and his political circle) adopt an "embracing, compassionate, egalitarian, benevolent" state mission. And in turn, they expect to find people who are tied their state with the links of loyalty toward the national unity and solidarity of the state. (Göktaş and Çakır, 1991: 15, 32)

The toleration –or 'mercifulness' in this case- is a characteristic performed by the sovereign for the obedient. Ilıcak (November 12, 1991, *emphases added*) states that

> Under September 12 [1980-coup] period those arrested and imprisoned on the grounds of separatism were exposed to heavy tortures. (Torture was also executed in the other regions to the ones with Turkish-ethnic origins, and nationalists [ülkücüler] got their share from all sorts of state violence in all regions as well as leftists did.)[150] We cannot applaud the torturing state, but we cannot disown it either by saying that "This is not our state" because it is not the state who is in charge but the ones who govern it [the state]. . . . . The problems cannot be solved through racial segregation[151] because there is not coercion and torture obviously targeting a single race [ethnicity]. That is why we should demand the *merciful state* (*şefkatli devlet*) for every individual of the Turkish nation.

Another column she wrote in the same period is also instructive and a paragraph in it deserves to be quoted in length:

> Thank God, most of our Kurdish-origin citizens are loyal to the state. Anyway, loyalty to the state (*devlete sadakat*) is an important qualification of Kurdish-originated citizens. They have the consciousness that they are the possessors of this country and they have rights on every bit of this land. Neither of them envisages spending a life separate from Turks even if you tell them to leave. The farthest point of their goals is federation. Now it is time to explain them that they can find a happier and peaceful life in a unitary state instead of a federation. (Ilıcak, October 29, 1991)

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[150] In the explanatory statement in parantheses, she implies that the state is not being discriminatory on ethnic, regional, or ideological grounds while resorting violence to the people in 1980s.

[151] Actually, she refers to *ethnic* segregation since in the sub-text of the column she talks about PKK, and Kurdish citizens of Turkey.

If Ilıcak's statements are decontextualized, it might be possible to argue that they are just portraying a state-society relation in which the society is protected by the state when it is deemed necessary. However, in the Turkish political context, '*the citizen in the arms of the merciful state*' or '*loyalty to the state*' which specified as a '*quality*' of the citizen pops up with its socio-political luggage. For the very reason of the political milieu that these statements flourish in, a critical perspective fits better with Ilıcak's utterance. The unitary state should protect its citizens by not torturing them, and in turn the citizens should be 'good citizens' by not demanding the things that may disarray the routines of the unitary and merciful Turkish state. Here, the state is envisioned as an upper symbol that the citizens should adjust themselves to (not the other way round). If there is a misconduct carried out by the state, it is not indeed the fault of the state, but of those who govern the state. However, the columnist preemptively challenges any possibility of 'making faults' by the side of the citizen through her characterization of 'loyalty to the state'. In other words, the central reference point in Ilıcak's arguments is always the state, and the society exists as long as the unitary state continues to exist.

In terms of unitary characteristic of the state, Akyol's arguments differ to a certain extent from Ilıcak's. He says that he supports the idea of the unitary state in terms of the fact that unitary state does not necessarily mean an authoritarian, totalitarian, or an anti-democratic state. It may or may not be in this way. Formally, a federative state might be authoritarian as well. The Ottoman Empire could be counted as a federative state in its own context, but it was obviously an authoritarian state. Akyol continues to argue that he supports the idea of a unitary state but a federative administration is acceptable in terms of decentralization (*adem-i merkeziyetçilik*). A

unitary state for Akyol means to have a single legislative organ within the state. Despite the fact that he acknowledges to have a decentralized state in terms of local administrative units, Akyol has some criticisms in case Turkish state loses its unitary characteristic. "In Turkey's customs, there is no tradition of federation in Anatolia. In this case, when it is said that "now, we have proceeded to a federation", we do not have any reliable arguments to see how it will be conceived and performed by different segments of the society." Due to this sociological obscurity and the lack of an economic integration to support a federative system, Akyol thinks that a federation may lead to social confrontation and disintegration. (Çakır and Göktaş, 1991: 212-213)

When it comes to the 2000s, the idea of unitary state, for example, starts to change in the columns. In that vein, the security approach -at discursive level- also transforms, though it does not disappear. Likewise, 'threat' and 'enemy' perceptions also change as they are included in the security approach. In terms of state-society relations, the state is now more an 'earthly' being that its activities and legitimacy begin to be questioned.[152] Even though security approach does not entirely disappear, columns become to be more critical on the issue of state-society interaction. Although we cannot generalize the results for the entire columns, it is fair to argue that the new discourse of this time period mostly emphasizes the necessity of pluralism (instead of a 'uniform and homogenized society'), globalization (in lieu of nationalism), and the significance of individual in her relationships with the state.

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[152] For the 1990s, I made a similar argument, however, the state's coming down to earth in 1990s was not as extended as it is in 2000s. In the former period, the superiority of state discussions remained limited with particular events such as Susurluk. In the latter time period, however, the state-society relations and individuals place in this interaction have become relatively more discussed topics with the increasing impact of globalization and liberalization (both economic and political).

The new emphases of 2000s are inherently relevant to the developments in the economic front as well. The economic transformation that starts with Turgut Özal continues to exist in the form of liberal economic policies in recent decades. Yet economic liberalization per se has not been enough to lead a politically liberal environment since the lack of a liberal tradition in Turkish political culture and the omnipresence of Ottoman state legacy in contemporary Turkey have rooted turnabouts in the discussions of state-society relations. Columns in this regard are no exception in revealing both traditional and neo-liberal tenets. Accordingly, the columnists' conceptualizations of the state in Turkey have two faces: i. stress upon the rising importance of individual in globalized politics, ii. volatile flashbacks to the conventional state-centered views. Nonetheless, the common emphasis of columnists in this decade is that "we have changed, so do our views on the state".[153] Overall, in comparison to previous two decades, in 2000s columns become more critical in interpreting state-society relations in Turkey. This change in discourses, however, is not necessarily a linear one in which authoritarian emphases transform into creeds of liberalism in the eyes of the columnists. In this context, the analysed columns disclose a blend of liberal discourse(s)[154] with scattered turnabouts to the state legacy if these turnabouts are purported 'necessary'.

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[153] This transformation in columnists' statements are neither independent from current political events nor from the global environment. The dominating idea of free market -one of the implications of globalization- is now inevitably inviting for Turkey which has assigned a Westernist policy-making route for itself due to its ever-ending journey of the European Union membership. Internal politics are also identifiers of this change in columns. Gezi Protests (2013) for instance was a turning point in that regard in reviewing traditional roles of the state and the society. (Since this paper analyzes up until 2007, these events are beyond the scope of this study.)

[154] It is difficult to talk about a unique form of liberal understanding in columnists' statements. Although most of the columnists repeat similar arguments on 'basics of liberalism' such as free market economy, individual rights and liberties, and so on; their ordering of importance and their elaborations of the liberal principles are diverse. In that vein, columnists' juxtapositions among 'people' (collectivist), 'citizen', and 'individual' may vary in columns. The pivotal point here is that which one of this trio is put in the face of the state and discussed in terms of rights and liberties while

Despite some changes in their emphases on security approach as explained above, in terms of evaluating state legacy, some columns keep their stress upon the Ottoman state legacy in 2000s. "The Ottoman state together with all of its phenomena still influences our lives." Barlas states. (July 6, 2007) However this legacy is now criticized in some respects: "The mentality of *Halaskâran-ı Zabitan* [*Kurtarıcı Subaylar* or *Savior Officers*] that was passed from the Ottoman should be abandoned at the borderline of the European Union." (Ilıcak, December 3, 2002)

This critical stance against *Halaskâran-ı Zabitan*[155] has particular importance in terms of the national security approach. Loosely speaking, with this statement Ilıcak refers to the necessity to abandon the interference of military with civilian politics. Moreover, it is not only a demand for diminishing impact of military on politics, but it is also a critique of '*how to save the state*' understanding since the group Halaskâran-ı Zabitan used to represent saving the [Ottoman] state. This group of military officers asserted that the Ottoman state could be saved through the declaration of constitutional period (*Meşrutiyet*). The other demand of this group was self-contradictory: this group of military officers was supporting the idea that the military should not interfere with politics. Ilıcak's statement was supportive of this claim in the sense that Turkish military should not deal with civilian politics. In comparison to 1980s and 1990s discussions that were basically around 'how to save

claiming liberal arguments. Further discussion is available in following categorical themes (4 and 5) in this chapter.

[155] It was an armed group of officers who claim to save the state by opposing the tenets of the Committee of Union and Progress. They symbolize the military influence and interference with politics that has been typical in Turkish political life. Since the scope of the paper is limited, please find a well-detailed analysis on: Alkan, Ahmet Turan. (1992) (2nd ed.) *II. Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordu Ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat. pp. 165-232.

the state from the internal and external threats', Ilıcak has different grounds for discussion here.

The emphasis on *Halakâran-i Zabitan* has significance for two other factors. First, it implied *loyalty to the state* (that is why they were protesting the political opposition of the Committee and Union and Progress, and of Young Turks). Similarly, in 1990s, Ilıcak was also speaking of loyalty to the state as discussed previously. She was bringing the issue of loyalty to the state when ethnicity-based opposition by Kurdish people was of the issue. In this discussion, Ilıcak was pre-emptively chastening Kurdish citizens of Turkey by reminding the reader how 'loyal' Kurds are toward the 'merciful Turkish state'. Compared to the 1990s, Ilıcak seems to 'rasp' her arguments on loyalty to and saving the state, in the 2000s. Nevertheless, this conclusion might be too claiming/speculative since it is not deducible from the column that what she exactly refers to by loosely speaking about Halaskaran-ı Zabitan.

The second significance of Ilıcak's argument is that it illustrates what Ilıcak understands from the Westernization process of Turkey since she particularly highlights the importance of the European Union. Therefore, she points out that if Turkey wants to be a member of the European Union, it should modify its civil-military relations accordingly. Not only Westernization but the European Union is a symbol of modernization as the assemblage of 'contemporary civilizations' which has been the 'level' (*muasır medeniyetler seviyesi*) the Turkish establishment elite aimed to achieve.[156]

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[156] Reaching 'the level of contemporary civilizations' has myriad interpretations by different political actors or groups throughout Turkish political history. That is to say, the aim at reaching this level is

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Barlas is also critical of former claims on alleged 'threats against the state's well being'. He argues that from the past to the present, the slogans which have been used in the electoral campaigns have rarely changed: "You sold out the homeland!", "Our unity and regime are endangered!", "If we hang a few [people], everything would be different!", "We are surrounded by interior and exterior enemies!". (Barlas, July 4, 2007) It is fair to argue that Barlas condemns former state-centred discourses which previously have reproduced the state power, and its discourse on 'enemies' and 'threats'. In order to cope with these 'baseless assertions' of the past, now it is time for "pluralism" as the new truth of the "unitary-sovereign state" because "globalization is not a threat, but a contemporary fact. Hereby you can only develop, emancipate, and be prosperous as long as you render your national issues harmonious with universal facts." (Barlas, July 4, 2007)

In another column, Barlas continues to criticize the state elite in terms of their alleged perception of 'threat': "Since Turkey's transition to multi-party democracy, whenever remaining political parties other than the RPP won general elections, certain circles [state elites: the army and the Republican People's Party] declared secularism and the regime to be under dire threat." (July 27, 2007) This argument of the columnist is in stark contrast to his previous statements in 1980s on military and its relations with democracy in which Barlas used to praise the military intervention and the junta leader (Kenan Evren) by stating that Turkish Armed Forces "had to make" the coup and the "success of September 12 [1980 coup] will lead to the

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not peculiar and restricted to the founding elites' modernization project. At the beginning of 2000s, a group of reformists ('reformist' in the context of National Outlook Movement led by Islamic-oriented political actors, namely I am pointing at the founders of current Justice and Development Party) came to governmental power with a pro-EU discourse. Their then-discourse was also aiming at reaching a form of contemporary civilization level by conserving their traditional and religious values.

triumph of democracy" because "the country was on the edge of civil war." (Barlas, November 14, 1983)

Although Barlas's statements in 2000s are critical of former perceptions of threat expressed by different political actors, he retains his stress on the Ottoman state legacy, albeit in a critical way. In the last decade, Barlas highlights traditional roles in state-society relations by arguing that the state in Turkey is a Middle Eastern state:

> In colloquial language, there is no other colossal bully in Turkey, but the state. (*Türkiye'de devletten büyük kabadayı yoktur.*) What the state decrees is obeyed. And this is a Middle Eastern state. . . . . It is the Middle Eastern geography's characteristic. The state owns everything. The state seizes and endows. (*Devlet alan ve veren.*) And this [common sense] knowledge is ingrained into our genes. It is both in the Ottoman and Turkish Republican states." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 13, 2013)

Here, Barlas portrays the dichotomous 'superior state-submissive society' relations by the term 'Middle Eastern state'. Contrary to the class-confrontational relations between the state and society in the Western countries' social formations, the Middle Eastern societies depict a subservient society vis-à-vis the exalted, demanding, and commanding state. To Barlas, the latter type of the state is the most bullying state because it can take whatever it desires to have from its society by through its far-reaching power.

Similar to other columns examined above, Çölaşan also highlights some arguments on the state-society relations in Turkey. Particularly, he puts forward some claims that he accounts as 'threat' against the state. On the contrary to Ilıcak's and Barlas' statements in 2000s however, Çölaşan's arguments are generally reflective of a state-

centric approach while defining these threats. In almost all of his statements, he is

sceptical towards those who govern the state. This sceptical attitude is very similar to

the typical reaction of the state elite in Turkey toward the politicians. To put it

differently and as Heper pinpointed, the center has alleged the periphery mistrustful

and this sceptical nature of the 'center' towards the periphery has inherited from the

Ottoman past, and survived in the Turkish Republic. The problem of trust between

the center and periphery –or more narrowly, the state elite and the political elite- has

resulted in 'heavy doses of arbitrariness' on the side of the center, and

'irresponsibility' on the side of the periphery as the two habits feeding on each other.

(Heper, 1985: 149-150) Likewise for Çölaşan, the current government tries to

confiscate state power in order to deceive the society and to realize its secret

agendas. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 10, 2013) "What is the aim

of these [people in the governmental power]? To destroy Atatürk [Atatürk's

principles], to erase him from the society's memory, and then to sell Turkey and

taking advantage of it." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 10, 2013) His

assertions are also similar to 1990s' in the context of portrayal of a 'threat against the

powerful Turkish state'.

His sceptical outlook towards politicians in government leads Çölaşan to question

traditional adjectives of the state. "I used to see the state as sacred. I mean I used to

believe [in its sacredness]. If the state lays hands on something, it used to bring a

solution in favour of the interests of the people and of the poor. Regardless of limited

facilities, the state used to bring a solution in one way or another. There is a saying

which relates that the second Caliph, Omar, reportedly said that "If a sheep gets

stolen in Tigris, I feel myself responsible." I mean today, there is no judicial branch

of the state. … The judiciary is entirely in the hands of the JDP [governmental party]

today. … It is impossible for me to respect such a state. Accordingly, the concept of

the state in my mind is now upside down. … There is for sure a state in Turkey. On

the other hand, there is no state for me. [There is no state but] I mean a vote-hunting

clique in line with their interests have been marauding Turkey and grabbing

everything for themselves with no regard for others' interests or concerns." (A. Kılıç

Aslan, personal communication, May 10, 2013)

2000s are also the decade that most of the columnists appear to be critical of

previously alleged 'threats' of Turkey. Some columns in this period find the

purported threats as nothing but an age-long paranoia. The columns propose that

these threats are, actually, politically constructed concepts by different actors. The

paranoia of perpetual threats rests on the concerns about 'saving the state' which is

inherited from the Ottoman state. Ahmet Altan is among the columnists who is

critical of the alleged paranoia of perpetual threats.

> [Turkish] Republic inherited 'fear' from the Ottoman [state]. Initially, it was the
> fear of losing 'sovereignty'. However, the nation had not had sovereignty to lose –
> despite the words of "Sovereignty, without any reservation and condition, belongs
> to the nation". … Then the fear of 'return of sharia' started. … Later on the 'fear
> from Kurds' arose. The Republic turned the Kurdish uneasiness, which was its
> own creation, into acute fear and increased the pressure as a result. After a while
> fear of communism came into being. ... The non-existent communists would have
> pop up and seized the non-existent possessions. Then we returned to the fear of
> Kurds again. Subsequently, the fear of sharia appeared again. (Altan, November
> 25, 2002)

In the same vein, Koru (November 21, 2002) proposed three fundamental alleged

'*fear*'s that haunted the Turkish state: the fear of communism, the fear of separatism,

and the fear of religion (reactionism). Since its establishment, Turkish Republic has

been struggling with these perpetual fears and it has been trying to survive alongside

with these fears. (Koru, November 12, 2002) These fears are also one of the tools that make us understand a map of the ideational construction and reconstruction of Turkish political life. In what ways these perceived fears can be explained?

Among many, one of the reasons of the persistence of '*fear*'s in Turkish politics is the absence of a lucid definition of the state. Despite its exorbitant use as a symbol in all spheres of socio-political environment, nobody was able to know what the state is and what the boundaries of its legitimacy in applying its activities are. The opacity of the state existence, however, has never been considered a flaw in its existence. Quite the contrary, it has enabled the state to reproduce its omnipresence in all spheres in different time periods. Henceforth, being an *appendage* to this insurmountable Leviathan has mostly been preferred over criticizing its unknown boundaries. Otherwise the *pac-man state* would have gotten larger by absorbing its antagonists against its supremacy.[157] In due course, different segments in the society or individual political actors preferred being *appendages to the state apparatus* instead of coping with its supremacy and concentration of its power. This appendage has been the mere window of opportunity for particular agents to have a share from the snowballing power of the state. As the scholars pertinently put, social groups and individuals seek not to reduce the state's sway over the society but to consolidate their own position/status within it by penetrating the state.[158] (Heper, 1985: 32-33; Aydın, 2009: 9, 39)

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[157] The allegory of 'pac-man state' is from a widely known computer game called pac-man. If the player fails to defeat the pac-man on time, it gulps the opposing agents down and gets bigger and more powerful.

[158] Another example and also a historical explanation of this appeadage to the state power is the case of local notables in the late Ottoman period. Instead of favoring further rights and privileges based on confrontational grounds, the local notables preferred to feed the state's power by penetrating it. It resulted in further peripherization of the periphery while the center further centralized its power. (Heper, 1985: 32-37)

One way of putting the appendage to the state into practice is either to create a 'threat', an 'enemy', 'fear' or to maintain the already created fears, threats or these sort of anxiety-mongering methods. Indulging the state with further power, therefore, has led to a certain type of state-society relations. The interesting element in these relations in the Turkish case is that it is barely a relation between a supreme state commanding over a passive society. Instead, the societal actors have actively involved in these relations by triggering or reproducing the already announced anxieties or crises. Yet –and broadly speaking- the anxiety mongering has been widely questioned by some of these societal actors –such as the printed press- first initially with the Susurluk Accident (1996) and then in 2000s[159]. However, for some columnists, this fear-mongering has no substance, and it is nothing but a paranoia. (Koru, November 7, 2002; Altan, November 4, 2002; Akyol, November 15, 2002; Akyol, November 6, 2002; Ilıcak, November 27, 2002)[160]

A column elaborates further on the state-society relations by questioning the socio-political actors who devote themselves to the state: "This community has wasted almost a century due to its quietness." But this quietness was not a preference of the people, but of the actors who enjoyed their share from the state power. "The jurists

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[159] As indicated before, the discussions of state-society relations start to be further intense in 2000s with the impact of liberal discourse and globalization. In addition, data results illustrate that in terms of the first decade of 2000s, the critiques and questioning of state-society relations -in the advantage of the society- intensified especially just after the 2002 general elections, the time period when the JDP first came to governmental power. Before it, Turkey had already experienced an economic crisis (2001) and started to question the impotency of the existing political parties and of the coalition government. The elections results were one of the indicators of this dissatisfaction on the side of the society. Therefore, with this void in political arena, the rise of newly-founded JDP meant renovation in the eyes of many people as they saw it as a silver lining of the previously problematic politics.

[160] Among these columnists, Cemal constitutes an interesting example. In most of his columns in 1997, he portrays 'religious reactionism' (*irtica*) as a threat against the survival of the secular state. In 2002, however, he argues that with 2002 election results, it was comprehended that religious reactionism cannot be a threat for the state. And "Is it possible to bring the order of sharia to Turkey? Not at all." he states. (Cemal, November 16, 2002)

devoted themselves to the state, not to the people. What the state was has never been identified either. The administrative cadre –consists of barely a thousand people- residing in the capital city was deemed as the state, and the rest who were not sharing the same ideas with them were oppressed by law on behalf of 'saving the state'. Those who declared new ideas, searched for the truths, and desired to eliminate deceptions were punished." (Altan, October 21, 2002)

Referring to the alleged threats as defined by the state, Çandar argues that there has been an instrumental use of purported threats in order to expand the state sphere unfavourably with societal demands. "Approximately two hundred countries are the members of the United Nations. Very few of them are like Turkey in which the concept and apparatus of state have *semi-sacred* character. It, by definition, brings to some problems and challenges." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013, emphases added) This semi-sacred state deems diverse demands of society a peril to its power. To Çandar, the state encoded the idea of decentralization (*adem-i merkeziyet*), federalism, free-market in economy, and self-government as 'threats'. "For a state which has so much powerful and sophisticated background, anything that potentially weaken the state is considered as an interference with its sanctitude, therefore all of them counted as *the sins*." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013, emphasis added) The existence of a semi-sacred state is the reason why Çandar thinks that there is not a substantive background of democratic culture and thought in Turkey.

A recent column summarizes well how the issue of 'national security' is actually an enigmatic phenomenon of Turkish politics.

Are we surrounded by enemies? Is everybody an enemy to us? Is everyone seeking the ways for seizing the political power? … Can anyone say yes to these questions? Is it possible? As we have witnessed several times in this country, this sort of discourse belongs to introverted and tense orders [regimes]. (Bayramoğlu, June 4, 2016)

This column illustrates that even in 2016, Turkish society continues to discuss the same issues and reactions that we used to discuss in 1980s and 1990s. And it also indicates how embedded these reflexes are in Turkish political life and culture.

4.1.2. Theme 3: Economy

Economy is another field of contestation in which state power is either reproduced or criticized by political actants. The examined data indicate that leading discussions on this sphere oscillate between two main poles: the statist approach and the neo-liberal market approach. Broadly speaking, neo-liberal approaches attribute a relatively minimal position for the state. For the economy to function well, the state's interference (and therefore the state's realm of authority) should shrink. Thus neo-liberal claims presume a referee role for the state. However, taking the cumbersome baggage of the state presence in Turkish politics into consideration, the state's contraction has not been an easy task to accomplish. Nor the ideas on economy have changed gradually and linearly from a statist discourse into a neo-liberal one. The founding elites' (mainly the RPP's) statist arguments on economy keep its significance for some columnists throughout the examined time period.

Although it is perplexing to come up with broad generalizations about the examined columns, I can at least argue that amongst the different data categories, economy is the one that hosts 'change' in the ideas of considerable part of the columnists the most. These changing ideas are not context-free. In the 1980s for example, corresponding data indicates that the ideational impact of the Soviet Union and communist arguments led the way for some debates on 'social state', 'social justice' (Barlas, November 21, 1983), or -as the opposing stance- the free-market economy.[161] These debates are also interconnected with the transitional period initiated by Turgut Özal who aimed at economic –and thus political- liberalization. Likewise, when they were asked for the reasons of the changes in their ideas on the state during the interviews with Çandar, Barlas, Koru, Ilıcak, Çölaşan, Akyol, and Alpay; they remembered the Soviet Union, collapse of communism, and Özal-led transition as the main external and internal stimulations for change in their ideas of the state. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communications, May 15, 2013; May 13, 2013; May 14, 2013, May 17, 2013; May 10, 2013; September 5, 2013; May 16, 2013)

The significance of these debates in terms of the concept state is that the assigned role for the state as a result of the suggested economic model was also determinative of the state-society relations. The changing nature of economical field together with the transitional periods, therefore, paved the way for further critiques and confusion about the presumed positions and boundaries of the state. Most of the attention-grabbing data examples are extracted from these fruitful critiques and discussions

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[161] Nonetheless, up until the late 1980s and early 1980s columns parsed through in this thesis do not harbour a meticulous attention toward free-market economy. Turkey's acquaintance with liberal economic policies was too new to play a part in current discussions. Therefore, in the first two critical junctures -1983 and 1987- the debates on economy were mostly around a perceived social justice, and the state's responsibilities on economy. Yet a succinct discussion on free-market economy is also available in those years. Nevertheless, another possibility is that since the analysed columnists pen the columns mostly on politics, long-winded debates on liberalism might have taken place in the columns on economy.

those, which the changing nature of economy brought to the agenda. All in all, Çandar's reference to Turgut Özal through the notion of '*garçon* state' (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013), reference to Necmettin Erbakan's 'guardian state', Akyol's 'nursing state' (*doyuran devlet*) or 'commanding state' (*buyuran devlet*) (Akyol, July 4, 2007), Barlas' 'bully state' ('*kabadayı devlet*') or 'state as a refuge' (*sığınak devlet*) (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 13, 2013), and Çölaşan's 'father state' (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 10, 2013) are not merely arguments on economy, but diverse portrayals of state-society relations in Turkey.

One of the main axes in the debates on economy is the principle of statism. The statist view asserts the necessity of state's interference with economy in order to protect the society, and supply-demand equilibrium. The statist model generally reflects the founding elites' approach. Considering the entire columns examined in this paper, Barlas', Cemal's, Akyol's, and Koru's columns generally support the necessity of a free market economy; while Çölaşan and Arcayürek's statements seem to portray relatively a more statist economic model. As to Şahin Alpay in 2000s, the state can interfere with economical realm if it is necessary to provide social equality, and fair distribution of resources as the tenets of social democracy, as he describes. The following data indicate the diverse understanding of economy and of state-society relations in Turkey.

In the 1980s, economically socialist, liberal, and protectionist arguments are available in columns. "Contemporary social democracy is not only a mechanism for critique, but also a political movement that constructs the ways of countries'

development and welfare. However, Turkish social democrats have not had the courage yet to say "we will construct the Atatürk Dam, we will finalise the Second Bosphorus Bridge"." (Barlas, November 15, 1983) Barlas' statements reflect a social democratic understanding in which the state is active in certain fields of economy such as infrastructural constructions. This statement indicates that at this time for Barlas, free market economy has not flourished effectively yet (because later on, in 1990s and 2000s, we will see how Barlas' columns utter neo-liberal thoughts). Arcayürek, however, seems to be neither in the same line with Barlas' suggestions for social democrats nor with neo-liberal principles while citing and criticizing Özal's justifications: "We are just selling the revenues of the bridge. Whose bridge is it? It is not the state's, but the nation's. The state is still the owner. I only guaranteed its revenue." (as cited in Arcayürek, December 8, 1983) As the latter statement indicates, protectionist vs. liberal state arguments embodies further discussions on the issue of privatization. With Özal, Turkey started to experience new forms of discussions via political economy.

In comparison to 1980s, 1990s are the years that now Turkish society appear to be more familiar with the terminology of economic liberalism. In his column, Barlas talks about the shrinking state "The change impacted upon the state. … Since the state revenues started not to cover the expenditures, the state unwittingly began to shrink. Now nobody expects from the state to construct dams, roads or power plants. All fields of investment are about to be opened for private sector." (Barlas, February 19, 1997) And he continues to illustrate his changing ideas on economy: "When you come across the people who still support the state's price determination or the state to take part in economical activities, you start to think and wonder if these [people]

live in a cave and appear as an outcrop after a hundred years." (Barlas, February 22, 1997) In his assertive criticisms, Barlas seems to support the idea of a free-market economy in which the state has less or no role in the economical area.

In a similar vein, Akyol raises some criticisms against the previous economic policies. He argues that in the past, some intellectuals (*aydınlar*) [referring to the left-wing intellectuals who defend statist economy] saw economy as a sphere of contestation in which the actors calculate 'who gets what' from the pie. And this attitude [of intellectuals] fits with the concept of "*gracious state*" (*kerim devlet*). (Göktaş and Çakır, 1991: 211) As Akyol rightly put the connection, certain economic regimes or policies lead to particular types of state understandings and vice versa. The state's permanent interference with economy and/or its protectionist policies, therefore, maintain a hierarchical understanding of the state in which the state is playing an active role in the distribution of resources and it acts as if it is 'donating from its own pocket' to the society. Akyol warns that this particular understanding might have the underpinning presumption: "To whom the gracious state will grant from its treasury?" (Göktaş and Çakır, 1991: 211)

The original quote referring to 'gracious state' includes important metaphors which represent a particular type of state-society relation. "*Kerim olan devlet, kesesinden kime "ihsan-ı şahane"de bulunacak.*" The term '*ihsan-ı şahane*' ('the greatest grace') is a loaded term that refers to sultanate regimes in which padishah donates from his own treasury *ex gratia* to its subjects, (not to *'citizens'*). In this regard, *kerim devlet*'s donation is considerably far from liberal state-society relations in

which distribution of economic resources are not the 'favour' of the state to its citizens, but it is a given 'right' of the citizens.

Akyol continues to criticize the leftist paradigm: "The leftists in Turkey used to like this [as I described]. However, especially with the Motherland Party [MP], it was acknowledged that economy is a technical field rather than is it a political field." By seeing the economy as a technical realm, Akyol paves the way for a relatively liberal argument: "What did the MP do? It has made the Turkish society to acknowledge [the reality of] individual." He delves into this claim by criticizing the former understandings of 'individual' before the MP came to power. [In the past there was the attitude of] "There is no individual, but the nation; no individual, but the [social] class." Here, Akyol seems to disapprove of the collectivist approach of socialist or communist regimes, which underestimate the significance of the individual. He concludes that this sort of understanding is over. "Now individual is prior and the MP has a great role in this." (Göktaş and Çakır, 1991: 211) Having said that, Akyol is critical of the economical perspectives that might lead to a non-democratic picture of state-society/state-individual relations.

In 2000s, the discussions on political economy gain a further liberal dimension. Especially with the broadening impact of globalization on individual economies, the necessity of a free-market economy has become almost given in most of the columns in the last decade. Nevertheless, some columns sustain economically protectionist understanding of the state: "Foreigners know the advantages and privileges we provided them, and they hit us from the inside. They exploit us to the marrow." Çölaşan displays his discomfort with foreigners who make investments in Turkey.

He is also suspicious about their 'genuine intentions'. "Similarly, in Ottoman era it was the group of bankers and of moneylenders, who composed of foreigners, robbed the state and the people. Now in Turkey, very similar to those [bankers and moneylenders], it is the foreigners who rob the country with the disguise of 'investors'." (Çölaşan, August 10, 2007) The 'dubious' character of foreign capital leads Çölaşan to categorize foreign investement as a *threat* against the welfare of state and society. In other words, the column reflects a 'national security' approach – which we have already discussed previously- towards a non-protectionist economy.

The distrustful ideas towards privatization are also available in some other columns of Çölaşan. Bringing the case of Petkim (a manufacturing site which produces oil products) to the agenda, he fiercely criticizes the proponents of privatization by calling them 'toadies of political power'. He asserts that the company was sold to "Jewish lobbies," to "Armenian lobbies [overall] to foreigners" and to "unidentified recipients" and asks if the government displays any sign of 'shame' as a result of this action [of privatization of the state companies]. (Çölaşan, July 7, 2007) Çölaşan's discourse on 'Armenian and Jewish lobbies' represents the alleged '*others*' of Turkey. Reflecting intense feelings towards a socio-politically created 'other' is a date-back and widespread habit of several groups in Turkish political life.[162] The alleged 'others' also point at the perception of 'enemies' (exterior or interior) who/which threatens the security and survival of the state. Çölaşan's further statements reflect a "Turkey is being deceived by others" ("*Türkiye üzerinde oyunlar oynanıyor*") paranoia, which is also prevalent in Turkish political environment.

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[162] Turkish nationalists are not an exception in this regard. The mouthpiece journal of the Nationalist Action Party –The National Action Journal (*Milli Hareket Dergisi*)- displays the sense of 'other' and 'external enemies' in 1960s and onwards.

(Çölaşan, July 7, 2007; Çölaşan, n.d. July-August, 2007) In Çölaşan's columns in the 2000s, these 'deceptions against Turkey'[163] is linked with privatization and foreign investment. Considering these reactions, the columns are indicative of a protectionist and/or statist economic model in which not the market but the state is the leading actor in economy.

The same case –privatization of Petkim company- is evaluated in totally different grounds by some other newspaper columns. Contrary to Çölaşan, Mehmet Barlas (July 9, 2007) and Metin Münir (July 7, 2007)[164] state that the companies regarded as 'Jewish' and 'Armenian' are actually American and Russian companies. ("What could have happened if the companies are Jewish or Armenian at all?" they also object to Çölaşan.) Barlas disapproves of this sort of 'outcries' in terms of privatization and find them racist. He supports the idea of globalized free market economy by harkening back to Münir's statement that "If everybody merchandised in the place of his own religion or of race, the world could not prevail against the stone age." (Münir, July 7, 2007 as cited in Barlas, July 9, 2007)

In 2013 in the interview, Çölaşan displays a protectionist social state understanding. His opposition against privatization prevails, too. In his critique of the party in incumbent government (JDP) and of the privatization policies it has led, Çölaşan argues that the state has lost its "*severity*". "The severity of state [*devletin ciddiyeti*] was undermined [by the JDP and its policies]. The state's point of view towards the

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[163] In his columns, the purported threats against the state's welfare is not only limited with 'foreign threats', but then-government (JDP) and 'Islamist actors' are also counted as the deceiving and threatening factors. (Çölaşan, July 7, 2007; Çölaşan, n.d. July-August, 2007)

[164] http://www.milliyet.com.tr/petkim-i-kimler--neden-aldi-/metin-munir/ekonomi/yazardetayarsiv/07.07.2007/205120/default.htm

people was wiped out." And one of the alleged reasons of these sorts of problems is that the governmental party has sold Turkey's national property to foreigners and government-collaborators. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 10, 2013) In his normative appraisal, Çölaşan seems to have nostalgia for the 'good old and *severe*' days of the state. "Accordingly, today there is no state in Turkey, there is one but only procedurally." However, the 'ideal' state, as portrayed by Çölaşan, is the one that sustains its power and gravity [over the society], feeds the poor, and its national economy subsists. This depiction of ideal state seems to be in close proximity with the early Turkish Republican period when the state's severity and omnipresence used to felt in every realm of politics.

The newspaper columns in 2002 and 2007 by Taha Akyol do not welcome the omnipresence of the state in the realm of economy. To Akyol, the duty of state is neither manufacturing nor *nursing*[165], but regulating the market, providing necessary infrastructure, and developing public services. (Akyol, July 4, 2007) In this sense, he assigns a minimal and technical role -which is limited with executing public service- to the state in the economic system. Depending on economy, Akyol sees that a change is happening in Turkish political culture. He proposes that in the past, a statist economy was praised, but later on, market economy has been admired. (Akyol, July 4, 2007) He delineates the evolution of economic practices by ideologically different political groups, and argues that there are two main axes in understanding economy in Turkey: The Republican elites', and the neo-liberals. The first axis prioritizes the

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[165] I translated '*doyuran devlet*' as '*nursing state*'. Nursing state is not necessarily the same as *nanny state*, though the latter might encompass the former. Here, Akyol seems to deliver the term 'doyuran devlet' in the realm of economy, but nanny state mostly refers to the political realm in which the state acquires benefits from the windows of opportunity to intervene in all aspects of social and political life. By this, I do not claim that nursing state does not or cannot interfere with all spheres of socio-political environment; but here, Akyol seems to use it narrowly to imply the field of (political) economy.

state's survival vis-à-vis the economic welfare with the motto "We cannot sacrifice from the Republic for the sake of economy." The other axis loves 'to initiate firms consistently, to cut ribbons, and to talk numerically'. "Today, our bourgeoisie are on the horns of a dilemma. Their thoughts are with the JDP's rise to governmental power; because they want economic development. But their hearts are with the RPP since they believe that secularism is being threatened [if Islamic-oriented JDP gains governmental power]" (Akyol, July 17, 2007)

Akyol's specific terminology is remarkable in understanding his conception of the state in Turkey. He has positive attributions to the market economy, which renders a referee position for the state in the economic structure. He asserts that the state should not be a '*nursing state*' (*doyuran devlet*) because, to Akyol, "*nursing state*" means "*commanding state*" (*buyuran devlet*) ['Nursing state' turns into a 'commanding state'. To nurse is only possible through holding the means of production and thus through commanding the society.] (Akyol, July 4, 2007) Alternatively, if we interpret Akyol's 'nursing state' as similar to '*nanny state*', it can be comparable to '*devlet baba*' (father state) understanding in Turkish political culture, albeit differently.

Akyol's '*nursing state*' can be interpreted as one of the many forms of '*devlet baba*' – the form in the realm of economy. Both allegories (father and nursing states) imply that state-society relations in both resemble the relationship between father (a symbol of hierarchy and primacy) and child (a symbol of submissiveness and impotency). Like a father who gives pocket money to his children and thus establishes his authority over them, the nursing state's control over economy leads state authority

over citizens. The father represents the authority of holding and using the means of production which provide necessary tools for the state to reproduce and to maintain its power. Having said that, it is possible to argue that by 'nursing state' Akyol also refers to a social state understanding.

Although Akyol attributes a pejorative meaning to the *nursing state*, his criticisms about *father state* do not follow a steady route in the longitudinal analysis. In the texts of 1980s, he seems to be influenced from the basics of socialism as he was writing about 'national goal in the economy' and 'social inequality'. (Akyol, November 7, 1987) Strikingly enough, Akyol acknowledges a relatively more state-centric approach by having considerable respect for the father state figure) in the 1980s and before.[166] (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, Akyol, September 5, 2013); contrariwise in the 2000s he disapproves of the nursing state –the economic form of the father state. However, despite his criticisms in 2000s for the father state understanding, his respect for the father state incarnates in his "loyalty to the state" which he says he still keeps. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, September 5, 2013) All in all, especially in 1980s Akyol embraces the 'father state' figure in the political realms; but he does not accept a protectionist form of state –namely the nursing state- in economy in 2000s since he asserts that it may turn into a totalitarian state.

As argued before, data illustrates that 2000s is the decade in which most of the columns reflect transformation in the ideas about the state's role in economy. What were the underlying factors of this transformation in the eyes of the columnists? The

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[166] Recalling 1980s' approach of himself, he expresses this respect for father state through the phrases such as 'sacred state', 'exaltedness of state', and 'superior state'.

most addressed factor for the change in economy and therefore in state-society relations is Turgut Özal. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communications, September 5, 2013; May 13, 2013; May 16, 2013; May 10, 2013) Özal led the process of economic liberalization in Turkey starting from 1980s. The widely known January 24 Decisions [1980] he initiated were illustrating the transformation into a free-market economy.

Özal-led transformation has been pivotal in the state-society relations in Turkey. Even though economic liberalization did not result in political liberalization immediately, it still paved the way for prominent inquiry about the perceived boundaries of the state formerly. It is argued that with Özal, the state has now been counted as a more profane –as the antonym of 'sacred'- existence. With Akyol's terms, "the state has come down to earth" with economic liberalization process. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, September 5, 2013) He explains this changing perception of people about the state as follows: "In our country, the most influential factor for changing ideas in terms of state-society relations was Özal. With the formulations of "State is not a father [anymore]" and "State is not a good manager [in business]", the concept of state has started to change." To Akyol, the economic realm is important in the sense of society's rising voice vis-à-vis the state because it was firstly the economic realm in which the society confronted with the state. The confrontation in political realm, however, has appeared after a long time. Why? Akyol's clarification is about the timing when Turkey first met liberalism. "Turkey came across liberalism for the first time in a time of financial crisis. … When the society saw that the new system of market economy was working, they grasped that market can achieve many things that used to be done by the state in the past. Thus,

market can function in lieu of the state in many areas such as health, education, and other public sectors." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, September 5, 2013)

As a result of Özal-initiated economic liberalization process, people started to grasp that the state is neither a father nor a good manager in economy. Not only the economic process, but also Özal's attitude has been affective in this ideational transformation. For Çandar, the underlying mentality of Özal's state understanding was that he was not only farsighted [in politics] but also rightly interpreted the globalization phenomenon and its parameters. (2016: 5) (In his discourse –on the contrary to the conventional 'sacred state' (*kutsal devlet*) approaches- Özal constantly highlighted that state is a means, or a device for people; not an end in itself. (Erdoğan, 2016: 29) To clarify, the master state (*efendi devlet*) understanding is noticeably rejected by Özal. (Yayla, 2016: 365) Then what was the raison d'être of the state according to Özal? It functioned as the apparatus of serving the people.

Barlas' statements certify an Özal-wise approach to the state with the emphasis on 'service to people'. Different from Özal, however, he associates 'service' with politics, instead of the state in some of his columns. "The raison d'être of democratic politics is 'service'." (Barlas, July 13, 2007) To Barlas, what is expected from politics is service and common happiness (*ortak mutluluk*). Since these two objectives –service and happiness- are relative concepts that depend upon the person, what is expected from politicians is to find a common ground for all segments of the society. (Barlas, July 26, 2007) The cure for making all of the people content is political stability, guaranteed fundamental rights and liberties, and a widespread belief that *equality of opportunity* exists. Despite frequent emphasis on 'service'

(Barlas, July 13, 2007; Barlas, July 26, 2007; Barlas, August 4, 2007), Barlas never elaborates on what *service* exactly means; he rather uses the word as a null concept. In terms of economic system, he depicts a liberal economy based on free-market which guarantees *equality of opportunity* (instead of *social equality*). However, in 1980s, some of Barlas' columns stress upon social equality and social justice as I pointed out before. All in all, Barlas' texts in 2000s portray an entirely and economically liberal understanding of the state.

Some of Barlas' arguments indicate how previously 'sacred and superior' state turns into an apparatus in the service of people. Nevertheless, Barlas does not prefer to use the phrases of 'instrumental state' or 'state as an apparatus', but he brings a class-based explanation in which the state is solely specified as a *refuge*. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 13, 2013) He argues that even though the state should be in the service of people –an understanding which was put forward by Özal- the expectations from the state have not transformed into a liberal one in the eyes of the Turkish people yet. To Barlas, the notion of the state is addressing the middle-class people. It does not matter which state is in power if you are poor. You do not mind whose flag is flapping above you "if you live in a cave" (if you are poor). Nor a person whose one foot is in New York and the other in Paris mind the state. In other words, Barlas asserts that the state has no significance if the person has financial power. The state does not mean anything either to a person who is economically underprivileged. To him, states should be evaluated in the eyes of the mid-class people which perceive the state as a *refuge*. By 'refuge', he refers to a 'protectionist' state which is responsible for security, health, education, and –overall- public

services of the people. And this state is a product of middle-class people. Having said that, I am dubious if Barlas and Özal refer to same thing by 'service'.

Although Barlas frequently endorses the state as a refuge for people, his statements are puzzling since his different characterisations of the state in Turkey are not complementary to each other. On the one hand, he argues that the state in Turkey is seen as a refuge especially after Özal's transformation. On the other hand, he claims that the state in Turkey is a bully state (*kabadayı devlet*). "In colloquial language, in Turkey, there is no greater bully than the state. It is a Middle-Eastern state." (Barlas, May 13, 2013) By 'Middle Eastern state', Barlas points to the state society relations in which the state prioritizes itself over the people. Historically in these relations, there is no 'citizen', or 'people', but 'servants' (*kullar*) of the state. This particular type of state-society interaction is different from a European model in which the power of the state is not concentrated but dispersed as a result of class conflicts or negotiations -as I reviewed in the part on the theories of the state. Barlas explains this difference between European states and Middle Eastern states by the ideas he claims to belong to Karl Marx. Due to seasonal differences, the amount of rainfall in the Middle East was less than Europe. Therefore, the state became responsible for the infrastructure of irrigation channels. As a result, private ownership could not develop in the Middle Eastern geography, and the state became the unique owner of anything and everything. This is also the case for Turkey, according to Barlas. "State is the one and only owner of everything. State gives and takes away. (*Devlet alan ve veren.*) This code has been ingrained into our genes. It is the same in the Ottoman era. So is it in the [Turkish] Republic." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 13, 2013) Here, Barlas' depictions of the state are like the adjectives of the

Lord. Based on these, it is fair to argue that Barlas grasps a God-like existence of the state in Turkey, and he clarifies it via economical relations between the state and the society.

In terms of 'service', Çölaşan proposes a different explanation in which the emphasis is on the 'honour of the state' (*devletin onuru*). He states that the service between state and society is reciprocal. State provides you some services in exchange for the taxes you paid. "But I opposed if the rulers favours their own interests." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 10, 2013) Onwards, Çölaşan links his arguments with Kurdish issue and displays his disapproval of the continuing negotiations between the state and Abdullah Öcalan by saying that "what kind of service is it?". "If you are the state, you are above all responsible for keeping the state's honour and self-respect." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 10, 2013) As seen in the discussions, the word 'service' may lead to ample interpretations by different agents depending on the agent's own -political or personal- inclinations. It is explicit that Özal's 'service' would not have pointed at the state-society relations akin to Çölaşan's.

Another interpretation of state understanding that appears as a result of economic liberalisation is made by Çandar. He argues that Özal's particular understanding of state opposed the idea of *father state*. Instead, he proposed the idea of *garçon state*. (personal communication, May 15, 2013) By garçon state, he means state as an apparatus of service for the people. "Özal used to say that the word 'father state' is not something good because from time to time 'father' beats [the child] if 'necessary'. If a father role is ascribed for the state, paternity is internalised as a

result." Moving from Özal's approach, Çandar argues that a dominating, forcing authority (of state) is worse than a state-as-service-apparatus. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013)

All in all, the data about the realm of economy has generated the most interesting and graphic characterisations on state-society relations. *Nursing state*, *commanding state*, *state as a refuge*, *bully state*, and *garçon state* are some of the appealing Turkish state characterisations depicted by the newspaper columnists. Furthermore, these statements pinpointed how diverge ideas on economy lead to various forms in the state conceptualisations of the columnists. These conceptualisations cannot merely be enlarged upon via the spectrum of 'strong state myth vs. neo-liberal (democracy) myth' that was previously suggested by Keyman (2000-2001). This spectrum has also worked in this research though, data illustrate that a solely dichotomous explanation is not sufficient enough to explain the overlapping boundaries of explanative data categories. Moreoever, longitudinal change (and turnabouts) in columnists' thinking could have been restricted with a dichotomous frame. This research is therefore complementary to the previously brought explanations and it takes a modest step forward by its attept for a thorough analysis on ten different critical junctures which help to understand the contextual underpinnings of different state conceptions.

4.1.3. Themes 4, &5: The State's Shrinkage, The Rule of Law and The Individual

This section portrays the discussions and changing ideas of the columnists about the shrinking boundaries of the state in Turkey. 1980s and partially 1990s used to reflect a statist mind of thought in which the realm of authority of state overweighed the political realm of society. Two incidents have been influential for questioning the broad realm of state in the columns: the Susurluk Incident (November 3, 1996) and economic liberalism process. Even though economic liberalisation has not necessarily brought a political liberalism understanding, the clashing boundaries between the state and the political have started to be questioned because previously inherited recipes of the Ottoman state have started to remain inefficient in the globalizing era. One of the most important and existential questions in this process in Turkish society was: What is the state for?

Is the state a means (for a better life, for the welfare of society, for providing further rights and liberties, for public services, so on and so forth) or an end in itself? It is one of the underlying questions in state theories, and the answer is determinative of actants' positions in interpreting state-society relations. Very broadly speaking, the answer of this question (what is the state for?) oscillate between two poles: transcendentalism versus instrumentalism. Hegelian political theory, for example, proposes a God-like state which is an end in itself as being the *objective will* that is the sole way of providing real freedom. (Hegel, 2001: 197) In contrast to Hegel's spiritual transcendental state, Machiavelli and Schmitt portray a more material (telluric) state that is seeking the ways to protect its survival.[167] Nonetheless, Machiavellian and Schmittean perspectives do not reflect an instrumentalist vision.

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[167] Further elaboration on state theories is available in Chapter 2.

Is the state in Turkey imagined as a means or an end? In the Ottoman tradition, the survival of the state had been of top priority and there was always 'the state and the rest' approach not only in the eyes of the rulers but also of the ruled ones. The attribution to state was a central and powerful image because it was seen the mere provider of peace and stability. In *nizam-ı alem* understanding -that I earlier discussed in the first part of this paper- it is possible to see this image casted for the state.[168] The Republican nation-state also sustained the centralized role of the state and consolidated its power through the attempts of homogenising the society.

First with the Tanzimat in Ottoman era and then with economic liberalisation in the Republic, the state started to be questioned in many ways. The challenges to state's position through the Tanzimat remained rather restricted since reforms aimed basically at saving the state and providing its survival. Economic liberalisation movement in 1980s –but mostly in 1990s- however, found for itself the eligible platform for discussing the roles and boundaries of the state vis-à-vis the society/individual. As already discussed before, however, the start of economic liberalisation process was not capable enough to entirely change the previously state-centric mindscape (both of the rulers and of the society). Nonetheless, these conjectural changes and the inquiry of state's boundaries as a result have deflected the debates on state-society relations into the issue of the rule of law. Therefore, the columns' specific reference to the rule of law, civil society, legitimacy or boundaries of state activities and of state power, the position of individual vis-à-vis the state, and

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[168] Nizam-ı alem understanding was so powerful that killing of siblings was allowed by a religious fatwa. It indicates that providing stability, order, and therefore survival of the state was prior to religious affairs.

to rights and liberties (either individual or communal) construct the framework of this category.

One of the implications that economic liberalisation has paved the way is the significance of the rule of law in the eyes of the people in Turkey. The rule of law basically implies that the law makers are also bound by the law and everyone is equal before law.[169] In Turkey, transformation of ideas from supreme state to the rule of law became more apparent first with Özal's liberalisation era, and second with Susurluk Incident. Nevertheless, none of these events per se was capable enough to open up a particular type of state-society relations in which individual rights and liberties prevail over the priorities of the state –such as security, state interest, order, and stability.

In this part, I try to examine the texts which have reference to the rule of law, individual or societal rights and liberties, the boundaries of state and of its activities, and political liberalism. Overall, this section attempts to depict a comprehensive portrayal of state-society relations as perceived by newspaper columns. Not surprisingly, 1980s are the years that the columns' emphasis on the rule of law and political liberalism is seldom-spotted. Especially in the post-1980 military intervention's restrictive environment, the statements of columnists were limited as well. Among these limitations, it was difficult to come up with a notable emphasis on the rule of law. That is why in this category, I neglect the 1980s, rather examine the 1990s and 2000s in which reference to the rule of law and its components are more

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[169] This is an overly superficial definition of the rule of law and it would be misleading if we do not touch upon juridical independence, clearly separated governmental branches, and even the political party system. Otherwise an inadequate definition of the rule of law would lead us to *Reichstaat* or to - its Turkish equivalent- '*kanun devlet*i', but not necessarily to the rule of law (*hukuk devleti*).

apparent in the texts. In the section on economy, I have tried to provide liberal arguments on the necessity of a minimal technical state in economy. The emphasis on minimal state continues to appear in the context of political liberalisation in the 1990s and 2000s.

The role of state and the scope of its interference are questioned by Akyol through liberal arguments. To Akyol, the relations between state elites and the people have been contradictory in Turkish politics. The founding elite (RPP) used to represent an elitist approach which was foreign to Turkish society. The DP reflected a more integrationist approach with people. This historically given conflicts and gap between the state (the state elites) and the people led to serious problems and sorrows. And for Akyol it is now time for reconciliation between the state and the society. But in which grounds is it possible? In contrast to the previously statist institutions (namely the RPP, and the Judiciary) which attempted to widen the scope of the state sphere and narrow down the public sphere, the state should be less interventionist and more neutral. To put it differently, unlike former state institutions' 'night-watchman' attitude in using state apparatus; the state should now adopt a more *impartial referee* position. (Akyol, November 28, 2002) Here, the *night-watchman state* represents a protectionist and interventionist state (the traditional state understanding in Turkey) while *referee* role symbolizes minimal or lack of state interference with the social and political lives of people. After his normative ideas, Akyol argues that the traditional state understanding in Turkey prevails through its institutions (such as the RPP and Judiciary, namely the state elite). However, this traditional structure should replace with a more liberal, and non-

interventionist state; and the boundaries between state and society should be extended in favour of the people. (Akyol, November 28, 2002)

In his criticism of widening boundaries of state against private sphere, Akyol presents differences between a liberal state and an ideological state in terms of the sphere of intervening by the state:

> An ideological state imposes its ideology and arranges the law accordingly. Liberal impartial state, on the other hand, are responsible for national defence, security, justice, education, and these sorts of public services, but it does not interfere with neither private lives of the citizens no the public sphere. (Akyol, November 30, 2002)

Eventually Akyol criticizes Turkish system as not achieving its transformation from 'night-watchman state' into 'liberal referee state'. (October 10, 2002)

In the same period, in contrast to Akyol, Ilıcak believes in the widening boundaries of the sphere of politics. Referring to the newly-appointed prime minister's (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) statements as a result of 2002 elections, Ilıcak states that "We have received the signals [from Erdoğan's speech] that the developments will be favouring [an approach of] 'the state of the nation' (*milletin devleti*), but not 'the nation of the state' (*devletin milleti*). There will be transparency in government, struggle with covertness, and the right to information by the citizen." (Ilıcak, November 28, 2002) On the one hand, Ilıcak statements of 'the state of the nation, but not the nation of the state' reflect a notable detachment from the traditional state-society relations in the sense that in the Ottoman-Turkish legacy the interests of the state have always been prior to the interests of the society since it was not an instrumental but transcendental legacy. On the other hand, Ilıcak's statements represent this legacy at the same time with its emphasis not on the individual but still

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on the community –the nation. As argued in the state theories section before, in a transcendental state there is no 'individual' but a 'moral community' and thus the interest of the state (and therefore of the society) is prior to the interest of the individual. (Heper, 1985: 7-8; Berki, 1979: 2-3; Grigoriadis, 2009: 66)

Although Ilıcak and Akyol bring some liberal arguments into the agenda, the emphasis is on the 'nation', on 'national' or 'public' sphere, but not sufficiently on 'individual'. In almost all of the discussions, *citizenship* overweighs *individualism*. This is one of the main issues of liberalism understanding appear in the examined columns, and it will be elaborated on the following parts of this section.

In the last decade, 2000s, considerable reference to liberal values appears in the texts. At the same time however, some statements of columnists in this decade indicate the signals of an approach in which the state is still regarded as a supreme authority over the society. The emphasis on the necessity for the people to 'be embraced by the state' (*devlet tarafından benimsenmek*) (Akyol, July 5, 2007) is an example of this hierarchical relationship between the state and the people. In this example, the feeling of 'being embraced by state' is presented as a necessary characteristic of the people toward their state. Here, the underlying main argument is that the ones who are being 'embraced' are the people, while the one who is in the superior position to 'embrace' is the state. From a different viewpoint, the statement does not talk about the state's efforts to make itself embraced by the people, for instance. Accordingly, the statement depicts an image of 'people' who will be embraced or –with a different term- be 'tolerated' by a superior authority. The people in other words are always in the passive voice. At this point, Habermas', Derrida's, and Bodin's arguments on

toleration (Borradori, 2003) will help to interpret the phrase *embracement by the state*.

Having Bodin's treatment of toleration, it is possible to argue that both Habermas and Derrida have a common ground with Bodin since all of them regard the concept of tolerance as being a hierarchical and a religious concept. Like Bodin, both Habermas and Derrida regard toleration as having origins in religion and hierarchical relations between the host and the hosted one. For Habermas, tolerance is intrinsically one-sided because "the threshold of tolerance, which separates what is still "acceptable" from what is not, is arbitrarily established by the existing authority." (Borradori, 2003: 17) For instance, Henry IV one-sidedly proclaimed tolerance towards Protestants. Here, the acceptance of the other has the character of an "act of mercy" or "doing a favour" (Borradori, 2003: 73-74). This is what Habermas defines as the tolerance in paternalistic conditions. Under these conditions, tolerance means tolerating the deviant practices of the minority. (Borradori, 2003: 40) This is one-sided declaration of a sovereign ruler. In this situation, what is "acceptable" and what is the "threshold of tolerance" are arbitrarily established by the authority. (Borradori, 2003: 40) It is possible to make similar claims for the case of *embracement by the state* that is seen as an act of mercy flowing from the sovereign state toward the people.

Despite some specific reference to powerful state, 2000s' columns and interviews continue to stress upon an 'earthly' state. In comparison to 1980s and 1990s' 'father state' image, most of the statements in late 2000s highlight that the state is nothing but an *apparatus* of service for the people. Çandar is among those who find the state

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as an earthly existence in the service of people. "The state is something people produced to organize their daily lives. … It is not something sacred. Nor it is transcendental. It is people's invention for a better life." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013) Çandar's specific reference to 'ene'l hakk'[170] is interesting to compare traditional understanding of state with the recent approaches.

> [If you say] "I die for my state." [No, why would I die for my state?] I am already the state itself [because I produced it for the organization of my life]. If I die, there is nothing left behind [on behalf of the state]. There is no other State than me. It is similar to *ene'l hakk* in Sufism." (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013)

Çandar's this alternative approach to the state is not available in previous decades in different columns. In the past, it has always been the state that was attributed a divine depiction. However, *ene'l hakk* replaces this divinity from the state to the individual as a result of liberal emphases in the final decade of analysis. Ultimately, this approach argues that in the 21st century, the state exists for the individual, not the other way round. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013) It is possible to alternatively argue that with secularisation, God does not appear in the picture as an explanative factor anymore, nevertheless every era creates its own 'god' as a reference point. From the Ottoman era until 2000s, this reference point has been the *exalted state* (*devlet-i âli*) while, especially in 2000s, the new 'god' has become *individual* with the impact of liberal arguments. In this sense, Turkey is not an exception in changing dynamics between the state and society even though the appearance of individual in Turkish politics is an issue open for further discussion.

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[170] Broadly speaking, it is a sufi tradition that claims that every creature innately possesses a piece from God. In this sense, every creature of God is a God-like being. Literally, 'ene'l hakk' means 'I am God'. Further explanation is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. Although they represent two different traditions, interestingly enough, '*ene'l hakk*' sounds very similar to '*l'état, c'est moi*'.

The coming of *individual* to the forefront in politics has been *sui generis* in Turkish political history. The corresponding developments on state-society relations are not necessarily a linear one, which progress from a conventional understanding towards a liberal understanding that highlights the significance of individual. There are plenty of underlying reasons. Kadıoğlu argues that in Turkish politics, the relation between nationalism and citizen has been determinative over the discourse of liberalism. As a result, in Turkey, *citizen-individual* comes into existence in lieu of *individual-citizen*. Citizen-individual refers how the phenomenon of citizen has always overshadowed individualisation in Turkish political culture. (Kadıoğlu, 2008: 284)

To Kadıoğlu, nation-building process in Turkey is neither similar to the France's nor to Germany's. In France's nation-building process, the notions of nationalism and nation-state appear concurrently. In Germany, nationalism arises half-century earlier than the appearance of nation-state phenomenon. In contrast to the approach of 'a nation in quest for its state' (*devletini arayan millet*) in German nation-state building process, it is possible to claim 'a state looking for its nation' (*milletini arayan bir devlet*) approch is more explanative of Turkish case. (Kadıoğlu, 2008: 287) In other words, Turks did not establish a state in an organized way by themselves, but the hollow identity of 'Turkishness' was tried to be substantiated once a nation-state was established.

Kadıoğlu explains why and how individualism has remained underdeveloped in Turkish politics. In the concerns of creating a 'nation' (after the state was established), one of the emphases was on the concept of '*duty*' which has challenged individualisation to flourish in a rational manner in Turkey. (Kadıoğlu, 2008: 288)

Not only the concerns of nation-building but -in conjunction with it- especially after 1902, the processes of modernization (*çağdaşlık*), and progressivism (*ilericilik*) has overshadowed the individual. In this way, it became more relevant to make a reference first to citizen-individual instead of an individual-citizen. The citizen-individual was depicted as those who owe certain duties to their state. From then on, individualism could not develop in a satisfactory way throughout the history of Turkish political thought. National identity always forestalled individualism as a result of the continuing emphasis on duties derived from the processes such as secularism, and modernisation. Overall, nationalism has forestalled individualism in Turkish political life. (Kadıoğlu, 2008: 292)

According to Akyol, a change in the state understanding has appeared in Turkey and the most important reason of this change is the modernisation process. The process is significant in terms of state-society interaction. Akyol argues that there are mainly two types of modernisation in Turkey: first, top-down modernisation that is started with the Ottoman Empire, and continued in Turkish Republic. This type followed a statist path in economy. Second one is the modernisation from periphery to the center that started with Democrat Party (DP) in 1950s (with initiation of multi-party politics) and continued with Özal in 1980s onwards (with economic liberalisation). In the second type of modernisation, we see *individualisation* in terms of state-society relations. (Akyol, August 18, 2007)

In a similar vein, Çandar refers to Özal's understanding of state in order to reflect the importance of individual in state-society relations in the last century. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 15, 2013) Despite the emphases of very few

columnists on the significance of individual in contemporary politics as represented above, a considerable amount of columns rarely and particularly focus on individual. The evaluations of state-society relations are generally made under the roof of liberalism though; most of the columns underrate the particular importance of individual. Instead they concentrate on state-society or state-citizen relations. In this sense, state-individual interaction remains as an overlooked issue in the columns as it has been in Turkish political life.

Individual remains underemphasised in Koru's statements although he criticizes the transcendental view of the state, and focuses on the necessity of relatively a more liberal interaction of state and society. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 14, 2013) Similar to Koru, Ilıcak also highlights the necessity of widening scope of civilian spheres, yet her emphasis on individual remains limited vis-à-vis a societal approach. She explains how her ideas on state have crucially changed by time. Although she criticizes the use of state power without any limits, she does not elaborate on how to achieve the protection of human rights in return. What are the ways or mechanisms to protect human rights? It is absent in Ilıcak's statements. Furthermore, her statements never emphasize liberties, but rights. In this respect, her arguments do not provide a full-fledged 'liberalism'. In this regard, Ilıcak proposes the following arguments:

> I was penning in *Tercüman* newspaper before 1980s. At that time, our state understanding was different. *Devlet ebed müddet* (immortal state), *being sacrificial for the state's survival*, and these kinds of thoughts were dominant. Pre-1980s period is really interesting. There was [political] polarization everywhere. An alleged understanding that 'communism threat is coming' was present. This perception itself was actually the reason of polarization. … At that time, we as *Tercüman* family were on the side of the state. By nationalism we meant to be statist. But later on, many things have changed. We experienced many things. Now, I think that human being is more important in the face of the state, and human rights should be protected. Well, I believe people established

states through [social] contracts, as John Locke said, in order to provide justice and equality. Especially the things we experienced have shown us that the Turkish state -or let say it secret state- misused its power and made mistakes on behalf of a so-called aim of 'establishing a state'. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 17, 2013)

As a result of these arguments, it is possible to argue that Ilıcak's state understanding is evolving from a conservative conventional one into a 'different one' in which the state power is questioned. Nonetheless, it is difficult to name this change in her statements as a liberal one since some *sine qua non* components of liberalism –such as emphasis on individual rights and freedoms- do not present there. The absence of liberties in Ilıcak's emphases is not surprising since it reflects how liberal arguments have not flourished properly in Turkish context. As a mentality, liberal thought has not settled down as a well-integrated whole in Turkey. (Takış, 2011: 7)

Alpay is hopeful about the future of state-society relations in Turkey that is enhancing in the advantage of the society as he claims. In his well-detailed synopsis of Turkish political life, Alpay argues that despite a state-dominating society in Turkey that is inherited from Ottoman past, some recent developments change the bulkiness of the state over society. The interest groups such as TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, trade unions, and civil society organizations are gaining power and take an active role in questioning the boundaries of the state and the state elites. He also talks about how the state is being downsized in the economical area. The opposition by different political groups (such as Kurds) is more apparent now. Overall, the idea of democracy is being adopted more in Turkey according to Alpay. (A. Kılıç Aslan, personal communication, May 16, 2013)

So far, I have tried to display how newspaper columns depict state-society relations within the framework of shrinking boundaries of the state. These relations are not dependent from an understanding of the rule of law. In state-society relations, if *the rule of law* turns into 'the law of the rule(r)' (the law of the state, or *Reichstaat*), it leads us to a raison d'état understanding in which the alleged sublime interests of the state are thought of top priority. Procrastination approach when the issue is democracy as I discussed earlier in this chapter is explanative of the circumstances where the law of the state overweighs the rule of law.

Consequently, data have illustrated the significance of some analytical tools *–the adherence of the media to the strong state, Westernization, saving the state-* upon the ideational worlds of columnists –idea entrepreneurs- while conceptualizing the state. The following chapter will provide the concluding remarks on the study.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced a coup attempt started and led by a group of junior to mid-ranking officers.[171] Radically different from previous conventional military coups –such as the 1960 and 1980 coups- the recent incident was an *on-air coup* in the sense that the people was literally able to 'follow' the attempt on TV channels and social media networks instantly with the bombardments, enclosures, and a 'pirate memorandum'[172]. In other words, civilians could 'binge watch' the coup attempt. Tracking every step of the coup plotters was so punctual that people could see how mainstream TV channels were seized by the putschists at the time of live broadcasting. The recent incident is a remarkable illustration of the critical role

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[171] While I type these sentences, the rumours and speculations about the perpetrators continue. The governmental sources point at a political group called Gülenists. The rumours also restart previous discussions on 'deep state'. Together with the rumours, the countermeasures taken by the government subsequent to the coup are also discussed in terms of the boundaries of the state power over the citizen.

[172] In the media, it was called a pirate or illegal memorandum since it was neither a compromised declaration of the entire Turkish Armed Forces nor in accord with the chain of command.

that media plays in the functioning, and even survival, of democracies, as I have discussed throughout the study.[173]

The present study focused on the print media in Turkey and mainly asked how columnists as idea entrepreneurs understand the notion of the state. This primary question was supplemented with such further questions as the following: What are the predominant conceptions of state for and among these columnists? If there are differences among these conceptions, why and in what ways do they exist? Are these conceptions fixed or have they evolved over time? In which periods did they shift and what explanations can be put forward to account for this shift? Do these understandings of columnists coincide with the existing literature on the state in Turkey? What sorts of clues for future research on the state may these perceptions of the columnists provide?

To answer these research questions, I conducted the study through a sample of ten widely known and influential newspaper columnists' columns that appeared in the mainstream national newspapers in Turkey in the 1983-2007 time period: Taha Akyol, Şahin Alpay, Ahmet Altan, Cüneyt Arcayürek, Mehmet Barlas, Hasan Cemal, Cengiz Çandar, Emin Çölaşan, Fehmi Koru, and Nazlı Ilıcak. These columnists have all been considered as having done more than routinely filling up their columns. This study departed from the grounded assumption that these columnists were 'idea entrepreneurs'. Thus, this study attempted to present a fresh

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[173] Not only their active role in politics, but also the significance of freedom of press in democracies was realized with this incident. By the time of coup attempt, the politicians and the people could be able to see the importance of free press since some of the TV channels such as CNN Turk which had been known its oppositional position toward the government continued to broadcast impartially during the incident. It was this channel which initially broadcasted the President's urgent speech during the crisis moments.

approach by taking one of the least studied groups within the media –the newspaper columnists-, whom it examined as agents of change, agenda-setters, actors of public opinion formation, informants of the public, risk-takers, innovators of new ideas, disseminators of new ideas, and possessors of notable networks of information.

The assumption in this study that takes columnists as idea entrepreneurs in Turkey has historical, sociological, and political grounds. The newspapers and the columnists have occupied a remarkable place in the country's development and socio-political reforms such as economic liberalization, modernization, and Westernization. Both in the Ottoman Empire's Reforms era, and in the Turkish Republican transformation into a 'contemporary nation-state', the newspapers, periodicals, and particularly the columnists acted as the representatives of change for the Turkish society. The role attributed to the press at critical times has paved the way for the columnists to be the timeless 'educators' and role models of the people. This role has opened up a considerable space for the columnists in forming the public opinion, and shaping the daily language of politics. Nonetheless, the specific context the Turkish columnists flourish in does not mean that the single case studied in this research is exceptional. Quite the contrary, this research may open new research vistas for research in different national and geographic contexts.

The late development of press and the corollary lack of scientific/intellectual environment, as a result, in the Ottoman-Turkish society have provided the necessary structural grounds that gave columnists and newspapers, which then used that ground to compensate the absence of scientific paradigm in the society. Therefore, they have been teachers and models of the society, and 'actors of change' at times of

transformation. The considerable influence of the columnists over the society as a result of the socio-political baggage in the Turkish context has not remained restricted to the transformation periods, but it has sustained in Turkish political life until today. This research also displays the present sphere of influence of the columnists in recent political events and on the political actors.

Some of the potential stances that criticize the notion of idea entrepreneur have also been discussed in the study. Spin doctoring, symbiotic relations between the media and politicians, and partisan approaches of columnists constitute some examples of the critical approaches. Although the present study acknowledges the impact of these examples, it also argues that they do not diminish the importance of columnists as idea entrepreneurs. Even some of the examples of spin doctoring or of columnist-politician interactions have landed credence to the main thesis on idea entrepreneuship.

In designing the research, I used a triangulation of different research techniques. Qualitative content analysis constituted the spine of the reseach paradigm adopted in the study. Archival document analysis and semi-structured elite interviews are the other techniques I applied. The newspaper columns contructed the unit of analysis. The content analysis has two phases. In the first phase, pre-coded categories were applied while coding the texts. It aimed at acquiring the panaroma of the entire research material in terms of the research question. The second phase coding composed of a posteriori codes in line with the five main themes as follows: national security and survival of the state, order and stability, economy, the rule of law, and the shrinking boundaries of the state. To put it differently, the examination of data

has led five extensive and complementary themes as the most explanative issues appeared in the newspaper columns in the given time period, 1983-2007.

The research material provided fertile grounds to discuss and explain the research question. Accordingly, five basic themes came to the fore: national security and survival of the state, order and stability, economy, the rule of law, and the shrinking boundaries of the state vis-à-vis the newly developing space of individual. The economy theme constitutes the most interesting and productive part since almost all of the state typologies and conceptualizations -as identified by the columnists- were juxtaposed and summarized in this section. *Garçon state* (Özal*)*, *guardian state* (Erbakan), *nursing state* (Akyol), *commanding state* (Akyol), *bully state* (Barlas), *state as refuge (*Barlas), *father state* (Çölaşan), *merciful state* (Ilıcak), *sacred state* (Çölaşan, Akyol), *exalted state* (Arcayürek), and *gracious (kerim) state* (Akyol) are most of these attention-grabbing entitlements about the state in Turkey.

In the study, some difficulties in analyzing the data have arisen either due to the scantiness of the number of columns in a given time period, or because of the relatively excessive number of periodical interruptions in writing columns of the analyzed columnist. In these cases, assessing the idea entrepreneurial activity of the addressed columnist has been difficult. The existence of these interruptions could be realized only after the archival studies came to an end. That is why, instead of leaving these columnists entirely out the study, I preferred sharing the relatively limited results on them since I considered the archival analysis and the labour for coding these texts in the content analysis still valuable enough to note. Because of these structural factors, the generalizability in assessing the results for Şahin Alpay,

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Ahmet Altan, and Cengiz Çandar has remained restricted in comparison to the derived conclusions for the rest of the analyzed columnists. I attempted to overcome the limitations on the generalizability of the results of content analysis by conducting the semi-structured interviews. Or in some cases, there are no interruptions in the columns but the existing columns remained irrelevant to the assigned codes. Therefore, the relative shortage in providing data examples for some columnists are due to these structural reasons.

All of the columnists examined in this study highlighted the legacy of Ottoman state tradition, bureaucratic structures and political culture transmitted into Turkish Republic. Beside this consensus among the columnists on the political and historical base, they also stressed upon similar (not the same though) points in terms of "what a state *should* be'' and "what the nature of state-individual or state-society relations should look like''. The common emphasis on these issues denoted by the columnists is the importance of liberal state in the 21st century. In this liberal state some features mostly referred by the columnists are: priority of the individual vis-à-vis the state, shrinking boundaries (in terms of interference and autonomy) of the state, a state in the service of the individual. However, despite the liberal rhetoric of the columnists, the examined columns also illustrate interesting conclusions.

One of the most interesting conclusions derived from the research is that the press considers itself as a part of the transcendental state that continues to play a central role in Turkish politics. In Anglo-Saxon tradition of media models, media are accounted as the fourth estate that is following the first three branches and forms a checks and balances mechanism on the state apparatus. However, the data results

indicate that the forth power theory does not best fit with Turkish press in the given time period. Media in Turkey redefine themselves via the state, and in the meantime, they become part of the state power by penetrating into and reproducing the state-centered discourse in politics.

This study has not argued whether the state in Turkey is strong (transcendental) or not. Nor it has intended to discuss that the newspaper columnists play a role in promoting the state as the locus of power in Turkish politics. It rather attempts to display how the state -still an important notion in Turkish politics- is understood and framed by columnists. Though this research starts with the presumption that media are influential in the political environment, it does not claim to measure the degree of media influence or effects over politics. Starting with the emphasis on media's functions and impact in democracies, this study has assumed that media in general and columnists as a particular group within them deserve scholarly interest as the idea entrepreneurs who take a relatively influential role in politics. Their influence might depend upon many factors such as the political regime type, media model, symbiotic or independent relations between media and political actors, the political economy of media structure (such as state-led media or media conglomerates), concentration of media ownership, and even the political party system in the country.

This study has commenced with the assumption that newspaper columnists function as idea entrepreneurs since they initiate new ideas, disseminate them, set the language of politics beside their changing roles coming from the usual effects –such as agenda setting, priming, framing, public opinion formation- of media. The results of this research have proved significant examples indicating the idea entrepreneurial

activities of these columnists as discussed through the five main themes in data analysis. Nonetheless, the results have also shown that the complex nature of media and politics is influential on columnists' idea entrepreneurial role. The relation between media actors and political actors is not exceptional in Turkish context in which the flow of influence (of media over politics or vice-versa) is uni-dimensional. Nor this study intends to measure the degree of this influence. That is the reason I have argued that idea entrepreneurs are context-dependent in spite of their initiating role in spreading ideas.

Having said that, the widespread and ever-lasting debate in social sciences, the 'agency vs. structure' should be thoroughly taken into consideration in evaluating the concept of idea entrepreneur as well. Especially for the media actors in an environment of sophisticated associations/nature of politics, their role as 'independent agencies' will always be questionable. Therefore the critique that portrays columnists as 'spin doctors' has been acknowledged and already discussed in this study. Nevertheless, the criticisms do not undervalue the evidence indicating that the agency of columnists as entrepreneurs still matters in setting and/or maneuvering the language of politics and of political actors, and also in being a part of this language as well.

In the light of these findings, the most important conclusion can be considered as the impact of *Janus-headed state* understanding.[174] In terms of state legacy and the evolution of the state, it is possible to reveal a dichotomous impact. The discourses of the press on the state in this regard, are Janus-headed because on the one hand,

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[174] '*Janus-headed state*' should not be confused with the '*double-faced state*' argument (Heper, & Keyman, 1998). The latter makes a comprehensive discussion on strong-weak state issues.

they have a great emphasis on both economic and political liberalization –and therefore- the highlight of individual rights and freedoms vis-à-vis the necessity of a shrinking state. On the other hand, some reflexes coming from the Ottoman legacy keep their importance in the state perceptions of the media. Despite considerable emphasis on the individual, most of the columns -except some columns of Ahmet Altan, and Cengiz Çandar- are prone to recall the state as a hegemonic, strong being. No matter how much liberal, socialist, or conservative the columnist is, the transcendental state legacy is still influential in the discourses of columnists. In practice, they might be supporting the idea of little or no state interference with economy, or the idea of priority of individual vis-à-vis the state in state-society relations; but especially during 'crisis times' (like Susurluk Incident, for example), they are unable to desist themselves from the cliché of "where is this state?'' or "the state should be doing something to get rid of the 'collapse' and to save its people'' as expecting some 'help' from the 'supreme' state.

In this context, data results illustrate that most of the columns oscillate between transcendentalism and instrumentalism in terms of the state understandings of the columnist in the 1983-2007 time period. Again, the state understandings as being portrayed in the examined columns are not consistent, but they change over time. This change is not necessarily a linear one departing from authoritarian paradigm and moving towards the liberal. All in all, the state-centered political language is recreated by most of the examined columns, and they also adhere to the already set language. The appendage to the state-centered discourse as portrayed by the considerable amount of columns leads the researcher to question the extent of idea entrepreneurial activity of the columnists in the single case study.

This study has been the preliminary step and an attempt to contribute to questioning of agency-structure debate, and it has shown that a dichotomous stance in this debate will not help in understanding the phenomenon of media-politics interaction. A second and complementary step for future studies might be to delve into the idea of idea entrepreneur and thus to question the degree of entrepreneurial activity in different contexts and under varying conditions. Comparative studies on the issue will proliferate fruitful arguments both in media-politics interaction, and agency-vs.-structure debates. Nonetheless, the research has not attributed a central place for these discussions in this study.

In the present study, I attempted to examine the idea entrepreneurs in the context of Turkish media. Future studies may depart from the same assumption that columnists can be acknowledged as idea entrepreneurs, and discuss it under different journalistic practices. This may allow future researchers to help understand the relationship, if there is any, between idea entrepreneurship and the context. In other words, such studies may clarify those models that seem to provide more space for this specific type of entrepreneurial activity? Last but not least, the framework of idea entrepreneurial activity can also benefit future research in the context of different actors or groups other than newspaper columnists. Thus a comparison between, for instance, 'columnists in Turkey' and 'think tanks in the Western societies' in the context of their influence in ideational dissemination and political discourse formation might be a subject of inquiry.

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