

To my Family

COSTS AND BENEFITS TO TURKEY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES: THE COLD WAR AND AFTER

The institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

December 2003

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ABSTRACT

COSTS AND BENEFITS TO TURKEY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES: THE COLD WAR AND AFTER

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Turkey's relations with the United States have always been a diagnostic element not only for its foreign policy but also its economic and sociological structure. As a global power, the US has always interested in the region from Eurasia to the Middle East, which inevitably highlight Turco-American relations. This thesis is a product of the idea, which gives importance to analyze the key issues in Turco-American relations in order to ferret out costs and benefits of Turkish side from its relations with the US. It probably gives us to chance to see alterations in relations and evaluate Turkish foreign policy vision in the long run. "Indefiniteness" can be accepted as the nature of the global environment of the post Cold War which has appeared specifically in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks. So, following developments in Turkey's region indicates that there is need to evaluate Turkish position in its relations with the US. This reevaluation period should not only comprise strategic, economic and political relations in Turco-American relations but also some cliché concepts like "strategic partnership", "dependency", "global power" and so on. This is why this thesis is analyzing Turco-American relations into two sections; the Cold War and the post Cold War Eras, because it aims to extract and underline in which ways this bilateral relation has changed with changing conjectures, which probably enlighten us about the near future of the relations. Therefore, it is possible to think that this thesis is an attempt to highlight the important linkage between an "established" or "weak" foreign policy and its possible reflections on the state's international statisko in more general meaning.

Keywords: Turco-American relations, strategic partnership, dependency, global power, international cooperation, the Cold war, the post Cold War, Turkish foreign policy.

ÖZET

SOĞUK SAVAŞ VE SONRASINDA TÜRKİYE’NİN ABD İLE İLİŞKİLERİNDEN KAYIPLARI VE KAZANÇLARI

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Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

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Türkiye’nin Amerika Birleşik Devletleriyle olan ilişkileri sadece dış politikası için değil aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyolojik yapısında her zaman belirleyici bir öge olmuştur. Küresel bir güç olarak ABD, Avrasya’dan Ortadoğu’ya kadar uzanan bölgeyle her zaman ilgilenmiştir ki bu da kaçınılmaz olarak Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin dikkat çekmesini sağlamıştır. Bu tez Türk tarafının ABD ile ilişkilerinden doğan kazançları ve zararlarını ortaya çıkarmak için bazı anahtar nitelikteki konuların analiz edilmesinin önemine inanan bir fikrin ürünüdür. Çünkü, bu muhtemelen bizlere bu ilişkideki değişimleri görme ve uzun vadede Türk dış politikasının vizyonunu değerlendirme şansı verecektir. Özellikle 11 Eylül terör saldırıları ve sonrasında Türkiye’nin bölgesindeki gelişmelerle beliren Soğuk Savaş sonrası küresel ortamın ‘belirsizlik’ doğası göstermektedir ki Türkiye’nin ABD ile olan ilişkilerindeki pozisyonunu acil olarak bir değerlendirmeye ihtiyaç vardır. Bu yeniden değerlendirme süreci sadece Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerindeki stratejik, ekonomik ve politik ilişkileri kapsamamalı bunu yanı sıra “stratejik ortaklık”, “bağımlılık” ve “küresel güç” gibi bazı klişe kavramların tekrar gözden geçirilmesini içermelidir. İşte bu nedenlerle bu tez Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini Soğuk Savaş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası diye iki bölüm halinde inceliyor. Çünkü, bu tez muhtemelen bizleri yakın gelecekle ilgili aydınlatacak olan bu ikili ilişkinin hangi konjektürde nasıl değişeceğini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. O yüzden daha geniş manada, bu tezin “oturmuş” veya “zayıf” bir dış politika ile buların değişik yansımalarının arasındaki önemli bağın bir ülkenin uluslararası statüsü üzerindeki etkilerini değerlendiren bir deneme olduğunu varsaymak muhtemeldir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, stratejik ortaklık, bağımlılık, küresel güç, uluslararası işbirliği, Soğuk Savaş, Soğuk Savaş sonrası, Türk dış politikası.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks to my thesis supervisor, Visiting Assist. Prof. Dr. Jeremy Salt. Actually, this work would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my supervisor and teacher, Visiting Assist. Prof. Dr. Jeremy Salt. He has given valuable support in my whole academic life and he has always directed me towards improve myself in this area.

I am deeply grateful to Assist. Prof. Dr. Aylin Güney, who is one of my committee members, for her support and comments on my thesis. I will never forget her abundantly helpful supports throughout all my years at Bilkent University.

I express my gratitude to Dr. Tore Fougner, one of my committee members, for his advice on my thesis. His advice motivated me to develop this study.

Finally, I would like to thank my family members, both my mother Ülker Buyruk, and my father Fatih Buyruk not only for supporting and encouraging me to pursue this thesis but also for supporting me during my whole study life. Without my family's encouragement, I would not have finished this M.A. degree.

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Most studies acknowledge that the world entered a new era in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. In this new era bilateral relations between specific countries have become a matter of primary concern, perhaps more so than during the bloc-oriented Cold War Era. As an important global power of twentieth century- the US led several different types of changes in the world order, whether in the Cold War Era or the Post Cold War Era. In this sense, Turkey has appeared as a good example to observe changing concerns in international politics. In essence, the direction of Turco-American relations during the Cold War and in the Post Cold War Eras can be accepted as an important indicator in determining Turkey's present and future positions in its relations with the US. Moving from this point of view, this thesis is an attempt to write an overview of Turco-American relations, to compare them between the Cold War and post-Cold War Eras and produce a kind of cost-benefit analysis focusing on key developments during these periods that have shaped relations between the two countries.

First of all it is better to underline the framework of this work in order to clarify the aims, behind the writing of this thesis. Regarding the framework of this thesis, the main purpose of this thesis is developing a sort of outlook on specific issues in Turco-American relations in order to ferret out main tendencies and accordingly their impacts on Turkish position. In other words, the general motive of this framework is specifying the key issues- which have created both positive and negative impacts on Turkey- to observe possible shifts in Turkish foreign policy

mechanism in related to US, rather than trying to rewrite Turco-American relations' nature. In this connection, it can be also possible to talk about two sub-motives of the analysis on key issues in Turco-American relations in the following chapters. First sub-motive is observing kind of opportunities and also constraints that Turkey had witnessed in its relations with the US. The second one is questioning the accuracy and impacts of some concepts such as 'dependency', 'real-politic', and 'strategic partnership' on Turco-American relations parallel to the shifts in Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, in short, I believe in the importance of analyzing key issues and their impacts on Turco-American relations in order to envisage how different interests and attitudes have changed the process, which probably enlightens us to look forward beyond some conceptual limitations. These are the main motives and accordingly limits of my framework for this thesis that have canalized me to research on Turco-American relations. So it is possible to point out that this thesis is going to try to demonstrate specific issues and analyze these issues according to Turkish costs and benefits.

When we refer 'cost-benefit' concept, we should clarify the limitations of these concepts to specify in which point of view these concepts are going to be use. First of all, it should be noted that the terminology of the cost and benefits is in fact open to subjective mean of analysis and accordingly biases. That is to say that it is very hard to signify both the costs and benefits for a country. In other words, for example, an obvious cost in Turco-American relations for one perspective could be easily perceived by another perspective as an opportunity or benefit. On the other hand, in my opinion, cost and benefits is an extrinsic mean of analyzing the real impacts of specific issues and the accuracy of some concepts (like the accurate impact of dependency concept) in related to Turco-American relations. On this point,

it is better to set some limitations on the cost and benefit concepts in order to avoid biases as much as possible. In this connection, the costs and benefits in this thesis is going to seek two main criterions. First, in general, costs and benefits will be evaluated according to their impacts on Turkey. For example, if one situation explicitly results with economic or political constraints for Turkey, this thesis will evaluate these constraints as “costs”. Secondly, specifically, this thesis is going to look the correlation between the results of the situations in Turco-American relations and the concepts which is explaining in the introduction chapter (like dependency). For example, this thesis is going to question whether a situation created dependency or another concept occurrence in Turco-American relations. By following these criterions, it will be easier to underline the costs and benefits according to more objective means. On the other hand, it is possible to claim that my individual background and the resources which will be used in analyzing will be somehow effectual on defining costs and benefits in Turco-American relations. But, instead of summing of these costs and benefits, the essential point is their specific impacts on the direction of Turco-American relations.

When we focus on Turkey in some detail we can see that most of the costs and benefits arising from its relationship with the US have been governed by domestic factors and foreign policy miscalculations, rather than the predominance of the US in the relationship. This may well be true of other countries that have a close relationship with the US. In other words, a combination of all possible elements is the best guide to understanding the relationship between countries, even when one (the US) is a global power. Although the US is now the only global super power, it still finds it impossible to impose unilateral domination or control over all the countries, which with it has relations. It is not just the weaker country that is affected

by the US. The US itself can be also affected by another country's smallest political maneuvers, a reality that highlights the validity of the notion of interdependency. This reality leads us to the conclusion that the unique power of the US is only one of several components in relations between the US and other countries. The interests of the US may well dominate its relationship with another country, but this might not be true of all countries. For this reason, an underlying theme of this thesis is that the other country's interests and foreign policies may have also a powerful effect on a country's relations with the US.

As noted before, clearly the costs and benefits will change according to the differing perspectives and evaluations of each historical period. Thus the costs and benefits in the Cold War Era were totally different from the post Cold War Era. More interestingly, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington broadened the debate on different opened values in the cost-benefit balance between countries. There is consensus that the world has witnessed an increase of tension between the state and ethnic/national particularism as well as with 'international terrorism'. The world seems to be reaching a point where, given alternative means, policies and accordingly complexities, it will be almost impossible for a single power or one or two powers to exercise total global control. There can be some difficulty in keeping up with the transformations now taking place; for example, according to Brat Roberts (1995: vol 18- 1):

Analysts labor with an intellectual inheritance often ill-suited to the problems of the present: common wisdom about the way states behave, problems of war and peace, and strategic weapons, arms control, and stability all derive from the highly distinctive cold war era. Government official's tinker with policy instruments designed for the problems of a different time. It is not surprising that the rapid and dramatic changes in international affairs of the last decade should have outpaced the understanding of an academic, policy, and intellectual community whose stance has been largely reactive.

This point of view also led me to work on Turco-American relations in order to explore differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War Eras. I have sought to pay particular attention to the way in which political, strategic, and economic issues have affected the relationship between the US and Turkey. As I have indicated, in the post-Cold War era, bilateral relations would seem to be of more value following the collapse of the 'bloc' mentality that characterized foreign policy relations at the height of the Cold War.

I regard political science as a complementary component to international relations in analysis of foreign policy because -- as already indicated -- domestic or political miscalculations along with such factors as religion can be very influential elements in the relationship between two countries. In this thesis the initial aim is to work from a perspective that takes into account a range of domestic factors as well as external issues that have affected the relationship between the US and Turkey. Preferring analysis to a chronological account of events, I will avoid deep historical and statistical data except where it is necessary to substantiate my analysis.

The relationship between the US and a cosmopolitan and geopolitically key country would be best illustrates the *sine qua non* need to get a broader perspective and accordingly to get rid of static and conceptualized analysis like "the US and others". Turkey is an extensive example related with all these arguments which this thesis going to try to explain, because Turco-American relations is extrinsically allows us to see the transformation of the interrelations between a super power and a regionally important country. It also gives us to analysis the chance to explore the regional and global effects of miscalculations and successes, confidences and distrustfulness, and their reflections on the future of multilateral relations. In this sense, it can be possible to see many actors at work in Turco-American relations,

whether negative or positive ones, such as embargos, military partnerships and alliances, manipulation and domination, ideological bombardment, speculation, dependency, interdependency and so on.

As a matter of fact, these elements are the ones that I shall focus on. Importantly, it seems to be important to shortly clarify some of these concepts, which is believed to be most influential on Turco-American relations. These are: global power, dependency (and also interdependency), realpolitik, democratization and strategic partnership. Therefore, it is better to look at some concepts that may or may not be influenced by shifting costs and benefits in Turco-American relations

First of all, it is therefore important to look in brief at the specifics of Turkish foreign policy and also the 'global power' of the US in this introduction part, before moving on to an examination of specific cases and a cost-benefit analysis in following chapters. First, I wish to clarify the concept of global power. There are the terms or expressions "global", "globalization" and "global conflict" with which the US is often associated but only the term "global power" sums up its diplomatic, economic and military reach. While the global power of the US was (and is) only one component of Turco-American relations, we need to identify the global power identity and its possible influence on Turco-American relations to highlight the other important components and the real impact of the US's global power identity on Turco-American cost benefit analysis. Max Weber underlines "power" as a source for expressing one's will in social relations. According to Weber power is the basic source for influencing others. (Goehler, 2000: 42-43) On this point Gerhard Goehler (2000: 43) asserts that the concept of power should be considered as the sum of different variables which emerge from all kinds of social, political, economic and cultural relations. Power is not simply one-sided domination. As Erkki Berndtson

has argued (Goehler, 2000: 155) globalization is creating a different mean of socialization, development and accordingly different ways of using of power. Political and ideological manipulation is closely associated with global power and accordingly the globalization process. (Spybey, 1996:151-152)

In general, the expansion of global power arose with the emergence of the Cold War. The conditions of the Cold War Era created polarization in all senses between the two main world powers, the US and the USSR. (Kissinger, 2000:393) For more than 40 years, global power was polarized in the ideological and economic sense between the 'west' and the communist world. [In addition to this, the Cold War also witnessed the huge differences within the so-called communist camp, between the USSR and China.] Such was the enmity between the two main world powers that each deployed its global power towards the sole end of beating down the other (possibly more true of the US than the USSR) This polarization directly affected other actors, generally in the form of limitations on their policies.(Kissinger, 2000:396) Indeed, the ideological element of global power during the Cold War era made other countries less capable of developing their own positions in world politics. (Kissinger, 2000:396-97). The limitations of the Cold War Era also affected their economic and social status. Turkey was one of these countries, and was perhaps affected even more strongly because of its geo-strategic position. Tobin Siebers (1993, 84-86) has also argued that the Cold War era also imposed conflicting ethical values on the world, which may be focused as an another important dimension in turco0American relations in connection with other effects.

The character of global power changed just after the collapse of the USSR: as the 'victorious' global power the US was able by various means to project its own values on to the world. Thus global power in the post-Cold War era has meant

reconstruction of the world according to American ideological, political and economic perspectives: the capitalist mode of production under the domination of American firms has become one cornerstone of the unique hegemonic power of the US as Bargchi has pointed out (Bargchi, 1987:4). Hegemony implies and demands total control. This is especially true of these regions of the world characterized by their strategic importance (because of geographic position, possession of vital world natural resources etc.). On the other hand, balancing all political and economical variables is an extremely difficult task even for the US. (Simai, 1990:165-166) Thus even for a global power “world order” must become “the sum total of the relationship among its [the world’s] components (elements) or the total effects of the regulating forces determining development, international movements and relations.” (Simai, 1990:166)

The post Cold War Era of the 1990s gave rise to a new kind of conflict between the US and various state and non-state actors challenging its hegemony. The violence of the September 11 attacks a new period. In this sense, even for the source and reasons attacking to the US is not extrinsically envisaging, whether it caused by opposition to the US as a hegemonic power or opposition to its policies in Muslim countries. This in fact symbolizes how flue the new period and open to complexities and surprises in the global politics and also in the foreign policy concept. But it let one exact consequence, that is, the expression of US global power has certainly had strong consequences – both negative and positive -- in various parts of the world. The Turkish case is a particularly interesting example of the relationship between a super power and a lesser player in the world arena because of Turkey’s strategic and geographical position (and importance to the global power) but also because of its type of government and demographic structure.

It is obvious that the “global power” of the US has been influential on Turco-American relations, but it is also necessary to look at the Turkish side to include all the background variables of Turco-American relations. Since the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey has been an important actor in European and international politics because of its geo-strategic position. In this period the relationship with the west has been the most dominant factor in the direction of Turkish politics both in domestic and foreign senses, both positively and negatively. It might be normal to see Turkish politics as constituting some sort of dependency on Western values or pro-European style politics. One of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy and accordingly Turkish politics has been to become European in the sense of modernization, democratization.(Kongar, 1999:460) This objective arises from Ottoman history but is also influenced by close proximity to Europe and the desire to modernize. The shifts and changes as Turkey seeks to achieve its goals vis-à-vis Europe or the US (or with respect to ‘westernization’ in general) affect Turkish domestic politics and at the same time are influenced by them, as Müftüler (1996: 256) has pointed out.¹ Political instability within Turkey indeed has to include as a critical component of Turco-American relations along with the particular role of the military in Turkey and the intervention of the army following waves of political instability. As E. Özbudun (2000: 29) has observed “the three military interventions in recent Turkish politics [1960, 1971 and 1980] resulted from profound crises in democratic rule.” It means that, military interventions and disruptions of the democratic regime created obstacles in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy. In this sense, even the military interventions somehow affected Turco-American relations.

¹ See chapter 2, section 2.1.and also 2.1 in order to proper analysis of Turkish domestic political manipulations and instability, especially on Democrat Party period during the Cold War.

In the early period of the Turkish republic the aim of the governing Republican People's Party was to create a high bureaucratic state structure. (Özbudun,2000:23) in which both foreign and domestic policy centered on the general ideal of 'westernization'. In consequence Turkey adapted western styles and values in its domestic politics and social life but on the other hand 'westernization' as an ideology inevitably led to more dependency on Europe and the US, especially in foreign policy decisions. During the Democrat Party government period (1950-1960) Turkish foreign policy was mostly dependent on the US in economical and also political senses. (See chapter 2 for detailed examples during this period). Ironically, this dependency developed out of the domestic politics dynamics of the Democrat Party period rather than the 'global power' identity of the US.

While influenced by domestic policy needs, Turkey's foreign policy is also affected by changing global and regional environments. The post Cold War environment has brought with it new issues and problems. Today Turkish foreign policy has several problems both internationally and domestically. For example, internationally, Turkish foreign policy has had to deal with involvement in the Gulf War and accordingly the ramifications of the Kurdish question in northern Iraq between 1991 and 1995. (See chapter 3-3.3) The Gulf War developed out of Turkish foreign policy control and brought with it substantial costs to Turkey. Today Turkish foreign policy faces fresh problems on its eastern borders as a result of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003. (See chapter 3-3.3) How Turkey responded to the invasion was important politically, economically and militarily. As can be seen the Turkish position (especially the refusal of the recently elected Turkish government to allow the US to use Turkey as the launching pad for the opening of a second front against Iraq) opened up a new chapter in Turco-American relations.

(See chapter 3 and also chapter 6). Turkey's so-called partnership with the US entered an extremely difficult period in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. (See chapter 4-4.3. for detailed analysis). The dilemma centering on the occupation of Iraq and the ramifications for Turkey has to be regarded as being separate from the more general question of how Turkey is to relate to the US as the world's only super power and how it is to fit other needs (i.e. to join the EU- See chapter 4-4.3) into this relationship. As has already been indicated such concepts as "democratization", "political instability", "dependency" and " regional dynamics" have added new dimensions to any cost-benefit analysis of Turco-American relationship: it is not simply decided by the "global power" of the US.

In this connection, secondly, it would be important to define the concept of dependency to the reason that dependency as a concept which is believed to have influence on Turco-American relations. In fact, dependency as a concept appears as another important topic that should be somehow clarified in order to draw limitations of the meaning of dependency in Turco-American relations. On this point, however dependency generally brings school of dependency theory to minds, this thesis is going to take up dependency as a concept in order to ferret out actual effects of specific situations on Turco-American. In other words, regarding the concept of dependency, political and economic constraints or opportunities, which is directly related to specific situations, will be considered for criterion of dependency evaluation, rather than evaluating Turco-American relations whether its linkage with dependency theories or not. Implementations and outcomes of the specific situations (both in the Cold War and after) in Turco-American relations, the concept of dependency have gain different type of complexities so that it is possible to think that dependency as a concept have played important role both in the specific issues

in Turco –American relations during the Cold War and its aftermath. It may be better to define the sources of dependency concept in Turco-American relations in order to clarify the actual impact of dependency on the specific issues in Turco-American relations. For example, Leyla Sen (2003:315) is evaluating the dependency concept in related to the Turco-American relations more than economic meaning of dependency. As she has pointed out, (2003:315)

In addition to economic issues, diplomatic issues became matters of confrontation. (For example) The milestone in this confrontation (During the Cold War) was the Cyprus issue that led to the breaking of the glass and compelled Turkey to see the realities.

This example in fact let to see the reality of dependency concept in Turco-American relations that demands of the super power, the US, has been mostly diplomatic and strategic, in return of Turkey's economic expectations (Foreign aids) from the US. The highlighted point here is the increasing complexities in Turco-American relations with the occurrence of dependency concept in separate issues such as economic, politic, and military. Inevitably, the level of dependency concept has arisen in economic, diplomatic and military issues that directly has affected the cost and benefit analysis in Turco-American relations. Moving from this argument, for example, Turkish economic dilemma has played an important role in its political relations with the US so that complexities and interrelations between economic, politic, and military issues can be regarding as the first source of the dependency concept in Turco-American relations that is underlined and somehow analyzed in the following chapters.

In addition to this main source of dependency in Turco-American relations, the US's increasing role in Turkish social and economic development in the Cold

War Era indicates another dimension of dependency concept in Turco-American relations. For example, as Sen has pointed out (Sen, 2003: 328)

Regarding the demands of the USA for an increased role and empowerment of private sector (during the first years of the Cold War), and without raising explicit objections Turkish policymakers preferred to refer to the previous experiences of the country. They defined the failure of the private sector to act as a locomotive of the Turkish economy during the first decade of Republic as the main reason that led them to adopt etatism.

Besides what this example tries to underline, the essential point of this example is to show increasing US's role on Turkish domestic economic and political mechanism during the Cold War and after. Therefore, it is again possible to highlight the involvement of dependency concept into the Turkish economic and political progress and the role of the US.

Some aspects of dependency can certainly be identified in the Turco-American relationship, especially during the Cold War when the level of political dependency could be described as almost full. (See Chapter 2). Another example arose in consequence of the US arms embargo in the mid-1970s: Turkish dependency on US arms created further costs in the sense of its political dependency. Subsequently (in the 1990s) Turkey turned to other countries (Russia and Israel) to buy arms. But surely they were never as important as US arms. (see chapter 4 section 4.1) The crucial role of the US securing loans from the IMF and the World Bank also (and obviously) arises in the context of dependency. Of course, examples can easily be augmented in Turco-American Relations history. The essential point here is the role of dependency both on appearing a specific situation in Turco-American relations and on subsequent situations.

Thirdly, *realpolitik* is a concept which may be partially important in Turco-American relations therefore we need to clarify in which perspective; *realpolitik*

became a topic in Turco-American relations. Here the important point is the basic definition of *realpolitik* rather than the details of political realism theory. In this sense I want to put my arguments based on Turco-American relations so that it is possible to think that this thesis will try to seek out whether *realpolitik* plays an important role in specific situations in Turco American relations. Therefore, it is better to start with the basic definition of the *realpolitik* in order to clarify in what sense I am going to focus *realpolitik* in Turco-American relations: “A usually expansionist national policy having as its sole principle advancement of the national interests”². In addition, another definition in fact is well summarizing the *realpolitik*. That is: “ruthlessly realistic and opportunist approach to statesmanship, rather than a moralistic one, esp. as exemplified by Bismarck”³ As it will be openly seen in the following chapters, we should underline the fact that Turkey and the US have continued relations mostly because of the conjectural strategic and national interests, rather than any other dynamics like neighborhood or ideological alliances or historical ties. It would be appropriate to evaluate Turco-American relations from the light of *realpolitik* to the reason that mutually national interests have been the main dynamic in Turco-American relations. In other words, Turkey has sheltered strategic and geographic specialties for the US global interests (like American use of Turkish territory for the military bases during the Cold War Era and Turkish support for American intervention in several different places in the Post Cold War Era). On the other hand, the US, as a global power, has sheltered *sine qua non* specialties for Turkey’s regional interests (like American support to Turkey against Soviet threatened in the Cold War Era and support for Turkey’s EU membership in the post Cold War Era).As a result, both strategic and geographic security have been fit into

² The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition
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³ *The Collins English Dictionary* © 2000 HarperCollins Publishers:

general characteristics of Turco-American relations. On this point, reciprocally national interests have played primary role in developing relations. Therefore, inescapably, national interests have become the key concept in Turco-American relations which opened hilly nature of Turco-American relations in general. So, it is appropriate to use the concept of realpolitik in order to clarify the basic motive of the parties in Turco-American relations.

Fourthly, the concept of democratization should be focused. In fact democratization in Turkey has been closely related to Turco-Western and specifically Turco- American relations. As Przeworski has pointed out, democracy and modernization are somehow embedded in each other (Przeworski, Limongi.1997: 158-9). As a matter of fact Turkish democratization has just come to Turco-American relations agenda as an primary component, because strategic interests has always played a essential role in its political and economic relations between Turkey and the US. For example, American oriented foreign aid to Turkey was not based on democratic advancement or human rights in Turkey in the past. But with the changing geographic and strategic interests the US has started to regard Turkish democracy as being a crucially important model in its struggle with radical Islamism in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. (See Chapter 3 section Sec. 3.4.). Therefore, it is hard to talk about primary place of democratization in Turco-American relations' history, especially during the Cold War, but, on the other hand, it needs to be focused in related to Turco-American relations

Strategic partnership is a concept which has been generally underlined by both American and Turkish administrators. So, fifthly, we should include the real meaning and the effects on the development of Turco-American relations. One of the aims of this thesis is questioning and enlightening the validity of the strategic

partnership in Turco-American relations. Beyond this, whether the relations fit into the strategic partnership explanation or not, both countries administrations have used this concept in order to explain their mutual relations, which catalyze us to investigate the strategic partnership. On this point, in order to get clear picture on the strategic partnership in Turco-American relations, we need to see some specific issues in contemporary history of relations. After this, I will turn to analysis of strategic partnership in the conclusion part.

As a result, this thesis defends three main assertions on Turco-American relations in the light of these concepts. After all these conceptual explanations, a core and the first assertion in this thesis is that Turco-American relations have developed in an interesting and somehow unique way. Unique part of the relations contains two main bases:

First, in an interesting way, reciprocal Turco-American relations have developed with a huge variety of international reflections on the global politics. Indeed, as exciting examples will be easily seen in the following chapters, Turco-American relations have gained international dimension because of both US's 'global power' identity and Turkey's geographic and strategic importance for the US. On this point, Turkey's geographical importance for the US benefits and foreign policy has played primary role in extraordinarily intensifying of Turco-American relations. Secondly, as indicated in the previous paragraph, both countries have needed to explain this relation with specific definition (such as 'Strategic Partnership') rather than explaining with some routine definitions (such as economic partnership or friendship or ally). Therefore, however strategic partnership definition is debatable concept, it constituted on of the basis for unique nature of Turco-American relations. In fact, all these explanations are not very clear explanations in

order to clarify the unique side of relations, but increasing intensity of Turco-American relations during the American intervention of Iraq and in the post invasion of Iraq, is the latest example to separate Turco-American relations from other diplomatic relations of the US in the post Cold War Era.(see chp.4) As a result, the relationship is an example of the variables that can be at work in the relationship between the US and potentially many other countries. At the same time the relationship between Turkey and the US is characterized by complexities of an international nature (as demonstrated by Cyprus and the question of Turkey's terrorism problems).

As second assertion, I prefer to underline the importance of political realism⁴ (in the limits which has defined above) in defining the historical development of Turco-American relations with referencing to conjectural differences in Turco-American relations. For most of the time the place of Turkey in US foreign policy has been dictated by global and national benefits to the US. For example, the Cuban Missile crisis, the opium crises and the arm embargo⁵ in the aftermath of the Cyprus operation all demonstrate political realism at work in Turco-American relations during the Cold War period. In addition to this, Iraq issues from the Gulf War to the recent US invasion of Iraq can count as significant examples of political realism in the relationship. As it can be seen in near past debates, Turkey's rejection to allow the US military activities in Turkey during the invasion of Iraq is the another pinpoint in Turkish American relations, because whether the Turkish government

⁴ Political realism assumes that "the general character of international relations is also true of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy. While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world. (Hans J. Morgenthau, 1978:11-12)

⁵ Respectively, see Chapter 2-2.4, 2.1 and Chapter 4- 4.1)

wanted to allow the US, public pressure on the government and the Parliament, Turkey has rejected the Americans request to use Turkish ground in order to pass into northern Iraq. So, in addition to realism, the Iraq issue is a good example of how other (complementary) factors, like public pressure may play an important role in Turco-American relations.

As an third assertion, in the light of the first and second assertions and the latest developments in Iraq, Turco-American relations seem likely to have a primary impact on the international system arising largely from perceptions of Turkey as a ‘moderate’ Muslim country which can perhaps be used in various ways (diplomatically as well as militarily – the use of Turkish troops as ‘peacekeepers’) to protect and further US interests. Clearly 2003 will turn out to be a pivotal year for Turco-American relations: more importantly, costs and benefits in a broad array of global and regional partnerships between the two countries will determine their future relationship.

As a result, this thesis can be no more than an overview of key issues in Turco-American relations. Within this limitation it seeks to set out the benefits and the costs to Turkey of its close relationship with the US. To what degree does Turkey fit the pattern of a dependent state? Does the concept like dependency (or other concepts like political realism), real politics, strategic partnership describe the Turkish position in the specific situations? To what degree can the relationship between the countries be described as patron-client? The answer to these questions, after the evidence has been presented, will be given in the concluding remarks of each chapter and mainly in the conclusion chapter.

CHAPTER 2

COST AND BENEFITS IN THE COLD WAR ERA

2.1 Ideological Affinities and Strategic Perspectives

The concept of ideology has been interpreted in many different ways since the French Revolution. During the Enlightenment “the study of ideas becomes focused on the ideas which animate human conduct, especially in the domain of the moral, the political, and the religious.” (Collins, 1993:9) However, the use of ideology and accordingly its definition almost totally changed or shifted in the conditions of the Cold War that began in the middle of the 20th century. In this period ideology was applied globally as part of an intricate weapons system deployed by rival powers. Ideology was embedded with lots of different meanings, which found a place itself both in the sociological and strategic dimensions in term of politics. For example, Ideological affinities became a dominant aspect of the Cold War period. Public groups put their interests on the line and individuals put their lives in jeopardy in the defense of specific ideologies, in the U.S., the Soviet Union and indeed around the world. Ideology meant different things to different people, different societies and different countries. For example, communists regarded their ideology as a source of freedom and equality between the people. In the U.S on the other hand, communism was demonized and given an entirely negative meaning. In short, every state and every faction in the Cold War – and this was especially true of the two main global powers; the U.S. and the USSR -- used ideology to support the extension of their power around the world. What effect did these ideological affinities have on the relationship between the U.S and Turkey, and what strategic choices did they

effectively force Turkish governments to make? These questions lie at the heart of this thesis.

If the Soviet Union was mostly concerned with promoting communist ideals around the world (albeit in its own national interest) the United States had no overarching ideology and preferred to talk more of such values as freedom and democracy. For this reason, the ideological affinities of the U.S seem to some observers to be more pragmatic than those of the Soviet Union. (Carlton, Levine, 1988:158). Both powers, however, did not hesitate to use force or subversion to implement their strategic goals. Differences between an ideological thesis (or an ideal abstract value) and reality had to be destroyed when necessary. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in 1979 can be given as just one example. In Latin America and elsewhere the U.S used similar means in pursuit of the strategic necessities that were cloaked by the rhetoric of freedom. In various parts of the world both the USSR and the US were also capable of adapting their rhetoric to evolving circumstances to maximize their influence.

In such an environment many countries – including Turkey -- became caught up in the Cold War rivalry, economically, politically and also strategically. Turkey, according to all these three variables, was in a key position both for the Soviet Union and the United States and accordingly came under ideological bombardment from both sides.

From the foundation of the Republic Turkey was close to the West and western-oriented ideologies. This tendency was strengthened after the Second World War by perceptions (and the reality) of Soviet expansionism and communism as a threatening structure of ideas. Thus it was that the desire for close relations with the West and fear of communism (the first increasingly shaped by the second) strongly

influenced the attitudes of post-war Turkish governments. As a close relationship with Turkey was also perceived as being in the interests of the US government the two countries quickly began to draw closer together. For the US Turkey served as a barrier against the expansion of communism and against a direct threat to Europe emanating from the USSR. The Middle East connection was also important because of perceptions of Soviet expansion there through the channel of sympathetic governments and political movements. Thus Turkey would also serve as a barrier or a bulwark against penetration from the south. US concerns were mostly shaped by perceptions of global Soviet expansionism whereas Turkey (once the 1945-46 crisis with the USSR had ended) was concerned more with regional issues such as border security as well as the drive towards 'westernization' and 'modernization'.

In the US consensus, between Democrats and Republicans at the onset of the Cold War (1946) served as the foundation stone for the policy of 'containment' of communism declared in the early 1950s. (Kunz, 1994: 1) It was at this time that the struggle with the Soviet Union took on a strikingly ideological nature as a metaphysical struggle (from the US perspective certainly) between good and evil rather than a temporal conflict with a rival super power. Already on April 1, 1946, a State Department officer, H. F. Matthews, had prepared a memorandum centered on the ideas of George Kennan⁶, who was then an influential U.S. diplomat. Thus it can

⁶ In July 1947, the quarterly *Foreign Affairs* published an anonymous article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which offered what would soon become the basis for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The policy offered was that of containment, which would remain fundamental for the duration of the Cold War. (<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/documents/x.html>) this article which named "X" article was one of the main guide of the Cold War and US containment policy against the USSR. As H Jack Matlock pointed out, his long telegram, which was sent and on which the "X" article was based, was really the key document, which set U.S. policy. He convinced the policy makers on this policy, which, broadly speaking was our policy until the end of the Cold War. (<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Matlock/matlockcon02.html>)

be seen that the ‘containment’ policy of the 1950s had a lineage stretching back to the beginning of the Cold War.

Central to ‘containment’ was American military and economic aid for countries, which shared borders with the USSR. (Kissinger, 2000:416). Thus it was that ‘containment’ served as the catalyst for the definition and shaping of new strategic alliances between the global powers and other actors (this was true of the USSR just as much as it was of the US). Many countries (including Turkey) were drawn into the containment strategy implemented by the US. Not that ‘containment’ was ever a fixed notion -- it hardened in some periods of the Cold War (the Eisenhower presidency from 1953-61) and softened during others (For example, Nixon’s presidency and his “Triangle”⁷ foreign policy in the aftermath of Vietnam). Geographically, its application ranged from Latin America and the Middle East to Southeast and East Asia to the borders of China.

During the entire period, however, the US constantly used the concept of ‘democracy’ to strengthen its strategic posture against the USSR even while failing to do much in practice to strengthen democracy around the world (indeed by its support of authoritarian regimes in south-east Asia and Latin America it did much to undermine it). On this point, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out (Kissinger, 2000:419) the promotion of democracy was especially valuable as a propaganda tool in Europe at a time when countries in eastern Europe were rapidly being turned into Soviet satellite states. Outside Europe, in Vietnam, Korea, Lebanon, Iran and various countries in Latin America talk of democracy quickly gave way to more forceful

⁷ Nixon’s Triangle Policy can be labeled as “Nixon’s Doctrine” in the US Foreign policy. In this sense, in the aftermath of Korea and especially Vietnam Wars, the US needs to revise its containment policy in 1970s. In short, these three basics of the Nixon’s triangle policy depend on: First, the US is going to be committed to obligations that the signed agreements in the previous periods, Secondly, if a nuclear power will be threatened a country which is important for the US national interests, the US will provide security shield to this third country. Thirdly, if there will be no nuclear threat for a country, the US wait to see this third country’s self-defending. (Kissinger, 2000: 672)

means of attaining strategic goals and protecting what were regarded as vital interests. Another tool was economic power. Of all the variables at work during the Cold War this served as one of the most effective means of winning the support of weak and dependent countries and ensuring their compliance with US ideological and strategic imperatives.

Turkey stood at a middle point between the promotion of 'democracy' in Europe and the search for 'alternative' policies. It means that the US was supporting democracy in Western Europe as an institutional tool in the aftermath of the Second World War. On the other side, according to pragmatic US interests, the US directed its policy in the Middle East towards controlling petroleum resources⁸ and strategic points in the Middle East. (Bal, 2001:700) Thus the US used a combination of different policies in the Middle East, rather than promotion of concepts like democratization and liberal and human rights. For example, even Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, underlined the fact that US intervention was not aimed at building democracy in the Middle East.⁹

In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran's popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. Moreover, during the next quarter-century, the United States and the West gave sustained backing to the Shah's regime. Although it did much to develop the country economically, the Shah's government also brutally repressed political dissent. As President Clinton has said, the United States must bear its fair share of responsibility for the problems that have arisen in U.S.-Iranian relations.

However, while the US has strong strategic interests in Turkey it also promoted democracy there. This was an ideal, which suited a country that was already into a process of political transformation. In order to focus on the costs and

⁸ Petroleum resources were one of the primary interests either for the US and the USSR during the Cold War, because half of the world's petroleum reserves were found in the Middle East and operating cost of Middle Eastern petroleum were nearly half of the other places. (Bal, 2001:700)

⁹ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june00/iran_3-17.html

benefits of the relationship to both sides, it is important to find out what was unique to the US-Turkish relationship. What singled out the American relationship with Turkey from the relations between the US and other countries? Two important factors were at work apart from ideological or philosophical affinity: economics and strategic imperatives.

In order to work out Turkey's position in the Cold War it is first important to concentrate on the US policies for the Middle Eastern region and beyond. As I have pointed out the US developed different tools in order to advance its interests in different places of the world. Bertil Duner, a Swedish political scientist writing about the Cold War, put U.S. policy options into six main categories.¹⁰ (Duner, 1987: 124) There was the category of threats in response to threats from the USSR. Second, there were 'negative sanctions' aimed at weakening the Soviet Union in some way. Third, there was 'positive sanction' which sought to convert a bad situation into one that would serve US interests. Fourth were the 'promises' aimed at rewarding allies in the struggle with the Soviet Union. Fifthly, there were 'obstacles' that could be put in the way of Soviet involvement or intervention in the affairs of other countries. Finally, there was 'cooperation', this referring to agreements that could be reached with the Soviet Union (such as that the understanding between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev that ended the Cuban missile crisis. (Duner, 1987: 125)

As has been already observed the US adjusted its policies in different regions of the world, directly or indirectly, according to these main six headings. Turkey was no exception to the application of these policy choices during the Cold War.

¹⁰ US policy was shaping with the goals against the USSR during the Cold War. USSR and the US struggle opened the way of different type of categorizations in foreign policy during the Cold War Era. Duner's categorization was only one of them but it also develops an extrinsic example in order to see in which perspective the US foreign policy saw the other actors like Turkey.

The economic aspect of the Turkish-American relationship, in particular, was closely connected to the strategic goals being pursued by the US and indeed was virtually dominated by the American ideo-strategic vision, preventing the development of a more stable and balanced economic relationship between the two sides. In its relationship with Turkey the US resorted to many of Duner's policy options including negative and positive sanctions, but the dominant tool remained the 'promise' especially in the early years of the Cold War. In this sense, the Truman Doctrine can be regarded as a 'promise' doctrine that delivered economic aid and promised more as long as Turkey adapted to the pursuit of US regional and global aims. The Truman Doctrine combined offers of economic and (as the Cold War started to intensify) military aid to several countries in the Middle Eastern region. Turkey signed an agreement with the US for Truman doctrine aid on 12 July, 1947. (Kongar, 1998: 458) In the economic sense the Truman Doctrine – leaving aside for a moment its ideological content -- appeared as an extension of the Marshall Plan which delivered financial aid to a variety of countries in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Interestingly, the U.S. had not initially planned to give economic support to Turkey because (according to the US perspective) Turkey had not suffered from the war in anything like the same way as European countries.¹¹(Ismael, 1986:142) However, in line with the Truman Doctrine, the US congress subsequently authorized (20 June 1947) an aid program of nearly \$400 million¹² to be distributed between Greece and Turkey in order – according to the US

¹¹ Turkey did not involve into the Second World War under Ismet İnönü's administration. Most of the time, İnönü did not argue on politics and decision that he had made, but at the end Turkey managed to put itself from out side the World War. (Heper, 1999:6) but it does not mean Turkey did not affected from heavy conditions of the Second World War.

¹² In March 1947, US president Truman accordingly told Congress and He asked for \$400,000,000 in aid specifically for Greece and Turkey, but the Truman Doctrine thus propounded universalized the American commitment to contain the spread of Communism. A Greek-Turkish Aid act was signed in May. (<http://home.wanadoo.nl/tcc/nato/marshall.html>)

government -- to protect them from the Soviet Union. (Ismael, 1986:142) In time economic aid developed into Turkish dependency. There were two reasons for this. First, the Turkish economy was in an extremely weak position in the aftermath of the Second World War. Secondly, the pronouncedly pro-American Democrat Party came to power in 1950. Both need and inclination were the determining factors in Turkey's developing economic dependence on the US, and this of course came at a political cost. The deepening of the Cold War provided the context for the strengthening of this dependency.

It can quickly be seen that economic aid was critical in the expansion of American political and ideological influence over Turkey. It was a cornerstone of the 'strategic partnership' that developed between the two countries. An ally is an ally not just militarily or strategically but economically. In other words, the US used economics as a tool in its relationship with developing countries (including Turkey) in the continuing effort to assert its supremacy over the USSR. In other words, the US, during the Cold War, wanted to use different form of tools, which mainly depend on building economic institutions. For example, Fred Bloc (Ikeberry, 1995:240) wrote for G. Kennan's "For Kennan, the Marshall Plan succeeded because it simultaneously concentrated the Soviet Union and strengthened liberal institutions in the West." As it can be extrinsically seen from the idea of G. Kennan's ideas the US focused on building economic institutions in Europe against the Soviet danger. In contrast, the economic aspect of Turco-American relations was built on the provision of aid oriented than the building of institutions. The American approach brought undoubted costs to the Turkish side because the Turkish economy became caught up in the American attempt to implement a global strategy.

In addition, Turkey's economic direction, along with the economic direction of many other developing countries, became subjected to the ideological predilections of the US or the USSR. Economic models were adopted according to the interests of the patron super power.¹³ The entrapment of economics in political-strategic necessities continued into the 1960s and 1970s. There were negative consequences as well as evident benefits. Economic difficulties in Turkey served to polarize and radicalize political groups in the 1970s. It can be said that as a result of the ideological bombardment of the Cold War economics and ideology were forcibly fused. The consequences were to be felt at both the political and social levels. The same was true of countries which came under the influence of the USSR.

Strategically, there were negative and positive consequences for the Turkish side but there were (and are) so many complexities in the Turco-American relationship it is difficult to strike a balance between them. All variables have to be included to bring out the costs to the Turkish side. However, there is no doubt that in the conditions prevailing at the time Turkey had no option but to choose one side or the other. According to the 'with us or against us' doctrine that prevailed in Washington in the 1950s there was little room for maneuver for developing countries (joining the non-aligned bloc – the middle position – was never acceptable to the US government). The strategic costs and benefits to Turkey will be weighed up in separate sections of this study, dealing, inter alia, with the Cuban missile crisis, the Cyprus crises of the 1964 and 1974 and the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

On the other side of the partnership, strategic interests were much more important to the US during the Cold War than economic concerns (at least explicitly because economic power ultimately lies at the core of any power relationship). To

¹³ This patron- super power dominancy during the Cold War Era let the question of Clientalism perspective in Turco-American economic Relations, which will be analyzed in Chapter 5-5.2.

the United States Turkey's strategic value lay in its geo-strategic position as a barrier against Soviet penetration and a possible in the case of a Soviet military attack that could well be nuclear. Turkey was effectively regarded as a front line state. There is clearly great distance between this point and the 1990s view of Turkey serving as an example of a Muslim democracy! This is not to say that the US was not interested in utilizing Islam in one way or another as an ideological tool against the Soviet Union's ideological model of socialist Islam.¹⁴ By the early 1950s Islam was rapidly unfolding as another tool to be used in the Middle East -- especially in the key countries of Egypt and Syria – in the ideological struggle between the superpowers. Leaving side the question of Islam, American (and British) support for conservative Arab regimes caused many headaches for Turkey in its relationships with Middle Eastern countries. The prevailing emotions and political tides were running strongly in favor of nationalism and Pan Arabism, leaving the governments with which the US wanted Turkey to have a close strategic relationship dangerously exposed. Turkish susceptibility to American approaches and its willingness to take part in externally-organized Middle Eastern 'defense' pacts left Turkey open to Arab charges of taking sides with imperialism (despite the underlying tensions that sometimes divided the countries of the western bloc). Not until the 1970s, in the wake of the oil boycott which followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the US embargo following Turkey's intervention in northern Cyprus, did Turkey seriously set about realigning its posture regarding the Middle East. Complications in its relationships with the Arab world can be included in the costs of Turkey's strategic

¹⁴ During mid1950s, the USSR managed to develop its relations with some of the Middle Eastern countries. It opens to way for the expansion of socialism in the Arab world. Egypt under Cemal Abdul Nasir and Syria under Hafez al Assad in the following period were the extrinsic examples. For example, Egypt and the USSR was dealing an the agreement which envisaged huge range of Soviet arm selling to Egypt in return Egyptian cotton in 1955. (Kissinger, 2000:489) this uprising ties between socialism and Islam was unacceptable for the US politics under the Cold War struggle conditions.

relationship with the US. At this point, we also should mention another perspective that highlighted the importance of rising American interests in the Middle East on Turco-American relations. In this sense, Abdülkadir Baharççek (Bal,2001:41) pointed out, the US needed to support Turkey with its rising interests in the Middle Eastern in the aftermath of rising economic (petroleum resources) and strategic (USSR's rising interest in the region) importance of the Middle East. Therefore, Baharççek (Bal, 2001:41) underlined the fact that the aid program which envisaged by US administrations after the Second World War mostly depended on pragmatic US interests in the Middle East and aligning Turkey against the USSR during the Cold War years.

In short, while the US developed a strategic partnership with Turkey during the Cold War that was important to both sides, its policies in the Middle East had numerous negative consequences for governments in Ankara. It has to be said also that in its dealings with Turkey the US was not consistent (not as consistent as the Turkish side). Whether as the result of lobbying in Washington or for other reasons the relationship between the two countries was frequently rocked by episodes that certainly left a feeling of bad faith (if not betrayal of a friendship) on the Turkish side. The most obvious example is Cyprus. There were to be other rough passages (right up to the Turkish decision not to allow itself to be used as a second front in the Anglo-American assault on Iraq in 2003), which had a cumulative negative effect on the relationship between the two countries. There were costs to the American side as well as those accruing to Turkey.

In the Middle East context, again, Turkey appears as a possible source of keep when the US was planning to rescue the 52 Americans trying held hostage in Tehran in 1981. Hostage crises (so-called 444 Days crisis is in fact a complex

dilemma in the US politics as Gary Sick (Kreisberg, 1985:155) pointed out,¹⁵) The main point from the Turkish Perspective was that the US launched a dangerous military operation against one of Turkey's neighbors without consulting or deeply informing Turkish government. To many Turks, this seemed like a replay of the Cuban Missile Crisis. (See Chapter2-2.4), In short, while Turkey quickly became an important strategic ally for the US during the Cold War, American governments were not always satisfied with the attitudes and performance of their friends in Ankara.

Proper analysis demands a more detailed study of particular aspects of the Turco-American relationship. Accordingly, this work will in subsequent sections look at specific issues, beginning with Turkey's involvement with and in the NATO alliance. As will be seen there have been costs and benefits throughout: apparent benefits in the placing of missiles near Izmir turning to costs during the Cuban missile crisis (see chapter 2- 2.4). In the chapters to come the approach will be issue-focused in preference to a chronological account of the relationship as it has developed. The hope is that this approach will bring out more strongly the costs and benefits to both sides.

2.2 NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established to prevent potential aggression by the USSR and to create an atmosphere of political sovereignty in the West. (Kaplan, 1994:2) This is the most common basic understanding of why NATO was created. However, a more complex analysis is required. One approach is to see NATO as the natural end product of a sequence of

¹⁵ The US changed to the operation center to USS Nimitz ship, which was found in the Persian Gulf. Surely, 444 days hostage crises was only a step in the continuous conflict between the US and Iran.

historical western alliances, which took root after the French Revolution. According to liberal approach, as Rebecca R. Moore has pointed out¹⁶:

Although NATO remains committed to the collective defense of its territory, its new mission reflects an evolving conception of security that is less state-centric, less deferential to the Westphalian principle of non-intervention, and dependent to a considerable degree on the triumph of liberal democratic values. Indeed, NATO is currently engaged in the active promotion of these values, having deemed them central to peace and stability in a globalizing world. This new mission and, indeed, the very notion that security can be constructed on the basis of a specific set of ideas or values is contingent upon essentially constructivist assumptions that states' interests are not wholly material but can be shaped or even constituted by ideas.

This is in fact a sort of institutionalist idea, which generally emphasizes the continuity of institutions like NATO and envisages the adaptation of institutions to the new period like the post Cold War. On contrary, a second approach sees NATO as a purely strategic institution of the Cold War years. Moreover, this approach questions the compatibility of NATO between the Atlantic and European communities and calls into question, furthermore, its validity following the end of the Cold War. For example, as one of the representatives of this counter attack one the institutionalists, as Celeste Wallander has pointed out¹⁷:

The puzzle of NATO's persistence is best addressed as part of a larger inquiry into institutional change. Institutions persist because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain, but this institutionalism argument is incomplete. Whether institutions adapt to change depends on whether their norms, rules, and procedures are specific or general assets and on whether the asset mix matches the kinds of security problems faced by their members. Assets specific to coping with external threats will not be useful for coping with problems of instability and mistrust, so alliances with only the former will disappear when threats disappear. Alliances that have specific institutional assets for dealing with instability and mistrust and general institutional assets will be adaptable to environments that lack threats

¹⁶<http://www.bham.ac.uk/cssd/content/csp23.1.htm>

¹⁷ <http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/intorg/v54y2000i4p705-35.html>

Irrespective of which interpretation is correct it is undeniable that the Cold War environment played an essential role in the way NATO evolved. And American involvement meant that NATO would play an important role in the rivalry between the two global powers -- a role that would transcend the defense of the integrity of Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the victorious wartime powers in Washington on 4 April 1949. NATO was not just a military 'defense' organization aligned against the Soviet Union but served as an important stepping-stone for the application of US foreign policy in Europe. In this sense, NATO was turned into a tool for the distribution of US military and economic aid to Europe, and a kind of umbrella over rising American influence both on European politics and economies. For example the Marshall Plan utilized NATO channels in the distribution of aid. In short, behind the protective wall set up to defend Western Europe NATO played a critical role in the passage of American policies and plans into the European continent. (Kaplan, L.S. 1994; Çayhan, E. & Güney N. 1996; Bilinsky, Y. 1999)

The existence of the Warsaw Pact on the other side of the 'iron curtain' was a useful counterfoil. Each had to exist for the sake of the other. Each became the guarantor against the hostilities arising out of the Cold War. Each could use the existence of the other to justify increased spending on weaponry and the opening of new bases. European fears (and doubtless Soviet fears) rose with the steady accumulation of nuclear weapons and the entry of new members into the 'nuclear club'. Both sides sought a military balance (Mellenthin, Stolfi, 1984:23). The dominant position of the US in NATO arose because the US was the only country that could give military support to Western Europe in the event of a nuclear confrontation with the USSR. However, the hegemony of one power created intrinsic

and extrinsic problems, in time changing NATO's role as it was originally envisaged: from an organization whose original brief was the defense of Europe it turned into one that frequently seemed to serve American interests above all. (American dominance in NATO's decision-making process can be given as an example.) For example, the IRBMs in Europe would have been launched according to American decision in the guise of NATO (see Chp. 2.4)) under the changing conditions of the Cold War combined with US pressure its role never could be static. For example, the US first wanted to use NATO to strengthen its military and political influence in Europe but later on it sought to utilize the organization in the context of the global struggle against the USSR. The Korean War appears, as going to be analyzed in the following section) is striking example of how the US sought to change NATO's structure and objectives during the Cold War.

For a country like Turkey, joining the western 'side' during the Cold War, NATO membership was a *sine qua non* necessity because of Turkey's geographic and strategic environment. Geographically Turkey stood at a critical point for US and Soviet policymakers alike but despite its strategic importance to the US and Western Europe it still had to wait for its NATO membership. It was invited to join the European Council on 8 August, 1949. Turks celebrated membership of the council but the fact that Turkey had not yet been included in NATO was the source of disquiet (Kongar, 1998:459) that could easily be placed in the general context of Turkey's difficult relations with the West. Surely in a similar ways, NATO as an organization benefited from accession of Turkey into organization: On the point,

Şerif Alp Atakcan has underlined the importance of Turkey for NATO and surely accordingly the US:¹⁸

Since its accession, Turkey has contributed to the alliance in every way. The nation assigned almost all of its military forces to NATO and fully cooperated in the peacetime training, planning, and infrastructure development of the alliance, often at the expense of its economic development. Furthermore, 29 bases and facilities in Turkey played a key role in NATO's defense plans in such areas as intelligence and early warning, forward basing, airlift and refueling capabilities and training during the cold war.

The Turkish side believed that NATO membership would greatly strengthen its security posture against the USSR, a position that was cemented when the Democrat Party came into government in the 1950 elections. Turkish attitudes to the USSR bore a sharp edge ideologically and politically. Under the anti-Soviet Democrat Party government, NATO membership was sought more urgently than two years previously. The enthusiasm for NATO membership was not borne of political manipulation for domestic consumption. NATO exercised real power, political as well as military, and stood as a powerful deterrent to the nuclear-armed Soviet Union¹⁹. NATO brought into focus the nuclear capacity of the Europeans.

In addition to the nuclear aspect of the confrontation between the two blocs western governments had decided, when meeting at Lisbon in 1952²⁰ to increase NATO's conventional forces from 25 to 96 divisions, thus raising the military stakes

¹⁸ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ozel/nato/serif.html>

¹⁹ The US acquired the nuclear weaponry with the Second World War and they practiced on Japan during the Second World War. Other global power of the Cold Term period, USSR acquired the ability to produce the nuclear bomb in 1949; the security of being the world's sole nuclear power suddenly vanished. The threat posed by two nations having nuclear weapons would eventually lead to a policy of deterrence. (<http://www.reagan.dk/newpolcha.htm>)

²⁰ So, as Allin pointed out, (Allin, 1995:17) from the beginning of NATO establishment, NATO was established to deter the Soviet Union so that NATO introduced as an defensive organization in W. Europe and in 1952, member states explicitly institutionalized this aim of NATO in Lisbon Meeting, 1952.

across Europe and the region on its borders. (Allin, 1995:17) According to NATO sources, the context of Lisbon meeting content was²¹

Accession of Greece and Turkey - Proposed European Defense Community - TCC recommendations adopted - Infrastructure- Military terms of reference revised - Adaptation of NATO's organization by appointment of a Secretary General heading a unified international secretariat and establishment of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session in Paris - Atlantic Community Committee's report adopted.

Even more than ever, NATO membership was regarded by Turkey as being necessary to its security and not just as a channel through which it could pursue its goals of westernization, modernization and association with Europe.

The Democrat Party regarded the Korean War as an opportunity to show itself as an ally of the western campaign and especially of the U.S. In addition to this, the party wanted to use the war for domestic political reasons. (Kongar, 1999:460) Consequently it decided to send a contingent of Turkish troops. However, as will be seen in subsequent section (See Chapter2-2.3) the costs were high. (Kongar, 1998:460) The important point to make is that Turkey accepted the commitment to Korea as the necessary cost of NATO membership, a cost arising from domestic policy concerns and the needs of the Cold War environment. But Korea was not the only entry point into NATO: by the beginning of the 1950s the US wanted to establish military and communications bases in Turkey to be used against the USSR. The Turkish government agreed to grant the US request but only if they were placed under the authority of NATO. This maneuver also helped Turkey to enter NATO, which it finally did on 18 February 1952.²²

²¹ <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm>

²² <http://gopher.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-a1> (Legal document on accession of Greece and Turkey, 18 February 1952)

NATO membership dramatically changed Turkey's foreign policy outlook: the Democrat Party governments and the governments that succeeded it began to wear NATO-tinted spectacles in the evolution of their foreign policy. Turkey had only limited tools in the development of foreign policy and so it was natural for it to shift the policy weight to states and an organization that represented their strategic interests in which Turkey's position was regarded as increasingly important. Here, the cost was the abandonment of a more balanced multi-dimensional foreign policy approach. Turkey might not have put all its eggs in one basket but it certainly put many of them in the US-NATO basket. Once it became a member of NATO (in which the old colonial powers, Britain and France, were still dominant) Turkey too often seemed to be acting as an agent of the West against Arab and third world interests. This was certainly the view from Arab capitals at a time when they were still struggling to eject the British and the French from the Middle East and North Africa, and when the US had taken the faulty view that indigenous nationalism in the Middle East (and elsewhere) was no more than a cover for Soviet penetration. As a member of NATO it might be argued that Turkey had no other choice but it remains a fact that Turkey started to see all international situations from the NATO perspective. Turkey's foreign policy choices were limited in consequence, and in the long run NATO membership brought numerous direct and indirect costs. (It will be discussed in the following part of this section and also Chapter 2, 2.5 and 2.6).

On what might be called the positive side NATO membership opened up access to the acquisition of military hardware by Turkey. The military equipment aspect of Turkish dependency on the main arms supplier – the US -- became more pronounced with NATO membership. Thus it can be seen that NATO also played an important role in accelerating military cooperation between Turkey and the US, but

this also brought its complications despite the value of military exchanges (weapons supply and training programs) to the Turkish army. For example, during the Cyprus crisis (1974) the US sought to prevent intervention by applying an embargo on the sale of military equipment. So if it is true that the Turkish side benefited from NATO membership and an accelerated supply of US military hardware it is also true that in the long run weapons dependency was followed by costs to the Turkish army and the country's foreign policy. As K.Kirişçi (Kirişçi, July 1997:13) has pointed out:

Turkish defense strategy assumes Middle East countries would be deterred from attacking since that would invoke a NATO response. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of April 1949 establishing NATO, committed member countries to defend any member facing aggression. In October 1951 it was extended to cover armed attacks "on the territory of Turkey." At the same time, Turkey has a credible ability to defend its territory should deterrence fail, with a large army, a large part of its budget dedicated to defense, and receiving Western, especially U.S., military aid.

As a result, NATO membership opened the way to a secure and developing partnership with the west, but it ushered in constraints in Turkish foreign politics especially in its Middle Eastern politics with developing Turco-American military partnership.

Turkish-American relation was also affected by fluctuations in US-European relations. In the 1960s but especially from the early 1970s, some European countries had begun to express dissatisfaction with the dominant economic global role of the US. The dominance of the dollar was rising dramatically, forcing most European banks to build up their holdings of the currency. This kind of 'dollar dependency' meant that US inflation and some other chronic problems of the US economy started eventually (in the 1970s) began to have an impact on European economies. (Allin, 1995:41-42) Many European countries -- like France which enjoyed a strong if

idiosyncratic relationship with the United States -- grew increasingly unhappy with the level of European military and economic dependence on the US²³. These difficulties were exacerbated by the deepening American involvement in Vietnam from the late 1960s attitudes (Allin, 1995:43) American foreign policy became even more Machiavellian (certainly in European eyes) after Richard Nixon became President and Henry Kissinger Secretary of State. Today, the same Machiavellian attitudes can be easily seen in the US foreign policies. (Leeden, 1999:152-3)

More importantly, American aspirations as far as NATO were concerned changed format with the passing of time and individuals. In the late 1960s and for almost all of the 1970s disappointments (for the Americans) emerged as the result of problems between the U.S. and European allies like France and Britain. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War became the occasion for a virtual shouting match between NATO members.²⁴

²³ For Example, De Gaulle was openly critical of the international monetary system, which made the dollar a reserve currency and gave the US considerable power, not least because it could ignore the usual rules on budget deficits. More over, France and the US disagreements explicitly increased with DeGaulle's presidency period: His analysis and the policies it inspired resulted in profound disagreement with the US. This became immediately apparent, in July 1958, when De Gaulle met the then US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. The Soviet threat to Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia was central to the US perception of the world. To counter it Dulles recommended bolstering Nato's political and military strength and setting up a regional defense system based on medium-range missiles and US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe so that it is possible to think that NATO also was effected from these kind of disagreements. (<http://mondediplo.com/2003/03/07franceusa>)

²⁴ With this war, the global dominance of the US in the Middle East became more apparent. After the Suez crisis, there were no more influential either Britain or France. Two global powers0 the US and the USSR explicitly dominated the scene. For example, The United States provided considerable re-supply to Israel, as the Soviet Union did to the Arabs. The Soviet airlift began on 9 October and was quickly supplemented by sealift. The United States effort had to rely more on airlift initially, due to the distances at sea. The United States airlift began on 14 October and the sealift effort did not reach Israel until after the ceasefires. This re-supply effort was the natural response of both powers to obligations that they had made in the region, both Israel and the Arabs had assumed that they would receive this and when it was asked for, and they had made certain of their logistical plans on that basis. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. were deeply committed to ending the conflict as soon as possible.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1989/PSJ.htm>

By this time Turkey was drifting into a mood of pessimism because of European and American differences (especially but not only as they related to the Middle Eastern region). On one hand, Europe had been a beacon for Turkish modernization and democracy; on the other there was the valuable relationship with the US, a distant ally but one of the two global super powers. When the two sides of the Atlantic differed, which one should Turkey choose? Almost uniformly the answer was the United States. During the Cold War, Turkey invariably supported American policies in NATO. It gave almost unconditional support to NATO-oriented policies (such as – almost all Turkish army segments were given to NATO command) and brought almost all its foreign policies in the Middle East into alignment with US preferences.

One other reason for aligning Turkish foreign policy with US interests (apart from arms and economic support) was that NATO went through periods of structural instability. For example, in 1966 France under DeGallue withdrew from NATO's military command. (Huntley, 1969:78) This can be taken as an example of the divisive effect political differences could have on the organization. The absence of France from the NATO military command was the cause of further divergences between allies. In fact it was increasingly clear that most members did not formulate their policies simply on the basis of NATO perspectives. According to the French point of view, NATO was no more than a military- strategic alliance. This was only partly true because the Cold War environment had added a political dimension to the organization, in which the US appeared as the power that put its politics into practice. In this sense, it is not surprising that the Turkish government became confused over the military and political missions of NATO and how they were to be reconciled. The dilemma became explicit with French opposition to US domination

of NATO.²⁵ France's withdrawal from the NATO military command was a sign of political instability within NATO. Accordingly Turkey's orientation within NATO was focused on the relationship with the US rather than relations with the European. Turkish membership of NATO should therefore be seen as having a sort of unifying effect on the Turkish-American relationship.

While NATO was established and organized under the control of the US it would be hard to say that NATO has always worked to an American brief (a view that can be held even more solidly against the experiences of recent years, especially disagreements within the organization over the Anglo-American attack on Iraq in 2003). For example, the US did not succeed in manipulating NATO to serve US needs in Vietnam or in southeastern Europe.

The American public was completely dominated by anti-communist propaganda during the Cold War. In this atmosphere any country under threat of communism 'subversion' and any country that evidently had joined the struggle against communism and the Soviet Union could easily be 'sold' to the American public. But without the intervention or mediation of the government of the media, explaining why country A should be regarded with special favor, the American public had little understanding of the dynamics that guided American relations with a country of which they knew very little. (Cottrell, Eberhart, 1969:51) A survey carried out by the Gallup polling organization in 1947 indicated that more than 63 percent of the American people supported the idea that the program of aid to Greece and Turkey should be turned over the United Nations. (Cottrell, Eberhart, 1969:51) This shows that American public did not understand the nature of or the motives for their government's direct relations with the key countries like Turkey during the

²⁵ <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/02/16/1045330467658.html>

Cold War. Moreover, the American public attitude towards Turkey was subject to fluctuations because of the manipulation of public opinion by special interest groups (Armenian and Greek lobby activities in the last decade is an good example, see chapter 4, 4-2) So it is hard to say whether Turkey's NATO membership had a direct effect on American public opinion. The administration itself was often caught between polarized views and needs arising from domestic pressures. It always had a difficult time during periods of Greek-Turkish tension or crisis, for example, because both Greece and Turkey were NATO members (and the influential Greek lobby did not make its life any easier). Sometimes the US supported the Greeks and sometimes the Turkish side in those crises. Again, after the Cuban missile crisis, the government was criticized domestically for insensitivity in dealing with NATO member Turkey (this situation will be discussed in Chp.2-2.4).

If Turkey occasionally suffered before American public opinion the responsibility at least partly lay on the Turkish side. Turkey rarely if ever used its strategic and geographic value (including its value to the US as a member of NATO) to get more out of the American administrations. In view of the pressure of the domestic lobbies in the US that directly targeted Turkey (human rights, Armenian, Kurdish and Greek pressure groups among them) it was surely essential for Turkey to lobby more vigorously itself and to make the best use of its strategic value to the US. If there was a cost here in terms of the Turco-American relationship it partly arose from the failure of successive governments in Ankara.

2.3 Korea

It is hard to find any signs that Korea was central to American concerns in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War but it quickly came on to the agenda as the Cold War heated up. (Stueck, 1995:16). Primarily concerned with Soviet expansion, the US quickly added China to the list of enemies that had to be confronted following the victory of the communist forces over the nationalists in October 1949 (Levering, 1994: 41) The differences that existed between Moscow and Beijing were not to come to light for another decade. The view from Washington was of communism spreading across the Euro-Asian land mass and quickly turning in other directions as the opportunity arose. It was in this context that Korea assumed such critical importance. The struggle where taking place in Korea between rival ideological forces was interpreted as a surrogate conflict being waged by China (with the USSR in the background) for control of the Korean peninsula. Once won it would serve as the launching pad for forays further a field. Accordingly the communists could not be allowed to come to power even at the cost of intervention and confrontation with the communist 'world' (as it was seen).

Thus the Korean War²⁶ had its roots in broader ideological concerns and not the struggle between rival forces within the country. (Lowe, 1984: 150) In time the war turned into one of the dangerous phases of the Cold War (along with the Cuban missile crisis) because of the battlefield confrontation between Chinese and American troops and the global tensions that were fed as a result. What the war also revealed was that while Chinese communist influence was growing across southern Asia neither the US nor the Soviet Union had a clearly developed strategy for the region. (Levering, 1994: 41) As a result events could quickly develop that were

²⁶ The Korean War (opening 25 June 1950 -- 15 September, US troops landed)

beyond their capacity to control. (Levering, 1994: 42) it is possible to talk about errors by the US in responding to Chinese foreign policy were a main precipitate cause of the Korean War: as many argued that the US had developed a foreign policy against the Soviet Union which mostly focused on European issues (Germany and south- eastern Europe) to the detriment of critical questions arising further field. Like Iran many years later, it was caught short by the rapid developments in China in the late 1940s.

The US tended to deal with issues arising in other parts of the world in a similar fashion, indicating that it had not yet developed an overall strategy even though it was one of the two global super powers. However, it can be said that developments in Europe after 1945 were important in determining the western response to the Korean crisis in 1950. (Lowe, 1985:126). Whatever the origins of the war, it was quickly inscribed on the Cold War agenda. Korea was yet another occasion for showing the Americans who their friends really were. While there was no sense in which Turkey could be said to be threatened by what was happening on the Korean peninsula strategic interests and the need to demonstrate the sincerity of its relationship with the US dictated that it should take a strong position. The United Nations (under whose aegis the US intervened) did not designate an active role for Turkey but Turkey surprisingly saw the war as an opportunity to be included in Western campaign. As C. Erhan has pointed out (Bal, 2001:120) there was clear linkage between the Turkish role in Korea and its NATO membership, with participation in the war playing its part in the cementing of initial Turkish-American relations. As H. Bagci pointed out²⁷ Prime Minister Menderes explained their

²⁷ *Turkish Daily News*, 26 May, 2000

decision to involve into the Korean War in an interview for the *Vatan* newspaper in 1951:

Because we saw that the country's security, in the long run, lay in taking a number of risks and maintaining our initiative in foreign politics. We could not leave the United States alone as that country was for the security of all free mankind, challenging the aggressor in Korea with large forces. We also saw great advantages for us from the standpoint of our own future defense in playing an active role. Our decision and the way it was carried out have given a vivid example of how we shall fight when exposed to aggression. Our admission to NATO is the result of our efforts along these lines. In international relations, Turkey is now being referred to as a great power.

As might be expected there were costs and benefits arising from Turkey's involvement in the Korean conflict. There were military benefits in the sense of accelerated US military aid to Turkey, that there is also a point of view that Korea was the true beginning of a long period of military dependency on the US (Kongar, 1999: 460). It is a fact that the Turkish army was not yet familiar with the new US military equipment it received. (Danışman, 2002:1-3) On the costs side, the Turkish army²⁸ lost 144 soldiers during the war²⁹. The number of Turkish deaths was one of the highest after Australians and British losses on the coalition side. (Kılıç, A.1956: 150) On this point, most authorities argue that many Turkish lives were lost because the Turkish force was a semi-independent unit that operated mostly under the direction of the US command.

The general political consequences of the Korean War could not but have effects on the structure of NATO. At the beginning of the 1950s, President Truman and the US administration assumed that the Soviet Union and Stalin had total control

²⁸ Turkey sent total 15.000 military personal to Korea between 1950-1953.
(<http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/uluslararası/barisdesharekatkatki/barisdestekkatki.htm>)

²⁹ Total casualties in the Korean War
United Nations (UN): 94.000 (the US casualties: 33.651)
Communist Bloc: 150.000
South Korea (Public): 1.500.000
Turkey: 144
(<http://www.cryan.com/war/death.html>) and (<http://www.iktibas.net/metin.php>)

over North Korea. The evidence, however, suggests that the USSR did not have as much control or influence as they thought³⁰ But whatever the real level of Soviet influence, these American perceptions ‘governed NATO’s reaction and widespread change in that organization resulted.’ (Kaplan, 1994: 42)

Turkey (and Greece) came into an organization that was quite different politically speaking from what it was before the beginning of the Korean War³¹. There are two different approaches to assessing the political results of Turkey’s involvement in Korea. According to the first, Korea was too high a price for Turkey’s acceptance into NATO and closer association generally with the West. (Kongar, 1999:460) The second is based on the view that Korea was critically important and that Turkey had to be involved. What Turkey got out of Korea was greater security against perceived Soviet antagonism and the opportunity to take a leading role in the Middle Eastern region. In this sense, this perspective also evaluates the Democrat party foreign policy and general policies between 1950 and 1960 as a sort of continuation of Atatürk’s foreign policy, as H. Bağcı has pointed out.³² In fact, it is hard to find a direct correlation between Turkish enthusiasm for becoming a leader in the region and the political results of the Korean War. Whether the first interpretation is more correct than the second, the Korean War was an important step towards future close relations between Turkey and the US, because it was one the first associated military operations of the Turkish-American partnership.

³⁰ However Northern Korea had used the Soviet tanks and arms at the beginning of invasion. As Kaplan pointed out there was a huge difference in communism perspectives between the USSR and Northern Korea.

(Kaplan, 1994: 42) and (http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_North_Korea)

³¹ Inevitably, the Korean War had an important role to shift NATO into political oriented of the Cold War period. In other words, NATO was explicitly appearing as an organization that stand against communism so that NATO gains a kind of military extension of a one political approach in the world wide in addition to its European security mission.

³² Turkish Daily News, 26 May, 2000

NATO appears as the only political result of the Korean War for the Turkish side. NATO membership deflected domestic criticism of the Turkish government while participation in the Korean War played an essential role in raising the popularity of the new Democrat Party government in Turkey at the beginning of the 1950s. The government did not hesitate to use Korea for domestic propaganda purposes. The Democrat Party used Korean War for the government's political propaganda in domestic politics. Ultimately, though, it does not seem possible to develop an exact analysis of the economic cost and benefits to Turkey from the Korean War. The economic costs of Turkish military involvement were mostly borne by the US. Beyond military spending, the Korean smoothed the way to increased foreign aid for Turkey.

The long-term effects of the Korean War on the Turkish economy can be best understood by focusing on the economic structure of 1950s Turkey. The outbreak of war coincided with the election into government of the Democrat Party. The negative effects of the war on the global economy compounded the economic problems facing the new government. The prices of raw materials and agricultural products quickly increased. In the short run Turkey, which was still trying to shake off the economic consequences of the Second World War, was worse affected by the negative consequences of the war than were European countries, especially in the agriculture sector. In this sense, the newly emerging close relations between the US and the Democrat Party government were affecting Turkey's economic choices. As Waterbury (Waterbury, 1993: 42) has written a quotation from Adnan Menderes:

It is claimed that the Democrat Party's program of 1950 stated that "the basis of our economic and financial views, it can be said, is to shrink as much as possible the state sector and to broaden as much as possible the private enterprise sector and to provide it security"

On the other side, the US wanted Turkey to increase agricultural output rather than industrial products because its benefits depended on the development of agricultural products in an allied country. (Tokgöz, 1997:115) Consequently the recently elected Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, started to pursue economic policies that were different from those followed in previous periods. . It is obvious; as Tokgöz (Tokgöz, 1997:115) has pointed out that the fact American economic specialists played an important role during the implementation period of the Democrat government's new economic plan. According to the economic policies of the new government, Turkey would give priority to the development of agricultural products. (Tokgöz, 1997:115-116) Secondly, the state would partially place industry in private hands. Lastly, Turkey started to quickly liberalize its' foreign trade which meant that Turco-American economic relations accelerated in the aftermath of the Korean War.

[As a consequence of changes in economic direction Turkey's production of wheat jumped from 2500 tons in 1949 to 5600 tons in 1951. (Tokgöz, 1997:115)]

It can easily be seen that the Korean War accelerated the close relationship between the US and Turkey. On the other hand, it is also possible to see that close relations were changing format through American intervention in Turkish politics and economics with supporting conditions of domestic political changes in Turkey between 1950 and 1960. The War also played an important role in developing the linkage between Democrat party government and the US relations. The Democrat Party's economic policies are still disputatious topic even today. Whether its policies

were right for that period's conditions or not, the important point here is to show how Turkish-American relations strengthened the Democrat Party rule in Turkey domestically and the Korean War internationally.

2.4 The Cuban missile crisis and IRBMs in Turkey

The nature of the Cold War changed dramatically with the launch of the Soviet space satellite, Sputnik, on 4 October 1957. The struggle for mastery of space had begun. The implications were military, strategic, political and global in nature. Earlier in the 1950s the US had already planned to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) against the Soviet Union threat. However, the launch of Sputnik raised the stakes in the confrontation between the US and the USSR, affecting the crises that were to develop between them in the following years. (P.Nash, 1997: 12-13) It is essential to note that the Cold War period's policies were dominated by high level of sensitivity, which meant that the launching of Sputnik was certain to have a powerful impact on the US and its policies. It must be remembered that the US (and the West generally) still did not have a lot of information about Soviet technological and military progress. Therefore, the US was not so much cognizant of the complexities of the Soviet side. The same was almost certainly true of the USSR's understanding of the US, giving rise to the fears and the suspicion that were so characteristic of the Cold War years. It has been argued (D.B.Kunz, 1994: 159) that the search for strategic equivalence between the global powers now took precedence in the policies adopted by both sides. NATO, under the leadership of the US and alarmed by the technological prowess demonstrated by the

launching of Sputnik, now started to search for potential hosts for the deployment of IRBMs in Europe against the so-called Soviet threat.

France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey appeared as willing candidates. There is no evidence that the U.S. forced IRBMs on its NATO allies. In some cases these allies wanted them because they were lesser partners during the Cold War years and because they were located close to the USSR (like Greece) or shared a common border with the Soviet Union (like Turkey). On the downside the deployment of these missiles would turn these countries into potential targets in any conflict between the US and the Soviet Union.

Ultimately Greece refused to accept the deployment of missiles because of strong public opposition. The Turkish government, however, was enthusiastic. There were two main reasons for this:

First, the strongly pro-American Democrat Party was in government between 1950 and 1960. The party's foreign policies were strongly anti-communist and anti-Soviet. In this sense, the Turkish government thought the deployment of IRBM deployments would yield political support both domestically and internationally. Second, there was a long history of antagonism between Turkey/the Ottoman Empire and the USSR/Tsarist Russia. The two countries shared a long border and it was the combination of geographical proximity, an adversarial history and crises in the modern period that drove Turkey to seek protection under the NATO umbrella. The psychology of the Cold War also had its effect on Turkish feeling at the government and popular level. (Kongar, 1999:460-1): The placement of missiles in Turkey has to be seen within the broader context of Turkey tightening of relations with the western bloc, with ramifications for its policies in the Middle East and elsewhere. As Nur

Bilge Criss, (Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1997 (1): no1)³³ has pointed out

the 1960 military coup did not bring about any significant change in Turkey's foreign policy. Its Middle East policy, which was still an extension of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy. The lack of cautiousness and the urge to act with the West, attitudes identified with DP governments, remained visible in Turkish actions. For example, on September 29, 1961, when Syria decided to break away from the United Arab Republic (UAR -founded by Syria and Egypt in 1958), Turkey became the second state after Jordan to recognize the new regime. That early declaration was probably prompted by Turkey's happiness to see a rift between the region's two most anti-Western states. This step drew the wrath of the Egyptian leadership, which cut all diplomatic relations with Turkey.³⁴

Finally Italy, Turkey, and Great Britain agreed to host the deployment of IRBMs in Europe. The Democrat Party government and the Eisenhower government signed an agreement for deployment of IRBMs on 25 October 1959 in Paris. (T.Yavuz, 1999: 67) (Interestingly, the Menderes government did not need to send this agreement to Turkish Grand National Assembly for ratification, which was a further sign of the strength of prevailing pro-American feeling). Subsequently the deployment of 30 Jupiter IRBMs in Italy was completed in July 1961. (P.Nash, 1997: 102-103). The US also supplied 60 Thor missiles to the UK and 15 Jupiter missiles to Turkey. The Jupiter missile was fitted to carry a nuclear warhead and had a range of nearly 1500 miles (2413 km) range. This meant that the Jupiters (deployed in the

³³ <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv011no1in.html>

³⁴ So, as Professor Bilge underlined the fact that Turkish politics the general tendency of Turkish foreign policy, which indicates pro- western attitudes, is going on. It was important point, because Turkey accepted to deployment of IRBMs before the 1960 Military intervention under Menderes (Democrat Party) government. So the military did not change Turkish attitudes to missiles under the cold war condition.

Çiğli region of Izmir) threatened a large part of the USSR ranging from Moscow to Leningrad.

The deployment of the missiles had positive and negative effects vis- a-vis Turkish security. On the one hand they provided a measure of psychological comfort to a country, which was geographically located at the centre of Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR. On the other the deployment of the missiles also turned Turkey into a potential primary target in the event of war: this was not simply the fear of the Turkish government but was made clear by the Soviet government in an announcement on Moscow Radio. (T.Yavuz, 1999: 69). In order to arrive at balanced conclusions about costs and benefits, the Cuban missile crisis will now be discussed in the context of Turkey's involvement through the deployment of the Jupiter missiles.

In November 1960, the Democrats won the US presidential elections and John Kennedy came into the White House. Kennedy wanted to remove the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey because he believed their presence increased the possibility of conflict with the USSR.³⁵ Against arguments that this would weaken the overall military posture of the US Kennedy had the trump card of the new Polaris submarine, which could launch IRBMs without even needing to surface. Thus the US no longer needed Italy or Turkey as European defense lines against the USSR in the Cold War. There was also a case to be made on the grounds of efficiency. Most experts argued that the immobile structure of the missile emplacements in Turkey

³⁵ For example as pointed out 24 The American restraints, despite their overwhelming advantage, is counter-intuitive and difficult to explain, except as the consequence of the fear of nuclear war itself. The American restraint becomes even more remarkable when considered in the light of new evidence that suggests that President Kennedy was willing to even make a public bargain of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, if that was what it would take to resolve the crisis short of war. (<http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-100.html>)

and Italy rendered them vulnerable to air attack or bad weather conditions. (May, Zelikow, 1998: 28).

On the other side the USSR was also preparing its own missile defense far from its borders by placing medium range SS-4 ballistic missiles in Cuba. The deployment of missiles close to the American mainland brought the world to the closest point of nuclear conflict since the end of the Second World War. (Allison, Zelikow, 1999:1). Given the involvement of numerous lesser actors in the Cold War the Cuban missile crisis could not but affect them. Following the dramatic revelation that the USSR had deployed missiles in Cuba (October 1962) US warships were sent to the island. The result was an eventual standoff between the two superpowers (and at a personal level between President Kennedy and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev).

The development of the Cuban crisis from beginning to end was a fascinating example not only of power politics and 'brinkmanship' but also of how decisions are made in crisis conditions. Faced with the grim reality of nuclear conflict both Soviet and American decision makers had to give up some of their principles and primary objectives. Turkey -- like Cuba -- unavoidably became a tool in the negotiations between the two super powers. If the Americans wanted the SS-4s out of Cuba the USSR wanted the removal of the Jupiters from a country on its borders and these mutual demands became the basis of the tacit agreement between them. According to some writers (like Zubok) (D.B.Kunz, 1994: 171) the negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev were actually steps in the search for arms control. The Cold War gains international importance rather than bilateral problem between the US and the USSR for two reasons. First, it is possible to say that the nuclear balance appears to have played a part in the crisis,

Because the missile crisis suggests even greater American restraint than was realized earlier, strengthening the proposition that the US was as deterred by the threat of war as the Soviet Union was, and was willing to go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the outbreak of such a war³⁶.

Today it is easy to see that the Cuban missile crisis and subsequent developments brought costs to the US at the global level in the form of deterrence and constraints in the US foreign policy alternatives.

Secondly, the other point about the Cuban Missile Crisis was its impact on third parties Turkey was a good example of how other actors were influenced by the missile crisis. Certainly Cuba increased the Cold War costs to Turkey. During the missile crisis the negotiations between the US and the USSR developed without the participation or even the knowledge of the Turkish government. The Turkish public certainly had little idea of what was going on even though the missile emplacement in their country was at key issue in the negotiations. This had a political effect on the Turkish 'public mind'³⁷ with consequences in the domestic arena and in Turkey's foreign policy orientation. The Democrat Party government had declared that the partnership with the US was a cornerstone of Turkey's security position in the face of the 'Soviet threat'. Whatever the real nature of this 'threat' the Democrats had used it as a foreign policy tool to serve their domestic political needs. (Kongar, 1999:460). Generally, the public accepted this view and came to regard the emplacement of the missiles near Izmir as being a necessary part of the country's security structure: However, it has to be explained that neither the public nor most of Turkish policy makers knew much about the conditions attached to possible use of the missiles.³⁸

³⁶ <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun-100.html>

³⁷ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/01/10/yazar/kohen.html>

³⁸ <http://www.haberaliz.com/detay.php>

The Cuban missile crisis showed that the presence of the missiles did not necessarily enhance Turkey's security position but might even threaten it. Furthermore, while Turkey had been put at risk through the emplacement of missiles it had been kept at arm's length during the negotiations to end the Cuban crisis. These developments tended to confuse and divide public opinion in Turkey but were certainly consequences for Turkey in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy. The Cuban issue raised question marks in the Turkish public mind about the relationship with the US. The fact that this relationship was continued as before was an indication that the Turkish side – far from blaming the US -- regarded the Cuban crisis as a 'natural' outcome of the Cold War. In addition, in the years to come Turkey remained enthusiastic about the 'strategic' partnership with the US which it regarded as a *sine qua non* because on balance the benefits seemed greater than the costs: Among these benefits was easier access to IMF credits than many Latin American countries and American support for Turkish membership of the EEC/EU. Surely, from the other side of the mirror, all these correlations developed as a result of different US interest in different time periods. Therefore, it is obvious that Cuba missile crises opened a more intimate stage in the relationship, but it does not seem to be possible to speculate on very deep impacts of the Cuban Missile Crises on Turco-American relations. In conclusion, while the relationship with the US remained strong, Cuba was an example of how the weaker partner in a power relationship can be forced to adopt a submissive attitude in a situation in which it is affected when the stakes are global in nature.

2.5 Military Bases

Military bases have always been an important aspect of relations between the US and other countries. It is generally assumed that the presence of US military bases around the world was most critical in the Cold War period. However they have remained important (in various countries and especially now in the Middle East and Central Asia) since the end of the Cold War because of their value in the projection of US global power.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US administrations started to give priority to establishing military bases for two reasons. First, as a super-power engaged in what was seen as a life or death struggle with the USSR, the US wanted to take control of strategically critical areas that it thought would give it the upper hand, two global powers started to challenge each other almost in everywhere. The two powers began to challenge each other around the world almost as soon as the Second World War ended. The US used military bases from Italy to Japan in order to ‘contain’ communism. In this way, the US strengthened its capacity to take military action in many parts of the world. In short military bases were the cornerstones of global effectiveness of the US military. The second reason for opening bases was the US desire to turn military powers into political power vis-à-vis both its friends as well as its enemies. As J. Odell has observed the fact that (Ikeburry, 1995:42-43) the military bases were a tangible demonstration of US power. In this sense, From 1950 until 1989, during the Cold War, the US spent an average of \$325 billion (current year dollars) on the military ³⁹(and most of them on military bases and arms

³⁹ <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/06161998Isaacs.html>

development) In short it can be said that the presence of military bases added much to the 'global reach' of the US.

The idea of political power accruing from military power -- hardly a new one and in the modern period one that was embraced by radical nationalists and communists as well as the 'reactionary' governments they were seeking to overturn across Latin America, the Middle East and South-East Asia -- was in fact one of the main building blocks in the establishment of NATO. It would be difficult to argue that NATO was established merely to provide a cover for US military bases around but NATO does appear to have arisen as a tool for legitimizing the American presence and the presence of military bases in friendly states. For example, Zoltan Grossman has argued that ⁴⁰

As each intervention was being planned, planners focused on building new U.S. military installations, or securing basing rights at foreign facilities, in order to support the coming war. But after the war ended, the U.S. forces did not withdraw, but stayed behind, often creating suspicion and resentment among local populations, much as the Soviet forces faced after liberating Eastern Europe in World War II. The new U.S. military bases (in addition to previous ones) were not merely built to aid the interventions, but the interventions also conveniently afforded an opportunity to station the bases.

On the other hand, it is possible to talk about NATO military bases causing political problems with allied governments (as pointed out before, for example, the French dilemma with the US) that reduced their effectiveness.

To minimize problems US administrations pursued two different strategies on the base question. Two categories of bases were opened. Those in the first category were placed under the command of NATO although the US remained influential in their operation through supplies of arms and other means of exercising influences. Bases in the second category were under the full direct control of the US government

⁴⁰ <http://www.counterpunch.org/zoltanbases.html>

and military. US bases in the Middle East (the US military Bases in Saudi Arabia for example⁴¹) were a good example of this type of base. The difference in type of base could be taken as a signpost to the nature of the relationship between the US and the host government.

The presence of US military bases (and the presence of the US in the form of a NATO base) had paradoxical results for host countries during the Cold War. The military presence of the US military was seen as providing a guarantee against Soviet aggression (this was especially important to countries that shared a common border with the USSR or were close to it). However, bases would inevitably arouse the hostility of the USSR especially when those bases were close to its borders. In short the presence of bases created contradictions for the host countries which continued even after the Cold War ended because a military base controlled by an outside power could always be used in a way that did not suit the interests of the host government (by attacking a neighboring country for example). Thus the presence of bases was likely to cause regional diplomatic complications.⁴² In the decades following the US decision to open bases all over the world their presence became an important issue in domestic and foreign policy debates in many countries.⁴³

In this context the base issue became a critical aspect in Turkish-American relations. The issue first came on to the Turkish-American agenda when Turkey applied to join NATO at the beginning of 1950s. The possible presence of US military bases in Turkey was an important subject for debate during negotiations between Turkey and NATO members. Indeed Turkey used its strategic position as a

⁴¹ U.S. military training mission established at Dhahran in 1953 provides training and support in the use of weapons and other security-related services to the Saudi armed forces. After the gulf war, a new base was constructed at Al Kharj, about 60 miles south of Riyadh. Al Kharj, one of the sites selected to receive Phase II aircraft, was a classic bare base location. It had been programmed as a massive Saudi military installation, (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/saudi-arabia.htm>)

⁴² <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/06161998Isaacs.html>

⁴³ Today, the US has got more than 400 military basis (including NATO oriented ones. Interestingly most of them were build during the Cold War Era. (<http://www.globemaster.de/cgi-bin/bases/>)

kind of trump card in order to secure acceptance into NATO. Turkey would not give the US permission to open bases without being given to NATO membership. (It was expected that Turkey was going to give permission to the US) (Kongar, 1999: 460) Another example which illustrates Turkish rejection to allow for using bases is, as Nur Bilge Criss (Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1997 (1):no1)⁴⁴ has also observed that

regarding the use of NATO bases for non-NATO purposes, Turkish policy makers preferred to preserve a degree of ambiguity, which they believed to have a deterrent value of its own. Although Turkey maintained that it would not allow the use of its bases during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, it is premature to argue that this was an indication of a complete reversal in Turkish foreign policy simply because Turkey refused to cooperate with the United States while adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality that tilted toward the Arabs.

It was Turkey's strategic importance that dictated the US desire for bases in Turkey. The most important aspect of this geographical proximity was Turkey's 360 mile long (579 km.) common border with the Soviet Union (See Chapter 2-2.2). On the Turkish side – once Turkey became a NATO member -- there was the need for American assistance to ensure the supply of military equipment and support facilities in order to meet NATO standards.⁴⁵ It can quickly be seen that Turkey successfully used its geo-strategic position to secure political and military benefits once the base issue came on to the agenda. However, the general Turkish view was that military bases should operate within NATO limits and under NATO rather than under the direct control of the US. At the same time, once military bases were opened in

⁴⁴ <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jvol1no1in.html>

⁴⁵ <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jvol1no1in.html>

Turkey it could be difficult to limit American influence especially given the pressures of the Cold War.

Several different bases were built in different parts of Turkey, from Izmir to Adana. The Incirlik air base was one of the most important American-oriented bases in Turkey, was opened as the result of negotiations over Turkish membership of NATO. Both sides (Turkish and American) “spent months negotiating an agreement with the USAF (United States Air Force) concerning joint use of the base, which both parties eventually signed on 6 December 1954. Several weeks later, on 21 February 1955, the base received its first official name, Adana Air Base (AB).”⁴⁶ The Incirlik base subsequently became one of the most important overseas bases for the US because of its close proximity both to the Soviet Union and the Middle East.

The Adana air base (renamed Incirlik in 1979⁴⁷) has supported almost all US activities in the region, including tactical military operations. Moreover, Incirlik has been used to reinforce US military activities in Europe (i.e. during the German Cold War crises and in most of the US oriented operation to the Middle East like US’s Lebanon operation) during the Cold War.

Incirlik was also used by the US intelligence service (the CIA) to gather information about the Soviet Union during the Cold War. U-2 aircraft flew from Incirlik to gather photographic imagery and electronic signals from the USSR for intelligence purposes. The U-2 plane crisis of the 1960s showed how use of bases created cost for Turkey. One of the planes, piloted by Francis Gray Powers, took off from Incirlik for ⁴⁸flight over the USSR without Turkey’s

⁴⁶ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlik-history.htm>

⁴⁷ In 1979, the base’s name became Incirlik Installation in accordance with the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the US and Turkey.

⁴⁸ <http://history.acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/francisgarypowers.html>

apparent knowledge and was shot down.⁴⁹ This situation opens extrinsic danger for Turkey, to abuse and threats from the USSR.

Incirlik gained in strategic and political importance during the Cold War as a point from which the offensive and defensive capabilities of the US against the Soviet Union (and vice versa) could be assessed. Incirlik alone is a fascinating topic in any cost-benefit analysis of Turkish- American relations. Incirlik was a physical symbol of the practical benefits from this relationship. It was a necessary element in American strategy regarding both the USSR and the Middle East (according to American perspective, it was using for mostly humanitarian aims, but on the other hand, it). The geographic location of Incirlik added a political dimension to the strategic importance of the base. It was a further step in the consolidation of American military power across the Middle Eastern region. After the precedent of Incirlik the Turkish government allowed the US to improve facilities at its air-to-ground range at Konya. Although the Konya Base (or 'training area') remained mostly under the control of the Turkish military it was important to the US as a testing area for the missiles that were deployed at Incirlik.

⁴⁹ Clarence "Kelly" Johnson at the Lockheed Skunk Works (on Dec. 1, 1954) developed the U-2 airplane. Project Staff was budgeted at \$35 million to develop 30 planes and sophisticated cameras developed by Edwin Land. Johnson's old boss Jimmy Doolittle at the Shell Oil Co. provided a special fuel that would not boil off at high altitudes, called "Kelly's Lighter Fluid No. 1." Johnson built the first U-2 plane in 88 days and the first U-2 test flight took place Aug. 6, 1955. In May 1956 the U-2 air the CIA with Turkey providing an air base at Adana established wing of 4 planes and 6 civilian pilots. The first U-2 flight over Russia from Adana to Bodo, Norway, a distance of 3788 miles at 80,000 feet, took place in June 1956 and was detected by Russian radar. The Russian spy Selmer Nielsen at the Bodo air base gave the Russians the time and routes of the U-2 flights. In the "Spirit of Camp David" Eisenhower had halted the U-2 flights in September 1959 but they were resumed April 9, 1960, to prepare for the Paris Summit Conference planned for May 1960. The U-2 flight of Gary Powers was shot down May 1 by a SAM-2 missile. Eisenhower learned that Powers was alive May 7, and Khrushchev displayed the recovered parts of his U-2 plane Moscow on May 11. Eisenhower departed for Paris May 14 for the summit conference. On May 15 Khrushchev made a threat against U-2 bases and the U.S. went on DefCon 3 alert. On May 16, Khrushchev canceled Ike's Moscow visit and walked out of the Paris summit. On Aug. 19, Powers made his confession during his trial that he was "deeply repentant and profoundly sorry" for his actions. He was jailed in Russia until exchanged for Rudolf Abel in Feb. 1962. The U-2 production at Skunk Works was shut down in 1969.(<http://history.acusd.edu/gen/filmnotes/francisgarypowers.html>)

Subsequently the number of US bases in Turkey gradually expanded (The most influential ones during the Cold War were Izmir Air Base and Adana Air Base)⁵⁰.

It can very easily be seen that NATO military involvement in Turkey frequently turned into US military involvement such as the deployment of the Jupiter missiles near Izmir. The US used the cover of NATO to legitimize and accordingly increase its military involvement in Turkey during the Cold War. The US saw Turkey and according Incirlik Base critically important: as Jane Brooker has pointed out⁵¹

As weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East, it will become increasingly vital to have Turkey on the side of moderation and stability. If it comes to conflict, the Turkish NATO airbase of Incirlik is within 1000 miles of much of the world's energy resources. This is a critical consideration as the Caspian Basin opens to export because Turkey is at the crossroads of transit to the West in competition with Russia and Iran.

From the discussion above it ought to be clear that the presence of military bases largely governed US attitudes toward Turkey and was central to cooperation between the two countries. The foundations of this cooperation were constructed out of the complexities of global political calculations, regional strategic goals, and economic benefits.

The presence of US military bases affected Turkey politically, psychologically and physically. In the psychological sense, the presence of the bases strengthened the feeling of unity with a global power. This was felt very strongly by Turkish governments and the general public in the 1950s (Kongar,

⁵⁰ <http://www.globemaster.de/cgi-bin/bases/>

⁵¹ http://www.daily.umn.edu/daily/1998/04/24/editorial_opinions/oo0424/

199:460-462) but within a decade Turkish attitudes to the US military presence were becoming more negative. In retrospect it is difficult to decide what the main reason was for this shift in attitudes but as have I pointed out in previous sections the Cold War was characterized by ideological affinities and by the 1960s the political climate in Turkey was changing. Newly emerging leftist and anti-imperialist sentiments affected Turkish society from the middle of the 1960s into the 1970s. Although Turkish governments (in line with state ideology) remained hostile to communism and suspicious of the USSR leftist tendencies were beginning to have an impact on public opinion. One outcome was increasing negativity on the base question. In other words, the 1960s witnessed the rise of anti Americanism in Turkish politics and society. After the Democrat Party reign, Turkey entered a period when Turkish public and politics started to be influenced by leftist tendencies. As Yetkin (Yetkin, 1970: 15-17) has written the leftist group were fragmented, anti-Americanism appeared to their only common point, especially during mid-1960s. More interestingly, pressures of American bases started to be more subject to the domestic politics. Turkish governments maintained their positive stand but even for them problems arose over the bases. The main reason was the difference in priorities between the US and Turkey over how and when the bases should be used. According to the Turks the bases should remain within NATO limitations, which meant they should only be used in the common security interests of NATO members. However, the US regarded the bases as a means of strengthening its regional and global strategic posture, as pointed out in the quotation from Jane Brooker⁵². The bases (especially Incirlik) also became subjected to differences that arose over Turkey's relations with its neighbors. For

⁵² http://www.daily.umn.edu/daily/1998/04/24/editorial_opinions/oo0424/

example, after Turkey intervened in Cyprus (20 July, 1974) it was placed under an arms embargo ordered by the US Congress. (See Chapter 4-4.1) In response to the Turkish government ordered in 1975 that all US bases be closed and placed under the control of the Turkish military and their transfer to would close and transfer control to the Turkish military.⁵³ Incirlik and Izmir air bases were allowed to remain open because of their NATO missions. All other US military bases that were non-NATO were closed by order of the Turkish government. This was an a good example of how military bases quickly became central to diplomatic crises. As noted before, response and counter response on the Cyprus question also showed that Turkey was prepared to use the military bases as a tool in its diplomatic relations with the US.

2.6 The Middle East

The relationship of the US with the Middle East totally changed with the end of the Second World War. The US became a global power, and this brought new problems and new perspectives into US politics. As a global power, American interests in the Middle East were soon regarded as a critical aspect of its global position. The region was important not just because of its resources but because of its strategic position during the Cold War. Involvement in the Middle East was especially complicated because the region lived in a state of continual crisis. This was largely the result of the partition of the Arab world after the First World War. It was the colonial powers who decided on boundaries and who decided to establish a

⁵³ the arm embargo totally lifted by the end of 1979

Jewish state in Palestine which, at the time the US moved into the picture, had set off waves of anti-western feeling from one Arab country to another. The most striking social characteristic of the region was the fragmentation between different political groups, religions, ideologies and ethnic groups which -- taken with the longstanding effects of the colonial past -- combined to create dramatically unstable political structures. These internal problems were aggravated by the continuing interest of outside powers in the region's resources and their meddling to increase their control over governments and access to these resources. The task ahead of the US was 'stabilization' of an area, which appeared to be inherently unstable. (Kissinger, 1994; Ripley, Lindsay, 1997; Kanter, Brooks, 1994)

The US used different tools and policies in pursuit of its strategic goals. From the beginning it supported Israel diplomatically and, increasingly, economically and militarily. On this point Alan Taylor, summarizing the linkage between Israel and the US, has defined US policy (in T. Y. Ismael's book, 1986:139) as being 'premised on the conviction that the new state would serve both as a stabilizing force and a watchdog for American interests in the Middle East'. It is in fact possible to elaborate many reasons for American support for Israel. In the climate of the Cold War a strong motive clearly was to build a barrier (through the close relationship with Israel and other countries) against the USSR. (Ismael, 1986:139) The second was to use Israel to polarize and divide Arab governments and public opinion. From this perspective, Americans thought (like the British and the French before them) that a unified Arab world would endanger their national and global strategic interests. Central to these interests were the petroleum resources of the region.

One US foreign policy priority was to the creation of an inter-connection between American foreign policy tenets and the foreign policies of Middle Eastern countries. However, American policy towards the Middle East did not run smoothly during the Cold War because of the divergence between US policy goals and the region's unavoidable realities. There was no 'parallelism' for most of the time (Kissinger, 1994: 491). As noted before, the US regarded Turkey as standing in the front line against Soviet expansion in the Middle Eastern region. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Middle Eastern politics of the US played an essential role in Turkish-American relations. So the US turned to countries like Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in order to contain the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East.

The US's strategic and ideological anxiety about the Middle East played an important part in the development of the 'containment' policy. According to this policy the US wanted to give Turkey a complementary or supplementary mission. The US wanted to create a Middle Eastern version of NATO as an additional barrier against the Soviet Union. (Kissinger, 1994: 493). One basic US goal was to establish a link between NATO and the countries of the Middle East. Turkey was central to US plans and a *sine qua non* element because it was already a NATO member. Through the Baghdad Pact (1955) the US proposed to create a Middle Eastern front line against the Soviet Union. Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran signed the Pact. Britain also came into the agreement. However, while the US strongly promoted the pact it was almost impossible (as Kissinger has pointed out) to run it successfully because it did not reflecting common goals and benefits. Neither was it based on a sense of common danger: to Arab states the problem of Israel was more menacing to their interests than any perceived 'threat' from the Soviet Union. Neither (unlike NATO) did the pact have the power to organize a military force against a common

danger (if one could be found). Lastly the governments, which signed the Baghdad Pact, did not enjoy a stable political environment (the Iraqi government was overthrown in 1958 and the monarchy destroyed). To complicate matters even further behind the façade of cooperation and ‘western unity’ the US and Britain were rivals for the leadership of countries, which had signed the pact. (Kissinger, 1994: 494).

Not surprisingly the pact came with costs for Turkey, which regarded its involvement as the natural extension of its pro-western and pro-US alignment. E. Kongar has summarized the costs to Turkey arising from involvement in the Baghdad Pact (Kongar, 1999:461). According to him Turkish-Soviet relations became more and more strained – inevitably – while Arab countries, which had refused to become involved (which meant most of them) started to see NATO and Baghdad Pact member Turkey as an agent of western imperialism in the region, representing US interests in particular. It is hard to see any benefits accruing to Turkey in return for these costs because (as Kongar has pointed out) Turkey had placed almost all of its military power under the control and authorization of NATO command. Moreover, its strategic partner across the seas -- the US -- did not want to become directly involved in the Baghdad Pact but only to give it support from the sidelines. Inescapably Turkey seemed to be America’s representative in the pact. The pact brought new responsibilities into Turkish foreign policy, but it was almost entirely because of the relationship with the US that Turkey had become involved in the first place in the Pact. Even today many scholars (such as E.Kongar) questioned whether the Baghdad Pact served Turkey’s interests or not. Because of the unstable political structures characterizing the Middle East it was certainly impossible for Turkey to develop a stable partnership with other signatories of the pact. Following

the revolution (1958) Iraq. The pact then became CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization) but the name change meant no real change: CENTO was a dead letter from the start.

The Middle Eastern politics of the US shifted under different administrations. The differences between the Kennedy and Johnson administrations stand as an example. Kennedy believed in the importance of the US image in the running of a productive foreign policy and wanted to win the support of the so-called 'Third World' countries. His administration certainly wanted to develop good relations with Arab governments but this was difficult (and became more difficult under the Johnson administration) at a time the US was just beginning to give Israel substantial military support. 'Stabilizing' the Middle East in US (and 'western') an interest in the Middle East was certainly a strong aspect of US policy during the Cold War. There was talk of democracy but (apart from Israel and Turkey where a democratic political system had only recently opened up) US interests tended to focus on states whose rulers showed little interest in introducing democracy any time soon (Iran and Saudi Arabia being two examples). The main concern was benefits to the US as measured in terms of resources or strategic gains. Towards these ends the US could show considerable flexibility. In the 1970s, for example, Henry Kissinger worked closely with the Soviets to bring the 1973 Arab-Israeli war to an end (Ismael, 1986:150) while the Nixon administration continued to support anti-communist forces in Syria and Egypt against the Soviet Union.

Turkey could not fail to be affected by twists and turns in American policy on the Middle East. Its involvement in the Baghdad Pact (arising from its desire to be seen as a good and reliable ally of the US and the 'West') was one example but there were many other examples of how American policy brought tensions – open and

hidden -- into Turkish foreign policy. In assessing the costs and benefits to Turkey of its relationship, complications in the Middle East have to be taken into account. The alignment of Turkish interests with the US could not but affect its relations with its Arab neighbors. Arab hostility to Turkey's willingness to join western 'defense' arrangements in the 1950s was only one example. Turkey also had to formulate a policy on Palestine that could be accommodated by the US and Israel without alienating Arab governments. The need to strike a balance was brought home dramatically during the oil boycott which followed the Arab-Israeli war of 1973: the desperate shortage of oil in Turkey was a powerful motivating force for a policy that took Arab concerns more into account.

Partly because it did not want to get caught up in Middle Eastern problems and partly because its focus remained strongly on attachment to the West and in particular the relationship with the US Turkish foreign policymakers in the 1950s and 1960s tended to put the Middle East to one side. Until the 1960s Turkey tended to follow the Middle East lead of the United States. Undoubtedly this 'west-centric' vision created costs for Turkey especially – given the size of the potential Arab market for Turkish products – economically. All Turkish governments have to share the blame for failing to develop stronger economic relations with the Arab world but their vision was primarily political and ideological and not economic: it was not until much later that the economic costs of isolation from the Middle East were brought home.

American Middle East policies were bound to have an effect on nationalist and subsequently Islamic feeling, with consequences that all governments in the region (including Turkey) were to feel to a greater or less degree. In the Cold War the US was swayed by the possibility of developing Islamic feeling as a counter-foil

to the spread of 'radical' nationalism or pro-Soviet influence but as the Americans were to discover well before Afghanistan, Islamic sentiment was a double-edged weapon. Islamic movements that were hostile to 'radical' secularized nationalism were likely to be as just as hostile as the secular nationalists to western penetration of the Middle East and support of Israel. The Iranian (and vehemently anti-American) revolution of 1979 came as a complete shock to the US administration. It has been argued that the revolution was even influential in the electoral victory of conservative parties in the US and Britain. It certainly brought home to the Americans the dangerous nature of Islamic radicalism in an area where the US has many interests. According to President Reagan 'the U.S. will not permit it [Saudi Arabia] to be an [other] Iran' (Zelikow, Zoellick, 1998:69) but it was too late in the Middle East: Iran had been established and had started to spread its radical Islamist ideas across the Middle East. Very interestingly, Barry Rubin, who is known for his support for American foreign policy in the Middle East, has underlined the reality and natural tendency of the US in the region, as Rubin (Middle East Review of Internal Affairs, 2001: vol5-4)⁵⁴

The United States, like all other countries, seeks to make a foreign policy that is in accord with its interests. In dealing with this particular debate about the Middle East, however, that factor is quite irrelevant. Even if the reason that the United States saved Kuwait from permanent conquest by a radical secularist regime in Iraq in 1991, for example, was primarily because of oil interests, the American policy was still in practice pro-Kuwait, pro-Muslim, and pro-Arab. After all, there were many alternatives available. The United States might have tried to seize contro

⁵⁴ <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue4/jv5n4a1.htm>

So, again, this claim highlights the claim that the US has inadvertently stimulated the radicalism in the Middle East during the Cold War Era. On that point, as Stephen Zunes⁵⁵ has claimed that;

Often, extremist Islamic movements arise in direct response to U.S. policies. The 1953 overthrow by the CIA of the moderate constitutional government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, followed by years of support for the brutal regime of the shah, led directly to the rise of the Islamic revolution in that country. U.S. support for the regime of Jafaar Nimeiry during most of his repressive 16-year rule of Sudan led to the destruction of much of that country's civil society, resulting in the 1989 coup by hard-line Islamist military officers who overthrew that country's brief democratic experiment. During the 1970s and 1980s, the destruction of moderate Muslim-led factions in Lebanon by U.S.-backed invasions and occupations from Syria and Israel—and later military intervention by the U.S. itself—led to a vacuum filled by more sectarian groups such as Hezbollah, even as most of the other militias that once carved up the rest of the country were disarmed by a revived central government and its Syrian backers. The roots of Islamic radicalism stem from economic inequality, military occupation, and authoritarianism. Given that U.S. policy in the Middle East and elsewhere has often perpetuated such injustices; responsibility for the rise of radical Islamic movements can often be traced to the U.S. itself.

Turkey was one country that was affected from the US foreign policies in the Middle East. The important point here is that American support for the Shah's repressive regime in Iran and its condemnation of the Islamic radicals who brought it down created costs for the Turkish side and later for the US itself. As Noam Chomsky has pointed out, political scientists would probably dismiss most of the events underlining the relationship between radical Islamism and the US as 'speculative'. (Chomsky, 2002:162). Others take a more cynical view of the means, which the US has been prepared to employ to achieve its purposes. According to H. Amirahmadi – writing of the US -- (Amirahmadi, 1993:14):

like any other super power, the U.S. has used a variety of malignant and benign means to achieve its interest in the Middle East. These have included both

⁵⁵ Foreign Policy in Focus 2001, September 12. (<http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=11479>)

peaceful and violent methods carried out by means of covert and overt operations.

So the US mainly developed and applied different means in order to get an advantageous position in the Cold War struggle including trade embargos, sanctions sabotages, and support for different ideologies in the Middle East. Sometimes these multi-basis policies had contradictory and ill-defined results, which inescapably played a role in defining today's fragmented structures in the Middle East. Directly or indirectly the chaotic political environment prevailing in the Middle East has affected Turkey.

There were also some exceptions to Turkey's policy of standing aside from politics in the Middle East, For instance, Turkey was the first NATO member to accept the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a representative of the Palestinian people (1975), and it recognized Palestine as an independent country in 1988. These initiatives had their effect on Turkish-American relations. For example, Turkey did not allow the US to use military basis in Turkey during the 1973 Arab-Israel War (for the reason of weakening relations in the aftermath opium poppy crises) while allowing Soviet planes to Turkish air space at the same time. (Sönmezoğlu, 1996:193) This and similar instances indicates that while the Turkish-American 'strategic partnership' has worked more or less well, there have been some periods of friction between two sides. Both sides have not hesitated to use the Middle Eastern card against each other: for example, when the US imposed an arm embargo on Turkey following its intervention in Cyprus in 1974, Turkey 'retaliated' by making contact with Arabian countries without consulting the US. Turkey was revising its complete Middle Eastern foreign policy in way that did not always suit

the US.^{56 57} As Sönmezoğlu has pointed out, Turkey supported the resolution put before the UN General Assembly by Muslim countries in 1975 (10 November) describing Zionism as a form of racism. (Sönmezoğlu, 1996:193) this attitude of Turkey was strongly opposed by the US. The ‘opium crisis’ of 1971 was a further example of the weakening of Turco-American relations, in the early 1970s. According to the CIA, Turkey was a prime source of opium delivered to the US drug market. In response to the US threats, Turkey appeared to stop opium cultivation. However, in 1973, the new Prime Minister B. Ecevit, expressing nationalist and leftist position at that time, lifted the ban. The US angered hurt but did nothing (like another embargo)

2.7. Concluding remarks

The Cold War Era symbolizes extraordinary political and diplomatic period in the world history. Surely, the level of security danger was uprising both for the dominant actors-- the US and the USSR-- and other actors during the Cold War Era, which meant that political polarization in the world was almost the explicit result of the conditions of the period throughout nearly 50 years. ‘Indefiniteness’ (both in the sense of political and economical) stood as the main source of the problem for the countries like Turkey, which was characterized by irrational and ideological world wide political polarization. Therefore, the Cold War conditions were being effectual on Turco-American relations development. In other words Turkey, similar to any

⁵⁶ The co-called ‘opium crises’ can be best described with example of global power – third actor. In this sense, in 1971, the US, depending CIA reports, which indicates Turkish opium as one of the main the source of drug market in the US, started to put pressure on Turkish government (leded by Prime Minister Nihat Erim). Turkey directly abandons the opium cultivation in Turkey under the US threats (economic and political), although Turkish agriculture had been benefited much from opium. Ironically, in 1973, new Prime Minister Ecevit announced that the prohibition on opium cultivation was lifted by the new government

⁵⁷ http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/dosya/abd_dehseti/19mensur.asp

other countries in its region, was affected from the political polarization and the indefiniteness political environment of the Cold War conditions. For example, Turkey faced with ineluctable reflections of the Cold War environment, such as Turkey had been forced to choose one side-- western side or eastern bloc ideologically, politically and economically. It means that the Cold War affected to whole Turkish system from economy to its' sociological structure. On the other hand, politically, it was almost impossible to remain neutral between two sides for the country like Turkey, because of its specific geographic position. On this point, it should be highlighted Turkey's geographic position's strategic importance for the two super power of the Cold War Era. This was the main reason why Turkey did not able to remain neutral like Switzerland from beginning to the end of the Cold War period. As has noted before in this chapter, this was the natural and unavoidable end result for the country like Turkey. But what was the US's role on Turkey during the Cold War?

On this point, as has indicated in the chapter, one question has become important: what single out American relations with Turkey than its relations with others? This question, which has been trying to find answer in this chapter, is in fact in the key position in order to understand how and in which ways Turco-American relations were effected from the Cold War environment. Therefore, it is possible to talk about two main results which probably were effectual on costs and benefits to Turkey in its relations with the US during the Cold War Era.

Firstly, it is essential to underline the fact that Turkey and the US have become closer with the Cold War conditions. As it can be seen in the specific issues, (like Turkey's NATO membership or American military bases in Turkey) the Cold War conditions directed Turco-American cooperation towards more or less strategic,

militarily and economic nature rather than directly ideological or even philosophical cooperation for most of time. (with some exceptions like 1950s Democrat Party rule in Turkey-see chp.2 2.1) This kind of process in relations is probably the characteristic reason for developing sort of ‘strategic partnership’ concept that has been expressed by both the US and Turkey administrations nowadays. As a result, as it can be easily seen in the specific issues in this chapter, both Turkey and the US were being closer to each other with mostly security and strategic anxieties. In other words, strategic perspective dominance of the Cold War Era in Turco-American relations has somehow effected perceptions on the costs and benefits concepts in the long run. For example, as it can be seen in the issues that have highlighted in this chapter, (like NATO, IRBMs and military bases in Turkey) Turkish administrations mostly saw its’ costs and benefits from its relations with the US from the point that short term economic and military gains or losses during the Cold War. This kind of perceptions is still prevailing in Ankara nowadays in the post Cold War Era. It means that the Cold War period were not only limited the nature and conditions of Turco-American relations, but also limited the perceptions on costs and benefits concepts that have inevitably effected nowadays perceptions of both sides to each other.

Second important result of the Cold War Era on Turco-American relations is the US’s “with us or against us” doctrine. As I have pointed out in this chapter, according to ‘with us or against us’ doctrine that prevailed in Washington since 1950s, developing countries like Turkey were somehow compelled to act in the limits that the US put. It means that there was very limited area for maneuver (both political and economic) for the countries like Turkey. More importantly, this doctrine brought up the priorities to US benefits and global interests while it certainly limited other actors. Whatever the reasons for the other actors like Turkey, it is certain that

global polarization and power balances of the Cold War conditions were open to run this kind of doctrine. More importantly, after September 11 attacks, US president George W. Bush have announced that the US will continue to follow “with us or against us” doctrine in their foreign politics. Latest developments in the aftermath of September 11 attacks exposed that the US foreign policy practices and policies have not so much different than the Cold War Era. Surely, this kind of foreign policy will be open to high level of controversial dilemmas between the US and its allies, because, the world has changed by the end of the Cold War and countries like Turkey want to give priority its own benefits in the regional politics. Turkey’s different attitude in the Middle East is an explicit example in the post Cold War Era and specifically during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

As it can be seen in this chapter, during almost whole Cold War Era, Turkey somehow followed the American oriented politics and limited itself to practices its own politics. On the other hand, Turkey abstained to the US invasion of Iraq and did not allow opening territories to the US campaign against Iraq. Just six months later, same Turkish administration decided to send Turkish troops to help the US in order to stabilize Iraq.(However, the US has abandoned its request for Turkish troops to Iraq because of regional anxieties.) So, the Cold War’s third actors like Turkey have started to seek primarily their privileges and need areas to maneuver according to their foreign policy benefits. So, it is impossible to expect that the US will lead the strict doctrines like during the Cold War. On the other, however these realities also underlined the fact that political conditions of the new era are different than the Cold War Era. The previous political exercises have somehow affected today’s politics. This reality is the biggest finding of this chapter which also means that Turco-American relations in the Cold War Era is still demanding more detailed studies and

research in order to ferret out nowadays' costs and benefits and accordingly the dynamics under Turco-American relations.

CHAPTER 3

COST BENEFITS IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

The post-Cold War Era has witnessed specific changes in the US interests and roles in the global realm. Linton, F. Brooks and Arnold Kanter have summarized the new American role in the post-Cold War Era. In this sense, as Brooks and Kanter (Kanter, Brooks, 1994:21) have pointed out,

The US post Cold War role has changed. The US is now, at most, the leader of a community of increasingly independent actors, rather than the commander of a military alliance united by a common threat. The US has become the world's sheriff, rather than the world's police officer.

As it can be easily seen from the tone which underlying these words, the US and its perspective of previous allies is totally changed by the post-Cold War conditions. In this sense, Turco-American relations have entered into a period of transformation. In the following chapter, I am going to try to illustrate changing attitudes between Turkey and the US with changing conjecture.

3.1 The new global environment

In foreign policy, sequences of events are the main stepping-stones in order to specify different periods in international relations. In other words, some specific events -- like the world wars -- designate periods of foreign policy. In this sense, the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union certainly had their effect on foreign policy formation. The complexities of the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union only to be followed by the growth of new complexities. These cannot be evaluated simply within the limits of conventional foreign policy thinking. The

world entered a different period with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a profound effect on strategic, geographic and military issues but also influenced the demographic and social structures across the world. J. Rosati (Rosati, 1999:36) argues that

U.S. foreign policy may have entered a time span where the contradiction between the legacy of America's expansive and cold war past, the implications of the tremendous changes that have enveloped the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the uncertainty of domestic support need to be addressed and reconciled.

The collapse of the Soviet Union not only changed the context of foreign policy tools but also changed almost all patterns and policies in US foreign relations. This new reality left the US as the single global power. Many if not most people would perhaps think that the ideological and political collapse of the world's other super power would also have brought down all obstacles to the spreading of western-type democracy, human rights and a high standard of life. But this has not happened. The globalization that has strengthened in the past decade has brought with it greater inequities and rising anger in developing countries against the economic institutions of the West. In the meantime, new enemies appeared in the place of the old: foremost among them are the Islamic radical groups opposing the general values of 'westernization' and the particular policies of the United States in the Middle East and other regions. The Cold War might have ended but US foreign policymakers now have to deal with issues no fewer complexes than their predecessors did in the 1950s and 1960s.

After the Cold War ended in practice in the 1980s, the US turned its attention to maximizing its global economic and political power in accordance with the new strategies being formulated as far back as the Reagan presidency by the 'neo

conservatives' who finally came into government with the election of President George W. Bush Jr. It is possible to think that US foreign policy goals were already planned before the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a global power the US was certainly going to experience problems and complexities in foreign policy with or without the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War world the US embarked on a series of interventions that delineated a new and more muscular approach to foreign relations based on directly confronting regimes that threatened American interests. It was surely no coincidence that US intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict (1990/91) came just a year after the collapse of the Soviet Union; that the Soviet Union's global power had started to decline in the mid-1980s. So, US dominance in the global realm started before its formal end. This momentous event seemed to open the way to the enactment of a policy that had already been developed.

It is an open question whether the collapse of the Soviet Union affected the foreign policy tools of the US rather than US foreign policy goals.⁵⁸ The US is now using its military power in order to maintain its strategic goals. This means that a world environment -- labeled as 'Post-Cold War' -- has arisen with new dilemmas, complexities and surely uncertainties both for the US and others. The concept of the 'U.S. and others' is indeed an inescapable consequence arising from the unique status of being the world's only super power. This new situation (in Iraq and elsewhere) is already bringing its own costs.

While the definition of the enemy has changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union it is hard to say it about for US strategies in foreign policy. The indicators since 1990 shows that while given a different emphasis they have largely been carried

⁵⁸ http://www.bayarea.com/ml/mercurynews/news/special_packages/Soviet

from the Cold War period. As Coit D. Blacker has pointed out (Kanter, Brooks, 1994: 55);

Topping the list of the US preferences is that the international community be dominated by countries that are more, rather than less, democratic in their political orientation. The goal of policy, therefore, should be to support democratic regimes where they exist, and to proffer assistance of various kinds to those struggling to establish such systems of government.

However this declaration of formal US foreign policy interest in fact has not been practiced by the post-Cold War US administrations in general.

Constant threats and the use of force are now (under the Bush administration) even more pronounced than before. In other words, power politics directed towards consolidating US hegemony (rather than democracy) has been a striking aspect of the new global environment since the Gulf War (which was to be followed – in President Bush’s words – by the construction of a ‘new world order’).

At this point it is necessary to ferret out the specialties and actors of the post-Cold War environment. First of all, globalization has replaced ideology⁵⁹. Globalization (especially its economic aspect) is now directing strategies, politics and surely conflicts in this new period. In the Cold War the ideological struggle led to ‘peaceful co-existence’ as a means of ending conflict. (Girgin, 2003:111) Today globalization and the drive for economic hegemony make the decision-making process more complicated: as the number of actors is constantly on the rise with new means of responding to powerful state actors’ conflicts seem to arise more than before. Economics has brought a range of actors into the arena of world politics: multi-international firms, NGOs, different types of lobbies and a huge media.

⁵⁹ On contrary to the idea of globalization has replaced the ideological affinities in politics, many would argue that the people behind Bush are extraordinarily committed ideologues. For example, new ideological politicians that has been dominant US politics with Bush administration, so-called “new conservatives” (See Chapter 3-3.4)

Naturally the new environment has intensified polarization between state actors and global institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) and their diverse anti-system critics (opponents of globalization). Other actors in the new environment include international terrorist groups and mafia organizations involved in a broad range of activities.⁶⁰ The essential point here is to the influence of all these new actors in the evolution of foreign policy. These actors are not part of the new environment but are forcing changes to the definition of ‘national’ interests.

Not surprisingly, the new environment has changed the nature and balance of costs and benefits to many countries. The new, very aggressive policies of the US administration (centering on disregard of sovereign rights, multilateralism and the taking of ‘anticipatory action’ against governments regarding as threatening US interests) create new challenges for the friends and allies of the US. They have to make the kind of choices that were imposed on various countries during the Cold War. This boils down to standing with the United States or against it – as defined in the rhetoric of President Bush and senior American officials in his administration. This is not a choice many of America’s friends feel they should have to make. Turkey, for example, has tried to develop a broader base for its foreign policy. While continuing its links with the US and Europe it has been seeking to consolidate its relations with the Central Asian republics and Russia, because the cost and benefits balances of the new stage of history seem to require a multi-dimensional political strategy.⁶¹ How successful this approach can be in practice remains open to question because of Turkey’s dependence on external financial support (from the US in particular but also other western sources) has been carried over from the Cold War. Clearly the rising importance of economics (particularly in global context) will play a

⁶⁰ See Section 4.3 for the analysis of globalization

⁶¹ For example, nowadays, many (including some generals) are rather frequently underlined the importance of being a multi dimensional foreign policy for Turkey.

dominant role in US foreign policy and will accordingly shape the policies of lesser players. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Turkey seems to have much of the strategic value it had in the Cold War but it may be only that the strategic importance of Turkey has changed, as the following examples would seem to indicate:

3.2 Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia & Kosovo) and Somalia

It is fact that the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence marked the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav case had both regional and global dimensions. The conflict in Yugoslavia arose as an important challenge to international society and the United Nations. The role of the world organization in settling the conflict marked a change in approach to traditional means of keeping or restoring the peace in global trouble spots. On this point P.F. Diehl (Diehl, 1993:77) has remarked that ‘peace keeping has been less problematic and has generally operated more smoothly when the danger has arisen from the threat to peace by external aggression’ rather than from problems within a sovereign if disintegrating state. Interestingly, when he wrote these words the Yugoslav crises had not ended but his view underscored general characteristics of what had been regarded as the limits of UN and western intervention in problem area. Until Yugoslavia the west had reached consensus on military intervention overseas relatively easily. (The Korean War was an extrinsic example-see chp.2-2.3). But Yugoslavia was almost in the middle of Europe and Western Europe countries could not agree or decide on a united course of action. Every country had its own perspective on Serbian aggression: some (Balkans countries like Greece) had a long history of cultural and religious

connections with Serbia.⁶² The inability of western European governments to agree on what to do about the disintegrating situation in Yugoslavia inevitably put pressure on the United States to override the Europeans and take actions itself. Eventual US intervention marked a change in US foreign policy at the beginning of the 1990s. What I mean here is very well summarized in James G. Roshe and G. Pickett (Kanter, Brooks, 1994:199):

For example, alliances may be seen as the useful tool in such crises (the NATO response to Bosnia). However alliances may be even less skilled than the US in understanding, controlling, and limiting commitments. They may have unwarranted optimism for the effectiveness of forces (e.g. air power), may lack the skills for providing civil affairs support in delicate situations, or may not realize that a peace keeping enterprise for them may be seen by one or more of the protagonists as inserting an additional aggressor to be fought and resisted.

Therefore, it can be possible to argue that at the beginning of 1990s, US started to follow an interventionalist policy for seeking consensus and partnership to intervene to anywhere in the world.⁶³

Slovenian independence was the first step in the development of the Yugoslav crises (June 1991). Serbia, the dominant nation in the federation, accepted Slovenian independence but reacted hostility when Croatia followed suit brought the UN and peace-keeping on to the agenda. In 1992, a UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) was dispatched to Croatia in order to monitor the cease-fire between Croats and Serbs. Meanwhile, as Haass has pointed out, (Haass.1999: 38) ‘the real Yugoslavian

⁶² Greece opposes NATO's approach for reasons based on history, culture, competing foreign policy goals, and public opinion. Its sympathies lie with the Serbs. Turkey is participating in the military operation; Greece is not. Greece is concerned about the refugee crisis destabilizing the region. It also is concerned about the implications that its position on Kosovo might have on relations with the United States and Europe. (<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS20149.pdf>)

⁶³ Surely, with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is possible to argue that these US priorities to seek out allies (especially with NATO) have disappeared in the US intervention policies in 2000s. (See Chapter 3-3.3 and 3.4)

crises, and the one that stimulated a great debate in the US, began in March 1992 with the formal declaration of independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina'. Both during the Bush (Snr.) and Clinton presidencies public opinion was divided over what role the US should play vis-à-vis Yugoslavia but there was general agreement that the US should do something. Differences being expressed tended to focus on type and the timing of intervention.⁶⁴ From other perspectives the Bosnia tragedy (in particular) demanded intervention solely on humanitarian grounds. Clearly neither Bosnia nor the Kosovo crisis that followed involved US strategic interests: Bosnia was a 1990s humanitarian tragedy, with the Bosnians being subjected to 'ethnic cleansing' by of Bosnians by Serbs even while the western Europeans and the Americans were trying to decide how they should respond. Therefore, it is possible to assume that lack of strategic and economic interests and the US search for consensus with Europe helped to prolong the conflict between Serbs and Bosnians (or more properly put, the Serb assault on Bosnia). (Kanter, Brooks, 1994: 16-17) On the other side, Coit D. Blacker has pointed out another essential and implicit reason for US intervention in the sense of US interests he says (Kanter, Brooks, 1994: 16-17) that:

Part of the US reluctance to take a more active military role in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has had to do with the issues of interests: how is the US' interests materially affected if the Serbs and Croats succeed in their efforts to dismember the Muslim republic? Unless the fighting spreads to other areas beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, the answer...has been... not very substantially...this despite the fact that no one in the public domain in the US denies that the war in Bosnia has been and continues to be a human tragedy of significant proportions.

The statement is a reminder of it was humanitarian motive behind US intervention, a notion supported by the American people: account to Gallup Organization/Dave

⁶⁴ <http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/09/p2s1.htm>

Herring- staff prepared the question to measure American public opinion. The poll question was ⁶⁵

If the current NATO air and missile strikes are not effective in achieving the US' objectives in Yugoslavian issue (and Kosovo), would you favor or oppose having President Clinton send US ground troops into the region along with troops with other NATO countries? In March poll resulted with 31% favor, in March 31 poll resulted with 39% and finally 7 April resulted with nearly 47 %

Therefore, it is again possible to claim that the US, both at the public level and at the administration level was clarifying the issue earlier than the European countries. On that point, it is impossible to undertone Turkish foreign policy influence, especially on the US administration level. So, here, it should be noted that Turkey played an important role both at the beginning of air strikes and also after the NATO operation.⁶⁶ Bosnia became a cornerstone in Turco-American relations and cooperation. On this point, it is essential to understand American attitudes, policy options and decisions in order to clearly understand Turkey's role in the development of US policy towards the Yugoslav crises (especially Bosnia and Kosovo). For example, as Ali Askerlioğlu has pointed out (Journal of Qafqaz University, 1999-vol.2 no.2: 101-102)

There were several peace initiatives made by Turkey or some international organizations, as Islamic Conference Organization or by the London Conference, which took place between 26-28 August 1992, in London. The first of them was the Resolution 749 adopted by the UN Security Council calling all the member states to cooperate with the efforts of EC to provide a cease-fire and political solution for the Bosnian problem. This resolution had been followed by the application of Turkey to the UN asking for necessary measures to protect territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same

⁶⁵ (SOURCE: GALLUP ORGANIZATION /DAVE HERRING - STAFF)-
(<http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/09/p2s1.htm>)

⁶⁶ From 1992 to 1995, Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans has centered on the question of support for the position of Sarajevo on the Bosnian question. Throughout the war in Bosnia Turkey has pursued active foreign policy by seeking attempts to stimulate international organizations to act reasonably and in a credible way in order to deter the aggressor. (Journal of Qafqaz University, 1999-vol.2 no.2: 101-102)

time Turkey sent letters to the USA, Islamic and European countries to draw attention to the worsening situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkish proposal about humanitarian aid for the people of Bosnia was approved in the June meeting of Foreign Ministers of Islamic Conference Organization which took place in Istanbul.

Turkey was not only trying to get the US attention to Bosnian case. Turkish diplomacy also tried to get issue to European agenda. For example, as Askeroglu (Journal of Qafqaz University, 1999-vol.2 no.2: 102) pointed out

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has also been an organization where Turkish diplomacy has been carried out for Bosnia. Mostly as a result of Turkish intensive diplomacy Bosnia-Herzegovina has been accepted to CSCE in May 1992. In fact, CSCE had been unsuccessful in solving the conflict, despite its self-formalized proposals.

As a result of Turkish efforts, on June 10, 1992, the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE called the UN to consider military intervention as a means to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia. In addition to this, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 752, according which all forms of interference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina should cease immediately. So, according to Askeroglu:

This Resolution was mainly directed against the units of Yugoslav National Army and Croatian Army. However, these attempts of the UN for cease-fire were fruitless, and being aware of this, on 17 June 1992, Turkey called international community for military intervention to stop the war, and clearly expressed its readiness to contribute to an international force in case the international community decides to intervene militarily.

The end of the Cold War made it possible for the US to shift away from the multilateralism that had been such a strong feature of western actions in the 1950s and 1960s (with some notable exceptions like the Suez War of 1956). When the Europeans could not agree on what they should do there was no longer the Soviet barrier to the US taking action of its own. The US had several options in the case of Serb aggression against Bosnia.

One of the basic topics of debate was that the UN force (UNPROFOR 2) should be given more power and military means to stop Serb aggression. At this point, in American politics, there was an idea that in tandem with the arms embargo against Serbia, the Bosnians should be given arms to defend themselves. It was a fact, however, that no matter what was going on in the major cities of Bosnia-Herzegovina the lack of strategic interest was the main reason why the US and the European powers were unable to arrive at a united policy position. (Haass, 1999:114) Over almost two years they failed to reach consensus over what kind of intervention there should be. They sought to avoid direct intervention by passing the responsibility to the UN.⁶⁷ (Haass, 1999:114)

Although there were no visible strategic benefits for Turkish foreign policy in Bosnia, Turkey played an extensive role in shaping western attitudes over Bosnia and then Kosovo [Turkey sent a brigade-994 soldiers-to Kosovo and sent 120 Turkish police to UN police force (UNMIK-CIVPOL)]⁶⁸

The Turkish government's position strongly reflected public sympathy and outrage over the plight of the Bosnian and Kosovan Muslims. At the same time, it seems that the government utilized the public mood to develop a more active policy towards Balkans.⁶⁹ Bosnia became an important stepping-stone for Turkey's new Balkans policy.⁷⁰ Turkey certainly wanted to end the humanitarian tragedy, but at least in the later stages of the crisis it wanted to use the situation to expand its influence in the Balkans. In this connection, the Turkish American 'strategic partnership' moved towards Balkans under the NATO umbrella and was given new

⁶⁷ For example, UN Security Council Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991, was an extrinsic example in order to see how the US and some other powers to avoid their own role in Bosnian at the beginning of Bosnian tragedy canalize UN to Bosnian case.

⁶⁸ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkce/grupc/cb/03.htm>

⁶⁹ http://haberaliz.com/tsk_dunya_barisini_sagliyor.php

⁷⁰ http://haberaliz.com/tsk_dunya_barisini_sagliyor.php

relevance, because the European and the US were finding it difficult to reach consensus. Turkey started to take on the role of a negotiator between them.⁷¹ Turkey's links with the region were certainly much stronger than those have the US and even most European powers. Turkish expectations and attitudes may be illustrated by reference to its NATO perspective and its regional perspective. As noted in the previous page, as a member of NATO, Turkey extrinsically wanted to put Bosnia on the organization's agenda. Turkey also tried to use its' special relationship with the US to activate both the US and NATO against Serbian aggression. Turkish involvement and influence was much more successful once the US began to move towards intervention. In addition to this, Turkey also opened NATO oriented military bases during attack against Serbian targets in Bosnia War. For example⁷²,

Turkey, a NATO member since 1953, agreed to give bases to NATO last month when the alliance decided to expand the air war against Yugoslavia which was launched on March 24. An unspecified number of US fighters have already arrived at Balıkesir base, which lies some 70 kilometers (45 miles) to the south of Bandırma. Thirty-eight F-15 and F-16 jets are to be stationed at Balıkesir, where cargo planes have been bringing equipment, provisions and NATO personnel since the weekend.

In the context of the 'regional' perspective, Turkish concerns were mostly a mixture of emotional identification with the plight of another Muslim people and anxiety to prevent new conflicts arising in the Balkans that would ultimately create new costs for Turkey. I prefer to use the phrase 'new' costs because in previous decades Turkey had done almost nothing in Balkans -- economically or politically -- because of the Cold War environment and Soviet domination of the region. It is an

⁷¹ As noted in quotations in the previous page, the period with Turkish role so London Conference is the extrinsic example of Turkish negotiator role between the US and European countries

⁷² <http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/features/Kosovo/txt/060301.html>

extrinsic reality that Turkey had suffered from communist expansion in Eastern Europe during the Cold War period. In the 1990s Turkey wanted a ‘peaceful and democratic’ environment in the Balkans region, which might enable it to play a leading role that democracy, and freedom in the Balkans would somehow smooth Turkey’s entry into the EU.⁷³ For example, Turkish Foreign ministry best summarizes⁷⁴;

In the Balkans, Turkey pursues a balanced, realistic and determined policy of conciliation, peace and stability. This is mainly due to the strong historical and cultural bondage between the Turks and the Balkan peoples as well as the geographical proximity, rendering Turkey sensitive to the developments of the region, both negative and positive. Also, the Balkans constitutes a natural gateway for Turkey in reaching to Western Europe.

On the Yugoslav question the costs and benefits for Turkish and American sides may be summarized up in the following manner. First, Turkey played an important role in stimulating American interest and persuading it to use its influence, as indicating above. Second, Turkey tried to develop its economic political and strategic linkage with the former communist countries of eastern Europe after the collapse of the USSR (especially Turkish firms have easily come into Balkan countries market, today, the amount of trade of Turkish firms which invested into Balkan countries (including Bosnia) has risen to billions) In this sense, American involvement in the Balkans seemed to work in Turkey’s favor in the view of Turkish foreign policy makers, as underlined in the quotation which is from Turkish foreign ministry documents. Through its support for American involvement in Yugoslavia, Turkey found a role for itself in the peacekeeping forces deployed both in Bosnia and Kosovo after the informal collapse of Yugoslavia. Accordingly it can

⁷³ <http://www.mideasti.org/html/b-islam030503.htm>

⁷⁴ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/em/03.htm>

be concluded that the 'strategic partnership' between Turkey and the US created benefits for the Turkish side both during and after the Yugoslav crises. At the end, first, Bosnia and Kosovo become independent from Serbia, which has opened more influential and direct effect of Turkey. On the other hand, secondly, the NATO operations (with clearly led by the US) was a kind of stepping stone to stability in a region that in which Turkey had sought influence since the beginning of the 1990s. As noted before, all these developments supported to Turkish perspective in Balkans.

The Bosnian situation in particular highlighted weaknesses in the foreign policy making mechanism of the EU. Turkey was reluctant to get involved as long as the western Europeans could not make up their mind, but the decision of the US to take action of its own gave Turkey the opportunity to do something on an issue of mounting humanitarian concern to the Turkish public. In this sense Europe's failure became Turkey's opportunity: at the very least in terms of costs (the commitment of troops and equipment) Turkey benefited by yet again demonstrating its reliability as a US ally. The Turkish-American partnership under UN and NATO during Bosnian and Kosovo crises played an essential role to developing confidence between two countries.

In the western and global context, UN intervention in Yugoslavia with NATO support could be taken as proof of NATO's continuing validity in the post Cold War Era while the post Cold War Era was questioning NATO and the relevance of its mission after the collapse of the Soviet Union. What the Yugoslav crises did to show that NATO did have a role: it could even be said involvement in Yugoslavia somehow prevented the collapse of the NATO alliance during the 1990s.⁷⁵ It was certainly helpful for the US to stress the role of NATO. NATO involvement expands

⁷⁵ <http://fto.int8.com/researchpapers/usandnato/>

the strategic means of the US. Turkey played an important bridging role in Bosnia and elsewhere between the Muslim majority and UN forces, thereby establishing the paradigm of secular, moderate Muslim states whose services could be useful in other situations involving the deployment of NATO or US forces in Muslim countries.

Somalia was one such country. The situation that developed in Somalia had very deep roots. The 'clan' structure dominated the political system as it did in other African countries. After 1969 the Marehan clan (headed by Siad Barre⁷⁶) adopted harsh state policies against other clans in the country.

Although drought conditions were partially responsible for this situation, civil war had devastated this already threatened country. Since 1988, this civil war has centered on more than 14 clans and factions that make up Somali society, all of which fought for control of their own territory. Their culture stresses the idea of "me and my clan against all outsiders," with alliances between clans being only temporary conveniences. Guns and aggressiveness, including the willingness to accept casualties, are intrinsic parts of this culture, with women and children considered part of the clan's order of battle.⁷⁷

During this period of conflict more than 300,000 civilians died in the conflict between the state and other forces. Moreover, more than one million people were displaced and became refugees in neighboring countries. (Akinrinade, 1998:182) In the capital city, Mogadishu, hundreds of thousands of people suffered from illness and starvation. By the end of 1980s, the crisis in Somalia seemed to have reached the point of violence. (Akinrinade, 1998:182)

⁷⁶ After the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the political situation deteriorated, with the clans in the northern part of the country trying to secede. With drought conditions worsening everywhere, clan warfare and banditry gradually spread throughout Somalia. By early 1992, these conditions brought about a famine of Biblical proportions: more than *one-half million* Somalis had perished of starvation and at least a million more were threatened. (<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books>)

⁷⁷ <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201990%20to%201995/Somalia%20Lessons%20Learned%20Jan%2095/allardch1.html>

The lack of Somalia's strategic and geographic importance was probably the main reason why the US and other UN members did not initially react to the events even though the Somali tragedy was beginning by the 1990s to find a place in the western media and on the agenda of NGOs. As S. Akinrinade has pointed out (Akinrinade,1998:183) the US started to take an interest in Somalia during the George Bush Snr. Administration, which finally decided to send, troops there. Humanitarian concern appears to have been the primary motivation behind US. The operation was turned into a UN operation⁷⁸ in April 1992⁷⁹but the rising number of peacekeepers arriving in the country was not enough to keep the peace even in Mogadishu. Chaos and violence were the order of the day. The US was the only county willing to intervene out of humanitarian concern: most western countries (especially EU members) failed to develop consensus on Somalia.

Whereas the Bush administration had chosen a lower-risk monitoring mission for U.S. forces, the Clinton administration tended to 'move to a policy of de facto peace-making and nation-building in spring, 1993, without putting in place the necessary forces or preparing the country [the US] for the inevitable costs'. (Haass, 1999:113) As a result the Clinton administration was not able to prevent US soldiers being killed⁸⁰ along with other material and hidden costs.⁸¹ Turkish military

⁷⁸ In April 1992, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 751, establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia—UNOSOM— whose mission was to provide humanitarian aid and facilitate the end of hostilities in Somalia.

⁷⁹ <http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06/appc.htm>

⁸⁰ The crisis came into full view on 5 June 1993, when Aideed supporters killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in an ambush. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 837, passed the next day, called for the immediate apprehension of those responsible—and quickly led to U.S. forces being used in a highly personalized manhunt for Aideed. After a series of clashes involving U.S. Rangers and other units, a major engagement occurred on 3 October in which 18 Americans were killed and 75 wounded—the bloodiest battle of any U.N. peacekeeping operation. Shortly thereafter, President Clinton announced the phased withdrawal of American troops that would end by 31 March 1994. U.S. forces largely were confined to force protection missions from this change of mission until the withdrawal was completed. (<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books>)

⁸¹ They did not properly link US strategic objectives and concerns to the tactical plan. The TF Ranger mission was a direct operational attempt to obtain a strategic objective in a single tactical action. Yet, they failed to assess the lack of strategic groundwork, the threat's intent and capabilities, and the

involvement in Somalia took place under the command of the United Nation Task Force (UNITAF). Under UNITAF Somalia's situation slowly improved compared to the previous US-UN operation. At this time, Somalia was receiving financial assistance of up to \$400 million (for Somalia's short term needs) while a great variety of Muslim troops were arriving from Tunisia, Turkey⁸², Kuwait, along with contingents from other countries, in the effort to stabilize the country. Turkish military involvement was strongly influenced by the US desire to bring into Somalia more troops from the region or from nearby countries. Turkey accepted to send limited force of peacekeepers whose main aims centers on the provision of security for the distribution of food and relief supplies. In the following periods, a Turkish general started to command UN forces in Somalia (Turkish involvement in the Somalia operation between January 1993- 22 Feb. 1994, involved 300 troops⁸³.)⁸⁴)⁸⁵.⁸⁶ Like the US Turkey has only limited interests in Somalia: the prime motivation for involvement was humanitarian concern. It is hard to talk about specific costs for Turkey but (like the Balkans) involvement in Somalia at the request of the US consolidated the relationship between the two countries.

Through its involvement in Somalia Turkey tried to find place in the new peacekeeping operations of the 1990s. It is possible to summarize the Turkish attitude in the case of Somalia. First, Turkey regarded involvement in peacekeeping

overall impact of the urban environment, to include the terrain and society, on the operation. Such an assessment may not have led to such a high-risk course of action and instead to one that de-emphasized military operations and emphasized a political solution that adequately considered the clans' influence (<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06/appc.htm>) (in fact this quotation is well summarizing the failure and its reasons of US in Somalia)

⁸² Turkey sent 300 troops to UNOSOM 2 force between 2 January 1993 and 22 February 1994 and a Turkish general commanded the UN forces for a specific period of time. (<http://www.tsk.mil.tr>)

⁸³ This late UN forces included the 4,000 US troops have been placed under a U.N. command headed by a Turkish general

⁸⁴ <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/uluslararasi/barisdesharekatkatki/bmmisyonlar.htm#%207>

⁸⁵ <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1993/o93/o93reports.html>

⁸⁶ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkce/grupc/cb/03.htm>

forces as a kind of tool that had to be paid in order to raise its regional power.⁸⁷. Somalia did not count in the context of Turkey's regional aims but still served to as a demonstration of Turkish influence in coordination with the US and the UN. Second, Turkey somehow saw involvement in Somalia as the natural result of its 'strategic partnership' with the US: Somalia was also tangible proof of the new role the US had in mind for Turkey following the end of the Cold War. No longer a frontline partner in the struggle against communism and the USSR the Americans had begun to see Turkey as a country that could help implement the global operations of its strategic partner. Turkish involvement in the aftermath of such operations has in fact been essential to the success of most US interventions. Most of the regions in which the US have been close to Turkey, not just in terms of geography but culturally, religiously and historically. In the sense of geography and religion and historical roots, it can be seen that Turkey's involvement in multinational force generally led by the US has expanded American alternatives and decreased its risks.⁸⁸ In sum the Somali case can be described as one, which has not resulted in a great variety of costs or benefits for Turkey or the US. But Somalia was important in delineating the form of Turkish-American partnership likely to emerge in the post-Cold War period.

3.3 The Gulf War

The outbreak of the 1990-1 Gulf War was affected by the change in the global power balance brought about by the collapse of the USSR, which had had a close client-patron relationship with Iraq since the 1970s. The dramatic events,

⁸⁷ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Foreignpolicy2001.htm>

⁸⁸ Because, as Roshe and Pickett pointed out, For the US involvement in local conflicts poses a number of risks, including subtle changes in commitments and objectives that embroil the US beyond its original intent and create threats to US personnel more severe than anticipated. (Kanter, Brooks, 1994:21)

taking place in Eastern Europe helped to free the hands of the US in the Middle East. However, already by the late 1980s the Soviet Union has been considering changes to its foreign policy approach. ('New thinking' approach). (Freedman, 1993, 74). Its chief architect was Mikhail Gorbachev. According to this, 'new thinking' the USSR would seek a "balance of interests that would take into account the legitimate interests of USSR, the US, and the regional states". (Freedman, 1993, 75). The Gulf War arose as the first test of the new foreign policy approach in practice.⁸⁹ Simultaneously, the war gave the US the opportunity to demonstrate its own determination to create a 'new world order', as President Bush called it.

The Middle East remained the focal point global and regional tensions. It has been argued (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis, 1991:13) that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was only the first step of territorial claims in the Middle East. According to Ken Matthews,⁹⁰ one of the main reasons for present and probably future territorial disagreements was past foreign intervention in the region. (Matthews, 1993:2). Whatever the real motives behind Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (a genuine belief that Kuwait should have been part of Iraq since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire or the desire to take its oilfields and gulf coastline) it triggered off unexpected patterns of reaction. According to the neo-conservative American commentator Daniel Pipes (Pipes, 1993:2):

Arab states proudly wore their American associations. Even so famous an anti-American as Hafiz al-Asad of Syria joined the U.S.-led coalition; more astonishing yet, Syrian and American troops stood together in Saudi Arabia. Old verities and structures appeared moribund; the Middle East had been

⁸⁹ There were five major principles in the 'new thinking' policy. First, to put humanity before nuclear weapons. In short, these are reduction of nuclear power with the claim of humanity. Secondly, to abandon such concepts as 'spheres of influence' and 'vital interests'. Third, to seek a balance of interests. Fourth, to accept the primary role of the UN in resolving regional conflicts. Fifth, seeks a joint action by the superpowers to reduce the likelihood of such conflicts. (Freedman, 1993, 74-75)

⁹⁰ Matthews has argued that the events were "the product of 'contingent factors, historical factors, and structural factors'". (Matthews, 1993:2-3)

altered in deep and irreversible ways; and the war's decisive end confirmed expectations that a new world order in the region had dawned.

It is impossible to explain Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by only the nature of Iraq-Kuwait relations and the nature of Saddam Hussein's political regime. Ken Matthews has argued that miscalculations were also among the origins of the war. (Matthews, 1993:46). Both Matthews and Baudrillard (Baudrillard, 1995:54; Matthews, 1993:49-50) attribute sinister ulterior motives to the US. According to Matthews (Matthews, 1993:49) the US consciously sent misleading signals to Saddam Hussein through the US embassy in Baghdad. If Iraq invaded Kuwait the US would not respond: this was allegedly the gist of the now famous conversation between Saddam Hussein and the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie: the cynical reading of her remarks is that the US was trying to draw Saddam into a trap in Kuwait. This interpretation was quickly denied by the US administration. However, it can scarcely be denied that whether Saddam was trapped or whether he walked into a trap of his own making, his invasion of Kuwait gave the US a golden opportunity to strengthen its presence in a region vital to its interests. In a larger perspective, it seems clear that all these political developments both in Iraq and Kuwait inescapably effected other regional powers like Turkey.

As American policy for Iraq, in ten years time have become irrational identity and support to anti-Americanism in the radical portion of the Islamic world. (Freedman, 1993:171-172) It means that however U.S. added to new dimensions of its global power identity at the beginning of the post-Cold War Era with mobilization capacity of its army during the Gulf War. The Gulf War and the American policy in the aftermath of the war added different types of costs on the region countries, for the U.S. and for Iraqi people in the long run. As Jean Baudrillard has pointed out in his

famous article- ‘The Gulf War did not take place’; “no accidents occurred in this war, everything unfolded according to pragmatic order, in the absence of passional disorder. Nothing occurred which would have metamorphosed events into a duel.” (Baudrillard, 1995:73) it seems to be adequately persuasive to see deep cost and benefit game under the Gulf War. As Baudrillard says the Gulf War was far away from being a real war, it mostly similar to programmed situation, which was supported by different sources including media, companies and politicians.

As Philip Robins has underlined (Dodd, 1992:71):

The invasion and the take-over of Kuwait by Iraq was an event, which Turkey could not afford to ignore. Iraq’s control of Kuwait (either as a surrogate, or directly once annexation was announced) threatened the power configurations in the Middle East.

Not surprisingly, the war added new dimensions to Turkish-American relations as well creating new costs and benefits. Turkey had its own view of what the war meant. There were civilian perspectives, government perspectives and military perspectives. President Turgut Özal saw US intervention as an opportunity for Turkey to come advantageous to a position in the eastern part of Turkey. (Such as solving the Kurdish question and so on) Moreover, Özal also expected economic benefits from the war such as increased Turkish access to Iraqi oil in the aftermath. As Dairo Navaro has pointed out in his article (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 81) even the Turkish military did not agree with Özal’s approach to the war: both the military and the government saw Özal’s position as kind of adventure which would end with a huge range of costs. As a result, the military chief of staff (the commander of Turkish Army) General Necmi Torumtay resigned because of the differences

between the military, the government and President Özal. By that point what were these differences between the president Özal and government?

As Navaro has asserted that (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 81-82)

Özal argued forcefully in favor of strong support for the US...as necessary measures to ensure Turkey an advantageous position in a post war peace conference and leading role in future regional security arrangements... Özal claim, “This is the most profitable business deal of my life. It is the first time that I am making such big profits with so little work.”. But there were also other more specific internal and regional concerns that have accentuated Turkey’s search for an active post war role in the Middle East. (Such as Kurdish question).

This was the core point of the arguments, which directly influenced Turkish domestic politics. The president was in favor of total support for the US including active involvement in the war. A significant section of the Turkish public did not support such a level of involvement. (Dodd, 1992:81-85) This opposition and criticism stretched into the ranks of the party Ozal had led as Prime Minister, the Motherland Party, before moving into the presidency.

Apart from the question of troop support Turkey gave important assistance as a close US ally and as a member of the UN. The Grand Assembly passed, by 250 votes to 148, a government motion declaring that that ‘the Turkish armed forces and foreign forces based in Turkey could participate in military actions against Iraq, effectively signaling the opening of a second front.’ (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 81). As result, Turkey did not send force to Northern side of Iraq during the ‘Desert Storm’ operation. However Turkey decided to out itself out of the hot conflict, Turkey decided to close the Kirkuk-Yumartalik pipeline⁹¹ in line with the embargo decision of the US and (accordingly UN). This was a crucial decision for Turkey

⁹¹ Kirkuk-Yumartalik oil pipeline opened 25 May 1977. Turkey was spending more than \$1 billion (according to present rate of exchange) it was closed unilaterally by Turkey to support UN embargo decision on August 1990. The pipeline was opened to limited oil transporting on 16 December 1996. (http://haber.superonline.com/haber/arsiv/haberler/0,1106,81758_4_8969,00.html)

both politically and economically, because of the importance of the pipeline to the Turkish economy. Iraq was also an important market for Turkish products and services and had become even more so because of Iraq's needs during its long war with Iran in the 1980s (1980-88). (Approximate total of the trading level between Turkey and Iraq had been \$ 2,5 billion per year before the Gulf War⁹²) important markets for Turkish economy during the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey increased its trade and investments in Iraq during 1980s and subsequently Iraq became its most important trading partner after Germany. (Bresheeth, Yuval-Davis.1991: 83) According to estimates, the cost to Turkey through the closure of the pipeline and the embargo on Iraq amounted to more than \$10 billion (and according to some estimates as much as \$40 billion⁹³). In this sense, the embargo on the Kirkuk-Yumartalık pipeline cost Turkey approximately \$ 1,252 billion. In addition to this, Turkey lost \$ 63 million from port revenues⁹⁴ during the 12 years period; these costs, from embargo on the pipeline, were not compensated by the US. More dramatically for Turkish benefits, as Philips Robins has pointed out (Dodd, 1992:75)

Once Turkey had closed the pipeline and halted all economic interaction with Iraq, the international spotlight turned away from Ankara. For, the anti-Iraq coalition, with the US clearly in the lead, Turkey was now of much less importance. This devaluation of Turkey from primary to secondary significance was to continue until the practical details of waging war against Iraq emerged as important issues.

In fact, Turkey's the loss of pipeline revenue was part of total cost of the Gulf War to Turkey. On that point, for example, Nadire Mater is evaluating the cost to Turkey as⁹⁵

⁹² <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/228704.asp#BODY>

⁹³ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/228704.asp>

⁹⁴ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/228704.asp>

⁹⁵ <http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/CJ13Ag01.html>

Turkey joined the alliance against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, but lost one of its biggest foreign trade partners, Iraq, under UN sanctions. Turkey's losses from the Gulf War are estimated at US\$40 billion, according to official reports, and it feels that it has not received the compensation it merits. Turkey is seeking billions of dollars in new loans from the International Monetary Fund to help finance debt due in 2002.

Turkey faced other problems in the aftermath of the Gulf War. By the beginning of the 1990s, PKK⁹⁶-Kurdish terrorism had almost been suppressed but at a huge economic, political and social cost. In the chaotic environment created by the defeat of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait the PKK looked to regroup and consolidate in northern Iraq. The US created a 'safe haven' in northern Iraq but was not able to exercise the same control over the region as had the Iraqi government, giving the PKK (which had been using northern Iraq as a sanctuary) a new lease of life. The conflict in Turkey's southeast was renewed. Within several years the number of people killed there (soldiers, civilians and PKK militants/terrorists) had climbed to about 30,000.⁹⁷Economically, according to some sources, as Ramazan Gözen has pointed out, Turkey spent more than half the total \$100 billion⁹⁸ on the struggle with the PKK between 1991 and 1996. Moreover, the general feeling of instability among the population in the southeastern provinces dramatically increased with the resurgence of PKK attacks. (Imset, 1992:191). As Ismet Imset pointed out (Imset, 1992:191)

The arrival of the US, French and British troops in Turkey and the effort to set up five to six 'safety zones' inside Iraq for the Kurdish refugees are expected to seriously affect the operations of the PKK in that region. Although international relief efforts have lifted some of the burden from Turkey's back, local officials here are aware that the influx has had some serious side

⁹⁶ the Terrorist organization, PKK changed its name to KADEK and it has changed to KHK.

⁹⁷ <http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/aihm/tcyaozgurgundem.html>

⁹⁸ http://www.liberal-dt.org.tr/guncel/Gozen/rg_turkiye1.htm

effects which have served Turkey's own separatists and may impose a long-term security risk in the region.

It can therefore be seen that the overall costs to Turkey of the war were huge. A supplementary issue was the flow of Kurdish refugees into Turkey from northern Iraq. Turkey had witnessed refugee experience at the end of 1980s before the Gulf War. (Dodd, 1992:82)(For example, more than 50.000 refugees crossed the Iraqi-Turkey border to escape Iraqi repression and by the beginning of the Gulf war 27.000 was still living in Turkey,) during and the aftermath of the Gulf War, more than a million Kurds. As P.Robins (Dodd, 1992:82) has pointed out, more than two million people were believed to be on the move in the border region. (Some 700.000 refugees traveled to the Iraq- Turkish border in the aftermath of the War) (Many of them fled for fear of a possible chemical weapons attack such as the one carried out by the Iraqi government against Halabja in 1988. (Dodd, 1992:82-85) Turkey was not prepared for a refugee flow of such a size. Most of the refugees were accepted as such by the Turkish government and allowed to stay in Turkish camps for more than a year. Different types of problems were created apart from the huge amount of money spent on maintaining them. In this sense, PKK militants also used the camps as cover for slipping into Turkey. As Tuncay Özkan, journalist who writes for *Akşam* newspaper, pointed out the American involvement in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War supported PKK involvement over Turkish borders.⁹⁹

As an ally and partner it was natural for Turkey to help the US campaign against Iraq. Unlike the Cold War, the danger to Turkey was direct. Iraq was a neighbor and taking such a strong position in support of the US (and the UN) it was

⁹⁹ *Akşam*, 1 March 2003

even thought possible that the Iraqi government could order missile attacks on Turkey. In return for the help it gave and the risks it took Turkey benefited from favorable US mediation in the securing of large loans from the IMF and the World Bank just after the war. However, it remains an open question whether the loans granted even equaled the losses and costs incurred by Turkey as a result of the war on the other side, the US started to give economical and military aids to some Arab countries in the aftermath of the Gulf War. As Stephen J. Hedges and Catherine Collins have underlined the American perspectives in the sense of economic aid in the aftermath of the Gulf War,¹⁰⁰

In the Persian Gulf region alone over the past two years, the United States has sold, lent or given away an estimated \$7.5 billion worth of weaponry, other military equipment and training assistance, according to State Department figures. Recipients have included such vital U.S. allies as Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. The deals include advanced fighter jets, radar systems and missiles. Airfields are being expanded. Military bases are being renovated. In return, the United States has won the right to build bases, house troops and use sovereign airspace if it wages a war against Iraq.

Turkish support for the US was not sufficient for it also to the given substantial military and economic aid. One clear gain, however, was unequivocal US support for Turkey on the question of PKK terrorism, as noted before, there is a question mark on the correlation between American involvement to Northern Iraq and PKK uprising in the aftermath of the Gulf War. But, However the formal announcement by the US of its opposition to PKK terrorism can be counted as somehow support to Turkish struggle with terrorism. At the same time, the US began stronger support to Turkey's EU accession. (See Chapter 3-3.5.3 for detail)

¹⁰⁰ *Chicago Tribune*, 2 Feb-2003

If the Turco-American relationship was strengthened by Turkey's active role in the Gulf War it was badly damaged by the unfolding of the US attack on Iraq in 2003. Turkey found itself unable to grant key US demands, especially relating to the use of bases in Turkey to launch a second front against Iraq. Clearly anticipating more help, the decision of the Turkish parliament to refuse base support surprised and angered the Bush government. The strategic relationship – strengthened through the Cold War and through Turkish military and/or peace-keeping operations in Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia – suddenly appeared to be close to collapse. The Gulf War and the second American operation against Iraq demonstrated the unpredictability of world affairs and the differences experienced by one country in harnessing its foreign policy interests to those of another even when that country happens to be a close ally.

3.4 The 'War on Terrorism' and Afghanistan

The US interventions in Afghanistan were characterized by complex local, regional and global complexities. There were first of all the regional tribal, religious and ethnic divisions between the Afghan people themselves. Moreover, Afghanistan had only recently experienced invasion and occupation by the USSR. This had destabilized the country, aggravated its internal divisions and set up the conditions of the struggle for power, which followed when Soviet forces were finally withdrawn. Globally, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan stemmed directly from the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon and American determination to get at the sources of 'international terrorism' and wipe it out. A further striking characteristic of intervention in Afghanistan is that unlike Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia there was no suggestion of intervention for

humanitarian purposes: the liberation of the Afghan people from the rule of the Taliban was entirely ancillary to the bluntly-stated US goal of removing the Islamic regime for the sake of its own strategic and national interests rather than any humanitarian assistance or ending of civil conflict. This is not to say that US interest in Afghanistan began on September 11. The US had been involved (especially with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) in the organizing, funding and training of the radical Islamic guerillas sent into Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. As Sankaran Krishna has pointed out (Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2002, vol 1-2: 74)

prospect of a collapse of the communist regime in that country, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. As disaffected factions within the Afghan communists made common cause with various tribal warlords in their fight against Soviet occupation, the Americans sensed an opportunity to ensnare their longtime adversary in a Vietnam of their own. American money and weapons poured into the Afghan resistance via its conduit in neighboring Pakistan. By the mid-1980s nearly a fifth of Afghanistan's twenty-odd millions were refugees – mostly in Pakistan – while thousands of others were either killed or seriously injured in the war. At its height, the Soviet occupation had involved over a 100,000 troops and they would lose more than 15,000 of them during that decade. When the mujahideen succeeded in forcing a Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (soon followed by the political collapse of Gorbachev's Soviet Union and the East bloc as a whole), the Americans turned their backs on both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

So it is possible to think that once the Soviets withdrew this policy backfired as the Afghan guerillas returned to the Middle East and other countries and declared war on their previous backers. By the mid 1990s their terrorist attacks in East Africa and elsewhere were beginning to point the way to future developments. By this time, also, the Taliban regime was allowing Islamic radicals to organize and train on Afghan territory. Paramilitary camps were established in the isolated mountain ranges alongside the border with Pakistan. In the first strikes against Islamic terrorism (following the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) in August 1998 the Clinton administration ordered cruise missile attacks on terrorist

camps in Afghanistan and what was mistakenly thought to be a chemical weapons material producing factory in Sudan in August 1998. (Haass, 1999:169). By this time this time al Qaida had been identified as the group most likely to have been responsible for the embassy bombings in East Africa: the organization's leader, Osama bin Laden, a billionaire Saudi, was among the radicalized Muslims who had gone to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and had then declared *jihad* against the US and Israel (Özkan, 2003:228-229)

Turks and the Turkish government shared the common global outrage at the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington. In Afghanistan, as had been the case in Bosnia and Somalia, Turkey as a moderate and modern Muslim country was in a good position to help the Americans in Afghanistan. There were deep historical relations between Turkey and Afghanistan (the first country to extend diplomatic recognition to the new Turkish republic in 1923) Turkey had given economic and military assistance to the Afghan government^{101 102} and throughout their modern history up to the Soviet invasion the two countries had developed a close relationship. They had taken a similar position on many international issues and in the 1950s Turkey had insisted on Afghanistan being included in the Baghdad Pact: at that time Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan were regarded as being like-minded 'northern tier' countries well suited to protecting western interests in an arc of territory close to or bordering the USSR.

¹⁰¹ <http://www.avsam.org/turkce/yayinlar/kitaplar/kitap/kitap46.htm>

¹⁰² Turkey's interest in Afghanistan is not a newfound one. Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the new Turkish Republic when it was proclaimed in 1923. Turkey has helped Afghanistan with its modernization efforts. Torn apart by decades of continuous warfare, the country is now entering a period of gradual recovery and reconstruction

(<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Foreignpolicy2001.htm>)

All these characteristics of the long Turkish involvement with Afghanistan made it likely that Turkey would be an early choice when the US began looking for allies to help it in Afghanistan. As a poor developing country, Afghanistan was not a military problem for the US but the maintenance of stability and security was a different matter. High costs were likely to follow because of Afghanistan's complicated social structure and even – it could be said – because of its geography, and the difficulties involved in getting at Islamic radicals in the remote mountains in which al Qaida had set up its training camps.

Although Afghanistan was important in the immediate aftermath of September 11 it soon became clear that the decision to destroy the Taliban regime there was only the first step in a global campaign against 'international terrorism'. The degree to which the war on terrorism was a convenient cover for the strengthening of the US presence in areas vital to its national strategic interests (because of oil resources and the pending construction of pipelines) is still being debated. Certainly Afghanistan seemed to fit into a matrix of issues and interests facing the US as it began to put in effect a strategy that would cement its global power against all possible rivals (including Russia and China) into the coming century. In the view of US 'neo conservatives' the US should use its power (including 'anticipatory action' against actually or potentially hostile regimes) to protect and extend its interests around the world. Given the extent of its power it could act alone: one striking characteristic of the Bush government has been its rejection of multilateralism and even of the wishes of world organizations if the consensus view does not suit American national interests. This attitude has been manifested in debate across a broad range of global issues (including arms control and environmental safeguards). The triumphalist American nationalism which has

been a striking characteristic of the new regime in Washington is being stimulated by the pressures of a wide range of vested interests, including oil, the media, fundamentalist Christian organizations (George Bush Jnr. is himself a reborn Christian) and the Israeli lobby. The new unilateral global vision being expressed by the US has caused many problems even with countries traditionally regarded as being part of the 'western alliance'. They are alarmed at what they see. This is especially true of France and Germany. Since September 11 Britain is the only one of these traditional allies to give continuous support to US policy as it has been implemented.

In this new environment what could or should be Turkey's role? Towards the success of the Afghan operation Turkey gave the US support on two levels. First, during the hot conflict phase of 'Enduring Freedom' operation (Turkey opened its airspace to US planes.) In addition Turkey also sent military personnel to CENTCOM (US)-Central Command. After the 'Enduring Freedom' operation Turkey took an active role in the multinational peacekeeping force assembled in Afghanistan. In addition to this, as by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Washington, D.C. (March 18, 2002)¹⁰³

Turkish bases have served as key transit points for medical evacuations, and they have been hubs for humanitarian assistance airlift missions. Turkey has allowed the use of its national transportation and logistics infrastructure and its military manpower and equipment beyond its borders. Turkish crews are receiving training so they can use Turkish KC-135s to refuel U.S. cargo aircraft.

Moreover, Turkey agreed to take command of the multinational force (the ISAF – International Security Assistance Force) for a two times period of six months.¹⁰⁴ While it is natural to assess Turkey's involvement according to the number of its soldiers sent to Afghanistan, its importance was greater than just the

¹⁰³ <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020318-depsecdef.html>

¹⁰⁴ First Turkish commander period was 21 December 2001-21 July 2002 and Turkey got responsibility as a commander of ISAF, 21 July 2002 to 10 February 2003

statistical size of its brigade. The US Britain shared the view ¹⁰⁵that Turkey could play an important role in the fulfillment of their plans in Afghanistan. Turkey's historical links with Afghanistan were seen as an advantage. Naturally, Turkish soldiers were able to maintain security in Kabul more easily than any other foreign troops. The Muslim identity of Turkish soldiers opened the way to easier communications and greater mutual confidence between foreign the powers and the Afghan people, surely it is hard to find objective evidence to support this. For example, is that¹⁰⁶

It seems ridiculous sometimes when a diplomatic corp. in a reception states that Turkey is playing an important role in Afghanistan as a NATO member and a Muslim country. One may believe so after a short visit to Afghanistan not because some high rank officers tell so but I heard Afghani children saying "merhaba Turkiye" (hello Turkey) in Turkish. I had similar feelings when Turkish - Farsi translator Atikullah Seycan stated that people used to say in the beginning of ISAF "how are you?" and that they were replying "How are you nist" (not how are you in farsi English mixed language) but "merhaba Turkey". Seycan pointed out that Afghans feel better since a Muslim country leads the command. These local interpretations show how fragile is situation in Kabul. Afghans may resist the ISAF but Turkish existence seems to prevent them doing so for the moment.

In fact Afghanistan arose as one of the biggest example of Turkish-US cooperation after the Korean War. The Turkish-American 'partnership' there decreased American costs both politically and strategically. In this sense, Turkish support also helped to legitimize US policy on the behalf of western world. In fact we should lighten up the deep American strategic interests in the region in order to ferret out Turkish position in the operation. At that point, Paul Watson has

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.turkey.org/news97/t060298.htm>

¹⁰⁶ Turkish Daily News, 23 June 2002 (Turkish Probe issue 491)

underlined the economic and accordingly strategic interest of the US as follows that¹⁰⁷

While the easily led follow the morality play being acted out on television using scripted dialogue like "liberation" and "democracy," let's play a quick game of connect-the-dots and see if some kind of pattern emerges -- behind the scenes. Even with all of the media attention on Afghanistan as we prosecute the war on terrorism, still we have only a fuzzy focus on that part of the world, and even less of a sense of our more camouflaged connections to the region. The picture that emerges is a land teeming with wild-eyed warlords, malnourished children, abused women, mud huts and treacherous mountain terrain whose taverns and underground caves are home to minions of malevolence -- basically, a scene out of Lord of the Rings. The Bush administration insists the war on terrorism, with Iraq as the next target, is all about fighting evil and defending innocents, and that it doesn't have anything to do with commercial interests.

In this sense, indirect benefits to Turkey in Afghanistan operation started to flow through several channels. For example, the US supported Turkish accession to the EU even more vigorously. In addition, as retired US ambassador Marc Parris¹⁰⁸ underlined that Turkey's image as a moderate and democratic Muslim country -- an example to other Muslims -- was also enhanced in the context of the US struggle against terrorism and Islamic radicalism. Turkey's 'Muslim democracy' was promoted for a Muslim world characterized by radicalism and authoritarian political structures. Whether the model will be emulated remains to be seen but Afghanistan highlighted Turkey's importance to the US both politically and structurally compared to its which strategic and geographic importance during the Cold War. On the Turkish side the new western preoccupation with 'international terrorism' allowed Turkey to justify its struggle with Kurdish terrorism before the western public and

¹⁰⁷ *LA Times*, May 30, 2002

¹⁰⁸ *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, April 2003

media. As an evidence for this claim, we can explicitly show Turkish Foreign Policy Ministry's formal declaration:¹⁰⁹

In order for the fight against terrorism to succeed, it has to be seen in the right perspective. Terrorism cannot be associated with any religion, culture, geography or ethnic group. The fight against terrorism is thus the common fight of the civilized world. The fight against terrorism should be a comprehensive effort. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 provides a valuable basis for the broad efforts to counter terrorism. In the context of the required international solidarity in the fight against terrorism, the decision of the European Union, taken in May 2002, to include PKK- a separatist/terrorist organization which has been renamed as KADEK- and the extreme leftist DHKP-C terrorist organization in the list of terrorist organizations constitutes a positive development.

At the same time it is essential to distinguish between Turkish and American perspectives. The US administration regarded 'Enduring Freedom' as the first stage in the implementation of a new foreign policy approach, aimed at preventing international terrorism in general meaning. Many observers, like Paul Pillar (2001:41-44) have defined this terrorism as new era in the post- Cold War Era. In this connection Afghanistan operation should be seen in this form. In this sense, Turkey supported US involvement in Afghanistan only because of its desires to demonstrate the value of its relationship with the US in the new global environment. Turkish support for the US was limited, and by its nature quite different from British support for the US. As differences between Turkey and the US over Iraq in 2003 demonstrated there could be no question of a 'permanent' relationship founded on the basis of Turkey following the lead of the US in all situations. At that point, it is possible to see changing Turkish public attitudes to the Afghanistan involvement of the US in the aftermath of US invasion of Iraq. The atmosphere, which has been created by differences between Turkey and the US also extrinsically, has influenced

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm>

on Turkish public perspectives on the Turkish involvement in Afghanistan. The polls also indicate this trend. According to this,¹¹⁰

An opinion poll by the research firm Strateji-Mori shows that 80 percent of those interviewed oppose Turkey's troop deployment in Afghanistan.

(Interestingly) A similar poll in September, conducted in the aftermath of the attacks in the United States on September 11, by A&G Research Company, showed that 74.3 percent of those interviewed considered that the US's declaration of war and Turkish involvement in it as wrong.

Much of what Turkey might have gained over its involvement in Afghanistan (in American eyes) it lost over Iraq: the decision not to give the US land, sea and air base support for the war on Iraq caused anger and frustration in Washington. However, in the new global environment Turkey's role vis-à-vis the US is still being moulded. Turkey is still working on how it can adapt its policy needs to those of the US in Iraq and elsewhere. However, given the fact that the US is now deeply and directly involved in the Muslim world Turkey is likely to be called on to play a more direct role in support of US policy than it during the Cold War. If it accepts this role there will again be costs as well as benefits.

3.5 Mixed blessings in Turco-American relations

There are no clear division between costs and benefits in many situations in the Turco-American relations: some can be put in the category of "Mixed blessings" as illustrated follow:

¹¹⁰ <http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/CJ13Ag01.html>

3.5.1 Greece and Cyprus

The relationship with Greece is one of the most ossified problems in Turkish foreign policy. The crux of the problem between the two countries has long historical roots. The Ottoman Empire had ruled the Balkans for more than 400 years. (Ülger, Efeğil, 2002:348). Taking advantage of the increasing weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and with the help of the European powers, Greece became independent in 1830.¹¹¹ From that time, as Ülger has pointed out, Greek foreign policy had irredentist aims against both the Ottoman Empire and then Turkey. During Turkey's War of Independence the conflict between Greece and Turkey (1919-1922) resulted from Greece's irredentist policies. (Ülger, Efeğil, 2002:349) The borders between the two countries were fixed in the agreement signed at Lausanne (1923). The political status has not changed until today with the exception of the Dodecanese case in the Aegean Sea.¹¹² The key point of the Turco-Greek relationship is the international than simply regional nature of the conflict between the two countries. The geographic and strategic positions of both Greece and Turkey have frequently given the problems between them an international dimension. After the First World War Britain openly supported the Greek invasion of Anatolia, providing some of the warships that ferried the Greek army across the Aegean to Izmir (Kartal: 1996:9-555). After the Second World War, Britain intervened directly in Greece to prevent the communists taking over during the civil war. The perceived communist threat to Greece, Turkey and Iran rapidly became of critical concern to the governments of

¹¹¹ Most of the countries that had been supported by the Western European countries (especially Great Britain that declared their independency from the Ottoman rule). In other words, both nationalist ideologies and the Western countries support had played important role in Serb or Greek revolts against the Ottoman rule. (Kutay, 1959:3924)

¹¹² The concept of the Dodecanese represents twelve islands, which are found in the Aegean Sea. These islands have always become a topic of dilemma between two countries. At the end, Paris agreement, in 1947 designates Greek domination in these islands. (Ülger, Efeğil, 2002:348)

Western Europe and the US. Keeping the peace between Greece and Turkey was a continuing concern of these governments during the Cold War. The two countries were admitted to NATO, which might have reduced the polarization between them but did not. The chronic problems between them can be summarized as the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, and the Turkish people who live in the Western Thrace. (Kongar, 1999:472) Each problem area has specific dimensions. For example, the Aegean Sea problem can be separated into differences relating to the extent of territorial waters, delimitation of the continental shelf, the militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands contrary to the provisions of international agreements and lastly air space related problems.¹¹³ The combination of all the problems has prevented a long-term improvement in Turkish-Greek relations. They have frequently found a place on the agenda of international organizations. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the main reason for the long history of these unresolved problems is the difference in perspective between Turkey and Greece.¹¹⁴ Domestic political dynamics has strongly affected Turco-Greek relations (Firat, 1997: 4) For example, during the 1980 PASOK (the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party) and its leader Andreas Papandreu won the elections (gaining 41.07 per cent of the popular vote)¹¹⁵. This shift in Greece's domestic politics influenced Turco-Greek relations, because Papandreu's¹¹⁶ foreign policy was strongly anti-Turkish (Sönmezoglu, 1996:487). The consequences were felt in the negative situations that frequently developed between the two countries. (For example, Greece politics which constituted the Aegean oriented problems mostly ossified the agenda during this period)

¹¹³ All these issues, which related with Aegean Sea, are quoted from the Turkish Foreign Ministry Web Page (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>)

¹¹⁴ (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>)- Turkish Foreign Ministry Web Page

¹¹⁵ <http://www.ana.gr/hermes/1998/julaug/politic1.htm>

¹¹⁶ Andreas Papandreu, the Greek prime minister during 1980s, known with his anti Turkish policies, He was the leader of PASOK party. After he lost 1990 election, Kostantin Mitsotakis became prime minister. Papandreu became prime minister after the election in 1993, but he had to recede from the government because of his illness and he died in 1996. (Sonmezoglu, 1996:487)

Both Turkey and Greece have frequently tried to use their global influence with governments and international organizations to support their positions against each other. For example, as Erol Manisalı has pointed out, Greece followed a policy that sought to bring its problems with Turkey to the agenda of international organizations and the super powers. (Ülger, Efeğil, 2002: 99).¹¹⁷ As already indicated, the US made strenuous attempts during the Cold War to keep the peace between Greece and Turkey. It had powerful strategic interests both in the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus issue. In the US view, a hot conflict between Greece and Turkey could well strengthen the position of the USSR in the Mediterranean and fragment the US's frontline, as Kissinger (2000:577-79) and he has observed, the US considered the situation in Eastern Europe and Turkey. As being as important as the stand by the western alliance against the USSR, the US attitude was that if Greek-Turkish problems (in the Aegean and elsewhere) could not be solved they had to be frozen in the general western interest during the Cold War. For example, as Henze has pointed out¹¹⁸ "U.S. policy has discouraged both Greece and Turkey from taking primary responsibility upon themselves for the management of their relations and has increased their governments' vulnerability to domestic partisan pressures." At the same time the US used its influence to prevent a hot conflict breaking out between Greece and Turkey in the Cold War and then the post-Cold War periods. (For example, during the Cold War, Johnson's Letter.

¹¹⁷ According to Erol Manisalı, Greece adopted the policy which can be explained as "open crises policy" against Turkey up to 1999, which means Greece openly its hostility openly declared on the behalf of international organizations like EU, European Council and so on. By this way, Greece expected to gain political advantages in its struggle with Turkey. (Ülger, Efeğil, 2002: 99-100)

¹¹⁸ <http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/aftermath.html>

The 1996 crisis over the Kardak rocks¹¹⁹ was one example that from the post-Cold War Era: in this case, the US put pressure both on Greece and Turkey to prevent conflict breaking out.¹²⁰ However, the American involvement in the Turco-Greek relations has also added new complexities to the problems between the two countries. When the US has appeared as a negotiator in Turco-Greek problems, the problem has directly gained a third leg because benefits and costs to the US become part of the problem. It would somehow be harder to strike a balance between three partners in practice. In sum, while US involvement has prevented conflicts between Turkey and Greece it has also added new complexities and specificities to their problems. Within this framework, Turco-Greek problems have started to play an important role in the Turco-American cost benefit analysis.

On the Cyprus question the US was often actively involved whether during the Cold War or in later periods. In the modern period the international significance of Cyprus goes back to June 4, 1878, when the Ottomans leased Cyprus to Great Britain on condition that it was eventually to be given back to the Ottoman Empire. (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 91) However, Great Britain unilaterally annexed Cyprus when the First World War broke out in 1914.¹²¹ With British domination of the island, the number of Greek Cypriots began to rise. Britain held the island until arrangements for independence were worked out in the 1950s, against the opposition of Greek Cypriots who favored *Enosis* with Greece. April 1, 1955 was the date when the Greek Cypriots used force against the Turkish Cypriots under the directives of

¹¹⁹ 1996 Kardak Rock crises stated that how the little rock piece would cause an huge conflict, According to Turkish Foreign ministry perspective, “The 1996 crisis over the Kardak rocks has erupted by coincidence in such an atmosphere when Greece was making announcements for recruitment of potential settlers from all over the world to some of these small islets and rocks” (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>). Interestingly, Greece perspective also reflects as the opposite like the other cases between two countries. As a result, it would be possible to show Kardak Crises as a good example of problems, which originated from different perspectives on the same issues.

¹²⁰ (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>).

¹²¹ With Lausanne agreement in 1923, annexation of Cyprus was accepted by new Turkey republic. (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 91)

Archbishop Makarios and with the assistance of Greece. At this point, EOKA appeared as the core of terrorist attacks against Turkish Cypriots. (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 91). 1950s passed with mostly Greece and Turkey struggle on the Cyprus in order to get political benefit on the behalf of the UN. For example, Cyprus question was brought to the UN by Greek side to carry out Enosis¹²² ideology Most of the time; the UN rejected these attempts. (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 92) The idea of enosis and the organization of EOKA arouses in the same manner. EOKA violence and reactions of Britain and Turkey against this formation in the island had been accelerated the developments at the end of 1950s. B.Akarcalı (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 92) summarized the case as:

After four year of Greek Cypriot terrorism for Enosis against the British and the Turkish Cypriot people, a settlement was reached in 1959 though the Zurich and London Agreements between the representatives of Turkey and Greece and the respective leaders of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot people in Cyprus. Thus, the foundation of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus was laid down.

This agreement creates a positive atmosphere in Turkey and accordingly among Turkish Cypriots. The agreement made Turkey, Greece, and the Great Britain as guarantors of the independent republic On the other side, as Skjelsbaek (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 9) points out, lots of Greek Cypriots, who initiated by ideological perspective of Enosis, found the creation of Cyprus Republic as a thwarting of their ‘Enosis’ ideology. On November 1963, President Makarios proposed new revision in the constitution. As Skjelsbaek has pointed out, (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 9) “the wide-range of veto power conceded to the Turkish Cypriots effectively immobilized legislation such key area as budget and taxes, and the proposed changes were not without a

¹²² According to Makides’ definition, “Enosis can be viewed primarily as the expression of a desire to reaffirm Greek Christian moral standards, which were being threatened by secularization and modernization. Enosis is not only a geopolitical goal, it is a catchword with Greek Cypriots understand to mean the preservation of their way of life” (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 8)

rationale.” This was somehow the starting point of the Cyprus dilemma that was going to open the way to chaos in the following years. Eoka and Greek Cypriots, standing for enosis or unification with Greece- started to use of force against Turkish Cypriots. On the other side, Turkish part also started to become armed against attacks. On the other side, the Turkish side also started to arm itself against threatened attacks.

The Greek Cypriot position was also affected by political maneuvers in Greece. Kongar (1999, 467) has underlined the fact that by the late 1960s, the Greek Cypriot leader and the republic’s president, Makarios, no longer supported the idea of Enosis because of the military coup d’etat in Greece. In consequence, Makarios lost the presidency through a coup d’etat on 15 July 1974, which was instigated by the Greek government. (Kongar, 1999, 467-68) While the level of violence increased between the two publics on the island, political maneuvering in both Greece Turkey added new complexities on the island’s political atmosphere,¹²³ from the beginning of dilemma in Cyprus, the UN had become involved. Necati Münir Ertekun (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 83) has underlined the role of the UN as follows:

When in 1954 Greece decided to make its first resource to the UN General assembly in an effort to obtain, under the guise, and with the assistance of, a one-sided application of the principle of the Self determination only to the Greek Community, a resolution to support its policy of Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece). The more direct involvement, however, of the UN itself with the physical presence in Cyprus of a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). Goes back to nearly a quarter of a century when, towards the end of March 1954, the first contingent of UNFICYP arrived in Cyprus pursuant to Resolution 186 (S/5575) of 4 March 1964 of the UN Security Council.

¹²³ <http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html>

I do not want to embark upon a critical analysis of how the UN became party to the issue, but, in my view – as also highlighted by Ertekun (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 83) – the fact that Cyprus had become an important strategic question for the global powers during the Cold War years limited the possibilities of the UN finding a solution.

In the context of the Turco-American relationship Cyprus became a strategic tool during the Cold War years. The development of the Cyprus problem during this period came at a difficult time for the Turco-American relationship, as Kongar and Fırat have pointed out. (Kongar, 1999: 46, Fırat, 1997:129-130). Four years after military intervention in Turkey (27 May 1960) the ‘Johnson Letter’¹²⁴ highlighted the importance of Cyprus as a strategic issue in international relations in Cold War circumstances. The American administration had come to the conclusion that a Turkish operation on the island was unacceptable (Kongar 1999, 466) As Kongar has pointed out the US became directly involved and decided to put pressure on the Turkish side to prevent its intervention in Cyprus. The letter written by US President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu became famous as the “Johnson Letter” in the history of Turkish Foreign policy. The letter strongly influenced Turco American relations in 1960s.

The main points of the letter, according to one observer, were as follows:¹²⁵

- 1) Turkey decided to intervene in the island in contravention of the Guarantee Treaty. Turkey cannot use its right to

¹²⁴ US president Johnson sent a letter which was explicitly threatening Turkey without using diplomatic language and tradition, to Turkish Prime minister Ismet Inonu on 5 July, 1964. (Kongar1999, 466)

¹²⁵ This summary of the Letter is quoted from <http://www.turk-yunan.gen.tr/english/answers/question16.html> and from (Kongar1999, 467). For accessing to full text and analyses, please apply to these sources.

intervene for the time being. 2) Any military intervention made by Turkey in the island may result in Turkey pitting itself against the Soviet Union. 3) Turkey took action without consulting its NATO allies and obtaining their "consent and approval." I (President Johnson himself) wonder if NATO is liable to defend Turkey in such a circumstance. Turkey did not take this point into consideration. 4) According to article 4 of the assistance agreement dated 12 July 1947 between Turkey and America, Turkey does not have the right to use the arms it acquired from America in the intervention in Cyprus. Because, these arms were given to Turkey for defense purposes (3). 5) President Johnson would like to meet with the Turkish Prime Minister for detailed talks.

In every respect, as Melek Fırat has pointed out (Fırat, 1997:129-133), the letter strongly affected Turkish thinking. Intervention did not go ahead, and Turco-American relations were severely strained as a consequence. Kongar (1999, 466) has shown how the letter became a focal point for the Turkish anti-Americanism that increased during the 1960s. Summing up the issue, it can be said that the Johnson letter strengthened newly emerging leftist tendencies in Turkey. (Kongar, 1999, 466) The letter tended to undermine Turkey's position as a guarantor of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, as established in the 1960 London Conference agreement. (Fırat, 1997:130) However, while the letter prevented a possible Turkish operation on the Island in the 1960s, it did not prevent Turkish intervention in the long run. What it did, in fact, was to weaken the Turco-American relationship

The Cyprus issue moved into the 1970s without being satisfactorily resolved. Eventual Turkish action in 1974¹²⁶ was triggered off by the fact that the inter-communal violence in Cyprus was reaching the level of ethnic cleansing, forcing the Turkish Cypriots into ghetto-like conditions in enclaves constituting only three per

¹²⁶ Turkey intervened as a result of rising violence against Turkish Cypriots on 20 July, 1974. This operation named the "Cyprus Peace Operation".

cent of the island.¹²⁷ One of the immediate causes of intervention was that the Greek colonels had conspired with the Greek Cypriots to bring about enosis.¹²⁸

On 20 July 1974, Turkey launched its unilateral Cyprus peace operation in accordance with Article 4 of the Guaranty Agreement. (Skjelsbaek, 1988: 13). By the evening of 22 July Turkey had accepted the armistice resolution of the UN Security Council. As a result of Turkish intervention, the military junta in Greece and the Cypriot government headed by Nikos Sampson collapsed. (Kongar1999, 468, Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 16).

Intervention had a strong effect on Turco-American relations. In its aftermath, the US decided to impose an arms embargo on Turkey. As Füsün Çoban Doskaya has pointed out¹²⁹,

American's justification for the embargo was that Turkey had used American supplied arms during the peace operation in Cyprus. Under need that decision was the effect of Greek lobbying which argued that such an action was against the rules of U.S. Foreign Assistance Act. However the supporters of this argument ignored the fact that the Greek Cypriots had been using U.S-supplied NATO arms against Turkish Cypriots for over eleven years and that the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces were still using them against the Turks.

This embargo increased pressure on Turkish politics and the economy. In the context of the relationship with the US, Kongar's analysis shows that Turkey did not manage to turn its military success in Cyprus into a success in the international

¹²⁷ <http://www.turk-yunan.gen.tr/>

¹²⁸ Peace prevailed between the two communities until the coming back of Grivas to the island in 1971. During that period Greek Junta began to see Makarios as an obstacle to Enosis. Papadopoulos and others "reached the conclusion that Makarios would never settle the Cyprus problem, whether by Enosis, double Enosis, or essential compromises with Turkish Cypriots" (Hart 130). Furthermore, when in 1973, a new junta came to power, matters became worse. Even the sudden death of Grivas did not better the events. On 15 July 1974 a coup led by Nicos Sampson destroyed the Presidential Palace and overthrew Makarios. However they failed to kill Makarios, who has fled with British help. Sampson immediately told that the negotiations would continue but this was not convincing. He was planning to unite Cyprus with Greece if Turkey had not intervened.

(<http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html>)

¹²⁹ <http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/mathesis.html>

arena. (However it domestically supports the prime-minister Ecevit's position and influences his popularity).(Kongar 1999, 467) While the embargo was lifted, politically the US has never agreed to end the international social, cultural, and economic embargoes applied against the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. (Akarcali, Raif, 2001: 60). The failure of the US to understand Turkey's position on Cyprus was extremely disappointing to the Turks, and led to questioning of the value of the US relationship: in addition, as had been the case in the 1960s after the 'Johnson letter', public anti-American feeling began to mount as a result. More importantly in the sense of Turco-American Relations, Johnson Letter became a pivotal point that Turkey began to reconsider its foreign policy to the US (Surely in the limitations of the Cold War Period). For example, Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin visited to Moscow, "Turkey adopted a "multi-faceted" foreign policy and Soviets tried to better Soviet-Turkish relations."¹³⁰ However, this claimed perhaps be seen as Turkey using a trump card against the US: The overturn to the USSR did not lead to radical change in aims of Turkish foreign policy in general.

Cyprus also became a dynamic element in the Turkish-EU relationship. The 'Heinze Report'¹³¹ indicated the impossibility of Cyprus being made a EU member in the political and physical circumstances created by Turkish intervention; the EU then moved (in the 1990s) towards the plan to accept the membership of Greek Cypriots in the name of a unified Cyprus. (Ahmetbeyoglu, Afyoncu 1997: 212) Greece's EU membership created further costs and complications for Turkey. Clearly Turkey's relationship with the EU has been greatly affected by the Cyprus issue. (Ahmetbeyoglu, Afyoncu.1997: 244). On this point, while continuing to

¹³⁰ <http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html>

¹³¹ Christian Heinze prepares the UN document, which is known as "Heinze Report", in 1997. This document mainly indicates that Southern Cyprus administration could not apply to full membership of EU because of Cyprus problem's historical roots that creates impossibilities in the sense of international law and science.

support Turkey's EU membership, the US remained impartial on Cyprus oriented problems between Turkey and the EU.(See chapter4-4.3 for more detail) On the other side, the US's nowadays attitudes to Cyprus problem is best summarized by McCaskill. He pointed out that¹³²

Cyprus does not have a very high priority in Washington these years. In contrast to former years when they spent considerable time looking for a solution, Cyprus has come to be regarded as a problem to be solved rather than as a situation to be managed. (43) Today America's policy of Cyprus is to support the UN Secretary General's proposals since they feel that that offers the greatest chance of success. However in the beginning United States preferred the de-internalization of the Cyprus question, and finding solutions away from the United Nations, that is, through NATO and bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey. "The United States did utilize the U.N. in Cyprus in order to legitimize solutions that served its broader politico-strategic interests, or when there were no other alternatives available" (Coufoudakis 65).

As a result, it can be concluding that American attitudes and involvement had neither benefited U.S. nor helped Greeks or Turks on Cyprus.

3.5.2 Armenia

The word 'Armenia' has generally negative connotations in the language of Turkish foreign policy-making. As a political question Armenia brings many complexities both to Turco-Armenian and Turco-American relations. There is more than one reason, which lies under the almost frozen diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. It is therefore better to delineate the specific dilemmas between Turkey and Armenia before discussing the correlation between Turco-Armenian and Turco-American relations.

First of all, there is the longstanding Armenian claim of for "genocide". The Armenians argue that there mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire

¹³² <http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/aftermath.html>

between 1915 and 1923. On the other side, Turkey argues that both Turkish and Armenians suffered from partisan fighting during the First World War and later as the Ottoman Empire collapsed. During the years when Armenia was under Soviet domination, the Armenian claims of “genocide” claims were limited. However, when Armenia declared its independence from the USSR on August 1, 1991, the accusation “genocide” was again voiced and started to find place in western public opinion and on foreign policy agendas.¹³³

However, even during the Cold War Armenian terrorists had carried out numerous attacks on Turks and Turkish diplomats all over the world. Many of these attacks were carried out by the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) terrorist group. Unfortunately, lots of innocent people were injured or died: they included 28 Turkish diplomatic and military personnel serving their country were assassinated in the western countries during the Cold War Era.¹³⁴ On that point, for example Sedat Laciner (T.C Merkez Bankası, 2002: 81) claims that US did not primarily focus on Armenian oriented terrorist attacks against Turkey and intended to prevent these attacks to weakening of Turco-American relations during the 1970s (because of opium crises and Cyprus crises and following the US arm embargo to Turkey). As Hyland has pointed out (Hyland, F.P, 1991: 32)

ASALA employed diverse tactics, receiving support from Armenians (mostly lived in the US), non-Armenians, groups, and states (such countries Syria and Iran gave explicit support to ASALA). The support was sometimes given freely, sometimes grudgingly, sometimes fearfully. The support was both financial and ‘in kind’ - weapons, explosives, training facilities.

¹³³ <http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030812091248752>

¹³⁴ <http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030812091248752>

For example, PKK appears as a group, which supported ASALA against Turkey, in that sense even in 2000s¹³⁵:

The terrorist organizations, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)(later renamed Kadek and nowadays it has changed to KHK) and ASALA, have reportedly signed an agreement concerning the training of terrorists in northern Iraq. (21.11.2001) Simon Zakarian a leader of the Armenian terrorist ASALA group has agreed with the PKK to train 110 of its militants on suicide and close combat techniques. The terrorist organizations, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) and ASALA, have reportedly signed an agreement concerning the training of terrorists in northern Iraq. Simon Zakarian a leader of the Armenian terrorist ASALA group has agreed with the PKK to train 110 of its militants on suicide and close combat techniques.

These first two problems – the claim of genocide and terrors -- dominated Turco-Armenian relations for a long time, but these are not the only issues that have created tension between Turkey and Armenia. When Armenia became an independent country it also laid claim – at least informally – to territory in eastern Turkey. Tansu Okandan, a former senior Turkish Foreign Ministry official, has defined the Armenian claims in the following words (as reported by the Turkish Daily News 3 December 2000):

Armenia was continuing its territorial claims on Turkey, adding that Armenian authorities have identified six Northern provinces of Turkey as “western Armenia.” Okandan called on US authorities to urge Armenia to give up its current policy towards Turkey in order for Armenia ties with Turkey to develop.

Moreover, Armenian territorial claims activated one of the first important conflicts in the region -- with Azerbaijan -- in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR when Armenia occupied the Azerbaijan territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Karabakh, especially, was the core point of the Armenian-Azeri dispute. Azerbaijan

¹³⁵ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2001/11/01x11x21.HTM# 12>

and Armenia fought over Nagorno-Karabakh for three years.¹³⁶ Some parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh, mostly populated by Armenians, proclaimed their independence from Azerbaijan in 1991 with Armenia's backing. This can be shown as another important factor that should be highlighted as one of the reasons for the frozen diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Armenia during 1990s. Ironically, Turkey was one of the countries that recognized Armenia's independence on August 1991. Ongoing fighting and the inconclusive cease-fire settlement in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh inevitably constituted a significant obstacle to the improvement of Turco-Armenian relations. Turkey started to use its dominant position in 1993 by closing its borders with Armenia. The air border remained open but land routes -- including the railway --- were closed. Armenia was blockaded both in economic and political senses.¹³⁷ The US paid close attention to the Turkish embargo on Armenia. According to the US perspective, Turkey should form a kind of economic bridge between Asia and Europe and as a result of US pressure. The border the land and rail routes were reopened.¹³⁸ It is clear that the US strategy was directed towards maintaining the openness between economies in the region. Turkey, however, was mostly interested in the political side of the issue. Obviously, this border issue turned Armenia into an important factor in Turco-American relations: it seemed to illustrate the separation of Turkish and American perspectives in the region. Turkey might block the oil pipelines crossing Armenian territory.

¹³⁶ The latest flare-up of this long-standing conflict occurred toward the end of the Soviet period, when the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh petitioned to become part of Armenia. Serious fighting erupted in 1991, and in the following two years Armenian forces not only gained control of Nagorno-Karabakh but also occupied almost 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory. The leaders of the Nagorno-Karabakh region have declared independence, though this status has not been recognized by any state. The fighting between Azeris and Armenians left more than 15,000 dead. (<http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks25/keypts25.html>)

¹³⁷ It has been estimated that Armenia would gain between USD 600 million and 1 billion a year if the railway was to open again. (<http://www.rosbaltnews.com/print/print?cn=63363>)

¹³⁸ <http://www.rosbaltnews.com/print/print?cn=63363>

Thus energy ¹³⁹in the Turco-Armenian context would add tensions to relations between the US and Turkey.

To sum up, the border issue between Turkey and Armenia opened ambiguous developments in Turco-American relation. At the same time Armenia began to escalate the genocide allegations and bring the so-called “genocide” issue on to the international agenda: it wanted judgment to be made before an international court.¹⁴⁰ In particular, the Armenians wanted to use lobby mechanisms in the US political system. In fact here, we should somehow separate the Armenians who live in the US and the formal attitudes of Armenian governments, because lobby facilities in the US have generally been independent of the countries. Şükrü Elektağ¹⁴¹, former Turkish ambassador to Washington, has summarized Armenian efforts in the US as follows:

The activities of the Armenian lobby to have a bill passed by the US Congress accusing Turkey of Armenian Genocide continued incessantly. As a result of these efforts and with the strong support of the Greek lobby, the Armenians were able to bring a bill to the floor of the General Council of the House of Representatives.

The Armenian lobby is one of the most influential groups in the US, after the Jewish lobby. Its anti-Turkish propaganda in the US is largely based on the genocide claim. As Elektağ has¹⁴² pointed out

In both cases [each attends of Armenian lobbies in order to be accepted] where heated discussions took place the bills were rejected. The rejection of these claims that are seen as undisputed facts by the Armenian lobby; their supporters and a majority of the Americans angered the Armenian circles. Not knowing what to do, they wanted to declare the Turkish Ambassador as 'persona non grata'. Deputy Speaker Tony Coelho presented a draft law to the

¹⁴⁰ *Milliyet*, 18 October 2000

¹⁴¹ *Milliyet*, 18-10-2000

¹⁴² *Milliyet*, 18-10-2000

House of Representatives with the signature of 60 deputies with that purpose. This attempt failed.

Even this case is adequate to see how Armenian lobby activities are influential in Turco-American relations.

One of the most serious periods of tension between Turkey and the US involving the Armenian lobby arose in October 2000, when the House of Representatives decided to put the Armenian claim of genocide on its agenda. This was the closest point that the resolution came to being discussed in the House of Representatives. President Clinton immediately warned the House not to pass the resolutions because it could damage the US partnership with NATO ally Turkey and seriously harm other US interests.¹⁴³ It was thought likely that such a vote could result in the Incirlik airbase being closed: thus US planes could not use the base for patrols in the no-fly zone in Iraq. Consequently the House of Representatives cancelled a vote on a resolution. Former Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem underlined how this resolution would have Turco-American relations:¹⁴⁴

Turkey's relations with the United States have been "saved from a grave threat" by the US House of Representative's withdrawal of the resolution accusing the Ottoman Empire of the genocidal killing of Armenians early last century.

Several attempts by the Armenian lobby to have the House of Representatives pass a genocide resolution have failed in the last decade through the intervention of the American administration: these failures represent Turkish foreign policy successes. The Armenian issue between Turkey has remained inconclusive but when the time is right the claim of genocide will again be brought to the agenda of

¹⁴³ <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/10/20102000061240.asp>

¹⁴⁴ <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/10/20102000061240.asp>

American politics. This issue has created further costs for both sides in relation to Turco-American relations. Indeed, when Turco-American relations seem to be weakening over other issues, the Armenian genocide claim often reappears on the US political agenda. For example, however it seems to be speculative news that the genocide resolution has come up for discussion in the aftermath of the US occupation of Iraq on the strength of Turkey's to give support to the US military during the American operation against Iraq. There is a probability of readapting of Armenian genocide in to the US political agenda. Thus it can be seen that the Armenian issue can cause very serious problems between the US and Turkey.

So, however Turkey has always found means to cope with the Armenian's lobby activities to have the so-called Armenian genocide recognized in some western European countries like Italy and France. There are some other problems that may bring further regional costs or benefits to Turkey in connection with the Armenian issue. Global developments will play a crucial role in determining the direction of Turco-Armenian relations and accordingly Turco-American relation. In this sense sociologist Şule Kılıçarslan who is chairperson of the Eurasia Cultural and Social Development Association (ECASDA) has summarized Turco-Armenian relations by saying ¹⁴⁵

Especially after September 11 and the recent war in Iraq, one of these is the need to benefit from the current situation especially after the tension in the Turkish-US relations in the northern front (in Iraq) and recognize that the Armenian genocide allegations will not bring any benefit for regional peace. On the contrary, two neighboring countries Armenia and Turkey should adopt liberal and mild rapprochement policies in the awareness of the destruction and economic depression brought by the war and should be able to see that there are more interests to be considered. The oil and gas energy transportation line projects may be the first part of this potential and communication and transportation technologies may become the new keys in Eurasia. This may be defined as one of the common

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030812091248752>

denominators where in accordance with the future enlargement policies of NATO both countries may cooperate in the security field. The second lesson to be drawn is that the determined foreign and security policies pursued by the US in the struggle against terrorism may lead to a new opportunity (for new phase of Turco-Armenian relations)

Now, one question remains unanswered: even if Armenia and Turkey develop a sort of common vision in the region, will it really affect Armenian lobbying activities in the US? It is hard to answer this question because Armenian lobby is activated generally as a result of weakness or crises moments in Turco-American relations rather than directly related to Turco-Armenian relations. Therefore, in my opinion the Armenian claim of genocide is used as a tool in the relationship between Turkey and the US, rather than being directly related to improvements in Turco-Armenian relation. In other words, the Armenian issue has been used as a kind of a variable in the cost and benefits balance both by different US administrations and also by the Armenian lobby. Therefore, it is possible to think that the US will use the “Armenian genocide” question at times of crisis with Turkey.

3.5.3 Turkey between the EU and the US

In the aftermath of the Second World War, when the western European countries were taking the first steps towards becoming a united Europe, involvement into the European Union¹⁴⁶ took its place as key Turkish foreign policy objectives. Turkish enthusiasm to become an EU member has a long and complicated history. Most of the time, Turkey’s striving for EU membership has ended in disappointment.

¹⁴⁶ “The European Union came into being when the Maastricht Treaty was ratified in November 1993. ‘Europe’ (the politics and institutions of European integration) was called the EEC (European Economic Community or, colloquially, the Common Market until the 1980s, when it became the EC (European Community).” (Kesselman, Christophers, Ost, Krieger, Hellman, Ross. 1997:571)

Obviously, it is possible to see difficulties in Turkish membership from several different variables. As of June 1993, the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ became the most critical obstacle to be overcome by Turkey.¹⁴⁷

On the other side, there are various different arguments which focus on Turkish displacement from the EU. On the other hand, however Turkey has been stepping decisive steps for the EU membership, especially political problems also played an important role as an obstacle against Turkey. It can be possible to be divided into two different segments such as the problems which depend on internal structural problems of the EU and secondly the political problems which directly depend on Turkish standing in the global world. For example, however as many pretend not to see, the period, which started with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, opened also a period of difficulties. The integration process has come into new process with expanding deeper problems. (Kesselman, Christophers, Ost, Krieger. Ross.1997: 631) For example, as Kesselman underlines the fact that the EU has internal problems like unemployment, which have hardened further involvement of countries like Turkey. So Kesselman (1997:631) points out the problematic period of the EU in the aftermath of the Maastricht as follows:

The new Europe had been promoted for its ability to create jobs. By the time of Maastricht, it had begun to be perceived as a job destroyer. Moreover,

¹⁴⁷ In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council recognized the right of the countries of central and eastern Europe to join the European Union when they have fulfilled three criteria: political: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; economic: a functioning market economy; incorporation of the Community *acquis*: adherence to the various political, economic and monetary aims of the European Union. These accession criteria were confirmed in December 1995 by the Madrid European Council, which also stressed the importance of adapting the applicant countries' administrative structures to create the conditions for a gradual, harmonious integration.

(<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000a.htm>)

analyses showed that EC unemployment was substantially greater than in comparable economies elsewhere, such as in the United States. For some deep reasons, Europe had less able to create jobs than other regions. As recession spread, observers also remarked that the Maastricht EMU proposals, with their stringent convergence criteria, would make it even more difficult for member state governments to stimulate economic activity.

So that it should be accepted the fact that the EU and its mechanism has also had difficulties in balancing its economic and structural integration, which means Turkish membership have faces problems other than Turkish oriented economic and social problems. (Kesselman, Christophers, Ost, Krieger. Ross.1997: 631-34) Naturally Turkish membership makes some EU member countries worried. In this sense, France is already concerned about a new wave of Muslim migration and the Germans are already dealing with thousands of illegal Turkish immigrants. Beyond these realities and difficulties of the EU project, differences in the political perspective seem to be as the main obstacle for Turkish involvement. More importantly, the US appears as the core point of the political oriented issues between Turkey and the EU. At that point, Hasan E. Şener has summarized the uncertainty of Turkey on the behalf of the EU. He says, “It also seems to an observer that there are *unwritten* political criteria, in addition to the Copenhagen criteria, that Turkey needs to fulfill in order to reach the point so often trumpeted in Europe "Turkey is destined to join the EU".”¹⁴⁸

On that point, the Cyprus issue is a core political obstacle against Turkish involvement. Especially with the Greece’s EU membership has been primarily role in changing EU perspective against Turkish occurrence in the Cyprus. The general tendency of the EU has reflected the idea that “Cyprus belongs to the Greek Cypriots

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.thesprout.net> (the Sprout, number 8,2003)

and they are prepared to impose minority status on the Turks living in Northern Cyprus” (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 27) Actually the decision which is taken by the EU at the Luxemburg Summit in 1998 is adequate to explore the EU perspective on the Cyprus issue. At this summit, the Cyprus issue was underlined with an attention being paid the idea of “Turkey should recognize the Greek Cypriot government in the south as the state for the entire island. This recognition, of course, would relegate the Turkish Cypriots to the status of a community” (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 92) In fact, the EU’s perspective on Cyprus and its possible results is another point but, more importantly, this issues explicitly show the reluctance of the EU regarding Turkish membership and support for he indefinite position of Turkey on the road to EU membership. (Akarcalı, Raif, 2001: 29). Cyprus issue also symbolizes one of the difficult periods in Turco-American relations such as “Johnson’s Letter” and arm embargo waggged Turk-American relations (1974). (See Chapter3.5.1 for detail) these cases have shown that the fact the US did not want a Cyprus oriented conflict in the region during the Cold War. So, it would be hard to argue that the US role in Cyprus negotiations did not support Turkish benefits in Cyprus for most of the time during the Cold War Era.

In general, the US gave its support to the establishment of a united Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. (Kissinger, 2000:768) According to the American perspective, a united Europe was essential to maintain security and welfare on the continent. Throughout the Cold War the US gave arms support to most EU countries. However, as Kissinger (Kissinger, 2000:781) has pointed out, the collapse of the USSR opened a new era in the US-EU relationship. Kissinger has underlined the fact that the European has not need to get American support against the USSR that explicitly means that the security and indefiniteness problem in the European

continent has gone away. On the other side, as he pointed out, the US also is not going to desirously bear the consequences of sacrifices for the sake of European security as much as the Cold war period and continue its solitude policy in most of the case (Kissinger, 2000:781-82)

The end of the Cold War was a pivotal point in determining in mutual relations the US and the EU. As a result, the EU has developed mostly as an economic organization, which is still far away from being a dissuasive military power. This reality ties the EU to US military power. However, there are serious differences of perspective and opinion of which Iraq is only the most recent. Inevitably, changing US perspectives on the EU have influenced the EU-Turkey and Turco-American relations. During the Cold War years the US saw Turkey as standing in the front line against the USSR and therefore supported Turkish involvement into the EU. It can be said that Turkish EU membership was not a primary foreign policy topic of US during the Cold War. However, US policy shifted with regard to Turkey's EU membership shifted enormously especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The US revised its foreign policy with the September 11 terrorist attacks. This had a direct impact on the Turkish position both in the region and in its relations with the EU. The previous US Ambassador to Turkey, Robert Pearson, best expressed the US position on Turkish-EU relations in a speech on May 28, 2002:

Referring to relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU), Robert Pearson described the inclusion of PKK and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front (DHKP-C) in the EU's list of terrorist organizations as an important step. He stressed that the United States had been supporting Turkey's full membership to the EU.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹<http://www.turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp?ID=5987>

Recent developments indicate that the US is increasing its pressure on a reluctant EU to admit Turkey and to promote its (the US) greater foreign policy goals in the Muslim and Arab world. US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz urged the EU 'to welcome Turkey into its fold' during its December 12-13 summit in Copenhagen.¹⁵⁰ He described Turkey as the only Muslim and secular country that is "striving to develop a free and democratic and tolerant society that could be a useful model for others in the Muslim world".¹⁵¹ Thus Turkey has appeared as a useful model for the US in its struggle against Islamist terrorism.

In addition, the US has also increased its pressure on the EU, Greece and Turkey to solve the Cyprus issue. As the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman pointed out¹⁵² "The US reiterated the support of the US government to the UN Secretary General's efforts to solve the Cyprus problem and expressed his country's support for Cyprus' accession to the EU." It means that the latest UN plan to Cyprus, so-called "Annan Plan", is supported by the US. The American supported Annan plan has opened new debates in Turkish domestic policy. Some portion including, Northern Cyprus Turk Republic President R.Denktaş also oppose to the plan in some degree, on the other hand, in Turkey some are underlying the importance of gains that the plan offer to Turkish Cypriots and evaluate as an historical changes both for Cyprus and both for Turkish membership to the EU. As, Mehmed Ali Birand, an influential journalist in Turkey, sees "Annan Plan" as an historical chance. He says, "Turkey is faced with one final historic chance. Though it does not fully satisfy the Turkish side, the Cyprus package does offer extremely important gains. Casting aside the 'We will not give away even a pebble,' litany, we

¹⁵⁰ <http://www.arabia.com/I87/pina>

¹⁵¹ <http://www.arabia.com/I87/pina>

¹⁵² http://www.pio.gov.cy/news/dailynews/news2002_6_20.htm

must take the most we can and close this file.” Whatever the different perspectives are, the important point here is the US support symbolizes increasing directly and indirectly pressures of the EU on Turkey in order to accept that Plan. As a result, however there is both the US and the EU pressures on Turkey and accordingly Greece, Annan Plan has carried out by two sides, but it does not fairly means that the EU pressures on Turkey will ended. More importantly, the US future attitudes will be envisaged the process.

The positive US position on Turkish membership of the EU has also helped Turkey during the arguments over the EU’s efforts to build its own defense arm force. For example, Doug Bereuter, an¹⁵³ influential Republican Congressman who is close to the Bush Administration, has said (according to the Turkish Daily News 3 December, 2000) that

Turkey should not be excluded from the decision-making mechanism of the proposed force .The EU cannot exclude NATO members from the decision-making process while using NATO assets. ... (He continued)... The EU is not autonomous and probably never will be. It would continue to need NATO facilities. Therefore, it cannot exclude NATO members, especially a strategic country like Turkey.

American support also was also shown in the aftermath of NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999.¹⁵⁴ The major decision taken at this meeting was that it was

clear that the work done on establishing WEU-NATO cooperation will have to be revised and reworked to provide for NATO-EU cooperation on a more equal footing. Thus it reflects a re-launch of the idea that the future of transatlantic relations should be based on two pillars - the EU and the United States.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ *Turkish Daily News*, 13 Nov, 2002

¹⁵⁴ The meeting is held for celebrating the 50th anniversary of NATO

¹⁵⁵ http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/99summit/nato_at_odds.htm

This decision strengthened Turkey's bargaining position as an NATO member. In addition, following US pressure on individual member states, the EU decided in December 2001 at its Helsinki Summit that the EU's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) would not intervene in the region close to Turkey without common partnership with NATO.^{156 157} This decision gave an indirect veto power to Turkey without it being actively in European security structure. However, all these examples do not allow us to determine exactly what direction US- Turkey and the EU relations will take in the near future, and accordingly, what role the EU will play in the cost-benefit balance between Turkey and the US.

3.6. Concluding remarks

Although it seems clear that Turkey has tried to develop a broader base/perspective for its foreign policy in the post Cold War, as indicated in this chapter, the obvious fact is the continuation of Turco-American linkage as much as the Cold War years. The important point is one difference or transformation in Turkey's quality on the behalf of the US perspective. That is, as it has been indicated in this chapter, (as Müftüoğlu and Yüksel has pointed out) "In the first years after Second World War, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic government, Turkey was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Middle East." (Müftüoğlu and Yüksel, 1997:188). Then, in the post Cold War Era, these specifics of Turkish structure has been started to view as a kind of model for the Middle Eastern despotic and religion oriented powers by the Western countries (and specifically by the US). This seems to be main difference of Turkey from the Cold

¹⁵⁶ <http://europa.eu.int/>

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.c3ed.uvsq.fr/c3ed/Axe6/Serfati-AEA-2002.pdf>

War to the Post Cold War for the Western and the US perspective. Especially, in the aftermath of September 11 attacks and with the rise of “Islamic” terrorism, Turkish secular and democratic structure has started to view as an important element for modeling the “new” Middle East rather than “bulwark” against one enemy. Actually, the US approach that is viewing Turkey as a model for the Middle East, which also means that US and the Western perspective is still seeing Turkey in the Middle Eastern context rather than European context. More exactly, all the costs and benefits which has mentioned in this chapter indicates that Turkish political and geographical position have been generally perceived and evaluated by the US according to US strategies in the Middle East rather than in Europe. So this reality should be highlight as a main characteristic of Turco-American relations.

After highlighting Turkish position in the post Cold War Era as one of the main remarks of this chapter, we can easily extract two main reasons from the Turco-American relations in the post Cold War in order to clarify Turkish position in nowadays political environment;

First, however, this thesis is somehow questioning “strategic partnership” between Turkey and the US in most of the sections; it is fact that Turkey has become one of the close partnerships of the US in its world wide operations, rather than becoming front line of the US like in the Cold War years. Turkish role and involvement in Yugoslavian and Afghanistan operations in the post Cold War are the most extrinsic examples of this partnership. In addition to this, however US invasion of Iraq is disputatious operation in terms of its legitimacy and efficiency; it has openly paved the way of new alternatives for Turco-American partnership, which may be beneficial or detrimental for Turkish position in the new global environment. As a result, transformation of Turkish position in its relations with the US from

“front line of the Cold War” to “partner in US operations” has inevitably caused new type of costs and benefits for Turkey in the post Cold War. Therefore, it is possible to remark that Turkish costs and benefits has been changing form with changing US global politics and becoming abundant in the post Cold War environment.

Second, in the post Cold War Era, it can be easily observing that there are still ongoing process of some issues between Turkey and the US which has started in the Cold War. In fact, these topics, which have been mentioned in the section--called “Mixed Blessings” section in this chapter, constitutes important place in determining the real nature of Turco-American relations in the post Cold War era. In other words, on one side, Turkey and Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War have showed cooperation and parallelism with the US global policy for most of the time; on the other side; Turkey and the US have still unclear issues in bilateral relations. For example, as has pointed out in this chapter, Cyprus, Armenia, and EU. All these issues are long time pasts in Turco-American relations. It can be easily observing that all these issues have common similarities in terms of Turco-American relations. First and the main similarity is Turkey have not changed its attitudes and policies so much to these three issues both during the Cold War and aftermath. On the other hand, as indicated in this chapter- the US approaches and accordingly policies to these issues has always been in alteration according to the US global interests. Therefore, these three issues (Cyprus and accordingly Greece, Armenian, and Turkish relations with Europe.) have gained ossified characteristics in Turco-American relations. For this reason, these issues become more important and diagnostic in Turco-American relations when Turco-American relations come into crises or in cooperation. For example, American support to Turkish membership to the EU has been uprising just after rise of global terrorism in 2000s, while it was

indistinct for most of the Cold War Period. Armenian issues indicate another example- Armenian claims of genocide and lobby activities has rapidly increases in the US Congress during the crises times in Turco-American relations. It also means that these three issues also plays important role to designate the level of costs and benefits in Turco-American relations, because these ossified issues can be suddenly activated as result of another problem or changing policy. So, it is possible to remark that these issues, which have been underlined in the “Mixed Blessings” section in this chapter, are staying a sort of question mark in the relations and also in the cost-benefit analysis in the post Cold War.

Another important concluding remark from this chapter is changing roles of the concepts like dependency, super power and so on in the Turco–American relations in the post Cold War. On this point, it is sure that Turco-American partnership and cooperation have continued in the post Cold War. On the other hand, Turkish side-both in the administration and public levels- has started to question the super power and dependency concepts much more than the Cold War Era. However the post Cold War environment has changed the dependency concept between Turkey and the US. Turkey proved its enthusiasm to increase relations with the US in the new global arena. In short, we can easily show two main reasons for Turkish desires to continue and expand its relations with the US. First one is the sensitive interrelation between Turco-American and Turco-EU relations. Second one is the increasing role of the US in both in the Middle East and Eurasia. (All these two reasons have been analyzed in this chapter).

On the other hand, what kinds of differences can be observed on the concepts of super power and dependency in Turco-American relations? The main difference is the US not only dependent to Turkey in terms of strategic anxieties, but also has

started to be dependent in terms of philosophy and ideology (Democrat and secular Muslim country). Therefore, it can be claiming that interdependency concept has replaced the dependency concept specifically in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks at one degree. As J.S. Nye's book-called "The Paradox of American Power" has pointed out, the US needs to other actor countries as much as the Cold War days in order to continue its "super power" status in the global environment. (Nye, 2003:5-6) On this point, as he has pointed out, the US is trying to find out balance between increasing dependency to other actors and its global strategies. For example, Clinton administration appropriated "multi-sided" foreign policy and tried to increase the number of its allies. (Nye, 2003:6). Then the Republican/Bush administration has totally changed that policy to "obstinately" American foreign policy on other actors in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. In both cases, Turkey developed different policies towards changing nature of the US foreign policy in order to secure its good relations with the US. It means that the US has remained diagnostic factor of Turco-American relations in the post Cold War. Therefore, however interdependency concept seems to be somehow replaced dependency concept. It is hard to argue that there has been total interdependency between Turkey and the US in the new global environment, which means that the dominance of dependency concept for Turkey and similar other actors in their relations with the US is still on political agenda. As a result, the main finding of this chapter is; the post Cold War has witnessed inevitable and huge issues (like September 11 terrorist attacks) that changed foreign policies and cost-benefit balance between Turkey and the US.

CHAPTER 4:

CONCLUSION: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

As can be seen from the analysis of previous chapters, Turkey has been strongly affected by the global balance of power both during and after the Cold War. What makes Turkey unique – in the context of its relations with the US -- is its strategic and geographic position. In the contemporary situation Turkey has become important to the US because of its structural uniqueness in the Muslim world. However much Turkey's geographic and strategic importance seems to be decreasing by the end of the Cold War, its secularized Muslim identity appeared as an important dynamic factor which pulled Turkey again into a global struggle. (See Chapter 4, 4.3) it may lead to create new reciprocal costs and benefits between Turkey and the US in economic, political and even in social structures. This means that Turkey, both politically and geographically and now structurally, is still in an important position during a new period of global struggle.

As a result, it is important to analyze the Turkish position both during the Cold War and also after the Cold War. Towards this end it is important to separate the outlook for Turkey into three areas: constraints in foreign policy, economic dependency and lastly in the sense of Turkey's costs and internal divisions arising from globalization. Therefore, this chapter will examine some of the general concepts that create differences in the Turco-American relations cost-benefit balance.

4.1. Constraints in foreign policy

The foreign policy of any country is influenced by both domestic and international politics and Turkey is no exception. A global power exerts its own pressures on the foreign policy decisions of any state, and perhaps especially so in the case of actors such as Turkey. Turkey is not well placed to develop an independent foreign policy. From the Middle East to the Caucasus the region is driven by conflict. In this kind of environment many important issues have to take second place to high-level security, military and diplomatic needs. In this context, foreign politics with its all subtopics become an airily essential area for Turkey's position in the region. (Kut, 2001: 5) In the past four decades, Turkish foreign policy has been influenced first by the global rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union and then by new developments in the post Cold War period just after the collapse of the USSR. For instance, as Şule Kut (Kut, 2001: 5) has pointed out, "in just two years, the number of states neighboring Turkey increased by 50 per cent". Therefore the development of Turkish foreign policy has been conditioned by global power both during the Cold War years and also in the post Cold War period.

It is essential to understand Turkish foreign policy in order to highlight the constraints under which it is developed. What makes Turkey distinctive is that its traditions are entirely different from Europe's. Turkey has a strong state tradition depending on the heritage of Ottoman Empire, which means that centralization has remained a dominant character of Turkish politics. Accordingly, when we look at the first decades of the republican period, the Republican Party government created a huge bureaucratic elite to carry out its political decisions. This has remained the

situation up till now. (Kongar, 1999:20) On the other hand, this kind of bureaucratic tradition sometimes is not enough to prevent the influence of populist politics on foreign politics. The important point here is the grey area between domestic and foreign policy making, which is connected with the role of the high state bureaucracy. (Kongar, 1999:20) The high state bureaucracy has mostly been able to run domestic politics and foreign policy in tandem. The interesting and unique point here is that the state structure canalizes both its foreign policy and domestic foreign policy towards the Westernization project as an ideology. However, this westernization as an ideology has led to more dependency on Europe and US especially in foreign policy decisions. This means that both the foreign policy and domestic policies of Turkey are somehow affected from outside. This is sure a sort of dilemma in Turkish foreign policy and somehow one of the reasons for foreign-origin constraints in Turkish foreign policy so that the US appears as the most influential actor in this sense.

What constraints have arisen as a result of the reality of American global power? As we have seen Turkey has been an important actor in all the global challenges that arose after the end of the Second World War. (Derengil, 1992:3). Between the 1950s and 1980s, most countries both in Balkans and also in Eurasia remained under the political domination of the Soviet Union. This highlighted Turkey's position as a bastion of western influence in the southeastern Europe and Middle Eastern regions. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy options were constrained because of the alignment with the US and the 'West'. For example, relations with countries in the Middle East region languished because of Turkish linkages with the US even though the Middle East region remained very important for Turkey both in the sense of economic and political relations. (Derengil, 1992: 4)

Turkish foreign policy never found a way to develop warmer relations, mostly because of the limitations arising from US policy interests during the Cold War which allowed Arab opinion to see Turkey as a servant of the west in the region.

In the sense of security, Turkey was also affected by the Cold War period. For example, during the Cuban missile crises at the beginning of the 1960s Turkish foreign policy became a 'trump card' between the US and the USSR. (Allison and Zelikow, P.1999: 356) During this period, President Kennedy offered to withdraw American missiles from Izmir as the price of securing the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.(see chapter 2, 2.4) Turkish foreign policy concerns had no effect on that decision of the US. (Allison and Zelikow, P.1999: 356) There are lots of different examples showing the constraints on Turkish foreign policy arising from the relationship with the US: one was when Turkey made a foreign policy decision separately from the US during the Cyprus operation, resulting in a long term arms embargo being imposed against Turkey. (See chapter 4, 4.1).

There were of course the advantages that have already been pointed out, i.e US support for Turkey' entrance into NATO. In the post Cold War period İlhan Üzgel has pointed out (Uzgel, 2001: 65) that Turkey started to establish strong economic and political ties with Balkan countries with the support of the US. For example, Turkey participated in peacekeeping operations both in Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo with strong backing by the US (see chapter3, 3.2) Turkey also gained advantages with the support of US on the issue of the Baku-Ceyhan¹⁵⁸ pipeline project. (Sasley, 2001:228).

¹⁵⁸ The Baku-Ceyhan scheme that has been reeling since 1992. If everything goes according to plan, oil will start flowing through the pipelines by 2005. The cost of the project was among the most contentious subjects up to now. Botaş (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation) assumed the responsibility of completing the Turkey part of the project. Pledging to complete the 1070 kilometer part of the pipeline passing across Turkey for \$1.4 billion including nationalization. The income to be drawn

Overall, it is possible to argue that the post cold-war has brought more complicated and surprising costs to the Turco-American relationship compared to the Cold War period. Kaner and Brooks have described how the costs of the cold War have moved into less obvious and less quantifiable categories than during the Cold War: (Kanter, Brooks, 116-17):

Every minor problem during overt intervention, especially military intervention, may have great political impact in the age of global televised news, when vivid images can bring about rapid changes in the national mood. The pictures of the October 1993 desecration of dead Americans in Somalia, for example, led directly to the American decision to withdraw its forces from the United Nations effort in that ravaged nation.

The September 11 violence and attacks have brought about a revolutionary transformation both in the expression of US power and in the position of other actors. The different way in which global power will be expressed is already clear: the US has expressed its determination to exercise a range of options including ‘anticipatory action’ against regimes it believes are threatening or may threaten its interests. Iraq is an example of the new policy in action: the US has made it clear’, in a manner strikingly familiar to the ‘either with us or against us’ rhetoric of the Cold War, that it expects other countries to fall into line with the new approach. What is clear is Turkey will be in the part of the US in the sense of “either with or against with us”, but the essential point in this sense that Turkey again will be one of the most affected country from new American foreign policy perspective and accordingly its practices because of its geographic position. In fact, that is why both economic and political relations of Turkey should be revised according to this new conjecture

from the transit fees of the incoming oil is projected at \$100-200 million annually. (http://www.turkishtime.org/ekim/42_1_en.htm)

4.2 Economic dependency

Secondly, economic phase of the global power occurrence is an important part of the relationships between the US and others. By nature, a global power depends on not only on militarily and physical power but also economic power, because the combination of economic and physical power is somehow the *sine qua non* element of becoming and remaining a global power. Turkey's economic dependency on the US started after the Second World War. The 'Marshall Plan' was the first step in Turkey's economic dependency on the US. In the following years, and generally with US support, Turkey applied for all kinds of credits from the World Bank and the IMF. By the end of 1974, Turkey had acquired debts of more than 63 billion TL. (According to 1974 exchange rate) of which 71.3 per cent was provided by the US. (Kongar, 1999: 488) In addition, by 1974 Turkey had acquired military aids and credits from the US of more than three billion dollars: by the 1990s Turkey's foreign debt had increased to hundreds of billion of dollars.

From the "cost-benefit" analysis perspective, Turkey benefited from this economic dependency on the US in the form of military and political support in the region and in the long road of the European Union Membership. (Cumhuriyet, 25-1997: 4) (See chapter 4, 4.3) On the other hand, the Turkish economy lost billions of dollars as the result of Turkey's strong support for the US during the Gulf War. The US invasion of Iraq will cause deeper economic dilemmas in Turkish economy. What is clear is that economic dependency is not a significant source of political dependency (For example, Turkey would not support the attack on Iraq in 2003). Therefore, Turkish economic dependency without political dependency will be open new dilemma in Turco-American relations. In this sense, Turkey will be constrained economically as a result of its political behaving against the US. It is

possible to argue that there has been very delicate linkage between economy and foreign policy in Turco-American relations' nature. It is clearly that Turkey has managed to successes in separating its foreign policy from its economic dependency in some cases (for example in Cyprus operation-1974 and US invasion of Iraq-2003). On the other side of the fact, Turkey has always been in the position to select economic costs or political one.

On that point, it would better to look at some values that highlight the gravity of the economic dimension in Turco-American relations. By the end of 2000, Turkey's foreign loans had reached \$ 114,324 billion. More importantly, the IMF and the World Bank constituted more than % 10 percent of these loans.¹⁵⁹ The US had played essential role to take these loans to Turkey. (As pointed out before, both IMF and the World Bank are the organization which can be count in American navigation.).¹⁶⁰ As C. Erhan has pointed out, (Bal, 2001:128) we should also look at capital transformation between Turkey and the US. The sum of the foreign capital that has entered into Turkish economy is approximately \$ 28,610 billion in the period between 1980 and 2000.¹⁶¹ More importantly, American companies' share was \$ 3,306 billion. Therefore, the US has become the fourth biggest country (after France, Germany, and Netherlands), which invested in Turkey. At this point, we should also underline the importance of Turkish attitudes to the US. Turkey, especially at the end of 1980s, started to struggle with strict American quote policy with the mentality of "trade instead of aid". (Bal, 2001:128). This new approach has given positive results and Turkish products have come into the US more easily than before. On the other hand, there is a still huge gap in Turco-American foreign trade balance for American

¹⁵⁹ <http://www.hazine.gov.tr>

¹⁶⁰ <http://www.die.gov.tr/TURKISH/SONIST/DISTICIST/06112001.htm>

¹⁶¹ Statistics are selected up to 2000 year, because Turkey lived series of economic crises which had an effect on both foreign and domestic economy in the aftermath of 2000, which probably mislead the real level of capital transformation between the US and Turkey.

benefits. For example, by the year 2000, the US was in the second place (After Germany) in Turkish exportation. (\$ 3.074 billion and % 9.2 percent)¹⁶². In the realm of imports, US were in the fourth position with \$ 3,887 billion and % 7.6 percent.

Here the important point that should be highlighted is examining the real effect of economic dependency of Turkey to the US and going forward to the question: Has this economic dependency really helped to create a sort of “patron-client structure” in Turco-American relations? It can be argued that the Turco-American relation has embraced some of the patron-client (Clientalism)¹⁶³ type of relationship in economic sense. In other words, unequal economic status of two countries somehow opens up to the question of the relationship as being a “patron-client” relationship, because economic dependency on the US inevitably creates constraints at some levels of the Turkish policy mechanism. Accordingly, all these debts have created some type of constraints in Turkey’ macro-economic decisions which can be shown as a one form of patron client relationship, because constraints in macro-economic decisions also impact on the country’s political and social structure. On the other side, ironically, the nature of the patron-client relationship involves total hegemony of the hegemonic state both on the other state’s economic and political decisions, especially in foreign policy. Turco-American relations do not fit into this type of Clientalism to the fact that Turkey (with some exceptions) have never included into American navigation of foreign policy in related to its economic dependency. American navigation in Turkish politics has been limited with some

¹⁶² <http://www.hazine.gov.tr>

¹⁶³ “The concept of Clientalism was taken up by the students of comparative politics in the 1960s to account for the patterns of political association and organization at the national level, in the “developing” societies of Latin America and Asia...” (Sargin, 2001: 2) but, on the other hand, macro level dependencies between countries can also be show the Clientalism specialties to some extent. But it needs to involve almost full dependency that open an extrinsic navigation way to one state on other which has not been the case in Turco-American relation for most of the time,. Therefore it is impossible to argue a full type of Clientalism structure in Turco-American relations whether in economic sense.

exceptions such as it can be arguing that Turkish Middle Eastern policy was under the direction of the US during the Cold War Era. (See Chapter 2) But, we should not forget the fact that it is hard to find any examples that illustrates economic dependency's transformation to the foreign policy decisions as a kind of constraint in Turco-American relations. As a matter of fact, almost all crises in Turco-American relations has been occurred because of different perspectives of the countries like in Cyprus peace operation, the Gulf War, the latest us invasion of Iraq and so on. So, we only mention a sort of patron-client structure in Turco-American relations limited with economic sense, rather than a full type of Clientalism.

4.3. Final evaluation

It is very hard to determine costs and benefits for a country involved in a relationship with another because the balance can be manipulated according to different perspectives. Some of the issues, which can be shown as a 'cost' according to one perspective, could be regarded as a benefit according to another. The important point here is to set out both the international interests and the foreign policy practices of each country. US foreign policy interests have largely determined the relationship with Turkey for most of the time since 1945: Turkey has been affected – politically and economically -- both by specific US policies and more general global foreign policy maneuvers. For this reason I have sought to illustrate US general policy along with its position in specific cases (such as NATO, the Korean War, the Gulf War and so on) before focusing on Turkey's position in these same cases.

As can be seen from previous chapters, one of the specific difficulties in analyzing Turco-American relations arises from the wide range of variables that

affect this relationship given Turkey's sensitive geo-strategic position between Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus (with the ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties between Turkey and Central Asia adding another dimension to this mixture). All of these interests have shaped the American attitude towards Turkey over the years. In this sense, more deep American interest in the region of Turkey means that more put dependency issue in Turco-American relations agenda. In this sense, dependency on the US appears as one characteristic of the US-Turkish relations. Following the observations made in the introduction and in chapter 5, does dependency theory fully describe the Turkish position in the Turco-American relationship? The answer is no: Turkey is not fully dependent on US foreign policy interests and economics in accordance with classical dependency theory as described in chapter one. Firstly, the Turkish position vis-vis the US can perhaps best described as 'undulating': as noted before, the relationship has not been static but has been repeatedly buffeted by all types of difficulties, as described in this study. There is an unchallenged consensus on the 'undulating' structure of Turco-American relations (as Prof. Emre Kongar). The two countries have lived through periods of strain (during the Gulf War, Cyprus and the latest US invasion of Iraq) as well as full cooperation (Bosnia, Somalia and the Korean War). As a result it is hard to conclude that dependency theory fully describes the Turco-American relationship. It fits some aspects of the relationship (i.e. Turkish dependency on US arms during the Cold War, which was a constraint on Turkey's foreign policy towards Greece and Cyprus (see chapter 4-4.1). Dependency can also clearly be seen in the economic aspect of the relationship. According to a US source: "As part of the cooperative effort to further Turkish economic and military self-reliance, the United States has loaned and granted Turkey more than \$4 billion in economic aid and more than \$14 billion in military

assistance.”¹⁶⁴ By the end of the year 2000, Turkey had been given approximately \$18 billion in economic and military aid (some of it a loan) by the US. In addition, Turkey was to receive another \$8.5 billion loan from the US in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. (We should also add the loans which have been provided by IMF and the World Bank, because the US also played an essential role in the decision to give these loans to Turkey). As a result, the Turkish economy has been strongly support with mostly American-oriented loans.

Here it must be said -- as observed in the beginning of this chapter – which Turkey has not allowed economic dependency to be transformed into total political dependency. Secondly, the relationship was symbiotic from the end of the Second World War: in pursuit of global and regional geo-strategic imperatives the US needed Turkey while Turkey needed American loans to develop its economy. In short, dependency theory only explains one part of the Turco-American relationship.

As I have pointed out, (See Chapter 1) *realpolitik* is another element explaining the nature of the Turco-American relationship. Turco-American relations have been constructed on the basis of the national strategic and geographic interests of both sides. This has remained true from the Cold War to the present US interest in Turkey’s Muslim and democratic secular structure in the aftermath of September 11 (see Chapter 3-3.4 and chap. 4-4.3). On the other hand, similar to dependency theory, *realpolitik* is also somehow not adequate to explain the whole nature of Turco-American relations. In the post-Cold War Era, as Sellahattin Bakan (Bal, 2001:17) has pointed out, realism theory suffers from being restricted to such concepts as the struggle between nation states when new issues are now involved.: (e.g. international terrorism). Even neo-realist tendencies do not seem adequate to explain today’s

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm>

complicated international relations. The conceptualization of theories may not be reflect all costs and benefits of a specific bilateral relations (like Turco-American relations): the post-Cold War Era has illustrated different complexities that strengthen the notion of fitting bilateral relations into general explanations of theories. In this sense, however realism has been referred to as one of the best and closest explanation to Turco-American relations. In other words, while realism is useful and even important a theoretical tool, the complex and opportunistic nature of Turco-American relations lead access to alternative description and explanations, that may be specific to Turco-American relations.

The insufficiency of general theories has caused me also to look for an adequate description of the Turco-American relationship. ‘Strategic partnership’ is the concept which has been frequently used. As retired US ambassador Marc Parris¹⁶⁵ indicates that

Formal recognition that the relationship had reached a new level of maturity came with Bill Clinton's November 1999 visit to Turkey. To prolonged, repeated applause from Turkey's Parliament, President Clinton declared the U.S. and Turkey to be "strategic partners," a term applied at the time to a very few close allies of the U.S., notably Israel.

Ironically, as I have shown in earlier chapters (Chp.1 and Chp.2 and also in Chp. 3), it is hard to see continuous total cooperation in the history of the Turco-American relationship. The evidence indicates that the concept of ‘strategic partnership’ has been used arbitrarily in defining Turco-American relations. The essential point here is how we define the concept of ‘strategic partnership’ between Turkey and the US. Almost all the cases that have been analyzed in this thesis somehow reflect the fact that the Turco-American relationship has been characterized by episodes of full cooperation (such as the Korean War, Bosnia,

¹⁶⁵ *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, April 2003

Somalia and Afghanistan) and also friction (over Cyprus, Armenia, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003). Therefore, in my opinion, the ‘strategic partnership’ is also inadequate as a convincing description of the relationship between the two countries. This seems particularly true of the developments in the aftermath of September 11; differences over the invasion of Iraq have again called into question the validity of the ‘strategic partnership’ in the long-run. (We can easily evaluate the relations between the US and the Great Britain as full meaning of “Strategic Partnership” concept. Then we may be questioning the strategic partnership concept between the US and Turkey.)

In summary, analyzing cost-benefits on the basis of particular issues makes more sense than trying to sum up the total costs and benefits involved in the Turco-American relationship. So this tendency also explains why I have preferred to add a chapter called “Mixed Blessings” (Chapter 4) in addition to its classical separation of Turco-American relations like (the Cold War, the post-Cold War), because Turco-American relations have been shaped by not only conjectural and global changes (like the end of the Cold War) but also it has been manipulated by very specific issues (Like Cyprus operation in 1974 and the following US arm embargo). More interestingly, as kind of unique side of Turco-American relations, even a specific issue may be influential in the direction of global politics. In other words, the strategic and geographic position of Turkey and global power identity of the US have made almost all issues in Turco-American relations as a key issue for other actors. Therefore, it is essential to look at particular cases in Turco-American relations rather than determining the relations in general terms. In this sense, Turkey had to pay lots of costs not only because of the global identity of the US, but also Turkey’s own failures have played a crucial role to determine the level of its’ costs (such as

Turkey specifically paid costs in the Middle East policies (sec.2.6) and in IRBMs issue (sec.2.4) and US Military Bases in Turkey (sec.2.5)). On the other hand, Turkey had to face with costs which originated directly to the US and its global hegemony (such as the Gulf War and the latest US invasion of Iraq (sec.3.3) and the ‘War on Terrorism’ and Afghanistan operation (3.4)).

In the realm of benefits, it is possible to claim that there have been two types of benefits which have been characterized by different cases in the contemporary history of Turco-American relations in the aftermath of the Second World War. First, as I pointed out before, Turkey has generally taken advantages of surprise opportunities in the aftermath of any global or regional initiative of the US (Such as the correlation between shifting the US foreign policy against radical Islamism and Turkey’s EU membership as a Muslim and secular country (sec.3.5.3)). The crucial point here is that most of these opportunities which can be labeled as “benefit” are mostly short-term, because they are also directly influenced by other developments which may not be directly related to Turkey. Therefore, again, as has been mentioned several times in the previous chapters, the ‘undulating’ nature of Turco-American relations somehow has constrained Turkish benefits and opportunities.

The second type of benefit which is deliberate outcome of Turkish Foreign policy. For example, Turkish influence on US policy in order to involve and lead NATO operations to prevent aggression of Serbia in accordance with its’ long-term plans for the Balkan region. Surely, it would be too optimistic to expect fulfillment of Turkish interests to in the regional and global policies of the US, because it is impossible to see both Turkish and the US interests in a complementary form. As noted before, Turkey’s costs have generally increased when its policies have been closely aligned with those of the US (i.e. its pro-western Middle Eastern policy

during the Cold War) or when they have run counter to US positions (i.e. over Cyprus or the invasion of Iraq in 2003). The conclusion arising from this study is that Turkey must develop a multi-directional and well-planned policy in order to minimize the possible costs that seem likely to emerge from the relationship with the US in the new global environment.

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