AGAINST ITS MODERNIST GROUNDS: RETHINKING CLIENTELISM

A Master's Thesis

by
AYŞE SARGIN

Department of
Political Science and Public Administration
Bilkent University
Ankara

February 2001

AGAINST ITS MODERNIST GROUNDS: RETHINKING CLIENTELISM

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

AYŞE SARGIN

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

February 2001

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks to my thesis supervisor, Hootan Shambayati for his precious academic and emotional support throughout the whole year. I also thank to my thesis committee members Fuat Keyman and Tahire Erman for their valuable comments. I want to express my gratitude to Galip Yalman and Pinar Bedirhanoglu for their academic guide during my undergraduate years at the Middle East Technical University. I also owe a lot to my family and to my friends, particularly, to Mehmet Zeki Cakir who was a great help in dealing with every technical difficulty I encountered during the process of preparing this study.

I certify that I have read this thesis and found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Asisst. Prof. Hootan Shambayati
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assist. Prof. Fuat Keyman
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assist. Prof. Tahire Erman
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu

ABSTRACT

AGAINST ITS MODERNIST GROUNDS: RETHINKING CLIENTELISM

Sargın, Ayşe

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Asisst. Prof. Hootan Shambayati

This thesis is an attempt to highlight an arbitrariness and vagueness in the academic usage of the concept of clientelism. It is argued that these deficiencies in the usage of the concept arise from a bias inherent to its very definition within the framework of the modernisation theory's thinking back in the 1950s and 1960s. Clientelism first emerged as a tool of analysis in the anthropological studies of small traditional communities. Later it was transported to political science to be used in the study of the politics of "developing" societies. These societies had institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties, which were "modern" institutions in terms of definition but which, functioned differently from their counterparts in the societies of the West. Clientelistic model was utilised by political scientists mainly to account for this deviation. Even in contemporary studies, scholars of clientelism tend to view clientelism as essentially a feature of the non-modern societies despite studies which acknowledge its existence in societies with various levels of development. In this thesis we explore and problematise the roots of the concept of clientelism in modernisation thinking and the evolution of it from anthropological studies to political science. We also investigate the perception of clientelism by the students of Turkish politics to provide an example to this bias. Turkish studies of clientelism are marked by a vague use of the concept; not all similar political behaviors and processes are identified as clientelistic, while those political behaviors and processes that are accepted as legitimate parts of the political system in another society, are condemned as clientelistic in these studies. This thesis argues that this arbitrary and vague use of the concept in Turkish studies arises from the particular state-society articulation in Turkish society understood as a cleavage between the "modern" center and the "traditional" periphery. A study of the state society interaction in the American political system is provided to highlight the difference between the two societies.

Keywords: Patron-client ties, Political clientelism, Modernisation, State-society cleavage

ÖZET

SİYASİ KOLLAMACILIĞIN MODERNİST TEMELİNE KARŞI
YENİ BİR BAKIŞ

Sargın, Ayşe

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Hootan Shambayati

Bu tez, siyasi kollamacılık kavramının akademik kullanımındaki keyfilik ve belirsizliğe dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Kavramın kullanımındaki bu yetersizliğin, kavramın 1950 ve 1960larda modernizasyon teorisinin düşünüşü cercevesinde yapılmış tanımına içkin bir önyargıdan kaynaklandığını savunmaktayız. Kavramın kullanımına ilk defa antropologlarin küçük geleneksel topluluklar üzerine olan çalısmalarında rastlanmıştır. Daha sonra kavram "gelişmekte olan" toplumların siyaseti çalışmalarında kullanılmak üzere siyaset bilimi disiplinine girmiştir. Bu toplumlar bürokrasi ve siyasi partiler gibi tanım itibariyle modern olan, fakat Batıdaki benzerlerinden farklı işleyen kurumlara sahipti. Siyasi kollamacılık modeli büyük ölçüde bu sapmayı açıklamak üzere geliştirilmiştir. Daha sonra yapilan çalışmalarda siyasi kollamacılık olgusuna "modern" toplumlarda da rastlandığı gösterilse de, günümüzde yapılan çalışmalarda halen, olgunun, asıl olarak, modern olmayan toplumlara özgü oldugu fikri yaygındır. Bu tezde, siyasi kollamacılık kavramının modernizasyon düşüncesindeki temelleri ve kavramın antropolojiden siyaset bilimine geçiş süreci sorgulanmaktadır. Ayrıca, Türk siyaseti araştırmacılarının siyasi kollamacılık kavramını kullanışları da, bahsi geçen önyargıya örnek teşkil ettiği için incelenmektedir. Türkiye'de yapılan siyasi kollamacılık çalışmalarında kavram belirsiz bir biçimde kullanılmaktadır. Benzer siyasi davranış ve süreçler siyasi kollamacılık örneği olarak adlandırılmamakta ve başka siyasi sistemlerde sistemin meşru bir parçası sayılan siyasi davraniş ve süreçler, Türk siyasetinde gözlendiğinde siyasi kollamacılık olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu tez, Türkiye'deki siyasi kollamacılık üzerine olan çalışmalarda, kavramın kullanılışındaki bu keyfilik ve belirsizliğin, Türkiye'deki devlet toplum ilişkisinin "modern" merkez ve "geleneksel" çevre bağlamında algılanmasından kaynaklandığını savunmaktadır. Amerikan siyasi sistemindeki devlet toplum ilişkileri üzerine yaptığımız inceleme de iki siyasi kültür arasındaki farkın anlaşılmasına yardımcı olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hami-adamı ilişkileri, Siyasi kollamacılık, Modernizasyon

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………..1
CHAPTER II: THE SHAKY GROUNDS OF THE CONCEPT OF CLIENTELISM - FROM ANTHROPOLOGY TO POLITICAL SCIENCE……………………………………………………..9
2.1. The Patron-Client Tie in Anthropological Studies……………..10
2.2. Dyads as the Basis of Clientelism ……………………………..18
2.3. Patron-Client Ties in Political Science Studies ………………..26
2.4. The Transportation from Anthropology to Political Science: A Rethinking ……………………………………………………..28
2.5. Roots of Clientelism in Modernisation Theory ………………..34
CHAPTER III: CHALLENGING THE PERCEPTIONS OF CLIENTELISM IN TURKEY ……………………………………42
3.1. Perceptions of Clientelism in Turkish Political Life …………42
3.2. Prevalence of Clientelism in Turkish Political Parties - A Delusion?……………………………………………………56
3.3. Patterns of Interaction Between State and Society in United States……………………………………………………..62
3.4. State and Society Relations in Turkey………………………..66
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION……………………………………… 75

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Clientelism is widely identified as a non-modern political phenomenon with the pejorative connotations of backwardness and underdevelopment both in academic and folk language. As such, it is viewed as "undesirable" and the concept often comes in a bundle with a bunch of other undesirable phenomena such as corruption, nepotism and favoritism. Occasionally the normative judgments surrounding the concept are established to the extent of undermining its analytical value, as these judgments lead to an arbitrariness and vagueness in the identification of clientelistic political phenomena in academic writings. At the basis of this particular perception of the concept, lies its root in the modernisation theory.

The concept of clientelism was first developed in anthropological studies to denote a specific type of interpersonal, face-to-face relationship based on reciprocal exchange between individuals of unequal status - usually landlords and peasants - in feudal or semi-feudal and agrarian settings. As such, the phenomenon was identified as a feature of the social organisation of non-modern settings. It proved to be a useful tool in the analysis of the structure and dynamics of non-primordial cleavages in these settings, particularly in the absence of class structures.

The earliest contributions to clientelism in the political science literature date back to the early 1960s and it was only in the early 1970s that the concept of clientelism ceased to be restricted to the field of social anthropology solely

(Lemarchand, 1981: 1). The concept was taken up by the students of comparative politics in the 1960s to account for the patterns of political association and organisation at the national level, in the "developing" societies of Latin America and Asia, which did not conform to the accepted model of political association, namely the group model of politics. The concept was developed in political science studies as a "residual" concept to explain the deviations from the group model in the political and administrative institutions of developing societies which were modern in the "appearance" but did function differently from similar modern institutions in the "developed" world.

The theoretical background of the studies of clientelism in political science was that set by the modernisation perspective which was the then prevalent theoretical framework in comparative politics. In its extreme form, modernisation theory held that societies followed a linear pattern along a traditional-modern continuum in order to get "developed". In this context, clientelism was perceived as a feature of traditional or "transitional" societies which would disappear with modernisation. Thus, from its inception in political science, the concept of clientelism was associated with specifically non-modern political action and processes, despite the fact that, the concept, after its transportation to political science, was used to study political processes within modern institutional contexts such as bureaucracies and political parties.

The study of clientelism has flourished since the late 1960s. Some authors argue that this can be considered as part of a broad reaction against modernist assumptions about the eventual move from clientelistic structures toward Western liberal forms of political development and bureaucratic universalism (Roniger, 1994: 3). For a long time both anthropologists and political scientists had regarded patron-

client relations as "marginal" phenomena in societies in that they "deviated" from the corporate kinship groups of anthropological literature and from the universalistic-bureaucratic and market frameworks which were usually portrayed in political science as "epitomes of modernity and rationality" (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 3). Earlier studies on clientelism in developing societies were done on the assumption that societies follow a linear path in their development and that, as the society got "developed", clientelistic relations would be replaced by modern forms of participation. Many empirical studies were carried out with the objective of understanding the role of clientelistic mechanisms of participation in political development. Some argued that clientelistic participatory mechanisms would bring political development in the end by integrating the periphery into the center (see Boissevain, 1966; Powell, 1970; Silverman, 1970; Weingrod, 1968; 1977). Others claimed that clientelism did not lead to modernisation at all; on the contrary it discouraged the development of citizen participation and thus the development of modern democracy (see Zuckerman, 1977). Nonetheless, in both cases the general expectation was the eventual replacement of clientelistic participatory mechanisms with interest-based politics as a result of increasing modernisation in the societies studied (Gunes-Ayata, 1994a: 20).

Later studies of clientelism reflected a growing awareness that patron-client relations were not bound to disappear despite the changes in levels of economic development or of political modernisation (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 28). It was argued that patron-client relations continued to exist as a central mode of social organisation in various societies with increasing levels of economic and political modernisation. However, economic and political development seemed to give way to the emergence of patron-client ties in new forms. There was a shift in the units of

analysis of studies of clientelism from traditional dyadic, interpersonal relations with a single patron to semi-institutionalised triadic relations or complex clientelistic networks in more organised settings, such as bureaucratic agencies and political parties (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). The argument was that a focus that was only restricted to the structural aspects of the phenomenon could prevent the perception of the changes that occurred in the forms of clientelism as a result of the process of modernisation (Lemarchand, 1981: 15).

Studies carried out in countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece revealed that patron-client relations were the central mode of political organisation shaping both interpersonal and organisational exchanges and the flow of resources in these societies (Eisenstadt et. al. 1987: 20). In other settings, patron-client ties have become an "addendum" to the central institutional modes of organisation and exchange having lost most of their hierarchical and diffuse tones, though still remaining particularistic (Roniger, 1994: 5). It was Landé who coined the term "addendum" to refer to the way patron-client ties operate "as additions to institutions whose deficiencies they remedy" (Landé, 1977: xviii). According to Landé:

> Formal, explicit institutionalised contracts do not offer an adequate explanation of the way a community works because they do not provide for all the needs of a community or of the individuals who enter into such contracts. Some of these must be enlivened by the superimposition upon them of voluntary relations of a more selective, flexible, intermittent and emotional sort that can give them a vigor not found in conventional institutionalised contracts when these stand alone. This need is met by the addition of dyadic alliances. (Landé, 1977a: xiii - xxxvii)

Clientelism is today seen as a phenomenon that exists in societies with various levels of development. The concept has been applied to various research areas and in diverse settings such as Nepal, Brazil, Japan, Lebanon, Italy, and the United States (Lemarchand, 1981: 1). Applications of the patron-client concept

appeared in Keith Legg's study of Greek politics (1969), James C. Scott's (1972) studies of Southeast Asia politics, and Rene Lemarchand's (1972) work on African politics. The study of Schmidt et al. (1977) drew together the general theoretical discussions on the concept and a cross-area collection of significant patron-client studies carried out between 1950 and 1970. The 1980s saw further studies based on the utilisation of the concept such as the study of personal rule in Africa by Jackson and Rosenberg (1984), while Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) have presented a sociological theory of clientelism.

The 1980s and 1990s are also marked with various studies which examine the role of clientelistic ties in relation to the major social and political dynamics of the societies in which they exist. Most of these studies acknowledge that clientelism is a particular mechanism of control in society in that it prevents unrest in the society by contributing to the material needs of population which cannot be satisfied in other ways. It is argued that clientelism represents a redistributive and stabilising mechanism that complements the poor capacities of the state and, as such, from the perspective of political participation, it appears to provide a viable alternative to complete exclusion (see especially Caciagli and Belloni, 1981; Migdal, 1994; Escobar, 1994).

In addition to these, starting from the 1970s through the 1990s, there have been various studies which revealed clientelistic phenomena in what is called modern societies as opposed to traditional or "transitional" societies. A large number of studies carried out in this period showed that patronage and clientelism were ubiquitous phenomena in countries like United States, Canada and France (for example, Schmidt, 1977; Gellner and Waterbury, 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1981; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; and Gunes-Ayata and Roniger, 1994).

In spite of these later studies which showed that clientelistic phenomena existed in societies with various levels of development and that, in fact, they were present even in modern societies, the evolutionary assumptions that clientelism was essentially a non-modern phenomenon characteristic of underdevelopment and was to be eradicated with modernisation remained intact. It is the claim of this study that these assumptions strip the analytical value of the concept of clientelism, as they lead to an arbitrariness in the use of the concept when applied to concrete cases. We provide the studies of clientelism in Turkey as examples to this arbitrary and vague use of the concept.

In the first Chapter, the clumsy transportation of the concept of clientelism from micro-level anthropological studies to macro-level political analysis is explored. The analysis of this transportation is regarded as crucial as we argue that it essentially culminated in the perception of political clientelism as a feature of non-modern societies. The chapter starts with an account of the definitions of the patron-client tie in the anthropological studies of small traditional communities. In the following section the particular use of the concept in political science studies as a feature of government is examined. The third section takes issue with this smooth transportation of the concept from micro-level anthropological studies to political science studies. The chapter also provides an account of the root of the concept of clientelism in the modernisation school. We argue that the evolutionary assumptions of the modernisation school are inherent to the very definition of clientelism and despite the decline of the school itself, they persist in contemporary studies of clientelism.

The second Chapter is on the perceptions of clientelism in the Turkish context. We believe that this chapter serves as a case study to the arguments made in

the previous chapters. The Chapter is organised in three sections. The first section provides an account of the perceptions as well as the alleged manifestations of clientelism in Turkey. The second section offers a rethinking of the examples of political behavior and processes identified as clientelistic in the first section. On the basis of these examples, two points are suggested here with respect to the accounts of clientelism in Turkey. First, the examples of clientelism tend to be chosen arbitrarily, that is, not all similar political relationships, behaviors and processes are identified as clientelistic depending on the difference in the nature and characteristics of the political actors involved and the political contexts. Second, various political phenomena identified as clientelistic by scholars of clientelism in Turkey may not be so indeed. A study of the character of constituency service and the patterns of interaction between interest groups and political and administrative bodies in the United States is provided in the third section to point out that what are claimed to be examples of clientelistic behavior in the Turkish context are not labelled as such in the United States. In the fourth section an analysis of the cleavage between the "modern-centre"-"traditional periphery" in Turkish politics is provided to account for this particular perception of clientelism in Turkey. Because politics in Turkey is widely perceived to be a continuous tension and confrontation between a state elite acting in the name of a self-defined public interest and at the "center", and the "peripheral" social forces to make room for themselves in the public space, attempts by the social forces to represent their interests in the center is perceived by the latter as clientelism.

The Conclusion provides an outline of the arguments made throughout the thesis as well as some concluding remarks.

CHAPTER II

THE SHAKY GROUNDS OF THE CONCEPT OF CLIENTELISM - FROM ANTHROPOLOGY TO POLITICAL SCIENCE

The recognition of the importance of patron-client relations in political analysis had its roots in anthropological studies (Pitt-Rivers, 1954; Campbell, 1964; Wolf, 1966; Potter, Diaz, Foster, 1967; Foster, 1977; Wolf, 1977).In anthropological studies the patron-client model was developed to denote a particular type of interpersonal exchange in small rural and/or tribal communities of non-modern settings. The concept was later transported to political science by the students of comparative politics who sought a new conceptual tool to account for the patterns of political organisation within modern institutional frameworks - such as bureaucracies and political parties in developing societies at the national level - which seemed to deviate from the existing models of political association.

Today clientelism is a popular political science term used vigorously in the analyses of political phenomena in both modern and non-modern settings. However, the concept is still widely identified as a feature of non-modern social and political organisation, thanks to the concept's transportation from anthropology to political science under the influence of a theoretical framework set by the modernisation perspective. We argue that it is important to understand this transportation and the theoretical context within which it occurred to be able to identify the modernist biases that are inherent to the definition of the concept of clientelism and that lead to

an arbitrariness and vagueness in the identification of clientelistic phenomena in concrete studies.

2.1. THE PATRON-CLIENT TIE IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES

Hall argues that patron-client relations can be traced far back in history, but "it was only with the growth of feudalism … that relationships of personal protection and subordination between lord and peasant came to form a basis for social, economic and political organisation" (1977: 510). He argues that, under feudalism, patron-client ties constituted a basic part of the system of land tenure and agricultural production, and had continued to exist in rural areas such as the Iberian Peninsula and Southern Italy long after the decrease of feudalism. The Spanish and Portuguese colonisers encouraged the patron-client system in the newly established plantations in Latin America and Southeast Asia as it proved useful for keeping a cheap and submissive labor force (Hall, 1977: 510). Hall points out that patron-client relationships tend to persist in rural communities that are isolated and that have rigid class structure based on land ownership which prevents possibilities for upward social mobility for peasants (1977: 510).

As Hall points out, patron-client ties were first identified in non-modern, particularly, feudal settings. First studies of the patron-client pattern in the 1950s were made by anthropologists in small rural communities and tribal settings. Anthropologists used the term "patron-client tie" to refer to a specific type of interpersonal relationship that is usually institutionalised in the form of a contractual agreement between individuals of unequal status, namely the patron and the client (Lemarchand, 1972: 103). In the words of Silverman (1977: 296), the patron-client relationship is

> an informal contractual relationship between persons of unequal status and power, which imposes reciprocal obligations of a different kind on each of the parties. As a minimum, what is owed is protection and favor on the one side and loyalty on the other. The relationship is on a personal, face-to-face basis, and it is a continuing one.

For Lemarchand (1972: 69), patron-client ties are

> more or less personalised relationships between actors [ie. patrons and clients], or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions.

Scott (1972: 92) defines the patron-client relationship as

> a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.

As described in these definitions, the distinguishing characteristics of patron-client relationships are reciprocity, unequal exchange, proximity and diffuseness. The combination of these four elements are what make the patron-client tie a specific type of exchange different from, say, friendships which also involve proximity, or from other power relationships which involve unequal exchange. We will consider each of these four features of the patron-client tie individually.

The element of reciprocity is important both in the formation and maintenance of the patron-client relationship since the patron-client relationship continues as long as each party is in need of the supply the other party provides. The relationship is essentially based on a reciprocal exchange of different types of resources - instrumental and economic resources as well as political ones such as support, loyalty, votes, and protection (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 48). According to Scott, patron-client relations become prominent in periods of rapid socio-economic change during which traditional patterns of deference weaken and "vertical

ties can only be maintained through a relationship of greater reciprocity" (Scott, 1969: 1146). He argues that "competition among leaders for support, coupled with the predominance of narrow, parochial loyalties, will encourage the widespread use of concrete, short-run, material inducements to secure cooperation" (Scott, 1969: 1146).

In a typical patron-client relationship - one between the landlord and the peasant - the client, that is the peasant, seeks material goods and services intended to reduce his environmental threats, while he, in return, provides the patron, that is the landlord, with less tangible rewards, such as personal services, indications of loyalty or deference or political services such as voting (Powell, 1970: 412). From a sociological perspective, Powell explains the development of personal ties between the patron and the client on the basis of the condition of the environment the peasants live in. According to Powell, peasants live in extreme scarcity. They have little or no free access to land which is the major factor of production in agriculture. Even when they have land, the productivity of these lands is likely to be very low because the peasants do not have access to technology or capital. Moreover, the peasants do not have much power to cope with both the natural and human threats which abound in their environment such as disease and death as well as violence, exploitation and injustice at the hands of the powerful, while their culture in general emphasises themes of vulnerability and misfortune. (Powell, 1970). In the face of these threats and feelings of insecurity, peasants develop some patterns of social relations in order to build some security. According to Powell, patron-client pattern is one such pattern of cooperative social arrangement along with clan organisations and fictive kinship relationships (Powell, 1970: 412; see also Foster, 1967: 304).

Silverman describes the formation of a patron-client tie between a landlord and the peasant as follows (Silverman, 1967: 284 cited in Powell, 1970: 412):

> A peasant might approach the landlord to ask a favor, perhaps a loan of money or help in some trouble with the law, or the landlord might offer his aid knowing of a problem. If the favor were granted or accepted, further favors were likely to be asked or offered at some later time. The peasant would reciprocate - at a time and in a context different from that of the acceptance of the favor, in order to de-emphasise the material self-interest of the reciprocative action - by bringing the landlord especially choice offerings from the farm produce, or by sending some member of the peasant family to perform services in the landlord's home, by refraining from cheating the landlord, or merely by speaking well of him in public and professing devotion to him.

The element of reciprocity is what gives the patron-client relationship its voluntary character. Clientelistic relationships are voluntarily entered into on the basis of the expectations of mutual benefits (Lemarchand, 1981: 15). According to Powell, the elements of reciprocity and voluntariness are what distinguish the patron-client tie from other power relationships - such as relationships based on coercion, authority and manipulation - which are also proximate and which also bind parties of unequal status but which do not rest on the reciprocal and voluntary exchange of goods and services (1970: 412).

Students of clientelism point out that the elements of authority, manipulation and coercion may still be present in the patron-client pattern. In fact, as Scott points out, the degree of coercion in a certain patron-client exchange depends very much on the degree of reciprocity involved in the same relationship. Silva argues that, although as a result of the patronage mechanisms the ruling elites get privileges, these mechanisms function as long as they provide for the expectations of clients (1994: 31). Scott argues that the client is neither coerced into affiliating with a patron nor his decision of doing so is the result of unrestricted choice. The needs of the client tend to be critical such as land to farm in order to feed his family while the

patron's needs tend to be marginal compared to that of clients. A landowner can get along without the loyalty of an individual peasant and his family. Besides the patron has more bargaining power as there are more peasant families with needs, than there are patrons with assets.(Powell, 1970: 413). However if the client has valued services to reciprocate with, if he can choose among competing patrons, and if he can manage without the patron's help, then the relationship will be more nearly that of equals. In other words, the degree and the extent of the power of the patrons depends on both the degree of the monopolisation of goods and services and on the rarity of the resources such as employment or land, as well as on their importance for the survival of the clients. However, in case, the client has few exchange resources to bring against the patron whose services he badly needs, then the relationship is more nearly a coercive one (Scott, 1972: 94). In the words of Silva, "the fewer alternatives to an asymmetrical arrangement, the greater the probability of the dependent client submitting "passively" to the dominating power of the master or patron" (Silva, 1994:30).

Nevertheless, coercion and authority are not part of the definition of the patron-client tie; and if they become dominant, then the tie is no longer a patron-client relationship (Powell, 1970: 412). Although the patron happens to be the one who gets more out of the relationship, reciprocity is a crucial element of the patron-client tie, especially, when compared to pure coercion or formal authority. According to Scott (1972: 93),

> A patron may have some coercive power and he may also hold an official position of authority. But if the force or authority at his command are alone sufficient to ensure the compliance of another, he has no need of patron-client ties which require some reciprocity. Typically, then, the patron operates in a context in which community norms and sanctions and the need for clients require at least a minimum of bargaining and reciprocity; the power imbalance is not so great as to permit a pure command relationship.

Another significant feature of the patron-client tie is the inequality of the exchange involved. Patron-client relationship is based on a strong element of inequality and on differences of power between patrons and clients. Lemarchand describes patron-client ties as essentially dyadic bonds between individuals of unequal power and socio-economic status. (1981:15). Hall traces the English term "patron" to the Spanish *patron*. According to Hall (1977: 510),

> the term 'PATRON' is derived from the Spanish *patron*, meaning a person of power, status, authority and influence. It may signify an employer, a ceremonial sponsor or even a protecting saint, but it is only relevant in relation to a less powerful person or 'client' whom he can help or protect …

As long as the patron and the client share similar values and cognitive orientations, the above-described vertical relationship between them is perceived as legitimate and it often involves a degree of affection (Silva, 1994: 30). In an oft-quoted phrase, patron-client tie is a "lop-sided friendship" (1954, Pitt-Rivers: 140). Therefore, besides from their basis in inequality and the element of reciprocity, two other distinguishing characteristics of patron-client ties are their face-to-face character and their diffuseness. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, there is a strong element of interpersonal obligation in the patron-client relationship; an element often phrased in terms of personal loyalty and attachment between patrons and clients (1984: 48). They argue that this element of solidarity may be very strong as in the traditional type of patronage or very weak as in many of the political machines in modern settings; but it is still found in all of them to some degree (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 48). It is argued that the development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact between the two parties. The personal, face-to-face quality of the relationship stems from the high degree of reciprocity involved. The continuing pattern of reciprocity

creates trust and affection between the partners. According to Powell, the exchanges being intimate and highly particularistic, depend upon such proximity (1970: 413). As Scott puts, "just as two brothers may assist each other in a host of ways, patron-client partners have a relationship that may also be invoked for almost any purpose; the chief differences are the greater calculation of benefits and the inequality that typifies patron-client exchange" (1972: 95). Moreover, in most settings, these feelings of affection and obligation to one another between the partners are backed by community values and ritual and they are expressed between nonrelatives by the use of terms of address that are normally used to refer to close kin. In this sense, patron-client tie is not only a link of mutual advantage but it is "often a durable bond of genuine mutual devotion that can survive severe testing" (Scott, 1972: 94).

Patron-client ties are also diffuse in their character, that is they are "whole-person" relationships rather than "explicit, impersonal-contract bonds" (Scott, 1972: 95). Scott describes the diffuseness of patron-client ties as follows (1972: 95):

> A landlord may, for example, have a client who is connected to him by tenancy, friendship, past exchanges of services, the past tie of the client's father to his father, and ritual co-parenthood … The patron may very well ask the client's help in preparing a wedding, in winning an election campaign, or in finding out what his local rivals are up to; the client may approach the patron for help in paying his son's tuition, in filling out government forms, or in getting food or medicine when he falls on bad times.

Scott notes that the elements of diffuseness becomes crucial to the survival of the relationship during rapid social change; the patron-client ties tend to survive even during these times - "so long as the two partners have something to offer one another" (1972: 95).

In the above definitions that come out of anthropological studies, the patron-client tie appears as a particular type of interpersonal relationship at the local level. Accordingly, in the anthropological studies, the study of clientelistic phenomena are

connected with the study of phenomena like ritual kinship and friendship. However, later, in political science, we see that the concept is used to denote a feature of government and that the study of clientelistic phenomena becomes part of the study of political machines and factions at the national level.

The transportation of the concept of clientelism from micro-level anthropological studies to macro-level political studies was explained on the basis of the argument for a transition from a local landlord-peasant relationship to a complex transaction system at the national level. The argument was that socio-economic change, particularly, increasing industrialisation and the penetration of the society by the state, altered the bases of patron-client relationships and as a result, the traditional resources of local patrons have been supplanted by control over government and political party positions (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981; see also Zuckerman, 1977: 63). As a result of this process, the patron became transformed into a broker, with state and market penetration of the peasant village, and appeared to act as a mediator between the peasants and the state (Powell, 1970: 413).

At the basis of this smooth transportation of the concept of clientelism from micro-level anthropological studies to macro-level political science studies, lied the theory of dyads. Anthropological studies define patron-client relations as a specific type of dyadic - a two-person, personal - relationship. However political scientists argue that patron-client ties are not necessarily dyadic and unidirectional, but may involve networks of reciprocities; that is depending upon their position in the society, one man's patron may act as another man's client. In other words, individual dyads are linked to other dyads in larger structures and all the dyadic ties within a society constitute a dyadic network (Mayer, 1966; Lemarchand, 1977). Thus, micro-level relationships, dyads, of anthropological studies are used to account for macro-level

political phenomena such as political machines and factions in political parties in political science studies. The transition from one to the other is explained on the basis of the argument for the " stacking up of dyads" to form dyadic networks.

2.2. DYADS AS THE BASIS OF CLIENTELISM

In a seminal essay of his, Schmidt, notes that clientelist analysis, through its emphasis on informal and personal relationships in the political process, overcomes the difficulty of describing polities where the study of interest groups, political parties and voting patterns fail to account for political behavior (1977: 305). Carl Landé points out to a similar thing; he reveals that the importance of personal networks in polities became manifest when a group of social scientists were asked by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council to study interest groups in a number of underdeveloped countries within a wider project of cross-national study of politics. Landé - one of the grantees - reports that the main conclusion they came up with at the end of the study was that, in the developing polities, interest groups do not play as important a role in the political process as had been expected (1973: 103). In a criticism of the existing theory of group politics advocated by Gabriel A. Almond (1960) and others, Landé argues that in many developing polities a great deal of "individual self-representation is self-representation pure and simple, without any pretence of a concern for the categorical interests of any collectivity, be it society as a whole or a subgroup within it" (Landé, 1973: 103).

Group theory of politics assumes that individuals in politics act mostly as members of groups. A group is composed of a set of individuals who share common attitudes that often stem from the similar background characteristics of these

individuals. These individuals act together because they believe that by doing so they will attain their common objectives and gain similar individual rewards (Lande, 1973: 103). The disposition to work in groups stems from the experience of people that is, "an individual … is politically rather helpless, but a group unites the resources of individuals into an effective force" (Dahl, 1961: 5 cited in Landé, 1977b: 506). There are different kinds of groups; some are primary groups dealt with in anthropological studies such as lineages, clans and castes. Some others are organised voluntary groups. There are also groups that are nothing but mere categories, that is "unorganised groups consisting of all individuals who have some particular characteristic in common" (Lande, 1977b: 506). The group model of politics assumes that within the nation there are to be found numerous distinctive categories of people. These people have formed themselves into associations, membership of which is sometimes based on mere geographic nearness; that is the sharing of the same county, town or city; and in some cases on specialised economic interests or similar points of view. Some of the functions of these subgroups within the nation interest only their own members while the activities of some subgroups have an effect upon the larger body politic and affect the members of other subgroups as well.

According to group theory of politics, individual citizens satisfy their needs by joining others with similar needs, to seek general legislation that will be of use to other citizens with the same needs. Thus, the individual attains his particularistic objectives through his fight for the categorical objectives of the group. This way of reaching one's private ends by advancing the interests of countless other people arises out of the fact that individual citizens have no other alternative to achieve their private interests rather than through a feeling of altruism. There is no other alterative

because the group theory of politics assumes the rule of general laws; that is, laws will be enforced rigidly and impersonally to all alike individuals. It also assumes that each individual clearly knows what her interests are and the categories that she belongs to; and will recognise the fellow members of these categories in collective efforts to seek legislation in their common interest, while recognising the categories whose interests clash with her and refusing offers coming from such groups to advance their interest at the expense of his. Politicians in the political parties are also assumed to know which of the categories they should choose among many and give priority to the demands of these categories while neglecting those of the others. Individual citizens in return are assumed to figure out which party does the most to advance their own interests and that they will give their support to that party (Landé, 1977b: 506-7).

Landé points out that one of the main weaknesses of this theory is its assumption that government proceeds according to the rule of law, that is the laws are enforced impersonally and that individuals can benefit only through the operation of laws which provide similar benefits to all that are similar. Only then, individuals agree to advancing their private interests by working for the similar interests of others. However, according to Landé, in many developing countries this assumption is not always true leading to alternative conceptualisations of interest articulation structure in the developing world (1973: 104).

This alternative conceptualisation for Landé is a "dyadically structured system" in which the basic structural unit is not the group, but the dyad (1973: 104). Landé describes a dyadic relationship as "a direct relationship involving some form of interaction between two individuals" (Landé, 1977a: xiii). Here the word "direct" connotes personal attachment. This element is important as it distinguishes a dyadic

relationship from one in which two actors are connected with each other "indirectly" as a consequence of their similar occupations or of the fact that they are the members of the same group (Landé, 1977a: xiii). Landé points out that the same two individuals may be engaged at the same time in both a dyadic and a non-dyadic relationship. According to him, the difference between them becomes clear under conditions of change or conflict when the individuals must make a choice between one or the other. Landé argues that the vassal of a medieval king and the serf of that vassal are involved in dyadic relationships - relationships whose effectiveness and stability are greatly based upon personal attachment - while the enlistee in a modern army, the Weberian bureaucrat, and the factory worker who takes orders from his foreman are not involved in dyadic relationships. It is true that personal ties may develop and even have a degree of influence in the latter relationships as well, but these relationships are still non-dyadic as the personal attachments are not essential to the relationships themselves (Landé, 1977a: xiv). According to Lande, the dyadic relationship can be voluntary or obligatory for both of the members. It can be diffuse or it can involve specific obligations for each member. It can be between members of equal or unequal socio-economic status. It can be of a short duration or last a lifetime. The main distinguishing characteristic of a dyadic relationship is that the relationship connects two individuals by a direct personal tie (Landé, 1977b: 507-9)

According to Landé there are two types of dyads; one is corporate dyads and the other is exchange dyads. In the former, the two persons behave as one, while in the latter they maintain their separate identities. Dyads may also be supportive or antagonistic; the main type of dyads Landé is concerned with is supportive exchange dyads. According to him, there are certain analytical characteristics of these types of dyads. First, dyads may bind persons of different occupational or class backgrounds

as well as those of the same backgrounds. Secondly, benefits obtained through dyadic exchanges tend to be particular rather than categorical; in other words, exchanging rewards does not mean that each partner support the goals of the whole category to which the other belongs. Thirdly, dyadic exchanges tend to involve some degree of reciprocity, but need not achieve exact reciprocity since the achievement of the latter facilitates the termination of the dyad (1973: 104).

Landé describes certain principles of dyads as follows (1977b: 507-9):

1. In dyads property is shared rather than pooled. Each partner lends or gives property to the other, but possession or ownership remains in one individual.
2. The sharing of property and the giving of aid is based upon strict reciprocity in dyads.
3. Dyads are fragile and their maintenance requires the exchange of favors. Thus, dyadic relationships must be between individuals who are unalike. Each partner gives the other something the other; either can never supply on his own or has a shortage of for the time being.
4. The benefits obtained through dyadic relationships are particular rather than categorical. The example that Landé gives is as follows: The shoemaker makes shoes for the butcher in return for meat from him but the shoemaker is not likely to be interested in attempts to better the butchering trade as a whole nor the butcher to support a legislation aimed at developing the shoe industry.

The early anthropological studies on the patron-client relationship mainly identify it as one specific type of a dyadic contract. In his studies of the social organisation of the Mexican peasant community of Tzintzuntzan, Foster has argued that it was not adequate to think of the community as formed by a conventional arrangement of sociological constructs. Foster pointed out that every adult in the

village of Tzintzuntzan organised his societal contracts outside the nuclear family by means of as special form of contractual relationship - "the implicit dyadic contract". The contracts were of a dyadic type as they occurred only between two individuals and implied reciprocal obligations of the parties to the contract. They were non-corporate since social units such as villages or extended families of the individuals were never bound. The contracts were informal, or "implicit" as they do not have a ritual or legal basis, that is they were not enforceable through authority, but existed only at the pleasure of the contractants.

Foster argues that the implicit dyadic contracts in the Tzintzuntzan can be divided into two categories on the basis of the type of the reciprocal obligations they imply: those that are made between social and economic equals such as members of a family as close as siblings, compadres or neighbors and friends; and those made between people of different status. In the former type - which binds people of equal status - the reciprocal obligations are complementary, as they are the same for both parties. The first type of contracts is thus called symmetrical. The second type of dyadic contract is called asymmetrical since it binds peoples of different status and the reciprocal obligations involved are noncomplementary, as each partner owes the other different kinds of things (Foster, 1977: 16-7).

Foster notes that villagers also recognise formal and explicit contracts - such as that of marriage, and the buying and selling of property - which rest on governmental and religious law, are registered in writing, and are enforceable through their authority. However, "the contractual relationship enables an individual to disentangle himself from the weight of ideal role behavior implicit in the totality of ascribed and achieved statuses he occupies in a society and to make functional such relationships as he deems necessary in everyday life" (Foster, 1977: 26).

According to Foster the dyadic contract model accounts for one distinguishing characteristics of Tzintzuntzan; and that is personalism which refers to a situation in which the individual distrust the system and relies on personal ties, and the other is the resistance of the people living in the community to all outside attempts to stimulate cooperative action for community improvement (Foster, 1977: 27). Foster notes that people of Tzintzuntzan were consistently reluctant to work for others toward group goals (Foster, 1977: 27). According to him (Foster, 1977: 27),

> The [dyadic] model suggests that where a society is conceived as a network of social relations based on dyadic contracts, in which no two people have exactly the same ties, there can be no blocks to serve as the basis for either positive or negative action. Neither is there a unit to serve as base for feuding, nor a unit to serve as base for cooperative work for mutual goals. The model is consonant with the atomistic, or particularistic quality of society which an anthropologist feels so strongly when living in the village.

According to Landé, dyads usually are linked to other dyads in larger structures and all the dyadic ties within a society constitute its dyadic network. Each member of a dyadically structured system has a personal combination of dyadic partners which is uniquely his own. An individual's personal set of dyadic relationships constitute his dyadic web. Personal webs can be subdivided analytically into horizontally and vertically structured ones. Horizontal webs are those whose central individual has status, resources or power roughly equal to those of his various partners. When they are political, Landé calls these relationships as "personal alliance systems". On the other hand, vertical webs are those whose central individual has greater status, resources or power than his various dyadic partners have. Landé calls vertical webs of political nature as "personal following" and a specific subtype of this type of webs are patron-client systems (1973: 104 -105).

As such, patron-client relationship is undertaken between individuals or networks of individuals in a vertical fashion rather than between organised corporate

groups and they seem to undermine the horizontal group organisation among clients and patrons themselves (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984 48).

Landé describes the main characteristics of a dyadically structured system of political leadership and followership as follows (1977b: 508):

1) The system rests on the single leader with his collection of followers some of which are bound to the leader by primary ties.
2) The system is leader-centred rather than group-centered in the sense that it is the leader that creates the group by seeking for individual followers after he has decided to become a leader.
3) The bonds that tie the system together are vertical and dyadic. There is little sense of corporateness, and of group solidarity among the leader's followers. Whatever group spirit that exists comes out of the fact that various individuals have chosen to follow the same man.
4) The interests that unite the leader and his followers are categorical. The purpose of the relationship between the leader and his followers is not the attainment of a common general objective but the pursuing of the complementary private interests of both the leader and those of the followers.
5) The relationship between the leader and his followers is symbiotic. Both need each other. What the leader expects out of the relationship is power and prestige and what the followers are after is protection.
6) The ties between the followers and the leader are reciprocal.
7) Both adherence to a leader and the willingness to take on a follower are voluntary actions. The relationship ends if one of the parties does not think that he benefits from the relationship.

8) These systems are dynamic and unstable systems. The personal attributes of the leader and his wealth are important factors that determine the size and the loyalty of his following.

2.3. PATRON-CLIENT TIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDIES

Weingrod points out that political clientelism can assume two distinct types: the clientelism of the notables and that of the modern mass party (1977b). Caciagli and Belloni make a similar distinction on the basis of the terms "old" and "new" clientelism (1981: 35). According to them, old clientelism, or clientelism of the notables, refers to the reciprocal, personal interpersonal relationship between the peasant and the landlord. This form of clientelism was characterised by "great inequalities" between patron and client. The deference enjoyed by the patrons derived form their status as aristocrats or large landowners and it was taken for granted by both the patrons and their clients as an established fact. The resources the patrons controlled in the "old" form of clientelism had little to do with the exercise of public power but flowed instead from the patron's personal wealth.

On the other hand, Caciagli and Belloni point out that the "new" clientelism rests upon organisation. It is tied to the modern mass-based party, particularly to the use of the party organisation and public resources. As such, the new clientelism has a greater capacity to provide benefits to its clients, benefits that it extracts from the state. In this context, the scope of governmental activities appears as a determining factor in the extent of clientelistic relationships in a society. It is claimed that when the government does not control rich resources, there is a limited role for patrons mediating between government and their clients (Weingrod, 1968: 393). When the government scope is broad, and when the government is involved in extensive

development programs, the role of patrons is particularly enhanced since the lives of their clients are more likely to be affected by governmental decisions (Scott, 1969: 1153-54).

In the "new" clientelism, the position of the new patron is more vulnerable

since

> with the passage of popular deference towards the patron, the days of …eternal gratitude on the part of the client are largely gone. In the absence of such intangible reinforcements of the patron-client relationship, the new patron is obliged to rely more and more on the distribution of tangible benefits as a means of retaining his following (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981: 39).

In other words, as a result of the transition from "old" clientelism to "new" clientelism, the psychological character of patron-client relationship has changed. According to Caciagli and Belloni, the terms of the contract between the patron and client now rest upon "an implicit element of bargaining: they are subject to negotiation and renegotiation". This is partly due to the fact that with socio-economic modernisation and greater centralisation in the society, the patron no longer plays the role "of gate-keeper, of the exclusive holder of information" on many aspects of political and administrative life which was the basis of the perpetuation of a strongly asymmetric type of exchange in the past (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981: 40-41). Another factor in the change of the psychological character of the relationship is that the new patrons, given their socio-economic background - professional politicians from low-middle and middle-class - do not have private resources which they can pour into the clientele distribution process. The resources of the new patron musts, then, all is public. To reach the public resources the patron requires the vote of the client and the new clientelism as such brings some advantages to the client. The asymmetry of exchange is somewhat minimised since for the individual, now the

vote is the principal resource; even the economic benefits that clients are able to extract from their patrons have increased in certain cases through "the client's method of threatening the patron to withhold his vote in the elections" (Caciagli and Belloni, 1981: 42).

The below quotation from a Sicilian politician does throw light to the way clientelistic forms vary through time with political development and modernisation.

> For at least fifteen years clientelism has been changing in nature and instead of being a vertical tie as it was before, descending form the notable to the postulant, it has become a horizontal one; it now concerns entire [social] categories, coalitions of interest, groups of [private] employees, employees of public office or of regional enterprises. It is mass clientelism, organised and efficient, which consists in laws… and concessions granted no longer to the individual, but to favored groups…..Today clientelism is a relationship between large groups and public power (cited in Caciagli, 1981: 36).

2.4. THE TRANSPORTATION FROM ANTHROPOLOGY TO POLITICAL SCIENCE: A RETHINKING

The use of patron-client analysis is largely developed by anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s for the study of a specific mode of interpersonal, face-to-face and reciprocal exchange between individuals of unequal status in local agrarian settings within feudal and semi-feudal societies. The prototype of the patron-client relationship was the personal, face-to-face tie between a landlord and a peasant in which the landlord provided the peasant with various material benefits which he could not get otherwise, in return for the peasant's deference and respect. The patron-client model proved to be a popular device in anthropological studies to examine the social structures based on interpersonal and informal networks of individual patron-client ties in the villages and towns of non-modern societies. It is later transported to political science where it is used to denote distribution of public and private benefits in return for votes in particularly what is called the transitional societies.

The assumption lying behind this shift of the concept from anthropological studies to the political science was that the studies on small-scale, non-institutional political processes in non-Western societies by social anthropologists provided valuable theoretical insights for the political scientists studying the mode of political organisation and association within political and administrative bodies in developing societies.

Studies done by anthropologists on dyadic structures, personal networks and action-sets at the local level have provided the ground for later studies by the students of politics on the informal networks cutting across modern institutions at the national level, such as bureaucracies and political parties in developing societies. Landé points out that in many developing societies, scholars have found out that personal relationships play a greater role in the organisation of political activity than do organised groups based on similar class, occupation or ideology. Even the latter types of groups in these societies - wherever they appear - often operate "less as disciplined collectivities than as clusters of personal relationships" (Landé, 1977a: xiii). On the basis of these findings, political scientists studying the political organisation and processes in the "developing" societies concluded that the analysis of the politics of the developing societies required conceptual tools other than those applied to the study of "modern" societies. According to them this need rose mainly from the fact that the basis of the political organisation of the developing societies - dyadic non-corporate groups such as patron-client ones - was different from that of the modern societies which operated on the basis of horizontal corporate groups such as classes. According to Landé, in developing societies "while class, ethnic, and religious cleavage may often explain a portion of the contest for power, clientelism often illuminates a vast range of political life which is not easily reducible to such

categorical groupings" (1977: ix). Landé points out that it is this finding which led the students of developing societies to refer to the interpersonal relationships - particularly patron-client relationships - identified by anthropologists in feudal and semi-feudal settings in order to explain various political processes in the developing societies.

According to Scott, patron-client analysis provides a framework for not only the analysis of the structure and dynamics of non-primordial cleavages at the local level but it is helpful also in understanding the informal power networks that cut across "nominally" modern institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties in the less developed nations (1972: 92). He argues that the dynamics of personal alliance networks are very crucial in the national institutions as well as in local politics; "the main difference is simply that such networks are more elaborately disguised by formal facades in modern institutions" (Scott, 1972: 92). Similarly, Powell claims that a clientelistic system serves as an important heuristic device for understanding certain patterns of political behavior like nepotism, personalism, favoritism and political structures such as cliques, factions, and machines in developing societies (1970: 412).

As we have pointed out in the previous sections, the theoretical framework behind this transportation of the concept of clientelism from anthropology to political science is the argument for the "stacking up of dyads". Schmidt provides an example of how the dyadic contracts at the individual level add up to form clientelistic networks at the national level. His example starts with the account of a dyadic contract between a landowner and a peasant - the "most classic" case of clientelistic relations. Mr. Alvarez (Mr. A) is a peasant working in a cattle ranch owned by Mr. Bueno (Mr. B). Mr. A chose Mr. B as godfather to his children. Mr. A's wife helps

out with housework at the ranch. Mr A brings token produce to Mr. B and also always votes for the National Party of which Mr. B is the local leader. In return Mr. B helps Mr. A in critical situations such as taking his daughter to the doctor in town when she was very ill or intervening with the authorities on the behalf of Mr. A's son and having him released when the boy was arrested and accused of stealing. He also provides Mr. A with the symbolic friendship with an "important" person which gives a sense of belonging to Mr. A (Schmidt, 1977: 305).

In this relationship Mr. A is the client and Mr. B is the patron. The relationship is dyadic and reciprocal. It takes place between unequals and involves proximity. The exchange that occurs in the relationship is enduring and intense. In the words of Landé, the relationship involves (1973: 105),

> broad but imprecise spectrum of mutual obligations consistent with the belief that the patron should display an almost paternal concern for and responsiveness to the needs of his client, and that the latter should display almost filial loyalty to his patron - beliefs reflected by the tendency for familial appellations to be employed in the relationship.

As such, the relationship between Mr. A and Mr. B is a prototypic example of the patron-client relationship initially identified by anthropologists in small traditional communities of feudal settings. In anthropological studies, the term referred to a particular pattern of social interaction. It denoted an informal hierarchy - "a kind of friendship network focused upon influence" and, as such, the analysis of clientelism in anthropological studies was the analysis of "how persons of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest or friendship, manipulate their relationship in order to attain their ends" (Weingrod, 1977a: 324-325). However, in political science, the analysis of clientelism is an analysis of a feature of government, of political organisation at the national level.

If we go back to our example, we see that Mr. A is most likely to have only one patron whereas Mr. B probably has many clients, and Mr. B also acts as a political broker between Mr. Casares (Mr. C) who is the provincial leader of the National Party - the regional patron - and several other people like Mr. A. In terms of the relationship between Mr. B and Mr. C, the former is the client and the latter is the patron; and thus the patron-broker-client "pyramid" is created by the stacking up of many dyadic patron-client networks (Schmidt, 1977: 306; see also Scott, 1972).

As seen in this example, the theorists of clientelism argue for the possibility of a shift between the "old" clientelism or clientelism of the anthropologists, and the "new" one, that is, clientelism of the political scientists easily in the sense that the existing dyadic contracts are replicated in the macro-level through the enlarging of the dyadic networks, without causing any qualitative change in the definition of the relationship. It is true that the differences in the bases and scopes of the ties as a result of the transition from old to new clientelism are acknowledged by the authors describing the two forms of clientelism. However the question of whether the two relationships can still be considered the same is hardly addressed.

On the contrary, we argue that only the social contexts of the two relationships, but also the elements of inequality and voluntariness involved in the relationship are different from each other in the two relationships. Mr. A has almost no alternative but to have such a tie with Mr. B. He works in Mr. B's ranch and obviously he does not have either enough money or influence to take his daughter to the doctor or to get his son released; so the main link Mr. A has with the public authorities is Mr. B. In this case the identification of the relationship between Mr. A and Mr. B as a voluntary relationship is irrelevant. Accordingly the element of inequality is far larger than the element of inequality in the relationship between Mr.

B and Mr. C. The social contexts and the norms that govern the two relationships are also different; Mr. B and Mr. C consider themselves as "equal individuals", while Mr. A' s relationship with Mr. B is one of deference and both take this for granted.

The perspectives of anthropologists and political scientists using the concept are different from each other. Unlike the special sense in which anthropologists use the term, clientelism in the vocabulary of political science has a 'folk' meaning". By clientelism, political scientists refer to "the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support". For the political scientist the study of clientelism is the study of how parties use public institutions and public resources to their own ends, and how various kinds of favors are given in return for votes (Weingrod, 1977a: 324). Thus for the political scientist clintelism is a feature of government. It is an attribute of the system; studying it does not require much interest in the internal structure of these relations.

The political scientist who studies patronage considers a formal organisation while its is the dyadic contracts that the anthropologist deals with (Weingrod, 1977a: 325-6). The major unit of analysis in political science studies is the political party and the key terms are "bosses" and "political machines", "merit versus political appointments" (1977a: 324). According to Key patronage may be considered " as the response of government to the demands of an interest group - the party machinery - that desires a particular policy in the distribution of public jobs" (Key, 1964: 348 cited in Weingrod, 1977a: 324). While for Sorauf (Sorauf, 1961: 309-10, cited in Weingrod, 1977a: 324),

> patronage is best thought of as an incentive system - a political currency with which to purchase political activity and political responses. The chief functions of patronage are: maintaining an active party organisation … promoting intraparty cohesion … attracting voters and supporters … financing the party and its candidates … procuring favorable government action … creating party discipline in policymaking.

In party-directed clientelism, that is, in new clientelism "clients are no longer individuals but social or territorial groups which trade off their votes for the goods and services the party machine provides" (Tarkowski, 1981: 174). Yet, as Weingrod notes "a patronage system cannot be simply reduced to a series of 'patron-client' ties; a political party is much more than a set of 'dyadic contracts' " (Weingrod, 1977a: 324). We argue that an examination of the transportation of the concept from anthropological studies to political science casts light on the dynamics of this eventual association of the clientelistic political phenomena with non-modern polities.

2.5. ROOTS OF CLIENTELISM IN MODERNISATION THEORY

Political scientists studying various societies in Latin America, Asia and Africa came to the conclusion that the accepted model of political association and interest representation, that is, the group theory of politics was less than explanatory for how politics was done in these societies. Thus, clientelism emerged as an alternative to serve as an explanatory framework for the politics of the "developing" societies which did not match up to the presumptions of the group theory of politics.

The group theory of politics, which provided the predominant theoretical framework in the 1950s and 1960s for the organisation of political activity in society, was formed basically on the basis of the development of mass politics in the West. The advocates of this theory mainly held that political activity and interest articulation structure in society were based on the activity of organised, corporate groups that were formed on the basis of shared horizontal ties - such as class and occupation identification - shared attitudes, as well as the shared goal of obtaining categorical benefits, that is benefits for the whole group. However, political scientists

studying the "developing" societies claimed to have found out that it was, on the contrary, sets of non-corporate, dyadic, interpersonal reciprocal relationships based on vertical loyalties with the aim of achieving particular rather than categorical benefits - that is benefits for only the reciprocating individual and not for the whole group - that constituted the base of political organisation and interest representation in these societies. Thus, clientelism was mainly developed as a model of political association to account for this "deviation" from the group theory of politics to the extent that the features of the clientelistic model was identified more on the basis of what it *lacked* (namely corporateness, horizontal ties and categorical benefits) in comparison to the interest group model than on the basis of what it *itself* constituted. In other words, as a theoretical construct, clientelism was developed out of attempts to put meaning into this so-called deviation and make it comprehensible on the basis of how clientelistic model related to (or differentiated from) the group theory of politics which was then accepted as the proper model of political association.

This mode of comparative analysis was part of a broader approach, that of the modernisation school, whose assumptions were accepted pretty much without question in comparative politics studies back in the 1950s and 1960s. First conceptualisations of clientelism were made on the basis of two principal assumptions of the modernisation school, those of the linearity and desirability of development along a continuum, the two ends of which were the traditional and the modern society. Traditional and modern society were in fact two ideal-typical constructs that did not exist in the real world; traditional being defined in the same way as clientelism was defined, that is on the basis of what it *lacked* when compared to what the modern was seen to have. The particular manner in which traditional and modern societies were defined is described eloquently by Huntington (1978: 41):

> Modernity and tradition are essentially asymmetrical concepts. The modern ideal is set forth, and then everything which is not modern is labelled traditional. Modernity, as Rustow said, "can be affirmatively defined", while "tradition remains largely a residual concept"… The characteristics which are ascribed to traditional societies are the opposites of those ascribed to modern societies.

Another important feature of the definition of modern and traditional societies was their basis in the contrast between "modern man" and "traditional man" (Huntington, 1978: 35).

Palmer identifies five variables on the basis of which traditional and modern societies could be compared. These are (1) affective neutrality/affectivity, (2) self-orientation/ collective orientation, (3) particularism/universalism, (4) ascription/achievement, (5) diffuseness/specificity (Palmer, 1989: 59-62). These characteristics of traditional and modern societies are in fact argued to refer to the major characteristics of traditional and modern individuals.

(1) Affective neutrality/affectivity: According to Palmer traditional individuals tend to be *affective* meaning that they tend to view other individuals in emotional terms and under the influence of personal values. The idea of other individuals behaving in a neutral manner is not familiar to them. On the contrary modern individuals are affectively neutral, that is disinterested and unbiased towards other individuals.

(2) Self-orientation/collective orientation: Palmer argues that traditional individuals tend to be *self-oriented*. They have low sense of civic responsibility, that is, little concern for the general or community goods unless these goods in some way directly relate to the needs of the individuals and their families. However, modern individuals are collectively oriented in the sense that they have an inclination to play

by the rules, to the extent of "sacrific[ing] personal values for the sake of the social or community good" (Palmer, 1989: 59).

(3) Particularism/universalism: Universalism denotes the uniform application of the rules to all individuals in the same situation. According to Palmer, the universalistic statement "all people are equal in the eyes of the law" is a characteristic feature of the modern society. On the other hand, traditional societies are characterised by *particularism* and favored treatment for friends and relatives.

(4) Ascription/achievement: Modern societies are characterised by achievement, that is, in the words of Palmer, "the granting of status and authority on the basis of demonstrated ability". It is argued that merit-based recruitment procedures for bureaucratic posts is another characteristic feature of modern political systems. On the contrary, in traditional societies, status, deference and authority are accorded on the basis of *ascription,* that is, on the basis of criterion other than performance, such as language or ethnic group.

(5) Diffuseness/specificity: Palmer points out that in traditional societies legal and contractual systems operate on the basis of *diffuse* rules and obligations while in modern societies legal norms are codified and clearly defined. In the former type of societies, formal relationships among individuals is regulated by accepted behavior standards, while in the latter they are governed on the basis of explicit codes. According to Clark, the contrasts between traditional and modern individuals stand out more when the political behavior of each group is explored (1991: 75).

> Their [the traditional people's] fatalism, their lack of faith in their own efficacy, and their reluctance to join with others in common enterprise frequently make them unable to mount an effective campaign to influence the political system … Modern persons, on the other hand … possess the motivation, the activist spirit, and the inter-personal and organisational skills to advance their interests through the political input process … People in traditional societies … [have] the everpresent intermediaries whose main job it is to obtain special treatment from the state bureaucracy for their clients …

> In modern societies, however, the task of protecting a citizen or a group from the adverse impact of public policy falls more into the realm of legitimate interest-group activities … All of this helps explain, why, in modern settings, we are more apt to find formal associations, interest groups, and political parties … Although such an arrangement appears to be largely institutional, it could not survive for long if the basic personality and political culture of modernity did not strongly support it.

The theorists of the modernisation school argued that development was desirable, and all traditional societies were to follow one linear pattern to achieve development, that is modernisation, in the experience of the West. In the words of Huntington, "the bridge across the Great Dichotomy between modern and traditional societies is the Grand Process of Modernisation" (1978: 35). That is, the shift from tradition to modernity was to be realised through modernisation. Modernisation was described as a complex process involving changes in almost all areas of human thought and behavior. According to Clark (1991: 70),

> Modernisation is a multidimensional phenomenon, meaning that it is a process that affects most of the mental structures of an individual as well as most of the social institutions of which he or she is a part. People do not become modern only in certain parts of their personality but, apparently, must make the transition along a wide range of mental activities.

In this sense modernisation is a systemic process; "changes in one factor are related to and affect changes in the other factors" (Huntington, 1978: 35). Somehow all the elements of modernisation "had to go together" (Lerner, 1958: 438 cited in Huntington, 1978: 36). According to Lerner, it is a "process with some distinctive *quality* of its own which would explain why modernity is felt as a *consistent whole* among people who live by its rules" (Lerner, 1958: 438 cited in Huntington, 1978: 36).

Modernisation is also a phased process in the sense that it is possible to distinguish the different levels of modernisation different societies have achieved.

Societies begin as traditional societies and at the end they reach the modern stage. The transitional stage can also be broken down to subphases. It is argued that although the pace of modernisation may change from one society to another, all societies move through the same stages. In this sense modernisation occurs globally; all societies that were traditional at one time have already become modern or are in the process of becoming modern (Huntington, 1978: 36). As such, the process is not only inevitable and irreversible, but also desirable. According to Huntington, "the rates of change [towards modernisation] will vary significantly from one society to another, but the direction of change will not" (1978: 36).

The concept of clientelism was developed by the students of comparative politics under the influence of this theoretical framework set by the modernisation school. Accordingly, clientelism - its defining features being reciprocity, proximity and particularism as opposed to affective neutrality, "civic"ness and universalism - was regarded as a characteristic of traditional societies that was bound to disappear at further stages of political development, or as a "syndrome" haunting "transitional" societies - that is, in-between societies with modern institutions but traditional political cultures - that had to be eliminated with further social and political modernisation. In both cases clientelism was identified as a non-modern phenomenon.

Despite the decline of the modernisation school itself and the later studies of clientelism that acknowledged the existence of the phenomenon in societies with various levels of development, and even in the advanced capitalist liberal societies of the West, the modernist assumptions that were inherent from the time clientelism was first theorised still persist to this day. The vulgar arguments for the linearity of development along a traditional-modern continuum are not as emphasised today with

consideration for other possible paths of modernisation and with the questioning of the concept of development altogether. However, the concept of clientelism still carries with it the pejorative connotations of backwardness and underdevelopment both in academic discourse and in folk language. There is a general tendency to see it more as a non-modern phenomenon, as a feature of the traditional feudal or semi-feudal society than as that of modern settings. Clientelism in non-modern settings is widely viewed as a natural adjunct of the prevalent feudal relations, while clientelism in the so-called transitional societies is seen to be a remnant of the society's past feudal relations lingering on behind the facade of modern institutions. In both cases the means to get rid of clientelism is put as political and social modernisation. The argument is that modernisation will replace the traditional ascriptive ties and particularistic norms - which are closely associated with clientelism in non-modern societies - with an impersonal bureaucracy operating on the basis of universal norms.

The argument is that the logic of civil society and democracy as such run counter to the logic of clientelism as the nature and functions of modern representation are believed to be radically different from the nature and roles of clientelism (Roniger, 1994: 9). It is claimed that modern constitutional democracies function on the basis of universalistic standards of public behaviour and clear "rules of the game". Rulers and contenders are subject to clearly defined rules according to which they compete for support of the public. These rules are aimed at ensuring the accountability of rulers through mechanisms for the recurrent change of those in positions of authority and for the distribution of power in society (Roniger, 1994: 9). Placing friends at critical places in political and administrative bodies is viewed as harmful to the institutionalisation of public accountability as well as to a "politics open to generalisation and participation on the basis of universal rules and to a

discourse aimed at the protection of individual and collective liberties and rights" (Roniger, 1994: 10). According to Roniger (1994: 9),

> clientelism is seen as defying the modern notion of representation, which predicates these elements: a system of public rights; a public debate on what should be conceived of in principle as rights and enjoyed in practice as entitlements; safeguards protecting the latter from infringement; and a competitive system for establishing the rights and priorities and for controlling their implementation according to public rules.

CHAPTER III

CHALLENGING THE PERCEPTIONS OF CLIENTELISM IN TURKEY

Turkish political life is widely characterised as clientelistic by various scholars of Turkish politics. The chief culprits in this state of events is seen as political parties; both the party officials working in the grassroots and elected politicians such as ministers, mayors and deputies. It is true that there are various instances of clientelistic behavior and activity in Turkish political life. However many other political phenomena that are claimed to be manifestations of clientelism are not clientelistic indeed. The perception of clientelism in the Turkish context serves as a case study to this arbitrariness in the usage of the concept of clientelism. In this chapter, we argue that the particular of the state-society articulation in the form of a cleavage between the "modern" center and the "traditional" periphery is what creates the perception of clientelism prevailing in Turkish party politics.

3.1. PERCEPTIONS OF CLIENTELISM IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE

It is commonplace to argue that clientelism is a very widespread phenomenon in Turkish society. Mango characterises Turkish society as one in which "the tradition of clientelism is well-established" (1991: 177). According to Sayari, various manifestations of clientelistic behaviour such as "the dependency relationships between individuals of differential status and authority, social networks of personal followings, factionalism, favouritism" are observed at many different levels of the

society like the bureaucracy, trade unions, civic associations and informal social groups (1977: 104). He notes that (Sayari, 1977: 104),

> the importance of patronage as a means for either strengthening one's status or for achieving particularistic goals is clearly recognised by most citizens. Establishing proper connections with the right people, therefore, assumes priority in all types of social interactions.

Party politics is where clientelistic tendencies in Turkish society manifest themselves most; it is widely argued that clientelistic practices have made wide impacts on political processes at different periods of Turkish politics. A prominent professor of Turkish politics goes so far as to suggest that "patron-client ties explain the rapid spread of party organisations throughout the countryside after the transition to a multi-party system in 1946" (Ozbudun, 1981: 265). The same author argues that "clientelism can be said to have been functional for the development of political parties in Turkey" (Ozbudun, 1981: 265). Others have held that "excessive use of patronage by clientelistic parties" in the 1970s was cited by the military as one major cause of the political turmoil experienced then, urging the military to take over in 1980 (Erguder and Hofferbert, 1988: 82).

It seems that many key scholars of Turkish politics agree that clientelism has a very visible existence in Turkish political life. Not only are there various articles written specifically focusing on analysing the clientelistic tendencies in Turkish politics, but also there are many other articles on political participation and political parties in Turkey that frequently make reference to clientelist relations, particularly in Turkish party politics. However the definitions and the accounts of political clientelism in Turkey provided by these studies tend to be surprisingly weak given the frequency of reference made to the concept.

The weakness of these definitions of clientelism does not arise from an incompatibility between the theoretical definitions made by the authors and the concrete examples provided *per se* but rather from the arbitrary manner in which the concrete examples of clientelism are chosen. Students of clientelism tend to be selective in their labelling of political behavior and activity as clientelistic. In other words, while one political behavior or activity is described as clientelistic on the basis of certain characteristics of it, another one with the same characteristics is not named as clientelistic. This suggests that the empirical studies carried out on concrete cases are heavily influenced by normative judgments which leaves them with little analytical value.

Following Lemarchand, Ozbudun defines patron-client relationship as "a more or less personalised relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or sets of actors commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions" (Lemarchand 1972: 69 cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 250). Ozbudun believes that this definition is broad enough to encompass both traditional and party-directed patronage. In fact, according to Ozbudun, "whether of a traditional or modern variety, a relationship can be designated as a patron-client relationship, as long as it displays the elements of reciprocity, proximity and inequality" (1981: 251).

For Sayari patron-client relationship refers to a "form of reciprocal exchange whereby individual patrons and/ or political parties seek to mobilise the support of their followers in return of assistance and various brokerage services" (1977: 103). Sayari notes that clientelism functions "as a mechanism which regulates social relationships between individuals and groups with differential access to economic and political resources" (1977: 103).

It is argued that "Turkey provides a fertile ground for the formation and maintenance of a wide variety of clientelistic relationships" (Ozbudun, 1981: 252). Various factors are identified to account for the flourishing of clientelistic politics in Turkey. According to Sayari, clientelistic relations prevail in societies with weak horizontal ties. In his words, where horizontal group or class affiliations are relatively weak, one would expect to find "a greater frequency of clientelist-based social interactions" which implies that there is an "inverse relationship between the strength of horizontal solidarities and patronage" (Sayari, 1977: 103). Clientelism tends to prosper in periods of rapid socio-economic change which causes the weakening of traditional patterns of deference but not yet the replacement of them by modern authority patterns - a change which will come with further socio-economic modernisation. His argument is that in this context vertical ties in the society can only be maintained by relationships of clientelism until further modernisation will lead to their replacement by horizontal class or occupational ties.

Socio-economic inequality is cited as another factor in the prospering of clientelistic relationships in Turkish society. Kudat argues that patron-client relations are characteristic of stratified societies where socio-economic differences are great (1975: 69; see also Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 58-59).). However, Kudat points out that the existence of socio-economic differences is not a sufficient condition for the development of clientelistic networks on their own. Individuals are more likely to become clients to local notables, if socio-economic inequality is accompanied with the failure of kin units to facilitate individuals' relations with expanded markets and state bureaucracies (Kudat, 1975: 69).

Another important factor that is said to contribute favorably to the prevalence of clientelistic ties in Turkey is weak center-periphery links. According to Gunes-

Ayata, after the proclamation of the Republic, the only way to integrate the periphery with the center and to extend the Western-oriented nation-state ideology and citizenship to the "village gemeinschaft" was to use the existing notables (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 50). She reasons that the peasants lived in a world in which the dominant type of relationship was primary, *gemeinschaft* type of relationship. In the eyes of the peasants, the local notables were part of their private life as opposed to the "cold and distant face" of public bureaucracy. The main external links of the peasants were with the local notables; they showed loyalty and respect to them as the latter, in return protected the peasants against the "alien" state. In some cases, these notables were Kurdish tribal leaders, and in others they were religious sheikhs; this varied according to the economic, ethnic, religious background of it of the region (Ozbudun, 1981). However most of the time they were the local landlords owning varying amounts of land. They often lived in the town centers to be able to maintain close links with the other local power holders and the local bureaucracy. The notables formed a link between the state and the periphery and the center recognised them as agents of the state and gave them access to central power (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b).

Ozbudun argues that the presence of electoral competition also encourages the expansion of clientelistic patterns. This is so for two reasons; first the power to vote improves the client's bargaining position with a patron, and secondly, each local patron in competition with other patrons running will seek more clients to get support in the elections (1981: 253). The transition to multiparty politics is claimed to be a turning point in the prospering of clientelistic ties in Turkish politics (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 52). According to Ozbudun, the transition from an authoritarian party rule to competitive multi-party system in 1946 has affected clientelistic patterns in Turkey

in two important respects. First, it led to the transformation of traditional patron-client ties into party patronage. Second it gave way to the emergence of new party-directed patronage patterns that are independent of the traditional patron-client ties (Ozbudun, 1981: 258). Gunes-Ayata points out that the development of competitive politics provided a channel for clientelistic relations in the periphery to develop and continue in political parties and in other institutional networks at the national level (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 52-58). Patrons, by their rise to important positions in the local party organisations, gained access to new sources of patronage which they used for further strengthening their authority over the clients (Ozbudun, 1981: 258). It is argued that the resources controlled by the administration were used expansively to build up networks at the local level (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b).

Ozbudun notes that traditional patrons assumed prominent roles in the local organisations of the newly established parties. Rural party organisations of these parties were most of time founded by the already existing groups in villages and towns and the party choices of each group were determined on the basis of the rivalries among themselves (1981:258; see also Sayari, 1975: 123-126). Ozbudun stresses that

> the reigning faction had necessarily already identified itself with the existing government, so that the headman and his supporters were automatically RPP. Those who opposed them were thus committed to the DP … This conversion of existing local factions into local sections of the national parties made possible the very rapid establishment of a two-party political system in full-scale activity (Stirling, 1965: 281-2 cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 258).

Thus, in the words of Gunes-Ayata, as a result of the transition to multiparty politics, "political parties [the DP and the RPP] placed primary group affiliations in a new context; old rifts between rival families assumed a political character … and individual loyalties were transferred from extended families to larger configurations" (1994b: 53)

It is also noted that, in addition to the existing traditional landowning patrons at the local level, new brokers who did not come from a traditional patron background emerged as well. A major part of them were not notables but businessmen, traders and professionals and were active in local party organisations competing with the traditional patrons (Ozbudun, 1981: 259).

Ozbudun notes that the transition from traditional patronage to party-directed patronage in Turkish politics became most manifest with the coming to power of the Democratic Party (DP) in 1950. Ozbudun describes DP as a political machine, that is "a non-ideological organisation interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leader and distributing income to those who run it and work for it" (Scott, 1969: 1114, cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 260).

According to Sayari " the principal explanation for the popularity of the Democrat Party among the rural electorate lies in its emergence as a highly efficient political machine" (1975: 127). According to Sayari, "since their primary goal is to win elections they [machine parties] tend to be highly adaptive to the local structures in which they exist, display little concern for ideological consistency or broad policy stands … " (Sayari, 1975: 127).

It is claimed that under the DP rule, "patronage was distributed through typical pork-barrel grants in the form of roads, waterways, mosques and various public works. These were rewarded to rural communities which had hitherto supported the DP or appeared willing to make a switch" (Sayari, 1975: 129). Ozbudun describes the election strategies of DP as follows:

> prior to elections construction machines were often sighted near hotly contested or electorally important villages, waiting for a favorable electoral outcome to start or to continue their work. Larger communities such as towns or provinces were sometimes rewarded with factories, which were called "election factories" by the opposing Republicans for their usually non-economic locations" (Ozbudun, 1981: 260).

According to Ozbudun, DP patronage in the rural areas also included a wide variety of individual inducements ranging from cash payments to agricultural credits, from employment to solving some bureaucratic difficulty" along with pork-barrel grants (Ozbudun, 1981: 260).

On the other hand, DP's policy of "vastly expand[ing] the scope of the government's rural development projects" is cited as another example of clientelism by DP (Sayari, 1975: 128). Moreover, Sayari notes that, during the DP tenure, "larger communities such as towns or provinces were sometimes rewarded with factories, which were called "election factories" by the opposing Republicans for their usually non-economic locations" (Ozbudun, 198: 260).

Among the accused policies of the Democrats for being clientelistic were some its policies in the issue of the relation between the state and the religion. Major ones of these policies were the lifting of the ban on the recital of the *ezan* (the call to prayer) in Arabic, the broadcasting of Koran readings on the state radio, the establishment of religious schools, and the expansion of the budget of the PRA (the Presidency of Religious Affairs - an institution established as adjunct to the office of the prime minister that functions to control religious affairs and religious education throughout the country). They were also accused of their mild attitude toward the *Nurcu tarikat*; the rumors were that the *Nurcus* gave support to the DP (Toprak, 1988: 124).

The Justice Party (JP) which was founded after the military coup of 1960 is said to be another important clientelistic party along with DP that used state resources to distribute pork-barrel benefits in order to mobilise voters and to support local brokers (Sayari, 1976).). According to Ozbudun, the continued electoral success of the Justice Party (JP) for two decades was partially due to its efficiency as

a "rural machine" (1981: 260). As Ozbudun notes, Karpat's study on the voting preferences of urban migrants illustrated that a large percentage of urban migrants who voted for RPP in their villages gave their votes to the JP after they came to the city (Karpat, 1975 116). Ozbudun suggests that this switch of votes to the JP was "a favorable response to the short-term, concrete, material benefits offered by the JP machine" (Ozbudun, 1981: 261). However, he argues, JP's electoral successes should not be exaggerated; despite its machine like characteristics, the portrayal of the JP urban organisation as functioning like "well-oiled, efficient American urban political machines are somewhat exaggerated" (Ozbudun, 1981: 261).

One factor behind the proliferation of clientelism in the 1970s is cited to be the width of the scope of governmental activities. The more the government controls economic activity and thus commands rich resources, the more roles the patrons assume as intermediaries between the government and their clients. Ozbudun argues that the state in Turkey has always been active in social and economic matters since the time of the Ottomans and that certain activities of the government are more likely to encourage clientelism than others. According to Ozbudun, while sectoral and sub-sectoral inducements such as agricultural price supports, minimum wages, labor legislation cannot be subject to patrons' manipulations, other services that the government undertakes, such as the provision of roads, drinking water, schools, mosques, electricity, irrigation projects, communitary development projects, licenses for growing certain agricultural products or individual benefits - such as agricultural credits, employment, choice of a factory or road location - are more likely to provide more favorable grounds for the development of clientelistic relations. According to Gunes-Ayata, as state penetration into the periphery increased, agricultural production became important in terms of national and international markets. State

intervention in the agroeconomy in the form of subsidies to agricultural production, buying and selling of ingredients and irrigation programs increased to a great extent. Thus, access to state resources became critical for the economic success of the peasants. According to Gunes-Ayata, preferential treatment appeared as necessary to obtain essential resources, such as credits and fertilisers, and since these were distributed throughout the bureaucracy, the access to it became very important (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 56).

In rural areas, JP's patronage activities focused on the subprovinces which gained importance as links between the villages and the provincial capitals after the abolition of village and district units with the 1960 coup. Gunes-Ayata notes that in this context, a good deal of patronage distribution took place at the subprovincial level through the local organisations of the JP.

Among the rural patronage activities of the JP, the most important two were cited to be providing employment and securing credits for the party's followers (Ozbudun, 1981: 264). Moreover, villagers often sought party assistance in bypassing the bureaucratic red tape (Sayari, 1976: 196).

Ozbudun notes that JP worked also as an "urban machine" but to a less extent. In the 1960s, urbanisation was noted to be the most important social and political factor giving rise to the breaking up of village communities in the 1960s. New communities were being formed in the cities among the migrants on the basis of ethnic, neighbourhood, and occupational associations. It is argued that the party organisations particularly of the JP working in these communities were effective in creating links between the party and the migrants (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b).

Ozbudun notes that the patronage activities of JP in the cities mostly targeted the new urban migrants (Sherwood, 1967 cited in Ozbudun, 1981: 260).

> A typical villager arriving in Ankara or Istanbul goes immediately to that district populated by people from his own village. The local Justice Party man helps him settle, aids in the problems with the authorities, and functions as an employment agency or a marriage bureau as the case may be.

Gunes-Ayata notes that

> The Justice Party's local leaders had to reinstate their power continually through preferential resource allocation. Patronage, in the form of roads, water, electricity, schools, mosques, and so forth, was channelled through the party and was the common instrument of voter mobilisation. Vertical linkages were established and strengthened, the party became an important means of access to state resources. These linkages were important because the state controlled the majority of credit facilities and because the economy was dominated by state economic enterprise despite the private-sector ideology of the ruling party. The various spoils were used to create local supporters in the periphery … (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 54-55).

Among JP's patronage activities, its relationship with Islamic groups is cited as well. According to Ayata, the JP formed "direct and lasting relationships with various Islamic groups, communities and leaders. This involved a process of exchanging votes and political support for access to public resources and protection against threats from the state and secular forces" (1996: 44).

After the late 1960s RPP is also claimed to adopt patronage strategies to benefit from "the political pay-offs of patronage" (Sayari, 1977: 111). According to Gunes-Ayata this was part of an ideological change; the RPP "adopted a populist, social democratic ideology, which inspired from the Democratic Party's antibureaucratic sentiments" (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 56). Sayari cites the party's attempts to "form party-affiliated peasant unions and agricultural cooperatives and establish close links with secondary associations such as trade unions" among the manifestations of party patronage by the RPP (Sayari, 1977: 111). Another such alleged manifestation of party patronage by the RPP is claimed to be its policy of "granting substantial price increases for agricultural products" during its tenure in

1974 (Sayari, 1977: 111). Similarly, Sayari claims that the Republican People's Party's policy of granting substantial price increases for agricultural products during its tenure in office in 1974 was an example of its clientelistic tendencies (1977: 111).

According to Gunes-Ayata, the Motherland Party (MP) which ruled the country for nearly a decade in the 1980s continued to rely on patronage politics like its predecessors (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 57). However, as Gunes-Ayata argues, its style of clientelism differed from its predecessors since the MP avoided creating clientelistic networks based on the party cadres and preferred to count on a few influential individuals in the big cities who later became party officials (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 57). She claims that the MP applied a pork-barrel distribution of spoils in the rural areas; it frequently turned subprovinces into provinces, carried out preferential electrification of villages and establisher telephone networks.

3.2. PREVALENCE OF CLIENTELISM IN TURKISH PARTY POLITICS - A DELUSION?

The remark by a prominent scholar of clientelism that "the main source of clientelistic politics is the political parties" in fact reflects a conviction widely taken for granted among not only the scholars of clientelism but also various other groups in Turkey (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 60). According to Ozbudun "clientelism and the related phenomenon of political corruption led to a marked popular cynicism and distrust towards politicians. In the popular image, politicians are often portrayed as unprincipled, self-serving wheeler-dealers" (1981: 266). Gunes-Ayata notes that "one of the main targets of the 1980 coup was party politics, which was closely associated with clientelism. The politicians were seen as corrupt, having little concern for moral principles and being oriented toward competition for spoils" (1994b: 57).

This section attempts to point out to an arbitrariness and vagueness in the identification of various political phenomena as clientelistic prevailing in most of the studies of clientelism. We argue that the source of this arbitrariness is twofold. One is the selective manner in which the label "clientelist" is used. A study of the concrete examples of political phenomena alleged to be clientelistic shows that not all similar political relationships, behaviors and processes are identified as clientelistic; the nature and character of the political actors involved and the political context seems to be more determining than the character of the political phenomenon itself. The second one is the dubious assumption that clientelism is essentially a feature of non-modern social and political organisation. However, an analysis of the character of constituency service and the patterns of interaction between interest groups and political and administrative bodies in the United States reveals that what are claimed to be examples of clientelistic behavior in the Turkish context are not named as such in the United States. There is the expectation that there are less chances of observing a clientelist behavior in the American context since it is a modern setting; while those types of political behavior, process and relationships in the modern institutions of Turkey such as political parties and bureaucracies that do not conform with the ideal typical model of modern society are accounted for by the concept of clientelism.

The allegations of clientelism directed at Turkish political parties stem basically from the activities and policies of the parties in three particular issues. These are the role of the state in the regulation of religion; state budget allocation and the character of the constituency service. More specifically, political parties are mostly criticised to be clientelistic on the basis of their perception of proper state-religion relations, particular public spending and investment policies when they are

in government and their personalistic policy-making that appears most visibly in the character of the constituency service performed by the deputies.

In fact, Heper and Keyman goes as far as saying that from 1950 onward the political parties were very much like "ventures established to promote solely their members' economic interests", as they preferred patronage instead of "planning", and "populism" instead of industrial growth (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 262). The authors argue that since the transition to a multi-party democracy in 1945, the political elite pursued a strategy of political patronage in formulating their socio-economic policies (Heper and Keyman, 1998). According to Heper and Keyman, during most of this time (1998: 259),

> … no effort has been made to develop coherent socio-economic policies; instead, the political elite tended to be overly responsive to the demands of particularistic socio-economic issues. What passed as "policies" on such matters were, on the whole, no more than slipshod decisions essentially motivated by a desire to garner votes.

In all these examples, the basis of the argument of clientelism for the policy in question is the authors' view that they are policies designed to garner votes. In other words, the authors identify these policies as clientelistic solely on the grounds that they are policies to get popular support in the form of votes. There is no mention of the element of particularism in these definitions. Particularism is one of the basic elements of a clientelistic political phenomenon (see Chapter 1: 5). Clientelistic distributions are particularistic distributions in the sense that the goods and services provided are not universally accessible. If the goods and services provided by these policies cited are universally accessible to every one, then definitionally they are not clientelistic policies. For instance if the price increases for agricultural products by the RPP government in 1974 for only certain individuals among agricultural producers, then this policy could be labelled as clientelistic. The fact that a policy is

designed for the benefit of a certain segment of the citizens in a society does not make that policy clientelistic.

As we have noted above, the basis on which the above examples are labelled as clientelistic is the mere fact that the authors view them as aimed at garnering votes. Not many would disagree with the argument that political parties in democratic systems are, in fact, should be concerned about their votes since it is the votes that provide the means to come to power for political parties. So it is not the desire to get votes that is condemned on its own here. It is rather the level of the desire to get votes; when this desire is perceived to be too great that the party disregard the "public" interest in order to get votes, then the authors define the policy in question as designed to get votes. The problem with such a definition of public interest is that in democratic societies there is not only one "public", but there are many each with its own special interests.

Ayata notes that during the single party rule the attempts of the RPP government to create a modern nation made new and difficult demands on large segments of the population. The development of a centralised state meant that the state had to increase its control over many aspects of public and private life and, thus to curb or replace the influence of certain social groups and political actors such as traditional local elites and the bourgeoisie. Moreover the reform in religion and education also adversely affected the power of religious functionaries and communities who had to give their public functions to the new state institutions (1996: 42). Not only the traditional elites but also the masses were negatively affected by the single party period reforms. It is also noted that especially during World War II the introduction of new taxes and rationing of basic consumption items peasants met with resentment from the peasants not to mention the new values and

lifestyles introduced by the state elite as part of the wider Westernisation project (1996: 42).

The DP appealed to the chief interests and fears of the social groups in small towns and of rural farmers who felt resentment to the secularist policies (Karpat, 1988: 138). Ozbudun's account of the mobilisation of local organisations of DP implies that however there is enough evidence that suggest that

> … not only did peasants and townsmen fail to benefit materially from the RPP regime, but they were also irritated by the regime's policies of cultural Westernisation and secularism. Peasants and townsmen, therefore, had little difficulty identifying with and supporting the DP" (Tachau, 104). Thus "peasants and workers did not need to be forced into their support of the Democratic Party by their patrons; given their destitution and frustration, they were more than willing to support an alternative government promising new policies (Sunar, 1974: 86 cited in Tachau, 1991:104).

The atmosphere immediately after the [1950 general] elections was almost apocalyptic. In Ankara a preacher in the Tacuddin mosque gave thanks to God in the Friday prayer for having freed Turkey from the government of the godless People's Party. Near Bursa, some peasants began to divide up the big estates, and when asked what they were doing, replied: 'Now we have democracy.' In Istanbul taxi-drivers cocked the Turkish equivalent of a snook at policemen and refused to obey their orders. (Rustow, 1979: 98 cited in Heper, 1985)

According to Ayata "from its inception, the DP identified itself primarily with the countryside, with agrarian interests, and with the rural population" (1996: 43). DP criticised the RPP regime for implementing a coercive state apparatus and for being insensitive to the needs and customs of the people. Accordingly, its political discourse placed significant emphasis on respect for tradition as well as freedom for business and religious activity (Ayata summarises succinctly the approach of DP to religion as involving (Ayata, 1996: 43):

> the incorporation of Islam as a living cultural tradition into the mainstream of Turkish politics. Religion, in this view, was a necessary social cement for the cohesion of society … Emphasis was placed on the idea that religious commitment and social development were not incompatible objectives, and that religion did not negate the positivism of a section of the single-party elite, who tended to present this relationship as mutually antagonistic.

One factor that played a major role in the electoral victory of the DP was its religious sensitivity as opposed to the "bureaucratic enforcement of secularism of the RPP. The source of the popular appeal of the DP in the 1950s was the strict secularism of the RPP which made particularly the peasants resentful of the government. This and also the economic policies of the DP show that it is not a non-ideological political machine. According to Gunes-Ayata

> Whereas the Republican People's Party was bureaucratic and centralist, the newly established Democratic Party (DP) advocated liberalism, equality, freedom of speech, participation, a direct ballot system, and rule by the people rather than by the state. The Democratic Party sought to provide an alternative to the oppressive RPP " (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 52).

According to Levi

> the tension between the RPP and the DP, which represented two separate wills were so well disguised that they could be mistaken for having derived from personal feuds. Ismet Inonu, chairman of the RPP and Adnan Menderes, DP prime minister throughout the 1950s, were involved basically in a strong ideological conflict (1991, 134).

Some of the measures initiated by the DP government on religion are argued to be among patronage-oriented activity of the DP – that is activity with the aim of garnering votes. However the liberalisation initiated by the RPP government on religion in 1949, just prior to 1950 elections are not viewed as such. Moreover there is nothing more natural than a party introducing measures and policies when it is in government that it based its election campaign and got a considerable number of votes from those who believed that the party would enact these policies when in government.

Toprak notes that "the strict secularisation program of the single-party period led to a partial relaxation after the inception of democratic politics in 1946. Between 1945 and 1950, eight political parties were established with explicit religious themes in their programs" (1988:123). The early years of multi-party politics, particularly in the 1946-1960 period was marked by the issue of how the proper relationship between the state and religion should be. The Republicans accused the Democrats who ruled the country until the military takeover of 1960 of undermine the secular policies of the Republic to garner votes.

The parties established with the multi-party politics in 1946 brought to the fore the issue of religion. Mass parties such as the DP and the JP were successful in getting the religious vote by their more lenient polices on secularism (Toprak, 1988: 125). The JP established in 1961 seemed to replace the DP as the target of the state elites' attack on the issue of the politicisation of Islam (Toprak, 1988:124).

According to Levi among the most important factors that accounts for the electoral success of the JP in its formative years were the support it received from a number of influential groups; and the pragmatic polices it pursued (Levi, 1991: 136). In order to win a large number of votes the JP aimed at being a mass party that represented the interests of various classes, ranging from city dwellers to villagers and from workers to employers (Levi, 1991: 140). Its policy proposals included free bargaining between employers and employees with their respective rights of lockout and strike; a comprehensive welfare program which would include social security against unemployment, free education and health security and introduction of various municipal and social services for the slums (Levi, 1991: 140). However in its economic development program - which was essential to achieve social justice in the

view of the party officials - the JP strongly supported a liberal anti-etatism and gave prime importance to the development of the private sector (Levi: 1991,141)

A third source of the allegations of criticism to the political parties for being clientelistic is the character of constituency service. The personalistic nature of the constituency service of the deputies and that of party officials in local organisation of parties are seen as examples of clientelism. Ozbudun argues that "the pervasive clientelistic political culture led to an excessive preoccupation on the part of the legislators with constituency services"(Ozbudun, 1981, 266). He refers to one study of political culture carried out by Ozankaya in four villages which showed that a majority of Turkish rural voters expect the deputies from their districts to render them local or personal services (Ozankaya, 1971, 158-159). "Consequently a very major part of a typical legislator's time is spent on such services, assisting his constituents to find a job, to obtain credits, to secure preferential treatment from a governmental agency, to be placed in a hospital, etc" (Ozbudun, 1981: 266). Similarly, Sayari notes that (1975: 105)

> a visitor to the National Assembly is likely to notice that the busiest sections of the parliament building are the waiting-rooms for the guests. The "guests" are mostly groups of peasants from the provinces who have come to Ankara in search of assistance from their deputies. The help which they seek usually involves particularistic favors: extension of the deadline for the repayment of the loan borrowed from the State Agricultural Bank, a permit to go to Europe as a worker, or a hospital bed in Ankara for a relative who is critically ill. Deputies spend a great deal of their time trying to secure preferential treatment from various bureaucratic agencies on behalf of their constituents.

It is argued that party patronage through constituency service has become so widespread that the primary job of elected officials is seen to be the carrying out of personal favors for the constituents (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 58). According to her (Gunes-Ayata, 1994b: 58),

> a new extension has been added to the legislature where each member of the parliament (MP) has an office and a secretariat to deal with clientelistic networks. Clientelism has not only expanded but it has even been systematised. MPs routinely spend every morning responding to demand from "voters" … Ministers, MPs, mayors, and all elected officials have to be highly accessible to re-create the ideology of subservient representatives ready to react on demand. This ideology of accessibility is so important that when the True Path Party leader, Mr. Demirel, returned to power in 1991 after an eleven-year interval, he spent about three months receiving delegates from his party's organisations all over Turkey, giving speeches, listening to their demands, and making promises.

However, in established democracies, these sorts of personalistic relationship are also widespread. Members of Congress in the US call this type of activity as “case work” and find it a good opportunity for incumbents to increase their popularity among their electorate (Walker, 1991: 19).

3.3. PATTERNS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES

The aim of this section is twofold. First, it attempts to show that the types of political behavior by various social actors that are considered as manifestations of clientelism in the Turkish context are not regarded as such in the United States. Second, it points out that the types of political behavior and action that would have been labelled as clientelistic had they been performed in Turkey, are not regarded as such in the American context.

In the American system, members of Congress have personal staffs assigned individually to each of them who are essential in helping the members with casework, that is assisting constituents with problems they may be having with government agencies. Assistance as part of casework includes various activities such as "helping with a delayed pension or social security check, facilitating the award of

a government contract, getting a pothole fixed, obtaining an official publication" (Mack and Edwards, 1989: 71).

In the US, the president and vice-president are elected by a national constituency, but members of Congress represent smaller constituencies and therefore they are close to group and individual interests. According to the Dunn and Slann, in the face of (1994: 441-2),

> a bureaucracy (that) tends to establish uniform rules for everyone and overlook the myriad of individual, regional, and group differences … congress is uniquely equipped to represent diversity. Because of their local concerns, members of Congress can balance the interests of a diverse population against the forces of uniformity.

According to Dunn and Slann (1994: 442),

> The legislature is much more accessible to the public than either the judiciary or the executive … The courts are solemn, the executive bureaucracy is impersonal, but Congress is open. A citizen may incur tremendous costs in bringing a lawsuit and enormous frustration in getting a response from the bureaucracy, while a simple letter or phone call to his or her representative or senator frequently produces the help needed.

Mack and Edwards note that the members are well aware that the quality of such services has a deep impact on voters' decisions on election day. According to Mann (1986: 239),

> Congressmen have always felt obliged to keep in close touch with their constituents. In the earliest congresses, representatives sent circular letters back home during their (relatively few) months in Washington. However, in the last two decades a vastly expanded governmental agenda, major changes in communications technology. And the ingenuity of politicians have combined to personalise the relationship between congressmen and their constituents, and in so doing further dilute party ties. Voters are reminded about the good work done by their representatives - through town meetings, workdays, mobile offices, and large district staffs, in the mail and newspapers, on radio and television. The volume of these communications back home has increased dramatically since the 1950s.

In the United States members of Congress are expected to represent and tend to their constituents. Interest groups offer legitimate opportunities for representation.

They also encourage increased levels of citizen participation. According to Keefe, the legitimacy of government itself depends in part on the capacity of the parties to represent diverse interests and to integrate the claims of competing groups in a broad program of public policy (Keefe, 1991: 34).

Most of the time the legislators do not have time to deal with each of their constituents. Still in case they are interested in the conduct of the congressional staff and the legislator they have a relatively easy access to them. Some people may have personal dealings with their representatives when they ask for assistance in negotiations with the Social Security Administration or receive information about a governmental program that might assist them in their business or profession (Walker, 1991: 19). According to Dunn and Slann, "in fact, casework, or the ombudsman role, is a major part of all congressional offices. A little-known but very important aspect of their work is the passage of private bills for individuals…" (1994: 442).

Smith points out that one significant factor for the openness of the American political system to pressure group involvement in the policy process is the fact that the policy-making system is fragmented as a result of the decentralised political power structure. Interest groups have many different access points into the system since there are many decision-making centers in the political system, namely the Congress, congressional committees and subcommittees, the presidency, administrative agencies and the Supreme Court (1993: 9). According to Smith, "as the policy process is so fragmented, and there may be many decision-makers involved in making decisions on a single issue, they have an interest in attracting interest groups in order to increased their legitimacy and political support in intra-agency conflicts" (1993: 9).

Another reason for the power of interest groups in American political system is the weakness of political parties and party discipline. Weak political parties rely heavily on interest groups for funding as well as on assistance in elections. The lack of party discipline and party ideology allows members of Congress to respond more openly to the concerns of interest groups since they do not have to follow a party line (Smith 1993: 9-10). Moreover in the absence of class politics it is argued that people are more willing to come together under interest groups (Smith, 1993: 10).

This particular character of constituency service in the United States should be thought as a reflection of a particular understanding of state-society relationship in the political discourse. Unlike in Turkey, American political culture and the constitutional arrangements of the American government "actively encourage the emergence of multiple political interests" (Loomis and Cigler, 1983: 6). Certain interest groups have “as much influence on the behavior of legislators and bureaucrats as legislative party leaders, national and subnational party leaders, or the president (Keefe, 1991: 36). In the words of one scholar, “almost no important decision is made in Washington without the active, continuous involvement of some parts of the interest-group system” (Walker, 1991: 1).

Wilson defines an interest group as "an organisation which seeks or claims to represent people or organisations which share one or more common interests or ideals" (1981: 4). In a more specific definition by another scholar, interest groups are described as "organisations which seek to represent the interests of particular sections of society in order to influence public policy" (Smith, 1993: 2). It is argued that interest groups play various roles in American politics. The foremost one is that they "represent" their constituents before government, that is, they work as a fundamental link between citizens and the government by means of which the

member citizens voice their opinions to the government (Berry, 1989). Walker points out that this function of interest groups is very significant since legislating in American democracy has in fact become “a highly specialised, full-time job” (1991: 19). According to him "most citizens would not be able to comprehend the information generated by the congressional staff, and even if they could, there is little reason to think it would interest them. People have better things to do" (1991: 19).

Interest groups also function as institutions that "educate" the public about political issues. Although on a political issue under discussion the concerned interest groups may tend to present the facts and interpretations that are most favorable to their positions, the exchange of information that stems out of the dialogue among themselves and with the government provide for a political atmosphere of rigorous public discussion which contributes positively to ta participatory democracy.

A related role of interest groups is agenda building which enables them to turn the otherwise specific concerns of their constituencies into public issues. After the government decided to deal with a political issue of concern to an interest group, the latter acts as a "program monitor" closely following the policies carried out and the programs implemented on the issue to check if they have any shortcomings. Walker notes that

> the interest group system provides a mechanism in an increasingly complex society through which emerging issues and ideas can be offered up as possible new items on the national political agenda. When interest groups begin to attract resources and attention to their causes, the parties are forced to alter their programs and reformulate their supporting coalitions to accommodate to shifts in the public’s principal concerns (Walker, 1991: 14).

In order to voice and press for their opinions interest groups make use of various tactics. The primary ones of such tactics are educating the public by disseminating research and/or by initiating a public relations campaign as advertisement in the newspapers and magazines; demonstrations; keeping voting

scorecards and lobbying. These strategies can be thought of in two categories: one is insider strategies and the other is outsider strategies. Lobbying and keeping voting scorecards are the main insider strategies while staging public rallies and demonstrations fall under the category of outsider strategies.

Among the tactics of interest groups what particularly concerns the purposes of this thesis is lobbying. According to Mack and Edwards, lobbying performs three important functions that are "essential to the proper functioning of government and democracy" The first one is providing means for the resolution of conflicts. The second is funnelling data, analysis and opinion to the government on public issues in order to facilitate balanced decision-making. According to Mack and Edwards, "no legislator, no government agency can possibly have all the information needed to make sound public policy decisions. But the affected interests do … Indeed legislators frequently solicit information from interest groups and their representatives" (Mack and Edwards, 1989: 8). The third one is that of creating a system of checks and balances between competing interest groups (Mack and Edwards, 1989: 6). According to Mack and Edwards, "because interest groups and their lobbyists generally play adversial roles on particular issues, they tend to act as a rein on each other, preventing any single interest from getting too powerful for too long" (1989: 8).

Lobbying "involves the advocacy, either by individuals or by groups, of a point of view - the expression of an interest that is affected, actually or potentially, by the affairs of government" (Mack and Edwards, 1989: 2). The practice of lobbying includes activities such as campaigns to mobilise constituents at the grassroots and political fundraising programs, etc. Direct lobbying, in the words of Mack and Edwards, refers to "the traditional form of personal persuasion [as such it]

commonly and typically involves personal, face-to-face communications" (Mack and Edwards, 1989: 63).

Berry notes that members of Congress do not limit themselves to meeting with professional lobbyists but they spend a lot of time meeting with a broad range of constituents during their frequent trips in their districts. Interest groups also arrange meetings with the members of Congress during such visits. According to Berry, "activism by rank-and-file citizens adds to the effectiveness of a lobbying campaign by demonstrating to policymakers that people are truly concerned about an issue that they want to see what policy actions are going to be taken" (1989: 116).Effective grassroots lobbying include "spontaneous" letters from constituents, constituent phone calls and computer-based direct mail campaigns (Loomis, 1983: 185). In fact, Berry notes that (1989:112)

> For lobbyists, members' letters and phone calls legitimise their activities. One business lobbyist stated simply, "My entree comes because I represent the people back home." When letters and phone calls come into the congressman's office, the role of the lobbyist is enhanced and their access is likely to be greater than normal.

The US Chamber of Commerce is cited one of the strong lobbies, which effectively performs many grassroots operations. On one occasion, it is claimed that the Chamber succeeded in getting four sympathetic House members named to a conference committee as a result of a successful grassroots campaign. To be able to affect the outcome of a critical procedural decision in Congress affecting legislation on accounting practices, the Chamber urged its members in four particular congressional districts to contact House Ways and Means Chairman and to request that he appoint their representatives as conferees (Loomis, 1983: 179).

Personal encounter with the legislator is one of the most effective tactics lobbyists use. Here the lobbyist finds an opportunity to present his group's case in

person. The impression they create about themselves is important, since it increases their credit. Personal relationships with the legislators usually begin at the staff level since committee staffers are more accessible than the representatives and the senators themselves. They can directly put lobbyists' ideas into drafts of legislation or bring them into the attention of their bosses (Berry, 1989: 141). Moreover, for lobbyists maintaining close links with government officials is important. An official working for ITT wrote (cited in Wilson, 1981: 113):

> There are several executive departments which are important to ITT and therefore contacts have to be maintained … I spend at least two nights a week with government personnel. These evenings include socialising, arranging and attending parties, attending sports events and other functions. Weekends are usually spent with Hill personnel.

According to Wilson these meetings create an atmosphere of "trust and *bonhomie* which are of help to the company" (1981: 113).

Bureaucracies are usually thought to benefit from interest groups in two main ways; for one thing, interest groups supply the bureaucracy with detailed information and useful advice on an issue area. Second, bureaucracies need the interest groups to provide "consents" to the former's policies (1981: 126). According to Wilson a second feature of the relationship between lobbyists and legislators is that legislators need technical guidance from lobbyists (1981: 114). A liberal Democrat, Senator Metcalf described this need in the following words (cited in Wilson, 1981:114):

> I want to say to you that as one legislator for almost three decades now, that I use the services of lobbyists in my activities more than lobbyists come and see me. One of my favorite lobbyists is the Montana Power Co. I do not think that anyone would say I am subservient to the Montana Power Co., but when I want some information I go [to] the Montana Power Co.'s lobbyist who is here in Washington and ask him if he could find it out for me. With all justice, they have never given me false information. Another favorite lobbyist of mine is the Anaconda Copper Mining Co. Every time I go to the Anaconda Copper Mining people for information, they give me the information I desire.

The importance of personalised relationships is acknowledged by the interest groups themselves. Loomis notes that (1983: 180)

> many of the Chamber's [i.e.US Chamber of Commerce] activities come from the ranks of more than 2700 Congressional Action Committees (CACs). The business-men/women who serve on these locally based committees of the national organisation ordinarily know their member of Congress fairly well and have some expectation of receiving a sympathetic hearing from them. Such a personal approach is a hallmark of Chamber strategy; the ties of friendship or past association can count a great deal when a member must decide whom to listen to … Directly related to the CAC strategy is the US Chamber's use of so-called 'key resource personnel' who, according to the Chamber, possess excellent personal access to their legislators.

3.4. STATE AND SOCIETY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

Various scholars of Turkish politics have stressed that Turkish politics is characterised by a tradition of strong state vis-à-vis weak periphery inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Heper, 1985; see also Mardin, 1975). Heper traces the origins of this state tradition to the patrimonial roots of the Ottoman Empire. According to him, contrary to the political experience in countries such as France and Germany, there was no estate tradition in the Ottoman Empire which constituted a "countervailing" power against the ruler (Heper, 1988). He points out that in France and Germany central authority was efficiently restrained by countervailing powers, whereas in patrimonial Ottoman society "the periphery is almost totally subdued by the centre … [which] … on its own set the norms of the polity … keeping everybody in its place and protecting the subjects" (Heper, 1985: 14-15). Thus the Ottoman political culture was characterised by an "ever-present tension … [which] derived from the bureaucratic centre's nervousness toward the periphery and the periphery's effort to circumvent the centre whenever it could" (Heper, 1985: 16).

This cleavage between the center and the periphery continued during the Republican period. The bureaucratic elite of the Republic, like that of the Ottoman

period, kept on to view the state as critical for maintaining the community (Heper, 1985: 16). Heper points out that when Ataturk abolished dynastic sovereignty, what he wanted to put in place was national and not popular sovereignty (Heper, 1985: 49). People would have sovereignty only when they have become "civilised". According to Ataturk, reforms needed to be imposed from above since "when the people are not educated they can easily be won over for all kinds of undesirable ends" (cited in Heper, 1985: 50). In the words of Heper, Ataturk held that "consulting public opinion really amounted to shaping it". According to Ataturk "a republic was a regime based on virtue" (Heper, 1985: 60). Public policy was not to be the outcome of an aggregation of interests but that of a search for "truth", and the state was "not to express the unconsidered thoughts of the crowd, but rather to add to them more mature thoughts" (Heper, 1985: 50)

According to Dodd the approach of Edmund Burke may be helpful in understanding Ataturk's attitudes towards political parties. Dodd notes that Burke views party as composed of not of "delegates" but of "representatives who think of themselves as "having a right to manage affairs as they thought appropriate in the interests of the country". Edmund Burke defined party as "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular on which they are all agreed" (cited in Dodd, 1991: 24). For Dodd, Burke's definition, is "highminded" and it is supposed to promote the national interest and leans on principle without particular concern for responsiveness (1991: 25).

Accordingly, for Ataturk, the Republican People's Party "was not a party which engaged in everyday street politics, as was the case in other countries". Rather its task was "enlightenment" and "guidance" (cited in Heper, 1991: 28). He once said that the existence of parties devoting particular political viewpoints was important

for promoting a clash of ideas: however these parties should not be like the old ones whose programs did not relate to national interests. (cited in Heper, 1991: 28). According to Ataturk ‘the party would be a school for the nation”. The RPP according to Ataturk was a "no-nonsense" party; it was not to act in the manner that would "please everybody" but instead to uphold "truths that would elevate the nation to higher levels of civilisation" (1985: 52).

Heper notes that "they have nevertheless continued to think that 'politicians cannot be trusted'" (Heper, 1985: 72). Heper argues that for the post-Ataturk bureaucratic intelligentsia "the elitism in Ataturkist thought was not a means but an end; it was not taken as a means to bring about an instrumental in place of a transcendental polity" (Heper, 1985: 72). According to them, politics should be guided by ideas instead of interest. Politics should not be an activity of providing benefits to certain social groups. They believed that politics led by intellectuals will be based on well-formulated, sound and rational ideas rather than "the push and pull of everyday politics" ((Heper, 1985: 77-79).

> It is clear that the post-Ataturk bureaucratic intelligentsia in Turkey did not have a conception of public interest that would be shaped as a result of competitive process … The [bureaucratic] intelligentsia in question were also completely opposed to any concept of public interest which was identified with the specific interest of a class, or even of economic groups was readily labelled as selfish. The bureaucratic intelligentsia instead nurtured a conception of public interest that was identified with certain norms and values (Heper, 1985: 81-82).

Heper argues that "the bureaucratic intelligentsia of the early 1960s … were after reviving a 'moral society' in place of an 'interest society', which in their opinion had drifted to extreme instrumentalism … [meaning] a society that did not heed the bureaucratised version of Ataturkism" (1985: 87).

With their concept of rationalist democracy, the state elites expected the party elites to give priority to the general interest as defined by the state elites themselves.

Still according to Heper, the post-Ataturk bureaucratic elite expected “an unrealistic degree of idealism and statesmanlike” behavior from the party elites. According to them public policy had to be determined on the basis of "rational" criteria however they accused politicians of trying to garner votes "articulating" and not "aggregating" interests (Heper, 1985: 82). Such attempts to create political party elites who were more attentive to "responsible leadership" rather than to "being responsive to the society" were outcomes of the idea of rationalist democracy which prevailed among the state elites. The notion of rationalist democracy as it is adopted in Turkey regarded democracy as “ an intellectual debate with the intention of determining the best policy, and not as an effort to reconcile and aggregate different views and interests”.

Accordingly, as Heper stresses, the opening up of the Turkish political system in mid-1940s was not coupled with a confrontation among different socio-economic groups or one between the central authority and powerful local forces, that is through the mechanism of "politics". Rather, it “evinced a configuration comprising, on the one hand, the state elites who posed as guardians of Ataturkism as they themselves interpreted it, and on the other hand, a not well-organised periphery” (Heper, 1988: 5). Thus it will not be altogether wrong to say that, since its inception in 1946, the history of multiparty politics in Turkey is marked by an endless confrontation between the state elites who imposed the integrity of the state over the particularistic demands of the periphery and various peripheral groups which attempted to carve a space for representing themselves in the public sphere – a confrontation marked by frequent crises that led to three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980. The military was sensitive to assert the “state” over “politics” after each constitutional and institutional arrangement undertaken after the interventions.

Tachau's account of how the members of the RPP – a minority party throughout the 1950s – viewed the DP party organisation and its electoral success may throw light to the discursive background behind the widespread perceptions of DP as a clientelistic party by most scholars of clientelism in Turkey. According to Tachau, the explanation that RPP partisans provided for their electoral failure against the DP was that the RPP no longer appealed to the less educated peasant voters with its insistence on reform and secularism. As Tachau puts it, in their view, "the Turkish electorate was divided into two mutually hostile camps, one enlightened, progressive, civic-minded and altruistic, the other uneducated, parochial and led by an unscrupulous self-interested elite willing to cater to the most obscurantist and reactionary sentiments among the masses" (Tachau, 1991: 105). According to the intellectuals, during the DP rule "politics is no longer an activity to get the most votes in order to formulate and implement policies in accordance with a philosophical view. It has become a process to promote the personal, individual and private interests" (cited in Heper, 1985).

According to Levi, since the decision to introduce multiparty politics to Turkey is taken from above, the state party RPP saw its introduction "almost of its volition" (1991: 144). In the single party years, politics did not have a separate sphere but were controlled by the representatives of the state. Politicians, from the beginning of the multi-party politics, acted as the representatives of the periphery's demands. According to Evin, "the period of the Democrat Party rule between 1950 and 1960 witnessed a transition of the governing elite from the realm of the state to the realm of politics" (Evin, 1988: 205).

Starting from the 1950s the center has began to be characterised by a "cultural heterogeneity" as a result of the "infiltration" of the peripheral forces into the centre.

He notes, particularly, after the 1960s public bureaucracy was composed of political elites who were of different backgrounds, with different values, and world views (Kalaycioglu, 1998). The Democrats came to power claiming that they represented "the people as against the bureaucracy (read the state)" (Heper, 1985: 75). On the other hand the bureaucratic elite viewed the Democrats as a threat to the "very essence of the Republican values and institutions which they had fought so hard to build and preserve" (Heper, 1985: 77). They were against DP rule as they argued that politics was not based on reason under their rule. It was scholars not politicians in their view who were to direct politics. In various empirical studies carried out among during the multiparty period suggested "an unwillingness on the part of this [the bureaucratic] intelligentsia to accept an instrumental polity with popular sovereignty as a fact of life" (cited in Heper, 1985: 75). In the exact words of some participated in the survey "democracy is not a regime where crowds should have a say. It is a regime of persuasion; however when passions rise, high crowds should definitely be overlooked" (cited in Heper, 1985: 76). And that "the facts may only be arrived at by those with education and experience … otherwise ideas in a society would be extremely chaotic" (cited in Heper, 1985: 76).

According to Karpat, the DP's actions with respect to the military were not sufficient in themselves to have caused the 1960 intervention. Instead he argues it was party politics "were the crucial ingredient in precipitation the army's action. The RPP did not take kindly to being out of power" (1988: 139). Besides, Menderes tried to decrease the role of the military and the bureaucracy and to in his economic policies instead strengthen the power and influence of the emerging entrepreneurial groups and that of countryside merchant-landowners. The result was a decrease in

the purchasing power of the military-civilian bureaucracy. Besides their prestige and influence also diminished (1988:138-9). According to Karpat (1988: 140),

> Menderes had expected the RPP to accept the new leadership developing in the ruling coalition in the same way that the entrepreneurs, agrarian groups, conservatists, Muslim fundamentalists, etc. had accepted the leadership of the secularists, Kemalists, statists, and the military in the past, although they had held their own views. To Menderes, this was the meaning of democracy. The Democrats had not, since coming to power, disturbed the foundations of the republican form of government or sought to destroy the legacy of Ataturk … Menderes was not prepared for militant opposition from the Republicans … However, to the new generation of RPP members, the DP ideology and policies were unacceptable.

After a temporary period of military regime democracy is restored in 1961. The revolutionary council, the National Unity Committee (NUC), was from the beginning willing to return power to civilian officials. However the NUC left its imprint on the political system through the new Constitution. The 1961 Constitution is prepared by a bicameral Constituent Assembly. One of the chambers was the NUC itself; thus the military was directly involved in the writing of the Constitution. The civilian chamber, on the other hand, was far from adequately representing the society. About a one-third of its members were chosen through indirect elections while the rest were either appointed or coopted by the two opposition parties (namely the RPP and the Republican Peasant Nation Party), the Head of the State - who was also the chairman of the NUC -, the NUC, and institutions such as the judiciary, the universities, bar associations, chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions and pr ess associations. At first glance the involvement of these associations and institutions may give the impression that the Constituent Assembly was representative of various social forces. However, in reality, the Constituent Assembly dominated by the military, the bureaucracy and the university professors and by RPP only allowed the representation of the political interests of the state elites. Moreover the supporters of the ousted party DP - which is said to constitute about half of the

electorate - were not represented in the Constituent Assembly and were excluded from the constitution making process (Ozbudun, 1997, 231).

Thus whatever there was civilian in the political atmosphere in which the Constitution of 1961 was drafted, by and large reflected the political interests of state elites and supporters of the RPP. The 1961 constitution is generally marked by its granting of extensive civil and social rights to the individuals by the students of Turkish politics. However one important feature of the Constitution that stands out less is its creation of an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of elected organs. The constitution reflects "a certain distrust of politicians and elective assemblies". While the 1924 Constitution stated that the nation would exercise its sovereignty solely through the Grand National Assembly, the 1961 Constitution gave the executive and the judiciary a share in the exercise of sovereignty. Article 4 of the 1961 constitution specified that the "nation shall exercise its sovereignty through the authorised agencies as prescribed by the principles laid down in the Constitution".

According to Karpat "The Constitution of 1961 was almost exclusively the work of the RPP" (1988: 142). The Constitution was the product of a thinking that privileged "the rule of law (read *Rechsstaat*, or *l`etat de droit*)" over "the rule of parliament" (7,1988). It reflected a basic distrust of a general vote and a system based on political parties alone. Thus the Constitution was so designed that public authority was derived not from parliament but from the Constitution itself (Heper, 1985: 87). According to Evin (1988: 206):

> the 1961 Constitution, which aimed to prevent the state from being manipulated by politicians, was drafted in such a way as to distinguish and separate the institutions of the state from the realm of politics. Accordingly, the office of the presidency was redefined as being above politics and a series of checks and balances was introduced delimiting the power of the government over the judiciary, independent organisations such as the universities and even over the bureaucracy. Such a reorganisation of the system did not so much aim to 'carve' a distinct arena for the state as it hoped

> to create mechanisms with veto power over the realm of politics. It was tacitly acknowledged that a cleavage existed between the realm of politics and that of state.

In the elections of 1961, the JP and the NTP (New Turkey Party) - the successors to the DP - together won 238 seats and gained a majority in the Assembly. According to Karpat, "the voters returned to power the party ousted by the military on the previous year" (1988: 143). According to Avner Levi (1991) "the case of the Justice Party (JP) may conveniently be studied within a framework of centre-periphery relations" (1991:144).

> The JP was anathema to many bureaucratic circles, not because of anything it had done, but because of what it was - a party based on 'political will' only. It is uncontroversial to state that, had the JP won the 1961 elections, the military would not have allowed the transfer of power. Even the fact that it came out as the second largest party created a crisis. It was obvious to everyone that it should not even attempt to form a coalition government without the RPP, although in the terms of parliamentary arithmetics it could have done so easily (Levi, 1991: 144).

W. B. Sherwood saw the JP as the only real grassroots party in the Middle East with a strong organisation and a large number of active members (cited in Levi, 1991: 146). According to Levi, "the organisation of the JP was a very important vehicle of social integration. It gave the citizen a kind of protection against the bureaucrats, it helped him in his personal, economic and even family problems" (1991:148).

Both the 1960 and the 1980 military interventions were aimed at producing “sensible politicians”, their "sensibility" defined on the basis of serving the "best" interests of the country. The obvious goal of the drafters of the 1982 Constitution was to contain the pluralist thrust of pre-1980 politics. In fact it is commonplace to think of the 1982 Constitution as a reaction to that of 1961 (Erguder and Hofferbert, 1988: 82). For the drafters of the 1982 Constitution the culprits of the pre-1980

political polarisation were the politicians who were not able to provide leadership. Moreover the pluralist aspects of the 1961 Constitution and the electoral system were also to blame. Thus one basic goal of the 1982 Constitution concerning the political parties and the party system was to prevent the intensive politicisation of citizens and groups. This was done by banning the political parties from establishing auxiliary branches for youth, women and other groups (Article 68). Political parties were also not allowed to establish clubs, associations, co-operatives, foundations, labor unions, occupational and professional associations and alike. Neither were they allowed to form political ties with such existing organisations. Furthermore, article 69 prohibits political parties from receiving financial aid from such organisations or associations. Similarly labor unions and voluntary associations are barred from engaging in political activity, establishing political ties with political parties, and receiving financial aid from them.

Ilter Turan points out that these laws give the political parties the whole responsibility for the articulation of the interests in the society, a responsibility that requires a considerable degree of organisational capacity that the Turkish political parties lacked at the time. Moreover Turan argues that, in fact "it is a moot point whether any political party within a democratic system could possess such capabilities" (1988, 70). He argues that the end-result is that such legal arrangements create many problems in the operation of a democratic political process as many interests cannot be represented causing frustrations in various segments of the society.

With the 1982 Constitution "the executive body no longer draws its authority from the legislature, but is elevated into a power authorised directly by the constitution" (Tanor, 1990: 155). Also the executive is strengthened by the increased

authority of the president, mostly at the expense other legislature (Tanor, 1990: 155). The 1982 Constitution views the assembly "not as a body where various policies are weighed and debated and a consensus reached, but rather a 'law-making factory' " (emphasis original (Tanor, 1990: 157). Among the three major functions of the assembly - discussion, supervision and legislation- the latter one is emphasised. Yet, Tanor notes, even the legislatory powers of the assembly are curbed with the new Constitution. There are already elaborate regulations in the Constitution on various subjects which normally would be expected to be dealt with by laws or by-laws made by the Assembly. Moreover the power of the executive to issue decrees under normal or emergency conditions has also been expanded. Besides the Constitution made the amendment of the Constitution difficult by making much of the text immutable (Tanor, 1990: 157).

In the 1982 Constitution "the political parties are not regarded as channels of popular participation in the decision-making process, but chiefly, as vehicles necessary for the achievement of popular consensus and acquiescence to the regime" (Evin, 1988: 154). According to Evin (1988: 208),

> The 1982 Constitution has asserted the supremacy of the state over the realm of politics and placed constraints on the political system to prevent it from weakening the control of the state over the governing institutions … The closing of the major political parties in 1981 and subsequent constraints placed upon political activity had already signalled that the military took the business of reducing the impact of political influence seriously).

Binnaz Toprak traces this approach of the drafters of the 1982 Constitution to the early times of the republic. According to her the state elite always viewed group solidarity as “a potential cause for the disintegration of the state” (1988, 120). Neither the existence of ethnic and sectarian groups nor the legitimacy of class interests was officially recognised for a long time. For her this view is partly a

remnant of the political legacy of the Ottoman Empire where group solidarity was viewed with suspicion by the Ottoman bureaucracy as a potential source of disintegration. The Constitution of 1982 not only strictly regulated the ties between political parties and interest groups but it also, to a great extent, restricted the basic rights and liberties of the individuals in the name of national concerns.

As Ozbudun stresses, constitution-making process affects both the mode of transition to democracy and the prospects of consolidation of democracy later (1997). If the process allows a lively atmosphere of bargaining, negotiation and compromise between different groups in the society, the newly established political institutions will be more likely to be based on wide consensus and to enjoy strong political legitimacy which will in return increase the chances for the consolidation of democracy. Ozbudun regards the Turkish experience in constitution making "as a series of missed opportunities to create political institutions based on broad consensus" (1997, 229). According to him, none of the three constitutions drafted under the Turkish Republic were made by a constituent or legislative assembly that was representative of different political forces in the society or that allowed for a process of bargaining and negotiation between these groups.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Clientelism has been one of the most popular terms in the political science literature. It has been used in manifold study areas such as exchange theory and factional systems, and to account for political process and organisation in various settings ranging from Italy to the Philippines. It has been claimed that although much of the work on political clientelism grew from the study of "third-world politics, the analysis of clientelism has proven useful in dealing with European politics, in explaining factional politics in socialist systems such as China, and in tracing the historical transition from feudal to class politics" (Schmidt et.al, 1977: ix).

Despite its popularity as a political science term, clientelism does not go without criticisms. One major criticism has been that the vision of society that the concept of clientelism bears is that of a highly cohesive and integrated system made up of relatively harmonious interdependent parts, as a result of which clientelistic mode of analysis excludes conflict situations and distorts the social reality by taking harmony for granted (Eagleton, 1976: 103; cited in Lemarchand 1981, 9). Another criticism was with respect to the perception of clientelism as an autonomous type of social organisation as opposed to a symptom of class oppression (Flynn, 1974: 139; Alavi, 1975: 15). Furthermore, various critics questioned the concept's shift from micro-level to macro-level analysis (Moore, 1974).

Among them, perhaps, that of Gilsenan was the most interesting one. Gilsenan claimed that the concept of clientelism was abundantly used to refer to diverse phenomena in diverse social contexts and geographical settings to the extent

of becoming a catch phrase with little analytical value. Having pointed out that, the term is used in settings as disparate as Mediterranean politics and New York City bossism, Gilsenan argues that clientelism (1977: 167)

> has become a concept for all seasons, applied quasi-universally to a multiplicity of relationships in a wide diversity of social and economic formations. It follows from this confusion that stipulative definitions ('when I say patron-client ties, I mean …') based as they are on a cobbling together of 'traits' based to an uncertain degree on specific empirical situations, are inevitably inadequate. They have no real theoretical base and lead merely to endless additions to or subtractions from various lists of 'characteristics'.

This thesis is an attempt to highlight a weakness of the concept of clientelism that has not been problematised much yet. We argue that depending on its roots in the modernisation school's thinking the concept of clientelism, it is loaded with normative judgments that its definition do not automatically entail such as corruption and underdevelopment. Thus the concept is used in a vague and arbitrary manner to the extent of undermining its analytical value. While in one context a relationship or a political behaviour is identified as clientelistic, in another setting alike relationships or political behaviors are not labelled as such.

First conceptualisations of clientelism in the 1950s were made on the basis of a principal assumption that "political loyalties in developing countries cannot satisfactorily be analysed through theoretical perspectives derived from the historical evolution of western Europe and North America" (Sayari, 1977: 103). One of the main political changes that occurred in the Western societies as a result of the process of their modernisation was the breakdown of vertical hierarchies giving way to horizontal ties and to the emergence of class or group affiliations as the bases of political behavior and mass politics in these societies. Political scientists studying the political organisation and processes in the developing nations in the 1950s and 1960s took this particular political evolution model in the West as a reference point in their

analysis. However their class or pluralist group approaches which were developed on the basis of the political experience of the West were far from being explanatory for how politics was done in the developing nations where the organisation of political activity was based dyadically structured systems of political leadership and followership. Clientelism or patron-client relations as a model was by and large developed by the students of comparative politics to account for this deviation from the political association patterns the group theory of politics provided. Thus the definition of clientelism is initially made with reference to the general characteristics of traditional societies in mind to conceptualise a modern phenomenon that diverges from the Western model.

Within this framework clientelism was identified as a feature of the traditional or transitional societies - that is, in-between societies with modern institutions but traditional political cultures - that can be and *should* be eradicated by social and political modernisation.

This definition was inherent to the concept from its inception in political science. According to Walston "we define clientelism as being deviant with respect to an official norm. It can only exist where there is an interplay between two sets of values" (Walston, 1988: 16). In other words clientelism identified as a valid concept to the extent that it deviates from official standards of morality. As Walston acknowledges, "such a definition greatly limits the scope of clientelism as an analytical tool" (Walston, 1988: 16).

The use of patron-client analysis had been the "province" of anthropologists for a long time until it was taken up by political scientists to be applied to the study of the political organisation, political processes and action in developing societies (Scott, 1977: 92). The origin of the concept in anthropological studies, defined

initially as a feature of social organisation in feudal settings, further emphasised this association of the concept of clientelism with "non-modernity".

The argument behind the transportation of the concept of patron-client tie from anthropological studies to political science was that the patron-client model which was developed to account for micro-level interpersonal relationship in the small traditional communities also provided the political scientists with the conceptual tools they needed in their study of macro-level political behavior and processes within national institutional contexts of developing societies. The theoretical basis of this smooth transportation of the concept from micro-level anthropological studies to macro-level political science studies was provided by one of the principal assumptions of the modernisation theory, that of the linearity of development. Since the change is evolutionary on their way to modernity, societies lose their traditional characteristics gradually. In this respect developing of modernising societies are in a sense "transitional" societies, that is "in-between" societies with modern institutions such as bureaucracies and political parties but traditional loyalties and norms cutting across these institutions. Modernisation theorists studying the political systems of such societies viewed these modern institutions as facades and what they see as the traditional elements of their political culture such as personalism, proximity and factionalism as the essential object of their studies.

Since the existing literature on political clientelism usually views the phenomenon as a remnant of the feudal past of the society in concern and is bound to disappear completely with further modernisation or as a reflection of its feudal relations lingering on behind the facade of modern institutions. Put as such, the sources for the emergence of political clientelism are not looked for in the

specificities of current political structures in a society but are thought of in terms of a feudal-modern axis and rather as a "development" issue.

This thesis is an attempt to point out that the evolutionary modernist assumptions which lead to the perception of clientelism as essentially a non-modern phenomenon decreases the concept's analytical value and suggest a new way of thinking clientelism as a distinct modern relationship the source of which should be sought in the current political and social structures of a society.

It has already been said that clientelism is now regarded as a widespread phenomenon existing in divergent settings with various levels of development. The concept has been applied to numerous research areas and in diverse regions. Turkey is one of those societies where clientelism has been utilised a great deal in explaining the dynamics of Turkish politics. It is widely argued that, particularly in politics, clientelism has become an epidemic, plaguing the political system especially since the inception of multi-party politics in the country. However a closer look at the examples of political behavior and processes identified as clientelistic suggests that this view of clientelism as an essential characteristic of the Turkish political system may be an exaggeration. Our argument is not that there is no political clientelism in Turkey. Rather we suggest that the portrayal of particularly Turkish party politics as predominantly clientelistic may be misguiding.

It is true that there are various instances of clientelistic behavior and activity in Turkish political life such as the distribution of private benefits, like jobs in return for votes, the allocation of public resources in a particularistic manner; and nepotism and favoritism in appointment to bureaucratic posts. Nevertheless, many other political phenomena that are claimed to be manifestations of clientelism - such as the high degree of the responsiveness of the political parties in government to the

demands of their constituents, the role of special groups in the overall decision-making process; the large role of personal, face-to-face relationships in the political processes - are not so indeed.

There is almost an unchallenged consensus among the scholars of Turkish politics that it is the political elite - as opposed to the bureaucratic elite - who is the chief culprit in this state of events. Political clientelism is perceived to be exclusively party-directed clientelism in Turkey; studies of political clientelism are predominantly studies of how politicians and political parties engage in clientelistic practices in order to get votes and to stay in power. It is true that patron-client relations is a widespread mechanism for "getting things done" in Turkish political system. It is commonplace to contact "friends" at critical places in the bureaucracy particularly if there is need to by-pass the red tape and get a job done faster than it would normally take if the normal procedure was applied.

The weakness of the accounts of political clientelism in Turkey come to the fore when specific examples of types of political behavior and activity by politicians, sections of society with special interests as well as by voters are provided as alleged manifestations of clientelistic behavior in Turkey. The sources of this weakness is twofold: one is the arbitrary manner in which the examples of clientelistic political behavior and processes are identified in the Turkish context; and the other is the hastiness to label too many political phenomena as clientelistic, particularly phenomena that are accepted to have legitimate place in other political systems. At the root of both of these weaknesses lie a feature of Turkish clientelistic perceptions: the identification of clientelistic phenomena on the basis of not the nature of the relationships or processes involved but rather on the basis of who the actors of these relationships or processes are.

Turkish studies of clientelism are arbitrary in their identification of clientelism, the context in which a political behavior, relationship or process occurs or the nature of the political actors involved tends to be more determining in the identification of a political phenomenon as clientelistic than the nature of the behavior, relationship or the process itself. The more the political structure or the political actors involved are associated with the "traditional" as opposed to the "modern", the more easily the political phenomenon that occurs in that political structure or that is performed by the political actor in question is identified as clientelistic. Similarly, if there is no doubt that the political structure or the social setting and the political actors involved are "modern", then there is less tendency to look for clientelistic features in it.

A study of the character of constituency service; the range and nature of the activities of interest groups as well as their relationship with the executive and legislative bodies in the United States points outs to this arbitrary identification of clientelistic phenomena in Turkey. Certain political decisions and actions that are labelled as proofs of clientelism in the Turkish context are identified as regular and perfectly legitimate elements of the political system when they are experienced in the American context. They also have a perfectly legitimate role in the overall functioning of the American political system. The study of these phenomena in the American context also reveals that the nature of these political activities in the United States are not in fact very different from the nature of the similar political activities in Turkey. What makes a particular political behavior, relationship, activity or process perceived as clientelistic and therefore illegitimate in one country and as merely a proper part of the functioning of the political system is the other, is not the

nature of the behavior, relationship, activity or process itself, but the character of the political actors involved and the nature of the political structure they operate in.

In the United States these activities have a legitimate role in the overall political structure, whereas in Turkey they are labelled as clientelistic and as maladies in the functioning of the political system. The political system in the United States provides legitimate ground for open to influence by interests in the society and provides legitimate access to specific interests to influence the decision-making process through pressure groups. American political structure is based on an acknowledgment that society is made up of groups with special interests and that the government should be responsive to and representative of these interests. However, Turkish state is characterised by a tradition of strong state which has always been suspicious of group solidarities and attempts of social forces to influence the government. Since the inception of multi-party politics and competitive elections in Turkey, the "modern" military-bureaucratic elite at the center has struggled to "prioritise" the "state" at the expense of "politics". In this context various activities of the political elites to represent the interests of their parties' voters are viewed as examples of clientelistic phenomena.

This thesis argues that it is the particular state-society articulation based on the historical cleavage between the "modern" center and the "traditional" periphery in Turkish politics that creates not only the arbitrary identification of clientelistic phenomena, but also a misguided perception of clientelism prevailing in Turkish politics. This nature of the state and center-periphery cleavage, a central historical feature of Turkish politics nurtures this perception of political clientelism in the Turkish context. To the extent that clientelism is seen in terms of a traditional-modern axis and as a "development" issue, the sources for the emergence of

clientelism are not looked for in the specificities of current political and social structures in a society.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akarli, E. and Ben-Dor, G (eds.) 1975. *Political Participation in Turkey:Histroical Background and Present Problems.*. Istanbul: Bogazici University Press.

Alavi, Hamza. 1975. *Dependency, Autonomy and the Articulation of Powe*r. Montreal: McGill University. Working Paper No. 7, Centre for Developing Area Studies,

Almond, Gabriel, A. and James S. Coleman. 1960. *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ayata, Sencer. 1996. "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicisation of Islam in Turkey", *Middle East Journal*, 50(1): 40- 56

Banton, M (ed.) 1966. *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*. London: Tavistock.

Berry, Jeffrey M. 1989. *The Interest Group Society* (2nd ed.) Illinois: Scott, Foresman Glenview.

Birch, Anthony, H, 1993, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy.* London and New York: Routledge.

Boissevain, J. 1966. Patronage in Sicily. *Man*. 1: 18-23.

Burke, Edmund, 1921, *Selections.* Oxford:Clarendon Press.

Caciagli M and F. P. Belloni. 1981. "The “New” Clientelism in Southern Italy: the Christian Democratic Party in Catania". In S. Eisenstadt and R. Lemarchand, eds., *Political Clientelism Patronage and Development*. London: Sage. 35-57.

Campbell, J. 1964. *Honour, Family and Patronage*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Clark, Robert P. 1991. *Power and Policy in the Third World* (4th ed.) New York: Macmillan.

Dodd, C. H. 1991. Ataturk and Political Parties. In Heper M. and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey,* London, I. B. Tauris :24 - 41.

Dunn, Charles, and Martin W. Slann. 1994. *American Government: A Comparative Approach.* New York: Harpers Collins.

Eagleton, T. 1976. *Criticism and Ideology.* London: Verso.

Eisenstadt, S. N. and L. Roniger. 1984. *Patrons, Clients and Friends.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eisenstadt, S. N, and Lemarchand, R. (eds.) 1981. *Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development*. London: Sage.

Eisenstadt, S. N. et. al. 1987. *Center Formation, Protest Movements and Class Structure in Europe and the United States.* London: Frances Printer.

Erguder and Hofferbert. 1988. "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns". In Heper and Evin eds., *State, Democracy and Military.* Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 81-102.

Escobar, C. 1994. "Clientelism and Social Protest: Peasant Politics in Northern Colombia". In Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 65-87.

Flynn, P. 1974. "Class, Clientelism and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 12(2): 138-56.

Foster, George M. 1967. "*Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good"* In Potter and Diaz and Foster, eds., *Peasant Society: A Reader.* Boston: Little, Brown.

-----.1967. "*Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good"* In Potter and Diaz and Foster,eds., *Peasant Society: A Reader.* Boston: Little, Brown**.**

-----.1969. "The Dyadic Contract: A Model of the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village", *American Anthropologist.*

-----.1977, "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village". In Schmidt et. al., *Friends, Followers and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 15-28.

Gellner E. and Waterbury, J. (eds.) 1977. *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies,* London: Duckworth.

Gilsenan, M. 1977. "Against Patron-Client relations". In Gellner and Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies.* London: Duckworth, 167-184.

Gouldner, Alvin W. 1977. "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement". In Schmidt et. al., *Friends, Followers and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 28-43.

Gunes-Ayata, A. 1994a. "Clientelism: Premodern, Modern and Postmodern". In Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 19-29.

-----.1994b. "Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey" In Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 49-65.

Hall, A. 1977. "Patron-Client Relations: Concepts and Terms". In Schmidt et. al., Friends, Followers and Factions. *Berkeley: University of California Press,* 510-512.

Harris, George. S. 1965. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics", *The Middle East Journal* 19(I):56-59.

Heper M. 1985. *The State Tradition In Turkey.* North Humberside: Eothen Press.

-----. 1988. "State and Society in Turkish Political Experience". in Heper and Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and Military*. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1-10.

Heper, Metin, and Evin, Ahmet (eds.). 1988. *State, Democracy and Military*. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.

-----. 1991. Heper M. and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey,* London, I. B. Tauris.

Heper, Metin, Kazancigil, Ali, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.) 1997. *Institutions and Democratic Statecraft.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Heper, M. and F. E. Keyman. 1998. "Double-faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*

Huntington, Samuel P. 1978. "The Change to Change." In Norman W. Provizer, ed. *Analyzing the Third World: Essays from Comparative Politics.* Cambridge, Massachusettes: Schenkman, 30-69.

Jackson, R. Hand and Carl G. Rosenberg. 1984. *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Karpat, Kemal. 1991. The Republican People's Party, 1923-1945. In Heper M. and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey,* London, I. B. Tauris.

Kaufman, R. 1974. "The Patron Client Concept Macro-Politics: Prospects and Problems," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16(3): 290-320.

Kazancigil, Ali, and Ozbudun, Ergun (eds.) 1981. *Ataturk: The Founder of a Modern State.* London: C. Hurst.

Keles, R. 1972. *100 Soruda Turkiye'de Sehirlesme, Konut ve Gecekondu*. Istanbul: Gercek Yayınevi.

Key, V. O. 1964. *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups.* New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell.

Kudat, A. 1975. "Patron-client Relations: The State of Art and Research in Eastern Turkey". In Akarli and Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation in Turkey*. Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 33-61.

Landé, C. H. 1965. *Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics*. New Haven. Conn: Yale University Press

-----.1973. "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics", *American Political Science Review* LXVII (1).

-----.1977a. "Introduction. The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism". In Schmidt et al.. *Friends, Followers, and Factions*, California: University of California Press, xiii-xxxvii.

-----. 1977b. "Group Politics and Dyadic Politics: Notes for a Theory". Schmidt et al.. *Friends, Followers, and Factions*, California: University of California Press, 506-510.
Legg, K. 1969. *Politics In Modern Greece*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lemarchand, R. 1981. "Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic". In Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, eds., *Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development*. London: Sage, 7-32.

-----. 1972. "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building", *American Political Science Review* 46(1): 68-90.

Lerner, David. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society.* Glencoe.

Levi, Avner. 1991. The Justice Party, 1961-1980. In Heper M. and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey,* London, I. B. Tauris : 134-151.

Loomis, B. A. and Cigler A. (eds.). 1983. *Interest Group Politics.* Washington D.C.: CQ Press.

Mack, Charles, and Richard A. Edwards. 1989. *Lobbying and Government Relations*. New York: Quorum Books, 76-77.

Mango, Andrew. 1991. The Social Democratic Populist Party, 1983 - 1989. In Heper M. and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey,* London, I. B. Tauris : 170 - 187.

Mardin, S. 1975. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?". In Akarli and Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation in Turkey*. Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 7-33.

Migdal, J. (ed.) 1994. *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Mintz Sidney W. and Eric R. Wolf. 1977. "An Analysis of Ritual Compadrazgo-Parenthood (Compadrazgo)". In Schmidt et. al., *Friends, Followers and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1-15.

Moore, H. C. 1977. "Clientelist Ideology and Political Change." In Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*. London: Duckworth, 257.

Nicholas, Ralph W. 1977. "Factions: A Comparative Analysis". In Schmidt et. al., *Friends, Followers and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 55-73.

Ozankaya, O. 1971. *Koyde Toplumsal Yapi ve Siyasal Kultur*. Ankara: AUSBF Yayinevi.

Ozbudun, Ergun 1975. "Political Participation in Rural Turkey" In Akarli and Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation in Turkey*. Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 33-60.

-----.1981. "Turkey: The Politics of Political Clientelism". In Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, eds., *Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development*. London: Sage, 249-268.

-----.1997. "Constitution Making and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey". In Heper, Kazancigil and Rockman eds., *Institutions and Democratic Statecraft.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 227-243.

Palmer ,Monte. 1989. *Dilemmas of political development* . (4th ed.) Itasca, Illinois: Peacock Publishers.

Pitt-Rivers, J. 1954. *The People of the Sierra*. London: Weidenfield and Nicholson.

Potter, Jack, M. May N. Diaz and George M. Foster. 1967. *Peasant Society: A Reader.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Powell, John. D. 1970. "Peasant Society and Clientelistic Politics", *American Political Science Review* LXIV (2): 411-425.

Roniger, L. and Gunes-Ayata, A. (eds.) 1994. *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Roniger, L. 1994. "The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World". In Roniger and Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1-19.

Rosetti, C. 1994. "Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy". In Roniger and Ayata, eds. *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 87-105.

Sayari, S. 1975. "Some Notes on the Beginning of Mass Political Participation in Turkey". In Akarli and Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation In Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems.* Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 121-133.

-----. 1976. "Aspects of Party Organisation in Turkey", *The Middle East Journal* 30(2): 187-199.

-----. 1977. "Political Patronage in Turkey". In Gellner and Waterbury, eds., . *Patrons and Clients.,* London: Duckworth, 103-115.

Schmidt, Steffen. W. 1977. "The Transformation of Clientelism in Rural Colombia" In Schmidt et. al., *Friends, Followers and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 305-323.

-----.et. al. 1977. *Friends, Followers and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Scott, James. C.1969. *"Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change", American Political Science Review* 63(4): 1142-58.

-----.1972. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", *American Political Science Review* LXVI(1):91-11.

-----.1977. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia". In Schmidt et. al. *Friends, Followers and Factions*. 123-146. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sherwood. W.B. 1967. "The Rise of Justice Party in Turkey", *World Politics*, 20 (3): 54-65.

Silverman, S. F. 1967. "The Community-Nation Mediator in Traditional Central Italy". In Potter, Diaz and Foster, eds., *Peasant Society: A Reader.* Boston: Little, Brown.

-----. 1970. Exploitation in Rural Central Italy: Structure and Ideology in Stratification Study. *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* 12: 327 - 339.

-----.1977. "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy" In Schmidt et. al. *Friends, Followers, and Factions*. California: University of California Press, 293-304.

Smith, Martin. J. 1993. *Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States.* Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead

Sorauf, F. 1961. "The silent revolution in patronage". In Banfield, E. ed., *Urban Government.* New York: The Free Press.

Springborg, R. 1982. *Family, Power and Politics in Egypt*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Stirling, P. 1965. *Turkish Village*. New York: Wiley.

Tachau, Frank. 1991. "The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980." In Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 99-118.

Tarkowski, Jacek. 1981. "Poland: Patrons and Clients in a Planned Economy". In Eisenstadt, S. N, and Lemarchand, R. (eds.) 1981. *Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development*. London: Sage, 173-191.

Toprak, B. 1988. "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey". In Heper and Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and Military*. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 119-136.

Turan, I. 1988. "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey". In Heper and Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and Military*. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 63-80.

-----. 1988. "Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic." In Ergun Ozbudun, eds., *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*. Ankara: Turkish Political Association.

Walker, Jack. L. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*. Michigan: Michigan Press.

Walston, James. 1988. *The Mafia and Clientelism: Roads to Rome in Post-War Calabria*. New York: Routledge.

Weingrod, Alex. 1977a. "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties". In Schmidt et. al. *Friends, Followers, and Factions*. California: University of California Press, 1977. 323-337.

-----.1977b. "Patronage and Power." In Gelner and Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies.* London: Duckworth.

Wilson, Graham, K, 1981. *Interest Groups in the United States* .Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wolf, Eric. 1966. *Peasants*. N. J.: Englewood Cliffs.

-----.1977. "Kinship, friendship, and Patron-Client Relations In Complex Societies ". In Schmidt et. al, *Friends, Followers and Factions*. Berkeley: University of California Press 167-179.

Yucekok, A. 1983. *Turkıye'de Parlamentonun Evrimi*. Ankara: SBF Yayınları.

Zuckerman, A. 1975. *Political Clienteles in Power*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

-----. 1975. "Clientelistic Politics in Italy". In Gelner and Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies.* London: Duckworth.