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NATO ENLARGEMENT

AND

ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

By

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ABSTRACT

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

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NATO, which has been throughout the Cold War a collective defense organization, was considered either useless or out of date with the end of the Cold War. However, as it did in the early years of the Cold War, habitually originating from its own dynamics, NATO transformed itself in order to meet the imperatives of the post-Cold War international environment. The geographical enlargement of NATO is the centerpiece of this whole transformation process. It bears implications not only for NATO itself but also for the foreign policy that Euro-Atlantic states follow. The partnership and membership aspects of the geographical enlargement preserved NATO's credibility and served NATO on its way to become a security community, and both aspects ensured NATO's survival. As such, the establishment of relations either through partnership, membership or other way with NATO became the objective of CEE, Balkan, Caucasian, and Central Asian countries, on their way to acquire a democratic, peaceful, and Western identity. In this context, NATO addressed the concerns of a community of 46 states in the Euro-Atlantic region. Meanwhile, on part of Turkey, there appeared some opportunities and setbacks. While consolidating Turkey's western identity on the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia, NATO enlargement brought new concerns to Turkey's agenda regarding regional security as well as Turkey's position in its only and most institutional and functional linkage with the Western Europe and the U.S. After the admission of three new members to NATO in 1999, the pros and cons of a second round of NATO enlargement requires an examination in depth as the decision time gets closer, not only for NATO but also for Turkey.

Keywords: NATO, alliance, security, identity, partnership, membership, expansion, enlargement, Turkey, regional, Eurasia, Euro-Atlantic, institution, organization, defence, zone, sphere, influence, interest

ÖZET

NATO'NUN GENİŞLEMESİ VE TÜRKİYE ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ

ÇATAL, ERDOĞAN

Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans

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Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca bir ortak savunma kuruluşu olan NATO, bu dönemin sona ermesiyle gereksiz veya çağdışı olarak düşünülmüştür. Ancak, NATO, Soğuk Savaşın ilk yıllarında olduğu gibi, 1990larda da, değişen uluslararası ortamın gereklerini yerine getirmek maksadıyla alışılmış şekilde kendi iç dinamiklerinden kaynaklanan bir değişim uygulamıştır. NATO'nun coğrafi genişlemesi, bir bütün olan değişim sürecinin en merkezi parçasını teşkil etmektedir. Coğrafi genişleme sürecinin hem NATO ve hem de Avrupa-Atlantik ülkelerinin izledikleri dış ve güvenlik politikalarında önemli yeri olmuştur. Bu sürecin ortaklık ve üyelik kısımları NATO'nun geçerliliği ve saygınlığını korumuş, NATO'ya bir güvenlik topluluğunun tesisi yolunda yardım etmiş ve NATO'nun bekasını temin etmiştir. Aynı şekilde, NATO ile ister üyelik, ister ortaklık, ve ister diyalog yoluyla ilişkiler tesis etmek, Orta ve Doğu Avrupa'dan Orta Asya'ya kadar bütün ülkelerin demokratik, barışçı, ve batılı bir kimlik kazanmak yolunda hedefleri olmuştur. Bu ortamda NATO, 46 ülkenin oluşturduğu Avrupa-Atlantik topluluğunun düşüncelerine hitap etmiştir. Bu süreç Türkiye için de önemli fırsatlar ve sakıncalar yaratmıştır. NATO'nun genişlemesi, bir yandan Türkiye'nin batılı kimliğini Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya'da perçinlerken, öte yandan Türkiye'nin Batı Avrupa ve Amerika ile tek ve en kurumsal ve en fonksiyonel bağı olan NATO içindeki konumu ve bölgesel güvenlik çıkarlarını doğrudan etkileyecek koşullar yaratmıştır. Bugün, 1999 yılında üç yeni üyenin NATO'ya katılmasının ardından, ikinci bir genişleme sürecinin artı ve eksilerinin derinlemesine incelenmesi, karar zamanı yaklaştıkça, hem NATO ve hem de Türkiye açısından gereklilik arz etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, ittifak, genişleme, Türkiye, Avrasya, Avrupa-Atlantik, güvenlik, kimlik, ortaklık, üyelik, savunma, bölgesel, yayılma, etki bölgesi, ilgi bölgesi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANP	Annual National Plan
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EPfP	Enhanced Partnership for Peace
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
IOs	Interoperability Objectives
IPP	Individual Partnership Programs
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PCC	Partnership Coordination Cell
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PfPTC	PfP Training Center
PJC	NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
PMSC	Political-Military Steering Committee
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Command Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
STANAGs	Standardized Agreements
SU	Soviet Union
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TGS	Turkish General Staff
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Commands
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US, USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP	Warsaw Pact
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION


The end of the Cold War has profoundly transformed Europe's security situation. Although traditional security issues remain important, the most immediate threats to security since 1989 have originated not from relations between states, but from instability and conflict within states that have threatened to spill over into the interstate arena. The revolutions of 1989 not only discontinued communism but also released a set of dynamics that have disjoined the peace orders of Yalta and Versailles. War in the Balkans, instability in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union, growing doubts about Europe's future as well as the future role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) underscored the lack of any stable post-Cold War European and Euro-Atlantic security order.¹ States' efforts to shape and control this new security environment have resulted in a unique hybrid arrangement containing elements of traditional alliances, state and community building, and collective security. (See Figure 1) By mid-1990s, the elements of Euro-Atlantic security build-up were in place with NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Partnership for Peace (PfP), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU).²

Amidst these old and new arrangements, NATO, which has been, all throughout Cold War period, a collective defense organization, was considered either

¹ R. Asmus, R. Kugler, "Building a new NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, Is. 4, Sep/Oct93, pp. 28-41
² Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard: The War in the Balkans*, 1994, p. 55, and Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 1998, p. 74, and also Gregory Flynn, Henry Farrell, "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the 'Construction' of Security in Post-Cold War Europe", *International Organization*, Vol. 53, Is. 3, Summer 99, pp. 505-536

useless or out-of-date by some statesmen and scholars at the beginning of the last decade of 20th century.³ In order to meet the imperatives of the changing international environment, NATO had to transform. This study intends to cover only one of the aspects of this adaptation process, namely the geographical enlargement of NATO. I contend that the geographical enlargement of NATO, especially on the part of Turkey, bears implications not only for NATO itself but also for the foreign policy that Euro-Atlantic states follow. Accordingly, in this context, this study has significance because the arguments and views presented in this study can be brought up when, or if, the process of enlargement continues in the following years.

Figure 1: Euro-Atlantic Security Structure in 1997



At this initial stage of my research, I wish to define the term "alliance". First, the alliance is in its most standard definition from Glenn Snyder; "a formal association of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified

³ Jan Willem Honig, *NATO: An Institution Under Threat*, 1991, p. 3

circumstances, against states outside of its own membership"⁴, as in NATO during the Cold War.

Second, because today the security organizations began to have the meaning beyond the task of defence and protection, it is also helpful to bear in mind the definition of alliance by Stephen Walt:

"a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, not a collective security agreement, an arrangement between states with very different regimes and political views and values, coming together of the states with similar and mutually reinforcing strategic interests and ideological principles, with a dense web of élite contacts and subsidiary agreements which exert influence on the attitudes and behavior of members, as in NATO today."⁵

Third, as broader approaches to international security and peace became popular, I also find it useful to quote the definition of Frank Schimmelfennig:

"from a constructivist viewpoint, NATO is best understood neither simply as a form of alignment (as in neo-realism), nor as a functional international institution (as in neo-liberalism), but as an organization of international community of values and norms. NATO is embedded in the Euro-Atlantic or "Western" community and represents its military branch".⁶

More clearly, I propose to adopt a combination of above approaches, which present strategic ideological, institutional, functional, and cooperational aspects of commitments on behalf of the member and non-member states.⁷

⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 4

⁵ Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?", *Survival*, Vol. 39, Is. 1, Spring 1997, p. 157

⁶ Frank Schimmelfennig, "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation", *Security Studies*, Vol.8, Is.2/3, Winter98-99, Spring 99, p. 213

⁷ See Chapter 4 for an elaborate approach to this linkage between NATO and its definition as an alliance with the direction that NATO is orienting itself. It is also helpful to understand the meaning of the Chapter 3 regarding NATO's transformation and enlargement with these approaches to alliance.

As for, the term "enlargement", in a broader context, it is defined as any kind of expansion, geographical, institutional, organizational and functional, so that NATO would be able to adapt itself to changing conditions. However, the scope of the thesis will be limited to examining the partnership approaches of PfP, EAPC, and membership expansion of NATO only from a viewpoint of geographical enlargement. At this point, the enlargement will include the accession of new member states to NATO, new institutional and organizational initiatives, the redefinition of the Transatlantic Area, and the promotion of "NATO Membership" idea to non-members. The other main issue of functional enlargement through NATO's acquiring new missions beyond its original duties will only shortly be touched upon in this study.

In this thesis, the geographical enlargement process is considered to have two main features. First is the enlargement of the geographical scope of NATO through institutional means such as PfP and EAPC. Second is the geographical expansion of NATO by acquiring new members into the alliance. This study also aims to examine the implications of the above-mentioned enlargement process for Turkey.

In conformity with this consideration, I suggest the following research questions:

What are the arguments for and against partnership (PfP and EAPC) activities in the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic region?

What are the arguments for and against NATO's acquisition of new members before and after the first round of enlargement?

What are various conflicting arguments and implications of the two aspects of NATO's geographical enlargement for Turkey's security and regional stability?

To meet the envisaged purpose of this thesis, primarily a short but detailed summary of the Cold War and post-Cold War dynamism of NATO will be provided in the second chapter. Moreover, a review of the events leading to the conclusion of NATO's first round of post-Cold War geographical expansion through membership enlargement will be presented. The second chapter aims to put forward the antecedents from a historical causal perspective with the emphasis that NATO has a habit of adaptation to changing circumstances. In addition, this study will also attempt to describe Turkey's position vis-à-vis the first actual enlargement at the beginning of the Cold War, when Turkey became a member of the Alliance.

The third chapter will provide descriptions of PfP and EAPC. The significance of the examination of PfP and EAPC stems from the fact that they represent NATO's initial efforts to institutionalize its adaptation process by way of cooperative relations with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. Especially PfP has been defined on various platforms as a pathway to NATO membership for non-member partners. The EAPC members are also likely to have similar aspirations.⁸ Third chapter will put forward arguments for and against partnership (PfP and EAPC), regarding its functions and performances following the descriptions of two initiatives on a complementary and historical basis. Finally, I will examine Turkey's approach to partnership enlargement, the implications of partnership activities for Turkey, such as exercises, training programs, operations, and other activities, within PfP.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the second aspect of the enlargement process, which is the admission of new states as members. In this chapter, along with the fundamentals and possible approaches of the membership expansion process, I shall

⁸ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliances New Roles in International Security*, USIP, 1998, p. 94, 103

examine the arguments for and against NATO's membership enlargement. Finally, I shall analyze the implications of the enlargement process for Turkey.

At the end of this study, I will outline an overall summing up of the major answers to the research questions together with my personal views on NATO's enlargement process. Although I do not intend to test theoretical propositions, I believe that the IR theory may provide an analyst with useful insights to better comprehend international affairs. For that reason, my treatment of the topic will also include references to the theory of international relations to the extent that such references will help to clarify the issues I am dealing with. The sources to be utilized in this study are not only Primary Sources from NATO and other official sources along with statistical or quantitative data released by official organs, but also Secondary Sources from International Periodicals on IR Literature. With these limitations and organizing principles, the objective of the thesis will be to provide an informative document on NATO Enlargement. It attempts to provide an assessment of the geographical enlargement and its implications for Turkey and the region.

CHAPTER 2

2. NATO'S DYNAMISM

After the WWII, when Western Europe was economically devastated and militarily weak, to the East stood a massive Soviet presence consolidating its gains through creating satellite regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In the immediate years following the end of WWII, Soviet Union maintained 5 million troops. The most mobile and ready portion of these troops were kept in Eastern Europe and amounted to 30 Divisions. In their susceptible position to Soviet or Soviet-backed movements, along with economic disaster, fragile democratic situation, and dispirited populations, Western Europeans sought means to assure their well being and survival.⁹ Although the WWII ally, the U.S., guaranteed their security and promised to help, Western Europe needed solid reassurances and commitments. In this context, through hardship, the Atlantic Alliance turned into the institutional framework for a secure future in Europe.

2.1. The Origins of the North Atlantic Alliance

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the outcome of many elaborate initiatives that took place after WWII.¹⁰ First of these initiatives was the US-British initiative to keep the machinery of information exchange that was created and based on the military structure of the allies during the WWII, which continued to function after 1945. This opened the way to the initiative called “fraternal association” in March 1946.¹¹ The French-British Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947

⁹ Richard Kuggler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War*, 1993, pp. 30-36, cited in Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 1998, p. 13

¹⁰ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Historical Aspects”, in *NATO Enlargement Opinions and Options*, ed. Jeffrey Simon, INSS, 1995, pp. 21-32, and *NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, 1998, p. 25-27

¹¹ Sean Kay, op. cit., p. 14

aimed to address the possibility of the renewal of German nationalism and Soviet intentions in the east like that of Greek civil war.¹² Then Truman Doctrine was initiated in March 1947, aiming to strengthen Turkey and Greece against communism. The Marshall Plan, too, providing economic assistance for Western Europe was designed to prevent the rise of nationalism, promote democracy, and establish containment of the Soviet Union. There were also the institutionalization initiatives, which were carried out synchronously with Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan from 1947 on. The creation of Brussels Pact, after the collapse of four power dialogue on Germany, and the growing fear of Soviet challenge, proved an initiative aimed at founding a Western Union of a collective understanding backed by power, money and resolute action.¹³ The Vandenberg Resolution envisaged an organization of continuous and effective self-help, mutual aid, and burdensharing. The Washington working group, which framed the Transatlantic Community, was another initiative that contributed to the development of NATO spirit. The group included US, Canada, and the Brussels Pact Powers.

The negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of an Atlantic alliance began on December 10 1948. The members of the Washington working group; the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to negotiations in March 1949. Finally, on April 4 1949, the representatives of 12 North Atlantic Community states signed the North Atlantic Treaty.

3.1. Dynamic Perspective of the North Atlantic Alliance

The primary reason for the Alliance was the Soviet threat in Central and Eastern Europe. The West Europeans were also threatened by the menacing presence

¹² D. S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: Alliances New Roles in International Security*, USIP, 1998, p. 28

of the Soviet Union and its early and newly acquired European satellite states. Although the Soviet threat and the emerging bipolar system were the driving factors, the dynamic vision of the alliance was put together by the help of multiple contributions, emerging from a series of voluntary interactions between democratic nations in Europe and North America.¹⁴ First, it was envisaged to use the alliance, in order to enhance the principles of peaceful international relations and democracy, as to reflect a broader purpose than collective defence. Second, in order to meet the challenge of fragile economies, weak political systems, spread of nationalism and communism, the alliance was meant to provide economic and military assistance as to maintain the necessary and sufficient room to European allies for creating their own national security perspective. Third, with the determination of the U.S. on the issue, the alliance was kept in such a special institutional form that gave priority to burdensharing and to strengthening the capacity of European allies to help themselves. Thus, at its founding, NATO was intended to perform four tasks.¹⁵

- The collective defence posture against the Soviet Union.
- The reassurance provided to Western Europeans for their security as to make them assume responsibility for their own security and thus enhance alliance burdensharing.
- Strengthening and expanding the international community based on democratic principles, individual liberty, and the rule of law in a peaceful international society.
- Building necessary institutional structures within the alliance and the ally states to maintain the achievement of all kinds of relevant duties.

¹³ Ibid., p. 28

¹⁴ David Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", *Survival*, Vol. 40, Is. 2, Sum. 1998, p. 135

¹⁵ D. S. Yost, USIP, op. cit., pp. 47-72, Sean Kay, op. cit. p. 33, and Lawrence S. Kaplan op. cit. p. 21

However, the most dynamic features originated from the North Atlantic Treaty.¹⁶ Above all, the NAC had the power to establish subsidiary bodies as might be necessary (Article 9). The Alliance had the mechanism to enlarge (Article 10). The members could review the treaty (Article 12). Any member could leave the Alliance on its own will (Article 13). Apart from extra measures to meet requirements for change, these features gave the Alliance capacity for change and adaptation.¹⁷

2.3.NATO's Dynamic Character During the Cold War

In its early years of founding, NATO was insufficiently organized to honor its security guarantee to its members. Along with the Soviet and communist expansion in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Far East, the unbalanced conventional postures, the technological parity regarding nuclear capabilities, the military organizational inadequacies of NATO urged the alliance to straight things out. The years from 1950 to 1952 witnessed geographical, organizational, and institutional expansions of NATO from political consultation to defense planning, from military restructuring to founding subsidiary military or political organs, from organizational locationings to geographical military deployments. Especially, the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 prompted the allies to "put the 'O' in NATO", with the persuasion to organize an integrated military command structure in peacetime.¹⁸

The most remarkable achievements can be enumerated as the establishment of Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), the merge of Western European Union military organization to NATO, the establishment and the operationalization of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the accession of two

¹⁶ See Appendix 1

¹⁷ Sean Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 34

¹⁸ David S. Yost, *USIP, op. cit.*, p. 29, and also Sean Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 35

new members, Greece and Turkey.¹⁹ Moreover, NATO synchronously made efforts to establish standardization, interoperability, and the means of information flow. These efforts can be described as infrastructural expansions.²⁰

By the year 1954, the requirements for the wellbeing of the alliance's new posture began to show up. The initial efforts in the long way in order to reach the goal of a united Europe or to a "European Union", were put forward after the Paris agreement. This was one of the major steps by which NATO was urged to cover a larger part of Europe.²¹ Thus, the need for the accession of Germany to NATO as a precondition for the fulfilment of collective defense plans proved inevitable and West Germany became a member of NATO on May 5 1955. Shortly after, the USSR with the application of the same reasoning to establish another collective defense pole in Europe, with Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania concluded the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).²² Moreover, by the early 1980's rather the same kind of reasoning for the smoothness and effectiveness of collective defense plans had influenced and necessitated the accession of Spain to NATO.²³ (See Figure 2)

Above all, NATO also met new challenges by the 1960s. In this era, increasing tensions between two superpowers, the Cuban Crisis, the events leading up to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and also the French withdrawal from NATO's military command structure proved vital tests for NATO's survival.

¹⁹ *NATO Handbook, An Alliance for the 1990's*, 1989, p. 100, and L. S. Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 24-26


²⁰ Sean Kay, op cit., p. 41

²¹ David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", op. cit., p. 31

²² *NATO Handbook*, 1989, op cit., p. 101, and L. S. Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 26-29

²³ L. S. Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 30-31

Figure 2: The Bipolar Rivalry of the Cold War²⁴



In this context, the Harmel Report of December 13 1967 opened the door for the reassessment of NATO's institutional tasks and provided NATO with a new doctrine. The Harmel Doctrine broadened NATO's scope to include coordinating multilateral activities in order to relax tensions with the Soviet Union. This doctrine was based on parallel policies of maintaining adequate defense while seeking the relaxation efforts in a context where the Mutually Assured Destruction²⁵ (MAD) was recognized.²⁶

It is also to be noted that Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty described the geographical limits of the Article 5 obligations.²⁷ In other words, Article 6 excluded the military operations out of the North Atlantic Treaty area. This principle was particularly significant important when decolonization problems of the U.K., France,

²⁴ The map reflects the geographical bipolarity in Europe, from David Yost, USIP, op. cit.

²⁵ The MAD portended that in case of a nuclear attack from either side both sides would be annihilated because the two superpowers had acquired substantial amount of nuclear weapons, and did not have means to evade the opponent's second strike capability.

²⁶ "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", (Harmel Report), Paragraph 15, *NATO Basic Texts*, December 13-14 1967, Brussels, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b671213a.htm>

²⁷ See Appendix 1

and Portugal had the potential to burden NATO. The Harmel Doctrine, however, mentioned to the possibility of out-of-area activities. It adopted that events occurring outside the treaty area can also be the subject of consultation within the Alliance. It accepted that the preservation of peace and security in the treaty area could be affected by events elsewhere in the world. Therefore, the NAC was empowered to consider the overall international situation on deciding whether the event needs reaction or not.²⁸ During the Cold War, however, the implementation of the Harmel Doctrine did never go beyond consultation because the allies did not reach unanimity for an out-of-area operation.

2.4.NATO's Dynamism in the post-Cold War Era

The common aspect of the expansion and adaptation was that all the arguments for the two processes have met with little objections, due to the context of the Cold War.²⁹ Nevertheless, with the unification of East and West Germany and the demise of the USSR, the Cold War ended. The rebirth of collective security aspirations, along with fears of nationalism, the changes regarding the European security with the attempts to introduce militarily and politically more active institutions to international arena, even as to challenge NATO, brought up new debates which evolved around NATO's validity in this post-Cold War context.³⁰ However, as far as the security aspect is concerned, no serious difficulty emerged in the beginning of the 1990s. It was made clear that NATO would not be extending security guarantee to any part of the former communist-ruled part of Europe, not

²⁸ See *NATO Handbook*, 1989, op. cit., p. 20, and also "Harmel Report", op. cit., par. 15

²⁹ Stanislav Kirschbaum, "Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution?", in ed. C. Philippe David, op. cit., p. 197; and also see the below section related to Turkey's membership to NATO.

³⁰ J. F. Paganon, "The WEU Path", in *NATO Enlargement Opinions and Options*, ed. J. Simon, 1995, pp. 35-42, and also R. L. Kuggler, *Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor*, ed. Kuggler, 1996, pp. 1-7

even to CEE.³¹ NATO was adamant on not spreading its protective umbrella eastwards across the old Cold War dividing line through Europe. On the other hand, however, it was known that without NATO the small states of the CEE were facing two options: either a weak alliance or entente amongst themselves or the domination of the Serbian or Russian power.³²

Furthermore, NATO appeared paralyzed when confronted with the horrific civil conflict that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. The UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO were unable to prevent or put an end to war in the Balkans, although the years from 1991 to 1995 were a period of considerable institutional efforts and activities.³³ However, the deadlock in finding a lasting solution, combined with collective fears of chaos in post-Cold War Europe, led to revitalization of NATO and minimization of the role of UN. Actually, NATO shifted from the role of a "subcontractor" responding to restrained UN requirements to a more active participant in seeking to stop the fighting and in defining its own mission and mandates.³⁴ Indeed, Bosnia provided the opportunity for NATO's first out-of-area action and set an important precedent, providing the legitimacy needed for further policies of enlargement and intervention in Kosovo.³⁵ NATO's role in helping to create the conditions for peace and in implementing its military aspects illustrated how the Alliance has adapted to the new security environment since the end of the Cold War.³⁶ At the same time, this constituted the beginning of a new transformation process. However, this time the transformation has been initiated by forces outside of NATO, such as UN call in July

³¹ Christopher Cviic, *Remaking the Balkans*, 1991, p. 91, and also Jan Willem Honig, op. cit., p. 5

³² Mark Almond, op. cit., p. 352

³³ Thomas M. Leonard, "NATO Expansion: Romania and Bulgaria within the larger context", *East European Quarterly*, Winter99, Vol. 33, Is. 4, p. 528, and also Sean Kay, op. cit., p. 5

³⁴ Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO", *Survival*, Vol. 39, Is. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 19-20

³⁵ Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 21, Is. 2, August 2000, pp. 56-58

³⁶ Gregory L. Schulte, op. cit., p. 20

1992 to NATO to enforce UN embargoes in Adriatic Sea. At first, all of NATO's out-of-area operations were undertaken under the authority of the UN Security Council. However, in June 1999 NATO's intervention in Kosovo took place before a UN mandate was approved.³⁷ At the same time, the synchronous impetus originating from outside of NATO gave reality to many aspects of NATO's transformation.³⁸

2.4.1. NATO's Transformation

During the Cold War, NATO's overriding objective was to deter or defend against an attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union and its allies. Collective defense was the cornerstone of the alliance. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that each member promises to assist any other member with "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security" of the Euro-Atlantic area.³⁹ Today, Russian conventional forces are not a threat to its neighbors and Western Europe. However, most allied states continue to emphasize NATO's traditional core mission of collective defense, in case Russia one day again puts on a threatening posture. CEE's emphasize that they view collective defense under Article 5 as the principal reason for their desire to join NATO.⁴⁰ NATO facilitated the collective defense of its members during the Cold War, and enlarged merely for strategic and collective defense reasons. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it had to adapt to a new, radically changed security environment. The post-cold war era urged NATO to transform its geographical,

³⁷ Beverly Crawford, *op. cit.*, p. 57

³⁸ Gregory L. Schulte, *op. cit.*, p. 20

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 396, Article 5, par. 1

⁴⁰ Stanislav Kirschbaum, "Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution?", in ed. C. Philippe David, *op. cit.*, p. 210

organizational, and institutional identity to the new context in order to survive.⁴¹ An overall summary of this transformation can be explained as follows:⁴²

At the London summit of July 1990 and the Rome summit of November 1991 the vision of a new Strategic Concept indicated NATO's desire for change. NACC, formed in November 1991, brought former adversaries together to talk and to begin multilateral cooperation, short of partnership. The emerging political dialogue helped CEE former WP states to understand NATO's contemporary defense requirements. The New Strategic Concept also envisaged a number of new functions short of conventional combat, such as crisis-management and anti-terrorist measures.

In January 1994, PfP and CJTF were introduced to create a new NATO with both internal and external changes. PfP changed enormously since its inception at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. Though some in CEE initially saw PfP as a pathway to enlargement, PfP only moved non-NATO members beyond dialogue and into practical partnership. It developed a framework and process, and established the norm that partners should be contributors and marked a shift from purely multilateral dialogue to bilateral (partner and Alliance) relationships in the form of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) and self-differentiation. It marked the establishment of a wide environment of cooperation, to include the Planning and Review Process (PARP), transparency, civil control of the military, and peace support operations.

In September 1995 NATO agreed on enlargement procedures and objectives. After the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the July 1997 Madrid Summit made PfP more relevant and operational by introducing enhanced PfP. It introduced

⁴¹ "NATO Adaptation/Enlargement", *Fact Sheet*, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, February 12 1997; available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_natoadapt.html

⁴² Charles-Philippe David, "Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse than Disease? NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock", in ed. C. P. David and Jacque Lévesque, op. cit., p.10, and Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership For Peace (PfP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo", *NDU Strategic Forum*, No. 167, Aug. 1999 available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum167.html>

the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and NATO-Ukraine Commission to keep Russia and Ukraine engaged in the partnership. At the same time, the NACC was turned into a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. EAPC became the most important indicator of NATO's strengthened political structure in the post-cold war era in a newly defined Euro-Atlantic community, whose members score up to 46 states today.⁴³ It announced three PfP states, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary with prospective admission. In April 1999 Washington Summit, these three states joined NATO. The 1999 summit also introduced programs to make PfP more operational and approved a new Strategic Concept. New partnership programs, however, created serious challenges for the Alliance in the form of greater differentiation among the 26 partners.⁴⁴

Created as a transatlantic fortification to defend Europe against a Soviet-led international and transnational communist movement, NATO transformed into an instrument of collective security in the new Europe. Thus, it took on new missions, such as peacekeeping, peace enforcing, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance.⁴⁵ According to NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991, risks to allied security were less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies. However, due to the changing context risks were anticipated to stem from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties caused by ethnic and territorial disputes in CEE.⁴⁶

Thus, the present day NATO began to take shape in 1991. The style, strategy, and substance of NATO's moves in the Balkans and CEE influenced the credibility

⁴³ See Chapter 3 of this study for detailed description of EAPC, and also <http://www.nato.int/natotopics>, p. 8

⁴⁴ Jeffrey Simon, op. cit., text available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum167.html>

⁴⁵ *NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, 1998, op. cit., p. 27, John Sewall, Jeffrey Simon, "Moving from Theory to Action, NATO in the 1990s," *National Defense University Strategic Forum*, No. 12, November 1994, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/z1206.html>

⁴⁶ David S. Yost, USIP, op. cit., p. 25; and also *NATO Handbook 50th Anniversary*, op. cit., p. 67

of NATO, WEU, EU, and OSCE.⁴⁷ By 1995, several NATO operations were providing support to UN Peacekeeping in the Balkans.⁴⁸ The plans that NATO has undertaken since 1993 with NACC (EAPC) and PfP were put into practice. NATO proved its ability to deploy 60.000 troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina and anywhere in the Balkan Peninsula when needed.⁴⁹ Peacekeeping has brought together military forces from 33 countries within the PfP. Eager to show their willingness to contribute to a NATO operation and to enhance their prospects for membership of the Alliance, the non-NATO member PfP countries' contingents reached 10.000 troops.⁵⁰

2.4.2. NATO's Enlargement

Late in his administration, by the early 1990s, President George Bush suggested the expansion of NATO beyond its current sixteen members.⁵¹ The North Atlantic Council (NAC), in its July 1990 London Summit, declared that it was possible for the Alliance to reach out to the countries of the East and extend them the hand of friendship.⁵² The first outcome became the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) whose function was to promote cooperation with the non-member states in Euro-Atlantic area. The NACC was open to former Warsaw Pact (WP) states and to the Newly Independent States (NIS) and focused largely on military cooperation.⁵³

In April 1993, Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, respectively the Presidents of the Czech Republic and Poland urged the new U.S. President Bill Clinton to expand

⁴⁷ David S. Yost, USIP, op. cit., p. 193, 251

⁴⁸ Sean Kay, op. cit., p. 79

⁴⁹ "Building Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo", at <http://www.nato.int/welcome/home.htm>

⁵⁰ James Gow, "Stratified Stability: NATO's New Strategic Concept", *EES Occasional Paper*, No. 52, at: <http://wwics.si.edu/PROGRAMS/REGION/ees/occasional/gow52.html>

⁵¹ J. W. Honig, op. cit., p. 5, 13

⁵² David S. Yost, op. cit., p. 73

⁵³ *NATO Handbook, Partnership and Cooperation*, 1995, p. 43, and Jeffrey Simon, op. cit. pp. 48-51, and also Gülnur Aybet, "NATO's New Missions", *Perceptions*, Vol. 4, Is. 1, p. 3, on text available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/default.htm>

NATO eastward.⁵⁴ The Clinton Administration, encouraged by demands from CEE states and backed above all by Germany, proposed the enlargement of the alliance at the January 1994 NATO summit. Instead of following suit, the allies initiated the PfP program at this summit and remained cautious about enlargement.⁵⁵ Thus, PfP moved from a mere concept to implementation.⁵⁶ PfP aimed to encourage its members to democratize themselves and provided a framework for evaluating states that may be interested in joining NATO. The program offered training to states in such areas as development of civilian control of the military, adaptation to NATO practices in military doctrine or operations in the field, and peacekeeping.⁵⁷ Another initiative of this summit was the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This concept was designed to enable NATO forces and military assets to be employed in a more flexible manner to deal with regional conflicts, crisis management and peacekeeping operations. In the NAC Brussels summit of January 1994, the agreement on reliance of WEU on NATO for military staff work, command structure, logistics, intelligence, and lift, constituted a significant effort of adaptation⁵⁸ regarding the "separable but not separate capabilities".⁵⁹ NATO declared its readiness to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the NAC, for Western European Union (WEU) operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their common security and defense policy.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ Thomas M. Leonard, op. cit., p. 524

⁵⁵ See Chapter 3 of this study for a detailed approach to PfP objectives and activities.

⁵⁶ Yüksel İnan, İslam Yusuf, "Partnership For Peace", *Perceptions*, June-Aug 99, p.69

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 72-73, and also Robin Bhatti, Rachel Bronson, "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia", *Survival*, Vol. 42, Is. 3, Autumn 2000, p.131

⁵⁸ J. G. Ruggie, "Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO's Future", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 20, Is. 1, Winter 97, p. 116

⁵⁹ "Partnership for Peace: Declaration of the Heads of State and Government", 10-11 Jan. 1994, par. 6

⁶⁰ "Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications", *Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of NATO*, Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, February 24 1997, U.S. Department of State, text available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html

At the 1994 Brussels summit, NATO members also undertook a study that would describe NATO's path towards enlargement. The study was released in September 1995. It stated that new members must accept the full range of NATO responsibilities, both political and military, such as building up a military establishment under a civilian democratic control and capable to contribute to collective defense.⁶¹ At this summit, NATO also initiated a Mediterranean Dialogue where today all NATO member states and 7 Mediterranean countries, namely Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, envisaged cooperative activities in both political and military domains.⁶²

A further step in the process of enlargement came at the NATO Ministerial Meeting of 1996. The allies agreed to invite "one or more" candidate states (all PfP members were considered in this category) to begin accession negotiations at the NATO summit of July 1997. NATO was open to the accession of new members and the communique stated that the goal was to admit new members into NATO by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in April 1999 while the door remains open.⁶³

2.4.3. NATO's Enlargement and the Former Adversaries

Most European allies wished to establish relations with Russia on firmer footing before proceeding with enlargement.⁶⁴ In 1996, France proposed negotiation of a NATO-Russia charter that would outline a cooperative framework in security matters. The U.S. administration was at first doubtful about the proposal, but French support for the idea ultimately led to negotiations, in which U.S. played a key role.

⁶¹ "Excerpts from Study on NATO Enlargement", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 45, Is. 4, July/Aug 98, pp. 46-48, and *NATO Basic Text*, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9501.htm>

⁶² *NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, 1998, op. cit., p. 81; and also <http://www.nato.int/natotopics>, p. 12

⁶³ Ministerial Meeting of NAC, *Final Communique*, Berlin, June 3 1996, and Gerald B. Solomon, "Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO Enlargement", *Orbis*, Vol. 41, Is. 2, Spring 97, p.214

On May 27, 1997, the negotiations resulted in a document called the Founding Act. The symbolic achievement of France had led to a substantial achievement of NATO. Although the Founding Act contributed to maintaining stability on the continent, it also made NATO and the U.S. increasingly dominant in the European security arena and made NATO the focal point of European security.⁶⁵ In the Founding Act, NATO declared that it will not in the foreseeable future station nuclear weapons on new members' soil, but that it may do so should the need arise. NATO further stated that military infrastructure adequate to assure new members' security under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would be maintained on their territory. The alliance pledged not to place substantial combat forces in the current and foreseeable security environment on new members' territory, but underscored its intention to increase interoperability, integration, and reinforcement capabilities with the new states. The Founding Act also established a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for consultation on matters of mutual interest, such as peacekeeping, nuclear and biological weapons proliferation, and terrorism, without interfering with NATO's or Russia's internal matters.⁶⁶

The Founding Act reflected the concerns of some allies that Russia should be consulted during the enlargement process. At the same time, in the light of clear indications that the alliance would proceed to enlargement with or without Moscow's acquiescence, some Russian critics contended that President Yeltsin had little choice but to sign the document, although the document gave Russia no substantive

⁶⁴ For an elaborate description of the facts around which the discussions revolve see; Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO and the have nots", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, Is. 6, Nov/Dec 96, pp. 13-21

⁶⁵ M.Claude Plantin, "NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs", in *The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, ed. C. Philippe David, Jacques Lévesque, 1999, p. 105

⁶⁶ "For NATO, eastward ho!", *Economist*, Vol. 342, Is. 8006, January 3, 1997, pp. 49-52, and also David S. Yost, op. cit., pp. 141-144

influence over NATO decision making.⁶⁷ In the U.S., some critics, however, contended that the document gave Russia a foothold in NATO decision making, and that Russia might use the opening to prevent the alliance from implementing new missions such as crisis management and peacekeeping.⁶⁸

Indeed, at Paris on May 27 1997, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, neither clearly limiting NATO's authority to station troops or weapons nor blocking NATO's planned eastward expansion brought Moscow into a powerful consultative position with its former western adversaries. This paved the road to Madrid and a new era of peaceful coexistence in Europe between Russia and NATO.⁶⁹

Furthermore, with a parallel approach to cooperation and a delicate balancing act, in order not to leave Ukraine to Russian sphere of influence, NATO initiated the NATO-Ukraine Partnership in the Sintra bilateral meeting on July 8 1997. NATO concluded the initiative the day after, in Madrid summit and turned it into a charter.⁷⁰

2.4.4. The Madrid Summit of 1997

After the Russian uneasiness had been soothed, it was the time to discuss about the advantages and disadvantages of the 12 former eastern bloc nations seeking admission to NATO, namely Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.


⁶⁷ Sergei Plekhanov, "NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics", in ed. C. Philippe David, Jacques Lévesque, op. cit., pp. 171-182

⁶⁸ "For NATO, eastward ho!", op. cit., and also David S. Yost, op. cit., pp. 139-143

⁶⁹ N. N. Afanasievski, "On the NATO-Russia Founding Act", in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton A. Bebler, 1999, pp. 75-79, and Martin Kahl, "NATO Enlargement and Security in a Transforming Eastern Europe", in *NATO Looks East*, ed. P. Dutkiewicz, R. J. Jackson, 1998, pp. 28-25

⁷⁰ Graeme P. Auton, "The US and an Expanded NATO", in P. Dutkiewicz, op. cit., p. 185-186

Figure 3: NATO Membership Aspirant European Countries⁷¹



The central issue at the Madrid summit was enlargement and its form, although other issues such as agreement over a new alliance command structure, enhancing Partnership for Peace, and further refinement of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept were dealt with as well.⁷²

On June 12 1997, Clinton administration announced that the U.S. would support the candidacies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary for admission to NATO. Poland and the Czech Republic became candidates with the strongest support. Both border Germany and lay between NATO and Russia. Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary (which provided critical support to U.S. and NATO Bosnia operations), had a readiness and ability to undertake the military and political obligations of membership, including domestic political and economic reforms and the end of any prolonged claims against neighbors.⁷³ These three states had made the

⁷¹ The map is taken from "For NATO, eastward ho!", op. cit., p. 50

⁷² See Chapter 4 of this study for a detailed description of the paths to enlargement. See P. E. Gallis, "NATO Enlargement: The Process and Allied Views", *Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Document*, July 1, 1997, p.6, available at: <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/eap/gallis/gsummary.htm>

⁷³ Madeleine Albright, "Perspective On NATO: Expansion Does Not Stop Here", July 3 1997, the text available at <http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/armscontrol/archive/1997/july/nat0703a.html>

greatest progress in reforming their militaries, developing democratic institutions and a free market, and ensuring civilian control of the military. Moreover, Germany was the greatest supporter of these countries.⁷⁴

The other states had also strong sponsors. France and Turkey supported Romania and Bulgaria.⁷⁵ Italy and Canada supported Slovenia. The Nordic NATO members supported the Baltic republics for admission to NATO. The U.S. officials concluded that the Baltic States' militaries were not sufficiently strong to contribute meaningfully to collective defense. Some U.S. and allied officials stated that the Baltic States could not be adequately defended under Article 5 due to their geographic location, and the countries that cannot be defended should not be admitted.⁷⁶ Romania and Bulgaria have recently moved firmly on the path towards democracy, and were struggling to implement a free-market economy. However, it was believed that they must make further progress towards civilian control of their military. Slovenia had a small defense force, able to make only a minimal military contribution to NATO.⁷⁷

Following the military success in Bosnia and its new security architecture in place by 1997, NATO was finally ready to decide on enlargement. Although allied states had lobbied to provide invitations to these states at Madrid, the U.S. views became dominant. Three countries were chosen at the Madrid summit on a compound of several criteria. At the end of 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, the allies eventually invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join NATO. They declared that the door would be open to any other country ready and willing to

⁷⁴ J. Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision", in Anton A. Bebler, op. cit., pp. 30-33


⁷⁵ See Chapter 4 of this study for Turkey's views for the necessity to include the Balkans in the Alliance.

⁷⁶ Bo Huldt, "The Enlargement and the Baltic States", in Anton Bebler, op. cit., p. 171-172

⁷⁷ David S. Yost, op. cit., p. 41

shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership.⁷⁸ The new members were admitted to NATO in 1999 Washington summit.⁷⁹

Figure 4: The Enlargement of NATO ⁸⁰



⁷⁸ *NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, 1998, op. cit., p. 83

⁷⁹ See Chapter 4 of this study for a detailed examination of the admission of new members to NATO.

⁸⁰ This figure reflects the understanding of sphere of influence by NATO Enlargement in the newly defined Euro-Atlantic Region based upon the information provided in official websites at: <http://www.shape.nato.int/pfp.htm> and <http://www.nato.int/docu/topics/2000/home.htm>

2.5. Turkey vis-à-vis NATO Membership and NATO Enlargement

2.5.1. The First Enlargement Round In the Cold War

Turkey was one of the earliest applicants for NATO's earliest enlargement move. After WWII, Turkey had been one of the first countries to receive the U.S. aid. However, in 1949, Turkey had been rejected when she had applied for NATO membership. At the time, Turkey's rejection had caused some important disillusion and anxiety.⁸¹ First, the efforts on keeping the wisdom of Westernization, which has always been the general philosophy of Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy, had begun to be questioned. Second, in spite of the U.S. efforts to keep Turkey distant from Soviet sphere of interest, the Soviet threat to Turkey had continued to exist as evidenced by a series of incidents. Third, Turkish authorities had believed that the establishment of NATO without Turkey would lead to Ankara's abandonment by the Western allies.

However, in the following years, after the U.S. proposal had been voted for at the meeting of the NAC in September 1951, in Ottawa, and later after the protocol of entry for Turkey had been signed in February 1952, in Washington, Turkey became a member of NATO.⁸² To this end, Turkey, right after the UN Resolution to this effect, had decided to assign a contingent of 5.000 troops for the war in Korea in 1950. This concrete attitude and the prowess that Turkish troops displayed in Korean War was influential as to convince the U.S. leaders about the usefulness of Turkey as an ally. After WWII, because of the continuing threat to her immediate neighborhood, Turkey had preserved her readiness as to be capable of offering troops up to 22 Divisions to allies. Especially after the Korean War this had a dramatic meaning in a

⁸¹ Mehmet Gönlübol, "NATO and Turkey, An Overall Appraisal", in *International Relations The Turkish Yearbook*, Vol. 11, 1971, p. 13

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 14

nuclear balance established between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Britain's interests in the Middle East as to the establishment of an alliance in order to keep her hand in the region had been backed up by Turkish promise to play a positive role. This promise had made Britain withdraw her objections about Turkish membership to NATO.

On the other hand, at the time, there had also been arguments against Turkey's admission to NATO in particular and NATO's enlargement in general.⁸³ First, Turkey's NATO membership would have meant the extension of security commitments to the Caucasian border of the Soviet Union and this would have increased danger of war by risking an armed conflict with the S.U. on account of Turkey. Second, Turkey's level of conventional power would have added on the part of NATO an indispensable weight to the balance on conventional force structure. This would in turn have increased the efforts for armsrace. Then, Turkey's membership to NATO would have spread NATO thin in its mission as a fortification against Soviet Union by weakening NATO organizationally. With an increase in the number of NATO members, the amount of the U.S. aid on part of the smaller allies of NATO would have been decreased. Finally, because Turkey had not been a part of the western civilized world, Turkish membership to NATO would have created an identity question and would have negatively affected the alliance cohesion. Curiously enough, the Western European allies are reiterating some of these arguments for today against Turkey's EU membership. However, once Turkey's NATO

⁸³ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Context", in *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, ed. J. Chipman, 1988, p. 89, and Mehmet Gönlübol, op. cit., p. 14

membership was realized, Turkey consolidated its Western orientation through this institutional and functional linkage.⁸⁴

2.5.2. Turkey's Perspective on the Post-Cold War Enlargement

Since its foundation, Turkish leaders have worked to build a state that has a strong Western component. Once it joined the Alliance, Turkey made efforts to contribute to NATO's every activity towards acquiring new missions. However, Turkey's participation in these transformed NATO activities has also developed piecemeal from passive naval posts to active peacekeeping activities on the ground from 1992 in Adriatic Sea to 1999 in Kosovo. Within this framework, in earlier expansions of NATO (Germany and Spain), Turkey had acted in parallel with the consensus reached in the NAC. Accordingly, before the beginning of accession talks with the three candidates, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, to NATO, President Süleyman Demirel stated that Turkey would welcome the new members and adapt itself to further enlargement.⁸⁵ On the other hand, when NACC was established and later PfP was initiated Turkey extended its friendly hand to all the former WP countries as early as 1990. Turkey perceived the PfP, as the basis of a dynamic and evolving Euro-Atlantic security system. It committed itself to widen and deepen its relations with partner countries and attached particular importance to the operational role of that initiative.⁸⁶ Furthermore, as an enthusiastic participant in NATO's PfP, Turkey established a PfP training center in Ankara.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, Is. 1, Fall 2000, p. 209

⁸⁵ Süleyman Demirel, Statement at the Signing Ceremony of NATO-Russia Founding Act, Paris, 27 May 1997, *NATO Speeches*, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970527f.htm> and also see Chapter 4 of this study for Turkish concerns about NATO's membership enlargement.

⁸⁶ Onur Öymen, Statement at the opening of the ministerial meeting of the NACC/EAPC, Sintra, May 30 1997, *NATO Speeches*, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997>; Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "NATO Enlargement and the South, A Turkish Perspective", *Security Dialogue*, Vol 30, Is. 2, 1999, p. 215

⁸⁷ See Chapter 3 of this study for Turkey's approach to PfP and its activities.

CHAPTER 3

3. ENLARGEMENT THROUGH PARTNERSHIP

Out of the ruins of World War II, the United States and Europe formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO successfully protected Western Europe from Soviet attack and brought to Europe one of its longest periods of stability in history. Out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and ashes of the Cold War, NATO launched a new security structure for Europe. This was the picture of a new NATO, a NATO revealing its commitment to a wider Euro-Atlantic stability, with the PfP and EAPC at its very center.⁸⁸ Accordingly, it is the aim of this chapter to describe the facts underlying this security structure while enumerating the arguments of both proponents and opponents of both PfP and EAPC. Because the historical evolutionary aspects and the overall arguments of both PfP and EAPC are closely related and complementary, these initiatives will be examined under the general heading of the PfP.

3.1. The Genesis and Evolution of PfP

During the Cold War, the Soviet acceptance of united Germany's NATO membership and transformation of NATO from an anti-Soviet alliance to a security institution offering cooperation and partnership to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was perceived something impossible.⁸⁹ However, in May 1990, President Bush announced such a possibility in an ambitious agenda for the upcoming NATO summit. Consequently, NATO delivered an invitation for cooperation, first through a

⁸⁸ Javier Solana, "Partnership for Peace: A Political View", Remarks on PfP Defence Planning Symp., Oberammergau, 15 Jan. 1998, *NATO Speech*, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980115a.htm>

⁸⁹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "The Cold War's endgame and German unification", *International Security*, Spring97, Vol. 21, Issue 4, pp. 159-186, the review article of both: Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, "A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity", Baden-Baden,

symbolic declaration at the Turnberry Ministerial meeting in early June 1990, to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries.⁹⁰ The invitation was reiterated at the NATO London Summit in July 1990.⁹¹ The London summit declaration started a process in which NATO began its adaptation to the post-Cold war era. It:

- announced the end of the Cold War,
- invited the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to establish permanent liaison missions with NATO,
- announced a restructuring of NATO's conventional force posture together with new initiatives for the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations,
- changed NATO's nuclear strategy to make nuclear forces weapons of last resort and announced unilateral reductions of NATO's nuclear stockpile.

The London summit, while opening the way to cooperation, constituted the first step toward establishing institutionalized ties with the former WP countries. Right after the summit NATO began making regular contacts with its former enemies. Subsequently, in November 1990 in Paris, NATO and former WP nations signed a Joint Declaration stating that they no longer regarded each other as adversaries⁹².

The November 1991 Rome Summit was notable for the publication of an historic framework document, laying down NATO's new strategy based not only on

Germany, Nomos, 1996, and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1995

⁹⁰ North Atlantic Council, "Message From Turnberry", Turnberry, United Kingdom 7-8 June 1990, *Ministerial Communiqués*, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm>

⁹¹ "Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council", (The London Declaration), London, 6 July 1990, *NATO Basic Texts* at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b900706a.htm>

⁹² *NATO Review*, December 1990, No. 6, p. 26

collective defence, but also on cooperation and dialogue with all European countries. A major initiative throughout this initial process of reconciliation was the construction of the joint NATO/Partner North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which held its first meeting in Dec. 1991.⁹³

The NACC met regularly at ambassadorial level and bi-annually in ministerial sessions. Under the auspices of the NACC, a cooperation programme or Work Plan was developed in 1992. This laid the foundation of cooperation and dialogue⁹⁴. It was limited to areas such as the sharing of information and observation of military exercises. It simply performed a series of activities without a permanent structure. These collection of activities, however, envisaged a new concept designed to meet the security concerns of the CEE countries and the filling of the security vacuum created in the heart of the continent. Major reasons for this arrangement were the persistent demands by the East Europeans to join the alliance, the unstable situation in Russia and the developments in the Yugoslav crisis. These same concerns were also behind the PfP and NATO's membership enlargement policy.⁹⁵

At the June 1993 meeting of the NACC foreign ministers in Athens, expanding NATO's membership was not yet on the agenda.⁹⁶ Later that year, the U.S. administration revealed the upcoming NATO summit's agenda by stating that a doctrine of containment must be replaced by a strategy of enlargement. This strategy

⁹³ *NATO Review*, December 1991, No. 6, p. 19, and David Yost, *NATO Transformed: Alliances New Roles in International Security*, USIP, 1998, p. 94

⁹⁴ NACC meeting at NATO Hqs, Brussels, 18 Dec. 1992 "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation", *Ministerial Communiqués*, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c921218b.htm>

⁹⁵ In late April 1993, at the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., President Clinton met some CEE leaders, including the highly regarded leaders of Poland and the Czech Republic, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel. Each delivered the same message to Clinton: their top priority was NATO membership. See also Madeleine Albright, "NATO Enlargement: Advancing America's Strategic Interests", US Department of State Dispatch, Mar. 1998, Vol.9, Is. 2, pp. 14-16

⁹⁶ James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision", *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1998, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 87

would seek to update NATO, so that the expansion of market economies and democracies should be protected by an enlarged system of collective security.⁹⁷

The idea for creating a peacekeeping partnership with the CEE and NIS was originally conceived by SACEUR, General John M. Shalikashvili.⁹⁸ During the summer and fall of 1993, Washington studied the issue of developing military ties between NATO and its former adversaries.⁹⁹ In September 1993, during the preparations for the announced summit the U.S. proposed a solution in the form of a “Partnership for Peace.” Officials at the Pentagon favored the PfP idea. From their standpoint, it was non-sense to talk about expansion until after NATO had established the type of military-to-military relationships that would enable new countries to integrate effectively into the Alliance. The Pentagon supported a sequential approach toward enlargement: countries would participate in the PfP for a number of years and then the Alliance might start addressing the issue of membership expansion.¹⁰⁰

In October 1993, at the informal Travemunde-Germany meeting of the NATO defense ministers, Les Aspin, then U.S. secretary of defense, presented for the first time a detailed proposal for PfP.¹⁰¹ He sought to gain Alliance support for the new project, and emphasized that NATO would not enlarge soon.¹⁰² The launching of the PfP program was also supported by an increased U.S. involvement in the handling of the war in the former Yugoslavia. The PfP was intended to be an

⁹⁷ Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”, Lecture at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, U.S. Policy Information and Text, 23 Oct. 1993, No. 97, pp. 6-12, and *National Security Adviser's Foreign Policy Speech*, 21 Sep. 1993, Washington

⁹⁸ US European Command Homepage, text available at: <http://www.eucom.mil/programs/pfp>, and Madeleine Albright, "NATO Welcomes Three New Members", *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 10, Is. 2, pp. 1-5, and also Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "America's stake in Russia today", *Orbis*, Winter 97, Vol. 41, Is. 1, pp. 31-39

⁹⁹ Goldgeier, op. cit., p. 86.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 87-88.

¹⁰¹ M. Ruehle, N. Williams, "PfP: A Personal view from NATO", *Parameters*, Winter 94, p.67, also David Yost, op. cit., p. 97

agreement between the sixteen NATO countries and each “partner for peace,” to offer the possibility of controlled cooperation.¹⁰³ It was also an activity within the NACC, instead of a new form of independent cooperation, which enables member states to put off questions of formal enlargement and of NATO’s current disposition in post-Cold War Europe.¹⁰⁴

At Travemunde, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, one of the first advocates of NATO’s enlargement,¹⁰⁵ received the U.S. initiative positively. The Germans eagerly embraced the PfP, as to constitute the European bridgehead of PfP, even though their interpretation of its significance differed from that of the U.S. From German point of view, PfP served and represented Germany's new Ostpolitik.¹⁰⁶ Germany also noted that PfP was not to be regarded as a substitute to NATO membership.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, to Germans, this initiative had inadequate relationship with NACC. They believed that opportunities were limited for a broad-based political cooperation because of PfP’s focus on military cooperation. There was also ambiguity within NATO about how and to what degree to include Russia in partnership activities.¹⁰⁸

However, despite its weaknesses, PfP was better than an alternative regional alliance in CEE¹⁰⁹ or a deal with Moscow in order to keep the CEE region under control.¹¹⁰ For Germany, the PfP, despite its shortcomings, was an excellent opportunity to work for the integration of the CEE countries into both NATO and the

¹⁰² Goldgeier, op. cit., pp. 91-92

¹⁰³ M. Ruehle, N. Williams, op. cit., p.67

¹⁰⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, “Strategic Visions”, *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1994, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 113

¹⁰⁵ Volke Ruehe, “Shaping Euro-Atlantic policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era”, *Survival*, Summer 1993, Vol. 35, pp. 129-137

¹⁰⁶ David Haglund, “Germany’s CE Conundrum”, *European Security*, Spring 1995, Vol. 4, No.1, p.35

¹⁰⁷ David Yost, op. cit., p.110

¹⁰⁸ Volke Ruehe, op. cit., pp. 132-134

¹⁰⁹ J. Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision", *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, Is. 4, 1997, p. 703

¹¹⁰ W. E. Odom, “NATO Expansion: Why the Critics Are Wrong”, *National Interest*, Spring 95, p.41.

EU. PfP was an opportunity not only to ensure security in the heart of Europe, “but also to keep the Germans themselves from any choices between East and West.”¹¹¹

At the Brussels NATO summit in January 1994, three PfP documents were approved; an invitation to countries wishing to take part in the program, a framework document for the PfP, and a document laying out the understanding of the PfP and Partners by NATO members.¹¹²

The PfP began to function under the NAC. The Alliance invited partners to participate in NATO’s political and military activities in PfP framework. Moreover, a self-differentiation approach allowed each Partner to determine the nature and depth of the cooperation, unlike NACC whose work plan applied to everyone. Every partner, with regard to its own capacity and desire, planned its own pace and scope for cooperation. They were also expected to define their own ways of work with the alliance. Furthermore, a 16+1 formula permitted the alliance to handle the approach and will of every partner individually and led to the formulization of Individual Partnership Programs (IPP). Finally, it was made clear to the CEEs that NATO was concerned about their internal stability and security, without giving them a formal guarantee of security and without letting Moscow accuse NATO of enticing these countries into the Western bloc, by allowing Russia, too, to take part in.¹¹³

All members of PfP were invited to establish liaison offices with NATO headquarters, as well as Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE). PfP became flexible concerning the degree of engagement that every state wishes to

¹¹¹ Jonathan Eyal, op. cit., p. 703

¹¹² *NATO Ministerial Press Communiqués*, M-1(94)2, Annex to M-1(94)2, and M-1(94)3, Brussels, 10 Jan. 1994, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110a.htm>

¹¹³ Sam Nunn, "NATO and the successors of the Soviet Empire", *Washington Post*, 26 Dec. 1993, *Partnership for Peace Framework Document*, above M-1(94)2, Brussels, 11 January 1994, Sect. 3.

perform with NATO. There was also the possibility of new agreements with the Alliance in case NATO accepted cooperation on the fields a partner proposes.¹¹⁴

On the other hand, the activities of the PfP began to be coordinated with those of the NACC, to provide effectiveness and avoid duplication of the NACC work plan. PfP activities in the fields of crisis control and military planning, especially the planning of exercises and other training activities were coordinated via the newly established Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, which functioned under the NAC.¹¹⁵

By the end of 1994, with the introduction of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) for the interested Partners, the emphasis within the PfP shifted from peacekeeping exercises to planning. Those countries that chose to integrate closely with NATO planning were invited to join the PARP. They were, every two years, to exchange data on their defense plans and budgets, and identify areas in which they agree to improve interoperability between their military forces and those of NATO. PARP applied to a variety of fields such as: peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.¹¹⁶ Moreover, a Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) became the most active PfP forum. It could meet, depending on the subject, in various combinations:¹¹⁷

- the 16, (only alliance members)
- the 16+1, (alliance members plus one partner)
- the 16+several partners, (alliance members plus one or more partners)
- in a full NACC combination, (all members of NATO and all partners)

¹¹⁴ "CBM, NATO, NATO Expansion, Norway, NWFZ, PfP", *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*, Apr99, Vol. 36, Is. 2, pp. 288-290

¹¹⁵ M. Ruehle, N. Williams, op. cit., p. 69, and also *NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998, p. 90

¹¹⁶ *NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition*, op. cit., p. 91

¹¹⁷ M. Ruehle, N. Williams, op. cit., p. 70

Furthermore, the activities of the NACC and the PfP were being increasingly combined. The PfP concentrated on practical defense-related and military cooperation activities, while the NACC was the forum for broad consultations on security issues, including security-related political and economic issues.¹¹⁸ The purpose of PfP was to enable intensive political and military-to-military cooperation with Europe's new democracies as well as other states, such as the neutrals. In order to create a practical security cooperation that Europe needed most, PfP sought to develop and strengthen the capacity to work together in the fields of peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian operations.¹¹⁹ PfP facilitated transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes, and democratic control of defence forces by supporting reform of militaries and defense ministries. By pushing Partner militaries' democratizations, it created a potential of reforms, which can spill over to other parts of society. PfP also provided engagement of these CEE states in a wide range of practical NATO efforts, from standardizing equipment and procedures to joining alliance forces both in military exercises and in the crisis zone of Bosnia.¹²⁰ However, the allies also recognized the need to complement PfP with a more political forum than NACC.¹²¹

Foreseeing the inevitable enlargement of NATO membership, NATO made PfP a means to enlarge NATO without weakening the alliance and without provoking a hostile response from Russia, to admit only a few countries without

¹¹⁸ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, *Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1994/1995*, Brussels, 2 December 1994

¹¹⁹ Javier Solana, "SG's Speech to the North Atlantic Treaty Association Assembly", *NATO Speeches*, Rome, 4 Nov. 1996.

¹²⁰ Alain Pellerin, "NATO Enlargement: Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us", *Aurora Papers* 29, 30 May 1997, Chapter 3 available at: http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/aurora_29/part04.htm

¹²¹ NAC Defense Ministers Session, 13 June 1996, par. 22, available at: <http://www.nato.int>, also with a similar approach to that of NATO's Defense Ministers' in June 1996, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen underlines in April 1997 Madrid summit the need for the enhancement of the PfP. The answer came as the EAPC.

isolating the others.¹²² Thus, NATO began to prepare solutions to prevent the emergence of new “dividing lines” in Europe after enlargement. In order to give the partnership with “non-Allies” a new and more profound meaning, NATO’s September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement" announced that PfP would become a significant institution for strengthening security in Europe secondary to NATO enlargement.¹²³

The Allied and Partner Foreign Ministers meeting at Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997, dissolved NACC and merged its role with PfP under an overarching cooperation organization, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC attempted to give partners an added sense of involvement with the alliance and allowed them to build stronger political relations with the Alliance.¹²⁴ With a decision to strengthen PfP it offered:¹²⁵

- First, greater involvement of Partners in decision making within the PfP and scope for them to develop their own PfP programs by enabling Partners to choose as many as they wish from amongst a broad menu of PfP options, ranging from civil aviation activities to peace enforcement exercises,
- Second, with an expanded scope of PfP exercises with the emphasis on increased quality and sophistication, unlike previous approach the alliance began to include peace enforcement missions in its exercises,
- Third, the involvement of Partners in planning and execution of PfP activities, unlike previous practices where the partner representatives were involved in planning phase only as liaison personnel,

¹²² Robert E. Hunter, "Maximizing NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, Is. 3, May/Jun99, pp. 190-204

¹²³ Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels, NATO, September 1995, par. 34 -36.

¹²⁴ Javier Solana, "Remarks by the Secretary General of NATO", Opening of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970530a.htm>

- Fourth, the appointment of Partners to international posts at the PCC in Mons,
- Fifth, the involvement of national personnel from Partner nations in the Alliance's CJTF Headquarters,
- Sixth, an expansion of the PARP with the aim of making it more like the NATO Force Planning System,
- Finally, freedom for greater scope within PfP regarding Partners' regional cooperation activities.

Afterwards, NATO introduced the “Concept for Enhanced and More Operational PfP” in Madrid in July 1997.¹²⁶ Moreover, PfP also offered signatories the right to refer any situation to the NAC that could threaten their integrity, independence, and security.¹²⁷ While a distinction between Allies protected by Article 5 (which calls for collective self-defense) and the Partners was inevitably envisaged, this constituted an extension of the provisions of Article 4 (which calls for consultation) of the Washington Treaty.¹²⁸ More openly, this allowed Partners an access to the governing body of NATO since both PfP and NATO members could call for consultations under Article 4.¹²⁹ However, the essential purpose of safeguarding the freedom and security of its members under the provisions of Article 5 remained intact.¹³⁰

The new dynamism of cooperation and partnership along with adoption of a larger scope of stability, and the wide European participation including Russia by the

¹²⁵ Javier Solana, "Statement to the Press by the Secretary General", Following the ministerial meeting of the NACC/ Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970530f.htm>

¹²⁶ "The Enhanced Partnership For Peace Programme", *Press Info*, 4 July 1997 available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/m970708/infopres/e-pfp.htm>

¹²⁷ See Appendix 2

¹²⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe", *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 95, Vol. 74, Is. 1, p. 41, and also see Appendix 1

¹²⁹ Vernon Penner, "Partnership for Peace", *Strategic Forum*, No: 97, Dec. 1996, INSS, NDU, available at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum97.html>

¹³⁰ See Appendix 1

mid-1990's to act together with a transformed NATO became the anchor of a cooperative security regime in Europe. NATO survived the end of the Cold War quite well, contrary to what some theorists predicted in 1990.¹³¹

3.2. PfP Today

Since its creation, the enhanced PfP and EAPC narrowed the gap between NATO members and its partners. They constituted a very successful programme of military and political cooperation. Together they became an essential component in building the European cooperative security and proved their worth in Bosnia and the Balkans where thirteen or more NATO and PfP states are making substantial contributions to the NATO-led peacekeeping missions.¹³²

Today after the first round of NATO Enlargement, PfP and EAPC are permanent features of the European security architecture. On NATO's 50th anniversary summit, NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) substantially established the linkage between PfP and NATO enlargement. Each NATO membership aspirant PfP member, provided to have devoted enough fund and resources, can apply to MAP to establish a pathway to NATO membership. On part of NATO as a practical manifestation of the NATO Open Door policy stemming from Article 10 of Washington Treaty, the MAPs identify five partner activity areas that develop the capabilities needed for membership.¹³³ Furthermore, the PfP biennial programme, in which Allies and Partners participate, now contains more

¹³¹ See, for instance, John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, Summer 1990, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56.

¹³² "Chairman's Summary of the meeting of the EAPC FM Session", *NATO Press Release*, M-EAPC-2000-123, 15 December 2000, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-123e.htm>

¹³³ See Chapter 4 of this study for details of MAP which include activity areas of political and economic, defense and military, resources, security, and legal issues.

than 2,000 activities, ranging from large military exercises down to small workshops grouping a handful of people, PfP touches virtually all areas of NATO's activity.¹³⁴

On the other hand, the Washington Summit has also provided serious challenges for PfP in the form of a greater differentiation than self-differentiation with these MAPs. In addition, because it is implausible to admit nine new members for the second round in the near term, the NAC must successfully deal with the expectations and needs of the MAP partners. Those declared interest in NATO membership include;¹³⁵ Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, who are downsizing their military, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovenia, who are building new armed forces, Albania and Macedonia, who still have security problems to solve. On the other hand, the 17 non-MAP partners are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Croatia, as well as the neutrals; Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland, the Caucasians; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asians; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. (See Figure 4 and Figure 5)

3.3. EAPC Today

The EAPC acts as a political roof for PfP. It offers the 19 Allies and 27 Partners a forum to exchange views on common security issues, providing for regular consultation and cooperation.¹³⁶ It meets periodically at the level of Ambassadors and Foreign and Defence Ministers, and Heads of State and Government. Almost all of the non-NATO EAPC members established diplomatic missions and are expanding contacts with NATO to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation.

¹³⁴ "Partnership for Peace: An Enhanced and more operational partnership", *NATO Fact Sheet*, 6 Sep. 2000, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/pfp-enh.htm>

¹³⁵ Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership For Peace: After the Washington Summit and Kosovo", *Strategic Forum*, August 1999, No: 167, at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum167.html>

EAPC also helps to foster practical regional security cooperation through topical seminars that form part of the EAPC action plan. The representatives of the 46 members in Washington in April 1999 concentrated on key-security challenges in the EAPC area, in particular the situation in the Balkans. They issued two documents relating to further development of PfP:¹³⁷

- "Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations", which addresses the involvement of Partner countries in political consultations and decision-making, in operational planning and in command arrangements for future NATO-led operations in which they participate,
- "Towards an Enhanced and More Operational Partnership for the 21st Century", which is designed to make the PfP more operational.

In this respect, areas of EAPC consultations and cooperation include development of a direct political relationship with the Alliance, helping to afford partner countries increased decision-making opportunities, and providing a forum for an increased range of subjects for consultations. EAPC activities, like those of PfP, run on a two-year action plan. The plan focuses on consultation and cooperation on a range of political and security-related matters, including regional issues, arms control, international terrorism, peacekeeping, defence economic issues, civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental issues.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Tajikistan is neither a NATO nor a PfP member but has a place in EAPC. Thus takes part on political domain of PfP. See Figure 4 and Figure 5.

¹³⁷ "Further development of the EAPC", *NATO Fact Sheet*, On-Line Library, 12 Sep.2000, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-eapc.htm>

¹³⁸ William Cohen, U.S. DOD, *Remarks*, Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 6, 1999



Figure 5: A map of the NATO/PfP Countries as of 13 August 1999. In Dec. 1999 Ireland has joined PfP. (See Table 1)¹³⁹

¹³⁹ 3rd NATO Community of Independent States (CIS) Symposium with Partners, NATO/PfP Nations Map, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/coopsymp99/pages/all.htm>

3.4. Arguments Related to PfP

3.4.1. Arguments In Support of PfP

Since 1990, with the NACC (EAPC) and PfP, NATO has made valuable efforts to extend the zone of peace, prosperity, and security eastward, and assisted to the stability in the former Soviet bloc.¹⁴⁰ However, when PfP first appeared as an idea, it was compared to NATO enlargement. It was argued that PfP had some big advantages over proposals to offer full, immediate NATO membership to Eastern European countries.¹⁴¹ First, it avoided drawing new security lines across the map of Europe liable to be destabilizing. Instead of drawing new lines that divide nations, the PfP established new lines that connect nations by providing shelter for all Europeans who want to align for cooperation. Second, the Partnership set up the right incentives. It offered aspiration of an alliance based on shared values of democracy and the free market. Third, it provided equal opportunities for all eligible countries, but measured progress entirely on the behaviour of individual states. PfP ensures that distinctions between countries are drawn on the basis of their own efforts, not some abstract set of criteria. In other words, it used a self-selecting method. The more a country achieves the more likely it will get closer to achieve membership of NATO. Finally, PfP put the question of NATO membership where it belongs, at the end of the process rather than at the beginning. After having some experience with the Partnership process, it would be clearer which among the eligible nations genuinely wants to be in the NATO ideas of shared democratic values and cooperative security.

¹⁴⁰ John S. Duffield, "NATO's functions after the cold war", *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter94/95, Vol. 109, Is. 5, pp. 763-788

¹⁴¹ Les Aspin, Former US Secretary of Defense, "New Europe, New NATO", *NATO Review*, Feb. 1994, Vol. 42, Is. 1, pp. 12-14

With another overall review, as an instrument to avoid a discussion about NATO's enlargement, PfP was at first presented as a structure which "neither promises NATO membership, nor precludes this membership". The partnership was deliberately designed to enable member states to put off questions of formal enlargement and of NATO's ultimate disposition in post-Cold War Europe.¹⁴² Once PfP became popular, the same concept was presented as the road to NATO membership. PfP has provided the necessary time and basic steps to acclimatise prospective members to NATO thinking and practices.¹⁴³ Interestingly, however, it was not PfP which dictated either the pace of NATO's enlargement or the timing of the process; PfP hid an essentially political debate for the well-being and survival of the alliance which was conducted within the alliance and not allowed the aspirants to be involved.¹⁴⁴

PfP has in its framework document formalized for the first time the reliance of WEU largely on NATO for military staff work, command structure, logistics, intelligence, and lift.¹⁴⁵ In this way, the EU drive which has its origins in WEU mentality, to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was by PfP kept from destroying the heart of NATO's integrated approach to military planning and combat.¹⁴⁶ Indeed PfP provided a NATO controlled playground for European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) by allowing WEU members to conduct their own regional activities.

Through its PfP Framework Document, NATO has made a commitment to PfP members to consult with any active participant in the PfP in case that Partner

¹⁴² Charles A. Kupchan, op. cit., p. 113

¹⁴³ Paul E. Gallis, "NATO Enlargement: The Process and Allied Views", July 1, 1997, available at: : <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/eap/gallis/gsummary.htm>

¹⁴⁴ Jonathan Eyal, op. cit., pp. 702-703

¹⁴⁵ See Chapter 1 of this study.

¹⁴⁶ Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe needs the US and NATO", *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring96, Vol. 111, Issue 1, p. 1-40

perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. Although this is not a defense pledge, it is not meaningless. All the same, it leaves the door open for NATO to decide whether it wants to aid a state under restraint, coercion or attack.¹⁴⁷ This inevitably cast the shadow of a successful alliance on hard security issues in Euro-Atlantic region. Accordingly, the military cooperation in terms of training and joint manoeuvres, preparations for peacekeeping and for meeting the new soft threats emerging after the Cold War, was organized within the framework of PfP. Within EAPC, which all participating states have a seat, NATO posture regarding soft security concerns was revealed and made to identify by non-NATO Europeans.¹⁴⁸

In today's Euro-Atlantic region, where conflict or the threat of conflict is always present, PfP and EAPC made NATO turn into an "international regime" aimed at peacemaking (as in Bosnia), civil-military socialization (via PfP), confidence-building (via EAPC, through efforts to ensure resolution of tensions between neighbors), and other collective endeavors. In this way, PfP played an important role for NATO to export more countries the traditions of civilian authority, parliamentary habits, and devotion to human rights, as to the political cost of enlargement be decreased.¹⁴⁹

Through NATO's PfP and its EAPC, virtually every nation from Kazakhstan (Central Asia) to Canada (North America), acquired the capability to act side by side with NATO. They shaped the exercises, missions, and policies undertaken with them, ruling out any possibility to perpetuate arbitrary lines of division in newly

¹⁴⁷ David Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", *Survival*, Vol. 40, Is. 2, Sum. 1998, p. 144

¹⁴⁸ Jan Prawitz, "Confidence-building in the Baltic Sea region", *Working Paper*, No. 25, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1998, pp. 1-15, as reviewed in "International Relations: Collective and International Security", *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*, Apr. 2000, Vol. 37, Is. 2, pp. 259-264

¹⁴⁹ Daniel N. Nelson, "Civil Armies, Civil Societies, and NATO's Enlargement", *Armed Forces & Society*, Fall 98, Vol. 25, Is. 1, pp. 137-160

defined Euro-Atlantic region.¹⁵⁰ This seems to constitute a giant initial step in a world of globalization as to globalize the post-Cold War concept of security.¹⁵¹

PfP is also regarded as an instrument to stabilize CEE and facilitate NATO enlargement without offending Russia. In turn stabilization was useful against future Russian expansion, against an independent German Ostpolitik, and against a possible German-Russian conflict.¹⁵² In order to accomplish this, PfP served as a means to build up a delicate balancing act between the reassurance of Russia and of the democracies in CEE.¹⁵³ Furthermore, US sought to make NATO "Russia-friendly" through Russian participation in the PfP.¹⁵⁴

PfP plays a critical role in promoting Western-style reform of the armed forces of CEE and Eurasia and helps them become more interoperable with NATO. Some European nations desire strengthened ties with the Alliance but not NATO membership. PfP provides an ideal vehicle for any kind of relationships. It formalizes relations, provides a mechanism for mutual beneficial interaction and establishes a sound basis for combined action when desired. This can be seen in the major contributions that some partners have made to NATO missions in the Balkans.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ A similar approach is put forward by Madeleine Albright, "NATO enlargement: Advancing America's strategic interests", *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Mar 98, Vol. 9, Is. 2, pp. 13-19

¹⁵¹ Under this shelter, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan expressed their readiness to jointly promote the territorial integrity and inviolability of existing borders, reject "aggressive separatism" and "ethnic intolerance", resist "religious extremism", halt arms supplies to conflict areas, desire to strengthen their multifaceted cooperation and interaction within international organizations and alike, and to develop interaction within the framework of EAPC and PfP, in "GUAM statement to the EAPC Political Committee", *NATO Statements*, Washington, DC, April 24, 1999, and also "What Is a Strategic Partnership?", *Problems of Post-Communism*, May/Jun2000, Vol. 47, Is. 3, pp. 15-25

¹⁵² Amos Perlmutter, "The Corruption of NATO: The Alliance Moves East", in *Special Issue: NATO Enters the 21st Century*, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Sept. 2000, Vol. 23, Is. 3, pp. 138-140

¹⁵³ Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the unipolar moment", *International Security*, Spring97, Vol.21, Is.4, pp. 49-89

¹⁵⁴ Andrei Kortunov, "NATO Enlargement and Russia: In Search of an Adequate Response," in David G. Haglund, ed., *Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, Kingston, Ontario: Queens University Centre for International Relations, 1996, pp. 69-92

¹⁵⁵ "A National Security For A New Century", *The White House Office of the Press Secretary*, 5 January 2000, available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov>

Unlike the procedures in NACC, the PfP plan envisaged from the start a process of self-differentiation, since cooperation agreements were signed between NATO and individual countries. With this partnership vision, NATO reached out to the peoples in CEE who endured decades of totalitarianism, to give them a taste and feel of Western values of their own will. NATO put forward, neither an obligatory nor a clear cut, operational/procedural criteria. This partnership vision assisted NATO in two ways. First, from US-NATO perspective, the PfP intended to create the possibility of reacting quickly to potential crises in Europe by means of political consultations based on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. NATO established a ground for consensus in a multilateral framework through PfP. Second, achievement of such a multilateral framework through developing bilateral security cooperation primarily between NATO and individual partners, helped NATO to retain complete control over the evolution of PfP and new Euro-Atlantic security structure. Otherwise, an uncontrolled institutionalization of a multilateral undertaking might have jeopardized the objectives of both stability and expansion.

Today, contrary to predictions of a rapid death of PfP after the first round of NATO Enlargement,¹⁵⁶ PfP continues to evolve and support the transformation of the Alliance. NATO views it as a dynamic process that will progressively draw NATO and Partners closer to each other, since almost all elements of PfP are related to NATO's new roles and missions. To some, as it was right before the first round of enlargement PfP is still supported and preferable to NATO enlargement with its accomplishments already in the tasks of ensuring civilian control of the military, transparent defense budgets, and training for NATO's new missions.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ J. Arnold, S. Grier, "NATO Enlargement", *Air Power Journal*, Summer98, Vol. 12, Is. 2, p. 81

¹⁵⁷ Paul E. Gallis, "NATO Enlargement: Pro and Con Arguments", CRS Report, February 13, 1998 at: <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/eap/poppro.html>

3.4.2. Arguments Against PfP

At the beginning, there were suspicions about PfP's long-term implications. NATO feared that it might not meet the expectations regarding accession to NATO membership that dedicated PfP members raised.¹⁵⁸ Despite its promise and now recognized success, NATO's PfP provoked immediate attack when President Clinton presented his vision of PfP in 1993. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued that the Partnership for Peace would "create a vacuum in Eastern Europe" and "dilute what's left of the Atlantic Alliance into a vague multilateralism". Former Secretary of State James Baker claimed that PfP would just confuse the Western Europeans, unsettle the Russians, and fail to reassure everyone else. In order to prevent this, NATO/US was initially intent on restricting the PfP to a series of bilateral agreements between individual states and NATO.¹⁵⁹

Another approach perceived PfP as inefficient in addressing the requirements of new Euro-Atlantic security structure. This perspective argued that in addition to programmatic efforts within NATO and PfP, the U.S. reached further to enhance cooperative security with countries like Romania and Ukraine. These states were seeking an alliance with the U.S. through NATO membership. However, the U.S. tried to compensate these states' denied alliances or non-allied security relationships with strategic partnerships without making hard security commitments.¹⁶⁰ All the same, these strategic partners are still the most eager seekers of NATO membership. Apparently, neither strategic partnership cloak nor the programmatic efforts within NATO such as PfP and EAPC have satisfied the CEE states' desire to bandwagon

¹⁵⁸ On one hand NATO seemed to give the impression that the accession to NATO was imminent; on the other the PfP was interpreted as an activity aimed at shelving membership. See Paul E. Gallis, op. cit., David Yost, op. cit. p.98, J. Goldgeier, op. cit. p. 92.

¹⁵⁹ Joseph S. Nye, "A partnership with peace", *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 Jan. 1995, Vol. 87, Is. 108, p20, and also see above-written arguments about "self-differentiation" in PfP activities.

¹⁶⁰ "What Is a Strategic Partnership?", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 47, Is. 3, 2000, pp. 15-25

Western alliance and no initiative could take the place of NATO membership. Accordingly, although the PfP framework was intended to delay or prevent NATO enlargement, it backfired and did just the opposite.¹⁶¹ Not any of CEE countries accepted being regarded in a secondary position as an ally or partner. Thus, all tried hard to gain NATO membership and still do.

Some Russian and Western analysts argued that the PfP provoked Moscow to form anti-western alignments. In fact, in 1995, Russia and Iran embarked on a strategic relationship. NATO's thoughts of expanding eastward and the new PfP is making Russia look around hurriedly for at least some kind of strategic allies. In this situation, the anti-Western and anti-American regime in Iran would be a natural and very important partner.¹⁶² With the Chechen war and NATO expansion, Russian nationalists looked to a closer relationship with Iran as a counterbalance.¹⁶³ The recent developments in January 2001 on Russian-Iranian arms transfer seem to validate the concerns related to Russian acts against NATO. Russia has unilaterally denounced the U.S.-Russian agreement to limit the extent of transfers on Russian arms transfer to Iran.

For others, PfP membership and consequently the promise of NATO entry have failed to generate a significant improvement of civilian control over national security matters in PfP members.¹⁶⁴ In this regard, NATO's enlargement process failed in addressing the needs to complete the transformation of forging civil armies through focused programs within or appended to PfP. Furthermore, the allies appear reluctant to fully fund PfP and bilateral efforts in CEE to promote military reforms

¹⁶¹ Robert Rauchhaus, "The Debate Over NATO Enlargement", *Working Paper*, No. 5.75, October 1998, Dept. of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

¹⁶² Pavel Felgengauer, "*Russian society is arriving at a consensus on the question of national interests*", translated in CDPSP, 21 June 1995, Vol. 47, No. 21, p. 3

¹⁶³ Robert O. Freedman, "Russian-Iranian Relations In The 1990s", *Middle East Review Of International Affairs*, (MERIA JOURNAL), June 2000, Vol. 4, No. 2

¹⁶⁴ Daniel N. Nelson, op. cit., pp. 140-144

and to spread security throughout the region. On the contrary, they must sponsor and fund programs for CEE countries still unsure of their destiny and the staying power of the West. Whether these efforts serve as a way station to NATO membership or substitute for it, allies must make investments equal to the historic nature of the task.

The NATO Washington Summit in 1999 and the war in Kosovo posed serious challenges for the PfP in implementing reforms among its partners and dealing with the expectations of the nine partners seeking NATO membership. Because the nine partners of the MAP have heightened expectations of NATO membership, the continuing lack of an invitation could lead to disillusionment. This could also lead to cleavage among MAP partners. Lessons learned by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic suggest that the nine MAP partners may find their human and material resources overwhelmed in harmonizing NATO Standardized Agreements (STANAGs) to their defense establishments. The result could develop two-tier armed forces in the MAP states, one tier designed to function within the PfP, the second developed according to national defense, but neither able to function well as a whole.¹⁶⁵

On the other hand, creation and existence of any lack of transparency may undermine stability in CEE. The individual approach to NATO membership in the form of self-differentiation, which is the essence of PfP, unless supported with full openness may not promote cooperation between partner countries. This would even undermine existing regional security cooperation, like that of happening between Visegrad Four. The transparency of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) and the access to these documents is important on the future of Euro-Atlantic security.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Jeffrey Simon, NDU, op. cit.

¹⁶⁶ "Partnerships For Peace: Drifting Into Secrecy", *Basic Papers*, No: 11, 7 June 1995, Occasional Papers On International Security Issues, available at: <http://www.basicint.org/bpaper11.htm>

In addition, the PfP goal of establishing inter-operability of military structures and equipment may open the door for future western weapons or technology transfers to selected PfP countries. Actually, NATO countries' differentiation in transferring the excess military equipment to CEE and Central Asian countries may undermine the stability in the Eurasian region. Such a development, in the context of semi-transparency, may heighten tensions between recipients and non-recipients and boost the popularity of nationalist forces in the excluded countries.¹⁶⁷

3.5. Turkey and Partnerships

“In our opinion, the first and the most important condition for the development of political confidence in the international arena is the sincere agreement of nations at least on the idea of preserving peace”. (Atatürk, 1932)

Until today, Turkey contributed to peace operations in Korea, Iran-Iraq, Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Georgia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, and Palestine. Today, it is making every effort to contribute to regional and global peace. Thus, Turkey frequently contacts high level officials from PfP countries, from the Balkan and CEE as well as from Caucasian and Central Asian states, with a view to provide them support to join and integrate with Europe.¹⁶⁸

The new risks and challenges that could affect the whole western world have increased Turkey's importance as a flank country. Turkey is one of the few western countries whose importance has increased in the post-Cold War period. NATO made possible the participation of Caspian and Central Asian states in NATO's PfP and in the regional peacekeeping organizations. In addition, the allied forces stage regular

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., and also reporting a NATO sponsored meeting in Turkey on 18-21 July 1994 "NATO encourages technology transfer as PfP develops", *International Defense Review*, Sept. 1994, p. 5

¹⁶⁸ Çevik Bir, 'Turkey's Role in the New World Order, New Challenges', Presentation To Members Of The National Defense University, July 1997, in Jonathan W. Pierce, Hans Binnendijk, *Strategic Forum*, No. 57, Nov. 1997, INSS, NDU, at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum57.html>

exercises with units from Caspian states. However, the reality is that only a few NATO allies, such as the U.S. and Turkey would readily accept the independence of these states to be a vital interest. As an individual NATO member, Turkey, along with the U.S. is steadily expanding military-to-military contacts with regional military establishments.¹⁶⁹ Although limited and confined to military realm, these initiatives are useful to create a milieu favorable to Turkey's security and other interests in the Caucasus and the Central Asia.

On the other hand, the development of Caspian energy resources and transportation routes is directly linked to the security of the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region. It should be noted that NATO's PfP (enlargement) already contributed to this directly or indirectly by providing training and security structures and by increasing the level of cooperation between allies and regional states. In addition, it might be stated that Turkey's interests overlap with those of the allies on the issue of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. It is also the pipeline map that provides the link between economic development on Turkey's immediate regional neighborhood and NATO's eastward PfP expansion. The Caspian gas and oil reserves have to rely on pipeline and tanker routes that pass near the areas threatened by instability and on the borders of the enlarged NATO. The Baku-Supsa pipeline, opened in April 1999, ends on the Black Sea where oil is then shipped by tanker through the Bosphorus and along the coasts of Greece and Turkey. A new pipeline is about to be constructed from Azerbaijan to the Turkish coast at Ceyhan.¹⁷⁰ Accordingly, Turkey pays great importance to the PfP programme, considering it as

¹⁶⁹ Richard Sokolsky, T. Charlick Paley, "Look Before NATO Leaps into the Caspian", *Orbis*, Spring99, Vol. 43, Is. 2, pp. 285-298

¹⁷⁰ For Turkey's position vis-à-vis Caspian resources with respect to NATO Enlargement see Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "NATO Enlargement and the South", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, Is. 2, June 1999, pp. 214,219, see also Revaz Adamia, "NATO: Caucasus in the Context of PfP", *Perceptions*, Vol. 4, Is. 1, March/May 1999

an important mechanism to enlarge the peaceful environment by improving friendly relations further with all PfP countries. Turkey actively participates in PfP exercises, providing support and even leading in many of the initiatives directed at regional security. Turkey continues to maintain a peacekeeping unit in the Balkans and runs a PfP training center in Turkey.¹⁷¹

Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been keeping its active contribution to the peaceful environment since the end of the Cold War by high level visits, participation in PfP exercises, joining in peace support operations and providing education and training support. Turkey has provided education and training support to neighbor partner nations, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia either at the TAF training facilities or in their own territory. Military cooperation activities conducted by Turkey concentrates on improving the neighboring partners' ability to reach the NATO Interoperability Objectives (IOs).¹⁷²

Nationally sponsored cooperation activities are essential for complementing and enhancing NATO's military cooperation efforts. Therefore, Turkey grants various training possibilities to hundreds of personnel from partner nations since the beginning of the PfP programme to facilitate the implementation of PfP military activities. By 1998, 1575 military personnel from various PfP countries were educated and trained in Turkey and in some partner countries in the framework of "PfP" and "in the spirit of PfP activities". As of November 1998, 1129 military personnel from various PfP countries attended activities at several military training institutions in Turkey. Military personnel of PfP countries take these educations on donation basis and Turkey meets all of their expenditures. Additionally, they are paid

¹⁷¹ Çevik Bir, op. cit.

¹⁷² Putting forward the Turkish cooperation activities with neighbors, a Russian official points to Turkish activities since 1990. See S. Cherniavskii, "Southern Caucasus in NATO Plans", *International Affairs: A Russian Journal*, Dec. 98-Jan. 99, Vol. 44, No. 6, pp. 2-5

a certain amount for living. As total, up to 1998, 70 million USD was spent for this purpose.¹⁷³ Up to spring 1999, only with Bulgaria Turkey has signed seven military agreements. Turkey has jointly conducted approximately 150 military activities.¹⁷⁴

3.5.1. PfP Training Center

Turkey declared her intention to establish a PfP Training Center (PfPTC) to enhance her existing contributions to PfP activities at the first EAPC meeting at Sintra, Portugal in May 1997. PfPTC was established on 9th March 1998. The headquarters is located in Ankara.¹⁷⁵ The PfPTC inaugurated on 29 June 1998 and according to the NATO's "Concept of PfP Training Centers", all procedures were completed and NATO recognized and accredited PfP Training Center on 12 February 1999. Following the Turkish example, several other TCs have been established in recent years. The PfPTCs already established in other partner countries are Yavoriv Training Center (Ukraine), Almnas PfPTC (Sweden), Bucharest PfPTC (Romania), Geneva Center for Security Policy (Switzerland), and Austrian International Peace Support Command.¹⁷⁶

The Ankara PfPTC has been since the inauguration and is an important step to improve existing close relations with PfP countries as to contribute to worldwide peace in the light of NATO/PfP activities. This center not only conducts regional activities but also serves worldwide and cooperates with all peace related institutions in the world. The Ankara PfPTC makes great contribution to the efforts of PfP countries to meet their requirements to reach NATO standards. The purpose of the

¹⁷³ Ismet Sezgin, Briefing on "PfP Training Centres and PfP Training Activities" in Ministerial Meeting in Skopje, 26 Sept. 1998, *Macedonian Defence Ministry*, at: <http://www.morm.gov.mk/ministerial/turk1.htm>

¹⁷⁴ Faruk Batirel, "Türkiyenin Balkanlara Yönelik Ekonomik Politikası Ne Olmalıdır?", speech at Turkish Army War Academy Symposium, *Symposium Publication*, 1999, p.220

¹⁷⁵ Text available at Ankara PfPTC Homepage <http://www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr/pfptc.htm>

¹⁷⁶ Burak Akçapar, "PfP Training Centres: Improving training and education in PfP", *NATO Review*, Autumn 1999, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 31-32, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9903-09.htm>

support given by Turkey to the personnel of these PfP countries is to assist them for adaptation to NATO's doctrine, principles, tactics, procedures and standards. A great number of participants from 27 partners and 19 members attend from time to time PfP activities in Turkey via PfPTC.¹⁷⁷ Until today, Albania, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldavia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan participated in the activities. The subjects are PfP Concept and PfP Activities Planning Procedures, PfP Exercises, Peace Support Operations, Logistics in Peace Support Operations, and International Decision Mechanism.¹⁷⁸

Military training cooperation activities conducted by Turkey concentrates on improving the ability of partner nations to conduct operations with NATO. These include military visits, military school, college and academy training or field training and education, various short term courses, on-the-job training at units, headquarters and institutions, unit/personnel exchange, cooperation in the field of military history, archives and museology, joint exercises, sending observers to exercises. All of these activities are compatible with NATO/PfP spirit and lead to develop friendly relations, and Turkey's military cooperation activities significantly contribute to the security and peace in the region and in the world.¹⁷⁹ On the other hand, Turkey has already signed bilateral training agreements with 32 friendly countries, including 13 PfP countries and 4 countries which have taken part in Mediterranean Dialogue.

¹⁷⁷ See Table 1

¹⁷⁸ İsmet Sezgin, op. cit.

¹⁷⁹ Turkey is perceived to be very successful in providing the force multiplier role of the ambiance created by PfP through its PfPTC. Lisa Bronson, "A US Vision of Europe", Speech at the 3rd Annual Conference of PfP Consortium, *Connections: The Bulletin of PfP Consortium*, Nov. 2000, Is. 2, available at: <http://www.pfpconsortium.marshalcenter.org/>


Negotiations about training agreements are continuing on the same issue with 9 countries, including 6 PfP countries.¹⁸⁰

In addition to the PfP countries, Turkey provides training opportunities to personnel from non-PfP countries like Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, Croatia, Gambia, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Pakistan, and South Korea. NATO countries such as the U.S., Germany, and France are also provided with training opportunities. By means of PfPTC, Turkey will increase its important role in the Euro-Atlantic region, where different geographies, histories, military cultures, and different national interests exist.

3.5.1.1. PfPTC Training and Education Principles

The mission of PfPTC is to plan and coordinate all PfP training and education activities (except for exercises for which PCC is responsible) at strategic (military-political), operational, tactical, technical level and language courses. (See Table 2)

Figure 6



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Some courses are conducted directly by the center while others are conducted at different academies, military schools and training centers under the command of Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie Training and Doctrine Commands.¹⁸² The

¹⁸⁰ Text available at Ankara PfPTC Homepage <http://www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr/pfpact.htm>

¹⁸¹ Figure is taken from Ankara PfPTC webpage <http://www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr/pfpct2.htm>

¹⁸² Text available at *ibid.*

PfPTC has a special organization because of the need to conduct international activities mentioned above.¹⁸³ (See above Figure) PfPTC has the authority to exchange information and make coordination with national and international military and civilian organizations to fulfil its missions. The coordination with NATO Hqs, and PCC is especially important and necessary. Furthermore, the cooperation with other military and civilian training centers in other countries and international organizations lead to exchange of experiences, lessons-learned, instructors and documentation. This provides consistent developments and rapprochement for all.

The principal objective of the Ankara PfPTC is to provide qualitative education and training support to military and civilian personnel of partner nations to reach IOs. All the courses are open to all partners as well as NATO allies. The activities shall not create any dividing lines.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ PfPTC is solely responsible to the Turkish General Staff (TGS), for planning, coordinating and conducting all PfP education and training activities. Army, Navy, Air and Gendarmerie Forces are responsible to conduct tactical-technical level courses according to the existing concepts and principles. This also means the follow-up of NATO policy, rules and procedures for PfP training activities. Its organization and chain of command gives the center the authority, flexibility and ability to use the expertise and all training and education resources of the TAF. The staff of the PfPTC comprises personnel from Land Forces, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie.

¹⁸⁴ Text available at Ankara PfPTC Homepage <http://www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr/pfptc1.htm>

Table 1: PFP Signatories¹⁸⁵

Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document			
No	Countries	Signed by	Date
1	Albania	PDT Sali Berisha	23.02.94
2	Armenia	FM Vahan Papazian	05.10.94
3	Austria	FM Alois Mock	10.02.95
4	Azerbaijan	PDT Geidar Aliyev	04.05.94
5	Belarus	FM Uladzimir Syanko	11.01.95
6	Bulgaria	PDT Jelu Jeleu	14.02.94
7	Czech Republic	PM Vaclav Klaus	10.03.94
8	Estonia	FM Luik Ovi	03.02.94
9	Finland	FM Heikki Haavisto	09.05.94
10	Georgia	FM A. Chukvaizze	23.03.94
11	Hungary	FM Jeszzensky	08.02.94
12	Ireland	FM Andrews	1.12.99
13	Kazakhstan	FM Saudabayev	27.05.94
14	Kyrgyz Republic	PDT Askar Akayev	01.06.94
15	Latvia	PM Valdis Birkavs	14.02.94
16	Lithuania	PDT Brazauskas	27.01.94
17	Moldova	PDT Mircea Snegur	16.03.94
18	Poland	PM Pawlak	02.02.94
19	Romania	FM Melescanu	26.01.94
20	Russia	FM Andrei Kozyrev	22.06.94
21	Slovakia	PM Meciar	09.02.94
22	Slovenia	PM Janez Drnovsek	30.03.94
23	Sweden	FM Margaretha Af Ugglas	09.05.94
24	Switzerland	FM F. Cotti	11.12.96
25	Macedonia	Head Of Gov. C. Branko	15.11.95
26	Turkmenistan	DPM B. Shukmurov	10.05.94
27	Ukraine	FM Zlenko	08.02.94
28	Uzbekistan	FM Saidmukhtar Saidkasimov	13.07.94

¹⁸⁵ In alphabetical order the list is taken from the webpage: <http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm> - 1

Table 2: Turkish Participation in PFP Exercises¹⁸⁶

Turkish Participation in Partnership for Peace Exercises				
No	Year	Name of Exercise	Date	Place
1	1995	Coop. Rescue	03-13 June	Black Sea-Bul.-Rom.
2	1995	Coop. Partner	01-16 September	Black Sea-Bul.
3	1995	Coop. Determination	10-15 September	Romania
4	1995	Coop. Mermaid	17-24 November	Italy
5	1996	Coop. Determination	04-12 July	Bulgaria
6	1996	Coop. Partner	22-28 July	Romania
7	1996	Coop. Key	15-18 October	Romania
8	1996	Peaceful Eagle	15-20 July	Albania
9	1996	Sea Breeze	10-16 August	Bulgaria
10	1996	Rescuer	21-26 October	Macedonia
11	1997	Coop. Nugget	11 June-04 July	U.S.A
12	1997	Coop. Partner	20-30 July	Black-Sea-Bulgaria
13	1997	Coop. Determination	13 May	Romania
14	1997	Coop. Demand	01-05 December	Turkey
15	1997	Coop. Key	08-10 April	Slovakia
16	1997	Peaceful Eagle	17-22 May	Bulgaria
17	1997	Rescuer	12-16 May	Macedonia
18	1997	Sea Breeze	23-31 August	BlackSea-Ukraine
19	1997	Hezarfen	08-12 September	Turkey
20	1997	Centrazbat	15-17 September	Kazakhstan
21	1998	Coop. Lantern	11-15 May	Hungary
22	1998	Coop. Determination	06-10 December	Bulgaria
23	1998	Coop. Partner	14-27 June	BlackSea-Romania
24	1998	Coop. Key	11-24 July	Turkey
25	1998	Coop. Best Effort	14-18 September	Macedonia
26	1998	Coop. Tide	15-19 June	U.S.A.-Canada
27	1998	BlackSeaPartnership	21-25 September	Black Sea-Turkey
28	1998	Centrazbat	17-27 September	Middle Asia
29	1998	CaucasianAmazon	20 April-4 May	BlackSea-Tur-Georgia.
30	1998	Peaceful Bridge	07-11 September	Thrace-Turkey
31	1998	Sea Breeze	25 Oct.-3 Nov.	Black Sea
32	1998	Silk Road	25 Oct.-3 Nov.	Kazakhstan
33	1998	Ibn-i Sina	25 Oct.-3 Nov.	Uzbekistan
34	1998	Ibn-i Sina	20 Nov.-5 Dec.	Uzbekistan
35	1998	Manas	25 Oct.-3 Nov.	King. Uzb.
36	1999	Combined Endeavor	6-20 May	Baumholder, Germany
37	1999	Coop Guard	18 May-4 June	Czech Rep.
38	1999	Coop Partner	14-28 June	Black Sea, Bulgaria
39	1999	Coop Key	19-30 July	Turkey
40	1999	Peaceshield	1-14 Aug.	Yavoriv, Ukraine
41	1999	Rescuer	10-19 Sep.	Mangalia, Romania
42	1999	Coop Automation	13-17 Sept	Netherlands
43	1999	Sorbet Royal	28 Sep.-8 Oct.	Turkey
44	1999	Coop Support	6-12 Oct.	Ukraine
45	1999	Coop Awa	16-23 Oct.	Slovakia
46	1999	Coop Determination	26 Nov- 6 Dec	Romania
47	1999	Reliant Mermaid	14-17 Dec.	Eastern Mediterranean
48	2000	Combined Endeavor	11-25 May	Baumholder, Germany
49	2000	Peaceshield	8-22 July	Yavoriv, Ukraine
50	2000	Rescue Eagle	11-20 July	Romania

¹⁸⁶ Turkey's participation as to show the importance given to PFP activities. The information until Nov. 1998 is taken from TAF's PPTC Official Website <http://www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr/pfpexer.htm>, and the 1999 information is taken from NATO SACEUR Website <http://www.shape.nato.int/PFP/99table.htm>, and information for 2000 is from US EUCOM Website <http://www.eucom.mil/exercises/index.htm>

CHAPTER 4

4. ENLARGEMENT THROUGH MEMBERSHIP

4.1. Fundamentals of NATO's Membership Enlargement

In light of the overall transformation of existing institutions, various concepts became the issue about the future of the security system in Euro-Atlantic region. At the same time, there appeared a need for a single, holistic security organisation, replacing present organisations, able to respond to challenges both within, and from outside, in which all states should have an equal voice. This was thought to be an entirely new security system as a forerunner of the future united Europe, which would provide some sort of security background or security guarantees, for which NATO could serve as a nucleus.¹⁸⁷ However, most of the democratic nations of the Euro-Atlantic region were not ready to jointly forge such a new security order. Therefore, after a short period of hesitation, NATO assumed the responsibility to build up a new system by a policy of enlargement.¹⁸⁸ In addition to various developments and organizational changes, NATO's enlargement through membership stood out as the fundamental part of a broader process of moving from the "traditional NATO" to a "new NATO".¹⁸⁹ In order to emphasize the evolutionary character of membership enlargement, the following interpretations and classifications of incidents are in order:¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ President Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakia, Presentation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, 10 May 1990

¹⁸⁸ President Vaclav Havel, Czech Republic, "A Chance To Stop the Violence," *Transitions*, December 1997, p. 16

¹⁸⁹ Amos Perlmutter, "The Corruption of NATO: The Alliance Moves East", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Special Issue of "NATO Enters the 21st Century", Vol. 23, Sept. 2000, No. 3, p.134

¹⁹⁰ Richard Rupp, "NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defence toward Collective Security", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Special Issue of "NATO Enters the 21st Century", Vol.23, Is.3, Sept.2000,pp. 162-167

An informal and ideal spark about the NATO membership took place with the NATO declaration at its 1991 Strategic Concept about the threat perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO saw the turmoil in CEE states as a threat to itself and the Europe. Believing that only West's international organizations could provide the internal and external security against the existing turmoil, membership in all of these West European organizations became the central foreign policy of CEE states. Moreover, NATO membership presented the ideal priority for the security that each new CEE government sought.

The creation of new formal associations with the CEE states raised their expectations for NATO membership. The NACC as the first of this kind of association created a formal link for December 1991. In 1992, NATO established linkages with both OSCE and UN especially in the field of peacekeeping. In 1993, it initiated the CJTF. These were the first steps in the transformation of NATO, leading to the enlargement of the Alliance.

By the end of 1993 the above-mentioned linkages did not satisfy the aspiring states that began to perceive NACC, OSCE, CJTF as the way to NATO membership. Pressures to the alliance from CEE governments including and even from the EU led the U.S. administration and the Alliance to formally consider the possibilities of an enlargement. However, as pressure and discussions persisted, NATO decided to give the CEE states a taste of what they wanted. The Alliance established PfP in January 1994. The CEE states regarded PfP as a major step towards their ultimate goal of full NATO membership. These moves paved the way to the actual enlargement because NATO put up an institutional mechanism linking member governments to CEE governments while a possible emergence of de facto security guarantee relationship

was recognized.¹⁹¹ Then came the formal principles of NATO enlargement. As declared to all partners in their individual PfP protocols, the alliance was open to new members. This required the establishment of a framework for enlargement. In September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement" met this need.

The U.S. administration named Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic as probable future members in autumn 1996. That was the "no-way-back" moment for NATO's membership enlargement process. In the Madrid summit of July 1997 the alliance formally invited these three states from amongst a dozen aspiring states. Though not giving a specific agenda, the summit announced the possibility of future membership invitations.

On 12 March 1999, a month before NATO's 50th anniversary, former Warsaw Pact countries, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, became NATO members.

The logic of NATO's membership enlargement has evolved on three rationales. First, Article 10 of NATO's charter states that all free and democratic countries that want to join and can contribute to NATO are entitled to apply. The second rationale predicated on a promise made to certain countries during the Cold War, that once freed from the WP, NATO would look favorably on their membership. The third rationale assumed that enlargement would break down definitively the Cold War's dividing line.¹⁹²

4.1.1. A Spectrum of Approaches to Membership Enlargement

There were different broad approaches for the alliance on how far membership enlargement should go and how to get there. Each approach leads to an enlarged NATO, with different rationale, assumptions, timetable, and criteria. The

¹⁹¹ See Chapter 3 of this thesis study about the commitments short of Article 5 to partners within PfP.

¹⁹² James Appathurai, "The New NATO", Seminar Presentation, Senior Planning Officer, *Political Affairs Division*, NATO, October 4, 2000, available at <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/fall00/appath.htm>

following paragraphs highlight some of the essential elements of each proposed approach in order to clarify the background of the debate on enlargement.¹⁹³

The first approach is an open door policy based on self-differentiation.¹⁹⁴ The aspirant countries' ability to meet the standards the alliance sets for new members determines enlargement's extent and pace. In principle, membership is open to all participants in PfP.¹⁹⁵ The aspirant partners establish the speed and extent of their transition to full NATO membership. Moreover, the self-differentiation is accomplished through PfP programs. This approach also leaves the door open to both Ukraine and Russia,¹⁹⁶ lessening their sense of isolation from Europe and softening Moscow's opposition to enlargement.¹⁹⁷

Another approach to NATO's membership enlargement can be termed parallel expansion.¹⁹⁸ NATO enlargement is part of the process of unifying the continent to produce a single Europe whole and free as a commitment to economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility.¹⁹⁹ However, excludes countries like Ukraine and Russia. It is assumed that NATO's membership

¹⁹³ See for an overview of these approaches with their in depth evaluations Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO and the have-nots", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75 Is. 6, Nov/Dec96, p. 13-21, and R. Asmus, R. Kugler, F. Larrabee, "NATO Enlargement: A Framework for Analysis," *NATO's Transformation, The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance*, Philip Gordon, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996), p. 93, and Alain Pellerin, "NATO Enlargement: The Way Ahead", CCIPS, February 14, 1998, at: <http://www.fas.org/man.eprint/nato-calgary.htm>, and also for NATO's official approach with some ignored official views about the linkage between EU and NATO enlargement see "Study on NATO Enlargement", *NATO Basic Texts*, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9501.htm>

¹⁹⁴ This is the declared and official policy of NATO as of July 8, 1997, Madrid Summit, see "The Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation", *NATO Press Release*, M-1 (97)81, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>

¹⁹⁵ See Amos Perlmutter, op. cit., p. 139

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ See Javier Solana, "Growing the Alliance", *Economist*, Vol. 350, Is. 8110, March 13, 1999, p. 24

¹⁹⁸ See "Study on NATO Enlargement", op. cit., Chapter 5, par. 17, 18, and 19 for the understanding of the parallelism between NATO and EU enlargement on the part of NATO. Also Gerald B. Solomon, "Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO Enlargement", *Orbis*, Vol. 41, Is. 2, Spring 1997, p. 215. Also for the ignorance or degradation of this view on part of EU see Robert J. Guttman, "EU View on NATO Enlargement", *Europe*, Is. 367, June 1997, p. 16

¹⁹⁹ See Strobe Talbott, "The U.S., the E.U. and Our Common Challenges", *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 8, Is. 4, May 1997, p. 30-31

enlargement would be easier to rationalize for such countries if enlargement is portrayed as the logical extension of European integration led by the EU.²⁰⁰

A third approach holds that NATO's membership enlargement would not take place or would not repeat after a first round, unless and until Russia moves in an authoritarian or expansionist direction and again poses a military threat to CEE countries.²⁰¹ This approach prescribes that NATO limits its enlargement on strategic criteria and geopolitical reasons while granting membership to only a handful of countries in CEE.²⁰² NATO's assessment of its own strategic interests, rather than the broader vision of Europe's future or an EU list, determines the new members.²⁰³ This approach contends that the U.S. and the EU top policy priority should be to stabilize Russia.²⁰⁴ An early expansion may destroy Russian stabilization approach because it will provoke Moscow and contribute to a resurgent Russian threat.²⁰⁵ However, in case a new Russian threat emerges, then the Alliance will enlarge quickly. This approach is the best strategy for minimizing conflict with Russia over enlargement.

Another approach sees no urgent reason for the Alliance to expand in the near future. The main problems facing CEE countries are economic and political and not military threats. Therefore, the objective should be the integration of CEE countries into the EU as the best means to address these problems. With these assessments, this approach emphasizes the importance of moving slowly, and using the time to ease

²⁰⁰ See Andrew Cottey, "Central Europe Transformed: Security and Cooperation on NATO's new Frontier", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 20, Is. 2, August 1999, pp. 1,30, and also see Adam Garfinkle, "NATO Enlargement: What's the rush?", *National Interest*, Is. 46, Winter 96-97, p. 110

²⁰¹ Richard Rupp, op. cit., p.167, and also Allain Pellerin, CCIPS, op. cit.,

²⁰² See Richard L. Russell, "American Security Policy and NATO's Future", *European Security*, Vol. 8, Is. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 17-18

²⁰³ Adam Garfinkle, op. cit., p. 108

²⁰⁴ See Ariel Cohen, "Engaged Realism", *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 19, Is. 1, Winter 1996/97, p. 33

²⁰⁵ See Robert V. Daniels, "The Danger of NATO Expansion", *New Leader*, Vol. 80, Is. 12, July 14, 1997, pp. 11-14

concerns in the EU and to diminish the risk of new confrontations with Moscow.²⁰⁶ NATO expansion might take place in some ten years. However, the stability and security issues, are European issues and, therefore, the EU should take the lead.²⁰⁷

A final approach, in contrast to previous, asserts that the political and economic situation in CEE is fragile.²⁰⁸ The consequences of the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union along with the security vacuum threatens the fragile new democracies in CEE. This approach emphasizes the linkage between democracy and security. NATO should provide a strong security framework and promote the stability for CEEs to develop into stable democracies and market economies. NATO cannot wait until the EU is ready to expand.²⁰⁹

Before the first round, NATO members began to make their own assessment for future members. Waiting to be discussed in Madrid summit which country/countries to invite, the U.S. favoured a small intake in the first enlargement round, including only Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary. On the other hand, Canada supported a wide enlargement to include these states, as well as Slovenia, Romania, and Slovakia, with a view to developing a broad transatlantic community. France, along with Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Turkey promoted a "southern enlargement" to balance the "eastern enlargement" by taking in Romania, Bulgaria

²⁰⁶ See Sherle R. Schwenninger, "World Order Lost", *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, Is. 2, Summer 1999, p. 46

²⁰⁷ Richard J. Newman, "Taking aim at Europe's ghosts: NATO expansion may face a bigger obstacle than Russia: History", *U.S. News & World Report*, July 14, 1997, at: <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/970714/14nato.htm>

²⁰⁸ See for the arguments that the EU enlargement is potentially more likely than NATO enlargement to produce negative consequences and political divisions, Andrew Cottey, op. cit., pp.1-30

²⁰⁹ See for the comments about the EU's slow movements with regard to NATO's enlargement initiatives, Warren Christopher, "Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. 61, Is. 18, p. 2, 5, and also Senator John McCain, cited in Gerald B. Solomon, op. cit., p. 215

and Slovenia.²¹⁰ French argued that NATO should worry about the Mediterranean and the Balkans as well as CEE.²¹¹

However, NATO has also set some basic criteria for membership. These are being a stable democracy, having civilian control of armed forces, possessing enough military capacity to contribute meaningfully not simply to one's own defense but also to collective security, and having no active disputes within or on one's borders. Furthermore, in order for a country to qualify for inclusion into NATO it must have fair treatment of its minorities, healthy civil-military relations, and be free of border disputes with its neighbors.²¹² It is under these fundamental views that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic received invitations to join NATO when leaders held a summit at Madrid in July 1997. NATO welcomed them into the alliance in 1999 Washington summit.²¹³

4.2. Arguments Related to the Expansion of NATO Membership

Some observers saw the expansion of the alliance to include three former members of the WTO as the epochal event to mark the end of the Cold War in Europe. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the decision "historic," and "an essential part of a broader strategy to build an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe".²¹⁴ Henry Kissinger wrote, "The Clinton Administration should be applauded for braving both domestic and Russian opposition in urging the admission

²¹⁰ For the evaluation of enlargement paths from a Turkish perspective, and for proposed policy moves on part of NATO after the first round for a second round with respect to EU, see Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "NATO Enlargement and the South", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, Is. 2, June 1999, pp. 214-216

²¹¹ Alain Pellerin, "Where We Came From and Where It Leaves Us", *Aurora Papers* 29, NATO Enlargement, Chapter 4, available at: http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/aurora_29/part05.htm

²¹² See "Study on NATO Enlargement", op. cit., Chapter 5

²¹³ Richard N. Haass, "Enlarging NATO: A Questionable Idea Whose Time Has Come", *Policy Brief No. 16*, May 1997, The Brookings Institution, Washington, at <http://www.brook.edu/ins/pb#16>

²¹⁴ Madeleine A. Albright, "NATO Enlargement: Advancing America's Strategic Interests," US Department of State Dispatch, No. 9/2, 1998, pp. 13-19

of new members into NATO".²¹⁵ At the same time, George Kennan did not keep back words in his opposition to the expansion. He claimed that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.²¹⁶ The influential foreign policy analyst of U.S., Michael Mandelbaum predicted that membership expansion would be a bridge to the nineteenth century as a tradition featuring great power rivalry, shifting alliances, and continuing concern with an unregulated military balance.²¹⁷

Theories of security institutions generally start with the assumption that states want to maximize their security at minimum cost and with the minimum necessary damage to their autonomy.²¹⁸ As an alliance defined in defensive terms, NATO's central task has been one of protecting the sovereignty of individual member states. Subsequently alliance and security practice has involved the drawing of clear boundaries, specifying whom to protect by the security guarantee and whom to leave outside.²¹⁹ The current challenge is to expand without reviving Cold War tensions or recreating a division of Europe. The purpose of the security organisations is now being defined less in terms of defence than providing an anchor of stability. This raises fundamental questions about the meaning of security and NATO's identity as a security organisation.²²⁰ A lively political and academic debate over NATO expansion has tended to revolve around the question of whether this move eastward will recreate the division of Europe or bring greater peace and stability to a

²¹⁵ Henry Kissinger, "Price of a bigger NATO may be too high unless Senate returns to basics," *Los Angeles Times*, 8 June, 1997, p. 2.

²¹⁶ George F. Kennan, "A fateful error," *New York Times*, 5 February, 1997, p. 23

²¹⁷ Michael Mandelbaum, "NATO Expansion: A bridge to the nineteenth century", CPSS, 1997, available at: <http://www.cpss.org/nato/mandel97.htm>

²¹⁸ In alliance theory security is the highest end for individual states, and that statesmen are rational cost-benefit maximizers. Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 20-24

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4

fragmented region.²²¹ Accordingly, all the proponents and opponents forwarded their arguments as whether NATO should enlarge or not. At such a high level of abstraction, major theoretical traditions in international relations seem to give inconsistent arguments about NATO's future.

Classical Realists could be found both prescribing and predicting NATO expansion as an insurance policy against future threats²²² and Neorealists prescribing and predicting the dissolution of NATO as an alliance without a shared enemy.²²³ Some institutionalists saw NATO as an essential part of a persistent regime²²⁴, others looked to different or new institutional settings in which European security ought to be or would be managed.²²⁵ Some Constructivists accepted NATO enlargement a natural and inherently progressive outgrowth of NATO's essential identity as a pluralistic democratic security community and as international socialization.²²⁶

Many advocates of membership enlargement wanted to see NATO as a security community. It makes sense to admit states based on their democratic

²²⁰ David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", *Survival*, Vol. 40, Is. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 135-160 and also Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity", *Millenium*, Vol. 29, Is. 2, 2000, pp. 357-387

²²¹ For the assessment of the enlargement and the indivisible security on NATO's Southern Flank see Ali Karaosmanoğlu, op. cit., pp. 213-224, also M. E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," *Survival*, Vol. 37, Is. 1, 1995, pp. 34-52, Michael MacGwire, "NATO expansion: 'A policy error of historic importance'", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, Is. 1, 1998, pp. 23-42, M. Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe*, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996, R. Asmus, R. Kugler and F. S. Larrabee "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," *Survival*, Vol. 37, Is. 1, 1995, pp. 7-33, C. L. Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe", *International Security*, Vol. 18, Is. 1, 1993, pp. 5-50, Stanley Sloan, "U.S. Perspectives on NATO's Future," *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, Is. 2, 1995, pp. 217-46

²²² Cited in Adam Garfinkle, "NATO Enlargement: What's the rush?", *National Interest*, Is. 46, Winter 96-97, p. 103, Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now", *Washington Post*, 19 December 1994, and Richard Lugar, "NATO out-of-area or out-of-business", *Remarks at the USDS Forum*, Aug. 93

²²³ Predictions concerning NATO's dissolution follows directly from the premises of neorealist theory. Kenneth Waltz, quoted in Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO", *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Autumn 1993, p. 17

²²⁴ John Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional force levels", *International Organizations*, Vol. 46, 1992, p. 836

²²⁵ Vinod K. Aggarwall, "Analysing NATO Expansion: An Institutional Bargaining Approach", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Special Issue, "Explaining NATO Enlargement", ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus, Vol. 21, Is. 2, August 2000, p. 77

²²⁶ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO", in *The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein,

standing, how their governments and armies behave, how they expressed Western or democratic values.²²⁷ Many opponents wanted to see NATO as an alliance. In that case it would make sense to admit states on the basis of concrete security interests, territories that are critically important for existing NATO states, or that could make a valuable contribution to NATO's own protection. Alliances do not strengthen themselves by including weak, dependent, and vulnerable new states.²²⁸

Table 3 ²²⁹

	Alliance	Security Community
Purpose	States join to defend against a common external enemy	States join to increase common welfare by enhancing interdependence
What kind of promise?	An attack on one is an attack on all: "I will use force to defend my allies even when my own security is not threatened"	Disputes between states are settled peaceably: "I will not use force against any member of the security community"
What kinds of institutions add credibility to the promise?	Authoritative or hierarchical decision structure. Unified military command. Maximum integration of armed forces	Egalitarian decision structure. Peaceful dispute settlement procedures. Other means for enhancing transparency, such as sharing information and confidence-building measures

The alliance and the security community differ obviously within the context of promises to create a unified theoretical perspective that can highlight the logical differences between them.

1996, and also Frank Schimmelfennig, "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation", *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, Is. 2-3, Winter 98-99, p. 209

²²⁷ Transition of alliance to security community is seen as a precondition for persistence of NATO. For an explanatory view see Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse", *Survival*, Vol. 39, Is. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 166-169, and also Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", *International Organization*, Vol. 50, Is. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 461-465

²²⁸ Stephen Walt, op. cit., pp. 156-158

²²⁹ The table is taken from Steven Weber, "A Modest Proposal for NATO Expansion", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 21, Is. 2, Special Issue, August 2000, p. 99

4.2.1. Arguments in Support of Membership Enlargement

NATO's enlargement process helps to prevent major conflicts in Europe, because the prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for aspirants to set up bilateral treaties, to resolve border disputes, to resolve minority issues, and to establish proper democratic reforms and democratic control over militaries. The MAP countries like Slovenia, began to use this opportunity to build a new government from the ground up.²³⁰

The process of application encourages states to get their domestic affairs in order, which in turn strengthens the overall stability of the region. Furthermore, by keeping an open door policy as to extend further memberships, NATO encourages additional states to become more democratic, thus creating a more stable political and security environment in Europe.²³¹ Enlargement will gradually end old Cold-War understandings in Europe and bring new members into an integrated Euro-Atlantic community. Although expansion of the EU is important for encouraging stability, integration of CEE countries fully, will take at least a couple of decades. Thus, NATO enlargement will further secure the transatlantic link that many European states wish to preserve and extend.²³²

Some advocates of enlarging NATO, particularly CEE leaders for whom the Soviets' iron grip is a recent memory, stress the extension of the alliance's traditional deterrent function. Collective defense remains the core of the alliance. Extending it to qualified new members will deter aggression in a traditionally unstable region. They also argue that membership in NATO would stabilize the region by filling the

²³⁰ Paul Gebhard, "NATO Enlargement Eastwards and NATO/Russia Relations", Director, Defense Plans Division, US. Mission to NATO, *Afers Internacionals*, Barcelona, Issue 38-39, available at: <http://www.cidop.org/afers/38-39gebhard.html>

²³¹ James Appathurai, op.cit., at: <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/fall00/appath.htm>

²³² Paul E. Gallis, "NATO Enlargement: Pro and Con Arguments", *Congressional Research Service*, Library of Congress, (Washington DC, 1997), at: <http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/eap/poppro.html>

power vacuum and eliminating the need for security competition, because Russia will not reconquer its former empire. Accordingly, membership enlargement will prevent the "renationalization" of defense in central Europe. Each new member need develop only that part of its military that serves overall alliance purposes, and will benefit from a NATO military infrastructure linking it to countries committed to collective defense.²³³

CEE, as a traditionally volatile area, is widespread with potential irredentist and ethnic conflicts, and NATO can help arbitrate and limit these disputes.²³⁴ Furthermore, certain aspects of NATO can help moderate the rivalries within the region after enlarging its membership with CEE countries.²³⁵ First, NATO ensures that member states' leaders meet regularly. When such meetings are necessary to defuse tensions, yet politically impossible to arrange bilaterally, NATO usefully supplies a face-saving forum in which statesmen can move beyond rhetoric. Second, the alliance powerfully influences the rivals indirectly, through the regular interaction of military officers, who gain greater understanding of their respective interests and perceptions. Third, the membership in the alliance provides the US with a measure of influence over their behavior. Thus, advocates of NATO enlargement believe that the initiative will bring peace to East-Central Europe just as the alliance did to France and Germany. NATO, they assert, will prevent steaming tensions in the region from "bubbling over".

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO: A New Transatlantic Bargain", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, Is. 4, 1993, pp. 28-40, Christopher L. Ball, "Nattering NATO Negativism? Reasons Why Expansion May Be a Good Thing", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, Is. 1, 1998, pp. 43-67, John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions After the Cold War", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 109, Is. 5, 1994, pp. 763-87.

²³⁵ For the positive consequences of the alliances for potential conflicts among especially regionally neighboring members see Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict", *International Organization*, Vol. 32, Is. 2, Spring 1999, p. 347,370

The enlargement process brings a larger circle of like-minded states together to contribute to collective security and collective defense. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a very important issue for Europe. Because it is not an issue developing over time, but where the technical development can move very quickly based upon the import of technologies and the delivery of missile systems. Such cooperation can be seen in consensus for prevention of WMD proliferation and in Bosnia and Kosovo where NATO plus all of the PfP countries are participating to maintain and keep peace and security.²³⁶

CEE leaders often portray NATO as merely a stepping-stone to the EU, arguing that alliance membership will send a welcome signal to financial markets and investors. The plenoprosperity will be established in a way when CEE countries join NATO. They will have a more stable climate for investment and economic reform. A large investor would certainly think about putting money into any of these countries coming into NATO, because clearly their investment risk is going to go down. Indeed, more countries and companies are going to be willing to put money into countries that are part of NATO thanks to the security guarantees that the Alliance supposes. Moreover, clearly, those investments will be a boost to their chances for wider integration with the West.²³⁷

NATO as an organization is comprised of a huge bureaucracy in place in Brussels. Whether it is domestic or international, an agency or a bureaucracy created to do a certain job is not easily gotten rid of the agency, or the bureaucracy, even after the job is long ago accomplished. It hangs on forever and ever. One cannot give orders and disband the alliance. Although there exists no more job of the kind that is accustomed to the organization begins to create new ones. This brings a new

²³⁶ Paul Gebhard, *op. cit.*

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

dynamism to the structure and mission of the organization.²³⁸ NATO needs to enlarge for it to survive. "Not to enlarge is the do-nothing option, achieve nothing option," this means accepting to disband, in the view of Secretary General Javier Solana, "it is the option the Alliance long ago rejected".²³⁹

NATO's membership enlargement will maintain and strengthen the role and effectiveness of NATO against a separate European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). As the situation and NATO troops in Bosnia and Kosovo make very clear, defense issues remain for Euro-Atlantic states to address. Furthermore, despite being at the far end of the conflict spectrum envisaged in threat assessments, the Gulf War demonstrated that there are also places outside of Europe where the U.S. and Europe can act together in defense of Western interests.²⁴⁰ Meanwhile, a separate ESDI based on calculations of self-interest on part of EU member NATO members, risks NATO to become a European tool. In this context, by covering a larger part of Europe than EU, the effectiveness of the NATO alliance and ultimately its future will be increasingly saved from becoming a tool for European interests alone.²⁴¹

While securing the future of the alliance, an enlargement of NATO would also call for an upgrading of the role of the European institutions such as OSCE. For instance, many of the interests of OSCE's participating states are related to the Alliance. This means that maintaining or even strengthening the role of NATO in European security could also enhance the interests of the participating states in OSCE. A strong and relevant Alliance coupled with a decisive leadership provided by a member state could provide better grounds for OSCE's role in European security and could better keep up the motivations of various states to make use of

²³⁸ See Chapter 3 of this study for the origins of PfP in which NATO officials played a large part.

²³⁹ Javier Solana, "Secretary General's speech at the CSIS," Brussels, 21 February 1997.

²⁴⁰ Paul Gebhard, *op. cit.*

OSCE. The best way to ensure an enhanced role and credibility of OSCE is to find a new relevance for the Atlantic Alliance, to have NATO address the security concerns of its partners, and to proceed with its enlargement²⁴¹

Moreover, regarding the yet immature ESDP, the Atlantic Alliance provides a useful alternative of defining and coordinating national interests instead of attempting to coordinate security policy cooperation on the basis of unspecified common European interests. With the enlargement of NATO, a EU smaller than NATO but fully covered by it would have no major problems in developing an ESDI, which could easily serve as the European pillar of the Alliance. In the case of a NATO covering a larger area than the EU the problem of “backdoor guarantees” would be solved. The members of the WEU (who are also members of the EU and NATO) could decide to include the new members of the EU without the danger of “covertly” extending to them the NATO (and ultimately the U.S.) security guarantee, because these new members would anyhow be covered by these commitments. In that case, there would be no institutional obstacle before implementing the ambitions for a common ESDI.²⁴²

Yalta treated the CEE countries unfairly, they suffered for more than forty-five years under Soviet domination, these nations now wish to rejoin the West, and the West, therefore, has a moral obligation to these nations. Membership enlargement is a noble democratizing mission that NATO should undertake, and the Western public will understand and support such a mission. CEE governments argue that anything short of NATO membership would unwittingly remind this old division

²⁴¹ John Kanter Deutch, "Saving NATO's foundation", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78 Is. 6, Nov/Dec. 1999, pp. 54-68

²⁴² István Szönyi, "The False Promise of an Institution: Can Cooperation between OSCE and NATO Be a Cure?", *CISAC*, Jan. 1997, at : <https://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/sites/cisac.html>

²⁴³ *Ibid*, and also see supporting arguments for the reasoning beyond awaiting the accession of NATO's three new members and at least a Black Sea state to EU before a second round of membership enlargement in Ali Karaosmanoğlu, *op. cit.*, p.223

and ratify a new division of Europe, exclude them from determining their strategic fate, and be untrue to Western values. The best time to extend NATO's reach before a new threat emerged is now. Furthermore, since the major Western governments have approved the idea of enlargement it is wiser to proceed than to cause the Alliance to lose credibility and confidence by publicly failing at its major post-Cold War policy initiative.²⁴⁴

Closely related to this argument is the "sense of belonging" which overlaps the identity problematic of these CEE countries. Any decision to refrain from taking in new members may cause the CEEs to begin questioning their identity vis-à-vis Europe that once they felt to belong. This can lead even their questioning the appropriateness of their move, while destroying the learning process that is achieved throughout the process of membership enlargement. Regarding the membership of NATO, the aspirant countries and also the original members see admission as the legitimization of their Western identity and social and political values.²⁴⁵

There is another, related justification that NATO's enlargement serves as a hedge against the possibility that Russia will reemerge as an authoritarian country prone to adventurism beyond its borders and the use of military force. According to this logic, enlargement will secure for the alliance a significant presence in a strategically important area, thereby limiting Moscow's potential sphere of influence. NATO enlargement should be done with Moscow's cooperation if possible and in the face of Moscow's opposition if necessary. If Moscow strongly opposes this NATO initiative, enlarging quickly is better for the Alliance, both to show Russia that this

²⁴⁴Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces", *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, Autumn 1997, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/iiss/survival.htm>, and also Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, available at <http://www.brook.edu/fp/commentary/ohanlon/1998.htm>, Reprint by permission of Oxford University Press <http://www.oup.co.uk/surviv>. For a similar view, see Richard N. Haass, op. cit.

²⁴⁵ Frank Schimmelfennig, op. cit., pp. 216-222

matter is settled and to do so before Russia becomes stronger and able to endanger the outcome.²⁴⁶

In accordance with balance-of-threat theory, the call for extending full membership to a group of CEE countries needs to be encouraged.²⁴⁷ It is argued that NATO is and its enlargement would be still needed “to reassure Germany that it need not arm itself more heavily to remain secure, something that would make Germany’s neighbors feel less secure.”²⁴⁸ It is also argued that the need to respond to an imminent Russian threat is a minor driving motive for NATO expansion but to forestall even a hint of an independent German foreign policy in the east.²⁴⁹ NATO expansion is essentially the adaptation of a politically familiar vehicle to the task of preserving U.S. primacy.²⁵⁰

The defense industries and their economies will also benefit by securing markets for their armaments in the newly allied states. NATO's membership enlargement will create an arms bazaar in a way not with an incentive to counter an opponent but to establish the standardization of inventories on a defensive basis.²⁵¹

²⁴⁶ Adam Garfinkle, "NATO Enlargement What's the rush?", *National Interest*, Is.46, Win 96-97, p.103, and also Ali Karaosmanoğlu, op. cit., p. 221

²⁴⁷ E. B. Kapstein, M. Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy After the Cold War", at: <http://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/kapstein/index.html>

²⁴⁸ M. Mandelbaum, “Preserving the New Peace”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, Is. 3, May 1995, p. 13

²⁴⁹ For the task of "small-c containment" which means to include and cooperate with the potential threat through close relations, see David G. Haglund, "NATO's Expansion and European Security: After the Washington Summit-What Next?", *European Security*, Vol. 8, Is. 1, Spring 1999, p.7

²⁵⁰ Barry Posen, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", *International Security*, Vol. 21, Is. 3, 1997, pp. 5-53

²⁵¹ Bill Messler, "NATO's New Arms Bazaar", *Nation*, Vol. 265, Is. 3, July 21, 1997, pp. 24-27

4.2.2. Arguments Against Membership Enlargement

Among numerous arguments, the one based on the adequacy of PfP should come first. In terms of this argument, PfP provides a more than adequate vehicle for extending a degree of military security and stability to the countries of CEE.²⁵² For that reason, enlarging NATO's membership would be unnecessary.

The alliance's leaders contend that bringing in CEE states will promote stability and democracy in the region, but none of the leading candidates for NATO membership has internal stability problems; indeed, this is a condition for membership. The CEE states having domestic problems, such as Albania, Macedonia and Slovakia, have been dropped to the bottom of the list of applicants. In any event, NATO, which is fundamentally a military organization, is not well equipped to help new members promote political stability, advance democratic reform, and address ethnic problems. Furthermore, some argue that even the NATO membership may fail to stabilize a historically volatile area.²⁵³ First, NATO membership may externalize these small CEE states' security, encouraging them to make a shift in foreign policy focus from the main threat (Russia) to regional interests, and prompting the emergence of the conflict. Second, alliance arms transfers may help transform the limited disputes of existing historical problems into a broader and deeper enmity. Third, in the context of deteriorating relationships, those features of the Alliance theoretically conducive to cooperation may fail to achieve that end. The transparency of capabilities fostered by the alliance would not sufficiently calm decision-makers anxious about the other's motives. The issue linkages it supplied may prove inadequate in negotiating a compromise, but rather help to broaden the conflict as

²⁵² See previous Chapter of this thesis study about the arguments related to PfP regarding NATO's membership enlargement.

parties seek bargaining leverage. Even the alliance itself, its forums and its other benefits, may become an object of contest.

Some strategists think that NATO enlargement as coalitions of military forces to maintain security will become far less effective in a world where poverty, economic corruption, pollution, refugee movements, drug trafficking, ethnic strife, shortages of water and arable land, weapons proliferation, terrorism and illegal trade in chemical and biological weapons are emerging as key threats.²⁵⁴ Military force embedded in NATO may be the wrong tool for shaping the future of Euro-Atlantic environment. The economics has truly overtaken military security, as the force shaping Europe today, then there is no need for expanding NATO. As a military alliance, it dares not expand to protect the countries that most need protection. As an economic alliance, the EU and other trade blocs would logically overtake its role. In the post-Cold-War era, securing European stability should be left to political institutions, such as the EU, and not to NATO. CEE's true needs are strong economic structures and democratic institutions. These, however, are not NATO functions and the EU can do more to contribute to CEE. EU countries are wealthy, and can well afford the costs of stabilizing their eastern neighbors.²⁵⁵

NATO expansion could also cause serious problems in the alliance's relations with Russia. The key Western interest in Europe is ensuring Russia's continued democratization and integration into the community of nations, since neither NATO nor regional states can effectively maintain security and stability without Russian

²⁵³ International institutions, including alliances, reshape states' definitions of their interests and pattern international interactions. Although central to international relations, they do not always foster cooperation, even among their members. Ronald R. Krebs, op. cit., p. 369

²⁵⁴ "A National Security Strategy For A New Century", The White House, December 1999, p. 1

²⁵⁵ Richard J. Newman, "Taking aim at Europe's ghosts: NATO expansion may face a bigger obstacle than Russia: History", *U.S. News & World Report*, July 14, 1997, at: op. cit. <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/970714/14nato.htm>

cooperation.²⁵⁶ However, membership enlargement will humiliate Moscow and make Russia vulnerable to Russian nationalists hostile to U.S. and Europe, who believe that the country's interests are being sacrificed by weak leadership. After the first round, Russian nationalists and political opportunists have another weapon to use against pro-Western factions in Russia's domestic political arena. The worst-case scenario is that embittered nationalists or opportunists will come to power and adopt hardly cooperative and much more aggressive policies toward Europe and the U.S. in turn redividing Europe in the process.²⁵⁷

Meanwhile, because of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the conventional balance in Europe has dramatically shifted. NATO forces now outnumber Russia's three to one. Adding new members to NATO will only increase the inequity and with it Russia's reliance on its nuclear arsenal and render this conventional superiority useless. Treating Moscow as a foe that must be contained undermines the task to address the danger posed by the large U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles. There is a dilemma of which to choose; a status quo NATO and arms control, or a larger NATO and no arms accord. Furthermore, before the first round of membership enlargement, decision for renegotiation of CFE, as part of an unspoken deal on enlargement between U.S. and Russia, has now proved too generous towards Russia and thereby made the political and military cost of enlargement too high.²⁵⁸ Moreover, the promise not to deploy nuclear forces in the territory of new members that has been made to Russia with the

²⁵⁶ For possible Russian reactions against a second round of NATO's membership enlargement see Ali Karaosmanoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-218

²⁵⁷ "NATO wins, we lose", Editorial, *The Nation Digital Edition*, at <http://www.thenation.com>

²⁵⁸ "Nato: Flirting With Disaster", Documentary Film Segment, No. a-4184-926, *America's Defense Monitor*, Show Transcript, Excerpts from Speeches by Adm. John Shanahan, William Perry, Mircea Dan Geoana, Jerzy Milewski, Daniel Nelson, Rep. Kay Bailey Hutchison, Alexei Semeyko, Senator Sam Nunn, Lawrence Eagleburger, Jacques Chirac, John Kornblum, President Bill Clinton, March 10 1996, Center for Defense Information, available at: <http://www.cdi.org/adm/store/index.html>, and also

NATO-Russia Founding Act is a potential controversial point among the members. NATO declared that it will not in the foreseeable future station nuclear weapons on new members' soil, but that it may do so should the need arise.²⁵⁹ However, the establishment of a NWFZ in CEE, along with the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons from CEE region seems to serve as an assurance to Russia that NATO's enlargement will not be a threat to her.²⁶⁰ Furthermore, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Spain have non-nuclear peacetime status in NATO.²⁶¹ All the same, NATO's level of flexibility for the demands of this kind, while some NATO membership aspirant CEE and Black Sea countries favor such an idea, is a matter of potential controversy in NATO. Such an action also bears substantial risks for some NATO members as to remain the only immediate nuclear target.²⁶²

On the other hand, CEE leaders act as if there is little chance that the mutual defense promises embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would ever be implemented. They insist that only the wording of those security commitments will deter aggression and enhance the stability of the region. Enlargement based on such an assumption is little more than an irresponsible bluff that Russia, given its extensive political, economic, and security interests in CEE, might in the future be

for events and scenarios of military issues regarding Russian stand towards arms control, weapons and technology transfers, see Ali Karaosmanoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220

²⁵⁹ "Russia Agrees to NATO Expansion; Deal Opens Way to Admit Ex-Soviet Bloc Members-Nuclear Deployment Limited", *Facts On File World News Digest*, May 15, 1997, p. 333A1

²⁶⁰ See William C. Potter and David Fischer, "Nuclear Free: Better than NATO", *Los Angeles Times*, September 30, 1996, and also W.C. Potter, "Next Steps in Nuclear Disarmament: The Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons", *Paper for Seminar on Nuclear Disarmament*, Kyoto, Japan, December 2-5, 1996, at: http://cns.miiis.edu/pubs/reports/pot_japn.htm

²⁶¹ W. Potter, "Unsafe at any size", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 53, Is. 3, pp. 11-14, and also see "CBM, NATO, NATO Expansion, Norway, NWFZ, PfP", *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*, Vol. 36, Is. 2, April 1999, pp. 288-290

²⁶² The countries favoring such an idea keep silent about whether to support this kind of an idea or not, mainly because they want first to get into NATO and then work on restraints on nuclear weapon deployments. See W. Potter, "Unsafe at any size", *op. cit.*, p. 13, also the new-members have rationalized their behavior of rejecting a NWFZ in CEE as avoiding a second-class member position in NATO, see "Breaking the Disarmament Deadlock", *Council for a Livable World Education Fund*, at: <http://www.clw.org/ef/deadlock/recommend.html>, and also for Turkey's concerns on this issue see Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey", in ed. Harald Müller, *Europe and Nuclear Disarmament*, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), pp. 169-173, 187-190

tempted to call. The only way to minimize the likelihood of such a challenge would be to deploy robust NATO forces in the vulnerable front-line states as to increase the tensions.²⁶³

Supporting the above argument, membership enlargement will dilute the alliance by complicating decision-making, and admitting countries without established traditions of democratic practices and civilian control of the military. The candidates are too small to contribute meaningfully to alliance missions, particularly the mission of collective defense. Increasing the number of NATO members risks diluting the alliance and the credibility of its Article 5 commitment in which every member state pledges to come to the defense of every other one. At some point, NATO becomes so large and diverse that it becomes more a political association than a military organization, a grouping of states whose commitments are more declaratory than real.²⁶⁴

Moreover, there is no threat to any current ally or candidate state, and no need to expand NATO's collective defense commitments. Membership enlargement will create new dividing lines in Europe by putting Russia on guard against an alliance moving into its traditional areas of influence. Not inviting such countries as the Baltic states and Romania to join the alliance signals Moscow that they are isolated and subject to its influence.²⁶⁵

NATO enlargement process bears also risks for NATO itself. Pushing NATO to bring in new members before EU takes any step forward, NATO takes on the EU's burdens and obligations on a variety of fields from democracy to technology. This will apparently overburden NATO. Crisis management, peacekeeping, and NATO's

²⁶³ Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's expensive trip east", *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb98, Vol. 77 Issue 1, pp. 2-7

²⁶⁴ Michael E Brown, "Minimalist NATO: A Wise Alliance Knows When to Retrench", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, Is. 3, May/Jun 1999, pp. 204-218

other "new missions" will make of the alliance a collective security organization, where political rather than military functions predominate. Furthermore, the EU could expand in the future, thereby extending additional political and economic support to these same CEE countries. The decision to enlarge NATO is thus both unfortunate and unnecessary not only for material reasons but also for moral reasons.²⁶⁶ The decision to extend membership without reasonable grounds may simply cause the original members to question their own values, norms, and identity. Thus, there is also the risk of creating divisions within individual NATO members.²⁶⁷

The centrality of the U.S. within NATO creates a problem for Russia. Nevertheless, the EU expansion would be perceived as less threatening by Russia. It would also force Europeans to address some important security problems that are basically European responsibilities. NATO's expanding before the EU takes further steps towards enlargement poses a serious risk to the Alliance.²⁶⁸

NATO enlargement will be expensive, not only on the part of the newcomers but also for the original NATO members. The allies show no willingness to share the costs. The military requirements that would follow from the first round of NATO expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been estimated to cost a total of at least \$27 billion to \$35 billion by 2010. Although the estimates may prove imprecise the actual cost could be twice this amount or even higher. NATO enlargement will also hit both potential and current NATO nations where they are vulnerable, economy. Aspirants are looking to buy U.S. or Western military armament and equipment. These countries expect that this would facilitate membership. However, they could buy only a little portion of what they want with

²⁶⁵ Paul E. Gallis, *op. cit.*

²⁶⁶ Michael E. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 213

²⁶⁷ Frank Schimmelfennig, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-234

the money allocated in their defense budget for importing military armament and equipment. In any case, the U.S. share will be one-third or more of the ultimate figure. The Administration has estimated a cost of \$27-35 billion over 12 years. Some other estimates are even higher depending upon the level of threat projected. Bosnia demonstrates that the Europeans are not willing to bear the burden for ensuring security in their own backyard. If instability develops in central Europe, the U.S. will have to shoulder the financial and military costs of bringing peace. The need for internal reform to achieve greater military burden sharing in NATO is another reason why NATO enlargement is a bad idea. Transforming NATO should be a higher priority than expanding it.²⁶⁹

4.3. After the First Round of Membership Enlargement

Since the early 1990s' unprecedented changes has taken place in NATO thinking and strategy. NATO extended from a 16-member-strong Western alliance targeted against the Soviet Union to an alliance of 19 democracies set on further enlargement and reoriented to new threats against Western interests.²⁷⁰ Today, the debate that preceded the first enlargement is expected to resurface, as questions about the alliance's future course and membership become more salient.²⁷¹ On the other hand, the rationale created among the allies during the long run-up to the Madrid summit and later the Washington summit continues to make sense even today. NATO accepts that European security is no longer premised on a known threat or geopolitical calculation that presumes a line of potential confrontation. Thus NATO's

²⁶⁸ T.Friedman, "NATO Expansion As a Crafty Consolation Prize," *International Herald Tribune*, 23 January 1996, p. 9

²⁶⁹Michael E. O'Hanlon, op. cit.

²⁷⁰ Ted Galen Carpenter, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual Muddle", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 23, Is. 3, Sept. 1999, p. 7

²⁷¹ Ronald Asmus, "NATO 2002: The Agenda Ahead", *Euro-Forum*, Vol. 2, Is. 7, Oct. 10, 2000, Series on the 2002 NATO Summit, CSIS Europe Program at: <http://www.csis.org/europe/frm0007.html>

goal is to become an encompassing institution without predetermined limits. It also transforms itself from a collective defense organization to a collective security organization, provided that aspirants can meet the rigorous membership requirements and the alliance can maintain its strength and purpose.²⁷²

After the 50th anniversary summit, accomplished the first round of membership enlargement, NATO's first concern became to determine if it has the military capacity to meet its new commitments. It launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to improve interoperability not only among NATO forces but also between NATO and partner forces. After the Washington summit, NATO began developing an Operational Capability Concept (OCC) that should help to engage partners and members in future military operations by identifying national or multinational forces that can be used in non-Article 5 activities. The OCC will result in a pool of forces that can augment NATO forces.²⁷³ However, there is hardly any consensus on this "capabilities" point among the members. The US planned that allies must bolster their ability to project military power. Britain asserted to have achieved this goal that new commitments are covered by capabilities to meet existing requirements. Other allies, including France and Germany, argued that they are already prepared to meet foreseeable contingencies, while some smaller allies have actually decreased their defense spending and force level. The only exception of this tendency are Turkey, Greece, and U.K.²⁷⁴ Certainly, if NATO's new roles and commitments are to be taken seriously, each ally must make its military contribution as the price of having an alliance in practice as well as on paper.

²⁷² Richard Rupp, "NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defense Toward Collective Security", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 23, Is. 3, Sept. 1999, p. 161

²⁷³ "Partnership for Peace – An Enhanced and more operational partnership", *NATO Fact Sheet*, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/pfp-enh.htm> and also for DCI and controversies over capabilities see David S. Yost, "NATO Capabilities Gap and EU", *Survival*, Vol. 42, Is. 4, Win. 2000, pp. 97-128

²⁷⁴ David S. Yost, op. cit., p. 119

In NATO's Washington summit, determined to reaffirm the principles of Madrid and to advance further the process of enlargement, NATO's 19 leaders also approved a Membership Action Plan (MAP).²⁷⁵ The MAP is a practical manifestation of the NATO's Article 10, open door policy. The MAP Annual National Plan (ANPs) generated by each partner allows each to set their own objectives and targets on preparations for possible future membership. The MAP is available to all declared aspirants on the basis of self-selection. Nine of NATO's current partners have declared their candidacy for future membership, including Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.²⁷⁶

Figure 7: NATO Membership Applicants for the 2nd Round²⁷⁷



Key elements of the MAP include:

- ANPs covering political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal aspects of preparing for membership;

²⁷⁵ Membership Action Plan, *NATO Fact Sheet*, Press Release NAC-S(99)66, Released by NATO at the Washington Summit, April 24, 1999, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm>

²⁷⁶ "The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington - 23-25 April 1999", p. 74-75, *NATO On-Line Library*, PDF Document available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde/rdr-gde-e.pdf>

- a feedback mechanism on progress that includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual assessments by the NAC;
- a means for coordinating security assistance by NATO and by member states;
- enhanced defense planning that includes establishment and review of agreed planning targets specifically tailored to prepare aspirant militaries for possible future membership.

As it is premature now to consider which set of countries will next be invited to join the alliance, the choices around which all 19 allies could easily coalesce have already in place. Those have been affirmed in the period from 1995 to 1999 during the first enlargement wave.²⁷⁸ The risk now is that allies will divide along regional lines, opting for candidates near them geographically while ignoring those farther away. So far the Nordic allies and Poland have shown interest in having the three Baltic states admitted, and the southern allies have chosen Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria for early entry, but there is little cross-support. Britain would likely be content with an indefinite pause, and Germany has gained the new allies it needs. The politics of the alliance will likely dictate a balanced package, drawing on both the Baltic and the Balkans with consideration of Slovakia, under its new democratic government, and Austria, if it applies. Most important, the allies must use the period ahead to build broad support for a workable approach to enlargement. As earlier commitments, it is important that NATO consider each aspirant individually, on its own merits; exclude no central European country, and although there may be military merit in choosing countries contiguous to NATO territory, not limit enlargement to

²⁷⁷ Figure 7 reflects the landscape of the second round of NATO's enlargement. Map is taken from; Javier Solana, "Growing the Alliance", *Economist*, Vol. 350, Is. 8110, March 13, 1999, p. 25

²⁷⁸ See, for example, a short view of what is expected politically and militarily of aspirants as well as what prospective members will need to do both politically and militarily to prepare themselves for NATO membership in "Excerpts from Study on NATO Enlargement", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 45, Is. 4, August 1998, pp. 46-48

geography.²⁷⁹ Above all, one concern for further membership enlargement has apparent and broad support of prominent NATO and U.S. officials that any nation that comes into the alliance must bring in capability.²⁸⁰

However, most of the Western European allies and accordingly NATO itself seem to not really want further enlargement in the near future, and certainly not until 2003.²⁸¹ All the same, prudence for a careful approach to membership enlargement calls time to integrate Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This provision centers on whether allies are able and willing to defend new members under challenge, whether they will underpin the domestic political and economic development of new entrants, and whether a much larger alliance can continue to take decisions and act on them.²⁸²

Today, the impact of NATO enlargement, even though no serious reaction took place after the first round, on Russia remains the biggest unknown and the most significant element in the NATO expansion equation. The potential impact on relations with Russia will play out in arms control and diplomatic relations.²⁸³ Adding members to NATO will endanger the current arms control accords and do nothing to protect West from the real threat of weapons of mass destruction. It is going to be increasingly difficult to obtain Russian cooperation in securing this material if NATO and Western actions are interpreted as attempts to exploit Russia's

²⁷⁹ Robert E. Hunter, "Maximizing NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, May/Jun99, Vol. 78, Is. 3, pp. 190-204

²⁸⁰ Press Availability with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Secretary Colin Powell, Brussels, February 27, 2001, at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/index.cfm?docid=1000>

²⁸¹ See for an elaborate assessment of the chances for a second round of NATO's membership enlargement with detailed evaluations of Article 7 of Washington Summit Communique, Article 8 of Washington Declaration, Article 1,3 of MAP, Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Will there be second, third wave in NATO's Enlargement?", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 56, Is. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 133-149

²⁸² See for assessments on prominent NATO members' willingness for further enlargement, R. C. Hendrickson, "NATO's Open Door Policy and the Next Round of Enlargement", *Parameters*, Win 2000, pp. 57-61, at: <http://carlisle.www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00winter/hendrick.htm>

²⁸³ See for the linkage within the context of existing arms control process; Andrei Shoumikhin, "Current Russian Perspectives on Arms Controls and Ballistic Missile Defense", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 18, 1999, p. 49, and also Alexander Tarasov, "Arms Control in Russia Today", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 19, 2000, pp. 69-77

current weakness, as they are by most Russian officials.²⁸⁴ Another consequence of NATO expansion is that it has decreased diplomatic cooperation with Russia. Moscow would disagree with the West on some issues of great importance. It is nevertheless crucial to maintain the best relations possible. Russia's influence can significantly aid or hamper efforts in many areas of the world. For example, without Moscow's cooperation, the UN Security Council will be unable to make decisions. In 1991, Russia's cooperation paved the way for creation of the Gulf War coalition whose actions were endorsed overwhelmingly by the UN Security Council. Since then, not only did Moscow not consent to U.S. military action against Iraq, it also seemed to be intent on preventing any reconstitution of a major anti-Iraq coalition under U.S. leadership. Apparently, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the PJC proved inadequate. Furthermore, the Russian action in Kosovo is evidence of how serious a future Russian reaction may be.²⁸⁵ The willingness of the Russians to work with the U.S. and Europe will decrease further if its legislature and its people believe that Washington and Brussels are taking advantage of Russia's current diplomatic, economic, and conventional military weakness.²⁸⁶

NATO's membership enlargement along with the general idea of a new strategic concept was the centerpieces of the 1999 summit. Although a decisive second round could have been initiated, the allies kept from declaration of any kind. Kosovo crisis knocked them off the front page and took out of enlargement some of the momentum, some of the urgency as to keep the issue in 34th place even in May

²⁸⁴ Ben Partridge, "Differences Persist over the Role of NATO", *East/West*, 8 March 1999, available at: <http://rferl.org/nca/features/1999/03/F.RU.990308134709.html>

²⁸⁵ "The State of the Alliance: A Good News Story", Speech by Deputy Secretary General, at the 11th International Antalya Conference on Security and Cooperation, Antalya, 30 March 2001, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010330.htm>

²⁸⁶ Thomas Valasek, "NATO Expansion: Full Speed Ahead But Where To?", *Defense Monitor*, Vol. 27, Is. 2, CDI, 1998, available at <http://www.cdi.org>

2000 NATO Ministerial in Florence.²⁸⁷ On the other hand, the war in Kosovo made accession of some CEE countries more important, more appropriate regarding their assistance at the time of crisis. The Kosovo crisis proved harmful to enlargement in some ways. First, the fact that NATO has grown from 16 to 19 increased the strength of the dilution argument. NATO has difficulty at hard times in agreeing on a course of action, either as a reflection of a lack of American leadership or else. The first round of expansion exacerbates the problem. So the idea of going from 19 to 20 or 21 is clearly put on the defensive. Second, the fact that Russia clearly opposes enlargement worries the advocates of an early second round. So suddenly enlargement no longer seemed quite as central as it did and its momentum has slowed down.²⁸⁸ Furthermore, to some NATO officers at SHAPE it would be appropriate to stop taking on additional members until NATO strikes an inner balance in 10 to 15 years.²⁸⁹ In a press release early this year, President Bush promised to "advance the process of NATO enlargement" at the next NATO summit in 2002. After all, advancing of NATO enlargement by 2002 does not necessarily mean expanding the alliance at that time, and it is not only a U.S. president's decision; the other 18 NATO allies must also give their consent. Moreover, after the Kosovo war, there is less enthusiasm in the U.S., as well as in Europe, to add more members to what has proved to be an often-divided alliance.²⁹⁰

Beyond these concerns there may be strategic benefits of NATO enlargement. NATO membership helps countries in transition to make the right choices when it

²⁸⁷ Ryan C. Hendrickson, op. cit. P. 3, and also "Final Communique", NATO Press Release M-NAC-1(2000)52, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000p00-052e.htm>

²⁸⁸ "NATO at Year 50, Kosovo at Day 33: A Scorecard for the Summit", A Brookings Press Briefing Panel, Ivo H. Daalder, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Richard N. Haass, Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Monday, April 26, 1999, Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C, at: <http://www.brook.edu/comm/Transcripts/19990426.htm>

²⁸⁹ Quoted in Ben Partridge, op. cit.

²⁹⁰ Tomas Valasek, "President George W. Bush and the "Other" Europe", Editorial, *The Republican Rule*, at: <http://64.225.203.92/republicanrule/index.html>

comes to democracy and modernization. The latest example is that of NATO's three new members, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. They were emerging from difficult periods of transition, and were making strong efforts to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic community while NATO responded by offering membership. This reinforced their reforms as a direct contribution to security in Europe. Furthermore, NATO's willingness to open its doors has brought Europe closer together in spirit and in practice. This is a reason why NATO remains so healthy today.²⁹¹

Nevertheless, U.S. Secretary of Defense declares that NATO will be in the future what it was in the past, the bulwark for security, peace and freedom on the Eurasian landmass, and something that Russia will have to deal with. He also asserts that there is no prioritization of the nine MAP countries at this time. On the other hand, NATO enlargement is a key part of the process of uniting all of Europe and the decision to invite in qualified new members will be among the most serious challenges the Alliance could have.²⁹² As NATO approaches the Prague Summit of 2002, the challenge is coming to some judgement within the alliance as to the standards wanted those nine countries to meet before considering their admission into NATO. Moreover, a unique set of sensitivities with the Baltic states in particular, and Russia in general, with the probable path of the second round of enlargement will be discussed in the upcoming NATO meetings of the spring and summer 2001. Surely without any veto on the part of Russia as to whether new members come in or not, despite her say via PJC and NATO-Russia Founding Act.

²⁹¹ Lord Robertson, "NATO in the 21st Century", Secretary Generals Speech, February 10, 2001, available at: <http://www.expandnato.org/1002.html>

²⁹² Press Availability with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Secretary Colin Powell, op. cit.

The decision on accession may be made at the NATO summit in the fall of 2002 in Prague.²⁹³

4.4. Turkey and NATO's Membership Enlargement²⁹⁴

At the end of the Cold War, after a period of hesitation, the risks springing from the instability put the NATO enlargement high on the agenda of West European NATO members. They approved or not, the European allies rushed to deal with the issue in order to cap or continue with it according to their own calculations. They did not want to be involved in crises of a volatile area because of some other's interests.²⁹⁵ On the other hand, Turkey was already part of a proposal to establish stability in the region before membership enlargement became the issue, and it was not very high on her agenda.²⁹⁶ However, the establishment of stability alone is of utmost importance why Turkey should support membership enlargement to its immediate west. Accordingly, the official Turkish position was declared as pro-enlargement with Foreign Minister İsmail Cem's declaration in Brussels as "the government has committed itself to NATO Expansion, and that is our position".²⁹⁷

²⁹³ Colin Powell, "No Russian Veto", Hearings of the House International Relations Committee, 07 March 2001, at: <http://www.expandnato.org/colinponato.html>, and also "Declaration on NATO Enlargement", *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*, 31 May 2001, Vilnius, available at: <http://www.nato-pa/plenary/01vilnius/au-146-en.html>

²⁹⁴ See Chapter 1 of this study for a historical perspective of Turkey's admission to NATO. Dean Acheson cited in Ronald R. Krebs, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-360, also see Melvyn P. Leffler, "A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War", Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992, pp. 289-90, 353, 419-20, and also Dean Acheson, "Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department", New York: W. W. Norton, 1969, pp. 569-70

²⁹⁵ See Ronald D Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-11

²⁹⁶ The proposals had several components political, economic, and security with eventual involvement of many key institutions, in particular the OSCE as well as the EU and NATO. NATO's role was critical because security is a prerequisite of any stabilization program. See Marc Grossman, "NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit", FDCH Congressional Testimony, April 04, 1999

²⁹⁷ Jeffrey Ulbrich, "NATO FMs Discussed Enlargement ", *Associated Press*, December 16, 1997, at: <http://www.newstimes.com/archive/dec1697/inb.htm>

However, when the enlargement process advanced, Turkey acted cautiously about membership enlargement for several reasons.²⁹⁸

The first reason is the linkage Ankara has established between NATO and the EU as well as its defence organisation, the WEU. When Tansu Çiller was the Foreign Minister in the Erbakan Government, even before the Luxembourg disappointment, she was the first to declare such a linkage between accession to NATO and the EU and WEU memberships.²⁹⁹ Arguably, it was NATO itself that first established such a linkage in the official "Study on NATO Enlargement" document of September 1995.³⁰⁰ Indeed, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are in the first round in both and Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania are the membership candidates of both organizations. There are Albania and Macedonia on NATO's part, which because of Turkey's influence in the Alliance became MAP members. Further complicating the matters for Turkish side is that the CEE countries most likely to join NATO would be ahead of Turkey on the EU membership. Ankara was concerned that CEE states may enter the EU by 2002/03, prior to Turkey. Mainly because, Turkey will certainly be called for defence of these countries in case they become involved in an Article 5 crisis while it will probably not be granted the equal status as a trading or political partner within the same environment.³⁰¹ In other words, the parallel drawn between the NATO and EU enlargements is not Turkey's

²⁹⁸ On December 16th, 1997, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem signed the enlargement document. However, when the U.S. Senate has already ratified and President Clinton signed on May 21st 1998 the Instruments of Ratification. the Foreign Affairs Committee of the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly) did not do so from April 1998 until the autumn 1998. See Alparslan Esmer, "NATO Eastward Enlargement: Turkish Parliament Appears Unwilling", *Turkish Daily News*, April 27, 1998, and also "Turkish Parliament Takes Its Time About NATO Enlargement", *Pulse Of Turkey*, No. 18, Thursday, June 25th, 1998, available at: <http://www.turkpulse.com/turkey.htm>

²⁹⁹ See for the conditions that Turkey brought the issue to the agenda of NATO Foreign Ministers meeting of Rome 1996, Klaus Kinkel, "Europe did not keep its promises to Turkey", *Press Release*, available at: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING97/02/97X02X06.TXT>

³⁰⁰ See "Study on NATO Enlargement", op. cit., par. 18

³⁰¹ See Tom Dodd, "NATO's New Directions", *House of Commons*, Research Paper 98/52, p. 12, available at: <http://www.open.gov.uk>

invention, but a fact, and the difficulty Turkey is encountering in one is inducing it to slow motion in the other organisation in which it has a weighty role and influence.³⁰²

The second and more important reason for the slow ratification is Turkey's wish to see Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Slovakia within NATO along with the other three CEE countries. This is because the Balkan countries face a bigger threat than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. While the CEE states are given priority in NATO enlargement, due to certain calculations of balances of power among the big NATO members, Turkey's neighbours are neglected. However, the Balkans are more the scene of subversion, racism, and racial cleansing activities than CEE, as evidenced by the events and even war crimes, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and the unrest and internal conflicts in Albania and Macedonia. Furthermore, it is clear that the Balkans becomes more and more part of Europe looking at the direction NATO is going in terms of its missions and policies. The Balkans occupy a vital strategic position in the new Europe.³⁰³ The eastern border of NATO now runs from Poland's east, through the Czech Republic, to Hungary's. The Balkans, however, pierce NATO's southeastern flank between the new members and the old members of NATO, Greece and Turkey. Serbia itself remains a zone of Russian influence in conformity with the classical realist arguments in favor of NATO's membership enlargement, the necessity of demonstrating the ability to dominate this area militarily is crucial to the expansion of NATO.³⁰⁴

³⁰² "Turkish Parliament Takes Its Time About NATO Enlargement", op. cit. At: <http://www.turkpulse.com/turkey.htm>

³⁰³ See for a scenario of the spill over of NATO, Russia, Serbia confrontation to the European continent for the sake of UN and humanitarian missions, Ali Tariq, "NATO's Balkan Adventure", *Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine*, Vol. 51, Is. 2, pp. 9-15, and for the potential and dangerous geo-political competition between Turkey, Greece and Russia see Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey In A Changing Security Environment", *Journal Of International Affairs*, Vol 54, Is. 1, p. 188

³⁰⁴ See also for the threat assessments and the linkage between Turkish and Western interests with respect to membership enlargement, John Rees, "Oil, Gas and NATO's New Frontier", *New Political Economy*, Vol. 5, Is. 1, March 2000, pp. 100-105

Moreover, from Turkish point of view the importance of a second round of membership enlargement to the area is crystallized because it provides a major contribution to the geostrategic continuity of NATO.³⁰⁵ If the stability is the objective, then the Balkans should certainly be included in enlargement process.³⁰⁶

The third and most important reason is the changed nature and structure of threat, after the downfall of the WP and the S.U. Turkey believes that the threat is now proliferation of WMD, nuclear smuggling, and terrorism. However, these threats seem far to European members.³⁰⁷ Curiously, as NATO goes more out-of-area with more peacekeeping and more peace support, with more involvement in the proliferation of WMD problem and terrorism problem, NATO will be focused on Turkish strategic environment. Actually, these out-of-area activities are much more likely to be done in the proximity of Turkey than on the Polish border. The Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East are the leading areas of security consumption today. After all, even focusing on the traditional Article 5 (defense of territory) missions, NATO engagement in the region will probably take place on Turkey's eastern and southern borders.³⁰⁸

On the other hand, there is the issue of establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in CEE by refraining from deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. In order to reassure Russia that NATO enlargement will not be a threat to her, proposals about creating a non-nuclear in CEE have been made. This will clear NATO's nuclear peacetime presence in CEE while keeping the ones in Turkey at place.³⁰⁹ Turkey's concerns on national security about the Russian

³⁰⁵ See Ali Karaosmanoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 214

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ See Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey", *op. cit.*, pp. 162-166, and also see M. Kibaroglu, "The General's Discontent", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 2001, p. 29

³⁰⁸ Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan", RAND, pp. 1-4, at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241>

³⁰⁹ See W. C. Potter, "Unsafe at any size", *op. cit.*, p. 14

National Strategic Concept of December 1999, and also WMD threat to its immediate neighborhood keeps it from demanding a non-nuclear position in NATO. However, this makes Turkey bear more risks and more responsibilities than the other and new NATO members which is against the principles of collective defense.³¹⁰

Turkey has also concerns of being overlooked, like Norway and Iceland, because of its exclusion from the ESDP decision-making mechanism while it has an exposed strategic position as an important flank country for the defense of Europe.³¹¹ Moreover, Ankara fears that the membership enlargement to CEE or Baltics along with the formation of an ESDI within NATO will shrink the importance of Southern Flank of NATO and inevitably of Turkey.³¹² An early accession before Turkey of new NATO members to EU will naturally make them full ESDP participants while Turkey is not granted such a status. This will move limited resources to new European allies that could otherwise be useful to Turkey, and exclude Turkey from taking part in decisions of utmost importance for its regional interests as it confronts a number of significant internal and external crises and risks. From this perspective, still little incentive counts for Turkey to support new NATO members in CEE unless granted closer ties with the ESDP.³¹³ There is also the concern that as NATO evolves from an organization charged with defence of territory to an instrument of collective security and crisis management, Turkey's weight in the alliance will correspondingly diminish.³¹⁴

³¹⁰ See M. Kibaroglu, "Turkey", op. cit., pp. 188-189

³¹¹ See Alyson Bailes, "Europe's Defense Challenge", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, Is. 1, Jan. 1997, p. 14

³¹² Parliamentarian Kamran Inan mentioned the possibility of reducing the significance of the Southern Flank by expanding NATO's frontiers during the ratification discussions of enlargement in TGNA Foreign Relations Commission, April 1998, cited in Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, "NATO's Enlargement and Turkey", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Annual, 1998/1999, Is. 4, p. 171

³¹³ See Ali Karaosmanoğlu, op. cit., p. 215, and also Hall Gardner, "NATO Enlargement: Toward A Separate Euro-Atlantic Command", American University of Paris, January 30, 1999, available at: <http://search.cetin.net.cn/internet/DSTI/FAS/man/nato/ccern/hallga2.htm>

³¹⁴ See Lionel Barber, "A Vital Interest for the EU", *Europe*, Is. 367, June 1997, p. 26

Despite all these problems, Turkey continues its pro-enlargement policy. Turkish Grand National Assembly has ratified the protocols of NATO's first membership enlargement round on 21st of October in 1998. Turkey is the last NATO member who ratified the protocols before Norway. Actually, Turkey has officially declared its support for Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Baltic states, Albania and Macedonia in their desire to become NATO members.³¹⁵

³¹⁵ The most assuring events are President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's and FM İsmail Cem's declarations on several bilateral or multilateral conventions or visits. See, for example, "Bulgaria and Romania seeks Turkey's backing for NATO", *Reuters*, Report on a Trilateral Summit of Heads of States, Plovdiv, Bulgaria, February 15, 2001, and "Turkey Says Backs Baltic and Balkan Expansion", *Estonian Review*, Vol. 10, Is. 23, June 11, 2000, available at: <http://www.vm.ee/eng/review/2000/review23.htm>, and also "Turkish Foreign Minister Arrives In Slovenia", *Slovene News Agency*, April 19, 2001, at: <http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=010419004589>

Figure 8: NATO Today



CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSION

The NATO alliance remains the center of European security debates. It was successful, both during and after the Cold War. It accomplished a series of transformations and adaptation processes in its central tasks of building political consensus, managing threats, defending its member states, capably organizing multinational military operations, and keeping the only remaining superpower, the U.S., involved in Europe. This transformation process has redefined the approaches to the meaning of alliances as NATO introduced novelties in its scope of preservation of peace, security, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The geographical enlargement of NATO, in the post-cold war era, is the centerpiece of this whole transformation process. With regard to its implications, after the first round of membership enlargement and enlargement through partnership, the incorporation of new members into NATO did not affect its tasks and the alliance's ability to successfully conduct them. The usefulness of a second round of enlargement, however, should also be considered from the perspective of its possible impact on Russian-NATO relations as well as on ESDP-NATO posture.

It has so far been reasonable to argue that NATO's enlargement on the whole, has been successful. Primarily, it has brought NATO the dynamism it needed to survive. Today, NATO is defined in terms of an alliance that has more functions than the mere collective defense. Especially regarding the mission of promoting stability in a traditionally volatile area, the enlargement through partnership seems more successful towards the establishment of a security community. On the other hand, membership enlargement, with the objective of creating a successful Euro-Atlantic

collective security organization, has served to sustain the credibility of NATO. Apart from Article 5 commitments extended to new members, the "security commitment" embedded in PfP through Article 4 consultation availability has served the creation of a stable environment at least on interstate level among 46 states. Moreover, with the values and norms it represents, the idea of NATO membership has encouraged all of CEE countries to acquire democratic principles, put up democratic institutions, and to develop as peaceful members of the international community.

From Turkey's perspective, NATO's first round of membership enlargement serves merely as a means to reestablish close relations with new members within the same alliance. Arguably, however, the first round did not contribute to Turkey's regional security concerns to a great extent. Nevertheless, a probable second round with the incorporation of both Romania and Bulgaria would certainly enhance the existing security cooperation and strengthen the security structure in both the Black Sea and the Balkans. On the other hand, there are risks of new confrontations in the region. The new NATO members may be tempted to exploit the Alliance to obtain more financial or political aid from the allies and to exert pressure upon their rivals. Turkey's alienation from European security architecture has the potential to support such considerations, when new members and the prospective members would have an advantageous position in taking part in European security initiatives.

Moreover, along with the enlargement of NATO's sphere of influence as to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Russian existence, Turkish sphere of influence will also be enlarged as to offer an institutional like-minded platform of states in the Black Sea and Caucasian region. Furthermore, the security produced in the Black Sea region will be projected to Caucasus and contribute to the security of the Caspian and Central Asian energy resources. With respect to the energy routes

from east to west, especially the Caspian energy inroad to West, the partnership enlargement further secures the Turkish economic and energy interests in the region. First, because PfP existence in the region is one of the basics of the stability in the region. Second, stability ensures the construction of the means to transport the regional potential of oil and gas to Europe. Finally, Turkey will economically benefit while PfP provides the continuance of resource flow to Europe.

On the other hand, with regard to the enlargement through partnership, the process of including Euro-Asian community of states into PfP and EAPC has encouraged the nations from the Balkans to Central Asia to further their relations with the West. In this respect, Turkey also had its own share. Partnership enlargement consolidated Turkey's role as a bridge between Caucasian and Central Asian Turkish Republics, and the West. Indeed, though largely on military and security grounds, PfP has provided Turkey with an institutional means to establish a teaching and learning process with the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia.

Accordingly, it can be argued that establishing close evolutionary relations with the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Central Asia enhances Turkey's own Western identity. A model of Western Turkish identity, which is Muslim, parliamentarian, democratic, laicist can also be projected to the partners in these regions.

APPENDIX 1

The North Atlantic Treaty *Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949*

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security (1).

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, (2) on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

Notes:

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey and by the Protocols signed on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Spain.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognised the independence of Algeria. The result was that the "*Algerian departments of France*" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing. Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

APPENDIX 2

Partnership for Peace: Framework Document

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council

Brussels, 10 January 1994

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10/11 January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.
2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.

In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.

They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means.

They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in pursuing the following objectives:
 - a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
 - b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
 - c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
 - d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.
5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.
6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:
 - a. those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
 - b. they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
 - c. they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
 - d. those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
 - e. building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
 - f. they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.
7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:
 - develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;
 - promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

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