

TRIBAL BANDITRY IN OTTOMAN AYNTAB (1690-1730)

A Master's Thesis

by

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To My Mother

TRIBAL BANDITRY IN OTTOMAN AYNTAB (1690-1730)

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by
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ABSTRACT

Tribal Banditry in Ottoman Ayntab (1690-1730)

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This thesis attempts to understand the tribal banditry through a micro historical analysis, which focuses on the tribal banditry in Ayntab region during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Though it focuses on a specific region, it tries to contribute to the discussion on banditry and also tries to develop a model for analyzing banditry in the Ottoman Empire. The novelty of this model is that it is more likely to consider different factors, like social organization, which is mainly shaped by the group perception of the actor, and social, economical, and political motivators, in understanding banditry. Moreover, this study offers an approach that sees the banditry as not sporadic events but a long lasting phenomenon in the Ottoman history. Thus, it reflects banditry as embodied socio-political conflicts.

Key Words: Tribes, social and political banditry, social power, social organization, kinship system, Ayntab, the Otoman Empire.

ÖZET

Osmanlı Ayntab'ında Aşiret Eşkiyalığı (1690-1730)

Soyudođan, Muhsin.
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü.
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Oktay Özel.

Bu tez, bir mikro tarih çalışması örneđi olarak, 17. yüzyıl sonu ve 18. yüzyıl başlarında Ayntab çevresindeki aşiret eşkiyalıklarını anlamayı hedeflemektedir. Her ne kadar belli bir bölgeye odaklansa da, çalışma eşkiyalık etrafında dönen bazı tartışmalara katkı sağlamayı; ayrıca Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki eşkiyalığı anlamak için bir model geliştirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu modeldeki yenilik, eşkiyalığı anlamak için, temelde eylemi yapanın grup algısı tarafından şekillenen, sosyal organizasyon ile ekonomik, sosyal ve politik güdüleyiciler gibi deđişik faktörleri göz önünde bulundurmasıyla alakalıdır. Bunun yanında, çalışma Osmanlı tarihindeki eşkiyalığı münferit olaylar olarak deđil, onları uzun bir zaman dilimine yayılmış bir olgu olarak anlamayı hedefleyen bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. Böylece eşkiyalık sosyo-politik çatışmaların somutlaşmış bir şekli olarak yansıtılır.

Key Words: Aşiretler, sosyal ve politik eşkiyalık, sosyal güç, sosyal organizasyon, soy sistemi, Ayntab, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Human beings are restless, purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good things of life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so.

Michael Mann¹

I.1 The Concept

I.1.1 What is 'Banditry'?

There are two problems in defining the concept 'banditry': the problem of detaching banditry from other outlaw actions and the discourse of banditry in the historical documents, which shall be used in this study. In order to avoid confusion it is necessary to draw the limits of the concept. Richard Slatta's definition of banditry appears reasonable to start with: "Banditry is taking property by force or the threat of force, often done by a group, usually of men."² This action-based definition however is insufficient to grasp the concept fully. According to this definition, it is the action of actor -"taking property by force or the threat of force"-that determines the banditry as an identity of the actor. However, the identity (banditry) of the actor can also determine whether the action is banditry or not. Let me explain this point with an example. As we learn from David M. Hart Arab bandits kidnapped females for

¹ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*. (London: Cambridge University, 1986), p. 4.

² Richard W. Slatta, "Eric J. Hobsbawm's Social Bandit: A Critique and Revision." (*A Contracorriente*, 2004), p. 22.

different purposes, such as, using them for sexual needs and selling them.³ Here, it is obvious that kidnapping is an action that can be treated as banditry. Can one, thus, conclude the same thing if s/he pulls out the word ‘bandits’ from Hart’s statement? It is difficult to answer this question positively, since what is called ‘*kız kaçırma*’ (girl abduction) is still concurrent sociological phenomenon in Turkey, particularly in rural communities where there are strict social rules about marriage. A case recorded in *Ayntab* judicial records (*sijils*) dated November 19, 1716 is a good example in point: A certain *Ömer* decides to give his daughter *Hatice* in marriage with his nephew (most probably his sister’s son). But his brother’s son *Ali* entered *Ömer*’s home with three fellows (those three men registered as bandits) and carry off *Hatice* by force to solemnize marriage before an *imam* (Muslim prayer). However, villagers rescued the girl.⁴ This example is a reflection of a patriarchal community. According to customs prevalent in that region, the priority of marriage to one’s daughter is a right for his brothers’ sons.⁵ In this case it is obvious that that crude behavior of *Ali* is adequate to social contract even if it was not in conformity with *shari’a* (Islamic law); therefore, it cannot be seen as banditry. If in the definition of banditry the actor is as important as the event then we can allege a process through which actor is given the identity of banditry. How can we describe this process? The process comprises both committing crime, which is labeled as banditry, and escaping from or resisting to the justice or punishment. Only if the guilty person could manage to do this and be outlaw, s/he can be accepted as bandit. The process itself then contributes to the reproduction of banditry. Therefore sporadic events, like *Ali*’s case mentioned above, can hardly be labeled as banditry.

³ David M. Hart, *Banditry in Islam: Case Studies from Morocco, Algeria and the West Frontier*. (Whitstable, Kent: Whitstable Litho Ltd., 1987), p. 15.

⁴ ACR 67, p. 44.

⁵ This custom can still be observed. Even sometimes only if father’s brother’s son declares to not marry his cousin girl is given in marriage with anybody else.

I am aware that this point can be objected since it is not always an easy task to see this process in a historical study. However, it is important for separating banditry from a bulk of similar criminal events that take place in daily life. At this point it is necessary to point out that crimes committed in cities especially in small towns such as *Ayntab*, cannot simply be labeled as banditry, since the city could only offer a limited space for escaping or hide out. Once the city criminal was identified it was not that difficult for officers to bring him/her before the court or eliminate. This is why fleeing to countryside was something that made those criminals go with the title 'bandit'. Countryside usually offered good niches to bandits to make themselves the forefront actor in the conflict with state executors. In each decision, whether they would flee or fight or surrender to justice or make an agreement with executors, they became main determinant, not the executors. Executors could only demand or threaten. At this point, other people saw bandits as brave heroes. The most of dirges and lyrics produced by mobs for those outlaws revolves around these braveness and heroic qualities.

Once outlaws were identified as bandits, not only rural space but also social organization in countryside facilitated the consolidation of this identity. Hence, their actions that violated laws can be seen as banditry by researcher. Indeed, such a way of defining banditry can lead to stereotypes; however we deliberately ignore such stereotypes to conceptualize a range of actions from simple robbery to the conflict between social groups and from rebellions to separatist movements under the heading of 'banditry'.

If one accepts such a dual view of banditry, the form of actions should also be questioned. It is true that bandits in general used force or threat of force to take property. However, this does not say much about the social dimension of banditry.

Bandits construct complex relations with other people. Hart in his discussion of *Jbala* (North western Morocco) gangs talks about a social figure known as *kamman*. This figure gives shelter to bandits and sells their spoils to especially old owners of property. In turn he gets a lion share. According to Hart, “*kammans* emerged as real bandit leaders”⁶. Throughout my research I came across many cases that bandits had relation with city dwellers. We will turn back to these points in the following discussions. Here I would like to emphasize that bandits must not be considered only with their targets; their relations with their supporters are also important. We can, therefore, conclude that what makes the one bandit is not only the criminal action itself but also the process of being outlaw. In that process, it is certain that, s/he may fulfill what can be expected from a bandit, but during the stagnant periods their supporters give them any support voluntarily. Even such a voluntary generosity cannot change their identity.

The third component of Slatta’s definition of ‘banditry’ is about whether they are single persons or they form groups. Almost all bandits are somehow are members of bandit groups. Even single bandits most of the time flock together with a band or another single bandit. In this study, as shall be seen, we will talk about tribal bandit groups formed sometimes by more than a thousand armed men. Such huge quantity appeared during battles with state armies or another bandit army. I say army, since such big groups are something more than simple bandit groups. Karen Barkey who emphasizes mainly *bandit levends* of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Anatolia (we will discuss the topic later) claims that bandits were imitating the organization of the Ottoman Army.⁷ It can be said this was quite normal since

⁶ Hart, *Banditry in Islam*. p. 16.

⁷ Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Troupe to State Centralization*. (Ithaca & London: 1994), p. 198.

levends were generally old mercenaries. I think such an organization can be claimed for huge tribal bands, which had the ability to defeat state armies as well.

On the other hand, these huge bodies divided in to small groups during raids and robbery. They generally formed groups consisted of around 40-50 men. Moreover, there were also opportunist small groups formed by three or four men who attacked when occasion arises. Most probably those small groups were not really outlaw bandits but simple thieves who after strike turn back to their homes.

Lastly, as Slatta points out, those bands were formed generally by men. It is not usual to see female bandits in history; however Gillian Spraggs talks about female highway robbers.⁸ Though, I haven't come across any examples of female bandits except for cooperation between females and bandits, Lucy Garnett points out the Ottoman female bandits in the last period of the Empire:

Various instances are on record of women, Greek and Bulgarian, having also adopted the hard and perilous life of brigands. Dressed in masculine garb, they for years successfully concealed their sex from comrades, and took part in all their exploits. About thirty years ago a Greek woman of Lower Macedonia, under the name of Spanó ("the Beardless") Vangheli, was for a considerable time at the head of a notorious band of freebooters, and held out stubbornly long after the majority of the brigand bands in her district had given in their submission...The wives of Bulgarian brigands have also often accompanied their husbands to the mountains in man's attire, fared like the rest of outlaws, and often shared their fate; and love of adventure seems occasionally to have led unmarried women of this race to adopt this calling, which is by no means in greater disrepute among the Bulgarian than among the Greek peasants.⁹

It is not difficult to estimate that the same manner was also prevailing among Muslim tribes. Maybe women did not take part in the ordinary bandit activities but most probably they were active in the tribal conflicts, which also will be handled as banditry in this study.

⁸ Gillian Spraggs, *Cutpurses, Highwaymen, Burglars: The Professional Thief 1558-1660*. (Bristol: Stuart Press, 1997), p. 10. Eric Hobsbawm also talks about Bavarian woman robber Schattinger. See Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. (United States: Delacorte, 1969), p. 32.

⁹ Lucy M. J. Garnett, *Turkish Life in town and Country*. (New York & London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904), pp. 306-7.

I.1.2 The Good Banditry and the Bad Banditry

Eric Hobsbawm rejects to use such a comprehensive definition discussed so far.

According to him historians and sociologists cannot use such a crude definition:

For the law, anyone belonging to a group of men who attack and rob with violence is a bandit, from those who snatch pay-rolls at an urban street corner to organized insurgents or guerillas who happen not to be officially recognized as such.¹⁰

Instead of that definition he prefers to use “social banditry”¹¹ which represents “some kind of robbers”.¹² The main criterion of his definition is the peasants’ perception of the banditry. According to him social bandits:

...are not regarded as simple criminal by public opinion...they are peasant outlaws whom the lord and the state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped and supported.¹³

This approach of Hobsbawm to banditry inspired a bulk of studies in different parts of the world. Even though his approach was widely accepted, recent studies have developed a revisionist critique of it.¹⁴ The first critique was raised against his method of study. Hobsbawm uses *ballads*, which, he thinks, were formed by peasants for their champions. Anton Blok claims these ballads much reflect myths and legends about bandits. These myths are much more related to middle class rather

¹⁰ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 13.

¹¹ Hobsbawm devoted his masterpiece, *Bandits*, to this concept but the root of the ‘social banditry’ can be found in his article “The Social Bandit” (Chapter II) in his book *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and the 20th Centuries*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1959).

¹² Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 13.

¹³ *ibid.* p. 13.

¹⁴ Richard W. Slatta’s “Bandits and Rural Social History: A Comment on Joseph” (*Latin American Review*, Vol. 26, No. 1:145-151; 1991) is a helpful article to see a general review of such revisionist critiques. See also Anton Blok, “The Peasant and Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered.” (*Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14(4): 494-503; 1972). The extended version of this article published in Anton Blok, *Honour and Violence*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2001); and David M. Hart, *Banditry in Islam: Case Studies from Morocco, Algeria and the West Frontier*. (Wisbech, Cambridgeshire, England: Middle East And North African Studies Press, 1987).

than peasants.¹⁵ Though this may have a certain degree of truth in certain cases but some cases say something different about ballads. In the district I am living the dirges (*ağit* in Turkish) wailed for last three bandits, who were active in the 1950s, generally inspired by the dirges that were keened by their relatives when they were killed. Of them the last bandit, Osman, who was not killed but died in 1990s, also have a ballad. It is not known who first time sung the ballad for him, but one might assume that it was sung by a troubadour (*aşık*).

However, it is hard to say that these ballads reflect a common perception in the cases of other two bandits who were wailed dirges by their families. Once these sentimental ballads become pervasive, generally through the people who come for visit of condolence disseminate them; people feel deep sorrow for them irrespective of their degree of relations. Therefore, it will be wrong to infer the sociality of banditry with base on ballads. In the case of Osman, on the other hand, we cannot be sure whether the troubadour really knew him, since, in fact, Osman was a very cruel bandit who was used by local lord (*agha*) against peasants; and we do not see this in the ballad wailed for him. Nevertheless, his fame spread through other regions with the spread of tape cassettes.¹⁶ What one can conclude from this example is that what remains from Osman is just an ideal type, which barely has truth in it.

In his response to such critiques Hobsbawm claims there is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bandits in public opinion, therefore banditry can be seen as a kind of social protest. And he continues that myth cannot be separated from reality.¹⁷ Though this might be

¹⁵ Anton Blok, “The Peasant and Brigand.” p. 500.

¹⁶ I have a personal experience of this case thorough my grandfather. Several years ago, my grandfather went to Urfa. A man met with him and somehow he found out that my grandfather was living in the neighbor village of Osman. To his astonishment he asked my grandfather whether had seen Osman with his own eyes. That man had never seen Osman and only knows him through ballads. I do not intend to devalue ballads for a research like this; I just would like to emphasize their limits as a raw material for such inquiries.

¹⁷ Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Social Bandits: Reply.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14/4 (September 1972), pp. 503-4.

true, the problem here is about his methodology. Ballads can, of course, say many things, but it is equally true that there are limits to generalizations that one can develop on them. A bandit can be both good and bad; however, it is difficult to see such duality in the one ballad. Hobsbawm himself accepts that “a man may be social bandit on his native mountains, a mere robber on the plains.”¹⁸ As a matter of fact, such a case evidently means ‘the group opinion’ rather than public opinion suggested by Hobsbawm. In this study I would like to emphasize such group opinions with examining tribes.

According to Hobsbawm this type of banditry “is one of the universal social phenomena known to history, and one of the most amazingly uniform.”¹⁹ To him, such universality is not something about importation of such a culture of banditry from one culture to another, but rather about similar universal conditions in which peasants face with the same problems.²⁰ The danger here is that when talking about the universality of ‘social banditry’, this also means, by definition, acceptance of a universal form of peasantry. What Hobsbawm calls ‘traditional peasant societies’ which “are based on agriculture (including pastoral economies), and consist largely of peasants and landless labourers ruled, oppressed and exploited by someone else - lords, towns, governments, lawyers, or even banks”²¹ is the fundamental producer of ‘social banditry’. He then generalizes:

Socially it seems to occur in all types of human society which lie between the evolutionary phase of tribal and kinship organization, and modern capitalist and industrial society, but including the phases of disintegrating kinship society and the transition to agrarian capitalism.²²

¹⁸ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 14.

¹⁹ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 14. In his book *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and the 20th Centuries* he describes social banditry as “a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more than endemic protest against oppression and poverty.” p. 5.

²⁰ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 14.

²¹ *ibid.* p. 15.

²² *ibid.* p. 14.

The ‘universality of social banditry’ that Hobsbawm points out requires a closer examination. As a matter of fact, what Hobsbawm says can simply be epitomized simply as such that: social banditry can be seen wherever banditry in general is seen. Hobsbawm proposes that since there is no internal stratification in kinship and tribal societies we cannot talk about social banditry but raiding.²³ In fact, in such a case it is hard to talk about neither banditry nor raiding. What Hobsbawm proposes by tribal and kinship society is what Marxists conceptualize as *Primitive Communal Societies*. Indeed, in such societies banditry cannot be expected since, theoretically, there is no so much economic and social differentiation between their members. This is what this study also suggests: banditry is hardly can be seen in the Ottoman tribes – in which we can expect social banditry if we approach the issue from point of view of Hobsbawm, since there was stratification among their members – but it is for sure raiding or banditry, in general, can be seen between them. He passes over the matter of ‘banditry between tribes’ with overemphasizing ‘raiding’ thus he concludes that there is no social banditry in Bedouin communities.²⁴ David M. Hart, on the other hand, disproves this point with giving the example of the famous bandit of Morocco ‘Ali l-Bu Frahi (‘Ali the Six Fingered) who he thinks was a social bandit.²⁵

No matter whether they are right or wrong, such overgeneralizations by Hobsbawm say less about banditry than what they ignore. If one looks at not in-group but between-groups relations s/he can say more about banditry. Colin Tudge draws our attention to the symbolic similarity between bandit and *Neanderthal* in

²³ *ibid.* p. 14.

²⁴ *ibid.* p. 14.

²⁵ “From Hobsbawm’s point of view the Robin Hood syndrome was certainly present in ‘Ali’s story. ‘Ali evidently never molested the poor. Wealthy caravaneers or traders certainly from his depredations, but unless met with resistance his robberies were bloodless...when wedding took place, he would even appear with a gift for the bridegroom.” Hart, *Banditry in Islam*. p. 10.

clash between *Homo Neanderthals* and *Cro-Magnons*, which is estimated to have happened throughout 5,000 years period between 40,000 and 35,000 years ago.²⁶ This idea is important not because that we take it for granted but because it points out the clash between social groups in which it is almost impossible to talk about inequality and stratification. Such a clash can take the form of banditry as we see later from the examples in the Ottoman society. Therefore, instead of a universal peasant society, we look for banditry in a society that was divided into groups through ethnic, socio-cultural, religious, economic and even professional lines. Living roughly in the same economic structure or system does not alter such group differences. What Hobsbawm calls ‘public opinion’, at that sense, cannot be thought without such divisions. As Slatta says “What united people behind outlaw gangs more often were kinship, friendship, and region- not class.”²⁷ That is what I shall try to emphasize by tribal banditry.

On the other hand, modern agrarian systems are also problematic and this is the other limit of social banditry. As Hobsbawm cogently points out, “combination of economic development, efficient communication, and public administration, deprives any kind of banditry...”²⁸ As it is seen here, what he formulated as a society for social banditry is exactly the one in which banditry takes place. His main purpose is to separate the good banditry (from the point of view of the peasants) from the bad one. However such a dichotomy cannot always be observed in that clarity.²⁹ This obscurity leads a fallacy. That is, what in fact Hobsbawm depicts is banditry, but not social banditry.

²⁶ Colin Tudge, *Neanderthals, Bandits and Farmers: How Agriculture Really Began*. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), pp. 26-8.

²⁷ Slatta, “Bandits and Rural Social History” p. 147.

²⁸ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 15.

²⁹ Hobsbawm is also aware of such an obscurity: “Of course in practice such distinctions are often less clear than in theory.” Ibid. p. 14.

Hobsbawm's concept of 'social banditry' inspired several works concerning the Ottoman banditry as well. Mehmet Bayrak's book *Eşkiyalık ve Eşkiya Türküleri* is not only a valuable collection of ballads but also is a good application of Hobsbawm's romantic approach.³⁰ Another one used the same approach in the Ottoman context is Sabri Yetkin.³¹ On the other hand, in her work on *celalis* of the turn of seventeenth century, Karen Barkey prefers to see banditry from a critical point of view. She emphasizes the relations of bandits with ruling elite and the state rather than the peasants. She depicts those bandits not only as those who had relations with state but also the ones who created barriers to peasants' uprisings. She goes further and concludes that through the state's soft and artful policies bandits' threats for the state contributed to the state centralization in the seventeenth century.³² Though I prefer to use Barkey's more realistic approach, her overgeneralizations are also not far from creating similar fallacies.

First of all, I have serious doubt about her methodology that compares centralization of the Ottoman state with other European states. The structural differences between the Ottoman and European systems are well explained by Immanuel Wallerstein. With Wallerstein's words, in the period 1450-1640 Northwest Europe became the *core*; the northern Spain and Italian city-states formed the *semi-periphery*, Northeast Europe and Iberian America were *periphery* of the 'capitalist world economy'.³³ However, he emphasizes the expansion period of 1750-

³⁰ Mehmet Bayrak, *Eşkiyalık ve Eşkiya Türküleri*. (Ankara: Yorum, 1985).

³¹ Sabri Yetkin, *Ege'de Eşkiyalar* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996).

³² According to Barkey "Even the pervasive banditry was less often crushed by force than it was managed by widespread bargaining. (p. 2)...Banditry provided a fundamentally new context within which the Ottoman state proceeded with some of its most important functions, territorial consolidation and administrative control. (p. 8.)" Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*.

³³ Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." in *The Essential Wallerstein*. p. 93.

1873 when the Ottoman Empire articulated to the *world-economy*.³⁴ More optimistically it can be said that only some parts of the Ottoman Empire began to articulate to the Capitalist World-Economy in between late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.³⁵ When Barkey compares these entities she does not seem to be aware that she compares capitalism or mercantilism with feudalism, Asian mode of production or anything else that can be attributable to the Ottoman system. In that sense, her question, “Why did Ottoman peasants not engage in rebellious activity on their own or alliance with other groups?”³⁶ remains inappropriate. On the one hand, she tries to emphasize the peculiarity of the Ottoman route to centralization; and on the other, she compares Europe and the Ottoman by the same concepts. This is rather simplistic usage of peasantry as a unit of analysis in such comparisons. As Hobsbawm simply established his concept of social banditry on peasantry, Barkey does the same on the same ground. However, it is hard to reach such a general conclusion that the Ottoman peasantry did not engage in rebellious activities? This is rather misunderstanding of the banditry in the Ottoman Empire. While Hobsbawm constructs his stereotypic category of ‘social banditry’, Barkey seems to have a prejudice against bandits. She has a tendency to see all of them as *levends* (irregular mercenaries) and/or *suhtes* (students of religious school). She is right in depicting them as more anti than pro-public. However, if she had looked at the period more carefully, she could have easily seen the peasants positioning themselves next to, even acting behalf of, those bandit groups. This not to say, that they were social bandits, but one can at least talk about the social dimensions in the acts of some of

³⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research” (original paper presented in the *First International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey* in Hacettepe University in 1977), p. 4.

³⁵ Murat Çizakça, “Incorporation of the Middle East into the European World-Economy.” *Review* 8/3 (1985): 353-377.

³⁶ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*. p. 11.

those groups. The best example in this respect is Cennetoğlu who had been a *timar*-holder, and was supported by people in return for protection against the oppression of *beglerbegi* (governor of province) and his men.³⁷ The second one is Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha, whose rebellion in the first half of the seventeenth century created one of the greatest problems at that period. She underlines his anti-soical dimension too; however, as simple bandits without public support, they could not have succeeded in anything and could not have challenged the Ottoman Forces. Since the Canpolatoğlu affair can also be analyzed under tribal banditry, I will come back to this case later on.

As a result, she overemphasizes on the issue of bargaining and in every case reflects the state as having total control over the procedure so her image of the state is a powerful one that successfully manipulated banditry. To the contrary, I argue that the bandits who often rebelled against the state, therefore labeled as bandits, were more determinants of the process, since they were often in a position to reject the offer by the state. Even though the state tried to dissuade Gürcü Nebi, for example, from banditry he was persistent about his idea to challenge the Ottoman administration in Istanbul.³⁸ In Canpolatoğlu's case the province of Aleppo was not granted to him but he captured that position by force. It is interesting to see that, the state remained silent and demanded only his loyalty. Though he declared his loyalty he immediately began to bargain with the state on providing soldiers in return for

³⁷ According to Çağatay Uluçay, even though the state propagated that *Cennetoğlu* was beguiling people, he was supported by people and he defended them against state authorities. Çağatay Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri*. (İstanbul: Manisa Halkevi, 1944), pp. 31-2. However, to Barkey, *Cennetoğlu* declared himself as *timar* holder and fought in the name of *timar* holders. Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*. p. 225. She also cites from Uluçay's same work, but she interestingly reflects the same bandit as a pro-*timar* holder. On the contrary, Uluçay says that those *timar*-holders complained about *Cennetoğlu* to the state. Uluçay, *Ibid.* p. 33.

³⁸ Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri*. p. 55.

more privileges.³⁹ Only after Kuyucu Murat at seriously defeated him he fell back upon Kalenderoğlu and eventually fled to İstanbul to be pardoned by the sultan and appointed as new governor to another province.⁴⁰ At this point Barkey concludes that:

A consideration of the final outcome reveals even more subterfuge on the part of the state; the arrangement with Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha became part of a policy by which the grand vizier accorded himself more time in preparation for war against the bandit. A patrimonial regime that ensured undivided control by either eliminating potential rivals or securing loyalty by incorporation into the household had to develop a strong tendency for deal making and brokerage.⁴¹

Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha was killed a year later as the governor of Tımaşver province. What this reveals is he did remain truly loyal to the state or, as it will be seen later, the state might not be so a unified entity. Bandits' holding offices in the state bureaucracy does not always mean that such bandits strengthen the state power. On the contrary, in his article "Centralization and Decentralization in the Ottoman Administration", Halil İnalçık clarifies how the state representatives became centrifugal powers.⁴² As a matter of fact, yhe bandis who the state pacified were not all but their leaders. It was not difficult for the bandit followers to remain intact and eventually reemerge under a new leadership. A good example of this was Kalenderoğlu who rebelled together with Karayazıcı against the state in the last decade of the sixteenth century. When the state eliminated Karayazıcı, he appeared as a new and even a stronger leader. Similarly, the followers of Cennetoğlu, after he was killed in 1625, continued their activities under the leadership of İlyas Pasha, yet

³⁹ William J. Griswold, *Anadolu'da Büyük İsyan, 1591-1611*. (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2002), pp. 92-4.

⁴⁰ Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri*. p. 18.

⁴¹ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*. p. 191.

⁴² Halil İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization in the Ottoman Administration." In *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, London & Amsterdam: Feffer & Simons, 1970.)

another Ottoman governor. As it shall be seen later one can follow this kind of continuity more clearly in tribal banditry.

Moreover, many of these rebel leaders resumed their banditries shortly after they were granted a pardon by the sultan. *Kalenderoğlu*, for example, he began his illegal activities once more only a year after receiving the position of governorship. Similarly, *Gürcü Nebi* was forgiven and bestowed a sizeable tax-farm somewhere at Niğde district. However, this did not stop him from reprising of banditry.⁴³ Barkey is right in emphasizing that the ideal of circle of justice was an important composite of political culture of the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁴ However, in the seventeenth century, the state was unsuccessful to uphold the idea of justice effectively. The role of banditry in that ineffectiveness cannot be fully understood unless its long lasting history is taken into consideration. It can be argued that banditry, both in and out of the state bureaucracy, contributed significantly to the gradual erosion of the state power. It is equally true that banditry contributed the state centralization, but it happened in the early twentieth century when they joined the nationalist forces to eventually fight against invading armies and separatist non-Muslims in Anatolia not in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire.

I.1.3 Banditry in the Ottoman Sources

Ottomans used the terms *haydut* (derived from *haiduk* or vice versa), *türedi*, *harami* or *haramzade* and *şaki* (pl. *eşkiya*) for bandit. In the primary sources examined in this study the common term used for bandit was *şaki* and *eşkiya* as it is case even today. This Arabic root of the word originally means to be miserable, unhappy, and wretched or to make one miserable, unhappy and wretched. The

⁴³ Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*. pp. 12-55.

⁴⁴ Karen Barkey, *ibid.*, p. 27.

sources often refer to people who involve in *şekavet*; the act that produces unhappiness, misery etc., and this is what bandits do. Would it be possible therefore to think bandit as the miserable person who creates misery? Such a definition is apt to the assertion that economically degraded people is more inclined to banditry. Hobsbawm's answer to the question "who becomes a bandit?" is that they are 'rural surplus population' and 'marginal people' who are not fully integrated to rural society.⁴⁵ Similarly, Karen Barkey also underlines that they were poor people who were usually behind the banditry in the Ottoman Empire in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁴⁶ That is a reasonable assumption; however, it is only the one side of the mirror. What can we say about people of whom the banditry is almost an inseparable part of their lives? John S. Koliopoulos, who describes the bandits in Greece, points out that, bandits were born to banditry.⁴⁷ The same can also be applied to tribal banditry in the Ottoman Empire. Disloyalty of tribes or the conflicts among themselves that is often referred to as banditry was far beyond economic reasons.

In the Ottoman registers, the similar behaviors of state officials in the countryside were termed differently from those of ordinary people. What these dignitaries did in generally named as oppression, hostility, and injustice (*zulüm* and *te'addî*)⁴⁸ rather than banditry (*şekavet*). In order their actions to be reckoned as banditry, they had to give up their official positions and became part of ordinary people. This also reveals the Ottoman perception of the main socio-political differentiation between military class (*Askeri*) and public (*Reaya*-taxpayers).

⁴⁵ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. pp. 25-7.

⁴⁶ See Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*. The similar point was underlined by Sabri Yetkin for late Ottoman banditry in *Ege'de Eşkıyalar*. p. 9.

⁴⁷ John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912*. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), p. 239.

⁴⁸ Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Hukukunda Zulüm Kavramı*, (Ankara: Birey ve Toplum, 1985), p. 9.

Based on the Ottoman sources we can now have closer look at different types of banditry.

Thief Bandits: What Ottomans called *sarik* (thief) or *sarik eşkiyası* (thief bandits) was used for a single person or small gangs who burgle a house or rob a person, mostly, in residential areas like villages, towns and cities. These people were generally working at night: they choose desolate street for robbing a person or burgle a house when its owner was not at home or somehow was not aware of situation. When they come face to face with their victims they usually did not hesitate to use force. Generally, people labeled as such were accused of walking up and down the streets at nights with war tools/fatal tools (*alet-i harb*)⁴⁹ and/or being with women or prostitutes in an immoral way.⁵⁰ Barkey shows such examples to prove how bandits can be so horrible: “Hundreds of court documents attest that bandits...paraded around with prostitutes, and even violated mosques with insults and disruption.”⁵¹ Barkey here refers, most probably, to the thieves. Though they were recorded as bandits in most of the documents, they should be accepted as what Hobsbawm calls ‘simple criminals’. The common usage of the term ‘banditry’ with a negative connotation in public often ended up accusing a person of in any simple misbehavior. It would be highly problematic for us to claim that drinking wine or parading around with prostitutes (if they were really prostitutes) is banditry. One should not forget that people who found such activities immoral often and easily lodged a complaint against such people, calling them bandits or women with them as prostitutes.

⁴⁹ With this term we understand any kind of dagger, sword, bow or firearms like pistols and rifles. As far as understood from the sources everybody was not allowed to carry those tools in everyday life. Because of that, people who carried them were labeled as bandits or vagabonds.

⁵⁰ In a case people from the same neighborhood in the city of Ayntab blamed a woman called Ayşe for having intercourse with bandits always in day and night. ACR 61, p. 83.

⁵¹ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*. p. 145.

As already mentioned before, I intend not to consider such criminals in residential areas as bandits. However, the essential difference between these and bandits often becomes obscure in rural areas. These thieves were also engaged in highway robbery as big bandit groups. But they appear not have been as courageous as bandits. Their main targets were usually single travelers or groups consisted of several people. Like their counterpart in cities, they also attack people in desolated areas in quiet times. They could burgle their neighbor's house in their own villages or steal their animals without hesitation.

Highway Robbery: Ebusuud Efendi, (1490 1574), the *şeyhülislam* of the Ottoman Empire between 1545 and 1574, explains the understanding of Islam of highway robbery as:

Even if they attempt to cut the roads in the city with weapons they will be accepted as highway robbers. If they attempt to kill people out of the city with stones or woods, where the protection cannot be possible, or at night in the city, they will also be accepted as highway robbers.⁵²

In the Ottoman documents this kind of banditry was recorded as *katt'-ı tarik eşkiyası* (road cutting bandits, highway robbers) or simply *kutta-i tarik* (highwayman). This Arabic word refers to banditry more precisely. At any rate, in the Ottoman documents this word is often used to mean banditry. *Kutta-i tariks* were these who attack any target with economic value moving on roads such as a caravan, a tradesman, a traveler, a convoy of pilgrims, or a military convoy that carry provisions for army. They were generally choosing strategic points on the road, like mountain passes, deep valleys etc., to attack. Relatively powerful bandit groups, also attack on plains. Contrary to thieves, they did not usually use violence unless faced a serious resistance.

⁵² M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi'nin Fetvalarına Göre Kanuni Devrinde Osmanlı Hayatı: Fetava-yı Ebussu'ud Efendi*. (İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, 1998), p. 240.

Rebellion and Rampage: It can be argued that rebellion (*ihtilal*) is different from banditry; but I include these two forms in the same category because of two reasons. Firstly, since we often see the tribes rebelling and doing banditry in the Ottoman Empire draw attention to the relation between rebellion and banditry. These two terms become meaningful that tribes were often seen by the state as the source of disorder and disobedience. Secondly, in many cases, rebellions were preceded by banditry. Therefore banditry became a method in rebellion. Mustafa Cezar in his book *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* gives some examples of how those two types of events went together: *Şahkulu* firstly began with brigandage and murdering people. He later began to burn and destroy (Rebellion) everything. *Zünun Baba*, who was another leader of a rebellion, firstly killed the son of Mustafa Bey, the *sanjaqbegi* of Bozok, the judge, and his deputy (*naib*) in 1516, and then went on to loot their properties. *Kalender*, yet another rebel, also began with highway robbery and murdering.⁵³ As we shall see later, especially *Zünun Baba*'s case is very much alike banditry of the *Okçu İzeddinli* tribe, the main focus of this study. They also killed state officials and began to resist to be punished.

In the sources some activities different in essence than banditry, such as, the quarrel between tribes, their raids and looting activities, also called *şekavet*, can be conceptualize *under* the term *rampage*. Those activities also were seen by the state as *making misery*. As we will see later on such acts usually took place when nomadic tribes were on their way of seasonal migration. Indeed, banditry, in general and especially *rampage* cannot be understood without group identity, which both shaped and was shaped by social structure which we discuss in chapter 2.

⁵³ Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*. (İstanbul: İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, 1965), pp. 88-92.

In fact these three types of activities explain well the tribal banditry in the Ottoman Empire, which took mainly the form of highway robbery and raiding. These bandits can be considered as ‘anti-social’ since the main targets were peasants. On the other hand, they can also be regarded social bandit as well, since they resisted against state representatives for the sake of a group. By group I do not mean the bandit group I rather refer to other members of tribes. However, in the eye of Ottoman officials the whole tribe could be bandit group. This is because of the strong relationship between members of the tribe. Whether or not this satisfies Hobsbawm to consider their banditry as social is another matter.

To sum up, here by banditry we understand group conflicts and group resistance against the state. Without considering the nature of their relations with each other and with the state, one cannot fully understand its social dimension. Approaching the matter with the dichotomy of ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ does of course not provide us a proper framework. Bandits can be good for a portion of the society and bad for another, according to changing and often conflicting interests. In this work I will attempt to melt down different types of social activities in the concept of banditry.

I.2 The Context

When studying banditry in the Ottoman Empire one must keep in mind that banditry was a continuous process which at least began with the fifteenth century, became chronic in the sixteenth century, and continued till the end of the Empire. Though the banditry was an ordinary phenomenon in pre-modern states, by banditry, I generally refer to the movements that at some point caught the attention of the state. In other word, I deal particularly with the banditry only in its form when became a

serious issue for law and order in the Empire. Karen Barkey proposes that banditry contributed to state centralization in the Ottoman Empire. However it seems that it is too premature to come to such a conclusion. As we all know, Barkey, like many others, focuses on the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century *celâli* rebellions. This study, which takes the period between 1691 and 1731, therefore complements the picture she provides. However, the main reason in choosing 1691 is to see the effects of the Ottoman policy of resettlement of tribes, which is generally known to have been gained a new momentum in 1691. On the other hand the year 1731 has no specific importance for this study. As it shall be seen later, the banditry continued after that year almost without any break.

The study is inspired initially by the works of Cemil Cahit Güzelbey who, with Hulusi Yetkin, published some selected texts from Ayntab Court Records between volumes that contain the period between 1729 and 1909.⁵⁴ When I read these texts, widespread social disorder, especially led by tribes, drew my attention to the banditry. Then I decided to find out the reason behind it. Since some texts refer to the resettlement of tribes I decided to take 1691 as the starting point. Thus, I analyzed the Ayntab court records contain from 1691 to 1731. Though the main focus of the study is the Ayntab region between 1691 and 1731, I would like to offer a model to explain Ottoman banditry; therefore, we will have to go back and forth in time.

In this study I examine tribes and tribal banditry in the *Ayntab* region. *Ayntab* was one of the four sub-provinces (*sanjaq*) that constituted the province (*eyalet*) of Maraş in the Ottoman Empire in this period. As in other *sanjaqs* the *sanjaq* of Ayntab was also governed by *sanjaq begi*, and in its central town or city (*Ayntab*) there were a judge (*kadı*) and a deputy (*naib*). The area of *kadı*'s jurisdiction formed

⁵⁴ Cemil C. Güzelbey, *Gaziantep Şer'i Mahkeme Sicilleri*, (four volumes). The first three volumes published in 1966 and the last volume published with Hulusi Yetkin, in 1970.

the judicial-administrative unit called *kaza*. In some *sanjaqs* there could be more than one judicial center but in the Ayntab *sanjaq* the Ayntab city was the only such a center, which consists of three *nahiyes*, namely, Ayntab, Tilbaşer and Burç. *Nahiye* was a district, which contained a center town or village and the villages around it.

I prefer to use the term region instead of *sanjaq* since the main sources that we used in this work contains information beyond that administrative unit. Since the court records reflect well the natural networks of relations the limitations of these records does not pose any difficulty in a problem-based historical analysis like this one. The main actors of this study, the tribes, lived mainly in neighboring *sanjaqs* of Ayntab. However, the court records of Ayntab are still invaluable sources for examining them. The region in question then contains an area crudely west-east direction from eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea to River Euphrates, and north-south direction from the Taurus Mountains to the northern Syria. It therefore contains the *sanjaqs* of *Kilis* and *Antakya*; the *Nahiyes* of *Rumkala* and *Birecik* *sanjaqs* situated the west of Euphrates and an important part of *Marash* *sanjaq*.

There are several reasons for the choice of this particular region for the study. If we draw crude sociological picture of this region both ethno-lingual and ethno-religious structures become apparent. Especially in the northern parts *Turcomans* were active as were *Kurds* in *Kilis* district and *Arabs* in southern regions. Sometimes we see that *Yezidis* were also participated in banditry. Therefore this region was highly cosmopolitan, therefore, provides us with a suitable case to examine social tensions and different sort of relations between various groups. Especially after the resettlement, began in 1691, of northern Turcoman tribes in the *Eyalet* of *Rakka* and *sanjaqs* of *Hama* and *Humus* and *Çukurova* region this cosmopolitan structure

become much more clear since many of fled people searched for shelter in this area where the one of closest places to all those regions of resettlements.

Ayntab was on the cross point of several important north-south and east-west roads. The flow of goods on these roads was whetting bandits' appetite. In order not to pay the custom duties in Aleppo the traders who come from the east began to shift their roads to *Ayntab* region in the period under review. On the other hand, in the same period, long wars with Persia contributed to the resurgence of the capacity of those roads since provisions sent to army through these roads. On the other hand, during the same warfare extra taxes levied the tax burden of ordinaries increased. All of these factors positively contributed to the banditry.

I.3 The Sources

The research will be based mainly on Ayntab Court Records (*Gaziantep Şeri'yye Sicilleri*). Though, these texts are mostly known as Court Records, the word 'court' can create confusion. Abdulaziz Bayındır rightly offers to substitute 'records of events' (*zapt-ı vekayi*) for Court Records.⁵⁵ As a matter of fact, these records were not only about events but also contain any information related to a specific *kadı* province. Therefore, I prefer to use as *kadı records*. Historians sometimes exaggerate the role of *kadı* as a judge. This fact plays an important role in Barkey's thesis that banditry contributed to the centralization of the Ottoman.

The institution and the judges each had negative effects on the ability of peasants to forge alliances with rural groups. The court system as established throughout the Ottoman lands was the main alternative for direct contact with the state, and complaint to the state, about local conditions. Ottoman peasants made frequent use of the courts, which functioned to deflect anger away from local tax-collecting patrons and acted as a safety valve for the Ottoman state. Peasants as well as nomads

⁵⁵ Quoted from Nasi Aslan, "Milli Arşivimiz İçerisinde Şeri'yye Sicilleri: Eğitim ve Terminoloji Problemi" (an essay presented in conference *I. Milli Arşiv Şurası*. Ankara: April 20-21, 1998), p. 1.

in rural society used local courts as a recourse against those who abused their livelihood and privileges. Especially for the peasant, the court was the main foundation of mediation between himself and the timar holder. It also weakened the tie between landholder and peasant, hampering their potential efforts at alliances.⁵⁶

The problem with Barkey's interpretation is that she assumes that the *kadıship* operated perfectly, fulfilling all the functions theoretically ascribed to it. True, when compare to France the Ottoman peasants were more free to use courts to defend their rights⁵⁷ but it must not be forgotten that the Ottoman courts were not the courts of modern France either. I am leaving aside the widespread corruption associated with the Ottoman court system throughout the history of the Empire.⁵⁸ As Boğaç Ergene rightly puts:

The main problem with this position is that it is a logical deduction and not a historical observation, and it will remain so until these historians accomplish the difficult tasks of not only demonstrating that the courts in Anatolia satisfied most of their clients by dispensing justice fairly, but also of proving that this satisfaction generated a continuous popular support for the regime.⁵⁹

The problem of satisfaction cannot be more than a speculation since it can hardly be deduced from court records.

Here, main aim is not to discuss this in detail but to question the limits of court records, therefore also questioning the reliability of my work. One should always keep in mind that many serious disputes were solved not in the *kadı* courts but *divans* (council) of local governors (*beglerbegi*) or by decrees sent by the government to the provincial authorities. Many bandits were judged and punished by those governors without asking any advice from *kadı*s. By *kadı* here I do not mention those in *divans*,

⁵⁶ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*. p. 103.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-5.

⁵⁸ Çağatay Uluçay ironically points out that *suhtes* later on would be *kadı*s and *naibs*. Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri*. p. 30. *Suhtes* were students of religious schools (*Medrese*). From the mid-sixteenth century on they became one of the main figures either as beggars or bandits in Anatolian countryside and contributed greatly to the deterioration of law and order.

⁵⁹ Boğaç Ergene, *Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu, 1652-1744*. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 3.

if there were any attending them. As we shall see later the governors (*beylerbeyi*) of Rakka, Maraş, and Aleppo in many cases just sent order to any official, who were expected to obey, in Ayntab sub-province. We have found out many cases of discontent of people from such decrees sent by the government or governors rather than from court records. Anyhow we can see this process from the *kadı* registers. The important question whether or not the peasants really and precisely used those channels to solve their problems. From my own experience in reading a bulk of these sources in detail, I can say that the problems, which were not reflected in these registers, are far more than those recorded. First of all, an important portion of those records was about the people of city dwellers than those in rural. Statistically speaking, one would have expected that the cases about rural population in these registers far exceeded these of city dweller. This is not the case at all particularly cases about death and inheritance.

The other point that we learn from the cases of banditry is that the litigants did nor or could not go to the court immediately after s/he was robbed. When their properties were stolen they tended to apply the court only when they found their property or saw items that resembling their stolen property. Let me give an example: in his complaint dated August 11, 1695, Mehmed said that “the donkey that is now under the property of this man is my donkey that Arab bandits in the *nahiye* of *Suruç* had taken from me six years ago by force.”⁶⁰ One can wonder that, what would have happened if Mehmed could not have seen that donkey by accident years later? For instance, the donkey could have died during that time. Most probably, we could not have learned anything about this man and his donkey. I would not be wrong therefore to say that what is reflected in the *sicils* about banditry was only the visible part of an

⁶⁰ ACR 43, p. 76. There are numerous cases resembling to this. They generally lost either a horse or mule or donkey.

iceberg. It is because of this, we are not in a position to exactly in what period banditry increased and/or declined. Therefore, the role of the *kadı* court in the peasants' lives should not be exaggerated as Barkey did in her study.

I am also suspicious whether the court really functioned as mediatory between peasant and the *timar* holder. It is true that there are some records of disputes of peasants over *timar* holder's inequities. On the other hand, there were numerous examples of peasant flight (*perakende ve perişan olmak*) because of the oppression by such Ottoman officials. That is to say, it can hardly be assumed that the *kadı* courts prevented them from becoming active figures of banditry or rebellion. To the contrary, in many cases *timar*-holders applied to the court with the allegation that the defendant peasant was a peasant of his land, therefore he should be taxed. On the other hand, most of the times, we find out from decree sent to local authorities that peasants had problem with *timar*-holders rather than disputes solved in the court.

Another point is the standard language used of in these records, which in itself poses a serious problem. In *sicils* a special type of script, called *talik*, was commonly used.⁶¹ This makes it easier for a researcher. Besides, there is also a standard language in expressing the events. We know that, for some practical reasons, a method of standardization (*Sakk Usulü* or *Sakk-ı Şer'i*) was taught to *kadı*s. For this guide books, called *sakk mecmuası*, were prepared for scribes (*kâtib*).⁶² This matter of standardization was solved with a serious education that was called *ilmü'ş-şurut* (science of stipulations) or simply *eş-şurut*.⁶³ The problem derives from this: diverse events were explained and recorded with special clichés, so the differences melt down in obscurity.

⁶¹ Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlı Tarihi Hakkında Mühim Bir Kaynak." p. 90. Kemal Çiçek, *Zimmis (Non-Muslims) of Cyprus in the Sharia Court: 1110/39 A.H / 1698-1726 A.D.* (Unpublished Phd. Thesis, University of Birmingham, October 1992), p. 18.

⁶² Aslan, "Milli Arşivimiz İçerisinde Şeri'yye Sicilleri." p. 5.

⁶³ Çiçek, *Zimmis (Non-Muslims) of Cyprus in the Sharia Court.* p. 25.

The term ‘banditry’ is also one of those clichés. It is therefore highly likely that the term was simply used as a jargon with a negative connotation. After the rebellion led by Sheik Celal in 1519, the Ottomans began to use the term *Celali* for all banditry and rebellions throughout the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Similarly, the term *eşkiya* was used for any unlawful activities regardless of their relation to banditry. Mehmet Bayrak explain this: “from the most personal one, to the most social one; from the most aimless one, to the one that have the most serious aim; from the worst one, to the holiest one; from the most bloodcurdling one, to the most lovable one, every uprisings were named as banditry...even contemporary revolutionists are called “city bandits.””⁶⁴ Indeed, I gave up looking for an ideal banditry, as defined by Slatta or Hobsbawm; it will be handled as a phenomenon that explains social tension and the conflict with the state. Nevertheless, the actuality of accusations attributed to someone (bandits) is still important. For example, it is quite probable to see such a cliché in decrees: ‘people sent us a written complaint that (certain) bandit (group) does highway robbery, kidnaps girls, collects money with force’. Here, the official who sent the decree might talk about a small case with a common cliché. That is to say, the bandit might do highway robbery but not kidnap anyone. In order to solve this problem I examined some other archival documents that were called Records of Complaints (*Şikayat Defterleri*) housed in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul. With that, I aimed to compare public perception of banditry with that of the state discourse. Unfortunately I could not see complaint in those records since they contain mainly the résumé of decrees, which were sent by the government to various people about certain complaints.

⁶⁴ Bayrak, *Eşkiyalık ve Eşkşya Türküleri*. p. 24.

Another source that I consulted to test this issue is the chronicles of *Raşid Efendi (Tarih-i Raşid)*. Even though to some degree these chronicles have great contribution to this study, they are not so sufficient to test *kadı* records. The only choice left was to compare the texts in the *kadı records* with themselves. By comparing complaints of people with the decrees sent by the government or local governors, it can be conclude that ordinary people could have been more slipshod in using the term banditry than the state. In the eyes of the public any simple act like drinking wine, playing musical instruments (like *saz*) could be labeled as banditry.⁶⁵ Similarly, the usage of tribe and tribal identity is also problematic, which will be discussed further in the Chapter 2.

⁶⁵ In a case some people from the village of Arıl accused some other men from the same village of being bandits, since they were carrying fatal tools; drinking wine and distur people. ACR 51, p. 225. In another case some people accused a man of always meeting with bandits and palying *saz* with them. ACR 59, p. 183.

CHAPTER II

BANDITS AND THE STATE

“Ferman padişahın dağlar bizimdir.”
“The command is emperor’s, mountains
are ours.”

Dadaloğlu¹

II.1 Bandit Groups

Lucy M. J. Garnett, who worked on the Ottoman life at the turn of the twentieth century, talks about the long-lasting widespread banditry in the Ottoman Empire:

Brigandage has from time of immemorial, and more especially perhaps during the last century and a half, played an important part in the social and political life of Turkey, and the present anarchic condition of Macedonia offers every facility for the pursuit of this adventurous calling. The brigand bands that infest many districts of Turkey, both Asiatic and European, are, strange to say, hardly at all recruited, as might be expected, from the nomad tribes...but present a motley gathering of outlaws of all races of the country, Moslem as well as Christian, one band frequently containing representatives of three or four.²

What she calls one century and a half period was, in fact, was no less than four centuries. As a matter of fact, banditry was a reality of almost all countries, in which, due to inefficient technological development, social control could not be fully maintained in every locality. That is to say, banditry was a concrete reality in places where there was no state authority. However, as far as banditry is concerned, the last four centuries of the Ottoman Empire mean something more than this concreteness.

¹ Dadaloğlu, who lived in nineteenth century, is a well-known poet from the Avşar tribe. His poems are invaluable sources for tribal life. Since during the period he lived the state tried to resettle his tribe, he often emphasized on migration. The above verse is about this issue. Ahmet Z. Özdemir, *Avşarlar ve Dadaloğlu*, (Ankara: Dyanışma, 1985), pp. 164-5.

² Garnett, *Turkish Life in Town and Country*. p. 305.

Banditry became a serious and long lasting problem on which the state worked overtime and made a great effort to get rid of.

During the period between 1691 and 1731 banditry was not only a problem limited to the region under review but also it was quite widespread throughout the Empire. The government often sent decrees to the state officials who administered in Anatolia to prevent banditry. There are lots of documents containing such information: ‘to *beylerbeyis*, *kadı*s, *sancakbegis*, *voyvodas*, *mutesellims*, *ayan*, *işerleris* (and others) ruling the districts and sub-districts located on the left, right and mid routes from *Üsküdar* to the end of these routes, we hear that banditry became widespread. For that reason, we choose the Governor of Anatolia (some other governors). And, you all deal with this problem in the places under your administration and cooperate with Governor of Anatolia in that affair.’³ In this chapter we shall focus on some important bandit groups and the state’s struggle with them in the case of Ayntab region.

II.1.1 Levends

The word, *levend*, was used in different contexts and different periods for various meanings. According to Mustafa Cezar, at first, it was used for soldier or the man who were able to fight in warfare. Then, the word came to mean ‘pirate’ and the tough seamen who were incorporated with them. And lastly, it was used for those

³ ACR 41, p. 158 (d. 1691); ACR 41, pp. 133, 170, 171 (d. 1692); A.DVN. 19/84, 174, 220, 400, 438 (d. 1694/5); ACR 43, p. 290; ACR 48A, p. 215 (d. 1696); ACR 47, p. 22; ACR 48A, p. 176 (d. 1697); ACR 51, p. 128 (d. 1700); ACR 52, p. 92 (d. 1703); ACR 54, p. 15 (d. 1704); A.DVN. 41/532 (d. 1704/5), ACR 62, p. 165 (d. 1712); ACR 65, p. 261 (d. 1714); ACR 62, p. 214 (d. 1715); ACR 67, pp. 596, 598, 307 (d. 1717); ACR 68, p. 456 (d. 1718); ACR 69, p. 245 (d. 1719); ACR 73, p. 214 (d. 1722); ACR 76, p. 111 (d. 1725). I could not look at the all A.DVN. (Atik Şikayat Defterleri) dated from 1691 to 1731. From 2 *defters* out of 8 we could see records, which mention that the government dealt with banditry through out the Empire. All these records do not show the banditry in different parts of the Ottoman Empire. They were the *firman*s, which were sent to almost all over the Empire and contain the cliché mentioned above. As it can be seen the banditry was quite widespread through out the Empire in the period under review.

who left their lands (*Çift Bozan*) and become vagrant.⁴ During the period in question it was used for a special kind of soldier who was not a part of the regular army, that is, *janissaries*, *timarli sipahis*, or *kapı kulu* corps. They were irregular mercenaries who were recruited during wars or campaigns to oppress a rebellion. In a decree (d. December 18, 1717) it was stated that (miri) *levends* were needed for being used in the war with Austria:

It is needed to conscript an amount of infantry *Levends* from Anatolia for the expedition over Austrian troops...1000 conscripts, that is, 20 flags (military unit) under each of which there will be 44 people plus excluded 6 military officers (*zapot*) with total of 50 people, are required...except for excluded officers, each of 880 recruits will be paid 35 *kuruş* tip and of 1000 recruits each will receive salaries of six months and provisions of three months in advance...total expense is 55.940 *kuruş*...⁵

In another record, it was pointed out that 242 cavalry *levends* were required to join the main army together with *züema* and *timar* holders.⁶ Here, as it is seen, *levends* were paid soldiers who could be either infantry or cavalry. Moreover, they were perceived as different from other military units of Anatolia. The problem is whether they were different from other mercenaries, called *sekbans* and/or *sarıca*.

Sekbans/sarıcas were mercenary troops that comprised governors or elites from ex-*timar* holders, the sons of janissaries and other local elites and ordinary people.⁷ Because of that they were known as ‘people of the door’ (door keeper, *kapı halkı*). When compared to *levends*, they were more like regular mercenaries. Generally, they were perceived differently than *levends* however when they began to take part in illegal activities they also began to be called as *levends*. That is to say, usage of

⁴ Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*. p. 17.

⁵ ACR 68, p. 175.

⁶ ACR 68, p. 169. (d. March 2, 1718)

⁷ Midhat Sertoğlu, “*Sarıca*” in Sertoğlu, *Osmanlı Tarih Lugatı*. (Istanbul: Enderun, 1986), pp. 303-4.

levendat as criminals or bandits enclosed both actual *levends* and *sekbans/saricas*.⁸ Moreover, other vagabonds might also join them during banditry. Thus, by bandit *levends* we mean all of those groups.

Beside tribes, *levends* were one of the most notorious bandit groups of the period in the question. However, the *levend* banditry had been continuing for more than one century and a half.⁹ *Sekbans* were used in political struggles throughout the seventeenth century. They reached their heyday during the period of 1687-1689.¹⁰ In the period 1688-1689 (h.1100), the government decided to abolish these corps and reform them as new corps under names of *divanegan*, *deliyan*, *gönüllüyan*, *farisan* and *azaban*.¹¹ However, that process took a long time. Throughout the period between 1691 and 1731 there were lots of decrees from different dates, which were sent to all over the Empire, for declaration of their abolition.¹² However, as we learned from Raşid, in 1726-7 the problem of *sekbans* was still continuing.¹³ As a matter of fact, their abolition did not prevent those actors from taking part in banditry, since both newly formed corps and those who refused to join those corps

⁸ According to Virginia H. Aksan, “*Levend* or *levant* is the most common name for troops (peasants who were mobilized into infantry regiments)...also meaning both “bandit” and “warrior.”” Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires.” *Journal of Early modern History* 3/2 (May, 1999); p. 115, footnote 38. Stressing so much upon peasant as the main actor who formed *levends* may depict the picture weakly. In Ayntab a *tumar* holder left his land and became a *sekban*. ACR 57, pp. 208, 209, 211, 212; ACR 58, pp. 40, 48. Though, it can be a calumny, it is still important to show the possibility that not only vagrants but also landholders could be *levends*.

⁹ According to Mustafa Cezar, *levend* movement began in the second half of the sixteenth century when they began to support *Şehzade Bayezid* in his struggle for capturing the throne and in return for money (being paid by him). See *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*. pp. 34-9. However, Mustafa Akdağ talks about the role of *levends* in the uprisings of the first half of the sixteenth century. According to him, when Shah Ismail captured the throne of Iran and established Safavid Empire he looked for source of power among *Kızılbaş* Turks. And masses who deprived economically, Akdağ reckons them as *levends*, began to go to Iran. In 1510 they looted the properties of *Şehzade Korkud*, however, as mercenaries *levends* were used by *Şehzade Ahmet* in his struggle for the throne against his brother *Selim I, the Grim*. Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası*. pp. 115-116.

¹⁰ Halil Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700.” (Archivum Ottomanicum 6: 283-337; 1980), p. 299.

¹¹ *Tarih-i Raşid*, Vol. 2. p. 70. Maybe the government decided before that date to abolish them; however the earliest document that I could find was dated h.1100.

¹² ACR 69, p. 245 (February 4, 1719), ACR 73, p. 262 (January 18, 1722), ACR 75, p. 22 (February, 1723).

¹³ *Tarih-i Raşid*, Vol. 6. pp. 404-6.

carried out banditry for a long time.¹⁴ Somehow, in general, the banditry of *levends* lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁵

During the period between 1691 and 1731, the Ottomans had engaged in war on the west and northwest frontiers, with Venice, Austria, and Russia, and at the east frontier with Persia. In general, *levend* banditry was related to that state of warfare. During those wars the state often demanded mercenaries who had experience in fighting and ability to use guns. We do not know much about the process of recruitments. Even though some historians estimate that those who volunteered were poor people, from the decrees sent to *Ayntab* we see that when the government demanded, for instance 1,000 mercenaries, their economic status was not regarded. Moreover, the government demanded 2,000 *levends* from several tribes, as a way of punishing those disloyal tribes, for the war with Persia in 1724.¹⁶ Thus, this explains why they deserted the army so often. Indeed, desertion was not the prerequisite for banditry but the state's treatment to them was influential in driving them towards banditry. As a rule, all mercenaries, including *janissaries* and other *kapı kulları*, had to be punished when they refused to join the army during the war or when they deserted the army. On the other hand, in the same case *timar* and *zeamet* holders lost their right to hold lands. This also explains the difference in frequency of becoming bandits between mercenaries and land-holding soldiers. However, the difference between janissaries and *levends* can be explained by coercive and seasonal recruitment of *levends*. Moreover, the banditry of *kapulu levends* (*sekbans*) was little different. Their banditry was more dependent on the position of their lords. When

¹⁴ In 1777 around Antioch some *divanes* were reported for their banditry. Mustafa Öztürk, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Antakya ve Çevresinde Eşkiyalık Olayları." p. 972. Those *deli* corps after a while due to their banditries would be decided to be abolished. In 1829 the government was certain to abolish them. M. Çağatay Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*. p. 80.

¹⁵ Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*. p. 80.

¹⁶ ACR 76, p. 116.

their lords were dismissed by the government or became economically too weak to feed those troops, the unemployed mercenaries began to get involved in banditry until they were recruited again or were punished.¹⁷ In that sense, when compared to the tribal banditry, *levend* banditry was more of a forced banditry and had anti-social character.

Levend banditry is a good example of the process to banditry mentioned before.

The following order of the governor of Rakka well explains that process:

Because of the disorder, of which the country has suffered from for several years, *levends* come and go. Some of them are employed by the state officials, and others who could not find such a job go on their ways. They wander from one village to another and they get food and fodder without paying their prices.¹⁸

At this point I am not certain whether that was a kind of begging or banditry done by force or whether they saw banditry as temporary or permanent.¹⁹ No matter what that was, once they were denounced as bandits they had to continue banditry, that is, they had to escape from the state authorities. Otherwise they had to accept punishments. Though they were not punished they could not feed themselves either. Therefore they went further and demanded money (*akçe*) under the name of *kıyafet*, *kurban*, *konak*, *zahireci*, *çavuş*, *hüddamiye*, *seyis*, *bayrak*, *ferman akçası*, *zahire baha* and *avaid*.²⁰ It was an obligatory process for a fugitive from army and justice, because while on the way to home from a campaign, they had to take part in such activities. But

¹⁷ Uluçay, *18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri*. p. 74.

¹⁸ ACR 55, p. 264 (April 15, 1705).

¹⁹ Eight men from Berazi tribe applied to the court: "we and our friends wandered in the *nahiye* of *Ayntab* and collected food, fodder and *akça* (money) from people (*reaya*) free of charge. Since villagers complained about us, the Sanjakbeg of *Ayntab*, Ibrahim Beg, captured and imprisoned us. Since he gave our horses and other properties back, we don't prefer a charge against him." ACR 54, p. 217. This case is interesting since in fact bandits had no right to claim property. This is why I say that it can be begging. Hrand D. Andreasyan also talks about the begging of bandits. To him some Armenian traders passed in front of Karayazıcı and his men, they did not rob the traders, instead they open their handkerchiefs and began to begging and traders gave them some money with their own will. After that they thanked them. Andreasyan, "Bir Ermeni Kaynağına Göre Celâli İsyânları." İÜEF Tarih Dergisi XIII/17-18 (Mart 1962-Eylül 1963), p. 31.

²⁰ ACR 54, p. 187; ACR 55, p. 251; ACR 65, p. 211; ACR 73, p. 171.

sometimes they did the same thing during recruitments. They wandered around from settlement to settlement and collected money and provisions as if they would join a war.

There were numerous records that refer to the activity in banditry in the period of 1717-8. Just after a year when 80 *levends* were put to the sword, a *levend* leader called *Postallı Bölükbaşı* refused to go and join the campaign in 1718. Together with 20 horsemen he wandered around and committed the crimes mentioned above.²¹ In the same period under the leadership of *Bölükbaşı Kara Ahmed* a group robbed *Surre* Company.²² Shortly after, some *levends* were executed in Ayntab.²³ However, we do not know whether they were the same *levends* who robbed *surre* since the similar brief records do not enlighten us.

II.1.2 Arab Tribes

From the very beginning of the Ottoman conquest of the Middle East in the first half of the sixteenth century to the end of the Empire, Arab tribes created many problems especially in the regions of Basra and Baghdad.²⁴ Even though Arab tribes were not so much effective in Ayntab region, their activities in northern Syria in the seventeenth century opened a new era for the history of tribes of Anatolia. The starting point of this thesis in a sense can be seen as the state's response to banditry of Arabic tribes. Around the middle of the seventeenth century a huge Arabic tribe, called *Şammar*, migrated from Arab peninsula to northern Syria. That migration would be followed by the migration of another tribe, *Aneze*, twenty years later. These

²¹ ACR 68, p. 487 (September 16, 1718).

²² That company was formed by special troops who escorted the money that the state each year sent to the holy land (Hijaz). ACR 68, p. 482.

²³ See ACR 68, p. 460 in Appendix V.

²⁴ Cengiz Orhonlu and Turgut Işıksal, "Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar: Dicle ve Fırat Nehirlerinde Nakliyat." (*Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, Vol. XIII(17-18): 77-102; 1962-3), pp. 96-7

invasions led the flight of peasants living in those regions. The struggle between these two masses led to further misery in those regions.²⁵

In the period of 1691-1731 there were many sporadic cases of banditry of Arab tribes. Like *levends* and other nomads, Arab nomads were also wandering around, seizing properties of people and involving in highway robbery. Here I intend to have a closer look at some important cases of banditry that occurred outside the Ayntab region but affected that region.

II.1.2.1 The *Mevali* Tribe and Huseyin Al-Abbas

In 1694, the Arabic Muntafik tribe captured Basra.²⁶ Just four years later, *Mevalians* under the leadership of Huseyin Al-Abbas began to surround the region.²⁷ In 1699, the Ottoman forces and Arab bandits were in a conflict and during that battle the Ottoman forces had suffered.²⁸ The region in question was one of the farthest regions of the Empire. The tribes and deserts between Anatolia and Basra made the situation much more difficult. One of the easiest ways to reach there was the Euphrates. The Ottomans had already several times built naval and trade ships in the previous century.²⁹ In order to transport provisions (≈ 640 tons of wheat) for troops that were in defense of Baghdad, a fleet was ordered to be built in *Birecik* in 1697.³⁰ We do not know if they were built or not; but in September 1699 constructing a fleet of 60 ships commenced. By February 1701 they could only finish 40 of them. The reason behind that slowness was the distance between the wharf and

²⁵ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı*. (Istanbul: Eren, 1987), pp. 45-6.

²⁶ Orhonlu and Işıksal, "Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar." p. 98.

²⁷ ACR 50, p. 317.

²⁸ In that battle a zeamet holder from Ayntab was killed. ACR 50, p. 313.

²⁹ In their article "Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar." Cengiz Orhonlu and Turgut Işıksal talk about building of fleet in different periods at *Birecik*, which was a town that had a wharf on Euphrates.

³⁰ ACR 47, p. 52

the timber forests. In July 1702 the construction of 60 ships (*firgata*) were completed except for some details, such as the insufficient number of oars.³¹

In 1700, Arab tribes invaded the rural of Basra and Baghdad. Most probably they captured those cities during that period, since according to Orhonlu, in 1701 Arabs had already captured the fortresses of Basra and Korna.³² Moreover, they were attacking and robbing tribes, which the state resettled in *Rakka*. In order to capture and execute Huseyin al-Abbas, the Governor of *Rakka*, *Hüseyin Pasha*, was charged with launching a campaign and the governor of *Maraş*, *Rışvanzade Halil*, would send reinforcement. On March 20, 1701 *Hüseyin Pasha* prepared his army and demanded 800 horsemen and infantrymen who were able to use firearms. Thus on 25 of March they would join and took their departures.³³ Al-Abbas was defeated before April and some of his men were imprisoned. We do not know further about Al-Abbas but in 1720 *Mevali* tribe was still continuing banditry that had begun 42 years before.³⁴

II.1.2.2 Security of Pilgrims and Sheik Kelib

The security of pilgrims was important and a matter of prestige for the state. In order to protect them from bandits, the state paid some money, *surre*, to important Arab tribes. In fact, that money could be seen as a tribute since it was paid to them to prevent their own attacks as well. In 1680 (*h.* 1090) the government donated 23,900 *kuruş* to the sheik of Damascus to distribute among Arab tribes *Al-ma'mur*, *Vehiden*, *Beni Samar*, *Gazze* and others. Between 1680 and 1699 (*h.* 1110) the amount increased to 111,000 *kuruş*. Whenever that amount was not paid, the tribes began to rob pilgrims who happened to travel across their regions on the way to Mecca. In

³¹ ACR 50, p. 181; ACR 51, p. 105; ACR 51, p. 159; ACR 53, p. 5.

³² Orhonlu and Işıksal, "Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar." p. 81.

³³ ACR 51, p. 70.

³⁴ ACR 72A, p. 265.

1698 the *Şerif* not only reduced that amount but also captured 150 of bandits and chained them. During their captivity 50 of them died. That led to further aggression of these tribes. Finally in 1700 (h. 1111) due to insufficient protection they attacked pilgrims and pillaged their properties. Many pilgrims were killed. Remaining pilgrims ran away, leaving behind their properties and animals.³⁵

Sheik Kelib was the Sheik of Damascus in 1705. We do not know whether he had relations with the event mentioned above but in July of 1705 he began to rebel. The governor of Şam (Damascus), Mehmed Pasha, was charged with suppression of that rebellion. As we can see from the records, it was a big rebellion since the armed forces in Rakka, Haleb (Aleppo), Diyarbekir, Ruha, Birecik and Ayntab were called for. The campaign could not advance in success. Court records inform us about several casualties of troops of *Ayntab*. Indeed records do not mention about all. I therefore think that Ottoman Army was seriously defeated since in March 1706 the state was still seeking a solution for the protection of pilgrims.³⁶

According to Raşid, Kelib had killed Hüseyin Pasha of Bosna and the state intended to take revenge of him. Nobody could perform that duty. The government at last assigned an ex-bandit Nasuh Pasha, the son of Osman,³⁷ who was the *muhassıl* (tax collector) of Aydın *Sanjaq* by that time, for the protection of pilgrims. He began to escort the pilgrims in the Arab dominated areas between Hidjaz and northern Syria. In April 1709, a bandit army of 4000 militias ganged up on the pilgrim route.

³⁵ *Tarih-i Raşid*, Vol. 2. pp. 503-4

³⁶ ACR 56, pp. 127, 185, 201, 224, 270, 271, 307.

³⁷ *Nasuh, the son of Osman* was a bandit who wandered around *Aydın*. The government bestowed him the position of collecting the taxes of that region. Then he was appointed to the Baghdad for protection of pilgrims. After he defeated Sheik Kelib he demanded a promotion to vizierate. Not only that demand was rejected but the government decided to eliminate him. Under the command of the governor of Rakka, *Yusuf Pasha*, a tribal army of 10,000 was prepared for a battle. Nasuh Pasha at first intended to fight but his army betrayed him so he planned to flee with his money to Yafa (Jaffa) to sail away. But he was found and killed in 1711 (h. 1123). *Tarih-i Raşid*, Vol.4, pp.14-7. In Çağatay Uluçay's article he was written as Sheik Küleyb. Uluçay based on different sources tell about the same story. Uluçay, M. Çağatay, Üç Eşkiya Türküsü. *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 13 (1958), p. 94.

The forces of Nasuh Pasha attacked them and slaughtered many bandits and the remaining ones fled from the battlefield to join the army of Sheik Kelib. Meanwhile, the Pasha encamped pilgrims in a shadow and sent 20 men for negotiating with Sheik Kelib. In fact, it was a part of the trap that Pasha had set. Sheik accepted the offer and came to the camp of Nasuh Pasha with his army. He went in the tent of the *Pasha* with 30-40 and he made the remaining 1000 militias to wait around the tent. With a signal of Pasha, his men killed Kelib and 7-8 of the *sheik's* men. When they left their dead bodies in front of other Arabs then they began to dissolve and disperse around with horror.³⁸

II.1.3 Kurdish Tribes

Unlike Arabs and Turcomans, Kurds, not only those of Ayntab but the most of other Kurdish emirates also welcomed the Ottoman conquests. Besides the role of the Ottoman pacifist policy, religious differences with Safavids brought Kurds closer to the Ottoman Empire.³⁹ But the Kurdish tribes of Kilis, which were the most notorious groups for their banditry in the period under analysis, lived along the border of Memluks so the relations between those groups and Mamelukes were much important than those with Safavids.

During the reign of the Ayyubid dynasty, a tribe leader called Mend achieved the leadership of Kurds living in the north of Aleppo. Within a short period of time he expanded his authority over all other tribes. However, Yezidi Kurds sometimes struggled with him. After the collapse of Ayyubids and during the sovereignty of Memluks, still a man, Kasım, from family of *Mend* ruled that region. However, Memluks supported a Yezidi sheik, İzzeddin, against him. Despite several attacks,

³⁸ Tarih-i Raşid, Vol. 3 p. 281-3.

³⁹ Solakzade, Mehmed Hemdemi Çelebi, *Solak-zade Tarihi vol. 2.* (trans. Vahid Çabuk, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989), pp.39-45

Memluk and Yezidi Army could not succeed to eliminate him. When Selim I came to conquer the region, Kasım and other opponents supported him against Memluks. However, after conquering those lands, Selim took Kasım and his son Canpolat to Istanbul. The governor of Aleppo, Karaca Beg and his ally İzzeddin sent a report to the sultan, Selim I, to prevent Kasım from coming back to the region stating that otherwise he would lead to a great disorder. As a result, Kasım was killed and his son Canpolat was trained for the state treasure.⁴⁰ After a period of a successful service in the army Canpolat managed to obtain the right to possession of income of Ma'arra and Kilis.⁴¹ After his death in 1572, his son Hüseyin somehow could expand his authority over Aleppo.⁴² He was then to be executed by Sinan Pasha, one of his best friends, under the pretext of being late to the battle with Iran in 1605, in which the Ottoman army was seriously defeated.⁴³

⁴⁰ Şeref Han, *Şerefname*. (trans. M. Emin Bozarlan, Istanbul: Hasat, 1990.) pp. 248-50. Another historian İbrahim Peçevi tells the story as: “when he was a child officials brought Canpolat in presence of the sultan (Suleyman, the lawgiver). The sultan rubbed his earring and ordered them to join him to his harem.” *Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 1*. (trans. Murat Uraz. Istanbul : Neşriyat Yurdu 1968), p. 33. William J. Griswold guesses that he was trained during the first years of Süleyman’s reign. See *Anadolu’da Büyük İsyân, 1591-1611*, pp. 66-68.

⁴¹ Griswold, *Anadolu’da Büyük İsyân, 1591-1611*, p. 68.

⁴² Hüseyin had fought against Iran as a second man after *Cağalzade Yusuf Sinan Pasha* in 1578. Griswold, *ibid.*, p. 68. That loyalty encouraged him to demand the governorship of *Trablusşam* and in response he promised to pay a good amount of tax. The government accepted that desire of him. He received the title *Pasha*. However, a man called *Kamize* did not like that situation, since he was the tax farmer of that district. Moreover he had borrowed 10,000 florin from Sa’d El-Mille ve’d-Din Hoca (According to Bozarlan he was Hoca Sadeddin Efendi p. 257, footnote. 278). When Hüseyin Pasha got that position he took that gold and hit the road in a panic to escape to İstanbul. After a while he was found dead and his gold was stolen. Hüseyin Pasha was blamed for that and he was imprisoned in Aleppo. See *Şerefname*. pp. 257-8. In his Phd thesis Metin Akis also claims his governorship of *Trablusşam* based on the state sources. He also talks about a debt but that was the debt that he borrowed from the state. Metin Akis, *XVI. Yüzyılda Kilis Sancağında Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat* (unpublished Phd. Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tarih (Yeniçağ) Anabilim Dalı: Ankara, 2002) footnote 36, p.8. It may be the amount that each year he had to pay to the state. He might have delayed his taxes. Griswold doesn’t mention about his position of governorship of *Trablusşam*. Similar to Akis he talks about that debt. According to him, since Hüseyin had borrowed an amount from the state he was imprisoned. Griswold, *ibid.*, p. 69. After a while he was found innocent and was set free. Şeref Han, *Şerefname*. p. 258. Anyhow, his struggle with the governor of Aleppo opened the way of his aim to capture that position. Once more his loyalty changed the equilibrium in favor of him; Sinan Pasha sent an order that appointed Hüseyin Pasha to the governorship of Aleppo. After it was approved by the sultan he was captured that position. Griswold, *ibid.*, pp. 75-6.

⁴³ Many historians see that as a great mistake. According to Griswold that was the second most serious mistake that Sinan Pasha had ever done. Griswold, *ibid.*, p. 85. Peçevi reproaches Sinan Pasha for

After the death of *Hüseyin Pasha* his nephew *Ali* held that position. Since *Sinan Pasha* had already been dead, the primary target for revenge no longer existed but he began to fight against his rivals, fabricating excuses about revenge.⁴⁴ After a while the government decided to eliminate him and the famous vizier *Kuyucu Murad Pasha* was sent to Anatolia. According to the Ottoman chroniclers *Ali Pasha* offered peace but *Murad Pasha* rejected.⁴⁵ *Ali Pasha's* army was defeated and after a period of fugitiveness he went to Istanbul to beg the Sultan *Ahmed I*, to be forgiven. Sultan forgave him and appointed him as the governor *Tımaşver* district. A year later, in 1610, he was killed.⁴⁶

II.1.3.1 The Kurds of Kilis and the *Okçu İzzeddinli* Tribe

After the rebellion of *Ali Pasha*, his followers were still effective in *Ayntab* in 1613.⁴⁷ It is not clear what happened there in the following eighty years period but it was apparent that the Kurds of *Kilis* from the 1690s to the end of the period under

leading to trouble. *Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 2. p. 410.* Çağatay Uluçay, goes further and blames him for making decisions that lead to many banditries. To him he was responsible for banditry of *Karayazıcı, Canpolatzade Ali, and Kalenderoğlu. Uluçay, XVII. Asirda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri.* p. 11. To some extent he was right; during the war with Iran he cancelled the right of some 30,000 officers to possess the tax of a land for not being in the battle. *Naima Mustafa Efendi, Naima Tarihi vol. 1. (trans. Zuhuri Danışman, Istanbul, 1967.) p. 171.*

⁴⁴ Griswold, *ibid.*, p. 90.

⁴⁵: According to *Peçevi's* version of the story *Ali Pasha* made an offer to *Murad Pasha*: “If it is my head that is demanded, send a man to whom you trust to my canvas to cut my head off and bring it to you. But if the purpose is eliminating all the bandits, let me hold my position in *Aleppo*. Then let me go to *Kızılbaş (Iran)* and let me take revenge for your losses. Either I will kill them or they will kill me. Let them (bandits, my soldiers) die. We can keep the remaining ones in fortress. Thus all of them will be eliminated.” But *Murad Pasha* did not accept that. *Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 2. p. 437.* *Naima* also talks about such a legend but does not give details. *Naima Tarihi vol. 2. p. 547.*

⁴⁶ According to *Naima* he continued his rebellious behaviors. Since he oppressed people, he was killed. *Naima Tarihi vol. 2. p. 554.* However *Peçevi* tells a different story. After oppressing bandits in Anatolia, *Murad Pasha* returned to Istanbul. When he heard that *Ali Pasha* had been forgiven, he asked the sultan how a man, apparently a *Celali (bandit)* could be forgiven. Then the young sultan sent a decree to capture him and bring him to Istanbul. His fellows warned him that he would be killed. But he did not take their advices and went to *Belgrade*. After 40 days of imprisonment he was killed. *Peçevi* also underlines another story. According to that, the sultan was not in favor of execution of *Ali Pasha* but *Murat Pasha* had him killed and reported to the sultan that he died because of an illness. *Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 2. p. 439.* *Griswold* also talks about a division between state officials about that matter. Some of them wanted him to be executed and some others did not. *Griswold, ibid, p. 122.*

⁴⁷ *Griswold, ibid, p. 125.*

review was still a source of trouble. Sometimes they created serious problems and sometimes just robbed people as almost all other tribes did.

The *Okçu İzzeddinli* tribe was one of the most disobedient tribes not only among Kurds of Kilis but also all over Ayntab region. When Selim I conquered those regions, *Okçu İzzeddinli* was one of the small tribes that were organized under the name of *Sanjaq of Kurds (Ekrad Sancağı)* under the Authority of İzzeddin Beg (the Yezidi sheik).⁴⁸ We do not have any evidence to show whether the *Okçu İzzeddinli* was more influential than others at that time. It can be speculated that the word İzzeddinli here refers to the name of İzzeddin Beg. However İzzeddin Beg had already a group known with his name, *Ordu-yı İzzeddin Beg*.⁴⁹ Whatever it was, after the defeat of the Canpolatoğlu Ali, *Okçu İzzeddinli* tribe, together with other tribes, began to be more active in banditry.⁵⁰

The first record which reports banditry of Kurds of Kilis in the period we analyze was dated 1694,⁵¹ however, they had long been involved in banditry⁵² therefore the year 1694 was not a milestone in their level of banditry. The importance of that year is rather related to the state's decision to fight against them. During the

⁴⁸ In the land register of 1518-20 İzzeddin Beg was recorded as the leader of those tribes. In 1527 those tribes organized as a separate *sanjaq* and again İzzeddin Beg was the leader of them and at the same time he was the governor of the district. Enver Çakar, *XVI. Yüzyılda Haleb Sancağı (1516-1566)*. (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi, 2003), p. 209.

⁴⁹ Enver Çakar, *ibid.*, p. 210. Mustafa Öztürk, *16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar*. (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkez, 2004), p. 22.

⁵⁰ In fact, banditry was a reality of those lands from the very beginning of the Ottoman sovereignty. When Canpolat was sent to Kilis banditry had already been so widespread. Canpolat was able to get rid of them in a short period. *Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 1*. p. 33. Şeref Han tells about an interesting story: "When Sultan Suleyman, The Lawgiver, went for campaign against Iran he encamped in Aleppo until the end of winter... a thief stole a sword embroidered with precious jewels from the section where the sultan used to sleep of the tent to which no one could come to close, even birds could not fly over. Sadrazam Rüstem Pahsa who felt antagonism toward Huseyin Pasha blamed him for that. Since, according to him, no one could dare except for Kurds depend on Huseyin Beg, who had been going too far. Thus, the sultan boiled with rage and decided to eliminate him. But Canpolat wanted a delay the execution for five days. If he could not capture the thief he would accept execution. On the fourth day the thief was captured. Hence he was pardoned." *Şerefname*, p. 252-3. Peçevi also talks about such an event but he does not give any details. See. *Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 1*. p. 33.

⁵¹ ACR 43, p. 199 (d. November 21, 1694)

⁵² ACR 43, p. 210. A man in this dispute mentioned that bandits had robbed his friend four years ago in Kilis. ACR 43, p. 164. (d. January 7, 1696)

period, some bandits from *Şeyhlu*, *Amiki* and *Okçu İzzeddinli* tribes formed an allied band and robbed people.⁵³ In 1696 a new wave of banditry by those groups surfaced. People who had been resettled in *Harran* several years ago came back to their motherlands and began to engage in banditry.⁵⁴ In 1697 the government was still trying to send them back to *Harran*.⁵⁵ We do not know to what extent the government had success in that policy but in 1698 the government sent a decree stating that no one should disturb *Okçu İzzeddinli* tribe since "...they occupied with their own affairs (*kendi hallerinde*)..."⁵⁶ Most probably, they reached an agreement in one way or another.

It appears that the terms of the agreement were broken by one of the sides after a short period of tranquility. In 1703, bandits from those tribes were wandering around in bands formed by 40-50 men.⁵⁷ The *voyvoda* of Kilis, Kartallı Ahmed was assigned with the duty of getting rid of these bandits. 7-800 bandits from the *Okçu İzzeddinli*, the *Amiki* and the *Musabeyli* tribes killed him in his house and looted his properties in 1704. Moreover, they looted properties (worth about 25,677 *kuruş*) of the commander (*serdar*) Abidin *Çavuş*, as well as those of his brother, his two sons, his father and his sister. After that event, the governor of Aleppo was charged with punishing them.⁵⁸ Although in summer the government conducted another campaign against them, throughout that summer they continued banditry.⁵⁹

⁵³ "The community of *Odunlu* and *Kavaklu*, which are subtribes of *Şeyhlu* tribe, and *Karcu*, his brother *Ali*, *Kasabcık Seydi*, *Heladiz oğulları*, *Kör Musa* and *Kızılbaşoğlu Hüseyin* from *Amiki* tribe, *Menla Musaoğlu Seydi*, his brother *Ali*, *Duloğlu Telli*, his brother *Süleyman*, *İnce Davud oğlu Kel Zeyni*, *Çömlek Kasım*, *İnce(?) Hüseyin*, *Kel Selim oğlu Yusuf*, *Kılıççı*, and *Kebaşçı İbrahim* from *Okçu İzzeddinli* were making alliances with each other and their followers...they are robbing people on highways..." ACR 43, p. 198. Those are just known ones. In fact that group seems quite crowded.

⁵⁴ ACR 48B, pp. 136, 137. *Kadızaade Hüseyin Pahsa*, the governor of *Rakka*, had resettled them in *Harran*. Most probably he died or was dismissed in the early days of 1695. Therefore those tribes had been resettled in *Harran* in between 1691 and 1694.

⁵⁵ ACR 48A, p. 221.

⁵⁶ ACR 49, p. 174.

⁵⁷ ACR 52, p. 358.

⁵⁸ ACR 54, pp. 9, 324.

⁵⁹ ACR 54, p. 40 (November 25, 1704.)

Another campaign that was conducted in the very beginning of 1711 continued throughout spring.⁶⁰ During the period, two other tribes, *Tacirli* and *Kılıçlı*, which we shall talk about later, were also targeted together with *Kurds of Kilis*. During that campaign it seems that they resisted against the state army.⁶¹ In 1713 they not only continued banditry but also disobeyed their *voyvoda* and refused to pay their taxes.⁶² In that period several bandits from *Okçu İzzeddinli* draw our attention: *Koco*, *Köse Bekir oğlu Halil* and *Sarı Hüseyin oğlu*.⁶³ Among them especially *Koco* would be a problem for the state. In 1714 a group of 5-600 people from *Okçu İzzeddinli*, *Heşetvanlı*, *Şeyhlü* and *Amiki* attacked the palace of *voyvoda*. During a violent confrontation they killed *Voyvoda Elhac Mehmed Kasım*, his *kethüda*, (servant) five *çukadars* (lackey) and two janissaries. They seized the revenue of the *hass* of the mother of the sultan as well as all the properties and livestock of *Elhac Mehmed*.⁶⁴ At the end of the year the *beylerbeyi* of *Maraş*, *Ali Paşa*, launched a serious campaign against them.⁶⁵

In January of 1720 the government planned another campaign against them.⁶⁶ In that campaign the commander was the governor of *Rakka*, *Ali Pasha*. At that campaign ten bandits were captured and imprisoned.⁶⁷ Nevertheless the problem could not be solved fundamentally. In 1721 they began to fight against each other.⁶⁸ We do not know the reason behind that but the government was discontented about the result. As it was made apparent, the effort of the government could not solve the problem. In 1722, *Koco* was still wandering around and he was even able to come to

⁶⁰ ACR 63, pp. 18, 19, 24

⁶¹ In a report, it was stated that an Ottoman soldier was killed in that battle. ACR 61, p. 43.

⁶² ACR 61, p. 239.

⁶³ ACR 65, pp. 213, 272.

⁶⁴ ACR 65, p. 243.

⁶⁵ ACR 65, p. 220.

⁶⁶ ACR 70, p. 262.

⁶⁷ ACR 70, p. 248.

⁶⁸ ACR 78, p. 322.

Ayntab without any difficulty.⁶⁹ In the period following 1722, the officials reached an agreement with them.⁷⁰ However, *Koco* was still being pursued in 1730.⁷¹

At the end of 1730, the government decided to recruit 1,000 *levends* from the *Okçu İzzeddinli* to use them in Baghdad against Iran.⁷² That decision made bandits of the *Okçu İzzeddinli* radicalize further. In February 1731 they carried out a daring raid with 300 bandits together with some other tribes at the city center of Ayntab, killing 53 people.⁷³ Unfortunately we do not know the exact reason behind that. Since we do not know who those 53 people were either, we cannot be sure whether the targets were officials as they had done before or ordinary city dwellers. After that event the government decided to send them together with their families to Cyprus in exile.⁷⁴ In order to capture them another campaign was launched.⁷⁵

II.1.3.2 The *Kılıçlı* Tribe

This tribe at first took part in sporadic robberies, which might be regarded normal. In 1706 they were resettled in villages of *Menbç nahiye* where the *İlbegli* tribe had been resettled before. At first they were giving the impression that they were loyal peasants who dealt with their own business and disturbed no one.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, some of them refused to be resettled. Those members of *Kılıçlı* went to the district (*nahiye*) of Ayntab and stayed there for one year and a half until villagers from 24 villages complained about them. According to them, they fed their animals on villagers' hay and usurped their cereals, animals and grapes. The estimated value

⁶⁹ ACR 73, p. 248.

⁷⁰ That agreement was mentioned in a record dated April 19, 1730. Therefore, the agreement was reached before that year. ACR 81, p. 106.

⁷¹ ACR 81, p. 212.

⁷² ACR 82, p. 161.

⁷³ ACR 82, pp. 31, 32, 95, 96.

⁷⁴ ACR 82, p. 96 (July 31, 1731.)

⁷⁵ ACR 82, p. 102 (2 records).

⁷⁶ ACR 57, p. 71B.

of the damage was around 36,000 *kuruş*.⁷⁷ Evidently, officials took their complaint into consideration. They immediately began an operation. Some of them were killed and some others were imprisoned in a fortress to be punished later.⁷⁸ Those who could save their lives promised to not get involved in banditry anymore but they did not keep their promise. The governor of Rakka, *Yusuf Pasha*, sent them an order to make them give back the properties they had stolen to their ex-owners and resettled them in areas where the government had determined before.⁷⁹ Not only they renege on the deal of the agreement but also they went further by killing people. Some members of *Kılıçlı* did not hesitate to kill people during banditry.⁸⁰ Because of that, as mentioned before, in the campaign of 1711 the *Kılıçlı* was also targeted.

So far it seems that everything is logical, since each story we talked about has coherence in itself. However, an interesting record that I have found in ACR 64 shows how history could be a fake and why the historian should be suspicious about historical phenomena. This record was not dated but most probably it was written in June, 1712. The record contains a report that was sent by the governor of Rakka, *Yusuf Pasha*, to the *müftü* of Ayntab:

You sent us a man and a proclamation, claiming that, “The Kurds of *Kılıçlı* disturb our villages and they take our wheat and barley.” Then we immediately sent an official (to them). They said “we bought the wheat and barley from villagers.” Then some livestock and cloths were seized from them and given to (your) *subaşı*s and the representatives of the village. You had sent a complaint to the noble state and claimed that “200 horsemen of the Kurds of *Kılıçlı* came to our city and raided the shopping district and bazaar and they killed a man.” ...However, in fact those horsemen had been 16 people. And they had brought three camels to sell at the bazaar. And you had claimed, “you raid our villages” and then attacked them. After they escaped you send them their camels later...⁸¹

⁷⁷ ACR 58, p. 172. (the beginning of June, 1707)

⁷⁸ ACR 57, pp. 38, 58, 59.

⁷⁹ ACR 63, p. 56.

⁸⁰ ACR 63, pp. 90, 255.

⁸¹ ACR 64, p. 40.

Do we need to revise our evaluation of those tribes? I do not think so. Even if the *Kılıçlı* in fact was an innocent tribe it is obvious that they had some problems with other villagers. What is meant here is that, the conflict between groups in a society gave birth to banditry. Banditry was something mutual but only one side was able to legitimize its' behaviors and labeled the other as bandit. In fact almost every group more or less took part in banditry or theft. But only some groups were conspicuous. That could be because of discriminatory attitudes against some groups or a stronger tendency of some groups to banditry. On the other hand it might be argued that the governor had sympathy for the *Kılıçlı*, therefore, he manipulated the reality. That is to say, what we see can be true or false but banditry as a mode of conflict between groups was a manifest phenomenon everyday life.

From the succeeding part of this record we learn that, because of so many complaints, *Kılıçlı* tribe was decided to be sent away from *Ahsendere* region of *Elbistan* and resettle in *Rakka*. However, after they went to *Rakka* people began to complain about *Cerid* and *Tacirli* tribes. Then, *Yusuf Pasha* ordered them to come back to *Elbistan*. As far as one can understand, *Yusuf Pasha* was trying to support *Kılıçlı* in order to use them against other bandits and to start a negotiation between villagers and *Kılıçlı*. As we shall see later he achieved his aim.

In between June 13 and July 5, 1712 (Cemaziyelevvel 8-30, 1124) some representatives from 19 different villages applied to the court. Everyone more or less talked about the same thing. Bandits of *Kılıçlı* had been coming to their villages every summer during the last five years. They had been destroying their crops and usurping their livestock and other properties. They notified the state on a number of occasions. The state had sent them decrees to make them return those properties to their owners. They accepted to compensate the damage but only those that were done

in 1711. So representatives informed the court about the amount of damage done to their villages.⁸² The estimated total value of the damage was more than 20,000 *kuruş*. After fixing the cost of the damage the *Kılıçlı* and villagers, thanks to the negotiator appointed by *Yusuf Pasha*, reached an agreement in a meeting held at *Düztepe* (now is a ward in the city of Gaziantep) on July 25, 1712. According to that agreement, *Kılıçlı* side agreed and promised that their members from then on would ever wander around the *Kaza* of *Ayntab*, *Menbiç*, *Ravendan* and *Sof Mountain*⁸³ and would not bother or pester anybody. They accepted to pay 20,000 *kuruş* to the shipyard⁸⁴ of the sultan and would not claim the blood money (*dem u diyet*)⁸⁵ of 40 members if they broke their agreement.⁸⁶

It seems that the efforts of *Yusuf Pasha* were in vain. Several months after the agreement, the state launched an operation against them. In September the government decided to resettle them back in Rakka.⁸⁷ That is to say, when they first time resettled in Rakka, as mentioned, *Yusuf Pasha* let them go back to their home place at Maraş. But at that moment, they would be sent to Rakka once more. It can rightly be thought that *Kılıçlı* did not keep their promise. However, the problem was more than that. We learn from a decree (*firman*) sent to the governor of Aleppo, *Mehmed Pasha*, that the government had confiscated (added to *havass-ı hümayun*) the *timar* lands in the *nahiyes* of *Zamantu*, *Pınarbaşı*, *Murmeşk (?)*, *Hinziri* and

⁸² ACR 64, pp. 205, 207 (2 rec.), 210(2 rec.), 222 (2 rec.), 223 (2 rec.), 224 (3 rec.), 225, 226, 227, 227, 228, 229, 230.

⁸³ We can interpret this point as that, after *Kılıçlı* tribe was resettled in Menbiç (Northern Aleppo), where *İlbeqli* tribe had been resettled before, they began to threaten the southern villages of Ayntab.

⁸⁴ As mentioned before at that period both the threat of Arab tribes and Iran in Basra and Bagdad increased the importance of the navy and transport ships which was built in Bireck wharf. Most probably with that article they meant navy of the Euphrates.

⁸⁵ Bloody money was very important in culture of those tribes. According to that when a member of a group was killed his family or other members of group had right to demand either a certain amount of property and/or money or retaliation (*kisas*). According to this article 40 members would be allowed to be punished and executed.

⁸⁶ ACR 64, p. 174.

⁸⁷ ACR 64, pp. 75, 78.

Ahsendere of Maraş together with the *malikane* of *kethüda* of *Kılıçlı*.⁸⁸ According to that decree, though *Kılıçlı* was ordered to resettle in Rakka, some of them had not gone there and they were still in Maraş and were involved in banditry.⁸⁹ At this point it will not be wrong to talk about a disagreement between the center and *Yusuf Pasha*. As a matter of fact the governors of Rakka were charged with resettling almost all tribes that were decided to send to Rakka. The contact with Aleppo instead of Rakka in the case of *Kılıçlı* might be because of that disagreement.

In November 1714 the government launched a campaign under the leadership of the governor of Maraş, *Ali Pasha*, against several tribes, which were the *Kılıçlı*, the *Tacirli*, the *Koyunoğlu*, the *Elci*, the *Bektaşlı* and the *Doğanlı*.⁹⁰ If those tribes would resist against them, they were allowed to kill the members of the tribes.⁹¹ During that conflict the tribes were destructed and more than 80 bandits were killed. Remaining members, who could save their lives, fled from Maraş to Ayntab.⁹² Since the Ottoman forces were insisting on eliminating that problem, they were pursued for a long time.⁹³ In that campaign lots of females and young boys were captured. They were imprisoned in the fortress of Ayntab. *Ali Pasha* planned to exile them to Cyprus. In his several orders sent to officers of the fortress of Ayntab he insisted on treating them in a good manner and giving them 150 *kıyye* (≈192 kg.) bread per day.⁹⁴ 447 (445) people had imprisoned after that operation. When they were registered two months later (in the first week of January 1715) only 272 of them

⁸⁸ That may be seen as a part of abolishing of *malikanes* in 1715. See, *Tarih-i Raşid*, Vol. 4, pp. 176-7.

⁸⁹ ACR 64, p. 75.

⁹⁰ ACR 65, pp. 225, 227, 229.

⁹¹ ACR 65, p. 229.

⁹² ACR 65, p. 228.

⁹³ ACR 65, pp. 226, 227, 228; In February 1715 it was ordered that if the remaining bandits were seen they would be punished. ACR 66, p. 245.

⁹⁴ ACR 65, p. 226. (November 19, 1714.) *Ali Pasha* in an order sent to the officials of Ayntab said that: "if there will be any missing person from (the number recoded in) the record you will have not been any answer (to excuse)" ACR 65, p. 217. (December 25, 1714.) However he could not prevent some tragic events. One boy from *Kılıçlı* was sold as slave in Aleppo. ACR 65, p. 206.

were registered as alive, 98 (97) had died and 76 people were too sick to even tell their names.⁹⁵ This means that each person consumed 431 gram bread. If the officers of the fortress really give them that generous amount, *ceteris paribus*, they had not to die so much in such a short time period. Indeed we do not know the conditions in the fortress, which they had been living in. Another important point is that the record had been written just before they began their long journey to Cyprus. If these 76 people were as sick as could not tell their names, we may then reckon them dead as well, since in such a condition arriving Cyprus after a long and difficult journey would be miracle, if they could stand up and walk through.

Adult males were not as unlucky as more vulnerable children and women. Some of them could save their lives. On the other hand men were not as lucky as those captives since lots of them were killed during the battle. And whenever they were captured they were put to the sword.⁹⁶ Nevertheless “the rumps of the sword” (*bakiyettu's-suyuf*) in every occasion continued banditry.⁹⁷ The growing conflict between Iran and the Ottomans created an appropriate situation for banditry. In 1131 *Kılıçlı* tribe was still carrying on banditry. Among 300 raiders who destructed Ayntab, we mentioned before, there were bandits from *Kılıçlı*.⁹⁸ Moreover, the year was 1775 and *Kılıçlı* was still a problem for the state.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ See Apendix ACR 65, p. 216.

⁹⁶ According to the orders sent after the battle where ever they were seen they had to be eliminated. When they captured and imprisoned 3 bandits from *Kılıçlı* and 4 from *Doğanlı* they were ordered to be put under the sword. ACR 65, p. 225 (November 29, 1714).

⁹⁷ ACR 78, p. 33 (February, 1727)

⁹⁸ ACR 82, p. 95.

⁹⁹ ACR 120, p. 97. Cited from Zeynel Özlü, *Gaziantep'in 120 Numaralı Şer'îye Sicili: Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme*, (unpublished master thesis, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1999), p. 445.

II.1.4 Turcoman Tribes

After the defeat of Seljukids in 1243, the weakened central authority opened the way for other Turcomans who had potential to construct political units. Thus, lots of principalities appeared. Only one, the Ottomans, could survive for a long time, expanding its rule over others, the last one of them being *Dulkadirs* that would be captured by Selim I in 1515.

The principality of *Dulkadirs*, which centered on Maraş and controlled Ayntab region for a long time, to a certain extent, was a buffer zone between the Memluks and the Ottomans. Sometimes they were pro-Memluks and sometimes pro-Ottomans. The last *bey* (ruler), *Alaüddeve*, of this principality during the reign of Mehmed II had established good relations with the Ottomans. According to Solakzade, “[*Alaüddeve*] had obviously betrayed...with provocation of Circassians [Memluks] they did not hesitate to raid the Ottoman territories...he did not fulfill the call for the campaign against Iran...[and] his ill-treatment towards traders exceeded the level of mercy...”¹⁰⁰ It is for sure, Turcomans were accused of banditry. In the battle in 1615 his army was defeated and those who could escape from the Ottoman rage ran to *Turna Mountain* for cover, but the Ottoman forces pursued and destroyed all of them.¹⁰¹

II.1.4.1 The *Tacirli* Tribe

The *Tacirli* was one of the most active tribes in the period of analysis. In their complaints some members of the *Kuşçu Ceridi* tribe claimed that bandits of the *Tacirli* and the *Ufacıklı* tribes had come to their village in 1688/1689 (h. 1100) and had usurped their properties; killed two men, and set 30-40 houses on fire with all the

¹⁰⁰ Solakzade, *Solak-zâde Tarihi*, p. 35.

¹⁰¹ Solakzade, *Solak-zâde Tarihi*, p. 37.

possessions in them.¹⁰² This is a unique case since burning down a house was not a common behavior of bandits, let alone burning down 30 of them. It was either a false claim or there might be an enmity between *Kuşçu Ceridi* and the other two tribes. In struggles between such groups such extreme violent phenomena could be possible. Nevertheless some members of *Tacirli* were imprisoned in that period because of banditry.¹⁰³

Because of their banditries *Tacirlis* were resettled in Rakka in the 1690s. However they escaped from Rakka and began to engage in banditry around *Maraş* and *Kars-ı Maraş*.¹⁰⁴ Nomadic segments of this tribe during their seasonal migration were destructing the crops and usurping properties of villagers.¹⁰⁵ With the help of *Okçu İzzeddinli* and *Bahadırli* tribes they expanded their field of banditry over villages of Ayntab.¹⁰⁶ People sent a petition to Istanbul in October 1704 to complain about their banditry.¹⁰⁷ The state ordered the payment of a pecuniary punishment of 50,000 *kuruş* and settling them in Rakka. Most probably because of that punishment, they began to sell more than 100 oxen secretly; but some spies informed the officials about that.¹⁰⁸ The governor of Maraş, *Hasan Pasha*, ordered Ayntab the capture of *Köse Hasan* who was blamed for that sale and that he be sent to Maraş with the animals he had.¹⁰⁹

The sporadic banditries of *Tacirlis* continued throughout the period of 1706-1708.¹¹⁰ We do not know whether the governors launched operations against them or

¹⁰² ACR 41, p. 22 (April, 1692.).

¹⁰³ ACR 43, p. 221.

¹⁰⁴ ACR 54, p. 273 (d. December, 1701).

¹⁰⁵ ACR 52, p. 358 (d. March, 1703).

¹⁰⁶ ACR 54, p. 33. The villagers of *Çartlı*, *Tıhkatan* and *Burç* complained about their banditries. (August 21, 1704).

¹⁰⁷ ACR 54, p. 46.

¹⁰⁸ ACR 55, p. 261. In another records it was said that *Köse Hasan* and his janissary friend *Osman Beşe* brought about 100 oxen, 4 camels and horses and some other properties. ACR 55, p. 258.

¹⁰⁹ ACR 55, p. 259.

¹¹⁰ ACR 57, pp. 26, 192, 231; ACR 58, pp. 42, 197 (3 rec.), 202; ACR 59, pp. 20, 50; ACR 60, p. 199.

not but as mentioned before, in the campaign of 1711, the *Tacirlis* were also targeted beside Kurdish tribes mentioned above. The government insisted on resettling them in Rakka since, as mentioned before, when *Kılıçlı* tribe was sent to Rakka, their banditry increased in 1712.¹¹¹ At last, an army equipped with fire arms was sent to put them in order.¹¹² If they resisted against the army, they would be massacred and their properties would be pillaged.¹¹³ In the campaign of 1714 *Tacirli* shared the same destiny with *Kılıçlı*.¹¹⁴ After that, from 1727 onwards, the name *Tacirli* was mentioned in many records together with *Okçu İzzeddinli* and *Kılıçlı*, (sometimes *İlbeqli*, *Bektaşlı* and *Elci* tribes as well) tribes.¹¹⁵ Can we conclude that bandits from those tribes cooperated in their actions? Most probably yes. In the case of raiding Ayntab city, they seem to have cooperated with *Okçu İzzeddinli* and *Kılıçlı*.¹¹⁶

II.2 The State Response to Banditry

The history of banditry in the Ottoman Empire is a history of the cycle of activation and deactivation of banditry. Whenever banditry appeared it was suppressed immediately on the second attempt if not on the first. That can be attributed to the success of the state or her centralization. However, as we have seen in the discussion so far, that success was an illusion. As a matter of fact, shortly after their repression, bandit groups reorganized and carried on their activities. What changed from before to after repression was a chronic tendency of banditry; because, instead of structural solutions, the state resorted to case-based solutions each time. But this does not mean that the state was completely unaware of the structural

¹¹¹ ACR 64, p. 40.

¹¹² ACR 62, p. 155 (May 11, 1712).

¹¹³ ACR 62, p. 156.

¹¹⁴ ACR 65, p. 229. Among the women and children recorded you can see someone from that tribe. See, ACR 65, p. 216.

¹¹⁵ ACR 78, pp. 33, 147; ACR 82, pp. 23, 95, 96.

¹¹⁶ ACR 82, pp. 95, 96.

problems. For example, if the policy of resettlement of tribes that began in the 1690s and continued till the second decade of the twentieth century¹¹⁷ had been successful, the Empire could have demolished the tribal structure, which was one of the main factors behind banditry. All in all, that rational project turned into an irrational insistence; since whenever they were resettled in elsewhere they came back to their host territories. The state could not provide security for them in their new places, or worse; in order to cut their link with their places of origin, the state reserved their territories for some other groups. That led to reproduction of banditry rather than elimination of it; because, as well as having violated the laws by returning back to their lands, they always faced the risk of struggling against newcomers when they got back.

II.2.1 The Process of Complaint and Response


We can divide the Ottoman realm into three entities (see figure below). The level of masses is the level of banditry, in which there is conflict between different groups. At this level the state spies¹¹⁸ and the victims could directly or indirectly (letters, petitions = *mektub*, *arzuhal*, *mahzar*) apply to officials on an organizational level or could send information about the situation to the Porte - the central government in Istanbul. Generally, the cases of minor importance were directly solved at the level of Organization 2. There are many records about how the disputes between plaintiffs and litigant bandits were solved in courts. On the other hand, if the

¹¹⁷ On March 9, 1916 a commission, called General Directorate of Immigrants and Tribes (*Aşâir ve Muhâcirin Müdüriyet-i Umûmiyesi*), was established as continuity of the resettlement policy of the Ottoman Empire. The resettlement of tribes continued at least until 1922. <http://www.khgm.gov.tr/kutuphane/toprakiskan1.htm> [Accessed August 8, 2005]. For the transition of that policy also see Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), pp. 1-9.

¹¹⁸ In 1705 spies informed the *beylerbeyi* of Maraş Hasan Pasha about the illegal activities of *Tacirli* tribes. See ACR 55, pp. 258, 259, 261.

situation was much more serious than they could deal with, they informed *beylerbeyis* or the central government.

Figure II-1: The Process of State Response to Banditry.



The *beylerbeyi* was the key figure in the state's struggle against banditry throughout this period. People who had problems with bandits often applied to them. *Beylerbeyi* could order the officials and notables of the Organization 2 what they had to do. He could order them to send someone to his council (*divan*) or execute someone. He had more authority in executive matters than anyone of Organization 2. For example, in a record dated 1697 the governor of Rakka ordered the warden of the castle (*kale dizdarı*) of Ayntab to send him the two prisoners who were imprisoned in

the castle.¹¹⁹ In another case, the *beylerbeyi* of Maraş ordered the *sancakbeyi* and the substitute judge (*naib*) to capture some bandits and to send them to Maraş.¹²⁰ Moreover, in 1701 the *beylerbeyi* of Aleppo demanded three bandits imprisoned in the castle to be punished.¹²¹ And in the last example, the *beylerbeyi* of Maraş ordered the officials of Ayntab to execute some imprisoned bandits and to send him their heads.¹²² Obviously, it can be seen the *beylerbeyi* could interfere with the judgment and that intervention was legitimized by *firman*s of the sultan. According to normal procedure, Ayntab was dependent on Maraş province; however, in the period under review one can see more orders of the *beylerbeyi* of Rakka than those of the *beylerbeyi* of Maraş. One reason behind this was that the *beylerbeyi* of Rakka was chosen by the state to resettle the tribes in Rakka and to deal with the problems created by them. Another reason might be about the rank of the *beylerbeyis*. In the records it can be seen that the governors of Rakka were often entitled to vizierate however the governorship of Maraş was turned almost into a kind of patrimonial administration of *Rışvanzades*.¹²³

Once a complaint or information was sent to the Porte the government would send decrees that ordered officials what they must do and how. Based on the organization of the operation, the center could send decrees to a *beylerbeyi* and give him full authority of the operation or could send these to any officials of

¹¹⁹ ACR 49, p. 170.

¹²⁰ ACR 55, p. 259.

¹²¹ ACR 60, p. 232.

¹²² ACR 65, p. 226.

¹²³ Between 1707 and 1737 Halil, Mehmed, Seyyid Mehmed, and Süleyman Pashas, who were from the same family known *Rışvanzades* held the governorship of Maraş respectively. Orhan Kılıç, *18. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdarî Taksimatı: Eyalet ve Sancak Tevcihatı*. (Elazığ: Ceren, 1997), pp. 132-3. Halil pasha was executed in 1712 due not to join the army during the war with Russia and being bandit. He was most probably from *Rışvan* tribe since there were several thousands bandits from this tribe and other Kurds. *Tarih-i Raşid*, Vol. 3, pp. 357-8. This is an important reason for the state to not trust them. Moreover, in the court records almost all the governors of Rakka were mentioned as viziers however, the same thing cannot be mentioned for *Rışvanzades*. As a matter of fact, in that period there were also some other governors but we do not know their titles.

Organization 2, mostly to all of them. But the general procedure was that, the *beylerbeyi* was chosen as the absolute authority in the operation and organization 2 was ordered to support him. Sometimes the decrees were only sent to *beylerbeyis* who were told that some officials of the organization 2 and/or *reaya* and/or some tribes were entrusted with him in that operation. After that, *beylerbeyi* sent orders (*buyruldu*) to anyone whom he needed the help of. When *beylerbeyis* sent their orders they sent the original *firman* (the imperial decree), or a copy of it together with his *buyruldu* (order). Hence, in the *kadı* records often these two orders were registered one by one.

Sometimes the government let them to be much free about the decision of what would be done against bandits. It could be ordered that “do what is needed” or “punish them with a punishment that they deserve”. Such obscure orders were embodied by *beylerbeyi*. At other times, they had no such luxury, as made apparent by such orders like “without sparing a minute, go/do...” or “execute someone and send their heads to my sublime gate.” Nevertheless, the organization of operation was planned by *beylerbeyis* or *sancak* officials.

II.2.2 The Ottoman Policies of Banditry

What did they have to do against bandits? In fact, the answer to this question varied according to the character of banditry. It might not need to mobilize a hundred militias to capture a single bandit or no need to punish them at all. The policies can be collected under some headings like, ‘imprisoning’ (*kalebendlik*), ‘amnesty’, ‘exile’, ‘(re)settlement’, ‘agreement’, ‘intimidation’, ‘recruitment’, ‘campaign’, ‘unrestricting’ and ‘banning’.

II.2.2.1 Imprisoning and Amnesty

Imprisoning and amnesty were the basic and most prevalent approaches to all the similar crimes. Usually ordinary criminals and bandits of small bands were imprisoned to execute later or used as slaves in galleys. Many bandits were recognized during their illegal activities or informants informed on them to officials so that they could be easily captured and brought before the court or other officials. Some others who were seen less guilty were sent to the prison after being captured in campaigns launched against their groups.

Sometimes when officials were convinced that they had corrected themselves (*ıslah-ı nefis*) they could be released. In a document, it had been recorded that old *muhzırbaşı* would be kept in prison until he corrects himself.¹²⁴ A man from Kilis named Seyit Mehmet was imprisoned but escaped by misleading the officials with a spurious *firman*.¹²⁵ After several months of freedom he was captured once more. Within a short time he was released because officials were convinced that he had corrected himself.¹²⁶

II.2.2.2 Exile and (Re)settlement

The more powerful groups were sent to exile to the distant places to isolate them from the communities they were attached to. Cyprus Island was one of the ideal places for that. As mentioned before, captives of the *Kılıçlı* and other tribes were sent

¹²⁴ ACR 55, p. 260 (April 18, 1705). There were made efforts to capture another man in order to correct his behavior; however, he escaped so he could not be captured. ACR 61, p. 279.

¹²⁵ ACR 58, p. 21 (January, 1707).

¹²⁶ ACR 58, pp. 21 (March 21, 1707), 45 (May, 1707).

to this island. The *Tacirli*, the *Kılıçlı*, the *Okçu İzzeddinli* and the *Bektaşlı* tribes were also decided to be sent there in 1731.¹²⁷ But we do not know if that had taken place.

On the other hand, resettlement was something more than punishing banditry. It had dual purposes: on the one hand the state tried to benefit from economic resources which came to halt because of depopulation; on the other hand the state gave priority to the resettlement of the tribes who took part in banditry. Thus, it became a kind of punishment to such tribes.

Due to banditry, invasion, of Arabic tribes, from Rakka to Harran, many settlements were depopulated. One of the primary aims of the resettlement policy was repopulation these empty places.¹²⁸ The government especially chose the nomadic tribe to settle there. With doing that the government planned both to increase the state revenues with putting the empty lands under cultivation and to pacifying the nomadic tribes who often engaged in banditry.¹²⁹ However, many sedentary tribes were also sent to Rakka for resettlement. At this point we must find a valid reason if the state did not put some land under the cultivation in expense of some others.

On the other hand, this policy was a part of the state's intention of preventing the banditry of Arabic tribes.¹³⁰ In this sense, the tribes settled in Rakka would be exempt from some taxes in return for protect themselves and these lands with their own forces.¹³¹ Moreover, if anyone of them committed crime they would hand

¹²⁷ ACR 82, p. 96. Since the tribes ressetled in İç İl involved in banditry the state decided to send them to Cyprus in 1712. Ahmet Refik, *Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri: (966-1200)*, (İstanbul: Enderun, 1989) pp. 143-4.

¹²⁸ ACR 40, p. 67; ACR 41, pp. 17, 42.

¹²⁹ ACR 56, p. 322.

¹³⁰ The government wanted to put *Savi* and *Semek* tribes under control; to prevent *Ben-i Kays* tribe not passing over Euphrates and to prevent Mevali tribe not collect money from the peasants around Aleppo. ACR 62, p. 233. in another record mentions that Reyhanli tribe would be settled near Aleppo both to put there under cultivation and to pacify the bandits of Arab tribes. According to this record "since the Mevalis realized the calamity will face with" they also accepted to be settles down. ACR 72A, p. 265.

¹³¹ ACR 41, p. 17.

him/her over to the law and when someone engaged in banditry, they would inform the governor of Rakka about the event and join the governor's forces to oppress bandits.¹³²

The plan of the government did not work properly. Some tribes accept settlement but some tribes did not go to Rakka, let alone, run away from Rakka. Almost all tribes mentioned in the table of Appendix I/A, who (re)settled in Rakka, Hama, Humus and Çukurova, left the place of resettlement. Sometimes big groups and sometimes families escaped. The Ottoman policy of banditry back fired, let alone, diminishing or eliminating the banditry. The tribes who resisted to the policy or who run away automatically labeled as bandits, since what they did was disobedience to the sublime imperial order. Moreover, they were labeled as bandits, since most of time they really involved in banditry. The problem of resettling the run away-tribes continued through out the period in question, and even, continued through a long period after that period. Sometimes, exactly similar operations launched against them, no matter whether they were bandits or not. One of such cases in this sort is about some Turcoman and Kurdish tribes who escaped from Rakka and scattered all over Ayntab region. In his order the governor of Rakka said to the officials of Ayntab to kill them and loot their properties.¹³³ In 1697 the government use cannons in an operation against some such tribes to force them to go back Rakka.¹³⁴ In another operation the government used 200 horsemen and 1,000 infantrymen who were able to use firearms.¹³⁵ These cases are only few examples among many to show how serious an operation can be.

¹³² ACR 41, p. 42.

¹³³ ACR 40, p. 148 (March 22, 1693).

¹³⁴ ACR 47, p. 34. See also ACR 48A, pp. 224, 225 (d. 1697).

¹³⁵ ACR 48A, p. 226.

No doubt, the resettlement policy triggered some fundamental socio-economic changes. The case of the *Okçu İzzettinli*, the *Amiki* and the *Şeyhlü* tribes is an explanatory example of such change. The governor of Rakka, Kadızade Hüseyin Pasha killed the leaders of these tribes and the remained members of these tribes were sent to Rakka. However, some 500 of them escaped and ran to mountains. Only when Hüseyin Pasha was dead they dared to go down to Kilis and Azaz where they had been living before. More than that, the resettled people also began to escape back to their motherlands in small groups. But they did not see a place where they left behind. The state had already sold their lands to some other people. Therefore, they were engaged in banditry. They prevented these new comers to cultivate the lands and captured some of their lands back by force. According to the decree if they could not be prevented and resettled in Harran many peasants would leave their villages.¹³⁶ The state was right to be annoyed, since in just several months later many peasants left their lands and took shelter in the farms of powerful (*zi-kudret sahibi*) lords.¹³⁷ In another document dated 1711 these farms were mentioned as military farms (*askeri çiftlik*).¹³⁸ Such demographic movements were against the benefits of the state, since the state was loosing its taxpayers.¹³⁹

However the social turmoil led by the bandit fugitives was much more serious. The state sent not only the tribes who were living in countryside, but any member of a tribe living city was also often sent to the place of resettlement. When two *imams* from the *İlbeyli* tribe, who were living in Ayntab, were sent to Rakka they lost their jobs.¹⁴⁰ In another case a man, who had been living in the city before resettlement,

¹³⁶ ACR 48B, p. 137 (May, 1696). In another case some people of the *Kızık* tribe who were resettled in Menbiç captured a land belong to *İlbeyli* tribe. ACR 54, p. 105 (October or November, 1704).

¹³⁷ ACR 48B, pp. 2, 3 (November 18, 1696).

¹³⁸ ACR 63, p. 29.

¹³⁹ ACR 48B, pp. 2, 3.

¹⁴⁰ ACR 43, p. 83; ACR 47, p. 9.

escaped from Rakka. When he came to the city his house had already been sold. That situation was led a tension and he began to harass other dwellers of the district.¹⁴¹ As a matter of fact it is a good example to see the logic behind banditry.

When fugitive could not be powerful enough, they began to take shelter among other tribes. A record dated 1704 mentioned the fugitives who took shelter in some Turcoman and Kurdish tribes.¹⁴² And this is also against the state interests since the host tribe would also be treated as guilty as the fugitives. On the other hand, such alliances would contribute the powers of such tribes.

II.2.2.3 Agreement and Intimidation

Social power facilitates a group's bargaining power against the state. As it is seen, some Arab tribes could have such a bargaining power. The state had to reach an agreement if she wanted to guarantee the safety of the roads, which passed through the lands of these tribes. According to Rita Stratkötter, the amount that the state paid them for security depended on their bargaining power that changed from time to time.¹⁴³ Another example of this issue is the case of Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha. He sent a letter in 1606 to the state in which he offered a deal of sending more Army to the campaign in return for more privileges.¹⁴⁴ The state had reached a reasonable compromise in order to prevent them from involving in banditry. However, such agreements lasted only for a limited period of time since either the balance of power changed in favor of the state or somehow one side broke the agreement. To make a

¹⁴¹ ACR 52, p. 263 (April 2, 1703).

¹⁴² ACR 52, p. 46.

¹⁴³ Rita Stratkötter, *Von Kairo nach Mekka. Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Pilgerfahrt nach den Berichten des Ibrahim Rif'at Basa: Mir'at al-Haramain*. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen-Band 145, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin 1991 Cited from A. Latif Armağan, "XVIII. Yüzyılda Hac Yolu Güzergâhı ve Menziller (=Menâzilü'l-Hacc)." *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 20 (2000), p. 78, footnote 18.

¹⁴⁴ To see that deal see Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, pp. 189-90.

sense, the banditry of Canpolatoğlu Ali and that of Sheik Kelib can be considered respectively.

Another type of agreement, which was much prevalent, was unilateral and contained imposed terms (*nezir*) defined by the state. In such agreements, the state did not make concessions; rather, in order to deter the bandit groups, she held them liable to heavy fines. The above mentioned *Düztepe Agreement* which was held between villagers and the *Kılıçlı* Tribe in 1712 was a good example of such agreements. Another example is the state agreement with the *Com*, the *Musabeyli*, the *Okçu İzzeddinli*, the *Amiki* and the *Şeyhli* tribes in between 1722 and 1730. According to that, these tribes agreed to pay 20,000 *kuruş* if they would involve in highway robbery and/or steal something from anyone.¹⁴⁵ Another agreement was between tribes of İfraz-ı Zülkadriyye and the tax-farmer, Paşazade İsmail Paşa. According to this agreement, if they had created difficulty in paying their Imperial taxes (*mal-ı miri*) or had given up cultivating their lands and taken part in banditry they would have paid a fine of 20 *kise akçe* each. However they did not remain loyal to the agreement and they robbed 65,000 *kuruş* from the provincial treasure of Aleppo.¹⁴⁶ Fahrettin Tızlak also mentions about such an imposition. After the suppression of the banditry of the *Şeyh Hasanlu*, the *Disümlü*, and the *Kurtlu* tribes in 1782, the state imposed them to pay 1,500 *kuruş* if they ever got involved in banditry again.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ ACR 81, p. 106 (April 19, 1730).

¹⁴⁶ ACR 57, p. 249. The same amount was recorded as 130 *kese* in ACR 57, p. 248. This means that each *kise* contained 500 *kuruş*. This is appropriate what M. Zeki Pakalın says. See Pakalın “Kese” *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*. Vol. 2. pp: 247-249. According to that each tribe accepted to pay 10.000 *kuruş*. We do not know the exact number of those tribes which were shown under the name of *İfraz-ı Zülkadriyye* but in one record 48 tribes (*cemaat*) were mentioned. See ACR 67, p. 558. That is, if every one of them were responsible for that they would be expected to pay a total 480.000 *kuruş*. It seems like an amount impossible to be collected.

¹⁴⁷ Fahrettin Tızlak “XVIII. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısı İle XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Yukarı Fırat Havzasında Eşkiyalık Hareketleri.” (*Belleten*, Vol LVII(220): 751-780; 1993), p. 762-3.

II.2.2.4 Recruitment and Campaign

The Ottoman state had realized the importance of recruitment from early periods of the Empire. Non-Muslim children were seen essential for the future of the central state. In the period under review, the state had already witnessed the miracle of recruitment.

The aim behind recruitment was to eliminate the potential threat of the bandits. Canpolatoğlu Ali's deal with Kuyucu Murat Pasha that has been mentioned above clearly explains this point:

If it is my head that is demanded, send a man to whom you trust to my canvas to cut my head off and bring it to you. But if the purpose is eliminating all the bandits, let me hold my position in Aleppo. Then let me go to *Kızılbaş* (Iran) and let me take revenge for your losses. Either I will kill them or they will kill me. Let them (bandits, my soldiers) die. We can keep the remaining ones in the fortress. Thus all of them will be eliminated.¹⁴⁸

Murat Pasha did not accept that deal but the state would try that method in the period of analysis. Throughout a long period of struggle with the *Okçu İzzeddinli*, the state could not get rid of the problem. Eventually she tried a new solution for bandits of the *Okçu İzzeddinli* in 1725. The Porte tried to recruit 2,000 *levends* from *Çermik*, *Bucak*, *Seyudek* (?) regions of Diyarbekir and from *Okçu İzzeddinli* and other tribes (*cemaat*) of Kilis.¹⁴⁹ In the following several orders dated 1725-1726 it was mentioned that 1,000 *levends* were demanded from Ayntab region.¹⁵⁰ Most probably those *levends* were those who were demanded from Kilis. Finally in December 1730, 1,000 *levends* were ordered to be conscripted from *Okçu İzzeddinli* and to be sent to Bagdad.¹⁵¹ It seems that the government could not recruit them throughout these five

¹⁴⁸ *Tarih-i Peçevi* vol. 2. p. 437.

¹⁴⁹ ACR 76, p. 116.

¹⁵⁰ ACR 77, p. 205, 219.

¹⁵¹ ACR 82, p. 61.

years from 1725 to 1730. Moreover, the raid on Ayntab that took place several months after the last order shows that plan failed.

The last form of punishment was campaign and operation. From smallest groups to the biggest ones, the state launched operations against bandits. The general characteristic of these operations was capturing bandits or preventing their actions. However some other operations called *sefer* (campaign) connotes the possibility of active conflicts between the state forces and bandit groups. In the period under review there were a lot of examples of campaigns, which were interestingly recorded by the name of ethno-lingual identity of the tribes on which the campaign was launched: ‘Arab campaign (Urban seferi)’, ‘Kurdish campaign (Ekrad seferi)’, and ‘Turcoman campaign (Türkmen seferi)’. Sometimes they were named by the tribal names, like *İfraz-ı Zulkadriye seferi*.

Generally speaking records are silent about the details of campaigns. Thanks to chroniclers we learn what happened during some important battles like that of Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha and Sheik Kelib described in detail before. Here I would like to emphasize some other points concerning those campaigns. Discussing the burden of those campaigns, the resistance of the state forces during the campaigns, their behaviors against targeted people and the use of *nefir-i amm* soldiers (arming the populace) in the operations are essential to understand the banditry in the Ottoman Empire.

Banditry had a twofold economic burden on the state. On the one hand, with robbing the taxpaying *reaya*, bandits stroke the state income; on the other hand in order to prevent banditry, the state had to launch operations, which did cost a serious amount. Depending on the importance of the campaign, some or all of the *levends*, *tumar* and *zeamet* holders, janissaries, other elements of the central army and *nefir-i*

amm in a specific region could be dispatched. For example, one of the most serious campaigns was launched against Arabs in 1700. In a *firman*, the government ordered all the administrative units in Anatolia to supply food for the recruited 1,000 *silahdars* and 1,000 *sipahs* from Anatolia.¹⁵² Moreover, in some campaigns the state forces took cannons with them as a measure or to use in those campaigns. Indeed, the amount of the expenditure changed depending on to what extent the state was taking the operation seriously.

The state expenditure for those campaigns reached an important amount at the period under review. Immediately after the attack of bandits of the *Okçu İzzeddinli*, the *Amiki* and the *Musabeyli* tribes to the *Voyvoda* of Kilis, Kartallı Ahmed, in 1704, the government launched a campaign against these tribes. In August, the official ordered nine villages that each taxpaying unit (*hane*) pay 1.25 *kuruş* for the military unit (*bayrak akçesi*) that was dispatched to Kilis to punish the bandits who were held responsible for the event. Accordingly, those nine villages would prepare a sum of 23 *kuruş* within a day.¹⁵³ In fact this amount is insignificant when compared to the expenditures from the beginning of June to the end of November. In the period of June-September, the total money taxed for the campaign was 1,074 *kuruş*, 1,064 *kuruş* of which was spent for the expenses of the campaign.¹⁵⁴ In the period of October-November, 906.5 *kuruş* was spent out of taxed 911 *kuruş*.¹⁵⁵ That is to say, the total money collected in the period of June-November was 1,985 *kuruş* without

¹⁵² These two corps were in fact were two cavalry group of the central army. Those corps was paid every three months. But in this case these corps seems to be mercenaries who were paid daily. See ACR 51, p. 122.

¹⁵³ ACR 54, p. 9.

¹⁵⁴ See Appendix III ACR 54, p. 18. The reason behind the leftover 10 *kuruş* is that taxpayers were divided into taxpaying units each of which paying the same amount. For example in the period of June-October from the countryside of Ayntab 228 *kuruş* was collected and the taxpayers of the city divided into 188 units each paying 4.5 *kuruş*. This shows us that after the calculation of estimated or real expenditure the expenses were allotted to determined units.

¹⁵⁵ See Appendix III ACR 54, p. 46. In this period only city dwellers were taxed. Of 188.625 units each paid 4.83 *kuruş* (4 *kuruş* and 10 *sümün*).

mentioning 23 *kuruş*. To make sense of these figures, one must take into consideration that the total annual *avarız* taxes collected in *Ayntab Sanjak* in the period between May 1704 and April 1705 (h. 1116) was about 1,870 *kuruş*.¹⁵⁶ As it is clearly seen, the expenses within 6 months for eradicating banditry exceeded the total *avarız* revenues of 11 months. If the total expenditure is calculated for a whole year it can be seen that in fact the expenses doubled the income from *avarız* taxes. The deficit increased further in 1714. During the campaign launched against *Kurds of Kilis, Kılıçlı, Tacirli*, and some others, the expenditures calculated for the cost of three days was 4,529 *kuruş*.¹⁵⁷ However, the income coming from *avarız* for the year 1713 was 1,243 *kuruş* and 1271 *kuruş* for 1715 (January-November). Worse, 4,529 *kuruş* was only calculated for the expenses of three days.¹⁵⁸

As a matter of fact those campaigns were not so big campaigns. For the campaign of 1714 only 3 flags (150 troops) were mentioned in the records of expenditure. Now let us look at the expenditure of the campaign of 1700 against Arabs. Among troops, commanders (*ağa*) would be paid daily 20 *akçe*, chiefs (*kethüda*) 15 *akçe*, officers (*zabit*) 10 *akçe* and others 7 *akçe* each. We do not know the exact number of people in each group. Ignoring high rank troops, the minimum daily expenditure for those 2,000 cavalries can be calculated as 116.7 *kuruş*. That amount was the only money that they would receive as salary. In addition, subjects on their route would supply their provisions. We do not know the amount of that provision. However, even if the total cost was accepted as 116.7 *kuruş* daily, the total expenditure of the campaign was far more than those expenditures mentioned above. Though we do not know the duration of the campaign, according to the term they would be allowed a vacation at the end of one-year period. That is to say their

¹⁵⁶ ACR 53, p. 100. In h. 1116 there were 373.875 tax units and each paying 600 *akçe* (5 *kuruş*).

¹⁵⁷ See Appendix III ACR 65, p. 220.

¹⁵⁸ ACR 61, p. 280; ACR 66, p. 244.

expenditures can be calculated between 3,500 *kuruş* (for one month) and 42,000 *kuruş* (for one year).

In all these operations, the almost whole costs of the operation were supplied by *re'aya*. And *re'aya* had to pay a quite serious amount to inform the government about their submissions. For instance, during the campaign of 1704 over Kilis, to inform the government about the event they paid a man (*muhzir*) 120 *kuruş*. Of course such expenses can be seen as normal for such operations. However, though the commanders of the operation received a quite good amount, which was 250 *kuruş* in the campaign of the 1704, he also received some extra money and service. During those campaigns they were demanding some money for their servants (*saraydar*¹⁵⁹) for their services in their palaces in his absence. He also got 12 *kuruş* for the repair of his palace. Moreover, he did not forget his shepherd who would receive 3 *kuruş*.¹⁶⁰ During the campaign of 1714 the commander, Ali Pasha, got some money for the clothes of his *saraydars*. It is interesting that the costs of the gifts presented to him were also calculated as the costs of the campaign.¹⁶¹ The money spent for those extra costs may not be seen a big amount but it became widespread.¹⁶² This reflects a degeneration of the bureaucratic and military discipline. That is to say, such costs were more than the fundamental cost of the struggle of the state to defeat bandits.

Indeed those expenditures mentioned are just only the surface of iceberg. The human cost of those operations also needs to be considered. Those operations could have tragic results for both sides. An operation was not only launched to punish bandits but bandit families and other members of their tribes could be punished as

¹⁵⁹ *Saraydar* were Armenians of Van or Kurds who were working in the kitchen and in other services in the houses of notables. Pakalın, "Saraydar" *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*. Vol. 3. p. 126.

¹⁶⁰ For a further information see Appendix III ACR 54, p. 18; ACR 54, p. 46.

¹⁶¹ See Appendix III ACR 65, p. 220.

¹⁶² The governor of Rakka, Ali Pasha, in 1718 ordered Ayntab to prepare provisions for six days. The expenditure was calculated 9,359 *kuruş*. In the record especially gifts (*pişkeş*), palace expenses (*saray harcı*) and repair of the palace (*saray tamirâtı*) were emphasized. ACR 68, p. 198.

well. This point can be clearly seen in the campaign launched against *Kılıçlı* tribe in 1714.¹⁶³ The following tables based on the record reporting the transfer of captives to Cyprus Island (See Appendix IV ACR 65, p. 216.) show how women and children suffered from that campaign. Those tables only contain the people whose names were recorded. Thus, they do not include 76 people, who, since they were seriously ill, were not able to tell their names to the officials. Table 1 shows the number and percentages of adult and child females and males among the total number of captives. The significant point is that adult males were very few among those captives, only 3%. One of the reasons behind this might be the fact that; adult males had more capability to escape when compared to children and women. The second reason might be that they were killed during the battle or executed after the battle. If we think that 5 (45.5%) of them had died in the prison we can say that those 11 adult males most probably were old people since adult men can be expected to be as stronger as adult women.¹⁶⁴

Table II-1: People Captured During the Campaign of 1714, and Age-Gender/Total Captives Ratio

Total		Gender					
		Female		Male		Total	
		%	#	%	#	%	#
Age	Adults	69.6	257	3.0	11	72.6	268
	Children	12.2	45	15.2	56	27.4	101
	Total	81.8	302	18.2	67	100.0	369

¹⁶³ As mentioned above, during the same period the *beylerbeyi* of Maraş, Ali Pasha, launched a campaign against Kurds of Kilis as well. Moreover, from the same record mentioning the campaign over *Kılıçlı*, we learn that some members from the *Tacirli*, the *Koyunoğlu*, the *Hacılar*, the *Elci*, the *Dokuz*, the *Mamalı*, the *Elhalub*, the *Bektaşlı*, the *Cihanbeyli*, and the *Doğanlı* tribes were also captured. See Appendix IV ACR 65, p. 216. That is to say, with that campaign the government might have tried to bridle all tribes taking part in banditry in one attempt.

¹⁶⁴ As a matter of fact one can reject this conclusion since 11 is not a sufficient number to infer a highly reliable conclusion. However, as mentioned before, at the same time 7 prisoners who were accused of being bandits from the *Kılıçlı* and the *Doğanlı* tribes were put the sword. Most probably those were young males. Moreover, talking about those tribes in the later periods as “the rumps of the sword” refers to a massacre happened at that period.

Tables 2 and 3 show respectively how many people were alive during the record and how many of them had died in prisons. Of living people, 86.8 percent were females. Especially the adult females constitute a great proportion 78.7 percent. However among the deceased children constitute a greater proportion than adults. This picture seems normal since children were more vulnerable than adults. Since the dispersion of these four categories was not normal, it can mislead us. For example the proportion of deceased adults and deceased children were close to each other however in general children much more vulnerable than adults.

Table II-2: Living Captives of the Campaign of 1714 during the Record and Age-Gender/Total Living Captives Ratio

Living		Gender					
		Female		Male		Total	
		%	#	%	#	%	#
Age	Adults	78.7	214	2.2	6	80.9	220
	Children	8.1	22	11.0	30	19.1	52
	Total	86.8	236	13.2	36	100.0	272

Table II-3: Deceased Captives of the Campaign of 1714 during the Record and Age-Gender/Total Died Captives Ratio

Died		Gender					
		Female		Male		Total	
		%	#	%	#	%	#
Age	Adults	44.3	43	5.2	5	49.5	48
	Children	23.7	23	26.8	26	50.5	49
	Total	68.0	66	32.0	31	100.0	97

Comparing Table 1 and Table 3 depicts the situation much clearly (see Table 4). For example it can clarify such a question like; what proportion were deceased adult females among the total number of adult females? We can see clearly which

groups were more vulnerable and which were stronger. In the prisons 26.3% of captives had died. If one considers those 76 sick captives who also died, it can be seen that 38.9% died only in prison. And god knows how many of them died on their way to exile to Cyprus. The calamity mostly struck children (48.5%), especially female children (51.1%). This table shows how much the death rate was among the adult males. That highness changes the picture. Even though the 32% percent of deceased people were males, of males 46.3% were dead. The proportion was lesser among females, of whom 21.8% dead.

Table II-4: The Death Rate among Adult and Children, Female and Male Captives of the Campaign of 1714 (Table 3/Table 1 Ratio)

Died		Gender		
		Female %	Male %	Total %
Age	Adults	16.7	45.5	17.9
	Children	51.1	46.4	48.5
	Total	21.8	46.3	26.3

In fact, it was not only the relatives of bandits who suffered from those operations since other people also often suffered from them. A man from *Gözü Kızıllı* tribe named Isenbeg applied to the court and charged some officials with seizing his money and properties by force:

When the men of the *beylerbeyi* of Maraş, Mustafa Paşa, were investigating the bandits of *Tacirli* four months ago, mentioned Menla Ahmed, Ali and Yakub, who unfairly sneak on me, brought them to my house. They made them to seize my 5 camels, worth 60 *kuruş*, 2 horses worth 30 *kuruş*, 8 goats worth 2 *kuruş* and 50 *kuruş* ready coins.¹⁶⁵

In their advocacy those three men claimed that the *beylerbeyi* of Konya had sent an order to loot the properties of *Tacirilis* wherever they found. And they claimed that

¹⁶⁵ ACR 58, p. 202 (the beginning of May, 1707).

they found them in Isenbeg's home. Moreover when they informed about him, that he was also one of the highway bandits, his properties were also looted. In the following three records, Isenbeg and two other men from the same tribe were accused of being bandits or cooperating with bandits respectively four, ten and eleven years before.¹⁶⁶ Isenbeg applied to the court for an event that had happened four months ago but he was accused of banditry that happened 4 years ago.

There are several other cases that quite resemble this case. A man from the *Okçu İzzeddinli* tribe claimed that when the *beylerbeyi* of Rakka, Kadızade Hüseyin Paşa, came there (to resettle them in Harran) 15 years ago, some men usurped his 130 goats.¹⁶⁷ He lost the case. Again, Hüseyin from *Bayadlı* tribe claimed that the mule that was under the ownership of İsmail was actually his mule, which was taken by force by the *kethüda* of *Tacirli*, Ali. In his response, İsmail claimed that three years ago when *kethüda* of *Tacirli* had gone to resettle *Bayadlıs*, their *kethüda* had bought that mule for 35 *kuruş* and sold to Ali. Two witnesses confirmed what İsmail told before the court so Hüseyin lost the case.¹⁶⁸

There are two shared features of those three cases. Firstly, in all of them plaintiffs accused men assigned by the state as officials of operations.¹⁶⁹ Secondly, all of plaintiffs lost adjudications. I am not sure whether these are accidental. Here it is important to rethink whether the courts could satisfy the needs and expectations of the *reaya*. Though those plaintiffs were considered as deceivers, their cases mirror a tension created due to the state conflict with tribes and anyhow in a situation of

¹⁶⁶ ACR 58, p. 197 (3 records) (the beginning of May, 1707).

¹⁶⁷ ACR 57, p. 297 (November 1706).

¹⁶⁸ ACR 53, p. 225 (December 1703).

¹⁶⁹ One can oppose this point since the last two cases talks about resettlements but not campaigns. As we shall see later the resettlement operations were as serious as campaigns launched against bandit tribes. Even in many records those operations were recorded as campaigns.

disorder no one can reject the high possibility of irrational and unfair behaviors either from the state or bandits.

Indeed there were other tokens of that tension. Once one group was declared as a bandit group, the others were forbidden to hide their members or their properties which most of the time the state tried to capture since either they were evaluated as robbed properties or the unpaid taxes. According to an order dated 1713, a man, named Abdullah, was accused of hiding and protecting the women and bandits of *Avşar* tribe. So his house would be sealed off.¹⁷⁰ It can be seen as a normal procedure of fighting against banditry; however the social comfort corrupted further. After the serious defeat of *Kılıçlı* tribe in 1714, as we have already mentioned, a boy from this tribe was sold by a janissary in Aleppo as a slave. In another case, a man, Üveys Beşe -most probably a Janissary or a provincial cavalry- from *Kızılhisar-ı Tahtani* village had married a woman from this tribe just after that defeat. More correctly he had brought that woman to his house and declared that he married her. The husband was now, April 1715, in the army. When he was away two times some officials had come to that village and demanded some money from villagers under the name of *Hizmet*. Moreover, a representative of the *mütesellim* of Ayntab came to the village and harmed villagers. Because of that, villagers wanted the son of Üveys and his wife to leave the village together with that woman.¹⁷¹ That is the point that makes the banditry communal. And this is why we could talk about something like tribal banditry.

It appears that in this period discrimination rose against tribes. This is another important point in understanding tribal banditry. It was easy for us to handle them as bandits but in fact their banditry could be something different from what we

¹⁷⁰ ACR 61, p. 282.

¹⁷¹ ACR 66, p. 130 (April 29, 1715).

understand. That is to say, they did not need to be actual bandits in order to be labeled as bandits. What happened to *Dedesli* tribe can clarify this point. 16 cavalry *delibaşs* (kind of military unit formed as an alternative to *levends*) had attacked some members of this tribe and killed one of them. They justified their action by accusing them of being bandits.¹⁷²

Public Army vs. bandits

As mentioned above, the government was using almost every kind of soldier against bandit groups. However, there were three important reasons behind preferring public army instead of or beside regular army or mercenaries. Firstly, the wars on the eastern and western fronts affected that decision. Secondly the government tried to decrease the costs of operations. Lastly, such a strategy could increase the effectiveness of the operations.

It was imperative for the state to keep a standing army ready due to long wars with Austria, Russia, Iran and Venice. Especially wars with Iran required a great men power. During those wars it was hard for the government to get rid of bandits. Hence the state had to find an alternative to standing army to use for solving internal problems.

As mentioned above, the conflict with bandits created a multi-faceted burden for the state. One way to minimize this burden was seen as using public armies against bandits. But this does not mean that such an army had no cost. The Officials directed their cost to bandits. Thus they were allowed to loot the properties of bandit groups. The best representation of this can be seen in the words of the *beylerbeyi* of

¹⁷² ACR 67, p. 327 (the end of October or beginning of November, 1716).

Rakka: “heads for us, properties for you.”¹⁷³ An order dated 1697 ordered the villagers of Ayntab that if bandits came to their villages and mistreated them, they were allowed to kill them. People who had killed bandits would seize properties of them.¹⁷⁴ In this case we cannot speak of an operation but the villagers were encouraged to defend themselves. Besides, they could rob bandits legally. Again, in 1707 a campaign launched against Turcomans of *İfraz-ı Zulkadriye*. Public army was called for this campaign and they were ordered to “...immediately arrive there. Kill them and plunder and spoil their properties. Capture their leaders and send to us.”¹⁷⁵

Indeed promising plunder might be meaningless without a legal ground. A *fatwa* dated 1695 answered whether killing bandits might be glorified and whether those who killed them were meritorious in God’s sight. According to *fatwa*, one who killed them would be meritorious in God’s sight and whom they killed would be martyrs.¹⁷⁶ In another *fatwa* dated 1697 it was legalized that if bandits showed resistance against armed forces, armed forces were allowed to kill them and plunder their properties.¹⁷⁷ Such a legitimization might be required much more for another army than public army. In this period, persuasion of an army to be mobilized against bandits was not an easy task. Sometimes the government threatened them when they were unwilling to take part in the operations against bandits. A *firman* dated 1703 ordered the governor of Maraş to launch an operation against Levends and Turcoman bandits. In that operation *tumar* and *zeamet* holders needed to be used. But if they refused to join the army or opposed the *firman*, their right to use lands would be

¹⁷³ In fact it was not clear who says that, but since at that time the governor of Rakka was dealing with the tribes, which had escaped from Rakka, we attributed this sentence to him. See ACR 43, p. 214.

¹⁷⁴ ACR 47, p. 36. In another record it was ordered same thing but here they were needed to cut their heads and send to Rakka. ACR 49, p. 173.

¹⁷⁵ ACR 57, p. 267 (January 24, 1707).

¹⁷⁶ ACR 43, p. 210 (August 27, 1695).

¹⁷⁷ ACR 47, p. 52.

abrogated and those rights would be conferred to someone else.¹⁷⁸ In 1704, this time the target was Kurdish bandits. However, somehow army had not joined the operation yet. Consequently, the governor of Maraş sent an order to Ayntab:

The troops did not go where they were ordered to go. Go there until the time of the afternoon prayer (*ikindi*). The troops who did not go to the campaign under the flag of Alaybeyi will be killed and their properties will be seized in the name of sultan and their houses will be put under seal. And give foods (lands) of *timar* and *zeamet* holders who haven't joined the operation to someone else.¹⁷⁹

We do not know what happened to them or whether the government was serious in this threat or not. In another similar case *Alaybeyi* and some *timar* and *zeamet* holders deserted from the campaign against *İfraz-ı Zülkadriye* without completing their duties. *Alaybeyi*, İsmail, was dismissed and a man from among *zeamet* holders was appointed to that position. Moreover, the lands confiscated from some *zeamet* and *timar* holders were supplied to some others who were thought to have deserved donation.¹⁸⁰

However, such an orientation did not always work due to the conflict of practice and laws. If the properties of bandits were those they had robbed from innocent people, then how right was it for the armed forces to plunder them? According to Islamic Law (*Şariat*) the ownership still belonged to the person, from whom the property was stolen. *Şeyhülislam Ebusuud Efendi* (1490-1574) clarifies this point. The question is that: “For example, the slave Bekr has been sold to Amr by Zeyd. Then the slave is proved to be stolen. Can Zeyd get the slave after Bekir Pasha has decided to get Bekr from Amr and judged Zeyd to give the money back to Amr?” His answer is that “the one from who Bekr was stolen was the owner. (So) he

¹⁷⁸ ACR 52, p. 45 (December, 1703).

¹⁷⁹ ACR 54, p. 14 (August 7, 1704).

¹⁸⁰ ACR 58, p. 12 (January 25, 1707).

will get him.”¹⁸¹ There are many other examples that the owners found their stolen property and proved their ownership before court and therefore took it. After the defeat of Kılıçlı in 1714, Ali Pasha ordered that some properties taken from those bandits to be sent to him.¹⁸² We could not be enlightened whether those properties were plundered from bandits or were bought from bandits sometimes before. If the first option was true than it means that those who took part in campaigns with the aim of counter-banditry (plunder) were disappointed. Therefore, possibly, they would be unwilling next time to join the army. If the second option is true then we must ask why the right owners waited till the defeat. 40 bandits from Kurds of Kilis had already killed the *çukadar* of the governor of Rakka and six other men in December 1709. After that two *levend* flags (100) had been charged with overcoming that problem. They had been able to kill six bandits and the remaining ones had escaped. After *levends* had returned back they had also returned back for taking revenge of their killed six friends. Because of that the settlers of three villages left their villages and migrated away.¹⁸³ This is one of the reasons why I have claimed that the banditry could be much more widespread than we think. Villagers who were threatened by bandits might hesitate to inform the state about what had happened to them.

Lastly, is this an effective method to get rid of bandits? To some extent it can be reckoned effective. First of all, by using villagers against bandits, the problem could be solved faster. Instead of informing the government and waiting for the response, ordering villagers that whenever bandits came to their villages they could kill them or could start operations automatically without being obstructed by

¹⁸¹ Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi'nin Fetvalarına Göre Kanuni Devrinde Osmanlı Hayatı*. p. 238.

¹⁸² ACR 65, pp. 226, 225.

¹⁸³ ACR 60, p. 229.

awkward bureaucratic hierarchy. When Okçu İzzeddinli and other tribes raided Ayntab in 1731 the governor of Rakka immediately demanded help from *Kızık*, *Çepni*, *Bahadırlı* and *Reşi* tribes.¹⁸⁴ Secondly, if villagers could be successful to prevent bandits the government would save an important amount of money and manpower. And lastly, since those people were potential bandits, the government had dual benefit from that. Especially it is important to underline that in many cases the government used tribal armies.

II.2.2.5 Unrestricting and Banning

Like other armed forces, *nefir-i amm* also had a cost. If ordering the villagers to protect their own villages or their recruitment was so simple, there had to be measures to keep them ready for fight. In other words, the villagers had to easily reach firearms. Arming *reaya* led to a contradiction that those flexible-minded people could easily change the side. After all, the space that banditry reproduced itself always fed on those masses. Because of that the government often restricted gun production in the seventeenth century.¹⁸⁵ In the period under review restriction of firearms continued. In a decree dated 1722 the government ordered closing down of the gun-producing workshops in Haleb, Şam, Sayda Beyrut, Ruha, Amed, Malatya, Ayntab and Maraş on the grounds that Arab bandits got the guns which were bought from them.¹⁸⁶

In this period ordinary dwellers of the cities were not allowed to carry fatal tools but it was almost impossible to restrict the armament of people of countryside. The close bond between countrymen and arms was something more than organizing

¹⁸⁴ ACR 82, p. 31.

¹⁸⁵ Ronald C. Jennings in his article "Firearms, Bandits and Gun-Control-Some Evidence on Ottoman Policy towards Firearms in the Possession of Reaya, from Judicial Records of Kayseri, 1600-1627." gives many examples about gun control in the seventeenth century.

¹⁸⁶ ACR 73, p. 259 (April, 1722).

countrymen as militias against bandits. Arms are not only tools with which humans kill each other but also human beings saw armament obligatory in their struggle with nature. For example, can a hunter or a shepherd be imagined without arms? Their professions would be irrational unless they did protect themselves and their means of survive.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, the logic behind armament of the groups like tribes was similar to that of states. That is to say, tribalism can be seen as a primitive version of nationalism and the relations between them as international relations. Suzette Heald cogently asks the question that “What does it mean to be warrior? What does it mean to be a thief?” The answer she offers for African tribes quite correctly explain the Ottoman tribal banditry. “Historically, the two are closely linked in the pastoral and agro-pastoral societies of Eastern Africa where political opposition was expressed largely through cattle raiding.”¹⁸⁸ This is why I insisted on looking at the relations between them to understand what banditry is. However, if those groups were living in the same system, in which, unlike international system, the rules were clearly defined by the ruler and laws, they could not struggle for survival and domination unrestrictedly. Thus, the arm control policies can be considered in this context.

Another point is that, the government used mercenaries not only in the wars with other states but also in the campaign against bandits. Especially *sekbans* had to go to campaigns together with their lords. On the other hand, as mentioned above, they were one of the most notorious bandit groups in the Empire. Though they were often thought as products of a natural process, which is related to economic deprivation, vagrants who joined that army, *levends* as a group, was an artificial

¹⁸⁷ A depiction of Ottoman Vlah shepherds can make sense. See Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause*. p. 160.

¹⁸⁸ Suzette Heald, “Tolerating the Intolerable: Cattle Raiding Among the Kuria of Kenya.” (in *Meaning of Violence: A Cross Cultural Perspective*. ed. Göran Aijmer & Jon Abbink, 101-121. New York: Oxford, 2000), p. 101.

group. The bond between their members was not as natural as that between the members of a tribe. The flags under which they joined and formed a group or the uniforms they were wearing created an artificial symbolic representation of a group unlike tribes' symbol of blood, which shall be discussed later. At least from the point of view of the government it seemed so. The government forbade their flags and clothes. The term the government offered was that if they left their flags and accepted to join under other flags like *divanegan*, *gönüllüyan*, *azeban* and *farisan* they would be pardoned but those who refused that and were still wandering in the clothes which were identical to them would seriously be punished.¹⁸⁹ The government must have thought that there were some malevolent people among mercenaries otherwise it must have known that reforming them as new groups could not have solved the problems they created.

II.3 Conclusion

This chapter has underlined several points: Firstly, the banditry, except for some short intervals, was a long-lasting and continuous phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, it was a broader concept than one that can be understood by looking at a specific kind of group. Lastly, as it is evident, the Ottoman response to the banditry can be examined under several contradictory concepts.

Without considering its long history, banditry cannot be understood clearly. This is why the thesis of Barkey remains premature. Could it be the case that in the seventeenth century banditry contributed the centralization of the state but in the eighteenth century led to its decentralization? Or should we consider *ayans'* banditry in the eighteenth century was still contributing to the rise of central state? It must not

¹⁸⁹ ACR 69, p. 245; ACR 75, p. 22.

be forgotten that the *sened-i ittifak* of 1808 was the most noticeable agreement with bandits we have ever seen. It is far from to prevent notables from political banditry. Moreover, I wonder if the non-Muslim banditry, which turned into separatist movements in the nineteenth century, can also be seen as contributor to the centralization of the state.

On the contrary, though the state was able to appease all uprisings or bandit movements, their effect on the state was like drops gradually eroding a stone by constantly striking it. Even, James Scott claims the same for what he calls ‘everyday forms of resistance’:

Collectively, however, these small events may add up almost surreptitiously to a large event; an army too short of conscripts to fight, a workforce whose foot dragging bankrupts the enterprise... (p. 6.) Acts that, taken individually may appear trivial, may not have trivial consequences when considered cumulatively.¹⁹⁰

Without mentioning the cost of banditry, the benefit of the state from it cannot be claimed. We have tried to show some costs of banditry at first glance, let alone its long term costs.

We have grouped the policies of the Ottoman Empire under several groups of two contradictory approaches. Barkey successfully interprets almost all such contradictions as the indicators of the power of the state. It is for sure that agreement was a more clever approach than fighting but can we be really sure that it worked? None of approaches above could prevent banditry; because, without detecting the real factor behind banditry, it could not be prevented. What the Ottomans did was extinguishing burning sporadic trees in a fortress fire, and when they extinguished the fire, or they thought that they did so; the flames had already spread to another tree. One of the basic factors was economic degradation. Understanding the peasant

¹⁹⁰ James Scott, “Everyday Forms of Resistance,” (in *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. ed. Forest Colburn, pp. 3-33. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), p. 13.

response to the seventeenth century crisis is the starting point of Barkey's approach. It is right that the reaction was much in form of banditry than a collective action in Barkey's sense. However she does not enlighten us whether the economic deprivation stopped in the period she has reviewed. She depicts the picture as if at the end of the seventeenth century the state had already overcome the serious political rivals -in fact to her none of bandits could be serious political rivals- and become a highly centralized state.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND BANDITRY

“Me against my brother. Me and my brother against my cousin. Me, my brother, and my cousin against the stranger.”

Arabic proverb


III.1 The Ottoman Social Structure

In the Ottoman historiography *millet* system is often associated with socio-religious organization and *timar* system with socio-economic organization of the Ottoman social structure. On the other hand, the tribal system is not given the same importance as the ‘millet’ and ‘timar’ systems. The one reason behind this is *millet* and *timar* systems were legally defined systems, whereas the tribal system was much a traditional social organization. For example, *millet* system was shaped by the legal space of Non-Muslims (*Zimmi*) drawn by Islamic Law (*sharia*). According to this system, there are two millets, which are ruling Muslims (*Millet-i Hakime*), and ruled non-Muslims (*Millet-i Mahkume*).¹ Nevertheless, *millet* system cannot be considered as purely religious, since such a social organization that was based on a belief system was at the same time an ethnic organization. On the other hand, *timar* system was a fundamental economic organization of the classical period of the Ottoman Empire. It was the main source of the Ottoman military and finance. Besides, it was a social

¹Bilal Eryilmaz, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Millet Sistemi*. (İstanbul: Ağaç, 1992), p. 13. According to this system Armenians, Jewish and Orthodox Greeks were recognized as different *millets*; however we are not sure about the positions of some other groups like Alevi Turcomans, Yezidi Kurds, Durzi Arabs and Assyrians. Alevis, Yezidis and Durzis were most probably seen as heretics than different sects or religions. So even if the state was not so negatively treated them, except for the Alevis after fifteenth century, the social pressure on them was much influential than political pressure of the state.

organization, which organized the society based on the relationship between labor, and land, which defines the productive capacity. Because of these factors *millet* and *tumar* systems have drawn historians' attention more. However, if it is the Ottoman tribe the point at issue, historians mainly reflect a reductionist tendency in their approach to the issue.² Tribes are almost always considered as identical to nomads, who are seen as deviant and non-stop problem-creating entities. Tribal system was not a *de jure* defined system it was rather a traditional social system formed by relation of blood. Because of that, historians almost always excluded tribal system from social structure of the Empire and analyzed it separately. However, the role of the tribes both in the formation of the state and in its transformation can hardly be ignored.

Figure III-1: Tribes in the Ottoman Social Structure



² The same approach cannot be claimed for pre Ottoman tribes, which often seen as the nomads who created a great empire.

III.2 An Ideal Type of Ottoman Tribal Organization

Tribal system was an optional system in the Ottoman social structure. Tribal ties usually dissolved more in the cities compared to the countryside. And tribal system was much widespread in Muslim communities than non-Muslims. Lastly, it was seen much in eastern regions than western regions of the Empire.

As we mentioned before the analysis of structural organization of tribal system is no less problematic than the definition of banditry. Kinship organizations, in fact, are quite systematic genealogical trees. The terminology used by tribes to represent their genealogy is constructed according to the generations.³ Ziya Gökalp details the structure of the Ottoman tribes as in the following table.

Table III-1: The lineage system of the Ottoman tribes⁴

Turks	Arabs	Kurds	French
<i>Kavim</i>	<i>Kavim</i>	<i>Kavim</i>	<i>Ethnie</i>
<i>Uruk (Cil)</i>	—	—	—
<i>İl</i>	<i>Şa'b</i>	<i>Bend</i>	<i>Peuplade</i>
<i>Kol</i>	<i>Kabile</i>	<i>Kabile</i>	<i>Confederation</i>
<i>Boy</i>	<i>Amâre</i>	<i>Amâre</i>	<i>Tribu</i>
<i>Bölük</i>	<i>Batın</i>	<i>Obe</i>	<i>Phratrie</i>
<i>Tire (Fahz)</i>	<i>Semiye</i>	<i>Ber</i>	<i>Clan</i>
<i>Yarım Tire (Fasile)</i>	<i>Tâli Semiye</i>	—	<i>Sous Clan</i>
<i>Soy</i>	<i>Asabe</i>	<i>Ezbet</i>	<i>Agnat</i>
—	—	<i>Malbati</i>	—
<i>Ocak</i>	<i>Ehl</i>	<i>Mal</i>	<i>Famille Agnatique</i>
<i>Akev</i>	<i>Ayal</i>	<i>Khani</i>	<i>Ménage</i>

Even though the above complex terminology was used to describe tribes, we cannot see the same complexity in the Ayntab court records. From the above list the

³ One of the practical reasons behind that terminological differentiation is the application of tribal laws. The tribal sanctions were rearranged according to the degree of kinship. Ziya Gökalp gives some examples of how punishment for the blood feud changes according that structure. *Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler*. p. 22.

⁴ For the structure of the Arabic and Turkish tribes see pp.19-21. He does not give a list for structure of Kurdish tribes however he talks about them in details from his explanations we draw a list for Kurdish tribes. 24-34.

terms *İl, Boy, Kabile, Ehl* and *Ayal* are only look familiar after reading the court records. In the records, all of these terminologies reduced to only six terms: ethnicity (it means *kavim* but I did not come across this term in the documents), *aşiret, cemaat, oymak, ehl* and *ayal*. However, the problems occur not just because of such reductionism, but also the meanings of terms are blurred in records because the terms were often served different purposes. Therefore, depicting the structures of the Ottoman tribes becomes difficult. Subsequently, this difficulty leads to a disagreement among historians. According to Cengiz Orhonlu the tribal system was formed by the hierarchy of *boy (aşiret), oymak (Cemaât), oba (mahalle)*.⁵ The model of Faruk Sümer was a little bit broader than that of Orhonlu: *el (il, budun, Ulus), Boy (kabile), oba (cemaat)* and *aile*. These two historians use the *oba* differently. Moreover, to Sümer ‘oymak’ was the can generally be used for ‘boy’ and its subdivisions.⁶ Yusuf Halaçoğlu describes the same hierarchy as *il (ulus), boy (kabile), aşiret, cemaat, oymak, mahalle, and oba (aile)*.⁷ Mustafa Öztürk is another historian who depicts the hierarchical structure of tribes. To him the Ottoman tribal hierarchical system can be depicted subsequently as *taife, oymak* and *cemaat* (sometimes last two terms were used interchangeably).⁸ Finally, according to Cevdet Türkay all of the terms like *boy, oymak, aşiret and cemaat* were often used interchangeably in the Ottoman documents.⁹ How such diversity can be possible? Interestingly, the hierarchical system that each one of these historians offers can not be rejected at all. There are several reasons behind this diversity. First, unstandardized language of the Ottoman official documents makes the terms

⁵ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı*, p.14.

⁶ Faruk Sümer, Faruk. *Oğuzlar (Türkmenler): Tarihleri-Boy Teşkilatı-Destanları*. (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1992), p. 163.

⁷ Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*, p. 16.


⁸ Mustafa Öztürk, *16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar*, p. XIII.

⁹ Cevdet Türkay, *Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar*. (İstanbul: İşaret, 2001), p.17.

ambiguous. Secondly, historians could have misunderstood some of the terms or unsuccessfully mixing Turkish terminology with Arabic. Finally, historians could have insufficiently compared the actual tribal structure with their hierarchical models.

The model of tribal lineage that I have drawn based on the court records is as follows: ethno-lingual groups, *Aşiret*, *Cemaat*, *Oymak*, and *aile*. However, such a claim is not easy at all, since the interchangeable usage of those terms makes it complex. The figure 2 shows an ideal lineage system that can be claimed for the Ottoman tribes. And the concrete application of this model can be seen in the table of Appendix I/A. Nevertheless, all of the terms used in this figure are needed to be discussed in detail.

Figure III-2: The Lineage System of the Ottoman Tribes



III.3 The Problems of Disclosing the Ottoman Tribal System

The Ottoman society can be mainly divided into two main entities: Muslims (majority) and non-Muslims (minority). Muslims, regardless of their ethnic or physical differences were accepted as *Ümmet* in Islam. That is to say, in theory there must not be any differences between them. As a matter of fact, different ethnic identities in the Ottoman Islamic society did not create problems for the state. Nor was the state hostile to any ethnic group for the sake of one another. In the cadastral records or other official documents they were just recorded as Muslims. Differences only emphasized with stereotypic attitudes like '*Etrak-ı bi idrak, Ekrad-ı bi insaf*' (unintelligent Turks, cruel Kurds). Then, how can one interpret the terms like 'Turcoman', 'Arab', and 'Kurd' that were often used in the court records? Are they actual ethnic identities or mean something else?

In a tribal system the ethnic and lingual differences automatically appear, because tribes' members as a part of their genealogical roots accept such differences.¹⁰ They could even trace their genealogy back to the formation of their ethnic identity. It was not so uncommon to see someone claiming to be descending from one certain son of Noah. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, claims that the ethnic terms used in the Ottoman documents do not often mean an actual ethnic identity.¹¹ No one can reject that ethnic terms were not always used for the actual ethnic identities however, no one can also reject that the Ottoman bureaucrats almost always used them correctly. There are several serious fallacies in Halaçoğlu's analysis. The first methodological fallacy is about not using statistical methods. It is a rule if, let us say, the ninety-nine percent of documents say the same thing about an issue, one cannot

¹⁰ Tribesmen claim that they were descended from an apical ancestor. They rationalize the differences no matter whether this figure is true or not.

¹¹ Halaçoğlu, "Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." (*Belleten* LX (227): 139-146; 1996), p. 140.

use the remaining one percent as the basis for generalization, instead the deviancy should be questioned.¹² It is true that one can see such terms as “*Ekrad-ı Türkmanan*” (Turcoman Kurds) or “*Türkman-ı Ekrad*” (Kurdish Turcomans)¹³ in the Ottoman records. However, in order to support his ideas, Halaçoğlu exaggerates the frequency of such usages. As a matter of fact, one does not come across such terms in the Ottoman records as often as he claims. It is quite normal to reject such dual identities. If one accepts that these kinship groups traced their lineages according to a patriarchal culture, there must be only one ethnic identity of which they had descended from male side. Otherwise, they must be accepted as unilineal societies. There might be such a thing. Or maybe the clerk recorded them wrongly. And many other possibilities can be found. But Halaçoğlu appears to have not questioned such possibilities.

The second fallacy is that, he does not accept that those groups could be mixed or assimilated by the other ethnic group. As a matter of fact, even though sub-tribes can be thought as homogeneous (due to being close societies) the same thing cannot be claimed for bigger groups. From the bottom to upper ranks of the tribal system the heterogeneity increased. Halaçoğlu claims that since the *Kılıçlı Ekradı* (Kurdish *Kılıçlı*) tribe was recorded among *Türkman-ı Haleb* (Turcomans of Aleppo) *Kılıçlı* must be Turcoman.¹⁴ How can one be sure that all the groups recorded under *Türkman-ı Haleb* were really Turcoman? It is a big contradiction in Halaçoğlu’s thesis that ethnic terms used in the records “most of times have connotations that

¹² I do not want to ignore the importance of the deviant information. I do not want to glorify statistical methods either. The thing that I am against is ignoring what majority of documents says and making generalizations based on deviant documents, like what Halaçoğlu does.

¹³ Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme.” p. 143.

¹⁴ Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme.” p. 144.

differ from their actual meaning.”¹⁵ His thesis is like that: both ‘A’ and ‘B’ is problematic. ‘A’ is problematic since ‘A’ is not ‘A’ but ‘B’. It is quite controversial to prove one problematic thing with another in same quality. However, the *Kılıçlı* tribe was not only dwelling among *Türkman-ı Haleb*, as mentioned in previous chapter, an important part of the tribe were living in Maraş and they were resettled in Menbiç among the Turcoman *İlbeyli* tribe in 1706. If one sees the *Kılıçlı* living amongst the *İlbeyli* in the documents without realizing this settlement policy then s/he can conclude that the *Kılıçlı* was either a sub-tribe of *İlbeyli* and/or a Turcoman tribe. As mentioned in the previous chapter the tribes that escaped from the places of resettlement were looking for shelter among other tribes.

As a matter of fact, the problem of their identity is not a primary concern of this thesis. The difficulty is not only related to defining their ethnic identity, but there is also a common problem in determining the lineage system of a tribe. If looked at the table in the Appendix I/A, one can see that the *İlbeyli* is a Turcoman tribe but we do not know whether *cemaat* of *Karataşlı*, which was recorded in the court records as the sub-tribe of the *İlbeyli*, was a Turcoman tribe or not. Most probably it was a Turcoman tribe¹⁶ but we cannot claim that just because of such records “*İlbeyli Türkmanı taifesinden Karataşlı cemaati*” (the *Cemaat* of *Karataşlı* of the Turcoman *İlbeyli*). Here the Turcoman was only represents the *İlbeyli*. We cannot actually be sure whether that *cemaat* was really descended from the *İlbeyli* tribe or another tribe.

Why we cannot be sure about the lineage system of a tribe? The demographic movements of tribes are one of the reasons behind this. Like other sections of the society, tribes were also dynamic groups, and because of economic, social and political reasons they could leave their settlements and mixed with other tribes.

¹⁵ Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme.” p. 139.

¹⁶ Türkay has recorded this tribe as a Turcoman tribe Türkay, *Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar*. p. 417.

Another reason is related to their economic organization shaped by the state. In all territories where the Ottoman state inserted its full authority, the society was organized into units according to an estimated surplus that each unit was expected to produce. The tribes were also organized more or less in same way. But it was never an easy task to organize those groups like the *Rışvan* and the *Reşi* tribes, which can be considered as semi-political social structures. Because of that reason the state preferred to impose tax farming rather than *tımar* system on such tribes. They were big territorial groups rather than simple lineage systems. Even, under the *Mukataa* (tax-farming) of *Yeni İl-Türkman-ı Haleb* some non-Muslim people were also recorded.¹⁷ On the other hand, when one examines the subgroups of the *Rışvan* tribe, s/he can see that some of them were Kurds some others were Turcomans or might be Arabs. Similarly, some other groups of tribes were organized as *hass*, like *Türkman-ı Haleb*, *Yeni İl Türkmanı*, *İfraz-ı Zulkadriyye*, and *Kilis Ekradı*. All of those groups were constituted by groups of tribes, which might not be in the same genealogical structure. That is to say, these groups were not tribes but kinds of tribal confederations. For example, *Türkman-ı Haleb* together with *Yeni İl Türkmanı* were constituted the *hass* of *waqfs* (pious foundation) of the mother of the sultan.¹⁸ Another group, *Kilis Ekradı*, was also depended on the same *waqf* of the mother of the Sultan. In the period under review an important change occurred. The *Şekaki* tribe from Diyarbekir region migrated amongst the *Rışvan* and the *Okçu İzzeddinli*

¹⁷ The *voyvoda* of this *mukataa* applied to the court and claimed that the defendant non-Muslims were the peasants of his *mukataa*. Those defendants refuted his claims, for they had been living in the city for a long time. ACR 56, p. 53 (October, 1705). This case shows that the non-muslims were also could be economically in the same system with tribes.

¹⁸ At the beginning of the seventeenth century *Yeni İl* and *Türkman-ı Haleb* annexed to the income of the mother of the sultan. At first the mother of the Süleyman the lawgiver enjoyed the revenue of *Yeni İl*. Then it was used by the *waqf* founded by the mother of the Murad III, known Nurbânu. Faruk Sümer, "XVI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irakta Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumi Bir Bakış." (*İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 509-522; İstanbul: 1952), p. 517. A court record dated 1692 mentions that the tribes of *Türkman-ı Haleb* had been giving their taxes for approximately a hundred. ACR 41, p. 24.

tribes, who were living the region in question.¹⁹ The *Şekakis* in time became a part of the Kurds of Kilis. Another example the Turcoman *Tacirli tribe* was recorded under *İfraz-ı Zulkadriyye* in 1707.²⁰ But in reality they had escaped from Rakka and in 1730 dispersed among the *Beydilli* tribe in Karaman region, the *Milli-i Kebir-i Tavan* around Diyarbekir and Mardin, *Kilis Ekradı* in Kilis region and some other tribes in Kars, Erzurum and Çıldır.²¹

Another dimension of the issue is about the separation of the tribes. Organizing both nomadic and resident groups under the same economic unit was not an easy task at all. The government could organize tribes according to the lands they cultivate. This is the basis of the *tımar* system. Think of such big tribes like the *Rışvan* that contain both nomadic tribes and resident tribes, how could it be possible to organize all of sub-tribes in the same economic organization? One option might be forming autonomous economic organizations, which is *mukataa* (tax-farming) system. It is to say, the state only appropriates a determined amount of tax. On the Other hand, the nomadic fractions and residents could be organized differently. According to Türkay, the *Baziki* was a Kurdish tribe and a sub-tribe of the *Rışvan*.²² In general, the court records correct him but in two documents this tribe was called a tribe of nomadic Turcoman (Konar-göçer Türkmanından).²³ If we accept what Türkay tells us then we can conclude that a nomadic group of the *Baziki* tribe was counted in the economic organization of nomadic Turcomans. If he is wrong, then the mentioned tribe might be a Turcoman tribe registered under the economic organization of the *Rışvan*. I

¹⁹ In this period this tribe migrated two times. In the first migration they went around Aleppo in 1703. ACR 53, p. 60. In the second wave they settled on the border of the territories of the *Rışvan* and the *Okçu İzzettinli*. ACR 63, p. 22 (May 26, 1711).

²⁰ Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*, p. 50.

²¹ Murat Çelikdemir, "Osmanlı Devletinin Rakka İskan Politikasında Önemli bir Kaynak: Mühime Defterleri." (*Birinci Ortadoğu Semineri: Kavramlar Kaynaklar ve Metodoloji*, ed. Mustafa Öztürk et al. Elazığ: Fırat Ünivesitesi Orta-doğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 2004), pp. 353-4.

²² Türkay, *Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar*. p. 212.

²³ ACR 79, p. 551; ACR 81, p. 4.

mentioned the first possibility since economic organization of *Rışvan* was not a single one. In the period under review there were both *hass* and *mukataa* of *Rışvan*.²⁴

It is for sure, that the clerks could sometimes write wrongly. A record dated January 1725 talks about two bandits, of them Arslan was a Kurd and Firuz Bey was a Turcoman.²⁵ However another record, dated February 1725, talking about the same bandits tells us that both of them were Kurds from Ruha.²⁶ Unfortunately, there is no other record mentioning the same bandits, therefore one of them must be wrong. As mentioned in the previous chapter, after the operation of 1714 against *Kılıçlı*, a boy from *Kılıçlı* was sold as slave. In this document the plaintiff says that “A janissary brought a boy from the Turcoman *Kılıçlı (Kılıçlı Türkmanı)* to the Bazaar of Aleppo claiming he was a slave...”²⁷ If approached the case from Halaçoğlu’s perspective, one can conclude that the title ‘Turcoman’ does not refer to an actual ethnic identity but the nomadic structure of the tribe. This is the last thing a historian can claim. Instead, we can claim that the plaintiff did not know the ethnic identity of *Kılıçlı*, since in all other documents we analyzed, it was recorded as Kurdish tribe. Moreover, I do not think that what the plaintiff said was wrong. If we look at the document ACR 65, p. 216 in Appendix IV, which talks about the same event, we will see that, in the beginning of the record it is mentioned that the document contains the list of the women and children captives from the *Kılıçlı* tribe. Herewith some of names taken from the list of the document: *Tohtemür* Meryem Bint Hamza, *Bektaşlı* Selur Bint Kara Mehmed, *El Halub* Arabından Safiye Bint Çerkes, *Kılıçlı* Besey Bint Ali, *Koyunoğlu* taifesinden Yusuf bin Mehmed, *Elciden* Musa Kızı Güllü, *Dokuz* taifesinden Elif and so on. The names written in italic are the names of tribes of the

²⁴ For the *mukataa* of *Rışvan* see ACR 77, p. 206; and for the *hass* of *Rışvan* see ACR 78, p. 13.

²⁵ ACR 76, p. 110.

²⁶ ACR 76, p. 90.

²⁷ ACR 65, p. 206.

captives. Can this legitimize historians' claim that all of those tribes were sub tribes of *Kılıçlı* tribe or all of them were Kurds? Highly unlikely. We learn from some other records that the military campaign of 1714 was launched not only against the *Kılıçlı* but also against the *Doğanlı*, the *Koyunoğulları*, the *Elci*, the *Tacirli* and the *Bektaşlı*.²⁸ But why the *Kılıçlı* was emphasized so much in the document? This is most probably because the *Kılıçlı* was the most notorious tribe amongst the other tribes. As it is seen, in order to answer such a question we have to look at as many different documents as possible. This is why I question the reliability of the records and suggest comparing the documents from the court records with each other.

The last point about Halaçoğlu's perspective is that he sometimes misleads with inaccurate examples. For example, he claims that the Turcoman *İzzeddinli* and the Kurdish *Okçu İzzeddinli* were the same tribes and for him the main reason behind that is the appointment of the İzzeddin Bey as the governor of *Ekrad Sancağı* (Sancak of Kurds).²⁹ Professor Mustafa Öztürk, who claims to descend from *Okçu İzzeddinli* tribe, points out exactly the same thing what Halaçoğlu mentions.³⁰ But in the following pages of his study he claims differently about the roots of this tribe.³¹ Indeed, he tries to assume how this tribe was named *Okçu İzzeddinli*. Therefore, his efforts can be respected. However, from the name archer (*okçu*) construction a link with Scythian is too much assertive. Among such works on onomastic İlhan Şahin's article "Osmanlı Devrinde Konar-Göçer Aşiretlerin İsim Almalarına Dâir Bâzı

²⁸ ACR 65, pp. 225, 227, 228 (2 records), 229.

²⁹ Halaçoğlu, "Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." pp. 142-3.

³⁰ Öztürk, *16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar*. p. 17.

³¹ Öztürk talks about some different possibilities to explain the word *İzzeddinli* in the name of the tribe but he does not mention that İzzeddin Bey named that tribe (pp. 21-2). He goes further and this time he explains the root from the *Okçu* (Archer). According to him this name *Okçu* refers to their culturally descendant from Scythian since those people were developed in arching. Öztürk, *16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar*. p. 42.

Mülâhazalar” can be a good reference.³² In this work Şahin points out some factors, which play a role in the naming process of the Ottoman tribes. The name of a geographic place or a notable name could be used as the name of tribe. Moreover, their economic activities, or a social phenomenon, or the category of tax paying could be the name of those tribes. He gives many interesting examples. But not every name of tribes was Turkish name; so determining their meanings can be controversial. In such an analysis the knowledge of Arabic and Kurdish can partly solve the problem to some extent. I would like to mention some clues, which can help a researcher to define their ethnic roots. The common suffixes used in the name of Turcoman tribes are ‘-lı’ (-li, -lu, -lü) that means ‘from’. Another suffix is ‘-lar’ (-ler) like the suffix ‘-s’ (plural) in English is not so widespread as ‘-li’ but it can explain something. For the Arabs prefix ‘Al-’ (el- in the Turkish pronunciation) means ‘the’ in English. Another clue is that in the names of Arabic tribes the word ‘beni’ (derived from Arabic word ‘ibn’) means ‘sons’. For the Kurdish tribes clues can be the suffixes ‘-i’ that means ‘from’ and ‘-an’ is the counterpart of the suffix ‘-s’ (plural) in English. These types of clues can be beneficial for basic analysis but can also mislead the researcher. For example ‘-lı’ in the name of the *Cerikanlı* is a Turkish suffix (from) however ‘-an’ is a Kurdish suffix (plural suffix ‘-s’). Moreover, many recorded names derived from the dominant language-Turkish. For example though the *Okçu İzzedinli* was a Kurdish tribe its name was a good example of influence of Turkish.³³

³² İlhan Şahin, “Osmanlı Devrinde Konar-Göçer Aşiretlerin İsim Almalarına Dâir Bâzı Mülâhazalar” *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, XIII, 1987, pp. 195-208.

³³ In court records this tribe was always recorded as a Kurdish tribe. Moreover, the letter sent by the leader of this tribe to the Turkish government in 1922 obviously mention about the identity of this tribe. See M. Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, *Dağıstan-Aras-Dicle-Altay ve Türkistan Türk Boylarından Kürtler*. (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1984), pp: 35-51.

Overall, it will be wrong to simply claim that those ethnic identities do not mean the actual ones. It is known that in the Ottoman official documents such ethnic identities of Muslim subjects were almost identical with tribal system. That is to say, it was not that frequent where people were recorded with their ethnic identity. The first thing one must question in this case is to know the reason behind the state's recording of ethnic identities of tribes. One reason can be sociopolitical organization of tribes. It's well known that some Kurdish tribes were autonomous. Such tribes could apply the tribal law to their subjects but had to pay taxes and give soldiers to the state. According to Orhonlu, the *Rışvan tribe* was one of the good example of having its own rules and regulations.³⁴ Such tribes were not unique case in that sense; in fact almost all other tribes had their own rules and regulations. Indeed those 'laws' were not written nor were necessarily religious rules, but unwritten customs. Their ethnic identities were most probably the symbolic representations of such laws.³⁵ Otherwise, there is no need to register the group of the *Kılıçlı*, which became part of Turcoman of Aleppo, still Kurdish.

On the other hand, economic organization of tribes also plays an important role on ethnic identities. Why did the Ottoman state records someone as 'the Turcomans of Aleppo' but not, let say, the Arabs of Aleppo. Indeed, the Ottoman tribes were more open communities than one can estimate. Pervasiveness of in-group marriage in such tribes can be shown as the evidence of their being close communities but it was quite common among tribes or peasantry, migrating and looking for shelter

³⁴ According to Orhonlu "in some organizations like the *Rışvan* the *boybeyis* (tribal leaders) were not chosen by the government; but by *Kethüdas* (a man who was a mediator between the state and members of tribe), *ihyars* (old men) and other arbiters who constitutes the tribal aristocracy." Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı*. p. 14.

³⁵ W. R. Hay mentions this point: "I am a tribesman' is the equivalent of 'civis Romanus sum.'...even though he is a member of no recognized tribe, will refer to himself as a tribesman, by which he means that he recognizes tribal law and customs and expects other to treat him as enjoying tribal rights." Hay, W. R. *Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918-1920*. (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1921), p 65.

among other tribes. Then, if there was still something as the ‘Turcomans of Aleppo’ then there must be a cultural and/or political dominance of Turcomans in that economic organization. Similarly the *Reşi* and *Rışvan* were registered as Kurds but no one can claim that there were no other groups amongst them. It will be, therefore, not wrong to suggest that the ethnic identity represents the economic organization, but not tribes, which were forming them. Nevertheless, using specific identities were not randomly chosen or used by accident; rather it is an evidence of the dominance of a specific group of a specific ethnicity.

We can conclude, from the above discussion that the problem was not only related to the ethnic identities, but the other ranks were also problematic. What are *Aşiret*, *Cemaat* and *Oymak*? Which group was descended from the other? That is to say, the meanings of these terms and their hierarchy are not an easy task to solve, otherwise there would not have been so many different approaches mentioned above.

To begin with, such terms as *il*, *el*, *ulus*, and *oba* which we could not see in the court records must be discussed. No doubt, *il*, *el* and *ulus* were used before for the big tribal groups and/or tribal confederations. But in the court records we see them as just a part of the names of some tribes like *İlbeyli*, or *Elbeyli*, and *Bozulus*. According to Halaçoğlu and Sümer *il* and *ulus* are the same things. If they are right, then these words in the names of these tribes do not show the tribal rank, but, in fact, *İlbeyli* was a sub-tribe of *Bozulus*.³⁶ Therefore, these words can represent different ranks. Moreover, in the period in question the *İlbeyli* was in fragments. There was no big economic organization constituted by them in Ayntab region. Maybe they were

³⁶ Tufan Gündüz, *Anadolu’da Türkmen Aşiretleri: Bozulus Türkmenleri 1540-1640*. (Ankara: Bilge, 1997), p. 77. In the court records the Bozulus was written as the *Bozulus Mandası*. In the common usage, *Manda* means mandate, but its meaning in this context is not clear.

much powerful elsewhere. Somehow, these terms were not a part of the terminology that described the ranks in actual kinship lineage.³⁷

Mustafa Öztürk considers *taife* as a concept representing a group in the lineage system of the Ottoman tribes. *Taife* was used in the ottoman documents to emphasize group identities in general. You can see that *taife-i Türkman* (Turcomans), *taife-i İlbeyli* (*İlbeylis*), *nisa taifesi*³⁸ (women) and *levendat taifesi* (*levends*) and so on. That is to say *taife* is not a term used specifically for kinship groups.

Aşiret is the actual term, which was used to signify the term ‘tribe’. The leadership is very important in this social organization. The leader of a tribe would be called *boybeyi*, *mir* or *sheik*. *Şeyh* (Sheik) was the title of the leaders of Arabic tribes.³⁹ *Sheik Kelib* was one of the important Arabic bandit leaders of this period. On the other hand, the common name for leadership was called *boybeyi*. This term was sometimes used as ‘*Aşair ve kabail boybeyleri*’ (leaders of *Aşirets* and *Kabiles*). *Kabile* was almost always used synonymously with the term tribe. The term used for leadership -*boybeyi*- shows that at the same time *boy* also means a tribe. In that sense, Halaçoğlu and Orhonlu cogently used *boy* and *aşiret* synonymous. Similarly, Sümer also correctly uses *kabile* and *boy* synonymously.

What is *mir*? This term was used for a special kind of tribe, namely *mir aşireti*. According to Orhan Kılıç some big tribes were organized as such. Their own tribal leaders called *mir-i aşiret* enjoyed the economic and politic power of these tribes. The leader had the right to collect *raiyyet rüsumu* (some taxes levied on peasants) and *curüm* (taxes of criminal events), and these taxes were fully possessed by the tribal leader. These privileges passed to their sons or other relatives. If there were no

³⁷ Gündüz points out the possibility that *Bozulus* was a name that the Ottomans gave to the tribes that had remained after the collapse of the Akkoyunlus. Gündüz, *Anadolu'da Türkmen Aşiretleri*. pp. 43-4.

³⁸ It is interesting; though there is such a usage as *nisa taifesi* in the court records, I could not see any document saying *erkek taifesi* or *adam taifesi* (men).

³⁹ Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı*. p. 14.

relatives to take the possessions, these privileges were not given to anybody else. In return, the tribal leaders had to join the ottoman army on demand. They could not enjoy full autonomy (*tabl u alem sahibi değiller*).⁴⁰ A *Mir-aşiret* can be considered as chiefdom. Their autonomy was not as much as that of principals-flag and drum owners. In the first half of the seventeenth century, there were more than 400 chiefdoms in the Empire. And some of them were given the status of *sancak*.⁴¹ In the sixteen century one of the *sancak*-chiefdoms was based in Kilis and was called *Ekrad Sancağı* led by İzzeddin Bey.⁴² In the period under review, the *İlbeyli*, the *Rışvan*, the *Reşi*, and the *Karalı* tribes were recorded as *mir-aşiretlik*.

The term '*aşiret*' was usually used for an actual group in a kinship system as well as for economic organizations and tribal confederations, which did not need to be kinship groups. The *Bozulus*, as mentioned before, was mainly a name of a top identity, which possibly had different lineage systems in it. The *Kılıçbeyli* was a tribe (*aşiret*), and a sub-group of the *Bozkoyunlu* who were also recorded as a tribe. Each step in the lineage system needs to be unique. This is not because these upper groups had no titles but because of the existence of reductionism in the Ottoman records. Such reductionism is a big obstacle for kinship studies.

Another kin-based group was *cemaat* (clan). In the Ottoman documents, however, *cemaat* sometimes has an even broader usage. *Cemaat* could be a religious society, like *yahudi cemaati* (Jewish society). In the records sometimes this word is used for people who were attending religious ceremony at a specific mosque. This

⁴⁰ Kılıç, 18. *Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdarî Taksimatı*, p. 14. In the Ottoman society drum (*tabl*) and flag (*alem*) were two symbols of full autonomy.

⁴¹ Kılıç, 18. *Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti'nin İdarî Taksimatı*, p. 14.

⁴² Mustafa Öztürk, 16. *Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar*. p. 18; Metin Akis, XVI. *Yüzyılda Kilis ve Azez Sancağında Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat*, p. 7. After the oppression of Canpolatoğlu Ali the government confiscated the lands and properties of Ali Paşa. Most probably at that period tribes of Kilis lost their title of chiefdom and were reorganized as *has* called *Ekrad-ı Kilis hassı* allocated to the *waqf* of the mother of the sultan. According to Griswold in the northern Syria there were a dozen of big tribes in which leadership passed from father to son. Griswold, p. 57. Most probably they were also in the status of *mir-aşiretlik*.

term was most probably used for the residents of a village or people living in the same district of a town. Moreover, *cemaat* could also refer to a group of Janissaries.

Each clan had a leader who was called *Kethüda*. According to Orhonlu, the *kethüda* of a clan was appointed by the *boybeyi* on whom he was socially and administratively dependant.⁴³ They were an official administrator and a medium between the state and the clan. When the government decided to resettle clans in Rakka, each *kethüda* was responsible for taking his clan there.⁴⁴ Moreover, sometimes a *kethüda* of a clan could intervene in the affairs of other clans when needed.⁴⁵

Oymak was a *cemaat* that had no subdivisions. On the one hand *oymak* can be seen as a clan, on the other hand as a sub-clan. As it is shown in the table of the Appendix I/A, there are many *oymaks* that are directly connected to an *Aşiret*. Maybe there were *cemaats* between them and *Aşirets*, but we know nothing about them, since the documents do not mention them. Another point is that we do not know anything about its leadership. The documents often mention the leadership of tribes and clans, *aşair ve kabail boybeyleri ve cemaat kethüdaları* (tribes' leaders and clans' leaders), but do not mention the leadership of *oymaks*.

Lastly, in the court records the basis of the structure of the kinship organization was mentioned as *aile* or *ehl u iyâl* (family). Though *ehl* is something broader than *ayal*, these two terms were always used together. Thus, these terms were employed both for nuclear family and extended family.

The hierarchical order that we have simplified so far, in fact, is much more complex. There are several reasons for this complexity. Firstly, the Ottoman

⁴³ If *kethüda* could not properly administer or collect taxes properly he would be dismissed. Some of *kethüdaness* of clans of Bozulus in Ankara and Aydın was turned into venality in 1698. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı*. p.15.

⁴⁴ See Appendix I ACR 41, p. 39.

⁴⁵ In 1701 the *kethüda* of *Tacirli* was charged with resettling of *Bayadlı*. ACR 53, p. 225.

administrative and economic systems sometimes overlap with lineage systems, but sometimes state organization could also be something broader than the lineage system, or divide the lineage into pieces. Small lineage systems like *cemaats* especially could be organized as independent economic systems. They could be organized as *timar*, *zeamet* or *hass*.⁴⁶ In a tribe, which was organized this way, subgroups were most probably the real descendents. In the united systems several kinship systems were organized under the same economic and administrative unit. The tribes that were organized as chiefdoms or principalities could appear in this form. For example, many different lineage systems were under the rule of Canpolatoğlu Hüseyin in the beginning of the seventeenth century. According to Griswold, his power was based in Arabic, Kurdish and Turcoman tribes.⁴⁷ In such systems the leadership had great importance on the identity of the tribes, since the identity of the unit was defined by the leader. Of course, leadership was not free from the dominant tribe or ethnic group. Why do we say the *Turcoman of Zulkadriye* or why do we say the *Mukataa* of *Rışvan*? This is related to dominance. Lastly, nomads or other migratorial group, if not sent back to their lands by the government, were reorganized under an available unit or formed into a new unit. It is hard to talk about a pure nomadic or sedentary tribe. Most likely, most tribes had power over both (semi)nomadic and sedentary sub-tribes. In a document this point was mentioned: “*Rışvan aşairinin konar ve göçer ve yerli ve yurtluları*” (nomadic and sedentary tribes of the *Rışvan*).⁴⁸ Moreover, sometimes some tribes reorganized because of economic policies. For example, in the beginning of 1715 the *malikane* organizations of the *Boynuinceli*, the *Şerefliü*, the *mahalle-i Küçük Şerefliü*, the *Beni Huneyn* (from

⁴⁶ In a record dated 1721 it is possible to see different tribes were organized in different economic organizations. ACR 72A, p. 257.

⁴⁷ Griswold, *Anadolu'da Büyük İsyân*, p. 71.

⁴⁸ ACR 76, p. 320. In different records separately the nomadic and indigenous subgroups of this tribe was mentioned.

Kırşehir Sancak), the *Bozulus tribes* at Ankara Sancak, the *Turcomans of Kara Bekir*, *Neferir Hacı Ahmedli*, the *Mamalu* (from Bozok Sancak), the *Dedesli* and the *Salmanlı* (from Maraş Eyalet), the *Geyikli*, the *Aybasanlı* and the *Çokşurucaklı* tribes (from Bozok Sancak) were abolished and annexed to the *hass* of Yeni İl.⁴⁹ This example shows that not every group within a tribe was reorganized, only some of them.

The *Beni Huneyn* has an Arabic name. In the court records its ethnic identity cannot be determined. According to Cevdet Türkay it was an Arabic tribe. Türkay recorded it both as an *aşiret* (seen at Mecca, Rakka, Sivas) and a *cemaat* (seen at Kırşehir, Çorum *sancaks*).⁵⁰ Just based on this information it can be claimed that a group from the *Beni Huneyn* tribe migrated to inner Anatolia. Moreover, we can follow the assimilation process of this separated group. According to Türkay the other name of this separated group is the *Çemelü* or *Çemenlü Arabı* (*Arabs of Çemenlü*). If one looks at the record of the *Çemelü* in his book, it can be seen that this group was recorded as *yörükân*.⁵¹ It is well known that *yörükân* means Turcoman.⁵² That is to say, this sub-group of the *Beni Huneyn* lost its ethnic identity and was integrated into Turcoman culture in time. But it is still possible its ethnic origin from the new name, the Yörüks of the *Çemenlü Arabs*. Thus, this is a good example of a shift within a lineage system. Most probably after the migration, this group began to claim an apical ancestor not among Arabs, but Turcomans.

⁴⁹ ACR 66, p. 251.


⁵⁰ Türkay, *Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar*. pp. 60 and 208.

⁵¹ Türkay, *Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar*. p. 253.


⁵² According to Ahmet Refik, *yörük* is the synonym of Turcoman. According to him the tribes situated at south of the River *Kızılırmak* and those who were living in Syria and Iraq. However, the Turcomans who had living at the west of this river were called *yörüks*. Sümer, "XVI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irakta Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumi Bir Bakış." p. 520.

Figure III-3: Formal (Legal) Organization of Lineage Systems


a) Overlapping Systems



b) United Systems



c) Separated Systems



Besides the dual organization of tribes, the language of the documents can sometimes mislead the researcher too. Normally, in such lineage systems the same name rarely applies to both a group and its sub-groups. The logic behind this is similar to that of difference between the names of father and son, or those of mother and daughter. Otherwise, the subdivision would be meaningless. Even if the sub-

group was known with the name of the upper group, there must be another name that shows the difference. For instance, all of the tribes, the *Bayadlı Ceridi*, the *Kuşçu Ceridi*, the *Sakallı Ceridi*, the *Şeyhli Ceridi*, the *Silsüprü Ceridi* and the *Sof Ceridi* were most probably the sub-groups of a big group called the *Cerid*. Nevertheless, Cevdet Türkay in his list of tribes recorded some groups under all categories-*oymak*, *cemaat* and *aşiret*. Is it true that the Ottoman clerks used these categories interchangeably? There is a possibility that the clerk could have recorded them carelessly. But, still the historian could/must correct this. In this sense, there is nothing wrong in historical sources; these are the mistakes of historians.

One of the problems is related to the dual organization of the tribes. The historian must not forget that the Ottoman records did not have a specific aim in revealing tribal organization; instead the government dealt especially with the taxes that tribes had to pay, and the army they had to provide. That is to say, the group connections these records mention are more about their formal organizations, rather than their traditional organizations. Therefore, the connections that the table of the Appendix I/A shows us do not necessarily have to be the actual kinship connections. On the other hand, as mentioned before, the formal organization of a tribe cannot be thought independent from kinship organization. In the court records I have found nine sub-groups of the Turcoman *Bozulus* tribe (see the table in the Appendix I/A). Four groups of them were recorded as Turcoman, but the ethnic identities of others are not mentioned. When one compares these groups to those mentioned by Tufan Gündüz's work on the *Bozulus*⁵³ it can be seen that they are one-hundred percent of them are the same. Another example is the *Rışvans*. This group was recorded as a Kurdish tribe, but among its seventeen sub-groups only four groups were recorded as

⁵³ See Tufan Gündüz, *Anadolu'da Türkmen Aşiretleri*.

Kurds, and we cannot clarify the ethnic identity of the remaining thirteen groups from the court records. Based on Trkay's list we learn that two of them were Turcoman tribes. There are several points to be mentioned. First of all, the example of the *Riřvan* tribe shows that a group may not always share the same identity with its sub-groups. I do not mean by identity only an ethnic identity; similarly, a tribe might be sedentary whereas some of its subgroups could have been nomads. Secondly, as mentioned before, the Ottoman officials recorded them according to their dominant group or leader. So instead of trying to prove the genuine identity by generalizing the identity of a group over its subgroups, or *vice versa*, spending effort to understand the logic of documents will be more helpful. Finally, different kinds of documents must be evaluated differently. In the case of the *Bozulus*, we learn of its subgroups from the records mentioning their resettlement in Rakka; however, in the later case we learn its subgroups from documents mentioning their economic organization into the *hass* or *mukataa* of the *Riřvan*. Therefore, the second example says less about the actual kinship organization than the first one. This is why there are both Turcoman and Kurdish sub-groups of the *Riřvan* tribe.

It is necessary to look at the language of the documents to see how it can mislead the historian. In general, tribes and sub-tribes were recorded as *taife* or with an ethnic identity. For example, in a record saying '*İlbeyli taifesi*' (*İlbeylis*) the position of *İlbeyli* in kinship organization is not clear, like '*İlbeyli Trkmani*' (*Turcoman İlbeyli*). In the table (see Appendix I/A) I have recorded such cases as *cemaat* if other records say nothing about their positions, for the term *cemaat* is a more common term in the records. Does every *cemaat* occupy the same position in the lineage system? To be more precise, if you see such a phrase as '*İlbeyli Ařireti*' (*İlbeyli Tribe*) you may think that there is a tribe with the name *İlbeyli*, but if you see

in another document the phrase '*İlbeyli Cemaati*', what will you do? Because of such contradictory records, Türkay claims that the Ottomans used terms interchangeably. However, based on the phrase '*İlbeyli Cemaati*' two different things might spring to the mind. One, 'there was a *cemaat* called *İlbeyli*'. The other, 'there was a tribe called *İlbeyli* and it had a *cemaat*'. The difference is like the difference between '*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*' (Republic of Turkey) and '*Türkiye vatandaşı*' (Turkish citizen). Based on these two phrases it can be said that Turkey, which is a republic but not a citizen, has at least one citizen. For that reason the Afşar tribe can be *aşiret*, *cemaat* and *oymak* at the same time in the work of Türkay. Similar records can be seen on our table as well. For example, *Rışvan* is a tribe, but I have recorded it as *cemaat* as well. This is not because that tribe was mentioned in one document as a tribe, and as a clan in another. The *Rışvan* was one of the tribes constituting the *Ulus* tribe, and the *Ulus* was one of the sub-tribe of the *Cihanbeyli* tribe. Similarly, the *Kılıçbeyli* was one of tribes constituting the *Bozkoyunlu*, which was a sub-tribe of the *Beğdilli (Beydilli)*. Determining *aşirets* and *cemaats* is not the primary concern of this study, since it is hard to find exact meanings for these categories. For this analysis, the relations between groups (either formal or traditional) are much more important than their actual position. Because of that, we treat them simply as tribes and sub-tribes. Indeed it would be better to define the exact positions of all tribes, but we may study fifteen years, as Türkay did, to prepare a more reliable list.

The last point about language is that, since there are not punctuations in the sentences, the documents can lead to confusions. What must we inetrprete from the phrase '*Kilis Ekradından Okçu İzzeddinli ve Tacirlü ve Kılıçlı ve Bektaşlı*

*cemaatlerinden 300 kişi...’?*⁵⁴ In this phrase we cannot be sure whether Kilis Ekradı identified all of the mentioned tribes or only the Okçu İzzeddinli.

III.4 Social Organization and Banditry

In a society groups are formed through various separating lines, which can be religion, ethnicity, language, geography, profession and so on. The special relation between the member and the group makes the individual more powerful. This is why the social organization is important for the action of the self. In the Ottoman society *levends* and tribes were good examples of groups who took part in banditry. Jenissaries was another group. In the period under review this group was a powerful group. They were influential in trade.⁵⁵ But they were still an important group in banditry.⁵⁶ That is to say, though to some extent the economic degerdation was important factor behind banditry, the social power of a group was no less important. Similarly the guilds also could be important power groups. In 1735 about 1,000 people, weavers of Ayntab together with their children and women, attacked the palace of the *voynoda* and rescued ten chained prisoners and then plundered the properties of the *voynoda*.⁵⁷ Similarly some people joined around notables, “community owners” and killed the *naib* of Ayntab in 1731.⁵⁸ The *naib* had collected some taxes for the warfare. But the war ended early and people began to demand

⁵⁴ ACR 82, p. 95.

⁵⁵ In this period some peasants began to leave their lands and work for janissaries. They used to go to Istanbul for trade and began to not pay their taxes under the pretext of being the relatives of janissaries. ACR 65, p. 376. Such kinds of events were mostly interpreted as the degerdation in the janissary corps. However, here they were important since such social networks made janissaries much more powerful. In the period in question in there were lots of cases about such networks. ACR 68, p.1.

⁵⁶ During the war against Iran in 1725 some hundreds jenissaries began to involve in banditry. ACR 77, p. 264. A record, dated 1711, mentions janissaries who did not join the army against Venice. ACR 62, 227.

⁵⁷ ACR 87, p. 207. Cited from Güzelbey and Yetkin, *Gaziantep Şer’i Mahkeme Sicilleri (Cilt 81-141) Fasikül: 1*, (Gaziantep: Gaziantep Kültür Derneği, 1970), pp. 17-8.

⁵⁸ ACR 82, p. 79.

their money back. Since he did not pay them back he was killed.⁵⁹ The point needed to be mentioned here is that those notables had already become important power owners. And in the following decades throughout the eighteenth century they would be certain bandits. Another point is that, as the document mentions they were ‘the owners of communities’. For example, one of them was Debbagzade Mustafa and the other was Basmacı Mehmed Efendi. Here *debbag* (tanner) and *basmacı* (dealer in printed fabric and cloth) obviously refer to their social organization. In the point of view of Hobsbawm social banditry lacks organization. However, banditry, especially tribal banditry, in the Ottoman case is closely related to social organization. There is a wide range of banditry from the personal level to the ethno-religious level. Each type of banditry was affected by the social organization that produced it. Therefore, we can talk about the different level of organization in banditry at different levels of the social structure.

The relation between banditry and social structure determines the level of sociality of the banditry. As Anton Blok cogently says:

In a sense, all bandits are 'social' in so far as they, like all human beings, are linked to other people by various ties. We cannot understand the behaviour of bandits without reference to other groups, classes, or networks with which bandits form specific configurations of interdependent individuals.⁶⁰


On the other hand, if we think of the banditry on the basis of group interactions, then we must accept that all bandits were anti-social at the same time. Here anti-sociality is not the exact opposite of sociality. That is to say, no one can claim that there is a negative correlation between sociality and anti-sociality. Therefore, the following figure shows not an increase in the social banditry, but mentions the possibility of

⁵⁹ ACR 82, p. 230.

⁶⁰ Anton Blok, “The Peasant and the Brigand,” p. 498.

experiencing social banditry considering combinations of different motivators and social organization.

Figure III-4: The Role of Social Structure on the Character of Banditry



Without considering different motivators, the character of banditry cannot be fully grasped. A social scientist can claim that there are infinite variables playing role in social phenomena. Because of that, looking for the actual reason behind a social phenomenon cannot be meaningful every time, especially in historical research. However, we grouped the possible causes into three groups, which are economical factors, social factors and political factors. It is certain that, a person suffering from poverty is expected to behave differently than another person whose family is massacred. The problem here is that these three factors, in general, are mutually

interdependent. It is not so uncommon to see social degradation and/or political conflicts following economic depression.

The second important factor behind banditry is social organization. The logic behind the relation between social organization and banditry can be thought of as twofold. Firstly, social organization is the area where the identity of self is formed. The stronger the tie of individuals to their groups, the more altruistic the behavior of the self. Even the self can sacrifice itself for the sake of its group. Secondly, the size of the group the bandit devoted herself/himself determines the level of sociality of his/her action. Think of a bandit stealing merely to fill his/her stomach, or a tribesman who attacks his enemy tribe for revenge, or a monk who targets 'infidel' Muslims for the sake of his 'faithful' brothers. By the way, it must not be misunderstood; all the groups we have been talking about are theoretically unprivileged groups, not dominant groups.

Even though we draw a perfect correlation between motivator, -the level of banditry, and social and political banditry, in reality it was much more complex. This figure is not drawn based on quantitative data. The purpose of this figure is to develop a multi- dimensional approach to banditry. That is to say, it shows the possible reaction of people to different motivators under different conditions. Hobsbawm talks about three forms of social banditry: 'the noble robber', 'the primitive resistance fighter or guerilla unit (*haiduks*)' and the 'terror bringing avenger'.⁶¹ According to him there are mainly two types of groups, which are more likely to be involve in banditry. The first group is the surplus population, which was produced by the limits of the rural economy or environment. The second one is the marginal people who could not integrate into rural society.⁶² As a matter of fact, one

⁶¹ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 15.

⁶² Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. pp. 25-7.

cannot talk about social banditry, since the sociality of banditry is not something static, but can be changed conjecturally, and was mainly determined by social organization and motivators. That is to say, the combination of social structure and different kinds of motivators could produce a much richer typology. On the other hand, it is true that the economic limits of rural areas produce banditry. To a great extent the *levend* banditry is a good example of this kind.⁶³ *Levends* can also be seen as marginals,⁶⁴ but they were one of the least social bandit groups. However, as we see in the first chapter, *levend* banditry, in fact, was just a small part of Ottoman history. As a matter of fact, neither economic reasons nor marginality can explain tribal banditry. In tribal banditry social cohesion can be an important factor behind banditry. Similarly, social and political factors can be as important as economical factors.

If we place the three types of Hobsbawm's social bandits in the figure above, then the insufficiency in the Hobsbam's model can be clearly seen. He sees Robin Hood as a noble robber. The main motivator behind his banditry is political rather than economical. In politically motivated banditries the action of the individual can only be meaningful when s/he gains public support. That is to say, s/he can either gather a group of people who think alike or s/he must increase the level of his/her banditry to an upper level. This is exactly what Robin Hood did. I do not know much about the social structure of the society he lived in, but at least he could get support from the peasants of the region by convincing them his movement was the right one for them. Unlike Robin Hood, *haiduks* were a part of Ottoman culture until its last century. According to Hobsbawm "their motives for going into the mountains were mainly economic, but the technical term for becoming a haiduk was 'to rebel', and

⁶³ As mentioned before, not all but an important quantity of levends can be seen as vagrants.

⁶⁴ According to Hobsbawm, "among such marginals, soldiers, deserters and ex-servicemen played a significant role." Hobsbawm, *Bandits*. p. 27. Such a definition is quite suitable for *levend* banditry.

haiduk was by definition an insurrectionary.”⁶⁵ It may be true that the economy was the main motivator, but the main factor that made them be seen as rebels is related to the bandit’s reference group, that is, the level of banditry. They were not only highly social bandits but they were at the same time highly political. Richard W. Slatta emphasizes the political side of *haiduks*:

I believe, however, the term ‘*guerrilla-bandit*’ is clearer than Hobsbawm’s rather murky depiction of the haiduk. Unless one’s native language is Turkish or Magyar, the term *haiduk* evokes little useful imagery. The term *guerrilla* locates such bandits in the irregular warfare of Spanish-American independence and civil wars.⁶⁶

Slatta has a tendency to separate political banditry from social banditry. To him, “Unlike social bandits, political bandits show clear partisan (rather than class) leanings.”⁶⁷ A similar tendency can be seen in Blok as well:

The more banditry is politically oriented and evolves into what Italian scholars have called *brigantaggio politico*, the more likely it is that it will assume ‘anti-social’ features when we take this term in the sense as understood by Hobsbawm, that is, anti-peasant. A surprisingly large number of the bandits mentioned by Hobsbawm were anti-peasant during most of their careers, which they typically initiated by righting personal wrongs.⁶⁸

However, these two features of banditry cannot be separated. Blok cogently talks about bandits’ anti-social character. Such anti-sociality is also caused by social organization. The social bandits of one group can be anti-social for another group. For that reason, the peasantry cannot be a good point of reference when talking about the sociality of banditry. Hobsbawm talks about “a certain Doncho Vatach, who flourished in the 1840s, only persecuted Turkish evildoers, helped the Bulgarian poor and distributed money.”⁶⁹ It is obvious that he could have never been a hero for a Turkish peasant. Another similar example, he gives, is Schinderhannes who was

⁶⁵ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, p. 64.

⁶⁶ Slatta, “Bandits and Rural Social History,” p. 148.

⁶⁷ Slatta, “Bandits and Rural Social History,” p. 148.

⁶⁸ Blok, “The Peasant and the Brigand,” p. 499.

⁶⁹ Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, p. 63.

active in the Rhineland in the late 1790s. "...he robbed only Jews, that is, dealers and moneylenders..."⁷⁰ Though we accept that he robbed only dealers and moneylenders, this is not sufficient explanation for his robbing only Jews. His reference group must be different. I do not know his religion but perhaps we wouldn't be wrong by thinking that his religion (most probably something different than Judaism) played an important role in his selectiveness? And I wonder whether Jewish peasants saw him as a hero or not.

In the Ottoman Empire religion, unlike ethnicity, could always be an important factor behind banditry. But the nineteenth century had a special importance for banditry. The nationalist movements melded ordinary banditry into the separatist movements. Arabic tribal banditry was also affected by these movements. In the twentieth century, other Muslim tribes, which had been known for their banditry for a long time, became militia bands during World War I and the War of Independence (1919-22) against the occupying forces.

The last type of social banditry of Hobsbawm, 'avenger', seems to be bandit groups, which are motivated by social factors rather than by the other two factors. No matter what the actual reason that sent them to mountains was, revenge is a part of bandit politics. It is hard for a bandit to survive on his own, so s/he must build networks with different groups. In society ordinary people had to choose between one of two mutually exclusive groups-bandits and others. So in any fault s/he can be punished by the anti-bandit group or by the bandit group. As a matter of fact such relations were not so clear. As we shall see later on, the bandits could punish someone because of betrayal and/or being on the side of 'the enemy'. Nevertheless,

⁷⁰ Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, p. 20.

such an action is more rational than just killing someone due to economic reasons, since the target is not an ordinary one, but the ‘bad’ one.

III.4.1.1 Personal Banditry

With personal level banditry we mean the small groups who could attack any body when the occasion arose. Even though such bandits seem more selfish, they cannot be analyzed unless we consider their relations with social groups. In the period under review, most of that kind of banditry was also done by tribesmen. It is hard to say that those bandits got involve in banditry in the name of their tribes, but, no doubt, they were encouraged by their tribes. Tribes were not mere economic or kinship organizations, they had serious social power. That power was the main encouraging factor for the self to take part in banditry. Similarly *levends* and janissaries had greater tendencies toward banditry than others. On the contrary, though there was a non-Muslim population in the Ayntab region, we cannot see any non-Muslim who took part in banditry. Two reasons could be proposed for that. Firstly, other than their prosperous position, since they were non-tribal communities, they had no serious social power in this period, when the tribe was the main source of the power in that region. Furthermore, Yezidi Kurds, ‘a heretical’, were organized into tribes, and therefore took part in banditry. In 1709 some 500-600 armed men from the Yezidis and the *Reşi tribe* pillaged the town of Rumkale.⁷¹ Secondly, even though they took part in banditry personally or in groups, their reference group would be a religious community, which would give them little much chance among Islamic groups. Here, the *Yezidis* or *Alevis* did not need to emphasize their religion, since they had alternative groups like tribes and ethno-lingual groups.

⁷¹ ACR 60, pp. 1, 2.

In the court records there are lots of examples of some three or four bandits attacking traders or others who were on the move on the trade routes or the roads connecting settlements. The stealth attack was the main *modus operandi* of personal bandits and small groups. Because of that, time and space are important for these bandits. They usually chose passes (*derbend*)⁷² in mountainous areas. *Sof Mountain* in the west of the Ayntab, and the mountains between the Maraş and Antakya were the main places for bandit activities. Alternatively, the deep valleys were other places of banditry, since valleys were the most forested places in an arid climate like that of the Ayntab region. They allowed bandits to escape quickly after the fact.

In banditry, time complements the space. Compared to large bandit groups, it was harder for personal bandits to rob people in daylight, so the time period between sunset and sunrise was usually preferred.⁷³ There are numerous cases mentioning the ordinary criminals who stole vines from vineyards at night. This kind of theft was a widespread form. Such a high frequency in such actions forced the owners of the vineyards to guard their lands at nights, which sometimes led to confrontations between them and thieves.⁷⁴

Warfare is another time period that had both pulling and pushing effects for banditry. Not only for the small groups but also for bandits in general, the time period of warfare facilitated them to be more comfortable in their actions. The reason behind this is that during that period the control mechanism of the state declines to a

⁷² In the Ottoman Empire there were specific villages, tribes or groups, which were called *derbendci*. Those people protected the mountain passes and they helped other officials to capture bandits. Özkaya, Yücel. *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kurumları ve Osmanlı Toplum Yaşantısı*. (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1985), p, 204.

⁷³ In many cases the bandits attacked their victims after evening (*Bade'l-magrib*,) or in the morning (*vakt-i zuhur, vakt-i tulû*).

⁷⁴ After the sunset two men from the *Bozkoyunlu* tribe entered a vineyard to stole some grapes. During the dispute between them and the owner of the land they injured the owner. ACR 58, p. 94 (September 1, 1707). In another case, a man from the *Kılıçlı* tribe similarly killed a man with a spear in his vineyard. ACR 63, p. 287 (August 18, 1711). Lastly, when a man from the *Dimleklü* tribe was staying in his vineyard at night, eight bandits from the Berazi tribe came and injured him. ACR 65, p. 85 (September 28, 1714). Also see ACR 59, p. 86.

minimum. The Ottoman-Iran war of the 1720s seriously affected, especially, the eastern regions of the Empire. A *firman* dated 1725 implies that due to the war with Iran at that time almost all the *beylerbeyis* and other regional officials joined the army. That created an opportunity for *levends* and tribes to take part in illegal activities.⁷⁵ Secondly, during that war an important quantity of provisions flowed through the routes that began in the İskenderun and Payas seaports at the east coast of Mediterranean and went to east. In 1720 the Arab tribes attacked ships that carried the guns and provisions on the Euphrates River.⁷⁶ The next time, in 1725, as a measure against them, the state charged ten contingents, which were about 500 cavalries, with riding down the bank of the river to protect ships.⁷⁷ Thirdly, during this period warfare many *levends* and other corpses either deserted or did not join the army. Some janissaries collected money and food free of charge on the pretext of going to war.⁷⁸ Those kinds of illegal activities were the general character of *levend* banditry. Deserting or refusing to join the army actually forced paid-army to take part in banditry since those illegal behaviors were need punishments. That is to say once they deserted they had to escape from the punishment, making banditry necessity and therefore chronic. The same thing was not true for the *zeamet* and *timar* holders. When they deserted from the campaign they just lost their right to the land. During the campaign of the defense of Tımaşver against the Austrian army in 1696, of the total *zeamet* and the *timar* holders of Maraş Eyaleti only 84 men remained in the campaign. All the others deserted. In the table of the Appendix II/A there are some names of *timar* holders who lost their right of regency over their

⁷⁵ ACR 76, p. 334.

⁷⁶ In 1720 some Arabic tribes attacked the ships carrying lumber. They captured 18 of them with lumber on them. Only 20 out of 38 ships could be reached the target place. Orhonlu and Işıksal, "Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar." p. 89.

⁷⁷ ACR 76, pp. 79, 133.

⁷⁸ ACR 77, p. 264.

lands. And the ACR 44, p. 90 in the Appendix II shows the *zeamet* holders who deserted from the campaign. All deserters lost their lands and their rights of using lands passed to loyal subjects. After that desertion mainly lands remained ownerless and some others collected under the control of a single man.⁷⁹ Indeed, we do not have any information whether ex-landholders turned into bandits, but the indirect effect of such changes in the economic life had great impacts on the social life, that is, banditry. The transformation at the end of the seventeenth century especially needs to be mentioned. The heavy economic burden of the wars at the western frontiers in the late seventeenth century forced the state to increase its income. In 1695 they tried to solve the problem by converting annual tax-farms (*mukataa*) into lifelong tax-farms (*malikane*).⁸⁰ In the next five years lots of *mukataas* were turned into *malikanes* in Ayntab. The simultaneity of the rise of notables (*ayans*) and that economic transformation must not be coincidence. Those notables through the eighteenth century became important powers challenging the state. The government realized that in a short time the state's control over land gradually weakened so in 1715 the *malikane* system was abolished.⁸¹

Lastly, spring was another important period for bandits. Not because the economic life awakened in spring, but trees' bearing leaves in this season allowed bandits to hide themselves.⁸²

So far we draw a picture of bandits motivated economically. However the social motivation behind personal banditry is also important. The case of a woman

⁷⁹ The total number of *tumar* holders was 150 and that of *zeamet* holders was 16 in Aynatb sancak in 1706. See ACR 52, p. 269. A record dated 1730 implies that four notables captured 30 timars. ACR 81, p. 34. Another case is that three men known as Bayezid oğulları (sons of Bayezid), who too the support of some tribes, captured the lands of the Keben (?) and Enderun districts of Maraş. See ACR 73, p. 217.

⁸⁰ Mehmet Genç, Genç, Mehmet. "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi." An article presented in *Türk İktisat Semineri*. Hacettepe, 8-10 Haziran 1973, p. 8.

⁸¹ Raşid Efendi, *Tarih-i Raşid*. p. 176-7.

⁸² ACR 82, p. 58.

named Elif is a good example of such banditry. Elif complained to some bandits about the bad treatment of (most probably sexual harassment) her father-in-law against her. Those bandits seized his fifty *kuruş*.⁸³ Actually, in this case the father-in-law was the litigant who claimed that she had slandered him. Maybe this was true, but the role of bandits in social justice is can be seen clearly. In another case, as mentioned before, a young woman, Hatice, was abducted by her cousin, Ali, to marry her. Similarly in this case several bandits helped Ali to abduct Hatice. As mentioned before cousin marriage was a cultural phenomenon that was widespread in this region. Therefore, in this case also banditry had a role in social justice.

Revenge is another type of banditry that can be considered socially motivated. Normally it is hard to see in-group banditry if a bandit is not extremely egotist. That is to say, in normal conditions, a bandit does not take action against someone from his/her group. One of the examples of such in-group banditry was occurred in the *Ceceli* tribe. Two men from the same tribe stole six sheep from a man from a man of the same tribe.⁸⁴ But the thieves were city dwellers. This shows the degenerating effects of the city. In cases of revenge in-group banditry can be seen as a way of executing social justice. Ömer, from the *Oturak Kızıği* tribe, together with some friends burgled the house of Zeynelabiddin who was also a member of the same tribe. He stole 18 oxen, 3 rugs, 5 kilos wheat, 2 swords, 2 quivers, 2 axes, 1 bowl, 1 salt cauldron, 1 silver belt, and 1 store cauldron had with storing capacity of 2.5 tons wheat.⁸⁵ At first this seems an economically motivated action. However, with that action Ömer claimed to take revenge for his brother, who had been killed by Zeynelabiddin. As a matter of fact, in law the family of a murdered person has the right to demand talion, or two sides could reach an agreement on blood money. If

⁸³ ACR 76, p. 274.

⁸⁴ ACR 76, p. 54.

⁸⁵ ACR 48B, p. 76.

these two options could not be met the event might turn into a blood feud. In this case it seems that both sides did not reach an agreement so the brother of the killed man preferred to take the value of his brother's blood. In such situations the action is motivated by reasons other than economical gain. In such cases only specific people, who were guilty in the eyes of society, were targets.

Actions against state agents or state regulations could also be seen as politically motivated banditry. It was not so uncommon to prevent tax collectors from performing their duties or stopping officials who carry the imperial taxes (*mal-ı mirî*) from one place to another. In 1720 some Turcoman bandits robbed the officer who took the imperial taxes to Aleppo.⁸⁶ They even stole the officer's clothes of the officer. Another example is that, in 1729 some bandits from the *Reşi* tribe several times prevented the tax collector from collecting Imperial taxes.⁸⁷ Lastly, since two men from *İlbeyli* tribe did not pay their taxes in 1730, were imprisoned by the governor of Rakka. One night, fifteen men from the *Ufacıklı* and *İlbeyli* tribes attacked the fortress of Ayntab and rescued those two men.⁸⁸ As a matter of fact it is hard to talk about personal level politically motivated banditry, because the political sphere related than to the power than to the political dissatisfaction of the people. Even the state itself did not tend to mention them as political bandits. What the Ottomans called *bağy* (rebellion or politically motivated banditry) "was used for the organized crimes which contained compulsion and had political purposes."⁸⁹ In order for the action to be rational the actor has to look for a common interest with other groups or must build close ties with the group s/he is belongs to. That is to say,

⁸⁶ ACR 70, p. 229.

⁸⁷ ACR 81, p. 214.

⁸⁸ ACR 81, pp. 83, 211.

⁸⁹ Mustafa Avcı, *Osmanlı Hukukunda Suçlar ve Cezalar*, (İstanbul: Gökkuşbu, 2004), p. 343.

generally, the politically motivated person looks for alliances with other people of that kind and larger groups.

III.4.1.2 Tribal Banditry

Tribal banditry was the most widespread form of banditry in Ayntab during the period under review. The socio-political power tribes enjoyed made them prominent in banditry. Indeed their power was only depended on their vertical relations with groups, which they descended from, but also horizontal alliances with other group were also an important source of power. A bandit could see the *Kılıçbeyli* as his reference group against other groups; the *Bozkoyunlu* against another tribe; the *Beğdilli* against another; Turcomans against other ethnic groups and Muslim against non-Muslims. This Arabic Proverb explains such a group psychology: “Me against my brother. Me and my brother against my cousin. Me, my brother, and my cousin against the stranger.” Because of that, banditry must be handled as something between-group activity.

Anton Blok emphasizes on the ‘blood symbolism of mafia’:

We shall see that the relationship through which *Mafiosi* in Sicily operate evoke blood imagery, and that blood metaphors are used to mark and foster reciprocity. These relationships include agnatic kinship (consanguinity), affinal kinship, ritual kinship (godparenthood, coparenthood) and ritual friendship (blood brotherhood).⁹⁰

In that sense, the tribal relations in the Ottoman Empire resemble to these of the mafia. So far, we have talked about the agnatic kinship of tribal system, but affinal kinship and ritual kinship were also important to to understanding the Ottoman tribal society.

⁹⁰ Anton Blok, *Honour and Violence*, p. 87.

According to Peter Tylor, “Peasants saw marriage as way to (only) partially diminish the dangers of enmity by concerting enemies into friends from whom one could expect support.”⁹¹ One of the apparent examples about such a marriage is the case of Canpolatoğlu Ali. The Canpolatoğlu trapped his top enemy, Seyfoğlu Yusuf, in Aleppo. Then, the two men reached an agreement, and Seyfoğlu accepted surrender. They married each other’s female relatives.⁹² Thus, instead of destroying Seyfoğlu, Canpolatoğlu converted the enmity into alliance. That event resembles the *berdel* tradition widespread among tribes. *Berdel* is a kind of exchange of women. In the same day two men marry each other’s relatives. Another example is marriages occurring after murder. The murderer side might pay, or give something, including women, to restore the peace. In this case the agreement is not reciprocal but one-way concession by the murderer’s side. The marriage cannot be seen as just a phenomenon that connect two sides, but more than that merriment during the weddings, like many public or religious festivals, creates cohesion between the people. The Kara *Kaşaklı* tribe, which was a nomadic sub-tribe of the *Ağcakoyunlu* tribe encamped on a mountain pasture at that time, invited the neighboring villagers to their wedding.⁹³ In fact, almost always there was a tension between the nomads and the settled population, but this event shows that they could build networks as well.

Secondly, brotherhood was another important way of redefining the border of the group. The blood brotherhood was a common phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire. A special form of this kind of brotherhood called *Kirvelik*, was especially a

⁹¹ Peter Taylor, “Some Ideological Aspects of the Articulation between Kin and Tribute: State Formation, Military System and Social Life in Hesse-Cassel 1688-1815.” (In *Agrarian Studies*, Edited by James Scott, 11-34. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.) p.18.

⁹² Griswold, *Anadolu’da Büyük İsyân*, p. 92-3.

⁹³ Ironically in that wedding the tribesmen and some guests began to fight during dancing. See ACR 58, pp. 119, 174 (2 records), 175 (May, 1707).

common among tribes. According to Mahmut Tezcan, this tradition has its origin in Islam. The *kirve* is the man who is a kind of godfather of the male children during the circumcision feast. The term *kirve* was derived from the Islamic concept of *Hirva*.⁹⁴ Tezcan points out that, the blood of a child that smudged on the *kirve* during the circumcision creates a bond similar to kinship.⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, *kirve* is not a single person, but a familial institution. When two men decide to be *kirve*, the families of these two men recognize each other as *kirve*. The important point is that members of these two families cannot marry each other. Another role of *kirve* is about marriage. *Kirves* pay for an important, sometimes the entire, amount of wedding expenditures. After the ceremony of nuptial chamber, the new couple's *kirve* declares the virginity of the bride. It is important since the woman is seen as the carrier of the honor (*namus*) of the family. Neither the family of the bride nor the family of bridegroom wants the community to suspect their honor. Indeed, the *kirveness* is a process of inclusion of the outsider to one's own. *Kirveness* is a symbol of prestige, power and honor.

During the revolt of Canberdi Gazali in 1521 the Ottoman commander Hayre Bey, in order to dissuade him from revolt, sent him a letter to warn him that if he continued his uprising, without considering the 'law of brotherhood', he would be punished by Hayre Bey.⁹⁶ As mentioned before, both tribes and *levends* collect money under different names, like *bayrak akçesi*, *kurban akçesi* and so on. Those terms were those used by the state. Such kind of banditry is a kind of deceit showing themselves as if they were working for the state. However one such kind banditry is needs a close look. Some tribes were collecting money from people under the name

⁹⁴ "It was claimed that the Prophet Muhammad was circumcised with *kirveness* of angels." Mahmut Tezcan, *Kültürel Antropoloji*, (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1997.) p. 90.

⁹⁵ Tezcan, *Kültürel Antropoloji*, p. 91.

⁹⁶ Solak-zâde Mehmed Hemdemi Çelebi, *Solak-zâde Tarihi*, p. 113.

of *Khuve*, which means brotherhood in Arabic. It seems it was a kind of tribute that the leaders of Arabic tribes traditionally took from weak tribes. As we learn from Ziya Gökalp in the beginning of the twentieth century, that tradition still continued:

Şammar tribe is like the locust of the tribes living in the desert and dealing with farming. As if this tribe was created for destruction on the earth. They hate every kind of official duties. They don't hesitate to feed their camels and sheep with (someone else's) crops without any sense of honor. Fundamentally they do not deal with any craft. Because of that, in order to protect themselves from the danger of this locust like tribe, poor wretched dwellers and cultivator tribes have to give some of their annual yields to *Şammars* as *khuve*.⁹⁷

Gökalp's description more or less describes *khuve*. A record dated 1704 talk about Arabs who took money from people under the same name.⁹⁸ However, it seems that he has prejudices about the *Şammar* tribe since it was a widespread action among some other tribes, which cannot be seen as 'locusts' at all. A record dated 1694 implies that several tribes from *Kilis Hassı* were taking 30, 40 or 50 *kuruş* from villagers by force. When someone resisted them they looted their houses.⁹⁹ That is to say *khuve* is not something only taken by destructive and useless tribes, but it was much more about tribal authority on a specific territory. That is to say it looks like the tribute taken by a sovereign state. But we cannot be sure whether the specific relation between the tributary tribe and the dominant tribe resembled that between a sovereign state and the tributary state. That is to say, did the tribe taking *khuve* protect the tributary tribe?

Khuve is a reflection of tribal politics. If it was seen as a real symbol of brotherhood, *khuve* most probably constituted alliances against rival tribes. At least it can be said that the tributary tribe did not expect invasion, pillage or simply banditry

⁹⁷ Ziya Gökalp, *Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler*, p. 63. Moreover, he says that the amount of *khuve* was something between 20-250 *mecidiye* and they took some wheat, and taxed the people who came and go to Mosul. Gökalp, *ibid.*, p. 86.

⁹⁸ ACR 54, p. 322.

⁹⁹ ACR 43, pp. 198 (2 records), 199.

from the *khuve* taking tribe. Indeed the tributary tribe might see them as enemy as well, and looking for alternative alliances with other groups. But as long as the agreement of *khuve* continued both group could see each other as a symbolic brotherhoods.

There is another form of horizontal alliance was that occurred in specific circumstances. As mentioned before migration could rearrange the border of the group. The long lasting relations between two groups could lead to the articulation of one to another. It could be as the shifting of the lineage system, that is, assimilation of one group or under the same political and economic organization a special form of alliance appeared. We do not know whether the whole tribes organized as *Kurds of Kilis* descended from the same root but in many banditry events they coalesced.

It is difficult to reveal the importance of any of those alliances from the Ottoman sources, at least, for this work. However, what we call tribe cannot be thought of without considering such horizontal and vertical bonds together.

As mentioned before, to some extent the personal banditry discussed so far was a part of tribal banditry. But with tribal banditry we mean much broader banditries. Similar to personal banditry it seems that economic motivators were dominant behind tribal banditry. It is unlike personal banditry, since tribal banditry was a kind of organized crime where the border between economic and political motivators is vaguer. Even if one considers the tribes as political units it can be said that almost all tribal banditry was political banditry. Unfortunately, court records usually do not mention about the social relations between robbed bandits and their victims. A record, dated 1693, mention the 15-20 bandits from the *Gözü Kızllı* tribe who robbed a man from the *Karışeyhli* tribe. Bandits took his 37 camels with their loads of

wheat.¹⁰⁰ With based on just this information it is hard to say that they were economically motivated. It is possible that their attack was caused by the enmity between those two tribes.

However, the events happened between two groups, which were geographically distinct to each other, and can be interpreted as economically motivated. The economic value that flowed on the route between Aleppo and Erzurum, which span the west bank of Euphrates, always attracted all kind of bandits. In 1703 some 20-30 bandits from the *Rışvan* tribe attacked some traders, who brought sheep from Diyarbekir, in locale of Merziman *Nahiye* of Rumkale *Sancak* and seized their 150 sheep, 2 felts and 1 fetter.¹⁰¹ In November 1705 a large group of 50-60 bandits from the *Rışvan* this time attacked some traders of the *Za'feranlı* tribe from Erzurum in the same locale. Bandits from the Rumiyanlı, Hemdanlı, and Hacılar sub-tribes of the *Rışvan* joined during that event. They took 110 sheep (≈ 264 *kuruş*), 120 *kuruş* cash and killed one man with a rifle.¹⁰² Besides those events, bandits several times attacked caravans. A record dated 1704 mentioned that bandits headed by a man called *Bektaşlı* Nebi had attacked a caravan, looted its loads and killed someone.¹⁰³ In 1712 another attack on a caravan was performed by bandits from the *İlbeyli* tribe.¹⁰⁴ In 1710 Kurdish bandits were wandering around Ayntab, so caravans were under threat. The governor of Aleppo, Mehmed Pasha, sent an order to the Officials of Ayntab to not allow the caravan going to Aleppo to stop in Ayntab because of that threat. He ordered them to escort the caravan with a sufficient amount of army.¹⁰⁵ All such events can be seen as economically motivated banditries.

¹⁰⁰ ACR 40, p. 101.

¹⁰¹ ACR 53, pp. 261, 273.

¹⁰² ACR 56, pp. 67, 68, 83, 94.

¹⁰³ ACR 55, p. 278.

¹⁰⁴ ACR 61, p. 285.

¹⁰⁵ ACR 60, p. 234.

In the case of the *Rıřvans* who attacked the traders, the importance of social organization is obvious. No matter whether all three groups had been descendent from the same apical ancestor, organizing under the same tribe created cohesion among them. Another example that shows the importance of organization is the quarrel happened between the Turcoman *Gevune* (كُون) tribe and *Rıřvan* sub-tribes in 1714. A hundred cavalrymen and infantrymen from the *Gevune* seized 1,200 sheep of the *Rıřvans*. When *Rıřvans* heard that event some men from semi-nomadic *Muykanlı*, *Belkanlı* and *řeyh Bilanlı* sub-tribes immediately went for intervened *Gevunean* attacked them and killed at least three men.¹⁰⁶ In the records three herds were mentioned. That means those three nomadic tribes performed a collective economic facility. Such collectivity brought about cohesion.

This last case is a good example of tribal conflict (between-group banditry). It was possible for every tribe to conflict with any other tribe(s). However, of them the conflict between nomadic tribes and sedentary tribes or between nomadic and sedentary life, in general, was apparent. The Ottoman historians who talk about tribal banditry make the nomads a scapegoat. To some extent they are right, since genuinely in many cases nomads fed their herds with peasants' crops and even more they sometimes looted their houses and seize their properties. The banditry of the *Kuzugüdenli* tribe in 1716 is a good example of this kind. 1,700 horsemen from that tribe came to the villages of *Abalı* tribe and took their 13,000 sheep and 30 camels and killed a woman.¹⁰⁷ However, the cases in which nomads were victim were not so much lees then those in which they were bandits. Some bandits raided the camp of a group of the *Chinabeyli* and killed a man. Worse, they were not allowed by the

¹⁰⁶ ACR 65, pp. 139, 141, 140, 142.

¹⁰⁷ ACR 68, pp. 35, 448. The important point is that, the tax collector of *Abalı* tribe was a man from *Pehlivanođlu* that was sub-tribe of *Kuzugüdenli*. When he went and demanded their taxes they applied to the court and took his 1,000 sheep. ACR 68, p. 450.

neighboring villagers to bury the dead man in their graveyard.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, the *Baziki* tribe encamped around a ruined village, where some 40-50 bandits from the *Gevune* tribe attacked them and took their 800 of their sheep out of 1,000.¹⁰⁹

In the court records there are many cases about struggles between people which ended with serious injuries and death. Interestingly, only a few of them were committed by tribe members. It seems contradictory that banditry was almost identical with tribes, but killing was not so common among them. No doubt, the *kadi* did not record every event. But the point I want to question is whether or not the killing is an identical part of banditry. Hobsbawm mentions that social bandits do not kill people if they do not suspect betrayal, or if the victims do not resist them. To tell the truth, there are few cases when bandits killed or injured their victims. Mostly such things happened when victims resisted. In one case the matter is more about betrayal than resistance. As has already been mentioned, revenge as a social motivator behind banditry led to a sort of banditry that was much bloody but no less social. One good example of this kind of banditry is the Kurdish bandits wandering around between Kilis and Ayntab. They killed the footman (*çukadar*) of the governor of Rakka and hung six people from Adana. When they were in the villages of Antakya the armed forces came and punished them. After the army left there they came back and began to mistreat the people. The bandits held the population responsible for the killing of their friends during the military campaign and blamed them for denouncing bandits to the state officials.¹¹⁰ Therefore, they came back for revenge. Here, I want to underline the difference between their first act, killing six people, and the second act, coming for revenge. If those six people were innocent people their action can be labeled as anti-social. However, the second action is a

¹⁰⁸ ACR 49, pp. 48, 53.

¹⁰⁹ ACR 57, p. 298 (November 24, 1706).

¹¹⁰ ACR 60, p. 229 (November, 1709).

more rational action. The target was no longer an ordinary one. They were now the enemies of these bandits. This action can be legitimized easier than the former one.

Lastly, in numerous cases the term used for tribal banditry is *bağy* (politically motivated banditry) and *dağı*¹¹¹ (highlander). In the Ottoman law code political banditry is separated from other kinds of banditry called *hirabe*¹¹² (economically motivated banditry), based on the political goals in it. Such kind of banditry was more common among the tribes, which had strong ties with their dominant kinship groups, and/or had strong ties with any other powerful groups. The revolt of Canpolatoğlu Ali was one of the best examples of how tribal banditry can be serious. Canpolatoğlu got not only the support of Kurds, with whom he had kinship ties but also the support of Arabic and Turcoman tribes, even, *levends*. That is to say, in his case both vertical and horizontal ties were quite obvious.

In politically motivated movements the leadership becomes more important than ever. Especially in long-lasting and serious movements the problem of leadership was generally solved by making it hereditary. At this point the family becomes important in banditry. Normally, family is not so important in banditry except for the blood feud between families. In serious political movements the leadership tends to be continued through the same familial lineage. For example, it is known that the Ottomans were established by the *kayı* tribe. However, they were known with their first most prominent political leader. After him the leadership became hereditary within inheritance in the same family until the end. This kind of leadership was true for almost all tribal powers and the states based on tribes. In that sense the political dimension of the rebellion of Canpolatoğlu is unquestionable.

¹¹¹ I am not sure whether there is a specific terminological meaning of *dağı*, so use the direct mean of it. Most probably it was used because of the functions of mountains in the political upheavals and banditry.

¹¹² Avci, *Osmanlı Hukukunda Suçlar ve Cezalar*. pp.301 and 304

However in many cases the political motivation behind banditry cannot produce such leadership so the banditry cannot tear down the limit of the tribe in which it exists. For example, the Kurds of Kilis did not give up their political stance after the defeat of Canpolatoğlu. They refused the highest-ranking official, *Voyvoda* (the administrator of the land of the palace and the governor), in Kilis.¹¹³ Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, they killed *Voyvodas* two times, in Kilis, and, they attacked such an official (*mutassarrıf*) once more in 1737.¹¹⁴ However, their political banditry could not be as serious as the Canpolatoğlu affair. This is the point where I think tribes differentiate from sub-tribes. Tribes can be as serious as ethnic movements. However the sub-tribal movements are much weaker.

¹¹³ ACR 63, p. 18. Kilis was a *sanjaq* at that time so there must have been a governor called *sanjaqbeyi*. But in none of the records such a figure was mentioned. So I think the *voyvoda* at the same time was the governor.

¹¹⁴ Güzelbey Cemil C. and Hulusi Yetkin, *Gaziantep Şer'î Mahkeme Sicilleri (Cilt 81 141) Fasikül: 1*, (Gaziantep: Gaziantep Kültür Derneği, 1970), p. 27.

CONCLUSION

Power elites left behind written materials, but ordinary people left almost nothing but some few words passed orally from generation to generation. Marxist historians and, especially, French *Annales School*, who claim to undertake 'history from below', began to concern with the later sort of sources as the base for the historical analysis of ordinary people. Hobsbawm, who was affected by Marxist methodology, is one of the distinguished historians of this kind. He produced an invaluable masterpiece in this field with using ballads produced in the folk culture in his research on banditry. His aim was to draw the attentions on the social bandits who were reflected in folk culture as good bandits. His studies resulted in the emergence of studies on social movements, especially banditry. From Latin American historiography to European historiography, even, to Ottoman historiography many works have been done on the banditry, which were mainly affected by Hobsbawm's thesis. However, many of these historians, instead of imitating his thesis, directed serious critiques to his approach.

The one of the critiques is about reliability of the sources produced by ordinary people. The problem is whether they reflect the common feelings or they are myths. Another critique is about the narrow limits of Hobsbawm's concept of banditry. These points are the main vulnerable points of Marxist methodology. In this approach, since the units of analysis are based on the relations of production, society mainly divided into two classes, the owners of means of production and non-owners. However, it is difficult to analyze, especially, the societies like the Ottoman society

by dividing into two ideal types; because, though this approach is consistent in itself, the role of subdivisions in the society based on socio-cultural and religious differentiations, which are indispensable for understanding some social phenomena, remains hazy.

Such divisions create units whose social movements can sometimes be unique among their counterparts. The movements of people, like *levends* who united under a military identity or those who were joined under a tribal identity had some similarities but were mostly different. In this limited study we try to explain mainly banditry tribes that had a certain place in the Ottoman social organization. However, some other groups like military and economic groups have only been partially mentioned.

Another problem is about the sociality of banditry. Besides some mentioned critiques to this point we have handled the banditry as something changes through the lines of subdivisions and the mental process of the actor in action. In this sense, social dimension of banditry is not something static but changed from one group to another and differentiated depend on conjecture. The main reasons behind this dynamism are the differentiations in group interests, motivators and mentalities varied from one group to another through the course of time.

Nevertheless, the reliability of this study is still open to dispute. Though I have offered an ideal type of the Ottoman social structure, due to the different limits related to myself and to the sources used in the study, it is not any easy task at all. The two methods that I followed to minimize the reliability problem were comparing different documents and even though we never can be sure whether the arguments in the disputes in the court records were true or not, we used them in their original form, since they are still invaluable in reflecting social and political conflicts.

Regardless of whether the accused was innocent or guilty, the process of a dispute itself reflects the tension between people. In this sense, the events mentioned in this study could be true or merely just slandering of plaintiffs.

Karen Barkey did a very valuable study on the Ottoman banditry in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, which cogently criticizes the thesis of Hobsbawm. She rightly questions the social roots of the banditry, relations between bandits and society and those between bandits and the state. However, there are several vulnerable points in her study. Like Hobsbawm she also had an economic-centric perspective. She tends to see almost all bandits as economically deprived and as *levends*. Secondly, she draws a picture of bandits as if they totally depended on the state policies of centralization. That is, bandits, in their relations with the state, totally manipulated the process. The state created the bandits and eliminated them when the time was suitable. Because of that process, the state prevented a collective action against the state. Lastly, she claims that rather than creating a threat for the state, actually bandits aided in its centralization.

In this study these assertive arguments have been criticized. Even if Barkey's thesis can be seen as an anti-thesis of Hobsbawm with her emphasis on the anti-social character of banditry-the positive relations between bandits and the state and elites; however, instead of reconceptualizing the issue, she builds her thesis on the Hobsbawm's approach to banditry. In our understanding of the sociality of banditry, social groups' alliances with other power groups, including the state power, against other factions does not make bandits anti-social. Therefore, if the state had relations with some groups it didn't contribute only to the interests of the state; but rather the relations were based on mutual interests. Thus, the state was not the only dominant group in such relations. And it is too simple to say that the state created them and

eliminated them whenever it deemed necessary. On the contrary, the state's oppression of bandits was nothing but an illusion based on conclusive evidence that banditry in the Ottoman society survived for long and continuous periods of time. The continuous banditry of a tribe supplied a ground for this argument of this study. If it so, then just picking up a period for analysis and concluding a quite assertive thesis, that banditry contributed the centrality of the state remains weak, since the banditry in its long history eroded the society thus leading to the weakening of the state power. Though the state used people, especially tribes, against bandits, both the high expenses created in the process of banditry and those created during the process of state action against bandits made the state undergo a serious loss both economically and politically. The mutual reinforcement of economical degradation and social corruption, which led to the rise of banditry, put a pressure on the relations of production. As a result the power of *ayans* (notables), who were generally considered as centrifugal powers (I prefer to substitute 'highly politically-motivated bandits' for them) rose from the late seventeenth century then on.

Overall we have tried to redefine the Ottoman banditry mainly based on the usage of the term in the period under review. This point will maybe be criticized as a state centric definition. However, the main purpose behind this is not to accept what was called banditry as it was but the state's usage of banditry for varied actions, which Hobsbawm denies, supplies a firm basis for this analysis of the interrelations between different types of social movements and reactions. Banditry is more than simply a phenomenon related to economical interests and drives, but rather a form of combinations of various external motivators and internal level consciousness.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Tribes and Resettlement

A) Tribal Organization and Resettlement *

Oymak	Cemaat	Aşiret	Ethnie	Resettlement
		Berazi	Kurd	
		Ceceli		Rakka
		Hevidi	Kurd	
		Reşi	Kurd	
		Rışvan	Kurd	
	Abalı		Turcoman	Rakka, Hama, Humus
Meş'al (?)	Abalı			Hama
	Abdallu			Rakka, Humus
	Abdili		Turcoman	Humus
	Acurlu	Boz Ulus Mandası		Rakka
	Adil Hacılu			Çukurova
	Afşarlu		Turcoman	Rakka
	Ağanlı			Humus
	Ağcalu			
	Ahmed Hacılu			
	Ahmedli	Rışvan		
	Ali Hacılu			
	Amiki		Kurd	Harran
	Anterli	Boz Ulus Mandası		Rakka
	Arablı			Rakka
	Atmalı		Kurd	
	Avşar	Boz Ulus Mandası	Turcoman	Rakka, Humus
	Aybasanlı			
	Aymaz Avşarı		Turcoman	Humus
	Ayranlık			
	Ayranlık			Haleb
	Ayranlu (İranlu)			
	Badili	Rışvan	Kurd	Rakka
	Bahadırlı			
	Bahadırlı-i Zülfikar			

	Barak	Beğdilli		Rakka
	Bardiganlı	Cihanbeyli		
	Barlu			
	Bayadlı			
	Bayadlı Ceridi			
	Bayezid Oğlu			
	Bayındır		Turcoman	Rakka
	Begelü		Turcoman	Rakka
	Begmişli	Beğdilli	Turcoman	Rakka, Hama
	Bektaşlı		Kurd	
	Belanlı			
	Belçin			
	Belkanlı	Rışvan		
	Beni Huneyn		Arab	
	Beni Rebi'		Arab	Hama
	Berenki			
	Beyaltun (?)			
	Bezerli (?)			
	Beziki (Bazikli)		Kurd	
	Bickanlı (?)			
	Boynuinceli	Danişmendli		
	Bozbeğ			
	Bozdoğanlı		Turcoman	
	Bozgeyikli			
	Bozkoyunlu	Beğdilli	Turcoman	Rakka
	Bozlu			Rakka, Hama
	Bozulusanlı			Rakka
	Bucak Avşarı			Rakka
	Bulasanlı			
	Burclu			Çukurova
	Çağd			
	Çağırğanlı	Boz Ulus Mandası	Turcoman	Rakka
	Çağlayan		Turcoman	
	Çakallı		Kurd	
	Çakallu Dokuzu		Turcoman	Hama
	Camuslu			
	Çanklı			Humus
	Çatal Depelü			
	Cebeluler			
	Ceceli Mürsellü			
	Cecelü			Rakka
	Çekanlı	Okçu İzzetinli (?)		
	Çekerbelü (?)			

	Çepni			
	Çepni-i Zülfikar			
	Cerid		Turcoman	Rakka
	Cerikanlı	Okçu İzzettinli	Kurd	
	Cigerlü		Turcoman	Rakka
	Çobanbeyli			
	Çobanoğlu Kasım			
	Çobkanlı			
	Cobur			
	Çokşur (Çokşurucaklı)	Barak		
	Com (Comlu)			
	Com Bahadırlısı			
	Com Kacalı			
	Com-u Şark (?)			Haleb
	Dadalı		Turcoman	
	Dağ Bahadırlısı		Turcoman	
	Dalyanlı	Rışvan		
	Da'seranlı (?)			
	Dedesli	Gönderlü		Haleb
	Delikanlı			
	Deliler			
	Dimlekli	Beğdilli	Turcoman	Rakka
	Doğanlı			
	Dögerlü		Turcoman	Rakka, Hama
	Dokuz Ceceli			
	Eksikli (?)	İlbegli	Turcoman	?
	El Hemrah		Arab	Hama
	Elci		Turcoman	Hama, Humus
	Eminlikli		Turcoman	Rakka
	Esenceli			
	Esenli Elçisi			
	Estecelü			
	Ferhadoğlu	Rışvan		
	Fettah Oğlu			
	Fıkıhlı	Mihmanlı		
	Firuzlu	İlbegli		
	Gedikli		Turcoman	
	Genceli Afşarı		Turcoman	Humus
	Gencli			Humus
	Gevune (?)		Turcoman	Rakka
	Geyikli		Turcoman	Haleb
	Göçer Kızık			
	Göçerlü			

	Gö nec		Turcoman	Rakka
	Gözü Kızıllı		Turcoman	
	Gözü Küçük lü	İl begli	Turcoman	?
	Günder lü (?)		Turcoman	
	Hacı Fakılı Oymađı	İl begli		
	Hacı İshak Uş ađı			
Kabođlu Dokuzu	Hacı İvaz Ođlu			Rakka
	Hacılar	Rı şvan	Kurd	Harran
	Halı calu (Halicelü)		Turcoman	Rakka
	Halidli		Kurd	Harran
	Halı kanlı	Rı şvan		
	Hamidli	Rı şvan		
	Hamza Hacı lu	Boz Ulus Mandası		Rakka
	Harar			
	Har bendeli		Turcoman	Humus
	Har mandalı			Rakka, Çukurova
	Hasan			Çukurova
	Hatal		Turcoman	
	Hem danlı	Rı şvan		
	He ştvanlı		Kurd	
	Hevidi			
	Heybeli			
	Hodar lu (?)			Çukurova
	Hüseyin Gazi			
	İl basan			Haleb
	İl begli		Turcoman	Rakka, Harran, Menbic
	İnal lu	Boz Ulus Mandası	Turcoman	Rakka, Humus
	İnen lü	Okçu İzzettinli	Kurd	
	İzmir Karakoyun lu (?)		Turcoman	Humus
	İzzettin	Boz Ulus Mandası		Rakka
	Kabaklı		Turcoman	
	Kabalı			Humus
	Kabuk lu			Haleb
	Kaçar Eymiri			Humus
	Kaçar İsalı	Kıllı		
	Kacelü (?)			Rakka, Hama
	Kadmerli (?)		Kurd	Harran
	Kahirman			
	Kahtan			
	Kalet lu			Haleb
	Kara A vş ar		Turcoman	Humus
	Kara Bekirli (yer)		Turcoman	

	Kara Boyunlu			
	Kara Ceceli			Rakka
	Kara Dede			Çukurova
	Kara Develi		Turcoman	
	Kara Gündüzlü			
	Kara Hallı			
	Kara Kaşaklı	Ağca Koyunlu		
	Kara Kocalu		Turcoman	Rakka
	Kara Mürsellü		Turcoman	
	Kara Musalu			
	Kara Sakallı		Turcoman	
	Kara Süleymanlı		Turcoman	
	Kara Yusuf	Oturak Kızığdı		
	Karaav (?) (Kara Avşar)			Hama
	Karaboğalı			
	Karaburclu			
	Karaca Arablı			Rakka
	Karacalı		Kurd	Harran
	Karagözlü			Humus
	Karakeçili		Turcoman	
	Karakoyunlu			
	Karalu			
	Karaşeyhli	Beğdilli	Turcoman	Rakka, Resayf (?)
	Karataşlı	İlbeğli		
	Karcılı			Hama
	Karkın		Turcoman	
	Karlefceli (?)			
	Karnıklı		Kurd	Harran
	Katırcalı			Rakka
	Katırlu		Turcoman	Rakka
	Kayalı		Turcoman	Humus
	Kayas		Turcoman	Rakka
	Kaygulu Dokuzu		Turcoman	Harran
	Kazlı			Rakka
	Keçebeyli		Turcoman	
	Keher Selek (?)		Turcoman	
	Kepekli			
	Kestan	Danişmendli		Hama
	Kılıçbegli	Bozkoyunlu		
	Kılıçlı		Kurd	Rakka
	Kıllı		Turcoman	
	Kırntılı		Kurd	Harran
	Kırlangaçlı			

Süleyman Kethüda	Kızık			
	Kızık			Rakka, Hama
	Kızıl Koyunlu			Rakka
	Kızılca Şarklu (?)			Haleb
	Kızkapanlı			
	Kocanlı	Okçu İzzettinli (?)		
	Koçlu (?)		Turcoman	
	Kösene	Danişmendli		Hama
	Koyunoğlu			
	Koz Habelü (?)		Turcoman	Rakka
	<i>Küçükklü</i>	<i>Boz Ulus Mandası</i>	<i>Turcoman</i>	<i>Rakka, Harran</i>
	Küçükklü	Danişmendli		Hama
	Kulak		Turcoman	
	Küveli Hasan			
	Kurdcuali (?)	Bozkoyunlu		
	Kürdlerin Depelisi (?)			
	Kurulu			
	Kuşçu Ceridi			
	Kuşlu			
	Kuyumcular			
	Lek (Yaycılar)			
	Lekvan		Kurd	Harran
	Lekvanlık			Rakka
	Mahalle-i Küçük Şerefli	Danişmendli		
	Mamalu		Turcoman	Harran
	Mamaş			
	Mamoli			Rakka
	Maraşlı			Çukurova
	Mehyanlı			
	Memaşeli (<i>Memeşeli</i>)		Turcoman	
	Mendoli	Rışvan	Kurd	
	Merdisi	Ahbiye (?)		
	Merdisi (?)	Cihanbeyli		
	Meskali (?)	Rışvan		
	Meskenilü (?)			
	Mezmanlı (?)			
	Mihmanlı		Turcoman	
	Mihmanlı			Haleb
	Mudlı			Rakka
	Muhayanlı	Rışvan		
	Mülükan	Rışvan		
	Musa Şeyh Oğulları		Turcoman	Rakka

	Musa Şeyhli			Rakka
	Musabeyli		Kurd	
	Musacalu		Turcoman	Rakka, Harran
	Muykanlı	Rışvan		
	Neferir (?) Hacı Ahmedlü	Boynuinceli		
	Ocaklı			Rakka
	Ödemişli	Pehlivanlı		
	Okçu			
	Okçu İzzetlini		Kurd	Harran
Cerikanlı	Okçu İzzetlini			
	Okçulu			
	Öksüzlü	Kılıçlı		
	Ömeranlı	Rışvan	Kurd	
	Ömerli	Boz Ulus Mandası		Rakka
	Oturak Bahadırılı			
	Oturak Ceceli			
Kara Yusufu	Oturak Kızık			
Mihmanlı	Oturak Kızık			
	Ovacıklı			Çukurova
	Ovacıklı-i Elhac Mehmed			
	Oylarlu (?)			
	Papaltun (?)		Turcoman	Harran
	Pehlivanlı		Turcoman	
Yüreğir	Pehlivanlı			
	Pehlivanoğlu	Kuzugüdenli	Turcoman	
Elhac Mustafa	Recebli		Turcoman	Rakka
	Recebli Afşarı		Turcoman	Rakka, Harran
	Reş-i Pir Oğulları İbrahim			
	Reyahanlı		Turcoman	
	Rışvan	Ulus		
	Rışvanoğlu Halil			
	Rumiyanlı	Rışvan		
	Sakallı		Kurd	
	Sakkallı Ceridi			Hama
	Şambayadı		Turcoman	
	Şarklı		Turcoman	Hama, Humus
	Saveceli Kızığı			
	Seherlü			
	Şekaki		Kurd	
	Selmanlı	Gönderlü		
	Seluri			Humus
	Sencarlu			Humus

	Şereflü	Danişmendli		
	Serketanlu	Okçu İzzetinli		
	Şeyh Bilanlı	Rışvan		
	Şeyh Hamzalu		Turcoman	
	Şeyhler		Kurd	Harran
	Şeyhli		Kurd	Rakka, Harran
Kavaklı	Şeyhli			
Odonlu (?)	Şeyhli			
	Şeyhli Ceridi			
	Silsüpür Ceridi		Turcoman	Harran
	Sipalkalu (?)		Turcoman	Harran
	Siphanlı Bölüğü			
	Sof Ceridi			
	Sofiler			Haleb
	Soran		Kurd	
	Suhaşvaklı (?)		Turcoman	
	Tabanlı		Kurd	
	Tacir			
	Tacirli (Tecerlü)		Turcoman	Rakka
	Taklı			
	Taklı Karkını			
	Tarikli (Taraklı)	İlbegli		
	Tatar İlyash	Pehlivanlı		
	Tecer İsalı		Turcoman	
	Tohtemürlü		Turcoman	Rakka, Hama
	Topaklı			Çukurova
	Türgeşli			
	Ufacıklı			
	Ulaşlu	Beğdilli	Turcoman	Rakka
	Ulus	Cihanbeyli		
	Vezbianlı (?)	Cihanbeyli		
	Yalavac			
	Yapraklu		Turcoman	Harran
	Yuz		Turcoman	
		Ağcakoyunlu	Turcoman	
		Arab-ı Süyuh (?)	Arab	Hama
		Avşar	Turcoman	
		Azberat	Arab	
		Bahadırılı		
		Barak	Turcoman	Rakka
		Bayezid		
		Baziki		
		Beğdilli	Turcoman	Rakka

		Beni Cedid	Arab	Hama
		Beni Kays	Arab	
		Beni Kelib	Arab	
		Boz Ulus Mandası	Turcoman	Rakka
		Bozkoyunlu	Turcoman	Rakka
		Çağırğanlı		
		Çakallu	Kurd	
		Çepni		
		Cihanbeyli	Kurd	Rakka
		Com	Kurd	
		Danişmendli	Turcoman	
		Delim	Arab	
		Denyati (?)		
		El Bermedi	Arab	Hama
		El Feza (?)	Arab	Hama
		El Meşhur	Arab	Hama
		Firuzlu		
		Gönderlü	Turcoman	
		Hecvanlı	Kurd	
		İlbegli	Turcoman	
Tarikli		İlbegli		
		Karaşeyhli		
		Kılıçbeyli		
		Kılıçlı	Kurd	
		Kılıçlı Bektaş		
		Kıllı		Haleb
Mihmadlı		Kızık		
		Kürdan		
		Mamalu	Turcoman	
		Merdisi	Kurd	
		Mevali	Arab	
		Milli		
Çepli (?) Ömer		Reşi		
Çorbali		Reşi		
Fıratı		Reşi		
Kara Mezra		Reşi		
Kızıl İn		Reşi		
Mendoli		Reşi		
Muhtin (?)		Reşi		
Mülukanlı		Reşi		
Pir Mir		Reşi		
Talaşık		Reşi		
Halikanlı		Rışvan		

Hamidli		Rıřvan		
Kametli		Rıřvan		
Ömeranlı		Rıřvan		
řeyh Bilanlı		Rıřvan		
		řamiyan		
		Savi	Arab	Rakka
		řekaki		
		řekeranlı (řekranlı)	Kurd	
		Semek	Arab	Rakka
		Sevahil	Arab	
		řeyh Hamzalu	Turcoman	
		řeyhkanlı		
Canan		Süveydi		
		Ufacıklı		
		Zahveranlı (Za'feranlı)	Kurd	
Berekatlı			Kurd	
Abalı			Turcoman	
Atmalı				
Bektařlı				
Karođlu (?)				
Pehlivanlı				
řeyh Hamzalu				

*** Notes:**

- 1) This table prepared based only the information grasped from Ayntab Court Records used in this study.
- 2) This table may not show lineage sytem, since it can also reflect tribes' economic and political organizations.
- 3) Some names may not be tribal names but are personal and geographical names.
- 4) The information in the right most columns are related only the left most columns. For example, look at the row written in italic. The *cemaat* of *Küçükklü* is a sub-tribe of the *Boz Ulus Mandası*. Here, Küçükklü is a Turcoman tribe and ressetled in Rakka and Harran. This doesn't mean that Boz Ulus is also a Turcoman and resettled there.
- 5) Here. *Oymak*, *Cemaat* and *Ařiret* are not actual identities of these tribes but it can be interpreted as a tribe in a left column is the sub-group of one in a right column in the same row.

B) Resettled Tribes

ACR 41, p. 39: *Suret ba-hatt-ı hümayun: Mucebince memur oldukları mahallerde iskan ettirilub işbu defterde ma'muliye olmak üzere mahallinde hıfz oluna. Zirde mustedi Türkman taifesinden iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir ki müfredatıyla zikr olunur Türkman-ı Haleb reayasından Hama ve Humus toprağına iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir.*

Cemaat-i Kacılı tabi' Hamza Kethüda	Cemaat-i Köseoğlu Şarkılı tabi' Durdu	Cemaat-i Kara Afşar tabi' Hamdi Kethüda
Cemaat-i Duger oğlan-ı Hama tabi' Mustafa.	Boz Sam Çerkes oğulları	Su'asaf (?) tabi' Mehmed Kethüda
İnallu tabi' Derviş Kethüda	Emir Ditrarlu (?) tabi Süleyman Kethüda	Sam Begmişlu tabi' Abdullah Kethüda
Hama Dögeri tabi' Derviş kethüda	Kara Tohtemürlü tabi' Muharrem Kethüda	Mezbur tabi' Köse Kethüda
Kara Tohtemürlü Erdoğan	Tokurcun Harbendelusı tabi' Murad Kethüda	Abalu-i Muşa'lı Kethüda
Abalu-i İdris Kethüda	Asaf (?) tabi' Mezbur	Beşir oğulları
Amher (?) Sancarlu tabi'	Amher (?) Çarık tabi' Mezbur	Amher (?) Tosun tabi' İsa Kethüda
Amher (?) Karagöz tabi' İbarhim Kethüda	Amher (?) Afan Kethüda	Bozlu tabi' Halil
Bozlu tabi' Ebudderva (?)	Kızıl Ali Tohtemürlüsü tabi' Halil	Türkman-ı Selluriye tabi' Trablus (?)
Makarreş (?) oğlu ve tevabuha (?) tabi' Trablus	Yekun cemaat aded: 26	Yekun cemaat aded: 2

Has-ı mezbur reayasından Rakka'ya iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir.

Dimleklu kasım	Şeyhlu an taife-i Begdilli be-nam-ı Uğurlu Şeyh oğulları	Şeyhlu be-nâm-ı Hamis (?) Şeyh
Tokalu benam-ı Musa Şeyh oğulları	Duger Mirza	Bayındır Rüstem Kethüda
Bayındır Hacı Ahmet Ekthüda	Bayındır Ramazan	Seçmen (?) tabi' Pir Ahmed
Seçmen (?) tabi' Emir Mec (?)	Kara Şeyhlu Hुरamlu tabi' Taban (?) oğulları	Kara Şeyhlu Ceke tabi' Kızıl Uris oğlu mermi (?)
Döger-i Seyf	Kara Şeyhlu-i Yadigar tabi' Elkays (?)	Kara Şeyhlu-i Yadigarlu tabi' İsmail Kethüda
A'aylar (?) tabi' Kara Şeyhlu	Kara Şeyhlu-i Torabeglu tabi' Kurt	Kadirlü tabi' Hüseyin kethüda
Bozkoyunlu tabi' Seyfhan Beg	Bilenlu-i Azaz Güherçile an Cemaat-i Bozkoyunlu Seyfhan Ahmed Fakih Uşağı mesela (?)	Kayas (?) Veli Kethüda

	Mehmedan beşdiye (?)	
Arablu Musa an taife-i Begdilli	Arablu İbrahim an taife-i Begdilli	Amar A'li (?) tabi' Dimlekle
Adiler tabi' Ahmed Kethüda	Begmişlü tabi' Ganim	Bozkoyunlu Tales tabi' Elciyar (?) kethüda
Bozkoyunlu tabi' Mir Fariz (?) Kethüda	Dimleklü-i Hacılar	Dimlekle tabi' Pir Budak Oğlu
Yekun Cemaat aded: 30		

Yeni İl hasları reayasından Rakka'ya iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir.

Musacalu tabi' İsa Kethüda	Musacalu tabi' Ebu Sultan Kethüda	Musacalu tabi' Amru (?) kethüda
Musacalu-i Tanburcalu Mülhem kethüda	Musacalu tabi' Ali Kethüda	Musacalu tabi' Bayazid Kethüda
Taif Afşarı tabi' Arab ali Kethüda	Turyan Taif Afşarı	Kanaatlu Dokuzu tabi' Hacı İvaz (?) oğlu İbrahim Kethüda
Kara Cecelu tabi'	Cecelu Yağmur oğlu Kethüda	Barak tabi' Arab Osman
Güneş	Kapaklu taife-i Begdilli	Baynelu (?) an Taife-i Begdilli
Cumalu an taife-i Begdilli	Seçmen (?) Deli Aliler	Kara Kocalu
Yekun cemaat: 18		

Has-ı mezbur reayasından Hama ve Humus Toprağına iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir.

Abdallu Hacı Mehmed	Kayalu tabi' Haydar kethüda	Elçi Ramazan
Sağırlı elçisi tabi' Mustafa	Asplu Elçisi	Boyulu Elçisi tabi' Delice oğlu
Ayluhanlı Elçisi	Ekrad-i Kılıçlı tabi' Asaf Kethüda	Şarklı Sultan Kethüda
Emir (?) Hacı Bayram tabi' Dede Kethüda	Halillü tabi' Danişmendlu	Genceli Avşarı
Yekun Cemaat: 10	Yakun Cemaat: 2	

Mukataa-i Akra'nın ve tevabi cemaatlerinden Rakka'ya iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir.

Leger-i atik (?) ve tevabimuha	Karanti (?) ve tevabimuha	Hacılar ve tevabimuha
Obaş (?) ve tevabimuha	Kızıl koyunlu ve tevabimuha	Yekun Cemaat aded: 5

Manda-i Bozulus Türkmanından Rakka Eyaleti'nde Nehr-i Belenc üzere ve kenarından

olan nevahilerde iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir.

İzzeddin ve tevabımuha	Gerçeklu	Avşar
İnallu	Anter (?)	Ömerlü
Çupu (?)	Ömerler ve tevabımuha	Şark Çağırğanlı
Yekun cemaat aded: 9		

Keskin (?) ilinde sakin Bozulus Türkmanının Rakka'ya iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir.

Cerid Musa ve Ömer ve İsmail Kethüda ve gayruhum	Gerçekler Ali Kethüda ve Zeynelabidin	Beyaltun Ömer Kethüda
Tacirli Birdal Oğulları ve İsmail ve Ali ve Mehmed ve gayruhum	Hertebedelu (?) tabi' Yakub Kethüda	Karaca Arablar
Cebeli (?) an sükanan-ı Recebli avşarı	Acurlu	Yekun cemaat aded: 8

Mukaddeman Ergani nahiyesinde sakin Batılar (Badiler) aşiretinden Kangırı ve Ankara sancaklarında kışlayan cemaatlerden Rakka Eyaletinde Harran nam mahale iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatler.

Arşvanlı (?) tabi' Badiler Mir-i (?) aşiret Abdullah	Avestudganlı (?) mir-i aşiret Murad	Çemganlı tabi' Badiler mir aşiret
Atmanlı tabi' Badiler mir aşiret Mustafa ve kethüdaları şah Hüseyin	Hacı Mirlü tabi' Badiler mir aşiret İsmail	Atmanlar tabi' Badiler
Kurdiganlı ve şedid tabi' Diyarbekir mir aşiret Şedid	Kurdiganlı tabi' Badiler mir aşiret İsmail	Memars (?) tabi' Badiler Musaili kethüda oğlu
Mudanlı tabi' Badiler mir aşiret Abdal ve Kethüdaları ve Avaz	Yekun Cemaat aded: 10	

Aydın ve Rum caniblerinde sakin Danişmendli Türkmanından Safle (?) sancağında Ayatluğ (?) nam-ı diğer Viranşehir mahalinde Torbalı nam mevzi'ye (?) varınca tulen ve arzen tahminen 12 saat mikdarı hali ve harabe olan arazide Balıkesir sancağında su seferliği (?) ve kemer gölü karibinde Timur Kapudan Viranhane dimekle ma'ruf arazi-i haliyede iskan olunub şin ve abadan eylemek üzere ferman olunan cemaatlerdir.

Karalu mir aşiret altı barmak zade Hüseyin	Küçük sermayeli kethüdaları hacı Hasan	Civanber (?) Musa ve Avaz kethüda
Kaşıkcı Hüseyin ve Süleyman ve Osman	Gülegir (?) sarı Bekir Kethüda	Büyük sermayeli Kodal (?) Ömer ve Ferhi (?) kethüda
Kürd Mihmanlı Veli Kethüda	Büyük süleymanlı köse İbrahim ve Bali Kethüda	Küçük Süleymanlı ali ve Keteş oğlu Bekir kethüda
Kürdengüde (?) ali ve	Berhan Hacı Mehmed	Heregli (?) Bektaş ve Kara

Mehmed ve Osman ve Ali ve İbarhim kethüda	kethüda	Ömer kethüda
Karaca Kürd ve Cafer Sırık Ali ve Oğlu Cüce kethüda	Boynu inceli İbrahim Kethüda ve Hacı Ömer oğlu Mustafa	Sarıca Mürsel kethüda oğlu Ömer ve Ali
Şarklı Kürdü Hacı Bekir ve Halil	Kuzi (?) Veli ve Kebir ve sağır ali ve elhac Avaz (?)	Sıddıklı Mehmed kethüda ve Bali ve Bektaş oğlu mirzali (?) ve sekban oğlu ağca
Büyük Selarlu ve küçük Bekir veyusuf oğlu İsmail ve Mustafa kethüda	Durdu Hasanlı tabi' İsmail	Veliler duman Oğlu Ahmed Kethüda ve Köse Mehmed
Diğer Kaşıkçı Kethüdaları İbrahim ve Rahman oğlu Ahmed Kethüda Arab oğlu Hacı Bekir ve gayruhu	Yekun cemaat: 22	

موجبتیجیه نامور اولوقلمر علیخان السکانی اشدولوب
اشبوه خرم معمول به اولوق اوزره محلیده حفظ اولونه

زیرجوسطوری نورجان طایفه سندن ایکنجه فرمان بیوریلان جماعتلرکه
منوره اتیله دکر اولونور بترکان خلعت کا اخصا باسندن جماعتیجه طبر افغنه
دکنجه فرمان بیوریلان جماعتلر

جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
قیلیوتایح حمزه کتخدا	کوسه اوغلم شرتکرایح کوردبر	حمزه افش زایح حمید کتخدا
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
دوکر اولوقلمر جماعت عیقل	بوز سام چوکس اوغوللر	شوعب زایح شوق کتخدا
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
ایتیا لوتایح درویش کتخدا	امیرد بتدر اولوتایح سلیج کتخدا	سام بکشایح عبدالله کتخدا
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
حما دوکری یایح درویش کتخدا	قره تختویرایح یایح فرم کتخدا	مر نور زایح کوسه کتخدا
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
قره تختویرایح ارطغرل	طوقور جون خرنده لوتایح درویش کتخدا	عباس او مشعل کتخدا
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
عباس او ادریس کتخدا	عسکرت زایح زینر	بشیر او غوللر
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
امهر سنجی لوتایح	امهر جاریح زایح زینر	امهر نوسون زایح عینی کتخدا
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
امهر قره کوز زایح ابراهیم کتخدا	امهر عثمان کتخدا	بوز لوتایح خلیل
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
بوز لوتایح ابوالورد	قرن عم توختور زینر زایح خلیل	نورجان سللو زایح طبر
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
نقد زینر اوغلم دوقا ابرها	یایح طایس	

حاضر بوز زرایح عباس سندن رقه به ایکنجه فرمان بیوریلان جماعتلر در

جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
دیمکلوق قاسم	شیخ شامو عن طایفه بیکدی نیام اغوزلو	شیخ لوتایح حسن شیخ
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
طغابون نیام موسی شیخ اوغوللر	دوکر میرزا	بایندر زایح رستم کتخدا
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
بایندر زایح احمد کتخدا	بایندر زایح رمضان	سپین زایح پیر احمد
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
سپین زایح امیرج	قره شیخو حوراملو زایح	قره شیخو چک زایح قرال دیرن
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
دوکر سیف	طامعی اوغوللر	اوغلم قرنی
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
عاجیل زایح قره شیخو	قره شیخو یایح کار زایح	قره شیخو یایح کار لوتایح
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
بوز قیتونلو زایح سیفان بکر	بلیانلو عنرا زکوجو طایفه عن جماعت بود قیتونلو	سیفان احمد فتنه اوشا عنی مسلایح آن بوشن
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
قیاس ویا کتخدا	عربو موسی عن طایفه بیکدی	عربو ابراهیم عن طایفه بیکدی
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
عادل علی یایح دیمکلوق	عادل زایح احمد کتخدا	بکمت لوتایح غانم
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
بوز قیتونلو طالس یایح البیا کتخدا	بوز قیتونلو زایح ویز کتخدا	دیمکلوق حاجیل
جماعت	جماعت	جماعت
دیمکلوق یایح بوز بوزان اوغلم		

Appendix II: The Deserters from the Defence of Tımaşver in 1696

A) Deserter *Tımar* Holders Who Lost Their Lands.

Village ¹	The amount of <i>Tımar</i> ²	Deserters ³	New Owners ⁴
Aynıfar	?	Mehmed	Yusuf
Aynıfar	8,000	Mehmed	Mustafa
Barna	3,000	Şaban	Mehmed
Bostancık	9,000	Ahmed	Mehmed
Bostancık	3,000	Ahmed	
Bostancık	3,000	Ahmed	Mehmed
Bostancık	?	Ahmed	Yusuf
Bostancık	9,000	Ahmed	Mehmed
Burucak	3,000	Mahmud	
Burucak	3,000	Mahmud	İbrahim
Burucak	3,000	Mahmud	Osman
Evliyacık (?)	2,500	Ali	Seyyit Mehmed
Güllüce	?	Mehmed	Ali
Güllüce	10,000	Mehmed	Selim
Güllüce	4,500	Zülfikâr	Mehmed Hanifi
Han-ı Kirman	5,500	Hüseyin	Hızır
Han-ı Kirman	3,000	Mehmed	Hüseyin
Harnuba (?)	3,000	Selim	Osman
Harpuştil	5,200	Mehmed	Mehmed
Hezek	18,000	Bekir	İsmail
Hümevri & Kızılcakend	4,500	Ali	Ali
Kara Dinek	3,800	Ramazan	Ahmed
Kara Dinek	3,500	Ramazan	Abdullah
Karaca Viran	16,000	Ahmed	Davud
Karaca Viran	16,450	Ahmed	Davud
Karaca Viran	10,000	Süleyman	Ahmed
Karaca Viran	5,300	Yusuf	Mehmed
Kefer Bostan	3,000	Ali	Mehmed
Kefercebel	?	Ömer	Mehmed
Kelbin	3,000	Ahmed	Ali
Kelbin	?	Ahmed	Ahmed
Kelbin	3,000	Ahmed	Ahmed
Kelbin	?	diğer Ahmed	Ahmed
Kelbin	3,000	Mehmed	Ahmed
Kered	?	Ebubekir	Ebubekir
Kerer	3,700	Ahmed	Ahmed
Kilisecik	3,000	Ahmed	Mahmud
Kilisecik	2,900	Ahmed	Mehmed
Kilisecik	2,900	Ahmed	Mahmud
Kilisecik, Kızılcakend...	10,000	Mehmed	Selim
Merserc (?)	?	Hızır	Ebubekir
Öyücek	4,250	?	Hızır

Pehlivan Çukuru	3,000	Mehmed	Hasan
Şağidin	7,537	Ali	Seyyit Mehmed
Şağidin (Çağdigin ?)	2,200	Musa	Mehmed
Savibönü	5,000	Ali	Ali
Savibönü	5,000	Ali	Mehmed
Savibönü	2,700	Mustafa	Mehmed
Savibönü	?	Mustafa	Hızır
Savibönü	2,700	Mustafa	Hüseyin
Savibönü	2,697	Mustafa	Mehmed
Saramiyye	3,500	Mehmed	Ömer
Segeberban (Seğer?)	7,500	Yusuf	Mehmed
Seğidin	1,500	Musa	
Seğidin	3,000	Mustafa	Mustafa
Sibge	3,998	Ebubekir	Mustafa
Sibge	4,000	Ebubekir	Mustafa
Şöhme	2,300	Ali	Hüseyin
Söndü	3,000	Mustafa	Abdullah
Torbalık	3,800	Hüseyin	Mehmed
Tozluburç	4,000	Mustafa	Hüseyin
Tucefe (?)	3,000	?	Mehmed
Turnalık	3,800	Hüseyin	Mehmed
Ulu Ma'sara	3,000	Mehmed	Halil
Yona	3,000	Şaban	Halil
Zenbur ?	3,000	Ali	Hüseyin
Zügürd (?)	?	Mehmed	Ali
Total	277,232		

Notes:

1. The places where the *timar* lands were located.
2. The estimated income from the land per year.
3. The *timar* holders who were deserted from the battle.
4. Men to whom the lands of desreters were granted. They took part in the battle or accepted to be *serdengeçti* (troops selected for a desperate enterprise).

B) Taxes Levied On Desrter Zeamet Owners and Their Villages

ACR 44, p. 90: Eyalet-i Maraş'da vaki züema ve erbab-ı tımarın 1106 senesinde sefere memur olub Tımaşver muhafazasından firar etmeleriyle sene-i merkumede zeamet karyelerinde hasıl olan mahsulat ve rüsumatları canib-i miriye zapt olunmak babında hala Maraş valisi olan Ahmed Paşa'ya hatt-ı emr-i ali sadır olunmağla paşa-i müşarunileyh tarafından buyruldu-i şerifle tahsile tayinine buyurdıkları Mehmed Ağa'nın cem' ve tahsil eylediği defterdir ki zikr olunur.

Evasıt-ı Şevval 1107 (May, 1696)

Name	Tax (kuruş)	Name	Tax (kuruş)
Kara Ahmed Bey	75	Demirci Hacı Yusuf	9.5
Hacı Süleyman	15	İlyas Bey Oğlu	21.75
Kılıç Bey	40	Köle Yusuf	13
Kör Mahmud	10	Bedir (?) Ağa Oğlu	10
Kefer Bistan (village)	30	Bedir (?) Ağa Oğlu Zukericoz	9
Temerçuğe (?)	20	Hacı Osman	50
Kuli Bey Oğlu	20	Halil Bey	19
Boz Ali Oğlu	10	Akal Hüseyin	15
Hacı Abdullah	10	Zebnurden	10
Katırcı Ömer	14	Salih (?)	9
Selim Bey	10	Osman Kefercebel	24
Çavuş Oğlu	100	Burc Ömer	35
Pekre Mustafa	12.5	Çolak Ali	9
İskender Oğlu	10	Elvend Oğlu Mehmed	15
Hızır Bey	16	Kara Dinek	15
Uzun Ahmed Oğlu	15	Geneyikli Hacı Ali	5
Deli Osman Oğlu	20	Kel Şaban	15
Cuma (?)Bey	60	Deli Ali	22
Hantemanlı Oğlu	35	Şahbaz	18
Kürd Musa	23.75	Çeribaşı Oğlu	40
Cebrail Bey	20	Siyaguş	20
Ades Bey	20	Ali Bey Şöhme Eyyup	20
Parmaksızzade	75	Abdullah Bey	30
Zaim Ali Oğlu	24	Kedi Oğlu	13
Elvend Oğlu	18	Şah Melik ve Söndü	12
Hasan Çavuş Oğlu	43	Ahmed Beşe Oğlu	60
Pekre Hüseyin	9	Körkün	18
Kürd Ali	12	Ömer Bey Oğlu	5
Kasaboğlu Ali	30	Deli Mustafa	20
Ramazan	14	Gergeri Oğlu Ali Bey	40
Ali Ağa Oğlu	30	Hasan Ağa	30
Çeri Paşa	22	Gergeri Oğlu Hacı Mustafa	15
Hacı Meşali (?)	40	? ? Abdullah	10
Kara Mehmed	24	Mizmiz	50
Zülfikar	35	Cem'an	168(4)

Mir-i için Mehmed Ağaya teslim: 1250

Mübaşir Mehmed Ağaya Ücret-i Mübaşeret: 250

Mübaşir-i merkum Mehmed Ağa'ya sarf olan mesarif-i yevmiye cem'an: 184.

Appendix III: The Expenditure for Campaigns against Bandit Tribes

ACR 54, p. 18: 1116 senesi saferü'l-hayr evailinden tarih-i deftere gelinceye değin medine-i Ayntab'da vaki olan mesarif ve medine-i mezbure beyi ekrad üzerine sefere gittik de piyade bayrağı için verilen akçe cümle ayan-ı vilayet marifetiyle tevzi' ve salyane olunduk da kuradan 228 guruş ve nefis-i şehrin 188 hanesi olub beher haneye 4.5 guruş isabet etmekle tahrir olunan mesarif defteridir ki ber vech-i ati zikr olunur.

Evahir-i Cemaziyyevvel 1116 (September, 1704)

Bey Kürd seferine gittik de:

The form of expenditure	In cash (kr)	In kind
Piyade bayrağı için	335	
Beye virilen	250	
Ref-i piyade bayrağı için	120	
Bazarbaşı Sof'a gönderildikde	2	
Haleb Paşası ağasına	22.5	
Vezir ağasına	24	
Beye üzüm ve karpuz	1	
Beyin hazinedarına ve kethüdasına ve sair uşaklarına	21.75	
Mustafa-i Halebiye kira	1	
Hacı Hüseyine kira ve kahve	3	
Mütesellim Mehmed Ağa'ya	3	
Arpacıya	25	
Ceridlere kira	10	
Beyin keçisini ra'y iden çobana	3	
Mütesellim Arab Ahmed Ağaya kilim	4kr 1s	
?	0.25	
Mah-ı saferü'l-hayrda saraydara	2	
Ruha'ya Arab eşkiyası için giden ademe ücret	10	
Saray çeşmesi tathirine	0.75	
Yükçüye	1s	
Müzellef Hamza ağaya oda kirası	3	
Saray tamiri için on ev ve binaya	12kr 7sm	
Gelüb ve çeker (?)	0.5	
Felek Efendi odasına kira	1kr 1s	
Gözü büyük oğlu odasına kira	2	
Mah-ı rebü'l-ahir ve cemaziyyevvel'de olan saraydara	4	
Mustafa-i Halebi beye gittik de bahşiş verdiği	5	
Mukaddeman olan salyaneden baki	60	
Pirinç	5kr 2s	
Bağ	4	8
Yoğurt	7sm	13.5
Üzüm	0.5	12
Asel	2s	22nugi
Sebzeyan	0.75	
Odun	0.5	
Bakkallar aldığı lehm	0.5	4

Etmek	1kr 2s	501
Arpa	7.25	10keyl
Lehm	3kr 10sm	30.5
Saman	1	3haml
Beye yorğan	16	7
Döşek ma' çit	8	
Keçe	3.5	
Yün	3	25
Beredi (?) Hasır	6	
Elhac Hüseyin'e ücret	6.5	
Bazarbaşıya ücret	20	
Cem'an	1064	

Kura'dan 228 guruş ve nefsi-i şehirden 846 guruş ki cem'an 1074 guruş hasıl olub meblağı mezkurun 1064 guruşu mesarif-i mezkur için verildikten sonra 10 guruşu izdiyad kalmağla bu mahale şerh verildi.

ACR 54, p. 46: 1116 senesi cemaziyyevvelî evahirinden tarih-i deftere gelinceye degin medine-i Ayntab'da vaki olan mesarif ve menzil cümle ayan-ı vilayet marifetiyle tevzi' salyane olunduk da nefis-i şehrin 188.5 (ve) nısf rub' hanesi olub beher haneye 4 guruş 10 sümün isabet itmekle tahrir olunan mesarif defteridir ki ber vech-i ati zikr olunur.

Gurre-i Şaban 1116 (December, 1704).

The form of expenditure	In cash (kr)	In kind
Menzilciye	600	
Avarız kesri	40	
Bağdad'a hazineye gittik de üç davar kirası	3	
Müzellef Hamza odasına mah-ı Cemaziyyelahire'de kira	2	
Mah-ı cemaziyyelahire ve receb'de saraydara	4	
Bektaşlı'ya asker tenbihi için muhızıra ücret	0.5kr 1sm	
İki defa Haleb ve Kilise giden ra'ıye ücret	5	
Boyacı mahallesinden kesr	2.25	
Yükçüye	0.5	
Çeşme tathirine	1	
Solak bey odasına Cemaziyyelahire ve Receb'de kira	3kr 2s	
Mah-ı receb'de Kabasakal oğlu odasına kira	5	
...Çırağa için şirugan	0.25	
Gözü Büyük odasına Cemaziyyelahire ve Receb'de kira	2	
Develik tımarına	4	
Yazıcı Ali sülbü Ruha'ya arz ve mahzar ile gönderildik de	10	
Yeni Han'da oda kirası	2	
Solak bey odası için iki kilim	4kr 0.5s	
Çırağa için balmumu	2.25	
Çırağa için bez	3.75	
Keçe	7	13
Bey gittik de saray bekçilerine masraf	2s	
Etmek	1s	
Mihciya	2.5	
Tacirli ve Ekrad ve Levendat için İstanbul'a mahzar götürüne ücret	120	
Mukkaddeman olan salyanden kesr	29	
Bey'e helva	1.25	
Beredi (?) Hasır	1.25	
Kamış hasır	1.5	
Bazarbaşıya ücret	10	
Şehir kethüdasına	5	
Kâtibe	2.5	
Uşaklara	25	
<i>Cem'an</i>	906.5	

Beher haneye 4 guruş 10 sümünden 911 guruş hasıl olmakla bu mahale şerh verildi.

بیکر یوزاونه التي سنه جادى الاول او خزندى تاريخ دفتره کليني دکی مدینه عین عبده واقوام
مصارف و منزل اجرتی علم اعیان و ولایت معرفتیم توزیع و لیسانه اولنوقده نفس شهرک بوز
سکزی بوی نصف ربع خانیه اولوب بهر خانیه دوت غوش اوزن کس اصابت ایتمک
تخیر اولنا، مصارف دفتر تبرک بروم آتی ذکر اولور، غزه شعبان المعظم سنه ۱۲۸۱

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بهر خانیه دوت غوش اوزن کسند، طوقوز یوز اوزن بر و دینه جمل اولوقده

ACR 65, p. 220: Halâ Maraş Valisi semavetlü Ali Paşa hazretleri ba-emr-i 'ali Kilis Ekradı ve Kılıçlı taifesi ve sair eşkıya üzerlerine tayin olunmakla Ayntab'a nüzul buyurdıklarında 3 günlük zevad ve zahire ve sair vilayet umuru için vaki olan maarif cümle ayan-ı vilayet ve mahallat ve...marifetiyle muhasebe olunduk da yalnız şehrin hanelerine salyane ve tevzi' olunub beher haneye 24.5 kuruş ve 2 sümün isabet etmeğin vaki olan mesarif defteridir ki ber vech-i ati zıkr olunur.

Evasıt-ı Zilhicce 1126 (December, 1714)

The form of expenditure	In cash (kr)	In kind
Şehirden asker talep olunduk da asker mukabelesinde paşaya verilen	800	
Kethüda beye ve divan efendisine verilen	200	
Asker için mübaşir İsmail Efendi ve Veli Ağa'ya	60	
Konakçı doğcuya"?	50	
Saman eminine	6	
Odun eminine	6.5	
Zahireci Veli Ağa'ya	120	
Veli Ağa'nın saman ve odun üzerinde olan adamına	2	
Zahireci Veli Ağa'ya ve üzerinde olan bölükbaşılara ... Masrafı	21	
Mezburalara etmek	5	
Veli ağa'ya şa'ir	25	25
Mezbura Ali Beşe'den alınan arpa	2.75	2 kl, 6 sm
Gergerizade İsmail Ağa'ya şa'ir	4	4 kl
Mezbura lehm	5.5	41.5
Veli Ağa'ya ve Bölükbaşıya ve Elhac Hasan Ağa'ya saman	10	16.5 haml
Veli Ağa'ya kahve	2.5	
Mahkemede bekçilere üzüm peynir	0.5	
Mezburalara etmek	2s	12
Paşa-i müşarünileyh mübaşiri Elhac Hasan Ağa'ya etmek	56ak	8
Mazbura şa'ir	2.25	18 sm
Bakkal zahiresi	1.5	
Lehm	7sm	4.5
...Has	2	
Paşaya hediye kavun ve karpuz	2.5	
Haleb'e giden iki sa'iye	3	
Paşaya ...ve sebzevat	5	
Elhac Ahmed'den alınan saman	20	
Arpacıdan alınan şa'ir	800	800 kl
Bazarbaşından alınan şa'ir	200	200 kl
Paşa için şa'ir	200	200 kl
Paşa için etmek	145	25 kn
Lehm	177.5	13 kn, 33 bt
Mumbar ve paca	2	
Berih	66kr 2s	3 kn, 33 bt
Bulgur	100	10 kn

Revgan-ı sade	120	2 kn
Mahlut yağ	83kr 1s	2 kn
Şem' revgan	3.75	10 bt
Asel	14kr 1s	43 bt
Şem' asel	2	3 okka
Tuz	1	
Nohut	2.5	
Nişasta	1.5	8.5 bt
Şeker	2kr 1s	21 nügi
Soğan	1.5	50 bt
Yoğurt	3kr 1s	50 bt
Biber	2.5	10.5 nügi
Keşenc? Ve badem ve sair hırdavat	8	
Yumurta	0.75	
Odon	2	
Bazarbaşının paşa matbahına aldığı odun	8	
Kürek ve zenbil	0.5	
Akçe tahsili için muhızlılara ve çavuşlara	20	
Kulavez	0.25	
Keçe	0.5	
Paşaya hediye için şerbet	5kr 1s	
Çizme-i mes ? Papuç	6kr 2sm	5 çift
Adalet fermanı getiren ağaya ve uşaklarına hizmet	27	
Haleb'e giden hazine için bargir kirası	4	
Hediye için üç eyer	38	
Çerkez Mehmed Paşa için Basmacızade'den alınan	3kr 1sm	
Menkur sarfı ve akçe kesri	15	
Şehreküstü mahallesinin konağa arpası	3	
İbn Eyyüb mahallesinin arpası	2	
Nefir-i amm askeri ihracına gelen Hizmet	30	
...Mezkure	1	
Kılıçlı için Haleb'e ve Maraş'a giden iki sa'iye	3kr 1s	
Karye-i Sam'a giden iki sa'iye	1	
Saraya hasır	1.5	7 top
Def' (?) hasır	2s	2 top
Keçe	7	15
Saraydarlara çizme	4	3 çift
Saraydarlara aba	4	
1126 Recebinden 1127 Muharremine gelince 6 ayda saraydarlara ücret	24	
Mehkeme saraydarına ücret	9	
Abdülmuttalib efendiye Şarkıyan mahallesinin masrafı	5	
Mezbura Şehreküstü mahallesinin masrafı	7	
Vekil-i harca Makulat masrafı	55kr 50 ak	

Vekil-i harca kahve	2.5	
Vekil-i harca hizmet	150	
Meblağ-mezkure...	5	
Mezbur için alınan etmek	4kr 48 ak	88
Sairden alınan etmek	10kr 24 ak	2 kn, 4 bt
Vekil-i harc Elhac ahmed'den alınan şa'ir	110	109 kl, 3sm
Ahmed'den alınan şa'ir	34	34 kl
Ömer'den alınan şa'ir	20	19.5 kl
Paşaya giden yağ kirası	3.5	
....Paşa geldik de alınan şa'ir	165	165 kl
Kasab Emir Hasan'dan alınan lehm	6	48 bt
Emir Elhac Abdullah'dan alınan lehm		98 bt
Samancı Mehmed'den alınan	30	67 yük
Paşaya etmek	25	5 kn
Etmekçi başıya hizmet	11sm	
Üç bayraka etmek	1.75	36 kn
<i>Cem'an</i>	4516.5kr	

Yalnız dörtbin beşyüz onaltı buçuk kuruşdur.

Districts of the city of Ayntab	Household
Mahalle-i Boyacı	2
Mahalle-i Bey	3
Mahalle-i Seng-i Taş	1.75
Mahalle-i Kara Sakal	1
Mahalle-i Cevizlice	3.25
Mahalle-i İbn-i Kör	2.5
Mahalle-i Ehl-i Cefa	3
Mahalle-i Kürkçiyen	8
Mahalle-i Şehreküstü	17
Mahalle-i Çukur	8
Mahalle-i Taşlaki	3.25
Mahalle-i Kürtüncüyan	7
Mahalle-i Şarkıyan	3
Mahalle-i Kızılca Mescid	5
Mahalle-i Ali Elnacar	10
Mahalle-i İbn-i Eyyüb	13
Mahalle-i Hayık Müslüman	8
Mahalle-i Bostancı	3.75
Mahalle-i Ammo	14
Mahalle-i Kanalcı	3.5
Mahalle-i Tarla-i Atik	8.625
Mahalle-i Seng-i Hoşkadem	3
Mahalle-i Seng-i Tavis	3
Mahalle-i ?	5.25
Mahalle-i Cabi	4
Mahalle-i Akyol	4.5
Mahalle-i Hayık Zımmiyan	1.5
Mahalle-i Kayser	3

Mahalle-i Tarla-i Cedid	3
Mahalle-i Tevbe	5.5
Mahalle-i Eblehan	2.5
Mahalle-i Kayacık	3
Mahalle-i Kastel	2
Mahalle-i Hacı Baba	0.75
Kurb-u Bostancı	1.5
Kurb-u Zincirli	2.5
Kurb-u Musullu Zade	0.5
Kurb-u Mella Ahmed	1
Kurb-u Kozanlı	2
Kurb-u Hayık Baba	0.5
Kurb-u Kozanlı	2.5
Kurb-u Tarla-i Cedid	0.5
Kurb-u Kayacık	0.5
Kurb-u Bey	0.25
Kurb-u Şehreküstü	1
Kurb-u Cevizlice	0.5
Kurb-u Hızır Çavuş	1
Kurb-u Kanalcı	0.25
Kurb-u Ali Elnacar	0.25
Kurb-u Kılıç Oğlu Bağı	0.25
<i>Cem'an</i>	183.625 (184.625)

Beher haneye 24.5 kuruş ile 2 sümünden 4529 kuruş hasil olub bilada zikr olunan 4506.5 (4516.5) kuruş mesarif verildikten sonra 12.5 kuruş izdiyad kalmağla bu mahale şerh verildi.

Notes:

S= Sülas

Sm=Sümün

kr=kuruş

bt=batman

kl=keyl

kn=kantar

محلک یوبابی خانه ۲	محلک سید خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۱۲	محلک قزو شعان خانه ۱۰	محلک صور خانه ۱۰	محلک انابور خانه ۱۰
محلک ابرق خانه ۳	محلک کورنجان خانه ۸	محلک سرکوشی خانه ۱۷	محلک صور خانه ۸	محلک طوقان خانه ۱۰	محلک کورنجان خانه ۷
محلک شرقیان خانه ۳	محلک قزو شعان خانه ۱۰	محلک علمدار خانه ۱۰	محلک ابن ابی خانه ۱۳	محلک جابک سلیمان خانه ۸	محلک سعید خانه ۱۰
محلک عمو خانه ۱۳	محلک خانان ابی خانه ۳۰	محلک نارالان خانه ۸۰	محلک سکران خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۳
محلک حاجی خانه ۴	محلک احوال خانه ۴۰	محلک حاجک سباز خانه ۱۰	محلک قصر خانه ۳	محلک نارالان خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۳
محلک نوبه خانه ۵۰	محلک ابرهان خانه ۲۰	محلک قزو شعان خانه ۳	محلک قصر خانه ۲	محلک حاجک سباز خانه ۳	محلک سعید خانه ۱۰
محلک زنجیلی خانه ۲۰	محلک موصلی زار خانه ۴	محلک ملا احمد خانه ۱	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲
محلک بانک بابا خانه ۲	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲۰	محلک نارالان خانه ۲	محلک قبا خانه ۲	محلک قبا خانه ۲	محلک قبا خانه ۲
محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱
محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱

محلک یوبابی
خانه ۱۸۳۰

محلک یوبابی درت بیگ بیگوزان طغوز
حاصل اولوب بالا درت بیگ بیگوزان قبیله عرش مصارفه
ویرلرکن صکره اون ایلی قبیله عرش از دیار قالمخل بو قلمشیرج ویریلر

محلک یوبابی خانه ۲	محلک سید خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۱۲	محلک قزو شعان خانه ۱۰	محلک صور خانه ۱۰	محلک انابور خانه ۱۰
محلک ابرق خانه ۳	محلک کورنجان خانه ۸	محلک سرکوشی خانه ۱۷	محلک صور خانه ۸	محلک طوقان خانه ۱۰	محلک کورنجان خانه ۷
محلک شرقیان خانه ۳	محلک قزو شعان خانه ۱۰	محلک علمدار خانه ۱۰	محلک ابن ابی خانه ۱۳	محلک جابک سلیمان خانه ۸	محلک سعید خانه ۱۰
محلک عمو خانه ۱۳	محلک خانان ابی خانه ۳۰	محلک نارالان خانه ۸۰	محلک سکران خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۳
محلک حاجی خانه ۴	محلک احوال خانه ۴۰	محلک حاجک سباز خانه ۱۰	محلک قصر خانه ۳	محلک نارالان خانه ۳	محلک سکران خانه ۳
محلک نوبه خانه ۵۰	محلک ابرهان خانه ۲۰	محلک قزو شعان خانه ۳	محلک قصر خانه ۲	محلک حاجک سباز خانه ۳	محلک سعید خانه ۱۰
محلک زنجیلی خانه ۲۰	محلک موصلی زار خانه ۴	محلک ملا احمد خانه ۱	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲
محلک بانک بابا خانه ۲	محلک قوزنلی خانه ۲۰	محلک نارالان خانه ۲	محلک قبا خانه ۲	محلک قبا خانه ۲	محلک قبا خانه ۲
محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱	محلک سکران خانه ۱
محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱	محلک علمدار خانه ۱

محلک یوبابی درت بیگ بیگوزان طغوز
حاصل اولوب بالا درت بیگ بیگوزان قبیله عرش مصارفه
ویرلرکن صکره اون ایلی قبیله عرش از دیار قالمخل بو قلمشیرج ویریلر

Appendix IV: Captives from Some Tribes

ACR 65, p. 216: Daima şirret ve şekavet ve katl-i nüfus ve nehb u garet-i emval-i ibad adet-i müstemirreleri olduğundan Kılıçlı Ekradı nefir-i amm olmak üzere haklarında ferman-ı ali sadır olan taife-i mezburenin hâlâ Ayntab kala'sında Maraş muhafızı devletli vezir-i ruşen-zamir Ali Paşa hazretleri buyruldu-i şerif ile mahbus olan nisvan ve sıbyanları Kırbıs (Kıbrıs) ceziresine nakl (?) ve iclalü için sadır olan ferman-ı ali mucebince cezire-i mezbureye irsalleri için vezir-i müşarunileyh tarafından varid olan buyruldu-i şerifleri üzere kala'-i mezburede habs olunan Kılıçlı Ekradının nisvanları üzerine 71 nefer dahi Maraş'dan gelüp cümleyi acilen ve mahaline getirmek buyruldu-i şerif ile ve tarafından mübaşir İbrahim Ağa marifetiyle Kilis'e nakl olan nisvan ve etfal defteridir ki bervech-i ati zikr olunur.

Evahir-i Zilhicce 1126 (December 1714-January 1715)

Tohtemür Meryem Bint Hamza	Nefer 1	Güllü Bint Senem	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Ayn Bint Süleyman	Nefer 1
Güher Bint Bektaş	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Elif Bint Bayram	Nefer 1	Reho (?) Bint Resto (?)	
Senem Bint Koca	Nefer 1	Güllü Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Döne Bint Abdi	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Meryem Bint Gündüz	Nefer 1	Rıhan Bint Kanber	Nefer 1
Abalı Döne Bint Hıdır	Nefer 1	Yusuf Bin Koca	Sağır 1
Kılıçlı Senem Bint Hasan	Nefer 1	Reyhan	Sağır 1
Güllü Bint Hasan	Nefer 1	Güllü Bint Koyun (?)	Nefer 1
Veli Kızı Havva	Nefer 1	Esmâ Bint Ali	Sağır 1
Ümmü Bint Hamza	Nefer 1	Sultan Bint Sehulu (?)	Nefer 1
Hatice Bint Mazlum (?)	Nefer 1	Gülşen Bint Ömer	Nefer 1
Veli Bin İsmail	Sağır 1	Kızkarındaşı Mum	Nefer 1
Fakara (?) Fatma	Nefer 1	Elif Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Sultan Bint Hacı	Nefer 1	Merci (?) Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1
Nergis Bint Cündi	Nefer 1	Meryem Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Menfeşe Bint Yusuf	Nefer 1	Kızkarındaşı Altun	Nefer 1
Esmâ Bint Hacı	Nefer 1	Meryem Bint Karaman	Nefer 1
Satı Bint Süleyman	Nefer 1	Selur Bint Şeker	Nefer 1
Elif Bint Hasan	Nefer 1	Sağır Kızkarındaşı Aşur	Sağır 1
Altun Bint Hıdır	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Allahvirdiyse	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Hacı	Nefer 1	Güllü Bint Selim	Nefer 1
Mercan Bint Davud	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1
Hüseyin	Sağır 1	Ayşe	Sağır 1
Şahin Bin Elmas (?)	Sağır 1	Senem Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Sefer	Nefer 1	Fatma	Sağır 1
Ayşe Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Sultan Bint Hakverdi	Nefer 1
Geyik Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1	Ayşe Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Meryem Bint Tanrıverdi	Nefer 1	Emine Bint Halil	Nefer 1
Karındaşları Sağır Zan (?)	Sağır 1	Emine Bint Ali	Nefer 1

ve Güllü	Nefer 1	Sağır Oğlu Hürmet (?)	Sağır 1
Ayşe Bint Derviş	Nefer 1	Güllü Bin Hüseyin	Nefer 1
Sağire Kızı Fatma	Sağır 1	Selur Bint Murad	Nefer 1
Hasan Bin Şuler (?)	Sağır 1	Fatma Bint Kenan	Nefer 1
Peri Bint Halil	Nefer 1	Kızkarındaşı Döndü	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1	Esmâ Bint İsmail	Nefer 1
Esmâ Bint İbrahim	Nefer 1	Bahar Bint Tanrıverdi	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Musa	Nefer 1	Arz Bint Bali	Nefer 1
Devlet Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1	Emine Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Hali Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Hemze (?) Bint Yusuf	Sağır 1
Döne Bint Savğan (Soğan)	Nefer 1	Senem Bint İbrahim	Sağır 1
Güllü Bint Bektaş	Nefer 1	Kızkarındaşı Zöhre	Sağır 1
Mereyem Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1	Cevher Bint Hüseyin	Sağır 1
Döne Bint Safer	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1
Güher (?) Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Mehmed İbn İbrahim	Sağır 1
Sultan Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Hıdır	Nefer 1
Döne Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Medine Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1
Aşiret Bint Şahdil (?)	Nefer 1	Sağır Oğlu Ali	Sağır 1
Zöhre Bint Ali	Sağır 1	Hani Bint Receb	Nefer 1
Bayram Bint Abdi	Nefer 1	Nazlı Bint Veli	Nefer 1
Döndü Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Hıdır	Nefer 1
Mehmed Bin Şah Bali	Sağır 1	Oğlu Ali	Sağır 1
Ayşe Bint Abdullah	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Mustafa	
Ayşe Bint Tanrıverdi	Nefer 1	Peri Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1
Güher Bint Bali	Nefer 1	Hanım Bint Kuma (?)	Nefer 1
Senem Bint Şahin	Nefer 1	Güllü Bint Elhas (?)	Nefer 1
Sağır Oğlu Mustafa	Sağır 1	Sağır Oğlu Hüseyin	Sağır 1
Zümrüt Bint Ali Sipah (?)	Nefer 1	Receb Kalender	Sağır 1
Fatma Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Senem Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1
Sağire Selur (?)	Sağır Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Gülşen Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Güzel (Bint) Hasan	Nefer 1
Muğal (?) Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Güllü Bint Hıdır	Nefer 1
Bektaşlı Selur Bint Kara Mehmed	Nefer 1	Hanzed (?) Bint Yusuf	Nefer 1
Altun Bint Murtaza	Nefer 1	Döne Bint Abdulkadir	Nefer 1
Sultan Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1	Sanem Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1
Safiye Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1	Satı Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Hüsna Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1	Ayşe Bint Hasan	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1	Bayram Bint Bekir	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Durmuş	Nefer 1	İbrahim Veled-i O	Nefer 1
Meryem Bint Serid (?)	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Bekir	Nefer 1
Sultan	Sağır 1	Leyli Bint Hudaverdi	Nefer 1
Süleyman	Sağır 1	Güllü Bint Hudaverdi	Nefer 1
Şaban	Sağır 1	Döne Uht-i O	Nefer 1
Mehmed	Sağır 1	Veli	Sağır Nefer 1
Gülef (?) Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Senem Bint Ağca	Nefer 1

Bağdad Bint Süleyman	Nefer 1	Ümmügülsüm Bint Ömer	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1	Cennet Bint ?	Nefer 1
Ali Bin Yusuf	Sağır 1	Sultan Bint O	Nefer 1
Ali Bin Abdulhalim	Sağır 1	Senem Bint O	Nefer 1
Kızkarındaşı Melike	Sağır 1	Elhelub Arabından Safiye Bint Çerkes	Nefer 1
Senkur (?)	Sağır Nefer 1	Fatma Bint O	Sağır 1
Hatice Bint Hakverdi	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Abbas	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1	Hüseyin Ibn O	Nefer 1
Musa	Sağır 1	Ayşe Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1
Döne Bint Musa	Nefer 1	Yusuf Ibn O	Nefer 1
Kar Bint Hasan	Nefer 1	Safiye Bint O	Nefer 1
Güllü Bint Hatır (?)	Nefer 1	Ali Ibn Süleyman	Sağır 1
Bayram Bint Musa	Nefer 1	Meryem Bint Harneb (?)	Nefer 1
Kızkardeşi Ayşe	Nefer 1	Çerkes Bin Ömer	
Cennet Bint Ahmed	Nefer 1	Hatice (?) Bint Sultan	Nefer 1
Hasan Ibn Yusuf	Nefer 1	Ramazan Bin Mehmed (?)	Sağır 1
Hatun Bint Abdi	Nefer 1	Bera' (?) Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1
Kıyye (Kaya) Bint Yusuf	Nefer 1	Tahir Bint Isamil	Nefer 1
Meryem Bint	Nefer 1	Tabanca Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1
Döndü Bint Ramazan	Nefer 1	Fatma Bin Abdurrahman	
Hatice Bint Ibrahim	Nefer 1	Yakub Bin	Sağır 1
Ebubekir	Sağır 1	Beyza Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Döndü Bint Hıdır	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Süleyman	Nefer 1
Husna Bint Lek (?)	Nefer 1	Elif Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Emine Bint Tohtemür	Nefer 1	Sultan Bint O	Nefer 1
Abdullah	Sağır 1	Cennet Bint Halil	Nefer 1
Hatice Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Gülizar Bint Osman	Nefer 1
Kızkarındaşı Fatma	Sağır 1	Mehmed Veled-I O	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Ayşe Bint O	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Elif Bint Imam	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Ibrahim	Nefer 1	Meryem Bint Arab	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1	Döne Bint Arab	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Bayo (?)	Nefer 1	Elif Bint Veli	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Battal	Nefer 1	Cennet Bint Tohtemür	Nefer 1
Elif Bint Kanber	Sağır 1	Gelo (Kelo) ibn İmam	Nefer 1
Elif Sağır	Sağır 1	Çukadar Hüseyin Avradı Fatma	Nefer 1
Raziye Bint Abdullah	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint	Nefer 1
Ayşe	Sağır 1	Havva Bint Murad	Nefer 1
Fatma	Sağır 1	Fatma Bint Ismail	Nefer 1
Mehmed	Sağır Nefer 1	Döndü Bint O	Nefer 1
Sultan Bint Şaban	Nefer 1	Şahbaz Bint	Nefer 1
Safiye Bint Selim	Nefer 1	Karkın (?) Senem Bint Mehdi	Nefer 1
Kızı Selur	Sağır 1	Döne Bint Elhac Ali	Nefer 1
Safiye Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Kılıçlı Besey Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Raziye Bint Ahmed	Nefer 1	Reyhan Bint O	Nefer 1

Safiye Bint Ahmed	Nefer 1	Ayşe Bint Koca	Nefer 1
Senem Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Hüseyin Veled-i O	Sağır 1
Döne Bint Ahmed	Nefer 1	Ayşe Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Asle (Aslı) Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Süleyman Veledi O	Sağır 1
Selur Bint Ahmed	Nefer 1	Emine Bint Mustafa	Nefer 1
Elif Bint Hasan	Nefer 1	Selur Bint O	Nefer 1
Ayşe Bint Şaban	Nefer 1	Senem Bint Kubad	Nefer 1
Asiye Bint Musa	Nefer 1	Kutlu Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1
Rışvan Elif	Nefer 1	Hanzde Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Meryem Bint Seyfi	Nefer 1	Esmâ Bint Gelo	Nefer 1
Ümhani Bint Kamber	Nefer 1	Lensey (Besey) Uht-i O	Nefer 1
Döne Bint Veli	Nefer 1	Asi	Nefer 1
Ali Bin Mustafa	Sağır 1	Mehmed Bin Bektaş	Nefer 1
Elif Bin Mustafa	Nefer 1	Döne Bint Zalim Ali	Nefer 1
Elif Bint Osman	Nefer 1	Selur Bint İlyas	Nefer 1

Mariz olub ismini

Edaya iktidarı olmayan nefer: 76

Neferat-ı mezkurenin 71 neferi Maraş'tan gelmiştir.

Nefer aded: 349

ACR 65, p. 216 Continue: *Ayntab kala'sı dizdarı ihbarı ile fevt olan nisvan ve sübyan ve defteridir ki zikr olunur.*

Koyunoğlu Taifesinden Yusuf Bin Mehmed	Sağır Nefer 1	Seydi Bin Yusuf	Sağır 1
Hacılardan Hüseyin Bin Yusuf	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Mahmud	Sağır 1
Hüseyin Bin Bektaş	Sağır 1	Mustafa Bin Kara Yusuf	Sağır 1
Elciden Musa Kızı Güllü	Sağır 1	Hanım Bint Ali	Sağır 1
Dokuz Taifesinden Elif	Nefer 1	Ali Bin Musa	Sağır 1
Kılıçlı Karamehmed Kızı Fatma	Nefer 1	Döne Bint Ahmed	Nefer 1
Ulus Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Esmâ Bint Fayad Sağır	Sağır 1
Belyaf (?) Bint Osman	Nefer 1	Mahmud Bin Kara Mehmed	
Bektaş'ın Kaynanası	Nefer 1	Emine Bint Mustafa	Sağır 1
Mezburun Ümmütesi	Nefer 1	Selman Bint Mikail	Nefer 1
Koyunoğlu Kızı Fatma	Nefer 1	Havva Bint Mir	Sağır 1
Gülbahar	Nefer 1	Ömer Bin Musa	Sağır 1
Mamalıdan Hatice Bint Yusuf	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Topal Mehmed	Nefer 1
Kılıçlıdan Arz Bint Mürsel	Nefer 1	Hatun Bint Isamil	Nefer 1
Meryem Bint Hüdaverdi	Sağır Nefer 1	Ali Bin Receb	Sağır 1
Elhalub Arabından Yusuf	Nefer 1	Balke Bint	Nefer 1
Süleyman Bin Mehmed	Sağır 1	Döndü Bint Osman	Sağır 1

Sanem Bint Kasım	Nefer 1	Fatma Bint Çerkes	Nefer 1
Bektaşlıdan Mehmed Bin Yusuf	Nefer 1	Halime Kızı Fatma	Sağır 1
Döne Bint Hamza	Nefer 1	Hasan Binr Mirzad	Sağır 1
Fatma Bint Hasan	Nefer 1	Ali Bin Osman	Sağır 1
Manend (?) Bint Barak	Nefer 1	Ismail Bin Başıbüyük	
Verdi Bint Mehmed	Nefer 1	Döner Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Bektaşlı Kara Mehmed Kızı Selur	Nefer 1	Meryem Bint Ali	Nefer 1
Mahmud Bin	Sağır 1	Ayşe Bint	Sağır 1
Kılıçlıdan Zemane (?) Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1	Ayşe Bint Abdulhalim	Nefer 1
Elhalub Arabından Elif	Nefer 1	Ahmed Bin Osman	Sağır 1
Elciden Temame (?) Bint Musa	Sağır 1	Şahneşe (?) Bint Mir	Sağır 1
Mustafa Bin Sefer	Sağır Nefer 1	Güllü Bint Bali	Nefer 1
Cihanbeyli Meryem Bint Ayna	Sağır 1	Ali	Sağır Nefer 1
Hanım Bint İbrahim	Nefer 1	Veli	Sağır Nefer 1
Hatice Bint Süleyman	Nefer 1	Arz Bint Kalender	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Hüseyin	Sağır Nefer 1	Oruç (?) Bint Cafer	
Malike Bint	Sağır 1	Hatun Bint Sener (?)	
Tabkıranlıdan Koca	Sağır 1	Döne Bint Kalender	Nefer 1
Kılıçlıdan Mustafa Bin Kara Mehmed	Sağır 1	Abbas Bin İbrahim	Sağır 1
Kayo Meciddeden Fatma	Nefer 1	Döne Bin Hasan	Sağır Nefer 1
Gülşen Bint	Sağır 1	Esencan (?) Bint Bayezid	Nefer 1
Fatma Bint Hüseyin	Nefer 1	Eymir Bin Ahmed Sağır	Sağır 1
Diğer Fatma	Nefer 1	Ayşe Bint Hasan	Sağır 1
Ahmed Bin Hüseyin	Sağır 1	Ahmed Bin Ali	Sağır 1
Cihanbegliden Hanım	Sağır 1	Veli Bin Karaca	Sağır 1
Receb Bint Osman	Sağır 1	Meryem Bint Ali	Sağır 1
Mercan Bint	Sağır 1	Fatma Bint Yağmur	Sağır 1
Tacirliden Veli Bin Ismail	Sağır 1	Sine Bint Ahmed	Sağır 1
Doğanlıdan Zalim Ali Validesi	Nefer 1	Fatma	Nefer 1
Kenan Bin Cüdi	Sağır 1	Zemzem Bint Halil	Nefer 1
Elciden Ali Bin Kara Hüseyin	Sağır 1	Hatun Bint Musa	Nefer 1
Cihanbegliden Ayşe Bint Ali	Nefer 1	Fevt Olan Aded Cem'an 98	

Appendix V: The Auction for Properties of Killed Bandits

ACR 68, p. 460: Bundan akdem kahr ve tedmir ve tertib-i cezaları için haklarında verilen fetva-i şerif ile hatt-ı hümayun şevket-makrun sadır olan levendat ve kutta-i tarik eşkiyasından olub hala Anadolu müfettişi veziri-i mükerrerem devletlu saadetlu Ali Paşa hazretlerinin kethüdası Ali kararları ve vekaletle Rakka muhafızı saadetlu Hüseyin Ağa ve vezir-i müşarunileyh hazretleri tarafından hala medine-i Ayntab mütesellimi fahirü'l-akran e's-seyyid Ebubekir Ağa medine-i mezburede katl eylediği levendatın müft-u şer' ile tahrir olunan eşyaları defteridir ki bervech-i ati zikr olunur.

12 Zilhicce 1130 (November 5, 1718).

Property	#	Value (guruş)
Cedid Seccade	11	30
Cedid ve köhne kilim	15	32
Siyah bayence	18	19.50
Köhne kürk	14	24
Köhne ?	31	24
Köhne kuşak ve puşi	33	21
Köhne çuka şalvar	7	4.75
Köhne entari	5	2.60
Köhne çakşura (?)	4	4.60
Köhne yağmurluk	13	23
Sağır kahve ibriği	8	5
Tas	3	
Köhne çuka kesme (?)	1	1
Köhne sarık	15	3
Köhne eyer ma' besat	3	6
Hurd u rest (?)	-	14.50
Boylu tüfenk	20	27 ?
Kara bena kılıç (?)	13	52
Kara bena pala	1	7.50
Köhne eyer ma' besat	22	45
Kurdeh (?) kılıç	36	100
Tabancalı tüfenk	35	
At ma' eyer ma' besat	105	1200
Nakde'l- ve zuleta ve para	-	260
Cem'an yekun		2331.50

Füruht olmayub a'yni mevcud olan eşyadır

At ma' eyer	55	
Sim kemer raht ma' başlık	1	
Sim sayserı (?) raht ma' başlık	1	
Sim hançer	1	

