

THE DEVIL'S BLESSING:
HARRY TRUMAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ATOMIC
BOMB,
SEPTEMBER 1945- JUNE 1946

A Master's Thesis

by
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THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

June 2007

To The Peacemakers

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The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

June 2007

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

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ABSTRACT

**The Devil's Blessing:
Harry Truman and International Control of the Atomic Bomb,
September 1945- June 1946**

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June 2007

As the first president who took a step towards nuclear non-proliferation, Truman's policy concerning the atomic weapons is worthy of academic scrutiny. This work focuses on the ten-month period from September 1945 to June 1946, during which American government initiated the international control of the atomic energy. Truman's domestic and foreign policy regarding this issue was influenced by several external and internal factors, including the supporters and opponents of the international control, rise of bipartisanship, the Republican opposition, public opinion and the Soviet conduct in different parts of the world. The focus of the thesis is President Truman and the shift in the foreign policy. The main argument revolves around how the president saw the international control, what factors affected his decisions and which actors were involved. From Secretary of War Stimson's proposal in September 1945 on approaching the Soviets to the collapse of the negotiations in the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee meeting in June 1946, Truman pursued policies that were in support of the international control. To come to this conclusion, primary documents, such as diaries, memoirs, state papers and

newspaper editorial were used as well as the secondary sources following a chronological order.

Key Words: International Control of the Atomic Bomb, Nuclear Weapons, Harry S. Truman, Disarmament, Origins of the Cold War.

ÖZET

**Şeytanın Lütfu:
Harry Truman ve Atom Bombasının Uluslararası Denetimi,
Eylül 1945- Haziran 1946**

Dumlu, Derya
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doçent Dr. Edward P. Kohn
Haziran 2007

Bu tez Amerikan hükümetinin Başkan Truman yönetimi altında atom bombasının uluslararası denetimini başlattığı Eylül 1945 ve Haziran 1946 tarihleri arasındaki dönemi kapsamaktadır. Uluslararası denetimi destekleyenler ve ona karşı çıkanlar, çift partili düşüncenin yükselmesi, Cumhuriyetçi muhalefet, kamuoyu ve Sovyet idaresi de dahil olmak üzere bir çok etken bu konuyla ilgili iç ve dış politikaları etkilemiştir. Tezin odak noktası Başkan Truman ve dış politikadaki değişimdir. Esas iddia başkanın uluslararası denetimi nasıl gördüğü, kararlarını nelerin etkilediği ve hangi etmenlerin yer aldığı konularının etrafında yoğunlaşmaktadır. Savaş Sekreteri Stimson'ın Eylül 1945'te yaptığı Sovyetlere yakınlaşma teklifinden Haziran 1946'da Birleşmiş Milletler Atom Enerjisi Komisyonu toplantısında görüşmelerin sona ermesine kadar Truman uluslararası denetimi destekleyen politikalar izledi. Bu sonuca varmak için ikincil kaynakların yanısıra günlükler, muhtırlar, devlet kayıtları ve gazeteler gibi birincil kaynaklar da zamandizinsel bir düzende kullanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Atom Bombasının Uluslararası Denetimi, Nükleer Silahlar, Harry S Truman, Silahsızlanma, Soğuk Savaşın Kökenleri.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is only fair to start with expressing my gratitude to Dr. Kohn for his invaluable comments, guidance, patience, encouragements and sarcasm. Without him, it would be impossible to write this thesis. Also, I'd like to offer my gratitude to Dr. Roberts for his ever open door for crying girls.

My faithful friend Dođuş made it possible for me to keep going. She listened, smiled and brought light. I don't know what I would have done without her.

My dear friends in the dorm, Öykü, Ayşegül, Aslıhan, Gökşen, Ayşegül, Gülşah, and Kara; thank you for not talking to me early in the morning, making me smile during the all-nighters, and being such loving friends.

I thank Mike and Aimee Wuthrich, who have always been hospitable and generous. They provided movies and wisdom when i felt like pulling my hair out.

I cannot forget Bahadır, Alev and Defne Çeliktemur, who supplied the sanctuary I needed in the times of ultimate boredom. Little Defne, your birth brought joy and beauty.

Lastly, I have to remember the Simpson Family, who was ever-faithful in showing up in my room regardless of time and bringing laughter.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom is: don't make the same mistake twice. Learn from your mistakes. [...] Maybe we make the mistake three times, but hopefully not four or five. There'll be no learning period with nuclear weapons. Make one mistake and you're going to destroy nations.

— Robert S. McNamara

Harry S. Truman became the president of the United States of America late in the afternoon on April 12, 1945. The death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt left Truman in charge of an unfinished war and the Manhattan Project, one of the biggest military projects in American history. Even though Truman, as senator and the chairman of the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, had attempted to inspect the nature of this project which demanded millions of dollars, Truman later withdrew his demand for an investigation after being assured of the project's importance and secrecy by Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson. In a very short time after becoming president, indeed, the very day after, James Byrnes, the former director of war mobilization, informed Truman about the development of a new destructive weapon, the atomic bomb. When Stimson talked to Truman on April 25, the course of the conversation was markedly different than those they had previously exchanged. Stimson said, “[w]ithin four months we shall in all probability have

completed the most terrible weapon ever known to human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city.”¹ This was three months before the first detonations of an atomic bomb.

The bomb had primarily been developed in response to the threat posed by Nazi Germany and the war in Europe, which raged during the years of Roosevelt’s presidency. Roosevelt, the architect of the project, apparently never expressed doubt or hesitations regarding the usage of the bomb, as Stimson notes: “at no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in war.”² By the time the bomb had been completed, however, the situation had changed dramatically. The war in Europe had come to a halt and Roosevelt had died before ever learning of the success of his two-billion dollar project. The Pacific War was still at hand, however, and the decision of whether or not to use the bomb in the war was left to Truman. The weight and responsibility of such a decision was reflected in the statements made by those who tested the bomb in Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 15, 1945. They, too acknowledged its deadly power. J. Robert Oppenheimer, for example, a theoretical physicist and the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, later recalled that testing day: “I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form and says, 'Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.' I suppose we all thought that one way

¹ Henry Stimson, “Memorandum discussed with the President, April 25, 1945, Stimson Diary”, Yale University Archives, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/3b.pdf>.

² Henry L. Stimson, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold war, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 245.

or another."³ For Truman, however, there was even more to consider than the bomb's capacity to kill.

Before any decision was made about using the bomb, Truman and other statesmen had to determine whether or not the Russians should be informed about it, a deliberation which drew heated debates. Secretary of War Stimson delivered the opinion of the conclusion of the American officials. As a result, at the Potsdam Conference in July Truman casually told Joseph Stalin about the invention of a new powerful bomb without going into any further details. In return, Stalin casually expressed the hope that it would be used against the Japanese as the Pacific War as the only front remaining in World War II. Truman shared the same mentality with Roosevelt and Churchill that this new device was simply a weapon: "I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used."⁴ On August 6, 1945, "Little Boy" was detonated over Hiroshima and three days later "Fat Man" over Nagasaki. On August 15, Japan announced its unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers. World War II had ended.

The debates over why Truman dropped the bomb have been going on since August of 1945. There are many arguments on the subject coming from different schools of thought. In *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* Gar Alperovitz argued that the bomb was dropped for political, rather than military, reasons and thus was not necessary to end the war with Japan. He contended that the bomb was dropped as a message to the Russians, not to end the war in the Pacific. On the other hand, some historians, like John Lewis Gaddis, in the book *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, argue that the atomic bomb was used in accordance with

³ J. Robert Oppenheimer on the day of Trinity Test, quoted in Ronald Takaki, *Hiroshima* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 15.

⁴ Harry S Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Decision*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955)

why it was invented, that is as a weapon. Furthermore, the rationale for why the bomb was detonated in Japan informs scholars about the way Truman saw the war, the Japanese, and the Russians. He is thus often labeled with the stereotype of being a militaristic president, a Cold Warrior, and a supporter of the arms race. However, in the midst of such arguments and stereotypes, there is a short period of time which, when analyzed, seems to challenge and, indeed, break such characterizations of Truman; it is this period which will be the focus of this study.

In 1945, there was not a Cold War, or a nuclear arms race. Even though Truman is presented as a Cold Warrior by the historians and is seen as a strong defender of the nuclear arms race, the months before the declaration of the Truman doctrine reveal that Truman was seeking a way to provide an international forum for the control of the atomic bomb. Truman and other American officials were well aware of the implications of the bomb's usage in the post-war world and became concerned immediately after the Japanese surrender. The reality of the atomic bomb was not a light burden to carry. The end of the war left the United States of America with unheard-of military power. The politicians, the scientists, the soldiers and the President were all looking into the future world with an awareness of the atomic bomb and its potential ramifications. The months between September 1945 and June 1946 is a period when Truman searched for both domestic and international support for his initiative concerning the international control of the atomic bomb. In September 1945, Secretary of War Stimson suggested that the United States would initiate talks leading to the international control of atomic weapons. The proposal was embraced by Truman and the following months witnessed a multitude of discussions, efforts at opposition, offers of support and various other plans concerning this issue. However, in June 1946, the attempts failed when, during the

meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on the method of international control during.

In the historiography of the origins of the Cold War, there appears to be three main interpretations. The first one is defined as the traditionalist or orthodox approach. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Herbert Feis, and Louis J. Halle can be counted among the traditionalist historians. The main arguments of traditionalism are: Stalin's aggressive and expansionist actions cause the Cold War, until 1947 American foreign policy was passive and defensive, the United States did not pursue its own interest and after World War II America embraced universalism and rejected the concept of sphere of influence.⁵

By the end of the 1950s, the antithesis of the traditionalist approach came with William Appleman Williams. Williams argued that Open Door policy the United States pursued created the basis for the American empire. Following Williams' work, many revisionist works appeared especially after the Vietnam War and American actions in the Caribbean. Gar Alperovitz, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber and Barton Bernstein can be counted among the revisionist scholars. The revisionists argued that the Truman administration dropped the atomic bombs not only to end the war with Japan but also to give a warning to the Soviet Union about their ambitions in the Far East and in the Eastern Europe. Then, in the early years of the Cold War, America created a rhetoric of “winning weapon” to intimidate the Russians. The Revisionists also argued that the atomic diplomacy increased the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, the main arguments of the revisionist approach are: Soviet Union was not the

⁵ Edward Crapol, “Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War,” *The History Teacher*, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Feb., 1987): 251-262.

only culprit of the Cold War, America had its own economic and political agenda, and therefore America did not pursue a passive and innocent foreign policy.⁶

In the last decade, the new synthesis for the historiography of the origins of the Cold War took the name of postrevisionism, or neo-orthodoxy or eclecticism. John Lewis Gaddis and George Herring gave eclectic interpretations of this period. Like revisionists, postrevisionists also put emphasis on economic factors and American expansionism. Postrevisionists argued that the United States used economics for its political goals, Stalin was an opportunist, United States at times exaggerated the external danger and there exists an American empire.⁷ In this spectrum of interpretation, the current work would fall into a category between revisionism and postrevisionism. It is revisionist since it attempts to explain that the post-war environment was created both by Americans and the Soviets. Thus, Soviets were not the only responsible party. It is postrevisionist, since there is more emphasis put on the individuals and less on the economics. Therefore, this study should be read keeping this framework in mind.

The period from September 1945 to June 1946 thus occupies a unique place in the history of the post-war world since these months witnessed the ambiguity of the international atmosphere, foreshadowed the Cold War and encompassed the efforts for the international control of the atomic bomb. However, the rise of the Cold War after the war dominates the history of the time between the dropping of the atomic bomb in August 1945 and the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. This poses several problems to the study of this period. First of all, historians tend to overemphasize the legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Truman administration, thus minimizing the uniqueness of the actors and the events of this period. Secondly,

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

the assumption that the origins of the Cold War go back to the World War I makes historians see this period merely as a piece of a single anti-communist phenomenon. Thirdly, the examination of the person of Truman as an unchanging and, usually, stubborn character without giving him the space to react to other persons and incidents is also an obstacle to the analysis of this ten-month period. Lastly, hindsight of the Cold War is also a problematic feature, which encourages the historian to interpret every event as a sign leading inevitably to the arms race and nuclear deterrence. Keeping these biases in mind, there are several books and articles contributing to the historiography of this ten-month period from 1945 to 1946. It should be noted, however, that none of the sources deal exclusively with the issue but are rather works which touch on the period at hand.

Doubtlessly, John Lewis Gaddis is one of the most important contributors to the historiography of the Cold War. His book, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, is a definitive work on the subject. Gaddis mostly focuses on the internal affairs and domestic opinion in relation to the foreign policy. His main argument is that the American policy makers were bound by domestic politics more so than their Russian counterparts. Therefore, Gaddis tends to put the blame on the shoulders of Russia and Stalin. Even though his work is crucial, his bias as a strong anti-revisionist should be taken into account. Nevertheless, in spite of this, Gaddis offers one of the best-researched and well-written pieces concerning the international control of atomic energy, concluding that American foreign policy moved away from atomic diplomacy in 1946. Another book by Gaddis *The Long Peace*, a collection of essays previously published or presented by the author, focuses on how the USA and the USSR managed to achieve a long peace, i.e., an absence of war, during what is called the Cold War. Gaddis's argument is crucial for this thesis in that he argues that

the leaders of both countries were extremely reluctant to use the bomb as a threat or as a weapon. Gaddis claims that, although it was suggested on five different occasions, Truman never considered using the weapon after 1945. Furthermore, Gaddis scrutinizes the atmosphere, which naturally impacted the view of the policy makers, within the United States and in Europe. In his latest book *We Now Know*, Gaddis looks at the Cold War from a post-Cold War perspective and analyzes the policies claiming the privilege of hindsight. Not surprisingly, he devotes a chapter to nuclear weapons, which, taking an unusual approach, addresses why the United States did not intend to start a preventative war while it had a monopoly over nuclear weapons. Even without taking into account his important remarks on the international control of the atomic bomb during the presidency of Truman, Gaddis's stance is worthy of consideration, especially after the opening of the Russian archives.

Andrew Fontaine's *History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950* is a very short book which, nevertheless, makes a relevant point which demands attention. Fontaine focuses on the argument that Truman never intended to use the bomb as a diplomatic tool against the Soviets; however, the bomb gave him ground to maneuver his policies if the Soviet side became tough. The first part of the thesis reveals in part Truman's perception of the bomb and its limitations.

Yet another notable source, written by diplomatic historian Michael J. Hogan, examines the developments within the state during the first decade of the Cold War in his book *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*. He presents a valuable history of the national security state, thereby providing a more accurate perspective about the policies that followed.

Though the period focused on in this thesis is covered in the book, Hogan devotes only about ten pages to the international control of the atomic bomb as the bulk of the book is devoted to the Cold War development. Still, Hogan's diplomatic history is helpful in that it gives an account of the dealings between the Republicans and the Democrats and between the civil and military authorities at this time.

Gregg Herken, likewise, is a historian who focused on this period with his book, *The Winning Weapon: the Atomic Bomb in the Cold War*. In this work, the four-year journey of the bomb, from the fall of 1945, right after Hiroshima, until the detonation of the hydrogen bomb in Russia in 1949 and its aftermath during 1950, was considered, with an emphasis on the first years of the weapon. He mainly argues that Truman's efforts to turn the control of the bomb over to the civilians were defeated by the apparent victory of the McMahon Act⁸. Although he states that the group of policy-makers believed in sharing the scientific knowledge with the Soviets, Herken also makes a point that the Baruch Plan ended all hope for serious international control of the bomb by offering an unacceptable prospect. Finally, Herken concludes that the Truman administration justified the status quo, i.e. the monopoly of the bomb in the hands of the United States, with the collapse of the negotiations in the IAEA meeting in 1946. *Specter of Communism* by Melvyn P. Leffler is a short account of the origins of the Cold War, dating from 1917 to 1953. The way the author roots the Cold War in the first half of the twentieth century is important as a counter argument for the current study, since the author claims that Truman possessed a Cold War mentality before 1946. However, even though the

⁸ McMahon Act, formally Atomic Energy Act of 1946, determined how the nuclear energy and technology would be used and directed in the United States. Most importantly, the act established that nuclear weapons and energy would be controlled by the civilian authorities rather than military. The act, which was sponsored by Senator Brien McMahon, was signed by President Truman in August 1946, and went into effect in January 1947. For further information see S. J. Ball, "Military Nuclear Relations between the United States and the Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act, 1946-1958, *The Historical Journal* Vol. 38, No. 2. (Jun., 1995): 439-454.

arguments will be considered as reference points, it should be kept in mind that this book lacks a wide range of primary sources. Joseph I. Lieberman's book, *The Scorpion and Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons 1945-1949*, provides quotations from many important figures of the time. Even though the analytical work and the perspective of this book is not satisfactory for use as a supportive scholarly work, the book is an extensive presentation of archival research.

The biographies of important figures are also significant secondary sources for the study at hand as through them one can see the importance of prominent actors and also grasp the environment they were in and the paths they followed. Dean Acheson was one of the key actors of this period. David S. McLellan's book *Dean Acheson: the State Department Years* contains a separate chapter on Dean Acheson's years as the undersecretary of state from 1945 to 1947. McLellan talks about how Acheson was involved in the formation of the domestic control of the bomb and how he was in favor of a rapprochement in relations with the USSR. The chapter devoted to this period of Acheson's career is one of the most detailed histories of the development of this period including the context of public opinion and the developments in the Congress and the Senate.

David E. Lilienthal was one of the members of the committee formed to frame a plan for the international control of the atomic bomb. Steven M. Neuse's book *David E. Lilienthal: the Journey of an American Liberal* is a biography which, although it does not contain much about the period leading to Acheson-Lilienthal plan, is a well-written overview. Another available source is related to one of the most important figures of the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy Commission, James B. Conant. James G. Hershberg supplies the perspective of this important figure and also provides a detailed account of the development of this ten

month period in *James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age*.

The biographies of Truman himself do not address this specific time period of his presidency. William E. Pemberton's *Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior* devoted fewer than twenty pages to the international control of the bomb after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though the book did give the reader valuable insight about Truman's dilemma between domestic and foreign policy. Other biographies like *The Man from Missouri* by Alfred Steinberg, *Mr. President: Truman* by William Hillman, and *Harry S. Truman: a Life* by Robert H. Ferrell include virtually nothing about the subject matter. Other biographical works including *Plain Speaking, an Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* by Merle Miller, *Truman in Retirement: A Former President Views the Nation and the World* by Gregory W. Sand, *The Truman Presidency* by Cabell Phillips and *Harry S. Truman* by Margaret Truman provide biased accounts since they tend to justify the works of Truman because of their kinship with him. However, these biases can illuminate the personal and emotional aspects of the president if the historian is able to see through the subjectivity. On the other hand, *Truman* written by David McCullough outlines the situation the thirty-third president was in after the end of the World War II by describing where Truman stood as a president who was trapped in the midst of post-war domestic affairs and the advent of a new super power. Although McCullough's account of this ten-month period occupies but a few pages in his book, he succeeds in portraying the limitations, hesitations and visions of Truman. Another book on Truman presidency covering this period is Robert J. Donovan's *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman*. Even though Donovan uses historical research methods and primary documents, his profession as a journalist is reflected in the methodology

employed in the writing of this book. The drawbacks of the scholarship, however, are not significant enough to destroy the potential of the book as a secondary source. Therefore, because Donovan examines only a short period of Truman's presidency, he inevitably discusses the developments of late 1945 and early 1946. He devotes two chapters to issues such as Truman's view of Russians, the development leading to Baruch Plan and the plan itself. Yet, the work is not to be relied on too heavily because of the lack of scholarly credibility of the author.

There are also some articles written regarding various aspects of the issue which are worthy of mention in the historiography. To begin with, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946" by Barton J. Bernstein offers a well-written overview of the events during these years, emphasizing the international control efforts during the Truman administration. Bernstein, in his conclusion, takes a position in the middle by claiming that the failure of the negotiations showed mutual mistrust. Secondly, "Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Introduction of the Atomic Energy in the United Nations: Discord and Cooperation in 1945" by Dimitris Bourantonis and Edward Johnson scrutinizes the approaches of the Truman and Attlee governments, focusing mainly on the meeting of three leaders in late 1945 and arguing that both governments supported international control under the United Nations. Thirdly, Henry B. Ryan's article titled "A New Look at Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech" is relevant because of its examination of the background, perspectives and conclusions related to this significant document of the early Cold War years. Lastly, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-1948" by Melvyn P. Leffler covers how the politicians and the policy makers saw national security in the post-war setting of Europe and the world. The article

points out the several different aspects of concern for the government at this time such as overseas bases and budgetary issues.

Along with the secondary sources, this study will rely on primary documents including diaries, memoirs, state papers and newspaper editorials. The memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Dean Acheson, James F. Byrnes, David E. Lilienthal, Henry Wallace and Arthur Vandenberg offer the insider's perspective on how important actors of the time perceived the potentials of the atomic bomb. However, the fact that the memoirs were written with the hindsight should be kept in mind. The letters and diary entries of J. Robert Oppenheimer shed light on how the scientist himself was affected by Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and how his view changed in the post-war period. Other declassified documents like memoranda of conversations between decision-makers, meetings and files reveal the primary concerns, aims and perspectives of American officials. Furthermore, newspaper editorials from *The New York Times* and *The Chicago Tribune* reflect the view of two influential newspapers of the time. These two newspapers were chosen to reflect positions of two opposing camps concerning the international control. The former paper was more supportive of the international control and collaboration with other countries. The latter was more isolationist and encouraging of preserving American nuclear monopoly. Considering that this time period has not been studied in depth by historians, the primary documents will occupy a significant part of the current study.

During the analysis of this period, in chapter two, I will discuss how the matter of international control of the atomic bomb came into being. This section will deal with the perspectives of the different actors involved in both decision-making and opinion forming, and also what initial steps were taken by the Truman administration. In the third chapter, the rise of opposition and the changing dynamics

in domestic and foreign policy will be put forward in an attempt to point out the change of direction in the policy making process. Lastly, the fourth chapter deals with the appointment of Baruch, the ramifications of this appointment and the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission meeting in June. In the fifth chapter, I will conclude the thesis with a review of what followed the collapse of the talks in the summer of 1946, a look at the importance and ramifications of this study and a discussion of the situation of nuclear disarmament today.

CHAPTER II

“THE COMMON INTEREST OF ALL”

*We knew the world would not be the same.
— J. Robert Oppenheimer*

Having a nuclear monopoly following the development of the atomic bomb, the United States was confronted with one of the biggest dilemmas in its history. There were many voices with clashing opinions entering into the debate over how to handle this newfound power. On the one side the politicians wanted to use the atomic bomb as the ultimate weapon and a means by which to create the world America wanted. The words of Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado reveal the extremity of some opinions in this camp: “God almighty in His infinite wisdom [has] dropped the atomic bomb in our lap, ... with vision and guts and plenty of atomic bombs.... [we could] compel mankind to adopt the policy of lasting peace... or be burned to a crisp.”⁹ On the other side, there were several different figures from politicians, statesmen and scientists who were aware of the power of the atomic bomb and saw the danger it could pose in the future. These two different camps of opinion determined the shaping of American domestic and foreign policy for the months ahead.

⁹ Senator Edwin C. Johnson quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 245.

The American public as a whole actually knew very little about the bomb. The secrecy of the Manhattan Project and the scientific complexity of nuclear physics made it almost impossible to create a solid and sane public opinion on the issue. Other than the knowledge of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even most of the politicians did not understand the strength and the implications of the atomic bomb. Thus, in September of 1945, the Truman administration sought to create a domestic and foreign policy concerning the atomic bomb in an atmosphere of ignorance, extremity and uncertainty. This quest, which began in August of 1945, reached a turning point in November 1945 with the Truman-Attlee-King declaration, the first step towards the international control of the atomic bomb in the post-war era. The developments over these four months demonstrate that even though Truman was under domestic pressure, he was willing to create an international platform for control of atomic weapons. He started the process by accepting a proposal to establish civilian domestic and international control of the bomb in September. The attempts eventually led to the Truman-Attlee-King Agreement in November 1945. This chapter will deal with the developments of this time period both inside and outside of the United States.

One important consideration in taking up the internal atmosphere and developments in the United States at the time is the perspectives of the various actors, including statesmen, scientists and military figures, who either endorsed or opposed international control. The statesmen of the Truman administration stood in different places in terms of their proximity to the bomb debate. Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson was one the men closest to the issue. Stimson was an experienced statesman, who was involved in the government during the presidencies of William H. Taft, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt and

finally Harry Truman. President Roosevelt appointed him as the supervisor of the Manhattan Project, which made him one of the most knowledgeable politicians on the development and usage of the atomic bomb. Stimson did not see the bomb purely as a military asset, but also considered the responsibility of possessing such an immense power: “development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk.”¹⁰ In general, Stimson was in line with the perspective of the scientists in that he endorsed the international control of the atomic bomb. However, he was also aware of the political atmosphere in the Soviet Union, which concerned him regarding the efficacy of any international control. It might become impossible to influence the developments inside Russia considering the totalitarian nature of the government. However, he believed that the instability of Russia should not become an excuse to prolong the American monopoly, but should only function as a condition that requires precaution. In the end, Stimson concluded that the atomic bomb should be controlled internationally despite the uncertain position of the Soviet Union.¹¹

Stimson, as Secretary of War, was able to see the current international situation and the role of the atomic bomb quite differently from his colleagues. He concluded that the struggle to sustain the nuclear monopoly would become the very thing that would lead to an arms race, since “any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make the objective we have in view less probable.”¹² It was possible that an initiative coming from the United States would cause acceleration in

¹⁰ Henry Lewis Stimson quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 248.

¹¹ Sherwin, Martin J. “The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic Energy Policy and Diplomacy.” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 78, No. 4. (Oct., 1973), pp. 945-968.

¹² Henry Stimson, *Henry Stimson to Harry S. Truman, Accompanied by a Memorandum, September 11, 1945*, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers (Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 1945), <http://www.trumanlibrary.org>.

developing the bomb in Russia. But, Stimson argued that withholding from such an action might instigate “a secret armament race of a rather desperate character.” The risk needed to be taken because “if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their mistrust of our purposes and motives will increase.”¹³ As a result, the Secretary of War proposed that the United States, Great Britain and Canada would approach the Soviet Union to mutually stop further bomb construction. Existing weapons would be confiscated, and an international agreement would be obtained forbidding the use of atomic energy for military purposes.¹⁴ This suggestion resulted in clashes, long meetings and negotiations.

Stimson’s proposal created different reactions from the members of the government, but most harbored significant concerns regarding the sharing of such information. The Secretary of the Navy of the Truman Administration, James Vincent Forrestal, had reservations concerning the international control of the atomic bomb because of his mistrust of the Russians. He stated,

Until we are very sure that it is the sense of the people to make disposition of this knowledge even to our Allies it seems to me that it is a step that should be considered most carefully and taken only after complete study and reflection so that the charge may never be leveled that it was done on impulse.¹⁵

Forrestal favored the idea that the United Nations would appoint the United States as the “trustee of all information regarding the atomic bomb.”¹⁶ Only under these circumstances, according to Forrestal, could the United States agree to use the atomic bomb in line with the directions of the international organization. The Secretary of the Navy was not alone in this line of thought; the Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ James V. Forrestal quoted in Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 31

¹⁶ Stimson quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 249.

were also reluctant to approve an information exchange. While they agreed that the general scientific knowledge of building the bomb was widely known, the know-how of how to actually build it was still a secret the United States possessed. They saw an armament race as inevitable and sharing any knowledge with the Russians would only hasten the process. The skepticism towards Russia was a pattern among the military staff. The Chief of Staff to the president, Admiral William D. Leahy, was also against sharing any information regarding the building of the bomb and was strongly in favor of continuing the American nuclear monopoly as long as possible.¹⁷ The political and military front of the top men of the administration did not look on Stimson's proposal with favor because of the way the Soviet Union acted during and after World War II. Their cynicism regarding what the Soviet Union might do with such a powerful weapon overrode fears of the possibility of a future arms race or a war including nuclear weapons.

On the other end of the equilibrium, and more closely aligned with Stimson's view, were the non-political actors. The scientists, the brains behind the atomic bomb, were strongly in support of international control and, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they tried to shift both public opinion and foreign policy in this direction. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who was the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, was doubtlessly the most influential of the nuclear scientists in the political and scientific arena. Oppenheimer delivered a speech in November 1945 at the Association of Los Alamos Scientists. Some five hundred distinguished scientists and physicists went to listen to Oppenheimer's speech, a speech which the majority, when asked, claim to have remembered years later. Oppenheimer first criticized the secrecy and control under which the scientific research was conducted, arguing that it

¹⁷ Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996), 130.

was against the very nature of science, which aims for the good of all and shares knowledge with whoever is interested in both scientific and material exchanges. Then he compared the atomic weapons to the Nazis, asserting that both should be dealt with within a community of responsibility:

If you approach the problem and say “We know what is right and we would like to use the atomic bomb to persuade you to agree with us,” then you are in a very weak position and you will not succeed, because under those conditions you will not succeed in delegating responsibility for the survival of men. It is a purely unilateral statement; you will find yourselves attempting by force of arms to prevent a disaster.¹⁸

Furthermore, he favored the multilateral action of the world governments, instead of a unilateral action by the United States, and the establishment of an atomic energy commission. At the end, Oppenheimer encouraged his fellow scientists to stick to the truth unconditionally, preserve the fraternity of scientists and not to forget that they were all, first and foremost, men.¹⁹ Oppenheimer's speech was, to a great extent, an expression of how the scientists viewed the atomic bomb and its future. His opinions were very influential because he was the leading scientist of the Manhattan Project and therefore one of the men who was responsible for the creation of the bomb itself.

However, Oppenheimer²⁰ was not the only one who raised his voice against the monopoly of the atomic bomb. Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist who specialized in atom and quantum physics, stated that technology had reached such a level as to remove any room for defense. Therefore, as early as August 1945, Bohr defended international control that would be effective only with “free access to all scientific

¹⁸ Robert J. Oppenheimer, *Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections*, eds. Alice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1980), 320.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 315-325.

²⁰ Oppenheimer also had a meeting with the President revealing his opinions about the issue. See “Memo of Conversation with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer and Dean Acheson”, September 25, 1945. Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection. Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 1945.

information and the granting of the opportunity of international supervision.”²¹ Moreover, many scientists not only favored international control but, taking it a step further, spoke against the bomb itself. In a book titled *One World or None*, the prominent scientists of the time combined their articles on different aspects of the atomic bomb and made a case against the bomb and its usage. In this book, Philip Morrison, the astrophysicist of the Manhattan Project, backed up Bohr’s argument by painting a picture of the death and destruction that had occurred in Hiroshima. Leo Szilard²², the physicist who conceived of the nuclear chain reaction, considered whether it was possible to prevent an arms race by an inspection system, concluding that, with international collaboration, this was a feasible solution: “if the United States, Russia, and other nations actually set up such an arrangement, an atomic arms race could be postponed and probably averted.”²³

Oppenheimer and Alberts Einstein, two of the well-known scientists of the time, joined their colleagues in making a public statement against the bomb. In the book mentioned above, Oppenheimer defended a collective effort towards the elimination of all atomic weapons and argued that the danger of this new weaponry stood above any kind of benefits its possession may provide: “the common interest of all in the prevention of atomic warfare would seem immensely to overshadow any purely national interest, whether of welfare or of security.”²⁴ Albert Einstein²⁵

²¹ Niels Bohr, “Science and Civilization” in *One World or None*, eds. Dexter Masters and Katharine Way (McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), X.

²² Szilard was the one who drafted the letter sent to President Roosevelt by Einstein. Szilard approached Einstein after writing it and convinced the well-known scientist to sign it.

²³ Leo Szilard, “Can We Avert an Arms Race by an Inspection System?” in *One World or None*, eds. Dexter Masters and Katharine Way (McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), 61.

²⁴ J. Robert Oppenheimer, “The New Weapon: The Turn of the Screw” in *One World or None*, eds. Dexter Masters and Katharine Way (McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), 25.

²⁵ Einstein was the physicist who wrote a letter to President Roosevelt informing him about the possibility of a new destructive weapon and urging him to start a project to develop the atomic bomb. However, after the end of the war, he became a strong defender of nuclear disarmament. The letter is available at:

[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-03-25&documentid=3-5&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1]

asserted that the only way to escape a devastating war was for individual governments to operate under international jurisdiction, by which they would be prevented from declaring war by a supranational organization. These premises should take place, according to Einstein, so that we can “have some assurance that we shall not vanish into the atmosphere, dissolved into atoms, one of these days.”²⁶ Therefore, the stance of the prominent scientists was unanimously in favor of international control. They tried to publicize their opinions as much as possible to encourage a similar public opinion on the issue thereby putting pressure on the government to take the necessary steps towards a solution.

As mentioned above, the military figures that were close to the foreign policy-making structure were reluctant to support international control. The War Department director of the Manhattan Project, Major General Leslie R. Groves was one of the strongest figures on the opposing front. He did not support any form of exchange of information with the Soviet Union. Groves advised that United States should maintain its superiority “until all of the other nations of the world are as anxious for peace as we are. And by ‘anxious for peace,’ I mean in the heart and not by speech or signature in a treaty which they do not intend to honor.”²⁷ Groves expressed his opinion to the president, taking a stance in accordance with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and seeing the atomic bomb as weapon that made the world more secure for the United States and other nations in the presence of unpredictable governments.

Groves was not alone in his skepticism. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who was one of the most influential political figures of the 1940s in America, joined Groves in his reluctance to share information and control. Byrnes served in all three

²⁶ Albert Einstein, “The Way Out.” in *One World or None*, eds. Dexter Masters and Katharine Way (McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), 76.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, September 22 and November 8, 1945.

branches of the government as a senator, governor, Supreme Court justice and, finally, as the secretary of state between 1945 and 1947. For Byrnes, the atomic weapon was a device to make the Russians easier to deal with. Even though he agreed with the scientists that other nations would develop their own atomic weapons eventually, Byrnes did not think that it was wise to hasten this process with an information exchange: "I felt that if any nation were opposed to submitting atomic energy to complete control by an international organization, with safeguards against violations, then the longer we could keep the bomb out of the hands of that nation, the better it would be for the people of the world."²⁸ For Byrnes, the scientists did not possess the knowledge to make comments on how to use the bomb. The politics of the bomb was to be left to the government, which should not hasten to take any definitive measure concerning the control of the atomic bomb, the weapon which could be used to shape the United States foreign policy in the near future.²⁹

However the opinions of the Secretary of State were not even endorsed by some members of his own department, starting with his Undersecretary Dean G. Acheson. Acheson, who played a key role in defining American Cold War foreign policy in later years, was appointed as the Undersecretary of State by President Truman in 1945. Since his chief Byrnes was out of Washington most of the time, Acheson found himself as the acting Secretary of State quite often. This gave more power to Acheson than his predecessors and, thus, he became one of the most important figures of the foreign policy-making process during his service. Furthermore, he was the middleman between Truman and Byrnes, influencing both on many issues including the international control of atomic weapons. Acheson endorsed and emphasized the scientists' conclusion that the scientific facts of nuclear

²⁸ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), 265.

²⁹ Harry S Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Decision* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1955), 87.

physics should not be, and indeed were not, under American monopoly. There was no doubt that the Russians were working on the development of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Undersecretary of State noted that any effort to exclude the Russians would result in insecurity and enmity:

The Joint development of this discovery with the U.K. and Canada must appear to the Soviet Union to be unanswerable evidence of an Anglo-American combination against them... It is impossible that a government as powerful and power conscious as the Soviet Government could fail to react vigorously to this situation. It must and will exert every energy to restore the loss of power which this situation has produced.³⁰

Besides individuals of the political, scientific and military world, opinions regarding the future of the weapon also appeared in the media and the public realm. Two prominent newspapers of that time, *The New York Times* and *Chicago Daily Tribune*, reflected the views of two different perspectives of the people who were knowledgeable enough about the bomb to offer such opinions. The former paper took a more liberal stance by supporting the international control of the atomic bomb, and thereby aligning with the scientists and the statesmen who favored negotiations with other countries. However, the latter was more conservative and isolationist, approving of the American nuclear monopoly and siding with those who were not willing to negotiate with the Soviets. *The New York Times* published information about nuclear energy and radioactive elements to enlighten the public as early as September 1945. The dangers of owning a nuclear arsenal and the possibility that any willing nation might obtain one were some of the concerns of the editors of *The New York Times*. Regarding these issues, they were unwilling to put the responsibility on the shoulders of either the politicians or the scientists alone, but rather encouraged a joint effort between the two:

³⁰ David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976), 63.

The world has been enriched with a discovery and an invention which should be hailed as the dawn of a new era, yet, for the moment, we can think chiefly of death and destruction. The only crumb of comfort that can be extracted from the situation in which we find ourselves is the growing realization that this world cannot risk a global war waged with atomic explosives.³¹

As a result, by depicting the destructive power of the weapon and the dangers of its existence no matter which country owns it, *The New York Times* took its place among the supporters of global control of some sort both within and outside the country.

The Chicago Daily Tribune, on the other hand, sanctioned a somewhat different approach to the debate on the future atomic policy. While *The Chicago Daily Tribune* also recognized that it was impossible to hold the basic scientific knowledge back and while the editors of the paper were open to the idea of scientific exchange as long as the secrets of engineering and the industry were not revealed, their support of such an international forum for control was not nearly as enthusiastic. Thus, although it seemed like the paper backed international collaboration, their distrust of Russia appeared so strong that the very existence of Russians in this exchange would paralyze the future plans for the bomb. As a result of said distrust, *The Chicago Daily Tribune* was quite reluctant to support this prospect fully: "We can be reasonably certain, that the Russians will grasp anything we offer but will hide anything of significance that their own scientists may discover, particularly if it has military value."³² Furthermore, the editors argued that it was not possible to avoid the disadvantage as being the party that possessed the most knowledge, since America would be the side who would sacrifice more to make the international control possible. The paper left the public with a vague and open-ended consent: "If the exchange is to produce any benefits, the information has to be

³¹ "Can the Secret Be Kept?" *The New York Times*, September 19, 1945.

³² "Controlling the Atom," *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, October, 9, 1945.

disseminated to the whole scientific community of the world, for no one can predict what scientist is going to take a given piece of information and use it as a stepping stone.”³³ Therefore, *The Chicago Tribune* possessed views mostly opposite of those of *The New York Times* because of its distrust of the Russians. This view was shared by a significant constituency among the Americans.

Undoubtedly, at the center of these arguments and debates stood President Truman. Harry S. Truman, born in Missouri, served in the Infantry Division in World War I. After serving as a judge in Jackson County, Missouri, he was elected as a Missouri senator under the banner of the Democratic Party in 1934 with the support of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1940, Truman won re-election, after an unremitting campaign, a victory which must be seen as a turning point in Truman's political career since it put him in a position to be considered a vice presidential candidate for the 1944 elections. Roosevelt chose Truman as his running mate, replacing the candidacy of Henry Wallace and the two won the election by a large electoral vote margin. On April 12, 1945, Eleanor Roosevelt summoned him to the White House, informing Truman that the president was dead. When he became president, Truman had been the vice president less than three months. Roosevelt did not inform his vice president either about foreign policy or about domestic policy issues.³⁴

As top of the executive branch of the government, and the man who ordered the dropping of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he was responsible for shaping the foreign policy about the bomb. While Truman was serving as vice president under Franklin D. Roosevelt, he was not informed about the Manhattan Project. The sudden death of President Roosevelt put the burden of ending the war, the use of the bombs and the leading of post-war America and the world on the

³³“Controlling the Atom,” *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, October, 9, 1945.

³⁴ David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 405-467.

shoulders of the new president. The future of the atomic bomb was not the sole concern of the American government at the time. The sudden end of the war with Japan left the country with uncertainty in the domestic arena. There were many loose ends to tie up for Truman including concerns over the following laws and issues: the Second War Powers Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, relief for veterans, taxes, government expenditures, federal subsidies, the Social Security Program, the National Health Program, etc. Furthermore, the field of foreign policy had changed dramatically as the world was now composed of a war-stricken Europe, two global powers, and the United Nations. Where the atomic bomb fell in the wide scope of these issues was not clear. The bomb could be used as a means to better ends, but at the same time, it could end up being the very reason for the development of a more unstable and dangerous world. Furthermore, the American public was still ignorant about the bomb, aside from their knowledge of its destructive power demonstrated in two Japanese cities. President Truman was ultimately responsible for America's place in this world. Therefore, one of the suggestions brought forth in early September 1945 was to begin general training of the American public concerning the issue of nuclear energy.³⁵

Amid these differing opinions and discussions, on September 30, 1945, Canadian Prime Minister William L. Mackenzie King informed President Truman about an elaborate Russian spy network³⁶ operating in Canada and the United States concerning the atomic weapons. Truman was not surprised and was not willing to take any action that might cause a permanent damage in Soviet- American

³⁵ "The President's Message," *The New York Times*, September 7, 1945.

³⁶ Igor Gouzenko was a cipher clerk for the Soviet Embassy in Canada and was caught with 109 documents concerning the Soviet espionage activities in the West. The documents revealed the Soviet Government's attempts to steal the nuclear secrets. It is believed that Gouzenko's testimony led to the prosecution of Klaus Fuchs, who was a theoretical physicist in the Manhattan Project. Fuchs testified that he shared the secrets of the Fat Man with the Soviets. Furthermore, in Fuchs's prosecution Harry Gold's name emerged, a man who was a key witness in the trials of David Greenglass and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.

relations.³⁷ A few days later, Truman gave a message to Congress on the atomic bomb. The president started his October 3rd speech on how the bomb dramatically differed from previous weapons and how it could be used as a means to establish world peace. To use the bomb for the “future welfare of humanity,” the battle was to be fought on two fronts: the domestic and the international. In relation to domestic policy, Truman suggested the establishment of an atomic energy commission with members appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate. The activities and the basic principles under which the commission was to operate should be determined by Congress and anything related to the raw materials of nuclear energy was to be submitted to this commission. Concerning the international aspect of the issue, Truman accepted that,

Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time.³⁸

With this in mind, Truman asserted that the international control of the production and restraint of atomic weapons was too urgent to wait upon the completion of a functioning United Nations Organization. Therefore, Truman stated, the discussions about the bomb should include “an effort to work out arrangements covering the terms under which international collaboration and exchange of scientific information might safely proceed.”³⁹ With this message, although Truman declared that he found an international arrangement vital, he neither clarified in what manner this approach would take place nor did he take a step towards Stimson’s proposal for immediately approaching the Soviet Union. Yet, this message revealed that Truman

³⁷ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 253.

³⁸ Harry S Truman, *Message to Congress on the Atomic Bomb, October, 3, 1945*, University of Maryland, <http://www.honors.umd.edu/HONR269J/archive/Truman451003.html>.

³⁹ Harry S Truman, *Message to Congress on the Atomic Bomb*.

was aware of a possible nuclear arms race and despite the strong reaction among his staff, he was in favor of international control of the bomb.

The end of the war left Truman with expanded executive power, power which Congress wanted to restrain. The creation of a Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy allowed Congress to affect foreign policy on matters related to atomic energy. The Congressmen were not very sympathetic to the idea of information exchange or international control. Richard Russell, a Senate Democrat, stated that, “I think we ought to keep the technical know-how to ourselves as long as possible.”⁴⁰ Republican Senator Vandenberg agreed that America should retain its monopoly until the existence of “absolute free and untrammled right of intimate inspection all around the globe.”⁴¹ Representative Chester E. Mellow put the opinions of many congressmen into words with the following statement: “Why anyone should desire to make available the knowledge we have acquired by our genius and our industry is beyond my comprehension.”⁴² The legislators were reluctant to approve international control not only because of the desire to limit executive power and to make the most of the two billion dollars poured into the Manhattan Project, which many saw as being wasted if information were shared, but also the skepticism how the Soviet Union might use the bombs. Senator Vandenberg claimed that it would be unthinkable to share the secret with the Soviet Union “behind its black-out curtain to do with it whatever Moscow pleases.”⁴³ Senator Raymond Willis likewise expressed this distrust clearly: “we know that we shall use atomic energy as an instrument of peace. We do not know what is in the minds of

⁴⁰ Richard Russell quoted in Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 129.

⁴¹ Arthur H. Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, (Westport: Greenwood Press and Publishers), 221.

⁴² Chester E. Mellow quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 255.

⁴³ Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 221.

leaders of other nations.”⁴⁴ The majority of the legislative branch was thus opposed to the idea of information exchange. This left Truman in a difficult position in maneuvering his foreign policy, since without the support of the Congress, it would be impossible to realize the international control of atomic weapons.

There were, however, some Congress members who grasped that it was impossible to keep the other nations from developing their own nuclear bombs in the next decade with or without American help. Jerry Voorhis told the House that “if I believed for one moment that it was possible for the United States to keep the secret [...] that is what I would be doing.”⁴⁵ Even Senator Vandenberg would later acquiesce on this point and started to support international control on the condition of infallible inspection was made possible. However, the supporters were still in a minority and most senators and congressmen tended to think that by the time other nations developed their atomic weapons “we shall [...] be too far ahead of them they will be afraid to use the secret they have discovered.”⁴⁶ When it became public that the Truman administration was preparing to divulge the information upon the advice of Secretary Wallace, a telegraph of the poll among the Congressmen was published in *The New York Times*, revealing the opposition: fifty-five out of sixty-one responding senators and representatives decidedly opposed sharing the knowledge of the bomb with any country.⁴⁷

The congressional opposition may be understood as simply a reflection of the public’s reaction to the future international control of atomic weapons. Even though opinion polls revealed that Americans understood that an American monopoly over nuclear weapons would not last, they were still reluctant to share the

⁴⁴ Raymond Willis quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 255.

⁴⁵ Jerry Voorhis quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 256.

⁴⁶ Vandenberg *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 224.

⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, September 29, 1945.

knowledge. A survey conducted in September, 1945, showed that eighty-two percent of Americans expected other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons and eighty-five percent were in favor of retaining the monopoly as long as possible. The polls in August and September also divulged that seventy percent of those questioned were against the idea of turning the control of nuclear weapons over to the United Nations.⁴⁸ Thus, the Truman administration had to overcome both congressional and public opposition to pursue a foreign policy favoring international control.

These domestic concerns loomed large as the London Conference took place in September, 1945. The foreign ministers of the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, France and China met in London to shape peace treaties for Finland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and all former German satellites. Even though America did not oppose the Soviet Union controlling these countries while the war was going on, with the end of the war, the conditions of the Yalta conference were to be honored by holding free elections.⁴⁹ American officials were aware that the United States did not possess the power to influence the events taking place in these countries directly, however, with diplomacy they hoped to convince the Russians to be loyal to the Yalta accord. Secretary Byrnes went to London armed with this strategy of pressuring the Russians through diplomacy, a strategy which was also shared by the President. Byrnes hoped that American possession of the bomb could

⁴⁸ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 257.

⁴⁹ Protocol and Proceedings of the Crimea Conference provided that:

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;

(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;

(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and

(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The Yalta Conference, February, 1945. Available at:

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm> Accessed on January 15, 2007

be used as leverage against the Russians, hopes that proved to be empty when the Russian foreign minister Molotov did not respond favorably to American demands. The conference was disappointing because the ministers could not agree on any of the issues related to the free elections, the status of China and France in the post war world, or on the publishing of a public communiqué.⁵⁰ Byrnes, in his disappointment, thought that, by being uncompromising, the Russians were after the uranium reserves in the Belgian Congo.⁵¹ The outcome of the London Conference was the augmentation of distrust towards the Russians. Furthermore, it proved that an American monopoly over the atomic bomb was not going to be as effective of a diplomatic weapon as American statesmen had thought. However, despite the failure of the London Conference, in a cabinet meeting in October, Truman was not ready to give up diplomacy, as stated in Wallace's diaries: "the president made the point that we were not going to let the public know the extent to which the Russians had tried our patience but that we were going to find some way to get along with the Russians."⁵²

The London Conference left a bitter taste in the mouths of the American statesmen which affected any further moves concerning the establishment of international control. Secretary Byrnes was worried that any attempt for premature control might result in further reluctance in honoring the Yalta Accord on the Soviet side. Byrnes thought that the Russians might want to see concrete efforts for international control before the issue of former German satellites was settled. Furthermore, the secretary did not find it feasible to establish a workable control

⁵⁰ Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 136-138.

⁵¹ The Belgian Congo possessed one of the richest uranium reserves of the time. In later years, other rich reserves were found. However during and immediately after the World War II, Congo was one of the only places where high quality uranium was known to be present.

⁵² Henry A. Wallace, *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946*, ed. John Morton Blum (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1973), 502.

scheme because of the technical difficulties.⁵³ The London Conference and the public opinion influenced Truman as evidenced in his first post-war speech delivered on October 27th in New York, a speech which also contained a clear message to the Soviet Union that the bomb was not a priority in the postwar treaties:

In our possession of this weapon, as in our possession of other new weapons, there is no threat to any nation. The world, which has seen the United States in two great recent wars, knows that full well. The possession in our hands of this new power of destruction we regard as a sacred trust. Because of our love of peace, the thoughtful people of the world know that that trust will not be violated, that it will be faithfully executed.⁵⁴

Even though this speech was perceived as a step back from the commitment to international control, it was merely an indication of how serious President Truman took the issue of peace settlement and how much he knew international control would not be possible without public support. An editorial in *The New York Times* interpreted this Navy Day speech as indicative of a step toward the control, not backing away from it. The editors pointed out that, even though at that time it was not possible to share the details about the manufacturing of the bomb, “the United States looks forward to the free exchange of fundamental scientific information with all nations, which presupposes and guarantees that these nations will reciprocate in good faith to establish effective methods of international control.”⁵⁵ At this point, Forrestal eloquently described where Truman stood on the issue: “passionate but desirous of making peace as soon as possible, but was at the same time reluctant to relinquish an element of American power which might help shape the final settlement.”⁵⁶ Consequently, Truman had to ascertain that the Soviets would comply

⁵³ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 268.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ “America’s World Policy,” *The New York Times*, October 29, 1945.

⁵⁶ Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, *Letter to President Truman from the Department of Agriculture Cautioning Truman not to Give the Russians the Formula to the A-Bomb*, September 25, 1945. Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 1945.

with measures taken to control the bomb, an assurance which could not be guaranteed until they took steps to keep their previous promises. As much as the President was desirous, he was also cautious.

Truman's hesitant passion can likewise be observed by his indication during the very same speech on October 27th that there would be a meeting with the Canadian and the British prime ministers concerning international control of the bomb.⁵⁷ The first full session of the United Nations General Assembly was to be gathered in London in January, 1946 and something was to be done before then. When British Prime Minister Attlee offered to come to Washington with his Canadian counterpart, King, Truman announced that the meeting would take place in early November, three days after the speech in New York.

The plans for the Truman-Attlee-King meeting were to be prepared by Vannevar Bush, who became the chairman of the National Defense Research committee in 1940 and a year later the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which controlled the Manhattan Project. Five days before the arrival of the prime ministers, Bush presented his ideas to Secretary Byrnes. Bush wrote that the basic American intention was to avoid a future nuclear arms race that might lead to war. The difficulty was the suspicious stance of the Soviet Union. Bush thought the answer was "to make the agreements in such a manner that it will be in Russia's interest to keep them."⁵⁸ Therefore, Bush suggested a three-step plan which would require confirmation from all parties after completion of each step. The first step was to invite the Russians to join the British and the Americans to create an organization under the supervision of the United Nations General Assembly to

⁵⁷ Harry S. Truman, *Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City, October, 27, 1945*, the College of William and Mary, <http://www.wm.edu/hwrc/worksheets/docelectronics.html>.

⁵⁸ Bush quoted in Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 60.

circulate the scientific information on the nuclear physics. This first step was to function as a security check for the Americans so that the Russian intentions and level of commitment could be exposed, while the Americans were not making a sacrifice since the scientific knowledge had already been acquired by the Russians.

The second step constituted a more concrete measure toward real control. This would involve the establishment of a United Nations Commission of Inspection which would have the authority to inspect the facilities and laboratories in the countries that undertook nuclear research. This commission would assume its functions gradually, so that the United States would not find itself in a disadvantageous position by revealing industrial secrets. After the second step was finalized, all the nations would agree on the third step, that being that the stockpiling of materials capable of atomic fission would be discharged for peaceful purposes only. The Commission was also responsible at this stage in overseeing the procedure and preventing any alteration. Bush suggested that until the full plan was perfected, the United States would keep gathering the materials that were necessary for the production of the bomb but would not assemble them.⁵⁹

President Truman sanctioned these proposals on November 7th. With an additional step provided by the State Department, on November 15th, 1945, Truman, Attlee, and King accepted the plan and called for the creation of a United Nations agency that would work:

1. for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
2. for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to endure its use only for peaceful purposes;
3. for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;
4. for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and

⁵⁹ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 59-61.

evasions.⁶⁰

The Truman-Attlee-King agreement was designed to prevent any premature relinquishment of the American nuclear monopoly. The declaration also clarified that these works would be undertaken step by step upon the completion of each phase. If, at any level, the Soviet Union failed to comply with the international agreement, the United States had the right to withdraw. Although, it was true that the plan and the practical aspects of it were still vague and disorganized, the Truman-Attlee-King Declaration constituted progress towards the international control of the atomic bomb and thereby revealed the positive intentions of the American government in the post-war world. This declaration showed where Truman stood in the spectrum of opinions in that, despite the unclear stance of the declaration, Truman had still made an unofficial commitment to international control. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Truman Administration was in favor of the international control of the atomic bomb and took concrete steps to realize this goal. A look at the two newspapers considered in this thesis also reinforce that these moves were understood to be definite measures toward international control of the bomb and reveal the highly divergent opinions of the public with respect to said actions.

In November 1945, *The New York Times* reported on Mr. Attlee's visit and stated that it was only a matter of time before the other nations would build their atomic bombs. The editorial article clarified for the nation once more that there was no scientific secret about the bomb, but that "merely some processes of manufacture" were left unknown. After stating this, the paper strongly urged the exchange of information initiated by Britain, Canada and the United States in order "to make sure that bombs are never again put to use."⁶¹ In this way the world would ensure that

⁶⁰ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 271-272.

⁶¹ "Mr. Attlee's Mission," *The New York Times*, November 11, 1945.

science would never be employed to do evil on earth. After defending the exchange of information, the editors pointed out that such an action would require serious commitment and sacrifice from every member of the United Nations, and that the United States should be at the head of this race to peace.⁶²

On the other hand, *The Chicago Daily Tribune* had a more conservative approach. The editorial of November 17th accused the leftists of trying to get Truman to “open atomic plants to the Russian copyists.”⁶³ The editors of the paper argued that those who favored international cooperation were self-contradictory and desired to give the most powerful weapons of the history to the Russians, whose aggressiveness had been proven in Europe, the Balkans, Korea and Manchuria. However, they were satisfied with President Truman’s actions and urged him to acquire Greenland, which had strategic importance. The stance of this paper reveals the anxiety of American people and, by extension, most of the politicians. The very existence of the bomb created an insecure world in which the United States should build a safe zone for itself. The bomb was not to be shared.

Despite its vagueness, the Truman-Attlee-King accord was thus understood to be the first concrete step towards the international control of atomic energy, and therefore a turning point in the post-war global politics. President Truman had heeded the advice of many, such as Stimson, Acheson and the scientists, and had taken steps to assure a more secure world brought forth by information exchange. However, Truman maintained his cautious stance by approving a plan in which the control would develop in phases and thus leave room to maneuver. This way, the president was able to please both those for and against the international control. In this atmosphere of hostility towards the Russians, it was important to attain this

⁶² “Mr. Attlee’s Mission,” *The New York Times*, November 11, 1945.

⁶³ “Atomic Diplomacy,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 17, 1945.

balance if any progress was to be made toward international control. The fact that Truman did not have many supporters on this issue required a more cautious and balanced approach. Despite the opposition he faced, the president carried the future of the atomic weapons from the domestic to the international platform. Following this declaration, efforts turned to fixing this as an issue in the platform of the United Nations.

CHAPTER III

“WHAT IS RUSSIA UP TO NOW?”

The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants.

— Omar N. Bradley

President Truman started the second volume of his memoirs with the subtitle *Control of the Atomic Energy*. The first sentences of the president revealed the chaos of the period following the war: “Within the first few months I discovered that being a president is like a man riding a tiger. He has to keep on riding or be swallowed.”⁶⁴ Concerning the future of nuclear weapons, the Truman-Attlee-King declaration was the first step towards the international control of atomic weapons, but there was much yet to come; the president had to “keep on riding.” The months after the meeting of the three leaders proved to be tough for Truman in both the domestic and international fields. From the foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow, to dealing with the first United Nations assembly in London and its aftermath, and finally, in addressing the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, the Truman administration witnessed months of changing winds. Naturally, the international control of atomic weapons was also influenced by these changes. However, despite strong

⁶⁴Harry S Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953* (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956)1.

congressional opposition, and even the strengthening of his own suspicions, Truman was not willing to give up on international cooperation. His reluctance to despair gave way to a positive outcome in the first United Nations meeting in January. Therefore, despite the darkening domestic atmosphere and the uncertain international mood, President Truman was able to pursue policies that made international control a realizable goal.

By the end of November, 1945, Byrnes proposed another meeting of the Big Three foreign ministers to be held before Christmas in Moscow. Byrnes' view of the Russians had changed slightly over the couple months following the London Conference. The secretary realized that it was not realistic to ask for American involvement in Eastern European countries, while the United States denied any Russian involvement in Japan. Byrnes was willing to compromise on these issues, since signing peace treaties for East Europe was going to open a door for the Russian troops to leave. Without any treaty, the Russians had legitimate grounds to keep the troops in place, and influence the domestic politics of these countries. Furthermore, by holding the conference in Moscow, it was possible to directly contact Stalin instead of trying to bend Foreign Minister Molotov's seemingly unbreakable will.⁶⁵ Byrnes also altered his tactics with regard to atomic energy. In a speech he delivered in South Carolina a couple days before his departure for London, he made remarks supporting the control of atomic energy: "without the united effort and unremitting co-operation of all the nations in the world, there will be no enduring and effective protection again the atomic bomb."⁶⁶ After the Truman-Attlee-King meeting, the Secretary of State planned to introduce the accord at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in January 1946. However, atomic scientists, their

⁶⁵ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 276.

⁶⁶ Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 69.

supporters in the Congress and Byrnes' advisers suggested that the Russians should be informed about the meeting of three leaders in November before the United Nations meeting in January. Byrnes gave in to the pressures and decided to notify the Soviet Foreign Minister about the Truman-Attlee-King declaration during the conference at Moscow. The secretary arranged a committee of advisers to draft what should be communicated to the Russians in Moscow.⁶⁷

Byrnes' advisers prepared a proposal for the meeting in Moscow in alignment with the four basic phases of the Truman-Attlee-King declaration. However, the draft omitted one of the most important conditions of the declaration. What made this process safe for the American government was the provision that the each new phase was to be started only under the condition that the previous one was fulfilled. The draft proposal suggested that “successful international action with respect to any phase of the problem is not necessarily a prerequisite for undertaking affirmative action with respect to other phases.”⁶⁸ This change was important because it made the scientific knowledge and information exchange possible prior to any establishment of safeguards. The reason the state department undertook this change is unknown; however, it can be perceived as an extra effort to appeal to the Russians to solve the problem in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Congress would find this proposal hard to approve without the inclusion of the safeguard conditions, which guaranteed American security. Before leaving for Moscow, Byrnes met with the Senate Foreign Relations and Atomic Energy committees to brief them on his plans for the meeting in Moscow. Despite Byrnes' briefing, the senators were angry at the way the secretary had altered the Truman-Attlee-King declaration and they resented that the state department did not consult them before taking any action.

⁶⁷ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 277.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Their primary concern was that the way the declaration was amended could cause premature commitment on an issue as controversial as atomic energy. The senators were opposed to releasing any scientific data without establishing the proper investigation process by the United Nations. Furthermore, when the senators learned that Dr. James B. Conant⁶⁹ was going to Moscow to accompany the secretary of state, they became even more furious at Byrnes for trusting a policy issue to a college professor. This strong senatorial criticism did not significantly affect Byrnes, however, and he left for Moscow two days after the meeting. Seeing that they did not have much impact on the secretary of state, the senators requested a meeting with the President himself.⁷⁰

The senators, including Connally and Vandenberg, met with Truman two days after Byrnes left for Moscow, on December 14, 1945. When they communicated their concerns about the draft, even though the president was not pleased with the alterations, he did not take any action to stop Byrnes, even declining a suggestion that he could contact the secretary via the radio. After the meeting, Senator Vandenberg stated that, “we shall hold the Executive Department responsible. It is our unanimous opinion that the Byrnes formula must be stopped.”⁷¹ Truman was left in a position where it was necessary to appeal to the senators' opinions and also further the attempts to establish international control. At a cabinet meeting, Truman defended Byrnes by stating that America was not that much ahead of the game. Wallace recorded in his diary entry how Truman saw the issue:

The president said he was convinced that they [the senators] were wrong; that the Russians had just as good scientists as we had; that the scientific information was now available to everyone and that it was

⁶⁹ James Bryant Conant was the president of Harvard University from 1933 to 1953. He also served as the chairman of the National Defense Research committee and played a key role in the Manhattan Project.

⁷⁰ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 278.

⁷¹ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 78-79.

important that we help create an atmosphere of worldwide confidence.⁷²

The President's opinion on where Russian science stood in regards to American nuclear science did not mean that he trusted the Soviet Government. He, too, had reservations on how international control was to be achieved, but his suspicions differed from those of the senators and the congressmen. Therefore, there was a misperception about Truman's and Byrnes' stance towards the Russians. Neither statesman relied on the trustworthiness of the Soviet government more than any senator:

What the senators did not understand, in their anger and ignorance, was that they hardly differed from Byrnes and Truman. It was not, as Vandenberg naively assumed, that the administration was acting in trust of the Soviet Union and the senators counseling mistrust. All agreed on mistrust to the Soviets—but not on the tactics that mistrust required.⁷³

At the same time, Truman did take note of the senators' opinions, as evidenced by the fact that, after the meeting, the President ordered the Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, who had been present as well, to cable a full transcript of the discussions. In spite of this, however, the President did not waver in his confidence in Byrnes. The undersecretary echoed the President's support of the secretary of state in his memoirs: “The President had me reassure Byrnes that the congressional flurry had not disturbed him, adding that he would be glad to consider any proposals the Russians might have.”⁷⁴ On December 17, the secretary of state replied to the President that he never intended to approve of an information exchange without proper safeguards and assured the President that he would undertake a more

⁷² Blum, *The Price of Vision*, 516.

⁷³ Bernstein, Barton J. “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946,” *The Journal of American History* 60, No. 4. (March 1974): 1003-1044, 27.

⁷⁴ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), 135-136.

strict policy toward the issue compatible with the declaration of the three leaders. When this conflict was leaked to the public, Truman stated that the secretary of state had his full confidence and support in Moscow.⁷⁵

Thus, Truman's attitude toward the Moscow conference involved a complex balancing of interests, the most compelling of which were the following: First, the opposition of these senators was an important consideration for Truman as he was not willing to alienate them for the international control of the bomb; he was well aware that their support was indispensable to carry out any sound foreign and domestic policy. Thus, he had to find a way to appeal to the senators to gain their support back. In addition to the consideration of the senators' opposition, another primary concern for Truman was the Soviet actions in the Middle East and in the Balkans. By the winter of 1945, there were more than half a million Russian troops in Bulgaria and some were moving to Iran. Truman knew that he had no recourse when the Soviets undertook *fait accompli* involvements in these countries.⁷⁶ And, finally, the criticisms Truman accepted on behalf of Byrnes and the lack of communication on the part of the secretary resulted in further problems between the two men. All of these matters influenced the way Truman replied to Byrnes and the way he approached the international control of atomic energy in Moscow.

Meanwhile in Moscow, it was easier for the secretary of state to secure Soviet Union approval for the formation of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission than it was to garner congressional support. The Russians did not show much interest in the issue and accepted the American plan except for requesting that the commission would report to the Security Council instead of the General Assembly. The arguments on the issue of which body would be reported to lasted a

⁷⁵ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 279.

⁷⁶ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 62-64.

couple of days both because such a decision would be definitive regarding the future of atomic weapons and because each option had certain advantages for the two superpowers. If the commission was responsible to the General Assembly, it would be more advantageous for the United States, since most of the countries participating in the General Assembly were sympathetic to the American cause. On the other hand, if the Security Council was in charge, the Soviet Union would have veto power, which gave them the capacity to control the developments. When Byrnes could not manage to persuade the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, he requested a meeting with Stalin. The two times Byrnes and Stalin met resulted in an agreement, of which the only concession from the Truman-Attlee-King declaration was that the UN commission on atomic energy would operate under the Security Council. Other than this problematic topic, the conferees agreed that the commission would suggest in stages the basic scientific knowledge exchange, limit the use of weapons of mass destruction starting with the nuclear weapons and set up strong safeguards. The Truman-Attlee-King declaration had paved the way and the Moscow Conference Communiqué fell in step by asserting that the international control of the atomic weapons would be carried out in stages: “the work of the Commission should proceed by different stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.”⁷⁷ Therefore, with the recognition of the Big Three Agreement by the Soviets, the American delegation felt assured about the peaceful future of atomic weapons.

Clearly, the Moscow Conference was not solely about the future of nuclear weapons; rather, it also dealt largely with the post-war arrangements of Eastern Europe and East Asia. Byrnes returned home with concessions from the Russians on

⁷⁷ *Interim Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 27, 1945*, Yale University, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade19.htm>.

most of these issues. While the problems in Iran and Greece were not solved, both sides agreed to hold a peace conference including France and China. Even though the Moscow Conference had ended with more positive results than the London Conference, the Republicans at home were not happy with the concessions made concerning the atomic bomb. Some members of the Truman administration, as well as many senators and congressmen, did not see why the United States had to give up its dominant position by being willing to allow international control of the atomic bomb. Since most of the statesmen believed that the United States was years ahead of the Soviet Union, even on the topic of nuclear science, the exchange of any information from their perspective constituted sharing the “secret” of the bomb. They feared that the scientists who went to Moscow as a part of the US delegation might have shared vital information with the Russians. Furthermore, the events of the previous year and the way Russia had dealt with its peripheral countries seemed to justify their suspicions about the Stalinist government. As a result, in the days after the Moscow Conference “the atomic blackout block”⁷⁸ was significantly strengthened. Therefore, although the secretary of state saw this conference as a success and returned to America with confidence that he would gain presidential, congressional and senatorial approval, things looked much different from the other side of the Atlantic.

It is important to note that although the domestic reluctance for collaboration with the Soviets was getting stronger, the Truman administration was relying, not on the good intentions of the Russian government, but on the assumption that they, too, were driven by their own national security concerns, like the United States. However, those who endorsed this national security position started to doubt

⁷⁸ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 80-83.

the intentions of the Moscow government after seeing the situation in Iran and Eastern Europe. Especially after the Moscow Conference and the more compromising attitude of the Byrnes delegation, many politicians were led to believe that the Soviets would do anything to slow down and weaken America's progress. Thus, most people in Washington saw the Russian collaboration on atomic energy as nothing more than a game, giving the Soviet scientists more time to catch up while the Russians acted like they were as interested in "world peace" as the United States was. This shift in the public view of Russian politics increased the anti-Soviet feeling in the United States and, it can be argued, affected foreign policy in the long run.⁷⁹

The Moscow Conference, as mentioned briefly above, also led to a conflict between Secretary of State Byrnes and President Truman. Byrnes enjoyed a relatively independent position in the Roosevelt Administration during the war as the mobilization and reconversion director. Therefore, when Byrnes became the secretary of state, he desired a similar kind of independence, which had the potential to cause separation between him and the president; this desire may be observed in his dealings in foreign relations, and thus in the Moscow Conference. He did not stay in proper communication with the president while he was in Russia partly because he thought there was a leak and was therefore reluctant to send telegrams to the White House as they might not be secure. From December 16 to December 26, Byrnes sent only one telegram directly to the president, which was not informative at all, as the president himself observed: "It was more like one partner in business telling the other that his business trip was progressing well and not to worry."⁸⁰ When Byrnes published the Moscow Conference Communiqué without consulting the president, an unnerved Truman awaited the return of the secretary. Upon his arrival, the president,

⁷⁹ David Halloway, *The Atomic Bomb and the End of War Time Alliance, The Rise and the Fall of the Grand Alliance*, 221

⁸⁰ Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 549.

the secretary of state and some other officials met on the presidential yacht, the *Williamsburg*. Though the accounts of what exactly happened on the *Williamsburg* are not consistent, one certainty is that the relationship between the president and the secretary of state deteriorated. As mentioned above, this difficulty with the secretary of state, along with the congressional opposition, created a negative atmosphere in which the president had to function in the aftermath of the Moscow Conference.

After the *Williamsburg* meeting, when the president examined the documents of the Moscow Conference left by Byrnes, he concluded that all was not as it had appeared: “it became abundantly clear to me that the successes of the Moscow Conference were unreal.”⁸¹ Truman was especially unhappy that Byrnes was not able to get any concessions from the Soviets concerning the international control of the bomb and withdrawal of the Russian troops from Iran. This dissatisfaction was the result of different objectives and expectations. For Truman, one of the most important issues of the conference should have been the post-war situation of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Since the secretary could not get any concessions regarding these problems, Truman was disappointed and this failure enhanced his distrust of the Russians. He expressed his disappointment in his memoirs referring to the Moscow Conference: “I could see that the Russians had given us no more than a general promise that they would be willing to sit down and talk again about the control of the atomic energy.”⁸² On the other hand, Byrnes looked back to other prior conferences and thought the Moscow Conference had been just as successful, if not more so, as there had been many accomplishments in Moscow compared to the previous years. Moreover, the president's dissatisfaction with the conference's outcome, in a way, reflected upon his interaction with Byrnes.

⁸¹ Ibid., 50.

⁸² Ibid.

Truman called Byrnes two weeks after his return and told him that the communication between the secretary of state and the chief executive was vital as evidenced by the result of this Moscow Conference. In the end, due to personal, domestic and international reasons, Truman saw the Conference not as a success on the way to permanent peace, but as a tactical diplomatic move which did not promise anything, either on the atomic energy or on the future of Eastern European or Middle Eastern countries.

With regard to public opinion at this juncture, *The New York Times* supported both the United Nations and international weapons control. In an editorial published on December 2, 1945, the editors argued that world peace was only possible with the United Nations and that this organization would be the only one that the nation could trust for the control of the atomic weapons.⁸³ The paper also embraced the Moscow Conference with hope and anticipation, stating that this was a renewed effort to “mend the broken strands of international peace negotiations.”⁸⁴ The paper pointed out that the big powers of the world seemed more separated and there had not been any steps taken to restore peace since the London Conference. On the other hand, the hope of the editors was tempered as they recognized the limitations of solving the world’s problems in only a couple of days of discussion. After the conference, *The New York Times* applauded the success of the meetings, citing the establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Agency as the most important outcome.⁸⁵

The Chicago Tribune, on the other hand, saw the meeting in Moscow as a chance for Truman and Byrnes to fix what they had done wrong in Potsdam. The editors of the paper criticized the leaders for opening the nation's wealth to other

⁸³ “The Big Four Dozen,” *The New York Times*, December 2, 1945.

⁸⁴ “The Moscow Meeting,” *The New York Times*, December 10, 1945.

⁸⁵ “A New Start for Peace,” *The New York Times*, December 19, 1945.

nations without receiving any payment. The paper believed that the only way to direct the Truman administration's policy was to pressure it with public opinion.⁸⁶ Furthermore, while Byrnes and the American delegation were in Moscow, the paper called on the government to resume the scientific research on nuclear weapons. The editors expressed their endorsement of nuclear armament by stating that “we might be getting a start on how to live with and master the problems of the atomic age, instead of sitting around wondering if we'll all be blown up some bright day.”⁸⁷ The timing of this editorial reflected how the paper saw the international control of atomic weapons. Instead of arguing for disarmament, the paper spoke against the foreign policy of Truman administration by identifying the failure of Truman and Byrnes and the wasted assets of the Manhattan Project.

By this time domestic American politics, which had been moving towards a more skeptical and conservative stance, became an overriding problem of the Truman administration. President Roosevelt and his administration built a bipartisan foreign policy after Pearl Harbor and this was one of the biggest strengths of the country during the war. However, starting from the end of the war, the new Truman administration did not enjoy this bipartisan calm because of the prejudices against both a strong executive branch and a foreign policy favoring the Soviet Union. This bipartisan unity was falling apart by the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, as will be detailed below. The Republicans were dissatisfied with the Truman government's foreign policy since the end of the war. Because the executive branch had gained so much freedom and authority during the war, Congress reacted, as might be expected, with skepticism and a desire to investigate the way the new administration made policy. As a result, the more sensitive issues, like atomic

⁸⁶ “The Idiocy of Potsdam,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 13, 1945.

⁸⁷ “Get the Scientists Back to Work,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 19, 1945.

energy, attracted even more attention. The Moscow Conference and Byrnes' concessions reinforced their suspicions about the administration and resulted in strong opposition, which was to haunt the Truman administration thereafter.

Republican dissatisfaction with the Truman administration started in the fall of 1945 when leading members accused Byrnes of forming diplomatic policy without consulting them. This uneasiness before the London Conference was not relieved even though Byrnes invited John Foster Dulles, who was a legal consultant to President Wilson and helped Senator Vandenberg to draft the United Nation Charter,⁸⁸ to be a part of the London delegation. After the London Conference, the Republican criticism directed at the administration policies accelerated. In December, 1945, the Republican members of the Congress issued a joint statement entailing a firmer stance on the issue of fulfilling wartime promises made to smaller nations. Governor Dwight Green of Illinois stated that “the shameful betrayal of Poland” should not be forgotten or tolerated. On an even stronger note, after the Moscow Conference, Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana compared Byrnes' concessions to “Chamberlain and his umbrella appeasement of Hitler.”⁸⁹ Senator Vandenberg was also a strong defender of a more strict policy towards the Russians, who looked upon the Byrnes' policy “with deep reservations [...] regarding the consistency and clear-sighted and self-interest of our policy practiced by Byrnes.”⁹⁰ The opposition was gaining strength.

To appease the Republicans and stronger opponents like Vandenberg, in December, Truman asked Vandenberg and Dulles to represent the Republican Party

⁸⁸ Dulles also worked as secretary of state under President Eisenhower and was known for his strong anti-communist stance. He was involved in the building of NATO in line with his support of massive retaliation policy towards the Soviets. See Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973.

⁸⁹ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 291.

⁹⁰ Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 237.

at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, which was to gather the following month. The Michigan senator reserved the right to resign if he disagreed with the proposals concerning the international control of atomic energy. Vandenberg wrote Dulles that he might return earlier than expected “if at London I collide with a Truman-Byrnes appeasement policy which I cannot stomach.”⁹¹ When Vandenberg read the transcript of the Moscow conference, he was on the verge of resigning:

It listed four stages for the work of the UNO commission—“disclosures” FIRST and total “security” LAST. Then it said that “the work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages” and that each “stage” should be completed before the next is undertaken. It seemed to me that this could be read in no other way than that the precise thing is to happen against which both *our* committee and the Foreign Relations Committee is so earnestly opposed. I felt that I had no right to go to London, as a Senate spokesman, under any such instructions to promote any such objectives.⁹²

However, when Vandenberg complained about this situation to Acheson, the undersecretary of state arranged a meeting between the senator and the president. Truman and Acheson persuaded Vandenberg that the Moscow Conference was strongly tied to the Truman-Attlee-King accord and that inspection and security were the priorities with regard to the international control of atomic weapons. After his meeting with the president on December 28, 1945, the senator not only agreed to go to London, but even thought that the circumstances demanded he be present at such a vital meeting. Because the bare text of the Moscow Conference did not include Truman's qualifications on the issue, Vandenberg believed that this agreement could not be the foundation of the proposal that would be presented to the General Assembly.

⁹¹ Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* 237.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 230-232.

In London, Vandenberg and Dulles pressured Byrnes on pursuing a more assertive policy with the Russians. Vandenberg was fearful that Byrnes “might be tempted to yield on vital issues for harmony's sake.”⁹³ Eleanor Roosevelt, who was another American representative present at London, observed the situation of the American officials: “Secretary Byrnes is afraid of his own delegation.”⁹⁴ Thus, the delegation in London was a picture of American domestic politics in miniature. This time, in contrast to the previous conferences, Byrnes had to bring dissenting voices with him and thereby could not help but grasp the strength of his opposition.

When Byrnes returned from London, he did not have much hope in the future bipartisanship of American foreign policy and stated to his friends that: “Vandenberg's –and for that matter Dulles's-- activities from now on could be viewed as conducted on a political and partisan basis.”⁹⁵ Byrnes's concerns were not unfounded. The statements of Vandenberg and Dulles upon their return from London pointed to a firmer foreign policy which required a change in direction from those currently employed:

It is our right and it is our duty to speak in these councils just as firmly and just as earnestly for ideals of justice and the fundamentals of freedom as it is for others in the UNO to assert their viewpoints. I hope to see the Government of the United States more firmly assert its moral leadership in these respects.⁹⁶

The Republican opposition intensified after the UN meeting in London. The criticism by the GOP became so strong by February, 1946, that Senator Vandenberg rose at a Senate meeting and demanded:

We ask it in Manchuria. We ask it in Eastern Europe and the Dardanelles [...] We ask it in the Baltic and in the Balkans. We ask it in Poland [...] We ask it in Japan. We ask it sometimes even in

⁹³ Ibid., 237.

⁹⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 292.

⁹⁵ Byrnes quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 292.

⁹⁶ Arthur Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 231.

connection with events in our own United States. What is Russia up to now?⁹⁷

In the same speech, the Michigan senator praised many statesmen, including some French and English diplomats, but avoided making any positive remarks about Truman's foreign policy or Secretary of State Byrnes. When he finished his speech, the Senate and the galleries gave their approval by applauding him standing and forming long lines to shake his hand, serving as an indicator for the Truman administration that if they continued their compromising policy, as they had in Moscow and London, they would not find congressional support behind them.⁹⁸

Concerning the United Nations meeting in London, *The New York Times* strongly urged full support of the delegation in an editorial of the beginning of the year: "The alternative is unthinkable: for the almost certain result of a competitive race in the production of atomic weapons is mutual destruction."⁹⁹ After the UN meeting in London, the paper informed the American public about the content of the agreement reached regarding the establishment of United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. However, the editorial of January 25, 1946, was more skeptical than the previous ones. The editors had many reservations concerning the efficiency and the future of the United Nations. Time would reveal the limits of the organization and, by the spring of 1946, even the most heated advocates of the international control of atomic weapons ceased to hope in its viability.

After the United Nations meeting, the secretary of state was determined to present a policy for the international control of atomic energy. Byrnes appointed a committee composed of five men: Acheson as chairperson and Groves, Conant, Bush, and Wall Street Attorney and former Assistant Secretary of War John

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 296

⁹⁹ "The Bomb at London," *The New York Times*, January 9, 1946.

McCloy¹⁰⁰ as the members. Except for Groves, all of the members of the committee were closely associated with Stimson and, thus, they were more prone than Byrnes to support a generous policy towards the Soviet Union. However, Bush and his associate Conant had earned Byrnes' respect and trust after making an agreement with him in November, 1945. The Acheson Committee appointed a Board of Consultants: David E. Lilienthal, Oppenheimer, Charles A. Thomas, vice-president of Monsanto Chemical Corporation and expert on plutonium chemistry, Chester I. Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone and Harry Winne, vice president in charge of engineering for General Electric and a former participant in the Manhattan Project.¹⁰¹ Similar to the previous Interim Committee, these groups also consisted of elite members of scientific, corporate, legal and governmental societies and therefore were not under direct political pressures. They were also acknowledged as possessing the necessary specialization and competence to understand this specific problem and produce a solution for it.¹⁰²

Lilienthal had been appointed by President Roosevelt as one of the three directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933. He served as the chairman of the authority from 1941 to 1946. When asked by Undersecretary Acheson to be the chair of the consultant team, Lilienthal described their job by saying, "our work is to develop a position, based on facts not known by our political officers, that will 'work,' and have a good chance of being accepted, especially by Russia."¹⁰³ The consultants formulated a report and presented it to the Acheson committee. Following the discussions in the Acheson committee, the report took its final form

¹⁰⁰ John McCloy was a lawyer and the assistant secretary of war during World War II. He was known for his opposition to the bombings in Japan. Later, he served as presidential advisor to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan.

¹⁰¹ Harry S Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 7.

¹⁰² Bernstein, Barton J. "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," 28.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 29.

with slight changes made by the committee. The report prepared by the consultants suggested a program that minimized inspections and did not rely on sanction for its vitality, but instead offered to focus on raw materials, such as uranium and thorium. The plan suggested that the ownership of these raw materials should be given to an international agency—The Atomic Development Authority (ADA)—which would lead to international control of atomic energy, keeping in mind that without these specific materials the enrichment and building of the bomb would be impossible. With this plan, instead of trying to carry out the negative task of preventing violation, the ADA had the positive task of promoting and guiding the peaceful development of atomic energy. Therefore, the ADA was not solely a peacekeeping force relying on the local governments who already possessed the bomb. Instead, by giving the raw materials to a plethora of countries, the plan attempted to create a safer atmosphere by making the materials available for other nations to develop their nuclear bombs in the event of a seizure of a country, which could cause a nuclear war. This way, the weaker countries would also own nuclear weapons, which would function as deterrents against the hostile countries.

Although there was less emphasis on inspections, the plan still called for free access to nuclear plants to detect possible deviations from the established codes. As a member of the Acheson Committee, Bush feared that the loss of American monopoly would leave the Soviets as the sole military super power in the world. Because of his influence, this plan was also to be carried out in stages, the first being the survey of the raw material and the last being the surrender of the nuclear monopoly. The only risk involved for the United States was the exchange of theoretical knowledge, which was still a gray area since there was not a consensus as to if this was sharing the “secret” of the bombs or not. This information exchange

might make it slightly easier for the Soviets to develop their nuclear bombs, but it was a slight risk that did not jeopardize American security to a significantly greater degree. Furthermore, the plan gave America the opportunity to retain its nuclear arsenal until the finalization of the last stage, preventing any premature disarmament which could imperil American security. Another positive loophole was that the report stayed silent on whether the United States could still produce nuclear bombs while the plan was in effect, thus providing the Americans with the ability to stay ahead of the nuclear armament if the plan failed, and thereby saving its advantageous position.¹⁰⁴

The Acheson-Lilienthal plan, as it came to be known, was not as generous as its authors had believed. The previous dealings of these men were much more open to a flexible plan concerning the future of the bomb. However, this plan was written in an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a Russian spy ring, which was trying to attain atomic secrets in both Canada and in the United States, was just exposed in Canada, justifying and reinforcing the suspicions of many. The plan had to address the suspicions of those who were against any collaboration with the Soviet Union concerning atomic energy. Although the plan foresaw a crucial information exchange before adequate safeguards were included, this exchange still involved little risk for the United States. On the other hand, there were several risks involved for the Soviets putting them in a disadvantageous position. First of all, the plan required the penetration of Russian secrecy, on which Soviet security depended. Moreover, the plan guaranteed the American nuclear monopoly until Russia would have developed the bomb by its own means anyway. But because the ADA would possess the right to control all plants

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 30-31.

and materials, the Soviets would not have any chance to break the American monopoly while the United States was able maintain a nuclear arsenal. If the United States chose to abolish the plan right before the final stage was completed, the Soviet Union would have been left even further behind the United States, prolonging the American monopoly.¹⁰⁵

The Acheson group was not trying to create an artificial atmosphere of American generosity either in domestic policy or in the international field. Most of these men had been strong supporters of international control, of which the Soviet Union would be the most important party. Undoubtedly, they were supporting cooperation with the Russians, in contrast to Senator Vandenberg or Tom Connally, who were against any form of appeasement with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Acheson and his group were still operating in a hostile and suspicious atmosphere, which, in some respects, forced them to be more cautious. One cannot assume that these men were free from any kind of anti-Russian sentiments or did not have any reservations concerning the sincerity and trustworthiness of the Russians. But compared to most of their counterparts, they were willing to leave a door open for collaboration concerning atomic weapons.

During the discussions, the Committee members tried to create the safest and the most secure plan for the United States without paying much attention to how the Kremlin would react to this plan. However, they did not find it appropriate to include any wording expressing distrust during the implementations of the stages and so they assumed “the good faith of Russia.” Since they were primarily concerned with protecting American security, overemphasis of this focus resulted in a plan which was hard for the Soviet Union to accept. In any case, considering the current

¹⁰⁵ Bernstein, Barton J. “The Quest for Security,”30.

domestic atmosphere, a proposal that would gain Russian approval would have not been accepted by the Senate and the House as Bernstein observed:

[B]y the spring of 1946, greater boldness might have been political suicide. Indeed, the authors might have been condemned as foolish visionaries. There were not many in America then who would have welcomed a bolder report.¹⁰⁶

There were also further indications that attitudes in government as well as in the public sphere were becoming increasingly anti-Soviet, a trend which must have been noted by the Acheson group as well. One such indication of these changing attitudes was the February 1946 telegram from George F. Kennan to the Secretary of State. The United States Chargé D'affaires in Moscow sent a 5300-word telegram explaining how Stalin saw the world and the politics. According to Kennan, Stalin needed a hostile world to legitimize his own authority in the country and, therefore, used international politics to strengthen his own autocracy.¹⁰⁷ According to Kennan, Stalinists used Marxism and Leninism as:

justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability.¹⁰⁸

There were other developments as well, pointing as Kennan did, to greater misgivings about the Soviet Union. One of the most important of these was Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech. In this speech Churchill demonized the Soviet Union to the extent that it made it impossible to deal with the Russians in a realist political way. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used the term "Iron Curtain" in his speech to Westminster College in Missouri on March 5, 1946:

¹⁰⁶ Bernstein, Barton J. "The Quest for Security," 31.

¹⁰⁷ David Mayers, "Soviet War Aims and the Grand Alliance: George Kennan's Views, 1944-1946" *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 21, No.1. (Jan., 1986): 57-79.

¹⁰⁸ *The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1946*, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an “iron curtain” has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.¹⁰⁹

The speech constituted a call for an Anglo-American coalition against the Soviet Union. He made the same remarks in the House of Commons and in New York. It should be stated that Churchill had great influence on the American people, even after Roosevelt's death. His words had an astounding effect on the Americans and many in the world. Churchill did not call solely for a political alliance but a military pact as well¹¹⁰:

Our American military colleagues, [...] A world organization has already been erected for the prime purpose of preventing war [...] We must make sure that its work is fruitful [...] Anyone can see with his eyes open that our path will be difficult and also long, but if we persevere together as we did in the two world wars—though not, alas, in the interval between them—I cannot doubt that we shall achieve our common purpose in the end.¹¹¹

The winds in America and in the West were thus blowing in an anti-Soviet and anti-communist direction. Furthermore, the Soviets themselves contributed to this trend when they did not withdraw their troops from Iran by the March 2, 1946 deadline, a date confirmed by the Kremlin.¹¹² Therefore, the year of 1946 inherited and reinforced the uncertainty of the year 1945 regarding the future of atomic weapons.

The president was not immune to this change either. It cannot be assumed that President Truman trusted the Soviets more than the congressmen or the senators.

¹⁰⁹ Winston S. Churchill, “*Iron Curtain*” *Speech, March 5, 1946*:

<http://www.seattleu.edu/artsci/history/us1945/docs/icsp.htm/>

¹¹⁰ Henry B. Ryan, *The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 170-171.

¹¹¹ Winston S. Churchill, “*Iron Curtain*”

¹¹² Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 98-99.

As a matter of fact, the new year ushered in more distrust and doubt for Truman as the first quarter of 1946 was marked with a decline in the hopes of international control of the atomic bomb. Although the president did not give up the attempts to solve this problem and to be the architect of the Cold War of coming years, the seed of doubt kept growing. Despite these reservations, Truman continued his plan of international control of atomic energy. Therefore, though it was clear that Soviet-American relations were becoming more distant either because of domestic opposition or because of Truman's personal convictions, the president was not willing to paralyze the future of atomic energy.

Nonetheless, in the second quarter of 1946 suspicion, opposition and anti-communism took a firm hold on American foreign policy. Reaching its climax in June 1946, the cooling of relations that had started earlier in the year came to a breaking point, leaving international control as an unrealized dream.

CHAPTER IV

“IT WENT BOOM AND IT KILLED MILLIONS”

The atomic bomb survivors... cannot wait another 50 years. Their highest hope is to see the abolition of nuclear weapons within their own lifetime. It is a steep climb to this goal, but one from which we must never relent.

— Iccho Itoh

In 1946, American and Russian visions of the post-war world started to move to different directions. The Soviet Union wanted to secure its western border by buttressing communist regimes in the Eastern European countries and therefore supported communist parties in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The growing Soviet influences in these countries resulted in suspicion and distrust with respect to Stalinist foreign policy. Furthermore, in March, the British troops withdrew from Iran, as mentioned in the last chapter, but the Soviet troops remained as Stalin attempted to establish a pro-Soviet regime in Iran. After United States pressure, however, the Russian troops were withdrawn in May. Another episode which revealed Stalinist foreign policy priorities was the Russian support of the Greek civil war, which broke out in 1942 but took a different shape with the involvement of the Greek Communist Party.

Therefore, atomic diplomacy was to be formed in an international atmosphere with growing Soviet influence.¹¹³

In the midst of the growing suspicion and opposition, Truman did not forsake the prospect of the international control of atomic weapons. The ever-growing mistrust clearly affected the way he perceived the foreign policy and the place of the Soviet Union in the world; however, he also knew that he had to work with this same Russian government in order to make the control of nuclear weapons viable. Thus he did not abandon the idea of international control in the midst of the unstable and unpredictable international politics. The time came for the Truman administration to appoint somebody to present the American plan for the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee meeting in June 1946. This man had to be somebody who would be approved of by Congress and by the people, and yet, who would also be supportive of the administration's position on the issue. Indeed this appointment proved more vital than Truman realized as Bernard Baruch's appointment led to the creation of the Baruch Plan, which was ultimately rejected by the Soviet government putting an end to the hope of the international control of atomic weapons.

In March 1946, Truman appointed Bernard Baruch as the United States ambassador to the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee. This was an important strategic move for Truman because, as the Republican opposition was getting stronger in both houses, he had to bring someone onto the scene who would ease the tensions with his personal connections and political past. In his memoirs, Truman mentions his correspondence with Byrnes about the future of atomic diplomacy if such tensions could not be tempered. He feared that Congress could pass a law about

¹¹³ Roy Douglas, *From War to Cold War* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1981), 130-134

atomic energy that would undercut the effort on the international control thereby making it impossible for America to take part in any kind of international arrangement concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, upon the suggestion of Byrnes¹¹⁴, Truman decided on Bernard Baruch as the spokesman.¹¹⁵ Baruch was a good choice for the Truman administration mainly because the popular support for Truman's presidency was decreasing and the Secretary of State was seen as being soft on communism. Baruch was seen as an ideal candidate in light of these circumstances as he "had the esteem of the Congress, the confidence of the nation, and the respect and the friendship of Byrnes."¹¹⁶ Truman expressed his reasons for Baruch appointment as follows:

Bernard M. Baruch seemed to me to be the most logical man, and for several reasons. Not the least important of these was that Baruch enjoyed considerable esteem in the Senate. His association with the administration's plan for the control of atomic energy might help remove some of the opposition to the McMahon Bill in the Congress. Baruch had also succeeded, over the years, in forming many friendships abroad, including that of Winston Churchill, and during a long life he had acquired the prestige of an "elder statesman."¹¹⁷

The press also endorsed the appointment of Baruch as *The Chicago Tribune* stated "we can all sleep better at night knowing ... clear-eyed Bernie Baruch is on guard."¹¹⁸ On the other hand, there were reasons that Baruch seemed, to some, less than ideal. Baruch was a native conservative and was not the best choice for a position as idealistic and visionary as the international control of the atomic energy required. The advisers he chose seemed like poor choices for the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. Furthermore, the fact that General Groves was chosen as one of the key consultants for the Baruch team created suspicions about Baruch's commitment to

¹¹⁴ Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 269.

¹¹⁵ Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 8.

¹¹⁶ Bernstein, "The Quest for Security," 31.

¹¹⁷ Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 8-9

¹¹⁸ *Chicago Tribune* is cited in Herken, 159.

international control. Acheson expressed his concerns regarding this appointment in his diary,

When I read this news last night, I was quite sick. ... We need a man who is young, vigorous, not vain, and who the Russians would feel isn't out simply to put them in a hole, not really caring about international cooperation. Baruch has none of these qualifications.¹¹⁹

Thus Acheson was anxious about Baruch's role, not only because of Baruch's age and political past, but also because he doubted Baruch's sincerity. It is ironic that what bothered Acheson about Baruch was actually what made Baruch the best option for that specific task at that specific time. Acheson's enumeration of his objections to Baruch's appointment, could also be read as an explanation as to why he was chosen as the face of the international control of the atomic weapons. He was not someone unheard of; he was a man who had proved himself in different areas of American life and gained the respect of many, though Acheson did not approve of the means by which Baruch had secured such prestige:

Mr. Baruch was undoubtedly a moneymaker through shrewd stock market speculations, as he himself has claimed. He made equally shrewd political use of his fortune, rarely squandering it on large party contributions, but dispensing it judiciously –and often non-partisanly –in small individual contributions to senatorial and congressional primary or election campaigns. This practice multiplied his admirers in the Congress while his gifted friend, Herbert Bayard Swope, polished his public “image.” My plea was useless. Mr. Byrnes, like his successor, General Marshall, had fallen victim to Mr. Baruch's spell.¹²⁰

Three weeks after his appointment, the Truman administration and Baruch encountered their first clash. Baruch's overconfidence displeased Truman when he sent the president a letter putting himself in the position of a policy maker: “I have no doubt that the public feels that I am going to have an important relation to the

¹¹⁹ Lilienthal, *The Atomic Energy Years*, 30.

¹²⁰ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 154.

determination of our atomic energy policy.”¹²¹ Truman was unsettled by this self-attested position: “Baruch is the only man to my knowledge who has built a reputation on a self assumed unofficial status as “adviser”. I had asked him to help his government in a capacity of my choosing. I had no intention of having him tell me what his job should be.”¹²² However, as mentioned before, Baruch was needed in the government as a public figure both to appeal the politicians and the dissidents of the international control. Consequently, when in the same letter Baruch threatened to resign upon learning about a leak of the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, Truman and Byrnes had to reassure him about his position.

Baruch was annoyed with this leak mainly because he had objections to the report and this leak might have tied his hands if it was perceived as the official policy. Baruch stated his concerns about the plan as follows: “Even the superficial and incomplete examination of the subject that I have been able to make in the last few days convinces me that this report is likely to be the subject of considerable and rather violent differences of opinion.”¹²³ Therefore, Baruch was afraid of becoming only a “messenger boy” for this plan. He wanted an assurance from the administration guaranteeing that he was not bound by the plan. When Baruch asked the president who would be responsible for drafting the plan that was going to be presented to the UN, the president answered, “Hell, you are!”¹²⁴ Not satisfied with Truman's response, Baruch approached Byrnes in April for a more official response. Byrnes told him that the President and the Secretary of State would still be responsible for the foreign policy making, but they would seek the advice of Baruch on the international control of the atomic bomb. Accordingly, even the first few

¹²¹ Bernard Baruch quoted in Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 9-10.

¹²² Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 12.

¹²³ Bernard Baruch quoted in Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, 10.

¹²⁴ Truman quoted in Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 160.

weeks of working with this elderly statesman had been a trial for Truman and Byrnes. However, both believed that they needed him to ease the growing opposition and both trusted that he was the suitable man for the task and were thereby willing to shoulder these difficulties.

After his confirmation by the Senate, a process which took only two days and further emphasized the support he enjoyed in the Republican Senate, Baruch was free to put a team together, mainly from old business associates. Banker John M. Hancock had worked with Baruch during World War II on industrial mobilization. Herbert Bayard Swope was Baruch's assistant during World War I on the War Industries Board. Ferdinand Eberstadt was an investment banker and a former aide to the Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal. Fred Searls, Jr., who was considered Baruch's most important appointment, was a mining engineer and a personal friend. As mentioned earlier, these choices created dismay among the supporters of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, mainly because of the lack of scientists on the committee and because of the qualifications of the members. Bush referred to the appointees as “Wall-Streeters” while Lilienthal saw them as “the old crowd.”¹²⁵

Consequently, when Baruch asked the members of the Acheson and Lilienthal Committee to stay on as advisers to his delegation, they declined. Acheson refused this offer by claiming to have too much work in Washington. But in fact, he was afraid that working with Baruch's delegation could be perceived as a confirmation of his policies. Further, the Acheson and Lilienthal group was uncertain to what extent Baruch was going to alter their plan and therefore opted for remaining outside the Baruch team in order that they might be able to raise their concerns instead of getting their voices drowned out on the committee. In the end, after

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Baruch's appointment, the people who had been a part of the policy-making process since the fall of 1945 remained distant, creating an important shift in the approach taken to international control. The new team also brought a new direction to the policy.

Although years later Baruch accused the scientists of running off and not being willing to serve, at the time he was clearly not enthusiastic about cooperating with the scientists. He expressed this reluctance in the following comment: “I concluded that I would drop the scientists because as I told them, I knew all I wanted to know. It went boom and it killed millions of people and I thought it was an ethical and political problem and I would proceed on that theory.”¹²⁶ Baruch did admit to wanting Oppenheimer to join his team, but the way he approached the scientist did not make it possible for Oppenheimer to work under him. The scientist described to Lilienthal the course of the meeting by quoting Baruch's words, “Don't let these associates of mine worry you, Hancock is pretty “Right,” but (with a wink) I'll watch him. Searls is smart as a whip, but he sees Reds under every bed.”¹²⁷ But what bothered Oppenheimer the most was that Baruch wanted to prepare the American people for a refusal from the Russians. For the scientist, the tone of his speech did not give any hope to the international control of the atomic bomb. As a result, Oppenheimer refused Baruch's offer diplomatically and chose to stay out of the decision-making body.¹²⁸ Therefore, not only the previously-involved politicians, but also the scientists, who had been in the center of the atomic energy development process since the beginning of the Manhattan Project, refused to work under Baruch.

¹²⁶ Truman quoted in Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 161.

¹²⁷ Baruch quoted in Lieberman, *The Scorpion and The Tarantula*, 273.

¹²⁸ After Oppenheimer's refusal, the FBI started tapping his phone. The FBI director, Herbert Hoover, sent the President a transcript of a conversation Oppenheimer had with a fellow scientist about other possible ways to pressure the American government for the international control. Oppenheimer thought that it might be possible to create a joint effort with the European scientists, mainly those in Poland, France, England and Holland.

It was not surprising that the Baruch delegation was unsympathetic to the Acheson-Lilienthal report. In addition to not having any scientists on his team, Baruch was not willing to accept any advice on the issue. He expressed his disinterest by turning off his hearing aid when reporters asked him what he thought about the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Furthermore, although Baruch and his staff received many letters supporting the report, few, if any, were answered. On the other hand, the letters that criticized the Undersecretary's plan were received with sympathy and responded to immediately. It was in this environment that Baruch started to draft the plan to be presented to the UN Atomic energy Commission meeting in mid-June. Although no one knew how much he was going to alter the plan, by alienating the scientists and the drafters of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, Baruch hinted at his stance.¹²⁹

The Acheson and Lilienthal group was correct in their suspicions concerning the way Baruch would deal with the report. The first confirmation of these suspicions came when Baruch admitted to Byrnes that the Acheson-Lilienthal Report required extensive amendments. Throughout the month of May, the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal group held a series of meetings. During these discussions the latter group learned the extent of Baruch's new plan. Lilienthal expressed his disapproval stating that, "the gravest danger is that they will put forward proposals in a spirit that will ensure their refusal."¹³⁰ However, these meetings did not prove very fruitful:

Other proposals by the Baruch group seemed to the consultants to weaken their plan by moving away from the concept of international authority as the sole performer of dangerous activities toward that of a regulation of their performance by others. At the end of two days no meeting of minds had occurred.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 162-163

¹³⁰ Lilienthal quoted in Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 163.

¹³¹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 156.

Because the meeting between these two committees had not ended in agreement, the Baruch delegation continued down their own path. In the beginning of May, Baruch and Hancock met secretly and decided that they would develop a new plan to present at the UN meeting, replacing the Acheson-Lilienthal report. The two men also decided that they would not make any concessions on their own plan, so as to portray a strong front both in the eyes of the public and the international community.¹³²

The draft of the new plan was presented to the Acheson group in mid-May. The Baruch Plan included four fundamental alterations from the Acheson-Lilienthal report. The first change was that the new plan called for a total disarmament instead of a nuclear disarmament, which would cause uncertainty for the future of the plan. As Lilienthal expressed, “this would hopelessly confuse and mix issues, and obscure the hope of working out something on the atom bomb.”¹³³ Such a change would remove the focus from the atomic bomb and focus instead on the much larger, complex and problematical issue of general disarmament. Secondly, the new plan put more emphasis on the punishment that would be imposed in case of a violation of the conditions. Baruch and his aides were not the first who thought about implementation of stricter sanctions, as the Board of Consultants also considered this option. However, concluding that it would create an atmosphere of distrust at an early stage, the previous group decided that such an action would be fatal for the future of the international control.

The third alteration was related to the previously-proposed International Atomic Development Authority. The new plan suggested that private industry would be responsible for the mining and refining of fissionable materials which could lead

¹³² Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 280-281.

¹³³ Lilienthal, *Atomic Energy Years*, 42-43.

to the creation of a private, not government-run, atomic energy industry. Such a potential was desired neither by the American government nor by the international community at that time, especially considering President Truman's speech in October, which urged the establishment of an atomic energy commission operating under the Congress. Hancock was one of the strongest supporters of the change, which he saw as a way to hinder the international socialized state. But the most controversial of the alterations was the last one, which suggested the abolishment of the veto power in the United Nations Security Council. Baruch argued that the veto power would enable Russia to abandon the Atomic Development Authority and withdraw from the plan.¹³⁴ Baruch had concluded that the Soviet Union was going to withdraw from any commitment it made after it gained sufficient technical information about the bomb,¹³⁵ a conclusion which justified this change.

As expected, the Acheson and Lilienthal group opposed any changes in the previous plan. Acheson objected to the new draft, arguing that the focus on the punishment and the removal of the veto power did not contribute to the security of the arrangement in the least:

Swift and sure punishment for violation of the treaty, if realistically considered, seemed uncomfortably close to the war, or certainly to sanctions that under the United Nations treaty were subject to the veto of permanent members of the Security Council. Did it seem likely that they would forgo it here? The only practicable safeguard in case of violations would be clear notice and warning that they were occurring. This would give other parties to the treaty knowledge that it was being breached and an opportunity to take such an action, separately to collectively, for their own protection as might be possible. Provisions for paper police sanctions to be imposed by the same parties were only an illusion.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Security Council veto was an American proposal for the UN charter, and was reluctantly accepted by the Soviet Union. After the war, Byrnes convinced the Soviets to abolish the veto power in Moscow. However, it was re-established in London when Senator Vandenberg strongly supported it.

¹³⁵ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 164.

¹³⁶ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 155.

The Undersecretary of State reasoned that if a state decided to violate the agreement, this would lead to the collapse of the United Nations and the withdrawal of that individual state from the international organization. Therefore, the plan was paving the way for failure and did not provide incentive for other nations to stay committed. Lilienthal opposed the motivations of Baruch and his aides even more than the changes they made. He believed that Searls provided insight as to what his true opinions were at a preliminary meeting. Lilienthal explained:

Searls said that in this we would find out what is going on in Russia. And if the Russians refused to accept this proposal, then we would know that they would not go along on any international scheme, and [...] he didn't finish the statement, but his eyes indicated what he thought should then be recommended, and it was anything but pleasant.¹³⁷

What Searls had in mind was not an international control but an atomic league of nations when he suggested in the same meeting that, “each nation be permitted a stockpile of bombs, as a deterrent against atomic warfare; and that the UN also have a stockpile of bombs for retaliation.”¹³⁸ This perspective was completely different than what Stimson and Truman had in mind at the end of 1945. They, too, were not willing to sacrifice American national security for the sake of nuclear disarmament, but after seeing what the bomb was capable of, for them the international control of the atomic weapons far surpassed a nuclear arms race, which could create an illusion of national security.

Baruch, for his part, was not willing to alter the new plan either. Baruch may have suspected that, by advocating the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan without being willing to make any concessions, the Board of Consultants were seeking to advance the previous report by withholding their approval from the Baruch Plan. With his team having a completely different mindset about nuclear weapons, Baruch naturally

¹³⁷ Lilienthal, *Atomic Energy Years*, 49-50.

¹³⁸ Searls quoted in Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 165.

was suspicious of the way the Board reacted to the new draft. The criticisms were coming from a group which was not willing to work under him, a disconnection made Baruch and his aides hold their ground even more strongly.

The reaction of the military should also be taken into account at this point. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, other than General Leslie Groves, top ranking soldiers of the time did not show any willingness to be involved in the future of the atomic bomb. After numerous discussions about whether the civilian authorities or the soldiers should be in charge of the nuclear weapons, Truman supported the civilian administration, and thus it may be that the soldiers were wary of being heavily involved in politics. Furthermore, the members of the Truman administration and the Acheson group hesitated to involve soldiers in this matter.

Baruch, on the other hand, desired the advice of the chiefs of staff and, in April, approached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking their opinion about the international control of the atomic weapons. The chiefs did not respond to Baruch with an opinion on the issue. Thereupon, Searls went to communicate with the members of Military Staff Committee, which was the military wing of the US representation in the UN. At this meeting, Searls learned that the members of the committee never discussed the future of the bomb. The approach of Baruch and Searls was also quite surprising to the military as they seemed to be seeking affirmation of, rather than advice about, the new plan. However, although the military men, such as Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, Carl Spaatz and William Leahy, did not give an official respond to Baruch, they expressed their view on the issue through personal correspondence. They argued that “the atomic monopoly put America in a preeminent bargaining position with regard to the Soviet Union, and

that much advantage should be exploited in the UN.”¹³⁹ They saw the bomb as a tool to be used diplomatically in times to attain the peace America desired: “Our monopoly of the bomb, even though it is transitory, may well prove to be a factor in our efforts to achieve first a stabilized condition and eventually a lasting peace.”¹⁴⁰

Thus, although Baruch did not receive any official military endorsement for his plan in these personal conversations, he perceived that the military was not willing to yield to nuclear disarmament and wanted to retain American nuclear monopoly. The military had been opposed to any form of nuclear disarmament since the efforts on the issue commenced. They retained their anti-communist and anti-Russian stance, which overruled any form of cooperation during this period. Although they chose to remain silent because of their reluctance to oppose the executive branch, this silence did not mean approval. Therefore, when Baruch sought their concurrence for his plan, the chiefs of staff did not accommodate him, not wishing to endorse any policy other than the one approved by the president. Nevertheless Baruch considered his plan closer to the military line than the Acheson-Lilienthal report; he failed to see that the chiefs were not going to affirm an unofficial draft favoring nuclear disarmament. When the official report finally came in late July, Baruch then understood that the military would only support his plan when it was in line with Acheson-Lilienthal report. It should be noted that the military wing waited to get reassurance from the President that their views on the future of the weapons did not conflict with the civilian plan. Hence, the Joint Chiefs simply aligned themselves with the commander in chief, regardless of the military stance on the issue.

¹³⁹ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 166-167.

¹⁴⁰ Spaatz quoted in Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 166.

When Baruch did not receive the support he expected from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he turned to General Groves as the main source of military advice. As indicated previously, Groves had started to work with the Baruch committee as a bridge between the Baruch delegation and the Military Staff Committee. Even though Acheson warned Hancock that Groves might not be expressing the opinions of the military staff, but rather his own, Groves held sway over many appointments within the delegation. For instance, he brought Richard Tolman, who was a physicist in the Manhattan Project, to the United Nations meeting, an appointment not favored by the scientists. Furthermore, Baruch entrusted Major General Thomas Farrell, who was Groves' deputy in the Manhattan Project, with the responsibility of estimating when the Russians would build the atomic bomb. His infamous estimation was twenty years, which was also Groves' estimation. Edgar Sengier, who was a wartime ally of Groves, became the raw materials expert in the delegation, fervently opposing the establishment of an international Atomic Development Authority. Sengier claimed that the organization would “upset wages, dissatisfy people and have tremendous difficulties of operation on account of the different nationals involved.”¹⁴¹ In this manner, Baruch was able to include some unofficial military influence into his team and his plan, adding to his base of allies and strengthening his plan’s position.¹⁴²

With all the influence he had in the Baruch delegation, Groves also made sure that the word “prompt” was replaced by the word “immediate” in case of violations of the plan, thus making it highly probable that violators would be punished with nuclear attack. Acheson and his advisers were strongly against this wording because of its hostile tone: “After careful analysis we had concluded that

¹⁴¹ Sengier quoted in Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 276.

¹⁴² Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 277-280.

provision for whether “swift and sure,” or “condign” punishment for violation of the treaty were almost certain to wreck any possibility of Russian acceptance of one.”¹⁴³ Unperturbed by such concerns, Baruch and his aides started to finalize the plan by the end of May, leaving intact two of its most important aspects, severe punishments for the violators and the abolition of the veto power. With Groves help, by the beginning of June, Baruch was certain that he had sufficient support to put these two strong provisions in his plan and present it at the United Nations meeting.

The reception of the Baruch Plan in America also revealed the power and popularity of Bernard Baruch himself. Baruch had been chosen by the Truman administration because of his previous experience and his popularity as a businessman and a statesman. An editorial in *The New York Times* on June 15, 1946 indicated how the editors of the paper supported the Baruch delegation:

Mr. Baruch, surely no fuzzy-minded dreamer, a patriot who has served his country devotedly down to what he yesterday called “the late afternoon” of his life, saw none [an alternative to the current plan]. In speaking for his government he also spoke out of his own wisdom.¹⁴⁴

The fact that the editors of this paper, who were behind the international control of atomic weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, saw the Baruch Plan as completely in line with Acheson-Lilienthal Plan demonstrated both the level of Baruch’s favorable reputation and his effective rhetoric. Thus, one should not take the support of *The New York Times* as a shift in their stance towards the issue, but as an indicator of the success of Baruch within the country, as implied in the passage below:

As far as the use and control of atomic energy is concerned nations must cease to exist. Mr. Baruch made it clear that he was not proposing government or any unnecessary interference with the

¹⁴³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 155

¹⁴⁴ “Mr. Baruch Reports,” *The New York Times*, June 15, 1946.

economic or political system of any nation. But he demonstrated that there must be a world government over split atoms.¹⁴⁵

At the same time, another editorial exposed how much the distrust of the Russians had increased. When the Russian delegation was not willing to surrender the veto power and requested early compromises from the United States, the paper replied:

This position may seem to imply a distrust of human nature – particularly of Russian human nature. [...] We will permit their [Russian] inspectors to enter upon our territory and draw their own conclusions. When we say that humanity is fallible and need police to encourage it in its good intentions we include ourselves.¹⁴⁶

The view of the paper reflected how many people in America did not perceive the shortcomings of the plan. Mr. Baruch had a strong support and even the ardent defenders of the international control seemed unable to identify the potential faults in his plan.

The first two weeks of June involved vigorous as Baruch sought to finalize his plan while others sought to influence or oppose the method by which this finalization was being achieved. When Acheson, Byrnes and Truman wanted to amend his plan, Baruch was able to rebuff them. When the State Department suggested that Baruch should have a final meeting with the members of the Board of Consultants to get scientific and technical advice, Baruch turned down the suggestion, complaining that the scientists were “inelastic.”¹⁴⁷ The final efforts coming from the state department and presidency resulted in another resignation threat from Baruch: “I have lost my confidence in my being able to work this out with the President and you [Byrnes] satisfactorily.”¹⁴⁸ His threat reached its target and Byrnes and Truman backed away from requesting any alterations of the Baruch

¹⁴⁵ “The Atom Knows No Nations,” *The New York Times*, June 16, 1946.

¹⁴⁶ “The Atomic Debate,” *The New York Times*, June 27, 1946.

¹⁴⁷ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, 169.

¹⁴⁸ Baruch quoted in Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*.

Plan as, at this point, neither was in a place to accept Baruch's resignation. After months of correspondence and considerable effort to secure public and congressional support, it would be too risky to get rid of Baruch now. Not only would they lose the support Baruch brought with him, but they also would risk creating an unstable atmosphere in domestic politics, turning the spotlight on Baruch and the shortcomings of the Truman administration instead of the United Nations meeting. Lilienthal explained this compromise: "As much as Truman disliked Baruch, he had to have someone Congress would trust and who could deflect criticism of the administration's atomic energy policy."¹⁴⁹ So, Baruch was triumphant. The sole alteration he accepted in his plan was that the word "prompt" was reinserted in the place of "immediate," leaving the nature of the punishment vague.

When the time approached for the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission meeting, there were many reservations concerning the Baruch Plan. Lilienthal recorded in his diary the day he went to Washington to read Baruch's speech:

When we went over B[aruch]'s draft of the speech (B. wasn't there), it consisted of much mediocre oratory, an adoption of our plan in a rather confused and badly organized form of statement, some absurd stuff about sanctions and penalties. On raw materials they said "tight control" was the key to the plan, and then gibbered about "dominion," and would not consider ownership of mines, even balked at ownership of primary plants!¹⁵⁰

The month of June and the time for the United Nations meeting arrived with the prospect of the Baruch Plan. Much had changed since the fall of 1945, when Stimson called for international control of atomic weapons. Doubtlessly, the Baruch Plan was far removed from what Stimson had had in mind. In fact, the drafter of Acheson-Lilienthal Report saw it as an invitation to failure.

¹⁴⁹ Lilienthal, *Atomic Energy Years*, 174.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

In the end, Baruch received a promise from President Truman that he would support Baruch and his delegation on the issue of abolition of the veto power and the punishments. Furthermore, Truman assured him that the former relationship with Britain and Canada on the atomic energy would be carried to the United Nations. Baruch was able to go to the meeting with the support of the state department and the presidency in his pocket, leaving the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan behind. This approval of the Baruch Plan was a turning point in the international control of nuclear weapons. The ideal of nuclear disarmament was drowned in the midst of Soviet foreign policy, the Republican opposition, growing anti-communism, the loss of public and congressional support and lastly the Baruch Plan.

Two possible explanations may account for the actions of the Baruch team and clarify their real intentions. First, it may have been that Baruch and his aides sincerely believed in the control of atomic weapons. Nevertheless, they failed to see that international control was not possible without Soviet support. On the other hand, it may have been that they supported American nuclear monopoly and wanted to use the atomic weapon as a diplomatic tool against the Russians. However, Stimson, Acheson, Oppenheimer, and Truman recognized the indispensability of Soviet support amidst their concerns about Soviet actions and intentions in the world and about American national security. This recognition prescribed the softer undertone in the Acheson-Lilienthal report in an attempt to work with an unpredictable Soviet government. The distinct difference in the tones of the two plans explains why the Baruch Plan was perceived by many as a path to failure.

“We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead,” declared Bernard Baruch at the beginning of his speech before the UN General Assembly. He proceeded to explain the essentials of the Baruch Plan, emphasizing “condign

punishment” as comprising the very heart of the American position. The punishment was one of the most important changes from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, since a country would be, Baruch explained, “ready to relinquish any winning weapons [...] it must have more than words to reassure it.”¹⁵¹ Baruch further clarified that none of the countries would possess a veto power over any provisions of the plan. In addition, he outlined that one of the first steps of the plan would be an inspection undertaken by the international Atomic Development Authority. These preceding conditions in particular would make the plan unacceptable for many nations, not only the Soviets. First of all, a preliminary raw-materials survey gave absolute authority to the agency, diminishing the power of the national governments:

The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium, and to bring them under its dominion. [...] The Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.¹⁵²

Another concern of other governments was the emphasis on the penalties and the veto power, which made unilateral decisions possible. Baruch made it clear that the issue of punishment lay at the heart of his plan. However, his strong stance on the issue of veto power and the violations turned the issue into one which was bound to fail instead of developing trust and relying on the commitments of other nations. An excerpt of Baruch’s speech identifies this emphasis on the veto power issue:

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization

¹⁵¹ *The Baruch Plan, Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946*, University of Maryland, <http://honors.umd.edu/HONR269J//archive/BaruchPlan.html>.

¹⁵² Ibid.

only by concurrence of each of the five great powers - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, China, France, and the United States.

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.¹⁵³

Furthermore, the Baruch Plan focused on the losses of the American government in case of either a success or a failure, as opposed to what the country and the world would gain. This understanding led to a defensive and exclusive outcome rather than an open and inclusive one which required that the international control of the atomic weapons happen under American conditions or not at all.

Considering the developments of 1946, that such a delegation emerged from the surrounding environment should not come as a surprise. A more optimistic delegation could not have been expected given the atomic-spy hysteria, the Republican opposition and the dealings of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and in the Middle East, all of which justified considerable cynicism. The nation and its leaders had been moving towards a more pessimistic outlook since the beginning of the year. One could argue that this tendency toward negativity and distrust affected the drafters of the Baruch Plan. It could also be maintained, however, that this pessimism was precisely the atmosphere Baruch and his aides needed to make their plan viable. In either case, it was the Baruch plan that was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee, not the Acheson-Lilienthal report. That was the changing of the tide.

Baruch referred to the atomic bomb as “the winning weapon,”¹⁵⁴ which revealed the way he perceived the bomb. For Baruch, America had a better bargaining position because of the atomic monopoly, making him and the American

¹⁵³ Ibid.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

delegation less eager to pursue the Russians for the international control of the bomb. Instead, with or without the Soviet approval, America would leave the meeting as the single owner of “the winning weapon.” Even if the Soviets accepted the Baruch Plan they still had to yield to the provisions of the plan, which included a complete investigation of the uranium and thorium reserves in Soviet Russia. Even after the investigation of the Soviet reserves, the agency was to possess the sole authority over these plants, compromising Soviet sovereignty in its own lands. Furthermore, although Baruch claimed that America was ready to make any concessions to achieve disarmament, in the provisions he offered there was nothing that would jeopardize American sovereignty or security. Moreover, in case of a violation on the Soviet side, nuclear attack was possible. The issue of punishment gave America much more room to maneuver as the sole owner of nuclear weapons. Thus, the plan, though it was born of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, took the shape of an ultimatum by the time it reached the United Nations meeting. Lilienthal recorded his first reaction to Baruch's speech in his diary:

I [...] pointed out that the raw material ambiguity and its importance; said as to “sanctions” that this talk of “condign punishment” set another and a discredited tone –the outlaw of the weapon business – and was contradictory to the spirit of our Report, but perhaps wasn't fatal.¹⁵⁵

There were several reasons why the Baruch Plan failed. As mentioned before, the Acheson and Lilienthal group had good reasons for insisting upon the punishment and the veto provisions. Even though Baruch and his aides kept the some aspects of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, these two provisions made America look arrogant and uncompromising. Furthermore, Baruch did not mention any timetables

¹⁵⁵ Lilienthal, *Atomic Energy Years*, 72.

or any deadlines, which made the plan look like an ambiguous set of ideas rather than an applicable concrete plan with phases and deadlines.

Nonetheless, there are indications that the Acheson-Lilienthal plan might not have proved any more successful had it been given a chance as it, too, had significant weaknesses. This first plan was idealistic and visionary, while the latter Baruch plan was realistic and politically applicable. It is true that the board of consultants proved the international control feasible on technical grounds. However, there were other aspects of the issue. For instance, assuming that the Atomic Development Agency would function the way the Acheson group had outlined was to deny the political atmosphere of the time. It was still too early for the United Nations or any international organization under it to function harmoniously and completely free from national interests. At that time, right after the war, the Soviets were experiencing an energy shortage. Therefore, placing a significant source of energy into the hands of an international organization might have been crippling for the Soviets, whether the plan was altered by Baruch or not. For these reasons, the cause of the deadlock of the international control cannot be laid solely on the Baruch Plan. Despite the fact that the alterations, the wording and the provisions most likely made it much easier for the Soviets to oppose the plan, the political and economic atmosphere of the post-war era was not a promising one in which to bring about nuclear disarmament.

On June 14, 1946, Baruch ended his speech with a paraphrase from Abraham Lincoln: "We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just - a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud."¹⁵⁶ However, despite the rhetoric, the Russian delegation did not see

¹⁵⁶ *The Baruch Plan*

the American plan as a means of salvation. In a week, the Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko explained the Russian plan proposing an international convention prohibiting the possession, production, and use of nuclear weapons. Gromyko stated that world peace was impossible “if the discovery of atomic energy is not placed in the service of humanity” and that international arrangements should be made “forbidding the production and use of atomic weapons based upon the use of atomic energy for mass destruction.”¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the Soviets were not willing to achieve this end under the American conditions. The Russians also rejected negotiations concerning the abolishment of the veto power. Eventually Gromyko added that the Baruch Plan was not acceptable “either as a whole or in their separate parts.” The next six months witnessed a debate on the international control of the atomic energy with neither side willing make any compromises on their plan. There the matter died.

The appointment of Bernard Baruch as the United States ambassador to the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee was definitely a vital decision for the international control of the atomic bomb. As discussed in the previous chapters, the year following the end of World War II was dominated by several struggles for the Truman administration. These hindrances led the leaders of the administration, starting with Truman and Byrnes, to seek a means to make the international control more appealing to the Congress and to the public. Keeping these internal dynamics in mind, one can conclude that Baruch’s appointment was not a bad political move. Although Baruch proved to be a hard man to work with, the president still believed that he was the right choice. Nonetheless, what made Baruch the best choice for the task was also what made him a man of strong will and determination. With the years of experience in politics and business, Baruch did not find it hard to raise the support

¹⁵⁷ Gromyko quoted in Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 309.

he needed for his plan. By ignoring the criticism and advice of the men who were involved in the process since the creation of the idea of international control, Baruch gave a new direction to the course. At the United Nations meeting, he presented a plan that brought the issue to a dead end by the conclusion of the year.

However, the Baruch Plan was not the only reason that the attempts for the international control of the atomic weapons failed. The global atmosphere of the time and the Soviet post-war economic and political struggles, doubtlessly, played an important role in this failure. Moreover, Stalin was aware of the implications of the atomic bomb and how much Hiroshima had changed the balance favoring the United States. As a result the Soviet premier initiated the project to build the Soviet atomic bomb, as he was aware of the power the bomb gave to the American government.¹⁵⁸ For that reason, it is important to differentiate the impact of Baruch in the domestic politics and in foreign policy. It is true that Baruch's appointment alienated many who had the ideal of preventing a nuclear arms race in the coming years. This shift had more effect on domestic politics than a foreign policy. By threatening the President with resignation more than once, he was able to alter the Acheson-Lilienthal report and still be supported by the executive branch. Since the Truman administration could not afford creating an atmosphere of crisis at such a critical time and lose the support Baruch brought with him, they complied with the Baruch plan. It should also be reiterated that the thought process of the Baruch team was not clear. It is true that the Baruch Plan was not technically against the idea of nuclear disarmament; however, Baruch and his aides could not perceive the importance of Soviet participation and their disadvantageous position even if they believed in the international control. Another possibility was that they wanted to retain America's

¹⁵⁸ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 97-99

superior position and thus secure America's position as the leader in the international politics. Either way, they created a plan, which was foolproof for the Americans, and which the Russians could reject quite easily.

The president was not driven solely by the changes in American domestic politics. Yet, at the same time, the man who had come a long way to make international control possible was not immune to the developments in the world and in the American society. Certainly, the growing opposition and the increasing Soviet involvement in the Middle East and the Eastern Europe affected the way Truman conducted American foreign policy. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the domestic politics of the first half of 1946 obliged the president to include a public figure who was not stained with the ongoing criticism of the administration. After the appointment, although he had several objections to Baruch, Truman did not think that the plan would be fatally injurious to the goal his administration had pursued since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

*I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.
— The Bhagavad Gita*

The atomic bomb started a new era. There were those who saw this era as the age of American power, since it was the only country that possessed nuclear technology. On the other hand, there were those who foresaw the danger lying ahead: a world wide nuclear arms race. Secretary of War Henry Stimson concluded that prolonging the American nuclear monopoly would become a catalyst for the arms race, rather than becoming a deterrent. He believed that the United States should take the first step towards the international control of atomic weapons. Stimson proposed that the United States, Great Britain and Canada approach the Soviet Union to halt further bomb construction. The scientists were supportive of Stimson's proposal. Robert Oppenheimer argued that the atomic weapons fell under the responsibility of the world community and only one government. Furthermore, nuclear scientist Niels Bohr defended free access to scientific information and international control. Leo Szilard agreed with Bohr, arguing that preventing an arms race through international collaboration was possible. Albert Einstein concurred with his colleagues declaring that international control was the only escape from a global destructive war.

Not everybody was as enthusiastic about the international control. The military figures of the time, like General Leslie Groves, for example, were hesitant to support any form of information exchange. On the political side, Secretary of State Byrnes believed that the atomic bomb would make the diplomacy with the Russians easier while Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, objected to this proposal because of his deep mistrust of the Russians. Amidst the ongoing discussions, President Truman believed that international control of atomic weapons was so vital that, before waiting for the establishment of a functioning United Nations body, he recommended the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission in the United States. Truman's decision on this issue revealed that he was not an ardent supporter of nuclear arms race as his policies in the latter years suggested. His support of international control showed that Truman was willing to give up the American nuclear monopoly to prevent global proliferation. The fact that Truman made this decision in the midst of congressional and public opposition further proves his earnestness on the issue.

However, Truman was also subject to the impact of domestic and international developments. By the end of 1945, several senators expressed their discontent about information exchange; they believed that the Soviets were not close to building their own atomic bomb, and that an information exchange would only help them to construct the bomb faster, thus shortening the life of the American nuclear monopoly. However, Truman disagreed with the senators, including Connally and Vandenberg. The President stated that America was not that far ahead of the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear science. Therefore, the risk of hastening the Soviet bomb construction was small enough to take in order to achieve international control. The fact that Truman was willing to take this risk did not mean that he trusted the Russians any more than any senator. In fact, his distrust grew increasingly

when he witnessed the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. These two issues, namely losing the support of the Senate and the course of Russian foreign policy, started to become important factors in Truman's foreign policy making.

Furthermore, the first months of 1946 witnessed the strengthening of the Republican opposition. Following the position of Senator Vandenberg, the Republicans strongly criticized Truman's and Byrnes's foreign policy. Nonetheless, although the front against the international control was gaining power, Truman still formed a committee to frame the American proposal in the upcoming United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June. The committee, which was comprised of politicians and scientists who were strong supporters of international control, drafted the Acheson-Lilienthal Report as the basis of the American position. In the wake of this report, however, Truman was pushed into a corner politically by Republican opposition and emerging bipartisan politics. Furthermore, the issues of Iran, Greece and the Eastern European countries, along with Kennan's long telegram and Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech led Truman to change the way he saw the Russians and their policy making.

Because of this growing opposition in the Congress and public discontent, Truman and Byrnes had to carefully choose the man who would present the American proposal in the United Nations meeting. When Byrnes suggested Baruch, Truman thought this elderly statesman was the best choice for the task. Baruch was experienced in politics and business and had been an adviser to several presidents. He was able to attract both public and congressional support. However, Baruch and his aides had a different mindset about the international control of the atomic bomb. Thus, when this new team started to draft the American proposal, they moved away from the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Even though the Board of Consultants expressed

their dissatisfaction and disagreement with the new plan, it was the Baruch Plan that was presented in June to the UN. Truman and Byrnes also had several objections to the way Baruch was drafting the plan; however, both because the fear of losing the support Baruch brought with his appointment and the fear of shifting the focus from the issue at hand, Truman went ahead with the Baruch Plan.

The developments discussed in the previous chapters shed light on a unique period of time in twentieth century history. Because it was Truman who made the decision to drop the bombs and because he was the first president of the period of nuclear arms race, he has been depicted as a president who was blinded by an anti-Soviet mindset. Doubtlessly, Truman was cautious in the way he dealt with the Russians, was the case with the previous presidents as well. Nonetheless, looking back to this period through the lenses of the Cold War, one might perceive Truman simply as an insincere politician. On the contrary, the foreign and domestic policy Truman pursued during this ten-month period reveals that he was not inherently a Cold Warrior, endorsing nuclear armament and promoting anti-Soviet policies at any cost. He sought a way to control further bomb construction in the world including, the United States, because he had witnessed its deadly power, power which could be used for or against America. Thus, although the dream of international control of the atomic weapons was not realized in 1946, or in the following years, Truman stayed committed to this ideal despite strong doubts, considerable domestic opposition, and troubling Soviet foreign policy.

After the collapse of the talks concerning the international control of atomic weapons, Truman presented what has come to be referred to as the Truman Doctrine. The doctrine was designed to contain communism, to prevent its spread and limit its sphere of influence. Truman was able to gain the support of the Republican Congress

when he proclaimed the doctrine on March 12, 1947, and thus opening the way to aid Greece and Turkey, helping to prevent these countries from becoming a part of the Soviet sphere. The Truman Doctrine was followed by the Marshall Plan, which was approved to rebuild the war-stricken Europe. The second term of Truman's presidency was marked by the establishment of NATO in 1949, the creation of People's Republic of China and the rise of McCarthyism. Furthermore, the United States involvement in Korea and Vietnam took place for the first time during this period. Thus, a wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was followed by anti-communist domestic and foreign policy starting in 1946.

On the issue of nuclear weapons, those who predicted that it would take twenty years for the Soviets to develop nuclear weapons were wrong. The first Soviet atomic test took place in August of 1949 and the Russians detonated their first hydrogen bomb in August of 1953. The decade of the 1950s witnessed nuclear proliferation both in the United States and in the Soviet Union. By the 1960s, some steps were taken towards limiting the nuclear proliferation. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United Nations to support the peaceful development of nuclear energy and to provide safeguards against the misuse of nuclear plants. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in 1962, bringing the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba on the verge of a nuclear war. The crisis showed the fragility of the balance regarding nuclear weaponry in the international sphere. A year later, in 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty banned all nuclear testing except for underground testing to prevent nuclear contamination. In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed by 188 states to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty had three fundamental points: non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peacefully use nuclear

technology. In 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which banned all nuclear explosions in all environments, was signed by many nations, including the United States of America¹⁵⁹ and the Russian federation.

In addition to these multinational treaties, the United States and the Soviet Union underwent several bilateral arms control attempts. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were comprised of two rounds of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. The negotiations started in 1969 and resulted in the SALT I Treaty, which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at the existing level for both countries and put restrictions on the construction of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The talks for SALT II took place between 1972 and 1979 as a continuation of SALT I. Another treaty was signed in 1979 curtailing the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons. START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was also another bilateral attempt between the two superpowers signed in 1991. Currently, there are five nuclear powers under the NPT: the USA, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and China. However, India, Pakistan and North Korea are also known to possess nuclear weapons while Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia are suspected of possessing nuclear arsenals as well.

In the year 2007, the topic of nuclear energy and weapons is still a controversial issue. After the first attempts of international control of atomic weapons failed in 1946, despite many efforts to quell the rise, the number of nuclear powers and nuclear weapons increased. Under the shadow of this proliferation, Kofi Annan delivered his last speech as the United Nations Secretary General on December 31, 2006 at the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri, a

¹⁵⁹ This treaty was not ratified by the Congress.

meaningful location, especially in light of nuclear disarmament. When Annan spoke about collective responsibility, he looked back to the presidency of Truman:

My first lesson is that, in today's world, the security of every one of us is linked to that of everyone else. That was already true in Truman's time. The man who in 1945 gave the order for nuclear weapons to be used - for the first, and let us hope the only, time in history - understood that security for some could never again be achieved at the price of insecurity for others.¹⁶⁰

The fact that Truman's presidency was essential in terms of international security indicates how important it is to study this period. The ideal of Truman, Acheson, Oppenheimer and others has not been realized. The waters, lands and the atmosphere are contaminated by nuclear fallout. Following the failure of international control, millions of people lived in fear of nuclear attack and mutually assured destruction. Children grew up learning where to hide in case of a nuclear war. Scientists predicted doomsday and a nuclear winter. The political and daily discourse was filled with acronyms such as MIRVs, ICBMs, SLBMs. Although the nuclear bombs had only been detonated over one country, they cast their shadow over the whole world for more than half a century, a shadow which lingers even today.

Indeed, this issue continues to demand attention today in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. One of the biggest issues in the United Nations is nuclear research for military purposes. Iran, who was a party to the NPT, is the current country on the agenda, having passed up North Korea, because they have developed a uranium enrichment program, claiming to be for peaceful purposes. Even though the United Nations passed a resolution dictating that Iran halt the enrichment program, it has not complied. Iran's neighbor is suffering from the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, because its leader, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, was suspected of building

¹⁶⁰ *Full Text: Kofi Annan's Final Speech*, BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6170089.stm>.

weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it was this fear of nuclear weapons which resulted in American military involvement in Iraq, as President George W. Bush verbalized: "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."¹⁶¹ The present day struggles concerning the nuclear weapons make the history of this issue more valuable, not only for scholarship but also for the politicians, humanitarian agencies and all the actors involved.

In 2005, Mohamed ElBaradei and the IAEA were announced as joint recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize for "their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way."¹⁶² The road to permanent peace in the world must go through nuclear disarmament. History has proved that the policy of deterrence only led to more fear and more nuclear bombs. Even though, in the past nuclear war did not occur, the future still holds the possibility, and it may be that it is stronger than ever before. That is the reason that ElBaradei's words are to be taken into account by every country:

Everybody has to chip in, I think, and see how we can have a functioning system of collective security where we do not continue to face the threat of countries trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction or particularly nuclear weapons. Right now what we have is countries [having nuclear weapons] because of historical incidents. They developed them in the '50s and '60s or [...] that again, that was not meant to be the norm in the future. It was suppose to be a temporary situation. We need to bite the bullet and see how we can move beyond nuclear weapons deterrence, and I think that we have not done that yet.¹⁶³

No, we have not done that yet; neither in 1946 nor in 2007.

¹⁶¹ *President Bush Outlines the Iraqi Threat*, The White House,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html>

¹⁶² *Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to IAEA and Directory General*, IAEA,

<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2005/nobelprize2005.html>

¹⁶³ ElBaradei, *Arms Control Today, Transcript's of the Director General's Interview on Curbing Nuclear Proliferation*, IAEA, <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2003/act112003.html>.

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