

ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN TURKEY

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ANKARA

March 2004

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## ABSTRACT

### ELECTORAL VOLATILITY IN TURKEY

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This thesis analyzes the persistent electoral volatility in Turkey in terms of party-system institutionalization mainly during the 1961-2002 period. In order to distinguish the different vote swings underlying Turkey's electoral volatility, this study divides electoral volatility into 1) cleavage-type volatilities based on social cleavages and 2) retrospective-type volatilities based on voter punishment of the incumbent. The two types of volatilities are analyzed in two separate regression models. The results show, first, that deep social cleavages used to increase electoral volatility but since the 1990s, they began to stabilize voting behavior. The party system in Turkey has thus been recently anchored into its major social cleavages. Second, electoral volatility as a whole nonetheless remained high because of a growing trend of retrospective voting. Low economic growth and high unemployment were the major reasons for this. In sum, the apparent instability in the party system stemmed not from representation but from government.

Keywords: Turkey, electoral volatility, social cleavages, retrospective voting

## ÖZET

### TÜRKİYE'DE SEÇMEN OYNAKLIĞI

Yasushi Hazama

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Döç. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya

Mart 2004

Bu tez, Türkiye'deki seçmen oynaklığını parti sisteminin kurumsallaşması açısından incelemiştir. 1961-2002 dönemini kapsayarak yapılan bu çalışmada; seçmen oynaklığının, 1) toplumsal bölünmelerden ve 2) seçmenlerin hükümeti cezalandırma arzusundan kaynaklandığı varsayılarak, farklı regresyon modelleri uygulanmıştır. Çalışmanın bulgularına göre, birinci olarak, eskiden derin toplumsal bölünmeler seçmen oynaklığını artırıcı etkiye sahipken, 1990'lı yıllardan bu yana oy kayması hareketlerini yatıştırmaya başlamıştır. Böylece, Türk siyasi parti sistemi, toplumsal bölünmeleri içine sindirmeye başlamış görünmektedir. İkinci olarak, gözlemlenen bu gelişmeye karşın, seçmen oynaklığının azalmamasının nedeni, yükselme eğilimindeki tepki oyudur. Düşük ekonomik büyüme ve yüksek işsizlik, en önemli etkenleridir. Kısaca, seçmen oylarındaki istikrarsızlık, temsil sisteminden değil iktidarlardan kaynaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, seçmen oynaklığı, toplumsal bölünmeler, tepki oyu

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Electoral volatility is a major conventional<sup>1</sup> measurement of the tendency for voters to change their support for parties from election to election. It is calculated as the sum of absolute differences in the party vote percentage between two consecutive elections divided by two.<sup>2</sup> Electoral volatility primarily measures party system stability. Longitudinal data of electoral volatility have been widely used to measure the level of party-system institutionalization or consolidation.<sup>3</sup> Bartolini and Mair showed that electoral volatility in Western democracies pointed to party-system stability in the long run. Electoral volatility for thirteen Western democracies during the 1885-1985 period was 8.6 percent on average.<sup>4</sup> Although electoral volatility in Western democracies is said to have increased in the 1990s, the mean volatility for eighteen countries during the 1990-1994 period was still 12.9 percent (Table 1).

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<sup>1</sup> Electoral volatility does not measure the gross shift but only the net shift of votes among parties. The measurement of the gross shift requires waves of panel surveys.

<sup>2</sup> Mogens N. Pedersen, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948-1977," *European Journal of Political Research* 7 (1979), 1-26. Change in the party vote percentage due to party mergers or splits were not counted. Nominal electoral volatility was thus excluded. For instance, if Party B splits from Party A between two consecutive elections, change in the party vote percentage stemming from Party A and Party B is calculated as (Combined vote percentage for Party A and Party B, Election  $t$ ) – (Vote percentage for Party A, Election  $t-1$ ). The above represents Bartolini and Mair's counting rule of electoral volatility. See Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, Appendix 1.

<sup>3</sup> Institutionalization is defined in general as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability." Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, MA: Yale University Press, 1968) 12. For empirical studies that used long-term electoral volatility as a measurement of party system institutionalization, see Scott P. Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: the Case of Brazil* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); James Toole, "Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe," *Party Politics* 6 (2000), 441-461; Richard Gunther and José R. Montero, "The Anchors of Partisanship: A Comparative Analysis of Voting Behavior in Four Southern European Democracies," in *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, eds. P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunter (Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); and Michelle Kuzenzi and Gina Lambright, "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries," *Party Politics* 7 (2001), 437-468. See also the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.

<sup>4</sup> Mean electoral volatility was obtained by averaging out electoral volatility for all the elections of all the countries. Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68.

**Table 1. Electoral Volatility for Western Democracies, 1885-1997**

	Pre-1918	1918-44	1945-65	1966-85	1980-4	1985-9	1990-4	1995-7
Austria	--	9.7	5.2	3.4	4.6	6.3	11.2	4.0
Belgium	--	8.3	9.4	7.7	16.4	7.1	13.0	6.3
Denmark	6.9	5.5	8.7	13.5	11.7	8.0	11.6	--
Finland	3.0	6.7	5.0	8.4	10.3	6.9	12.4	10.8
France	25.3	13.7	16.3	9.3	13.5	10.5	19.1	4.0
Germany	9.5	17.8	12.4	5.8	6.5	5.9	6.3	--
Greece	--	--	--	--	27.2	5.7	8.1	8.9
Iceland	--	--	--	--	10.4	23.6	13.3	11.6
Ireland	--	13.3	10.7	5.1	5.5	15.4	15.4	9.1
Italy	8.1	--	12.7	7.2	8.3	8.4	28.6	--
Luxembourg	--	--	--	--	15.2	14.6	5.6	--
Netherlands	10.4	8.4	5.2	11.0	9.1	7.8	21.5	--
Norway	8.4	9.0	4.8	10.4	11.2	9.9	14.8	16.2
Portugal	--	--	--	--	7.3	22.3	9.6	20.2
Spain	--	--	--	--	39.0	7.3	10.5	5.7
Sweden	9.5	9.0	5.0	6.7	7.9	7.5	12.8	--
Switzerland	7.9	8.6	3.3	6.3	6.1	8.0	7.4	7.4
U. K.	4.5	10.9	4.6	6.7	11.1	3.9	5.1	12.6
Mean	9.4	10.1	7.9	7.8	11.3	10.2	12.9	--

Source: Compiled by the author from Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*, 111, table 4.3 for the 1885-1985 period and Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane, "Electoral Instability and Party System Change in Western Europe," in *Comparing Party System Change*, eds. Paul Pennings and Jan-Erik Lane (London: Routledge, 1998), 31, table 2.5 for the 1980-97 period.


Electoral volatility for Turkey has been consistently high. During the 1961-2002 period, mean electoral volatility was 21.0 percent (Figure 1).<sup>5</sup> Even Southern European democracies which with Turkey formed the Third-Wave<sup>6</sup> democratization

<sup>5</sup> Even if the most volatile election of 2002 was excluded, mean electoral volatility for the 1961-1999 was still 18.1 percent.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

saw electoral volatility decline after democratic transitions, such as 10.6 percent for Spain in 1993, 9.5 percent for Portugal in 1991 and 3.3 percent for Greece in 1990. Mean electoral volatility from the democratic transition to consolidation was 14.6 for Spain (1977-2000), 13.9 for Portugal (1975-1999), and 11.8 for Greece (1974-2000).<sup>7</sup>

**Figure 1. Electoral Volatility in Turkey, 1965-2002**



*Source:* Calculated by the author at the national level from Appendix III.

*Note:* Electoral volatility for the general elections immediately after the military interventions (in 1960 and 1980) was not calculated. This is because military interventions either partly or totally disrupted party-system continuity. The 1960 military intervention led to the closure of the largest party in the parliament, the Justice Party. The military government after the 1980 intervention

<sup>7</sup> Gunther and Montero, “The Anchors of Partisanship,” 90, Table 3.2. Latin American countries, which also experienced the Third-Wave, generally have higher electoral volatility than the southern European countries. But Latin American countries invariably have presidential systems whereas Western and Southern European democracies are predominantly parliamentary systems. In presidential systems, high electoral volatility is understandable given that the executive branch of government (presidency) does not rely on the control of the legislative majority. See Arend Lijphart, ed., *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992); Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). Especially in democratizing countries, a strong presidency and a weak party system give rise to delegative democracy. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 5: 1 (1994), 55-69.

closed down all political parties. In addition, electoral volatility for 1987 was not shown since the transitional 1983 general election was not fully competitive. In the 1983 election, only three parties were allowed to participate.

These differences between Turkey and western democracies invite the following questions. Does the persistently high electoral volatility for Turkey signify a low level of party-system institutionalization? Or, is there an artifactual effect of measurement? Ergun Özbudun once warned that electoral volatility, as it had been applied to Turkey, did not distinguish between various types of transfer of votes among parties. According to him, electoral volatility may result from 1) voter mobilization by local notables in the less developed provinces, 2) the rise and fall of ephemeral parties, or 3) voter alignments. The first two reflect a low level of institutionalization whereas the third factor may well lead to institutionalization in the long run. He then argued that in the Turkish case, the combined votes for the two major parties, rather than electoral volatility, were a better measurement of party-system institutionalization.<sup>8</sup>

More recently, however, the major assumptions in Özbudun's argument have substantially changed. First, post-1980 Turkish electoral data do not support the voter-mobilization hypothesis. Electoral participation in the general elections held between 1983 and 2002 was consistently *lower* in the less developed provinces than in the more developed provinces.<sup>9</sup> Second, the 1983 parliamentary electoral law discouraged small parties from participating in elections by the provision that required each party to collect 10 percent of the total votes nationwide in order to prevent party system fragmentation. Only parties above a certain level of organizational strength dared to participate in elections.

Does this then justify the use of electoral volatility as a measure of party-system institutionalization in Turkey? This study contends that electoral volatility reflects the level of party-system institutionalization only when it is divided into categories of vote swings. Özbudun's criticism that electoral volatility does not distinguish various types of vote swings is still valid even though the political background has changed in Turkey. In this study, electoral volatility is thus divided into 1) cleavage-type volatilities based on social cleavages and 2) retrospective-type volatilities based on the voter assessment of the incumbent. These two types of

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<sup>8</sup> Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization and Fragmentation," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (1981), 236.

<sup>9</sup> See section 5.4.

volatilities are then analyzed in two separate frameworks.

The present research thus investigates the institutionalization of the Turkish party system in terms of electoral volatility. This study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of empirical theories of electoral change and lays out a theoretical argument concerning the major sources of electoral volatility. Chapter 3 gives an overview of major studies on Turkish electoral behavior with reference to electoral change. Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical assumptions and methods employed in this analysis. The main part through Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 applies in the Turkish context the empirical theories of electoral change developed in the previous chapters. The last Chapter 8 consists of summaries and tentative conclusions.

## CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL THEORIES OF ELECTORAL CHANGE

This section reviews relatively recent literature on electoral change in various countries to find out major sources of electoral change. In electoral politics, there are voter-led and party-led models of electoral competition.<sup>10</sup> Bartolini and Mair combined the two and explained most comprehensively the electoral volatility of European democracies in terms of 1) voters' cleavage identities, 2) policy distance, 3) the number of political parties in competition, 4) electoral institutions, and 5) electoral participation.<sup>11</sup> Since this study focuses on voters' tendency to change their support for parties *under a given party system*, party-led models are not treated here.<sup>12</sup> The following review of electoral behavior in general shows that major sources of "voter-led" electoral change and/or volatility are 1) party identification, 2) social cleavages, 3) retrospective voting, and 4) values. These four variables are put in almost chronological order regarding when each became a major research area.

### 2.1 Party Identification

The concept of party identification as an independent variable developed after the discovery of a major vote swing in the American presidential elections of 1952 and 1956. In these Eisenhower elections, a significant part of the electorate changed votes from the Democrats to the Republicans while claiming loyalty to the Democrats. Angus Campbell and others assumed that candidates and issues triggered short-term vote swings but party identification explained a long-term support for the

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<sup>10</sup> Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, *The Loyalties of Voters: A Lifetime Learning Model* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 2-3.

<sup>11</sup> Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*. Since their analysis is cross-national, some of their independent variables such as the number of political parties in competition, electoral institutions, and electoral participation are not relevant to this study.

<sup>12</sup> This is not to deny the importance of the party system variable in the explanation of electoral change in general. A new institutionalism perspective in the 1990s asserts that electoral results fluctuate due not so much to changes in the electorate as to changes in the party system or by institutional reforms. See Pippa Norris, "Introduction," in *Elections and Voting Behaviour: New Challenges, New Perspectives*, ed. Pippa Norris (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), xix-xxii.

party.<sup>13</sup> David Butler and Donald Stokes were the first to employ the same concept to explain electoral behavior in Western Europe.<sup>14</sup>

Since the late 1960s, however, growing electoral volatility in Western Europe raised doubts on the assumption of stable party identification. Eurobarometer data from 1974 to 1988 showed that party attachment, a modest expression of party identification, had been declining in most part of Western Europe.<sup>15</sup> William Miller and others concluded, based on panel surveys, that weaker party identification led to a higher probability of voting shift at the individual level although they did not explain what had made party identification weaker.<sup>16</sup> Malcom Brynin and David Sanders, relying on two waves of the British Household Panel Survey, demonstrated that party identification and vote choice were very similar in terms of their temporal variation and socioeconomic correlates and asserted that both could be measuring the same phenomenon.<sup>17</sup> There are relatively few scholars who argue that party loyalties are stable in Western Europe.<sup>18</sup> Russel Dalton's most recent evidence also attested to declining party identification across advanced industrial democracies.<sup>19</sup>

## 2.2 Social Cleavages

Social cleavage approaches to electoral change centers on the relationship, stable or

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<sup>13</sup> Angus Campbell, et al., *The American Voter* (New York, NY: Wiley, 1960); Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, *Controversies in Voting Behavior* (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), 275-276; This study investigates the institutionalization of the Turkish party system in terms of electoral volatility. Ian Budge, "Party Identification," in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science*, ed. Vernon Bogdanor (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 417-419.

<sup>14</sup> David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1969).

<sup>15</sup> Hermann Schmitt, "On Party Attachment in Western Europe and the Utility of Eurobarometer Data," *West European Politics* 12 (1989), 122-139.

<sup>16</sup> William L. Miller, et al., *How Voters Change: The 1987 British Election Campaign in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

<sup>17</sup> Malcolm Brynin and David Sanders, "Party Identification, Political Preferences and Material Conditions," *Party Politics* 3 (1997), 53-77.

<sup>18</sup> For such an example, see Bradley M. Richardson, "European Party Loyalties Revisited," *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991), 751-775.

<sup>19</sup> Russel J. Dalton, "The Decline of Party Identifications," in *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds., Russell J. Dalton and Martin Wattenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

fluid, between the cleavage structure and the party system. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan asserted that in Western democracies, four social cleavages (center-periphery, church-state, land-industry, and owner-worker) had historically institutionalized the present party systems by the 1920s.<sup>20</sup>

Scholars who challenged Lipset and Rokkan's "frozen (or stabilized) cleavage" hypothesis emphasized changing cleavage structures since the late 1960s.<sup>21</sup> They argued that such variables as embourgeoisement, social mobility, mass society, community integration, cognitive mobilization, aging party system, and value change would function in dynamic processes with some preceding and/or reinforcing others.<sup>22</sup> What these variables imply in common is that the preexisting party system became less able to reflect the changing social cleavages.

Mark Franklin and others found that social cleavages were becoming less important for party choice in Western democracies.<sup>23</sup> Using the vote for the leftist parties as a measure of electoral change, they also stressed different patterns of relationship between the cleavage-party nexus and electoral change. In those countries where the relationship between social cleavages and the party system remained strong, electoral change was moderate. In others where the above relationship was becoming weaker, a significant electoral change occurred due to other important variables.<sup>24</sup>

Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane also concluded that growing electoral volatility in Western Europe in the 1990s invalidated the model of frozen party system. Instead,

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<sup>20</sup> Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

<sup>21</sup> For an opposite view that party realignment has not occurred in this period, see for instance Michael Gallagher, et al., *Representative Government in Western Europe* (London: McGraw Hill, 1992), chapter 4. Relatedly, Evans concluded that decline in class voting was less prevalent and uniform as it had been asserted. He also argued that class voting declined due to party strategy change that reflected social change, rather than to social change itself. See Geoffrey Evans, "Class and Voting: Disrupting the Orthodoxy," in *The End of Class Politics: Class Voting in Comparative Context*, ed. Geoffrey Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 333.

<sup>22</sup> See a review by Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck, and Scott C. Flanagan, "Electoral Change in Advance Industrial Democracies," in *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* eds. Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>23</sup> Mark Franklin, et al., *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>24</sup> Mark Franklin, "The Decline of Cleavage Politics," in *Electoral Change*, Franklin, et al., 403.

they underlined the importance of the floating electorate.<sup>25</sup> At a more theoretical level, Mair criticized that Lipset and Rokkan took the freezing as granted and devoted little attention to how and why the freezing persisted after the 1920s.<sup>26</sup>

In a more long-term perspective, Bartolini and Mair contended that West European party systems were relatively stable from 1885 to 1985. Among the various institutional and socioeconomic variables they used to account for (the limited) electoral change, deep-seated social cleavages were found to discourage electoral volatility. The strength of social cleavages, measured for each country by the composite index of four standardized variables (ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity, the left-parties' membership ratio, and trade-union density), turned out to be negatively correlated with electoral volatility.<sup>27</sup> This is because, they argued, the stronger the voter's group identification, the less likely would he/she be to change support to the party between elections.

### 2.3 Retrospective Voting

The source of volatility that reflects rational choice is retrospective, or economic, voting.<sup>28</sup> The retrospective voting model<sup>29</sup> assumes that individuals make a voting

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<sup>25</sup> Svante Ersson and Jan-Erik Lane, "Electoral Instability and Party System Change in Western Europe." See also Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, 4th ed. (London: Sage, 1999), chap. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Peter Mair, "The Freezing Hypothesis: an Evaluation" in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited*, ed. Lauri Karvonen and Stein Kuhnle (London: Routledge, 2001), 33-35. See also Peter Mair, "Myths of Electoral Change and the Survival of Traditional Parties: the 1992 Stein Rokkan Lecture," *European Journal of Political Research* 24 (1993), 121-133.

<sup>27</sup> Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, 241-242. Bartolini and Mair's definition of social cleavages is conceptually more precise than most others'. They contended that social cleavages must have three factors, i. e., objective social-structural attributes, sources of identity, and organizational links. *Ibid.*, 215. They refined the concept of cleavage in line with Lipset and Rokkan's framework such that "the strength of cleavages depends on social homogeneity, organizational density, and cultural distinctiveness." *Ibid.*, 224.

<sup>28</sup> Retrospective voting is a type of issue voting. Issue voting extends on a time dimension (retrospective and prospective) and a content dimension (position, performance, and attributes). See Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies*, 2d ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1996), 222-225.

<sup>29</sup> The retrospective voting model was initially formulated by Fiorina. He demonstrated with American national election data from 1956 to 1976 that retrospective evaluations had not only a direct effect on voting decision but also an indirect effect through party identification, issue concerns, and future expectations. See Fiorina, M. P., *Retrospective Voting in American National*

decision judging by the previous socioeconomic gains/losses under the incumbent government rather than what the government promises. Although it shares a socioeconomic perspective with the cleavage model, the time span for the independent variable is shorter (most often one year or less<sup>30</sup>) than in the cleavage model.<sup>31</sup>

For single-country studies of retrospective voting, the choice of the independent variable between macro and micro levels became a major methodological issue. Some scholars have argued that gains and losses are perceived in terms of not individuals but the community/nation to which they belong. Ron Johnston and others explained reasons for the changing geographic patterns of voting in Britain from the late 1970s to the 1980s by analyzing individual opinion poll data.<sup>32</sup> They found out that the widening geographical gaps in voting behavior were associated with growing variance in socioeconomic geography. In relatively affluent/deprived regions, people tended to vote for/against the party in power since they approved/disapproved the party's policy outcome in the regions.<sup>33</sup> Their analytical framework rested on John Agnew's view that emphasized place as a determinant of political behavior.<sup>34</sup> It was

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*Elections* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981). For a review, see Niemi and Weisberg, *Controversies in Voting Behavior*, 137-151. For the most recent and comprehensive treatment of the theme, see Han Dorussen and Michael Taylor, eds., *Economic Voting* (London: Routledge, 2002).

<sup>30</sup> For instance, six-month average prior to the election month. See Randolph T. Stevenson, "The Economy as Context: Indirect Links between the Economy and Voters," in Dorussen and Taylor, eds., *Economic Voting*.

<sup>31</sup> Ron Johnston and Charles Pattie, however, recently drew attention to a more long-term voter calculation. It was found for the 1997 British general election that the voters' evaluation of government policy since the last general election also affected their "punish or reward" consideration. See Ron Johnston and Charles Pattie, "Dimensions of Retrospective Voting: Economic Performance, Public Service Standards and Conservative Party Support at the 1997 British General Election," *Party Politics* 7 (2001), 469-490.

<sup>32</sup> R. J. Johnston, C. J. Pattie, and J. G. Allsopp, *A Nation Dividing, The Electoral Map of Great Britain 1979-1987* (London: Longman, 1988). See also R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, "Local Economic Contexts and Changing Party Allegiances at the 1992 British General Election," *Party Politics* 3 (1997), 79-96. R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, "Composition and Context: Region and Voting in Britain Revisited during Labour's 1990s' Revival," *Geoforum* 29 (1998), 309-329.

<sup>33</sup> Regional variations in voting behavior began to decrease in the early 1990s, however, as support for the Labor increased while the Conservatives lost ground. See the last two articles in note 33.

<sup>34</sup> John A. Agnew, *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1987); John A. Agnew and Duncan, James S., *The Power of Place, Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

difficult, he argued, to account for political behavior simply by socioeconomic variables of individuals as if these variables had the same meaning everywhere. According to Agnew, place is where individuals with these variables interact with each other before making their own decisions. Place therefore puts a contextual constraint on political behavior.<sup>35</sup> Steven Reed and Gregory Brunk's time-series analysis of Japanese parliamentary elections supported the macro-criteria hypothesis.<sup>36</sup>

In contrast, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister<sup>37</sup> as well as McAllister and Donley Studlar<sup>38</sup> showed with individual opinion-poll and survey data that once the socioeconomic status of a constituency was controlled, the effect of constituency environment on voting behavior became insignificant. In other words, their results indicated that the probability of a person with a particular socioeconomic status voting for the Conservatives would not change whether he or she moved to a constituency characterized by higher or lower socioeconomic status.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Brynin and Sanders showed that voters who felt themselves in good health were more likely to vote for the incumbent than for the opposition.<sup>40</sup>

In the meantime, it seems possible to incorporate both personal and collective aspects of gains/losses in the analysis of a specific country. Gregory Markus argued

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<sup>35</sup> Agnew, however, did not empirically demonstrate the *net* effect of place on political behavior. Although he described various patterns of electoral behavior across regions in Scotland and the United States, he ended up with explaining these patterns in terms of socioeconomic variables. See Agnew, *Place and Politics*. His explanation thus lacked evidence that place had a stronger effect on political behavior than did the aggregated effect of socioeconomic variables that represented the place.

<sup>36</sup> Steven Reed and Gregory G. Brunk, "A Test of Two Theories of Economically Motivated Voting, the Case of Japan," *Comparative Politics* 17 (1984), 55-66. But their study did not seem to reject the individual-criteria hypothesis as they claimed to. They contended that only for the post-oil shock period, their model had shown a significant relationship between the incumbent vote and macroeconomic indicators. The insignificant relationship during the consistent economic-growth period (1960-1973), they argued, suggested that personal grievances, which had definitely existed then, had not affected the incumbent vote. The last point may support the macro-criteria hypothesis but does not necessarily deny the individual-criteria hypothesis.

<sup>37</sup> Rose and McAllister, *The Loyalties of Voters*.

<sup>38</sup> Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar, "Region and Voting in Britain, 1979-87: Territorial Polarization or Artifact?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (1992), 168-199.

<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, they found that government performance had significantly influenced voting behavior.

<sup>40</sup> Malcolm Brynin and David Sanders, "Party Identification, Political Preferences and Material Conditions," *Party Politics* 3 (1997), 66.

that in elections, voters took into consideration both their personal economic predicaments and the nation's economic condition. His analysis of pooled individual-level survey data from eight U. S. presidential election years provided support for his hypothesis.<sup>41</sup>

Cross-national studies dealt with different analytical problems. A collection of country studies edited by Helmut Norpoth, Michael Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique Lafay<sup>42</sup> on the whole attested to the validity of the retrospective voting model whereas Martin Paldam's chapter for cross-national study<sup>43</sup> in the same book failed to provide substantive evidence to support the model. Bingham Powell and Whitten made an important improvement on Paldam's work.<sup>44</sup> They point to the importance of the political context of the election in the consideration of economic performance on voting behavior. Their cross-national analysis of 102 elections in 19 democracies in the 1969-88 period showed, first, that the partisan nature of the incumbent government made difference in economic variables that affected popular support for the government. While right-wing governments gained/lost support because of inflation that was higher/lower than the current international standard, left and center governments were rewarded/punished for lower/higher unemployment. Second, more importantly, the context of political responsibility affected the degree to which voters held the incumbent government accountable for economic performance. Although all incumbent governments tended to lose votes in elections, minority governments (the least responsible) were likely to lose the least while single-party majority governments (the most responsible) were likely to lose the most, of all types of governments. Christopher Anderson's separate analysis of five democracies concurred with Powell and Whitten's work. Anderson, who concluded that popular support for the government was a function of both economic performance and political responsibility, applied the most appropriate measurement

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<sup>41</sup> Gregory B. Markus, "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (1988), 137-154.

<sup>42</sup> Helmut Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique Lafay, eds., *Economics and Politics, The Calculus of Support* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1991).

<sup>43</sup> Martin Paldam, "How Robust Is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four Decades," in Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, and Lafay, eds. *Economics and Politics*.

<sup>44</sup> G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Guy D. Whitten, "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (1993), 391-414.

of political responsibility to each country according to its constitutional setting.<sup>45</sup>

Retrospective voting is not exclusive to Western democracies. Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff investigated economic voting in developing countries by using macro data instead of opinion polls. They contended that economic decline brought about loss of support for incumbent governments while economic growth did not increase their votes.<sup>46</sup> For Latin America in the 1980s, Karen Remmer measured political responses to economic performance.<sup>47</sup> In particular, the incumbent loss/vote turned out to be responsive to short-term economic indicators and electoral volatility to medium-term indicators. In other words, “incumbents pay the price for short-term economic setbacks,” while “deeper crises may be translated into broader political shifts and high overall levels of electoral volatility.”<sup>48</sup> Both the incumbent loss/vote and electoral volatility thus seemed significantly to reflect economic impact on electoral behavior. Kenneth Roberts and Erik Wibbels analyzed the high level of electoral volatility in Latin America during the 1980s and the 1990s.<sup>49</sup> They found short-term economic disturbances as well as institutional discontinuities, party system fragmentation, and (to a lesser extent) loose cleavage structures increased electoral volatility. Roberts and Wibbels too made distinctions between total electoral volatility and incumbent vote change, which produced different results between legislative and presidential elections. Norpoth showed for 38 countries including both established and emerging democracies in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, that there was a significant correlation between GDP growth and the vote received by the major party in government. He assumed that voters held the major party in government, rather than its minor-party partners, responsible for economic management.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Christopher Anderson, *Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).

<sup>46</sup> Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Redcliff, “The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World,” *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (1995), 745-759.

<sup>47</sup> Karen Remmer, “The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s,” *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991), 777-800.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 785.

<sup>49</sup> Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, “Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations,” *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999), 575-590.

<sup>50</sup> Helmut Norpoth, “The Economy,” in *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*, eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (California, CA: Sage, 1996).

## 2.4 Values

Value change has become a major theme since the 1980s when traditional social-cleavage accounts, such as class voting, increasingly lost their explanatory power.<sup>51</sup> The most influential argument about value change has been developed by Ronald Inglehart. He initially drew attention to value change in postindustrial society from materialism that emphasized economic and physical security to postmaterialism that emphasized self-expression and the quality of life.<sup>52</sup> He sought the main reason in that younger generations had experienced relatively high economic security during their formative years thus inclined to seek alternative values. Inglehart and his collaborators later demonstrated their hypothesis by larger cross-national studies that included industrializing as well as industrialized countries.<sup>53</sup>

In terms of political polarization, Inglehart argued that the conventional axis of political polarization, i. e., the left-right axis, based on social class and religiosity, was being challenged by the emerging axis based on materialist-postmaterialist polarization. Since the new axis has not been institutionalized, it is superimposed on the conventional axis thus with the left-right axis conveying two different meanings, according to Inglehart. Methodologically, Inglehart claimed that for gauging change in voting behavior, left-right *self-placement* is a better indicator than is left-right *voting*. The former is more neutral and independent of static party loyalties than is the latter, as he explained. He then showed that value priorities (materialism-postmaterialism) were a more important determinant of left-right self-placement than was social class in Western Europe in the late 1970s.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Norris argued that it was a renewed interest in the role of values. The earliest attempt to study democratic values was conducted in the 1940s by Lazarsfeld and others. See Norris, "Introduction," xiii-xiv.

<sup>52</sup> Ronald Inglehart, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity," *American Political Science Review* 75 (1981), 880.

<sup>53</sup> Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, *Value Change in Global Perspective* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

<sup>54</sup> Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society," in *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck. Inglehart argued that religiosity that constituted the conventional polarization axis survived value change since the materialism-postmaterialism axis conformed to the clerical-anticlerical divide. The right is clerical on the conventional axis and is resistant to change on the new axis while the left is anticlerical on the conventional axis and advocates social change on the new axis. *Ibid.*, 57.

Rose and McAllister demonstrated for Britain in 1987 that among all the variables in a lifetime of learning, political values had the most important effect (27.9 percent of variance explained) on voting behavior, followed by family loyalties (19.7 percent), current performance of parties and leaders (10.5 percent), and socioeconomic interests (9.7 percent). Party identification (3.4 percent) and the social and political context (1.7 percent) had very little effect.<sup>55</sup> Pippa Norris and others found that by the mid-1990s people came to lose their trust with the government while still supporting the democratic form of government.<sup>56</sup> A major reason lies, according to Inglehart, in that postmodernization processes lead to weaker respect for authority but to stronger trust with democracy.<sup>57</sup>

## 2.5 Summary

The preceding literature review suggests that across countries, social cleavages, retrospective voting, and values provided clues to electoral change in general while party identification had little explanatory power outside the United States. Table 2 summarizes the four models reviewed above by dependent variable, independent variables, time span, and ubiquity.

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<sup>55</sup> Rose and McAllister, *The Loyalties of Voters*.

<sup>56</sup> Pippa Norris, "Conclusions: The Growth of Critical Citizens and its Consequences," in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, ed. Pippa Norris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>57</sup> Inglehart. "Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy," in *Critical Citizens*, ed. Norris.

**Table 2. Four Models of Electoral Change**

Model	Dependent variable	Independent variables	Time span	Ubiquity
Party identification	Party support	Party identification	Long	Low
Social cleavages	Party support	Socioeconomic groupings	Long	High
Retrospective voting	Incumbent support	Recent change in affluence	Short	High
Values	Party support	Values	Long	Medium

*Source:* Compiled by the author in light of the above discussions.

Both cleavage and value approaches assumed the party system to be representing an underlying cleavage/value structure. Thus, it is possible to regard these two approaches as representational accounts. While representational accounts explained relatively long-term volatility, the retrospective voting approach was concerned with short-term volatility. Electoral change thus stemmed from voters' search for better representation as well as from their resentment toward the incumbent government. In recent years, retrospective voting and values give a better account of electoral change than do social cleavages (and party identification). Methodologically, the measurement of electoral change differs among the four models. While the retrospective voting model uses incumbent support as the dependent variable, the other three models treat party support as such.

## CHAPTER 3: STUDIES OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN TURKEY

This section reviews major works on electoral behavior in Turkey in order to find out which theoretical frameworks are valid for Turkey and what indigenous contexts should be taken into account. This review encompasses, more broadly, electoral *behavior* in Turkey not only because of the dearth of research on electoral *change* in Turkey but also because of the necessity to elucidate behavioral characteristics of the Turkish electorate that do not necessarily conform to the general theories of electoral behavior. Most of the literature on electoral behavior in Turkey either explicitly or implicitly draws on one the four theoretical frameworks introduced in the foregoing literature review.

### 3.1 Party Identification

In Turkey, it is difficult to find those works that are primarily concerned with long-term party identification. Among such few scholars, Ersin Kalaycıođlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay investigated factors leading to partisanship in childhood. The partisanship of one's father as well as of one's friends was found to be a major determinant of party identification.<sup>58</sup>

The shortage of this genre of literature is largely due to short lifetime of political parties of the past in Turkey. First, most importantly, the military that intervened in 1960 and 1980 closed down, respectively, the party in government (the Democrat Party) in 1960 and all the political parties in 1981. While the Justice Party succeeded the Democrat Party in 1961 thus maintaining the Democrat tradition, the largest two (the center-left Republican People's Party and the center-right Justice Party) of the parties that were disbanded in 1981 could not revive in their original form later. Two parties, instead of one, succeeded either of the two parties.<sup>59</sup> Second, the

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<sup>58</sup> Ersin Kalaycıođlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "İlkokul Çocuklarının Parti Tutmasını Belirleyen Etkinler," *Türkiye'de Siyaset: Süreklilik ve Değişim*, eds. Ersin Kalaycıođlu and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, n. d. ).

<sup>59</sup> The Motherland Party and the True Path Party represented the center-right tradition and the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Left Party represented the center-left tradition.

Constitutional Court, established in 1962, has also disbanded political parties for their unconstitutional activities. From 1962 to 2001, the Court has dissolved 22 political parties.<sup>60</sup> Third, a relatively low level of political institutionalization in Turkey has given birth to splinter parties from major political parties (see Appendix I and Appendix II). Özbudun also observed that weakening party identification in Turkey was typical of many new democracies that suffered from voter disillusionment.<sup>61</sup>

### 3.2 Social Cleavages

There is a relatively large body of literature that studies socioeconomic structures and voting behavior in Turkey. Those works that explicitly deal with social cleavages, however, came to appear only recently.

Earlier studies linked socioeconomic characteristics with voter turnout and/or support for political parties. As part of a comprehensive investigation of the 1965 general election in both legal and political science perspectives, Nermin Abadan analyzed the electoral behavior of local opinion leaders of various socioeconomic attributes.<sup>62</sup> Abadan and Ahmet Yücekök more specifically explored the relationship between income groups and voting behavior.<sup>63</sup> Among nine large cities with a population of more than 100,000, Abadan and Yücekök found patterns of support by income groups for particular political parties.<sup>64</sup> They also found that between the 1961 and 1965 elections, voting turnout decreased most for the middle-income group. They interpreted this finding as indicating that the middle-income group was the

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<sup>60</sup> Out of the total 31 referrals, 22 were accepted and 9 were rejected. A document provided for the author by the Constitutional Court on 5 August 2002.

<sup>61</sup> Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (2000), 79.

<sup>62</sup> Nermin Abadan, *Anayasa Hukuku ve Siyasi Bilimler Açısından 1965 Seçimlerinin Tahlihi* (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1966).

<sup>63</sup> Nermin Abadan and Ahmet Yücekök, "1961-1965 Seçimlerinde Büyük Şehirlerin Oy Verme Davranışlarıyla İlgili Bazı Yorumlar," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 21 (Aralık 1967), 103-117.

<sup>64</sup> The lower income group supported the center-right Justice Party and the conservative Nation Party, which were relatively pro-Islamic, while the upper income group supported the Republican People's Party and the Turkish Workers' Party, which shared staunch secularism.

least interested in voting.<sup>65</sup> Muzaffer Sencer's questionnaire survey of 419 voters in metropolitan Istanbul in 1969 confirmed the pattern of party support found by Abadan and Yücekök.<sup>66</sup> Sencer also revealed an important distinction about voters with no party to give support for. On the one hand, voters with *no idea* which party to vote for consisted of lower socioeconomic groups. On the other hand, voters who *intended to abstain* from voting came from higher socioeconomic groups.<sup>67</sup>

The urban-rural difference is also an important determinant of electoral turnout. Deniz Baykal, in his analysis of the 1965 general election, argued that higher electoral turnout in the less developed provinces, which he discovered, stemmed from the higher percentage of the village population in these provinces.<sup>68</sup> Cenap Nuhurat focused on *unusual* voting in the village, which consisted of no turnout, low turnout (with the rate of voter turnout ranging from one to ten percent), and unanimous voting (with one party or candidate gaining 95 percent or more of the valid votes), which was the most frequent among the three.<sup>69</sup> When he correlated socioeconomic indicators of the village with its voting behavior, he found that unanimous-voting villages were less developed (i. e. having more landless peasants, more closed communication, a smaller population, a lower education level, etc.) than

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<sup>65</sup> This finding, however, showed *only* that the middle-income group had decreased their propensity to vote the most among the three income groups, *not* that their turnout rate had been the lowest. Their original data, in fact, refuted their contention. A recalculation of their original data by the author showed that the mean turnout rate of the nine cities had been the lowest for the upper-, not middle-, income group in both general elections. The mean turnout percentages for the upper-, middle-, and lower-income groups were 73.8, 79.6, and 77.7 for the 1961 election and 66.4, 69.6, and 70.4 for the 1965 election.

<sup>66</sup> Muzaffer Sencer, *Türkiye'de Sınıfsal Yapı ve Siyasal Davranışlar* (Istanbul: May Yayınları, 1974), 277-278.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 278-279. This distinction applied when housewives that comprised the majority of non-partisans were excluded from them.

<sup>68</sup> Deniz Baykal, *Siyasal Katılma: Bir Davranış İncelenmesi*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1970). He showed that if electoral turnout was examined for the province as a whole, turnout was (slightly) higher in the nine least developed provinces than in the nine most developed provinces. A different picture emerged, however, when turnout was examined separately for the city, borough, and village. For each of the three categories, turnout was higher in the more developed provinces than in the less developed ones. At the same time, turnout was higher in the village than in the borough, and higher in the borough than in the city.

<sup>69</sup> Cenap Nuhurat, "Türkiye Köylerinde Olağandışı Oy Verme," *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 26 (Mart 1971), 219-244. While the total number of villages with no turnout and with small turnout was respectively 128 and 215 in the five lower- and upper-house elections during the 1961-1969 period, the total number of unanimous-voting villages was 5,338. *Ibid.*, 220-221.

no- or low-turnout villages. Nuhrat thus inferred that, on the one hand, no or low turnout indicates the villagers' conscious expression of grievances about lack of infrastructure and public services. Unanimous voting, on the other hand, allegedly indicated voter mobilization by local notables in a feudalistic relationship.<sup>70</sup>

Socioeconomic characteristics and voting behavior can be interpreted in a developmental context as well. Özbudun demonstrated the hypothesis that as societies develop economically, class-based participation would replace individual or communal-based participation, by using socioeconomic indicators and election results across provinces and some subprovinces in the 1960s and the early 1970s.<sup>71</sup> He also found the answer to a paradoxical voting behavior in Turkey; voter turnout was higher in the less developed regions than in the more developed regions. He argued that in the less developed regions, mobilized voting was prevalent while in the more developed regions, people voted more autonomously.<sup>72</sup> Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert<sup>73</sup> mainly substantiated Özbudun's findings. Their pooled-factor analysis of party voting percentages across the provinces during the similar period elicited three factors that explained voting variations, i.e., "periphery-center," "left-right," and "anti-systemic." Their results, however, did not point to major electoral realignment in the period,<sup>74</sup> contrary to Özbudun's observation of Turkish politics in the 1970s.

Since the late 1980s, the social cleavage model began to be more consciously adopted for the analysis of Turkish politics. This is due not only to the development

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<sup>70</sup> One might wish, however, that Nuhrat also demonstrated how the socioeconomic characteristics of the three types of villages had differed from the rest of the villages (randomly sampled, if the number was too large). One would assume that the three types of *unusually*-voting villages were, as a whole, less developed than usually-voting villages given the fact that 71 out of 128 no-turnout villages, 99 out of 215 low-turnout villages and 3750 out of 5338 unanimous-voting villages were found in eastern (including southeastern) Turkey. *Ibid.*, 222-224.

<sup>71</sup> Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Ergun Özbudun, "Voting Behavior: Turkey," in *Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites*, eds. Jacob Landau, Eugun Özbudun, and Frank Tachau, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1980).

<sup>72</sup> Since Özbudun's work is a major milestone in Turkish electoral studies, the following section of this study examines it in more detail.

<sup>73</sup> Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988). For a similar analysis that encompassed the 1950-1999 period, see note 151.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

of political research in Turkey but also to the scholarly awareness of the transformation of social cleavages in the post-1980 period.

The major research agenda in more recent years included the relationship between the party system and the cleavage structure. Ali Çarkoğlu, assuming that party platforms reflected social cleavages, tried to explain by them electoral volatility and fragmentation in the Turkish party system.<sup>75</sup> He found that parties in the post-1980 Turkey tended to change issue profiles more frequently than before. His factor analysis of party platforms also elucidated a new cleavage structure that incorporated market-economy and civil-society dimensions. In contrast, Tanju Tosun believed that parties, not voters, had changed. He argued that political parties in the post-1980 Turkey deviated from their original cleavage structure. He attributed the erosion process of the center-right and the center-left parties in the 1990s to their inability effectively to represent voters in terms of ideology and organization.<sup>76</sup>

Other scholars shed light on voter profiles, including religiosity and class, and party support. Kardan and Tüzün asserted that Turkish society in the mid-1990s was divided into anti-Islamists represented by urban, better educated, higher-income citizens and pro-Islamists represented by suburban, less educated, lower-income citizens. At the same time, they argued that there was not any significant difference in socio-demographic attributes between *center-left* voters and *center-right* voters.<sup>77</sup> Korkut Boratav contended that class was an important explanatory variable for party support.<sup>78</sup> The large sample size ( $N=8,024$ ) of his questionnaire survey enabled class subcategories to show their differences in party preference.<sup>79</sup> For the relative weight

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<sup>75</sup> Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change," *Political Studies* 46 (1998), 544-571.

<sup>76</sup> Tanju Tosun, *Türk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Solda Parçalanma* (Istanbul: Boyut Matbaacılık, 1999).

<sup>77</sup> These conclusions drew on a nationwide survey of 2,396 voters conducted in June 1996, shortly after the Welfare Party won the December 1995 general election. Ahmet Kardan and Sezgin Tüzün, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kutuplaşmalar ve Seçmen Davranışları* (Ankara: Veri Araştırma, 1998), chap. 4.

<sup>78</sup> Korkut Boratav, *İstanbul ve Anadolu'dan Sınıf Profilleri* (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1995), 106-110.

<sup>79</sup> In brief, for the two center-right parties, the Motherland Party and the True Path Party, more support came from the large- and medium-sized bourgeoisie, pensioners, young small-firm workers with a lower education level, and (especially for the TPP) large and medium-sized farmers than from other groups. The center-left Social Democratic Populist Party found relatively more support from public- and private-sector white collar workers with a higher educational level and poor villagers than from other groups. The other major center-left party, the Democratic Left Party, competed with the pro-Islamic Welfare Party, for support from blue-collar manual workers

of these variables, Yusuf Ziya Özcan demonstrated that religiosity was the strongest determinant of the left-right preference of the Istanbul voters (for the 1989 genral local elections) *after* controlling for the previous voter preferences (for the 1987 general election).<sup>80</sup>

Apart from social cleavages, there are other recent findings about socioeconomic characteristics and voting behavior. Murat Erdoğan's research,<sup>81</sup> while focusing specifically on the Southeastern Anatolian region in the 1970s and 1980s, discovered that, there was a *positive* relationship between socioeconomic development and voting turnout in the sub-province. He also found that in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, unanimous-voting villages did not significantly differ from the other villages in the region. These are the clear indications that what Nuhurat and Özbudun had found for the 1960s were undergoing a significant transformation.

Necat Erder's two waves of opinion polls pointed to the growing rate of protest votes. Protest votes were measured as the number of respondents answering that they would abstain from voting or cast an invalid vote if there were an election on that day. Protest votes did *not* include undecided votes. The rate of protest votes to the total responses increased from 19.4 percent in April 1996 ( $N=2,396$ ) to 30.2 percent in May 1998 ( $N=1,800$ ).<sup>82</sup> Urban voters expressed more frequently their intention to cast a protest vote than did rural voters.<sup>83</sup> Another study that encompassed a shorter

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and people with an intermediate level of education in the urban area as well as middle-income voters in the rural area. The Welfare Party also attracted more votes from a large section of the employers than from other groups. Boratav's class subcategories ranged widely. Urban households were categorized into nine groups and rural households into eight groups. *Ibid.*, 5-12.

<sup>80</sup> Yusuf Ziya Özcan, "Determinants of Political Behavior in Istanbul, Turkey," *Party Politics* 6 (2000), 505-518. Özcan made a secondary analysis of teh data used in Boratav's work cited above.

<sup>81</sup> M. Murat Erdoğan, *Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölgesi 'nde Seçmen Davranışı: 1970-1990*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyaset Anabilim Dalı, Ağustos 1991. See also M. Murat Erdoğan, "'Olağandışı Oy Verme Davranışı' ve Mobilize Katılım: Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Bölgesinde Toplu Oy Veren Köyler Üzerine Bir Araştırma," *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 47 (1992), 277-310.

<sup>82</sup> Necat Erder, *Türkiye 'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve Eğilimleri* (Istanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TÜSES), 1996), 150; Necat Erder, *Türkiye 'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni*, (Istanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TÜSES), 1999), 106. In the book published in 2002, Erder did not use the concept of protest votes but reported undecided voters (15.6 %), abstentions (16.9 %), and no replies (9.2 %). See Necat Erder, *Türkiye 'de Siyasi Partilerin Yandaş/Seçmen Profili (1994-2002)*, Istanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TÜSES), 2002), 60.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 112-113. One may find its reasons in a higher level of education and a more individualized way of life in the city than in the village.

period (from 1996 to 1998) reported an increase of those people who defined themselves neither rightists nor leftists (from 28.2 percent to 35.1 percent) while there was a slight decline in the percentage of leftists (from 15.5 percent to 14.4 percent) and almost no change in the percentage of rightists (from 41.2 percent to 41.1 percent).<sup>84</sup>

### 3.3 Retrospective Voting

Despite its potential importance, research into retrospective voting has been limited in Turkey. At the individual level, Sencer found earlier that people were more likely to vote by looking back to the past than by looking forward.<sup>85</sup> His results showed that people voted for the party more because they liked its performance (23.7%) rather than because they liked the party program (16.1 %).<sup>86</sup> The dominant majority of voters decided which party to support *before* the electoral campaign (82.8%) rather than during or after it.<sup>87</sup>

Macro-level studies consist of cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Earlier cross-sectional research was faced with lack of economic data at the provincial. Tuncer Bulutay and Nuri Yıldırım used statistics of agricultural products as proxies for income statistics. They demonstrated, for 20 selected provinces in the 1950-1965 period, that in those provinces where farm incomes rose sharply, the incumbent party fared better in the upcoming election than it did in other provinces.<sup>88</sup> This second-best approach made sense when the majority of the population lived on agriculture.<sup>89</sup> No major cross-sectional studies have been published since. Çarkoğlu

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<sup>84</sup> Erder, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Parti Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni*, 54, Tablo 2.1. Erder’s survey in 2002 introduced a new “nationalists” category. Out of the total respondents, 34.0 percent answered as such. Most of the former “neither leftist nor leftist” respondents probably chose this category. See Erder, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partilerin Yandaş/Seçmen Profılı*, 106.

<sup>85</sup> Sencer, *Türkiye’de Sınıfsal Yapı*. 171-180.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 171-172.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 173-175.

<sup>88</sup> Tuncer Bulutay ve Nuri Yıldırım, “Türk Seçmenlerinin Oy Verme Eğilimlerinde İktisadi Sebeplerin Önemi Üzerinde Bir Deneme,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 22: 4 (1969), 7-39. See also Tuncer Bulutay, “Türk Toplumsal Hayatında İktisadi ve Siyasal Gelişmeler,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 25: 3 (1970), 79-119.

<sup>89</sup> The percentage of the rural population to the total population was 68.1 in 1960, 61.6 in 1970, and 56.1 in 1980. State Institute of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook* (Ankara: State Institute of

more explicitly dealt with retrospective voting. His time-series analysis showed that unemployment and inflation had a negative effect on the vote for the governing party/parties during the 1950-95 period. He tried to maximize the number of time points (observations) by including not only general elections but also Senate, general local, and by- elections.<sup>90</sup>

### 3.4 Values

Value change has recently become a research agenda in Turkey.<sup>91</sup> The Turkish Values Survey, conducted in Turkey in 1990 and 1997, formed a database for several works.<sup>92</sup> Yılmaz Esmer described major five political parties with socioeconomic and value characteristics of their supporters.<sup>93</sup> Kalaycıoğlu found that the dominant part (75 percent) of the Turkish electorate remained moderate (either center-right or center-left) in terms of both party preference and ideological identification. According to him, “the ideological composition of the Turkish electorate has been quite stable since the 1970s.”<sup>94</sup> His later study suggested that the Turkish electorate had moved to the right on the left-right continuum and that cultural values, rather than socioeconomic attributes, came to determine party preference in the late 1990s.<sup>95</sup> Esmer also reported that between 1990 and 1997 all of his seven indices of left-right measurement pointed to change to the rightward direction, five of which

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Statistics, various years).

<sup>90</sup> Ali Çarkoğlu, “Macro Economic Determinants of Electoral Support for Incumbents in Turkey, 1950-1995,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17 (Fall 1997), 75-96.

<sup>91</sup> It is worthy of note in this connection that the 1990-91 World Value Survey results showed Turkey’s postmaterialist values to be high for its per capita GNP. See Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 151, Figure 5.7.

<sup>92</sup> Another large-scale survey was conducted in 1998 under the auspices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. İstanbul Mülkiyeliler Vakfı Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, *Türk Gençliği 98: Suskun Kitle Büyüteç Altında* (Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 1999).

<sup>93</sup> Yılmaz Esmer, “Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties,” in *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, eds. Çiğdem Bağlım, et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

<sup>94</sup> Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey, Changes and Continuities in the 1990s,” *Comparative Political Studies* 27: 3 (1994), 416.

<sup>95</sup> Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold War Era,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 20 (Spring 1999), 47-76.

were statistically significant.<sup>96</sup> Another study that encompassed a shorter period (from 1996 to 1998) reported an increase of those people who defined themselves neither rightists nor leftists (from 28.2 percent to 35.1 percent) while there was a slight decline in the percentage of leftists (from 15.5 percent to 14.4 percent) and almost no change in the percentage of rightists (from 41.2 percent to 41.1 percent).<sup>97</sup>

Most other works about values in Turkey involve research at one point in time. Şeker was concerned with the perception of the Turkish electorate of different socioeconomic attributes.<sup>98</sup> Based on his 1994 survey with 3,500 samples, he found among others that Turkish voters of certain employment statuses entertained common values. Farmers tended to be more confident in the state and politics but less favorable to democracy, women, and secularism than did other categories of voters. Public servants were more favorable toward work and economic liberalism than other voters were.

### 3.5 Summary

The preceding literature in review suggests, first, that social cleavages, retrospective voting, and values provided certain clues to electoral behavior in Turkey. Second, voting in Turkey was not, in Özbudun's term, always voluntary, or autonomous. It thus becomes necessary to scrutinize voting data for the possibility and extent of mobilized voting, while taking into account spatial and temporal differences in voting behavior. Third, few of the reviewed studies explicitly examined electoral change and volatility in Turkey. Relatively abundant research based on the (broadly) social-cleavage model provided rather static explanations of Turkish voting behavior; it did not analyze change in the cleavage structure over time. Studies that adopted the retrospective voting model or the values model were more attuned to a longitudinal and dynamic analysis but such research was rare.

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<sup>96</sup> Esmer's scaling consisted of 1) egalitarianism-entrepreneurialism, 2) private-public ownership, 3) individual-social responsibility, 4) competition-cooperation, 5) accommodativeness of interests, 6) status quo-change, and 7) old-new ideas. See Yılmaz Esmer, *Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye'de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik Değerler*, (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV), 1999), 53-58.

<sup>97</sup> Necat Erder, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Parti Seçmenleri ve Toplum Düzeni* (Istanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TÜSES), 1999), 54, Tablo 2.1.

<sup>98</sup> Murat Şeker, *Türkiye'de Seçmenin Algılama Süreci* (Ankara: İmaj, 1995).

## CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND METHODOLOGY

The preceding two chapters that reviewed literature on electoral change both in general and in Turkey revealed that 1) in general, social cleavages and values accounted for long-term volatility and retrospective voting for short-term volatility and that 2) in Turkey the dominant framework is broadly socioeconomic and few studies explicitly used the social-cleavage, values, or retrospective-voting approach. It is necessary to fill the theoretical and empirical void in these areas of research in Turkey. Accordingly, this study adopted both the social-cleavage and retrospective-voting approaches. The party identification approach was discarded since, as Chapter 2 has shown, party identification was a controversial independent variable when applied for countries other than the United States.

The value approach was not put aside but integrated into the social-cleavage approach. Values are conceptually divided into materialism and postmaterialism but in the actual operationalization of the concept, the difference becomes blurred. In particular, most of the existing research includes religiosity in postmaterialist values. While religiosity is definitely not materialist, it is also pre-materialist. As Lipset and Rokkan showed, the secular-religious cleavage preceded the materialistic capital-labor cleavage.<sup>99</sup> This ambiguity of operational definitions is understandable given that the values approach grew from an attempt to revise the conventional social cleavage approach. Both approaches are concerned with how voters' material and nonmaterial interests are represented by political parties. It seems reasonable here operationally to expand the scope of social cleavages to include both conventional social cleavages and post-material values.

This chapter explains the framework of the study, the dependent and independent variables, the main hypotheses, the analytical method, and the data sources. In brief, this study uses regression analysis to investigate at the provincial level how social cleavages and economic change affect electoral volatility in Turkey. The object of the study is not individual voters but groups of voters that share a socioeconomic environment.

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<sup>99</sup> Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*.

## 4.1 Framework of the Study

The primary aim of this study is to understand the nature of the dependent variable (electoral volatility) and its relationship with social cleavages and economic change. Relevant hypotheses are tested over time and space by time-series (1950-2002) and cross-sectional (1961-2002) analyses. The unit of analysis ranges from the whole nation, the province, to the sub-province.<sup>100</sup> The difference in time span between the time-series and cross-sectional analyses is due to the paucity of cross-sectional data for the pre-1961 period.

The basic advantage of treating a collectivity of individuals as the unit of analysis lies in that behavioral outcomes include social interactions in the shared cultural and geographical environment. As Agnew pointed out, place is where individuals with various socioeconomic variables interact before making their own decisions.<sup>101</sup> In the case of the Kurds in Turkey, for instance, it has been the feudalistic social structure in southeastern Turkey, rather than Kurdish ethnicity per se, that led to high electoral volatility among Kurdish voters in the pre-1980 period.<sup>102</sup> This study thus analyzes the *combined* effect of sociopolitical variables attributed to individuals and interactions of such variables.

## 4.2 Dependent Variable: Electoral Volatility

The dependent variable of this study, electoral volatility (=total electoral volatility), is defined as the sum of absolute differences in the party vote percentage between two consecutive elections divided by two.<sup>103</sup> Although total electoral volatility indicates the level of party system instability in general, it does not specify what constitutes such instability. In fact, various combinations of vote swings represent different dimensions of electoral volatility in the aggregate.<sup>104</sup> Bartolini and Mair

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<sup>100</sup> The province is the largest administrative unit of local administration in Turkey. The number of provinces increased from 67 to 81 between 1989 and 2000. When this study dealt with provincial socioeconomic data, the number of provinces analyzed was kept to 67.

<sup>101</sup> John A. Agnew, *Place and Politics*; Agnew and Duncan, *The Power of Place*.

<sup>102</sup> See section 6.3.

<sup>103</sup> See note 2.

<sup>104</sup> Total electoral volatility is synonymous with electoral volatility, which is used in more general contexts. Therefore, the term “total electoral volatility” will be used when various dimensions of

divided total electoral volatility into inter-bloc volatility and within-bloc volatility.<sup>105</sup> For Bartolini and Mair, the term “bloc” referred to either the leftist parties or the rightist parties. The concept of “bloc,” however, does not have to be confined to the left-right dimension, as they pointed out. This study expands the concept of “bloc” to analyze four inter-bloc volatilities (Table 3). The first two inter-bloc volatilities that reflect cleavage structures (cleavage-type volatilities) include left-right volatility and systemic volatility. The two others that reflect voters’ retrospective evaluation of government performance (retrospective-type volatilities) include incumbent volatility and traumatic volatility.

*Left-right* volatility consists of absolute net vote swings between the leftist votes and the rightist votes. It is calculated as the absolute sum of differences in the vote percentage for the parties in the left (or right) bloc between two consecutive elections. In Turkey, leftist parties are more secular and more supportive of the state’s role in the economy than are rightist parties.<sup>106</sup> Rightist parties are more religious and more supportive of the free market.<sup>107</sup> (for the classification of political parties in Turkey, see Appendix I and Appendix II). Religiosity is a major definitive element of the left-right dimension not only in Turkey. Empirical findings showed that religiosity determined, more strongly than social class did, issue positions (economic and noneconomic) on the left-right scaling.<sup>108</sup>

*Systemic* volatility is comprised of absolute net vote swings between the

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electoral volatility are discussed.

<sup>105</sup> Inter-bloc volatility is calculated as the absolute sum of differences in the vote percentage for the parties in either bloc between two consecutive elections. Inter-bloc volatility thus measures volatility between one bloc of parties and the other bloc. Within-bloc volatility is the residual of inter-bloc volatility in total volatility. Within-bloc volatility by definition consisted of volatility within one bloc and volatility within the other bloc. Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, chap. 1.

<sup>106</sup> Andrew Mango, “The Social Democratic Populist Party, 1983-1989,” in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), 171-179. In this article, Mango suggested that the secular-religious divide, while parallel to the one in Europe, might be deeper in Turkey than in Europe. *Ibid.*, 173. See also Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, eds., *Political Parties in Turkey* (London: Frank Cass, 2002).

<sup>107</sup> Far-right parties, however, are less supportive of a free market economy than are center-right parties.

<sup>108</sup> Ronald Inglehart, “The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society,” in *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, eds. Dalton, Beck, and Flanagan, 53-57; Arend Lijphart, “Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The ‘Crucial Experiment’ of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland,” *American Political Science Review* 73 (1979), 442-458.

pro-systemic parties and the potentially anti-systemic parties. Potentially anti-systemic parties in Turkey include pro-Islamic, nationalistic, and pro-Kurdish parties. Since all these parties proclaim their abidance by the law, their anti-systemic nature is only potential.

*Incumbent* volatility is expressed as absolute net vote swings between the governing party/parties and the opposition parties. Governing parties are defined here as the parties in the last government, before the general election, that served for more than one year.

*Traumatic* volatility is represented by absolute net vote swings between the parties that have ever stayed in government for more than one year consecutively and those that have not.

**Table 3. Inter-bloc Volatilities Defined**

Type of volatility	Inter-bloc volatility	Vote swing
Cleavage (CV)	Left-right Systemic	Secularism and the public sector vs. religion and a market economy Pro-systemic vs. anti-systemic
Retrospective (RV)	Incumbent Traumatic	Government vs. opposition Former/present incumbents vs. others

*Source:* Compiled by the author.


As the above definitions have shown, cleavage-type volatilities and retrospective-type volatilities are qualitatively different in voters' criteria for their party choice. Cleavage-type volatilities are probably associated with voters' search for parties better representing their social grouping while retrospective-type volatilities are influenced by voter evaluation of the past performance of the incumbent(s) (and the former incumbents). The two types of inter-bloc volatilities therefore require separate analytical settings and different independent variables.

Figure 2 shows that cleavage-type volatilities (CVs) were nearly as strong as retrospective-type volatilities (RVs) during the pre-1980 period. During the post-1980 period, however, cleavage-type volatilities became far less significant than retrospective-type volatilities. Total electoral volatility was more reflective of retrospective-type volatilities than cleavage-type volatilities during the post-1980 period than during the pre-1980 period. Although cleavage-type volatilities (left-right and systemic volatilities) seem to have grown in the 1990s in absolute terms, this

increase depends on the expanding overlap between cleavage-type and retrospective type volatilities. When the overlap was controlled for, cleavage-type volatilities turned out to be smaller during the post-1980 period than during the pre-1980 period (Figure 3).

One should be careful therefore not to treat total electoral volatility as the dependent variable. Given the theme of this study, it would be more meaningful to analyze separately two groups of dependent variables—cleavage-type volatilities (Chapter 6) and retrospective-type volatilities (Chapter 7).

**Figure 2. Inter-bloc Volatilities, 1965-2002 (N=67)**




*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix III and Appendix V.

*Note:* Four types of inter-bloc volatilities overlap with each other in one way or another.

CV: cleavage-type volatility.

RV: retrospective-type volatility.

**Figure 3. Cleavage- and Retrospective-Indices for Volatility (N=67)**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix III and Appendix V.

*Note:* The cleavage-volatility index (CVI) measured composite cleavage-type volatility with composite retrospective-type volatility controlled for. The CVI was calculated as the difference between 1) the mean between left-right and systemic volatilities and 2) the overlap between the mean between left-right and systemic volatilities and the mean between incumbent and traumatic volatilities that was divided by two. The overlap was calculated as the difference between 1) the sum of the mean between left-right and systemic volatilities, and the mean between incumbent and traumatic volatilities and 2) total electoral volatility.

The retrospective-volatility index (RVI) measured composite retrospective-type volatility with composite cleavage-type volatility controlled for. The RVI was calculated as the difference between 1) the mean between incumbent and traumatic volatilities and 2) the overlap, as defined above, between the mean between left-right and systemic volatilities and the mean between incumbent and traumatic volatilities that was divided by two.

#### 4.3 Independent Variables: Cleavages and the Economy

For the independent variables of this study, among the four models of electoral change reviewed in the previous section, two of them, i.e., the social cleavage model and the retrospective voting model, were chosen. Party identification and values as independent variables were discarded not only because relevant data lack at the provincial and sub-provincial levels. In particular, party identification has been a controversial independent variable when applied for countries other than the United

States.

The first independent variable, the strength of social cleavages in the province, is measured by the demography of the politically significant societal groups. These societal groups are the pious Sunnis, the Kurds, and the *Alevis*. A full explanation of the choice and measurement of these variables is given in section 6.1 of Chapter 6.

Second, the independent variables for the retrospective voting model are change in economic conditions prior to a general election. Almost all previous studies on retrospective voting treated economic conditions as short-term variables (measured for at most one year) and demonstrated that voters were sensitive to short-term change in their well being when deciding to vote for or against the incumbent(s). Although retrospective voting does not deal with electoral volatility per se, incumbent vote losses account for a substantial part of electoral volatility, as Figure 2 indicated.

**Table 4. List of Variables for Analysis**

Independent variable	Dependent variable	Time span	Expected effect
Social cleavages	Cleavage-type volatility	Long	Negative
Change in economic conditions	Incumbent vote change <sup>a</sup>	Short	Positive

*Source:* Compiled by the author.

<sup>a</sup> Incumbent vote losses are indicated by minus signs. In contrast, electoral volatility takes value not less than zero.

#### 4.4 Main Hypotheses

The preceding section both conceptually and operationally defined the dependent and independent variables. This study uses these variables to test the relationships 1) between social cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities by the cross-sectional analysis at the provincial level during the 1961-2002 period and 2) between change in economic conditions and incumbent vote change both by the time-series analysis during the 1950-2002 period and by the cross-sectional analysis at the provincial level during the 1977-2002 period. Two major hypotheses can be formulated as follows:

Assumption 1: Strong social cleavages stabilize the relationship between

cleavage groups and political parties.

Hypothesis 1: Those provinces with stronger social cleavages have smaller cleavage-type volatilities (left-right and systemic volatilities) than the provinces with weaker social cleavages do.

Assumption 2: Voters punish the incumbent according to the most recent economic performance prior to the general election.

Hypothesis 2: The governing party/parties lose a larger percentage of votes in the provinces that have experienced a greater income decline prior to the election than in the provinces with a smaller income decline.

Before testing the above hypotheses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, this study makes an explorative investigation of the nature of electoral participation in Turkey in Chapter 5 that immediately follows. While electoral volatility assumes voters make their own choice, voting participation in rural Turkey in the 1960s was found to be mobilized rather than voluntary. The next chapter aims to find out whether local leaders still hold sway over the voters and, if so, to what extent it affects electoral volatility.

#### 4.5 Methodology and Data

This study uses separate regression analyses to test the effect of 1) social cleavages and 2) economic conditions on electoral volatility over time and space. The unit of analysis is the province for the social-cleavage model. For the retrospective-voting model, the unit of analysis includes both the nation and the province. Detailed explanations on methodology and data are given in the beginning of the relevant chapters (sections 6.1 and 6.2 in Chapter 6 and sections 7.1 through 7.4 in Chapter 7). In calculation, statistical package programs such as the Statistical Analysis System (SAS), EViews, and STATA were used.

Although this study is not about inference of individual behavior from aggregate data (ecological inference), the statistical method used here is identical with that of ecological inference. Problems with ecological inference have been extensively discussed especially since William Robinson warned of ecological fallacy.<sup>109</sup> Leo

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<sup>109</sup> William S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review* 15 (1950), 351-357.

Goodman shortly proposed the application of a regression model to the problem of aggregation bias that Robinson pointed out.<sup>110</sup> In the Goodman model (ecological regression), however, there was a shortcoming in that the model assumed constant variance in the error term of the regression, which is not necessarily met in reality.<sup>111</sup> This is a problem of heteroscedasticity most commonly found in cross-sectional data. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variance of the dependent variable for each value of the independent variable is not constant.<sup>112</sup>

For the potential problem of heteroscedasticity, in this study, power transformations were used,<sup>113</sup> when necessary, to reduce the skewness of the distribution of the dependent and independent variables.<sup>114</sup> Then, each regression result was checked using the White test<sup>115</sup> for any sign of heteroscedasticity.

This study relied on electoral, socioeconomic, and demographic data at national and provincial levels. The main source of data is the State Institute of Statistics (SIS).<sup>116</sup> Other secondary sources include academic articles and books. See APPENDICES for the complete list of data sources.

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<sup>110</sup> Aggregation bias is considered to occur when individual data are aggregated into collective data in certain forms of grouping (but not in others). These forms of grouping include 1) grouping by the dependent variable (For instance, students of different ethnicities are grouped by class achievement before their ethnicity is correlated with class achievement.) and 2) grouping by a variable related to both the independent and dependent variables. Laura Irwin Langbein and Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), 17-21.

<sup>111</sup> Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chaps. 3–4.

<sup>112</sup> This is typical for the relationship between income and vacation expenditure of the household for the sample population. When the income is small, the variance of travel expenditure is small due to the upper limit. When the income becomes larger, the variance of expenditure increases since the household can choose either to restrain or to expand the expenditure. Jack Johnston and John Dinardo, *Econometric Methods*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 163. In general, when actual positive numbers are used for regression, the variance of the dependent variable for each value of the independent variable most typically increases as the mean of the independent variable increases. This is because the greater the mean of the dependent variable the maximum possible range of values for the dependent variable to take expands.

<sup>113</sup> Logarithmic transformation appeared to be the most appropriate method for the data used in this study.

<sup>114</sup> “Regression does not require assumptions about the distribution of X variables, but in practice skewed X distributions are often associated with statistical problems such as influence and heteroscedasticity.” Laurence C. Hamilton, *Regression with Graphics* (Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1992). 55.

<sup>115</sup> Johnston and Dinardo, *Econometric Methods*, 166-167.

<sup>116</sup> Data on per capita provincial incomes were kindly provided to the author by the State Institute of Statistics in electronic files.

## CHAPTER 5: FROM MOBILIZED TO AUTONOMOUS VOTING

This chapter analyzes the relationship between socioeconomic development and electoral participation in the 1961-2002 period. It is assumed that a positive relationship between the two variables in the province indicates autonomous participation whereas a negative relationship suggests mobilized participation. This analysis is necessary because the concept of electoral volatility implicitly assumes that voters cast a ballot of their own will. In the rural areas of Turkey, however, mobilized voting used to be prevalent.<sup>117</sup> Whether voting is autonomous or mobilized makes a great difference in the interpretation of electoral volatility. Large electoral volatility under autonomous voting would mean weak voter loyalties (or trust) to political parties. But under mobilized voting, electoral volatility does not very much reflect party loyalties.

The main contention of this chapter is that electoral participation in Turkey over the last forty years has become more autonomous than mobilized. What follows in this chapter first overviews voter turnout at the national level during the 1961-2002 period and explains major reasons for quantitative and qualitative changes in voter turnout. Second, the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout is examined at the provincial level for the general elections during the above period. Third, in order to supplement the second inquiry, another indicator, party competition, measures autonomous/mobilized participation at the sub-province level over time.

### 5.1 National Voter Turnout

Two major factors have influenced voter turnout in general elections in Turkey. First, voter turnout has tended to be higher in the post-1980 period than in the pre-1980 period. This is because the Law on Election of the Members of Parliament (Law No. 2839), passed on June 10th, 1983, made voting compulsory. Article 63 of the law stipulates a fine, imposed by the sub-provincial electoral council chairman, on

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<sup>117</sup> Özbudun, *Social Change and Electoral Participation in Turkey*.

registered eligible voters who, without legitimate reasons, did not participate in either the general election or the by-election of the parliament. Actually, the author was unable to come across any reports or personal remarks indicating that the fine had been implemented. It is plausible, however, that the possibility, though very small, of fine and the sense of obligation that the law generated among the voters induced voter turnout higher than in the pre-1980 period.

Second, however, there has been substantial variance in voter turnout from election to election, both for the periods since 1983 and before 1983. A surge in electoral participation seems to accompany a transition from military to civilian rule<sup>118</sup> or the incorporation of untapped voters into a party's constituency. In 1961, the general election was held for the first time since the 1960 military intervention (and the introduction of Turkey's most democratic 1961 Constitution). During the election campaign, the newly created Justice Party demanded justice for its predecessor, the Democrat Party, dissolved by the military government. These factors probably raised popular interest in this election. The ensuing short-lived coalition governments most probably disappointed voters, particularly those in the middle class,<sup>119</sup> and national voter turnout declined.

In the early 1970s the Republican People's Party chose its new leader, Bulent Ecevit. The party then consolidated its ideological shift to the center-left and gained votes from the urban masses. The turnout increase between 1969 and 1973 was more significant in the city, to which the RPP strengthened its appeal, than in the village.<sup>120</sup> The 1983 general election was a transition election from the 1980-83 military government although only three parties were allowed to participate. The 1987 election was the first competitive general election after the civilian transition in 1983. These pivotal elections produced higher voter turnout than did the other elections in the same period (either before 1983 or since 1983).


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<sup>118</sup> In general, the first two or three elections after democratization produce high electoral turnout. Arend Lijphart, "Turnout," in Richard Rose, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Elections* (Washington, D. C.: C Q Press, 2000), 316.

<sup>119</sup> Abadan and Yücekök, "1961-1965 Seçimlerinde Büyük Şehirlerin Oy Verme Davranışlarıyla İlgili Bazı Yorumlar," 107.

<sup>120</sup> Voting turnout rose by 6.4 percent points in the cities but only by 1.3 percent points in the villages. At the same time, the Republican People's Party increased its votes by 8.8 percent points in the cities, compared to 3.2 percent points in the villages. See Özbudun, "Turkey," 116, Table 5.2.

**Figure 4. National Voter Turnout, 1961-2002**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix III.


## 5.2 Invalid Votes

The introduction of compulsory voting in 1983 reduced the abstention rate. Then, how have former or potential nonvoters come to vote since then? Do they cast a vote for any party or independent candidate? Or do they intentionally cast an invalid vote? Figure 5 shows that for potential nonvoters, voting for any party is the norm while casting an invalid vote is contingent on political situations. Between the periods before and after the introduction of compulsory voting, the period-average rate of invalid votes to the total votes cast does not significantly differ. It is probable that most of the former nonvoters came to turn out and cast a valid vote. Since 1983, however, the variance of invalid votes became larger than the previous period.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Before voting became compulsory, the rate of invalid votes was gradually declining presumably because learning effect was reducing errors in voting. The same kind of errors, however, cannot account for the greater volatility of the rate of invalid votes since 1983.

**Figure 5. Invalid Votes, 1961-2002**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix III.

The occurrence of invalid votes has become more dependent on political contexts. The high rate of invalid votes in 1983 might well have reflected some voters' protest against the exclusion of all but three parties from the general election. In the 1995 and 1999 general elections, the growth of invalid votes coincided with heightened political distrust, represented by the corruption perceptions index (Table 5).<sup>122</sup> Casting invalid votes, however, is not so widespread. A change in the rate of invalid votes has contributed at most to about a two-percent-point change in the rate of voter turnout between two consecutive elections.

**Table 5. Corruption Perceptions Index for Turkey, 1980-2003**

Year	1980 -1985	1988 -1992	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
CPI	4.06	4.05	3.54	3.21	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.2	3.1

<sup>122</sup> Major political scandals in the 1990s started with the İSKİ (Istanbul Municipality Water Administration) affair in the early 1990s. Later, corruption charges against former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller after 1995 and the Susurluk affair in 1996 further revealed to the public the prevalence and depth of political corruption in Turkey.

*Source:* Compiled by the author from the homepage of the Internet Center for Corruption Research, accessible from <http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~uwvw/corruption.index.html>. This homepage is a joint initiative of the University of Passau and Transparency International.

*Note:* The corruption perception index is a composite rank index generated from evaluation by businessmen and country specialists on the extent of corruption practices among public servants and politicians in a particular country. The higher the rank, the more serious is the corruption.

### 5.3 Urban-Rural Difference

Voter turnout used to be higher in the rural than the urban sub-province but this urban-rural difference has been considerably shrinking since the 1970s (Table 6). A possible reason is that when national voter turnout began to increase in the early 1970s, urban turnout accounted for most of the increase. This is a process to recapture the significant decrease in urban turnout in the late 1960s. Rural turnout, which had been stably high, did not have much room for further increase. Another possibility is that rural voting behavior began to approximate urban voting behavior, which will be discussed later.

**Table 6. Urban and Rural Voter Turnout, 1961-1995**

Year	1961	1965	1969	1973	1991	1995
Urban	74.6	66.2	56.3	62.7	81.6	81.8
Rural	83.2	77.3	68.1	69.4	87.2	86.1
Difference	-8.6	-11.1	-11.8	-6.7	-5.6	-4.3
Number of provinces	67	67	67	67	73	76

*Sources:* Compiled by the author; for 1961-73 from Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976), Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey," Part II: Voting Behaviour, in Jacob Landau, Ergun Özbudun, and Frank Tachau, eds., *Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites* (London: Croom Helm, 1980) and for 1991-95 from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 20.10. 1991* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1992); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 24.12.1995* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1996).

*Note:* For 1977, 1983, and 1987, the State Institute of Statistics did not show urban and rural voting turnout by province.

### 5.4 Relationship with Socioeconomic Development

The relationship between voter turnout and socioeconomic development significantly

changed in the last four decades. The regular line in Figure 6 shows the relationship between provincial socioeconomic development and provincial voter turnout and the broken line shows voter turnout at the national level. From 1961 to 1969, as Özbudun already showed, the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout was either insignificant (1961 and 1965) or negative (1969 and 1973). The relationship later, however, swung to the reverse. Since the 1980s, a positive relationship was established, in which voter turnout is higher in the more developed than the less developed regions.

Then why did the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout in the province change so dynamically? There are two major reasons. One is short-term and the other is long-term. First, the above relationship in the province depends on the level of national (or provincial-average) voter turnout. If national voter turnout is relatively high compared with other election years, the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout in the province becomes positive and vice versa. This is due to different impacts of socioeconomic development on autonomous versus mobilized voting.

In general, autonomous voting is positively related with socioeconomic development. After reviewing elections in democracies, Lijphart summarized that higher socioeconomic status (in terms of incomes, wealth, and education) led to higher voting turnout.<sup>123</sup> Franklin found that for 22 democracies, individual incomes were positively correlated with voting turnout.<sup>124</sup> According to another study, the level of human development also explained the difference in voting turnout across countries, either democratic or nondemocratic. The higher the value of the United Nation's human development index (HDI), the more electoral participation in the country.<sup>125</sup> For the United Kingdom, Parry, Moyser, and Day asserted that wealth increases voter turnout, based on the findings of a sample survey of nearly 1,600 people.<sup>126</sup> Even in Japan, where voting turnout has been known to be high in less developed constituencies, multiple regression analyses showed that, the higher

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<sup>123</sup> Arend Lijphart, "Turnout," 314-322.

<sup>124</sup> Mark N. Franklin, "Electoral Participation," in *Comparing Democracies*, eds. Le Duc, Niemi and Norris.

<sup>125</sup> International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), "Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1998: A Global Report on Political Participation," accessible from <http://www.idea.int/>.

<sup>126</sup> Ikuo Kabashima, *Seiji Sanka* (Political participation) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989).

age of the voter, not the lower level of income, tended to increase the voting rate in less developed constituencies.<sup>127</sup> Similarly, Gary Cox, Frances Rosenbluth, and Michael Thies also pointed out more intense social networks in rural than urban sub-provinces in explaining higher turnout among rural than urban voters in Japan.<sup>128</sup>

In Turkey too, voter turnout in the (dominantly autonomous-voting<sup>129</sup>) city has been positively correlated with socioeconomic development since the 1960s.<sup>130</sup> Since autonomous votes tend to vary between elections, they significantly affect *change* in national voter turnout. Mobilized votes, on the other hand, are relatively predictable and do not vary significantly between elections. The proportion of autonomous votes to the total votes tends to be high when national voter turnout is *high*; the proportion of mobilized votes tends to be high when national turnout is *low*. Thus, high national voter turnout reflects higher/lower turnout in more/less developed regions while low national voter turnout represents higher/lower turnout in less/more developed regions.

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
<sup>127</sup> Geraint Parry, George Moyser, and Neil Day, *Political Participation and Democracy in Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>128</sup> Gary W. Cox, Frances M. Rosenbluth, and Michael F. Thies, "Mobilization, Social Networks, and Turnout: Evidence from Japan," *World Politics* 50 (1998), 447-474.

<sup>129</sup> Nuhurat reported that mobilized voting was observed only in the village. See note 69.

<sup>130</sup> Özbudun analyzed voter turnout by city size but did not find any significant relationship. *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*. Baykal's data implies such possibility but did not go through a test of statistical significance. See Deniz Baykal, *Siyasal Katılma*.

**Figure 6. Voter Turnout and Autonomous Voting, 1961-2002**



Sources: Calculated and compiled by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 15.10.1961, 10.10.1965, 12.10.1969, 14.10.1973, 05.06.1977* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 24.12.1995* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 18.04.1999* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2000); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 2002* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2003); Erdoğan Öztün, *Türkiye'de Gayri Safi Yurt İçi Hasılasının İller İtibarıyla Dağılımı, 1979-1986*, Araştırma Dairesi, Yayın No. 1988/8 (İstanbul: İstanbul Sanayi Odası, 1988); State Planning Organization's website, accessible from <http://www.dpt.gov.tr/>.

Note: Positive correlation indicates that autonomous voting was prevalent across provinces. Correlation coefficients were statistically significant at the 0.05 level except for 1961, 1965, and 1977.


Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the above contention. In Figure 6, the correlation coefficient between voter turnout and per capita GDP in the province (the regular line) moves in tandem with the national voter turnout (the dotted line).<sup>131</sup> In this figure, however, each of the two variables is autocorrelated.<sup>132</sup> Figure 7 shows the

<sup>131</sup> For socioeconomic development, the only time-series data available at the provincial level was per capita GDP.

<sup>132</sup> Voter turnout at time t was positively correlated with voter turnout at time t-1. Likewise, the

relationship between the two variables with autocorrelation controlled for by taking their first-order differences. The horizontal axis measures change in the correlation coefficient between voter turnout and per capita GDP in the province. A plus change means that voting became more autonomous than in the previous election and a minus change means that voting became more mobilized than in the previous election. The vertical axis measures change in the voter turnout percentage. It was confirmed that an increment in the correlation coefficient (between voter turnout and per capita GDP in the province) was positively correlated with an increment in national voter turnout ( $r=0.823, p<0.01$ ).<sup>133</sup>

**Figure 7. Change in Turnout and Change in Autonomous Voting, 1961-2002 (N=10)**



Sources: See Figure 6.

correlation coefficient between voter turnout and socioeconomic development in the province at time t was positively correlated with the same correlation coefficient at time t-1.

<sup>133</sup> The original autocorrelation was almost completely erased with the Durbin-Watson test statistic being 2.030.

*Note:* The horizontal axis measures change in the correlation coefficient (Pearson's  $r$ ) between voter turnout and per capita GDP in the province. The vertical axis measures change in the voter turnout percentage. Labels show election years.

The second reason is long-term social change including urbanization and rural development. Rapid urbanization since the 1960s raised the proportion of urban voter turnout to the total provincial voter turnout. Urban voting behavior (represented by a positive relationship between voter turnout and socioeconomic development) thus increasingly shaped voting behavior in the province as a whole. Rural development increasingly reduced the political and economic influence of local notables. In the least developed region such as southeastern Anatolia, the development of infrastructure and mass communication especially since the beginning of the Southeastern Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi=GAP) weakened the tribal and feudalistic structure in the region.<sup>134</sup> In the meantime, the introduction of compulsory voting also added to voter turnout in the rural area though less significantly than in the urban area. This presumably had the effect of increasing the rate of autonomous votes to mobilized votes.

These long-term changes manifested themselves in the transformation of voting behavior in the rural area. For rural Turkey in the 1960s, Özbudun found a negative relationship between voter turnout and socioeconomic development.<sup>135</sup> By the early 1990s, however, the relationship between the two variables has been reversed. Table 7 shows for 1991 and 1995 that even in the rural area, voter turnout is positively

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<sup>134</sup> The tribal and feudal structures of the Kurd-populated region are showing a sign of decline due to the development of infrastructure and the mass media, especially after the realization of the Southeastern Anatolian Project. Political instability in the region since the 1980s also contributed to the virtual superiority of the villagers over the landlords. Some lands are under peasants' control while others are being sold to peasants at a cheap price. (Akçay, A. Adnan, "Toprak Ağalığından Kapitalist İşletmeciliğe Türkiye Tarımında Büyük Topraklı İşletmeler," in *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı (Istanbul: Numune Matbaası, 1999), 129.) In Southeastern Anatolia, "the traditional forms of land ownership, land tenure and labor organization have been transformed into more widespread ownership in the villages by resident farmers using more advanced agricultural technology." (Bahattin Akşit, et al., "Population Movements in Southeastern Anatolia: Some Findings of an Empirical Research in 1993," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 14 (Spring 1996), 59.) Doğu Ergil, who prepared the report "Eastern Problem (Doğu Sorunu)," published in 1995 by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchanges, asserted that in the Kurd-populated region, feudal relationship no longer existed in a practical sense. According to Ergil, *ağalık*, or Kurdish lordship, does not only mean large land ownership but it also rests on comprehensive power to sanction a large section of society. He said that large landownership still existed but it had become difficult for landowners to exert punitive power over the peasants (*Nokta*, 21-27 Eylül 1997, 9).

<sup>135</sup> Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*.

correlated with socioeconomic development. Similarly, the urban-rural gap in voting turnout, which Özbudun referred to as an indication of mobilized voting, is no longer significantly correlated with socioeconomic development in the 1990s.

**Table 7. Voter Turnout and Socioeconomic Development, Urban vs. Rural**

Year	1969 <sup>a</sup>	1991	1995
Urban	0.213*	0.297**	0.426***
Rural	-0.452***	0.274**	0.531***
Province	-0.569***	0.388***	0.580***
Urban-rural gap	0.513***	0.129	0.146
Number of Provinces	67	73	76

Sources: See Figure 6.

Notes: Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients. Compiled electoral data for urban and rural constituencies were available for only these general elections.

<sup>a</sup> For per capita provincial income, the 1979 data was used.

\*  $p < 0.10$ .

\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 5.5 Relationship with Party Competition

It would be desirable to confirm the above results at the lower level such as at the sub-provincial level. At this level, however, socioeconomic data is very difficult to come by. Instead, this section explores the relationship between *party competition* and voter turnout to find any evidence of autonomous/mobilized voting. Özbudun showed that in rural Turkey, one-party dominance in the village was often a sign of mobilized voting.<sup>136</sup> It would be possible to apply the same logic to all sub-provinces nationwide to investigate the relationship between party competition and voter turnout over time. If *mobilized* voting is prevalent in the country, then high (or low) voter turnout should coincide with one-party (or no) dominance, or low (or high) party-competition. If *autonomous* voting is prevalent, then high voter turnout should be observed with high party competition that stimulates popular interest in voting.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., 169-173.

<sup>137</sup> Indeterminate electoral competition increases the voter's perceived importance in deciding the electoral outcome.

It is thus assumed here that the association between high (or low) turnout and low (or high) party competition attests to the prevalence of mobilized voting whereas the association between high (or low) turnout and high (or low) party competition indicates the prevalence of autonomous voting. When statistically no significant relationship exists between voter turnout and party competition, the mode of electoral participation is most probably an even mixture of mobilized and autonomous voting.

Table 8 shows that over the years, the relationship between party competition and voter turnout has changed from negative to statistically insignificant. In earlier years, those sub-provinces with low competitiveness, or high one-party dominance, had high voter turnout. A large percentage of the voters went to the polls presumably not so much because they were interested in the almost predetermined electoral results in their sub-province as because they felt obliged to vote for the dominant party in the sub-province. In those sub-provinces where no dominant party could exert pressure the voters, they did not feel a strong urge to cast their ballot. Since 1983, the relationship between voter turnout and party competition may seem inconclusive. There is, however, a clear trend toward a more autonomous voting pattern. The correlation coefficients are consistently negative and the strength of the correlation is increasing for every new general election. Consequently, for the 1995 election the coefficient has turned significant at the 0.01 level.

**Table 8. One-party Dominance and Voter Turnout by Sub-province, 1961-1995**

Year	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	1983	1987	1991	1995
<i>r</i>	.123***	.080**	.077*	.264***	.245***	-.013	-.047	-.051	-.132***
<i>n</i>	636	637	638	638	638	640	646	894	918

*Source:* Calculated and compiled by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 15.10.1961, 10.10.1965, 12.10.1969, 14.10.1973, 05.06.1977* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 24.12.1995* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998).

*Note:* Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients between the voter turnout percentage and the squared percentage of votes cast for the largest party in the sub-province.

## 5.6 Double-registered Voters in the Village?

The preceding results consistently showed lower electoral participation in less

developed provinces or in the villages than in more developed provinces or in the urban area. One may suspect, however, the lower voter turnout in less developed constituencies is an artifact of double-registered voters. A massive scale of internal migration may have produced a large number of migrants whose previous voter registration in their native villages has not been erased. Voters in net-emigrant provinces thus may be double-registered. If this is the case, then the rate of voter turnout in the net-emigrant constituencies will be reported as *lower* than it actually is. (Voting rates in the net-immigrant constituencies can be considered more accurate since internal immigrants cannot vote until they are registered there.) This section examines whether the present level of irregularity in voter registration invalidates the previous findings.

According to an official of the Higher Election Council,<sup>138</sup> there are two potential sources of irregularity in voter registration. One is double registration and the other is voter transfers. First, the fact that neither residential nor voter registration is fully computerized in Turkey allows or results in double registration.<sup>139</sup> It is not unusual for Turkish citizens, particularly those from rural areas, intentionally to have two or three of their addresses registered. These citizens will have double or triple voter registrations, which are prepared according to their residential registrations. In unintentional cases, old registrations remain on the book even after the death or emigration of voters. The number of unerased registrations thus increases with each election. Second, voter transfers between different constituencies occur when marginal votes can influence the electoral outcome in the constituency. Such cases include municipal elections, parliamentary by-elections, or general elections for highly competitive constituencies. Voter transfers, however, are not very widespread over the country. Thumb marking is used to prevent voters from voting more than once.

The above information gives a clue to the examination of voter statistics irregularity. First, both sources of irregularity should in theory *bloat* the number of registered voters. For double registration, it is obvious by definition. Voter transfers or transports (across constituencies by bus) also artificially increase the number of registered voters since these transferred voters have to have them registered

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<sup>138</sup> An interview with Şadi Tokay, Vice General Director of Electoral List (Seçim Kütüğü Genel Müdür Yardımcısı), Higher Election Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu), August 9, 2002, Ankara.

<sup>139</sup> In Turkey, voter registration is computerized for only 30 of the total 81 provinces. An interview with Erol Tuncer, president of Toplumsal, Ekonomik, Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı (TESAV), August 7, 2002, Ankara.

beforehand in the constituency. Second, the extent of over-registration should be greater in the less developed provinces than in the more developed ones. This is because the less developed provinces have a larger net out-migration (to other provinces) than the more developed provinces do. Out-migrants can be an important source of unintended irregularity in voter registration, as they were discussed above.

With these two assumptions, it is possible to measure the extent of irregularity in voter registration by comparing the number of registered voters and the estimated population of voting age calculated from the most recent population census, taken in 1997, prior to the general election in 1999. The most recent years were chosen for analysis since, according to the above official, unintended double registrations are being accumulated without check over time. In the following, two null hypotheses will be tested for data shown in Table 9. If there is a rampant irregularity in voter registration, then the following two hypotheses must hold. First, the number of registered voters should be unnaturally close to or even greater than the estimated population at voting age. Second, the rate of registered voters to the estimated population at voting age should be higher in the less developed provinces than in the more developed ones.

**Table 9. Voter Registration Ratio by Province, 1999**

Province	Population at voting age* (A)	Registered voters (B)	Registration Ratio (B/A)
Hakkari	110497	76524	0.693
Adiyaman	362397	271482	0.749
Şırnak	149477	113856	0.762
Isparta	312829	243330	0.778
Bitlis	150777	117367	0.778
Erzincan	176186	137695	0.782
Malatya	508381	405744	0.798
Muş	191079	153212	0.802
Afyon	493266	404132	0.819
Şanlıurfa	630518	518259	0.822
Mardin	323774	274887	0.849
Konya	1197725	1018792	0.851
Siirt	124859	106556	0.853
Kırıkkale	219724	188362	0.857

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Diyarbakır	636437	546722	0.859
Bilecik	136013	117881	0.867
Antalya	1058790	917784	0.867
Kütahya	429891	375960	0.875
Bingöl	122277	107302	0.878
Ağrı	212639	187131	0.880
Tekirdağ	416297	368061	0.884
Van	361570	320254	0.886
Yozgat	349933	310582	0.888
Kahramanmaraş	557120	494971	0.888
Trabzon	533716	476708	0.893
Bayburt	54118	48815	0.902
Karaman	139113	125865	0.905
İçel	957910	866832	0.905
Çankırı	161538	146401	0.906
Ankara	2592451	2351122	0.907
Kars	176808	161601	0.914
Erzurum	483495	442654	0.916
Hatay	703415	693725	0.919
Osmaniye	260989	239922	0.919
Tunceli	54349	50120	0.922
Ordu	498267	461818	0.927
Batman	187553	174255	0.929
Kırklareli	230372	214741	0.932
Bursa	1382705	1289774	0.933
Edirne	287033	268902	0.937
Aydın	614748	576630	0.938
Istanbul	6524650	6134811	0.940
Kocaeli	792918	749026	0.945
Muğla	464123	439587	0.947
Çanakkale	330766	314536	0.951
Eskişehir	466686	445415	0.954
Sivas	406190	388045	0.955
Manisa	831258	798578	0.961
Denizli	541251	520973	0.963
İzmir	2231374	2150970	0.964

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Giresun	282513	272436	0.964
Bolu	367119	354370	0.965
Burdur	173528	167583	0.966
Gaziantep	639449	618027	0.966
Tokat	420563	407448	0.969
Nevşehir	179082	174027	0.972
Uşak	208663	202975	0.973
Yalova	116084	113996	0.982
Elazığ	316550	311507	0.984
Aksaray	204710	202248	0.988
Iğdır	79864	78998	0.989
Kayseri	599575	595291	0.993
Balıkesir	730409	731515	1.002
Rize	204904	205692	1.004
Amasya	223642	226314	1.012
Gümüşane	85229	86265	1.012
Karabük	145011	147208	1.015
Sakarya	477795	486022	1.017
Kilis	60165	61359	1.020
Adana	1029420	1056015	1.026
Niğde	191820	199260	1.039
Artvin	118835	124440	1.047
Çorum	349502	369406	1.057
Kırşehir	144003	152236	1.057
Zonguldak	386155	410444	1.063
Ardahan	70224	75332	1.073
Samsun	708490	763659	1.078
Kastamonu	237963	257029	1.080
Sinop	129444	141019	1.089
Bartın	117336	128327	1.094

*Source:* Calculated and compiled by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 18.04.1999* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2000); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *2000 Census of Population: Provisional Results* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2001).

*Note:* Entries are shown in the ascending order of the registration ratio.

\*Estimated by the author as the provincial population at voting age (18 and above) as of 1997, including those who are constitutionally ineligible to vote (privates and corporals serving in the armed services, students in military schools, and detainees and convicts in prisons), multiplied by the provincial population growth rate for the two years (1997-1999). The ratio of total

registered voters (37,429,120) to the total population at voting age as defined above (40,138,299) was 0.933.

The data in the table showed, however, no significant sign that the number of registered voters was extensively bloated. First, the voter registration percentage at the national level was estimated as somewhere between 93.3 and 103, in the following procedure. At the national level, the ratio of registered voters to population at voting age was 93.3 percent (Table 9). This ratio, however, includes “privates and corporals serving in the armed services, students in military schools, and detainees and convicts in prisons” that the Article 67 of the Constitution bars from voting.<sup>140</sup> The results of the General Population Census do not show the number of these people who have no right to vote at voting age. In order to obtain the entire military population, the civilian population (64,062,820<sup>141</sup>) was extracted from the total population (67,844,903<sup>142</sup>) as of 2000. Then, the military population as of 2000 was estimated to be 5.57 percent of the total population. When the same percentage for the military population was applied to the total population as of 1999, the military population was estimated to be 27,258,755, or 9.8 percent of the population at voting age for 1999 (This percentage, 9.8, includes not only privates and corporals but also the other higher ranking soldiers and officers). The addition of this percentage, 9.8, to the ratio of registered voters, 93.9, yields 103.7. This percentage, 103.7, suggests that the voters are far from double-registered, given that it includes the unknown percentage of those military officers who are eligible to vote and thus should have been discounted from this ratio.<sup>143</sup> This result rejected Null Hypothesis 1.

Second, more importantly, the rate of registered voters to the estimated population at voting age was *lower* in the less developed provinces than in the more developed ones. This result rejected Null Hypothesis 2. In fact, the above-mentioned official attested that in less developed provinces, the rate of registered voters to the

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<sup>140</sup> The constitutional amendment on October 3, 2001 lifted the ban on those detained or convicted for professional negligence.

<sup>141</sup> Data accessible from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s website (<http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/>).

<sup>142</sup> Data accessible from the State Institute of Statistics’ website (<http://www.die.gov.tr/>).

<sup>143</sup> The most recent evidence also indicates that the number of registered voters is smaller than the number of people eligible to vote (if registered). In the 2002 general election, the Higher Election Council expected 45 million voters to be registered according to the latest 2000 population census and population growth since then. In reality, however, only 41 million and 400 thousand voters were registered. See *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 30 Ekim 2002.

population at voting age was low. He explained that young people in less developed provinces first went to military service and then settled in large cities, like Istanbul, where they made their first voter registration. Since their native provinces remain as their permanent addresses, the rate of voter registration in these provinces tends to be lower than in more developed provinces.<sup>144</sup> The rate of such young population, subject to military conscription, to the total provincial population is also higher in the less developed provinces than in the more developed provinces (See Chapter 5). In all, these results imply that the lower electoral turnout in the less developed constituencies does not come from irregularity in voting registration.

## 5.7 Summary

This chapter has shown change in electoral participation in the last four decades. Table 10 summarizes the major findings. First, in the long term, the level of national voter turnout was higher under compulsory voting since the 1980s than the previous two decades. In the short term, however, national voter turnout significantly varied between elections due to political factors, during either the former or the latter two decades.

**Table 10. Summary of Electoral Participation in Turkey, 1961-2002**

Parameters	1961-1977	1983-2002
National turnout	Low	High
Urban-rural difference in turnout <sup>a</sup>	Large	Small
Invalid votes	Stable	Unstable
Relationship with socioeconomic development: urban <sup>b</sup>	Positive	Positive
Relationship with socioeconomic development: rural <sup>b</sup>	Negative	Positive
Relationship with socioeconomic development: total	Negative	Positive
Relationship with party competition <sup>c</sup>	Negative	Positive

*Source:* Compiled by the author.

*Notes:* <sup>a</sup> Not tested for the 1980s.

<sup>b</sup> Not tested for the 1970s, the 1980s, 1999, and 2002.

<sup>c</sup> Not tested for 1999 and 2002.

<sup>144</sup> See note 138.

Second, the *average* rate of invalid votes did not significantly differ between the two periods before and after the introduction of compulsory voting while the *variance* in the rate of invalid votes was greater after the introduction of compulsory voting than before. Now that voters have more difficulty resorting to abstention, invalid votes more sensitively reflect voter distrust than in the 1960s and the 1970s.

Third, the urban-rural difference in voter turnout has diminished in the last two decades, which points to a decline in mobilized voting in the rural area.

Fourth, the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout in the province depends on the level of national voter turnout. Low voter turnout, often caused by voters' disillusionment with the political system, reduces autonomous votes and consequently increases the ratio of mobilized votes to the total votes. High national voter turnout, due either to democratizing elections or to compulsory voting, leads to an increased weight of autonomous voting. The pattern of rural electoral participation has by the 1990s closely approximated that of urban electoral participation, in which greater socioeconomic development induces higher voter turnout.

Lastly, the relationship between party competition in the sub-province and voter turnout provided complementary supportive evidence that electoral participation changed from mobilized voting to autonomous voting. In the pre-1980 period, one-party dominance in the sub-province led to greater voter turnout. In the post-1980 period, this relationship disappeared. Most recently, the more competitive sub-provinces stimulated greater turnout than the less competitive sub-provinces did.

## CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND VOLATILITY

This chapter investigates relationships between social cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities in Turkey during the 1961-2002 period at the provincial level. First, instead of postulating certain cleavages, this chapter starts with pooled-factor analyses of provincial voting patterns to extract those factors that potentially represent major social cleavages. These factors point to three major social cleavages formed by Sunni religiosity, Kurdish ethnicity, and *Alevi* sectarianism,<sup>145</sup> respectively. Second, demographic data on these social groups in Turkey are used to operationalize social cleavages. Third, both long-term and short-term relationships between social cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities are analyzed.

In this chapter, the dynamics of party system consolidation in democratization processes was also examined. While Turkey made a transition to a multi-party system in 1946, it experienced two military interventions in 1960 and 1980. In other words, electoral democracy is not new in Turkey but has not been very stable. At the same time, discontinuities of the Turkish party system associated with the two military interventions have resulted in two cycles of party system consolidation.<sup>146</sup> The period under study, 1961-2002, was thus divided into the pre-1980 period (1961-1977) and the post-1980 period (1987-2002). The two years in each pair of parentheses indicate the first and the last free elections in each period.

The results of multiple regressions show that in the long-term, social cleavages on the whole have increased cleavage-type volatilities rather than reduced them. The cleavage-volatility relationship, however, has changed over time. Repeated elections since each civilian transition (in 1961 and 1983) have mitigated the volatile effect of social cleavages on voting behavior, as political parties have become more

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<sup>145</sup> Sectarianism is used here to refer to affiliation or identification with the sect. It is intended not to convey any derogative meanings associated with the word sectarianism.

<sup>146</sup> After the 1960 military intervention, the governing party was disbanded while the other parties remained intact. The parliamentary electoral system was changed from a plural-member majoritarian system to a proportional representation and the senate was established. These measures were intended to prevent the tyranny of the majority that led to the coup. A competitive transition election was held in 1961. After the 1980 military intervention, all the political parties were disbanded and all their leaders were banned from politics until 1987. The transition election in 1983 was thus not fully competitive besides the fact that the military government allowed only three of the newly formed parties to participate.

representative of the existent social cleavages.

## 6.1 Choice of Cleavages

Which cleavages should be put into the analysis of electoral volatility? Lipset and Rokkan cited four social cleavages, i. e., center-periphery, secular-religious, urban-rural, and capital-labor, for their explanation of the emergence of the West European party system. In a broader sense, social cleavages pertain in the main to culture, language, religiosity, ethnicity, and class. For the purpose of this study, it is more important to discern the most relevant social cleavages to be analyzed rather than to prepare a list of numerous socioeconomic indicators that at least vaguely represent any social cleavages. The choice of cleavages thus should depend on one's analytical assumptions while the success in choice should be evaluated by the explanatory power of the cleavages. Lane and Ersson stress the need for theoretical justification when choosing cleavages.

The choice of cleavages to be included in the analysis may be justified not on the basis of a typology or on the basis of an enumeration of types of cleavage found, but on the basis of theoretical arguments about interrelationships between cleavages and the other properties to be studied. Whether a proper choice of cleavages has been made depends on the amount of understanding provided of factors which are assumed to be interrelated to cleavages.<sup>147</sup>

This study has chosen those social cleavages that most effectively influence provincial voting patterns. It is assumed that strong social cleavages reduce electoral volatility while weak social cleavages reinforce it.

Compared with cross-country studies, it is much more difficult to measure the strength of social cleavages across provinces in a single country, due to both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, little information is available about how the level of group identification varies across provinces. Theoretically, if attitudinal variables such as group identification are to be approximated by socio-demographic variables, it is not very clear which socio-demographic features help to nurture strong social

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<sup>147</sup> Lane and Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, 43-44.

cleavages. And both practically and theoretically, the conventional index of cleavage, segmentation,<sup>148</sup> is more difficult to apply to a province than to the country as a whole. Even if the level of segmentation is the same between two provinces, the provincial majority may not always coincide with the national majority. If the party system underrepresents the provincial majority, a low level of segmentation may well lead to voting instability rather than stability. This is because a large bloc of votes lacks strong party loyalties.

For the analysis of cleavage strength at the provincial level, it makes more sense, therefore, to measure the strength of each major social cleavage by the relative population size of major national minorities in the province. Let us assume here that 1) each social cleavage in the province is formed by one of the major national minorities, on the one hand, and the residual groups (consisting of the national majority group and the less relevant minority groups), on the other and that 2) each social cleavage in the province becomes the more prominent depending on whether a particular minority accounts for a large proportion of the population in the province. Then the strength of each social cleavage can be measured by the percentage of that minority population to the total population in the province. It would be preferable to choose these major national minority groups as objectively as possible.

Factor analysis of party votes by province enables to elicit potential social cleavages that include the most relevant minority groups. Table 11 shows factor patterns (i. e., configurations of factor loadings) of party votes for the post-1980 periods by pooled-factor analysis.<sup>149</sup> Three factors, i., e., secular-religious, Turks-Kurds, and *Alevi* factors, were extracted to explain the variation in voting behavior.

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<sup>148</sup> See Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, 226. The other cleavage index that Bartolini and Mair used was organizational strength measured by the unionization rate. This index is also both very difficult to obtain at the provincial level and restricted to the left-right cleavage.

<sup>149</sup> In order to delineate clear cleavage patterns, the results of the 2002 general election were not included in the analysis. In 2002, a great deal of punitive vote swings (see Figure 2) slightly blurred the consistent provincial voting pattern up to 1999. As the following analysis shows, however, the high electoral volatility for 2002 primarily stemmed from retrospective-type rather than cleavage-type volatilities. Provincial patterns of party support have not substantially changed along social cleavage dimensions. In this sense, it is too early to call the 2002 general election a dealignment/realignment election rather than an aberration.

**Table 11. Factor Analysis of Provincial Voting Behavior, 1987-1999 (N=67)**

Factor1: Secular-religious		Factor2: Turks-Kurds		Factor3: <i>Alevi</i>	
Party	Factor Loading	Party	Factor Loading	Party	Factor Loading
<b>DLP99</b>	<b>0.87624</b>	<b>NAP99</b>	<b>0.84338</b>	<b>RPP99</b>	<b>0.86126</b>
<b>DLP95</b>	<b>0.81600</b>	<b>NAP95</b>	<b>0.60143</b>	<b>RPP95</b>	<b>0.80954</b>
<b>DLP91</b>	<b>0.71497</b>	<b>NWP87</b>	<b>0.54605</b>	<b>SDPP87</b>	<b>0.71218</b>
<b>TPP95</b>	<b>0.65199</b>	MP87	0.44614	<b>SDPP91</b>	<b>0.57165</b>
<b>DLP87</b>	<b>0.53914</b>	TPP91	0.36909	NAP95	0.34751
<b>SDPP87</b>	<b>0.49967</b>	TPP87	0.31533	NWP87	0.33344
TPP91	0.41076	WP91	0.28198	NAP99	0.24270
MP99	0.33919	TPP95	0.26906	MP87	0.10970
RPP95	0.27486	DLP91	0.26772	WP91	0.01570
RPP99	0.19559	DLP99	0.23034	DLP99	-0.00067
TPP87	0.16233	DLP95	0.22432	WP95	-0.03689
TPP99	0.08434	RPP95	0.19928	DLP95	-0.04389
SDPP91	0.05025	MP95	0.18374	DLP91	-0.05117
MP91	0.00554	VP99	0.17846	DLP87	-0.05909
MP95	-0.00188	WP95	0.16180	PDP95	-0.07834
PDP95	-0.20220	RPP99	0.07719	VP99	-0.11210
MP87	-0.21755	MP91	0.05306	PDP99	-0.13218
PDP99	-0.23597	TPP99	-0.01286	TPP95	-0.28033
NAP99	-0.25131	MP99	-0.03598	MP91	-0.29897
NAP95	-0.28891	DLP87	-0.27118	WP87	-0.31379
<b>NWP87</b>	<b>-0.55610</b>	<b>SDPP87</b>	<b>-0.33160</b>	TPP99	-0.36701
<b>WP87</b>	<b>-0.73020</b>	WP87	-0.39845	MP95	-0.43178
<b>VP99</b>	<b>-0.83050</b>	<b>SDPP91</b>	<b>-0.68310</b>	MP99	-0.49432
<b>WP95</b>	<b>-0.89650</b>	<b>PDP95</b>	<b>-0.86470</b>	<b>TPP91</b>	<b>-0.50850</b>
<b>WP91</b>	<b>-0.90760</b>	<b>PDP99</b>	<b>-0.86860</b>	<b>TPP87</b>	<b>-0.59760</b>
Percentage of variance explained					
28.27		19.08		16.76	

Source: Calculated by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 15.10.1961, 10.10.1965, 12.10.1969, 14.10.1973, 05.06.1977*

[diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 24.12.1995* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 18.04.1999* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2000).

*Notes:* Entries are varimax factor loadings calculated from the percentages of votes that each political party received in the provinces during the 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, and 1999 general elections. Factor loadings equal to or above 0.50 (or below -0.50) are indicated in bold characters. Acronyms of the political parties are as follows:

WP=Welfare Party: pro-Islamic.

VP=Virtue Party: pro-Islamic, succeeding the WP.

MP=Motherland Party: center-right.

TPP=True Path Party: center-right.

DLP=Democratic Left Party: center-left.

SDPP=Social Democratic Populist Party: center-left and supported by *Alevi* sect Muslims; succeeded by the RPP; allied with the pro-Kurdish People's Labor Party for the 1991 election.

RPP=Republican People's Party: center-left, succeeding the SDPP.

NWP=Nationalist Work Party: far right, succeeded by the NAP.

NAP=Nationalist Action Party: far right, succeeding the NWP.

PDP=People's Democracy Party: pro-Kurdish.

The three factors were extracted due to the following two criteria. First, if an eigenvalue falls steeply after the  $n$ th factor, then the  $n+1$ th and the following factors should be excluded. For this study,  $n$  was four (See the table below). Second, each factor should contain at least three variables (=party votes in a given election) whose factor loadings are above 0.5 or below  $-0.5$  and which have not been contained in the higher-order factors. Among the four factors extracted by the first criterion, the fourth factor was discarded due to the second criterion.

**Table 12. Eigenvalues of the Reduced Correlation Matrix**

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Eigenvalue	6.79	4.59	4.03	3.12	1.67	1.22	0.78	0.62	0.35	0.23	0.17	0.13	0.11


*Source:* Compiled by the author. See Table 11.

The geographical distribution (by province) of each factor is shown in Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10. Ergüder and Hofferbert<sup>150</sup> already demonstrated for the pre-1980 (1965-1977) period that voting variations across provinces in Turkey depended on the periphery-center, left-right, and anti-systemic factors. The “periphery” end of the first factor represented the less developed Kurdish region. The “left” end of the second factor reflected support for the secular Republican People's

<sup>150</sup> Ergüder and Hofferbert, “The 1983 General Elections in Turkey.”

Party coming from the *Alevi* sect. The one-tailed anti-systemic factor more strongly embodied far-right, i.e., religious and nationalistic votes than far-left votes.<sup>151</sup>

**Figure 8. Factor 1: Secular-religious**




*Source:* This map and the following two maps were compiled by the author from the data sources shown in Table 11.

*Note:* The map shows factor loadings by province.


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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 91-93. Çarkoğlu and Gamze Avcı conducted a factor analysis for the 1950-1999 period, without distinguishing the pre- and post-1980 periods, and extracted five factors, i.e., 1) center-left vs. religious right, 2) center vs. periphery, 3) Turkish nationalist vs. Kurdish support, 4) marginalism, 5) center-right vs. minor personalistic right-wing. See Ali Çarkoğlu and Gamze Avcı, “An Analysis of the Electorate from a Geographical Perspective,” in *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey*, eds. Sabri Sayari and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). Theoretically, this is a more logical approach. The characterization of each factor, however, seems to have become blurred. This is because the analysis included many parties of different inclinations that emerged and disappeared over the years. The definition of common denominators, or factors, thus became broad rather than specific.

**Figure 9. Factor 2: Turks-Kurds**



**Figure 10. Factor 3: Alevi**



Thus, despite different wordings, both the pre- and post-1980 factors suggest that devout Sunnis, ethnic Kurds, and the *Alevi* sect form major social cleavages in Turkey. First, while the overwhelming majority of the Turks are Sunni Muslims, those who support the introduction of Islamic law form a tiny minority.<sup>152</sup> Second, ethnic Kurds are the largest ethnic group in Turkey. The majority of them are Muslims, while they are divided into Sunnis and *Alevi*s just as non-Kurdish Turks are. Although no official statistics have been taken for ethnicity in Turkey since 1965, those whose mother tongue was the Kurdish language were estimated to account for 12.6 percent of the population as of 1990.<sup>153</sup> Third, the *Alevi*s are a mosaic of different nonorthodox or secular Muslims. The majority of *Alevi*s denies strict adherence to the Koran and also shows leniency to different religions.<sup>154</sup> Individual surveys give supportive evidence to the above relationships between voter characteristics and party preference.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Results of the survey conducted in 1999 for 3054 respondents in 16 provinces showed that support for an Islamic state was 21.2 percent. Support rates became even lower when concrete questions were asked such as Islamic-law divorce (14.0 percent), a smaller inheritance share for daughters (13.9 percent), polygamy (10.7 percent), and Koranic punishment for adultery (1.4 percent). See Binnaz Toprak ve Ali Çarkoğlu, *Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV), 2000).

<sup>153</sup> Servet Mutlu, “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996), 517-541.

<sup>154</sup> Faruk Bilici categorized them into four groups. Mystic *Alevi*ism emphasizes compassion over piety and accommodates people of different religious origins. The members of a second group consider themselves as within Islam but bring about a contemporary interpretation to the Kuran. They also seek representation in the state organ for religious affairs. A third new group is closer to Shiism and Twelve Imams, partly influenced by Revolutionary Iran. The fourth group includes Marxist *Alevi*s that also embraced Kurdish nationalism. The last two groups, however, form a small minority. See Faruk Bilici, “Alevi-Bektaşî İlahiyatının Günümüz Türkiye’sindeki İşlevi,” in *Alevi Kimliği*, eds. Tord Olsson, Elizabeth Özdalga, and Catharina Raudvere, trans. Bilge Kurt Torun ve Hayati Torun, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı (Istanbul: Numune Matbaacılık, 1999), 68-73. Bozarslan also emphasizes that Alevism is a community-based political formation that emerged due to competition with political Islam and Kurdish nationalism. See Hamit Bozarslan, “Alevism and the Myths of Research,” in Paul J. White and Joost Jongerden, eds. *Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 13.

<sup>155</sup> Erder’s survey in 1996 ( $N=2,396$ ) indicated that the *Alevi* voters most strongly supported the Republican People’s Party (34.4 percent) compared with the total average support of 5.5 percent for the same party. The Kurdish voters distinctly and strongly supported the People’s Democracy Party (17.4 percent) compared with total average support of 2.0 percent for the same party. They also strongly supported the Welfare Party (28.8 percent) but the total average support for the same party was also as high as 22.2 percent. Devout Muslims predominantly supported the Welfare Party. Among the respondents who wanted Islamic law (22.2 percent of the total respondents), 52.3 percent supported the Welfare Party. See Erder, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Parti*

## 6.2 Operationalizing the Social Cleavages

In order to test the above claim that these social cleavages affected voting behavior, the factor score for each of the six factors (by province for the pre- and post-1980 periods) was regressed against the three social cleavages that were operationalized in the following manner.

First, Sunni religiosity was measured by the percentage of *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* (clergy high school) junior students to the total junior high school students by province calculated from the State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *National Education Statistics: Formal Education, 1992-1993* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistic, 1995). This indicator was chosen because *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* is recognized by society as institutionalized Sunni religiosity and reflects societal support for religious values.

The original form of *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* was established in 1924 originally to produce prayer leaders and preachers. Since the 1960s, however, the number of *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* and their students began to increase. The school began to admit even girls, who could not become prayer leaders or preachers. The school thus virtually became a general, not professional, high school that taught both general and religious subjects. The Ministry of Education in 1975 allowed *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* graduates to apply for the theology faculty of a university. Moreover, in 1983 the military government amended the National Education Basic Law to enable the graduates to apply for any faculty. For these reasons, pious Sunni parents send their children to *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* so that the children can acquire both modern science and religious knowledge. By the 1990s, the number of its students reached one-tenth of the total high school students. Only one-tenth of the graduates become clergies.<sup>156</sup>

It is true that statistics on *İmam-Hatip Lisesi*, Koran course<sup>157</sup> students, or religious associations capture only the formal aspect of religiosity in Turkey.<sup>158</sup> The informal

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*Seçmenlerinin Nitelikleri, Kimlikleri ve Eğilimleri*, 117 and 162.

<sup>156</sup> Doğan Duman, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık* (Izmir: Eylül, 1997), 150-180; Zekai Baloğlu, *Türkiye'de Eğitim* (Istanbul: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, 1990), 132-139; A. Baki Mert and Çınar Bahçacı, *Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi* (Ankara: Türk Demokrasi Vakfı, 1995). With the introduction of eight-year compulsory education in 1997, the junior section of *İmam-Hatip Lisesi* was abolished and its graduates became almost unable to enter faculties other than the theology faculty, due to a 0.3 coefficient applied to the scores of examinations outside one's own specialization. The above data, however, was taken before the education reform.

<sup>157</sup> For Koran courses, see Duman, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık*, 181-197.

<sup>158</sup> Ahmet N. Yücekök, *Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-ekonomik Tabanı (1946-1968)*,

aspect of religiosity such as *tarikât* (Sufi) membership however, substantially overlaps with Kurdish ethnicity.<sup>159</sup> When a hierarchical linear model was run with Murat Şeker's data ( $N=10,662$ )<sup>160</sup> on *tarikât* membership (by region) and Kurdish ethnicity (by province) as independent variables, the *tarikât* membership variable became an insignificant predictor of any inter-bloc volatility. It is thus more reasonable explicitly to treat formal religiosity as one of the three independent variables and then let the next Kurdish ethnicity variable implicitly reflect informal religiosity.

Second, Kurdish ethnicity was measured by the logged percentage of the Kurdish population to the total population in a province as of 1965 and 1990. Servet Mutlu<sup>161</sup> extrapolated the latter data from the former data and inter-provincial migration flows published by the SIS. (Since 1965, there have been no official statistics on mother tongues of the Turkish citizens.) On Mutlu's data, a logarithmic transformation was used to reduce the positive skew of the sample.<sup>162</sup> This step helps to bring possible heteroscedasticity under control. The 1965 statistic was used for the analysis of the pre-1980 period and the 1990 statistic for that of the post-1980 period. For the analysis of the entire period, the mean of the two statistics was used.

Third, *Alevi* sectarianism was measured by the log-transformed number of *Alevi* villages from the mid-1960s to the 1970s.<sup>163</sup> The author calculated the number of *Alevi* villages from various tables compiled by Peter Andrews.<sup>164</sup> The major source of these tables is the Village Inventory Survey published in 1965 by the Ministry of Village Affairs. Since then, data that referred to the dominant ethnicity of the village

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Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları No. 323 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971); Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: the Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany : State University of New York Press, 1989).

<sup>159</sup> Murat Şeker, "Türkiye'de Tarikatlar" Unpublished paper (ca.1998).

<sup>160</sup> Prof. Murat Şeker kindly provided his cross-tabulated data for the author. The date of research was not specified.

<sup>161</sup> Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey."

<sup>162</sup> Rae R. Newton and Kjell Erik Rudestam, *Your Statistical Consultant: Answers to Your Data Analysis Questions* (Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage, 1999), 173-177.

<sup>163</sup> In the process of transformation, a numerical value of one was added to the actual number of *Alevi* villages since a zero cannot be logged. The number of villages was not standardized by the total number of villages or the population in the province. Such standardization would overkill the original statistic.

<sup>164</sup> Peter Alford Andrews, ed., *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey* (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert, 1989).

have not been published (The other sources are various village surveys by individual researchers).

In 21 provinces, no *Alevi* villages were recorded. In most of these cases, such as Bolu, Bursa, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Hakkari, Kastamonu, Kocaeli, Rize, Sakarya, Sinop it appeared that there were really no or very few *Alevi* villages. In the other few cases, the Village Inventory Survey did not use the sectarian category that was used for other provinces. In these cases, the Survey identified all the villages as Muslim villages. The lack of mention of *Alevi* villages in Çankırı and Muş, where a tangible proportion of the population is considered to consist of *Alevi*s, makes one wonder the authorities concerned avoided supplying this information due to the sensitivity of sectarian divisions in the province.<sup>165</sup>

In the current study, the lack of reporting was recorded as zero value for the following reasons. For the *Alevi* village data, intentional suppression of the *Alevi* identity of any village seemed relatively rare, probably about five provinces, or less than ten percent of the sample. A deletion of the provinces for which no *Alevi* villages were recorded thus would lead to a serious loss of information and, more specifically, to an overestimation of the number of *Alevi* villages.

The demographic data described above indicated that the three social groups were the major determinants of social cleavages in Turkey. Table 13 shows that religiosity, ethnicity, and sectarianism were varyingly correlated with factors for the pre- and post-1980 voting patterns. The demographic data also showed that the relative distribution of social cleavages across provinces did not fundamentally change over time. It appears that the relative distribution of the logged Kurdish population by province, for instance, had remained very stable from 1965 to 1990 ( $r=0.8591$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ). Social cleavage data for the 1960s, such as the *Alevi* village data, thus would not appreciably mislead the inter-provincial analysis of electoral volatility in the 1990s. Similarly, previous studies treated social cleavages as a relatively long-term variable (the change of which is usually measured at intervals of one decade<sup>166</sup> or more<sup>167</sup>).

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<sup>165</sup> There is a solution to missing data problems in general. See Gary King, et al., “Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data,” *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001), 49-69. Such a solution, however, is useful only when there are several variables in the data so that the missing value of any variable can be estimated from other variables that are more or less correlated with it. The problem for this study is that it is not certain whether the data were missing or it had a zero value.

<sup>166</sup> Franklin, et al., *Electoral Change*.

<sup>167</sup> Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*.

**Table 13. Factor Structures and Cleavages, 1961-1999 (N=67)**

Dependent variable: factor		Independent variables <sup>b</sup> : cleavages			Regression results		White test <sup>c</sup> :
		Religiosity	Ethnicity	Sectarianism	Adj R-sq	F Value	p<chisq
Pre-1980	Center-periphery	-0.065	-0.820***	0.178**	0.626	37.777***	0.363
	Left-right	-0.283**	-0.252**	0.354***	0.211	6.890***	0.146
	Anti-systemic <sup>a</sup>	0.365***	0.110	0.345***	0.150	4.878***	0.208
Post-1980	Secular-religious	-0.467***	-0.639***	-0.006	0.323	11.493***	0.740
	Turkish-Kurdish	0.262**	-0.475***	0.286***	0.381	14.537***	0.359
	<i>Alevi</i> <sup>a</sup>	-0.216**	0.052	0.571***	0.428	17.440***	0.356

*Source*: Calculated by the author from Appendix IV and the same data sources as in Table 11. The author calculated factor scores for the pre-1980 factors, which were not reported by Ergüder and Hofferbert. Also, they did not include the results of the 1961 election.

*Notes*: Entries are standardized regression coefficients. Regressions were run with each of the six factors as the dependent variable and the three social cleavages as independent variables. The theoretical model is as follows:

$$F_n = a + b_1REL + b_2ETH + b_3SEC + e$$

where  $F_n$  is the  $n$ th of the six factors extracted for the pre- and post-1980 periods, REL is Sunni religiosity, ETH is Kurdish ethnicity, SEC is *Alevi* sectarianism,  $a$  is the estimated intercept,  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3$  are estimated partial slopes, and  $e$  is the error term.

<sup>a</sup> One-tailed.

<sup>b</sup> Multicollinearity was not detected for any of the independent variables. The largest value of the variance inflation factor (VIF) was 1.306. Multicollinearity is suspected if VIF exceeds 10.

<sup>c</sup> The White test (of first and second moment specification) rejected the null hypothesis (the presence of heteroscedasticity) for both regressions.

\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

### 6.3 Cleavages and Long-term Volatility

Do social cleavages play an anchoring role in the electoral behavior in Turkey? Multiple regressions were run between the three social cleavages and each cleavage-type volatility that was standardized<sup>168</sup> and averaged out for the 1965-2002 period. The results, shown in Table 14, revealed that 1) Sunni religiosity raised systemic volatility, 2) Kurdish ethnicity raised both left-right and systemic volatilities,

<sup>168</sup> Standardization neutralized the variation of national electoral volatility from year to year. Volatility for each year thus have equal weight throughout the period under investigation.

and 3) *Alevi* sectarianism reduced left-right volatility.

**Table 14. Social Cleavages and Cleavage-type Volatilities, 1965-2002 (N=67)**

	DV: Cleavage-type volatility <sup>b</sup>		VIF <sup>c</sup>
	Left-right	Systemic	
IVs: Social Cleavages <sup>a</sup>			
Sunni religiosity	-0.173*	0.331***	1.275
Kurdish ethnicity	0.268**	0.396***	1.239
<i>Alevi</i> sectarianism	-0.391***	-0.044	1.064
Adjusted R-square	0.192	0.116	
<i>F</i> value	6.21***	3.87***	
White test <sup>d</sup> : $p < \chi^2$	7.72	6.13	

*Source*: Calculated by the author from data shown in Table 13.

*Notes*: Two multiple regressions were run. Entries are *t* values for multiple regression coefficients.

<sup>a</sup> One pole of the social cleavage dimension. For instance, Sunni religiosity forms one end of the “devout Sunnis vs. others” cleavage dimension.

<sup>b</sup> Standardized period mean.

\*  $p < 0.10$ .

\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

<sup>c</sup> Multicollinearity is suspected if the variance inflation factor (VIF) exceeds 10.

<sup>d</sup> The White test (of first and second moment specification) rejected the null hypothesis (the presence of heteroscedasticity) for both regressions.

These results seem to correspond to the general picture of Turkish politics for the last four decades. The effect of each cleavage on cleavage-type can be explained by the following evidence. First, the positive effect of Sunni religiosity on systemic volatility suggests that devout Sunni voters tend to shift their support from center-right parties to far-right (pro-Islamic or nationalistic) parties and vice versa. In Turkey, most of the vote swings on the systemic dimension have been triggered by the emergence or decline of far-right parties such as the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Republican Peasant Nation Party, and the Nationalist Action Party during the pre-1980 period and the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, the Justice and Development Party, the Happiness Party, and the Nationalist Action Party, during the post-1980 period. The most significant split of the Turkish right, dominated until then by the Justice Party, arose when its religious conservatives formed the National Order Party in 1970, to be succeeded by the National Salvation Party. Feroz Ahmad asserted that these parties represented the small bourgeoisie in Central Anatolia that increasingly felt neglected by the Justice Party representing the

interests of large industrial capitalists.<sup>169</sup>

In order to test the above interpretation, let us define 1) far-right volatility as the inter-bloc volatility between the far-right parties and the other parties and 2) far-left volatility as the inter-bloc volatility between the far-left parties and the other parties. Mean far-right/far-left volatility for the 1965-2002 period is used here as the variable to be correlated with the Sunni-religiosity variable. The partial correlation analysis, applied to the above data with Kurdish ethnicity and *Alevi* sectarianism controlled for, showed that Sunni religiosity was positively correlated with (period-mean) far-right volatility ( $r=0.284$ ,  $p<0.05$ ) but not with (period-mean) far-left volatility. In other words, the stronger the Sunni religiosity in the province, the more likely it is for religious or nationalistic parties to trigger electoral volatility.

Second, for Kurdish ethnicity, until 1990 there had been no Kurdish party that appealed to Kurdish ethnic identity. This lack of structural bondage to any political party, together with a significant size of bloc votes that Kurdish clans were able to mobilize, gave rise to large vote swings along both left-right and systemic dimensions. It has been claimed that Kurdish clans change support from one party to another depending on their own political and economic interests. Martin van Bruinessen using examples from Hakkari Province and Şırnak Municipality showed how clan rivalries affected voting practice in the Kurdish region. One alliance of clans would vote for one of the two rival parties while the other alliance would vote for the other party.<sup>170</sup> Clan leaders were sometimes elected as independents during the pre-1980 period,<sup>171</sup> when the electoral law allowed better chances for independents than during the post-1980 period.

Indeed, a cursory review of the pre-1980 electoral results indicated a significant size of bloc votes that local leaders were able to mobilize. There were more changes in the first party in the Kurd-populated provinces<sup>172</sup> than elsewhere (Table 15). The

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<sup>169</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977), 245.

<sup>170</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 75-76 for Hakkari Province and 313-314 for Şırnak Municipality.

<sup>171</sup> Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*.

<sup>172</sup> Kurd-populated provinces were conventionally defined here as the provinces in which the Kurdish population accounted for more than 40 percent of the total provincial population. The Turkish provinces classified by the percentage of the Kurdish population consist of two groups, one with a population below 30 percent and the other with a population above 40 percent..

results of the Wilcoxon test showed that the median number of defeats of the first party during the pre-1980 period was higher in the Kurd-populated provinces than in the other provinces ( $Z=2.8192$ ,  $p<0.0048$ ). This result does not necessarily contradict the assumption that the fewer seats<sup>173</sup> in the Kurd-populated (and sparsely populated) provinces than in the other provinces should give the incumbent representatives a greater advantage over their challengers.

Rather, more frequent changes in the first party *despite* the greater incumbent advantage in the Kurd-populated provinces than elsewhere, suggest that the incumbents, or the local power behind the incumbents, changed their support from one party to another.<sup>174</sup> For ideological fluidity in the Kurd-populated region, changes in the first party in the Kurd-populated provinces reflected disarrays of parties, from left to right and from large to small. In particular, the first party of the province seldom coincided with the first party of the nation. In the other provinces, the patterns for the first party were more consistent. Their first parties either defied contenders or came and went due to the national electoral swing.

**Table 15: Defeats of the First Party in the Province, 1965-1977 (N=67)**

Population Kurdish (%)	<i>n</i>	Number of defeats					
		0	1	2	3	4	Median
>40	13	0	4	4	2	3	2
40	54	14	18	18	4	0	1
Total	67	14	22	22	6	3	1

Source: Calculated by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 15.10.1961, 10.10.1965, 12.10.1969, 14.10.1973, 05.06.1977* [diskette]: (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998); Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey."

Note:  $Z=2.8192$ ;  $p<0.0048$  (Wilcoxon test for the difference between two medians).

During the post-1980 period, however, bloc votes in the Kurd-populated region almost disappeared (Table 16). The results of the Wilcoxon test showed that the number of defeats of the first party in the province was *smaller* in the Kurd-populated region than elsewhere ( $Z=-2.7344$ ,  $p<0.0063$ ). The pre-1980

<sup>173</sup> Under proportional representation in Turkey, the number of seats for the province is basically determined by the population size.

<sup>174</sup> In fact, the few cases of less frequent changes in the first party in the Kurd-populated provinces are largely due to the reelection of the independent candidates, which can seldom be found elsewhere. This fact confirms incumbent advantage in the dominantly Kurdish provinces.

tendency thus had been reversed, mainly due to the growing strength of the pro-Kurdish PDP/DPP that garnered consistent popular support since 1995, which will be discussed in the next section.

**Table 16. Defeats of the First Party in the Province, 1991-2002 (N=67)**

Population Kurdish (%)	<i>n</i>	Number of defeats						Median
		0	1	2	3	4		
>40	13	1	3	4	4	1	2	
40	54	0	5	6	30	13	3	
Total	67	1	8	10	34	14	3	

Source: Calculated and compiled by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 06.11.1983, 29.11.1987, 20.10.1991, 24.12.1995* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1998); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 18.04.1999* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2000); State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Results of General Election of Representatives: 2002* [diskette] (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2003); Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey."

Notes:  $Z=-2.7344$ ;  $p<0.0063$  (Wilcoxon test for the difference between two medians).

Third, the negative effect of *Alevi* sectarianism on left-right volatility indicates the existence of a consistent *Alevi* support for secularist parties that are characterized as left. The *Alevi*s have historically supported secular political parties as a protection against Sunni majority oppression. These secular parties consisted of the Republican People's Party (center-left), the Turkish Labor Party (far-left), the Turkish Union Party (far-left and pro-*Alevi*) during the pre-1980 period, the Social Democratic Populist Party/ Republican People's Party (center-left) during the post-1980 period.<sup>175</sup> However, the *Alevi* vs. non-*Alevi* cleavage has not appreciably affected systemic volatility, since these secular parties included both pro-systemic (center-left) and anti-systemic (far-left) parties, as mentioned above.


<sup>175</sup> Dankwart A. Rustow, "Political Parties in Turkey: An Overview," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Heper and Landau, 16; Harald Schuler, *Türkiye'de Sosyal Demokrasi: Particilik Hemşehrilik Alevilik* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1999), 159-171; Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurds, Turks and the *Alevi* Revival in Turkey," *Middle East Report* 26: 3 (1996), 7-10; Ayşe Ayata, "The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17 (Fall 1997), 65-69.

## 6.4 Cleavages and Short-term Volatility

The preceding long-term analysis showed, first, that left-right volatility increased by Kurdish ethnicity but decreased by *Alevi* sectarianism. Second, systemic volatility increased by Sunni religiosity as well as by Kurdish ethnicity. Have these relationships been stable over the past four decades? Multiple regressions were run for each election between social cleavages and left-right volatility (Figure 11) as well as systemic volatility (Figure 12). These graphs seem to allow for both general and specific interpretations in terms of temporal changes in the relationship between cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities.

Generally, the pre-1980 period and the post-1980 period showed similar patterns. The positive (reinforcing) effect of cleavages on volatility was stronger in the second and/or third free election since each military intervention. In the subsequent elections, the effect of cleavages became either more weakly positive or insignificant, or even negative. In other words, as elections were repeated, the party system seemed to become better able to accommodate and represent social cleavages. The most distinct examples of such elections were the last two elections in 1999 and 2002.


**Figure 11. Left-right Volatility and Social Cleavages 1965-2002 (N=67)**



Source: Calculated by the author from the data sources shown in Table 13.

Note: Entries are  $t$  values for multiple regression coefficients.  $p(t = \pm 1.96) = 0.05$ .

**Figure 12. Systemic Volatility and Social Cleavages. 1965-2002 (N=67)**



Source: Calculated by the author from data shown in Table 13.

Note: Entries are  $t$  values for multiple regression coefficients.  $p(t = \pm 1.96) = 0.05$ .

The last two elections indicate more strongly than before a consolidating process for the Turkish party system. In both elections, first, left-right volatility was *reduced* (not increased) by Sunni religiosity and Kurdish ethnicity. Second, systemic volatility was *not* increased (either unaffected or even reduced) by either Sunni religiosity or Kurdish ethnicity. Third, *Alevi* sectarianism not only retained its stabilizing effect on left-right volatility but also more or less to reduced *systemic* volatility. The emerging change in the relationships between cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities that became evident first in 1999, thus implies that the Turkish party system has become more anchored to major social cleavages than ever before.

Phenomenally speaking, the early 1990s saw the resurgence of the pro-Islamic party (Welfare/Virtue Party) and the emergence of the pro-Kurdish party (People's Labor/Democracy/People's Democracy Party). Since the late 1990s, these parties have consolidated their electoral support from the provinces where Sunni religiosity and Kurdish ethnicity were strong, respectively. This electoral alignment took the form of the relative retreat of the pro-Islamic party in the Kurd-populated provinces while concentrating its power in Central Anatolia where Sunni religiosity is strong.

As Table 17 shows, since the late 1990s, Sunni religiosity and Kurdish ethnicity have thus each become more strongly associated with support for the pro-Islamic party and the pro-Kurdish party, respectively, than before. In the mean time, the center-left party with an *Alevi* constituency has continued its reliance on the *Alevi* votes in the post-1980 period.

**Table 17. Correlations between Cleavages and Party Votes, 1987-2002 (N=67)**

Cleavage	Party votes	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002
Religiosity	WP/VP/JDP+HP and NWP/NAP <sup>a</sup>	0.032	0.269 <sup>**</sup>	0.234 <sup>*</sup>	0.390 <sup>***</sup>	0.507 <sup>***</sup>
Ethnicity	SDPP/PDP <sup>b</sup>	—	0.468 <sup>***</sup>	0.577 <sup>***</sup>	0.615 <sup>***</sup>	0.701 <sup>***</sup>
Sectarianism	SDPP/RPP <sup>c</sup>	0.503 <sup>***</sup>	0.295 <sup>**d</sup>	0.616 <sup>***</sup>	0.669 <sup>***</sup>	0.378 <sup>***</sup>

*Source:* Calculated by the author from the data sources shown in Table 13.

*Notes:* Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients.

<sup>a</sup> The combined votes of 1) the pro-Islamic Welfare/Virtue Party/Justice and Development+Happiness Parties and 2) the nationalistic Nationalist Work/Nationalist Action Party. These parties appeal to religious voters though the former more strongly than the latter.

<sup>b</sup> For 1991, the Social Democratic Populist Party, which formed an electoral alliance with its splinter party, the People's Labor Party. For 1995 and 1999, the People's Democracy Party, which was formed after the successor to the People's Labor Party was disbanded. For 2002, Democratic People's Party, which was formed in anticipation of the abolition of its successor, the People's Democracy Party.

<sup>c</sup> For 1987 and 1991, the Social Democratic Populist and for 1995, 1999, and 2002, the Republican People's Party. It is true that part of the *Alevi* enclaves in Turkey, mainly those in Central Anatolia overlap with strongholds of the Nationalist Work/Nationalist Action party. But the correlation of the *Alevi* sectarianism cleavage with SDPP/RPP votes was much stronger than its correlation with NWP/NAP votes. The latter relationship became statistically insignificant when the SDPP/RPP votes were controlled for. For all the post-1980 elections, DLP vote percentages and *Alevi* sectarianism were not correlated at a statistically significant level.

<sup>d</sup> This temporary weakening in the correlation reflects the electoral alliance between the SDPP and the pro-Kurdish PLP. The DLP, the other center-left party, probably did not appreciably affect this relationship. While the DLP's vote percentage steadily rose from 1991 to 1999, the above relationship weakened only for 1991.

## 6.5 Summary

This chapter has corroborated the national trend shown in the Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 that social cleavages are becoming less responsible for electoral volatility. Three major social cleavages in Turkey on the whole have increased cleavage-type volatility rather than reduced it during the last four decades: 1) Sunni religiosity

raised systemic volatility and 2) Kurdish ethnicity raised both left-right and systemic volatilities while 3) *Alevi* sectarianism reduced left-right volatility. These relationships, however, have changed over time. It appears that both during the pre-1980 (1961-1977) period and the post-1980 (1987-2002) period, repeated elections since each civilian transition had mitigated this general tendency by strengthening the ties between political parties and cleavage groups. Although the 1980 military intervention aborted the earlier development of party-cleavage nexus during the pre-1980 period, the post-1980 period has witnessed a stabilization of the relationship between cleavages and political parties, especially since the late 1990s. In other words, social cleavages and the party system in Turkey seem to be heading for convergence.

## CHAPTER 7: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND VOLATILITY

While the Turkish party system has been recently anchored to major social cleavages, as the preceding chapter has shown, total electoral volatility in Turkey has not declined correspondingly. This is because the electoral volatility stemming from retrospective voting has increased especially since the 1990s (Figure 2 and Figure 3). The retrospective voting model in general assumes that the electorate evaluates the incumbent by economic performance in the recent past, as the Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 has shown. Does this model apply to Turkey?

This chapter investigates the relationship between change in macroeconomic variables (per capita real GNP, unemployment, and inflation) and change in support for the incumbent party/parties. The first part of the chapter discusses how to choose and to compile dependent and independent variables. Second, the retrospective voting model thus derived is applied to the time-series analysis. The third part tests for individual elections the cross-sectional model of retrospective voting with the province as the unit of analysis. The results show that 1) in the time-series analysis, change in per capita real GNP and unemployment, but not inflation, affects change in incumbent votes, and 2) in the cross-sectional analysis, retrospective voting is observed in only those cases in which major assumptions for the retrospective voting model (such as diminishing incumbent votes and full or long incumbency) are met.

### 7.1 The Choice of the Dependent Variable: Support or Swing?


The retrospective voting model posits that people make voting decisions according to the past performance of the incumbent. The model, whether time-series or cross-sectional, measures the relationship between (change in) the governing party's/parties' vote percentage in the present election and economic indicators or voters perception of economic conditions in the last twelve months or less before the election. This study chose as the dependent variable change in the party's/parties' vote percentage between two consecutive elections, hereafter called "vote swing," which constitutes the dominant portion of electoral volatility.

There are both conceptual and methodological reasons why the dependent

variable for this study should be change, not level. Conceptually, the major concern of this study is voters' reaction to the government performance, or the cost of ruling (the incumbent vote swing),<sup>176</sup> rather than the level of incumbent support. Methodologically, the clear declining trend that existed in incumbent votes required data transformation by differentiation. The following paragraphs explain the reasons for and the processes of data transformation.

When dealing with time series data for a linear regression, it is necessary, first of all, to check whether the dependent variable is influenced by time. Linear regressions assume constant mean and variance for the error term, which is the difference between the real and the predicted value of the dependent variable. Time series data often violates this “stationarity” assumption, due to the very nature that the value at the present time point often strongly depends on the value at the previous time point.

**Figure 13. Votes for the Incumbent Party/Parties, 1950-1995**



Source: Compiled by the author from Çarkoğlu, “Macro Economic Determinants of Electoral Support for Incumbents in Turkey.”

The unit-root test shows whether the mean and variance of the data significantly vary across time. If that is the case, the data is called nonstationary. Nonstationary

<sup>176</sup> Harvey D. Palmer and Guy D. Whitten, “Economics, Politics, and the Cost of Ruling in Advanced Industrial Democracies: How Much Does Context Matter?” in *Economic Voting*, eds. Dorussen and Taylor, 73.

data is strongly autocorrelated with its first lag. The vote data, used by Çarkoğlu, that represented the level of support for the incumbent party/parties in various elections<sup>177</sup> had a clear declining trend and thus was nonstationary (Figure 13). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root test, when applied to this time series data, failed to reject the null hypothesis that the time series was nonstationary ( $p=0.272$ ). The vote data thus violated the stationarity assumption for the time-series dependent variable.

Conventionally, nonstationary data can be transformed into stationary data by differentiation. For this study, however, it is more appropriate to use the vote swing for the incumbent party/parties between two consecutive elections (Figure 14) rather than the difference between incumbent vote<sub>*t*</sub> and incumbent vote<sub>*t-1*</sub> since incumbents may change between two elections (at time *t* and time *t-1*). The results of the ADF test suggested<sup>178</sup> that the new time series thus created was stationary ( $p=0.01$ , maximum lag=5), with the mean and variance constant and independent of time.<sup>179</sup>


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<sup>177</sup> The elections included general elections and by-elections of the national assembly, elections of the senate, and general elections and by-elections of local governments.

<sup>178</sup> Probabilities and critical values may not be accurate for this sample size of 17 since these values were calculated for 20 observations, the minimal number for the *t*-test table of the ADF test.

<sup>179</sup> The value for the 17th observation (for 2002) seems to be far from the mean. The following analysis shows, however, that the exclusion of the 17th observation does not change the overall results.

**Figure 14. Vote Swing\* for the Incumbent Party/Parties, 1950-2002**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix VI.

*Note:* Compared with Çarkoğlu's article, the number of observations is smaller since they excluded senate elections and by-elections (both parliamentary and local) although they included more recent 1999 and 2002 general elections.

\* Change in the incumbent vote percentage.

When stationarity is confirmed, the second step is to check autocorrelation by correlogram. Whereas the unit-root test ensures that the autocorrelation of the time series data is not seriously high (lower than one), the correlogram analysis measures the degree of autocorrelation. The correlogram of the vote swing data revealed no statistically significant autocorrelation for any of its lags. It is justifiable then to use the vote swing data as the dependent variable. The time-series multiple regression, when applied to the data set for which the vote data was replaced with the vote swing data, showed that none of the independent variables, i.e., per capita GNP percent change, the unemployment rate, and the inflation rate were related to change in electoral support for the incumbent party/parties.

## 7.2 Per Capita Economic Growth Rate: Fluctuations

As the dependent variable needs careful scrutiny, so do the independent variables, which in this study were represented by economic indicators. Regression analysis in theory postulates no assumptions on the distribution of independent variables. In

practice, however, trends and fluctuations in time-series independent variables can blur their relationships with the dependent variable.<sup>180</sup> It is also necessary in the beginning to ensure that economic data are measured consistently over time. An examination of time series data for per capita real economic growth, inflation, and unemployment revealed that these variables could not be used for analysis without having been modified.

First, for Turkey, the last year value of economic growth *cannot* always be a good measurement of voter grievances. The reason lies in a highly erratic economic growth in Turkey,<sup>181</sup> compared with major Western democracies (Figure 15 and Figure 16). A sudden jump in economic growth in the election year does not significantly calm voter resentment that has been accumulated in the previous years of stagnant or negative economic growth.<sup>182</sup> In the Western democracies, however, the real per capita economic growth rate already reflected a significant part of its previous value. The degree of association between the present year's value and the previous value can be measured by autocorrelation coefficients. The correlograms of real economic growth data for the Western democracies shown in Figure 17 revealed that for almost all countries, the series were positively autocorrelated with (at least) its first lag, the value for the previous year. But for Turkey, the autocorrelation coefficient was statistically insignificant with a negative sign.


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<sup>180</sup> This is the case when the dependent variable is free from or properly cleaned of any trend if one existed. In contrast, the regression of a trend-stationary dependent variable (which contains a trend) with trend-stationary independent variables is likely to display a spurious relationship.

<sup>181</sup> The ADF test showed that time-series data for per capita real GNP in Turkey were stationary.


<sup>182</sup> The most conspicuous example is the general election in November 2002. Although the rate of real GDP per capita was 6.2 percent in the election year, the voters punished the government with an unprecedented loss of votes at 38.8 percent points. This is mainly because per capita real GDP fell from the inaugural year to the election year (the accumulated yearly changes being -3.1 percent) for the first time under any government in the post-Second World War period. For this calculation, GDP was used instead of GNP, the data of which was not yet available for 2002. Real GDP per capita was calculated by the author from IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, CD-Rom, October 2003.

**Figure 15. Per Capita Real Economic Growth Rate, Western Democracies and Turkey, 1961-2002**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics* [CD-Rom] (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2003).  
*Note:* Due to the availability of comparable data, economic growth is measured by GDP.

**Figure 16. Standard Deviation of the Per Capita Real Economic Growth Rate (%) , Western Democracies and Turkey for 1961-2002**



Source: See Figure 15.

Note: Due to the availability of comparable data, economic growth is measured by GDP.

**Figure 17. First-order Autocorrelation of the Per Capita Real Economic Growth Rate, Western Democracies and Turkey, 1961-2002**

Country	Autocorrelation	AC	Q-Stat	Prob
France	*****	0.592	15.817	0.000
Germany	**	0.246	2.7184	0.099
Italy	**	0.285	3.6713	0.055
United Kingdom	**	0.267	3.2218	0.073
United States	**	0.198	1.7629	0.184
Turkey	*	-0.163	1.1642	0.281

Source: Calculated and compiled by the author from International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics* [CD-Rom] (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2003).

Note: Included are Turkey and major Western democracies (Germany, the United States, France, Britain, and Italy), for each of which retrospective voting was confirmed in Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, and Lafay, eds., *Economics and Politics*.

In such a circumstance as in Turkey, the present year's value of economic data should be imbued with previous value. High economic growth in the election year may realize as reaction to low economic growth in the previous year. Low economic growth may occur due to the saturation of a period of high economic growth. In this study, the per capita real GNP growth rate for the present year was combined with the corresponding value for the previous year. This process in essence controled for the rate of economic growth that preceded the election year. Only the first lag (the value for one year before) was used due to the fact that for most of the Western democracies, there is only a first-order autocorrelation for the real GNP growth rate, as shown above.


### 7.3 Unemployment: Trend, Extrapolation, and Definition

Unemployment data for Turkey requires caution for two main reasons. First, there is a long-term upward trend that stems from Turkey's industrialization and urbanization processes (Figure 18). The unemployment rate, as is defined in Turkey, is lower in the rural area than in the urban area. This is due to the fact that unpaid family workers, which are by definition included in employment statistics, form the largest portion of the employed in the rural area (Figure 19). Since the majority of the unpaid family workers are employed in agriculture, the decline of agriculture reduced this type of employment and thus increased unemployment.<sup>183</sup> In Western democracies, unemployment also had an upward trend during the corresponding period.

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
<sup>183</sup> See also Tuncer Bulutay, *Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey*, International Labour Organization (Ankara, 1995), 237.

**Figure 18. Unemployment Rate in Turkey, 1945-2002**



Source: Tuncer Bulutay, *Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey* (Ankara: International Labour Organization, 1995), 256, table 8.A; State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Labour Statistics* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, various years).  
 Note: Percentage unemployed to the total civilian labor force.

**Figure 19. Unpaid Family Workers to Total Employment, 1991-2002**



Source: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Household Labour Force Survey Results* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, various years).

Methodologically, for both Turkey and Western democracies, these long-term trends in independent variables may blur the real relationship even if the dependent variable has no trend.<sup>184</sup> It is more appropriate then to use change in, instead of the level of, unemployment.<sup>185</sup> Then what time span should be applied to change in the employment rate as an independent variable for the Turkish model? For both Turkey and The Western democracies, change in the employment rate was positively autocorrelated with its first lag (Figure 20). This fact justifies the use of change in the unemployment rate for the last year in the Turkish case as well since the last year's value reflected the previous year's value.

**Figure 20. First-Order Autocorrelation for Unemployment Rate Change, Western Democracies and Turkey, 1986-2002**

Country	Autocorrelation	AC	Q-Stat	Prob
France	*****	0.724	10.059	0.002
Germany	*****	0.870	14.529	0.000
Italy	*****	0.774	11.508	0.001
UK	*****	0.628	7.5618	0.006
US	*****	0.748	10.737	0.001
Turkey	****	0.475	4.3337	0.037

Source: Calculated and compiled by the author from OECD, *Main Economic Indicators* (Paris: OECD, various years).

Note: ADF test showed that all the time series were stationary. Second- and lower-order partial autocorrelation coefficients for these countries are negative, weak, or insignificant.

While it is desirable to use change in the unemployment rate, change-based data requires more precision than level-based data. It is doubtful whether unemployment data in Turkey before 1988 are sufficiently accurate. The State Institute of Statistics (SIS) has been conducting a systematic labor force survey since 1988. But before then, samples for labor force statistics were limited and thus failed to represent

<sup>184</sup> If the dependent variable has any trend, the regression may display a spurious relationship.

<sup>185</sup> Anderson, who used changes in unemployment as an independent variable for explaining the level of monthly incumbent support between 1960 and 1990, justified that the change variable "cancels out any long-term trend there may be in the unemployment series." Anderson, *Blaming the Government*, 94.

Turkey as a whole. The only long-term data available for the pre-1988 period<sup>186</sup> was compiled by Bulutay. Bulutay extrapolated unemployment rates for the 1923-1988 period from per capita investment with the 1988 Labor Force Survey as the structural basis. As the data shows, yearly changes in unemployment were mostly less than one percent while levels of unemployment ranged from three to ten percent. An error margin of 1 percent point in the unemployment data thus can easily change the positive to the negative of changes in the unemployment rate. One cannot expect that this data has such precision as to distinguish changes in unemployment from one year to the next.<sup>187</sup>

Second, employment statistics for Turkey since 1989 contains “underemployment” that ranged approximately from six to eight percent (Figure 21). Persons underemployed are defined by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) as either “persons who work less than 40 hours because of economic reasons during the reference period and are able to work more at their present job or are capable of doing a further job” or “persons who are not in the above group [sic] want to change his/her present job or are seeking a further job because of an insufficient income or because of not working in his/her usual occupation.”<sup>188</sup> Thus, a substantial number of underemployed persons as well as unpaid family workers in the unemployment category makes the definition of unemployment much narrower than in Western democracies. Moreover, the rates of underemployment and unemployment do not necessarily change in the same direction. Nor do they always move in the opposite direction, either. In fact, neither pattern held. The results of the regression analysis with semi-annual data for the 1989-2002 period showed that change in the unemployment rate was not related to the underemployment rate at a statistically significant level.<sup>189</sup> The combination of the unemployment and underemployment

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<sup>186</sup> Ali Özdemir, specialist, Social Planning Section, State Planning Organization. Interview by the author, Ankara, July 28, 2003.


<sup>187</sup> Bulutay conceded the limitation of his study by saying “[the] figures show, of course, only the rough estimates reached under some simple assumptions. They may not be very reliable.” Bulutay, *Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey*, 235.

<sup>188</sup> Compiled by the author from State Institute of Statistics, *Household Labour Force Survey Results, October 1993* (Ankara, 1994), 188-189. Economic reasons include “i) Slack work for technical or economic reasons, ii) There was no work, iii) Could not find full-time job, iv) The job has just started or has come to an end during the last week.” Ibid., 189. The reference period covers one week.

<sup>189</sup> In this data set, the unemployment data was first-difference stationary and the underemployment data was stationary.

rates therefore does not solve the problem.

**Figure 21. Unemployment and Underemployment, 1988-2002 Semiannual**



Source: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Household Labour Force Survey Results* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, various years).


Note: Underemployment data is available since 1989.

Thus, in the following analysis, the first problem can be mitigated by a separate treatment of the pre-1988 and post-1988 periods. The second problem needs to be dealt with only if the post-1988, more reliable, unemployment data do not show the expected effect on change in incumbent votes.

#### 7.4 Inflation: Indexation and Inertia

Just like the unemployment rate, the inflation rate has an even more upward trend (Figure 22). For the same reason as with the unemployment, it is appropriate to use change in the inflation rate. The ADF test, when applied to this time series data, failed to reject the null hypothesis that the time series was nonstationary ( $p=0.222$ ). The same test showed that the first difference of the time series, i.e., change in the inflation rate (Figure 23), was stationary ( $p=0.0001$ ).

**Figure 22. Inflation in Turkey, 1945-2002**



Source: Compiled by the author from International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics* [CD-Rom] (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2003).  
Note: Inflation was measured by percentage change in the consumer price index.


Change in inflation reflects the erosion of real incomes more accurately than the level of inflation when inflation is continuously high and thus inertial. Turkish inflation became inertial since the 1980s.<sup>190</sup> Inflation in Turkish society since then became the fact of life and was relatively accepted as long as it did not accelerate substantially. Behind this inertia was the indexation mechanism, such as for rent, that mitigated the impact of price increases in the past.<sup>191</sup> Although the indexation mechanism partially alleviated social costs of inflation, at the same time, it allowed the inflationary momentum to continue. Thus, the prevalence of inertial inflation justifies the use of a change-based variable instead of a level-based variable for

<sup>190</sup> Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu and A. Erinc Yeldan, "Dynamics of Macroeconomic Disequilibrium and Inflation in Turkey: The State, Politics, and the Markets under a Globalized Developing Economy," Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, 1999; Haluk Erhat, "Long Memory in Turkish Inflation Rates," Paper presented at the 21st Annual Conference of the Middle East Economics Association, New Orleans, January 5-7, 2001.

<sup>191</sup> Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, "Inflation Report" (June 3, 2000), 14. Accessible from <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/>. Indexation for wages, as shown above, is not so consistent as for rent.

inflation.

**Figure 23. Change in the Inflation Percentage, 1946-2002**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix.

*Note:* Inflation was measured by percentage change in the consumer price index.

The question still remains, however, for the time span of the variable. As was already shown above, the value of certain economic indicators reflected their previous value. These autocorrelated, although stationary, data have been used for retrospective voting analyses of industrial democracies.<sup>192</sup> The results of correlograms showed that for the Western democracies, inflation rates were invariably positively autocorrelated with their first lag (Figure 24). For Turkey, on the other hand, change in the inflation rate was negatively autocorrelated at the 0.10 significance level ( $r=0.239$ ,  $p=0.088$ ). It is desirable therefore to use the last-two year mean for change in the inflation rate, in the same way as for the real GNP growth rate, so that the value for the last year of incumbency reflects the value for the previous year.

<sup>192</sup> See section 2.3.

**Figure 24. First-order Autocorrelation of Inflation Rates for Western Democracies and Turkey, 1949-2002**

Country	Autocorrelation	AC	Q-Stat	Prob
France	*****	0.599	20.141	0.000
Germany	**	0.296	4.9257	0.026
Italy	*****	0.787	35.330	0.000
United Kingdom	*****	0.781	34.762	0.000
United States	*****	0.705	28.386	0.000
Turkey*	**	-0.239	2.9164	0.088

*Source:* Calculated and compiled by the author from International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics* [CD-Rom] (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2003).

*Note:* ADF test showed that all the time series were stationary. Second- and lower-order partial autocorrelation coefficients for these countries are generally weak or insignificant.

\*1954-2002, the first difference.

### 7.5 A Time-series Analysis with Modified Data

This section shows the results of a time series regression that tested the effect of 1) the per capita real GNP growth rate for the last two years before the election, 2) change in the unemployment rate for the election year, and 3) change in the inflation rate for the last two years before the election, on change in the governing party/parties' vote percentage between two consecutive elections. The compilation process of these three independent variables was extensively discussed in the previous section and is summarized in Table 18. When the election took place in the first six months of the year, the previous year's value was used as the value for the election year and the value for the second previous year was used as the value for the year before the election.

The dependent variable is change in incumbent vote percentage. The incumbent was defined here as the last incumbent party/parties that ruled for at least a year before the general election was held. Two control variables were included among the independent variables. One is the number of years between two consecutive elections and the other is the number of political parties in the government. First, the vote swing for the incumbent party/parties is negatively affected by the number of years in incumbency due to the effect of the "cost of ruling." The longer in power, the

greater the loss of votes for the incumbent party/parties. Second, it takes more votes for a coalition government than a single-party government to be formed. This is because the first party obtains more seats per vote than the other smaller parties, even under proportional representation. If a government includes any parties smaller than the first party, then the total number of votes required to form a government should be larger than the total number of votes required for a single-party government. Change in incumbent votes between two elections thus is expected to be larger for a coalition government than for a single-party government.

**Table 18. Summary of the Economic Data Series, 1945-2002**

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	First-order autocorrelation ( $r$ )	Time-series compilation
Real GNP per capita change	2.317	4.361	Not significant	Last-two year mean
Change in the inflation rate <sup>a</sup>	0.635	17.284	Negative (-0.239 <sup>*</sup> )	Last-two year mean
Change in the unemployment rate	0.139	0.662	Positive (0.291 <sup>**</sup> )	Last-year value

*Source:* Compiled by the author from the sources cited in Appendix VI.

*Notes:* This table summarizes the (stationary) time series economic data, from which the independent variables were derived, in terms of 1) descriptive statistics, 2) autocorrelation patterns, and 3) the method of time-series compilation. When the series was not positively autocorrelated with any of its lags, such as for real GNP per capita growth and change in the inflation rate, the mean value for the last two years before the election was used. When the series was positively autocorrelated with its first lag, such as for change in the unemployment rate, then the last-year value was used.

All variables are shown in percentage.

<sup>a</sup> The inflation rate was measured by percentage change in the consumer price index.

<sup>\*</sup>  $p < 0.10$ .

<sup>\*\*</sup>  $p < 0.05$ .

The sample space ( $N=17$ ) consists only of general elections of the national assembly and of the provincial assemblies from 1950 to 2002. By-elections of the national assembly, the senate (until 1980)<sup>193</sup> and local by-elections, which were included in Çarkoğlu's study, were excluded from this study since these elections did not take place in all the provinces of Turkey and thus did not accurately represent

<sup>193</sup> Senate elections were partial elections that change one-third of the seats and were thus held in some of the provinces.

electoral support across time and space.

The results of a multiple regression with modified economic variables (Table 19) showed that percentage change in per capita real GNP accounted for change in incumbent vote percentage at a statistically significant level. The other two economic variables had statistically insignificant regression coefficients while the two control variables had the expected effects. This unsatisfactory performance of the regression model did not arise from the temporal compilation of economic variables. When multiple regressions were run with the *last-year* value for all the three economic variables, which is the conventional approach to retrospective voting, none of their regression coefficients were statistically significant.

**Table 19. Retrospective Voting Model for Turkey, 1950-2002 (N=17)**

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.	VIF <sup>a</sup>
Real GNP per capita change last-two year mean (%)	2.485	.564	4.405	.001	2.090
Unemployment rate change last year (%)	1.703	2.537	.671	.515	1.568
Inflation rate change, last-two year mean (%)	.051	.166	.307	.764	1.172
Number of years in office	-3.384	1.113	-3.040	.010	3.421
Number of governing parties	-4.703	1.746	-2.694	.020	3.419
R-squared	0.803	Mean dependent var		-7.476	
Adjusted R-squared	0.721	S.D. dependent var		10.508	
S.E. of regression	6.675	Akaike info criterion		6.863	
Sum squared resid	534.613	Schwarz criterion		7.108	
Log likelihood	-53.332	Durbin-Watson stat		2.352	

*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix VI.

*Note:* The dependent variable was the vote swing for the incumbent party/parties between two consecutive elections. The intercept was not included since it was not statistically significant ( $p=0.987$ ) when included in the model.

\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Note: <sup>a</sup> Multicollinearity is suspected if VIF exceeds 10.

## 7.6 Why GNP but Not Inflation and Unemployment?


Although the above model showed that per capita real GNP change was a strong predictor of the vote swing, why did unemployment and inflation fail to explain? At this stage, two speculations can be made. First, for unemployment, it may have been inappropriate to generate a change variable from extrapolated data for the pre-1988 period. As was already explained above,<sup>194</sup> the extrapolation method used by Bulutay was inevitable and theoretically acceptable for generating the yearly level of unemployment by using five-year interval census data. Extrapolating change in employment, however, is much more difficult. The proportion of error will be greater for change in unemployment than for the unemployment level, which has a trend and thus is strongly determined by its previous value. The contamination effect of the extrapolation correlates will be also greater for change in unemployment than for the unemployment level.

In fact, the unemployment data until 1987 and the vote swing display a pattern that is contrary to the theoretical expectation. A rise in the unemployment rate *increased* incumbent votes (Figure 25). This consistent relationship indicates that the pre-1988 unemployment data was systemically influenced in the extrapolation process. Indeed, a further examination revealed that change in the unemployment rate during the pre-1988 period was *positively* correlated with per capita GNP growth rate (Figure 26) while, in theory, economic growth reduces unemployment. From the beginning, the lack of collinearity between economic growth and change in unemployment in the retrospective voting equation for Turkey was rather strange. The truth of the matter is that there was a negative relationship between the two variables for the post-1988 period but that relationship was cancelled out by the seemingly positive relationship for the pre-1988 period. The spurious relationship for the pre-1988 period is due to the negative relationship between change in the population growth rate and change in the unemployment rate (Table 20).

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<sup>194</sup> See section 7.3.


**Figure 25. Spurious Relationship between Change in the Extrapolated Unemployment Rate and the Residual Vote Swing\*, 1950-1987 (N=11)**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix VI.

*Note:* The effect of the control variables (the number of incumbent parties and the number of years in incumbency) was subtracted from change in the incumbent vote percentage.

**Figure 26. Change in Per Capita Real GNP and Change in the Extrapolated Unemployment Rate, 1950-87 (N=11)**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix VI.

**Table 20. Population Growth and Change in the Unemployment Rate,  
1970-1987**


Independent variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	<i>t</i> -Statistic	Prob.
Population growth (%)	-2.298	0.722	-3.184	0.005
<i>R</i> -squared	0.350	Mean dependent var		0.128
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.351	S.D. dependent var		0.690
S.E. of regression	0.556	Akaike info criterion		1.718
Sum squared resid	5.256	Schwarz criterion		1.767
Log likelihood	-14.461	Durbin-Watson stat		1.491

*Source:* Compiled by the author from International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics* [CD-Rom] (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 2003).

*Note:* The dependent variable was change in the unemployment rate. The data is annual.

On the other hand, the relationship between the post-1988 unemployment data that was actually measured, not extrapolated, and the incumbent vote swing indicates that a rise in unemployment *did* increase the loss of incumbent votes (Figure 27). This is to show that unemployment, in reality, was a critical determinant of retrospective voting. Change in the unemployment rate for the post-1988 period was also negatively related to change in per capita real GNP (Figure 28), which conforms to the economic theory that economic recessions increase unemployment.


**Figure 27. Change in the Unemployment Rate and the Residual Vote Swing\*,  
1988-2002 (N=6)**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix VI.

*Note:* The effect of the control variables (the number of incumbent parties and the number of years in incumbency) was subtracted from change in the incumbent vote percentage.

**Figure 28. Change in the Unemployment Rate and Change in the Per Capita Real GNP, 1988-2002 (N=6)**



*Source:* Compiled by the author from Appendix VI.

Second, for inflation, a tentative speculation can be made. Under high and/or inertial inflation, what matters to wage earners and pensioners that form the masses are inflation adjustments for their fixed incomes rather than the level of or change in inflation per se. The preceding results suggest that inflation adjustments did not accurately reflect inflation on the yearly basis. The extent of inflation adjustments can be measured by change in real wages. There is an indication that change in real wages induced retrospective voting. In other words, a larger decline in real wages led

to a larger loss of votes for the incumbents. In Table 21, the results of the bivariate regression with White's heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance<sup>195</sup> showed that change in real wages was positively (though weakly) related to the vote swing residual ( $r=0.149$ ,  $p=0.084$ ). Change in real wages for each year was used since the time series was positively autocorrelated with its first lag ( $r=0.366$ ,  $p=0.007$ ) for the 1950-2002 period, thus reflecting the previous year's value.

**Table 21. Change in Real Wages and the Vote Swing Residual, 1950-2002**  
( $N=17$ )

Independent variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Change in real wages	0.149	0.081	1.843	0.084
R-squared	0.124	Mean dependent var		0.069
Adjusted R-squared	0.124	S.D. dependent var		8.574
S.E. of regression	8.023	Akaike info criterion		7.060
Sum squared resid	1029.940	Schwarz criterion		7.109
Log likelihood	-59.006	Durbin-Watson stat		1.774

*Source:* Calculated by the author from Appendix VI and Bulutay, *Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey*, 306, table 9.J; Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey's website, accessible from <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/>.

*Note:* White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance were used. The dependent variable was the vote swing with the number of parties and years in incumbency controlled for. Change in real wages is two-year mean. Intercept was statistically insignificant and thus excluded from the equation.

Indeed, change in inflation was not a very decisive factor for change in real wages (Table 22).<sup>196</sup> Change in real wages was primarily related to its first lag. Although change in real wages was secondarily affected (negatively) by change in inflation, there were other forces that determined change in real wages (Figure 29). Until 1980,

<sup>195</sup> This method was applied, instead of the standard regression analysis, to the inflation data that had multiple spikes (See the "actual" line in Figure 29 that follows). The heteroscedasticity consistent covariance provides correct estimates of the coefficient covariances when heteroscedasticity is present whose form is unknown.

<sup>196</sup> The effect of inflation on real wages was statistically insignificant. Since both inflation and real wages were nonstationary (trend stationary), the cointegration test was made to investigate whether the two variables were statistically related to each other. The results showed that statistically there was no relationship between inflation and real wages at the five percent level of significance.

yearly gains and losses in real wages occurred cyclically and relatively unintentionally. Since 1980, however, change in real wages was heavily influenced by government policy. From 1980 to 1986, real wages were severely reduced due to the IMF-supported stabilization program that sought to increase export by lowering labor cost and the foreign exchange rate. Under the military government (1980-83), labor union activities were prohibited. The transition to a fully competitive election in 1987 alarmed the governing Motherland Party that since 1983 had been responsible for economic austerity. The Motherland Party since then adopted a more generous wage policy and raised real wages. Distinct rises in real wage coincided with general elections in 1987 and 1991 and the general local election in 1989. While the temporary decline in 1992 is a reaction to the previous large increases, consistent negative residuals since the mid-1990s were due to the IMF-prescribed structural adjustment policy that was continually implemented since the economic crisis in 1994.<sup>197</sup> These results imply that even *change* in inflation, not to speak of inflation per se, did not accurately reflect the level of grievances among the wage earners.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>197</sup> IMF Stand-by arrangements required a stringent fiscal policy and a tight monetary policy. The following table shows the IMF standby agreements with Turkey since 1983.

1,000 SDR

Facility	Date of Arrangement	Date of Expiration or Cancellation	Amount Agreed	Amount Drawn	Amount Outstanding
Standby Arrangement	Feb 04, 2002	Dec 31, 2004	12,821,200	10,780,000	10,780,000
Standby Arrangement of which Supplemental Reserve Facility	Dec 22, 1999 Dec 21, 2000	Feb 04, 2002 Dec 20, 2001	15,038,400 5,784,000	11,738,960 5,784,000	4,994,973 0
Standby Arrangement	Jul 08, 1994	Mar 07, 1996	610,500	460,500	0
Standby Arrangement	Apr 04, 1984	Apr 03, 1985	225,000	168,750	0

*Source:* Compiled by the author from the IMF website (accessible from <http://www.imf.org/>).

*Note:* As of November 30, 2003.

<sup>198</sup> Farmers/peasants and/or unpaid family workers have had inflation hedges such as government support prices and stockpiling.


**Table 22. Time Series Regression for Change in Real Wages, 1952-2002**

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Intercept	2.335	1.536	1.520	0.136
Change in real wages t-1 (%)	0.577	0.119	4.863	0.000
Change in real wages t-3 (%)	-0.331	0.115	-2.874	0.006
Change in inflation (%)	-0.335	0.089	-3.756	0.001
R-squared	0.454	Mean dependent var		2.680
Adjusted R-squared	0.417	S.D. dependent var		13.332
S.E. of regression	10.177	Akaike info criterion		7.556
Sum squared resid	4661.059	Schwarz criterion		7.711
Log likelihood	-181.130	F-statistic		12.457
Durbin-Watson stat	1.982	Prob(F-statistic)		0.000

*Source:* See Table 21.

*Note:* Real wages are for manufacturing.

**Figure 29. Unexpected Change in Real Wages (%), 1954-2002**



*Source:* Calculated and compiled by the author from Bulutay, *Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey*, 306, table 9.J; Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey's website, accessible from <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/>.

*Note:* Unexpected change in real wages is indicated by the bold line.

In sum, the foregoing analysis demonstrated that change in per capita real GNP and change in unemployment affected the vote swing. Change in inflation did not display its expected effect.

## 7.7 A Cross-sectional Analysis with Modified Data

This section investigates retrospective voting behavior across provinces in Turkey.

The following single-country cross-sectional model adopted Powell and Whitten's cross-national analysis by replacing the country with the province as the unit of analysis.<sup>199</sup> The dependent variable is change in the governing party's/parties' vote percentage in the present election. This change is usually negative since incumbents tend to lose votes in elections. The independent variables consist of 1) per capita real GDP growth under the incumbent government, 2) the vote percentage for the governing party/parties in the previous general election, and 3) change in the governing party's/parties' votes (usually positive) in the previous general election.

The first independent variable is the single economic variable. Other economic variables that are generally used for retrospective-voting analysis, such as inflation and unemployment, were not available at the provincial level in Turkey. Just as the time-series approach to retrospective voting did in the previous section, the following cross-sectional analysis used mean per capita real GDP<sup>200</sup> change for the election year and the year before if the election took place in the last half of the year. Mean per capita real GDP change for two years before the election year was used if election took place in the first half of the year. The relevant general elections took place on 5 June 1977, 20 October 1991, 24 December 1995, and 18 April 1999. The last two independent variables are control variables.

It is thus hypothesized that *a greater decrease in provincial per capita real GDP in the incumbent period brings about a larger loss of votes in the province for the governing party/parties* if the previous government vote percentage and the previous government vote swing are controlled for. Since provincial GDP statistics were available only for 1975 and onward, four multiple regressions were run for the 1977, 1991, 1995, and 1999 general elections (Table 23).<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> They have refined Paldam's retrospective-voting model that explained change in the governing party's/parties' votes by macroeconomic variables (inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth) and the previous government vote percentage. One of their improvements on Paldam's model is relevant to the setting of this study. Powell and Whitten have added a new independent variable, i.e., change in governing party's/parties' votes in the previous general election. This is because the larger the (usually positive) "swing" in the previous election, the larger decrease is likely in votes for the governing party/parties in the coming election.

<sup>200</sup> By definition, provincial economic growth is measured by GDP, not GNP.

<sup>201</sup> The 2002 general election was excluded since statistics for provincial GDP in 2001 were not yet available.

**Table 23. Retrospective Voting in the Province (N=67) for the 1977, 1991, 1995 and 1999 General Elections**

Year	Results <sup>a</sup>			Parameters <sup>b</sup>			Overall Fit
	Per capita real GDP Growth	Previous government vote swing	Previous government vote percentage	Present government vote swing (Negative)	Previous government vote swing (Positive)	Government term (Full)	
1977	1.040	1.135	<u>-4.622***</u>	3.6	<u>5.5</u>	2 years	No
1991	-1.991*	1.856*	<u>-5.725***</u>	<u>-11.7</u>	-8.4	<u>4 years</u>	No
1995	<u>3.249***</u>	<u>-5.077***</u>	<u>-2.185**</u>	<u>-19.6</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>4 years</u>	Yes
1999	1.478	0.480	0.656	<u>-0.4</u>	-1.2	2 years	No

*Source:* Calculated by the author from the same data sources as in Table 11 and online data in the State Institute of Statistic's website (<http://www.die.gov.tr>). For the 1991 case, White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance were used since the relevant per capita real GDP data was heteroscedastically distributed.

*Notes:* The following theoretical model was applied to each of the four general elections:

$$SW_t = a + b_1G + b_2SW_{t-1} + b_3V_{t-1} + e$$

where  $SW_t$  is change in the government vote percentage (vote swing) in the general election,  $G$  is per capita real GDP growth,  $SW_{t-1}$  is change in the government vote percentage in the previous general election,  $V_{t-1}$  is the government vote percentage in the previous general election,  $a$  is the estimated intercept,  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3$  are estimated partial slopes, and  $e$  is the error term.

The governing party/parties (defined as those parties in the last government, before the general election, that served for more than a year) for each election were as follows.

1977: JP, NSP, RRP, and NAP (31 March 1975-21 June 1977).

1991: MP (21 December 1987-20 November 1991).

1995: TPP and RPP (21 November 1991-30 October 1995).

1999: MP and DLP (30 June 1997-11 January 1999).

<sup>a</sup> Entries are  $t$  values for multiple regression coefficients with the government vote change of the year as the independent variable. Underlines show that the regression coefficient complies with the model assumptions.

<sup>b</sup> Entries are means for 67 provinces. Underlines show that the parameter complies with the model assumptions. In parentheses are assumptions for the parameters.

\*  $p < 0.10$ .

\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

In the above table, only the regression for the 1995 general election showed that change in per capita real GDP in the election year was positively correlated with change in the governing party's/parties' vote share. The reason the other three regressions did not produce the expected results may be sought in that these three cases failed to meet the three ideally-typical assumptions of the retrospective voting

model applied here. The model implicitly assumed, first and foremost, that the first party in the general election should serve until the present election. Long incumbency would contribute to decline in popularity. The remaining assumptions are corollaries of the first. Second, the incumbent should receive a smaller percentage of votes than in the previous election that it won. This means a negative vote swing in the present election. Third, the incumbent should have received a larger percentage of votes in the previous election than in the earlier election. This means a positive vote swing in the previous election.

This first assumption, a full-term government led by the first party (alone or in coalition), was not met for the 1977 and 1999 cases. For 1977, the previous 1973 election was won by the RPP. After the RPP-NSP coalition government collapsed in 1975, the JP-NSP-RRP-NAP government was formed. For 1999, the previous 1995 election was won by the WP. The WP, however, led a coalition government only for a year between 1996 and 1997. It was the MP-DLP government that effectively ruled until the next election.<sup>202</sup> In both cases, the retrospective voting model was tested not for the party that won the previous election but for the parties that took over the government abandoned by the former incumbent.

The second assumption, a negative vote swing (of the governing parties) in the present election, did not apply to the 1977 case. In 1977, the total incumbent votes (the JP, the NSP, the RRP, and the NAP) in the province *rose* by 3.6 percent on average. Also in 1999, the total incumbent votes (the MP and the DLP) declined so little (0.4 percent) that this case does not fully satisfy the second assumption. Weak performance in the previous election (the initial level being low) and their short office term (expectations still remaining) prevented a major decline in voter support in the present election.

The third assumption, a positive vote swing (of the governing parties) in the previous election, was not valid for the 1991 and 1999 cases. In the 1991 case, the previous vote swing in 1987 was negative 8.4 percent on average across provinces. In the 1987 election, the incumbent MP had retained its incumbency *despite* a decline in electoral support compared with the earlier 1983 election. This is typical of a second victory of the incumbent in consecutive elections but is not congruent with the assumptions of the retrospective voting model. The source of a negative vote

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<sup>202</sup> As was defined in this study, the interim DLP government was not regarded as the incumbent since it served for only three months. Expectedly, the retrospective voting model, when applied to the data for the DLP government in the 1999 election, did not show any statistically significant relationships.

swing, a reaction to the incumbent, is the very positive vote swing that the incumbent earned in the previous election that brought it into government.<sup>203</sup> In the 1999 case, it is already clear from the fact, as described for the first assumption, that the MP and the DLP were not victors in the previous 1995 election. In the previous 1995 election, the total incumbent votes (the MP and the LDP) declined 1.2 percent on average across provinces compared with the earlier 1991 election. Although the DLP's vote swing in the previous 1995 election was positive, the MP's negative vote swing in the same election slightly outweighed it.

In all, only the 1995 case validated the retrospective voting model by satisfying all the three assumptions of the model. The 1991 case met two of the three assumptions. The results for the 1991 case, though short of statistical significance, were closer to the hypothesis than were the other two cases that satisfied only one of the three assumptions. While the limited number of cases prevents a sweeping generalization, the above findings suggest that in cross-section analysis, only those conditions necessary for the ideal or pure type of retrospective voting (a negative present swing, a positive previous swing, and a full-term first-party government) produce robust results.

The cross-sectional retrospective voting model is particularly inappropriate for successive short-lived governments.<sup>204</sup> If the present incumbent parties take over the government abandoned by the first party, as in the 1977 and 1999 cases, the vote swing in the present election may not be negatively correlated with the vote swing in the previous election as stipulated by the model. This is because in the previous election, the positive vote swing may not have reached its potential upper limit. The present vote swing thus is more likely to be *positively*, rather than negatively, correlated with the previous vote swing.

## 7.8 Summary

This chapter investigated the relationship between change in macroeconomic variables (per capita real GNP, unemployment, and inflation) and change in support

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<sup>203</sup> It remains unanswered, however, why in the 1991 case there was a negative relationship between the present government vote swing and per capita real GDP.

<sup>204</sup> The foregoing time-series analysis already demonstrated the significant negative effect of the length of incumbency on the vote swing.

for the incumbent party/parties. The first part of the chapter discussed how to choose and to compile dependent and independent variables. Second, the retrospective voting model thus derived was applied to the time-series analysis. The third part tested for individual elections the cross-sectional model of retrospective voting with the province as the unit of analysis.

The results showed that in the time-series analysis, change in per capita real GNP and unemployment, but not inflation, affected change in incumbent votes, when years in incumbency and the number of parties were controlled for. In the cross-sectional analysis, retrospective voting was observed in only those cases in which major assumptions for the retrospective voting model (such as diminishing incumbent votes and full or long incumbency) were met. In all, the retrospective voting model demonstrated the importance of the government economic performance in explaining the vote swing for the incumbent party/parties.

## CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

This chapter first summarizes the major findings of this study and then draws some conclusions that help to answer the questions raised in the introductory chapter. Finally, the implications and limitations of this study are discussed.

### 8.1 Summary

This thesis analyzed the persistent electoral volatility in Turkey in terms of party-system institutionalization mainly during the 1961-2002 period. In order to distinguish the different vote swings underlying Turkey's electoral volatility, this study divided electoral volatility into 1) cleavage-type volatilities based on social cleavages and 2) retrospective-type volatilities based on voter punishment of the incumbent. The two types of volatilities were analyzed in two separate regression models. The results showed, first, that deep social cleavages used to increase electoral volatility but since the 1990s, they had begun to stabilize voting behavior. The party system in Turkey has thus been recently anchored into its major social cleavages. Second, electoral volatility as a whole nonetheless remained high because of a growing trend of retrospective voting. Low economic growth and high unemployment were the major reasons for this. In sum, the apparent instability in the party system stemmed not from lack of representation in parliament of major social groups but from the poor performance of the government. What follows are the summaries of each chapter.

Chapter 1 addressed the major research question as whether persistent electoral volatility in Turkey reflected a lack of institutionalization in the party system. It was contended that electoral volatility should be decomposed into subcategories in order to understand its implications for party-system stability.

The review of the literature on electoral change in Chapter 2 suggested that across countries, social cleavages, retrospective voting, and values provided clues to electoral change in general while party identification had little explanatory power outside the United States. Both cleavage and value approaches assumed the party system to be representing an underlying cleavage/value structure. Thus, it is possible

to regard these two approaches as representational accounts. While representational accounts explained relatively long-term volatility, the retrospective voting approach was concerned with short-term volatility. Electoral change thus stemmed from voters' search for better representation as well as from their resentment toward the incumbent government.

The literature review on electoral change in Turkey in Chapter 3 suggested, first, that social cleavages, retrospective voting, and values provided certain clues to electoral behavior in Turkey. Second, voting in Turkey was not, in Özbudun's term, always voluntary, or autonomous. It thus became necessary to scrutinize voting data for the possibility and extent of mobilized voting, while taking into account spatial and temporal differences in voting behavior. Third, few of the reviewed studies explicitly examined electoral change and volatility in the post-1980 period. Relatively abundant research based on the social cleavage model provided rather static explanations of Turkish voting behavior; it did not analyze change in the cleavage structure over time. Studies that adopted the retrospective voting model or the values model were more attuned to a longitudinal and dynamic analysis but such research was rare.

Chapter 4 defined both conceptually and operationally the dependent and independent variables. This study used these variables to test, at the national and or/provincial level, relationships 1) between social cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities and 2) between economic conditions and change in the incumbent vote. Two major hypotheses were formulated as follows:

Assumption 1: Strong social cleavages stabilize the relationship between cleavage groups and political parties.

Hypothesis 1: Those provinces with stronger social cleavages have smaller cleavage-type volatilities (left-right and systemic volatilities) than the provinces with weaker social cleavages do.

Assumption 2: Voters punish the incumbent according to the most recent economic performance prior to the general election.

Hypothesis 2: The worse the economic condition prior to the election, the greater the loss of votes for the incumbent party /parties.

The two main hypotheses were further elaborated and operationalized in the relevant chapters (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).

Before testing the above hypotheses, Chapter 5 investigated to what extent electoral participation was voluntary, or autonomous. This was necessary because the concept of electoral volatility implicitly assumes that voters cast a ballot of their own will. In the rural areas of Turkey, mobilized voting used to be prevalent. During the post-1980 period, however, the so-called negative relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout disappeared. Voter turnout is now higher in the more developed than the less developed provinces. It was also found that the relationship between socioeconomic development and voter turnout in the province depended on the level of national voter turnout. High national voter turnout, due either to democratizing elections or to compulsory voting, lead to an increased weight of autonomous voting.

Chapter 6 showed that social cleavages were becoming less responsible for electoral volatility. Three major social cleavages in Turkey have on the whole increased cleavage-type volatility rather than reduced it during the last four decades: 1) Sunni religiosity raised systemic volatility and 2) Kurdish ethnicity raised both left-right and systemic volatilities while 3) *Alevi* sectarianism reduced left-right volatility. These relationships, however, have changed over time. It appears that during both the pre-1980 (1961-1977) period and the post-1980 (1987-2002) period, repeated elections since each civilian transition mitigated this general tendency by strengthening the ties between political parties and cleavage groups. Although the 1980 military intervention aborted the earlier development of the party-cleavage nexus during the pre-1980 period, the post-1980 period has witnessed a stabilization of the relationship between cleavages and political parties, especially since the late 1990s. In other words, social cleavages and the party system in Turkey seem to be heading for convergence.

Chapter 7 investigated the relationship between change in macroeconomic variables (per capita real GNP, unemployment, and inflation) and change in support for the incumbent party/parties. The results showed that in a time-series analysis, change in per capita real GNP and unemployment, but not inflation, affected change in incumbent votes, when years in incumbency and the number of parties were controlled for. In the cross-sectional analysis, retrospective voting was observed in only those cases in which major assumptions for the retrospective voting model (such as diminishing incumbent votes and full or long incumbency) were met. In all, the retrospective voting model demonstrated the importance of government economic performance in explaining the vote swing against the incumbent party/parties.

## 8.2 Conclusions

The introduction section asked whether the persistently high electoral volatility for Turkey signified a low level of party-system institutionalization or whether it had anything to do with measurement. In conclusion, the problem lies with the level of measurement but not with measurement itself. When electoral volatility was broken down into politically relevant inter-bloc volatilities, a clear picture emerged. It was demonstrated that electoral volatility, when divided into major inter-bloc volatilities, revealed two parallel processes in party-system institutionalization, i. e., declining cleavage-type volatilities and growing retrospective-type volatilities.

Persistently high (total) electoral volatility in Turkey does not mean that its party system is not very much accepted by the society. On the contrary, the Turkish party system has come to accommodate major social cleavages more firmly than before. It was rather that governments have recently become more susceptible to severe punishment by the voters due to poor economic performance. In other words, the resentment of the voters was directed not against the system but against the incumbent. The results indicate that the party system has recently become anchored into social cleavages in Turkey. The voters have been increasingly critical of the government but they do not necessarily reject the political system.

## 8.3 Implications and Limitations

It is true that disruptions in Turkish political institutions, including military interventions and the disbanding of political parties, restrict the research fields to which conventional theories can be applied. This does not mean, however, that conventional frameworks are useless. On the contrary, one can find idiosyncratic factors *only after* one has tried out the conventional explanations. This study was an attempt to test the general concepts of electoral volatility, social cleavages, and retrospective voting in the Turkish context and to find out what remains to be explained.

The overall results basically confirmed the validity of these concepts. Electoral volatility made sense when it was divided into inter-bloc volatilities. The

social-cleavage and retrospective-voting models, at the outset, did not produce the same results as for other democracies. The differences, however, arose not from the models but from their parameters. In Turkey, the party system was not sufficiently representative of social cleavages before the 1990s. Economic growth was so erratic that the electorate could not judge the performance of the incumbent for just a year prior to the election. The process of parameter revisions created an opportunity for the researcher to model the specific political and economic environment for that country. The two models used in this study thus helped to elucidate the political and economic characteristics of Turkey while demonstrating their general explanatory power.

Admittedly, this study leaves much to be desired. The independent variables may need more effective operationalization. While there is no easy solution to the problem of the scarcity of socioeconomic data on the provincial level, the recent release of economic data on the sub-provincial level by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) will enable the testing of certain hypotheses at a lower level of aggregation.<sup>205</sup> There are important issues to be explored in future research. In particular, Turkey's already high electoral volatility doubled from 1999 to 2002. One may ask whether this indicates an electoral realignment or is just an aberration due to the serious policy failure of the incumbent. It requires more than one general election to answer this question.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Socioeconomic data at the sub-provincial level exists but it consists of a sample for one year. Bülent Dinçer, *İllerin Sosyo-ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Arastırması* (Ankara: State Planning Organization, 1996).

<sup>206</sup> Tanju Tosun, *Siyasette Yeniden Mevzilenmeler: Lliberal Sosyal Sentez, Muhafazakar Demokrat Sentez Ekseninde 3 Kasım 2002 Seçimleri* (Istanbul: Buke, 2003); Ali Eşref Turan, *Türkiye'de Seçmen Davranışı: Önceki Kırılmalar ve 2002 Seçimi* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2004).

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I. Political Parties for the 1961-77 General Elections

Party acronym <sup>a</sup>	Foundation (split from) /succession	Abolition <sup>b</sup> (merged into)	Ideology: L=left, R=right P=pro-, A=anti-systemic	Incumbent elections <sup>c</sup>
DP	1973 (JP)		R-P (Center-right)	
JP	1961		R-P (Center-right)	1969, 1973 <sup>d</sup> , 1977
NP	1962 (RPNP)		R-P (Conservative)	
NOP/NSP	1970/1972	1971	R-A (Religious)	1977
NTP	1961	1973 (JP)	R-P (Center-right)	
RP/RRP	1967 (RPP) /1973		R-P (Center-right)	1977
RPNP/NAP	1958/1969		R-A (Nationalist)	1977
RPP	1923		L-P (Center-left )	1965
TLP	1961/1975	1971	L-A (Marxist)	
TUP	1966		L-A (Alevi)	
Ind.			R-P (Conservative)	

*Sources:* Compiled by the author from Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994).

*Notes:*

<sup>a</sup> DP: Democratic Party.

JP: Justice Party.

NOP/NSP: National Order Party/National Salvation Party.

NP: Nation Party.

NTP: New Turkey Party.

RP/RRP: Reliance Party/Republican Reliance Party.

RPNP/NAP: Republican People's Nation Party/Nationalist Action Party.

RPP: Republican People's Party

TLP: Turkish Labor Party.

TUP: Turkish Unity Party.

Ind.: Independents.

<sup>b</sup> Abolition by the Constitutional Court. All the political parties were disbanded in 1981 following

the military intervention.

<sup>c</sup> Defined as an election until which the party stayed in government for more than one year.

<sup>d</sup> Excluding the above-party government during the 1971-1973 period.

## Appendix II. Political Parties for the 1987-2002 General Elections

Party acronym <sup>a</sup>	Foundation (Split from) /Succession	Abolition (Merger into) <sup>b</sup>	Ideology: L=left, R=right P=pro-, A=anti-systemic	Incumbent elections <sup>c</sup>
DLP	1985		L-P (Center-left)	2002
HP	2001 (VP)		R-A (Religious)	
JDP	2001 (VP)		R-A (Religious)	
MP	1983		R-P (Center-right)	1987, 1991, 1999, 2002
NWP/NAP	1983/1993 <sup>d</sup>		R-A (Nationalist)	2002
PDP/DPP	1995/1997 <sup>e</sup>		L-A (Kurdish)	
SDPP/RPP	1985/1992		L-P (Center-left)	1995
TPP	1983		R-P (Center-right)	1995
WP/VP	1983/1997	1998, 2001	R-A (Religious)	1999
YP	2002		R-A (Nationalist)	

*Sources:* Compiled by the author from Frank Tachau, ed., *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994).

*Notes:* This list excludes minor parties that did not obtain more than two percent of the votes.

<sup>a</sup> DLP: Democratic Left Party.

DPP: Democratic People's Party.

HP: Happiness Party.

JDP: Justice and Development Party.

MP: Motherland Party.

NWP/NAP: Nationalist Work Party/Nationalist Action Party.

PDP: People's Democracy Party.

SDPP/RPP: Social Democratic Populist Party/Republican People's Party.

TPP: True Path Party.

WP/VP: Welfare Party/Virtue Party.

YP: Youth Party.

<sup>b</sup> Abolition by the Constitutional Court.

<sup>c</sup> Defined as an election until which the party stayed in government for more than one year.

<sup>d</sup> change of name.

<sup>e</sup> Although the DPP was formed in 1997 in anticipation of the abolition of the PDP, the PDP was not disbanded until 2003. The PDP thus ran for the 1995 and 1999 general elections. For growing fear of abolition, it did not take part in the 2002 general election (See an interview with the party chairman, Murat Bozlak, in *Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 21 October 2002). Instead the DPP ran, in alliance with two small parties, one leftist and the other center-left.

### Appendix III. General Election Results (1961-2002)

Year	Registered voters	Actual voters and rate	Valid ballots cast	Political parties: 1961-1980												Ind.
				JP	RPP	RRP	RPNP	DP	NP	NAP	NSP	TUP	TLP	NTP		
1961	12925395	10522716 81.4	10138035	3527435 34.8	3724752 36.7	-	1415390 14.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1391934 13.7	81732 0.8
1965	13679753	9748678 71.3	9307563	4921235 52.9	2675785 28.7	-	208696 2.2	-	582704 6.3	-	-	-	276101 3.0	346514 3.7	296528 3.2	
1969	14788552	9516035 64.3	9086296	4229712 46.5	2487006 27.4	597818 6.6	-	-	292961 3.2	275091 3.0	-	254695 2.8	243631 2.7	197929 2.2	511023 5.6	
1973	16798164	11223843 66.8	10723658	3197897 29.8	3570583 33.3	564343 5.3	-	1275502 11.9	62377 0.6	362208 3.4	1265771 11.8	121759 1.1	-	-	303218 2.8	
1977	21207303	15358210 72.4	14827172	5468202 36.9	6136171 41.4	277713 1.9	-	274484 1.9	-	951544 6.4	1269918 8.6	58540 0.4	20565 0.1	-	370035 2.5	
Year	Registered voters	Actual voters and rate	Valid ballots cast	Political parties: 1983-2002												Ind.
				WP/VP /JDP	TPP	MP	DLP	SDPP /RPP	PDD /DPP	NWP /NAP	PP	RDP	NDP	YP	Other parties	
1983	19767366	18238362 92.3	17351510	-	-	7833148 45.1	-	-	-	-	5285804 30.5	-	4036970 23.3	-	-	195588 1.1
1987	26376926	24603541 93.3	23971629	1717425 7.2	4587062 19.1	8704335 36.3	2044576 8.5	5931000 24.8	-	701538 2.9	-	196272 0.8	-	-	-	89421 0.4
1991	29979123	25157089 83.9	24416666	4121355 16.9	6600726 27	5862623 24	2624301 10.8	5066571 20.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	108369 0.4	32721 0.1
1995	34155981	29101469 85.2	28126993	6012450 21.4	5396009 19.2	5527288 19.6	4118025 14.6	3011076 10.7	1171623 4.2	2301343 8.2	-	-	-	-	455284 1.6	133895 0.5
1999	37495217	32656070 87.1	31184496	4805381 15.4	3745417 12.0	4122929 13.2	6919670 22.2	2716094 8.7	1482196 4.7	5606583 18.0	-	-	-	-	1515961 4.9	270265 0.9
2002	41407027	32768161 79.1	31528783	10808229 34.3	3008942 9.5	1618465 5.1	384009 1.2	6113352 19.4	1960660 6.2	2635787 8.4	-	-	-	2285598 7.2	2399490.0 7.6	314251 1.0

Source: Compiled by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Statistical Yearbook* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, various years).

#### Appendix IV. Social Cleavage Indices by Province

No.	Province	Sunni religiosity: <i>İmam-Hatip Lisesi</i> students (%)	Kurdish ethnicity: Kurdish population (%)	<i>Alevi</i> sectarianism: Number of <i>Alevi</i> villages
1	Adana	6.74	0.02	14
2	Adıyaman	10.63	0.03	93
3	Afyon	10.31	0.03	4
4	Ağrı	14.47	0.04	0
5	Amasya	11.49	0.04	17
6	Ankara	2.96	0.07	6
7	Antalya	7.54	0.13	26
8	Artvin	11.36	0.13	0
9	Aydın	4.84	0.14	18
10	Balıkesir	7.33	0.20	49
11	Bilecik	8.28	0.22	4
12	Bingöl	10.54	0.24	0
13	Bitlis	3.34	0.25	0
14	Bolu	12.80	0.26	0
15	Burdur	10.55	0.27	3
16	Bursa	12.03	0.58	0
17	Çanakkale	11.10	0.61	3
18	Çankırı	10.35	0.76	0
19	Çorum	13.45	0.80	80
20	Denizli	8.10	1.26	10
21	Diyarbakır	2.47	1.71	8
22	Edirne	2.65	1.05	6
23	Elazığ	6.28	2.07	19
24	Erzincan	6.89	2.10	218
25	Erzurum	8.31	2.26	127
26	Eskişehir	3.71	1.28	4
27	Gaziantep	6.52	2.81	83
28	Giresun	15.73	1.68	0
29	Gümüşhane	14.25	1.57	0

30	Hakkari	11.36	1.82	0
31	Hatay	5.65	1.63	84
32	Isparta	13.45	1.75	23
33	İçel	5.76	1.77	15
34	İstanbul	2.86	3.89	0
35	İzmir	2.61	2.03	43
36	Kars	4.00	2.17	125
37	Kastamonu	19.01	2.27	0
38	Kayseri	10.35	3.34	22
39	Kırklareli	1.11	4.70	25
40	Kırşehir	5.15	3.80	1
41	Kocaeli	7.43	6.61	0
42	Konya	12.56	5.29	2
43	Kütahya	11.98	3.98	0
44	Malatya	5.40	4.22	223
45	Manisa	8.69	5.47	31
46	Kahramanmaraş	8.16	5.61	97
47	Mardin	1.90	7.32	0
48	Muğla	8.39	11.73	12
49	Muş	5.13	12.66	0
50	Nevşehir	7.46	15.37	15
51	Niğde	8.57	16.00	5
52	Ordu	15.47	17.20	46
53	Rize	12.76	20.69	0
54	Sakarya	12.86	19.74	0
55	Samsun	13.10	43.16	4
56	Siirt	4.42	45.05	0
57	Sinop	17.24	47.84	0
58	Sivas	8.73	55.86	215
59	Tekirdağ	3.11	64.03	8
60	Tokat	12.46	67.70	93
61	Trabzon	11.54	70.45	3
62	Tunceli	3.58	70.70	676
63	Şanlıurfa	8.49	72.78	2
64	Uşak	8.21	74.87	1
65	Van	3.21	76.58	0

66	Yozgat	12.04	78.78	55
67	Zonguldak	9.24	89.47	1

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*Source:* Compiled by the author from State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *National Education Statistics: Formal Education, 1992-1993* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1995); Servet Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996), 517-541; and Peter Alford Andrews, ed., *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey* (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert, 1989). For details, see section 6.2 of this study.

## Appendix V. Calculating Electoral Volatility in Turkey, 1965-2002

Year	Volatility type	Vote swings <sup>a</sup>
1965	Total	$(JP65-JP61) + (RPP65-RPP61) + (RPNP65+NP65-RPNP61) + (TWP65-TWP61) + (NTP65-NTP61) + (Ind.65-Ind.61)$
	Left-right	Left = $(RPP65-RPP61) + (TWP65-TWP61)$
		Right = $(JP65-JP61) + (RPNP65+NP65-RPNP61) + (NTP65-NTP61) + (Ind.65-Ind.61)$
	Systemic	Pro-systemic = $(JP65-JP61) + (RPP65-RPP61) + (NTP65-NTP61) + (Ind.65-Ind.61)$
		Anti-systemic = $(RPNP65+NP65-RPNP61) + (TWP65-TWP61)$
	Incumbent	Incumbent = $RPP65 - RPP61$
Opposition = $(JP65-JP61) + (RPNP65+NP65-RPNP61) + (TWP65-TWP61) + (NTP65-NTP61) + (Ind.65-Ind.61)$		
Traumatic	Government experience = $RPP65 - RPP61$	
	Never in government = $(JP65-JP61) + (RPNP65+NP65-RPNP61) + (TWP65-TWP61) + (NTP65-NTP61) + (Ind.65-Ind.61)$	
1969	Total	$(JP69-JP65) + (RPP69-RPP65) + (NAP69-RPNP65) + (NP69-NP65) + (NTP69-NTP65) + TUP69 + (TWP69-TWP65) + (Ind.69-Ind.65)$
	Left-right	Left = $(RPP69-RPP65) + (TWP69-TWP65) + TUP69$
		Right = $(JP69-JP65) + (NAP69-RPNP65) + (NP69-NP65) + (NTP69-NTP65) + (Ind.69-Ind.65)$
	Systemic	Pro-systemic = $(JP69-JP65) + (RPP69-RPP65) + (NP69-NP65) + (NTP69-NTP65) + (Ind.69-Ind.65)$
		Anti-systemic = $(NAP69-RPNP65) + TUP69 + (TWP69-TWP65)$
	Incumbent	Incumbent = $JP69-JP65$
Opposition = $(RPP69-RPP65) + (NAP69-RPNP65) + (NP69-NP65) + (NTP69-NTP65) + TUP69 + (TWP69-TWP65) + (Ind.69-Ind.65)$		
Traumatic	Government experience = $(JP69-JP65) + (RPP69-RPP65)$	
	Never in government = $(JP69-JP65) + (NAP69-RPNP65) + (NP69-NP65) + (NTP69-NTP65) + TUP69 + (TWP69-TWP65) + (Ind.69-Ind.65)$	
1973	Total	$(JP73+DP73-JP69-NTP69) + (RPP73-RPP69) + (RRP73-RRP69) + (NP73-NP69) + (NAP73-NAP69) + NSP73 + (TUP73-TUP69) + (Ind.73-Ind.69)$

	Left-right	Left = (RPP73-RPP69) + (RRP73-RRP69) + (TUP73-TUP69) Right = (JP73+DP73-JP69-NTP69) + (NP73-NP69) + (NAP73-NAP69) + NSP73 + (Ind.73-Ind.69)
	Systemic	Pro-systemic = (JP73+DP73-JP69-NTP69) + (RPP73-RPP69) + (RRP73-RRP69) + (NP73-NP69) + (Ind.73-Ind.69) Anti-systemic= (NAP73-NAP69) + NSP73 + (TUP73-TUP69) + (Ind.73-Ind.69)
	Incumbent	Incumbent = (JP73+DP73-JP69-NTP69) Opposition= (RPP73-RPP69) + (RRP73-RRP69) + (NP73-NP69) + (NAP73-NAP69) + NSP73 + (TUP73-TUP69) + (Ind.73-Ind.69)
	Traumatic	Government experience = (JP73+DP73-JP69-NTP69) + (RPP73-RPP69) Never in government = (RRP73-RRP69) + (NP73-NP69) + (NAP73-NAP69) + NSP73 + (TUP73-TUP69) + (Ind.73-Ind.69)
1977	Total	(JP77-JP73) + (RPP77-RPP73) + (RRP77-RRP73) + (DP77-DP73) + (NP77-NP73) + (NAP77-NAP73) + (NSP77-NSP73) + (TUP77-TUP73) + TWP77 + Ind.
	Left-right	Left= (RPP77-RPP73) + (RRP77-RRP73) + TWP77 Right = (JP77-JP73) + (DP77-DP73) + (NP77-NP73) + (NAP77-NAP73) + (NSP77-NSP73) + (TUP77-TUP73) + Ind.
	Systemic	Pro-systemic= (JP77-JP73) + (RPP77-RPP73) + (RRP77-RRP73) + (DP77-DP73) + (NP77-NP73) + Ind.. Anti-systemic = (NAP77-NAP73) + (NSP77-NSP73) + (TUP77-TUP73) + TWP77
	Incumbent	Incumbent = (JP77-JP73) + (RRP77-RRP73) + (NP77-NP73) + (NAP77-NAP73) + (NSP77-NSP73) Opposition = (RPP77-RPP73) + (DP77-DP73) + (TUP77-TUP73) + TWP77 + Ind.
	Traumatic	Government experience= (JP77-JP73) + (RPP77-RPP73) + (RRP77-RRP73) + (NP77-NP73) + (NAP77-NAP73) + (NSP77-NSP73) Never in government = (DP77-DP73) + (TUP77-TUP73) + TWP77 + Ind.
1991	Total	(DLP91-DLP87) + (MP91-MP87) + (SDPP91-SDPP87) + (TPP91-TPP87) + (WP91+NAP91-WP87-NAP87) + (Other91-Other87) + (Ind91-Ind87)

	Left-right	Left = (DLP91-DLP87) + (SDPP91-SDPP87) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (Other91-Other87)
		Right = (MP91-MP87) + (TPP91-TPP87) + (WP91+NAP91-WP87-NAP87) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (Other91-Other87) + (Ind91-Ind87)
	Systemic	Pro-systemic = (DLP91-DLP87) + (MP91-MP87) + (SDPP91-SDPP87) + (TPP91-TPP87) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (Other91-Other87) + (Ind91-Ind87)
		Anti-systemic = (WP91+NAP91-WP87-NAP87) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (Other91-Other87)
	Incumbent	Incumbent = MP91-MP87
		Opposition = (DLP91-DLP87) + (SDPP91-SDPP87) + (TPP91-TPP87) + (WP91+NAP91-WP87-NAP87) + (Other91-Other87) + (Ind91-Ind87)
	Traumatic	Government experience = MP91-MP87
		Never in government = (DLP91-DLP87) + (SDPP91-SDPP87) + (TPP91-TPP87) + (WP91+NAP91-WP87-NAP87) + (Other91-Other87) + (Ind91-Ind87)
1995	Total	(DLP95-DLP91) + (MP95-MP91) + (RPP95+PDP95-SDPP91) + (TPP95-TPP91) + (WP95+NAP95-WP91) + (Other95-Other91) + (Ind95-Ind91)
	Left-right	Left = (DLP95-DLP91) + (RPP95+PDP95-SDPP91) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (Other95-Other91)
		Right = (MP95-MP91) + (TPP95-TPP91) + (WP95+NAP95-WP91) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (Other95-Other91) + (Ind95-Ind91)
	Systemic	Pro-systemic = (DLP95-DLP91) + (MP95-MP91) + (RPP95+PDP95-SDPP91) + (TPP95-TPP91) + (Other95-Other91) + (Ind95-Ind91)
		Anti-systemic = (WP95+NAP95-WP91) + $\frac{1}{2}$ (Other95-Other91)
	Incumbent	Incumbent = (RPP95+PDP95-SDPP91) + (TPP95-TPP91)
		Opposition = (DLP95-DLP91) + (MP95-MP91) + (WP95+NAP95-WP91) + (Other95-Other91) + (Ind95-Ind91)
	Traumatic	Government experience = (MP95-MP91) + (RPP95+PDP95-SDPP91) + (TPP95-TPP91)
		Never in government = (DLP95-DLP91) + (WP95+NAP95-WP91) + (Other95-Other91) + (Ind95-Ind91)

1999	Total	$(DLP99-DLP95) + (MP99-MP95) + (RPP99-RPP95) + (TPP99-TPP95) + (VP99-VP95) + (NAP99-NAP95) + (PDP99-PDP95) + (Other99-Other95) + (Ind99-Ind95)$
	Left-right	Left = $(DLP99-DLP95) + (RPP99-RPP95) + (PDP99-PDP95) + \frac{1}{2} (Other99-Other95)$ Right = $(MP99-MP95) + (TPP99-TPP95) + (VP99-VP95) + (NAP99-NAP95) + \frac{1}{2} (Other99-Other95) + (Ind99-Ind95)$
	Systemic	Pro-systemic = $(DLP99-DLP95) + (MP99-MP95) + (RPP99-RPP95) + (TPP99-TPP95) + \frac{1}{2} (Other99-Other95) + (Ind99-Ind95)$ Anti-systemic = $(VP99-VP95) + (NAP99-NAP95) + (PDP99-PDP95) + \frac{1}{2} (Other99-Other95)$
	Incumbent	Incumbent = $(DLP99-DLP95) + (MP99-MP95)$ Opposition = $(RPP99-RPP95) + (TPP99-TPP95) + (VP99-VP95) + (NAP99-NAP95) + (PDP99-PDP95) + (Other99-Other95) + (Ind99-Ind95)$
	Traumatic	Government experience = $(DLP99-DLP95) + (MP99-MP95) + (RPP99-RPP95) + (TPP99-TPP95) + (VP99-VP95)$ Never in government = $(NAP99-NAP95) + (PDP99-PDP95) + (Other99-Other95) + (Ind99-Ind95)$
2002	Total	$(DLP02-DLP99) + (MP02-MP99) + (RPP02-RPP99) + (TPP02-TPP99) + (JDP02+HP02-VP99) + (NAP02-NAP99) + (DPP02-PDP99) + YP02 + (Other02-Other99) + (Ind02-Ind99)$
	Left-right	Left = $(DLP02-DLP99) + (RPP02-RPP99) + (DPP02-PDP99) + \frac{1}{2} (Other02-Other99)$ Right = $(MP02-MP99) + (TPP02-TPP99) + (JDP02+HP02-VP99) + (NAP02-NAP99) + YP02 + \frac{1}{2} (Other02-Other99) + (Ind02-Ind99)$
	Systemic	Pro-systemic = $(DLP02-DLP99) + (MP02-MP99) + (RPP02-RPP99) + (TPP02-TPP99) + \frac{1}{2} (Other02-Other99) + (Ind02-Ind99)$ Anti-systemic = $(JDP02+HP02-VP99) + (NAP02-NAP99) + (DPP02-PDP99) + YP02 + \frac{1}{2} (Other02-Other99)$
	Incumbent	Incumbent = $(DLP02-DLP99) + (MP02-MP99) + (NAP02-NAP99)$ Opposition = $(RPP02-RPP99) + (TPP02-TPP99) + (JDP02+HP02-VP99) + (DPP02-PDP99) + YP02 + (Other02-Other99)$

+ (Ind02-Ind99)

Traumatic      Government experience = (DLP02-DLP99) + (MP02-MP99) +  
(NAP02-NAP99) + (RPP02-RPP99) + (TPP02-TPP99)  
Never in government = (JDP02+HP02-VP99) + (DPP02-PDP99) +  
YP02 + (Other02-Other99) + (Ind02-Ind99)

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*Source:* Compiled by the author.

*Note:* For definitions and counting rules, see. 4.2, especially pp. 30-31.

<sup>a</sup> For total volatility, the sum of the absolute value of each vote swing is divided by two. For inter-bloc volatilities (left-right, systemic, incumbent, and traumatic), the absolute values of both blocs are combined and are divided by two.

**Appendix VI. Time-series Data for the Retrospective Voting Model, 1950-2002**

Year	Day-month	Incumbent parties	Vote <sub>t</sub> (A)	Vote <sub>t-1</sub> (B)	Swing (A-B)	Real GNP/cap change	Inflation change	Jobless change	Num. of parties	Office years
1950	14-May	RPP	39.9	54.0	-14.1	(0.6)	(6.5)	(-0.5)	1	4
1954	5-Feb	DP	56.6	53.4	3.2	(8.5)	(0.2)	(0.9)	1	4
1957	27-Oct	DP	47.3	56.6	-9.3	2.6	-2.6	-0.4	1	4
1963*	17-Nov	RPP, RPNP, NTP	45.8	64.4	-18.6	5.3	1.9	0.0	3	2
1965	10-Oct	RPP	28.7	36.2	-7.5	1.1	1.4	0.2	1	1
1968*	2-Jun	JP	49.1	52.9	-3.8	(5.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	1	3
1969	12-Oct	JP	46.5	49.1	-2.6	2.9	0.6	0.7	1	1
1973	14-Oct	JP <sup>1</sup>	41.7	46.5	-4.8	3.1	3.9	0.5	1	2
1977	5-Jun	JP, NSP, NAP	51.9	45.0	6.9	(5.0)	(0.8)	(1.4)	3	2
1984*	25-Mar	MP	41.5	45.1	-3.6	(1.7)	(0.6)	(-0.1)	1	0
1987	29-Nov	MP	36.3	41.5	-5.2	5.9	-3.1	0.4	1	4
1989*	26-Mar	MP	21.8	36.3	-14.5	(-0.7)	(34.8)	(0.5)	1	2
1991	20-Oct	MP	24.0	21.8	2.2	2.7	1.4	-0.2	1	2
1994*	27-Mar	TPP, SDPP <sup>2</sup>	36.3	47.8	-11.5	(-0.8)	(18.1)	(0.4)	2	2
1995	24-Dec	TPP, RPP	29.9	36.3	-6.4	6.0	11.0	-1.3	2	2
1999	18-Apr	MP, DLP	35.4	34.2	1.2	(4.2)	(2.1)	(-0.1)	2	2
2002	3-Nov	DLP, NAP, MP	14.7	53.4	-38.7	-3.5	-12.5	2.1	3	4

Source: Compiled by the author from the following sources.

Election data: State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Statistical Yearbook* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, various years).  
Real GNP per capita and inflation (measured by the consumer price index): State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Statistical Indicators: 1923-1990* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1991); Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey's website, accessible from <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/>.  
Unemployment (age 15 and above): Tuncer Bulutay, *Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey*, International Labour Organization (Ankara, 1995), 256, table 8.A; State Institute of Statistics (SIS), *Household Labour Force Survey Results* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, various years).  
*Note: DP* signifies the Democrat Party (1946-1960), which is different from the Democratic Party (DP) shown in Appendix I  
\* General local elections.  
<sup>1</sup> DP votes included.  
<sup>2</sup> RPP votes included

