

**THE MAKING OF TURKEY'S WESTERN
ALLIANCE:
*1944-1952***

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCP	: Chinese Communist Party
DP	: Democrat Party (in Turkey)
DPRK	: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korean)
ECA	: Economic Co-operation Administration
ERP	: European Recovery Program
IBRD	: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
JCS	: Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
JUSMMAT	: Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
MEC	: Middle Eastern Command
MEDO	: Middle Eastern Defense Organization
MFA	: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in Turkey)
MP	: Member of Parliament
NAT	: North Atlantic Treaty
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA	: Near Eastern and African Affairs (in the US Department of State)
OEEC	: Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
PCC	: Palestine Conciliation Commission
PRC	: People's Republic of China
ROK	: Republic of Korea
RPP	: Republican People's Party (in Turkey)
SU	: Soviet Union
SWNCC	: State-War-Navy Coordination Committee (US)
TGNA	: Turkish Grand National Assembly
TGS	: Turkish General Staff
UNRAA	: United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency
UNCOK	: United Nations Commission on Korea
UNCURK	: Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNTCOK	: United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
US	: United States
WEU	: Western European Union

Abstract

This study analyses the formulation of Turkish foreign policy in the period 1944 to 1952 and considers the making of Turkey's Western Alliance in this context. The thesis aims at indicating that Turkey's resolute quest for a Western alliance in the aftermath of WW II was a natural end-result of the experiences inherited from wartime diplomacy. While Turkey's sensitivity against the bloc strategy of world powers was continuing, it was evaluated by the makers of Turkish foreign policy that aggression could emerge from the totalitarian regimes which combined their forces or by one of them. Previously, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 had demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a collective movement. Shortly afterwards, it was understood that the split in this bloc had not removed the threat either. In this framework of analysis, the thesis discusses that forced by the conditions of an unpredictable international environment, Turkey constantly sought the ways to enhance its security; an effort which eventually paved the way to the formation of an alliance with the West.

In order to deepen the discussion in this context, the thesis makes a comparative study of Turkish foreign policy of the period in concern as well. Thus, attitudes of consecutive governments as mainly divided between those run under the Presidency of İsmet İnönü and the Democrat Party era after May 14, 1950 elections towards the course of international events are explored. On this premise, a contention is advanced that the making of Turkey's Western Alliance and its adherence to NATO was the end-product of a variety of incidents and policies which operated towards this effect. Turkey's participation in the plannings for a Middle Eastern Defence Organization (MEDO) and its decision to assign a combat force of a brigade size in the UN Command in Korea are evaluated as the main events of this process.

In 1946, facing the Soviet assertiveness in global affairs, it was increasingly felt by the makers of Turkish foreign policy that maintaining an alliance with Britain and the USA was of utmost priority. At this juncture, Britain was pursuing a regular withdrawal policy from its global status which hampered London to develop a strategic partnership with Ankara. In its turn, Washington was not in favour of extending its commitments and had the opinion that as far as the coordination of security plannings were concerned Turkey was in Britain's area of responsibility. It was the Truman Doctrine that marked a complete change in the US perception of Turkey and Greece. The thesis aims to shed light on a set of matters, the futile efforts around the MEDO and the concurrent hot conflict over Korea being the most significant ones. The period subsequent to the elections of May 1950 after which the Democrat Party administration decided to push Turkey to its limits - through hasty attempts at times - where the reflexes of benevolent neutrality towards the Allied side inherited from WW II left its place to an active search for security and partnership with the West is examined as the last phase in this process. In this framework, the thesis also aims to elaborate that the continuation of politics by war, and the continuation of war by politics continued throughout 1950 and 1952 which finally paved the way to the first enlargement of Western Alliance within the framework of NATO by the inclusion of Turkey and Greece.

Key words: Turkey, West, Alliance, 1944, 1952.

Özet

Bu çalışma 1944 ve 1952 yılları arasında Türk dış politikasının oluşturulmasını ve bu kapsamda Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakının kurulmasını analiz eder. Tez, 2. Dünya Savaşının ardından Türkiye'nin bir Batı ittifakını kararlılıkla arayışının, savaş dönemi diplomasisinden devralınan deneyimlerinin bir sonucu olduğunu ortaya koymayı amaçlar. Türkiye'nin Dünya güçlerinin izlediği bloklaşma stratejisine karşı hassasiyeti devam ederken, Türk dış politikasının hazırlayıcılarınca, saldırganlığın güçlerini birleştiren totaliter rejimlerin tarafından veya bunlardan birinden doğacağı tahmin ediliyordu. Daha önce, 1939 yılında Nazi-Sovyet Paktı tehlikenin birleşik bir hareket olarak ortaya çıkabileceğini göstermişti. Kısa zamanda, bu bloktaki ayrışmanın da tehlikeyi ortadan kaldırmadığı anlaşılmıştı. Bu analiz çerçevesinde tez, öngörülerde bulunmanın güç olduğu bir uluslararası ortamda Türkiye'nin süreklilik arzeder şekilde, sonuçta Batı ile bir ittifak oluşturmasına giden güvenliğini pekiştirme yollarını aramasını tartışmaktadır.

Bu kapsamda tartışmanın derinleştirilmesi amacıyla, tezde, Türk dış politikasının araştırmaya konu dönem içinde karşılaştırmalı bir incelemesi de yapılmaktadır. Bu itibarla, esas olarak İsmet İnönü'nün Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve 14 Mayıs 1950 seçimlerinden sonraki Demokrat Parti dönemindeki hükümetlerin uluslararası gelişmelere yönelik tutumları araştırılmaktadır. Bu zeminde, Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakının kurulmasının ve NATO'ya girişinin, bu yönde gelişen bir dizi olayın ve politikanın sonuç-ürünü olduğu düşüncesi ortaya konmaktadır. Türkiye'nin bir Orta Doğu Savunma Organizasyonu'na ilişkin planlamalara katılması ve Kore BM Komutanlığı'nda tugay ölçeğinde bir muharebe gücü görevlendirmesi sözkonusu sürecin ana olayları olarak ele alınmaktadır.

1946 yılına gelindiğinde, Sovyetlerin uluslararası ilişkilerde etkinliğini artırma çabaları karşısında, Türk dış politikasının hazırlayıcıları, İngiltere ve ABD ile bir ittifak sürdürmenin ilk önceliği taşıdığını artan bir biçimde hissediyorlardı. Bu aşamada, Londra, Ankara ile stratejik bir ortaklık geliştirmesini engelleyen, küresel konumundan düzenli geri çekilme politikası izlemekteydi. Vaşington ise, taahhütlerini genişletme yanlısı olmayıp, güvenlik planlamalarının eşgüdümü sözkonusu olduğu sürece, Türkiye'nin İngiltere'nin sorumluluğunda olduğu görüşündeydi. ABD'nin Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a yönelik algılamalarında bütüncül bir değişiklik Truman Doktrini ile oldu. Bu hususlar ile birlikte, tez, en önemlileri Orta Doğu Savunma Organizasyonu etrafındaki sonuçsuz çabalar ve bununla eş zamanlı olarak Kore'deki sıcak savaş konusundakiler olmak üzere bir dizi konuya ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Demokrat Parti idaresinin Türkiye'yi - kimi zaman da aceleci girişimlerle - 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan devralınan, müttefikler yanında faydacı tarafsızlık politikasını, aktif bir güvenlik ve Batı ile ortaklık arayışı ile değiştirdiği limitlere itme kararını aldığı Mayıs 1950 seçimlerinden sonraki dönem bu sürecin son aşaması olarak incelenmektedir. Bu çerçevede, tez, 1950 ve 1952 yılları boyunca siyasetin savaşı ve savaşın da siyaseti izlemesinin, sonunda, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın dahil olmasıyla Batı İttifakının NATO çerçevesinde ilk genişlemesine giden yolun açıldığını ortaya koymayı da amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye, Batı, İttifak, 1944, 1952.

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offered me their invaluable long discussions, but also explained their analytic view on the working of the diplomatic mechanism of MFA both today and in the past.

During the course of my research, I have partially consulted the material relevant to the present study in the archives of the MFA. They include, press statements, and some limited extractions from correspondence between the MFA and embassies, and between the MFA and the foreign representatives in Ankara, which I utilized - and confined - to present a chronological flow of events. While completing this work, I have benefited from the assistance of officials too numerous to name to find out the relevant material related to my research in there. On the other hand, it was not surprising to see that since the archives of the MFA have not yet been opened to the public, they have their own peculiar limitations. Although they offer considerable insight into the decision making mechanism and procedure in the MFA, their lack of a proper classification sometimes contain gaps, while at the same time they sometimes throw up leads, which unfortunately can not be followed up. Moreover, as a result of the weaknesses in cataloguing, the files do not necessarily complement each other. Despite such handicaps, the material available in there i.e., statements, press releases, and the collection of relevant documents including foreign and Turkish journals, were undoubtedly of great use.

I aimed at bridging the gaps left by the MFA archives basically with information and comments obtained from the memoirs of various statesmen, officials, soldiers and journalists, and the books written by them. I have consulted the FRUS, Keesing's Contemporary Archives and Document on International Affairs series as well which offered a complete picture of Turkey's relations with the USA and Britain in particular and the West in general during the period under review. In addition to the relevant literature available, I have also consulted the translations of published some Russian, Chinese and Korean primary and secondary sources which cast light upon the discussion at hand.

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Danışman, Prof. George Harris, and Retd. Col. Şükrü Erkal in the TGS, ATASE, Directorate for Military History and Strategic Research. Of course, my interviews with these people were of great use for my research since they were able to provide me with the first hand information in relation to my questions regarding the period in concern. Ambassador Günver and Ambassador Yolga had served in different posts during these years, Prof. Harris was a graduate student of Harvard in the first half of the 1950s who was pursuing further research in Ankara, Mr. Danışman was the Aide and personal interpreter of Brig. Gen. Sırrı Acar, Commander of the Turkish Brigade to Korea and Retd. Col. Şükrü Erkal who had left the ranks of the Army following the coup of 1960 in Turkey, had served in eastern Anatolia during the years of Moscow's growing ambitions over the territories of this region, witnessing the preparations of the Turkish Army against a probable Soviet offensive. My special thanks go to these people who generously shared their understanding of the issues with me, which no doubt, enriched this study through their perspectives on the subject.

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I INTRODUCTION

I . 1 Argument of the Study

In conventional world political systems, stability was always expected to result from strategic and political engineering by the concerted actions of great powers within the workings of a balance of power system. The divergent attitudes among the victors regarding the post-war order at the end of World War II, however, paved the way to a state of extreme tension between the United States and the Soviet Union - two major allies of the war - which admittedly dominated global politics for the next 44 years, until the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The outbreak of the Cold War and spinning events within, compelled the West in general, and the United States in particular to implement a fresh policy to consolidate the western camp against threats generated by Soviet aspirations for power. These measures were to involve different parts of the world, since the Kremlin might envelope additional areas in Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, before the end of the war, the West had decided that the Soviets were playing a double game. The prospect of Soviet aggrandizement in Asia Minor and the Middle East posed a major threat in this regard.

As for Turkey, a country that followed a policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Allied side while remaining non-belligerent in the global conflict, the need for a reassessment of its security concerns with regard to changes in the balance of power on the European

theatre was emerging, soon to become an utmost priority. Though Turkey had remained outside the alliance schemes in the course of the war, and the struggle had not spread to its land, changing times and conditions would make it almost impossible for the Turkish policymakers to remain outside emerging trends in international relations.

With the rapid growth of mutual suspicion and acrimony, exemplified first by the Soviet's imposition of full blockade on Berlin in June 1948, the Cold War was given a start. The Cold War, can be defined as the state of extreme tension between the superpowers "*stopping short of all-out war but characterised by mutual hostility and involvement in covert warfare and war by proxy as a means of upholding the interests of one against the other.*"¹ Apparently, the resulting tensions ensured that both sides maintained a continuous state of readiness for war. As Robin Brown stated, the superpowers appeared to be locked in a relationship of tension and danger from which there seemed no escape.²

As Kenneth W. Thomson stated, Stalin's military strategy from the early 1940s was geared to his post-war ambitions. Despite the dramatic incidents in the summer of 1941, when the SU was attacked by Germany, Stalin never lost sight of political objectives. Indeed, the Soviet plans to grasp control of Eastern Europe was as evident in the negotiations between Molotov and Ribbentrop held in Berlin in 1939, as in Stalin's talks with Roosevelt and Churchill in 1945 in Teheran and Yalta.³

¹Michael L. Dockrill, *The Cold War 1945-1963*, (NJ: Humanities Press, 1988), p 1.

² Robin Brown, "Towards A New Synthesis of International Relations", in *From Cold War To Collapse Theory and World Politics in the 1980s*, Ed. by, Mike Bowker and Robin Brown, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1.

³ Kenneth W. Thomson, *Cold War Theories Vol. I: World Polarization 1943-1953*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981) , p. 28.

At this stage, Turkey found itself compelled to immediately figure out the ways in which it could incorporate its efforts with those of the West to assure an inviolable security. The division of blocs were rising and the fate of “Soviet liberated” nations of Europe were alarmingly falling into the hands of their liberators. No doubt, this amazing dynamism of the Soviets in the post-war months were gaining strength to openly pronounce further desires on Turkish possessions: the Straits issue; and the demand of return of some Turkish eastern provisions to the SU being the most cited ones. In their turn, with their war shattered economies and crippled resources, the Western democracies were unwilling to pay immediate attention to Turkey’s efforts to draw attention to growing Soviet ambitions.

Given these premises, it is the contention of this study that:

1. Turkey’s resolute quest for a Western alliance in the aftermath of WW II was a natural end-result of the experiences inherited from wartime diplomacy. While Turkey’s sensitivity against the bloc strategy of world powers was continuing, it was evaluated by the makers of Turkish foreign policy that aggression could emerge from the totalitarian regimes which combined their forces or by one of them. Previously, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 had demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a collective movement. Shortly afterwards, it was understood that the split in this bloc had not removed the threat either. In this context, it is aimed to indicate that, forced by the conditions of an unpredictable international environment, Turkey constantly sought the ways to enhance its security.

2. Another objective of the thesis is to indicate that in a world moving onwards a bipolar cold or hot conflict, two epic events in totally different parts of the globe played significant roles in the making of Turkey’s Western alliance: the decision to create MEDO, and the

Korean War. On this premise, a contention is advanced that making of Turkey's Western alliance was the end-product of a variety of incidents and policies which operated towards this effect. Turkey's participation in the plannings for a Middle Eastern Defence Organization (MEDO) and its decision to assign a combat force of a brigade size in the UN Command in Korea are evaluated as the main events of this process.

In an attempt to deepen the discussion in this context, the thesis makes a comparative study of Turkish foreign policy of the period in concern. Thus, attitudes of consecutive governments as mainly divided between those run under the Presidency of İsmet İnönü and the Democrat Party era after May 14, 1950 elections towards the course of international events are explored.⁴

I . 2 A Précis of the Chapters

The second part of this work analyzes the Allied and Axis relations with Turkey and the making of Turkish foreign policy in this period. In this context, it is explained that while

⁴ The "Comparative Study of Foreign Policy" (CFP) methodology includes two central features: a commitment to foreign policy phenomena as the object of inquiry and a commitment to the comparative method. The study of foreign policy as the central core culminates in a perception that foreign policy had to be considered not only as a concept but as a set of variables that could assume different discernible values in covariation with other variables. The most pervasive orientation envisioned foreign policy as a dependent variable, the patterns of which are to be comprehended by investigating various explanatory sources.

It has been widely accepted that the comparative method placed in CFP may embrace different forms of interpretation. Some have stated that it envisages a commitment to multi-national comparisons, while the others have stressed that the CFP also includes comparisons of a system through time as well as comparisons across units. Charles F. Hermann and Gregory Peacock, "The Evolution and Future of Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann(ed.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, (London: Allen&Unwin, 1987), pp. 13-32.

Turkey's sensitivity against the bloc strategy of world powers was increasing, the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a collective movement. Subsequently, it is asserted that the split in this bloc had not removed the threat and in an unpredictable international environment, Turkey constantly sought the ways to enhance its security; an effort which eventually paved the way to building a sui-generis crisis management/prevention system of its own. As stated in this chapter, this was a complex system which could not be explained in terms of neutrality or an evasive foreign policy.

Here, it will also be argued that, from the early 1940s on, the Soviet military strategy was geared towards post-war goals. Despite the dramatic incidents in the summer of 1941, when the SU was attacked by Germany, Stalin never lost sight of political objectives. The consistent Russian purpose was revealed when Stalin offered the British a straight sphere of influence deal at the end of 1941. He suggested that Britain should recognize the Soviet absorption of the Baltic states, part of Finland, eastern Poland and Bessarabia in return for Russia's support for any special British need for bases or security arrangements in Western Europe.

In this framework of analysis, the very beginning of the period of "polarization" was considered as having its roots in the diverging attitudes of the former Allies. Indeed, the Soviet plans to grasp control of Eastern Europe was as evident in the negotiations between Molotov and Ribbentrop held in Berlin in 1939, as in Stalin's talks with Roosevelt and Churchill in 1945 in Teheran and Yalta. From then on, Anglo-Americans faced a situation that the war should be fought for the dual purpose of defeating Germany and forestalling the emergence of the SU as a mighty power in the center of Europe.

On the part of Turkish-Allied States negotiations, the events of 1943, the talks between the Turkish President İnönü and Churchill in Adana on January, 30-31, 1943; the Cairo Talks between the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, and the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on November, 4-6, 1943; and the Cairo Conference of December, 5-8, 1943 between İnönü, Churchill and Roosevelt, are also discussed in the context of providing the background in which Turkey chose to continue talks with the Allied powers while adopting a benovelent neutrality in the course of events. This chapter finally examines the Turkish-Soviet talks between 1944 and 1946 which culminated in Ankara's decision that the situation could not be improved with Moscow.

The third part tries to elaborate that surfacing problems with peace were coupled with consolidating rival blocs both on the part of the Soviets and the West between the years 1946 to 1948. Here, it is analyzed that by the turn of 1946, facing the growing ambitions of the Kremlin in different parts of the continent, Ankara was more apprehensive than ever about the consequences of Soviet moves. In this period, Turkey accelerated its efforts to bring its foreign policy nearer to that of the USA and tried to enhance its relations with the democratic camp in Europe. In this context, this chapter discusses the visit of *USS Missouri* at the Turkish Straits and the ambivalence of Washington about its policy towards Ankara. Here, the Turkish-Soviet exchange of Notes in 1946 is examined as well.

The fourth part concentrates on the USA's inclusion of Turkey in its foreign assistance programs, the Truman Doctrine being the most cited one. Within the context of discussing the developing crisis in international affairs, the circumstances under which the Truman Doctrine was launched and Ankara's efforts to side with the European democracies are

analyzed. It is extensively discussed that Ankara's inclusion in the US aid program was subjected to considerable difficulties and truly, the US aid was not automatically offered at all, in contrast it was first requested by Ankara. In this chapter, weaknesses in Ankara's position of negotiation which opened up a period of bilateral agreements - some of which were of a secret nature - with the USA were brought under scope as well.

The fifth part discusses the Turkish role in regional defence and the creation of the MEDO between 1948 to 1950. This chapter begins with discussing the increasing tensions of the Cold War in Europe which resulted in the signing of the Brussels Pact on March, 17, 1948 by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to face the emerging threat. It is then explained that however, the coup in Czechoslovakia and Stalin's rigidity in Eastern Europe showed this would not be enough. The full scale blockade of Berlin by the Soviets in the summer of 1948 fostered this line of thinking. There was also a counter-blockade in the Russian zone by the west that made Stalin agree for a mutual lift in January 1949. Clearly, the success of airlift in breaking the blockade increased western unity and confidence. However, the division over Germany through the establishment of the German Democratic Republic re-alarmed the West. Facing the undelightful course of events in Europe, Truman immediately recommended support for the Brussels Pact, and on June, 11, the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution, pledging the USA to associate itself with regional and other collective arrangements of this kind. The direction of negotiations for a new and expanded pact was undertaken by Secretary George C. Marshall, and then completed by the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Negotiations between the USA and Canada then followed on the creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited to take part in this process. These negotiations culminated in the signature of the Treaty of Washington in April 1949. It was confirmed by the US Senate on July, 21, 1949 by a vote of 82 to 13. Although the degree to which the members were bound to take action was unclear, the US adherence to the treaty marked the end of its non-entanglement policy.

Turkey's plea of combining its defence with the rest of Europe received poor support. Ankara's exclusion from the alliance as a founding member in NATO is discussed in this framework. Considerable evidence supports that Turkish non-involvement in WW II was among the most crucial reasons behind this interlude in relations with the West. As will also be discussed, the Turkish policymakers were facing the dilemma of enhancing the security of their vast land on the cross-roads between east and west, and getting involved in the active defense schemes being launched by both London and Washington, which might either ensure deterrence or provoke further aggression.

For Washington, it was essential to determine whether the inclusion of Turkey in NATO would provoke or deter the Soviets. As will be further explained, no doubt, question marks were more than one: would the advantages that would accrue be offset by the administrative burdens that would be imposed on NATO's half-completed organizational structure? Would Turkey be reassured by the additional guarantees or frustrated by the statements that NATO lacked the capabilities to offer much concrete assistance should a hot war erupt in the near future?

Consecutively, it is explained that to the disappointment of the Turkish Government, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed similar reservations on the untimely admission of Turkey (and Greece) into NATO since this would hamper their commitments in western Europe. The decision was to offer Turkey and Greece an associate status and when western capabilities grew, it would be desirable to include Turkey and Greece in NATO. There were no explicit promises, however. In this period of uncertainty, Washington hoped to placate Turkey and sustain the strategic advantages of cooperation.

As subsequently discussed, in May 1950, Foreign Office Under Secretary, Michael Wright, raised the possibility of establishing a Middle East defense pact, perhaps linked to NATO. The US policy makers reacted unenthusiastically and skeptically, refusing to extend American obligations under NATO to the Middle East. However, shortly after, domestic political factors forced Washington to commit itself to the maintenance of stability in the region. Arms supply to the Middle East had been a political and diplomatic issue since the UN embargo ended. To entice Egypt to participate in a joint defense pact that would settle the base dispute, Britain resumed shipments of arms to Egypt and other Arab countries in late 1949. Israel simultaneously asked permission to purchase American military equipment, but Pentagon rejected it, because Israel refused to explain how the equipment would be used. The arms deliveries began to destabilize the entire Middle East by encouraging the Egyptian nationalists and increasing Israeli uneasiness. At this juncture, a joint American-British-French declaration was designed to prevent a Middle East arms race and intraregional aggression. In due course, American and British officials worked out the wording of a

tripartite declaration, and the USA, Britain and France announced the declaration concurrently on May, 25 1950.

Meanwhile, Washington's concerns were heightened by reports that increasing mobility was taking place on the part of North Korea. The outbreak of war in Korea on June, 25, 1950 prompted the belief in Washington that North Korean troops marched to the Kremlin's cadence and encouraged fears that the Soviets would initiate aggression in other regions. Officials in the State Department began to apply the lessons of Korea to the Middle East.

Evidently, Korea was another area of conflict to which Turkey would pay particular attention to consolidate its position within the western camp. In this framework, **the sixth part** discusses another concurrent struggle on the part of Korea.

Following the surrender of the Japanese forces in Seoul, the Korean lands were divided in two. In fact, almost two years ago, at Cairo in December 1943, the USA, Britain, and China had joined in declaring that in due course Korea should become free and independent. This multilateral pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, and subscribed to by the SU when it entered the war against Japan - following the dropping of A-Bombs - by the USA. In Moscow in December of 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain and the SU concluded an agreement designed to bring about the independence of Korea. This agreement was later adhered to by China. It provided for the establishment of a joint US-Soviet Commission to meet in Korea and, through consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, to decide on methods for establishing a provisional Korean government. The Joint Commission was then to consult with that provisional government on methods of giving assistance to Korea, any agreement reached would be submitted for

approval to the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement. Two years later, the independence of Korea was no further advanced. In the end Korea remained divided.

The demarcation line of the 38th parallel had no basis in Korean history, geography or anything else. It had been settled on hastily in the last week of WW II, as a temporary measure to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops, and those north of the line had surrendered to the Soviets, those in the south, to US forces. Consecutively, the USA continued to support that the best interests of the Korean people would be served by the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Korea at the earliest practicable date. This same view was also embodied in the UN General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, in which provision was made for such withdrawal as soon as practicable after the establishment of the Korean Government which it was the intention of that resolution to bring into being. The SU, in turn, remained reluctant to cooperate in carrying out the provisions of the resolution of November 14.

Throughout 1949, the North Korean leadership continued its efforts to receive aid to incorporate the south. Receiving the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung in the Kremlin on March 5, 1949, Stalin showed obvious concern about the plea of his interlocutor. In the beginning Stalin considered that it would be wise to wait for the maturation of the alleged attacks from the south. In answering Kim, he stated that only if the adversary attacked P'yongyang could they try military reunification by launching a counter-attack.

In the subsequent months, P'yongyang continued to try to persuade the Kremlin that the Northern armed forces were superior to the southern army after the withdrawal of American troops. When, finally, Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending on

September 11, 1949, instructions to the Soviet embassy in P'yongyang to study the military, political, and international aspects of a possible attack on the South, the scene was set for war in Korea.

From the recognition of the Korean Government to the involvement in war over Korea, Turkey's attitude around the developments over this far eastern country gradually moved onwards combining its policy with that of the USA. The UN Security Council's call of June 27, 1950, upon the members of UN for taking a stand against aggression in Korea received a positive response from the Turkish Government as well. The Turkish Government informed the UN Secretary General that a brigade of 4.500 soldiers would be assigned to UN command. No doubt, this policy demarche later became subject of debate in Turkey, paradoxically creating a favourable climate for a renewed application for membership in NATO as well.

Ankara's renewal of its application for membership in NATO in August 1951, following the Menderes Government's decision of contributing troops to the UN Command in Korea was declined by the Council of North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) on the grounds of its smaller members' unwillingness to make commitments for the defense of Turkey.

It is explained that in view of the stalemate in Korea and the course of events in the Middle East, the US policymakers maintained their suspicion that Turkey could reappraise its attitude in the Cold War. Turkey was contributing troops to the struggle in Korea and participating in the defense of freedom and containment of communist totalitarianism in the Middle East. When Ambassador George McGhee visited Turkey in February 1951, President Celal Bayar stated his personal displeasure with the existing partnership. Why should they

assent to the desires of the US Navy to mine the Straits in peacetime and why should they make commitments to allow US forces to use their airbases in war time if they lacked a guarantee of defense cooperation in return ? Why should they accept to be left in a vulnerable position ?

A practicable solution was apparently reached soon after the new British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison's public announcement of UK's support for the admittance of Turkey and Greece to NATO. Subsequently, the idea of creating a common Middle Eastern Defense Board including the USA, UK, France and Turkey was welcomed. Consequently, the Middle Eastern Defence Organization (MEDO) and the Middle Eastern Command (MEC) were established. On October 13, 1951, the Four-Power proposals to incorporate Egypt into the MEC was forwarded. But the turning point came about when the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha, rejected the suggestions for Egypt's agreement with Four-Power statements. To some extent, Egypt's policy towards the west and Israel would become the model to be emulated by all other Arab states.

From then on, the conditions of the Cold War soon dictated its own requirements in Turkish-NATO relations. Here, it is explained that through its participation in the Korean War and in the military/diplomatic efforts aiming at establishing a defensive grouping in the Middle East, Ankara had demonstrated that it had all the assets to assume its responsibilities within NATO. It is finally expressed that, backed by the US evaluation that Turkey's geostrategic position was of tremendous value for the alliance, the difficulties caused by the resistance of the European members of NATO were removed.

II THE MAKING OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: (1941-1945)

Admittedly, many of the underlying motives of the post-war Turkish foreign policy were inherited from the years of the world war. Throughout the war, Ankara remained outside of the conflict, but the Turkish foreign policy makers always perceived a threat of being dragged into it. In the war years, Ankara's threat perceptions were almost equally associated with Berlin and the Kremlin. Besides, the period between the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 and Berlin's declaration of war on Russia on June 22, 1941 dramatically increased Ankara's suspicions of these totalitarian regimes. Hitler's onslaught on Russia could merely introduce a limited change in these assessments. In the eyes of the Turkish statesmen, either allied with Germany or on its own, Moscow was not reliable at all, and was considered as another potential enemy at times.

Indeed, Ankara was at odds between the Nazi-Soviet aggression and the British insistence on Turkish belligerency in accordance with its undertakings as set forth in the October 19, 1939 Anglo-Franco-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty as well. In an international arena which was dominated by the relentless attacks of the aggressors which took over Turkey's neighbours and allies within the Balkan Entente one by one, eventually, Ankara chose to continue its policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Allied side. This being the case, Turkish foreign policy makers' decision to build a strategy to deal with the aggressive totalitarian regimes while maintaining an alliance with the democratic regimes of the West had its roots in these years. Undoubtedly, experiences of the war helped them to quickly

adapt in the post war era which was dominated by Soviet expansionism. Thus, the German and Nazi-Soviet position vis a vis Turkey and their economic and political pressure, and finally, Ankara's emergence as an important political center in which Allied and Axis diplomacy tried to counterbalance each other will be an appropriate starting point.

II . 1 The Question of Turkish Belligerency Reviewed

By the time war broke out in Europe, Turkey was unprepared to resist any large scale aggression. The economy of the early republic was in a state of serious underdevelopment. A considerable foreign debt hindered capital development so essential for an ailing economy. The country was predominantly agrarian and underpopulated.⁵ As for foreign relations, the Kemalist tradition had laid the foundations of a policy in which affiliation with alliances of unclear objectives or similar grouping of states were regarded as a threat to the regime's security. In accordance with this policy, all revisionist attempts and conspiratory endeavours with unrevealed goals were considered as having a negative impact on the international states system.

Immediately after coming to power on January 25, 1939, the government of Dr. Refik Saydam announced the peaceful orientation of Turkish foreign policy as formulated in the

⁵ As late as 1932, the largest portion of the budget (146,210,355 Turkish Liras) was allocated to the repayment of the public debt while only 86,007,582 Liras were expended on defence, finance and other public services. As for the population, it was under 14 million according to the 1927 census, with only 16.4 percent living in urbanized areas. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 94-95.

A census taken on October 21, 1940 gave the population of the Republic as 17,869,901, an increase on the last (1935) census of 1,771,883 or 18 per 1,000 per annum. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. No. IV, 1940-1943, p. 4369.

Government's program. He stated that the spinning developments with changes in every moment in world affairs required Turkey's foreign policy to remain more alert than usual. The contemporary world crisis, bringing the nations against each other, culminating in the removal of states within a few days, was naturally of close interest to the Republican Government. But, he said, all these changes, being next to quick and fundamental developments, did not indicate an alteration in Turkey's foreign policy.⁶

Meanwhile, disturbance of the Turkish officials about the change and unpredictabilities of the SU were obvious. On October, 19, 1939, when Turkey concluded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France and entered into an alliance with Western democracies, the Soviets had expressed satisfaction with this development. However, this was merely an uncelebrated gesture. The Nazi-Soviet Pact - which was soon to be unrevealed - was secretly concluded on August 24 and the visit of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Şükrü Saracoğlu, in the following month, had served as a catalyst for Turkey to immediately enter into a formal alliance with Britain and France. In Moscow, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, had repeatedly put forward the Straits issue and also demanded that Turkey should commit itself not to make war on Germany on behalf of the Western powers.

In November 1940, Molotov's talks in Berlin once more spurred Turkish anxieties of further Germano-Russian agreement. In Berlin, the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von

⁶ From Prime Minister Refik Saydam's speech in TGNA on his government's programme, April, 3, 1939. The MFA Archives. Interestingly, Saydam's speech included a strong commitment to the effective and timely function of the TGNA, in case necessity arose, in a period of quick changes in the international arena: "*With a view towards the general interest of peace and Turkish high interest, we will subject new conditions to a constant examination and alert status and exercise the necessary*

Ribbentrop, proposed to Molotov a plan for extending the three-power pact to include the SU, accompanying it with two secret protocols inspired by those of 1939, and including a revision of spheres of influence on certain bases which envisaged Moscow's control of the region south from Russia towards the Indian Ocean; splitting of Turkey from the western system and modification of the Montreux Convention with a view to assuring only the Black Sea states of unrestricted passage through the Straits and a permanent base for the SU in the Straits.⁷

On November 26, Molotov told the German Ambassador, Schulenburg, that his government accepted Ribbentrop's proposals under the following conditions; the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland; the conclusion of Soviet-Bulgarian treaty of mutual assistance; granting of land and naval bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the SU; recognition of the zone south of Baku and Batum toward the Persian Gulf, as a center of Soviet aspirations; and Japan's renunciation of its rights to coal and oil concessions in northern Sakalin. As Andre Fontaine put it, "*four years later Stalin presented virtually the same demands to the Western Allies. What interested him was the stakes themselves; it*

care with attention to the Great National Assembly to exert its control and right decision timely and fully."

⁷ Hitler disclosed these designs after his invasion of the SU. On this see, *Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, (Washington: US Department of State, 1948), pp. 217-259.

Ribbentrop's proposal on the revision of spheres of influence were on the following bases as well:
Germany: European territorial changes to be postponed until after the conclusion of a peace treaty;
Central Africa.

Italy: Same reservation, North and Northeast Africa.

Japan: The Far East south of the Japanese archipelago.

See, Andre Fontaine, *History of the Cold War*, (NY: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 146-147.

*mattered little to him from what source the promise came so long as the source could deliver.”*⁸

A month later, at 3.00 a.m. in the morning of October 28, the Italian Minister in Athens Grazzi, handed to General Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, an ultimatum in which Greece was accused of tolerating the use of its territorial waters and ports by the British Navy for the prosecution of the war against Italy. Metaxas rejected the ultimatum and told Grazzi that he regarded it as an Italian declaration of war against Greece. At 5.50 a.m., half an hour before the ultimatum was due to expire, Italian troops operating from Albania attacked Greek territory. The British War Cabinet met early the same morning and replied vigorously. The plans already made for extending Greece all help in Britain's power under the guarantee given on April 13, 1939 were reviewed and W. Churchill sent a message to Metaxas. The day after, First Lord of the Admiralty A.V. Alexander declared that British naval help for Greece had already begun.⁹

On the Turkish side, Prime Minister Saydam, broadcasting to the nation, said that the situation was becoming graver. He stressed that Turkey was sure of its power and the nation would not hesitate to defend itself. Meanwhile, the British Ambassador, H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, and the Greek Ambassador saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu, on October 28. The Italian attack on Greece they said, had called into operation Article 2 (1) of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty of October 19, 1939, which provided for Turkey's collaboration effectively and lending the UK and France all aid and assistance in

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁹ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. No. IV, p. 4312.

its power “*in the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are involved.*”¹⁰

However, Saracoğlu responded with the “Protocol Number Two” which was annexed to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Treaty. He stated that Turkey’s belligerency might cause it to become involved in war with the Soviets. Based on this reason, he explained, Turkey would retain its neutrality. In fact, facing an unpredictable neighbour like the Soviet Union, Turkey had demanded the inclusion of the “Protocol Number Two” according to which “*the obligations undertaken by Turkey...can not compel the country to take action having, as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.*”¹¹ with a view to obtaining a general reservation clause to save itself from being dragged into the global conflict.

To justify Ankara’s concerns, on January 17, 1941, having regarded the occupation of these countries by German troops, who were constantly being concentrated in Rumania, as a threat to Russian security, the Soviet Foreign Commissar told the German ambassador that his government considered the Bulgarian territory and the Straits as the security zone of the SU. Berlin paid no attention to this stament. At the end of February, King Boris of Bulgaria

¹⁰ *Ibid.*; For the text of this treaty, see, appendix in, Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

¹¹ *Ibid.* In the meantime, Turkey’s commercial relations with Britain were increasingly continuing. On December 5, 1940, a new financial and trade agreement was announced between the two countries, whereby in exchange for British munitions, rolling stock, textile goods and other Government requirements, Turkey would send agricultural and primary products. Besides, The UK Commercial Corporation, the British Government’s agent, had already arranged under the agreement a contract for 22 locomotives and 650 waggons. *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, Vol. No. IV, p. 4380.

joined the three-power pact and agreed to the German occupation of his country.¹² Under these circumstances, during 1940-41, the issue of the Straits was more than once the subject of negotiations between the Nazi and Soviet leaders.

In fact, Bulgaria's ambiguous position between Germany and the SU had already turned the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship dated February 17, 1941, for which Ankara had felt limited trust, to an ineffective document. The Soviet Foreign Commissar was insisting that the German troops should not enter Bulgaria and this country should be left in the Kremlin's sphere of influence. However, under the pressure of Berlin, Sofia agreed that the German forces would use the Bulgarian territory for transit passage. Facing the unpredictability of Berlin, this time the Kremlin turned to Ankara and suggested the signing of a communiqué along the lines of 1925 non-aggression treaty between the two countries. In their turn, President İnönü and the makers of Turkish foreign policy saw no reason to decline the Russian proposal and the Communiqué was announced in Ankara and in Moscow simultaneously on March 24.¹³

In the meantime, Saracoğlu met with the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. Eden and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, had arrived at Ankara on February 26, after their visit to the Near Eastern fronts for conferences with their counterparts. Prior to the departure of Eden and Dill from Ankara for Athens on March 1, an official

¹² Upon this incident, Molotov handed the German ambassador a memorandum "deploring" the German move and warning Berlin that it could not count on the Kremlin's support on this issue. Andre Fontaine, *History of the Cold War*, pp. 147-148.

¹³ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, Vol. II, 1938-1950, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 7th ed., 1999), pp. 179-180; Kamuran Gürün, *Türk Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953)*, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), p. 239.

communiqué was issued by the Turkish Government which stated that Eden and Dill were received by President İnönü and had conversations with Prime Minister Saydam, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu, and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak. It stated that the two governments recorded their firm adherence to the Turco-British alliance, that the present international situation was examined in detail and special attention was given to the situation in the Balkans, which closely concerned the mutual interests of Turkey and Britain. There was complete agreement between the two governments on their policy with regard to all these problems.¹⁴

In this chaotic international environment, and in the absence of substantial assistance from the Allies, Ankara had shifted to consider the ways in which it could obtain a treaty of non-aggression with Germany in order to balance its international position. Obviously, the ground was not convenient for Turkey to openly pronounce its intention to this effect. Following a period of exchange of letters between İnönü and Hitler, both Turkish and German Foreign Ministries were authorized to draft a treaty which would serve towards this objective. In fact, upon his receipt of İnönü's reply on March 17, 1941, Hitler had gone to the extent of expressing that Germany had ended its friendship with the SU in order to side with Turkey on the issue of the Straits. He said, the Germans had friendly feelings towards Turkey which was Germany's former comrade in arms, and Turkey's presence in the Straits and in İstanbul were in Germany's political interest. Besides, he narrated his talks with the Soviet Foreign Commissar in a distorted manner, and said that Molotov had demanded a base in the Black Sea Straits in order to adhere to the Tripartite pact which he had strongly rejected.

¹⁴ *Communiqué* dated March 1, 1941. The MFA Archives.

As for Bulgaria, the Nazi dictator said, Molotov had demanded to send the Russian forces to this country and in return for this, he had suggested to force the Yugoslavians to cede Macedonia to Bulgaria, a proposal which himself and the King of Bulgaria had declined. According to him, the presence of German troops in this country was serving to save this country from the emergence of Bolshevism. To assure the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, Hüsrev Gerede, of his friendly policy towards Turkey and ultimately to increase Ankara's suspicions of the Kremlin he said, through saving Bulgaria he had assured Turkey's position as a strong and independent country safeguarding the Straits. The Nazi tyrant had basically in mind securing Germany's Balkan wing before launching the offensive against the SU.¹⁵

On March 15, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Münir Ertegün, called on Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, to inform him of certain assurances that the Turkish President İnönü had received from Hitler relative to the German occupation of Bulgaria. In his turn, Hull told his interlocutor a commonly admitted fact that the German dictator had taken this communication out of his stock on hand of similar communications. He had been sending these to each of the dozen countries he had occupied or conquered and he seemed to contemplate sending them to countries whose seizure he had in mind in the future.

Meanwhile in Yugoslavia, following the Regent's acceptance to adhere to the Axis pact, a coup d'état occurred in March 27, 1941 and King Peter assumed control of the country and

¹⁵ As for the Italian attack on Greece, Hitler said, Germany, like Turkey had no responsibility concerning this war. The Nazi dictator put forward one single negative issue which was about the press attacks in Turkey that were directed at both himself and the Nazi regime. Gerede, particularly emphasized this point in his report. See, the report of Turkish Ambassador to Berlin Hüsrev Gerede dated March 17, 1941 to the MFA, in Hüsrev Gerede, *Harb İçinde Almanya*, (İstanbul: ABC Ajansı Yayınları, 1994), pp. 184-185. See also, Johannes Glasneck, *Türkei im Deutsch-Angloamerikanischen Spannungsfeld*, Berlin 1968, trans. Arif Gelen, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, undated), pp. 144-145.

General Simovic became premier. However, Yugoslavia could regain its independence only for the moment. Ten days after the coup, the Germans launched their attack on Yugoslavia and Greece. Expectedly, the Yugoslav coup d'etat which resulted in the overthrow of the Tsvetkovitch Government and its replacement by an-all party government under General Simovitch led to an immediate worsening of relations between Yugoslavia and Germany. On April 1, von Heeren, German Minister in Belgrade, left for Berlin to report after a lengthy conversation with Nintchitch, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, during which he had demanded an apology for the anti-German demonstrations, which marked General Simovitch's coup, immediate ratification of the Tripartite Pact, and demobilization of the Yugoslav army.¹⁶ By the first week of April, reports from all Balkan capitals spoke of the concentration of German troops and mechanized forces on the Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian frontiers of Yugoslavia.

Indeed, Nazi-Soviet relationship was crystalizing around the Balkan situation. *Pravda*, in an article on April 1, contradicting rumours that the Soviet Government had cabled congratulations to General Simovitch's Government, wrote: "*There would have been nothing extraordinary if congratulations had actually been sent. If they were not sent it was perhaps an omission on the part of the Soviet Government, or because the idea did not occur to anyone.*" On the same day, M. Gavrilovitch, Yugoslav Minister without portfolio and Minister in Moscow, had a conference in Ankara after discussions in Moscow. A few days later, on April 3, Lieutenant General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall and Air Vice-Marshal

¹⁶ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. No. IV, p. 4535.

Elmhirst, representing the British Middle East Command, arrived in Ankara for defence talks with Turkish military chiefs.¹⁷

On April 6, within a few hours of the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, a meeting of the Turkish Cabinet was held and the British, Greek and Yugoslav Ambassadors were received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu. Shortly afterwards, on April 9, the Allied diplomatic representatives were informed of the decisions taken by the government on Turkey's attitude in face of the extension of the war in the Balkans. As explained by the Ankara Radio on April 11, the government, following the military situation, might be obliged to make new decisions and the present attitude of non-belligerence was in keeping with Ankara's treaty obligations. It was also stated that this was an initial decision, since there was no way of foretelling future developments of the war, which was being waged at a close distance. Given this, Ankara paid particular attention to the attitude of Bulgaria and it was reported that the Bulgarian Minister had denied statements by the Yugoslav Minister that Bulgarian troops were operating with the Germans.

Against this background, on June 18, 1941, the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Germany was signed by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Saracoğlu and German Ambassador Franz Von Papen in Ankara. Article 1 of the treaty stated that "*The Republic of Turkey and the German Reich mutually undertake to respect the inviolability and territorial integrity of each other and to refrain from every action directed at directly or indirectly against each other.*"¹⁸ The subsequent article included that Turkey and Germany binded

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ For the text of the treaty which was signed in Turkish and German languages, see, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Alman Reich'i Arasında Andlaşma", in İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Dış*

themselves in the future on all questions concerning their common interests to meet in friendly contact to reach an understanding on the treatment of such questions. Thus, at least on paper, the Turkish position in war was moved a step forward towards the center between the Allies and the Axis. Interestingly, the TGNA ratified this treaty on June 25, 1941 with Law No. 4072, three days after Germany's attack on Russia. The protocol pertaining to the ratification of the treaty was signed by the Turkish Ambassador Gerede and the Secretary General of the MFA, Cevat Açıkalın and his German counterpart Ernst Weisaecker in July 5, 1941, in Berlin.

On the other hand, having concluded such an agreement Turkey was not less suspicious of either German or Soviet acts since the memory of the short-lived Nazi-Soviet pact was still in minds. After Germany's invasion on June 22, 1941, the Soviet attitude towards Turkey changed overnight. Formerly, Ankara had been blamed for not maintaining complete neutrality, now it was gradually accused of objectively serving the interests of Germany by staying neutral.

As for the German attack on Russia, by the autumn of 1941, the German war-machine had understood that the Russian defense would not allow its advance as envisaged by the Operation Barbarossa. From then on, the German concept of lightning war turned to a deadlock and the center of gravity of the German onslaught was gradually shifted to the south and north wings of the front. This brought the case of Turkey under discussion again by Germany. However, it was eventually decided to refrain from coercive methods in relations

Münasebetleriyle İlgili Başlıca Siyasi Andlaşmaları, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, TTK Basımevi, 1965), pp. 293-294; Hüsrev Gerede, *Harb İçinde Almanya*, p. 212.

with Ankara while the option of developing an attack through Anatolia was shelved for the time being.¹⁹ Then Ribbentrop instructed Papen firstly, to enhance Turkey's confidence to the effect that Germany had no territorial claims over Turkey, and recognized it as the guardian of the Straits; to revitalize the deep seated imperialistic tendencies of Turkey against Russia; and finally, to decline all the suggestions of Ankara for a conciliatory peace with Britain.²⁰

On August 19, 1941, Ribbentrop told Gerede that the Red Army would be destroyed within a few weeks. In his turn, Gerede told his interlocutor that based on the informations he had from American sources, he had found this information to be exaggerated. When Ribbentrop inquired as to what he had thought in regard to the people of Turkish origin in the Caucasia and in the east of Caspian Sea, Gerede told him that in line with the official policy of Turkey, Ankara had no claims beyond its frontiers. Shortly afterwards, in Ankara, Saracoğlu communicated the content of the Ribbentrop-Gerede talk to the British Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen.²¹

In fact, considerable evidence suggest that as his personal choice - which no doubt had an effect on his interpretation of issues - Saracoğlu maintained a strong anti-Communist policy. Correspondingly, on September 30, he told Papen that he attributed utmost importance to the overthrow of Bolshevism. But, he said, "*the chauvinist circles were suggesting to their leadership to wait for the development of the military operation in silence.*"²²

¹⁹ Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de...*, pp. 156-157.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

²¹ For an interesting account of Saracoğlu-Knatchbull-Hugessen talks, see, Barry Rubin, *Istanbul Intrigues*, (NY: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1989), pp. 45-47.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 159. Meanwhile, on August 10, 1941, Britain and the SU communicated to the Turkish Government that they never had claims on the Straits while the Kremlin further expressed that in

On July, 9, 1942, Şükrü Saracoğlu - now Prime Minister, after Dr. Saydam's death on July 8 - explaining his government's foreign policy stated that Turkey, who had not and would nor run after any adventure outside of its frontiers, had searched for the ways in which it could stay out of the war and had found those ways in its march on a conscious and positive neutrality. He said, "*Turkey would not and will not be able to preserve its neutrality through a negative impartiality before a tragedy which has been devastating and ruining the world for three years. Turkey's impartiality is the processed form of an international system. And our policy has a sincerity and transparency which will not drag anyone into anxiety.*"²³ Saracoğlu emphasized that Turkey's alliance agreement with England would continue to serve both parties as a beneficial instrument, and that the Turco-British alliance was the expression of reality brought into existence as an essential pillar of the international political system. He maintained that another clear and sincere manifestation of this policy was the Turco-German agreement which confirmed the mutual understanding and friendship between Turkey and Germany. Turkish position towards these two major opposing parties and Turkey's relations with each of these states were therefore "*clear examples of this positive policy.*"²⁴

view of the German propaganda, it saw a necessity to repeat its assurance which it had lastly expressed in the Communiqué dated March 24, 1941 that the SU had no claims on the Turkish territory and the Straits. Ernst Jache, P. Kuturman (trans.), *Yükselen Hilal*, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1946), pp. 273-274; Yüksel İnan, *Türk Boğazlarının Siyasal ve Hukuksal Rejimi*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1995), p. 104.

²³ From Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu's speech in TGNA on his government's programme on July 9, 1942. The MFA Archives.

²⁴ Ibid.

II.2 In Time of War Prepare For Peace: Strains and Stresses of Wartime

Diplomacy

Upon entering WW II, the USA considered the ways to bring allies closer and took the lead in drawing up and signing the Declaration of the United Nations on January 1, 1942. Other signatories were Britain, the SU and China, five nations of the British Commonwealth, the governments in exile of eight European countries overrun by the Axis powers, and nine states of Latin America that had followed the USA into the war. The original signatories numbered twenty-six and as will be discussed later, particularly with an emphasis on the Turkish Government's declaration of war on Germany and Japan and adherence to the UN, before the war's end the number had increased to forty-seven.²⁵

The principles of the Atlantic Charter were endorsed by the SU with an interpretative approach and were accepted by the governments signing the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942. The Kremlin, meanwhile, was working towards ends that directly contradicted the principle of self-determination, emphasized in the Atlantic Charter. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, visiting Moscow in December 1941, was confronted with a demand that Britain recognize Russia's annexation of the Baltic States and a part of Finland. In his turn, Eden felt obliged to pass on Moscow's proposal to London and

²⁵ The signatories in order were the US, the UK, the USSR, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia. Subsequent signatories were Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela. All of these governments declared war against one or more of the Axis powers.

Washington. Washington promptly rejected the demand since it was in conflict with the Atlantic Charter. Churchill concurred at the time, however in March 1942, he admitted, *“under the pressure of events, I did not feel that this moral position could be physically maintained. In a deadly struggle it is not right to assume more burdens than those who are fighting for a great cause can bear.”* Accordingly, he wrote Roosevelt:

...The increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny to Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her. This was the basis on which Russia acceded to the Charter...

I hope therefore that you will be able to give us a free hand to sign the treaty which Stalin desires as soon as possible...²⁶

Foreign Commissar Molotov, visiting London in May 1942, added eastern Poland and a slice of Romania to the claims which Moscow demanded recognition. In their turn, the British and US officials declined these claims, while Molotov settled for a twenty-year treaty of alliance with Britain in which both governments agreed to act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. For the time being, this phraseology accorded well with the Atlantic Charter.

In January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Casablanca. Stalin was invited to attend the meeting, but he informed the US President and the British Prime Minister that he was unable to leave Russia at the time of the great offensive which he himself, as Commander-in-Chief, was directing. On January 26, 1943, in his remarks to the press correspondents at the close of conference, Roosevelt informed the reporters that the Democracies' war plans were

to extricate the “unconditional surrender” of the Axis. The use of this phrase, which had been endorsed in advance by Churchill and the British War Cabinet was evidently intended to convince the Kremlin that the USA and Britain were determined to fight the war to a finish. However, in the opinion of most analysts, it had the unintended and unfortunate effect of stiffening enemy resistance and postponing the day of surrender. Conducing to the complete destruction of German and Japanese military potential, it helped to ensure the collapse of the balance of power and the military ascendancy of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia.²⁷

Indeed, among the essential factors which created a power vacuum in Europe was the doctrine of 'Unconditional Surrender' put forward by Churchill and Roosevelt and their Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference in January of 1943. Obviously, in certain respects the strategy of 'Unconditional Surrender' worked to Stalin's advantage. It increased the "*proletarianisation*" of the people of Germany and Central Europe, and made them more susceptible to Communist influence. Secondly, the propounded doctrine meant that the Red Army, having advanced to Elbe, would have a legitimate reason for staying there and "*for maintaining what would amount to occupation forces in the countries through which its supply lines ran*".²⁸ Having understood the undelightful course of developments, for the rest of the remaining eighteen months of war, Churchill would try to persuade the Americans that

²⁶ Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate (The Second World War), Vol. IV*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p 327.

²⁷ For an interesting account of this declared policy and its repercussions see, H.W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War*, (NY: Harper&Row Publishers, 1950), pp 683-691; Anne Armstrong, *Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy on World War II*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961).

²⁸ Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle For Europe*, (NY: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 714.

the war should be fought for the dual purpose of defeating Germany, and forestalling the emergence of the SU as a mighty power in the center of Europe.

At the close of a twelve days' conference between October 19-30, 1943 in Moscow, the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three issued a communiqué and a number of declarations concerning Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, France and Austria. Within this framework, it was agreed to set up in London a European Advisory Commission to study and make recommendations upon questions that might arise as the war developed. China was invited to join in a Declaration of Four Nations on General Security in which the four governments pledged that the united action of wartime would be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security, and recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international conference towards this end.

Consecutively, it was agreed that the next meeting would be at Teheran. This was as far as Stalin could be induced to travel from Russia at the time. In his turn, the Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek did not hesitate to fly to Cairo where he conferred with Roosevelt and Churchill as they stopped there en route to Tehran. In Cairo, the three leaders issued a declaration of significance for the post-war Far East:

...It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territory Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.²⁹

²⁹ Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., (NJ:Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), p. 426.

Roosevelt was to meet Stalin for the first time in November 1943. A month before that, Secretary of State Hull had gone to Moscow to confer with his Russian and British counterparts. In the meantime, Italy had surrendered to the Allied forces and German corps were being steadily pushed back. The Russian armies had taken the offensive as well. The tide of war had evidently turned and the time was nearer to consider post-war settlements.

The talks between the Turkish President İnönü and Churchill in Adana on January 30-31, 1943; the Cairo Talks between the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, and the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on November, 4-6, 1943, where the Allied decision of inviting Turkey to take its part on the Allied side (made at the Moscow Conference of October, 19) was expressed to the Turkish Officials; and finally the Cairo Conference of December, 5-8, 1943 between Roosevelt, Churchill and İnönü constituted a background in which Turkey chose to continue the talks with the Allied powers while adopting a benevolent neutrality in the course of events.

During the war, three other conferences were held between the heads of governments of the 'Big Three'. To many analysts, Turkey's entry into the war was considered as it would have a direct effect in the form of diverting nine Bulgarian divisions and leave the Germans alone to battle in Yugoslavia and Greece. In this context, at Teheran, Churchill assured Stalin that Britain "*had no ambitious interests in the Balkans but merely wanted to pin down the German Divisions there*".³⁰ In his turn, Stalin replied to his question on whether or not the

³⁰ Cited in, Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945*, pp. 198-199, see note (23) on p. 199 as well.

Turkish negotiators should be incited to war by stating, “*I am all in favour of trying again. We ought to take them by the scruff of the neck if necessary*”.³¹ It was however, put forward that the Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes of the first plenary meeting registered the opposite and cited Stalin as having commented that Turkey could not be brought in by force. At Teheran, in November 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin negotiated the Anglo-American plan for the Second Front. On November 28, at the first session of Teheran, Churchill raised the issue of Turkey’s entry into the war. According to him, opening the Straits would allow a free flow of supply and war equipment to the Soviets and the Allies would use the Turkish airports. He asked his counterparts as to which could be the most efficient way for Turkish belligerency in strategic terms. The questions he posed were as follows: Should Turkey first attack Bulgaria and then declare war on Germany ? Should it confine its military drive to Thrace or shift to a larger offensive - If this approach was adopted, what would Bulgarians think about Russia which was their prime liberator - ? And lastly, what kind of affects could be expected on the part of Roumania - a country which was at odds between surrounding Axis or Allied forces and striving for moving out of war - or on Hungary ? According to Valentin Berezhkov, a diplomat of the Soviet delegation, Churchill addressed these questions to Stalin and added that these were matters of specific problems on which Russians had particular views. As will be stated below, Stalin gradually shifted to adopt an attitude less hopeful of Turkey’s entry into war. He expressed his belief that no pressure was likely to lead to this effect.

³¹ Cited in ibid.

However, Churchill emphasized that Turkey should be deceived or pressed hard to accept belligerency before Christmas, and he was willing to undertake the mission of informing the Turkish President İnönü of the decisions reached at Teheran. Churchill also stated that he was ready to tell İnönü that in case Turkey rejected the Allies' proposal to join the war, he would state that this could have serious implications for Turkey and could effect its rights over the Straits. Moreover, he added that Britain would not be frustrated if Turkish belligerency could not be realized. The invasion of some Turkish islands could also be considered since this could secure the way through the Dardanelles. He said, this would not bother Germany either which could continue its activities in the region. On November 29, the military experts stated similar views regarding Turkish belligerency as it would have rather positive results for the Allies.

At the last day of the conference, Harry Hopkins, special aide of Roosevelt, said that the problem of Turkish belligerency depended on how much aid could be transferred to Turkey from the USA and Britain. Apart from this, it was required to harmonize Turkey's entry into war with the Allies' general strategy. When Stalin recalled that Churchill had mentioned earlier to allocate 2 to 3 divisions and some further war equipment to Turkey, Churchill denied this statement and replied that these 2 or 3 divisions were planned to be used if the invasion of Turkish islands was decided. The military arsenal which could be allocated to Turkey could comprise 17 air squadrons deployed in Egypt under the Anglo-American joint command and, three anti-aircraft regiments to cooperate in Turkey's air defense. In his turn, Roosevelt explained that he was keen on keeping the promises given to Ankara, whereas he

had strong anxieties given the incomplete war preparations of the JCS for OVERLORD. He said, he would prefer if this issue did not alter the agreement reached the day before.

While these deliberations were going on, Stalin chose to forward no further argument with a view to endanger plans of OVERLORD. When Churchill demanded that the USA add military equipment to British offers for Turkey, Roosevelt responded that he would need to consult his military advisors first. At a later stage, when Eden suggested that Turkey might be convinced to open its airports to the Allies, Stalin said that if Turkey opened its airports to the Allies, it was fairly possible that Bulgarians would not attack Turkey. The Germans would not attack Turkey either and expect Turks to attack first. In the meantime, “*The Allies would use Turkish airports and harbours and this was a very good thing.*”³²

To sum up, although he was ready to exploit the occasion, Stalin postponed a full discussion of the overall Soviet territorial demands, whereas he realized a preliminary agreement on the boundaries with Poland. As for Turkey, at Teheran, the USA was convinced that it would inevitably get involved in the Aegean and the Straits if Turkey entered the war. Stalin also reversed the position his Foreign Minister had taken at the Moscow Conference, and instead of supporting the British on the question of Turkey, sided with Roosevelt. He expressed that it would be better to concentrate all efforts upon OVERLORD and to consider the other campaigns as diversionary. Stalin said that he had lost hope of Turkey’s entering the war, and was now certain that it would not, in spite of all the pressure that might be exerted.³³ However, considerable evidence suggests that the SU,

³² Valentin Berezhkov (Trans. Hasan Ali Ediz), *Tahran 1943*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1970), p. 143.

³³ *FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, p. 505.

together with Britain, was still interested in Turkey's entry into the war. Churchill himself, was also ready to exploit Russian ambitions since he suggested that such a large land mass as Russia deserved access to a warm-water port and this could be settled agreeably between friends. Then Stalin inquired about the regime of the Dardanelles. He said "*Since England no longer objected, it would be well to relax that regime.*"³⁴

Consecutively, on United States' invitation, the US, British, Russian and Chinese representatives met between August 21-October 9, 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks, a mansion in the Georgetown area of Washington. The outcome was a charter drafted along the lines of the 4th paragraph of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security mentioned above, similar to the Covenant of the League of Nations but, it was hoped without its faults. As will be briefly discussed later, it was accepted at the Yalta Meeting with modifications, subject to final action by a conference of all nations at war with the Axis powers.

With a view to the agenda of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Big Three, Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov held a meeting at Moscow on October, 19, 1943, where the Soviets demanded that the three powers coerce Turkey immediately into war, and open the Second Front in the spring of 1944 as scheduled. Considerable evidence suggests that it was agreed then between Britain and the Soviets to push Turkey into the war on their side in one way or another. As will be briefly discussed, eventually, for the British, the most appropriate way to do that appeared as extending military aid to Turkey, around

³⁴ Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945*, (NY: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 199-200. Stalin did not neglect to imply that he was merely interested to discuss the issue on general terms. In his turn, Churchill was still cautious while trying to bring Turkey into the war and at the same time was pleased to send a message to the Turks that their refusal to accept would have serious political and territorial consequences regarding the future status of the Straits after the war.

which they made a few attempts that remained in vain given the problems of furnishing the poorly equipped Turkish army while the global conflict was being carried on.

When Hitler's weakened Eastern Front allowed the Soviets to advance from the Vistula to the Oder, right before the Yalta Conference, *"This strategic situation reacted directly on the diplomatic discussions of that historic conference, for Stalin, having overwhelmed his enemies in the field, was able to outmaneuver his allies at the conference table."*³⁵

The Yalta Meeting was held in February 1945. It has been said that at Yalta, the SU was empowered to establish its control over the liberated countries of Eastern Europe. In effect, the Soviets were already in military occupation of all Eastern Europe, except Greece, which was liberated by the British forces in 1944. In the previous meeting of Teheran, the scheme put forward by Churchill to invade Eastern Europe, which would have forestalled the SU, might have altered the situation, but it lacked the support of the USA.

At Yalta, Roosevelt was anxious to ensure the SU's involvement in the war against Japan. However, Stalin appeared in the remaining months of the war, highly interested in assuring Russian domination in the heart of Europe, moving up the Danube through Bucharest and Belgrade to Budapest and Poland. Stalin persuaded General Eisenhower to hold back the Western advance to Prague and resumed the attack on Berlin only when the Americans were near the German capital. Thomson stated that, *"It was military strategy in WW II and not the diplomacy of Yalta which created power vacuums on either side of Russia into which it*

³⁵ Explicitly, the timing of the conference was quite unfortunate for the Western Allies, coming as it did just after the setback they had suffered in the Ardennes, while the Red Army was winning continuous victories in Poland. See also, Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle...*, p. 12.

irresistibly expanded."³⁶ Given this, the crucial question for the Western leaders was how much farther would the SU expand? In this political atmosphere, at Yalta, the Big Three arranged for a conference to be held at San Francisco to draft the Charter of a United Nations Organisation. The date set for the conference was April 25, the place, San Francisco.

Regarding Roosevelt's concerns, agreement was reached on a matter of great importance to the USA. This was the SU's undertaking to enter the war against Japan. However, Soviet policy in collaborating with the USA was not genuine. Within three months after the collapse of Germany, Stalin demanded the return of Russia's 1905 losses and the recognition of Soviet interests in Manchuria.

Another diverging difference arose over Poland. The Soviets had established at Lublin, a communist dominated provisional government which rivalled the exiled Polish government in London. At Yalta, Britain and the USA agreed to withdraw recognition from the Polish government in London in return for holding free elections in Poland.³⁷ Although the SU was allowed to retain those provinces it had acquired with Nazi collaboration in 1939, little agreement could be reached over the frontiers of Poland. It was finally agreed that Poland should be compensated in the north and west at Germany's expense.

At Yalta, in the fifth plenary meeting, Stalin used Turkey as a symbol in raising the issue of which states should be admitted and which should be excluded. In fact, at Yalta, each of the Big Three advocated the invitation of countries who sided with them in the course of war

³⁶ Kenneth W. Thomson, *Cold War Theories Vol. I: World Polarization 1943-1953* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), p. 29.

³⁷ Graham Ross, *Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914-1945*, (NY: Longman, 1991), p. 143.

to the United Nations. Then Roosevelt stated a principle that only those nations that had declared war on Germany should be accepted to the status of Associated Nation and suggested March 1945 as the deadline for the as yet uncommitted to declare war on Germany. Referring to Turkey, Stalin declared that certain nations had “*wavered and speculated on being on the winning side.*”³⁸ In his turn, Churchill responded that if a large group of hitherto uncommitted nations were to declare war at this time it would have an effect on Germany’s morale. Churchill also added that Turkey’s candidacy “*would not be greeted with universal approbation*”. But, he concluded that Turkey had allied with them at a very difficult time and had proved both friendly and helpful.³⁹

Stalin also speculated about the Montreux Convention as it was outmoded and needed revision. In the end, it was agreed that the negotiation of the issue would be included in the agenda of the first meeting of Foreign Ministers to be held in London. The Soviets turned their attention towards Turkey. Shortly after the conclusion of Yalta, in order to bring pressure upon Turkey, on March 19, 1945, Moscow informed Ankara that it would terminate the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression of December, 17, 1925, renewed in accordance with a protocol dated November 7, 1935. According to this protocol, the treaty itself was renewed for 10 years, to be prolonged by tacit consent for further 2-year periods unless denounced 6 months before expiry. If therefore the treaty were not to remain operative

³⁸ *Yalta Papers, Fifth Plenary Meeting, February 8, 1945, Bohlen Minutes*, Cited in, Weisband, Edward, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945*, pp. 299-300. See also, *FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 1945, (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1955), pp. 771-82.

³⁹ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri, (1920-1953)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 276-277.

until at least November 7, 1947, it would have to be denounced by one party or the other by May 7, 1945, at the latest.

It was also understood that the SU had not informed the Allies of its decision a priori. The memorandum Molotov handed the Turkish Ambassador, Selim Sarper, on the same day included that though the Soviet Government, with a view to continuation of the friendship relations of the two parties appreciated the value of this agreement, because of the deep changes emerged during WW II, had found the agreement inappropiate for the new conditions and, with its conviction that it required an amelioration in a serious manner wished to terminate the agreement in concern.⁴⁰ On March 21, the US Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, reported to Washington that it had been anticipated in Turkish circles in Moscow that the Russians would denounce the treaty, and the Turkish Ambassador had avised his government to this effect one or two months ago. Then the denunciation itself was not a surprise, but the circumstances in which it took place were unexpected. According to Harriman, Sarper had arranged to return to Ankara for a period of consultation which was expected to last several weeks. He was scheduled to depart on March 25 and on March 19 he informed the Foreign Commissariat that before his departure to Ankara he would be glad to call on Molotov for a courtesy visit since he had nothing to discuss with him. To Sarper's surprise, Assistant Foreign Commissar Kavtaradze told him that he was invited to call the same day on 15.00 hrs. Harriman explained that Molotov informed the Turkish Ambassador of the denunciation of the treaty and told him that the Soviet Government had intended to take this step at a somewhat later date, but in view of his impending departure had decided to

⁴⁰ İsmail Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Kronolojisi ve Türkiye*, (İstanbul: ISIS Yayıncılık, 1997), pp. 3-4.

act at once, in order that he might be able to discuss Turkish-Russian relations with his government against this background. Although Molotov had used this ostensible reason as a pretext to communicate the decision of the Kremlin, at this stage Harriman chose not to alert Washington, and stated in his assessment that Soviet Foreign Commissar's attitude was consistently friendly and correct, and there was no intimation on his part that the action reflected ill feeling or any tendency to bring pressure on Turkey.

According to Harriman, Sarper then inquired about Molotov's views as to the ways in which the present treaty might be "improved". However, Molotov was unwilling to commit himself on this point, and said that after the Ambassador had talked with his government he would be glad to learn how the Turkish Government felt on this point. He evaluated that in denouncing the treaty, the Russians had in mind the anticipated discussion of the Montreux Convention at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three Allies.

The US Ambassador, however, said the denunciation of the treaty made it possible for them to insist on the early redefinition, in a new agreement, of their relations with Turkey and thus opened up a channel of pressure on the Turkish Government, which might prove useful as the question of the Straits again came under discussion. Interestingly, he needed to emphasize that the Soviet-Bulgarian policy seemed pointed in the same direction. He stated that it was evidently Russian tactics to maneuver the Turks into coming forward first with their ideas on the redefinition of Turkish-Russian relations. What would come after that was of course impossible to predict, but the Russians would then be free to accept or to criticize the Turkish suggestion as they liked, and issues might be raised in the course of these discussions which would provide opportunities for the exertion of strong political pressure.

Not surprisingly, this in turn, would open several possibilities. In this context, Turkey might be asked to accept in advance broader discussions, a given set of Soviet views with respect to the regime of the Straits, on the assumption that it would be difficult for any outside power to challenge or ignore a program advanced by the two countries most directly concerned.⁴¹

II . 3 Implications of New Soviet Tactics and the Turkish “Long Telegram”

During the war, Turkey’s suspicions were first confirmed when Nazi-Soviet Pact was concluded. Following that, Moscow had refused to withdraw its forces from Iran, and conspired in an assassination attempt against the German Ambassador to Ankara, which further deteriorated Russo-Turkish relations.⁴² Thus, it came as no surprise when on March, 13, 1945, Moscow announced its intent to renounce the December, 17, 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with Turkey.⁴³

⁴¹ *FRUS*, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 1221-1223.

⁴² *Ibid.* Upon this incident, the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin Hüsrev Gerede, sent a personal telegram to Papen to whom he expressed great sympathy and named him as his old fellow-in-arms, sincere friend and valuable colleague, on February, 25, 1942 and arranged another telegram to be sent by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Berlin on the same day. He also visited Secretary General of the German Foreign Ministry, Ernst V. Weizsaecker to convey the Turkish Governments’ and his personal sadness about the incident. Though Weizsaecker warmly welcomed Gerede, a few days later on March 3, asked him for another visit to the German Ministry and to the disturbance of Gerede, conveyed German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop’s message demanding his personal knowledge regarding the dark side of the assassination attempt and in case he had no further information, to pass this request to the Turkish Government. When the Ankara Radio broadcasted police investigation report on March 5, to leave this unpleasant debate behind, Gerede dispatched its German translation to the Ministry. See, Hüsrev Gerede, *Harb İçinde Almanya 1939-1942*, (İstanbul: Binay Matbaacılık, 1994), pp. 347-348.

⁴³ This treaty between Turkey and the SU, named the Treaty of Friendship, Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality or the Treaty of Non-aggression and Neutrality throughout the relevant literature, referred to one single document which is the December, 17, 1925 treaty between Turkey and the SU. For a detailed discussion of the issue, including the prior agreements of March, 16, 1921 Moscow and

Soviet charges against Turkey of weakening the Allies through maintaining political and commercial relations with Germany had become more aggressive particularly after the battle of Stalingrad. In his turn, President İnönü chose to repel Soviet charges through suppressing both the extreme leftist and rightist activities in Turkey. In his speech on May 19, 1944, İnönü stated that when the Independence War of Turkey ended, Turkey was friendly with only the Soviets and in the present international arena, those who claimed that Turkey had become racist and Pan-Turanist were serving the interests of foreigners. He said, “*it is for sure that those who wish to perpetuate these ideas which will only bring trouble and disaster to the Turkish nation will be of no service to the Turkish nation.*”⁴⁴ Then, the arrests to which the government gave wide publicity followed.

To the disturbance of Turkish officials, the SU had persistently sought ways in which Turkey could be channelled to follow a special kind of relationship with itself. This had become repeatedly evident particularly towards the end of the war. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, interviewed Sergei Vinogradov, the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara on May 22, 1944, just two weeks before his resignation due to increasing British pressures on Turkey’s chromite trade with Germany in exchange for weaponry. In their talks, Menemencioğlu felt obliged to tell Vinogradov that Turkey

October, 13, 1921 Kars, between Turkey and the SU. See, Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, pp. 63-71, 109-118, respectively.

⁴⁴ Uğur Mumcu, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı*, (Ankara: Um:ag Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), pp. 46-47. See this work for a detailed examination of the issue regarding the cases of both leftist and rightist extremists. See also, Günay Göksu Özdoğan, “II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarındaki Türk-Alman İlişkilerinde İç ve Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Pan-Türkizm” (Pan-Turkism As An Instrument of Domestic and Foreign Policy in Turkish-German Relations During the Years of WW II), in Faruk Sönmezoğlu, 1st ed., *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), pp. 357-372.

considered Turco-Soviet relations as having an independent nature, and implied that relations with the SU were not under the influence of Britain and the USA. He further stated that issues raised in the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Molotov's statement to the press on April 2, 1944, regarding the situation in the Balkans in general, and Roumania in particular, might be turned to an agreement between Turkey and the SU since these countries shared the view that cooperation in the Balkans would be the first step for cooperation in European affairs.

Saracoğlu's fairly negative experience when he visited Moscow in September 1939 to conclude a mutual cooperation pact limited to the Black Sea and the Straits still remembered, Menemencioğlu suggested that such an understanding could include the expression that the two countries would undertake political consultations in case circumstances threatening their security and interests arise. Though Vinogradov was pleased to hear Menemencioğlu, Moscow's response which came on June 5 was not in the affirmative. The Kremlin stated that before Turkey terminated its relationship with Germany through making a fundamental transformation in this respect and declare war on this country, no political agreement would likely to produce any effect.

On June 15, this time, General Secretary Cevat Açıkalın, who resumed the talks following Menemencioğlu's leave of office, interviewed Vinogradov. He told Vinogradov that the SU handled the issues of improving Turco-Soviet relations and political consultations and cooperation in the Balkans separately and regarding the latter, laid down the condition of Turkey's declaration of war on Germany. Açıkalın asked if the SU had a condition concerning the improvement of Turco-Russian relations as well. Instructed by the Kremlin, Vinogradov started a tour d'horizon, expressing a series of Russian views and expectations

on the trial of the Russian citizen who attempted to assassinate von Papen, Panturanistic movements in Turkey directed at people of Turkish origin in the Caucasus and Central Asia, press attacks against Russia, and the negative effects of the friendship treaty which Turkey concluded with Germany three days before the German assault towards Russia. In his turn Açıkalın stated:

“You were not just affiliated with Germany through a military aggression pact, but as a political partner in actual practice. On our return from Moscow a couple of months ago [Açıkalın referred to the visit of Şükrü Saracoğlu to Moscow in September 1939 - following the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 24 which lasted nearly a month, however, without any outcome], as an answer to our proposal for cooperation, we had a German reservation in our pocket handed over to us by yourself...Do you mean it was no sin when you had laid down the condition of a German reservation for our proposal for cooperation, but it is bad of us as we concluded a non-aggression treaty with Germans through succeeding to make Germans accept our alliance when and despite German armies had reached our frontiers and there was no possibility to expect any assistance from our Allies ?”⁴⁵

What brought Turkish apprehensions concerning the ambitions of the Kremlin “*to a near fever pitch in September 1944, notwithstanding the moderate Soviet position toward Iran, Czechoslovakia, Finland and Romania, was the Russian invasion of Bulgaria.*”⁴⁶ On September 8, in an attempt to appease the Kremlin, the Bulgarian Government, headed by Constantine Muraviev, broke diplomatic relations with Berlin and called for an armistice with the SU. However, Soviet troops under Marshal Tolbukhin had already begun to invade Bulgaria. The next day, Kimon Georgiev, the pro-Soviet leader of the Fatherland Front assumed the Premiership and King Simeon II was forced to consent to the new regime. From

⁴⁵ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri...*, pp. 264-265.

⁴⁶ Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy...*, p. 277.

then on, the possibility of a synthesis between Bulgarian irredentism and Soviet supported Communist menace alarmed Ankara. Thus, Ankara suddenly found itself bordering a country “*which had long been irredentist toward Thrace and Macedonia, had long openly coveted a port on the Aegean, and which had now become the instrument not only of Bulgarian nationalism but of Soviet expansionist aspirations as well.*”⁴⁷ Anxieties in Ankara grew when Tito, along with Georgiev broached the subject of Pan-Slavism in January 1945.

Turkey finally declared war on Germany and Japan and adhered to the Charter of the UN on February 23, 1945 through the unanimous vote of existing 401 members of parliament in the TGNA.⁴⁸ In his speech before the Assembly, Prime Minister Saracoğlu expressed that Turkey had sided with the democratic nations since the breakout of the war threat. He stated that Turkey had proceeded in the same direction with its Assembly and the Government and this time “*...would like to fulfill the place that we have actually been occupying in official terms as well*” and towards this objective, Turkey declared war against Germany and Japan, in accordance with the good of the world and humanity and the national interests.⁴⁹ From then on, admittedly, Turkey approached the end of the war with closer ties to its ally, Britain, somewhat strained. George Harris maintained that if Turkey focused its attention primarily on dealing with the British in the supply of war material rather than addressing

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 278. Interestingly, Necmettin Sadak, a journalist who would be appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs a few years later in September 1947, showed a relative calmness in his column in *Akşam* explaining that the SU was acting in consonance with the British and the Americans and that the invasion merely suggested that the Kremlin intended to treat all defeated Axis countries alike. See, *Ayn Tarihi*, Vol. 130, September 1944, pp. 269-270. However, most of the voices in the press pronounced a heavy criticism of the Russian invasion of Bulgaria.

⁴⁸ *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), February 24, 1945, No: 5940, p. 1.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

itself to Washington with the same urgency, this was because Britain was a formal ally and in fact served as the main channel for equipment during the war.⁵⁰

Turning back to Turco-Soviet talks, on June 7, 1945, Molotov received the Turkish Ambassador S. Sarper, as will be discussed below, to introduce a pragmatic solution to the deterioration in bilateral relations. In this context, before he left Ankara for Moscow, Sarper was instructed to deliver Turkey's offer of an alliance with the SU.

At the outset of talks, to the surprise of Sarper, Molotov first criticized the Moscow Agreement of March 16, 1921, and demanded that the injustice done by this agreement should be corrected. The point raised by Molotov was quite distasteful for Turkey since the agreement in concern had laid down the basis of bilateral relations. Now, the Soviets had declared that they no longer appreciated it, and on the contrary expressed their view that they were interested in changing it. The Soviet Foreign Commissar's statement included that the SU had suffered immense losses during the war, and it was compelled to spend a part of its energy for its security in the Black Sea. The situation in this region had not turned to a source of threat but the Soviets had felt that "*the fate of 200 million people depended on Turkey's will.*"⁵¹ Molotov added that they were sure of Turkey's goodwill, but they could not rely on its capability to defend the Straits. When it was understood that no agreement was likely, Sarper suggested to leave this issue aside and continue the talks on other matters. Molotov stated that they might not negotiate this issue, but this would not mean that they had settled down all questions of dispute between the two countries.

⁵⁰ As told by George Harris in a personal interview. September 1999, Bilkent University, Ankara.

⁵¹ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953*, p. 284.

Sarper's difficulty to state Turkey's proposal for an alliance with the SU continued since Molotov insisted on inquiring as to which guarantees Ankara could give to Moscow in case two countries entered into an alliance. Sarper told his interlocutor that the joint defense of the Straits could be subject to discussions of military experts in case the necessity arose, and it was evident that Turkey would do whatever necessary to be victorious if it was left with no option but to engage in war. Then, Molotov turned to the issue of revising the Montreux Convention and to the astonishment of Sarper, put forward that both countries might hold parallel negotiations for an alliance and determining a joint approach towards the regime of the Straits concurrently. Regarding the Soviet Foreign Commissar's last statement, Sarper expressed that if talks were held for the revision of Montreux in the future, this could only be a mere exchange of views since any revision in the convention was a matter of multilateral talks in the form of a conference to be held specifically for this purpose. However, there would be a difference between pursuing these talks under existing conditions and with an alliance with the SU. Following another futile round of talks, Sarper suggested to state the issues to be negotiated in the form of articles. However, Molotov declined this proposal and said that any agreement could only be made after the issues were settled. In the end, all the matters negotiated were left unsolved.

Right after the talks, Sarper informed Ankara by phone that the situation could not be improved with the Soviets. Decoding of Sarper's telegram was completed on June 12, and on the same day it was decided in Ankara to instruct him to communicate to Molotov that no territorial change or allocation of bases with a view to the conclusion of a treaty could be

accepted, and no significant outcome could be expected from the bilateral talks on the revision of Montreux as explained before.

To the disturbance of Turkey, following the first round of talks, it was announced through *Pravda* and *Izvestia* that the decisions regarding the territorial demands of Armenia from Turkey, and a call for the return of Armenians in diaspora adopted at the Armenian Catholicos Election Congress were endorsed by Moscow. Besides, illustrations of solidarity were held between the Soviet and Armenian committee representatives in San Francisco.⁵²

Meanwhile, Ankara had informed Washington and London of the Moscow talks. On June 9, before he read Sarper's complete telegram which was arriving at Ankara in parts, İnönü told the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nurullah Esat Sümer, to speak to the British and US Ambassadors in Ankara about urging their governments to react against the Russian designs at once.⁵³

The second Molotov-Sarper meeting took place on June 18. In the opening of talks, to the astonishment of Sarper, the Soviet Foreign Commissar continued along his previous line of maximalist debate. In his turn, Sarper held the opinion that the Soviet proposals would violate Turkey's sovereignty and might adversely affect its strategic and political position. Sarper's telegram also underlined that the talks were abruptly ended:

...When Molotov said that the Soviet Republics were a great and mighty country, but this would not be a reason for sacrificing the rights of the smaller republics of Armenia and Georgia, I said I had come to Moscow with great expectations. I had very much appreciated to have the opportunity to work in order to put an order and reform the relations between our countries. But if this

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 288.

⁵³ For Sümer's talk with the US Ambassador in Ankara, see, Joseph C. Grew. *Turbulent Era*, Vol. II, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1953), pp. 1468-1470.

can not be realized..it is the outcome of your leaving us before this impasse..' Molotov standing, said 'it will be very good if you think once more about this matter.' I replied 'let's consider together, you consider it some as well' and we left.⁵⁴

Sarper's second telegram was received on June 20. On the day Sarper's telegram was read in Ankara, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sümer, spoke to the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov. Sümer told Vinogradov that "*under these conditions, instead of friendship and understanding we have been pursuing, a freeze and distance will resurge.*"⁵⁵ Sümer observed that the Soviet Ambassador appeared complaisant and uninsisting in his answers to Turkish rejections. However, the real Soviet position was contrary as Vinogradov explained to the US Ambassador in Ankara, Edwin Wilson, towards the end of June. Wilson stated that Vinogradov was keen on expressing Molotov's demand for certain measures necessary for the security of the Black Sea without directly referring to the allocation of bases on the Straits. He also stated that territorial demands of the SU were voiced on behalf of Armenia which needed additional lands. When Wilson asked if any Armenians were living in the eastern provinces of Turkey, he replied that there were only a few since the Turks massacred most of them. The US Ambassador noted that Vinogradov was very critical of Turkey in this matter and on other issues.⁵⁶ However, it was understood that neither the USA, nor Britain were in favor of imposing a constraint for themselves and handicapping the talks through declaring a policy in regard to the Turkish case two weeks before the opening of deliberations with the SU at Potsdam.

⁵⁴ Cited in, Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953*, p. 289.

⁵⁵ Cited in, *ibid.*

⁵⁶ Cited in, *ibid.*, p. 290.

Meanwhile, Washington tried unsuccessfully to ease the tension between Ankara and the Kremlin. Britain was not less anxious than the USA to develop a policy in this regard. On June 18, John Balfour, the British Chargé to Washington, called on Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, to discuss the situation. It was indeed surprising that Soviet Foreign Commissar should have made a demarhché at a time when Britain and the USA were still awaiting the Soviet views in regard to the Straits promised at Yalta. Then, Balfour communicated the proposal of London in view of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, to support the Turkish position particularly as the position taken by Molotov appeared to be in direct conflict with statements made by Stalin at Yalta. Subsequently, the British Chargé d’Affaires inquired if Grew would endorse a joint Anglo-American approach and that this approach be made to the Soviet Government prior to the meeting of the Big Three at which it might well be necessary to discuss this whole question.

In his turn, the US Secretary of State promised the necessary attention to the suggestion, explaining that it would be preferable to withhold action until the end of the San Francisco conference and that if action was to be taken, there would presumably be plenty of time between the close of the conference and the meeting of the Big Three. Balfour said he agreed with Grew, but he was further instructed to state that even if Washington should not feel in a position to make a joint approach with the British Government, “*his Government hoped that we would at least support the British action with some step of our own.*”⁵⁷ Two days later, on June 20, Ambassador Wilson in Ankara suggested that Washington express an interest in this matter in Moscow for the reason that “*the Russian proposals to Turkey are wholly*

⁵⁷ Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Vol. II, pp. 1469-1470.

*incompatible with the spirit and principles on which we are seeking with the participation of the Soviet Union to set up a new world organization.”*⁵⁸

On July 7, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, H. Ragıp Baydur, called on Grew and after some preliminary talk concerning the success of the San Francisco Conference, he turned to the conversation which had taken place in Moscow three weeks ago between Sarper and Molotov in which the former had stated the Soviet demand for a rectification of the Turco-Soviet frontier; a demand for bases on the Dardanelles and a bilateral modification of the Montreux Convention. Subsequently, Molotov had added that there might be also certain requirements from the Balkan states, “*which the Ambassador interpreted as some sort of a territorial demand from Bulgaria.*”⁵⁹ Baydur said that he had come to visit Grew for the purpose of ascertaining the attitude of the American Government towards this situation.

Grew told Baydur that the American Government was very definitely concerned with any threat to the peace which might fall within the purview of the UN Organization. However, for the present, he said, they understood that the conversations had been a friendly exchange of views and that no concrete threats had been made. In his turn, Baydur asked Grew whether, if the Soviet Government should demand that the USA cede to the Soviet Union the cities of Boston and San Francisco, it should not consider such a demand as a threat, and he also asked whether the USA felt that such a demand could be a matter for negotiation. Grew replied definitely in the negative, but asked Baydur whether the Soviet Government had specified the nature of the frontier rectification which it desired and whether the demands

⁵⁸ Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1974), pp. 219-220.

⁵⁹ Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era*, Vol. II, p. 1471.

were yet of such a concrete nature as to be regarded as open threats. Baydur replied that “*Mr. Molotov had stated that the Treaty of 1921 had been negotiated at a time when Soviet Russia was weak and he had said, ‘Now we are strong.’ The obvious implication was that Soviet Russia desired the return of the Vilayets of Kars and Ardahan.*”⁶⁰

Consecutively, Baydur said he wished Grew to know that Turkey would not cede one inch of territory, and that if Soviets should appropriate such Turkish territory, Turkey would immediately fight. A situation would thus be created which was totally contrary to the spirit and letter of all that had been achieved at San Francisco. The Turkish Ambassador underscored that the Turkish Government felt very strongly that strong representations by the United States in advance of possible trouble would have a powerful effect on Moscow. Baydur had understood that Grew had told the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, that the American Government would support the proposed demarché of the British Government in Moscow, but that later the US Ambassador at Ankara, Edwin Wilson, had informed the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs that the matter would be further studied, and had implied that the US Secretary of State had made no such statement.

To the disappointment of Baydur, Grew said that the Ambassador was quite right since he had had no conversation on this subject with Lord Halifax whom he had not seen officially since his return from San Francisco.⁶¹ He then told Baydur that he had to know very well

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Grew stated that Baydur was clearly referring to the Grew-Balfour conversation in which the US Secretary of State had said that they would prefer to delay action on this matter until after the Sanfrancisco Conference and that if action were to be taken there there would be some time between the close of the conference and the meeting of the Big Three. Grew also stated that Balfour then called on him a few moments after his conversation with Ertegin and definitely corroborated his understanding of what he had said to him. Balfour told Grew that he had reported his position

himself that the USA had been following this situation with concern; that he hoped the subject might be discussed at the meeting of heads of government and that, for that purpose, the US President had been fully briefed on all the information in possession. Grew noted that he personally believed that much more could be accomplished by a direct talk between the US President and Stalin than could be accomplished by any formal representations made in Moscow.

Washington's reluctance to respond to Ankara in the affirmative was no doubt another blow on Turkish political circles, given Turkey's narrowed sphere of action under the pressure of Russian tactics which were pushing it into coming forward first with its ideas on the redefinition of Turco-Russian relations or gradually shifting to accommodate the designs of the Kremlin.

Turning back to talks of the Big Three, the third meeting of the heads of governments took place at Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin, between 17 July-1 August 1945. Roosevelt was dead and his place was taken by Harry S. Truman. Churchill and the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden were replaced by Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin respectively, while the Conference was in progress, as a result of the Labour Party's victory in the general election. Stalin, who was the sole survivor from the earlier meetings, had in effect obtained the position of dominance in Eastern Europe to which "*Imperial Russia had aspired in vain in the First World War*".⁶²

accurately to his government and that no indication had been given of any commitment whatever on Grew's part. *Ibid.*, p. 1472.

⁶² Graham Ross, *Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System*, p. 145.

At Potsdam, Turkey and the Straits were once more in deliberations, but in different ways and on different premises. Truman had come to Potsdam with the idea that the free and equal rights of all nations to transport on the waterways of Europe, the Rhine, Danube, Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal would be advantageous if not essential to the preservation of peace in Europe. He was also prepared to make such a proposal to the conference. However, at the end of the first session on July 17, Truman had the impression that Stalin wanted the Black Sea Straits for Russia, as had all the czars before him, while the British Premier was determined that Britain should keep and even strengthen its control of the Mediterranean.

Indeed, Stalin clearly expressed that the Montreux Convention was “inimical” to the SU. Furthermore, he added that Turkey was too weak to give any effective guarantee of free passage, and it was only right that the SU should have bases to defend the Straits. As stated above, in his turn, Truman declared that while the USA agreed to a revision of the Montreux Convention, it believed however, “*that the Straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and guaranteed by all of us.*” Commenting on this interchange, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes said, “*that presented the issue. The Soviets wanted the free navigation of the Straits guaranteed by the Soviets, or by the Soviets and Turkey. This meant their armed forces would be on Turkey’s soil. We wanted the free navigation of the Straits guaranteed by the United Nations.*”⁶³

On July 21, the British delegation agreed with the Soviets to take up the issue of modification of the Montreux Convention and other aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations in the deliberations. In fact, Churchill had agreed to raise these issues at Potsdam during his

⁶³ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, (NY: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 77-78.

Moscow talks in October 1944. Against this background, on July 22, he stated that the British Government favoured the revision of the Montreux Convention through an agreement among the signatories with the exception of Japan. Churchill also expressed that Britain would endorse an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships, naval or merchant, through the Black Sea and back. He pointed out the necessity of not alarming Turkey as well. However, massing of forces on the part of Bulgaria and Soviet press, and radio attacks and by the turn Sarper-Molotov talks had taken, Churchill argued that the Turco-Soviet discussions had not included Soviet demands from Turkey since Turkish officials formulated an alliance option with the SU.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 226.

As for the approaching end of the war, the drop of two atomic bombs brought a quick end to the war in the Pacific, whereas uncertainty persisted in Western Europe, especially concerning the settlement of differences of opinion over Germany. In Germany, America and Russia confronted each other, no longer quite allies, not yet open enemies. Graham Ross, *The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914-1945*, p. 46.

The Western Democracies-SU relations further deteriorated when the Kremlin concentrated on its domestic regime which became increasingly suspicious of the Democratic camp. In 1945, Stalin charged A. A. Zhadanov with the task of enhancing the control of the Communist party, and countering the increasing power of some influential figures. The pressures of war had led to the rise of the Red Army, which had won much prestige in the SU as a result of its victories over Germany. Again, the rise of the heavy industry sector under G.M. Malenkov, which had been expanded enormously to meet the needs of the war, and of the political police (NKVD/KGB) under L. B. Beria, had accumulated vast powers during the war. See, Michael Dockrill, *The Cold War 1945-1963*, (NJ: Humanities Press, 1988), pp. 31-32.

Concurrently, internal struggles, together with Stalin's concern over relations with the USA, were responsible for the cautious nature of his foreign policy, "*willing to test Western positions, yet receding if he met resistance, insisting on the SU's rights, yet uncertain of how to achieve them. Molotov's stubborn behaviour at the London Conference demonstrated the Soviet Union's determination to be treated as an equal by the West, and was designed to show that she was not to be overawed by the American monopoly of the atomic bomb*". *Ibid.*, p. 32.

As for the post-war settlements, meanwhile, Molotov accepted the proposal by J. Byrnes that the Foreign Ministers should meet in Moscow in December 1945. At Moscow, it was agreed that, a Four-Power Control Commission should be sent to Romania to ensure non-Communist representation in its government, while non-Communists would be given posts in the Bulgarian government. In return, the USA agreed to set up an Allied Council in Tokyo to make suggestions to General MacArthur, the US Supreme Commander there, about the regime in Japan. Finally, it was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet in the spring of 1946 to draw up peace treaties with Germany's former European allies. Dockrill argued that although the Moscow Conference led to a temporary thaw in US-Soviet relations, "*These mutual concessions were purely cosmetic: the Western powers would continue to have as little influence in internal political arrangements in Romania as the Allied Council would have in Tokyo*".⁶⁵

For Turkey, optimistic expectations for the new post-war order were short-lived. This was due to an intensifying Soviet propaganda warfare which seemed to have growing ambitions to envelop additional territories in Europe, Middle East and elsewhere. Following the end of the war, the Soviet Union had emerged as a vigilant force in the midst of a devastated Europe. Being one of the winners, it had openly launched a series of revisionist demands on the Red Army occupied territories of Eastern Europe, and proved to have further designs in other parts of the globe. Encouraged by the vacuum in this newly shaping international environment, the SU demanded a revision of the Montreux convention of 1936, and the transfer of Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan - to restore the pre-WW I status

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 31,32.

quo since these provinces were gained by Russia at the Congress of Berlin, but lost again to the Ottoman Empire after the Great War. Besides, it was demanded of Turkey to break its relations with Britain and conclude a treaty “*similar to those the Soviet Union was concluding with the nations of eastern and south-eastern Europe.*”⁶⁶ Not surprisingly, examples of Moscow’s twisted rhetoric did not cease even after Turkey declared war on Germany.

At this stage, İnönü’s policy line proved to be right. Indeed, the Turkish leadership was criticised both in domestic political circles and in the international arena for its over cautious, slow - but in fact, calm and collected - policy. Turkey was in a key position in the Balkans and the Middle East, and both Britain and Germany wanted the country as an active ally. Ankara’s decision to ally with Britain was another fact. However, events proved that Turkey was almost obliged to confine itself with the rules of a cautious neutrality. Then, from Berlin’s standpoint a change in Turkey’s attitude to benevolent neutrality was regarded as an important diplomatic gain at Britain’s expense. This occurred in June 1941 when Ankara signed a treaty with Berlin.

The Nazi Reich had also pressed for a secret protocol allowing them deliveries of military personnel and war material across Turkey into Iraq and Syria. Facing all these challenges and a highly unpredictable and chaotic course of international events, İnönü had based his policy on the following policy calculations which amazingly all came into existence:

- i) The Western Powers and the democratic front would eventually win the war;
- ii) It was rightful to adhere into an alliance with Britain and France;

⁶⁶ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection* , (London: The MacMillan Press, 1990), p. 14.

iii) Both Germany and Russia would try to draw Turkey into an alliance or at least into a state of benevolent neutrality towards them. However, none of these might be an alternative, but a lethal entrapment for Turkey. Vis-a-vis these powers, Turkey should seek the ways it could strengthen its hand and apart from its geo-strategic assets, the only way for this was to rely on an alliance with the democratic countries of the West;

iv) During the WW, the real threat for Turkey had been generated from the Soviets. So the calculations of Turkey should have a special emphasis on avoiding this power;

v) There would inevitably be a war between Germany and Russia. In this case, alliance with Britain and France would acquire an additional meaning in the name of Turkey's security. As will be discussed below, this new international arena paved the way for a rapprochement to be later institutionally strengthened, as Turkey on the one side, the USA and Britain on the other.

It can be evaluated that the threat posed by the totalitarian regimes had necessitated Ankara to constitute an uninterrupted policy of integration with the West. It was clearly understood that these regimes could unite around their objectives and create blocs as well. With a view to this fact, it was unthinkable that Turkey could follow an independent course without integrating its foreign policy to that of the democratic grouping of states. As will be discussed next, Ankara's steps in this direction indicated that no alliance could be maintained through an evasive policy and alliances could prove to be costly.

III TENSIONS REVEALED: PRELUDE TO WAR, COLD AND HOT, AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE TURKISH QUEST FOR SECURITY (1946)

This chapter discusses the emergence of the crisis in Turkish Soviet relations in 1946 and Ankara's increasing security concerns throughout the same year. In this context, it is first explained that at a time when Turkey, Greece and Iran were under pressure of the Kremlin, ambivalence prevailed in Washington as to what extent it could counterbalance the Soviet moves, and which policy it should follow in regard to these countries. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on the main events of the period under review, the visit of *USS Missouri* and the Turkish-Soviet exchange of Notes (concerning the Soviet demands for a re-arrangement of the Straits regime and Ankara's rejection of these demands), being the most important ones.

III . 1 “*In the Near East Things Are Not Always What They Seem*”⁶⁷

By the turn of 1946, the Soviet press and radios had intensified their broadcasting campaign against Turkey. The broadcasts propagandized that Turkey had served Axis interest

⁶⁷ Statement of Dean Acheson in explaining the events in Iran. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 197.

during the war, that the Turkish government had fascist tendencies; and, in addition to Georgians, the Armenians had also legitimate rights over Turkey. Turkey's reply came on January 6, when Turkish Premiere Saracoğlu explained in his statement to the press in Ankara that Soviet Russia had no rights over Kars and Ardahan. Those provinces had been ceded to Russia at the end of the 1878 Berlin Agreement, for the first time in history, in exchange for a huge war indemnity - an amount which couldn't be met - but were returned to Turkey following WW I through a plebiscite as well by the Brest-Litovsk (1918) treaty, reiterated by the subsequent Moscow and Kars Agreements (1921). Addressing the claims of Georgian professors, Saracoğlu pointed out that throughout those claimed areas Turks were in the majority and these claims resembled Hitler's well-known "living space" theory. In this context, Saracoğlu also explained his gratitude to the world press that supported Turkey's rightful cause. ⁶⁸

A few days before Saracoğlu's press conference, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, H. Saka, had arrived in London on January 3 to attend the first session of the UN General Assembly which was to be held on January 10. Saka interviewed allied and friendly statesmen for an entire week. While these deliberations were going on, Turkey's participation in the founding organizations of the free world was increasing through its adherence to another major agreement. In this framework, on January 4, 1946, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Britain and the USA signed

⁶⁸ İsmail Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Kronolojisi ve Türkiye*, p. 19. For a large account of the discussion on the Brest-Litovsk treaty, see, Selami Kılıç, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinin Doğuşu* (The Birth of the Turkish-Soviet Relations), (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1998).

the Agreement of European Coal Organisation in London.⁶⁹ Subsequently, on his way back to Ankara, Saka paid a visit to Paris where he held similar talks with his interlocutors.

Meanwhile, the watershed in US-Soviet relations came in February 9 when Stalin delivered another major speech and described the causes of war. In this context, the war, he said, had been caused not by Hitler but by the workings of the capitalist system: "...*Marxists have declared more than once the capitalist system of world economy harbors elements of general crises and armed conflicts and that, hence, the development of world capitalism in our time proceeds not in the form of smooth and even progress but through crises and military catastrophes.*"⁷⁰ If Stalin's analysis was correct, there was no essential difference between Germany and the Soviet Union's allies in the war against Germany. A new war was inevitable sooner or later, "*and the Soviet Union was experiencing armistice, not a true peace.*"⁷¹

On February 22, George Kennan sent his telegram to express his views that were already known and widely accepted within the US government. Kennan's cable is rightly regarded as one of the landmark documents of the early Cold War period.⁷² In it, Kennan stated that:

⁶⁹ Law No. 4906, concerning the ratification of the Agreement of the European Coal Organisation by the TGNA was published in *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette) dated June 1, 1946, No: 6322. See also, *Düstur* (The Records of the Registrar), Vol. 27-3, (Ankara: Devlet Matbaası, 1947), p. 1171.

⁷⁰ Cited in, Michael H. Hunt, *Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 145. Stalin's address included further assessments such as: "...*the unevenness of development of the capitalist countries usually leads in time to violent disturbance of equilibrium in the world system of capitalism, that group of capitalist countries which considers itself worse provided than others with raw materials and markets usually making attempts to alter the situation and repartition the 'spheres of influence' in its favor by armed force. The result is a splitting of the capitalist world into two hostile camps and war between them.*" Ibid.

⁷¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 440.

⁷² Not surprisingly, it contained a persuasive analysis of the Soviet history, society, outlook, and intention that influenced US policy toward the SU for fifty years thereafter. As stated by Kennan, his

...Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as northern Iran, Turkey,...a "friendly" Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf...⁷³

...Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran),...⁷⁴

Indeed, the crisis over Iran, indicated the way the Cold War was to be conducted. The country had been occupied by Britain and the Soviets since 1941 and both countries had agreed to withdraw by 2 March 1946. However, even before the war ended, the Soviets tried to exact an oil concession from the Iranian government. Failing to realize this, the Soviets began to encourage the northern province of Azerbaijan to establish its independence under their influence. The Soviets backed concurrently the leftist Tudeh party to spread its organization in the country. However, the Soviet designs reached a climax in January following the establishment of a Soviet sponsored "Mahabad Republic" of Kurds. The republic was headed by Ghazi Muhammed and the Kurdish warlord Molla Mustapha Barzani

telegram contained in five parts, the following subjects: **I** Basic features of postwar Soviet outlook, **II** Background of this outlook, **III** Its projection in practical policy on official level, **IV** Its projection on unofficial level and finally, **V** Practical deductions from stand point of US policy. See, *FRUS*, Vol. VI, 1946, p 701-708. For a detailed discussion of the subject, see, George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, (NY: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 271-297 *passim*.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p 702.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p 705.

who had fled from Iraq following his rebellion, and undertook the defense ministry with 3.000 militia.⁷⁵

In its turn, the Truman administration aimed to counter the Soviet aims. American support was given to the Shah's decision to send troops to the northern border. The issue had come before the Security Council between January 28-30, 1946, and the US Secretary of State, Byrnes, had also seized the chance to publicly condemn the Kremlin since then. After a deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet forces passed in March 1946, the US Embassy in Moscow issued notes of protest to the Kremlin.

Explicitly, once Germany was defeated, the Soviets had shifted to re-evaluate their position over the lands they began to control in Europe and ceased to cooperate with their former Allies. As a result of the war, the SU had extensive territories under its sphere of influence. Equally significant was the fact that the governments set up, after Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were liberated by the Red Army were under the influence of the Soviets. It was in these circumstances that Winston Churchill, on a visit to America early on 5 March 1946 said: *“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended.... Behind that line lie all the capitals of the States of Central and Eastern Europe - all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow.”*⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Barzani's feudal clan was said to have had 15.000 armed men engaged in fighting against the Iranian troops since March 23, 1947. *Ayn Tarihi*, No: 161, 1-30 Nisan 1947, p. 119.

⁷⁶ Quoted, from the Winston S. Churchill's speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. See, *Winston S. Churchill His Complete Speeches 1897-1963*, Vol. VII, 1943-1949, Ed by. R. Rhodes James, (NY: Cheelsea House Publishers, 1974). See, *“The Sinews Of Peace”*, *passim*.

Turning back to the Soviet onslaught in Iran, exchanges of grave notes between Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko and Byrnes regarding the situation in this country followed.⁷⁷ On March 6, Washington issued a strong protest to Moscow on the basis of the US-UK-Soviet tripartite treaty of 1942. However, the situation continued to deteriorate. The US representative in Tabriz reported that by March 19, a minimum of 235 Soviet tanks and 3500 trucks had passed into Azerbaijan through the railhead in Tabriz. Concurrently, the Soviet troops appeared to be strategically heading in the direction of Turkey and Iraq. At this juncture, Iran called upon the UN for assistance and intense negotiations ensued, which shortly afterwards culminated in a worldwide support to Iran. Then the SU agreed to withdraw its forces, but quickly created a local militia “*stiffened by a cadre of Soviet ‘volunteers’ numbering about 800*”⁷⁸ as well. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Tabriz government created in Iranian Azerbaijan and the Kurdish republic were completely dissolved. Ghazi Muhammad, the President of the Kurdish republic was executed on March 31, while Barzani passed to the SU.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Gromyko stated that “*A murky wave of anti-Soviet feeling at once rose up and a question was tabled at the Security Council - which was what Washington wanted. I received the following instructions from Moscow: ‘If this question is tabled, say that our troops are being kept in Iran because of unforeseeable circumstances.’ When the initiators of the discussion heard our explanation, they asked ‘would you mind telling us, please, just what these unforeseeable circumstances are?’ I replied, ‘Unforeseeable circumstances are unforeseeable precisely because you can’t foresee them.’”*. Andrei Gromyko (Trans. Harold Shukman), *Memories*, (London: Hutchinson (Arrow edition), 1989), p. 304. Gromyko also attempted to explain the presence of Soviet troops in Iran in connection with the continued existence of British bases in Iraq and India, and the large number of US bases around the perimeter of Soviet frontier.

⁷⁸ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, p. 16.

⁷⁹ Having concentrated his forces in Ochnovick - his last resistance point, 12 km north of Iraq - Barzani continued his hopeless fight until this town fell to the Iranian forces on April 7. On April 15,

The Russian troops withdrew in April, but the Majlis (Iranian parliament) repudiated the joint oil company. Tension increased again as the Tudeh Party demanded an election under its control.⁸⁰ Then, the USA sent a favourable response to the Iranian Government's request for strong support should the SU object to Iranian forces entering Azerbaijan. When the troops arrived, the separatist regime collapsed and shortly afterwards the whole province was reacquired. In May of that year, when the Soviet forces completed their withdrawal from Iran, the crisis was over.

The Soviets' withdrawal from Azerbaijan, however, was not acclaimed as a signal that the Kremlin had accepted a more reasonable attitude towards Turkey or that it had abandoned its ambitions to encroach on Iranian and Turkish sovereignty.⁸¹ W. Bedell Smith, the US Ambassador to Moscow, suggested that Russia's determination to gain a foothold in the region reflected the Soviets' conviction that their security interests were at stake and that they desired to gain independent access to the Mediterranean and the Arab world by severing the British Empire's "jugular" at Suez. Smith stressed that if the SU portrayed a friendly face to Turkey, it would be a purely tactical and temporary action, "*as the Russians since the time*

he surrendered to the Iranian army, near Iranian-Iraqi border. *Ayin Tarihi*, No: 161, 1-30 Nisan 1947, p. 118.

⁸⁰ Acheson stated that in his talks with the Iranian Ambassador Hussein Ala - who wanted the US to take the initiative in reopening the Iranian case in the Security Council and in having it supervise elections in Azerbaijan - in October 1945, he had said to him and asked the US Ambassador George Allen in Tehran to tell the Iranian Prime Minister Qavam that the USA would not act but only in support of the Iranian Government. He asserted that it seemed a mistake to hold elections until Iranian authority was established in the province and it was only then the UN observation could be useful. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 197.

⁸¹ As explained by Walter Bedell Smith, US Ambassador to Moscow. George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO...*, p. 16.

of czars had linked advances in the Near East to their domination (or 'liberation', in Soviet parlance) of Turkey."⁸²

As for Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East, Ankara was interested in developing its relations with the countries of the region through completing a series of basic treaties. In this context, the treaty of friendship and good neighbourhood between Turkey and Iraq was signed on March 29, 1946 in Ankara by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saka and the Secretary General Erkin and the President of the Iraqi House of Representatives, Nourry As-Said, and the Iraqi Regent Prince Abdulilah. In fact, the Turco-Iraqi treaty was more than an expression of a wish to perpetuate friendly relations between the two countries. The treaty was concluded to last for an indefinite period and included six additional protocols envisaging a broad range of cooperation which pertained to: the regulation of the waters of Euphrates and Tigris; mutual assistance on the issues of security; education, training and cultural affairs, mailing, cable and telephone services; economic affairs and border controls.⁸³

Having concluded an important framework treaty with Iraq, in Ankara there was still a sense of urgency for assuring the security of the country. To justify these concerns, a few days before the US decision to send military advisers to Iran, the Soviets also tried to bring pressure to bear on Turkey to permit Soviet troops to have bases near the Straits. Together with this, the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan were also claimed by the SU within the context of restoring the pre-WW I status quo. This incident reinforced the already strong

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ "Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood Between the Republic of Turkey and the Kingdom of Iraq", in *Düstur* (The Records of the Registrar), Üçüncü Tertip, (Kasım 1946-Ekim 1947), 28-3, (Ankara: Devlet Matbaası, 1947), pp. 1501-1502.

suspicions of Washington. A special report prepared for President Truman by his White House aide, Clark Clifford, stated that, “*compromise and concessions are considered by the Soviets, to be evidence of weakness.*”⁸⁴ Here, it was also underlined that the USA must avoid the error of 'appeasement' and should even be prepared to go to war if necessary to resist Stalin's ambitions for world conquest.⁸⁵ As will be explained below, in his turn, Truman decided to give a decisive response to Soviet strategic maneuvers.

III . 2 The US Gunboat Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and Its Aftermath

On November 11, 1944, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Mehmet Münir Ertegün died in Washington, not a very important event at a time when Allied forces were sweeping across France and Eastern Europe towards Germany and Berlin and Tokyo were approaching the imminent end. Sixteen months later, however, the ambassador's remains were the “*focus of world attention as the curtain went up on a classic act in the use of armed forces as a political instrument.*”⁸⁶

Subsequently, on March 6, 1946 the Department of State announced that the late Ambassador Ertegün's remains would be sent to Turkey aboard the battleship *USS Missouri*, visibly the most powerful warship in the US Navy and the ship on board which General Douglas MacArthur had recently accepted Japan's surrender. It was also decided that the

⁸⁴ Cited in, Joseph Smith, *The Cold War 1945-1965*, (London: Basic Blackwell, 1986), p. 12.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Missouri would be accompanied by two cruisers, *USS Providence* and *USS Power* during its mission. Between the ambassador's death and this announcement, not only had WW II ended, the cold war - as yet untitled - had begun. In addition to conflicts between Washington and the Kremlin over Poland, Germany and other areas, the Kremlin had demanded from Ankara the cession of two provinces in the east and in the west, a base in the Straits. ⁸⁷

The *USS Missouri* and the two cruisers left New York on March 22, and arrived in İstanbul on April 5. On the same day an extra-ordinary welcoming ceremony with dozens of gun salutes for the visit from Turkish battleships was made. The ceremony was attended by the personal representative of Truman, A. Veddell, representative of the State Department, George Allen, Admiral Henry Hewitt and Rear Admiral Jules Cames who were in the US delegation and Ambassador Wilson, and the representatives of the President of TGNA, Prime

⁸⁶ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, "US Military Forces As A Political Instrument Since World War II", in *American Defense Policy*, Schuyler Foerster and Edward N. Wright (ed.), (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 321.

⁸⁷ İsmail Soysal stated this incident briefly as "*America's famous battleship Missouri, accompanied by two destroyers, brought the body of Turkey's Ambassador Münir Ertegün who had died in Washington to İstanbul and handed to Turkish authorities with a ceremony on April 5, 1946.*" İsmail Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye - Olaylar Kronolojisi (1945-1975)*, p. 23. In regard to the issue, Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, noted that "...*The USS Missouri was already at İstanbul, where it had been sent earlier with the ashes of a former Turkish Ambassador.*" Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 195. The terms of offices of the Turkish Ambassadors in Washington between 1934 and 1955 were as follows: September 1934 to November, 11, 1944, Münir Ertegün; November, 11, 1944 to March, 15, 1945, Orhan Halit Erol (Charge d'affaires); March 16, 1945 to July 29, 1948, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur; August, 11, 1948 to June, 18, 1955, Feridun Cemal Erkin. The MFA records.

Interestingly, *Missouri's* sail to the Mediterranean followed by the dispatch of aircraft carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt* to the area in August. Thomas G. Paterson, *On Every Front*, (NY: W.W. Norton Co., 1993)p. 65. In any case, the US' interest in showing its concerns in the region and the acknowledgement of Turkey for this gesture was evident. For another interesting account of the incident which explained the Turkish perception of this visit as an indication of the US' emerging independent course of action in the Middle East which might serve to Turkish interests, see, Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Bermuda Şeytan Üçgeninde Türkiye*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), pp. 315-316.

Ministry and the MFA, respectively, MP Halit Bayrak, Cemal Yeşil and Ambassador Şevki Berker, Governor of İstanbul, Lütfi Kırdar, General Cahit Toydemir and Asım Tınaztepe.

The next day, the US delegation paid a visit to Ankara where they were received by President İnönü. Regarding the visit, Prime Minister Saracoğlu stated that “*the youngest and the most perfect child of our old world America and the Americans, the flags of humanity, justice, freedom and civilization in their hand, are marching onwards establishing a great world of humanity of the United Nations with strong and unwavered steps.*”⁸⁸ Saracoğlu also expressed that Turkey would take its place in the frontiers the USA would form and remain next to them [the Americans] “*to serve the great cause.*”⁸⁹ The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, Kazım Orbay expressed similar views and said that Turkey was aware of the noble meaning in the demonstration of friendship through the assignment of *Missouri*, a historical and one of the mightiest ships of the US Navy, to the mission of returning the body of Ambassador Ertegün. It was the first time since the end of the war that American vessels were in Turkish waters. This, to some extent, proved that the US was ready to face any danger, not only in the Pacific, but in the waters of the Mediterranean as well which dominated European affairs.⁹⁰ George Harris stated that to the man on the street here at last was tangible proof that Turkey did not stand alone, despite the refusal of the American visitors to confirm openly that their mission was more than a mere courtesy call. Regarding

⁸⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, Ankara, Nisan 1946, pp. 61-63; Bilal Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), p. 314.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Necmettin Sadak, “Aziz Dostlarımız Hoş Geldiniz”, *Akşam*, March, 5, 1946. A year and a half later, Sadak was nominated as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Government of Saka which remained in power from September 10, 1947 to June 10, 1948.

the Turkish press, it hailed the USA as the defender of “peace, right, justice, progress and prosperity.”⁹¹

As for the commentaries of the leading newspapers, repercussions of this incident were quite positive at large. N. Nadi wrote in *Cumhuriyet* that “*the people of İstanbul joyfully welcome Missouri which visits the free and blue waters of the free Straits for a few days from across the Atlantic and see the idealism that works to realize tomorrow’s peaceful world in the mighty features of this greatest American battleship.*”⁹² Another comment was made in *Vakit* which pointed out that the visit of the US vessels to İstanbul coincided with a turn of events around the Iranian question towards acquiring a character in accordance with the UN Charter:

It would be right to consider this coincidence as an auspicious sign...the US might assign another ship in order to send Erteğün’s body to Turkey...the dispatch of *Missouri*, the symbol of American victory in the Far Eastern war is enough to express that a distinguished meaning other than a mere demonstration of friendship exists...It is unnecessary to conceal this additional and distinguished meaning with any policy consideration. On the contrary, it is in the good of humanity and international peace if this is understood by the world...We can now believe that the Russian occupation forces will move out of the territory of Iran until May 6...We find a relationship between the coming of *Missouri* vessel to Turkish waters and the turn of events around the Iranian question towards acquiring a character in accordance with the Charter of the UN. We have an intuition that a meaning exists in the coincidence of these two incidents indicating the victory of human rights and international peace.⁹³

⁹¹ George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 20.

⁹² Nadir Nadi, “Dost Amerika’nın Denizcilerini Karşılarken”, *Cumhuriyet*, March, 5, 1946.

⁹³ Asım Us, “Missouri’nin Türk Sularını Ziyareti”, *Vakit*, March 6, 1946.

Considerable evidence suggests that no one missed the meaning of this demonstration of serious concern of the USA about Middle Eastern developments. Washington had not subtly reminded the Soviets that the USA was a great power and that it could project this power abroad, even to shores far distant. Whether the visit of *USS Missouri* and subsequent US actions deterred the SU from implementing any planned or potential aggressive acts towards Turkey will probably never be known. “*What is clear is that no forceful Soviet actions followed the visit.*”⁹⁴ Besides, as an illustration of American support for Turkey vis-a-vis the SU, the visit of *USS Missouri* was well received and appreciated by the government of Turkey, the Turkish press and by the public opinion at large. The US Ambassador Wilson stated that to the Turks the visit indicated that “*the United States has now decided that its own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by the USSR to destroy Turkey’s independence and integrity.*”⁹⁵

According to Blechman and Kaplan, the 1946 visit to Turkey by the *Missouri* and further displays of US military support for Ankara which culminated in the decline of Soviet pressures on Turkey was an example of discrete political use of the armed forces which contributed to the establishment of new international relationships, such that US interests were protected for decades. They pointed out that generally, skilled US diplomacy during incidents has typically borne fruit only after ambiguous US military commitments were clarified by the movement of major military units. Their conclusion however, included that demonstrative uses of the military in some cases with very special circumstances, were often

⁹⁴ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, “US Military Force As A Political Instrument Since World War II”, p. 321.

effective political instruments in the short term, and that effectiveness declined when situations were re-examined after long periods of time had elapsed.⁹⁶

Undoubtedly, Turkish foreign policy makers were interested in to utilize this momentum in the economic field as well. In this context, Ankara's relations with the emerging Western Bloc was further developed when the TGNA approved Turkey's adherence to the United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency on May 8, 1946. According to Law No: 4881, the Government was authorized to adhere to this agency which was founded by the agreement signed by the UN in Washington on November 9, 1943 as member and pay for Turkey's contributions.⁹⁷

Turning back to the crisis precipitated by the Kremlin's twisted vision of world domination, although the outcomes of the US gunboat diplomacy in the Dardanelles were favourable, evidence had been accumulating that Stalin's offensive had further aims. Acheson explained that geographically the Soviet offensive was concentrated along Russia's borders in

⁹⁵ Cited in, *ibid.*

⁹⁶ For an account of this analysis see, *ibid.*, pp. 321, 323 and 326, respectively. Similarly, Blechman and Kaplan argued that in the absence of a prior US commitment, as in Korea in 1950 for example, the US might surmise that not only would China and the SU have gone further in their initial actions, but also that diplomatic action, even if supported by a discrete political use of force, might have had a lesser effect. They suggested that the firmer the commitment implied by the military operation, the more often the outcome of the situation was favorable to the US.

Thus, explaining one of the basic features of the US foreign policy, they said the US should (and could) not count on skilled diplomacy as being effective in controlling crises in the absence of prior commitments and reinforcing uses of the armed forces. Based on the past experiences, they asserted that the US *should however, aim to avoid such difficult tests in the first place by being quite clear as to what its commitments are.*" *Ibid.*, p. 321.

⁹⁷ "Birleşmiş Milletler Yardım ve Kalkındırma İdaresine Katılınması Hakkında Kanun" (Law Concerning the [Republic of Turkey's] Adherence to the United Nations Relief And Reconstruction Agency), 8 Mayıs 1946, in *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 10, 1946, No: 6303.

Eastern Europe and the Middle East, where the Soviets' physical position was strongest and that of the USA weakest. In a tour d'horizon he said:

Politically, it [the Soviet offensive] centered against efforts to create a United Nations military force and the United States plan to put atomic energy under effective international control. Blocking tactics in the United Nations were made easy by Soviet possession of the veto. The creation of Soviet Satellites succeeded only where the Red Army was present to reinforce it. When the attempt moved beyond the Soviet occupied areas of Eastern Europe to West Germany, the Balkans, and the Middle East, the United States Government gave fair warning that, if necessary, it was prepared to meet Soviet force with American force, rather than with mere protests and resolutions in the United Nations. The first warning was given in August 1946 . . .⁹⁸

Indeed, in the August of 1946, the US Secretary of State, Byrnes found himself "*enfiladed from three fields of fire.*"⁹⁹ The first question was the settlement of the Yugoslav-Italian border dispute. Since May, it had turned into a prestige battle between the Russian and the Anglo-American positions. On August 9, Yugoslavia forced down, and then on August 19 shot down unarmed US Army transport planes. Simultaneously, the Kremlin which had backed Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to pressure Greece to detach its northern provinces, launched an all-out drive in the UN against Greece in support of an attempted Communist takeover in Athens by the National Liberation Front (EAM).¹⁰⁰

As for the general problem of the Soviets independent course, the Soviet perception of post-war settlements was further complicating the process of negotiations. Given this, the

⁹⁸ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 194. Acheson maintained that "...but Stalin continued to probe cautiously and to receive firm but cautious responses until June 1950, when throwing off pretense, he made an attack in force through a satellite on the other side of the world in Korea. Here the American response was unequivocal." *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

Council of Foreign Ministers met in London (September 1945); Moscow (December 1945); Paris (April-May and June-July 1946) and New York (November-December 1946) in prolonged and finally successful efforts to make treaties with the former Eastern European Axis satellites. In accordance with the agreement at the Potsdam Conference, the Council of Foreign Ministers drew up draft peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland.¹⁰¹ The Peace Conference sat in Paris from July 29 to October 15, 1946. It could only recommend. All final decisions were made by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Then, the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London produced nothing but an unseemly wrangle. Though the agenda was limited to Europe, Molotov complained repeatedly of the exclusion of the Soviets from a share in the control of Japan.¹⁰² When the Council of Ministers next turned its attention to the treaties with Austria and Germany, the SU which was extensively exploiting Austria's resources, refused to negotiate the German and Austrian questions separately and no agreement could be attained.¹⁰³

In the meantime, the situation in the Balkans in general, and in Turkey and Greece in particular, could not be improved either. As will be discussed below, on August 7, the Soviet

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ It had been agreed at Potsdam that France should participate only in drawing up the treaty with Italy. The USA which had not declared war upon Finland was not to be a party to the Finnish treaty.

¹⁰² It was perhaps for these reasons that Molotov blocked all action by the Council. In Moscow, three months later, concessions were made on both sides and with reference to both Europe and the Far East. Partial agreement was realized on the question of satellite treaties as well. Ultimately, the five treaties were agreed upon in New York and signed in Paris, in February 10, 1947. Julius Pratt, *A History of the United States Foreign Policy*, (NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), p. 457.

¹⁰³ It was not before 1955 that, peace was signed with Austria alone upon condition that the SU received heavy reparations, and that Austria would be neutral.

Government demanded that Turkey allow the SU to participate in what it called the defense of the Straits “*but which meant the occupation of Turkey.*” ¹⁰⁴

III 3. Setting the Stage for Turco-Russian Cleavage

In the aftermath of the crisis in Iran and at a time when Greece was still in serious turmoil, the Soviet note of August 7 marked an ominous phase in the softening-up process of Turkey. Indeed, following the Soviet note which Soviet Charge d'affaires conveyed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Saka, an atmosphere of extreme caution dominated in Ankara. A copy of the note was given to the US and the British governments in the guise of informing Washington and London of the Soviet wish to assume a greater responsibility in the defense of the Straits. Here, it was argued that some incidents of the last war had indicated that the Montreux Convention was no longer adequate to meet the security needs of the Black Sea states.

The Soviet claims included that during the war, contrary to the convention, some battle and frigate ships had passed through the Straits. In particular, a demarché was made when

¹⁰⁴ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 195.

German coast guard ship *Seafalke* had passed to the Black Sea on July 9, 1941. The note expressed that in the same year, an Italian frigate ship, *Tarvisio*, was given permission to pass to the Black Sea and in October 1942, the SU had informed Turkey that German frigates each 140 tons were scheduled to pass through the Straits disguised as merchant ships. The SU had also protested the passage, in May and June of 1944, of eight *EMS* and five *Kriegstransport* type battle and frigate ships. Given these incidents, it was understood that the convention regarding the Straits could not prevent hostile states to use the Straits against the SU and other allied states for the purposes of war and “*Turkey could not be held irresponsible in such a situation.*”¹⁰⁵ And for this reason the Soviet Government had proposed to discuss the question of the regime of the Straits. It was known that the Conference of Three States at Potsdam had agreed on the following:

a) the Three Governments recognized that the Convention regarding the Straits, concluded at Montreux, should be revised, failing to meet present-day conditions;

b) the Three Governments agreed that as the next step, this matter would be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three states and the Turkish Government.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ From the Note of the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the Republic of Turkey, August, 7, 1946, para. 8, cited in, Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1968), pp. 414-415.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p.415. Howard pointed out to the existence of different texts regarding the phraseology here. He figured out that according to Anglo-American version as Foreign Secretary Bevin presented in an address to the House of Commons on October 23, 1946: “...it was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the Three Governments and the Turkish Government.” But, according to the Soviet version, the three governments agreed that “as the proper course” the problem of revision of the Montreux Convention “would be the subject of direct negotiations ...” Interestingly, as stated above, my direct translation from the Turkish version of this part of the note emerged as a mixture of both versions. Since the note was addressed to Turkey but circulated to both the USA and the UK as well, it is very probable that either official or courtesy translations were added to the original note. However, perhaps intentionally too, phrases

It was also stated that the note of the British Government which was given to the Turkish Government on November 21, 1945 was known to the Soviets. In fact, this note had followed the note of the US Government dated November 2, 1945. Both notes had similar departure points concerning the admittance of a need to revise the Montreux Convention. The note of the UK, however, was different since it stated that negotiations towards this end was not an immediate question. Thus, the first three of these principles were in general consonance with the US and the British viewpoints.¹⁰⁷

Against this background, the Soviet demands were explained with brutal clarity:

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
2. The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.

and interpretations of the SU appeared differently. As Howard pointed out the USA, Britain and Turkey in the period which followed the Potsdam Conference, looked upon the phrase “direct conversations” as being tantamount to an exchange of views prior to the calling of an international conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention, not as “direct negotiations” leading to a bilateral agreement between the SU and Turkey. Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 231. For various texts, see, US Department of State Press Release No: 238, March 24, 1947; United Kingdom, *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, fifth series, 427, cols. 1500-02; Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945-1946*, (NY:Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations), 8: 936; and F. Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 414-415.

¹⁰⁷ According to Howard, points 4 and 5 which outlined a new regime of the Straits by the Black Sea powers and the development of a joint Turco-Soviet system of defense for the Straits, were considerably identical with what Molotov had demanded of Nazi Germany during November 1940, and presented to the Turkish Ambassador in June 1945. Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 244.

As for the US note dated November 2, 1945, the principles of which was also accepted by Turkey as stated by the Turkish Note of December 6, and the note of the UK, dated November 21, see, Yüksel İnan, *Türk Boğazlarının Siyasal ve Hukuksal Rejimi*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1995), pp. 108-109; Kudret Özersay, *Türk Boğazlarından Geçiş Rejimi*, (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları, 1999), pp. 90-91 and *Aydın Tarihi*, (1945) Kasım, No. 144, p. 71; Aralık, No. 145, pp. 146-149, respectively.

3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.

5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.¹⁰⁸

The Soviet note had been transmitted to the USA and the UK as well and one of the first things done upon its receipt was to order a respectable naval task force to the Mediterranean, the *USS Missouri* arriving in the Bosphorus on April 5. The aircraft carrier, the *Franklin D. Roosevelt* and two destroyers, following a rendezvous off the Portuguese coast with two cruisers and three destroyers proceeded to the Mediterranean. The next step was to develop a firm position to stand resolutely by the Turkish Government. Truman asserted that this was an open bid to obtain control of Turkey. “*To allow Russia to set up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into Turkey, ostensibly for the defence of the Straits, would, in the natural course of events, result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet control.*”¹⁰⁹

Then, as expected, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs which maintained regular exchange of views with the US Ambassador Wilson and the British Ambassador David Kelly, increased its efforts to draw Washington and London’s attention to the threat posed by the

¹⁰⁸ *FRUS, The Near East and Africa, 1946*, Vol. VII, (Washington, D.C.:USGPO, 1969), p. 829.; Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, p. 415.

Soviets. In his turn, Wilson informed Washington that the real objective of the Soviets was not to revise the Montreux Convention but to destroy Turkish independence by introducing to Turkey its armed forces with the ostensible aim of enforcing the joint control of the Straits and establishing a friendly regime and make Turkey its satellite. He pointed out that if Turkey fell under Soviet control, the last barrier would be removed before the Kremlin's advance to the Persian Gulf and Suez. Wilson concluded that the assets Turkey provided should not be allowed to fritter away.¹¹⁰

The developing crisis reached its climax when the news on an observable increase in the military activities of the Soviet troops were reported. McGhee underscored that in this context, reliable information indicated that the SU, as part of its continuing war of nerves against Turkey, also directed ground forces towards Turkish territory and held naval manoeuvres 45 miles off the Turkish coast. In its turn, Turkey, suspecting a real attack, mobilised its own forces under the guise of manoeuvres.¹¹¹

Shortly afterwards, Truman instructed the Departments of State, War and Navy to study the situation and on August 15, at a meeting in the White House with Acheson, Secretary of War, Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of Navy James Forrestal and the Chief of Staff, Dwight D. Eisenhower, where a report was discussed. Acheson stated that the report expressed the seriousness of the Russian moves against Turkey and Greece, which aimed at the domination of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. He said the report asserted that they should be resisted at all costs and maintained, a note to Moscow "*should by its studied restraint impress*

¹⁰⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 97.

¹¹⁰ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 836-837.

the Russians that we meant every word of it. Where they had valid criticisms of the Treaty of Montreux, we should say so, but be adamant against any interference with exclusive defense of the Straits. We recommend making very plain to the Russians, Turks, British and French that we were in deadly earnest." ¹¹² Here, it was also noted that if Turkey, under pressure, agreed to the Soviet proposal, any case which the US might later present in opposition to the Soviet designs before the UN or to the world public would be materially weakened. Besides, it was not realistic to count on Turkey's will to resist by force Soviet attempts to secure bases in Turkish territory even if it had to fight alone without assurance of support from the USA. It was explained that the best hope of preserving peace was the conviction that the USA would not hesitate to join other nations in meeting armed aggression by the force of American arms.¹¹³ On August 16, in view of the delicacy of the situation, the Turkish Government was advised to assume a reasonable, but firm attitude and was told verbally that the American position of firm support had been formulated only after full consideration had been given to the matter at the highest levels.

Meanwhile, the *USS Missouri* was already in the Dardanelles and during this meeting it was also urged sending a powerful naval force, including the newly commissioned supercarrier *USS Franklin D. Roosevelt* to join the former vessel. Then, Acheson stated:

General Eisenhower asked me in whisper whether I had made it sufficiently clear that the course we had recommended could lead to war. Before I could answer, the President asked whether the General had anything to add. I repeated his question to me. The President took...a large map of the Middle East and eastern

¹¹¹ As told by Retd. Col. Şükrü Erkal, Research Specialist, in the TGS ATASE, Directorate for Military History and Strategic Research.

¹¹² Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 195.

¹¹³ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII., pp. 840-842.

Mediterranean and asked us to gather behind him. He then gave us a brief lecture on the strategic importance of the area and the extent to which we must be prepared to go to keep it free from Soviet domination. When he finished, none of us doubted he understood fully all the implications of our recommendations.¹¹⁴

On the following day, on August 19, Acheson delivered the US note to the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires, Fedor T. Orekhov and sent copies to Ankara, Paris and London, urging their government to consider the issue. He told Orekhov that the fourth point in the Soviet note did not seem to require a revision of the Montreux Convention, but, devising a new regime would in effect exclude all the non-Black Sea countries. The US Government had already declared that the regime of the Straits was an international question, the settlement of which required the contribution of all interested states including the USA. As for the fifth point, the US Government maintained its position that Turkey should be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits and warned: “*Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations.*” The note also declared that the regime of the Straits “*should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations*” while ensuring its “*function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations.*”¹¹⁵ The USA considered that the establishment of a regime in the Straits was not the exclusive concern of the Black Sea Powers. The US view was made public as well since two days before this

¹¹⁴ Dean Acheson, *Present...*, pp. 195-196.

¹¹⁵ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII., pp. 847-849; Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits...*, p. 246.

interview Acheson had briefed the press, stressing the seriousness of the situation, their decision to stand firm against any outside military interference with the defence of the Straits, and the undesirability of speculation upon possible developments.¹¹⁶

A few days later, in its note of August 21, the British Government declared that it had long been internationally recognized that the regime of the Straits was the concern of other states besides the Black Sea powers. Thus, the British Government could not agree with the Soviet view that the future regime should be the concern of the Black Sea powers and Turkey alone. As regards the fifth proposal that Turkey and the SU should organize the defense of the Straits by joint means, it was considered that Turkey, as the territorial power concerned, should continue to be responsible for defense and control of the Straits.¹¹⁷

In view of these circumstances, the Turkish formal reply was given to the SU on August 22. It is interesting to note that the Turkish Note was not forwarded to the Soviets before the US and British Notes were sent. Moreover, on August 20, the US and British Governments informed Ankara that they had agreed with the “*draft of the reply*” to be forwarded to the SU.¹¹⁸ Given this premise, in its lengthy format, the Turkish Note addressed each of the Soviet claims concerning the passage of the Axis ships contrary to the convention, and emphasized that Turkey has strictly applied the rules pertaining to the passage of ships in

¹¹⁶ Dean Acheson, *Present...*, p. 196; *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VIII, pp. 847-848. McGhee explained that urging Turkey to reject these demands, after consulting with the British and Turks, Truman sent this note to the Soviet leadership. The US President had the opinion that this incident had constituted a threat to international security and “*would clearly be a matter of action on the part of the Security Council.*” George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO...*, p. 17.

¹¹⁷ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 849-851; Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, p. 246.

¹¹⁸ F. Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, pp. 296-297. Erkin stated that France had sent a note on the same issue to the SU also at about the same time.

concern. None of the Axis ships were in the list of frigate vessels except *Tarvisio* - petroleum ship - whose passage was allowed upon the statement of Italian Embassy, which declared that it was excluded from this list and it was cruising for purely commercial purposes. The passage of *Tarvisio* was not permitted for the second time and Turkey's determination in this regard was acknowledged by the Soviet Ambassador on August 25, 1941 in his interview with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The passage of *EMS* and *Kriegstransport* ships were also in conformity with the convention since the inspections had proved that the load of these ships were coal, timber and grass and they were not on the list of frigates either. Therefore, they could not be regarded under the IInd Annex of the Convention.

However, based on a reliable intelligence from the UK, forwarded to the Turkish MFA, which explained that these ships were employed in the navy and joined the activities of transport of troops, the first ship of this type was interrupted and from then on these grouping of ships were not permitted to pass through the Straits. It was also underlined that no breach of the convention was tolerated and the exploitation of Turkey's good intentions was not allowed to repeat. The note stated that with the aim of obtaining a regime for the Straits, completely along the lines of its national interest, the Soviet Government was basing its evidence on the inadequacy of the regime established by the Montreux Convention to provide the conditions for the prevention of the hostile use of the Straits against the Black Sea states.¹¹⁹ In fact, except for a few incidents of fraudulent passage which were then followed by the demarchés of the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Government had not appealed to the Turkish Government throughout the war for circumstances of passage endangering its

security in the Black Sea. Besides, the SU had repeatedly observed that despite the facilities it provided vis a vis tactical and strategic targets, the Axis powers could not dare to force the Straits. It was emphasized that this was not an outcome of the underestimation of the use of the assets of the Straits, but an end-result of the power and honesty Turkey maintained, sometimes at its own expense, in this regard.¹²⁰

The note also pointed out that the objective of the Soviet Government was understood to have been the revision of the Convention in accordance with Article 29, which envisaged a term of 5 years after which requests for amendment might be directed. If this were the case, the SU would need at least one other signatory state to endorse its appeal which should be forwarded to other contracting parties with a minimum period of three months in advance. It was stated that the “*Republican Government which took note of the wish expressed by the Soviet Government for revision, and on the other hand, desired to satisfy the wish of the American public opinion concerning the free use of the waterways*”¹²¹ did not intend to cause any difficulty in regard to the examination of any demand for revision in an international conference, following the approval of the contracting parties and the USA.

Besides, the Turkish Government had favoured the first three articles of the Soviet Note in compliance with the suggestions of the Note of the USA dated November 2, 1945. The reply of the Turkish Government to this note had included that Turkey would not hesitate to seriously examine the issue since it was informed about the viewpoints of the states present at Potsdam. The Turkish Government, however, had asserted that it had considered the

¹¹⁹ From the Note of the Government of the Republic of Turkey to the Government of the Soviet Union, August 22, 1946, para. 18, cited in, *ibid.*, p. 419.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

suggestions of the USA in the affirmative and found these proposals to plausibly constitute the basis for discussions under certain pre-conditions and reservations. As for the participation of the USA in the proposed conference, the Turkish government stated that it considered this “*not just a realization of an ardent wish, but an international requirement.*”

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However, the 4th and the 5th points of the note were found particularly inconvenient. In this framework, the 4th point appeared to be claiming the revision of the Straits regime through introducing new principles by the Black Sea countries and Turkey by excluding the other signatory states. Such a consideration was assessed as having inadmissible effects since it disregarded the coherence and the specific clauses pertaining to the revision of the convention which was agreed to last until 1956 in the first instance. Moreover, it did not leave room to the wishes of other states which had clearly expressed their will to take a part in the negotiations.

As for the 5th principle put forward in the Soviet Note, the Turkish Government observed that it had “*no other meaning but the arrangement of a joint Turco-Soviet defense for the security of the Straits against any violation originating from the Mediterranean.*”¹²³ Thus, the Soviet proposal was found against the sovereign rights and the security of Turkey. It was stated that the acceptance of this suggestion would result ending Turkey’s role of balance and communication, and the establishment of the so called security of the Black Sea countries upon the destruction of Turkish security. Besides, the note underlined that the Turkish

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 420.

¹²² Ibid., p. 421.

¹²³ Ibid.

Government had the conviction that wherever any danger might come from, the duty of defense belonged to Turkey alone. It was maintained that history had not recorded any example of war that Turkey participated in where Turkish nation did not perform its duties for the country. If Turkey had not the power to defend its sovereign rights over the Straits through its own instruments, it could not save itself from sharing the destiny of all its neighbours, which were subjected to violations or military invasion in the greatest war history registered.¹²⁴

Lastly, it was emphasized that at a time in which all nations were contesting to establish peace and security, it would be a sign of mistrust to demand further reinforcement of a defense system which proved to be successful in the past. It was also pointed out that in addition to this strong assurance Turkey extended, in accordance with the new perception of war, Turkey had considered it rightful to conclude that the security of all states were primarily under the guarantee of joint forces that both Turkey and the SU allocated to the authority of the UN. Thus, in all circumstances, including the occurrence of an attack originating from the Mediterranean - which was stated as impossible - and passing through the Straits to the Soviet positions in the Black Sea, it was stated that “*the Turkish Government is of the opinion that the Soviet Government should also trust the effectiveness of the organization of the UN to which the Turkish Government is strongly attached.*”¹²⁵

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1946, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported that they viewed Kremlin’s moves in the Middle East as “*calculated Soviet policy of expanding de facto geographical control*” and concluded that Turkey “*was the most important factor in the*

¹²⁴ Ibid.

Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.”¹²⁶ Among other things, the JCS underscored that since Soviet military base rights in the Straits would not provide effective control of traffic unless such rights were extended to include military dominance of the area for several hundred miles in all directions. Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits would also tend to justify further military penetration through the Aegean. If the Soviets attained military dominance by political concessions in Turkey, there was grave doubt that in the event of a major world crisis, the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean could be considered militarily tenable for the non-Soviet powers. It was recognized that an unwavering opposition to the SU rested essentially on the Turkish Government, that the security interests of Britain were more direct than those of the USA, and that the American people were not well informed regarding problems in the region. The JCS suggested encouragement of the Turkish purchase of both economic and military supplies from the USA.¹²⁷ Thus, concurrently with the crisis in Turco-Russian relations, the rationale for US assistance to Turkey had been established, while in discussions with Britain the USA gave assurances that it was prepared to assume greater responsibility in the region.

The SU did, however, continue its reckless policy towards Turkey. Following a short period of deceptive silence, the SU conveyed its second note dated September 24, 1946 to Ankara. Although different in texture and intensity, the second Soviet note was more or less a reshuffle of previous arguments and claims, but this time with a stronger phraesology. It

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* , p. 422.

¹²⁶ *FRUS*, (1946), Vol. VII, pp. 856-858; George McGhee, “*The US-Turkish-NATO...*”, p. 17.; Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits...*, pp. 248-249.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

was firstly stated that the Soviet note of August 7 had not comprised all the incidents of violationary passages of German and Italian ships from and to the Black Sea. According to the Soviet note, the Turkish Government's acceptance of the passage of hostile ships before the protest of the British Government confirmed the Soviet declaration that the convention on the Straits was no longer adequate to prevent the use of the Straits for purposes of war. The overtones of intimidation were not confined to this. It was argued that Turkey had not raised the issue of revision of the related articles of the convention during the war, and it had not accepted the need for revision before it became inevitable.

The Soviets also disagreed with the Turkish statement that the SU never applied to the Turkish Government claiming its security was endangered in the Black Sea as reflecting the truth. Besides, no correlation between Turkey's efficiency in regard to the performance of its duties in the Straits and the hesitation of Axis powers to dare any venture to violate the regime of the Straits could be made. In this context, it was argued that with a view to these free passage of enemy ships, the Soviets were compelled to move a significant number of their forces from the essential areas of the theater of war for the defense of the Black Sea region.¹²⁸

Subsequently, it was put forward that the Black Sea was an inland sea and it was natural that the passage to this sea was regarded as a matter of greater concern for the Black Sea states since the positions of these countries could not be compared with other states. Besides, the case of the Straits differed in terms of the user nations and with a comparison of its

¹²⁸ From the Note of the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the Republic of Turkey, September 24, 1946. Cited in, Ibid., p. 424.

characteristics to that of other waterways of global importance such as the Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.

To the astonishment of Turkish officials, the Soviet note explained the Kremlin's perception that the special position of the "Black Sea Straits" was recognized through the Turco-Soviet agreement of March 16, 1921 where it was agreed to deliver the issue of determination of the definitive status of the Straits and the Black Sea to a conference composed of riparian states. Moreover, it was stated that a similar clause existed in the agreement between Turkey and the South Caucasian Soviet states dated October 13, 1921 and in the agreement of January 21, 1922 between Turkey and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine. According to the Soviets, inclusion of the principle of determination of the Straits regime by the Black Sea riparian states was a clear indication of the degree of importance these countries and Turkey attributed to the matter. Given these, it was argued that the 4th point of the Soviet note of August 7, was entirely in harmony with the previous agreements Turkey had signed since this proposal was designed to help the establishment of the conditions required for the maintenance of security in the Black Sea. Consequently, this would reinforce general peace. Moreover, both the experiences of the last war and the principle concerning the establishment of the Straits regime which was agreed to by the SU, corresponded to the rightful interests of the Black Sea states and these points did not contradict the "*stability of the general peace and the interests of the other nations concerned with the security of nations.*"¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp. 426-427.

At this juncture, Soviet accusations of Axis ship appearances in the Black Sea during the war were combined with an historical example. This was the assault of the German cruisers *Göben* and *Breslau* to the Russian navy and some Russian harbors in the Black Sea in 1914. According to the Soviet note, it was “very well remembered” that the two cruisers had inflicted a serious an unexpected damage, and regarding the proposal of the Soviet Union on the joint defense of the Straits, these were all considered. The reference of the SU to an event in the Great War which had emerged as an outcome of the planning of the German Joint Staff and a small cliqué within the Ottoman Joint Staff, was regarded quite disturbing in this regard.

There was another blame directed at Ankara with which the note reached its abrupt ending. It was stated that the Soviet Government had felt it necessary to express that the Turkish Government seemed to have disregarded the decisions of the Big Three as stated in the Berlin Conference, and in this context, as for the preparations towards a conference on the regime of the Straits, the demand for an extensive negotiation of the issue through direct talks was repeated.

Interestingly, as it did in replying to the earlier note, before Ankara’s reply, on October 9, Washington again responded to the second Soviet Note although it was not addressed. This time, the note had been handed by Lt.-Gen. Bedell Smith, US Ambassador in Moscow, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Here, the USA, reiterating its previous position, recalled that in the protocol of the proceedings of the Potsdam Conference the three governments had recognized that the Straits Convention should be revised for failing to meet present-day conditions and it was further agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct pour-parlers

between each of the three governments. Through this repetition it was aimed to underscore that the US Government did not believe that the Potsdam Agreement contemplated that direct conversations envisaged in the protocol should have the effect of prejudicing the participation of the other two signatory powers in the revision of the Straits regime. On the contrary, it was stated, the Potsdam Agreement had definitely contemplated only an exchange of views with the Turkish Government as a useful preliminary to a conference of all interested powers, including the USA, to consider the revision of the Montreux Convention. It had also declared that in the US view Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defence of the Straits and that should the Straits become the object of an attack or threat of an attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would be a matter for action by the UN Security Council.

In its reply on the same day, like the USA, the British Government laid down the same point that the Potsdam Agreement stated that as the next step, the problem should be subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish Government. But, differently, the British Note emphasized that the “next step” had already been completed by the exchange of views which had “*now taken place between these Governments.*” As a result, it saw “*no need for or purpose in the continuing direct correspondence on the subject.*”¹³⁰ In other words, the future of the Straits regime between Turkey and Russia had now reached the limit which the British, US and Soviet representatives had in mind when they agreed at Potsdam that each should discuss the problem separately with the Turkish Government before moving towards the international conference necessary to revise the Montreux Convention. As for the points 4 and 5, it was stated that the British attitude

¹³⁰ *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII., pp. 876-878; Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits...*, p. 251.

towards these remained as it was indicated in the note of August 21. Given this, the British Government was ready to attend a conference of the USA, the SU, the UK, France and all other signatories of the Montreux Convention, with the exception of Japan, to consider a revision of that Convention.¹³¹

On October 15, Ankara radio reported that representatives of the British and US Embassies had had long meetings with Turkish officials at the MOFA and that Turkey “*considering Britain and America party to all negotiations, is keeping them informed of all developments of the question of negotiations about the Straits,*” although the Soviet Government had failed to send a copy of its Note of Sept. 24 to London and Washington.¹³²

The nature of Turkish reply to the Soviet Note was indicated in a statement by R. Peker, the Turkish Prime Minister, to the Ankara correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, on October 17. Peker said that there were no grounds for supposing that the Turkish reply would contain any modification of Turkey’s position. He declared that Turkey could neither accept the 4th point of the Russian demands limiting discussions to the Black Sea Powers, which involved what would amount to bilateral conversations with the Soviet Government, nor the fifth point demanding the joint defence of the Straits by Turkey and the SU. He stated that Turkey believed in the UN and said, “*no one will admit the right of any Power to make demands on the territory and sovereignty of another, no matter what strategic convenience is at stake.*”

¹³¹ *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1946-1948, Vol. VI, p. 8199. On October 10, the problem of the Straits came up indirectly this time at the Paris Peace Conference. The larger issues involved, of course, were those of the sovereign rights and the territorial integrity of Turkey.

For a detailed account of the support of Russian thesis of the *mare clausum* in the Baltic and Black Sea Straits, and for some American perceptions of the regime of the Panama Canal which suggested settling of disputes in this area within the domestic jurisdiction of the USA, see, Harry Howard, *Turkey, the Straits...*, footnote (77), p. 252.

¹³² *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1946-1948, Vol. VI, p. 8199.

Peker pointed out that it had always been the Turkish view that direct conversations regarding the provisions of the Montreux Convention could only usefully take place provided all interested parties were included, and that the conversations should only be preparatory to a general conference. While the continued state of partial mobilisation of the country's armed forces was unquestionably accepted by the Turkish people, it hindered the realisation of government plans for economic development and the resumption of normal life in every direction. Schools, hospitals, clinics, and the building of 12 000 miles of highways, etc., were, he added, among the immediate needs of the country, as well as a great expansion of textile production, which was at present inadequate to clothe the population. Because of the present state of alertness however, he said, the Turkish Government could not make an effective start with its economic and social programme. Peker, expressing full satisfaction with the British and US attitude, concluded by stressing the five cardinal points of Turkish foreign policy as follows:

1. To maintain the sovereign rights of the Turkish nation and the territorial integrity of the Motherland.
2. Confidence in, and loyalty to, its friends and Allies, Britain and the United States.
3. Sincere attachment to the United Nations.
4. Within the framework of these conditions, friendship with its neighbours and especially the restoration of sincere friendship and reciprocal confidence with the SU in accordance with the tradition established after the Turkish War of Independence and developed between the two world wars.

5. Normal and reciprocal commercial relationships throughout the world. ¹³³

On October 18, a lengthy note of the Turkish Government in reply was forwarded to Moscow. Here, it was reiterated that with a view to the concrete positions adopted by both the parties “*it would be useful to consider that discussion in the field of diplomacy was exhausted*” ¹³⁴ and the Turkish Government would accept to go to international arbitration (as it was stated in its previous note) if the Soviet Government wished to do so as well. As for the German ships which were subject of Soviet claims once more, since these ships were built in the dockyards in the Danube, it was expressed that their presence in the Black Sea could not be related to the will of Turkey. Besides, if they had passed through the Straits this was because they had not carried any feature of battle or auxiliary support ships.

Regarding the Soviet statement on the Turkish Government’s cession of the circulation of reports on the navigation in the Straits, it was explained that according to Article 24 of the Montreux Convention, Turkey was entitled to circulate the reports in concern to the contracting parties, but not to belligerent forces. Thus, it was explained that the Turkish Government had asserted that with a view to the interdiction of the passage of the warships through the Straits while the conflict was going on, and considering that no other war vessels from other countries were present in the Straits in this period, these reports which remained unrepresentative of regular peace time statistics, and were not conveyed to the Secretariat of the League of Nations or to the signatory states. These records were kept on a regular basis. This being the case, it was assessed that the distribution of information concerning

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ From the Note of the Government of the Republic of Turkey to the Government of the Soviet Union, dated October, 18, 1946, cited in ibid. , p. 429.

commercial navigation activities could have no use and in contrast, would have a negative effect on the Allied side since such reports would declare that these activities had considerably decreased as a result of the conflict. It was for this reason that though it had regularly prepared them, Turkey had dispatched annual reports pertaining to the years 1941-1944 following the end of the conflicts in 1945, on January 29, 1946. Besides, it was also worth noting that no signatory state to the Montreux Convention had raised an objection to Turkey's conduct. Meanwhile, the riparian states had not informed Turkey of the total tonnage of their ships in the Black Sea, as of January 1 and July 1 each year, during the period either, which would naturally be included in these reports. Given this, it was stated that Turkey had not considered to complain about this attitude of the SU.¹³⁵

In sum, Turco-Soviet exchange of Notes in 1946 produced no outcome, but culminated in a strong suspicion of Ankara of the Kremlin's intentions towards Turkey. As will be discussed under the subsequent title, from then on Ankara increased its efforts to side with the democratic regimes of the western democratic camp. The Turkish policy makers asserted that the most direct way to achieve this objective was to democratize the regime in Turkey. Their consideration would no doubt introduce a fundamental change in the country, but still a discreet one amidst the controversies of an unpredictable international political atmosphere.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 430.

IV THE FORMULATION OF TURKISH STRATEGIES IN ADAPTING TO A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (1945-1947)

This chapter discusses the developments concerning the formulation of Turkish foreign policy vis a vis the emerging trends in international affairs between 1945 and 1947. Here, the events leading to USA's inclusion of Turkey in its foreign assistance program and the foundation of Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) in Europe were also examined.

Evidently, following the end WW II, the idea of rejecting totalitarian regimes was increasingly gaining ground in Turkey and elsewhere. In his turn, İsmet İnönü, who had

assumed the presidency and the leadership of the RPP after Kemal Atatürk in 1939 was at odds between his attempts to protect the political status quo or devise a new one. Actually, this tension between the old and new lasted, perhaps, much shorter than expected. As a result of President İnönü's search for a popular support of democratic nations, fundamental changes were introduced, commencing a multi-party political life in the country as well. As will be first discussed below, external factors served as a catalyst towards this effect.

IV 1. Turkey's Response to Emerging Trends in International Affairs

At the end of the war, challenged by the forces of change, the status quo orientation of Turkish policies were experiencing sporadic and local political disturbances. The destruction of the one party regimes in Italy and Germany, the adherence of Turkey to the UN Declaration, and closer relations with the West considerably weakened the foundations of one-party rule in Turkey. Accordingly, the political atmosphere abroad, especially in the USA, made it apparent that without a democratization of its political system Turkey would not be able to gain in the West the proper moral recognition it desired and needed. Besides, the strains of discontent at home, stemming from various economic social measures taken during the war had become "*so serious that it was necessary to 'open a safety-vale' to prevent a general upheaval*".¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey", in *International Affairs*, XXVIII (1952), p. 322. Cited in Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 140-141. Karpat stated that he had also subscribed to Lewis' assessment which he attributed to the Democrats.

In this period, the challenging needs of the government during the war forced it to pursue ways in which it could simply increase its revenues to perform its role as a provider of welfare and to support an army which was kept fully mobilized for years throughout the war. As a result, in 1942, the government shifted to other measures: the capital tax, and the compulsory sale of a part of the agricultural production to the state below the market price. Through the capital tax, it was intended to levy tax on war profits emerging out of commercial activities. However, it caused a serious burden on the weak middle class, which started to believe that the small merchants and agricultural producers had mistakenly devoted their efforts and capital for further production and investment. Besides, the compulsory sales which were expanded during the war damaged both the farmers and infant bourgeoisie.

In fact, in 1942, the German armies were concentrating their strongholds throughout Europe and being deployed in key areas. At a such a point in time, Ankara had shifted to implement the “capital tax” on the revenues of non-Muslims. Correspondingly, anti-semitist propaganda and the claims of the non-Muslims selfishness regardless of the countries domestic socio-economic problems were also increasingly tolerated in the press, radio and elsewhere and shortly afterwards, the first group of indebted was sent to Ashkale in January 1943. Despite the fact that Ankara’s measures against non-Muslims never acquired a wicked nature similar to that of Nazis, considerable evidence suggest that in this move, İnönü had planned to divert the attention of the Axis war machine to somewhere else, and give a message that Turkey was considering to give credit to the new order envisaged by the revisionists.

But, İnönü was pursuing a meticulously calculated policy. Within a year, when he saw that the course of the global conflict was gradually removing Turkey out of the scope of belligerent powers, this time he decided to lift the pressures on non-Muslims in the country to the extent of abolishing the working camps. It was also declared that the taxpayers would pay their debts without leaving their homes.¹³⁷

This was followed by another foreign policy oriented decision of Ankara in domestic politics. In 1944, when the Red Army was gaining victories, İnönü administration then turned against the Pan-Turanists, who were shortly after found guilty of racist activities¹³⁸. Explicitly, with these steps, İnönü was aiming at sending a message to the Soviets that Turkey would not allow the activities of the racists and those sympathetic to the Nazi empire.

At this juncture, by accepting the Charter of the UN, Turkey moved towards the democratization of its regime. It decidedly set the stage for the opposition to one-party rule, since it provided the dissidents with legal and moral arguments against the one-party system, and encouraged them to bring their opposition into the open and to seek popular support. The

¹³⁷ Rıdvan Akar, *Aşkale Yolcuları* (Passengers of Ashkale), (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2nd impr., January 2000), p. 137. Akar explained that as of September 1943, activities of the working camps were virtually terminated and for those serving in these camps, a waiting period for their return to home had started. It was stated that 1.229 indebted persons were sent to these camps and 21 people died - mostly as a result of age - during their stay in Ashkale. No torture or misbehaviour against these people were reported. However, the issue of working camps casted a shadow on the respectability of the Turkish Government. See, *ibid.*; Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, (Capital Tax and the Turkification Policies), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), pp. 197-198.

For the Turkification policies, see, Rıfat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni* (Turkey's Jews During the Republican Years, An Adventure of Turkification), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2nd impr., 2000).

¹³⁸ The Military Court in İstanbul announced its decision pertaining to the sentences of Pan Turanists on March 29, 1945. The Military Court of Cassation, however decided on October 27, 1947 that all those tried of racist activities are not guilty and should be released. Uğur Mumcu, *40'ların...*, pp. 67-68.

Turkish delegation to San Francisco was instructed to declare that liberalization was under way in Turkey. In this context, it was also underlined that after the war every democratic tendency would be allowed to develop in the country. A few days later, İnönü declared on May 19, 1945,

...the political régime and the government of the people established by the Republican regime shall develop in all aspects and in every way, and as the conditions imposed by war disappear, democratic principles will gradually acquire a larger place in the political and cultural life of the country. The Grand National Assembly, our greatest democratic institution, had the Government in its hand from the very beginning and constantly developed the country in the direction of democracy.¹³⁹

After the relatively stagnant first few months, contrary to the RPP's liberalization promises, a destructive action took place in İstanbul on December 5, 1945 and in a couple of hours crowds destroyed leftist journals and magazines as well as bookstores that were selling Soviet literature. This incident could be explained in part by the deterioration in Turco-Soviet relations prompted by the Soviet demands on Turkey. But undoubtedly, it once more covered the beginnings of democracy in Turkey with a cloud of fear and suspicion.

Ş. Süreyya Aydemir pointed out that İnönü and the RPP Group had decided that under the existing laws an opposition could not flourish and it was an outstanding necessity to complete the legal framework before the general elections. Shortly afterwards, on April 29, 1946 a law concerning the modification of the clauses of the law of municipalities pertaining to elections was enacted. This was followed by the law of amendment of the elections law and the modification of the law on associations. Subsequently, on June 11, 1946, clauses of the law

on the administration of provinces concerning elections were changed. Shortly afterwards, elections for the municipalities, provinces and the Assembly were scheduled.¹⁴⁰

As a result of the control imposed on elections, the majority in the TGNA (396 seats) was easily attained by the RPP. In its turn, the DP won 65 seats in uncoercible regions including İzmir and İstanbul. Having been rather discomfited since the notorious election results of 1946, when RPP rule experienced the very first challenge against its power, but managed to keep it in its hands in one way or another, the numbers suspicious of the honesty of the foundations of RPP rule were constantly rising. Indeed, 1946 elections where open voting and closed counting of votes system raised considerable criticisms. It was claimed that counting of votes and announced results were untrustworthy. Under these circumstances, on May 6, 1946, in a public speech, İnönü expressed that “...in this period it is required to make it clear as to which direction and understanding Turkey’s policy would take. We saw the necessity in this regard with a view to the great interests of the country...”¹⁴¹ Thus, advised by President İnönü, the Turkish Government had clearly defined a direct relationship between the success of democratization process in the country and achieving a defensive partnership with the western grouping of states.

Undoubtedly, the first democracy experience of Turkey in the general elections of July 21, 1946 was marked by a great debate. From then on, both external and internal developments served to prepare the ground for political freedoms and necessitated the easing

¹³⁹ Cited in, *ibid.*, p. 141. As for the instruction given to the Turkish delagation to San Francisco, see footnote (12) in the same page. For the declaration of İnönü, see also, *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1945, pp. 52-53.

¹⁴⁰ Ş. Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, Vol. II, 1938-1950, p. 446.

¹⁴¹ From, Akşehir Söylevi (Speech at Akşehir), in *Ulus*, May 7, 1946.

of the political restrictions. Thus, in the light of strong criticisms of the Ankara regime, İnönü had gradually shifted to revise his attitude against his political opponents. Under such external and internal pressures, İnönü began to exhibit a conciliatory attitude towards his critics.

While maintaining a democratisation process in the country, there is ample evidence to believe that İnönü did not adopt a hasty anti-Soviet foreign policy. In contrast, he paid special attention to personal likes and dislikes between the Turkish statesmen and the Kremlin leaders. Erkin related one of the episodes in regard to the Kremlin's indirect messages to İnönü to have Prime Minister Saracoğlu removed and have him replaced by another person who would be amenable to wishes of the SU. He maintained that by January 1946, the Soviets began to implement tactics towards this end. The most direct attempt was made however, on an informal ground, during a reception by a foreign ambassador in honour of the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nurullah Sümer. According to Erkin, the host had the audacity to approach Sümer and following a tour d'horizon on the reasons of the disturbing tension which poisoned the Turco-Soviet relations and had adverse effects on the political situation of Europe too, to tell him - as a very confidential secret - that the prevailing distrust that the Kremlin leaders felt towards Saracoğlu and his cabinet was the major reason why the Turco-Soviet relations could not be improved.¹⁴²

Erkin stated that having been told of such an undiplomatic and an discourteous act, he himself called in the foreign representative to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and informed him in the strongest terms possible that the Turkish Government would not permit the foreign

¹⁴² F. Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve...*, pp. 275-277.

representatives to interfere in its domestic affairs, and neither would it tolerate public statements by such envoys concerning their approval or disapproval of its conduct. However, as events unfolded, it was understood that Moscow's assertive policy towards Ankara would remain unaltered. Then, Secretary General of the MFA, disclosed the subsequent Soviet overture. Although he had not disclosed the details of the first incident, he stated that this time at a reception held by the British Ambassador, Maurice Peterson, in mid-February, to the disturbance of Ankara, an unexpectedly lengthy discussion between the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sümer and the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov had taken place.¹⁴³

Under these circumstances, Turkey's inclusion in the US aid bill was brought to the agenda. Concurrently, during the debates in the US Congress on the military aid to Turkey and Greece, the heated discussions on this aid focused on Turkey's political regime. On April 12, 1947, a US delegation headed by Congressman Barkley, visited Ankara. The aid bill which included a provision allowing American radio and newspapermen freely to transmit news concerning the implementation of the aid program was eventually accepted by the Congress.

Undoubtedly, the Turkish Government followed the debates in the American Congress closely. Shortly after the decision of the Congress, President İnönü stated to a correspondent of the Associated Press that American aid was a step towards the defense of democracy and that closer relations between Turkey and the USA would contribute to the firm establishment of democracy in Turkey.

¹⁴³ Ibid., pp. 280-282.

Meanwhile, opposition within the RPP began to organize itself in a more concrete manner as well. Different tendencies in the party paved the way to forming of two rival groups. The first group were the “extremists”headed by Prime Minister Peker, who opposed any compromise and tried to give the opposition a subordinate role, while the second group, the *otuzbeşler* (thirty-fives) emerged as moderate and younger Republicans. The position of *otuzbeşler* became clear in the RPP Group’s seven hour debate in August 1947 on the policies of the Peker government. At the conclusion, 303 deputies voted in Peker’s favor and thirty-four against him. In the end, despite the great number of votes in his favor, Peker’s position was shaken, because the votes cast against him meant that the government did not have the confidence of the party hierarchy. In an attempt to satisfy the critics, Peker changed six members of the cabinet, which, however, increased the disturbances within the RPP since they were not consulted prior to this. Meanwhile, Peker’s disagreement with İnönü, who expressed that the approval of the the TGNA of the recent changes in the Cabinet should immediately be assured in order to comply with the Constitutional process, was mounting. Eventually the TGNA approved the changes, whereas three days later Peker resigned in view of the assessments in the party concerning the cabinet even after it received a vote of confidence. Shortly afterwards, the Hasan Saka Cabinet - the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs who had signed the San Francisco Charter - was established on September 10, 1947.

The period in which the cabinets of H. Saka served was marked with an expectation that he would better the relations between the government and the opposition. It is also worth noting that since the beginning of WW II, İnönü had adopted a particular strategy in regard to the changes of governments and this was greatly based on the nomination of Minister of

Foreign Affairs as Prime Ministers. Thus, even the manner in which the changes came is reflective of the adaptive capabilities of the Turkish political system to maintain its permanent features. This being the case, upon Saracoğlu's resignation, Hasan Saka was re-appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Recep Peker Government which remained in office between August 7, 1946 and September 9, 1947. Aydemir stated that Peker was a man of the one-party regime and he could act as a strong administrator in a totalitarian regime. In fact, İnönü had first proposed the Premiership to Hilmi Uran.¹⁴⁴ However, Uran declined this offer, suggesting Peker to this post. With a view to these considerations, İnönü's nomination of Peker was a half-hearted decision. Shortly afterwards, the Turkish President's unwillingness surfaced in his decision to appoint Saracoğlu as the Deputy Head of the Party.¹⁴⁵ Following the resignation of Peker, this time İnönü instructed Saka to form the new cabinet on September 10, 1947. On June 10, 1948, following a reshuffle by President İnönü, Hasan Saka formed his second cabinet in which Necmettin Sadak kept his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴⁶ Despite the fact that Saka resigned on June 8, 1948 and was

¹⁴⁴ İnönü appointed former Minister of Justice Uran as the Secretary-General of the RPP on October 15, 1945 in replacement of N. Atif Kansu as a precaution to the extremists in the party. Since his nomination of Uran in December 1938 as the Minister of Justice in the IInd Cabinet of Bayar in which he had made important changes that were made necessary because of the "*mismanagement of the of the domestic and external affairs of Turkey on the part of the responsible Ministers*", Uran was the entrusted man of İnönü. Feroz, Bedia Turgay Ahmad, *Türkiye'de...*, p. 26; Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats*, p. 221; Ş. Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, Vol. II, p. 26; Hikmet Bila, *CHP 1919-1999*, pp. 85-87.

¹⁴⁵ Ş. Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, Vol. II, p. 456. Aydemir noted that since the Atatürk era, it was customary that the Prime Ministers assumed this title as well.

¹⁴⁶ Saka remained in office until resigned once again on January 14, 1949, on account of strong differences of opinion between himself and the Parliamentary Group of the Republican People's Party and President İnönü.

reappointed as Prime Minister, the political situation in Turkey had been acquiring a relatively stable course while liberalization was showing rapid progress.

IV. 2 The Situation on Turkey's Western Flank Levels the US Aid

Considerable evidence suggests that by the year following the end of WW II, the US administration had left behind the times it was at odds between a confrontation or seeking peace with the SU, and decided to shift to a policy less tolerant of the Soviet ambitions. The US and Soviet forces had confronted each other in Iran, with the Kremlin relinquishing claims to the northern portion of the country. Negotiations over the fate of Germany had faltered and the prospect of a permanently divided Germany seemed more and more likely. The gathering storms of Cold War were contributing to respond to such situations harsher than ever.

Despite these developments, the Kremlin continued to maintain its foreign policy based upon expanding the territory under its control and weakening its potential opponents. No doubt, the crisis in Turco-Soviet relations was among the most significant trouble-spots which required diligent and considered effort on the part of the USA if Soviet efforts for penetration were to be prevented. However, a scheme for the systematic support of regimes opposing the Soviet menace was still unorganized. A thoughtful observer then could see that the Soviets would not consider to hold back. As will be discussed below, shortly afterwards, the Kremlin did not hesitate to make another attempt to flow into the Straits.

In view of these circumstances, the primary Turkish effort was to strengthen its ties with the West to secure strong support for its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of Soviet irredentist claims. Towards the end of January 1947, the US Ambassador Wilson visited General Secretary of the MFA, Erkin. Erkin stated that it was usual for the British Ambassador to visit him once a week while Wilson made these kind of visits two to three times a week. This time Wilson was scheduled to leave for Washington shortly after his interview with Erkin. In his talk with the Turkish General Secretary, Wilson explained that Turkey's determined and calm resistance against the menacing attitude of the Soviets aroused great admiration in the USA and with these bold efforts Turkey was not only defending itself, but was also undertaking a defensive role in the name of the Western Europe and the USA. In his turn, Erkin told Wilson that his assessments were entirely true, and in case of aggression Turkey was determined to defend itself whatever the cost and degree of pressure would be and the calm behaviours observed was the peace and the calm of people who had decided to perform their duties for the motherland. However, this will of Turkey compelled it to keep a large army in mobilization which brought the Turkish economy to the brink of collapse. Given this, Erkin inquired if the concerned countries which were the beneficiaries of Turkey's efforts might be urged to share the financial burden emerging from these defense expenditures. Then, Wilson, according to Erkin, remained silent as "Sphynx" for a while, and continued his course of talk without addressing Erkin's statement.

Following the talks, as usual, Erkin sent a copy of his interview to the President, Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The day after, İnönü invited the General Secretary and congratulated him for his timely demarché he made in his talks with the US

Ambassador. However, R. Peker who was nominated as Premier following the elections of July 1946 was critical of Erkin's statement. To the disturbance of Erkin, Peker argued that his demarché might have negative implications. Erkin explained to Peker that his reply was prompted by Wilson's speech and it was his duty to elaborate on this. The conversation ended in such an atmosphere after which Erkin decided to leave his office for a post in Rome.¹⁴⁷ The following months would prove that Erkin's statement had prompted the inclusion of Turkey in the financial aid program for Greece which was launched following the British Government's informing of Washington that it desired to turn over its undertakings towards this country.¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile, specific warnings concerning the situation in Greece had been crossing Truman's desk for weeks. As early as February 3, the US Ambassador in Athens, Lincoln MacVeigh, reported rumors that the British were pulling out of Greece, where, since 1945, their forces and finance had helped maintain a royalist government in a raging civil war with Communist guerrillas. On February 12, another dispatch from MacVeigh urged immediate consideration of American aid to Greece. A few days later, Mark Ethridge, publisher of the *Louisville Courier-Journal* and a member of a UN investigating committee, cabled from Athens that Greece was a "ripe plum" ready to fall into Soviet hands.

¹⁴⁷ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 yıl*, Cilt I, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), pp. 184-185.

¹⁴⁸ As stated by Wilson to Erkin towards the end of March. *Ibid.*, p. 188. Erkin pointed out that the Truman Doctrine was announced a few days after his talks with the US Ambassador. However, Erkin said, prior to this, his dramatic interview with Peker in which he was criticized of acting without an instruction of the government in his talks with the US Ambassador, had reached an unexpected and unpleasant ending. Erkin also felt it necessary to express that Wilson's informing of the Truman Doctrine which came shortly afterwards, made Peker regretful of his previous criticisms in regard to his demarché.

In his analysis of the Communist onslaught in Greece, Acheson pointed out that Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh had informed in December, 1946 that the SU wanted complete control of Greece and would interfere with all positive steps by the Greeks to save themselves.¹⁴⁹ Meanwhile, warnings about Turkey had come even sooner, and Turkey had “*little hope of independent survival unless it is assured of solid long-term American and British support,*” cabled Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who had replaced Averell Harriman as the American Ambassador in Moscow.¹⁵⁰

At this juncture, Erkin’s assessments are worth noting with regard to the accumulated evidence on the strong correlation between the course of events in Iran, Greece and Turkey. Erkin pointed out that the Soviet efforts aimed at the domination of the Mediterranean were not merely confined to the political and military pressure exercised on Turkey, but constantly supported by the plans applied in Greece and Iran as well. He explained that since the failure of the civil war in Greece, subversive activities of Communism was provoking conflict between the Communists and the non-Communists on the one hand, and supporting the “Balkan insurgents” in their war of attrition against the Greek army and the public on the other. He explained that through this the SU aimed at destroying a British out-guard post in the Mediterranean and on the same occasion, obtaining the control of the Dodecanese islands which were “granted” to Greece in a hasty manner in the Italian Peace Conference through the support of the Soviet Government, though they belonged to Turkey in historical and geographical terms in one way or another. Then, eventually, Turkey would suffer and the SU

¹⁴⁹ Dean Acheson, *Present in the Creation*, p. 198.

¹⁵⁰ David McCullough, *Truman*, (NY: Touchstone, 1992), p. 540.

would use Greece to spread its influence to Italy and ultimately acquire the most convenient opportunity towards the establishment of Communism in Europe with its all consequences.

Then, Erkin combined the cases of Greece and Iran and stated that the Soviet intervention had also caused a tragic crisis in Iran. Moscow had attempted to establish an obedient government in Tehran, annex Azerbaijan, terminate the British influence over this country and capture oil reserves both in the south and north of Iran. *“It was not the product of an ordinary coincidence that all these plans were applied in a harmonious way in Greece, Turkey and Iran.”*¹⁵¹ He further assessed that though in appearance, the campaign which was carried on in a balanced way in Greece and Iran had a local meaning, in reality, it had an extensive nature.

Turning back to discussions at Ankara, in late March, while Erkin was still in his office, Wilson paid another visit to him. He stated that he had explained the difficulties of Turkey regarding the large army it constantly maintained. And when he conveyed this message to Washington, concurrently, due to a serious lack of resources, the UK had stated its wish to transfer its undertakings towards Greece to the USA. At this juncture, upon the statements of Wilson and the directive of the Secretary of State, it was decided to add Turkey to this aid program, which was named the Truman Doctrine and would be announced in the near term.

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In fact, as explained by the Minister of Finance, N. Esat Sümer, on the occasion of his presentation of the programme pertaining to the 1946 fiscal year in the TGNA, the Turkish Government had already decided to obtain long-term credits and increase its internal debts in

¹⁵¹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi*, p. 342.

order to overcome the economic bottleneck. Correspondingly, Ankara had started receiving economic aid from Washington prior to the Truman Doctrine. In this framework, it was also pointed out that the issue of bilateral agreements had its roots in the year 1945, when an agreement between the Turkish Government and the US Government which envisaged Turkey's inclusion in the countries considered within the scope of the Lend and Lease Act of March 11, 1941, was signed on February 23, 1945 - the same day with Turkey's declaration of war on the Axis. Through this agreement, it was decided that as authorized by the President, the US Government would continue to transfer defense items, defense information and services to the Turkish Government. In its turn, the Turkish Government would provide items, services, facilities or information to the USA.¹⁵³ It was also stipulated that the Turkish Government would return the undestroyed, unused and unlost items - in the conclusion of this extraordinary situation - which might be employed in the defense of the Western hemisphere, as determined by the US President.

Indeed, Turkey was faced with a dilemma of pursuing industrialization and maintaining a large armed force at the same time. To hamper the already crippled economy, the prices of Turkish export commodities which were high during the war, had fallen to a normal level with the end of the war. The transformation of Turkey from an agrarian to an industrialized country was one of the objectives of the government while agricultural production was conducted by primitive methods and poor transportation means. Thus, it was obvious that

¹⁵² Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, Vol. I, p. 188.

¹⁵³ Haydar Tunçkanat stated that particularly this clause had forced Turkey to assume broad undertakings since it had not prescribed the items, services or facilities in concern to have a "defensive" nature. Haydar Tunçkanat, *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü* (The Inside of Bilateral Agreements), (Ankara: Ekim Yayınevi, 1970), pp. 23-26.

Turkey could not achieve the purpose of industrializing on its own. On the other hand, there were no signs of an economic collapse since Turkey had gold and foreign exchange reserves amounting to 245 million dollars which Turkey kept in case of a Soviet attack.¹⁵⁴ Given this, Turkey sought foreign military and economic aid as a contingency measure.

In October 1945, Turkish-US talks had led to a Turkish request for a credit of \$500 million from the Export-Import Bank. In April 1946, concurrently with the visit of *Missouri* President İnönü had taken the opportunity to reveal Turkey's request of 500 million dollars credit for the realization of industrial development as well as infrastructure projects. At the same time, he had disclaimed any desire for American military equipment, saying that he "*hoped it would not be needed*".¹⁵⁵ However, only 25 million dollars were offered to Turkey despite the endeavours of Ambassador Wilson who argued that not to exceed Eximbank's 25 million dollars aid would be a severe shock the Turkish Government. In this context, he suggested that the State Department might take the following points into consideration before

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28. According to George Harris the amount was \$270 million in gold and foreign exchange. George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 24. Max W. Thornburg stated that when the Turkish Central Bank was established in 1931, paper money in circulation amounted to 158,748,563 Liras (about \$75 million at the 1931 rate of 2.11 Liras to the Dollar). Concurrently, the government passed to the Central Bank the liability of redemption at some future time when the currency should be stabilized. To cover the liability, the government paid to the bank 500 000 Turkish Liras in gold, and the balance in Treasury bonds, to be amortized at the rate of one per cent of the credits provided each year in the ordinary and special budgets of the state. He also explained that in effect the gold standard had been abandoned except to a limited extent in international exchange, though the gold reserve was ample, amounting to 68 per cent of the currency in circulation at the end of 1946 (931,444 Liras). As for the external debt, he explained, this was almost entirely funded and the doubling of this debt from 355 million Liras in 1945 to over 780 million Liras in 1946 was due not to new borrowings as much as to the devaluation of the Turkish Lira in September of that year. See, Max W. Thornburg, *Turkey An Economic Appraisal*, (NY: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), pp. 147-148; 155-157; 260, respectively.

¹⁵⁵ *New York Times*, April 7, 1946. Cited in, George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 20.

giving its final decision: first, since the Turkish position vis-a-vis the SU was critical, an unfavorable loan treatment could lead to misunderstandings in the Turkish Government; secondly, even though Turkey was not devastated by war, it was in need of financial aid in order to make certain economic readjustments; and lastly, Turkey was in need of modernizing its agriculture, minerals development, transportation and communications so as to bring its economy to a better situation, all of which necessitated more credits. At the same time, Ankara was informed that the stated amount far exceeded the total resources available to that lending agency and that much more detailed justification would be required in any event. Subsequently, in March, Washington sent word that Turkey was likely to receive no more than \$23 million.¹⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the first bilateral agreement between Turkey and the USA in the aftermath of the WW II was signed in Cairo on, February 27, 1946. It was decided that a credit of 10 million dollars would be given to Turkey. Turkey would pay this credit back in 10 years in equal installments with an interest rate of 2, and in 3/8 ratio. Shortly afterwards, on May 7, 1946, another agreement between the two governments concerning the lend and lease requests was signed in Ankara. Oral Sander stated that through the credit agreements of 1946, and as

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21; *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 902-904. On May 23, 1946, the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, made clear to the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, H. R. Baydur, that because of the Banks's shortage of funds as well as its previous commitments, the chances of giving a 25 million dollars loan to Turkey was high but, increasing it to 50 million was not possible. Shortly afterwards, on July 3, 1946, Eximbank, with the approval of the National Advisory Council, gave 25 million dollars in exporter credits to Turkey for fiscal years 1946 and 1947. The term "exporter credit" meant that Eximbank would participate up to 25 million dollars in financing projects put forward jointly by the Turkish Government and the US suppliers, or put forward by the US suppliers and approved by the Turkish Government. In any event, Turkish Government's notes or Turkey's guarantee would be required, culminating in the effect that no advances would be made without the approval of the Turkish Government. *Ibid.*, pp. 907; 911.

will be discussed below, the agreement of July 12, 1947, Turkish statesmen sought the ways to increasingly obtain US economic aid beyond the military assistance provided by the Truman Doctrine.¹⁵⁷

While these developments were taking place, within the framework of increasing Turkey's participation in the major organisations of the UN, Turkey adhered to United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRAA) on May 8, 1946.¹⁵⁸ On the same days, Turkish experts and commissions of Foreign Relations and Finance were working on the conditions for Turkey's adherence to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as well. In the aftermath of the completion of these commissions, a justification of the law in regard to Turkey's accession to this organisation signed by Prime Minister Peker, was submitted to the TGNA for approval on November 30, 1946. Here, it was pointed out that Turkey's share in these organisations would amount to 43 million dollars for each. Finally the TGNA approved the Law No. 5016 on February 14, 1947.

Turning back to the crisis in the Mediterranean, evidently, the attention of the US foreign policy officials had already been drawn to the necessity of implementing a new strategy by the events in Iran and especially the Eastern Mediterranean. The real division between the SU and the USA came in 1947, over Greece. Since its liberation by the British troops in 1944, Greece had been torn by a civil conflict between nationalists and a group of Soviet supported communist guerrillas. In 1946, as a result of elections, the Royalists formed a government

¹⁵⁷ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, pp. 44-45. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 26-36 *passim*.

¹⁵⁸ *Birleşmiş Milletler Yardım ve Kalkındırma İdaresine Katılınması Hakkında Kanun*, in *Resmi Gazete*, 10 Mayıs 1946, Vol. 6303.

and a plebiscite declared in favour of the return of the King. Civil war then broke out again. Greece took the case before the Security Council, and stated that the insurgent communists were receiving aid from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. The Soviets refused to accept the Greek appeal and attributed the disorders to the vindictive policies of the Greek government. On 24 February 1947, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, told the Secretary of State that, Britain due to its financial problems, would no longer assist the Greek army in its conflict against the Communists. The United Kingdom explained the necessity of the replacement of its aid with US subsidies. As will be discussed below, the response of the USA was launching the Truman Doctrine.

By articulating a greater concern and apprehension about the Soviet menace in the post-war era, the problem of assistance to Turkey and Greece was being studied by a special committee since February. Kennan, who was asked to participate in the deliberations of this committee was then in his tour of duty at the War College. Establishment of different structures within a short period of time was surprising to Kennan as well. Previously, he was informed by Under Secretary Acheson that General George Marshall, who had assumed the Office of the Secretary of State in January, had in mind the establishment within the Department of State of a planning unit - something to fill the place of the Divisions of Plans and Operations to which he was accustomed in the War Department - and Kennan himself would be asked to head this new unit.

When the special committee headed by Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Loy Henderson - a colleague of Kennan from Moscow and Riga days ¹⁵⁹ - met on February 24, Kennan asserted that, what they had before them, on that occasion, “*was the task of recommending whether to respond affirmatively at all to the problems posed for us by the British withdrawal, or whether to leave the Greeks and Turks to their own devices*”. ¹⁶⁰ Kennan stated that he had revealed that it was in fact had already been decided in principle, and that the task of the committee was to outline in more detail the course of action that should be recommended to the President and Gen. Marshall. In his turn, Kennan gave it as his opinion that the US had no choice but to accept the challenge and to extend the requisite aid. This was the consensus of the group as a whole and subsequently, an appropriate recommendation was drawn up.

However, on the day before the State Department’s final draft of this message went to the White House, when Kennan came over to the department to have a look at the paper, he figured out that the language to which he took “*particular exception was not the product of Henderson’s pen or of any of his associates in the geographic divisions*.” ¹⁶¹ It had been produced, at the initiative of the Department of State’s public relations office, in a sub-committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) which clearly felt itself under the necessity of clothing the announced rationale for Truman’s decision in terms more

¹⁵⁹ Based on Daniel Yergin’s “Riga and Yalta axioms”, Arthur M. Schlesinger explained that one school of American policy-makers, guided by foreign service officers like Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen who had studied the SU from the Riga listening post in the years before American recognition, saw a revolutionary state committed by Leninist ideology to world conquest. The Yalta school, on the other hand, saw just another traditional great power. Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Cycles of American History*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986), p. 204.

¹⁶⁰ George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, p. 314.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

sweeping than anything that Kennan envisaged. Kennan admitted that the reasons behind his unhappiness over the wording of Truman's message lied in the exclusion of conclusions he had obtained from the lengthy discussions of different working groups in the War College on the situation in Greece and Turkey, and the question of why it was desirable that the US Government should respond to the challenge of the British move which he later developed to lay down the basis of the text in concern. ¹⁶²

On March 12, 1947, after the British Government formally informed Washington on February 24, through a note dated February 21 that as of March 31 the British Government could no longer shoulder the burden of militarily supporting Greece and Turkey and "*would be obliged to discontinue the financial, economic and advisory assistance which it has been giving*" to these countries, Truman informed Congress and the public of the situation and recommended that the US Government extend aid to Greece and Turkey. In his historic address to the Congress, the main points of which were to become known as the Truman Doctrine, the US President justified this request through describing a worldwide struggle between the free world and totalitarianism.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 315-316. Kennan stated that in the words of the following War College presentation he had accepted the conclusion, to which many others in the government had arrived: "*if nothing were done to stiffen the backs of the non-Communist elements in Greece at this juncture the Communist elements would soon succeed in seizing power and in establishing a totalitarian dictatorship along the lines already visible in Balkan countries.*" *Ibid.*, p. 316. However, he had considered that the Russians and their Eastern European associates were poorly set up to take responsibility either for the governing of Greece or for the support of the Greek economy. He said, "*all this might boomerang on them in the form of serious economic difficulties and other problems, which the West might even ultimately exploit to good advantage.*" *Ibid.* But, Communist rule he asserted would probably be successfully consolidated in the long run and might some day have most unfortunate strategic consequences from the standpoint of any military adversary of the SU and more important were the probable repercussions which such a development would have on neighboring areas.

Regarding the crisis in Greece, he said, the existence of the Greek state was threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defied the government's authority particularly along the northern boundaries, while the Greek Government was unable to cope with the situation.¹⁶³ It was considered that the UN might assist in the crisis. He said, the situation was an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the UN and its related organizations were not in a position to extend help of this kind that was needed.

As for Turkey, he stated that the future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state was clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. Truly, the circumstances in which Turkey found itself were considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey had been spared the disasters that had beset Greece and during the war, the United States and Britain had furnished Turkey with material aid. Since the war, Turkey had sought financial assistance from Britain and the USA for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. "*That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East*" Truman said.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ "Message from President Truman to the Congress on the Truman Doctrine", in, Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Dynamics of World Power*, pp. 111-115, *passim*. Truman also pointed out that the Greek Government which had made mistakes had been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. Nevertheless, it represented 85 per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election considered to be fair.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Truman concluded his speech pointing out,

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.

We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

In this context, Truman further explained that it was in the US national interest to help free nations like Greece and Turkey become strong enough to resist Communist aggression and he proposed an emergency military and economic aid program, which the Congress finally approved on May 22, through the “Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey”.¹⁶⁵ Among other things, the Act emphasized that “*the President may from time to time when he deems it is in the interest of the United States furnish assistance to Greece and Turkey, upon request of their governments and upon terms and conditions determined by him...*”¹⁶⁶ Thus, in parts, the Truman Doctrine comprised aid to Turkey, and large economic and military missions were established in Athens and small ones in Ankara to transfer \$750 million worth of assistance.¹⁶⁷

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world-and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our Nation.

¹⁶⁵ Known as Public Law 75 (80th Cong., 1st. sess.) too. From, “Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, May 22, 1947”, in, Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Dynamics of World Power*, pp. 122-125.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 122. It was enacted that the President would implement the program by rendering financial aid in the form of loans, credits, grants, or otherwise to those countries; by detailing to assist those countries any persons in the employ of the Government of the USA [Provided that no civilian personnel would be assigned to Turkey and Greece to administer the purposes of this act until such personnel have been investigated by the FBI]; by detailing a limited number of members of the military services of the USA to assist those countries, in an advisory capacity only; by providing for the transfer to, and the procurement for by manufacture or otherwise and the transfer to those countries of any articles, services and information and the instruction and training of personnel of those countries; and by incurring and defraying necessary expenses in connection with the carrying out out of the Act. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

¹⁶⁷ George McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World*, (NY: Harper&Row Publishers, 1983), p. 20. The initial amount was stated as \$400,000,000 appropriated to the US President to carry out the provisions of the Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey of May 22, 1947. In their turn, the Soviets had not viewed these developments without protest and countermoves. In fact, while the future of the US aid programme was back in the lap of the American Congress, the Kremlin was making clear to the world the hostile interpretation they had of it and the Communist parties in Western Europe were trying to overthrow pro-Marshall Aid governments. Shortly afterwards, the Cominform was announced on 5 October and the Foreign Minister’s autumn meeting in London, like

In his appraisal of the Truman Doctrine, Kennan pointed out that the situation of Turkey differed quite fundamentally from that of Greece. He evaluated that there was no serious Communist penetration in Turkey and no comparable guerrilla movement. “*The Turks had nothing to fear but fear.*”¹⁶⁸ He considered that if the Turks did not lose their nerves, if they kept their internal political life relatively clean and orderly, and refused to get involved in negotiations with the Russians on a bilateral basis over complicated issues such as that of the Straits, they would probably continue to enjoy a temporary and precarious immunity to Russian pressure. He said, should they be increasingly encircled by Communist-dominated entities, it would plainly be harder for them to maintain this stance. Thus, aid to Greece was important as a support for stability in Turkey as well. However, Kennan concluded that this view of the problem of Turkey afforded no rationale for the mounting of a special aid program for Turkey itself.

According to him, the accent was put on international morale and on firmness of diplomatic stance, not on military preparations. Kennan stated that it was for this reason that he was not happy to find in the draft of the President’s message to the Congress a proposal for aid to Turkey as well as to Greece. He suspected that what was intended was primarily military aid, “*and that what had really happened was that the Pentagon had exploited a favorable set of circumstances in order to infiltrate a military aid program for Turkey into*

all its predecessors stalled under Soviet intransigence. However, in the middle of December the USA gave interim aid to France, Italy and Austria and by a new agreement with the UK relieved it of all dollar expenditures in Germany, as well as assuming seventy-five per cent of the cost of both zones.

¹⁶⁸ George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, p. 316.

*what was supposed to be primarily a political and economic program for Greece.”*¹⁶⁹ Then, Kennan asserted that since it was important that the Soviet threat be recognized for what it was - *“primarily a political one and not a threat of military attack - it seemed unfortunate that the picture of what was needed in Greece should be confused by association with something that was not needed - or, if needed, was needed for entirely different purposes - in Turkey.”*¹⁷⁰

In fact, the difference of the situation in Turkey was pointed by Acting Secretary Acheson as well. In his statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations on March 24, 1947, he explained that the Turkish Government had on various occasions applied to the United States for financial aid, but the US Government had not had the facilities for responding to those requests and since British aid was not available, the needs of Turkey for assistance were greatly increased. Subsequently, Acheson referred to both Turkey and Greece and said, *“Greece and Turkey are in urgent need of aid and there is no other country to which they may turn.”*¹⁷¹

Following his explanation on the situation in Greece, Acheson underlined that the case of Turkey was substantially different, but Turkey needed this help. The Turkish Army had been mobilized since the beginning of WW II and this had put a severe strain upon the national economy. During the war, Turkey had received substantial assistance from Britain and the USA, which had helped it carry this load. But, if these subsidies were no longer available,

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 317.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ From, “Statement by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on an Explanation of the Truman Doctrine”, in, Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Dynamics of World Power*, p. 115.

the Turkish economy would not be able to carry the full load required for its national defense and at the same time proceed with economic development which it needed to keep the country in sound condition.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, R. Baydur, informed Ankara on June 25, 1947 that it was admitted in Washington circles that the US assistance prompted by the serious economic decline of France and Italy, and consecutively extended to other countries, had been unfruitful. The amount of the US aid in credits and donations to Europe had reached 12 billion dollars, however it could accomplish very few tasks. Anarchy and Communism was gaining ground in Europe and the situation was likely to deteriorate further. Baydur also pointed out that the US-Europe trade balance was 15 billion dollars greater in favour of the former. The European countries could no longer sustain these commercial relations with the USA due to their huge budget deficits and lack of finance in dollars. This would inevitably represent a 7.5 billion dollars decline per year in the trade volume with Europe.

In this context, Baydur underscored that when President Truman presented his aid plan to Greece and Turkey, despite the acknowledgement of the need for assistance to these countries, many congressmen had raised criticisms on the ill-defined scope of the programme and demanded a budgetary planning which would clearly state the boundaries of the job in hand. Consecutively, Secretary of State Marshall's speech at Harvard on June 5, was to the effect that it should be admitted that the assistance to Europe had remained in a particular disorder, weakening its effect, and the aid to Europe must be effectively coordinated and executed singlehandedly. He said, in its turn, Europe had to unite and the USA should

encourage its efforts in this direction. As will be further discussed below, Baydur pointed out that following Marshall's speech, Britain and France had acted "*at a speed which diplomacy did not witness before*" to respond to the situation. According to Baydur, however, the US assistance programme was not ready even after the speech of Marshall. Baydur said, his encounters in the State Department had shown that the programme was mostly a projection aimed at preparing European public opinion and stimulating the European states to take necessary steps for unanimous action. Thus, the programme was expected to be substantialized at a later phase. In the meantime, Truman had decided to set up three commissions to examine the appropriation resources, to determine the positive and negative effects of the proposed assistance programme over the US economy, and the distribution of aids to the recipient countries.¹⁷² In this context, Baydur stressed that the reactions of the Congress might be seriously negative since Truman had vetoed the law which envisaged a tax reduction of 4.5 billion dollars in regard to the income revenues which was promised to the US voters by the Republicans.

Baydur's assessments concerning the possible course of action of the SU included: first, Moscow's satellites would request the permission of the SU to adhere to the US assistance scheme; secondly, the SU would desire not to stay out of the European integration which was under construction, and would consent to an immediate ratification of the peace treaties and the settlement of the question of Germany; and lastly, a phase of exchange of views would be given its start between Moscow and its satellites, eventually half-removing the iron curtain. This would represent an ease for world peace. However, in case Russia declined the

¹⁷² From, *The Embassy in Washington to the MFA* (extract), dated June 25, 1947. The MFA

American proposal, the USA would shift to an enforcement policy “*which would mean the crystallization of the western bloc and the accomplishment of peace between the two blocs would get harder to achieve*”.¹⁷³

As for the participation of Turkey in the programme for the reconstruction and economic development of Europe, through the Note of the British Embassy dated July 4, 1947, the MFA was informed that the British and French Governments had studied the suggestions contained in the speech of Secretary of State of the US, Marshall, at Harvard University on the 5th June, and the two governments had recognized that Europe had to take the initiative in the work of reconstruction, and that for this purpose it was essential to draw up as quickly as possible a programme covering both the resources and the needs of Europe. It was stated that “*in the opinion of the two Governments a temporary organisation must be set up to bring together the data on which such a programme will be based.*”¹⁷⁴ It was further stressed that this organisation should consist of a “Committee of Co-operation” which would co-ordinate the work of special sub-committees to deal with certain products or branches of economic activity. The Committee of Co-operation would be set up with instructions to prepare a

Archives.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ From, *The Note of the British Embassy in Ankara to the MFA, July 4, 1947* (extract). The text of the, *Annex* [of this note] *to the invitation to European Countries* further explained that the British and French Governments regarded it as all-important that swift action should be taken for the reconstruction and economic development of European countries which had suffered from the ravages of war. It was stated that the governments believed that this task would be made easier by economic aid from the USA such as that suggested by Marshall in his speech of 5th June. Thus, the first step should be for Europe to help itself by developing the production of its basic resources. “*The support of the United States is essential to enable Europe to accomplish this by contributing resources which are lacking until this has been achieved. This is the best way to ensure the economic recovery of European countries and to safeguard their independence.*” Ibid.

report on the available resources and needs of Europe during the next four years.¹⁷⁵ It was stated that the Committee of Co-operation should, as the American Secretary of State himself suggested, seek the friendly aid of the USA in drafting the programme. It would consist of representatives of the UK, France and certain other European states.

In this framework, four sub-committees would be set up to assist the work of the Committee of Co-operation in regard to the following subjects; food and agriculture; fuel and power; iron and steel; and transport. British and French governments would invite representatives, appointed by countries which agreed to participate, to a meeting in Paris on the 12th of July in order to settle the composition of the Committee of Co-operation and the special sub-committees which would begin their work on the 15th of July. It was also decided that the report of the Committee of Cooperation should be drawn up in time to be presented to the US Government on the 1st of September, 1947, at the latest. As for the relations of this organisation with other international bodies, the Economic Commission for Europe would be informed at its forthcoming session of the setting up of this organisation. The Committee and sub-committees would be in contact with the UN Organisation and its specialised agencies and services of inter-governmental organisations.

The Note concluded that;

In the conviction that Mr. Marshall's suggestions are in the interests of Europe as a whole, that the task of European reconstruction would obtain essential help from the assistance of the United States of America, that this assistance is dependent on European nations making the effort to co-ordinate and to help each other, His Majesty's Government and the French

¹⁷⁵ In regard to Germany, which was of course significant for Turkey as a trade partner, it was stated that information relating to resources and needs of Germany would be requested from Commanders-in-Chief, members of the Control Council. Ibid.

Government have the honour to invite the Government of Turkey to take part in the administrative machinery which they desire to see set up.¹⁷⁶

Interestingly, the Note Verbale of the British Embassy discussed above was followed by a Note Signee dated July 5, in which Ambassador David Kelly explained that he was instructed to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saka, that an important sentence was accidentally omitted from the preamble to the Annex attached to the invitation. After this sentence was inserted at the end of paragraph 2, it would read:

2. In order to collect quickly the information needed to draw up a programme covering the available resources and needs of Europe, a special organisation will be set up. All European states willing to do so will collaborate with this organisation. It will not interfere with the internal affairs of these states and no action will be taken by it which could be regarded as a violation of their sovereignty. [There will be no restraint placed upon desirable developments of European trade.]¹⁷⁷

Despite the fact that the announcement of the Truman Doctrine paved the way to a greater collaboration in Europe, Kennan's unhappiness with the wording of Truman's message was evident. As he pointed out himself, this was mostly related with the inherent limits of the statement. He said, if he were reacting "today" to the Truman Doctrine, he would certainly have added to the list of specific requirements the willingness and ability of the threatened people to pick up and bear resolutely the overwhelming portion of the responsibility and effort in their own defense against both direct and indirect aggression. Kennan also expressed

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ The Note concluded that "*I am further instructed to inform Your Excellency that no significance should be attached to this omission and that the sentence is one to which both the United Kingdom*

that what the USA was concerned to defend in Greece was the democratic quality of the country's institutions. The USA would find it necessary to give aid, over the ensuing years, to a number of regimes which could hardly qualify for it on the basis of their democratic character.¹⁷⁸

Almost three weeks before the announcement of the Public Law 75, it was decided to send a military mission to Turkey, whose work, later on would also serve the drafting of the Aid to Turkey Agreement signed on July 12, 1947, which provided the basis for carrying out the Turkish aid programme. The goal of the US military mission to Turkey, as directed by the SWNCC, was to assess the situation on the ground and recommend to the State Department how much of the \$400 million authorised for Public Law 75, but not yet appropriated, was required that year by Turkey. The SWNCC group was also empowered to examine the needs of the Turkish armed forces for equipment and supplies and to suggest priorities; to evaluate the need for a reorganisation of the Turkish armed forces and for staff training by the USA or Britain; to make suggestions as Britain's future role in aid to Turkey and how the two countries could work together if British aid were to continue; and finally, to make recommendations in concerning supervision of the use of US aid.

George Harris maintained that in its turn, the US Congress was suspicious of Truman's decision to help Turkey. He stated that the Congressmen generally considered that the administration wanted to help Turkey, but since it could not do it on its own, it attempted to

and French Governments attach considerable importance." The Note of the British Embassy in Ankara to the MFA (extract), July 5, 1947. The MFA Archives.

¹⁷⁸ Kennan admitted that it was unwise to suggest that this, too, was an essential criterion. "*But these omissions, the recognition of which does indeed reflect the promptings of hindsight, only reinforce the validity of the objections to the language of the message that suggested themselves at the time.*" George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, p. 321.

combine Turkey's case with Greece, where the problem was much more acute. The Truman Doctrine he said, finally marked a very sharp break because the British no longer had much of a role in protecting Turkey. Then the Turkish MFA and the military heavily focused on the USA as the source of support.¹⁷⁹

As McGhee put it, it was decided that the US aid mission to Turkey should work under the authority of Ambassador Wilson, since it was feared that the presence of an independent military mission might be construed as interference in Turkish domestic affairs. According to him, the Turkish Government had already expressed concern that Washington would try to exercise its "*control*" in Turkey. In his turn, Wilson assured the Turkish Government of the limited and cooperative nature of any such control. He said, the US Government "*after consultation with Turkey, will determine what military equipment and other aid should be provided to Turkey...All that will take place on Turkish territory will be 'observing' by US officials as to the manner in which Turkey utilizes assistance given.*"¹⁸⁰

At this juncture, the question of the use of American advisers was discussed by Max Weston Thornburg in his work on the Turkish economy in the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine. Here, Thornburg pointed out that before WW II, Turkey had made extensive use of foreign advisers from Germany, Britain and Russia and since 1940, forced by circumstance, the government had relied on Turkish specialists, However, most of these technicians had not had the requisite experience to guide the economic development of the country and until this lack was supplied, the need for foreign advisers would continue. He asserted that "*since*

¹⁷⁹ As told by George Harris in my interview with him.

¹⁸⁰ Cited in, George McGhee, *The-US-Turkish NATO...*, p. 40.

Turkey must in the next few years rely principally on the United States for resources previously supplied from Europe, there will be a need for American experts, who are familiar with American standards and practices.” ¹⁸¹ According to him, the object was not to spread American influence, but to offer the Turks whatever they were capable of making their own. It would not be in accord with “*the American spirit to try to transplant a wholly alien system to Turkish soil, as the Russians and the Germans did during the thirties.*” ¹⁸² He explained that the governmental need for skilled advisers might be fulfilled through nominating:

a) General Consultants: Engineers with broad economic and industrial background to study the over-all needs and resources of the nation, its state of economic development and the priority which should be given to various fields of work;

b) Experts in Public Works: Engineers and other experts with appropriate specialized experience to work with the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Transportation and Communications and other agencies of government, to guide detailed studies of major projects;

c) Technical Specialists: Geologists, Mineralogists, Chemists, Architects, and other experienced specialists available in the USA from the government and from private professional ranks whose selection could be made by a private consultant to Ankara. Close collaboration between Turkish and American technical colleges, interchange of ideas and publications with corresponding American organizations and formation of Turkish professional societies would offer a similar gain;

¹⁸¹ Max Weston Thornburg, *Turkey An Economic Appraisal*, , p. 212.

¹⁸² Ibid. p. 216.

d) Agricultural Experts: Agricultural and livestock experts with long experience in American practices;

e) Public Health, Education, Economics Experts, who should be sent “*especially to gain the benefits of American experience in vocational training, and to assist in adapting the technical programs in the higher schools to prepare students for work with Americans.*”¹⁸³

In this context, Harris pointed out that in the long run, Turkish critics of the USA would assail the Marshall Plan stress on agriculture in Turkey as a direct challenge to the philosophy of etatism the foundations of which were laid by Atatürk. Indeed, the idea that political independence required a self-sufficient industrial base had become widely accepted by the Turkish intelligentsia since the foundation of the Republic. Harris stated that according to the opponents of the assistance program, the American aid for development seemed to spurn industrial development. He explained that the program for aid to Turkey concentrated the limited available resources on agricultural and infrastructure projects. Of the some \$300 million aid provided between 1948 and 1952, almost 60 percent appeared to have been invested in the agricultural sector. As a result, by 1953, Turkey had become one of the world’s major wheat exporters and the Turkish national income grew nearly 45 percent during the five years following the start of the program. Besides he said that the aid emphasis on agriculture encouraged the government’s orientation towards the peasant masses.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

¹⁸⁴ George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp.33-35. According to Harris, the operation of the Marshall Plan could be faulted for practices as encouraging diversity in the variety of agricultural equipment imported, thus excessively complicating the problem of spare parts. He stated that the mechanization of the Turkish farmer and of the military also paved the way to new demands for petroleum imports. However, overall, he said the American aid “*served to impart needed dynamism to the agricultural sector which faced the monumental challenge of a rapidly increasing population.*” *Ibid.*, p. 34.

The US Embassy in Ankara also favoured the continuation of the assistance program in Turkey and advised that the time was right in order to increase the activities of the US military mission to Turkey. On June 6, Wilson reported to Washington that the Turkish Government and people welcomed US aid wholeheartedly, noting that a failure to produce the aid could be widely misunderstood. The investigations thus far, he stated, had revealed extensive need for equipment, supplies and training even greater than had been anticipated. Consecutively, as mentioned above, on July 12, Aid to Turkey Agreement was signed. In the preamble Article 1, the general framework for the agreement which had the Public Law 75 in its core, stated that aid was being supplied by the USA at the request of Turkey to strengthen its security forces and maintain economic stability. The aid would further the basic objectives of the UN Charter and strengthen ties of Turkish-American friendship. Turkey would make effective use of the aid of the US Government as the President of the USA might authorize in accordance with acts of Congress.

Article 2 of the agreement envisaged that information and technical assistance would be furnished as determined by the US Chief of Mission to Turkey in consultation with representatives of the Turkish Government, financial conditions being decided directly between the two governments. Accordingly, Turkey would send full reports, information and observations concerning use and progress of the aid program. The 3rd Article required that the aid program would be observed and reported by the representatives of the American press and radio. Importantly, Article 4 stipulated that both governments would take such measures for the security of articles, services and information furnished under the aid program “*as the*

other judges necessary.”¹⁸⁵ In this context, Turkey would not transfer title to the foregoing, permit use by anyone not official Turkish representative, nor use for any purpose other than that intended without the consent of the USA.¹⁸⁶ By Article 5, it was secured that Turkey would not use any proceeds from aid to pay on a loan or interest to any other government.

Regarding the wording of the agreement, George Harris pointed out that the Turkish MFA had worked to soften the terms of the statutory requirements imposed by the US Congress. Concerning the 3rd Article he said, after considerable bargaining, the Turkish negotiators inserted phraseology making the freedom of reporters to gather news subject to “security” considerations. Besides, to remove the suggestion of foreign control, the term “aid administrator” was dropped in favor of the title “chief of mission.” Washington also agreed to act discreetly in carrying out its supervisory functions. “*As a further gesture to Turkish sensibilities, Ambassador Wilson was named chief of mission in an effort to submerge this function in his normal reporting responsibilities.*”¹⁸⁷

In his speech made on the occasion of the approval of the agreement in the TGNA, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, explained the main features of the agreement. He maintained that the agreement provided a framework in which Turkey’s use of the American aid was determined. Since the amount, application and duration of the agreement was not

¹⁸⁵ For the text of this agreement (signed in Ankara by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saka, and the US Ambassador Wilson), see, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 5, 1947, No. 6699, pp., 1-2. See also McGhee’s discussion of the Aid to Turkey Agreement, George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO...*, pp. 41-42; and *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 190-192.

¹⁸⁶ Years later, this point was raised in connection with the Cyprus crisis in the shocking letter of President Johnson dated June 5, 1964, which he sent following İnönü’s informing him of the Turkish consideration of intervening in the island. See, *ibid.*, and Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1979), pp. 26-27.; Melek M. Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), pp. 130-133; Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 114-115.

stated, these issues would be subjected to special agreements pertaining to its application. As a result, it would remain in force unless an action was taken on the contrary and would provide the necessary basis for a permanent and unilateral aid program.

On July 23, Wilson sent another report to Washington including the recommendations of the SWNCC team and in which he urged a five-year assistance programme be implemented in order to modernise the armed forces while at the same time reducing their size by two-thirds, at an estimated five-year cost of \$500 million. Meanwhile, towards the end of September, the Turkish Government informed the US Embassy in Ankara that, for budgetary reasons, it intended to demobilise a whole class of recruits, reducing the size of the army from 485 000 to 350 000. In this context, \$100 million in US aid funds was requested to cover an anticipated deficit in the defense budget. Neither the State Department nor the British Foreign Office opposed the force reduction, “*but Wilson and the department agreed that US aid should be limited to supplying military equipment and that funds should not be allocated for meeting the budget deficit, although US purchase of equipment should help to ease the deficit.*”¹⁸⁸

Meanwhile, reactions of the Kremlin towards the US-Turkish collaboration were culminating in a stronger criticism. In August 17, 1947, E. Zhukov, writer of authoritative articles on international affairs and Soviet vision of world politics, alleged in *Pravda* that the USA had finally replaced Britain as the world’s imperialist power. He argued that one of the

¹⁸⁷ George Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 28.

¹⁸⁸ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO...*, p. 43. As stated by a later State Department report, the breakdown of the \$100 million furnished to Turkey were as follows: Ground Forces \$48 500 000; Air Force \$26 750 000; Naval Force \$14 750 000; Arsenal Improvement \$5 000 000; and Highway Improvement \$5 000 000. Ibid.

peculiarities of the postwar period was the increase in numbers of states that found themselves in a greater or lesser degree of dependency upon American imperialism. According to him, the expansion of the USA directed itself primarily against sovereign states, which were thus threatened with the danger of becoming semi-colonial. The same thing applied to Turkey “*which lost its independence as a result of the realization of the so-called ‘Truman doctrine’.*”¹⁸⁹

Similarly, A. Zhdanov put forward that the strategic plans of the USA envisaged the creation in peacetime of numerous bases and vantage grounds situated at great distances from the American continent and designed to be used for aggressive purposes against the SU and the countries of the “new democracy”. Within a list of countries the USA engaged in activities, Zhdanov mentioned Turkey, as “*the US Government has officially declared that it has committed itself to assist in the modernization of the Turkish army.*”¹⁹⁰

Against this background of events, on September 21, a US delegation headed by John Taber, the Chief of Committee on Appropriations of the US House of Representatives, arrived in Ankara on a mission to examine the use of US subsidies. Similar visits followed in the consecutive months including a visit of the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations who expressed their mission as preparing a report to the US Congress.¹⁹¹ The visit of the Members of the US House of Representatives on October 31, 1947, had coincided with the visit of a parliamentary delegation from the British House of Commons and on November

¹⁸⁹ E. Zhukov, “The Colonial Question After the Second World War” Trans., in, Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Dynamics of World Power*, p. 348.

¹⁹⁰ A. Zhdanov, “The International Situation”, September 1947, in, *ibid.*, p. 356.

¹⁹¹ *Ayin Tarihi*, No. 166, Eylül 1947, pp. 13-15; No. 168, Kasım 1947, p. 1

1, both delegations were present in the inauguration ceremony of the 8th term, 3rd legislation year of the TGNA.

On the same occasion, İnönü delivered a speech in which he underscored that the decision of the USA, which acknowledged Turkey as a sincere and trustworthy element of peace in this part of the world, and increasing its legitimate rights of defense as it would serve the world peace, to extend assistance to Turkey was a unique evidence of its efforts for peace. The approval of the TGNA of the July 12 agreement was an expression of the appreciation of the Turkish nation. İnönü stressed that Turkey was neither pursuing a policy of aggression nor would it tolerate any act of aggression against its territorial integrity. This was the straightforward and open policy of Turkey which had passed through an ordeal. He said, though it desired good relations with the Soviet Union, Turkey was subjected to the unrightful allusions of this country, which promoted the events of the past as it perceived them and in a false manner. This being the case, Turkey wished the removal of these issues from the agenda. ¹⁹²

In addition to this emergency assistance, the Marshall Plan, designed to reconstruct the war-ravaged economies of Western Europe, opened the door for large scale military and economic assistance to Turkey. On August 7, Major General Horace L. McBride was appointed Chief, US Army Group in Ankara. Later in 1947, separate Air Force and Navy Groups were also established. Subsequently, these programs paved the way for a greatly

¹⁹² Opening Speech of the President İnönü On the Occasion of the Inauguration of the TGNA'S 8th Term, 3rd Legislation Year, November 1, 1947, *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları 1920-1073* (The Speeches of İsmet İnönü in the TGNA 1920-1973), İkinci Cilt (Vol. II) (1939-1960) (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi Müdürlüğü, 1993), pp. 71-72.

increased American presence in Turkey, but it is from the establishment of the Army Group that Joint United States Military Mission for Aid (JUSMMAT) traced its history.¹⁹³ The US aid mission to Turkey under the act in March 1948 comprised 182 personnel, including 51 civilians, 71 Army Group, 34 Air Force Group, and 13 Navy Group.¹⁹⁴

At that moment, unquestionably, it was important for Ankara to ensure a partnership position with Washington to guarantee the flow of US subsidies in increasing amounts. An overwhelming majority of the Turkish military circles shared the contention that American war material would best suit the needs of the Turkish Army. There were, however, opposing views concerning the implications of Turkish-American military partnership. A retired Turkish Army officer, Orhan Erkanlı explained that through military aid, the USA gave a vigorous start to re-organize the Turkish Armed Forces at American standards. He pointed out that under the umbrella of the US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, the US military experts were assigned in smaller field teams, which were designed to serve as advisory boards in the Turkish divisions. Correspondingly, courses were opened by these experts to introduce the Turkish officers and NCOs to the US war equipment. The Turkish Army

¹⁹³ In 1949, MG McBride united the three groups to form the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. This tri-service organization was one of the first of the military assistance and advisory groups (MAAGs) that the USA was to organize in many countries to administer the distribution of American military equipment and to help train foreign military personnel. MG McBride served between August 10, 1947 - June 30, 1950 and was replaced by MG William H. Arnold who served between June 30, 1950 and Jan 31, 1953.

By 1951, JAMMAT had 1250 military and civilian personnel assigned and was the largest US MAGG. In 1958, JAMMAT was renamed JUSMMAT - the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. *40th Anniversary of Military Assistance to Turkey, Commemorative Pamphlet*, (Ankara: JUSMMAT, August 11, 1987).

¹⁹⁴ Programmes conducted by US specialists included intensive training in the fields of supply, communications, ordnance, aircraft flight and maintenance, medical care, highway construction and machine operation and maintenance. George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO...*, pp. 43-44.

personnel also attended programmes in West Germany and in the USA. Circumstances of the Turkish economy indeed further compelled Ankara to increasingly leave the control of its armed forces to the Americans as far as training, organization and logistic support activities were concerned. However, *“since the US was carrying out a calculated and future oriented planning, as much as generously acting, together with its equipment, weaponry and knowledge, it brought its own military procedures into Turkey providing itself with a single handed supply of resources.”*¹⁹⁵

Concerning the US perception on the need of supporting the Turkish Land Forces, McGhee pointed out that when he came to Ankara as Ambassador in 1952, he figured out that the military had a call on the first 40.000 school graduates among those inducted into the Turkish Armed Forces each year - approximately 135.000, many of whom had not finished school - the Navy 16.000 and the Air Force 20.000 with the Army taking what was left. He underlined that this had created a great handicap for the Army in training those required as a result of the modernisation of tanks, trucks and electronic communications equipment.¹⁹⁶

Turning back to the economic aspects of the assistance, as Sander pointed out, it is almost impossible to figure out the total amount of US aid since these programmes were widespread and outnumbered. It goes without saying that the debate around the issue of bilateral agreements rightfully underlines the existence of various joint activities of unrevealed nature, the scope and the financial dimensions of which are unknown even today.

¹⁹⁵ Orhan Erkanlı, “Türk Ordusu Yeniden Düzenlenmelidir” (The Turkish Army Should Be Given A New Order), in *Milliyet*, February 19, 1968.

¹⁹⁶ George McGhee, *“The-US-Turkish-NATO...”*, p. 45.

IV 3. The US Assistance Program and the Turkish Participation in the Committee of European Economic Co-operation

Explicitly, US diplomacy favoured the continuation of the wartime collaboration and the fostering of international cooperation with the SU. However, the post WW II era proved to be too eventful to continue with this expectation. By the Summer of 1946, the dominant body of official opinion in Washington held that the very existence of the SU threatened American security. By March 1947, the idea that Soviet Communism was bent on world conquest had been firmly implanted.¹⁹⁷ Michael MccGwire stated that even "*the idea of preventive war was common currency and the option of bombing Moscow was openly discussed, to enforce compliance with US policies*".¹⁹⁸

With these considerations in Washington, the US Government sought the means to counterbalance the Soviet challenge without waging another war. Undoubtedly, the US assistance programme for Europe, which was launched to draw the free countries of the region together served towards this objective. Although the recovery programme was intended to contain Communist expansion, Marshall stated that it was open to all European countries, including those under Communist regimes. He stated that, "*Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos*".¹⁹⁹ In this framework, after Marshall opened discussion of the the plan on June 5, 1947,

¹⁹⁷ Michael MccGwire, "Is There A Future For Nuclear Weapons ?", *International Affairs*, 70:2, (April 1994), p. 216.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Cited in, ibid., p. 15.

Washington made it clear that the Europeans should take the initiative in drawing up the specifics of the program, that the SU and its allies were invited to participate, and that German recovery was necessary for the program to work.

On June 17-18, British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin and his French counterpart, Georges Bidault, met in Paris to discuss the speech of Marshall. Here, Bidault convinced Bevin that it was politically necessary for Paris to make a gesture to include the Kremlin.²⁰⁰ Then they issued an invitation to Molotov to consult with them in Paris during the last days of June. In their turn, the Soviets accepted the invitation made by the foreign ministers of Britain and France to attend a Three-power preliminary conference to discuss the American proposals.

On June 17, N. Menemencioğlu, then Turkish Ambassador to Paris, reported to the MFA that the grave consequences of the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of March 1947 had been followed by the widening of gap between the USA and the SU. Menemencioğlu asserted that, having felt a necessity to enhance its sphere of influence, Russia had sponsored the coup in Hungary in May 1947, and had quickly begun to strengthen its position in the Balkans. It was eager to engage in activities even in Austria. Facing the Soviet threat, for the USA, there could be no other option but to indicate a firm stand against the Kremlin. However, he said, this could not be in the form of an actual intervention. The fate of protests or resorting to the mechanisms of the UN could also hardly produce any positive outcome.

²⁰⁰ After having ousted the Communists from his coalition, Socialist Prime Minister Paul Ramadier was governing with a precarious majority. If the Soviets were excluded, the Communists would attack him that he was alienating the SU and dividing Europe. The Gaullist right as well, would denounce him for compromising French interests, sacrificing national well-being for Dollars etc. Bidault, however, assured Bevin that he would not tolerate Soviet delays or demands. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 184.

Thus, it could be foreseen that the USA would mobilize its powers other than arms to respond to the situation. This could be explained in terms of increasing the influence of the USA on the satellites of Moscow too.

In this context, Menemencioglu pointed out that Britain and France had taken action separately in the aftermath of Marshall's speech. However, they had acted together in order to ensure the US Secretary of State to announce that his speech had also meant an invitation to the SU and the eastern European states. Then, he said, France had assumed a special role in this regard. However, the officials of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw little prospect for Moscow's wholehearted participation in the proposed assistance programme. According to them, the Soviets would either remain silent or accept the invitation, but if the latter option prevailed they would attempt to overthrow the organisation from inside. Thus, he said, with an objective analysis it could be perceived that the acceptance of the Marshall Plan by the Kremlin was out of question. Admittedly, within the framework of a general economic cooperation, the SU could hardly challenge Washington's leading position. In fact, if the Russians could admit this situation, the present impasse would not have been experienced. As a result, the SU would do everything in its power to ensure the failure of the US assistance plan.²⁰¹

On the same day, the Turkish Embassy in Moscow informed the MFA that British diplomats in Moscow were emphasizing that Britain had an independent foreign policy from the USA, and it was determined to protect this position. Similar statements were to the effect that the arguments on the American control of British foreign policy were pointless.

²⁰¹ From, *The Embassy in Paris to the MFA* (extract), June 17, 1947. The MFA Archives.

Particularly, with a view to tension between Washington and the Kremlin, they said, Britain could play a role of dispersing the causes of any actual or potential strife. With this objective in mind, the removal of reasons for the American intervention (which was prompted by a need for the reinforcement of British interests) in the Middle East and in the eastern Mediterranean, would serve the maintenance of peace as well as the Soviet interests. It was also stated that this status of Britain was significant in regard to the avoidance of any conflict which might break out between these two powers. The telegram stressed that the tones in these statements were worth noting especially on the eve of talks at Paris and since it had been understood that the British desired to communicate these issues to the Kremlin at a critical phase of the deliberations.²⁰²

Against this background, on June 27, 1947, Molotov arrived at Paris with a huge contingent of experts. In the talks, he raised mainly two issues. Claiming that the Marshall Plan would infringe on the sovereignty of recipient nations, he urged that European nations should individually calculate their needs and collectively submit their requirements to Washington. Secondly, he inquired how the European Recovery Program (ERP) would influence Germany's level of industry and reparation payments. Bevin and Bidault sought to avoid the German question and instead, they told the Soviet Foreign Commissar that the USA required a comprehensive plan, not a list of national requirements, "*that American demands for statistics and cooperation were innocuous, and that European squabbling might mean the*

²⁰² From, *The Embassy in Moscow to MFA* (extract), June 17, 1947, Ibid.

forfeiture of American generosity."²⁰³ According to Molotov, however, the US aid was not without strings attached and the prospect of American supervision was unacceptable. After communicating with Moscow, he became more shrill and intimidated that unilateral Western action might lead to the division of Europe rather than to its rehabilitation. Then, he abruptly withdrew from the talks and accused the USA of attempting "*to rescue American capitalism by economically enslaving Europe*".²⁰⁴ As the Soviets saw the Marshall Plan as a serious threat to their control of Eastern Europe, they applied pressure to persuade the governments of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia which had expressed their intention to attend the conference to be held at Paris in late July. In the meantime, the Kremlin was perpetuating a systematic harassment of noncommunist parties especially in Poland, but there was still no outright Soviet suppression of them. However, the SU decided to reply to what it regarded as America's economic domination of Europe by calling a rival conference in which Cominform - Communist Information Bureau - to coordinate the activities of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, France, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the SU was created.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (NY: Simon&Schuster, 1994), p. 443. In the first two years after the war, Stalin had been able to impose Eastern Europe's frontiers without undertaking an inordinate risk because the Red Army already occupied those areas. Until then, Albania and Yugoslavia had established communist regimes while Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania had coalition governments in which the Communists were the strongest but not yet the unchallenged political center of gravity. See also, George McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World*, p. 20.

²⁰⁵ See, Commentary of Arthur M. Schlesinger, in, *Dynamics of...*, Vol. II., p. 349. When Tito endeavoured to create national Communism in Yugoslavia, the Cominform declared him a heretic and expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc in 1948.

In fact, while Molotov was still in Paris, circles around the US Embassy in Moscow had started to express the sentiment that Molotov's participation in the Paris talks aimed at creating an atmosphere of chaos rather than showing a real effort for the settlement of issues. On June 28, the Turkish Embassy in Moscow informed Ankara that through expressing similar views in the diplomatic circles of Moscow, the US officials were pointing out that the next couple of months would acquire a decisive character. Given this, the USA was not expecting the Paris talks to produce any favourable outcome. Particularly, the word "decisive" would serve the effect that the "Soviet satellites and the democrats" had moved into totally different camps in regard to the issues of international importance. As for the possibility of an armed conflict, based on his personal impressions of Ukraine and its vicinity, an American diplomat in Moscow had explained to his Turkish counterpart that with a view to its crippled economy, the Soviets could hardly dare a war with the West.²⁰⁶

Correspondingly, on July 1, 1947, Cevat Açıkalın, then the Turkish Ambassador in London, reported that in London the prevailing idea on the Russian participation in Paris talks was not in the affirmative either. However, the talks at Paris had been expected to have one of the two definite outcomes: agreement or break off. Here, Açıkalın asserted that the conclusion of the deliberations in the negative meant a reaffirmation of the tragic division of Europe.²⁰⁷

According to M. Leffler, the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan was harsh and calibrated, but it was no declaration of war for the control of Europe as the US Ambassador in Moscow, B. Smith, said. He argued that the Soviet leadership saw its periphery being

²⁰⁶ From, *The Embassy in Moscow to the MFA* (extract), June 28, 1947. The MFA Archives.

probed in Turkey and as well as in Eastern Europe, its fiercest enemy Germany revived and its foreign supporters imprisoned as in Greece, or excised from governments as in Italy and France. Thus, the Soviets had reacted defensively and their aim was to consolidate the Kremlin's power within the orbit of Soviet influence rather than to seek new gains in the West.²⁰⁸

Having excluded the Soviets and their relentless delaying tactics, democratic grouping of states in Europe gave fresh momentum to coordination and planning activities to create the conditions for a regular US assistance at once. Admittedly, the bulk of the work on the US assistance programme was being planned by the Committee of Co-operation to which Turkey was a party since its foundation at the Conference of Paris of July 12-15, 1947. N. Menemencioğlu, the Turkish Ambassador to Paris, headed the Turkish delegation in the Conference. On July 15, Menemencioğlu informed Ankara that it was agreed that the conference mechanism would be replaced by the Committee of European Economic Cooperation. As another point of great importance, the talks in Paris had ended in a way in which the original Anglo-French initiative aiming at confining the participation in the Committee of Co-operation²⁰⁹ to a limited number of European states, and presenting the programme in concern to Washington along these lines, had left its place to a greater scheme. In this regard, all nations present in Paris could have a seat in the Committee of Co-

²⁰⁷ From, *The Embassy in London to the MFA* (extract), July 1, 1947. *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 186.

²⁰⁹ Menemencioğlu explained that within the organisational structure of the European Economic Cooperation Committee, the Committee of Cooperation was designed to assume a privileged role since it would be the executive branch of the organisation which would directly engage in deliberations with the USA on behalf of the whole organisation. From, *The Embassy in Paris to the MFA* (extract), July 15, 1947. The MFA Archives.

operation, which would assume a representative role as well. Technical committees and sub-committees would also address their reports to the Committee of Co-operation which would have an executive board of five. Despite Menemencioğlu's demarché, Britain and France favoured the inclusion of the Netherlands, Norway and Italy into this board while proposing Turkey a seat in the committees of iron-steel industry and transportation.

Interestingly, Menemencioğlu stated that prior to the talks on the establishment of the committees and the sub-committees, the Turkish and the Greek representatives had agreed to act as the representative of two states to optimize the benefits of their work. Greece was placed in the committees of energy, food and agriculture, while Turkey was given a seat in the sub-committee of agriculture. In its turn, Greece took a part in the sub-committee of naval transportation too. In the conclusion of his cable, Menemencioğlu also urged Ankara to send specialists to join the works of the relevant committees and the sub-committees.²¹⁰ Within ten weeks after the Paris Conference of July 1947, a comprehensive scheme was drawn up for the economic recovery of Western Europe.

As for the formulation of US policy towards the growing cleavage between the Western and Communists blocs, in an article published in July 1947, Kennan, then Director of Planning at the State Department, stressed the need for “*a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies*’”.²¹¹ He stated that the USA should continue to regard the SU as a rival in the political arena. Subsequently, the term 'containment' was widely adopted to describe the aim of US policy in its dealings with the

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ George Kennan (attributed to “X”), *The Sources of Soviet Conflict*, in Foreign Affairs, July, 1947, in William Dudley and Teresa O’Neill, *The Cold War Opposing Viewpoints*, p. 57.

Soviets. Furthermore, Kennan stressed that the political personality of Soviet power was the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they exercised for decades in Russia. Shortly afterwards, his telegram circulated in Washington's corridors of power and finally leaked to the press and definitively authored the US policy towards the SU. According to Alan Cassels, Kennan's strategy of containment had already been put into effect and "*policy began to catch up with ideology*" when the Truman Doctrine was enunciated before the US Congress.²¹²

Turning back to the implementation of the US aid program, the committee of 16 beneficiary nations of the Marshall Plan completed its report on September 22, in which the amount of aid required by these nations was stated as 22.5 billion dollars for the years 1948-1951. According to this report, Turkey's share would remain relatively small in the first years.²¹³ On September 27, members of the "Committee of European Economic Co-operation"²¹⁴ in Washington sent an aide-memoire to the State Department, and explained that a large number of technical points which could not be clarified in the report of the 16 participating countries were then clarified. These particular points to which the attention of

²¹² Alan Cassels, *Ideology & International Relations in the Modern World*, (London: Routledge, 1996), 209.

²¹³ İsmail Soysal, *Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Türkiye...*, pp. 44-46. This report is also known as the Paris Report.

In Paris, Turkey requested 615 million dollars for financing its projects. But, as will be further discussed below, in the beginning, the American experts were unwilling to meet this request while placing Turkey in a group of countries that had been considered capable of contributing to the development of war ravaged European economies with a view to its raw materials, gold and foreign currency reserves and foreign trade balance.

²¹⁴ Within weeks after its foundation, this cooperation mechanism acquired different names such as, "The Committee of Co-operation; The Committee of European Economic Co-operation; or the European Group" which all referred to the same organization.

the State Department was drawn, consisted of the aid envisaged; its form and conditions; and the organisation which should be set up for its administration.

In this framework, it was pointed out that the figure for the dollar deficit in the balance of payments of the 16 participating countries during the next four years as shown by the Paris Report, constituted an order of magnitude below which the amount of aid should not be reduced without the risk of jeopardising the achievement of the programme that the participating countries had in view. It was also emphasized that it was not possible to calculate exactly the amount of this deficit which depended on the size of the harvests, on the movement of prices, on the development of dollar earnings, on the resumption of trade between Western and Eastern Europe, etc., while the uncertainty of the factors affecting the figure contained in the Paris Report might lead to revisions upwards as well as downwards. However, with a view to the consequences of insufficient availability of certain commodities necessary for the rehabilitation of the European economy, it was stated that *“this factor, far from reducing the global amount of aid necessary, would tend to increase it”*.²¹⁵

In regard to the form of proposed aid it was underscored that the American aid could be furnished either wholly in dollars or wholly in goods, or partly in dollars and partly in goods. It was preferred, however, that the greatest possible part of the external aid would be supplied in dollars. In carrying out the programme of imports, it was requested that so far as possible, the ordinary channels of trade should be used. Thus, this condition would be more difficult to fulfill if aid was furnished in commodities rather than in dollars. In addition, the

²¹⁵ *Aide Memoire of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation to the State Department, October 27, 1947* (extract). The MFA Archives.

possibility of receiving dollars rather than goods would permit each of the purchasing countries to procure the types and qualities of goods which were best suited to their needs. The aide memoire underscored that *“there is no doubt that these dollars will for the most part be used directly in the U.S. themselves which are the principal suppliers of raw materials, foodstuffs and the necessary equipment.”*²¹⁶ It was also expressed that the European nations would need to place contracts outside the USA with producers who would demand payment in dollars. The participating countries would consequently have to rely on the dollar to enable them to pay for these supplies which were indispensable to the execution of the European programme. Additionally, it was recognized that all necessary steps should have to be taken to limit the inflationary pressure which might result from the purchases. Thus, the European Group was ready to examine with the US Government how it might best cooperate in this regard with the US administration in the common interest.

As for the conditions of the proposed aid, it was explained that the estimated requirements were so considerable that if the aid that was furnished should lead to Europe having to make large transfers, the participating countries would not be in a position at the end of the period in view to ensure a stable equilibrium in their balance of payments. At the same time, the charges to be paid to service an external debt that was too heavy would make it more difficult to obtain credits from the International Bank or private banks, which would certainly be necessary to pay for long term capital equipments. The conditions under which these funds might be used would vary from country to country as well. Consequently, the arrangements governing the use of these funds would be different for each country and would lead to

individual discussions. It was also considered important to note that these funds should be the property of the recipient countries.

Admittedly, the question of how these sums should be handled posed a delicate political problem given the Soviet propaganda warfare. Regarding the need for a political counter-offensive against the opponents of the Marshall Plan who had “*announced their intention of using all means to block it*”, and who would “*seek to show that the existence of these funds is capable of conferring upon the U.S. considerable powers infringing the independence of the European countries concerned*”, it was suggested that these governments have these funds in local currency at their disposal, and employ them in accordance with whatever arrangements might be concluded.²¹⁷

Lastly, as would also constitute the basis for an organisation of the 16 participant countries, it was reiterated that the concerned governments had declared in the Paris Report their readiness to set up a joint organisation with two functions; on the one hand, to examine and report on the extent to which the programme was being realised; on the other hand, to ensure by joint action, the realisation of the economic conditions necessary to enable the general objectives to which each country had pledged itself to be effectively achieved. Consecutively, the task which would be entrusted to this organisation would be elaborated. It was, however, evident that such an elaboration would depend on the character of the external

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

aid and of the organisations “*which on its side the American Government deems it useful to set up to ensure the execution of the programme.*” ²¹⁸

On November 4, in reply to the above discussed aide-memoire, the State Department informed the European Group through an informal aide-memoire that the USA had to give careful thought to additional factors. The capacity of the USA to continue to export far larger quantities of goods than it imports was strictly limited. Thus, the USA could not assume unlimited obligations to meet the balance of payment deficits of other countries. It was stated that many of the commodities most essential to European recovery were in critically short supply, not only in Europe and in the USA, but in the entire world. In this context, if the USA were to make more dollar assistance available than could be honored in the form of goods, the additional assistance would be purely illusory and would merely contribute to an undesirable inflationary spiral in world prices.

Hence, it was recognized that the problem of European recovery had both a commodity aspect and a financial aspect. Thus, a program of assistance from the USA could be worked out when considered from either point of view, to a total program which would give real promise of success. However, “*this could not be merely an American program.*” ²¹⁹ Furthermore, the most intense efforts would be required on the part of the European

²¹⁸ *Ibid.* In the Paris Report, the sixteen countries had declared their readiness to give, within the framework of the overall programme which they had in mind, a certain number of pledges concerning particularly their production targets, their foreign trade, European cooperation etc. As will be later discussed, in his explanations in the TGNA on Turkey’s signing of the Agreement of European Economic Co-operation on April 16, 1948, and subsequently, the Turkish-US Economic Co-operation Agreement on July 4, 1948, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, stated that Turkey had submitted projects in the fields of agriculture and metallurgy.

²¹⁹ From, *Informal Aide-Memoire of the State Department to the European Group, November 4, 1947* (extract). The MFA Archives.

countries, both individually and collectively, which called for prompt and vigorous steps to restore internal monetary and budgetary stability. The participating countries were also expected to boost their production and their exports if sufficient means of payment were to be found to finance their other requirements. It was clearly basic to the whole program that exports from the European countries be rapidly developed, and that these exports be of a character which could continue and expand after special US assistance to European recovery came to an end. Then, it was underscored that any conditions as to the use of materials supplied by the USA in the export trade of the participating countries “*had to be worked out with this basic objective in mind.*”

The aide-memoire also stated that the US Government was in agreement with the point of the European Group that restrictions imposed on the use of local currency arising from US assistance should not interfere with or prejudice the economic and financial control of the economy that had to be exercised by the government of each country. Thus, it was desired that “*a formulae can be mutually agreed upon between this government and the governments of the participating countries with respect to the use of these funds which will promote and not interfere with the over-all objectives of European economic recovery.*”²²⁰ The aide-memoire underscored that the US Congress had a controlling voice, which it would exercise in these matters as well, and this point was mentioned again to emphasize the present trend in formulating the recommendations of the State Department for presentation to the Congress.

In their turn, the Republican majority hesitated to grant a huge amount to fund the programme to be spent by a Democratic administration. With a view to the deterioration of

²²⁰ Ibid.

the international situation, however, in December 1947, the US Congress passed an interim aid program, with \$552 million for Europe and \$18 million for China. Doubts were quickly dispersed by the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. On March 17, 1948, Truman stated in his Congressional speech that, “‘*We have learned that we must earn the peace we seek just as we earned victory in war, not by wishful thinking but by realistic effort*’”.²²¹ Describing Moscow’s ruthless destruction of the independence of various Eastern European nations, and its intent to sabotage the Marshall Plan, he asked that the Congress complete action on the Marshall Plan and provide for a general military training program. Fortunately for the Marshall Plan’s chances of passage, as explained above, the SU and Moscow-oriented nations refused to participate, for Truman got it through the budget-conscious Eightieth Congress by presenting it in a crisis atmosphere. The Congress responded to his call and on April 3, 1948, he signed the Foreign Assistance Act, under which the USA provided \$12.4 billion to Europe over the next four years.²²²

Semih Günver, who had served in Brussels as a Turkish diplomat in these years, pointed out that particularly the deterioration in the French and Italian economies had prompted the regular American aid to Europe. He explained that despite the financial assistance provided by Washington in the aftermath of war, Communism had advanced in Europe, necessitating a detailed aid project. He said, the US administration had come to the conclusion that no positive outcome could be expected from assistance packages made on an irregular basis, and

²²¹ From “Message by President Truman to Congress on Western Reaction to the Soviet Coup in Czechoslovakia, March 17, 1948”, Arthur M. Schlesinger (Gen. ed.), *Dynamics of World Power*, p. 129.

a total action plan was required. Besides, it was agreed that Europe should be encouraged to unite and effectively cooperate in the administration of the aid. Interestingly, Günver said, in the beginning, it was evaluated by the USA that the SU would also accept the assistance in line with its policy to remain in the negotiation table where the future of Europe was discussed. Thus, it was initially expected that through this move, the Kremlin would neither categorically reject the aid, nor would it direct its satellites to do so. At this juncture, he said, launching of the assistance to Greece and Turkey was a serious decision which went through a process of long discussions in the US Congress, since the US administration was already experiencing a considerable difficulty to explain about the future of the aid program to Europe. This period, he said then included a broader publicity of the Soviets' vicious goals and the Kremlin's assertiveness in different parts of the world, including the Mediterranean.

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As will be discussed next, particularly in the aftermath of the Marshall Aid, Ankara's efforts to achieve a Mediterranean security organization took place. Meanwhile, Turkey's efforts to express its security concerns faced setbacks since the US administration could hardly receive Congressional support to include Turkey in its further defense programmes, and Britain could no longer be counted as provider of an offer in this direction with a view to its weak talks about revitalizing the 1939 mutual assistance treaty.

²²² William E. Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman*, p. 100. "Draft Speech (Undelivered), April 17, 1948", in Robert E. Ferrell (ed.), *Off the Record*, (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1997), p. 133. See also note of the editor on p. 129.

²²³ As told by Retd. Ambassador Semih Günver in a personal interview. May 11, 1998, Ankara.

V LAUNCHING OF THE WESTERN SECURITY PACTS AND THE TURKISH ROLE IN REGIONAL DEFENCE (1948-1950)

Admittedly, from 1948 to 1950, the Turkish role in regional defense was a matter on which uncertainty prevailed. During this period, drawing on a variety of assumptions, Ankara produced a range of policy alternatives to associate its defense with that of the West. On this premise, this chapter explains that as a result of the lack of an invitation to become a founding member first in the Brussels Pact in March 1948 and a year later in NATO in April 1949, Ankara increasingly needed to embark on developing its own projections, a Mediterranean security groupement offer being the most cited one. Here, it is also explained that, concurrently, increasing efforts to draw Middle Eastern states together under a new security umbrella also raised the possibility of establishing a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) perhaps linked to NATO.

That was not what happened however. And, eventually, Anglo-American efforts to create a regional security grouping of states proved to be in vain. Given this, this chapter discusses that the conditions gradually arose for Ankara - which was both trying to promote its Mediterranean security pact proposal, and contributing to the efforts around the establishment

of MEDO - to renew its efforts for joining the Western defense scheme, but this time in an entirely different region, in the Far East.

V . 1 Progress Towards A Euro-Atlantic Pact Contains Turkish Participation in the Alliance

Evidently, the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the US aid program, addressed only in part, from Ankara's point of view, Turkish security concerns since it did not provide Turkey with a permanent security mechanism. Thus, in the absence of an American commitment in the Mediterranean, and while the British maintained an essential strategic interest in the area, inevitably, Turkey relied on its treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France of 1939 in its efforts to counter any future Soviet pressure. Concurrently, Turkey had been hoping for some security arrangement with the US since 1947, when the waning of British power in the Eastern Mediterranean became apparent.

Meanwhile, according to McGhee, in a period of increasing demand of the UK for US support "*in other parts of the Middle East than Greece and Turkey, as the military value of British treaty rights in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan declined*"²²⁴, the British whose objective was to hold on to these rights for as long as possible, perceived the defence of the Middle East as an instrument of continuing British influence in the region. Indeed, there were clear

²²⁴ George McGhee, *The-US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, p. 54.

indications that Britain had shifted to formulate its foreign and security policies on different defensive grouping of states each led by either itself or the USA. McGhee pointed out that the main strategy of the British was “Inner Defence” centred on the “Inner Ring” whose locus was Suez. The USA, however, saw Middle East defence as a way to defend the region as a whole from Soviet aggression by bolstering the military strength of Turkey, Iran and Iraq - the “Outer Ring” - within an “Outer Defence” strategy with “Inner Defence” as a backdrop.²²⁵

In a memorandum dated 5 January 1948, Ernest Bevin presented his account of Soviet policy according to which British and American interests were undermined everywhere by growing Soviet ambitions. There was a risk, he thought, that the Communists would control Italy, France and Greece. If Soviet plans in Greece succeeded Turkey also would collapse. Consequently, the success of Russian expansionist designs would imperil the ‘three elements of Commonwealth defence, the security of the UK, the control of the sea communications, and the defence of the Middle East’.² A few days later, on 8 January Bevin discussed with the Cabinet his idea of forming, with American backing, a Western democratic system which would include France, the Benelux countries and Britain, and which would eventually extend to comprise Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal. At a later stage, Spain and Germany could also be included. The Cabinet endorsed the proposal and on 13 January Washington was approached. Along the lines of the same policy, Ernest Bevin proposed a Western alliance against Moscow. When Truman responded positively, discussions quickened. At the same

²²⁵ Ibid. As McGhee put it, these defensive strategies were extensively discussed during US-UK talks in 1950 in order to determine the ways in which the two allies could co-operate in defence matters

time, Bevin communicated the idea to his French counterpart as well, who agreed to cooperate. The exact nature of the alliance, and the American relationship to it, emerged slowly, and as will be further discussed below, on March 17, 1948, Britain, France and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Pact, which provided for collective security.

On January 22, Bevin delivered to the House of Commons a message which underlined that the USA and the UK were heading towards a western collective security arrangement. He said, “*We are, indeed, at a critical moment in the organisation of the postwar world, and decisions we now take, I realise, will be vital to the future peace of the world...I hope that treaties will thus be signed with our near neighbours, the Benelux countries, making with our treaty with France an important nucleus in Western Europe.*”²²⁶

Undoubtedly, Bevin’s speech gave rise to mixed feelings in Ankara. On the one hand, the British initiative addressed what the Turks saw as a need for Western defence cooperation to counterbalance Soviet power. On the other hand, however, the proposed defence arrangement did not encompass the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara became concerned over this exclusion. The world division into two blocs of power, which had become unmistakably clear by the end of 1947 certainly justified this concern.

In the meantime, a series of treaties of friendship and mutual assistance between the SU and Romania (February 4), Hungary (February 18), Bulgaria (March 18) and Finland (April 6) were concluded. The Eastern Bloc to which Poland and Czechoslovakia also belonged, and from which Finland would gradually move out, started to take shape.

²²⁶ CAB129/23 C.P.(48)7, 5 Jan. 1948; CAB128/12C.M.2(48),8 Jan 1948; see also, Harry Truman, *The Memoirs of Harry Truman: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1951*, p. 257; 13 January 1948. *FRUS*, Vol. III, pp. 4-5.; William E. Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman*, p. 103.

In the intensification of the Cold War in Europe, two crises had the responsibility more than anything else for sharpening the acrimony: the Communist assumption of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and the Berlin blockade, which lasted from June 1948 to May 1949. The Czechoslovakian coup surprised Washington precisely because it came against a backdrop of uncertainty about Soviet intentions. Another importance of the Czech crisis in its wider effects was that it heightened tension in the Cold War, and accentuated apprehension over a Soviet attempt to extend Communism elsewhere. Shortly afterwards, the Kremlin designed its consecutive move towards West Berlin. The Brussels Treaty was scarcely signed when the Soviets started the blockade of West Berlin (June, 1948). It was to last for 323 days, and was only countered by the organization of a costly air-lift by the Western powers. The Berlin Blockade no doubt hastened the setting up of Western defence.

Having watched the events helplessly, the American and British governments concluded that nothing could be done directly, but the right lessons should be drawn for other parts of Europe. Shortly afterwards, with Anglo-American encouragement and with the Czech crisis as a backdrop, Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands increased their efforts to form a pact for collective defense.

From a Turkish point of view, however, the omission of Greece and Turkey as possible members of the Western bloc was deliberate. According to F. Cemal Erkin, at the time Ambassador in Rome, Bevin had in mind the creation of a bloc of states which would enable Britain to make some sort of a deal with the Soviet Union, possibly at the expense of certain small states such as Greece and Turkey. Besides, he had conceptualized an evolving western

European security system to which Italy and Germany would eventually be restored. Under these circumstances, exclusion of Turkey and Greece - without an implication of the change in their status in the future - was not understandable.

Turning back to prevailing ambiguity about the Turkish situation in the aftermath of Britain's declared policy, the Turkish President asked urgently for an official summary of the speech and instructed the Anatolian News Agency to be instantly informed by telephone of world reactions as they came in. İnönü stated that the speech had impressed him more favourably because, it constituted a decision which meant that leaders in Western Europe were about to adopt to courageous activity in order to get organized.

As Erkin put it, Bevin's speech on January 22 was enthusiastically received in Ankara. He stated that the broadcasts of the radiohouse in Ankara included the statements of Turkish statesmen, who expressed great satisfaction on the news concerning the political and military alliance, which was in fact, confined to west Europe. However, such positive reactions from Ankara would soon prove to be untimely. Erkin maintained that the attitude of west Europe lacked adequate attention to the fact that the Truman Doctrine had clearly underscored the existence of a threat against Turkey and Greece. Turkey had successfully repelled the Soviet threat directed at the Straits and its territorial integrity very recently. Given this, it was disregarded that the Soviets were aiming at settling the question of the Straits, while Greece was in a bitter civil conflict and Iran was under occupation,²²⁷ placing Turkey in pincers. Furthermore, troop movements on the Bulgarian-Turkish border were taking place as part of Soviet designs aimed at increasing the pressure on Turkey.

When Erkin cabled his views to Ankara, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, immediately invited him for consultations. In Ankara, Sadak told Erkin that a day before his statement, Bevin had informed Ambassador Açıkalın in London, and Kelly had visited him in Ankara concurrently, in order to explain the British initiative, and the guarantee of Britain's uninterrupted interest and friendship, and stated that the British Government was convinced that this development would satisfy Ankara as well. Contrary to Erkin's expectations, Sadak also implied that Ankara was satisfied with these statements, and the guarantee which Britain extended to Turkey. Subsequently, in Erkin's visit to Prime Minister Hasan Saka, the Turkish Premiere expressed similar views too.

However, Erkin considered that Turkey had failed to take prompt action. He found a convenient ground when İnönü asked his assessments on the Brussels Treaty and its foreseeable outcomes. When Erkin explained his anxiety about the exclusion of Turkey, and the formulation of the new defensive scheme in Western Europe, İnönü agreed with Erkin's anxiety, and asked him as to what could be done next. Erkin said that having failed to emphasize the imperative of Turkey's political and military presence of Turkey immediately after Turkey was informed of the new formation, it was very unlikely that demarchés from then on could result in the affirmative. However, since the inclusion of Washington in this formation was nearer, it might be of use if Sadak was instructed to visit London, he told

²²⁷ F. Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*, Vol. I, p. 267. Erkin considered this country then still under Soviet influence.

İnönü. Against these expectations, Sadak visited London. But, deliberations in London were fruitless.²²⁸

As mentioned before, the coup in Czechoslovakia which took place on February 25, 1948 accelerated the discussions between the Western European States and the USA regarding the establishment of a defensive alliance. In fact, the Prague Government which had favoured participation in the Marshall Plan was obliged to revise its views and reverse its decision after hasty visits by the Hungarian Premier C. Gottwald, and the Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk to Moscow in July 1947. From then on, the Communists, by means of a campaign of denunciation, secured the arrest and trial of many members of the democratic party which held an absolute majority, and finally in February 1948, Moscow's special envoy Zorin, engineered the resignation of President Benes to pave the way to the formation of a Communist Government.

Under these circumstances, on March 4, 1948, negotiations were precipitated towards the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty, which was proposed by Britain and France to Benelux countries, and within a fortnight's time on March 17, the treaty was signed. The Brussels Treaty had its roots in the Treaty of Dunkerque between Britain and France, and came into being as an end-result of the extension of this formation. The Treaty of Dunkerque was signed by the UK and France on March 4, 1947 for a minimum of 50 years. This was an alliance treaty which included clauses explicitly directed against Germany, should it try to renew a policy of aggression and in certain aspects, it was regarded as an attempt at

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 269. Erkin maintained that Turkey's underestimation of Western efforts towards the conclusion of a defensive organization would repeat itself and cause considerable hardships in Turkey's application to NATO as well.

revitalising the “Entente Cordiale”. Under its terms they were also bound, by means of continuing consultation on problems bearing on their economic relations, to take all measures necessary to increase their prosperity and economic stability and thus, enable them to make a more effective contribution to the economic and social aims of the United Nations.²²⁹

The Brussels Treaty was thus mainly directed against Germany and similar objectives were unavoidably transferred to it. This treaty was directed at different objectives afterwards. It represented the first step in the post-war reconstruction of Western European security and brought into being the Western Union and the Brussels Treaty Organization.²³⁰ The signatory countries pledged themselves to build up a common defence system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties. This security mechanism was particularly endorsed by the willingness of the participant countries’ expression of their readiness to come to the aid of any contracting party in case it became an object of an armed aggression “in Europe” as expressed in Article IV. This article stated that in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the other signatories to the treaty would afford the attacked party “*all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.*” It was also stated in Article V of the treaty that all measures taken as a result of the preceding Article would be immediately reported to the Security Council, and they would be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 270. Dankward Gerhold, “Armament Controls of Germany: Protocol III of the Modified Brussels Treaty” in, Fred Tanner (ed.), *From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States*, (NY: United Nations Publications, 1992), p. 72. See also footnote (1) on the same page.

Article VII of the treaty provided for the creation of a supreme body in Western Union, known as the Consultative Council, consisting of the five Foreign Ministers. Under it was a Western Defence Committee consisting of the Defence Ministers. Here, it was stated that at the request of any of the contracting parties, the council would be immediately convened in order to permit the contracting parties to consult with regard to any situation which might constitute a threat to peace, “*in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.*”²³¹ It is interesting to note that towards the final articles of the agreement, the definition of threat was more clear and expressed merely as the “renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy” and “danger to economic stability”. This, no doubt, was a clear indication of the decision of the participating countries to confine the scope of the agreement.

Turkish disenchantment with being left out of this agreement might be considered as untimely or as an exaggerated reaction. But, the Brussels Treaty was designed to introduce a broader defense perspective which included cross-Atlantic partners, namely the USA and Canada. In this context, it might be argued that the diversion of opinion between Ankara and the members of the Western Union had its roots in their perception of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid. According to Ankara, together with Greece, Turkey was unquestionably in the center of the Truman Doctrine and the American interest in Europe,

²³⁰ As will be discussed below, it was also the first step in the process leading to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) in April 1949 and the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Brussels Treaty is the founding document of the present day Western European Union (WEU).

²³¹ “Brussels Treaty”, in, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Facts and Figures*, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, October 1971), pp. 266-268.

while the others saw these two countries on the brink of Europe and whose defense had a minimum role for the security of the continent. Obviously, closer contacts of the WEU with Washington was shaping a similar idea in the minds of the US officials. This being the case, Ankara rightly saw the danger of being excluded from this treaty which paved the way for a greater collaboration.

Meanwhile, economic aid to Ankara was no doubt on Washington's agenda. Marshall, in a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on February 26, requested on behalf of the administration a further appropriation of \$275.000.000 so as to ensure continuing military aid to Greece and Turkey to June 30, 1949 as the next step. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 19, approved the administrations' request, and the Senate passed it on March 25.

The Foreign Assistance Bill in its final version was passed by the Senate on April 2, and by the House of Representatives the same day by 318 (167 Republicans and 151 Democrats) votes to 75 (62 Republicans, 11 Democrats, 2 American Labour) and on April 3, was signed by Truman, who declared that the act constituted an historic step in American foreign policy, that it was "*America's answer to the challenge facing the free world,*" and that it was "*a striking manifestation of the fact that a bi-partisan foreign policy can lead to effective action.*" ²³²

²³² As finally approved, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 therefore provided for expenditure on foreign relief and rehabilitation as set forth below:

ERP (first 12 months) \$5.300.000.000

China \$463.000.000

Greece and Turkey \$275.000.000

UN Children's Fund \$60.000.000

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. No. VI, 1946-1948, p. 9252.

Turning back to the cross-Atlantic reactions to this new treaty formation of states, the treaty was met with interest particularly by the Canadian Government. Subsequently, on April 28, 1948, the idea of a single mutual defence system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty, was publicly put forward by St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. A report of the Canadian Foreign Ministry on the international situation concluded on April 29, 1948 with a statement on possible intensification of cooperation between those free countries, which would assure mutual assistance and protection under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. On the other hand, despite his general support for the Brussels Treaty and his willingness, in principle, to grant assistance by appropriate means to the five signature states if necessary, the US President Truman did not express that Washington was ready to enter an alliance with those five states, and to accept concrete obligations in the framework of a regional pact as Bevin had proposed. But it was essential that the USA should be able, constitutionally, to join the alliance. The Vandenberg Resolution eventually brought out a break-through when it passed the US Senate on June 11, 1948.²³³

As for the reactions of Washington, contrary to Turkey's expectations, the USA was not attempting to propose any modification in Britain's formulation of west European defense, which would hamper the fulfillment of the European Recovery Programme originally

²³³ The Vanderberg Resolution included that within the UN Charter, the US Government should particularly pursue "...*progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense...association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security...*" "The Vanderberg Resolution, June 11, 1948" in, Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Dynamics of...*, p. 133.

prompted by assistance to Greece and Turkey. In an attempt to explain Turkey's case, on May 11, 1948, Turkish Ambassador to Washington, R. Baydur, criticized the US policy which envisaged to give certain guarantees to west European countries against aggression without any mention of Turkey. Baydur emphasized the existence of a small minority who were pro-Soviet in Turkey, arguing that for such a small country like Turkey, it was in vain to resist the SU. Baydur stated that the present US policy which gave the impression that the security of Western Europe was more significant than Turkey's, would not only encourage the Kremlin to increase its pressure against Turkey, but also strengthen this minority group while undermining public morale. In this framework, he also pointed out the disappointment of Turks in regard to reduction of the European Recovery Program (ERP).²³⁴

Another country which was interested in the developments around the Brussels Treaty was of course Italy. To share his concerns, on his return to Rome, Erkin visited the Italian Foreign Minister C. Sforza. Following an exchange of views on the foreseeable outcomes of the Brussels Treaty, Erkin underscored the US interest to adhere to this new grouping of states. This would turn the defensive bloc in concern to a strong and large alliance, which

In the meantime, alarmed by the crisis of the Berlin Blockade, common consultations on military questions within the Western Union were held, which led to the establishment of a permanent defence staff under Marshal B.L. Montgomery in August 27-28, 1948.

²³⁴ *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. IV, pp. 83-85. Around the same issue, McGhee stated that both Greece and Turkey were included in the proposed ERP then before the Congress and it was assumed that any additional economic requirements of these countries would be met from that programme. If Turkey was required to spend considerable amounts on military equipment beyond the US aid programme, "a gold and dollar drain might be created that would prejudice its participation in the European Recovery Program on a cash basis." George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO...*, p. 48.

would leave Turkey alone vis-a-vis Russia, eventually further weakening its position. Thus, he pointed out that he couldn't avoid reproach the exclusion of Turkey on these premises.²³⁵

Erkin, this time as Ambassador in Rome, sent a long report to Ankara on May 8. Here, having combined his impressions of the talks he held in Rome and the experiences of years of service as Secretary General of the MFA, he explained the parameters of Turkey's Mediterranean policy, and the position of the regional countries towards a Mediterranean agreement. Firstly, he evaluated the Italian foreign policy towards participating in a regional agreement and partnership with Turkey within this "groupement". Erkin explained that the Italian Foreign Minister Sforza had made it clear that Italy had always felt itself sided with Turkey while always keeping itself as "*far from any tumultuous and detrimental demonstrations.*"²³⁶ However, Erkin had the impression that Italy had an objective of ensuring the revision of the clauses on its armed forces and the future of its colonies of the Italian peace treaty, in return for its accession to the Mediterranean groupement as well.

Regarding France, this country was unlikely to raise any objection to this "groupement" in the Mediterranean since previous deliberations in Paris were in the affirmative. However, he said, he could merely state his general impressions of the French attitude towards the groupement under discussion.²³⁷ In this framework, he pointed out that based on the

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 270. In his report to Ankara dated May 8, 1948, Erkin asserted that Italy was then reluctant to appear attached to one of the emerging blocs. Though it was a natural member of the civilization and the corporate values of the West, he considered that this country would subject its accession to the WEU or the Mediterranean grouping of states to the revisions in the Italian Peace Treaty pertaining to military issues and the future of its colonies. See also, pp. 278-279.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

²³⁷ On various occasions, Erkin implied that he was poorly informed of the talks held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak and the officials of the Ministry, in Ankara and elsewhere. This being the case, while he was in Rome and subsequently in Washington (From June 1947 to August 1948 in

instructions of the government, he had exchanged views with American, Greek, Italian and Egyptian ambassadors on a theoretical basis. Then, referring to his talks with the Egyptian Ambassador in Ankara, Emin Fuad, on the possibility of realizing a regional agreement, he said, this issue was discussed during a private visit of King Farouk to the Turkish coasts and Mersin as well. It was then decided that the conclusion of a Turco-Egyptian treaty could be announced on the occasion of an official visit of Farouk to be arranged accordingly. However, the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute had handicapped this idea.

Lastly, Spain might assume a place in this groupement, if it could remove the obstacles caused by its regime said Erkin. His report underlined that the natural members of the

Rome and Ambassador in Washington as of the latter date), he considered himself sometimes grooving in the darkness. He asserted that the way in which his personal relationships developed with Prime Minister Peker, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak and his successor in Ankara as General Secretary Fuad Carim had served to this effect. According to him, deterioration of his relations with the government was a result of Carim's ambitions who had constantly explained to Erkin, Saka's personal dislike of him while expressing similar views to Saka on behalf of Erkin. Interestingly, Erkin stated that he had not felt any negative vibes for a long time and on the contrary, he had suggested Carim as his replacement. See, *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143; 157; 175-177; 183-193, respectively.

Of course, this represents an ample example of the debate on the role of "agent(s)" in foreign policy/decision-making. Although familiar throughout the discipline of international relations, the agent-structure debate has been brought under discussions of international politics increasingly. It is now widely accepted that any analysis of events must be able to generate explanations that take account of both structure and agency. The problem arises because explanations so frequently operate at one of two extremes. At one extreme, human beings (actors-agents) are seen to be free agents with the power to maintain or transform the systems in which they operate. At the other extreme, it is assumed that actors are caught in the grip of structures which they did not create and over which they do not exercise control. Then the problem of structure and agency surfaces because of the failure to find a way of synthesizing these two extreme positions.

The debate is admittedly too large to reach a conclusion here since both old and new approaches (i.e., structuralism, opposing a unit (actor-agent)-based explanation of the behaviour of states in terms of their internal properties and advocating that in social systems agents are constrained by the structure of the systems in which they operate; scientific realism explaining that invisible structures have just as tangible an existence as the individual agents constrained by them) introduced a variety of analysis around the question. The problem still persists apparently particularly in developing democracies. For a general explanation, see, Barry Buzan, (1st ed.), *The Logic of Anarchy Neorealism to Structural Realism*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 102-113, *passim*.

envisaged regional agreement would include these nations, whereas, in the future this defense mechanism would certainly depend on the attitudes of Britain, France and particularly, of the USA. As his personal opinion, he stated that the Americans would prefer to extend their guarantee to a political union of 16 nations that had already united around the Marshall Plan. Above all, this would serve to safeguard the future of the program and support the firm stand of the recipient nations against possible attacks. However, some small states were refraining from enlarging the term “region” while the British and the French had adopted a phase by phase enlargement policy for the union. ²³⁸

At this juncture, on July 4, 1948, Turkey and the USA concluded another major agreement in regard to the application of US assistance programmes to Turkey. The Economic Co-operation Agreement between Turkey and the US of July 4, was also significant since it underscored that Turkey had adhered to the Agreement of European Economic Co-operation signed in Paris on April 16. ²³⁹ Interestingly, both agreements were approved by the TGNA consecutively, allowing the Turkish-US economic cooperation agreement to state that Turkey was a participant country in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. In this framework, Ankara agreed to facilitate the activities of the press which would underscore the objectives and the progress achieved concerning the programs of the ERP, to further improve a sense of joint effort and mutual cooperation. Besides, Ankara would release information in regard to the use of finance, commodities and

²³⁸ F. Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*, Vol. I, pp. 277-281, *passim*.

²³⁹ Sixteen signatories of this agreement were Turkey, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and the commanders of the US, the UK and France of Germany under occupation. *Resmi Gazete*, July 13, 1948, No: 6956, p. 14393. The TGNA approved this agreement with Law No: 5252

services received through this program every three months.²⁴⁰ Besides, Article 8 of the agreement envisaged the establishment of a “Special Economic Co-operation Mission” of US experts, which would be considered as an integral part of the US diplomatic mission in Turkey.

Meanwhile, on June 10, 1948, following a reshuffle by President İnönü, Hasan Saka formed his second cabinet in which Necmettin Sadak kept his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is worth noting that since the beginning of WW II, İnönü had adopted a particular strategy in regard to the changes of governments and this was greatly based on the nomination of Minister of Foreign Affairs as Prime Ministers. As mentioned above, on September 13, 1944, Saka was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 2nd Şükrü Saracoğlu Government.²⁴¹ He had served as the chairman of the Turkish delegation in the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. Upon Saracoğlu’s resignation, he was reappointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Recep Peker Government, which remained in office between August 7, 1946 and September 9, 1947. Following Peker’s resignation, İnönü instructed Saka to form the new cabinet on September 10, 1947. Saka resigned on June 8, 1948, but he was reappointed as Prime Minister.²⁴²

and the Economic Co-operation with Law No: 5253 consecutively on July 8, 1948. For the texts of the agreements see, *ibid.*, pp. 14393-14398; 14398-14401 respectively.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 7, pp. 14399-14400.

²⁴¹ The Saracoğlu Governments served between July 9, 1942-March 9, 1943 and March 9, 1943 to August 7, 1946 consecutively. In the cabinets of Saracoğlu, Numan Menemencioğlu (until June 15, 1944) and subsequently, Hasan Saka were nominated as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Previously Dr. Refik Saydam had formed two cabinets consecutively, between April 3, 1939 and July 9, 1942 in which Saracoğlu had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Kemal Girgin, *T.C. Hükümetleri Programında Dış Politikamız 1923-1993*, (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), pp. 19-21.

²⁴² Saka remained in office until he resigned once again on January 14, 1949, on account of strong differences of opinion between himself and the Parliamentary Group of the Republican People’s

The period in which the cabinets of H. Saka served was marked with an expectation that he would better the relations between the government and the opposition. Besides, the small opposition group in the RPP was pressing for the establishment of a truly democratic regime and the elimination of restrictions over political freedoms. About this time, President İnönü was seeking economic and military assistance from the USA. However, a considerable number of US Congressmen were strongly critical of the nature of Turkey's political regime since the discussions on the Truman Doctrine. In fact, the Truman Doctrine was explained in the US Congress as an effort to save democracy and freedom in Turkey as well. "*The views expressed in the U.S. Congress and the necessity of establishing closer relations with the West, may be assumed to have had some impact on political developments in Turkey.*"²⁴³ On July 8, 1948, Sadak explained in the TGNA that the Turkish-US agreement was made in accordance with the US Foreign Assistance Act, which envisaged the signing of separate agreements between the US Government and the recipient governments. He said the Turkish-US agreement was designed to serve to the effect that the US Congress would undertake to forward assistance to Turkey within the framework of the Aid Act, while Turkey would assume general responsibility in regard to the use of aid in concern effectively. He pointed out that in the beginning, as a result of the hasty assessments of the US specialists of the numbers and statistics submitted by the Turkish experts to the conference of the 16 in Paris,

Party and President İnönü. On January 16, 1949 Şemsettin Günaltay succeeded him and served until the defeat of RPP in the general elections of May 14, 1950 (formally, until May 22) which brought the Democratic Party and Adnan Menderes to power.

Meanwhile, in the both cabinets of Saka and in the subsequent Günaltay Government, Necmettin Sadak served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), pp. 315, 328, 341, 344, 352; Kemal Girgin, *T.C. Hükümetleri...*, pp. 21-26.

Turkey's dollar reserves were estimated greater than they were, eventually causing Turkey's replacement in a category which would purchase goods from the USA through payment in cash. Following Turkey's explanations, this mistake was corrected, placing Ankara into the category of recipients of assistance. As a result, based upon the appropriations of the US Government, an amount of 10 million dollars would be transferred to Turkey for the first three months. Saka explained that Ankara had submitted projects in the fields of agriculture (6 million dollars) and metallurgy (3 million dollars) for financial consideration. He said, the Turkish Embassy in Washington was informed by the Economic Co-operation Administrator in charge of the ERP, Paul G. Hoffman, that following this period of three months, allocation of long-term credits of an uncertain amount would be also considered. In this framework, Turkey had submitted its projects, totalling 85 million dollars for a period of one year to the Committee of Co-operation and Washington.

Sadak also pointed out that in the letter of Ambassador Wilson dated July 4, the US Ambassador had stated that the Economic Co-operation Agreement between Turkey and the USA was approved, and through this Washington admitted that Turkey would enjoy the most favoured nation status in its commercial transactions in West Germany, Trieste, Japan and South Korea as long as the USA maintained its controlling or occupying status in these countries. In this regard, the US Government would apply the related articles of the Trade Agreement between Turkey and the USA dated April 1, 1939 or the General Agreement on Customs and Tariffs, dated October 30, 1947 and the latest agreement (July 4, 1948). Sadak said, "*it is needless to mention the significance of the German market in Turkey's exports. . .*

²⁴³ Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 189.

We hope that the American Government which have made us valuable contributions, will not create a situation through closing Germany to Turkish goods which will have grave consequences, and will carefully examine this issue.”

Turning back to the issue of Turkey’s participation in the Brussels Treaty, Ankara would soon have another try, following the nomination of Erkin to Washington. In fact, time was against Ankara, and there were no prospects of realizing a treaty relationship with the West. The US officials were finding it too hard even to try to explain Turkey’s case, given the poor public interest towards a country on the margins of the reach of the US assistance programs. Similar difficulties were experienced during the discussion on the extension of aid to Turkey in February 1947. Thus, Ankara could hardly expect to involve Washington in its active search for a security partnership with the West. However, the officials of the MFA strongly believed that they might convince all the concerned parties that Turkey’s position was vital for an effective defensive grouping of the Western states since the basic idea had its roots in the Truman Doctrine, which focused on Turkish economic recovery as well as supporting the Greek Government in its fight against the Communist insurgents. They considered that the ERP had a symbiotic relationship with the US aid to Greece and Turkey, just as the subsequent economic (Committee of Co-operation) and defensive (Brussels Treaty) grouping of the Western states had. Consecutive developments which culminated in Turkey’s being left outside the Brussels Treaty, however, were both frustrating and inadmissible. Thus, Ankara launched an active foreign policy in order to “correct” a mistake. Washington was no doubt, a crucial place to pursue this objective since it was the center of Euro-Atlantic discussions aimed at transforming the Brussels Treaty into a major defense mechanism.

In August 1948, Erkin left his post in Rome and arrived in Washington in replacement of Baydur. Erkin stated that among the files he examined at the Washington Embassy, one single issue was of particular importance to him. This was a file on the demarchés of Turkey which would ultimately enable Turkey to adhere in the “Regional Agreement”.²⁴⁴ He noted that the MFA had instructed Baydur to approach the British and French Ambassadors in Washington in regard to Turkey’s accession to the Brussels Pact. According to Erkin, this demarché was prompted by the Turkish Ambassador to Paris, Numan Menemencioğlu’s interview with the French General Secretary in which, upon Menemencioğlu’s suggestion on Turkey’s joining the deliberations that concerned the “Western Regional Agreement” in Washington, his French interlocutor pledged to instruct French Ambassadors in various capitals to express Turkey’s desire on the grounds this issue would be discussed.

Subsequently, Baydur had visited his French counterpart in Washington, but, he was told that no instruction had arrived from Paris towards this effect. In his turn, Baydur had cabled Ankara and explained the situation. The MFA had passed this information to Paris, and following a renewed demarché, Menemencioğlu had informed Ankara that this time the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, himself, had told him that there might be a delay between Paris and Washington, and in any case the instruction would be renewed. The file he examined included that eventually it was decided that Erkin would relaunch the initiative as the new ambassador.

²⁴⁴ Erkin used the terms “Regional Agreement” and “Western Regional Agreement” to refer to an agreement which was being planned between the USA and the countries of Western Europe (which emerged as the North Atlantic Treaty) throughout his work.

Towards the end of August, Erkin interviewed his French counterpart, Henry Bonnet, and inquired if he was instructed to explain Turkey's wish during the deliberations between the USA, Western European Union and Canada. Bonnet said that he was informed of the talks in Paris, which he assumed remained more along the lines of a friendly exchange of views. To the astonishment of Erkin, he added that he had expressed to the former Turkish Ambassador, Baydur, too that he was not particularly instructed to pronounce Turkey's wish in this regard in the Washington deliberations which was in an early phase. In his turn, Erkin replied that with a view to the statement of Bonnet, it was understood the time for Turkey's formal application would have been too soon. However, if a defensive bloc were to be formed in Europe in association with the USA, no other country's membership in it could be imagined as more natural than that of Turkey since it had launched resistance against the threat first time three years ago in own capacity. Thus, he said Turkey would formally apply to the union from the moment the US partnership was incorporated into the WEU. Finally, in his conclusion, Bonnet told Erkin that the limited membership in the WEU was a result of the members' unwillingness to undertake military commitments outside their area. As for Turkey, however, this time he had stated unintentionally that deliberations in Paris were discussed in Washington within the framework of general exchanges of view.

At the end of the talks, Erkin had reached to the conclusion that Bonnet was instructed to make a demarché to point out the need for the willingness of the Mediterranean countries to assume their role within the West European security system. However, his efforts to invoke a response in this regard had remained futile. Thus, it was very likely that Bonnet had refrained from expressing the unfavourable responses of the countries in concern.

Furthermore, Erkin criticized Bonnet's attitude when he explained the position of the USA as too positivistic and rejected the US' call for an emphasis on the self-help of the Europeans before US subsidies were dispatched.

Shortly afterwards, on August 31, Erkin interviewed Undesecretary of State Robert A. Lovett, who had assumed the chairmanship of the Committee of the Six ²⁴⁵ as well. To the disappointment of the Turkish Ambassador, Lovett made it clear that Washington would not intervene in the question of the enlargement of the Brussels Treaty. As set forth in the Vandenberg Resolution, Washington would only examine if the general requirements for the US participation in any defensive arrangements were met or not, and if these agreements were of interest to American national security. Regarding the term, "regional agreement", Lovett said, this would acquire the name North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and would include the countries along the east and west coasts of the North Atlantic Ocean which shared the seas, languages, cultures, civilizations and world views which had come together to defend themselves and their common values. He said, Turkey was, of course, a country whose importance was greatly acknowledged. But how one could incorporate this country which was on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean into this definition and the Atlantic world ?

In his turn, Erkin strongly objected to Lovett's conceptualization of the Atlantic community, and explained that the progress in the world civilization had reduced the continents to the size of cities in the sense that nations were brought closer and the solidarity among them were enhanced. Then, the term, "region" had lost its geographical meaning and

acquired a definition pertaining to the common interests of the nations. To make this point another way, it was because of the same perception of the US administration that the threat against Turkey was considered as directed against the USA as well. The Truman Doctrine and the aid act were accepted on the same premise, and the mighty war vessel *Missouri* was dispatched to Turkey again with such an objective in mind. Thus, Erkin's interview with Lovett ended in a friendly atmosphere, however, producing little impetus. Subsequently, as will be discussed below, the Turkish Ambassador felt obliged to discuss the same issue, with Secretary of State Marshall.

In his talks with Marshall where Lovett was also present, Erkin reiterated Turkey's wish and need to accede to the most convenient regional agreement to be formed in Europe, and which would enjoy actual American military aid. Erkin stated that from his interview with Lovett, he had an impression that the time for Turkey's participation in the deliberations of the Committee of the Six had not come yet. Then, Erkin inquired if in this interval President Truman or Secretary of State Marshall could publicly declare that with a view to the close relationship between peace and security in the Mediterranean region and that of the Atlantic, Turkey's territorial integrity, sovereignty and national existence, which was an indispensable component of peace and order in the Mediterranean, was of vital importance for the USA. A declaration of this kind, would have significant effect on the morale of the Turkish public, and on Russia which was watching for an opportunity to hunt down Turkey with appealing

²⁴⁵ As Erkin stated this committee consisted of the ambassadors of the WEU and Canada who participated in deliberations at Washington. F. Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*, Vol. II, p. 11.

suggestions. Erkin stated that a declaration of this kind would introduce an additional element of peace to the Near East too.²⁴⁶

Meanwhile, at Washington, the Committee of Six, headed by Undersecretary of State Lovett, concluded the Washington Security Talks on September 9, 1948. The Washington Paper drafted by the committee recognized the existence of a tie between European security and the USA, and denigrated the possibility of peaceful coexistence with Soviet Communism and surveyed the practical problems of defining a North Atlantic security area.

Turning back to Erkin's discussions at Washington, having exchanged views on the regional pact with Under Secretary of State, a few days later, Erkin held a meeting with Secretary of State, Marshall where the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, was also present. Referring to the Washington Security Talks, the Turkish Ambassador said that the completion of an adequate security mechanism undoubtedly required the inclusion of Turkey in the partnership of the West Europeans and the Americans. He underscored that options pertaining to the formation of one or more regional agreements should be revised as well. Erkin explained that for instance, Turkey, Greece, the UK and the USA could form a groupement in the region. He maintained that while this and other similar options were being considered - as he repeated his projection on various grounds for a few times more from then on - it would be very useful if the US Presidency could declare the US "vital interest" in Turkey's integrity and sovereignty. He underscored as his personal view that the basis of such a declaration was included in the Greek-Turkish

²⁴⁶ As Erkin was informed by the Department of State later on, though it was unusual, President Truman had undertaken to deliver a message on the occasion of the celebration of the Day of

Aid Bill, and what he suggested as a formula would represent a further step in this direction which will be in harmony with the constitutional requirements of the USA. The Turkish Ambassador emphasized that to respond to Turkey's needs would introduce additional components of peace to the Near East. In his turn, Marshall questioned Erkin on the scope of his projection. However, he gave his interlocutor no sign of approval or decline. As for the Turkish exports to Germany, he explained that the decisions of the budgetary commissions of the Congress were heavily politicized, and suggested that Erkin could approach the Administrator of the ECA, Paul Hoffman.²⁴⁷

Subsequently, Erkin visited the coordinator of assistance to Greece and Turkey, Wilds. Here, he explained the crisis in Turkey's export items, and its need to re-open trade relations with Germany. In his turn, Wilds, told Erkin that he had noted these points, however, he should like to make a "friendly suggestion." Turkey was not paying enough attention to the Marshall Plan, and the preparations of its projects, which culminated in the delay of affairs in concern. In this regard, Turkish balance of payments were totally imaginery and full of incoherent numbers.

Concurrently, the Turkish Ambassador in London, M. Cevat Açıkalın, held similar talks with his interlocutors. In the same days, he interviewed Bevin as well on the question of Turkish adherence to the WEU. The British Premiere considered the extension of the military

Republic on October 29, in which he expressed his admiration of the Turkish revolution and republic and the importance he attributed to the Turkish-American co-operation. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 15-16. The report of the Director of NEA Satterthwaite revealed that the State Department initially refused the suggestion of Erkin on a US declaration for Turkey. See, *FRUS*, Vol. IV, pp. 173. However, Erkin said, Satterthwaite shortly afterwards informed him that although it was not customary for the US administrations, Truman had undertook to release a congratulatory statement on the occasion of October 29, Turkey's Republic Day. Indeed, Truman's message was released on the same day. F. Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde...*, Vol. II, p. 17.

guarantee of the WEU and of the USA to Turkey, which was under discussion in Washington, as untimely. As for the Mediterranean Regional Agreement, with a view to the situation both in Italy and Spain, and the reactions of the Arab nations which might consider such an agreement against themselves as a result of their exclusion, planning for an organization to include a large number of countries was excluded from the current agenda too.

Around the same days, Erkin gave an interview to the Associated Press in which he explained that no statement was made to Ankara on the discussions pertaining to the “question of regional agreements”. In this context he said, it was imperative that, either throughout entire Europe, or as a combination of separate systems in the northern, western and Mediterranean regions, unity be secured. PanAmerican unity he said, could be a model, and in one way or another, Turkish participation in any security mechanism of the European states would be natural. His statements included that the Charter of the UN had envisaged the formation of regional agreements for the purpose of defense, and he was of the opinion that it would be preferable if the Asian countries in the southeast of Europe also conclude similar agreements and ultimately achieve solidarity among them. The next day, his statements were published in some US journals, which basically included that Turkey desired to take part in the Mediterranean sector of the security system as soon as the Western Unity actively started. Erkin noted that the correspondent informed that the interview was also cleared with the State Department. However, he said, the news also particularly emphasized an overwhelming significance to the Mediterranean formula by his voice.

In discussing the approaches of various Western countries towards a regional agreement in the Mediterranean, Erkin stressed that the Greek Ambassador to Washington, Vassili Dendranis, told him that a competent official of the State Department had expressed that Washington desired the formation of a regional grouping in the Mediterranean. Erkin noted that in his interviews, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, had also pointed out that a separate formation of states in the Mediterranean would be good. The Ambassadors of Belgium and the Netherlands, however, had made it clear that their governments were against any enlargement of the Brussels Pact.

A few days later, to Erkin's big surprise, Ankara cabled him, and demanded an explanation of the news in regard to a statement of the spokesman of the State Department, declaring that the projections on a regional agreement in the Mediterranean were not approved by the USA. Erkin stated that there were no news in the journals published in Washington to this effect. Having been disturbed by the news he had received from Ankara, in order to disperse the clouds of suspicion, Erkin asked for an urgent appointment with Satterthwaite. In their discussion, Satterthwaite told Erkin that although they had no fixed decision on the issue, the State Department was in fact, inclined to welcome a rapprochement among Turkey, Greece and Italy to this effect, hence, he assured Erkin that the State Department had not made and would not make a statement of this kind. The Director of NEA added that a statement on the issue might only be expected as a result of the meeting of the General Assembly of the WEU in Paris within three months.

Turning back to the discussion around Turkey's role in regional defense, in an attempt to explain their assessment of Turkey's possible course of action in view of these developments,

the Turkish political leaders made it clear that Turkey, too, could have a role to play in these new developments. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmeddin Sadak, the speech of Bevin “*held out the prospect of a system of political and economic collaboration from the Arab states through Turkey, Greece and Italy to the West which the Turkish Government would make every effort to help realise*”.²⁴⁸ Turkish diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, he told Kelly, were directed towards this end, as Turkey’s support for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty had already indicated.²⁴⁹ In other words, Ankara’s hope was to activate Britain’s interest in including the Eastern Mediterranean in its defence schemes by pointing out that Turkey could become the bridge between London and the Arab states.

²⁴⁸ As stated in the reports of Ambassador David Kelly to London (FO, 26 Jan. 1948, FO371/72534 R1203/114/44 and FO, 28 Jan. 1948, FO371/72534 R1270/114/44), cited in, E. Athanassopoulou, “Western Defence Developments and Turkey’s Search for Security in 1948”, in, Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey, Identity, Democracy, Politics*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 79.

²⁴⁹ In late 1947, Bevin had launched a major initiative to negotiate mutual defense treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan on the premise of recognizing the independence of those states, elicit their voluntary support of Western strategic needs in the region, and eventually perpetuate British influence in the region. Envisaged Anglo-Arab treaties promised to mitigate the political and strategic losses caused by the British withdrawal from Palestine and to “*reconcile the Labour government’s anti-imperial ideals with the realities of Cold War.*” Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956*, (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1991), p. 59. Correspondingly, on January 15, 1948, Bevin and Iraqi Prime Minister Saleh Jabr signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (The Portsmouth Agreement) that Bevin hailed as the first in a new series of treaties regularizing and expressing the friendship between Britain and the Arab world. However, a shocking incident forced the British foreign policy makers to re-consider the threats towards Britain’s position in the Middle East. In the aftermath of this agreement which sought to extend the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in the guise of revising it, six days of mass demonstrations and some of the worst violence took place in Iraq. To ensure the extension of the 1930 treaty had great importance for Britain. This treaty was drawn up to safeguard the essential features of the British order before the expiry of the mandate by October 1932 and would provide Britain a legal basis for its continuing presence in the country. To Britain’s disappointment the Iraqi Government decided not to ratify it and with the resignation of Salih Jabr’s government, the treaty negotiations were suspended indefinitely. For a very good discussion of the issue and related subjects, see, Martin

V 2. A Period of Redesign in the Middle East and the Anglo-American Perceptions of Turkish Regional Role

Having been excluded from the talks of the Western Union, it was imperative for the Turkish foreign policy makers to bring other alternatives - which would connect Turkey to the Western strategic grouping - under discussions at once. Against a background of the world's division in two rival blocs, which had become unmistakably clear, dictated by the circumstances, Ankara was concerned over two developments: first, the Western Union which had addressed the need for a Western defense cooperation, had excluded Turkey; and secondly, the proposed defence arrangement had not introduced any prospect in regard to the inclusion of the Eastern Mediterranean. Then, as will be discussed below, for Turkey, the possibility of assuming a self-imposed role of leadership in the Middle Eastern security grouping of states, which would be in direct connection with the West was increasingly brought under scope.

In their turn, the British and American Governments had shifted to reorganize their defense positions in the region with a view to consolidate their stand against the Soviet threat through an ideological and actual penetration into this region. The Middle East was the pivot of security concerns of Britain, which was carrying out a regular withdrawal from its global status, and its significance to the USA was determined mainly along the lines of replacing "Pax Britannica". At this juncture, considerable evidence suggests that, Ankara ultimately concluded - through a partnership with the Anglo-Saxons - the making of a sound foreign

Kolinsky, *Britain's War in the Middle East*, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Michael J. Cohen and

policy towards the region might culminate in two main outcomes: first, Turkey's direct inclusion in the Western Union might be ensured; or the complete integration of the defense grouping in the Middle East - under the leadership of Turkey - to the Western Union might be realized, eventually bringing the Middle East and Europe under one single security umbrella.

Around the same issue, a counter-argument pointed out that after the Czech coup and the Berlin Blockade, Washington's primary concern was the establishment of a formal security arrangement for Europe without mention of Turkey - and perhaps of Greece. Deliberations in regard to the establishment of a Middle Eastern pact were already launched. Correspondingly, on February 4, 1948, the Greek Ambassador to Washington, V. Dendranis, explained Athen's suggestion on the establishment of forming an entente between Greece, Italy, Turkey and the Arab states under the leadership of the USA and Britain, which he said, could give the necessary support and encouragement. While similar views were considered in Ankara, opponents of Turkey's active participation in defensive grouping of states advocated that the Middle East entente or pact was such a vast concept that could not be fulfilled, and even if it was realized on paper it would not have an operational value. In this context, it was also argued that a formal defense organization might provoke the Kremlin, and the eastern bloc since it would be evaluated that it was established against them. This being the case, Turkey would remain weaker before such a danger since the

extent of the US support to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries was still unclear.²⁵⁰

To a certain extent, as will be discussed later, these doubts would prove to be right since the formation of such a pact - though still in vague and limited terms - would not be achieved before a series of attempts prompted by the Tripartite Declaration on May 25, 1950 by which the USA, Britain and France recognized the existing Middle Eastern frontiers. In this framework, the creation of the Middle Eastern Defense Organization (MEDO), the Middle East Command (MEC) and the subsequent Four-Power proposals which Turkey, the USA, Britain and France drafted for a MEC to Egypt, could be realized a year and a half later, in mid-1951, as part of a half-baked attempt towards the conclusion of the same issue.

In 1948, however, it was indeed an outstanding necessity for Ankara to assume the role of a reliable defense partner of the West, and the circumstances had laid the groundwork for Turkish contribution in the discussions around Middle Eastern security. While the Turkish interest in Middle Eastern affairs were shaping along these lines, in July 1947, Egypt took its case against Britain, regarding the continuation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and sovereignty over the Sudan, to the United Nations Security Council. In fact, since 1946, the British government had been negotiating with Egypt for the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez base stationed there according to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which had given Egypt full recognition as an independent and sovereign state after fifty four years of British occupation. The question of Egypt's sovereignty over the Sudan of which there had been no mention in the 1936 treaty, became also a matter of discussion. These two issues

²⁵⁰ *FRUS, 1948*, Vol. IV, pp. 71-72.

were seen by virtually every political circle in Egypt as matters of national pride and instigated nationalistic resentment against Britain.

In effect, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 formally recognized Egyptian sovereignty, ended the British occupation of Egypt, and granted the UK the right to deploy 10 000 soldiers, 400 pilots and an unspecified number of personnel in the Suez Canal and in Sinai, and personnel to run naval bases in Alexandria. Both Cairo and London had gains from the 1936 treaty. In this treaty, Egypt had agreed to provide Britain with supplies and facilities and when war flared in Europe in 1939, Britain invoked the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and 55 000 British troops arrived in Egypt. British forces repelled the attacks of the Italians and Germans in the autumn of 1940 and in late 1941. However, despite the proximity of fighting, Egyptian authorities did not abandon their neutrality. Egyptian neutrality was disliked by the British, and prompted a confrontation between Cairo and London when General Erwin Rommel repeated the German offensive in 1942, and captured El Alamein, just sixty miles from Alexandria. King Farouk, worried about German occupation, appointed Ali Maher as Prime Minister who was known for his sympathy towards the Germans. However, the British Ambassador, Miles Lampson, insisted that Nahas Pasha should be appointed in replacement of Ali Maher. In his turn, King Farouk resisted, and on February 4, 1942, Lampson and General R.G. Stone surrounded the Abdin Palace, with troops and tanks. Then, Lampson and Stone with a group of guards marched into the Palace and repeated their demands in Farouk's private study room. Here, Farouk was pressed to appoint Nahas or abdicate. Unable to raise any objection, Farouk appointed Nahas who stopped the activities of Axis sympathizers.

. Following the parliamentary elections in which the Wafd won 231 of 264 seats, Egypt was kept on the Allies' side as a friendly neutral. In November 1942, General B. Montgomery defeated Rommel at El Alamein and drove the German forces out of Egypt. Then, Rommel was squeezed between the forces of Montgomery and Allied troops under General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Ultimately, the Axis forces surrendered on May 13 and Egypt remained secure for the rest of the war.²⁵¹ However, matters were still complicated in regard to the future of the Nahas government.

Given this background, since the 1936 treaty was not due for revision before 1956, Britain was not obliged to enter into talks with Egypt. Nevertheless, when the Egyptians formally requested for a revision in 1945, Bevin agreed to negotiate on condition that the base would continue to operate under joint Anglo-Egyptian supervision, and that British troops would be able to reoccupy the base in the event of a Soviet incursion in the Middle East. Discussions went through different stages, but by 1947 they reached a deadlock. The Egyptians inflamed by nationalistic feelings, demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal of British troops and absolute sovereignty over the Sudan. In their report to the Security Council, they argued that the stationing of British troops was an offence to Egypt's dignity and an infringement of 'fundamental principles of sovereign equality', and that the British had encouraged an artificial separatism in the Sudan, aiming to destroy the unity of the Nile Valley. Egypt failed to establish its contention that the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty was no longer valid, yet Britain won a modest victory. Although the Security Council did not present the British with an ultimatum to withdraw, it did not make a clear-cut decision in

²⁵¹ Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956*, pp. 11-12, 30.

favour of sanction of the treaties as Britain had wished. Instead it called on Egypt and Britain to resume negotiations for a revision.²⁵²

Meanwhile, Britain's position in Iraq received a serious blow as well. The Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed on 5 January 1948 and it was a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of Alliance of 1930, due to expire in 1958. The 1930 treaty had terminated the British mandate and recognized Iraq's independence. It had also contained, like the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, military clauses - Britain's acquisition of two air-bases and its right to transport forces across Iraq in the event of war,- which were unacceptable to Iraqi nationalists. The new treaty of 1948, which Bevin hoped would provide the model for defensive alliances with the other Arab states too, was signed as a first step towards relinquishing British military presence in Iraq. For the time being, however, Britain was again granted the right to use Iraqi territory in case of war, and to maintain the bases in Iraq, but by 'sharing responsibility' with the Iraqis.

The treaty gave rise to serious opposition in Iraq and it was never ratified. Iraqi nationalists maintained that it was even worse than the old treaty on the grounds that while Britain enjoyed basically the same rights as before, it was no longer committed to defend Iraq in case of war. On January 21, (before Sadak's conversation with Kelly on the same issue in which the former expressed Turkey's support for the British endeavour to renew the treaty in concern), the Iraqi Regent who had signed the new agreement had stated that he was not going to ratify it.

²⁵² Ibid.

Under these circumstances, King Abdullah of Jordan who had a long friendly relationship with Britain, asked in early 1948 for a revision of the 1946 treaty with London. Abdullah's aim was more to silence Arab accusations that he was a British stooge, rather than seriously challenge the British military presence in Jordan. Thus, in the revised treaty, the essential military clauses remained unaltered. Nevertheless, his move did not help to alleviate the fact that British influence in the area was collapsing.

Ankara's foreign policy towards the region throughout 1949 and then on, had also been shaped with a view to its relations with Israel. Considerable evidence suggests that Ankara had included Israel in its policy plannings, and had been approaching this country in a constructive way. Explicitly, formulation of Turkish foreign policy towards the developments in Palestine and the Arab-Jewish conflict were under the strains of Turkey's historical ties with the region as well. Turkey and previously, the Ottoman Empire had no "Jewish problem" or anti-semitist feelings in the past. As for the Arabs, despite sharing the Islamic faith and again a long common past, emotionally, the Turks had a feeling that the entire region, including the Holy Lands and Palestine were lost to the Arabs - operating under British command - in the Great War who had betrayed the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, after the British occupied the southern part of Palestine, local Arabs joined the Army of the Arab revolt led by Amir Faysal, son of the Sharif Husayn of Mecca. Some of them participated in the conquest of Syria in 1918. Some remained in Faysal's Syrian army until its destruction by the French in July 1920.²⁵³ As a result of these dictating perceptions on the Turkish people,

²⁵³ Joseph Nevo, "Palestinian-Arab Violent Activity during the 1930s" in, Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky (eds.), *Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s*, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 170. See also footnote 6 which explains that Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the future Mufti of Jerusalem

as will be discussed below, beyond any binding moral obligations towards the region - except viewing the developments from the perspective of international law and the decisions of the UN - Ankara eventually felt comfortable in adopting a similar policy to those of the Big Three towards the State of Israel. In fact, soon after the proclamation of the State of Israel, Turkish foreign policy makers had realistically seen the fact that, it would be a lasting entity in the region. This early decision to recognize Israel, no doubt, provided the Turkish and the Israeli statesmen with extra time in improving bilateral relations.

Undoubtedly, since the beginning of the British Mandatory rule by the decision of the League of Nations in July 1922, the issue of Palestine, had been pursued by Ankara with close interest. Correspondingly, in the first years of the Republic, Ankara showed an interest towards Palestine and members of the Jewish community from Palestine were invited to join in the economic and cultural activities, the first İzmir Exhibition of Commerce and Industry which was, and has been held annually to this day. In the meantime, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal had also dispatched experts to examine the situation in Palestine. In November 1938, the leader of the Jewish community, Chaim Weizman (later the first President of Israel) visited Turkey and held conferences with his interlocutors.

As for the establishment of Israel, particularly in the first months of 1947, Britain's inability to reconcile the conflicting demands of the Jewish and Arab communities led the British Government to request that the question of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the

had helped to mobilise 2000 persons. Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem, Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 12. Another source [Arabic] stated that the number amounted to several thousands throughout the country. Bayan Nuyhad al-Hut, *Leadership and Political Institutions in Palestine 1917-1948*, (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1981), p. 56.

United Nations General Assembly in April 1947. Shortly afterwards, a special committee was constituted to draft proposals concerning the country's future. On November 29, 1947, the Assembly voted to adopt the committee's recommendation to partition the land into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish community accepted the plan, while the Arabs rejected it. Turkey voted along with Arab countries against the UN resolution. Following the UN vote, local Arab militants, supported by irregular volunteers from Arab countries, launched attacks against the Jews in an effort to prevent the establishment of a Jewish State. The Jewish defense organizations routed most of the attacking forces, taking hold of the entire area which had been allocated for the Jewish state.

The UN vote for partition of Palestine essentially enhanced the same impression while simultaneously it made it obviously more difficult for London to appease Arab nationalists, who viewed 'Zionism' and 'British Imperialism' as complementary, if not identical forces. On May 14, 1948, the day Britain withdraw from Palestine, the State of Israel was proclaimed according to the UN partition plan. Less than 24 hours later, war erupted between Israel and the Arab states which refused to recognize this new entity. The regular armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq invaded the country. The war lasted some 15 months. Between the years 1948 and 1950, during which heated discussions took place over the question of Palestine, Ankara closely watched the developments in the region, and nominated the journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın as one of the three members in the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) who would also serve as the Chairman in this body - although the Arab countries were against the formation of this commission - established in

December 1948 by the General Assembly.²⁵⁴ In the aftermath of his visit to Israel, in his report to the President İnönü, Yalçın pointed out that it was very unlikely that Israel would emerge as a Communist state in the region, and it would be a right decision for Ankara to extend its recognition of this new state at once.²⁵⁵

During the first months of 1949, direct negotiations were conducted under UN's auspices between the conflicting parties. Ultimately, Israel concluded armistice agreements with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan²⁵⁶ resulting in armistice agreements which reflected the situation at the end of the fighting.²⁵⁷ Subsequently, on May 11 1949, Israel took its seat as the 59th member of the UN.²⁵⁸

With a view to the emergence in the region of Israel as a state, and its recognition by its neighbours through armistice agreements, and the prompt extension of *de jure* recognition of various states - including the USA and the SU - of Israel, Ankara's *de facto* recognition of this new entity came on March 28, 1949. Towards the end of the year, Turkey's first

²⁵⁴ From, *Note on the Turco-Israeli Relations* (extract), The MFA Archives.

²⁵⁵ Gencer Özcan, "50. Yılı Biterken Türk-İsrail İlişkileri" (Turco-Israeli Relations Towards the End of Its 50th Year), in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç* (Contemporary Turkish Diplomacy: A Process of 200 Years), Symposium Papers, Ankara, October 15-17, 1997, (Ankara: TTK, 1999), p. 538. See also, George G. Gruen, "Dynamic Progress in Turkish-Israeli Relations", in *Israel Affairs*, (Vol. I, No. 4, Summer, 1995), p. 44.

²⁵⁶ Except Iraq which has refused to negotiate with Israel to date. *Facts About Israel*, Israel Information Center, 1996, pp. 31-32.

²⁵⁷ Accordingly, the coastal plain, Galilee and the entire Negev remained within Israel's sovereignty, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) came under Jordanian rule, the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian administration, and the city of Jerusalem was divided, with Jordan controlling the eastern part, including the Old City, and Israel the western sector. As for the partition plan of 1947 (UN Resolution 181) and 1949-1967 armistice lines, see, *ibid.*

²⁵⁸ The first 120-seat *Knesset* went into session following the elections on January 25, 1949. As mentioned above, Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization, was elected as the first President and David Ben-Gurion, head of the Jewish Agency was chosen as the first Prime Minister.

representative to Israel, Seyfullah Esin was dispatched to Tel-Aviv as Charge d'affaires. Shortly afterwards, Turkey elevated its emissary in Tel-Aviv to Minister Plenipotentiary.

Undoubtedly, the year 1949 - particularly in the aftermath of Ankara's recognition of Tel-Aviv - marked a turning point in the making of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Under the pressure of dictating circumstances, Turkish foreign policy towards the region envisaged a categorical denial of the Soviet influence from the region. Thus, the foreign policy makers in Ankara evaluated that Turkey could assume a leadership role in a military and economic alliance of the Arab and other countries in the Middle East. In this context, Ankara followed a policy of improving its technical and economic relations with Israel, which it assessed, was a country with Western norms, while maintaining its relations with this country in the military and economic fields in a discreet manner to avoid the sensitiveness of the Arab states.

Admittedly, Turkish-Israeli relations were essentially based on an acknowledgement of the mutual needs of both countries. There were however, some suspicions in Ankara in regard to the future of the regime in Israel. The position of the leftist parties and labour unions in Israel had prompted certain anxieties both in the RPP and in the DP - which came to power in May 1950 -. ²⁵⁹ Following the outbreak of the crisis in Korea, when the Arab states remained impartial towards the conflict, while Israel supported the UN decisions, Ankara's remaining suspicions were quickly dispersed. ²⁶⁰ On July 4, 1950, a modus vivendi regarding economic and commercial relations was reached, and technical and cultural

²⁵⁹ Amicam Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece - Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean*, (London: Frank Cass, 1987), pp. 44-49.

²⁶⁰ Gencer Özcan, "50. Yılı Biterken...", p. 538.

relations were provided with a regular fora. Military attaches were also nominated in each capital.²⁶¹

Turning back to the British considerations on the establishment of a regional organization, at this stage, the Foreign Office had increasingly felt that they had to pull back since the over-extended use of their resources had caused serious strains for the British economy. In the eastern Mediterranean, this situation had first culminated in Britain's withdrawal from its status as the main supporter of Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the war. Ankara was also informed of Britain's difficulty to continue as the main supplier of countries in this region. Britain's war ravaged economy "*was the reason they came to the USA and said, we can no longer help the Turks, we don't have the resources and if you don't do it, nobody could.*"²⁶² The deterioration in Britain's ability to take the lead in regional affairs was also apparent in London's weak attempts to create a defensive grouping in the Middle East.

Under these circumstances, Anglo-American officials agreed that "*it did not seem wise to consider evacuating British troops from Egypt . . . , Russian aggression in the Near East was entirely possible and it would be essential to our common strategic plan to have the British on the spot.*"²⁶³ But clearly, there were strong differences of opinion on the need for a regional pact. In May 1950, Foreign Office Under Secretary, Michael Wright, drew attention to the possibility of making a Middle Eastern defence pact, probably to be linked to NATO. He asserted that this would also remove the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian talks. However,

²⁶¹ Subsequently, in 1951, an air transport agreement was signed, which gave a start to the flights of the Israeli airways, El Al to both Ankara and Istanbul. In 1953, Israel dispatched aid to the earthquake struck regions in Turkey and Israeli war vessels visited Istanbul in the same year.

²⁶² As told by George Harris in a personal interview.

the Near Eastern Affairs officials of the State Department declined this project, which would force to extend the obligations of the USA under NATO to the Middle East and expressed their view that the area lacked a “*power center on the basis of which a pact could be built.*”

²⁶⁴ In their turn, the officials at Pentagon opposed the idea also, because it might represent an undertaking of the USA to use force against aggression in the Middle East.

Despite these reservations, the State Department officials drafted the declaration in May. Subsequently, on May 25, 1950, the Tripartite Declaration by which the USA, Britain and France recognized the existing Middle Eastern frontiers came into the scene. The Tripartite Declaration was defined as the expression of these powers of their determination to lean on their security interests in the area. Besides, through the Tripartite Declaration these countries aimed to coordinate the supply of arms to regional states, which were under an embargo imposed by the UN after the May 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

In fact, Britain was at odds between continuing its supply of arms to the countries of the Middle East which were polarized around the Arab-Israeli dispute, and merely suggesting them to leave their deep disagreements behind and unite under a defense organization in the region; the latter no doubt constituting an unconvincing option. Besides, controversially, the more these countries were armed, their inclination towards an armed struggle would increase, and in case the British rejected their demands for the supply of war material, they (particularly the Arab states, except Jordan with which Britain maintained the strongest relations in the region) could gradually move to the Soviet orbit. Indeed, in February, 1950,

²⁶³ Sayed-Ahmed, Muhammed Abd el-Wahab, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952-1956*, (Surrey: Laam Ltd., 1989), p. 23.

²⁶⁴ Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956*, p. 97.

to convince Egypt to join a defense body, Britain agreed to sell this country arms and munitions, including jet-fighters. As expected, Israel asked for similar war equipment from the USA. Regarding the Israeli demands for military assistance, although the USA had initially chosen to avoid any commitments in the region, domestic pressures were forcing the USA to change this policy. Given this, Anglo-American understanding around the question of the Middle Eastern security was handicapped by the intricacies of the inter-state tensions in the region. In the end, having regarded the weak possibility of forming a joint defense body in the Middle East, the USA, Britain and France launched a project to limit the flow of arms to the region. This was the Tripartite Declaration. Similarly, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, held the view that under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 three powers were alone responsible for preventing another round in the Arab-Israeli struggle and there was every reason to demand this responsibility be more widely shared.²⁶⁵

Attempts to achieve a reliable defense organization in the region, thus had these limitations in their origin. From then, following the talks in the second US Chiefs of Mission Conference in İstanbul in February 14-21, 1951 the considerations for the formation of a regional defence organization continued in some vague forms. At this stage - and as will be further discussed in the subsequent chapter - in an atmosphere dominated by the success of Turkish Brigade in Korea, on July 18, the new British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, publicly announced Britain's support for the admittance of Turkey and Greece to NATO.

²⁶⁵ Anthony Nutting, *No End of A Lesson*, (London: Constable&Co.Ltd, 1967), pp. 33-34.

As will be discussed below, there is indeed every reason to assert that Ankara was demonstrating a vigilant policy in the same period. Turkish foreign policy makers were displaying a performance which reflected that Turkey was an able actor in international affairs to maintain a primary role on the side of the Western democracies in two different regions: in the Middle East and in Korea.

IV. 3 The North Atlantic Treaty Takes to the Stage

One year after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, and in the absence of a formalized relationship with Washington, Turkey continued to rely on its alliance with Britain in its search for security. In Açıkalın's words, Great Britain was Turkey's closest friend and ally and an important link with the West.³⁵ Indeed, as far as the Middle East was concerned, despite its obvious weakness, Britain was still the only power heavily involved in the region and with long established interests there. As İnönü put it in July 1948 to an American journalist, he would very much like an alliance with the United States, but he was of the opinion that American interest in Turkey was not a permanent factor.²⁶⁶ Truly, İnönü's doubts were confirmed previously on April 23, 1948 when the US Undersecretary of State, Robert Lovett, stated that the US was not against proposals towards this effect, but it was neither prepared to make any promises nor take any initiative about the proposed pact of the Middle Eastern or Eastern Mediterranean states. The US Department of State regarded the

²⁶⁶ C.L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles, 1934-1954*, (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 356.

prospect of including Arab states dubious, hence, suggested a Turkish-Italian-Greek trilateral declaration which seemed more advantageous.²⁶⁷

In one way or another, alternative bases in the Mediterranean were appealing to Washington because, if war should erupt suddenly, the USA would have a greater capability to defend this area. This being the case, attention focused increasingly on the Wheelus field in Tripoli, still under British control pending UN resolution of its status and in January 1948, the USA and Britain struck a deal providing for American access to Wheelus which envisaged its use by transport airplanes while military aircrafts had the right to land there as well. Lovett's suggestion for a trilateral declaration which would also include Turkey, was reasonable with a view to the fact that in late 1948, the Americans started to refurbish the housing and petroleum facilities, and planned to lengthen the runways so that the Air Force could use Wheelus for strategic operations in case of war.²⁶⁸ For Ankara, however, an Italian-Greek-Turkish trilateral declaration or pact with military bases in Libya as its center, was outside the reach of Turkish interests. It was plausibly calculated that any concentration of power in this defensive scheme, might weaken the defense ability of Turkey rather than enhance it.

In its turn, for the USA, the Middle East was still a peripheral area, one of secondary importance and had an auxiliary relationship to Western Europe by holding the largest oil resources and potential bases for airfields on which the USA and British strategic plans depended. Indeed, the Marshall Plan had accentuated US economic interests in this region.

²⁶⁷ *FRUS, 1948*, Vol. IV, p. 79.

²⁶⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 289; see also notes (87) and (88) on the same page and *FRUS, 1949*, Vol. IV, pp. 526-613.

There was a shortage of Western Hemisphere oil, and the USA was becoming a net importer of oil. The Middle Eastern petroleum was easy to get out of the ground and could be transported to Europe cheaper than Western Hemisphere oil. Section 112 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 mandated that European petroleum requirements should be fulfilled as much as possible from repositories outside the USA.²⁶⁹ Besides, studies suggested that in wars that might break out in the mid-1950s, petroleum of the Middle East would be vital to the West, and the Soviets would be forced to wage an oil-starved war if they could be denied entry into this region.²⁷⁰ Equally important for the USA and Britain were the use of airfields in the region. However, as will be discussed below, the safeguarding of air operations depended on the active defense of the area by the Turkish Army.

In the fall of 1947, war plan BROILER had assumed that within fifteen days after the eruption of hostilities, the USA would launch the air offensive from bases in the Middle East, Britain and Okinawa. The base at Cairo-Suez was particularly important since a major target was the Soviet oil-refining facilities. Almost 84 percent of this refining industry was thought to be within the radius of B-29s operating out of Egypt. In the spring of 1948, the JCS adopted war plan HALFMOON which incorporated much of the Middle East strategy initially outlined in BROILER. It was estimated that Soviet radar nets and air defenses in the south were weak and that launchings from Egypt might be possible up to six months before Soviet forces seized the area.

As for the coordination of the American and British strategic planning, British war plan SPEEDWAY of December 1948 called for the defense of Egypt - despite continuing Anglo-

²⁶⁹ *FRUS, 1948*, Vol. V., pp. 550-51.

Egyptian dispute - by British Commonwealth forces while the US Air Force utilized Cairo-Suez to launch a nuclear offensive with scores of heavy bombers. Admiral Richard Conolly, commander of the US forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was headquartered in London as well and coordinated Middle East strategy with his British counterparts.²⁷¹

At this juncture, the US officials intensified their military aid programs in Turkey. This was no doubt, an urgent requirement in order to complement the Middle East Strategy envisioned in BROLIER and HALFMOON. The US Army Group in Ankara sought to reorganize and modernize the Turkish Army, augment its mobility and firepower, improve its command, control and communication skills, its transportation infrastructure and logistical capabilities. The US advisers wanted the Turkish Army to retard the Soviet land offensive, thereby affording time for the US and Britain to launch the strategic air campaign from Egyptian bases. *“The Turkish army was given equipment to blunt a three-pronged Soviet attack across the Bosphorus, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus, to fallback gradually, and to mount a final, large-scale stand in southern Turkey in the Iskenderun pocket.”*²⁷²

Throughout 1948, Washington also transferred over 180 F-47s, 30 B-26s, and 86 C-47s to the Turkish Air Force which would assist Turkish Land Forces, and help interdict Soviet troops moving towards the Persian Gulf oil or sweeping toward Cairo-Suez. The Pentagon placed ever greater stress on reconstructing and resurfacing airfields in Turkey at such places as Bandırma (west) and Diyarbakır (south). Concurrently, training of the Turkish Air Forces was increasingly supported. On July 11, 1948, on the occasion of the visit of US

²⁷⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, pp. 237-238.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 238.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 238-239.

Undersecretary of the Army, General William H. Draper, the head of Air Group in Ankara, Major Gen. Earl S. Hoag, expressed to the Turkish press that, supported by the assistance material and the expertise of the technical advisers, over 40 specialized training courses were continuing its activities in Turkey. It was stated that the objective of the courses was to train the trainers. The training comprised A-26 Invader and P-47 Thunderbolt fighters, C-47 Dakota planes and related command, control and communication systems. Besides, 45 Turkish officers had attended further training programs in the USA.²⁷³

In fact, top level visits of US officials frequently took place in mid-1948. Previously, on July 1, Admiral Forrest Sherman had visited İstanbul with three cruisers, each carrying two sea-planes and equipped with lethal weapons which, no doubt, further impressed his Turkish counterparts. Admiral Sherman was the former vice chief of naval operations, and a member of a sub-committee of SWNCC with an exclusive focus on the SU. In this post, he was the subordinate of Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal. In the same sub-committee, Secretary of War, Robert Patterson had designated General John R. Deane, while Secretary of State Byrnes appointed his adviser Charles E. Bohlen. Since then, Sherman was known as a strong defender of Turkey's strategic position. During the discussions on assistance to Turkey, when the Director of Policy Planning, George Kennan, claimed that the Pentagon

²⁷³ *Ayn Tarihi*, Vol. 176, July 1-31, 1948, pp. 25-26. In his statement to the Turkish press, Undersecretary of the Army, Draper, underscored that an answer to the question whether the USA would come to the aid of Turkey or not in case Turkey was attacked could be given by the State Department. He stated that he believed no one desired a war and no prospect of war in the near future could be mentioned.

Gen. Draper also explained that the USA had understood the importance of restoring Turkish foreign trade with Europe and providing a greater flow of Turkish export items, tobacco being in the first place. The US policy in this regard he said, was to support trade activities in Europe to reach the pre-war numbers without any barrier. But, particularly for Germany, priorities were food items and wheat. See, *ibid.*, pp. 43-45.

deftly inserted military aid for Turkey into legislation originally designed as a political and economic program for Greece, Sherman had conceded that Greece was on the flank, but if Turkey fell into the Soviet orbit, the USA would have an impossible situation. According to him, the Mediterranean strategy of the USA was of vital importance, and it should be conceived as a highway for the projection of military power “*deep into the heart of the land mass of Eurasia and Africa.*”²⁷⁴ Secretary of Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, and Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal wanted some of the airstrips designed to handle B-29s which, if wartime circumstances allowed, US forces would fly in. Moreover, by the end of 1948, officials in the State Department endorsed the idea of constructing medium bomber bases in Turkey. Consequently, “*Turkey began to develop the ability to attack vital Soviet petroleum resources in Romania and the Caucasus.*”²⁷⁵

As the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department, on December 17, 1948, McGhee recommended \$300 million in aid for fiscal year 1950, including \$200 million to Greece and \$100 million to Turkey. Three weeks later, in early January 1949, Ambassador Averell Harriman, the US Special Representative in Europe for the ECA, met with President İnönü, most of the members of cabinet and a number of senior government departmental administrators.²⁷⁶ Shortly afterwards, on January 6, 1949, Harriman cabled the ECA Administrator, Hoffman, explaining that after his conversations he had a renewed confidence in determination of the Turks, and in their effective use of

²⁷⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 144.

For Sherman’s visit to İstanbul, see, *Ayin Tarihi*, *ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p. 239. Leffler also pointed out that when Tito suspended aid to the Greek insurgents and guerrilla activity waned, it was agreed to transfer aid under the Greece-Turkey program to the latter nation where the money could be used to bolster overall strategy for the Middle East.

²⁷⁶ George McGhee, “*The US-Turkish-NATO...*”, p. 57.

American aid under the direction of the USA. Harriman said, İnönü stated that he believed war could be avoided if the USA could develop unity among the free countries of Europe, which required determination and maximum effort by each country, and that Turkey would do its part. He underlined that the Turkish President emphasized that firm American moral support was of even greater value than material aid. He urged that the US supply Turkey as a matter of urgency on the recommendations of Russell H. Dorr, Chief of ECA Mission in Turkey, in consultation with Ambassador George Wadsworth and General McBride. Harriman concluded that *“with our assistance, and only with our assistance, can Turkey become an increasingly effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and a contributor to economic developments in Eastern Mediterranean and Europe.”*²⁷⁷

In the meantime, in the aftermath of Anglo-Turkish financial talks in Ankara which was concluded on January 23, 1949, the British Government announced that agreement had been reached with the Turkish Government on the question of drawing rights under the Intra-European Payments and Compensation Agreement of October 16, 1948, and that subject to approval by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the UK Government proposed to grant such rights in sterling in favour of Turkey to the equivalent of \$8.000.000 (£2.000.000). The statement added it was expected that Turkish exports to Britain in 1949 would be larger than ever.²⁷⁸

The continuation of US financial aid was also of great importance for Ankara. However, contrary to the ECA Administrator Harriman’s initial considerations, the aid was being

²⁷⁷ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, pp. 1640-1641.

²⁷⁸ *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, Vol. No. VII, 1948-1950, p. 9769.

reduced. On February 19, during a general discussion in Paris, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, told Harriman that his government was disappointed at the reduction which had been made in aid for Turkey in ECA's recent submissions to the Congress. Harriman said he explained to Sadak that these submissions were purely of an illustrative nature and they were "*in no sense designed by ECA to prejudge the recommendations which might be made by OEEC in connection with the division of whatever American aid might be available.*" ²⁷⁹

Harriman also expressed that parts of this program which had been included in Turkey's estimates were probably beyond the scope of ECA financing. He suggested that Turkey should push the negotiation to obtain World Bank funds in order to finance some its projects. In his turn, Sadak recalled Turkey's need for the continuation of foreign assistance, because, 48% of the Turkish budget was devoted to defense expenditures which drained sources to be spent for local investment objectives. ²⁸⁰

Meanwhile, negotiations of the Brussels Pact powers with the USA and Canada towards the creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America intensified. They were concluded in September 1948 with a report to the various governments. The report was accepted by all governments in concern, thus enabling the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty to announce complete identity of views on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic area in October 1948.

²⁷⁹ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 1643.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1643-1644.

The text of the Treaty was published on March 18, 1949 and three days later Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited by the Brussels Pact states to become participants in this new formation. In spite of the efforts of the SU to prevent the formation of the alliance by a memorandum addressed to the twelve original signatories alleging the hostile nature of their action, the talks followed the signature of the Treaty of Washington on April 4, 1949, bringing into being a common security mechanism among these 12 countries. The parliaments of the member countries ratified the Treaty within five months thereafter.

The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) consists of a preamble and fourteen articles. It is short and clear as to require very brief explanatory comment. Worthy of special note, however, is the emphasis which those who drafted the Treaty have placed on its conformity with both the letter and the spirit of the UN Charter. Principally, the NAT consists of a framework for a broadly based cooperation among the signatory countries. It is not only a military alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel should it occur, but it also provides for continuous joint action in political, economic and social fields. In this context, in accordance with the terms of the UN Charter, the signatory countries undertake to protect peace and international security, and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. In addition, they undertake to eliminate possible conflict in their international economic policies and encourage economic collaboration between their countries (Article 2). In this respect, the Treaty has a dual aspect: affirming the importance of economic and social progress on one hand, and adopting a policy of common security based on the inherent right of collective self-defense on the other.

Article 3 treats the means of maintaining and increasing the individual and collective capacity of NATO member countries to resist and to act jointly through the medium of mutual assistance. Such joint action might be achieved by a gradual integration of armed forces, and coordination of instruction and training which has been an essential function of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to this date.²⁸¹

Article 4 pertains to a threat to one of the NATO countries. The only obligation stated in this Article is for signatory countries to consult together if the territorial integrity or political independence of one of them is endangered. Such consultation may be requested by a country other than the one threatened, and this consultation would take place within the framework of the North Atlantic Council meetings. As stated in Article 7, which expresses the compatibility of the Treaty with the Charter of the UN, the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council is in no way affected. Thus, in the event of threat, when a consultation of member countries of NAT reveal that enforcement action should be taken, the only competent body to authorize such action would be the Security Council or in case of default, the General Assembly of the UN.

Article 5 contains one of the essential provisions: *“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...”* This commitment, no doubt, introduced an exceptionally important measure, because the resulting solidarity created a situation against any possible aggression.

²⁸¹ It was explained that “mutual aid” also meant the assistance of any kind. In this respect, the Treaty allowed that the military assistance provided by the USA might take the form of end-items (delivery of a wide variety of military items ranging from ammunition to ships and airplanes) or to off-shore orders (which was designed as a system whereby the USA bought in various European countries with funds from its Military Assistance Program and gave equipment to one of the Allied

The Article then goes on to define the obligations of countries in the event of armed attack. These obligations consist in taking forthwith individually and in concert with the other member countries to the Treaty, such action, including the use of armed force, as is deemed necessary by each Party. Significantly, joint action is justified by the exercise of the natural right of self-defence, individual or collective, as provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It was, therefore, admitted that the right of self-defense is a legitimate right, the exercise of which in no way affects the primary competence of the Security Council in matters relating to the maintenance and restoration of peace. The final provisions of the Article include that the measures so taken shall be reported to the Security Council, and shall be terminated when that body has taken the necessary measures.

Article 6 defined the area in which the provisions of the Article 5 are applicable.²⁸² In this context, it is emphasized that the NAT Organization was not established to defend a geographically homogenous territory, but was created to defend a way of life. Significantly, the definition of the area in no way implied that political and military events occurring outside it can not be the subject of consultations within the Council. It is believed that the overall international situation is liable to affect the preservation of peace and security in the area in question, and it is to consider this situation that the Council must and does devote its attention as a matter of course.

Article 7 expresses the compatibility of the Treaty with the Charter of the United Nations and in Article 8, the Parties confirm compatibility of the Treaty with their other international

countries for equipping its armed forces). Monroe MacCloskey, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, (NY: Richard Rosen Press, Military Research Series, 1966), pp. 25-26.

obligations, and undertake not to enter into any international engagements in the future in conflict with the Treaty.

Article 9 makes provision for the creation of bodies to implement the Treaty. It is these bodies which constitute the 'Organization' as such within the meaning of the NAT.

Article 10 states that the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty to accede to it. In this brief examination of the Text of the Treaty, it should also be noted that the NAT Organization has no supranational character. All decisions must be taken by national representatives unanimously,²⁸³

Turning back to Turkey's exclusion from this formation of states, evidently, the political and military circles in Ankara were greatly disturbed by the course of developments. Until then, Ankara had repeatedly expressed its willingness to incorporate its defense scheme to that of the West. Towards this end, Turkish policy makers had made endeavours to create a Mediterranean pact including the West European countries, the scope of which included the defense of the Middle East. Despite their optimism, neither the plans around a Mediterranean pact nor the projects aiming at realizing a defensive grouping of states in the Middle East were fulfilled. Italy's inclusion to NAT was another surprising development. Although the US and British Ambassadors communicated their governments' view to Ankara that the NAT

²⁸² It was amended after the accession of Turkey and Greece to the Treaty through the Protocol dated October 22, 1951 the ratification procedures of which were finally completed on February 18, 1952.

²⁸³ Undoubtedly, throughout the years of the Alliance common sense was applied in this regard. Agreed that the unanimity requirement in actual usage leads to what is tantamount to a veto, however, it reflects motives opposed to those which underlie the right of veto. The latter is essentially negative. It confers on certain members the definite right, by casting a negative vote, to nullify a majority decision without even giving reasons for doing so. The unanimous requirement, on the contrary, constitutes a pressing invitation to reach agreement.

was based on certain geographic boundaries which contained only countries of the North Atlantic region, Ankara, soon realized that Italy which was regarded as a Mediterranean country in previous security plannings, as well as territory in North Africa comprising the Algerian departments of France, would be included in this formation. Ankara, then considered that its exclusion might indicate the reduction of US strategic interest coupled with an imminent reduction of US aid.

The Turkish Government thought that they should not lose further time to launch a diplomatic campaign to seize an opportunity to incorporate Ankara to the emerging defense scheme. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sadak, despite the suggestions of some officials in the MFA to postpone his demarché, decided to beat the iron when it was still hot, and traveled to New York in early April on the occasion of the opening of the Second Part of the Third Session of the UN General Assembly which was scheduled to meet between April 5 - May 18. As will be discussed below, Sadak, who was the first Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit the USA, visited Washington from April 12 to 15 to hold conversations with his counterpart and the officials of the State Department.

In his meeting with Acheson on April 12, Sadak communicated the views of the Turkish Government on the present circumstance that Turkey felt itself deprived of the US guarantee offered to Europe. In the beginning of their conversation, Sadak told his counterpart that he would review the position in which Turkey found itself as a result of the recent signature of the NAT. He said, in March 1947, the US Government had announced its program in support of the independence and security of Turkey. Subsequent to that time, Acheson told Sadak that this support was confirmed through the effective military assistance which Turkey

received from the USA, and later the formation of the WEU took place and the talks were directed at a security arrangement with the USA for the North Atlantic area. Acheson recalled that in the autumn of 1948, conversations took place at Ankara with the US and UK Ambassadors in which Turkey raised the question of Turkey's position in the contemplated security arrangement. The US Secretary of State reminded Sadak that the Turkish Government was informed in reply by written memoranda that while details of the proposed arrangement had not yet been formulated, the conception was clearly a geographical one, restricted geographically in scope to countries of the North Atlantic region.

Concerning Italy, the Turkish Government having been previously informed that the contemplated pact would be limited geographically, and that Italy would not be included, had so informed the TGNA. Ankara was satisfied with this situation since the geographical conception of NAT was clear and understandable while this left the door open for later consideration of a Mediterranean defense arrangement within which Turkey might consider to find an adequate place together with other Mediterranean countries. Acheson said, despite the fact that the Turkish Government was informed that Italy would not be included, "*subsequently, however, it was learned that Italy and the territory in North Africa comprising the Algerian departments of France would in fact be brought within the scope of the North Atlantic Pact.*"²⁸⁴ Then, he admitted that the inclusion of Italy completely upset the situation so far as the views and perceptions of the Turkish Government were concerned.

Subsequently, Acheson underlined that the overall situation seemed all the more incomprehensible to the Turkish Government and people inasmuch as Turkey had been

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 1648.

undergoing constant Soviet pressure and threats since the spring of 1945. He pointed out that since that time Turkey had been making great sacrifices by maintaining a large armed force to withstand Soviet threats, at the cost of what was becoming an unbearable burden upon Turkey's economy and finances. He said, the fear had begun to creep into Turkish minds that with the negotiation of the Atlantic Pact, the USA had altered its position concerning Turkey, and that it no longer maintained the powerful interest in the maintenance of Turkey's independence and integrity which had characterized the attitude of the US Government since 1946, and added that the Soviet propaganda had not been slow to make the most of this situation. Then, he expressed that Sadak said that he was frankly at a loss to know what explanations he could give to the Turkish Parliament and public.

However, considerable evidence suggests that the US Government was still lacking a firm conception of Turkey's role in any given defense mechanism. Correspondingly, in reply to Sadak, in addition to his previous perception of Turkey's role in regional defence within a Mediterranean security arrangement, this time Acheson said that the security of the Middle East was one of the most important problems with which the Department was confronted soon after he had become Under Secretary in 1945. This time he explained that facing Soviet demands over Turkey, the President and the Department took a serious view of this challenge and the conclusion was reached that the Soviet aspirations of dominating Turkey would be contrary to the vital interests of the USA. *“As a result a strong position was taken by the US Government in support of Turkish independence with the full knowledge of the possible consequences. The President considered this the most important decision he had made*

subsequent to the Bombing of Hiroshima.”²⁸⁵ Indeed, as discussed before, the first action taken by the US Government was the dispatch of *USS Missouri* accompanied by the *USS Providence* and *USS Power*, the prolonged effects of which continued in the following decades.²⁸⁶ Then Acheson went on to summarize the incidents until the making of NAT, and assured Sadak that in the US President’s thinking and in his, the vital importance to the USA of Turkey’s independence and integrity was in no way diminished as a result of these developments.

In his turn, Sadak told Acheson that two years ago Turkey had stood in the very forefront of US preoccupations concerning security questions. However, recently, the USA had transferred its interests to the West European countries, and had now gone further in guaranteeing their security than it had in the case of Turkey. As regards the West European countries, the USA pledged to come immediately to their aid if they were attacked; no such pledge existed concerning Turkey. *“If there were any consistency or logic in international relations, then it would seem that Turkey, the first object of US solicitude in security matters, would have been the first to be given, the protective cover of a guarantee.”*²⁸⁷ However, Sadak said, this had not proved to be the case. If, as stated, the US position towards Turkey had not changed, why had it been impossible for the US to extend the Atlantic Pact to include Turkey, or for Ankara at least to consider the extension of a similar guarantee to an Eastern Mediterranean Pact ?

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1649.

²⁸⁶ Interestingly, it is still explained commonly by the Turkish and American officials that the foundation of the 6th US Fleet had its roots in this incident. Referring to the statements of high level US officials, a similar assessment was made by Kamran İnan on May 24, 2000, the Head of Foreign Relations Committee of the TGNA presently, during his explanations to the Committee concerning his visit to Washington in May, 2000. Diary note.

Acheson replied that first, there was the series of statements by Truman and himself already referred to beginning in 1946 at the time of the Soviet demands on the Turkish Straits up to those made in connection with the signing of the Atlantic Pact. Secondly, there was the important military assistance rendered to the Turkish Government by the USA. In a matter of days a new military assistance bill would be presented to the Congress. From the hearings in Congress on this bill, it would be made clear that a substantial amount of this assistance was intended for Turkey. This would, he said, give evidence of continuing US interest in Turkey. Thirdly, in Truman's thinking the economic development of the Middle East, particularly of Turkey, Greece, Iran and the Arab states, complemented the ERP. US assistance in this respect also would make evident US interest in that region.

As for the invitation extended to Italy to become one of the North Atlantic Treaty countries. Acheson pointed out that:

this had been done not merely to please that country or France, but was a logical development. France had argued that Italy has been the backdoor into France through which throughout history attacks had been made upon it. It was only after this backdoor had been closed through the decision to include Italy that France's attitude had changed with reference to its own security problems and that it had been found possible to reach a settlement in West Germany.²⁸⁸

Before parting, when Sadak asked to whom Acheson could recommend him to discuss economic issues, Acheson suggested that he discuss these problems with Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Williard L. Thorp and Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Satterthwaite. The next day Sadak held a conference with Thorp. In their talks,

²⁸⁷ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. VI, p. 1650.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1651.

Sadak requested increased US financial aid, citing the serious financial position of the Turkish Government as a result of its continuing defense burden, which was making most difficult financing ECA and anticipated IBRD projects. He requested a US grant of additional \$30 million under the military aid program to finance current consumption items. Acheson stated that Thorp had informed him that Sadak also requested US support in anticipated approach by the Turkish Government to US private money market for a loan probably less than \$70 million with the principal objective of providing dollar exchange for imports by Turkish private enterprise.

Meanwhile, on April 13, Sadak conveyed the message of İnönü to Truman in which the Turkish President expressed that he should like to lay particular stress on the precious military aid which had been given to Turkey by the USA in one the most critical periods which the world was going through. No doubt, in the same days, the makers of US strategic military planning were increasingly concerned with strengthening US strongholds in the Eastern Mediterranean. In a policy paper approved by the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee on May 25, 1949, it was pointed out that it was the long-range US military objective to be able to prevent the loss or destruction of Western European and Middle East nations, and by securing the natural approaches to the enemy sources of power to facilitate conduct of offensive operations. It was explained that the short-range military objective was to improve to the maximum extent practicable, and at the earliest day possible, the capability of Western European nations to provide for their own defense, and to increase the capabilities of the Middle Eastern countries to impose a delay on enemy operations directed towards their areas. In this context, it was pointed out that Italy and Turkey were important

for their strategic locations astride a natural sea approach to areas from which air power may be projected towards an important segment of the industrial capacity of Soviet areas.²⁸⁹

The US NSC, was however, in favour of adopting a careful policy concerning the issue of including Turkey to the Western defence scheme. The NSC asserted that it would be unwise for the time being to seek an arrangement with the Turkish Government for the construction of airfields or for the stockpiling of aviation gasoline. The reason for this decision was that these efforts would be regarded by the Kremlin as a threat to its security, and would stimulate further pressure on Turkey and perhaps on Iran. It was pointed out that the SU was watching carefully any development which could be exploited to support the Soviet thesis that the NAT was aggressive in intent and operation.²⁹⁰

As for Ankara's foreign policy towards Europe, after much effort, finally on August 8, 1949, Turkey and Greece were invited to be members of the Council of Europe. Although Turkey was admitted into the Council of Europe, Turkish foreign policy makers were of the opinion that this could not constitute an alternative to the commitment of the USA within a formal alliance or through NATO. Under these circumstances, Ankara could not help seeking Turkey's security under the defensive shield of the Western democratic camp. But, as will be discussed next, there was a price which Turkey was required to pay for admittance into the Western defensive system.

²⁸⁹ *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. I, pp. 314-315.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.324.

VI THE TEST OF WILLS IN THE KOREAN WAR AND THE TURKISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT (1950-1952)

This chapter will discuss the development of a local dispute in Korea between 1950 and 1952 into the biggest international conflict since WW II. Here, the emphasis will be on the Turkish participation in this conflict and the background of events which shaped Ankara's decision. In this context, it will be first explained that the crisis over Korea embodied and fostered the global agenda of the Cold War era. Indeed, Korea, the place where the world peace was broken not even five years after the end of WW II, was fated to be the battleground of contesting ideologies and interests. It was the Korean war that first brought Communist China into the international arena as well. At this stage, having withdrawn all troops in 1949 in line with a policy of disengagement, the USA was unprepared for involvement in the war that began with a massive attack on South Korea by the North Koreans on June 24, 1950 and lasted three years at a cost of more than 150,000 US casualties.

Consecutively, the making of Turkish foreign policy, leading to Ankara's decision to assign a combat force under the UN Command in Korea will be examined. In this framework, Turkey's participation in the Korean War will be explained as a crucial point in recent Turkish history, which marked an important test case for Ankara's re-evaluation of Turkey's place in international politics. Here, it will be underscored that participation in the war ended nearly 30 years of a policy of non-involvement in international conflicts as well. Given this, Turkish entry into the Korean War, especially after maintaining a strict policy of

avoiding involvement in international conflicts since the founding of the Republic, will be explained through a critical examination of Ankara's efforts to tie Turkey's defense with that of the USA and NATO. The impact of Turkish involvement in the conflict in its foreign and domestic policies will also be discussed in this context.

VI . 1 Conflicting Strategies Lay Out Options From Total to Limited War

As for the agreements of victors on the future of Korea, it was decided by the USA, Britain, and China at the Cairo Conference of 1943 that once the Japanese had capitulated, Korea was again to become a free and independent nation. At the Potsdam Conference of 1945, these same powers reaffirmed this pledge. In its turn, when the SU declared war against Japan in August of 1945, it formally agreed to stand by these pledges.

At Yalta, Roosevelt had been urged by his military planners to seek a definite commitment for intervention of the SU in the Pacific struggle. The US President also sought Stalin's agreement to giving China a significant place in the UN, and allowing it to gain back its lost territories. Shortly afterwards, the USA received guarantees of Soviet entry into the Pacific war. In effect, outer Mongolia and strategic assets were conceded to the Soviet Union following the defeat of Japan with the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which Roosevelt agreed to obtain. Eventually, the SU agreed to conclude with the Nationalist government of China a pact of friendship and alliance. It was also agreed that part of the agreement on the Far East would remain secret, because Russia had a treaty of neutrality with Japan, and information that might leak from the Chinese Nationalists to the Japanese,

and an immediate announcement might jeopardize negotiation on differences between Chinese Nationalists and Communists, which the US Ambassador to China, Major Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, evaluated were close to success. Resultantly, the terms agreed at Yalta were not officially disclosed to Chiang Kai-Shek until June 15, 1945.

It was in September of 1945 that Japan's unconditional surrender brought World War II to its formal ending. Liberated from Japan in 1945 only to become a hostage to the Cold War, Korea remained divided at the 38th parallel, its two halves occupied by US and Russian troops until 1948 when communist refusal to accept UN-supervised elections led to establishment of rival regimes: the US backed Republic of Korea (ROK) in South, and the SU sponsored People's Republic in North. Countries who sent their troops to Korea could hardly dream that the two leading Communist powers, SU and China would blatantly combine in rallying against them.

The Kremlin, in fact, had made preparations for occupation of North Korea in August 1945 where People's Committees operated extensively. While it is true that in this same month a line was drawn across Korea at the 38th parallel, this was done to facilitate the arrangements made for the surrender of Japanese forces in the area. Russia would accept the surrender of Japanese troops north of this line, while the USA would handle those troops surrendering south of the line.²⁹¹ Thus, the 38th parallel was the result of a temporary expediency, having nothing to do with natural boundaries, politics or the history of the country.

²⁹¹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, II, p. 317.

At the end of 1945, a big-power conference at Moscow called for a five-year period of trusteeship by Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and the establishment of a provisional democratic government. But, when the executive agency of the trustees, the Soviet Union and the United States, met in Seoul in March of the new year, it was obvious that it would not work. All the Korean political parties except the Communists demanded immediate and complete independence and refused to cooperate. The Soviets then insisted that the Communists were the only legitimate party in Korea, and that it form the government, but the United States was equally insistent otherwise. Ultimately, both sides set up their own governments in their own zones. The Soviets passed control over to a Provisional People's Committee, and in the summer all of the parties of the north coalesced into the Korean National Democratic Front; then the northern part of the peninsula made a predictable transition into a People's Democratic Republic, the standard Marxist-Leninist one-party state modeled after the Soviet Union, while in December 1946, in the south, a legislative assembly was set up, half of them elected and the other half nominated. However, the country was in near chaos, hundreds of thousands were hungry, unemployed and homeless, while they wanted their independence.

In May 1947, the Joint Commission of the Trustee Powers made one more try. The Americans proposed free elections throughout the entire peninsula; the Russians rejected the idea. They countered by proposing a meeting of equal numbers of representatives of all the parties of the south, and all the parties of the north, which would have meant the Communists, since they were the only one. Washington declined this suggestion on the

grounds that the representatives of the Communist party of the north would be controlled by the Russians.

As for the reasons behind China's increasing attention towards Korea, it can be stated that developments in China in the first half of the 1940s were of crucial importance for the sequence of events in 1950, culminating in the Chinese intervention in Korea in October 1950. During WW II, the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, was regarded favourably by the US administration as a result of the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. However, the US Government's disillusionment with China developed from the negative contribution made by Kuomintang in the Pacific War. Instead of playing a vigorous part in the defeat of Japan in the Pacific, the top Kuomintang officials and generals were interested in exploiting large-scale American aid for their own benefit while Chiang Kai-Shek was pre-occupied with his long-term feud with the Chinese Communists. Indeed, numerically, the Kuomintang forces were superior to the Communists, but in morale, commitment and leadership the Communists were far ahead of the Kuomintang as the civil war was to reveal. The Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung had managed to transform the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into a powerful platform to attract the Chinese masses.

In fact, the Japanese aggression of 1937 had first created the conditions for a Communist leadership in China and for spreading the conflict to most of the neighbouring countries. At this juncture, Stalin surprised the Chinese Communist rebels after having forced them into a reconciliation with the nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek against the invader, when he concluded a non-aggression treaty with Japan in August 1941 that implied among other

things, the end of Soviet assistance to China, and the recognition of Manchukuo, and hence of the seizure of China's richest province by the Japanese imperialists.

After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Kremlin followed a cautious policy towards China "*and one less sympathetic to Chinese communism than might have been expected.*"²⁹² Stalin was considerably dubious about the character of the CCP and the prospects for the CCP taking power throughout China. It is argued that the Soviet leader anticipated a slow decline of the Kuomintang, balanced by a gradual growth of the CCP which could point towards a division of China. This also explains the Kremlin's preservation of diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang until a surprisingly late stage in April 1949, by which time it was obvious that the CCP would succeed on the mainland in the near future.

Meanwhile, speculation grew at the end of 1948 and beginning of 1949 as to whether Chiang Kai-shek might stall tactically or because he had wearied of the setbacks that had occurred. In October 1948, in his statement to the *New York Tribune*, Chiang spoke of the world menace of Communism and of the need to support nationalists' resistance to Communism. In this context, he linked his message with Communist activities in Korea and Japan. "*A feature of the decline of the Kuomintang was Chiang's interest in forging links with [the designated South Korean President] Syngman Rhee and his reference to Korea was one first signs of this trend. Chiang and the clique surrounding him had reached the conclusion that the only hope for the salvation of the Kuomintang lay in the third world war; this, too, was a consistent theme to the outbreak of the war in Korea and after.*"²⁹³

²⁹² Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 2nd ed., (London: Longman, 1997), p. 112.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

In October 1949, following a decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, the CCP formally proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC).²⁹⁴ The PRC had an immediate agenda for regulating its international affairs based on its ideological vision. At the top was the conquest of Tibet, preparations were made to take over Taiwan and the conclusion of an alliance with the SU. Beijing did also quickly exchange diplomatic recognition with P'yongyang, the North Korean capital.²⁹⁵

Turning back to the efforts for a settlement of the Korean question in the UN, in September 1947, the USA took the problem to the United Nations. Two months later, the United Nations agreed that Korea ought to be independent, and voted to set up a temporary commission to bring that about. Members from eastern Europe boycotted the vote, and when a UN commission reached Korea early in 1948, with the task of supervising elections, it was refused admission to North Korea. With no recourse, it then recommended free elections in the south; these were held on May 10, and the conservative rightist parties gained a large majority. On August 15, 1948, Syngman Rhee became the first president of the Republic of Korea.

Four months later, the republic was recognized by the UN as the only free state in Korea. But it was given diplomatic recognition just by the western powers, as the People's Democratic Republic received recognition solely from the eastern bloc. The UN then set up a permanent commission to try to unify the country. The Americans ended their military

²⁹⁴ In the months following, the socialist-bloc states, joined by some Asian neutrals (-i.e., Burma, India and Indonesia) as well as Britain, Switzerland, and Scandinavian states offered diplomatic recognition to the new Chinese regime. The USA held aloof, and the doors to the UN closed shut.

presence in government of the south, and agreed to provide advisers and training for defense forces. The Russian occupation forces left the north. Both countries left behind a government which the other denounced as illegitimate and which claimed to represent all of Korea. Within six months, there was occasional raiding across the 38th parallel, and major exchanges of gunfire. Both sides were calling each other “reactionary imperialist traitor” or “Communist terrorist revolutionary”.

In fact, Truman’s policy on Korea at the United Nations experienced a significant success during the last month of 1948. On December 6, the Political and Security Committee voted by a large margin to reject the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s claim to legitimacy, and instead to invite the ROK to send representatives to the UN. It then paid attention to Washington’s proposal calling for international involvement in Korean affairs. John Foster Dulles, then the US Representative to the UN, delivered a speech appealing for UN approval of the resolution. American diplomatic pressure proved to be effective and two days later, the Committee overwhelmingly voted to recommend that the General Assembly adopt the American resolution.²⁹⁶ Four days later, on December 12, the General Assembly approved the American resolution despite sharp criticism from the Soviet delegation. After rejecting the Soviet proposal to disband the planned commission on Korea by a wide margin, the General Assembly voted to create a new commission that would be smaller than its

²⁹⁵ By then, Mao had already begun to repatriate Koreans who had fought in the Chinese civil war, and by June 1950 some fifty thousand to seventy thousand had crossed the Yalu River into Korea to strengthen the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s army. Michael H. Hunt, *Crises in...*, p. 172.

²⁹⁶ It amended the proposal to provide for withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea “as soon as practicable” rather than ninety days, after adoption. At the same time, however, the Committee refused to recognize the ROK as Korea’s national government, observing that it controlled only half the peninsula. James Irving Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade*, (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 177-178; *FRUS*, 1948, VI, p. 1335.

predecessor, United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), excluding both Canada and Ukraine. It was decided that within thirty days, the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) would arrive in Korea, and begin to cooperate with the ROK for the achievement of reunification.

Meanwhile, in April-May 1949, secret consultations between Communist China and North Korea with regard to the invasion of South Korea were given a start, one year before the outbreak of the war, with the visit to China by Kim Il, Chief of the Political Department of the North Korean Army. The Kremlin was a part of the process as well, since prior to his visit to China, Kim Il had held a meeting with Stalin in Moscow.²⁹⁷

In December, this time Mao visited Moscow and stayed there for about two months, holding extensive meetings to discuss with Stalin the expansion of Communism throughout Asia, and the rest of the world, and other pending issues between the two countries. On January 2, 1950, Mao cabled his Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, and informed him that Stalin had agreed to Zhou's and other necessary aides' arrival in Moscow, and to the signing of a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, as well as agreements on credit, trade, civil aviation, and others.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ *The Korean War*, Korea Institute of Military History, (Seoul: The Military Mutual Aid Association, 1998), p. 5. In Moscow, as proposed by Kim Il Sung, Chief of the Political Department Kim Il and his Soviet counterparts initially agreed that the war should begin in the form of North Korea's counterattack against South Korea's "provocation". It was also agreed that China's role in connection with the invasion plan and the Chinese-Korean relationship would be settled through consultation with Mao Tse Tung. It was in compliance with these agreements that Kim Il Sung dispatched Kim Il to Beijing. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6

²⁹⁸ "Mao Cables from Moscow", in the appendix of, Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners Stalin, Mao and the Korean War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 242. In its appendix, (pp. 229-291), this book includes a selection of translated documents

In the Republic of Korea, as the scope of the Communist attack became apparent, there was dismayed alarm. The frontier was fully breached, the capital threatened, refugees thronged the roads. What was important in this situation was therefore not what the North Koreans intended to do, which was clear enough, or what the South Koreans could do, which was little enough, but rather what the USA and the UN could do.

VI 2. The Democrat Party's Redefinition of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's Participation in the Korean War

Against this background, on March 30, 1949, the US Embassy in Ankara conveyed a Memorandum to the MFA, expressing the views and expectations of the US Government with regard to the problem of Korea. The US Memorandum underscored that it was the US view that the UN had made substantial progress towards restoring the freedom and independence of the Korean people, and that in the General Assembly Resolution of December 12 it had a "*formula for pursuing that progress to fruition.*"²⁹⁹ Here, it was stated that the USA believed in consolidation of existing gains, and the success of further UN efforts in Korea would depend in large measure on the firm and unwavering support by the UN member states of the December 12 Resolution, and the endorsement of the Government of the Republic of Korea contained therein. In this context it was emphasized that the USA

from Mao Tse Tung's manuscripts on the period September 1949-December 1950, which introduce an interesting account of negotiations regarding Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Korean War.

For the record of conversations between Mao, Zhou En lai and Stalin, see, *The Cold War in Asia*, Cold War International History Project, Issues 6-7, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1995/1996).

felt that every assistance and facility should be afforded the UNCOK in its efforts to help the lawful Korean Government to achieve the objective of a free and united Korea, “*a goal to which the United States is convinced an overwhelming majority of Koreans of both north and south wholeheartedly aspire.*”³⁰⁰

The Memorandum also explained the US position on troop withdrawal as based on the view that to withdraw its occupation forces prematurely or to permit their retention on Korean soil for any longer than necessary would, in either case jeopardize attainment of UN objectives in Korea. It was stated that it was the intention of the USA to continue to provide limited amount of economic, technical, military and other assistance regarded as essential to the economic and political stability of the newborn Republic. Lastly, it was underscored that the main burden of responsibility for the failure of UN efforts “*must be placed on the Soviet Union and its evident determination to subordinate legitimate aspirations and the welfare of the Korean people to its own objective of Communist domination of the entire Korean peninsula.*”³⁰¹

Meanwhile, there were some efforts to bring the Korean question to Ankara’s attention on the part of Seoul. On July 21, 1949, Ambassador Chough, Pyung Ok, Permanent Observer to the UN, sent a letter to Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN, Selim Sarper, in which he explained that in addition to the USA, Britain, China, the Phillippines, France, Brazil,

²⁹⁹ From, *Memorandum by the US Embassy in Ankara to the MFA, March 30, 1949* (extract), The MFA Archives.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Ibid. In fact, Ankara’s efforts in the same direction produced a favourable outcome in Turco-Italian relations and a month later, on March 24, 1950, the Turco-Italian treaty of friendship was signed. Despite Ankara’s optimism that this timely step would support the establishment of a Mediterranean pact, it was soon understood that Washington was not willing to re-evaluate its

Chile, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Dominican Republic and Cuba, the Government of the Dominion of Canada accorded full recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea.

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By the beginning of 1950, in Ankara, there were, however, no signs of relating the Turkish wish for joining NATO and supporting the US efforts in Korea. Thus, the US position in Korea was still a matter of less interest for Turkey, as Ankara was still concentrating on its Mediterranean security groupement offer. But, it would soon prove that Ankara would be obliged to shift to participate in the US sponsored discussions on the future of Korea to perpetuate its policy of drawing together with Washington.

As part of Ankara's last effort on its usual line of policy, on February 15, 1950, Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Erkin renewed Turkey's suggestion for a Near Eastern Pact with the support of the US. However, Erkin tried in vain to obtain some sort of a US assurance to Turkey, and explained that such an assurance could be in the form of a declaration by the US President which would announce Turkey in the same category as members of the NAT.³⁰³

position on the subject. For a summary of considerations on this issue, see, Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan...*, p. 70.

³⁰² From the, *Letter of Chough, Pyung Ok, Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Korea, and Permanent Observer to the United Nations to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey, Selim Sarper, July 21, 1949* (extract), The MFA Archives. As will be discussed below, despite the expectations of Seoul and Washington, Ankara did not attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Seoul before its decision to dispatch troops to the UN Command in this country.

³⁰³ Erkin also proposed, while awaiting the decision for a US political commitment, that the General Staffs of the two countries could undertake discussions of common defense and assistance plans. Although, this suggestion was declined by the US on the ground that such planning could not be undertaken without a political agreement first, The US Chief of Military Mission in Ankara, Gen. McBride, continued to extend strategic military advice - which he said, would not mean that the US would directly or indirectly commit itself to any future course of action - to his Turkish counterparts. *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. V., 1232; 1236-1238; 1239-1240.

Grooving in the darkness, on April 27, Erkin this time pointing to the possibility of the Soviet Union to create a crisis in order to alter the Montreux Convention in 1951, suggested that the establishment of Mediterranean pact would increase the confidence of Turkey as well as serve as a warning to the Kremlin. He requested his suggestions to be discussed in the London meetings. To his disappointment however, in London, NATO's enlargement was not on the agenda.³⁰⁴

On May 11, 1950, while İnönü was still President, Turkey applied for admission to NATO. However, at that time the Atlantic Pact members declined Turkey's application. Admittedly, there were various reasons behind the Council's denial of Turkey's request. Firstly, the European members of NATO regarded that the membership of Turkey and Greece would be disadvantageous for their short and long term interests since it would represent an extension of their own financial commitments, and increase their risk of involvement in a possible conflict. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, London was supporting the idea of establishment of a Middle East Command under MEDO, consisting of Britain, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Greece and the Arab League countries.³⁰⁵

At this juncture, the Democrat Party's success in May 14, 1950 elections in Turkey marked a turning point in Turkish politics. Out of 8.905.576 eligible voters, 7.953.055, or

³⁰⁴ In fact, Ankara's efforts in the same direction produced a favourable outcome in Turco-Italian relations and a month later, on March 24, 1950, the Turco-Italian treaty of friendship was signed. Despite Ankara's optimism that this timely step would support the establishment of a Mediterranean pact, it was soon understood that Washington was not willing to re-evaluate its position on the subject. For a summary of considerations on this issue, see, Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan...*, p. 70.

In bilateral terms, in order to compensate Turkey's disappointment, jet aircraft and rehabilitation of air strips at Diyarbakır, Kayseri and Eskişehir were added to the US aid program in the same days. . *Ibid.*, pp. 1252-1253; 1264-1265.

³⁰⁵ Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1991*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 583.

%89.3 of registered voters joined elections. The candidates of the DP received 4.242.831 votes and the Republican candidates 3.165.096 votes. Since the majority system was accepted in Turkey, out of the total of 487 seats in the Assembly, 396 went to the DP and 68 to the Republicans. Since the foundation of the Republic, the RPP rule had dominated in Turkish politics, and as far as official efforts for modernizing the Turkish nation are concerned, in all aspects of social life. It had undoubtedly controlled the destiny of the country, always maintaining its Kemalist revolutionary character. With a view to this past, the result was more than surprising for President İnönü, who had assumed the title of “the National Chief”, and controlled the regime’s destiny after Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the sole political party organization until then, namely the RPP.

The DP’s election victory can be explained in various ways. Among these, the RPP’s overconfidence of its power and its control over the establishment, and the basic structure of the country should be stated first. As expected by the RPP officials, even under a pressing international political atmosphere for the democratization of the regime in Turkey, the opposition could only flourish within the RPP. Subsequently, the short process of searching for a new leader paved the way to a race between several aspirants and their groupings. According to Ergun Özbudun, it was some of these factions within the RPP “*which eventually provided the cadres who led the movement to establish opposition parties or to join the opposition movement after its successful commencement in 1945*”.³⁰⁶

Another factor which served the DP’s coming to power was a genuine wish of the voters to enjoy the liberalism of another political party. “*The average citizen thought that a real*

political liberalization could not be achieved except by sending the Republican Party into opposition.”³⁰⁷ Besides, the DP propaganda successfully exploited the similarities of single party rule in the country with those of totalitarian regimes. Meanwhile, there were almost no attempts on the side of RPP to introduce at least some kind of transparency to its monopoly on the rule of the country, nor any sign of will to improve democratic skills in Turkish political life. Having rather been discomfited since the notorious election results of 1946, when RPP rule experienced the very first challenge against its power, but managed to keep it in its hands in one way or another, the numbers suspicious of the honesty of the foundations of RPP rule were constantly rising. Again, the 1946 elections where open voting and closed counting of votes system applied raised considerable criticism. It was claimed that counting of votes and announced results were untrustworthy. Under these circumstances, a general discomfort in the country strengthened the feeling of revanchism and ultimately paved the way to the election victory of DP.

On May 22, Celal Bayar was elected as the 3rd President of the Republic of Turkey. İnönü issued a declaration a day later, and announced that following the end of his term of office he would actively undertake the Chairmanship of the RPP.³⁰⁸ The Günaltay government, the fourth since the 1946 elections, was replaced by the government of Adnan Menderes. Fuat Köprülü was designated as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.³⁰⁹ As will be

³⁰⁶ Ergun Özbudun, (ed.), *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, p. 69.

³⁰⁷ Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 243; *Vatan* (editorial), 7 June, 1949.

³⁰⁸ Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin...*, Vol. II, 1950-1954, pp. 30-32.

³⁰⁹ Fuat Köprülü served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ist (May 22, 1950-March 9, 1951) and IInd (March 9, 1951-May 17, 1954) Menderes governments. Türker Sanal, *Türkiye'nin Hükümetleri*, pp. 130-131.

discussed below, the change in the Turkish leadership introduced an imminent deviation from the cautious policy of İnönü administration.

Turning back to the situation in Korea, on June 25, 1950, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Tyrgve Lie, was informed by the United States and the United Nations Commission on Korea that North Korean forces had invaded Korea that morning. On the same day the Security Council determined by 9 votes to non, with 1 abstention of Yugoslavia and 1 member absent (the SU), that the armed attack was a breach of peace, called for immediate cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of North Korean forces to the thirtieth parallel, and the assistance of members in carrying out the resolution. The SU had not participated in the Council's work since January 13, 1950, explaining that it would not recognize as legal any decision of the Council until the representative of the Kuomintang Group had been removed. It resumed, however, attendance at the meetings on August 1, 1950, when the Presidency of the Council again devolved upon it under the system of monthly rotation.

On June 27, the Security Council adopted a United States draft resolution, noting that the authorities in North Korea had neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces, and recommending that members furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area. The vote was 7 to 1 (Yugoslavia), with the SU absent and with Egypt and India not voting, but later indicating their positions as abstention from and acceptance of the resolution, respectively.

Also on June 27, the United States announced that it had ordered its air and sea forces to give cover and support to the troops of the Korean Government. On June 30, it informed the Council that it had ordered a naval blockade of the Korean coast and authorized the use of ground forces as a further response to the June 27 resolution. Fifty one member states expressed support for the stand taken by the Security Council, while five, including the SU, together with the PRC and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, shared the view that the June 27 resolution was illegal, because it had been adopted in the absence of two permanent members of the Security Council, the PRC and the SU. The SU also declared that the events in Korea were the result of an unprovoked attack by South Korean troops and demanded the cessation of the United States intervention.

Turkey was a member of the UNCOK which made the recommendation that the Security Council take military action against North Korea. From the beginning, the Menderes government supported the Security Council decision. Thus, the leaders of the DP believed that Turkey's participation in the UN effort in Korea would enhance its international standing.

Turkey's position concerning the Security Council resolution of 27 June was stated in a cable dated June 29, 1950, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü, addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations as follows:

With reference to your telegram number 8755 of 28 June, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Turkish Republic regards the steps taken by the United Nations Council with a view to putting an end to the tragic situation existing in Korea as the proper expression of a salutary decision to restore peace and to safeguard the sovereign rights of a State which has just been the object of an unprovoked attack. Such a decision, constituting the most certain guarantee of independence the peaceful nations will

certainly have the effect of strengthening the confidence of anxious people in world security. It is with conviction that, in reply to the recommendation you communicated to it on behalf of the Council, my Government declares that it is ready to execute loyally and in complete conformity with the provisions of the Charter the undertakings which Turkey assumed as a member of the United Nations.³¹⁰

Two days later, on July 1, the UN Secretary General Lie communicated the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 474th meeting on June 27, which recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. The telegram of Lie also included that in the event that the Turkish Government was in a position to provide assistance, it would facilitate the implementation of the resolution.³¹¹

On the same day, Köprülü cabled Lie expressing that:

Reply to your telegram dated 1 July, as I had the honour to inform your excellency on 29 June last, the Government of the Republic of Turkey is faithful to its undertakings arising out of the Charter of the United Nations. It is consequently ready to comply with any decision taken by the Security Council on this subject and to enter into contact with the Council.³¹²

On July 7, the Security Council, by 7 votes to none, with abstentions (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia), and 1 member absent (SU), requested all member states providing military forces in pursuance of the Council's resolutions to make them available to a unified

³¹⁰ From, *Telegram of Fuat Köprülü to the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, June 29, 1950* (extract). The MFA Archives.

³¹¹ Lie said, the UN expected to receive an early reply which he would transmit to the Security Council and to the Government of Korea. From, *Telegram of the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Köprülü, July 1, 1950* (extract). Ibid.

³¹² From, *Telegram of Fuat Köprülü to the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, July 1, 1950* (extract). Ibid.

command under the United States. Subsequently, combatant units were provided by the following sixteen member states: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the UK and the USA. In addition, five nations - Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden - supplied medical units. The Republic of Korea also placed all its military forces under the Unified Command.

Following the Resolution of July 7, recommending that all assistance should be made to the Unified Command under the United States, and authorizing the Unified Command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating, responsibility for deciding what specific measures would be taken to assist the Republic of Korea rested upon members of the United Nations.

On July, 18, a meeting of Council of Ministers convened far from Ankara at Yalova. In fact, endorsed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Köprülü, Prime Minister Menderes had made up his mind much before this meeting. Under these circumstances, discussions could hardly produce a different outcome other than condoning Prime Minister Menderes. Following a hasty discussion, the Council of Ministers decided to send a 4.500-man unit to join the US troops in Korea.

Not surprisingly, in the same days, the Menderes Government was paying special attention to the frequently discussed issue of Turkish participation in the Korean War with the US Government. On July 20, at a private talk with Ambassador Wadsworth, Köprülü said he wished particularly to brief the US Ambassador in relation to major matters discussed at the

Yalova conference. Köprülü then informed Wadsworth that the conference discussed and decided that there was pressing need to strengthen existing Turkish Armed Forces; immediate action would be taken in cooperation with aid mission to implement the recommendations, which were explained by the Head of US Military Aid Mission, General McBride, to Turkish Chief of General Staff, Nuri Yamut, in the letter of the former dated, June 30; and finally Menderes should invite Köprülü and Wadsworth to confer “*to review entire field US-Turkish cooperation from economic as well as military aspects.*” Besides, Köprülü explained that the conference “*took position that in event third world war, defense through neutrality would be illusory for any nation and for Turkey.*”³¹³

On July 22, this time, Köprülü told Wadsworth that he would discuss with him the Turkish reply to the UN Secretary General Lie’s circular to 50 UN member nations, urging that they consider offering effective assistance - including ground forces - to resist North Korean aggression. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs went on to explain that the Turkish Government wished its reply “*bear witness to its sincere desire manifest by practical action its loyalty to UN and Turk-US collaboration*” and added that “*we wish particularly that our reply conform with US policy and public opinion.*”³¹⁴ In his turn, Wadsworth noted that his immediate reaction was that he should urge prompt dispatch of ground forces. Bu he said, “*I refrained from so replying except in general appreciative terms pending consultation with General McBride.*”³¹⁵

³¹³ “Wadsworth to the Secretary of State”, in *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. V., 1950, p. 1280.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1281.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

A day later, on July 23, after consultation with General McBride and Senator Harry P. Cain - who arrived from Athens - Wadsworth decided to reply that in his personal view, the Turkish Government could best manifest its support of UN policies by prompt dispatch of fully equipped regimental combat team. Wadsworth noted that McBride described this force as consisting of infantry regiment, artillery battalion and appropriate headquarters, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, engineer, motor transport, signal, ordnance and medical units and normal loads of ammunition, spare parts, mines, wire, etc; a fully self-contained combat unit of between 4.000 and 4.500 officers and men, approximately 10 percent above war strength. Wadsworth said, McBride gave further details as to such a unit could be assembled for embarkation at a Turkish port within one month. If sent, it would after arrival have to be maintained by UN Commander. Its artillery, trucks and general services equipment would conform to US Standards.

Wadsworth stated that on July 24, he had presented this strictly personal suggestion of McBride to the Secretary General of the MFA, Faik Zihni Akdur. The US Ambassador said, Akdur told him that he *“trusts this decision will be taken promptly by Cabinet and will render even more effective our collaboration in political as well as military fields.”*³¹⁶

In the same cable to Washington, Wadsworth explained more than that. He stated that on the same afternoon, Senator Cain, General MacBride and himself had prearranged conference with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense, Chief of TGS and Commanding General of Turkish Ground Forces. According to Wadsworth, here, Köprülü said, *“personally I am wholeheartedly in favor of sending ground forces promptly and will*

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 1282.

present your suggestion to Cabinet at earliest opportunity, if possible tomorrow.” In his turn, Minister of National Defense said *“I share my colleague’s view.”* Wadsworth noted that the TGS was also wholly favourably disposed. He knew that the G-3 of General Staff, Maj. Gen. Yusuf A. Egeli wrote a memorandum to the Chief of TGS, Yamut, expressing that *“it will be the greatest crime in Turkish history if we fail to take advantage of this opportunity.”*³¹⁷

On the same day at dinner, Köprülü informed Wadsworth that he had telephoned President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes and three other Ministers due to return to Ankara the next day from a Bairam holiday to arrange Cabinet meeting that afternoon. Wadsworth said, Köprülü expressed that *“he hoped sincerely and believed favorable decision could then be taken. If so, he would at once telegraph Secretary General Lie and instruct Turkish Embassy at Washington to inform the Department.”*³¹⁸

A day later, on July 25, the Council of Ministers met in Ankara under the Chairmanship of President Bayar to determine the details of the decision at hand and the wording of the press statement. After the meeting in Yalova, the President of the TGNA, Refik Koraltan, the Minister of National Defence, R. Şevket İnce, and the Chief of General Staff, General Nuri Yamut were again present in the meeting. Shortly afterwards a text was finalized which included that the Council of Ministers had realized exchange of views on the text prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Köprülü and considered the subject in full details. On the same day, in accordance with the decisions taken in the Council, a telegram signed by Köprülü was sent to Secreatry General Lie expressing that:

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

In reply to your cable of 15 July; the Government of the Republic of Turkey, believing it to be its duty to comply with the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations as well as with the decisions of the Security Council, has examined carefully and in this spirit your aforementioned cable. As a result of this consideration, and realizing, in the present world conditions and in the interest of general peace, the necessity and the importance of the effective implementation of the aforementioned decisions, the Government of the Republic of Turkey had decided to place at the disposal of the United Nations a Turkish combat force of 4500 men to serve in Korea.³¹⁹

Menderes Government's announcement of the decision to send troops to Korea remains a controversial issue to this date. The RPP and the whole opposition put forward that the capacity to send armed forces abroad was strictly in the power of the Assembly, and no decision was obtained from the TGNA to this end. Their point of departure was from the Constitution which stipulated that the making of agreements and peace with other countries or to declare on any state war was in the jurisdiction of the Assembly. In his turn, Menderes argued that the sending of the troops to Korea did not mean to declare war on this country and the decision of the government was entirely in conformity with the Charter of the UN; a document which was previously approved by the TGNA and acquired the force of a law for the Republic of Turkey.³²⁰

George Harris maintained that the decision of the Turkish Government had emerged from the approach of Menderes and Bayar. He stated that the decision of the DP was well calculated in the sense that it had not taken too long for the DP administration to see the importance and the opportunity it provided. According to Harris, the reason that they could

³¹⁹ From, *Telegram of Fuat Köprülü to the UN Secretary-General Tyrgve Lie, July 25, 1950* (extract). For the Turkish text of the telegram, see, Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin...*, p. 80.

take such a quick decision was that Bayar and Menderes were also very strongly in control of their party. He pointed out that at a time of uncertainty when the orientation of the new deputies was not certain, both Menderes and Bayar had managed to overcome the difficulties in this regard. Harris also asserted that the control they could exercise over the DP was quite unusual since they did even not know all the deputies. In contrast to the DP's case, in previous years, İnönü had known all the deputies and he had put them on the list himself because he knew them.

However, Harris explained that the problems of the speed with which the DP regime had taken the decision to send troops to Korea could not be confined to the reactions of the opposition. He said, when Bayar and Menderes had made this decision, they had realized that they had to leave out the Minister of National Defense, İnce, and one other Minister (of Health and Social Assistance) Nihat Reşer Belger, whom they thought would vote against them on sending troops to Korea. Thus they had not created a unified cabinet on this one question either.³²¹

Around the same issue, R. Salim Burçak, a member of the TGNA from the DP pointed out that in certain respects, it was indeed hard to explain the decision of the Menderes government that it took after one and a half months of its coming to power on Turkey's "entry into the war" and sending a force of 4.500 to a country which the Turkish people had not even heard of its name. He said, while the RPP had based its domestic propaganda on its success of Turkey's remaining outside of WW II, the DP was following an

³²⁰ Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin...*, Vol. II, pp. 82-83.

³²¹ As told by George Harris in a personal interview.

entirely different policy and involving Turkey in a war. This situation however, constituted a negative propaganda subject which could be used against the DP. ³²²

Kasım Gülek, then the Secretary General of the RPP, stated that upon the news on the Menderes government's consideration of a decision to enter into the Korean conflict, he had visited İnönü to express his view that such a decision should be the outcome of a united national will, and it ought to be unanimously made by both the government and the opposition. However, Gülek said, İnönü replied to him as "*You can not explain this.*" Gülek stated that, consecutively he had visited Menderes as well who was a very close friend of him since the years of the single party rule in Turkey. Gülek said, he had told Menderes that "*you won a great victory. A Historical one. There is now again a historical matter. Turkey will enter into war. Make it with the opposition as a joint national decision.*" Then, Gülek explained that Menderes replied to him "*It is difficult to decide on these matters. If I go and propose this to İsmet Pasha, people will hear about this. And then, people will say, 'they are inexperienced, they felt obliged to go and consult the old experienced ones', this will not be good for us.*" Gülek commented that perhaps Menderes was right in his suspicions. But, in one way another, this opportunity was lost. ³²³

Not surprisingly, there were different reactions in the Turkish press and civilian organizations on the government's decision. On August 28, Abidin Daver of *Cumhuriyet* wrote that if Soviets had an intention to attack Turkey, they would not have difficulty to find

³²² From the interview with former Member of Parliament, Rıfki Salim Burçak, cited in M. Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkırat*. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık A.Ş., 1999), pp. 78-79.

³²³ From the interview with the former Secretary General of the RPP, Kasım Gülek, cited in, *ibid.*, p. 79.

a reason other than Turkey's sending troops to the Korean War. Meanwhile, the Friends of Peace association protested Turkey's participation in the Korean War, and some of its members were arrested and sentenced to various prison terms.

Turning back to the discussions in UN, the June Resolutions of the Security Council were the first occasions in history when an international organization as such used force to stop aggression. The prompt action of the Council and of certain members of the United Nations, which included Turkey, acting in accordance with the Security Council's recommendations not only served to throw back the armed attack but, in addition, greatly enhanced the security of all people living under the fear of aggression that the assistance would be forthcoming when needed. In particular it increased the feeling of security of those people, like the people of Turkey, who at the time enjoyed no other protection than that provided by the guarantees of the United Nations and their own ability to resist. Despite these developments in the General Assembly, the progress on the ground was not favourable for the UN forces. Korea's capital, Seoul, fell on June 28, 1950, and in August the United Nations forces were confined within a small area in southeast Korea.

Meanwhile, the situation in Korea had been brought to the agenda of the TGNA. On July 30, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü, following his announcement of UN Secretary General's telegram on the aggression in Korea before the members of the TGNA, stated that:

Esteemed friends,

It is of your knowledge that in our foreign policy, to participate in the Charter of the UN with full strength and sincerity constitutes an unwavering principle for us. In actual and spiritual capacity of this charter, to protect peace and security on earth, to resist aggression, and respect the territorial integrity and independence of all nations, to ensure the welfare and well-being of humanity is the basis of our foreign policy...Along the line of these tenets, our close and sincere

cooperation with US, our present alliance with England and France are the requirements of our open, explicit and correct policy. Facing this last situation, had the UN not taken action immediately and accept this fait accomplis, this would be a source of insecurity for all the regions of the world and global peace would suffer. Therefore, it is the duty of all peace-loving and democratic nations who believe that aggression is completely illegal, to welcome the US who took prompt action and mobilized its forces to implement the UN decision to protect the world peace.³²⁴

Köprülü also stated that he had informed the UN Secretary General Lie that he was prepared to carry out his undertakings in the capacity of a member of the TGNA. Following Köprülü's words, the statement of Dr. Hayri Üstündağ and his five colleagues, expressing their praise for the government's peace understanding under the principles of UN was endorsed by the TGNA.

From then on, as the TGNA did not function between the 7th and 10th months of each year, and no special session or gathering was asked of the TGNA, the criticisms of opposition could be voiced - of course in limited ways under the threat of censorship - in other fora, which were mainly the press statements of the MPs from the opposition.

Meanwhile, the second application of the Turkish Government to NAT was made on August 1, 1950. With a view to its recent decision of contributing troops to the UN Command in Korea, the Menderes Government considered that this timely action of Ankara could provide it with a favourable response. However, evidence suggests that the matter was not cleared in Washington, and within the Alliance, and following a short period of delay,

³²⁴ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. IX, (Ankara: 1950, Devlet Matbaası), p. 313.

the NAT Council declined this application, merely inviting Greece and Turkey to the planning efforts for the defense of the Mediterranean.³²⁵

Turning back to the international repercussions of Ankara's decision, the picture so far presented of Turkey's willingness to cooperate with the democratic countries of the West in general, and the US in particular, reached a post-war peak in the Korean War. Turkey, although thousands of miles away from Korea, and although it strived for years under considerable economic strain, demonstrated an impressive example of the sense of responsibility to the Charter provisions for enforcement measures against an aggressor when it contributed forces for Korean action. During the general debate in the Fifth Assembly in September, Turkish Permanent Representative, Sarper, stated in connection with the Korean action that:

Aggressive elements in Korea have, by an actual breach of the peace, threatened the peace and security of the world, and challenged not only the decisions and actions of this august Assembly, but also the very principles of our Charter. In the face of this challenge, the high sense of responsibility and solidarity demonstrated to the world by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations was an expression of the high responsibility of the United Nations, and a living proof of the reality of a fundamental principle of this Organization, that is, that the peace and security of the world is one and indivisible and that all should join hands in co-operation and devotion in order to safeguard this sacred treasure. The action taken in Korea clearly showed that

³²⁵ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan...*, p. 76. In fact, the Pentagon officials were still maintaining their belief that the admission of Turkey and Greece to NATO could adversely affect the progress which was achieved since they had to give substance to existing military undertakings in Western Europe before making new commitments. Shortly afterwards, the US JCS Omar Bradley's article in *Combat Forces Journal and Readers Digest* expressed his views that Turkey was located outside of the region the US should extend its commitments for its defense. For a discussion of Bradley's article, see, Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990), pp. 30-33.

this principle was not only a theory destined to remain in the pages of the Charter, but the expression of a living spirit.³²⁶

Undoubtedly, Ankara tied its commitment to the UN effort in Korea to entry into NATO. Previously, Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Erkin told Acheson on August 25 that the commitment to send troops to Korea intensified among the Turkish leaders and the people that Turkey should be included in the European collective security arrangement. Erkin said “*today there are three important organizations: the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey is included in the first two, and her exclusion from the latter on a geographical basis would, in my opinion, be inconsistent.*”³²⁷

Similarly, on September 12, President Bayar told Wadsworth of his concerns about Washington’s reluctance to extend formal support for Turkey’s entry into NATO. Here, Bayar straightforwardly asked Wadsworth if the Government of the USA did not realize that Ankara would consider further deferment of favorable action on its request by the Atlantic Pact powers as a refusal and as unwillingness to accept Turkey as an equal partner in meeting jointly any threat of aggression. Bayar said, “*we have shown our good faith by forthright action towards meeting the Korean crisis. I fear frankly that, if Atlantic Pact Council of Foreign Ministers turns down our request, our morale will be seriously affected.*”³²⁸

In the meantime, on October 7, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which recommended that all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea; established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of

³²⁶ From, *The Text of the Speech by Ambassador Selim Sarper Delivered in the UN, September 1950*, The MFA Archives.

³²⁷ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. V., p. 1301.

Korea (UNCURK) of seven member states to represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of all Korea; and recommended that the United Nations forces should not remain in Korea otherwise than for the objectives stated, and that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea. Meanwhile, in mid-October, following an amphibious landing at Inchon, the UN forces regained almost all the territory of the Republic of Korea and were advancing far into North Korea.

Amidst these developments, the first Turkish Brigade, led by Brigadier General Tahsin Yazıcı arrived at Pusan in October 1950. The Brigade did not arrive with its own weapons, and had to be trained to use new American weaponry which was in fact, an effort begun during its long sea journey.³²⁹ An intensive training period then immediately started for the Brigade.

On November 6, 1950, a special report of the United Nations Command informed the Security Council that United Nations forces were in contact in North Korea with military units of the PRC. A representative of the PRC participated in the Security Council's subsequent combined discussion of complaints of aggression upon the Republic of Korea and of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa). On November 30, because of the negative vote of the SU, the Council did not adopt a resolution calling, among other things, on all states and

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 1312.

³²⁹ Colonel Celal Dora stated that as a result of the hasty composition of the brigade, most of the soldiers had not completed their training and had not even seen the new American war equipment, including infantry rifles and other small arms. Referring to the Chief of TGS Yamut's absence during the farewell ceremonies held in İskenderun port on September 25, Dora said, unable to hide his anxieties on the dispatch of the half-trained Turkish Brigade to Korea, Yamut had chosen to watch the departure of the Brigade's ship from his hotel room. See, Celal Dora, *Kore Savaşında Türkler* (Turks in the Korean War), (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1963), pp, 27; 32, respectively.

authorities to refrain from assisting the North Korean authorities, and affirming that it was United Nations policy to hold inviolate the Chinese frontier with Korea. The Council rejected by a vote of 1 (the SU) to 9, with India not participating, a draft resolution condemning the United States for armed aggression against Chinese territory and armed intervention in Korea, and demanding withdrawal of United States forces.

Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Yazıcı informed his American counterparts that it was for almost two months that his brigade was not given a duty. Yazıcı said, the Brigade had completed its training and was in Korea to fight, not to parade. Subsequently, towards the end of November the Turkish Brigade was moved to the northern front just as the Chinese launched a massive counterattack that drove the UN forces out of north Korea. Following its battles in Wawon (November, 28) and Sinnim-ni (November 28-29), the Brigade saw its first great action in the battle of Kunu Ri and in the Sunchon Passage (November 29-December 1).

The mission of the Brigade required it to support the regular retreat of the 8th Army, a duty which was left to it when the 9th Corps, concerned with the ROK collapse, sent the Brigade up the Kunu Ri road to Tokch-on to guard 2nd Division's flank. Shortly afterwards, however, the Turks understood that the main strength of the Chinese burst over them. At a point when completely surrounded by the Chinese forces, the Brigade stormed the Chinese position with hand-to-hand combat. The Brigade engaged in an uninterrupted fighting for two days in minus 15 C, low in ammunition and supplies and finally arrived in P'yongyang on December 1. Evidently, the repercussions of this success immensely contributed to Turkey's image throughout the Western world. A few days later, the General Assembly on December 12, 1950, requested the Secretary General to arrange with the Unified Command for the

design and award of a distinguishing ribbon or other insignia for personnel who had participated in Korea in the defense of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.³³⁰

On December 6, 1950, the General Assembly included the item “Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea” on its agenda. On December 14, it established a three-man Cease Fire Group-the President of the Assembly, Canada, and India- to recommend satisfactory cease-fire arrangements in Korea. The Group’s program, aimed at achieving a cease-fire by successive stages, was transmitted to the PRC on January 13, 1951.

After discussing the Chinese reply to the Cease-Fire Group’s program, the Assembly adopted a resolution in February which noted that the People's Republic of China had not accepted the United Nations proposals to end hostilities, and found that it had engaged in aggression in Korea. The Assembly called on it to withdraw its forces and nationals from Korea, requested a committee - the Additional Measures Committee - to consider measures for meeting the aggression, reaffirmed the policy of achieving United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and created a Good Offices Committee (the President of the Assembly, Sweden, and Mexico) to further those ends.

³³⁰ In my interview with him, H. Basri Danişman explained that when the Chinese onslaught came, the UN forces were thrown off balance and the situation at the front had become alarmingly critical. Danişman said, then the Turkish Brigade - which was the only reserve at the disposal of the Allied Command - was ordered to advance, engage the enemy and hold on. It was hoped this would allow Allied units to pull back. He stated that the Brigade carried this order out to the letter and after hard fighting it slashed its way out with their bayonets. Danişman said, under the conditions of intense fighting, Col. Dora saved the flag of the 241th Infantry Regiment - that was carried traditionally with the Brigade - by wrapping it to his body. For a detailed discussion of the battles of the Turkish Brigade in Korea see, Celal Dora, *Kore’de...*; Ali Denizli, *Kore Harbi’nde Türk Tugayları* (Turkish Brigades in the Korean War), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1994).

Meanwhile, the Turkish Brigade was adding to its reputation in Korea. Between January 25-27, 1951, the Brigade won another astonishing offensive battle in Kumiangjang-ni against the Chinese forces. The reports soon arrived that the American troops had counted 1734 bayoneted Chinese around the trenches in Kumiangjang-ni. Upon the news on this fascinating fighting power, the Turkish Brigade was awarded the American Distinguished Unit Citation; the South Korean Presidential Unit Citation; and the South Korean Order of Military Merit Taeguk with Gold Star.³³¹

IV . 3 The Final Steps Towards NATO

On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly, in the absence of a satisfactory progress report from the Good Offices Committee, recommended that every state apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Chinese Central People's Government and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, items useful in their production, petroleum, and transportation materials. The SU and four other members

³³¹ It was explained that particularly the psychological effects of the Turkish Brigade's legendary fighting will was used against the Chinese forces by the Americans. From then on, illustrations of a Turkish soldier bayoneting a Chinese and other Chinese shot between their eyebrows were dropped on the Chinese positions. See, Ali Denizli, *Kore Harbi'nde...*, pp. 131; 136; 207; 209. Danişman also recalled this action of the Brigade. He stated that when the Allies resumed their offensive, after crossing the Han River, the Brigade ran up against a hill which was strongly defended by the enemy and "*using a process seldom encountered in modern warfare, the Turks fixed bayonets and charged. The enemy resisted fiercely, but to no avail. The hill was captured.*" H. Basri Danişman, *Situation Negative!*, (Thailand: SEATO, 1969), p. v.

As for the planning activities in regard to the expenditures of US and allied troops in Korea which underscored differences of wealth between Americans and others, Cemal Madanoğlu explained that Turkish privates were paid 10 dollars per month, while officers up to the rank of Lt. Col. received 25, and 40 dollars were paid to Lt. Col. and above. Madanoğlu stated that in their turn American

did not participate in the voting on the ground that the matter was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

Meanwhile, Turkey's significance as an ally was explained by Truman in his message to Congress, dated May 24. He said, he had transmitted in the first week of May a request for 60 billion dollars for the US defense establishment during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, and this time he was recommending for the same year a Mutual Security Program.³³² As explained by Truman, the bulk of the assistance was allocated to the members of the NAT, but, in addition, substantial quantities would be supplied to nations in the Middle East and Asia.

As for the US aid to the Middle East, Truman pointed out that no part of the world was more directly exposed to Soviet pressure. Truman stated that until then the Kremlin had lost no opportunity to stir these troubled waters, as the post-war record amply demonstrated. He said, "*civil war in Greece; pressure for Turkish concessions on the Dardanelles; sponsorship of the rebellious Tudeh party in Iran; furthering a fractional strife in the Arab states and Israel - all reflect a concerted design for the extension of Soviet domination to this vital area.*"³³³ The US President put forward that the pressure on the nations of the Middle East could only be overcome by a continued build-up of armed defenses and the fostering of

privates were paid 120 dollars, while officers received between 1200-1500. Cemal Madanoğlu, *Anılar 1911-1953*, (İstanbul: Evrim Yayinevi, undated), p. 355.

³³² See, "Extracts From President Truman's Message to Congress Containing His Recommendation For A Mutual Security Programme, 24 May 1951", in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1951, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 32-33.

The Mutual Security Program envisaged: (i) military assistance to other free nations in the amount of 6.25 billion dollars; (ii) economic assistance to other free nations in the amount of 2.25 billion dollars, primarily to support expanded defense abroad. These amounts compared with 5.3 billion dollars appropriated for military assistance, and 3 billion dollars for economic assistance, in 1951.

economic development. Thus, to this end, he said he was recommending 415 million dollars in military aid, for Greece, Turkey and Iran. He underscored that continuing military aid for Greece and Turkey would make possible the further strengthening of these countries' large and well-trained armed forces, "*which have already displayed their valiant resolution in the fight for freedom in Korea.*"³³⁴

In the meantime, armistice negotiations between the military commanders of the opposing sides began in Korea on July 10, 1951. On October 8, 1952, the negotiations were recessed indefinitely because of differences over whether all prisoners of war should be returned, by force if necessary. The United Nations Command was willing to return all except those who would resist repatriation. The other side, however, insisted on the return of all prisoners.

At this stage, on June 8, 1951, the British Chief of Staff, William Slim, and the Chairman of the US JCS, Omar Bradley met in London to discuss the British proposal that Turkey should be a part of a Middle Eastern Command, which would be linked to NATO. In this context, the British Government accepted Turkey's entrance to NATO if it would be part of the Middle Eastern theatre of operations under an integrated command, "*and provided that theatre, which would include Egypt and certain members of the Commonwealth in addition to Turkey and the three great Western Powers, be placed under a special military organism that*

³³³ Ibid., p. 38.

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

assures its high level strategic direction.” Interestingly for Greece, it was considered that this country should be attached to theatre operations of SACEUR.³³⁵

On 18 July, the new British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, publicly announced UK’s support for the admittance of Greece and Turkey to NATO.³³⁶ It was concurrently believed in the Foreign Office that Turkey’s presence in the envisaged Middle Eastern Defense Organization (MEDO) would be of considerable value. In this context, at the State Department, the idea of creating a common Middle Eastern Defense Board including the US, UK, France and Turkey was welcomed. Shortly afterwards, the Ambassadors of the US, Britain, France and Turkey drafted the Four-Power proposals for a MEC to Egypt. With these proposals it was aimed to stress that *“Egypt belonged to the free world and in consequence, her defense and that of the Middle East in General is equally vital to other democratic nations.”*³³⁷ However, the dominant opinion in the Foreign Office was that the Egyptian Government would not show any marked friendliness towards these suggestions.

³³⁵ *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 530-531; 556.

³³⁶ George McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World*, p. 273.

³³⁷ See, “Proposals on Defence Presented to the Egyptian Government by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA, France and Turkey, 13 October 1951”, in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1951, p. 425. This was the second major document since the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950 by the US Britain and France which recognized the existing Middle Eastern frontiers.

Undoubtedly, Britain’s defense scheme in the Middle East was centered around Cairo and the Suez. To the disappointment of the Foreign Office however, before the Four-Power Treaty was concluded, due to the increasing anti-British sentiment in Egypt, a British effort in April 1951, to realize joint defense arrangements and British retention of the military base at Suez had failed. Subsequently, the policy planning staff developed another plan. This was based on a Supreme Allied Commandment with its headquarters in Cairo. The base at Suez would be turned over to Egypt, and all British forces not allocated to the Supreme Commandment would be withdrawn. By such clauses, it was hoped to transform the character of remaining British forces from ‘occupiers’ to ‘defenders’.

Against this background, the text of the “Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey” was finally completed in London, on October 22, 1951. As the Article III of the protocol stipulated that “*the present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof*”, it was opened to the approval of the member countries.

Concurrently, Ankara was taking its part in the negotiations concerning the security of the Middle East. On November 10, 1951, the USA, Britain, France, and Turkey issued a declaration expressing their intention to establish the MEC. Here, among other things, it was decided that the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East would command forces placed at his disposal and would develop plans for the operations of all within the area or to be introduced into the area in time of war or international emergency. Leaving the door open to other states in the region (and perhaps the US, which insistently stayed out of defense groupings in the region), it was stated that the sponsoring states of the MEC did not regard the initial form in which the MEC would be organized as unchangeable.³³⁸ In this framework, combined with its support for Ankara’s entry into NAT, it can also be evaluated that, through these steps, Britain was considering to place Turkey “*into the Middle Eastern picture as a firm ally*”³³⁹ despite the fact that its proposal of MEC would come to nothing.

³³⁸ See, “Declaration by the Governments of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, France and Turkey on Their Intention to Establish A Middle East Command, November 10, 1951”, in *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, p. 427.

³³⁹ Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden Full Circle*, (London: Cassell&Co.,1960), p. 244.

In December 1951, Assistant Secretary of State, McGhee replaced Ambassador Wadsworth when the latter announced his retirement. McGhee also succeeded Wadsworth as Chief of US Aid Mission to Turkey. He stated that soon after his arrival, he was present in the visitors' balcony of the old TGNA when the "*Majlis voted unanimously, with one abstention, to accept the invitation to join NATO.*" Subsequently, McGhee made his first official meeting with Köprülü on January 8, 1952 by expressing his hope that Ankara and Washington could develop close and early consultation, and coordinate their actions regarding major world events. In this context, he particularly mentioned the usefulness of the consultations the two governments held on Iran, the Middle East Command and Korea, telling Köprülü that he hoped this type of consultation could take place on a regular basis. When the discussion turned to a review of events surrounding the recent NATO decision to extend an invitation to Turkey, McGhee explained that the delay in the completion of this procedure merely reflected the length of time required to clear important matters at all levels of the US Government and with NATO allies. He also assured Köprülü that the upcoming ratification vote in the US Senate on the "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey" would be favourable.³⁴⁰

Shortly afterwards, on January 15, 1952, in a statement to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate when it considered the "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey", the Chief of US JCS General Omar Bradley remarked that from the military view point, it was impossible to overstate the importance of Greece and Turkey. Bradley said, "*located as they are - and allied with the free nations - they serve as*

³⁴⁰ See, George McGhee, *The US-Turkish...*, pp. 92; 94-95, respectively.

powerful deterrents to any aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa...Turkey, astride the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south." ³⁴¹

On January 18, 1952, the Council of the NATO invited the Governments of Turkey and Greece to consider with appropriate NATO bodies the applicability of the findings and recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee of North Atlantic Council to them, and "*it opened the way for the participation of Greece and Turkey on a full and equal basis in the annual review to be undertaken beginning next summer.*" ³⁴² Finally, the "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey" went into effect following the completion of the NAT members' notification of the Government of the USA of their acceptance on February 15, 1952 .

³⁴¹ Bradley also explained in this context that "*Turkey, too, flanks the land routes from the North to the strategically important oil fields of the Middle East.*" Cited in *ibid*, pp. 88-89. McGhee stated that by a vote of 73 to 2, with 21 members not voting, the Senate approved ratification of the protocol on February 7, 1952.

VII CONCLUSION

International relations of the post WW II environment was dominated by chaotic changes. Admittedly, the Soviet assertiveness in global affairs was the main reason which prompted a rivalry between the Kremlin and Washington. Unlike any other Allied country, the SU had reached the end of the war with its forces deployed in critical parts of Europe. The vigilance of Soviet military machine had also paved the way to assure the Kremlin a seat in the negotiation table of the Big Three. Soviet assertiveness, thus was perceived as a potential threat by many countries, particularly by those bordering the SU.

As for Turkey, the prelude to the post WW II period was marked by its suspicions of the Kremlin's intentions. At this juncture, the Soviet demands on Turkish territories, and over the Turkish Straits in 1945 accelerated Ankara's search for a definitive alliance with the West. Despite the fact that some Turkish statesmen and ex-military officials i.e. the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, and Marshal Çakmak advocated that an understanding between Ankara and the Kremlin could be reached - similar to the first Turco-Soviet

³⁴² See, "Communiqué on the Agreement Reached Between President Truman and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, on the Appointment of A Supreme Commander for the Atlantic,

rapprochement which took place during the Turkish War of Liberation - events proved that the conditions in 1917 and in 1945 were dramatically different, making any agreement hardly possible.

Undoubtedly, Turkey's quest for a Western Alliance in the aftermath of WW II was a natural end-result of the experiences inherited from wartime diplomacy. According to Turkish foreign policy makers, the years of the WW had proved that the aggression could emerge from the side of totalitarian regimes which had combined their forces or by one of them. While Turkey's sensitivity against the bloc strategy of world powers was increasing, the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 demonstrated that the danger could emerge as a collective movement. Subsequently, it was understood that the split in this bloc had not removed the threat. Thus, the threat itself was asserted as being in the very existence of undemocratic and totalitarian powers.

With a comparison to the Atatürk era, İnönü administration was in favour of a maintaining a more flexible foreign policy. Correspondingly, in 1942, when the German armies were concentrating their strongholds throughout Europe and being deployed in key areas, Ankara had shifted to implement the "capital tax" on the revenues of non-Muslims. Consecutively, the Turkish citizens of Christian and Jewish origin who could not meet the enormous amounts of tax arbitrarily assessed and imposed by the Turkish authorities were sentenced to serve years in working camps. With a view to the fact that, however, Ankara's measures against non-Muslims never acquired a wicked nature similar to that of Nazis, there is every reason to assert that in this move, İnönü had planned to divert the attention of the

Washington, January 18, 1952", in *Documents on International Affairs, 1952*, p. 4.

Axis war machine to somewhere else and give the message that Turkey was seriously considering to give credit to the new order envisaged by the revisionists.

Within a year, when he saw that the course of the global conflict was gradually removing Turkey out of the scope of belligerent powers, this time İnönü decided to lift the pressures on non-Muslims in the country to the extent of abolishing the working camps. It was also declared that the taxpayers would pay their debts without leaving their homes.

In 1944, when the Soviet armies were gaining victories Ankara then turned against the Pan-Turanists. This was clearly a message to the Kremlin which underscored that Turkey would not allow the ultra-nationalists to act freely in the country.

Despite the fact that Ankara's balancing attitude was also being shaped by the course of international affairs, in general terms, Turkish foreign policy was oriented towards the Allied side during these years. In a larger framework of analysis, Ankara's responsiveness against the fluctuations in international politics cannot necessarily be evaluated as deviation from Atatürkist foreign policy. While the first years of the Republic were marked by avoidance of alliances except for engaging in regional pacts such as the Balkan Pact of 1934 and the Saadabad Pact of 1936, there were no alliance blocs in between world wars either.

As for the flexibility in İnönü's foreign policy during WW II and after, Atatürkist foreign policy had never ruled out such a policy course. Atatürk's policy was just as flexible in the Mousul issue, because Turkey needed reconciliation with Great Britain in 1926, as it was forward with the French over the contested issue of Hatay (the Sanjak of Alexandretta) between 1936 and 1938. Atatürk considered war as a criminal act unless it was undertaken

for defense of the country. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that Atatürk would have followed a different path from İnönü had he been alive during WW II.

Under these circumstances, the development of Turkish democracy, basically had its roots in Ankara's wish for joining the Western democratic camp. While the difference between the Western democracies and the Eastern bloc was crystallizing, Ankara moved quickly to put its domestic affairs in order. The first elections in 1946 were not a successful attempt in this respect since rumours of Ankara's manipulation of elections were widespread in the country.

Apparently, the postelection government was at odds between pursuing a more liberal attitude towards the opponents of the regime in Turkey and closing of ranks against the external danger. Initially, it was aimed to develop a middle-way approach to conciliate these policies, which soon proved to be in vain. Again, İnönü felt a necessity to bring Ankara's foreign policy in line with the basic trends in the Western grouping of the states and a strong anti-Communist policy adopted by the government became dominant. From then on, this closing of ranks against the SU affected particularly the left wing of the political spectrum.

The Turkish forces were also increasingly deployed against a threat which might possibly be generated from the SU. Even after 1944, when the SU preferred the preservation of Turkey's non-belligerent status and tried to give assurances of its good intentions, alarmed by the vigilance and assertiveness the Soviets demonstrated, military exercises were regularly held in Eastern Anatolia. Here, the troop movements on a large scale were a clear indication of Ankara's threat perception from the Red Army, which the Turkish General Staff

considered that might attempt to exploit the chaotic international situation to grasp the long disputed provinces in this region.³⁴³

In the aftermath of the war, Turkey was indeed at a turning point. It was increasingly felt in the power corridors of Ankara that maintaining an alliance with Britain and the USA was of utmost importance. Meanwhile, in 1945, in line with the opinion of some British statesmen and officials, the British Minister for Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, pointed out in his speech in the House Commons, that the 1939 mutual assistance treaty between Britain, France and Turkey was still in force, and could be utilized as a proper basis to strengthen relations with Ankara. Britain's acknowledgement of the 1939 was an encouragement to the Turks. It was, however, soon understood by İnönü that British efforts were overwhelmingly focused on the Middle East.

In its turn, the USA was not in favor of expanding the scope of the 1939 treaty either. Until the Truman Doctrine Washington had thought that Turkey was in Britain's area of responsibility. It was the Truman Doctrine that marked a complete change in the US perception of Turkey. With a view to the attempts of the Kremlin in the region, in fact, Washington was mainly interested in Greece and Turkey and to some extent in Iran. It was considered that Greece was the country that was under siege while Turkey was relatively quiet.

Thus, in the aftermath of the Marshall Aid, Ankara's efforts to achieve a Mediterranean/Middle Eastern security organization either as proposed by London along the

³⁴³ As told by, Retd. Col. Şükrü Erkal, Research Specialist in TGS, Directorate of Military History and Strategic Research, in a personal interview.

lines of 1939 treaty or in another form, proved to be unfruitful. Because, the US neither dealt with the 1939 treaty nor did it react to suggestions for a Mediterranean pact.

Even after the Turkish participation in the Korean War, Washington had not decided to give its support to Turkey's adherence to NATO. In September 1950, the US JCS was still arguing that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey to NATO could adversely affect the progress which was achieved. The JCS then asserted that the inclusion of these states would cause a problem in concerting military planning and actions in the Middle East and the Mediterranean with those in progress in Western Europe. Therefore, the JCS offered to give these countries associate status by which their representatives would participate in coordinated planning against any Soviet attack.

Undoubtedly, Ankara's exclusion from NATO as a founding member and consecutively, the rejection of its two formal applications caused both anxiety and disturbance in the Turkish Government. The second application of the Turkish Government was made in August 1950, following the Menderes Government's decision of contributing troops to the UN Command in Korea. However, to the chagrin of Ankara, the Council of NATO declined this application on the grounds of its smaller members' unwillingness to make commitments for the defense of Turkey.

Turkish foreign policy deviated from its traditional path, with the DP's decision to send troops to the Korean War. But even then, this was for the purpose of relaying the message to the West that Turkey was ready to assume and was capable of conducting military undertakings. This was plausibly to erase its image of an "evasive neutral" during the WW

II, as well as to use this opportunity to prove its commitment to Western values with the ultimate aim of being accepted as a member in the Western Alliance.

Against this background of events, the conditions of the Cold War dictated its own requirements in Turkey's relations with the Western security camp. Through its participation in the Korean War and in the military/diplomatic efforts aiming at forming a defensive grouping in the Middle East, Ankara had demonstrated that it had all the assets to assume the role of a reliable ally. Ultimately, backed by the US evaluation that Turkey's geostrategic position was of tremendous value for the alliance, the difficulties caused by the resistance of the European members of the NATO were gradually overcome. In fact, this time, the US leading role in the alliance was forcing the American military planners to make recommendations for the inclusion of Turkey in NATO. The listening stations in Turkey and the intelligence gathered by the U-2s based on Turkish territory would soon provide the US with an efficient system of monitoring the Soviets; a regular reconnaissance activity which would otherwise cost tens of million dollars to the USA.³⁴⁴

For Turkey, the years 1950 to 1952 marked the end of an era and the beginning of another. The Turkish position in the Cold War was first consolidated in the same period. Eventually, Turkey placed itself in the western camp with its privileges and no doubt, with accompanying duties, and problems arising thereof.

³⁴⁴ As told by George Harris in a personal interview.

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