THE SIMULACRUM SURFACED:

A STUDY ON THE NATURE OF THE IMAGE

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by

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June 2004

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims at understanding the nature of the visual image through discussing the notion of 'simulacrum' within the philosophy of Plato, Baudrillard and Deleuze and trying to locate its importance within the representational system of models and copies. The notion of imitation and representation is found problematic in explaining the fascination within visual imagery and Deleuze's term 'becoming' is suggested as more appropriate. It is discussed in this thesis how the simulacrum threatens and destabilizes model/copy relations of representation through its role in Deleuze's 'sensation.'

Key Words: Simulacrum, Simulacra, Image, Representation, Visual Arts

ÖZET

YÜZEYE ÇIKAN SİMÜLAKRUM:
İMGENİN DOĞASI ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA

Evren Erlevent
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü Yüksek Lisans

Bu tezin amacı görsel imajın doğasını, Plato, Baudrillard ve Deleuze'un 'simülakrum' üzerindeki görüşlerine yer vererek anlamaya çalışmaktır. Temsili sistemin öğeleri; model ve kopya incelenerek, simülakrumun bu ilişki içindeki yeri tespit edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Taklit ve temsil kavramlarının görsel sanat eserlerinin yarattığı büyüleyici etkiyi açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığı tartışılmakta ve Deleuze'un "oluş/başkalaşış" kavramı önerilmektedir. Bu tezde simülakrumun temsili sistemi nasıl tehdit ettiği ve model/kopya ilişkilerini Deleuze'un 'duyusal' kavramındaki rolüyle dayanaksız kıldığı tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Simülakrum, Simülakra, Suret, İmaj, İmge, Temsil, Görsel Sanatlar

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The motivations behind this study lie in life-long fascination with the surface, and/or, the image. After 10 long years of being a visual arts student, my urge to comprehend representation had almost become vital. I feel lucky to have had the opportunity to attend graduate courses that were all related in this way or the other with the subject of this thesis.

I would like to thank the deadline before anything else, nothing else would have stopped me in my search and endless sessions of reading, writing, doing and thinking whatever, (which was always in every case), extremely important to my thesis. It is my duty here to apologize to every person in history, who has ever thought and produced about these matters, for not being able to have found their work in time for this thesis. As all thesis' are, this is a lifetime project.

Among the actual people and things I owe gratitude are my advisors and jury members, all who have been extremely patient and friendly towards me. I also

Much of the content in this text is philosophical. The author would like to declare to those who require such a demand of status that the conclusions and statements drawn upon these alien fields are not truth-claims but only the playful -yet dreadfully serious- adaptations of a designer pulled off to better understand her material. Such a declaration is needless, even ridiculous, where it is not obligated.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. THE AIM AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study aims to understand the peculiar nature of the image and its processes. What is it that 'works' in representation? Is there always some form of imitation, or a model to copy? How is the whole model – copy relation established and what is simulacra's role within this relation? Does the simulacrum have anything to do with the timeless, captivating power in images that cannot be explained with sign/signified systems?

These seemingly simple questions prove to have complex and strongly opposing answers within philosophy, cultural theory and philosophy of art. Since ancient Greece, the argument of the simulacrum has tended to either the absolute approval of all forms, arts and spectacles or the complete condemnation and hatred of any kind of appearance as imposture. While the fervour of most of these ideas force us to decide between simulacrum as simply good or bad, together with the enormous explosion of imagery since the 60's, texts that deal with the matter in depth have been written,

further complicating the for and against attitudes towards the simulacrum.

As shall be seen, there are good reasons to believe that the simulacrum is the key to comprehending the ways of the image as well as anything that has not been established in any side of a strict duality, or as a way to deconstruct established meanings through art. Although simulacra could be thought to envelope every possible term that implies any kind of instability, ambiguity, un-decidability, two-naturedness or paradox; such as madness, ecstasy, gibberish, noise, bi-sexuality, or phantasms, these aspects are left out (or at least are tried to) in this study for the sake of producing a coherent whole that concentrates on visuality and the image.

For the reason that the argument on simulacrum is one made in the territory of the Idea and the copy, it is directly related to the fields of ontology, art, technology, philosophy of art with an emphasis on representation and issues of subjectivity. At times it will be difficult to smoothly correlate these various fields because of the differences in jargon, yet it is impossible to consider one without the other.

Throughout this text, I will be trying to summarize a number of philosopher's views related to the simulacrum. Starting with Plato and moving on to the more socially concerned Baudrillard, I will proceed with the more artistically interested; Deleuze and Durham. Especially Deleuze's notion of simulacrum and its consequences within visual arts are important to this thesis. Other philosophers and authors such as Derrida, Klossowski and Nietzsche will be referred to at certain points where Deleuze refers to or leaves unmentioned, further allowing me to analyze the relations between the model and the copy which holds a crucial role in understanding the importance of the simulacrum. Last of all I will discuss the simulacrum and its role through artworks and present my conclusion.

I have felt strongly at times that there is yet a lot more to learn, and even learn better and unlearn, from Heidegger, Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe. I do not have the required philosophical background to dwell in these issues at large nor the time to read all the material - which is rather inhumanely immense anyway- that may have been use to this thesis.

1.2. IMAGE AND THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION

> "Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of images. And by image we mean a certain existence which is more than what the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing, an existence placed half-way between the thing and the representation"(Bergson, 9).

The very special condition of being an image, whether a realistic sculpture, film, mental picture, thought or metaphor, lies in its position of being "placed half-way between the thing and the representation", as Bergson puts it. In other words, an image can never be a total thing in itself and also cannot be the thing it mimes to be.

The earliest known theory of art in Western Philosophy belongs to Plato (B.C. 427-347) who has condemned all visual artists, dramatists, most poets and musicians for operating imitatively. In *Republic*, his main concern seems to be that these artists, through the act of imitating people and things that they are not in reality, arise highly complex and strong emotions in the viewers/audience that have the power of destabilizing them, which is dangerous to his Ideal

State and good sense in general. Plato's understanding of visual arts as a mirror held to nature, is dominant in Western society until the 20th century. According to Plato, art simulates appearances. It shall be discussed, that although, together with political, economical and social changes the understanding and appreciation of things gathered under the name 'art' have changed in the recent centuries, Plato's notion of art as imitative, mimetic or figurative has become problematical, yet remained. In 1747, Batteux, in his attempt to classify the Fine Arts, wrote in *The Fine Arts Reduced To A Single Principle;*

> "We will define painting, sculpture and dance as the imitation of beautiful nature conveyed through colours, through relief and through attitudes. And music and poetry are the imitation of beautiful nature conveyed through sounds, or through measured discourse" (qtd. Carroll 22).

Batteux's single proposed founding principle of fine arts, as conceived in the 18th century, is that it 'imitates' beautiful nature. Only a century after the ultimate task and motivation of fine arts was defined by Batteux as such, (as the long term result of trying to precisely imitate a country view in fog, the myth says), Monet and his friends would open up a possibility in the visual field of art and give way to what we now claim to be a landmark in art history; the

Parisian des Refuses Exhibition in 1863. As we shall
see later in Deleuze, it is not correct that the
Impressionists, or Realists before them, invented a new
meaning for art, rather, their paintings made it clear
that the effect art has on us, or the way it works, is
and had always been more than simply imitating
beautiful nature. In the case of the Impressionists,
they were strictly still imitating beautiful nature in
the sense that they were consciously trying to imitate
the effect or impression that beautiful nature has on
us through painting. The Platonic understanding of art
as imitation still seemed to be valid at this point,
but as Modernism moved on it encountered fatally
serious threats; Toulouse-Lautrec's extreme
stylizations, Cézanne's landscapes, Picasso and
Braque's first collages using real wood imitation
wallpaper, all pointed to the direction of bringing out
the surface of the painting and showing the material a
visual image is made of, thus moving away from
figuration and imitation and also introducing (as the
Impressionists introduced the already existing
impression or effect) an intellectual aspect of the
arts; whether it be socially, culturally or yet again
artistically concerned. It was also questioned by this
time whether music was really imitative or not, or
whether architecture imitated anything at all.
Duchamp's ready-mades or Rothko's colour-field

paintings are the extremes points of Modernism in which it seems that figuration or imitation has come to its end.

> "Today, after almost a century of abstract painting, [Plato's] theory seems obviously false. […] Art history has shown us that the theory of art associated with Plato is too exclusive; it confronts too many exceptions; it fails to count as art everything that we regard as belonging to the category of art" (Carroll 21).

It is rather obvious that the modernists have shown us that art is not about mere imitation. Representation has took the place of imitation and with the introduction of semiotics, it has become generally accepted that an artwork, like a word, is a representation of something understood as such. With this definition, images have the right to exist at least, but only on the condition of referring to something else. It is a generally acclaimed notion today that the visual image stands for something else and if it is not successful in doing so, it succumbs to represent and becomes nonsense. Something has to be found to make the indexical image meaningful, this is usually a word, a name, or if the artwork is complex, a sentence. The main problem with Plato's understanding of art as imitation was not so much that the artwork might be mistaken as real, but the strict indexical

relationship of the work to its model that fails in explaining the fascination one experiences through art. The index value remains, this is why art as representation does not bring a new understanding and is no different than seeing the image as imitation. This could be likened to Nietzsche's notion of the death of God in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; the deaths of God is meaningless if we do away with God as an outer referent and keep the place embodied within. Such is the relation of imitation to representation; the place is kept. Furthermore, although the limits may be forced, it is obviously true that art does resemble and is related with forms, figures and in general, appears to be imitating something else. The problem of imitation in visual arts is not an easy one to prove false through a few problematic counter-examples. All appearances have their basis in this duality, thus a more radical approach is needed to claim imitation wrong.

Appearances are thought to fall in two main categories: copies and simulacra. To make a quick and very broad definition in a way that most of the philosophers mentioned in this text would not disagree; simulacra is a copy that does not totally function as a copy does, it is said to not have a model.

1.3. SIMULACRUM: ETYMOLOGY

> "If the term 'simulacrum' has become a key word, even a slogan, in discussions of culture after modernism, it is because it would seem to authorize the critic to relate the disparate elements of that culture as so many instances of a single aesthetics and interpretive problem; that of the image which, having internalized its own repetition, calls into question the authority and legitimacy of its model. In this sense, the simulacrum appears as the privileged form through which something like a "postmodern experience" might be imagined" (Durham 3).

Although the word 'simulacrum' has been the centre of attention in describing and theorizing postmodernism, as Scott Durham tells us in *Phantom Communities*, The word 'simulacrum' (likeness, image, statue) has its etymology in the Latin word "'simulare' (simulate, copy, imitate, look like) that is related to 'similis' (similar, like, resembling)"("simulacrum" Def. 1a). "The word has entered English from French in the 14th century", together with 'image', and is one that has increasingly been "used in a derogatory sense" ("simulacrum" Def. 1b). While in Latin the connotation was on the degree of 'similarity' of the copy to the model, and 'especially solid form, statue' has been noted in many dictionaries, it is possible to see from

the dictionary entries alone that the everyday usage of the word has increasingly drawn to emphasize 'fake', 'false', 'pretend' or with the closest in everyday language: 'imposture.' Further etymologic studies show that the nuance between 'image' and 'simulacrum' seems to be that a simulacrum, although considered a sub-category of image, is very precise, even life-like in copying and always in an act of resembling formal qualities as Taylor describes in *Reading Pierre Klossowski.*

> The word "simulacrum" is restricted by English usage to "a representation of something (image, effigy)," to "something having the form but not the substance of a material object (imitation, sham)," and to "a superficial likeness (appearance, semblance)." Contemporary French understands the term similarly, while maintaining traces of more concrete Latin meanings: "statue (of a pagan god)," even "phantom." Interestingly, French adds "a simulated act" to these semantic possibilities: […]"he took his head in his hands and performed the futile simulacrum (*fit le futile simulacre*) of tearing it off." For Roman writers, a simulacrum could also be "a material representation of ideas" (and not just that of a deity), as well as "a moral portrait."

It is a safe claim to say that Baudrillard's *Simulacrum and Simulacra* popularised the word in the early 80's, leading most to think of the term as his buzz-word or produced in and for the television age. What more, it

is possible to come across 'simulacrum' in many American college and university level writings used to describe the false imagery within advertisements. The sense one gets of the simulacrum in this convention is always one of 'imposture' and always used within the context of mass-culture, especially television and advertisements.

With the increasingly wide usage of the Internet, developments in virtual reality environments and sophisticated simulations (flight, rally, city...etc.) the words simulacra and simulation have increasingly been used and also understood as a technology related term, which is a neutral usage that also brings out the direct relation of the simulacrum to technology.

2. SIMULACRA AS SPECTACLE

2.1. PLATO: IN THE CAVE

> "- Him who makes all the things that all
> handicraftsmen severally produce.
> - A truly clever and wondrous man you
> tell of!
> - Ah, but wait, and you will say so
> indeed, for this same handicraftsman is
> not only able to make all implements, but
> he produces all plants and animals,
> including himself, and thereto earth and
> heaven and the gods and all things in
> heaven and in Hades under the earth.
> - A most marvellous Sophist!"
>
> (Plato 821; *Republic*, Book X)

Plato's view of art, especially all kinds of visual art
as imitation, is one that is preliminary to philosophy
of art. As we have seen earlier, if we do not over-
simplify Plato's views as being unable to encompass and
explain modern artworks, the argument remains intact on
the most part and cannot be overlooked in a study
of/over representation.

According to Plato, the everyday, world of matter and
its components are not primary reality but a world of
appearances that are the distorted reflections of a
timeless and immaterial realm of 'Ideas' (also

translated as 'forms' and 'universals') that is knowable only by use of the intellect. In the famous cave allegory the physical world and its truth is likened to shadows cast on the wall of a cave.

> "Picture men dwelling n a sort of subterranean cavern with a long entrance open to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered [chained] from childhood, so that they remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters [chains] from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet shows have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets. […]See also, then, men carrying past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material" (Plato 747: *Republic,* Book VII).

Plato claims through the analogy that our world of sight is the underworld of shadows and the real objects in the Upperworld are the everlasting Ideas. Of course, only the philosopher is capable of striding outside the cave under the sun, seeing the real through Reason and it is his duty to return to the cave, the State and enlighten the blind also. There is a divorce between the rational/spiritual and the material aspects of human existence, one in which the material is devalued.

This hierarchical separation of Matter and Form, of Soul and Body, Reason and Desire or of Idea and Copy are the founding structure of Western thought. In other words, Plato's dualism is the starting point of Metaphysics in which the Idea reins. This separation automatically implies a hierarchy and a lineage where some things are closer to the original than others. In Book III of *Republic*, Plato condemns all forms of visual arts, almost all musical instruments, any form of literature that does not use simple narration and also tragedy as mere imitations. Furthermore, imitating the slaves, madmen, horse or any other animal as well as the sound of the wind and a woman quarrelling with her husband should be strictly forbidden in the State. Any form of imitation is to be restricted, if it has to be at all it should be from youth upward with only one acceptable and worthy model; one hero for future heroes of the State, with the characters that are suitable to their profession; the brave, courageous, temperate, holy, free and the like. The painter is three times degraded from the truth; he is who works with and gives way to simulacra; the copies of copies. According to Plato, all imitative art not flourishing from reason appeals to the emotions, thus furthers us away from the pursuit of universal knowledge. Even worse, these copies of the copies have such extrinsic likeness that

the illiterate and small children might mistake it as being truthful, that is, a faithful copy to the Idea.

Plato is not unaware that all things are not loyal to his system of Ideas, he is merely very economical and suggests it is wiser to simply condemn or avoid all things (of which are mostly done for the sake of pleasure) that will lead to confusion in his project of tracing down the Realm of Ideas onto the State of Reason. This attitude of avoiding is made explicit in most of his texts. For example, in *Republic,* he clearly states that although certain passages in Homer are dearly close to his heart, they are still imitation and must be away with. A most extreme example of Plato's avoiding from *Republic*, is where he actually decides to put away with certain myths, even if they are true, in order to purify his principle notion that all divine things are good and can only lead to similarly good things . The extremity does not come from the irony of Plato actually telling/writing the stories to be condemned, for example "the doings of Themis and Zeus", but that myths themselves are usually the founding structure and criteria of Plato's selections (627; *Republic,* Book II).

Plato further writes of the simulacrum in *Philebus*. There are two dimensions of things; one of which have

particular fixed qualities and measurable states, size or lengths, the other of pure becoming without measure.

> "Once you give definitive quantity to 'hotter' and 'colder' they cease to be; 'hotter' never stops where it is but is always going a point further, and the same applies to 'colder', whereas definite quantity is something that has stopped going on and is fixed. It follows therefore from what I say that 'hotter', and its opposite with it, must be unlimited. " (1101).

Strangely enough, these things of which Plato says are in the category of "unlimited" things, combined with the measurable "finite" ones, bring out a third category (which he sometimes entitles "health" or the "source of all the delights of life") is "that of the equal and double, and any other that puts and end to the conflict of opposites with one another, making them well proportioned and harmonious by the introduction of number" (1102; *Philebus*). In other words, things belonging to the mixed third category are ones that have tamed the unlimited. Although Plato does not state it overtly, the definition is one of art. He later introduces a fourth category that is the "cause" of the mixed third kind, and from there on ties it to reason, "glorifying his favorite god" again (1103-1105).

In a very similar manner of proving most arts as being imitative, unreliable and untruthful, in *Sophist* Plato unmasks and hunts down the sophist. At this point it is important to better understand what Plato is trying to

do by unmasking and condemning. It has already been said that most art, together with any form of imitation in society, should be controlled so that it does not trigger or stir up intense emotions in the viewer/audience/subjects that could lead to instability. Similarly in the case of the sophist, he is such an instable character (so to speak) that there are a multitude of definitions needed to "track him down." The sophist still has the power of escaping these definitions because he is not strictly tied to any form of "Upperworldy" notions such as truth, good or just. Although the sophist is not a faithful devotee of, for instance, the Truth, he is constantly performing the act of putting forth or bringing out certain statements, words and conclusions about the Truth that are by nature, necessarily; Upperworldy. What is being stated at the moment is actually very obvious; since analytically the only difference between a philosopher and a sophist is that the former strives for consistency while the later has scattered the necessary consistency to philosophize into small pieces, or to put it a different way; on the level of their character; a philosopher believes in what he is doing while a sophist only believes in order to do what he does. The sole existence of the sophist puts the

relation of the philosopher to the Truth in danger. What else is a philosopher than a devoted sophist? In this sense, a philosopher is a faithful copy to the original while a sophist is a simulacrum. It is the act of coming and going between the world of Ideas and of matter that Plato needed to restrict according to this loyalty, or else the Ideal State would never become a faithful copy of the perfect Realm of Ideas through instantaneous and personal experience, which is in itself already two fold and erratic.

Plato does not rest after hunting down the sophist as a hunter, a trader and a warrior; his final movement is when he proves that the sophist is an imitator.

> "The art of contradiction making, descending from insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that presents a shadow play of words ---such are the blood and lineage which can, with perfect truth, be assigned to the authentic sophist" (1016-17; Sophist).

2.2. BAUDRILLARD: SIMULATIONS

> "Whoever fakes an illness can simply stay
> in bed and make everyone believe he is
> ill. Whoever stimulates an illness
> produces in himself some symptoms"
> (Littré qtd. in Baudrillard, 3).

Baudrillard, is no doubt, the first name that comes to mind today when one pronounces 'simulacrum' in public. The metaphysical, binary relations in Plato are intact in Baudrillard's theory, but, as we shall see, in an entirely different way. As is apparent from his quotation from Littré in *Simulacra and Simulation*, Baudrillard observes that imitation (or representation) is extremely different than simulation. In the former, the reality principle remains, for example in the case of illness, one can objectively understand through science, medicine or examination if the patient is truly ill or not ill and only imitating to be. If the person claiming to be ill is a psychosomatic, then s/he has real symptoms of the illness and it is not possible to objectively say that s/he is ill or not ill or imitating to be ill. It is a paradoxical or hyperbolic situation; the patient is both ill and is not at the same time. If a symptom can be produced, writes Baudrillard, then symptoms can no longer be seen as

facts of nature and medicine loses its meaning. He also gives the example of Iconoclasts and says that they were the ones to understand simulacra as is; "forever radiant with their own fascination" (5). The reason why the Iconoclasts were so zealous, claims Baudrillard, was not their belief that the divine could not be represented but their fear that it can be. They knew that the simulated God would "deploy their power and pomp of fascination […] and efface God from the consciousness of men" (4). He argues that if the Iconoclasts had really believed that images were worthless attempts at representing the unrepresentable, there would have been no reason to destroy them. As is in the relation of simulated symptoms to the truth of medicine, the fascination of God icons would make apparent that God never existed, that he was never anything else but his own simulacrum. Images, when unmasked, dissimulate the fact that there is nothing behind them, they are therefore the murderers of the real, says Baudrillard; they murder their own model.

However, he adds that all good Western faith opposed to this [dark] murderous power with a [bright] dialectical power; that of representation. If a sign could be exchanged for the depth of meaning (for simulation is a

always on the surface) then the reality principle could be obtained, the sign would be in second rank to the signified. The only thing that could guarantee such an exchange, claims Baudrillard, is God. The moment God is simulated, the whole system turns into a simulacrum. The principle of representation lies in the equivalence of the sign to the real, whereas the logic of simulation has its roots in the radical negation of sign as value.

> "Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself as a simulacrum. Such would be the successive phases of the image:
>
> 1. It is the reflection of a basic reality.
> 2. It masks and perverts a basic reality.
> 3. It masks the absence of a basic reality.
> 4. It bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum."
>
> (Baudrillard 6)

In the first case the image is 'good', it is representation in a sacramental order. The second is 'evil', it is of the order of maleficence. The third 'plays' in the order of sorcery and the last is mere simulacra that is no longer in the order of appearance (as the appearance of something else). Baudrillard categorizes the orders of simulacra in a similar successive fashion in another essay from *Simulacra and*

Simulation; Simulacra and Science Fiction. In the First Order of simulation, simulacra are 'natural' and founded on the image, in this phase, class mobility allows traditional reference systems to be swapped yet signs are still in reference to an original and tied to social relations of power. In the Second Order, simulacra are 'productive'; Baudrillard claims that together with the Industrial Revolution, things counterfeit were able to do so in large quantities. Signs loose their qualities of being references/representations and become mere products. The Third Order is mere 'simulation', the cybernetic game, there is no longer a specific product or producer but only a set of codes (121-128).

Baudrillard's much-acclaimed article, "The Precession of Simulacra" begins with citing the Borges fable in which the cartographers of the Empire prepare a map that is equal in size to its territory.[1] The allegory of simulation no longer reflects our situation, says Baudrillard, since the real/ territory has not survived the simulation/map. The shreds that are left in the desert to decay are those of the territory, not the map. In fact, says Baudrillard, the inversion of the analogy is not useful either since there no longer remains a sovereign difference between the map and the territory; the metaphysical, representative quality is totally lost. Today, the real is produced from

"miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, models of control—and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times from these models" (2). The process of simulation is a constant operation that has cut loose of any reference outside itself such as an ideal (good, truth, ethically correct…etc), it has nothing to measure itself against. "Our reality", says Baudrillard, "is in fact no longer a reality at all given that we no longer have an imaginary to envelope our reality" (2). Baudrillard calls this new reality "hyperreal." There is no longer a question of imitation, meaning or duplication, not even parody because the liquidated signs in this hyperreal only refer to other signs and can lend themselves to any system of binary opposition or equivalence. In short, in Baudrillard's theory of simulation, humanity has reached the point in history where the machine of simulation has become full-operational and no longer needs its former model; the real. The real is now unable to produce itself and we are like the people in Borges's fable that live on the map with no access to the territory.[2]

I think it would be just to describe Baudrillard's theory of simulation as a –near fatal- combination of technological fascination with Debord's notions of the

Spectacle. Guy Debord showed in *The Society of The Spectacle* how the spectacle, "a social relation among people, mediated through images" (Chapter 1, par. 4), was the means that separated and isolated people/viewers only to connect them through itself. Debord claims that the spectacle is the opposite of the dialogue. In Baudrillard, there is the Real and there is what we live in, separated and joined by the spectacle which through our/its excessive act of simulation we/have turned into an inescapably huge television screen and prevented any kind of real contact whatsoever.

The obvious objection to Baudrillard has been heard and told so many times; why is the emphasis on 'today', does this separation not exist in the very structure of language itself, what is so special about 'now'? Another objection can be made on the level of what he so well categorises as the "successive phases of the image." These should not be seen as successive phases, but true all at once of the image. The first three 'phases' could be thought as only one, since an realistic portrait, for example, imitates the person (first stage), perverts the reality of the person through the act of imitating/referring to him/her (second stage) and can only refer to the person in his/her absence anyway (third).

There a variety of difficulties in reading Baudrillard; although he strives for a systematic and totalizing philosophy that encompasses everything, he obviously fails to do so and is highly contradictory at times. It is hard to approach him because of the ambiguity or indecision of some issues that are in fact crucial to his philosophy. For example, he uses the word 'model' interchangeably, while at times applying the Platonic sense of the word as the origin, the essence as when he uses it for the model of the real. In turns, the real is a model to the simulacrum and finally simulacra becomes models to and amongst themselves in Baudrillard. There is a logical fault in the whole process, by definition, the first model as essence, original, does not contain any form. If it does have a form, then it is no longer the essence. Then how does a copy ever copy that which does not have form? This is what Heidegger criticizes in Plato's model and leads him to add the essence of the essence. Plato tries to escape the question by pointing out the example of the bed in *The Republic*; if there are two ideas of the bed, Plato says, then a third would still appear from behind and would be the idea of former two. Since this would go to infinitum as such, decides Plato, there can only be one idea of the bed. This is why it is said that Plato is economical. He has established an analogy that seemingly applies to all things, all things that are

said to be models are in the same relation to the things said to be copies. Whereas the relation of the Idea (as essence) to its faithful Copy, cannot be the same as the relation of the faithful Copy to the thing that seemingly copies the copy. Analogy disregards difference amongst what it encompasses as its modules, it may be said that Baudrillard takes Plato's analogy for granted. Another approach to Plato's notion of Idea, 'Eidos', could be that it shows us our inability to think without forms and could lead to the denouncement of any kind of transcendental realm or anything related to it. Then, the appearing of a third bed behind the first two as their essence and yet a fourth behind them and so on would only show that these things can not be the essence and are able to forever multiply within themselves. They can be considered as nothing else but simulacra, the whole world is and has always been nothing else than a perfect simulacrum with no origin whatsoever. In this case, there would have never been any Real at any time, therefore it is meaningless to claim as Baudrillard does, that we no longer have access to the Real since there wasn't any to begin with.

3. SIMULACRA AS PURE APPEREANCE

3.1. Massumi: Replicants

Massumi's e-published article on the simulacrum *Realer Than Real* begins with a short summary of Baudrillard's *Simulations*, of which he later entitles "one long lament". According to Baudrillard's simultaneously apocalyptic and doomed vision of the world, we can do nothing else but hopelessly inhale "an ether of images" that are floating around aimlessly, left with no connection to the real whatsoever. Images are interchangeable, meaning has imploded thus is out of reach and we have no other option, according to Baudrillard, than to gasp in fascination, speechlessly, as we function as the ground to all the scenery. "We do not act, but neither do we merely receive. We absorb through our open eyes and mouths. We neutralize the play of energized images in the mass entropy of the silent majority" writes Massumi to make the Baudrillardian scene clearer than ever. Although Massumi does not disagree with Baudrillard about the circumstances, and even rather enjoys most of the depictions, he is radically critical about the attitude

and pessimism. "It makes for a fun read. But do we really have no other choice than being a naive realist or being a sponge?" he asks and proceeds by stating that Deleuze and Guattari have opened a third way;

> "Although it is never developed at length in any one place, a theory of simulation can be extracted from their work that can give us a start in analyzing our cultural condition under late capitalism without landing us back with the dinosaurs or launching us into hypercynicism" (Massumi, Realer Than Real).

The third way that Massumi mentions has implications in almost all of Deleuze's work and could take several different names of which some are 'Overturning Platonism', 'Eternal Return', 'Drawing Lines Of Flight' and the 'Power of the False.' It is more of an incessant project than the revolution it implies. Massumi states that he prefers to call it 'Positive Simulation.' He starts mapping out Deleuze and Guattari's positive theory of simulation by underlining the emphasis Deleuze gives to the simulacrum in *Plato and The Simulacrum:* "The simulacrum is not simply a false copy, it places in question the very notions of copy and model" (Deleuze, *Logic Of Sense* 256). As to be mentioned in detail shortly, according to Deleuze the simulacrum has only a likeness to the model which is merely a surface effect, an illusion and it lacks the intrinsic resemblance, the sameness established by the

copy. Massumi adds in *Realer Than Real* that the inner dynamics of the copy and simulacrum and the process of their production are entirely different.

> "It is that masked difference, not the manifest resemblance, that produces the effect of uncanniness so often associated with the simulacrum. A copy is made in order to stand in for its model. A simulacrum has a different agenda, it enters different circuits. Pop Art is the example Deleuze uses for simulacra that have successfully broken out of the copy mold: the multiplied, stylized images take on a life of their own. The thrust of the process is not to become an equivalent of the "model" but to turn against it and its world in order to open a new space for the simulacrum's own mad proliferation. The simulacrum affirms its own difference. It is not an implosion, but a differentiation; it is an index not of absolute proximity, but of galactic distances."

Massumi further explains that the resemblance of the simulacrum is a means, not an end, and quotes from Deleuze and Guattari,

> "In order to become apparent, [the simulacrum] is forced to simulate structural states and slip into states of forces that serve it as masks. […] Underneath the mask and by means of it, it already invests the terminal forms and the specific higher states whose integrity it will subsequently establish" (*Anti-Oedipus* 91).

There are two immediately very important points put forth in these quotes, in the later; unlike Baudrillard's claim of simulacra being aimless and random, Deleuze and Guattari actually state that simulacra have a purpose, or function; "to establish the integrity of specific higher states." This crucial point will be discussed in a later chapter. The important claim made by Massumi is that the very action of "slip[ping] into states of forces" with an intention totally different than what it seems to be, tells us Massumi, is mimicry. Massumi's usage of 'mimesis' is important as it shows how the simulacrum actually performs its act of resemblance. How can something resemble externally and not internally? Furthermore, how can something perform an act of resembling without referring to the thing being resembled? Massumi reminds us that mimicry is camouflage and the same principle of using resemblance not to be 'same' (meld with vegetable state) but only to be 'like' (as-if-vegetable) in order to enter a higher realm (predatory animal warfare) is the same in nature. He continues, "It [mimicry/camouflage] constitutes a war zone. There is a power inherent in the false: the positive power of ruse, the power to gain a strategic advantage by masking one's life force." The ultimate enemy in this war of ruse, Massumi says, is the so-called model itself. He exemplifies the replicants in *Blade Runner*

(Ridley Scott, 1982), who return to Earth for the purpose of undoing their pre-programmed deaths in order to live full lives of their own, "on their own terms", not to blend with the human population but have a life like humans. Massumi marks a cue by the dominant replicant Roy Batty (Rutger Hauer), uttered while he is about to break the neck of the bio-engineer who made his NS-7 eyes, as being a "general formula for simulation"; "If only you could see what I have seen with your eyes."

Massumi quotes Alliez and Feher's observation that the best weapon against the simulacrum is not to unmask it as a false copy, but to force it to be a true one, "thereby resubmitting it to representation and the mastery of the model." The replicant making company in *Blade Runner*, Tyrell Corporations, had implanted actual human memories in a second generation NS-7 replicant, Rachel (Sean Young). Because of the very humanly implanted memories of her childhood to remind her of her human past, Rachel did not know she was a replicant, and it took Deckard (Harrison Ford) quite some time on the Voight-Kampff Test to determine that she was a fake and not an original. The *Blade Runner* example could even be taken further than what Massumi says, as Deckard himself is strongly implied to be a replicant at the end of the film, making him a

simulacrum so faithful to the original that he actually goes out to kill his own kind out of the belief in his own originality.

Massumi returns to the question of simulation and reality by referring to Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*; they say that simulation does not replace reality but affirms and produces reality. It is more than real. Massumi claims that simulation creates the entire network of resemblance and that both copy and model are the products of the same process. "Reality is nothing but a well-tempered harmony of simulation." So we are left with nothing but two modes of simulation; one that affirms the entire system, building it up and reproducing it over and over again. This mode of simulation is selective and is called 'reality' in general. The other mode, says Massumi, turns against the current system and is distributive rather than selective, it multiplies potentials and is, in general, called 'art.' This is why Deleuze and Guattari insist on the collective nature of becoming, says Massumi, because revolutionary (or minor) artists draw in all the powers of the false their community has to offer and inject it back into society as a simulation.

The conclusion that Massumi draws to in *Realer Than Real* is that since we were simulacra all along and are

now at the moment of the dissolution of old
territories, now that objects, images and information
is unleashing itself as never before, this
deterritorialization may be forced with the power of
the false to the point of "shattering representation
once and for all" and reterritorializing as a new
positive simulation of the highest degree.

Massumi's way of seeing things is much more preferable
than Baudrillard's, but it seems to me that the whole
point of this article is to establish a distance
between himself and Baudrillard, they are in fact very
close to one another at the core of their arguments.
Similarly to Baudrillard, Massumi takes other
appearances as the model, as in the replicant example
in *Blade Runner* in order to show how a simulacrum is at
war with "its own model." Massumi seems to be saying
that humans are the models of replicants, therefore the
ultimate enemy. This is a misunderstanding of Deleuze
as it takes the Platonic analogy seriously as
Baudrillard does, confusing models with copies. It is
extremely important at this point to note that in the
example of the replicant the original that is
undermined is not human beings themselves (not
replicants going out to kill humans), it is whatever
makes human or what it is that gives human its quality
of being unique. Human beings are only copies of this

original and replicants are what at first sight seem to
be copying the copy. With the emergence of replicants
that want a life of their own, our own relation of what
we have established as the essence of human life is
destabilized and forced to deterritorialize.
Furthermore, as we shall see in Deleuze, the model of
the simulacrum is not the copy, not even the model to
that copy, but something entirely different. Massumi
states this himself yet fails to be loyal to Deleuze
while putting forth his own examples.

Massumi takes Baudrillard one step further while he is
introducing the essential elements in Deleuze and
Guattari's thought, but, relaying on *A Thousand
Plateaus*, his conclusion strays away from the
representation/simulacrum or root/rhizome relationship
(3-25). It is not possible to "shatter representation"
as Massumi says, we can never do away with
representation. In the very beginning of *A Thousand
Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari show how there are
hierarchic structures in rhizomes, and rhizomic ones in
hierarchies. The two rely on one another; it might be
true that in Deleuze' philosophy the simulacrum has two
modes, one that serves as the copy and the other as the
paradoxical simulacrum, or that what we know as real is
only "a harmony of simulation" as Massumi puts it, yet
this whole system is no more productive than Plato's.
If the act of the simulacrum's resembling is, as

Massumi says, operated through mimicry, how are new values established? How are we to think of difference in such a system since signs refer to only one another as either affirming or negating? And since art is so important to this theory, what exactly is art?

3.2. DELEUZE: PARADOXA AND MAD BECOMING

In the very beginning of "Plato and The Simulacrum", the first appendix of *The Logic of Sense,* Deleuze asks what Nietzsche really means by 'Overturning Platonism' as it could not be the already taken up project by Kant and Hegel of "denunciating essences and appearances" (253). Deleuze underlines that the distinction Plato makes between finite, 'hot' and infinite, 'hotter' things is not between the Idea and the copy, but between the appearances themselves; copies and simulacra. The distinction takes place between material, this-worldly pretenders who all have a claim to the Idea. Deleuze gives the example of the lover in Platos's *Phaedrus*, "the method of selection", says Deleuze, "is not one of dividing genus into species but of selecting lineages".

> ""A simulacrum is an image that does not resemble; the image is maintained whereas the resemblance is lost. It does not have an internal relationship to a model but only an external relationship built on
>
> the model of the Other from which there flows an internalized dissemblance." […]the Platonic dialectic is neither a dialectic of contradiction nor of contrariety, but a dialect of rivalry, a dialectic of rivals and suitors. The essence of division does not appear in

> its breadth, in the determination of the
> species of a genus, but in the depth, in
> the selection of lineage. It is to screen
> the claims and to distinguish the true
> pretender from the false one" (*Logic Of
> Sense* 254, 258).

While the copy has an intrinsic, internal link to the
Idea and is faithful at representing it, simulacrum has
-some how- escaped from it's bound and acts as a mad
element, moving paradoxically at both directions at
once. Paradox is of great importance here; it is that
which affirms the dualistic directions (hot/cold)
mapped out by the realm of measurable and static things
simultaneously (hotter). All this, needless to say, is
a great threat to the model/copy relationship, for the
copy is that which claims its link to the model.
Simulacra are also claimants, but they simulate with
intrinsic dissemblance, and become the father, fiancée
and lover all at once, putting the whole relation,
continuously, in jeopardy. It would not be a threat if
it had no claim to the model in Plato's lineage,
however far it may be from the 'Truth' it has to enter
the line of representation to become a threat as the
'False.' The reason why Deleuze says the simulacrum
avoids both the model and the copy is that the way it
makes its claims are from multiple directions at once.
Just like the sophist, the simulacrum takes its place
in the lineage only to make the claim from somewhere
else, again and again. This is why it meets all the

formal, extrinsic elements necessary, because it becomes a figure only to vanish again, only in it's passing to another form. This paradoxical movement is the reason why it lacks the internal resemblance and the reason why, as Baudrillard has also stated, it undermines the internal resemblance of the copy to the model altogether; images do not hide anything behind them. Through the simulacrum it is possible to see that all copies are nothing other than what Massumi calls "forced to believe" simulacra. At some point in their mad becoming, they have for some reason, decided to be.

Deleuze's understanding of Nietzsche's 'Overturning Platonism' is not a simple 'End of Metaphysics' project aiming at shattering all dualities. Neither is it a 'Counter-Platonism' that simply switches the hierarchical position in favour of the degraded opposition as Massumi tends to present. It is extracting the category of the false from Plato's theory of the Same and the Similar (copies producing copies) and affirming the simulacrums rise and claiming its rights among copies and models. In Deleuze, simulacra does not murder and take the place of reality as in Baudrillard nor is it in a life and death war with the model as in Massumi. Both of these views presume that the operations of representation and simulation are different from one another; they place

the simulacrum in an exterior relation to the model and copy and posit a certain hierarchy which makes no difference. In contrast, Deleuze shows us how the simulacrum is in operation as an aggressive element within representation, not against the established system from outside but from within it. This does not mean that Deleuze appropriates one of the hierarchic views in Baudrillard; that of representation enveloping simulation, it is rather that the Same and Similar are two forces of the machine of representation, which itself produces only simulation. Simulacra have a crucial role in the system of representation as they establish indexical, faithful relations to the model (as copies) and on the other hand put the whole relation in jeopardy by showing that the relation is not one of the Same but of Similar. Simulacra has an affirmative and productive role, for it denies that appearances, whether good or not cannot be categorized according to the primacy of an original over them. On the other hand, it is true that the model has a primacy over the copy. "What needs a foundation, in fact, is always a pretension or a claim" states Deleuze (*Logic of Sense* 255). He refers to Derrida's notion of Father/Son to better describe the relation. To give an over-simplified summary, in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida describes what he calls the "Logic Of The Supplement"; the Father/Son, Mythos/Logos, spoken word/writing or

Model/Copy relationship as one in which the son has to precede the father in order for the father to become father. In this sense, the son is "originary" to the father. The supplement of the father; the son, is therefore both secondary and primary to the father. His example of masturbation in *Of Grammatology* shows how there is a certain lack in our nature that is corrected and at the same time perfected by masturbation (153). Derrida says it is "undecidable" whether the supplement is "accretion or substitution", it is both at once (144). According to Deleuze, the claim of the pretender (the copy, the son or supplement in Derrida) grounds the foundation, and therefore copies are in a sense "originary" to models whereas simulacra make their claim "against the father", with no loyalty to their model (Derrida qtd. in *Logic of Sense* 257). To further the discussion around Derrida's 'Logic of the Supplement' with relation to Deleuze's simulacrum relationship; it could be said that what Derrida calls the undecidability of the supplement is valid in the simulacrum, the simulacrum which seemingly has a single mask (the 'loyal son') claims to have the same face as the father and is thought to be a coherent part of the originality and unity of the model. The simulacrum that shows yet another mask infinitely under the one resembling the father (the 'bastard son') puts the models unity and uniqueness in danger, it is an

extension, a supplement that shows the lack of the model to express itself for itself. These are not two kinds of different things says Deleuze, but "the two halves of a single division" (*Logic Of Sense* 257).

Being simulated as the Same or Similar can not have a hierarchical superiority since they are both simulation. The aim of representation understood as aiming to establishing a truthful indexical relation, simulation should be exteriorized. Plato clearly states and defends himself of doing so; the simulacrum should be buried deep in the ground or "shut up in a cavern at the bottom of the Ocean", what Deleuze, via Nietzsche, defends and celebrates is that "it always comes back from the abyss" (*Logic of Sense* 259). Deleuze summarizes the aim of Platonism as to impose a limit on the "maddening" becoming of the Simulacrum, to try to exteriorize it from the system of representation. It is possible to state that both Baudrillard and Massumi's suggestions are within the Platonic system of representation; the first because simulacra are seen as copies of copies and the second for the reason that the model of the simulacrum is taken as the same model of the copy, whereas Deleuze says the simulacrum's model is the other. Both Baudrillard and Deleuze lead to a closed system of references which could be interpreted

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as either utopic or dystopic, making no difference, as shall be discussed by Durham.

There is a demonic power in the simulacrum says Deleuze, God made man in his image and resemblance, through sin man has lost the resemblance while maintaining the image. We have become simulacrum and if we still have a model, this model is not that of the Same, claims Deleuze, "it is of the Other" and he further remarks that "it is not enough to invoke a model of the Other, for no model can resist the vertigo of the simulacrum" (*Logic of Sense* 262).

How are we to understand this? What is this extreme difference that Deleuze calls the 'Other'? This other is the same as when Deleuze and Guattari say 'Becoming Animal' in *A Thousand Plateaus*, or rather just by itself 'becoming' as to become something else is to loose oneself and experience what one can not be in the borders of the identical self under the system of the Same. In another jargon this absolute difference is called the Unthought. When we put the relation in this way, it is necessary to understand what Deleuze thinks of difference.

> "It seems that it [difference] can only become thinkable only when tamed – in other words, when subject to the four

iron collars of representation; identity in the concept, opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception. As Foucault has shown, the classical world of representation is defined by these four dimensions which co-ordinate and measure it. […] Every other difference, every difference that is not rooted in this way, is a unbounded, uncoordinated and inorganic difference: too large or too small, not only to be thought but to exist"(Difference and Repetition 262).

In Deleuze's philosophy, mere representation (sign-signified relation), figurativeness and dialectics have to be fought against for the reason that they claim to correspond to and encompass every difference, whether extremely small or large. Philosophy, science and art deal with difference in different ways. Deleuze's philosophy of difference and repetition, as well as his crucial relation of the virtual and the actual are highly complex. Although they are at the core of his philosophy and essential to understand both his works standing in philosophy and arts and simulacra's importance in his, they are beyond the aim and contours of this thesis and can only be roughly sketched were necessary in the argument of the simulacrum and arts.

4. FURTHER INTO NIETZSCHE'S ABYSS

4.1. DURHAM: PHANTOM COMMUNITIES

> " […]where there is talking, the world is
> like a garden to me. How sweet it is,
> that words and sound of music exist; are
> words and music not rainbows and seeming
> bridges between things eternally
> separated? […]Appearance lies most
> beautifully among the most alike; for the
> smallest gap is the most difficult to
> bridge […] Are things not given names and
> musical sounds, so that man may refresh
> himself with things? Speech is a
> beautiful foolery: with it man dances
> over all things" (Nietzsche 234).

Scott Durham, unlike Massumi, does not decide between
the views of Simulacrum as being dystopic as in
Baudrillard or utopic as Massumi, and sometimes Deleuze
tends to present. Instead, in *Phantom Communities* he
suggests that it is undecidable about what the
simulacrum is, as the whole discussion has its basis in
Platonic metaphysics and therefore "the false
opposition of the real to the virtual"(16). Durham,
like Massumi, is quick in noting that Baudrillard's
view is a rather naïve one that does not take in
consideration that the simulacrum is not a mere copy of
the copy, and also that his theory of simulation
doesn't take us anywhere at all. Yet he does not
refrain from considering the strong opposition and
negativity put forth by Baudrillard, as well as Jameson
and Debord. Durham states that while Baudrillard's
simulacra is almost always strictly related to mass
communication and low-art, leading to the 'prison

house', pessimism and resentfulness, Deleuze's examples or influences are always in the field of high-art, which are somewhat liberating, almost always highly playful and affirmative. At this point Durham ties the points of view of these philosophers looking at the same, yet seeing two seemingly very different things to the two stages of Eternal Return of Zarathustra (Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*). The first stage of the Eternal Return as "the condemnation of subject to the repetition of an empty self-identity, as the nauseating inevitability" is Baudrillard's stage of the simulacrum, where the memory of a now unreachable Real haunts the subject in a prison-world of repeating appearances that have lost their link to their original (Durham 11). Zarathustra falls sick and hopeless in this stage, it is at the second moment of the Eternal Return when the "unfounding of appearances and the dissolution of the world of simulacra" are the most joyful and positive events (Durham 12). It is at the second stage when the actor or artist discovers he is no longer subject to morals or another favourite Nietzsche term, gravity. Needless to say, this is the

Deleuzean side of the Simulacrum. These two appearances of the simulacrum can be interpreted as Nietzsche's "smallest gap" which is the most difficult to bridge. Art, like speech, is the beautiful foolery which seems to establish "rainbows and seemingly bridges" between the two separate forces of the simulacrum.

Durham's concern, as he repeatedly states in *Phantom Communities* is not so much "what the simulacrum is but what it can do." He claims that postmodern art "is confronted with a singular dilemma: that of articulating the experience of a deterritorialized humanity" (186). Human desire, memory, dreams and perception continue to exist, but have all been exteriorized, we are not so sure that our desire is our own or if the experience is our selves because the very codes of such things are presented to us as being transpersonal. They are continuously articulated and invented in mass media and institutional spaces as productive and performative uses of imagination, desire and memory. Up to this point, this is what Baudrillard and Deleuze together with many others are saying anyway, Durham also adds that the new culture of simulacrum opens up new potentials for forms of individual and collective subjectivity that is in itself an undeniable utopian promise that gives us all the tools to produce reality without having to refer to an already acclaimed foundation. The problem is, according to Durham, that we don't feel that the possibilities are our own, "it is as if another humanity were being created in our absence, a humanity whose transformations could be conceived only in the displaced form of a spectacle from which we are

irremediably excluded" (187). The tension between virtual and actual, as well as the resonance, has become unbearable as culture has concentrated and established itself upon the separator and connector of the two; the spectacle, or the screen. This surface is the domain of the simulacrum that as we have seen before, continuously slides around, mostly avoiding to permanently attach itself with any foundation and at other times grounding the foundation itself. Since we ourselves are mostly creatures of the actual, we feel isolated compared to the colourful immobile nonspace of the imagesphere. Durham points out primarily three important artists in *Phantom Communities* that have interpreted postmodernity according to the characterizing strain between the virtual and the actual. The first is J.G. Ballard who is mostly taken as a somewhat Baudrillardean example. In the dystopic world of *The Crash*, "it is the private fantasy of Ballard's suicidal consumer-hero to break violently through the screen that separates the inferior spaces of consumption from the nonspace inhabited by his or

her simulacral doubles." The second artist/author is Pierre Klossowski who is seen to be more on the utopian side of Deleuze's simulacrum. Klossowski's attempt and desire at constructing a "purely virtual subjectivity that would refer to no existence outside the screen itself" is, however philosophically and aesthetically appealing it may be, no less problematic than the apocalyptic view.

> "What remains unthinkable in both of these myths is the possibility of passage between the virtual and the actual in the postmodern world; neither Klossowski nor Ballard problematize the structural separation of the virtual subjectivities figured in the imagesphere from the vestigial subjects who are reduced to merely consuming those images *as* spectacle" (Durham 189).

The third artist is Jean Genet, which seems to be the perfect example for Durham's own propositions. According to Durham, Genet is not concerned with finding a solution for the postmodern situation or elaborating a world view in which the spectacle might be grasped in its totality. In this sense, says Durham, "Genet's appropriations of the simulacral image are not ideological or metaphysical, but pragmatic." He says in *Phantom Communities* that Genet is interested not in what the simulacrum is, but what it may become.

> "What forces of attraction and repulsion,
> of domination and resistance, are
> mobilized in the serial image? What are
> the actual and potential effects of its
> variations and metamorphoses from one
> moment of the series to the next? These
> questions constitute the point of
> departure for all of Genet's writings […]
> where the spectacle comes to transgress
> its own limits: where the virtual and the
> actual, the spectacle and the spectator,
> the dominant and the emergent pass into
> one another, as divergent expressions of
> the same power of the false" (190).

Genet's fictions, claims Durham, order the relations of
power and desire that they map and shape the forms of
life that they express. The question is, according to
Durham; to what extent can the elements and relations
in the dominant be transformed through their repetition
in and as fictions? Durham says that Genet uses the
potential of becoming other than himself to the degree
that he is "dying to himself", what more, the images
and narratives that he produces (because they are in a
weaving act, a continuous movement between the various
actual and virtual worlds) are not in isolation (as is
in the case of Klossowski) but transpersonal and
collective.

Durham's main concern throughout *Phantom Communities* is
to find a possible way through which Deleuze's
simulacrum can be integrated in narrative. Or to put it

in a better way, Durham says that collective narrative
in itself is the ultimate desire and need of the
postmodern culture which without would not be possible
to think of postmodernity in the first place. And,
since postmodern culture is shaped by the simulacrum,
how could these two things; narration and the
simulacrum, come together, especially if we consider
how the simulacrum itself poses a serious problem in
the context of narration. Above all, Durham needs to
"find an aesthetic, political and ethical potential" in
the simulacrum (5).

Durham's critiques and understanding of the simulacrum
is important, first of all because while appropriating
Deleuze's view of the simulacrum he does not
underestimate the importance of the unthought and
unthinkable and secondly, his views are relevant
because there really is gap between the possibilities
granted to simulacra in theory which have no or very
little correspondence in practice. Nevertheless, he
does not succeed in convincing that his personal hero
Genet is the example of the perfect use of the
simulacrum. If for nothing else, only because he makes
an example out of Genet, whereas the simulacrum is
supposed to be the mask of difference. It is
continuously stated in celebratory postmodern texts
that there opens up an infinite number of possibilities
of "figures who live at the limit of the difference

[…], the borders of the actual and virtual" who with their sole existence bring into question the dualities and truth relations, rendering the conventional roles as nothing more than roles (175). But the possibilities and the 'difference' just doesn't open up, it is as if the mask of difference hides and holds only the transsexual or the cyborg. Durham is no exception and after he glorifies the transsexual, as done millions of times before, he can not find additional roles and or masks although he strives for it. The same critique could be made of Deleuze himself and although Durham does point out a certain confusion with what to do with Deleuze's simulacrum as well as the formal elements of art that Deleuze tends to avoid, it could not be said that his theory or examples do not add anything to Deleuze's views of the simulacrum except for the danger that it may be thought to be utopic. The 'shattering of representation' is not murdering the mirror of representation, it is truly shattering it in to small pieces (with a hammer perhaps) so that we see it is a mirror of similarity and not sameness.

In the following chapter I will try to analyze the two movements of the simulacrum within visual works of art while considering Durham's critique of Deleuze and also further discuss Deleuze's notion of art.

4.2. SIMULACRA AT WORK

> "within painting, Pop Art pushed the copy, copy of the copy, etc., to the extreme point at which it reverses and becomes a simulacrum (such as Warhol's remarkable 'serial' series, in which all the repetitions of habit, memory and death are conjugated)" (Difference and Repetition, 293-294).

As stated before, Plato's understanding of art, especially painting or tragedy is limited to imitation leading to the understanding of simulacra as only a degraded or false copy of a copy. In Book III of *The Republic*, there is a point where he asks "… and what about the painter? I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?" Of course, the answer is the later, and the only piece of evidence or justification is yet again an analogical one; that although we see a bed from only one angle in time, we know that a bed does not change in reality even though it may seem to be different from different fixed points of view, including the one in a painting. The answer is most unsatisfying, it still leaves the possibility that painting may be not imitating the copy but the model, or maybe even something else, or performing something

totally different in its gesture of imitation. Of course, in a different way and with a totally different agenda than the copy does. It is a general claim today that we have long gone beyond this understanding of the arts as mere imitation by replacing the word with representation. As stated before, except for granting painting and tragedy the right to exist for and within itself, it seems to me that our act of going beyond Plato is nothing else but simply jumping over, leaving the problem as it is. This is especially true if we consider Deleuze's objections to the generally claimed notion that painting was historically a form of documentation/imitation that had to abandon this quality with the introduction of the superior form of precise documentation and figuration; photography, and open a new field within itself; the abstract. The important point here is that thinking of painting and photography in similar terms is the same mentality in Plato that gives painting the quality of copying appearances, being figurative, whereas Deleuze claims that painting has never had the sole intention of representing the thing or the story anyway. He gives the example of El Greco's *The Burial of the Count of Orgasz*, **(fig.1)** where there is a narration of the burial in the lower half of the painting yet in the upper part the figures are freed from being representative, narrative or figurative.

Fig. 1. "*Burial of the Count of Orgasz,*" El Greco.

"With God –but also with Christ, the Virgin, and even Hell— lines, colours, and movements are freed from the demands of representation. The Figures are lifted up, or doubled over, or contorted, freed from all figuration. They no longer have anything to represent or narrate, since in this domain they are content to refer to the existing code of the Church. Thus in themselves, they no longer have to do with anything but "sensations", celestial, infernal, or terrestrial sensations. Everything is made to pass through the code, the religious sentiment is painted in all the colours of the world. One must not say, "If God does not exist, everything is permitted." It is just the opposite" (*Francis Bacon*, 9).

As is clearly seen in the quotation, according to Deleuze, what painting deals with, together with all art, is sensations. In all arts the concern is not inventing or reproducing new forms but of capturing forces, for this reason Deleuze claims that no art is figurative (*Francis Bacon* 34). Furthermore, in the Eleventh Chapter of the same book, Deleuze says that the false figurative belief follows from the mistake of thinking that a painter works on a white surface. The painter, says Deleuze, already has many things in his studio around him and even more in his head. It does not make an important difference if these things are virtual or actual, they are all already present in the canvas. If the canvas had been an empty white surface, the painter would have been in the position of reproducing an object functioning as a

model in front of him, thus filling the canvas with paint, whereas his position is one of cleaning, clearing, emptying the canvas from the already present images, with paint. "[…] he paints on images that are already there in order to produce a canvas whose functioning will reverse the relations between the model and copy" (*Francis Bacon* 49). Although later in *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze together with Guattari will write that art does not need a viewer, not even the artist, in *The Logic of Sensation* Deleuze admits that "figuration exists, it is a fact, and it is even a prerequisite of painting." Figuration is there in the canvas, in forms of what Deleuze calls 'clichés'. In several points throughout *Francis Bacon,* Deleuze manifests a certain dislike towards what he calls "art still to intellectual." It is possible to only transform, mutilate or manipulate the already existing cliché, but for Deleuze this is too intellectual and abstract and it gives way for the cliché to rise from its ashes leaving the artist at its utmost to parody and nothing more. Although Deleuze only quotes D.H. Lawrence's passage over Cézanne as an example of fighting against the cliché and resurrecting it in most cases, it is possible to give numerous examples for the notion at stake, including but not limited to Cubism, Suprematism, Minimalism, Action Painting (but not colour-field painting), Photo Realism, Pop-Art and all so-called Conceptual Art. Of course it is not possible to decide and generalize in the way I have just have for undoubtly all of the work of the artists in these categories have sensational qualities, it is just as unavoidable as the figurative. What is at stake is more about the way that such works 'work', they deal with decomposing and recomposing effects, as Deleuze refers to, which only

transforms the clichés at hand, just to show the clichéness of the cliché. In a sense, this is the usage of the simulacrum as a negating destructive element, it is the lesser side of Deconstruction. Certain surface qualities are mimed or repeated (it is severely important to be repeated) with an element of difference and not sameness. This movement puts the relation of the 'original' copy to the original into jeopardy, what was covered before is made explicit and the former meaning dissolves, or is forced to change slightly. A good and clear example would be the early *Untitled Film Stills* (1980) of Cindy Sherman, **(fig.2)** in which "Sherman has manufactured a series of masks of herself based on current myths, stereotypes and images of women, deconstructing as it were, each female character she assumes, […]masquerading her various 'selves' through mocking photographic scenarios, she makes us aware that these are not just images of women but signs of difference, markers or templates of masculinity" (Honour & Fleming, 875). Sherman, by miming mass-produced images of female characters in these series, makes a critique to

Fig.2. "*Untitled Film Still No. 13,*" Cindy Sherman.

that distribution by forcing herself a simulacral image. Although her posture and the settings in the photographs are similar, although she has an extrinsic likeness to the models and actresses in films and magazines, she is not. We know she is not. Sherman's *Untitled Film Series* therefore decompose and recompose the cliché, parodying the copies of which are female figures in mainstream cinema.

Another example would be Vincent Leo's black and white photographs in the 80's which "upon first examination "[…] look like pastiches of the photographs of Robert Frank. In fact –and here Leo's work separates itself resolutely from the realm of academic pasticheur- they *are* the photographs of Robert Frank. What Leo has done is to cut up the reproductions, […]reposition and collage them, and re-photograph the results to yield (in Marchel Duchamp's words) "a new thought for that object"" (Solomon-Godeau, 82-83).

Although the examples are taken from photography, and seem to be directly linked with postmodernism, there is no reason to think this is specific to the discipline or era, rather; together with photography and the explosion of imagery this aspect of all arts have become clearer. What Deleuze claims of the simulacrum, whether we like it or not, is no doubt at work in these

examples and they achieve all that is said of the simulacrum in *The Logic of Sense*. The only visual example I have ever encountered in Deleuze and/or Guattari of the simulacrum 'at work' is that of Andy Warhol's pop Marilyn series, (**fig.3)** which is precisely the same in its elements and movements as the examples given above. This usage or aspect of the simulacrum seems to be very close to what Debord calls "détournement" in *Methods of Détournement*, it is also accompanied by a certain belief or attitude of "leaving formal representation behind" or at least using representation at the minimum where only the indexical value remains. What has become important, in its double sense, is being performative. Conceptual art is the high point of this attitude and approach in arts, it has brought the image to a point where visual art comes as close as it can to words. In *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari write "the plan of composition tends to become informative, and the sensation depends upon the simple "opinion" of Conceptual Art.

In their final book written together in 1994, Deleuze and Guattari take up a definition of art that is historically persistent instead of being era specific. Because *What Is Philosophy?* is more of a "book of philosophy as a practice of the creation of concepts" it is at times somewhat difficult to relate it to

Fig. 3. "*First Marilyn*s," Andy Warhol.

Deleuze's former, 'more philosophical' work (*What Is Philosophy?* Translators' Introduction, vii).

> "The young man will smile on the canvas for as long as the canvas lasts. Blood throbs under the skin of this woman's face, the wind shakes a branch, a group of men prepare to leave. In a novel or a film, the young man will stop smiling, but he will start to smile again when we turn to this page or that moment. Art preserves, and it is the only thing in the world that is preserved. It preserves and is preserved in itself *(quid juris?)*, although actually it lasts no longer than its support and material--stone, canvas, chemical color, and so on *(quid facti)*. […] The thing became independent of it's "model" from the start…" (Deleuze & Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 163)

The difficulty is apparent; formerly we have seen how Deleuze celebrates Warhol's *series* as having pushed the copy to the extent that it becomes a simulacrum, which has proven to be nothing more than transforming the cliché that does not satisfy the role given to the simulacrum. This questions will find answers in the preceding pages of *What Is Philosophy?*, yet it is still difficult to relate the notion of art taken up in this book, to the simulacrum that has been seen as such a vital part of art in the context of the former texts.

The artwork, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is not only independent from the model, but is independent of

the creator of the work and also the viewer. This is because the preserved thing (the artwork), write the authors, is "a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects" (*What Is Philosophy?* 164). Percepts are not perceptions and affects are no longer affections, they are independent from the state of the person(s) who perceive or undergoes them, Deleuze and Guattari further say that sensations (and therefore affects and percepts) are "beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived" (*What Is Philosophy?* 164). Furthermore, sensations come to existence only in the absence of man, because they catch the viewer in the stone, in words, on the canvas and the viewer is no longer himself at that moment, he is becoming stone, is caught in the becoming of the bloc of sensations. Art is independent from the creator, because the only law of creation is that the compound must stand on its own, the greatest difficulty for the artist is to make the compound of sensations stand, that is, be preserved in itself and nothing else, when this is achieved the artwork no longer needs the creator and comes to existence alone. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the material is the condition of the percept and affect that are preserved within themselves. Even if the material lasts for a few

seconds, it gives sensation the power to exist and be preserved within itself, "in the eternity that coexists within this short duration" (*What Is Philosophy* 166).

Art, say Deleuze and Guattari, is all about sensations; we paint, sculpt and write sensations with sensations. Percepts do not refer to objects, "if they resemble something it is with a resemblance produced with their own methods; and the smile on the canvas is made solely with colors, lines, shadow and light" (166).

With the light of these views on art, I will be trying to relate Warhol's *Marilyn Series* in a way that it goes beyond the act of being indexical and producing the simple sensation of recognition. Deleuze must have had more in mind than this.

In another version of Warhol's *Marilyn Series* **(fig.4)**, it is possible to see what it may be that Deleuze found in Warhol. The application of colour on what is obviously a photocopy of the famous photograph, seen in its details, (the red of the lips 'more' than the lips) is captivating in its grotesqueness. It is hard to write about why this image has more sensational power than the previous Marilyn, yet it is my opinion that the secret lies in my very inability of not being able to make the sensational reasonably verbal.

Fig. 4. "*Marilyn,*" Andy Warhol.

5. CONCLUSION

Durham and Deleuze have shown us, how the simulacrum, as Massumi's replicants, can betray or be forced to forget their own nature of moving paradoxically and become representative copies, loyal to the model and how copies can be forced to break their chains and become simulacra. Under the light of the same authors, the simulacrum is what gives way to new meanings and opens up the possibility of new subjectivities by submitting itself in the system of representation as an element of difference, yet it is at times accompanied by a certain utopic revolutionary sound to it, as if it has yet to come, whereas Plato's conception, along with Debord and Baudrillard's, have projected (at the least) displeasing views out of the notion of simulacra as copies of copies that paralyze social relations as well as individuality, forcing us into a state of being subject with no possibilities of anything else. There is no reason to think that the situation is new, in either cases, the conflict between these two groups has its basis on trying to decide, between the virtual and the actual, which is in itself a quasi-supposition[4] that we need to maintain in order to think or create. The simulacrum reveals itself in its pure innocence,

which is beyond all good and evil, of truth and falsehood. It is the moment that simulacra stops becoming and transforms itself into a copy that gives way to new models. As Derrida shows in his logic of the supplement, the original needs the simulacrum to come about and grant itself with its originality. This is how old (and new) law tables are made. Such an understanding is the Nietzschenean 'Overturning of Platonism' itself, accomplished, yet it is important to note that this is not the 'End of Metaphysics' for the Ideas and Copies have/are functions that cannot be away with. The one thing that is made impossible is a static truth or good, or everlasting value. Although with the acceptance of the world as appearances there logically seems to be no place or need for the Idea or the Copy, (for their rein is over), they are mere 'tools' with which thought and language makes itself possible. Furthermore, art itself is not, and cannot be mere 'positive' simulation as Massumi relying on Deleuze put forth. The dual movement of the simulacrum is how language operates and art does not make an exception to this, the difference of art is that through sensation it gives the possibility (or forces us) to become other than ourselves and experience what we cannot know through the intellect.

In Pierre Klossowski's vocabulary, the word 'phantasm' and 'simulacra' differ from one another, the first "refers to an obsessional image produced instinctively from the life of the impulses" and the second "is a willed reproduction of a phantasm (in a literary, pictorial, or plastic form) that simulates this invisible agitation of the soul. The simulacrum, in its *imitative* sense, is the actualization of something in itself incommunicable and nonrepresentable: the *phantasm* in its obsessional constraint" (Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, Translators Preface x-xi).

There is still a confusion in where to situate, where to find the simulacrum. Deleuze's philosophy is productive and consistent, as far as I can see, even inspiring and explanatory of the sensational becoming in art. But where is this simulacrum? It escapes all forms or only disguises temporarily and when it becomes a copy we can no longer clearly see the simulacrum because it shows the thing it refers to. It's like a riddle. Just because I have haunted myself with this riddle, 'where is simulacra?' I made up an answer (that I believe in), with the help of Pierre Klossowski, that would satisfy the question.

"How does "simulacrum" relate to all this? In the self-elucidating fourth section of *Tableaux vivants: essais critiques 1936-1983* (2001), Klossowski recalls that in antique statuary, because it was impossible to create a soul to animate the simulacra of gods, the souls of intermediaries—that is, demons and angels—would be invoked and locked inside holy or sacred images so that these "idols" would thereafter have the power to perform good or evil deeds. Klossowski infers a psycho literary theory from this ancient custom: the emotion contained in a work of art —and thus provoked in the spectator or reader— is correlative to a "demonic movement." Klossowski's characters are "idols" in this literal, as well as ancient, sense" (Tyler).

Simulacra are in the material. It is matter, that is; stone, clay, paint itself that has the potential of "demons or angels" within it. Matter becomes material of the simulacrum through a captivating and simultaneous resemblance and dissemblance. Benjamin's twofold critique of mechanical reproduction is the outcome of the "loss of aura" in this sense; that there is no longer a material, spatial distance in which he/we can perceive the material in its gesture of resemblance (Benjamin 221). Samuel Weber shows how this is not the character of being present in space and time, but of mediation itself. Chemicals of photography and film, even of the digital light of the monitor or projector are not exceptions, they still have the same movement of everyday matter turning into phantasmal material through the gesture of resemblance. The

simulacrum, I have come to conclude, is the "resemblance that haunts material." As such, it has two kinds of appearance.

> "If resemblance haunts the work of art, it is because sensation refers only to its material; it is the percept or affect of the material itself, the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay, the thrust of metal, the crouch of Romanesque stone, and the ascent of Gothic stone. The material is so varied in each case that it is difficult to say where in fact the material ends and the sensation begins" (Deleuze & Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* 166).

The first movement of the simulacrum concentrates on the 'resemblance' and attaches itself to its model and becomes a copy in the platonic sense. This is true for almost all images in mass-production, especially advertisements and also eventually conceptual art and 'art still too intellectual' in Deleuze's terms.

This understanding of the simulacrum is available in Baudrillard, Jameson, Lyotard and Debord among others. I have come to believe that they have taken Plato's analogy (based on the belief in the power of analogy itself) a step too further while ignoring the definition of essence to the point that the original is understood as nothing else than again matter. *Mona Lisa* is not the original. The pepper that Edward Weston

Fig.5. "*Pepper #30,*" Edward Weston.

photographed in *Pepper No. 30* **(fig. 5)** is not the original, and the pepper in the photograph is no longer a pepper. As stated before, the understanding of the world as appearances can lead to only Nihilism, this is the first step of the Eternal Return that needs to be negated. Resemblance haunts the material in the sense that it becomes a reference to something that does not exist or is made completely unreachable through the very act of the resemblance. It is a closed system, in theory; nothing escapes.

The second movement of the simulacrum is when it concentrates on the 'haunting'. Its resemblance is, like many of the philosophers in this study have pointed out, one that does look like something but is terrifying in the way we know it is not that thing. A ghost is a simulacrum, it may look exactly like our long-dead beloved but all we can see in 'it' is the difference, not the resemblance. It lacks the essence, the link or faith to the original (the essence of the beloved) and is a thing within itself. This is also the case of artworks. It doesn't matter if we know the model is homosexual English painter Francis Bacon who is staring back at us in *Self Portrait* **(fig.6)**, what captures us is not 'his' stare, but 'its' stare. The paint, brush strokes and colour, their relation with

Fig. 6. "*Self Portrait,*" Francis Bacon.

one another, capture and force us in to their own mad becoming of the flesh or the face of Bacon or Bacon.

In fact, it is not even possible to say that the becoming is 'becoming flesh' for just as we are no longer ourselves at the moment of becoming, neither is the flesh. It is also not possible to directly talk of the experience. Pierre Klossowski describes this beautifully in his article on Georges Bataille.

> "The simulacrum is not exactly a pseudo-notion: the latter would still serve as a reference point until it could be denounced as a false path. The simulacrum constitutes the sign of an instantaneous state and is unable to establish the exchange between one mind and another, nor permit the passage from one thought to another. In the aforementioned "discussion" and in a conference several years later, Bataille rightly denied communication because one would only ever communicate the residue of what one claims to communicate" (Klossowski, *Bataille*).

Bataille did communicate though, in *Inner Experience* he wrote of the impossibility of communicating the 'mystical' experience without origin while being faithful to it. One has to betray it to knowledge, systems of signs and codes. In this sense, the virtual and actual can never come together in coherence, they can never blend or be discussed and experienced on the same level. They co-exist, it is not possible to say

which is which because the separating lines constantly escape us. The actual relies on the virtual not only because it gives the actual the right to install itself as it is, but also because it is the virtual that brings difference through repetition into the actual, letting it expand; form and install new Truths, new Realities, new Beings, new Laws, all with a capital letter, new Values. This is the "higher states" Deleuze and Guattari describe as the aim of the simulacrum in *Anti-Oedipus*. In turn the actual supplies the virtual the ground to fly from and ends up destroying values.[5] Similarly, the two movements of the simulacrum; that of being a copy and mad paradoxical object rely on each other. The simulacrum needs something to haunt and turn into non-sense. Deleuze's favourite example in *The Logic of Sense* is Louis Carroll's *Alice In Wonderland.* All of the paradoxes in the book are meaningful only because Alice is in the threat of losing her proper name. Likewise, she in fact needs the experience and danger of losing herself to establish herself and to be 'Alice.' When she finally returns to the real world where little girls have good sense, can recite poems and don't change sizes, she returns with a "different face" (Nietzsche qtd. Lacoue-Labarthe 49).

NOTES

1

> In that Empire, the Art of Cartography achieved such Perfection that the Map of one single Province occupied the whole of a City, and the Map of the Empire, the whole of a Province. In time, those Disproportionate maps failed to satisfy and the Schools of Cartography sketched a Map of the Empire which was of the size of the Empire and coincided at Every point with it. Less addicted to the study of Cartography, the Following Generations comprehended that this dilated Map was Useless and, Not without Impiety, delivered it to the Inclemencies of the Sun and of the Winters. In the Western Deserts there remain piecemeal Ruins of the Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars. In the entire rest of the Country there is no vestige left of the Geographical Disciplines.
>
> (Borges and Casares, 123)

It is interesting to note that the Borges story is about the meaninglessness of making such a map.

2 It is not fully clear in Baudrillard if (to go on with the Borges analogy) the map has somehow destroyed the territory and there no longer exists such a thing as the Real, or if the map we (think we) play, work and live on prevents direct access to the Real. Baudrillard refers to both cases through out *Simulacra and Simulation*. If the former option is the case, one must ask how a whole realm has totally disappeared or what has become of it and also, since it doesn't exist any longer, there is no point in longing for it. If the second option is true ('true' because Baudrillard claims so), then he would be following a similar line

of thought with Lacan's screen and because the map was mediated in the first place (as a representation of the territory) it would have left at least the signs of its inability to fully represent that could still serve as sensational points of contact with the real. The map could still "gaze" back in Lacan's term.

[3] I understand Deleuze when he says that the painter must fight with the figure in order to bring out the figure, because both abstraction and figurative painting are systems for the intellect, they do not effect our nervous system as Francis Bacon does. He is intellectually very correct, yet in my opinion, imitation can also be sensational. Take the example of Mezzoni's *Lamentation* **(Fig.7)**. Deleuze is rather critical of narration and sees figuration as an inescapable enemy that has to be fought with.

[4] The term "quasi-supposition" was suggested by Zafer Aracagök instead of the former "false pre-supposition".

[5] The relations I have written on the virtual and actual are to find their references in Lacoue-Labarthe's 'Gestell-Gestalt' relationship in *Typography*, Derrida's 'Father-Son' relation in "The Double Session" and in almost everything I have ever read in Deleuze /and Guattari. I am not referring to these sources directly because I can't say where I exactly encountered the concept, and I may also be saying something different (or even wrong or exactly the same) than what Deleuze says in *Difference and Repetition* in particular.

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