

To my parents

**TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS (1945-1980): QUEST FOR
SECURITY AND ADAPTING TO CHANGE**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

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**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS**

in

**THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

January 2007

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ABSTRACT

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS (1945-1980): SEARCH FOR SECURITY AND ADAPTING TO CHANGE

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This thesis aims to elaborate on Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1980. It attempts to give an account of the major developments and trends in the relations between the two countries in the selected timeframe. It purports to find out the domestic and international economic, political and military factors and developments that were instrumental in the constitution of a close partnership between the two countries and in the alienation and partial disengagement that were observed in the relationship as of the mid-1960s.

Keywords: Turkey, United States, Alliance, Cyprus, The Cold War, Change in Relations

ÖZET

1945-1980 YILLARI ARASINDA TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ: GÜVENLİK ARAYIŞI VE DEĞİŞİME ADAPTASYON

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Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss

Ocak 2007

Bu tez 1945 ve 1980 yılları arasında Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini irdelemeyi amaçlayıp, zikredilen zaman diliminde iki ülke ilişkilerinde vuku bulan önemli olay ve olgulara dikkat çekmektedir. Çalışma, iki ülke arasında yakın bir işbirliği teşkil edilmesinde ve 1960'ların ortalarından itibaren ilişkilerde gözlemlenen kısmi yabancılaşmaya sebep olan iç ve dış, ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri etmen ve gelişmeleri betimlemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İttifak, Kıbrıs, Soğuk Savaş, İlişkilerde Gözlemlenen Değişimler

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I feel most fortunate to have been guided and supervised by Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss and would like to express my deepest gratitude to her for her valuable recommendations and for her support and patience during my undergraduate years and the preparation of my thesis.

I owe more than I can express to Prof. Yüksel İnan for his support, generosity throughout my undergraduate and graduate years and for his constructive comments and criticisms, which contributed to the improvement of my thesis.

I would like to convey my thanks to Asst. Prof. Aylin Güney for her constructive comments and criticisms, which contributed to the improvement of my thesis.

I am also very grateful to my former professors Asst. Prof. Gülgün Tuna, Prof. Duygu Sezer, the late Prof. Stanford Shaw and Prof. Ali Fuat Borovalı, for they introduced me to the subjects of international relations and history and prompted me to pursue my graduate studies in international relations.

Last but not least, I am forever in debt to my family for their support, encouragement and patience during my university years and the preparation of my thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The history of Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1980 witnessed several changes. The relationship was in essence, close and cordial in the late 1940s, the 1950s and the early 1960s. During this era, the problems and disagreements that appeared in the relationship were subordinated to the need to cooperate within the context of the main goal of containing Soviet expansionism. This era of basically harmonious relations came to an end as the thaw in the Cold War, the receding of the Soviet threat and the relative decrease in the importance that the parties attached to the alliance; domestic developments in both countries and last but not least, the Cyprus conflicts of 1964 and 1974 and the following Johnson letter and the imposition of an American arms embargo on Turkey, altered the relationship. The two countries came to terms with the fact that the almost complete confluence of Turkish and Americans goals and policies were no longer and the degree of economic, military and diplomatic cooperation between the two countries decreased. Yet, in the words of American scholar George S. Harris, the alliance relationship “remained one of impressive intimacy, even if punctuated by friction over subsidiary issues and characterized by public mistrust”.¹

¹ George S. Harris, *Turkish-American Relations since the Truman Doctrine*, p.66.

In order to place the changes in the nature of the Turkish-American relations into a reasonable context, the history of the two countries' relations between 1945 and 1980 needs to be analyzed. This study attempts to achieve that objective and tries to examine the major developments and trends in the relations between the two countries in the selected timeframe. Moreover, the study attempts to find out the domestic and international; economic, political and military factors and developments that were instrumental in the constitution of a close alliance partnership and in the changes and relative alienation that were observed in the relationship as of the mid-1960s.

The study has a descriptive method in that it tries to give an insight regarding the history of the relationship between the two countries. It presents a portrait of how relations between the two countries took shape. It also makes a comparative analysis and examines the behavior, views and motives of both sides concerning a certain development and does not solely reflect one side's perspective. Moreover, the international system, the states and the individuals are jointly considered during the analysis of events and trends.

In this context, Chapter II will study the factors and developments that were instrumental in the desire on the part of both countries to constitute an alliance relationship. This will be followed by a discussion on the substance of the military, diplomatic and economic relationships during the 1950s. The chapter will be concluded by a discussion of the aftermath of the 1960 coup in Turkey and the Cuban Missile Crisis and its effects upon the relationship. Chapter III will study the 1964 Cyprus crisis, the following Johnson letter and the factors and developments that played a part in the alienation and increasing disagreements observed in the relations between the two countries as of 1964. This will be

followed by a discussion concerning the ramifications of the Johnson letter on the relations and on Turkish foreign policy. Specific issues such as the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey as of 1964, problems of aid, the bilateral agreements, the 1967 Cyprus crisis and the opium controversy will also be examined in detail. Chapter IV will start with the analysis of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the subsequent imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey by the U.S. Congress and the major factors and motives involved in the embargo decision. This will be followed by a discussion of the effects of the embargo on the relationship and on Turkish foreign policy as well as the diplomatic developments that took place during the three-and-a-half years during which the embargo was in effect. The chapter will be concluded by an overview of the developments following the repeal of the embargo legislation and the factors and developments involved in the decision on the part of both countries to constitute a closer alliance partnership as of the late 1970s.

CHAPTER II

COLD WAR PARTNERS: 1945-1964

2.1. Search for Security

During the Second World War, Turkey concluded that the Soviet Union was going to demand a revision of the Montreux Convention, which regulated passage through the Turkish Straits (Straits, hereafter), “in the Soviet Union's favor, and possibly other concessions” after the war had ended “without knowing the exact nature of the demands.”² In March 1945, the Soviet government officially denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression of 1925 with Turkey, citing that “this treaty was no longer in accord with the ‘new situation’ and needed serious improvement.”³ Three months later, in June 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov told Selim Sarper, the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, that as a price for renewing the treaty, the Soviet Union wanted a new Straits Convention, that would be negotiated only between Turkey and the Soviet Union, which would provide for the free passage of Soviet warships through the Straits and their closure to non-Black Sea states, the lease to the Soviet Union of naval bases at the Straits, and the retrocession to the U.S.S.R. of Kars and Ardahan. Sarper's reply was that “Turkey could not consider Soviet bases at the Straits, or the retrocession of the two provinces,” while “any revision of the Montreux

² William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 111.

³ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 34.

Convention would have to be a matter for international negotiation and agreement.”⁴ “These Soviet demands and the manner of their presentation” terrified Turkey. They “left no doubt in the Turks’ mind that the Soviet aim was not only the control of the Straits, but also submission of Turkey to satellite status”⁵ and “pointed up to the necessity of improving ties with the West.”⁶ Moreover, “tension was heightened by the presence of at least twenty-five Red Army divisions near the Turkish border whose maneuvers on Turkish frontiers posed a definite threat.”⁷ “Turkey was made even more apprehensive by the renewed civil war in Greece between the government forces and the communist insurgents and the establishment of Soviet puppet governments in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.”⁸ At that stage, Turkey was not in a position to maintain its army mobilized against the Soviet Union for a very long time. Furthermore, Britain no longer had the power or the resources to support Turkey against the Soviet Union. Hence, the Turks had to try to “involve the United States in defending Turkey against the Soviet Union and bring the American position on the Straits into harmony with the Turkish view”,⁹ for the U.S. seemed as the only country powerful enough to counter the Soviet threat. “To this end, the İnönü government stepped up its consultations with the United States, attempting to dramatize the Soviet threat, arguing that the Kremlin would be deterred not by

⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 111.

⁵ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 173.

⁶ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, (Washington D.C.: AEI Hoover Policy Study 2, 1972), p.16.

⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, “U.S. Forces in Turkey,” p.331. In Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years: 1945-1970*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), pp.331-350.

⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, *U.S. Forces in Turkey*, p.338.

⁹ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 17-18.

concessions, but by firmness.” It also argued that Turkey’s geo-strategic location vis-à-vis the Middle East made it a country very important for the West.¹⁰

However, when informed about the Soviet demands, the U.S. State Department deployed a detached attitude saying that “the United States considered Turkey an area of conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Britain.”¹¹ “At that stage, the Americans were very reluctant to take on distant commitments, such as ensuring the security of the Turkish Straits”¹² and still believed that the wartime partnership with the Soviet Union could be continued after the war. Therefore, the United States tried to calm down Turkey and did not criticize Moscow regarding the Soviet demands over Turkey and did not oppose Stalin on this issue during the first post-war meeting of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union at Potsdam in July-August 1945. At the end of the Potsdam Conference, the “Big Three” agreed to work out the Straits problem with Turkey in bilateral negotiations to produce a new regime, while “Ankara had not been sanguine about seeing e its intimate concerns debated in its absence.”¹³

In November 1945, the U.S. presented its views concerning the regime of the Straits, which foresaw freedom of passage for warships of the Black Sea states, and limited rights for the warships of non-Black Sea states-“a position similar to that of the Soviets and one which somewhat alarmed the Turkish government.”¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Soviet Union kept heavy diplomatic pressure on Turkey regarding

¹⁰ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.18.

¹¹ Süha Bölükbaşı, “The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations Between 1917-1960,” *Foreign Policy* Vol. 16, Nos: 1-2, p.87.

¹² Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey—Anglo-American Security Interests: 1945-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO*, (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 43 quoted in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.112.

¹³ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.17.

¹⁴ Harry N. Howard, “The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations,” *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 30, No.3, (1976), p. 306.

the Straits issue during late 1945 and 1946. The Soviet position regarding the Straits issue was formally presented on August 7, 1946, repeating its views in 1945. Turkey refused the Soviet note.

On August 15, 1946, President Truman told the Turks that “the U.S. would support them in opposing the Soviet demands” and the Turkish government was “advised on August 16 to assume a reasonable, but firm, attitude.” Truman held that the “American position of firm support” to Turkey “had been formulated only after full consideration had been given to the matter at the highest levels.”¹⁵ On August 19, 1946, the U.S. reply to the Soviet note of August 7, noted that “a regime of the Straits was not the exclusive affair of the Black Sea powers” and warned:

Should the Straits become the object of an attack, or the threat of an attack, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the UN Security Council.¹⁶

By that time, the U.S., as a result of Soviet actions in Germany, Eastern Europe and Iran, had started to become suspicious of the U.S.S.R.’s expansionist policy. It had realized that the post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union could not be continued and that the world was being divided into communist and anti-communist spheres. Accordingly, it had to forego its traditionally isolationist foreign policy and adopt a global foreign policy by leading the Western world and by embarking on a policy of containing Soviet expansionism through the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* around the U.S.S.R.¹⁷ Truman wrote:

¹⁵ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 194-196.

¹⁶ Harry N. Howard, “The Turkish Straits after World War II: Problems and Prospects,” *Balkan Studies* Vol. 11, No: 1, (1970), p. 46.

¹⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 446-472.

I had a very good picture of what a revival of American isolationism would mean for the world. After World War II it was clear that without American participation, there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal. Inaction, withdrawal, “Fortress America” notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them. This was the time to align the U.S. clearly on the side of the free world.¹⁸

Hence, the United States decided to strengthen Europe militarily (in a defense system against the U.S.S.R.) and economically under its leadership. Parallel to these developments, Washington had realized by then that, “taken in conjuncture with Soviet actions elsewhere and in the light of the unsuccessful conference of foreign ministers in December 1945,” “the Soviets clearly wanted to take control of” not only “Turkey” and the Straits,¹⁹ but also the Middle East.

The U.S. displayed its concern for Turkey's security by “privately assuring Ankara that it would not permit Turkish sovereignty to be violated”²⁰ and by dispatching the battleship Missouri to İstanbul²¹ on April 5, 1946. “The Turkish press hailed” the dispatch of the Missouri by calling “the United States, the defender of peace, right, justice, progress, and prosperity.”²² “This ‘show of force’ was a warning which could not have escaped the attention of Moscow”²³ and was generally accepted as “marking the end of Turkey's post-war diplomatic

¹⁸ John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p.33.

¹⁹ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p.107.

²⁰ George S. Harris, “Cross-alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union,” *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yılığı (The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations)*, Vol. 12, (1972), pp. 10-11.

²¹ The Battleship Missouri was carrying the remains of the deceased Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Münir Ertegün, who had passed away two years ago.

²² George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 20.

²³ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 173.

isolation’’²⁴ “However, it was still unclear what concrete form’’ that American support for Turkey against the Soviet Union “would take.’’²⁵

On 24 September 1946, the Soviets proposed bilateral negotiations regarding the Straits issue to Turkey, but were refused by both the United States and Turkey. “In the event, this turned out to be the end of official diplomatic exchanges on the issue, but neither the Turks nor the Western powers could have known this at the time. Hence, Turkey still had to find effective means of securing its defense.’’²⁶

Meanwhile, Britain was in dire economic straits and in February 1947, it announced that it would no longer be able to support Turkey and Greece economically or militarily. “By this stage, U.S. leaders had been convinced that the defense of Greece and Turkey was essential for the protection of Western interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.’’²⁷ The result was the “Truman Doctrine’’ whereby President Truman, on 12 March 1947, asked from Congress approval of a \$400 million military and economic aid program to Greece and Turkey (of which, \$100 million was assigned to Turkey). The Congress accepted Truman’s proposal.

The launch of the Truman Doctrine was an important turning point not only in Cold War history, but also in Turkey's quest for security in the face of Soviet threats to its independence and territorial integrity and in its relations with the United States. “It signified the formal emergence of the U.S. as Turkey’s chief

²⁴ Mensur Akgün, “Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye ile Rusya Arasında Görünmez Bağlar: Boğazlar (Invisible Ties between Turkey and Russia from the Past to the Present),” p.74. In Gülten Kazgan and N. Ulçenko, eds., *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye ve Rusya* (Turkey and Russia from the Past to the Present). (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), pp. 45-83.

²⁵ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.114.

²⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000)*, p. 115.

²⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000)*, p. 115.

support in the West.’’²⁸ ‘‘Turkey’s inclusion in Truman’s program was a clear signal to the U.S.S.R. that the U.S. was prepared to make a material rather than a purely symbolic contribution to the defense of Turkey.’’²⁹ As Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak (1949: 461) explained: ‘‘The Truman Doctrine was a great comfort to the Turkish people, for it made them feel that they were no longer isolated.’’³⁰ During 1948, Turkey also began to receive Marshall Plan aid. ‘‘Between 1948 and 1952, Turkey would receive a total of \$792.7 million in general aid and \$687 million in military aid from the United States.’’³¹ Moreover, the United States and Turkey signed a military assistance agreement i.e. the Aid to Turkey Agreement of 1947³² as a result of which, weaponry and other military equipment were supplied by Washington. Furthermore, ‘‘programs of road and harbor construction and the establishment of strategic installations’’ were embarked on with the ‘‘financial aid offered by the United States’’.³³

The Truman Doctrine was not, however, a permanent U.S. commitment to Turkey’s defense. Thus, the Turks still needed to commit the Americans to protecting Turkey permanently. Meanwhile, ‘‘with the Berlin blockade’’ and the forceful establishment by the Soviets of communist regimes favorable to Moscow in Central and Eastern Europe, ‘‘the Cold War assumed definite shape in Europe,

²⁸ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 25.

²⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 115.

³⁰ Necmeddin Sadak, ‘‘Turkey Faces the Soviets,’’ *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27, (1949), p.461 quoted in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 115.

³¹ Nur Bilge Criss, *U.S. Forces in Turkey*, p.341.

³² This agreement stipulated the conditions under which Turkey would receive aid under the Truman Doctrine. For the full Turkish text of the agreement, see Fahir Armaođlu’s *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri* (Turkish-American Relations: A Documentary Record), (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 162-164. For the full English text, refer to George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 213-215.

³³ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, pp. 125-126.

and its institutional structures began to emerge,’’³⁴ while the United States had become determined to establish a security organization for the defense of western Europe. Subsequently, in November 1948, Turkey filed an application for its inclusion in such an organization. The U.S. and Western Europeans were, however, not very enthusiastic about Turkish membership because at that point they “could not afford to spread meager resources thinly by extending the lines of defense” over too wide an area.³⁵ Therefore the Turkish application was not successful and the Turks were worried about this development since “Turkey’s exclusion” from the prospective defense organization could lead to a decrease of American interest in Turkey’s security and “might send a signal to Stalin that the Western powers were not prepared to protect Turkey.’’³⁶

“The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on April 4, 1949, formalized the new alliance, but disappointed Turkey, mainly because Italy had been included, but Turkey and Greece left out.’’³⁷ Membership to NATO was seen by Turkey as the only way of ensuring a permanent security guarantee. Turkish membership of NATO was to be held up for three years by complex obstacles. According to Hale (2000: 117):

the most important of these was that the Truman administration initially tended to see Turkey as part of the Middle East rather than Europe, and assumed that U.S. interests in the region were minimal compared with those of Britain and given budgetary constraints between 1948 and 1950, the U.S. army still preferred to concentrate its resources on western Europe. The British, meanwhile, were primarily concerned with trying to prop up their decreasing power in the Middle East, and believed that, rather than joining NATO, Turkey should take part in a British-led Middle-Eastern defense system. Turkey was willing to

³⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 116.

³⁵ Nur Bilge Criss, *U.S. Forces in Turkey*, p.331.

³⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 116.

³⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 117.

consider such an arrangement, but only on condition that admission to NATO was part of the deal.³⁸

The global situation was then fundamentally changed by the Korean War in June 1950. Consequently, the U.S. defense budget was sharply increased. “This relieved the Truman administration of the need to define Turkey's strategic location. The funds were now there to incorporate Turkey (and Greece) into NATO.”³⁹

The Korean War also gave Turkey a very good opportunity to display its solidarity with the West. A month after the start of the war, the Democrat Party (DP) government, elected in the first free elections in 1950 and led by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, sent a 4,500-men military unit to join the UN forces, in order to display its commitment to the Western world, “eradicate its image as an unreliable ally because Turkey had declared non-belligerency in World War II despite its treaty alliance of 1939 with Britain and France”⁴⁰ and hence facilitate Turkish entry into NATO. “The Turkish brigade performed well during the war and earned high praise.”⁴¹ A week after the decision to send Turkish troops to Korea, Turkey filed another application to join the Atlantic alliance. The Americans, however, were still reluctant to extend full membership to Turkey (and Greece). Shortly afterwards however, an important change in U.S. military strategy took place. Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR):

saw Europe shaped like a bottleneck, with the Soviet Union representing the wide part. If the Soviet Union tried to move forward into the central

³⁸ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 117.

³⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 117.

⁴⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*, (Unpublished paper, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 2000), p.4.

⁴¹ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), p. 69.

bottleneck, then the West should attempt to hold it there, but also hit the wide part of the bottle hard from both flanks, using air power.

He believed that “Turkey was essential to this strategy, as the main anti-Soviet country on the southern flank.” But Turkey could not be expected to do act accordingly “unless it was given a firm security commitment by the Western powers”, that is, its inclusion as a full member in NATO.⁴² Furthermore, the Americans had now realized that a Soviet attack on Turkey would have important repercussions for the security of the West due to the geo-strategic position of Turkey.

The Truman Administration was convinced by these arguments and in May 1951, it decided to press for the admission of Turkey (and Greece) as full members of NATO. “This left Turkey with the duty of convincing the other NATO allies. Britain wanted to make Turkish admission to NATO conditional on the Turks' agreement to co-sponsor the plan for a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO).”⁴³ The Turks agreed to this British pre-condition and hence, Turkey (and Greece) officially became a member of NATO in February 1952. “Turkey's diplomatic and military isolation since 1878 and all the ramifications such isolation predicated upon the Ottoman Empire as well as the early Republic had come to an end.”⁴⁴

To sum up the main reasons why the United States wanted to constitute an alliance relationship with Turkey and pressed for Turkish membership of NATO, it can be said that⁴⁵ first, “for the U.S., Turkey was an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’

⁴² Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 70, (1991), pp. 48-49 quoted in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 118.

⁴³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 119.

⁴⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*, p. 3.

⁴⁵ The following discussion as to why the U.S. wanted to constitute an alliance relationship with Turkey relies mainly upon Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO: 1945-1952,” *The Journal of American History* Vol. 71, No. 4,

which could be used to stage attacks on the vital Soviet industrial centers and oil fields should war erupt.”⁴⁶ Second, the Soviet explosion of its first atomic bomb in 1949 marked an important turning point in U.S. foreign policy by increasing the threat to the security of the Western world. “This Soviet achievement forced the U.S. to take more effective security measures.”⁴⁷ Third, in 1950, a treaty of alliance was signed between the U.S.S.R. and China, which gave the impression to the U.S. that these two giant communist powers had formed a monolithic alliance against the West. “Against such a common front, the U.S. wanted to extend the policy of containment initiated by the Truman Doctrine.” Fourth, the Korean War was seen by the United States as the “first sign of the global military campaign launched by the U.S.S.R. for world domination and falsified the American belief that, due to American nuclear superiority, the Soviet Union would not dare to cause regional wars.”⁴⁸ Fifth, Turkey's important geo-political location vis-à-vis the strategic Middle East was an important factor in the American decision. And sixth, Turkish membership to NATO would force the Soviet Union to divert a significant number of forces from eastern and central Europe to its southern border.

On the Turks’ part, the search for security in the face of the Soviet threats to their independence and territorial integrity, the desire to become a full and equal member of the Western world and to be recognized by the West as such and the need to receive military and economic assistance from the West in order to

(1985), pp. 807-825, Oral Sander, “Turkey: The Staunchest Ally of the United States?,” *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı* (The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations), Vol. 15, (1975), pp. 10-24, Mehmet Gönlübol, “NATO and Turkey,” *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı* (The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations), Vol. 11, (1971), pp. 1-38.

⁴⁶ Melvyn P. Leffler, *Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO*, pp. 813-815.

⁴⁷ Oral Sander, *Turkey: The Staunchest Ally of the United States?*, p. 14.

⁴⁸ Oral Sander, *Turkey: The Staunchest Ally of the United States?*, p. 15.

strengthen its armed forces and hence increase its deterrence capability and to finance its economic development, impelled it to become a member of the Western security system and to constitute a close alliance relationship with the United States. Moreover, the transformation of the multi-polar nature of global politics into one characterized by bi-polarity forced Turkey to ally itself with the West. Further, World War II had ended with the victory of the Western democracies. Parallel to this development, Turkey was making the transition to multi-party politics.⁴⁹ This had an effect on Turkish foreign policy as the “leaders of the DP genuinely believed that Turkey’s entrance to NATO was necessary for the future of the democratic system in Turkey and their own existence.”⁵⁰

According to Coufoudakis (1981: 180), in order to attain the above-mentioned goals:

Turkey had to gain the Americans’ commitment to both the security and the economic and social modernization of the country. The latter was to be achieved through the commitment of public and private funds from the United States. Attaining the former goal required Turkey’s military alignment with the U.S. and the American-inspired and sponsored alliances in Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s leadership would utilize a variety of tactics, but primarily relied on their country’s most important asset, its strategic location. ...In the steadily escalating Soviet-American confrontation of the late 1940s and the threat posed to Turkey by the Soviets, Turkey did not have to try very hard to gain America’s commitment.⁵¹

2.2. The Menderes decade (1950-1960) in Turkish-American relations

As stated earlier, NATO membership in 1952 had ended Turkey's diplomatic and military isolation. For Turkey, NATO membership not only

⁴⁹ The most important factors behind İnönü’s decision to introduce multi-party politics were the increasing internal resentment against one-party rule, U.S. congressional criticisms towards Turkish democracy and İnönü’s personal belief regarding the merits of democracy.

⁵⁰ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p. 109, 112.

⁵¹ Van Coufoudakis, “Turkey and the United States: The Problems and Prospects of a post-war Alliance,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 9, (1981), p. 180.

provided security against the Soviet Union, but also, it meant that Turkey would continue to receive the economic aid that it desperately needed for its economic development. Hence, “Turkish policy makers enthusiastically embraced a discourse of being NATO's ‘staunch’ ally and a ‘bulwark’ against communism.”⁵² During this era, “literally everything other than Turkey’s core objectives of maintaining security, political independence and territorial integrity were subordinated”⁵³ to the goal of constituting a close alliance relationship with the United States. Moreover, as a result of its dependency on the United States, Turkey tried to coordinate its policies with those of the West, particularly the United States.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, that is, in the bi-polar “all white” or “all black” atmosphere and high political and military tension of the early Cold War era, “Turkey's commitment to and engagement with the Western alliance in general and the United States in particular were at their height.”⁵⁴ In this era, NATO membership and alliance with the U.S. were appreciated by an overwhelming majority of the people in Turkey, while in the United States, the Congress supported the successive Administrations’ policy of constituting a close alliance relationship with Turkey. In essence, Turkish-American relations appeared to be harmonious and Turkish policy makers worked to “capitalize on the mutuality of strategic and political objectives with the Americans”⁵⁵ and thus involve the United States as much as possible in Turkey’s economy and defense. “Obviously the Turkish leadership believed that Turkey stood to benefit from a

⁵² Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*, p.6.

⁵³ Nur Bilge Criss, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No.1, (1997), p. 3 and Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*.

⁵⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 121.

⁵⁵ Van Coufoudakis, *Turkey and the United States: The Problems of a post-war Alliance*, p.181.

comprehensive association than from a bare formal security guarantee. To bring the somewhat refractory United States to this conclusion, the Turks were willing to take on a wide range of obligations.’’⁵⁶

During this era of basically harmonious relations (1952-early 1960s), Turkey and the United States approached their relations on the assumption of the confluence of the military and political interests and objectives of the two countries. The problems that appeared in the relationship were eventually solved within the context of the main mutual goal of containing communism. The perception of the congruence of national interests and Turkish foreign policy makers' confidence in the United States also prevented Turkey from putting restrictions on American military activity on its soil or “looking for ulterior motives behind American actions affecting Turkey”. “Events such as American use of the İncirlik base during the 1958 Lebanon crisis” in an out-of-area operation without prior consultation with Turkish authorities, “the U-2 incident in 1960” or the economic aid controversy in mid-1950s, “were considered by the Turks as too trivial and insignificant to harm the alliance.’’⁵⁷

On the Americans' part, as indicated above, Turkey's geo-strategic location vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Middle East had made it a very important part of NATO. “In defending Turkey, the U.S. was acting as a nation whose global interests would seriously be endangered if Turkey faltered militarily or economically.’’⁵⁸ Consequently, “assuring the best possible defense of Turkey required joint arrangements” i.e. bilateral agreements, “joint installations” to be

⁵⁶ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 44.

⁵⁷ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations between 1917-1960*, pp. 80-81.

⁵⁸ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 372.

set up in Turkey and economic and military assistance to be provided to Turkey. Hence, a “special relationship” evolved.⁵⁹ The United States, too, approached relations with the assumption that, Turkish-American national interests and policies were congruent. Therefore, in the words of American observer George S. Harris (1972: 45), “Americans thereafter tended to overestimate U.S. freedom of action in Turkey; they did not foresee the difficulties that would eventually arise from using the alliance for purposes that were not directly connected with containing the Soviet Union.”⁶⁰

2.2.1. Military alliance

As a consequence of accession to NATO, the Turkish armed forces integrated with NATO defense structures and the American military presence in Turkey developed very rapidly during the 1950s. Accordingly, “three-quarters of Turkey's land forces were reserved for NATO purposes under the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), while the air force and navy were assigned to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR)”.⁶¹ According to NATO strategy, the presence of Turkish military forces near the Soviet border would cause the Soviet Union to move a significant amount of its forces stationed in its western border to defend its Turkish border, thereby reducing the number of Soviet forces that could be available to attack western Europe. Under bilateral and secret agreements, twenty-five U.S.-cum-NATO bases and installations⁶² were constructed in Turkey, including, most

⁵⁹ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 372.

⁶⁰ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.45.

⁶¹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 123.

⁶² According to Sander , despite the general conviction that these bases and facilities were under American control, Turkish governmental officials maintained that they were part of Turkish state

importantly, an air base in İncirlik (Adana) “connected to the Strategic Air Forces Command of NATO, to be turned over to American control in case of a crisis”⁶³ with other bases such as the Çiğli (İzmir) Air Base and intelligence-gathering installations in Karamürsel (Kocaeli), Trabzon, Belbaşı (Ankara), Pirinçlik (Diyarbakır), Sinop and Samsun. Moreover, “naval facilities and storage facilities were established at İskenderun (Hatay) and Yumurtalık (Adana)”⁶⁴ Furthermore, Turkey hosted U.S. strike aircraft armed with nuclear weapons “under an agreement reached in 1957, and by the late 1960s the number of U.S. military personnel and dependents on Turkish territory would reach 24,000”⁶⁵ Turkey allocated 32 million square meters of land for the construction of these bases.⁶⁶

Harris maintains that:

this rapid increase in personnel evidenced a shift in American interest in Turkey. Initially, Washington had seen defense of Turkey and the blocking of Soviet expansion in the area as its main concerns. Soon, Americans increasingly came to recognize the benefits from using Turkey as a base of operations for intelligence-gathering within the Soviet Union⁶⁷

and out-of-area operations to intervene in the Middle East. This eventually brought the issue of sovereignty to the fore.⁶⁸ But at that point, the perception of the mutuality of goals and interests with the United States caused Turkey to downgrade this issue and led it to “put few restraints on American action”⁶⁹.

property and under Turkish control. According to the agreements in force, the American personnel could theoretically use them against other states only after they had notified and received the permission of the Turkish state: Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964*, (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1979), p. 119. But as we shall see in the discussion on the Lebanese crisis of 1958, there was no indication that the American military authorities consulted with the Turkish officials before using the İncirlik base to land marines on Lebanon.

⁶³ Mehmet Gönlübol, *NATO and Turkey*, p. 25.

⁶⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 123.

⁶⁵ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 123.

⁶⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, *NATO and Turkey*, p. 24.

⁶⁷ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 56.

⁶⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, “A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” *The Journal of American History* Vol. 89, No. 2, (2002), pp.472-484.

⁶⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p. 473.

Consequently, “Soviet allegations in February 1956 that meteorological balloons launched by Americans from Turkey were used for espionage purposes failed to trigger any significant Turkish reaction.”⁷⁰ Turkey cooperated with the U.S. in the U-2 program of reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. “This activity would become an issue of public discussion only after four years of uneventful operation when a U-2 plane, which had taken off from the İncirlik Air Base in Turkey, was forcibly grounded in the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960.”⁷¹ After the Soviet Union made public the downing of the reconnaissance plane, “a major diplomatic scandal followed, involving Turkish compliance in violating Soviet airspace. The Turkish press treated the matter as if Turkey had not been involved at all, and the Turkish government agreed.”⁷² On 8 May 1960, Turkey announced that it had not given permission for reconnaissance flights from its soil and that Turkey “bore no responsibility for flights outside its airspace. The implication was that the Turkish government had no knowledge of such flights, though the top echelons of the Turkish General Staff probably knew.”⁷³ The flights were discontinued for the time being.

In the meantime, American military aid, equipment and training enabled Turkey to modernize and increase the strength of its armed forces. “Total U.S. military assistance to Turkey between 1948 and 1964 amounted to \$2, 271 million, plus \$328 million in deliveries of surplus equipment.”⁷⁴ All in all, NATO membership was a welcome development for the Turks in the 1950s in that, it would be very difficult for Turkey to achieve high growth rates, while at the same

⁷⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol (ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası: 1919-1995*, p. 315 and George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 57.

⁷¹ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.57.

⁷² Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p. 473.

⁷³ Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p. 473.

⁷⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 123.

time deter a Soviet attack, without this military assistance.⁷⁵ However, this was by no means a one-sided relation as Turkey was an indispensable ally for the U.S. Moreover, as American Ambassador to Ankara, George McGhee would confess, “in exchange for each dollar spent in Turkey, America saved three dollars' worth of security.”⁷⁶

Meanwhile, bilateral agreements dealing with specific aspects of the Turkish-American military presence in Turkey such as “U.S. force deployments, military exercises by U.S. forces, the legal and administrative status of U.S. forces, intelligence activities, operations plans for U.S. forces and operations plans for joint force commands”⁷⁷ were signed between the two countries. Some of these agreements were open i.e. ratified and published by the Turkish parliament while some others were “secret exchanges of notes and executive agreements concerning such matters as the deployment of weapons systems in Turkey and the right of U.S. personnel to carry on activities of a military or intelligence nature.”⁷⁸ These secret agreements made it difficult for Turkey to exercise effective control over the American military presence on its soil. And as Harris (1972: 55-56) notes:

already before the end of the 1950s, the opposition would begin to attack on constitutional grounds those agreements not ratified by the Turkish Parliament. While at first these attacks were directed far more at the DP administration than at the United States, in the 1960s, it would be only a short step to centering fire on the United States as well.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Kamran İnan, “Turkey and NATO,” *Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute*, Vol. 4, No. 1.

⁷⁶ George C. McGhee, “Turkey Joins the West,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 32, (1954), pp. 617-630.

⁷⁷ Richard F. Grimmett, *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean*, Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations by Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 6 quoted in Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, pp. 70-71.

⁷⁸ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 54.

⁷⁹ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 55-56.

2.2.2. Diplomatic cooperation

During the 1950s, Turkey engaged itself in two unsuccessful projects to form Western defense organizations in the Balkans and in the Middle East as Turkey was trying to pursue an active foreign policy in these regions as part of its pro-Western foreign policy. Turkey's primary goal in its policy towards these regions was to prove to the West that it was a reliable ally and hence receive more financial and military aid. Therefore, Turkey pursued a staunchly pro-Western and pro-American foreign policy in especially the Middle East. The Menderes government's staunch anti-communism was another important factor in the pursuit of such a foreign policy.

Upon American encouragement,⁸⁰ Turkey persuaded Yugoslavia to forego neutrality and on 9 August 1954, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Defense Pact, according to which the three countries undertook to help one another in case of attack by an outside party (meaning the Soviet Union). Thus, Yugoslavia was indirectly brought under NATO's protective umbrella, that is, if Turkey and Greece came to its help in case of an attack. However, this alliance soon lost its importance as Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved after the death of Stalin and the Cyprus problem emerged as a major bone of contention between Turkey and Greece.

Turkey's other main foreign policy concern at the time was the Middle East. The United States and especially Britain wanted Turkey to pursue an active diplomacy in order to convince the Middle Eastern countries to join a military pact aimed at containing Soviet advance into the region and at ensuring the security of petroleum. During 1951-1953, the formation of a Middle East Defense

⁸⁰ Mehmet Gönübol (ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası: 1919-1995*, p. 238.

Organization (MEDO) was contemplated whereby Turkey (because of its promise to Britain to work towards the formation a pro-Western organization in the region as a pre-condition for British acceptance of Turkey's accession to NATO), the United States and Britain tried to bring in the Arabs to the prospective organization. But their efforts did not produce the desired result because since the end of World War II, the idea of pan-Arabism had emerged and found wide support and because the foreign policies of most Arab countries were anti-Western while the Soviet threat did not mean much to them.

The Arabs' resistance to MEDO did not prevent a renewed effort to prevent Soviet penetration into the region. "The principal promoter" of the new project "was the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles",⁸¹ who tried to persuade the regional countries to join the new plan. When it was realized that most Arab states opposed the scheme, the United States decided to pursue the objective of constituting a security organization based on the "northern tier" states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, "where proximity to the Soviet Union induced a greater awareness of the communist danger."⁸² This plan was also seen by Menderes and Dulles as a way of persuading the Arab states to join another version of MEDO. But Western policies had the opposite effect of prompting the Arabs to move closer to the Soviet Union and thus allowing the U.S.S.R. to enter the equation in Middle Eastern affairs, for Turkey and the United States had again misjudged regional dynamics. Nevertheless, this new Dulles policy eventually led to the formation of the so-called Baghdad Pact. In 1955, Turkey had signed a treaty with Iraq which foresaw military cooperation between the two countries. "Turkey had played an active and enthusiastic role in bringing Iraq into this bi-

⁸¹ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 279.

⁸² Harry N. Howard, *The Bicentennial in American-Turkish Relations*, p. 306.

lateral arrangement”, which Menderes saw as an “important way of increasing Turkey’s security along its southern border, and of enhancing Turkey’s value to the West as an ally”.⁸³ Iran, Pakistan and Britain acceded to the Turkish-Iraqi ‘pact’ in the same year thereby forming the Baghdad Pact.

The Pact amounted to very little in practical terms due to the lack of integrated military forces, fierce Arab opposition and because the U.S. was not an official member. But although the United States, in order not to further alienate and antagonize the Arabs, did not become a member of the pact, it nevertheless did participate in the Pact’s meetings and met much of the expenses. The Pact did not provide the Turks with more security or added to its Turkey’s deterrence. The main value of it in the eyes of the Democrat Party government was that it “represented Turkey another channel for obtaining American military and economic aid.”⁸⁴

Meanwhile, in April 1955, Turkey attacked the policy of non-alignment at the Conference of Afro-Asian Nations at Bandung (which gave birth to the Third World Movement) by stressing the threat that communism posed to the world and “denouncing the policy of non-alignment by equating it with pacifism”,⁸⁵ to the chagrin of the participants from Asia and Africa. Moreover, in the same year, it voted against Algerian independence in the United Nations General Assembly in the context of “synchronizing” its foreign policy with those of its NATO allies. Turkey would later come to resent these staunchly pro-Western undertakings for

⁸³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 126.

⁸⁴ Metin Tamkoç, “Turkey's Quest for Security through Defensive Alliances,” *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yılığ* (The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations), Vol. 2, 1961, p. 29.

⁸⁵ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations between 1917-1960*, p. 93.

causing Turkey's isolation in international fora in the 1960s, especially as regards the Cyprus conflict.

In the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Turkey supported the American policy. After the attack by Britain, France and Israel on Egypt, Turkey voted for the American motion in the United Nations, calling for an immediate cease-fire.⁸⁶ In the aftermath of the failure at Suez, British power in the Middle East declined considerably, while the Soviet Union became a major actor in the politics of the region. Consequently, members of the Baghdad Pact, especially Turkey, started to pressure the United States government to join the alliance in order to rectify this situation. However, after the Suez fiasco, "Washington was even less willing to assume formal membership". "Instead, it produced the Eisenhower Doctrine to allay anxieties of the few pro-Western Arab leaders and to give encouragement to the members of the Baghdad Pact".⁸⁷ In an address to Congress on January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower "invited the U.S. Congress to authorize economic cooperation and programs of military assistance, including the deployment of U.S. forces to countries "requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." His proposals were endorsed by Congress.⁸⁸ The Eisenhower Doctrine was widely welcomed by Turkey.⁸⁹

By this stage, "it appeared that Adnan Menderes had a more Dullesian-than-Dulles phobia about the dangers of communist penetration in the Middle East, and that his Western allies had to restrain him from taking a more aggressive

⁸⁶ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 396.

⁸⁷ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 283.

⁸⁸ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 283.

⁸⁹ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası* (Foreign Policy during the Democrat Party Era), (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1990), pp.83-85.

stance in the region”,⁹⁰ especially towards Syria which had moved close to the Soviet Union.⁹¹ In 1957, the expulsion of American officials from Syria, because they were allegedly conspiring with the help of the Turkish government to topple the Syrian government, increased tensions between Ankara and Damascus.⁹² Moreover, the Soviet arms transfers to Syria was an unwelcome development for Turkey. As a result, Turkey concentrated its military forces near its Syrian border, which prompted Soviet mobilization on the Turkish border. According to a contemporary British Foreign Office report, Turkey “seemed to have considered ‘going it alone’ over Syria” if local or international communists took control of the Syrian government.”⁹³ In response, Soviet Premier Khrushchev threatened that “if the crisis resulted in war, Turkey would not last even a single day.”⁹⁴ Although the U.S. State Department emphasized that “if Turkey were attacked, it would carry out its defense commitments to Turkey with all its power,” it appeared that the U.S. was “gravely disturbed by Turkey's apparently aggressive attitude towards Syria”, and feared that “it might provoke a Soviet attack on Turkey which could lead to a full-scale conflict between the two superpowers.”⁹⁵ According to Harris, “it was hard to tell with any assurance what the DP government hoped to gain by its overly aggressive stance towards Syria”. Perhaps the Menderes government wanted to “dramatize the communist danger in hope of assuring greater American support for the Baghdad Pact”.⁹⁶ The crisis ended with an abrupt change of policy by Khrushchev. “His decision to embark on a peace

⁹⁰ Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika* (Our Leaders and Foreign Policy), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1996), p. 44 and William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 128.

⁹¹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 128.

⁹² Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975*,

⁹³ Quoted in Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Pinter Publishers, 1996), p. 26.

⁹⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 129.

⁹⁵ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 129.

⁹⁶ George S. Harris, *Cross-alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p. 18.

offensive towards Turkey failed to produce any tangible results in Turkish-Soviet relations”, but it eased tensions and Turkey withdrew its troops.⁹⁷

In June 1958, a leftist coup d'etat in Iraq overthrew the pro-Western regime. After the coup, it was alleged that Menderes wanted Turkey to intervene and remove the coup-makers from power, but was “dissuaded by the Americans from such an act”.⁹⁸ However, within two weeks Menderes changed his policy and recognized the new Iraqi regime. Following the Iraqi coup, the name of the Baghdad Pact was changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the headquarters of the ‘new’ organization were moved to Ankara. From then on, “the pact only served as a forum for dialogue between its regional members and the United States”.⁹⁹

Shortly after the Iraqi coup, American military forces landed in Lebanon following an invitation by the Lebanese president in the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine, using NATO bases in Turkey (without prior consultation with Turkish authorities because the Americans “due to the need for haste in preparation of the force deployment” did not notify the Turks until after the military unit had landed in İncirlik)¹⁰⁰ to transfer their troops to Lebanon for an out-of-area operation which fell outside the confines of Turkey’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. This American *fait accompli* led to resentments in some circles in Turkey and “left scars that would eventually contribute to a narrowing of American freedom of action”.¹⁰¹ However, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu praised the American action and made the statement that “the American Ambassador had

⁹⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 129.

⁹⁸ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American relations between 1917-1960*, p. 95.

⁹⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*, p. 7.

¹⁰¹ George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), p.185.

asked Turkey's prior cooperation to use the İncirlik base, which the Turkish government had granted.” “Although the American data contradicted Zorlu's statement about timing, the Foreign Minister did not see a *fait accompli* in the matter”¹⁰² and “the Turkish government overlooked this breach of protocol”.¹⁰³

Turkey's over-zealously pro-Western foreign policy would later come under immense criticism for having alienated the Third World in general, and the Arab world in particular. This would lead to Turkey's international isolation regarding the Cyprus issue, which in turn would prompt Turkey to try to make amends in its relations with the non-Western world as of 1964.

Within the context of Turkish-American relations of the era (1945-1964), it is beneficial to examine Turkey's relations with the other superpower: Following Soviet territorial demands on Turkey, “relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey further deteriorated proportionate to Turkey's alignment with the West”.¹⁰⁴ However, Soviet policies towards Turkey had softened following the death of Stalin (shortly after which the Soviet Union renounced its previous territorial claims from Turkey and embarked on a peace offensive towards the Turks in the context of its new global foreign policy of peaceful coexistence of the two blocs¹⁰⁵), but this had little effect in changing Turkey's perceptions of and policies towards the Soviet Union as Turkish policy-makers believed that the Soviet change of policy was only cosmetic and because Turkey feared that a rapprochement with the Soviets could endanger its relations with the United States. Moreover, the Soviet efforts to establish close relations with Turkey's

¹⁰² Nur Bilge Criss, *Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair*, pp 101-102.

¹⁰³ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁴ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p. 112.

¹⁰⁵ Haluk Ülman, “NATO ve Türkiye (NATO and Turkey),” *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* Vol. 22, (1967), pp. 150-151.

southern neighbors, Syria and Iraq caused a fear of encirclement on Turkey's part and "the violent crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution only worked to confirm Turkish suspicions about ultimate Soviet motives".¹⁰⁶ Thus, till the mid-1960s, Turkey would reject Soviet offers of a rapprochement and "would make known their desire that Turkish-Soviet relations would remain within the framework of East-West relations".¹⁰⁷

2.2.3. Economic ties and domestic politics

As mentioned previously, Turkey needed American economic and military assistance for financing its economic development and the United States needed close relations with Turkey for the sake of its national interests, which resulted in the extension of aid to the Turks by the United States. Therefore, Turkey constantly sought economic aid from the United States, but from the very beginning, it was disappointed by the amount of aid that it actually received and the strings attached to such aid.¹⁰⁸ ¹⁰⁹ So, in this sense, cooperation in the economic field would become a thorny aspect of the Turkish-American relationship in the 1950s. According to American observer Ferenc Vali (1971: 331), "it was only understandable that the U.S. government and Congress were anxious that American taxpayers' money should be put to proper use."¹¹⁰ "The strings attached to U.S. economic assistance criticized by the Turks" (during the

¹⁰⁶ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p.113.

¹⁰⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East*, p.5.

¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the United States did provide Turkey with economic aid totaling \$2,351 million from 1947 to 1968; Turkey ranked sixth among the countries receiving American aid in that period: Leo Tansky, *US and USSR aid to developing countries: A comparative study of India, Turkey and the U.A.R.* (New York: Praeger, 1968).

¹⁰⁹ U.S. economic assistance was handled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

¹¹⁰ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 331.

stabilization fund controversy of the mid-1950s, whereby the U.S. refused to provide the \$300 million that Turkey asked from the Americans in order to solve its financial problems-unless the DP government promised to take the necessary economic austerity measures) “were seen as necessary concomitants of the Turkish dependency on aid and not a result of an American policy to control the Turkish economy.”¹¹¹ Washington was definitely not happy about having to extend economic aid to Turkey. “But because the American intention was to put Turkey (and other aid recipients) on its own feet, it nonetheless appeared necessary to control the use of the assistance to produce the optimum results.”¹¹² The Turks on the other hand perceived such American pre-conditions as interference in Turkish internal affairs. But nevertheless, Taşhan maintains that “although various American sources pointed out 1954 as the date for the beginning of change in Turkish-American relations” after Turkey failed to obtain the desired amount of economic assistance from the United States, “it is difficult to say that this failure had any influence that went beyond a sense of mild disappointment in Turkey and it certainly evoked no change in the Turkish attitude towards the United States”.¹¹³

As mentioned above, the DP government continuously pressured the United States for a \$300 million fund to stabilize the Turkish economy between 1954 and 1958, but American officials rejected the request due to the Democrat Party government’s unwillingness to apply rational, and not populist, economic policies. In that context, the U.S. called on the Turkish government to cut back investments, reduce agricultural subsidies, increase tax rates and significantly

¹¹¹ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 331.

¹¹² Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 331.

¹¹³ Seyfi Taşhan, “Turkish-US Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday,” *Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute*, Vol.11, Nos.1-2, p. 8.

devalue the Turkish lira. But this American request “would mean slower economic growth and thus Menderes remained unwilling to adopt these measures until he had exhausted every other alternative”.¹¹⁴ Harris points out that “for almost four years, the Turkish and American governments fought a behind-the-scenes battle over this issue”.¹¹⁵ But by 1958, the Turkish economy had come to the brink of financial insolvency which compelled Menderes to finally agree to apply the American prescriptions. “To assist him in carrying out these measures, the West provided \$359 million in credit, of which the big majority came from the United States. This eased the economic crisis for the time being”.¹¹⁶

The DP government believed that Turkey's importance to the West would force the U.S. to provide extensive economic assistance even if they refused to follow an economic policy along the lines requested by the American aid mission. Harris believes that “such a calculation was by no means far-fetched”. “While the Americans continually pressed Turkey to follow rational economic policies”, the U.S. eventually provided the economic assistance to save Turkey from financial insolvency.¹¹⁷

Meanwhile, it was “alleged at the time that after the overthrow of the pro-Western Iraqi regime in 1958, Menderes had begun to appeal to the United States to promise help if Turkey was threatened with communists internally”.¹¹⁸ At about the same time, the Middle Eastern members of CENTO were pressing the United

¹¹⁴ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 74.

¹¹⁵ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 74-75.

¹¹⁶ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 73.

¹¹⁷ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 73.

¹¹⁸ Metin Toker, *İsmet Paşa (Vol. 2)*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi), p.39 quoted in Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p. 397.

States to join the Pact as a full member. Consequently, Washington started bilateral negotiations with the Middle Eastern members of CENTO to forge closer bilateral relations without becoming a full member of the organization. One outcome of this was the signing in 1959 of a Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Turkey. According to the agreement, the United States agreed, “in case of ‘internal aggression’ against Turkey to take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon in order to assist the Turkish Government at its request.”¹¹⁹ “In the Turkish context the term ‘internal aggression’ gained special meaning”,¹²⁰ for relations between the ruling DP and the opposition RPP had begun to deteriorate and the DP had imposed restrictions on the press and the opposition. Members of the RPP feared that this treaty included an American commitment to suppress the opposition upon the DP’s request. “But, clearly at this stage the reaction caused by the Cooperation agreement was directed primarily against the DP and was by no means sharply aimed against the U.S. Few Turks were yet essentially mistrustful of American motives”.¹²¹

2.3. The aftermath of the 1960 coup and the Cuban missile crisis (1962)

On May 27, 1960, the Turkish armed forces overthrew the Menderes government in order to preserve national unity, “avert fratricide” and prevent the breakdown of the political system. The coup-makers feared American intervention in view of the aforementioned 1959 Bilateral Agreement, so their first

¹¹⁹ For the full text of this agreement, refer to George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 221-223.

¹²⁰ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.68.

¹²¹ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 70.

announcement was to assert that Turkey would abide by its foreign policy commitments and that it would continue to be a member of NATO and CENTO. The Americans were satisfied with the fact that the coup was not directed against Turkey's Western connection and it soon became clear that the U.S. had no afterthoughts about recognizing and supporting the military regime.

There was no major disagreement among members of the junta as regards Turkey's foreign policy. They believed that continuing the close alliance relationship with the U.S. was in the final analysis, to Turkey's benefit and they therefore rejected Soviet offers of aid and neutrality. Further, "coming out of Turkey's military tradition, they were reasonably satisfied with Washington's performance, although they did aspire to regulate U.S. personnel more rigorously than in the past in order to prevent abuses of extraterritoriality and to ensure the application of Turkish laws".¹²² Consequently, no major change would take place in either Turkish foreign policy or Turkish-American relations and the catalyst for substantial change in relations between the two countries would only come following the Cyprus crisis of 1964.

In the domestic front, the military leaders embarked on a campaign to democratize the regime, including the promulgation of a new constitution that provided for extensive political rights and freedoms. This would lead to changes that would eventually have important effects on Turkey's foreign policy orientation. Civilian government was eventually restored and after general elections in October 1961, a coalition government under İsmet İnönü's leadership was established.

¹²² George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, pp. 185-186.

Meanwhile, in 1959, Turkey had signed a bilateral agreement with the United States whereby it agreed to install on its soil, fifteen intermediate-range Jupiter ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads. The missiles became operational in the spring of 1962 and were subject to the dual-key system, that is, they could only be used with the joint permission of the American and Turkish governments. What prompted the United States to take such an action was the “Soviet development of a long-range missile initiated by the Sputnik experiment in 1957”.

The myth of a missile gap between the US and the USSR soon became prevalent in the American media and although the U.S. policy-makers knew better, the myth had to be propagated perhaps in order to justify military/defense spending coupled with the policy of strengthening the Atlantic linkage.¹²³

The main reasons for the Turkish decision-makers to want strategic nuclear missiles on Turkish territory, despite the risk of causing problems with and being the potential nuclear target of a neighboring super power in case of a war and even though weapons of mass destruction are not necessarily defensive, were enhancing Turkey’s deterrence against the Soviet bloc, displaying solidarity with the American ally and “the hope of increasing the United States' strategic dependence on Turkey. Increased aid from the U.S. could follow at a time when Turkey was in dire economic straits”.¹²⁴ “Promoting mutual dependence also seemed to be an insurance against a possible East-West rapprochement”.¹²⁵

Meanwhile, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had realized that the Jupiters had been rendered obsolete by technological developments. Accordingly, on several occasions during 1961 and 1962, U.S.

¹²³ Nur Bilge Criss, *Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair*, p. 103.

¹²⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, *Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair*, pp. 98-103.

¹²⁵ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West: 1946-1999*, p. 8.

President John Kennedy asked for a review of the decision to deploy the missiles, only to be met with vehement Turkish opposition. Consequently, the Jupiters were still in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis erupted in the fall of 1962.

This exposed Turkey to the risk of being faced with nuclear annihilation during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and made it the subject of super power secret diplomacy and turned it into a bargaining chip. In return for the U.S. promise to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey (without consulting the Turkish government), the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles from Cuba. Nevertheless, at the time, “it appeared” to the public at large “that the Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba without the U.S. having to make any concessions on the Turkish Jupiters”. “This was the line that was held by both the Kennedy administration and the İnönü government”.¹²⁶ However, in his memoirs published in 1968, President Kennedy's brother, U.S. Attorney-General Robert Kennedy confessed that, “on the president's instructions, he had met the Soviet ambassador, Dobrynin on 27 October, that is, before Khrushchev's letter agreeing to the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles had been received.” He had told the ambassador that “if the Soviets agreed to withdraw its missiles, it was their judgement that, within a short time after the crisis was over, the Jupiters would be gone.”¹²⁷ So the Kennedy administration had bargained with the Soviet Union over Turkey's interests without consulting its government.

“Turkey proved to be more sensitive to this breach of protocol than to the removal of the missiles. Moreover, being presented with what was perceived as a *fait accompli* upset Turkish confidence about the absolute commitment of the

¹²⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 135.

¹²⁷ Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Norton, 1961), pp. 86-87 quoted in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 135.

United States to Turkey's defense".¹²⁸ As George E. Gruen concluded, "the seeds were sown for a lingering suspicion in Ankara that Washington might be tempted by superpower considerations to bargain away Turkey's security interests"¹²⁹ and "the stage was set for a reevaluation of links with the United States".¹³⁰ Turkish foreign policy makers started to realize that being a NATO member was not necessarily tantamount to increased security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The danger of nuclear annihilation that the crisis caused for Turkey led to criticism against the uni-dimensional Turkish foreign policy of almost exclusive dependence on the U.S. On a positive note, with the removal of the Jupiters, Turkey was no longer a major target in a possible nuclear war and this removed an important obstacle before the improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations and underscored the need to adopt more flexible policies vis-a-vis the superpowers in the second half of the 1960s. But because the super power bargain was not known to the public at large at the time, it did not lead to much public criticism of the United States in Turkey and in any event, the much more important Cyprus crisis of 1964 would eclipse the effects of the Cuban missile crisis on Turkish-American relations.

¹²⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, *U.S. Forces in Turkey*, pp. 346-347.

¹²⁹ George E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in the Alliance: US Interests in the Middle East and the Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. 24, (1980), p. 369 quoted in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 136.

¹³⁰ George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, p.186.

CHAPTER III

ADAPTING TO CHANGE: TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1964-1974

3.1. The 1964 Cyprus crisis

The Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 with the end of British colonial rule. The Greek Cypriot nationalist movement, which aimed to gain the island's independence from Britain and then achieve *enosis* i.e. union of the island with Greece, had “gained momentum in the 1950s and started to challenge British rule.” “Turkey became a party to the dispute when the possibility of ending British rule began to be discussed.”¹³¹ Eventually, a compromise was reached between the Greek, Turkish and British governments in 1959-1960 through the Zurich-London Agreements. A federal constitution establishing a bi-communal checks and balances system to safeguard the security and protection of the rights of the outnumbered Turkish Cypriots was elaborated. The island became independent and an alliance agreement was signed between Greece, Turkey, Britain and Cyprus. Moreover, Britain, Turkey and Greece, through a treaty of guarantee, would jointly insure the protection of the constitutional order and each had the right to intervene on the island jointly or independently if the

¹³¹ İter Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, (Ridgway Working Group on Challenges to U.S. Foreign and Military Policy, November 2005), p. 3.

constitutional order was violated.¹³² Taşhan (Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus: 166) argues that “the West was content with the signing of these treaties because it would eliminate a source of conflict between Turkey and Greece.” “The Communist world was also pleased with the creation of a new non-aligned country open for the possible future development of communism.”¹³³

However, the Greek Cypriot president of the republic, Archbishop Makarios and Greek nationalists considered the creation of the Republic of Cyprus as only the first step towards the realization of their eventual goal i.e. *enosis*. Even though the 1959-1960 Agreements that they had signed ruled out *enosis*, they intended to overthrow these agreements. Thus, soon after independence, Makarios began to complain that the constitution hampered effective governance. In December 1963, he proposed thirteen constitutional amendments to the Turkish side which, if implemented, would do away with most of the special rights of the Turkish community on the island and hence reduce them into a mere minority. The Turkish Cypriots vehemently refused the proposals and were forced to withdraw from the Cyprus government. Tensions on the island began to rise. On December 21, 1963, the Greek Cypriots launched an attack on the Turkish community in order to solve the problem through the use of force, which led Turkey to contemplate a military intervention in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. “From early on, Turkish Prime Minister İnönü had wanted the United States to address the problem,”¹³⁴ but was informed by the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “that the U.S. was not a party to the conflict”.¹³⁵ ¹³⁶ “To underline the

¹³² For more information on the Zurich-London Agreements, see Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, (Ipswich: The Ipswich Book Company, 1987), pp. 21-25.

¹³³ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p.166.

¹³⁴ İlder Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 4.

¹³⁵ Faruk Sönmezoglu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980* (The United States' Policy towards Turkey), (İstanbul: Der Yayınevi, 1995), pp. 8-9.

urgency of the problem, Turkey flew its jets over the island on December 25, 1963.’’¹³⁷ This action led to a failed attempt by the three guarantor powers to negotiate over the establishment of a peacekeeping force to be stationed on the island. ‘‘Inter-communal fighting prompted by the Greek Cypriots to coerce the Turkish Cypriots into accepting the constitutional demands continued.’’¹³⁸ The Turkish prime minister told the American Ambassador in Ankara, Raymond Hare on January 28 that ‘‘unless the rights of the Turkish Cypriots were assured, Turkey would have to exercise its legal right under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and intervene on the island.’’¹³⁹ As a result of İnönü’s warning, an Anglo-American plan, which foresaw the establishment of a NATO peacekeeping force to be stationed on the island, was prepared. However, Makarios, who was following a policy of non-alignment and believed that a NATO force in Cyprus would help consolidate the Zurich-London Agreements, rejected the plan. Efforts to convince him to accept the plan failed. Soon after, Makarios unilaterally abrogated the 1960 Treaty of Alliance with Britain, Greece and Turkey and ‘‘decided to form a Cypriot army, a decision in contravention of the 1959-1960 Agreements.’’¹⁴⁰

These developments and the escalation of attacks on the Turkish community led Turkey to consider a military intervention on the island once again.

‘‘The U. S. was still trying to not get actively involved in the conflict, hoping that

¹³⁶ According to Seyfi Taşhan, the primary concern of the United States Government was over the effect of the Cyprus dispute upon the relations between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, from the very beginning of the Cyprus conflict, the United States tried to follow a policy of neutrality and non-interference in the conflict, for it involved two allies and it seemed necessary to be equidistant to Greece and Turkey in order not to alienate either party: Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p.168.

¹³⁷ İter Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 4.

¹³⁸ İter Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 4.

¹³⁹ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri:1947-1964*, pp. 225-241.

¹⁴⁰ Faruk Sönmezoglu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası:1964-1980*, p. 14.

Britain, Turkey and Greece would be able to find a solution.’’¹⁴¹ On June 4, 1964, İsmet İnönü told the U.S. Ambassador Hare that Turkey would intervene on Cyprus. Mr. Hare asked for a postponement so that he could consult his government. İnönü accepted. ‘‘Washington reacted to İnönü’s apparent determination with haste.’’¹⁴² The next day, the Turkish government received a very harshly-worded letter from American President Lyndon Johnson,¹⁴³ asking Turkey not to stage a military intervention. The letter, written in a condescending style, rejected İnönü’s assertion that all peaceful means had been tried and stated that Turkey did not yet have the right to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus. Moreover, it implied that NATO might not come to the defense of Turkey if its unilateral action led to a Soviet intervention ‘‘(Given that the Soviet government had been strongly supportive of Makarios, this was not an empty threat).’’¹⁴⁴

Johnson said:

I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.

He then pointed out that he was committed to a peaceful means of finding a solution to the problem and invited İnönü to the United States to settle the problem through negotiations.

¹⁴¹ İter Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 5.

¹⁴² Süha Bölükbaşı, ‘‘The Johnson Letter Revisited,’’ *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 29, No.3, (1993), p. 517.

¹⁴³ The letter was drafted by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretaries of State Harlan Cleveland and Joseph Sisco: Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu: Türk-ABD İlişkilerini Değiştiren Olayın Perde Arkası* (The Johnson Letter: The Background of the Letter that Changed Turkish-American Relations), (İstanbul: Gendaş A. Ş., 2002), p. 30.

¹⁴⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.149.

“İnönü, not surprisingly, decided to cancel the intervention and accepted Johnson’s offer of negotiations.”¹⁴⁵ “His visit to Washington took place on 22 and 23 June 1964, and there he was persuaded by President Johnson that the U.S. would now take things more firmly in its hands.”¹⁴⁶ Both İnönü and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou agreed to the appointment of former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson as Johnson’s Cyprus mediator.¹⁴⁷ “Papandreou at first seemed reluctant to accept an American mediation, but Dean Rusk convinced him by saying that Johnson would not forestall a new Turkish landing attempt, and even if he tried it was doubtful that the Turks would listen to him again.”¹⁴⁸

The Turkish and Greek representatives met with Mr. Acheson in Geneva on 14 July 1964. His plan foresaw the union of Cyprus with Greece; for a military base in the north under full Turkish sovereignty and several Turkish cantons exercising local autonomy. Turkey was ready to accept the plan, provided that the base area was sufficiently big, covering the whole Karpas Peninsula. The Greeks however, did not want to cede land to Turkey permanently and were only willing to offer a smaller military base for 25 years. Before discussions on the plan started, violence once more erupted in Cyprus when Greek Cypriot forces attacked a

¹⁴⁵ Most analysts agree that, because Turkey lacked the military equipment necessary to carry out a landing operation on Cyprus, because international conditions were unfavorable (i.e. the troubled relations between Turkey and the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet support for Makarios) and because of his generally cautious foreign policy, which led him to prefer a peaceful settlement involving American mediation, İnönü had no real intention to embark Turkey on a landing operation in Cyprus. But due to strong domestic pressure to stage an intervention due to the violence against Turkish Cypriots, “he believed that only a strong warning from the United States could justify reconsidering the military option.” He thus escalated the crisis so that the U.S. would be forced to be involved in the solution of the problem. Hence, he announced Turkey’s intention to the U.S. Ambassador knowing that Mr. Hare would ask for a postponement of Turkey’s military operation. The warning led to the Johnson letter and succeeded in pulling the U.S. into the conflict, saving Turkey from a military intervention which could possibly fail. The U.S. became the scapegoat: Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu: Türk-ABD İlişkilerini Değiştiren Olayın Perde Arkası*, pp. 102-103, Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, pp. 520-521 and İlter Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁶ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, p. 517.

¹⁴⁷ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, p. 517.

¹⁴⁸ Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 108 quoted in Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, pp. 517-518.

Turkish enclave, prompting a Turkish bombardment on the Greek Cypriot forces on 8 and 9 August, which led the UN Security Council to adopt a cease-fire resolution, and “Khrushchev to intimidate Ankara with ‘grave consequences’.”¹⁴⁹ İnönü and Makarios accepted the cease-fire and the negotiations resumed in Geneva on 15 August 1964. Yet the revised “second” Acheson Plan was not satisfying to Turkey because it now foresaw the leasing-instead of cession-to Turkey of a small base.¹⁵⁰ Makarios rejected the plan, too, for he couldn’t settle for anything less than *enosis* of the entire island. Therefore, the Geneva Conference ended in failure.¹⁵¹

After the December 1963 and August 1964 battles in Cyprus, the conditions which the Zurich-London Agreements foresaw “ceased to exist.”¹⁵² Cypriot Turks had to withdraw into small, land-locked enclaves and constantly faced the danger of massacres by the numerically superior Greek Cypriots. They stopped the efforts to participate in the Greek-led Cyprus government, which was internationally recognized as the legitimate government of the whole island. Greek Cypriots on the other hand, started a blockade over the Turkish Cypriot enclaves.¹⁵³ Moreover, Greece managed to infiltrate 20,000 troops into the island between 1964 and 1967.¹⁵⁴

The U.S. Administration, meanwhile, was “growing frustrated with the failure of its mediation,” believing that “the Geneva negotiations had stood a good chance of success had it not been the interference of Makarios,” on whom

¹⁴⁹ Cumhuriyet, 9 August 1964 quoted in Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, p. 518.

¹⁵⁰ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, p. 518.

¹⁵¹ This account on Mr. Acheson’s mediation efforts relies mainly on Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, pp. 518-519 and Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD’nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980*, pp. 17-20.

¹⁵² Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), p. 371.

¹⁵³ The blockade continued until 1967.

¹⁵⁴ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, p. 522.

the United States had very little influence, “forcing Papandreou to be intransigent.”¹⁵⁵ Moreover, Makarios’s cordial relations with the Third World and the communist world displeased the American government, which consequently started to favor *enosis* or partition of Cyprus.

3.2. The Johnson letter

As mentioned above, President Johnson tried to avert a Turkish intervention on Cyprus by implying in his letter that the U.S. would not come to Turkey’s help if the Soviets attacked Turkey following a Turkish intervention on Cyprus. He also told İnönü that, under article four of the Aid to Turkey Agreement of 1947, “Turkey was required to obtain America’s consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished.” Johnson added, “I must tell you in all candor that the U.S. cannot agree to the use of any American-supplied equipment for Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.”¹⁵⁶

In his reply to the letter, İnönü maintained that “if the commitment of an alliance was conditional, this would destroy the credibility of the alliance,” adding that “in case of such an event, a new world order would be established and Turkey would take its place in that order.”^{157 158} He maintained that:

One condition of the 1947 Aid to Turkey agreement regarding U.S. military assistance to Turkey was that it conformed to the principles of independence and security of the two countries. This aid was given in return for Turkey’s placing at American disposal a number of facilities intended for joint use. Thus, the requirement that Turks must use their

¹⁵⁵ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Johnson Letter Revisited*, p. 519.

¹⁵⁶ For the full text of Johnson’s letter and İnönü’s reply to it, see: *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer 1966), pp. 386-393.

¹⁵⁷ İlder Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ That a similar view would never again be voiced was an indication that U.S. policy makers had realized the dangerous implications of such a statement.

army and equipment only with the consent of the U.S. would contradict the independence of Turkey.¹⁵⁹

According to Seyfi Taşhan (*Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on the Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday: 9*), this new American perception “marked a change” in Turkish-American relations. He asserts that “this change when compared with an incident that took place only six years earlier” showed how radically the American view of the alliance had been altered.¹⁶⁰ “In 1958, during the crisis at Lebanon, Turkey was rumored to have had troop concentrations along the Syrian border. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had threatened to overrun Turkey if Turkey attacked Syria. At that time, the reaction of the U.S. government was swift and categorical: “any Soviet attack on Turkey would meet with the automatic response of the Atlantic Alliance”. “The Johnson letter was therefore considered as a step back” and interpreted as “introducing an arbitrariness into the functioning of the Alliance.”¹⁶¹

The reasons for this change of perception and attitude on the American part deserve closer examination: According to Oral Sander (1975:18), “the nuclear balance of power of the early 1950s had been transformed into a nuclear balance of terror, which stabilized the relations between the two super powers.”¹⁶² Further, international relations of the 1950s and Cold War politics were different from international relations in the 1960s and détente (i.e. the improvement in the relations between the two super powers) politics. Moreover, the advent of long-range missiles meant that the U.S. no longer needed air bases in Turkey to be able to hit the Soviet Union. These changes meant that Turkey's role and strategic

¹⁵⁹ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 167-168.

¹⁶⁰ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday*, p.9.

¹⁶¹ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday*, p.9.

¹⁶² Oral Sander, *Turkey: The Staunchest Ally of the United States?*, p. 18.

importance in NATO and in the Cold War diminished and Turkey's influence would follow suit. According to him, "this helps explain the change in American behavior."¹⁶³

Members of the Johnson Administration on the other hand maintained that, "President Johnson and his senior advisers were so concerned lest a Turkish move against Cyprus precipitate war between Greece and Turkey that they hastily dispatched such a letter." According to the advisers who participated in its drafting, "the harshness of the tone-reflecting the shortness of time and also the exasperation that the specter of Turkish intervention could not be laid to rest-seemed essential to head off Turkish action."¹⁶⁴

3.2.1. The effects of the Johnson letter

Although the Johnson letter was not made public for the next eighteen months, its contents were partially leaked to the Turkish press by the Turkish government soon after its receipt. Turkey, in both official and public opinion level, was shocked by the letter's harsh tone and particularly by Mr. Johnson's implication that NATO might not necessarily and automatically come to Turkey's help against the Soviets, which led to questions concerning the reliability of the American commitments. The letter led to resentment against and disillusionment with the United States as the Turks felt abandoned by the U.S. despite Turkey's total loyalty to the Western Alliance. Moreover, restraining only Turkey from intervention was perceived by the Turks as taking the Greek side by "permitting a

¹⁶³ This paragraph relies mainly on Oral Sander, *Turkey: The Staunchest Ally of the United States?*, pp. 10-24.

¹⁶⁴ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 114-115 and Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu: Türk-ABD İlişkilerini Değiştiren Olayın Perde Arkası*, pp. 29-65.

buildup of Greek Cypriot forces equipped with foreign arms, which could be used to attack and liquidate the Turkish community at will.’’¹⁶⁵ The letter left a long-lasting legacy on Turkish-American relations and ‘‘from that time forth,’’ noted Harris, ‘‘all Turkish governments would be on the defensive in regard to the American connection, and the memories of the Johnson letter would color popular impressions of the United States for the years to come’’.¹⁶⁶ The letter also indicated to Turkish policy makers that the national security interests of the two countries were not necessarily congruent and that, in American eyes, Turkey’s strategic importance was not as important as it once used to be. Furthermore, the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the subsequent Johnson letter made Turkish foreign policy makers realize that the uni-dimensional and uncautious foreign policy (of overdependence on the U.S. and the urge to follow a policy similar to that of the Americans) that had been followed in the 1950s and early 1960s had caused Turkey to become dependent on the U.S.A. and restricted its freedom of action. As of that date, the close Turkish-American alliance relationship, which began with the Truman Doctrine and reached its peak in the 1950s and early 1960s, would begin to cool. A torrent of public protests against the U.S. ensued and the letter, along with other factors, was instrumental in ushering an anti-American aura in Turkey.¹⁶⁷ In this context, the 1964 Cyprus conflict and the following Johnson letter became the catalysts for the need to implement changes in Turkish foreign policy and thus follow a more multi-dimensional course. And, as of 1964, Turkey would embark on an attempt to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, the

¹⁶⁵ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.112.

¹⁶⁶ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.116.

¹⁶⁷ According to Turkish scholar İlder Turan, following the Johnson letter, ‘‘the domestic anti-American movements acquired a political legitimacy that they had never had before’’: İlder Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 7.

Third World and Middle Eastern countries in the context of its new, multi-dimensional foreign policy.

Having said these, the pro-Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy would never be questioned at the policy-making level. Turkey did want to retain its NATO membership and continue the relations with the United States as the main aspect of its defense and foreign policy, but its relationship with the Americans and the Atlantic Alliance would be altered, and Turkey's dependency on them would be lessened in order to ensure greater freedom of action in foreign policy.

However, it would be an oversimplification to base the changes, as of 1964, in Turkish-American relations and in Turkey's foreign policy towards the non-Western world only on the Johnson letter. In the 1960s, there were also "important systemic and internal changes" that led Turkey to "re-evaluate its strictly Western orientation."¹⁶⁸ Mustafa Aydın (2000: 115) points out that:

The detente process and the consequent loosening of the bipolar balance, which had initiated important changes in world politics, also greatly affected Turkey's international position. The Cold War had earlier necessitated, on the one hand, Turkey's dependency on the U.S., but on the other, also sustained unquestioning Western support either militarily or politically including economic aid. During the 1950s the Soviet threat was felt by Turkey so much that there was no reason for on the Turkish part to question its total dependence on the West, as long as the West (mainly the U.S.) committed itself to protect Turkey from Soviet aggression. But, the 1960s witnessed a softening of inter-bloc tensions.¹⁶⁹

Although, international relations continued to be dominated by the two super powers, the thaw in the Cold War decreased the animosity between the two blocs

¹⁶⁸ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p.115.

¹⁶⁹ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p.115.

and “gave smaller states a considerable degree of autonomy in their foreign policies.”¹⁷⁰

Moreover, partly as a result of the thaw in the Cold War and partly due to the Soviets’ continuous overtures for better relations with Turkey, there took place a change in Turkish perceptions of the U.S.S.R., whereby the Soviets no longer seemed as big a threat to Turkey’s security. Further, Turkish foreign policy makers had realized that Soviet support for the Greek Cypriots seriously weakened Turkey’s position on the Cyprus question and “made it more vulnerable to American pressure.” Since the Soviet government had desired an improvement in its relations with Turkey since 1953, “the Soviet-Turkish détente developed quickly”.¹⁷¹

Another international development that prompted a change in Turkish foreign policy was the adoption by first the Kennedy Administration, then by NATO of the strategy of “flexible response and limited war” following the achievement of nuclear parity between the two superpowers. This development led to doubts in Turkish minds that NATO would not come to the Turks’ help aid if Turkey were attacked by the U.S.S.R. This could mean that their allies could possibly sacrifice the Turks to receive a concession from the Soviet bloc. “For the Turks then, the emergence of détente and the aforementioned strategic and technological developments signified a loss of bargaining power with the West, a bargaining power based on the Cold War and Turkey’s strategic position.”¹⁷² This reinforced trends towards the adoption of a more independent and multi-

¹⁷⁰ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası (Vol.1)* (Turkish Foreign Policy) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp.657-680.

¹⁷¹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.151.

¹⁷² Oral Sander, *Turkey: The Staunchest Ally of the United States?*, pp. 10-24 and Van Coughoudakis, *Turkey and the United States: The Problems of a post-war Alliance*, p.189.

dimensional foreign policy. Moreover, the import substitution economic policy adopted in the early 1960s accentuated Turkey's need to find foreign financing. As aid from the U.S. was declining, Turkey would have to improve its economic relations with the non-Western world.¹⁷³

In such a changed international environment, Turkey could afford to and did need to follow a more diversified and multi-dimensional foreign policy and improve its economic and political relations with the Soviet bloc and the Third World. Parallel to these international developments, Aydın (2000: 16) asserts that “Turkey had gone through important socio-political changes, a combination of which affected the approach of Turkish people to the matters of foreign policy.”¹⁷⁴

Up to the early 1960s, Turkish foreign policy decision making and implementation was conducted by a very small group of elites, which included the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and there was very little, if any, public criticism of government foreign policy. However, after the 1960 coup and the promulgation of a very liberal constitution in 1961, which enhanced pluralism in Turkish politics, foreign policy became a topic of parliamentary debates and started to attract much more public attention. Further, “the new electoral law introduced a system of proportional representation which allowed small parties to enter the Parliament and therefore created a multiplicity of views in foreign policy.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Duygu Sezer, “Türkiye'nin Ekonomik İlişkileri: 1945-1965 (Turkey's Economic Relations: 1945-1965),” pp. 431-487. In Mehmet Gönlübol, ed., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1995*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996).

¹⁷⁴ The following discussion on the internal developments that prompted a change in Turkish foreign policy relies mainly on Mustafa Aydın's *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, pp.116-119.

¹⁷⁵ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p.117.

“Along with a pluralist parliament, the new system also created a plural society”¹⁷⁶ by providing for extensive rights and freedoms. Under this air of freedom, foreign policy issues became an important part of public discussion and consequently, public opinion, the majority of which wanted a re-orientation in Turkey’s foreign relations, began to exercise more pressure on governmental foreign policy.

Yet another factor which was to indirectly contribute to the reorientation of Turkey’s foreign policy was the emergence, following the 1961 Constitution, for the first time in Turkey’s history of a genuine socialist movement, which advocated the destruction of Turkey’s ties with the West and the normalization of relations with the non-aligned and communist countries.¹⁷⁷

Its anti-Western and anti-American campaign started to win supporters from the masses after the Cyprus crisis of 1964. As a result of these domestic developments, the Turkish leadership became more receptive to public opinion and this was an important factor that led them to re-evaluate Turkey’s foreign policy with more emphasis on relations with the Middle East and the Soviet Union and to follow a more independent policy vis-à-vis the United States.

However, Mustafa Aydın (2000: 119) claims that:

In terms of fostering a new direction in Turkish foreign policy, the developments stated above affected only a limited circle of politicians and intellectuals until the Cyprus crisis. Not until the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the following Johnson letter did the emerging independent policy trend at the top find wide support. Cyprus and the following Johnson letter, then, were the catalysts which compelled Turkey to re-examine its foreign policy in the light of a rapidly changing world system.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, pp.118.

¹⁷⁷ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, pp.118.

¹⁷⁸ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*, p. 119.

3.2.2. Turkey's more independent and multi-faceted foreign policy

As a result of the aforementioned developments, Turkey embarked on a foreign policy course of reducing its political, military and economic dependence on the United States and NATO and developing its relations with the non-Western world. The Turks no longer automatically followed American policies as they concluded that Turkish and American national interests were not necessarily confluent. Military relations between Turkey and the U.S. would come to develop within the NATO framework, too and not merely on a bilateral level and Turkey would no longer automatically allow the use of NATO-cum-American bases on its soil for non-NATO purposes. Bilateral agreements between the two countries would be revised and “any concessions granted to Americans in Turkey that went beyond privileges extended by other NATO members would be repealed.”¹⁷⁹ Turkey would also try to reduce its dependency on American aid. Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy makers did not rule out cooperation with the U.S. and did not contemplate pulling out of NATO,¹⁸⁰ but “ceased to follow American policies automatically and tried to make a decision concerning each foreign policy issue only after due consideration was given with regard to Turkish national interests.”¹⁸¹

To give a few tangible examples of this new policy, Turkey, in 1965, withdrew its support, due to Soviet objections, to the plan to establish a

¹⁷⁹ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, pp. 137-146.

¹⁸⁰ Turkish foreign policy decision makers never seriously contemplated pulling out of NATO, because they knew that if Turkey did resign from NATO membership, (1) The economic aid that it received would decline significantly. (2) It would have to spend more money on defense. (3) NATO enhanced Turkey's deterrence against the Soviet Union. (4) Withdrawal from NATO membership would weaken Turkey in its conflict with Greece and Cyprus. (5) It would hamper Turkey's cherished goal of becoming an equal member of the Western world: Fahir Armaoğlu, “Turkey and the United States: A New Alliance,” *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı* (The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations) Vol. 6, (1965), Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, pp.159-161, Sezai Orkunt, *Cumhuriyet*, April 10, 11, 12, 1968 and Mehmet Gönübol, *NATO and Turkey*, pp. 1-38.

¹⁸¹ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p.133.

Multilateral Force (MLF) of nuclear within NATO. “In 1965, it for the first time criticized the United States’ Vietnam policy.”¹⁸² “In 1968, it refused to allow NATO maneuvers to be held along the Syrian border because of the unrest in the Middle East.”¹⁸³ Between 1966 and 1969, it renegotiated the bilateral agreements between itself and the United States and consequently, it started to exercise more control over the American military presence on Turkish soil.

The U.S., on the other hand, in order not to further harm relations with the Turks, sought to calm down Turkey. For example, in order “to mitigate the fears provoked by the Johnson letter,” it repeatedly “assured” Turkey that it would come to Turkey’s help “if it was attacked by the U.S.S.R. while using its treaty rights on Cyprus.”¹⁸⁴ Moreover, in 1965, “it even voted against a UN General Assembly resolution favoring the Greek position,” although it “generally sympathized with the Resolution.”¹⁸⁵

3.2.2.1. Turkish-Soviet relations in the post-1964 era

One of Ankara’s main tasks in the context of its new foreign policy was to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Turkish foreign policy makers placed only two conditions on the establishment of good relations between the two countries, namely, a more balanced attitude towards the Cyprus issue and acceptance of Turkey’s membership in NATO.

¹⁸² Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 674.

¹⁸³ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 136.

¹⁸⁴ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 120.

¹⁸⁵ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp.120-121.

“The Soviet Union, which had been trying to woo Ankara since the death of Stalin reacted vigorously.”¹⁸⁶ In order to take advantage of the problems in Turkish-American relations, the U.S.S.R. now adopted a more neutral policy in the Cyprus dispute. Visits of high level officials ensued, culminating in an exchange of visits by the Presidents in 1969. In 1972, the two countries signed a Declaration on the Principles of Good Neighborly Relations, “although this did not amount to much in practical terms.”¹⁸⁷

Trade and economic relations between the two parties increased. The Soviets extended \$200 million in an economic assistance program to construct seven major industrial facilities on concessional terms.¹⁸⁸ As a result of these developments, Turkish-Soviet relations moved very rapidly from hostility towards a rapprochement. Harris (1972: 24) points out that, “in part, the enthusiasm of the Turks represented the depths of their disappointment with U.S. policy towards Cyprus. But it also expressed pent up relief that once again normal, rather than hostile, relations were possible with the northern neighbor.”¹⁸⁹ A rapprochement with the Soviets gave Turkey not only the chance to receive a substantial amount of economic aid, but also provided it with increased security.

Yet, there were limits to this rapprochement, for it was hard for the Turkish leaders to be sure that the Soviet Union had fully abandoned its revisionist policy towards Turkey and its plans to control the Turkish Straits, and because orientation towards the West remained a core principle of Turkish foreign policy.

¹⁸⁶ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975*, p. 409.

¹⁸⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.151.

¹⁸⁸ Mehmet Altan, *Süperler ve Türkiye: Türkiye’de Amerikan ve Sovyet yatırımları* (The Superpowers and Turkey: American and Soviet Investments in Turkey), (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 1986), pp. 192-226.

¹⁸⁹ George S. Harris, *Cross-alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p.24.

3.2.2.2. Changes in post-1964 Turkish-Middle East/Third World relations

In the early 1960s, as a result of Turkey's over-zealously pro-Western policies in the 1950s, "its credit with the" Third World and with Middle Eastern countries "was bankrupt."¹⁹⁰ The UN General Assembly's acceptance of Greek Cypriot theses in 1964 and 1965 attested to the failure of Turkey's foreign policy of the 1950s. It also showed how isolated Turkey was in the international arena and accentuated the need to reduce this isolation by improving relations with the Third World in general and the Middle East in particular. According to Sander (1987: 57-58), "another factor that had an impact on the Turkish change of heart towards the non-aligned bloc was the deterioration of Turkish-American relations. The Johnson letter had clearly showed to the Turkish government that a more balanced foreign policy had become a necessity."¹⁹¹

Consequently, as of 1964, Turkey embarked on an attempt to improve its relations with the Third World and the Middle East. It tried to convince them that it had abandoned the policies of the 1950s. Accordingly, it sent goodwill missions to Third World countries and started an economic aid program to Africa. In its attitude towards Middle East crises, it started to act more cautiously, "carefully weighing the pluses and minuses of each potential action and deciding accordingly."¹⁹² Hence, it started to tilt towards the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, it did not permit the United States to use Turkish bases for aiding Israel and it tried to refrain from taking sides in intra-Arab disputes.

¹⁹⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975*, p. 410.

¹⁹¹ Oral Sander, "Turkey and the Middle East," *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, Vol. 2, No. 10, (1987-1988), pp. 57-58.

¹⁹² Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East*, p.5.

As a result of this new foreign policy, relations between Turkey and the Arabs were normalized. As political ties developed, economic relations followed suit. But as in the case of Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, there were limitations to further development of relations for Turkish governments had always given top priority to the West in their foreign policy and saw relations with the Middle East as complementary to Turkey's Western connection, not as a substitute for it. Moreover, continuing Third World/Arab suspicions concerning Turkey's extensive ties with the Western world prevented the further improvement of relations.

3.3. The rise of anti-Americanism

Following the Cyprus dispute, "persistent public questioning of American motives began"¹⁹³ and there took place a sharp increase in anti-American sentiment and anti-American protests in Turkey. A variety of accusations started to be directed towards the U.S. To name a few, "American military presence and the bilateral agreements violated Turkish sovereignty; the U.S. interfered in Turkish domestic affairs; the Americans were secretly given the right to occupy Turkish territory in case of a domestic uprising."¹⁹⁴ "These accusations against the U.S. and NATO were refuted by Turkish officials and denounced by moderate press organs,"¹⁹⁵ but to no avail. The growth of this phenomenon negatively affected Turkish-American relations in the 1960s and made cooperation in many fields very difficult.

¹⁹³ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.125.

¹⁹⁴ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, pp. 134-135.

¹⁹⁵ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, pp. 134-135.

This anti-American feeling was caused by many factors: For one thing, Taşhan (Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus: 170) asserts that “on the problem of Cyprus, which stirred so much national feeling in Turkey, the Turkish public opinion thought that “the U.S. had twice restrained and tied Turkey’s hands without being able to obtain a *quid pro quo* from the Greek side.”¹⁹⁶ Consequently, people “of all political persuasions took to the streets to protest the American role in blocking Turkey.”¹⁹⁷ Second, there was a widespread belief that the U.S. breached Turkish sovereignty. Third, some Turks, especially those from the radical left distrusted the U.S. due to its allegedly “imperialist” foreign policy. Fourth, there was a widespread belief that “the strings attached to American economic aid created a “colonial dependency” on the part of Turkey”¹⁹⁸ and that the U.S. controlled Turkish domestic and foreign policies through its proxies in the Turkish political establishment. Fifth, the rise of the radical left and the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and their staunchly anti-American propaganda led to a general climate of suspicion of the U.S. among Turkish society at large. Sixth, the 1962 Cuban Crisis made Turkey realize that the Americans could bargain away Turkey’s interests. Seventh, during the opium controversy of the 1960s and 1970s, the American attitude towards Turkey was considered condescending and led to resentments amongst Turks. These factors reinforced each other and led to the rapid rise of anti-American feelings.

Criss (2002: 472) maintains that “while subtle acts of resistance came from the military and other government officials” as a reaction to the United States’ actions that challenged Turkey’s sovereignty, “most protests came from

¹⁹⁶ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p.170.

¹⁹⁷ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.129.

¹⁹⁸ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 145.

the ideologically-motivated radical left.’’¹⁹⁹ And although government-to-government relations improved as of 1968-1969 (following the Cyrus Vance’s mediation effort whereby he was successful in solving the 1967 Cyprus crisis in a way satisfactory to the Turks and after the signing in 1969 of the Defense Cooperation Agreement), “the extreme left” in Turkey increased its “agitation against the U.S.” “In the universities and public meetings, anti-American and anti-NATO slogans became customary.’’²⁰⁰

3.3.1. Sovereignty and anti-Americanism

As indicated earlier, throughout the 1950s, Turkey had felt little need to restrict American activity on its soil. In turn, the Americans had abused this freedom of action by using it for purposes other than merely containing communism. Consequently, “friction between the Turkish and American militaries began to increase” and Turkey began to be more sensitive towards breaches of its sovereignty in the 1960s.²⁰¹ To give but a few examples, in the 1958 Lebanon crisis, the Americans had used Turkish bases to land marines in Lebanon without prior consultation with the Turks. In the U-2 incident of 1960, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had announced that the government had not given permission to the U.S. for reconnaissance flights using bases in Turkey implying that the Turkish government was not aware of such flights. This was followed by a similar incident in 1965 when an American reconnaissance aircraft crashed into the Black Sea. Despite Turkish opposition, “the U.S. military mission” insisted on “investigating the accident themselves”. “An American destroyer did not

¹⁹⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p.472.

²⁰⁰ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p. 170.

²⁰¹ Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p.473.

acknowledge Turkish warnings and tried to force its way through the Bosphorus,” before it was stopped by Turkish naval ships. Following the investigation, the Turks “concluded that the American pilot was flying over the Soviet border before his plane crashed.”²⁰² The same year, the Demirel government banned reconnaissance flights from Turkish territory. “But the ban did not prevent a similar incident in 1967” when a reconnaissance aircraft was “grounded by the Soviets when the airplane entered Soviet airspace.” The Turks accepted “the American account that the aircraft was on a cultural mission, but the general’s tenure in Turkey was short-lived.”²⁰³

“As a result of these incidents, Turkey began to exercise more control over U.S. installations on Turkish territory.”²⁰⁴ Consequently, Turkey, in three occasions, disallowed the U.S. to use bases in Turkey for out-of-area purposes.²⁰⁵ Moreover, the bilateral agreements between the two countries were renegotiated and consequently, relations were put on a more equal footing, as a result of which, the Turks started to exercise more control over American military activity on Turkish soil.

3.3.2. Ideologically motivated anti-Americanism

As mentioned above, the liberal 1961 Constitution led to the emergence of a strong socialist movement in Turkey. The new constitution also led to increased political activity among leftists, who among other things, wanted Turkish withdrawal from NATO and an end to Turkey’s American connection, while

²⁰² Nur Bilge Criss, *U.S. Forces in Turkey*, p.348.

²⁰³ Nur Bilge Criss, *U.S. Forces in Turkey*, p.349.

²⁰⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p.474.

²⁰⁵ Namely, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars and the 1969 Lebanon crisis.

“anti-Americanism and anti-Vietnam War sentiments helped fuel their radicalism.”²⁰⁶ Soon after, they established the Turkish Labor Party (TLP).

“When in 1963 the TLP made public the contents of the secret bilateral agreements between Turkey and the United States, the government was obliged to renegotiate them because some clauses were incompatible with Turkish sovereignty.” But the radical left wanted Turkey to “withdraw from NATO altogether.”²⁰⁷ At the time of the 1964 Cyprus crisis, there were widespread nationalist, anti-American demonstrations. The radical left skillfully manipulated these strong nationalist feelings and protests and succeeded in generating a general aura of suspicion of and resentment against the U.S. among Turkish society at large. Anti-American demonstrations by the leftists, the workers and the university youth became ordinary and widespread. The American presence in Turkey, military and civilian, was the major target for attack of the radical left’s staunch anti-Americanism. In late 1967, when President Johnson’s mediator for the 1967 Cyprus crisis, Mr. Cyrus Vance, arrived in Ankara, due to the anti-American demonstrations at the civilian airport, his aircraft had to land at the military airport. When the U.S. Sixth Fleet visited İstanbul in 1968, leftist university students protested and some American sailors were thrown into the sea. Consequently, the Americans tried to make their presence in Turkey “less visible” and the “number of Americans in Turkey”, along with the visits of the Sixth Fleet, were “reduced.”^{208 209}

A parallel undertaking was the transfer of the Çiğli Airport in İzmir and the radar bases at Trabzon and Samsun to the Turkish Armed Forces,

²⁰⁶ Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p.477.

²⁰⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, *A Short History of anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case*, p.477.

²⁰⁸ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 145.

²⁰⁹ Other factors that were influential in this decision were budget cuts and the Vietnam War: Nur Bilge Criss, *U.S. Forces in Turkey*, p. 344.

while the status of the radar bases at Karamürsel (Kocaeli), Sinop and Pirinçlik (Diyarbakır) and of the İncirlik airport in Adana were adjusted to the principles of the Defense and Cooperation Agreement of 1969.²¹⁰

Meanwhile, defeat in the 1969 elections²¹¹ led to disillusionment in some sections of the radical left regarding the feasibility of succeeding through the parliamentary system. As a result, some of these segments began a campaign of violence against the American military presence and personnel. They started attacking U.S. military installations. In 1969, the car of U.S. Ambassador Robert Komer was burnt on the charge that he was a “CIA” agent involved in a “conspiracy to split the left.”²¹² In December 1970 and March 1971, several American military personnel were kidnapped and briefly held.

These “spectacular terrorist incidents”²¹³ “provided the final impetus to the generals” who were displeased with the “deterioration of law and order in Turkey.”²¹⁴ On March 12, 1971, they compelled the Demirel government to resign with a “coup by memorandum” thinking that a new government controlled by them would be able to end widespread political terrorism and solve the mounting social and economic problems.²¹⁵ For the next two and a half years, they controlled the “above-party” governments. Martial law and a massive crackdown on the left followed. “These moves, though designed in the first instance to

²¹⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol, *NATO and Turkey*, pp. 27-28.

²¹¹ The TLP received only %2.7 of the votes in the 1969 and with the changes in the electoral law, the number of TLP deputies in the Turkish Parliament had fallen from 15 in the 1965 elections to 3 in 1969.

²¹² George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.139.

²¹³ George S. Harris, *Cross-alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union*, p. 30.

²¹⁴ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*.

²¹⁵ Nur Bilge Criss (2000:1) maintains that, like the previous 1960 coup, the 1971 coup was “made for domestic reasons and not because of Turkey’s foreign policy choices and Turkish foreign policy remained essentially Western-oriented”: Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West*, p.1.

combat anarchy and terrorism, nonetheless served effectively to silence many of America's most virulent critics."²¹⁶

3.4. Problems of development assistance and military aid

Following the military intervention of 1960, an era of planned development started in Turkey. This new economic policy coupled with the rising balance of payments deficit accentuated Turkey's need to find foreign economic financing. Meanwhile, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, "the severe and growing balance of payments problems had led Washington to begin to shift" its general aid policy increasingly "from grant aid to loans" and to try to involve its European allies in sharing the burden of assistance to "less developed "countries like Turkey."²¹⁷ Following negotiations to this end, a consortium of 14 Western countries for aid to Turkey was established in 1962, in which the U.S. was the main donor. Meanwhile, "the intensity of the Cold War was visibly receding and with it went some of the urgency in providing both economic and military assistance to Turkey."²¹⁸ ²¹⁹ Consequently, Turkey now had less bargaining power for aid and U.S. assistance to Turkey would be "annually reduced by Congress", which was reluctant to fund foreign aid (despite the opposition of the U.S. executive).²²⁰ As the American contribution to the Consortium for Aid to Turkey fell considerably, the European members of the consortium increased their contribution to a certain extent. Nonetheless, the total assistance given by the

²¹⁶ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p.146.

²¹⁷ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp.99-101.

²¹⁸ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 100, 173.

²¹⁹ President Johnson suggested in 1967 that economic aid to Turkey could end by 1973: Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980*, p.55.

²²⁰ American economic assistance, which was \$135 million in 1968, was reduced to \$60 million in 1969 and to \$43.5 million in 1970: Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p.331.

consortium declined significantly from \$269 million in 1967 to \$165 million in 1968.²²¹ Due to declining American (and Western) aid, Turkey was forced to seek other sources of assistance and started to meet its need for external financing from the IMF and the European Monetary Agency and improving economic relations with the Soviet Union.

Another thorny issue in the economic realm of the relations were the strings attached to U.S. economic aid. The Americans wanted the Turks to put more emphasis on private sector initiatives and market forces and wanted development assistance to be spent in an economically rational way, for more feasible projects, rather than (what they deemed) in a populist manner. Moreover, “following the stabilization program of 1958, the U.S. came to devote a higher proportion of its assistance to support for specific projects and less to underwriting a share of the Turkey’s balance of payments deficit,”²²² leading to Turkish protests of interference in their internal affairs. Further, American diplomacy in the late 1960s and early 1970s “used economic and military aid as a weapon to compel Turkey to ban poppy cultivation,”²²³ causing resentment in Turkey.

After having reached a peak in the early 1960s, American military aid levels started to decrease as of 1963. Throughout the 1960s, there was a big difference between the amount of military aid that Turkey expected from the U.S. and the American aid that it actually received. The Turks continuously voiced their dissatisfaction that the Americans were not meeting a sufficient proportion of Turkey’s military burden within the context of the Atlantic Alliance.

²²¹ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p.332.

²²² George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, p. 99.

²²³ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD’nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980*, p.56.

3.5. Bilateral agreements

Between 1947 and 1966, fifty-five bilateral agreements regulating the American military presence in Turkey had been signed between the U.S. and Turkey. Some were verbal and some were on paper. Some of these agreements were open, while some were secret. “Following the 1964 Cyprus crisis and under the impact of rising anti-American sentiment, the opposition parties demanded the publication, cancellation or revision of the bilateral agreements, which they believed compromised Turkish sovereignty”.²²⁴ Moreover, the Turkish military and the Turkish government wanted to exercise more control over the joint installations and over the status of the American personnel and aimed to prevent abuse of some of the privileges contained in these accords. Consequently, following a proposal by Turkey, “Turkish-American negotiations for the revision of the bilateral agreements began in March 1966 and it was agreed between the two parties that the provisions concerning the stationing of American forces would be combined into a ‘basic’ agreement.”²²⁵

Following extensive negotiations, the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the two sides was signed on July, 3- 1969. “This agreement, which replaced the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, revised some of the bilateral arrangements and attempted to clarify others.”²²⁶ It based Turkish-American defense cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty and equality of the two parties. In order to prevent future *fait accomplis*, it was foreseen that the joint military installations in Turkey and the way they were used had to have the approval of the Turkish government. Turkish authorities could

²²⁴ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 139.

²²⁵ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 139.

²²⁶ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 140.

inspect the installations, which were to be jointly managed and used. American military and civilian personnel had to obey Turkish laws and the Turkish government would allow U.S. forces to engage in any activity only after obtaining full information about the nature of these activities. The property rights of the areas, where joint defense installations were set up, belonged to Turkey.²²⁷

Vali (1971: 141) points out that “the implementation of this consolidated basic agreement, while hardly satisfactory to the radical left, was more acceptable to the moderates and removed the principal reason for the anxiety which grew from the surrender of Turkish sovereignty to the United States.”²²⁸

3.6. The 1967 Cyprus crisis

On November 15, 1967, tensions in Cyprus rose again when the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers from the mainland launched an attack on a Turkish enclave. The attack led to nation-wide demonstrations in Turkey and strong public pressure on the Turkish government to conduct a military intervention in order to protect the Turkish community on the island. Consequently, Turkey started preparations for a landing and it notified the U.S. (and the Soviet Union) that it would take action to solve the problem. President Johnson responded by proposing to solve the conflict through negotiations and sent his special envoy, former U.S. Undersecretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance to mediate a solution.²²⁹

²²⁷ This paragraph is based upon George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1971*, pp. 229-238, Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, pp. 277-285 and Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, pp. 140-141.

²²⁸ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p.141.

²²⁹ Like the 1964 crisis, Turkey lacked the necessary military equipment, nor were its soldiers trained for a landing operation. Therefore, the American proposal of mediation was again welcomed by Turkish government.

During Mr. Vance's mediation efforts, Turkey demanded the permanent removal of all infiltrated mainland Greek forces in Cyprus, the re-implementation of the 1959-1960 Zurich-London Agreements and the lifting of the blockade on Cypriot Turks as conditions to cancel its intervention on the island. The Greek junta, which needed American support, had to make concessions. Most of the Greek troops stationed in Cyprus since 1964 were withdrawn; the Turkish Cypriots were allowed to establish their own administration and the Greek Cypriot blockade on them were lifted.

The 1967 crisis was solved in a way satisfactory to Turkey. But nevertheless, the problems between the communities in Cyprus remained. This time, "conscious of the adverse effects of the Johnson letter, U.S. diplomacy was more careful."²³⁰ "Cyrus Vance had accomplished his task of averting a Turkish landing and hence preventing the outbreak of Turkish-Greek hostilities and he negotiated a settlement of the dispute to the satisfaction of the Turkish government without creating false impressions and resentment"²³¹ in that, "in Turkish eyes, this solution helped to salve the wounds of the past, for the U.S. in this instance was not seen as having acted inconsistently with the alliance."²³²

The 1967 crisis constituted an important turning point in Cyprus. It showed to Archbishop Makarios that trying to push for *enosis* despite Turkey's opposition was unrealistic and this realization forced him to reverse his intransigent policy and led him to start favoring some sort of a compromise for the solution of the conflict. In 1968, the remaining restrictions on the Turkish community in Cyprus

²³⁰ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p.169.

²³¹ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 132.

²³² George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, pp. 190-191.

were lifted and in the same year, inter-communal negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots began.

3.7. The opium controversy

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, drug addiction and the concomitant increase in the number of crimes had begun to emerge as a grave problem in the United States. The Nixon Administration was extremely concerned by this situation so much so that it proclaimed drug abuse as the United States' public enemy number 1 and embarked on an all-out attack on the threat. Meanwhile, "American authorities were convinced that a major proportion (some 80 percent was the common estimate) of the heroin illegally introduced into the United States" was produced using opium poppy "diverted from legal challenges in Turkey."²³³ This led the U.S. to pressure Turkey to solve the problem by ending poppy harvesting on its soil. Most Americans felt that, "after having given Turkey \$5 billion in aid over the years with the flow of money still moving at the rate of \$200 million a year, Turkey "owed the United States one".²³⁴ Moreover, they believed that "Turkey's legal income from opium production was small."²³⁵

The Turkish view of the situation was quite different. "The opium poppy", which was used in the production of legal pain-killing drugs, "was the main cash crop in the Afyon region."²³⁶ Moreover, the Turks held that the American allegation that, 80 percent of the heroin in the U.S. was produced by using Turkish opium poppy, was simply not true. According to a report prepared

²³³ Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*, p.68.

²³⁴ James W. Spain, "The United States, Turkey and the Poppy," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (1975), p. 303.

²³⁵ James W. Spain, *The United States, Turkey and the Poppy*, p. 303.

²³⁶ Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu* (The White War: The Opium Conflict in Turkish-American Relations), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), pp. 28-41 and James W. Spain, *The United States, Turkey and the Poppy*, p. 305.

by the Turkish Gendarmerie General Commandership, “the entire opium produced by Turkey in a year would suffice the drug addicts in the U.S. for only twenty-four days.”²³⁷ The Turks believed that even if Turkey ended cultivation of the opium poppy altogether, illegal drug traffickers would find ample sources elsewhere. “They felt that the United States was singling out Turkey”²³⁸ “by not putting the same kind of pressure on its allies in Southeast Asia.”²³⁹

Nevertheless, due to constant American pressure as well as the “threats of economic and military sanctions such as the introduction of a trade embargo, a ban on weapons sales and the suspension of trade”²⁴⁰ if it did not eradicate poppy cultivation, Turkey cooperated with American and UN narcotic agents, it significantly improved its controls and law enforcement mechanisms, it increased the government purchasing price for opium and the number of provinces, where cultivation was allowed, was progressively reduced from thirty in 1961 to four by March, 1971.²⁴¹ But, despite these Turkish measures, American pressures on Turkey to totally ban cultivation continued as they believed that Turkey was not doing its best to prevent leakage of opium poppies into illegal channels. “In retaliation” to Turkey’s refusal to ban poppy cultivation altogether, “economic aid from the U.S. to Turkey decreased considerably, and credits were curtailed.” “Turkey became the only ally of the U.S. to have lost its most favored nation

²³⁷ Quoted in Çağrı Erhan, “Uluslararası Uyuşturucu Kaçakçılığında Türk Afyonunun Yeri (The Place of Turkish Opium in International Drug Trafficking),” *Mülkiyeler Birliği Dergisi*, Vol. 20, No. 195, (1997), p. 59.

²³⁸ İlder Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 8.

²³⁹ James W. Spain, *The United States, Turkey and the Poppy*, p. 307.

²⁴⁰ “The economic threat was made by U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell at a Congressional hearing. After widespread protests by various groups and institutions in Turkey, the Americans gave assurance that such a measure was not being entertained”: Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş*, pp. 106-107 quoted in İlder Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 9.

²⁴¹ Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu*, p. 86.

status.’’²⁴² But, due to the political importance of the ‘‘75.000 farm families, which produced poppy,’’²⁴³ it was very difficult, if not impossible for an elected government to ban cultivation completely despite continuous American pressures to do so.

Meanwhile, on March 12, 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces coerced the Demirel government to resign due to rising political terrorism and unrest. The generals wanted a new government to be formed in order to amend the constitution and the laws so as to more effectively fight terrorism and put an end to domestic unrest. Accordingly, a new government was formed under the leadership of Nihat Erim.

Erim needed international and especially American support for his weak government and that led him to bow to American demands. Moreover, unlike the previous, civilian government, the technocratic, non-party government of Nihat Erim, did not have an electorate, to which it was responsible, and this facilitated the decision to eradicate poppy cultivation. Hence, soon after assuming office, he declared a total ban on poppy cultivation. In return, the U.S. undertook to extend to Turkey \$35 million to compensate the farmers and facilitate the switch to other crops.

This decision was welcomed in the United States, but was very unpopular and ‘‘contributed to anti-Americanism and to a decrease in American prestige.’’²⁴⁴ The United States was criticized by the Turkish public and in the Turkish Parliament for pressuring Turkey to end cultivation. The Turks believed that the

²⁴² Nur Bilge Criss, ‘‘Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey’s Terrorism War,’’ p.126. In Barry Rubin, ed., *Terrorism and Politics*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 123-150.

²⁴³ James W. Spain, *The United States, Turkey and the Poppy*, p. 305.

²⁴⁴ Sha Blkbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, (University Press of America, 1988), p. 173.

ban would not stop the drug abuse problem in the United States since illegal drug traffickers would easily find suppliers of opium elsewhere. But due to the political conditions of the time (March 1971- October 1973), the Turkish Parliament could not oppose governmental policies, so the ban remained.

The first elections after the military intervention were scheduled for October, 1973. All political parties promised to lift the ban on poppy production in their electoral campaigns. According to Ahmad (1977: 419), “the question was not merely viewed as a matter of restoring the cultivators’ right to grow opium poppies, but of regaining Turkey’s right to exercise autonomy and restoring its independence, dignity and prestige.”²⁴⁵ Hence, soon after taking office, the new coalition government of the RPP, led by Bülent Ecevit and the National Salvation Party (NSP), declared that it would consider lifting the ban. Meanwhile, “the U.S. seemed to be encouraging India to expand its production” of opium and contemplated starting cultivation of opium poppies itself²⁴⁶ (in order to overcome the shortage of opium used in the production of legal pain-killing drugs, which was partly caused by the Turkish ban). Moreover, the drug abuse problem in the U.S. could not be reduced despite the Turkish ban. Therefore, despite American pressure to maintain the ban and “warnings that U.S.-Turkish relations would worsen” if the ban was lifted,²⁴⁷ Prime Minister Ecevit announced at the end of June 1974 that the ban would be repealed.²⁴⁸

On 30 June 1974, the United States Executive reacted by calling back its ambassador to Ankara, William Macomber, for consultations in Washington. The

²⁴⁵ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, p. 419.

²⁴⁶ James W. Spain, *The United States, Turkey and the Poppy*, p. 307.

²⁴⁷ Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 26.

²⁴⁸ But to calm down the Americans, Turkey changed its poppy-harvesting technique, which prevented to a large degree the leakage of opium poppies into illegal channels.

U.S. Congress passed resolutions, whereby the President was advised to start negotiations with his Turkish counterpart in order to prevent the resumption of cultivation and if that failed, end American aid to Turkey. “The President, however, confined his actions to the suspension of aid that was being given as part of the 1971 ban package.”²⁴⁹ Soon after, an arms embargo was imposed on Turkey following its military operations in Cyprus. “The idea of punitive action as a result of the repeal of the ban had provided the psychological and legislative groundwork and had already promoted an utterly negative and preconditioned attitude towards Turkey in the American Congress, media and public.”²⁵⁰

In late 1974 and early 1975, the U.S. Congress passed more resolutions advising the President to pressure the Turks to reinstitute the ban. “These recommendations did not produce any action” by the U.S. Executive “in the direction the Congress recommended” since the American government believed that “the measures that Turkey had taken” to prevent leakage of opium poppies into illegal channels had been effective.²⁵¹ Thereafter, the opium poppy ceased to be an issue of controversy in Turkish-American relations.

²⁴⁹ İter Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 12.

²⁵⁰ Laurence Whetten, *Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday*, p. 16, Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, (Unpublished paper, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 2004), pp. 4-5, 20 and Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p. 26.

²⁵¹ İter Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 13.

CHAPTER IV

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1974-1980

4.1. The 1974 coup in Cyprus and its aftermath

As indicated above, from March 1971 to October 1973, Turkey was ruled by above-party, technocratic governments that acted in accordance with the armed forces' requests, while the Turkish military tried to solve the problem of domestic terrorism and the threat of wide-scale internal unrest by curtailing civil rights²⁵² and embarking on a crackdown against the left.

Civilian politics resumed in October 1973 with two new-comers in the political arena. The new leader of the RPP, Bülent Ecevit supported the idea of a “more independent foreign policy within NATO”²⁵³ and believed that Turkey “could afford to adopt an assertive foreign policy in contrast to İnönü’s policies of caution vis-a-vis the superpowers”²⁵⁴. The National Salvation Party (NSP), led by Necmettin Erbakan had an anti-Western foreign policy. A coalition government of the RPP and the NSP was formed in January 1974.

In Cyprus, American diplomatic efforts regarding the Cyprus issue had ended following the start in 1968 of inter-communal negotiations. The Cyprus

²⁵² Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 171-172.

²⁵³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, pp. 154-155.

²⁵⁴ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 175.

inter-communal negotiations did not bear any fruits due to the wide disparity between the views of the two parties. Meanwhile, Greece had taken control of the Greek Cypriot security forces and it had turned them into an organization that paid allegiance to the Athens colonels' junta in Greece, rather than to the government of Makarios, who was "becoming disenchanted with the Greek military government and more interested in maintaining the status quo than in continuing the drive for *enosis*",²⁵⁵ to the chagrin of the colonels.

In November 1973, Colonel Demetrios Ioannides, who detested Makarios due to the Archbishop's cordial relations with local and international communists and the non-aligned movement, and determined to realizing *enosis*, overthrew Colonel George Papadopoulos and became the new leader of the Greek junta. Soon after, "the 'new' junta took over full control of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and EOKA-B, the extremist successor of EOKA",²⁵⁶ prompting a harsh reaction from Makarios, who on July 6, 1974, made public a letter that he had sent to the junta accusing it of political murders and conspiracies, including several foiled coup attempts, and "demanding the immediate withdrawal of mainland Greek officers in the National Guard"²⁵⁷ because they were trying to overthrow his government. The Greek junta responded to the letter with a coup on 15 July, which overthrew Makarios and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, who had the reputation of hating Turks.²⁵⁸

"The Cyprus crisis presented a serious diplomatic challenge to the U.S. at a time when President Richard Nixon was pre-occupied with the Watergate

²⁵⁵ Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p.33.

²⁵⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.155.

²⁵⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.155.

²⁵⁸ Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO: Past, present and future," *Orbis*, Vol. 27, No. 2, (1983), pp.421-445.

affair’’²⁵⁹ and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Middle East peace process. Following the coup in Cyprus, ‘‘the picture as seen from Washington was described by International Herald Tribune journalist James Reston in the following words’’:

The immediate concern of the U.S. Government in the Cyprus crisis is to avoid open warfare between two of its NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, but beyond that it is faced with an extremely awkward set of political and strategic problems. First, Washington deplores the authoritarian military government in Athens, but is dependent on bases in Greece. ...Second, while Washington sympathizes with the plight of President Makarios of Cyprus, he had tended to turn for help to Moscow when in trouble, and the one thing the U.S. wants to avoid other than losing base privileges in Greece, is to have Soviet forces based on Cyprus.²⁶⁰

‘‘Washington was taken by surprise when the coup d’etat against Makarios was reported. There had, however, been many warning signs in intelligence reports over the previous five months’’.²⁶¹ Most notably, on June 3, 1974, Ioannides had told to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official that, ‘‘Greece was capable of removing Makarios and his key supporters from power with little if any blood shed.’’ ‘‘If Makarios continued to ‘provoke’ Athens, Ioannides said he would have to consider whether to remove him once and for all.’’²⁶² Once the United States Government was made aware of this plot, it asked its Ambassador in Athens, Henry Tasca to personally discuss the issue with Ioannides. ‘‘However, Ambassador Tasca chose only to send an aide to see Ioannides’’. According to

²⁵⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.5.

²⁶⁰ James Reston, ‘‘Cyprus Crisis and NATO’s Southern Flank,’’ *International Herald Tribune*, July 18, 1974 quoted in Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 171-172.

²⁶¹ Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 395.

²⁶² Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, p. 395.

Taşhan, “it is not clear whether Mr. Tasca really made an attempt to dissuade Ioannides from embarking on this plot”²⁶³ ²⁶⁴

In July 16, the day after the coup, Turkish policy-makers began to discuss the situation in Cyprus. They all believed that only a military operation could prevent a Greek *fait accompli* and it was decided to start military preparations for a landing. If Turkey did not take action, it would be unable to prevent the realization of *enosis* and Turkish Cypriots would face dire consequences. Before the military operation, Ecevit would consult with only one of the other two guarantor powers of Cyprus, that is, the United Kingdom for a joint intervention (since Greece, the other guarantor power of Cyprus, had carried out the coup) and if the British were against a joint intervention, Turkey would act alone.²⁶⁵ Accordingly, Turkish forces would first try to capture a bridgehead in northern Cyprus, which would be followed by talks for a new constitution during which Turkey would have the chance to negotiate from a position of strength. If the Greeks refused this, then the second stage of the operation would be given the go-ahead, whereby Turkish military forces would try to gain territory big enough to host and secure the protection of Turkish Cypriots.²⁶⁶

On 17 July, Ecevit flew to London for consultations with the British government. However, the British were against a joint intervention.²⁶⁷ Meanwhile, when it was realized that Turkey was intent on taking action, Kissinger sent his

²⁶³ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p.171.

²⁶⁴ Kissinger was accused of negligence due to his failure to examine U.S. intelligence reports which predicted the coup. He later admitted that if he “had ever had twelve hours and been able to pick out an intelligence report, he would have seen that the situation needed attention.” Bölükbaşı maintains that “Kissinger’s excuse was understandable because as one observer suggested, the Yom Kippur war which erupted in 1973 and the ensuing peace efforts occupied most of his time”: Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 184.

²⁶⁵ For a detailed account of these developments, see Mehmet Ali Birand’s, *30 Sıcak Gün* (30 Hot Days), (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1984).

²⁶⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1974-2000*, p.156.

²⁶⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1974-2000*, p.156.

Under-Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco to London “in order to attempt mediation that could delay the Turkish intervention”²⁶⁸, but Ecevit did not want Sisco to join the British-Turkish negotiations since the U.S. was not a guarantor power of Cyprus. So, the meeting of Ecevit and Sisco took place later, in 18 July. “As Ecevit expected, Sisco tried to stop the Turkish military intervention by a combination of rewards and threats”²⁶⁹. The United States would increase its military assistance to Turkey that had been decreased due to the opium conflict; a military intervention would mean the end of American aid and a military operation by Turkey would prompt a Turkish-Greek war, which would in turn have serious repercussions on Turkish-American relations. Ecevit did not yield and put forward several conditions to cancel Turkey’s military intervention: “the Greek officers who had conducted the coup should be withdrawn from the island”; Turkey should be able to send a sizable armed force to Cyprus and “Turkish Cypriots should be given control of a coastal region in the north and negotiations for the creation of a federal system should start”²⁷⁰. Sisco then notified the Athens junta of Turkish demands who duly refused them. “He then went to Ankara to tell Ecevit about the Greek reply”. Ecevit did not budge. “Sisco once more flew to Athens, but again came back empty-handed, save a Greek willingness to withdraw the officers that had taken part in the coup”²⁷¹.

Meanwhile, Kissinger engaged in “phone diplomacy” in order to convince Ecevit to call off the intervention. Ecevit asked Kissinger that “the U.S. should not apply the same type of pressure as it had in 1964, which he indicated, might lead

²⁶⁸ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 191-192.

²⁶⁹ İlder Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 15.

²⁷⁰ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 192.

²⁷¹ İlder Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 16.

to the permanent rupture in Turkey's relationship with the Western alliance.²⁷²

Thus, neither the Greeks nor the Turks could be persuaded and Turkey embarked on its military operation on 20 July.

Before going into Turkey's military intervention and the subsequent developments, the most important factors which affected Ecevit's determination to engage his country in a landing operation should be examined: First, the Sampson coup did not prompt a strong reaction on the part of the U.S. executive branch. "Deploying a detached attitude", State Department spokesman Robert Anderson maintained that "in our view, there has not been outside intervention in Cyprus"²⁷³ and refused to condemn the Greek junta.^{274 275} This gave Ecevit the impression that if Turkey did not act quickly, it would be unable to prevent a Greek *fait accompli* i.e. *enosis*. Second, the unpopularity of the Greek junta in the eyes of world public opinion made international conditions conducive to a Turkish operation. Third, Ecevit believed that "U.S. omnipotence belonged to the early Cold War years" (when ethnic conflicts were subordinated to Cold War politics), "and that smaller allies of the U.S. could therefore ignore American preferences, creating *fait accomplis* with reasonable prospects for a favorable outcome".²⁷⁶ Another major factor that contributed to Ecevit's assertiveness was the implicit Soviet support for a Turkish intervention. "The Soviet leadership knew that the Sampson coup would not only eliminate Cypriot non-alignment, but that *enosis*,

²⁷² Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

²⁷³ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*.

²⁷⁴ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980*, p.74.

²⁷⁵ The view that, due to their disapproval of Makarios's cordial relations with local and international communists, the U.S. Administration of the time in general and Henry Kissinger in particular were pleased with the Sampson coup, is shared by many authors: Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980*, p.78-82.

²⁷⁶ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 193.

which they believed would follow shortly, would bring Cyprus under the firm control of Greece, thus NATO”.²⁷⁷ And last but not least, unlike the 1964 and 1967 crises, Turkey now had the necessary military equipment and planning to carry out a successful landing on Cyprus.

Consequently, the landing went ahead in 20 July. By the time a cease-fire was established through Resolution 353 of the UN Security Council in 22 July, Turkish forces had taken control of a territory constituting only 7 percent of the island’s geographical area and less than what had been foreseen in the military plans, which left % 65 of Turkish Cypriots outside of Turkish protection.²⁷⁸ But nevertheless, Turkey notified the parties concerned that it was ready to start negotiations.²⁷⁹

The Greek colonels’ regime had not foreseen such a development and could not mobilize the Greek army, and as a result of the ensuing fiasco, the junta was ousted and was replaced by a civilian government on 23 July. Simultaneously, Sampson had to resign and the moderate Glafkos Clerides was made the head of a provisional government in Cyprus.

In 25 July, the negotiations for peace talks started between Turkey, Greece and Britain (with the super powers as observers) began in Geneva. “By 29 July, they reached a deadlock”, but at that point Kissinger intervened and succeeded in convincing Ecevit that “acceptance of the UN Resolution did not mean that Turkey would have to withdraw its forces immediately, and the parties signed a joint declaration the following day”, which made the withdrawal of Turkish forces

²⁷⁷ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 194.

²⁷⁸ Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler (Relations with Greece),” p. 743. In Baskın Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 716-768.

²⁷⁹ Turkey had to stop its military operation due to strong international pressure.

conditional on “the achievement of a “just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned””.²⁸⁰ Hence, Greece and Britain had “recognized Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus and acknowledged the legitimacy of its right to occupy a part of Cyprus till a new Constitution was elaborated””.²⁸¹

The British, Greek and Turkish delegations met again in Geneva in 9 August, in order to engage in negotiations to produce a new constitution. However, the Greek Cypriot and the Greek side were no longer interested in finding a solution to the conflict because: “Klerides actually believed that time was on the Greeks’ side and if the negotiations lasted long enough, international pressure on Turkey would make it increasingly difficult for Turkey to pursue a policy of blackmail” and the conditions that existed before the coup would eventually be restored.²⁸² Therefore, the Greek side employed a very intransigent attitude during the negotiations, rejecting Turkish offers and “ignoring British and American recommendations of a federal state and their threats that they might not be able to prevent Turkey from conducting a second operation.”²⁸³ Nevertheless, “under American pressure, the Ankara government agreed to the ‘cantonal plan’, under which the Turkish Cypriots would be given six separate cantons within a federal structure””.²⁸⁴ When the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, presented this plan to him on 13 August, Clerides asked for a 36-hour recess to examine the Turkish proposals. This was perceived by Güneş as an excuse to gain time by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots for the reasons indicated above and was therefore

²⁸⁰ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1974-2000*, p.157.

²⁸¹ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 201 and William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1974-2000*, p. 157.

²⁸² Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 206.

²⁸³ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 206.

²⁸⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1974-2000*, p.158.

refused by him. Moreover, the 40,000 Turkish troops on the island were in a precarious situation as they were stuck in a small area making them very vulnerable to attack and the Greek Cypriot National Guard was still in occupation of isolated Turkish enclaves on other parts of the island.²⁸⁵ Further, Turkey wanted to take control of a bigger piece of land, which could be used as a leverage in future negotiations and if it didn't move for a second time, it could be resigned to suffice itself with the 7 percent of the island it currently held. Thus, the next day, on 14 August, the second Turkish military operation went ahead and Turkish forces soon established control over 36 percent of the northern part of the island.

Neither super power did anything to prevent a second Turkish landing. Kissinger²⁸⁶ defended himself against the accusations of the U.S. Congress and the Greek lobby regarding his failure to threaten sanctions in order to prevent the Turkish landing operations by claiming that the U.S. did not employ threats to Turkey for these reasons: First, he believed that such an action would not succeed in averting a Turkish intervention because Kissinger knew that “he was dealing with a Turkish Government that, unlike its predecessors, considered assertiveness a virtue in itself”.²⁸⁷ In any case, American aid to Turkey had decreased to a “bare minimum due to budgetary reasons and also possibly because of Congress’ attitude on the poppy question”. “So, this was not a sufficient weapon to stop Turkish action”.²⁸⁸ Second, Kissinger maintained that “the U.S. was giving economic and military aid as a reflection of its common interest in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean and not as a favor to Turkey.” Short of that embargo

²⁸⁵ Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün*.

²⁸⁶ Kissinger was preeminent in foreign policy making at the time because President Nixon was living the last days of the Watergate scandal whereas President Ford was inexperienced in matters of foreign affairs.

²⁸⁷ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 210.

²⁸⁸ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p.173.

threat, however, “they had made the most repeated and urgent representations to Turkey in order to prevent a military action.”²⁸⁹ Third, Kissinger thought that the approach most likely to succeed in dissuading Turkey’s landings was to “continuously assure the Turks that the U.S. considered their demands legitimate and that negotiations would sooner or later bring favorable results”.²⁹⁰ Fourth, Kissinger did not want to use the U.S. 6th Fleet “to discourage or coerce Turkey” because “the Turkish mood was”, as was stated earlier, “beyond being affected by mere threats”. Hence, when “Henry Tasca suggested that the 6th Fleet should be deployed near Cyprus to indicate American dissatisfaction with Turkey’s expected military operation, Kissinger refused to comply”.²⁹¹ Fifth, preventing Turkey from saving Turkish Cypriots from massacre at the hands of Greek Cypriots for the second time in 10 years would shock the Turks, causing tremendous harm to Turkish-American relations. Moreover, as Kissinger asserts, “in 1964 and 1967, the U.S. had been preeminent. In 1974 however, with Nixon on the verge of either resignation or impeachment, the U.S. was in a weak position to threaten or cajole”.²⁹² Therefore, “in the absence of other leverages and given the situation that President Richard Nixon was in, the U.S. could only work through diplomacy”,²⁹³ which Kissinger did by sending Joseph Sisco to the London talks and through the Geneva Conference.

After the second operation, Ecevit thought that the Greeks would return to negotiations and Turkey would be able to achieve a favorable solution, thanks to its position of strength following the second operation. But the Greek side did not

²⁸⁹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, pp.192-239.

²⁹⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, pp.192-239.

²⁹¹ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*.

²⁹² Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 208.

²⁹³ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus*, p.174.

want to resume the negotiations. “Turkey had enjoyed broad international support and sympathy at the time of the first landings because the independence of Cyprus was threatened by the Greek junta and the safety of the Turkish community was in danger”.²⁹⁴ Moreover, the international community granted that Turkey had used its right within the context of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to reinstitute the independence of Cyprus. But Hale (2000: 159) argues that “it sacrificed this support and sympathy by embarking so precipitately on the second operation”,²⁹⁵ which was perceived by the international community as expansionism and contrary to the stipulations of the Zurich-London Agreements.

4.2. The arms embargo

While ending U.S. assistance to Turkey was already being contemplated by the American Congress due to Turkey’s repeal of the ban on poppy cultivation, the second operation and Turkish use of American military equipment (which was seen in some congressional circles as a violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Acts) soon became an issue of concern for the Congress.

4.2.1. The shaping of American policy after the second Turkish intervention

Before going into the discussion of the embargo legislation, the factors and motives that were influential in the arms embargo decision and the arguments put forth by the congressional supporters and executive opponents of the sanction should be examined in order to better comprehend the context in which the decision to sanction Turkey was taken: The imposition of the arms embargo on

²⁹⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.159.

²⁹⁵ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.159.

Turkey was partly the product of the Watergate crisis, as a result of which the executive branch lost its previous power in foreign policy decision making. Consequently, executive policies²⁹⁶ started to lose credibility in the eyes of the Congress. In addition to the effects of the Watergate imbroglio, “Congress was already showing signs of disappointment with the Administration’s mishandling of American foreign policy and with its policies towards Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile and Soviet Union”²⁹⁷ and “resented the monopolization of foreign policy decisions by the Nixon-Kissinger duo”²⁹⁸. According to Company (1986: 78), “these factors and the power vacuum caused by the Watergate scandal led Congress to want to ‘re-assert’ its role in foreign policy decision making ‘after three decades of executive dominance and congressional subordination in foreign policy making to the extent that any infringement of the executive on congressional authority was the target of a strong reaction’”²⁹⁹. Within this context, Kissinger’s attempt to “downplay the legal aspects of the Turkish situation, and his attempts to convince Congress that the Administration was in the best position to evaluate U.S. national interest in the Cyprus crisis, backfired”³⁰⁰.

According to Süha Bölükbaşı:

Another reason for the effectiveness of the pro-embargo effort was the fact that the party system in American politics had lost its former power. Interest groups such as the Greek lobby now gained easy access to individual Congressmen. Further, the intense activism of the Greek lobby in the U.S. to have an arms ban imposed on Turkey also strengthened the hands of those Congressmen, who were promoting the embargo and convinced some other Congressmen to join the embargo bandwagon.³⁰¹

²⁹⁶ In our case, the opposition of the U.S. Administration to the imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey.

²⁹⁷ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 212.

²⁹⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.2.

²⁹⁹ Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p.78.

³⁰⁰ Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p.78.

³⁰¹ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 214.

In this context,³⁰² the Greek Orthodox Church of Northern America was instrumental in arousing Greek-Americans. The most important Greek-American civil societal organization in this context was the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), which prompted Greek Americans to pressure Congressmen and Senators by writing letters. Both AHEPA and the American Hellenic Institute (AHI), another lobbying organization, hired public relations firms, kept “voting records of Congressmen and Senators” and worked hard to find support for the Greek cause in the Congress (with the help of Congressmen of Greek descent such as John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes and opponents of Kissinger’s foreign policy such as Edward Kennedy, Benjamin Rosenthal and James Eagleton) the press, the radio and television. “Before Congressional votes, AHEPA and AHI organized massive telephone campaigns to apply additional pressure on those who were still undecided”. Several mass-scale demonstrations were staged by Greek Americans in major American cities. According to some studies, “the pressure from Greek Americans affected the votes of many Congressmen” at a propitious time period for the Greek lobby when the U.S. mid-term elections were approaching. “There was an especially significant correlation between the size of the Greek American constituency and the way in which some House and Senate members voted”.³⁰³

³⁰² The following discussion on the activity of the Greek lobby is based upon: Paul Y. Watanabe’s *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), Süha Bölükbaşı’s, “The Greek Lobby: The 1964 and 1974 Campaigns,” *Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute*, Vol. 16, Nos. 3-4, (1992), pp. 66-91 and Süha Bölükbaşı’s, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 214-217.

³⁰³ Sallie Hicks and Theodore Coulombis, “The Greek Lobby: Illusion or Reality,” p.88. In Abdul Aziz Said, ed., *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: Praeger, 1977) and Keith Legg, “Congress as Trojan Horse: The Turkish Embargo Problem: 1974-1978,” p. 126. In John Spanier and Joseph Noguee, eds., *Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981) quoted in Süha Bölükbaşı, *The superpowers and the third world: Turkish-American relations and Cyprus*, pp. 215-216.

Several arguments were effectively used by the Congressional proponents of the embargo: First, according to most Senators and Representatives, Turkish intervention in Cyprus did not constitute self-defense; it was illegal and “the Administration had ignored the rule of law by continuing its assistance to Turkey”,³⁰⁴ which had used American military equipment for a purpose that they deemed as other than internal security or self defense. In that context, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 and the 1947 Aid to Agreement between Turkey and the United States (which prohibited the use of American-supplied weapons for purposes other than defense) were mentioned to prove that Turkey, which they believed had engaged in aggression, “should be ineligible for further military assistance because it did not use U.S. arms for internal security or legitimate self-defense”.³⁰⁵ Second, the embargo proponents in the Congress suggested that such a foreign policy action would coerce Turkey to be more accommodative in Cyprus negotiations towards the solution of the problem, thereby facilitate the peace process. For them, not cutting off military aid to Turkey would be tantamount to rewarding it for its action in Cyprus. Moreover, it would harm the United States’ relations with Greece. Third, the arms embargo gave many congressmen who resented Turkey’s recent decision to lift the ban on poppy cultivation a good chance to punish Turkey. Fourth, there were those Congressmen who argued that “Turkey was no longer important to the geopolitical interests of the United States and thus did not deserve assistance”.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 216.

³⁰⁵ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 216.

³⁰⁶ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 217.

Officials of the U.S. executive branch on the other hand maintained that: First, Turkey was a strategically very important ally with respect to its location vis-a-vis the Middle East and the Soviet Union and the embargo would mean the end of American military and intelligence-gathering activities in Turkey, which were very important for monitoring the Soviet Union. Second, the embargo would weaken the Turkish armed forces and the defense of NATO's southern flank would suffer. Third, an embargo would fail to coerce Turkey to make concessions on Cyprus. On the contrary, it would strengthen Turkish intransigence. Consequently, "the embargo would alienate Turkey without actually satisfying Greek concerns over Cyprus".³⁰⁷ Fifth, while Turkey's use of American weapons in its military interventions might be a violation of U.S. laws, use of such weapons in a similar fashion by other American allies, such as by Israel in Lebanon, had not prompted an American reaction and it would be unfair to single out Turkey and apply selective punishment. And sixth, "while the threat of an aid cut off would conceivably do some good, it would lose its effectiveness as a leverage once imposed".³⁰⁸

Thus, as can be seen from the above discussion, there was a "fundamental difference in the perception" of the U.S. Administration, which "attached primacy to military and strategic interests" and "Congressional circles, which did not place the same importance on Turkey's military and strategic importance as the Administration" (in a time period when the American public wanted a reduction of U.S. commitments abroad), and which sought to selectively uphold

³⁰⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, pp. 192-239.

³⁰⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, pp. 192-239.

the U.S. rule of law and “to reconcile American interests with their own election concerns”³⁰⁹.

4.2.2. The embargo legislation and Turkey’s reaction

The congressional proponents of an embargo were not convinced by the arguments of the executive branch against punishing Turkey and would soon move to impose a sanction. On 15 August, 1974, U.S. Congressmen of Greek origin led by John Brademas visited the Secretary of State and condemned the failure of the Administration to prevent the second Turkish intervention, with Brademas claiming that the use of American weapons in Cyprus was a contravention of American laws and the fourth article of the Aid to Turkey Agreement of 1947 between Turkey and the U.S.³¹⁰, which stipulated that Turkey had to have American consent for the use of U.S. military assistance. Meanwhile, the Executive tried to delay congressional action with the State Department announcing that it was ‘studying’ the issue on 10 September 1974, while Kissinger stated that an investigation would be started by the executive in order to determine the source of the weapons used in Turkey’s military interventions and the legality of that action, adding that a decision on Turkey would be made afterwards.³¹¹ But nevertheless, Congress started to work for the imposition of an embargo on Turkey without waiting for the results of the executive investigation because it was convinced that “Kissinger’s easygoing approach towards Turkey had caused the

³⁰⁹ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday*, p. 7.

³¹⁰ Çağrı Erhan, “ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler (Relations with the U.S. and NATO),” p. 705. In Baskın Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 681-715.

³¹¹ Çağrı Erhan, *ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler*, p. 705.

Turkish expansionism and therefore, Congress had to take control of the U.S policy towards Turkey”³¹².

In response to congressional arguments in support of a ban, the Turks held that under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee of Cyprus, Turkey had the right to intervene independently (after consultations with the other two guarantor powers) “to preserve the independence of Cyprus” and that the “UN Charter allowed for self-defense” adding that, “the threat of extermination facing the Turks in Cyprus, created the proper legal justification for self-defense”³¹³. Moreover, “Greece had used American weapons against Turks, too and yet no such reaction was observed in the United States regarding the violation of American laws”³¹⁴ and the Turks believed that the Cyprus problem and Turkish-American relations were two separate issues. And like the U.S. Executive, the Turks maintained that they were “extended aid not as a favor, but as part of joint defense” within the context of the Atlantic Alliance and that imposition of a sanction would weaken the southern flank of NATO.³¹⁵

Nevertheless, on September 19, a sense of the Senate resolution to impose an embargo passed by a vote of 64-27. Five days later, the sense of the Senate was followed by sense of the Congress by a vote of 374-26 and became legislation. The legislation prohibited any funds (including economic aid) from being used to

³¹² Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 212.

³¹³ Kamran İnan, “The U.S. Military Embargo: Its Causes and Effects,” *Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 90-91.

³¹⁴ There were many other instances when other countries had used American arms for non-defensive purposes. For example, “Greece had shipped American weapons to the Greek sector of Cyprus in the past and these weapons were used against the Turks, as admitted by Joseph Sisco”: Kamran İnan, *The U.S. Military Embargo: Its Causes and Effects*, p. 91. According to Bölükbaşı, “the American failure to universally apply its laws and impose arms embargoes on such states proved that the Turkish arms embargo was not the result of a simple compliance with the law, but rather an exercise of a normative judgement on the part of the Congress”: Süha Bölükbaşı, *The superpowers and the third world: Turkish-American relations and Cyprus*, p. 219.

³¹⁵ Çağrı Erhan, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, p.707.

supply military assistance to Turkey including Foreign Military Sales (FMS) military credits, grants and guarantees and banned the government-to-government or commercial military sales (of weapons (and their spare parts) made or licensed by the United States)³¹⁶ until the President certified to the Congress that ‘substantial progress toward agreement had been made regarding the Cyprus issue.’ The new U.S. President Gerald Ford vetoed this legislation. But despite the efforts of Mr. Ford to prevent other embargo legislations from becoming law, the efforts by the Congress were renewed and the President realized that a compromise had to be reached with the Congress in order to prevent further damage on executive-legislative relations.

Accordingly, Congress passed, on October 17, 1974, the embargo legislation (by adding amendment ‘x’ to the 620th section of the 1961 U.S. Foreign Assistance Act),³¹⁷ including equipment worth of \$185 million that was already paid for by Turkey. “But, in a bow to Ford’s entreaties, a grace period of four months, to February 5, 1975, was granted if substantial progress could be made in negotiations”³¹⁸.

After the adoption of the legislation, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit made the following points, harbinger of Turkish retaliation:

After the adoption of this resolution, any move to be unilaterally taken by us to facilitate the settlement of the Cyprus problem will be interpreted as being initiated under the threat of Congress resolution. I do not need to explain to you how strong a reaction this might create in the Turkish public opinion with all its negative effects on the image of the United States. Any gestures to be made by Turkey after the adoption of this resolution will be taken by those circles who believe in the use of threat and pressure to solve the Cyprus deadlock as a confirmation of their view. The 10,000 strong Greek National Guard in Cyprus from mainland Greece were armed and equipped with U.S. supplies, and it was going to be most

³¹⁶ For a list of the embargoed military items, see Appendix A.

³¹⁷ For the text of this legislation, see Appendix B.

³¹⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 235.

difficult to explain to the Turkish public why U.S. legislation was directed against Turkey alone. This would lead to questioning the nature of collective security and extra effort would be required to justify the presence of common defense installations within the concept of bilateral cooperation.³¹⁹

Nonetheless, Kissinger's mediation efforts regarding the Cyprus crisis continued unabated. Meanwhile, Nur Bilge Criss asserts that, the intransigence in negotiations of Greece "which now relied on exertion of Congressional and UN pressure on Turkey, coupled with Ecevit's coalition partner, Necmettin Erbakan's refusal of" making concessions "towards the Cyprus issue became the main causes of Ecevit's resignation from office".³²⁰ Other political parties refused Ecevit's call for early elections, knowing that the RPP would almost definitely receive enough votes to form a single party government owing to Ecevit's popularity at the time. Hence, Senator Sadi Irmak was appointed as prime minister on November 17 by President Fahri Korutürk to form an interim government that would stay in office till the elections took place. The Irmak era "coincided with the congressional activity to impose an embargo on Turkey". "Throughout this period", the weak Irmak government, unlike the previous Ecevit government, was not in a situation to "take the steps necessary to calm the U.S. Congress" during the four-month delay of the coming into effect of the embargo,³²¹ so an important opportunity for a solution of the Cyprus and embargo crises was missed. Nevertheless, U.S. executive efforts to convince Congress to reconsider its action and its mediation efforts between the Turks and Greeks continued. In a press conference on December 7, 1974, Kissinger underlined that "U.S. military aid was not a favor but part and parcel for the defense of NATO's southeastern flank, and

³¹⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.7.

³²⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.7.

³²¹ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 212.

that Congressional insistence on cut off, while mediation continued, would thwart U.S. leverage and Turkish flexibility in Cyprus negotiations.”³²²

As February 5 approached, Prime Minister Irmak stated that “the suspension of U.S. military aid over the Cyprus issue would compel Turkey to review its ties with NATO.”³²³ President Ford wrote to President Korutürk:

The deep feeling with which this action is viewed by the Government and people of Turkey is well understood in this country where ties with Turkey are highly valued. It is for this reason that I am confident that corrective action will be taken to remove the cause of our current concern. I urge therefore that Turkey join us in exercising restraint while major efforts are under way to restore military assistance.³²⁴

Two days later, Kissinger “urged” the new Turkish Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel “to explain the administration’s efforts to revoke the bill to President Korutürk and other members of the Turkish Government so that from your side, insofar as possible, nothing is done to that will make our efforts more difficult.”³²⁵ Meanwhile, Korutürk’s reply to Ford reflected the

... deep feeling of general disappointment in Turkey... “The suspension of military aid can hardly be construed as compatible with the relationship which must exist between countries who, in addition to their membership in the same Alliance, also maintain close bilateral cooperation for common defense... However, I want to assure you that my Government will try its best so that the relationship between the two countries emerge from the situation created by the action of the Congress with as little damage as possible.”³²⁶

Thus, when the embargo went into effect on February 5, 1975, the Turkish reaction was relatively restrained. Turkey refrained from closing the American bases on its soil at that point in order not to hamper the efforts of the Ford Administration to have the embargo lifted and sufficed itself with establishing a

³²² Robert Siner, “Aid Cutoff to Turkey Approved by House,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 12, 1974 quoted in Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, pp. 7-8.

³²³ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.8.

³²⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.8.

³²⁵ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.8.

³²⁶ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.9.

Turkish Cypriot Federated State on February 13 and announcing that it would not participate in the NATO winter exercises of February-March 1975. Turkish policy makers would not take substantial retaliatory measures until they were totally convinced that the U.S. Administration could not change the congressional policy of support for an arms embargo on Turkey.³²⁷

Meanwhile, Kissinger visited Ankara on March 11, 2005. He asked to his Turkish whether it was possible to convince the two communities in Cyprus to engage in inter-communal negotiations. “The Turks said they were amenable but without any preconditions”.³²⁸ Irmak reminded Kissinger that the Cyprus conflict and Turkish-American relations were two separate issues. Kissinger “agreed to explore an approach to de-link the issues, but this would not happen until 1977 with President Carter’s diplomacy”.³²⁹

On May 19, 1975, the U.S. Senate adopted, 41-40, the bill S.846 to end the embargo. On 17 June, the Turkish government issued a formal note to the U.S. government that unless aid was resumed in 30 days, the status of U.S. forces in Turkey would change. But on 24 July, the House defeated the Senate bill S. 846, 223-206, which would have lifted the embargo. On July 24, Kissinger told Esenbel that “they expected some retaliation from Turkey, but advised that this should not be too radical for the sake of future relations.”³³⁰ The next day, Turkey announced the suspension of the activities of all U.S. military installations (except for those that had a purely NATO function i.e. the İncirlik air base) and placed them under full Turkish control. It also placed restrictions on U.S. personnel who worked in

³²⁷ But nevertheless, the same day, “following an emergency meeting of the Turkish National Security Council, the acting Prime Minister Irmak warned that, U.S. actions would result in a ‘reassessment’ of Turkish ties with the United States and NATO and that U.S. bases would be closed if aid was cut”. Kamran İnan, *The U.S. Military Embargo: Its Causes and Effects*, p. 85.

³²⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.9.

³²⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.10.

³³⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.12.

the installations,³³¹ but they were not asked to leave the country in order to prevent a further deterioration of Turkish-American relations, for the U.S. Administration was working hard to end the embargo.³³² Moreover, the Turks unilaterally abrogated the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) because “the joint defense agreements had lost their legal validity.” This happened at a time when the U.S. wanted to use the intelligence-gathering facilities in Turkey³³³ to monitor whether the U.S.S.R. was acting in accordance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT I). Criss maintains that:

The diplomatic dimension of the closure, however, was to eventually compel the U.S. legislators to see the difference between the Cyprus issue and bilateral relations. Esenbel advised the Foreign Ministry that the time had come to change the legal framework of the joint defense installations, outside the aid linkage.³³⁴

The embargo was considered unjust by the Turkish public opinion and all political leaders, as well as being heavily criticized in the Turkish press, with the radical left claiming that the imposition of this sanction proved yet another time the “unreliability of the United States”. “As a result of the reaction” of the Turkish government and the Turkish public, “U.S.” executive “efforts to have the embargo lifted the embargo were soon renewed”.³³⁵ On 31 July, the Senate adopted, 47-46, the bill S.2230 that partially lifted the Turkish arms embargo. The partial lifting of the arms embargo permitted (1) the shipment of arms contracted for with the U.S. before the embargo went into effect and (2) cash sales of arms on the commercial market. “Direct military grants and government sales and

³³¹ Çağrı Erhan, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, p.707.

³³² George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (London: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 142-145.

³³³ i.e. the intelligence-gathering facilities at the Sinop, Diyarbakır, Belbaşı (Ankara) and Karamürsel (Kocaeli) installations: Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 277.

³³⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.12.

³³⁵ Çağrı Erhan, *ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler*, pp.707-708.

credits³³⁶ would continue to be prohibited”.³³⁷ “The same day, “Ray J. Madden (D-Indiana), the U.S. House of Representatives Chairman of the Rules Committee, tackled the bill by not convening the committee to provide the bill rule for debate, but was circumvented after the Congressional recess”.³³⁸ With the end of the recess, ““bill S.2230 was referred to the House International Relations Committee” and on October 2, the House voted 237-176, to partially lift the embargo. Four days later, Ford signed the bill into law (PL 94-104).

4.2.3. Diplomacy under the arms embargo

The Ford Administration opposed the embargo and on many occasions, Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger tried vigorously to convince members of Congress and prominent members of the Greek lobby that the embargo was not successful in coercing Turkey to be more accommodative towards the settlement of the Cyprus issue by removing flexibility from both the Greek and Turkish sides in negotiations, while at the same time it was damaging U.S. interests, too, by weakening the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance. In their efforts to convince the Congress to lift the ban, U.S. executive officials occasionally employed strategic and military arguments concerning Turkey’s value to the Atlantic Alliance. To give but two examples: At a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 5 September 1976, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Ellsworth summarized Turkey’s significance as: “allowing NATO to control the Straits, forming a buffer between the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East, diverting

³³⁶ Government sales were economically much more advantageous than commercial sales: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, *Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını* (The Past, Present and Future of Turkish-American Relations), (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1994), p. 59.

³³⁷ Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, p. 172.

³³⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.12.

Warsaw Pact forces from the central flank, and denying the Soviets overflight privileges”. He also stressed the importance of the bases and facilities that enhanced the U.S. strategic position in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean and underlined the importance of electronic intelligence facilities “that allowed the U.S. to collect unique and important data on Soviet scientific, technological and military activities, and to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT I”.³³⁹ The importance of the intelligence collection sites in Turkey was described by the former NATO Supreme Commander, General Lemnitzer with the following words:

There is no area in the world compatible to Turkey as a vital base of intelligence gathering operations against the Warsaw Pact. This serious loss of vital U.S. intelligence for more than three years is extremely damaging to American and NATO interests because these bases when fully operational are capable of providing irreplaceable intelligence coverage.”³⁴⁰

As time passed, many congressmen who had initially supported the embargo decision started to realize that an embargo would fail to change Turkish policy as regards the Cyprus conflict and that the sanction against Turkey hurt American strategic interests, too. But in the words of Henry Kissinger, “congressional ‘discipline’ had so broken down in the post-Watergate era that the embargo was not finally lifted until well into the Carter era.”³⁴¹

Meanwhile, following the abrogation by Turkey of the 1969 DCA, talks for a new defense cooperation agreement ensued. After a year of negotiations, a new Defense Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and the U.S. was signed on March 29, 1976. The agreement stipulated the re-opening of some of the military facilities. It stipulated that the NATO-cum-U.S. bases in Turkey were in Turkish

³³⁹ Quoted in Duygu Sezer, “Turkey’s Security Policies,” *Adelphi Papers*, No: 164, (1981), p.21.

³⁴⁰ Quoted in Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p.57.

³⁴¹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 238.

control, but lifted most of the restrictions on U.S. personnel. It also foresaw military assistance of \$1 billion between 1976-1980, \$200 million of it in grants. The agreement was to enter into force after the embargo was lifted and subject to Congressional approval. But despite administrative efforts, the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the agreement because there was insufficient progress in Cyprus negotiations. Hence, the 1976 DCA was never put into effect.

Following the 1976 U.S. presidential elections, the Republican Ford administration was replaced by the Democratic Carter administration. The election of Jimmy Carter gave Turks the impression that the new U.S. executive would pressure on Ankara regarding the Cyprus issue since Mr. Carter had displayed a pro-Greek rhetoric in his election campaign.³⁴² But soon after taking office, Carter changed his policy in line with U.S. national interests and after having realized that the Cyprus issue was difficult to solve while the troublesome relations with Turkey continued. Therefore, the new administration renewed the previous executive efforts to persuade Congress to lift the embargo and started to oppose the Congressional policy of making the lifting of the embargo conditional on the solution of the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, the American perception of detente was changing in the late 1970s. According to the U.S. policy makers, the Soviet Union was taking advantage of the thaw in Cold War at the expense of the United States by extending its sphere of influence. Moreover, a change in the nuclear balance in the Soviets' favor had increased the importance of conventional forces. In addition, Turkey's steadily growing relations with the Soviets and with anti-American Arab countries and the accompanying fear on the American side that

³⁴² Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964-1980*, p. 110.

“the Turks could opt for neutrality”³⁴³ were all alarming developments for American foreign policy.

Therefore, soon after assuming office, Carter “sent Clark Clifford as his personal representative off to the eastern Mediterranean with a well-publicized display of concern on a fact-finding mission”.³⁴⁴ Mr. Clifford recommended a course of action similar to the one followed by the previous Ford Administration. Moreover, “a working group and an agenda were formed to consider a possible scenario to restore the Turkish-U.S. relationship”³⁴⁵ and efforts to have the embargo lifted were intensified. “On March 28, 1978, President Carter sent a delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to discuss with Ecevit a plan that would lift the embargo”.³⁴⁶ “On 3 April 1978, the United States released a text stating that “the U.S. and Turkey had agreed to renegotiate the DCA signed in 1976, but not ratified” by Turkey or the U.S. adding that “new and mutually satisfactory defense cooperation arrangements between Turkey and the United States would be negotiated” and that the U.S. executive would ask the Congress to lift the embargo on Turkey.”³⁴⁷

Following continuous and vigorous U.S. administrative efforts to lift the embargo, the Turks replied in kind in April 1978 and “offered more elaborate constitutional proposals and more specific areas for territorial negotiations than

³⁴³ Laurence Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, (New York: Times Books, 1977), p. 152.

³⁴⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.15.

³⁴⁵ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.15.

³⁴⁶ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.16.

³⁴⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.17.

ever before in regard to the Cyprus problem”³⁴⁸ According to American observer George Harris (1985: 195):

The executive branch of the United States understood and had some sympathy for the compulsions that had led Turkey to act in Cyprus. But the U.S. Congress was far less willing to accept the reasons put forward by the Turks as to why they had to keep their forces on the island. As a result, it proved a difficult challenge to win over a sufficient number of congressmen to lift the embargo completely and to restore a high level of military assistance to Turkey.³⁴⁹

The attempt by the Carter Administration in early 1978 to convince the Congress to extend \$50 million in economic aid to Turkey and to sell it \$175 million worth of arms was unsuccessful. “But the Administration persisted in its determination to have the embargo lifted”³⁵⁰ and was finally able to persuade a sufficient number of congressmen to end the embargo in late 1978. On September 26, 1978, Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was repealed, ending the 43-month embargo, with the condition that the President “give reports on progress towards the solution of the Cyprus problem every 60 days.” Soon after, arms transfers to Turkey resumed and the Turks, on 9 October 1978, allowed some American installations to be re-opened under Turkey’s control and on an interim (one-year) basis (with some other installations being handed over to the Turks) while a new defense cooperation agreement was being negotiated.

In the meantime, the inter-communal negotiations for a settlement of the Cyprus problem under UN auspices had resumed on April 28, 1975, but these talks did not produce any tangible results, dragging on endlessly. “The U.S. was not a party to these negotiations, but had an interest in their progress, and from time to

³⁴⁸ George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, p. 195.

³⁴⁹ George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, p. 195.

³⁵⁰ İltar Turan, *The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism*, p. 19.

time made proposals to both sides in the hope of furthering the talks”³⁵¹.

According to Company (1986: 61-63):

The U.S. positions appeared to have contributed little directly to talks. ...they did not materially further the Cyprus negotiations, but they did serve a domestic purpose, however, in that they formed the basis for administration findings that progress was being made and that aid to Turkey should resume.³⁵²

4.2.4. The effects of the embargo

Political effects: The arms embargo on Turkey was the first time that the U.S. was applying such a measure “under a special law and to a NATO ally”³⁵³. Its main goals were to coerce Turkey to be more flexible in the negotiations to settle the Cyprus problem and to punish it for its allegedly illegal intervention in Cyprus. The embargo failed to achieve the declared purpose of forcing Turkey to be more flexible in Cyprus negotiations. On the contrary, it increased Turkish intransigence as Turkey refused to bow to foreign pressure and “chose to suffer the deprivations of the embargo rather than accept the humiliating conditions set by Congress, which practically meant the adoption of Greek demands prior to negotiations”³⁵⁴³⁵⁵. Successive Turkish governments refrained from taking steps that could be seen as concessions made as a result of American pressure. Turkey never changed its policy of “maintaining military forces on the island” nor did it back down on its preference for a “bi-zonal” federation in Cyprus”³⁵⁶. Moreover,

³⁵¹ Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p.61.

³⁵² Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, pp. 61-63.

³⁵³ Kamran İnan, *The U.S. Military Embargo: Its Causes and Effects*, p.81.

³⁵⁴ Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 226.

³⁵⁵ Another reason for this policy was the political instability and weak Turkish governments of the era. Consequently, governments could not take any action that could result in loss of political support. Hence, making concessions concerning the Cyprus issue proved to be very difficult.

³⁵⁶ George Harris, “Turkey Between Alliance and Alienation,” *Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute*, Vol. 8, Nos. 3-4, p. 120.

the embargo led to the further questioning of the reliability of the American commitment to Turkish defense. In the words of Nur Bilge Criss:

It changed Turkey's foreign policy behavior towards assuming a more professional and assertive approach in its relations with the United States as well as ...teaching Turkey to be utterly cautious with the U.S.A. ...The bilateral relations took on a more professional course towards partnership only when and if the national interests of both parties coincided. ...It was a healthy sign unlike in the past, when both sides took each other for granted.³⁵⁷

The embargo contributed to anti-Americanism in Turkey³⁵⁸ and to questioning of NATO membership (though not at the state level)³⁵⁹ and it antagonized some segments in Turkey which were friendly to the United States, such as the Turkish Armed Forces.

Military effects: Due to the embargo, Turkey lost a considerable amount of its war-making capability, deterrence capacity and military readiness^{360 361} and the modernization of the Turkish military was halted “while the bulk of the Turkish aircraft and armor entered block obsolescence”.³⁶² Hence, the embargo's goal of punishing Turkey had succeeded, though by weakening the Western alliance, too. As mentioned above, the suspension of the activities of American

³⁵⁷ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, pp.1, 20-21.

³⁵⁸ But due to the facts the catharsis in Turkish-American relations had been passed with the 1964 Johnson letter and the subsequent developments (William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*) and because the semi-military regime of 1971-1973 had embarked on a crackdown on the Turkish left, the embargo failed to prompt as much anti-Americanism as the previous Johnson letter era.

³⁵⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the West*, p.1.

³⁶⁰ NATO military officials, including SACEUR General Alexander Haig, “pointed on various occasions that Turkish Armed Forces had lost about half their effectiveness particularly in the Air Force”, and Admiral Shear, then NATO's Commander of the Southern Forces of NATO (CINSOUTH) “agreed that Turkey was suffering in terms of military readiness”: Quoted in Duygu Sezer, *Turkey's Security Policies*, pp.24-25. “It was estimated by the Turks that it would take \$600 million worth of spare parts alone to make up the losses caused by the embargo”: CSIA European Security Working Group, “Instability and Change on NATO's Southern Flank,” *International Security*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1978), p. 152.

³⁶¹ The Turkish Air Force was the commandship that was the most adversely affected by the embargo. Due to the difficulties in finding spare parts, some aircrafts, missiles, anti-aircraft artilleries and radars had to be dismantled/reduced and used as spare part: Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

³⁶² Richard C. Campamy, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p.65.

military installations on Turkish soil had important repercussions for the Americans. It seriously limited the United States' ability to gather intelligence about the Soviets, which depended to a significant extent on the data collected by the electronic installations in Turkey.³⁶³ Thus, “the signs were that the embargo had at least as damaging an effect on U.S. military capabilities as on those of Turkey”³⁶⁴.

The U.S. arms embargo also made Turkey realize the extent to which it had come to depend on just one country as a source for its military equipment since the late 1940s³⁶⁵ and how vulnerable it was to manipulation on this issue. This pushed Turkey to diversify its sources for weaponry and seek as much self-sufficiency as possible in defense and in the procurement of military material in order to reduce the military dependence on the U.S. and withstand threats or actual impositions of military embargoes in the future. The Turkish Armed Forces started to successfully procure a considerable amount of military spare parts from local producers at cheaper prices in short order and started to meet the needs of maintenance and repair of military systems from local industries.³⁶⁶ Moreover, the efforts that had begun before the embargo to establish a domestic arms industry were accelerated in order to reduce the dependency on imported military equipment. Several projects were embarked upon by the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Ground, Air and Naval Forces to produce certain military equipments domestically, but because Turkey in the 1970s lacked the foreign

³⁶³ “According to press reports” quoted by Khalilzad, “40 percent of the U.S. intelligence about Soviet weapons system came from installations in Turkey”: Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Superpowers and the Northern Tier,” *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 3, (1979), p.15.

³⁶⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 161.

³⁶⁵ Following the constitution of the alliance relationship with the United States and the accession to NATO, Turkey's efforts to enhance its military power had become dependent to a large degree on the weaponry sold or granted to Turkey by the United States.

³⁶⁶ Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

exchange and the industrial and technological bases needed to realize such a policy, not much improvement was recorded in that timeframe. But nevertheless, Turkey continued its effort in the following years and would start to bear the fruits of this policy in the 1980s and 1990s through joint-production schemes with foreign, especially American, companies and the import of technological know-how.

On a positive note, the embargo made the Turkish military establishment realize that a considerable amount of the military spare parts that were till then purchased from the U.S. could be procured from local producers for much cheaper prices and that the needs of maintenance and repair of military equipments could be met to a considerable degree by local industries, thereby helping to alleviate the problem of dependence on the U.S. for the purchase of military spare parts and for the maintenance and repair of military items.³⁶⁷ Further, following the embargo, a national military inventory system was initiated in order to stock a sufficient amount of military spare parts so as not to be negatively affected by a shortage of spare parts during future embargoes in at least the short and medium terms.³⁶⁸ Moreover, fund raising campaigns were initiated by the Turkish public to meet some of Turkey's urgent military needs.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁷ For example, during the embargo years, an American-origin missile system in the Fifteenth Turkish Missile Base in İstanbul was left idle for months because the valve that was needed to provide air pressure to the missile system was out of order and could not be purchased from the U.S. due to the embargo. It was realized that the sought-after valve was available at a local producer in İstanbul for a much cheaper price. Yet another example was when it was realized that antenna motors used in American-made missile systems could be repaired by a small-scale local producer of such devices for a price of 15 dollars and in a day or two. Till the embargo, it would take several months to have the same antenna motors repaired in the U.S. at a price of thousands of dollars: Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

³⁶⁸ Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

³⁶⁹ For example, Turkish guest workers in Germany collected money for the purchase of a navy ship. The ship that was purchased with the funds that were collected was named "Gurbet":

Economic effects: Before the embargo, “U.S. grant aid had fallen down to 62 million dollars per year”.³⁷⁰ Hence, the direct economic effect of the embargo wasn’t very substantial. Indirectly, however, because “almost the entire Turkish army was equipped with American-made arms and equipment”, “transition from U.S.-made arms to West European arms” necessitated a substantial degree of expenditures and “could be realized only as a long-term project”.³⁷¹ “Utilization and maintenance of” Turkey’s U.S.-origin “weapons required the import of spare parts of U.S. origin or license”³⁷² and as many Western European countries produced their weapons under U.S. patents and licenses, the time and the expense of acquiring weapons had increased to a great degree.³⁷³ Further, with the ban on U.S. military assistance, many funds that would otherwise be used to solve Turkey’s various social and economic problems had to be spent for purchasing military equipment and spare parts. This was an important reason behind Turkey’s foreign exchange crisis and mounting foreign debts in the 1970s.

Other effects: According to Nur Bilge Criss:

the sanction also led to many unforeseen legal and financial burdens. As of February 5, 1975, major military equipment and spare parts were cut off. ...Honest John and Nike tactical missile programs as well as training had ceased. Approximately hundred tons of untransported equipment were kept in storage in New York and Galveston Bay harbors. Storage and insurance expenses of these material continued to mount. Since these were considered to be U.S. Defense Department property, the Turks were told that when the embargo would be lifted, there would be a price differential according to current pricing and Turkey would have to bear

Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

³⁷⁰ Kamran İnan, *The U.S. Military Embargo: Its Causes and Effects*, p.82.

³⁷¹ Erol Manisalı, “The Economic Effects of the U.S. Arms Embargo,” *Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute* Vol.5, No. 1, pp. 95-96.

³⁷² Erol Manisalı, “The Economic Effects of the U.S. Arms Embargo,” *Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the Foreign Policy Institute* Vol.5, No. 1, p. 96.

³⁷³ According to Harris, “the embargo legislation” had banned “deliveries of U.S. weapons by all NATO countries, thus impeding the ability of other allies in NATO to replace U.S. supplies”: George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, p. 193 and Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

the costs. ...On February 18, 1974, an agreement had been signed by which the U.S. Lockheed firm would repair the wings of four C-130 aircraft. If Turkey sent these airplanes back to the USA, they would not be returned, and if the planes were not sent until August 26, 1975, Turkey would have to pay \$350,000 in damages to the firm. If Turkey abrogated the agreement unilaterally, it would have to pay a \$20,000 fine. Tank modernization projects were also stalled. And, there was a lot of difficulty in purchasing U.S.-origin spare parts from elsewhere.^{374 375}

4.3. An altered alliance relationship and changes in Turkish foreign policy

The embargo and the resulting problems in the relations with the United States led to further Turkish disillusionment with the United States. As indicated above, the embargo raised further questions in the minds of Turkish policy makers regarding the reliability of the United States and increased the desire to reduce the almost exclusive dependence on the United States. The Turks no longer believed that the defense and foreign policy interests of the two countries were identical. The embargo also attested to the belief that Turkey had to reduce its dependency on the United States in the military, economic and political fields as “Turkish security was seen as being held hostage to the vagaries and peculiarities of U.S. domestic politics.”³⁷⁶ Consequently, Turkey’s efforts to change its almost exclusively pro-Western and uni-dimensional foreign policy and to follow a more diversified, flexible and multi-lateral foreign and economic policy and its policy of acting more independently within NATO and in its international relations, which it had embarked upon in the mid-1960s, gained further momentum. Turkey’s economic relations with the non-Western world steadily improved.

³⁷⁴ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p. 13-14.

³⁷⁵ Due to huge price differentials: Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

³⁷⁶ CSIA European Security Working Group, *Instability and Change on NATO’s Southern Flank*, p. 167.

As in the post-1964 developments, it would be an oversimplification to claim that the changes in Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s was caused only by the Cyprus conflict of 1974 and the subsequent American arms embargo on Turkey. In addition to the arms embargo, there were other major factors involved in the erosion of alliance cohesion and in Turkey's adoption of a different foreign policy: (1) The detente process decreased Turkey's threat perception of the U.S.S.R. and it provided smaller allies within the two blocs with "relative autonomy" in foreign policy.³⁷⁷ Consequently, smaller allies did not have to follow the policies and suggestions of the superpowers on every single foreign policy issue. (2) As a result of the increasing pluralism in Turkish politics in the 1960s, foreign policy had become a very popular issue among the Turkish people at large and this pluralism made possible the realization that Turkish "security interests do not always converge with other allied interests".³⁷⁸ (3) Turkey's need for foreign financing and economic aid had increased as a result of the economic crises in the 1970s and due to decreasing Western aid, which underlined the need to forge closer economic relations with the non-Western world. (4) As a result of the domestic changes in the United States following the Watergate crisis and the developments in Vietnam, the U.S. Congress (which was more interested in parochial concerns rather than strategic national interests)³⁷⁹ had come to play a bigger role in foreign affairs in the 1970s. Consequently, domestic political factors such as the ability of ethnic lobbies to affect foreign policy decision making processes, had increased and the U.S. executive branch (with which

³⁷⁷ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, pp. 657-680.

³⁷⁸ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, *Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday*, p. 26.

³⁷⁹ Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo*.

Turkey's relations were much more cordial) no longer had the freedom of action in the conduct of foreign policy, that it did before 1974. A good example of this development was the ability of the "Greek lobby" to maintain the arms embargo against Turkey for more than three years despite the fact that the ban hurt American national interests, too.³⁸⁰ Under such circumstances, "it was uncomfortable for" Turkey "to feel that its security was in the hands of an unpredictable superpower³⁸¹ and this underlined the need to reduce the dependency on the United States.

Prime Minister Ecevit's personal conviction was an important factor, too. In his view, "the nature of Turkish-American relations had changed and a new reality had to be defined."³⁸² He believed that Turkey had to adopt a new "National Security Concept".³⁸³ He did not believe that it would be beneficial for Turkey to withdraw from NATO. Ecevit still believed in the ultimate merits of Turkish membership of the Atlantic Alliance. However, he argued that "Turkey was over-dependent on the United States and that its contribution to NATO should be commensurate with NATO's contribution to Turkish security."³⁸⁴ At the same time, Ecevit believed that "Turkey's contribution to NATO should not constitute a serious risk for Turkey by rendering it provocative in its region".³⁸⁵ Hence, Turkey would decrease the number of troops it committed to the NATO's joint,

³⁸⁰ CSIA European Security Working Group, *Instability and Change on NATO's Southern Flank*.

³⁸¹ Duygu Sezer, *Turkey's Security Policies*, p. 41.

³⁸² Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p. 27.

³⁸³ For Ecevit's views on this new concept, refer to Bülent Ecevit "Turkey's Security Policies," In Jonathan Alford, ed., *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance-Adelphi Library 12*, (Great Britain: Gower Publishing, 1984), pp. 136-141.

³⁸⁴ Quoted in Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 256.

³⁸⁵ Quoted in Süha Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 256-257.

integrated forces³⁸⁶ and further try to improve its relations with regional states. Turkey would also accelerate its efforts to develop a domestic arms industry, to increase the number of its sources for military equipment and push for further changes in its bilateral military relationship with the Americans in order to put Turkish-U.S. relations on a more equal footing.

One good example of these efforts was seen in 1979, when Turkey (in response to an American demand) told the United States that it would allow American U-2 planes to embark on reconnaissance flights to monitor Soviet observation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Agreement II (SALT II) when and only if the U.S.S.R agreed, too. As expected, the Soviets rejected, so Turkey did not allow the U.S. to use bases in Turkey for such flights. Another was witnessed when Turkey deployed a cold-aloof approach to hosting the Rapid Deployment Force on its soil.³⁸⁷

Having said these, there were limits to how much this new foreign policy was and could be pushed. The long-term perspective of the foreign policy Turkey, the most important characteristics of which are the priority it has always attached to relations with the Western world, its pragmatism and its realistic and rational assessment of events and developments, proved powerful and prevented a further deterioration in Turkish-American relations. As in the post-1964 developments, Turkey refrained from taking rash initiatives. Furthermore, relations with the Soviets and the Middle East were never seen by the Turkish foreign policy establishment as an alternative for Turkey's ties with the United States, but were rather seen as complementary to them. Plus, Turkey was largely dependent on the

³⁸⁶ Interview with İsmail Pakel, retired Staff Colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, November 22, 2006, Ankara, Turkey.

³⁸⁷ The Rapid Deployment Force was constituted to prevent outside powers from gaining control of the Middle East.

United States in a variety of realms and ultimate Soviet goals towards Turkey were not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Hence, Turkey never seriously contemplated pulling out of NATO or permanently closing down the American bases in Turkey and Turkish-American military cooperation continued within the larger NATO framework. Turkey refrained from “overruling collaboration with the U.S. and preferred to make its decisions *ad hoc*”.³⁸⁸ Plus, “the fact that the catharsis in U.S.-Turkish relations had already been passed in the 1960s” coupled with the fact that the U.S. executive opposed the embargo “moderated Turkish reactions”.³⁸⁹ Moreover, Turkey continued its cordial relationship with the U.S. executive branch, the State Department and the Pentagon in view of the fact that they were trying vigorously to have the embargo lifted and because the “U.S. executive did not mind Turkish purchases of U.S.-origin spare parts from other NATO members. In the words of George Harris, “despite the vicissitudes in the collaboration”, there was present “a degree of understanding of the extensiveness of shared interests in the official level”.³⁹⁰

4.3.1. Turkish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union

Following the imposition of the arms embargo, the improvement in Turkish-Soviet relations that had started in the mid-1960s accelerated. In addition to the disillusionment with the U.S., the decreasing of the threat that the Soviet Union posed to Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s and the detente process were important factors in this development. Visits by high level civilian and military officials continued; the Soviet Union continued to extend economic assistance and

³⁸⁸ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East*.

³⁸⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.161.

³⁹⁰ George Harris, *Turkey Between Alliance and Alienation*, pp. 117-118.

credits on favorable terms for industrial facilities³⁹¹ and both countries agreed on the merits of peaceful co-existence of the two blocs.

Moreover, during 1974-1979, Turkish-Soviet trade increased three-fold. Soviet economic assistance to Turkey in the same timeframe amounted to \$650 million which was “one third of all Soviet economic assistance for that period”,³⁹² attesting to the desire on the U.S.S.R.’s part to improve relations with Turkey. Furthermore, the Soviets continued to extend economic to Turkey to build industrial facilities.

Political relations further improved, too. In June 1978, the two sides signed a Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation, which, though “going much less far than the fully fledged non-aggression pact that the Soviets government had been working for”,³⁹³ stipulated that the two countries would not allow the use of their territory for aggressive purposes or for subversive activities against each other. In July 1976, the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev trespassed the Turkish Straits even though the passage of such navy ships is not allowed in the 1936 Montreux Convention. “The Turkish Government accepted the Soviet description of the Kiev as an anti-submarine cruiser”,³⁹⁴

Nevertheless, cognizant of the Russians’ unending continuing desire to control the Straits and their long-term intentions vis-à-vis Turkey, the Turks continued to act with a degree of caution in their relations with the Soviet Union

³⁹¹ Mehmet Altan, *Süperler ve Türkiye: Türkiye’de Amerikan ve Sovyet yatırımları*, pp. 192-226.

³⁹² Richard C. Company, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p. 80.

³⁹³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p. 162.

³⁹⁴ CSIA European Security Working Group, *Instability and Change on NATO’s Southern Flank*, p. 172.

and hence refused for example, to purchase Soviet military equipment or to sign a non-aggression pact.

4.3.2. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East

In the 1960s, the problems in the relations with the United States and the need to garner diplomatic and political support for its Cyprus policy had led Turkey to pursue the objectives of separating its foreign policy towards the Middle East from its alliance relationship with the United States and improving its political relations with the countries of the region, regardless of those countries' regimes. This policy was intensified and in the 1970s, an economic rationale was added to the need to further pursue this policy: The oil price hikes of 1973-74 had increased Turkey's need to purchase oil inexpensively. Moreover, it was thought that Turkey's foreign exchange shortage could be solved by convincing the Arabs to invest their money in Turkey and by increasing exports to the region.

Therefore, Turkey continued its earlier policy of refraining from acting as an American proxy in Middle East conflicts and began to adopt an even more pro-Palestinian policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1976, it officially recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and a PLO office was opened in Turkey in 1979. In the same year, Turkey allowed the Americans to use the bases in Turkey to evacuate the Americans in Iran, but it refused to take part in the U.S. embargo on Iran following the hostage crisis, in order not to offend its southeastern neighbor. In the economic sphere, Turkey's trade relations with the region increased considerably. 200,000 Turks became employed in Middle Eastern countries and many Turkish construction companies signed contracts in the region.

As a result of these policies, the memories of the strained relations between the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey in the 1950s were forgotten and a relative degree of confidence started to characterize Turkish-Arab relations. “Without changing the basic tenets of their foreign policy, Turkish policy makers were able to pull the Middle East states to their side to the extent that was possible”.³⁹⁵

4.4. Turkish-American relations after the embargo and American economic assistance to Turkey

After 1978, Turkey “entered a phase of re-engagement in the Western alliance”,³⁹⁶ in that the strains in Turkish-U.S. relations receded and Turkish-American relations improved significantly. “As in the case of the previous phase” (1964-1978), “this realignment had both international and domestic political causes”.³⁹⁷ First of all, the repeal of the embargo legislation removed an important obstacle before the improvement of Turkish-American relations. Parallel to this development, changes in the relations between the super powers at the end of the 1970s had heightened tensions in international politics. The Americans no longer perceived the détente process as beneficial to American national interests, while the change in the nuclear balance in the Soviets’ favor increased the value and importance of conventional military forces. As a result, the Carter and Reagan Administrations were determined to increase American war-making power and NATO’s military capability. Moreover, regional developments like the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, and the changing naval and aerial military balance in the eastern Mediterranean in the

³⁹⁵ Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East*, p.6.

³⁹⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-200*, p.163.

³⁹⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-200*, p.163.

Soviets' favor in the 1970s and the resulting American concerns about the security of this strategic area accentuated Turkey's importance to the Western alliance. Within this context, the U.S. embarked on a policy to improve economic, political and military ties with the Turks.³⁹⁸ On the Turkish side, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made many realize "what could happen to a small country on the borders of the Soviet Union which opted for neutrality".³⁹⁹ The new international environment also limited Turkey's foreign policy choices vis-à-vis the superpowers, underscoring the need to constitute a closer alliance relationship with the United States.

Parallel to these international developments, Turkey was witnessing rampant political polarization and violence between the left and the right, along with an acute economic crisis in the late 1970s. Consequently, the Turkish military intervened in politics again on 12 September, 1980. Following the coup, the military junta (1980-1982), which was known to be pro-American and staunchly anti-communist, promulgated a restrictive constitution and embarked on a crackdown on political terrorism. In the United States, the aforementioned international developments enhanced the value of Turkey in the eyes of many Congressmen. As a result of these domestic and international changes, all aspects of Turkish-American relations would start to markedly improve in the 1980s while Turkish relations with the Soviets would deteriorate considerably.

³⁹⁸ For example, "the level of U.S. security assistance to Turkey almost doubled during the time of the first Reagan Administration": Richard Perle, "Turkey and U.S. Military Assistance," p. 23. In George S. Harris, ed., *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations*, (Report of A Heritage Foundation Conference, 1984), pp. 23-26.

³⁹⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, p.163.

4.4.1. The 1980 Defense and Cooperation Agreement

After the embargo on arms transfers to Turkey was lifted in 1978, negotiations for a new defense and cooperation agreement ensued. Affected by the economic repercussions of the three year-long sanction, Turkey was insistent on including economic aspects in the agreement and wanted to rule out the use of NATO bases for non-NATO purposes. Further, “to limit the ability of the U.S. Congress to restrict Turkish access to arms or to impose drastic cuts in aid, Ankara wished the accord to commit Washington to multi-year aid packages”.⁴⁰⁰ Moreover, Turkey, intent on establishing a viable domestic arms industry, asked for extensive technology transfer from the United States.

The Turks were successful in having the Americans accept most of its above-mentioned demands owing to the rise in the importance and value that the United States attached to the Turkish alliance and following 16 months of negotiations, the new DCA was signed in 30 March 1980.⁴⁰¹ Unlike the previous agreements, the 1980 agreement was comprehensive, regulating many aspects of the relationship, including an economic component (whereby the United States explicitly committed itself to the strengthening of the Turkish economy and improving economic and trade relations between the two parties), so the 1980 agreement was named the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). The duration of the agreement was to be five years. Unlike the non-ratified 1976 DCA, the 1980 DECA did not foresee a specific amount of aid to be provided to Turkey, but the Americans undertook to provide the necessary military equipment to enhance Turkey’s military capacity. The Turks, on the other hand

⁴⁰⁰ George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, p.196.

⁴⁰¹ For the full text of the 1980 Defense and Cooperation Agreement, refer to Richard C. Campamy’s *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, pp. 103-123.

allowed the United States to maintain military personnel and carry out joint defense activities in 12 bases and installations (which would be jointly used by the Turks and the Americans) including the İncirlik (Adana) air operations and support base, the Sinop electromagnetic monitoring base, the Pirinçlik (Diyarbakır) radar warning and space monitoring base, the Yamanlar (İzmir), Şahintepe (Gemlik), Elmadağ (Ankara), Karataş (Adana), Mahmurdağ (Samsun), Alemdağ (İstanbul) and Kürecik (Malatya) nodal communication sites, the Belbaşı (Ankara) seismic data collection site and the Kargaburun (İstanbul) radio navigation site.⁴⁰² The loss of intelligence-gathering installations in Iran following the Islamic Revolution in that country had increased the importance of especially the monitoring bases in Sinop, Pirinçlik (Diyarbakır) and Belbaşı (Ankara). Moreover, the Agreement explicitly stipulated that the bases are under Turkish control and part of Turkish state property. Thirteen joint military facilities were handed over to the Turks.

The 1980 DECA also specifically and explicitly ruled out out-of-area operations in the Middle East using the NATO bases on Turkish soil. It separated economic aid from military aid and foresaw American support for the nascent Turkish defense industry through the transfer of American technological know-how and military equipment to Turkey. The most important part of this program stipulated the joint-production in Turkey of F-16 aircraft.⁴⁰³

In concluding, one can state that, all in all, these developments in the political and military spheres of the relationship as of the late 1970s were another vindication of the widely-shared claims that:

⁴⁰² Richard C. Campany, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p. 115.

⁴⁰³ Richard C. Campany, *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, p.71.

the general American attitude towards Turkey, which was basically security-oriented (which was itself a result of the interaction of détente, U.S. internal politics and threat perceptions) prevented a consistent and steady development of relations⁴⁰⁴

and that alienation was observed in Turkish-American relations in times of détente, whereas a rapprochement was witnessed when the Cold War intensified.

4.4.2. Economic relations

As indicated in Chapter III, American economic aid to Turkey had started to dwindle as a result of the change in general U.S. foreign aid policy⁴⁰⁵ while loans started to constitute a bigger portion of U.S. assistance at the expense of the obviously more lucrative grant aid. This trend continued in the early 1970s. Moreover, “Western technical assistance for all practical purposes ended in 1975 with the closing down of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Ankara⁴⁰⁶ .

The 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo prohibited military aid, but posed no legal barrier to economic assistance. Yet there was none until the economic crisis of the late 1970s, the rise in the strategic importance of Turkey and the lifting of the arms embargo brought a resumption of economic aid in 1979.⁴⁰⁷

It also seemed that the U.S. used pressure in regard to foreign trade.⁴⁰⁸

Meanwhile, along with the oil price hikes of 1973-4 and 1978-9 (which doubled the amount of Turkey’s imports, leading to a big rise in Turkey’s trade

⁴⁰⁴ Seyfi Taşhan, *Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman’s Birthday*, p. 8.

⁴⁰⁵ Owing to the rising U.S. balance of payments deficit and the pressure of their constituency, members of the American Congress were loath to extend foreign aid, be it military or economic.

⁴⁰⁶ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p. 14.

⁴⁰⁷ James W. Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey: Memoirs of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 72 quoted in Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p.14.

⁴⁰⁸ Erol Manisali, *The Economic Effects of the U.S. Arms Embargo*.

deficit), the economic recession in Europe, wrong economic policies⁴⁰⁹ and the refusal of the IMF to reschedule Turkey's debts and extend loans (due to Turkish governments' opposition to adopting austerity measures as part of the stand-by agreement), the "curtailment of U.S. economic assistance",⁴¹⁰ and the ban on U.S. military assistance (because limited economic resources had to be diverted to purchase military equipment and spare parts resulting in a serious foreign exchange crisis) were major causes of the crisis in the Turkish economy. Furthermore, according to Criss, "it is plausible that Turkey's loss of prestige due to the embargo might have rendered loans and credits from Western banks more difficult to obtain".⁴¹¹ Turkey also "probably lost some foreign investment as well, because of the unsettled atmosphere of the sharp confrontation with the United States".⁴¹²

As the result of the above-mentioned factors, Turkey, in the late 1970s found itself in a vicious cycle of rampant inflation, a very high unemployment rate and a severe foreign exchange shortage, with foreign debts exceeding \$13,5 billion. In order to solve the crisis, Turkey, in 1978, signed an agreement with the IMF for a loan to relieve its foreign exchange crisis, but the second installment of the loan was not released by the IMF, for the Ecevit government refused to implement all the austerity measures that the Fund asked from Turkey (including a major devaluation of the Turkish lira, wage freezes and further cutting of government expenditures and subsidies).⁴¹³ Nevertheless, in January 1979, the

⁴⁰⁹ This was caused to a large extent by successive governments' inability to take unpopular yet (economically) rational measures due to the political instability and weak governments of the era.

⁴¹⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*, p. 14.

⁴¹¹ Nur Bilge Criss, *Sanction and Diplomacy*.

⁴¹² George S. Harris, *Turkey between Alliance and Alienation*, p. 121.

⁴¹³ According to American observer Richard Vine, "the United States hid behind the IMF during Turkish-IMF negotiations in order to assure that the IMF criteria of stringent economic and financial measures would be put into place and applied. It was generally agreed in the United States

U.S. and Germany extended a loan of 380 million German marks to Turkey, thereby preventing a financial insolvency in the short-term. Despite this emergency aid, the Turkish economic crisis deepened and in November 1979, the new Demirel government had to accept the severe IMF austerity measures and embarked on a neo-liberal economic stabilization program (in consultation with the IMF and international banks), which emphasized a market economy at the expense of reducing government intervention in economic life and foresaw an export-led development strategy to replace the import substitution method of industrialization. The IMF, in exchange, extended new loans and rescheduled Turkey's foreign debts.⁴¹⁴ This economic policy was continued during the military regime and the following Özal government. As a result of these developments and with the resumption of very high levels of U.S. military and economic aid to Turkey,⁴¹⁵ the Turkish economic situation would significantly improve in the 1980s.

that this was required in order to restore health to the Turkish economy": Richard D. Vine, *Turkish-U.S. Relations Revisited on Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday*, p. 25.

⁴¹⁴ "The United States was in the forefront of the IMF's program to provide relief to Turkey's hard-pressed economy": George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, p. 198.

⁴¹⁵ "American economic assistance to Turkey between 1947 and 1979 was estimated at nearly \$4 billion": Van Coufoudakis, *Turkey and the United States: The Problems of a post-war Alliance*, p.182.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Soviet demands from Turkey towards the end of World War II terrified the Turks and prompted a search for security. The United States seemed as the only country that was militarily capable of countering the Soviet threat to Turkey's territorial integrity and its independence, so the İnönü government tried to involve the United States in the protection of Turkey. However, the Americans at that stage were not interested in protecting Turkey, believing that the wartime partnership with the Soviet Union could be continued. But by mid-1946, as a result of Soviet expansionism, Washington realized that cooperation with the Soviets could not be continued and that the world was being split into two rival blocs. Hence, the United States had to forego its traditionally isolationist foreign policy and embark on a project of containing Soviet expansionism by strengthening Western Europe militarily and economically. It had also realized that the Soviet extension of control over Turkey would have important ramifications for the Western world owing to the important geo-strategic location of Turkey.

Accordingly, the United States showed its interest in Turkey's security by sending in 1946 the battleship Missouri to İstanbul, which ended Turkey's diplomatic isolation following World War II, and with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which was aimed at strengthening Turkey (and Greece) against communist

aggression and, which was a clear sign that the U.S was prepared to make a substantial contribution to Turkey's defense. However, the Doctrine did not establish an alliance relationship between the two countries. Thus, the Turks still needed to secure a permanent American commitment to Turkey's defense.

Meanwhile, by 1948, a security organization i.e. NATO to strengthen Europe's defensive capability against Soviet expansionism was in the making. The first two Turkish applications were unsuccessful because the United States initially wanted to use its insufficient defense budget to provide for the protection of the more important Western Europe. But the initial American reluctance to extend NATO membership to Turkey was overcome by the outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent change in American military strategy, as a result of which, the American defense budget increased considerably and Turkey's geo-strategic value vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and the Middle East was magnified.

Accordingly, Turkey acceded to NATO in 1952. Turkish diplomacy had finally achieved its foremost post-war goal. On the American side, the reason for wanting to constitute an alliance partnership with Turkey was almost exclusively based on the strategic and military needs. In defending Turkey, the U.S. was acting as a nation whose global interests would be endangered if Turkey faltered economically, militarily or politically.⁴¹⁶ On the Turks' part, the search for security in the face of Soviet threats, the pro-Western tenet of its foreign policy and its need for economic aid were the most important factors that prompted it to want to accede to NATO and constitute a close alliance relationship with the U.S.

During the following phase of Turkish-American relations (1952- early 1960s), Turkish policy makers enthusiastically followed a foreign policy very

⁴¹⁶ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus*, p. 372.

similar to that of the United States. Turkey pursued a policy of constituting as close an alliance relationship with the U.S. as possible in the diplomatic, economic and military realms at the expense of even subordinating some of its national interests.

During this era, Turkish-American relations were, in essence, harmonious owing to the perception of congruence of Turkish-American interests within the context of the main goal of checking Soviet expansionism. The relatively small problems and disagreements that arose in the relationship such as the American use of Turkish bases in the 1958 Lebanon crisis without notifying the Turks beforehand or the economic aid controversy of the 1950s were solved or subordinated within the mutual main, long-term goal of containing communism. Moreover, the perception of the congruence of Turkish-American interests and policies prevented Turkey from putting restrictions on the activity of Americans, who started to use the NATO-cum-U.S installations on Turkish soil for purposes other than containment of communism.

Serious problems would start to appear in the alliance partnership as of the early 1960s. Many of these arose as detente seemed to grow in super power relations and as the Soviet threat receded to both the United States and Turkey. Moreover, strategic and technological developments lessened the value of Turkey's alliance in American eyes, too. But the major catalyst in the deterioration of Turkish-American relations was the Cyprus crisis of 1964. Then, President Johnson tried to avert Turkish intervention in Cyprus by refusing to extend support in case of a Soviet attack on Turkey that would come as the result of a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. The letter and the subsequent troubles constituted a major turning point in the history of the relations. The letter led to resentment

against and a major Turkish disillusionment with the U.S. It also created doubts in Turkish eyes about the automaticity and reliability of the Americans' commitment to Turkish security. Together with parallel international and domestic developments, the letter prompted a change in the relations. As of that date, the close Turkish-American alliance relationship, which had reached its peak in the 1950s and early 1960s, would begin to cool. Ties would weaken. A widespread anti-American sentiment emerged. Turkey embarked on a policy of normalizing its relations with the non-Western world and trying to put its relations with the Americans on a more equal basis and it tried to reduce its dependency on the United States. But cooperation with the Americans was not ruled out and Turkey did not contemplate pulling out of NATO at the policy making level, for Turkey was dependent on the United States in a variety of realms, be it economic, military or political. On the Americans' part, too despite the changing international circumstances, there weren't any second thoughts regarding the usefulness of the Turkey's alliance.

Another turning point that led to deterioration in relations came with the Cyprus crisis of 1974 when Turkey carried out two military operations in Cyprus to protect its kin on the island, prompting the U.S. Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey in early 1975. In response, Ankara suspended the activities of American bases on its soil and abrogated the 1969 Defense and Cooperation Agreement. The embargo led to further questioning of the reliability of the United States and underlined the need to lessen Turkish dependency on the United States. Along with parallel international and domestic developments in both countries, the embargo prompted Turkey to intensify its 1960s policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union and with Middle Eastern countries and put its relations with

the United States on a more equal footing. The alliance relationship loosened. The parties, especially the Turks, no longer believed that the foreign policy goals of the two countries were identical on almost every issue.

But nevertheless, as in the aftermath of the Johnson letter, the alliance relations continued (though the degree of cooperation decreased considerably). For, it still had a considerable military value in the eyes of both parties and Turkey was so much dependent on the West in general and the U.S. in particular that, a shift to neutrality in its foreign relations seemed unfeasible. Further, the fact that the U.S. executive branch vehemently opposed the embargo also softened Turkish reaction and prevented a further disengagement in relations.

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APPENDIX A

THE EMBARGOED MILITARY ITEMS

As mentioned in the thesis, the American arms embargo on Turkey encompassed all American-made or American-licensed military equipment, systems and their spare parts.

The Land Forces

1. Tanks, anti-tank cannons and similar systems and their ammunition and spare parts.
2. Surface to surface tactical missiles and rockets and their spare parts.
3. Military engineering, communication (signals), loading systems and equipments.
4. Communication systems.
5. Anti-aircraft systems.
6. Infantry arms.
7. Maintenance and repair systems of the above-mentioned military equipments and systems.

8. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned military equipments and systems.

9. Measurement and calibration devices for the above-mentioned arms systems.

The Navy

1. Surface vessels and submarines and their ammunition and spare parts.

2. Anti-aircraft systems.

3. Systems facilitating loading and unloading in ports.

4. Navy aircrafts.

5. Electronic systems, maintenance and repair systems and measurement and calibration devices.

6. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned military equipments and systems.

7. Communications (signals), radar and monitoring systems.

The Air Force

1. Aircrafts and their guided bullet, rocket and machine gun systems.

2. Helicopters.

3. Surface to air missile systems and their radars.

4. Anti-aircraft cannons and radars.

5. Communication (signals) systems.

6. Radar systems.

7. Air base storage, loading and unloading systems, devices and facilities.

8. Military engineering devices.

9. The maintenance and repair systems of the above-mentioned military equipments and systems.

10. Educational services, equipment and exemplars for the above-mentioned military equipments and systems.

11. Measurement and calibration equipment of the above-mentioned military equipments and systems.

Source: Interview with retired Staff Colonel İsmail Pakel. November 22, 2006. Ankara, Turkey.

APPENDIX B

THE EMBARGO LEGISLATION: SECTION 620(x) OF THE 1961 U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guarantee, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended on the date of enactment of this subsection unless and until the President determines and certifies to to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress towards agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: *Provided* That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and such acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only until February 5, 1975, and only if, during that time, Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase the forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any U.S. supplied implements of war.

Source: Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri* (Turkish-American relations: A Documentary Record), Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991, p. 286.