

**THE BEGINNINGS OF OTTOMAN-GERMAN PARTNERSHIP:
DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY
AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

A Master's Thesis

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the course and nature of Ottoman-German diplomatic and military relations before the First World War. It suggests that Germany and the Ottoman Empire acted according to their own political interests since their first interaction at the beginning of the eighteenth century, although their diplomatic relations were mostly cordial. Far from being close collaborative partners before the First World War, the eventual alliance of the two empires during the war was the natural outcome of each empire's own political and military objectives rather than the outcome of their friendship before the war. The thesis also studies the Baghdad Railroad Project, the Russian threat against Germany as well as the Ottomans, the German military reform missions to the army of the Sultan, and the political situation in the Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Keywords: The Ottoman Empire, Germany, Wilhelm II, Abdulhamid II, Ottoman-German Alliance, Enver Pasha

ÖZET

Bu tez Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesindeki Osmanlı-Alman diplomatik ve askeri ilişkilerinin seyrini ve karakterini incelemektedir. İncelemenin gösterdiği, Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun diplomatik ilişkilerinin genelde samimi olmasına rağmen iki devletin de onsekizinci yüzyılda başlayan ilişkilerinde aslında tamamen kendi politik çıkarlarına göre hareket ettiği görülmektedir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde çok yakın işbirliği içinde olmaktan uzak olmakla birlikte, iki imparatorluğun savaşta ittifakı, savaş öncesi yakınlıklarının sonucu olmaktan çok her iki imparatorluğun kendi politik ve askeri amaçlarının doğal bir sonucudur. Bu tez bu bağlam içinde, Bağdat Demiryolu Projesi'ni, Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na karşı Rus tehdidini, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Alman Askeri Reform Heyetlerini ve imparatorluğun ondokuzuncu yüzyılın sonundaki ve yirminci yüzyılın başındaki politik durumunu da incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Almanya, II. Wilhelm, II. Abdulhamid, Osmanlı-Alman İttifakı, Enver Paşa

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOA, HR, SYS: Bařbakanlık Osmanlı Arřivi Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım

BOA, MV: Bařbakanlık Osmanlı Arřivi Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları

BOA, DH, KMS: Bařbakanlık Osmanlı Arřivi Dahiliye Nezareti Kalem-i Mahsusa

ATASE: Genelkurmay Bařkanlıđı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Bařkanlıđı Arřivi

MUZC: Meclis-i Umumi Zabıt Ceridesi

INTRODUCTION:

At the beginning of 1915 the streets of İstanbul were full of men with Wilhelm-like moustaches. Several hundred of them were Germans, but the rest were Ottoman men who were following the fashion of day. These men had embedded in their minds long-nourished hopes for the survival of the long-lived Ottoman Empire. They believed that the Ottomans, with the help of Germany, could defeat the French, the British and the Russians. Like the story of the mythical phoenix that reincarnated out of its ashes, the Ottoman Empire's final chance of regaining its glorious past nourished the dreams of Ottomans, high and low alike. The Empire's alliance with the Central Powers gave confidence and hope to Ottomans who believed that German military superiority would be instrumental in bringing back the glorious ages of the past.

This thesis analyzes the diplomatic and historical background of the Ottoman-German alliance during the First World War. I have tried to discuss and analyze the core components of the relationships that developed between the Ottoman Empire and Germany before the First World War. The nature of each country's attitudes towards the other is evaluated. Study of the consistency or lack of consistency of the foreign policy of each nation in relation to the other is an essential part of this thesis. It deals with the issues of German military reform missions and economic enterprises in the Ottoman Empire as factors both reflecting and shaping the relationships. Finally, I have sought to find out to what extent the main components of their relations before the First World War influenced their final decision to join together to fight the Entente alliance of Britain, Russia and France. I

have tried to follow a chronological order while discussing these subjects in the historical context of the late Ottoman Empire. At the end of each chapter of the thesis, brief analyses of the periods, which the respected chapters cover, are provided.

Chapter I, discusses the first diplomatic interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Prussia-later Germany- and the roles of the initial German military officers sent to help reform the traditional Ottoman army. The intensification of Ottoman-German relations during the reigns of Abdulhamid II and Wilhelm II in the late 19th and early 20th centuries constitute an important part of the first chapter. The negotiations concerning the Baghdad Railroad Project and Kaehler's Military Reform Mission are dealt with in the context of contemporary diplomatic developments in Europe as well as the Ottoman Empire.

Chapter II gives a more detailed panorama of the years between the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Raid on the Sublime Porte in 1913, which led to the deposition of Abdulhamid II, and undertaken by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) under the leadership of Enver Paşa. . The formation of alliances in Europe and their repercussions on the Ottoman Empire are analyzed whenever the Empire was heavily influenced by the acts of the European Powers.

In Chapter III, in the wake of an approaching European war, the Ottoman Empire's political structure and its efforts to regain power after the Balkan Wars are discussed. The arrival of Liman Von Sanders' Military Mission and the solidification of the CUP's grip on Ottoman political power constitute the main subjects that are discussed. German views of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman awareness and reaction to European diplomatic developments are also discussed.

Chapter IV discusses the telegrams exchanged between Berlin and the German ambassador in Istanbul in order to show the German attitude towards an alliance with the Ottomans. German efforts to lure the Ottomans to ally with them, culminating in the secret treaty of August 2, 1914, are given considerable attention as well as the war aims of both allies in the context of their uneasy relationship.

The conclusion summarizes and highlights the important features of the German-Ottoman relationship before and during the First World War. I try to find whether or not there was a sufficient partnership between the two before the war to cause them to enter the war in alliance.

This thesis covers several aspects of the German-Ottoman partnership. Instead of following the traditional way of evaluating the German-Ottoman relations in relation to the Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War, it is designed to understand both countries' approach to each other until the First World War. In this context, German *Reelpolitik* and the Ottoman lack rational checks and balances comprise the most important part of the thesis. The new Ottoman documents are used in order to understand Ottoman evaluation of the diplomatic developments in Europe and official legitimization about the policy choices of the Empire. The last chapter of the thesis covers an extensive use of German Foreign Office documents, which were not used by the Turkish historians before. These documents show how German attitude about the Ottoman Empire changed within a couple of weeks. They are also instrumental in showing that German political and military interests prevailed more than anything else.

In my thesis, I used several primary sources to support my ideas or to help form new conclusions. I used documents from the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri*) in İstanbul from the sections of Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (*Hariciye Nezareti*), Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Dahiliye*) and the reports from the Cabinet (*Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları*). I also used documents from the ATASE Archives (*Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi*) and the library of the Turkish Historical Association (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*). For the German Foreign Office documents I used the books of Ernest Jackh and Ulrich Trumpener, who published or cited the original telegrams of the German Foreign Office in their works.

The documents from the Prime Ministry Archives helped me to understand many details, which were not covered in the secondary sources. However, from the ATASE documents I could not deduce the views of Enver Paşa or his military colleagues, which would be helpful to understand the Ottoman decision to get involved in the First World War. Instead, I used the German documents, which gave many hints about the final decisions of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire before the First World War. This thesis looks at the beginnings of German-Ottoman partnership from new perspectives, which can be changed and expanded with exploration of new Ottoman documents.

CHAPTER ONE:
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BEFORE
THE REVOLUTION OF 1908

A. Political and Military Relations Between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire Before The Reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II

The first interaction between Prussia and the Ottoman state occurred in 1701 when the Ottomans sent a mission of fifteen people led by Asım Said Efendi to celebrate the coronation of Friedrich I as King of Prussia.¹ From then on, the relations between the two states developed slowly until they both had problems with Russia towards the end of the eighteenth century. Prussia helped the Ottomans considerably well in the peace negotiations, which ended the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774. Prussia and the Ottoman Empire followed this by concluding a defensive alliance in 1790 when the Ottomans were fighting against both Austria and Russia.² In consequence, Austria-Hungary left the war in 1791, and soon after the Ottomans and Russians signed the Treaty of Jassy in 1792.

Selim III (1789-1808) established permanent embassies in the major European capitals in order to lessen the diplomatic isolation of his state. As part of this policy, he appointed Giritli Seyyid Ali Efendi as the first Ottoman ambassador to

¹ Veli Yılmaz, *I. Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Alman İttifakı ve Askeri Yardımlar*, (İstanbul: Cem Ofset Matbaacılık, 1993), p.19.

² This alliance was the first actual alliance signed with a European state. Yılmaz, p. 19-20.

Prussia.³ Ottoman ambassadors like Ali Efendi informed the Sultan of the diplomatic and military developments of Napoleonic Europe.

Until the rise to power of Otto von Bismarck during the last quarter of the 19th century, Prussia's attitude was basically sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time it refrained from acting in a manner that would distort what it considered more important interests, namely its relations with the other members of the Concert of Europe. Prussia did, however, act as a friendly mediator when possible, favoring the Ottomans in the negotiations regarding the Near Eastern crisis, which led to the Treaty of Edirne, signed in 1829, and also in the peace negotiations that followed the Crimean War (1853-1856).

Throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman Army needed reorganization and reform if the state was to maintain a status as a respected power in Europe. Selim III began the process at the start of the 19th century by trying to create a new and modern Ottoman army as part of his *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order) reforms, for which a Prussian officer, Colonel von Goetze provided overall supervision, and other Prussian officers joined the Ottoman campaigns against Russia that followed.⁴

Selim III's efforts were largely unsuccessful due to many factors, among which was resistance by members of the Janissary corps, who sought to retain the old order to keep their position in Ottoman society. As a result, in 1826 Mahmud II (1808-1839) abolished the Janissary corps entirely, killing many of its members, making it far more possible to introduce far more comprehensive reforms in Ottoman society as well as the army in the reform movement which came to be known as the Reformation (*Tanzimat*). Once again, Prussia provided the Ottomans with military

³ Yılmaz, p.21, Süleyman Kocabaş, *Pançermenizm'in Şarka Doğru Politikası: Tarihte Türkler ve Almanlar* (İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1988), p.19.

⁴ Jehuda Lotthar Wallach, *Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi: Türkiye'de Prusya-Almanya Askeri Heyetleri (1835-1919)*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1985), p. 7.

leadership. Captain Helmuth von Moltke of the Prussian General Staff and Lieutenant von Berg from the First Special Regiment of Prussia were sent to Istanbul in 1835 to lead the reforms. While they were in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan asked the government of Prussia to send eleven officers and four non-commissioned officers with three-year contracts to train the Ottoman Army (January 1836).⁵ The appointment of the officers was delayed, however, because of government crises in Istanbul, Prussian re-evaluation of the initial selections, responsibilities and duties of these officers, and von Moltke's reports and recommendations concerning the existing situation of the Ottoman Army and officers. Finally, the two states agreed on the appointment of only three officers in addition to von Moltke. These were von Vincke, Fischer and von Mühlbach who came to Istanbul in August 1837.⁶

Von Moltke and the three officers stayed in the Empire until the end of Mahmud II's reign in 1839. They did not resemble the previous foreign advisors for the Ottoman Army who were mostly adventurers and were retired officers or soldiers in their native countries. These Prussian officers were assigned by their state and their salaries were paid by Prussia. They did no more than observe the situation of the Ottoman army and offer advice, which often was ignored or overlooked by the Ottomans. Their services were ended following the Ottoman defeat by Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa's armies at Nizip, followed by the death of Sultan Mahmud II in 1839. The only lasting benefit which the Ottomans got from their services were the memoirs of von Moltke, which served as guidelines for all subsequent German officers who served in the Ottoman Empire.

Mahmud II's successors, Abdulmecid (1839-1861) and Abdulaziz (1861-1876), continued efforts to reform the Ottoman Army, bringing many more Prussian

⁵ The Prussian King approved the appointment of these officers in June 1836.

⁶ Wallach, pp. 11-15.

officers to train and command. This time, however, they were not officially sent by the Prussian State. Instead, they were retired military men who no longer were in active service with the Prussian Army. In 1875, the British ambassador to Istanbul stated that they numbered no more than a few dozen, a figure which military historian Jehuda Wallach estimates to be an exaggeration.⁷

These officers helped the Ottomans particularly during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. The former Prussian artillery officers von Kuczkowski, Schwenzfeuer, Wendt, Grunwald, Malinowski and Strecker helped the Ottomans reorganize their artillery battalions. The official Prussian (German) Military Committees in the Ottoman Empire came only during the time of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908).⁸

The start of the Eastern Question⁹ is said to have been the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), which gave Russia the ability to influence and stir up the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in both Southeastern Europe and Eastern Anatolia. The mid-19th century military and political developments, which led to German unification, took place at the same time as the Ottoman reform (*Tanzimat*) movement. The threats to Ottoman integrity which developed during the Napoleonic wars and as a result of Russian expansion, the Greek independence movement, and the uprisings of the Sultan's other Christian subjects in the Balkans, along with the threat posed by the independent policies of the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa led Great Britain to develop a policy of defending Ottoman integrity, which in turn greatly increased British influence on internal Ottoman policies. When Britain tried to get the Ottomans to substitute British for Prussian officers, however, the Ottomans refused. British Foreign Secretary Palmerston feared

⁷ Nevertheless, these Prussians were mainly military tutors and were not more successful than the previous ones. They taught at the military schools established by Mahmud II.

⁸ Yılmaz, pp. 35-37, Wallach, pp. 20-23.

⁹ Matthew S. Anderson, *Doğu Sorunu (1774-1923)*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), p. 387, pp. 145-8.

that this would lessen British ability to influence Ottoman affairs though his military advisors reported that Prussia was sending the officers to help the Ottomans due to fear of Russian attacks against Prussia as well as the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ For the British, Russians were a threat to the European balance of power, especially when Russia offered the Ottomans diplomatic and military support during the Egyptian crisis in 1838-1839. Ottoman statesmen accepted the Russian offer reluctantly due to a quite justified fear that Russia would use its military penetration to expand their political influence in the Ottoman court as well as the Christian provinces of the Empire.

The Crimean War (1853-1856) resulted largely from British and French efforts to stop the expansion of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. With strong British and French support, the Ottoman Army was able to push back a Russian invasion of northeastern Turkey, though it was unable to prevent the Russians from stirring the Armenians resident there to accept Russia as their defender and to abandon their loyalty to the Sultan in order to achieve independence. The Ottomans were forced to accept loans from Britain and its other allies, which helped in the short run but ultimately led to European control of Ottoman finances during the last half of the 19th century. In the Peace of Paris (1856), the Ottoman Empire was accepted as a European power and its territories were guaranteed by other European powers including Prussia. European interference to guarantee Ottoman integrity and frustrate Russian ambitions, however, only increased Russian grievances against the Ottoman Empire and led to new wars a quarter century later.¹¹

¹⁰ Oral Sander, *Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü: Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1993), p. 177.

¹¹ Sander, pp. 207-227.

Until Bismarck, Prussia did not deal much with the Eastern Question and the Ottoman Empire, called the “sick man”¹² by the Tsar Nicholas I, except for sending some officers and taking part in peace negotiations to protect Ottoman integrity and enable the Empire to survive. With Wilhelm I's accession to the throne (1888) Bismarck, who was a former member of Prussian parliament, envoy to Frankfurt Diet and ambassador to Russia and France, was appointed as Minister-President, head of the Prussian government. His subsequent policies were aimed at uniting the German states under Prussian control and making Germany the strongest state in Europe. He worked to achieve these ends by defeating the Austrians, isolating the French in European diplomatic affairs, and maintaining peace with Russia, ambitions which he had achieved by 1871. Victory against France (1871) culminated in his effort to unify the German states under Prussian domination. As a result, Germany had become the most powerful industrial nation in Europe after Great Britain, with a population of 56 million.

¹² Alan Palmer, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Son 300 Yılı: Bir Çöküşün Yeni Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Yeni Yüzyıl Yayınları, 1995), p.189, Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent: Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, (New York: Farrar& Rinehar, Inc., 1944), p. 45.

B. Political and Military Relations Between Germany and the Ottoman Empire During The Reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II

From 1871 to 1890, Bismarck effectively controlled the new German Empire, while at the same time Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) effectively ruled the Ottoman Empire. Whereas the brand-new German Empire was an industrialized, strong and coherent state; the old Ottoman Empire was becoming an increasingly weakened and internally shattered entity, at best concentrating on keeping its territories away from several internal and external threats.

Abdulhamid's reign started with the declaration of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876 and soon after witnessed a devastating war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia during 1877-1878. On the other hand, in Western Europe, Germany defeated France and Austria as part of its effort to unify. After these 'blood and fire' steps, however, Bismarck preferred to spend Germany's energy on strengthening its economy and administrative structure, rather than on external conflicts, such as those involved in the Eastern Question. He was forced to participate, however, by developments beyond his control. Germany and the other Great Powers in Western Europe refused to accept the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), which the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign with Russia that gained considerable territorial concessions as well as political domination within the Ottoman Empire.

Russia was unprepared to fight a threatened war with the other Great Powers, so it agreed to participate in the Congress of Berlin, which Bismarck organized in order to revise those elements of San Stefano that threatened Ottoman

integrity and gave Russia a dominant position within the Ottoman Empire. At the Congress of Berlin (1878), Bismarck forced the Great Powers to accept revision of the Treaty of San Stefano since he feared that to accept it would bring not only hostility from Austria-Hungary but also rapprochement between France and England, since both hated Russia and feared the danger which its expansion into the Ottoman Empire would bring. The final Treaty of Berlin denied Russia most of the territorial gains it had achieved at San Stefano, while at the same time compensating Austria-Hungary with what was promised to be a temporary military occupation and administration of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ottomans also were forced to allow Great Britain to occupy Ottoman Cyprus in return for Britain's promise to pretext its interest at the Congress. Bismarck thus angered the Russians, but he was successful in defending Ottoman integrity while keeping the Balance of Power in Europe.

In the process, however, Great Britain gave up its 19th century policy of preventing Ottoman collapse and supporting Ottoman integrity once it saw that the Ottoman Empire could no longer act as a buffer state against Russian expansion against the British dominions in the East. On the other hand, the substantial military and diplomatic defeats inflicted on the Ottomans demonstrated very clearly to Sultan Abdulhamid that the Ottoman Empire was weaker than he thought at the start of his reign and he could not trust Britain to defend its interests since it had used the occasion of the Congress of Berlin to occupy Cyprus, and was clearly intending to take over Egypt as well, if for no other reason than to control access to the eastern seas and India through the Suez Canal.

Abdulhamid also felt that he could not trust the other Great Powers either. The French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, Russian claims on the Balkans and the

Turkish Straits, subsequent Austria-Hungarian efforts to expand their occupation from Bosnia-Herzegovina into the western and southern Balkans and the Italian claims on Tripoli, made him think about regaining the support of Germany, which seemed to be the only Power that did not seem to have ambitions for Ottoman territory.¹³

Colonialism was not Bismarck's priority during the early years of his domination of German life. In his view, the Eastern Question, "it is not worth the good bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer".¹⁴ Before the Berlin Congress, he had the idea that Germany had only economic interests and not political interests in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ Successful unification and the development of industrial and economic power, however, led to growing German public opinion, and in particular the increasingly prosperous industrial and agricultural markets to demand expansion into colonial markets, forcing him to work to secure and control parts of southern and western Africa, an ambition which, in turn, forced modifications in Bismarck's diplomatic activities following the Congress of Berlin. Although, still far from openly intervening in Ottoman affairs, Germany thus began to develop a *penetration pacifique* policy towards the Ottomans.

Germany began to increase its representation on the Ottoman Public Debt Commission (*Düyun-u Umumiye*), established by Abdulhamid II in 1882 in order to enable the Ottomans to pay off foreign loans without bankrupting the Empire. At the same time, however, the Ottoman government encouraged new German investments in the Ottoman economy, thus increasing the public debt. İlber Ortaylı argues that Ottoman public gratitude for German intervention at the Congress of Berlin made the

¹³ Sevgi Çetinkaya, 'Osmanlı Devletinin 1. Dünya Savaşına Girişi', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, İstanbul University, (1995), p.3.

¹⁴ Ottoman Empire could only be a little figure against the Russians in his eyes. Jackh, p. 126.

¹⁵ Muzaffer Tepekaya, 'Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914)', *Türkler (Cilt 13)*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), pp. 41-42.

Empire ideologically suitable for further development of German influence.¹⁶ Since most of the lost territories in Southeastern Europe had substantial Christian populations, moreover the Empire had a far more dominant Muslim majority, though of several ethnic groups, than had been the case in the past. The idea of Islamic nationalism, therefore, coalesced into the ideas of pan-Islamism, and became a definite policy option. Germany did not have Muslim colonies and did not support national uprisings in the Balkans. On the other hand, France, England and Russia ruled substantial Muslim populations in India, Central Asia and North Africa, and at the same time were stirring the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire to revolt against Muslim Ottoman rule. In ideological and political terms, moreover, Abdulhamid preferred the authoritarian German regime to the English constitutional regime and French republican regime.¹⁷

Abdulhamid was more of a reformer than a reactionary. Although, he did not want any opposition to his authority, he was compelled to make radical reforms in the military, police, and judicial and administrative organizations in order to strengthen the Empire sufficiently for it to resist further territorial and political losses. The success of the German army against the French army in 1871, moreover, fascinated him. This fascination was strengthened by German assistance at the Congress of Berlin. In 1887, when Bismarck concluded the “*Dreikaiserbund* (Three Emperors League)” between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, Abdulhamid felt Germany would have benefited far more by expanding its influence as far as the Persian Gulf, instead of acquiring even more of what he felt to be needless colonies. It is apparent that although he was cautious about the idea, Abdulhamid was in favor of a possible Ottoman-German partnership in economic as well as military matters.

¹⁶ İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983), p.35.

¹⁷ Ortaylı, pp. 52-58.

After 1880, therefore, he started an intensive effort to bring German military and civilian officers to the Empire in order to direct the reforms, which he was introducing to the Ottoman Army.

Bismarck was reluctant to diffuse German energies and power by intervening actively in Ottoman affairs, but he was persuaded by German ambassador Count Hatzfeld, who felt that an Ottoman partnership would be advantageous for Germany and recommended that the Ottoman request for German officers would enable Germany to counter possible Russian efforts to expand their influence into the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ In response to this recommendation, on April 11, 1882,¹⁹ the Kaiser, Wilhelm II approved the assignment of four German military officers to the Ottoman Empire.²⁰ The officers were Colonel Kaehler (Head of Commission), Captain Kamphönever, Captain von Höbe and Captain Ristow. Abdulhamid subsequently requested additional officers to help the reorganization military education and training. This request was also accepted, and on June 18, 1883, Major Baron Colmar von der Goltz was assigned to the task, beginning a career in the Ottoman military, which would last, with some breaks, until his death in Mesopotamia during the First World War.²¹

In order to meet the inevitable reactions from Russia and Britain against the resulting increase of German influence in Ottoman affairs, the newly-appointed German officers were accepted as regular Ottoman officers, but their salaries, paid in very high amounts, came from the treasury of the Public Debt Commission (*Düyun-u Umumiye*), thus under the control of the European bankers who dominated that body. In the meantime, Kaehler was promoted to the rank of Turkish lieutenant general as

¹⁸ Mahmud Muhtar, *Maziye Bir Nazar: Berlin Antlaşması'ndan Harb-i Umumiye Kadar Avrupa ve Türkiye-Almanya Münasebetleri*, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1999) p. 55.

¹⁹ Wallach, p. 25.

²⁰ Wallach, p.31.

²¹ Çetinkaya, p. 7

well as aide-de-camp (*yaver-i ekrem*) to the Sultan. The other German officers were given similar appointments, thus starting a new policy of officers serving in a foreign army without cutting their ties with their own army. They agreed to enter Ottoman service since they could not have achieved such important posts so quickly in their own country. They felt, however, that both as Germans and Christians, they were superior to their Ottoman colleagues. This led them to ignore Ottoman traditions and rules whenever they wished, causing considerable friction with the Ottomans as time went on. Their primary duties were to prepare reports on the organization and the situation of the Ottoman Army and to advise on needed reforms and reorganization. The long and detailed reports which they prepared, however, were accepted but not actually put into effect for some time, because although Abdulhamid wanted to modernize his army, his long-standing paranoia caused him to fear the possibility that a reorganized and strengthened army might well act against him and his policies.²² Kaehler's group of German officers thus had little effect on Ottoman military development.

In June 1883, Major von der Goltz was assigned to the service of the Ottoman Army as Head of the Inspectorate of Military Schools with the rank of Staff Lieutenant Colonel and made considerable contribution in training young Ottoman officers. In 1886, the Sultan promoted him to the rank of Vice-Head of General Staff while he continued to advise in modernizing Ottoman military schools.²³ Von der Goltz also helped improve the Ottoman Navy and of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits fortifications. He even worked on the committee that supervised the construction and improvement of Ottoman military train stations.

²² Wallach, pp. 34-40, Ortaylı, p. 60.

²³ Hayati Aktaş, 'Türk-Alman Askeri İlişkileri (1913-1918)', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Selçuk University (1994), pp. 9-10.

Von der Goltz's first term of service in the Ottoman Empire ended in 1895. Wallach states that during his twelve years of service, Von der Goltz published several books and pamphlets, and he was the only German reformer who directly contacted the German embassy and the German military headquarters about the situation of the Ottoman army.²⁴ Goltz was a typical successful example of a German officer whose passion and ambition had been hindered in Germany. He was an active, hard-working and clever political intelligence officer as well as military expert, but whose passion and ambition had been hindered in Germany. He was the only German officer who influenced the Ottoman generals and knew the Ottoman army best.²⁵ He was, moreover, extremely influential in getting the Ottoman government to purchase German rather than British arms, thus enabling the important German firms of Mauser, Krupp and Loewe to profit enormously from their sales to the Ottoman army.²⁶

Von der Goltz had in fact undertaken and accomplished so much during his years in the Ottoman Empire that after his return to Germany, the German government had to appoint several military and naval attachés in the Ottoman Empire in order to fill the gap left by his departure. After his departure, several German military attachés began to serve effectively in the Ottoman Empire. Among them Von Morgen, Von Stempel, Von Leipzig, Von Lossow and Humann were the most important. They reported directly to the German Emperor of the important developments in Turkey. They were very effective at influencing the Ottomans to continue their arms purchases from Germany. At the same time, they established

²⁴ Wallach, p.54, p.71.

²⁵ For Goltz's evaluation of the situation of the Ottoman Army, see Appendix 1, "*Von der Goltz Paşa'nın 16 Teşrinivevel (Ekim) 1899 tarihinde Alman Genelkurmay Başkanı Waldersee'ye yazdığı raporun Yıldız Arşivi'ndeki Türkçe tercümesi*" BOA, Yıldız Evrakı, Kıs: 15, Zarf: 74/81 in Ortaylı, pp. 143-144.

²⁶ Ortaylı, pp. 78-79.

connections with the important figures of the Young Turk movement after the Revolution of 1908, particularly with the man who later became the Minister of War and dominated the Ottoman government, Enver Paşa. They also worked hard for the economic interests of Germany leading to the award of Baghdad Railway concession.²⁷

The most successful German military attaché in Ottoman service following von der Goltz's departure was Major Kurt Morgen, who served between 1897 and 1901. Erich von Leipzig served for six years. Walter von Stempel also was an influential figure starting in 1907 until the military commission led by Liman von Sanders came to the Ottoman Empire in 1914.²⁸

In 1898, there were only three official German military reformers left in the Ottoman Empire: Marshall Kamphönever, and the generals von Grumbekow and von Hofe. Kurt Morgen demanded from his government the dispatch of qualified military officers. In 1899, Captains von Mesmer-Saldern and von Rüdigisch were sent to Turkey. In 1901, they were joined by majors Von Diefurth, Imhoff and Auler.²⁹

These officers took part in the "Commission of Fortifications", which was designed to strengthen the fortifications of the Straits and İstanbul. In 1907, General Diefurth proposed the establishment of the "Model Battalions (*Numune Taburları*)", in which nine-month theoretical and applied courses were followed. Reports made at the start of the third term in March 1908 stated that these battalions were having good results. However, the salaries of the German officers, which were three times the salaries of Ottoman officers in similar positions, caused considerable discontent among the latter. In addition, the older generals were uncomfortable with the

²⁷ Wallach, p. 71 Stempel and Humann had close ties with Enver Paşa.

²⁸ Ulrich Trumpener, 'Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu', in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu ve Büyük Güçler*, ed. by Marian Kent (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), pp. 132-133.

²⁹ Wallach, pp. 71-73.

unfamiliar reforms that were being applied. As a result, following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908-1909, most of the Ottoman press began to advocate that the German officers be dismissed.³⁰

During Abdulhamid II's reign, the German officers also served in the Ottoman Navy. After serving several years, Captain Starcke returned to Germany in 1891. In his place, Lieutenant Commander Kalau von Hofe was assigned in 1892. Despite a few quarrels with the Minister of Navy, Hasan Paşa, he carried out useful service during his years in the Ottoman Empire.³¹

During most of the 19th century, it was Great Britain that protected the Ottoman Empire, albeit for its own purposes, fearing that otherwise Russia and France would dominate the lines of communication through the Middle East to India. Britain, however, preferred the Ottoman Empire to be weak so that it could control it or at least influence its policies. But the replacement of Benjamin Disraeli's Conservative government with the Liberals of William Gladstone marked a significant change in British policy, away from supporting Ottoman integrity to one of supporting the nationalist ambitions of the minorities of the Ottoman Empire, even though this could well increase Russian influence in the area.

Ottoman suspicions of changing British policies and intentions were stimulated originally by Britain's insistence on occupying Cyprus in return for its role defending the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin. Subsequent British occupation of Ottoman Egypt (1882) confirmed these fears and caused the Ottomans think about a new protector.³²

³⁰ Wallach, p. 75-77.

³¹ Wallach, pp. 88-90.

³² Bayram Soy, 'II. Wilhelm, Weltpolitik ve II. Abdülhamid', *Türkler (Cilt 13)*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 14.

Kaiser Wilhelm II's accession to the German throne in 1888 opened a new era in Ottoman-German relations as he began to spread German influence in place of British influence throughout the Middle East. The new energetic and ambitious German Emperor did not accept Bismarck's conservative foreign policy and concentration on internal development. Bismarck had advocated the policy of preserving the peace in the Continental Europe. He wanted alliances with both Austria-Hungary and Russia. Wilhelm II, however, advocated an aggressive foreign policy that aimed at finding new resources and markets for the developing German industry. He believed that Germany should only ally with Austria-Hungary on the continent of Europe. In 1890, therefore, he refused Bismarck's desire to renew the non-aggression pact with Russia that had supported the latter's efforts to expand its influence in the Balkan states.³³ This in turn, alienated Russia from Germany and forced it toward a rapprochement with France, and later with England in what became the Triple Entente. Bismarck's subsequent resignation left Wilhelm II as the dominating force in determining German foreign policy, and enabled him to begin a new "*Weltpolitik* (World Policy)" approach to Germany's relations with the rest of the world.³⁴

The second turning point was the appointment of Prince Bernhard von Bülow as the new foreign minister and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz as the new Chief of Navy in 1897. By this time Wilhelm II also consolidated his rule and *Weltpolitik* began to be functional. For *Weltpolitik* to be successful, the German Navy, which ranked only the sixth in the world at the time, had to be strengthened at least to the point of equality, and if possible supremacy in relation to the British Navy, which had ruled the seas for the two previous centuries. Following the German

³³ The issue of the renewal of the defensive alliance with Russia caused friction between Wilhelm II and Bismarck. Bismarck resigned from his post soon after this friction.

³⁴ *Weltpolitik* is the name given to the aggressive foreign policy of Wilhelmian Germany, which tried to turn Germany into a world power competing for overseas expansion from a country confined to Continental Europe.

Parliament's (*Reichstag*) acceptance of a new naval law, Germany began an intensive shipbuilding program that made its navy the second in the world by the start of the First World War.³⁵ Naval development enabled Germany, in turn, to extend its colonial possessions. Germany's role in the Transvaal rebellion (1900) and the Moroccan crises (1905, 1906) showed that Germany was becoming a first class power that could not be ignored.

Weltpolitik's reflection in the Ottoman Empire could be seen in several areas. As Germany participated in the colonial race very late, there were not many territories left in the world to be colonized. Therefore, Germany turned to the traditional empires of Persia, China and the Ottoman Empire. Persia and China were already divided into spheres of influence, leaving little room for German expansion. It was relatively easy, however, for the Germans to penetrate into the Ottoman Empire where the other Great Powers were seen as devoted entirely to their own financial benefit.³⁶ Count von Hatzfeld³⁷ persuaded Wilhelm II that the Ottoman Empire was most suitable for German economic penetration. According to his view, France had been the most favored country in the Empire until Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. Afterwards, Britain had replaced France because of its assistance in driving the French armies out of Egypt. However, now, in view of the changes taking place in British policies, the Ottomans were seeking a new protector, giving Germany an opportunity to fill the gap. Wilhelm II was convinced, so Germany began to follow a friendly policy towards the Ottoman Empire, trying to benefit from Ottoman resources by peaceful means.³⁸

³⁵ Soy, p. 26.

³⁶ Ortaylı, pp. 12-24.

³⁷ Former German ambassador to İstanbul.

³⁸ Soy, p. 27-8.

While Wilhelm II's Germany was pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, Abdulhamid was very cautious about the future of his old empire. He faced many opponents and threats to his authoritarian regime because of his efforts to modernize the Ottoman state and society, and he wanted to achieve his goals without threatening the Empire's territorial integrity. The first Young Turk committee was established in 1889. Most of the leaders were arrested and exiled in 1895, but the Armenian revolts and large-scale Armenian terrorism caused even more trouble since it developed with the encouragement and support of Russia and, to a lesser extent, Britain. The problems, however, remained, and Christian uprisings and massacres of Turks in Crete and Macedonia kept the Sultan busy during the remaining years of his reign. Finally, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, including the declaration of the Second Constitutional Regime meant the end of Abdulhamid's political domination and left the Empire for the most part dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress through the years that remained until the end of the First World War.

On the whole, Abdulhamid was successful in consolidating his power despite the many threats to himself and his reign. In the midst of the political turmoil in the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s and the early 1900s, and lacking both political and military power, he was successful by balancing off the conflicting interests both within and outside the Empire. He was well aware of the conflict of interests between the Great Powers, and successfully played them against each other. Typical of his methods was the manner in which he granted concessions in the Baghdad Railway Project.

The Baghdad Railway was not an original project developed by the Germans.³⁹ The other great powers had also been considering the benefits of

³⁹ For detailed information see Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, The Great Powers, and The Baghdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923).

extending the Anatolian Railroads to the southern end of Iraq. For the Germans, it was a part of the *penetration pacifique* plan, which had been advocated and supported since the 1870s by the German orientalist who hoped to dominate the Arab portions of the Empire by colonizing them. Germany also worked to take over the Baghdad Railway Project as a means of counteracting French and British economic and political expansion elsewhere in the Middle East.

When Abdulhamid was convinced that Turkey should stop its dependency on British diplomacy before it was too late, Germany presented itself as a good option. Although far from being allied to Germany, the Ottoman Empire under the Sultan's leadership used German economic interests as a political and diplomatic tool against Britain and France. In 1888, with the initiatives of Alfred Kaulla and Georg von Siemens, a German syndicate had obtained a concession to build a railway from İzmit to Ankara. In 1889, The Anatolian Railway Company (*Societe du Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie*) was established, with Otto von Kühlmann, a leading official of the German Foreign Office, as its director. This was followed almost immediately by Kaiser Wilhelm II's first visit to the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the signature of the Turkish-German Trade Agreement on August 28, 1890.⁴⁰

The 1888 concession marked the beginning of German economic influence. Naturally the German government favored these developments, which received powerful backing from the able ambassador sent to Istanbul in 1897, Baron Marschall von Biberstein. Within a few years he had acquired a dominant situation in the Turkish capital, while the efficiency of German promoters, bankers, traders, engineers, manufacturers, ship-owners and railway builders soon undermined French and British interests and created something like a German economic empire in the Near East.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Rathmann, Lothar. *Alman Emperyalizminin Türkiye'ye Girişi*, (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1976), pp.59-60.

⁴¹ J. P. T. Bury, 'Diplomatic History (1900-1912)' in *The Shifting Balance of World Forces (1898-1945)*, *The New Cambridge Modern History (Vol. XII)*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 115.

In 1893, the Germans completed the railway running from İzmit to Ankara. This led Abdulhamid to grant the Germans the right to construct a commercial port and railroad station in Haydarpaşa, on the shores of the Gulf of İzmit across the Sea of Marmara from İstanbul, and the concession in principle of the right to extend their railway from Konya to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf in 1899, a grant which was made official in 1903. Wilhelm II tried hard to get these concessions for his subjects. He visited the Ottoman Empire second time in 1899. During his visit, he traveled to the Arab provinces of the Empire, and in Damascus he declared that he was the friend and protector of 300 million Muslims in the world.

The construction of railways was of major importance to the Ottoman Empire. They would bring prosperity to its backward districts and at the same time enable the government to move troops more rapidly to defend the frontiers or deal with internal revolts. The economic and diplomatic support of a distant and disinterested Germany was therefore preferable for such projects to the imperialist minded empires of Britain and France. For Germany, the Baghdad railway would connect Berlin to Istanbul and it would block Russia's possible line of expansion to the Mediterranean through the Balkans. Russia did not want the Ottomans to prosper and regain their power since this would make it far more difficult for it to gain control of the Straits and thus secure free access to the open sea. The Berlin-Baghdad axis was also seen as a menace to British imperial interests in Egypt, Iran and India⁴² as well as to French interests in Syria and Levant.

⁴² Die Bagdadbahn, Rohrbach in W. W. Gottlieb, *Studies in Secret Diplomacy (During the First World War)*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), p. 23. "England can be attacked... on land in one place only... in Egypt. With the loss of Egypt, England would lose not only the mastery over the Suez Canal and the link with India and Asia, but presumably also her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by an Islamic power like Turkey, moreover, could have dangerous repercussions on England's sixty million Moslem subjects in India, and also on Afghanistan and Persia. But Turkey can only think of India if she has a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria... German railways, if the need arose, would be the direct instrument... for pressure upon England in the direction of Egypt."

Germany realized that development of the Anatolian railroad without the support of its European neighbors would not only force it to invest an inordinate amount of money, but also would lead to constant European opposition to all German economic and political plans elsewhere in the world. The *Deutsche Bank*, therefore, tried to interest British, French, and Russian investors to join the project, but only with minority status. Instead, in 1900, Russia forced Turkey to accept the Black Sea Agreement, which dictated that only Russian citizens should be granted railway concessions in Northern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia. The British and French governments also refused to join in the project so long as it was dominated by Germany. As a result, the Germans began the construction of the first section of the railway in 1904 without the financial aid or political support of any other foreign government, imposing new strains on Germany and the Ottoman Empire's relations with all the major European powers.⁴³ This situation accelerated the rivalry of Germany and Great Britain on the international level, and was a major reason that Britain concluded an alliance with France in 1904, and Russia in 1907, thus forming the Triple Entente, starting the series of events that culminated in the outbreak of the First World War.

The Baghdad Railroad Project was one of the most important elements of the German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire. Throughout Abdulhamid's reign, German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire increased substantially. Between 1890 and 1910, Germany's share in Turkey's trade volume increased from 6 per cent to 21 percent. Ottoman exports to Germany rose from a value of 766,000 to 3,203,000 pounds sterling during the same years. German exports to the Ottoman Empire rose from 1,970,000 in 1890 to 5,778,000 pounds in 1910. The holdings of

⁴³ Bury, p.116

Germany in Ottoman debt increased from 7.5 to 15 percent between 1881 and 1898. And while France accounted for 25.9 per cent and Britain for 16.9 per cent of the foreign money invested in Turkish enterprise, Germany alone reached 45.4 per cent.⁴⁴ Although it was still not dominant, Germany became one of the biggest powers shaping the Ottoman economy throughout Hamidian times.

In the diplomatic arena, Abdulhamid's policy was to secure German support without allying with it in order to avoid major diplomatic problems with Britain and to keep Russia neutral. Germany, however, was not content with Abdulhamid's neutrality and balance politics. It wanted a more substantial commitment of cooperation and support from the Sultan. As the two great diplomatic blocs were in the process of formation at the start of the 20th century, therefore, Germany tried to lure the Ottoman Empire into its alliance with Austria-Hungary. Just at this time, the Committee of Union and Progress was becoming a major threat to the Sultan's regime. So, Germany did not want to alienate them in case they managed to replace the Sultan with their own regime. Germany, therefore, covertly joined Britain and France in supporting the CUP, which in 1898 encouraged Wilhelm II to help bring Murad V to the Ottoman throne.⁴⁵

Germany continued to assist the Ottoman Empire in international issues and crises. In 1895, Lord Salisbury became the new British Prime Minister, but he continued the policy of abandoning the traditional British policy of defending Ottoman integrity in order to prevent the Middle East from falling under Russian control. Just at this time, Russian stimulus and encouragement led to the outbreak of a major Armenian revolt and the spread of Armenian terrorism throughout the Empire. In reaction, Salisbury told the German Ambassador in London, Hatzfeld that

⁴⁴ Ortaylı, pp. 42-49, Gottlieb, p.21.

⁴⁵ Ortaylı, p.56.

even if the Ottoman Empire solved that Armenian issue, it could not survive much longer, and proposed partition of the Empire between Britain and Germany in order to keep the Russians out, an idea which Germany rejected, preferring to keep the Ottoman Empire intact, though under its own political and economic domination.⁴⁶

In response to the Armenian Revolt, the Great Powers, in particular Great Britain and Russia, advocated the introduction of widespread reforms in Eastern Anatolia. Abdulhamid believed that any reform unique to the provinces where the Armenians were revolting would result in the segregation of those provinces from the rest of the Empire, and anger the Empire's Muslim majority unless the latter received the same benefits. He believed that Britain was planning to establish an Armenian state in the east under British control in order to prevent Russia from expanding through the Middle East and to balance the German sphere of influence in Anatolia that would be created by construction of the Baghdad railroad. An autonomous Armenia would constitute a buffer zone against Russian expansion through Anatolia toward the Mediterranean. Germany did not give a full support to Abdulhamid on the Armenian question, but it did not position itself on either the Russian or the British side due to the fear of upsetting its relations with them elsewhere in Europe.

Another domestic problem that had international repercussions was the Macedonian Question. Macedonia was an arena in which the newly-independent states of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria claimed overlapping territories, where various ethnicities, religions and nationalities were intermixed under the umbrella of

⁴⁶ Holstein (leading German politician before the First World War) evaluated British plans as diverting the Great Powers' attention to Anatolia and the Balkans, and being alone in and totally occupying Egypt. Offering the Straits to the Russians would relieve Britain in the Far East, as it would make the Russians focus on the Near East. At that time, Britain's relations with France and Russia were not on good terms, so it delayed its plans on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Salisbury stated also that Abdulhamid's deposition should be the only solution to the Eastern Question. Bury, pp. 128-129.

Ottoman control, each attempting to secure control of the entire area with the help and support of Russia as well as one or another of the Balkan states. In response, the Great Powers of Europe demanded reforms in the areas of Macedonia inhabited by Christians, more or less on the model of the reforms being demanded for the Armenian areas of Eastern Anatolia, in the process using their insistence on supervising the reforms, while supporting nationalist agitation and terrorism, in order to develop their own political and economic presence in the area. Abdulhamid II responded to these demands in 1903 by establishing a new Inspector-Governorship (*Rumeli Umum Müfettişliği*) for Macedonia in a special province called East Rumelia. Each Balkan state, however, and each Great Power followed its own agenda for its own purposes, stimulating each national group to demand control over the entire area, with contradicting claims resulting in increasing terrorism and anarchy in the early years of the twentieth century.

Whenever Abdulhamid II tried to send in troops to curb the terrorism, Europe's politicians and press accused him of massacring Christians, so little in fact was done and the violence continued. The turmoil in Macedonia contributed to the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, when the young Ottoman officers in Macedonia who were leading the troops to fight against the Bulgarian and Greek bandits reacted to Abdülhamid II's continued surrender to European pressure by failing to send them sufficient arms and men to put down the terrorism by revolting against his autocratic rule, and a year later deposing him in favor of Sultan Mehmed V Reşad, who became little more than a puppet in their hands. On the Macedonian question, Germany had a pro-Austrian policy that wanted to limit Serbia and Bulgaria's expansionist policies and expand the influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire since it was a potential ally of Germany. When Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in reaction

to the Young Turk revolt, its support by Germany created substantial questions in Ottoman minds about the extent of German support for Ottoman integrity.

Germany did not join the other European powers in supporting the Greek uprisings in Crete during the 1890s. Wilhelm II had dynastic ties with the King of Greece, as he had with most of the other crowned heads of Europe, but he did not support the Greeks because of the fear that their success would help Russia most of all. Greece was finally forced to withdraw its soldiers from Crete as a result of international pressure, but it simply sent them to East Rumelia, where they joined the local Greek terror bands in attacking Muslims as well as the other Balkan Christian groups that had claims on the area. This led to a war in which the Ottomans defeated the Greeks (1897). This, in turn, caused the Greeks to revolt again in Crete, with substantial assistance from the Greek mainland. This time, France, Russia, England and Italy landed soldiers and took control of the island. For all practical purposes, therefore, it was the de facto end of the Ottoman sovereignty on the island. After the 1908 Revolution, the Cretan Parliament declared Crete's unification with Greece, but its effort was not fulfilled until 1912.⁴⁷

Domestically, Abdulhamid's main enemies were the Young Turks who wanted to depose him and establish a Constitutional regime, though under their domination. These Young Turks were mostly the generation of people who studied abroad or studied in the new schools, which had been opened by the sultan.

Abdulhamid's major weakness was his failure to instill loyalty in the new generations of bureaucrats and officers, the Ottoman intelligentsia, which was being produced by his own expanded educational institutions. While it could be argued that his government succeeded remarkably well in keeping the remains of the empire intact, it completely failed to provide inspiration and a sense of direction to its own servants.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Soy, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁸ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1993), p. 90.

The students of schools like the Civil Service Academy (*Mülkiye*) and War Academy (*Harbiye*) were attracted to liberal and constitutional ideas. The first Young Turk society was established in the Military Medical College (*Tıbbiye*) in 1899, later transforming itself into the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The Committee was put under considerable pressure by the Sultan's government, but the establishment of the Ottoman Freedom Society (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*) and the union of the two groups (1907) made the committee a powerful and influential organization. The Macedonian problem and the Reval Agreement between Russia and England (1908), which proposed to resolve the Macedonian problem by turning it over to foreign control, while leaving the Sultan with only formal suzerainty, were the direct causes of the Young Turk Revolution which took place in July 1908. “When news of the Reval Agreement reached Salonica, accompanied by rumors that Britain and Russia had agreed to partition the Ottoman Empire, the CUP decided to act. The timing of its actions was probably also influenced by the discovery that government agents were on the verge of uncovering parts of the organization.”⁴⁹ The CUP therefore incited a full-scale revolt in Macedonia and when the sultan saw he could not stop them, he gave in and on the night of 23 July 1908 restored the Ottoman Constitution after an interval of thirty years.

To sum up, the main factors that directed German-Ottoman relations before the First World War were economic and geopolitical. By the granting of economic concessions, the Ottoman government tried to attract Germany to its side, and in opposition to Russian ambitions, in the wars and international crises that were taking place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Abdülhamid II hoped that

⁴⁹ Zürcher, p. 94.

allowing German economic penetration into his Empire would prevent Russia from achieving its ambitions in the Balkans, the Straits and Eastern Anatolia. On the other hand, when Britain joined those who wanted to partition the Ottoman Empire after the Congress of Berlin, Germany replaced Britain as the new diplomatic protector. Abdulhamid's policy that alleviated the ambitions of France, Russia and Great Britain by using Germany worked well. Basically he applied the policy of divide and conquer on the Great Powers, with considerable success. Germany became a serious rival of those Great Powers in the Ottoman Empire, and this, in turn, created more sophisticated power struggle in the Eastern Question. When Abdülhamid requested German military officers and trainers from Wilhelm II, relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire improved further.⁵⁰ To what extent this military help profited the Ottomans is debatable, but it certainly benefited German economic enterprises such as Krupp and Mauser, and bolstered German economic penetration in the Ottoman Empire. Before the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the Ottoman army's equipment was modernized, but full-scale efforts were not made to reform the army structure, its officer corps and chain of command. German military, economic, and diplomatic dealings in the Ottoman Empire surely gave a new dynamism to the Ottomans. Although Abdulhamid had reformist domestic policies, he never wanted to risk the status quo of the empire by becoming an official ally of Germany since this would alienate Britain and France and leave Germany in control. He never let Germany have a say in defense policy.⁵¹ German military officers were never allowed to initiate drastic changes in the Ottoman army since Abdulhamid felt that a powerful army most certainly would constitute a major menace to his autocratic

⁵⁰ Feroz Ahmad, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu', in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu ve Büyük Güçler*, ed. by Marian Kent (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), pp. 11-12.

⁵¹ Mustafa Gencer, 'Osmanlı-Alman Münasebetleri Çerçevesinde Şark Meselesi', *Türkler (Cilt 13)*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), pp. 36-37.

regime. Whether Abdulhamid prolonged or shortened the life of his empire by developing relations with Germany is a difficult question to answer, since the German military assistance was in fact more political and economic than it was military.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 1908

A. Domestic Affairs

The CUP had to persuade the people in Istanbul and Anatolia that the restoration of the 1876 constitution was its own work and not that of the Sultan. Starting with the arrival of the CUP leaders in Istanbul, though for the most part they concealed their membership and identities, they tried to establish themselves in the public mind as the real architects of the revolution and the resulting Constitutionalism. They also began to think of what to do with the government. For the moment, they left the government in the hands of the incumbent Grand Vizier, Said Paşa and did not depose the Sultan.⁵² Said Paşa, however, was not so willing to continue as Prime Minister because the turmoil in İstanbul made it difficult for him to exercise full authority. Additionally, when the imperial edict of Abdulhamid II concerning his dedication to the constitutional regime specified that he would directly appoint the ministers of War and Navy, the CUP objected, demanding that the Grand Vizier choose these ministers, though Said Paşa supported the Sultan's position. A group of CUP leaders came to İstanbul from Salonica to discuss the issue with the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, but the only result was that Said Paşa was compelled to resign on

⁵² The reasons for leaving them in their posts were: The sultan was good at manipulating public opinion; if the CUP deposed him he could change the situation in his own favor. Secondly, the CUP leaders were not experienced as politicians and they were too young to hold authority in people's eyes. "Age and seniority were very important preconditions for authority in Ottoman society and the Young Turks". Zürcher, p.98.

August 5, 1908 while his bitter rival during the Abdulhamid II years, Kıbrıslı Kamil Paşa, was appointed in his stead.⁵³

Kamil Paşa favored Great Britain rather than Germany, but he shared Said Paşa's view that the country was not ready for a fully constitutional regime. He also did not sympathize with the CUP, and included none of its members in the cabinet.⁵⁴ He was willing, however, to compromise with the CUP on political matters. His task was not an easy one. For the most part, the Ottoman people perceived freedom to be lawlessness. It was therefore incumbent on him to first end the social turmoil caused by the revolution before he could make real changes in the manner in which the Empire was governed. The Young Turk Revolution led workers to demand wage increases, resulting in over one hundred strikes in the six months following the revolution. In response to this situation, the Cabinet decided to hold early elections.

The election campaign and the elections themselves resolved the political situation. The results showed the CUP's dominance in the parliament although most of its members refused to reveal themselves as such though they supported those candidates that advocated its political programs and who accepted the leadership of its Unionist (*İttihad ve Terakki*) party. The opposition Party of Ottoman Liberals (*Ahrar Fırkası*) managed to win only one seat in the parliament. Although the CUP believed that Kamil Paşa supported the Liberals rather than the Unionists, the CUP leaders did not overthrow him, but instead continued to dominate the government indirectly while refusing to reveal their CUP connections. Only after a series of conflicts between the Grand Vizier and the Unionists in parliament did they finally

⁵³ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi IX. Cilt İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1908-1918)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), pp. 45-46.

⁵⁴ The cabinet members were all former ministers or officers of the pre-constitution Hamidian regime.

replace him in February 1909 with an openly Unionist Grand Vizier, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa.⁵⁵

Neither the Ottoman liberals nor the conservative religious circles liked the CUP's actions. Supported by the British and French, the Party of Ottoman Liberals joined the religious extremists in carrying out demonstrations and spreading propaganda against the new regime. On 12 April 1909,⁵⁶ the imperial guards from the Taşkışla barracks in İstanbul marched to the Parliament with religious teachers and students, demanding changes to the cabinet, restoration of the Muslim Holy Law (*şeriat*) and amnesty for the rebellious troops. Under this pressure, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa resigned from his office the next day with the approval of the sultan, while Tevfik Paşa was appointed in his place. In the meantime, the rebels assassinated a number of well-known Unionists in the capital and drove most of the other members out of İstanbul and back to Macedonia. The Liberal Party (*Ahrar*) thus failed in its efforts to keep the insurrection “a purely anti-CUP affair and to prevent it from moving into a reactionary, anti-constitutionalist and pro-Abdulhamid direction.”⁵⁷

Confronted with a real threat to the constitutional regime, the CUP organized an “Army of Deliverance (Action Army)”⁵⁸ in Macedonia led by Mahmud Şevket Paşa in order to suppress the insurrection. On April 24, the Action Army moved from Salonica to İstanbul by train, occupied the city, arrested and executed a large number of the rebels. Three days later, the CUP deposed Abdulhamid II and replaced him with Mehmed V. “The new sultan, Mehmed Reşad, was at the mercy of the Committee, who made a clean sweep of the palace and put their own nominees

⁵⁵ Karal, pp. 64-72, Zürcher, pp. 99-100.

⁵⁶ March 31, 1909 according to the Ottoman calendar. Therefore, the counter-revolution is called “*31 Mart Ayaklanması*” in Turkish historiography.

⁵⁷ Zürcher, p.101.

⁵⁸ *Hareket Ordusu*.

into key positions there. From now on, the Committee of Union and Progress became the real masters of Turkey.”⁵⁹

Since the Action Army suppressed the reactionary rebellion, the army held all power in its hands. Some articles of the constitution were changed.⁶⁰ The cabinet led by Hakkı Paşa replaced the one led by Hilmi Paşa in December 1909. Radical reforms were applied both to the bureaucracy and the officer corps, leading to early retirements and salary reductions.⁶¹ The commander-in-chief, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, urged military officers not to get involved in politics. Despite oppositions to its domination both in the army, and by the newly formed opposition parties,⁶² the CUP central committee managed to handle the affairs reasonably well from behind the scenes until the Italians invaded Tripoli (*Trablusgarb*), beginning the Tripolitan War (1911-1912) and revolts which began in Yemen and Albania made it difficult for it to control the situation. The grand vizier, Hakkı Paşa resigned and was succeeded by Said Paşa, who had served in that position during Abdulhamid II’s reign. In reaction, most of the Ottoman opposition parties united to form the Party of Freedom and Entente (*Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası*), which constituted the first real threat to CUP’s domination. Therefore, in the elections of 1912⁶³ the CUP tried and succeeded in preventing them from becoming dominant in the parliament and succeeded in this

⁵⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 217.

⁶⁰ The constitutional changes of August 1909 were the real steps towards a better constitutional and parliamentary regime. With the changes, the sultan only had the right to appoint *sadrızam* and *şeyhülislam*, the parliament could only be dissolved if the cabinet could not get a vote of confidence, and legislation and the conclusion of treaties became the prerogative of the parliament.

⁶¹ Over 1000 or roughly one-third of the officers were removed over the next few years. Zürcher, pp. 104-105.

⁶² Zürcher, p. 106.

⁶³ The elections of 1912 is known as the “election with the stick (*sopalı seçim*)” because of the CUP’s strong effect on the decision of voters.

aim. The new government headed by Said Paşa gained a vote of confidence, but he resigned, as he did not trust the parliament.⁶⁴

A new cabinet was formed after Mahmud Şevket Paşa resigned from his office. The new cabinet, known as the Great Cabinet⁶⁵, headed by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, denounced the interference of the army officers in politics and saw the CUP as responsible for the political chaos in the Empire. In order to suppress CUP's influence in the parliament, the cabinet dissolved the CUP-dominated parliament by adjourning, in agreement with the anti-CUP leaders in the army, the Saviour Officers (*Halaskar Zabitan*).⁶⁶ They lifted the martial law put into force during the counter-revolution of April 1909 and began to persecute the leading CUP members.

At the end of October 1912, Kamil Paşa became the new grand vizier. He was glad to continue the ousting of the Unionists, but the beginning of the Balkan Wars rendered his government weak and incompetent. When the government accepted the Great Powers' proposal of handing over Edirne after the disastrous defeats of the Ottoman Army by the Balkan states, the insecure CUP leaders found their justification to grasp power and took action. They organized a coup d'état⁶⁷ by marching to the Porte, killing the War Minister Nazım Paşa, and forcing Kamil Paşa to resign. The CUP formed a new cabinet with Mahmud Şevket Paşa as its grand vizier and War Minister. Soon after, a supporter of the *Hürriyet ve İtilaf* shot the

⁶⁴ Lewis, pp. 222-223.

⁶⁵ It was called "*Büyük Kabine*" in Turkish because of the veteran bureaucrats who had an understanding and formed the cabinet.

⁶⁶ Lewis, p. 223 "Their objective was to remove an illegal government and parliament, to break the power of the CUP, to hold new and free elections, and to return to constitutional legality. Like all opposition parties of the Young Turk period, this group of military conspirators demanded the withdrawal of the army from politics. The army would of course have to mend what the army had marred; after that it could return to its proper task of defending the Empire, leaving its government to the politicians and officials. Faithful to this principle, the group accepted no civilian recruits, allowed its numbers to accept no governmental appointments."

⁶⁷ Known in Turkish as "*Babıali Ayaklanması*".

grand vizier. This caused the inner circle of the CUP to tighten control over Ottoman politics.

B. International Affairs

As the second Constitution was being proclaimed in 1908, the Ottomans witnessed a troubling international situation. Soon after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared its complete independence and annexed the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia, and Crete was united with Greece. While all these actions impacted the Ottomans, further damaging their belief that the Powers would fulfill their obligation to protect Ottoman integrity, none was more damaging than the Austrian action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina on the pretext that Serbia was getting stronger because of support from France and Russia. In September 1908, Austria-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Lexa Aehrenthal met secretly with Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Iswolsky in Buchlau, and reached an agreement by which Russia agreed to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in return for the latter's acceptance of Russia's rights to occupy and control the Ottoman Straits. The agreement was never put into force, however, because while France was subsequently non-committal on the issue, Great Britain and Germany absolutely opposed the plan, the latter because of the fear that it would jeopardize its economic and political influence in the Ottoman Empire. Germany, however, did want a strong Austria in the Balkans to prevent Russian expansion into the area, so it gave full consent to Austria-Hungary's action in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁸

The Austria-Hungarian *fait accompli* provoked all the Balkan states and the Great Powers. It was like a try-out of the First World War.⁶⁹ Serbia was ready for

⁶⁸ Bury, pp. 132-134.

⁶⁹ Sander, p. 250.

war. However, Russia could not support it, because it was not ready for a major war after its defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Without real support from the Powers, therefore, the Ottoman Empire finally consented to the annexation in return for an indemnity, though its faith in the willingness of the Powers to live up to their treaty obligations was further shattered.

The Austria-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia ended without causing a major war, but it created many problems for the future. Oral Sander claimed that it was the beginning of the crises and defeats, which would erase the Ottoman Empire from history.⁷⁰ In the Balkans, Bulgaria and Serbia began to pursue aggressive policies, which would eventually lead to the Balkan Wars. In the international arena, humiliated Russia⁷¹ had no option but to join the Entente, which had been concluded by the French and the British in 1904. With the secret treaty of Racconigi in 1909, Italy agreed to support the Balkan status quo in case of an Austrian threat, in return for Russia's recognition of its interests in Tripoli.

The alliances were complete. The Russian-French Dual Alliance of 1893, the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, the Moroccan crisis of 1905, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the Reval Meeting of 1908 between England and Russia combined with the Bosnian crisis roughly formed the blocs for a total major war: Germany and the Austria-Hungarian Empire on one side, and France, Great Britain and Russia on the other.

The second Moroccan crisis in 1911 made sure that both sides were ready for war. The Agadir crisis also impelled Italy to move upon Tripoli by opening the way to the French protectorate of Morocco. Italy's conquest and annexation of

⁷⁰ Sander, p. 252.

⁷¹ Russia's attention turned from the Far East to the Balkans again with the annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary.

Tripoli was the signal for the Balkan states to make a concerted attack upon Turkey.⁷²

On October 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans began to experience defeats on both fronts by the Serbians and Bulgarians as the new War Minister Nazım Paşa did not apply the defensive war strategy of the former Chief-of-Staff Ahmet İzzet Paşa who was in Yemen fighting against the Arab rebels.

⁷² Bury, p. 139.

C. Ottoman-German Relations

During the five years from the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 to the Bab-ı Ali coup d'état of 1913, according to the Ottoman point of view, relations with Germany did not follow a steady path due to many domestic and international events. Many people thought that the revolution had created a pro-British atmosphere in the Ottoman government circles. It was true that most of the Young Turk leaders were British and French sympathizers.⁷³ Furthermore, German support for the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina turned the public opinion against Germany and the German Military Commission in the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish press was urging the government to send the German military officers back, and some generals shared this view.⁷⁴

In order to balance the German influence which had increased greatly before the Young Turk Revolution, Grand Vezir Kamil Paşa brought in British naval officers to reorganize the Ottoman navy, and also limited the German military officers to no more than fifteen to twenty men of whom none would be below the rank of Colonel, a move which caused anxiety and dissatisfaction among the Germans already there.⁷⁵

The Germans' fear was not unfounded. The Young Turks were leaning towards Britain because they regarded Abdulhamid's friendship for the autocratic

⁷³ "Liberty, equality, fraternity, the slogan of Republican France became the watch-cry of the new era in Turkey. Parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility under a constitutional monarch, the political contribution of Britain to Western civilization, became the aim of reformers in Constantinople." Earle, p. 217.

⁷⁴ Even one of the major generals in the Ottoman Army, Osman Nizami Paşa proposed to the German military attaché in İstanbul, Von Stempel that the Turkish military officers who had been training in Germany could accomplish the reorganization of the Ottoman Army better than the aged German military officers in the Ottoman Empire. Wallach, p.78.

⁷⁵ Wallach, p.79.

Kaiser Wilhelm as the basis of his own autocratic policies.⁷⁶ In furtherance of his effort to balance the German influence following the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Grand Vizier sent to London two leading Young Turks, Dr. Nazım Bey and Ahmet Rıza Bey to propose an alliance with Britain, an overture which was, however, rejected by the British.⁷⁷

In the autumn of 1908, the Baghdad railroad concession granted in 1903 became a subject of intense discussions in the Ottoman parliament. Since the concession was seen as the means by which Abdulhamid gained friendship and support from Wilhelm II, the Young Turks felt that certain undisclosed provisions in the Concession treaty endangered Ottoman political independence, while giving Germany political as well as economic and financial advantages. The Baghdad representative in the Ottoman parliament, İsmail Hakkı Bey, proposed that the existing contracts with the Deutsche Bank, the basic core of the concessions, be repudiated outright. The Ottoman minister of Finance, Cavid Bey, was more moderate on the subject. He believed that the concession violated Ottoman economic and administrative independence, but he felt the solution was to revise the agreement in the interest of Ottoman sovereignty, without actual repudiation.⁷⁸ Witnessing these developments in İstanbul closely, the German ambassador, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein warned the German chancellor, Prince von Bülow that German influence was waning and some actions had be taken to stop these proposals from being put into effect.

⁷⁶ “The Young Turks, liberals of every shade, believed that Germany had been a staunch supporter of Abdul Hamid’s tyrannical government and that the German influence constituted a decided danger for the era of liberalism. That thought was zealously supported by the English and French press in Constantinople. The Young Turkish liberalism showed in the beginning a decided leaning toward a certain form of Anglomania...” Earle, p. 218.

⁷⁷ Ahmad, p. 16-17.

⁷⁸ Earle, p. 220.

In order to reorganize the Ottoman Navy, the Young Turks placed it under the command of a British admiral, Admiral Gamble. In addition, many British advisors were brought to the Ottoman Empire and entered into several ministries, while a French officer was made inspector-general of the gendarmerie.⁷⁹ All these developments worried the Germans. One of the directors of the Deutsche Bank, Karl Helfferich stated that the dream of Berlin-Baghdad Railway had fallen into ruins.⁸⁰ The only German who did not seem to be worried about Germany's position in the Ottoman Empire was Wilhelm II, who believed that the Revolution of 1908 had been the product of the Young Turk military officers who were trained in the German military traditions. Furthermore, Wilhelm II also believed that because of the ongoing problems between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain and Russia, the Ottomans would have to continue to rely on German protection. Nevertheless, German influence in the Ottoman Empire was stronger than that of the British or French only in areas of railroad construction and arms sales.⁸¹ The Germans could continue their influence in Turkey only if they were not defeated in those areas by the other Great Powers.

It was the suppression of the Counter-revolution in April 1909 by the Action Army that gave Germany the opportunity it was seeking to take back its favored position in Ottoman affairs. Britain and France denounced the suppression of the insurrectionists, though they had supported the liberal regime that was being suppressed. Furthermore, British interference in Crete and the British support of the rebellious Sheikh of Kuwait endangered the British position in the Ottoman Empire at the same time when the CUP leaders also learned that it had been the British

⁷⁹ Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, Cilt:1 (1888-1918)*, (İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1970), pp. 102-103.

⁸⁰ Rathmann, pp. 103-104.

⁸¹ Rathmann, pp. 104-105.

Intelligence Service, which had organized the counter-revolution.⁸² Germany, on the other hand, supported the suppression of the counter-revolution and the restoration of the Constitutional Regime. Whereas France and England had denounced the rising of Turkish nationalism and pan-Islamic revival, for Germany it was good news as Germany's policy in the Near East was based upon strengthening the Ottoman Empire.⁸³

After the suppression of the counter-revolution, the Young Turk military leaders began to intervene in political affairs while taking control of various important posts. Chief-of-Staff İzzet Paşa requested the government to bring Colmar Von der Goltz back to Istanbul as military advisor for a new effort to reorganize the Ottoman army. The Ottoman government officially applied for his services to the German government in May 1909. Von der Goltz agreed to undertake temporary service in the Ottoman Empire and he came to İstanbul in June 1909.⁸⁴ Besides his military duties, German Chancellor von Bülow also ordered von der Goltz to do everything he could to influence the Ottomans to favor Germany in economic and political matters as well. He thus had to do all he could to restore the Anatolian railroad concessions as well as to secure Ottoman purchases of German arms and armaments⁸⁵ In addition to the appointment of Goltz, Germany also agreed to dispatch eleven military officers to serve in the Ottoman Army for a term of three years. Colmar von der Goltz and the German military officers came to Turkey in October. In addition, fourteen Ottoman military officers were sent to Germany for advanced military education.⁸⁶

⁸² Yalman, pp. 178-179.

⁸³ Earle, pp. 222-223.

⁸⁴ Wallach, p. 81.

⁸⁵ Rathmann, p. 108.

⁸⁶ Wallach, p. 85.

Von der Goltz stayed in Turkey for three months. During this short time, he prepared a comprehensive program for military maneuvers in the Balkans and İstanbul. He designed a military maneuver in which two Ottoman corps participated. He established a drilling ground in which 120 officers could be trained in one semester. He also prepared pamphlets called “Advice for the German Military Tutors in the Ottoman Service”. He then returned to Germany, but continued his service to the Ottomans by sending reform proposals, but he did not return again until the early years of the First World War.⁸⁷

In spite of his significant influence on the Ottoman military leaders, Von der Goltz’s second service in the Ottoman Empire was not direct or sustained. Indirectly, however, he had an important influence on Turkish politics until the arrival of Von Sanders Military Commission in 1913, since most of the Ottoman military leaders in the younger generation had been trained according to his program during his first service in the Empire. Additionally, the leading military figures such as Ahmet İzzet Paşa and Mahmut Şevket Paşa were the generals who had been to Germany for training.

The renewal of the German military officers was a good opportunity for Germany to strengthen its position in the Ottoman Empire, but it was not enough. The real opportunity came when France and England rejected the Ottomans when the Turkish government tried to raise a loan of 30,000,000 francs secured by the customs receipts of the Ottoman Empire. France demanded that the Ottoman government consent to have its budget administered by a French adviser in return for the loan. The Minister of Finance, Cavid Bey did not accept the French proposal. When he went to London to negotiate the same loan, the British government demanded that

⁸⁷ Wallach, pp. 86-87.

the Ottoman government renegotiate the Baghdad Railway Concession in return for the loan. The British Foreign Office informed Cavid Bey that the existing concession was not in the best interest of the Ottoman Empire and it was a significant menace to the position of British trade in Mesopotamia. Rejected by the French and British, the Ottoman government turned to Germany for the loan. On request from the German government, the Deutsche Bank agreed on a contract for the entire issue of 30,000,000 francs of the Ottoman Four Per Cent Loan of 1910.⁸⁸

As Cavid Bey stated in his memorandum, the loan agreement was a great diplomatic victory for Germany.⁸⁹ It was a milestone on the road to a future Ottoman-German partnership. With this loan agreement, Wilhelm II was proved right on his foreseeing on the Turkish-German relationship. In late October 1910, in the message he sent to the Ottoman government, he seemed quite happy with the developments in Turkey. He especially appreciated the works of Goltz and assured the Turks that there would be no delays on the loan, which would reach the Ottoman treasury in November. However, he stated that Turkey should accept the partition of the sphere of influences in Persia by Great Britain and Russia.⁹⁰

German influence was increasing. In February 1910, Marschall von Bieberstein received a new order of arms in huge amounts from the Ottoman government. In the same year, the net revenues of the Anatolian Railway Company reached 5,169,894 French Francs.⁹¹ The German railways proved profitable for the Germans, and at the same time profiting the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was

⁸⁸ Earle, pp. 224-225, Rathmann, p. 109, Ahmad, p. 16, Kocabaş, p. 130.

⁸⁹ Earle, p. 225 "On this occasion the Germans handled the business with great intelligence and tact. They brought up no points which were not related directly or indirectly to the loan, and they made no conditions which would have been inconsistent with the dignity of Turkey. This attitude of Germany met with great approval on the part of the Turkish government, which was then in a very difficult position. The result was the greatest diplomatic victory in the history of the Ottoman Empire between the revolution of 1908 and the outbreak of the Great War."

⁹⁰ BOA, HR. SYS., Dosya:22, Gömlek:42.

⁹¹ Rathmann, pp. 111-115.

compensating the kilometer guarantees for the railways. The Anatolian and Baghdad Railways were achieving their prospected profits. “They increased political security in Asia Minor; they brought about an economic renaissance in the homeland of the Turks; they justified the investment of public funds which was necessary to bring the system to completion.”⁹²

The German investments were not enough to put the Ottoman economy on track, though. In order to get a relief, the Ottoman government decided to have a four per cent increase in customs duties. However, the British and French governments declared that they would object to an increase unless they acquired the concessions they wanted in Mesopotamia. This move also created animosity against the British and French in the Ottoman government and press. “The press roundly denounced the British and said that once again Turkey had been shown the wisdom of friendship for Germany.”⁹³

The Germans did accept the Ottoman proposal for the customs duties increase, but they also decided to abandon their right to construct the railway from Baghdad to Basra because of the critical international situation. Germany did not want to have problems with England at a time when the Moroccan crisis (1911) was increasing tensions. Therefore, Germany and the Ottoman Empire signed a new concession agreement on March 21, 1911. Here, it is obvious that the Germans wanted to extend the limits of their economic and political influence on Turkey without having big problems with England.

The British and French rejection of the increase in the Ottoman customs duties made the Ottomans approach the Germans further. The relations between

⁹² Earle, pp. 234-235. By the year 1910, 200 kilometers of German railways in operation carried 71665 passengers and 27756 tons of freight making a gross receipt of 2571.43 French Francs per kilometer.

⁹³ Earle, p. 228.

Germany and the Ottoman Empire assumed a cordial character. The official and semi-official visits and meetings between the two countries progressed in pace.⁹⁴ In June 1911, the Ottoman counselor in London, Cevat Bey, and the German counselor, Kühlmann, met to discuss the Baghdad Railroad and the Moroccan crisis, and exchanged views.⁹⁵ In September 1911, “the Sultan has conferred high decorations on Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, and the German Ministers for War, Marine and Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the General Staff, and on other high personages”, when they visited Turkey. Even the British newspapers such as *The Advocate of India* said “the moment is opportune for Germany to give expression to her friendship by supporting Turkey, not merely in economic transactions, but also in certain pending political questions.”⁹⁶ However, the Italian declaration of the occupation of Tripoli formed a setback in Ottoman-German relations.

In September 1911, Italy invaded Tripoli. Trusting the improving relations with Germany, Turkey asked for German support. However, Germany did not want to jeopardize the international balance of power. Additionally, Germany did not want to lose Italy as an ally. Germany had an understanding attitude for the Ottoman cries, and many Germans thought that the loss of Tripoli would put Turkey in a very difficult situation. The only effort by the Germans came from Baron Marschall who recommended that the Ottomans put armed resistance in Tripoli. Actually, rather than being optimistic, he thought that the loss of Tripoli would encourage the British to annex Iraq, and it would be a real menace to the German influence in the Near

⁹⁴ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1976), pp. 165-166.

⁹⁵ BOA, HR. SYS., Dosya: 110, Gömlek: 14.

⁹⁶ BOA, HR. SYS., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 54.

East.⁹⁷ The Ottomans felt alone in the face of the Italian *fait accompli*, which they believed was very unfair. Then, the Ottoman government turned to the British, and proposed an alliance. However, Britain rejected the proposal.⁹⁸

The Tripolitan affair showed Germany's real intentions toward the Ottoman Empire. Although, Kaiser was a friend of Abdulhamid, he did not have consistent thoughts about the value of the Ottoman friendship and partnership. He believed in the potential benefits of the Ottoman Empire for Germany, but he never thought of the Ottoman Empire as an ally like Austria-Hungary. As the developments will show, Germany never considered the Ottoman Army trained and equipped enough to make a sound ally in a potential European War until the outbreak of the First World War. The only concern of the German Kaiser and his governments was to increase German trade and investments in the Ottoman Empire. Only, in this concern was Germany consistent in its policies towards the Ottoman Empire.⁹⁹ Germany acted in accordance to its *Realpolitik* especially in international issues. Concerning the Italian annexation, Kaiser told his Foreign Minister "the Ottoman-Italian War is not dangerous for our interests. The Italian forces are settling in North Africa; by this way Italy will compete against France both in the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa. Therefore, the challenge between France and Italy will throw Italy to our side (Germany and Austria-Hungary)."¹⁰⁰

Germany showed the same attitude in the Balkan Wars just after the Ottoman-Italian War. Instead of preventing the war, Germany left Turkey alone. The Germans believed that the Ottoman Army could defeat the armies of the Balkan League with the help of the Krupp artillery and the advices of Von der Goltz.

⁹⁷ Muhtar, p. 143.

⁹⁸ Ahmad, p. 17.

⁹⁹ Trumpener, 'Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu', pp. 141-142.

¹⁰⁰ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi (Cilt: 2 Kısım:4)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), p.84.

Actually, it was obvious that Germany did not care much for the Ottoman victory or defeat. The Germans even thought that Turkey should leave the Balkans in favor of Anatolia.¹⁰¹

Germany did not want to attract Russian hostility, and eventually cause Russia to participate fully in the Anglo-French Entente. For this aim, Germany already signed agreements with Russia in November 1910, and August 1911 in Potsdam. With these agreements, Germany recognized Russian sphere of influence in Northern Persia, and agreed not to support Austria-Hungary in its Balkan policies. In return, Russia gave up its objections to Baghdad Railway and accepted the extension of a railway line to Tehran by the Germans, which would be connected to railways it would build in Persia.¹⁰² Furthermore, when the Ottomans appealed to the German government for the rejection of Russian requests on the renegotiation of and changes in the Turkish Straits regime, Germany informed Turkey that it was not against the renegotiation of the Straits regime. The indifference and the negative attitude of Germany on this issue was clearly criticized by the German ambassador, Baron Marschall who tried to convince his government about the potential menace of Russian domination in the Ottoman Empire. He even wanted to resign from his post if his warnings were not taken serious. However, his warnings were disregarded.¹⁰³ After a couple of months, this ambitious ambassador who was regarded as the real

¹⁰¹ Wilhelm II told just before the Balkan Wars that: "Rumelia offers no benefits for you; it is proper for you to have a strong state in Anatolia. When you are strong enough, you can expand to Buhara, Persia, Turkistan and the Caucasus, and establish a Turan state. That state would be an Asian state with a population of eighty or one hundred million." Goltz recommended the transfer of the capital from İstanbul to Konya, Kayseri or Halep. Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi IX. Cilt İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1908-1918)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), p. 180.

¹⁰² Rathmann, p. 123, Trumpener, 'Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu', pp. 142-143, BOA, HR. SYS, Dosya: 111, Gömlek: 15.

¹⁰³ Cemal Tükin, *Boğazlar Meselesi*, (İstanbul: Pan Yayıncılık, 1999), pp. 417-418.

architect of the establishment of German influence in İstanbul¹⁰⁴ was replaced with Baron von Wangenheim. Later his government appointed him to London.¹⁰⁵

As a matter of fact, it was not the German military techniques but the German diplomacy or policies that harmed the Ottoman Empire. From the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 to the Bab-ı Ali coup d'état, German-Ottoman relations did not follow a consistent path. The Ottomans began to favor the Germans when they requested the second service of Goltz, and Germany provided the loan that the Ottomans needed in 1910. However, the Italian and Balkan Wars proved to the Ottomans that they were actually isolated in European diplomatic circles. The international developments showed that all of the Great powers had imperialistic designs on the Ottoman Empire, which constituted the core of the Eastern Question. Germany provided an exception only in the sense that unlike the other Great Powers, it did not want the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Germany wanted to transform Turkey into a minor partner or a satellite state in the Near East. "While Britain, France, and Russia were each tugging at the best portions of the Empire from outside, the Reich was endeavoring to hold it together by capturing the whole from within."¹⁰⁶ With its *penetration pacifique* policy, Germany favored the policy of controlling the economy and military of the Ottoman Empire in friendly terms, while at the same time trying to stay in the new 'Concert of Europe' that was based on disagreements and deterrence rather than agreements.

¹⁰⁴ Trumpener, 'Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu', pp. 131-132.

¹⁰⁵ BOA, HR. SYS., Dosya: 24, Gömlek: 9.

¹⁰⁶ Gottlieb, p. 32.

CHAPTER THREE:
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM THE RAID ON THE PORTE
TO THE SECRET ALLIANCE OF AUGUST 2, 1914

A. Developments Before the Arrival of Von Sanders Mission

The famous “Raid on the Sublime Porte” occurred on January 23, 1913. The Ottoman Cabinet was meeting in order to prepare a note to the Great Powers about the armistice negotiations then going on in London designed to end the First Balkan War. On that day in the afternoon, “Enver (later Paşa) led an army band into the Porte building, burst into a (the) cabinet meeting, and forced (Sadrazam) Kamil (Paşa) to resign at gunpoint.”¹⁰⁷ The CUP declared that it designed the raid in order to end the defeats in the Balkans, and take Edirne back from the Bulgarians by taking over government.¹⁰⁸ The inner circle of the CUP dominated by Enver and Talat, who were the real designers of the coup d’etat, arranged for General Mahmut Şevket Paşa to become the new grand vizier, while Cemal Bey was made commander of the First Army, which was the garrison of İstanbul. Although Kamil Paşa’s cabinet had been overthrown, Mahmut Şevket Paşa appointed only three Unionists to the new cabinet,

¹⁰⁷ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975)*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 295. About the details of the “Bab-ı Ali coup d’etat” see Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa (Cilt II: 1908-1914)*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971), pp. 379-386, Ziya Şakir, *Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adamı: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar*, (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1944), pp. 99-103.

¹⁰⁸ The real intentions of the CUP before the coup d’etat can be seen in the work of Ziya Şakir, who was close to the inner circles of the CUP: “Edirne is starving in submission. The enemy is at the gates of Çatalca. It has been seven months since we lost the government...” Therefore, the CUP was trying to secure power again. Şakir, p. 35.

leaving all the previous ministers in their places. A week later, at the request of Enver Paşa, the Sultan appointed respected general Ahmet İzzet Paşa as Chief of the General Staff.

The new government first tried to secure a base for restoring public order through key military and civilian appointments. It then turned its attention to the issue of foreign affairs. Most of the ministers joined Enver and the young officers in desiring to resume the war in order to secure a more favorable settlement than that being prepared in London. Mahmut Şevket Paşa and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, however, opposed the idea on the grounds that the army was not ready. However, "there were those Unionist civilians who felt the need for an immediate military success in order to consolidate their position."¹⁰⁹ The Grand Vizier therefore, insisted to the London Conference that Edirne and eastern Thrace be returned before the Ottoman Empire would agree to peace. Without agreement, however, the conference broke up on January 30 and the Ottomans resumed the fight.¹¹⁰

But as the war continued, the Ottoman army continued to suffer defeats on almost all fronts. At the same time, the new government tried to reform the army. In February, the Regulation for the General Military Organization and the Service Dress and Uniform Regulation¹¹¹ were put into force. German Ambassador "Wangenheim was able to report a general feeling in ruling circles favoring requests to foreign governments for aid in reforming the Ottoman Empire. He continued that the Ottomans hoped the Kaiser would place a German general, who, aided by German officers, would reorganize the army."¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, The Military and Ottoman Collapse*, (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), p. 288.

¹¹⁰ Shaw, p. 296.

¹¹¹ BOA, MV. Dosya 233. Gömlek 127.

¹¹² Turfan, pp. 309-311.

On April 24, 1913 Mahmut Şevket Paşa asked Wangenheim's opinion about the desirability of asking for a new German military reform commission, stating that the Germans had been reforming the Ottoman Army for more than thirty years, and it was impossible to change that tradition at that late date.¹¹³ However, the 'German style' Ottoman Army continued to fail in the ongoing wars. "In the meantime, in the face of all the disasters Mahmut Şevket had to offer a restoration of truce and full acceptance of the powers' peace terms. The armistice was restored on April 16, negotiations resumed on May 30, and ten days later the Treaty of London signed, with the Midye-Enez line being established as the new Ottoman boundary and with Thrace and Edirne in enemy hands."¹¹⁴

The First Balkan War ended calamitously for the Ottomans and the Ottoman Empire entered into a state of havoc. Besides the material losses, the Empire collapsed psychologically. Undecided about what to do next and without hope for the future, the Ottomans began to seriously question the value of German friendship and military assistance. In the European press, the victory of the Balkan League was attributed to the superiority of French Cruiseot artillery over German Krupp Artillery.¹¹⁵ The popular view in the Ottoman Empire was that the German military reformers had been unsuccessful in reorganizing the Ottoman Army. Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not, however, of the same opinion, and with the support of the inner cabinet of the CUP, led by Enver and Talat, on May 22, 1913, he asked Wangenheim to relay his request to Berlin for a new German military mission.

¹¹³ Cemal Paşa, *Hatıralar: İttihat ve Terakki, I. Dünya Savaşı Anıları* ed. Behçet Cemal, (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1977), pp. 87-88.

¹¹⁴ Shaw, p. 296.

¹¹⁵ The Greeks and Serbs used French artillery whereas the Ottomans used German artillery. The news served to provoke the Ottoman Army, because the Bulgarians and the Romanians also used Krupp artillery.

The defeat in the Balkans had, indeed, proved how weak the Ottoman Empire was. The CUP and the Ottoman intellectuals now felt really drastic reforms were needed in order to save the Empire from collapse and destruction. They understood, however, that the Empire had to be careful about the nature of the new German military mission. The new situation in the Balkans had changed the views of all the European Powers about the Ottoman Empire. The ongoing negotiations between Germany and England about the railroad concessions took new shape. Germany, for one, began to define its future policies regarding Anatolia on the supposition that the Ottoman Empire would finally be partitioned.¹¹⁶

In the spring of 1913, Wilhelm II agreed to send a new military mission to Istanbul, but at the same time showed that his real intention was to use it to control Ottoman affairs, while at the same time preventing Russia from dominating Anatolia. To achieve this end, he tried hard to secure an agreement with Britain regarding the settlement that he made if the Ottoman Empire was partitioned:

Let us ensure that the partition shall not be carried without us. I want Mesopotamia, Alexandretta, Mersina. The sensible Turks are already expecting this fate patiently... It is very important to have definite objectives in this event (the partition), instead of warning the Turks, which the present Turkish government does not deserve and would never be acted on anyway... I could not wish for a better... merciless judgement upon the policy of great adventures and Ententes of my uncle Edward VII! In the long run a policy directed against Germans with Slavs and Gauls is absolutely unworkable for the Anglo-Saxons! We shall find one another in Asia Minor, either for the sake of Turkey... or at her expense!¹¹⁷

It is not certain that the German Foreign Office and General Staff shared Wilhelm II's views, but in any case Germany went ahead to seek British friendship in order to detach it from Russia and France, thus isolating France and preventing Russia from realizing its goals in the Near East. In İstanbul, without giving any

¹¹⁶ BOA, HR. SYS, Dosya: 202, Gömlek: 36, BOA, HR. SYS, Dosya: 43, Gömlek: 53.

¹¹⁷ Fritz Fischer, 'World Policy, World Power and German War Aims', in *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims*, ed. H. W. Koch, (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1984), pp. 135-136.

signals about the Kaiser's real intentions, Wangenheim succeeded in showing 'sincere' German friendship to the Ottoman government. The political chaos in the Ottoman Empire, however, made it very difficult for Mahmut Şevket Paşa to understand Germany's real intentions. Turfan argues that "...the real cause of the Grand Vizier's wish to invite a prominent German general to reorganize the Ottoman Army, was his prevailing aspiration establish explicit control over the officer corps."¹¹⁸ Whether this statement is true or not, the vizier tried to use the new mission as a political tool, especially against the Ottoman liberals who were being supported by the British. On June 11, 1913, however, Mahmut Şevket Paşa was assassinated. Cemal Paşa's memoirs stated that it was the work of the Ottoman liberals led by Kamil Paşa, Damat Salih Paşa and Fitzmaurice, and Tyrel from the British Embassy.¹¹⁹ The assassination might have been the work of the military circles,¹²⁰ because Mahmut Şevket Paşa had been working to keep the military officers out of politics. In a telegram of 13 June, two days after the assassination, the British ambassador wrote:

It is not clear whether murder was a result of an opposition plot or of an act of revenge for assassination of General Nazım Paşa at the Porte on 23rd January. Despite denials there would seem to have been a participation of section of military element.¹²¹

On June 15, 1913, German general Otto Liman von Sanders received a letter asking whether he would accept to lead the military reform mission that would be sent to Turkey. He accepted, and before coming to Turkey, Wilhelm II ordered him to draw politics out of the Ottoman army.¹²² The Kaiser might well have known more about Mahmut Şevket's death that he told Von Sanders, since many Ottomans

¹¹⁸ Turfan, p. 308.

¹¹⁹ For the details of the assassination, see Cemal Paşa, pp. 31-53, Aydemir, pp. 396-398.

¹²⁰ Yalçın claimed that though Cemal knew about the plans of assassination and could prevent it, but he did not. Yalçın, p. 194.

¹²¹ Turfan, p. 328 Turfan covers almost ten pages for the events behind the scene of assassination. pp. 321-330.

¹²² Otto Liman Von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Yıl*, (İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968), pp. 13-14 Here Kaiser stated that the biggest mistake of the Ottoman military officers was to meddle with politics.

who were connected with the CUP were very much involved in politics when he arrived.

Soon after Mahmut Şevket Paşa's death, the CUP replaced him as Grand Vizier with Said Halim Paşa, a member of the Mehmed Ali dynasty of Egypt, who was also a member of the CUP. The assignment of four other CUP members to key cabinet positions started the CUP dictatorship, which took over the Empire soon afterwards. The new grand vizier started his work just as the second Balkan War began, with Bulgaria being attacked by its former allies who were dissatisfied with the London settlement.

In the meantime, the CUP led the Ottoman press and public in advocating restoration of Edirne. The cabinet was divided, with some members fearing that such an advance would only lead to a disastrous new war. In the end, however, Talat and Enver prevailed. On July 21 the Ottoman army was able to reoccupy all of eastern Thrace and move into Edirne without meeting any resistance, since the Bulgarians had withdrawn their army to meet their former allies. In response to the Ottoman push the latter soon made peace, though at Bulgarian expense, in the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10).¹²³

The Treaty of İstanbul between Turkey and Bulgaria, signed on September 29, 1913, ended the Second Balkan War with substantial losses for the Ottomans. The Army lost fourteen infantry divisions and 250,000 soldiers. Only, six out of its original forty-three infantry divisions were saved without real damage. "This was a military disaster of unprecedented magnitude for the empire, which all but destroyed the regular Turkish Army as an effective fighting force."¹²⁴ The Empire lost 83 percent of its land in Europe and 69 percent of its European population. Sixty

¹²³ Shaw, p. 297.

¹²⁴ Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered To Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001) p. 10, Erickson states the results of the Balkan wars for the Ottoman army as follows: Timetable-planning is unsuitable, given the poorly developed lines of communication. Immense losses in equipment, trained leaders and experienced formations preordained the enlargement of the existing German military mission. The loss of entire Second Army and much of First Army obviated any future mobilization that supported war plans at early offensive operations. The loss of the armies necessitated unit reconstitution rather than training of soldiers and their preparation for war. Erickson, p. 23

hundred square miles of European territories (Albania, Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia) were lost. İstanbul was filled with refugees who brought epidemics with them. The Ottoman Empire lost whatever prestige it still had in European public opinion, and the Ottoman people fell into real despair.

For the Ottoman public, however, despite the losses of population and territory and the devastation inflicted on the army and the Ottoman public overall, “the recapture of Edirne stimulated a mass Ottoman exaltation so intense that the CUP’s right to rule unopposed was accepted and confirmed without further discussion or opposition”.¹²⁵ The fact that the CUP had been able to abandon the Treaty of London and retake Edirne solidified its hold on to government, which enabled it to start new efforts at reform as well as to support the new German military mission.

After several months of negotiations, the agreement for the new German military mission was concluded on November 9, 1913. The German government appointed Von Sanders as the head of a commission of forty-two officers, which was given substantial duties and responsibilities to reorganize and modernize the Ottoman army.¹²⁶

The government was later criticized for the agreement, which equipped the new mission with vast authority in the Ottoman army. However, given the diplomatic situation, the Ottoman government desperately needed German support in order to save the Empire from further losses, particularly since Britain was supporting the Russian efforts to introduce reforms into Eastern Anatolia which it was planning to use to secure an autonomous Armenia under its control, thus inflicting substantial

¹²⁵ Shaw, p. 298.

¹²⁶ For the conditions of the agreement and the scheme of the mission see Appendix, Cemal Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi, I. Cilt: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Siyasi ve Askeri Hazırlıkları ve Harbe Girişi*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1970), pp. 272-278.

new losses on the Ottomans at the same time that Russian was developing new ambitions to gain control over Istanbul itself as well as the Straits in order to achieve its ambition of controlling the waterways that connected it with the open seas.¹²⁷

The Ottomans had tried to end their diplomatic isolation following the Balkan Wars by proposing alliances with Britain in June 1913, as well as with Germany in September. Both offers, however, were rejected.¹²⁸ After the alliance proposals were rejected, in the face of the Russian threat, the Ottoman government accepted the German military mission as the only alternative.¹²⁹ On December 1913, Wilhelm II stated that:

...As they (the instructions to Wangenheim) are herein drafted, no! They look like a capitulation on our part to Russia! I am no longer in the mood to bargain with Russian wishes at the cost of my army and Turkey... Once again Russia, as so often before, has tried one of her several attempts at bluff at our cost and through her allies... Turkey's prestige will increase as the result of any great Russian disgrace!¹³⁰

Wilhelm II was ready to support Turkey to the end at Russian expense. However, as it is visible from his thoughts about British cooperation, he respected Turkey's prestige only if Russia expressed its claims on Turkey. Otherwise, Germany, in particular the Kaiser, could take any vital decisions at Turkish expense.

The British, French, and Russian ambassadors mounted diplomatic pressure in an effort to limit the Von Sanders mission, even before it arrived in İstanbul on December 14, 1913.¹³¹ However, Otto Liman von Sanders came to İstanbul on December 14, 1913 with the mission of 42 officers who were mostly captains and majors in the German Army. The next day, Sultan Mehmed Reşad officially accepted

¹²⁷ Karal, p. 377-378.

¹²⁸ Turkish ambassador to Germany, Mahmut Muhtar Paşa stated that Germany refused Turkish proposal in the pretext that Turkey was not ready as a capable ally (*Türkiye ittifak kabiliyetine hazır olmadığı cihetle keyfiyetin hükümetçe tecile uğradığı...*). Wilhelm II ordered Wangenheim not to refuse outright, but to follow a dilatory policy about the alliance. Kocabaş, p. 146.

¹²⁹ For Russian plans and ambitions in the summer and autumn of 1913, see Tükin, p. 391.

¹³⁰ Fischer, 'World Policy, World Power and German War Aims', p. 159.

¹³¹ Cemal Paşa, pp. 90-91.

Sanders and the mission to the Ottoman service.¹³² The Ottoman Empire agreed to give Sanders the rank of full general as the commander of the First Army in Istanbul, with a ranking in protocol, which placed him immediately after the Ottoman Minister of War.

Britain, France, and Russia heavily criticized the presence of the new German military mission. Russia, in particular, did not want Sanders to control the Turkish First Army, because it meant that the Straits were in fact under the authority of a German general. According to the Ottoman documents reporting the minutes of the Austria-Hungarian parliament, Russia conceived the transfer of Sanders as an insult to itself.¹³³ Russia insisted that the German Foreign Office should have consulted it before deciding to send the mission to İstanbul. The German Foreign Office replied that von Sanders' transfer had been arranged by a personal order of the Kaiser, given through the Military Cabinet, without any consultation with them.¹³⁴ On the other side, France and England condemned the transfer of the mission as a political act rather than a military support.

The year 1913 ended with the German Military Commission working with the Turkish army. Von Sanders' powers included the right to appoint and dismiss the German officers in his mission, which gave him practical control over everything they did.¹³⁵ The Ottomans, who had been left in despair and desolation by the results of the Balkan Wars, were relieved and hopeful for the future. The CUP, which controlled the Ottoman government throughout the year, now felt itself in a position in which it could start the reforms the Empire needed at a time when Europe seemed

¹³² BOA, MV, Dosya: 232, Gömlek: 9, Von Sanders, p. 15, Yılmaz, p. 47, Yalman, p. 197. It is interesting that a document from the same date in the Ottoman archives stated that a German cruiser called Breslau would visit several Ottoman ports in the near future. (BOA, DH.KMS, Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 12) This cruiser, accompanied by the famous ship Goeben was the main actor driving the Ottoman Empire to the World War.

¹³³ BOA, HR. SYS, Dosya: 171, Gömlek: 66.

¹³⁴ Prince von Bülow, *Memoirs: 1909-1919*, (London: Putnam Press, 1932), p. 128.

¹³⁵ Yılmaz, p. 47.

to be headed for a major war. The CUP leaders felt that the social and economic development of the Empire would be impossible without a strong army, given the fragility of its situation. The help came from Germany, which in fact saw the Empire as no more than a potential satellite useful for German economic investment and for the supply of raw material. It therefore opposed concessions to its still-potential allies, Italy and Austria-Hungary.¹³⁶ The disastrous Ottoman losses in the Balkan Wars, however, made the Germans, especially the Kaiser, think that partition of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable and that all means should be used in order to limit the resulting benefits which might flow to Germany's historic enemy. Instead of acting as the Ottomans' big brother, therefore, Germany was ready to cooperate with the British in dividing what was left in the possession of the Sultan so long as the real benefits were kept out of the hands of the Russians.

¹³⁶ BOA, HR. SYS., Dosya: 217, Gömlek: 68.

B. The Ottoman Empire Before July 1914

The CUP, which was the actual ruler of the Ottoman Empire following the Raid on the Porte, consolidated its grip on power in early 1914. During this time the CUP went through intense discussions regarding the appointments to principal positions in the government. When Enver returned from Edirne, Talat, one of the most powerful members of the Committee, informed him that they wanted him to become Minister of War.¹³⁷ The other contender for the ministry was Cemal, who had been promoted to the rank of colonel at the same time as Enver, on December 18, 1913.¹³⁸

Current Minister of War Ahmed İzzet Paşa had opposed the CUP's desire to begin reforming the Ottoman army by forcing its senior officers into retirement. He was therefore forced to retire in favor of Enver, so the first step in the reform process could begin.¹³⁹ The CUP's desire to substitute Enver for the current Minister of War Ahmet İzzet Paşa resulted from their desire to begin reforming the Army by forceably retiring its senior officers, most of whom were long past their prime, an idea which Ahmed İzzet had resisted.¹⁴⁰ Talat got Cemal to agree by offering him the position of Minister of the Navy.. Appointment as Minister of War required the rank of Brigadier General, however, while Enver still was only a Colonel. The CUP solved this problem by increasing his seniority level on the grounds of his services in both the Tripolitanian and Balkan wars. In three days, therefore, Cemal and Enver were both promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, thus making possible their

¹³⁷ Aydemir, pp. 411-415.

¹³⁸ Aydemir, p. 427.

¹³⁹ The CUP's thought of removing A. İzzet Paşa dated back as early as November 1913 as seen in Enver's private letters. Aydemir, pp. 422-427.

¹⁴⁰ Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları*, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), p. 180.

appointments to the senior military ministries.¹⁴¹ Ahmet İzzet Paşa resigned, and on January 3, 1914 Enver Paşa became the Minister of War at the age of thirty-four.¹⁴² Cemal Paşa became the Minister of Navy. Five days later, Enver Paşa became the Chief of the General Staff.¹⁴³

With these appointments, the CUP's hold on governmental power was assured, at least for the moment. With the German Reform Mission working with him, Enver continued the army reforms which had been begun in the spring of 1913, introducing ever more radical measures as time went on. Edward Erickson states that:

Between July 1913 and August 1914, the Turkish Army was undergoing an enormous reorganization and reconstruction effort as a result of the Balkan Wars. Compounding this huge task was Enver Paşa's determination to rid the army of older and less active officers, obstruction to modernization. Over thirteen hundred officers were involuntarily retired during this period.¹⁴⁴

In this manner, the rule of the Triumvirate, which dominated the Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War, began. Enver Paşa's Prussian-style discipline soon prevailed in the army. At the same time, Cemal Paşa's techniques at getting information and suppressing political opposition centers prevented any kind of real threat to the new regime. Talat Bey was the political genius who provided the link between the inner circle of the CUP and both the cabinet and the ambassadors to the Porte. İstanbul was therefore politically ready for a war in which the control of

¹⁴¹ Şakir, pp. 115-116, For Enver's promotion decree, see M. Muhtar, p. 304 "*Harbiye Nazırı İzzet Paşa Hazretleri'nin vuku-ı istifasına mebni, Bingazi'deki hidemat-ı ber-güzide ve fedakaranesinden dolayı zammolunan üç sene ile kıdemen miralaylığı ihraz eden Enver Beyefendi'nin Balkan muharebesindeki fedakarlığa mükafaten üç sene daha kıdem zammıyla rütbesine mahsus müddet-i asgariyi ikmal etmiş olmasına ve miralaylıktan mirlivalığa terfi nizamnamesi mucibince, keyfiyet-i terfi intihab ve icra olunacağı göre, mir-i mumaileyhin mirlivalıktan Harbiye Nezareti'ne tayinine irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i padişahi şeref-sadır olmuştur.*" 2 January 1914.

¹⁴² Turfan, p. 313, Aydemir, p. 427, Yalçın, pp. 202-203.

¹⁴³ It is interesting that neither the Ottoman Sultan nor the German mission were informed about the assignments. Von Sanders, pp. 19-21. It shows Enver's future attitude about keeping the important moves secret, in order to prevent opposition.

¹⁴⁴ Erickson, p. 9.

the political leadership and the masses would be easier and more complete than in the past. Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Secretary to Sultan Mehmed Reşad, states in his memoirs:

Once Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa seized control of the Army and the Navy, they carried out so-called 'reformation' in the Navy and Army by dismissing almost all of the officers who graduated from the military schools before Enver and Cemal. Thereafter, the reins of government passed from the hands of the Sublime Porte to those of Enver Paşa.¹⁴⁵

These Ottoman military reforms were of considerable concern to Russia, which quickly designed new plans to achieve its ambitions in the Straits and Anatolia. Combined with British and French protests, Russia managed to force the Ottomans to change Von Sanders' position. Originally he had been appointed as an Ottoman marshal and head of the Ottoman General Army Inspectorate.¹⁴⁶ Russia, however, demanded in response that an international conference be immediately convened to decide on the future of the East Anatolian provinces where most Armenians resided. On February 6, 1914 the resulting Yeniköy Agreement (*Yeniköy Mukavelenamesi*) was signed between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire, according to which reports prepared by neutral inspectors from the Netherlands and Norway would be the basis for the reforms to be applied in Eastern Anatolia. In the end, however, the agreement was never applied because of the outbreak of the First World War.¹⁴⁷

During the negotiations on reforms in Eastern Anatolia, Germany tried to counterbalance the aggressive Russian demands, which it understood would eventually lead to the autonomy of Eastern Anatolian provinces under Armenian and ultimately Russian control. At the same time, however, while supposedly defending Ottoman interests in the matter, Germany was negotiating secretly with Britain about

¹⁴⁵ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984), p. 111.

¹⁴⁶ According to the Ottoman Army Regulations marshals could not be the commanders of the armies in peace time.

¹⁴⁷ Mahmut Muhtar, p. 311, Yalman, p. 198.

dividing the same provinces into spheres of influence divided between the two.¹⁴⁸ In fact Germany opposed any partition only if it did not share the spoils.¹⁴⁹

It is presumptuous to assume that the First World War broke out because of the Russian aims at occupying the Straits and İstanbul.¹⁵⁰ The Russian threat to accomplish this was, however, instrumental in bringing the Ottomans into the war. On January 14, 1914, Russia established the secret Commission for the Occupation of the Straits, consisting of several Russian ministers, ambassadors and the Chief of General Staff, which quickly drew up a detailed plan to occupy the Straits, submitting it to Tsar Nicholas II on March 28, 1914.¹⁵¹ The Ottoman Military Intelligence Service was only partially aware of this threat.¹⁵² Russia delayed execution of this plan because of concerns regarding the feasibility of the occupation. It feared, with considerable justification, that Britain would never allow such a move without general international agreement. Russia therefore decided to delay the effort until it was part of a general war. In the meantime, Russia would try to negotiate with the Ottomans to secure a Russian protectorate over the Straits like the one, which had been attempted during the Egyptian crisis of 1833. In the end, however, strong

¹⁴⁸ German ambassador to London, Prince Lichnowsky was the initiator of the talks about this issue. Yalman, p. 198. Corrigan also pointed out similar talks by Jagow, who in his telegrams in July 1913 talked about the liquidation of Turkey. “Jagow asked himself-and Baron Wangenheim- whether a regime similar to that established by the British in Egypt would not be the most practical and the cheapest for Germany in the event of a ‘liquidation’ of Turkey. Maps of Asia Minor were prepared in the Wilhelmstrasse showing by means of colored markings the German ‘Zone of Work’, a phrase which Jagow preferred to ‘sphere of interests’.” H. S. W. Corrigan, ‘German-Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of War in 1914: Re-Assessment’, *Past and Present*, Vol. 0, Issue 36 (April, 1967), p. 146.

¹⁴⁹ Corrigan, p. 146. “She (Germany) had to appear as Turkey’s friend, although in this she was not succeeding; she had also to ensure her share of the legacy-and she was desperately anxious to exploit every opportunity for this that offered.”

¹⁵⁰ Karabekir stated that the most important reason of the First World War was Russia’s ambition of occupying the Straits. For his views, see Kazım Karabekir, *Birinci Cihan Harbi’ne Neden Girdik? (I. Cilt)*, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1994), pp. 91-102.

¹⁵¹ Muhtar, pp. 208-216, Karabekir, pp. 103-126, Halil Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe’nin Anıları*, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), p. 181, Tukin, pp. 421-422.

¹⁵² Karabekir, pp. 125-128.

Ottoman opposition to any such plan caused the Russians to delay, and ultimately abandon the plan.¹⁵³

There were few reasons for the Ottoman Empire to ally with Russia. In the spring of 1914, however, Germany feared that such an arrangement might in fact take place. The German military mission in Turkey was doing well, and Colonel Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf was appointed as the first Assistant Chief of Staff of the Ottoman General Staff. Despite this, Kaiser Wilhelm II feared that the presence of the mission was not adequate to keep the Ottomans on his side. In *Eagles on the Crescent*, Weber reports that German ambassador Wangenheim learned at this time that Enver had conferred several times with Russian agents in order to use their money to bribe the internal Ottoman police as a means of strengthening his dictatorship.¹⁵⁴ Weber further states that the Austria-Hungarian ambassador to İstanbul, Pallavicini was accusing Wangenheim of indifference in the face of warming Ottoman relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Russia in order to secure a Balkan alliance.¹⁵⁵

Before the summer of 1914, Germany tried to keep the Ottoman Empire in its orbit without any commitment or guarantee except the military mission. However, the Ottoman Empire was not fully committed to the German cause.¹⁵⁶ The German military leaders did not even think that the mission could in fact improve the Ottoman Army. In March 1914, the German Chief of Staff von Moltke wired the Austrian Chief of Staff Hötendorf that the Ottoman Empire was not worth anything militarily,

¹⁵³ Muhtar, pp. 215-216. As a diplomat, M. Muhtar argued that if Turkey had tried to negotiate with Russia over the Straits, it would take advantage of the clash of interests between the Great powers and would acquire an international guarantee for the Straits, like the Convention of London of 1840.

¹⁵⁴ Frank G., Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance 1914-1918*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 38.

¹⁵⁵ Weber, pp. 47-48.

¹⁵⁶ MUZC, D III/C 1/İçt. 1, Appendix 2.

likening his military mission to doctors taking care of a patient destined to death.¹⁵⁷ In May and June, Wangenheim reported to Germany that the Ottoman Empire did not deserve to be an ally of Germany-an Ottoman alliance would put burden mainly on Germany, so it would be a big mistake to accept the Ottomans as allies.¹⁵⁸ His main concern was to secure all possible economic concessions for Germany. He reported to the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg on May 12, 1914 that:

...The (German) military mission is not an end in itself, but only an expedient for our Baghdad Railway policy. Because of that it is indispensable that the activity of the military mission be subordinated to our political interests.¹⁵⁹

In reply Bethmann-Hollweg stated that:

...We are only interested in the success of the reform work if, and for as long as, Turkey remains on our side. If we fail to keep Turkish support, any increased battle-worthiness of their army would merely be a gain for our enemies. We have no reason to sharpen the Turkish sabre for France or Russia...¹⁶⁰

Emperor Wilhelm II was equally pessimistic about the possibility of losing the Ottomans to the Entente side:

It is absolutely nothing compared with earlier! Turkey no longer intends to stick with us. She is trailing in the Russo-French wake, where money is thrown about, and is feeding us solely with words... We cannot! (keep Turkey on our side) because we have no money! They are no longer on our side!

...While she amuses us with phrases and fine-sounding words and a few Turkish princes, she is joining Russia and the Triple Entente for anti-Greek aims. We are in fact sharpening Turkish weapons for them.¹⁶¹

Wilhelm II was worried about Ottoman-Greek relations. In April 1914, the negotiations between the Ottomans and Greece started in the island of Corfu as a result of a German initiative. The Emperor's dynastic ties with the king of Greece and

¹⁵⁷ Kocabaş, pp. 146.

¹⁵⁸ Kocabaş, p. 147.

¹⁵⁹ Fischer, 'World Policy, World Power and German War Aims', p. 161.

¹⁶⁰ Fischer, 'World Policy, World Power and German War Aims', p. 161.

¹⁶¹ Fischer, 'World Policy, World Power and German War Aims', p. 162.

his long-standing phil-hellenic tendencies forced him to open negotiations between the two countries.¹⁶² The Ottomans wanted to secure at least some of the Aegean islands lost during the Balkan wars and conclude an alliance with Greece if possible. Finally, in June 1914 the negotiators did manage to agree on some points, but the outbreak of the First World War prevented the agreement from being realized. Wilhelm II continued to disparage the Ottomans in the last months before the outbreak of war:

The dishonesty and hollowness of the Turks expressed itself in that they even wanted to buy cruisers immediately from us now to use against Athens! I will no longer stand for it. If the Turks want to make war on the Greeks over the islands, I will withdraw the officer mission!.. Turkey is beyond help, and of no further value! She may as well go to pieces in the arms of the Triple Entente!¹⁶³

Wilhelm II worried a good deal as a result of Cavid Bey's visits to France in search of loans, reports of secret meetings between Talat Paşa and the Russian Foreign Minister in May, and Cemal Paşa's meeting in June with the French Foreign Minister, both in search of an alliance. The Ottomans, however, were unable to secure an alliance with any of the Great Powers. Refused by England, Russia, and France, the Ottomans could either stay out of the trouble by concluding alliances with the small Balkan states or by accepting the partnership of one of the Great Powers. Remaining neutral or at least waiting for a year in case of a general war, and strengthening the army and the country, were accepted options by those Ottoman generals and politicians who had vision and common sense.

By June 1914, the Ottoman Empire had in active army service 200,000 men and 8,000 officers. Although undergoing substantial revision and reform, it still was ill-equipped to fight a modern war. Transportation was a critical weakness. The

¹⁶² Weber, pp. 50-51.

¹⁶³ Fischer, 'World Policy, World Power and German War Aims', pp. 162-163.

Baghdad railroad had two unfinished sections in the Taurus and Amanos mountain ranges in the southeast, which would hamper all efforts to bring soldiers and materials to Syria, Arabia, and Egypt.¹⁶⁴ On April 7, 1914, Bronsart von Schellendorf completed the “Primary Campaign Plan for the Turkish Army”, but it was completed under the assumption that the Ottoman Empire would oppose an Eastern European coalition of Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia.¹⁶⁵ When the Ottoman Empire in June 1914 got the chance of becoming allied with some of the Balkan states, the plan had to be revised.

The Von Sanders mission, comprised of thirty officers and forty men had considerable influence in the Ottoman army before July 1914. It was fully staffed, and several German officers held the commanding positions in some Ottoman infantry divisions.¹⁶⁶ In May and June, the German cruisers, *Goeben* and *Breslau* paid visits to several Ottoman ports.¹⁶⁷ Although not favoring an alliance, Germany was prepared for some sort of military engagement with the Ottomans in the preliminaries, which were leading to war.

In many aspects Germany was right not to favor the Ottoman Empire as a military ally. It remained educationally backward, industrially underdeveloped, resource poor and financially bankrupt. Despite its physical landmass, strategic geographic position, and population base for the army, it would not add much to the powers of Germany.¹⁶⁸ In addition, the Ottomans had no particularly deep commitment for an alliance with Germany. They preferred such an alliance only as a desperate measure in order to preserve the Empire intact. The Ottomans did trust

¹⁶⁴ Erickson p.7-8.

¹⁶⁵ Erickson, p. 37.

¹⁶⁶ Erickson, p. 12.

¹⁶⁷ BOA, DH. KMS. Dosya: 22. Gömlek: 10, BOA, DH. KMS. Dosya: 2/1. Gömlek: 37, BOA, DH. KMS. Dosya: 23. Gömlek: 42.

¹⁶⁸ Erickson, p. 15.

Germany more than any other Great Power because the Germans had not occupied any Ottoman territory and had no important economic involvement with the Capitulations. For the Turks “the fear of, and hostility to, Tsardom was foremost in deciding Turkey’s orientation (towards Germany), and the alliance of her former protectors (France and Great Britain) with Nicholas II was viewed as an ill omen”.¹⁶⁹ Except for Enver Paşa, there was not an unconditional commitment of any important Ottoman figure to the Germans before the war broke out. Enver Paşa’s presence as the most powerful and important figure in the Ottoman Empire was, however, an adequate reason for a potential alliance with Germany in case of a general European war. As he stated in a decree issued in January 1914, even though he was only a minister, he had the power to overrule any of the other ministers on any occasion, thus showing the power and determination to make decisions on his own authority.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Gottlieb, p. 31.

¹⁷⁰ Yılmaz, p. 56.

CHAPTER FOUR:
FROM THE ALLIANCE TREATY TO THE
DECLARATION OF HOLY WAR

A. Developments Until The Arrival of The *Goeben* And *Breslau*

Ernest Jackh, in his study, *The Rising Crescent*, published many of the telegrams exchanged between Berlin and its emissaries in Istanbul during the month that preceded conclusion of the Ottoman-German alliance, between July 14 and August 5, 1914. These telegrams show how Germany's attitude toward an Ottoman alliance changed substantially during just twenty days. They also give many hints about the situation in Istanbul, and how the Ottoman government responded to the emerging threat of war in Europe.

What we lack for the most part are the Ottoman sources. The few that have come to us consist of memoirs left by the leading generals and cabinet members which, while useful, consist only of what their authors wanted us to know about their thoughts and actions. Since real power in the Ottoman government was in the hands of Enver and Talat, they did not exchange views with the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, Mahmut Muhtar Pasa, nor was there any sort of formal decision-making process including other members of the cabinet. There are some letters surviving from Cemil Bey, Ottoman military attaché in Berlin, written to colleagues and friends in Istanbul, which shed some light on Istanbul's supreme ignorance about affairs and

interests in Europe at the time, but that is about it. The Ottoman diplomatic archives surviving from this period have yet to be made available or explored.

Just at the time that Franz Ferdinand, Heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated in Sarajevo, in June, 1914, the Ottomans were attempting to secure alliances to avoid a general European War with minimum damage or even with some gains for the Empire. The Entente Powers, however, rejected all Ottoman attempts for an alliance, and among the Balkan states only Bulgaria was willing to join in such an alliance with the Ottomans. It was the subsequent Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, with German consent, which changed the German attitude toward an alliance with the Ottomans.

The German ambassador to the Porte, Wangenheim, was the most influential factor, which took the Ottoman Empire into the Triple Alliance that had been formed many years before by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Wangenheim was a keen observer of affairs in the Ottoman Empire at the time, and his reports to Berlin reflected reality. He did not react, however, whenever the German government did not accept his views or act on them. On July 14, he shared the view of von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister that “Turkey could be regarded only as passive factor for next few years because of her unfavorable army situation, and Turkey, in her present situation could assume no other position than that of swinging like a pendulum between powers, eventually joining the stronger and more successful group”.¹⁷¹ On July 18, in answering von Jagow, Wangenheim opposed the ideas of the Austrian ambassador to the Porte, Pallavicini on the grounds that it was needless “to induce Turkey to join Austria through Bulgaria”. He added that: “Without doubt, Turkey today is totally incapable of carrying an alliance...For the

¹⁷¹ Jackh, pp. 10-11.

present, Turkey can only be advised to remain aloof from any political adventure and maintain good relations with all countries.”¹⁷²

It is difficult to know whether or not the Ottoman politicians were aware of the Ottoman uselessness as an ally.¹⁷³ The Turkish historian, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, who himself served in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry soon after the war, claims for the most part that Enver and Talat, who were the real decision-makers in the Ottoman government just before the start of the war, were incapable of knowing or properly analysing events.¹⁷⁴ In his telegram to von Jagow on July 22, Wangenheim stated that Enver Paşa shared his view about the Ottoman Empire being a useless ally, concluding that it should remain aloof from political adventures. Enver Paşa added “in practice, however, Turkey’s difficulty is that she can only reorganize with international calm and thoroughness if she is protected externally from attack. For this, she needs support of one of groups of great powers.”¹⁷⁵

This telegram was in fact an Ottoman offer of alliance with Germany. Enver Paşa tried to apply leverage by adding that there were sympathizers with the Entente in the cabinet, and that if Germany refused his offer, it would be hard to suppress them. Wangenheim stated that: “Enver Pasha could therefore say that present Turkish government urgently desires to join Triple Alliance, and only if she were rejected by us would she decide, with a heavy heart, in favor of pact with Triple Entente.”¹⁷⁶ In his July 23 telegram to von Jagow, Wangenheim stated that: “Finally, the Grand

¹⁷² Jackh, p. 11.

¹⁷³ In his telegram dated July 21, 1914 Cemil Bey, the Turkish military attaché in Berlin sent a report to Turkey. It is visible that he followed the events concerning Turkey more than Enver and his colleagues. He stated that the Russians shifted one of their Caucasian armies to Europe. Italy was hesitant to engage in military operations on the side of Triple Alliance. Greece and Rumania would favor neutrality in case of a war. He ended his report by stating that there would be difficulties for the transportation of the ammunitions, which Germany would send Turkey via Rumania. ATASE, Kls. 243, Dos. 1009, fih. 4. in Yılmaz, p. 63

¹⁷⁴ The real problem was about Enver’s sincerity. Until he made a decision, he was mostly reasonable in words. Enver Paşa’s character reveals that he hid his real thoughts on many occasions.

¹⁷⁵ Jackh, p. 12.

¹⁷⁶ Jackh, p. 12.

Vizier repeated the desire expressed to me yesterday by Enver Pasha- Turkey desires her formal entry into Triple Alliance to be made possible...The Grand Vizier answered that Turkey demands exclusive protection against Russia on part of Triple Alliance, but not against France and England.”¹⁷⁷

A week before the conclusion of the Ottoman-German alliance, Enver Paşa and Said Halim Paşa made offers of alliance to Germany. Enver Paşa’s claim that the cabinet favored Germany as the first possible option of an ally, however, hardly seems to be true. When the Ottomans and Wangenheim negotiated about the treaty, the only cabinet members who were present were Enver, Talat and Said Halim, and Halil Bey.¹⁷⁸ They did not inform any other cabinet members or military men about the alliance until the treaty was concluded.

On July 24, 1914, Germany changed its position about rejecting the Ottoman Empire as an ally. The German Foreign Office did not alter its feeling that the Ottomans would not be a suitable ally, nor did Wangenheim, but on the same day that the Austrian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered that such an alliance be concluded.¹⁷⁹ The Personal Minister of Kaiser, Wedel wrote to the Foreign Office that:

His Majesty the King and Kaiser considers Freiherr von Wangenheim’s statements theoretically correct, but is of opinion that at present moment Turkey’s inclination toward Triple Alliance must be taken advantage on grounds of opportunism.

Therefore, if Stamboul definitely wishes to conclude alliance “under sponsorship of Triple Alliance or by one of powers of same”, then she should certainly attempt to bring Rumania and Bulgaria together, and place herself at Austria’s disposal. Wangenheim should use his influence toward this end in Constantinople.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Jackh, p. 14.

¹⁷⁸ The Chairman of the Parliament.

¹⁷⁹ Jackh, p. 112. “The secret alliance originated in an Austro-Hungarian suggestion, was favored by four Ottoman ministers in Constantinople, and was finally decided upon by one man in Germany, the Kaiser himself, despite the fact that the German ambassador in Constantinople and the foreign minister in Berlin had argued throughout against the German-Austrian-Ottoman alliance.”

¹⁸⁰ Jackh, p. 14.

Since the Ottoman Empire had been rejected as an ally by the other Powers, once it decided that it could not stay out of the war and had to take one side or the other, it was destined to choose to join the German alliance. On July 27, Wangenheim reported to Jagow that: “even if Turkey is not absolutely assured of protection against Russia on our part, Turkey still is not lost to Triple Entente.”¹⁸¹ Even if the Serbian-Austrian conflict would not turn into a European war, Germany would prefer to keep Turkey under control. It was advantageous for Germany, therefore, to keep the Ottomans in its orbit, and it could pretend that it was an ally that trusted the Turks’ military power. Von Sanders convinced Wangenheim quickly that the Ottoman Empire could serve as a useful capable ally: “I must naturally readjust my opinion on whether Turkey is capable of fulfilling an alliance. General Liman told me today that he takes full responsibility to defeat any opponent under any conditions as long as he is in command of the five Turkish army corps which can be put immediately into the field.”¹⁸²

The next day Wangenheim informed von Jagow by telegram that the Ottoman Grand Vizier had secretly proposed an alliance agreement of five articles, which became the basis of the Treaty of August 2, 1914.¹⁸³ Both sides recognized the need for secrecy. Wangenheim stated that: “The negotiations should be carried out in strict secrecy, even as regards Turkish ministers. Grand Vizier requested me not to say anything about this at present to any of my colleagues, labeling it as ‘indispensable’, so much so that even Mahmud Muktar Pasha should not be informed.”¹⁸⁴ The German Foreign Office did not even want Pallavicini to be

¹⁸¹ Jackh, p. 15

¹⁸² Jackh, p. 15

¹⁸³ For the Turkish proposal see, Jackh, pp. 16-17

¹⁸⁴ Jackh, p. 16

included in the negotiations. On the Ottoman side, however, something different was going on. Said Halim, Enver, and Talat were trying to act on their own in this matter, without consulting or getting the opinions of other members of the Cabinet. Whereas the German ambassador was fully authorized about the negotiations, the Ottomans did not even inform their ambassador in Berlin, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa about what was going on. Said Halim, Enver, Talat and Halil were thus fully responsible for the signing of the treaty that would drag Turkey into the war a few months later.

After a few days of negotiations between the two governments, on July 31, 1914 German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg fully authorized Wangenheim to sign the treaty.¹⁸⁵ The next day, Wangenheim advised German Foreign Office that: “in case the Goeben (German battleship) should not be absolutely needed in Mediterranean, then she would well be in position, strengthened by Turkish fleet, to keep Russian Black Sea Fleet in check, assure cable connections with Rumania, and prevent a Russian landing on Bulgarian coast.”¹⁸⁶ Once the alliance was concluded, therefore, it was almost certain that the Ottoman Empire would be involved in the World War on the side of Germany.

Wangenheim reported to von Jagow on August 2, 1914 that Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa and Wangenheim signed the Treaty of Alliance between Germany and Turkey at four p.m. on that day:

Constantinople, August 2, 1914

1. Both contracting parties pledge to preserve strict neutrality in regard to the present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

¹⁸⁵ Jackh, p. 18. However, Hollweg reminded Wangenheim that: “It should be established beforehand, whether Turkey can and will undertake worth-while action against Russia. In case of negative answer, alliance would, of course, be worthless and should not be signed.” Hasan Babacan, ‘Enver Paşa’, *Türkler (Cilt: 13)*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 269.

¹⁸⁶ Jackh, p. 19.

2. If Russia should intervene with active military measures, and should thus bring about a *casus foederis* for Germany with relation to Austria-Hungary, this *casus foederis* would likewise enter into effect for Turkey.
3. In case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey. The latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an effective influence on the general conduct of the army, in accordance with the understanding arrived at directly between His Excellency the Minister of War and His Excellency the Chief of the Military Mission.
4. Germany obligates herself, if necessary, by force of arms to protect Ottoman territory in case it should be threatened.
5. This agreement, which has been concluded for the purpose of protecting both Empires from international complications, which may result from the present conflict, goes into force as soon as it is signed by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, and shall remain valid, together with any similar mutual agreements, until December 31, 1918
6. If this treaty is not given notice of cancellation by one of high contracting parties six months before expiration of term mentioned above, it remains in effect for a further period of five years.
7. This present document shall be ratified by His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and by His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of one month from the date of its signing.
8. The present treaty shall remain secret and can only be made public by one of the high contracting parties only after an agreement by both said parties.

FREIHERR VON WANGENHEIM

SAID HALIM¹⁸⁷

As Erickson states, “in reality, the Secret Treaty of Alliance was a very weak document with no operative power of enforcement and it was written only for the situational context of the ongoing Balkan crisis of July 1914”.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, when some of the cabinet members such as Cavid Bey heard about it and objected to its

¹⁸⁷ Jackh, pp. 20-21. For the German and Turkish versions of the treaty, and the original treaty in French see Appendix 3. Yılmaz, pp. 248-250, Aydemir, p. 510.

¹⁸⁸ Erickson, p. 25. Trumpener shares this view by stating that: “ Reflecting the delays occasioned by Berlin’s hesitant attitude, some sections of the treaty text were obsolete at the moment it was signed... It was a hastily made agreement rather than the logical culmination of carefully laid German plans.” Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, (New York: Caravan Books, 1989), p. 17.

provisions, Said Halim Paşa prepared additional articles, which included the real Ottoman concerns. Germany accepted these articles a few days later.¹⁸⁹

Basically, the alliance was concluded primarily to prepare a common defense against Russia.¹⁹⁰ For the Ottomans, however, it meant considerably more than this, which is why Said Halim Paşa added the additional clauses. The main Ottoman concerns, which were added, involved the abolition of the capitulations, the retake of Aegean islands, reaching an agreement with the Bulgarians, preservation of the Ottoman territorial integrity, the Muslims in Russia and war indemnity.¹⁹¹ It is logical to accept Erickson's view that "in the absence of a clear foreign policy or coherent military war plans, these six proposals probably come as close to defining Turkey's war aims prior to hostilities than any other documents."¹⁹²

On the day the treaty was signed, the Ottomans declared general mobilization and armed neutrality. The Grand Vizier also got the Sultan to dissolve the Ottoman Parliament¹⁹³ thus blocking all the opposition to the treaty. However, the treaty really needed a revision as it was signed after the German declaration of war on Russia.

¹⁸⁹ Said Halim's proposals were accepted by Wangenheim on August 6, but there are not adequate sources in German archives as to whether they were officially ratified. The proposals were: 1. Germany promises its help in the abolition of the capitulations. 2. Germany agrees to lend its support to understandings with Rumania and Bulgaria, and it will see to it that Turkey secures a fair agreement with Bulgaria with reference to possible spoils of war. 3. Germany will not conclude peace unless all Turkish territories, which may be occupied by its enemies in the course of the war, are evacuated. 4. Should Greece enter the war and be defeated by Turkey, Germany will see to it that the Aegean islands are returned to the Turks. 5. Germany will secure for Turkey a small correction of her eastern border, which shall place Turkey into direct contact with the Muslims of Russia. 6. Germany will see to it that Turkey receives an appropriate war indemnity. Erickson, p. 27

¹⁹⁰ "In fact, German war aims ranged from irresponsible Pan-Germanism - which treated the Ottoman Empire as a German vassal, a prospective 'German Egypt,' a stepping stone to British Egypt and India- to the authentic policy of the German Foreign Office, which ranged from a belief in 'spheres of influence' to a wholehearted determination to grant full independence to a loyal and valuable ally." Jackh, p. 139.

¹⁹¹ Jackh witnessed in 1915 the Ottoman leaders saying to him that they desired no additional territory. They were just assuming tremendous burdens solely to gain their national freedom, self-determination, and independence. Jackh, p. 131.

¹⁹² Erickson, p. 27.

¹⁹³ The group consisted of Enver Paşa (the War Minister), Talat Paşa (the Minister of Interior Affairs), Said Halim Paşa (the Grand Vizier), Halil Bey (the Chairman of the Parliament) and Cemal Paşa (Minister of Navy), who after learning the conclusion of the treaty took sides with the group.

The treaty had various problems, even at the time it was signed. Firstly, Article 1 was already out of date since Germany had already declared war on Russia. Article 2 was not clearly worded since the phrases “to intervene with active military measures” and to “invoke *casus foederis*” could be interpreted in various ways.¹⁹⁴ Secondly, Article 3 provided “leverage for Germany over Turks” by stating that “in case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey. The latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an effective influence on the general conduct of the army”.¹⁹⁵ This article was worded finally after the meeting between Enver Paşa, Wangenheim and Sanders on August 1, 1914. In the German Embassy, they discussed “the military implications of the proposed German-Ottoman pact”¹⁹⁶; and “they reached an agreement that Turkey would stand on the defensive on the Caucasian frontier and assemble an army of 210,000 men in Thrace for operations against Russia, but with Bulgarian and Rumanian neutrality uncertain, alternatively against Greece”.¹⁹⁷ Wangenheim thus had created the grounds for Germany to force the Ottoman Empire to enter the war whenever it wanted by means of military pressure and control.

¹⁹⁴ Erickson, p. 25. “It (the treaty) became activated only in the case of Russian intervention with active military measures against Austria-Hungary. In fact, Russia had only mobilized and had not intervened, when Germany declared war on her first. Therefore, when Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914, the Secret Treaty of Alliance (which was signed the very next day) was in effect invalid on signature.”

¹⁹⁵ Erickson, p. 25.

¹⁹⁶ Ulrich, Trumpener, ‘Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.1, Issue 4 (October, 1966), p. 182. The only known prewar plan for German-Ottoman action against the Entente was agreement of 1 August 1914 between Wangenheim, Liman and Enver who met in German Embassy. Agreed that once the alliance was signed, Ottoman army should take defensive position in Caucasus against Russia, concentrate most of their land forces in Thrace for offensive in cooperation with Bulgaria against Russia or Greece. At that point they did not know if Bulgaria would join the Central Powers or if Rumania would allow Turco-Bulgarian advance through its territory against Russia, so agreement had little meaning, except to show that Ottomans intended to participate in the German war effort. But Wangenheim knew it would take at least one month for Ottomans to assemble their forces in Thrace, but he felt that on basis of this agreement he was justified in signing the alliance on afternoon of 2 August. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 23.

¹⁹⁷ Erickson, p. 25.

Thirdly, Articles 4 and 5 were designed by taking Von Sanders mission's presence into consideration. The duration of the treaty was accepted as five years, because the contracts of the Von Sanders mission would end around that time according to the agreement of 1913. However, the same agreement provided that Germany had the right to call back the mission in case of a war.¹⁹⁸ Thus, the German military guarantee for Turkey was not sincere or strong.

Finally, Articles 6, 7, and 8 were the least problematic ones. In his telegram of August 2, however, Wangenheim noted that the Turkish "Grand Vizier wishes explicit ratification of treaty by both sovereigns so that Turkey remains committed unconditionally, even if he perhaps should be overthrown".¹⁹⁹ This shows that Said Halim Paşa was aware of the fact that they were taking a risky, if not a dangerous step, for Turkey, which would well cause him to lose his position. The Ottoman Sultan ratified the treaty officially on October 17, 1914,²⁰⁰ even though it was over a month after it was signed.

The analysis of the treaty shows that its wording was very ambiguous, and left the Ottoman government with very little maneuvering room to stay out of the war at the last minute. What made the Ottoman government to sign such a treaty? Did not they consider the possible results of such an engagement? Enver Paşa was an important factor in the decision to sign. He thought that he could raise an army of two million soldiers and, believing in a quick German victory in a general European war, he sought rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire by military victories, which would be gained as a result of German partnership. Talat Paşa, as a politician, saw the German

¹⁹⁸ Von Sanders and his officers wanted to return on August 19, 1914 by using this clause. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 33, Trumpener, 'Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance', p. 184 Liman was suspicious about Enver's statements, he thought that Turkey would not intervene in the foreseeable future –certainly not until Russia had been beaten by the Central Powers.

¹⁹⁹ Jackh, p. 21.

²⁰⁰ Cezmi Eraslan, 'I. Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye', *Türkler (Cilt: 13)*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 49.

alliance as the only means of assuring the Empire's survival.²⁰¹ He believed that the Ottoman Empire should take advantage of the German alliance in order to reconstruct the country. He was aware of the seriousness of the situation, but he did not want the Empire to miss the chance of allying with a great power.²⁰² These views prevailed as Enver and Talat had the real power in the Ottoman government at the time.

The Grand Vizier and the other ministers were either hesitant or opposed to the alliance. They could not oppose or get involved in the decisions, however, either because for fear of the CUP which supported Enver and Talat, or because the decision-makers had successfully hidden the entire procedure from them.

The long term German and Ottoman expectations from the alliance differed considerably. A survey of the literature on the Ottoman-German partnership reveals that the expectations on both sides were considerably different. Whereas the Ottomans saw the alliance as an opportunity for survival, the Germans felt the alliance assured them of control of the Ottoman Empire as a satellite state that would ease their military campaigns and economic future. Before 1914, the main instrument for German economic aims was the Baghdad Railroad. In the summer of 1914, however, the Baghdad Railroad did not seem to offer a bright future. The Deutsche Bank, the main sponsor of the project, was on the verge of bankruptcy, and "the (Baghdad) line was neither capable of dominating economic life nor suitable instrument for exerting political pressure on the Porte".²⁰³

²⁰¹ Corrigan, p. 147. Talat said "Turkey was in the position of a man in a forest beset by robbers. He would willingly give up his clothes, his money, his goods and his chattels, if only his life and perhaps his shirt were saved".

²⁰² Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918), p. 34. Talat told Morgenthau that: "We understand that (turning Turkey into a colony like Egypt) is Germany's programme. We also know that we cannot put this country on its feet with our own resources. We shall, therefore, take advantage of such technical and material assistance as the Germans can place at our disposal. We shall use Germany to help us reconstruct and defend the country until we are able to govern ourselves with our own strength. When that day comes, we can say good-bye to the Germans within twenty-four hours".

²⁰³ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 8.

The diplomatic and political situation arising from the start of a world war closed the gap between Turkish and German interests. But the war plans which were put into effect and the expectations that were realized mostly matched those of Germany rather than the Ottomans. Von Jagow wired Wangenheim on August 3, 1914 that secrecy of alliance was needed because of the German ship movements i.e. the movement of *Goeben* and *Breslau*, in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Von Jagow ordered Wangenheim to “see that Mohammedan catchword is spread in English colonies, particularly toward India; revolutionization of (Mohammedan) Caucasus is desired.”²⁰⁴ The plans of using the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in order to control the Russian fleet, and using the Islamic appeal of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph in order to stir up the Muslim populations of the Russian and British empires were the German plans accepted by the Ottomans before the war began.

Wangenheim’s telegram to Von Jagow, on August 4, revealed that Enver Paşa had instructed the military authorities in the Dardanelles to permit German and Austrian warships to pass through as early as the fourth of August.²⁰⁵ This shows that Germany did not design a *fait accompli* for the entrance of the two ships on August 10.²⁰⁶ Likewise, on the issue of the British requisition of the newly-completed Turkish ships, *Sultan Osman* and *Reşadiye*,²⁰⁷ about the same time, Trumpener claims that Enver and Talat Paşa hid the truth from the public, that “on August 1, Enver and Talat offered to direct the Sultan Osman to a German port, a proposal directly

²⁰⁴ Jackh, p. 21 see also, Tirpitz to Jagow in, Jackh, p. 22

²⁰⁵ Jackh, p. 23

²⁰⁶ Cemil Bey’s telegram on August 3, strengthens this view that he informed Turkey about German plans of permitting the two ships to go to the Black Sea in order to join the Ottoman fleet. ATASE, Dos. 243, Kls. 1009, fih. 7-2.

²⁰⁷ These ships, of which Turkey paid sums amounting to seven million British pounds, were requisitioned by England on August 3, 1914.

accepted by Berlin”. He argues that this proposal, learnt by the English, might have made England to requisition the ships.²⁰⁸

The telegrams by Von Jagow to the German ambassador to Sofia, dated August 4 and 5 revealed that an Ottoman attempt to secure an alliance with Bulgaria was initiated by Germany.²⁰⁹ After lengthy negotiations by Talat Paşa and Halil Bey with the Bulgarians from the sixth to nineteenth of August, a secret mutual defense pact was signed. Bulgaria, however, did not agree to collaborate with the Ottomans in war since Rumania had not yet officially declared its neutrality. The resulting Ottoman-Bulgarian treaty was thus no more than a non-aggression pact in which both parties agreed not to attack any other Balkan state without consulting each other, and to avoid confrontation with Rumania.²¹⁰

In the meantime, after an adventurous escape from the British fleet, on August 10 *Goeben* and *Breslau* passed through the Dardanelles as a result of an order issued by Enver Paşa, though the Grand Vizier opposed the passage due to uncertainty about Bulgarian and Rumanian involvement in the war.²¹¹ On the issue of arrival of the ships, Gottlieb argued that without the cruisers the Ottomans would have delayed their entry into the war for some time, which might well have caused Russia to go ahead and occupy the Straits. “But just the expected downfall prompted London and Paris to seek a means of preventing Petrograd from achieving her aims.” He concluded that that was why Britain allowed the German ships to reach İstanbul,

²⁰⁸ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, pp. 23-24 “On the same day that Said Halim told Wangenheim he feared British would seize the *Sultan Osman*, the British did in fact seize both it and the *Reshadiye* without any Ottoman provocation. However in fact there was provocation, for on 1 August 1914, Enver and Talat had offered to send the *Sultan Osman* to a German North Sea port, and Germans had accepted the offer.”

²⁰⁹ Jackh, p. 23.

²¹⁰ Erickson, p. 31, Trumpener, ‘Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance’, p. 185.

²¹¹ See Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, pp. 25-37 for the details.

and once accomplished their task of arriving Turkey, the ships made it inevitable for Turkey to join Germany in war.²¹²

On the day the *Goeben* and *Breslau* entered the Sea of Marmara, Germany was already at war with England, France, and Russia. With the ships in İstanbul, Germany was certain about the Ottoman entry on its side.²¹³ Berlin ordered Admiral Souchon, commander of *Goeben*, to open hostilities against Russia as soon as possible to force an immediate Ottoman entry into the war. In the face of Entente Powers' protests about the German Mediterranean Fleet's presence in İstanbul, on August 11, 1914, the Ottoman government acquired the *Goeben* and *Breslau* by means of a fictitious sale in order to avoid immediate entry into war, and to continue the Ottoman neutrality as long as possible.²¹⁴

²¹² Gottlieb, p. 47.

²¹³ Morgenthau, p. 80. "With them (*Goeben and Breslau*) the Turkish navy became stronger than the Russian Black Sea Fleet and thus made it certain that Russia could make no attack on Constantinople... The passage of the Strait by these German ships made it inevitable that Turkey should join Germany at the moment that Germany desired her assistance, and that it likewise sealed the doom of the Turkish Empire."

²¹⁴ Halil Menteşe, pp. 189-191.

B. German-Ottoman War Aims and the Ottoman Empire's Entry Into the First World War

The point of no return for the Ottoman Empire started with the arrival of the German ships in İstanbul. In the meantime, the war went on with pace in the European theater, and the Germans were increasingly insistent that the Ottomans openly live up to their treaty obligations and enter the war. According to the German war plans, the Ottoman Empire had to achieve the following goals. "The Ottomans would be used mainly to serve the German interests of diverting the Russians and British from the main war theaters of Europe. The Ottomans therefore were to advance into Egypt and to invade the Caucasus, with an appeal for a Holy War enhancing their efforts in these campaigns as well as undermining the enemy's ability to mobilize its forces" from the Muslim populated colonies.²¹⁵ Furthermore, Turkish participation in the war could impress and intimidate the Balkan states to join the Triple Alliance.²¹⁶ However, most members of the Ottoman cabinet did not want to enter the war unless Bulgaria and Rumania openly joined the Central Powers.²¹⁷

According to the Ottoman point of view, the war was an opportunity to preserve possession of the Straits and Eastern Anatolian territories, to bring an end to the continuous loss of territories which had been taking place since the 18th century, to regain control of Arabia and Egypt, to unite the Turks of Persia, Caucasia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan under the Ottoman flag, and to continue the leadership of

²¹⁵ Shaw, pp. 313-314, Eraslan, p. 343.

²¹⁶ Cemil Bey to Enver Paşa, ATASE, Dos. 243, Kls. 1009 in Yılmaz, p. 74.

²¹⁷ Gottlieb, pp. 35-37.

the Empire in the Muslim world.²¹⁸ Gottlieb states, “Turkey was expected not only to defend the Straits and protect her frontiers but conquer Egypt, free Persia, prepare the creation of independent states in Trans-Caucasia, threaten India from Afghanistan and furnish active assistance in European theaters.”²¹⁹

At the end of August 1914 a new group of German military personnel came to the Ottoman Empire as a result of a request made earlier by Enver Paşa. This second group consisting of 460 men was headed by German coastal specialist Admiral Usedom who was assigned by Enver Paşa as Commander of the Straits Fortifications.²²⁰ Its arrival had been delayed because of objections by Rumanian President Bratianu, who closed the Rumanian borders against shipments of military personnel and materials.²²¹

As the Ottomans could not secure Rumanian and Bulgarian collaboration in war activities, at the start of September 1914, the Ottoman General Staff -despite Enver Paşa's pressure- still was hesitant about entering the war since they felt it would be very difficult to get the proposed German military help through those countries. Another concern of the Ottoman General Staff was the issue of mobilization, which had been declared the same day that the treaty with Germany was signed. Although, they had initially expected to complete the mobilization in twenty or twenty-five days, by the end of August they understood that it would not be finished until the end of September.²²² They therefore recommended that unless the issues of Bulgarian collaboration, mobilization and supply of military materials

²¹⁸ İsmet Görgülü, *On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu (1912-1922): Balkan- Birinci Dünya ve İstiklal Harbi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1993), p. 47.

²¹⁹ Gottlieb, p. 35.

²²⁰ With Usedom officially in charge of all Ottoman coastal defenses, German coastal specialists begin repair of Dardanelles defenses at the beginning of September. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, pp. 36, 140.

²²¹ Ulrich Trumpener, ‘German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation’, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 32, Issue 2 (June, 1960), p. 147.

²²² Turkish mobilization was not complete until early November. Erickson, p. 33.

by Germany were achieved, the Empire should not enter the war until the spring of 1915.²²³ Most of the ministers in the cabinet and some Turkish ambassadors in Europe shared this view. The Turkish ambassador in London, Tevfik Paşa, wired Talat Paşa on August 29, of rumors within political circles in London that Germany's fate would not be good at all, and it would be defeated by Russia.²²⁴ The Ottoman ambassador to France, Rıfat Paşa also warned the Turkish government on August 28 that the Russian were in control of the road to Vienna, that Rumania and Italy would join the Entente powers, and concluded that the Ottoman Empire should stay neutral as Germany would inevitably be defeated.²²⁵

According to the German war plans, the German army would defeat the French army in six weeks after the start of the war, and then after the French front was closed, it could turn to the eastern front to defeat Russia. Enver and Talat developed their plans for Ottoman participation in the war on the supposition that this German plan would be successful. But the French army stopped the Germans at the Battle of the Marne, which ended on August 9, 1914, making a quick German victory on the Western Front almost impossible and inaugurating years of trench warfare and stalemate.²²⁶ It was as a result of this defeat that Germany pushed the Ottomans into an immediate entry into the war, just as the suppositions, which were behind Enver and Talat's willingness to join melted away. The head of Prussian general staff, Moltke pushed von Sanders, and Wangenheim pushed Enver to open hostilities against Russia.²²⁷

Enver Paşa was determined to enter the war as soon as possible, but the “failure to obtain Bulgaria's assistance, the poor condition of the Dardanelles

²²³ Görgülü, pp. 48-50.

²²⁴ BOA, DH.EUM.VRK. Dosya 13. Gömlek 44.

²²⁵ Yalman, p. 218, Kocabaş, p.173.

²²⁶ Eraslan, p. 344.

²²⁷ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 36

defenses, and the lack of military preparedness”²²⁸ made the other cabinet members increase their opposition to entering the war at that time. “Wangenheim advised Berlin on September 8 that Enver’s hands are tied by unwillingness of colleagues and technical problems.”²²⁹ Besides Germany’s pressure, some of the Turkish newspapers, bribed by the Germans, tried to conceal the German defeat at the Marne from the Ottoman public in order to bring the Ottomans into the war before the public found about the real situation. They spread propaganda about German victories and Wilhelm II’s view of Ottoman greatness: “The Russian bogey, inflated beyond measure, was blamed for all the country’s ills” by these newspapers.²³⁰

On September 6, 1914 the Turkish General Staff formally and significantly changed the Primary Campaign Plan for the Turkish army.²³¹ The plan now required the Fourth Army to be sent to Egypt, and the Third Army to the Caucasus. The Ottoman General Staff²³² and Liman von Sanders exchanged views on the possible Turkish offensives against the Triple Entente. According to the new plan, Turkey would open fronts in Syria, Egypt, and the Caucasus. Von Sanders proposed an offensive to Odessa. His proposal was not accepted, as it was too risky to launch an attack on Odessa. The concentration plans included the Turkish concentration of forces in Thrace, Caucasia, and Palestine.²³³

In the meantime, the Turkish government announced a unilateral abolition of the long-hated Capitulations on September 9, 1914 that would be valid after

²²⁸ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 35, Eraslan, p. 345.

²²⁹ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 36.

²³⁰ Kocabaş, p. 172, Yalçın, p. 217. Gottlieb claimed that the Germans bought the newspapers, *İkdam* and *the Osmanischer Lloyd*, Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 59.

²³¹ For the war, mobilization, and concentration plans and their applications, see appendix IV and Akbay, pp. 212-238.

²³² see Görgülü, p. 53, appendix V. Actually, Enver Paşa, Hafız Hakkı Paşa, Bronsart, and von Sanders were the actual planners.

²³³ Erickson, pp. 39-42, Trumpener, ‘Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance’, p. 186-188.

October 1, 1914.²³⁴ The German and Austrian ambassadors joined the ambassadors of the Entente powers in formal protest notes against this action, but told the Ottomans privately that they would not press the issue at that time.²³⁵ With the completion of the war plan and the incitement of the Entente powers by abolishing the Capitulations, the Ottoman Empire was at the brink of the war, only needing a final reason to openly join Germany and Austria.

For those Turks who opposed immediate involvement in the war, there were enough reasons to avoid entry. Chances were slim for a steady flow of supplies from Germany because of the situation in Rumania. On September 11, Cemil Bey reported from Berlin that the German situation in France was unfavorable. The Germans did not expect immediate collaboration by Rumania and Bulgaria, and the military materials from the Krupp factory could not reach Istanbul for some time.²³⁶ The cabinet therefore on September 14 rejected Enver Pasa's authorization for German Admiral Souchon, who now commanded the entire Ottoman Black Sea fleet as well as the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, to conduct fleet maneuvers in the Black Sea.²³⁷

Admiral Souchon, more than any others, was the person responsible for forcing the Ottoman Empire to openly enter the war. After the Ottoman cabinet rejected Enver Paşa's order for him to enter the Black Sea and lead naval maneuvers, he declared that he would act on his own even if he could not get official permission. As a result, on September 21, the cabinet provided the necessary authorization, three days later appointing him Vice Admiral. In this way, the Ottomans would have an excuse if Souchon attacked Russian ships, because as a German naval officer he

²³⁴ Eraslan, p. 344, Tepekaya, Muzaffer, 'Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914)', *Türkler (Cilt: 13)*, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), p. 51.

²³⁵ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 38, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi (Cilt: 3 Kısım: 1)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), pp. 167-171.

²³⁶ ATASE, dos. 243, Kls. 1009, fih. 24 in Yılmaz, pp. 80-81.

²³⁷ Trumpener, 'Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities', p. 371.

would only be responsible to Wilhelm II, but as an Ottoman admiral he would be responsible to the Sultan. "If an incident should occur, the Porte would declare that Souchon had overstepped his authority, that he had been forbidden to do anything against Russia".²³⁸

Despite efforts by most cabinet ministers including the Grand Vizier to prevent immediate Ottoman entry into the war,²³⁹ Enver Paşa eased the way to achieve the German aims. On September 26, after the British ships which had patrolled the Dardanelles entrance since the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had entered, stopped an Ottoman torpedo boat soon after it left Ottoman waters, he personally ordered that the Dardanelles closed to all ships.²⁴⁰ The Ottomans also began to lay mines at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Furthermore, "on October 1 the Ottoman customs duties, traditionally controlled by the powers through the Capitulations, were unilaterally increased by four percent".²⁴¹ Enver Paşa, "the war minister, was confident that the empire was militarily ready to intervene. In fact, the only difficulty was the lack of money, he had to be sure of Germany's financial support once the Turks had started marching."²⁴²

Germany assured Enver Paşa that the money he had asked for would be sent, but not the German personnel and war materials because the Rumanian president Bratianu "notified the German minister in Bucharest on October 2 that he would permit no further shipments of materiel for Turkey to enter the country".²⁴³ Aware of this fact, opposition cabinet members continued to maintain their position

²³⁸ Trumpener, 'Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities', pp. 372-373.

²³⁹ Although Said Halim Paşa signed the alliance treaty he opposed the immediate entry into the war. He was the spokesman of the cabinet members opposed to the entry into the war. Trumpener claims that Germany would like to see a coup against the grand vizier by Enver Paşa. More interestingly, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa proposed a scheme for a coup d'état against the grand vizier, which was not taken seriously by Germany. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 45.

²⁴⁰ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 46.

²⁴¹ Shaw, p. 312.

²⁴² Trumpener, 'Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities', p. 375.

²⁴³ Trumpener, 'German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation', p. 149.

against the war. In the meantime, impatient Sanders tried to withdraw his military mission from Turkey, but he was ordered by his German superiors to remain in his post.²⁴⁴

Enver Paşa and the Ottoman interventionists held a secret meeting with Wangenheim on October 11. Enver Paşa told Wangenheim that “Enver, Talat, Halil and Cemal agreed that their group in the committee were committed to war, that Souchon would be authorized to attack the Russians as soon as Berlin deposited two million Turkish liras, and they would induce the grand vizier to resign if he refused to agree to German intervention”.²⁴⁵ Wangenheim promised Enver Paşa that the money would be delivered if war was declared, “and arrival of the gold (money) on October 21 cleared the way for action”.²⁴⁶ The same day Enver Paşa took the title of “vice-generalissimo (or deputy-commander in chief)”.²⁴⁷

The next day, the German imperial headquarters received Enver Paşa’s final war plan. The plan required that “the opening blow was to be delivered by a surprise attack on the Russian fleet” in the Black Sea. “Furthermore, Enver’s plan provided for defensive land operations in Transcaucasia and the advance of an expeditionary corps against Egypt, while the bulk of the Ottoman army was to stand by for action against Russia’s southern flank.”²⁴⁸ The German Supreme Army Commander, Falkenhayn who replaced Moltke after the Marne defeat accepted the plan. On October 25, Enver Paşa drafted the authorization to Souchon, which “explicitly called for Black Sea maneuvers with the entire fleet and an attack on the

²⁴⁴ Trumpener, pp. 43-45 German intelligence said there was a three way split in Ottoman cabinet. Enver and Cemal supported joining Germany in war; Said Halim and Finance Minister Mehmed Cavid Bey opposed intervention; Talat acted as mediator between the two.

²⁴⁵ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 49.

²⁴⁶ Shaw, p. 312.

²⁴⁷ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 68.

²⁴⁸ Trumpener, ‘Turkey’s Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities’, p. 377, for the details of the plan see Yılmaz, pp. 89-90, Kocabaş, pp. 177-178.

Russian fleet if a suitable opportunity presented itself”.²⁴⁹ Similarly, “Cemal issued a secret directive to senior officers of the Ottoman fleet that Admiral Souchon was entitled to receive their compliance with orders”.²⁵⁰ The other members of the Cabinet were unaware of these developments.

Within the Turkish General Staff many –like Bronsart and Hafız Hakkı Paşa who were sent to Berlin on October 24 in order to learn the detailed opinions of the German headquarters about the war plan- thought that the best course of action was to wait out the developments. Enver Paşa, however, did not share this view.²⁵¹ He left the rest of the issue about starting a war to Souchon who would be the main actor for assault on Russian ports.²⁵²

On October 29, the Ottoman fleet headed by Admiral Souchon shelled many Russian ports in the vicinity of Odessa and sunk some Russian vessels. Erickson argues that “the naval mission had no viable strategic objective.” The Ottoman fleet could only sink one warship, two gunboats and five merchant vessels. This shows that it was not a serious naval operation but a political provocation.²⁵³

The raid angered the anti-interventionist members of the cabinet as it meant Ottoman involvement in war. “When the news of Souchon’s raid reached the Porte, Said Halim and Djavid demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities. According to the plan, Enver obliged by sending not only an order to that effect, but also a hint

²⁴⁹ Jackh, p. 117 gives the telegram of Enver to Souchon

²⁵⁰ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, pp. 53, 55, Erickson, p. 34, Eraslan, p. 345.

²⁵¹ ATASE, Dosya: 73, Kls.: 1646, Fih.: 4, Appendix IV.

²⁵² Trumpener, ‘Turkey’s Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities’, p. 378. “As Enver explained to Wangenheim the fleet was to depart for the Black Sea as soon as possible. Careful arrangements had been made to allow Souchon freedom of action even if some members of the Porte tried to stop the raid. In that case, the admiral would receive wireless instructions not to open Enver’s sealed order of attack, but this would be a merely formality.”

²⁵³ Erickson, p. 35.

directing Souchon to disregard the same.”²⁵⁴ However, the anti-interventionists were not persuaded, and they asked for a cabinet meeting.

The next day the cabinet met, and four ministers resigned, as they did not wish to be involved in a government, which was responsible for war.²⁵⁵ Enver persuaded Said Halim Paşa to remain at his post by promising that he would send conciliatory notes to the Entente powers, especially to Russia. Pallavicini and Wangenheim also worked to persuade the Grand Vizier not to resign. Said Halim Paşa therefore agreed to remain, but Russia did not accept Turkey's excusatory note.²⁵⁶ “On November 2, 1914 Russia replied with a war declaration on the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France followed three days later.”²⁵⁷ On November 11, the Ottoman government declared war against Russia, France and Great Britain, and the same day Sultan Mehmed Reşad V, and the *şeyhülislam* declared Holy War against the Entente Powers.²⁵⁸ In his speech calling the parliament back into session, the Sultan summarized the official legitimization of the Ottoman entry into war stating that the Russian hostilities compelled the Ottomans enter into the war.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ Trumpener, ‘Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities’, p. 378.

²⁵⁵ The ministers who resigned were Cavid Bey (Minister of Finance), Oskan Bey (Minister of Posts), Süleyman Elbostani (Minister of Commerce and Agriculture) and Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa (Minister of Public Works).

²⁵⁶ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, pp. 56-60. Trumpener claims that the grand vizier's life was implicitly threatened by the CUP in order to make sure he would stay in office.

²⁵⁷ Shaw, p. 312.

²⁵⁸ see appendix VI, Aydemir, pp. 560-564.

²⁵⁹ MUZC, D III/ C 1, İçt.2, appendix VII.

CONCLUSION:

The Ottoman Empire chose to become involved in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. On both sides, it was not a carefully planned, clearly defined, and wholeheartedly believed decision. Although Germany and the Ottoman Empire had close ties for more than forty years, the history of the relations between the two countries did not influence their decision much to conclude an alliance in the final stage. Instead it was the diplomatic improvisation of Germany led by Kaiser Wilhelm II in July 1914 and the individual decisions of Enver, Talat and later Cemal, which made the German-Ottoman alliance possible. “Faced with the likelihood of a general European war, Germany’s leaders in late July 1914 abruptly set aside their misgivings about a close association with the decrepit Ottoman state and accepted the proffered military help of the Turks.”²⁶⁰ The Turks, whose fate was in the hands of Enver Paşa and his close colleagues, thought that the Central Powers would be victorious in a general European war. The Ottoman leaders thought that it was impossible to stay out of war, and that joining the Central Powers would help them reconstruct the Empire.

I have tried to analyze the course of the Ottoman-German military and diplomatic relations before the First World War and to see whether the Ottoman-German alliance was the inevitable outcome of the close economic, military and diplomatic relations which had been developed during the previous quarter century. It is difficult to conclude that the alliance was as inevitable as has been depicted since the Ottomans made several attempts to secure alliances with France, Great

²⁶⁰ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 366.

Britain and Russia, all of which were rejected. The Ottomans, however, did have reasons to prefer Germany once they decided that they needed a big brother in order to survive. There were common concerns and coincidents of interests between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, as well as increased rivalries between Germany and the Entente Powers before the First World War.²⁶¹ One cannot claim, therefore, that the Ottomans could have avoided the war by only analyzing the last three months before their entry into the war.

This study concludes that several factors influenced the course of relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The Russian threat, the Baghdad Railroad Project, the German military reform missions and the German ambassadors in the Ottoman Empire, the friendship between Wilhelm II and Abdulhamid II, and the Young Turk sympathy in the military circles for the German militarism were the factors shaping the German-Ottoman partnership. However, actually, both countries' own state interests, and their ways and choices of conducting foreign policy defined the degree of the partnership between the two states. Most of the Turkish sources emphasize one or few of the factors, and try to depict the Ottoman Empire's entry into war as an eventual result of those factors. Historians like Gottlieb, Earle, Trumpener and Weber focus on the separate parts of the picture. Foreigner or Turkish alike, the historians tend to evaluate the period after the signing of the treaty of alliance as the continuation of the previous periods. This thesis tries to cover a broader picture of the relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire and concludes that the German-Ottoman relations had different characteristics before and after their treaty of alliance. Before the alliance the Ottoman Empire tried to ally

²⁶¹ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, pp. 5-6. "...It is generally agreed today that the frictions between Germany and the Entente Powers in and along the edges of the Ottoman Empire contributed substantially to the general atmosphere of distrust which made the World War I possible."

Germany in order to help survive the Empire whereas Germany tried to maximize its economic dominance and benefits in the Ottoman Empire without an actual commitment for an alliance. After the alliance the Ottoman Empire, while continuing its previous goal turned out to be a German ally, served for the ambitious and adventurous goals of Enver Paşa and his colleagues. Germany, on the other side, still not fully committed, agreed to ally the Ottoman Empire for its political and military needs.

The Russian threat and the Baghdad Railroad Project were the two important factors, which led to a diplomatic rapprochement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Russia had been the Ottomans' most dangerous enemy since the early years of the eighteenth century. Prussia had helped the Ottoman Empire considerably during that century since it felt that a powerful Russia on its eastern border would threaten its security. The Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 made it clear that Russia would try its best to dissolve the Ottoman Empire and to occupy the Straits and Eastern Anatolia. At the Congress of Berlin, as a result largely of Bismarck's initiatives and arbitration, the Great Powers changed the clauses of the Russian-imposed Treaty of San Stefano (*Ayastefanos*), which could have hastened Ottoman dissolution. Bismarck had tried hard, nonetheless, to keep Germany on good terms with Russia throughout the years that he served as Chancellor. Bismarck's resignation from in 1890 opened the way for Wilhelm II to apply an aggressive foreign policy called *Weltpolitik*, according to which Germany challenged the other Great Powers by entering the race of colonization as the primary means of becoming a world power. Wilhelm II's failure to renew Bismarck's non-aggression pact with Russia in 1890 was a clear sign that Bismarck's cautious policy had been abandoned. Germany therefore joined the Ottomans in considering Russia as a

potential enemy. Bismarck had managed to avoid having both France and Russia hostile to Germany at the same time. It was Germany's reaction to Russia's alliance with Britain and France that caused it to enter a defensive alliance against Russia with the Ottomans, who thought that the Russian threat would be eliminated with a German victory.

By establishing close ties with Abdulhamid II, Wilhelm II secured permission to construct the Baghdad Railroad, which opened Ottoman dominions to German economic penetration. This was a real threat to Russian ambitions in Anatolia as well as to French and British interests in Iraq. Abdulhamid II and Wilhelm II, two real autocrats, appeared to the other Great Powers as real friends. Abdulhamid II tried to use German economic penetration as a means of balancing the economic domination of France and Britain in the Ottoman Empire as well as to establish security in his dominions. Abdulhamid II attracted more reactions from the Great Powers when he convinced Wilhelm II to send a Military Reform Mission to Istanbul. His grandfather, Mahmud II (1808-1839) had brought the first Prussian officers to the Empire. Among them, von Moltke had made a major impact on the new Ottoman army created during the *Tanzimat*. During Abdulhamid II's reign Von der Goltz made an even bigger impact. The young Ottoman officers who were trained by these German officers admired the Prussian militarism characterized in the personality of Wilhelm II. The latter tried to use the German Military Support Missions to deepen German economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire. He supplemented this work by visiting the Ottoman Empire twice, in 1889 and 1898, appealing to the Ottomans, and through them to all Muslims, to demonstrate that he was the real protector of the Muslims and Islam.

Wilhelm II and Abdulhamid II created friendship between the two countries, which was basically fictitious since they were really acting entirely for the interests of their respective countries. Abdulhamid II was trying to end his Empire's diplomatic isolation and to use the German card as leverage against France, Britain and Russia. Wilhelm II was trying to make the Ottoman Empire favor Germany politically and militarily in order to achieve its economic interests in the Ottoman territories.

The Ottomans tried to turn to Britain, France and Russia after the Revolution of 1908. But since they were rejected by France and Britain and threatened by Russia, they continued Abdulhamid's policy of promoting German railroad projects and economic investments as a means of securing German protection and support. It was for this reason as much as anything else that the Young Turk leaders welcomed the German Military Reform Mission headed by Von der Goltz in 1909. Germany also helped the Ottoman Empire financially with a state loan of 30,000,000 francs in 1910, after Britain and France refused to provide the same amount of money, a clear diplomatic victory for the Germans. As a result, the Ottoman leaders began to believe that the Germans were their most likely protectors. German help was not so much the product of admiration and friendship as it was the simple result of Wilhelm II's policy of *Reelpolitik*, which required keeping on good terms with the Ottomans without actually making a commitment in the form of an alliance. The year 1910 was the peak of German-Ottoman rapprochement before August 1914, when the Treaty of Alliance was finally signed.

The Revolution of 1908 was the product of Young Turks who were mostly organized under the umbrella of the CUP. Enver Paşa, one of the heroes of the 1908 Young Turk revolution, was the product of the military schools, which had been

reformed by the Germans during the late nineteenth century. In the same way, Mahmut Şevket Paşa and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, both of whom served as Chief-of-Staff during this time, were heavily influenced by German militarism. Like Wilhelm II, the last generation of the Ottoman generals believed that the survival of the Empire depended on a strong army, which would be the guarantee of the Empire's economic and political independence as well as the deterrent to internal and external threats to the Empire.

Faced with diplomatic isolation during the Tripolitanian War of 1911-1912, and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, when the Powers refused to live up to their treaty obligations to protect Ottoman integrity against Italian aggression, intervening only to accept and preserve Ottoman territorial losses, the Ottoman leaders at first did not turn to Germany due to the German failure to support the Ottomans at the time that Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909. Instead, to avoid becoming a tool of German interests, they tried to secure the alliance of all other states, including even the Balkan states that had attacked them. Contrary to the claims of Turkish historians following establishment of the Turkish Republic, Enver, Talat and Cemal were not the tools of German interests. The Ottoman military's involvement in politics as the guarantor and dominator of Turkish politics prevailed in the Empire after the Raid on the Porte, but this was not the outcome of the leaders' commitment to Germany. Mahmut Şevket Paşa and Enver Paşa admired German militarism, but their main concern was to establish authority and strengthen the Ottoman army rather than turning the Empire into a satellite state of Germany.

From the end of 1910 to the beginning of 1914, the Ottoman leaders did not feel that Germany was a protector that could be trusted. They were aware that Germany would not guarantee Ottoman territorial integrity in case of a partition, but

would rather try to share the spoils. Indeed, the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars, and the resulting substantial territorial losses, proved to the Germans that it would be very difficult to prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the efforts of the German ambassadors in İstanbul, Marschall and Wangenheim, who urged Berlin to save the Ottoman Empire in order to benefit Germany, Germany merely sought military and economic dominance in the Empire without going to the trouble of protecting its integrity.

The work of these able and influential ambassadors ultimately enabled Germany to become the least dangerous Great Power in the eyes of the Ottoman leaders, despite the fact that behind the scenes Germany was still involved in secret negotiations regarding partition of the Empire, which demonstrated that in Germany there was not harmony between the thoughts of Wilhelm II, ambassadors and the German Foreign Office. After Abdulhamid's single-handed formulation and execution of Ottoman foreign policy, subsequent Ottoman leaders were unable to formulate a consistent foreign policy because of the many changes in the cabinets, which took place after 1908. The CUP leaders were not experienced enough to handle foreign affairs, but nonetheless they were forced to do so. The German-Ottoman Treaty of Alliance of August 2, 1914 can be evaluated as the result of the inconsistent policies of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire. As Erickson argues in *“Ordered to Die”*:

The Young Turks did not orchestrate foreign policy through a professionally staffed foreign ministry or foreign office, preferring instead diplomacy personally conducted by inner circle cabinet members. The period July through September 1914 was characterized by a series of Ottoman diplomatic initiatives which appear contradictory and confused. It is arguable that because of the Young Turks' propensity to conduct diplomacy in isolation, that any given time between August and November 1914, no single individual within the Turkish government (including Said Halim and Enver Paşa) had a global awareness of the entire diplomatic situation affecting the Empire. This

compartmentalization of awareness destroyed any chance of rational checks and balances which might have prevented the war.²⁶²

The lack of rational checks and balances on the Ottoman side was the most important reason why the Ottomans could not avoid entering the war. Until the last moment, Enver and Talat hid their decision to get into the war from the other cabinet members. The secret alliance of August 2, 1914 and the passage of Goeben and Breslau into Ottoman waters “provided the engine that separated Turkey from meaningful dialogue with the entente, while at the same time obligated Turkey to support Germany in an almost unavoidable slide toward war.”²⁶³ It would not have been easy for Germany to drag the Ottoman Empire into the war if it had a government that knew more about the situation in Europe at the time and was not subject to the personal decisions and dictations of Enver and Talat. It is necessary to add that the efforts of Admiral Souchon as well as of Ambassador Wangenheim only accelerated Turkey's entry into the First World War.²⁶⁴

Last but not least, the German mission headed by Liman von Sanders helped significantly in the reorganization of the Ottoman Army, but it was far from orienting the Ottomans towards a commitment as an ally. It, like the previous German missions, was seen rather as the extension of German economic investments in the Ottoman Empire, but nothing more. The German missions were successful at providing substantial profits to the German weapons industry by getting the Ottomans to purchase most of their arms and ammunition from the great German companies like Krupp and Mauser. Like von Moltke and von der Goltz, von Sanders

²⁶² Erickson, p. 30.

²⁶³ Erickson, p. 20.

²⁶⁴ Erickson, pp. 36-37. “With the exception of Enver Paşa, Turkey went unwillingly to war and, absent the relentless determination of Ambassador Wangenheim and the accidental presence of Vice Admiral Souchon, might have successfully avoided involvement. Overall, maneuvering Turkey into the war was possibly the best strategic move that Germany made in the first years of war, costing them almost nothing, while at the same time creating a strategic problem for the entente of enormous consequence.”

assessed the value of Ottoman military power realistically, and concluded that the Ottoman Empire lacked the strength to supply the force needed from a real ally. The memoirs of Ali İhsan Sabis and Kazım Karabekir who held important positions in the Ottoman Army before and during the First World War reveal that the Ottomans did not sincerely regard the missions as useful for the Empire. In addition to the reforms they applied to the Ottoman Army, the missions mostly served to introduce German discipline and punctuality to the Ottomans. The young officers who were trained in German ways acquired the German militarist approach and later served as the core cadres of the Ottoman general staff during the First World War and the Turkish War for Independence. The presence of the von Sanders mission in the Ottoman Empire served as a deterrent factor against the Entente powers before the war, but it was far from being an effective tool to drag the Ottomans into the war. Germany never considered the German missions as the indispensable tools for persuading the Turks to agree on an alliance. After signature of the secret treaty of Alliance and the arrival of the Goeben and Breslau, however, Germany tried to use the German officers as leverage against the Turks and the Entente Powers.²⁶⁵

To sum up, German-Ottoman diplomatic relations were mostly cordial following the first interaction at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The Ottoman-German Defensive Alliance of 1790, the arrival of the Kaehler Reform Mission in Turkey in 1883, the Baghdad Railroad Concession of 1904, Germany's supply of a state loan to Turkey in 1910, and the arrival of the von Sanders Military Mission in December 1913 were the peak points in developing relations between the two states. Although there was a regression in their relations in the first months of 1914, the secret treaty of August 2, 1914, which was designed as a defensive treaty

²⁶⁵ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918*, p. 368.

against Russia, culminated in Ottoman involvement in the First World War as a partner of Germany.

It is difficult to argue that Germany and the Ottoman Empire were involved in a close partnership after the early eighteenth century. Throughout the whole period, the two countries followed policies best fitted to their interests. Germany sought for economic and political domination in the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire wanted to reform and reconstruct its army and economy in order to survive. In the last two centuries of its existence, the Ottoman Empire lacked the presence of a professionally staffed foreign office, which could dominate its conduct in foreign affairs. Instead, the individual acts and decisions of the Ottoman politicians and sultans shaped its relations toward the Great Powers, including Germany. Germany, on the other side, was strongly motivated by its economic ventures in the Ottoman territories, but it also lacked a consistent policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The biggest factor that caused the rapprochement of the two countries was their historical enemy, Russia.

Contrary to the arguments in many secondary sources, thus, the German traditions in the Ottoman Army and the services of the German officers in the Ottoman Empire did not eventually lead to the alliance of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. They were factors in the final decision, but not the major one. As Germany faced the belligerency between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which led to the potential belligerency of Russia against Germany, Germany concluded an alliance with the Ottoman Empire. In the last three months before the Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War, the willingness of Enver and Talat combined with the determination of Wangenheim and the aggression of Souchon prepared the end of the Ottoman Empire.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

“Von der Goltz Paşa'nın 16 Teşrinevvel (Ekim) 1899 tarihinde Alman Genelkurmay Başkanı Waldersee'ye yazdığı raporun Yıldız Arşivi'ndeki Türkçe tercümesi” Başbakanlık Arşivi, Yıldız Evrakı, Kıs: 15, Zarf: 74/81

Bundan evvel takdim ettiğim tahrirata zeyl olmak üzere Avrupa-yi Osmani'nin ahval-i tedafüyyesini hulasaten arz ederim.

Avrupa-yi Osmani ber vech-i ati iki suretle müdafaa olunabilir. Evvela; Dersaadeti himaye için tedabir-i lazime ittihazı ve saniyen; payitahtdan baid olan hudud hatları üzerinde köyleri muhafaza için bazı merakiz-i tedafüyyesinin teşkil ve ihzarı; Meriç vadisi ne Priştine ve Üsküp ve ne de Selanik'den müdafaa olunabilir. Devlet-i aliyye Avusturya ve Macaristan askerinin memalik-i mezkureye tecavüzlerini men itmek kaziyyesini başka bir devlete tevdi itmeğe mecburdur. Mamafih Selanik ile Üsküp ve Avlonya beyninde mumted olan hat, Makedonya ve Arnavudluk ve Eski Sırbistan aleyhinde ehemmiyeti haizdir. Sırbistan ile Bulgaristan aleyhinde icra olunacak hareket-ı askeriyeninistinadgahı Üsküb ve daha doğrusu Kumanova'dır. “Müezzi?” ovasını müdafaa için bundan mühim bir nokta olamaz. Devlet-i aliyye Yunanistan'dan çok korkmalıdır. Zira Yunanlılar denizi istila iderler ise Osmanlılar'ı sevhil-i garbiyede her nevi hareket icrasından men edebilirler. İşbu tehlike-i hakikiyeden uzun uzadıya bahs itmeksizin şurasını beyan etmeliyim ki, Osmanlı donanması külliyyen kıymetden aridir. Boğaziçi ile Kale-i Sultaniye'den Dersaadet'e muvasalatı men için inşa olunan istihkamat gayri kafidir. İstihkamat-ı mezkure bir düşman donamasına yirmi dört saat bile mukavemet idemez. İstihkamat-ı ... tamir olunmadıkları gibi teçhizatı dahi noksandır. Karaya gelince; Dersaadet civarları Karasu ile tayin olunan Çatalca hattı ile himaye edilmektedir. Çatalca mevkii bir taraftan Marmara denizinde vaki Küçükçekmece körfezi ve diğer taraftan Terkos köyü üzerine istinad etmektedir. Beyker (Baker) ve Blum Paşalar tarafından tahkim edilmiş olan hatt-ı mezkur elyevm metruk bir haldedir.

İmdi elyevm icrası lazım gelen şeyler bunlardır: Evvela; Dersaadet'in deniz cihetini torpidolar ve tahtelbahir, edavat-ı harbiyye ile müdafaa itmek, saniyen; Kavakların iki sahilinde, biri Rumili ve diğeri Anadolu cihetlerinde olmak üzere kubbeler ve cesim toplar ile mücehhez bazı (tabyeler) inşa eylemek, Fenar Boğazı için denize doğru bazı bataryalar inşası dahi lazımedendir. Kale-i Sultaniye'de küçük bir filonun içtima'ı ve bu filoya erzak ve mühimmat yetiştirilmesi için Büyükdere küçük körfezinin gözedilmesi icab-ı haldendir. Kavak geçidi bunun için intihab idilebilir. Bunali (?) ve ? tafya ve iskele ve Magore (?) Sultaniye kalesi nam mahallerde inşaat-ı hazıra yerine, usul-ü cedide üzere istihkamlar inşası ehemdir. Kara ciheti için bundan evvel takdim ettiğim tahrirata istinad ederim. Tahrirat-ı mezkure bizzat keşf ve muayene eylediğim bilcümle tefsilat-ı mükemmeliyeye havidir.

Almanya'ya i'zam olunacak Osmanlı zabitanı haşmetli imparator hazretlerine bağayet sadık görünen zevattan mı, yoksa efkarımıza iştirake meyl ve her hususda bize muavenete hazır olan zabitan meyanında intihab idilecektir. Bu babda taraf-ı acizaname talimat irsalini rica iderim.

Beyan-ı hal, ibraz-ı measir-i ihtiramkariye vesile ittihaz olundu.

Fi, 16 Teşrinevvel sene 89

Appendix II

D: 3 C: 1 İ. S.: 2

Meclis-i Umumi Zabıt Ceridesi

1. İnikad 1 Mayıs 1330 (1914) Küşat Saati: 15.15

1. Celse Bedi Müzakerat

Reis: Reis-i sin Rıza Paşa

...Devletimizin şimdiye kadar mahrum olduğu menabii varidattan istifade edebilmesi için bazı düvel-i muazzama ile müzakerata girişilmiş ve Fransız Hükümeti ile hitam bulan bu müzakeratın İngiltere Hükümeti ile ikmalî kuvve-i karibeye geldiği gibi, Almanya ve Rusya Hükümetleri ile de pek yakın bir zamanda hüsn-ü neticeye iktiranı kaviyyen memul bulunmuştur. Bu itilafların bir taraftan gelecek seneden itibaren bütçemizi tevzin ve diğer taraftan Devletimizle düvel-i saire arasındaki münasebat-ı siyasiyye ve iktisadiyyeyi takviye ve tahkim ederek memleketimizin sulh ve sükun dairesinde terakki ve inbisatı iktisadisini temine medar olacağını ümit ederim.

Siyaset-i hariciyyemiz, hukukumuzun tamamen muhafazasıyla hukuk-u gayri riayetkar olmak esasına müstenit bulunmak itibariyle, Düvel-i Muazzama-i mütehabbe ile münasebat-ı siyasiyyemiz kemakan samimi, her taraftan mütehabben ibraz olunan meaşir-i itilaf ve müsalemetperverane ile daha ziyade müstaidi inkişaf ve inbisattır. Hal-i harp hitam bulmak hasebiyle, komşu devletlerle münasebat-ı siyasiyyemiz iade olunmuştur...

Appendix III

İTTİFAK MUAHEDESİ

İstanbul-Tarabya
2 Ağustos 1914

1. Tarafeyn-i akideyn, Avusturya-Macaristan ile Sırbistan arasında tahassüs eden ihtilaf-ı hazırı karşı kati bitaraflık muhafazasını deruhde eder.
2. Rusya, Avusturya-Macaristan aleyhine fiili tedabir-i askeriyye ve müdahale ederek böylece Almanya'nın da harbe duhulünü mecburi kılsa bu husus Osmanlı Devleti'nin de harbe iştiraki için sebep teşkil edecektir.
3. Hal-i harbde Almanya, heyet-i ıslahiyesini Osmanlı Devleti emrinde ibka edecektir. Buna mukabil Osmanlı Devleti de bu heyet-i ıslahiyyeye, harbiye nazırı hazretleriyle heyet-i ıslahiye reisi hazretleri arasında doğrudan takarrür edecek esasata tevfikan ordunun sevk ve idaresi hususundafili bir nüfuz itasını temin eder.
4. Tehdide maruz olacak Osmanlı topraklarını, Almanya lüzumunda silahla müdafaa eylemeyi taahhüd eder.
5. Her iki devleti ihtilafat-ı hazırıdan tevellüt edebilecek ihtilata karşı siyanet maksadıyla akdedilmiş olan itilaf zirde isimleri muharrer murahhaslar tarafından imzası akabinde meri olacak ve mütekabil mümasile ile 31 Kanunuevvel 1918 tarihine kadar hükmü devam edecektir.
6. Balada tespit edilmiş olan tarihten altı ay evvel tarafeyn-i akideyn tarafından bir ihbar vaki olmadığı takdirde muahedenin ahkamı yeniden beş sene daha meri olacaktır.
7. Bu muahede haşmetlu Almanya İmparatorluğu ve Pruya kralı hazretleriyle Osmanlı İmparatoru hazretleri tarafından tasdik edilecek ve müsaddak nüshalar tarih-i imzadan bir ay zarfında teati olunacaktır.
8. Bu muahede gizli tutulacak ve ancak tarafeyn-i aliyeyn-i akideynin arasında bilitiraf neşredilecektir...Tasdiken

Baron von Wangenheim

Sait Halim

Deutsch-Türkischer Bündnisvertrag

Konstantinopel, 2. August 1914

- Die beiden vertragschließenden Teile verpflichten sich, gegenüber dem gegenwärtigen Konflikt zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien strikte Neutralität zu bewahren.
- Falls Rußland mit aktiven militärischen Maßnahmen eingreifen und dadurch für Deutschland den casus foederis gegenüber Österreich-Ungarn herbeiführen sollte, so würde dieser casus foederis ebenfalls für die Türkei in Kraft treten.
- Im Kriegsfall wird Deutschland seine Militärmission zur Verfügung der Türkei lassen. Die Türkei ihrerseits sichert der genannten Militärmission, entsprechend den zwischen Sr. Exz. dem Kriegsminister und Sr. Exz. dem Chef der Militärmission unmittelbar getroffenen Vereinbarungen, einen wirksamen Einfluß auf die allgemeine Armeeführung zu.
- Deutschland verpflichtet sich, das Gebiet des Ottomanischen Reiches im Falle der Bedrohung nötigenfalls mit den Waffen zu verteidigen.
- Dieses Abkommen ist getroffen, um die beiden Reiche vor den internationalen Verwicklungen zu schützen, die aus dem gegenwärtigen Konflikt entstehen könnten; es tritt in Kraft, sobald es durch die erwähnten Bevollmächtigten unterzeichnet ist, und bleibt nebst den gegenwärtigen ähnlichen Verpflichtungen bis zum 31. Dezember 1918 in Gültigkeit.
- Falls dieser Vertrag nicht durch einen der hohen vertragschließenden Teile sechs Monate vor Ablauf des hier oben genannten Termins gekündigt wird, bleibt er für einen weiteren Zeitraum von fünf Jahren in Kraft.
- Die vorliegende Urkunde wird durch S. M. den Deutschen Kaiser, König von Preußen, und S. M. den Kaiser der Ottomanen ratifiziert, und die Ratifikationen werden binnen eines Monats nach dem Datum der Unterzeichnung ausgetauscht.
- Der gegenwärtige Vertrag bleibt geheim und kann erst nach einem zwischen den beiden hohen vertragschließenden Teilen getroffenen Übereinkommen veröffentlicht werden.

Baron Wangenheim

Said Halim

Appendix IV

ATASE, Dosya: 73, Klasör: 1646, Fih.: 4

Harbiye Nezareti Erkan-ı Umumiye Riyaseti

29 Teşrinievvel 1330

Son vaziyet-i siyasiyyeye göre “harb planı” hakkında bazı müalaat

VAZİYET-İ SİYASİYYE:

Müttefikler: Almanya, Avusturya, Bulgaristan

Düşmanlar: Rusya, İngiltere, Fransa, Yunan, Sırb

Bulgaristanın Sırbistana ilan-ı harbi ile beraber Yunan Bulgara ilan-ı harb edecek ve bittabi biz de Yunana ilan-ı harb edeceğiz. Bunu müteakip İngiltere, Rusya, Fransa bizlere ilan-ı harb edecekler. Bu vaziyet de dolayısıyla ordunun vezaifi:

1. Bulgaristana yardım etmek
2. Boğazları ve İstanbulu karadan ve denizden müdafaa
3. Bunların ifasından akdem umumi harbin iyi netice etmesine mümkün mertebe müessir bir surette yardım etmek
4. Umumi harbde Alman ve Avusturyaya yardım

1. Bulgaristana Yardım Etmek

Harb-i umuminin neticesine balkan harbi çok az tesir yapar. Bulgara yardım Bulgar ordusunun Sırb ve Yunan ordularına galibiyetini tesir edecek bir harda olmalıdır.

Bu tarafa ne kadar az kuvvet gönderirsek netice-i katiyye cihetinde o kadar kuvvet bulundurabiliriz. Sırb ordusu Avusturyalılarla meşguldür. Bulgarların taaruzu ile beraber Avusturyalılar da taarruza kalkışabilirler. O halde Sırbılar Bulgarlara karşı 100,000 kişi bile gönderemez.

Yunan ordusunda yeni silahlar ve toplar çok ise de zabitan miktarının azlığına dair mütemadiyen gelen haberlere göre Yunan, teknil redif ve müstahfizlarla beraber 200,000 den fazla ordu çıkaramaz. Ceman 300,000 e varamaz. Bu iki müttefik ordusuna karşı beherinin mevcudu 35,000 den aşağı olmayan on Bulgar fırkası (mevcudu 350,000 nefer) yalnız mutavaffık olur. Biz de iki kolordu verirsek (ceman 80,000 bin neferdir), o halde Bulgarlar düşmanlarına karşı hepsi syyar ve muvazzaf olmak üzere 430,000 neferle hareket etmiş olurlar ki 140,000 nefer bir tevfiğ vardır. İşbu 430,000 kişilik kuvvetin 180,000 neferlik beher fırkası Sırba ve müteyakısı Yunana dönerek muzafferiyetli bir harb yapabilir. Bizim bu cihetle ikinci kolordudan başka altıncı kolorduyu vermemiz münasib olur. Çünkü nisbeten daha iyi iktidarda olan diğer kolordularımız daha kuvvetli düşman olan müttefiklere karşı lazımdır.

2. Boğazları ve İstanbulu Karadan ve Denizden Müdafaa

Düşman donanmalarından Rus donanmasını bizim donanmamızın mahv etmesi ümid olunur. Her halde donanma kumandanından bu hususdaki muvaffakiyet derecesi sorulmak lazımdır. İngiliz ve Fransız donanmalarının Çanakkale Boğazını

zorlaması cihetiyle gelince bu ya karaya asker çıkarmak ve denizden zorlamak yahud yalnız denizden zorlamak suretleriyle olur.

Düşman donanmalarının boğaz istihkamatını tamamen mahv ve tahrib edip edemeyeceğini boğaz kumandanlığından ve sevahil istihkamatı müfettişliğinden sorulmalıdır. Boğazın ağzındaki izledikten sonra boğazın içine giren asıl büyük istihkamlarımızı tahribe mani olmak için Almanyadan birkaç ağır obüs bataryası getirtmeğe çalışmak ve boğazın içine serseri torpil vaz' etmek pek faydeli olur.

İşbu boğaz istihkamatının arkasına karaya asker çıkarmak suretiyle de boğaz istihkamatını düşürmeğe çalışabilirler. Her ne kadar Yunanlar Osmanlı-Bulgar ordularıyla, Fransa Alman ordularıyla paymal olurken ve İngiltere Mısırdaki tahrib edilirken boğazın arkasını alabilecek ihtimali bir kuvvet tefrik etmeleri müşkil ise de İstanbulun zabt-ı İslam üzerine ve Devlet-i Aliyyenin Rusyaya taaruz ilanına tesir-i azim yapacağı her hal muhtemel bir harekettir.

İngiliz donanmasının İstanbul önüne gelmesi Devlet-i Aliyyeyi harbtan alıkoyamazsa da oradan taarruzu gayri mümkün ve Kafkasyaya taarruzu müşkil kılar. Her halde Çanakkalenin müdafaası son derece mühim bir meseledir.

Düşmanlarımızın burada çıkaracağı kuvvetin azami bu müşkil ahval içinde 40,000 den fazla olamayacağından seyyar jandarmalarla beraber üçüncü kolordu bu mikdara takviye edilirse hem Çanakkale edilmiş hem de düşmanın küçük kuvvetlerle İzmir ve sevahiline yapacağı taarruzlara karşı şiddetli hareket edilmek imkanı istihsal edilmiş olur.

3. Harb-i Umuminin İyi Neticelenmesine Müessir Bir Surette Yardım Etmek (Yani Almanya ve Avusturyaya Yardım Etmek)

Fransa cihetine bir yardım yapamayız, binaenaleyh bizim uğraşacağımız düşman ikidir: İngiltere ve Rusya

A. İngiltereye Karşı:

a. Mısıra Taarruz: Sekizinci kolorduyla Mısıra taarruz. Sekizinci kolordunun Süveyş istikametine karşı tehşidi beray-ı İngilizlere vakit bırakmamak için sekizinci kolorduyu şimdiden Kudüs ve şimalinden tehşide başlamak lazımdır.

İngilterenin Mısıra takviye ederek harbi uzatması haline karşı İngiltere için en mühim bir nakit olan bu cihette harbi tahaddi ettirmek için onikinci kolordunun da bu cihete tahsis edilmesi lazımdır.

Bu cihetle Arabandan ve Hicaz firkasından da istifade olunabilir.

b. İrana taarruz: Hind kolordusuyla Araban ve İmam Hüseyin hazretleri İran üzerine taarruz etmelidir.

c. Basra Körfezi cihetine taarruz: Ebussuud Hazretleri Araban ile Basra firkası ile Kuveyt veye ve bu cihetle İngiliz nüfuzuna tabi menatika taarruz olunur.

d. Bağdad ve havalisi kumandanının toplayabildiği bütüm asakir kuvvetleriyle İranda İngiliz orduları aleyhine bir cihad açılır.

e. Harbi neticelendirmek için İngilizlerin inadını kırabilmek: Bu harbde maddeten en az zarar gören İngilizlerdir. Fransız, Rus, Alman ve Avusturyalılardan yüz binlerce ölürken İngilizlerden ancak beş-on bin ölüyor. Ticareten de en az İngilizler zarardide oluyor. Binaenaleyh harbin tahaddisinde inad etmek en ziyade İngilizler için kabil ve faydelidir...

Appendix V

Başkomutan Vekili ve Harbiye Nazırı	Tuğg.	Enver Paşa
Başkomutan Vekili Yaveri	Yzb.	Kazım (Orbay)
Genelkurmay Birinci Başkanı	Tuğg.	Bronzart von Schellendorf
Genelkurmay Birinci Başkan Yardımcısı	Alb.	Hafız Hakkı
Genelkurmay Birinci Başkan Yardımcısı	Alb.	Bahattin
Harekat Şubesi Müdürü	Yrb.	Von Kress
Harekat Şubesi Müdür Yardımcısı	Bnb.	İhsan (Sabis)
Harekat Şubesi Müdür Yardımcısı	Bnb.	İsmet (İnönü)
İstihbarat Şubesi Müdürü	Bnb.	Kazım (Karabekir)
İstihbarat Şubesi Müdürü	Bnb.	Seyfi (Düzgören)
İstihbarat Şubesi Müdür Yardımcısı	Bnb.	Ömer Lütfi
Demiryolu ve Muvasala Şube Müdürü	Bnb.	Patrich
Demiryolu ve Muvasala Şube Müdür Yardımcısı	Bnb.	Refik
Demiryolu ve Muvasala Şube Müdür Yardımcısı	Yzb.	Mümtaz
Menzil Umum Müfettişliği	Yrb.	Nihat
Sıhhiye Umum Müfettişliği	Alb.	Dr. Süleyman Numan

Appendix VI

**29 TEŞRİNİEVVEL 1330 (11 KASIM 1914) HARB HALİ
BEYANNAME-İ RESMİSİ**

Şehr-i halin onaltıncı günü donanmay-i humayunun bir kısmı tarafından Karadenizde manevra icra edilmekte olduğu sırada Karadeniz Boğazına torpil dökmek vazifesiyle hareket ettiği bilahire anlaşılın Rusya donanmasının bir takımı mezkur manevraları ihlal ve müteakıben izhar-ı muhasema ile Boğaza doğru hareket etmeleriyle donanmay-ı humayun tarafından mukabele olunmakla beraber şayan-ı teessüf olan şu hadise hakkında hükümet-i seniyyece Rusya devletine müracaatla tahkikat icrası ve vakıa esbabının zahire ihracı teklif ve bu suretle bitarafılığı muhafazaya ihtimam edilmiş olduğu halde Rusya devleti müracaat-ı vakıaya cevap vermeksizin sefirini geriye celp ettiği gibi kuvay-ı askeriyyesi de Erzurum hududunu hatt-ı muhtelifeden tecavüz etmiş ve bu sırada Fransa ve İngiltere devletleri dahi sefirlerini geriye çağırıldıktan başka İngiliz ve Fransız donanmaları müştereken Çanakkaleye ve İngiliz kruvazörleri Akabeye top atmak sureti ile bilfiil muhasemata ibtidar ve ahiren de düvel-i mezkureye Devlet-i Osmanıyyece müstainen bittevfikat-ı Allah-u teala mezkur üç devlete hal-i harp ilanını irade eyledim.

22 Zilhicce 1332/ 29 Teşrinievvel 1330

Dahiliye Nazırı ve Maliye Nazırı Vekili
Talat

Harbiye Nazırı
Enver

Şeyhülislam ve Evkaf Nazırı
Hayri

Nafia Nazırı
*

Maarif Nazırı ve Posta
T. T. Nazırı Vekili
Şükrü

Bahriye Nazırı
Cemal

Adliye Nazırı ve Şuray-ı
Devlet Reis Vekili
İbrahim

Ticaret ve Ziraat Nazırı
Ahmet Nesimi

29 TEŞRİNİEVVEL 1330 (11 KASIM 1914) TARİHLİ CİHAD-I EKBER HATT-I HUMAYUNU

ORDUMA, DONANMAMA

Düvel-i muazzama arasında harb ilan edilmesi üzerine her daim nagihani ve haksız tecavüzlere uğrayan devlet ve memleketimizin hukuk ve mevcudiyetini fırsatçı düşmanlara karşı icabında müdafaa edebilmek üzere sizleri silah altına çağırıştım. Bu suretle müsellaah bir bitarafılık içinde yaşamakta iken Karadeniz Boğazına torpil koymak üzere yola çıkan Rus donanması talimla meşgul olan donanmamızın bir kısmı üzerine ansızın ateş açtı. Hukuk-u beynelmilele muğayir olan bu haksız tecavüzün Rusya tarafından tashihine intizar olunurken gerek mezkur devlet ve gerek müttelikleri İngiltere, Fransa devletleri sefirlerini geri çağırarak suretiyle devletimizle münasebat-ı siyasiyelerini katlettiler. Müteakiben Rusya askeri hududumuza tecavüz etti. Fransa ve İngiltere donanmaları müştereken Çanakkale Boğazına İngiliz gemileri Akabeye top attılar. Böyle yekdiğerini takip eden hainane düşmanlık asarı üzerine öteden beri arzu ettiğimiz sulhu terk ederek Almanya ve Avusturya-Macar devletleriyle müttelik menafi-i meşruamızı müdafaa için silaha sarılmaya mecbur olduk. Rusya devleti üç asırdan beri devlet-i aliyyemizi mülken pek çok zararlara uğratmış şevket ve kuvve-i milliyyemizi artıracak intibah ve teceddüt asarını harble ve bin türlü desayis ile her defasında mahva çalışmıştır. Rusya, İngiltere ve Fransa devletleri zalimane bir idare altında inlettikleri milyonlarca ehl-i İslamın diyanete ve kalben merbut oldukları hilafet-i muazzamamıza karşı hiç bir vakit su-i fikr beslemekten fariğ olmamıştır ve bize müteveccih olan her musibet ve felakete müsebbib ve muharrik bulunmuşlardır. İşte bu defa tevessül ettiğimiz Cihad-ı Ekber ile bir taraftan şan-ı hilafetimize diğer taraftan hukuk-i saltanatımıza karşı ika edilegelmekte olan taaruzlara inşaallahuteala ilelebed nihayet vereceğiz. Avn-i inayet-i bari ve meded-i ruhani-i Peygamberi ile donanmamızın Karadenizde ve cesur askerlerimin Çanakkale ile Akabe ve Kafkas hududunda düşmanlarımıza vurdukları ilk darbeler hak yolundaki gazamızın zaferle tetevvüc edeceği hakkındaki kanaatimizi tezyid eylemiştir. Bugün düşmanlarımızın memleket ve ordularının mütteliklerimizin pay-i celadeti altında ezilmekte bulunması bu kanaatimizi teyid eden ahvaldendir.

Kahraman askerlerim,

Din-i münibiniz vatan-ı azimize kasteden düşmanlara açtığımız bu gaza ve cihad yolunda bir an evvel azm ü sebatan ve fedakarlıktan ayrılmayınız. Düşmana aslanlar gibi savlet ediniz. Zira hem devletimizin hem fetva-i şerife ile davet ettiğim üç yüz milyon ehl-i İslamın hayat ve bekası sizlerin muzafferiyetinize bağlıdır. Mescitlerde, camilerde, Kabetullahta huzur-u Rabb-ı alemine kemal-i vecdi istiğrak ile müteveccih üç yüz milyon masum ve mazlum mümin kalbinin dua ve temenniyatı sizinle beraberdir.

Asker evlatlarım,

Bugün uhdenize terettüp eden vazife şimdiye kadar dünyada hiç bir orduya nasib olmamıştır. Bu vazifeyi ifa ederken bir vakitler dünyayı titretmiş olan Osmanlı ordularının hayrülhalefleri olduğunuzu gösteriniz ki düşman-ı din ü devlet ile bir daha mukaddes topraklarımıza ayak atmaya, Kabetullahı ve merkad-i münevvere-i nevebiyi ihtiva eden arazi-i mübarekey-i Hicaziyyenin istirahatini ihlale cüret edemesin. Dinini, vatanını, namus-u askerisini silah ile müdafaa etmeyi padişah

uğruna ölümü istihkar etmeyi bilir bir Osmanlı ordu ve donanması olduğunu düşmanlarımıza müessir bir surette gösteriniz.

Hakk-ı adil bizde zulm-ü advan düşmanlarımızda olduğundan düşmanlarımızı kahretmek için cenab-ı adil-i mutlakın inayetli gurrası ve Peygamber-i zişanımızın inayet-i manevisi bize yar ve yaver olacağına şüphe yoktur.

Bu cihaddan mazisinin zararlarını telafi etmiş şanlı ve kavi bir devlet olarak çıkacağımıza eminim. Bugünkü harple birlikte hareket ettiğimiz dünyanın en cesur ve muhteşem iki ordusu ile silah arkadaşlığı ettiğimizi unutmayınız. Şehitlerimiz şüheday-ı Salifeye müjde-i zafer götürsün. Sağ kalanlarınızın gazası mübarek, kılıcı keskin olsun.

22 Zilhicce, 29 Teşrinievvel 1330
Mehmet Reşad

CİHAD-I MUKADDES FETVASI

İslamlık aleyhine düşman hücumu vaki ve İslam memleketlerinin gasb ve yağma edilmesi ve İslam halkının esir edilmesi ortaya çıkınca İslam padişahı bütün halkı silah altına almak suretiyle Cihadı emrettikte “Enfiru” ayeti hükmünce bütün Müslümanlar üzerine cihad farz olup genç ve ihtiyar piyade ve süvari olarak bütün Müslümanların mal ve canları ile Cihada baş vurmaları farz-ı ayn olur mu? El cevab: Olur.

Bu suretle bugün İslam halifeliği makamına ve Osmanlı ülkesine harb gemileri ile ve kara kuvvetleri ile hücum etmek suretiyle İslam halifeliğine düşman ve Allah korusun Müslümanlığın yüksek ruhunu söndürmeye çalışmakta oldukları gerçekleşmiş olan Rusya, İngiltere ve Fransa ile onlara yardımcı ve destekçi olan hükümetlerin aleyhine harb ilan ederek ve harekete geçerek gazaya hemen başlamaları farz olur mu? El cevab: Olur.

Bu suretle maksadın gerçekleşmesi bütün Müslümanların Cihada baş vurmalarına bağlı iken Allah korusun karşı koysalar bu davranışları büyük günah ve isyan olup Allah gazabına ve bu ağır günahın cezasına müstahak olurlar mı? El cevab: Olurlar.

Bu surette İslam hükümeti ile muharebe eden adı geçen hükümetler İslam halkı öldürmüş ve bütün ailelerini mahv ile istemeyerek ve zorlanmış olsalar bile İslam hükümeti askeri ile muharebe etmeleri şer’an haram olup öldürülerek cehennem ateşini hak etmiş olurlar mı? El cevab: Olurlar.

Bu suretle bugünkü günde İngiltere, Fransa, Rusya, Sırp, Karadağ hükümetleri ile bunları destekleyenlerin idareleri altında bulunan Müslümanların Osmanlı hükümetine yardımcı bulunan Almanya ve Avusturya aleyhine harb etmeleri İslam halifeliğinin zararını mucib olacağından büyük günah olmakla çok acı azabı hak etmiş olurlar mı? El cevab: Olurlar.

Ketebetül fakiri ileyhüm teala
Hayri bin Avni Elürgabi afa anhuma

Appendix VII

D: 3 C: 1 İ. S.: 2

Meclis-i Umumi Zabıt Ceridesi

1. İnikad 1 Kanunuevvel 1330 (1914) Pazartesi

1. Celse Bedi Müzakerat Saat: 13.15

Reis: Reis-i sin Rıza Paşa

Hükümet-i Seniyyemiz ihtiyar ettiği müsellaah bitaraflıkta sebatı azmetmiş iken, Donanma-i Humayunumuz Karadeniz’de Rus Donanması’nın tecavüzatına duçar olmuş ve müteakıben Rusya ve İngiltere ve Fransa Devletleri hudutlarımıza asker ve donanma sevk ile fiilen muhasemata başlamış oldukların, Avni Bari ve inayet-i Peygamberiye bittevessül düvel-i mezkureye karşı hal-i harbi ilan ile hudutlardaki ordularına ileri hareket emri verdim.

Muazzam müttetiklerimiz Almanya ve Avusturya-Macaristan Devleti’nin şanlı orduları tarafından müşterek düşmanlara karşı Avrupa’da ihraz olunan muzafferiyat-ı mütevaliye Kuvay-ı Berriye ve Bahriyemizin ve emr-i şeri ile Rusya, İngiltere ve Fransa’ya karşı cihada davet edilen mücahidiyn-i İslamın, Asya ve Afrika’da parlak zaferler ilave edeceğine ve bundan sonra Cenab-ı Hakkın muhafaza-i hak ve adl için silaha sarılmış olan Devlet-i Aliyyemize ve çar aktar-ı cihandaki İslamlara şeref ve saadetle mübeşşir bir istiklal bahşedeceğine mutekidim.

Devletimizce vaktiyle ecanibe bahşolunan müsaadat-ı mahsusa, anenfeanen işgal ve makasidini tebdil ederek, hukuk-u hükümranimizi haleldar edici bir mahiyyet-i muzırta iktisap eylemiş olduğundan, hukuk-u beyneddüvel esasatından hiçbirine temas etmeyen ve kapitülasyon namı altında içtima eden bilcümle imtiyazat-ı ecnebiyyenin refini irade ederek, düvel-i sairede olduğu gibi, Memalik-i Şahanemde dahi ecanip ve bunlara müteallik muamelat hakkında hukuk-u beynelmilel ahkâmının tatbiki usulünü vaz eyledim.

Harb-i Umumiye iştirak etmeyen düvel-i muazzama ve hükümat-ı saire ve bilhassa komşumuz Bulgaristan ile münasebat-ı siyasiyyemizin kemakan halisane ve dostane olduğunu maal memnuniyye beyan ederim.

Appendix VIII

Nezaret-i Umur-u Bahriye

Birinci Daire

Şube: 1571

Donanmay-ı Humayun Birinci Komutanlığına tayin buyrulan Amiral Suşon cenapları tarafından Donanmay-ı Humayun talim için Karadenizde bulunduğu sırada vereceği her nevi emirlere harfiyen itaat edilmesini bu hususta katiyen tereddüt gösterilmeyerek emirler gereğinin her türlü haller ve şartlar dairesinde yapılmasını isterim.

11 Teşrinievvel 1330 (24 Ekim 1914)

Bahriye Nazırı Ahmet Cemal

Akbay, p. 93

(Ek-10)

İdare cihetile buldukları
Kolordu idarelerine bağlıdır.


Islâh Heyeti Başkanlığı teftiş ve denetimi altında bulunan eğitim kurumları ve bunların bağlı buldukları makamlar

Genelkurmay 2 nci Başkanlığına bağlı	Erkânı Harbiye Mektebi (Kara Harp Akademisi) Erkân ve Ümera Talimgâhi (General ve üssubaylar talimgâhi) Levazım Okulu
1 nci Kolordu Kur. Bşk. lığına bağlı	Piyade Atış Okulu İstanbul Piyade Subay Talimgâhi İstanbul Astsubay Okulu
6 nci Kolordu Kur. Bşk. lığına bağlı	Halep Piyade Subay Talimgâhi Hadep As subay Okulu
9 ncu Kolordu Kur. Bşk. lığına bağlı	Erzincan P. Sb. Talimgâhi Erzincan P. As sb. Okulu
Harbiye Okulları Genel Müdürlüğü	Harbiye okulları (Harbiye okulu, topçu okulu) Askeri idadi okulları Yatılı Rüştüye askerî okulları
Süvari Genel Müfettişliğine bağlı	Süvari tatbikat ve binicilik Okulu Süvari As subay Okulu
Sahra Topçu Genel Müfettişliğine bağlı	Sahra Topçu Atış Okulu Sahra Topçu Astsubay Okulu
Ağır Topçu Genel Müfettişliğine bağlı	Ağır Topçu Atış Okulu Ağır Topçu Astsubay Okulu
Ulaştırma Genel Müfettişliğine bağlı	Ulaştırma Okulu


(Ek-10-A)

ALMAN ISLAH HEYETİ ŞEMASI

Islah Heyeti Başkanı



Kur. Bşk.



..... No. lu Numune Kolordusu

1. Kolordu K. (Aynı zamanda ISLÂH HEYETİ BŞK.)
 2. Tümen K.
 3. Nişancı Alayı için bir kıta subayı
 4. Süvari Alayı için bir kıta subayı
 5. Sahra Top Alayı için bir kıta subayı
 6. İstihkâm Bölüğü için bir kıta subayı
 7. Bir Ağır Topçu Taburu için bir kıta subayı
-
1. Üç kurmay üstsubay (Gnkur. Daire Bşk. lıkları, aynı zamanda Kara Harp Akademisi öğretmenliği için)
 2. İdadi okulları için bir kıta subayı
 3. Harp okulları için bir müdür (Kur. Sb.), iki öğretmen
 4. Piyade atış okulları için bir müdür
 5. Sahra Topçu Atış Okulu için bir müdür
 6. Ağır Topçu Atış Okulu için bir müdür
 7. Süvari Binicilik Okulu için bir müdür
-
1. Astsubaylar ve Astsubay ilkokulu için bir subay
 2. İki ordu müfettişliği için piyade, süvari, topçu Sb. ları (6 adet)

3. Numune alayları için iki komutan
 4. Müstahkem mevkiler için askerî bir mühendis (Üstsubay)
 5. Nakliye sınıf için bir üs subay
 6. Demiryolları ve kıtaları ile otomobil, telefon, telgraf işleri için bir subay
 7. Bir askerî doktor
 1. Jimlastik okulu için bir müdür
 2. Askerî Sanayi Subay Okulu için bir subay
 3. Levazım Okulu için öğretmen
 4. Tayyarecilik ve Balonculuk için bir müdür (Komutan)
-

(Ek-11)

Alman Islâh Heyeti Sözleşmesi

Bir taraftan Osmanlı Hükümeti adına Hariciye Nazırı vekili Mahmut Paşa hazretleri, diğer taraftan Prusya Ordusundan Tümgeneral Liman Von Sanders hazretleri tarafından Osmanlı Ordusunun ilerleme ve yükselmesi için ıslâhat yapılmak üzere aşağıdaki mukavelename aktedilmiştir.

1. Prusya Ordusundan Tümgeneral Liman Von Sanders beş sene müddetle Osmanlı Ordusu için Korgeneral yetkisi ile ve ıslâh heyeti başkanı ünvanı ve vazifeleriyle kullanılacak ve işbu müddet içinde 1 nci Kordunun komutanı olacaktır. Kendileri askerî şûra üyesidir. Buna binaen başlıca aşağıdaki görüşmelerde reyine önem verilecek fakat karar çoğunluk oyuna tabi olacaktır.

Disiplin, terfi, mükâfat ve cezalandırma hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Islâhat, tensikat, eğitim ve öğretim hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Donatım, silâhlendirme ve giydirme hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Levazım ve iâşe hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Sağlık, veteriner hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Asker alma ve kura hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Seferberlik, haber alma ve tahkimli yerler hakkındaki esas maddeler.

İstatistik hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Demiryolları, telefon ve telgraf hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Ulaştırma, tayyarecilik, balonculuk hakkındaki esas maddeler.

Bundan mada General Liman Von Sanders bütün askerî okullar ve askerî öğrenci kıtalarının ve numuna alayı ve talimgâh ve Osmanlı askerî hizmetinde bulunan bütün yabancı subayların doğrudan doğruya amiridir.

Amirleri Osmanlı subayı olan bazı kıtalardaki yabancı subaylar hakkında bu mesele ayrıca tanzim ve tayin edilecektir.

2. General Liman Von Sanders'in tayin olduğu beş senelik müddet içinde Osmanlı Ordusu için lâzım gelen ecnebî subayları celp ve tayin ve vazifesine son vermek yalnız kendilerine aittir.

Çeşitli rütbeler için ayrılacak maaşlar yabancı yani kendi memleketlerinde üsteğmen olanlar için 40 Osmanlı lirasından fazla olmayacak.

Kendi memleketinde yüzbaşı olanlar için: Osmanlı Ordusunda 60 liradan fazla olmayacaktır.

Kendi memleketinde binbaşı olanlar için: Osmanlı Ordusunda 80 liradan fazla olmayacak.

Kendi memleketinde yarbay ve albay olanlar için: Osmanlı Ordusunda 100 lirasından fazla olmayacak.

Yabancı yani kendi memleketinde general olanlar için: 125 Osmanlı lirasından fazla olmayacaktır.

Kendileri Osmanlı Ordusundaki görevlerine mahsus tayinatı dahi ayrıca alacaklardır.

Hatıra olarak sözleşmeler yapılır yapılmaz gidiş ve sözleşmenin sonunda dönüş parası olmak üzere evli olmayanlar için birer ve evli olanlar için ikişer maaş verilecektir. General Liman Von Sanders'in maaşı: Tayinat ve bedeller, harcırah vesaire dahil olmak üzere 275 Osmanlı lirasıdır. Bu maaş ve harcırah için ayrıca verilecek tayinat hariç olmak üzere General Liman Von Sanders'e senevi 50 bin liralık bir banka kredisi verilecek ve her senenin nihayetinde hesap görülmek üzere işbu para tecavüz ettirilmeyecektir. Sene nihayetinde işbu paradan bir miktar arttığı takdirde Harbiye Nezareti veznesine teslim edilecektir.

General Liman Von Sanders'e verilmiş olan görevi yaparken kazanan uğradığı yara ve bir kazadan dolayı devlet hizmetinden ayrılmayı gerektirecek derecede malul olduğu takdirde bir senelik maaşına karşılık bir para devlet tarafından kendisine emekli maaşı yerine tazminat olarak verilecektir.

Fakat işbu kaza derhal veyahut nihayeti altı ay zarfında ölüme sebebiyet verecek olursa bir buçuk senelik maaşı nispetinde bir para tazminat olarak eşine veyahut çocuklarına verilecektir. Diğer subayların emekli maaşı için ilişik cetvele başvurmak lâzımdır.

3. General rütbesine terfi edecek üstsubaylar için bir tahsil devresi, eğitim ve öğrenim devresi, kurmay gezileri, özel eğitimler, harp oyunları ve emri altında olan subayların yollukları ve bazı giderler için de ayrıca senelik 50 bin Osmanlı lirası ayrılacaktır ve bunun için bankaya kredi verilecektir.

4. Harbiye Nazırı, General Von Sanders'e, aşağıdaki müsaadeleri verecektir :

a. General Von Sanders'in emri altında bulunan veyahut eğitim kurumlarında kullanılan Osmanlı subayları ancak generalin rızası ile diğer bir yere atanabilirler.

b. Osmanlı subaylarının eğitim için Almanya'ya gönderilmesi bunların seçimleri ve atanması yalnız General Von Sanders'in rızası ile olabilecektir.

5. Yükselme için yapılacak sınav programları general tarafından düzenlenecektir.

Yükselme ve sınav komisyonlarını teşkil edecek olanlar askerî şûraca seçilecek ve atanacaktır.

6. General Liman Von Sanders'in makamı Harbiye Nazırından sonradır. Fakat Genelkurmay Başkanı, General Liman Von Sanders'ten kidedemli ise General Von Sanders doğrudan doğruya adı geçen reisten sonra gelir ki, general şu halde Osmanlı Ordusunun ikinci veya üçüncü makamını haiz bulunur.

7. General Liman Von Sanders Harbiye Nazırını haberdar ederek Osmanlı ülkesindeki katalar ve askerî mevkilerini ve demiryollarını vesair ulaştırma araçlarını vesaireyi denetlemek yetkisini taşır. General Liman Von Sanders Osmanlı hizmetine girişinden itibaren bütün harekât, denetlemeler ve hizmetini gizli tutacağını taahhüt eyler.

8. General Liman Von Sanders Osmanlı Ordusunda bütün kurmay subayların, strateji ve taktik, iase vesaireyi nazarı olan eğitimlerini tamamlamalarını ve bitirmelerini deruhte eder.

9. Cezalandırma hususunda da General Liman Von Sanders kolordu komutanı yetkisini taşır.

10. General Liman Von Sanders'in Harbiye Nezareti adına getireceği subay ile aktececeği sureti ilişik sözleşmelerde yukarıda söylenen şartlardan başka ilişik cetvelde gösterilen şartlar da esas olarak kabul edilecektir.

Şu kadar ki bir istisna yapmak icap ederse maaşlar veya diğer malî şartlara tecavüz edilmeyecektir.

11. Almanya Devleti Osmanlı Devleti hizmetinde bulunan ıslâh heyeti başkanı ile birkaç veya bütün subayların Alman ordusu, Avrupa'daki bir muharebeye iştiraki halinde sözleşmeleri yürürlükten kaldırabilir. Maaşlar, gidiş gününe kadar ödenecek, yolluk olarak yalnız yarım verilecektir.

12. İki taraf işbu sözleşmeyi padişah iradesi ile onaylama ve ikmal-den sonra söylenen bütün şartlar ve vazifelerin vicdan ve doğruluk içinde yapacaklarını taahhüt ve imza ederler.

27 birinci teşrin 1329
(9 Kasım 1913)

Bahriye Nazırı ve Harbiye Nazırı
Vekili
(Çürüksulu) Mahmut

(Ek-12)

Birinci Dünya Harbinde İlk Plan

Başkomutanlık Genelkurmay 1 nci Yar Başkanı Bronzart Von Shellen-dorff Paşanın 20 ağustos 1914 (7 ağustos 1330) tarihli lâiyhası (Sefer Planı).

7 ağustos 1330 (20.8.1914) vaziyetin muhakemesi (durum muhake-mesi) (Nazır Paşanın Karadeniz'deki iki taraf donanmaları bir harbe se-behiyet vermeleri halinde ne yapmalıdır? Sualine karşı) :

Osmanlı donanmasıyla Rus donanmasının çatışmasından bir harp başlayınca Osmanlı Ordusu da harekâta başlamalıdır.

İngiltere ile Fransa hemen Rusya tarafına geçeceklerdir. Bizim ha-rekâtımız Rusya ile İngiltere aleyhine olabilir.

Rusya aleyhine :

1. Balkan yarımadasından geçerek yanına ve gerisine hareket :

Bu hal ancak Romanya ile Bulgaristan'ın daha başlangıçta, Osmanlı Devleti ile müttefik olmasıyla kabildir. Şimdilik bu ihtimal yoktur.

Eğer yalnız Bulgaristan bizimle beraber olursa, Bulgarlarla beraber İrpları aleyhine hareket için iki kolordu vereceğiz ki, Avusturya kuvvet-eri bir an evvel serbest kalsın.

Eğer Romanya bu harekete karşı kalkar ve Avusturya aleyhine yü-ürse o halde Osmanlı Ordusu büyük kısmıyla Romanya aleyhine yürür.

2. Takriben Odesa istikametinde olmak üzere Karadeniz'in kuzey ayısına taarruz. Bu hareket en iyisi ve Avrupa harbini neticelendirecek lerecede mühimdir. Fakat bunun icrası için donanmamızın deniz hakimi-etini kazanması ve Romanya'nın hiç olmazsa Osmanlı Devletine karşı ayet dostane bir tarafsızlık göstermesi lâzımdır.

Romanya hududundan Akkerman'a kadar yalnız Rus hudut posta-rı var. Odesa garnizonunun ehemmiyeti büyük olmasa gerektir. Fenaî rrlukları varsa da katlanılabilir. Bu hareketin yapılması zamanını tayin in Almanya - Avusturya taarruzunun Rusya içinde ne kadar ilerleyece-îni tayin etmek lâzımdır.

3. Kafkas hududundaki 3 ncü Ordu ile beraber Rusya istikametinde areket :

Bu hareketin büyük harbin cereyanına tesiri yoktur. Binaenaleyh bu hareket askeri olmaktan ziyade azamî olarak siyasi bir maksatla icra olunur. Eğer burada büyük kuvvetlerimiz meşgul olursa o halde Kafkasya'nın haricinde vukua gelecek olan kesin sonuçlu muharebelerde lüzumlu kuvvetimiz bulunamaz.

4. Yalnız 3 ncü Orduyla Kafkasya'daki Rus kuvvetlerine taarruz :

Şimdiye kadar gelen malumata göre Ruslar burada özellikle topçu kuvvetince bizim 3 ncü Orduya üstündür. Taarruz üstün kuvvetlere ve tahkimli yerlere çatacak ve muhasara parkının olmamasından sorunlu olarak duracaktır. Osmanlı Ordusu Kafkasya'da bir kış harbine hazırlanmamıştır. 3 ncü Ordunun iagesi güçtür. Eğer, 3 ncü Ordu şimdiden bütün hazırlıklarını yaparsa, Kafkasya'dan gelecek taarruzlara karşı durabilir. Eğer Ruslar Kafkasya'daki kuvvetlerini azaltırlarsa 3 ncü Ordu behemahal ilerlemelidir.

İngiltere aleyhine hareket: 8 nci ve icabına göre 12 nci Kolordu da beraber olarak Mısır'a taarruz :

Bu hareketle İngiltere'nin en hassas yönüne dokunulmuş olacağından büyük harbe tesiri büyüktür. Bundan sonra Balkan hükümetlerinin vaziyeti aydınlanıncaya kadar Trakya'da, İstanbul civarında, Marmara havzasında büyük kuvvetler bırakmak lâzımdır. Çünkü burada, mevcut yazışmalara ve andlaşmalara rağmen, Bulgaristan'a itimat olunmuyor. Trakya boşalınca Bulgarların bundan faydalanarak oraya taarruz edebileceği zannediliyor. Yunanlılar da düşmanlarımıza, donanmaları ve Gelibolu yarımadasıyla İzmir'e çıkarma ile yardım edebilir. İşbu mütalâalara dayanarak aşağıdaki tedbirleri teklif ediyorum :

1. Donanma harp ilân etmeden Rus donanmasını basarak Karadeniz'de deniz hâkimiyetini kazanmalıdır. Hareket zamanı Amiral Suşon'un reyine tabidir.

2. Rusların harp ilân etmesi üzerine padişah Osmanlı Devleti ile Almanya ve Avusturya'nın düşmanlarına cihadı mukaddes ilân edecektir.

3. Kafkasya hududundaki Osmanlı Ordusu Kafkasya'daki Rus kuvvetlerini oyalayacaktır.

4. 8 nci Kolordu icap ve ihtiyaca göre, 12 nci Kolordu ile takviye edilerek Mısır üzerine hareket edecektir. Bununla beraber bu hareket altı haftadan evvel olamaz.

5. Eğer Bulgarlar beraber hareket ederlerse, Osmanlı Ordusu kısmen Bulgar Ordusuyla beraber Sırbistan aleyhine yürür. Kısmen bu harekâtı Romanya ve Yunanistan'a karşı örter.

6. Romanya'da bizimle beraber olursa Osmanlı Ordusu büyük kısıyla Romanya Ordusuyla beraber Rusya aleyhine yürür.

7. Bulgaristan 3-4 kolorduluk bir kuvvetle denizden Odesa istikânetinde taarruza hazırlanır. Fakat bunun yapılması Karadeniz hakimiyetine ve Romanya ile Bulgaristan'ın dostane tarafsızlığına bağlıdır. Bunun başka harekâtın yapılma zamanı Almanya - Avusturya taarruzunun Rusya içinde ilerlemesine bağlıdır. Bu zamana kadar Trakya'da ve Mar-marâra havzasındaki Osmanlı Kuvvetleri yerlerinde kalır. Balkan Devletleri düşman olursa Bulgar üzerine yürürüz. Bundan başka bu teşebbüs-öre esashca hazırlanmak ve herşeyden önce harp cephanesi, ikmal edil-mek lâzımdır. Bu veçhile harekâtın başlangıcına kadar geçecek zaman ar-du eğitim ve teçhizatının ikmaline hasredilir.

Her halde hemen harbe başlamayı askerî sebeplerden çok siyasi du-um icap ettirebilir.

Bronzart Von Shellendorff

EK-1

Constantinople, le 2 Août 1914.

Entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, d'une part, et

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, d'autre part, il a été convenu qu'une alliance défensive soit conclue entre les deux Empires de Turquie et d'Allemagne.

A cet effet ont nommé leurs plénipotentiaires

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans

Son Grand Vézir et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, S.A. le Prince Said Halim Pacha,

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse.

Son Ambassadeur auprès de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, Son Excellence le Baron de Tangeheim

lesquels, après avoir trouvé leurs pleins-pouvoirs en due forme, ont conclu l'arrangement suivant:

1) Les deux Puissances contractantes s'engagent à observer une stricte neutralité en face du conflit actuel entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

2) Dans le cas où la Russie interviendrait par des mesures militaires actives et créerait par là pour l'Allemagne, le casus foederis vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie, ce casus foederis entrerait également en vigueur pour la Turquie.

3) En cas de guerre, l'Allemagne laissera sa Mission militaire à la disposition de la Turquie.

Celle-ci, de son côté, assure à ladite Mission Militaire une influence effective sur la conduite générale de l'Armée, conformément à ce qui a été convenu directement entre Son Excellence le Ministre

EK-1'İN DEVAMI

de la Guerre et Son Excellence le Chef de la Mission Militaire.

4) L'Allemagne s'engage à déjurer, au besoin par les armes, le territoire ottoman au cas où il serait menacé par la Russie

5) Cet accord qui a été conclu en vue de garantir les deux Empires des complications internationales qui pourraient résulter du conflit actuel, entrera en vigueur dès sa signature par les Plénipotentiaires susmentionnés et restera valable, avec les obligations mutuelles analogues, jusqu'au trente et un Décembre Mille neuf cent dix-huit.

6) Au cas où il ne serait pas dénoncé par l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes six mois avant l'expiration du délai ci-haut fixé, ce traité continuera à être en vigueur pour une nouvelle période de cinq ans

7) Le présent acte sera ratifié par Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, et les ratifications seront échangées dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la date de la signature.

8) Le présent accord restera secret et ne pourra être rendu public qu'à la suite d'un accord ultérieur entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes.

En foi de quoi les deux Plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent accord et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

L.S. signé Said Halim

L.S. signé Wangenheim.

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