

WHY DOES TURKEY JOIN OR AVOID JOINING  
U.S.-LED MILITARY COALITIONS?

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by  
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Department of Political Science and Public Administration  
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Ankara

September 2016



*To Özge, Duygu and Müge*

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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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
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
September 2016

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Çerağ Esra Çuhadar  
Supervisor

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
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
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Director

## **ABSTRACT**

### **WHY DOES TURKEY JOIN OR AVOID JOINING U.S.-LED MILITARY COALITIONS?**

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The US frequently forms coalitions to go to war with other countries and Turkey is one of its many allies asked to contribute to these military coalitions. This thesis aims to reveal why Turkey joins some US-led military coalitions but chooses not to join others. In order to achieve this aim, this study identified eight historical points, called decision occasions, when decisions on whether or not to join coalitions were made, and analyzed seven independent variables for each of these occasions utilizing structured, focused comparison analysis. These decision occasions were August 1990, December 1990 and January 1991 from the Gulf War; November 2001 and January 2002 from the Afghanistan War; March 1, 2003, March 20, 2003 and October 2003 from the Iraq War. The study used paired comparison analysis carried out with decision-makers involved with each decision occasion, together with 47 elite interviews conducted with cabinet members, parliamentarians, high level civilian and military bureaucrats to rank the independent variables. The findings indicate that the decision-makers regard alliance dependence on the US as a key factor in Turkey's joining coalitions; and the actual decision-making process and risk aversion as the

main factors in Turkey's decision not to join coalitions. Legitimacy by UNSC resolution and NATO decision, along with Turkey's interest in the region/desire to enhance influence did not produce any consistent pattern; yet, the decision-makers viewed them as supportive factors in the context of joining the coalition. Finally, the seventh variable, military capability is not regarded as influential in any decisions made to join or not to join a US-led military coalition.

Keywords: Afghanistan War, Gulf War, Iraq War, Turkey, US-led Military Coalitions

## ÖZET

### TÜRKİYE, ABD ÖNCÜLÜĞÜNDEKİ ASKERİ KOALİSYONLARA NEDEN KATILIR VEYA KATILMAZ?

Yegin, Mehmet

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Çerağ Esra Çuhadar

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ABD savaşlara diğer ülkelerle birlikte gider ve Türkiye, bu askeri koalisyonlara katılması sıkça talep edilen bir ülkedir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin ABD liderliğindeki askeri koalisyonların neden bazılarında katılıp, ötekilerine katılmadığını ele almıştır. Çalışma, yapılı odaklanmış karşılaştırmalı analiz (*structured focused comparison analysis*) çerçevesinde sekiz karar alma noktası tespit ederek, bu vakalarda yedi farklı bağımsız değişkeni incelemiştir. Bu karar alma noktalarında Ağustos 1990, Aralık 1990 ve Ocak 1991 tarihlileri Birinci Körfez Savaşı'ndan; Kasım 2001, Ocak 2002 tarihlileri Afganistan Savaşı'ndan ve 1 Mart 2003, 20 Mart 2003 ve Ekim 2003 tarihlileri ise İkinci Körfez Savaşı'ndan tespit edilmiştir. İncelemede bağımsız değişkenlerin sıralanması amacıyla hem karar alıcıların gruplanmış karşılaştırma yöntemi (*paired comparison analysis*) ile her bir kararın arkasındaki faktörleri sıralamaları sağlanmış hem de 47 kabine üyesi, parlamenter, üst düzey diplomat ve askeri yetkili ile derinlemesine mülakat yapılmıştır. Çalışma sonucunda karar alıcılara göre Türkiye'nin ABD liderliğindeki koalisyonlara katılma nedeni olarak ittifak



bağımlılığı; katılmama yönünde ise karar alma süreçleri ve riskten kaçınma faktörleri öne çıkmıştır. BMGK ve NATO'nun oluşturduğu meşruiyet ve Türkiye'nin müdahale edilen bölgeye olan ilgisi/etkisini artırma isteği istikrarlı bir etki oluşturmazken koalisyona katılmayı destekleyici bir unsur olarak öne çıkmıştır. Diğer taraftan karar alıcıların hiçbir kararda askeri kapasite faktörünü dikkate almadıkları görülmüştür.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** ABD Liderliğinde Askeri Koalisyonlar, Afganistan Savaşı, Irak Savaşı, Körfez Savaşı, Türkiye

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Coalitions are an important mechanism for collective action. An inability to procure enough resources to achieve a goal, or an intention to reduce costs, persuades actors to act collectively. Since it is a common phenomenon for all occurrences of the aforementioned conditions, the term 'coalition' is used in diverse fields. From psychology and business administration to political science there are different examples of coalition studies.

The word 'coalition' is used in the field of personal relations and psychology scholars tend to use the term when referring to marital relations. Coalitions are applicable in business: where coalitions between companies and their dynamics are among the interests in the field of business administration. Coalitions are, of course, vital in the political arena. Individuals or groups may come together in civil society to form an advocacy group and create a greater impact. Political parties form coalitions for

electoral success, or they come together in order to hold a necessary number of seats in a parliamentary democracy to assume the role of government. Countries come together for common military action. The history of wars by coalition goes back to ancient Greece and possibly beyond.

In brief, coalitions are employed in various fields and diverse disciplines study coalitions, together with their dynamics in terms of formation, maintenance and dissolution. This study focuses on the formation of military coalitions and its dynamics, with a particular reference to Turkey's coalition policy.

### **1.1. Scope of the study and research questions**

This study will examine Turkey's coalition behavior as a non-leading country. It aims to rank influential variables that affect the coalition participation behavior of Turkey. In this vein, it aims to bring out the conditions under which Turkey has joined, or has avoided joining, military coalitions. It also aims to reveal the conditions that differentiate the level of commitment. Along with the Turkish cases, it aspires to contribute to coalition literature with new findings. Thus, the research questions this study seeks to answer are: What factors explain Turkey's coalition behavior? What are the conditions that determine the level of commitment of Turkish participation (support) to US-led military coalitions?

### **1.2. Dissertation Plan**

The dissertation consists of seven chapters including the introduction and conclusion. Following this introduction, the second chapter will present the literature on coalitions and the methodology. In order to examine the phenomenon, firstly the term ‘coalition’ will be defined. Secondly, the dynamics of military coalitions for both leading countries and non-leading coalition partners will be reviewed. This will be followed by a review of Turkey’s coalition policy in current literature. Lastly, the methodology used in this study and the logic of case selection in the dissertation will be provided.

The following three chapters will focus on the cases examined for this work. The third chapter studies the three decision occasions of the Gulf War, firstly giving background information on these decision occasions, then scrutinizing each decision occasion by means of paired comparison analysis and finally a detailed evaluation of the decision. For example, the first decision occasion led to parliament denying war powers to the government and president. The second decision occasion resulted in an avoidance of sending troops to the coalition. On the third decision occasion it was agreed that Turkish airbases should be opened to the coalition. The reasons behind these three decisions will be examined.

In the fourth chapter the two decision occasions of the war in Afghanistan will be reviewed. Each decision occasion will be examined via background information, a paired comparison analysis, assessment of independent variables and evaluation of the decision. For the first decision occasion, the decision to send troops for combat will be examined. For the second decision occasion, the agreement to send troops for non-combat missions will be evaluated.

The fifth chapter covers the three decision occasions of the Iraq War. Firstly, the controversial March 1st Bill associated with the first decision occasion will be evaluated. The second decision to open airspace will then be examined. Lastly, the third decision occasion involving the sending of troops to Iraq for non-combat missions will be scrutinized.

The dissertation ends with discussion and conclusion chapters. In the discussion chapter the cross analysis of sending troops or avoiding this commitment will be examined. The results of paired comparative analyses and qualitative findings will be discussed and their theoretical contributions will be evaluated. Furthermore, differentiation in the level of commitment will be studied if possible. The results will be compared to the findings of past studies. In the conclusion chapter, the dissertation will end with wrap up of the study. In this chapter, the summary of theoretical contributions and implications to Turkish foreign policy will be provided. Also the chapter will end with the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THEORY & METHODOLOGY**

#### **2.1. Coalitions and Alliances**

The term coalition is particularly used for certain types of cooperation between countries with some scholars using the term as a synonym for alliance, another type of security cooperation.<sup>1</sup> Hence the literature on coalitions, and its counterpart in relation to alliances, are related and at times even compete in academic terms. Indeed, coalition literature which was born in the 1960s, went on to be “overshadowed by alliance theory” during the 1980s, then was revived after the Persian Gulf War and the humanitarian coalitions of the 1990s (Kober, 2002: 3).

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<sup>1</sup> Mostly realist scholars such as Stephen Walt and Glenn Snyder use the term in such a fashion.

The common ground within coalitions and alliances is that of countries combining their resources in order to construct a better security instrument. Liska determines the aim of an alliance as “maximizing gains and sharing liabilities” (1968: 26). This is quite similar to coalitions, but the nature, scope and the purpose of these security instruments are rather different. Thus, coalitions and alliances are two distinct phenomena.

Given that this study focuses on US-led military coalitions, it would seem important to give credence to the US military definition of the terms currently under consideration. The US Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms distinguishes between the terms coalition and alliance. According to the DoD Dictionary, a coalition is defined as “an arrangement between two or more nations for common action”; whereas, an alliance is determined as “the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.” (2014: 12, 36).

Unlike the usual formal nature of an alliance, coalitions may have an informal character (Baltrusaitis, 2008: 28). In fact, there are few non-treaty alliances, with most of them being enshrined within formal, written arrangements. Robert Osgood uses the adjectives “*reciprocal*” and “*formal*” for alliances (1968: 20). Glenn Snyder reiterates the same qualities when he defines alliances as “formal associations of states” (1997: 4). In comparison with this formal quality of alliances, coalitions are generally considered to be informal and short term. Thus, the coalition members’ contribution to the common action with political, diplomatic, military and economic

support is not formalized, with the coalition arrangements being dissolved once specified goals have been achieved.

The second difference between alliances and coalitions is that of a “long-term versus ad hoc nature” (Kober, 2002: 2). The duration that countries come together for differs between the two arrangements. Alliances are long-term commitments made by countries to act together. On the contrary, coalitions are formed for specific military operations and are dissolved once the war is over, or even during, a campaign; whereas, alliances tend to continue for a longer period. For instance, the Persian Gulf War coalition was dissolved a mere six weeks after the liberation of Kuwait. In contrast, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was valid from 1955-79; the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) remained active from 1954-77; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established in 1949 is still active; as are the Australia, New Zealand and US Security Treaty (ANZUS) dating from 1951 and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (RIO Treaty) signed in 1947. These last three alliances have survived even after the termination of the Soviet threat (Beard, 1995: 12).

One other difference is that alliances necessitate a long-term more widespread commitment among the partners; whereas, coalition commitments are particular to a specific action. The allied countries help each other in terms of military build-up and expect a united action in cases of threat posed against any one member. Osgood regards this broader cooperation as additional to war commitments and points out that alliances “increase the obligation of signatories to carry out specified commitments and co-operation” (1968: 20). On the other hand, coalitions have limited cooperation

for joint military action. Coalition members do not have responsibilities other than military action, such as supporting each other in terms of armament or military preparedness.

Another difference between alliances and coalitions is the aim of the military cooperation involved. Coalitions are formed for an active military operation and mostly for offensive purposes; whereas, “alliances are formed for defensive purposes” (Ashraf, 2011: 16-17). Thus, countries unite within an alliance framework in order to deter a common enemy or enemies, which may be both external and internal. Hence, alliances operate for “reducing the impact of antagonistic power” (Liska, 1968: 26). Generally, the outcome of alliances is the inaction of the parties<sup>2</sup> and on rare occasions of war, the loyalty of the partners is not taken for granted. In short, alliances may be defined as “a latent war community” (1968: 19). On the other hand, coalitions are dynamic and formed for an offensive action. In order to be acknowledged as a coalition member, countries should be active and generally expected to send combat troops to the field of operations.

Despite the differences, some scholars misuse the two terms or do not use them appropriately. For instance, Randall Newnham (2008) points out the problem with the term alliance and mentions its shortcomings in terms of excluding informal alliances, which are not based on written agreements, such as the Coalition of the Willing (COTW). This perspective tends to place coalitions within alliance literature and may lead to confusion over the correct use of the terms.

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<sup>2</sup> On rare occasions alliances trigger wars as well. Once the countries have become more confident they may act in a more bellicose fashion.



The main confusion would seem to arise when academics examine coalitions in terms of alliance reliability. These studies are focused on allied countries that join or avoid joining the military involvements of their allied partners. Coalitions are not exclusively comprised of allied partners, nor do all members of an alliance necessarily participate in coalition warfare. For the record, coalitions are not wartime alliances. Even the characteristics of alliances in wartime and alliances in peacetime are different from each other (Weitsman, 2004: 6). Furthermore, being in an alliance with the leading country is not the only path to joining a coalition; non-allied countries may participate in coalitions as well. For instance, when Turkey joined the Korean War coalition, it was not an ally of the US. Indeed, there are countries joining US-led coalitions in order to become allies of that country.

## **2.2. Coalition Dynamics for Leading Countries**

Two or more countries, bringing resources and operational capabilities in order to achieve a particular military objective, form military coalitions. If the coalition partners are equal or nearly equal powers, they share similar reasons for forming the coalition, mostly related to the outcome of the military campaign. The rationale behind forming coalitions for non-equal partners; may differ from equal or nearly equal powers' approaches to coalition formation.

Following the Second World War, most of the coalitions have been led by powerful countries such as the US and France, or they have used the name of an international organization. This asymmetry in coalition partners changes the fundamental dynamics of the coalition and differentiates the motivation of the coalition leader from the other coalition participants.

Looking at the US, particularly in the role of a coalition leader, it may be said that coalition warfare is a part of American security culture. The US has used coalitions “almost every time” and has avoided going to war alone (Riscassi, 1993: 53). This perspective is based on the idea of burden sharing and a “combined police force rather than a world police-man” (Dixon, 1993-94:27). According to former US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, it is highly likely that the US will continue to use military coalitions in the future (1997: 47). Despite the unilateralist rhetoric of the Bush administration, during his term of office military operations continued to be conducted using coalitions.

The Bush administration developed different approaches to coalitions in terms of defining the mission and decision-making, yet it still used coalitions for both the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (Rumsfeld, 2001). During the Obama administration, another approach to coalition was developed for the Libya intervention: leading from behind under the banner of NATO (Lizza, 2011a; Lizza 2011b). Libya revealed NATO to be an important institution having a “common doctrine... and common capabilities and command structure for *quickly* integrating national forces” (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012: 4). The most recent coalition campaign, the coalition against ISIS, would seem to indicate that from the unilateralist Bush to multilateralist Obama, coalition warfare seems to be an essential feature of all US administrations.

Strategic and political assets make coalitions indispensable. For coalition leaders, individual members as strategic assets “bring capabilities... that improve the overall chances of success” and as political assets coalition partners provide “international

legitimacy” (Jermy, 2011: 247). Strategically, coalition partners may provide use of territory in terms of bases and access to airspace, that could be as important as advanced military capability. Along with concerns about the actual military operation, political concerns are also important. In terms of the US, Perry, Pirnie and Gordon’s comparison of these two assets is striking since they assert: “the United States tends to regard its coalition partners as indispensable for political reasons but only marginally useful for military operations” (1999: 20).

In addition to international motivations to choose to go war with a coalition rather than alone, there are also domestic motives for this choice. US presidents would seem to want to form coalitions during election periods and in times of economic difficulties (Tago, 2005: 598). Coalitions give the impression that the intervention burden does not solely rest with the US in economic and military terms, and the multilateral war image increases the chance of domestic support.

However, alongside these advantages military coalitions are not free from problems. Conducting a military operation with participation from different countries is not easy in the field. Since the military divisions consist of troops from different countries, they bring their different national interests, languages, equipment and military training to the field and managing all these differences may be quite challenging (Riscassi, 1993: 63; Auerswald & Saideman, 2014). Smart and Sycara liken this differentiation to communication with technical devices between a cat and a bird, trying to make sense of each others meows and tweets (2013: 52-53). They also underline another difficulty in coalition warfare: that of military personnel with different levels of knowledge and experience, trying to make collective sense in the

field under combat (2013: 52-53). There may be dramatic consequences of miscommunication such as friendly fire. One quarter of all American troop casualties in the Gulf War were caused by friendly fire (Weitsman, 2009).

It must also be borne in mind that in some ways the coalition as a whole may become dependent on, and/or may be restricted, by the individual members. In terms of dependence, the coalition could be seen to be vulnerable to domestic developments within all member countries, with any domestic crisis possibly resulting in a withdrawal from the coalition, which could damage the planning and execution of a campaign (Weitsman, 2014: 28). Furthermore, the individual restrictions of coalition members could result in restraints on the coalition as a whole. For instance, the problem of “legal interoperability” or the legal constraint of coalition members; can have a negative influence, particularly with regard to naval operations (Dalton, 2008: 7). Thus, the more countries that join a coalition, the greater the possibility that restrictions will be applied to that coalition. Lastly, planning and proceeding with agreement among coalition members during combat is not easy, and the Kosovo Operation in 1999 is an important example in this matter (Nardulli, Perry, Pirnie, Gordon IV & McGinn, 2002: 121). Scott Wolford (2016) argues that in the post-war period reaching a sustainable peace is also become less possible with increase of number of junior coalition members.

Despite the difficulties which are seemingly inherent in coalition warfare, the US prefers coalitions, in which it takes the lead country role, because of both operational advantages and legitimacy purposes. Coalitions also provide US presidents with advantages in domestic politics. Thus, their approaches may change, but coalition

warfare itself continues, despite the problems it may lead to within military campaigns.

### **2.3. Coalition Dynamics for Non-Leading Countries**

Coalitions facilitate military interventions for lead countries both politically and strategically. Why do other countries go to war alongside the US? For the non-lead (minor) countries there are different dynamics, which may be examined in two categories: international and domestic.

#### **2.3.1. International dynamics**

In 1966, Olson and Zeckhauser published an early study in this context which highlights the unwillingness of countries to join in military operations. Since the leading country will intervene anyway, participation in coalitions is costlier for other participants than the free-riding option. Olson and Zeckhauser emphasize the free-riding tendency of countries in coalition burden sharing. This study assumes the operation to be a “collective good” for non-lead countries, and emphasizes the importance of security needs as a factor in coalition participation. They argue that “small nations have little or no incentive to provide additional amounts”, unless security is the over-riding reason for their participation, or institutional arrangements are in place (1966: 35-36).

Bennett, Levgold and Unger in their ground-breaking study, turned on Olson and Zeckhauser’s argument on collective action (1994: 70). They examined the Persian

Gulf War and argued that, under certain circumstances, states are willing to share the burden instead of free-riding. They argue that, despite an inherent tendency towards free-riding, the balance of threat and especially alliance dependence can be important variables that encourage countries to join a coalition effort (1994: 70).

The term ‘balance of threat’ comes from Stephen Walt’s (1987) work in which he explains that alliances are formed not to create a balance against the great powers in general, but particularly concerned with countries seen to be posing a threat. Thus, beyond the common good, the non-lead countries in any coalition may perceive a direct, particular and individual threat from the target country (Bennett et al., 1994: 43). The expectation is that such countries threatened by the target country, will be more than willing to join the coalition in order to neutralize this threat (Auerswald, 2004: 631).

The other variable, alliance dependence, is “the net benefit (a state) is receiving from (an alliance), compared to benefits available from alternative sources” (Snyder, 1997: 166). Despite Snyder’s limiting these benefits to the military sphere, other coalition scholars include the economic benefits as well. Thus, in terms of alliance dependence, it is proposed that the junior member of a coalition avoids any rift with the lead member(s) that may result in loss of benefits in terms of both security and the economy (Bennett et al., 1994: 44). In security terms, an allied state’s major fear is “abandonment in his (the) hour of need” (Mandelbaum, 1988: 101). Daniel Baltrusaitis (2008) claims security dependence on coalition leader determines a country’s decision about coalition burden sharing. The security dependence idea was further refined with the argument that dependence is not a one-way phenomenon;

despite its asymmetric character there is a security interdependence between the coalition leader and other members (Fritz, 2008: 59-61).

The non-leading country may also be dependent on the leading one in the economic sphere alongside security concerns. Thus, the countries with economic links to the US are also dragged into the coalition. For instance, the US used carrots and sticks in terms of aid and trade relations and convinced relevant countries to join the COTW (Newnham, 2008: 197). Marina Henke goes beyond this concept and claims that an “international security cooperation market” exists where coalition leaders offer “selective incentives” to countries that do not have direct interests in joining the coalition; which she names as “laggards” (2012: 18). In contrast, there are also countries ready to join coalitions to become close to the leading country in order to profit, and they are said to act like “jackals” (Schweller, 1994: 93).

Additionally, the US does not automatically increase or decrease economic and military aid with regard to the participation of minor countries in coalition wars. Actually, the US as the coalition leader allocates less resources in a more efficient way to influence the decisions of the countries. Indeed, the US has been known to punish aid-taking countries that do not participate in coalitions by reducing or totally cutting existing foreign aid, but it does not automatically give or increase foreign aid to new coalition participants (Tago, 2008: 390-393).

Security along with economic incentives become even more attractive for small countries that need both. Wivel, Oest and Noe examined the dynamics of coalition participation of microstates and found that security and economic dependence on the

US is important, along with the indirect effect of former experiences ( 2010: 439-448). And also in this context of security and economic dynamics, David Lake offers a more ambitious approach. Lake rejects the idea of joining a coalition for the purpose of profit-making, he argues that hierarchy brings the consent of countries to join coalitions and explains that this takes place because “they respect and comply with the authority of the dominant state” (2009: 173).

Jason Davidson asserts that alliance value and threat perception are the international variables (2011: 22). Patricia Weitsman considers the alliance itself as an institution providing the leading country with a structure, through which it is able to convince the member countries to join the coalition and to provide legitimacy for the campaign (2014: 16-18). Furthermore, it is argued that the alliance structure influences the member states’ actions when faced with war, since their “reliability and reputation” matters for their future alliance relations (Crescenzi, Kleinberg, Kathman & Wood, 2009).

The justification for the military intervention is an important independent variable for joining a coalition. Thus, a “UN legitimization and... non-universal international institutions such as NATO and OAS” has the potential to facilitate smaller countries responding positively to an invitation to be part of a coalition (Tago, 2007: 192). This does not mean institutional structures provide a problem free coalition management. Hylke Dijkstra (2016) argues on the member states losing control over the coalition warfare to institutions secretariat as a problem in the conduct of coalition warfare through institutional structures.



Besides, “major power status” for such countries may result in more interest in developments in the target state/region, or having a special relationship historically, or simply protecting interests in general during and after intervention, may also be important factors in joining coalitions (Tago, 2007: 194-196). Relatively major countries with an interest in the target country are more war prone and have the “willingness” to join a war, since joining a war effort is less likely for states without enough power and resources (Siverson & Starr, 1990: 48-49). It may also be highlighted that states with powerful militaries are more likely to use force (Fordham, 2004).

Lastly, having a similar linguistic or cultural background with the leading country is another factor that influences the choice to join a coalition. Vucetic refers to several works that define the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, along with the US, as the “Anglosphere... an imagined community of English-speaking states/nations” and argues these countries almost automatically join US-led coalition efforts (2010: 28).

In summary, in terms of international dynamics, the coalition leaders’ level of dominance in the system is important either by the authority it naturally exerts, or through an alliance structure which enables it to influence the minor country’s coalition behavior. Furthermore, security and economic dependence, or profit making purposes, increase the chances of participation in a coalition. Lastly, a similar identity with the coalition leader may also influence the decisions of the countries involved.

### **2.3.2. Domestic dynamics and the decision-making process**

The decision to join a coalition may not be examined solely in terms of international dynamics. This approach leads to assumptions of the unitary nature of the state as a “black box” and a rational entity. Nevertheless, decisions are made by a limited number of people, the foreign policy elite, and the decisions are highly bound to the beliefs, values and goals of the decision-makers (Ripley, 1993: 406). Thus, domestic dynamics and hence the actual decision-making process itself, also influence the outcome. Robert Putnam argues that negotiations on international affairs are “two-level games” which consist of both maximizing the benefits in the international arena and satisfying the domestic audience (1988: 434). In order to capture the whole picture, this study will also include the decision-making process and domestic dynamics.

The prominent domestic variable in the context of coalitions is the regime type. The regime of a country has significant influence on alliance commitments, with democracies being more predictable in terms of alliance membership. Nevertheless, in terms of joining a coalition they may be less reliable than other types of regimes. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) argue that democracies are actually less reliable allies when it comes to joining a war effort because of the autonomous nature of the public. Yet, additionally, after taking the decision to join a coalition, they are “less likely to than non-democratic states to abandon” that coalition (Choi, 2012: 628).

As a non-routine issue certain crises may hamper the willingness of countries to join coalition wars. Tago points out that nationwide riots and economic crises force the executives to primarily allocate their resources to solving domestic problems rather than helping allies in a war effort (2012: 11-12).

There are other domestic variables that also restrict participation in a coalition. In particular, Ali Ashraf suggests a developed version of the Bennett et al. and Auerswald model for coalition burden behavior, and he proposes military capability as an important intervening variable (2011: 73). Since coalition participation necessitates military input, the non-lead country needs to have “a deployable, interoperable and suitable military force” in order to make a meaningful contribution (Ashraf, 2011: 76). Without these abilities the non-lead country’s contributions may remain limited, despite its will. Thus, military capability has an influence on the level of the contribution.

The interaction among the actors in the actual decision-making: the executive, public opinion and the bureaucracy; are also important. There may be divergence between the executive and the public about joining the coalition. In such cases as Bennett et al. suggests, the public generally opposes participation in the coalition, whilst the executive are more prone to join due to international pressure (1994: 17). In this case the ability of the executive to take the decision alone becomes an important factor in the decision outcome, which is referred to as state autonomy (Bennett et al., 1994). State autonomy is determined by the way governmental institutional structures are shaped (Auerswald, 2004: 631). These structures may lead to the bureaucracy being an influential actor in the decision-making, which is referred to as “bureaucratic politics.” In bureaucratic politics “officials who occupy positions on top of major organizations” share the authority to decide with political leaders (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 255). Furthermore, in the decision-making process the “player’s stand depends

on his personal interests and his conception of his role” (Allison & Halperin, 1972: 48).

Davidson (2011) argues that public opinion and electoral influence are key variables in the domestic sphere. Since elected officials have to respond to public demands, they prioritize domestic concerns over international issues, especially at election time. Thus, the election cycle is an important variable that can influence the decision to join a coalition. According to Tago (2009), elections have a significant effect on countries forcing them to focus on domestic concerns, and these concerns subordinate their commitment to the alliance. He also refutes other possible explanations and proposes that neither having a parliamentary or a presidential system, nor any change in the executive, have a significant effect on the decision (2009: 232).

These diverse theories of and approaches to domestic matters, which may influence a country to join or avoid joining a coalition, can be combined within the variable ‘decision-making process’. In order to achieve a “greater comprehensiveness and flexibility” in examining the decision-making process, in this study “decision units” will be used as a framework (Hermann, 2001: 76). The decision unit approach categorizes different decision-making actors into three units that make it easy to compare different cases, and offer the opportunity to apply the framework to countries other than the US.

In this approach Hermann argues for an “authoritative decision unit” that will “commit the resources of the society...make a decision that cannot be readily reversed” (2001: 48). The decision units comprise predominant leaders that have the

ability to decide alone, single groups as “members of a single body” or a coalition of autonomous actors that do not have “the ability to decide and force compliance on the others” (2001: 56-57). This approach takes each decision making point in time as an occasion of decision and regards the process as aggregated occasions. Hermann likens the relationship between the occasions and the process to frames in a film. This framework has also been tested, and yielded fruitful results, in other studies of Turkish foreign policy decisions (Çuhadar & Özkececi, 2004; Çuhadar, 2012; Taydaş & Özdamar, 2013).

The decision unit approach provides insights into the dynamics of the process and the end results in cases of consensus and conflict among the decision-makers. According to Hermann, Stein, Sundelius & Walker (2001) and Hagan, Everts, Fukui & Stempel, (2001) in case of divergence among the decision making actors a “broker role” in the single group or a “pivotal actor” in coalitions may play a crucial role in bringing the parties to an agreement. In groups, successful broker role results in an “integrative solution: “a compromise among members in which they accept a solution that is of lower value to them than their first choice”; whereas, in non-presence of a broker role the result is a deadlock where group members are “unable to bridge their their differences and stalemate results” (Hermann et al., 2001:149). In coalitions where unanimity is required, in the presence of pivotal actor the process ends with “broad compromise” in which actors come together by making concessions and without a pivotal actor the process ends with “stable deadlock” in which case the decision makers may not go further in action (Hagan et al., 2001: 180).

## **2.4. Turkish Foreign Policy and Military Coalition Participation**

There is not one particular study in the literature about Turkey's coalition participation policy. Turkey's military involvement in US-led coalitions has not been examined from the perspective of coalition dynamics. Rather it has been, and continues to be, studied as participation in operations via international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) under the formal name of "Contribution of Turkish Armed Forces to Peace Support Operations" (Çakmak, 2004: 116).

Despite the extensive focus on peace-keeping in the present literature, the reality is quite different. Turkey's coalition participation goes back even to Ottoman times with its joining of the Crimean War coalition with Britain, France and Sardinia (Shaw & Shaw, 1977 :139-140) Thus, Turkey's participation in coalitions are not limited to peacekeeping operations. Along with this study's focus of concern since the US-led operations were not all peace operations, neither are all coalition participation decisions taken under the legitimacy of international organizations, nor are all operations driven for pure peace purposes. Latterly, Uğur Ziyal (2004) included military operations with third parties other than international organizations.

Other related studies on Turkey mostly consider single cases without any attempt at generalization and without reference to coalition theories. Several scholars have individually examined one Turkish case within a broader research agenda, and that case mainly happens to be the Turkish parliamentary decision taken on March 1st,

2003. Or quite rarely they examined more than one case, but only to test one variable.<sup>3</sup>

In one of these rare studies Haydar Çakmak provides the basic parameters of Turkey's contribution to international peace in the time of crises. He rebuts both the unilateral approach and taking the leading role in a military campaign for Turkey by "planning, organizing and enforcing" the operation (Çakmak, 2004: 81,116). Çakmak also rejects the idea of "bandwaggoning for profit" and argues for Turkey's economic and political losses giving the examples of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (2004: 257). He argues for Turkey's participation in these operations being due to its role within the Western alliance, particularly "a close ally of the US" (Çakmak, 2004: 80).

Other scholars endorse the Western influence approach. Ali Karaosmanoğlu defines the national security culture of Turkey before the 1990s with the term "defensive non-involvement *realpolitik*" and argues that this approach was softened along with "activist multilateralism in foreign policy in the 1990s" (2000: 216). Thus, Turkey joined certain military coalitions during and after the Cold War. This change in policy was aimed at protecting the position of Turkey in the West after the collapse of Soviet Union, by joining peacekeeping operations to reinforce its position in the Western world (Oğuzlu & Güngör, 2006: 480).

Oğuzlu and Güngör refute other possible reasons for joining peacekeeping operations such as the "forward security" concept or the ethnic lobbies in Turkey, and reiterate coalition participation as "a strategy to help re-establish Turkey's Western and pro-

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<sup>3</sup> For instance, Baltrusaitis' thesis is among those that only focus on the March 1st Bill; Fritz's thesis is a rare study that examines more than one of the Turkish cases.

American/European identity” (2006: 478-481). Patricia Weitsman endorses this approach and refers to “fears of abandonment in the post-Cold War world” and claims this was not solely applicable to Turkey, but also to the UK, France, Germany and Japan (2014: 62). Morgan Fritz proposes asymmetric security inter-dependence between Turkey and the US because, he claims, in both the Korean and the Gulf War, Turkey took too costly a path to join the coalition in order to be able to ask the US to help Turkey in the future. He deems this to be “currying favour”; on the contrary the US was dependent on Turkey in the Iraq War (2008: 37, 332).

Official sources refer to Turkish participation in the UN operation in Somalia known as UNOSOM; various operations in Bosnia including UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, Sharp Guard, and Deny Flight; the ISAF operation in Afghanistan; and Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya (“Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Barışı Destekleme Harekatlarına Katkıları,” n.d.). Mehmet Öcal (2008) claims Turkey’s participation in military coalitions via international organizations as yet another dimension of coalition participation: international legitimacy provided by international organisations.

Yet another point is suggested by Çakmak (2004) who states that Turkey does not have any specific interest in the target geographies, or aim to expand its influence rather, it is proposed, that any crisis on former Ottoman territory pushes Turkey to become involved. However, this idea would seem to be easily challenged because of Turkey’s involvement in coalitions outside former Ottoman territories such as Afghanistan, and in terms of Turkey enhancing influence both in the target region and on a global scale. According to Jin Woo Kim, after the collapse of the Soviet Union



Turkey had the opportunity to become more influential in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, hence its motivation to join coalitions was to “increase its political and economic influence in multiple regions” (2010: 54). Çevik Bir (1999) sees the increase in international influence as a factor as well as influence in particular regions.

In short, studies that examine Turkey’s coalition participation policy in general, provide certain parameters on the matter. The main parameters determined in the present literature are: the involvement of international institutions; being part of the Western alliance, particularly any alliance with the US; and the opportunity to enhance influence in particular regions and in the international area.

## **2.5. Importance of The Issue**

From consideration of cases throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century it would seem that the US has a military culture of going to war with other countries (Weitsman, 2014: 26). Especially following the ending of the Cold War, as Carment and Rowlands (1995) suggests the unipolar world system eliminated the barriers for intervention. In the first half of the 1990s alone, the number of UN resolutions concerning military operations was double the number issued during the entire Cold War (Weiss, 2004: 136). These wars were mainly fought by coalitions.

Recently, the Arab Spring brought about the humanitarian intervention in Libya and a coalition against ISIS, and it would seem that there is potential for intervention in other problematic countries by a US-led or US-supported coalition. Thus, coalitions are regularly employed and have the potential to be employed in the future as well. In

order to better understand the dynamics of previous coalitions, but also have the opportunity to make predictions about such arrangements in the future, there should be more research in this context. The topic of coalitions demands further study for better understanding.

Nevertheless, there are a few studies of coalitions, although some relevant studies do not systematically examine the issue because of the aforementioned confusion with alliances. This situation leaves many grey areas within the issue of coalitions to be elucidated. For instance, the present literature reduces the military contributions of coalition countries to the issues of sending troops, allowing access to airbases and giving rights to airspace, even though in some cases they have more intrinsic, strategic importance than the sending of a symbolic number of troops for non-combat missions would indicate.

Turkey is one of the countries that have given, and will presumably continue to give, different types of support to US-led coalitions on different occasions. However, as previously discussed, the literature on Turkey's coalition policy is quite sparse.

Indeed, there is no study on the dynamics of Turkish coalition politics by a researcher with Turkish language skills having access to Turkish sources. There are field studies on wars in which Turkey fought as a coalition member, yet they are not examined within a theoretical framework of coalitions. The works that include Turkey's coalition policy are mostly single case studies and there is no systematic comparison among the cases, nor any focus on independent variables within these studies.

In this work, Turkish coalition policy will be examined for the first time within the relevant theoretical context, by a Turkish-speaking scholar having access to Turkish sources. Additionally, for the first time Turkey's coalition policy will be examined comparatively with multiple cases. This study will not only compare cases, but also rank independent variables by interviewing the actual decision-makers involved in respective cases.

Within the coalition literature in general there is interest in the deviant case of Turkey's not joining the US Coalition of the Willing (COTW) in the Iraq War. The current study on the other hand, will examine a range of diverse cases considering a total of eight decision occasions including the March 1st decision, and thus providing variation in the dependent variable. Additionally, some findings from these Turkish cases do not fit existing coalition literature. These findings may also contribute to modification of military coalitions' theory. Furthermore, there is no extant literature on why countries avoid joining coalitions. This study aims to reveal the causes of avoiding coalition participation in the case of Turkey. These new findings will provide new ideas to be tested with other countries by other scholars in future research.

Another issue this study will examine, which would seem to be lacking in the literature, is the range of types of support which can be given in military coalitions. In some military operations, Turkey sent combat troops to battle; in others non-combat troops were provided for peace keeping operations; in some cases, it opened its bases for the use of the US; in other cases, it merely gave access to airspace. This study will examine the complete range of support provided by Turkey. Thus in terms of level of

commitment, the differentiation was examined for Turkish cases and it is hoped that this may lead to large-N studies in the future.

## **2.6. Methodology and Case Selection**

### **2.6.1 Definition and operationalization of dependent and independent variables**

The dependent variable of this study is “coalition behavior of Turkey in US-led military coalitions”. In order to examine various aspects of the phenomenon two different indicators will be used with the dependent variable (Table-2 provides details of this coding). The first one is ‘join/not join the coalition’. In case Turkey joins the coalition, the second indicator is the ‘level of commitment of Turkey to US-led military coalitions’. The level of commitment is coded as: ‘weak commitment’; and ‘strong commitment’. In order to determine the level of commitment, the type of support given will be used. Opening airspace and airbases is defined as ‘weak commitment’ and sending troops for combat/non-combat missions is specified as a ‘strong commitment’.

In order to capture the conditions that affect joining coalition and the level of commitment, certain independent variables are operationalized. These independent variables are derived from the literature discussed earlier on coalition burden sharing in general and on Turkey in particular. Furthermore, interviews conducted with the Turkish decision-makers resulted in the emergence of new variables. The number of independent variables was deliberately kept low to facilitate analysis, with similar items being dropped.

It was shown in the literature above that legitimacy provided by international institutions and alliance structures is seen to be potentially influential; hence this will also be tested for the Turkish case. In order to evaluate its impact, the presence of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, or a NATO decision, and the perception of decision-makers about their salience will be scrutinized. Thus, the first two independent variables are: 'legitimacy by UNSC resolution' and 'legitimacy by NATO'. Turkey's alliance dependence on coalition leader has also been identified as an important factor. Hence, 'alliance dependence' is another independent variable that refers to coalition participation in order to avoid loss of benefits of alliance with the leading country in the areas of security, economy or politics.

Here a distinction is made between alliance dependence to the US and legitimacy by NATO variables. The former variable refers to Turkey's bilateral strategic and security dependence to the US; whereas NATO variable takes into consideration the institution as a whole with all member states since NATO takes its decisions with unanimous vote. Thus, the latter variable refers to 28 countries rather than one of its members even if it is the strongest one. Still NATO presence creates a certain legitimacy different from the US going it alone. As mentioned in the literature before, there are even arguments that favor the institutional secretariats usurpation of control at the expense of member states. Thus, the two variables differ from each other and it is necessary to evaluate them as separate independent variables.

Another variable is 'interest in region/enhance influence'. This variable refers to the country's level of interest in the target country. Certain similar variables in the literature, such as 'seeking major power status' has been incorporated within this

variable in this study. The major power status term found in the literature was not deemed directly applicable to Turkey. However, some aspects of this term are applicable to Turkey, such as regarding the target state as historically or geographically related and important, or seeking further international/regional influence by being part of the coalition.

The ‘risk aversion’ variable is derived from the pilot study of Turkish cases. It is defined as avoidance of risks from participation in the military operation. The ‘decision-making process’ on the other hand needs further clarification. It is a broad term that may focus on many aspects of decision-making discussed in the literature. In the Turkish case, Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution sets out the guidelines for ‘Declaration of State of War and Authorization to Deploy the Armed Forces’ as:

The power to authorize the declaration of a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Thus, the constitution avoids a single person to make the decision for the commitment to use force and pushes a single group or coalition of autonomous actors as the decision-unit and necessitates consensus for the commitment of forces. In this study, the focus in decision-making process will be thus the existence of consensus or dissensus/conflict among the decision makers in the process.

**Table 1: Codebook Summary**

Variable	Coding categories	Indicators/questions	Source
<b><i>Dependent variable:</i></b>			
Coalition behavior	Join coalition/ not join coalition	Does Turkey open airspace/airbase or send combat/non-combat troops? If so then join coalition.	Parliamentary or cabinet decisions
	Weak commitment/ strong commitment	If joins coalition, does Turkey contribute the coalition by logistical support or by sending troops? If open airbase/airspace, then weak commitment. If send combat/non-combat troops, then strong commitment.	
<b><i>Independent variables:</i></b>			
Legitimacy by global institutions (UN)	High/Low	Is there a UNSC resolution that the military intervention relies on? /How influential was the variable in the decision outcome?	UNSC resolutions/ Paired Comparison Analysis
Legitimacy by non-universal institutions (NATO)		Is there a NATO decision that the military intervention relies on?/How influential was the variable in the decision outcome?	NATO decisions/ Paired Comparison Analysis
Alliance dependence		Is the country's dependence on the coalition leader a high priority for the decision-makers?	Paired Comparison Analysis and interview with decision makers
Interest in region/Enhance influence		Is Turkey's interest in target state or enhancing influence a high priority for the decision-makers?	Paired Comparison Analysis and interview with decision makers
Risk aversion		How influential was the risk assessment in operation participation?	Paired Comparison Analysis and interview with decision makers
Decision-making process		Does the process of decision-making result in consensus or dissensus? Does the actors opposing to join coalition convinced by a pivotal actor?/How influential was the variable in the decision outcome?	Paired Comparison Analysis and interview with decision makers
Military capability		Does the country have enough military capability to contribute to operations?//How influential was the variable in the decision outcome?	Paired Comparison Analysis and interview with decision makers

Factors such as public opinion, bureaucratic politics and the election cycle will be examined within this variable when relevant. Finally, the ‘military capability’ variable refers to the country’s military capacity to perform its specific assigned role in the military operation. These variables will be examined in the light of a range of data including interviews with the decision-makers and secondary sources outlined in

the literature above. Information on coding, indicators and the sources of dependent and independent variables are summarized in Table-1.

### **2.6.2 Triangulation of methods**

In this study certain methods will be triangulated to obtain more accurate findings.

Firstly, in order to test the hypothesis, a comparative case study method will be utilized. A comparative case study has the problem of “too many variables and a small number of cases”; yet it has the advantage of providing the ability to “intensely examine” the cases (Lijphart, 1971: 685, 691). Furthermore, if this method is employed prudently, it may go beyond “merely generating initial hypotheses” and may “yield... powerful new insights.” (Rueschemeyer, 2003: 307).

In their practical guide Kaarbo and Beasley argue that lately the “method of structured, focused comparison” as the best way to employ a comparative case study (1999: 377). Thus, the selected cases will be examined with the “method of structured, focused comparisons” derived by George and Bennett. The gist of this approach is presented by George and Bennett as:

The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. (2005: 67).



In this sense, a clear research objective was determined: revealing the reasons behind the different levels of commitment of Turkey to the US-led coalitions. The possible causes are legitimacy by UNSC resolutions, legitimacy by NATO decisions, alliance dependence on coalition leader, interest in region/enhance influence, risk aversion, nature of decision-making process and the level of military capability. Along with these parameters structured questions were asked in each selected case.

#### *2.6.2.1. Paired Comparison Analysis*

In addition to the comparative case study approach, it is important to classify significant and insignificant factors. For this study, it was not possible to ascertain the influence of each variable using regression analysis. Nonetheless, the ranking of perceived influence of the variables by individual decision-makers can be attained. In order to obtain this ranking of variables a sophisticated method of ordering, paired comparison analysis, is used which involves: “a series of paired judgements between objects is made by the respondent on the basis of his preference” (D’Amico, 1969: 125). This method facilitates comparison of “distinct sub-classes” to reach “better sensitivity” in the comparison (Bradley & Terry, 1952: 325).

Therefore, in this study a two-by-two comparison of seven independent variables was made by the decisionmakers (see Table-2). Thus, the respondents make 21 comparisons in all. To ensure robust results in the paired comparison analysis, the independent and dependent variables are defined for the respondents before they

make their paired judgements. Their judgements are collected in a matrix. Along with this matrix the z-scores were obtained for normalizing the distribution.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 2: Paired Comparison Table**

	Legitimacy by NATO	Risk aversion	Interest in region/enhance influence	Decision making process	Alliance dependence	Military capability
Legitimacy by UNSC	More/Less	More/Less	More/Less	More/Less	More/Less	More/Less
Legitimacy by NATO		More/Less	More/Less	More/Less	More/Less	More/Less
Risk aversion			More/Less	More/Less	More/Less	More/Less
Interest in region/enhance influence				More/Less	More/Less	More/Less
Decision making process					More/Less	More/Less
Alliance dependence						More/Less

Finally, the ranking of the variables and the distance between the variables with weights were obtained. In the z-score matrix tables, variables with lower weights are more influential in the decision outcome than variables with higher weights.

#### 2.6.2.2. *Elite Interviews*

The second data collection method was elite interviews. In order to obtain alternative insights on the issue “intensive interviews and in-depth analysis of historical materials” were used (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). This data was gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources comprised official documents, memoirs and exclusive interviews, whilst secondary sources included news sources, particularly the reporting relevant to the decision-making process, and the results of previous research.

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<sup>4</sup> The z-score matrix table of each decision occasion is provided before the detailed evaluation of independent variables. The weights and rankings of the variables are reasserted in the evaluation section of each decision occasion.

Elite interviews have an important place in the study. Random sampling was not employed for the interviewees; rather the subjects were selected by purposive sampling. The interviews followed a semi-structured format, in order to “provide detail, depth, and insider’s perspective while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing” (Leech, 2002: 665). For ethical conduct and “guaranteeing confidentiality” the names of the subjects were not directly disclosed in the study (Mosley, 2013: 15-16). For validity and reliability purposes the interviews were recorded with only a few exceptions, and notes of the non-recorded interviews were kept for revisiting the statements (Mosley, 2013: 24-25). Nonetheless, due to time constraints, re-interviewing in order to check the information gathered could not be achieved except in a few cases.

In order to avoid *subjectivity* and *exaggerated role* attributions by the interviewees, the literature on conducting such semi-structured elite interviews suggests the interviewer be well prepared before the interview and “use multiple sources” (Berry, 2002: 680-681). Hence, the interviews were conducted after preliminary research had taken place involving secondary sources of books and other print media. Major daily newspapers *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* were examined primarily for the news in Turkey during the time periods in question. Thus, the possibility of subjectivity was reduced by using different sources on the same matter and cross checking the information.

Furthermore, there may be a problem of government subjectivity, in that the decision-makers may provide a story that omits any mistakes of the ruling party, or may even

provide biased information favoring the party in power. In order to avoid such bias, sources from the bureaucracy, which are not a part of government, were used to avoid government subjectivity. Nonetheless, it is difficult to claim that data is totally free from subjectivity, yet the strategies employed here were designed to reduce subjectivity to a manageable level. One of the imperfections was the limited number of interviews with high-level bureaucrats from the military. This problem was mainly caused by on-going prosecutions in the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials; some of the former military personnel were detained and others were not comfortable talking, even with an academic researcher.

For this study, a total of 47 elite interviews were conducted. These included the ministers of foreign affairs and defense in office at the time of the decision occasions. In total eight ministers holding these positions were interviewed for eight examined cases. Three of them were ruled out since two of them had passed away prior to this work being undertaken, and one was still active in post. The remaining interviewees consisted of cabinet members and high-level bureaucrats, including undersecretaries of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish ambassadors to the capitals of the target countries, together with US ambassadors to Ankara. Therefore, interviews were carried out with key actors who played a significant role during the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War, and the interviews provided insights and new data for this study.

### **2.6.3 Case selection**

In qualitative research, random sampling for case selection may not give robust results as in quantitative research, since the random sampling may exclude important

cases in qualitative terms (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012: 182; King et al., 1994:126). For this piece of work, case selection was a deliberate process yet, as in random sampling, the qualitative case selection had two main objectives: “firstly, a representative sample and secondly a useful variation on the dimension of theoretical interest” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 296). Thus, the selected cases would provide a basis for generalization and provide theoretical insights.

To achieve both of these particular objectives this study uses *diverse cases* which are compatible with *testing correlational hypotheses* (Rohlfing, 2012: 62). In this study hypotheses emerging from coalition literature with particular focus on Turkey were tested. In diverse cases “achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions” can be achieved (Gerring, 2007: 97). Thus, this study aims for the utmost variation in dependent variable. The variables were categorized and are presented within their categories in Table-3. The key for diversity will be these categories since “where the individual variable of interest is categorical, the identification of diversity is readily apparent” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008 :300). Thus, the cases will include all the coding categories shown in Table-2 and Table-3.

In terms of sampling, the *universe of cases* may be identified as all decision occasions in Turkey on the contribution to US-led interventions after the Cold War. Therefore, these decision occasions may be found within the assembling of military military coalitions for the Persian Gulf War, the Bosnia and Kosovo Intervention, the Afghanistan War, the Iraq War, Libya Intervention and the anti-ISIS coalition. Examining these coalitions, the level of commitment according to type of contribution may be categorized as ‘weak commitment’ with contributions of access

to airspace and airbases; and ‘strong commitment’ with the sending of troops for either combat or non-combat missions. This categorization will automatically be applicable to the ‘join coalition’ and ‘not to join coalition’ categories as well.

From all of the possible cases listed above it would seem that the Iraq War, Gulf War and Afghanistan War have the most diverse decision occasions in terms of dependent variables. Since there is a variance of decision outcomes in these three cases of intervention they allow comparison both across similar cases and within cases.

According to King et al. “selection should allow...at least some variation on the dependent variable” in order to avoid selection bias (1994: 129). Taking the decision occasions of November 2001, October 2003, January 1991, March 20th 2003, December 1990 in descending order of contribution type drawn from these cases, the utmost variation in dependent variable is achieved.

George and Bennett (2005) argue for “control and variation” for the selected cases. Furthermore, when the other three decision occasions of August 1990, January 2002, and March 1st 2003 are added, the observations selected from these three cases, along with certain similarities and a level of variation, enable the study to make both within-case and cross-case comparisons. Due to limited time and resources, eight decision occasions were selected, within these three cases, rather than drawing more decision occasions from the Bosnia, Kosovo or Libya interventions. Thus, in this study the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War cases will be examined.

**Table 3: Case Summary**

<b>Gulf War Coalition Decision Occasions</b>	<b>Afghanistan War Coalition Decision Occasions</b>	<b>Iraq War Coalition Decision Occasions</b>	<b>Contribution Type</b>	<b>Commitment Level</b>	<b>Decision for Joining Coalition</b>
(1) August, 1990			No Contribution	Avoid Joining Coalition	
(2) December, 1990			No Contribution		
		(1) March 1, 2003	No Contribution		
		(2) March 20, 2003	Open Airspace	Weak Commitment	Join Coalition
(3) Jan, 1991			Open Airbases		
		(3) October, 2003	Send Troops for Non-Combat Mission	Strong Commitment	
	(2) January, 2002		Send Troops for Non-Combat Mission		
	(1) November, 2001		Send Troops for Combat Mission		

Three decision occasions will be taken from the First Gulf War, two decision occasions from the Afghanistan War and a further three decision occasions from the Second Gulf War. These decision occasions are set out in Table-3 above and can be summarized as follows: August 12th 1990 when parliament rejected the issue of giving extra powers to the government; December 1990 when it was decided to avoid sending troops to the Gulf War; March 1st 2003 when parliamentary rejection of joining the Iraq War took place; are the three cases Turkey did not join the coalition. The rest of the cases are the ones Turkey joined the coalition. They may be further categorized as 'strong commitment' and 'weak commitment' cases. 'Strong commitment' cases are represented by: November 2001's decision to send troops for combat missions in the Afghanistan War and January 2002's decision to send troops for non-combat missions in Afghanistan, together with the October 2003 decision to send troops for non-combat missions in the Iraq War. Finally, 'weak commitment' cases are found in the January 1991 decision to open airbases in the Gulf War and the March 20th 2003 decision to open airspace for the Iraq War.

Whilst this case selection is not claimed to cover all variances, it is believed that it provides an optimum number of cases to strike a balance between richness and parsimony.



## **CHAPTER III**

### **GULF WAR (1991)**

In this chapter, cases from the Gulf War in 1991 are examined in terms of Turkey's coalition policy with a detailed analysis of three decision occasions. The first decision occasion was the parliamentary vote which took place on August 12th, 1990 and resulted in the government's request for war powers being rejected. The second decision occasion took place in December of the same year, when it was decided not to send troops or ships to join the coalition. The third and final decision occasion was the January 17th, 1991 parliamentary decision to allow access to airbases for coalition forces to use in air operations. These three decision occasions will be examined in detail below.

#### **3.1. Decision Occasion 1: Rejection of Extra Powers (August, 1990)**

Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Turkish National Security Council held an emergency meeting on 2<sup>nd</sup> of August 1990, under the leadership of President

Turgut Özal. This was the first of many such meetings led by Özal throughout the crisis in order to determine Turkey's policy. Some of the cabinet members interviewed, confirmed that Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut was not aware of the most of the calculations made by the President during the crisis, nor did he attend all of the related meetings which were held (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 24, 2013; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013; Cabinet Member III, personal communication, May 22, 2013; ANAP MP I, personal communication, May 23, 2013). Yet, this does not mean that he was not influential in decisions which were taken.

Immediately after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) embargo decision, Özal decided to close the oil pipeline from Iraq. Indeed, Iraq itself had closed one of two such pipelines, with the other working at only 30 – 40% of its capacity. Iraq was not sending oil at full capacity due to the concern that Turkey might keep the oil against the Iraqi government's unpaid debts (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, May 22, 2013; Presidential Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013). The closure decision led to a debate about its timing. It was an early decision in which Turkey played a leading role in encouraging other countries to join the effort (Presidential Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013).

However, there were criticisms about this early decision to act. The decision-makers claimed that it was a pre-emptive move to show solidarity with the coalition, before US Secretary of State James Baker could officially demand such an action. Thus, Turkey took the decision as an independent, sovereign country before pressure could be brought to bear by international actors. As the US Ambassador to Ankara Morton

Abramowitz asserts (personal communication, April 9, 2014) this gesture brought both Özal and Bush as leaders, and Turkey and the US as countries, closer. Secretary Baker himself later admitted during a visit to Turkey that, had Turkey not taken this decision, the coalition forces would have employed a blockade in the Mediterranean to prevent the sale of oil from such pipelines (Güner, 2000: 100).

US Secretary of State, James Baker, visited Turkey on August 9th and asked for three things from Turkey according to then US Ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz. The specific demands were: 1) opening Incirlik airbases to the coalition forces; 2) allocating Turkish troops to south east Turkey across the Iraqi border region; and 3) sending Turkish troops to Saudi Arabia to join the coalition forces (Abramowitz, 2000: 5). In other words, the US wanted Turkey to fully join the coalition forces, and this demand would continue till the end of the crisis (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013; Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 24, 2013).

Allowing coalition ground troops to use Turkish territory for a northern front was ruled out by Özal in the beginning (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, May 22, 2013). This was seen to be more serious than giving access to bases, since it involved giving permission for coalition troops to move into Iraq on land. A similar request would later be rejected by the Turkish parliament on March 1st, 2003 during the Iraq War. In fact it did not become a central issue in the discussions on this crisis. As mentioned before, joining such a coalition necessitates a parliamentary decision since it includes the case of ‘sending Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and allowing foreign troops to be stationed in Turkey’. The government brought forward

a bill (1990) in 126<sup>th</sup> Session to obtain the authorization<sup>5</sup> of parliament for “declaration of war, use of armed forces, sending Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries or allowing other countries’ troops to be stationed on Turkey’s territory.” Nevertheless, this attempt on August 12th 1990 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), ended with an amendment to the bill that did not give any additional authority to the government. The government had to withdraw the bill and bring another one, as a bill cannot be changed after coming to the parliament floor as a device to prevent major political crises (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). Thus, Prime Minister Akbulut managed to amend the bill by adding the statement “in case of a violation against our country with the aim of responding immediately.”<sup>6</sup> This statement limited the ability of the government to solely act only in the case of a direct attack.

Hence, this bill did not empower the government to send troops to join the coalition. According to Mesut Yılmaz, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a prominent figure in the ANAP, the “bill was passed after dilution...the original version of the bill would have given the government the ability to send troops, but the amended version did not include such powers” (Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 424).

As mentioned above this decision outcome will be examined using a paired comparison analysis and also via qualitative data. The paired comparison analysis ranks the seven independent variables according to responses given by the ten main decision-makers. The table below displays the ranking of variables relatively and

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<sup>5</sup> In this particular bill, the government asked for ‘authorization’ rather than ‘permission’ and this led to debate on the difference between these two terms.

<sup>6</sup> The new version of the bill was read after the first vote had taken place in the same parliamentary session.

provides the z-score matrix. Each independent variable will be examined in detail as outlined in the first chapter.

**Table 4: Decision Occasion-1a Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	DM Process	Risk Aversion	UNSC Resolution	Interest/ Influence	NATO Decision	Alliance Dep.	Military Capability
DM Process	0.00	-0.52	1.18	1.18	0.50	3.49	3.49
Risk Aversion	0.52	0.00	1.18	3.49	1.18	3.49	1.18
UNSC Resolution	-1.18	-1.18	0.00	0.52	0.84	0.25	0.00
Interest/ Influence	-1.18	-3.49	-0.52	0.00	0.52	0.25	3.49
NATO Decision	-3.49	-1.18	-0,84	-0,52	0,00	0,00	0,00
Alliance Dep.	-3.49	-3.49	-0.25	-0.25	0.00	0.00	0.00
Military Capability	-3.49	-1.18	0.00	-3.49	0.00	0.00	0.00
Sum	-12.31	-11.04	0.75	0.93	3.04	7.48	8.16
Mean	-1.76	-1.58	0.11	0.13	0.43	1.07	1.17
Weights	0.00	0.18	1.87	1.89	2.19	2.83	2.93
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

According to the paired comparison analysis, the decision-making process and risk aversion variables strongly influence with the lowest weights. The UNSC resolution, interest in the region/enhance influence are clustered as moderately influential. Lastly, the NATO decision, alliance dependence and military capability variables have the least influence on the decision.

### **3.1.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait alarmed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the member countries acted together against this Iraqi violation. UNSC Resolutions 660, 661 and 662 were issued after the incident with the first one, UNSC Resolution 660, emerging on 2nd August 1990. This resolution stated that Iraq's action was a "breach of international peace and security" and called upon Iraq to withdraw and solve its problems with Kuwait through the Arab League.

The Iraqi government refused to cooperate with the international actors, which led to the issue of the second resolution (661) on August 6th 1990. This resolution reiterated the condemnation of Iraq's invasion and interpreted the event as "Iraq has usurped the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait." UNSC Resolution 661 also established an economic embargo on the Iraqi government and, by closing the oil pipelines, Turkey became the first country that complied with this decision of the UNSC.

UNSC Resolution 662 was issued on August 9th, after Iraq declared Kuwait to be its 19<sup>th</sup> province. The resolution determined this action as "null and void" in terms of international law and the resolution also called for all international actors to "refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation."

Thus, before the decision was taken in the Turkish parliament, the three UNSC resolutions had already been issued. These resolutions condemned the Iraqi action, issued an economic embargo on Iraq and warned other countries not to legitimize the

Iraqi violation in order to end the invasion as early as possible. However, these UNSC resolutions did not include any agreement for the use of military force to end the invasion.

In Turkey, one of the concerns of the opposition parties was the absence of such a UNSC resolution, legitimizing military engagement with Iraq. Since the decision was made by the parliament as a whole, the opposition parties in parliament were theoretically among the decision-makers. Examination of the content of opposition party leaders' speeches on the issue, before and during the parliamentary decision, it can be seen that they attached considerable importance to the UN decision, frequently addressing the issue of 'legitimacy'. For instance, the leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), Erdal İnönü (1990), stated:

The most guaranteed way to solve the problem is for the UN to take on the issue and solve it by actions determined by the common will of its members...Otherwise a call by the US and some other Western countries and their intervention may end with their victory, but it will neither contribute to world peace nor international law.

This statement would seem to be in direct opposition to a coalition led by the US taking action without a UN decision. In line with this approach, İnönü declared his support for a UN-led coalition, which he called a "world army" ("İnönü: Irak'a Karşı Dünya Ordusu Kurulsun," 1990; Ekşi, 1990). The other major opposition party, the True Path Party (DYP), also referred to the absence of a UN decision as justification for its opposition. In parliamentary talks in a closed session, DYP leader Süleyman Demirel (1990) declared his opposition to sending troops to Saudi Arabia without a UN decision, even if membership of the European Economic Community was offered in return.

On the other hand, intra-party opposition within the governing party (ANAP) was not primarily referring to the UN decisions. Since this group was mathematically crucial for the change in the bill, their attitude was important. Their primary concern was risk aversion by avoiding war altogether, rather than the mere absence of a UNSC resolution for the use of military force. The legitimacy issue was more than a supporting idea within opposition to the bill, with some of those involved not taking the UNSC decision seriously (ANAP MP I, personal communication, May 23, 2013; Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, May 30, 2013). For instance, according to one ANAP member, whilst there was no UNSC resolution that legitimized the use of force, there was no resolution against it either (personal communication, May 23, 2013). Thus, it was not the primary issue within the decision-making process.

In brief, the decision makers made references to the UNSC resolutions, and they were influential in the decision. The main dynamics were resistance in the cabinet and ruling party, together with their perception of the high risk involved in passing a bill that would authorize government to make a declaration of war. Accordingly, the results of the paired comparison analysis conducted with decision-makers indicate that the UNSC variable is only the third most influential variable in the decision with a moderate influence on the decision outcome, while the decision-making process is the first with the risk aversion variable lying in second place.

### **3.1.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**



NATO, as an institution, took the side of the international actors that opposed the invasion of Kuwait. It reacted against the Iraqi invasion and declared its condemnation of Iraqi aggression. Turkish President Özal “wanted a clear signal from NATO that the alliance would back him if Iraq attacked in retaliation for closing the pipeline...Manfred Wörner (then NATO General Secretary) was confident that the alliance would back him” (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998: 332).

NATO member countries met at a ministerial level summit in Rome on August 10th. During this summit, the member countries did not agree on a NATO-led military coalition against Iraq. The crisis in the Middle East was regarded as ‘out of area’ and the U.S could not convince the other member countries to take any such action (Baykan, 1998: 26).

Nevertheless, NATO did not put any restrictions on member states individually joining a coalition for solving the crisis. Indeed, it could be said that NATO, by virtue of its assurances, rather encouraged action by individual member states, particularly Turkey (Baykan, 1998: 26). At the summit NATO reaffirmed its commitment to Turkey’s security and announced that any Iraqi aggression, would activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which necessitates NATO action to protect its members.

In Turkey, NATO’s declaration of its commitment to Turkey’s security did not create any widespread enthusiasm that would encourage the decision-makers to decide to join the coalition. The decision makers generally regarded NATO as overshadowed by the UNSC decision, and even that was not a primary reason to reject joining the coalition. For instance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Bozer, stated at a NATO ministerial meeting that Turkey does not act in Iraq “as a NATO member having a

border with Iraq or gendarmerie in the region, it rather acts as reflecting a mode of thinking and values that characterize the members of the civilized world” (Bozer, 2011: 747).

Furthermore, these assurances could not convince some members of the cabinet, one of whom disclosed his doubts about NATO’s ability to protect Turkey if the country was attacked from Iraq (Doğan, 1990). Some were even opposed to NATO’s involvement in this issue with one ANAP MP stating: “We did not care about a NATO decision and I think it would have affected Turkey’s image negatively to act with NATO in Iraq” (Ruling Party MP I, personal communication, May 23, 2013).

In brief, NATO did not take a decision to become involved in the crisis by means of a NATO-led coalition, but it did make a commitment to Turkey’s security and allowed member states to be part of an international coalition against Iraq. This position offered incentives to Turkey to join the coalition, whilst reducing doubts about its security. Thus, NATO effectively encouraged Turkey to take part in the operation and facilitated a Turkish decision to be part of the mission without hesitation. However, NATO’s role in this issue was not an influential factor in the decision. The decision-makers did not regard it as an important factor on the decision outcome. According to the paired comparison analysis, the NATO decision was the third least influential factor among the seven operating in the decision.

### **3.1.3. Risk aversion**

Turkey's foreign policy culture and previous cases were discussed during the debates leading to a decision. The opposition argued that Turkish foreign policy did not have irredentist characteristics. Thus, since a classic foreign policy approach would seem to favour aversion to high risk, the bill should have been rejected. The urge to maintain established Turkish foreign policy practice led to the opposition coming out in favor of rejecting the bill (Ardıç, 1990). There were concerns about a change to Atatürk's principle of "Peace at home, peace in the world" and the image of a peaceful and stable Turkey since Atatürk's term (Civaoğlu, 1990).

The risks were not just confined to Turkey's image, as there were concrete material risks in committing itself to the coalition. The first concern was retaliation from Saddam. In this context the perception was that there were no reasons for Saddam to attack Turkey, as long as Turkey did not provoke its neighbor. During the parliamentary debates, Süleyman Demirel (1990) said "Iraq only attacks Turkey, if we anger it." Thus, Turkey should have avoided taking any parliamentary decisions which could have angered Saddam and led to an attack on Turkey.

Some opposition figures such as Deniz Baykal, Deputy Chief of SHP, regarded a support for intervention by Turkey as an "adventure." He said that his party would not "let Turkey be part of an adventure... major powers will send aircraft and warships (from afar) but Turkey with its 50 million population is near the fireplace" ("Baykal: Türkiye Jandarma Olmasın," 1990). Demirel (1990) carried on the use of this rhetoric during the open parliamentary session and said that this action was like: "turning around the fire and we should keep our distance from the fire since it is not an issue of bravery, but it is an issue of adventure."

One of the cabinet members, a member of the governing party and one of the key figures in changing the bill, stated that he “regarded the issue as an existential threat to Turkey” (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). He saw the issue as a huge risk taken for the US, in an issue which did not directly concern Turkey. The two candidates for the ANAP leadership at the upcoming party convention were also opposed to the bill. Mesut Yılmaz declared his reason for opposition to be “the previous version of the bill could be perceived by Iraq as the preparation of a declaration of war against them” since the previous text included a war declaration (“Özal’ın Yetkisine Sınır,” 1990; “Yetki Nasıl İzin Oldu,” 1990). The other candidate, Hasan Celal Güzel, reiterated a similar concern that “the first version would be regarded as Turkey having the intention to fight a war and unnecessarily pinpoint Turkey” (“Güzel’den Özal’a Destek,” 1990).

There were also concerns about the risks during any war and its aftermath. The first concern was the number of casualties in the case of involvement. According to one of the cabinet member:

Estimated casualties were around 35-40,000. This huge number of casualties would be hard to explain, since the majority of the Turkish army was comprised of conscripts. If Turkey did become involved, there was a possibility of becoming trapped in Iraq, and the way out was not clear. Moreover, the cost of war would be heavy and the Turkish economy was not strong enough to provide the necessary funds. All these risks were presented and discussed during the cabinet meeting which

took place prior to the parliament vote. (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 24, 2013).

There were also risks concerning the Turkish economy in general and ethnic problems. Joining a war would have a negative influence on the Turkish economy (“Yetki Nasıl İzin Oldu,” 1990). There were concerns about “panic in the Turkish economy, crisis in the stock market, and speculation in the market” (“Özal Nasıl Frenlendi,” 1990) There were also concerns about the probability of the establishment of a Kurdish state after the overthrow of Saddam (Doğan, 1990). Demirel (1990) pinpointed this issue in closed session parliamentary talks with his statement that: “the southeast of Turkey is uneasy that we are not ready to open a northern front to Iraq.”

Lastly, there were perceived risks about the image of Turkey in the Arab world. Erdal İnönü (1990) in his speech to parliament stated:

Turkey should be above the conflict between Arabs...it should not give the impression of being with one party against the other...it should definitely avoid being seen as a tool of the West (Batının bir aracı) within the solution of the problem.

Süleyman Demirel (1990) mentioned a similar concern with his words: “Why stigmatize Turkey as an enemy in the eyes of some Arab countries after all the efforts to change that image?” He also argued that the difference between sending troops to Korea and sending troops to Iraq, a Muslim country, would be regarded as “Turkey that claims to be a Muslim country, acted with the West and crushed us.” These concerns were shared by some of the members of the ruling party, such as ANAP MP Hasan Celal Güzel, but others were thinking differently. One of the cabinet members

said: “historically Turkey both waged wars on the Arabs and also lived in peace with them” (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). Hence, such concerns should not be seen as highly significant.

There was a tendency to risk aversion by both the opposition parties in the parliament, and also the opposition groups within the ruling party. According to the paired comparison analysis, the risk aversion variable is the second most influential variable in the decision. Indeed the analysis shows that it has an impact factor quite close to the decision-making process variable. Thus, risk aversion variable may be categorized as a strong influence variable. Thus, the decision makers in the cabinet avoided being a party in a war in general, and they also had concerns about the details of such involvement. The opposition party on the other hand, was opposed to the idea of war for both ideological and practical reasons.

#### **3.1.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

Turkey has reasons to be interested in Iraq, in that Iraq is a country which borders on Turkey, and a country in which developments can also affect Turkey. There were also Turkey’s problems with the Kurdish issue. Hence, groups in Northern Iraq seeking to establish an independent Kurdish state were a concern to the Turkish government. Another concern was the PKK terrorist organization using Iraqi territory in order to launch attacks on Turkey.

Nonetheless, these concerns did not directly translate into an intention to enhance influence by joining the coalition. A US military involvement in Iraq was not definite, the policy makers were not yet sure that the US would launch a military operation against Iraq (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). It was too early to pass a bill in parliament authorizing the government to declare war, since such an action would bring unnecessary attention to Turkey. Besides, there was an approach which would meet the concerns by avoidance of joining the coalition and maintaining good relations with the Iraqi people.

In short, Turkey had a clear interest in the region, yet the climate was not ripe for enhancing influence by joining the coalition. According to the decision-makers' ranking in the paired comparison analysis, the 'interest in region/enhance influence' variable is the fourth factor in the decision. Thus, it is clustered with moderate with other variables such as the decision-making process and risk aversion being more influential.

### **3.1.5. Alliance dependence**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the powerful cold war alliance of Turkey and the west, particularly the US, tended to fade. This created concerns in Turkey about its importance in the eyes of its allies, which led to an attempt to highlight the strategic position of Turkey. The Gulf crisis provided an opportunity for Turkey to prove its importance (Çelik, 1999: 77). President Özal would seem to have been especially invested in this idea of Turkey proving its importance (Brown, 2007: 87).

He said: “.....the incident is a pity yet, it is beneficial in terms of revealing Turkey’s role in stability” (Özkök, 1990).

Press reports of Washington’s policies also confirmed the change in the US perspective. For instance, the Hürriyet daily newspaper representative, Sedat Ergin, asserted that “Turkey, a country losing its importance, has again become appealing ... the experts address Turkey as one of the two key countries” (Ergin, 1990). The parliamentarians did not subscribe to this approach though, at least until they were subjected to Özal’s vigorous efforts to convince them following the failure of the bill. Thus, these concerns were not very influential in the outcome of this decision. In brief, the alliance dependency on the coalition leader was a significant factor for some actors, primarily for President Özal who supported joining the coalition. Nevertheless, the opposition in the ruling party that prevented the government obtaining the necessary authorization for involvement, was not influenced by such an idea. According to the paired comparison analysis conducted with the decision-makers, the ‘alliance dependency on coalition leader’ variable was ranked as the second least influential factor in the decision as a low influence variable.

### **3.1.6. Decision-making process**

The bill was prepared by President Özal and given to Prime Minister Akbulut, with the cabinet gathering to debate the issue prior to the parliamentary vote. Some members of the cabinet declared their opposition to the bill in a strong fashion. Indeed, the cabinet members were under public pressure via phone calls, because of a possible decision in favor of going to war. Moreover, people living in the east of the



country began migrating to the west (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, May 29, 2013).

Thus, specific public opposition, or the atmosphere in general, had an influence on cabinet members. Some of them were firmly against the war and they declared their opposition to the bill during the cabinet meeting before the parliamentary vote. There were claims about opposition increasing to the point at which it took the form of threats to withdraw from the cabinet. Thus, rather than a consensus the very character of situation was a dissensus/conflict on the matter. As a result, the Prime Minister decided not to put the bill forward for a vote. Nevertheless, Kamran İnan, as one of the hawks in the cabinet who supported the bill, warned the Prime Minister that the cabinet's inability to decide would be leaked to the press, and people would learn that President Özal had originally prepared the bill (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 24, 2013; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 23, 2013).

Prime Minister Akbulut decided to bring the bill to the parliament floor, but with changes as requested by MPs within the ruling party. Akbulut could not stand up to this opposition or play a pivotal role, indeed, some argued that the Prime Minister did not himself believe in the bill or in joining the coalition (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, May 29, 2013; Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, May 29, 2013). One of the cabinet members solved the issue by adding the phrase of "in case of a violation against our country" which effectively disabled the bill and brought it to the parliament floor. Later prominent figures of the intra-party opposition within the ANAP, namely Mesut Yılmaz, Hasan Celal Güzel,

Yasin Bozkurt and Ülkü Gökcalp Güney, stated that if there had been insistence on presenting the original bill to parliament, it would have been rejected (Civaoğlu, 1990; “Yetki Nasıl İzin Oldu,” 1990; “Güzel’den Özal’a Destek, 1990).

In terms of the authoritative decision unit, there was not a single actor but a group as “an entity of two or more people all of whom interact directly with one another and collectively reach a decision” (Hermann et al., 2001: 133-134). In the decision, the president, cabinet, ruling party and military, were expected to be influential in the decision. Yet, during the parliamentary process, the other actors –primarily the president- were bypassed by the cabinet/ruling party. Thus, the decision was taken by this group of people. President Özal could not play a pivotal actor role in the decision and Yıldırım Akbulut, as Prime Minister, had to try to hit a balance in the cabinet. The proposed way to solve the problem may be regarded as a kind of brokering between the sides and in the end the process ended with an “integrative solution” by changing the bill but bringing it to the parliament floor. (Hermann et al., 2001: 144-145). Consequently, the amended bill passed through parliament, but it did not receive the full support of the governing party. Despite the fact that the party in power, the Motherland Party (ANAP) had 277 MP’s in the Parliament; the bill was passed with the votes of only 216 of these MPs.

In brief, there was a dissensus on the matter and there was not a pivotal actor to bring the group members on board. According to the paired comparison analysis the ‘decision-making process variable’ is a strong factor operating on the result. Thus, respondents agreed that on this occasion this process prevented the bill from passing

through parliament in its original form. The Prime Minister had go for an intergrative solution and agree to amend the bill before sending to the parliament floor.

### **3.1.7. Military capability**

Military capability was a matter of debate throughout the crisis. According to Correlates of War project national material capabilities, in 1990 Turkey's military expenditures were 2,980,000 USD, iron and steel production was 8373 tons, military personnel was 769 thousand (The Correlates of War Project/National Material Capabilities, n.d.). Opposition parties referred to both Iraq and Turkey's respective military capacities in a comparative manner. During the parliamentary talks Süleyman Demirel (1990) disclosed some numbers illustrating Iraqi military power:

Iraq was at war for ten years (to underline military readiness) and has 950,000 troops, 530 aircraft including Mirages and MtGs, 5,400 tanks, 2,300 missiles with a range of 1,200 km, chemical weapons and warheads. It became a power in the region, a power hard to control (zaptedilmesi güç).

Indeed, according to extant intelligence reports, Iraq's military power was greater than Turkey's (Presidential Aide I, personel communication, May 27, 2013).

Nevertheless, this was not an influential issue for ruling party members as most of the decision-makers were so opposed to the idea of a war, that they would not have supported the bill even if Turkey had been in a position of superior military capability. Besides, most of the decision-makers were not aware of specific military capacity, or they tended to over-estimate Turkish military power (Cabinet Member II, personel communication, May 21, 2013). Additionally, some of the decision-makers were basing their calculations on Iraq being a weak opponent, since it would have to

combat the strongest armies in the world (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, May 29, 2013).

In brief, military capacity was not an issue despite the perceived weaknesses. The ‘military capability’ variable was not as influential as the other six factors in the decision-making process. The paired comparison analysis for the first decision occasion indicates that the military capacity variable is the least influential factor in the decision-making process.

### **3.1.8. Evaluation of the decision**

Parliament softly rejected the bill that would have enabled the government to send troops. Members of the cabinet urged the Prime Minister to revise the bill, to produce a format that would be in line with governmental powers already present within the constitution. Although the amended bill was passed by parliament, it could actually be regarded as a rejection of the original format.

Thus, the decision was regarded negatively. One of Turkey’s prominent newspapers, the daily *Hurriyet*, used the headline: “Restriction to Özal’s War Powers” (“Özal’ın Yetkisine Sınır,” 1990). A columnist at the daily *Cumhuriyet* described the change in the bill as a U-turn for the government under the headline: “We Escaped with No Harm” (Arcayürek, 1990). Despite the changes in the bill it was still roundly rejected by the opposition parties, with the SHP taking the decision to the constitutional court, claiming it was actually unconstitutional (“SHP Savaş Yetkisine İtiraz Edecek,” 1990).

When we look at the factors behind this decision, the decision-making process is the most powerful variable. The resistance among cabinet members and ruling party MPs, persuaded the Prime Minister to amend the text of the bill in order to avoid a possible political crisis. Risk aversion comes a close second according to results in the above table. The decision-makers avoided certain risks such as stimulating retaliation from Saddam, harming the image of Turkey, and the risks related to the Kurdish issue. Broadly speaking, the risks of entering into a war were avoided by the decision-makers. The legitimacy by UNSC resolution was the third most influential factor in the decision. The decision-makers were concerned about going further than the international coalition, as this was seen as leading to unnecessarily making Turkey the target of Saddam. In the main, opposition parties in the parliament subscribed to this factor.

The interest in the region/enhance influence and legitimacy by NATO decision variables are less influential on the decision, lying in fourth and fifth places respectively among the total of seven influential factors. The decision-makers did not adopt the idea of joining the coalition in order to have influence on development in the target country, since the war was by no means yet certain, nor was the NATO decision seen to be highly influential. The latter had not only failed to vote in favour of a NATO-lead coalition, but Turkey's decision-makers also had concerns about NATO protection in case of an Iraqi attack.

**Table 5: Decision Occasion-1a Paired Comparison Analysis Summary**

	DM Process	Risk Aversion	UNSC Resolution	Interest/ Influence	NATO Decision	Alliance Dep.	Military Capacity
Weights	0.00	0.18	1.87	1.89	2.19	2.83	2.93
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

According to the paired comparison analysis the least influential variables are ‘alliance dependency’ and ‘military capability’. The decision-makers, primarily the opposition groups within the ANAP, would seem to have regarded a declaration of war on a neighbor as a far too risky move. Thus, despite the views of Özal, they did not take relations with the US as the primary defining factor in their position. Military capability was also not that influential, since the figures and calculations associated with waging a war were not at the center of the debates. Besides, some of the decision-makers were not aware of Turkey’s military capacity: they did not know whether Turkey’s military capacity was sufficient to confront the Iraqi army or not. Thus, this variable was regarded as the least influential one in the decision.

### **3.2. Decision Occasion 2: Özal Refrains from Joining The Coalition (December, 1990)**

According to the then US Ambassador to Turkey, the third request of the US asked that troops be sent as follows: “Turkish battalion to Saudi Arabia to join the allied forces assembling there” (Abramowitz, 2000: 5). This request was made during the US Secretary of State, James Baker’s, visit to Turkey. According to some decision-makers in Turkey, the US request was not limited to merely sending a battalion to

Saudi Arabia, rather it requested that Turkey actively participate in the operation and intervene in Iraq from the north (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 24, 2013; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013; Cabinet Member III, personal communication, May 22, 2013). This request was voiced during President Özal's meeting with Chief of Staff, Colin Powell, and during Prime Minister Akbulut's meeting with Congressman Solarz (Özdemir, 2014: 373-383). Yet, Abramowitz, rejects the idea of opening a northern front and also claims the troop request was more of a cosmetic gesture aimed at showing political support from a Muslim country (personal communication, April 9, 2014).

President Özal's position was in favor of joining the coalition in order to pursue an active foreign policy. It may be argued that, because the President felt that Turkey should be part of the coalition, he tried different ways to make this happen. Thus, all the different scenarios were actually aimed at one target: joining the military coalition (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, June 7, 2013).

One of these possible scenarios featured Turkey opening a northern front using its own military forces against its south eastern neighbor. It is claimed that the US was in favor of Turkey's opening a northern front since such an action would divert Saddam's forces from the south (Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, May 29, 2013). By intervening from the north, Turkey could possibly bring about a change to the land border with Iraq, from its line along the crest of the mountains to somewhere along the foot of the peaks, thus allowing Turkey to better protect this border from terrorist leaks (Ruling Party MP I, personal communication, May 23, 2013). Turkey could also have created a safe zone covering some 40-50 km from the

Turkish border as far as Zaho, in order to prevent the setting up of PKK camps in the area (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, May 29, 2013). Or, as famously claimed yet firmly denied, Turkey could get to Mosul and Kirkuk in order to realize its national pact (*Misak-ı Milli*). Indeed, Özal himself told ANAP MPs that that was a dangerous idea and could be a trap for Turkey (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, May 22, 2013).

After the failed bill on August 12<sup>th</sup>, the government did not have the proper parliamentary authorization to join the coalition. Then Özal changed his mind about opening a northern front and began to talk about other alternatives like troop allocation near the border (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 24, 2013; Efeğil, 2002: 185). After the UNSC Resolution 665 passed on August 25<sup>th</sup>, Özal suggested sending a warship to participate in the blockade (Brown, 2007: 87). Another option was to send a warship, a brigade, or even just a group of military officers, to join the coalition (President Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013; Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, May 29, 2013). Özal toyed with these ideas and placed them on the agenda.

Özal, in his speech at the opening of parliament on September 1<sup>st</sup>, suggested that parliament should pass a bill on the issue. In order to facilitate the passing of such a bill, Özal talked with ANAP MPs in groups (President Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013). The government brought the new bill to the floor of parliament on 5<sup>th</sup> October. The text of the bill suggests that the motivation was to “avoid a situation from which it may be hard to recover by the use of agile and dynamic policy.” According to the bill, the government would determine the



“necessity, limits and scope” of the operation. Another difference from the previous bill was that this time it was asking for ‘permission’ rather than ‘authorization’.<sup>7</sup> The bill was passed by parliament with 246 supporting votes easily defeating the 134 who voted against. Even so, the Turkish authorities stipulated a UN resolution for the authorization of the use of force as a pre-condition for active military involvement in the crisis (Pope, 1990).

In November, US Secretary Baker made a trip to the region and one of his stops was Ankara. Baker talked about the high possibility of the US seeking UN authorization for the use of force. After his meeting with Özal, Baker declared that “It's very important that when the United Nations takes action . . . that those resolutions and actions be implemented” (“US to Add Two Divisions to Gulf Force,” 1990). Thus, Baker reiterated his request for support after the UN resolution.

The decision about sending troops was made at the end of November or early December. In his memoirs, Bush mentions that after Baker’s visit to Turkey, Özal “wanted a further UN resolution and agreed to think about sending an armored brigade to Saudi Arabia” (2003: 403). Necip Torumtay confirms this with his words that: “the issue was discussed only one time at the end of November and the discussion was inconclusive” (Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 432). Lastly, but exhibiting a very cautious stance, Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut announced the possibility of sending troops only, in early December (“Turk Ready to Help US,” 1990).

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<sup>7</sup> The parliamentary records of 18th parliament, Vol. 47, 4<sup>th</sup> Year, 3<sup>rd</sup> Session (October 5th, 1990).

**Table 6: Decision Occasion-1b Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	DM process	Risk aversion	Military capability	UNSC res.	Interest/ Influence	NATO decision	Alliance dep.
DM process	0.00	0.25	1.18	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49
Risk aversion	-0.25	0.00	0.84	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49
Military capability	-1.18	-0.84	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.00
UNSC resolution	-3.49	-3.49	-0.25	0.00	0.52	0.25	0.00
Interest/ Influence	-3.49	-3.49	-0.25	-0.52	0.00	0.00	0.52
NATO decision	-3.49	-3.49	-0.25	-0.25	0.00	0.00	0.25
Alliance Dep.	-3.49	-3.49	0.00	0.00	-0.52	-0.25	0.00
Sum	-15.39	-14.55	1.27	6.46	7.23	7.23	7.75
Mean	-2.20	-2.08	0.18	0.92	1.03	1.03	1.11
Weights	0.00	0.12	2.38	3.12	3.23	3.23	3.31
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Despite Özal’s eagerness to join the coalition forces by sending troops, resistance and strong opposition to the policy, especially in military and government circles, prevented Özal from achieving this aim (Borowiec, 1990). Thus, Özal did/could not use the agreement reached in parliament to join the coalition via sending troops. The ranking of the independent variables within the paired comparison analysis in the context of this second decision occasion, and relevant explanation, is provided in Table 6.

Thus, the decision-making process and risk aversion variables are strongly influential with the lowest weights. Since these two variables do not have a significant difference, they could be evaluated together as the most important variables without ranking between them. The legitimacy by UNSC resolution, interest in the region/enhance influence, NATO decision, and alliance dependence to coalition and military capability factors can be clustered together as low influence variables.

### **3.2.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

After resolutions 660, 661 and 662 outlined above, the United Nations' Security Council continued to keep Iraq on its agenda and issued other resolutions. The Council issued resolution 664 on August 18th, 1990 which was mainly focused on the "well-being of third-state nationals in Iraq and in Kuwait" as a response to letters from various countries such as Italy, Spain and Belgium.

Adopted on August 25th, 1990, resolution 665 was aimed at preventing the Iraqi government from "using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil" and it asks for the assistance of member states. Resolution 666, intended to relieve the situation of civilians in Iraq and Kuwait. It was adopted on 13<sup>th</sup> September, 1990 and opened the path for food supplies, in a restricted manner, to reach civilians in need especially the most vulnerable groups of women, elderly people and children. This resolution also declared that medical supply to the country was not covered by the economic sanctions.

Resolution 667 issued on September 16<sup>th</sup> mainly concerned the diplomatic missions in Kuwait and their personnel. The UN Security Council condemned the violations of the Iraqi government. Resolution 669 was issued at the particular request of the government of Jordan due to the negative influence of sanctions. Resolution 670 was issued next to ensure the application of the economic sanctions imposed by resolution 661. This resolution calls for “all necessary means being applied to the strict and complete application” of the economic sanctions with a particular reference to flights and shipments to Iraq. Resolution 674 adopted on September 24<sup>th</sup>, 1990 reaffirmed the previous decisions, reminded all of the Iraqi government’s obligations and demanded action, especially in the matter of third country nationals.

Resolution 678 was adopted on November 29<sup>th</sup>, 1990. This differed from the previous resolutions in that it gave a certain period of time to the Iraqi government to comply with all relevant resolutions, and authorized member states “to use all necessary means” to implement Resolution 660, which referred to unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait with a deadline of January 15<sup>th</sup>, 1991.

Resolutions 665 and 678 were both significant resolutions. Firstly, Resolution 665 gave the US blockade a legal backing (Brown, 2007: 87). Resolution 678 openly stated that the Iraqi government would face a forceful reaction, unless it acted accordingly. Thus, this was a clear signal for use of force legitimized by the UN Security Council after a certain date.

In Turkey, following this UNSC resolution, the decision-makers were considering joining the coalition. Prior to the adoption of the resolution, President Özal had told

U.S Secretary of State Baker that “If there will be a military operation against Iraq, Turkey prefers it to happen under the banner of the UN” (“Ankara’dan Şartlı Destek,” 1990). Furthermore, Turkish Prime Minister Akbulut reiterated a similar approach in which a “possible intervention should be under the UN umbrella” (“BM’siz Savaş Olmaz,” 1990). Thus, the Turkish position was determined, the country would wait for a UN decision before making a decision on whether or not to join the coalition. It was a necessary, but on its own not a sufficient, condition for joining the coalition.

Nonetheless, as a significant symbolic move, the Turkish Chief of Staff, Necip Torumtay, resigned right after the adoption of this UNSC resolution. One of the Generals, Doğan Bayezit, then explained: “the commanders make their decisions with precise timing.” Thus, it is claimed that the Chief of Staff resigned due to the increasing possibility of requests to send troops after the adoption of the UN resolution (Sazak, 1990a). In this regard, the decision-making process hindered the possibility of sending troops in any form.

In summary, the last UNSC resolution provided a legitimate base for the use of force in case Iraq refused to abide by the conditions of previous resolutions. For the decision-makers the UN legitimacy was an important condition for joining the coalition, but not on its own a sufficient one. According to the paired comparison analysis, the UNSC resolution is the fourth ranking variable in the outcome with low influence, coming after the strong and moderate variables of decision-making process, risk aversion and military capability.

### **3.2.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**

NATO summits were instrumental in debating the crisis and requesting help from the member countries. During the Helsinki Summit held 10<sup>th</sup> – 11<sup>th</sup> September, there was a demand for troops from each ally even in symbolic terms. Yet, in terms of Turkey, US Secretary of State, James Baker, stated: “U.S troops are located in Saudi Arabia and since Turkey is the northern neighbor of Iraq its troops are located on its own territory.” In this context, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Bozer, said: “Turkey may be regarded as a country having troops in the region” (“Körfeze Asker Çağrısı,” 1990). Thus, at this stage, there was no insistence on Turkey sending troops to Saudi Arabia; later the coalition was not satisfied with this level of involvement.

NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner (1990), made a speech in Brussels, in which he responded to the US criticisms of NATO, declaring solidarity against the Iraqi action, defending the organizational actions that had endorsed the enforcement of the UN resolutions and also acted as a deterrent to the Iraqi threat. Furthermore, the Secretary General (1990) made an unofficial call for member countries to “send ground troops to the Gulf as suggested by the United States of America.”

On December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1990 NATO issued an official release on the Gulf Crisis. The statement put NATO on the same side as the UN, but there was no reference to collective action against Iraq. There were statements about individual members’ contribution according to the UN resolutions. These contributions included assistance on the implementation of the economic sanctions, and the use of force in case Iraq did not comply with UN Resolution 678. The release also referred to the bordering

country Turkey, and pledged the solidarity of NATO to defend Turkey in case of Iraqi aggression.

The NATO role was to encourage its members to be part of the coalition.

Specifically, in terms of Turkey, there were NATO guarantees that facilitated Turkey sending troops without hesitation in the case of finding itself alone against an Iraqi attack. Nevertheless, despite all the statements from the NATO Secretary General (1990), and debates at the summits in which allies were encouraged to be part of the coalition, there is no reference for a NATO organizational decision to use force against Iraq.

In Turkey, the role of NATO was not an important factor in the decision. The paired comparison analysis conducted from the responses of the decision-makers indicates that NATO played a minimal role in the decision. According to the analysis the NATO decision variable is the second least influential factor, followed by interest in region/enhance influence as the least important variable. Thus, whilst security assurances were important, in terms of actually joining the coalition, NATO was not high on the list of influential factors according to the decision-makers.

### **3.2.3. Risk aversion**

Joining the military coalition had risks for Turkey, especially in the case of adopting the northern front option. This was further complicated by the fact that the Turkish armed forces were structured for defense purposes, and did not have plans for

offensive operations. Therefore, putting pressure on the military for an unprepared operation would entail unforeseeable risks (Military Bureucrat I, personal communication, October 5, 2013). Indeed, the military was primarily regarding the operation itself as taking an unnecessary risk. According to one of the cabinet members, the Turkish armed forces' main concern was that the: "Middle East is a swamp and the one who enters loses" and cannot get back. Thus, they thought Turkey should refrain from being part of any such coalition (Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, May 29, 2013; M. Abramowitz, personal communication, April 9, 2014).

President Özal had convinced the civilian leaders of the necessity of involvement, hence the possible risks involved were mainly voiced by the military. Military circles were opposed to all possible scenarios related to joining the coalition. They were even against sending military officers to operational headquarters, believing such visits could result in Turkey being perceived as a member of the coalition (Presidentai Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013).

The Chief of Staff, Necip Torumtay, as a key figure in the decision not to send troops, gave details of the risk analysis of sending troops and opening a second front. He referred to the risk of moving troops from their normal location which could have made Turkey vulnerable to a Soviet or PKK attack, and stated that another important risk was that "there would be casualties" (Birand & Yalçın, 2001:431-432). He declared his personal position of not being a party to the war, and made reference to the disastrous results for the Ottomans following their involvement in the First World



War, an involvement that emerged from adventurist policies (Torumtay, 1994:117-126).

In short, the decision-makers perceived risks which they felt were important.

Primarily in military circles voices were raised about taking unnecessary risk. Since the military was influential in the abortion of the process, their risk assessments were also influential. According to the paired comparison analysis conducted to determine the ranking of the variables influential in the decision, the risk aversion variable is a strong influence variable along with the decision making process.

#### **3.2.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

The developments in Iraq would clearly have certain effects on Turkey. President Özal had concerns about Saddam's military power based on oil revenue, and aimed to hamper Iraq's economy to prevent the re-emergence of such a threat (Özdemir, 2014: 389). Furthermore, any changes in the status of the Northern Iraq, or the involvement of other countries in the region, could be crucial developments for Turkey (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, May 29, 2013). Thus, those decision-makers in favor of joining the operation, subscribed to the idea that being part of the coalition would better protect Turkey's interests in the region.

The main defender of this position was President Turgut Özal. In his opening speech for 18th Legislative Term and 4th Legislative Year on 1st of September 1990

President Özal, stated the reasons for joining the coalition as:

We may not disregard the effects of developments during the Gulf crisis and the aftermath of changes to our country. Thus, we need to pursue a dynamic policy in order to be in a position to influence the developments...

He was arguing that one way or another there would be a vacuum of power in northern Iraq, with Özal's motivation for joining the coalition being his aim to put Turkey in a position to fill that vacuum of authority. Only by joining the coalition and sharing the burden of military action could that be achieved (Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, May 29, 2013). Özal wanted to be at the peace table after the war, and the West could exclude Turkey from such talks if it had avoided joining the coalition (Presidential Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013). As the decision was not in line with Özal's expectations, it is hard to claim this variable to be highly influential in the decision.

Briefly, the decision-makers were interested in the region mainly due to the fragile position of Northern Iraq and its possible negative security implications for Turkey. Supporters of the bill seemingly regarded joining the coalition as a way to influence the development in Turkey's favor. Nonetheless, this perspective did not prevail in terms of the outcome, and the decision was to avoid joining the coalition. According to the paired comparison analysis the 'interest in region/enhance influence' variable is the second least influential variable with the NATO decision in last place. It is among low influence variables.

### **3.2.5. Alliance dependence**

Turkey was dependent on the US for several reasons and feared from abandonment; nevertheless, this factor was not influential on this decision occasion. Turkey's dependency on the US included areas such as the economy, security and the defense industry, all of which could be seen as critical given the circumstances (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, May 29, 2013). The end of the Cold War increased Turkey's concerns about its ability to obtain the attention and support of the US. Thus, the Gulf War was regarded as an opportunity to regain the lost attention (Efegil, 2002). President Özal argued that Turkey's moving with its ally at this difficult time would be reciprocated by US support and help if Turkey faced difficulties (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, June 7, 2013).

Turkey's dependence on the US was not confined to defense and economy issues. Some important figures claimed that Özal was concerned about Turkish domestic policy as well. The alliance was based on military co-operation and the situation was causing imbalances in Turkey's democracy. During the Gulf Crisis Özal wanted to: "take foreign policy decision-making away from the military establishment" (Çelik, 1999: 87). Özal wanted to be closer to the US by joining the coalition in order to empower civilians against the military in the country (Ruling Party MP I, personal communication, May 23, 2013). Özal's Principal Advisor, Fevzi İşbaşaran (2013) confirms this attitude and claims that after Özal's failure to join the coalition, the US contacted the military directly rather than involve civilians again. Nevertheless, Özal failed to take the decision to join the military coalition.

In brief, Turkey was dependent to the US and feared abandonment. It had dependencies on its ally in certain areas but these dependencies were not influential

on this particular decision occasion. The decision was taken to avoid joining the military coalition. According to the paired comparison analysis the alliance dependency variable is the least influential factor in the decision.

### **3.2.6. Decision making process**

In order to act on the issue the government first needed permission from parliament. Since the previous bill failed to pass, and thus the government was not authorized to send troops without direct Iraqi aggression against Turkey, another bill was prepared. President Özal (1990) mentioned the need for the bill in his parliament opening speech, when he stated: “I suggest you give the necessary permission other than the declaration of war mentioned in Article 92.”

As stated above, the President’s aim was to ensure a seat at the peace table after the war and, in order to achieve this goal, he saw a necessity to be part of the war one way or another. Thus, he requested help to be able to sit at the peace table (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, May 29, 2013). He talked to the parliamentarians in groups to persuade them to vote in favor of the bill, in this he was successful. The government brought the new bill to the parliament floor on 5<sup>th</sup> of October and this second bill was passed by parliament with 246 supporting votes and only 134 against.

After having thus acquired permission from parliament, the decision to join the coalition still needed agreement from different actors. According to one of the cabinet members, the main decision makers were: the president, the prime minister and the

military. Since these are separate actors involved in making the decision, the decision-making unit was actually a coalition and there were no established rules for decision-making.

As mentioned above the President was in favor of joining the coalition, nevertheless the other actors were against it. According to one of the cabinet members, “Özal wanted to enter Northern Iraq, Akbulut and the Turkish General Staff were against it. In the end, Özal failed to achieve his goal” (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 439; Ruling Party MP I, personal communication, May 23, 2013).

Özal was a successor of military rule and it is important to acknowledge that Turkey was a country where the civil-military balance was heavily in favor of the military. The military’s position was avoiding what they called the “Middle East swamp” as mentioned above. The military did not respond positively to the idea of Turkey opening a northern front. They were not even in favor of a military exercise near the Iraqi border, which Özal thought would give a clear message by virtue of its: “use of force short of war” (President Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013). Besides, it was discussed in the cabinet that they were not even leaning towards allocating troops near to the Iraqi border (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, May 29, 2013).

The Chief of Staff, Necip Torumtay, resigned on 3<sup>rd</sup> December without clearly explaining the reasons behind his action but later the disagreement on the coalition participation revealed. Indeed, the resignations of the Minister of Defense, Safa Giray, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Bozer, were also connected to the

disagreement on joining the coalition (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, May 29, 2013). Nevertheless, the most shocking was General Torumtay's resignation, a fact that was reflected in the Turkish media's handling of this news, portraying it as a "warning", or an "ultimatum" or even a "memorandum" ("Uyarı Gibi İstifa," 1990; "Ültimeatom Gibi İstifa," 1990; "Muhtıra Gibi İstifa," 1990).

It was claimed that the resignation was mainly because of President Özal's openly-stated desire to send troops, and the totally different perspective of the Chief of Staff (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, May 29, 2013; "Ankara'da Tartılışan 6 Neden," 1990; "Org. Torumtay'dan Şok Karar," 1990). The Turkish General Staff prepared a directive that was not in line with the views of President Özal, and he prepared the text of a directive disregarding the General Staff's approach, and signed it for implementation (Özdemir, 2014; High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, December 4, 2013; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). At the time of this move the Chief of Staff resigned. Since the military were not in a position to in any way act against the civilian president, they reacted in a 'passive' manner in order to prevent the sending of troops. They claimed the replacement to the post of Chief of Staff would not let the president send troops either (Bila, 1990; Sazak, 1990b; "Turkish Military Chief," 1990).

At the time of his resignation, General Torumtay publicly refuted all the claims related to reasons behind his action. Years later in his memoirs he inherently accepts that his resignation came about due to his divergence from the President on the issue of sending troops. Outside observers claimed the divergence was due to a dislike of Özal's meddlesome approach to military affairs and phobia about involvement with

Arab countries (M. Abramowitz, personal communication, April 9, 2014). Torumtay (1994) affirms that the fact that he did not agree with the president on military matters, eventually caused the resignation. He declared his position of not being a party to the war, referring to Atatürk's way of describing war as "murder without necessity" (Torumtay, 1994: 129).

One of the cabinet members thinks that Torumtay's resignation was an international signal that the military was opposed to sending troops and "the resignation killed the idea of sending troops" (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). Özal's statements after the resignation confirmed the claims about a rift over the sending of troops. Özal said, "Some generals are not able to catch my policies. They act in a status quo preserving manner and put the brakes on our brave moves... Generals should be prepared for all possibilities" ("Otorite Çatışması," 1990).

The other important actor against sending troops was Yıldırım Akbulut. He asserted:

What would be our contribution to the coalition? We could send a brigade ..... or a Navy force..... or open a northern front... I as the Prime Minister, along with the cabinet, reiterated to Özal and to the media that we will never do such a thing. We declared to the public, we said to him: it is impossible for us to open a northern front. (Birand & Yalçın, 2001 :435).

Prime Minister Akbulut also says he is committed to keeping Turkey at a distance from war and he kept his promise (Cevizoglu, 2003). For the other options, it could be stated that no actor took the idea of sending troops or warships to Saudi Arabia seriously, except for Özal (President Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013). Actually, neither was the issue of sending troops to Saudi Arabia discussed in cabinet meetings nor did the Prime Minister place it on his agenda (Cabinet Member VII,

personal communication, May 29, 2013). According to one cabinet member it is not possible to direct people by ‘remote control’; despite his low profile image, Yıldırım Akbulut resisted joining the coalition in all ways other than agreeing access to airbases (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013).

In terms of decision unit analysis, in the “absence of any single group or actor with the political authority to commit the state in international affairs”, the decision unit is defined as a “coalition of autonomous actors” (Hagan et al., 2001: 169). In this decision occasion the president, prime minister and the military involved in the decisionmaking process as a coalition of autonomous actors. The president could not play a pivotal role and convince the other parties. Indeed, the Chief of Staff had resigned and Prime Minister maintained his opposition. Thus, the president decided to not to join the coalition with a “broad compromise” (Hagan et al., 2001: 180).

In short, the most powerful factor behind the decision is lack of consensus among the decision-makers. The President could not play a pivotal role and the process ended in broad compromise with him abandoning the idea to join coalition due to the opposition of the Chief of Staff and Prime Minister. Yet, as said by most of the decision-makers, the Chief of Staff was more influential than the Prime Minister. The paired comparison analysis confirms the role of the decision-making process, when it shows that the decision-making process was the most influential factor in the decision.



### **3.2.7. Military capability**

There were problems with the military's capacity to conduct the operation that President Özal envisioned. This military capability issue became more apparent, over time becoming central to the debate, due to negative comments on their ability made by military officers themselves. It would seem that the structure of the military was not designed for an offensive operation, the army did not have the necessary plans in place nor was it in a state of readiness for such an operation (Military Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 5, 2013; Military Bureaucrat II, personal communication, November 6, 2013).

There were even problems in the allocation of troops and their vehicles near the border. There were no proper vehicles to transport tanks to the eastern border (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, December 4, 2013). Furthermore, the Turkish military might was inferior to its Iraqi equivalent. The capability of Turkey, and the demands being made of Turkey, was another issue of debate. Opposition leaders were claiming that sending troops would be punching above the country's weight, after they learned from the Turkish Armed forces' briefings that Iraq had superior military power in comparison to Turkey (Kutay, 1990).

According to one cabinet member there were concerns about the economic burden in general, and in particular finding sufficient funds to send troops or a warship. He stated that there would be heavy costs both in terms of personnel wages and, more importantly, high material costs for weapons and missiles used in the case of an attack (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 24, 2013).

To summarise, the military capability issue played somewhat a role on this decision occasion. The military commanders were hesitant about conducting an offensive operation against Iraq, and looking at the reality on the ground their concerns were not baseless. According to the paired comparison analysis the military capability variable was the third influential factor in the decision to avoid joining the coalition, with the decision-making process and risk aversion lying in first and second places respectively. Yet, military capability still categorized as a low influence variable due to the high weight.

### 3.2.8. Evaluation of the decision

In the end Turkey did not join the coalition by sending troops. When the operation was over, Özal declared his regrets about not sending troops to the battle. He said: “Our commanders could have seen the high tech devices and learned about war in the battlefields” (“Keşke Biz de Gönderseydik,” 1991). Interestingly, the current US Ambassador to Ankara claims the inability did not cause a negative reaction from the US side, and actually they were content with the overall contribution of Turkey (M. Abramowitz, personal communication, April 9, 2014).

**Table 7: Decision Occasion-1b Paired Comparison Analysis Summary**

	DM process	Risk aversion	Military capability	UNSC res.	Interest/influence	NATO decision	Alliance dep.
Weights	0.00	0.12	2.38	3.12	3.23	3.23	3.31
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In terms of evaluation, the paired comparison analysis clearly shows that the decision-making process is the most powerful factor in the decision. The opposition of the military is highlighted as the main reason for this decision. During the decision-making process the resignation of the Chief of Staff had an important influence on the process, together with the Prime Minister's opposition.

Following closely behind the decision-making process, risk aversion would also seem to play a significant role in this decision. One member of the cabinet claimed that risk aversion was the main reason behind the decision, rather than the resignation of the Chief of Staff. He asserted that if the decision had been made, the resignation would not have prevented its implementation (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, June 7, 2013). Thus, these two variables strongly influence the decision outcome.

Inadequate military capability is the third influential variable in the decision. This lack of capacity can be traced to the actual structure of the military, together with the fact that it is designed to function for defensive purposes. This situation raised concerns of inability to take a successful role within an offensive operation, or at the least face possible problems due to inexperience. This issue was also advocated by the military itself.

Lastly, the four other low influence factors: legitimacy by UNSC resolution, interest in the region/enhance influence, legitimacy by NATO decision and alliance dependence to coalition leader; are less influential variables. Since these variables were espoused by decision-makers that favored joining the coalition, they come after

the variables that seem to be against joining. Despite clear UNSC legitimacy and concerns about Northern Iraq, the UNSC resolution and interest in the region variables did not influence the end result. Despite NATO as an institution having encouraged Turkey to join the coalition, not to mention Turkey's dependency on the US, these variables were not deemed important at all in comparison to other variables playing a part in the decision.

### **3.3. Decision Occasion 3: Decision To Open Military Bases (January, 1991)**

The use of İncirlik airbase was on the table from the beginning of the Gulf Crisis. However, serious debate about the issue only began towards the end of November, when President Bush mentioned this issue alongside that of the Egyptian bases. He said both country leaders were not objecting to the presence of US aircraft at bases on their territory. Nevertheless, they did have concerns about the public reaction to their use for bombardment in Iraq (Bush & Scowcroft, 1998: 403). In the light of these concerns, Turkey requested the US to push for a UN decision on the issue (President Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013).

Indeed, in legal terms there was no need of another parliamentary decision for opening bases for the coalition forces. Özal was fully backing this position, but the Prime Minister, Yıldırım Akbulut, had a different perspective. Akbulut claimed that the previous bill solely gave permission for logistical use of military bases. He claimed: “there is no authorization for foreign troops to use our bases and go to Iraq (for bombardment)” (Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 438). Thus, there was a need for either another bill to be passed by parliament, and/or additional agreement with the US on

the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement signed in 1980 (Bölme, 2012: 336).

The government could actually have given permission for the bases to be used within the terms of the UNSC resolution, but it wanted to bring the issue to parliament and secured the President's agreement to this proposal ("Akbulut Özal'ı Yetki İstemeye Mecbur Etti," 1991). Hence, the government was aware that the bill was actually unnecessary in legal terms. Some members of cabinet claimed that the parliamentary bill was mainly a symbolic declaration of Turkey's position in the war. They think the bill was for legitimacy (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013; Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, May 29, 2013).

The US Ambassador to Ankara, Abramowitz, mentioned his late night communication with Turgut Özal about use of Turkish airspace and airbases. Özal approved the coalition forces' use of Turkish airspace; for use of the bases he mentioned the need for a parliamentary decision, and was confident this would take place (Abramowitz, 2000: 5).

The government brought a new bill on January 17th, 1991. The bill differed from the previous one in two ways. Firstly, it was enabling the government to decide the "time" alongside the "necessity, limits and scope" as in the previous bill. Thus, the new bill was providing more powers. Secondly the bill was giving permission to "use" the "Turkish troops sent to other countries and foreign troops stationed on Turkish territory." As Özal expected, the Turkish Parliament accepted the

government's request for permission. The bill was passed with 250 supporting votes against 148 opposing.

**Table 8: Decision Occasion-1c Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	UNSC res.	Alliance dep.	Risk aversion	Interest/ influence	NATO decision	DM process	Military capacity
UNSC resolution	0.00	0.25	0.84	0.84	3.49	1.18	3.49
Alliance dep.	-0.25	0.00	1.18	1.18	0.84	3.49	1.18
Risk aversion	-0.84	-1.18	0.00	0.25	0.52	0.84	3.49
Interest/ influence	-0.84	-1.18	-0.25	0.00	0.52	0.84	1.18
NATO decision	-3.49	-0.84	-0.52	-0.52	0.00	0.84	1.18
DM process	-1.18	-3.49	-0.84	-0.84	-0.84	0.00	1.18
Military capability	-3.49	-1.18	-3.49	-1.18	-1.18	-1.18	0.00
Sum	-10.09	-7.62	-3.08	-0.27	3.35	6.01	11.70
Mean	-1.44	-1.09	-0.44	-0.04	0.48	0.86	1.67
Weights	0.00	0.35	1.00	1.40	1.92	2.30	3.11
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The paired comparison analysis ranks the influence level of the independent variables at Table 8. According to the findings, legitimacy by UNSC resolution and alliance dependence are top influence variables by the decision-makers. Military capability selected as the least influential variable. This ranking and the details of each variable will be explained in details below.

### **3.3.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

UNSC Resolution 678 set a deadline of January 15th, 1991 for the government of Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council decisions and withdraw its forces from Kuwait. However, the Iraqi government did not abide by the resolution during the given time period. All diplomatic efforts were to no avail, in particular the last two approaches called ‘one last attempt’ and ‘one last hope’. One last attempt was negotiation between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iraq and the US: Tarik Aziz and James Baker respectively. One last hope refers to attempts by the UN Secretary, General Javier Perez de Cuellar. Both of them failed right before the given deadline (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, November 1, 2013). This negative response by the Iraqi Government empowered the coalition to use all necessary means, including the use of force, to act on behalf of the UN, and restore matters to conditions that had pertained before the Iraqi invasion.

The UN Security Council decision was important in Turkey in terms of legitimacy. In order to attain this legitimacy President Özal talked with US President Bush on the necessity for a UNSC Resolution. The Turkish President said:

You will ask for the use of the Incirlik airbases. There is a strong and rigid opposition in our country which makes it hard to respond to your requests in a positive way. It is better that you pass a resolution in the UN. (President Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013).

This position can also be seen within the official statements at that time. During the decision making process the Prime Minister, Yıldırım Akbulut, referred to the need for a UN resolution when he stated: “It would not be right to give permission for the

use of Incirlik Base without a UN decision. Yet, along with the UN decision it becomes legitimate” (“Özal: Savaşa Girebiliriz,” 1991). After the resolution was in place, President Özal reassured the public about the rightness of the decision referring to the UN decision as follows: “Turkey acted in line with the UN decision in an honest way and this action has generated great respect for the country” (“Özal Son Sözüünü Söyledi,” 1991).

Opposition leader Erdal İnönü in his speech at parliament (1991) criticized the UN inability to solve the problem without the use of force, and stated that: “there is the weakness of the UN in this issue” referring to the inability to solve the issue through diplomatic channels. Nonetheless, he himself had based his arguments on the same UNSC resolution. Indeed, both İnönü and Demirel in their speeches in parliament (1991) mentioned the resolution wording of “appropriate support” in order to make their point about the unnecessary giving of logistical support.

Since Russia and the US were sharing similar views, a very different situation from the previous crises, it behoved the UN Security Council to take decisions. This legitimacy mobilized a broad-based coalition including Arab countries. Özal’s perception was that nearly the whole world was against Saddam, and that Turkey should not be excluded from this movement (Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, May 29, 2013; President Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013). Thus, the UNSC resolution was important in Turkey’s decision to open the military bases, since the decision-makers in Turkey did not want to be at odds with a legitimate Western coalition.



In short, the UNSC resolutions had the most powerful impact on the decision-makers. This is confirmed by the paired comparison analysis conducted with decision-makers. The legitimacy of the UN brought a broad coalition against Saddam Hussein, and Turkey did not want to be totally excluded from this coalition.

### **3.3.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**

There still was no NATO decision to actively send troops into battle throughout the crisis. Thus, NATO's position on the Gulf crisis had not changed. However, the encouragement continued and NATO decisions and assurances that facilitated countries' joining the coalition were substantiated. Before the decision in the Turkish parliament, NATO sent Allied Command Europe mobile forces to deter an Iraqi aggression, and show solidarity to the alliance. As NATO Spokesman asserted (1991), the alliance decided to "deploy to South East Turkey the air component of the AMF (Allied Mobile Force) consisting of aircraft from the Belgian, German and Italian air forces, to demonstrate the collective solidarity and determination of the alliance."

These devices were supposed to be deployed on the 6<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> of January, 1991. In line with a request from the Turkish government, NATO also provided navy forces to cruise in the Mediterranean in order to deter Syria ("NATO'dan Şimdi de Deniz Gücü İstedik," 1991). However, the weapons and aircraft delivered for this purpose were not as sophisticated as the Turkish government had requested. The aircraft had been mostly used for training purposes or they were machines with limited abilities. The Turkish media claimed that the authorities did not welcome obsolete aircraft such as

Alpha-Jet Mirage 200s and MB-339s instead of F-16s and Tornados (“Çevik Değil Çürük Kuvvet,” 1991).

However, other voices put forward a different argument. They claimed that the NATO moves were more symbolic, rather than aimed at truly providing an excellent defence for Turkey. In his speech at parliament on January 15, 1991 Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, along with empowering the Turkish defense capability “NATO forces gave a message to third parties, including Iraq, that the alliance is with Turkey.” President Özal referred to the NATO forces as “purely symbolic” to say “If Iraq attacks Turkey, NATO will be involved too, alongside the coalition” (Borchgrave, 1991). Otherwise Turkey had its own F-16s which were far better than the NATO aircraft sent to Turkey.

In brief, NATO maintained its position of encouraging individual member’s contributions, and provided air and navy forces assistance to Turkey. The efficiency of NATO support and whether it was symbolic or adequate, were debated in Turkey. Nevertheless, it is hard to claim any significant impact of the NATO decision. According to the paired comparison analysis, the NATO decision variable is a moderate influence variable but the third least influential factor. Thus, it was not among the top factors that decision-makers took into consideration.

### **3.3.3. Risk aversion**

Opening military bases did not directly bring the risk of being a party in the war. It did not involve sending troops, so there was no possibility of direct involvement in any military conflict and no direct risk of casualties. Nevertheless, providing the bases for bombardment could trigger a response from Iraq. The opposition in parliament would seem to have genuinely thought that this was a risk, with the leader of the DYP, Süleyman Demirel, in his speech (1991) on behalf of his party at parliamentary talks arguing that:

Turkey is providing access to its territory for a war without an attack. What is this? This is drawing the resentment, hostility and attack of the other side [Iraq] if we have enough power... we have doubts and do not want this decision to be used to put Turkey into the war.

The leader of the SHP, Erdal İnönü, (1991) debated the risks from another perspective in his speech on behalf of SHP at parliamentary talks:

Turkey being a party in a war taking place between two Arab country blocks is risky. The UN resolution is asking for ‘appropriate’ assistance rather than ‘necessary’ help. If Turkey joined the coalition by opening its airbases it would unnecessarily get into a war with its neighbor, the negative effects of which could take time to repair.

Nonetheless, the ruling party members did not perceive high risks. According to one cabinet member the main worry was Turkey’s involvement with its military, its opening airspace and airbases were not that problematical (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). The risk evaluation was that Saddam could only fire missiles as far as the border, and the government based its actions on that fact (Military Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 5, 2013). Furthermore, most of them were thinking that Saddam would not be in any position to attack Turkey, as he would be fully occupied facing massive attacks from the coalition forces (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, May 22, 2013).

In brief, the risk aversion was taken into consideration during the decision-making process. Nevertheless, since the ruling party members did not perceive the risk to be high enough to change their decisions, the end result was not rejecting the bill. Thus, this variable did not change the decision to avoid joining the coalition. According to the paired comparison analysis, the risk aversion variable is the third influential variable.

#### **3.3.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

Turkey had a two-fold interest in the region. The first was based on concerns about Saddam Hussein and his influence in the region, and the second was about the possible scenarios in a post-Saddam future. With regard to the first concern, the decision-makers were in favor of getting rid of Saddam Hussein. The Turkish government argued that Saddam should be removed from power as soon as possible. After the war started, a member of the cabinet stated: “the main advantage of the Gulf War for Turkey was that the unreliable, unpredictable and threatening Saddam was unmasked (*ayakları suya değdi*)” and lost his power to threaten.” (Cevizoğlu, 2003: 158).

There were concerns that the next target might be Turkey (Özdemir, 2014: 351). President Turgut Özal referred to this possibility when he said: “...if Saddam is encouraged by a lack of response to his actions, there may be certain problems pertaining to Turkey in the future” (“Abluka, Ambargo, Olmazsa Harp,” 1990). Özal himself warned US President Bush during his visit before the Gulf crisis. When

George Bush mentioned Ghaddafi as a problem, Özal pointed to Saddam as the primary problem. He said: “.... there is one man in the Middle East. He will cause both you and us problems” (Presidential Aide, personal communication, May 27, 2013; Bush & Scowcroft, 1998: 332).

Saddam directly threatened Turkish Prime Minister Akbulut during his visit to Iraq in May 1990. This visit aimed to solve the Iraqi debt problem via bartering oil in exchange. Akbulut explained this threat using Saddam’s own words in his speech in parliamentary closed session on September 5, 1990:

What will happen to you now? NATO lost its function and your friend the US will not help you. Besides it is not a powerful country. If the US were powerful it would make itself listened to by the other countries in its vicinity. The US may not influence us.

One of the cabinet members in the Turkish delegation for this visit confirmed this conversation, and another claimed that the threats and insults were not limited to those words (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, May 22, 2013; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013).

Furthermore, Saddam’s actions were not welcoming towards Turkey’s senior leadership figures. During the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey remained impartial and high level visits to both countries continued. When Özal visited Baghdad, Iran stopped its bombardment of the city. Nevertheless, despite the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saddam did not stop bombarding Iran during Özal’s visits to that country (Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, May 29, 2013; Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, May 29, 2013).

Other than worries about Saddam Hussein remaining as a threatening neighbor, President Özal also had concerns about the future of Iraq after Saddam. In the aftermath of the war there was concern about possible changes to territory ownership, and this concern was mentioned at the council of ministers (“Savaş Çıkarsa Körfezd’de Harita Değişebilir,” 1991). A possible division in Iraq would bring different risks. The main risk that could emerge from the dissolution of Iraq, was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. There were claims that the US, planning to have the support of the Kurds for the coalition inside Iraq, would in return guarantee Kurdish independence. With regard to such concerns, Özal was aiming to help the coalition to the extent that Turkey could influence outcomes, rather than the Kurds or any of the other actors in the region (Gözen, 2001: 520-522).

President Özal referred to the risk of “not being at the table” that would determine the future of Iraq after the war. The President also talked with the ANAP MPs in groups at Çankaya, explained to them the necessity of giving coalition members access to the bases, because otherwise “Turkey would not be different from Iran and Syria” (“Özal: Biz Üsleri Kullandırmaya Mecburuz,” 1991).

This desperate urge to be part of the decision-making process after the war, was based on the fears and threats that the future Iraq could pose to Turkey. The main threat being the possibility of the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which Özal said would not be allowed (“Özal: Savaşa Girebiliriz,” 1991). Yet in order to avoid that happening Turkey was obliged to open its bases by passing the bill (“Irak’a Girmeye Hazırlanıyoruz,” 1991).

In order to convince others about the rightness of the decision, the example of France was given. Özal highlighted France's decision to participate in order to seek influence. He compared Turkey with France and asserted: "Turkey cannot just be in a position to watch whilst the map of the Middle East is redrawn" (Mengi, 1991).

In short, Turkey was interested in the region because of concerns related to Saddam and worries about future scenarios after Saddam had been removed. The decision-makers were arguing that in order to be influential in the aftermath of the war, Turkey had to contribute to the coalition and opening bases was the minimum level of participation. According to the paired comparison analysis, the 'interest in region/enhance influence' variable ranks as the fourth most influential variable in the decision. It comes after the UNSC resolution, alliance dependency and, interestingly, after risk aversion.

### **3.3.5. Alliance dependence**

From the beginning of the crisis President Özal regarded the issue as "a golden opportunity for the realization of Turkey's greatness" (Duman, 2010: 354). In order to seize upon this opportunity, Turkey had to pursue an active foreign policy and move with the coalition lead by the US.

Turkey wanted to be seen as a reliable partner of the US during this crisis. According to the Turkish President, assistance given to the US on this issue would provide certain advantages to Turkey in any future case of need (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, June 7, 2013). Nevertheless, Özal's attempts to take an active part in

the coalition failed. Opening bases was regarded as the minimum requirement to act with its ally. It must be borne in mind that, if Turkey had not agreed to open Incirlik airbase, it would have been regarded as Turkey not only avoiding being part of the coalition, but also siding with Saddam Hussein. Thus, in order to underline its position with the coalition forces, parliament passed a bill allowing access to the airbases (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013).

There were particular matters for which Turkey needed US assistance. For instance, the war would affect the Turkish economy in a negative fashion whether the country joined the coalition or not. Thus, Turkey needed the support of the US in order to compensate at least some of its losses arising from war (Presidential Aide I, personal communication, May 27, 2013). Indeed, Turkey's active position during the crisis, brought forth positive responses from the US in the form of: "doubling the value of its textile quota and granting the Turkish government \$282 million in additional military and economic assistance for 1991" (Çelik, 1999: 78).

In brief, after international legitimacy, relations with the US played the most important role in the decision. Turkey wanted to take the advantage of the crisis and opening its bases was regarded as the minimum level of contribution, which Turkey should not withhold. According to the paired comparison analysis conducted with the decision-makers, the alliance dependency variable is the second most important factor in the decision. It comes only after the UNSC resolution variable.



### **3.3.6. Decision making process**

As in the previous case above, the authoritative decision-making unit was a coalition. The coalition comprised President Özal, the government, military and the parliament. There were established rules for the decision-making since it depended on a parliamentary vote. The decision did not require anonymity; indeed, a minimum winning coalition was enough. In this decision the President played the role of pivotal actor, and the decision ended with broad compromise in favor of joining the coalition (Hagan et al., 2001: 177-181).

The decision-making process was not that influential in the decision results. Public opinion was against the use of bases, with the opposition reaching as high as 70 – 80% in different polls on the issue (Brown, 2007: 88). Furthermore, there was also weak, almost symbolic, resistance within the Turkish General Staff about not taking responsibility for activities on the bases. Despite a government announcement that authority had been given to the Turkish General Staff to regulate activities on the airbases, the institution refused to fully accept this responsibility (“İncirlik Bunalımı,” 1991).

Nevertheless, the governing party was not divided as had been the case in the first bill. President Özal talked with parliamentarians from the ruling party, in groups of 25, convincing them to support the bill when it came to the floor (Özkök, 1991). The newspapers reported this as the ANAP rallying round Özal and passing the bill immediately (Coşkun, 1991). However, even though the bill was passed by parliament, there were still some 26 MPs from the ANAP, who did not support the

bill, including such prominent figures as Hasan Celal Güzel (“Irak’a Girmeye Hazırlanıyoruz,” 1991).

In short, the decision-making model was a coalition and the process with consensus different from the previous decision occasions. Along with this consensus, the process itself was not influential in the end result. According to the paired comparison analysis the decision-making process variable is the second least influential variable in the decision.

### **3.3.7. Military capability**

According to Correlates of War project national material capabilities, in 1991 Turkey’s military expenditures were 4,400,000 USD, iron and steel production was 8572 tons, military personnel was 804 thousand (The Correlates of War Project/National Material Capabilities, n.d.). Yet, the military capability issue was not debated throughout the crisis. There were certain concerns about use of force in an offensive manner, and such use was vigorously resisted in military circles. Nevertheless, on this decision occasion the debate was based upon opening military bases, rather than joining a military offensive.

Opening military bases for a foreign country to conduct an air offensive on another country is not directly related to the host country’s military capacity. The host country does not need a high military capability to allow access to its military bases. Thus, the military capability issue was not influential in the decision to either open or avoid opening military bases to the coalition.

To summarise, the military capability variable was not relevant to the decision. The paired comparison analysis confirms this to be the case. According to the analysis, the military capability variable is the least influential variable in the end result. Thus, the decision-makers did not take the military capability issue into serious consideration in the decision to open the military bases.

### **3.3.8. Evaluation of the decision**

According to the decision-makers the primary reason for opening the bases was the existence of the UN Security Council resolution that determined the Iraqi government was an aggressor, and urged its members to use all necessary means to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The paired comparison analysis suggests the dominance of the UNSC resolution variable in the decision. Yet, it would be misleading to assume that Turkey was not aware that the driving force for UN decisions and their enforcement was the western powers, primarily the US (Gözen, 2000: 380).

According to the paired comparison analysis conducted with the decision-makers, the second most influential factor behind the result was alliance dependence. Thus, Turkey's dependence on the US influenced the decision result. Turkey did not send troops to the coalition, in other words it had no active involvement in the war. Thus, it was crucial that Turkey at the very least give logistical support to the coalition forces, in order to demonstrate its supporting position. Otherwise, there was the risk of Turkey being portrayed as sided with Saddam against the coalition forces.

**Table 9: Decision Occasion-1c Paired Comparison Analysis Summary**

	UNSC res.	Alliance dep.	Risk aversion	Interest/ influence	NATO decision	DM process	Military capacity
Weights	0.00	0.35	1.00	1.40	1.92	2.30	3.11
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The third most important variable that was taken into consideration in the decision was, according to the paired comparison analysis, the risk aversion factor. Opening bases to the coalition was regarded as a risk in terms of its unintended consequences which, according to the opposition, could even include Turkey becoming further involved in the war. Nonetheless, following the President's discussions with ruling party members in groups, this risk was not perceived as being high.

According to the paired comparison analysis, the fourth most influential variable was 'interest in the region/enhance influence'. Turkey's decision to open the airbases was also based on the idea of removing Saddam and the urge to influence future developments in the aftermath of the war. Turkey's concerns over the establishment of a Kurdish state, or Iran and Syria's invasion, put pressure on Turkey to ensure the country was part of any decisions which were taken about Iraq. To ensure its place at the table, Turkey had to be part of the coalition.

Finally, the NATO decision, decision-making process and military capability variables are the least influential variables in the decision. The NATO action to send air and navy forces to protect Turkey was debated during the process, but did not seemingly influence the decision. The decision-making process ended smoothly with

broad compromise, and the military capability issue was not relevant in terms of opening bases to third parties.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **AFGHANISTAN WAR (2001)**

In this chapter, cases from the 2001 Afghanistan War are examined, focusing on Turkey's coalition policy and studying two decision-occasions. The first of these is the Council of Ministers' decision to send Special Operation Forces (SOF) to Afghanistan on November 2nd, 2001. The decision to send troops to this combat mission was announced but not implemented. The second decision-occasion took place in January 2002 and involved sending troops for a non-combat mission. The government at the time, and successive governments, resisted the use of troops in combat missions. These two decision-occasions will be examined in detail below.

#### **4.1. Decision Occasion 1: Decision To Send Troops For Combat Mission (November, 2001)**

The 9/11 attacks targeted the US on its own territory. In the international arena, these attacks portrayed even the US, with its military and intelligence capabilities,

vulnerable to asymmetrical attacks. In the country itself, the attacks increased the perception of threat among the American people. Since threat perception increases the public demand for retaliation, American public support for the use of military force escalated (Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav, 2005: 601).

The US administration chose to respond to the 9/11 attacks with military campaigns in order to send a message to both international audiences and its own society. Using ground forces was particularly important for the administration since it would give a clear message by action. The US President George W. Bush preferred “to employ cruise missiles, bombers, and boots on the ground” as the most aggressive alternative among options, in order to give a “serious response” to attacks (Bush, 181,191).

General Tommy Franks planned the operation in Afghanistan. In President Bush’ (2010) words it consisted of four stages:

The first was to connect Special Forces with CIA teams to clear the way for conventional troops to follow. Next we would mount a massive air campaign to take out al Qaeda and Taliban targets, and conduct humanitarian airdrops to deliver relief to the Afghan people. The third phase called for ground troops from both America and coalition partners to enter the country and hunt down remaining Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Finally, we would stabilize the country and help the Afghan people build a free society. (Bush, 194).

According to the US President, the second and third steps necessitated allied countries’ support. In the second stage, the US asked for alliance assistance on humanitarian airdrops. The third stage was based on Special Operation Forces (SOF) making contact with the Northern Alliance (NA) fighters and conducting the ground operation. The mission of SOF was to “advise and assist the Northern Alliance in conducting combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, kill, capture and

destroy al-Qaeda, and deny them sanctuary” (Wright et. al., 2005: 75). Thus, this task included both assistance and combat missions.

The Turkish government condemned the terrorist attacks that took place on 9/11 and declared solidarity with the US (“Dostumuzun Yanındayız,” 2001). The Turkish National Security Council (NSC) decided to act with the US against terrorism (“MGK’dan ABD’ye Destek Kararı Çıktı,” 2001). Turkey was among the parties to which the American government presented evidence on Bin Laden’s involvement in the attacks, evidence which was also presented to the NATO Secretariat. The Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit’s, response as to the credibility of this evidence was a hallmark of solidarity with its ally when he said: “If the US regards the evidence as convincing, I am convinced as well” (“Son Ültimatım,” 2001).

Since NATO invoked the collective defense clause of the alliance agreement, Turkey provided logistical support to the US as a member country. According to Defense Minister Çakmaköğlü (2001) Turkey “opened its airspace and promised use of airports, harbors and highways, refueling, logistical support, intelligence support and providing personnel at Incirlik Airbase from September 26th 2001.”

Apart from these contributions, Turkish troops were also requested from the government. The US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, mentioned the experience of Turkish Special Forces during his visit to Turkey and tested the water for utilizing them within the coalition when necessary (Sarıkaya, 2001). Along with this unofficial request, the US officially asked for a group of officers headed by a liaison officer experienced in combat with the PKK in South East of Turkey. Turkey



responded that, in order to send troops, there would have to be the necessary parliamentary approval, but the liaison officer could be sent immediately (“İlk Ekip Pentagon’da,” 2001; Bila, 2001; “ABD Türkiye’den İrtiba Subayı İstedi,” 2001; “ABD, Komutan İstedi,” 2001). Accordingly, Turkey sent a group of three soldiers headed by Brigadier Ümit Şahintürk to Tampa, Florida (“Türkiye’siz Olmaz,” 2001).

Indeed, the actual necessity of parliamentary approval for sending troops to Afghanistan became a matter of debate, as had been experienced previously in similar situations. One of the cabinet members argued that, since Turkey would act according to its existing international commitments, it was not necessary to seek parliamentary approval. Nevertheless, the government went ahead with a parliamentary debate on the matter, not in terms of necessity, but as a way of showing respect to parliament and ensuring its support (“Meclis Yetkiyi Verdi,” 2001); “Asker Gönderme Yetkisi Mecliste,” 2001). The government brought a bill on the matter to parliament on October 10th 2001.

The bill referred to Article 92, as was usually the case in such debates, and also Article 117, which was not seen as normal procedure since that Article referred to the position of commander-in-chief. This reference became a matter of discussion in parliament and the government was criticized for usurping the constitutional rights of the president by leader of the True Path Party (DYP) Tansu Çiller and MP Mehmet Ali İrtemçelik at parliamentary talks. The bill, passed by 21<sup>st</sup> Parliament’s 4<sup>th</sup> Year, 5<sup>th</sup> Session, set out Turkey’s position on terrorism, its solidarity with the US, which had made contributions to Turkey’s struggles with terrorism, and also pointed out the legitimacy that was in place provided by NATO and UNSC resolutions. Moreover,

the bill also gave the government significant leeway in terms of determining the time and place for sending troops (Balbay, 2001a). Despite certain reservations such as the mission of Turkish troops, most of the opposition parties supported the bill. It was passed with 319 votes out of a possible 422, with 103 MPs voting against the bill.

The official request for combat troops was made via the Turkish liaison officer in Tampa on October 26th, 2001 (“Afganistan’a 90 Asker Gönderilecek,” 2001). Since the government had already obtained permission from the parliament, the Council of Ministers was able to take the decision to send 90 members of the SOF on November 2nd, 2001 (“Türk Askeri Afganistan’a Gidiyor,” 2001). As a show of gratitude the US Congress introduced H.Con.Res. 265 on November 7, 2001, which set out appreciation for Turkey’s offer of Special Forces to Operation Enduring Freedom as the “first Muslim country to offer direct military participation.”

Nonetheless, the process was aborted at this stage, whilst Turkey had officially offered combat troops to the US, this offer was not realized, and official documents endorse this situation. For instance, Congress Resolutions such as H.Con. Res. 334, dated February 26, 2002 and H. Con. Res. 437 dated October 16, 2002 itemize Turkey’s supporting efforts for America in the war on terror. On troop contribution to Afghanistan they state “Turkey’s offer to the United States of troops” rather than “send troops.”

Turkish military officials announced that Turkey was not responsible for the outcome (“Türk Askeri 15 Ocak’ta Afganistan’da,” 2001; “Türkiye Afganistan’da AB’den Daha Etkili,” 2001). Indeed, debate still continues as to the reason for Turkish troops

not actually going to Afghanistan, with several different arguments. One of these is that regional actors such as Iran and Russia influenced the Northern Alliance and urged them to resist the stationing of Turkish troops in Afghanistan (Özkan, 2001). Another argument is that the coalition members did not want Turkish troops with concerns about possible support for General Rashid Dostum and influence in the Turkestan region (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, August 26, 2013). Nonetheless, according to one high level bureaucrat, there were quite a number of countries that did not wish to see Turkish troops in Afghanistan. Yet, it is more logical to look for reasons within the coalition, primarily in the US, rather than outside (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, July 19, 2013).

US policymakers were inclined to avoid an intervention under the banner of institutions (especially NATO) or with the involvement of a high number of countries in Afghanistan, so as not to complicate the decision-making on the ground. Lessons learned from the Kosovo intervention included the fact that with many countries on the ground, it was difficult to reach consensus in the field during the operation (Nardulli et. al., 2002: 121). Hence, the US policy was mainly to exclude allied forces from the battle in Afghanistan since “a small number of troops from Turkey, Canada and Australia would complicate decision-making” (Sanger & Gordon, 2001). Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld (2001) called the new understanding a “floating coalition” where “the mission will define the coalition – not the other way around.” Thus, the US asked for troops to utilize when necessary, especially if the operation proved to be prolonged (Balbay, 2001b).

There were some debates in the Bush administration about bringing Turkey into Mazar-i Sharif for legitimacy, yet the fall of Mazar-i Sharif and Kabul came about earlier than expected (Woodward, 2002: 263). After the fall of Kabul the need for policing revealed the need for a different kind of force. Turkey's combat troop contribution to Afghanistan changed into a peace force instead of performing the previous task and the new task necessitated more than 90 troops ("Türkiye'ye Barış Gücü Görevi," 2001; "Afganistan'a 28. Tugay Hazırlanıyor," 2001). In short, Turkey had originally taken the decision to send 90 Special Forces troops, but their deployment was suspended ("Powel 4 Aralık'ta Türkiye'ye Geliyor," 2001).

**Table 10: Decision Occasion-2a Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	Alliance dep.	UNSC resolution	NATO decision	Enhance influence	DM process	Risk aversion	Military capability
Alliance dep.	0.00	1.18	3.49	1.18	3.49	3.49	3.49
UNSC resolution	-1.18	0.00	0.25	0.25	1.18	3.49	3.49
NATO decision	-3.49	-0.25	0.00	0.52	0.84	3.49	3.49
Enhance influence	-1.18	-0.25	-0.52	0.00	0.52	0.84	1.18
DM process	-3.49	-1.18	-0.84	-0.52	0.00	1.18	0.84
Risk aversion	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-0.84	-1.18	0.00	1.18
Military capability	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-1.18	-0.84	-1.18	0.00
Sum	-16.32	-7.48	-4.60	-0.59	4.01	11.31	13.67
Mean	-2.33	-1.07	-0.66	-0.08	0.57	1.62	1.95
Weighting	0.00	1.26	1.67	2.25	2.90	3.95	4.28
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In order to reveal the extent of the influence of each variable on the decision, a paired comparison analysis was conducted with ten decision-makers. This analysis provides a weighted comparison of each independent variable by making comparisons among them in pairs. The results of the paired comparison analysis are provided above.

Looking at the dynamics of the decision, the most weighted variable appears to be the alliance dependency on coalition leader and the least weighted variable is the military capability. The UNSC resolution and NATO decision follow the alliance dependency on coalition leader, with only small differences in scores between these two variables. Indeed, it could be argued that they were both likely to be the second most influential variables in the decision. The military capability variable is likely to be the least influential variable. The paired comparison analysis provides the quantitative analysis. This analysis will be tested against data collected from the individual interviews and the influence of independent variables will be examined one by one.

#### **4.1.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

The UNSC issued two resolutions after the events of 9/11, but neither of these resolutions directly legitimized the use of military force. Though the resolutions could be interpreted as a pretext for a claim of legitimacy, they condemned international terrorism and acknowledged the right to self-defense. The first resolution was issued just one day after the 9/11 attacks when the UNSC gathered, and released UNSC Resolution 1968 on September 12th 2001. The resolution determined the event as an act of international terrorism and recognized the “inherent right of individual or

collective self defense in accordance with the charter.” Furthermore, it asked all member countries to cooperate with regard to finding the people behind the attacks, and with the US prosecution process thereafter. It also urged cooperation of countries to prevent further terrorist attacks.

On September 28th 2001, the UNSC issued another resolution that strengthened the former. The UNSC Resolution 1373 reiterated the right of individual and collective self-defense. This resolution warned all states not to assist terrorist groups or individuals in an “active or passive” manner. It also declared that the acts of states would be monitored and the council would “take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this resolution.”

The decision-makers were not highly interested in the legal/scholarly discussions on whether the resolutions were providing true legitimacy to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or not.<sup>8</sup> Rather they were in agreement on the idea of UNSC decisions providing legitimacy to the action. According to one member of the cabinet: “.....the UNSC resolutions laid the legal infrastructure....” for the operation (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013). During parliamentary talks he referred to the two resolutions of the UNSC in terms of legitimacy.

According to the conducted paired comparison analysis, the UNSC resolutions come as the second most important variable in the decision. Thus, it was one of the most important factors for the outcome of the decision. Nonetheless, it was not the main driver behind the decision. The decision-makers regarded the UNSC factor as only a

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<sup>8</sup> None of the Interviewees referred to these debates.

supporting element in the decision. One cabinet member asserted “without a UN decision we could not intervene; yet, we do not join all the coalitions for which UNSC passes a resolution” (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, July 2, 2013).

This supportive role may be explained by way of its two-fold effect on the decision-makers. Once the quest for legitimacy by domestic actors had been met by the resolutions, it helped the leading actors to convince others to join the coalition. Equally, it was hard to resist demands from the coalition leader because the action was regarded as internationally legitimate (High Level Bureaucrat III, personal communication, October 11, 2013).

In short, the UNSC resolutions played an important role in taking the decision of sending SOF to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, according to the decision-makers, the UNSC resolution was necessary but not sufficient for sending troops. Thus, whilst it was an important factor for ensuring the legitimacy of sending troops, the UNSC resolution was not the primary issue in the decision.

#### **4.1.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**

The day 9/11 happened, NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, (2001a) condemned the attacks and NATO member countries announced their support for the US. More importantly, North Atlantic Council (2001) announced on September 12th that the action would be examined in the context of Article 5 of the North Atlantic

Treaty (1949) with the stipulation: "...if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad." Article 5 includes the "collective defense" principle, which asserts:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...

On October 2nd, the NATO Secretary General (2001b) announced that it had been confirmed that the attack was directed from abroad and the issue is "covered by the Article 5" of the treaty. Along with invocation of Article 5 (2001), NATO countries cooperated with the US in patrolling US airspace, opening their airspace and facilities for US operations, and providing increased intelligence sharing. In line with the NATO decisions, Turkey opened its airspace and airbases for the use of US forces. The US Ambassador to Ankara welcomed the Turkish efforts and made reference to NATO for the cooperation ("Pearson: Türkiye'nin Desteginden Memnunuz," 2001).

The NATO decision to cite Article 5 had an influence on the decision-makers in Turkey. According to our paired comparison analysis this factor comes right after alliance dependence and UNSC resolution. Since Turkey is a member of NATO and the treaty binds Turkey, decision-makers took Turkey's membership into consideration as well. Furthermore, "NATO appeals to the military circles in Turkey" (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, July 18, 2013). Thus, the NATO decision was not only influential among civilian decision-makers, but also among the military with regard to sending troops.



The role of NATO differs from the UNSC resolution with its more binding character. This difference was explained by one cabinet member: “the UN decision was important for legitimacy, yet for implementation NATO is more important than the UN” (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013). Not a majority by any means, but some of the decision-makers, referred to the NATO decision as more important than the UNSC resolutions. This would seem to be because of the collective defense perspective. For instance, one cabinet member states: “the most important issue was the invocation of Article 5 of NATO” (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 3, 2013). In line with the collective defense perspective, if Turkey did not provide assistance to an attacked NATO member, that would be tantamount to Turkey’s rejection of the main principle of the alliance. This approach could lead to others avoiding assistance when Turkey itself was attacked, or Turkey could be asked to totally withdraw from the alliance (High Level Bureaucrat III, personal communication, October 11, 2013). Thus, a negative response to NATO could cause potential future problems for Turkey.

In short, the NATO invocation of Article 5 was an important development for the decision-makers. Along with the collective defense, Turkey contributed to the coalition with logistical support such as opening airspace and airbases. It was also influential in taking the decision to send troops as well. Loyalty to the alliance would strengthen Turkey’s position if it needed to ask for help in case of an attack against its territory. According to the paired comparison analysis, the legitimacy conveyed by NATO was very close to the legitimacy provided by the UNSC. In the interviews there were also claims about NATO supremacy over UNSC.

### 4.1.3. Risk aversion

The decision-makers did not perceive an existential risk in joining the coalition that intervened in Afghanistan. In the parliamentary debates this perception was declared openly. Ahat Andican, member of one of the parliamentary coalition parties, ANAP, asserted (2001) that the debate was about a place: “.....within Turkey’s interest but 4,000 km away from Turkey and not a life and death matter.” One of the cabinet members stated: “due to geographic distance there was not much risk perception” (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, July 18, 2013).

Interestingly, the risk assessments were often made by comparison with Iraq, and the conclusion of such comparisons always ended with the subordination of risk in Afghanistan. Leading figures Devlet Bahçeli and Mesut Yılmaz declared their concerns about the possible expansion of the operation into Iraq (“Türkiye Operasyonun Irak’a Sıçramasından Endişeli,” 2001). Mesut Yılmaz stated: “We wish the US operation to be restricted to toppling the Taliban regime and targeting Bin Laden Bahçeli reiterated the same concerns saying: “We want the operation to be limited to Afghanistan” (“Mesut Yılmaz: ‘Operasyonun Afganistan'la sınırlı olmasını diliyoruz’,” 2001; “Bahçeli: ‘Tezkerenin bugün gündeme alınacağını tahmin ediyorum’,” 2001). From the main coalition party, State Minister, Şükrü Sina Gürel, asserted that:

We don't expect or anticipate such a development (intervention in Iraq) and frankly we certainly don't desire it... We are very sensitive on this matter and our allies are

aware of our sensitivity. A man who has burnt his mouth with hot milk blows on his yoghurt. (Boulton, 2001).

The Turkish Armed Forces openly stated these concerns as well. The Chief of Staff, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, stated, “We are against any attempts and developments that may end up with the dissolution of Iraq” (Bila, 2001b).

The risk assessments were mostly based on Turkey’s image, not on any concrete physical threat against Turkey, but on worries about the country’s image in the Muslim world. There were concerns that Muslim countries would: “perceive it to be different or wrong” which could have triggered problems (Bila, 2001b). According to one of the MHP MPs “there were worries about reactions from Turkey and Afghanistan on combat troops. Thus, the government announced that the mission of the Special Forces would be training and that they would fight only if they had to in order to minimize the reactions” (MHP MP I, personal communication, July 10, 2013).

In conclusion, there were risks inherent in the sending of troops to Afghanistan, but these were mostly seen to be confined to issues around the image of Turkey.

Nonetheless, these risks were not influential on the decision. According to our paired comparison analysis conducted with decision-makers, risk aversion comes as the second least influential factor after military capability. Thus, this factor did not prevent the decision-makers taking the decision to send troops. The main concern in government and military circles was any operation in the neighboring country, Iraq, rather than Afghanistan.

#### **4.1.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

Turkish decision-makers were interested in the issue and they wanted to influence the process. Since the operation was part of the ‘war on terror,’ campaign decision-makers had the motivation of becoming influential in international attempts to combat terrorism. Turkey had been dealing with the terrorism issue for decades, and it was one of the headline topics on Turkey’s diplomatic agenda. Thus, it would be ethically wrong for Turkey to avoid giving assistance in an issue it repeatedly brings to the agenda on a range of different platforms (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013; High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 17, 2013; Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 3, 2013).

Furthermore, the new developments provided the opportunity for Turkey to better explain itself and derive support for its on-going struggle against PKK terrorism. This co-operation could also help Turkey to persuade the US to add the terrorist organizations operating in Turkey, such as the PKK and Turkish Hezbollah, to their official list of such organizations, and provide international legitimacy to the Turkish battle with terrorist organizations (“PKK ve DHKP-C Listeye Alınacak,” 2001; Elekdağ, 2001). According to one of the cabinet members: “.....we had concerns about cutting financial, political and logistical support to the PKK” and the process could help Turkey to convince countries to co-operate in its anti-terrorist endeavors using international norms (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 3, 2013). Thus, enhancing influence on the issue of terrorism was among the reasons for

support in Afghanistan (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 17, 2013).

Other than terrorism, the region was important for Turkey as well, because Turkey has important historical relations with Afghanistan and its people. According to one cabinet member, the importance given to Afghanistan in Turkey is visible from the locations of the Afghan Embassy and various consulates around the country. They are all in highly sought after locations in comparison with establishments belonging to other countries (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, July 2, 2013). This situation originates from the strong bilateral relations of the two countries during their establishment. Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the Republic of Turkey, and Turkey reciprocated by being the second state to recognize the independence of Afghanistan.

During parliamentary talks, sending troops was endorsed by the argument that Turkey should participate and be part of the rebuilding period. ANAP MP Ahat Andican (2001) urged the government to: “push for Uzbek Turks to take places in the government to be formed in Afghanistan after the Taliban.” Newly established Justice and Development Party (AKP) MP Abdullah Gül (2001) stipulated their sympathies with the bill and hoped Turkey would and be able: “to take a dynamic role and be influential about changing maps in the region.” Another MP Gaffar Yakin (2001) argued: “Turkey should have an important role in the process of rebuilding Afghanistan. It should be influential as an equal actor with the US.”

Despite these ambitious statements from members of parliament, for the decision-makers this involvement was no more than maintaining a friendly relationship with the Afghan people. According to one of the cabinet members: “.....there was no point in seeking such influence beyond Turkey’s immediate vicinity. Turkey was not interested in controlling Central Asia or going after underground sources” (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, September 2, 2003).

All in all, interest in the region and the terrorism issue was among the factors that created positive momentum for joining the coalition. The concerns on terrorism were more influential than any interest in the region. One of the cabinet members asserted: “I acknowledge the historical background, but such decisions are not taken based on history” (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, July 2, 2013). According to the paired comparison analysis conducted with the decision-makers, this factor comes as fourth in level of importance. Thus, the concerns about gathering international support for combatting PKK terrorism and maintaining a friendly relationship with Afghan people, inherited from the Ataturk era, were taken into consideration. However, when it came to actually taking the decision to send combat troops, dependency on the U.S together with the international context was more influential.

#### **4.1.5. Alliance dependence**

Turkish decision-makers gave utmost importance to relations with the US in their decision. One of the cabinet members stated: “....the primary issue in sending troops was the necessity to act with our friends and allies” (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, July 2, 2013). One ruling party MP said: “.....the main issue was

the sake of our friends” (MHP MP I, personal communication, July 10, 2013). Lastly, one of the cabinet members even claimed that: “. . . . .the main reason was relations with the US and all others were trivial.” He argued that all politicians in Turkey had concerns with the US before AKP, always worrying about reprisals from the strong ally (Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, July 31, 2013).

There are several aspects of alliance dependency affecting the decision to offer Special Forces to the US. Firstly, Turkey regarded assistance to the US as necessary, in terms of helping an ally at a time when it was under attack. Besides, all its allies and even rivals were offering support, and that put pressure on Turkey to also act. For instance, Germany pledged 3,900 troops, France 2,000, and Italy 1,000 (Sanger & Gordon, 2001). It may be argued that Turkey as an ally felt the necessity to offer something (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 17, 2013).

Turkey as a country that suffered from terrorism should have had more understanding of, and empathy with, the situation than other countries. Thus, the Presidency office announced “Turkey regarded the US sympathetically during its combat with terrorism. As a country that has suffered greatly from terrorism, it is normal that Turkey should stand side by side with the US” (“Ülkeyi Maceraya Sürüklemeyiz,” 2001). Furthermore, the US was instrumental in capturing the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and following his capture terrorist attacks in Turkey stopped. Turkey regarded helping the US as a way of returning the favor. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that: “The US supported Turkey’s combat with terrorism, despite the avoidance of European countries. . . contributing to Operation Enduring Freedom is a duty of loyalty and humanity” (“Ecevit: Afganistan'a Asker Göndermek Atatürk'ün

Vasiyeti,” 2001).

Besides, Turkey had certain economic and political issues and badly needed US support. Turkey was facing a major economic crisis during the debates on this issue and it needed credits for recovery. The US had a strong influence on the decisions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through its weight in voting mechanisms (Rapkin & Strand, 1997: 274-275). There were also examples where the US had used its position to influence the IMF for political reasons (Momani, 2004). Thus, good relationships with the US would possibly facilitate obtaining the necessary funds from the IMF.

The issue was debated in the media and in public as if the issue was a simple exchange: Turkey’s support for IMF funding. The media linked the IMF delegation visit to Turkey, and Turkish Minister Kemal Derviş’ visit to the US, both of which took place very close to the time of the decision, to be in connection with the support decision (“IMF Delegation Due in Turkey,” 2001; Hacaoğlu, 2001). It was claimed that Turkey was: "trying to play the card of their strategic importance. And it helps" (Pope, 2001). Some argued in favor, some argued against the idea (Birand, 2001; Mengi, 2001a; Mengi, 2001b; Bilaller, 2001; “Çiller Criticizes Government for Being Indecisive,” 2001).

Nevertheless, Kemal Derviş rebuked both supporters and opposers of an open negotiation, when he stated: “It is not ethical to negotiate such issues” (Balbay, 2001a). He also said “We are in a clear position. We do not make our contribution to the war on terror purely as a bargaining chip” (“Derviş Olumlu Konuştu Ama IMF 3



Milyarlık Krediyi Erteledi,” 2001). Other two members of the Council of Ministers, also refuted the idea of an open negotiation (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, July 18, 2013; Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013). US Ambassador to Ankara, Robert Pearson, confirmed these statements from the US side (personal communication, April 8, 2014).

Consequently, the issue might not be a subject for direct negotiation. However, it must be borne in mind that, whether Turkey regards it as a matter of negotiation or not, for the US it was a foreign policy tool. Since Turkey became more important for US foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks, the IMF could act “more generously toward Turkey” (Öniş, 2003: 16). The IMF gave 9 billion dollars in 2002 and nearly 24 billion dollars in total after the economic crisis in Turkey (Öniş, 2009: 429).

Previously the US had successfully lobbied for Turkey’s EU bid in a timely European context, which resulted in the Helsinki decision of candidacy for Turkey (Tocci, 2012: 402). Thus, US support for Turkey’s EU bid was an important political issue for Turkey. There were other political issues mentioned such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline and the Cyprus issue as well (Birand, 2001; Mengi 2001b).

In conclusion, alliance dependence was the most important issue in Turkey’s decision to send combat troops to Afghanistan. According to the paired comparison analysis this factor comes as the most influential one in the decision. The 9/11 atmosphere and helping an ally against terrorist organizations were important. Besides, Turkey needed the political support of the US on issues including the economy, EU membership and Cyprus.

#### **4.1.6. Decision making process**

The troika consisting of leaders of the coalition parties in the government made decisions for the crisis although at the same time, the military and civilian bureaucracy was influential in the decisions (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 3, 2013; MHP MP I, personal communication, July 10, 2013). The issues were also brought to the cabinet afterwards. Nevertheless, according to two members of the Council of Ministers the issue was not debated in the cabinet (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, September 2, 2013; Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, July 31, 2013). Thus, the decision-making unit was a coalition in which there was no “single group or actor with the political authority to commit the state in international affairs” (Hagan et al., 2001: 169). And there was a consensus among these coalition actors.

Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel mentioned the tendency of Ecevit to dominate foreign policy decisions, for which he played a pivotal role in the decision-making group when necessary. Nonetheless, on this decision occasion he did not have to play such a role. The decision passed without resistance from the Council of Ministers and parliament supported the bill with some opposition parties outside the ruling majority coalition, approving the bill as well. The military, as another actor powerful in the context of decisions on sending troops, did not resist this decision. Normally the military in Turkey is not eager to join such coalitions. Nevertheless, NATO’s citing of Article 5 and links with the Pentagon, were sufficiently influential in military circles to endorse sending troops to Afghanistan (Cabinet Member II, personal

communication, July 18, 2013; Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, July 31, 2013).

Public opinion, as in other cases, was against sending troops, but it was not very influential in terms of the decision, since the decision was not taken close to election time. Turkish people did not support sending troops to Afghanistan, with several polls revealing a strong opposition. According to one well-known Turkish public opinion research institute, KONDA, 71% of Turkish people were against sending troops to Afghanistan in October 2001 (“Türk Halkı Savaş İstemiyor,” 2001). Furthermore, according to the public opinion poll conducted by another institution, ANAR, 86% of respondents were against such a move by the Turkish government (“Zirvede Konuşulan Ankete Göre Halk Afganistan Operasyonuna Karşı,” 2001). Lastly, according to ‘October 2001 Turkey's Current Affairs Poll’ 80% of Turks were against sending troops to Afghanistan, with only 15% being in favor of such an action (“Turks opposed to sending troops according to the results of an opinion poll,” 2001).

In conclusion, despite public opposition, influential actors in the decision-making process did not veto the decision to send combat troops to Afghanistan. Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, was not faced with a substantial resistance from either the Ministerial Council or the parliament or the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, there was a consensus on the decision, and consensus decreases the influence of decision making process as a factor in the outcome. According to our paired comparison analysis, the decision making process comes as the third least influential factor on this decision occasion.

#### **4.1.7. Military capability**

According to Correlates of War Project/national material capabilities, in 2001 Turkey's military expenditures were 7,219,000 USD, iron and steel production was 14.981 tons, military personnel was 515 thousand (The Correlates of War Project/National Material Capabilities, n.d.). Yet, the military capability issue turned out to be off the agenda in the case of Afghanistan. Despite there having been concerns during the Gulf War, certain improvements had taken place in terms of capability and it was not a problem during the Afghanistan War (Military Bureaucrat I, personal communication, November 6, 2013). There was no concern about Turkish troops being in any way deficient with regard to fighting in Afghanistan. Indeed, Turkish Special Forces were capable of working in Afghanistan better than many of their counterparts.

Since they were experienced in combat with terrorist groups, there was a debate as to whether or not the US might ask that Turkey make use of its experience if the operation was prolonged (Balbay, 2001b). Furthermore, the Turkish Special Forces were experienced in fighting in mountainous terrain and, since Afghanistan is a very mountainous country and would present difficult terrain for forces from some other countries, this was another advantage for the Turkish troops ("Türk Komandoları Kara Harekatında Öncü Olacak," 2001). Military circles were confident about the capability, with former General Doğu Aktulga stating: "The other countries' special forces are at least as capable as the Turkish Special Forces" ("3 Kişilik Keşif Ekibi Hemen Yola Çıkıyor," 2001).

In short, the decision-makers were confident about military capability, to the extent that it was not a barrier to them joining the coalition because of any perceived lack of capability. It could even be argued that Turkish forces were more capable than the forces of the other countries. According to the paired comparison analysis conducted with decision-makers, military capability is the least influential factor. In line with the paired comparison analysis, for most of the interviewees this factor had no influence at all on the decision. In brief, military capability was not a concern rather it was a distinguishing quality that made the US ask for forces from Turkey.

#### **4.1.8. Evaluation of the decision**

Turkey decided to send combat troops to Afghanistan but owing to actual conditions on the ground in Afghanistan, the troops were deployed in a different fashion to that originally planned. The decision to send the troops was based on several factors. In terms of our independent variables, in descending order these factors were: alliance dependency on the coalition leader, legitimacy by UNSC resolution and NATO decisions.

According to the paired comparison matrix, alliance dependency is the most important factor in the decision. Since the US had been a victim of international terrorism, it was regarded as the right time to show solidarity with this ally.

Furthermore, Turkey needed the political support of the US in other issues such as the economy, its bid for full membership of the EU and the Cyprus issue.

The second and third most influential factors were effectively related to Turkey's international commitments. The UNSC resolutions provided legitimacy for the actions and NATO backing the issue by invoking Article 5, put pressure on members to take a decision for collective defensive action. Despite the legal debates on the UNSC resolutions the Turkish decision-makers regarded the two resolutions as providing ample legitimacy for the action. Furthermore, it was the first time that NATO had activated the collective defense clause, hence Turkey, as a part of the alliance, felt the necessity to act. The difference between the second and third variables is very small according to the paired comparison analysis. Thus, they may be evaluated together as joint second most influential variables. It should be also noted that there were decision-makers who claimed NATO subordination of UNSC in the interviews, which slightly contradicts with the paired comparison analysis.

**Table 11: Decision Occasion-2a Paired Comparison Analysis Summary**

	Alliance dep.	UNSC resolution	NATO decision	Enhance/influence	DM process	Risk aversion	Military capability
Weighting	0.00	1.26	1.67	2.25	2.90	3.95	4.28
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The fourth factor was interest in the issue/enhance influence as seen from the table. Turkey was quite irritated with the apparent European indifference to the terrorist organizations and their illegal activities to generate finance, which were spread all over the continent (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013). Furthermore, the issue of 9/11 and international terrorism was seen as an opportunity

for Turkey to take a clear stance against terrorist organizations, such as PKK and DHKP-C, and Turkey aimed to influence the process of the war on terror to form an international platform for cooperation against terrorist organizations.

The remaining three variables: the decision-making process, risk aversion and military capability variables, were the least influential factors in the decision. Firstly, with regard to the decision-making process, there was no dissidence among the decision-makers on the issue other than public opposition, which was not actually influential. Secondly, the risk perceptions were also not influential, since the location of the target state was far away, and the decision-makers were more focused on a possible intervention in Iraq, which subordinated the concerns about Afghanistan. Lastly, the generic military capability was almost not an issue at all, unlike during the Gulf War; rather the capabilities of the Turkish Special Operation Forces in particular were debated.

In conclusion, according to the decision-makers alliance dependence was the most influential factor on this decision occasion. The UNSC resolutions and the NATO decision were closely behind the top variable. Interest in the issue, enhancing influence, the decision-making process and risk aversion factors have limited influence. Lastly, military capability is the least influential factor in the decision.

#### **4.2. Decision Occasion 2: Sending Troops for Non-Combat Missions (January, 2001)**

After the fall of Kabul, the new situation in Afghanistan necessitated a different kind

of mission. The vacuum created by the overthrow of Taliban had to be filled with a security structure, and the US administration did not want to carry this burden alone.

At one of the meetings on the issue Bush asserted that:

The US forces will not stay...we don't do police work. We need a core of a coalition of the willing...and then pass on these tasks to others. We've got a job to do with al Qaeda. We need to look at WMD targets. (Woodward, 2002: 267)

Providing security assistance for the new Afghan administration, together with training the new Afghan army in order to build its security capacity, were left to the international community (Maloney, 2003: 3-12). In order to build the new Afghan administration, the 2+5 group along with the UN<sup>9</sup> put pressure on the various Afghan groups to come together. They reached a consensus on the roadmap for the future of Afghanistan in Bonn on December 5th, 2001. Along with the agreement, the Afghan groups approved this security assistance. Bonn Agreement- Annex 1: International Security Force acknowledged the Afghan primacy with regard to its own security matters. It also asserted that:

With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas.

Following the Bonn Conference, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was formed on December 19th, 2001. US forces maintained Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) independent from ISAF, and did not allocate troops for ISAF. There

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<sup>9</sup> Maloney implies that it was not only the UN. Interestingly, for the ISAF command after Britain the US reached out to Turkey rather than the United Nations. This indicates the US leading role in the operations.



were “clear lines between the two missions” and the two “are wholly distinct in nature and purpose” (Palmer, 2003). ISAF forces were not under US command. Its operational headquarters and coordination center was located in the leading country of ISAF, and rotated along with the rotation of the role of leading country (Palmer, 2003). It was a loosely coordinated coalition, with ISAF forces being led by their national command rather than being under the strict control of the coordinator country, or the U.S itself (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, August 26, 2013). In the end, this structure turned out to “make (s) international efforts more complicated though not necessarily more effective” (Yalçinkaya & Açar, 2009:78).

In terms of the rule of engagements, the US and Turkish governments shared on-going decision-making on whether or not to respond in case of an attack. The US expected the troops to conduct operations that might include military offenses, such as intervening in cases of mayhem, and to help the local forces. However, as each NATO member determined their own limits in the campaign, Turkey wanted to send troops that would solely contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful environment (Yalçinkaya & Açar, 2009: 75; Boztaş, 2001). One of the cabinet members stated: “.....the US wanted to push Turkey to the firing line, yet Turkey insisted on focusing on non-combat missions” (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013). The request for combat troops from the US also continued over the following years. According to a high-level bureaucrat, the “.....commander of US forces asked for troops for OEF in person, and they put pressure on Turkey to give troops to OEF” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, August 26, 2013).

Nonetheless, Turkey declined to take part in combat missions from the beginning and resisted repeated requests to join combat missions. Turkish General Staff called this restriction the “national constraint” referring to Turkey’s relations with the Afghan people. It was stated that Turkish troops did not take roles “outside their area of responsibility and for operations involving minesweeping, combatting terrorism and drug enforcement” (“Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Barışı Destekleme Harekatlarına Katkıları,” n.d.).

Thus, Turkey pledged to send non-combat troops and announced this intention in the middle of January (“Türk Askeri Yola Çıktı,” 2002). The Turkish government had permission from parliament to send troops to Afghanistan. Indeed, the bill was so powerful that some argued the government even usurped the Commander in Chief, by mentioning Article 117 in the bill (“Hükümet Sezer’in Başkomutanlığına Talip Oldu,” 2001). It was decided to send a pioneer group of 12 first, in order to explore and facilitate necessary planning in middle of January before the actual deployment (Afghanistan’a 261 Asker,” 2002; “Afghanistan’a Önce 261 Mehmetçik Gidecek,” 2001). The main group would begin to arrive in Afghanistan on 16th February 2002 (“Türk Askeri Afganistan’da,” 2002).

Turkey’s taking the leading country role in ISAF had been debated since the middle of November (Cindemir, 2001). Moreover, the Turkish government had declared its willingness to lead both through formal and informal channels (Toker, 2001; “Kabil Planı Hazır,” 2001; “Türkiye, İngiltere’den Sonra Barış Gücü Komutasına Talip,” 2001). Thus, planning was carried out for Turkish troops to be participants in the coalition, and for Turkey also to be a leading country. Turkey decided to send a

colonel in the first place, during the British leadership of the ISAF. After Turkey took over the leading role, a major general would replace him (“Afganistan’a Tümgeneral Gönderiliyor,” 2002). The number of Turkish troops was 276 and they were assigned from the 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. The number of troops was later subject to change according to Turkey’s position in the coalition.

A paired comparison analysis was conducted for this decision occasion with responses from the decision-makers. The results of this analysis are provided below in Table-12.

**Table 12: Decision Occasion-2b Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	Alliance dep.	UNSC resolution	NATO decision	Enhance/influence	DM process	Risk aver.	Military cap.
Alliance dep.	0.00	0.52	1.18	0.52	1.18	1.18	3.49
UNSC resolution	-0.52	0.00	0.00	0.25	1.18	3.49	3.49
NATO decision	-1.18	0.00	0.00	0.84	1.18	3.49	3.49
Enhance influence	-0.52	-0.25	-0.84	0.00	0.52	0.84	1.18
DM process	-1.18	-1.18	-1.18	-0.52	0.00	0.52	1.18
Risk aversion	-1.18	-3.49	-3.49	-0.84	-0.52	0.00	1.18
Military capability	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-1.18	-1.18	-1.18	0.00
Sum	-8.07	-7.89	-7.82	-0.93	2.36	8.34	14.01
Mean	-1.15	-1.13	-1.12	-0.13	0.34	1.19	2.00
Weights	0.00	0.02	0.03	1.02	1.49	2.34	3.15
Rank	1	2	3	4	6	5	7

According to the paired comparison analysis, the most influential variables are alliance dependency on the coalition leader, legitimacy by UNSC resolution and legitimacy by NATO decision. Indeed, there is not a significant difference between these three variables and they may be evaluated together. The interest in the region/enhance influence variable follows these three variables. According to analysis, the least influential variable is again military capability. These findings will be evaluated in detail in the light of interviews an secondary below.

#### **4.2.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

Other than issuing the UNSC resolutions that legitimized the intervention in Afghanistan, the UN also played an active role in the reconstruction of the country. It was instrumental in the diplomatic efforts to establish the new administration. As one of these diplomatic efforts, the UN reappointed Lakhder Brahimi as the Special Envoy of the UN to Afghanistan, two years after his resignation (“Algerian Diplomat Is Afghan Point Man,” 2001).

The UN was active in the convening of the Bonn Conference. This conference reduced the totality of different Afghani political groups to just four: Northern Alliance, Rome process; Cyprus process and Peshawar process (“UN wants Afghan Interim Administration to Set Up Soon,” 2001). The Northern Alliance referred to the alliance of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rashid Dostum; the Rome process was the name given to supporters of the former King Zahir Shah led by Abdul Sattar Sirat (Gladstone, 2001: 18, 27). The Peshawar process referred to the group who wanted the return of former King Zahir Shah lead by Sayyedun

Ahmed Gaylani and the Cyprus process was the name given to the Afghan exiles in Cyprus endorsed by Tehran (Sfeir, 2007: 21; “Interview with Syed Ishaq Gailani, leader of the Cyprus group,” 2001). These groups reached an accord in Bonn.

After the Bonn Agreement the UNSC issued a resolution that endorsed the agreement. The UNSC Resolution 1383 was issued on 6th December 2001. This resolution referred to the Secretary General’s letter on the Bonn Conference. It supported the Bonn agreement and called for the internal groups of Afghanistan, together with donor actors in the international community, to facilitate and contribute to the implementation of the Agreement.

A further resolution that went into the details of the implementation of the Agreement, the UNSC Resolution 1386, was issued on December 20th, 2001. The resolution: “authorizes... the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist” the transition government on securing the capital, Kabul. Besides, it “authorizes the member states... to take all necessary measures to fulfill its (ISAF) mandate.” Thus, the resolution provides the necessary legitimacy for the action of the ISAF.

In Turkey this UN legitimacy was important for the national decision-makers. The UN actively participated in the process and the ISAF was under the UN umbrella. For Turkey, in the second decision the international legitimacy of the UN was more influential than for the first decision (High Level Bureaucrat III, personal communication, October 11, 2013). Thus, the issue became more owned by the international community. This perception was confirmed with the words of one of the

cabinet members when he defined the action as: “adapting to the international community” (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, July 14, 2013).

Nonetheless, the US position and influence was still applicable.

In short, the UN took on a more active role in the process and this development increased the legitimacy of sending troops. According to the paired comparison analysis conducted in this context, top ranked legitimacy by UNSC resolution, alliance dependence and legitimacy by NATO decision do not differ from each other significantly. These three variables each refer to conforming to the international community. Thus, the action came to be more owned by the international community and sending troops became preferable in the eyes of the Turkish decision-makers.

#### **4.2.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**

NATO provided the utmost support for the US by citing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Along with the call for help to the alliance members, NATO members provided other type of support. NATO continued its support for the war on terrorism. After the Ministerial Meeting on December 18th, 2001, NATO issued the following:

Individual Allies have offered forces and other assets to the campaign against terrorism and for use in humanitarian relief. We will continue our support to the United States for the US-led operation against these terrorists until it has reached its objectives. We will provide this support in accordance with our decisions and in full compliance with all our commitments under international law and relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Thus, NATO maintained its efforts to assist the US, but with individual member contributions. There is no reference to a collective NATO-led military operation.

Indeed, the US policy makers were against a NATO undertaking in this operation but the appeal for support and individual contributions from the alliance members continued (Woodward, 2002: 263). NATO (2001) responded to this appeal positively, and went along with efforts such as “.....taken steps to strengthen the protection of sensitive facilities, and increased exchanges of information and intelligence...” which may be regarded as collective action. Consequently, NATO took over the command of ISAF in August 2003 (“NATO and Afghanistan,” n.d.). Yet this is beyond the scope of this study.

In Turkey, for the decision-makers the reference to the collective defense clause of the alliance agreement was influential. According to one high level bureaucrat: “...there was a NATO decision and we could not ignore that” (High Level Bureaucrat III, personal communication, October 11, 2013). Furthermore, one of the governing party MPs stated that the most important factors should be formulized as “US plus NATO but NATO does not act without a UN decision” (MHP MP I, personal communication, July 10, 2013). This statement neatly refers to all three variables at the same time.

In short, NATO played an important role in the decision to send troops for non-combat missions. Not as an institutional involvement, but by strong encouragement of individual allies with reference to Article 5, NATO was influential for the Turkish decision-makers. According to the paired comparison analysis the legitimacy by NATO decision variable comes with the factor of alliance dependency on the coalition leader and the UNSC resolution variable.

### **4.2.3. Risk aversion**

There was not a broad risk perception among the decision-makers on this occasion, even though some of them have spoken of several concerns about sending troops, yet it would seem the general environment neutralized these concerns. One of the concerns was the uncertainty of going to war together with a possible US failure in Afghanistan. One of the high level bureaucrats mentioned these risks, along with the influence of the neighboring country. He referred to the Iranian influence in Afghanistan and then the conflicting nature of Turkish-Iranian relations. Thus, Iran could make the job of the Turks harder in Afghanistan (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, July 19, 2013).

As in all military operations there were concerns about losing military personnel. One of the cabinet members mentioned this concern for casualties. He stated: “We did not want to see casualties on the territory of a friendly country like Afghanistan” (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013). Nonetheless, such risks may be applied to all military operations and according to another member of the cabinet: “if necessary the military takes the risks” (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 3, 2013).

Additionally, several factors diminished Turkish concerns regarding risks in Afghanistan. Primarily, at this time the Iraq debate was more heated and Turkey was even more concerned about that issue. Along with the Iraq issue, Turkish decision-makers thought that sending troops to Afghanistan may increase Turkey’s leverage over the US for the Iraq issue (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication,



October 17, 2013). Thus, comparison with Iraq encouraged the decision-makers to take the risks in Afghanistan. Besides, Turkey would send non-combat troops to Afghanistan and would not participate in combat missions. Lastly, before sending troops, Turkey contacted nearly all the groups in Afghanistan including the Taliban (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, August 26, 2013). These contacts would decrease the risk for Turkish troops in Afghanistan.

In short, there were minimal risks in sending troops to Afghanistan. This is confirmed by the paired comparison analysis, where the risk aversion variable comes in as the second least influential factor. The risk perceptions of the decision-makers were not high because of the nature of the troops' mission in Afghanistan and the geographic distance of the target country. Moreover, US pressure over Iraq caused Afghanistan to be seen, in comparison to Iraq, as a less risky area in which to join a military coalition.

#### **4.2.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

The strong reaction immediately after 9/11 became weakened over time and Turkey's interest in Afghanistan became influential at the expense of the terrorism issue (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 17, 2013). Turkey's good relations with Afghanistan are historically rooted. An important figure in the last decades of Empire, Cemal Paşa, along with several military officers established an exemplary regular army unit and opened a military school in Afghanistan (Uca, 2009). He informed Mustafa Kemal, as the leader of the independence movement in

Anatolia, of his activities. On 21st December 1920, Mustafa Kemal sent a letter to the Minister of Defense, Fevzi Paşa, that ordered him to send a group of military officers. In the letter Mustafa Kemal (1920) gave details of the mission that the “committee is not to involve itself in politics but to focus on military affairs and win the sympathy of the Afghan, Turkistan and Bukhara people.” The reference to different ethnic groups indicates another aspect of the policy: equal treatment of all groups.

The purpose was to help Afghanistan form a strong military, as defense against the neighboring British colony of India. In time of war this request indicates the importance given to pursuing this policy. Furthermore, the idea was to open another front against Britain, actually within its colonies, as a potential bargaining chip at the negotiation table.

This policy was institutionalized, and was later expanded to different areas of expertise as part of two alliance agreements signed in 1921 and 1928. In the agreement, (1928) Turkey guaranteed to: “.....choose professionals in the areas of law, science and military and give them into the service of the Afghan government in order to develop and improve the Afghan national education and army.” Thus, Turkish scholars established the first medical school, law and political science faculties in Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup>

In brief, there is a tradition of Turkey sending professionals, especially military officers, to Afghanistan. This is the reason for popular sayings in Afghanistan such

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<sup>10</sup> The first medical school in Afghanistan was established by Prof. Kamil Rıfkı Urgan in 1932. The first law school and political science departments were established by Prof. M. Ali Dağpınar in 1938.

as: “With a Turkish officer, an Afghan soldier, and German weapons, an army becomes invincible” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, August 26, 2013). Or “No Afghan was ever killed by a Turkish bullet” and “No Afghan trained by Turks has ever betrayed his country” (Erman, 2010: 41).

This historical legacy still exists in Afghanistan, and recent developments in the country have endorsed this historical understanding. Even the Taliban showed respect to Turkey and Turkish institutions in Afghanistan. One of the cabinet members said:

They had a special approach to Turkey. The only Embassy that the Taliban did not enter was the Turkish Embassy and the only institution that was standing in Kabul was the Ataturk Pediatric Hospital (Cocuk Hastanesi). Besides, we saw huge respect given to the Turkish troops in the country. Thus, we could not send troops for combat missions under such circumstances. (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, July 18, 2013).

The Afghan groups that participated in the Bonn meeting, made a call to Turkey to join ISAF forces (High Level Bureaucrat III, personal communication, October 11, 2013). US Ambassador Robert Pearson asserts that they knew Turkey was highly regarded in Afghanistan, hence they asked for Turkey’s help (Personal communication, April 8, 2013). Additionally, during encounters with Afghan leaders about the possibility of sending Turkish troops, the Afghans stated they welcomed Turkish troops, but warned Turkish officials about sending combat troops. The overthrown President of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, after his meeting with Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, stated that: “We need only logistical support from friendly countries; we have enough forces to fight the Taliban” (“Rabbani Sezer’den Lojistik Destek İstedi,” 2001). Furthermore, it was argued that “it is better for the Turkish forces to make long-lasting contributions, rather than being involved in combat operations” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer Rabbani ile Görüştü,” 2001). One of

the participants of these meetings confirmed that Rabbani said to Sezer “You were always with us through history. Yet, no Afghan died from a Turkish bullet. Do not let it happen” (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, July 19, 2013).

Other groups contacted in Afghanistan gave similar reactions. They welcomed Turkish troops and argued: “better to have Turkish troops here rather than others.” Nevertheless, they made similar warnings such as: “...never enter an Afghan house without consent and beware the Turkish bullets do not kill any Afghan” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, August 26, 2013).

In short, Turkish decision-makers decided to send troops to Afghanistan but restricted their mission to non-combat operations. Nearly all decision-makers referred to this historical background in explaining Turkey’s sending non-combat troops to Afghanistan. According to the paired comparison analysis conducted with the decision-makers, interest in the issue/enhance influence comes as the fourth most important factor in the decision.

The cautious approach arising from historic relations was mentioned as “national constraint”, and during their mission in Afghanistan Turkish troops avoided joining operations that had any risk of close combat, such as counter-terrorism and drug trafficking operations (“TSK’dan Afganistan Açıklaması,” 2012). When Turkish troops arrived in Afghanistan they implemented a different form of rules of engagement. The loose structure of ISAF allowed Turkish troops to act in relative autonomy. They did not enter Afghan houses without consent, did not search women, conducted their patrols on foot and kept their weapons to pointed to the ground

during their patrols, as a symbol of their intention not to engage (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, August 26, 2013; High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, July 19, 2013).

#### **4.2.5. Alliance dependence**

Turkey's alliance dependency on the US was the most important factor in the decision. According to one of the cabinet members: "the US was the primary factor in the decision if not the only one" (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, July 14, 2013). There were several particular reasons for alliance dependency to gain importance in the decision.

Turkey was still under the influence of the economic crisis 2000-2001 during the period when the decision was taken. In this context, it needed financial assistance. It is hard to claim a direct relationship between Turkey sending troops to Afghanistan and the financial assistance of the IMF. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the position of Turkey, and its close cooperation with the US, facilitated the realization of desperately needed support from the IMF.

According to Öniş (2009), the IMF extended its generosity in line with the increased importance of Turkey for US foreign policy. He argues that:

The role of the IMF should be examined in line with the foreign policy objectives of the US...Turkey benefited from its geo-strategic location...whose importance became even more important in the post-September 11 global context. What is significant is that the IMF was able to devote its resources on a much larger scale compared to the meager amounts in the pre-crisis context. The amount of financial assistance not only rendered the IMF far more

powerful in the policy space, but also allowed Turkey to ride over the crisis much more smoothly than would otherwise have been the case.

Şaban Kardaş argues for an “assistance-cooperation formula” which refers to Turkish support for the war on terror, against US assistance on the EU bid, on a solution of the Cyprus issue, along with the IMF money (Kardaş, 2011: 32). This argument was debated at the time as well. One ANAP MP argued that: “Turkey opened a new page with the US” since it endorsed the latter without hesitation, and sent troops to Afghanistan. In return the Bush administration increased its assistance to Turkey (Cemal, 2002).

Indeed, the entire list of issues for US assistance is a long one. During Prime Minister Ecevit’s visit to the US, a list longer than that mentioned above includes: avoiding an operation that divides Iraq; taking the lead in ISAF; over-looking the Foreign Military Sales debts (4 billion dollars); increasing the textile quotas; signing an FTA; 2-billion-dollar grant support for Turkish military modernization and reimbursement for the costs of sending troops to Afghanistan (Birand, 2001). Yet, Ecevit was realist enough to not expect miracles on these issues once Congress became involved (Sazak, 2002).

In short, one of the most important factors was dependency on the US as the coalition leader that asked for troops from Turkey. According to the paired comparison analysis, the alliance dependency variable is one of the most influential factors along with legitimacy by UNSC resolution and NATO decision in the decision to send troops for non-combat missions. Turkey did not want to reject its ally’s request after a major attack. Besides, Turkey was seeking US political support on economic issues,

the EU bid, and the Cyprus issue. Dependency on the coalition leader, together with the UNSC and NATO legitimacy, created an international environment that encouraged countries to join the coalition. Nonetheless, Turkey's interest in the region and the special relation with Afghanistan restricted the contribution to non-combat troops.

#### **4.2.6. Decision making process**

As for the authoritative decision unit, this comprised three coalition party leaders with bureaucratic influence, both civilian and military, as outlined in terms of the first decision above (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 3, 2013; MHP MP I, personal communication, July 10, 2013). Since there was no actor or group having the authoritative power to decide, a coalition as an authoritative decision-making unit was determined. There was no disagreement among the decision-makers about contributing to the coalition. None of the actors blocked or resisted the decision to send troops for non-combat missions. Thus, the decision was taken by consensus.

Furthermore, since parliamentary approval had already been obtained, there was no significant pressure on the government over this decision. The decision could have been taken by the Council of Ministers alone, and it was also seen to be totally in favor. However, public opposition to sending troops to Afghanistan continued. Indeed, along with Poland, the least public support for the coalition among the countries included in the ISAF missions was in Turkey. Nevertheless, public opinion

was not influential in the decision-making process, since the decision occasion was not close to any election cycle (Marton & Nik, 2012).

In brief, despite the decision-making unit being a coalition, the process did not end with stable deadlock or fragmented symbolic action, with the actors in the coalition decision-making unit refraining from exercising their veto. Thus, the process ended smoothly. Since there was a consensus on the decision, the decision-making process itself appeared to be less influential in the decision outcome. In line with this, according to the paired comparison analysis the decision-making process was the third least influential factor in the decision.

#### **4.2.7. Military capability**

According to Correlates of War Project/national material capabilities, in 2002 Turkey's military expenditures were 8,034,000 USD, iron and steel production was 16446 tons, military personnel was 515 thousand (The Correlates of War Project/National Material Capabilities, n.d.). Yet, military capability was not an issue in the avoidance of combat missions; rather it was a deliberate choice due to Turkey's relations with the Afghan people. The decision-makers saw the potential for a greater contribution within non-combat missions (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 17, 2013). The Turkish military had the capability for peacekeeping operations. Despite the fact that the Turkish military is a conscript army rather than a professional one, there is a brigade allocated for such purposes. The 28<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Infantry Brigade stationed in Mamak, Ankara specialized in peace-keeping operations and the troops sent to Afghanistan came from this brigade ("Türk



Askeri Afganistan'da," 2002). Since the same brigade played a part in similar missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, it was also experienced. Thus, in terms of military capability there was no problem.

In terms of military devices there were minor problems during the take over as the lead of ISAF forces, in later phases of the operation. Nevertheless, this issue was not a matter of concern during the time of the original decision to send troops. The Turkish military did not have sophisticated communication devices in order to lead the ISAF mission. These communication devices were taken from the British forces, which had been the first leader of the ISAF forces, and the issue was resolved (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, July 19, 2013).

In short, on this occasion military capability was not a barrier for the decision-makers. According to the paired comparison analysis, the military capability variable is the least influential factor acting on the decision. Other than special operation forces, Turkey had a brigade specialized as peacekeeping forces and it also had experience of such missions. There were minor issues on devices, which was not a problem in the initial phase. The only issue was the financial costs, which were provided by the coalition leader.

#### **4.2.8. Evaluation of the decision**

The second decision to send troops to Afghanistan for non-combat missions has quite similar dynamics to the first decision. The alliance dependency on the coalition

leader, legitimacy by UNSC resolution and NATO decision and interest in the region/enhance influence, were again the most influential factors in the decision. Nonetheless, the impact factor of these variables has changed. The UNSC resolution and NATO decision variables weight in the ranking in comparison to alliance dependency decreased to a non-significant level.

**Table 13: Decision Occasion-2b Paired Comparison Analysis Summary**

	Alliance dep.	UNSC resolution	NATO decision	Enhance influence	DM process	Risk aversion	Military capability
Weights	0.00	0.02	0.03	1.02	1.49	2.34	3.15
Rank	1	2	3	4	6	5	7

Since the operation was essentially a peace-keeping mission under the UN umbrella, this direct involvement of the UN increased the legitimacy of the operation and distinguished the character of this mission from the former. Thus, international legitimacy and collective defense issues progressed one step further. Nonetheless, the alliance dependency was still one of the most influential factors in the decision. Since the country was trying to recover from a major economic crisis, and needed support for political issues such as the EU bid and the Cyprus issue, this time the decision-makers were influenced by the economic dependence of Turkey.

It may be argued that the collective defense idea along with the NATO decision was still applicable. As the fourth factor, Turkey had historical relations with Afghanistan and the operation was quite similar to previous historical actions. Turkey would train the Afghan Army and contribute to the rebuilding activities.

Lastly, the decision-making process, risk aversion and military capability variables were the least influential factors in the decision. The decision-making process was not influential in the decision, limited risks were disregarded by the decision-makers and avoidance of combat missions was not due to military capability. Rather the issue was about relations with the Afghan people.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **IRAQ WAR (2003)**

In this chapter, cases from the Iraq War in 2003 are examined for Turkey's coalition policy. There are three-decision occasions studied for this analysis. The first decision occasion was the parliamentary vote on March 1st, 2003. The US request to station its troops on Turkish territory, and have use of airbases and airspace, was brought to parliament, but the necessary majority was not obtained. The second decision occasion was again a parliamentary vote on March 20th, 2003. The US' request for opening airspace for US missiles and aircrafts was approved by the parliament on this decision occasion. The last decision occasion was the October 7th, 2003 parliamentary decision to send non-combat troops to Iraq to join the Coalition of the Willing (CoW). These three cases will be examined in detail.

### **5.1. Decision Occasion 1: Parliament's Rejection of Bill On March 1st, 2003**

The war planning began after the fall of Kabul in November 2001 (Ricks, 2006: 32). As had been the case in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks planned the operation in Iraq. Franks' planning took the form of "robust, reduced and unilateral" options according to the level of cooperation from Iraq's neighbors (Franks & McConnell, 2004: 334-335). In President Bush's words, the plan "envisioned a fast invasion from Kuwait in the south, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the west, and Turkey in the north" (Bush, 2010: 234; Woodward, 2004: 83). Franks had concerns about the level of cooperation, especially with Turkey, so he argued that the President had to ask his famous "Are you with us or against us?" question to the "region's leaders" if only for the sake of success (Franks & McConnell, 2004: 352-353).

The plan was not receiving the support of all involved. For instance, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had his reservations when he stated:

Some 80,000 going through Turkey?...This is a new Islamic government that can't handle all of this... I think they can handle the air space...when you talk about moving an armored division overland through the length of Anatolia... with a long huge train behind it, huge numbers of vehicles, going to invade another Muslim country... I don't think we can get it and we're taking a risk at losing it all by going for that. Rumsfeld and Franks deemed it essential (Woodward, 2004: 325).

Secretary of State Powell was marginalized and in the end, he did not raise opposition to the issue (R. Pearson, personal communication, April 8, 2014). General Franks was committed to the idea that a northern front would facilitate the operation by "dividing the attention and resources of Saddam's regime" and it would be faster to "safeguard

the oilfields near Kirkuk and prevent ethnic fighting between Kurds and Arabs” (Gordon & Trainor, 2006: 111).

The negotiations started with Cheney’s visit to Ankara when the US asked for Turkey’s political support, access to Northern Iraq for a two-front war and involvement of Turkish Armed Forces in the coalition as peace-keepers (R. Pearson, personal communication, April 8, 2014; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014). However, this first approach did not produce tangible results since an early election was called. An out-going government in stasis was not in any position to decide on such an important issue before the elections. After the new government had been sworn into office, the issue came to the table. Since time was limited, the bill that authorized American soldiers to examine the condition of the facilities, and necessary modernization, was passed in early February.

Meanwhile negotiations were going on for a memorandum of understanding. At the end of these negotiations, a bill would be presented authorizing 37,742 US troops to be stationed in Turkey, passing from the ports of Iskenderun and Mersin via railways and highways to Northern Iraq. Furthermore, the use of Turkish airspace for aircraft and Tomahawk missiles, the stationing of a total 320 aircraft and use of bases at Incirlik, Diyarbakir, Batman and Mus, with backups in Çorlu, Afyon, Sabiha Gökçen and Oğuzeli, would be provided by the Turkish government (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 32). In return the US government agreed for Turkish troops to be stationed 40km inside Northern Iraq (*yağmur hattı*), and weapons given to Kurdish groups would be recollected with Turkey monitoring the process (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 47-48; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014).

Nevertheless, the bill did not secure the necessary majority of votes in the Turkish Parliament on March 1st, 2003. According to official report of Turkish Parliament, from the 533 members of parliament present, 264 voted in favor, 250 against the resolution, while 19 abstained. Since it needed an absolute majority, the bill fell short by 3 votes.

This result caused reactions in the US, particularly within the Bush administration. US President Bush stated that he “was frustrated and disappointed... Turkey, our NATO ally, had let America down” (Bush, 2010: 250). Furthermore, he and Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, blamed Turkey for the years of insurgency in Iraq after the war, claiming it happened due to the absence of the northern front (Bush, 2010: 250; Rumsfeld, 2011: 520). Vice President Cheney explained the decision as the “worrisome change” of Turkey pointing out the Islamist characteristics of the new government (Cheney, 2011: 379). However, not everyone agrees with these criticisms, and some have argued for the result to be seen as normal in a democratic decision-making process (R. Pearson, personal communication, April 8, 2014).

The factors resulting in this decision to avoid joining the US-led coalition will be examined through seven independent variables. In order to rank these independent variables, a paired comparison analysis was conducted with ten decision-makers. The results of the paired comparison analysis indicate the level of influence of the independent variables in a comparative manner.

**Table 14: Decision Occasion-3a Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	DM proc.	Risk aver.	All. dep.	Enhance Influence	UNSC res.	NATO dec.	Military cap.
DM process	0.00	0.84	3.49	1.18	1.18	3.49	3.49
Risk aversion	-0.84	0.00	0.84	1.18	1.18	3.49	3.49
Alliance dependence	-3.49	-0.84	0.00	0.00	3.49	3.49	3.49
Enhance influence	-1.18	-1.18	0.00	0.00	0.84	1.18	3.49
UNSC resolution	-1.18	-1.18	-3.49	-0.84	0.00	1.18	3.49
NATO decision	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-1.18	-1.18	0.00	3.49
Military capability	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	0.00
Sum	-13.67	-9.34	-6.14	-3.15	2.02	9.34	20.94
Mean	-1.95	-1.33	-0.88	-0.45	0.29	1.33	2.99
Weights	0.00	0.62	1.07	1.50	2.24	3.28	4.94
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

According to the analysis, the decision-making process and risk aversion variables ranked first and second. Thus, according to the decision-makers, these two factors were the most influential variables in the decision. There is not much difference in the weight of these variables, thus they may be examined together as strong influence variables. Legitimacy by UNSC resolution, NATO decision, and military capability are ranked as the least influential variables. The alliance dependence to coalition leader and interest in the region/enhance influence variables are grouped as moderately influential. Below the results of the paired comparison analysis will be examined and discussed along with the interview data.



### **5.1.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

The US government was suspicious about the UN from the beginning. There was a debate within the Bush administration about pursuing a UN resolution or abstaining from that process. Eventually, the supporters of going for a UN resolution convinced President Bush and, accordingly, he designed his speech on the issue to be delivered at the UN opening ceremony (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004: 98). Nonetheless, there was no consensus among United Nations Security Council members on the Iraq War. The council members agreed on weapons inspections in Iraq, but they differed in their responses to the result of such inspections.

The Security Council members agreed to pass UNSC Resolution 1441 on November 8th, 2002. The resolution reiterated previous violations of the Iraqi government and earlier decisions of the UNSC on the matter. It underlined the Iraqi violation of UNSC Resolution 687 via inhibiting a complete inspection of weapons by international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which later worked under the name of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The resolution emphasized the Council's commitment to "ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions and restrictions." It offered a "final opportunity" to Iraq and warned the Iraqi government of "serious consequences" in the case of continuation of the violations.

Two institutions, UNMOVIC and IAEA, ran inspections in Iraq after this resolution and their directors, Hans Blix and Mohammed El-Baradei, presented reports to the UNSC. It would seem that the reports were ambivalent in that two groups of countries at the Council interpreted them in different ways (Fitchett, 2003). Whilst the US and the UK moved to initiate another resolution that claimed the Iraqi government had failed to use its final opportunity, France and the Russian Federation tried to pass a resolution that gave more time for inspections (Cockayne & Malone, 2008: 400-401). Thus, the direction of the second resolution became a matter of divergence among UNSC members.

The US and the UK advocated for the non-compliance of Saddam, thus for legitimacy in the use of military force. On the other hand, France was against the idea of “automaticity” which means any non-compliance to the resolution could be interpreted as UN support for the use of force; parallel to this approach Russia was against the idea of a resolution that provided a legal framework for war (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012: 347). Since all Security Council members have a power of veto laid down in the UN Charter, and both sides’ efforts to convince each other fell short, no other resolution on Iraq was passed before the war.

This divergence in the UN Security Council complicated the legitimacy issue in Turkey. Legitimacy and abiding by international law is important in Turkish foreign policy culture, and on this occasion concerns were voiced by different actors. Beforehand, the National Security Council in Turkey declared with its press release dated January 31<sup>st</sup> 2003 that “international legitimacy and consensus are the main principles that guide Turkey’s position on a military operation.” Furthermore, after a

high level summit participated in by the President, Prime Minister, Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs and Chief of General Staff, it was declared “...without a second UN Security Council decision, it would be difficult to obtain a mandate from parliament” (Gözen, 2005: 78). When asked by the US President’s National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, one of the high level Turkish MFA bureaucrats made a similar comment. He responded to Rice’s question as to how Turkey could be brought on board, by saying the country would be on board with “everything apart, international legitimacy and consensus” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). The UNSC resolutions were also regarded as important by the government, since Davutoğlu claimed Tayyip Erdoğan’s December 24th visit to Moscow, and January 14th visit to China, were to monitor UNSC members’ tendencies (Yalçın, 2013: 172).

Later, when it transpired that there would be no consensus at the UNSC, some groups in Turkey continued to insist on legitimacy. They opposed war, claiming the illegitimacy of action based on the lack of a clear resolution that particularly authorized a military action to Iraq. Some were even claiming the unconstitutionality of being a party to war. The main proponent of this idea was the President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, formerly President of the Constitutional Court in Turkey (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014).

On the other hand, actors supporting the move with the US dropped the legitimacy issue. They argued for the primacy of national interests and pointed to the Turkish parliament as a source of legitimacy, rather than the UNSC (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014). The importance of the UN was

questioned and it was argued that another resolution was not necessary (Yetkin, 2003).

Looking at the views of members of parliament, the UN legitimacy had an indirect effect on the decision-makers (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, October 25, 2013). The opposition party, CHP, might not have opposed the bill had there been a UNSC resolution in place (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014). However, since international legitimacy was not the primary concern for all MPs, such a resolution could be seen as superfluous. The paired comparison analysis endorses this premise. According to the paired comparison analysis, the UNSC resolution variable is ranked as the third least influential factor in the decision, so it may be categorized as a low influence variable. The UNSC resolution legitimacy had a limited influence in decision.

### **5.1.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**

US-led military intervention in Iraq caused serious divisions among NATO members. There was no NATO decision to become involved in this war as an institution. Turkey's protection from possible Iraqi aggression became a matter of serious divergence among NATO members but, despite these differences, the issues about Turkey were eventually resolved. Yet, this change did not make NATO's position an influential factor on the decision result.

As in previous military clashes in its region, Turkey requested the invocation of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty in NATO for Iraq. Since the European countries “genuinely did not [perceive a threat from Iraq]” and they were “more averse to war in general,” they refused to be a part of it (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004: 83-85). A division erupted in NATO similar to the UNSC. The European allies resisted any NATO active involvement in the war.

Three countries: France, Germany and Belgium; wanting to veto Turkey’s request to invoke Article 4 before the action, caused the “worst disagreement” within the alliance (Pauly & Lansford, 2005: 94). These countries argued that such a move would give the wrong message that “war has begun and diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis were over” (Segell, 2004: 152). Since NATO takes decisions unanimously, technically even one country could prevent the decision. The disagreements were becoming public, yet the organization rejected the idea of any substance. NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, stated after the meeting, in his press briefing on February 6<sup>th</sup> 2003 that:

The Washington Treaty imposes responsibilities on all NATO members. These responsibilities will be met. Where there has been a disagreement is over when to formally task this military planning. Not whether to plan but when to plan. The Council this afternoon examined the arguments in great detail. We did not reach a final conclusion. But we have put a set of decisions under a silence procedure for agreement early next week.

Possible solutions, such as giving support to Turkey on a bilateral basis, were discussed and the problem was finally solved by underlining the fact that the NATO support was not for the Iraq War but “relates only to the defense of Turkey” (Kopson, 2003: 46). After reaching an agreement at the NATO Defense Planning Committee

Meeting, the alliance agreed on missions of “deployment of AWACS aircraft ... theatre missile defenses and ... allied chemical and biological defense capabilities” and made it public at press briefing on February 16<sup>th</sup> 2003. Thus, before the decision NATO had come to a consensus on the necessary commitments for Turkey’s security against a possible Saddam attack on its territory.

NATO was not in a position to take the lead, or even become actively involved, in the Iraq War. With such division in its ranks, NATO could not play a decisive role in encouraging individual members, including Turkey, to join the coalition (High Level Bureaucrat III, personal communication, October 23, 2013). NATO was regarded as a source of problem during the negotiations, so the US and President Bush told the Turkish side to disregard the opposition in the alliance (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). The main perception was that the game was more about power, rather than legitimacy or international institutions. Thus, for the decision-makers, when compared to other concerns NATO was not an important factor that influenced the decision. One of the cabinet members’ words on NATO’s role illuminated this matter further: “NATO played a role that is as much influential as the Bird Lovers Society in the decision” (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 25, 2013).

According to the paired comparison analysis, the NATO position variable is the second least influential factor in the decision outcome. In short, NATO did not play an important role in encouraging or discouraging Turkey as a member of the alliance

in joining the military coalition for Iraq. It came after the UNSC resolution variable as a secondary source for international legitimacy.

### **5.1.3. Risk aversion**

Turkey was not bothered by the *status quo* in Iraq, yet a war would bring uncertainties (R. Pearson, personal communication, April 8). The risk perception was not about an Iraqi attack on Turkey, that was ruled out by the decision-makers (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2013). The perceived risks were more about the developments during and after the operation, once Turkey had joined the coalition. These risks persuaded the decision-makers to vote against the bill. Parliamentarians from different political parties and different ethnic/ideological backgrounds held diverse and sometimes contradicting risk perceptions. However, they were in consensus about opposing the bill due to these perceived risks.

In terms of the ruling AKP, there were different groups, which could be categorized as “those coming from the Motherland Party; nationalists; and those coming from Kurdish populated regions” (Kardaş, 2006: 322). One of the groups in parliament that perceived risk was the ethnically Kurdish MPs. They were against a war since it posed risks for Kurds. When referring to ‘Kurds’ the MPs had a broad spectrum of groups in mind from the Kurds living in Turkey, to Kurds resident in Iraq and even to PKK members stationed in Northern Iraq (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 25, 2013; AKP MP I, personal communication, October 8, 2013). Kurds living in Turkey would be negatively influenced by the instability

caused by war. Obviously the members of parliament had to act according to their constituencies, to ensure their re-election.

For the Kurds living in Northern Iraq, there was the possibility of the Turkish army clashing with those Kurds. There were allegations about possible lobbying activities by Massoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, one of the major factions in Northern Iraq (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, November 18, 2013). Lastly, along with the agreement with the US, Turkey could conduct operations against the PKK in their camps located in Northern Iraq. Some members of parliament had acted purely to prevent these risks, in particular the ethnically Kurdish members of the AKP mainly held this view. Thus, their negative votes had a major impact in the overall negative consequence of the voting (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). An AKP member claims that the most organized and influential group was the ethnically Kurdish lawmakers (AKP MP II, personal communication, October 25, 2013).

The second risk perception was about the country's image. The decision-makers found cooperation with an outside power to invade a neighboring-Muslim country to be risky in terms of future relations with neighbors. They did not want to look subservient to the US and be part of an invasion with a high probability of civilian deaths. It must be emphasized that the quality of being a neighbor was an important factor (AKP MP I, personal communication, October 8, 2013). One of the cabinet members claimed the reaction would be similar even if the target country was Greece (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, October 25, 2013). However, Iraq being a predominantly Muslim and Arab country had a particular influence that led to



certain religious groups and brotherhoods in Turkey lobbying against war (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 25, 2013). Furthermore, interfering in the domestic matters of an Arab country could invoke Arab nationalism against Turkey in the Middle East. Turkey would be the obvious target within a coalition of non-Arab countries targeting Arab territory, and this was another concern of the decision-makers (High Level Bureaucrat III, personal communication, October 23, 2013). In particular, AKP members with a pious/Islamist background (as/or NOM tradition) subscribed to these risk perceptions (Kardaş, 2006: 324).

The nationalists in the AKP, and especially in the CHP, had different risk perceptions. One of these originated from the high number of US troops to be stationed on Turkish territory. Some Republican People's Party (CHP) members, especially the secular/nationalists (*ulusalcılar*), voiced the concern that “the US will invade Turkey under the pretext of the Iraq War” (Türkmen, 2012: 204). Although this was “illogical” in Füsün Türkmen's words, there was a reaction when people envisioned American boots on Turkish soil (AKP MP I, personal communication, October 8, 2013). There was a genuine risk perception of US troops remaining on Turkish territory for a long time, as had been experienced with Operation Providing Comfort and Operation North Watch (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 25, 2013; Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014).

There was also the perception of risk to sovereignty by accepting the terms of American use of Turkish soil. The idea of not being able to control the stationed US troops was much debated and caused agitation. In his speech in parliamentary talks

CHP Secretary General, Önder Sav, (2003) claimed that Turkish officials, even ministers and the Prime Minister, would not be able to enter facilities and ports provided for the use of the US. Furthermore, he likened the US navy ships and troops in the Mediterranean to the invading combat ships in Istanbul after World War I, and even mistakenly called them “enemy warships.”

Lastly, despite US assurances, some MPs and even people close to the Prime Minister were not convinced about the unity of Iraqi territory, which mainly referred to an independent Kurdish state (Güney, 2005: 348; Olson, 2005: 146). A then advisor to the Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, later commented: “Turkey foresaw the explosion of chaos, the possibility of Iraq’s disintegration after the war, and the difficulty of controlling this” (Yalçın, 2013:176). The outcome did not have to be intentional. They thought that no matter what was written on paper it could result in an independent state in Northern Iraq. As Bill Park (2004: 499) rightly put it the risk was broadly defined as:

...a war with Iraq could – whether by design, default or through opportunistic exploitation of chaos and uncertainty – raise the risk of an enlarged, oil-rich, and more autonomous (if not fully independent) Kurdish self-governing entity emerging in northern Iraqi territory.

The US cooperated with the Kurds during the Iraq War, and the inability of one of their official’s to choose Turkey, when asked to make a decision between Turkey and the Kurds in a televised interview in Turkey, increased the concerns (Yetkin, 2004:175).

These reactions may seem to be exaggerated. Yet, the Kurdish issue and separation of the country as a result of intervention by the major powers have been concerns of the Turkish elite since the Sevres Treaty, with its provisions regarding a Kurdish State to the east of the Euphrates River (Türkmen, 2012: 178-179). It is claimed, “Involvement of the major external powers in Iraq seemed to invoke the traumatic experience of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the war of independence” (Altunışık, 2006: 193). The strategic culture in Turkey was highly influenced by this event, and the elite read developments in the region as steps to divide the country, rather than making a realistic assessment (Aras, 2004: 172). This background may help to make sense of Sav’s analogy with the invasion of Istanbul.

In conclusion, the risk perceptions of parliamentary members were influential in the negative decision. According to the paired comparison analysis, risk aversion ranked second. Yet, since the difference of weight between the decision-making process and risk aversion variables is not significant, these two variables could be taken together as the most influential variables in the decision outcome.

Regarding the risk concerns, they originated from the uncertainty surrounding the operation, and each group perceived different perils from their own point of view. One group had concerns about Kurds. Another group was concerned about being part of a coalition that targeted a neighboring country, and the possible harm this could do to the country’s image. Lastly, the concerns about the establishment of an independent Kurdish state on Turkey’s border were influential on those voting against the bill. It is difficult to determine the ranking of these concerns. Interestingly the

Islamists' concerns differed from others; nationalists and ethnically Kurdish MPs voted for contradicting risk perceptions and purposes. Yet, they all came together to vote against the bill.

#### **5.1.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

In the decision process, the government had beforehand tried to avoid war, whether via “soft” or “aggressive” means” (Yalçın, 2013: 169). Nonetheless, day-by-day it became more obvious that the US would execute its war plans regardless of these attempts. After it turned out that avoidance might not be possible, the cabinet focused on how to minimize Turkey's losses and to maximize benefits if at all possible (Kardaş, 2006: 312; Cabinet Member III, personal communication, October 25, 2013). Thus, the political and military concerns of Turkey in Iraq could only be addressed by joining the coalition. Along with this perspective, Turkey negotiated hard to secure these issues in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Turkey and the US.

Along with these negotiations: “Turkey secured its military interests and the political concerns were just short of a comma related to the status of Turcomans which could have been achievable with approval of the bill” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). The Turcomans are important for Turkey not only because of ethnic affinity, but also to counterbalance the Kurds in Northern Iraq (Oğuzlu, 2004: 320). Thus, in order to guarantee their security and political status in

the future of Iraq, Turkey had to have a say after the operation. This was an important concern for Turkey; yet, later some important decision-makers acknowledged that they had been misguided about the population and political unity of the Turcomans in Iraq (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014).

The MoU would allow Turkey to conduct operations against the PKK and intervene with the US in case Kurds entered the oil rich regions (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 45).

Furthermore, Turkey could enter Iraq along with the US forces and prevent the Kurds from establishing a Kurdish state, and could control certain regions to deny the PKK sanctuary (Yetkin, 2004: 71; Jenkins, 2008: 13). This view was mainly held by the military since this 50km area was strategic in terms of controlling the region (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 23, 2013). Some of the decision-makers were also thinking of this offer as an opportunity to eradicate the PKK from Northern Iraq (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, October 8, 2013). Besides, there was the idea that a Turkish military presence in the region would prevent any unwelcomed development in terms of a Kurdish state. According to one of the cabinet members, in such a case: “There would be no Qandil and Turkey would have control of the region” (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, October 8, 2013).

If Turkey did not become part of the coalition, it would lose the ability to influence developments in Iraq. The Minister of Defense, Vecdi Gönül, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underlined the importance of being involved in the developments and stated that: “If we avoid involvement in this matter, we will be totally excluded from the events happening just beside our borders”. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yaşar Yakış,

asserted: “For our national security and interests we have to be active. We may not remain a bystander to events just next door to Turkey” (“Hayır’da Hayır Yok,” 2003). Furthermore, then leader of AKP, Tayyip Erdoğan, stated that “our decision is based on the necessities of living in this geography, Turkey’s geostrategic interests....and the security concerns of the nation” (“AKP’de Tezkere Sıkıntısı,” 2003). In short, the cabinet came to an agreement that taking the deal was the lesser evil.

Most of the AKP members who voted for the bill were subscribed to the perception of a lesser evil mentioned above. Nevertheless, the necessary majority of parliamentary members did not share this view. According to the paired comparison analysis, the interest in the region/enhance influence variable was regarded as moderately influential after the alliance dependence by the decision-makers. In short, enhancing influence to avoid possible security and political risks, was an influential issue in the decision-making process, yet it did not have sufficient influence to change the decision to pass the bill.

#### **5.1.5. Alliance dependence**

The alliance dependency of Turkey on the US was an important factor in the debate for joining the coalition. Turkey’s need for the assistance of the US continued with regard to several issues. In President Bush’s words, the US administration pledged to: “provide economic and military aid, help Turkey access key programs from the International Monetary Fund, and maintain (our) strong support for Turkey’s admission to the European Union” (Bush, 2010: 250).

The economy was another important issue for Turkey. Turkey had unpleasant experiences of compensation for economic losses from the Gulf War because of its cooperation with the US (Güney, 2005: 348; Altunışık, 2006: 186; Gözen, 2005: 80). More importantly, Turkey had only recently experienced an economic crisis and the Turkish economy was moving in the right direction for recovery. Nonetheless, it was still fragile. A war near Turkey's border could be costly to the Turkish economy. According to a high level bureaucrat, the war could also have been a danger in terms of increasing the risk of investing in Turkey, and result in the withdrawal of money from the Turkish economy. Thus, Turkey, as had been suggested by the IMF, needed the US to guarantee a certain amount of loan or credit as a buffer to relieve the investment market and keep money in the country (High Level Bureaucrat V, personal communication, November 1, 2013). Based on the experience of the Gulf War, the negotiators calculated a projected economic loss based on the Gulf War numbers and asked for partial compensation, which ended up with "horse trading" allegations (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014).

The US and Turkey could not come to an agreement on economic issues at the time of the MoU. Turkey asked for 80-90 billion American dollars from the US, and in response the US offered only 15 billion (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 68-69). Further negotiations ended with the insulting "horse trading" words of President Bush, and the political cartoons that appeared in US newspapers. These cartoons, and the whole American approach to the issue, were regarded as arrogant by parliamentary members

and caused bitter reactions to the US administration (AKP Member I, personal communication, October 8, 2013; Güney, 2005: 348; Olson, 2005: 146).

As another dependency, Turkey needed US assistance in its ongoing relations with the IMF and the World Bank, and the US had a certain influence in both of these institutions (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013).

Interestingly, looking at AKP leader Erdoğan's statements, the economic theme is the dominant one for advocating support for the bill. He reiterated the "billions of American dollar debt" of the country on several occasions, and argued that the people opposing the war would act differently if their paycheck was delayed for three days ("İkna Operasyonu Tamam," 2003; "Tribüne Oynamayın," 2003).

Contrary to Bush's words, support for EU admission was not regarded by Turkey as crucial. Indeed, the Bush administration's pressure over the EU issue turned out to be counterproductive in the early 2000s (Tocci, 2012: 403; High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). Furthermore, influential countries in the EU such as Germany and France were against the war. Indeed, after the Turkish parliament's rejection of the bill on 1st March, European countries developed a more positive attitude towards Turkey (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013).

In conclusion, economic issues were important for the Turkish decision-makers because the Turkish economy was in a delicate recovery process. It needed



guarantees to convince investors and to compensate losses at least partially. Nevertheless, the agreement was not satisfactory for the Turkish side and the US behavior during the negotiations negatively influenced the decision-makers. According to the paired comparison analysis, alliance dependence was moderate influence variable. Thus, it regarded as important by the decisionmakers; yet, not as influential as decision-making process and risk aversion.

#### **5.1.6. Decision making process**

The decision-making process was unique and played the cardinal role in the decision outcome. Thus, it is important to examine the process itself as well. The decision-making unit along with parliament for its legislative function, the president and the Turkish Armed Forces as part of the National Security Council was specified as a coalition of autonomous actors (Taydaş & Özdamar, 2013: 8).

Looking at the autonomous actors in more detail, despite the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is generally active in lobbying and public statements on military matters, this time it remained neutral since it did not want to take political responsibility (Altunışık, 2006: 181,190). Thus, there was no open military declaration by the top cadre of TAF other than statements pointing to the civilian authority, the government, as the sole decision-maker. US General Tommy Franks confirmed the military position of allowing the civilian government to decide the matter from his meeting with Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök, and mentioned his counterpart's reference to the EU process and democratization as the main reasons for

this approach (Franks & McConnell, 2004: 408). The government's attempts to get an NSC decision on the matter failed due to the military's position, and the Head of the Council, President Sezer's opposition to the bill. Thus, the decision was left to the government and the parliament.

Government members were divided over the matter and some ministers even openly declared their opposition (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, October 8, 2013). This division was applicable to party members as well. The ruling AK party had the majority of members in parliament but on this occasion the AKP group itself was revealed as a coalition. The party was ruled by two: Party Leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül and latter was not supporting the bill (Sever, 2015). Some claim that this situation caused a duality that prevented Erdoğan from strongly pushing for his agenda; one of the cabinet members claimed that, had this not been the case, there was no reason for the bill to fail (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, October 8, 2013).

There are other approaches as well. For instance, one of the cabinet members argued that Erdoğan acted like the Prime Minister without officially holding the office. Thus, he rejected the arguments about lack of authority, instead pointed the straw poll and claimed the result would not have changed (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). Since the straw poll before parliamentary voting indicated that the bill would easily be passed by parliament, Erdoğan did not whip the MPs to vote in favor (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). The

straw poll revealed 50 defectors from the party; yet in the actual vote the number was almost 100 (Henke, 2014). Clearly the straw poll gave the wrong impression about the actual vote.

Other people argued that this result was mainly due to lack of experience and knowledge about the necessary number of votes to pass the bill (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). And there are arguments that owing to certain personal traits, Erdoğan let “the process unfold” rather than challenging the constraints (Çuhadar et. al., 2015: 21). There are also claims that Erdoğan made a strategic choice to balance the domestic and international pressures, and did not take a group decision (Özdamar, 2012: 496-497). One way or another, Erdoğan did not bind or try to convince the parliamentarians, rather he left them to their own devices. Thus, the process made parliament the “decision-making authority” (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010: 32).

AKP members got into trouble due to “pressure from its grassroots” (Güney, 2005: 348). The opposition came from both elite groups and public opinion, with the media close to the AKP and opinion leaders being against the bill (Gözen, 2005: 78-79). They were influenced by public opinion, which was strongly against the bill as well. Since the voting date was after a holiday during which MPs went to their constituencies and had close contact with their voters, they would surely have been under the influence of public opinion (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014).

According to the polls in December 2003, 86.7% of respondents; in January 2004, 90% of respondents, were against the war. Furthermore, 61.3% of Turkish people were against parliament's approving and allowing US troops the desired access (Uslu et. al., 2005: 80,106). The bargaining between Turkey and the US on economic incentives did not soothe the public opposition rather the wrong discourse further alienated Turkish people (Sadık, 2009: 47). Furthermore, the the public was active in protesting and lobbying against the bill. Universities such as Hacettepe and Ege, together with labor unions including DISK and KESK, and NGOs such as İnsan Haklari Dernegi (IHD) and Mazlum-Der made declarations and organized protests all around the country ("Savaş Karşıtı Eylemler Sürüyor," 2003).

According to Deniz Bölükbaşı, alongside the influence of public opinion, parliamentary members were not adequately informed before the vote. He and the Under Secretary of the MFA, Uğur Ziyal, were invited to parliament but they did not inform MPs about the MoU during the closed session (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 87). The ruling party had made the voting closed in order not to project a weak government image. Nevertheless, this move encouraged MPs who were against the bill to vote without hesitation (Kapsis, 2006: 39-40). Consequently, the vote failed to pass the bill and parliament could not decide to allow the American troops. Indeed, according to one of the cabinet members: "The issue in a nutshell is that parliament was not able to decide and that is the summary of the whole affair" (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, October 25, 2013).

According to the decision unit framework, there was a dissensus among the autonomous actors and AKP leader Erdoğan did/could not played a pivotal role in order to convince its party members. The end result was a deadlock with the indecision of parliament. According to the paired comparison analysis the most influential variable in the decision-making process along with risk aversion. Thus, the process and risks determined the decision outcome.

#### **5.1.7. Military capability**

According to Correlates of War Project/national material capabilities, in 2003 Turkey's military expenditures were 9,036,000 USD, iron and steel production was 18298 tons, military personnel was 515 thousand (The Correlates of War Project/National Material Capabilities, n.d.). Yet, the military capability was not an issue debated and taken into serious consideration in the decision-making process. According to one of the high level bureaucrats: "We believed that the Turkish military was capable of doing everything that was planned within the memorandum" (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). Furthermore, there was no debate about the readiness of the military in this case, in contrast to the Gulf War. According to one of the cabinet members, the military was just waiting for the signal from the civilian authority (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, October 8, 2013). Thus, the military capability was not a concern and it was also not influential in the decision-making process at all.

The results of the paired comparison analysis endorse these statements. According to the analysis, the military capability variable is ranked as the least influential factor in the decision outcome. Thus, it can be concluded that the decision-makers did not have sufficient concern about Turkish military’s capability to influence the decision-making process.

### 5.1.8. Evaluation of the decision

The independent variables are ranked above according to their level of influence in the decision outcome and have been individually examined. The primary factor in the outcome was the decision-making process followed by risk aversion. Thus, the way the issue was presented and voted on in parliament led to the negative result. The military did not want to carry the political burden, and the government was new and inexperienced hence MPs felt free to make individual choices (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, October 25, 2013; Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 25, 2013).

**Table 15: Decision Occasion-3a Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	DM proc.	Risk aver.	Alliance dep.	Enhance influence	UNSC res.	NATO dec.	Military cap.
Weights	0.00	0.62	1.08	1.50	2.24	3.29	4.94
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Risk aversion was the second most influential factor in the negative outcome. The MPs in parliament rejected the bill according to their diverse personal risk assessments. The war was accompanied by uncertainties and risks for MPs according to their ideologies and backgrounds. These risks were mainly related to possible negative effects on the Kurds, negative influences on Turkey's image, the risks associated with a high number of foreign troops being stationed in Turkey, and the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. The risk assessments on Kurds and a possible Kurdish state would seem to be contradicting each other, since ethnically Kurdish and nationalist MPs subscribed to the same position, but with opposing concerns.

Since the issue was highly controversial, and the number of votes in favor and against the bill was so close, the factors in favor of the bill are seen to be the third and fourth most influential variables in the decision. Thus, the alliance dependence and interest in the region/enhance influence variables follow the first two most influential variables. Alliance dependence was important since Turkey did not want to hurt bilateral relations and needed economic support to protect its recovering economy. Enhancing influence was also an important matter due to Turkey's concerns about the territorial unity of the Iraqi state. Turkey wanted to have a say on a possible Kurdish state and to deny sanctuary to the PKK in Northern Iraq. However, these two factors were not enough to change the decision.

The UNSC resolution had a relatively low influence on the issue, with the NATO decision and military capability also not playing any significant role in the decision outcome. Since the international actors were divided in both the UNSC and NATO, this division marginalized their influence. Finally, the issue of military capability was not part of the debate at all.

## **5.2. Decision Occasion 2: Parliamentary Decision to Open Airspace (March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003)**

The rejection of the 1st March Bill, based on a negotiated agreement to meet the needs of both sides, brought a new dimension to the issue. The US decided to conduct the Iraqi operation solely from the south, yet it still needed Turkey for permission to use air space and logistical support. In return, Turkey was concerned about being sidelined from the developments in Iraq. Furthermore, there were also worries about a backlash from the 1st March decision, especially on the Turkish economy and the country's political standing in the international arena.

Indeed, the 1st March decision surprised the US side and the neo-conservatives in particular felt betrayed by the Turkish administration (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). For instance, Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, described the decision as a “big mistake” since he claimed the deal between the two countries was of greater benefit to Turkey than the US (Küntay, 2011: 164).



On the other hand, some others such as Assistant Secretary of State, Marc Grossman, and the US Ambassador to Ankara, Robert Pearson, argued the necessity of respect for a democratic decision (Küntay, 2011: 162; R. Pearson, personal communication, April 8, 2014). In a partially self-blaming approach Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, regarded the issue “very likely...avoidable” via Secretary of State, Powell, on his visits to Ankara, and/or Bush and Cheney’s “appeal to Turkish leadership” (Rumsfeld, 2011: 451).

After the rejection of the bill by the Turkish parliament, the US kept its 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry in the Mediterranean for some time, despite the failure of the bill. This would seem to have been done as deception for Iraq, behaving as if there was a secret agreement with Turkey and all would be revealed just before the campaign started (Franks & McConnell, 2004: 429). Nevertheless, the US did not request another bill featuring the same terms. The Turkish Prime Minister’s question to US officials as to whether: “The previous MoU is on the table or not” drew a negative response from the American authorities (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, October 25, 2013). The US government would not accept the same terms enshrined within a new bill, since Congress was not on board (R. Pearson, personal communication, April 8, 2014). Later, praise from European and Arab countries on Turkey’s democratic decision consolidated the Turkish stance throughout this process (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014).

Thus, neither party could obtain the negotiated gains. The US had no permission to use any facility and the airspace belonged solely to Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey lost the negotiated political, economic and military gains. The debate on the use of Turkish territory was over, but the US forces needed permission to use Turkey's airspace. After the war began, the US asked for over flight rights for both aircraft and Tomahawk missiles. Furthermore, the US needed access for supply routes, otherwise it would be in a difficult position with regard to supplies (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014). This request also necessitated parliamentary approval.

Meanwhile, AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan managed to officially hold the position of prime minister. Thus, on this decision occasion not only the terms of the agreement have changed, but also the government of Turkey and, therefore, the composition of the decision-making group had been transformed. An amendment to the Turkish criminal code enabled Erdoğan to be nominated from Siirt in repeat elections on March 9th 2003 (Bila, 2003: 244). After being elected as a member of parliament, Erdoğan established a new government that gained the vote of confidence on March 18th, 2003 (Bila, 2003: 244). The new government passed another resolution and brought it to the parliament floor on March 20th, 2003. The new resolution was to both allow the government to send Turkish troops to Northern Iraq, and also to fully open Turkish airspace.

According to official report of parliament (2003b), at the end of the session, from 535 members, 332 voted in favor and 202 voted against the bill, with 1 abstention. Thus, the bill passed through parliament and the US was able to use Turkey's airspace for bombing and transfer of personnel and vehicles. Indeed, they were able to transfer armored vehicles (Abram tanks) and SOF which deceived the Iraqi military into thinking they were the northern front (Franks & McConnell, 2004: 501).

In return the US agreed to allow 1,000-1,500 Turkish Special Forces to remain in Northern Iraq, but Turkey's request to station 20,000 troops on the border to prevent a flow of refugees was rejected (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 110-120). Compared with the previous agreement Turkey only gained a green light to keep its SOF stationed in Northern Iraq. It did not receive either the desired financial assistance or the guarantees for the Turcomans (Gordon & Trainor, 2006: 344). Furthermore, US President Bush announced Turkey as being part of the CoW to the outside world, but in bilateral terms Turkey's involvement was not regarded as significant in terms of field contributions from an ally (R. Pearson, personal communication, April 8, 2014).

Looking at the reasons behind the decision taken by the Turkish parliament, the same seven variables were tested with a paired comparison analysis. The variables and their rank in influence on the decision are examined in detail at Table 16.

**Table 16: Decision Occasion-3b Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	All. dep.	Interest/ inf.	NATO dec.	UNSC res.	Risk aver.	DM proc.	Military cap.
Alliance dependence	0.00	1.18	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49
Enhance influence	-1.18	0.00	0.52	3.49	3.49	1.18	3.49
NATO decision	-3.49	-0.52	0.00	-0.84	-0.52	0.52	3.49
UNSC resolution	-3.49	-3.49	0.84	0.00	0.00	0.52	3.49
Risk aversion	-3.49	-3.49	0.52	0.00	0.00	0.84	3.49
DM process	-3.49	-1.18	-0.52	-0.52	-0.84	0.00	3.49
Military Capability	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	0.00
Sum	-18.63	-10.99	1.36	2.13	2.13	3.06	20.94
Mean	-2.66	-1.57	0.19	0.30	0.30	0.44	2.99
Weights	0.00	1.09	2.85	2.96	2.96	3.10	5.65
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

According to analysis, the alliance dependence on the coalition leader emerged as the most influential variable in the decision. In particular, the timing of the decision, coming after the March 1st rejection, caused worries about exacerbations in bilateral relations with the US, and that played a major role in passing this second bill. The second most influential variable is interest in the region/enhance influence in the region. Looking at its weight, it is a moderate influence variable rather than a strong one. The rest of the variables are regarded low influence variable by the decision-makers. And, the least influential factor turned out to be the military capability variable among them.

### **5.2.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

There was already a division among UNSC members before the first decision occasion of March 1st. Previously, UNSC Resolution 1441, urged the Iraqi government to fully cooperate with the weapon inspectors as a last chance. After the report of the inspection institutions to the UN, two groups at the Security Council disagreed about whether the report legitimized the use of force or not. The division at UNSC became more apparent before the second bill was introduced to the Turkish parliament. Thus, the rift between the two opposing groups in the Security Council widened in March.

France, Germany (non-permanent member of UNSC) and Russia declared that they “would not let a resolution pass that would authorize force” on March 5th, 2003 (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012: 353). In response to France’s threat to veto any resolution that legitimized the use of force, the US, UK and Spain (non-permanent member of UNSC) agreed to withdraw their resolution from the UN Security Council (Cockayne & Malone, 2008: 401). Indeed, according to UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, “Washington never believed it needed” a second resolution (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012: 349). Thus, the coalition agreed to proceed without a UN resolution and started the campaign. Once the US-led coalition had entered Iraq, Kofi Annan, declared: “It is a sad day for the United Nations” and made public his disappointment on the failure to reach an agreement at UNSC (“Annan highlights Iraqis’ ‘plight’,” 2003).

However, the negative atmosphere at the UNSC did not primarily concern the decision-makers in Turkey. According to one of the high-level bureaucrats, if there was concern expressed about the decision of the UN Security Council, it would be harder to pass the bill in parliament (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, November 18, 2013). President Sezer announced that he held the same reservations about international legitimacy; thus, his position had not changed, and he “did not approve of the unilateral act carried out by the US” (“Sezer: ABD Harekatını Doğru Bulmuyorum,” 2003).

The AKP leaders were not in line with the President. They were mostly focused on the damaged relations with the US. The focus on the alliance problems decreased the UN influence on the decision-makers. Indeed, some even argued once the operation was underway: “talking about the UN became redundant” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). Thus, the focus shifted to minimize the negative effects of the campaign rather than continuing with debates on legitimacy issues.

According to the paired comparison analysis the UNSC resolution variable was placed among the least influential variables. Thus, alliance dependency and the risk of losing this ally, subordinated the UN legitimacy. Thus, the role of UN legitimacy was further marginalized in the second decision occasion in comparison to the first one.

### **5.2.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**

NATO experienced a similar division among its UNSC members. France, Germany and Belgium, as the NATO member countries that were against war in Iraq, questioned the NATO role in Turkey's security in the context of an offensive war in Iraq. Since NATO was a defense pact, these members questioned its role in the Iraq context (High Level Bureaucrat VI, personal communication, October 28, 2013). Yet, the US administration was confident about its ability to convince other NATO members, and assured Turkey that it should ignore the negative voices in the alliance (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). After the problem was solved, NATO sent the necessary capability into Turkey's service as protection.

Nonetheless, the operation was not a NATO-led operation, nor was it based on the consensus of all NATO member countries. Furthermore, the contributions of allies were provided on a bilateral basis rather than through NATO. Interestingly, even the staunchly antiwar countries did not abstain from providing logistical support to the US during the campaign, on a bilateral basis. Countries that included France, Germany and Belgium opened their airspace, and in addition to airspace Germany opened its airbases and Belgium opened its ports to the US ("Savaşa Karşı Çıkanlar da ABD'ye Destek," 2003).

In short, contributions to the coalition were made on a bilateral basis and NATO did not play an important role in Iraq. According to the paired comparison analysis, the NATO decision was ranked the third influential factor but its weight is too high for a strong or even moderate influence in the decision outcome. Turkey's decision to open

its airspace was a product of bilateral relations with the US, and did not take place via the NATO channel. NATO's role as an encouraging actor for Turkey was not applicable as in the Afghanistan case (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). NATO protection was important, yet, it was not a primary concern or driving power in the decision to pass the 20th March Bill and open the airspace for US air assets.

### **5.2.3. Risk aversion**

The type of contribution to the coalition expected from Turkey was not accompanied by high risks. In particular, the risk perceptions from the first decision occasion were not applicable. For instance, there were no worries about US troops remaining on Turkish territory (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014). Thus, the risk perception about the country's sovereignty was abandoned.

Since the campaign began without a northern front some risk assessments made before the war became invalid. However, the risks associated with the territorial integrity of Iraq, together with the possibility of a Kurdish state being established, were still applicable. Yet, Turkey was not in any position to stop the war.

The bill did not include sending troops to combat zones which eliminated the risk of casualties, and there was no huge risk perception attached to opening the airspace. Since a long term no-flight zone was implemented before the operation, risks from Iraqi aircraft were mostly ruled out (Cabinet Member I, personal communication,



May 9, 2014). Baghdad was under bombardment and it was not in a position to attack Turkey. It could only send suicide bombers, which indeed were not usual before the Iraq war itself (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). A clash over Turkish airspace was unlikely, yet there could always be accidents and a Tomahawk missile did indeed fall near Şanlıurfa (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 105).

According to the paired comparison analysis, the risk aversion variable is a less influential variable coming in the second tier with UN and NATO legitimacy and the decision-making process variables. In short, the risks were pretty limited and did not have a major influence over the decision-makers.

#### **5.2.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

After the rejection of the March 1st bill by the Turkish parliament, the US administration declared its opposition against a unilateral Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq. Under Secretary of State, Marc Grossman, publicly stated this position and later US President George Bush himself told Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan that they were against an uncoordinated involvement of Turkish forces in Northern Iraq (“Grossman: K. Irak’a Yalnız Giremezsiniz,” 2003; Bölükbaşı, 2008: 97).

These developments increased worries at both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and within the Turkish Armed Forces about “remaining out of the game” (Yetkin, 2004: 185). For instance, Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök, stated: “We made all the calculations

based on a bill that would be passed. We may not remain uninterested (kayıtsız) in Iraq. We are obliged to find a new formula” (“Derin Çatlak,” 2003). Thus, there were concerns about the future of Iraq, and its influences on Turkey. Besides, Turkey could play a role in the reconstruction of Iraq after the war.

Nevertheless, there were limits on the maneuvering ability of Turkey in the context of it having an influence. Firstly, the terms of the MoU negotiated for the first decision occasion were not applicable for this bill. Secondly, the US administration was so furious with Turkey, that the atmosphere was not appropriate for demanding such political and economic involvement in Iraq (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 25, 2013). Indeed, by rejecting the previous bill the Turkish side effectively lost its ability to negotiate and demand (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, October 25, 2013).

According to the paired comparison analysis, the interest in the region/enhance influence is the second influential parameter in the decision. The decision-makers had concerns about their ability to influence developments in Iraq. Nonetheless, any harm done to relations with the US could have broader consequences, hence the alliance dependence variable was more important. Furthermore, solving the problems with the US could ease the Turkish position in Iraq as well. Thus, enhancing influence in the future of Iraq was important, yet subordinated to the alliance dependence.

### **5.2.5. Alliance dependence**

Alliance dependence played an immense role in the decision to open airspace. The negative influence of the March 1st bill caused concerns for the decision-makers. The parliament's inability to pass the 1st March bill, despite there being a majority of ruling party members, was not welcomed by the US administration. US President George Bush (2010) stated that he "...was frustrated and disappointed. On one of the most important requests...ever made, Turkey, our NATO ally, had let America down." Under Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, blamed the military because of its lack of leadership for the rejection of the bill (Altaylı, 2003). Thus, the military to military relations were harmed as well. Indeed, the American troops waiting in the Mediterranean caused bitter exchanges even between one star and two star generals (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). Hence, the American authorities' reaction to the failure of the bill increased concerns in Turkey.

Due to dependency on the US, the government had concerns about "being marginalized in international politics and facing an economic crisis" (Yetkin, 2004: 180). On the first issue, the government concern about "being marginalized" was not solely related to international politics. There were concerns about the possible effects on domestic politics as well. Most of the AKP members had a background in the National Outlook Movement, and they had legitimacy problems. There were claims that the top two leaders of AKP were concerned that they might face the same fate as a previous Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, who prematurely initiated the D-8

project and afterwards had to leave the office as his party was closed down (AKP MP I, personal communication, October 8, 2013).

On the second issue, there were also economic concerns since the Turkish economy was fragile after the 2000-2001 economic crises. One of the high level bureaucrats argued that speculations of a crisis after the rejection of the March 1st bill were baseless. He claimed that the government perceived exacerbating relations with the US as having an influence on international financial institutions, namely the IMF, to make it harder for Turkey to extend agreements, complicate the requirements for funds and also have a negative effect on foreign investment entering the country (High Level Bureaucrat V, personal communication, November 1st 2013). Besides, there would be economic losses due to the effects of war on Turkey's investment in the target country; trade with and through Iraq would also be negatively affected by war (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). Thus, the economy would be negatively influenced without the country being a party to the war, cooperation with the US could help obtain at least partial compensation.

Lastly, the individual contributions of the US's other allies had a certain influence on Turkish decision-makers. A refusal to open the airbases for war could end up as a major blow to the alliance. As President Bush highlighted in his letter dated March 13th, Turkey remained the only NATO member that had not declared its airspace open (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 97). Even countries that had blocked the UNSC resolution, including France as the most vocal country in opposition to the US use of force,

opened their airspace (McCabe, 2010: 100). Thus, rejection of airspace rights would hurt the alliance badly. According to one of the high level bureaucrats, “.....all the others were helping the US and Turkey could do it as well” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). Thus, Turkey’s counterparts’ cooperation with the US was a pushing factor for opening airspace.

According to the paired comparison analysis, the alliance dependence variable was revealed as the most influential factor in the decision outcome. Some decision-makers even argue for the limited influence of all other variables (AKP MP I, personal communication, October 8 2013). Thus, the bill was mainly passed to “appease the American government” and the primary concern was to prevent further antagonizing of the ally (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). This was due to perceived negative economic effects and political abandonment if the request were to be rejected.

#### **5.2.6. Decision-making process**

The decision-making process was not as important as in the previous case. The decision unit in this case was again a coalition of autonomous actors of parliament, military and the presidency (Taydaş & Özdamar, 2013: 8). Indeed, the result of the first vote in parliament indicated the need for a “stronger” leadership (Kesgin & Karboo, 2010: 32) In line with this, the change in leadership and its strength, and

additionally the change in the type of contribution to the coalition, led to an agreement among these actors.

This time the military did not remain silent as it had at the time of the previous bill. The Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök, made public statements supporting another bill. Özkök stated: “The position of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is the same as that of the government as it presented the draft bill to parliament” (“2. Tezkereye Erken Tavsiye,” 2003). Most of the AKP members were not resistant to the new bill, which was limited to opening airspace (Cabinet Member VI, personal communication, October 30, 2013).

In the AKP group, the two-headed government was over and the party leader, Tayyip Erdoğan, had become Prime Minister. Thus, the authority of Erdoğan had increased in the party. According to one of the cabinet members the previous bill would also have passed if Erdoğan had been Prime Minister (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, October 8, 2013). Thus, the uncertainties that had left the MPs alone in their decisions, did not apply for the March 20th bill. Besides, the Prime Minister talked with his party members in groups and convinced them before the voting.

The authoritative decision unit here is again the coalition of autonomous actors. This time, despite President Sezer’s continuing opposition to the issue but he did not put effort to stop it. The AKP group, with the support of the military, had enough political resources to decide on the matter. Tayyip Erdoğan was now Prime Minister and had

the legal status to lead, which gave him the ability to play a pivotal role and control his party in parliament. Thus, having the majority of votes in parliament, the AKP leadership secured a “minimum winning coalition” (Hagan et al., 2001:174).

According to the paired comparison analysis, the decision-making process is the second least influential factor in the final result. The prime minister played a pivotal role in the decision-making process, but there was no major institutional or individual resistance to his decisions. Consequently, this situation made the process itself a trivial matter in the decision result.

#### **5.2.7. Military capability**

The military capability of Turkey did not play a role in the decision. The bill was about opening airspace and keeping the already stationed Turkish troops in Northern Iraq. Since the bill did not require extra military maneuvers, it did not necessitate any military capability. Thus, the military capability issue was not debated prior to the decision.

According to the paired comparison analysis, the military capability variable was the least influential factor in the decision result. There were no concerns about the capability of the military in terms of the planned operation, hence it was not a matter of concern in favor of or against the opening of airspace to the coalition.

### 5.2.8. Evaluation of the decision

This decision was somewhat overshadowed by the effects of the previous decision-making occasion. Parliament's inability to decide on the March 1st bill caused a rift between Turkey and the US. Therefore, the decision-makers were mostly concerned with reassuring the erstwhile ally of their continued dependence. According to the decision-makers, all other variables were insignificant when compared to alliance dependency. They avoided exacerbating relations, which could have certain political and economic repercussions.

**Table 3: Decision Occasion-3b Paired Comparison Analysis Summary**

	Alliance dep.	Interest / inf.	UNSC res.	Risk aver.	NATO dec.	DM proc.	Military cap.
Weights	0.00	1.09	2.85	2.96	2.96	3.10	5.65
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

There were concerns about being excluded from the re-establishment of Iraq. Nonetheless, opportunities had been missed since the negotiated MoU was not applicable for the new bill. Furthermore, the new bill provided a very limited role for Turkey, thus, seeking an influential role in the future of Iraq was the aim of the decision-makers. However, in the end this was not achieved.



The UNSC resolution and risk aversion variables had limited influence in the decision outcome. It should also be borne in mind that the decision-making process lost its salience, following the experience of the first decision occasion. The military became more vocal in supporting a possible bill and Erdoğan solidified his position by establishing another government. Moreover, the bill was only about opening the airbases and less risky than the previous one. Thus, the MPs of the ruling party did not resist. Lastly, the military capability issue was not a part of the debate since decision-makers did not have such concerns.

### **5.3. Decision Occasion 3: Parliamentary Decision to Send Non-Combat Troops (October, 2003)**

The US needed peace-keepers in Iraq during the reconstruction period. The security situation in Iraq was worsening with bombings taking place on an almost daily basis. Hence, the US was looking for troops from its allies to deploy in Iraq. Indeed, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, had speculated before the war that France might want to be among the countries that would join the reconstruction of Iraq after Saddam (Shimko, 2010: 145). However, US attempts to convince France or another ally, Germany, to sending peace-keepers did not yield fruit.

As another option, bringing in Muslim peace-keepers was debated. This would also help to respond to the propaganda on “America waging war against Islam” (Rumsfeld, 2011: 672). American military officers were expecting 10-15 thousand troops from Muslim countries, but Pakistan and India were not convinced either (“US Diplomatic Appeal For Iraq Plan Met With Resistance,” 2003). The possibility of

Saudi involvement was regarded as risky, since Saudi nationals might act against the US (Gordon & Trainor, 2006: 470-471).

On the other hand, Turkey offered help with rebuilding Iraq during Under Secretary of the MFA, Uğur Ziyal's, visit to Washington in June and additionally at a high-level summit on August 12<sup>th</sup>. The civilian and military bureaucracy, along with the government, agreed on sending peacekeeping forces to Iraq on August 12<sup>th</sup> (Çağaptay, 2003). Turkey helping establish stability in Iraq as a democratic country with a Muslim population, different from Iran and Syria, was regarded as important ("Our Friends the Turks," 2003). The debates between the US and Turkey on this issue had begun unofficially in April (Hale, 2007: 126). Given that the US was asking for troops, it was seen that its need had to be quite important (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014). On September 19<sup>th</sup>, the US formally asked Turkey to send troops to Iraq (Segell, 2004: 548).

Planning for Turkish troop deployment in Iraq caused grumblings, but these did not alarm the Turkish government. The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hoshiyar Zebari, himself from an ethnically Kurdish background, announced his opposition to the idea, but later stepped back and talked about "a solution...[that] satisfy all sides" ("Iraqi Foreign Minister Repeals Objections to Turkish Troop Deployment," 2003).

In order to have parliamentary authorization, the Turkish government brought another bill about Iraq to the floor of the house on October 7<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This bill was seeking parliamentary permission to: "Send Turkish Armed Forces to Iraq in order to contribute to security and stability" and it gave a broad authority to government in terms of determining the "need, scope, limits and time" of the mission. The bill

passed with 358 votes in favor, 183 against and 2 abstentions from a total of 543 parliamentary members. This time the ruling party members followed the lead of the government.

After the bill, opposition in Iraq to Turkish involvement grew apace. Iraqi Kurds held the leading role in this opposition and staunchly resisted the deployment of Turkish troops (High Level Bureaucrat II, personal communication, November 18, 2013). Kurds turned out to be crucial for the US during the campaign and in the post-campaign period, so the US was not in a position to overrule the Kurdish opposition to Turkish troops (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). According to Hale, the opposition was not coming solely from Kurds; Shiite and even Sunni Arabs were also against the idea ( 2007: 127).

One of the cabinet members argued that the primary reason was the unresolved problem of a location at which the Turkish troops should be stationed (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, December 4, 2014). Furthermore, the opposition in Iraq was reflected in the statement of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, Paul Bremer, when he referred to the Ottomans as “occupiers” in Iraq and the “sensitivity” in the country to Turkish troops (Weisman, 2003). These words irritated the Turkish authorities and, alongside other reactions, the idea of Turkish peace-keepers was postponed (“Dışişleri: Bremer’in Sözleri Talihsizlik,” 2003). On November 6th, Turkish MFA, Abdullah Gül, announced that the offer of sending 10,000 troops to Iraq was off the table, an announcement that also influenced other Muslim countries debating whether or not to send troops to Iraq (Chantiloupe, 2010: 250).

In order to obtain a ranking of the factors that influenced the decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq, a paired comparison analysis was conducted with decision-makers' responses. Below the ranking of the independent variables are given in Table 18. According to the paired comparison analysis, interest in the region/enhance influence and alliance dependence are ranked as the first and second variables. In other words, they are the two most influential variables on the decision result.

**Table 18: Decision Occasion-3c Paired Comparison Analysis Z-Score Matrix**

	Enhance inf.	Alliance dep.	Risk aver.	DM proc.	UNSC res.	NATO dec.	Military cap.
Enhance influence	0.00	0.00	3.49	0.84	3.49	3.49	3.49
Alliance dep.	0.00	0.00	1.18	1.18	3.49	3.49	3.49
Risk aversion	-3.49	-1.18	0.00	0.52	0.84	1.18	3.49
DM process	-0.84	-1.18	-0.52	0.00	-0.25	0.25	3.49
UNSC resolution	-3.49	-3.49	-0.84	0.25	0.00	1.18	3.49
NATO decision	-3.49	-3.49	-1.18	-0.25	-1.18	0.00	3.49
Military capability	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	-3.49	0.00
Sum	-14.80	-12.83	-1.36	-0.95	2.90	6.10	20.94
Mean	-2.11	-1.83	-0.19	-0.14	0.41	0.87	2.99
Weights	0.00	0.28	1.92	1.97	2.52	2.98	5.10
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Since the weighted difference between the two variables is not significant, the two may be evaluated together. The risk aversion variable follows these two in ranking. The analysis points out the least influential factor as the military capability variable.

### **5.3.1. Legitimacy by UNSC resolutions**

Members of the UNSC would seem to have abandoned their former antagonistic stance in the post-campaign period and in a “pragmatic atmosphere” these countries successfully focused on the reconstruction of Iraq (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012: 355). This perspective provided the opportunity to adopt UNSC Resolution 1483 on May 22nd, 2003. This resolution lifted the restrictions and sanctions that had been put in place against the Saddam regime. It encouraged member states to contribute to the rebuilding process in Iraq and assist the Iraqi people with humanitarian issues. Furthermore, the resolution offered the UN direct involvement in this matter by sending a representative of the UN Secretary General to Iraq.

The resolution opened a path for UN engagement in Iraq, yet this attempt failed due to differences between coalition forces and the UN. The UN aimed to keep its distance from the coalition, to avoid giving the impression of supporting “an occupation that followed an unsanctioned war” (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012: 355). The UN was also not eager to provide legitimacy by resolution, without having any actual say in the decision-making in Iraq. Kofi Annan stated:

It would imply not just burden sharing but also sharing decisions and responsibility with the others. If that doesn't happen, I think it is going to be very difficult to get a second resolution that will satisfy everybody. (Goldenberg, 2003)

The role of the UN became a matter of discussion among the coalition forces.

Nevertheless, they did not lean towards the idea of giving up control on the ground in Iraq. The UK Foreign Minister, Jack Straw, stated that for: “.....an effective military operation.....” the US should keep its leading role (“Annan Urges Bigger UN Role,” 2003). There was a divergence between the UN and the coalition forces on the exact terms of the UN role.

Other than this divergence, the UN Baghdad office was attacked on 19th of August and 15 UN employees died, including the Head of Mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello (“Top UN Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello killed in Terrorist Blast in Baghdad,” 2003).

Another attack targeting the UN mission killed an Iraqi policeman. These attacks increased concerns about the security of UN staff, and the UN Secretary General began to emphasize the UN role as needing solid protection (“Annan will pledge UN ready for Iraq role,” 2003). According to Secretary General Annan, there was a dilemma for the UN mission in Iraq:

If we were going to be effective in playing a role distinct from the occupation, we could not base ourselves in the coalition security area called the “Green Zone,” separated from the people of Iraq in the most glaring and dominating manner. At the same time, by basing ourselves outside the zone at Canal Hotel, we would be exposed to a greater degree to the violence and terror unleashed by the invasion’s aftermath. (Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012: 356).

Consequently, the security issue became a prerequisite for the UN’s role in Iraq, not only in military terms but also in a political fashion (“Annan Rules Out the Quick Return of a U.N. Presence in Iraq,” 2003). Kofi Annan openly declared his criticism of Washington and suggested an Afghanistan-like interim government in Iraq as a

pre-condition for the UN's role ("Annan, ABD'nin Irak Tasarısına Karşı," 2003; "Bu da Annan'ın Irak Planı," 2003). Thus, eventually the idea of a UN role in Iraq failed. On examining the reaction to events in Turkey, it can be seen that agreement on the first resolution was welcomed. However, the failure of a second resolution had a limited impact on the decision-makers. Indeed, Turkey announced that the UNSC Resolution 1483 was "very much in line with Turkey's policy toward Iraq" with Undersecretary of Turkish MFA, Uğur Ziyal's (2003) speech at American Enterprise Institute. The rift between the UN Secretariat and the coalition in Iraq increased the concerns of the Turkish President in terms of legitimacy. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer reiterated his precondition of a UN resolution as the issue came back to the table ("Sezer Tezkere Diyor," 2003).

However, the government was holding a different position. Despite Annan's declarations and the decreasing possibility of the UN taking a role in Iraq, the ruling party was in favor of sending troops to Iraq. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, mentioned the lack of necessity for UN legitimacy, pointing out the institution's limited influence. He stated that: "If we say it is legitimate, then it is legitimate. Turkey's national interest is important" ("Biz Meşru Diyorsak Bu İş Meşrudur," 2003). The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, stated: "A UN resolution may ease our job, but we did not declare it to be an absolute necessity" ("Asker için BM Kararı Şart Değil," 2003).

In short, the UNSC resolution was not taken into consideration other than by a limited number of actors. According to the paired comparison analysis, the UNSC resolution comes with the least influential variables in the outcome of the decision. As a

reflection on this situation the bill referred to UNSC Resolution 1483, but the absence of a UN role in Iraq was not a matter of concern. The future of Iraq as a bordering neighbor was regarded as more important than international legitimacy.

### **5.3.2. Legitimacy by NATO decision**

NATO had no objection to its members' making individual contribution to the Iraq War. Yet according to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, (2003c) there was no "request... for NATO to be formally involved itself." Accordingly, 11 NATO member countries out of 18, other than the US, were in Iraq before Turkey's decision. In addition, NATO provided assistance to Poland and Spain, which had joined the coalition as NATO members.

The security alliance also helped Turkey to strengthen its defense against a possible Iraqi attack in Lord Robertson's (2003a) statement. In short, the NATO role was limited to allowing its members to join the coalition and provide assistance if necessary. It was also an important base for co-ordination and avoiding confrontation between member countries. One concern at NATO was Turkey's increasing its military presence in Northern Iraq, or directly sending troops. According to one of the cabinet members, NATO regarded Turkey as an unpredictable country, and there were concerns about Turkey acting as a lone wolf (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). Yet in the end, the Secretary General (2003b) accepted the assurances given by the Turkish authorities on Northern Iraq.



In Turkey, NATO was not an influential factor in the decision. However, some opposition members used the lack of a decision from NATO as evidence for illegitimacy of action. Deputy Chairman of the main opposition party, CHP, Onur Öymen, stated:

There is no legal basis for sending troops to Iraq. There is no constitutional basis for that purpose. There is no UN force, no NATO force to be deployed in Iraq. Consequently, why should Turkey send troops to Iraq? Why should Turkey risk the lives of Turkish soldiers under the present conditions? (“To send or not to send troops to Iraq? That is the question,” 2003).

According to the paired comparison analysis, the NATO decision variable is the second least influential factor among all parameters. NATO had concerns in line with the US on Iraq. It did not take an official role as an institution, but it encouraged individual contributions. Nonetheless, NATO as an institution did not have a significant influence on Turkey’s decision to send troops to Iraq. The concerns were mostly about bilateral relations with the US, rather than a multilateral formal alliance.

### **5.3.3. Risk aversion**

There were substantial risks in sending troops, but the government was seemingly prepared to take these risks. In the wording of the bill, the Prime Minister acknowledged the “security risks and perils in the field” but argued for them to be seen in the context of sending troops being a better option for the long-term interests of Turkey. Thus, the idea of influencing developments in Iraq outweighed the risks. The most substantial risk was casualties, since the coalition forces in Iraq were under attack on a daily basis. Even though Turkish forces would only carry out non-combat

missions, there was still a high risk of casualties, indeed, the US commanders in Iraq were warning their counterparts about the high possibility of casualties (“Kayıplara hazır olun,” 2003). Furthermore, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yaşar Yakış, commented: “If there are casualties it should not come as a surprise” (“Yakış: Zaiyat Sürpriz Olmaz,” 2003).

Indeed, the risk assessment was confirmed when an attack took place on the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad. One week after parliament passed the bill, a suicide attack took place targeting the Turkish Embassy (“Bağdat’ta Türkiye’ye Karşı İntihar Saldırısı,” 2003). The embassy personnel survived due to the concrete block structures which had been erected in front of the building just before the attack. Other than this attack, the Turkish Embassy was subjected to two other rocket attacks (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 23, 2013). Moreover, Turkey became a target of Al Qaeda in Istanbul, with the British Consulate and HSBC bombings (Smith, 2003).

According to the paired comparison analysis, risk aversion was the major negative factor in the debate. Yet, it was the third most influential variable after two others in favor of sending troops. Thus, the Turkish parliament decided to join the coalition and indeed, even after the attacks on the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad, the government did not change its position and remained firm (“‘Gelmeyin’ Bombası,” 2003).

In short, there were concerns about these risks, and the risk assessments about possible attacks on Turkish troops were real. Nonetheless, the other factors such as

interest in the region/enhance influence and alliance dependence were regarded as more important, and these risk perceptions were not influential to the extent of preventing the decision-makers from sending troops. The decision-makers acknowledged the situation and ran the risk of being attacked in Iraq.

#### **5.3.4. Interest in the region/enhance influence**

After the March 1st bill, Turkey was not included in the coalition debates on issues pertaining to Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq was even avoiding diplomatic relations with Turkish authorities. Its administrator, Paul Bremer, was avoiding meetings with the Turkish Ambassador to Iraq and with the Under Secretary of Turkey's MFA, Uğur Ziyal and under US rule in Iraq, Turkish diplomats did not enjoy diplomatic immunity or the necessary security arrangements (High Level Bureaucrat IV, personal communication, October 23, 2013).

A new structure was being established near to the Turkish border. The growing instability would have a negative influence on Turkey, and Turkey could help the coalition as a regional actor. Thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gul, stated:

Turkey's high interest requires that it intervene in the chaotic situation in Iraq, to help establish stability, which is in Turkey's national interest. Turkey cannot stay as a by-stander when 31 distant countries are involved in an international coalition. Turkey is the biggest actor in the region. ("Troops discussions to heat up in October," 2003).

For Turkish authorities the close cooperation of the US administration with the Iraqi Kurds was a matter of concern, particularly the fact that it led to consolidation of the Kurdish role in Baghdad, and autonomy in Erbil (Olson, 2005: 147). Moreover, the position of the Turcomans was in peril. After the invasion their position in the newly-established system was not good and it was reported that:

The Turcomans have not been fairly represented within the temporary Iraqi Governing Council in proportion to their numbers, and nor have they been given a better political status in Northern Iraq, mainly Kirkuk, the main Turcoman city in the region. (Oğuzlu, 2004: 321).

Furthermore, the US was dragging its feet in terms of taking concrete steps on the PKK in Northern Iraq. The security establishment in Turkey was eager to send troops despite the absence of a UN mandate, in order to “keep the American-Kurdish cooperation in check” (Taşpınar, 2003).

The daily bombings in Iraq did not change Turkey’s mind about sending troops. Turkey wanted to be in a position to influence the US and increase its bargaining power (“Turkey could decide next week on troops for Iraq,” 2003). According to General Yaşar Büyükanıt: “The risk in Iraq was high; yet if there is a fire in our neighbor’s house, we cannot remain uninterested or turn a blind eye” (Yetkin, 2004: 229). Thus, Turkey wanted to be part of the equation. Turkish troops were already stationed in the Al-Anbar region, with the authorities believing that the presence there would be influential in the whole of Iraq (High Level Bureaucrat I, personel communication, October 17, 2013).

Moreover, Turkish firms could join the construction business in Iraq. Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül (2003a) stated that cooperation between the US and Turkey: “.....will not only benefit the Iraqi people... but also companies interested in the reconstruction of this country.” Turkish firms were close to the country, knew the circumstances in the region; they could fix problems faster and cheaper. Doing business in Iraq would further develop relations with Iraq (Cabinet Member IV, personel communication, October 25, 2013; High Level Bureaucrat I, personel communication, October 17, 2013).

Turkey declared its interest in assisting in Iraq to the US, with the visit of the Under Secretary of Turkey’s MFA, Uğur Ziyal, to Washington being of particular importance. He (2003) underlined the importance of Turkey in the Iraq rebuilding process and declared the country’s vision was to make contact with all interested parties in Iraq:

As a neighboring country with close historical, cultural and economic bonds with Iraq, our potential to help Iraq back on its feet should not be underestimated. Turkey will cooperate with the United States and others to prepare the conditions for the Iraqi people to fully take charge of their country. In the time ahead, we are resolved to promote even closer and diverse ties with all segments of the Iraqi people, thereby extending a full embrace to Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans and others all at once.

According to the paired comparison analysis, the primary issue in the outcome of the decision was the interest in the region/enhance influence variable along with alliance dependency to coalition leader factor. The decision-makers had worries about being excluded from the reconstruction period. They wanted to be part of the process and especially influence developments near the shared border (Cabinet Member I, personel communication, May 9, 2013). Thus, enhancing influence in Iraq was the most influential motive with alliance dependence for the decision-makers to send troops to Iraq, despite all the risks in that country.

### 5.3.5. Alliance dependence

The damage done to bilateral relations by the 1st March bill was not yet repaired and Turkey was concerned about relations with the US (High Level Bureaucrat I, personnel communication, October 17, 2013). Turkish dependency on the US pushed the decision-makers to avoid US reprisals in Iraq. On July 4th, Turkish soldiers were arrested in Sulaymaniyah with allegations of an assassination attempt on the governor of Kirkuk. The way the Turkish troops were arrested by the US authorities, and kept under lock and key for more than two days, became known as the notorious ‘hood event’ and became the hallmark of a new nadir in bilateral relations (“Çuvalın Rövanşı Alındı İddiası,” 2003).

This incident led to the MFA, Abdullah Gül, being in two minds about his visit to Washington scheduled for 22-26 July, but Gül and his staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed that the visit must take place after this incident (Yetkin, 2004: 225). Gül (2003a) highlighted the importance of bilateral relations in his speech at ATC when he said:

My visit to the United States aims to add impetus to Turkish-US relations, overview the state of affairs and take up issues that stand in our way. Our relationship is too important to be left to time and coincidences. We perceive Turkey and the US as two indispensable partners in the region.

During the visit, the possibility that Turkey might take a decision to send 10,000 Turkish troops to Iraq was debated (Cooley, 2003). Turkey wanted to show solidarity with its ally. More importantly, Turkey badly needed the US to work with in the

region. Abdullah Gül, (2003b) in his speech at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Studies (WINEP) stated:

My Government is fully committed to the further development of our time-tested alliance with the United States. We need to address together, old and new challenges... We still have a lot to do for the realization of our common vision for dialogue, prosperity and peace in the Middle East; for the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.

This concern can be applied equally to both the government and the bureaucracy. The Turkish military in particular, having close relations with the Pentagon, had been accused of a failure of leadership over the issue of access to Turkish territory, and they were anxious to restore their image (Taşpınar, 2003b).

Additionally, there were economic concerns on the Turkish side. The Turkish economy had not yet fully recovered and Turkey still needed US backing for its financial stability (Culpan, 2003). Turkey needed US funding guarantees as a buffer for its fragile economy when faced with a war in its border (High Level Bureaucrat V, personal communication, November 1, 2013). Thus, Minister of Treasury, Ali Babacan, signed an agreement in Dubai on September 22nd, 2003.

This agreement was for a US grant of one billion American dollars or 8.5 billion American dollars' loan guarantee for Turkey, and signed to be effective immediately before the September 30th deadline for the fiscal year (Toker, 2010; "Dubai Anlaşması Gaflet ve Dalalet," 2010). According to the US Congress bill, H.R. 1559 the agreement was linked to Turkey's cooperation on "facilitation of humanitarian

assistance to Iraq and not unilaterally deploying troops into northern Iraq.” This stipulation caused bitter reactions from the opposition and was suspended in July 2004, yet until its suspension it served as a guarantee for investors in Turkey anyway (High Level Bureaucrat V, personal communication, November 1, 2013).

Lastly, Turkey’s support at a critical time when other countries such as France, India, and Pakistan were avoiding making a commitment, would bring an opportunity for Turkey to show solidarity with its ally and influence developments. According to the paired comparison analysis, the alliance dependency variable was ranked second. Along with the interest in the region/enhance influence variable it was the most influential factor in Turkey’s decision to send troops to Iraq.

### **5.3.6. Decision making process**

Public opinion was still against involvement in the Iraq issue. Before the decision, more public protests took place and according to the polls 72.5% of the public were against sending troops (Culpan, 2003). The Head of the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions, Süleyman Çelebi, declared: “It is unacceptable that our children's lives will be put into danger for the United States' dirty interests” (“Turkey PM Pushes Lawmakers to Vote To Send Troops To Iraq,” 2003).

Nevertheless, public opinion had no influence on the decision-makers since the election cycle was a way into the future. The circumstances at the time of the first



decision occasion were not applicable to this third decision occasion. Despite public opinion, MPs did not hesitate to send troops to Iraq. MFA, Abdullah Gül, even claimed that “public opinion in Turkey is changing” in favor of sending troops (Safire, 2003).

Another difference from the 1st March bill was that Tayyip Erdoğan, as the Prime Minister, had consolidated his authority over the party (Cabinet Member VI, personnel communication, October 30, 2013). He was able to lift political bans and at this time had held the office of Prime Minister for more than six months, ample time for him to establish his authority (Özdamar, 2012: 497). Furthermore, the party congress was scheduled to take place quite close to the vote for the bill, hence MPs did not want to upset Erdoğan, and miss out on the possibility of a post within the party administration (Akyol, 2003). Thus, despite there being a feeling that the military would emerge as an influential actor outside the legal process, and that the AKP MPs would possibly vote against the bill, both scenarios proved to be wrong (Taşpınar, 2003c).

According to the Hermann (2001) and Hagan (2001) approach, the decision unit was a coalition of autonomous actors. Erdoğan, with his powerful status, had the ability to control his party in the parliament and Erdoğan, as the leader of the party that had the majority of parliamentary members, decided to pass the bill for sending troops and the bill passed from parliament without problems.

Despite the opposition of President Sezer, the other autonomous actors were on board because of concerns about Turkey’s limited influence in developments in Iraq. There

were no matters for disagreement since the risks were limited compared to the first decision occasion on March 1st. Thus, the military and civilian bureaucracies were in agreement with the ruling party in terms of the decision to send non-combat troops to Iraq, and this consensus provided the “minimum winning coalition” for a decision to be made. The paired comparison analysis reveals the influence of the decision making process as the fourth influential factor. It was not one of the primary factors, but rather played a limited role in the decision outcome.

### **5.3.7. Military capability**

As in other cases after the Gulf War, military capability was not an important matter for this decision occasion. The Turkish military had, in fact, developed its capabilities for such military operations over the intervening time period. Besides, the plan was for Turkish troops to serve as peace-keepers in a Sunni populated area. Indeed, the Turkish Armed Forces had previous experience, which was mentioned in the bill, having served as peace-keepers in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Thus, the perception of Turkish troops was positive in the context of this mission.

If the plan was implemented, Turkish troops would be third in number after the US and the British, and Turkey: “would have its own command” (Hale, 2007: 127). It could be argued that there were concerns about possible casualties, but no problems with the military’s capability to achieve the goals of the mission. The risk of casualties was equally applicable to the American and British troops. Thus, the mission was not regarded as an overwhelming one for the Turkish troops.

According to the paired comparison analysis conducted in order to rank the independent variables, military capability was placed as the least influential factor in the decision. In short, the military capability issue was not an important factor for the decision-makers. The decision-makers had complete confidence in the Turkish military for this mission. Thus, capability issues were not an influential factor in the decision at all.

### **5.3.8. Evaluation of the decision**

The main motivation for the decision was concern about the future of Iraq. Thus the paired comparison analysis and the elite interviews converge with regard to the ranking of independent variables. The decision-makers were pushing for a way to ‘catch the train’ of the coalition, in order not to be excluded from the process. They decided to send peace-keeping troops despite the high risk of casualties. Thus, the primary factor in this decision was the interest in the region/enhance influence variable, along with the factor of alliance dependence.

Turkey needed to repair alliance relations after the 1st March bill and this was a chance to achieve that aim. Turkey needed the US’ help in protecting its interests in Iraq. Furthermore, it needed support to overcome the negative economic influences of the war. Direct US support for Turkey, together with acting as a guarantor, would

facilitate both the flow of foreign direct investment and would also decrease the interest rate of the credit.

The main negative factor about sending troops was risk aversion. There was a genuine risk of casualties and the decision-makers were concerned about this possibility, but other factors were more influential so that the decision was in favor of sending troops to Iraq. The UNSC resolution and NATO position had limited influence on the decision and the military capability was the least influential factor among the independent variables.

**Table 19: Decision Occasion-3c Paired Comparison Analysis Summary**

	Enhance inf.	Alliance dep.	Risk aver.	DM proc.	UNSC res.	NATO dec.	Military cap.
Weights	0.00	0.28	1.92	1.97	2.52	2.98	5.10
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In short, in reaching their decision to send troops for non-combat missions in Iraq, the decision-makers were influenced primarily by the factors of enhancing influence and alliance dependence. Despite the inherent risks, the bill was passed by parliament relatively easily, since Prime Minister Erdoğan had consolidated his position in the party, and the imminent party convention persuaded MPs not to contradict the leader before such a critical time for top party positions.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **DISCUSSION**

In the previous three chapters, the eight decision occasions under consideration were evaluated one by one, with two types of findings being produced for each case: one using the quantitative results of the paired comparison analysis; the other based on the qualitative findings from interviews, together with primary and secondary data research. In this chapter the findings for all the decision occasions will be compiled for evaluation. First, the paired comparison analyses results will be evaluated and then these findings will be discussed in tandem with the qualitative findings.

#### **6.1. Paired Comparison Analysis Results and Evaluation**

In the paired comparison analysis, each decision-maker ranked seven independent variables from the most influential to the least in two-by-two comparisons. The ten judgments for each decision occasion were aggregated as z-score matrices for normal distribution and their weighted distances were obtained. The most influential variable is weighted as 0 and the other variables' are ranked according to their distance from the most influential variable. As the distance from 0 increases, the influence of the variable within the decision-making process decreases.

**Table 20: Not- Join Decision Occasions Weight-Ranking Summary**

Decision Occasion & Weight	Ranking						
	1 <sup>st</sup> Variable	2 <sup>nd</sup> Variable	3 <sup>rd</sup> Variable	4 <sup>th</sup> Variable	5 <sup>th</sup> Variable	6 <sup>th</sup> Variable	7 <sup>th</sup> Variable
Decision Occasion (Aug. 1990)	DM Process	Risk Aversion	Legitimacy by UNSC	Interest/ Influence	Legitimacy by NATO	Alliance Dependence	Military Capability
Weight	0	0.18	1.87	1.89	2.19	2.83	2.92
Decision Occasion (Dec. 1990)	DM Process	Risk Aversion	Military Capability	Leg. by UNSC	Interest/ Influence	Leg. by NATO	Alliance Dependence
Weight	0	0.12	2.38	3.12	3.23	3.23	3.31
Decision Occasion (March 1, 2003)	DM Process	Risk Aversion	Alliance Dependence	Interest/ Influence	Leg. by UNSC	Leg. by NATO	Military Capability
Weight	0	0.62	1.08	1.50	2.24	3.29	4.94

In previous chapters, the details of each paired comparison analysis have been presented prior to evaluation of independent variables for each decision occasion. The weights and rankings of the variables were summarized at the end of each decision occasion within the evaluation section (See pp. 62, 82, 100, 126, 146, 174, 192, 212). In this chapter, the weights and rankings of decision occasions will be considered in comparison in order to identify common patterns. Turkey did not join US-led coalitions during the August 1990, December 1990 and March 1, 2003 dated decision

occasions. Thus, these occasions are classified as not-join cases. Table 20 above displays findings for these not-join cases, with the variables ranked according to their level of influence on the decision-makers.

The other five decision occasions are the ones in which a decision to join the coalition was taken. As can be seen in Table 21, two of these five decision occasions: January 1991; March 20, 2003; culminated in a weak commitment by only opening airbases and airspace as logistical support. Whereas the other three cases: November 2001; January 2002; October 2003; are strong commitment cases in which the decision to send troops either for combat or non-combat missions was taken.

**Table 21: Join Decision Occasions Weight-Ranking Summary**

	Decision Occasion & Weight	Ranking						
		1 <sup>st</sup> Variable	2 <sup>nd</sup> Variable	3 <sup>rd</sup> Variable	4 <sup>th</sup> Variable	5 <sup>th</sup> Variable	6 <sup>th</sup> Variable	7 <sup>th</sup> Variable
Weak Support Cases	Decision Occasion (Jan. 1991)	Legitimacy by UNSC	Alliance Dependence	Risk Aversion	Interest/ Influence	Legitimacy by NATO	DM Process	Military Capability
	Weight	0	0.35	1	1.40	1.92	2.30	3.11
	Decision Occasion (March 20, 2003)	Alliance Dependence	Interest/ Influence	Legitimacy by NATO	Legitimacy by UNSC	Risk Aversion	DM Process	Military Capability
	Weight	0	1.09	2.86	2.97	2.97	3.1	5.65
Strong Support Cases	Decision Occasion (Nov. 2001)	Alliance Dependence	Legitimacy by UNSC	Legitimacy by NATO	Interest/ Influence	DM Process	Risk Aversion	Military Capability
	Weight	0	1.26	1.67	2.25	2.9	3.95	4.28
	Decision Occasion (Jan. 2002)	Alliance Dependence	Legitimacy by UNSC	Legitimacy by NATO	Interest/ Influence	DM Process	Risk Aversion	Military Capability
	Weight	0	0.03	0.04	1.02	1.49	2.34	3.15
	Decision Occasion (Oct. 2003)	Interest/ Influence	Alliance Dependence	Risk Aversion	DM Process	Leg. by UNSC	Leg. by NATO	Military Capability
	Weight	0	0.28	1.92	1.98	2.53	2.99	5.11

Combining the rankings and weights gives an impression of the level of influence emanating from different variables. Nonetheless, the weights may not be used as absolute values to refer to the influence of each variable, since they actually reflect the difference among the variables instead of any absolute magnitude of influence. They can only be used for indicating the level of influence relative to each other. Thus, in order to have a more accurate picture, the nominal values in numbers were transformed into ordinal categories. Along with the ordinal variables the paired comparisons should provide a better level of analysis for this study.

Thus, all paired comparison analysis results are presented below in Table 22 which covers all decision occasions studied for this work. The decision making occasions are categorized according to both in terms of joining the coalition and in terms of level of commitment. As mentioned above, the weights in this table are presented in three ordinal categories: strong influence, moderate influence and low influence.

Since 0 is the highest influence level the values 1 and 2 are used as cut-off points for moderate and low influence variables respectively. According to their weights, variables that fall between 0 and 1 are coded as strong influence variables; variables that lie between 1 and 2 are coded as moderate influence variables; variables that are equal to or higher than 2 are coded as low influence variables.



Table 22: Variable Influence on Decision Occasions Summary

		Decision Occasions	Legitimacy by UNSC	Legitimacy by NATO	Alliance dependence	Interest/Enhance influence	Risk aversion	Decision making process	Military capability
Not-Join Coalition		August/1990 (Gulf War)	<i>Moderate</i>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<i>Moderate</i>	<b>Strong</b>	<b>Strong</b>	<u>Low</u>
		December/1990 (Gulf War)	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<b>Strong</b>	<b>Strong</b>	<u>Low</u>
		March-1/2003 (Iraq War)	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<b>Strong</b>	<b>Strong</b>	<u>Low</u>
Join Coalition	Weak Commitment	March-20/2003 (Iraq War)	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<b>Strong</b>	<i>Moderate</i>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>
		January/1991 (Gulf War)	<b>Strong</b>	<i>Moderate</i>	<b>Strong</b>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>
	Strong Commitment	October/2003 (Iraq War)	<i>Moderate</i>	<u>Low</u>	<b>Strong</b>	<b>Strong</b>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<u>Low</u>
		January/2002 (Afghanistan War)	<b>Strong</b>	<b>Strong</b>	<b>Strong</b>	<i>Moderate</i>	<u>Low</u>	<i>Moderate</i>	<u>Low</u>
		November/2001 (Afghanistan War)	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<b>Strong</b>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Low</u>

## **6.2. Theoretical Implications and Discussion**

In all cases where Turkey made a commitment, either moderate or strong, to join the coalition, decision-makers considered alliance dependence as strong influence factor. This was especially true in the November 2001 and October 2003 dated cases, when alliance dependence was perceived as the only strong influence variable by the decision-makers. On the other hand, in cases where Turkey did not join a coalition, alliance dependence was not regarded as a strong influence variable by the Turkish decision-makers.

The current literature on coalition participation identifies several variables for coalition participation for non-leading countries, with alliance dependence being referred to as one of the key international dynamics for coalition participation (Bennett et. al, 1994: 70; Baltrusaitis, 2008). Alliance dependence refers to “the net benefit (a state) is receiving from (an alliance)” in comparison to the other options (Snyder, 1997: 166). The harder it is for a state to substitute security needs with other alternatives, the more dependent that state becomes on an alliance. Thus, in order to avoid any “abandonment in his (the) hour of need,” states are more inclined towards being “dragged... into a war over interests of the ally that one does not share” (Mandelbaum, 1988: 101; Snyder, 1997: 181).

This thesis has demonstrated that alliance dependence is an important variable but a contingent one. The decision makers regard alliance dependence as strong influence

variable only when risk aversion is not regarded as a primary factor. Thus, a consensus among the decision-makers as to the higher value of avoiding abandonment by the ally than the risk taken by joining the coalition results in joining the coalition. Otherwise, lack of consensus or a conflict among the decision-makers as to this calculation and the absence of a pivotal actor to resolve the conflict among the actors result in the decision of not to join the coalition.

Despite Snyder's (1997) approach to alliance dependence constrained to military issues, the Turkish decision-makers were not considering abandonment solely in military terms, but were also aware of the possible important side effects of abandonment in the economic and political sphere. In particular, economic support from the US, together with its influence on financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, were regarded as important for Turkey, particularly in the cases of both Afghanistan and Iraq (2003) after the economic crisis in 2001 (Öniş, 2009: 429). In the political sphere there were concerns about marginalization in the international political arena. For instance, in the case of November 2001, the 9/11 attacks on the US were a very recent phenomenon from which shock waves were still resonating around the world. The allies of the US, including Turkey, were faced with the threat of US President Bush, demanding they reveal whether they were: 'with the US or against it.' Thus, the decision to join a coalition on that occasion was taken under less than comfortable circumstances. There are claims of concerns in the context of domestic politics as well especially in terms of the civil-military balances in Turkey. In the December 1990 and March 20, 2003 cases, senior members of the ruling party had concerns about the military having a stronger hand over the civilian administration and even remove it from the administration (See pp. 75, 187-188).

In short, Turkish decision-makers' motivation to join a coalition with its ally would seem to originate from necessity, rather than being based on any form of opportunistic approach or profit making goal. The present literature refers to other kind of relations such as jumping on the "band-wagon for profit" (Schweller, 1994: 93). This study could not trace any reference to such relationships in Turkey beyond straightforward alliance dependence. Thus, Turkey's coalition participation was not about profit making, but rather minimizing risks by avoiding abandonment and, if possible, compensating any reasonable losses. For example, economic losses after the Gulf War were a concern of Turkey's in the negotiations with the US on March 1, 2003 when Turkey wanted to avoid the possibility of similar economic losses. However, rather than any form of direct compensation for the earlier losses, Turkey could only secure a certain amount of financial loan as a buffer to relieve its investment market. In the event, this loan was only used as a guarantee due to domestic pressure (See p. 207-208).

As a major contribution to coalition studies this study indicates alliance dependence is not the sole determining factor in any decision to participate in a coalition. It also demonstrates that the decision-making process and risk aversion variables are regarded as strongly influential by decision-makers when choosing to avoid joining military coalitions. Thus, the key dilemma for the decision-makers is between alliance dependence and risk aversion which are like the two sides of the same coin.

In current literature, there is an alternative, expanded term for alliance dependence in the context of a country not joining a coalition: 'asymmetric security inter-

dependence' (Fritz, 2008: 37). Whilst the final word in this phrase would seem to acknowledge the reciprocal nature of dependence, the first word highlights the fact that one party is almost invariably more dependent than the other. However, despite providing conceptualization of the situation, current literature would not seem to sufficiently explain the mechanism and reasoning behind any avoidance of joining a coalition. In terms of the decision-making process, studies within recent literature mostly focused on the government structure within which decisions are made that result in a negative outcome. The structure of governmental institutions, together with the inability of the executive to take the necessary decision alone, have been cited as reasons for avoidance of coalition participation (Auerswald, 2004: 631; Bennett et.al, 1994: 39). Furthermore, in this context there are also references to the influence of public opinion on the decision, since legislative structures that participate in the decision-making process should reflect public opinion (Davidson, 2011: 22). The argument would seem to be that, when the executive is unable to take decisions alone, any decision to join a coalition can only be realized with public support (Auerswald, 2004: 643; Bennett et.al, 1994: 45-46; Taydaş & Özdamar, 2013).

This study used Hermann et al.'s (2001) decision unit approach in order to provide a broader structure that facilitates comparison of different processes within one framework. In all cases the authoritative unit was either a group or a coalition of autonomous actors. This is both because of the constitutional design gives the authority to the parliament as well as the executive rather than a single dominant actor. Plus, the Turkish military has a strong role and a say in the decision either through the National Security Council or by informal means. The coalition of autonomous actors is often comprised of the Council of Ministers, Turkish Armed

Forces (TAF), President, and the Parliament. In the cases in which, the single group is the authoritative unit either the president was bypassed or TAF passed the buck. Thus, the decision was made either by the Council of Ministers or the Parliament. In this regard, executive in the form of either the prime minister or a dominant president were among these coalition of autonomous actors. Executive does not have the ability to commit the resources alone and need to reconcile with these legislative and bureaucratic actors. In short, it may be regarded as 'medium executive' similar to how it is referred in the current literature (Auerswald, 2004: 643).

In all cases where Turkey did not join the coalition, the coalition of autonomous actors could not reach a consensus in the decision-making process and there was no pivotal actor to convince the actors in opposition. The process ended in favor of the opposition, either with integrative solution in case of August 1990 or a broad compromise in December 1990. In the former, cabinet members came together to change the content of the bill in such a way that it did not give any additional authority to the government. However, in March 1, 2003 the process ended with stable deadlock. In the cases in which Turkey joined the coalition, either all actors were in agreement to join, or one actor played a pivotal role and the decision ended in joining the coalition. It can be concluded that the less disagreement among the autonomous actors involved, the less influential is the decision-making process variable in the end result. These findings partially confirmed the state autonomy approach since both argues for the need for bureaucratic and legislative support for joining the coalition in the absence of strong executive. Yet, different from the present literature, this study suggests that legislative support does not necessarily mean public support for coalition participation.

Indeed, any public influence on the process itself is not substantiated by this study. In all cases in which Turkey joined the coalition, public opinion was against it and clearly disregarded by the decision-makers. This was particularly true in cases when Turkey decided to send troops, against which the public opinion opposition level was quite high. For instance, in November 2001 public opinion polls indicated that opposition to sending troops was 80% according to ‘October 2001, Turkey's Current Affairs Poll’ and even higher, reaching some 86% in the poll conducted by KONDA (“Türk Halkı Savaş İstemiyor,” 2001; “The Turkish Public Are Opposed to the War”, 2001). Notwithstanding the fact that troops were sent on a peace-keeping mission rather than a combat operation, this opposition continued against the ISAF mission in the case dated January 2002. Similarly, in October 2003 72.5% of Turkish people were against sending troops and public protests took place (Culpan, 2003). Yet, the government disregarded the public opposition. In the cases where Turkey did not join the coalition there would seem to be no clear link between public opposition and the decision. Only in the cases of August 1990 and March 1, 2003, are there specific references to public opinion’s (potential) influence on the decision-makers (Taydaş & Özdamar, 2013). Thus, in Turkey it seems public opinion may be disregarded by the people’s legislative representatives in the decision-making process.

This study also investigates the reason behind the disagreement among decision-making actors that, if it cannot be resolved, ends in blocking a decision to join the coalition or a deadlock. Looking at the three cases Turkey did not join the coalition, it is seen that high risk perception has a corresponding influence on the decision-making process. In contrast, in cases where Turkey joined the coalition risk was not

regarded as a strong influential variable. Thus, perceived risks caused some decision-makers to oppose joining the coalition, whether they were from the Turkish Armed Forces, or members of the ruling party. These actors blocked the decision to join the coalition effort if they were not persuaded otherwise by pivotal actors in the coalition of autonomous actors decision making setting.

In the two cases of the Gulf War dated August 1990 and December 1990, the decision-makers were highly skeptical about joining the war at all. They regarded joining the coalition as an adventure and unnecessary risk taking (Torumtay, 1994: 125; Birand & Yalçın, 2001: 435). For instance, then, the main opposition party leader Süleyman Demirel (1990) likened joining the coalition to “turning around the fire” and joining the coalition as not an “issue of bravery, but an issue of adventure.” According to one of the cabinet members, the Turkish armed forces’ main approach was that: “Middle East is a swamp and the one who enters loses and cannot get back.” Thus, they thought Turkey should refrain from being part of any such coalition. In these cases, the military did not only avoid sending troops or a warship, they even avoided sending officers as a symbolic form of participation, since they did not want to be seen as a coalition partner (Cabinet Member VII, May 29, 2013).

As the principal reason for avoidance, another primary source of risk perception was the Kurdish issue. Some of the decision-makers were concerned that any intervention in Iraq “whether by design, default or through opportunistic exploitation of chaos and uncertainty” would end with a Kurdish state on Turkey’s border (Park, 2004: 499). Furthermore, it was also claimed that “involvement of the major external powers in Iraq seemed to invoke the traumatic experience of the disintegration of the Ottoman



Empire” among the Turkish elite (Altunışık, 2006: 193). Thus, the Turkish decision-makers risk perception was much higher than any other country’s risk assessments related to joining a military coalition which is usually about military and economic costs rather than territorial integrity that is the mere survival of the country.

Interestingly, in the cases dated August 1990 and March 1, 2003, where the parliament was instrumental in the rejection of joining the coalition, some of the lawmakers with a Kurdish ethnic background rejected the bill due to their risk perception on behalf of the Kurds. In particular, the ethnically Kurdish members of ANAP and AKP had concerns about the possibility of the Turkish Armed Forces clashing with Kurds in Northern Iraq. One AKP member even claimed that the most organized and influential group working for the rejection of the bill was comprised of ethnically Kurdish lawmakers. There were also claims of possible lobbying activities in the Turkish parliament by Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the major factions in Northern Iraq, who allegedly presented the risks as perceived by Kurds (See pp. 159-160). Interestingly, in the case dated March 1, 2003, despite the risk perceptions of different groups being in contradiction with each other, they united in the same direction as rejecting the bill.

Other major risk perceptions arose from the actual military risks of taking part in the campaign, together with the possible political risks in terms of the country’s image if it were to take part in an attack on a neighboring/Muslim country. With regard to casualties within the military, according to one cabinet member during discussions prior to decisions taken in August 1990 and December 1990, the estimated casualties were given as 35-40,000 (See p.52). Since the majority of the Turkish army is

comprised of conscripts, such casualty estimates would lead to hard to bear public reactions. Furthermore, attacking a neighboring country with Arab/Muslim population was also regarded as risky by Turkish decision-makers. The decision-makers were concerned about Arab reactions to Turkey, as a non-Arab country, becoming involved in Iraq. Then, the main opposition party leader Süleyman Demirel (1990) asserted that involvement in the coalition may “stigmatize Turkey as an enemy in the eyes of some Arab countries.” In the case dated March 1, 2003, AKP members with a pious, Islamist background in particular, found cooperation with an outside power to invade a neighboring Muslim country as risky in terms of Turkey’s image among Muslim countries as a whole (Kardaş, 2006: 324).

This is not to say that risk aversion was the ultimate variable in the eyes of decision-makers that determines the end result. Interestingly, despite high risks in sending troops to Iraq in October 2003 case the decision-makers did not rank risk aversion as a strong influence variable in paired comparison analysis. The risks were apparent from the increasing number of casualties taking place among the coalition troops stationed in Iraq, and later major al-Qaeda attacks took place in Istanbul and Baghdad targeting the Turkish Embassy. As a response the decision-makers did not avoid risks and stayed firm about the decision to send troops for non-combat missions until the Iraqi authorities declared their objection to the matter. On October 2003 decision occasion, along with the high risks, there was neither a UNSC resolution nor a NATO decision that could encourage the decision-makers to send troops, but Turkey’s aim to enhance its influence in the future of Iraq brought the decision makers to take a decision in favor of joining the coalition. Thus, interest in the region/enhance

influence variable was ranked by the decision-makers as the highest influence variable along with alliance dependence.

Thus, along with all previously considered possibilities, there is also the chance that maintaining /enhancing Turkey's interest in the region may trump risk aversion, which is an area that needs further research for confirmation. Yet, along with the findings in hand, it can be argued that risk calculations may change in terms of taking risks for the country's own vital interests, rather than taking risks for an ally or on behalf of the international community. One of the cabinet members endorsed this idea when he stated that his perception of joining the coalition was one of "taking huge risks for the US." (Cabinet Member II, personal communication, May 21, 2013). Hence, for the country's own interests, taking risks for the US may be regarded as bearable by the decision-makers.

Theoretically, it would seem that the interest in the region/enhance influence variable may be regarded as a supporting variable in decisions to join the coalition. This variable was ranked as a strong influence variable once, and a moderate influence variable in five cases. Yet, there is not a clear pattern from which to make theoretical inferences. Hence this variable, as mentioned above in the case dated October 2003, may provide insights for future research. In October 2003, Turkish decision-makers regarded the interest in the region/enhance influence variable as a strong influential factor. This case differs from others in that there was a strong urge to take part in the reconstruction of the target country in the aftermath of the campaign, thus preventing unwelcomed outcomes. For Turkish authorities the close cooperation of the US administration with the Iraqi Kurds was worrisome hence, in order to have an influence on the process, Turkey should "keep the American-Kurdish cooperation in

check” by being part of the coalition (Olson, 2005: 147; Taşpınar, 2003a). Thus, it became an important matter in the decision outcome and differs from all other cases.

Another issue of interest with regard to enhancing Turkey’s interest in the region would seem to be about the cases of November 2001 and January 2002 when Turkey decided to send peace-keeping troops to Afghanistan to support its reconstruction. There has been an affinity between Afghanistan and Turkey going back to late Ottoman/early Republican times, during both of which periods there was a culture of sending troops and professionals to Afghanistan from Turkey. Nonetheless, the interest in the region/enhance influence was not regarded as a strong influence variable by the decision-makers in both of these cases. In the paired comparison analysis for the former it was regarded as a low influence variable; whereas in the latter case it was a variable of moderate influence. As one of the cabinet members asserted “I acknowledge the historical background, but such decisions are not taken based on history” (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, July 2, 2013). Another reiterated a similar approach when he stated “...there was no point in seeking such influence beyond Turkey’s immediate vicinity.” (Cabinet Member V, personal communication, September 2, 2003).

Legitimacy by UNSC resolution and legitimacy by NATO decision variables are seen as supporting variables in decisions to join the coalition. None of these variables are regarded as strong by the decision-makers in not-join cases. However, they emerge individually as strong influencing variables in join coalition cases in various decision occasions.

Tago, (2007) tests both legitimization by UNSC and NATO with regard to their effects on coalition participation and finds positive results for the former. Among all the decision occasions examined in this study, there are clear UN mandates in only three cases. In two of these cases dated January 1991 and January 2002, legitimacy by UNSC resolution was regarded as a strong influence variable by the decision-makers. Indeed, in the January 1991 case, the UNSC resolution was ranked as the highest influential variable. On this decision occasion the US and Russia seemed to be in close agreement, that some of the decision-makers regarded the coalition as being based on a broad and strong base in which Turkey should take part (see pages 82-83). In the January 2002 dated case, the ISAF mission was based on UNSC Resolution 1386 and Turkish decision-makers regarded joining the coalition as “adapting to the international community” (Cabinet Member VII, personal communication, July 14, 2013).

Nonetheless, in the case dated December 1990, the presence of the UNSC resolution was not regarded as influential in the decision to join the coalition. The UNSC resolution was regarded as a catalyst, but not of sufficient strength to warrant joining the coalition. Thus, Turkish decision-makers may push for a UNSC resolution in order to present a convincing façade to a domestic audience, but even when such a resolution has been passed it does not automatically mean Turkey will join the coalition. In December 1990 both President Özal and Prime Minister Akbulut stipulated a UN resolution for sending troops, but after this was achieved, sending troops was not realized (See pp. 87-88). Furthermore, in the case of March 1, 2003 one of the Turkish high level bureaucrats commented to Bush’s National Security Adviser Rice, that Turkey would be on board with “everything providing there is

international legitimacy and consensus” (High Level Bureaucrat I, personal communication, October 17, 2013). However, in the event the UNSC resolution was regarded as a low influence variable in this case. As in the words of one of the decision-makers “without a UN decision we could not intervene; yet, we do not join all the coalitions for which UNSC passes a resolution” (Cabinet Member III, personal communication, July 2, 2013).

There were occasions in which the absence of a UNSC resolution did not prevent Turkish decision-makers opting to join a coalition. In October 2003, Turkey decided to join the coalition without a UNSC resolution that legitimized the use of force. In this case, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, referred to the inefficiency of the UN in preventing the Iraq War and rather than seeking the necessary UNSC resolution, he emphasized the national interest as a reference point for legitimacy (“Biz Meşru Diyorsak Bu İş Meşrudur,” 2003). Nonetheless, in this occasion those opposed to joining the coalition made great use of the absence of a UNSC resolution. In the case dated August 1991, again in the absence of a resolution, the opposition party leader Erdal İnönü pointed to the UN as ‘the address to solve the problem’ and declared his support for a UN-led coalition (“İnönü: Irak’a Karşı Dünya Ordusu Kurulsun,” 1990; Ekşi, 1990). Furthermore, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, formerly President of the Constitutional Court, made a strong point about the unconstitutionality of being a party to war without a UNSC resolution (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, May 9, 2014). He maintained his opposition to US unilateral use of force in all decision occasions related to the Iraq War.

Considering the legitimacy granted by NATO's influence on matters, NATO's invoking Article 5 is only applicable to the two Afghanistan War cases of November 2001 and January 2002. In one it had a moderate influence; in the other it strongly influenced the outcome. In these cases some of the decision-makers even argued for the superiority of NATO influence over any UNSC resolution. One decision-maker stated that "the UN decision was important for legitimacy, yet for implementation NATO is more important than the UN" (Cabinet Member I, personal communication, July 29, 2013). However, the paired comparison analysis do not support this argument that it indicated that indeed legitimacy by UNSC resolution is regarded as more influential than legitimacy by NATO.

Without invoking Article 5, NATO's mere encouragement of its members was not regarded as influential by Turkish decision-makers. In three cases where Turkey did not join the coalition, the main debate was around the NATO encouragement of its members to join, and its protection of Turkey against an attack coming from the target country. In all three cases, even with debates and divisions in that of March 1, 2003, NATO declared its commitment to protect Turkey. Nonetheless, as in this case, one of the decision-makers asserted that "NATO played a role that is as influential in the decision as the Bird Lovers Society" (Cabinet Member IV, personal communication, October 25, 2013). Thus, other than in the Afghanistan cases, NATO only encouraged its members to join the coalition, but the decision-makers did not take this encouragement as a strongly influential factor in the decision outcome.

Another contribution of this work to the literature is about military capability. The literature refers to military capability as an important intervening variable in coalition

participation (Ashraf, 2011: 73). However, in the paired comparison analysis this variable appeared as a low influence variable in all cases. Turkey did not have a “suitable military force” with regard to the cases dated August 1990 and December 1990. After 1990, the Turkish Armed Forces’ capabilities were improved over time as can be seen from the increases in expenditure on the military.

Year	Iron and steel production (thousands of tons)	Military Expenditures (US Dollar)	Military Personnel (thousands)	Energy consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents)	Total Population (thousands)	Urban population
1990	8,373	2,980,000	769	158075.2	56,098	20,974
1991	8,572	4,400,000	804	153181.0	57,305	21,464
2001	1,4981	7,219,000	515	234487.0	68,365	21,539
2002	1,6467	8,034,000	515	253214.2	69,302	20,313
2003	1,8298	9,036,000	515	279970.6	70,231	19,086

Nonetheless, despite this improvement over the years, in other cases too Turkey did not become keen to join a coalition. Thus, this study provides evidence that does not fit with the current literature, in that military capability did not appear as an influential variable in any of the decision occasions for either to join or not join coalitions.

Whilst this study did not focus on geographical proximity as a specific variable, some of the findings would seem to have important implications in this context. The current literature argues that geographical proximity has the effect of increasing chances for coalition participation, as in Siverson and Starr’s (1990) reference to having a border with the target country, or Tago’s (2007) reference to being in the same region with



the operation. Thus, it is expected for the countries that the closer the target country is, the eager they will be to join the coalition. In this study, in contrast to these arguments, there is a case in which decision-makers are less eager to join a coalition that targets a geographically close country. Turkish decision-makers perceived higher risks in participating in coalitions in Iraq than in the more distant country of Afghanistan. With regard to the latter, one MP stated in parliamentary debate that it was a campaign “4,000 km away from Turkey and not a life and death matter.” (See p.113) For the Turkish decision-makers joining a coalition that was targeting a country in close geographical proximity was regarded as riskier; whereas a country a greater distance away, was more bearable.

Last but not least, despite the emergence of clear patterns in terms of differentiation between the cases when Turkey decided to join coalitions and cases in which Turkey decided not to join, the same cannot be said for the level of commitment as a dependent variable. In terms of the paired comparison analysis there is not a clear differentiation between weak and strong commitment cases. At the beginning of the study, I expected to reach findings with stronger influence of legitimacy by UNSC resolution and/or NATO decision, together with interest in the region/enhance influence variables, within strong commitment cases when compared to moderate commitment cases. However, the findings did not support the expectations and especially in January 1991 dated decision occasion these expectations were not fulfilled. In this study, there is no clear evidence that any one variable is pivotal in terms of differentiation between weak and strong commitment. Further research with a different research design and definition of strong and weak commitment may yield meaningful results.

## **CHAPTER VII**

### **CONCLUSION**

This dissertation examines Turkey's decisions to participate in US-led military coalitions. The decisions were categorized at two levels: whether or not to join the coalition; and whether the support/commitment was a weak or strong one. In the case of participation, the level of contribution was categorized as weak commitment when only airspace and airbases were offered, and strong commitment when troops were offered for non-combat and/or combat missions.

In order to examine Turkey's decision-making in US-led military coalitions, three military campaigns, in which the US administration asked for Turkey's participation in coalition, were selected. These are the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. In these military campaigns, occasions in which decision-makers were faced

with the reality of joining or not joining the coalition were identified, and eight such decision occasions were examined in detail. Three decision occasions were taken from the Gulf War. August 1990 dated case is the first decision occasion in which the Turkish parliament rejected giving extra war powers to the government than already provided by the constitution. December 1990 dated case is the second decision occasion in which the president refrained from joining the coalition and January 1991 dated case is the third decision occasion in which the parliament decided to open military bases. Two decision occasions took place during the Afghanistan War. In January 2001 dated case the government took the decision to send troops for non-combat missions and in November 2001 dated case the government decided to send troops for combat missions. Finally, three further decision occasions were selected from the Iraq War. In March 1, 2003 dated case the Turkish parliament rejected to open Turkish territory and bases. In March 20, 2003 dated case Turkish parliament decided to open country's airspace and in October 2003 dated case Turkish parliament decided to send troops for non-combat missions.

These decision occasions were examined using structured, focused case comparison methodology. Furthermore, seven independent variables were ranked in terms of their level of influence on the decision-makers within the decision-making process. These seven independent variables are: legitimacy by the UNSC; legitimacy by NATO; risk aversion; interest in region/enhance influence; decision-making process; alliance dependence on coalition leader, and military capability.

In order to determine the level of influence of these variables, paired comparison analysis method as an advanced method of ranking was used. In order to get meaningful results with the lowest number of people, these analyses were conducted with 10 decision-makers for each decision occasion. The results of paired comparison analyses and in-depth interviews constitute the core data of this dissertation. In order to expand on the numerical values with qualitative data, 47 elite interviews were conducted with the decision-makers involved in these decision occasions. Since some of the interviewees did not participate in the paired comparison analysis the interviews, along with memoirs and other secondary sources, provided triangulation to the results of paired comparison analyses and interviews.

### **7.1. Theoretical Contributions**

The Turkish cases examined within this study confirm the alliance dependence thesis for countries joining US-led military coalitions. According to this thesis, there are other variables such as risk aversion and the decision-making process that may trump alliance dependence depending on the conditions. If decision-makers reach a consensus that abandonment of the country by its ally constitutes a higher risk, alliance dependence becomes the dominant variable. In this case, Turkey is more likely to join the coalition. But if one or more actors regarded joining the coalition as bringing more risk to the country, then the decision-making process, together with risk aversion, turn out to be strong influence variables. In this case, Turkey is more likely to not join the coalition. In this study, risk aversion is came up for the first time as a reason to avoid joining a military coalition for non-leading coalition participants.

This study did not find any evidence of Turkey joining a coalition for possible financial benefit, indeed money was only mentioned in terms of compensation for the country's losses, in other words to reduce costs. Thus, it rejects the alternative thesis that Turkey jumping on the "band-wagon for profit". This study found that the authoritative decision unit was mainly comprised of group or a coalition of autonomous actors which rejected the presence of a strong executive with the necessary power to allocate resources for joining a war alone. Nonetheless, contrary to the current literature, in the case of Turkey joining a coalition was not reinforced by public support. In all cases, public opinion was against joining coalitions and there were even public protests against being part of a war. Having controlled for the public opinion variable, the variation is due to other variables such as alliance dependence, risk aversion and enhance country's interests. The decision-makers, including members of the parliament, would seem to have simply ignored public opinion when making their decisions to join various coalitions.

Furthermore, this study provides deviant cases which may prove useful in the context of future research. One of these concerns military capability. According to the findings from paired comparison analysis in this research, the military capability variable is not regarded as influential in consideration by the decision-makers on either in joining or not joining US-led military coalitions. Another area in which findings within this work contradict those of the literature, is that the Turkish case refutes the currently held belief that decision-makers are more likely to join a coalition if the target country has geographic proximity. Even though Iraq was a

neighbor, Turkey shied away joining the coalition against this country in number of occasions.

## **7.2. Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy**

Coalition participation dynamics are more of a concern for people studying American foreign policy, since coalition warfare and burden sharing is a frequently debated phenomenon from the perspective of the coalition leader. On the contrary, scholars working on Turkish foreign policy would seem to have little interest in this context since Turkey is merely a participant within coalitions. Thus, the current literature on Turkish foreign policy examines the issues of the First and Iraq Wars and the Afghanistan War as individual cases within overall foreign policy, rather than considering them as a systematic issue under the umbrella of coalition participation dynamics.

Current literature on Turkish foreign policy on this matter refers to the reasons for cooperation with the US as being “a close ally of the US” or “re-establishing Turkey’s Western and pro-American/European identity” (Çakmak, 2004: 80; Oğuzlu & Güngör, 2006: 478-81). Whilst these studies are clearly moving in the right direction, they do not pinpoint the exact concept. This study has identified the precise concept as alliance dependence and also gives detailed analysis of other relevant factors.

In another matter, the current literature solely focuses on peacekeeping operations carried out under an international organization, officially named as “contribution of the Turkish Armed Forces to peace support operations” (Çakmak, 2004: 116). This implies that the Turkish military only joins military coalitions when legitimacy has been provided by international organizations (Öcal, 2010: 78). However, in this study it has been shown that Turkish policy makers, despite the absence of a UNSC resolution, decided to send troops to Iraq in the case of October 2003. However, as the US did not accept this offer, no action actually took place.

Finally, in the current literature, the absence of Turkey’s specific interests in target countries and an aim to expand its influence has been argued as a reason for support (Çakmak, 2004: 78). In this study, though interest in the region/enhancing influence appeared not as a primary reason, but as a secondary variable, albeit an influential variable in the decision to join coalitions. Interest in the region/enhance influence emerged as a possible factor within the levels of commitment applied within this work, and would seem worthy of further study, particularly in the context of moderate and strong commitment.

### **7.3. Importance of the Study**

This study would be the first one to examine Turkey’s foreign policy during the First and Iraq Wars and the Afghanistan War in the context of coalition policy literature. A total of eight decision occasions were examined for the first time in a theoretical context utilizing mid-range theories on coalition participation.

This study, for the first time, ranked the influence of seven independent variables concerning the particular decision, for each of the eight decision occasions with the paired comparison analysis method. As a result of this ranking, confirmed with correlational data, the study concluded that Turkish decision-makers consider alliance dependence on coalition leader as the strongest influence in join coalition cases. For the not-join cases, the strongest variables were risk aversion and the conflict in decision-making process.

Furthermore, this study has generated a hypothesis for testing in future research based on the interest in the region/enhance influence variable. This variable emerged as a possible factor within the levels of commitment applied within this work and would seem worthy of further study, particularly in revealing the difference between moderate and strong commitments.

Last but not least, this study for the first time examined the decision-making process of sending troops to the Afghanistan War (2001). There is no other study that has focused on this matter. Furthermore, this study by means of first-hand data gathered from the actual decision-makers, has provided new insights on the First and Iraq Wars in 1991 and 2003 respectively. In particular, Turkey's decision in October 2003 to send non-combat troops was understudied in comparison with March 1, 2003 case. This study is one of the very few that have examined the latter decision occasion.

#### **7.4. Policy Implications**



This study's results and findings also have policy implications. The first and foremost lesson is the need for more informed decision-makers. In the study, it is seen that despite the Turkish constitution gives the authority to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to decide on coalition participation, parliament members are often not informed adequately on the process and parameters of joining the coalition. There are even claims about cabinet members not having factual data on critical matters such as Turkey's military capability, let alone the parliament members (See p.59). Besides, during March 1, 2003 parliamentary talks, the Undersecretary of Turkish MFA and the chief negotiator were invited, but they were not provided the chance to inform the parliamentarians (See p.172). Thus, at such a crucial parliament voting, the parliament members casted their votes with incomplete information. Thus, the first lesson taken should be along with the authority to decide, the proper information channels should be provided to decision makers.

Another issue is once the permission is given by the parliament to the cabinet, the government faces direct pressure from international community or the coalition leader to act. Thus, it would be wiser for the parliament to give limited permissions to the government on the use of military rather than granting the whole authority with the "time, limits and scope" altogether as referred in the bills. This would provide the ability to maneuver especially to halt the process when facing high risks by the hands of parliament without provoking harsh reactions from the allies. Along with the developments on the ground the parliament may expand the permission.

Another matter is important for the decisionmakers: that is to know that while rejecting to join a coalition, it does not directly equate to an economic crisis, or accepting to join the coalition does not mean an automatic participation on the ground. Especially, March 1 bill created a concern in Turkey about an economic crisis without having a factual basis. Despite the risks of having a border with the country in war, avoiding to be part of the war is better than directly involving in economic terms (See p.187). About the decision and participation gap, Turkey decided to send troops for combat mission in November 2001 case and for non-combat mission in October 2003 case and both were not materialized due to the parameters on the field.

As another matter, the findings of this study indicates that timing of coalition participation decision is as important as the decision itself. Since the coalition participation is more important in political terms than the actual campaign contribution (See p.11), the later the decision is taken it diminishes the legitimacy of the campaign. Thus, the decision makers should evaluate coalition participation as a time sensitive matter. If the decision makers give high importance to alliance dependence or enhancing Turkey's interests in the target country, it is better to decide joining coalition early rather than late. Especially, in Iraq War Turkey's late decision to join the coalition limited its ability to negotiate for its crucial interests. Still, Turkey decided to send troops to Iraq eventually, the US did not regard Turkey's involvement as significant at that time. On the contrary, the timely but limited contribution during the Gulf War was highly regarded by the counterparts.

Lastly, along with the findings of this thesis, it is seen that the public opinion is not regarded by the representatives on a critical issue such as join a military coalition or not. In a democratic country public opinion should be taken as an important input and reflected by the representatives in the decision. Thus, one of the things we learned from this study is that there is a need for better channeling the public preferences into the decision-making process in Turkey.

### **7.5. Limitations of the Study and Future Research**

One of the aims of this study was to reveal the dynamics of differentiation within the level of commitment. However, it proved impossible to establish a clear pattern of differentiation. In terms of the paired comparison analysis there is no clear differentiation between moderate commitment and strong commitment cases. The distribution of the UNSC resolution, NATO decision, and/or interest in the region/enhance influence variables are mixed in terms of being strong or moderate variables.

One possible explanation is that this study examines the commitment level according to the measure of contribution given to the coalition. Opening airspace and airbases are coded as moderate commitment, whereas sending troops for combat and non-combat missions are coded with strong commitment. Nevertheless, the decision-maker's perception of which case is a strong commitment and which weak may be different. In this study, perceptions of the level of commitment were not sought from the decision-makers, which could form the basis for future research.

Another issue could be that the balance of threat was not included as an independent variable, since the current literature does not refer to Turkey undertaking coalition participation due to threats perceived from the target country. Furthermore, the interviewees did not refer to issues related to the balance of threat. However, as the findings of this study have demonstrated that military capability was never an influential variable in decision-making, it could be that future studies may substitute a balance of threat variable for that of military capability.

Finally, despite the lack of international legitimacy via a UNSC resolution, together with the presence of a genuine risk of casualties in the October 2003 case, the decision-makers offered to send troops for non-combat missions. Indeed, several attacks in the target country and in Turkey took place; yet, these attacks did not change the decision. In this case, the presence of the interest in the region/enhance variable as a strong influence variable may be decisive. This interesting case hints at the need for more research on the interest in the region/enhance influence variable. Future research in this context could be undertaken in the context of the Bosnia or Kosovo decision occasions, or the decision to join the coalition known as ‘Operation Providing Comfort’ in April 1991, all of which could provide promising results in examining the differences of weak and strong commitments.

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## APPENDIX

### ELITE INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS LIST

#### (A-Z)

#### Gulf War

Abdulkadir Aksu, Minister of Interior

Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ali Bozer, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anonymous Military Bureaucrat I

Anonymous Military Bureaucrat II

Fevzi İşbaşaran, President Özal's Aide

Güneş Taner, Minister of Defense

Halil Şıvgın, Cabinet Member

Hasan Celal Güzel, ANAP MP, Party Head Hopeful

Hüsnu Doğan, Minister of Defense

İmren Aykut, Cabinet Member

Işın Çelebi, Cabinet Member

Kamran İnan, Cabinet Member, Parliament Committee of Foreign Affairs

Kaya Toperi, President Özal's Aide

Mehmet Keçeciler, Cabinet Member

Morton Abramowitz, U.S. Ambassador to Ankara

Namık Kemal Zeybek, Cabinet Member

Necati Utkan, Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad

Oltan Sungurlu, Cabinet Member

Vecdi Gönül, Undersecretary of Ministry of Interior

Vehbi Dinçerler, Cabinet Member

### Afghanistan War

Abdulhaluk Çay, Minister Responsible Turkic World

Aydemir Erman, Turkey's Special Representative to Afghanistan

Edip Safter Gaydalı, Cabinet Member

Haydar Ateş, ISAF Commander (Col.)

Mehmet Keçeciler, Cabinet Member

Müfit Özdeş, Turkey's Ambassador to Kabul

Oktay Vural, Cabinet Member

Robert Pearson, U.S. Ambassador to Ankara

Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu, Minister of Defense

Sadi Somuncuoğlu, Cabinet Member

Şükrü Sina Gürel, Cabinet Member, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Türkekul Kurttekin, Deputy Undersecretary of MFA

Uğur Ziyal, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Yaşar Okuyan, Cabinet Member

### Iraq War

Abdulkadir Aksu, Minister of Interior

Ali Coşkun, Cabinet Member

Anonymous AKP MP I

Anonymous AKP MP II

Anonymous MFA Bureaucrat

Deniz Bölükbaşı, Chief Negotiator of Turkish MFA on MoU Talks

Erkan Mumcu, Cabinet Member

Faik Öztrak, Undersecretary of Treasury

Hüseyin Diriöz, MFA Spokesperson

Kürşat Tüzmen, Cabinet Member

Robert Pearson, U.S. Ambassador to Ankara

Uğur Ziyal, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vecdi Gönül, Minister of Defense

Yaşar Yakış, Minister of Foreign Affairs