

SECURITIZATION, MILITARIZATION AND GENDER IN TURKEY

A Master's Thesis

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To my parents Aziz and Füsun, my sister Sine and my aunt Nurten

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Tore Fougner
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

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The process of securitization reflects the dominant security understanding and the forces that play on this security understanding in a country. In Turkey, this process of securitization is experienced in close relation to militarization. With four military interventions since the republic was established, - two of which were full-scale coups d'état. - Turkey has gone through an intensified process of militarization that has affected the process of securitization. These processes are constructed, but claimed to be “natural” for the securitization to work smoothly. This construction is based on a gendered understanding and discourse especially with the way that the security agenda is constituted, which helps for consolidation of the dominant security understanding. With the effect of militarization on the process of securitization, the

security agenda is formed with the state as the sole referent object, and this results in the individual security being taken for granted. Furthermore, the state can also be a source of threat for individual security within this relationship of securitization and militarization. The militarized understanding of security and the close relationship between the processes of securitization and militarization results in a hierarchical attitude towards events and developments where individual security in general, and the security of women in particular, are neglected. This thesis analyzes the relationship between the processes of securitization and militarization and shows their gendered construction in Turkey.

Keywords: Security, Securitization, Military, Militarization, Gender, Turkey.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DE GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRME, MİLİTARİZASYON VE CİNSİYET

Yağanoğlu, Setenay

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Tore Fougner

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Bir ülkedeki güvenlikleştirme süreci o ülkedeki baskın güvenlik anlayışını ve bu anlayışın hangi kaynaklardan nasıl etkilendiğini yansıtır. Türkiye’de güvenlikleştirme süreci militarizasyon süreci ile yakın ilişkili olarak tecrübe edilmektedir. Türkiye cumhuriyet tarihinde yer alan resmi dört askeri müdahale ile – ikisi direkt darbe olmakla beraber – güvenlikleştirme süreci üzerinde önemli bir etkisi olan yoğun bir militarizasyon sürecinden geçmiştir. Bu süreçlerin “doğal” olduğu iddia edilse de, bu süreçler oluşturulmuş süreçlerdir. Doğal olma iddası güvenlikleştirme sürecinin daha yumuşak çizgiler ile algılanması içindir. Bu oluşturma özellikle güvenlik gündeminin belirlenmesi açısından cinsiyetçi bir bakış açısına dayanmaktadır. Cinsiyetçi bakış açısı özellikle kullanılan güvenlik dilinin oluşumunda, iletilmesinde pekiştirici rol oynamaktadır. Militarizasyonun güvenlikleştirme süreci üzerindeki etkisi ile güvenlik gündemi sadece devleti baz alan bir anlayış ile oluşturulmaktadır. Bu durum da birey güvenliğinin göz ardı edilmesine yol açmaktadır. Dahası, güvenlikleştirme ve militarizasyon süreçlerinin arasındaki yakın ilişki sonucunda devlet zaman zaman birey güvenliği için tehdit oluşturabilmektedir. Güvenlik anlayışının militarizasyon çerçevesi içerisinde algılanması ve güvenlikleştirme ve militarizasyon süreçlerinin arasındaki bu yakın ilişki güvenlik gündeminde olayların gündeme alınması hususunda hiyerarşik bir

tavrın olmasına sebep olur. Bu da kadınların içinde yer aldığı birey güvenliği ile ilgili sorunlarının göz ardı edilmesine sebep olur. Bu tez güvenlikleştirme ve militarizasyon süreçleri arasındaki ilişkiyi ve bu oluşturulmuş süreçlerin cinsiyetçi bir bakış açısına dayanarak oluşturulduğunu Türkiye üzerinden açıklama amacını taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik, Güvenlikleştirme, Ordu, Militarizasyon, Cinsiyet, Türkiye

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about the relationship between securitization, militarization and gender in Turkey. The purpose of this thesis is to explore both the relationship between the processes of securitization and militarization in Turkey, and the extent to which they are based on a gendered understanding. The securitization theory of Ole Wæver will constitute a point of departure for the analysis of securitization, which I will try to build on when analyzing the case of Turkey. As it will be shown in the thesis, the process of securitization takes on particular significant characteristics when it interacts with a militarization process, as is the case in Turkey. So, the analysis is based on Turkey's experience with the securitization process, which exists in a cyclical relationship with militarization, and stands on a gendered construction.

Before entering into the analysis of the relationship between the processes, the key concepts of the thesis should be defined. Throughout the thesis, securitization will refer to the discursive act that labels and presents an event as a security issue, as defined and discussed by Wæver. Militarization refers to a process of evolution of military thought, in which an extensive trust in the military is constructed not only for the protection of a country in times of war, but also in the political life of that country. The usage of the concept of gender will refer to the social construction of sex roles where sex refers only to the physical differences between woman and man

while “gendered constructions” will refer to the furthering of this separation to form dichotomies used for social construction of labeling people, attitudes and behavior as masculine and feminine. The thesis aims to explore if and how these key terms play a role in the formation of the security agenda and security understanding in Turkey.

In Turkey, while a wide range of issues are included on the agenda through the process of securitization, the negative implications of their inclusion are not questioned and, furthermore, issues related especially to individuals, such as women, are excluded from the security agenda and while done this way women are affected negatively by the way that securitization is occurring. The logic behind these two opposite attitudes is based on a statist understanding of security. The militarization process in the context of Turkey has an intensified past with four military interventions, two of them being *coups d'état*, within 83 years of the republic. The military's role in politics and the acceptance of its privileged position by society had great effect on the process of securitization. In the occurrence of crises, the military's strong position in the decision-making process as the protector of the state and the nation was accepted with the process of militarization. So, the process of securitization has fed from militarization, but this specific kind of securitization also played into the continuance of militarization, because the militarized discourse of securitization called for more threat perceptions and for more militarization in order to protect the state and the nation. The securitization process, because it is based on regime security as the main and sole referent object of security, in Turkey has worked for both the external and internal threats. This is in close relation with the process of militarization and its success and with the fact that the execution of this cyclical relationship and its consequences being not questioned. Although there are

developments for the questioning of this relationship, it is still not at a sufficient level.

These processes are constructed processes, but are claimed to be “natural” in the context of Turkey. Its geographical condition is the main reason for this, as claimed by many. In more specific terms the claim is that since Turkey is situated in a geo-strategically important place, it is a vulnerable state to perceive threats from outside and it protects this vulnerability from threats stemming from outside and inside environments because of its condition of having a sensitive geographical location. The construction of this argument is based on a gendered understanding, where certain attitudes are portrayed as masculine (representing strength) and certain others as feminine (representing weakness and vulnerability), and certain roles are attached to women and men in separate to serve the well-being of the nation and the state. The regime is being constructed on a feminine understanding, which to be protected from any internal and external threats, and the state is portrayed as strong and masculine in favor of aggressive or militarized solutions in order to protect both the vulnerable regime and fragile women and children from threats. The processes are gendered constructions based on gendered discourses, as it will be shown in the thesis.

The first chapter of the thesis is called “Securitization, Militarization and Gender”, and aims to give a literature discussion on the key concepts of the thesis. Its purpose is to provide the conceptual tools and theoretical framework within which the empirical analysis of Turkey will be conducted. The chapter has three sections, the first of which shows the understanding of security, from which the process of securitization departs. Then, the relationship between securitization and militarization will be highlighted. The chapter continues with feminist engagements

with the concepts of security, securitization and militarization, in which the feminist understanding of the processes and the gendered discourse that feeds these processes will be discussed. The chapter closes with the final section in which the gendered discourse of security will be discussed. The chapter has a key role for the thesis overall, because it supplies the general template for the empirical analysis of Turkey, and gives my position in the argument.

The second chapter is called “Militarization in Turkey”. Its purpose is to provide factual background information concerning the role played by the military in Turkey – this, in part because the importance of this for securitisation is emphasized in the first chapter and in part, because it will prepare the ground for discussing the securitisation-militarisation relationship in the next chapter. The chapter is organized in a way that analyses the indicators of the militarization process in Turkey. These are, after giving the characteristics of the republic’s establishment period, the occurrence of the four military interventions, and the consequences of these interventions in the institutional and societal sense in general.

In the third chapter, called “Militarization and Securitization in Turkey”, the purpose is to discuss and analyse the securitisation-militarisation relationship in Turkey. While referring to the process of militarization in Turkey in general, Cynthia Enloe’s (1990) argumentation of militarization, with the dynamics of “ideology of national security” and “recruitment”, as conscription the case of Turkey, will be a reference point. Based on the general template of the relationship between securitization and militarization, the event of the Cyprus Operation in 1974 will be the focus example of the analysis. This event is important in the way that it was securitized on a militaristic ground. Furthermore, it is important in its historical context, because the time of the operation came in between two official military

interventions, and it represents a period where the military loses its confidence in any other foreign power in a determinant way. It is also important in the way that consequence led to further militarization - the increase in requests for military service and taking part in the operation being an example of this. The securitization of the PKK issue will also be touched upon, with its representation on the security agenda and the outcomes of this securitization process. Again, the glorification of compulsory military service as an outcome of this process will be discussed. The dynamic that Enloe states as “recruitment” and Ayşe Gül Altınay’s (2004) analysis of the military service will be the templates that will be used specifically in the chapter. The chapter is important for the thesis, because it shows how [the purpose of analyzing] the relationship between securitization and militarization works in practice.

The fourth chapter, “The Gendered Construction of Militarization and Securitization in Turkey”, serves for discussing and analysing how the securitisation-militarisation relationship in Turkey is gendered in its construction. Moving from the discussion made on the securitization practice of Turkey in the third chapter, the gendered construction of these processes will be discussed. The chapter is organized in a way that it begins with the analysis of the gendered security understanding, and then moves towards the gendered securitization and gendered militarization in Turkey. The analysis of recruitment that begins in Chapter 3 will continue in this chapter with showing the gendered construction of the dynamic of recruitment. Then, the chapter will conclude with the negative impacts of the gendered understanding on women. This is important because, while I think that the fact that more securitization of issues constitutes more danger for the individual security because of the common and current executions, I think it is still important to highlight that while not

securitizing these issues no alternative solution is recommended and the categorizing of issues as security or not with strict borders can be problematic in some cases. Furthermore, the statist security understanding results in the insecurity of individuals, especially women, and this situation requires solution urgently.

The thesis will end with a conclusion, where the discussion of the research will be summarized, and a space for the possibility of future improvement will be opened, based on discussing whether there are efforts at de-securitization and demilitarization and looking at some developments with the focus on individual security especially within the European Union (EU)–Turkey dialogue. The general picture of the current situation will be drawn with examples from current debates.

This thesis is to serve for a discussion on the cyclical relationship of securitization and militarization and their gendered construction, which is not among the highly discussed topics in Turkey. To understand Turkey's behavior in international relations, especially on the point of international security, I argue that these processes and their construction should be analyzed. The hope of change is necessary for the improvement to occur, but in order to change the situation the historical and current situation should be analyzed well. With this understanding, Turkey is analyzed with its experience in securitization, militarization and gender, and with the calling for improvement and hope for change.

CHAPTER 1

SECURITIZATION, MILITARIZATION AND GENDER

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework based on which I am going to study the processes in Turkey. The content of this chapter is arranged as beginning with the discussion under “Security to Securitization” (Section 1.1). In this initial section a general discussion on the security literature will be drawn specifically pointing to the distinction between traditional and alternative ways of defining, naming and studying security which became a hot debate especially after the Cold War ended. This, I believe, is a crucial point to start because it constitutes the background by which the theory of securitization arose as a reaction to the way Security Studies had transpired before. This section is then going to continue with the introducing of the securitization theory, and the basic assumptions of the theory will be discussed for it to be clearly understood.

Then, in the second section called “Securitization and Militarization” (Section 1.2), firstly I am going to show how the process of militarization is characterized in the relevant literature. At that point, the way both the processes of securitization and militarization are described and discussed is aimed to be clear. The

main aim of this section is to point to the relationship between the two processes to show their mutuality. Although the naming of the section might give the idea that the process of securitization comes before the process of militarization the intention is not as such. One of the intentions behind the analysis of this relationship in the thesis is to show the cyclical relationship between the two processes.

The next section of this chapter is named as “Feminist Engagements with Security, Securitization and Militarization” (Section 1.3). Since one of the aims of the thesis is to reveal that the processes of both securitization and militarization exist in Turkey with their gendered dimensions, this theoretical backup is crucial to clarify the feminist stance towards these processes. The main position that I will be having in my thesis will be of the feminist way of looking to the concept of security and the processes of securitization and militarization. This section will serve as a clarifying apparatus as to show both my position and to show the way these processes are discussed in the feminist literature.

In the section (Section 1.4), which is called “ Gendered Discourses: “Are You Hearing to What You Are Saying?” the discourse that the gendered construction of the related issues will be discussed. Finally I will end with clarifying my position and conclude by pointing out the relationship between the literature discussed and Turkish practice.

1.1 From Security to Securitization

International Relations as a discipline was formed to heal the ill conditions that cause war and to establish the conditions of peace after the devastating experiences of World War I and World War II. The Cold War era, an era defined by bipolar division

of power, came right after the World War II and dominated the way that the security was understood, defined, studied and practiced till late-1980s.

The “traditional approaches” were the reflection of this domination in theoretical terms. Since the term will be used commonly through out the thesis, it is the appropriate point to explain what is meant as “traditional approaches”. As explained before too, the end of the Cold War brought out the differences between approaches on the basis of their attitude towards the concept of security. Here by the term traditional approaches mainly realist and neo-realist theories will be suggested. In its characterization, Jack Donnelly points out to the interest of realism, as of the traditional approach, in the concepts of state, power and national interest: “In International Relations, political realism is a tradition of analysis that stresses the imperatives states face to pursue a power politics of the national interest” (2005:29). In this understanding, security is the main concern, the concept of power works as a variable, and the departure is “the nature” of the international structure which is defined as anarchic and constituted of states which are limitedly defined and autonomous units based on the demonstration of their sovereignty in a self-help system. The concept of “survival” becomes the crucial issue at this point as it is stated in Terriff et al.

The key to understanding this anarchic system is recognition that each state can, in the end, depend only on itself to ensure its survival. The aims of states are endlessly varied but survival is a prerequisite for attaining any of them. (1999:34)

This creates a defensive attitude that the state goes through. Since the possibility of trust to any other actor or cooperation with any other actor is seen as low in this self-help system, maintaining power becomes a marker in the position that they take in relation to each other. This legitimizes the use of the force option: “States cannot be certain that others will be constrained from resorting to force, and indeed states resist

attempts to limit their freedom to act as they see fit” (Terriff et al, 1999:36). This brings the opportunity for further anarchy to occur. Donnelly explains the ground that prepares this understanding.

In international relations, anarchy allows, even encourages, the worst aspects of human nature. [...] Statesmanship thus involves mitigating and managing, not eliminating, conflict; seeking a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just or peaceful one (2005:31).

It becomes a question of “to be in the play” after a certain point. This is a result of distrust that is accepted as part of the nature of the international environment. “Even though any state might be willing, under ideal conditions, to curb anarchy in some fashion, in the world as states find it they must live with anarchy and will sometimes go further and take steps that reproduce or sustain the continued existence of anarchy” (Terriff et al, 1999:36). As it is further argued in the book *Security Studies Today*, this anarchical structure and the belief in itself has some further implications as states’ “preoccupation with maintaining autonomy” and “accumulation of power” (the capability of using force is meant here) and this results in “reinforcement of anarchy” (Terriff et al, 1999:37).

The power seeking behavior of states in this type of structure, as also argued above, leads them to the usage of military means as basing their justification on the way that the concept of sovereignty is represented. “Assessments of power begin with military capabilities, and only then turn to other capabilities that contribute directly to maintaining and applying military capabilities, then to factors that more indirectly make such a contribution, and so on” (Terriff et al, 1999:37). This obsession with the power of states creates a mutual relation with security, which states find themselves in further insecurity, which shapes their relationship with other states as it is stated in Terriff et al : “Their power, and the insecurity it produces, dominates their relations. The result is that security is their constant preoccupation”

(1999:39). The traditional approach to security accepts these characteristics as they define it and do not question the underlying factors that could make the world look like as such and furthermore it is expected for the other to receive the world as such, like the realists do. Realists' exemplified stance is given as such:

To realists, however, trying to eliminate war by uncovering its origins is not a promising way to proceed. Political conflict is ubiquitous and cannot be eliminated. The analyst should just assume the existence of serious political conflicts amongst states and proceed from there (Terriff et al., 1999:39).

The stance based on this logic leaves no room for change or questioning of how the world looks like. The general overview of what is meant by the term "traditional approach" to security is explained as such. Throughout the thesis with the usage of the term, the assumptions that are outlined above will be implied.

The dominated space in the Cold War era was occupied by the realist paradigm, which claimed to define all the "necessary" issues that needed to be studied and "all" the possible ways of studying these issues. The realist paradigm focused on the concepts such as security, anarchy based on states as the central issues that needed to be studied in international relations and understood and defined these concepts and accepted these to be factual. The concept of security was taken as given, meaning as "natural", without any need of questioning the assumptions of its definition, of its existence and of the way it is studied. The Cold War structure featured a heavy input on strategic concerns because of its main and only centralization on the prevention of an occurrence of war between the two "main" powers: Soviet Union and United States of America. Buzan points to the rivalry between these two powers:

During the Cold War, international security was dominated by the highly militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontation between the superpowers. This confrontation divided the industrialized North into the First World (the West) and the Second World (the Soviet bloc.) Because their rivalry

was intense, the danger of war was real, and political/military dominates the security agenda (1991a: 433).

The claim of the realist paradigm was that the escalation of aggression between the two big powers would lead to devastation in the world and this could be the only issue that was “worth” studying. The way that the concept of security was defined was based on this understanding of security. With this definition the concept of security was studied on a fixed and limited area. The reasoning that labeled this formulation of security concept was, as said before also, the power structure of the Cold War. Any move from the centralization of the problem was seen as a threat to the existence of the so-called peace that was already understood as fragile.

However, how peaceful was the era of Cold War was discussed later by many scholars such as Mary Kaldor (1990). These discussions began in the late-1980s when the Cold War era started to show signals of its end. The fixed, highly determined and limited understanding, definition and explanation of the concept of security and the conditions of its examination began to be questioned since the different way(s) of looking to the same concepts, the world itself, and the events that could be interpreted in different ways indeed moved further from realization to the expression of the self with a push and courage taken from the evident change occurring in the world power structure. The realist paradigm was left with rigid definitions, which with its basic and main assumptions could not fulfill every case as claimed to have. With the end of the Cold War Era, officially in 1989, the voices of the “unheard” throughout the era finally had the chance to come to surface¹, which pointed out to the existence of these empty boxes of security in traditional terms. This existence was realized long before, but since the Cold War thinking of security

¹ For examples of early discussion see Buzan (1991(b), but published in 1983 at first), Tuchman (1989).

not only limited itself to any kind of change or improvement but also it prevented any other interpretation to come into the agenda because of its prioritization in its understanding led to an existence of hierarchy of issues.

To sum up, the security understanding of realism which is pessimistic, state-centric, its propensity to military means can be given as the basic features of the theory that are under question. With the claim to study what is “out there”, the realist paradigm both undermined the formation of argumentation based on this formulation of “out there” and the questioning of a possibility of a change. This attitude in fact was a part of the basic assumptions the paradigm has. Burchill draws a general picture of the realist paradigm:

Realists are unified in their pessimism about the extent to which the international political system can be made more peaceful and just. The international realm is characterized by conflict, suspicion and competition between nation-states, a logic which thwarts the realization of alternative world orders. Realism is a pessimistic theoretical tradition. Fundamental changes to the structure of the international system are unlikely, even if they are needed. [...] For realists, international politics is a world of recurrence and repetition, not reform or radical change (2001: 70).

With this point of view of the security in the world, realists claimed their “primary” stance in the discussion of international relations, which was in fact mostly unquestioned throughout the Cold War Era.

With the end of the Cold War era, the belief of the realist paradigm in the bipolar power structure faced a challenging situation. This situation created a place for alternative ways of looking to the security issues, the voices of the unheard to fulfill the empty boxes that were left in the hands of the realist paradigm. Beginning with the questioning of the belief the Cold War structure as the best power structure to exist the world politics, these different interpretations came to surface not only about the Security Studies but also about the Cold War Era itself. The main logic behind this movement was to show that the “reality” was in fact not out there or not

out there for everybody in the same form, and the ways that to reach the knowledge was not fixed and limited. These ontological and epistemological claims challenged the basic assumptions of the realist paradigm. Because of its too deterministic and pretentious attitude in its interpretation of the world the existence of these empty boxes were inevitable. If one claims its way of interpreting the world is as the only one, then cannot escape of strong challenges of the alternative interpretations because it cannot fulfill the places it leaves out if it does no more than ignore them.

The empty boxes that were left out by realist paradigm throughout the Cold War Era, came to be fulfilled by different perspectives once they found the stage that they could raise their voices. Approaches named themselves as Critical Security Studies, Postmodernists, Constructivists and Feminists with illustrating their interpretations and methods gave chance the world audience to realize and think about how differently the world politics in general and specifically the concept of security could be defined, examined, studied and taught even. The differentiation was mainly on the centralization of the issues, focus point on the main actors and the resources to be selected to get the necessary information. These points were definitely highly connected to each other, effective in mutual ways.

The alternative approaches to the security understanding in contrast with the traditional approaches to security brought their assumptions and views of how the world looks like and should look like. The distinctive characterization of the approaches that criticized the traditional approach stemmed from firstly the way they interpreted the world and the way they construed the world. In the awareness that the approaches differ in many ways as stated above, since the differences between them exceeds the purpose of this thesis, the common points they share in contrast to traditional approaches will be given. In ontological terms, these approaches' stance

towards the “reality” of the world that the traditional approaches assume and claim to exist is not natural as argued but is a constructed one. Christian Reus-Smit shows the challenge that the critical theorists bring in to this point, against the rationalist attitude that the traditional approaches argue, which the other post-Positivist approaches, Critical Security Studies also share.

Ontologically, they criticized the image of social actors as atomistic egoists, whose interest are formed prior to social interaction, and who enter social relations solely for strategic purposes. They argued, in contrast, that actors are *inherently* social, that their identities and interests are socially constructed, the products of inter-subjective social structures (2005: 193).

Alternative approaches question the traditional conceptualization of the realist paradigm in different ways. For example concepts such as “sovereignty” which resides in the heart of the traditional approaches to security as demonstrated before, are firstly received as socially constructed and their place in the security definition are questioned. Devetak shows the stance of the postmodernism on this point.

State, sovereignty, and violence are long-standing themes in the established traditions of International Relations that have gained renewed importance after the September 11 terrorist attacks. They are also central themes in postmodern approaches to international relations. However, rather than adopt them uncritically from traditional approaches, postmodernism revises them in view of insights gained from genealogy and deconstruction (2005:171-172).

Postmodernists take the concepts as such and analyze how these operate in the legitimization of state authority. The nation-state that is analyzed with how it has reached to its final form throughout the history with the constitutive features that these concepts attach on states, which lead to the use and legitimization of use of force and violence. Devetak shows the link between the concept of security and the legitimacy in politics.

The sovereign claims the right to decide the exception. This leads, among other things, to the sovereign’s right to decide who is in and who is out of a political community. [...] In modern politics, it is the reason rather than power or violence which has become the measure of legitimacy (2005:174).

The relevant points within the feminist theory will be given in the Section 1.3 of the thesis, so the general overview towards these approaches will end with the Critical Theory's specific argumentation of change which also constitutes a distinctive position from the traditional approaches to security and which is shared by other alternative approaches that are named. Devetak states the distinctive position of the Critical Theory by stressing the belief shared on the possibility of change.

Critical international theory is not only concerned with understanding and explaining the existing realities of world politics, it also intends to criticise in order to transform them. It is an attempt to comprehend essential social processes for the purpose of inaugurating change, or at least knowing whether change is possible (2005:163).

This aim of transformation goes through the argument of emancipation. Booth defines emancipation as "freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political, and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (1997:110). With this understanding, it can be seen that the reference point is not fixed to states as the exclusive attitude of the traditional approaches does, but rather individuals are included in the security understanding. This is also a challenging position towards the traditional approach to security.

With the end of the Cold War period, as given before too, different approaches to security came up with different agendas. The core issue for poststructuralists became as the widening the security agenda and its implications.

Hansen shows the contribution of the poststructuralists on this point:

Poststructuralism advocates a position different from both the traditional realist and idealist perspectives in IR and offers important insights on the construction of the national-international dichotomy, the relationship between national identity and security politics, the discursive character of the concept of security. Specifically, poststructuralism is an important contribution to the debate on whether and/or how to expand the concept of security (1997: 369).

The Copenhagen School on Security Studies came up with the claims of the uniqueness and the sufficiency of the status of their approach to Security Studies. Barry Buzan (1991b) with his book *People, States and Fear* (the book came out first in 1983) brought in the rethinking of security within the changing dynamics of the post-Cold War Era. Without losing the referent object of states, his work in general terms realized the possibilities of insecurities stemming from state itself but for this problem he claimed the solution was evolving states in the aim of being strong states. The contribution that the Copenhagen School made to the study of the security stemmed from a context where the concept needed to be re-analyzed. The specific security understanding of the Copenhagen School is shown as:

The central concept of security would be analysed, developed and re-inserted into the usual analyses - thus affecting them since this concept no longer fitted. [...] [The Copenhagen School] does not understand security as an 'objective' phenomenon, which could be deduced from some power calculus. At the same time, it avoids the pitfall of reducing security to an arbitrary 'subjective' phenomenon. It does so by not concentrating on what 'security' means and is exactly, but rather on what 'security' does. It argues that whenever security (or the national interest/security) is invoked, particular issues are taken out of regular politics and made part of a special agenda with special decision-making procedures and justifications attached to it. 'Security' mobilizes intersubjectively shared dispositions of understanding and political action. (Guzzini and Jung, 2004: 5)

Ole Wæver, with his contribution with his "Securitization Theory", opened an area of discussion on the security issues from a different perspective. Referring to the main topic of the thesis it is important to analyze his argument of securitization in detail. To clarify his argument his two essays on the subject will be the two main texts. These are *Security a New Framework of Analysis* (Buzan et al., 1998) and *Securitization and Desecuritization* (Wæver, 1995). Ole Wæver joins the debate on security by pointing to the importance of the clarification of the concept in the first place. He claims that the discussions on the concept of security mainly went about whether enlarging it or not, and whether the concept stems from the individual or the

state. His claim was that these should not be the main issues to be discussed or changed from the traditional way of looking at the concept. Rather, he claims that one should accept the traditional assumptions of the concept, and from that point on move to another level of discussion that has not occurred before that is “securitization”. Before entering to this claim of his, I think it is important to clarify the roots of his approach to security, as he also does in his explanation of his contribution, to see where his theory stands. Firstly he accepts subjects of defense and the state at the core of the security argument. This point is similar to the traditional ways of approaching to security. However, the first difference that takes attention is the ontological stance of the concept. Unlike the traditional approaches, Wæver refuses to accept the concept of security as given or natural:

In place of accepting implicitly the meaning of “security” as given and then attempting to broaden its coverage, why not try instead to put a mark on the concept *itself* by entering into and through its core? This means changing the tradition by taking it seriously rather than criticizing it from the outside. I begin by considering security as a concept and a word (1995: 47).

Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of security goes parallel with the traditional “military-political” (Buzan et al, 1998: 21) understanding. “Traditionally by saying “security”, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development” (Buzan et al, 1998: 21). The discourse builds up the infrastructure of his argument, and it is important because based on this framework he brings out the importance of the process of securitization. From the specific understanding of the concept of security, the process of securitization takes its form. “ “Security” is the move that makes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan et al, 1998: 23). So, the condition of

priority is created when an event is represented as a threat. This priority gives the state the authority to put its reception of threat into force. *“In naming a certain development a security problem, the “state” can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites”* (Wæver, 1995: 54). What is a security problem then? According to Wæver “... security problems are developments that threaten the sovereignty or independence of a state in a particular rapid or dramatic fashion, and deprive it of the capacity to manage itself” (1995: 54). The formulation of his argument then takes this shape in this stage:

occurrence of a development → reception of the event as state’s survival in danger → prioritization of the event → state labels the development in the security agenda → state claims special right and means to deal with the development

Based on this logic, the process of securitization becomes highly related to the understanding of security. The beginning point of the process that a development is received as an existential threat makes the security understanding self-referential according to Wæver and his colleagues as stated in Buzan et al. “ ‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue - not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). So, the core element of the framework of the theory is the way it is represented politically so that it is understood and accepted as a security subject. This is also another proof of Wæver’s, as inside of the Copenhagen School, ontological stance as not taking the concept of security as an objective reality, but rather as a subjective process of reception and interpretation. The condition of “acceptance” is what makes securitization exist according to Wæver

and his colleagues. “A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization — this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). With the consent of the audience, the public or the society, the political representation of a claim of the urgency and priority of a development as an existential threat reaches its final stage and the process of securitization from then on can be claimed to exist. So the final shape of the process looks as such in a general overview:

occurrence of a development → reception of it as a security problem by the state → presenting the development as a security problem → acceptance of the issue as a security problem by the targeted audience

The distinctiveness and the specification of the process of securitization lies in this politicized representation as Wæver and his colleagues argue. “The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”)” (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). The importance of the process of securitization in understanding, defining and explaining the concept of security is pointed out.

In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of priority; thus by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that “really” endanger some object to be defended or secure; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. (Buzan et al, 1998: 26)

The core of the argument lies in the understanding of security as a speech act, which forms the ground for this way of representing and dramatizing developments as security problems to be put into the security agenda. On this ground, Wæver builds his approach to security and his argument of securitization with the help of language theory: “With the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act” (1995: 55). So, the impact of the concept of security lies in its basic word form. When something is considered or conditioned as a subject of security it is labeling within the word “security” makes it significant.

Finally, although his argument differs ontologically from the traditional approaches, his position stipulates for the agreement with the traditional approaches on the limitation of the security agenda. His claim is that security should not be defined in positive terms but rather in negative terms. This way of labeling security as in a negative framework may have a different point than the traditional approaches, and in fact his opposition to the securitization of the issues from a wide range is understandable because of the negative consequences that the contemporary execution of the process causes. However, still the question of what has to be done with the issues threatening the security of individuals is not answered completely. He criticizes post Cold War approaches, which take different referent objects like individuals rather than states therefore to look for a wider security agenda is threatening for the referent object because they lose the core point of the concept.

The security of individuals can be affected in numerous ways; indeed economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights are germane more often than military issues in this respect. The major problem with such an approach is deciding where to stop, since the concept of security otherwise becomes a synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable (Wæver, 1995: 47).

This in return, Wæver argues, brings the reproduction of securitization. So, in Wæver's theory the referent object is the state. Security as a concept stems from the state like in traditional approaches. Two main conditions for the security concept to support the utterance, thus the act, take place in Wæver's argument. These are "urgency" and the "survival" of the state. Urgency determines the priority of an issue to enter the security agenda, the calling for the necessity of taking care of the issue in whole without losing any time since the time turns against the state. The survival of the state is also important for the concept of security because when a state is claiming that it receiving a threat, it takes it as a test to prove its sovereignty to others and to itself. And the more the security agenda includes, the picture of the concept comes up more negative according to Wæver. He criticizes the "classical" way of critical security approaches where he disagrees about the content of the security agenda.

An agenda of minimizing *security* in this sense cannot be based on a classical critical approach to security, whereby the concept is critiqued and then thrown away or redefined according to the wishes of the analyst. The essential operation can only be touched by faithfully working *with* the classical meaning of the concept and what is already inherent in it. The language game of security is, in other words, a *jus necessitatis* for threatened elites, and this it must remain (1995: 56).

Taking the "other" developments outside of the security agenda can be a help to them to be dealt with "normal" ways according to Wæver based on the logic of the label of security and the process of securitization they go through as explained before. Wæver finally points out to his contribution with his argumentation of securitization as pointing out to a point that has missed out from the critical security approach.

Critics normally address the what or who that threatens, or the whom to be secured; they never ask whether a phenomenon should be treated in terms of security because they do not look into "securityness" as such, asking what is particular to security, in contrast to non-security, modes of dealing with particular issues. By working with the assumption that security is a goal to be maximized, critics eliminate other, potentially more useful ways of

conceptualizing the problems being addressed. [...] As soon as a more nominalist approach is adapted, the absurdity of working toward maximizing “security” becomes clear (1995: 57).

This section aimed to give a clear picture of Wæver’s (within the Copenhagen School) argument of securitization, how he formed his argument based on his approach to security. This section is to prepare the necessary substructure to build the example and the critiques on clarified basis. Wæver’s contribution is one that cannot be denied, especially his conceptualization and focus on the process of securitization is important because it highlights how the concept of security is formed on what background it is constituted. In a way, it makes us see the big picture rather than focusing on just the outcomes as did the traditional approaches. However, there are some points in his argument, which I find problematic. First of all, although in his argument of securitization he does not address the military means as the only or specific means to use as a special right when facing a security problem, I argue that this way of taking the issues (whether consciously or not) paves the way for militarization in certain conditions, which I aim to clarify in the coming section. Also, in his argument of narrowing the security agenda, I understand his cautious stance towards the danger of dealing the events in abnormal ways (which supports my argument of the relationship between securitization and militarization), but his position does no more than that which leaves out issues as gender for example. Especially with the end of the Cold War, the effect of gender on Security Studies, the relationship in between, have been brought up by many scholars in an important scale. I will clarify this point in the final section, where I will draw upon the feminist literature to point to the lacking points of gender that I find in Wæver’s argument.

1.2 Securitization and Militarization

Assuming that Wæver's argument of securitization is explained and clarified at this moment now its connection with militarization will take place. To understand the connection better, one has to look at how Wæver positions the place of the military in his argument of securitization. The clues to his stance begin with the way he aims to explain how in fact the realist position on military means is different from the general disbelief and claims that this is the position that the realist approach does not share with the strategic studies.

Strategic studies often focused on the military aspects of security, whereas the realists and neorealists of International Relations seldom a priori defined military threats as primary. Indeed Morgenthau, Aron and many others took the position that, to ensure its security, a state would make its own choices according to expediency and effectiveness, and these might not always involve military means. A state would make threats in the sector in which the best options are available (1995: 52).

To clarify his position, Wæver argues, "the means to security should be secondary to the ends" (1995: 52). The whole issue of security does not lie in the means that are used to heal the ill condition of the state that it sees itself in it, but how it suits itself into this ill condition according to him.

I find two main problems in this statement at this point. Firstly, it may be true that the intention is not wholly and only focused on military means, but the way a development is securitized, as shown before, includes calling for the protection of sovereignty, for testing it to the self and the others, and for special rights to deal with the situation. These callings, even if they do not bring it out implicitly, do prepare a strong ground for militarist concepts to stand upon.

To explain the point better it is necessary to show what is meant by militarism, from which militarization as a process stems from. Shaw states that “It can be used to refer generally to war preparation, or more specifically to ideological mobilization” (1991: 9). However, he claims that it is an issue that goes further than war-preparation, it is an issue, which is closely connected to the society. This connectedness, according to him, occurs with the attendance of the society in this thinking. While he points to the importance of “participation” and “mobilization” in time of war, he claims that these are not concepts valid only for time of war.

Societies or social groups ‘participate’ in wars under coercion, but also sometimes with a strong ideological identification and with expectation of benefiting from wars. They are mobilized, but often they also mobilize themselves. Both ‘participation’ and ‘mobilization’ are double-edged concepts which are important to the discussion of militarism and militarization (Shaw, 1991: 9).

Joshua Goldstein’s definition is: “Militarism is the glorification of war, military force, and violence through TV, films, books, political speeches, toys, games, sports, and other such avenues” (2001: 151). Alfred Vagts before defining militarism makes a distinction between “a military way” and a “militaristic way”. According to him:

The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency; that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure. It is limited in scope, confined to one function and scientific in its essential qualities. (1959: 13)

Militarism as a concept according to Vagts is something more related with and rooted in culture, it “presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending the true military purposes” (1959: 13). Vagts goes further to point to the effect on the concept of militarism on civilian life. He argues that militarism “covers every system of thinking and valuing and every complex of feelings which rank military institutions and ways above the ways of civilian life, carrying military mentality and modes of action and decision into

the civilian sphere” (Vagts, 1959: 17). So, the core point of the concept of militarism lies not in using military means only, but in this usage of military means, which leads to becoming a habitual behavior that becomes easily established in the culture so that it pervades into many aspects of civilian life.

The audience in the securitization process, which Wæver argues is a factor that must exist to prove the existence of the securitization argument, closely connects this point to the factor of acceptance of the securitized event. So, in militarist countries, when a development is securitized and presented as a security problem, first it is easier for the society to expect military means to be used to deal with the situation even the decision is not declared or chosen in the first place by the elites, and second it is easier for the militarist audience to accept the usage of military ways if it is chosen by the elites. So, there is almost no room for questioning the “rationality” of this choice. This constitutes a danger, because as Goldstein also argues, the persistent or being prone to the usage of military means regardless of the rationality of the choice can exist in individuals or characteristics of the states.

Certainly some individual leaders seem more prone to turn to military force to try to settle conflicts on favorable terms. [...] [T]he potential for warfare seems to be universal across cultures, types of society, and time periods — although the importance and frequency of war vary greatly from case to case (2001: 199).

So, it is probable of this constructed have the propensity to use the military means to deal with a security problem and/or conflict for individuals and states in general but the variety that Goldstein points is related in my point of with the argument that I have just made about the militarist societies being constructed to be prone to the usage of military means as the first choice in the securitization process. Goldstein also points to the factor that security becomes a justification label for the military means to be used in the first place when dealing with security problems and based on this approach states make security the reason to spend their resources on military capabilities.

For many states, the reason for this dedication of resources is largely defensive. Military capabilities are maintained in an effort to ensure *security* — the ability to feel safe against the threat of military attack (or other usages of force as leverage by other states). The overall utility of military force in IR may be declining, but for the narrow purpose of repelling a military attack there is often no substitute for military means. Because of the security dilemma, states believe they must devote large resources to military capabilities if even a few other states are doing so (Goldstein, 2001: 244).

The relationship may not be seen well at the first sight, but as Wæver's argument will be scrutinized in detail it will appear better. As it was pointed just before also, Wæver's argument brings out the potential to feed the militarist ideas. Traditionally when a state receives a development as a security issue and sees it necessary to prove its sovereignty, it is the militarist means that it uses. The issue of sovereignty with its protection and substantiation lies at the heart of the main missions and reasoning that are given to the military's status in a society.

Furthermore, labeling an event as a security problem and putting it within the security agenda, securitization is done by the elites according to Wæver, but it is left uncertain as to which elites he is talking about. When looked within a context where militarized states and societies are in question, the strong status of the military in naming an event as a security problem can be seen clearly, because that is one of the justifications that the understanding of military dictates. The Military basically and in common sense protects the state from threats in general. In addition to this, the calling for special rights even if the elites in defining the security agenda are civilian can be interpreted as a call for military means to be used. And when the case that the existence of the military personnel in the group of elites that see themselves as decision-makers of the security agenda of the state occurs, it is inevitable for the issue "special rights" to at least contain military means. Although this is not given as a specific choice in Wæver's argument, it is a point that can be used for the justification of military means to be used in dealing with a security problem in question. And as it

is argued above also, this justification can very easily be turned into a habitual behavior and create a militarist culture, where the usage of military means can be easily accepted and furthermore expected because it becomes normalized after a point.


Up to this point, explanation of militarism has been given to explain well so that the militarization process, which has its root in militarism, can be better understood. If we think of militarism akin to believing in an ideology, then militarization in the simplest way would refer to shaping one's life according to this belief. According to Cynthia Enloe, "[m]ilitarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military *or* comes to depend for its well-being, on militaristic ideas" (2000: 3). So, if militarism, put in simplest way, is the glorification of war and the usage of military means with becoming an aspect of the civilian life, militarization is the process through which the individuals become accepters being attached to what is been practiced by this understanding.

The conception of normalization is crucially important in the process of militarization as it has been seen in militarism too: Altınay points to the main condition that sustains the process to be successful: "Militarization is successful when it achieves a discourse of "normalcy" in public discussions concerning the power of the military in civilian life, politics, economics, and people's self-understandings" (2004: 2). So, the usage of military means goes further than being a tool of reaction against security problems. In fact this "tool of reaction" becomes a normalized routine and furthers its borders and pervades to the society. This is done through the common justification of protection of sovereignty against threats stemming from outside and inside. It becomes to exist even there is not a direct or

obvious existential threat under a “cautious” attitude. So, the scope of the approach widens when the militarization occurs inevitably.

At this point, I would like to clarify the usages of “militarized state” and “militarized society”, because these terms will be used throughout the thesis. By “militarized state” what is meant is a state where the military is in the security elite in a strong position and where the politicians i) do not respond or question the status of the military because they accept the situation as it is and furthermore as a part of the culture ii) cannot respond because of the historical construction of the military is strong in the institutional sense especially with the constitutional support. By “militarized society”, a society in which, the existence of militarized state is not questioned by the majority and a specific and special meaning is attributed to the military where it is seen as a safeguard to concepts such as democracy rather than trust or doing something active itself as a society is meant here.

Securitization is closely related to the process of militarization as well as to militarism. Firstly, it is because militarism and militarization are not distinct concepts because as explained above, if one explains the general framework the latter becomes its process and its execution in civilian life. Then the way a development is securitized in a society being militarist culture it is very expectant that it is at the same time being militarized. By this it is not just meant the choice of military means, but it is being made a further point here, which refers to the cyclical and “chicken and egg” relationship of securitization.



This is because the specificity that the process of securitization comes from the militarization that the securitization is fed from and that it enables the continuation

of. Although Wæver argues that the securitization of an event takes the issue dealing far from “normal” ways, in a militarist understanding when an event is securitized it is expected that military means are the major ways to deal with it and as times goes by it becomes as it is the “normal” ways to deal with it. So, interpretation of “normal” changes its direction and causes a different version of normalization to occur which is the normalization of the militarist approach, militarization.

Finally, the “acceptance” factor of the process of securitization is crucially important for the process of militarization. The acceptance of the usage of militarist ideas, when it becomes frequent and suits in the security approach of the elites and the society, works for the militarization process to spread it faster and easier in the society. Once the militarism is attached to a society’s security understanding the effects of it on the civilian life is seen as normal by the society.

This section examined the relationship between securitization and militarization. Although Wæver’s argument of securitization does not directly call for military means to be used, the crucial concepts emphasized in the argument prepares the ground for military means to come into mind in the first place especially in the militarist societies. Whether this is done deliberately or not is not the question, but the point that is emphasized here is that the way the argumentation is presented with the way it is framed and the concepts it constitutes, militarization becomes an effect of the securitization process. With the feminist contribution on the argument of security and militarization in the next section, this point will become more evident.

1.3 Feminist Engagements with Security, Securitization and Militarization

The general framework on the situation for the Security Studies was given in the beginning of the chapter. As it was argued there too, feminist approach to Security Studies was among the silenced voices in the Cold War Era. However, beginning with the 1980s specifically, and making their specific and concrete enter to the Security Studies in the post-Cold War era, feminist approaches showed that the gender dimension in international relations and in the concept of security specifically has always been there. It was just not in the interest of the traditional approaches to admit it and to bring it in because, as it will come out clearer through the thesis, this gendered understanding of the security approach supports and maintains the traditional approach to security with its contribution to preserve the status-quo politics. First it is necessary to begin with showing the picture of how the feminist approach interprets the concept of security in general terms. It will be shown in its general form because as it is known, the feminist approach is not like an ideology in terms of its every assumptions suitable to every aspect of the approach itself. Feminist theory consists of different points of view with their different point of departures, different focuses and different problematics (postmodernist feminists, radical feminists, Marxist feminists, liberal feminists, etc.), but all are based on some common assumption as to how the world politics is gendered. So, this common base is the base for this chapter, because getting into the differences between these stances would fall into another argumentation different from the one of this thesis.²

² For a discussion of the differences between feminist positions see Tickner (2001)

1.3.1 Feminism and Security

Feminist theory reads the realm of International Relations differently than the traditional approaches in the first place. It reads the description and explanation of world, politics and international relations by the traditional approaches but it does not interpret the same concepts in the same way that is and has been represented throughout the years. Peterson describes the different reading of the world by feminism.

Constituted as the study of ostensibly anarchical relations between (not within or across), IR remains dominated by Anglo- and Euro- centric male practitioners (scholars, national policy makers) and masculinist constructs (state power, national security, sovereignty, Realpolitik, military might). Dichotomies — and their attendant positivist, ahistorical and reductionist commitments — dominate the field's key assumptions and debates: war-peace, international-domestic, anarchy-order, realism-idealism, politics-economics (1998: 581).

As Peterson states, the general stance of feminist theories towards the traditional approach in International Relations is one of a critical stance towards the ontological and epistemological features of traditional approaches. Ontologically, the traditional approaches see the world 'as it is' with their referent object of states and with the belief in objectivity and naturalness in concepts such as sovereignty and national security and these objectivities universal applicability. However, feminists like other reflectivist approaches, show what is seen as constructed rather than as presenting the reality. The concepts in international relations are reflections of modes of thinking which form the concepts in return. Tickner describes how the reflectivist stance is different from and in contrast with the rationalist traditional stance:

They are concerned with understanding how we think about the world, and how the ideas, including those of the theorist, help shape the world. Coming out of sociological rather than natural scientific approaches, they stress the role of social forces as well as the impact of cultural practices, norms and values that are not derived from calculations of interests as in rationalistic theories (2001: 26).

Epistemologically, traditional approaches favor the 'scientific' methods and values to get to the knowledge, which describes their positivist label. However, feminists generally disagree with the applicability of 'scientific' methods in social sciences, since they do not believe in a universal and objective theory as it is claimed by the traditional approaches to exist in the world politics. Instead, feminists point to the subjectivities that form the claims of realities in that prove how our knowledge and perception of the world is constructed. In fact, besides the essentialist arguments, the concept of gender, which is a key term for feminist theories, is a socially constructed rather than biologically determined concept.

So, "social construction" is the concept that describes the way that most feminists interpret the world politics and concepts such as national security and sovereignty. With this ontological infrastructure, feminist theories look at the concepts that has been defined by traditional approaches, show how these concepts are constructed (deconstruction) and then prove that since this mode of thinking can be constructed how a different mode of thinking can be constructed (reconstruction). These are in general terms the exclusivist, top-down theorizing, dichotomies between theory-practice, men-women, international-domestic, essentialist attitudes, their drawings on fixed hierarchical conceptualization of power, limited focus and definitions of security, focus of the security and violence. The crucial point of course in the process of criticism that feminists do is that they analyze these based on the gender factor. Moving from the point of taking gender as a socially constructed definition of individuals, feminists point to how the above mentioned and debated concepts are not only constructed, but how gendered they are in the construction they go through. So, as Tickner argues, feminists are not calling for bringing women in to the discipline of international relations in quantitative terms simply and only, but

rather “they are revealing how gender is already embedded in the theory of practice of international relations” (2001: 29). Christine Sylvester explains the feminist contribution to international relations with an emphasis on the inclusive attitude that it has in contrast to the exclusivist attitude of the traditional approaches.

Feminist theorizing offers numerous reasons to strive for greater inclusivity in theory; among them are the possibility of less biased, less partial understandings of the world, the possibility of greater justice in theory and practice, the possibility that we discover, through the binoculars of gender research, that our very categories of identity and attachment are habits rather than realities (1994: 316).

Feminist theories criticize an abstract, dehumanized idealization way of looking to international relations by traditional approaches. Jacqui True points to these dimensions of traditional approaches.

Until relatively recently, the twentieth century field of International Relations (IR) studied the causes of war and conflict, the development of diplomacy and international law, and the global expansion of trade and commerce with no particular reference to people. Indeed the use of abstract categories such as ‘the state’, ‘the market’, ‘the system’, predominance of strategic discourses of national interest and national security, military defence and nuclear deterrence, and research approaches such as methodological individualism and inductive reasoning have effectively removed people as agents embedded in social and historical contexts from theories of international relations (2001: 231).

This absence of the “human touch” represents the top-down attitude of the traditional approaches to the security understanding. This feature can be seen from the way Tickner points to the main characteristics of the traditional approaches: “Realists define security in political/military terms as the protection of the boundaries and integrity of the state and its values against the dangers of a hostile international environment” (2001: 38). As it is seen from the definition, the concept is defined on a defensive ground and defense in terms of defending the state is given priority. This is consistent with Stephen Walt’s claim that “the main focus of Security Studies is easy to identify, however: it is the phenomenon of war” (1991: 212). So, the “state” is to be maintained that is the subject of the security concept and it should be secured

from war. The “easiness” as a definitive adverb here proves the hierarchical attitude that the traditional approaches hold which feminists point their criticisms to. This hierarchical stance results in the centralization of the referent object as the state. The logic behind this hierarchy is that once the security of the state is provided, the mission is complete because it is the security provider for the individual.

1.3.2 Feminism and Securitization

In contrast to the centralization on states, feminists favor the other post-Cold War approaches the broadening of the security agenda with bringing in women and security problems related with them. Based on this ground, feminist theory favors a bottom-up attitude towards security, which stems from the individual rather than the state. In addition to this, the state as the provider of the security is a skeptical definition for feminists. Tickner argues that based on this ground, “many feminists have adopted a multidimensional, multilevel approach, similar to some of the efforts to broaden the definition of security” (2001: 48) and point to the “security problems” such that states play a role not as security provider but rather threat to security. The “different realities” (Tickner, 2001) of the two approaches are explained as such in

Security Studies Today:

The broad school embraces notions of structural as well as direct violence in its understanding of security, opening up a dimension of power relations that tend to be insidious, and which feminists also seek to expose. Direct violence can be defined crudely as physically assaulting B, with the intention of causing harm, pain or suffering. In strategic studies, this means armed acts of war. However, violence need not to involve a direct physical assault. There may be policies of violence, for example those which deliberately or knowingly result in the deaths or suffering of others from starvation or disease (Terriff et al, 1999: 85).

For feminists the concept of security and the way the states deal to this concept is closely related with the concept of identity as it is with the constructivists as Tickner argues.

Most feminists would agree with constructivists that state behavior cannot be understood without analyzing issues of identity and the social relations in which identities and behaviors are embedded. The gendered identities of states and the construction of national ideologies should be examined in order to better understand their security-seeking behavior (2001: 53).

Feminists, building on this framework, bring in the argument that these identities “often depend on the manipulations of gender.” (Tickner, 2001: 54) The state’s self definition the identity it labels is effective on its security understanding. If the state’s security definition is limited, and the state is the referent object, then to justify this point state elites have to represent the state as the security provider and to represent to the public, they have to show that state is the representative of the nation, so that its centralization could be seen as legitimate. For this understanding to be formed, it is necessary for the nationalist ideologies to blend with this representation so that a construction of “us” could be created and the authority to represent “us” could be given to the state against “them” or the “others”. Tickner points to the relation between power and legitimization of identity, which are based on gendered constructions.

Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states’ survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representations that are constructed and re-constructed over time (2001: 54).

So, the national identity that is necessary for this kind of understanding towards the concept of security is based on an definition of oneself to stand on a nationalist base which draws in certain portions of the society and marginalize the other parts which

causes in its understanding not “foreign” threats only but “internal” threats to its existence too. This stance justifies the process of militarization, which becomes a front to prove the state’s sovereignty in physical and mental terms within the state and outside its boundaries. From this attitude, the stances such as “untouchable” or “taboo” issues come to exist in states having militarist cultures and statist security cultures such as Turkey. The Armenian Question in this regard constitutes an example for this statist security culture, where it has been rejected for many years to enter in such a dispute, because it has been seen as a threat for the identification of the nation state to let such an argument within. The reactionary stance of the military elites and the public against the conference on the issue in September 2005, which was held in İstanbul, can be an example of this attitude where the contributors and the listeners were blamed as traitors.³

This nationalist identification of the state can better direct its executions when the gendered understanding is existent in the public and then becomes its culture. The “national security” understanding and agenda of the state expects men to be “men” against the threats outside and inside, encourage them to fight for the sovereignty of the state, because its sovereignty should be protected in any case and no matter what happens to individuals while they are protecting the state’s sovereignty it is the state’s existence that is crucial and that should be immortal. This can be achieved through and is reproductive of the normalization of the usage of military means because as it has been seen from Walt’s argument also, the main focus of the security agenda in this conventional understanding is war. From this stance security problems are received as such that they can be dealt only or best with military terms to overcome them. For this choice of means to be justified, an

³ The Conference on Armenian Issue was supposed to be held on 22 September 2005 at Boğaziçi University, however was canceled by a verdict and then it was held on 24 September 2005 at Bilgi University.

understanding should be existent in the society. So, in Wæver's argumentation of securitization, where elites are the main organ that label the security problems as such, the propensity to use military means in states that are holding nationalist identifications and militarist cultures is dangerous that it brings militarization into the scene of the security agenda and this has a reproductive role for further securitization.

securitization in states that have propensity to militarism:

(militarization →) securitization → militarization → securitization → militarization

Since states do not call themselves as nationalist or militarist explicitly, this situation should not be seen as an exception or alien to the argumentation of securitization. It is in fact what we mostly see in world politics. Sheila Tobias points to the American propensity towards the militaristic attitude: "Despite the American tradition emphasizing civil control of the military, men with military experience have played a more prominent role in our politics than in other democratic countries" (1990: 164). Furthermore, Tobias argues that the war or military experience of the elites when to be voted for the representation of the society becomes crucial criteria in times of elections in America. "Still, war service is presented to the voter as an appropriate apprenticeship for leadership, the ultimate school for those aspiring the public office" (Tobias, 1990: 165). This is a proof that the way that the securitization is in fact not universal and can have different and furthermore dangerous implication in societies having different attitudes towards militarism.

Furthermore, the argumentation that Wæver constructs, even if it gives no room to the broadening of the security agenda for the sake of the problems stemming different from the state for them to be dealt with "normal" ways, still this separation

of issues seems strict and the ways to deal with the excluded issues are not explored enough. While their differences are emphasized, it leaves no room for these problems to be dealt with even when their relationship with security is proved. Although Wæver's argument is on the collective survival of the state, for a development to be treated as such it has to go through the discursive process represented by the elites and accepted by the audience. However, the gender issues have been and still being treated as trivial, or issues to be silenced. Hansen draws attention to the insecurity stemming from the honor killings in Pakistan, which reflects this problematic stance of the Copenhagen School:

Although honour killings target individuals, these individuals become targets because of their transgression of particular gendered norms. This inter-linkage of threat and gender implies that one cannot appropriately identify this as a case of individual security: the targeting of *individual*. Pakistani women is deeply connected to their inscription within an inferior gendered *collectivity*. Or put differently, a decision to locate this case within the realm of individual security would seriously diminish our possibilities of grasping its collective aspects (2000: 291).

So, even if the security understanding is defined on the basis of state as the referent object, the gender issues do not stay in the individual level, their silenced stance does not mean they have connection with collective security problems.

1.3.3 Feminism and Militarization

In addition to bringing the gender issues in the framework of security, as it is argued before too, states can be the source of threat to individual security indeed. Tickner points to this factor: "State violence is a particular problem in certain states, but it must also be emphasized that many states, although formally at peace, sustain huge military budgets at the same time as social spending is cut; this too, can be a form of violence" (2001: 62). State elites in their choice of protection of sovereignty bring in

the securitization of certain events, which inevitably causes a militarization process to occur within the society. As it is shown above how securitization brings militarization, this process in addition is rooted in a gendered discourse, as it is the case in International Relations as a discipline as Tickner shows.

Since foreign and military policy making has been largely conducted by men, the discipline that analyzes these activities is bound to be primarily about men and masculinity. We seldom realize we think in these terms, however; in most fields of knowledge we have become accustomed to equating what is human with what is masculine. Nowhere is this more true than in international relations, a discipline that, while it has for the most part resisted the introduction of gender into its discourse, bases its assumptions and explanations almost entirely on the activities and experiences of men. Any attempt to introduce a more explicitly gendered analysis into the field must therefore begin with a discussion of masculinity (1992: 5-6).

Militarization's success depends on the formation of patriarchal myths that depend on the division of sex roles between men and women, representing men as the protectors of the state and the women and children to be protected, who are categorized as weak and supporters of the protectors of the state and the nation. Enloe (1990) points to the factor of "military prostitution" as a gendered issue of the militarization process. She argues that since the military crew is seen as the protectors of the state and the nation, as sacrificing their own position in life, in many countries "military prostitution" is seen as legitimate and necessary for the "healthy" conditions that the soldiers need to be in. She indicates that this issue is not the only factor that shows how the process of militarization is gendered.

In our attempt to discover just how much militarization is a gendered process, that is, a process that won't "work" unless men will accept certain norms of masculinity and women will abide by certain strictures of femininity, we might consider three other dynamics in addition to military prostitution. The first is *rape*. The second is *military recruitment*. The third is the *ideology of national security* (Enloe, 1990: 202).

Without undermining its relevance with the security concept at all, I think that the issue of rape should be put aside for this thesis because the thesis focuses on the

process of securitization which is the process that becomes before the occurrence of a war however the issue of rape is consistent with the wartime itself as to hurt the conflicting party not only in territorial terms and also it is masculine state of the war itself. Furthermore, Turkey has not been involved officially and actively in a war since World War I. Military recruitment on the other hand plays a certain role to show the how militarization is produced by securitization and how this process produces further securitization. Military recruitment is a representative of showing that the state is ready to cope with a security development in military means with its manpower. The status of the military with its the qualitative and quantitative characteristics represents the strength of the protection of sovereignty in this sense. This brings in the justification of military spending which extends the obligation of attending the recruitment has a further implication as becoming a part of the process of the militarization. As it is the case in Turkey this obligation takes an important amount of time in the life of men and at an important time of their life.

However, this does not mean that this obligation affects men only. Firstly, this obligatory service affects the mothers and the wives of these men. Furthermore and more importantly, this obligatory duty serves for the process of militarization especially in its phase of normalization. The acceptance and unquestioning of this obligation shows that the society is coerced and accustomed to the necessity of the usage of military means any time when it is seen as necessary by the authorities since this obligation service is not chosen with a poll but rather authorized by the elites and accepted by the society. When a state is just out of war, not wholly but *may* be more logical for the necessity of the recruitment when a possible rise of an aggression is considered. However, when this obligation continues more than 80 years after the

state has been involved in a war, this becomes a coercion of acceptance of this duty and becomes a part of militarization.

The political presentation of a development as a security problem and its acceptance fills the argument of securitization in. Since the acceptance of the public gives the argument its final shape, the representation of the development plays a more crucial role since based on that the public gives its acceptance. For this representation to be persuasive, it has to be based on a strong discourse to reach to the public. However, when the public is already directed towards an understanding long before, it is easier to get the acceptance, predict it even be sure of it, which the militarist societies experience. Lene Hansen points out to this discursive aspect of Copenhagen School. She argues, “It is the discursive power of securitization which brings together actors and objects” (2000: 291). Through this discursive process developments are attached to the concepts of national security and the survival of the state and they are securitized. It is through this discursive process the security agenda is formed in fact. And this is important since through this agenda some developments are prioritized and some are chosen left aside. Hansen states that “[t]he definition of securitizing actors depends in other words on their ability to perform a successful securitization to get a sufficient acceptance of the threat in question from the relevant audience” (2000: 289).

The strength of this discursive process is based on a gendered understanding in the way that it nationalizes the developments while securitizing in its strong relationship with militarization, which prepares an available and strong ground for further securitization. As it is argued before, the concept of war is a condition that is kept always on the agenda of securitization due to the way the argumentation is formed, and this aspect although is understood in Wæver’s terms should be taken as

abnormal, goes through normalization in order to be accepted as it is and in fact as to be kept in the agenda by the public. For this, the representation of the concept of war goes through prioritization of the development in question and its “cruciality” should be stressed. This is based on the representation of the importance of sovereignty of the state for its national security above everything else on a gendered discourse, which serves for the glorification of the strength of the state and “dignity” which is assumed to men as protectors of the fragile ones left behind which are women and children. Then the casualties that can damage the lives of men and women in different ways are undermined. This is done for a purpose, as Sara Ruddick points out:

While an ethos of assaultive masculinity legitimates abusive war and warlike abuse, a myth of manly protection, sustained by military androphilia, prevents men and women from seeing what they already know: wars almost always leave everyone in their vicinity radically *unprotected*. By looking through myths of manliness, women and men should be better able to see the cruel realities of war engraved on bodies of all ages and both sexes (1993: 113).

The gendered discourse that is commonly used plays a role in the formation of the argument of preparedness to any uprising threats and defensive character of the securitization argument which brings along itself the justification of the militarization process. There are many examples for this. For example when a man dies or is being tortured as a soldier in a war or in a conflicting situation by the opposite side, he is considered as honored and named as martyr. However, women are victimized in the war time through their sexuality mostly; rape, and when the women of a state are raped this becomes a representation of the nation state since women hold the capability of giving birth which in this stance mystifies the national “identity” of the future born babies. The suicidal casualties of German women after they have been raped by the Russian soldiers in the World War II and the systematic

rape that occurred and became a part of the war indeed in Bosnia are among the examples of these.

1.4 Gendered Discourse: “Are you hearing what you are saying?”

The discursive feature of the gendered constructions in the discipline of International Relations and the processes of securitization and militarization have been introduced. At this part of the thesis the focus will be on the specific gendered discourse that is used which creates a powerful stance and enables a specific understanding of security. Carol Cohn argues that the specific jargon that belongs to the discourse of national security formation has further implications in that it constitutes a mind of thought that serves for the reproduction of the concept again. In her article “Clean Bombs and Clean Language” (1990) she shares with the readers her experiences of a MIT-Harvard Summer Program on Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in 1984 in which she attended. She gives examples of how gendered labels are used in the nuclear jargon, which is not far from the issue of securitization since the existence of the nuclear weapons is connected with the defensive character of the national security understanding, which brings its position in the process of securitization in the way it is represented. “Patting the missile”, as Carol suggests, is a term used for the reaction given as touching when a missile is seen by the naked eye. “Losing virginity” is another term used for the labeling of the states when get related with the nuclear bombs within its militaristic stance.⁴ Cohn deconstructs this discourse and points to the purpose and implications underlying this usage of discourse. Through this usage, the formation of “sexual imagery” and “abstraction” are formed, which

⁴ For further examples see Cohn (1990: 33-57).

serves for what is being in fact done to be seen as a matter of courage and not related with the humanity side of it but rather the primacy of the survival of the state. Cohn states this basing on the “patting” example:

Patting is an assertion of intimacy, sexual possession, affectionate domination. The thrill and pleasure of “patting the missile” is an expression of that phallic power with the possibility of vicariously appropriating it as one’s own. [...] But if the predilection for patting phallic objects indicates something of the homoerotic excitement suggested by the language, it also has another aspect. Patting is not just an act of sexual intimacy. It is also what one does to babies, small children, the pet dog. The creatures one pats are small, cute, harmless-not terrifyingly destructive. Patting removes the object’s lethal purpose (1990: 36).

So, the gendered language of the discourse that is attached to the national security understanding plays a role in encouraging to dignify the “manly” behaviors. This works for the construction of the emotional “feminine” features away and prompting at the same time adds a “manly” pressure. This forms a mind of thought, which moves away the attendant of the discourse from the implications of the military means on the human lives as Cohn argues.

It is a world that is in some sense complete unto itself; it even includes death and loss. But it is weapons, not humans, that are “killed”. “Fratricide” occurs when one of your warheads “kills” another one of your own warheads. There is much discussion of “vulnerability” and “survivability”, but it is about the vulnerability and survival of weapons systems, not people (1990: 40).

This represents the lack of touch that True argued before. This situation, in fact, as Cohn argues for the nuclear environment, is a necessary condition to be within the elites responsible for the security agenda.

In the civilian defense intellectuals’ world, when you are in professional settings you do not discuss the bloody reality behind the calculations. It is not required that you be completely unaware of them in your outside life, or that you have no feelings about them, but it is required that you do not bring them to foreground in the context of professional activities. There is a general awareness that you *could not* do your work if you did; in addition, most defense intellectuals believe that emotion and description of human reality distort the process required to think well about nuclear weapons and warfare (1992: 231).

Cohn also directs attention to the construction of gendered dichotomies based on the formation of attitude given above. This attitude, she argues, brings along the marginalizing some issues with characterization with feminine features, which assemble for their trivial stance for the national security. This is consistent with Hansen's point on how the definitive and discursive characteristics of the securitization argument makes it difficult for the issues of gender to be counted within the security agenda. As Cohn shows the definition of "feminine", this kind of labeling enables the logic of dichotomies to work for the security understanding. "Certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings, and meanings are marked in national discourse as feminine, and are devalued" (1993: 231). This forms an explanation of gender issues are not put within the security problems, since the discourse that needs to satisfy the elites to put in a political representation for the survival of the state is already gendered. This, as Cohn continues to argue, prepares the ground for militarization to occur in which the normalization of the usage of military means is a necessary condition. She argues that "gender discourse informs and shapes nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and absences" and "it degrades our ability to think well and fully about nuclear weapons and national security, and shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our deliberations" (1993: 232).

Finally, this specific discourse necessary for the presentation of a development as a security problem remains limited to the usage of the language and the militarized condition that the state is put in, but it also shapes the thought of the attendants of the discourse in a way such that it brings further securitization. This can be proven with the experience that Cohn has gone through as she explains.

If I was unable to speak my concerns in this language, more disturbing still was that I also began to find it hard even to keep them in my own head. No matter

how firm my own commitment to staying aware of the reality behind the words, over and over I found that I *couldn't* stay connected, couldn't keep human lives as my reference point. Soon I found I could go for days speaking about nuclear weapons without once thinking about the people who would be incinerated by them. [...] When you choose to learn it you are not simply adding new information and vocabulary; you are entering into a particular mode of thinking about nuclear weapons and, military and political power, and about the relationship between human ends and technological means (1990: 46, 50).

Although her experience is based specifically on the usage of nuclear weapons, as argued before it can be constituted within or in close relation with the usage of military means in general. This process therefore works for the situation of the world politics in current times too. In addition to this, and although the prospects of an occurrence of a nuclear war between two superpowers has ended with the end of the bipolar power structure at the end of the Cold War, the alerting attitude towards countries such as North Korea and Iran shows that it is still in the question of defense.

1.5 Conclusion

Based on the stance of the traditional approaches, feminists firstly deconstruct the way that security is constructed by traditional approaches, and show how the concept of security is shaped in its dominant understanding with the way it is represented. Then the task is to reconstruct a different understanding of security where the fallacies of traditional approaches that the feminists see can be eroded by basing on changing the way the security is thought, defined and taught. This is, as given before too, a common task for the most Critical Security Theories.

Without denying his contribution at all, the argumentation of Wæver in Security Studies leads in my point of view reconstruction of the traditional approach to security especially with its connection with militarization as I argued before too.

Furthermore, as Ken Booth states the issue is not simply one of widening or narrowing the security agenda, but deepening the understanding of security should be the core point where based on this understanding the fallacies that stem from the argument of securitization can be eroded.

Security is what we make it. It is an epiphenomenon intersubjectively creates. Different worldviews and discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security. New thinking about security is not simply a matter of broadening the subject matter (widening the agenda of issues beyond the merely military). [...] The broadening of the concept of security, to my mind, is the inevitable consequence of the (primary) aim of critical security studies to deepen our understanding of security. By *deepening* I mean investigating the implications and possibilities that result from seeing security as a concept that derives from different understandings of what politics is and can be all about, and specifically, politics on a global scale (1997: 106, 111).

This preference for deepening of security has an inclusive attitude to the variables that shape and characterize the dominant understanding of security, which is treated as the excluded issues in Wæver's argument. As to my position in this thesis, I argue that gender is the question in this problematic, however I do not undermine any other excluded issues, but rather gender dimension constitutes my starting point of the critiques that I form of Wæver's argument. Booth points out to the importance of the issue of gender: "To talk about security without thinking about gender is simply to account for the surface reflections without examining what is happening deep down below the surface" (1997: 101).

Feminist theory with its ontological position and its main concerns constitutes my underlying position in the analysis of the thesis. Based on this background, I will show how militarization is constituted in Turkey and within this background how securitization takes place. Highlighting the "elite" that is responsible for the specific stance that the process of securitization has in Turkey. Based on this understanding with building on the basis of the relationship between securitization and militarization, in the following chapter I will show how the process

of militarization works in Turkey. Especially focusing on the construction of the military's strong position, which I argue that it prepares a ground for the militarization in the state and society, which is socially constructed. The status that the military has in the understanding of the security in the example of Turkey will constitute how the relationship between relationship of militarization and securitization works in practice and how both processes are reproduced in the mutual ways.

CHAPTER 2

MILITARIZATION IN TURKEY

The aim of the chapter is to provide factual background information concerning the role played by the military in Turkey. This is crucial to understand the process of securitization better, since militarization is a process that feeds into the process of securitization in Turkey. With the historical information it gives, this chapter also aims to form a linkage to the relationship between militarization and securitization in the following chapter. Based on this background, this relationship can be discussed, explored and understood better as a whole.

The chapter comprises selected indicators of militarization in the context of Turkey. These are the four military interventions, the constitution of a militarized state as a result of these interventions, the high military expenditure and a militarized society. First, the militarization that existed in the establishment period will be discussed (Section 2.1). Later on, the four military interventions will be given as the indicators of militarization (Section 2.2). Within this section, the indicators of the process will be discussed firstly on the state. The discussion in this part is going to reflect the consequences of the military interventions. Then, military expenditure

is going to be explained as another indicator and, finally, the militarization process on the basis of society is going to be discussed. The key term in understanding and discussing militarization in this chapter will be “normalization”; each section will serve for showing how military thinking is normalized through this process.

2.1 Establishment of the Republic

The historical background of Turkey begins with the establishment of the republic. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the task to establish a republic from a sophisticated empire history was a hard one as one can imagine. The daily life, the official language, the infrastructure of the country and so forth, everything was to be re-organized and formed. The role of the military, which had the primary role in the struggle against the invaders of the country with the victories gained, in return was connected to establishment of the republic and was among the difficult subjects within this task. In fact, this connection is an important remark for understanding the military’s privileged position in the eyes of civilians and politicians. George Harris points to the importance of this remark in shaping the society’s view on the military by giving examples from Ottoman experience.

True, the standing of the officer corps as a most honored calling ran as a basic thread through all Ottoman and modern Turkish History. This attitude of respect for and confidence in the military commanders was in recent times to underlie their inclination to intervene when they saw threats to the state and to condition popular acceptance of a military move. But whereas the guardian role of the officers is deeply rooted in Turkey’s past, until after the abolition of the Janissaries and the institutional reforms of the Tanzimat, military excesses by unruly troops eroded the bond of popular trust in the armed services. That confidence had to be reestablished by the patriotic service of the army during the struggle for independence under Atatürk before the modern role of the military could fully take shape (1988: 180).

Harris's point shows that the victory experiences of the military constitute references for the construction of the military's distinctive status in politics, with which the "crucial" role of the military in a state is emphasized. Altınay argues that this is in fact a common point for nation-states where militarism and nationalism constitute a theme together for the formation of the nation-state. She argues that this tandem theme can be analyzed on two axes, one is "wars, nation-states and modern nationalisms" and the second is the "citizen-armies, obligatory military service and education." (Altınay, 2005a)⁵

In Europe, the formation of the modern, nation-state has happened as the consequence of wars. This condition is the same with Europe, the continent where the nation-states were born, as it is with Third World Countries, which were formed as a consequence for the independence wars. This is why some wars (and some battlefields) have become a symbol for the nation-states. (2005a)

She goes on by stating that this is the National Struggle War - The War of Sakarya -, in Turkish case.⁶ She underlines the fact that since this is the case for the formation of nation-states in general, this does not and should not give an exceptional reasoning for Turkey in contrast to the general belief. This is important for the role that the military undertakes for itself in the politics of Turkey in relation with the attitude of gratitude by the public that it justifies its stance.

In the early republic years, although the gratitude towards the military was felt and recognized intensively, since the claim was a democratic republic, the task was to place military in such a way that its place would not be a harming one to the democratic and political scene of the state. William Hale argues that during the early years of the republic, a moderate place for the military in comparison with the status of the Republican Party was witnessed in the country. He argues that " The party

⁵ Together with this quotation, all quotes which are originally Turkish are translations of the author of the thesis.

⁶ This war is called as "Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi" in Turkish. It is accepted as the war that began the struggle for independence in 1921.

commanded the gun, rather than the reverse, and the party was in turn commanded by the president” (1994: 313). He continues on this point with “it is clear that during the single-party period the army was relegated to a secondary position, behind the Republican People’s party.” (1994: 313). Harris takes the argument further, and argues that the situation was formed with a conscious manner.

Atatürk’s practice in governing the Republic provided patterns that could not be copied in their entirety by his successors. His military prowess formed a springboard to power. His charisma held his countrymen in a lasting grip, while he set up institutions intended to obviate the need for a personal hold on power and to remove the officers from day-to-day involvement in the affairs of state. Thus, on the one hand, he enunciated a litany of exhortations to the military to be the bulwark of the state against all enemies, domestic or foreign. He indoctrinated them with the principle of his modernizing reforms. And he kept the military leaders attached to the office of presidency. Yet after allowing them a political role in the independence movement, he took that away once the independence was won. They were even deprived of the right to vote. Moreover, he cut back on the influence of retired officers in parliament; and their numbers declined significantly during his lifetime (1988: 181).

So, it can be said that the conscious efforts to position the military in the state existed during the period. Hale points to one of the important functions that the military is given in the state in the early years of the republic:

Politically, a vital function of the army was to serve as one of the regime’s most important agents for the spread of the ideas of modernization and secular nationalism, especially among the conscripts. A poster issued by the Republican People’s Party in the 1930s lauds the army as ‘the school for the people’, with graphic illustrations (1994: 80).

Although the efforts to separate the military from politics were existent, especially this labeling of military as the “agent” for modernization led to the constitution of the military as the “only agent responsible and representative of the modernization process” (Bilgin)⁷ in the way it is represented. Hale also underlines the legal aspect of the position given to the military during the period, which became open to differences of interpretation.

⁷ Taken from a conversation with Bilgin about the issue.

Legally speaking, the role of the armed forces was defined by the Army Internal Service Law, enacted 1935. Article 34 of the law stipulated that ‘the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic, as determined in the Constitution’. Later army activists were to interpret this clause (which was interpreted in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law of 1960 as Article 35) as meaning that they were obliged to intervene in the political sphere if the survival of the state would otherwise be left in grave jeopardy (1994: 80).

The place left for the interpretation, as Hale suggests too, was filled by the military, which prepared a ground for the privileged position that the military undertook for itself. As it can be seen from Hale’s argument also, ‘*the survival of the state*’ is a crucial part of the representation of the army as the protector of the state. So, the establishment period gives a sense of militarist beginning as it is with many other states also, but with some efforts of placing the military into a democratic scene. However, the missions that the military has been identified with, especially being the “agent responsible with the modernization process”, has its roots in this period as shown above, which will turn into being a justification argument in contexts where military plays an active role in the politics. It should also be noted that during this time the ideology of Atatürk (i.e. Atatürkçülük, Kemalism) has developed, which became a referent text for the military in their discourse of protection of the state and the being the representative of the modernization.

It should be explained here what is meant by Kemalism (used interchangeably by many with Atatürkçülük, although still there are discussions on whether it should be used in this way). The word Kemalism is used in general sense the nationalistic attitude based on the principles of Atatürk because of his major contribution in the establishment of the republic. Tanıl Bora identifies the official nationalism with “Atatürk Nationalism”.

Official nationalism, with its ideological ambiguity, thoroughly depends on the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state, its symbols and rituals, its pomp and omnipresence. The army, as the crystallized evidence of the

existence, power and manifestations of the nation-state, takes on a central role in the regeneration of official nationalism. Owing the requirements of the ideology of vigilance and the automatic system of perceiving threat internalized by all armies, and specifically as a consequence of the “state-founding military” character of TSK (Turkish Armed Forces), which are identified with Mustafa Kemal and his mission, the army considers itself to be the “true owner” and personified symbol of nationalism. Official nationalism, whose core is the army, has a mental perspective focused on the state itself and on populist attributions of heroism (2003: 437).

The Kemalist stance, which will be referred in several places throughout the thesis, is based on this understanding. Bora argues that especially in the late years of the republican period two main dynamics feed Turkish nationalism. These are “reactionary nationalistic movement” and the other is “pro-Westerns nationalistic movement”. It is the fact that the Turkish military accepts Kemalism as its base and especially is rising in the last decade, this ideology is used within the nationalistic stance. Bora states this “reactionary nationalistic movement” “uses the theme of national survival in a dramatized way — this movement not only strengthens the opposing radical nationalistic movement, but also influences right-wing politics, and even, increasingly, the center-left-wing; furthermore, it dominates the army, above all, but also the state elite” (2003: 436).

In the book *Emret Komutanım* (translated as *Shirt of Steel* in English) written by Mehmet Ali Birand (1986), which was an original analysis of the structure of the military at the time of its publication, the cruel place of the ideology of Atatürk in the education of military cadre can be seen. The below is a quote taken by his interview that Birand makes with one of the students of the military education:

-What is Atatürk for you?

His eyes were shining. Furthermore, he responded as if with an understanding attitude of the ignorance that lies behind the question:

... Atatürk is the one who rescued and established this country. He is the one who set the principles which shows how this country can develop. Our leader...

-Do you believe in his ideology?

It can be a reaction against the word of ideology, he might have responded without thinking:

-We do not agree with any ideology. We are Kemalists.

-But you learned the ideology of Atatürk also...

-That is different. We were taught the principles of Atatürk, how Ata thinks (1986: 108-109).

Birand in his book also states that in the 1950s, Atatürkçülük was not something to be taught as distinctively as it changed later on especially beginning with 1960s (timing with the first two interventions) and getting more and more distinctive with the 1980 military intervention (1986: 93-94). It is relevant to close this part, which aimed to explain what is meant by the usage of words of *Kemalism*⁸, ideology of Atatürk and Atatürkçülük with one officer's answer to Birand:

Is Atatürkçülük really an ideology? For one of the officers who has contributed one of the biggest efforts to Armed Forces Atatürkçülük is an exact ideology:

-[...] In fact communism is described as an ideology, but for me what goes for an ideology is Atatürkçülük. It is a real ideology. It has an answer to every event, every development. It is dynamic, not static as communism. ... And we execute this ideology in every arena, in education, in family, in everything (1986: 95-96).

Before moving into the discussion of the militarization on the basis of its indicators, two important developments are in relation with the Turkish military in the international context is the German effect during the World War II, and the Cold War. World War II brought in the German effect, the rise of nationalism, in Turkey. Especially the extreme nationalist movements affected the newly established republic, which worked for the formation of its identity on a definition that featured a single ethnical property. Hale, although he finds the possibility low, states that the nationalist stance of Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak during the period may have played a role in his retirement, which was made felt by İnönü (Hale, 1994: 82-82). The crucial issue at this point is İnönü's attitude after Çakmak's retirement,

⁸ For more information about *Kemalism* see Bora and Gültekin (2001).

which brought in an institutional change on military-civilian government relations as Hale shows.

Coincidentally with Cakmak's retirement, an attempt was made to reduce the independence of the chief of General Staff, and thus reduce the independence of the Chief of the General Staff, and thus of the army establishment as a whole, by making him responsible to the Minister of Defence, rather than directly to the president. This attempt underlined the point that although Atatürk's reforms had extricated the army from day-to-day involvement in politics, they had not established effective institutional control by the government over defence policy or the army's performance of its professional functions (1994: 83).

This leap for an institutional change is very important because, as it will be seen in the coming parts of the chapter, the institutional changes that came with the interventions, in my argument, became a crucial move for the process of militarization, acceptance of the military's position as an acceptable agent in politics. Hale continues his statement with showing that this leap was not welcomed by the military, which again exemplifies the role that the military established since the establishment of the republic process.

The new proposal apparently ran into stiff opposition from the top of the military hierarchy. Accordingly, a compromise was agreed on, by which the Chief of the General Staff was placed under the prime minister, with instructions to deal directly with other ministries when occasion required (1994: 83).

The word "compromise" is worth attention taking because it shows that the administration of the state still does not intensively stand on the civilian authority. In a reverse case, where the authority is based on more or less a civilian ground, compromise would be an assertive word to describe the situation since the linguistic nature of the word, with its dictionary meaning as "settlement of a dispute by concessions on each side"⁹ distributes same or similar roles to the sides. The distinctive status and the stance of authority that the military appointed itself can be seen in quotation taken from Ümit Cizre.

⁹ Collins Dictionary.

The military positioned itself at a distance from the rest of the society for several reasons. Most important, the army reproduced within itself its sentry role as an ideological task force prescribed by Kemalism, the official ideology of the state, named after the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Kemalism as an ideology came to the fore in a series of general congresses of the RPP, beginning in 1927 and culminating in 1935, as a project of politically constructing and manipulating a modern Turkish nation-state on secular and westerns rather than Islamic precepts. It relied on the officer corps as the main carrier of these positivist-progressive ideals. (1997: 154)

The second important development is the Cold War context in which siding with United States of America politically in the bi-polar power structured world between United States of America and Soviet Union. This led to the undertaking of modernization of the Turkish Army, which was left as the same after the war of independence, by the U.S.A. Then, with the participation in the Korean War in 1950, Turkey entered NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1952. The participation in the Korean War at the time took some reaction among the intellectual environment. A part of a poem written by famous poet Nazım Hikmet can be given as an example:

“a homeland in far asia
people with yellow moon faces
are fighting with a white dragon.
there sent four thousand five hundred memet [a nickname for soldier]
from yours
to butcher their siblings.”¹⁰

However, the state elite’s position on the issue was however, concentrated on the contribution of Turkish army and support given to the U.S.A. and the result of getting access to NATO membership which was interpreted as success. NATO

¹⁰ Original is as follows:
“uzak asya’da bir memleket
sarı ay yüzlü insanlar
beyaz bir ejderhayla dövüşmekte.
oraya gönderildi seninkilerden
dört bin beş yüz tane memet
kardeşlerini katletmeye.”

membership was presented and interpreted as a highly prestigious position. This continued even after the Cold War ended as Şenesen shows.

Turkey is the only member of NATO in the Middle East. Even though the Cold War ended, Turkey thinks NATO's importance will not decrease in the future. Turkey's official view is that Turkey will be the "nucleus of dialogue between the 16 countries" of NATO. Furthermore Turkey is a candidate to take over key roles in the Europe wing of NATO. This is why "the tendencies of disarmament in the world does not render to change Turkey's defence policy"¹¹ (2000: 2).

After these clarifications, now the indicators of militarization will be discussed. The establishment period as explained above, reflects the close relation between the military and society in the beginning. However, the state elite did try to somehow draw the borders of the duties of the institution, but the missions it thought to undertake marked the beginning or the expectation of the militarization process, as it got stronger with every military intervention.

2.2 Indicators of Militarization

Militarization is a process that can be observed through some practices that can be labeled under the name of indicators. But firstly to remember and define the process of militarization Enloe's argumentation is worth quoting:

Militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military *or* comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal. Militarization, that is, involves cultural as well institutional, ideological, and economic transformations. To chart the spread of militarization, then, requires a host of skills: the ability to read budgets and interpret bureaucratic euphemisms, of course, but also the ability to understand dynamics of memory, marriage, hero-

¹¹ Quotes used in Şenesen are from an interview made with the Minister of the National Defence H.Doğan at that time, 1991.

worship, cinematic imagery, and the economies of commercialized sex (2000: 3).

As Enloe defines, militarization is a process by which the idea of militarism comes to be existent and pervasive in a society and state which by the society and state is perceived to be a part of the nature of the existence. Based on the discussion on militarism and militarization in Chapter 1 the concept of militarism, which feeds the process of militarization, can be reminded here. As Altunay (2005b: 352) argues, “the active role of the military in the political and societal life, the perspective of seeing the use of violence in the solution of the crises as legitimate, the glorification of the hierarchy, the identification of masculinity with the use of violence and femininity with the need for protection” are used in the definitions of the word militarism. Based on this, the direct military interventions speak for themselves to prove the key role the military has played. But, furthermore, these military interventions worked for the normalization of the active role of the military to be accepted by the politicians and the society, since even the event of intervention came to be expected in many crises. The latest military intervention, although did not share some formal characteristics with the interventions before (did not overtake the administration or make constitutional changes), the way the procedure took place and the consequences had also constituted an example of the existence of the militarism and also serve for keeping process of militarization to be alive. In the coming parts, these will be proved with the historical information of the interventions that took place. Then, the consequences of these interventions first on the basis of institutional sense then on the societal sense will be discussed. The military interventions in Turkey did not just happen to be only of taking the authority over and giving it back to politicians again. With the first three interventions, institutional changes resulted in such a way that the military intervention as an event became to be a common concern

before giving a statement or taking an initiative in the political arena. The changes that the intervention brought made the word “intervention” not only something fearful but also something usual (The three military interventions took followed each other). For society, the indicators can be seen in the reactions the public gives to the crises, to the interventions and to events even they are not considered to be crises. It is very hard to show point by point the militarization of the society when compared to the analysis of the militarization of the state, but some solid indicators as the responds to the polls that are conducted will also be provided in the discussion.

2.2.1 Military Interventions

2.2.1.1 The 1960 Military Intervention

To understand the military interventions, the historical background should be given. If we start with the first military intervention that took place in, then we see that the political scene gets busy with the first active multi-party system.¹² The Democrat Party, the opposition party to the RPP, gained victory in the elections in 1950. The difference of position between the Democrat Party and the RPP caught the attention of both the society and the military, but in different ways. Hale summarizes the difference of the two parties:

The Democrats’ political philosophy was hard to sum up. They were generally liberal in their political inclinations, but in practice drew together the large and diverse range of people who, for one reason or another, had come to resent the RPP’s long monopoly of political power — farmers who felt neglected by the regime’s concentration on industrialization, businessmen who hoped to end the dominant role of the state in industry, urban workers and clerks who had suffered severely from wartime inflation, and some religious conservatives who wished to soften the official emphasis on secularism.

¹² An attempt to multi-party system was made before in the 1930s , but lasted very short.

Against this national liberal alliance the RPP could offer only its historical role as the party of Atatürk and İnönü, which had spearheaded the dramatic reforms of the 1920s and saved Turkey from the horrors of war between 1939 and 1945 (1994: 89).

The entrance of Democrat Party into the politics filled the gaps that existed in the limited definition of the state. For the first years of administration, the party protected its fresh entry in the eyes of the public. However, this did not continue for so long. The economic liberation that the Democrat Party promised did not come out as it was presented and in addition to this the chaotic atmosphere of the protests by the civilians. Against these developments, the Democrat Party took extreme steps to oppress the protests and even tried to close the RPP as an opponent party. Based on this ground came the first military intervention of the military in 27 May 1960. Harris argues the distant place that the Democrat Party positioned itself against the military played a role in this intervention. He states that “the Democrats, who had no close ties to the military establishment, pointedly ignored the views of the military leadership, a humiliation all the more painful since members of the armed services were not eligible to vote” (Harris, 1988: 182). This, in addition to the political chaos that the country was in, became a justification for the claim of the Democrat Party’s inability to govern the country by the military. Harris suggests “as the political contest became increasingly embittered, the idea of the need to intervene to prevent a breakdown of the political machinery began to gain legitimacy within the officer corps.” (1988: 182)

2.2.1.2 The 1971 Military Intervention

Before going directly to the second military intervention, since the time period in between is very short, it should be given to look at the situation that ended with the

intervention. After making constitutional changes, the military passed the power to Justice Party after 1961. A coalition government was formed between the RPP Party's and the Justice Party under the leadership of İnönü and Demirel. Justice Party was seen as the successor of the Democrat Party by almost everyone. Although the transfer of powers to civilian government by the military was presented as a stable one, the instability that the coalition signaled in the years after the intervention prepared a ground for the military's reasoning again. In 1962, an attempt of military take-over happened, but since it was not a collectively directed move and came from the lower ranks, it did not succeed. The next year, the attempt was revived, but the intended result did not happen again. Harris argues that the period till the second official intervention in fact witnessed a distant attitude of the military to the politics. He states "the intensity of military involvement in political matters fell off gradually during the 1960s as the civilians began to use the power of military assignment" (Harris, 1988: 185). This is in coherence with the statements made in the public over the comparison of 1961 and 1982 constitutions in relation with paying more sympathy to the changes that the 1961 constitution brought in overall terms. However, this does not change the fact that this intervention played a role in the settlement of the process of militarization among the public, as it will be analyzed in the coming parts of the thesis.

At the end of the 1960s, especially with the student movement of 1968, Turkey was also affected by the international context where similar movements were seen in different regions of the world. The ideological differences within the society reached their climax especially among the university students. The situation was surely effected by the Cold War structure, as it was the case in other regions of the world. Criminal cases began to occur within the country and in addition to the

political instability the instability within the civilians became vivid also. The discomfort of the military was implemented when they sided (support of thought) with the students, who rioted against the state according to the government as Harris (1988: 186) states. This stems from the insecure attitude towards the military since the government was not based on one hundred percent civilian authority mentally. Harris explains the exact military thought at the time: “The main commitment of the officers, however, was to the safety of the state” (1988: 186). With this infrastructure, the second official military intervention occurred on 12 March 1971. Harris argues that the act was not fully an intervention in definitive terms.

The 1971 military ultimatum was not a full military intervention into the political arena. On its face, it was a declaration that the generals would use the authority vested in them to protect the state and would take power directly only if the civilians refused to provide more effective role (1988: 187).

Although he agrees with the non-harshness of the stance of the military in the second military intervention, Hale builds his argument on the assumption of a clear military intervention.

General Tağmac and Gürler were apparently very reluctant to take any overt action against Demirel’s government, but eventually felt obliged to do so by the upsurge in terrorism and violence. Accordingly, they agreed with Batur on the compromise formula of the ‘12 March memorandum’. In effect, this resulted in the establishment of a moderator, or veto, regime in which the machinery of civilian government remained formally in place, but the government’s actions were directed, or at any rate restricted by the military (1994: 314-315).¹³

To sum up, the 1971 military intervention was different from a direct *coup d’état* but still is labeled as a military intervention based on the characteristics of the act as discussed.

¹³ Batur was a military person in the military cadre at the time.

2.2.1.3 The 1980 Military Intervention

The importance of the international context comes to the surface again with the occurrence of the Cyprus Operation in 1974 before going into the explanation of the third military intervention. The unstable situation between the Turk and Greek Cypriots that continued since 1963 in Cyprus, reached its climax in 1974 when Turkey sent military force on the land and got hold of the situation in its terms. However, the USA, which supported the modernization of the forces of the Turkish army, and the big power whose ideology was believed in the political arena of Turkey, warned Turkey not to use the armament that was given by USA during the operation. Against this background, the Cyprus Operation is especially important in two crucial ways. First, the trust in the USA got decreased highly, and this led to the extreme distrust to the external environment by the military, which in turn strengthened the military's status as a guardian of the state to outside. Second, the consequence of the securitization (the way it was done) of the event (based on the militarized background brought so far) led to the militarization where the conscription quests marked a rise as, which is stated as a strong dynamic of militarization as it was seen in Enloe's argument.

During the period, the chaos in internal politics continued between the different ideological groups. This period also witnessed more explicit presentation of discomfort with the administration by the islamist discourse. The rise of this discourse under the representative of the National Salvation Party was not very welcomed, especially regarding the increase of the effect of the party in the political

arena. It began to become parts of the quickly changing cabinets during the time.

Harris draws in the discomfort of the military in this situation.

It was the manifest political failings of the coalition governments that were most upsetting to the military leadership. On the one hand, the ability of the National Salvation Party to exploit its swing position as a necessary part of any viable coalition to extract concessions that appeared to compromise the secularist approach associated with Atatürk's reform program, powerfully disturbed the commanders. The National Salvation Party's success in shaping government policy toward education and even foreign policy was unacceptable to many generals (1988: 193).

The insufficient economic situation was in the background of this chaotic atmosphere as to many interpretations. The difficulties that rose with these developments added up together for the military, which was watching the events carefully. The military intervention occurred on 12 September 1980. The thought in mind was still state-centric but with emphasis on democracy this time. As Harris suggests "they believed that they were acting to save Turkish democracy from itself" (1988: 193). The "protector of the state" and the "representative of modernization" now added to its definitive features the "representative of the democracy". However, the suitability of this is arguable when the position of the military in politics is compared with an ideal democracy type. The justification of this situation, especially in the comparison made with the EU countries in the late 1990s and later on was justified on the ground of "geo-political determinism" (Bilgin, 2003). The argument was that Turkey had a unique geo-strategic position so the issues such as civil-military relations, military's position in politics, individual rights and freedoms, humans rights had to be adapted differently in accordance with the exceptional case that Turkey faced.

2.2.1.4 The 28 February 1997 Intervention

Post-1982 Constitution period is interpreted as a transition period by many scholars. The president became Kenan Evren, who was the commander that led the 1980 military intervention. The political party that came into power was the Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal, who became known to follow a relatively more liberal policy than his precedents. In 1987, the first efforts of the challenging military's artificial traditional status in the politics on the question of the presidential elections and this effort's implications came afterwards in 1989. Ergun Özbudun points to the developments in the period:

In 1987, Özal bypassed the military's candidate for chief of the General Staff, General Necdet Öztörün (in the Turkish armed forces tradition, the commander of the land forces becomes chief of the General Staff), and appointed his own choice. When Evren's term as president ended in 1989, Özal announced his candidacy and was elected by the Grand National Assembly — the first president of civilian background since the military ousted President Celal Bayar in 1960. As president, Özal took an active (to some critics, an unconstitutional) role in formulating foreign and security policies, particularly during the Gulf crisis (2000: 118-119).

This implies that efforts took place for the “civilianization”¹⁴ in the politics, but as Özbudun continues this was not taken at ease by the military.

His personalistic style of handling the Gulf affair led the chief of the General Staff, Necip Toruntay, to resign. Many observers commented wryly that in the past a chief of staff who strongly disagreed with the government staged a coup or issued a memorandum rather than resign (2000: 119).

These steps were important in their role of being initiatives. However, although efforts took place at the time, Cizre argues that these were not sufficient for the ideal type of civil-military relations.

¹⁴This term is often used by Ergun Özbudun (2000).

Despite Özal's rather inflated image as a challenger of the military's political power and his seeming success in imposing the civilian government's choice for the general chief of staff in 1987, he could not have acted in this manner had he not procured the support of President Kenan Evren, the ex-general and leader of the coup. Nor did he attempt to change the military's legal framework, which would have been the institutional prerequisite to subject the military to civilian control (1997: 153-154).

Still, in general terms it can be argued that the traditional status of the military in politics that has been constructed so far began to be de-centralized in the late 1980s.

One of the important factors for this process can be argued with Turkey's journey on EU application with its ups and downs. The rough process after 1987, continued with its ups and downs till the present date. The differences on civil-military relation especially became an issue for debate during this period. So, in the 1990s the de-centralization of the military's privileged status began to be pronounced again, though, this was not an easy process and it had its ups and downs as well. However, the struggle with the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) during this period, which continued till the late-1990s, which also is in relation with the process of militarization.

Moving along the historical axis, after Özal's death in 1993 Demirel, who was known long before with his political experience in the Justice Party, became the president. In 1995, constitutional amendments took place, which, as Özbudun suggests, represented a continuity of the efforts of strengthening the civilian authority began in 1987.

Some of the legacies of the military regime have been removed through constitutional amendment; thus the ban on political activities of former politicians was repealed by a 1987 constitutional referendum and was not voted by President Evren. The 1995 constitutional amendments also repealed some provisions dear to the 1982 military fathers, such as those banning cooperation between political parties and other civil society institutions such as trade unions, associations, foundations, and professional organizations (2000: 117).

However, the “civilianization” of the period did not continue in an ideal way where the direction nearly led to an opposite direction in 1997. The parties in power at that time were the Welfare Party and the True Path Party. The TPP were largely considered as a continuation of the Justice Party, whereas the WP of the National Salvation Party. The coalition formed was taken at a discomfort by the military from the beginning, because the Islamist discourse that the WP led was interpreted as a threat to the secular structure of the state. WP leader Erbakan’s statements in coherence with the Islamic discourse of his party became a justification ground for the military’s arguments of the necessity of reminding the military’s protective role of the state.

On this ground as Özbudun suggests, “Turkey witnessed the 28 February 1997 meeting of the National Security Council, at which the commanders strongly criticized the government for its permissiveness toward “reactionary activities”(2000: 120). The act was represented as the recommendations to the state; however, many people interpreted the act as a “post-modern military intervention”. The implications that the act made and the way that the act occurred are important for the sake of getting a better picture of the existence of militarization in Turkey. Mustafa Erdoğan describes the act as a “memorandum”. He argues that this is because “the meeting agenda of 28 February 1997 was not prepared by the president as it should be according to the constitution but by the military days before it came out in the meeting” (Erdoğan, 1999: 22). Furthermore, he argues that this act has further implications on the de-civilianization of the politics in Turkey.

In fact, when we think about the “authorization” of the NSC General Secretary’s on the guarding of the instructions given by the NSC to the government after the meeting together with the authorization given before on the coordination for the crisis management “*on behalf of the prime minister*” it has a special meaning. This, as it is understood as such, shows that NSC General Secretary is going to become a *de facto* prime minister. According to

this situation, NSC from now on is going to substitute the parliament (Erdoğan, 1999: 23).

Ergun Özbudun also points to the significance of the act with its aftermath implications.

The military's behavior during the 1997 crisis suggests that it still sees itself in a guardianship role against threats to its deeply felt values, such as the indivisibility of the state and its secular character. [...] The events that followed the 28 February 1997 meeting of the NSC demonstrated the limits of the military's tolerance for civilian leadership (2000: 120,121).

Furthermore, Erdoğan argues that the implications of the act constituted a new period in the Turkey's political life. He considers the 28 February intervention as an act not only happened and ended on that day but as an act which was constituted within a process under the leadership of NSC General Secretary which he calls as the a normalization of the politics. As it can be seen from Erdoğan's argument that this act, when seen together with the previous interventions that took place in political history of the country, worked for 'normalization' of the military's interference into politics. He states that "Nearly effective for a century, one of the unchangeable themes of the political discourse of Turkey, augmented especially after the Democrat Party's coming into power in 1950, complaints and discomforts on 'the increase reactionary and anti-secular movements' always resulted in the restriction and suspension of democracy" (Erdoğan, 1999: 28). Moreover, he states that this led to the securitization of threats that were established at the expense of the other issues that were important for the security also, which in return strengthens the state-centric approach of the dominant security understanding. This is an example of the negative consequence of the argumentation of securitization both in the states where militarism and state-based understanding of security are strong and alive concepts. Erdoğan states that at the time, there was corruption in the government and it was a

threat to not only democracy but to the “judicial state”, but this was not taken into consideration as seriously as anti-secularism by both the NSC and the state elites (Erdoğan, 1999: 29). He also states that these led to pluck of the already decreased connection and trust of the society to the politics in Turkey (Erdoğan, 1999: 31). This was a consequence of the militarist experience that the society had to live through and based on this ground the “acceptance” for the securitization of certain issues and not some certain issues found a strong ground defined by the state elites under the effect of the military in Turkey.

As said before, the act was not an official military intervention, or to say it more correctly it was not a coup d'état in classical meaning. The representation of the intervention was more like a recommendatory movement. However, the seriousness of the act with the seriousness of the way the threat perceptions were defined and interpreted together with the preparedness of the military means made the act a very important one in the scale of militarization in Turkey's political history. This act was the latest tension close to a coup d'état. The military tanks were sent to the streets of Sincan (a quarter of the city of Ankara known to be religiously conservative at the time). It was said that the tanks were driven just as a signal of a warning. The events following the time were mostly influenced by the EU application process, which the current situation is stemming from.

2.2.2 Consequences of the Military Interventions: A Militarized State

As it is argued before, militarization is a process, which is successful through normalization, as given in Altunay's argument. The institutional changes that the military interventions brought served for the effective role of the military in politics to gain more strength. This served for the political arena of the country to get used to the occurrence of military interventions. Here the consequences of the military interventions, which resulted in the formation of the militarized state, are given in relation to the institutional changes.

2.2.2.1 Post-1960 Military Intervention

The military passed its powers to the civilian government in a short time after the 1961 Constitution was prepared. The new constitution is important in the sense that it prepared an institutional ground for the militarist understanding to be accepted by the civilians. This crucial change in this logic was the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). As Harris argues too, this is an important development in civil military relations. Harris states "the central element of the new system, which has endured its essentials, was the creation of National Security Council as a legal mechanism to assure violence for the military profession" (1988: 182). This change is not only about the institutional basis, the establishment of this institution proves the presence of militarization and in fact increases its power in the decision making process through the changes made in the political structure in relation with this institution with the two coups d'état and one military intervention resulting with

constitutional changes (1971 intervention) and one defined as “post-modern” coup d’état, four military interventions in total.

Ümit Cizre points to the military’s increasing role in the decision-making process: “In the last two decades the military has not only gained more strength vis-à-vis civilian actors, but by participating in the civilian authority over areas that were traditionally under civilian control” (1997: 157). The establishment of this institution, as it is seen in Cizre’s words also resulted in the augmentation of the military’s weight in politics in practice. She states “it is now apparent that the military has simply consolidated its political hegemony more deeply and made it unassailable” (1997: 157). She states that the underlying logic of the institution as “designed to serve as a platform for the military to voice its opinion on matters of national security” (Cizre, 1997: 157). This fits with the “ideology of national security” dynamic of Enloe’s argument of militarization. Harris gives the structural feature of the institution:

This body, established in the 1961 Constitution, was composed of the chief of general staff and the force commanders meeting with the prime minister and ministers of defense, the interior, and the foreign affairs under the chairmanship of the president. Its broad mandate to consider all matters of security concern guaranteed the continued involvement of at least the top ranks of the military establishment in political affairs (1988: 183).

In addition to the formation of NSC, the constitution brought changes within the position of the general chief of staff within the political structure. Cizre draws a historical outline of the change of this position:

The position of the Turkish general chief of staff has gone through three stages. In 1924 it was subjected to the prime minister; in 1949 it was placed under the control of the minister of defense; and under the 1961 constitution it once again became the prime minister’s responsibility. That this position is above the minister of defense and other elected officials is confirmed by the general’s manner of appointment and his duties. The general chief of staff is appointed by the president from the generals who were formerly commanders of the land forces, upon nomination by the council of ministers. In time of war, also under 1982 constitution, the general chief of staff exercises the duties of commander-in-chief on behalf of the president of the republic (1997: 159).

The consequences of the first *coup d'état* in the history of the republic were felt with the institutional changes that gave a way to the powerful position of the military in the politics and in the eyes of the public.

2.2.2.2 Post-1971 Military Intervention

In the aftermath of the second military intervention the institutional changes especially regarding the place of NSC continued. Cizre points to the additional difference that the constitutional amendments after the second intervention in 1971 regarding the NSC. “With the 1973 amendments the primary function of the NSC was extended to making recommendations to the government” (1997: 157). Harris also shows the effect of the amendments on NSC:

In terms of bolstering the position of the armed forces, the amendments provided authority to pass a law to adjust the powers of the minister of defense; specified that the National Security Council could represent to the cabinet not merely its basic views on security, but its recommendations as well; increased the possibility that civilians could be tried in military courts; removed review of military personnel actions from civilian administrative courts; and increased the ranks of members of court martial (1988: 188).

In concern with the defense structure, Cizre points to the changes that came out in the period.

Two separate laws passed in 1970 specified the duties of the minister of defense and general chief of staff. The general chief of staff obtained autonomy in determining defense policy, the military budget, future weapon systems, production and procurement of arms intelligence gathering, internal security, and all promotions (1997: 159).

These changes have a constitutive effect on building a militarist institutional set up to feed a militarist culture which caused the audience to accept what came up after the decision making process without much rejection. In fact, these changes occurred in

theory did not leave room for a representation of a rejection in practice in my point of view. Harris states that “there appeared to be some measure of popular acceptance of the government’s claim that Turkey faced: “a strong, active uprising against the motherland and the republic”” (1988: 187). Harris shows this point in his observation, especially on the issue of declaration of martial law in the eastern provinces.

[...] [A]s part of the justification for imposing martial law in a number of provinces, the new government cited the threat of “sabotage, subversion, and separatist movement” in eastern Turkey. Thus there was little general protest when the authorities launched a broad wave of arrests of suspects, a number of whom had had no connection with violence (1988: 187).

As it is stated in the observations and arguments of different scholars from different backgrounds also, military intervention’s consequences of institutional changes effected to shape the society’s point of view on the position of the military in politics by legitimizing its strong position. Harris draws a general picture of the constitutional changes brought by the intervention:

Basically, the changes in 35 regular articles and the addition of nine temporary articles to the Constitution took two general approaches: strengthening the powers of the government against threats to national unity, public order, and national security; and increasing the autonomy and freedom of action of the military establishment in more or less subtle ways. As regards the first, the changes sought to reinforce the powers of the authorities to prohibit the exploitation of “class, sect, religion, race, or language” to divide the nation; to restrict the press from promoting violations of “national unity”; to limit the right to form unions and associations; to give the cabinet power to issue decrees with the force of law when so instructed by parliament; to specify that university autonomy should not be allowed to shield perpetrators of crimes; to strengthen state control over radio and television; to extend the length of time that the cabinet could impose martial law without parliamentary approval; and to postpone elections due in October 1971 to October 1973. (1988: 188)

The 1971 military intervention also served for constructing the strong position of the military and also since it happened after a short time after the first intervention the concept of military intervention became a stronger possibility in the politics from that time on.

2.2.2.3 Post-1980 Military Intervention

The changes that the 1980 military intervention brought with constitution established in 1982 play an important role on the institutional changes, which brings important changes especially in regard to NSC. As Cizre states: “under the 1982 constitution its position was enhanced: its recommendations would be given priority consideration by the council of ministers” (1997: 157). She draws upon the differences in quantity between civilians and the officers in the NSC. “The number and weight of senior commanders participating in the NSC also increased at the expense of civilian members.” (Cizre, 1997: 158) Birand also points to this change in his analysis of the military in Turkey. He shows that the NSC is the agent responsible for the national security policies in the decisions regarding “appointment, determination, and its execution”. As he states also the relationship with the civilian authorities work as such: the NSC announces its opinions to Council of Ministers and the Council of Ministers takes into consideration the resolutions of NSC in priority because it is based on the ground that these decisions are resulted in the necessity the NSC finds due “to the survival and independence of the state, the unity of the country and the protection of the society’s peace and security” (Birand, 1986: 461). Ergun Özbudun takes the argument further by showing the implications of the latest constitution in regard to the NSC pervaded into the civilian life:

Indeed, an analysis of the 1982 constitution and other laws during the NSC period clearly suggests that one fundamental aim of the NSC regime was to demobilize the working class and depoliticize the society at large, especially by outlawing all cooperation between political parties and other civil society institutions such as trade unions, professional organizations, and voluntary associations (2000: 27).

The setting of state security courts in the aftermath of the latest official intervention was also important for the context of the chapter. These courts were brought in before with the 1973 amendments, but were invalidated in 1975 afterwards. (Cizre, 1997) Cizre shows the characteristics and the role of the courts:

A new system of criminal courts, called the state security courts, was founded after 1980. Trying cases involving the security of the state, they were yet another blow to the principle of an independent judiciary because of the political manner in which the new courts' members were appointed (1997: 157).

Ümit Cizre's words sum up the 1982 Constitution's overall implication on Turkey. "While extensively restricting individual rights and freedoms, the latest constitution of 1982 entrenched the military's veto power in the political system to such an extent that it has made crude military intervention into politics redundant" (1997: 153-154). The 1980 military intervention, the last example of an official *coup d'état* so far, created a stronger military than before with also an emergence of a de-politicized generation afterwards.

2.2.3 Military Expenditure

Military expenditure is among the indicators that sustain the existence of the process of militarization as argued by Enloe. For the case of Turkey, although it is known and felt to be existent, it is very hard to prove with statistical and numerical factors since it is not transparent expenditure. Gülay Günlük Şenesen while in her article suggests that "national income data contains military trade" she also states that is very hard to prove the expenditure or the arms trade that Turkey takes as a side (2000: 1). She also states that Defence Industry Undersecretary Funds are exempted from check system that some other similar ranked institutions are (Şenesen, 2000: 5).

In addition to non-transparency, some events that took place in the country, which showed the intensive concentration of the budget planning on the military expenditure. Beginning from the early-1980s, reaching its climax in 1990s, Turkey witnessed a struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) inside. This is important for the process of militarization in Turkey, because as stated before, this served as a support for the dominant discourse of the protection of national security also. With an argument of identifying the case with the survival of the state, and general attitude of identifying problems regarding the ethnically Kurdish origin citizens with the PKK, the so-called "Kurdish Question" became securitized with the emphasis on the necessity of the usage of the military means for the solution of the case. As Cizre argues, these developments affected the military budget, where any discussions on it were silenced even before it was put into words with the justification of the importance of the developments for the sake of state's survival. "With the additional effect of the struggle against the Kurdish PKK, the air of urgency and secrecy surrounding military expenditure has escalated" (1997: 160).

To have a general look on the case some numerical factors could be relevant to the discussion. Turkey is ranked in the 14th place of the Military Expenditure in MER (Market Exchange Rate) dollar terms where UK, France, Germany and Italy are the only European countries in the list and also in the 11th place in the list where military expenditure in PPP (purchasing power parity) dollar terms in which again France, UK, Germany and Italy are the only European countries in the list as documented by the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).¹⁵ As

¹⁵ The full list can be seen at: http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf
Also a detailed table on Turkey can be seen at: http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php?send

for the ratio of military expenditure as a share of GDP, Turkey's military expenditure ratio changes between 4.4-5.0 within the years of 1998-2003.¹⁶

2.2.4 Militarized Society

As argued before, the analysis of the militarization on the basis of society is different in the way that it cannot be shown or proven with official documentation in whole like the institutional changes, but rather, as Enloe points out it is a process, which the military thinking is pervaded to society through different channels. The key element for the analysis of the militarization of the society is that not only the society agrees with the necessity of the existence and continuance of the military thinking but also interprets the military thinking as the “normal” way of thinking. This results in interpreting a wide range of issues on the basis of military thinking that is in general meaning in conformity with the classical militarist logic. The representation of the interventions also worked for the process of militarization in Turkey. Bilgin states that, many interpretations were made about the military interventions in Turkey by building a relationship to the militaristic characteristics of the society as if it was given. However, she claims that this attitude does not show the whole picture unless the process of militarization is analyzed. She also states that geopolitical explanations rendered the process of militarization to be alive (Bilgin, 2006: 16). The Turkish military on this respect not only gained from this process of militarization it also helped this process to reproduce itself more (Bilgin, 2006: 18). The militarization process, then, is a process in which the military and the military interventions contribute but takes it further and makes it a process to be prolific of

¹⁶ The detailed list can be seen at: http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_share_gdp.html

itself. Altınay argues that “just like in the military interventions where the military or the militarist elite plays a direct active role in the process of militarization, in some other cases militarism pervades through processes where the subject/subjects are indefinite, the active participation of the civilians and consent exist” (2005b: 353). Based on this argumentation some examples will be analyzed to show the militarization of the society.

As it is argued above, it is difficult to measure the militarization of the society in statistical or official terms. However, the results of polls that show the confidence in the military reflect the existence of the militarized society as shown by Heper and Güney.

The Turkish military has a good reputation in the country. In 1990, some 92 per cent of the Turkish population expressed confidence in the armed forces, while only around 50 per cent had any faith in the political system. Thirteen years later, the number of people expressing confidence in the armed forces was hardly less at 88 per cent (Heper and Güney, 2000: 635-646 cited in Soeters et al., 2004: 355).

Metin Heper and Aylin Güney point to the public support to the latest military intervention that took place in 1997 as explained before.

On April 29th, the General Staff gave a briefing to the members of the media about the threat of political Islam. Meanwhile, in March and April, every night, starting at 9.00 p.m. sharp, many people began to protest Refahyol by turning off and on their lights at home for ten minutes. The people had started to display their support for the military (2000: 646).

Tanel Demirel points to the privileged position of and comfort in the military in the society.

It is not wrong to say that the militarist values constitute an important component of the collective identity of the Turkish society. The values that constitute the distinctive color and define the Turkish society are mostly in relation with the military and conscription (2002: 35).

To prove his point he gives examples from the “discourse of military-nation and the prophet”, “the resplendent sending off the conscripts”, “the ideal bridegroom

modeling of an officer with his uniform in the old Turkish movies”, “the habit taking photos of boys in uniforms”¹⁷ (Demirel, 2002: 35). In addition to these, Gülay Günlük Şenesen (2000: 3) states that the donations that were necessary for the construction of an independent national defence industry reflected the public support.

The society’s reactions as the examples of militarization are diversified when looked into the media. The reaction of the crowds in the funeral of the judge Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin (who was among the judges who decided the headscarves not be worn in schools and was killed by a lawyer, who is claimed to have a religious and nationalist background) was very positive towards the military cadre who attended the funeral while the ministers were hooted. When the military cadre entered the funeral place, they were responded with the applauses of the public who attended the funeral. Before the funeral ceremony was held, a crowd of about 120,000 people, among which university teachers, the law cadre, teachers and students were attended, walked to the tomb of Atatürk in Ankara to protest.¹⁸ The Chief of the General Staff, Full General Hilmi Özkök, gave statement after these developments he interpreted the reactions of the public as “sensitive” and “worth appreciating” and states that “it should not be limited to only one event, but these reactions should have a continuity.”¹⁹ In this event, the conformity between the military and the society can be seen. Furthermore, years later than the polls, the immediate positive attitude towards military seems to be continuing.

In another funeral ceremony, the response of the people was on the same axis but the expected behavior was different. A young man, called Ata Türk, who was a contestant in a television show, was found dead in a hotel room and the

¹⁷ To see more examples and the details of these examples see, Demirel (2002)

¹⁸ Hürriyet, 19 May 2006, Radikal 19 May 2006

¹⁹ Hürriyet, 20 May 2006. Also in: Radikal 20 May 2006,

Turkish flag was put on the coffin in his funeral. However, many people through media channels especially reacted to this, because in practice the Turkish flag is put on the coffins of martyrs, and people who serve for the state and the army. Later on, an investigation was opened against the family because of this event.²⁰ The reaction of the people in this incident proves that the flag of the country cannot be on a coffin of an “ordinary” citizen but rather of the ones who prove their service to the state and the nation. In the eyes of the public, this is a natural and a necessary procedure for the martyrs, the statesmen and soldiers with the justification of the identification of the flag with the perception of honor.

The media is important to show the militarization of the society on the basis that it goes parallel with general view of the majority especially in some topics like the military’s status in the country. Here, what I mean is that the media in general cannot and does not dare to publish contrary views to the common sense of the public especially on the issues of in relation to the military and its position in the civil life. The initiatives contrary to this understanding began to emerge in the last years with especially the emergence of different media resources rather than the known big media groups. Some alternative newspapers and journals began to emerge and increase in amount and also some writers with different views rather than the traditional dominant perspective on the military began to be seen in the newspapers. Still, these initiatives are being questioned harshly by the majority of people and as with especially the military interventions the stance of media gives an important clue of the militarization process. At this point, the book *Türkiye’de Askeri Müdahaleler ve Basın* (The Military Interventions and The Media in Turkey) by İrfan Neziroğlu will be used as the reference point, since it constitutes to be an

²⁰ Hürriyet, 21 September 2005, <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid-2@nvid-634101.00.asp>

original source on this topic. Neziroğlu states that “the executions of the military after the interventions found sometimes forcefully, but mostly voluntarily support from the press” (2003: 79). He points out that the press at the period defined the first military intervention as “revolution”, “national feast”, “only the first step to a true democracy and a full period of tolerance” (Neziroğlu, 2003: 77). Neziroğlu’s statements about the press at that period also hint at where the society stood before it went through the militarization process, which was backed by the military interventions.

27 May, the first military intervention in the history of Turkish democracy, served to be a litmus test for the Turkish press. If the situation that the biggest problem of the intervention is the legitimacy and the support of the public which is done by a group of officers, besides the command-control chain is taken into consideration then the crucial role of the press from the future of the democracy is seen. However, the newspapers, in their first serious challenge rather than questioning the legitimacy of the intervention they were as if competitors to prove how right was the act (2003: 79).

Many people who were witness to the first intervention from the public also state that the intervention was a surprise for most of the people and in fact before the act the military cadre was not perceived to be highly prestigious in the eyes of the public especially in civilian life. The media in this event failed to reflect the common interpretation and chose to get in conformity with the military thinking. This resulted later in the process of militarization to occur smoothly on the perception of the society. The continuance of this attitude of the press can be seen on the interpretation made about the second military intervention in Neziroğlu’s observations.

Abdi Ipekçi, in his article called “Memorandum and Realities” stated that it is possible to find the memorandum against the democratic law order, but if the case is taken not solely from the point of law, it is possible to deduce other things and the given memorandum in fact does not aim to cut off the parliamentary regime and democratic order but on the contrary it is possible to think it aims to rescue the regime (2003: 157-158).

When the third military intervention is the case, the extremely chaotic atmosphere and disorder among the society just before intervention as explained before became a justification of the intervention. Everybody was aware of the restless situation and the need for doing something to change it, but some questioned whether this should have been done by the military or if another kind solution could be found as Neziroğlu shows.

Uğur Mumcu in his article dating 14 September interpreted the take over of the Armed Forces as “natural as the raining of the rain”. Mumcu after enumerating the previous interventions till 1950 stated that this meant that we could not make the multi party system liberalistic democracy and constitutional order live (2003: 174).

Here, how the normalization is at work can be seen from Mumcu’s words. Now that the third time the military intervention had occurred and the comparison to rain in its naturality is crucial here. When the headlines right after the intervention is looked at, the general view can be understood better and seen in Neziroğlu’s book.

Newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Hürriyet* “Military Took Over the Administration”, *Milliyet* “Administration is at the Military” and *Tercüman* “Armed Forces Took Over the Administration” gave as headlines the military intervention of 12 September on the same day the event occurred. On 13 September the headlines were though as such: in *Cumhuriyet* “The Main Aim is Atatürkçülük”, in *Milliyet* “Evren: Everybody Should Help the New Administration”, in *Hürriyet* “Continuity on the Route of Atatürk” and in *Tercüman* referring to Evren “New Constitution Will be Prepared” (2003: 175).

Furthermore, a journalist called Rauf Tamer in his article dating 18 September defines the military intervention as “Peace Movement” (Neziroğlu, 2003: 180). It is true that the atmosphere in the civilian life just before the military intervention was extremely and violently chaotic, but still the solution of the disorder, whether it could be healed through a different channel or with a different way than that of the military intervention, has not been questioned aside from a few other journalists. Even if the press’s difficult position under the military order is recognized, to define the act as a

“peace movement” rather for example a “necessity” says something more about the process of militarization: the healing of the society to the military’s acts has now reached to normalization and even further appreciation which in this respect opens a way to result in the expectation from military in political life.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to inform about the process of militarization in Turkey with backing up with historical information. The four military interventions as explained before, with their occurrence take attention above all. But further, the aftermath of the interventions and especially the institutional changes that they have brought served for strengthening the position of the military in institutional sense. Furthermore, these interventions and the changes they brought both rendered the process of militarization made it an alive, prolific process within the eyes of the public. The process of militarization became to be unquestioned by the society and pervade into the civil life, so the society became militarized.

Based on the historical knowledge given in this chapter, how the process of militarization affects the process of securitization and how this relationship became rooted can be understood better. The construction of the process of militarization, as shown in the chapter is based on the militarization of the state and the society, which make the process of securitization significant.

CHAPTER 3

MILITARIZATION AND SECURITIZATION IN TURKEY

Building on the framework that has been produced so far, with the general discussion on the theory of securitization and militarization and the historical factual information of militarization in Turkey, this chapter aims to look at and discuss the relationship between the processes of militarization and securitization in Turkey.

The first section (Section 3.1), which is called “Securitization as Normal Politics”, aims to give the general outlook of the security culture in Turkey with the dynamics it is nourished with. Based on this security culture, which feeds from militarization, the process of securitization takes a conspicuous form where a wide range of issues are frequently welcomed to be interpreted to be in the security agenda.

In the second section (Section 3.2), “Securitization as Militarist Impulse: The Cyprus Issue”, the focus is going to be on the process of securitization when occurred in a militarized environment taking The Cyprus Operation (1974) as the case to discuss it from. This the section will also serve for pointing out the difference

in securitization process in militarized countries with emphasize of the process becoming itself a tool for militarist understanding at the same time.

In the third section (Section 3.3), “(Re) Militarization Through Securitization”, the practice of conscription within the concept of recruitment will be discussed on the basis of Turkey as the case. The section will show how through conscription militarization gets stronger on the basis of a militarized security understanding.

In the final section, the shape of the relationship, which is cyclical, and what is meant by “cyclical” will be clarified. Since the concepts feed into each other frequently, this section will serve for the clarification of this situation.

3.1 Securitization As Normal Politics

To understand better the process of securitization in Turkey, it is for the best to ask some questions about the security understanding, specifically the concept of national security in Turkey. The leading questions for this can be grouped as follows: 1-How is security understood? 2-Whose security is in question? 3-How is it practiced? Through the answers to these questions, the practice of securitization in Turkey will be shown with reference to the process of militarization that the country has gone through as discussed in chapter two. As it will be clearer later, the answers to these questions lead the researcher to one main direction, which is the status of the military in the politics of Turkey.

The main focus here will be on the state-centric feature of the security understanding, which affects the process of securitization in Turkey. Not only this though, furthermore, in militarist societies such as Turkey, security is not only about

the state, but a state where a specific Turkish identification exists in a way that the way that the military as an institution is defined as a protector of an “us”. The challenge that is brought in here shows the difference that occurs in militarized societies in the execution of the securitization process. The question that comes in mind is if this specific kind of definition of security and the status of the military occurs in a society that does not witness this kind and much militarization although this is not within the scope of the thesis. In the following sub-sections, firstly the security understanding in general terms will be discussed, then, the military influence will be given.

The concept of security in Turkey is understood in state-centric terms where the state protects the regime from internal and external threats by justifications based on the geographical location of Turkey. This is argued as a factor that represents and should represent Turkey as a unique case while the security concept is thought about Turkey. The security understanding in Turkey represents a construction that has been characterized by a defensive attitude, the Westernization objective and a strong military positioning as Karaosmanoğlu states.

First Turkey has historically displayed a relatively consistent security culture of *realpolitik* which has evolved across centuries from a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive character. Second, since the 18th century, the process of Westernization has left its imprint on the national security discourse. It has greatly motivated Turkey’s Western-oriented policies and introduces liberal and internationalist elements into foreign policy. At the same time, it has given rise to an identity problem that has, in turn, complicated the understanding of Turkey’s foreign and security policy behavior. Third, although the military continues to play a significant part in foreign and security policymaking, its role has limits and has diminished gradually (2000: 200).

Although he continues his argument with stating that civilians in fact are more effective in policymaking than it is thought, the effectiveness can be questioned when the civilians also support the military’s strong position in the politics since they

are gone through militarization. Bilgin points to the continuous process in the national security understanding beginning from establishment of the republic.

The traditional discourse on security in Turkey has been that of the civilian-military bureaucratic elite since the foundation of the republic. Indeed, there has been little (if any) public questioning of Turkey's definition of 'national security' during this period (2005a : 183).

She states that this discourse stands on two components: 'fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory' (Criss and Karaosmanoğlu: 12 quoted in Bilgin, 2005a: 183) and 'geographical determinism' (Bilgin, 2005a: 183). The security discourse basically is characterized by defensive attitude and as argued in Chapter 2, the argumentation of geography as a distinctive characteristic that shapes the security behavior. Before going into the military influence on the politics of Turkey, Cizre's explanation of national security in Turkey can be given which also connects this section to the next section.

The national security concept in Turkey is formally called the "National Military Defense Concept" and is contained in National Security Policy Documents (henceforth NSPD). These documents are prepared by the Secretariat of the MGK [i.e.NSC] and turn into government policy after being accepted by the MGK without any input from Parliament either at the debating or ratification stages. The formulation of the concept, publication of the document, and the security policies that follow are then confined to the MGK secretariat which coordinates with the General Staff and foreign ministry during the preparation stage (2003: 221).

As argued above, there is an inclination to military's guardian role in the political life of Turkey. This attitude can be seen from the "threat concerns" that are stated, and how the developments in the world are interpreted on this basis by the Turkish General Staff (2006):

After the collapse of the bipolar world order, power vacuum, which occurred in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, has increased the global ambiguity and led to the geographical vulnerability in these regions. After numerous conflicts and crises in these power vacuum areas and terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; asymmetric threats came on the agenda. The school raid in North Ossetia showed the public how far terrorism as the most distinct asymmetric threat may reach.

In this context, Turkey's basic security concerns are focused on;

- Terrorism,
- The threat of Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
- Religious Extremism,
- Regional Conflicts.

As it can be seen, the stated "threat concerns" are categorized as concepts but vaguely because the limitation or the borderlines of what is seen as a threat or not cannot be determined. Especially "Terrorism" and the "Religious Extremism" are open to whether internal or external threats are in question. The state and the regime are the ones to be protected from because the targeted center of protection from the threat perception is as such. In addition to this, the context of the threats show that it is the state that is to be protected both from within and outside. This results in the wide range area that security is formulated which helps to strengthen the status of the military as the protector of the state.

Furthermore, the geo-political explanations on Turkey's defense policy show the weighted place that the nationalist attitude has in shaping the defense policy. As it seen below, the linguistic change from "defense policy" to "national defense policy" is worth attention taking in my point of view.

Defense policy of Turkey, which is located in the Center of the Caucasus, Middle East and the Balkans which are most unstable regions in the World, is designed to preserve and protect the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country. Accordingly in its National Defense Policy, Turkey considers the following targets; ... (Turkish General Staff, 2006)

Among the targets listed Turkey also aims to undertake a security provider role within its geographical location. "To be a nation that produces strategies and security that can affect all strategies regarding her region and beyond, ..." (Turkish General Staff, 2006)

This specific security understanding makes the strong position of the military as an elite group in the securitization process in Turkey possible, which reflects the

close relationship between securitization and militarization. Firstly the above quotations are from the official web page of Turkish General Staff, which constitutes a proof itself. As seen from the quotations the declarations for security is done by the military with an assertive and strict discourse. Furthermore, the mission that the general staff sets for itself with the strength that it takes also from the constitution show the securitization difference that occurs in militarized societies.

The Turkish Armed Forces missions and responsibilities are clearly stated in the Turkish constitution and determined by laws as to react against new security challenges and crises in 2000's, to be ready to face uncertainties, and to ensure the security of Turkey against internal and external risks (Turkish General Staff, 2006).

At this point the external and internal threats are spelled out more straightforward. The specificity of the securitization process in Turkey in which the weighted role that the militarist understanding, in institutional terms, plays can be seen by the one task that has been listed among others, "analyses of the security and operation area". (Turkish General Staff, 2006) In the original Turkish version of the web page this task is stated in more definite terms as "giving shape/formation of the security/operation environment". (Turkish General Staff, 2006) From these examples it can be seen that the security understanding in Turkey is based on statism. Here by statism it is meant that "the concentration of all loyalty and decision-making power at the level of sovereign state" (Booth, 1998: 52; quoted in Bilgin, 2002: 102).

The security understanding in Turkey first of all is state-centric because the referent object of the security, the object to be securitized is the state. Furthermore, it is a statist understanding in representation because the justification of the military's strong position is based on the sake of the sovereign state's well being in fact for the sovereignty of the state even. The sovereignty issue in the decision-making process is the direct responsibility of the military in the case of Turkey. As Bilgin argues in

conformity with Altınay with reference to the National Security textbooks that are taught in the high school education in Turkey, the responsibility of decision making (her focus is on foreign policy making here) is given as it should be in the safe hands of science which the military has in the country (Bilgin, 2006: 17) because any kind of political institutions or representatives are to be corrupted.

The inferior status of the Ministry of Defense in comparison to the Turkish General Staff is rendered by the dominant argumentation of the military. Since the military, with the status that it has with the constitutional changes that has been made as it is been told in the Chapter 2 of the thesis, justifies its strong status in the security discussions and the securitization processes in Turkey based on “strategic concerns” stemming from country’s geographical position, the mission that the Ministry of Defense has been given and has given itself stays as having the responsibility of directing the “important” issues to the Turkish General Staff. The missions of the Minister of Defense is stated on the pre-situated and accepted basis that he/she shapes the missions that he/she has “according to the defense policy of the Armed Forces that has been determined by the Council of Ministers and according to the principles, priority, and main programs that is to be determined by the Turkish General Staff.” (Turkish Ministry of National Defense, 2006) As it can be seen the frames of the mission of the Minister is been shaped by the decisions of the Turkish General Staff. This in the institutional sense proves to be an example of the militarization especially on the basis of national security concept where the Ministry of Defense in Turkey is stated in a national linguistic form, Ministry of National Defense (MND). Further proof can be seen from the missions that are stated to MND.

Under the light of National interest and military concept, in the peacetime and the wartime, to supply the arms systems and logistic equipment both, from

within and outside the country at the right time, that are the most qualified and the most appropriate to the need of every unit of the Turkish Armed Forces.

To take the necessary measures to obtain the necessity of the Turkish Armed Forces' strength and to increase the activity in the regional power vacuum and NATO.

To change the body of the current law to which the Turkish Armed Forces is dependent on in conformity with the necessities and to make the necessary regulations to prevent the loss of time by reaching conclusions rapidly in the cases that the MND is side.

In the other activities that falls to the MND (budget assurance) to provide counseling in the level of expertise.

To carry on and to hold the MND's domestic and international relations in coordination with the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other related institutions (Turkish Ministry of National Defense, 2006).

As it can be seen from the quotes from the official web page of the Ministry of Defense, the frames of the MND's status and the missions are drawn under the accepted the ground that the Turkish General Staff has a superior status, rather than following its missions independently from the military. Furthermore, the importance of NATO membership that has been introduced in Chapter 2 can be seen here also. The membership to NATO, as seen above, constructs an argument of the "necessity" of the strength of the military.

Finally for the MND, the values of the MND are stated in a manner that shows the strong attachment to the Kemalist ideology and national sovereignty on a militarist understanding where the individuality is being sacrificed under a common and collective spirit of "us". The related values that are stated in the web page of the MND are:

The attachment to the principles of Atatürk,
To protect the national values and interests,
To be able to say "We did it" instead of saying "I did it",
To be proud of to be a member of the MND (Turkish Ministry of National Defense, 2006).

The importance of the Kemalist ideology in understanding especially the process of militarization that Turkey went through was discussed in the Chapter 2. The way that these values are represented provides the ground for a collective manner in which the

membership is being expected and accepted on the basis of fulfillment of these features, which in return provides an understanding of “us” which can result an “us” vs. “them” where nationalism plays a significant role.

When it is looked for the security understanding the official declarations of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the stated features such as geographical position of the country can also been as a peculiar place.

The primary objective of Turkish foreign policy is to help secure and nurture a peaceful, stable, prosperous and cooperative regional and international environment that is conducive to human development at home as well as in the neighboring countries and beyond.

In the post-Cold War period, Turkey found herself at the center of a large landscape, Eurasia, stretching from Europe to Central Asia. This area is destined to gain increasing geopolitical significance in the new millennium (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

This stance takes its place in Turkey-EU dialogue too. Turkey claims to have a crucial role for European integration and a great input to Europe in strategic terms.

The pioneering project of European integration would be incomplete without Turkey’s membership to the EU. Also, in strategic terms, Europe would have a more compelling voice in world and regional affairs with the inclusion of Turkey which has woven an intricate web of peaceful relations in a multitude of geographies and can, as a secular pluralistic democracy, be a source of inspiration for other nations desiring reform in her extended region (Turkish Ministry of National Defense, 2006).

These official arguments made by Turkish General Staff, Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are important in the sense that they give a general understanding of the agents that play a role in the process of securitization. As it can be seen from the above quotations too, the security understanding of the elite, which has a crucial role for the argumentation of securitization, is constituted of arguments based on geo-political argumentations in which militarist understanding plays a significant role. The explicit argumentation of securitization by the Turkish General Staff and the mission it places for itself and furthermore the acceptance of its superior role in the securitization by the Ministry of National Defense are proves of

this in institutional terms. These help the normalization of the militarization on the basis of elites.

Building on this stance securitization takes a different from where it occurs as normal politics. By “securitization as normal politics” it is meant that on this peculiar understanding of security every issue begins to be included in the security agenda of the country, but under the representation of being a “threat to national security” of the country. However, while a significant number of issues are being securitized, the security of the state in sole is at stake. This means state’s security is in question rather than the individuals. Because of this understanding while issues, related or not, being securitized for the sake of state, some other issues such as gender issues are seen as unrelated to the security of the state so unnecessary to deal with a necessarily serious manner. On this basis the reforms to be done with reference to the understanding of individual security to fulfill the required fields to be within EU becomes to a loudly discussed topics. Bilgin explains this point:

Although Turkey has had to deal with ‘strategic globality’ for a long time, the process of joining the EU posed challenges that involved the adoption of international societal norms, which are perceived by some to threaten Turkey’s ‘national security’. Such norms weaken the grip of the state over political processes and introduce ‘new’ actors who challenge established approaches to issues (such as cultural pluralism, linguistic rights or gender relations) that are considered ‘sensitive’ by some (2005a: 176).

As it is stated before, the vagueness of the Turkish General Staff’s argued threat perceptions as internal and external open a way to include a wide range of issues to be securitized. It should be noted that, until recent times, especially when the dialogue between EU and Turkey became activated, other local languages such as Kurdish language were accepted as illegal to communicate officially and unofficially. This was done in the understanding of securing the unity of the nation and the state. So, the nation state is in question at the expense of individual

communication in this example. Furthermore, even with the constitutional amendments that took place at the beginning of 2000s, the spirit of reservation seems to be existent. It was claimed that the opening of language courses of Kurdish were prevented from opening with the justifications of small details where the size of the equipments of the course made to be obstacles.

There seems to be an attitude of making an unquestionable relation between the usages of Kurdish language the rights of the minority and the PKK. This understanding provides a justification ground for securitization of nearly every issue related with the Kurdish culture. Although, as said before too the current scene seems to be improving the securitization behavior on this issue for years happened to be on this axis. So, even before occurrence of a crisis the militarist understanding of securitization and the existence of militarization provide a ground for all-inclusive securitization. In the occurrence of a crisis, the securitization is argued to proceed with reference to the “vulnerability” of Turkey, which stems from its geographical position with strategic features and from its cosmopolite structure as was argued. This justification then serves to strengthen the national identity of the country.²¹ This is done through the representation of the characteristics of the country as a unique and nation based.

3.2 Securitization As Militarist Impulse: The Cyprus Issue

Securitization on this ground becomes to have a significant character where it becomes to serve as a militarist impulse to crises that it faces. The interpretation on the decision making process becomes to have defensive character where the

²¹ The relation between crisis production and identity can be seen with the U.S. example in Jutta Weldes (1999)

opponent parts of the crises are categorized as “them” vs. “us” immediately. Based on this formulation the one and only solution that is thought stems from the military thinking. On this basis the Cyprus Operation, which happened in 1974, can be analyzed as an example of how an event is being handled in the process of securitization. The focus here will be the agents of securitization rather than the questioning of the why’s and how’s of conflict since that would need a combination of historical and sociological outlook which would extend the main theme of the thesis.

Without entering the detailed discussions of the island on its historical roots²², what can be significantly told about Cyprus Issue for Turkey is that, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC, which was established in 1983 but the reference here is the Turkish community in the island of Cyprus at the period) has always been interpreted as an extension of the Turkish culture in heart, and is called as “baby motherland” within the talks and media. The linguistic feature that is attached in the definition of the country results in shaping an understanding of issuing a mission to Turkey such that it has the responsibility of its baby motherland. If something is defined as a baby than surely it has a parent that is necessary for the definition and execution of this description.

So, the attitude that Turkey takes towards TRNC and events related to the country is in fact built on an interpretation as such. This combined with the “strategic” geographical position that the land has, makes the land very important and any attempt against its arguments of TRNC is seen as threats to both TRNC and Turkey in both “emotional” and “strategic” sense. Alper Kaliber (2005) in his article “Securing the Ground Through Securitized Foreign Policy; The Cyprus Case”

²² For the detailed discussions on history of the Cyprus Dispute: see Clement H.Dodd (1995) and (1999)

analyzes “Turkey’s security discourse on Cyprus.” Kaliber explains how Turkey interprets the island. “The ‘foreign’ policy and security establishment in Turkey has always placed special emphasis on the geostrategically vital status of Cyprus for the country’s defense and security” (2005: 324-325). Furthermore he states that “the geographical proximity of the island to the Anatolian heartland is made use of to represent the issue in domestic politics either as a source of imminent, fatal and persistent threat to the Turkish nation and state or an indispensable element and integral part of Turkey’s national defence and security” (Kaliber, 2005: 325). He analyzes Cyprus on this basis in two main headlines: “Cyprus as a Source of Existential Threat and the Fear of Encirclement” and “Cyprus as an Indispensable Element of Turkey’s National Security”.

As it can be seen, these perspectives reflect the beginning point of interpretation of the island in militarist terms. Based on this understanding the habitual behavior towards the events related to and about the island takes such a form that the process of securitization becomes shaped by the dominant status of the military in the decision making process. Kaliber gives a general outlook of how the island is represented as a significant issue for argumentation of the threat of encirclement with giving references to the usage of this argument by some.²³ The main argument here is that if the island is captured by Greek part then Turkey would be left without both breathing and mobility space against the aggressors. The second perspective, which renders “Cyprus as an indispensable element of Turkey’s National Security” also draws from militarized understanding with again bringing out the argumentations of the importance of the geographical condition of Turkey in it’s security understanding by the security “makers’. Kaliber points to the common

²³ Kaliber draws a general picture of the discussion on p.326 in the same article.

usage and pervasiveness of this argument. “The notion that Cyprus is geographically a part and a natural extension of Anatolian heartland, and thus an integral part of its defence and security, has been articulated by many prominent Turkish bureaucratic and political figures throughout the long history of the dispute” (Kaliber, 2005: 327). The “bureaucratic” figures here refers to the military elite in the process of securitization in my argument, as it can be seen from the dominant status as a security agent as it defines itself.

The role that the military has played in the process of securitization of the Cyprus operation can be understood from the words of a person, Suat İlhan, who was responsible from the Intelligence Planning and Coordination in the General Staff at that time. He explains the events at the time being as such: he states that as soon as the Nikos Sampson made an intervention into the politics with the intention of enosis, the General Staff broadcasted operation commands related to the event. Then after the prime minister of the time, Bülent Ecevit, who was in the city of Afyon, was invited to the General Staff (İlhan, 1999: 221). The meeting is explained as such.

The meeting, which to the Chief of General Staff Full General Semih Sancar and the authorities attended, took place in the small meeting room, which was just beside the entrance in the bottom where the briefings were generally held at that time and a short briefing was given by the Chief of the Intelligence of General Staff Lieutenant General Recai Engin and the decisions taken regard to operation precautions, broadcasted commands, in short what was going to be done was explained. The General Staff did not have any other kind of operation in mind (İlhan, 1999: 221).

The important point here is that the way the event was perceived by the security agents, which implies the dominant status of the military in the decision making process. The institutional changes that the military interventions might have supplied the crucial phase for the constitution of the securitization process to be complete in the accessibility to militarist terms. The institutional changes after the military

interventions especially in relation to the establishment of NSCs as discussed in the Chapter 2, serves for the ideology of national security to be directed by the militarist understanding and leads to the prioritization of the military means in the process of securitization since the military officers exist strongly in the decision making process. This, as Enloe argues, which is stated before, is among the dynamics that proves the existence of militarization. The establishment and the changes in the National Security Council, in my argument, played a constitutive role in the militarization process, where the militarist ideas do not exist in the protection of the borders solely but also builds into the culture of the civilians. Moreover, within this understanding the process of securitization occurs where it leads to further militarization. The “ideology of national security” as stated as a prerequisite for the existence of militarization in Enloe’s argument is important in the sense that as it will be shown in the case of Turkey also, the constitution of the “ideology of national security” works for the process of militarization and makes the acceptance of the audience easier for the usage of militarist means in dealing with a securitized issue. It appears that the meeting was not held in a nature of meeting but rather as a declaration of the decision made to the state elite as it is commonly used in which the dominant agent bothers to tell what is going to happen next on the basis of the sole interpretation of the event as in its terms solely. Furthermore, the last sentence shows that the securitization process took in de pre-determined manner where the event was not open to discussion and the political party, which was in power, was there to be informed rather than to have a discussion and decision with together. This can be understood from again from the way İlhan does his observations.

In 15 July 1974 Nikos Sampson, with the support of Greeks, made a revolution with the intention of enosis (the annexation of Cyprus with Greece) and overturned the President Archbishop Makarios. Turkey had to choose one of the two ways: to give up from Cyprus for ever; to condone to the murder of 150

thousand Cypriot Turks; to condone to their deportation of them, to pretend not to see the threats and danger that the strategic disadvantage that Cyprus has by surrounding Turkey's south or to put in order the balance that has been destroyed in Cyprus by a military operation and bring peace to the island (1999: 220-221).

As it can be seen from above too, the security understanding is shaped by a militarized manner such that the focus is on the "strategic" concerns. Based on this understanding the event is interpreted and represented as a threat to the survival of Turkey and no other solution to the problem was announced. The consequence of this is that, with this way of representation, the event can be handled through only military means and military is the agent that is responsible with the security issue. This shows how securitization results in militarization. The mission it has is to interpret and decide in the process of securitization by having a dominant role.

3.3 (Re-)Militarization Through Securitization

The specific process of securitization causes and affects the process of militarization. In militarized societies the state is perceived as a subject to be pre-securitized and the securitization process, which takes the state as the sole referent object, directly leads to the continuance of militarization. The significant process of securitization as argued before, in the chapter, reinforces the continuous existence of militarization, many times with a strengthened position. This can be by the reinforcement of the dynamics that constitute militarization as were pointed in Enloe's framework of militarization. Recruitment, as stated before in the thesis also, is one of the dynamics that makes militarization. This section will use the execution of conscription in Turkey as one form of the recruitment to explain the (re)militarization through securitization with references to Cyprus operation and Turkey in general.

The securitization process as explained before, in militarized countries takes a different form, which results in the reinforcement of militarization again. Pinar Bilgin, points to the different forms that securitization has in developing countries. She states “national security politics in developing countries could be used for establishing the domination of the military and riveting this domination on society” (Bilgin, 2005b: 13). The specific understanding of national security concept in Turkey was explained before. Since the militarization that shapes the securitization process of Turkey has been constructed in time, as explained in Chapter 2, the securitization process takes a militarized form where the military plays the dominant agent in the process and it is accepted as such by the other elites and the society as argued in the second section of the current chapter. Following from this, the decisions that come up in the securitization process are not questioned by the audience, because the audience does not accept in fact after a process of thought and questioning but rather accepts because no other way is thought as if it’s the only and natural way. As Altınay suggests “[m]ilitarization is successful when it achieves a discourse of ‘normalcy’ in public discussions surrounding the power of the military in civilian life, politics, economics and people’s self-understandings.” (2004: 2) So, by the specific character of securitization militarization reaches its success. Bilgin explains this in relation to the traditional character of the securitization process in developing countries.

Security, especially the procurement of the national security, is a concept and execution that is not permitted to talk much about it, when it is spelled out everybody is all ears and fulfill what is expected of them without going into discussion because of the secrecy armor it is being kept, states do not hesitate to make use of this magic of it. When problems are defined as security problems, which, means they are added into the national security agenda, the magic word ‘security’ becomes effective, discussion stops, citizens fulfill what the state demands from themselves without questioning it. With this justification they do not question the auction of the taxes, the cutting back on education and health spending, the limitation of some democratic rights and freedoms, to reduce to

the daily life, not to question the search on the outfits of one when entering the buildings (2005b: 13).

Her examples reflect the practices in Turkey. As it was given at the end of the Chapter 2, even the attempts that were taken for opening the discussion of security agenda were faced with harsh criticisms and difficulties. Even the changes that were to be adopted with relation to the status of the military in Turkey, after Turkey's candidate status to EU was accepted, were open to discussion but not the security agenda and the status of the military in the process of securitization.

Bilgin outlines 3 inconveniences of the search for and perception of security by spending a great amount of money for the prevention of war by armament, which can be applied to Turkey's position since its military spending is a significant one when compared with the EU countries. These are:

- 1- When the money spending for the prevention of war goes in a way that increases the credibility of mutual threats (which means gets into the arms race) it is possible that rather the procurement of the security a spiral of insecurity can come up. While looking for security, states can find themselves at the point they started and even in the backwards of that point.
- 2- Another inconvenience of this kind of armament and the efforts of seeking security through mutual threat is that during this process of search the money that is spent is not used in removing the deficiencies inside the country, the discontentment that these deficiencies cause other disputes and even civil wars, that is to say, the efforts to increase the security results in the internal and external insecurities in the middle and the long term.
- 3- The multitude of the military spending is problematic even it does not cause internal or external disputes or wars. Because since the actual dominant (traditional) security understanding puts the military threats on the top of the agenda, the practices that this understanding shapes rather than providing the human security becomes a threat to the human security. In other words, the main aim of the security politics, which is the procurement of the security of humans and the fact that state's security institutions and practices are agents for this aim can be forgotten. (2005b: 5)

These inconveniences as the quote speaks for itself too, cause the reinforcement of militarization. The existence of the cyclical relationship becomes possible through the practices. For the first point Bilgin makes the “pre-securitized” (Tore Fougner)²⁴ attitude towards Greece by Turkey that has been existent for long years can constitute an example. Greece maintained a significant place in the security agenda for years. Furthermore, the general attitude towards Cyprus Question is one of a spirit of struggle between Turks and Greeks. The cyclical relationship that is formed between militarization and securitization in this way leads to a strong and sharp occurrence of an “us” vs “them” separation, which reinforces nationalism that comes as reinforces out of militarization. In fact the problematical relationship between Turkey and Greece for years has been made a subject of distracting attention from other problems of the countries. Pinar Bilgin also gives the Kardak Crisis that occurred in 1996 between two countries as an example of this.

The second point is also a proof of militarization because since no questioning of the security agenda and the process of securitization happens, the discomforts that raise because the military spending result in Turkey in huge economical differences between the people in the society. Since the spending is cut from in fact the education and health services as Bilgin indicates too, the quality of these services decrease and these become the arenas where the huge economical differences come up significant.

The third point is applicable to Turkey also, since the question of whose security becomes one of the state as explained the first section of the chapter. The traditional attitude of having a dominant say on the creation of the security agenda, the hierarchical positioning of the problems by the military and the politicians with a

²⁴ Taken from a conversation with Fougner about the issue.

militarist understanding becomes a state-centric attitude where a big amount of issues, even the individual's daily life experiences, such as Bilgin gives an example of the search of the body when entering the buildings, are securitized, however, the problems that are seen as individual security problems such as issues specifically in relation with women are not being securitized and even more are not paid attention with the justification of not consuming time, space and money because all these should be directed to the "hard" and "solid" threats to security. So the attitude of forgetting why the state is for in the first place is a common feature of the security understanding in Turkey.

The reinforcement of the militarization is seen in different ways, in many aspects of daily life as it is touched upon just above. One of the important ways, and one of the dynamics that constitute the militarization outline of Cynthia Enloe, is recruitment. In Turkey, throughout its history, only once the exemption from the whole military service by payment occurred. The compulsory character of the service continues its existence. This service, with the education it gives, constitutes the reinforcement of militarization. The gendered construction of this process proves that the aim of the education that is given during this service is not a natural or unconscious one. The following section aims to continue the discussion of the processes of militarization and securitization by looking into the gendered dimensions of the processes, especially with the focus of recruitment.

3.3.1 Recruitment

Compulsory military service, conscription within the meaning of recruitment here, is an example of how the relationship between militarization and securitization results

in a practice that also makes possible the relationship to be one of a cyclical character. It is important to analyze because in the context of Turkey especially, it reinforces the statist understanding of security and plays an important role in the relationship of the processes of securitization and militarization. In militarized states and societies such as Turkey, the very visible outcome of the relationship is the issue of conscription. To be more specific, the way that the securitization process takes place in a militarized understanding, as explained above, renders the military service to be compulsory (with the way it is represented, not that is natural in fact) which strengthens the status of the military, as it is the coordinator of the execution of the service, and it also has an increasing effect of the militarization of the society, however, where any kind of discussion of this relationship is not very easy to pronounce in Turkey. Kadir Varoğlu and Adnan Bıçaksız in their article state that the compulsory military service, with the way it has been and is an indicator of Turkey's militarized culture, as "given" rather than constructed. "In our view, the status of the draft and of (conscripted) soldiers should be looked upon as the prime token of the kind of martial society Turkey always has been and still is" (Varoğlu and Bıçaksız, 2005:584). However, in my point of view this can be an argument part of and stemming the construction of the militarization in Turkey. As it will be showed in the coming parts of the thesis also, militarized discourse that feeds the recruitment is constituted rather than being natural and part of the culture and as it is been claimed usually.

On this ground the case of Cyprus Operation is a good example for demand for conscription, however a controversial breaking point for the issue of conscription can be observed in the example of PKK Issue (because in the late 1980s when the struggle with PKK was continuing whether the quest for military service was not as

clear as it is in the Cyprus case). Controversial ideas and experiences will be analyzed in this section. The way that the Cyprus Issue was securitized was explained and discussed in the previous chapter. Here the focus is on the resulting effect of the securitization of the issue with its relation to militarization. Recruitment, in the form of conscription in the case of Turkey, becomes an indicator in this case of the militarized society's reaction that shows the continuance of the militarization. The attached attitude towards recruitment, conscription in the Cyprus Operation is stated in the article of Varoğlu and Bıçaksız and it reflects the traditional point of view towards the issue.

Though geographically Cyprus is not a part of Turkey, Turkish people nevertheless refer to Cyprus as *yavru vatan*, which literally means "baby land," denoting an area that needs the motherland's (Turkey's) protection. The operation in 1974 was launched to secure the lives of Turkish brethren on the island, which they inhabited alongside the Greek Cypriots. The casualties in this protection amounted to four hundred ninety-eight, and more than four hundred of these were conscripts. Since the end of hostilities in August 1974, Turkish troops on the island are on operational status, which means that had there been any incident leading to resumption of the hostilities, the risk of becoming a casualty would be significant. Thus professionals and conscripts deployed there are all aware of this risk. There is no indication of any serious efforts avoiding being deployed to Cyprus (2005:588).

Even more striking is that the people that were young at that time tell that people lined up to be conscripts to serve in Cyprus. Since the issue was made be one of the national issues, the reaction by many people was that it was worth dying in the fight for the nation.

When it comes to the PKK struggle a confusing picture comes up. PKK was formed in the middle 1970s and became to be announced with its current name in 1978 with the aim of constituting a socialist Kurdistan and fighting against the feudal structure in the southeast part of Turkey and the Turkish Army. The fight increased especially between the middle 1980s and middle 1990s. Certain regions in the southeast part of the country were taken into the emergency status. As it is argued in

the several places of the thesis the “Kurdish Issue” which in fact in essence shelters the cultural and linguistic rights of Kurdish people in the country became to be matched with the PKK by securitization elite which led to the further othering of the people with Kurdish origin and presented to be a national struggle which in return was used a front to prioritize the army and its struggle. This of course became an obstacle in Turkey’s EU accession process. With especially the change in the international surrounding of the country with the EU accession determination, the attitude towards the Kurdish rights was not a unified one as Ersel Aydınli points to.

Those parties in favor of a political response, holding tight to the justification of entering the European Union, have declared that recognizing some Kurdish rights is a ‘must’ or at least something to be considered. The army-led anti-political-response front, on the other hand, has not backed down from its negative position, though it tries not to appear completely opposed to EU accession, which has overall support of most Turkish people. The army has nevertheless declared on several occasions that it is against the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights (2002:214).

Furthermore Aydınli shows in the continuing parts of his essay that certain state representatives were in fact in favor of the recognition of the Kurdish rights. However, as it is not surprising like in the discussion of the army’s status in Turkey during the EU application process. From Aydınli’s discussion National Intelligence Organization, The Supreme Court of Chief Justice, the Foreign Ministry’s positions were not totally against the recognition of Kurdish rights. However, the army’s position and it’s reasoning was in parallel with the militarized understanding that it achieved to constitute. Aydınli shows the military’s attitude on the issue of the usage of the Kurdish language.

A surprise ally for those in favor of a political response appeared as the director of the National Intelligence Organization announced that Kurdish television and education might in fact help the state to better manage problems in Turkey’s southeast, since more than half of all Kurdish mothers in the region do not speak Turkish. [...] In the next National Security Council meeting, however, the army generals stipulated clearly that the army did ‘not share the thoughts of the intelligence director’ and added that such rights would be against the unitary character of the Turkish state (2002:214).

Aydınlı argues that this is a reflection of the security understanding that has been continuing for years and this understanding seems to be insufficient for the time and status that the country wished to be in.

Turkish security forces have succeeded in eliminating most of the PKK's armed combatants and capturing the group's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, leading to the retreat of virtually all remaining PKK units from Turkish soil. Nevertheless, there are strong indicators that a new, political struggle between Turkey and the PKK, in its own way as intensive as the first, has only just begun. Even though this new phase is more political in nature, the primacy of security and threat perceptions seems to be continuing unabated, and the Turkish security establishment seems reluctant to relinquish management of the issue to the political circles (2002:209).

Stephen Kinzer looks to the situation as a foreigner who has had the chance to observe closely to the state and security establishments. He claims that the security understanding and the establishment that the country endures becomes an obstacle itself.

Something about the concept of diversity frightens Turkey's ruling elite. It triggers the deep insecurity that has gripped Turkish rulers ever since the Republic was founded in 1923, an insecurity that today prevents Turkey from taking its proper place in the modern world (Kinzer, 2001: 69).

He draws attention to and strongly criticizes the threat perception logic that has been established through militarization, which shapes the process of securitization.

Military commanders, prosecutors, security officers, narrow-minded bureaucrats, lapdog newspaper editors, rigidly conservative politicians and other members of this sclerotic cadre remain psychologically trapped in the 1920s. They see threats from across every one of Turkey's eight borders and, most dangerously, from within the country itself. In their minds Turkey is still a nation under siege. To protect it from mortal danger, they feel obliged to run it themselves (2001: 70).

The conscription case for the PKK struggle is generally represented on the basis of as martyr funerals in the media. The struggle is represented as a national war where when the soldiers die, their families are told be proud because they are families of martyrs. Although especially in the late 1990s there seems to be a refraction where the people began to question the "necessity" of the struggle and the

compulsory service, Varoğlu and Bıçaksız seem to take a different point of view on this case based on the annual conscription rates from a release from the Ministry of Defense with a special permission. Taken from the interpretation of the rates:

In the period under review, 1990 to 2003, the conscription rates were always above 90 percent, suggesting that the Turkish Armed Forces had more than required number of conscripts. The conscripts rate in 1994 (the culminating year of antiterror operations) was 102 percent! (Varoğlu and Bıçaksız, 2005: 590)

Furthermore, they suggest that the period, which marked the climax of the struggle, also marked a high request for the conscription.

Prior to 1984, petitions by conscriptions to serve in a certain region or garrison were rare, almost unknown. After 1984, the written petitions by the conscripts to serve in the operationally risky region started to appear on the scene. During the peak period, such petitions were flooding within or outside the command line (2005: 593).

However, the consequence of the experiences looks different in the interviews that Nadire Mater made with the ex-soldiers who did their military service in the southeast Turkey during the most restless period of the struggle. Her book consists of the interviews she made with 42 ex-soldiers who made their compulsory military service in the Southeast Turkey during the climax of the PKK struggle. Below are the several attention taking quotes of the different ex-soldiers from Nadire Mater's book which is formed by these interviews.

How can they see me as a hero? I fought against my own people (Mater, 1998:33).

If the height is 1.72 and the weight is 45 kg then they give you a putrid report. Mine in 47-48 kilos which is at the border, so I have to give weight. I forced myself some more and I did not eat, I did not drink. I did not get exhausted like that. Of course it was not easy. I did not touch any bread, rice, spaghetti and no dough. I ate just fruits, I dranked the souce of the dish only. Without any bread and rice my weight decreased to 46 kilos. After I expressed myself explicitly, I say do not give a report like "change of air". At last the doctor wrote my weight as 45 kilos even though it was 46 kilos. They gave me a putrid report from Gulhane (Mater, 1998:35).

Why should be eager to go to the Southeast, what do we do there? We are children of peasants. Does the child of peasant have any backer? They send desolate ones, there is a lot of favour. To protect the motherlan becomes the duty of poor-fellows, wealthy ones know which side their bread is buttered. Society does not care untill it touches them. Martyrs if we die, ghazi if we stay alive, what if I become a disabled... (Mater, 1998:47)

I think the military service should be done, but I do not know why (1998:30).

Conscription is not an example solely showing the outcome of the relationship in question as said just before too, it serves for the continuation of the relationship and is a gendered service on its own. In Altınay's book *The Myth of The Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey*, she allocates a chapter for the practice recruitment as conscription in Turkey in specific. While analysing the issue she summarizes her aims which shows the constructive feature of the issue. She states the aims of her analysis as:

(1) examine military service as a disciplining, nationalizing, and masculinizing citizenship practice, (2) highlight the contradictions and silences it embodies, and (3) inquire into the recent changes in its conceptualization and experience (Altınay, 2004: 62).

It can be argued from the route she draws that conscription is such a practice that it has a dynamic role in the continuance of the construction of the militarist, nationalist and gendered perspective of security understanding and securitization. Altınay works on her route by bringing in the discussion of obligatory military service from the relevant literature and from the interviews she made with the people who experienced the service.

Altınay first explores the “disciplinary” aspect of military service, that is, its connections to the development of the “art of the human body” (Foucault, 1979: 137, cited in Altınay, 2004: 63) modern history (2004:63). By making references to Foucault's arguments on discipline²⁵ she argues the outcome of disciplining mechanism of military “is a productive body that is obedient” (2004:63). The experience of the military service on this ground by “training” the body, and not only the body but the thought of mind also, shapes the male according to the benefit of the

²⁵ Altınay states that Foucault analyses the concept of discipline on the two bases: education and military. For more information see Foucault (1979: 138).

state that makes the security understanding for the sake of state primarily rather than the individual. Furthermore, this obedience can be considered as a pre-practice for the acceptance of the security politics by the citizens without a manner of interrogation. The military service has been represented as a “natural” obligatory service for long years and this is still going on, but the difference at these times is that it has now been began to be questioned at some level. The discourse of “necessity” of the service as a compulsory service stands on two points: for the well being of the state and “necessity” for the completion of the citizenship. The connection between the “proper” citizenship and the military service and the establishment of this understanding can be seen from the person who Altınay interviews who she calls “Ali” as a nickname. She states, “for Ali, compulsory military service was a rite of passage to citizenship and manhood, an aspect of his “culture” that he took for granted” (Altınay, 2004:62-63). The obedience in question, the existence of the militarization even beforehand the military can be proved from “Ali” ’s answer to Altınay where she asks if he was glad to do the military service. His answer can be given as a quote without any change: “ “First of all it is an obligation that has been given to you. You have no other choice but to do it.” ” (quoted in Altınay, 2004: 63). Another example takes this militarized understanding back to the early school practices. Another interviewer, whom Altınay calls “Memhet” ’s words exemplifies the case.

“ So I went for military service and started participating in the daily routines. Something was strange. It was almost like déjà vu. As we exercised, or did roll, call, I felt a strange sense of familiarity”[...] “Then I realized that I knew about all soldiers, you know, get in line, turn right, turn left. And the roll call was just like the Monday morning and Friday afternoon ceremonies.” (quoted in Altınay, 2004:66)

The ceremonies that “Mehmet” mentions take place in elementary and high schools every Monday morning before the school begins and every Friday afternoon

before leaving the school. In these ceremonies the general theme is that students get in the lines and in order and sing the national anthem. With this ceremony they start and end the study week. Furthermore, as Altınay also writes in her book, the National Security Knowledge Course is one of the obligatory courses that once in the high school education students have to take. So, militarization begins with the education for high school graduates and then consolidates with the compulsory military service.

Furthermore and more striking when looked from outside is that normalization, as argued before in the thesis too with reference to Altınay's argument, is an issue that renders the process of militarization possible, of the violence becomes one aspect of the disciplinary feature of the military service. Altınay reflects this with references to the interviews she has made.

Use of physical violence in the military by higher-ranking soldiers is both legitimate and routine. There was no ex-soldier that I talked to who did not bring up the issue of beating, especially in relation to the initial training phase.²⁶ ...For many soldiers, direct physical violence is a central and painful memory. If the aim of military discipline is to make productive, yet docile, bodies, use of direct violence as public spectacle seems to be a crucial tool in this process (2004: 64,68).

The legitimating of the use of violence prepares a ground for strengthening the relationship between militarization and securitization specifically in the way that no other alternative in the securitization process. Since the policy determiners even other than the dominant military personnel also go through this education and the military service (male policy makers have been and still are high majority politics) they have undergone through this disciplining practice, which also includes the normalization of the use of violence. So, the perspective that accepts the use of military means as appropriate and in many cases as the only way to deal with a crisis begin before even when the people in question are not within the military personnel.

²⁶ She states in her notes that the exception for this situation is the soldiers who payed compensation to to their service in short term that happened once in the history of the practice of the compulsory military service in Turkey.

This works in a systematic procedure to settle the obedience and put the rationale for the irrational. This can be seen from another male ex-soldier that Altınay interviews:

The soldier's task is not a good one. It is basically to fight, kill or, die. In order to motivate people to do this, you have to break their spirits. You cannot tell a normal person to shoot at people: he won't do it. That is why there are orders, physical and psychological violence...otherwise, that person will *think*. (2004:64)

As given in the beginning of the discussion too, another aspect of the compulsory military service lies in its nationalizing feature. Altınay begins her analysis on this aspect by referring to Eugen Weber, who calls the military service (based on the early French Republic experience) as the "school of fatherland" (Weber, 1976: 298, cited in Altınay. 2004: 68), which gives a sense for the nationalizing aspect of the compulsory military service. Altınay argues that:

The political side of discipline is not only about increasing the soldier's utility in political terms through obedience, but it is also about increasing his utility as a new political body, a national one. In other words, the category of the "citizen-soldier" does not only involve soldiering; it is also about being a proper citizen (2004:68).

The general sense of the compulsory military service in Turkey exists as it has to be completed to be a "proper citizen" as Altınay calls, so that after this completion a male citizen can think of applying to a job or forming a family without any legal or "moral" obligations. "Most Turks refer to the military service as *vatanî görev*, that is, "duty for the motherland," rather than as mandatory service, compulsory service, conscription, or any other term that implies involuntariness," argue Varoğlu and Bıçaksız (2005: 584-585). However, they fail to recognize the questioning attitudes of the young males for the last years. The way that the military service is executed, taught and represented in Turkey makes a clear example of nation-states' practice. Altınay argues that "universal compulsory military service and universal compulsory education" are the "two main tools to create citizens with a military spirit" in the nation states (2004:69). So, the militarisation in question here stems from the early

education of citizens as argued before too. Altınay refers to the example of Turkey in this case again. “In Turkey, education and educators have been given a nationalizing and militarizing role from the early years of state-formation” (Altınay, 2004:69). Furthermore, the military service constructs on this a “didactic” feature is attached based on this because “military service was and is seen as an educational practice” (Altınay, 2004:70). The examples about the weekly ceremonies and the course of National Security Knowledge are relevant examples here too because they prepare a militarizing mind of thought. Altınay on this ground analyzes the National Security Knowledge textbooks to bring out the nationalizing aspects. The manner in question here in turn shapes the logic and the necessity of the military service as Altınay suggests:

[...] [T]he stress here is not on the need for the military service for the defense of the country, but on its role in the life of the individual male citizen. To prepare for real life situations and to become somebody in relation to himself, his family, his nation, he needs to serve in the military. In this formulation, military service does not appear as an obligation to the state, but an obligation to one’s nation, one’s family, and one self (Altınay, 2004:70).

Based on the ground above, the military service becomes a practice where the males begin to form connection between themselves and the people coming from different regions of the country. Altınay states “military service becomes an important experience through which the soldier learns about his nation as a community and his homeland as a territory.” (2004:70) This builds the concept and side of “us” first as it brings out the “common” points they males share during the experience. Based on this ground then it begins to define the “others” and/or “them”. This begins with the religious differences within the practice at first. Altınay points to the practice with its deficiencies and contradictions:

Despite the fact that the Turkish military defines itself as a secular institution (in fact, as the vanguard of secularism against the Islamic threat), the discourse inside the army is based on the assumption that all soldiers are Muslims. The non-Muslim

soldiers in the military bear the mark GM (which stands for the first letters of *gayri Muslim/non-Muslim*) on their nametags. This practice was explained to me by several people as a way of knowing what kind of burial to give to the soldiers if they die. The problem with this explanation is that what is written on the nametags is not the soldier's religion (Jewish, Christian, Muslim, etc, each indicating a different kind and place of burial), but the fact that the soldier is NOT a Muslim. This mark suggests that he belongs to one of the recognized "minority" groups in the predominantly Muslim Turkish Republic: Jewish, Greek, or Armenian (2004:73).

This attitude on the hand features an extreme exclusive manner based on religion, but at the same time an extreme inclusive manner in which people from the same religion are accepted to be the same from A to Z.

However, the situation gets complicated with the "Kurdish Issue". Altınay points to the fact that Kurds are considered to be "people from East" both by the people and "as with state policy on the Kurdish issue since 1930s" (Altınay, 2004:73). She states, "framing of the Kurdish issue as one of "civilization" has been a major strategy for avoiding its recognition as a political or cultural issue" (Altınay, 2004:72). At this point the mission that the military gives itself as the representative of modernization, which was argued in the Chapter 2 before too, bases on its educational attitude especially for the people who could not have equal educational opportunities when compared to the rest of the country. This can be observed from Altınay's interview experiences as she tells:

"Illiteracy" and "ignorance" were often presented to me in direct association with Kurdishness. One ex-soldier shared several stories along these lines. One was about a Kurdish soldier who had participated in a political demonstration organized by the pro-Kurdish party HADEP (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*-People's Democracy Party) with his uniform. Apparently, the demonstration was taped by the police and this man was identified with his uniform. The Turkish ex-soldier who told me this story described this act as "ignorance" and "pure stupidity". He said: "I would empathize with him for being a supporter of the party, but he should at least have had the brains not to go there in his uniform." Similarly, he cited "not knowing Turkish" as an example of ignorance (2004:72).

Based on this attitude the military service is represented to be responsible for the "civilization" of its citizens, especially for some citizens who see called as "ignorant"

because they do not know Turkish as well as other citizens since they should not have no cultural differences as can be seen from Altınay's observations.

Indoctrination of official ideology on what it means to be a Turk is a direct form of educating the young soldiers into proper Turkish nationals, where not all are equal. Minorities are reminded of their history of "treason" and Kurds are told they are indeed Turks. One ex-soldier who served in 1994 told me that his commander cited Kurdish as the East Anatolian version of the Ottoman language, and not a language of its own (2004:73).

Up to this point the military service's characteristics in relation to the security perception of Turkey is given. The conscription case in Turkey proves to be a resulting example of how the processes of securitization and militarization feed into each other.

3.4 Securitization and Militarization: A Cyclical Relationship

The process of securitization is a process where the significant characteristics of the state come up to the surface with the way it securitizes and the developments it securitizes with specially the distinctive bureaucratic procedure the process goes through as shown in the current chapter. The militarization process, which is also a constructed process as shown in Chapter 2, has both its signs in the daily life and comes up to the service in the securitization process as significant also.

The distinctive procedure that securitization goes through in Turkey, consisting of a militarized state and society, both feeds from militarization and feeds militarization. Firstly, the securitization process takes a significant shape because of the military's strong position and the military thinking that it represents and produces, which is 'normalized' by both the other state elites and the society. So, the militarization process in this way influences the securitization process. However, the securitization process, which comes from this specific understanding, also influences

the process of militarization, which is also influenced from the security politics that are decided within the securitization process. The conscription quests right after the Cyprus Operation in 1974 and the strong trust of the public in the military institution exemplifies this. The way that the Cyprus Crisis has been securitized as explained before, stemmed from the militarized understanding of security and also resulted in the continuance of militarization with the strong support of conscription by the public as a reaction that made the cyclical relationship of the two processes to continue. So, the relationship is a cyclical one and the processes are intermixed in the way that they feed into each other and at some points it becomes difficult to separate them with strict borders.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to discuss the relationship between militarization and securitization in Turkey. After showing how the process of militarization worked for Turkey, building on that background this chapter aimed to show how the process of securitization in Turkey takes its source from militarization and leads to militarization. The relationship between the processes is a cyclical one as explained.

Based on this ground, the next chapter will prove how these processes are gendered in the case of Turkey. The construction of the processes and behavior that is executed within the processes are gendered and in the case of Turkey this is both very explicit, in the way that the problems in relation to the gendered construction of the processes can be seen in practice and (aimed to be) implicit, in the way that is been exposed to othering. Next chapter will analyze this point in detail.

CHAPTER 4

THE GENDERED CONSTRUCTION OF MILITARIZATION AND SECURITIZATION IN TURKEY

So far the processes of militarization and securitization have been discussed. What the processes mean and how these processes exist in Turkey were the main concerns within the last 2 chapters. However, as it was introduced in the first chapter too, the processes are not complete unless the gender dimension of the processes is highlighted. The word “highlight” is important here because the gendered construction of the processes are not concepts such that should be picked up and showed, but rather, to show how the processes are gendered in their construction, so it is not a side effect but rather at the core of the problematic.

With references to the discussion in the 1.3, this chapter will consist of 3 main parts. In the first section (Section 4.1), a general discussion to show the gendered construction of security, securitization and militarization in Turkey will be discussed with references to the discussion in the 1.3. Then, in the second section (Section 4.2), the practice of recruitment, as conscription in the case of Turkey, will be discussed as a proof and consequence of the relationship between militarization

and securitization. In the final section (Section 4.3) negative implications of the discussed concepts on women will be discussed.

The gendered discourse that gives a shape to the thought of mind that makes the concept of security in the securitization and militarization processes specific. It will be argued that the gendered construction of the processes stem from both gendered thought of mind and ignorance of the women's experience and participation in the process of securitization. An example of implication of securitization and the relationship between securitization and militarization, the concept of recruitment with reference to Turkey as a case will be examined. The Cyprus Operation in 1974 and the PKK issue during the late 1980s and 1990s will constitute the referent points of the analysis.

This chapter aims to show by discussing the gendered construction of the processes of militarization and securitization in Turkey. The argument here is that the process of securitization does not happen same everywhere, the gendered understanding that can direct the process can have different levels and furthermore, the lack of gender issue in Wæver's theory as Hansen points out continues to exist as an obstacle, which was discussed in the Chapter 1. Here based on this discussion the case of Turkey will be analyzed.

4.1 Gendered Security, Securitization and Militarization

4.1.1 Gendered Security

The gendered construction of the concept of security is an issue that has been made a literature about as it was pointed out in the 1.3 section of the thesis. The gender

dimension of the security has been discussed intensively there. First of all, as it was given in the related section, feminist theories see the discipline of International Relations, in the way that it has and is been interpreted in relation to the dominant traditional discourse as full of dichotomies.²⁷ These dichotomies begin with the gendered separation between males and females. The traditional understanding sees the separation between males and females as something further than a biological difference. This logic results in an attitude where certain roles are given to males and females without a permission of crossing in between. Furthermore, and the more crucial point for the thesis is that dichotomies are applied on this simple logic in national security discourses where women are there for the reproduction of the soldiers of the nation whom are obliged to protect the nation. The nation is represented as a female, which is always “fragile” and to be protected based on this logic too. This is the case in Turkey. As it was explained in the previous chapter, the security understanding in Turkey has a defensive character in which the regime is perceived as feminine, always to be protected from threats. The threats are perceived to be always there and to protect the regime threat perceptions are based on an extremely defensive understanding. At this point argumentation based on geographical situation, nationalism and which are built on a gendered understanding. The nation’s honor is represented especially from the bodies of the women. As it was seen in Altınay’s example of Sabiha Gökçen’s flying experience in the Dersim events, the female body represents the honor of the nation.

Feminism sees the gender difference between males and females as a biological one, and argue that the dichotomies are socially constructed rather than being natural separations. The description of females and the attachment of the

²⁷ See the quote from Peterson (1998) on p. 25.

gender of female to certain concepts are production of the masculine traditional discourse in this sense. This discourse works in favor of nationalism where further dichotomies are made through side construction. This begins in and results from the way the world and the concepts are shaped in thinking. So, the crucial point for feminism is not about the inclusion of women into the areas such as security and securitization as it is commonly thought but rather, the focus is on the change of mind of thoughts, which happens to be a masculine one.

To show how gendered the concept of security is in its traditional dominant version the points can be summarized with reference to the discussion in section 1.3 as such:

- security is perceived in militarist terms: the military thought shapes the understanding of security with its definition and execution
- security is perceived in statist terms: it takes the state as the referent object, which results in the hierarchical attitude in the construction of the security agenda.

When security is perceived in militarist terms the execution of security politics becomes military focused, where the military takes an essential role in the definition of security threats and determination of the executions. This is related with the statist approach where the military justifies its strong position in politics with the argument that takes the state as the referent object and the crucial agent to be protected along with the nation. So, the argument becomes one in which the sake of the nation is connected to the sake of the states which the military is the protector. The referent object of the security, meaning here the one to be protected from becomes the state rather than the individuals. On this ground the freedoms and rights of individuals can

be taken for granted for the sake of the state's security. Women are along these individuals in fact they construct the key roles of the argument. The exemplifying cases can be seen from the gendered attitude that the women were exposed to during the Cold War period. In the Cold War period, especially in the USA with the threat of communism, the classical type of family structure was promoted in the society as a value against the threats stemming from outside and inside. In this model family structure women are stereotyped as "decent wives and mothers" within the housewife position and the men were as the "fathers and head of the family" basically.²⁸ This dichotomy intensifies with the representation of women as fragile to be protected and of men as strong and protector of the fragile ones.

4.1.2 Gendered Securitization

As it is seen throughout the thesis too, the route from security to securitization is not one with harsh and clear-cut borders. The particular form that the process of securitization takes is stated on a particular security understanding that feeds the general logic that shapes the securitization process. Again with reference to the discussion in section 1.3, the general points of securitization that the traditional understanding has and feminism aims to deconstruct can be summarized as such:

- the security agenda is formed on the understanding of "war" in the essence, and this brings in a hierarchical order of security threats where certain ones are represented as crucial, while other ones are represented relatively less important or even irrelevant.

²⁸ For more information about genderedness of the Cold War period see: Elaine Tyler May (1988).

- the elite that determine the security threats and shape the securitization process may have propensity to militarist terms of securitization, the usage of military terms in solving the problems, especially in countries such as Turkey where the military has a certain and significant role in politics

When the security agenda is formed only on the basis of the concept of war then from the same logic one expects that the executions of the security politics is constrained on the basis of war perception, meaning, the protection of borders in the war time. However, the execution in countries where the states are militarist in general shows that although the security understanding is minimized on the basis of “war”, the process of securitization occurs in such a way that any event or crisis can be turned into a security threat such possibilities of war, invasion etc can be thought immediately. This brings in a discourse where the power politics are executed and defined with masculinity. By masculine here, it is referred that seeing the world politics as the arena of proving the manhood where the strength of the state is proved by its “any time ready for a war” attitude. In addition to this, the securitization process, in countries such as Turkey are carried out by men in an overwhelming majority. I argue that gender construction begins and exists in the mind of thought not in the separation of genders but still, in countries such as Turkey, where a gendered mind of thought in practice, in daily life exists already, the securitization process brought into force by a majority of men additionally exists on male experiences and fails to reflect the security threats to and problems of women.

Turkey’s PKK struggle exemplifies how gendered is the process of securitization. The gender understanding does not consist of the exclusion of women as explained above. The mind of thought that finds the solutions of the threats in aggressive attitudes towards the threats perceived as the only and feasible solution

makes the process gendered. When the events are perceived as a threat, the context in which it is defined is the context of war. Rather than investigating the sources and reasons, the events have been interpreted within the context of war understanding without looking for any other alternative interpretations of the event, since the securitization is a process of construction. Furthermore, the aggressive policies dealing with the issues such as terrorism as it is in the example of Turkey, the securitization of this kind, results in the representation of the issue as a threat in a way of showing the strength to deal with the issue.

4.1.3 Gendered Militarization

When it comes to the process of militarization the gendered construction of the process can be summarized with these points again with the reference to the discussion that took place in section 1.3:

- the process is fed from the concept of militarism, where the concept is based on the logic of dichotomies, which begins with the highlighting the differences between males and females as “strong” and “fragile”.
- the fact that a society is militarized results in the interpretation of concepts like “national security” based on militarist mind of thought such as “war” and “survival of the state” solely stemming from a gendered discourse where actions taken by military means are represented as “manly” behavior, whereas other alternative solutions are represented as undermining the state prestige

It can be argued that the logic of dichotomies created between males and females prepares a ground for the patriarchic dichotomies created as “us” vs. “them”. The

logic of separation begins with the separatist role-attachment based on genders and when this role giving approach becomes an attitude it becomes easier to define somebody as a constitutive of a side as “us” or “them”. The “natural” outlook that is attached to the gender separation is applied to the nations so that somebody becomes naturally from “us” or “them”.

As the example of Cyprus shows, which is given in the chapter 3, militarized minds of the security elite results in the pre-securitized behavior when the question is one related to the Greece in one way or another. In this example Greece, or any kind of argument that criticize the behavior of Turkish government is accepted to be siding with “them” whereas any kind of argument that backs up the dominant behavior is included in “us”. The “Sevres Syndrome” that becomes a pre-securitization factor in the “Kurdish Question” is another example as shown.²⁹ Any kind of issues related with the cultural rights of minorities other than the ones included in the Lausanne Treaty is interpreted as against the “national sovereignty” and connected to the “survival of the state”. In both incidents, the behavior of Turkey is based on only one way of dealing with the issues rather than trying to think of whether other alternatives are possible or not. The first and the last thing comes into mind in the process of securitization becomes one of the military means which is an exemplifying case of militarization in the institutional sense.

²⁹ For a detailed discussion on the “Sevres Syndrome” Aydınlı (2002)

4.2 A Gendered Practice: Recruitment

The males in Turkey likewise in many countries are experiencing the compulsory military service.³⁰ However, although this experience is officially for males only, it is an experience that includes females from different standpoints. Altınay shows the experience is one that has connections to both sexes:

With universal military service, the apparatuses of the state reached an increasing percentage of the adult male population. Very soon, every single citizen of the new nation-state would be “connected” to the military either directly (by serving in it) or indirectly (by sending their sons, husbands, brothers, lovers, friends for military service) (2004:70).

Although males are the active participants in the military service, the “indirect” involvement of the mothers, sisters, friends etc. that Altınay points out shows that it is an experience that effects not only the personal life of the participant but the social environment of the person too. This includes women, especially the mothers who are obliged to send their sons to pass through an experience they themselves have not been experienced in person. Furthermore, they are expected to be proud and not be rebellious if they lose their child during this compulsory service. It is a common portrait that the high ranked commanders tell the mothers to be calm since they are the mothers of martyrs during the funerals of their sons when they die during the military service. Tanel Demirel’s observations goes even further as he gives the example of “parents who played drums in the funeral of their son who lost his life on duty” (2002:36) for the militarist values of Turkish society.

The gendered aspect of the military service lies in the basic formulation of the obligation. Altınay points to the conscious manner in the arrangement of the service through laws. She states that “lawmakers were aware of the impact of their decision

³⁰ Israel is an exceptional case, where both women and men are obliged to do compulsory military service but with differences in times and conditions.

when they passed the Military Service Law of 1927” (Altınay, 2004:77). She argues that this consciousness was strongly in relation to the gendered discrimination on the citizenship concept. “They recognized that military service was a major citizenship practice and that they were about to create a two-tiered citizenship by making it compulsory for men only” (Altınay, 2004:77). Varoğlu and Bıçaksız argue that after the completion of the service, the male is eligible to be integrated into the society.

Upon his discharge from the service, he is welcomed as a victor, and return celebrations take place. Now he is ready to continue he family business or find a job, and become a full member of the society (2005:585).

The expression “full member of society” is especially attention taking here. In coherence with Altınay’s argument, it leaves no room for the condition of the females as “full members of the society”.

The anomalies of the experience that the males have to go through throughout the compulsory service were explained in the general discussion of the recruitment. It can be argued that this experience stands as a life-changing one and in the post-military service period the changes, the outcomes of this experience shows itself in the personal life and world opinions of men which can be observed especially on their relations to women. First as the dominant social relationship style male expects from female to be there ready for him and in fact sees this as his right. Delaney points to her observations in her study on the case of Turkish Village Society:

If a man marries before his military service, he expects to be presented with a child upon return; if not married before his military service, he expects to marry on his return. A woman is the prize or reward for having endured the hardships of military service (1991:109).

Furthermore, Altınay suggests that the military service becomes a male experience that the male equips himself with the knowledge and experience he gains from his compulsory service such that in his return he becomes the “man” of his house. She

proves her stance based on a fiction that was published in 1933, where the communication between Hüsmen, a male that comes back from his military service and Kezban, his wife, is illustrated and where she argues “reiterated the gendered difference created through military service as a cultural given” (Altınay, 2004:77). From what she illustrates it can be argued that this action is done consciously and the military service is used to strengthen the male dominance in the society.

In this story, participation is linked directly to the masculinity where military knowledge is power over women. Hüsmen may have been a private accepting orders in the military, or beaten up by his officers, but he is guaranteed the *unconditional* position of the commander at home (Altınay, 2004:77-78).

The general attitude of people who go through oppression to oppress the people they define as inferior to them can be applied to the military service practice here. Furthermore, the experience of military service leaves a resident propensity to violence in males that can affect their post-military life. In Nadire Mater’s book, this propensity of violence can be observed clearly from the words of the males.

I returned from the military service. I shout in the streets, people look at me to learn why I am shouting. Nearly a fight will come up. I mean one becomes very nervous. For example, after a police station bust I jumped out of bed frequently for week...As a matter of fact it continued here too. I am at home, having a nap. For a moment I open my eyes, I begin to shout at my wife saying, “where is your hat, why has your hair got longer like that”. My wife first thinks I am making a joke. I clasped her by the throat nearly I am going to beat my wife by saying, “where is your hat”. I mean we really become like monsters (1998:47).

It is attention taking that the person states later he has not experienced a killing or death in his period of conscription. It makes oneself think what more effects do the military service leave on the males who experience such cases.

Conscription, in addition to its logic of construction in the first place, accommodates the inferiority of “female” understanding in its daily life practices. The roles that are attached to females and males in separate in a gendered understanding, becomes stronger with the military service practice. Altınay shows

how this attachment and labeling based on sex differences to different behaviors is practiced.

Yet the road to being a commander at home is a thorny one, which involves various levels of masculine humiliation. It is significant that in military training “being like a woman” is often used as an insult and, simultaneously, as a strategy for promoting “docility”. Several ex-soldiers mentioned this aspect of military training in the interviews, often smiling while they talked about it. One man in his late twenties for instance, told me about his astonishment when soldiers working in the kitchen were given women’s names by their commander. “They took a group of soldiers into the kitchen and the commander asked, ‘what is your name?’ and the soldier answered ‘Hayri.’ The commander said. ‘No, your name is Ayşe.’ He went around telling the soldiers their names: Zeynep, Semra - all women’s names. He then asked them to wash the dishes” (2004:78).

This stance strengthens the already gendered understanding that is pervasive in countries such as Turkey. After the military service the male becomes more “man” and so the definite determiner of the family issues.

There was no controversy among the soldiers that men were “naturally” the ones to decide on important family matters. They were the ones who could tell right from wrong, not women (Altınay, 2004:78).

Furthermore, the completion of service becomes a completion of a drawback that directs the continuance of social life. The correlation between “being a man” and completion of the military service is perceived to have even more meaning when the male carries the physical traces of it for in the rest of his life.

Most important, he is now socially eligible to marry and be the father of a family because he has honorably proved his masculinity; military service is accepted by society as a proof of masculinity. In a similar vein, a visible scar on the body means an even sounder proof of masculine identity. It only commands more respect in society and the veteran himself is usually proud of such a scar (Varoğu and Bıçaksız, 2005:585).

One wonders if the males who completed their military service with the loss of part of their bodies can feel the same way, especially with the different conditions that they are made to be obliged to attend in their social, working and etc. life after they turn back. Furthermore, the discourse that feeds into the theme of the article by

Varoğlu and Bıçaksız, as can be seen, is strikingly different from Nadire Meter's book, which is done through interviews with the real people.

The "necessity" of conscription has been established with an argument with the claim that "it is cultural and natural", people do not question generally the necessity of it rather it becomes an issue of completing one's manhood. One of the men that Altınay interviewed states:

"It is often said that you cannot become a man before you do your military service. Just as circumcision is a step into manhood, military service is its proof" (2004:78).

Varoğlu and Bıçaksız's argument also represents the connection formed between masculinity and recruitment. They do not just connect the obligatory service to masculinity, but also argue that it is a part of the traditional culture.

For the average Turkish man, there are three significant events in life that are celebrated with festivities. The first one is the circumcision ceremony, the second one is the departure for military service and the return after the honorable completion of that service, and the third one is marriage. All three stages are celebrated together with family, relatives, and the community, but the festivities surrounding military service are the most memorable (2005:585).

Keeping in mind the military backgrounds of Varoğlu and Bıçaksız, how the service is being "naturalized" and "normalized" can be seen from their way of explanation.

The execution's gendered construction stems from the gendered discourse that serves for argumentation of the military service. This discourse stems from the gendered security understanding that feeds securitization and militarization. The gendered discourse of war, representing women and children as fragile and in need of protection stands for the conscription also, since the military service involves the education for the arms and strategies that can be needed for the wartime. The fragility of the females goes further than to be protected to the representative of the "honor of the state and the nation". This is underlying logic of the systematic rape that occurred and occurs in the wartimes, when the women of a nation that is a side

of the war are raped, that becomes the final point that symbolizes the defeat.³¹ In Turkey, since no “declared war” has taken place since World War I, this aspect of the discourse is seen in the struggles that the country has gone through, as it is been named as such in general. Altınay unravels this aspect with the example of Sabiha Gökçen who was known as the first female war pilot of the world. She took part in the military operation in Dersim in Turkey. Gökçen’s femaleness constituted a special condition in her service as Altınay’s example shows.

She might have become a young soldier, but she was also a young woman whose sexuality needed to be protected and negotiated as she was given permission to into war. In Atatürk’s view, the threat to her honor (through rape, an unspoken, unnamed act in this narrative) was the ultimate danger, not death. Her permission to go to was based on her readiness to kill herself in order to protect her honor, and her nation’s (2004:39).

This fragility that is attached to the females can create a distance between the males and females after the males complete their military service. After completing a striking experience, especially the ones who has to go through more painful experiences because of the harshness of the political situation that the country is in at the time of their service period like the PKK struggle time, experience difficulties in sharing their experiences with people, even with their mothers. The stance, that forms this distance between the mothers and the sons after the military service, is that the construction of “fragility” of the females that has been represented on and on in the discourse of the education throughout the military service. In the consequence of this discourse females are being protected from the real life experiences as if they are not part of it only because they are not serving. Altınay exemplifies this by pointing to Mater’s experience in interviewing the ex-soldiers that served in the Southeast. “Many mothers complained to Mater about not being able to make their sons tell

³¹ Two examples can be given for this point: the systematic rape that Bosnian women were exposed to in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Bosnia-Serbian War in 1990s, and Russian soldiers at the end of the World War II exposed German women to collective rape.

them about their experiences in the military and many sons explained that they did not want to burden their mothers with all that they had suffered” (Altınay, 2004:84).

The experience of military service draws a gendered line between males and females in a way that it becomes a service that males share and women do not know about. To render the obligatory service meaningful a hierarchical attitude is formed as if by completing the military service a person, male here, reaches the stage to express his opinions since “he knows what the world is about” now. Altınay exemplifies this by referring to the interviews she made during her research. She states “It seemed like men would always claim a better knowledge of the country, the nation, and subsequently of politics based on their acquired “wisdom” during military service” (Altınay, 2004:82).

4.3 Negative Implications for Women

The gendered construction of the mind of thought dominant in the security understanding, securitization and militarization were discussed before in the chapter. This section will point out the negative aspects of these processes on the women. When it is talked about security, are women included in the concept of it in practice and in theory even? And how this gendered thinking in security terms results for women? The basic obstacle in the security understanding is that even if the discourse claims to shelter the women’s rights the problematization stays limited and even in the issues that are securitized the execution in the dealing of the problems becomes insufficient. Caprioli states the problem in the definitions of the certain concepts.

Common definitions of human rights are based on political rights and limited to abuses perpetrated by the state. Research has demonstrated, however, that women’s security is systematically violated in both the public and private spheres, and that legal equality in the public sphere cannot lead to women’s security without equality in the private sphere (2004:412).

So the application of “democracy” or the expression that “there is democracy in this country so women are equal with men anyway” do not reflect the truth in fact. The patriarchal understanding can hide behind the mask of democracy and it can become in fact a justification for not dealing with the issues related to women’s security. In the countries where a statist and militarized understanding is dominant, women’s security does already have inferior and sometimes no place at all due to the hierarchy that exists in the security agenda of these states. So, the basic assumption that could serve for women’s security is the individual that security should be built upon. Furthermore, the narrow definition of security on the basis that interprets women security as inferior to the other issues should be given up. Bilgin reflects the failure of the contemporary political practices in reflecting the human security.

The problem with prevalent policies that ‘promote democracy’ and advocate ‘women’s human rights’ is not only that they are based upon gendered definitions of democracy and human rights, but also that they fail to provide for ‘human security’. Inquiring into such insecurities would require the analyst to question the patriarchal philosophy that warrants those statist approaches to security and those narrow definitions of democracy and human rights that shape academic analyses as well as policy making; to cross political and cultural boundaries when seeking the roots of structural inequalities and violence; and go back to history to delve into the historical processes of global social change that have enabled the adoption of such assumptions and definitions. Hence the need to consider the international politics of women’s insecurities (2004:502).

Within this statist structure it is not always easy to bring in the women’s security issues since they in time become or made to become taboos that people hesitate to talk on and investigate about.

Measuring women’s security is difficult, because it is often rooted in and defended by state and social policies/culture. Not only are data on women not routinely collected cross-nationally, but also illegal discrimination and violence is under-reported, because of fear of reprisal, biased social polices, and the unconscious psychological collusion of victims of social violence with their oppressors (Caprioli, 2004:417).

This was the case with my research when I made for Enloe's outline of militarization. The two indicators as the "ideology of national security" and "recruitment" are analyzed throughout the thesis. However, for the other two indicators of "rape" and "military prostitution" the case was different. First of all since Turkey's historical experience does not match with an inclusion of an "official" war the indicator of "military prostitution" and "systematic rape" becomes inappropriate to adopt. But, for the military prostitution an example can be given not within the territory of Turkey but from the experiences of Turkish armed forces in peace operations abroad. Joseph Soeters et al.'s article constitutes a comparative analysis of the experience of Turkish and Dutch armed forces that participated in the peace operations. The below quote taken from the article hints the place of women, who are seen as pure sexual needs, in the conscription services:

General Hikmi Akyn Zorlu (the Turkish ISAF commander from 2002 to the beginning of 2003) stressed that during Ramadan nothing was to be eaten or drunk in the presence of the local population. Nor was it permissible to search women at random in the street without good reason (Soeters et al., 2004:362).

About the issue of rape, when I searched for the concept of rape in relation with the militarization it was hard to find something directly related because the rape itself is a taboo on its own.

Not only the narrow definitions of democracy and human rights within the concept of security understanding in question is problematic, but also the way that the power is defined when applied to women's issues within the traditional attitude is problematic also. Yeşim Arat criticizes this attitude in which she claims even some feminist studies fall into claims that the "patriarchal approach" can make the issue better to be better seen.

It is implicitly assumed that women have a submissive, passive role within the patriarchal relationship. In other words, the "power of the weak" is ignored. The

possibility of women's revolt to (male dominance) or women's separate realms of power do not become serious issues.
The power of the weak is best recognized if power is defined as a shared and ongoing process rather than a fixed structure of domination (1989:19).

As Mary Caprioli also suggests, the general attitude of healing to women security by focusing on the theoretical changes is not enough. It is the gendered thought of mind that is the source of women's insecurity, which feeds the dominant security understanding that the securitization culture is built upon. The mind of thought should be questioned in such a way that women can feel secure at their homes too, not only in the places that the law violations become public. "Security in private spheres is crucial to women's security but is often excluded from prevailing measures of security that focus on public rights" (2004:413). The representation of this problem gets difficult in security cultures in militarized states and societies where nearly everything is securitized for the sake of state whereas issues as women security is not found to be of the prioritized issues. Even when the dangers to women security are open it is hard to expect from women that they are aware of their security issues and they can conduct the theory in practice when illiteracy is high in countries like Turkey. "With 50 percent of the female population illiterate, Turkey has a high female illiteracy rate not-only higher than Western countries such as Italy, France, or the United States, but also higher than Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan and Kuwait" (Elise Boulding, et al. *Handbook of International Data on Women*, quoted in Arat, 1989:35). This is highly related with the practice of recruitment as Altınay shows. More specifically recruitment as a result of the strong relation between militarization and securitization happens to be a practice that results in women's conditions to be taken granted. To be clear, Altınay's example of the illiteracy problem of women in relation with the military service is relevant here. She argues that in the southern eastern parts of the country where Kurdish language is

learned as the first language, since males learn and/or improve their literacy and Turkish during the conscription the illiteracy and communication problems of women is being ignored.

Since the 1930s, among the Turkish-speaking uneducated population, men have gained advantage over women by learning literacy in military service- and thus becoming eligible for better jobs and having access to such things as newspapers and the laws. Moreover, lack of schooling in rural Turkey, particularly in the Eastern provinces had meant that while Kurdish (or Arabic speaking) men learn Turkish in the military, many women spend their lives not speaking any Turkish at all. This means that they have little access to the things going on in the larger society that are having an impact on them (or men become their translators), and it includes having no access to the laws (Altınay, 2004:79).

Arat draws a broader picture in relevance to the inferior status of women in the Turkish society with relevance to their use of rights and opportunities that are presented to them.

Women formally secluded from men in the urban Ottoman society have legal access to economic and political power in the Turkish Republic. Yet beyond the issue of formal legal seclusion, at a more substantive level, lack of education coupled with economic independence on men prevent women from challenging the strict functional division of labor between the sexes. To this day, men's power in the public realm and formal authority in the family prevails. Half of Turkey's women as opposed to a quarter of its men are illiterate. Only about a third of the primary and secondary school graduates and one fifth of the university graduates are women. Even though women make up 36 percent of the labor force, more than 90 percent of women in the labor force are in the agricultural sector working as unpaid family laborers³² (1989:46).

The thought of mind in the theory extends to the practice in such a way that the thought itself can become the source of insecurity rather than its representation of being a security provider. This thought of mind feeds from the traditional attitudes and approaches that apply gendered roles to women and men in separate. Caprioli discusses this problematic under the title of "cultural violence".

Religion, ideology, and language, among other aspects of culture, support cultural violence. Stereotyping women as simpleminded and therefore unfit for certain responsibilities—ranging from control over their own bodies to suitability for public office—provides a rationale for cultural violence (2004:413-414).

³² Arat examines these observations based on the several researches made on the case of Turkey, for the detailed discussion, see the relevant chapter in her book *Patriarchy in Turkish Society* (Arat, 1989)

This is in relation with the recruitment's discussed consequences as males' attitudes of completing their citizenship and so they can have a better say on the world issues. Arat's observations are more specific on this ground in which she introduces a literature based on researches made on Turkey. "Women defer to the authority of their male relatives when they have to make political choices. Social scientists document the apolitical character of Turkish women from various perspectives" (Arat, 1989:42). The most striking example she shows on this ground is a research done by Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, where he brings out from the interviews he made with women that women are prone to follow their husbands' political choices.³³

The feminist point of view on the security of women points out to the gendered mind of thought of the security understanding and the necessity of inclusion of women into the foreign policy making, policy determination in the process of securitization. However, the inclusion of women and their experiences to reflect an ungendered understanding execution can be meaningful only if the definitions of the concepts that security shelters and itself and if the securitization culture is questioned. One should not forget that both Tansu Çiller and Margaret Thatcher were women in their gender appearance however this did not prevent them from serving the masculinized power politics. In fact they were appreciated that they "acted like a man" and "strong" by many people. Condoleezza Rice who is responsible from the foreign affairs of the USA for the last years is also a woman but a representative of the political group that supported the invasion of Iraq. Tickner shows the feminist point of view that gives importance to the questioning of the rooted concepts.

Questioning the role of states as adequate security providers, but being aware of their continuing importance as the political category within which security is defined by

³³ For the relevant discussion see: Arat (1989: 42)

policymakers and scholars alike, leads feminists to analyze power and military capabilities differently from conventional studies. Rather than seeing military capability as an assurance against outside threats to the state, militaries are seen as frequently antithetical to individuals' (particularly women's) security...and as legitimators of a kind of social order that can sometimes even valorize violence. ... Calling into question realist boundaries between anarchy and danger on the outside and order and security on the inside, feminists point out the state-centric and structural analyses miss the interrelation of insecurity across levels of analysis (Tickner, 2001:62-63).

The inclusion of women experience shows itself in the Turkish case, where men in the establishment of the state in fact initiated the legislative improvements for women's security and rights before than the European experience even. However, as shown before in the thesis too, this has stayed in the theory, which has a huge gap between the practice and itself. So, without ignorance of the advantages that women gained, rather than healing to the source of the problematic the "solutions" stayed superficial. Furthermore, there are arguments in which it is claimed that the "women rights" issue was in fact a tool for a certain goal rather than the sincere intention of solving women security issues. Arat gives her opinion on this issue:

Women's rights were a dictate of the secular, national, and democratic republic Mustafa Kemal intended to establish. Only thus could the formal criteria of inclusion in the ranks of Western nations be met. [...] Before many Western countries, Turkey recognized full rights of citizenship for women. This crucial event prompted by the exigencies of westernization perhaps preempted the emergence of a women's movement such as those found in Western countries. Such a movement might have heightened women's consciousness of being underprivileged in the public realm. Leaving aside these conjectures and putting the historical facts into perspective, Turkish women's social and political rights were man-made privileges that served the grand design of westernization. Men, rather than women, insisted on recognizing women's rights to westernize the country (1989:33).

So, in the beginning, in the process of determination and process making women were not participants even for the sake of their own future. One can see the continuance of this as a remark of - constructed - "tradition" or "culture". Arat's example on the reactions that were observes on the Civil Code in the advantage of women shows the existence of the dominant discourse's gendered formulation.

The rootedness of patriarchal values in society becomes more evident when there is the possibility of a challenge to these values. In 1981, when the Civil Code Commission, after several years, proposed conceding a woman's right to use her maiden name and the abolition of the clause, "the husband is the head of the family" from the Civil Code, the Turkish public — generally silent on political issues — was suddenly politicized, expressing its resentment in the press. In an interview with the politically moderate daily *Milliyet*, ex-admiral Bulent Ulusu the prime minister of the 1980-83 junta that prided itself on its Kemalist heritage, expressed his opposition to the proposal — which has not been accepted to this day—as follows: "The male, regardless of what the Civil Code says, is the head of the family as the tradition of the Turkish nation dictates. Nations live by their traditions and laws should be made in compliance with those traditions... My personal opinion on this subject is definite. The head of the family is clearly the man. In the Cabinet meeting, I will express my opposition to the proposal decisively" (*Milliyet* and *Hürriyet* Newspapers 5-30 October 1981 especially, 12-18 October 1981 and Mete Akyol, "Karı mı Koca mı" *Milliyet*, 12 October 1981, quoted in Arat, 1989:45).

This construction of tradition stems from the militarized and nationalist construction where certain roles are attached to the genders, as argued before in the thesis. Enloe points to the irony in the "masculinity" of militarist understanding that is commonly argued:

Masculinity has been intimately tied to militarism, yet the two sets of ideas are not inseparable. Masculinity and militarism might be pictured as two knitting needles; wielded together, they can knit a sturdy institutional sock. But even such a sturdy sock — the military — is not immune to holes. When darning is required, military planners try to wield their two needles in a way that knits new narratives sustaining both militarism and masculinity. For this maneuver to succeed, for the military to obtain and keep the number and kind of men in the ranks that officials think they need, military policy makers have to control not only men but women. If very particular concepts of motherhood and femininity — and at times, the concept of the liberated women — are not sustained, the sock may unravel (2000:235).

To sum up, the gendered constructions of processes of militarization and securitization have negative reflections on women in practice as well as the gendered construction of thought. Through the negative implications on women security gendered construction of thought finds a way to be stronger.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at looking the genderedness of the processes of militarization and securitization, which a specific gendered understanding of security feeds. This gendered understanding that feeds the militarization which shapes the securitization prevents the women security issues to be existent in the security agenda of a country with the justification that there are some “other” more important issues that should come first because of the specific kind of threat perception that specific kind of security understanding gives a rise to.

Individualist rather than the statist understanding of security lies at the core of feminist understanding of security and with this way women security can be provided. The state which claims to be the security provider can be source of insecurity as in the Chapter 1 Lene Hansen’s example of honor killings in the Pakistan showed. The honor killing admonition to Sabiha Gökçen as given in this chapter also constitutes an example for this point. A security understanding that has no or sufficient touch of human in its understanding does not provide women security. So, the basic understanding of security should firstly be individualist which, under the current circumstances stays to be the primary step but not covering whole idea of the women security, that the gendered construction of the concept of security and processes of securitization and militarization can be brought in more meaningfully to appeal to the gendered mind of thought, which in fact is what the traditional understanding of security and practice of securitization depends on. As it is given in Enloe’s quote at the end of 4.3 too, in fact it all depends on women but should be deconstructed since it is constructed at the beginning.

The inclusion of women experiences and women in the process of securitization is important because the outcomes of the traditional attitude of securitization result in with the ignorance of the women security and development as shown in the chapter. The basic concepts and attitudes that are used in the “healing” to women issues stays artificial as long as these concepts are not redefined and a detailed process of deconstruction of the gendered und understanding takes place. As it is reminded in the chapter too, the quantitative inclusion of women do not constitute the core of the women problem in the securitization and solving women problem processes, since the core of gendered construction lies in the mind of thought which is asexual, which means it can exist in the minds of men and also in the women. This chapter, along with the points discussed in the previous paragraphs aimed to show the existence and the importance of gendered construction in the security understanding, militarization and securitization.

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed at analyzing the processes of securitization and militarization, the relationship between the processes, and the genderedness of these processes in Turkey. As it is argued throughout the thesis also, the process of securitization can take a significant form in the states and societies that have gone through militarization. The key concept of “normalization” (Altnay, 2004) within the process of militarization makes the process of securitization in a way that the referent objects is a state that is defined in militarist and nationalist terms which bases its acceptance and continuance on a gendered construction of thought of mind. While discussing securitization, Wæver’s argumentation of securitization provided the basis of questioning the process. Although sharing similar concerns with the widening of security agenda in terms of securitizing them by using the current traditional military means, I still think that the way to deal with the individual security is left out in the argumentation. Still appreciating his argumentation of having a projector attitude towards the process in the way that aiming to show what is the dominant practice, especially the state as the referent object, I still find it problematic. In the end we are left out with individual security, as Hansen shows in the case of honor killings of women in Pakistan, and the problems that are stimulating from the state itself.

In Turkey, as it is showed, the process of securitization occurs within a militarized context. The case of Turkey is in conformity with the dominant traditional statist security understanding. However, although Wæver states that the securitization process does not necessarily include military terms, in Turkey which is a country that gone through an intensified militarization with the four military interventions in specific constructed a common acceptance of militarist thinking among the society, as it is shown in Chapter 2, the securitization process comes to be in close relationship with militarization. In fact, as it shown especially in Chapter 3, the two processes feed into each other in alternate, which makes the relationship a circular one. The two processes result in preparing a ground for the other and strengthening each other.

These processes are not natural and in fact, as Wæver argues, the threat perceptions that the process of securitization begins with is in fact not given as many mainstream theorists argue so. The processes of securitization and militarization, as discussed in Chapter IV are not only artificial, but also constructed on gendered thought of mind. This is because on a gendered basis, these processes stand to claim to be working for the aggressive policies and short-term solutions to the crises, which threat on individual security.

At this point it can be asked if the cyclical relationship between militarization and securitization can be broken. While easy to ask, this question is a difficult one to answer strictly and simply. In my point of view, the key point to break of this cyclical relationship is the acceptance of that these processes are constructed and gendered, and represent a threat to individual security. The stance of theoretical differences between the mainstream and critical international studies enters at this point with the questions: how is security defined? Whose security is in question? Of

course, in order to break up this chain, one has to transfer the theoretical understanding to the practice. With using deconstruction and discourse analysis, I think de-securitization and de-militarization can be achieved, and a reconstruction of a security understanding can come over the insecurities of individuals and so that the security agenda need not be wide and the redefined security would not make the process of securitization as it is now.

In Turkey, efforts at de-securitization might be said to occur when it is looked especially during the European Union -Turkey Relations. The long dialogue between the two parties began in 1959 and has been continuing with ups and downs. The specific characteristics of Turkey's security discourse, which reflect the close relationship between the securitization and militarization processes, were on the scene of changes that needed to occur. The reform packages in the early 2000s reflected political and economical changes that have been criticized for a long time by the EU. For example, the status of National Security Council, which plays a key role in the securitization process in Turkey, took its place in article 118 of the 5th reform package. Özbudun states that three reforms on this base can be grouped as such: Firstly, "with the addition of assistants of Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, the civil majority was sustained in the council". Second, "the decisions of the council were signified as having "recommendatory" characteristics". Finally, "the initial expression on the decisions of the council being primarily taken into consideration by the Council of Ministers was changed to "to be evaluated" (2000: 27) ³⁴.

The post-2000 period also marked important development of the occurrence of the debate of national security concept in Turkey in relation with the EU application

³⁴ This grouping was constructed on the information written in Ergun Özbudun (2000).

and the reforms that needed to be adopted for the admission to the union. This initiative was taken by Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the Motherland Party, in 2001.

Speaking at the Congress of the Motherland Party in August 2001, Yılmaz maintained that Turkey's integration into the EU is delayed by the 'national security syndrome' that thwarted changes in Turkey's Constitution and other reforms demanded by the EU. According to Yılmaz the problem was not only Turkey's conceptualization of 'national security' was far too broad compared to its EU counterparts, it was also that in Turkey 'national security' was defined behind close doors (Bilgin, 2005a: 191).

This initiative became an original one, where for the first time the concept was put into the discussion. The originality of this act presents an example of how the militarization exists in one way since the military's privileged status in the definition and execution of the national security concept was privileged such that it was not questioned. Although the EU application fit very well with the westernization task of the republic, the reforms regarding especially the military's privileged position and expansion of the individual rights were perceived as a state of distress for many. This is another way that proves the existence of militarization in regard to the national security concept, because the interpretations of these reforms as risky were following the statements of the military discourse that has been dominant on the national security concept so far, and called for the protection of the state-centric security approach from which the concept was stemming from.

The EU has placed radical demands on Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. At the top of these conditions is the democratic principle of civilian control of the military, which would decrease the political leverage powerful generals have enjoyed. Both military and civilian leaders coming from nationalist and Kemalist ideologies backgrounds would like to see the continuation of the militarization of politics, which they perceive as a guarantor for the regime. Hence, they oppose any call for further democratization. Because of Turkey's "special" conditions, they argue, the democratization process has reached its natural threshold, and moving it further would only jeopardize national security (Kösebalaban, 2002: 138-139).

This resulted in the occurrence of a debate on the issue. The debate between the conflicting parties on the EU-Turkey dialogue stemmed from the contrasting

positions that the parties took on this “traditional discourse”. The side that took a hesitant attitude towards the reforms demanded by EU reflected the construction of militarization throughout the years

The Eurosceptics are aware of the potential benefits of joining the EU. Yet, they consider the reforms demanded by the EU as threatening Turkey’s national security. Thus, when EU actors call for changes in Turkey’s policies these are interpreted within an inter-state framework and represented at best ‘interference in Turkey’s domestic affairs’ and at worst as ‘attempts to carve out portions of Turkey’s territory’ (Bilgin, 2004: 183).

Kösebalaban interprets this situation as a dilemma for the Kemalist ideology that formed the dominant discourse on the national security concept.

The Kemalist political establishment, including the politically strong Turkish military, was caught strategically and psychologically unprepared. From their nationalistic perspectives, the membership conditions such as the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights posed real threats national security and integrity. ... The opposition to the EU within the Turkish political and intellectual establishment is cognitive rather than material, rooted in the way Kemalism perceives the country’s security environment and constructs threats to its national security (2002: 131).

The influence of the Kemalist ideology on the militarization of security and its effect on securitization was explained in the Chapter 3 especially.³⁵ This point of stance on security seems to make the avenue for possible changes for the break of the cyclical relationship between securitization and militarization difficult for the moment.

Besides these, however, civil organizations have been emerged and are continuing to emerge. Especially the issue of military service and gendered politics are being questioned by some civil organizations and groups. These organizations in general take their stance in favor of the EU membership because of the human rights object. The women’s organizations work to point out the necessary constitutional changes for providing healthy social and constitutional changes for women. These efforts, of course, takes attention and reaction by the nationalists and skeptics of EU project. The EU project in a way is perceived to be stimulating threats to Turkey’s

³⁵ For further elaboration on Kemalism see Günay (2005).

“fragile” condition and based on this understanding it is being securitized in a way. The latest example of a journalist-writer Perihan Mağden’s case is an example of this polarization in the country. Perihan Mağden (2005) in her article in a journal pointed to the conscious rejection to military service in the country. Since the laws state as such, it is not a recognized right and in fact is a case to be made against. She, on this basis, is being judged for estranging the public from the military service. Her initiation on this basis can be an example of an effort of de-militarizing and questioning the militarization process and its consequences. Writer Orhan Pamuk (2006) in an article in the Guardian gave his support to Mağden and claimed that this case will serve to be an example of Turkey’s experience with democracy and presented his beliefs that Turkey will overcome this exam of democracy.

In conclusion, in a chaotic atmosphere of efforts at de-securitization and de-militarization this thesis served for analyzing the cyclical relationship between the processes of securitization and militarization, and showing the gendered understanding these processes are built on. The breaking of this chain and its problematic consequences are hard, but since the belief in change constitute the basis for development, I hope with the analysis in this thesis, a discussion on these processes can be stimulated which in fact, as seen throughout the thesis, is rare because of the difficulties it faces and because of the success of the construction of the processes of militarization and securitization on the society.

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