

THE US POLICY ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

A Master's Thesis

by

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July 2005

To My Wife, Aynur

THE US POLICY ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

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ABSTRACT

THE US POLICY ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

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This thesis analyzes continuity and change in the US policy on the Cyprus question in chronological order, starting from 1950s, when US interest in the island began to increase by the beginning of the Cold War, to this day. It mainly puts the determinants of US policy in the Cold War and post-Cold War period and tries to find continuing and changing aspects of it while looking at its effects on finding a solution to the problem. It examines the Annan plan, as the latest and most important effort of the international community for the solution, in detail. The thesis aims to put forward a general picture of US policy on Cyprus especially focusing on crisis periods, and thus explain its role in the evolution of the conflict. The study claims that policy of the US on Cyprus has been very much related with its interests in Mediterranean, its strategic security needs in the region and neighbouring regions and its relations with Turkey and Greece. These determinants indicate that main lines of US policy on Cyprus have not changed radically through this almost fifty years old conflict although it sometimes showed little variations.

Keywords: The US policy, Cyprus, Crisis, Conflict, Continuity, Change

ÖZET

ABD’NİN KIBRIS MESELESİ POLİTİKASI: SÜREKLİLİK VE DEĞİŞİM

Dundar, Murat

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez ABD’nin Kıbrıs meselesine dair politikasındaki süreklilik ve değişimi, Soğuk Savaşın başlamasıyla beraber ABD’nin ada üzerindeki çıkarlarının artmaya başladığı 1950lerden günümüze kadar kronolojik bir düzende incelemektedir. Tez genel olarak Soğuk Savaş ve takip eden dönemde ABD politikasını belirleyen faktörleri ortaya koymakta ve bir yandan bu politikanın meselenin çözümüne etkilerini araştırırken diğer taraftan da bu politikanın süreklilik arz eden ve değişen taraflarını bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Annan planı ise uluslararası camianın çözüm için en son ve önemli çabası olması açısından detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Bu tez özellikle kriz dönemleri üzerine odaklanarak ABD politikasının genel bir resmini ortaya koymayı, ve böylece anlaşmazlığın evrimindeki rolünü ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma ABD’nin Kıbrıs politikasının Akdeniz’deki çıkarları, bölgedeki ve komşu bölgelerdeki stratejik güvenlik ihtiyacı ve Türkiye ve Yunanistan ile ilişkileriyle yakından ilgili olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu faktörler göstermektedir ki ABD’nin Kıbrıs politikası zaman zaman ufak değişiklikler göstermişse de bu politikanın genel hatları radikal bir şekilde değişmemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler : ABD politikası, Kıbrıs, Kriz, Anlaşmazlık, Süreklilik, Değişim.

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LIST OF ABBRAVIATIONS

AKEL	Communist Party of Cyprus
AKP	Justice and Development Party
BDH	Peace and Democracy Movement
BTC	Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
DECA	Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DP	Democratic Party
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
MAP	Military Assistance Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TNSC	Turkish National Security Council
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UBP	National Unity Party
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
US	United States

INTRODUCTION

Since Cyprus was a British Crown Colony until the mid-1950s, the US was not involved in it before the Cold War. But its strategic interests and the British call for help on the Cyprus question played the most important role in involvement of the US.

The Subject of this study was inspired by an interest in presentation of US role and influence, as the only Super Power and most influential actor in the international community, on the Cyprus question since it was involved in the issue. It will analyze continuity and change in the US policy on the Cyprus question. It is arranged in chronological order, and latest developments are examined in detail. Major questions to be answered, are as follows: What has been the policy of US on the Cyprus question? What have been the determinants of this policy? What has been the role/influence of this policy on efforts to find a solution to the problem? What are the continuing and changing aspects of US policy on the Cyprus question since it was involved in the issue?

The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, US policy on Cyprus during the Cold War is analyzed. The 1950s was taken as the starting point since US interest in the island began in this period. The birth of Cyprus Republic and the following events are presented in chronological order, and the role of the US in these events or its reactions to them are put forward. Determinants of US policy are examined.

The second chapter deals with US policy toward Cyprus in the post-Cold War period until the presentation of the Annan plan. The End of Soviet influence and beginning of the European Union (EU) and its effect, conflicts between the two sides, as well as Turkey and Greece, and continuation of the solution efforts for the Cyprus question are important headlines in this period.

In the third chapter, Annan plan, which was thought as the best chance ever for reaching a settlement by the Americans, its referenda and aftermath are analyzed in detail. The US role in preparing and presentation of the plan, its will and pressure on the two sides to put it on referendum are examined. In the last parts of the chapter, reactions of the US, along with the UN and the EU, to the results of the referenda are presented.

CHAPTER 1: CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE US DURING THE COLD WAR

1.1. Introduction

The US was not involved in Cyprus historically or geopolitically before the Cold War, because the island was a British Crown Colony until the mid-1950s. But the Cold War formed US strategic interests considerably. The increase of US concern with Cyprus was very much related with the containment strategy of the Americans. This strategy was intended to prevent the spread of communism, especially in regions, strategically critical for the US.¹

This chapter will try to find out the policies of the US during the Cold War years. The reason why the US got involved in the Cyprus question and the influential factors affecting its policies in this period will be examined.

First of all, it should be mentioned that the US policy toward Cyprus during the Cold War years was based on four main aims that reflected the general extent of US interests in Eastern Mediterranean: First, the political stability of the Republic of Cyprus should take precedence over all other factors. Therefore, Cyprus would be taking sides with the other founding states against communism. Then the island should be economically developed and democratic to pursue pro-Western policies.

¹ John Lewis Gaddis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. quoted in Aylin Güney. "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, p.28

Third, the US must be able to continue using its communication facilities in Cyprus. Lastly, the British bases should be used by any Western nation for any friendly Western aim.²

1.2. American Policy in the 1950s and 1960s

In the 1950-1960 period the US was a passive onlooker about the Cyprus issue. For Cyprus was still under Britain's sphere of influence and it was a British problem. Main concern of the US was to prevent a crisis that might arise between Greece, Turkey and Britain over Cyprus. For the US, the type of the solution was not so important as long as it was accepted by all three countries. In order to prevent weakening of the southern flank of NATO, the US neither objected to ENOSIS nor "taksim", partition of the island. The Americans were against the Cyprus issue to be brought to the UN because the Soviet Union might get involved in the problem there. It, therefore, stood on behalf of Britain against Greece's efforts to bring the issue to the UN between 1954 and 1958.³

The US closely watched ethnic violence and the terrorist activities of EOKA, National Organization of Cypriot Fighters in 1950s but it did not play an active role as Britain mediated in the conflicts and in the establishment of Republic of Cyprus in 1959 and 1960.⁴ The US did not take initiatives and did not play an important role until the 1963 crisis in Cyprus.⁵

2 T. W. Adams and J. Alvin Cottrell. *Cyprus Between East and West*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1968, p.56

³ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, pp.37-38

⁴ Ioannis D Stefanidis. *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*. London: Hurst, 1999, p.199

⁵ Aylin Güney. "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, p.29

1.3. The Birth of Cyprus Republic

Based on the policies of the US in 1950s about Cyprus, it welcomed the Zurich-London settlement and the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the US statesmen a big problem had been solved which could have harmed the relations between three NATO allies, and which might be dangerous for the security of the southeastern flank of NATO.⁶

1.4. 1963-1964: Beginning of Inter-communal Clashes and the First Serious American Involvement in the Cyprus Question

1.4.1. Importance of Cyprus for the US

When the first inter-communal violence broke out in Cyprus in December 1963, the US endeavoured to contain the conflict and prevent it from turning into a bigger war between the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, which could in turn involve enemy powers such as the Soviet Union. According to the Americans, a war between the two countries should be prevented at all cost because the US was the leader of the Western camp, and that a war of that kind would inflict grave damages on US interests. Turkey and Greece were strategically located. They were the gates of the Soviet Union to the warm waters. There were American bases in this region, which were very important for the interests of the US and the West. If one of the two countries left the alliance because of the Cyprus problem, this would cause a great security problem. Main dangers for the American interests were as follows: 1-

⁶ Van Coufoudakis. "US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question", *Cyprus Reviewed: A Seminar on the Cyprus Problem* (ed.), Michael A. Attalides, Nicosia: Jus Cyprici Association, 1977, p.108

Southeastern flank of NATO could collapse. 2- Political, military and economic cooperation with these countries could be undermined which could cause the closing of American bases and facilities in these countries. 3- The Soviet Union might get a chance to destroy or destabilize southeastern flank of NATO. 4- Even if NATO was not damaged physically, the prestige of the Alliance could be harmed.⁷ Another opinion of the American officials was that the problem should not be internationalized and the UN should not be involved. For these reasons, on 23 December 1963, the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, warned all three sides to stop the fighting and not to use Military Assistance Program (MAP) weapons.⁸ But, on the other hand, the US did not condemn or criticize the flights of the Turkish jets over the island on 25 December 1963 although it warned Turkey not to intervene unilaterally.⁹

Cyprus had a great strategic importance for the US. First of all, it was strategically located at the crossroads of the three continents. It is 44 miles south of Turkey, 64 miles west of Syria, 130 miles northwest of Iraq and 240 miles north of Egypt and Suez Canal. Cyprus controlled the opening of the pipelines on the coasts of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and the northern entrance of the Suez Canal and the line of containment of the Soviet Union along its southern borders. In 1960s the developments made Cyprus more valuable for the US. These were Arab-Israel crises, the growth of the Soviet influence in Arab countries and the Soviet fleet in the region, American concern in Middle Eastern oil supplies and protection of oil

⁷ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.70

⁸ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, pp.58

⁹ George S. Harris. *Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.108

shipping routes, the importance of the Suez Canal and the loss of American bases in the area.¹⁰

There were already two British bases in Cyprus, Dhekelia and Akrotiri. Britain could use them for military or other purposes. The US could also use these facilities as an ally and NATO member. Especially Akrotiri was an important Royal Air Force (RAF) base, which could be used for operations in the Middle East and, if needed, in the Soviet Union. In fact Makarios had already authorized CIA to use this base for U-2 spy plane operations, to set up radio monitors in Cyprus to eavesdrop on communication between Middle East and Warsaw pact countries and to install secret antennas for its electronic intelligence network. Thus the US already had communication facilities of radio listening and broadcasting stations and the horizon radar installations for the detection of Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launches in the Soviet Union.¹¹ This strategic importance of Cyprus was also a motive for the US officials on their policies of not letting Cyprus fall into enemy hands. According to them the island should be in NATO hands at whatever cost.

1.4.2. American Involvement

During the 1963-1964 crisis the US did not want the Greek Cypriots to bypass the 1959 Zurich-London treaties by involving the UN in the Cyprus question and through the right of self-determination. In December 1963 clashes, the US was

¹⁰ Van Coufoudakis. "US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question", *Cyprus Reviewed: A Seminar on the Cyprus Problem* (ed.), Michael A. Attalides, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977, p.109

¹¹ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, p.13

worried about the situation on the island, but it did not want to get involved. It preferred the problem to be solved by Britain and the guarantor powers.¹²

On 25 January 1964, while the London Conference, which was convened to find a solution to the violence in Cyprus, was continuing, British government sought help from the US for a NATO Peace Keeping Force plan for Cyprus. The British government could not bear the Cyprus burden alone any more and if the Americans did not get involved in the Cyprus issue Britain would bring the issue to the UN, which might affect negatively US interests in the region. In American Under-Secretary of State, George Ball's, words, 'Cyprus was merely one more step in Britain's painful shedding of Empire, and London had no longer the will or the resources to preside over such a quarrel'.¹³

The US was not pleased with the possibility of involvement in the Cyprus question. But it was clear that if further steps were not taken, Turkey would intervene as a guarantor power and this would increase tension, endanger stability and in the end threaten US interests in the region. Thus the US had to get involved in the Cyprus question. As a result, the British stitched to gather a plan with American support on 31 January 1964.¹⁴ This plan proposed that the problem would be solved within NATO. It was accepted by Turkey and Greece on 1 February 1964 but, Makarios rejected it on 4 February, so the London conference brought no results.¹⁵

¹² Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, p.61

¹³ George Ball. *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, p.340

¹⁴ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, pp.63-64

¹⁵ *ibid*, p.64

Although the Greek Cypriots rejected the NATO plan, the US was still eager to implement it. On 9 February George Ball was sent to Athens, Nicosia and Ankara to persuade them accept the plan. But Ball's shuttle diplomacy was not enough to make Greek Cypriot side to accept the NATO plan. According to Makarios, the issue should go to the UN and the solution should be found within the framework of the UN.¹⁶

In the Cold War atmosphere it is important to mention the Soviet approach to the Cyprus question, because the two Super Powers were affected by each other's policies on every issue through these years. From the beginning of the crisis, the Soviet Union supported independence and non-alignment of the Cyprus republic. It objected to NATO involvement and supported Makarios in bringing the issue to the UN. Hence, it condemned the London Conference on 30 July 1964 and offered the disclosure of the NATO plan. Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, sent messages to the UN Security Council members and Turkey, Greece and Cyprus as a warning.¹⁷ The US president, Johnson, replied by explaining that their policy of Cyprus was to restore peace on the island, not to make the problem more complex. Johnson wished the Soviets to avoid any action that would aggravate the situation in Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁸ The Soviet Union announced in August 1964 that it would help Cyprus in case of a Turkish invasion and it promised for military equipment aid to Cyprus in September.¹⁹

¹⁶ George Ball. *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, pp.340-341

¹⁷ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, p.141

¹⁸ T. W. Adams and J. Alvin Cottrell. *Cyprus Between East and West*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1968, p.35

¹⁹ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, p.141

After the NATO plan was rejected by Makarios, Britain made a request to the UN on 15 February 1964 for the discussion of Cyprus, a request to be immediately followed by. The session began on 18 February 1964 and ended on 4 March 1964.²⁰ In spite of all US efforts for not bringing the Cyprus question to the UN, it was inevitable. The US tried to pass a neutral resolution to make both sides happy. To that end, US officials proposed a draft resolution with the British. According to the Greeks, this draft Anglo-American resolution was supporting the Turkish side.²¹

On 4 March 1964 the UN Security Council accepted a different resolution, Resolution-186 which resolution respected the intervention rights of the guarantor powers but called upon all states to refrain from interference in Cyprus. It required a UN peace force to the island as quickly as possible.²² It was a success for the US, because both sides were happy and the Soviets were kept out as far as possible. According to American officials UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) suited American interests on the island which was the restoration of peace and stability. In addition, there were no Eastern Bloc nations in the UNFICYP. But the appointment of a mediator did not satisfy the US and it sought for new initiatives in the following months.²³ The UN Secretary General U Thant appointed Sakari Tuomija as the UN mediator for Cyprus on 24 March 1964. UNFICYP became operational on 27 March 1964 and reached its planned level of 7.000 men in May 1964.²⁴

²⁰ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp.36-37

²¹ Dimitri S. Bitsios. *Cyprus: the Vulnerable Republic*, Thessalonica, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975, pp.141-146

²² Full text of the UN Security Council resolution-186 available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/Kıbrıs

²³ Ellen B. Laipson. "Cyprus: A Quarter Century of US Diplomacy", *Cyprus in Transition 1960-1985*(ed.), John T. Koumoulides, London: Triglyph, 1986, pp.60-61

²⁴ Robert Stephens. *Cyprus: a Place of Arms*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, p.191

The 4 March resolution, Resolution-186, was accepted by both sides. According to the Greek side, it prevented the Turkish intervention and recognized the legality of the government of Cyprus and not mention the Zurich-London treaties. For the Turkish side it did not end Turkey's intervention rights, restored peace and stability and put an end to the killings of Turkish Cypriots.²⁵ But the term "Government of Cyprus", which was used in the Resolution-186 would be one of the main sources of argument between the two sides in future. Besides, the issue was internationalized for the first time and this was an important turning point for the Cyprus issue, because the Soviet Union could involve itself in the issue indirectly through its role in the UN Security Council.²⁶

In May 1964, American President, Johnson, sent Senator J. William Fulbright to London, Ankara and Athens to find out the views of the parties. The US tried to give the impression that this initiative was not to propose a solution but that it was just an effort to prevent a war. But Fulbright proposed that Turkish Cypriots be transferred from Cyprus to Anatolia, and this was rejected by Turkey.²⁷

1.5. Continuation of Violence in Cyprus and the Johnson Letter

Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus and told the American ambassador to Turkey of its intention on 4 June 1964. It was because of the fact that although there were American assurances and UN force in Cyprus there were still attacks and violence against the Turkish Cypriots in April and May 1964. Turkish

²⁵ Dimitri S. Bitsios. *Cyprus: the Vulnerable Republic*, Thessalonica, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975, pp.155-156

²⁶ Aylin Güney. "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, p.31

²⁷ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.41

government wanted to take control of one part of the island and then start negotiations.²⁸

American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Harlan Cleveland and Joseph Sisco prepared a letter to be sent by the American president Johnson to the Turkish Prime Minister in order to stop Turkish intervention. According to Ball, this letter was the “most brutal diplomatic note” he had ever seen. On 5 June 1964 it was signed and sent to İnönü.²⁹ Main points of the letter were as follows: the grave concerns of the US President and the need to consult with the US government before such an action, bad results of such an action such as the partition of the island and a war between two NATO allies, namely Greece and Turkey. Furthermore Johnson wrote “I hope you will understand that your allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.” Another point was that the US did not permit Turkey to use the weapons and equipment that had been given Turkey as military assistance.³⁰ The letter was a real shock for Turkish officials.

Johnson Letter is one of the most important incidents of Turkish – US relations on Cyprus question that affected deeply the relations between the two countries. The Turks expected an opposition but the tone of the warning was really brutal. The value of the alliance started to be questioned in Ankara. And for the first time they felt like

²⁸ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, p.75

²⁹ George Ball. *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, p.350

³⁰ “President Johnson’s Letter to Prime Minister İnönü”, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.20, No.3, 1964, p.368

a satellite country. It was unacceptable for them that the US used the alliance as a threat to them. According to Stearns, it was a mistake on the part of the Americans.³¹

1.5.1. Why did the Americans Send Such a Letter to Turkey?

As far as the US was concerned, the violence should be stopped and any action to flame the violence should be prevented. For this reason, it put pressure on both Turkey and Greece and supported UNFICYP. According to the US officials, the problem should be solved in diplomatic ways with limited internationalization. They did not wish the problem of Western states to be argued in international forums.³²

The Americans were not eager to put forward a plan for solution because this might hurt one side or the other. They wished Turkey and Greece to find a solution through bilateral talks. At the beginning, an independent Cyprus did not seem appropriate for US interests because this might attract the Soviet Union or could cause a war between Greece and Turkey. In the end, they reformulated the ENOSIS plan with some concessions to Turkey, namely the Acheson Plan. By this way the island would be put under NATO control. But then, when it was understood that this plan would not work, they began to favor the independence of Cyprus as long as NATO alliance was not damaged.³³

Another concern of the US officials was the impact of communism on the Mediterranean region. The Soviet Union had already acquired enormous influence in the Middle East and had good relations with non-aligned Arab countries, which were all anti-Western. If Cyprus fell into Soviet hands, Western interests in the

³¹ Monteagle Stearns. *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations P, 1992, p.24

³² Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.72

³³ *ibid*, p.72

Mediterranean and the Middle East could be totally damaged. The Americans were already on alert because of the policies of Makarios. He was in good relations with the Soviet Union and had trade agreements and contacts to buy Soviet weapons. The Cyprus government had a non-aligned policy and had close contacts with non-aligned countries. It rejected Western solutions for the Cyprus problem and the communists began to play a great political role in the country.³⁴

AKEL, the communist party of Cyprus, was a strong factor in Cyprus politics. It was a danger for the US and the West. If AKEL took political control of the island, the American and British military presence on the island would be in danger. Moreover, AKEL might permit the Soviet fleet to use Cyprus ports, which would be a disaster for the US. Therefore, the US officials preferred a solution without Makarios and AKEL.³⁵

To execute this policy, the US tried to prevent Turkish intervention in the island but the fact that it could not control the Greek Cypriot government entirely complicated this policy. At this stage, the US used all its influence to make sure that Turkey would be kept away to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey. For this aim, it they even used undiplomatic, threatening Johnson letter, although the US officials always said that they did not prevent Turkey from intervention, they simply warned it about the dangerous results of a war.³⁶

According to American officials, Johnson letter was intended to stop the Turks from a landing on the island. It, therefore, had to be effective, because it was intended to

³⁴ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp.16-17

³⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.73

³⁶ *ibid*, p.73

shock the Turks. But one thing they did not predict was the response of Turkey. Although the Americans managed to prevent the landing, the Turkish-American relations took a sharp turn for the worse. The US administration might think that as a small country Turkey would obey their orders. But one thing they did not calculate was the pride of the Turks. They later realized that they might alienate the Turks and lose their alliance, which was important for the US interests, and from then on, they acted more carefully with regard Turkey.³⁷

Especially, Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block countries and the Third World after Johnson letter created doubts that it might improve relations with the Warsaw Pact, and that it might even be affected by the Soviet Union. These concerns caused the US officials to be more careful with regard Turkey, and they began to re-cultivate Turkish friendship.³⁸

To that end, the American administration issued statements about the protection of Turkey in case of an enemy attack and offered more assistance. They did not object to Turkey when it rejected the mediation of Galo Plaza as the UN mediator of Cyprus.³⁹ In December 1965, when the UN General Assembly resolution about the independence of Cyprus passed, the US was one of the 6 countries with Turkey, which voted against the resolution.⁴⁰

³⁷ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.74

³⁸ *ibid*, p.70

³⁹ George S. Harris. *Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.120

⁴⁰ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp. 84-85

1.5.2. Aftermath of the Johnson Letter and the Geneva Talks

İnönü and Papandreou visited Washington one after another in June 1964. Papandreou rejected direct talks, instead he accepted indirect talks in Geneva with the mediation of Sakari Tuomioja, UN mediator for Cyprus. Dean Acheson, former American Secretary of State, would be there for the talks, too.⁴¹

The Geneva talks began on 8 July 1964 under the chairmanship of Sakari Tuomoja between Greek and Turkish officials. No Cypriots had been called, and on 14 July 1964 Acheson submitted American proposals. First phase of the Geneva talks ended with no solution on 6 August 1964 due to the Greek Cypriot attacks in Cyprus.⁴² Turkish side accepted the first Acheson plan as negotiable but the Greek side did not.⁴³ In the second phase, beginning on 15 August 1964, Acheson brought a modified version of the first plan and this plan was rejected by both sides. The Geneva talks ended with no solution on 31 August 1964.⁴⁴

According to the American officials, especially Acheson, the Greek side, mostly Makarios was responsible for the failure of the Geneva talks. According to him, NATO, Turkey and Greece lost, and Makarios and the Russians gained power from these developments.⁴⁵

⁴¹ George Ball. *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, p.355-356, Andreas Papandreou. *Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1970, p.102

⁴² Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, p.70

⁴³ Nihat Erim. *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, Ankara: Ajans-Türk, 1975, pp.360,372

⁴⁴ *ibid*, pp.399-401

⁴⁵ H.W. Brands, Jr. "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle 1964", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.23. No.3, July1987, pp.359-360

1.6. American Policy in the 1965-1967 Period

According to some authors, American intelligence services worked to bring about the downfall of İnönü government and ensure that the Justice Party and Demirel come to power in 1965 in Turkey. According to them, rightist Justice Party could listen to US advice more closely.⁴⁶ There are similar claims about fall of the Papandreou government in Greece in the same period. According to many Greeks, the military coup of 21 April 1967 was supported by the US, because the election was close and the US did not want Papandreou to win again.⁴⁷

1.7. 1967 Cyprus Crisis and the US

On 15 November 1967 Greek National Guard and police forces, under command of General Grivas, attacked Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) and Kophniou (Geçitkale), and the UN forces could not stop them.⁴⁸ On 16 November 1967 Turkish National Assembly authorized the government to intervene in Cyprus when necessary.⁴⁹ Following this, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel issued an ultimatum-like note to Greece on 17 November.⁵⁰

The US, again, intensified its efforts to prevent a war. It tried to stop the Turks from taking action on the one hand while it pressured Greece to follow Turkish demands on the other. American Ambassador, Parker Hart, established close contacts with Turkish Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil and told him that the US president Johnson

⁴⁶ George S. Harris. *Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.136

⁴⁷ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp.71,146-147

⁴⁸ Thomas Ehrlich. *Cyprus: 1958-1967*, London, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.98

⁴⁹ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, p.136

⁵⁰ Andreas Papandreou. *Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1970, p.211-212

requested Turkey not to intervene but he chose not to send written message because of the Turkish public reaction. The Sixth Fleet was meanwhile, deployed close to Cyprus and it was, for most of the critics, to deter Turkish forces from launching a military operation.⁵¹

Greek government rejected the Turkish demands on 22 November 1967. The same day Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance, the former deputy Secretary of Defense, as his special envoy to mediate between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus question.⁵² The American stand was that Vance was only a mediator and he did not threaten sanctions. But according to rumors, the military aid of the US to both sides was on the table. In Ankara, Vance reminded the Turkish government that the US supplied weapons could not be used according to the agreements. In Athens, he said that the US might not be willing to stop the Turks from intervening in the island any more.⁵³

For the Americans, concerns, aims and tactics were the same as in 1964 crisis. The only difference was that they acted more carefully not to alienate Turkey. This time it forced Greece, not Turkey. As a result they were successful in preventing the Turkish landing without alienating the Turks. But it became obvious that the Turks wanted to solve the Cyprus problem in their own way. Because, according to them, the US intervention was not effective enough to solve the problem. According to the US, Makarios was still seen as an obstacle, and for the solution, he should be removed.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, pp.135-137

⁵² *ibid*, pp.139

⁵³ Thomas Ehrlich. *Cyprus: 1958-1967*, London: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp.111-112

⁵⁴ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.103

The Soviets, too, used the same methods in their intervention in the 1967 crisis. But this time, their target was Greece. Athens was forced to comply with Turkish request and withdrew from the island a large bulk of Greek forces sneaked into Cyprus secretly.⁵⁵ There were two reasons for that change: After the Johnson letter Turkish side developed its relations with the Soviet Union⁵⁶ and the 1967 coup in Greece was backed by the US and the Greek junta was pursuing an anti-communist policy. According to the Soviets, this policy of the Greeks would lead the island to double ENOSIS, which would cause the island to fall completely in NATO hands.⁵⁷

1.8. Events in the 1967-1974 Period and the US

After 1967 crisis, both sides, Greece and Turkey, were willing to have secret talks to find a political solution to the Cyprus question. The US supported the idea but nothing came out of these secret negotiations.⁵⁸

The US stopped its diplomatic efforts to find a solution for Cyprus question after 1967. The negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives, Denktaş and Klerides seemed to suit American interests because there was a relative calmness on the island and international conflict seemed to disappear from the agenda of the US. Washington supported inter communal talks, aim of which was to restore 1960 constitution in a workable way and to protect the Turkish rights.⁵⁹ As a result, the US

⁵⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.103-104

⁵⁶ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, pp.118-119

⁵⁷ Joseph S. Joseph. *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, London: Macmillan, 1997, p.70

⁵⁸ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp.153-154

⁵⁹ Van Coufoudakis. "US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question", *Cyprus Reviewed: A Seminar on the Cyprus Problem* (ed.), Michael A. Attalides, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977, pp.119-120,127

started to support independence policies of the Makarios regime. Makarios appeared to be ready to work together with the Americans, too. He permitted the US to use British bases on Cyprus for its spying flights, intelligence gathering efforts and for other communication means.⁶⁰

The Americans also favored the Turkish side's position. During Turkish president Cevdet Sunay's visit to the US in April 1967, Johnson officially supported the "two communities" concept of Turkish side. According to this concept, there were two equal sides, not a majority and a minority.⁶¹ Two presidents agreed on the value of the existing treaties. The US was in favor of bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey and bi-communal talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. But there was a problem: the talks were going nowhere. The US started to put pressure on both sides in 1973 to find a solution.⁶²

Some Greek authors are of the opinion that, the US was still pursuing double ENOSIS or the partition policies and supporting the overthrow of Makarios. They argue that in June 1971, the US State Department analysts concluded that Greece and Turkey were in favor of double-ENOSIS. They thought that Makarios would accept double-ENOSIS if he was confronted with something worse. In that case the Makarios problem was left to Greece. They suggested that the partition plan should be put into operation quickly to face the Soviets with a fait accompli.⁶³ According to them, the US decided to solve the problem permanently at any price and the most favorable solution was the partition of the island. This would provide the island to be

⁶⁰ Laurence Stern. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, New York: Times, 1977, pp.106-107

⁶¹ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, p.153

⁶² *ibid*, p.103

⁶³ *ibid*, p.154

in NATO hands. As a result, the US could use it for strategic and military purposes. Another advantage would be that the two allies in NATO, Greece and Turkey, would solve their problem in peaceful means. The main obstacle for this plan was Makarios. He should be removed from power or at least weakened.⁶⁴

Greek authors argue that the US and Greek junta together with pro-ENOSIS elements in Cyprus were in preparation to overthrow Makarios and destroy the independence of Cyprus. According to them, American intelligence services were very active in Cyprus, and they even supported terrorist activities. After an assassination attempt at Makarios in 1970, most of the authorities condemned US intelligence for planning it or doing nothing although it had known the plan.⁶⁵

In this period, the Greek junta was isolated in international arena and it needed American support to survive. Therefore, it was open to pressure from the US, who used this and put more pressure on Greece than on Turkey to accept double-ENOSIS or partition plans.⁶⁶

1.9. 1974 Military Coup, Turkish Intervention in Cyprus and the US

1.9.1. The Coup

Greek authors maintain that the US had already known all about the coup. The CIA had close contacts with Greek intelligence and knew what was going on in Athens. Makarios himself publicized that a coup against him was in the making.⁶⁷ It is argued

⁶⁴ Van Coufoudakis. "US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question", *Cyprus Reviewed: A Seminar on the Cyprus Problem* (ed.), Michael A. Attalides, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977, p.128

⁶⁵ *ibid*, p.128

⁶⁶ Polyviou G. Polyviou. *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980*, London: Duckworth, 1980, p.127

⁶⁷ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p. 116

that the US could prevent the coup if it took strong action against the Greek junta. Neither Kissinger nor Sisco took initiative to stop it although they had enough evidence. Kissinger denied that his department had any prior knowledge about it.⁶⁸ According to Uslu, the American rulers continued their policy to leave Makarios issue to Greeks. They did not want to get involved in their disagreements in spite of enough warning about the coup. They did not want to alienate Greek side because of the American interests in Greece.⁶⁹

On 15 July, Greek Cypriot National Guard and units of EOKA-B, led by Greek officers, attacked presidential palace with heavy weapons. It was believed that the coup was planned and supported by the Greek junta leader Ioannides. Greek regime replaced Makarios with Nikos Sampson.⁷⁰

The US administration did not condemn the coup and nor did it criticize Athens junta for its involvement in it. It did not call for the withdrawal of Greek officers who led the coup. In the first few days the US seemed to follow a wait and see policy. Although it expressed its opposition to the violence in Cyprus, it did not criticize Athens. The Americans did not even openly say that it was the Athens junta who organized the coup. According to them, this was an internal affair of Cyprus. It seemed that the US welcomed the coup, because Makarios, who was regarded untrustworthy for his neutralist and pro-Soviet ideas, was overthrown. A high rank US official expressed his inconvenience when he learned about the escape of

⁶⁸ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, pp.183-184

⁶⁹ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.119

⁷⁰ Suha Bölükbaşı. *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus*, Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of Virginia, 1988, pp.185-186

Makarios from death and Cyprus.⁷¹ The US vetoed a UN Security Council draft resolution condemning Greece for the role it had played in the coup. In addition, American Ambassador to Cyprus, Roger Davies, received the Foreign Minister of Sampson regime, Dimis Dimitrou, on 18 July 1974, on the latter's request. Thus, he strengthened suspicions on the US approval for the coup and the US became the only state which established official contact with the Sampson regime.⁷²

American Secretary of State, Kissinger, feared that if the US alienated the Greek junta by condemning the Cyprus coup, this might cause the overthrow of the regime by new, younger and anti-Western officers. According to the Americans, their air and naval bases were needed and nothing should be done to risk them with the present and future governments of Cyprus. And Kissinger thought that Makarios was politically dead.⁷³

According to the Turks, the US was on the Greek side and they feared that the US would recognize the Sampson regime if they did not intervene quickly. On the other hand, the Greeks thought that the American attitude toward the coup worked to the advantage of the Turks because this attitude gave the Turks a good pretext for military intervention. If the US acted like Britain and the Greek officers were called back to Greece, the Turks could be persuaded to abandon their action.⁷⁴ According to Uslu, it is difficult to say that the American attitude was aimed to encourage the Turks for the intervention. Because this would bring the results that the US might

⁷¹ Theodore A. Coulombis. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle*, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp.88-89

⁷² *ibid*, pp.89

⁷³ Laurence Stern. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, New York: Times, 1977, p.113

⁷⁴ Polyviou G. Polyviou. *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980*, London: Duckworth, 1980, pp.156-157

suffer the loss of Greece and dangers for American interests. In any case the US attitude pleased neither side.⁷⁵

On 17 July 1974 American under Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, was sent to the crisis zone by Henry Kissinger. His mission was to help the British to start negotiation process and delay Turkish intervention. He would shuttle between Athens and Ankara trying to find a solution to prevent an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey, which would threaten American bases in both countries. According to some authors, Sisco's mission was doomed to failure, because Turkey was, at that stage, unstoppable and American attitude toward the coup had been too soft according to the Turks.⁷⁶ But the Turks, according to their view, showed goodwill and agreed to wait until the end of Sisco's mission.⁷⁷ Consequently Sisco was unsuccessful to stop Turkish military intervention.

1.9.2. First Phase of Turkish Military Intervention

Turkish military operation started at 5:30 a.m. on 20 July 1974. For the Turkish government the reason of the intervention was the coup d'état which had been planned by Athens junta and carried out by Greek contingent on the island and National Guard led by Greek officers.

The Americans knew that, if they threatened Turkey, they would lose it completely. According to Karpat, alienation of Turkey might cause Turkey to move slightly toward the Soviet bloc, which might change the balance of power in the

⁷⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp. 124

⁷⁶ Theodore A. Coulombis. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle*, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.91

⁷⁷ Ümit Haluk Bayülken. *Cyprus Question and the United Nations*, Lefkoşa: Cyprus Research & Publishing C, 2001, p.120

Mediterranean region.⁷⁸ Kissinger states in his memoirs that the US was in no position to support one side against the other in the crisis. Turkish intervention could not be stopped without alienating it, and this was impossible.⁷⁹

This was the most important example of American administration being helpless to influence Turkey to act in a certain way. In fact, the Americans were not against a slice of Cyprus territory, a base, for instance, given to Turkey and in the past they themselves had offered a controlled ‘invasion’ of a part of the island by Turkey. However, this was an uncontrolled ‘invasion’ and might cause a war between Turkey and Greece. And the diplomatic efforts were not enough to stop the Turks this time. Another point to mention was that the American government was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal, and that it was not strong enough to deal with the Turks effectively. Moreover, the Turkish landing was likely to bring less damage to US interests than alienating the Turks, and the possibility of Greek-Turkish war was reduced, because the Greeks were not prepared for a war with Turkey.⁸⁰

After the first phase of the Turkish military operation in Cyprus, American policy was to avoid actions which would alienate any of the NATO allies. After the coup, the US had not condemned the Greek junta and Sampson regime for its interests in Greece. After the Turkish intervention, it showed almost the same attitude toward Turkey again for its strategic interests in Turkey. In both events, the US chose a kind of passive policy.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Kemal H. Karpat. “ War on Cyprus: the Tragedy of Enosis”, *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974* (ed), Kemal H. Karpat, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.198

⁷⁹ Henry Kissinger. *Years of Upheaval*, London: Weidenfield and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982, pp.1189-1190

⁸⁰ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp. 131-132

⁸¹ *ibid*, p.136

There was a reality that American administration did not condemn Turkish action officially. It seemed that American policy appeared to be in favor of Turkey to minimize losses within NATO and preserve American interests. The Greek side had already been alienated with the intervention of Turkey, and alienating Turkey might cause a total destruction of American interests in the region. The US, therefore, tried to pursue a policy aimed at limiting Turkish operation with the hope that the Greek side would accept it as a *fait accompli*.⁸² Ulman's view is that the US attempted to find a new status for the island that would have a chance of acceptance by all parties concerned.⁸³

According to Kissinger, aim of the US was to keep both states in the alliance. Although he was urged by some officials to force Turkey, he was convinced that the Greek junta would not last long, and if the US took side of Greece it might pay for it in the years to come. He also argued that the Watergate scandal restricted American capability.⁸⁴

To evaluate the developments correctly, the attitude of the Soviet Union, should be mentioned, too. For the Soviet Union main concern was to prevent Cyprus from becoming a NATO territory. ENOSIS or partition of the island would lead to that. The coup would also bring about the same result, because the next step for the Sampson regime would be to declare ENOSIS. For that reason, the Soviet Union condemned the coup strongly. It demanded restoration of Makarios regime. The Soviet Union directed its accusations at the Greek military regime and its supporters,

⁸² Pierre Oberling. *The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp.169-170

⁸³ A. Haluk Ulman. "Geneva Conferences, July-August 1974", *Foreign Policy (Dış Politika)*, Vol.4, Nos:2-3, 1974, p.50

⁸⁴ Henry Kissinger. *Years of Upheaval*, London: Weidenfield and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982, pp.1191-1192

the US and NATO.⁸⁵ The Soviet rulers did not condemn but welcomed Turkish operation, because, according to them, this would prevent ENOSIS and lead to return of Makarios to power.⁸⁶

1.9.3. Geneva Conferences

After the Turkish government agreed to the cease-fire, the first Geneva Conference was held between 25 and 30 July 1974 and the second one took place between 8 and 14 August 1974.⁸⁷ Toward the end of the second Geneva Conference, the American attitude seemed increasingly favoring Turkish position. In fact the last Turkish proposal had a lot of inputs from Kissinger. According to some authors, American statements might have encouraged the Turks for the second phase of the intervention. They seemed to regard Turkish policy as just and fair, and supported Turkey's cantonal proposal.⁸⁸

1.9.4. Second Phase of Turkish Military Intervention

After the second operation started, the first reaction of the US was to declare that it would cut off military aid to both parties if Greece and Turkey were to be embroiled in a war. This was not a firm stance against Turkish intervention, either.⁸⁹

According to the Greek side, the US was biased in favor of Turkey because it tolerated Turkish expansion and it seemed to accept bi-regional settlement. Kissinger

⁸⁵ A. Haluk Ulman. "Geneva Conferences, July-August 1974", *Foreign Policy (Dış Politika)*, Vol.4, Nos:2-3, 1974, p.50

⁸⁶ Kemal H. Karpat. "War on Cyprus: the Tragedy of Enosis", *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974* (ed), Kemal H. Karpat, Leiden, Netherlands. E.J. Brill, 1975, pp.199,202

⁸⁷ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp. 139-141

⁸⁸ Theodore A. Coulombis. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle*, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp.96-97

⁸⁹ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.146

chose to support Turkey by refusing serious attempts to hold back the Turks, furthering their military gains in Cyprus. His statements, right after the operation, of not intervening in the Turkish moves increased Greek alienation.⁹⁰ It should be noted that, when the second operation took place, American officials were still pre-occupied with government crisis and the only thing Kissinger could do was to recommend immediate continuation of talks between the parties.⁹¹ American strategic concerns in Eastern Mediterranean took precedence over the Turkish intervention. It did not condemn only one side, but forced both sides to cooperate. As it was stated before, it was vital for the American administration not to alienate Turkey by condemning its action in Cyprus.⁹²

The Soviet Union, however, strongly opposed second Turkish operation, unlike its attitude toward the first one. Turkey's federation thesis was not suitable for the Soviet Union because this would lead to double-ENOSIS. Decision of Greek government to withdraw from military structure of NATO led the Soviet Union to soften its attitude toward Greece. On 22 August 1974 the Soviet Union claimed that the guarantee agreement was not valid, and that a conference between the all interested parties and the UN Security Council members should settle the Cyprus question. This proposal was totally against Turkey's viewpoint.⁹³

The Greek side was angry about the US because it did not stop Turkey's second intervention. They criticized Kissinger for not blaming Turkish actions. To demonstrate their anger, the Greeks announced withdrawal of Greece from the

⁹⁰ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, p.176

⁹¹ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.147

⁹² *ibid*, p.147

⁹³ Fahir Armaoğlu. "1974 Cyprus Crisis and the Soviets", *Foreign Policy (Dış Politika)*, Vol.4, Nos.2-3, 1974, pp.181-182

military structure of NATO on 14 August 1974. As a reaction, the US decided to discontinue the Sixth Fleet home-porting arrangements in Greece.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, in a large anti-American demonstration in Nicosia, Greek Cypriot guards opened fire on American embassy and killed Ambassador Rodger P. Davis and an embassy secretary on 19 August 1974. In August and September large demonstrations were organized in Greece, Cyprus and the US against the American passiveness toward second Turkish intervention.⁹⁵

1.10. The Arms Embargo and the Turkish-American Relations

Turkey's second military operation which resulted in securing a substantial part of the island caused a long battle between the American administration and the Congress. The main subject was whether an arms embargo should be imposed on Turkey.⁹⁶ Even before the end of the second operation, a delegation of Greek - American Congressmen visited Kissinger to request sanctions against Turkey. According to them, Kissinger was the one who should be blamed. And according to Kissinger, these Congressmen were only instruments of Greek foreign office. He could not accept their intervention in foreign issues, but he assured them the US was engaged in a very active diplomacy with the Turks.⁹⁷

When Kissinger was asked about the legality of the Turkish use of US supplied military equipment in its actions in Cyprus, he told that he needed to get legal opinion, which he had not done. The next day, on 20 August 1974, he initiated this study with a legal team. The team completed the study but it was not made public.

⁹⁴ Theodore A. Coulombis. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle*, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp.97-98

⁹⁵ *ibid*, pp.98

⁹⁶ R. Rauf Denktaş. *The Cyprus Triangle*, London: K.Rüstem & Brother, 1988, p.80

⁹⁷ Laurence Stern. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, New York: Times, 1977, p.141

However, it was leaked to Senate staffs by the administration. On 3 September, a state department official told Senator Thomas Eagleton's chief foreign policy aide of the study. The conclusion was that Turkey's action could not be regarded as legal.⁹⁸

Eagleton hearing this started a battle with the American administration about the issue. On 19 September 1974 Kissinger addressed the Senate democratic caucus. He wished them not to coerce the administration and the president in this issue. He accepted that the Turkish action in August in Cyprus was not legal according to 1947, 1960 and 1961 agreements with Turkey, but according to him some other things, such as continued access of the US bases in Turkey were more important than the law and for the American interests in the region.⁹⁹ If Congress decided to cut off aid to Turkey, the US bases in this country would be jeopardized.

On 19 September 1974 the Senate passed the Eagleton-Stevenson amendment to the export-import bank bill. The amendment urged the president to end shipment of US arms to Turkey. On 24 September the House of Representatives voted 307 to 90 to adopt the Rosenthal-Dupont amendment to the Continuing Appropriations Bill for the fiscal year 1975. This amendment favored an arms embargo on US military assistance to Turkey until the president certified that substantial progress toward agreement was made regarding military forces in Cyprus.¹⁰⁰

On 25 September Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, condemned the Congress decision. On 30 September, the Senate adopted an amendment, which called for an embargo on US military assistance to any country that used US arms and aid in

⁹⁸ Laurence Stern. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, New York: Times, 1977. pp.143-144

⁹⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand. *Diyet : Türkiye Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar*, İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1979, p.56

¹⁰⁰ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.151

contravention of US laws. On 14 October President Ford vetoed the bill including the cut-off in American aid to Turkey. On 16 October the Senate passed a new amendment permitting the president to continue military assistance to Turkey until 10 December 1974, if it was determined as useful for a peaceful solution in Cyprus.¹⁰¹

Meanwhile, Turkey accepted the UN General Assembly resolution of 1 November 1974, which was about the respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus, and the permission for the return of refugees to their homes. On 5 November Turkish National Security Council (TNSC) decided for some territorial concessions and withdrawal of 5,000 Turkish soldiers from the island. But Prime Minister Ecevit resigned due to Mr. Erbakan, coalition partner of Ecevit government, refusal to approve concessions. Thus, planned visit of Kissinger to Ankara had to be cancelled. The caretaker government of Sadi Irmak came to power, which meant that Turkish side could not make any concessions at that moment.¹⁰²

As a result, on 18 October 1974, president had to sign the embargo decision, which was permitting him to continue military assistance to Turkey until 10 December 1974.¹⁰³ On 4 December 1974, the Senate allowed the president to delay the ban of military aid to Turkey until 5 February 1975 if Turkey abided the cease-fire agreement and did not send more troops to Cyprus.¹⁰⁴ Kissinger held talks with Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers between 12 and 14 December 1974 and asked

¹⁰¹ Mehmet Ali Birand. *Diyet : Türkiye Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar*, İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1979, p.72

¹⁰² *ibid*, pp.79-82

¹⁰³ Michael A. Attalides. *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp.165-171

¹⁰⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand. *Diyet : Türkiye Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar*, İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1979, pp.90-94

them to speed up the solution efforts for Cyprus. The American administration tried to change the decision of Congress on the arms embargo but to no avail.¹⁰⁵

On 5 February 1975 the embargo came into effect. This led the Turkish government to harden its determination on Cyprus issue rather than making concessions. Turkish government announced the same day that it was suspending talks with the Americans on agreements relating to the joint defense bases and installations in Turkey. Turkish officials stated that this embargo would not change Turkey's attitude toward Cyprus, and Turkey would reconsider its relations with the US and NATO.¹⁰⁶ According to them, the military aid of the US was not a privilege but a part of mutual responsibilities. According to Birand, a Turkish journalist, Turkish Prime Minister, Irmak, and Foreign Minister, Esenbel, were against the closure of the US bases, because these bases were securing Turkish interests, too. In addition, Kissinger had promised that the embargo would not last long.¹⁰⁷

The criticism of Turkish officials sharpened as the embargo began to be implemented. On 22 March 1975, Foreign Minister, Esenbel, warned the US that the relations between Turkey and the US would be badly affected if the implementation of the embargo continued.¹⁰⁸ On 10 March 1975 Kissinger was in Ankara to talk to Turkish leaders about the Cyprus issue. According to Birand, he wished for some territorial concessions to change the decision of arms embargo. On 22 April, this time Arthur Hartman, American Under-Secretary of State for European Affairs, came to Ankara. He asked Turkish government to work for positive results in inter-

¹⁰⁵ Mehmet Ali Birand. *Diyet : Türkiye Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar*, İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1979, pp. 99-100

¹⁰⁶ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp.152-153

¹⁰⁷ Mehmet Ali Birand. *Diyet : Türkiye Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar*, İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1979, p. 100

¹⁰⁸ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.153

communal negotiations, which would start in Vienna for the restoration of normal relations between Greece and Turkey.¹⁰⁹

On 19 May 1975 the American Senate passed a bill authorizing the president to lift the embargo if US security interests were at stake. On 23 May Kissinger held talks with Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, and Foreign Minister, İ. Sabri Çağlayangil, in Ankara during the CENTO meetings and, again, in Brussels on 30 May, telling them if they made a concession on Cyprus, the American administration would have a better chance to lift the embargo. But Demirel replied that there would be no solution before the embargo was lifted. The level of harshness in criticizing the American arms embargo decreased as the time passed.¹¹⁰

Through the end of 1975, American administration tried to persuade the Congress to lift the arms embargo completely. Then it turned out to be a partial lift, but even this was not accepted on 24 July 1975. The next day Turkish government announced that the defense cooperation agreement of 1969 and all other related ones had lost their validity. All the American bases in Turkey, except Incirlik, came under control of Turkish armed forces. And the Incirlik airbase was to be used for only direct NATO purposes. Operations at the intelligence collecting centers at Karamürsel, Sinop, Diyarbakır and Belbaşı were deferred.¹¹¹

On 2 October 1975 American House of Representatives lift the embargo partially, but this move was not enough for Turkey because it did not reconsider the closure of

¹⁰⁹ Mehmet Ali Birand. *Dişet : Türkiye Kıbrıs Üzerine Uluslararası Pazarlıklar*, İstanbul: Ađaođlu Yayınevi, 1979, pp.118-120

¹¹⁰ *ibid*, pp. 123-128, 164

¹¹¹ *ibid*, pp.175, Theodore A. Coulombis. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle*, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.151

American defense installations in Turkey.¹¹² Turkey and the US signed a new defense cooperation agreement, On 26 March 1976, offering \$800 million in foreign military sales and \$200 million in grant over a four-year period. But it was not permitted by the Congress and it was never put into operation.¹¹³

The embargo was finally lifted on 26 September 1978 completely. Turkish government's stand against the embargo was not the only reason for the lifting of the embargo. There was a change in Iran regime and the US had lost one of its last standpoints in the Middle East by the fall of Shah in Iran. Thus Turkey should be regained. After the lifting of the embargo, Turkey announced that the termination of the suspension measures was applied to US bases and facilities in Turkey. On 29 March 1980 Turkey and the US signed a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA).¹¹⁴

In conclusion, the aim of the Congressmen by the embargo could not be attained because Turkish government did not change its policies vis-à-vis Cyprus as a result of the embargo. Although the two states remained allies within NATO, the arms embargo and suspension of functioning of military bases in Turkey represented a serious cut off in Turkish-US military relations. The embargo did not produce the desired effect from the US point of view, but it reminded the Turks that they were heavily dependent on the US for their defense. The Turks showed that they were not

¹¹² Richard C. Company. *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, New York: Praeger, 1986, p.63

¹¹³ *ibid*, p.63

¹¹⁴ Theodore A. Coulombis. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle*, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.106

merely a straight partner of the US by abolishing the 1969 agreement. But they could not save themselves entirely from military dependence on the US.¹¹⁵

1.11. The US and the Cyprus Question between 1974 and 1983

After the 1974 events American administration continued to recognize the Greek Cypriot government as the only representative of Cyprus. The UN Security Council with its all members accepted Turkish Cypriot demands to join the Cypriot administration in a partnership project.¹¹⁶ Although the US did not favor the Greek Cypriot side openly in the Cyprus issue, Turkey came under heavy American criticism and even pressure about the issue. Turkish officials felt the pressure of the Turkish public not to give in to American demands in return for the removal of the arms embargo. They could not do that because if they did, they would have given the feeling that they were moving back under pressure.

The Cyprus issue became an important one which drew the interest of the whole American nation in 1976 American elections. Nixon and Ford had failed to reverse the partition of Cyprus, and after that the Democrat Party candidate for presidency, Jimmy Carter, stated that a positive approach should be adopted toward the Cyprus issue. The interest of American people in the matter led Carter to send former Defense Minister, Clark Clifford, to the region to find out the realities of the Cyprus question and to make contribution for a peaceful solution, thus prevent the weakening of the southern flank of NATO, reducing tension between Turkey and

¹¹⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.156

¹¹⁶ James H. Wolfe. "United States and the Cyprus Conflict", *The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of United Nations*(ed.), Kjell Skjelsbaek, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, November, 1988, p.51

Greece. According to Clifford, the disagreements in the Aegean and Cyprus should be dealt with making a defense agreement with Turkey collectively.

After the Turkish Peace Operation, Cyprus negotiations really started off in 1977 under the good offices of UN secretary-General with the inter-communal talks between the presidents of both sides, Archbishop Makarios and President Denktas. At the talks, the two leaders agreed on four guidelines to establish an independent, bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic.¹¹⁷ After the death of Makarios, the representatives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Denktas and Clerides signed a document, which demonstrated that they agreed on important basic points in 1977.

But there was severe reaction of Greek Cypriots to the American initiative in 1978. This reaction led the American officials to take a relatively low profile attitude on the issue in the following years. Meanwhile, the American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, met with the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktas, as the successor of Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who had been elected as the vice-president of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. This was an indication that the Americans might extend some kind of recognition to the Turkish Cypriot side.¹¹⁸

The Cyprus question began to lose its position as an issue having the potential to affect the American elections of presidency gradually. By the beginning of the

¹¹⁷ **The Guidelines Agreed Between President Denktas And The Late Archbishop Makarios on 12 February 1977:** 1. We are seeking independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.

2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

3. Questions of principles, like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.

4. The powers and functions of the central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa/PrinterFriendly/PrinterFriendlyIMG.aspx>

¹¹⁸ James H. Wolfe. "United States and the Cyprus Conflict", *The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of United Nations*(ed.), Kjell Skjelsbaek, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, November, 1988, p.52-55

Reagan administration, the Cyprus issue was no longer a problem that the president of the US would concentrate his/her attention. It was handled by experts and special envoys instead of high-level policy makers. For the Reagan administration it was a regional problem, not a burning one that would concern American interests seriously. In parallel, the US and Soviet representatives did not consider this issue when they met to deal with world affairs.¹¹⁹

The American special envoy for Cyprus was not assigned to the task of mediating for Cyprus by President Reagan. But a permanent desk within the State Department was created which would deal with the Cyprus issue: 'Special coordinator for Cyprus'.¹²⁰ Some of these special coordinators were Reginal Batholomow, Christian Chapman, Richard Hass, James Wilkinson, Nelson Ledsky, Richard Holbrooke and Thomas Weston. American opinion on this stage of the Cyprus question opposed initiation of impressive plans on the matter. The Americans thought that they should take modest actions to normalize the relations between the two communities of the island and should focus on the confidence building measures instead.

1.12. Proclamation of the TRNC

Although the talks continued until 1983 between the leaders of two communities, no solution had been reached. In this period the Greek side tried to internationalize the dispute and this was the most important reason for the failure of inter-communal talks under the auspices of the UN. The Greek side tried to take advantage of their recognition as the Government of Cyprus during the inter-communal talks preferring

¹¹⁹ Ellen B. Laipson. "The United States and Cyprus: Past Policies, Current Concerns", *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (ed.), Norma Salem, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp.96-97

¹²⁰ James H. Wolfe. "United States and the Cyprus Conflict", *The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of United Nations*(ed.), Kjell Skjelsbaek, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, November, 1988, p.56

international propaganda. As a result of this propaganda for internationalization of the Cyprus question, the UN and the international community continued to recognize the Greek Cypriot side as the legal Government of the Cyprus Republic.¹²¹

On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot side declared the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a reaction to the negative attitude of the UN towards Turkish Cypriots during the negotiations. The plan of the Turkish side was to underline that there were two sovereign and equal communities in Cyprus. According to the Turkish side, the only way to find a federation was to reach an agreement between two equal communities.

Proclamation of TRNC, on 15 November 1983, constituted a radical development opposing the American attitude of recognizing the Greek side as the official representative of Cyprus. Following the Turkish Cypriot declaration of 15 November 1983, the UN Security Council met on 17 and 18 November and, at the request of the Greek Cypriots, adopted Resolution-541. This resolution was adopted by 13 votes in favor, 1 against and 1 abstention.¹²² It considered the Turkish Cypriot declaration as “... incompatible with the 1960 treaty...” and “... that the attempt to create a ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ was invalid,...” Moreover it called upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.¹²³

On 11 May 1984, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution-550, confirming the Resolution-541, with 13 votes in favor, 1 against (Pakistan) and 1 abstention (this time the US). This resolution said that all secessionist actions, including the

¹²¹ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, p. 38

¹²² In favor: China, France, Guyana, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Poland, Togo, SSCB, Britain, The US, Zaire, Zimbabwe. Against: Pakistan, Abstaining: Jordan.

¹²³ Full text of the UN Security Council Resolution-541 available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/Kıbrıs

purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were illegal and invalid and called for their immediate withdrawal. It repeated its earlier call for all the states not to recognize the TRNC.¹²⁴ The abstention vote of the US for this resolution is interesting because although it accepted the Resolution-541, by this abstention vote it tried to prevent the problem from getting worse by showing Turkey that the atmosphere was not completely against the Turkish side.¹²⁵

The UN Security Council, meanwhile, supported the Greek Cypriot embargo on the TRNC and this embargo has been restraining the development of a tourist industry of any size in northern Cyprus by prohibiting direct flights. This has led to the comparative poverty of the TRNC economy although it has great economic potential.¹²⁶ The American administration was not pleased with the proclamation of TRNC, and it prevented the recognition of it by Muslim countries by warning them one by one.¹²⁷ However, the US did not take forceful measures and continued to support inter-communal negotiations for a solution. But prevention of recognition for TRNC became one of the basic principles of the American policies about the Cyprus issue after this date.¹²⁸ Meanwhile, one of the actions of the American Congress to achieve, at least, the economic reunion of the island, was its appropriation of 250

¹²⁴ Full text of the UN Security Council Resolution-550 available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/Kıbrıs

¹²⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl, 2000, p.378

¹²⁶ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglio*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, p.38

¹²⁷ For example Bangladesh recognized the TRNC but it had to draw back this decision when the US threatened it with withdrawing its support from this country. Pakistan, too, stated its wish to recognize TRNC, but in the same way it was threatened. Stephen, Michael. "Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinin 186 ve 541 Sayılı Kararları ve KKTC'nin Tanınması", *Kıbrıs'ın dün, bugunu ve geleceği ilişkin vizyonu konulu uluslararası Sempozyum Bildiri Kitabı*, Huseyin Gökçekuş, Yakin Dogu Üniversitesi, Lefkosa, Cyprus, 2001, pp.311-322

¹²⁸ Ayşe Özkan. "ABD'nin Kıbrıs Politikası", *Stratejik Analiz*, Vol.3, No.28, August 2002, p.35

million dollars of aid for the Cyprus Peace and Reconstruction Fund in May 1984.¹²⁹ In the following years the apparent war between American Congress and the administration on the Cyprus question began to be replaced by the opinion that they should cooperate to persuade the parties to the Cyprus problem for a solution.¹³⁰

1.13. Proximity Talks

After the Turkish Cypriot declaration of the sovereignty, proximity talks were held between the two communities with the help of the UN Secretary-General, Perez De Cuellar. He offered a draft framework agreement in 1986 after a series of discussions. The agreement would provide a federal, bi-communal, bi-zonal constitution, in many ways similar to 1960 treaties. American Secretary of State, George Shultz, considered the 1984-1986 proximity talks as the last chance for the solution of the Cyprus problem.¹³¹ President Reagan sent a letter to Turkish President, Kenan Evren, on the issue. He asked the sides to make serious efforts to reach a quick solution. According to him, the ultimate aim should be to establish a federal republic, which would end the partition of the island.

The US promised the Turkish administration that it would end its pressures if Turkish side accepted the UN written proposals of 17 January 1985 and 29 March 1986. The Turkish side accepted the document with only one exception, which was the clarity of the undefined dates for the implementation of the plan. Then again, the TRNC had agreed to a much stronger federation in which the remaining powers were kept in the two states. They accepted the federal sovereignty over all the territory of

¹²⁹ Nasuh Uslu. "Kıbrıs Sorunu ve ABD", *Avrupa Birliği Kısacasında Kıbrıs Meselesi (Bugünü ve Yarını)*(ed), Ertan Efeğil and İrfan Kaya Ülger. Ankara: HD, 2001, p.149

¹³⁰ Ellen B. Laipson. "The United States and Cyprus: Past Policies, Current Concerns", *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (ed.), Norma Salem, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p.96

¹³¹ Brian Mandell. "The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Solution", *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (ed.), Norma Salem, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p.216

Cyprus and a single citizenship. But, Greek Cypriot government rejected the proposed settlement at the last minute. Greek Cypriot President, Kyprianou, persuaded by the Greek Government in Athens, put some prerequisites, which were the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, the return of all Turkish settlers to Turkey, effective international guarantees to change the Treaty of Guarantee and the application of the three freedoms.¹³² Thus, Turkish side gave its approval to these proposals. But the American pressures were directed again toward the Turkish side although it was the Greek side that rejected the proposals.¹³³ During his visit to Washington, TRNC President, Denktaş, met with members of the Congress, but he was not accepted by the US State Department. This treatment alienated Turkish side in September 1986.¹³⁴

The US avoided giving the slightest impression that they recognized the Turkish Cypriot administration. This attitude created a contrast with their earlier approach to the Cyprus question in the aftermath of the 1974 events.¹³⁵ Another point that needs to be evaluated about the American policies before 1990 is the efforts of the American Congress, with the effects of the Greek lobby, to relate economic aid to Turkey to the condition of withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island. This approach of the American Congress continued after the end of the Cold War, too.¹³⁶

The strategic importance of Cyprus for the US was not changed in this period. The

¹³² A.J.R. Groom. "The Process of negotiations 1974-1993". *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus* (Ed.), C.H. Dodd, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1993, pp.26-27

¹³³ Sabahattin İsmail. "Kıbrıs Üzerine Bildiriler", Lefkoşa: CYREP, 1998, p.287

¹³⁴ Nasuh Uslu. "Kıbrıs Sorunu ve ABD", *Avrupa Birliği Kıskaçında Kıbrıs Meselesi (Bugünü ve Yarını)*(ed), Ertan Efeğil and İrfan Kaya Ülger, Ankara: HD, 2001, p.150

¹³⁵ However, although there was an intensive Greek opposition, the Turkish Cypriot bureau in New York was able to become one of the players of diplomatic game and TRNC established contact with the American authorities and foreign missions in New York. James H. Wolfe. "United States and the Cyprus Conflict", *The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of United Nations* (ed.), Kjell Skjelsbaek, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, November 1988, p.52

¹³⁶ Ayşe Özkan. "ABD'nin Kıbrıs Politikası", *Stratejik Analiz*, Vol.3, No.28, August 2002, p.35

Americans continued their operations and the use of facilities on the island. This issue remained as one of the determinants of the US policy.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, p.116

CHAPTER 2: THE END OF THE COLD WAR: NEW POLICIES AND NEW ACTORS

2.1. Introduction

In the beginning of the post-Cold War period the Cyprus problem was still there remaining to be solved. In the American and NATO eyes, the Cyprus problem was still a matter of conflict between two NATO allies and thus, should be solved as soon as possible to avoid the decrease of NATO effectiveness in the new world order.¹³⁸

In fact, threat perceptions of the US had been changed by the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc. The US came out the only Super Power and thus, the containment strategy of the US was no longer pertinent.¹³⁹ But the Middle East was gaining more importance as a center of crisis, for example, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent Gulf War led by the US. This proved that the Mediterranean was still important for US strategic interests and the US involvement in the Mediterranean was needed in the post Cold War period, too.¹⁴⁰ The weakening of the southern flank of NATO could bring much more damage than it could in the Cold War period.

¹³⁸ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p. 175

¹³⁹ Aylin Güney. "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, p.34

¹⁴⁰ Ian O. Lesser. *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992, p.3

In the post-Cold War period the US had global as well as regional interests in the Mediterranean. Its regional interests were on the Southern Europe and Middle East and the global one involved the crisis management. Oil reserves in the region, security of Israel, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which the states like Iran and Iraq had, were the main concerns of the US in the Middle East.¹⁴¹

Cyprus, with its strategic location, was still important for the US. As a matter of fact, it became more important. According to US officials Cyprus was a partner against new global threats, such as proliferation of WMD, international crime, illegal narcotics and terror.¹⁴² Thus a peaceful solution should be found to the Cyprus question.

In this period the US affirmed that the status quo in Cyprus, based on the partition, could not be acceptable and pointed out that inter-communal negotiations should be continued without any precondition. It pressurized the two sides to activate inter-communal talks continuously and put more pressure on the side, which seemed to avoid the negotiations. Turkish side was considered as the origin of the difficulties because it was firm on the recognition of TRNC and the breaking off of the EU membership process of the Greek Cypriots before achieving a complete solution. Thus, it was to be pressurized more.¹⁴³ By the active participation of the EU to the Cyprus issue Turkey would come under more pressure because it was not a member of the EU and was thought as the guilty side in the problem by the EU.

¹⁴¹ John W. Holmes. 'U.S. Interests and Policy Options', *Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges in the Mediterranean* (ed), John W. Holmes, Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1995, p. 217

¹⁴² Meltem Müftüleri-Baç. 'The Cyprus Debacle: What the Future Holds', *Futures*, 31(6), 1999, p.567

¹⁴³ SİSAV Dış İlişkiler ve Savunma Araştırma Grubu, *Kıbrıs Sorunu: Gelişmeler ve Görüşmeler*, İstanbul:SİSAV, September 1990, pp.74-75

This chapter will try to find out the policies of the US in the post-Cold War period until the presentation of the Annan Plan and the effects of the end of the Cold War, new world order and the new actors, like the EU, on its policies toward the Cyprus question.

2.2. The Set of Ideas and Other Initiatives in the Early 1990s

At the end of 1980s, the American administration appointed Nelson Ledsky as the special coordinator for Cyprus and American President met with Greek Cypriot leader, Vasiliou, in June 1989 in Washington and called on the two communities for new negotiations. Ledsky went to Cyprus at the end of 1989 and inter communal talks were held at the beginning of 1990. But this initiative did not produce the desired result.¹⁴⁴

According to the Turks these new initiatives in American position was to promote the candidacy of Cyprus for the EU because the Cyprus problem should be solved in order to make Cyprus' entry into the EU possible. On the other hand, the Americans considered Denktaş as the only obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus problem and they wanted the Turkish government to pressurize him for a more moderate attitude.¹⁴⁵

The inter-communal talks failed in March 1990 but the US wanted to use the positive atmosphere created after the Gulf War to solve the problem.¹⁴⁶ Turkish President, Özal, with American encouragement, proposed a four-partite conference between Greece, Turkey and Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on 30 May 1991. But

¹⁴⁴ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp.176-177

¹⁴⁵ *ibid*, pp.176-177

¹⁴⁶ Suha Bölükbaşı. "The Turco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects", *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects* (ed), Clement H. Dodd, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992, p.51

the Greek side wanted a conference with the participation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. This time Turkish side refused it because the real intention of the Greek side was to put pressure on Turkey by great powers.¹⁴⁷

2.2.1. Set of Ideas

Serious initiatives were to be taken on the Cyprus question in 1992 and the inter-communal talks under auspices of the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, came to an important point with his proclamation of the Set of Ideas. Turkish side found 91 articles of the 100-article package acceptable and rejected the remaining 9, because they proposed a federal system in which Turkish Cypriots would have no sovereignty or self-determination rights.¹⁴⁸

On the other hand, Greek Cypriots objected to some larger parts of the Set of Ideas, such as return of the displaced persons, property, and others on the status of the Cyprus during the transitional period, which might delay the accession of Cyprus to the EU. But they accepted the Set of Ideas in principle.¹⁴⁹ Consequently the talks were postponed to be restarted after the elections in Southern Cyprus since the two sides could not resolve their differences. But, interestingly, the Turkish side was considered as guilty one for the refusal of the package by the US, UN and the international community.

According to the Turkish Cypriot side, the Americans and Ghali, who was under American influence, tried to impose an agreement on the Turkish side, which would bring the Greek Cypriots to authority on the island and thus, the dark days of the period before 1974 would come back. When it failed, the Americans agreed with the

¹⁴⁷ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, p.43

¹⁴⁸ Sabahattin İsmail. *Kıbrıs Üzerine Bildiriler*, Lefkoşa: CYREP, 1998, p.277

¹⁴⁹ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, pp .46-49

Greek side on passing an anti-Turkish resolution, Resolution-789, in the UN Security Council.¹⁵⁰

Cyprus question continued to be a frustrating point in Turkish-American relations after the failure of the Set of Ideas. The US wanted Turkey to take actions of Confidence Building Measures (CBM), such as reducing the number of Turkish troops in Cyprus and persuade the Turkish Cypriot leadership to continue the solution process. Then again, American officials were very unhappy with the persistence of Denktaş in not accepting the UN proposals. In Turkish eyes, the Set of Ideas was based on giving territory in return for constitutional rights and according to the Americans, it was normal. But the point of the Turkish Cypriots was more important basic things, such as recognition of equal status for the two communities.¹⁵¹

The UN, by American initiative, tried to convince the two Cypriot communities to assume CBMs following the failure of UN's Set of Ideas in 1992, too. These CBMs were to basically permit the Greek Cypriots to return to Varosha (Maraş) in return for the opening of Nicosia (Lefkoşa) International Airport for the use of both sides. The opening of the Nicosia (Lefkoşa) Airport was very important for the Turkish Cypriots because it could greatly decrease the results of internationally supported embargo on the North. The package was accepted by the Turkish side although there was some reservation. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots in the end rejected the new changes suggested during the negotiations and did not accept to continue the negotiations on the CBMs.¹⁵² Their fear was that their contribution to the talks might

¹⁵⁰ Sabahattin İsmail. *Kıbrıs Üzerine Bildiriler*, Lefkoşa. CYREP, 1998, p.226-227

¹⁵¹ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.180

¹⁵² Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, pp.55-60

cause some degree of recognition of the North, and that CBMs could remove the embargoes on the Turkish Cypriots¹⁵³ and bring difficulties for the EU membership of Cyprus.

Denktaş proposed a fourteen-point peace plan on 20 January 1995, but the Greek side rejected it, although the UN declared that there were some positive points in the document.¹⁵⁴ On 23 January 1995, American President, Clinton, sent a special message to Denktaş in which he supported the establishment of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with two equal political communities in this one state. According to him, CBMs was the only way for progress in the solution of the problem but there was a reality that the Americans were not pleased with the Turkish Cypriot attitude of putting more emphasis on their sovereignty and the right of self-determination.¹⁵⁵

2.3. The EU as a New Actor in the Dispute

Greek Cypriot application for the EU membership in the early 1990s constituted an important turning point for the Cyprus problem and changed the existing parameters on which a solution to the problem was sought. There were two opposite views on the influence of it upon the Cyprus problem. There were those who thought that the EU membership would have an accelerating and facilitating effect on the solution efforts for the Cyprus question¹⁵⁶. Conversely, there were those who claimed that EU membership would destabilize some characteristics of the Cyprus issue, such as the

¹⁵³ M. Necati Münir Ertekün. "The Turkish Cypriot Outlook", *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives* (ed), Clement H. Dodd, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1999, p.106

¹⁵⁴ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglio*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, p.70

¹⁵⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp.180-181

¹⁵⁶ Thomas Diez. "Last Exit to Paradise? The European Union, the Cyprus Conflict and the Problematic 'Catalytic Effect'", *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union* (ed), Thomas Diez, Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, pp.139-162, 2002, pp.140-141

bi-zonality or bi-communality of the settlement foreseen by UN resolutions, and thus, would have a troublesome effect.¹⁵⁷

At the beginning, the US administration was against the transfer of the Greek Cypriot application to the EU Commission on 17 September 1990. According to some US officials, the Cyprus issue should be solved in accordance with the interests of NATO. They also against EU intervention in Cyprus because Turkey opposed it.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, some other American officials were hoping that it would help resolve the problem.¹⁵⁹ In fact, from time to time, American position seemed conflicting. This can be observed in the statements of Richard Holbrooke. In 1998, he stated that ‘if progress is to be made on Cyprus, both sides must be willing to engage in a genuine give-and-take. This is not the current situation, especially in regard to two positions taken by the Turkish side.’ But, in the same statement on the EU application of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ as represented only by Greek Cypriots, according to him, it was clear and no one had disputed that Glafcos Klerides did not represent or had control of the people in Northern Cyprus.¹⁶⁰

It was a different view from the EU perspective. Although it was a fact that the submission of Greek side’s application was on behalf of the island, the European Commission considered the likelihood of the accession of Cyprus to the EU positively in 1993. But the Cyprus question should be solved and the division of the island should be ended before the accession. According to EU officials, this would increase the speed of the negotiation process and finding a solution to the Cyprus

¹⁵⁷ Oliver P. Richmond. *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations*, London: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 128

¹⁵⁸ Nicholas Emiliou. “Knocking on the Door of the European Union: Cyprus’s Strategy of Accession”, *Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?* (Ed), Heinz-Jürgen Axt and HansJörg Brey, Mühlin: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997, p.128

¹⁵⁹ Ellen B. Laipson. “The United States and Cyprus: Past Policies, Current Concerns”, *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (ed.), Norma Salem, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p.98

¹⁶⁰ “Fatura Denktaş'a Kesildi”, *Radikal*, 5 May 1998

problem. However, they changed their view in 1994 Corfu Summit and showed a tendency to the idea of accepting Cyprus as an EU member even if a solution was not found. This change was the result of Greek threat of veto on the enlargement decisions of the EU. Cyprus took a date for the start of the accession negotiations on 6 March 1995.¹⁶¹

Turkish side was totally against the Greek membership to the EU because that would result in indirect ENOSIS and most of the Turkish principles about the Cyprus issue, such as sovereignty, the Turkish guarantee, bi-zonal state, etc. would become meaningless. The Turks also thought that this would be used as a tool to keep Turkey outside the EU. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot application for the EU membership and its backing by the EU was illegal according to Cyprus constitution of 1960 and international law. According to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus could not join in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever, in which both Turkey and Greece are not members.¹⁶² And the treaties of 1959-1960 were still valid, since its signatories did not amend it.

But the EU did seem to have a different opinion. It considered the Turkish force in Cyprus as occupying one. Thus, Turkey tried to prevent the Greek Cypriot application to the EU and started joint agreements with the TRNC in 1995.¹⁶³ However, Turkey had to let Greek Cypriots continue membership negotiations in return for signing the Customs Union with the EU in March 1995. Greece removed

¹⁶¹ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, p.64

¹⁶² Haluk Kabaalioglu. "Greek Cypriot Application for the European Union Membership", *Perceptions*, Vol. IV, No. 3, September – November 1999

¹⁶³ SİSAV Dış İlişkiler ve Savunma Araştırma Grubu, *1997 Yılı Sonu İtibariyle Kıbrıs Sorunu*, İstanbul:SİSAV, March 1998, p.23

its threat of veto on the Customs Union agreement and, in return, Turkey kept quite about the EU decision to schedule the membership negotiations with Cyprus.¹⁶⁴

According to the Americans, the change in the Greek attitude about Turkey's relations with the EU was positive and valuable. The US encouraged the EU to include the Turkish Cypriot side into the negotiation process. But the fact was that the US recognized the Greek Cypriot side as the only and official representative of Cyprus. American Presidential envoy for Cyprus, Richard Holbrooke, tried to persuade the Turkish side for the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the EU negotiations. According to him, the two sides should come together and sit on the EU table together in spite of conflict.¹⁶⁵

But according to the Turks, this would mean that they were giving up their recognition efforts and accept the loss of their basic rights and powers. Meanwhile, Turkey and TRNC signed an economic cooperation agreement on 3 January 1997 and a partnership council agreement on 20 July 1997 in the way of integrating TRNC with Turkey. Their view was to carry out the structural cooperation and adaptation agreements in retaliation to the EU-Greek Cypriot relations just as the EU and Greek Cypriots did. The US warned the Turkish side against these initiatives, for the reason that they could harm the solution process of the Cyprus issue, although it had not showed any objection to the Greek Cypriot- EU arrangements.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Sadi Somuncuođlu. *Kıbrıs'ta Sirtaki. (Sirtaki on Cyprus)*, Ankara: Boyut Tan. Mat., 2002, p.173-185, Andreas Theophanous. "Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a New Constitution", *Journal of Southern Europe*, Vol.2, No.2, 2000, p.169

¹⁶⁵ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglıo*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, pp.111-112

¹⁶⁶ SİSAV Dış İlişkiler ve Savunma Araştırma Grubu, *1997 Yılı Sonu İtibariyle Kıbrıs Sorunu*, İstanbul:SİSAV, March 1998, pp.13-14

The Greek side had now managed to make the EU part of the Cyprus problem.¹⁶⁷ The plan of the Greek side was to ensure that the Greek Cypriots enter the EU before a solution was reached. Thus, the EU would become more active and this would force Turkey for a more favorable solution to the Greek side, since Turkey was trying to enter the EU.¹⁶⁸ The EU council and the UN Security Council hoped that the EU membership process would help reach a solution by putting pressure on both sides. But the EU should work on the basis which had been achieved by the UN Secretary General and should be in close contact with the US.¹⁶⁹ According to some authors, negotiations challenged the relatively stable division of the island and was complicating rather than helping the resolution of the problem.¹⁷⁰

2.4. Holbrooke as a New Hope for Cyprus

In early 1996, Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia Herzegovina, was appointed by President Clinton as his special envoy for Cyprus. He tried to apply the Dayton model to Cyprus, too. But, he had to postpone his visit to Cyprus because of the Kardak (Imia) crisis between Turkey and Greece. Even only this event proved that the Cyprus issue was not merely an ethnic conflict of the type he had dealt with in the Balkans. It was more complicated than that and the

¹⁶⁷ Nicholas Emiliou. "Knocking on the Door of the European Union: Cyprus's Strategy of Accession", *Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?* (Ed), Heinz-Jürgen Axt and HansJörg Brey, Müh: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997, pp.127-128

¹⁶⁸ Peter Zervakis. "The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: The Greek Viewpoint", *Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?* (Ed), Heinz-Jürgen Axt and HansJörg Brey, Müh: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997, p.139

¹⁶⁹ Franz Eichinger. "Cyprus and the EU From the German Point of View", *Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?* (Ed), Heinz-Jürgen Axt and HansJörg Brey, Müh: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997, p.201

¹⁷⁰ John Roper. "The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests", *The International Spectator*, Vol.34, No.1, January-March 1999, p.93

Dayton model might not work at all. But the Americans believed that new initiatives might bring about positive results.¹⁷¹

After the Kardak crisis, Turkey offered a package solution for all the problems between Turkey and Greece. But the killing of a Greek Cypriot, who was trying to lower the Turkish flag during the provoked border events in July 1996 in Turkish-Greek frontier in Cyprus worsened the situation again. The US protested, saying the flag was not more important than human life, but that these words fell on deaf ears in Turkey.¹⁷²

In the second half of 1997, Holbrooke was prepared to intensify his initiatives. But he wished to wait for the end of Denktaş-Clerides meeting in Troutbeck on 9-13 July 1997. It was the first meeting of Cypriot leaders after three years. Meanwhile, the visit of Turkish Prime Minister to Cyprus for the anniversary of Turkish military intervention of 1974 troubled the Americans. According to them, good relations between Greece and Turkey, which was brought about by the Madrid Summit of NATO on 8-9 July, should not be harmed.¹⁷³ Denktaş and Clerides met in Switzerland on 11-16 August 1997 and in Nicosia on 26 September 1997, but no solution came out. In November, Holbrooke told Denktaş that the Turkish Cypriot participation in the EU negotiations would be in Turkey's interests. On 11 November, he held a meeting in Ledra Palace, on the Green Line with the leaders of two communities but they produced, again, nothing.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ F. Stephen Larrabee. "Yunanistan ve Balkanlar: Politika Önerileri", *Yunan Paradoksu* (ed), Graham T. Allison and Kalipso Nikolaydis, (translated to Turkish by Bülent Tanatar), İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, October, 1999, pp.138-139

¹⁷² John Roper. "The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests", *The International Spectator*, Vol.34, No.1, January-March 1999, p.93

¹⁷³ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, pp.101-103

¹⁷⁴ SİSAV Dış İlişkiler ve Savunma Araştırma Grubu, *1997 Yılı Sonu İtibariyle Kıbrıs Sorunu*, İstanbul:SİSAV, March 1998, p.15

In Luxembourg Summit at the end of 1997, the EU decided to start full membership negotiations with Greek Cypriots but Turkey was not on the candidate list. The Americans opposed this decision because the delicate balance between Greek and Turkish side was affected. The continuation of inter-communal talks and seeking for a federal solution lost its meaning in Turkish view. After that, the aim of the Turkish Cypriots was to receive international recognition and equal and independent status before getting at the negotiation table.¹⁷⁵

In early 1998, Holbrooke started a new initiative to reduce tension on the island. He proposed a Dayton style conference under the chairmanship of the US. The Turkish side put forward three preconditions for the continuation of the negotiations in order to balance the Greek Cypriot position, which gained some weight after the Luxembourg Summit because of EU membership prospect. This preconditions were as follows: Acknowledgement of the northern Cyprus administration as an equal side with the administration in the southern Cyprus, withdrawal of the Greek Cypriot side's application for the EU membership and putting an end to the economic embargo on the northern Cyprus.¹⁷⁶ The Greek side was not keen on a conference style negotiation process since it might bring the international recognition of TRNC. As a result, this initiative of Holbrooke was killed off although his attitudes seemed to favor both sides at different levels.

According to the Turkish side, Holbrooke was not responsible for the failure of his initiatives. EU's flawed approach in Luxembourg Summit was the main reason for the Greek side's reluctance about the negotiations. Holbrooke had openly said that

¹⁷⁵ Andreas Theophanous. "Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a New Constitution", *Journal of Southern Europe*, Vol.2, No.2, 2000, p.223

¹⁷⁶ "Turkey Says Quadripartite Conference on Cyprus is not on the Agenda", *Cyprus PIO: Turkish Cypriot Press and Other Media*, 23 March 1998 available at www.hri.org

the southern Cyprus had no authority in the north, namely TRNC. According to Denктаş, Holbrooke could speak more openly if he was not attacked by the Greek lobby in the US.¹⁷⁷

2.5. S-300 Crisis

An important incident during Holbrooke's term was the Greek Cypriot initiative to purchase S-300 ground-to-air (anti-aircraft) missiles from Russia. Turkish response was swift, declaring that force might be used to remove the missiles if needed. Americans did not approve this response but at the same time they were not happy with the Greek Cypriot initiative, either. There was a threat to the stability of Eastern Mediterranean and the US felt the need to intervene.¹⁷⁸ On 6 January 1997, the US administration criticized the Greek Cypriots severely for ordering new missiles.¹⁷⁹ Meanwhile, in response, presidents of Turkey and TRNC, Süleyman Demirel and Rauf R. Denктаş, signed a joint defense declaration on 20 January 1997, which said that the postponement of the deployment of the missiles was meaningless, and that any attack on the TRNC would be regarded as an attack on Turkey. In addition, Turkey and TRNC would respond in the same way, in case of any activity in southern Cyprus. According to Turkey, this was a Greek provocation and its aim was to raise tension in the region.¹⁸⁰ President Clinton gave assurances to Turkey about the missiles during Mesut Yılmaz's visit to Washington in 1998. American assurance was important because Turkey was in a mood of resentment due to the EU's rebuff in

¹⁷⁷ "Interview with Denктаş". *Turkish Daily News*, 12 May 1998

¹⁷⁸ Clement H. Dodd. *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Huntingdon, Eng.: Eothen Press, 1998, pp.99-101

¹⁷⁹ "US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing DPB #3", 6 January 1997 available at <http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1997/01/msg00005a.htm>

¹⁸⁰ Carol Migdalowitz. "Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations", *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, 30 January 1997, p.1

Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 and it felt free in taking action about the S-300 crisis.¹⁸¹

The delivery of the missiles was postponed for four months from February to August 1998. The Americans considered that S-300 missiles initiative was provocative, and it complicated the diplomatic efforts for Cyprus. Russia declared that this was only a commercial deal, and that their aim was to hold up their weak military industry. But it might have other motivations, such as extending its influence in Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁸² The US thought that the reason for Russia's sale of the weapons was to cause problems for NATO by supporting tensions between Greece and Turkey in addition to extending its influence to the Mediterranean. They realized that Russia was interested in the region more than it had been during the Cold War years. Cyprus was important for Russia in several ways: first, it was a good point for the intelligence opportunities in Eastern Mediterranean. Second, Cyprus might be used to extend Turkish-Greek tension to the Balkans, thus the expansion of the NATO could be hit back by parting the southern flank of NATO. Third, Cyprus was important for money laundering purposes for the Russians.¹⁸³

In fact, these weapons were effective enough to worry Turks but not enough to change the military equation in the region. But this crisis showed that connection of Russia by selling weapons to Greek Cypriots was rather disturbing although the Cold War was over. American administration used its influence to stop the sale of the missiles; it at the same time tried to prevent the frustration of the Greek Cypriots.

¹⁸¹ SİSAV Dış İlişkiler ve Savunma Araştırma Grubu, *1997 Yılı Sonu İtibariyle Kıbrıs Sorunu*, İstanbul:SİSAV, March 1998, p.19

¹⁸² Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp.186-187

¹⁸³ Aylin Güney. "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, pp.36-37

The crisis ended with Greek side's decision to install the missiles in Crete instead of Cyprus. But the US had to get involved in the Cyprus question more deeply because of the rising danger in the Mediterranean.¹⁸⁴

2.6. Developments After the S-300 Crisis

Crisis following one another and capture of terrorist leader, Öcalan, increased the tension in the region in 1998 and at the beginning of 1999. But the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 and sincere offers of help during these disasters brought about a new period of détente in mutual relations. This positive atmosphere created new hopes for the solution of the Cyprus problem.¹⁸⁵

Officials of Turkey and Greece persuaded Greek and Turkish Cypriots for proximity talks in New York through American encouragement. American diplomats put forward proposals, using the UN channel, in this atmosphere. Clerides and Denktaş held a five-round of proximity talks between 3 December 1999 and 10 November 2000 under the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary General without any precondition. Both sides showed a firm attitude on their ideas at the beginning. The Greek side demanded for unitary sovereignty whereas the Turkish side wished to be recognized as an equal partner.¹⁸⁶ One week after the start of the first round of the negotiations, Helsinki Summit of the EU began and Turkey was granted candidate status as Greece removed its veto. This gave an impetus to Cyprus negotiations. According to some authors there was another bargain behind the scene with the help of Americans, like in 1995 Customs Union agreement. This time Turkey seemed to

¹⁸⁴ Aylin Güney. "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 36-37

¹⁸⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.187

¹⁸⁶ "Başladı Başlamasına", *Radikal*, 6 July 2000, "Denktaş Ateş Püskürdü". *Radikal*, 13 July 2000

give unspoken approval to the EU decision that the political settlement of the Cyprus problem would not be a precondition for the accession of Cyprus to the EU, in return for gaining the candidate status.¹⁸⁷ Another comment on this issue was that in 1997-1999 period, it became obvious that leaving Turkey outside the candidacy status for the EU might complicate Cyprus negotiations and this might cause serious crisis between Greece and Turkey. Thus, the EU gave Turkey the candidate status, but it did not change its attitude toward the Cyprus issue.¹⁸⁸

At the beginning of the fourth round of the five-round proximity talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots held between 12 and 16 September 2000, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated that there were politically independent parties on the island not representing each other, and that they should constitute a new partnership as equal partners.¹⁸⁹ These statements pleased the Turkish side, but Greeks reacted strongly against them. Negotiations were interrupted after the fifth round of talks on 10 November 2000. The Nikiforos-Toksotis military exercise of Greek Cypriot side held between 17 and 21 October was one of the main indicators of the cooling of of the relations between two sides after Annan's statements in September. This exercise was carried out on the basis of the scenarios of attacks on the Turkish side.¹⁹⁰

Change of American administration and elections in the Greek Cypriot side on 27 May 2001 prolonged the waiting period in the Cyprus negotiations. The new American administration seemed not willing to put pressure on the parties to the Cyprus question, which would please the Turkish side. But economic crisis in

¹⁸⁷ Andreas Theophanous. "Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a New Constitution", *Journal of Southern Europe*, Vol.2, No.2, 2000, p.223

¹⁸⁸ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.192

¹⁸⁹ Dışişleri Güncesi, September, 2000, Ankara, TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, p.135

¹⁹⁰ Dışişleri Güncesi, October, 2000, Ankara, TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, p.197

Turkey and TRNC emphasized the possibility that the Turkish side might be open to more pressure on Cyprus issue.¹⁹¹

2.7. Developments in the 2001-2002 Period

After the failure of the proximity talks, the meetings between Turkish and Greek Cypriots stopped for a year, although there were attempts by the UN representative to bring the sides together. In the end the US and the EU pressure led the sides to return to the negotiations. Turkey was pressurized internally too, because of the economic crisis. Denktaş called for face-to-face talks that the third parties would not participate. The two leaders, Denktaş and Clerides met in the buffer zone in Cyprus on 4 December 2001. The UN Special Adviser for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, was there for only note taking purposes. Denktaş proposed a partnership state, which would be founded by two separate existing states in the north and south parts of the island. In this proposal he softened his former attitude by strengthening the central government authority, as it had been demanded by the Cypriot side before. But the Greek side did not accept this proposal, either, because, according to them, this was a trick of the Turks for the partition of the island. But, at the end of the meeting, de Soto made a statement announcing that the two leaders agreed for direct talks in mid-January 2002. The negotiations would be held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. There would be no preconditions and all issues would be on the table. Besides, the negotiations would continue until a complete settlement was achieved.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp.189-190

¹⁹² http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/Kıbrıs/Kıbrıs_tarihce.htm

There were now different factors from the Turkish point of view. There was international and domestic pressure for restarting the negotiations, and the economic crisis in Turkey hindered Turkey's and TRNC's resistance to these pressures. Second, the EU would decide on the accession of Cyprus at the end of 2002 and it was clear that the accession would be completed probably in 2004. This might be the last chance for the Turkish side to reach a solution before the full membership of 'Cyprus' to the EU. Turkish Cypriots could enter the EU with the Greek side, if a solution would be reached. And this development could help the accession of Turkey, too. In contrast, Greek Cypriot membership to the EU before a solution might bring about contradictory results.¹⁹³

For the Greek side, on the other hand, the EU membership was almost a done deal, and this would bring them a great advantage in their cause in the Cyprus question. Inter-communal talks would not cause any trouble. Quite the opposite, it would increase their prestige in international arena. It would reduce the likelihood that the world powers, such as the US, would oppose Cyprus becoming a member of the EU for strategic reasons.¹⁹⁴ Direct inter-communal talks, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, began on 16 January 2002, de Soto being present.

2.8. Effects of the 'September 11' Attacks on Cyprus

It can be said that the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 did not have any direct effect on the Cyprus question. But, September 11 attacks brought about a new international situation that the entire world should face. In this new era, it was very important for the US to maintain the unity of the western powers and to solve

¹⁹³ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.193

¹⁹⁴ *ibid*, pp.193-194

the problems for the west in order to struggle against new threats, more powerfully. In this context, the Cyprus problem had always the potential to cause a major conflict within the west to harm US interests in critical regions such as Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Central Asia. Turkey and Greece were important partners for the US and they had vital place in American policies in these regions. US authorities believed that it was now high time to remove the Cyprus issue from the agenda of Turkey, Greece, the US and the EU as bones of contention.¹⁹⁵

Thus, the Americans decided to intensify their efforts to persuade the Greek and Turkish authorities in bringing their respective allies in Cyprus to the negotiating table, again, and the result was the restart of the negotiations at the end of 2001, as it was stated above. Moreover, the Americans' fight against terrorism and their new initiatives, such as the 'Greater Middle East' would increase the importance of the regions, like the Middle East and the Caucasus, and Cyprus was holding the key strategic position for operations in these regions. The period beginning with the September 11 would, once more, prove the strategic importance of Cyprus.

¹⁹⁵ Nasuh Uslu. *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.194

CHAPTER 3: THE ANNAN PLAN

3.1. Introduction

Face-to face talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not result in a breakthrough agreement, and it became evident that they needed outside help for a solution. The UN Secretary General proposed a new plan for the complete settlement of the Cyprus issue on 11 November 2002. The package, known as Annan Plan, was then revised on 10 December 2002 and 26 February 2003.

At the beginning Annan's aim was to finish the procedure of the plan by 12-13 December 2002. The Copenhagen summit of the EU would be held on that date and the membership of Cyprus would be approved in the summit. This time limit for the decision on the plan was indicating that there was a degree of clear EU involvement in this plan and the Cyprus issue in general.

The chances for the United States in a resolution were apparent and important. A solution would put an end to an essential disagreement between two NATO allies. It would be a win-win for the parties and make a very important impact on peace and stability in the region. According to the Americans, certain things were clear: first, negotiation and mutual agreement was the only way to resolve the Cyprus problem. It could not be imposed from the outside. Second, as long as the problem remained, it would get harder to solve it and lack of a solution was costly for both sides. Third, there was not a choice for the Cypriots between the Annan Plan and a theoretical new

and better one, which had not been prepared. Their choice was between negotiating the Annan Plan and no solution for the predictable future.¹⁹⁶

American officials stated that the role of the US and the international community should be to give political support and aid to the UN effort and to promote the situation on the island that could make easy a settlement, not imposing a one from outside. The US had been working on the island to ensure that diplomatic efforts succeed.¹⁹⁷

The Annan Plan was prepared with the help of American, British, and the EU officials. In fact, the initiatives of restarting the inter-communal negotiations, which paved the way to the Annan Plan was mainly an American initiative, and Thomas Weston, US special envoy for Cyprus, along with Lord Hannay of Britain and Alvaro de Soto, UN Secretary General's special coordinator for Cyprus, were the main architects of the plan. They tried to consider the interests of the all parties in addition to theirs while preparing the plan. The Greek and Turkish sides were thought to be not involved in the preparation process. But it was later understood that the Greek Cypriots became actively involved in the process without the information of the Turkish side.¹⁹⁸

It was obvious that those who prepared the plan used EU structures significantly. Several European models were talked about such as Belgium and Switzerland in the process. Especially the Belgium one was argued mostly. Even, then Turkish Prime

¹⁹⁶ "A Critical Period in U.S.-Cyprus Relations: Prospects for a Settlement", Remarks by Ambassador, Michael Klosson, Western Policy Center, 8 January 2004

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ "Rumların AB Heyeti Başkanı, İngiltere'nin Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisine Hisselerini Devretti. BM Planı ve Kirlili İlişkiler.", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 February 2003

Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, said that this model was an acceptable one before the presentation of the plan.¹⁹⁹

This chapter will try to find out American policies in the period between the presentation of the Annan Plan to the present time, including the role of the US in the negotiations of the plan until the referenda and the position of the US before and after them.

3.2. Presentation of the Plan and Developments before the Referenda

On November 11, 2002, the plan was presented as a comprehensive proposal for Cyprus settlement. But the timing of the plan and its deadline for the final answer, which was 12 December, was not appropriate although it was a sign of the high EU and the UN motivation to solve the Cyprus problem, because first, Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş was in hospital for a heart operation and second, the government could not be formed in Turkey after the 3 November 2002 general elections. It was impossible for the Turkish side to evaluate and decide on such a detailed plan in a limited time.²⁰⁰ The timing was important for the Greek side, too, because they were under pressure to reach a settlement before the signing of the accession treaty of Cyprus to the EU on 12 December 2002 in the Copenhagen summit. But the Greek Cypriots were not willing to sign the agreement since the election was close in southern Cyprus and the existing government would not want to sign an agreement before the elections.

However, American officials supported the Annan Plan by their statements at all levels of negotiations and the referendum procedure. These supportive statements

¹⁹⁹ “Erdoğan Atınayı Memnun Etti”(Erdoğan pleased Atina), *Cumhuriyet*, 11 November 2002

²⁰⁰ “Kıbrıs planının Zamanlaması Yanlış”(The Timing Of Cyprus Plan is Wrong) ,*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 2002

went so far that most of the Turkish authors and politicians started to think that Turkey was forced to make the Turkish Cypriots accept the plan immediately. For example at the beginning, right after the election victory of AKP on 3 November 2002, Marc Grossman, American Under Secretary for Political Affairs, stated that they hoped to achieve a solution about Cyprus until 12 December.²⁰¹ Moreover, the US Secretary of State, Collin Powell, sent a message to his Turkish counterpart Şükrü Sina Gürel, two days before the announcement of the plan and wanted him not to say ‘NO’ immediately and the US would support the membership of Turkey to the EU. On 14 November Turkish foreign minister Gürel said that Turkey had learned that the plan had been given to the Greek side before, and that this created great doubts for Turkish side along with the timing and the purposes of the plan.²⁰² According to Richard Holbrooke, the American administration should convince Turkey to put pressure on Denktaş to start the negotiations before the Copenhagen summit of the EU.²⁰³

3.2.1. Copenhagen Summit

Membership of the southern Cyprus to the EU was agreed in December 2002 in the Copenhagen summit of the EU though the Cyprus problem had not been resolved. The accession treaty would be signed on 16 April 2004 and the southern Cyprus would become a full member on 1 May 2004 on behalf of the whole island. In the same summit, the EU gave Turkey a conditional date of December 2004, to decide the beginning date of the accession talks. The date for the beginning of the accession talks would be given if enough progress about the implementation of the reforms was

²⁰¹ “Pearson: Desteğimiz Tam”, *Cumhuriyet*, 6 November 2002

²⁰² Bilal Şimşir. *AB AKP ve Kıbrıs*. (EU, AKP and Cyprus), İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi ,2003, pp.52-53

²⁰³ Richard C. Holbrooke. “Turkey, Cyprus and the European Union”, *Int. Herald Tribune*, 3 December 2002

achieved by Turkey.²⁰⁴ This decision led to uneasiness on the Turkish side about the EU. As a result, Turkish officials increased their support to the Turkish Cypriots and president Denktaş because the Copenhagen Summit decisions had decreased the possibility of a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots decided to continue negotiations on the Annan Plan. Meanwhile, UN Secretary General, Annan, prolonged the time limit for a conclusion until 28 February 2003. Referenda would be held by both sides on March 30 simultaneously.

In fact, Thomas Weston and David Hannay were sent to the Copenhagen summit to help achieve an agreement and put pressure on parties on behalf of their governments. But, nothing came out and negotiations were prolonged until 28 February 2003.²⁰⁵

Turkish public opinion was separated into two as pro-plan and pro-Denktaş. Turkish government was in favor of the agreement although TNSC and most of the Turkish parliamentarians were supporting Denktaş in his view that this plan would bring risks to the Turkish Cypriots.²⁰⁶ Greek Cypriots, too, showed their dislike of the plan in several opinion polls. Most of the Greek Cypriots did not wish to consider Turkish Cypriots as politically equal as the plan somewhat recommended. Presidential elections would be held in southern Cyprus on 15 February 2003 and the south was waiting for the results of this election.

²⁰⁴ “Avrupa yolunda devam”, *Radikal*, 14 December 2002, “European Copenhagen Council, Presidency Conclusions”, 12-13 December 2002

²⁰⁵ Bilal Şimşir. *AB AKP ve Kıbrıs*. (EU, AKP and Cyprus), İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003, pp.185-186

²⁰⁶ *ibid*, pp.248-251

3.2.2. The Hague Meeting

The efforts of the international community and the US continued during the period between the Copenhagen summit and the Hague meeting. The main aim was to pressurize Turkey and to persuade Denktaş to accept the Annan Plan. On 6 February 2003, Thomas Weston came to Ankara and met with foreign ministry officials about the Cyprus issue. He made statements about the solution of the Cyprus problem until 28 February. He stated that the sides would do their share for a solution until 28 February, and that this plan should achieve a solution in the timeline of the UN and the EU.²⁰⁷ This visit was important because this was the last step of the EU-UN-US pressures on Turkey for a solution. Weston was just one of the visitors of Ankara in those days after de Soto, Hannay and the EU Troika. Visitors' aim was to make Ankara accept the plan and persuade Denktaş accordingly. Most important carrot for Turkey was the EU membership. If the Cyprus issue was not solved, membership of Turkey might be in jeopardy.

Annan visited Ankara on 23-24 February 2003 with his new version of the plan and wanted support for it. Then he went to Athens for the same purpose. Meanwhile, Weston, too, visited Ankara on 24 February and notified the Turkish officials of the US support for the plan.²⁰⁸ Another interesting event about the American view was the passing of Weston and Closson, US Ambassador to Cyprus, to northern Cyprus and watching the anti-Denktaş demonstration in Lefkoşa, İnönü Square on 27 February 2003.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ "ABD'nin Kıbrıs Temsilcisi: 'Irak ve Kıbrıs Arasında Bağlantı Yok'", *Zaman*, 6 February 2003

²⁰⁸ Bilal Şimşir. *AB AKP ve Kıbrıs*. (EU, AKP and Cyprus), İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003, p.421

²⁰⁹ "Anan Şerefine Dev Miting", *Radikal*, 28 February 2003

Richard Boucher, American foreign ministry spokesman, put American administration's attitude as a complete support to Annan in his mission. According to the US, putting the plan into referendum was a democratic and constructive way to determine the future of the Cypriots. This might be the last chance for the Cypriots to go into the EU together and the meetings in the TRNC were the proof of the idea that most of the Cypriots wanted this. According to Boucher, the parties should meet in the Hague and put the plan on referendum on 30 March 2003.²¹⁰

Papadopoulos, who was known as an ex-EOKA leader came to power by the February 2003 elections in the south. Annan met with the leaders of both sides, Denktaş and Papadopoulos, in March 2003, in Hague.²¹¹ His aim was to learn their answers whether they would hold the referenda on March 30 on the Annan Plan. There were essential objections on basic points from the Turkish side and thus, they would not accept the plan in that form. The plan was not completed yet and could be risky for them. The Greeks had several objections concerning the security provisions and constitutional issues. They needed more time for the referendum. But at the end Papadopoulos made a tactical move and said that he would withdraw his objections on the plan if the Turkish side did the same thing.²¹² The necessary changes of the Turkish Cypriots were much more essential, thus they could not agree on the referendum. Nevertheless, the later developments would make clear the unwillingness of Papadopoulos to accept the Annan Plan. However, for the time being, it was apparent that the Greek Cypriots could turn the issues to their own advantage if Denktaş agreed on the plan because the common state was in their hands and that Cyprus was under the steady pressure of the unifying policies of the

²¹⁰ Bilal Şimşir. *AB AKP ve Kıbrıs*. (EU, AKP and Cyprus), İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi ,2003, p.440

²¹¹ "Annan: Kararı Halklarınız Versin", *Radikal*, 6 March 2005

²¹² "Kıbrıs Kâbusu Başlıyor", *Radikal*, 12 March 2005

EU. As a result Turkish side, especially Denktaş, was blamed for the failure of the talks in the Hague meeting. The UN Security Council accused the Turkish side for its negative approach in its resolution about the Hague summit.²¹³

The United States was "deeply disappointed" with the results of the Hague meeting as the State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher stated on 11 March. He said that:

"The United States has long supported the efforts of the Secretary General of his initiative to find a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.... We find it very regrettable that Mr. Denktaş has denied Turkish Cypriots the opportunity to determine their own future and to vote on such a fundamental issue..... We think Turkish Cypriots should have gotten the opportunity to decide these issues in a referendum... The United States worked very hard on the UN proposal,..."²¹⁴

US officials thought that there were advantages, not only to the peoples of Cyprus or the security of Turkey but also for Turkey's accession to the European Union, of reaching an agreement on the Cyprus issue.²¹⁵

3.2.3. 1 March 2003 Decision of Turkey and its Impacts

On 1 March 2003, The Turkish parliament rejected a proposal that would have permitted the US to position an invasion force on Turkish soil. This was an important turning point in the Turkish-American relations and it was expected to have negative effects on the US attitude to the Cyprus issue for the Turkish side.

²¹³ "AB'ye Kıbrıs Belası", *Radikal*, 15 April 2003, "Security Council Resolution-1475", 14 April 2003 available in www.un.org

²¹⁴ "U.S. Disappointed at Failure to Agree in UN Cyprus Talks", 11 March 2003 available at <http://www.useu.be/Categories/US&EUEnlargement/Mar1103USCyprusTalks.html>

²¹⁵ *ibid.*

Many Americans reacted furiously in the aftermath of the vote, as though the Turkish position was a betrayal or the start of a basic reorientation of Turkey into an anti-American nation. This concept of betrayal was wrong because Turkey reached its decision by means of democratic processes.²¹⁶ The reality of the issue was that U.S.-Turkish relations were suffering in the short term from the outcomes of the Iraq War prior to this decision.

Reaction of the US to the 1 March decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), along with all others, was likely to play a role in Turkey's sensitivity of Cyprus and its willingness to push Denktaş to cooperate. If Turkey became more isolated, it would be probably less willing or less able to push for a solution on Cyprus. Therefore, it was very important for the US not to isolate Turkey, although it deeply felt angry at Turkey's negative response to agree to a northern front.²¹⁷ The Bush administration's decision to offer Turkey an aid package of US\$1 billion on Iraq War-related losses symbolically confirmed that Washington was not ready to abandon Turkey because of the parliamentary vote of 1 March.²¹⁸

Experts argued that, the US should accept the difficulties on Cyprus as short-term delays and push the parties to close a final deal with greater enthusiasm. The US role in near future of the Cyprus negotiations was critical for four reasons: first, the US was the only country that could influence Turkey and this influence was the center of the next phase on the Cyprus negotiations because at this stage only Ankara could persuade Denktaş to accept an agreement. Second, it could make sure that there was

²¹⁶ On October 7, Turkey agreed to send its own troops to Iraq, reaffirming its ties to the United States. But Iraqi officials refused this. This opposition, along with statements by Coalition Provisional Authority administrator Paul Bremer discouraging a Turkish deployment, left the Turkish leadership both annoyed and embarrassed. On November 7, Washington officially told Ankara that it does not want Turkey to send troops to Iraq.

²¹⁷ Henri J. Barkey. "Cyprus: Between Ankara and a Hard Place", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Summer/Fall 2003, Volume X, pp.235-239

²¹⁸ *ibid*, p.239, "Türkiye'ye Savaş Yardımı", *Radikal*, 26 March 2003

no backtracking on the conditions of the present deal on the table. This was a likelihood if the deteriorated bargaining position of the Turkish Cypriots evaluated, but this could solidify the resolution of Denктаş, therefore ruin the deal forever. Third, the American participation would make sure that the devastating majority of Turkish Cypriots who had seen their expectations eroded by the present course did not lose confidence and move abroad. Finally, strong US involvement would be needed to support the UN Secretary General because the UN was likely to be one of the casualties of the Iraq War and, as a result, its ability to forcefully push for a Cyprus solution might be seriously prevented.²¹⁹

3.2.4. Aftermath of the Hague Meeting and New Initiatives by the Turkish Cypriots

Denктаş started some initiatives after the Hague meeting. His proposal was to open Varosha (Maraş) to Greek Cypriot side in return for ending the embargoes imposed on Turkish side on the island. Turkish side said that it would lift the measures of July 2000 about the movement of UNFICYP in the TRNC if the initiatives were agreed. Establishment of a bilateral reconciliation committee to develop mutual respect and understanding between the two parties was another offer.²²⁰ Greek Cypriot side rejected these proposals, since, according to them, this was an effort to achieve the recognition of the Turkish side.

On 3 April 2003, the US Secretary of State, Powell, said through his meeting with Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, that the Annan Plan should be revised and come to the table again for achieving a solution. But, at the same time he was saying that he

²¹⁹ Henri J. Barkey, "Cyprus: Between Ankara and a Hard Place", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Summer/Fall 2003, Volume X, p.239

²²⁰ "Denктаş'tan Rum Tarafına 6 Maddelik Öneri Paketi", *Radikal*, 2 April 2003

supported the Turkish proposals for the solution. This created a contradiction between his two expressions.²²¹ Meanwhile, the convention on accession of the Greek Cypriot side to the European Union was signed during the EU Athens Summit, on 16 April 2003. According to the Greeks, they had now achieved ENOSIS in the end.²²²

3.2.4.1. Opening of the Border Gates by the TRNC

Although the Greek side did not accept the proposals of Denktaş for rebuilding confidence Turkish side continued its initiatives by opening the border between Turkish and Greek Cypriot side on 23 April 2003. In fact, this was retaliation of Denktaş against the EU agreement signed on 16 April for the accession of southern Cyprus to the EU. It was aimed as a step for the de facto recognition of the TRNC.²²³ The Greek Cypriot government could not prevent the free passages although the Greek Cypriot National Council stated that it did not recognize Turkish Cypriot decision.

After this, Turkish Cypriot government took another step by allowing Greek Cypriots to stay at the Turkish hotels for three days. Thereupon, Greek officials drafted a law, which would bring two years of imprisonment and a fine to Greek Cypriots who stayed at the Turkish hotels. Moreover, the Greek Church made statements to discourage people from entering the TRNC.²²⁴ In the meantime, Greek Cypriot national council decided to start a counter-attack and allowed the Turkish

²²¹ Bilal Şimşir. *AB AKP ve Kıbrıs*. (EU, AKP and Cyprus), İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003, p.489, "Köşk: Bu Öneri Çok Yapıcıydı.", *Radikal*, 4 April 2003

²²² "Denktaş: Simitis Şuurltındaki Düşüncesini Açıkladı", *Radikal*, 21 April 2003

²²³ "Rumlara Denktaş Çelmesi", *Radikal*, 23 April 2003

²²⁴ "Kıbrıs Konusundaki Son Gelişmeler(11 Kasım 2002 Tarihinden İtibaren)", available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PrinterFriendly/PrinterFriendlyIMG.aspx

Cypriots to have the right to contribute to the European Parliament elections if they signed the document, proving that they were the citizens of the Cyprus Republic.²²⁵

Next move of the Turkish side was the proposal of Denktaş, which offered the opening of the Nicosia (Lefkoşa) International Airport for the use of both sides in return for the opening of the part of a closed sector of Varosha (Maraş). Turkey would open its seaports and airports to the Greek Cypriot vehicles, too, if the agreement was achieved.²²⁶ But it was, again, refused by the Greek side. According to the Greek officials, the talks should be restarted on the basis of the Annan Plan.

3.2.4.2. New York Talks

The election in TRNC was a turning point for the Cyprus problem because it was considered as a referendum on the Annan Plan. And the result of the election was interesting since the votes were divided between the pro-plan parties block, namely CTP-BDH, with 48 percent and anti-plan parties block, namely UBP-DP, with 46 percent. Pro-plan block had been strengthened with considerable support of the EU membership propaganda, based on presumed increase in the standards of living and the end of economic difficulties that the Turkish Cypriots had been suffering for years.

These results encouraged the Turkish government in Ankara, which was supporting the Annan Plan. In fact it had to support the plan, because on 5 November 2003, in the European Commission Strategy Report on Turkey's application, it was affirmed that the absence of a settlement on the Cyprus issue could be a serious problem to

²²⁵ "Rumlar Teşvik Paketini Açıkladı", *Radikal*, 30 April 2003

²²⁶ "Kıbrıs Konusundaki Son Gelişmeler (11 Kasım 2002 Tarihinden İtibaren)", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PrinterFriendly/PrinterFriendlyIMG.aspx

Turkey's EU objective.²²⁷ According to the EU and the other international actors, Turkish Cypriot President, Rauf Denktaş, and Turkey were the obstacles to the solution. With the results of the elections and the international pressures, the Turkish government had to persuade Denktaş for new talks on the Annan Plan. Turkish Prime Minister formally requested UN Secretary General to restart the negotiations between the two sides.²²⁸

The UN Secretary-General invited the parties to New York on 10 February 2004 to restart the negotiations on the basis of a draft plan. He thought that an agreement could be achieved on 13 February to restart negotiations to realize a comprehensive settlement throughout separate and simultaneous referenda before 1 May 2004, the accession date of the Cyprus to the EU.²²⁹

The Greek Cypriot side wished the Annan Plan to be the basis for the talks, not a starting point, in New York. They also wanted the Secretary General to be the only person to fill in the gap in the plan if an agreement was not achieved. They demanded that the EU should take an active role in the negotiation process with Turkey and Greece. Turkish side accepted every demand of the Greek Cypriots except the EU's active role in the process since it would make it a party to the talks and this would not be appropriate for the structure of the Annan Plan. On the other hand, Turkish officials offered that Turkey and Greece could enter the conversation before authorizing Annan to fill in the blanks. This offer was accepted, but Annan

²²⁷ "Verheugen: Bu Siyasi Bir Mesaj", *Radikal*, 6 November 2003, "Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress towards accession by Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria", available at www.europa.eu.int

²²⁸ "Türkiye Kıbrıs İçin Tarihi Adımını Attı", *Radikal*, 25 January 2004

²²⁹ "Cyprus: What Has Happened?", available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Whathashappened.htm

had given assurances that the EU would accommodate a settlement and the European commission would offer technical assistance.²³⁰

After the discussions on the suggestions, the two sides agreed to work on a fixed schedule to reach a solution by 1 May 2004 under pressure of the third sides. The parties would try to reach an agreement about the different ideas on the plan until 26 March 2004, and then Turkey and Greece would come to the stage and try to resolve as many problems as possible. As the last step, the UN Secretary General would fill in the blanks before the referenda. The plan would then be put into separate referenda by both sides on 21 April 2004.²³¹

The first phase of negotiations between the parties leading to the Annan Plan took place in Cyprus. But very little progress if any could be achieved in this phase, because of the Greek Cypriot attitude. Alvaro de Soto was the chairman of the negotiations. The negotiations of this phase were held at political and technical level. Main point of the political level negotiations was the efforts to agree on the changes of the Annan Plan. Two sides could not reach an agreement. Since its EU membership was guaranteed the Greek side was in a mood of indifference and it had no motivation to reach an agreement.²³²

3.2.4.3. Bürgenstock Talks

The Secretary-General invited the leaders to move to Bürgenstock, Switzerland, for the second phase of the talks after it was understood that the sides could not reach a complete agreement. Denktaş did not go to Bürgenstock, and the Turkish Cypriot

²³⁰ “Kıran Kırana Pazarlık”, *Radikal*, 13 February 2004

²³¹ “Tünelin Ucu Göründü”, *Radikal*, 14 February 2004

²³² “Kıbrıs Konusundaki Son Gelişmeler(11 Kasım 2002 Tarihinden İtibaren)”,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa_tr/PrinterFriendly/PrinterFriendlyIMG.aspx

Prime Minister, Mehmet Ali Talat, and the Foreign Minister, Serdar Denktaş, negotiated on behalf of Turkish Cypriot side.²³³

The Bürgenstock talks started on 24 March with the participation of Turkey and Greece. According to the timetable, the agreement should be reached until 29 March. The UN sent the parties a recommended outline for their thoughts and judgments. But there was no agreement between the two sides. Annan submitted a revised version of his plan to the sides for their consideration. This new plan was answering the Turkish demands about the return of properties, the voting for senate, freedom of movement and settlement. At the same time, it included the Greek Cypriot worries about the effectiveness and validity of the requirements of the plan.²³⁴

The parties could not reach an agreement on this fourth version of the Annan Plan, either. Main objections of the Turkish side were about the arrangements on property issue and the securing of the rights given by the Annan Plan after entering the EU by derogations. On the Greek side, the important issue was the complete withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the island. It was obvious that the two sides could not arrive at an agreement. Thus, Annan finalized the plan on 31 March and presented the final version to the endorsement of the two sides.²³⁵

The EU Commission was also there at the final phase of negotiations in Bürgenstock and the EU assurance concerning the comprehensive settlement was decided upon between the parties and the EU Commission. The EU had frequently stated its strong inclination for the accession of a reunited Cyprus and its support to the good offices

²³³ “Denktaş Gitmiyor”, *Radikal*, 18 March 2004

²³⁴ “İsviçre’de Zorlu Pazarlık”, *Radikal*, 26 March 2004

²³⁵ “Cyprus: What Has Happened?”, available at

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Whathashappened.htm

mission of the UN Secretary-General and had made exact assurances to hearten and promote such a result.²³⁶

3.3. The US and Cyprus before the Referenda

The US played a very active role during the negotiations to encourage circumstances that would help the UN efforts to a successful conclusion because of its interests in a solution and the hopeful window of opportunity it saw. Its role was to give diplomatic support and assistance to the UN efforts and to contribute to conditions on the island that would ease a settlement, not imposing one from the outside.²³⁷

Its diplomatic assistance was in the form of regular discussions with the parties, Greece, Turkey, the UN and EU, and other governments. US officials tried to understand the concerns and priorities of the parties, propose ways they might be addressed, and arrange support for such solutions. They were especially active during the critical period between February and April 2004 in supporting accommodations of key concerns of both sides so as to advance prospects for the outcome they wanted a twin “YES” in the two referenda, by which Cypriots themselves would welcome the solution.²³⁸ At a pre-donors conference in Brussels in April organized by the European Commission, the US promised to donate \$400 million, which was the largest pledge made, to facilitate realization of the UN plan.²³⁹

²³⁶ “Cyprus: What Has Happened?”, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Whathashappened.htm

²³⁷ Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), “The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost”, speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

²³⁸ *ibid.*

²³⁹ “USAID's Natsios Pledges \$400 Million for Cyprus, Urges Reconciliation”, <http://www.useu.be/Categories/US&EUEnlargement/Apr1504NatsiosCyprusConference.html>, “AB’de ‘Ambargoyu Sona Erdiririz’ Dedi”, *Radikal*, 15 April 2004

The US was actively involved in supporting the UN effort for a number of reasons. It evaluated that there had been a gathering of forces over the past years producing the best chance ever for reaching a settlement. Because of its interests and the specific opportunity it saw, the US committed to helping the UN Secretary General's Good Offices Mission to achieve success. There were four aspects that led to this evaluation. Primarily, there was the aspiration of all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish, and Turkey to join the EU. According to the Americans, Europe was an important catalyst for a complete solution in this phase of UN efforts. The EU accession process gave a timeline to force the settlement efforts more powerfully. The vision of EU membership provided the UN with a framework of objective motivations for all parties in which it could encourage a resolution.²⁴⁰

This UN effort was different from all past ones with the action-forcing event of Cyprus's EU membership. The EU frequently clarified its desire for accession of a reunited Cyprus in April 2004, and mentioned that a resolution would ease Turkey's own membership goals. Greek Cypriots frequently repeated their wish for a reunited Cyprus to join the EU. But regrettably, by the time Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side modified their position on the UN initiative earlier in 2004, the motivations for cooperation on the Greek Cypriot side had considerably declined because it had already signed the EU Treaty of Accession in 2003. Both in the April referenda and in December 2003 legislative elections, Turkish Cypriots established common support for EU membership by means of a settlement. The UN Secretary General

²⁴⁰ Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), "The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost", speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

always underlined the support he received from Greece and the Turkish Government elected in November 2002, which started a change in policy.²⁴¹

The second important element for the Americans, improving the hopes for a settlement was the UN proposal called the Annan Plan. It was put forward in November 2002 and negotiated over the past months. The plan was entirely encouraged by the UN Security Council in April 2003 as the sole basis for further negotiations. It was the most comprehensive and detailed proposal of its kind, and characterized a cautious plan assessing main concerns of both sides. It offered both a proposal for a functioning government and a roadmap to a better future in the EU for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to the Americans, the Annan plan represented a culmination of UN efforts over the years to address key issues dividing the parties, such as security, sovereignty, governance, territory, property and so forth within the agreed context of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.²⁴²

The third element improving the hopes was the Turkish Cypriot side's decision in April 2003 to relax restrictions across the buffer zone. That initiative had a devastatingly positive influence on the atmosphere of the island.²⁴³ No serious incidents happened between the two communities although there were millions of crossings. The hope of a solution became more real with this huge improvement in interaction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots after decades of separation.

The fourth development that increased the chance of a solution was the exceptional political excitement that was seen in northern Cyprus together with the change in the

²⁴¹ "The UN Secretary-General's Report on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus," 2 June 2004

²⁴² Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), "The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost", speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

²⁴³ *ibid.*

policy of the Turkish Government in Ankara.²⁴⁴ The impetus produced by pro-solution Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in early 2003, especially calling on the officials to support the Annan Plan, was carried from the street into the ballot box in December 2003 legislative elections. Pro-solution parties defeated the establishment parties that campaigned against the UN peace plan with a slight margin. This vote brought forth new Turkish Cypriot political leadership that supported a solution based on negotiating the Annan Plan with the purpose of joining Europe as part of a united Cyprus. During this period, Turkey expanded its new approach that a “non solution” was not a solution. In his January meeting with UN Secretary General Annan, Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, expressed Turkey’s new policy on Cyprus, supporting a continuation of UN negotiations based on the Annan Plan.²⁴⁵

Another important reason for the American enthusiasm about the solution and its pressure on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots for a ‘YES’ vote came to light by the news that the US administration was aiming to upgrade its half-century intelligence presence on Cyprus into a full-fledged army base when and if the Greek and Turkish Cypriots sides agreed on reunification in the referendum. According to strategic analysts, the Pentagon might begin by establishing a "bare-bones" military presence on Cyprus, following the possible reunification of the country that would facilitate US military interventions in the region.²⁴⁶

There are high stakes in the region for Washington, some of which are the energy markets of the Persian Gulf and North Africa, a booming military presence

²⁴⁴ Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), “The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost”, speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

²⁴⁵ “Türkiye Kıbrıs İçin Tarihi Adımını Attı”, *Radikal*, 25 January 2005

²⁴⁶ Iason Athanasiadis. “US Seeks Major Military Base on United Cyprus”, *Asia Times Online*, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FD10Ak04.html, 10 April 2004

throughout the Caucasus and the ambitious Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. If Cyprus changes into an island of stability in the region, it could be the ideal position from which to monitor the variable unstable places of international diplomacy.

If the US could use Cyprus as a logistics base, it would allow the Pentagon more flexibility in planning interventions in the Middle East and give it more control over the oil-rich regions of the Middle East, North Africa and the Caspian Sea. It would allow easier management of regional sea-routes and balance the US presence in Djibouti that guards the southern access point to the Suez Canal by establishing a presence near the canal's northern exit.

Moreover, the strategic importance of the Turkish port of Ceyhan, which is situated about 70km from the northern tip of Cyprus, will increase over the next years as northern Iraqi oil runs through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline begins operating.²⁴⁷ Experts say that there are important oil and natural gas reserves found in Cyprus, around Karpaz, and southern Cyprus administration works on this subject with the Egyptians.²⁴⁸ The above-mentioned reasons prove the importance of Cyprus in the 'Greater Middle East' project of the Americans. Cyprus has a great importance for the realization of the aims defined in this project, both geo-politically and geo-strategically.²⁴⁹

Another interpretation about the Cyprus issue is that according to some authors, there is a war between the EU and the US of the power supremacy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean regions and Cyprus is one of the key points to gain domination.

²⁴⁷ Iason Athanasiadis. "US Seeks Major Military Base on United Cyprus", *Asia Times Online*, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FD10Ak04.html, 10 April 2004

²⁴⁸ "Hasan Ünal ile Söyleşi: Türkiye'nin Kazandığı Hiçbir Şey Yok." (Interview with Hasan Ünal: There is Nothing Turkey Gains.), 2023, No:36, 15 April 2004

²⁴⁹ Şenol Kantarcı. "Kıbrıs'ta 70bin Kişilik Yeni Bir Türk Askeri Üssü Kurulmalı", 2023, No.36, April 2004, pp. 36-39

The US wants the island for its military strategies while the EU wants it for its political and economic projects. Policies of the EU on Syria, which the US tries to make unstable, its resistance to the US in invading Iraq and its policies on Palestine, which are opposing American-Israeli policies, may be indicators of this power struggle between them.²⁵⁰

3.4. Referenda and Aftermath

3.4.1. Turkish and Greek Attitudes before the Referenda and the Results

The parties held the referenda on 24 April. It would be done in both parts of the island simultaneously. On the Turkish side, TRNC president Denktaş was against the plan for several reasons, and asked people to say ‘NO’.²⁵¹ But the government was supporting it and the common political atmosphere in the TRNC showed that most of the people were in favor of the plan with the EU membership carrot dangling although it was clear that the plan had many negative points for the Turkish Cypriots. The AKP government in Turkey was also in favor of the plan and supported the ‘YES’ votes during the referendum with its statements.²⁵²

On the Greek side, Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos was against it. He started a ‘NO’ campaign right after going back to Cyprus from Bürgenstock and stated that the final Annan Plan would not satisfy the aspirations of the Greek Cypriot side.²⁵³

Most of the other political parties, including the biggest party AKEL, turned against the plan, and they campaigned for the rejection of it.²⁵⁴ They prevented the UN and

²⁵⁰ İbrahim Karagül. “Yüzyılın Kapışması, Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ve Kıbrıs”, *Karizma*, Vol.5, No.18, Apr-May-June 2004, pp.95-97

²⁵¹ “Denktaş: Kıbrıs Elden Gidiyor”, *Radikal*, 1 April 2004

²⁵² “KKTC'de Ortam Kızışıyor”, *Radikal*, 4 April 2004

²⁵³ “Rum Liderden 'Hayır' Çağrısı”, *Radikal*, 8 April 2004

²⁵⁴ “AKEL 'Hayır' Dedi”, *Radikal*, 11 April 2004

the EU mediators from making comments to the media. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot church threatened the supporters of the plan by saying that they would go to Hell.²⁵⁵

In this propaganda period for the referenda the US supported the ‘YES’ side and wanted the Turkish and Greek government to follow suit.²⁵⁶ On 24 April 2004, separate simultaneous referenda were held in TRNC and the Greek Cypriot side. It was accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side with 65% of the votes, while 76% of the Greek Cypriot people devastatingly rejected the plan.²⁵⁷

3.4.2. Aftermath of the Referenda

The Cyprus issue took a new turn and a new state of affairs emerged in the island after the referenda of 24 April 2004. The Turkish Cypriots proved their dedication to the fundamental European value of compromise by approving the Annan Plan and they should be recompensed for that.²⁵⁸ The UN Secretary General, numerous international organizations and high-level officials of countries congratulated the Turkish Cypriot’s positive vote and they necessitated the instant renovation of their direct political, economic, trade and cultural activities internationally without any constraint to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.²⁵⁹

International community deeply regretted the rejection of the UN plan by the Greek Cypriots because an exceptional opportunity had been missed and only the Greek Cypriot side of the island was able to join the EU. This caused an inconsistency

255 Jon Gorvett. “Vote on Annan Plan Results in Reversal of Fortune for Turkish, Greek Cypriots”, *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Vol. 23, Issue 5, Jun2004

256 “ABD Gözüyle Kıbrıs”, *Radikal*, 10 April 2004

257 “Cyprus: What Has Happened?” available at

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Whathashappened.htm

258 Soner Çağatay. “UN Plan Fails In Cyprus: Implications For Turkey, The European Union, And The United States”, *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch #865, 29 April 2004

259 “Cyprus: What Has Happened?”, available at

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Whathashappened.htm

because the Turkish Cypriot side, which accepted the reunification of the Island and the EU membership, was left outside the EU, while the Greek Cypriot side, which rejected the plan, joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 on behalf of the whole Cyprus. It became apparent by the result of the referendum in southern Cyprus that the Greek Cypriots assumed that if they had rejected the plan, the international community would come back with a better one for them.²⁶⁰ In addition, since southern Cyprus was a member of the EU they had the veto power, which they could use against Turkey in case they needed it.

3.4.3. Reactions of the Third Parties

3.4.3.1. The UN

Secretary General expressed his disappointment in his Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, dated 2 June 2004. He stated that “the rejection of such a plan by the Greek Cypriot electorate is a major setback. What was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint.”²⁶¹

He requested the Security Council to invite all states to abolish the restrictions and embargoes that the TRNC was exposed to. His criticisms on the Greek Cypriots have not been appreciated by all UN states in which the Greek Cypriots have been lobbying actively. Annan made entirely no compromise to the Turkish Cypriot claim for international recognition although he did not seem on the Greek Cypriot side. He warned the international community not to follow that path. Furthermore, he read the Turkish Cypriot “YES” vote as evidence that the Turkish Cypriots had abandoned all

²⁶⁰ Andrew Boroviec. “Failed Cyprus Vote Victory for Turkish Side”. *The Washington Times*, 27 March 2004

²⁶¹ *ibid*, “The UN Secretary-General’s Report on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” 2 June 2004

demands to independence.²⁶² The new Turkish Cypriot Government led by Mehmet Ali Talat, has also come to a decision not to request for international recognition, which was the fundamental aim of Turkish Cypriot policy since 1974.

3.4.3.2. The EU

The EU reacted negatively to the Greek Cypriot leadership that did not support a plan to which it had given its approval earlier for a while after the referendum.²⁶³ The EU then started discussing new measures toward the TRNC. These measures included opening up a representative office in TRNC, establishing commercial links with it and offering aid to the TRNC. This policy of rewarding cooperation by revoking the trade embargo and creating contact with the TRNC in Eastern Mediterranean might work as a basis of US attitude toward the island.²⁶⁴

Foreign ministers of the EU said that they were strong-minded to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot population and made easy the reunification of Cyprus by heartening the economic progress of the Turkish Cypriot community. They invited the Commission to present offers. Thus, the "Green Line Regulations," accepted on 29 April 2004 and would be effective on 23 August 2004. These regulations wanted Greek Cypriot officials to put an end to the limitations on travel of the EU citizens between the south and north parts of Cyprus and permit Turkish Cypriots to export more products through southern Cyprus.

Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, but EU laws and regulations postponed in the north until a settlement. The Commission has been offered to end the isolation of the

²⁶² Clement H. Dodd. "Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its Antecedents", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005, p. 49

²⁶³ Soner Çağatay. "UN Plan Fails In Cyprus: Implications For Turkey, The European Union, And The United States", *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, PolicyWatch #865, 29 April 2004

²⁶⁴ *ibid*,

Turkish Cypriots and to help remove the economic differences between the two communities on the island on 4 July 2004. These actions included 259 million Euros (US \$318 million) in aid for 2004-2006 and permitting direct trade between EU countries and the TRNC. The Greek Cypriot response was hostile to these proposals.²⁶⁵ It tried to find ways to put conditions on the aid and to postpone direct trade, which did not let the TRNC obtain features of a state without international recognition. It also argued that they were not necessary owing to the Green Line regulations.²⁶⁶

There were even clues that if this process was not stopped, and if more pressure was not applied to the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots might delay, or even veto, a decision by the European Council in December 2004 to accept EU accession negotiations for Turkey. The EU pointed out that it would consider measures for the Turkish Cypriots after the December decision on Turkey's accession negotiations to avoid this connection.²⁶⁷ As a result, the Greek Cypriots were successful and none of the measures to end the isolation of the TRNC has been implemented yet. Moreover, the Greek Cypriots can now express their demands from Turkey more easily. Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, Iacovou, claimed, on 12 October 2004, that Turkey should recognize the Republic of Cyprus before the EU summit on 16-17 December 2004 in which Turkey would be granted a date to begin negotiations for EU accession. He also wanted Turkey to lift its prohibition on Greek Cypriot ships in Turkish ports, permit Greek Cypriot planes to use international air corridors over Turkey, to decrease the number of Turkish settlers and soldiers on Cyprus, and stop vetoing

²⁶⁵ Clement H. Dodd. "Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its Antecedents", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 49-50

²⁶⁶ "Recent Developments, UN-Mediated Negotiations and Related Issues", *International Debates*, March 2005

²⁶⁷ Clement H. Dodd. "Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its Antecedents", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 49-50

membership of Cyprus in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).²⁶⁸

3.4.4. The US and Cyprus after the Referenda

The US officials were disappointed by results of the referendum in southern Cyprus and they agreed with UN Secretary General Annan that it characterized another missed opportunity to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.²⁶⁹ Weston's statements can be viewed as a part of the American position right after the referenda: Weston stated that the attitudes of some Greek Cypriot politicians in the referendum had annoyed him. He said that he believed Turkey had done whatever it could for a solution, and that Talat's victory in the elections was an essential indicator of the Turkish side's firmness on a solution for the world in general and the Greek Cypriots, in particular.²⁷⁰

The US started some initiatives to relieve the restrictions of the Turkish Cypriots. But these actions were weak in character and did not improve much, and most of them remained only in words. Mr. Talat visited the US in May 2004. He held talks with US Secretary of State Colin Powell as well as other Executive and Legislative Branch officials. In an effort to make travel from Cyprus to the US more suitable for Turkish Cypriots, owners of northern Cyprus passports qualified for consideration of

²⁶⁸ "Recent Developments, UN-Mediated Negotiations and Related Issues", *International Debates*, March 2005

²⁶⁹ Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), "The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost", speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

²⁷⁰ "Former US Cyprus Coordinator: Greek Cypriots Should Take Action for Solution", 28.02.2005, <http://www.abig.org.tr/en/template.asp?nx=0&id=10379&go=News%3ANews%3ATowards+Negotiations%3ACyprus>

a visa valid for up to two years.²⁷¹ While they focused on measures to help the Turkish Cypriot community, they would continue to support organizing and funding bi-communal programs through UNOPS and other channels.²⁷²

According to the Americans, Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan represented an important hindrance and brought to light essential questions about their allegiance to a federal solution. Greek Cypriot leaders clarified that by this vote Greek Cypriots rejected a particular plan, not the idea of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution itself, which has been the agreed basis for over twenty-five years of a UN settlement efforts. That might be true, but many Turkish Cypriots started to question whether Greek Cypriots were really ready to share the island with them.²⁷³

The Americans thought that the vote and other polling data explained that much work was needed to be done on the Greek Cypriot side to create public support for the necessarily sore compromises that a federal solution would require. The commitment of the Greek Cypriots to such a solution needed to be confirmed. The best way to do that, according to the Americans, would be to support the Secretary General's call, which they strongly approved, for the international community to move to remove unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the outcome of isolating Turkish Cypriots and hindering their development.

Reducing their isolation will encourage Turkish Cypriots to remain dedicated to a resolution and reunification. The US is working to realize the Secretary General's

²⁷¹ "Kuzey Kıbrıs'a Yeni Vize Rejimi", *Radikal*, 28 May 2004

²⁷² Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), "U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus After the Referenda", Remarks in Rotary Clubs of north Cyprus in Nicosia and Kyrenia, Saray Hotel, Nicosia, 27 May 2004

²⁷³ Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), "The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost", speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

suggestion. It is working in parallel with the EU on actions to endorse economic improvement of northern Cyprus in order to make easy an ultimate settlement and reunification of Cyprus within the EU. But it is clear that diplomatic recognition of north Cyprus is not on the agenda. Despite the common feelings on this island that a gain for one side necessarily means a setback for the other, this is not a zero sum game. In contrast, lessening inequalities between the north and south will enhance hopes for reunification.

The Secretary General has made clear that there is no basis for restarting his Good Offices Mission as long as the current impasse continues. The Americans agree with this idea. They thought that the hopes for reunification, therefore, lie first and foremost in Cypriot hands.²⁷⁴

After the referenda, Greek Cypriot leader, Papadopoulos stated that the Greek Cypriot side wanted to negotiate further changes to the plan,²⁷⁵ but the Turkish Cypriot side was opposed to reopening the plan for negotiations after the referendum, because a greater part of Turkish Cypriots supported it in their referendum. According to the Americans, nevertheless, the Annan plan has not gone away and it is hard to anticipate any future solution outside the balance of adjustments it stands for.²⁷⁶ They think that maybe their views of a suitable resolution will develop as Greek Cypriots get a bigger sense of security due to their EU membership. As far as Greek Cypriot worries about security and realization of the plan are the major

²⁷⁴ Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), "The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost", speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

²⁷⁵ Until the time of writing he has been refusing to make public the changes that he and his government want on the Anan Plan.

²⁷⁶ "Former US Cyprus Coordinator: Greek Cypriots Should Take Action for Solution", 28.02.2005, <http://www.abig.org.tr/en/template.asp?nx=0&id=10379&go=News%3ANews%3ATowards+Negotiations%3ACyprus>

barriers for the solution, the Americans are ready to work with Security Council members to deal with these problems, as recommended by the Secretary General.²⁷⁷

The US officials think that the contradictory results of the twin referenda highlighted the persistent lack of a common attitude on the part of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

More direct contact between the two sides at a people-to-people level is necessary to deflate myths and get rid of labels that hinder building a pledge to a shared future.²⁷⁸

3.5. Recent Developments

The UN Secretary's request for ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots has not yet any significant concrete results, neither in the EU nor in any other international actors. The policy of the Greek Cypriots along with their lobbies in Europe and the US and their advantageous position in the EU are main reasons for this deadlock.

The international community seems want to see the UN plan revitalized. This would be accepted by temperate elements in the South, including former President Glafcos Clerides. In that case much would rely on whether AKEL would remove its support from President Papadapoulos but the opinion polls still show very important support for him.²⁷⁹

From the Turkish side's point of view, foremost changes in the plan would not be suitable to the Turkish Cypriot Government. Talat declared that the Annan Plan was not renegotiable. It would seem very unlikely they could be accepted without new referenda, if only small changes were offered by the Greek Cypriot side, which is

²⁷⁷ Michael Klosson. (US Ambassador to Cyprus), "The Cyprus Problem and U.S. Support for the U.S. Initiative: An Opportunity Lost", speech in IIMCR 2004 Middle East Symposium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Nicosia, 29 June 2004

²⁷⁸ *ibid.*

²⁷⁹ Clement H. Dodd. "Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its Antecedents", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.1, March 2005, p.50

very improbable. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots might refuse any adjusted version of the Annan Plan, more and more aware that the main Greek Cypriot thinking is that the Turkish Cypriots should have only minority status.²⁸⁰

The international community, even now, usually seems to think that the reunification of Cyprus in proportion to the UN Plan is both pleasing and feasible. But, the plan, for many Turkish Cypriots does not recognize that the TRNC, and the Greek Cypriot state should be the building blocks of the preferred federation. As a result, a two-state solution would be a less complicated, and a more constant solution than a federation according to many Turkish Cypriots. They indicate that the “YES” vote of the Turkish Cypriots for the UN Plan came mostly because of the Turkish Cypriot annoyance with their long economic and social isolation and not having the political recognition.²⁸¹ The UN Secretary-General has himself declared this in his Report: “the benefits of European Union membership were an important factor ...”²⁸²

After it was understood that the political and economic restrictions will not be completely lifted, the Turkish side started to look more flexible to new initiatives about the solution of the Cyprus problem because it became obvious that the promises of the international community, especially the EU and the US, about the lifting of the restrictions were only in words, not in action. Thus Turkish officials started to give positive signs about the reconsideration of new initiatives for the solution of the Cyprus problem.²⁸³ Meanwhile, by some changes in American administration, Condolliza Rice became the new Secretary of State and Cyprus

²⁸⁰ Clement H. Dodd. “Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its Antecedents”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.1, March 2005, p. 50

²⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp. 50-51

²⁸² “The UN Secretary-General’s Report on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” 2 June 2004

²⁸³ “Erdoğan: BM'nin Kıbrıs Planı Yeniden Gözden Geçirilebilir”, *AP*, 26 December 2004, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/DISBASIN/dis.htm>

problem was frozen for the US until April 2005.²⁸⁴ President's special envoy for Cyprus, Weston, has been retired and another envoy has not been appointed. But American officials continue to pay attention to the issue. For example on 10 February 2005 it was stated that the US would donate 30 million dollars to TRNC for relieving its economic difficulties.²⁸⁵ Moreover, on 17 February 2005, right before the elections in TRNC, a visit by a small group of American businessmen backed by the American administration was a small but welcome gesture by the US to keep its undertaking to relieve the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ "Kıbrıs Meselesi Nisan Ayına Kadar Donduruldu", *Ethnos*, 11 January 2005,

<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/DISBASIN/dis.htm>

²⁸⁵ "ABD'den Kıbrıs'lı Türklere 30 Milyon Dolar Yardım", *Macedonian News Agency*, 10 February 2005, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/DISBASIN/dis.htm>

²⁸⁶ "Lefkoşa ABD Heyetinin Kuzey Kıbrıs'a Gitmesini Eleştirdi", *Financial Times*, 18 February 2005, "ABD Şirketleri Kıbrıs'ın Türk Kesimine Önemli Bir Ziyarete Bulundu", *Gulf Daily News*, 19 February 2005, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/DISBASIN/dis.htm>

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

This thesis attempted to find continuity and change in US policy on the Cyprus question in chronological order. It examined determinants of US policy, and tried to find US role and influence in efforts to find a solution to the problem.

As it was mentioned in the first chapter, the US policy on Cyprus during the Cold War years was based on four main aims: First, the political stability of the Republic of Cyprus should be reached. Therefore, Cyprus would act together with the other newly established states against communism. Second, the island should be economically developed and democratic to pursue pro-Western aims. Third, the US must be able to continue using its communication facilities in Cyprus. Lastly, the British bases should be used by any Western nation for any friendly Western aim.

In 1950s and in the first years of 1960s the US pursued a relatively passive policy on Cyprus, and it left the problem to Britain. The important issue for it was the solution of the problem. Thus, it welcomed proclamation of the Cyprus Republic. But the US had to involve itself in the Cyprus question in 1964, after the first inter-communal clashes broke out on the island and Britain tried to solve the problem. At this point the US was against the internationalization of the problem, and did not want the UN to get involved. Since the Soviet Union was a member of the UN Security Council it could get involved in the problem. However, that was not possible and the issue was brought to the UN in 1964.

Another concern of the US in the Cold War period was to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece, since it would create weakness for NATO against the Soviet bloc, and an intervention to Cyprus would cause this. Therefore, the US tried every way to make these two countries not to start a war. The Johnson letter was the most important proof of this.

At the beginning, the US supported the partition of the island between Turkey and Greece, as it was proposed in Acheson plan. But, this policy later changed, and the US started to defend bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the island. Cyprus was strategically important for the US because it was important for the containment strategy. It was very close to the Suez channel and it controlled the Middle East.

The Military coup in Cyprus in 1974 and Turkish intervention was another turning point for the Cyprus question and Turkish-American relations. Although it did not reach its aim, the arms embargo was another harsh decision against Turkey, after the Johnson letter.

Cyprus was an important subject of politics in the US until 1980s. By the beginning of the Reagan administration it lost importance gradually. But the US had begun to take sides with the Greek Cypriots gradually after the 1974 Turkish intervention because Denktaş and the Turkish side were seen as the obstacle for solution, although it was Makarios, who, in 1960s and 1970s, had been considered as the one who raised difficulties to the solution efforts. This came to surface in almost all occasions after that. For example, the US warned all the Muslim states not to recognize TRNC, when it was proclaimed in 1983. Another example was seen in 1986, when the Turkish side was pressurized and alienated although it had accepted the UN proposals whereas the Greek side rejected it.

The US has always recognized the Greek Cypriot side as the official government of Cyprus, after the UN Security Council Resolution-186 of 1964, although sometimes American officials declared that the Greek side did not represent Turkish Cypriots.

Threat perceptions of the US changed with the end of the Cold War. The US came out as the only Super Power and thus, the containment strategy was no longer pertinent. But, the Middle East was gaining more importance as a center of crisis. Thus, Cyprus, with its strategic location, was still important for the US.

At the beginning of the 1990s, by the end of the Cold War, the Cyprus question entered a new period. The EU entered the scene as a new actor. There were two opposite views on its influence upon the Cyprus problem. There were those who thought that the EU membership would have an accelerating and facilitating effect on the solution efforts for the Cyprus question. Conversely, there were those who claimed that EU membership would destabilize some characteristics of the Cyprus issue, and thus, would have a troublesome effect. After a small hesitating period, the US accepted the EU as an accelerating effect, and tried to use it to convince the sides for a solution.

In the 1990s, the US thought that inter-communal negotiations should be continued without any preconditions. It also thought that bi-zonal and bi-communal federation was the only way to solve the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, the US criticized Turkish Cypriots due to their firmness on the recognition of their state and breaking off of the EU membership process of the Greek Cypriots before achieving a complete solution. Thus, it pressurized the Turkish side much more than it did the Greeks. American officials tried to find ways to prevent the outbreak of crises because of the Cyprus problem, since they knew that they would have to intervene in such an event,

which would result in more dangerous circumstances. Their main endeavor concentrated on pressurizing the Turkish side for a quick solution. But some crises such as Kardak (Imia) and S-300 ones occurred which hampered their efforts. It proved that relations between the two sides, as well as Turkey and Greece, were still not improved enough, and tension was still high. Especially the S-300 crisis had another important aspect, showing that the US was still considering Russia as a threat in the Mediterranean.

All the solution efforts and initiatives of the US, as well as other actors of the international community did not bring about a result, and all negotiations failed for one reason or another until the Annan plan, which was the best hope for a solution for the US ever. The US was involved in the preparation of the Annan plan, and it supported it in every phase of the negotiations. The plan was the best chance ever for the solution of the question, and all the conditions were appropriate. It evaluated that there had been a gathering of forces over the past years producing this chance for reaching a settlement. The US thought that the EU had a catalyst effect throughout negotiations of the Annan plan, because there was the aspiration of all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish, and Turkey to join the EU. Moreover, Turkish Cypriot side's decision in April 2003 to relax restrictions across the buffer zone improved the hopes.

Referenda of the plan brought about new conditions and changed the minds of the US and other international actors. The US was disappointed by the results of the referendum in southern Cyprus and it agreed with UN Secretary General Annan that it characterized another missed opportunity to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. It was understood that the Greek side, not the Turks, was the obstacle for solution,

and northern Cyprus does not deserve all the embargos and restrictions with which it had to deal. The US started some initiatives to relieve the restrictions of Turkish Cypriots. But they were weak in character and nothing has come out until now, except some gestures.

The US policy on Cyprus does not seem to change radically. It seems that the US may seek ways to restart negotiations, although the Greek Cypriot side does not want it. This may be achieved by way of relieving the restrictions and embargoes on TRNC gradually and allow some kind of recognition by some Muslim countries, forcing the Greek side, which is an EU member and gives signals that it wants a solution inside EU without other international actors, for new negotiations.

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