

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE
WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TURKEY'S LEADERSHIP

A Master's Thesis

by
R. Deniz Ateş

Department of
International Relations
Bilkent University
Ankara
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

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by

R. DENİZ ATEŞ

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ANKARA

September 2004

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanođlu
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Prof. Dr. Huseyin Bađcı
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Gölgin Tuna
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Kırşat Aydođan
Director

ABSTRACT

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

Ateş, R. Deniz

M.A., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

September 2004

This thesis describes and explains the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with special reference to Turkey's leadership. The significance of Turkey's leadership, organization and activities of ISAF will be explained alongside the events led to the establishment of ISAF, its history, mission, and competences. After the U.S.-led multinational operation defeated the Taliban regime and damaged Al Qaeda heavily, the maintenance of security and the reconstruction of Afghanistan were vital in order to prevent revitalization of the broken link between Afghanistan and international terrorism. As a part of the UN state-building activities in Afghanistan, to assist the Afghan authorities in the maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areas, the UN Security Council authorized ISAF, initially led by Great Britain. After September 11, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against terrorism and she, being a country that suffered from terrorism for years, supported fully all the counter-terrorism activities. Turkey actively participated in ISAF, and when the British mandate was over, she took over the command of ISAF. Turkey was a perfect choice to lead ISAF since she had an Islamic population with a secular and democratic government and was one of the few countries whose forces were capable of coping with this kind of mission. By assuming the command of ISAF, Turkey has demonstrated her determination to fight against terrorism once more. During her leadership, ISAF operated efficiently and the stability and security in Kabul and surrounding areas improved gradually.

Keywords: Peace operations, ISAF, Turkey's leadership, United States, September 11, Afghanistan, NATO, UN, Al Qaeda, Taliban.

ÖZET

ULUSLARARASI GÜVENLİK YARDIM KUVVETİ

Ateş, R. Deniz

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin liderlik sürecine özel ağırlık vererek Uluslararası Güvenlik Yardım Kuvveti (UGYK)'ni tanımlamış ve izah etmiştir. UGYK'nin kurulmasına sebep olan olaylar ile UGYK'nin tarihi, görev ve yetkilerinin yanısıra Türkiye'nin liderliğinin önemi, UGYK'nin organizasyonu ve faaliyetleri izah edilmiştir. A.B.D. önderliğindeki çokuluslu operasyon Taliban rejimini devirip El Kaide'yi ağır bir şekilde yıpratıktan sonra, güvenliğin sürdürülmesi ve Afganistan'ın yeniden yapılandırılması, Afganistan ile uluslararası terörizm arasındaki kopmuş olan bağın yeniden kurulmasını engellemek açısından önemliydi. BM'in Afganistan'da devletin tesisi faaliyetlerinin bir parçası olarak, BM Güvenlik Konseyi, Afgan yetkililere Kabil ve çevresinde güvenliğin idamesinde yardımcı olmak maksadıyla, ilk olarak İngiltere tarafından yönetilen UGYK'ni yetkilendirmiştir. 11 Eylül'den sonra, Türkiye terörizme karşı mücadelede önemli bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkmış ve yıllardır terörizmden çekmiş bir ülke olarak terörizmle mücadele faaliyetlerini bütünüyle desteklemiştir. Türkiye UGYK'ne aktif olarak katkıda bulunmuş ve İngiltere'nin görev süresi dolduktan sonra UGYK'nin komutanlığını devralmıştır. Laik ve demokratik bir yönetimle idare edilen müslüman bir nüfusa sahip olması ve silahlı kuvvetleri bu tip bir görevin üstesinden gelebilecek az sayıda ülkeden biri olması sebebiyle Türkiye UGYK'ne komuta etmek için mükemmel bir seçimdi. Türkiye UGYK'nin komutasını üstlenerek terörizmle mücadeledeki kararlılığını bir kez daha göstermiştir. Türkiye'nin liderliği altında UGYK etkin bir şekilde faaliyet göstermiş ve Kabil ve çevresinde güvenlik ve istikrar giderek iyileşmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış Operasyonları, UGYK, Türkiye'nin liderliği, A.B.D., 11 Eylül, Afganistan, NATO, BM, El Kaide, Taliban.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| ABSTRACT | iii |
| ÖZET | iv |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | v |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | vi |
| LIST OF TABLES | ix |
| LIST OF FIGURES | x |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | xi |
| CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER II: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) .. | 7 |
| 2.1 Events Leading to the Creation of ISAF | 7 |
| 2.1.1 September 11 Terrorist Attacks and International Response..... | 7 |
| 2.1.2 US-Led Operation in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom ... | 10 |
| 2.1.3 Efforts for the Establishment of a Post-Taliban Government | 13 |
| 2.1.4 Bonn Agreement | 14 |
| 2.2 Establishment of ISAF | 17 |
| 2.2.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1386 | 18 |
| 2.2.2 Military Technical Agreement | 19 |
| 2.3 A Brief History of ISAF | 20 |
| 2.4 Role in Relation to Other Military and Political Efforts in Afghanistan ... | 25 |
| 2.5 Mission of ISAF | 27 |
| 2.5.1 Tasks | 28 |

| | | |
|---|--|----|
| 2.5.2 | Area of Responsibility | 30 |
| 2.6 | Organization of ISAF | 31 |
| 2.6.1 | Force Composition | 31 |
| 2.6.2 | Command and Control Structure | 35 |
| 2.7 | Competences of ISAF | 37 |
| 2.8 | Finance of ISAF | 38 |
| CHAPTER III: TURKEY’S LEADERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY | | |
| | ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF II) | 40 |
| 3.1 | Turkey and Peace Operations | 40 |
| 3.2 | The Road to Turkey’s Leadership of ISAF | 44 |
| 3.2.1 | The September 11 and Turkey | 44 |
| 3.2.2 | Turkish-Afghan Relations | 46 |
| 3.2.3 | Turkey’s Contribution to ISAF I | 47 |
| 3.2.4 | Turkey: A Perfect Choice to lead ISAF | 48 |
| 3.2.5 | Turkey’s Motivations | 49 |
| 3.2.6 | Turkey’s Hesitations | 50 |
| 3.3 | Transfer of Authority from Great Britain to Turkey | 53 |
| 3.4 | The Organization of ISAF II | 54 |
| 3.4.1 | ISAF II Task Organization | 54 |
| 3.4.2 | Command and Control Structure | 54 |
| 3.4.3 | Force Composition | 56 |
| 3.4.4 | Area of Responsibility | 58 |
| 3.4.5 | Deployment of ISAF II | 58 |

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|-----------|
| 3.5 | The Activities of ISAF II | 59 |
| 3.5.1 | Security Issues | 59 |
| 3.5.1 | Information and Psychological Operations | 61 |
| 3.5.1 | Communication and Information Systems | 62 |
| 3.5.1 | Logistics Support | 63 |
| 3.5.1 | CIMIC Issues | 64 |
| 3.5.1 | Training Issues | 66 |
| 3.6 | Relations with Local Population, Afghan Authorities, NGOs and UN Agencies | 67 |
| 3.7 | Turkey’s Contribution to ISAF III and ISAF IV | 69 |
| 3.8 | Lessons learned | 69 |
| CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION | | 74 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | | 79 |
| APPENDICES | | |
| A. | MAP OF AFGHANISTAN | 88 |
| B. | KEY LEADERS: AREAS OF CONTROL | 89 |
| C. | BONN AGREEMENT | 90 |
| D. | UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1386 | 91 |
| E. | MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT | 94 |
| E. | PHOTOGRAPHS | 103 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. ISAF Leadership Phases | 25 |
| 2. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 7 March 2002 | 32 |
| 3. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 31 July 2002 | 33 |
| 4. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 11 August 2003 | 33 |
| 5. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 29 March 2004 | 34 |
| 6. ISAF II Troops Contributing Nations | 57 |
| 7. ISAF II Force Composition | 57 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. Bonn Process | 16 |
| 2. The Components of ISAF | 35 |
| 3. Basic Command and Control Structure of ISAF | 36 |
| 4. ISAF II Task Organization | 55 |
| 5. ISAF II Chain of Command | 56 |
| 6. ISAF II Area of Responsibility | 58 |

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| AFNORTH | : Allied Forces North Europe |
| ANA | : Afghan National Army |
| AOCC | : Afghanistan Operation Coordination Center |
| AOR | : Area of Responsibility |
| APOD | : Air Point of Disembarkation |
| BLACKSEAFOR | : Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group |
| CENTCOM | : Central Command |
| CIMIC | : Civil Military Cooperation |
| COMISAF | : Commander of ISAF |
| DDR | : Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| EOD | : Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| EU | : European Union |
| FMG | : Financial Management Group |
| HQ | : Headquarters |
| IA | : Interim Administration |
| IFOR | : Implementation Force |
| IMF | : International Monetary Fund |
| ISAF | : International Security Assistance Force |
| JCB | : Joint Coordination Body |
| KFOR | : Kosovo Force |
| KIA | : Kabul International Airport |
| KMNB | : Kabul Multinational Brigade |
| MNMCC | : Multinational Movement Coordination Center |
| MOU | : Memorandum of Understanding |
| MTA | : Military Technical Agreement |
| NA | : Northern Alliance |
| NATO | : North Atlantic Treaty Organization |

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| NGOs | : Nongovernmental Organizations |
| OEF | : Operation Enduring Freedom |
| OSCE | : Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PfP | : Partnership for Peace |
| PRTs | : Provincial Reconstruction Teams |
| ROE | : Rules of Engagement |
| SEEBRIG | : Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force |
| SFOR | : Stabilization Force |
| SHAPE | : Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe |
| TA | : Transitional Administration |
| TCNs | : Troop Contributing Nations |
| TIPH | : Temporary International Presence in Hebron |
| UK | : United Kingdom |
| UN | : United Nations |
| UNAMA | : United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan |
| UNIKOM | : United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission |
| UNIIMOG | : United Nations Iraq-Iran Observer Group |
| UNOMIG | : United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia |
| UNOSOM | : United Nations Operation in Somalia |
| UNPROFOR | : United Nations Protection Force |
| UNTAET | : United Nations |
| U.S. | : United States |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The necessity of international peace and security has been a concern of humankind for generations. When the League of Nations was established in the 1920s, international peace became a pressing goal for world leaders. The preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations identifies the goal of promoting international cooperation and achieving international peace and security. But in practice, this goal could not be achieved.

After the dissolution of the League of Nations, states did not relinquish concern for the maintenance of peace, especially after the horrors of the Second World War. A new institution named the United Nations (UN) was established. The birth of the UN put maintenance of international peace and security at the forefront of the agenda of the states, according to the expressed aim of its Charter. Nevertheless, the characteristics of a bipolar world made it impossible for the UN to play an effective role. During the Cold War, the UN developed the format for traditional peacekeeping, which served the United States (U.S.) and Soviet desires to avoid direct clashes of arms in the regions of tension.¹ The main purpose of these traditional peacekeeping operations was to localize the conflicts in those regions, and

¹ William J. Durch, 1996, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s", in William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of 1990s*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1-35.

so prevent the conflicts from turning into confrontation between the “Great Powers.” Traditional peacekeeping forces were usually small and played a very limited role.

With the end of the Cold War, the international community has increasingly come to expect the UN to take greater initiative in maintaining peace and security. The UN Security Council has responded to this challenge by launching a number of peace operations to contain and resolve conflicts. Indeed, the peacekeeping operations have become a major field of UN activity. The end of the Cold War also signaled a new role for the UN in the era of state building. Since most of the places where the UN intervened had stateless societies, the UN’s mission was to construct the state apparatus from the ground up.

Terrorism, whether carried out individually or collectively, poses one of the greatest threats to international peace and security. The terrorist attacks perpetrated against the U.S. on September 11 have demonstrated the level of threat that terrorism poses to humankind and underlined the need for international solidarity and concerted action in the global fight against terrorism. After the terrorist attacks occurred in the U.S., the relationship between these attacks and the Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan has come to light. Because the Taliban regime closely associated with Al Qaeda and because it was allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for terrorism, a US-led multinational operation was carried out against Afghanistan. As a result of this operation, the Taliban regime collapsed and Al Qaeda was heavily damaged; however, there was a high probability that terrorists would continue their activities in Afghanistan because of the security gap. In order to prevent the broken link between Afghanistan and international terrorism from being established once again, security and reconstruction of Afghanistan were vital.

Without security, nation-building and development stand little chance of success and terror cannot be controlled unless order is built in the anarchic zones where terrorists find shelter. In Afghanistan, this implies creating a state strong enough to keep Al Qaeda from returning. To maintain basic security throughout their country, newly established governments within unstable societies need outside support. Preventing anarchy requires well-armed and well-planned peace operations as a sign from the international community that the world is watching and ready to intervene to ensure stability. Robust peace operations permit humanitarian aid to get where it is needed, allow economies to start functioning again, and give governments the time they need to gain the people's confidence.²

The end of the Cold War enabled the UN to authorize peacekeeping missions commanded by a single state or coalition. Previously, lightly armed troops led by officers from disinterested nations under UN command carried out most peacekeeping operations. In 1990s, however, the US led a UN-authorized mission in Haiti, Australia led one in East Timor, and NATO continues to lead missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. These new generation of missions had political backing they needed to make them much more effective than UN-commanded missions.

After the Taliban regime had collapsed, the UN immediately began its state building activities in Afghanistan. As a part of these activities, in December 2001, the UN Security Council authorized a multinational force – International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – to assist the interim Afghan government in the maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areas.

Turkey's policy has always been to integrate with the community of the Western states and the ideals of the UN. To this end, Turkey has supported peace

² Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, "Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 26(1): 35-52.

initiatives by the UN, NATO and other regional organizations in order to prevent regional and ethnic conflicts. She has the second largest army in NATO and valuable experience in peace operations; its contribution to the UN peace operations increased in the post-Cold War era. Over the past decade, Turkish troops have deployed to Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against terrorism. She supported the international coalition against Taliban and Al Qaeda. When the Taliban rule came to an end, it became possible to launch international initiatives to rebuild the country. Although not able to make a significant contribution in terms of financial and economic reconstruction aid, Turkey actively participated in this endeavor. Moreover, when the British mandate is over in June 2002, Turkey took over the command of ISAF. It was the first time the Turkish Military assumed full command of a multinational force. The Turkish army is regarded as a considerable regional force, but leadership of ISAF would further its claim to a greater role outside its immediate environment. It was also an important opportunity for the Turkish Army to prove its professionalism in peace operations.

In this study, the main focus will be the analysis of ISAF and Turkey's leadership. The purpose of this study is not to make value judgments, but merely to describe, understand and explain. The study will certainly require the description of events that led to the establishment of ISAF, and Turkey's leadership role. For this purpose, this study will attempt to provide answers to the questions stated below:

- Which events led to the establishment of ISAF and how has it evolved so far?

- What is the mission of ISAF and how has it been organized to achieve its mission?
- What were Turkey's motivations in accepting the command of ISAF and what was the significance of Turkey's leadership?
- Why did Turkey hesitate later while she was so keen on leading ISAF beforehand?
- How was ISAF organized under Turkey's leadership?
- What were the activities of ISAF during Turkey's leadership?
- Which lessons can be taken from the phase of Turkey's ISAF leadership?

To find answers to these questions, in the second chapter, the events leading to the establishment of ISAF, a brief history, mission, competences, organization and finance of ISAF and its role in relation to other political and military efforts in Afghanistan will be described beforehand in order to provide a better understanding of Turkey's leadership and the operation itself.

In the third chapter, Turkey's approach to peace operations, the road to Turkey's leadership of ISAF, the organization and activities of ISAF under Turkey's leadership, relations with Afghan government, civil population, the UN agencies and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) will be examined. At the end of this part, lessons drawn from ISAF operation will be formulated.

In conclusion, a concise overall evaluation will be presented and some research topics will be recommended for future research.

The significance of this study arises from the fact that neither ISAF nor Turkey's leadership has so far been researched from a scholarly perspective. There are no books on these subjects, but only a few articles. Therefore, this thesis was

written mostly on the basis of first-hand material. The main sources come from the UN Security Council resolutions, reports from the lead nations to the Secretary-General on the activities of ISAF, briefing papers presented by the commander and deputy commander of ISAF, press statements, some other official documents, and interviews.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

(ISAF)

2.1 Events Leading to the Creation of ISAF

2.1.1 September 11 Terrorist Attacks and International Response

On September 11, four commercial airline jets on U.S. domestic routes were hijacked and used in suicide bombings. The planes were flown into the buildings symbolizing the U.S. economy and military. These terrorist attacks shocked the international community more than any other event in 2001.

At 08:45 A.M. local time, a passenger jet crashed into the north tower of World Trade Center in New York. 18 minutes later, a second aircraft was flown into the south tower. The impact of the two aircraft and subsequent fires caused the collapse of both towers at approximately 10:00 A.M. At around 9:45 A.M., a third hijacked aircraft was flown into the Pentagon in Washington DC causing a part of it to collapse. Those incidents were followed by the crash of another aircraft into the Pennsylvania countryside at around 10:10 A.M. The death tolls in these incidents were approximately three thousand, “the worst casualties experienced in the United States in a single day since the American Civil War.”³

³ Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law”, *The American Journal of International Law* 96(1): 237-255. See also “U.S. and Allied Casualties: Sept. 11, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Anti-Terrorist Campaign” for the casualties on September 11, available at <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/casualties-pr.cfm>>.

As for the responsibility for the terrorist attacks, the United Kingdom (UK) and the U.S. made it known immediately that Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization based in Afghanistan, and its leader Usama bin Laden carried out the attacks.⁴ Even prior to September 11, Al Qaeda had been suspected of involvement in several terrorist attacks against the United States. However, Usama bin Laden himself did not expressly claim responsibility for the attacks.⁵

The U.S. regarded the September 11 incidents as comparable to a military attack.⁶ Whether they do indeed constitute an armed attack is an important question, as Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” The U.S. has relied on the right of self-defense to justify its military action after September 11.⁷ In the aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration turned its attention to waging a war against terrorism. First, on the domestic front, the administration sought and received a joint resolution from the Congress, authorizing use of military force. In the language of the resolution:

The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.⁸

Second, the U.S. sought and received enormous international support. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the UN, and

⁴ On October 4, 2001, the U.K. released a document claiming the responsibility for the terrorist attacks. See “Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001”, available at <<http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ukreport.html>>.

⁵ Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law”, *The American Journal of International Law* 96(1): 237-255.

⁶ Colin McInnes, 2002, “A Different Kind of War? 11 September and the United States’ Afghan War”, available at <<http://www.ex.ac.uk/~tgfarrel/courses/McInnesfinal.pdf>>.

⁷ For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Christopher Greenwood, 2002, “International Law and the War against Terrorism”, *International Affairs*, 78(2): 301-318.

⁸ Michael M. Collier, 2003, “The Bush Administration’s Reaction to September 11: A Multilateral Voice or A Multilateral Veil?”, *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 21: 715-730.

numerous heads of state responded with support for the U.S. and its war against terrorism. On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council, the governing body of NATO, released a statement announcing,

If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.⁹

On October 2, after being briefed on the known facts by the U.S., the Council determined the facts were “clear and compelling” and that “the attacks against the United States on 11 September were directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”¹⁰ It was the first time in the history of the Alliance that Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked. NATO’s invocation of Article V did not institute direct military action; however, it facilitated the building of a military coalition under the U.S. leadership.¹¹

The EU also declared its full solidarity with the U.S. It issued a declaration from the extraordinary meeting of the General Affairs Council on September 12, indicating that the EU members would work together to combat terrorism.¹² In a ministerial statement on September 20, 2001, the U.S. and the EU outlined several key areas for future cooperation in their effort to eliminate international terrorism. The statement said, “The U.S. and the EU are committed to enhancing security measures, legislation and enforcement” and added, “We will mount a

⁹ NATO Press Release (2001)124, September 12, 2001, “Statement by the North Atlantic Council”, available at < <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm> >.

¹⁰ NATO Speech, October 2, 2001, “Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson”, available at < <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm> >.

¹¹ Michael M. Collier, 2003, “The Bush Administration’s Reaction to September 11: A Multilateral Voice or A Multilateral Veil?”, *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 21: 715-730.

¹² EU Declaration, September 12, 2001, “Terrorism in the US”, Special Council Meeting-General Affairs, available at <<http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=168>>.

comprehensive, systematic and sustained effort to eliminate international terrorism--its leaders, its actions, its networks.”¹³

As for the UN, on September 12, the Security Council, “recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter”, unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 condemning “the horrifying terrorist attacks” and regarding these attacks “as a threat to international peace and security.”¹⁴ Further, on September 28, the Security Council unanimously adopted, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1373, which contained specific measures against the financing of terrorism. It called on member states to implement comprehensive measures to fight against terrorism, and called for expanded information sharing among member states. Resolution 1373 further required Member States to refrain from allowing their territory to be used in support of terrorist actions or to recruit members of terrorist organizations. Additionally, it established a Security Council committee for monitoring these measures on a continuous basis.¹⁵

2.1.2 The U.S.-Led Operation in Afghanistan: “Operation Enduring Freedom”

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was an expectation within the United States for a military response. From the outset, the suspicion turned toward Al Qaeda, whose leadership and training bases were in Afghanistan and under the protection of the Taliban. As the U.S. government discovered further

¹³ The United States Mission to the European Union, September 20, 2001, “Joint US-EU Statement on Combating Terrorism”, available at <<http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/EUResponse/092001USEUJointStatement.html>>.

¹⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (S/RES/1368), September 12, 2001, para. 1.

¹⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373), September 28, 2001, para. 1-3, 6.

evidence¹⁶ tying the attacks to Usama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda, it turned its attention towards Afghanistan and the Taliban regime. The U.S. government demanded from the Taliban delivery to the U.S. of all the leaders of Al Qaeda, and to close all terrorist training camps.¹⁷ It also emphasized that those demands were not open to negotiation. The Taliban rejected these demands, calling for proof of Usama bin Laden's involvement in the terrorist attacks.¹⁸

With the Taliban continuing to reject its demands, the U.S. began to prepare for the use of armed forces in Afghanistan. On October 7, the U.S. informed the Security Council that it had "initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on September 11, 2001." The letter went on to note that the U.S. Government had obtained "clear and compelling information that the Al Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in these attacks" and that the U.S. Armed Forces had initiated actions "designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States."¹⁹

The concept of operation, which was dubbed "Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)", was to "destroy the Al Qaeda network inside Afghanistan along with the illegitimate Taliban regime which was harboring and protecting the terrorists."²⁰ The U.S.-led multinational military campaign, OEF, has roughly 10,000 troops inside Afghanistan, as well as air support and logistics elements outside of it.

¹⁶ See "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001", available at <<http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ukreport.html>>.

¹⁷ Because the United States has no diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, U.S. demands were communicated to the Taliban through the government of Pakistan.

¹⁸ Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", *The American Journal of International Law* 96(1): 237-255.

¹⁹ UN Security Council, October 7, 2001, "Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/946)", available at <<http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm>>.

²⁰ Statement of General Tommy R. Franks (Commander in Chief, US Central Command), February 7, 2002, Senate Armed Services Committee, available at <<http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2002/Franks.pdf>>.

Twenty nations including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Norway provided troops and support.²¹ The operation began with massive aerial strikes against selected military targets and expanded to include political and infrastructure targets as well as Al Qaeda bases. After the Northern Alliance (NA) set up its offensive, the focus of the bombing campaign changed to disturbing the ground forces opposing the NA.²² On 9 November, the NA troops entered the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif. In the following days, Taliban military forces were collapsed in most of the country, many of them fleeing toward the southern city of Kandahar, where the Taliban originated. On November 13, the NA forces entered the capital city of Kabul. Kandahar, the last city held by the Taliban, succumbed to the pressure from continual Coalition bombing and ground action by anti-Taliban Afghan forces on December 7.²³

As a result, the Taliban was removed from power and the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan was destroyed heavily. However, Coalition Forces have continued to locate and destroy remaining pockets of the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters and continued to search for surviving leadership.²⁴

²¹ Victoria K. Holt, June 2002, "Peace And Stability In Afghanistan: U.S. Goals Challenged By Security Gap", Peace Operations Factsheet Series, available at <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/AfghanSecurityGapfactsheet_063102.pdf>.

²² The Northern Alliance, known formally as the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or the United Front, is a loose and constantly shifting confederation of Afghan militias and warlords, drawn largely from ethnic minorities who live in the north of Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance was composed mainly of Tajiks and Uzbeks, but did not include Pashtuns, Afghanistan's main ethnic group.

²³ Colin McInness, 2002, "A Different Kind of War? 11 September and the United States' Afghan War", available at <<http://www.ex.ac.uk/~tgfarrel/courses/McInnesfinal.pdf>>.

²⁴ Statement of General Tommy R. Franks (Commander in Chief, US Central Command), February 7, 2002, Senate Armed Services Committee, available at <<http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2002/Franks.pdf>>.

2.1.3 Efforts for the Establishment of a Post-Taliban Government

In parallel with the advance of military operations by the U.S. and other forces, the international community, especially the UN, has begun to focus on the problems associated with creating a new political, economic, and socially viable state. The first step on this road was the establishment of a new broad-based Afghan government.

Even before September 11, the UN had tried for a peaceful transition from civil war to a broad-based government in Afghanistan. These UN efforts, at times, appeared to make significant progress, but ceasefires and other agreements between the warring factions always broke down.²⁵ The September 11 attacks and the U.S. military action against the Taliban introduced a new necessity, which was the search for a new government that might replace the Taliban. In late September 2001, Lakhdar Brahimi²⁶ was brought back as the UN representative to help Afghan leaders arrange an alternative government. On November 12, the Foreign Ministers of “Six plus Two” met with Brahimi at the UN to discuss Afghanistan’s future.²⁷ Given the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, the Group agreed to accelerate the process of assembling a “multiethnic, politically balanced, freely chosen government.”²⁸ One day later, at the meeting of the Security Council on November 13, Brahimi outlined an approach for the creation of a transitional government and for the deployment of a multinational force.²⁹

²⁵ Kenneth Katzman, April 1, 2003, “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy”, Report for Congress, available at <<http://carper.senate.gov/acrobat%20files/RL30588.pdf>>.

²⁶ Brahimi, who was a former foreign minister of Algeria, worked as UN Mediator to Afghanistan from August 1997 to October 1999.

²⁷ The “Six plus Two” Group included the United States, Russia, and Afghanistan neighbors Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Turkmenistan.

²⁸ Declaration on the Situation in Afghanistan by the Foreign Ministers and Other Senior Representatives of the “Six plus Two”, November 12, 2001, available at <<http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/sixplus.htm>>.

²⁹ Sean D. Murphy, January 2002, “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law”, *The American Journal of International Law* 96(1): 237-255.

On November 14, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1378. The Security Council expressed “its strong support for the efforts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional administration leading to formation of a government...”, and affirmed that the UN should play a central role in this process. It also expressed its full support for Brahimi in the accomplishment of his mandate, and called on Afghans to cooperate with him.³⁰

The UN representatives led by Brahimi arrived in Kabul on November 18 to convince Afghan leaders to participate in talks about their country’s future. At the beginning, the NA leaders wanted the conference to be held in Kabul. However, with the pressure of the U.S., they agreed to a meeting to discuss a post-Taliban government in a neutral location in Europe rather than Kabul.³¹

2.1.4 The Bonn Agreement

From November 27 through December 5, the German city of Bonn hosted the UN talks on Afghanistan, to form an interim, post-Taliban administration for the country, and to establish a framework for its physical, political, and economic reconstruction. The meeting brought together the UN officials and the representatives of major Afghan factions to discuss the country’s future.³²

The meeting was held behind the closed doors and included a series of plenary talks and direct talks between the Afghan factions themselves and between

³⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1378 (S/RES/1378), 14 November 2001, para. 1-3.

³¹ Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force”, *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12, available at <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no2/pdf/v4n2-p03-12_e.pdf>.

³² Four delegations of anti-Taliban ethnic factions attended the Bonn Conference: the Northern Alliance; the "Cyprus group," a group of exiles with ties to Iran; the "Rome group," loyal to former King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who lives in exile in Rome and did not attend the meeting; and the "Peshawar group," a group of mostly Pashtun exiles based in Pakistan. The Northern Alliance and the Rome group each contributed 11 representatives to the discussion, while the Cyprus and Peshawar groups contributed five. See Frontline, “Filling the Vacuum: The Bonn Conference”, available at <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cindex.html>>.

the UN representatives and the representatives of each faction. The concept of an international security force for Afghanistan was developed during these negotiations. The objective of Bonn conference was to reach a consensus on an interim administration and future security architecture.³³

During the first days of the conference, the delegates agreed on a road map for the process of forming a government. However, some disagreements occurred related to the multinational forces. The NA favored an all-Afghan force to provide security for the capital, not an outside force. The delegates of three other factions, on the contrary, preferred a multinational force with a UN mandate in Kabul. According to Maloney, these views related to the relative coercive power that the NA forces held in Kabul vis-à-vis the forces of other factions.

In Afghanistan, as it is after any regime collapse, force is a prerequisite for political activity, therefore elements from other areas of the country included in an Interim Government either had to bring their own military forces to Kabul or find some substitute so they could protect themselves and influence political events on the ground. But, clearly, the NA held all the cards in Kabul and for the time being didn't want to let go.³⁴

After some discussions, the delegates came to an agreement on December 5, 2001. The agreement called for three major political steps. The first is the formation of an Interim Administration (IA) consisting of 30 members. Hamid Karzai was selected as the chairman of the IA in which a slight majority of the positions, including key posts of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior, were held by the NA. Second, a special 21-person commission was to be established to prepare an emergency "Loya Jirga"³⁵ to be convened in six months. This body was to select a


³³ Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force", *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12, available at <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no2/pdf/v4n2-p03-12_e.pdf>.

³⁴ Ibid. See also Anthony Davis, December 19, 2001, "Stability in View", *Jane's Defence Weekly* 36(25):17.

³⁵ "Loya Jirga" is a "grand council" of elders from Afghanistan's tribes, factions, and ethnic groups, which is convened by the Afghan king to settle disputes, discuss social reforms, and acts as a sort of constitutional convention.

Transitional Administration (TA) to rule for a period not to exceed 24 months, at which time elections for a permanent government will be held. Third, no later than 18 months after the IA assumes the power, another Loya Jirga was to be held in order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan.³⁶

Figure 1: Bonn Process³⁷



As for the security force issue, the Bonn Agreement included an annex, entitled “International Security Force”, which sought international help to establish and train Afghan national security forces. Because some time would be required for the new Afghan Security Forces to be fully constituted and functioning, it was requested “the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. Such a force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas.” Moreover,

³⁶ Bonn Agreement, December 5, 2001, General Provisions, para. 1-6, available at <www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm>.

³⁷ Turkish General Staff, “Afghanistan Bilgi Dosyası (Afghanistan Information File)”.

the participants in the Bonn conference pledged, “to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban areas in which the UN-mandated force is deployed.”³⁸

The Bonn Agreement did not mention force size, mandate, or timing probably because the U.S.-led campaign was continuing on the ground when the agreement was signed. Moreover, there were still disagreements on these issues between the NA leaders and the others, and more importantly, an international security force in Kabul meant that the NA had to cede control of capital. At the end, it had consented to such a force because of the pressure coming from the “Six plus Two” group, especially from the U.S. and Russia.³⁹

2.2 Establishment of ISAF

Kandahar was taken and the Taliban regime collapsed one day after the Bonn Agreement was signed, in December 2001. This was an unexpected and early development. The UN Security Council quickly passed Resolution 1383, which endorsed the Bonn Agreement. After a force generation conference at CENTCOM, the UK formally offered, to the UN Security Council, to organize the International Security Assistance Force and act as lead nation for it. The Security Council accepted this offer on December 20 by adopting Resolution 1386.⁴⁰

Concurrent with this announcement, a force planning conference was held for possible Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on December 19, 2001.⁴¹ At this conference, 21 countries offered forces. The United Kingdom, after evaluating the offers, preferred 17 countries to deploy troops alongside the UK forces as part of

³⁸ See Appendix C for that annex.

³⁹ Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force”, *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12. See also Frontline, “Filling the Vacuum: The Bonn Conference”, available at <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cindex.html>>.

⁴⁰ Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force”, *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12.

⁴¹ Ibid.

ISAF. Major General John McColl, from British Army, was designated force commander.⁴²

2.2.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1386

The UK formally informed the Security Council that it was willing to become the initial lead nation for ISAF with a letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the UK to the President of the Council. According to the letter, the responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan resides with the Afghans themselves, and ISAF would assist the IA in maintaining security.⁴³

On December 20, 2001, the Security Council, determining the situation in Afghanistan constituted a threat to international peace and security, passed Resolution 1386 authorizing the establishment of the ISAF, for six months, to assist the IA in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas.⁴⁴ It also welcomed the UK's offer to take the lead in organizing and commanding ISAF.⁴⁵

Being voted unanimously, Resolution 1386 passed under chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized participating countries to "take all necessary measures" in carrying out their responsibilities. It called on Member States to contribute personnel, equipment, and other resources to the Force. It also called upon ISAF to work in close consultation with the IA and the Special Representative of the Secretary General.⁴⁶

⁴² Geoff Honn (The Secretary of State for Defence in UK), January 10, 2002, "International Security Assistance Force for Kabul", Statement in the House of Commons, available at <http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1336>.

⁴³ UN Security Council Press Release (SC/7248), December 20, 2001, "Security Council Authorizes International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan", available at <<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7248.doc.htm>>.

⁴⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386), December 20, 2001, para. 1.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid, para. 2-4.

Resolution 1386 also called on all Afghans to cooperate with the Force. It welcomed the commitment of the parties to the Bonn Agreement to “do all within their means and influence” to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all UN and other international personnel in Afghanistan.⁴⁷

Resolution 1386 urged the Afghans to withdraw all military units from Kabul in cooperation with the ISAF. Member States participating in ISAF were called on to help the IA in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.⁴⁸

2.2.2 The Military Technical Agreement

Major General John McColl, with a reconnaissance unit, went to Afghanistan to meet and determine the details of ISAF with the members of the IA.⁴⁹ There occurred several points of disagreement. The most important issue was the size of ISAF. The Afghans, in particular Defense Minister General Fahim Khan, insisted on a force no larger than 1,000, while Western leaders wanted a force 5,000-6,000 strong.⁵⁰ They also insisted that ISAF would be restricted to a static security role, guarding key buildings and political figures, while patrolling the city would remain under the responsibility of Afghan police and military personnel.⁵¹

This reflected Fahim’s view that the presence of ISAF on the streets would undermine his control of the city. On the contrary, ISAF’s view of the task was for a

⁴⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386), December 20, 2001, para. 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid, para. 6,10.

⁴⁹ Geoff Honn (The Secretary of State for Defence in UK), December 19, 2001, “International Security Assistance Force for Kabul”, Statement in the House of Commons, available at <http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1298>.

⁵⁰ Daniel Smith and Rachel Stohl, December 21, 2001, “Afghanistan: Re-emergence of a State”, available at <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/reemergence.cfm>>. See also Robin Oakley (CNN’s European Political Editor), December 19, 2001, “Disputes Delay Afghan Peacekeepers”, available at <<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/12/18/gen.peacekeeping.force>>.

⁵¹ Anthony Davis, December 19, 2001, “Stability in View”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* 36(25):17.

force that was able to patrol freely throughout the city, in many cases as a joint activity with the Afghan police, but with no restriction on its freedom of movement.

After intense negotiations, McColl and the IA signed a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) on January 4, 2002. The MTA set out the relationship between ISAF and the IA. It gave ISAF the powers it required to operate freely and without hindrance, and defined the legal status of ISAF, its deployment, authority, and the support that the IA would provide. It also specified the location of barracks in Kabul to which Afghan forces would be confined. Moreover, it clarified what the ISAF would do and where it would operate.⁵²

After the MTA was signed, the participation of TCNs was formalized through the signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)” in London.⁵³ The MOU set out the arrangements, responsibilities, general principles, and procedures by which the TCNs would implement. This represented the final step in agreeing on the structure of ISAF for its period under UK leadership.

2.3 A Brief History of ISAF

Deployment of ISAF to Afghanistan began in early January 2002, following the conclusion of MTA on January 4. Initial operating capability was reached in mid-January. ISAF declared the achievement of full operational capacity on February 18, 2002.⁵⁴ Germany assumed the command of Kabul Multinational Brigade on 19 March, while the United Kingdom remained in place as lead nation and in command

⁵² Geoff Honn (The Secretary of State for Defence in UK), January 10, 2002, “ International Security Assistance Force for Kabul”, Statement in the House of Commons, available at <http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1336>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ UN Security Council, March 18, 2002, “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security (S/2002/278)”, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 55-59, available at <<http://www.un.org.pk/latest-dev/key-docs-sg-report.pdf>>.

of ISAF headquarters. At the same time, the details of the handover of ISAF lead nation responsibility from Great Britain to Turkey were working out.⁵⁵

According to ISAF statistics, the security situation in Kabul improved significantly since the arrival of ISAF. Most of the population of Kabul welcomed the security and confidence that ISAF brought.⁵⁶ The NA forces began to pull out of Kabul and move into the barracks, which were designated in the MTA.⁵⁷

In Geneva in April 2002, a number of nations agreed to take the lead in training segments of the Afghan security sector. The U.S. volunteered to train the Afghan military and border security service; Germany pledged to train the Afghan police force; Great Britain agreed to lead the counter-narcotics effort; and Italy volunteered to run a rule of law program. In April, the UN approved the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), which was to oversee implementation of the Bonn process.⁵⁸

In April 2002, Turkey announced that it would take over the leadership of ISAF on certain conditions. Turkey insisted that the UN renew the ISAF mandate, and that the Area of Responsibility (AOR) remain limited to Kabul and its environs with no expansion.⁵⁹ The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1413 on May 23, 2002. This Resolution resolved to extend the authorization of the ISAF for Afghanistan as defined in Resolution 1386, for a period of six months beyond June 20, 2002. The AOR remained unchanged. UN Security Council Resolution 1413 also transferred lead nation status for the execution of the ISAF mission from the UK to

⁵⁵ UN Security Council, April 25, 2002, "Second Report on the Activities of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/479)", available at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/D73C9ADAA9BB195EC1256BAA0040794D>>.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ See Annex C of the MTA in Appendix E

⁵⁸ Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2002, "Views On Security in Afghanistan: Selected Quotes and Statements by U.S. and International Leaders", Peace Operations Factsheet Series, available at <www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/ViewsonAfghanistan.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force", *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12.

the Republic of Turkey, for the same period of six months from June 20, 2002 to December 20, 2002.⁶⁰ Therefore, Turkey's lead nation responsibility of ISAF II started on June 20, 2002 under the command of Major General Hilmi Akın ZORLU.

At the same time, as it had been planned at the Bonn Conference, the emergency Loya Jirga was opened on June 10, 2002. It ended the authority of the IA and selected the members of the TA, and Karzai as the chairman of it. The TA took office on 24 June.⁶¹

Towards the end of Turkey's tenure as ISAF lead nation, the search for the subsequent lead nation began. In the autumn of 2002, German Defense Minister Peter Struck expressed the view that NATO should take over command of ISAF, arguing that this move would resolve logistical and communications problems and allow for continuity of command after the Turkish frame. From the outset, there was interest in Alliance circles in the idea of NATO rotating the lead nation in ISAF every six months. However, Germany and the Netherlands agreed to take over the ISAF command jointly from Turkey. For several reasons, including the fact that NATO still had made no decision about its involvement, it was decided that the Headquarters of German/Netherlands Corps deploy to Kabul to run the mission.⁶² The Corps Headquarters, headed by German Lieutenant General Norbert van Heyst, was a multinational one. As well as German and Dutch troops, it included personnel from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.⁶³

On November 27, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1444, which extended the authorization of ISAF for a period of one year beyond December

⁶⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 1413 (S/RES/1413), 23 May 2002.

⁶¹ See Figure 1.

⁶² Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force", *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12.

⁶³ Mark Burgess, December 17, 2002, "CDI Fact Sheet: International Security Assistance Force (December 2002)", Center for Defense Information (CDI), available at <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/isaf_dec02-pr.cfm>.

20, 2002 as defined in Resolution 1386. The mission and AOR of ISAF remained again unchanged. Resolution 1444 also welcomed the offer of Germany and the Netherlands to assume jointly the ISAF command from Turkey.⁶⁴ Normally Turkey would have handed over the command on December 20, 2002, but Turkey's leadership was extended until February 10, 2003 and Germany/Netherlands took over the command from Turkey on that day.

As of April 16, 2003, NATO, which was providing 95% of the force as well as providing logistical and planning support, at last declared its intention to take over the command of ISAF. On August 11, 2003, at the end of Germany/Netherlands tenure, NATO formally assumed the leadership role of ISAF. It was the Alliance's first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.⁶⁵ In addition, Canada became the lead nation for the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB). Although NATO has taken the command of ISAF, numerous non-NATO nations and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations have continued taking part in ISAF. The NATO-led ISAF has continued to use the same banner and operates according to UN resolutions. NATO's leadership role of ISAF has overcome the problem of a continual search for a new lead nation every six months. Moreover, the creation of a permanent ISAF headquarters has added stability, increased continuity and enabled smaller countries to play a stronger role within a multinational structure.⁶⁶

The North Atlantic Council has provided political direction to ISAF, in close consultation with non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, has assumed the strategic command and control and hosted the ISAF international coordination cell.

⁶⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1444 (S/RES/1444), November 27, 2002.

⁶⁵ NATO Briefing, August 2003, "Working to Bring Peace and Stability to Afghanistan", available at <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/briefing_afghanistan_01.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Underneath SHAPE, another headquarters, Allied Forces North Europe (AFNORTH) has been responsible at the operational level for manning, training, deploying and sustaining ISAF. AFNORTH has served as the operational command between SHAPE and ISAF.⁶⁷

In January 2004, NATO appointed Hikmet Çetin to the post of Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. Hikmet Cetin is responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan and receives his guidance from the North Atlantic Council. He works in close coordination with the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) and UNAMA as well as with the Afghan authorities and other bodies of the international community.⁶⁸

After NATO assumed the command of ISAF, the discussions over the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul accelerated. Finally, on October 13, 2003, after the North Atlantic Council consented to the expansion of ISAF, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1510. Resolution 1510 authorized expansion of ISAF to allow for the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul. It also extended the mandate of ISAF, which was to expire on 20 December, for a period of an additional 12 months.⁶⁹

The expansion of ISAF to other cities of Afghanistan would become reality in the shape of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which had been previously developed by the Coalition Forces. The main purpose of the PRTs was to help in reconstruction by “winning hearts and minds through small projects.”⁷⁰ First, the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz was transferred from

⁶⁷ “NATO and the ISAF Mission”, August 28, 2003, available at <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure_NATOISAF.htm>.

⁶⁸ NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, “NATO in Afghanistan”, available at <<http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/factsheet.htm>>.

⁶⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (S/RES/1510), October 13, 2003.

⁷⁰ The Council on Foreign Relations, June 2003, “Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?”, Task Force Report, available at <http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Afghanistan_TF.pdf>.

Coalition Forces Command to ISAF Command on January 6, 2004. The mission of the Kunduz PRT was to facilitate ISAF's effort to assist the government of Afghanistan to extend its authority and influence, to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment, and to advance security sector reform and reconstruction efforts within the PRT area of operations.⁷¹ The PRT in Kunduz was a pilot project for further ISAF expansion. Other PRTs under ISAF Command have been planned.

In short, the leadership of ISAF has gone through a number of phases, referred to as ISAF I, II, III, and IV. The first lead nation to command ISAF was the United Kingdom. Turkey followed it, and then Germany and the Netherlands jointly assumed the command. Finally, NATO assumed the command for an indefinite period. There is not a fixed end date for ISAF, and it will be in existence until the accomplishment of the Bonn process.⁷²

Table 1: ISAF Leadership Phases

| | LEAD NATION | TIMEFRAME |
|----------|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| ISAF I | United Kingdom | December 2001--20 June 2002 |
| ISAF II | Turkey | 20 June 2002--10 February 2003 |
| ISAF III | Germany/Netherlands | 10 February 2003--11 August 2003 |
| ISAF IV | NATO | 11 August 2003-- |

2.4 Role of ISAF in Relation to Other Military and Political Efforts in Afghanistan

ISAF operates separately from other forces operating in Afghanistan under OEF. The character of OEF is different from that of ISAF. OEF is best described as a

⁷¹ NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, "NATO in Afghanistan", available at <<http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/factsheet.htm>>.

⁷² "Frequently Asked Questions", available at <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/Update/media_faq.htm#q6>.

combat-focused mission aiming to counter Taliban and Al Qaeda threats. Nevertheless, the end state for both missions is the same: to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan under the auspices of an elected and democratic government. Therefore, ISAF and OEF have to work together to achieve their objectives. To prevent overlap between ISAF and OEF forces and for reasons of effectiveness, it has been agreed that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) activities would take precedence and CENTCOM would have operational authority over ISAF.⁷³ In addition, the OEF forces have provided logistical, communications, and intelligence support to ISAF, and have been ready to act as a quick-reaction force to rescue ISAF units if they get into trouble.⁷⁴

ISAF is a UN authorized mission, but it is neither a UN mission nor is it led by the UN. It is a “coalition of the willing” and has been deployed under the authorization of the UN Security Council. Therefore, it operates separately from the UNAMA. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 called upon ISAF to work in close consultation with the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, who leads UNAMA.⁷⁵

Moreover, a “Joint Coordination Body (JCB)” was set up on January 13, 2002 to ensure close cooperation between the IA, ISAF and the UN on matters related to the security issues. The JCB has met on a bimonthly basis, and included the Ministers of Defense and Interior of Afghanistan, the COMISAF and the Special Representative of the Secretary General.⁷⁶

⁷³ Letter from the Permanent Representative of the UK to the President of the Security Council dated 19 December 2001(S/2001/1217), cited in UNSC Resolution 1386.

⁷⁴ Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, “Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan,” *The Washington Quarterly* 26(1): 35-52.

⁷⁵ UNSC Resolution 1386, December 20, 2001, para. 4.

⁷⁶ UN Security Council, March 18, 2002, “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security (S/2002/278)”, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 60, available at <<http://www.un.org.pk/latest-dev/key-docs-sg-report.pdf>>.

2.5 Mission of ISAF

Through Resolution 1386, the Security Council, “recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghan themselves”, authorized ISAF to “assist Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Administration as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”⁷⁷ Further, the Security Council called on the states participating in ISAF to “provide assistance to help Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.”⁷⁸

As stated in Resolution 1386 and in the Bonn Agreement, ensuring security throughout Afghanistan is ultimately under the responsibility of the Afghans themselves. The role of ISAF is to “assist” the IA and its successor, not to replace its role as the government and undertake its responsibility for security. As time moves on, the Afghan government will build up its own new security forces, and ISAF will help that process. Therefore, ISAF is a temporary force until the creation of a national army and police force.

As Hamid Karzai explained, the Afghans have seen the presence of ISAF as “a guarantee against interference, as a guarantee for the commitment of the international community, and as a guarantee internally within Afghanistan that they would be given a sense of security.”⁷⁹

According to Barnett Rubin, who has written widely on Afghanistan and who was a consultant to the UN team during the Bonn conference, ISAF is a security assistance mission and not a peacekeeping mission. In the words of Rubin;

⁷⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386), December 20, 2001, para. 1.

⁷⁸ Ibid, para. 10.

⁷⁹ Online Newshour, January 9, 2002, “Prospects for Peacekeeping”, available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june02/peacekeeping_1-09.html>.

...the mission of ISAF is not to keep the peace...this force is not sent there to enforce or to monitor an agreement among the warring parties. This force is sent there with the agreement of essentially the victorious Afghan party, which is a coalition, in order to assure the political neutrality of the capital and to maintain security there so the government can go about its business, but also very importantly so that people from all over the country can come there in delegations, meet people from all parts of the government, and carry out the necessary preparations for holding the Loya Jirga or grand council, which will take place there in June. Again the role of the security assistance force, which is what rather than a peacekeeping force, will be important in assuring the neutrality of the capital when that very important gathering takes place.⁸⁰

Although Rubin does not consider ISAF as a peacekeeping operation, the tasks of ISAF mentioned by him have been usually included in peace operations undertaken in the post-Cold War era.

2.5.1 Tasks

The MTA designated a number of probable tasks for ISAF:

- Conduct protective patrolling in AOR.
- Assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures.
- Assist the Interim Administration in reconstruction.
- Identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan security forces.⁸¹

So far, ISAF has conducted patrols in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Over a third of these patrols have been carried out jointly with the Kabul Police.⁸² ISAF has assisted the restructuring of a new Afghan National Army (ANA), providing advice and allowing the Afghan authorities to direct development, and ultimately offering training support. It has also proposed and supported the development of new Kabul police structures. It trained first units of the new ANA and Afghan Police. ISAF has also contributed to the progressive consolidation of Afghan national institutions. It has contributed to strengthening the IA/TA in Kabul, while providing a security

⁸⁰ Online Newshour, January 9, 2002, "Prospects for Peacekeeping", available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june02/peacekeeping_1-09.html>.

⁸¹ See Appendix E.

⁸² NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, "NATO in Afghanistan", available at <<http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/factsheet.htm>>.

blanket to the UN agencies and the NGOs engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.⁸³

However, concerning ANA training, most activities were conducted by the U.S., Great Britain, and France outside of the ISAF framework, though ISAF assisted with its resources when possible. Moreover, Germany committed itself to assisting the training of Afghan police force, a mission again quite separate from ISAF joint patrolling system.⁸⁴

Since October 2003, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process has been continuing in Afghanistan. The Afghan government runs the DDR process with the assistance of UNAMA and ISAF. Up to March 13, 2004, in the KABUL area, 1,870 Afghan former combatants and soldiers were demobilized.⁸⁵ Simultaneously, ISAF has also been supporting the Afghan Ministry of Defense in its efforts to carry forward the cantonment of heavy weapons outside Kabul city limits. This is an important step towards the further development of ANA because most of these weapons will likely to be used to equip ANA units.⁸⁶

Besides the security issues, ISAF has been helping the Afghan authorities and international assistance organizations in the reconstruction of the country under the terms of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). ISAF coordinates CIMIC projects throughout its AOR. These projects have been focused on supporting the provision of basic human needs such as fresh water, electrical power, shelter, and on the improvement of the local infrastructure destroyed by 23 years of conflict. CIMIC projects have also supported the rebuilding of medical facilities and the renovation of

⁸³ NATO Press Statement, August 11, 2003, "NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission", available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/08-august/e0811a.htm>>.

⁸⁴ Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force", *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12.

⁸⁵ NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, "NATO in Afghanistan", available at <<http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/factsheet.htm>>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

schools.⁸⁷ Support to humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development is critical to mission success. However, due to the limited resources, ISAF needed to select carefully the projects that have broad and rapid impact.

2.5.2 Area of Responsibility

The Military Technical Agreement has detailed ISAF's area responsibility, which included an area from Bagram to Kabul and its environs. The AOR is marked out on the map in the Annex B of the Military Technical Agreement.⁸⁸

Since the deployment of ISAF, Kabul has become a more secure place. Crime rate was reduced and the city has come back to life. This has mainly happened because ISAF has given the people of Kabul, a sense of stability and security. However, other parts of the country have remained unstable and insecure. The Afghan government, UNAMA, and most of the NGOs in the country have advocated ISAF's geographic mandate to be expanded beyond Kabul since early 2002.⁸⁹ In addition, most Afghans, including powerful regional leaders such as General Rashid Dostum and Abdul Karim Khalili, have supported the idea of expansion. The UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan requested in his report that the Security Council take into consideration the wish of the Afghan people for the expansion of ISAF.⁹⁰

The Bonn Agreement had left open the possibility that ISAF could be expanded across Afghanistan in the future. However, the U.S. and most of the troop

⁸⁷ NATO Press Statement, August 11, 2003, "NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission", available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/08-august/e0811a.htm>>.

⁸⁸ See Appendix E for that map.

⁸⁹ William J. Durch, October 16, 2003, "Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and Democracy", Testimony of William J. Durch before The Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, available at <<http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/DurchTestimony031016.pdf>>.

⁹⁰ UN Security Council, March 18, 2002, "The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security (S/2002/278)", Report of the Secretary-General, para. 57-59.

contributing nations opposed expansion.⁹¹ In addition, another Security Council resolution would be necessary to authorize ISAF to expand its mission beyond Kabul.

Only after NATO assumed the ISAF command it became possible to expand the ISAF's area responsibility beyond Kabul. On October 6, 2003, the NATO Secretary General informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that North Atlantic Council had approved a set of preliminary decisions related to a possible expansion of NATO's ISAF mission. Following this, the Security Council approved Resolution 1510 in October 2003 after it received a letter from the government of Afghanistan in which the Afghan government requested the Council to consider expanding the mandate of ISAF.⁹²

In the text of Resolution 1510, the Security Council authorized

expansion of the mandate of the ISAF to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the UN and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.⁹³

2.6 Organization of ISAF

2.6.1 Force Composition

ISAF is not a fixed organization because it is a multinational force with several countries providing personnel. However, its composition has remained

⁹¹ HRW (Human Rights Watch) Report, December 5, 2002, "Afghanistan's Bonn Agreement One Year Later A Catalog of Missed Opportunities", available at <<http://www.hrw.org/background/asia/afghanistan/bonn1yr-bck.pdf>>; see also Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2002, "Views On Security in Afghanistan: Selected Quotes and Statements by U.S. and International Leaders", Peace Operations Factsheet Series, available at <www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/ViewsonAfghanistan.pdf>; see also Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, "Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 26(1): 35-52.

⁹² UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (S/RES/1510), October 13, 2003.

⁹³ *Ibid*, para. 1.

relatively constant. From the beginning, it was anticipated that ISAF would sustain a force of around 5,000 military personnel.⁹⁴

The countries and individual contributions by each country have changed on a regular basis due to the rotation of troops. As the lead nations for ISAF and KMNB changed, the previous lead nations decreased and the new lead nations increased their contributions and the number of their troops. Besides, while some countries drew back their troops from ISAF, others inserted their troops to ISAF. Therefore, the number of ISAF troops remained around 5,000. The examples of troop contributions at different dates were shown in Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5.

Table 2: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 7 March 2002⁹⁵

| | | | | | |
|---|-------------|-----|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1 | Austria | 56 | 10 | New Zealand | 7 |
| 2 | Bulgaria | 32 | 11 | Norway | 27 |
| 3 | Denmark | 47 | 12 | Portugal | 8 |
| 4 | Finland | 46 | 13 | Romania | 26 |
| 5 | France | 499 | 14 | Spain | 340 |
| 6 | Germany | 879 | 15 | Sweden | 40 |
| 7 | Greece | 121 | 16 | Turkey | 275 |
| 8 | Italy | 357 | 17 | United Kingdom | 1863 |
| 9 | Netherlands | 218 | Total | | 4841 |

⁹⁴ Anthony Mckeown, 2003, "Repeating History? Warlords, Promises, and Indifference in the 'New' Afghanistan", Bristol University, available at <http://naspir.org/members/anthony_mckeown/repeating_history.pdf>

⁹⁵ UN Security Council, March 15, 2002, "Report on the Activities of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/274)", available at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/7a72b915b0ca15e0c1256b8100572438?OpenDocument>>.

Table 3: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 31 July 2002⁹⁶

| | | | | | |
|----|----------------|------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1 | Austria | 71 | 11 | Italy | 403 |
| 2 | Belgium | 19 | 12 | Netherlands | 232 |
| 3 | Bulgaria | 32 | 13 | New Zealand | 8 |
| 4 | Czech Republic | 132 | 14 | Norway | 17 |
| 5 | Denmark | 36 | 15 | Romania | 55 |
| 6 | Finland | 31 | 16 | Spain | 349 |
| 7 | France | 520 | 17 | Sweden | 38 |
| 8 | Germany | 1121 | 18 | Turkey | 1322 |
| 9 | Greece | 163 | 19 | United Kingdom | 426 |
| 10 | Ireland | 7 | Total | | 4982 |

Table 4: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 11 August 2003⁹⁷

| | | | | | |
|----|----------------|------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1 | Albania | 23 | 17 | Italy | 135 |
| 2 | Azerbaijan | 23 | 18 | Latvia | 9 |
| 3 | Belgium | 241 | 19 | Lithuania | 2 |
| 4 | Bulgaria | 42 | 20 | Macedonia | 10 |
| 5 | Canada | 1900 | 21 | Netherlands | 43 |
| 6 | Croatia | 36 | 22 | New Zealand | 4 |
| 7 | Czech Republic | 7 | 23 | Norway | 64 |
| 8 | Denmark | 49 | 24 | Poland | 12 |
| 9 | Estonia | 6 | 25 | Romania | 32 |
| 10 | Finland | 31 | 26 | Spain | 113 |
| 11 | France | 548 | 27 | Sweden | 21 |
| 12 | Germany | 1500 | 28 | Switzerland | 2 |
| 13 | Greece | 125 | 29 | Turkey | 163 |
| 14 | Hungary | 11 | 30 | United Kingdom | 267 |
| 15 | Iceland | 1 | 31 | United States | 110 |
| 16 | Ireland | 7 | Total | | 5537 |

⁹⁶ UN Security Council, August 16, 2002, "Monthly report on the Operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/940)", available at <<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/41d85aa4f649531cc1256c1b00575f68?OpenDocument>>.

⁹⁷ NATO Press Statement, August 11, 2003, "NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission", available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/08-august/e0811a.htm>>.

Table 5: ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of 29 March 2004⁹⁸

| | | | | | |
|----|----------------|------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1 | Afghanistan | 80 | 19 | Latvia | 11 |
| 2 | Albania | 22 | 20 | Lithuania | 2 |
| 3 | Azerbaijan | 22 | 21 | Macedonia | 11 |
| 4 | Belgium | 280 | 22 | Netherlands | 24 |
| 5 | Bulgaria | 38 | 23 | New Zealand | 3 |
| 6 | Canada | 1756 | 24 | Norway | 241 |
| 7 | Croatia | 47 | 25 | Poland | 18 |
| 8 | Czech Republic | 17 | 26 | Portugal | 1 |
| 9 | Denmark | 96 | 27 | Romania | 27 |
| 10 | Estonia | 6 | 28 | Slovenia | 21 |
| 11 | Finland | 42 | 29 | Spain | 118 |
| 12 | France | 536 | 30 | Sweden | 46 |
| 13 | Germany | 1833 | 31 | Switzerland | 4 |
| 14 | Greece | 167 | 32 | Turkey | 151 |
| 15 | Hungary | 13 | 33 | United Kingdom | 354 |
| 16 | Iceland | 1 | 34 | United States | 60 |
| 17 | Ireland | 7 | Total | | 6536 |
| 18 | Italy | 481 | | | |


As seen on these tables, the lead nations and some other countries contributed the highest number of troops while some countries provided symbolic contributions.

Fundamentally, ISAF was structured into three main components: ISAF headquarters, the KMNB, and the Kabul International Airport Task Force. Figure 2 shows the components of ISAF. The ISAF headquarters serves as the operational command for the mission. It liaises with and assists in the work of UN, the Afghan Authorities, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The KMNB is ISAF's tactical headquarters. It is responsible for tactical command of the troops on

⁹⁸ NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, "NATO in Afghanistan", available at <<http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/factsheet.htm>>.

the ground and the planning and conduct of patrolling.⁹⁹ The Kabul International Airport Task Force is responsible for running the military part of the airport, which was a crucial link in ISAF's logistics operations and Afghanistan's window to outside world.

Figure 2: The Components of ISAF



ISAF is a light force. It has no heavy weapons such as tanks, attack helicopters, or artillery, and mobility has been provided mainly by wheeled vehicles. All the vehicles and equipment should be transportable by aircraft, because the deployment to Afghanistan must be only by air.


2.6.2 Command and Control Structure

Figure 3 illustrates the basic command and control structure of ISAF, which is essentially the structure that has been in place from the ISAF's inception. After NATO assumed the leadership of ISAF, the command and control structure slightly changed as it was described above (A Brief History of ISAF). In addition, military

⁹⁹ NATO Factsheet, April 22, 2004, "NATO in Afghanistan", available at <<http://www.nato.int/issues/Afghanistan/factsheet.htm>>.

elements of the German-led PRT in Kunduz became subject to the ISAF chain of command on January 6, 2004.

Figure 3: Basic Command and Control Structure of ISAF¹⁰⁰



There is no direct link between UN and ISAF. The UN communicates its input to ISAF through UNAMA and other UN agencies, but the TCNs are free to commit or withdraw their personnel at their own judgment, without official objections from the UN.¹⁰¹ However, the lead nations of ISAF provide periodic reports on the activities of ISAF and the progress towards the implementation of its mandate to the UN.

According to the MOU signed between TCNs, command of ISAF and the post of COMISAF were to be held by the lead nation. Members of TCNs were to remain under full command of their national contingent commander. Operational control of all national contingents contributed to ISAF was assigned to COMISAF. COMISAF had coordinating authority over national logistics assets in order to meet operational requirements or to prevent confliction of use of limited infrastructure or

¹⁰⁰ Turkish General Staff, “Command Structure of ISAF”, available at <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/bashalk/isaf_int/kurulus.htm>.

¹⁰¹ Anthony Mckeown, 2003, “Repeating History? Warlords, Promises, and Indifference in the ‘New’ Afghanistan”, Bristol University, available at <http://naspir.org/members/anthony_mckeown/repeating_history.pdf>.

assets. National contingent commanders were responsible for the supply and maintenance of order and discipline within national contingent under his/her command.¹⁰²

2.7 Competences

The ISAF mission was conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, providing for robust Rules of Engagement (ROE). The Security Council resolutions on ISAF authorize the member states participating in ISAF to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.” This means, under the UN authority, ISAF has the right to use all necessary measures, in other words lethal force if necessary to carry out its mandate.¹⁰³

The ROE for ISAF were drafted using NATO language as in NATO operations in the Balkans. This gives COMISAF a suitable degree of control over the use of force. The fundamental driver for the level of permissiveness in the ROE profile is force protection rather than the ISAF mission. Members of ISAF may possess and carry arms and ammunition for the purposes of carrying out the ISAF mission.¹⁰⁴

According to MTA signed between ISAF and IA:

- The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF Commander will have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of force, to protect the ISAF and its Mission.
- The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF will have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of Afghanistan.

¹⁰² Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Command Arrangements and Related Matters in ISAF, January 10, 2002.

¹⁰³ Online Newshour, January 9, 2002, “Prospects for Peacekeeping”, available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june02/peacekeeping_1-09.html>.

¹⁰⁴ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Command Arrangements and Related Matters in ISAF, January 10, 2002.

- In consultation with the Interim Administration, the ISAF Commander is authorized to promulgate appropriate rules for the control and the regulation of surface military traffic throughout the area of responsibility.
- The ISAF will have the right to utilize such means and services as required to ensure full ability to communicate and will have the right to the unrestricted use of the electromagnetic spectrum, free of charge, for this purpose.
- The ISAF and its personnel will not be liable for any damages to civilian or government property caused by any activity in pursuit of the ISAF Mission. Claims for other damage or injury will be submitted through Interim Administration to the ISAF.
- The Interim Administration agrees that it will return all military units based in Kabul into designated barracks as soon as possible. Such units will not leave those barracks without the prior approval of the Interim Administration and notification to the ISAF Commander by the Chairman of the Interim Administration.
- The Interim Administration will refrain from all offensive actions within the AOR.
- The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will be immune from personal arrest or detention.¹⁰⁵

As mentioned before, the role of ISAF is to assist the IA and its successors, not to replace its role. There are a number of limitations to this supporting role. If ISAF considers that security activities within Kabul are inappropriate or undesirable, its ability to intervene is limited if these activities under the control of the IA/TA. In such circumstances, ISAF does not have the authority to use force. Such difficulties have to be overcome through dialogue. Moreover, linking ISAF to the IA/TA in this way might inhibit its ability to deal with other powerful groups within the city that are not part of the IA/TA.

2.8 Finance of ISAF

According to UN Security Council Resolution 1386, the TCNs were expected to bear the burden of their participation. However, with the establishment of ISAF,

¹⁰⁵ See Appendix E.

the UN Security Council authorized the creation of a trust fund to support ISAF and the countries participating in the operation.¹⁰⁶

The MOU signed between the TCNs detailed the finance of ISAF. According to the MOU, each participant is responsible for the funding of its own contribution to, participation in and withdrawal from ISAF. Participants will be individually responsible for payment of:

- All pay and allowances for their forces, including the civilian component;
- All costs, including accommodation, travel and other expenses, arising out of business performed by their forces, including the civilian component, away from HQ ISAF;
- All costs arising from the deployment of their forces, including the civilian component, to and from theatre.¹⁰⁷

In addition, a Financial Management Group (FMG) has been established for the management of multinational financial issues. It is comprised national contingent commanders or their nominees. Multinational costs have been shared between the TCNs in the proportions detailed in the MOU. The FMG have authority and responsibility for determining whether a specific expenditure is a multinational-shared cost and determining the cost-sharing formula to be applied. It also has the responsibility for resolving the financial disputes between the TCNs.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (S/RES/1386), December 20, 2001, para. 8.

¹⁰⁷ Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Command Arrangements and Related Matters in ISAF, January 10, 2002.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER III

TURKEY'S LEADERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ASSISTANCE FORCE

(ISAF II)

3.1 Turkey and Peace Operations

Since its foundation, Turkey's policy has always been to integrate with the community of modern nations. Turkey's doctrine for foreign relations, which has held true to this day, was formulated in the words of Atatürk, "Peace at Home, Peace in the World." Turkey has usually supported peace initiatives by the UN, NATO and other regional organizations in order to preserve international peace and security. Her commitment to peace operations is reaffirmed in the Ministry of National Defense White Book 2000, which states "Turkey provides support to the Peace Operations carried out under the sanctions or control of the UN, NATO or the OSCE for world and regional peace, in the direction of the principle of Peace at Home, Peace in the World."¹⁰⁹

The first example of Turkish contribution to peace operations is during the Korean War. Turkey deployed a brigade consisting of 4,500 soldiers under the command of the UN.¹¹⁰ After the Korean War, she became a member of NATO. During the Cold War, she was preoccupied with her own immediate security

¹⁰⁹ Turkish Ministry of National Defense, 2000, *Beyaz Kitap 2000* (White Paper 2000), Ankara.

¹¹⁰ Turkish General Staff. 2001. *Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, pp. 3-4.

concerns. She did not participate actively in the UN peace operations. She wanted neither to be a battlefield for the Cold War, nor to provoke Russia. In addition, her troubled relations with Greece and domestic conflicts limited Turkey's ability to deploy her troops outside the country.

The collapse of the Soviet Union concluded the Cold War era. During the Cold War, the threat to international peace and security was specific, massive, and static. Following the end of the Cold War, this kind of threat was replaced by multi-dimensional threats such as terrorism, proliferation weapons of mass destruction, regional uncertainties and instabilities, ethnic cleansing, religious fundamentalism. Since Turkey is surrounded by the Caucasus, Middle East, and the Balkans she is at the center of volatility and instability. This has made it necessary for Turkey to react properly to new security challenges, respond to crises, and be prepared for unexpected developments.¹¹¹

After the Cold War, Turkey began to pay particular attention to peace operations. Turkish policy on peace operations has become a part of its foreign and security policy, and her contribution to the UN peace efforts has increased. Turkey participated in UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) with a mechanized company of 300 personnel from January 1993 to February 1994. For a time, a Turkish general (General Çevik Bir) assumed the command of the peacekeeping force, called UNOSOM II.¹¹²

Turkey also contributed to the Italian-led multinational force in Albania, called Operation Alba, with a Marine Battalion Task Force comprised of 779

¹¹¹ Turkish General Staff. 2001. *Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, pp. 1-3.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 5.

personnel from April to August 1997. A Turkish general served as deputy commander of Operation Alba.¹¹³

Turkey provided a regimental size unit for UNPROFOR. After IFOR was established under the auspices of NATO, Turkey reinforced the Turkish regiment in UNPROFOR to the brigade size and assigned it to IFOR. Later, the brigade was assigned to SFOR, which took over the IFOR's mission in December 1995. SFOR was reorganized in April 2000 and the Turkish contingent was reduced a battalion size unit accordingly. In addition to land forces, various Turkish naval vessels and aircraft participated in SFOR operations and successfully played an important role. The Navy participated in "Operation Sharp Guard" in the Adriatic from July 1992 to October 1996.¹¹⁴ Turkish Air Force participated in NATO's "Operation Deny Flight" with an F-16 squadron from April 1993 to December 1995 to enforce the no-flight zone over Bosnia and to protect "safe areas."¹¹⁵

During the Kosovo crisis in February 1999, ten F-16 aircraft were assigned to NATO's "Operation Allied Force." Moreover, Turkey has assigned a mechanized infantry battalion comprising 998 personnel to KFOR since July 1999. Additionally, Turkey has contributed frigates, destroyers, tanker and minesweeper vessels to the Kosovo operation.¹¹⁶

Besides the peace operations mentioned above, Turkey also participated in several international observer missions named UN Iraq-Iran Observer Group (UNIIMOG), UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and Temporary International Presence in Hebron

¹¹³ Turkish General Staff. 2001. *Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, pp. 5-6.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 6-9.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 6-9.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 10-12.

(TIPH). Turkey has also backed the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).¹¹⁷

In order to contribute to regional security and stability, while participating in several peace operations, Turkey assumed a leading role in the formation of the Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force (SEEBRIG) and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR).¹¹⁸ Turkey also continues to contribute to international peace and stability efforts within the framework of PfP programs. For example, Turkey established a PfP Training Center in June 1998 in Ankara. This is the first recognized PfP Training Center in NATO.¹¹⁹

Turkey believes every dispute has a specific reason, so the mandates of the peacekeeping forces should be clear and feasible. Also, the parties' consent to the conflict, transparency, limited mission duration, impartiality, and credibility are the prerequisites for success in peace operations. The effectiveness of peace operations can be greatly increased through a more transparent functioning of the UN Security Council and an efficient consultation mechanism with troop contributing nations.¹²⁰

After the September 11 attacks, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against terrorism and supported the international coalition that mobilized soon after the attacks. After the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was removed from power, it was possible to launch international initiatives to rebuild the country. Although not able to make a significant contribution in terms of financial aid and

¹¹⁷ Turkish General Staff. 2001. *Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, pp. 17-25.

¹¹⁸ Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, 2004, "Globalization and Its Impact on Turkey's Security", in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds.), *The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls*, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, pp. 11-23.

¹¹⁹ Turkish General Staff, April 2001, *Turkish Armed Forces Contribution to World Peace*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, pp. 15-16.

¹²⁰ Turkish MFA Website, "Turkey's Contribution and Approach to UN Peacekeeping Operations", available at <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/groupa/peacekeeping.htm>>.

economic reconstruction, Turkey actively participated in ISAF. Significantly, after Great Britain's leadership, Turkey took over the command of ISAF.¹²¹

3.2 The Road to Turkey's Leadership of ISAF

3.2.1 The September 11 and Turkey

During the Cold War, Turkey was a strong ally of the West against the Warsaw Pact. After September 11, she became an important ally against international terrorism. The U.S. efforts to eradicate terrorists in Afghanistan and in the Middle East brought Turkey to the forefront. She has borders with Middle Eastern countries and is the nearest country to Afghanistan within NATO. Additionally, as a Muslim country, Turkey is a part of the Islamic world and as a secular democracy, a part of the Western world. It was considered that Turkey, acting together with the Western world, might prevent the war on terrorism from turning into a clash between Western and Islamic civilizations.¹²²

Turkey is very sensitive to terrorism. After the September 11 attacks, she was the only state who understood the U.S. feelings most. She has long suffered from terrorism and lost thousands of her citizens in terrorist attacks. In the country's defense policy, Turkey defines terrorism as the major threat against the world peace. Whatever its source is, terrorism has a global character and international consequences.¹²³ However, Turkey could not received necessary international support in its own fight against terrorism. On the contrary, her struggle has always been a point of tension in her relations with Western countries. However, after

¹²¹ Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, 2003, "Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited", Paper prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, May 12, available at <<http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>>.

¹²² Fotios Moustakis and Ella Ackerman, 2002, "September 11: A Dynamic for Russo-Turkish Co-operation or Conflict?", *Central Asian Survey* 21(4): 423-434.

¹²³ Turkish Ministry of National Defense, 1998, *Beyaz Kitap: Savunma* (White Paper: Defense), p. 2.

September 11, Turkey was one of the beneficiaries of the new international atmosphere. At last, terrorism was recognized as an international concern.¹²⁴ Turkey grasped this opportunity without delay and joined international cooperation against terrorism. Following the September 11 attacks, Turkish officials immediately condemned the attacks as a crime against humanity and supported NATO's decision to invoke Article V of the Washington Treaty.

Turkey also argued that the September 11 attacks showed that Turkey's own counter-terrorist policies are warranted. After Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer pointed out that terrorism was a crime committed against all humanity, he went on to say that "the attacks on the U.S. has shown how correct Turkey is in her stance against terrorism." Similarly, Ismail Cem pointed out that "what everyone is trying to do collectively today is no different to that which Turkey has strived to achieve for years."¹²⁵ So, Turkey emerged as an important U.S. partner in the fight against terrorism. In October 2001, the Turkish government obtained a parliamentary authorization to contribute troops to the U.S. campaign. The bill also authorized the government to allow the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish territory and permit the use of Turkish airspace and airbases. During the campaign against Afghanistan, Turkey gave the U.S. overflight rights, helped with airplane refueling from Incirlik Air Base, and provided intelligence.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, 2003, "Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited", Paper prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, May 12, available at <<http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>>.

¹²⁵ Quoted in Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, 2003, "Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited", Paper prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, May 12, available at <<http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>>.

¹²⁶ http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/turkey.htm.

3.2.2 Turkish-Afghan Relations

Turkey's interest in Afghanistan is not new. She has deep-rooted ties of friendship with that country. These friendly relations go back to even before 1923. Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha played a significant role in enhancing relations between the two countries. Cemal Pasha worked hard to make European countries recognize Afghanistan, and he succeeded.¹²⁷ Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the new Turkish republic. During the early years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sent to Afghanistan military officials, experts, and trainers to contribute to the modernization of Afghanistan. Afghan King Emanullah Khan visited Turkey in 1928 and returned to Afghanistan having been inspired from Atatürk's reforms. Later on, during the 1930s, Turkey dispatched teachers and professors to Afghanistan in the fields of medicine, law and political sciences.¹²⁸ Many Afghan students and officers were educated in Turkey. Before World War II, Germany and Italy began to get active in Afghanistan in the context of their invasion and occupation activities and they tried to penetrate this country. Turkey again came to Afghanistan's aid in its difficult position. In 1937, with Turkey's initiative, the "Sadabat Pact" was signed between Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran. Later, Iraq joined this Pact. In the troubling days before World War II, these countries, acting together, supported each other. So, German and Italian dominance of Afghanistan was prevented.¹²⁹

Turkey's friendly relations with Afghanistan weakened by the 1990s due to the Second World War and increased Soviet influence that finally led to the Soviet

¹²⁷ Meşkure Yılmaz Börklü, 1998/1999, "Tarihsel Boyutu İçinde Afganistandaki Gelişmeler ve Türk-Afghan İlişkileri (Developments in Afghanistan in its Historical Dimension and Turkish-Afghan Relations)", *Avrasya Dosyası* 4(3-4).

¹²⁸ Turkish MFA Website, "Turkey's Relations With the South Asian Countries", available at <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>>.

¹²⁹ Meşkure Yılmaz Börklü, 1998/1999, "Tarihsel Boyutu İçinde Afganistandaki Gelişmeler ve Türk-Afghan İlişkileri (Developments in Afghanistan in its Historical Dimension and Turkish-Afghan Relations)", *Avrasya Dosyası* 4(3-4).

occupation. From the 1990s onward, Turkey began implementing assistance projects, particularly in the humanitarian field, providing medical and educational services and shelter to the people of Afghanistan.¹³⁰ Even before September 11, Turkey backed the NA in its fight against the Taliban regime whose Islamic fundamentalism was disliked by Ankara.

3.2.3 Turkey's Contribution to ISAF I

Turkey has long advocated a broad-based Afghan government including all ethnic groups for lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan. After the September 11 attacks and the following events in Afghanistan, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1386, establishing ISAF, it was only natural for Turkey to take part in that Force.¹³¹ Turkey participated in ISAF I with an infantry company composed of 267 soldiers. The Turkish company was deployed in Kabul on February 15, 2002.¹³² It carried out security patrols and participated in humanitarian aid efforts.

On the other hand, Great Britain had assumed the command of ISAF for three months and wanted to hand it over. The main reason why Great Britain was so ready to do so was that the ISAF's three-month commanding mission would be over by the end of April. The Blair government wanted to transfer its duties to another country by that time, particularly given the pressure it was receiving from the opposition.¹³³ Turkey had long been pointed out as the most likely successor to lead ISAF after Great Britain. Initially, Turkey was eager to lead ISAF and expressed her interest in this direction. Moreover, Great Britain and the U.S. officials regarded Turkey, a

¹³⁰ Turkish MFA Website, "Turkey's Relations With the South Asian Countries".

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Sami Kohen, February 27, 2002, "Keeping the Peace in Afghanistan on Turkey's Shoulders", *Milliyet*. Available at <<http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/498.cfm>>.

NATO member and Muslim populated country, as the “perfect choice.” Nevertheless, Turkey would later hesitate due to some specific concerns which will be explained in the following sections.

3.2.4 Turkey: A Perfect Choice to lead ISAF

The U.S. operation against Afghanistan and support for Usama bin Laden in some parts of the Islamic world created fears that these developments might lead to a “Christian-Muslim confrontation.” Therefore, the U.S. administration tried to prevent this possibility. Within this light, Turkey emerged as a valuable partner for American policy.¹³⁴ The U.S. insistently wanted Turkey to assume the command of ISAF as the presence of Muslim troops would eliminate accusations that America’s war against international terrorism was in fact directed against Islam. Furthermore, being a secular democracy with almost an entirely Muslim population, the Turkish model was expressed as an alternative to the Taliban version of Islam for Afghanistan, not only by the Turkish policy makers, but also by the international observers and U.S. officials.¹³⁵

Additionally, Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and has valuable experience in peace operations. Turkey's army is one of the very few armies in the world that has the capability of coping with such kind of missions and Turkey has important historical and cultural ties to Central Asia and Afghanistan. This was an important asset for Turkey’s leadership being welcomed by the population of Afghanistan.

¹³⁴ Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, 2003, “Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited”, Paper prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, May 12, available at <<http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>>.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

3.2.5 Turkey's Motivations

Although Turkey has historical bonds with Afghanistan and Central Asia, she usually adopted a circumspect attitude toward the region. ISAF provided a new opportunity to enhance her role in the region and she, in principle, did not want to miss this opportunity.¹³⁶ It was the first time that Turkish military would assume the full command of a multinational force.¹³⁷ It would be a great test for the Turkish General Staff, which until that time had never been vested with such broad responsibilities in a peace operation. The Turkish army is regarded as a considerable regional force, but leadership of ISAF would further its claim to a greater role outside its immediate environment. Moreover, since Turkey wants to consolidate its role as a regional power, this would be an important opportunity to promote this objective. The success would boost its profile both in the region and in the eyes of the international community.¹³⁸

Turkey suffered from terrorism for years and wanted to assist the international community in the global war against terrorism. Turks believe that terrorism is a common challenge which requires a common response. It can strike any community at any time. Moreover, the close historical and ethnic ties with Afghanistan were another motivation for her to accept the command of ISAF. She wished to extend a helping hand to the people of Afghanistan.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, October 2002, "The Command Issue of ISAF in Afghanistan Mystery and Turkey", ASAM Newsletter, available at <<http://www.avsam.org/turkce/yayinlar/newsletter/1/newsletter1.htm>>.

¹³⁷ A Turkish general, General Çevik Bir, had already assumed the command of a peacekeeping force, called UNOSOM II. However, Turkey only assigned the force commander and UNOSOM II was under the control of the UN. As for ISAF II, Turkey assumed the full command and control. The commander of ISAF II received orders only from Turkish General Staff, not from the UN or any other organization. And also, she provided more than half of the headquarters' personnel and many combat troops and support units in addition to the force commander.

¹³⁸ Jean-Christoph Peuch and Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Turkish Armed Forces Assume ISAF Command, Embark on Crucial Test", available at <<http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/06/20062002151706.asp>>.

¹³⁹ Interview with M. Emin Alpman (Deputy Commander of ISAF), May 14, 2004, Ankara.

On the political and economic side, Ankara believed the leadership of ISAF would increase Turkey's prestige in the international arena and the government wanted to receive sympathetic support on various issues. Turkey had already received some concessions from the World Bank and the IMF on the economic front. Turkish leaders thought that by helping the U.S., these concessions would continue. Also, Turkish leaders believed that Turkey's leadership of ISAF would show Turkey's strong commitment to the centrality of her role in Western and NATO strategic thinking and would be beneficial in Turkey's bid for the EU membership.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, in the context of growing American-Turkish strategic partnership, Turkish officials believed the U.S. would press the EU to accept Turkey to membership.

3.2.6 Turkey's Hesitations

When the decision to send a multinational force to Afghanistan was being made, Turkey was among the first countries to announce her wish to participate and later lead the Force. However, the military and political authorities concluded that the task was not as easy as it first seemed when they studied the matter in depth. Consequently, Turkey lost the initial enthusiasm and started to approach the event in a more rational fashion. She started giving signals to the international community that she was not very keen to accept the post. Nevertheless, no other country stepped forward to take over the command and Turkey came to the forefront again. Realizing

¹⁴⁰ Jean-Christoph Peuch and Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Turkish Armed Forces Assume ISAF Command, Embark on Crucial Test", available at <<http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/06/20062002151706.asp>>.

there was no escape from the mission, the Turkish government put forward some concerns over the size, scope and the cost of the mission.¹⁴¹

Officials from Turkey, Britain and the U.S. came together several times to work out Turkey's concerns on her possible takeover of the command of ISAF. Turkey requested financial support and clarification of the mission's mandate. She sought assurances that NATO members would maintain their presence in Afghanistan and that Turkey would receive logistic support. Turkey also wanted the ISAF's area of responsibility to remain confined to Kabul and surrounding areas, and opposed any expansion.¹⁴² Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit made it clear that Turkey did not want to be forced to operate beyond Kabul and that providing security outside the capital should be left to Afghans.¹⁴³

During the negotiations, the economic problems came to the forefront as the main reason for the delay.¹⁴⁴ Turkey was seeking firm assurances that the international community would share the financial burden caused by her taking over the command of ISAF because she was recovering from its worst economic crisis since World War II. Countries contributing to the Force were meeting the expenses of their own troops. Turkey's expenses would increase as the number of her troops participating in the Force grew due to its taking command. In his visit to the US, the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, stated: "The costs of deploying troops overseas exceeds Turkey's planned defense budget."¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, October 2002, "The Command Issue of ISAF in Afghanistan Mystery and Turkey", ASAM Newsletter.

¹⁴² Khaleej Times (online), March 3, 2002, "Turkey, US, Britain to Discuss Snags in ISAF Command Handover Next Week", available at <<http://www.khaleejtimes.co.ae/ktarchive/030302/theworld.htm>>.

¹⁴³ Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Afghanistan: Turkey Sending Delegation to Kabul Ahead of Possible ISAF Takeover", available at <<http://www.rfel.org>>.

¹⁴⁴ Sami Kohen, February 27, 2002, "Keeping the Peace in Afghanistan on Turkey's Shoulders", *Milliyet*. Available at <<http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/498.cfm>>.

¹⁴⁵ Ertuğrul Kürkçü, January 15, 2002 "Turkey's Ecevit: Hopes and Worries Arrive in Washington", available at <www.mafhoum.com/press2/82P2.htm>.

Besides economical concerns, Turkey was also cautious about the political situation in Afghanistan and a possible U.S. military strike on Iraq.¹⁴⁶ Afghanistan is a difficult and unpredictable country exposing risks for peacekeepers. The remnants of Taliban and Al Qaeda still pose a threat to ISAF personnel. Afghanistan is one of the countries that produces narcotics, and has many refugees in neighboring countries. While the outside of the Kabul was not secure yet, the Afghan refugees wished to return to Kabul. As the refugees returned to Kabul, it would be necessary to find food, homes and jobs for them to prevent them from resorting to illegal means. Moreover, the aggression in uncontrolled territories, especially in the northern part, of Afghanistan might spread and threaten the peacekeepers.¹⁴⁷ On the other hand, a U.S. operation in Iraq might reduce the U.S. interest in Afghanistan and incite ethnic rivalries there. This kind of development would probably jeopardize the ISAF mission.

All these concerns led Turkey to be cautious. Turkey did not want to blindly assume command of ISAF. Doubtless, this mission would enhance Turkey's reputation; however, the risks needed to be minimized before Turkey took it on.¹⁴⁸ According to Maloney, this delay was a tactic used by Turkey to get more concessions from the U.S. in areas unrelated to Afghanistan. Turkey tried to get concessions from the U.S. on the Cyprus issue and economic field.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ Jean-Christoph Peuch and Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Turkish Armed Forces Assume ISAF Command, Embark on Crucial Test", available at <<http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/06/20062002151706.asp>>.

³⁷ Zeynep Güranlı, "Afghanistan Concerns", available at <www.aciksite.com/incs/yazilar.asp>.

¹⁴⁸ Sami Kohen, February 27, 2002, "Keeping the Peace in Afghanistan on Turkey's Shoulders", *Milliyet*. Available at <<http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/498.cfm>>.

¹⁴⁹ Sean M. Maloney, Summer 2003, "The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins of a Stabilization Force", *Canadian Military Journal* 4(2):3-12, available at <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol4/no2/pdf/v4n2-p03-12_e.pdf>.

3.3 Transfer of Authority from Great Britain to Turkey

After a series of negotiations, some promises were given to Turkey considering her concerns, and then, on April 29, 2002, the Turkish government decided to assume the command of ISAF for a period of six months. In the letter dated 9 May 2002 from Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, Turkey requested a new Security Council resolution authorizing lead nation status of Turkey and an extension be granted for the ISAF mandate. Resolution 1386 had authorized ISAF for only six months and it would expire in June 2002.¹⁵⁰

Through this letter, the Turkish government also delivered its provision including the mandate and the ISAF's AOR would be maintained as stipulated by the Security Council in its Resolution 1386.¹⁵¹ On May 23, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1413. After reaffirming the articles of Resolution 1386, Resolution 1413 extended the mandate of ISAF for a period of six months beyond June 20 and authorized the lead nation status of Turkey.¹⁵²

After Turkey decided to assume command of ISAF, a Turkish reconnaissance team went to Kabul to determine the requirements of the operation. Following this, the necessary preparations were made in Ankara and the first units of Turkish military contingents assigned to ISAF began to be transported to Afghanistan on May 24, 2002. The transportation of all the personnel and equipment continued until the end of June. For the transportation of the personnel, Turkish Airlines aircraft were chartered in addition to Turkish Air Force's C-130 and C-160 aircraft; Russian AN-124 airplanes were chartered for the transportation of equipment.

¹⁵⁰ UN Security Council, May 22, 2002, "International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan: Letter from Turkey to the UN Secretary General (S/2002/568)".

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² UN Security Council Resolution 1413 (S/RES/1413), May 23, 2002.

Turkey officially took over command of ISAF from Great Britain in a colorful military ceremony in Kabul on June 20, 2002. The newly elected Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Defense Minister Fahim Khan, and the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi attended the handover ceremony. The transition of command was completed smoothly and without any gaps in operations. The Turkish Battle Group moved into the south of Kabul to take over the mission of the United Kingdom Battle Group as of 27 June 2002. Turkey also took operational command of the Kabul airbase on June 30, 2002.¹⁵³

3.4 The Organization of ISAF II

3.4.1 ISAF II Task Organization

The ISAF II organizational structure consisted of the ISAF Headquarters (with its own Communication and Information unit, Service unit, Protection unit, a CIMIC Coordination Center, Force Liaison elements, Human Intelligence teams, and Information Operations/ Psychological Operations units), the KMNB, and the Kabul Airport Task Force. Germany was the lead nation for the KMNB. Under the KMNB were three battle groups, headed by German, French, and Turkish troops. ISAF Task Organization under the Turkish command is shown on the Figure 4.

3.4.2 Command and Control Structure


ISAF II Headquarters served under the command of the Turkish General Staff. Command of ISAF and the post of COMISAF were held by the Republic of Turkey. Members of TCNs remained under the full command of National Contingent Commanders. Turkish national force elements were under the command of Turkish

¹⁵³ UN Security Council, August 16, 2002, "Monthly Report on the Operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/940)".

Military Representative (Deputy COMISAF). Operational control of all National Contingents contributed to ISAF was assigned to COMISAF.


ISAF activities were executed in coordination with U.S. CENTCOM based in Tampa/Florida. Additionally, the Afghanistan Operation Coordination Center (AOCC) and Multinational Movement Coordination Center (MNMCC), including a section for the liaison officers of TCNs, were established at the Headquarters of Turkish General Staff in Ankara to ensure coordination between TCNs. The chain of command of ISAF under Turkish command is shown on the Figure 5.

Figure 4: ISAF II Task Organization¹⁵⁴



¹⁵⁴ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

Figure 5: ISAF II Chain of Command¹⁵⁵



3.4.3 Force Composition

ISAF II had an authorized personnel strength of roughly 5,000, drawn from 22 countries. ISAF’s manpower strength included 4517 personnel from 11 NATO countries, comprising 95 percent of the total. Twelve EU countries contributed 3,152 personnel to the Force. This makes up two-thirds of ISAF’s manpower. If Turkey’s contributions are added as a candidate country, then the EU component goes up to 94 percent.¹⁵⁶

At the beginning of Turkey’s tenure, 19 countries were contributing to the Force.¹⁵⁷ As time passed, Belgium left, and Albania, Azerbaijan, FYROM and Lithuania joined the Force. The TCNs and their personnel strength are shown in Table 6 and ISAF II Force Composition is shown in Table 7:

¹⁵⁵ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)”, Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ See Table 3 (Chapter 1).

Table 6: ISAF II Troops Contributing Nations¹⁵⁸

| | | | | | |
|----|----------------|------|--------------|----------------|-------------|
| 1 | Albania | 30 | 13 | Italy | 442 |
| 2 | Austria | 72 | 14 | Lithuania | 4 |
| 3 | Azerbaijan | 30 | 15 | Netherlands | 222 |
| 4 | Bulgaria | 27 | 16 | New Zealand | 3 |
| 5 | Czech Republic | 133 | 17 | Norway | 17 |
| 6 | Denmark | 37 | 18 | Romania | 35 |
| 7 | Finland | 43 | 19 | Spain | 268 |
| 8 | France | 454 | 20 | Sweden | 31 |
| 9 | FYROM | 2 | 21 | Turkey | 1331 |
| 10 | Germany | 1139 | 22 | United Kingdom | 379 |
| 11 | Greece | 123 | Total | | 4829 |
| 12 | Ireland | 7 | | | |

Table 7: ISAF II Force Composition¹⁵⁹

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Force Headquarters | Multinational, Turkish led |
| Brigade Headquarters | Multinational, centered around a German Brigade headquarters |
| Three infantry battle groups | Turkish battalion French battalion German-led battalion, including Dutch, Austrian and Danish troops |
| Other infantry units | France, Italy, Turkey, Albania |
| Kabul Airport Task Force | Turkey, Spain |
| Reconnaissance squadron | France |
| Engineer group | UK, Greece, Italy, Spain |
| Explosive Ordnance Disposal | Turkey, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Spain |
| Medical | UK, Germany, Portugal, Czech Republic |
| Logistics | Turkey, UK, Bulgaria, France, New Zealand, Norway, Spain |
| Helicopter support | Germany, Spain |
| Military Police | UK, Germany, Romania |
| Other specialist troops | Turkey, Finland, Italy, Sweden |
| Information Ops/ Psychological Ops | Turkey |
| Air transport support | UK, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Portugal |


¹⁵⁸ M. Emin Alpmann (Deputy Commander of ISAF II), 2002, "International Security Assistance Force", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, October 7.

¹⁵⁹ Available at <<http://www.operations.mod.uk/fingal/orbat.htm>>.

3.4.4 Area of Responsibility

The Area of Responsibility of ISAF under the Turkish command remained unchanged. It expanded 50 km in the north-south and 45 km in the east-west directions. The total area of the AOR of ISAF II is 2,250 square kilometers.¹⁶⁰ The ISAF II area responsibility is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: ISAF II Area of Responsibility¹⁶¹



3.4.5 Deployment of ISAF II

ISAF II forces were deployed as follows: ISAF II Headquarters and its support units in the center of city, Kabul Airport Task Force in Kabul airport, Kabul Multinational Brigade, Turkish Battalion Task Force and 1st Turkish Company in

¹⁶⁰ M. Emin Alpman (Deputy Commander of ISAF II), 2002, "International Security Assistance Force", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, October 7.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

northeast of the city, on the Celalabat road, 2nd and 3rd Turkish Companies in west and south of the city and the other units along the road to Kabul airport and along the Celalabat road.¹⁶²

The Turkish Task Force operated in the west and southwest; the German Task Force, including a Dutch Company and an Austrian Platoon, in the north, center and northwest; and the French Task Force in north of the city. The Italian Force Protection Company operated in the center.¹⁶³

3.5 Activities of ISAF II

3.5.1 Security Issues

The main threat to the security and stability of Kabul was posed by remnants of Taliban and Al Qaeda, as well as various groups opposed to the existence of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. These elements were unlikely to have massive support, as Afghans had been tired of violence during 23 years of conflict. However, Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants might be able to carry out isolated attacks in Kabul. Security in Kabul improved everyday during Turkey's leadership, despite the residual threat of terrorism. Terrorist attacks were rare and isolated, and crime rates were lower than many Western cities of similar size.¹⁶⁴ This situation led to lifting the night curfew as of 3 November 2002 for the first time in 23 years, and greatly boosted local population's morale. No major incidents occurred from the date that the night curfew was lifted to the end of the Turkey's leadership.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁶³ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, November 22, 2002, "Turkey Has Been Successful As the Leader of the International Security Assistance Force", Special Policy Forum Report, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

¹⁶⁴ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, December 2003-2004, "A First in NATO: Peace Operations in Afghanistan", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs), Special Issue on Peace Operations.

¹⁶⁵ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

The assassination of Public Works Minister Hadji Qadir in an attack outside his office on July 6, 2002 highlighted the lack of coordination among security entities in Kabul and the insufficient security precautions concerning the ministers' personnel safety. ISAF provided assistance with investigating the incident. ISAF started to run a close protection training course for the bodyguards of Afghan ministers and senior officials and prepared a booklet on individual protection measures, which was to be distributed to all senior officials in order to ensure all ministers would have adequate protection. Turkish experts visited ministerial buildings in order to assess their security arrangements and wrote reports containing ISAF's recommendations. These arrangements were presented to the Afghan authorities.¹⁶⁶

ISAF II also tried to initiate a comprehensive security coordination and intelligence-sharing system, both among the Afghan security entities themselves, such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the National Directorate for Security and Kabul Garrison, and between these entities and ISAF. A Committee for Intelligence Coordination was set up. The Committee met on a weekly basis and intended to promote effective and timely exchange of intelligence.¹⁶⁷

During the Turkish leadership, ISAF conducted approximately 50 patrols a day on a 24-hour basis, and mostly on foot. Nearly 70 percent of these patrols were conducted jointly with the Afghan Police. Random checkpoints were also established in close cooperation with the Afghan Police.¹⁶⁸ By conducting the activities jointly

¹⁶⁶ UN Security Council, August 16, 2002, "Monthly report on the Operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/940)".

¹⁶⁷ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁶⁸ UN Security Council, February 21, 2003, "Quarterly report on International Security Assistance Force operations 1 Nov 2002-10 Feb 2003(S/2003/210)".

with the Afghan Police, ISAF helped to train Afghan police officers in conducting patrols and treating citizens of Kabul properly.¹⁶⁹

Approximately 1.8 million refugees returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran since the deployment of ISAF. Nearly 600,000 returnees settled in Kabul, and most of them were living in tents or houses that were largely destroyed, without basic facilities. ISAF provided the United Nation Winterization Task Force with the information it collected on concentrations of returnees, it also arranged patrol routes in the neighborhood of aid warehouses and stood ready to provide further security assistance on a case-by-case basis.¹⁷⁰

ISAF also provided additional security, including checks for explosive ordnance, prior to and during national and international conferences, fairs, meetings, and visits by foreign statesmen.¹⁷¹ ISAF found and confiscated a significant number of weapons and ammunition, including rockets, unexploded ordnance, and air defense systems in its AOR. As of 10 February, ISAF Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams destroyed approximately 175,000 rounds of ammunition for heavy weapons, including anti-tank weapons, unguided missiles, rockets, mines and anti-aircraft weapons.¹⁷²

3.5.2 Information and Psychological Operations

ISAF ran a strong public information and psychological campaign through all available means during Turkey's leadership. This campaign focused on;

- Recognition and acceptance of ISAF by the people,

¹⁶⁹ See Appendix F, photographs 15-16.

¹⁷⁰ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² UN Security Council, February 21, 2003, "Quarterly report on International Security Assistance Force operations 1 Nov 2002-10 Feb 2003 (S/2003/210)".

- Importance of providing support to ISAF and Afghan Transitional Administration,
- Terrorism as a threat to humanity,
- Importance of the unity and solidarity among ethnic groups, the risks of ethnic segregation in Afghanistan,
- The superiority of democracy and tolerance,
- The dangers of unexploded explosive ordnance.¹⁷³

Despite the fact that only seven percent of the Kabul citizens had television sets and only 40 percent had radios, they were fully aware of ISAF's role and contribution.¹⁷⁴ ISAF made use of public announcements by loudspeakers, radio and television advertisements, and posters. Moreover, ISAF published a fortnightly newsheet called "ISAF News" and distributed 50,000 free copies of it in the city biweekly. In addition, more than 150,000 leaflets were printed and distributed. ISAF also ran two radio stations to inform local population and ISAF troops about ISAF activities and security situation in Kabul, "Radyo Türkiyem" and "Sadahje Azadi (Voice of Freedom)."¹⁷⁵ Radio Türkiyem broadcasted music and international and local news, ISAF activities, security situation in Kabul in local languages and Turkish. The Voice of Freedom broadcasted music, news and information in local languages.¹⁷⁶

3.5.3 Communication and Information Systems

As the lead nation, Turkey provided communication and information systems for ISAF II. The main responsibility was to establish a strategic rear link connection to AOCC, which was located in Ankara, and to provide communication and

¹⁷³ UN Security Council, August 16, 2002, "Monthly report on the Operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (S/2002/940)".

¹⁷⁴ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁷⁵ See Appendix F, photographs 17-20.

¹⁷⁶ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, December 2003-2004, "A First in NATO: Peace Operations in Afghanistan", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs), Special Issue on Peace Operations.

information links between the ISAF headquarters and the subordinate commands. Secure voice, data and video teleconferencing facilities were established and functioned well during Turkey's leadership. ISAF II had a strategic rear link connection to Turkey via Turksat 1-C Satellite.

Turkey also established a secure VHF/FM radio network in Kabul. Two information systems, US Centrix and Turkish secure local area network systems were in operation. The US Centrix system was a local area network which was also connected to U.S. military installations around the world. It supported office applications and provided e-mail and internet services. Turkish secure local area network provided the data and message exchange between ISAF headquarters and AOCC. Turkey also established an internet service.

For the use of ISAF personnel, the Turkish Telecom Company provided international payphones and a GSM network called "Aycell" at very reasonable rates. Calls to Turkey were charged at local Turkish rates, and calls to other countries were charged at rates between Turkey and those countries.

3.5.4 Logistics Support

All logistics and support arrangements functioned smoothly during Turkish leadership. TCNs coordinated their efforts through ISAF's Multinational Joint Logistic Component, which met on a weekly basis.¹⁷⁷ As the lead nation, Turkey concluded a contract with "Supreme Food Service Company", which had an office in Kabul, for the provision of food and fresh water to all ISAF II forces except German, French and Spanish. During Turkey's leadership, ISAF II had ample second-line stocks of food and water. Turkey also concluded a contract with "Shell Pakistan Fuel

¹⁷⁷ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

Company” for supply of fuel and LPG to all ISAF forces except Finnish and Swedish. Again, ISAF II had sufficient reserves of fuel.¹⁷⁸ The countries that did not participate in these systems provided themselves the food, water and fuel needs of their forces. Turkey also ran the military part of the Kabul Airport, which was a crucial link in ISAF’s logistics operations and Afghanistan’s window to outside world. Turkey also provided air traffic control for the entire airport.¹⁷⁹

3.5.5 CIMIC Issues

CIMIC activities can be defined as the cooperation and coordination between the commander and civilian community, including international and national NGOs as well as civil society organizations and local population in order to support the mission. Therefore, CIMIC operations became an essential part of the ISAF activities and a great importance was attached to conduct them. The coordination and cooperation carried out by CIMIC in support of the mission, between ISAF, the Afghan authorities, NGOs, and Afghan people greatly contributed to the overall success of ISAF.¹⁸⁰ It set a bridge between ISAF and other organizations in Kabul.¹⁸¹

At the very start of the ISAF deployment, education and healthcare took priority in CIMIC activities. Since Turkey had taken over ISAF command, 176 projects were carried out. Local labor was used wherever possible. These projects

¹⁷⁸ Ertuğrul Durgal, 2003, “Logistics Support in ISAF and Lessons Learned”, Lecture given at the PfP Staff Officers Logistics Orientation Course, Pfp Training Center, Ankara, May 14.

¹⁷⁹ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)”, Briefing paper presented at Pfp Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁸⁰ Oktay Çakırlar, 2003, “Lessons Learned from ISAF”, Lecture given at the CEP/CIMIC Course, Pfp Training Center, Ankara, November 07.

¹⁸¹ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)”, Briefing paper presented at Pfp Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

played an important role in the ongoing reconstruction and rehabilitation process of the country.¹⁸²

As for the finance of CIMIC projects, there was no specific common fund. Turkey provided fund for CIMIC projects being the lead nation as required. There was also some fund from EU spent after EU approval. The remaining CIMIC funds were provided by ISAF nations subjected to the national approvals.¹⁸³ A summary of CIMIC projects realized during Turkey's leadership were listed below:¹⁸⁴

- Working and living conditions of ISAF staff and headquarters elements were developed. The ISAF accommodations; the mess hall, the kitchen and the laundry were built.
- Local workers were employed in the construction of these new facilities.
- Military items were provided to the Afghan security forces.
- Police stations were reconstructed and equipped.
- A circumcision campaign was conducted and 247 children were circumcised during this campaign.
- Projects specifically aimed at improving the quality of life for children such as establishing playgrounds and providing school materials and toys were developed.
- The Rehabilitation Center was restored. Additionally, ambulance medical items and medicine were provided to the clinics and the hospitals. The clinics were reconstructed.
- The Emergency Service of Kabul Military Hospital was repaired and equipped.
- ISAF medical assets helped people and conducted health checks even in the villages.
- Baby food was distributed in Kabul.
- The water shortage is one of the most important problems in Kabul. ISAF worked with Kabul Municipality to provide support for the water. A phased water project was initiated and first phase of the project covering first four districts was completed by ISAF. We also hired three vehicles for the chlorination campaign of the Kabul city.
- Many schools and kindergartens were constructed. The construction of the Yakatoot High School is a good example of the restored schools. Yakatoot High School is one of the biggest schools in Kabul and has 6000 boys and girls on its roll.
- School items and toys were distributed to the schools and kindergartens.
- The oldest and most historical mosque of Kabul was restored.

¹⁸² Hilmi Akin Zorlu, December 2003-2004, "A First in NATO: Peace Operations in Afghanistan", *Perceptions* (Journal of International Affairs), Special Issue on Peace Operations.

¹⁸³ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁸⁴ See Appendix F, photographs 21-38.

- ISAF provided transformers to districts suffering from electricity problems.
- The veterinarian support was also provided in some districts.
- ISAF engineers constructed roads and sewerage.
- ISAF also actively participated in the winterization studies to assist the UN organizations and local authorities in dealing with the problems of the returnees.
- The Library and the Reproduction Center of Kabul University were repaired.
- Fire Fighting, Air Traffic Control and Meteorology Training were given to the Afghan staff.¹⁸⁵

Furthermore, Turkey handed over to the Afghan Authorities eight buildings, which were constructed or renovated for the use of Turkish units in the city.¹⁸⁶

3.5.6 Training Issues

As mentioned before, one of ISAF's tasks is to assist with the establishment of new Afghan security structures including a new ANA. ISAF II supported the process of establishing and training of a new ANA, which would serve the interests of the entire Afghan nation. Its assistance ranged from advice on conceptual matters of organization to the provision of specialized training for individual battalions.¹⁸⁷

Toward the end of Turkey's leadership, TA issued a final government decree, proposing the formation of four new corps, instead of the ten corps controlled by regional leaders. The plans for a National Army envisaged the formation of a central corps in Kabul and three additional corps to be located in other provinces, with 70,000 troops.¹⁸⁸ Turkish instructors provided ten weeks of advanced training between 21 September and 01 December 2002 to the 1st Battalion of the Afghan

¹⁸⁵ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21

¹⁸⁶ UN Security Council, February 21, 2003, "Quarterly report on International Security Assistance Force operations 1 Nov 2002-10 Feb 2003 (S/2003/210)".

¹⁸⁷ M. Emin Alpman (Deputy Commander of ISAF II), 2002, "International Security Assistance Force", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, October 7.

¹⁸⁸ UN Security Council, February 21, 2003, "Quarterly report on International Security Assistance Force operations 1 Nov 2002-10 Feb 2003 (S/2003/210)".

National Guard, which had been initially trained by ISAF during the UK leadership and later equipped and dressed by Turkey.¹⁸⁹ During Turkey's leadership, Turkish and Italian instructors provided close protection training to 794 bodyguards, in an effort to ensure all ministers have adequate protection. The bodyguards of the former king were given weapon training.¹⁹⁰

3.6 Relations with Local Population, Afghan Authorities, NGOs and UN Agencies

The Turkish ISAF leadership took great care to remain equally distant to all ethnic groups in Afghanistan. It avoided any involvement in Afghan domestic politics. The Turkish ISAF leadership and all ISAF personnel fully respected Afghan customs, cultural values and religious beliefs. The commander of ISAF issued strict orders to all ISAF II personnel to be polite and kind to Afghan citizens at all times. ISAF II worked in close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the representatives of the UN and NGOs.¹⁹¹ These fundamental operating principles of Turkish ISAF leadership contributed the success of ISAF greatly.¹⁹²

These principles also helped ISAF to win the full confidence of Afghan authorities and the Afghan people. The citizens of Kabul knew that ISAF personnel were there to help them. One of the crucial aspects of peace operations is to secure and maintain mutual trust and respect. ISAF Turkish leadership achieved and

¹⁸⁹ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. See also Appendix F, photographs 11-14.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² See Appendix F, photographs 39-44.

maintained this.¹⁹³ There was no show of hostility towards ISAF personnel during the Turkish leadership.¹⁹⁴

The ISAF leadership was able to establish excellent professional relations with Afghan authorities. There was full harmony between the objectives of ISAF and TA. The Commander of ISAF maintained regular contacts with President Karzai, Defense Minister Fahim Khan, Interior Minister Muhammed Wardak and the other Afghan officials.¹⁹⁵ ISAF II also worked in close consultation with Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, by regular bilateral contacts, periodic meetings and kept continuity of the presence of a UN representative at daily ISAF briefings.¹⁹⁶

Furthermore, ISAF was actively involved in the work of the Joint Coordinating Body (JCB) set up in accordance with the MTA. During the Turkish ISAF leadership, the JCB became a highly effective and operational body, allowing periodic consultations among ISAF, the UN and the Afghan authorities on security issues and coordinated activities.¹⁹⁷

It was essential to establish an effective and continuing coordination between ISAF and various NGOs in Kabul. Projects, which would be carried out, had to be well evaluated and deconflicted. ISAF established good coordination and cooperation with NGOs with the help of its CIMIC teams.

¹⁹³ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21

¹⁹⁴ UN Security Council (S/2003/210), 21 February 2003, "Quarterly report on International Security Assistance Force operations 1 Nov 2002-10 Feb 2003".

¹⁹⁵ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ UN Security Council, February 21, 2003, "Quarterly report on International Security Assistance Force operations 1 Nov 2002-10 Feb 2003 (S/2003/210)".

3.7 Turkey's Contribution to ISAF III and ISAF IV

Turkish leadership ended on February 10, 2003 and German-Dutch leadership took over the ISAF command. The redeployment of Turkish units started on January 23, 2003 and was completed on February 20, 2003. However, Turkey continued to contribute ISAF III and later ISAF IV with a reinforced company team supported by logistics and administration units as in ISAF I. An Azerbaijani and an Albanian platoon of 23 personnel each have been also included into the structure of the Turkish company and Turkey assigned staff officers to ISAF headquarters. Recently, in line with NATO's demand and as a requirement of its responsibilities as a NATO member country, Turkey directed 3 helicopters and 56 flight and maintenance personnel to serve ISAF.

3.8 Lessons learned

The main principle in peace operations is to show polite behavior to people, and take great care to set an equal approach to all ethnic groups making up the country in which you operate. Another important point is to avoid any interference with the domestic politics of the country. In addition, all the personnel should respect the customs, cultural values and religious beliefs. In other words, they should be careful about the sensitivities of the country. Otherwise, people can easily see them as the invaders of their country. For this reason, it is essential for countries to provide prior training to their personnel on this delicate aspect of peace operations, which require politeness and impartiality towards to the local population.¹⁹⁸

During her leadership, Turkey gave great importance to these issues. In the beginning, Turkey's relations with General Rashid Dostum had caused some anxiety

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Hilmi Akın Zorlu, March 15, 2004, Ankara.

in Afghanistan. Later, as Turkish leadership acted in an impartial way, she won the Afghan people and authorities' confidence. The mutual trust and respect between the Afghan people and ISAF personnel became the most critical aspect of the ISAF II operation. General Hilmi Akin Zorlu issued strict orders to all ISAF personnel to be polite and kind to Afghan people at all times, and to remain equally distant to all ethnic groups in Kabul. Thanks to these principles, a good relationship between the Afghan people and ISAF personnel was established and during the Turkey's leadership, any hostile act against the ISAF personnel did not occur.

Working in close consultation and coordination with the local authorities, the UN representatives and NGOs was another key issue. A perfect reconnaissance with the specialists before coming to theatre is of crucial importance. It helps to clarify the real requirements of personnel, logistics, communications and all the other equipment.

The ratio among combat troops and support personnel in peace operations should be determined carefully. While ISAF II had roughly 4,800 personnel, only 850 were infantry troops assigned patrolling and checkpoint duties; the rest were staff and support personnel. The main reason for this was the preference of most of the countries to assign support troops instead of combat troops.¹⁹⁹

Reacting against incidents and reporting correctly and timely in a peace operation are essential for command and control units to follow the ongoing situation properly. For this purpose, during Turkey's leadership, seminars were made available to train the staff officers and commanders of the sub-units.

Force protection of all units is also an important issue in a peace operation. Security equipment, such as detectors, x-ray devices, armored vehicles and narcotic-

¹⁹⁹ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

detecting dogs are some of the essential equipment and assets to ensure the security and force protection.²⁰⁰

Logistics is an important problem in peace operations, particularly in a country where there is no host nation support, and the transportation must be made by air because of the security and infrastructure reasons such as in Afghanistan. Because of perfect planning during Turkey's leadership, there was no problem with logistics support. Turkey managed to support all ISAF units very well with food and water, fuel and other items. It was an economic way to provide food and water from the "Supreme Food Service Company" and fuel from the "Shell Pakistan Fuel Company" instead of bringing them from Turkey.²⁰¹

The UN Security Council resolutions on ISAF called for a trust fund to be established for common expenses. Actually, such a fund was necessary, but no contributions have been made to this fund. The lead nations therefore had to meet the bulk of ISAF's substantial costs by herself.²⁰² The UN should take measures that are more efficient to ensure that the member countries contribute to such kind of funds for peace operations. By this way, the financial burden of the lead nation can be reduced and the number of countries who will contribute can be increased. The heavier international presence in peace operations, the greater the likelihood of credible results.

Well-established communication systems have an important role and assist the success of peace operations. Being aware of that, Turkey established an excellent communication and information system that won the appreciation of other countries.

²⁰⁰ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

²⁰¹ Interview with a Turkish officer worked at ISAF II Logistics Section.

²⁰² Interview with Hilmi Akin Zorlu, March 15, 2004, Ankara.

Furthermore, the establishment of Turkish Telekom GSM and payphones were very effective in improving personnel's morale and motivation.

Selecting the specialized and experienced personnel for peace operation forces and preparing the troops for the operation are other key issues for success. Officers selected for the command functions should be culturally aware and sensitive, patient, adaptive and tolerant. While determining the Turkish personnel who would be assigned to ISAF, particularly to the important positions, priority was given to ones who had already experienced other peace operations.

CIMIC operations are the main operations for the success of peace operations. They enable peacekeepers to win the hearts and minds of the host societies. While conducting CIMIC projects, working in close coordination with the UN agencies, NGOs and the local authorities is important. In this context, ISAF II conducted an extensive CIMIC program designed to provide assistance to the local community through carefully selected projects in close coordination with other organizations in Kabul. However, a common CIMIC fund would be useful. During Turkey's leadership, ISAF did not have such a fund and some countries provided limited funds for CIMIC projects; therefore, Turkey had to finance most of ISAF's assistance activities towards the local community.²⁰³

Peace operations need an effective information capacity. This enables the Command to explain their purpose to the local population and prevent misinformation by providing a credible and correct source of information. Radio is the most effective instrument for this purpose. ISAF II information operations, including two radio stations, played an important role by informing local and international community about ISAF activities and incidents, which took place in

²⁰³ Hilmi Akın Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PFP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

AOR of ISAF, on time and accurately, and prevented incorrect news production. During Turkey's leadership, press briefings were held by the ISAF media officer everyday to inform public with correct information. Additionally, the Commander's monthly press briefings provided suitable atmosphere for media to get first-hand information from the most authorized personnel.²⁰⁴ If media is not informed on time and accurately, they may produce incorrect stories depending on the false information they acquire.

²⁰⁴ Hilmi Akin Zorlu, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)", Briefing paper presented at PfP Training Center, Ankara, March 21.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The September 11 terrorist attacks affected the international community more than any other event in recent years and they made the collective struggle against terrorism the main issue for the world. The U.S. started a comprehensive war against terrorism with the support of many countries. NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its history.

The first step was the war in Afghanistan. After the relationship between the attacks and Al Qaeda was discovered, the U.S. and Coalition Forces attacked the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda which was using Afghanistan as a base for terrorism. During this operation, the Taliban regime collapsed and Al Qaeda was heavily damaged. However, ensuring the future stability of a failed country would require leaving behind well-functioning national security institutions under the direction of a strong government. Capable security institutions would hinder terrorists trying to reenter the country and reestablish training bases there.²⁰⁵ Hence, it was necessary to create effective security institutions in Afghanistan.

Consequently, an Interim Administration was established and a UN-mandated multinational force to assist in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas was called for creation at the Bonn Agreement. As a response to this request, the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 authorized the establishment

²⁰⁵ Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, "Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan", *The Washington Quarterly*, 26(1): 35-52.

of ISAF to assist the Interim Administration and its successors in the maintenance of security in Kabul while the responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan resided with the Afghans themselves. Therefore, the Bonn Agreement and the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 formed the legal basis of ISAF. ISAF is not a UN mission; it is a “coalition of the willing” operation that has been deployed under the authorization of the UN Security Council. As stated in Resolution 1386, the role of ISAF is to assist Afghan authorities, not to replace their role as the government or undertake their responsibility for security. There is not a fixed end date for ISAF. However, it may be expected to continue until the Bonn process is accomplished.

NATO’s overtaking the command of ISAF was an important event because it was the Alliance’s first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Its leadership of ISAF has overcome the problem of a continual search for a new lead nation every six months. It also enabled smaller countries to play a stronger role within a multinational structure, increasing the chance of success for ISAF. Only after NATO assumed command did the expansion of ISAF become possible.

As ISAF is still an ongoing operation, it is too early to conclude whether it is successful or not. Nevertheless, the progress achieved so far in the Bonn process has been satisfactory. Since the deployment of ISAF, there has been a visible improvement in Kabul. Crime rates have been reduced and life has returned to normal. Schools have reopened to both sexes; commercial life has been developing at a rapid pace; the people of Kabul have felt themselves confident; the night curfew has been lifted for the first time in 23 years. The elections in Afghanistan, which will be conducted at the end of the Bonn process, will be a great test for ISAF as well as other international efforts in Afghanistan.

After September 11, Turkey emerged as one of the leading actors in the fight against terrorism. She, being a country suffered from terrorism for years, fully supported all activities to counter terrorism. Although she was not able to make a meaningful contribution in terms of financial and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, she actively participated in ISAF from the beginning, and after Great Britain, took over the command of ISAF.

In the eyes of allies, particularly the U.S. and the UK, Turkey was a perfect choice to lead ISAF. Turkey had an Islamic population with a secular and democratic government. She was one of the few countries whose forces were capable of coping with this kind of mission and her army has valuable experience in peace operations. Turkish society was a living example to the people of Afghanistan of a society that is both Muslim and progressive. It should also be understood that chances for success in peace operations increase when a strong state or coalition with well-armed, well-trained troops takes the lead.²⁰⁶

To assume the command of ISAF was also in the interest of Turkey. She wanted to demonstrate that she was an important actor in the international arena. The success would boost its profile both in the region and in the eyes of the international community. However, some concerns over the size, scope and cost of the mission caused Turkey to hesitate. After some promises were given considering her hesitation, she accepted command of ISAF.

By assuming command of ISAF, Turkey has demonstrated her determination to fight against terrorism. Because of the deep rooted friendship between Afghanistan and Turkey, Afghan people felt secure with ISAF forces under the Turkish leadership. During Turkey's leadership, stability and security in Kabul

²⁰⁶ Kimberly Zisk Marten, Winter 2002-03, "Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan", *The Washington Quarterly*, 26(1): 35-52.

improved gradually and the people of Kabul were very happy with ISAF's activities. Under Turkey's leadership, ISAF operated in good harmony. Turkey successfully performed its mission and Turkish officers' professionalism in peace operations was underscored once more.

There are several reasons for Turkey's success: First, as members of a Muslim country, Turkish personnel knew about the Afghans' customs to such an extent that they do not feel like aliens in Afghanistan. Broad cultural differences between military personnel and the local population would make it difficult to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding. Second, Turkey has traditionally had good relations with the Afghan nation. These relations go back to the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Third, under the Turkish leadership, ISAF never became involved in Afghan domestic politics. Therefore, the Afghan people and officials trusted ISAF fully.

Finally, it must be remembered that ISAF is more than a military force. It is a symbol of the international community's determination to help Afghan people. It should also not be forgotten that peace operations cannot, in themselves, create democracy and state building; instead, they can create an environment that enables local actors to achieve their goals. Peace operations can sow the seeds of democracy, but the people should nurture these seeds.

This study has not dealt with all the issues related with ISAF. A number of important questions have inevitably remained untouched. While preparing this thesis, I took note of them and would like to bring them to the attention of prospective researchers as listed below:

- Is the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan legal in terms of international law?

- To what extent has the Bonn process been successful? Are the ongoing international efforts adequate to make Afghanistan a responsible member of the international community?
- Which kind of peace operations are more efficient, UN peace operations or “coalition of the willing” operations under the leadership of a strong state?
- To what extent is ISAF successful? What are the achievements and shortcomings of ISAF? Which lessons can be drawn from ISAF for future peace operations? (After its mandate came to an end.)

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APPENDIX A


Map of Afghanistan²⁰⁷



²⁰⁷ Turkish General Staff, “Afghanistan Bilgi Dosyası (Afghanistan Information File)”.

APPENDIX B

Key Leaders and Areas of Control²⁰⁸



²⁰⁸ M. Emin Alpman, 2003, "International Security Assistance Force", Briefing paper, Ankara, October 7.

APPENDIX C

ANNEX I INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE²⁰⁹

1. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves. To this end, they pledge their commitment to do all within their means and influence to ensure such security, including for all United Nations and other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan.
2. With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.
3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and armed forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas.
4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed. It would also be desirable if such a force were to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure.

²⁰⁹ Bonn Agreement (Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending The Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions), December 5, 2001, available at <www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm>.

APPENDIX D

United Nations

S/RES/1386 (2001)



Security Council

Distr.: General
20 December 2001

Resolution 1386 (2001)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4443rd meeting, on
20 December 2001**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1378 (2001) of 14 November 2001 and 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001,

Supporting international efforts to root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirming also its resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 and 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001,

Welcoming developments in Afghanistan that will allow for all Afghans to enjoy inalienable rights and freedom unfettered by oppression and terror,

Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghan themselves,

Reiterating its endorsement of the Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001 (S/2001/1154) (the Bonn Agreement),

Taking note of the request to the Security Council in Annex 1, paragraph 3, to the Bonn Agreement to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of an international security force, as well as the briefing on 14 December 2001 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on his contacts with the Afghan authorities in which they welcome the deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations-authorized international security force,

Taking note of the letter dated 19 December 2001 from Dr. Abdullah Abdullah to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/1223),

Welcoming the letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General of 19 December 2001 (S/2001/1217), and *taking note* of the United Kingdom offer contained therein to take the lead in organizing and commanding an International Security Assistance Force,

Stressing that all Afghan forces must adhere strictly to their obligations under human rights law, including respect for the rights of women, and under international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority established by the Bonn Agreement,

Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Authorizes*, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment;

2. *Calls upon* Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the International Security Assistance Force, and invites those Member States to inform the leadership of the Force and the Secretary-General;

3. *Authorizes* the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;

4. *Calls upon* the International Security Assistance Force to work in close consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority in the implementation of the force mandate, as well as with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

5. *Calls upon* all Afghans to cooperate with the International Security Assistance Force and relevant international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and welcomes the commitment of the parties to the Bonn Agreement to do all within their means and influence to ensure security, including to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all United Nations personnel and all other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan;

6. *Takes note* of the pledge made by the Afghan parties to the Bonn Agreement in Annex 1 to that Agreement to withdraw all military units from Kabul, and calls upon them to implement this pledge in cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force;

7. *Encourages* neighbouring States and other Member States to provide to the International Security Assistance Force such necessary assistance as may be requested, including the provision of overflight clearances and transit;

8. *Stresses* that the expenses of the International Security Assistance Force will be borne by the participating Member States concerned, *requests* the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund through which contributions could be channelled to the Member States or operations concerned, and encourages Member States to contribute to such a fund;

9. *Requests* the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force to provide periodic reports on progress towards the implementation of its mandate through the Secretary-General;

10. *Calls on* Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces;

11. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX E

MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT²¹⁰

Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan ('Interim Administration').

Preamble

Referring to the 'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions', signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, ('Bonn Agreement'), The Interim Administration welcomes the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386.

The ISAF welcomes the Interim Administration's commitment in the Bonn Agreement to co-operate with the international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organised crime and to respect international law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the international community.

Article I: General Obligations

1. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the Bonn Agreement requires a major contribution on its part and will make strenuous efforts to co-operate with the ISAF and with the international organisations and agencies which are assisting it.
2. Interim Administration understands and agrees the Mission of the ISAF is to assist it in the maintenance of the security in the area of responsibility as defined below at Article I paragraph 4(g).
3. The Interim Administration agrees to provide the ISAF with any information relevant to the security and safety of the ISAF mission, its personnel, equipment and locations.
4. For the purposes of this Military Technical Agreement, the following expressions shall have the meaning described below:
 - a. 'The Parties' are the Interim Administration and the ISAF.
 - b. 'ISAF' includes all military personnel together with their aircraft, vehicles, armoured vehicles, stores, equipment, communications, ammunition, weapons and provisions as well as the civilian components of such forces, air and surface movement resources and their support services.
 - c. The 'Interim Administration' is the organization as detailed in the Bonn Agreement.
 - d. 'Military Units' includes all Afghan factions, armed representatives or personnel with a military capability, to include all mujahidin, armed forces, and armed groups, other than the 'Police Force' defined at paragraph 4e. The

²¹⁰ Military Technical Agreement, 4 January 2002, available at <<http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf>>.

definition of 'Military Units' in this context does not include the ISAF, Coalition Forces or other recognized national military forces.

e. The Interim Administration 'Police Force' means individuals who have been formally appointed as Police by the Interim Administration, are recognizable, and carry official identification. The Police Force includes the national security police, the criminal police, the uniform police, the traffic police and the border police.

f. 'Host Nation Support' (HNS) is the civil and military assistance rendered by the Interim Administration to the ISAF within Afghanistan.

g. Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the area marked out on the map attached at Annex B.

h. 'Coalition Forces' are those national military elements of the US-led international coalition prosecuting the 'War on Terrorism' within Afghanistan. The ISAF is not part of the 'Coalition Forces'.

i. An 'Offensive Action' is any use of armed military force.

j. Designated Barracks to be agreed between the parties and to be detailed at Annex C.

5. It is understood and agreed that once the ISAF is established, its membership may change.

Article II: Status of the International Security Assistance Force

1. The arrangements regarding the Status of the ISAF are at Annex A.

Article III: Provision of Security and Law and Order

1. The Interim Administration recognizes that the provision of security and law and order is their responsibility. This will include maintenance and support of a recognized Police Force operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and Afghanistan law and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking other measures as appropriate.

2. The Interim Administration will ensure that all Afghan Military Units come under its command and control in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. The Interim Administration agrees it will return all Military Units based in Kabul into designated barracks detailed at Annex C as soon as possible. Such units will not leave those Barracks without the prior approval of the Interim Administration and notification to the ISAF Commander by the Chairman of the Interim Administration.

3. The Interim Administration will refrain from all Offensive Actions within the AOR.

4. A Joint Co-ordinating Body (JCB) will meet on a regular basis. The JCB will comprise of designated Interim Administration officials and senior ISAF representatives. The purpose of the JCB will be to discuss current and forthcoming issues and to resolve any disputes that may arise.

Article IV: Deployment of the ISAF

1. UNSCR 1386 authorizes the establishment for six months of an international force to assist the Interim Administration in the maintenance of security in the AOR. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF is the international force authorized by UNSCR 1386 and may be composed of ground, air and maritime units from the international community.

2. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF Commander will have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the ISAF and its Mission.
3. The Interim Administration understands and agrees the ISAF will have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of Afghanistan. The ISAF will agree with the Interim Administration its use of any areas or facilities needed to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable.
4. In consultation with the Interim Administration, the ISAF Commander is authorized to promulgate appropriate rules for the control and regulation of surface military traffic throughout the AOR.
5. The ISAF will have the right to utilize such means and services as required to ensure its full ability to communicate and will have the right to the unrestricted use of all of the electromagnetic spectrum, free of charge, for this purpose. In implementing this right, the ISAF will make every reasonable effort to co-ordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration.

Article V: Illustrative Tasks of the ISAF

1. The ISAF will undertake a range of tasks in Kabul and surrounding areas in support of its Mission. ISAF will make every reasonable effort to co-ordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of the Interim Administration. Possible tasks, which may be undertaken jointly with Interim Administration Forces, will include protective patrolling.
2. By mutual agreement between the ISAF Commander and the Interim Administration the ISAF may:
 - a. Assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures.
 - b. Assist the Interim Administration in reconstruction.
 - c. Identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan security forces.
3. The ISAF will liaise with such political, social and religious leaders as necessary to ensure that religious, ethnic and cultural sensitivities in Afghanistan are appropriately respected by the ISAF.

Article VI: Identification

1. ISAF personnel will wear uniforms and may carry arms if authorized by their orders. Police Force personnel, when on duty, will be visibly identified by uniform or other distinctive markings and may carry arms if authorized by the Interim Administration.

Article VII: Final Authority to Interpret

1. The ISAF Commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Military Technical Agreement.

Article VIII: Summary

1. The purposes of the obligations and responsibilities set out in this Arrangement are as follows:
 - a. To provide the necessary support and technical arrangements for the ISAF to conduct its Mission.
 - b. To outline the responsibilities of the Interim Administration in relation to the ISAF.

Article IX: Final Provisions

1. Certified copies of this Military Technical Agreement will be supplied in Dari and Pashto language versions. For the purposes of interpretation the English language version of this Military Technical Agreement is authoritative.

Article X: Entry into Force

1. This agreement will enter into force upon signature by the Participants.

| | |
|--|---|
| Signed by the Minister Of Interior, QANOUNI | Signed By General McColl, COMISAF |
| | |
| On behalf of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan | On behalf of the International Security Assistance Force |
| Dated | Dated |
| Witnessed by BG DE Kratzer for Lt Gen PT Mikolashek Coalition Forces Land Component Commander | |
| Dated | |

Annexes:

- A. Arrangements Regarding the Status of the International Security Assistance Force.
- B. Map of Area of Responsibility.
- C. Designated Barracks.

**ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE
STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE**

SECTION 1: JURISDICTION

1. The provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on mission will apply *mutatis mutandis* to the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel.
2. All ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, enjoying privileges and immunities under this Arrangement will respect the laws of Afghanistan, insofar as it is compatible with the UNSCR (1386) and will refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of the Mission.
3. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will under all circumstances and at all times be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offences which may be committed by them on the territory of Afghanistan. The Interim Administration will assist the ISAF contributing nations in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions.
4. The ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, will be immune from personal arrest or detention. ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, mistakenly arrested or detained will be immediately handed over to ISAF authorities. The Interim Administration agree that ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to the custody of, an international tribunal or any other entity or State without the express consent of the contributing nation. ISAF Forces will respect the laws and culture of Afghanistan.

SECTION 2: ENTRY INTO AND DEPARTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN

5. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, may enter and depart Afghanistan with military identification and with collective movement and travel orders.
6. The Interim Administration understands and agrees that the ISAF will have the unimpeded right to enter Afghan airspace without seeking prior diplomatic clearance.

SECTION 3: INDEMNIFICATION, CLAIMS AND LIABILITIES

7. ISAF will be exempt from providing inventories or other routine customs documentation on personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering and exiting or transiting Afghanistan territory in support of the International Security Force. The Interim Administration will facilitate with all appropriate means all movements of personnel, vehicles, aircraft or supplies, airports or roads used. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft used in support of the mission will not be subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance. ISAF will use airports, roads without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges. However, ISAF will not claim exemption from reasonable charges for services requested and received, but operations/movements and access will not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such services.
8. ISAF will be exempt from taxation by the Interim Administration on the salaries and emoluments and on any income received from outside the Interim Administration.

9. ISAF and their tangible movable property imported into or acquired in Afghanistan will be exempt from all identifiable taxes by the Interim Administration.
10. The ISAF and its personnel will not be liable for any damages to civilian or government property caused by any activity in pursuit of the ISAF Mission. Claims for other damage or injury to Interim Administration personnel or property, or to private personnel or property will be submitted through Interim Administration to the ISAF.

SECTION 4: FORCE SUPPORT

11. The ISAF will be allowed to import and export free of duty or other restriction, equipment, provisions and supplies necessary for the mission, provided such goods are for official use of ISAF or for sale via commissioners or canteens provided for ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel. Goods sold will be solely for the use of ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, and not transferable to other participants.
12. The ISAF will be allowed to operate its own internal mail and Telecommunications services, including broadcast services, free of charge.
13. The Interim Administration will provide free of cost, such facilities as the ISAF may need for the execution of the Mission. The Interim Administration will assist the ISAF in obtaining at the lowest rate, the necessary utilities such as electricity, water and other resources necessary for the Mission.
14. Nominated representatives of ISAF will be allowed to contract direct with suppliers for services and supplies in Afghanistan without payment of tax or duties. Such services and supplies will not be subject to sales or other taxes. ISAF Forces may hire local personnel who will remain subject to local laws and regulation. However, local personnel hired by ISAF will:
- a. Be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.
 - b. Be immune from National Service and/or national military service obligations.
 - c. Be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the ISAF.
15. The Interim Administration will accept as valid, without tax or fee, drivers licences and permits issued to ISAF and supporting personnel, including associated liaison personnel, by their respective national authorities.


SECTION 5: MEDICAL AND DENTAL

16. The Interim Administration will permit the importation and carriage of controlled drugs as required by ISAF and as officially issued to individual personnel.
17. The Interim Administration will ensure that ISAF Forces and MEDEVAC aircraft, including helicopters, will be given the highest priority to transit to, within and from the relevant operation area and given unrestricted access to the airspace of Afghanistan to fulfill any emergency mission.

SECTION 6: APPLICATION

18. The protections hereby set out shall apply to the ISAF and all its personnel, and to forces in support of the ISAF and all their personnel. This will not derogate from additional protections, rights and exemptions other forces operating in connection with the ISAF may negotiate separately with the Interim Administration or the follow-on Government.

AO: KABUL AND ITS SURROUNDING AREAS



**ANNEX C
TO THE MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT
DATED 4 JAN 02**

LOCATION OF MILITARY BASES WITHIN KABUL AOR

| SER | NAME & TYPE OF UNIT | LOCATION | COMMENT |
|-----|--|----------------------------|---------------|
| 1. | 055 LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION | KHYER KHANA | |
| 2. | 315 TRANSPORT BRIGADE | KHYER KHANA | |
| 3. | 10 ENGINEER DIVISION | KHANJA BOGHRA | |
| 4. | 255 TANK BRIGADE | KHANJA BOGHRA | LOCATION ONE |
| 5. | 219 TRANSPORT REGIMENT | KHANJA BOGHRA | |
| 6. | NATIONAL GUARD UNIT | KHANJA BOGHRA | |
| 7. | POLICE SUPPLY BASE | KHANJA BOGHRA | |
| 8. | 2 ND GUARD REGIMENT | KHANJA RAWASH FIELD | KABUL AIRPORT |
| 9. | AIRPORT PROTECTION BATTALION | KHANJA RAWASH FIELD | KABUL AIRPORT |
| 10. | AVIATION UNIVERSITY | KHANJA RAWASH FIELD | KABUL AIRPORT |
| 11. | 22 ND CITY PROTECTION REGIMENT | SHARI NAO | |
| 12. | 717 ENZIBAT SUPERVISION DIVISION | QALA-I-MARANJAN | |
| 13. | 52 ND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION | 1 ST MICROROYAN | |
| 14. | AIR DEFENCE UNIT | 1 ST MICROROYAN | |
| 15. | AIR DEFENSE REGIMENT | TATA-I-MARANJAN | |
| 16. | NATIONAL GUARD | BALA HISSAR | |
| 17. | AIR DEFENCE UNIT | BE BE MAHRO HILL | |
| 18. | 5 TH TRANSPORTATION REGIMENT | SEYA SANG | |
| 19. | PROTECTION & COMMUNICATION BATTALION | TELEVISION HILL | |
| 20. | POLICE PROTECTION DIVISION | MICROROYAN | |
| 21. | 101 SECURITY PROTECTION | GARNESION | |
| 22. | 1 ST GUARD REGIMENT | PALACE (ARGE) | |
| 23. | OPERATORY POLICE DIVISION | DEHMAZANG | |
| 24. | 5 TH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MAIN OFFICE | DARUL AMAN | |
| 25. | 235 UNIT | DARUL AMAN | |
| 26. | 21 PROTECTION DIVISION | DARUL AMAN | |
| 27. | 206 DETECTIVE UNIT | PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN | |
| 28. | 205 DETECTIVE UNIT | DARUL AMAN | |
| 29. | 3 RD GUARD REGIMENT | TAJBEEK HILL | |
| 30. | 313 ESCOT UNIT | TAJBEEK HILL | |
| 31. | 61 ZARBATE (SERIES) DIVISION | MAHTAB QALA | |
| 32. | 88 TOOY (T) REGIMENT | DARUL AMAN | |
| 33. | MILITARY SCHOOL (HARBE SHOWANZY) | MATAB QALA | |
| 34. | MUSIC BATTALION | MATAB QALA | |
| 35. | MILITARY UNIVERSITY (HARBE POHANTOON) | PULLY CHAR KHI | |
| 36. | TECHNICAL ACADEMY | PULLY CHAR KHI | |
| 37. | 57 TRAINING DIVISION | HOOD KHEL | |
| 38. | CENTRAL ARMY REPAIR CENTRE | HOOD KHEL | |
| 39. | TECHNICAL SCHOOL (SHOWANZI-I-TEKHN) | HOOD KHEL | |
| 40. | SENIOR OFFICERS COURSE (KORSE-I-ALEE-I-AFSARAN) | PULLY MAHMOD KHAN | |
| 41. | SECURITY DIRECTORATE OF KABUL CITY | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |
| 42. | 1 ST INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |
| 43. | 2 ND INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |

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| 44. | 3 RD INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |
| 45. | 4 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |
| 46. | 5 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |
| 47. | 6 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |
| 48. | 7 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | AIRPORT BLOCKS | |
| 49. | 8 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | KARTA-1-NAO | |
| 50. | 9 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | KARTA-1-NAO | |
| 51. | 10 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | KHYER KHANA | |
| 52. | 11 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | KHYER KHANA | |
| 53. | 12 TH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE | ARZAN QEMAT | |
| 54. | MILITARY FIREFIGHTING SECTION | ASMAEE STREET | |
| 55. | MILITARY WORKSHOP | ASMAEE STREET | |
| 56. | MILITARY MUSEUM | DARUL AMAN | |
| 57. | ACADEMY FOR MEDICAL SCIENCE | BB BE MAHRO | |
| 58. | MILITARY HEALTH CENTRE | SHANI NAO | |
| 59. | LOGISTICS INSTALLATION | SHANI NAO | |
| 60. | 2 ND MILITARY HOSPITAL | PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN | |
| 61. | MILITARY SLAUGHTER HOUSE | PULLY MAHMOOD KHAN | |
| 62. | MILITARY VEHICLE PARK | MICROROYAN | |
| 63. | | SHASH DARAK | |
| 64. | GARNISON HEADQUARTERS | SHASH DARAK | |
| 65. | 4 TH TANK PARKING DEPOT | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 66. | 10 TH TANK PARKING DEPOT | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 67. | RESERVIST TRAINING INSTITUTION | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 68. | PRODUCTION DEPOT | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 69. | MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 70. | 10 TH ENGINEERING COMPANY | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 71. | MILITARY CLOTHING STORAGE DEPOT | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 72. | STORAGE DEPOT | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 73. | 255 TANK BRIGADE | PULLY CHARKHY | LOCATION TWO |
| 74. | 4 AND 15 MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX | PULLY CHARKHY | |
| 75. | 5 TH TRANSPORT COMPANY | KHANJA BOGHRA | |
| 76. | 704 COMPANY | KHANJA BOGHRA | |
| 77. | 220 AVIATION COMPANY | NORTH OF AIRPORT | |
| 78. | TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INSTALLATION | KHYER KHANA | |
| 79. | MILITARY STORAGE DEPOT | KHYER KHANA | |
| 80. | FOOD STORAGE DEPOT | KHYER KHANA | |
| 81. | 16 TH TANK BATTALION | OIL TANKS | |
| 82. | 1 ST INFANTRY BATTALION | KARGHA | |
| 83. | MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUILDING | DARUL AMAN | |
| 84. | DARUL AMAN PALACE BUILDING | DARUL AMAN | |
| 85. | UNIT 195 T BUILDING | DARUL AMAN | |
| 86. | CENTRAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATION BUILDING | DARUL AMAN | |
| 87. | MILITARY SLAUGHTER HOUSE | PULLY MICROROYAN | |
| 88. | MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX | QAMBER CROSS ROAD | |
| 89. | MILITARY HOUSING COMPLEX | QAMBER CROSS ROAD | |
| 90. | MILITARY TECHNICAL WORKSHOP | SHARE POOR | |

APPENDIX F

PHOTOGRAPHS

Afghan People and Kabul City





Transfer of Authority



Training



Patrolling



Information and Psychological Operations



CIMIC







Relations

