

A CASE IN DIASPORA NATIONALISM:
CRIMEAN TATARS IN TURKEY

A Master's Thesis

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To my grandmother who was born, lived and died in diaspora...

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ABSTRACT

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September 2000

"Diaspora", an old phenomenon, signifying dispersed people outside their homeland, who sustain their ties with their homeland and their co-ethnics, highly mobilized in politics in recent years, certainly in a new form. This thesis suggests the term "diaspora nationalism" for this unique phenomenon. As "diaspora nationalism" is based on the triadic relationship of homeland, host-state and diaspora community, it differentiates from mainstream nationalisms. While challenging the dominant conceptualizations of nationalism, in fact diaspora nationalism reconstructs nation and ethnicity in a global framework. Therefore it necessitates a new conceptual tool for fully appreciating its features. "Transnationalism", which is a new term to denote the relations

across the borders, provides us with the adequate conceptual tool. The rising diaspora nationalism of the Crimean Tatars in recent years can only be fully apprehended in the light of this conceptual framework. With this conceptualization of diaspora nationalism, this study specifies, periodises, and tries to analyse the diaspora nationalism of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey, by also suggesting the case for further theoretical and historical inquiry. Having transnational and hybrid features, Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism faces with different problems and find different solutions, which in the end contribute to the “new politics” in the global era.

Keywords: Diaspora, Diaspora Nationalism, Transnationalism, Crimean Tatars

ÖZET

DİYASPORA MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNDE BİR ÖRNEK:

TÜRKİYE'DEKİ KIRIM TATARLARI

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"Diyaspora", ana yurtlarının dışına dağılmış, ama ana yurtları ve soydaşlarıyla bağlarını sürdüren topluluğu anlatan eski bir olgu olarak, son yıllarda, yeni bir biçimde olmakla beraber, oldukça hareketlendi. Bu tez bu benzersiz olgu için "diyaspora milliyetçiliği" terimini önermektedir. Diaspora milliyetçiliği ana yurt, konuk eden devlet ve diaspora topluluğu arasındaki ilişkiye dayandığından, belli başlı milliyetçiliklerden ayrılır. Diaspora milliyetçiliği, milliyetçiliğin hakim kavramsallaştırmalarını yerinden oynatırken, aslında bir taraftan da millet ve etnikliği küresel bir çerçevede yeniden kuruyor. Bu nedenle özelliklerini ve yapısını tam olarak anlayabilmek için yeni bir kavramsal araç gerektiriyor. Sınırları aşan ilişkileri betimlemek için yeni bir terim olan "ulusaşırı milliyetçilik" (transnationalism) bu işlevi görür. Kırım Tatarları'nın son yıllarda yükselen diaspora milliyetçiliği ancak bu kavramsal çerçevenin ışığında tam olarak anlaşılabilir. Diaspora milliyetçiliğini bu şekilde kavramsallaştıran bu çalışma hem Türkiye'deki Kırım Tatarları'nın diaspora milliyetçiliğini belirleyip dönemlere ayırarak analiz etmeye çalışmakta, hem de bu örneği ilerki kuramsal ve tarihsel çalışmalar için

önermektedir. Kırım Tatar diaspora milliyetçiliđi diđer milliyetçiliklerden daha farklı problemlerle karşılaşmakta ve sonunda küresel çağdaki 'yeni siyaset'e katkıda bulunan farklı çözümler getirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Diaspora, diaspora milliyetçiliđi, uluslararası milliyetçilik,
Kırım Tatarları

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"I *am* deeply sensitive to the spell of nationalism. I can play about thirty Bohemian folk songs (or songs presented as such in my youth) on my mouth-organ. My oldest friend, who is Czech and a patriot, cannot bear to hear me play them because he says I do it in such a schmalzy way, 'crying into the mouth organ'. I do not think I could have written the book on nationalism which I did write, were I not capable of crying, with the help of a little alcohol, over folk songs, which happen to be my favourite form of music." from 'Reply to Critics' in *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*

Diaspora is an ancient social formation, comprising people living out of their ancestral homeland, retaining their loyalties towards their co-ethnics and their homeland from which they were forced out. Diasporas are observed to be revived in recent years. Not only the old diasporas like Jewish, Armenian, and African diasporas have activated, but also active international migrant communities of the Sikh, Chinese, Indians, South Asians, Mexicans, Tatars, Ukrainians, Russians, Caucasians, and Turks have proclaimed themselves “diasporas.” This fact implies the relationship of diasporas with globalization.

The Crimean Tatar diaspora, which has been predicted to be assimilated until now as a whole, also motivated since the end of 80s. In Turkey the number of Crimean Tatar solidarity associations increased from three to thirties. Three foundations and one institute

was established. Two major journals and many bulletins are being published by them. More people uncovered themselves to be Crimean Tatars, and more people registered to the Crimean Tatar associations from various places in the political spectrum in Turkey. Previous single path of nationalist activity diversified especially in 90s. Tight relations with the homeland was established, and diaspora has become both materially and spiritually an important support of the revitalizing Crimean Tatar national identity in the Crimea, homeland.

However though the size of diaspora activity increased, activists themselves started to question the “quality” of it. They complain of the decreasing of “idealism,” criticise approaching national activity as a side interest, folkloric pursuit, or minor occupation. It proves difficult for early activists to invest in this recent national awakening as they rather regard it a temporary interest of the newcomers.¹ But there is another possibility: Maybe this recent activation seems that weak because it does not confirm a number of criteria that we look for in a nationalist movement, and because it is something that is not known previously, a new phenomenon in the full sense, whose emergence was fostered by globalisation. According to me, what is emerging is a “new nationalism” which poses questions different than other nationalisms.

In fact the main purpose of this thesis is to suggest “diaspora nationalism” as a new concept to signify this newly emerging phenomenon. However it is important to note that it is not simply another type of nationalism, but something that we can appreciate only in a

¹ Though the approaches of both Hakan Kırımlı and Ünsal Aktaş was welcoming to the newcomers, they also pronounced of “being careful”. Aktaş, Ünsal. August, 9 2000. Unstructured Interview with the author. Sıhhiye, Ankara. Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author.. Bilkent, Ankara.

“transnational framework.” “Transnationalism” was also identified newly in parallel to the global processes, implying a transformation with a more limited purview than globalization. Transnationalism as a conceptual tool enables us to understand the existence of phenomenon transcending state borders, in their organization and policy, like diaspora nationalism. Therefore transnationalism in this thesis is used to denote tense relationship of communities supplementing the political space of the nation-states. Diaspora nationalism is therefore regarded as a form of transnationalism.

It is important to note that diaspora nationalism does not denote the ideology of nationalists themselves, but the consequent structure, which did not develop necessarily in accordance with the goals of the nationalists, but being affected by their activities as well as other forces, to be sure.

While the main question of this thesis is if diaspora nationalism as a political structure exists, the second question will be about the making of it. However answering this question has to keep in mind yet uncomplete condition of it, in the continuing global process.

The relationship of diasporas with the global processes proved to be very complex. Though national identities are challenged and particular conjunctures of race, ethnicity and nationality may be disaggregated by mobilization of large numbers of migrant communities and diasporas, they continue to be very real categories and rearticulated through transnational processes. Thus diasporas still engage transnational nation-building projects in

spite of their deterritorialization. Diaspora is able to engage in a new nationalist politics, which is based on the transnational ethnic solidarity.

The Crimean Tatars, who turned into a completely a diasporic nation since 1944 (deportation of the parent community following the previous mass migrations) interestingly was not subject to academic research in terms of its diasporic features. I aim to suggest the case for historical and theoretical inquiry. In the text I refer the previous studies of Crimean Tatar communities abroad, which are not very satisfying in this respect, like the one of Lowell Bezanis(1994) “Soviet Muslim *Emigres* in the Republic of Turkey” and the one of Nermin Eren(1998) “Crimean Tatar Communities Abroad”. They conceptualised the Crimean Tatars as *émigré* community, meaning the communities living outside who maintained an imagined or real link with the homeland and parent group. Their effort to distinguish politically conscious *emigres* from the emigrant who lack this consciousness is a contribution. For Kırımlı(1996) too the ones who migrated before the turn of the 20th century were emigrants while the ones who migrated afterwards were *emigres*. However Eren and Bezanis, both predicted that *émigré* activity would diminish, simply because *émigré* activity by nature diminishes. This can explain neither the a century of national movement outside the Crimea, merely continued by second, third, fourth generation “*emigres*”. In fact the Crimean Tatars after 50s are not *emigres*. *Émigré* politics is short-lived and weak as Eren and Bezanis supposed, and doomed to turn into diaspora politics, as *emigres* themselves turn into diaspora, by developing integration to host states/societies, while preserving their links to the homeland. *Emigres* also were very small in number in Crimean Tatar diaspora if we think that most of the population migrated before the turn of the century.

However the influence of *emigres* has been larger than their size, to trigger the national movement of diaspora, to be sure. After all, the great leader of diaspora nationalism until today is recognised as Cafer Seydahmet, who was an *émigré* politician. Therefore I designated “*émigré* nationalism” as a vital period for the development of diaspora nationalism, and itself as a field of inquiry. Different than Eren and Bezanis, I suggest the employment of “diaspora” instead of “*émigré*” as a better term to conceptualise the sociological existence and politics of Crimean Tatar people in Turkey today.

Before periodising diaspora nationalism of Crimean Tatars, I also addressed the development Crimean Tatar national movement and identity tracing its roots to the 19th century, partly independent of the diaspora. However I underline the importance of *émigré* period in its taking the final shape. Locating the development of national identity in the context of diaspora nationalist politics, I try to enlighten the interaction between the diaspora and homeland.

Methodology:

While being not always shaped in accordance with the wishes of activists in the diaspora, the main architects of diaspora nationalism are the activists for sure, not the mass they are appealing. Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism remained as an elite movement, though it slightly increased its grass roots activities in the recent years. Therefore most of the findings about diaspora nationalism may not be valid for the mass. This study takes diaspora nationalism as a form of politics limited to the elite, who are the activists and theoreticians of it.

Therefore I concentrated on the main institutions which were founded by Crimean Tatar diaspora elite, namely the associations, foundations, and publications. I investigated the structures of these institutions by examining the legal documents, policies and activities of them, and conducting unstructured interviews with the prominent activists, who represent an important number of people within these institutions. I also made a content analysis of the periodical publications, and tried to extract main discourses and policies of these institutions, as well as the occurring changes in them.

The main plan of the thesis is as follows. Firstly, in the theoretical chapter I delve into the original meaning of diaspora and main components of it as a sociological body. Next, I concentrate on the politicisation of this social body, and look at the emergence of diaspora nationalism as a theoretical term. Then I briefly consider the “original meaning of nationalism,” and uncover its contradictory assumptions. Asserting that the discourse of nationalism is overwhelmed by state-based assumptions, I conclude that diaspora nationalism is basically in contradiction with these assumptions, but it is not contradictory in itself. I will state that diaspora nationalism bases on a triadic relationship between the homeland, host state/society and the diaspora community, which creates its transnational and hybrid structure. However I will state these features do not impede diaspora to imagine itself as a ‘transnational nation’ and describe main forms of social and political organization of diaspora nation, and finish by referring the “new politics” that diaspora nationalism contributes.

In the second chapter I investigate the origins and history of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism. To understand it, I start with the reasons of emigration, migration history and patterns of Crimean Tatars and the transformation of these migrants into a diaspora, namely diasporisation. After relating the emergence of nationalist thought among the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea, I emphasize the émigré nationalism as a bridge to carry this nationalist thought to the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. After a relatively detailed account of émigré activity, which I do also to enable a comparison with the diaspora activity, and foster better understanding of it, I detect the main features of diaspora nationalism in the end of 50s and periodise the subsequent development in it. According to this rough periodisation, 60s and 70s are largely identical and form the first period. In this period though diaspora nationalism is not perceptible, it takes its shape in general. The 80s loosely corresponds to the second period in which diaspora nationalism activates and surfaces because of the conjunctural changes, and evolve in a new shape. The new shape is the global one which largely uncovered in 90s, in the third period. Diaspora nationalism which was previously identified as a different phenomenon than a mere nationalism, now can be called a transnationalism. In this period we observe the Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism has evolved rather into a complex discourse and movement.

Subsequently I provide an analysis of diaspora nationalism of the Crimean Tatars in the light of my previous conceptualisation of diaspora nationalism and historical periodization. After avowing that the Crimean Tatars in Turkey today constitute a diaspora, not simply an émigré community, I focus on the diasporic features of it, especially the relations with the Crimea, homeland and Turkey, host state. I trace back the diaspora consciousness to the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, and then relate it with the *émigré*

nationalism. I outline the main premises of *émigré* nationalism, which showed a continuity in the diasporic period. However still differing from them fundamentally, I exemplify how diaspora movement of the Crimean Tatars appeared as transnational and hybrid overthrowing the dominant forms of thinking nationalism, which largely meant belonging to either Turkish state or Crimean Tatar nation exclusively in the beginning of 80s. I underline how the nationalist reforms were undertaken to restore these dominant forms, but how the triadic nature of diaspora resisted it by asserting belonging to both Turkey and the Crimea. Finally I figure out the politics of diaspora nationalism is nothing but playing with the balance of the triadic bases, that is to say Crimean Tatar diaspora inclines either to Turkey or Crimea to certain extents. This is the main axis of dispute in the Crimean Tatar diaspora politics currently. Exceeding the national public sphere of Turkey, these politics in fact takes place in a transnational public sphere including the Crimean context, Turkish context, international sphere and Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalists. Finally I try to outline the prospects of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism, its probable future problems as well as the strong points of it as a form of politics in the globalizing world. I want to emphasize the potentials of the diaspora nationalist movement to be directed to positive humanitarian goals, rather than reconstructing the destructive discourse of nationalism.

CHAPTER II

DIASPORA NATIONALISM: CONCEPTUAL INQUIRY

...whether I feel myself “more French” or “more Lebanese has been always asked me. My answer does not change: “Both!”...it is what exactly defines my identity... half French, half Lebanese? Not at all! Identity can not be separated into divisions, it is not composed of neither halves, nor one-thirds,...

Amin Maalouf, *Les Identites Meurtrieres*

Diaspora nationalism came to the fore in the last decade as a result of the mobilization of diasporas in the whole world. Old diasporas evolved to develop new functions and “new diasporas” flourished. Together Robin Cohen (1997) calls them “global diasporas.” Global diasporas of course were founded on the type of organization based on old diasporas, but they also transformed it enormously. What is obvious is that the diaspora proved a particularly adoptable form of social organization in the global age. Diaspora nationalism is also identified as a unique phenomenon that depends on the existence of some conditions brought forward by globalization.

The aim of this chapter is to suggest “diaspora nationalism” as a new term to denote specific type of phenomenon and investigate it. I want to underline that it does not mean simply diaspora adapting nationalist ideology, but a new type of nationalism. Diaspora nationalism poses different questions.

In this chapter I will briefly consider the major conceptualizations of diaspora and diaspora nationalism to determine which will be helpful for a better understanding of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the following chapters.

Therefore, in the following pages, the reader will find an investigation to the origins of diaspora and the nature of its social organization, contributing to a better understanding of diaspora nationalism. Then, the premises of diaspora nationalism will be investigated. Finally, diaspora nationalism will be located in a global context, and the type of politics diaspora nationalism formulates will be uncovered.

2.1. The Origin of Diaspora

Diaspora is a Greek word, derived from the verb *speiro*-to sow- and the preposition *dia*-over-. The term was initially used for Greeks who lived outside of Greece for reasons of colonization (Cohen,1997: 9). However, diaspora gained the connotation it has today by the traumatic Jewish experience, mass exodus, and the following aspiration of return. The Jews were the most ancient and known diasporic people who had no country. For a long time diaspora meant almost exclusively the Jewish people.

Especially in the last decade, “diaspora” has been “rediscovered” and expanded to include businessmen, refugees, *gastarbeiter*, students, traders, migrant workers, “expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, ethnic and racial minorities *tout court*.” (cited in Cohen,1997:21) Metaphorically, the term has also been

applied to anyone who is in some place but feels to be in another place because of technological revolution in communication. This idea of diaspora is different from both the Jewish and Greek models. This widespread application of diaspora to almost anyone out of his/her assumed homeland naturally causes undertheorisation of the concept. Consequently, it loses its explanatory value.

William Safran (*cited in* Cohen,1997:21) suggests that diaspora should be limited to “expatriate communities” who satisfy more precise criteria: those are dispersal from an original centre, to two or more foreign regions, retention of collective memory of the original homeland, partial alienation from the host society, aspiration to return to an ancestral homeland, the committance of all members to the maintenance and restoration of the homeland, continuation of the relations with the homeland and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity. (van Hear:1998,5) (Cohen,1997:23) According to Esman (1996:316), diaspora should exclude groups whose minority status resulted not from migration but from conquest, annexation, and arbitrary boundary arrangements. Thomas Faist (1999:10) asserts that the international migrants of the global age are rather transnational communities, and the term diaspora should remain limited to old diasporas.

Cohen (1997:ix) however has defined the determinative “common features” of old and new diasporas as such: “all diasporic communities settled outside their natal(or imagined natal) territories, acknowledge that ‘the old country’-a notion often buried deep in language, religion, custom or folklore- always has some claim on their loyalty and emotions” fostering “a sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background.” Complementing Safran’s definition, but adopting it to include new diasporas as well, Cohen

defines the main features of diasporas best: dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more regions; alternatively not traumatically but because of mostly economic reasons; a collective memory and myth about homeland, including its location, history, and achievements; an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation; the development of a return movement that gains collective approbation; a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness; a common history and belief in a common fate; a troubled relationship with the host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at least or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group; and a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement. (Cohen,1997:26) This definition puts well the triadic bases of all diasporas, the host state/society, homeland and the diaspora community, and the relations between these triadic bases, distinguishing diaspora from any migrant community or ethnic minority. This is the basic definition of “diaspora” used in this work.

Diaspora as an historical, or anthropological community in fact provides us with alternative examples of human organization. However one should not forget that even the most ancient diasporas have transformed in time, and have not stayed intact. Cohen maintains that globalization has enhanced the practical, economic and effective roles of diasporas, proving them to be particularly adaptive forms of social organisation. (Cohen,1996:157) The extraordinary mobilization of diasporas brought the concept to the fore in the global age. Therefore, in a sense, what we are more concerned with are not the features of ancient diasporas, but the global diasporas, and the functions they have retained, gained or recombined in new forms in global era. Crimean Tatar diaspora is certainly an old

diaspora, but it also transformed very much in the global age. But to begin we still have to answer the question: how are diasporas distinguished from other social formations?

2.2 Diaspora as a Social Formation

Diaspora is first of all a migrant community which crosses borders and retains an ethnic group consciousness, and peculiar institutions over extended periods. (Esman, 199:317) Marienstras claims one distinguishing feature may be durability: “Its reality is proved in time and tested by time.” (van Hear,1998:6)

Therefore as time needs to pass to conclude that a community is a diaspora, most diasporas are relatively old ethnic communities. Subsequent movements may lead to further dispersal and add to, reinforce or consolidate already existing diaspora communities (Van Hear,1998:47). This is the case in the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Sometimes even within the same ethnic group mutual support and solidarity may be strained by tensions and conflicts between earlier and later arrivals. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that diaspora has been formed generally, not by the migration of a whole body of people altogether, but as a result of subsequent migration flows.

According to Faist, these are true communities connected by dense social and symbolic ties over time and across space based upon solidarity in the sense of *Gemeinschaft*, reaching beyond narrow kinship ties. Diaspora communities through reciprocity and

solidarity achieve social cohesion and “ a common repertoire of symbolic and collective representations.”(Faist,1999:10)

Like other migration systems, the diaspora also should be thought of as rising on triadic bases: the diaspora community, the homeland and the host state/society. At the international level, we add to this scheme the relations of diaspora communities with each other. We will now elaborate on the relations of diaspora community with homeland and the host state/society.

Relations between the diaspora community and the homeland

Cohen(1997:xii) asserts that the relationship between diasporas and their homelands form a crucial nexus. Collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, and achievements, accompanied by an idealisation of homeland and collective commitment to its well-being, even its creation or recapture represent the core of the diaspora. For most migrant groups, the concept of homeland is quite specific and clear. (Esman,1996:317) Depending on historical experience, it may become less clear. It is also possible that migrants have few or no contacts with that land, and no affinities with its governors, but they may still be attached to their homeland. To diaspora communities, the homeland may be an ideological construct or myth, but this is no less significant to them than the specific homelands to which other migrant communities relate. (Esman,1996:318) According to Faist, diasporas do not need concrete social ties to survive. Homeland may well serve as a sufficient symbolic tie to survive. (Faist,1999:10)

To van Hear, diaspora may have three types of relationship with the homeland: actively maintained, dormant/latent, or severed. Esman (1996) proposes that communication with kinfolk and financial remittances to relatives are the most common form of exchange. (Esman,1996:317) The social ties are more lively than other migrant communities, they may return to their home country for visits and for permanent repatriation; fresh flows of recruits may nourish the migrant community, and help to maintain language, culture, and personal contacts ; nostalgic third generation migrants may visit their homeland to rediscover their roots. (Esman,1996:317)

Main feature of diaspora is dispersal from an homeland to various foreign places, often because of a “traumatic event”. (Safran,1991:83-84) (Faist,1999:10) (Cohen,1997:26) Although traumatic event is not a necessary determinant for identifying diaspora for Cohen², the involuntary migration in a more or less traumatic way shapes the identity of most of the diasporic community. As John Armstrong (1996:140-141) claims, this memory of traumatic history makes diaspora a distinguishable community for centuries even before the emergence of nationalism. Van Hear(1998:47) also states that forced migrants are more active.

Thus, diaspora is the result of collective involuntary migration, i.e. mass exodus. The migration can be located on a line of degrees between the total involuntary and voluntary migration. To comment that emigrating because of overpopulation, landlessness, poverty or an unsympathetic political regime is voluntary, since it does not involve being directly dragged, expelled, or coerced to leave by force of arms is unjust. That is why, as we can not

measure the level of voluntariness, and as there can be harsher pressures than merely physical coercion, we can only conclude that diaspora can only be located close to involuntary migration. In fact the actual level of voluntariness is less significant than it being remembered as involuntary.

The interesting and vital issue is, as significant time has to pass to become a diaspora, the members of diasporic community has not lived the traumatic events personally. Much of their catastrophic origins has come to leave in folk memory. Although their origin as victims is firstly self-affirmed, it can also be accepted by others. But this does not mean that it has no trace in historical documents, what is important is that “trauma” is rather a historical myth mobilised to preserve the sense of distinctiveness, and common identity.

In relation to central place of homeland, and involuntary reasons of leaving there, development of a collective return movement is peculiar in diaspora politics. In this sense diaspora lives an ‘illusion of impermanence’. (Esman,1996:317) Indeed the migration to the state of Israel and the return of some North Caucasians from Turkey soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union after more than a century of separation prove that “return” is not merely fiction. Indeed, there were decisive Crimean Tatars who moved to the Crimea from the diaspora, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.³

Relations between the diaspora community and the host society

² Cohen classifies the diaspora who lived a traumatic event as “victim diaspora”, which is one of the types in his typology.

³ Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara.

As opposed to the exile community, which does not integrate in the host society, diaspora achieves a special integration to the host society without being totally assimilated to it (Faist,1999:197). In fact, the problems of adaptation after returning back prove that diaspora has evolved into a different community in spite of the ‘common roots’. Indeed the course of diaspora politics is shaped by the circumstances provided by the host state/society (Faist,1999:191) Hence the branches of the same diaspora in different countries show high level of differentiation, in effect creating them difficulties for synchronisation of activities. That is, each group has grown up within different education, language and thought systems, traditions, practices, and lifestyles of different countries.

However, by a combination of preference and social exclusion, diasporas maintain their identity and solidarity over extended periods in the host society. (Esman,1996:317) “Diaspora *ethnie* may assimilate to their host societies, yet leave the *ethnie* in question intact.” (Smith and Hutchinson,1996: 5)

Because the term ‘host’ connotes a welcome attitude, van Hear (1998:55) suggests “prior or established” society as a more neutral term. Diaspora may face a range of reactions on the side of the host society, among which unconditional acceptance is the least likely. In fact, the reaction of host society depends largely on the resources available. According to Faist (1999:191) factors conducive for the development of diaspora include favourable technological variables; troubled nation-state formation; contentious minority policies; and restrictions such as socio-economic discrimination. In addition, political opportunities such as multicultural rights may also advance border-crossing webs of ties. The emphasis of diasporic identity may depend on the class position of the migrants or the offsprings of the

migrants. Cohen states that there is a tendency for relatively well-to-do migrants do not to accept lower class co-ethnics.

2.3. Politicization of Diaspora

There are basically two problems that face the diasporas: The problem of assimilation and the loss of homeland. Both mean disappearance for the diaspora. Every diaspora develops different strategies, different types of organization and mobilization due to its particular case. Although nationalism is a choice for the diaspora according to Gellner(1983:108), “the problems which face it if it does not engage in nationalist option may be as grave and tragic as those which face it if it does adopt nationalism.” He underlines that “the extreme peril of the assimilationist alternative which makes the adherents of the nationalist solution espouse their cause in this situation.” (Gellner,1983:108) Cultural revivification, acquisition of territory, and coping with the natural enmity of those with previous claims on the territory in question, compose the special agenda faced by diaspora nationalism. Those of them which retain some residue of an ancient territory may face problems which are less acute. (Gellner,1983:108)

According to van Hear(1998:57) migrants and their networks are also counted among political actors in the global era besides states, international organizations and transnational corporations. With their variable capacities, opportunities and propensities to exert influence on behalf of their domestic or external interests, diaspora communities can be regarded as interest groups and political actors. (Esman,1996:318) Esman (1996:318)

also notes that in some situations politicization is barred from the diaspora. In that case, although these diasporas are required to be entirely passive, their presence and activities can become the subject of inter-state relations this time.

Diaspora solidarities can be mobilized and focused to influence political outcomes for the home country, to provide economic, diplomatic and even military assistance to the home country and help its government. They may strive for cultural preservation, lobby, engage in interest group politics, work with NGOs, human rights and international organizations, apply to international decision-making bodies for restoration or protection of their rights to self-determination (Esman, 1996: 316-321).

The relations between immigrants, home country politics, and politicians have always been dynamic. They might take a vital interest in political developments in the home country and even try to influence them. If possible, they might try to remigrate, or they might support the foundation of their state economically, politically and diplomatically. Diasporas not only strive to link themselves to homeland politics, they carry the debates and factions of the homeland politics to their diaspora agenda. The diaspora community is not a unified body. Like any political body it is not immune from internal disputes, fragmentation, and multiplicity of routes to follow to reach the 'common aim'. The "homelands" or the parent communities also increasingly engage in efforts to gain the support of "their" diasporas. Political parties can propagate among the emigrants, and emigrants can try to influence homeland politics, or may lobby the host government for their homeland and their own health and welfare. Likewise, the government of the home country may call on diaspora community for economic and political support, and the host country's government may

attempt to use the diaspora community to promote its interests vis-à-vis the home country. So diaspora bridges the societies by forming a transnational channel.(Esman, 1996: 316-321).

In the middle of overlapping and differentiating relations diaspora nationalism embodies a unique way of nationalist politics, which is better to be called transnational. It should be noted that the course of diaspora nationalism is distinct from the nationalist movement of the homeland or parent community. There are two national movements in the Crimean Tatar history; one has developed in the parent community within the USSR, and the other has developed in the diaspora. Hence, diaspora nationalists are not nationalists who happen to be living in another country; they have for long defined their own route to follow. Crimean Tatar national struggle has its own national concept, legitimacy, discourse, principles, political leaders, symbols, premises, policies different than the Crimean Tatar national movement in the Crimea. The discourse of diaspora is largely shaped by the hegemonic discourse in the host state. The Crimean Tatar diaspora has a Turkish outlook, to be sure. Diaspora politicians inevitably link their discourse to the dominant debates in the host society politics. Crimean Tatar nationalism is certainly a way of asserting oneself in Turkish political sphere, considering the abundance of Crimean Tatar associations. However the perspective of Crimean Tatar politics is not limited to Turkey, it also aims to present itself in the international platform. Diaspora politics may become a way of articulating political standpoint both in the national and the transnational. public sphere.

However firstly politicisation is needed to transfer a diaspora consciousness into a national identity politics. The influence of emigres are significant in the politicization of

diaspora. In fact “émigré nationalism” formulates the type of politics that forms the basis of diaspora nationalism subsequently, and it involves the contradictions that diaspora nationalism will also face with. Therefore émigré nationalism will not be conceptualised separately, as it is not very different in its structure and politics than diaspora nationalism, but it will be placed as a historical period preceding the fullscale diaspora nationalist politics. It is significant because it explains how diaspora nationalism has emerged. The Crimean Tatar diaspora has a long tradition of “émigré nationalism, ” and in fact emigre features can still be observed later in diaspora period, but I accept some rough breakpoints to enable a better understanding of the case.

In the following pages I will explore the concept of diaspora nationalism, but first of all I will look over the emergence and thinking of the term in the literature.

2.3. 1. “Diaspora Nationalism” as a new term:

“Diaspora nationalism” is a new term. In his book of *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner(1983:101-110) mentions diaspora nationalism in his typology of nationalisms. In the 1990s, when “diaspora” is “discovered” by academia, “diaspora nationalism” is also included in the terminology of studies of ethnicity and nationalism. However the nature and making of diaspora nationalism still remains unclear.⁴ Is there sufficient evidence to support

⁴ For instance, in Bhatt, Chetan and Parita Mukta. 2000. “Hindutva in the west: mapping the antinomies of diaspora nationalism,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(9) : 407-41, there is no clear definition, its meaning seems to be taken for granted as “nationalism of diaspora.”

the existence of diaspora nationalism as a distinct analytical device or does the existing term suffice?

This question is not unusual for a new term, especially in this era of global complexity. The fact that the term “diaspora nationalism” emerged recently, despite the ancient existence of diasporas, reveals its relation with globalization. As the “distinctive structural change transforming modern societies in the late twentieth century”(Hall,1992:274) eroded understanding of society as a “well bounded system”, a question of “how social life now is ordered across time and space” replaced it. (Giddens,1990:64) As Rosenau (1990:5) puts well, because of this “historical breakpoint, ...present premises and understanding of history’s dynamics must be treated as conceptual jails” we should locate diaspora nationalism in a new conceptual framework in order to understand it.

To write about diaspora nationalism is possible in a way that it was not previously. Because of globalization, we are able to question some forms that went unnoticed within the dominant discourse of the nation-state, as outlaying the conceptualization of nationalism. However we need to consider major conceptualizations of nationalism.

2.3.2. Nationalism and the diaspora

According to nationalist ideology, nation is a natural, unchanging, immemorial communal essence that has always existed. The task of the nationalist is to remind it, thus to “awaken” the nation. (Smith,1995:18) The essence of the nation has always been an issue of debate. Does it consist of objective or subjective elements? The answer is generally both. Language, race, culture, religion, history, geography, and territory are more frequently mentioned objective factors.⁵ The will to become a nation, the desire to live and develop as such, the *volk* spirit, group consciousness, love of community, love of home, group symbolism were mostly referred subjective bases.⁶ On the other hand the objective factors are each disputable to be sure, needed to be defined themselves. The subjective bases pointed out that the nation is mostly a belief, not a fact. Yet there is no agreement on a certain definition of nationalism. It is impossible to remember Hugh Seton-Watson (1977) 's conclusion :

I am driven to the conclusion that no 'scientific definition' of a nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists. ..All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not necessary that the whole of the population should so feel, or so behave, and it is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this belief, it possesses 'national consciousness'

At this point Ernest Gellner reminds us that people actually did not hold this belief at all times. Nations did not exist at all times and in all circumstances and that nations are modern phenomena. Nations are not universal, natural, eternal or immemorial, but they are very new constructs:

nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given

⁵ For a better account of objectivist position see, Carlton J. Hayes. 1960. *Nationalism: A Religion*. NewYork

⁶ For a better account of subjectivist position, see Kohn, Hans. 1962. *The Age of Nationalism*. Westport: Greenwood Press

language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non- members. (Gellner,1983:6-7)

Gellner(1983:55) puts that "It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round." The nationalist ideology creates the nations because nation is the only tested, in fact only viable framework for economic and social development. Moreover nation itself is an epiphenomenon of deeper social mechanisms which is modern communications for Karl Wolfgang Deutsch in his *Nationalism and Social Communication*, modern industry for Ernest Gellner in his *Nations and Nationalism*, and capitalism at a particular stage of its development for Eric Hobsbawm in his *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*. Therefore nation is politically and socially determined.

Anthony Smith (1995) though accepting that the nation is a construction, debates the role and amount of past and 'primordial roots' in this construction.⁷ Post structuralists push it further to the other side. The premise that nation is constructed actually means nation is ultimately a text that must be 'read' and 'narrated.' Nation is nothing more than a historical discourse with its peculiar set of practices and beliefs, which must first be deconstructed for their power and character to be grasped. (Smith,1995:8)

In spite of nationalist discourse, in fact nation as such does not exist. Nation is a form of cultural representation. Nation is made in national histories, literatures, media and popular culture. These produce a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical

events, national symbols, and rituals which represent the common fate that makes the nation meaningful. (Hall,1992:293)

For Benedict Anderson(1991:6) nation is an “imagined political community” "because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community." It is a community, he goes on, because it is "conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship." (Anderson,1991:6).

As opposed to the modernists, Anderson underlines that nation is constructed by not self-consciously held political ideologies, but with large cultural systems that preceded it. Post structuralist accounts shift the analysis to cultural construction and representation rather than social and economic factors. However it is not possible to reach a full account of nation and nationalism without looking at its relation with the state.

Breuilly (1985:1) asserts that "the term 'nationalism' is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments..." After all the natural consequence of nationalist premises is a doctrine of popular freedom, self-determination and sovereignty. (Hutchinson and Smith,1994: 4)

⁷ For a detailed account, see Gellner, Ernest and Anthony D. Smith. 1996 “The nation: real or imagined?” *The Warwick Debates on Nationalism.* *Nations and Nationalism* (2) 3, 357-370

However Gellner (1983:6) puts forward that nations and states are not the same contingency although “nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy.”:

...before they could become intended for each other, each of them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and contingent. The state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state. It is more debatable whether the normative idea of the nation, in its modern sense, did not presuppose the prior existence of the state. (Gellner, 1983, 6)

Richard Handler(1988:7) also states that states created nations more than nations created states and even in the classical nation-states of Western Europe state-building bred national identity rather than simply following it. Anderson(1991:7) also puts that nation is imagined as limited and sovereign:

The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation ...

...It is imagined as *sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. .. when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.

Hence nation is designated as limited, sovereign, homogenous, integrated, fixed, stable and ahistorical and framed with a state. Nation is of course based on the conception of “society as a well-bounded system”. (Giddens, 1990)

...a nation—its life, its reality—is defined by boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing diversity. In principle a nation is bounded—that is, precisely delimited—in space and time: in space, by the inviolability of its borders and the exclusive allegiance of its members; in time, by its birth or beginning in history. In principle the national entity is continuous: in time, by virtue of the uninterruptedness of its history; in space, by the integrity of the national territory. In principle national being is defined by a homogeneity which encompasses diversity:

however individual members of the nation may differ, they share essential attributes that constitute their national identity; sameness overrides difference.(Handler,1988: 6)

However Handler (1988:7)points out the critical issue:

And, it is much less customary to observe that our notions of "nation" and "state" imply similar senses of boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing diversity. The state is viewed as a rational, instrumental, power-concentrating organization. The nation is imagined to represent less calculating, more sentimental aspects of collective reality. Yet both are, in principle, integrated: well-organized and precisely delimited social organisms. And, in principle, the two coincide.

The bounded imagining of nation cause us to think of it identical with the state. Timothy Brennan (1990:45), points out the word nation refers “both to the modern nation-state and to something more ancient and nebulous-the *natio*- a local community, domicile, family, condition of belonging”

In order to get out of this dilemma Anderson (1991) emphasizes that we should better think of nation together with the phenomena like community, religion, family, solidarity, rather than state and power. Connor (1994) claims this paradox rises from the problematic conceptualization of nationalism.

Actually the “problematic marriage of nation and state” (McCrone,1998) epitomised in nation-state were challenged by globalization. We are shocked by the erosion of nation-state concurrently with the rise of nationalism. While national identity as a fixed, homogenous whole has been eroding, concurrently the local and ethnic-national identities strengthen. Globalization appears as a contradictory process. (Keyman,1995:93-94)

However it is rather nationalism which is contradictory. Nationalism pretends to be about the “*natio*,” and presents the state as the natural consequence of it. In fact,

nationalism is based on the state, and creates the “*natio*.” Our political vocabulary is full of this pretence. International relations actually mean inter-state relations. United Nations actually refers to Union of States. The term nation-state connotes there is only one nation in that state and this is the normal case, but there are almost no state in the world that is composed of one nation. It is not clear when an ethnic community becomes a nation. Connor (1994) concludes his book on ethno-nationalism as such: it is founding up a state which makes an ethnic community a nation. In fact nationalist ideology undermines the meaning of nation as a type of community and underscores its identification with the state. Referring to one or the other when necessary, this ambivalent nature characterises nationalism.

Thus I prefer to regard nationalism as an ambivalent phenomenon. The discourse of the nation- that is about *natio*- does not coincide with its reality -the nation-state.

What globalization does is to challenge the main principle of the world order, that is the integrity of the state. The hyphen between the nation and the state is questioned, and nation largely realised a separate entity. It is interesting that most of the “ethnic” nations, though they were suppressed by the dominant nationalist ideologies of the nation-states previously, asserted themselves only recently.

It is also interesting that the nationhood of diasporas came to the fore only recently. Of course previously the nationhood of diasporas were noticed. But it was only at the times when they were also activated to found their nation-states. Then diasporas were either supported as in the Jewish case, or accepted as a threat to the international order again as in

the Jewish case. The Armenian diaspora came to the fore by its support of the independent Armenian state. The African diaspora attracted attention when it founded Liberia. Diaspora nations were not accepted as considerable actors when they did not engage in state-formation activity.

Now diasporas are accepted as influential actors of the international system along with the transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations. It is not because they all engage in separatist activities to form their state suddenly, but because they can exert considerable influence not through their nation-state or in the absence of their own nation-state but by engaging into a new form of national political organization. Bauback accepts the flourishing of diasporas as the “slow emergence of interstate societies.” (*cited in van Hear,1998:5*)

2. 3. 3. The Making of Diaspora Nation

Even the word society premising a well-bounded system does not fit to depict these unbounded nations. Bhabha (1994) claims these nations overthrow the dominant premises of race and nation. It is true that diaspora nations are not based on limited, sovereign, united, homogenous, fixed and integrated imagining of nation because it is not embedded in the boundaries of one nation-state. Diaspora nations are actually cross-border, dispersed, heterogenous, hybrid, transnational communities. As all communities, maybe more than most, diaspora communities are imagined. By transnational imaginary, diaspora nation is imagined as transborder comradeship. Faist (1999:10) puts that diaspora community is a real *Gemeinschaft* which “encompasses all forms of relationship which are characterised by a

high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time”

Transnational social space is a new term to conceptualize the different kind of social formations other than society (Faist, 1999: 5). It can enhance the understanding of the organization of diaspora nation. Transnational social space of diaspora encompasses “globally dispersed but collectively self-identified groups, the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside, and the homeland states and contexts where they or their forbears has come”. (Vertovec,1999:449) Transnational social spaces supplement the international space of sovereign nation-states. According to Faist(1999:5), transnationalization is a phenomenon overlapping globalization, but has a more limited purview.

Transnational social spaces are delimited by pentatonic relationships between the government of the immigration state, civil society organizations in the country of immigration, the rulers of the country of emigration (sometimes viewed as an external homeland), civil society groups in the emigration state, and the transnational group-migrants and/or refugee groups, or national, religious and ethnic minorities... Whereas global processes are largely decentred from specific nation-state territories and take place in a world context above and below states, transnational processes are anchored in and span two or more nation-states, involving actors from the spheres of both state and civil society. (Faist,1999:5)

Transnationalism as a conceptual tool prevails in the understanding of diaspora nationalism. For, diaspora nationalism is delinked with the dominant assumptions of nationalism-that is to say it is related with the nation-state- but it still preserves the nationalist premises related to the *natio*, like a deep horizontal comradeship based on a transnational imaginary rather than the nation-state. Unlike globalization which connotes the eroding of nation-state, transnationalism emphasizes the emergence of new social spaces and social formations besides the nation-states. They do not necessarily erode nation-state, but rather articulate new forms between the old political formations and premises and the

new ones These rather can be called transnational social formations. Diasporas are one of these.

Transnational social formations do not have to seek “integration” and “centralization” as in the territorial conception of nationalism. Its relations are organised in the form of networks. The network has no center, no end and no beginning. Every part of network is autonomous, but also connected to the whole. As globalization has eroded the classical sociological understanding of society as a well-bounded system, we now concentrate on how social life is ordered across time and space. (Giddens,1990: 64) Faist (1999:10) claims in fact diasporas are one type of “transnational communities.” Transnational communities consist of international movers and stayers connected by dense and strong social and symbolic ties over time and across space to patterns of networks and circuits in two countries- based upon solidarity. “The community without propinquity link through reciprocity and solidarity to achieve a high degree of social cohesion, and a common repertoire of symbolic and collective representations.” (Faist,1999:10) Among transnational communities, Faist claims diasporas do not necessarily need concrete social ties: “It is possible that the memory of a homeland manifests itself primarily in symbolic ties” (also approved in Cohen,1997:176)

Diaspora by its very nature challenges the unified conception of identity. Diasporas are linked simultaneously by more than one nation. (Schiller et al,1992:11) Dominant nationalist discourse is exclusionary. For the diaspora the condition of belonging to an *ethnie* does not prohibit belonging to other. Their assimilation is not a process of

acculturation, but of cultural syncretism as they draw on their own ethno-cultural elements and the culture of the host society.

Despite all of the new forms of national organization that diaspora brought forward, Yasemin Soysal (1999:3) claims the dominant conceptualization of diaspora presume a “tightly bounded communities and solidarities (on the basis of common cultural and ethnic references) between places of origin and arrival.” For Soysal, the diaspora is bounded on the basis of exclusive ethnic otherness and identity. Diaspora is an extension of the place left behind, the “home,” so it is very much fixed, and in this sense it is very much embedded in the fixations of national territory and nation-state discourse. Thus although diaspora is deterritorialized, “diaspora nation” is imagined as territorial.

It is true that the nationalists in the diaspora are no different than any other nationalists in their fervor. I do not assert diaspora nationalism cause overthrowing belonging, on the opposite, it has very strong belongings. Diaspora is not homelessness. Diaspora rises from a developed “home” consciousness, not of the non-existence of it. Diaspora by nature builds its discourse on homeland, in a sense it is the definition of diaspora. However, homeland does not automatically coincide with territoriality and nation-state. It exists before the development of nationalism, territoriality, and nation-state. It is the main symbolic tie to help diaspora to imagine itself as a community. The best example is the Crimean Tatars, which started to imagine themselves as one nation, certainly after linking their ethnicity to the territory. Most diasporic people did not have a common identity when they were in the homeland, but they generated a common identity on the basis of coming from the same place when they left there. This seems to be more likely for the Crimean

Tatar diaspora as well. The twist is this: the pre-modern conception of homeland coincided with the premises of modern nationalism. Thus, when diasporas claimed that they are nations, they converted the aspiration for return into a demand for territoriality. Homeland is reconstructed to be the "*patrie*." The development of the concept of *patrie* took place in 1910s for the Crimean Tatar diaspora, while the homeland certainly had an older history, as it was obvious with the old folk literature.

However it is not the point diaspora provides challenges to dominant conceptions of nation. Diaspora challenges territoriality because it has two countries. Diaspora may have one homeland, but it has two *patries*. Moreover, in some cases homeland does not mean more than a country of origin. I have observed in the Crimean Tatar case that the parts of discourse which well coincide the dominant nationalist thinking are emphasized, but others were not. In fact they accept both Turkey and the Crimea as homeland and *patrie*.

Yasemin Soysal seems to take for granted diaspora nation as part of a nation, living abroad, without blending with the host society in any way. Diaspora nationalists are not simply nationalists who happen to be living outside of their homeland. Being transnational the diaspora is culturally hybrid. (Werbner,1999:12) That is why great problems of social integration appeared in Israel when different branches of diaspora returned. Similarly, the Circassians who went back to the North Caucasus after the break up of Soviet Union could not adopt to the society there and returned back. For similar reasons the Crimean Tatars in Turkey have not fully appreciated the contemporary Crimean Tatar folk dance groups which came to Turkey for tours from the Crimea, but rather prefer Anatolian folk dances. They

had developed different ways of life, tastes, styles different from their parent community. There are disparities occurred between folklores of different branches of diaspora.

As Marientras (1989) emphasized, we talk about relatively long time when diaspora is concerned. (Globalization might have caused time-space compression and might have shortened this necessary time can be an explanation for the new diasporas) Thus it is only natural for diaspora to hybridize with the society in which it is embedded culturally, not to mention ethnically. If it does not, and lives as segmented and isolated, then it is an exile community. (Faist,1999:11) Diaspora community is a part and parcel of the host society but they retain their sense of distinctiveness. The reality of “hybridity” is curiously not mentioned in the essentialist discourse of nationalists in diaspora. According to Werbner (1999:12), the hybridity of transnationals is unconscious, organic, and collectively negotiated in practice, as opposed to deliberate, external, and transgressive hybridity.

Hybridity is a new term to describe the culture composed of people retaining links with the territories of their forbears, but coming to terms with the culture they inhabit. In this sense hybridization refers to forms separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices. However the most important point is that it is not an amalgamation or mixture, it is a dialectical articulation. Thus diaspora is not pure or mixed. In other words hybridity does not cause anti-essentialism or anti-integrationism, the hybrid culture or identity itself becomes the essence of their loyalty. Although the hybrids think globally like cosmopolitans, in fact their loyalties are anchored in translocal social networks and cultural diasporas rather than global ecumene.(Werbner, 1999:12;Modood, 1999;van der Veir,1999;Bauman,1999) They need a ‘home’, and ‘community’ or loyalty to a lost ‘home’.

According to Ahmad(1995:13) political agency is ‘constituted not in flux and displacement but in given historical locations’ but by having a coherent ‘sense of belonging, of place. And of some stable commitment to one’s class or gender or nation’. (Werbner, 1999:21)

Diasporas, which base on “common cultural and ethnic references” are hybrid. Thus they can not be “tightly bounded” on the basis of “ethnic otherness and exclusiveness.” It is impossible for the hybrid child, the diaspora to deny its mother or father. Instead what diaspora child try to do is to love both of them. Both do not have to be mutually exclusive. Diaspora is of course an extension of the place left behind, home, of course it has memory about another place and time, these are how it imagines itself as a nation, like other nations. It has a homeland, but at the same time it accepts its new place as home. What diaspora actually does is to contradict with the totalizing discourses of nation-state and territoriality. It is totalizing because it is founded on “either/or.” “You either belong to one nation or another, either to a home or another, either here or there...” Diaspora simply says “and.” “I belong to this nation and other nation, my homeland and my host state, here and there...” It is the “empowering paradox of diaspora”...

In fact, though diaspora challenges the dominant conceptions of nation, it is also true that diaspora does not overthrow the nation, in the sense of belonging to a “*natio*.” This is basically what I assert in this thesis. It only realises a new articulation between some old premises and its specific conditions which were to be uncovered more clearly with globalization. According to Arjun Appadurai(1996:220)

These “new patriotisms” are not just the extension of nationalist and counter-nationalist debates by other means, though there is certainly a good deal of prosthetic nationalism and politics by nostalgia involved in the dealings of exiles with their

erstwhile homelands. They also involve various rather puzzling new forms of linkage between diasporic nationalisms, delocalised political communications and revitalised political commitments at both ends of the diasporic process.

2.3.4 What kind of politics diaspora nationalism will bring about?

In the 90s as the previous left-right politics seems due, and the locus of politics shifts towards the identity concerns, diaspora nationalism seems to have something to say. I maintain diaspora offers much potential for accommodating 'difference' in a peaceful way. After all it is accommodated within diaspora identity. What diaspora nationalism brings in practice is "imaginary coherence for a set of identities". (Hall,1990) It may be tempting to think of identity in the age of globalization as destined to end up in one place or another; either returning to its roots or disappearing through assimilation and homogenization. This may be a false dilemma. For there is another possibility; that of 'translation'. This describes those identity formations which cut across and intersect natural frontiers, and which are composed of people who have been dispersed forever from their homelands. They are not and will never be unified in the old sense, because they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, belong at one and the same time to several homes. (and to no one particular home) They are irrevocably translated. (Hall,1992:310)

Therefore diaspora nationalism broadens its base in the global age. More people, not from strict nationalist circles, but from various places in the political spectrum, can find a place for themselves in the politics of diaspora nationalism. The racist, and essentialist discourse of diaspora nationalism seems to leave its place to the discourse of human rights, civil society, rights of self-determination, multiculturalism, preservation of cultural richness,

voicing the alternative, and criticising the realist assumptions of inter-state system. For some it is a new make-up of nationalists, basically not different in content.

Nevertheless, together with the new social movements which also became salient in the new “global public sphere” diaspora nationalism formulates “new politics”, new agenda, new goals, new style of making politics. They together make transnational politics which activate “in spaces characterised but not delimited by contiguous nation-state borders.”(Faist,2000:198)In the global era considerable political activity can be done transnationally.⁸ Transnational social movements increasingly establish themselves for pursuing various specific goals. We observe the emergence of transnational public space.

Can the diaspora nationalism, largely recognized as a transnational phenomenon still be called as nationalism? Some will assert that nationalism inheres the aspiration for integrity, unity and homogenous identity, thus diaspora nationalism is a counterfeit nationalism, a malady of nationalism, or a weakening nationalism. I agree from a nationalist perspective diaspora nationalism is a scenery of death. But, from a transnational perspective it offers new potentials for new politics, which is more practical and close to the life, less ideological to be sure. Perhaps diaspora nationalism reconsiders nationalism in its old premises, and paradoxes while reformulating it in the global context.

However as we are still in the beginning of the process, this work aims to point out the emergence of a new nationalism, and suggest it for theoretical inquiry. Yet one of the limitations is the fact that this process is still evolving, not yet to take its final shape, and thus we are not able to analyse it as a whole.

⁸ <http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/>

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CRIMEAN TATAR DIASPORA NATIONALISM

“...Dünyanın dört bucağına dağılmış ve perişan bir durumda olan Kırimlılar huzur ve sukunu ancak bu mübarek yurdun ak ve pak toprağında bulabileceklerini anladılar...”**

“Tarihin er geç yazacağı şey müstakil ve mesut Kırim’dır.”***

Cafer Seydahmet, Antlı Kurban’dan

The Crimean Tatars are Turko-Muslim people who were remnants of the Crimean Khanate, which was one of the khanates that succeeded the disintegrating Golden Horde

** “...the Crimeans who were dispersed in all the corners of the world have understood that they would be able to find peace and tranquility only in the white and sparkling soil of holy fatherland...”

Empire in 15th century and ruled the north of Black Sea for over three hundred years. From 1475s on, the Crimean Khanate existed as the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire. As a Sunni Muslim and Turkic people who spoke one of the most close dialects to the Anatolian Turkish, and because of the strategic position and the geographical proximity of the Crimea, especially to the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Tatars have enjoyed very close relations with the Ottoman Empire. In every aspects the Crimean Tatars were within the Ottoman cultural world.

However after the 1769-1774 Turko-Russian War, Ottoman protection over the Crimean Khanate ended with the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* (1774). After a short period of political turbulence, Russia annexed the Crimea in 1783, by recognising equal treatment, protection of culture, and exemption from military service of the Crimean Tatars. (Fisher,1978:35) Since then Russians started a colonization policy in the Crimea, to Russify the place and the people. In fact it was also impossible for the Muslims of the Crimea to live under Christian domination, thus a mass exodus has started from the Crimea to the Ottoman *aktoprak*.⁹ The Crimean Tatar diaspora of today are descendants of the emigrants who started to leave the Crimea after the annexation.

In the following pages I will explain the formation of the Crimean Tatar diaspora and the development of diaspora nationalism among them. To explain this, I will briefly describe the emergence and development of nationalism in the homeland, which actually became

*** “What history will soon or later write is the independent and happy Crimea.” Cafer Seydahmet, from *Anth Kurban(Devoted Sacrifice)*

⁹ Literally means “white soil” and was used in the Crimean Tatar dialect to denote Muslim, that is to say Ottoman land at that period.

determining for our topic. The bridge between the two paths of national movement is established by the émigré nationalism, therefore I will specially elucidate it too.

3.1 The Emigration and The Formation of Crimean Tatar Diaspora

According to Alan Fisher (1978:81), “Throughout the 19th century, the Tatars experienced one of the most heavy-handed policies of Russification anywhere in the Empire.” The Russians actually regarded Tatars as a hostile element and encouraged their emigration while colonizing the areas by inviting serfs and foreigners, who were thought to be more friendly to the Russians. (Pinson,1972:44) The migration was largely the result of systematic government policy of Russians. (Fisher,1981:18)

The period between 1783-1883 was a “Dark Age” in Crimean Tatar history. Though the Crimean Tatar historiography was productive before and after this period, it seems the Crimean Tatars did not write anything about themselves, even about anything in this period. Kırımlı (1996:7) states that:

The most striking aspect of Crimean Tatar history under tsarist rule, especially during its first hundred years is the mass emigration of Crimean Tatars to Ottoman Turkey...With the exception of the 1944 mass deportation¹⁰, those mass emigrations were probably the single most determining as well as devastating factor during the last two centuries of Crimean Tatar history....and most of the Tatar inhabitants of the Crimea were regarded as potential emigrants not only by Russians and others, but by themselves as well.

¹⁰ The Crimean Tatars who did not emigrate before the foundation of USSR were deported from the Crimea to Siberia and Central Asia on 18th of March, after their accusation for treason against the Soviet Union as a whole nation.

It seems everyone waited for his or her turn to migrate under the fear of being forcefully deported and Christianized. The Crimean Tatars were living in ‘*dar-ul-harb*’ (the land ruled by infidels), and religiously glorified action of ‘*hijra*’ (emigration for the sake of God) was to take place towards the seat of the Caliph. ¹¹ (Kırımlı,1996:8)

The fact that there is no reliable statistical data especially during the earlier period of emigration, the complex migration patterns and following remigrations pose several difficulties for researchers of the Crimean Tatar migration. (Eren:1998, 325) The information of the volume of migration of the Crimean Tatars largely depends on the numerical estimates of Russian and Crimean Tatar sources, and settlement patterns in the Ottoman documents.

The estimate of the Crimean Khanate’s population is based on the statements of Baron de Tott, the advisor of the Khan between 1768 and 1769. He states that the population of the Khanate should have been between 2 to 5 million. (*cited in* Gözaydın,1948:27) Ahmed Özenbaşı, who provided best Crimean Tatar source on migration put that 500 000 people emigrated between 1783 and 1853. (Özenbaşı,1925:65) 1785-1788, 1789-1790, 1812, 1828 were the periods of main mass migrations. (Gözaydın,1948:102-103) Russian sources estimate 300,000 for this period. (*cited in* Eren,1998:326)

¹¹ The Crimean Tatar nationalists still call the immigrants “*muhacir*” (refugee with an Islamic connotation)

However, especially after the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire in 1853, suspicion for the loyalty of the Tatars grew, and the rumors about the possible deportation of them to the inner Russia came to the fore. (Pinson,1972:44)Before it was implemented, a mass exodus started from the Crimea to the Ottoman lands. (Karpat,1984:3) According to Ottoman sources between 1854 and 1864 approximately 600 000 migrants mostly from the Crimea emigrated and 120 000 of them were settled to Dobruca. (Karpat,1984:7) It was also because at the end of the Crimean War, the Ottomans had decided to assist those wishing to emigrate and promised them free land, draft animals and aid in procuring seed and agricultural implement, especially those who would settle in Dobruca. (Karpat,1984:7) However by the Turko-Russian war of 1877-8 most of those who settled in Dobruca had to retreat with the Ottoman armies to settle in Anatolia.¹²

Apart from 1860-2 exodus another great migration wave took place between 1890 and 1893 following the 1877-8 Turko-Russian War. Ethem Fevzi Gözaydın, a Crimean Tatar scholar (1948:103) provided that from 1793 to 1914, the amount of emigration was 1, 5 million, and only 238 000 were left in the Crimea. In the famine of 1920-1, 50000 more fled to Romania. According to Kemal Karpat(1985:66), who conducted one of the best researches on the Ottoman population, the number of Crimean Tatars who immigrated to Ottoman lands between 1783 and 1922 was no less than 1,8 million. A small number was added to this by the World War II.

¹² In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, Tatars who were forced out of their homeland less than a century before fought so ferociously that the Russians and Bulgarians could not take any prisoners. (Eminov,2000: 169)

Consequently the diaspora communities of the Crimean Tatars today far exceeds the parent community in the Crimea, though there is no certain number of them. Diaspora communities currently live in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, former USSR, Germany and the US. There are certain ethnic groups affiliated with the Crimean Tatars in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine (except the Crimea), Belarus and Finland.¹³ Diaspora communities are the product of waves of migration, so it is possible to come across first generation immigrants to fifth generation immigrants today. The largest part of the migrants remained in the former Ottoman lands, especially in Turkey. The immigrants in Turkey claim they are almost 5 million however there is no certain statistical data for that Twenty thousand is estimated to live in Bulgaria (Eren,1998:331), forty thousand is estimated to live in Romania, (Eren,1998:332) and eight thousand is estimated to live in the US. (Eren,1998:333) The parent community in Uzbekistan experienced a deportation in 1944 so they are actually an exile community rather than diaspora. Their number is approximately 500 000 and only half of them could return to the Crimea. Thus it is not very wrong to think of Turkey as the main geography where the main branch of the Crimean Tatar diaspora lives. Crimean Tatars largely concentrated in the following provinces: Eskişehir, Ankara, İstanbul, Konya, Bursa, Adana, Balıkesir, Çorum, Kütahya, and Tekirdağ. (Andrews,1989:304-308)

3.2. The Emergence of Nationalism among the Crimean Tatars

¹³ Some of them have founded an “International Federation of Tatar Clubs.” (Crimea-L, 28,08,2000)

In 1883, İsmail Bey Gaspiralı initiated the “national awakening” in the Crimea and among the Turko/Muslim population of the Russian Empire. He is the author of the most of the innovations in the cultural world of the Muslims. He started to publish a newspaper among the Muslims of Russia, when even the idea of press was a novelty. By his “*Tercüman*” (Interpreter) which was widely circulated not only in Russia, but also in the whole Muslim world (Kırimer,1996:73-74), he actually established the first school of enlightenment for the Muslims in Russia. He invented a new method in education, which was called as “*Usul-ü Cedit*”(New Method) (Devlet,1988:12), and opened more than 5000 schools in the Crimea, İdil-Ural, Caucasus and Central Asia (Kırimer,1996:11).

Financing them by the support of Muslim bourgeoisie, he aimed to increase literacy and initiate a cultural renaissance for the Muslims. (Devlet,1988:14) Well aware of the social, economic and cultural differences between the eastern and western countries, and the fact of colonization, his nationalism was one of the anti-colonial nationalisms. Not an exception for anti-colonial non-Western nationalisms, İsmail Bey Gaspiralı¹⁴ was the first person to connect the retreating and backward condition of his society to the immediate question of identifying the natural allegiance of Muslim peoples as a nation.¹⁵ He aimed “the renewal of Islamic and Tatar society through an acceptance of Western forms enclosing an Islamic and Tatar content.” (Fisher,1978:101)

Kırımlı (1996:40)states that in the age of national unions and pan-movements Gaspiralı came to the idea of a profound coalition of the Muslim-Turkic peoples of the

¹⁴In *Tercuman* Gaspiralı criticised colonial politics of the western powers, by not directly pronouncing the Russians, but implying them in some senses. (Kırımlı, 1996:42)

Russian Empire. His slogan was “Unity in language, idea and work.” He devoted his life to show and spread the possibility of a common Turkish language which will provide a basis for the cultural unity of all Turko/Muslim people. (Kırimer, 1996:41) Actually his *Tercüman* was read in all the parts of Muslim world, from Istanbul to China, and Kazan to Egypt. (Kırimer,1996:74-5)

It is important to note that he never formulated any political Turkish unity on a political basis, as it was unfeasible in these circumstances. (Kırımlı,1996:40) His concern was to lay a socio-cultural framework for the future political struggle of the Muslims.(Kırimer,1996:65-6) It is important to know that he was a man of *realpolitik* so he accepted the Russian rule as a fact of life, and aimed first of all to improve the social and cultural conditons for the Muslims in Russia. (Kırimer,1996:59)

According to Gaspıralı Crimean Tatars could only exist by trusting a large coalition with the other Muslim population of the empire, who were more or less in the same position. Kırımlı (1996:40) points out that within this broad concept Gaspıralı never singled out the Crimean Tatars apart from addressing the local issues. Indeed “Crimean Tatar” as a national identification did not exist then. For the Turkic-speaking Muslim inhabitants of the Crimea, even “Tatar” identification was not necessarily automatic or unanimous. Below Islamic identity as the paramount one, regional and clan identifications were most of the time more determinative. After all Tatar was ascribed by the Russians or Ottomans to most of the Turko-Muslim population of the Russian Empire, like Caucasian Tatars, Uzbek Tatars, Turkmen Tatars, Volga Tatars etc. (Kırımlı,1996:36-37) According to Gaspıralı “Tatar” was

¹⁵ Chatterjee (1986: 3) mentions the fact that ‘eastern’ type of nationlaisms value the ideal of progress “- a strive to to transform their inherited cultures in order to make them better suit for the conditions of modern world-...”

attributed by Russians in order to divide the Turkish nation, therefore after 1905 he mostly used “Turks”(Kırımlı,1996: 40) although previously he interchangeably used “Tatar,” “Turko-Tatar,” “Muslim,” and “Turk.” After that time he opposed the use of the term “Tatar” to connote a language and ethnicity separate from Turkic/Turkish. (Kırımlı,1996:127)

Gaspıralı was influenced by the pan-Slavism to develop foundations of his national ideas, and he employed themes of pan-Turkism and used the ‘Turkness’ as the category to which all the Turks belonged. After 1905 he opened up that his concept of nation, “*millet*” was not in the Ottoman sense, but rather in western sense, merely ethnically defined. (Kırimer, 1996:78; Kırımlı, 1996: 117)

Although Gaspıralı never himself favored or engaged in a political struggle, at the turn of the century, the new body of Tatar intelligentsia was largely stemmed from his efforts did, and indeed shaped the national struggle of Crimean Tatars. (Kırımlı,1996:54) According to prominent Crimean Tatar historian, Edige Kırimal(1981:29) these intellectuals mainly formed three groups:

The first group was Gaspıralı’s close followers who continued to follow an evolutionary path and remained in association with the pan-Turkic and pan-Muslim movements. They acted within the All-Russian Muslim Congresses. They struggled within the Russian system participating in the political institutions. They organized “Union”(İttifak-ı Muslimin) with other Muslim nations to join in First Duma activities after 1905. (Kırimal,1981:29)

The second group was the Young Tatars who represented the transformation of the apolitical “enlighteners into a politically conscious and idealistic national intelligentsia”. (Kırımlı, 1996: 76; Kırimal,1981: 35) They were social democrats, influenced by revolutionary activity in Russia and criticised Gaspiralı’s monarchic alignments. They were definitely not pan-turkic or pan-Islamic. They were mainly concerned with “national, social and political liberation of Crimean Tatar people” as well as a “struggle against the autocratic sytem of tsarist Russia” (Fisher,1978:105) By the ideas that they expressed in their major newspaper, “*Vatan Hadimi*” (1906-1909) (Servant of the Fatherland) they contributed to the emergence of national conscioussness particularly among the Crimean Tatars. (Kırimal,1981:31-34) This newspaper for the first time attributed to the concept of “Fatherland” in the sense of *patria*. The primary object and basis of its nationalism was the particular Crimean Tatar people in “an ethno-religiously and territorially defined setting.” (Kırımlı,1996:85)In other words, it did not view the Crimean Tatars merely as an anonymous fragment of a much larger religious and/or ethnic body. According to Kırımlı (1996:86)

In fact they imbued the Turkic and Islamic components within a particular Crimean(Tatar) identity, and actually consolidated the latter with the former. This three-dimensional Crimean Tatar nationalism, which found its rudimentary form in the Weltanschaaung of the Young Tatars, manifestly defined the platform of all future Crimean Tatar national movements up to this day.

The Young Tatar movement which flourished in the thaw of the 1905 revolution seemed to fade away by the end of the first decade, with the straining of autocratic measures, but the revolutionary underground organization was preserved and evolved to provide the bases for the future nationalist movement of 1917, which would achieve more mass support than the Young Tatars. (Kırımlı,1996:100-102)

Young Tatars were rather in a Russian milieu, they were generally educated in Russian schools and deeply influenced by Russian revolutionaries. However the members of “*Vatan Cemiyeti*” (Fatherland Society), the third group of nationalists who founded the first independent Crimean Tatar Republic in 1917 were rather in a Turkish milieu.

3.3 Emergence of Nationalism in Crimean Tatar Diaspora in the Ottoman Empire

Although the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the Ottoman Empire were late in nationalist “awakening” like other Muslim subjects of the Empire, there is evidence that Crimean Tatars in diaspora sustained a group solidarity, a “sense of belonging” by their diaspora allegiances since the beginning of migration. When Gaspıralı initiated the nationalist “awakening” in the Crimea, many Ottoman citizen teachers of Crimean Tatar origin came to serve in the Crimea despite the impediments of the Russian government.¹⁶ (Kırımlı,1996:152) Indeed the Crimean Tatars, as a part of rural and traditional Ottoman society remained largely as a closed community, impeding exogamy. They preserved a kind of rather sociological Crimean Tatar identity by their language, traditions, oral literature and folklore. The Crimea, the aspiration to return to the homeland lived in their folk literature. Furthermore, the fact that local people also identified them as “Tatars” recognising them as a separate community also contributed the consolidation of the diasporic identity. But,

¹⁶ The Ottoman citizen teachers, who were descendants of former immigrants, were accepted by the native people easier and were influenced by the culture of the homeland, and even settled there. Şevki Bektöre for instance, was son of a Crimean Tatar *emigre*, later he worked in the Crimea as a teacher, and became one of the most famous poets of Crimean Tatar literature. (Kırımlı, 1996:152-3)

although Crimean Tatar nationalism matured in interaction with Istanbul, the diaspora in the Ottoman Empire did not contribute it much at the beginning.

The first and single diaspora organization was *Tatar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi* (Tatar Charitable Society) which was founded in İstanbul in 1908 by the descendants of Crimean Tatar immigrants of the 19th century. Kırımlı (1996: 162) notes that the Society reflected the frame of mind of pre-reform, pre-Gaspıralı Crimea. Though they retained some of earlier folkways, traditions and Steppe[Çöl] dialect as frozen they were also partially assimilated to the Ottoman society. “It was an organization representing a sub-ethnic group in the Ottoman Empire rather than a Crimean Tatar society per se.” (Kırımlı,1996:162) Moreover “Tatar” was applied by them to any Muslim Turkic from the Russian Empire. Though they could not of course define a separate “Crimean Tatar” identity, what they sought to preserve in the name of cultural consciousness was the traditional Muslim folk culture of the Crimea. Its aim was determined as to work for the preservation of religious and ethnic character of “our brethren abroad”, but for the most part confined living in the Ottoman Empire. In practice it showed little interest to the territory of the Crimea, and to the Crimean Tatar students in Istanbul, though they at first joined their meetings. (Kırimer,1961:58;Ülküsal,1966:251) It had branches in Bandırma and Eskisehir. They sponsored two journals called “Çolpan”(Venus), and *Tonguç* (first born child)(1909-1910), both published in Istanbul. Apart from some news about the Muslims in Russia, and Crimean Tatar immigrants, they were not different from the other Ottoman newspapers. As it is very important for my analysis I directly quote its features (Kırımlı,1996: 164)

The concept of “Tatarness” promoted by Tonguç and Çolpan remained a vague one, ...neither Tonguç nor Çolpan brought forward or defended any all-Turkic (let alone Crimean) scheme in any clear terms. Although a concept of “Tatarness” was

emphasized quite frequently, especially by referring to the dialect and folkways of the Crimean Tatar immigrants, this was never based on any territorial definition; it was purely a cultural concept, mostly applied within the context of the Ottoman Empire. In other words the focus was... “Tatar” immigrants within Turkey....As most of the members of the Tatar Charitable Society (or their ancestors) had left the Crimea before the reform drive there, in many senses their outlook on national conceptions represented an anachronism compared to the contemporary situation in the Crimea. A traditional extraterritorial Islamic based universalism, with the addition of certain Turkic notions freshly acquired from contemporary Ottoman Turkist circles and partly from the Turkic press in Russia was characteristic. Interestingly, many notions of this specific “Tatariness” were shaped based on Ottoman stereotypes about historical “Tatariness” (which were not always complimentary) rather than from authentic Crimean provenances. This was why the Tatar Charitable Society exalted (and tried to “rehabilitate” historically) Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, the quintessential “Tatars” in classic Ottoman historiography, as the “heroic” ancestors of the Tatars,” though the direct relationship of these two figures with the contemporary Crimean Tatars was rather controversial, to say the least.

It should be noted that Tatar Charitable Society which was the original diaspora organization was not really a political one.

3.4. Crimean Tatar *Emigres* and The Rise of Crimean Tatar Nationalism

The third group of Crimean Tatar nationalists after Gaspıralı, indeed the ones who founded the independent Crimean Tatar Republic in general developed their ideas in Istanbul, when they were *émigré* Crimean Tatar students.(Kırımlı,1981:29 That is to say for the development of Crimean Tatar nationalism *émigré* life proved very influential. For our concern this period also resembles the first phase of *émigré* nationalism.

The Revolution of 1908 brought forward new spectrum of ideas in Ottoman intellectual circles, such as Islamism, Ottomanism, Westernism, and Turkish and other nationalisms. Part of these currents matched Gaspıralı’s conceptions. (Kırımlı,1996:143)

The cultural transaction between the Ottomans and Muslims of Russia extremely increased and transferred to the legal sphere. Gaspıralı and other Muslims of Russia brought their emphasis on salvation of all Turkic world. The newly developing Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire was more due to the post-Tanzimat intellectual tradition¹⁷, and ethnically-based Turkish nationalism of Gaspıralı and other Muslim intellectuals of Russia articulated on these traditions. The final synthesis of Ziya Gökalp. “Turkification, Islamization, Modernization” was not a novelty neither for Gaspıralı nor for most of the other Muslim intellectuals from Russia. After 1908 Gaspıralı himself and other Muslim intellectuals from Russia were more involved in Turkish intellectual life, i. e. *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Society), “*Türk Yurdu*” Society and journal. (Kırımlı,1996:145), mostly due to the straining of the regime in the Russian Empire.¹⁸

The Crimean Tatar students could not find direct appeals to their concerns in Tatar Charitable Society. In the atmosphere of the revolution of 1908, largely influenced by the

¹⁸¹⁷ “The ideas advocated (by Turkish nationalists in the Ottoman Empire) were Western liberal ideas; consitutionalism and parliamentary government. But it were not these ideas in themselves that appealed to them..but these ideas as a means to strengthen and eventually save the Ottoman state. As Tarık Zafer Tunaya has remarked, their central preoccupation was with the question: Bu devlet nasıl kurtulabilir? (How can this state be saved?) In other words they were ardent *Ottoman nationalists*.” (italics are mine) (Zürcher,1984:22) This was a significant difference between Gaspıralı’s nationalism and Ottoman nationalism. Turks of Russia were strictly resembling the German nation, who have already formed their nation before they could establish their state. They were seeking to found their independence and their state. However the Ottomans, already had a state, their point was to preserve it. So in that sense they had to develop a civic nationalism, as in the case of France or Britain, offering equal citizenship to all within the borders.

¹⁸ In 1907 Stolypin, president of the Russian government took back most of the liberties given in the revolution of 1905. Thus the revolutionary and nationalist intellectuals had to escape from the country. For the Muslim intellectuals the revolutionary atmosphere of Turkey provided a good basis for the development of their ideas.

nationalist-revolutionary spirit of the Young Turks, they founded a “*Kırım Talebe Cemiyeti*” (Society of Crimean Students) in 1909. (Kırırmer,1993:58) They were in close cooperation with the Association of the Muslim Students from Russia, which was founded by students from Volga-Ural region. In February 13, 1912, they were united under the name of “*Rusyalı Talebe Cemiyeti*” (Association of Students from Russia) (Hatif,1998:11)

Crimean students disputed over the prevalence of Turk or Tatar in self-identification. Tatar was the name that the students were referring themselves, and called by the Ottomans, but sometimes with derogatory connotations. (Kırırmer,1993:57-8) This caused them to attach the name stickly. The Volga Tatar publications, which had a strong sense of “Tatarness” also influenced them. However this did not cause a categorical denial of Turkish identity, as it was unthinkable because of the great influence of Gaspıralı and the Turkist circles in Istanbul. In fact this debate reflects the existence of a distinct ethnic conscioussness, that cause the problem of naming it. According to Kırımlı, dispute about national appallations were stemming from yet unsettled definitions. (Kırımlı,1996:164-5)

After ‘*Kırım Talebe Cemiyeti*’ (Society of Crimean Students), the third group of Crimean Tatar nationalists founded an illegal “*Vatan Cemiyeti*”(Fatherland Society) in 1909. (Kırırmer,1993:59) The prominent leaders of it, Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet defined their aim as “the liberation of our nation” and ‘their nation’ was the ‘Tatars’, to include all Muslim Turks in a broader interpretation, but referred to the Crimean Tatars in terms of operational ground and focus of interest. (Kırımlı, 1996:169)

The young nationalists emphasized Tatar self-identification subsequently. Many of the symbols national identity as recruited from history of Crimean Khanate, such as azure flag and *Kurultay* were also adopted in this period. Kırımlı (1996:196) puts

the Crimean Khanate was not important as an intrinsic political entity as it had existed in history, but as set of real or attributed symbols and values to be derived from the past which would then be applicable to the shaping and definition of a contemporary Crimean Tatar identity whose rights to the fatherland would be authenticated with the past statehood of its ancestors.

These symbols emphasized the uniqueness of Crimean Tatar identity, and established the historical legitimacy for Tatar rights over Crimea. As it was seen in the name of the Society, the concept of “fatherland” was well consolidated in the national thought. (Kırımlı,1996:195) Therefore historical-territorial component of the national identity was being theorised for the first time, and it implied a totally modern concept. Hence the aim could not be reestablishment of Crimean Khanate, but rather a modern nation-state. They were also revolutionary but what will happen after the revolution only evolved in the course of time to the definite aim of establishing an independent Crimean Tatar state.

They were conspirational in character and had established secret nationalist cells in all of the Crimean Tatar residents. It seems that some other Tatar underground revolutionary activities and groups existed, but very little information about their real character, whether they were related to Young Tatars, Fatherland Society, or Russian revolutionaries, or whether they had connections with “Young Turkey”. No matter, these groups seemed to constitute the historical link, or a kind of transition between Young Tatars and Fatherland Society. In 1912, the Fatherland Society also initiated secret revolutionary cells in the Crimea. (Kırımlı,1996:175)

In 1910s, “the conscience of an ethno-religiously defined identity, and the aspirations for a national future spread among masses.” (Kırımlı,1996:189) in the Crimea. The Crimean Tatar nationalists of 1910-4 were mostly in Turkish milieu. They adopted the intellectual products of post-revolutionary Turkey in the Crimean context, thus “this left its imprint to the Crimean Tatar political and cultural identity.” (Kırımlı,1996:195)

Between 1914 and 1917, there was no contact between the Crimea and Istanbul due to the war situation. Crimean Tatars together with other Turkish *emigres* organized an ad hoc committee “for the defense of the rights of Turko-Tatars in Russia.” The initiative in organizing it belonged to Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*¹⁹ (Special Organization). This Turko-Tatar deputation visited the capitals of Axis and also appealed to neutral states such as the US, Scandinavian states and the Entente. They raised the issue of self-determination of the Muslim Turks in the Russian Empire. (Kırımlı,1996:203)

In 1916 “Society for Defense of the Rights of the Muslim Turko-Tatars in Russia” participated in the “League of the Alien Peoples of Russia” which appealed to Wilson in the name of Russian nationalities and demanded help. In May 1916, it took the name of “*Rusyada Sakin Müslüman Türk-Tatarlarının Haklarını Müdafaa Cemiyeti*” (Society for the Defense of the Rights of the Muslim Turko-Tatars in Russia).” It is not clear who was the Crimean Deputy among the Crimean Tatars in the Society. He was either a Crimean Tatar emigrant born in Romania, Mahmud Esat Çelebizade or as Cafer Seydahmet claimed, Mirza Said Bey, who was the grandson of a famous Ottoman Pasha of Crimean Tatar

¹⁹ Intelligence service of CUP

origin, Said Mirza Pasha. Mirza Said Bey was also an active member of Tatar Charitable Society, and former publisher of *Tonguç* in Istanbul. (Kırımlı,1996:203-6)

It should be noted that the “Turko-Tatar Committee” or Society was not connected with the nationalist movement in the Crimea, which was initiated by Fatherland Society, probably due the war conditions. It had not tight relations with the Crimean Tatar students or members of Fatherland Society in Istanbul, either. Though the action together with the League, especially the joining the Third Conference of the Union of nationalities in Lausanne (May 1916) constituted the first time for the Crimean Tatars to bring their national question to the international platform, as it is seen in the weakness of Crimean Tatar presentations it is obvious that Crimean Tatar could not formulate a unified and consolidated national discourse yet by coordinating with the national activity in the Crimea, and the diaspora. (Kırımlı,1996:205-207)

When Germany invaded Crimea after the collapse of the Russian Empire, CUP decided to send a national intellectual cadre to the Crimea. Mostly intellectuals of Crimean Tatar diaspora volunteered for this. (Bowman,1996:7)

Meanwhile Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet, who proclaimed the self-determination of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea, called all the Crimean Tatars outside “to take national duty in the historical days for the Crimean Tatar independence”, thus many intellectual youth from diaspora including Müstecip Ülküsal, future diaspora leader succeeded to go to the Crimea.(Ülküsal,1999:74-80)

The second organization in the diaspora, *Kırımlılar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi*²⁰(Crimeans' Charitable Society) was rather established by émigré and diaspora intellectuals together in İstanbul in 1918. (Kırimer,1993:312) These émigrés were generally the students who could not leave for the Crimea, when the national movement has started there. They published a journal to support the Crimean Tatar national movement, “*Kırım Mecmuası*” (Crimean Journal) on a bimonthly bases, beginning in May 1918 in Istanbul. It was owned by the Crimean Tatar émigré book dealer, Süleyman Sudi. Edige Kırimal stated that it was published by the “Crimean Turks in Turkey to defend the interests of young Crimean republic and Crimean Turks outside the Crimea”²¹ Its contributors were Fevzi [Elitok] Altuğ, Fahrettin Tonguç, Mehmet Niyazi, Ömer Seyfettin, Yusuf Vezirov, Osman Kemal Hatif, Şevki Bektöre and others. The main articles were about the constitution of new Tatar republic, the right of Crimean Turks to independence, Cafer Seydahmet, Çelebi Cihan, Tatar people, the indivisibility of Turkdome, the importance of popular literature, Tatars of the Danube, Muslims of Dobruca, with some nationalist poetry. (Bezaniş,1994:107-108)

Both this journal and the Society were strongly Ottoman and German backed efforts, which utilised the Crimean Tatar diaspora to bring the Crimea under Turkish control.

(Bezaniş,1994:106-108)

²⁰ According to Kırimer (1993: 312) it was called “Kırım Müslümanları Cemiyeti” (Crimean Muslims Society). The Society was established on 23rd of March, 1918, by Osman Kemal [Hatif], Bekirzade Hamdi, Mahmut Ekrem, Şevki Bektöre, Belir Muhittin. (Kırimer, 1993:312)

²¹ Kırimal, Edige. 1961 “Kırım Türklerinin Milli Basını,” *Emel*(6), p. 5 (article taken and shortened form 23. and 24.issues of “Dergi”)

3.5. The Culmination of Crimean Tatar Nationalism: First Crimean Tatar Republic

According to Tatar historian and politician, Edige Kırmal²² the interaction of three streams of nationalist thought, Gaspıralı, Young Tatars, and Fatherland Society gradually prepared the ground for broad popular nationalist movement among the Crimean Tatars that came into open in March 1917. (Kırmal,1984:19) Crimean Tatars were particularly successful in creating the foundations of national society out of a demolished “backward” society of the “Dark Age”, and the “Tatar intelligentsia” was more advanced and prepared than many other groups in the national sense when the Empire collapsed in 1917. (Fisher,1978:107)

By 1917 the Fatherland Society had completed the recruitment of former nationalist revolutionary cells in an organization, which was ready to handle the national destiny when the revolution outbroke in March 1917 in Russia, though the leaders, Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet were not in the Crimea. In April, an All-Crimean Muslims Congress was upheld, and a Central Executive Committee was formed. (Kırımlı,196:209) and declared autonomy proclaiming that “Crimea belongs to the Crimeans” and opened the Crimean Tatar National Parliament, *Kurultay* in Bahçesaray on December 9, 1917. (Fisher,1981b:20) The first Crimean Tatar government was headed by Çelebi Cihan, and Director (Minister) of War was Cafer Seydahmet. On December 26, 1917 the Crimean Tatar constitution passed by the *Kurultay* (Kırimer,1993:247). Kırımlı notes that “the leaders and

²² Edige Kırmal has written one of the best accounts of the Crimean Tatar national struggle between 1883 to 1946, with an emphasis of 1917 and 1918 events. After graduating from Oriental and Slavic Studies, he completed his doctorate study on East European monographies in Poland. His exalted work, *Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken*, is based on Crimean Tatar, (Ottoman)Turkish, Russian, German, Ukrainian, Polish and French primary sources. (Emel 124, 24-38) Turkish translation was published in Emel, starting from 124th issue.

members of Fatherland Society constituted the backbone of *Kurultay* and the subsequent *Milli Firka* (National Party)” which indirectly controlled the political life of the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet times to some extent as well. (Kırımlı,1996:210-211)

In January 1918, Bolsheviks crushed the Crimean Tatar *Kurultay* government and killed Çelebi Cihan (Kırimer,1993:298) and Crimea changed hands between the Red Army, White Army, Germans, Russian kadets, and the Crimean Tatars until the final takeover of Bolsheviks in November 1920. (Kırımlı,1996:210) Crimean ASSR was established on October, 18th, 1921 by a kind of alliance with *Milli Firka* (National Party) of the Crimean Tatars (Fisher,1982:34).

On December 18, 1921 Red Army Journal was writing that “...The Soviet power will not favor a nationalist government along the lines of those that appeared....in the Tatar Republic.” (Fisher,1978:131) Soon Cheka²³ arrived in the Crimea to purge “bourgeois-national” elements. The purges of nationalist intellectuals were completed only in 1938, but until then Crimean Tatars were able to develop a restricted national life in the Crimea.

The main narratives of the Crimean Tatar history provides well account of the fate of the national movement followed in the Soviet Union. This is not our primary concern in this thesis, however we should note the main events as they have determining implications for the diaspora, and its nationalist movement. The influence of left wing of *Milli Firka* (National Party), who remained inside the USSR ended by the beginning of Stalin’s terror,

²³ First intelligence service of USSR

Crimean Tatar peasants were largely sent to *gulag*²⁴ and the intellectuals including the members of *Milli Firka* were liquidated after their accusation as “bourgeois nationalists.” However the catastrophe that determined the rest of the Crimean Tatar nationalism both inside the Soviet Union and in the diaspora was Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars as a whole from the Crimea to Siberia, and Central Asia on 18th of May, 1944, accusing the whole nation of treason by collaborating the Germans. This is accepted as an attempt to genocide, since half of the population died on the way and the rest were forced to live in labour camps for ten years. It also caused the break up of the relations among the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union and the diaspora.²⁵ The left wing of *Milli Firka* died in their exiled places, so this first line of national movement disappeared within the parent community.

Before, the right wing of *Milli Firka* which escaped from the Crimea had asserted to be related with the left wing which was left in the Soviet Union. Previously the Soviet Union was regarded as only a temporary catastrophe which was impossible to sustain for long period. Therefore nothing more than an émigré nationalist movement developed in the diaspora. The émigré politicians expected to return to the homeland soon, and regarded their existence outside the Crimea as temporary. Let alone the collapse, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower after the WWII not only ended the hopes, but also the first line of national movement after the proclamation of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars from the Crimea. After all the émigré movement had not claimed to embody a different

²⁴ Soviet collective working camps as a kind of punishment

²⁵ İsmail Otar stated that previously there was a restricted contact with the movement “inside,” but it ended with the deportation. 20th October, 1999. Unstructured Interview with the author. Erenköy, İstanbul.

national movement, but strove to express the voice of the national movement which was curbed.

3.6. Émigré Nationalism after the Fall of First Crimean Tatar Republic

It is impossible to understand the émigré nationalism of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey without referring the interaction between Tatars in Romania, Poland and Turkey as well as the émigré movements of other Turko-Muslim peoples in this period. However here I do not aim to analyse the interwar émigré movement as a whole, which is of course not only beyond both the aims and limits of this study, but also not very well enlightened historically. However, I rather aim to trace the roots of some diaspora nationalist characteristics in the émigré movement, which I believe to be indispensable to understand the development of diaspora nationalism.

In this period the émigré movement of Crimean Tatars was inseparable from the broad émigré platform of Soviet refugees, especially the Muslims. Soon after non-Russian nationalities of the Tsarist Russia have proclaimed their independent governments, they were all crushed by Bolsheviks. Therefore the leaders of national movements had to take refuge in many adjacent territories, especially in Paris, Berlin, Genoa, Istanbul, most of all Warsaw, by Marshall Pilsudski, who was under direct threat of USSR. The *Promethee* movement was established under these conditions. It was an organization of non-Russian anti-Soviet refugees. The members of *Promethee* had had political and personal bounds since 1917, and even knew each other since 1905 Revolution. (Copeaux,1997:17-22) Their

common enemy had not been only Bolshevism, but also Russian imperialism. Up to the acceptance of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations(1934), these nationalist intellectuals evaluated the USSR as a temporary phenomenon, and expected the collapse of it in a short time. (Copeaux,1997:29-30)

The Turko-Muslim population of the Russian Empire, who had greatly managed to synchronize their activities by 1917 (It was the first time all Russian Muslim Congress was able be organized) were also able to act together in the exile, and formed one of the milestones of the *Promethee* movement. Bezanis (1994:70) claims that the short-lived émigré serials of 1920s, issued in Turkey or Europe, which possessed a qualified writing cadre, network of contacts in the homeland, and a financial backing(Polish) was not reached by any succeeding publication of these emigrants in the level of sophistication in later periods.

The activity of Muslim émigré intellectuals in Turkey, which started in 1910s continued in 1920s, in a diminishing sense. Although at first the anti-communist, Turkish nationalist, and progressive publications were benefited for the consolidation of the secular and nationalist policies of the newly founded Turkish government. (Bezanis,1994:68, 77) They had to work on the building the identity of “Turk” not, “Turkestani” or “Tatar”. Actually they produced a lot of valuable academic work in this period, in Turkish Language Association, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara University Language, History, Geography Faculty, and Turkology Institute. In these activities it is important to understand one thing for the general of the thesis: “cultural pan-Turkism” was let to be promoted only in so far as it strengthened the roots of Anatolian Turkish nationalism and steered clear of

“adventurism” or “political pan-Turkism”. This meant to work merely in cultural matters, not the political. (Bezani,1994:77)

Keeping in mind the yet uncovered the interaction of foreign and domestic policies of the one-party rule, the reasons may be the Soviet-Turkish amity, the previous affiliations of most of the *émigres* with the CUP and its political pan-Turkism, as well as the limitation of freedoms of press and expression in the new republic. In fact it seems that instead of *émigré* activity and consequent expulsion from Turkey, these intellectuals might have preferred prestigious and well-paid jobs in the academics, bureaucracy, and assembly of newly founded Turkish Republic. The *émigres* could not establish a firm foothold in Turkey in the early years of the Republic. Bezani (1994:72) claims that actually these *émigré* leaders were not let to activate their diaspora.

After suppression of their publications in 1931 and 1932 and especially restrictive 1938 Law on Associations the “clandestine broadcasting or systematic distribution of anti-Soviet, separatist literature using in Turkey as a base” was virtually impossible (Bezani,1994:75-77). Thus key *émigré* activists left Turkey for Europe between 1927 and 1932 and continued their activities largely in Europe in the interwar period. After the restrictive press law of 1931 all *émigré* publishing based outside of Turkey. The weak *émigré* organizations in Turkey in 1920s and 1930s were a branch of the ones in European capitals, where the largest anti-Bolshevik support can be recruited. (Bezani,1994:69, 76)

One external reason for shifting of *émigré* activity from Turkey was the fact that they were supported in Europe without condition and materially, since the Westerners needed

them to attain real information about the nature of the societies of the USSR, and to have them educate cadres for information services, and politics.

Still Copeaux (1997:27) underlines they have never turned away or published negatively about Turkey in their publications including *Promethee* or other sister journals. Turkey was still indispensable for the *émigres*, especially because of their ideological stance, i.e. Turkey was the only independent Turkish state.

The only dynamic period in Turkey for the *émigré* activity has been the WWII. In October 1939 the Soviet request for a strategic position on the straits was rejected by Ankara, and pro-german sympathy rose. With the success of German arms, pan-Turkist agitation was encouraged, however the loudest speakers in this period were Anatolian pan-Turkists, like Nihal Atsız or Reha Oğuz Türkkan, and showed strong racist and anti-semitic orientation. (Bora,1998) The Muslim *émigré* politicians rather regarded these days as historical opportunity to change the fate of their nations, and they also uncovered irredentist thinking. Moreover Turkish government was holding talks with Germany both officially and unofficially regarding its interests about the Turks of the USSR, and Muslim *émigres* also took part in this. (Landau,1981:108-120)

However by the Soviet victories, Turkey declined in its anti-Soviet policy. A pan-Turanist group including soviet Muslim *émigres* was uncovered in May of 1944, and President İnönü denounced them publicly before their trial²⁶ in September of 1944. Some of the *émigré* politicians, including Cafer Seydahmet were decided to be expelled, however

²⁶ Widely known in Turkish public as “Türkçülük-Turancılık Davası”

they were quietly released, when this did not work for improving Turkish-Soviet relations, and Stalin insisted on territorial claims. (Weisband,1974)

After the WWII the opposing forces to Soviet Union were organized in Munich by “American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism”. It founded the “ Institute for the Study of the USSR” which published many journals, including a qualified one, “*Dergi*”(Journal) Some activists of *Promethee* studied in the institute, like Baymirza Hayit and Mirza Bala, or independent activists like Zeki Velidi Togan. Later the representative of the Crimean Tatar national cause in Europe, Dr. Edige Kırimal also worked there. For Copeaux (1997:46) the bonds which were built in decades now came to form a real organization to be used for nationalist purposes but unfortunately they became tool of the USA in the harsh Cold War environment, because it was very difficult for them to follow independent policy with “the strong enemy in the north.” Therefore the main feature of the exile movement is to seek an ally, as the *Promethee* sought to be with France, Germany, Poland. (Copeaux,1997: 46-7).

3.6.1. Cafer Seydahmet and Émigré Nationalism

The Crimean Tatar émigré nationalism was no different than this general story, however it was continued solely by one man, Cafer Seydahmet²⁷. According to Mustecip

²⁷ Besides his articles in Emel and in other journals, he wrote the followings: Yirminci Asırda Tatar Millet-i Manzumesi (Istanbul, 1911); La Crimee(Lausanne, 1921); Krym (Warsaw, 1921); “Wschod i Tiurkowie”(The East and the Turks), Wschod (Warsaw),no.2, (1931):22-26; Rus Inkılabı (Istanbul,1930); Gaspiralı İsmail Bey (Istanbul, 1934); Rus Inkılabının Bolşevizme ve Cihan İnkılabına Sürüklenmesi (Istanbul, 1948) (collection of five conference papers); Mefkure ve Türkçülük (Istanbul, 1965) (collection of conference paper); Unutulmaz Gözyaşları (Istanbul, 1975), and Nurlu Kabirler (Istanbul, 1992) (collection of articles from Emel)

Ülküsal (1973:2), Crimean Tatar national movement was known in the world today solely due to the efforts of Cafer Seydahmet. Besides his great role in the Crimean Tatar independence, his role as an émigré politician was comparable with this.

When the Crimean Tatar government was crashed by Bolsheviks, he came to Turkey to contact Enver and Talat Pashas and complained about Ottoman Empire's indifference to the Crimean Tatar independence. In this period he was supported in Turkey especially by Crimeans' Charitable Society. After the German invasion of the Crimea, he returned to the homeland with some Crimean Tatar youth from Turkey. The new Muslim Parliament had elected him as the prime minister, but he was refused by kadets²⁸ and socialists in the Crimea, thus he resigned in order not to cause divisions in the national movement (Ülküsal,1980:201-203, 208). He became minister of foreign affairs in the new government. Later before the invasion of the White Army, Crimean Parliament charged Cafer Seydahmet with full power to defend the rights of Crimean Tatars in Europe and the world. This actually constitutes the legitimacy of Cafer Seydahmet until today. Thus he sent notes to the Allies and League of Nations to protest the invasion of the Crimea. (Kırimer,1993:318-319;Ülküsal,1980:223-225).

The cause of Cafer Seydahmet, or the Crimean Tatar national cause as he defined, is based on the premise that Crimean Tatars are a nation, thus they have right to self-determination as other nations. Actually the Crimean Tatars had had historical rights for independence based on Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca(1774)*, which had recognized the independence of the Crimean Tatars, but it had been violated by Russia in 1783.

(Ülküsal,1980:225) So in 1917 the Crimean Tatars asserted their self determination, which was acclaimed by both Lenin and Wilson for all peoples, and proclaimed their independence. The Crimean Tatars are the native people of Crimea, hence the nation who has the right to own there. Although the Crimean Tatar Khanate only existed since the 15th century, it was nevertheless descendent of the previous Turkish peoples who ruled the peninsula for centuries. The Crimean Tatars are Turks, so were the indigenous people of the Crimea. Their right to establish an independent Crimean Tatar state was once again violated by Russians, this time by the Soviet state. The deportation of all the Crimean Tatar nation accusing them by treason wrongly, death of half of the population, and the subsequent punishment of forced labor constitutes an act of genocide and Soviet Union is guilty for this humanitarian crime. It should accept its guilt in front of the international society, and the subsequent punishment. It should ghive back the honor and rights of the Crimean Tatars, and sustain their repatriation in the Crimea with the necessary compensation.

In 1920, Cafer Seydahmet, after being expelled by Damat Ferit Pasha because of his contacts with national government in Ankara (Ülküsal,1980:202) passed to Switzerland, and Poland, but actually he traveled in the rest of his life to deliver conferences, protests, notes, memorandums, and conduct diplomacy on behalf of the Crimean Tatars and the other “captive” Turkish people. He played an effective role in the foundation of *Promethee*. He tried to follow the fate of his brethrens in the USSR as much as possible. He contacted with Vatikan, Red Cross, Turkish politicians in order to help in the Crimean famine of 1920-2. In the World War II he activated the national center to lobby on behalf of the Crimean Tatar independence, and he at least succeeded to bring the Crimean Tatar refugees in German

²⁸ Constitutional Democrats

camps to Turkey. (Ülküsal,1965:3-40) His legitimacy was great among all the Crimean Tatar nationalists as he most of all represented the Crimean Tatar independent republic, and played an historical role. Thus he became the natural leader of the Crimean Tatars.

In his life-long struggle, Cafer Seydahmet was mainly supported by the Crimean Tatars who started to publish the journal, *Emel*(Aspiration) especially by Müstecip Ülküsal who later directed Constanza division of *Promethee*. (Akiş,1996:1) Although *Emel* was at first a Turkish nationalist (Pan turkist) journal of the Crimean Tatar immigrants in Dobruca, mainly concerning the conditions and rights of the Crimean Tatars in Dobruca, Cafer Seydahmet urged it to become the official organ of Crimean Tatar national cause.

Emel started to be published in Pazarcık, Dobruca (by then belonged to Romania) on January 1st, 1930 by ten Crimean Tatar youth.²⁹ After 5 years of appearance in Pazarcık, *Emel* moved to Constanza.³⁰ *Emel* had to cease its publication by 1941, and Müstecip Ülküsal had moved Turkey by also with the consent of Cafer Seydahmet, as Romania was invaded by Hitler. In 1942 it sent all its typographical materials to *Azat Kırım*, the newspaper which started to be published in the Crimea under German occupation.³¹ (*Emel* 1,1960:4)

²⁹ It was later given to Bulgaria.

³⁰ *Emel* was published every two weeks, but after two years it became a thicker monthly journal until 1942. It has published 355 articles, 120 poems, and 56 stories in 5000 pages between 1930 and 1942.

³¹ *Azat Kırım*

Emel was working in parallel to other sister émigré journals belonging to *Promethee* group.³² (Copeaux,1997:29). These journals exchanged articles, the authors wrote for each other, and the activists often met.³³ Though they were specialised in one certain nation, they supported the cause of each other too.

Apart from recruiting *Emel*, Cafer Seydahmet also activated “Crimean Tatar National Center” in Turkey. It is an unofficial concept which largely appeared in 1950s to denote the national organization of the Crimean Tatars in diaspora.(Ülküsal,1980:323) Cafer Seydahmet, as the head of national center sent Müstecip Ülküsal and Edige Kırimal, a Crimean Tatar who was the representative of the Crimean Tatar national movement to Europe to Berlin to lobby for the rights of the Crimean Tatars and their right to self-determination as well as the condition of Crimean Tatar war prisoners, who had to fight in the Soviet army, and caught by the Germans or defected the Soviets, and passed to the German side. (Ülküsal,1980:298)

3.6.2 Transition From Emigré Nationalism to Diaspora Nationalism

Though conditions were rather better for émigré organizing and publishing, after passing to multi party system in Turkey, it was too late to create an effective organization and cadre in Turkey. The old elite, which was drawn to Radio Liberty or Institute for the

³² *Yaş Türkistan* (Berlin-Paris), *Yana Milli Yul, İstiklal, Kurtuluş* (M.E. Resulzade’s), *Şimali Kavkas* (Warsaw), *Trisub-Le trident, Sakartvelo* (Paris), *Volnoe Kazachestvo* (Prague).

³³ Apart from Cafer Seydahmet, Mehmet Emin Resulzade, the leader of Azerbaijani independence, Ayaz Ishaki the leader of Kazan Tatar independence often came to visit Müstecip Ülküsal, they were writing each other and constantly in touch. (Ülküsal,1999:147)

Study of USSR in Western Europe was irreplaceable. In fact, prime minister Adnan Menderes curbed this relatively free atmosphere soon.

Still, the Turkish government undertook two limited attempts for *emigres*. *Türk Göçmen ve Mülteci Dernekleri Federasyonu* (Federation of Turkish Immigrant and Refugee Associations) was founded in 1954 but ended in mid-70s. The Federation was composed of associations of North Caucasian, Crimean, İdil-Ural, Azerbaijani, Turkistani, Kerkük, Cypriot, Bulgarian, and Bayr-Bucak (Syrian) ‘Turks.’ They were encouraged for solidarity and compliance with the state ideology. The biggest sin has been “*kabilecilik*” (tribalism) – that is to say to emphasize the “Tatar” identity, for instance, which meant dividing the great Turkish nation. This attempt was not successful in any sense, and even could not form a platform among the migrants. (Bezaniş,1994:81-82) Some Crimean Tatars, including Gaspıralı’s daughter, Şefika Gaspıralı had also established *Kırım Türk Kültür Derneđi* (Crimean Turk Culture Association), which also went to cooperation with this federation.

Müstecip Ülküsal, the publisher of *Emel* in Dobruca, and one of the representatives of the Crimean Tatar national center to Germany during the war founded the second association, *Kırım Türkleri Yardımlaşma Cemiyeti* (Aid Society of Crimean Turks) in Istanbul in 1954, with other politicians who were related to *Promethee* and *Emel*. Actually after 1955 Cafer Seydahmet was not healthy enough for directing national activity, therefore he wished to leave his place to Müstecip Ülküsal. He then became a natural leader of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, though not in the other countries. He and his cadre started to publish *Emel* again in 1960, as a reaction to the publishing of a journal called *Kırım* in diaspora.

In 1957 some new *emigres* who came to Turkey after the WWII, rejected the leadership of Ülküsal and formed a new group composed of Cafer Ortalan, Mehmet Sevdihar, Mustafa Çorbacı, and Sermet Arısoy and published a short-lived journal called *Kırım*(Crimea).³⁴ This group recognised the leadership of Cafer Seydahmet [Kırimer], but rejected his successor Müstecip Ülküsal. Instead they supported Şevki Bektöre, who arrived in Turkey, in 1957 following some 25 years of imprisonment in the USSR. *Kırım* reappeared again in 1960, as a reaction to the reappearance of *Emel*. But then this group mostly re-emigrated to the US. Appearing under Gaspıralı's slogan 'Unity in language, thought, and action' It was financed by its main author Sevdihar, who had worked in *Azat Kırım* in the Crimea, during the German occupation, but then took refuge in Turkey. Sevdihar, as a new *émigré*, was grown up in the Soviet period, where Tatar nationalism could have flourished to a certain degree. He was thus committed to more Tatarism rather than (pan) Turkism, though he had to change his usage of the term Crimean Tatar into Crimean Turk in Turkey by warning of a MIT(Turkish intelligence) member. (Bezaniş,1994:108) He wrote about Crimean Tatar literature, history, poetry and some recollections from the homeland. (Bezaniş,1994:108) The content of the journal was not very qualified, mostly because they had to limit the themes to the anti-communism, cultural Pan-Turkism and Atatürkism. (Bezaniş,1994: 82)

3.7. The Development Crimean Tatar Diaspora Nationalism

³⁴ *Kırım* was 32 page monthly journal published in Ankara. One thousand copies of each issue were published and there were 62 subscribers.

While the research about the *émigré* or diaspora political activity in Turkey in general is very little, the significant ones (Bezanis, Eren, and Copeaux) are also very insufficient in analysis. After naming some of the associations and journals, and their contents, they usually conclude about the ineffective or negligible nature of these activities. This is obvious in their designation of these activities as simply “émigré,” the remnants of lively *émigré* life of interwar period. Not only the scholars, but also diaspora nationalists themselves, also do not think that *émigré* activity after the WWII is worth to mention.³⁵ I also agree that as an *émigré* activity it was dying, merely because it was turning into a diaspora activity, something different. That is to say it was more realising a special integration in the mechanisms of the society, so it was becoming harder to recognise and detect. Developing more in a confined way, the existence of a different phenomenon only surfaced as such recently.

Sabri Arıkan³⁶, who have been an activist since 1930s provided that the most important indeed the sole activity was publishing *Emel*³⁷ because of the political limitations. *Emel* in fact describes the 40 years of diaspora nationalist movement very well, and deserves to be a subject of study itself alone. Therefore while trying to figure out main periods of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism as a movement and thought, I rather base on the guidelines *Emel* provides about the nature of the activity.

³⁵ Sabri Arıkan. August 14, 2000. Conversation with the author.

³⁶ Sabri Arıkan is a retired military officer and a member of the national center.

3.7.1. The Leadership of Müstecip Ülküsal: Single Path

After the death of Cafer Seydahmet Kırimer in 1960, Mustecip Ülküsal³⁸ assumed the leadership, and his cadre largely consolidated to include Abdullah Zihni Soysal³⁹, Şevki Bektöre⁴⁰, Edige Kırimal⁴¹, İbrahim and İsmail Otar⁴², Yusuf Uralgiray⁴³ Ali Kemal Gökğiray⁴⁴, Emin Bektöre,⁴⁵ Nurettin Mahir Altuğ, Sabri Arıkan. They were directing the

³⁷ Sabri Arıkan. August 14, 2000. Conversation with the author.

³⁸ Müstecip Ülküsal was born in Azaplar, Constanza. His family has migrated from the Crimea in 1862. After his secondary and high school education in Istanbul, he graduated from Law School of Bucharest University. In Romania, he worked for the organization of the Muslims, and founded “*Dobruca Türk Hars Birliği*” (Dobruca Turkish Cultural Union) and published *Emel* from 1930 to 1940. In 1940 he immigrated to Turkey and restarted to publish *Emel* in 1960. He wrote the editorials of *Emel* until 1983, and continued to write in *Emel* until 1986. He died in 1996.

³⁹ Abdullah Zihni Soysal was born in Kerç, Crimea in 1905. He immigrated to Turkey in 1920. After graduating from Istanbul University, he received his Ph. D. in Turkology from Karakow University, Poland. In 1941 he went to Berlin to work with Edige Kırimal and Hüseyin Balıç to find aid for Crimean Tatar prisoners of war. He died in Istanbul in 1983.

⁴⁰ Şevki Bektöre as a second generation émigré, and was born in Kavlaklar, Dobruca in 1888. His family immigrated to Turkey and settled in Karakaya, Eskişehir. He became an active member of Crimean Students Society, went to the Crimea, and served as a teacher in 1920s in the Crimean ASSR and Turkmen SSR. He was arrested in 1932 and spent 25 years in prison. In 1957 he was allowed to return Turkey. His memoirs are published under the name, “*Volga Kızıl Akarken*” (Red Flows the Volga).

⁴¹ Edige Mustafa Kırimal was born in Bahçesaray in 1912. His family had moved from Poland to the Crimea. He finished Pedagogical Institute in Akmescit, Crimea. He escaped to Turkey after the revolution but then he went to Poland, where his relatives lived and graduated this time from Vilnius University School of Political Science in 1939. During the WWII he assisted the Crimean Tatar war prisoners in Germany, and settled there after the war. He received his doctorate from Munster University in 1952 and worked for the Institute for the Study of Soviet Union and became the editor of *Dergi*. He wrote in German one of the best accounts of the Crimean Tatar national movement. He died in Munich in 1980. He was the representative of the national center to Europe.

⁴² Otars were sons of a Crimean Tatar who emigrated Turkey from Otar village of Bahçesaray, Crimea directly. İbrahim (1913-86) and İsmail Otar was born in Bursa and they are second generation *emigres*. İbrahim Otar completed his education in Poland and Turkey and became a lawyer. He was employed in Warsaw as a member of national center. He proposed for the first time to found a cultural foundation to collect the historical and ethnographic materials about the Crimea. As he died in 1986, his brother İsmail Otar continues to collect materials for the Crimean Tatar library.

⁴³ Yusuf Uralgiray was born in Toprakhisar village of Constanza. He graduated from Al-Azher University in Cairo. He worked in Ankara and Riyad Universities. He wrote an arabic book called “*Kırım Faciası*” (Disaster of the Crimea) He has translations and articles, which were published in *Emel*. He studied on language. In 1978 he spoke at Luzern Conference on Crimean Tatars cause. He contributed to the establishment *Emel* Foundation. He was the representative of national center to the Middle East. In 1970 he joined the Asian Muslims Congress in Pakistan to represent the Crimean Tatars.

⁴⁴ Ali Kemal Gökğiray’s family had emigrated from Canköy, Crimea to Dobruca in 1833. They re-emigrated to Turkey in 1900, and settled in Eskişehir. He was a military officer and a graduate of Istanbul Law Faculty. He

works of Crimean “Turk” Associations in Ankara and in İstanbul, and the one founded in Eskişehir in 1972 by Emin Bektöre for folklore. (Kırım 29,1999:62-63) The associations were largely acting and thinking in the same line epitomised in *Emel*. *Emel* symbolizes this single path of diaspora nationalism.

The journal was for a long time owned by İsmail Otar, who was the brother of İbrahim Otar, a member of national center, employed in rather Warsaw. *Emel*'s editorials were written by Ülküsal until 1983. Prominent contributors included N. Ağat, A. Soysal, S. Taygan, A. Aktaş, M. Altan⁴⁶, in addition to the members of national center and other activists from the other Turko-Muslim émigré circles.

New *Emel*⁴⁷ asserted that it was a continuation of the first *Emel* in Dobruca. (*Emel* 1,1960:1-3) In fact the Crimean Tatar diaspora perceived Dobruca and Turkey as the same geography in spite of the borders. According to Ülküsal, *Emel* continued consistently its previous aim to contribute to the aim of independence of all Turkic peoples, including but not privileging the Crimean Tatars.⁴⁸

worked as a lawyer too. He for a long time owned and directed *Emel*, and wrote many articles under the name Kırimsar. He died in 1983.

⁴⁵ Emin Bektöre was born in Pazarçık, Romania in 1906. A second generation émigré, he organized several Crimean Tatar folk dance ensembles, wrote and staged didactic plays. He immigrated to Turkey in 1940 and settled in Eskişehir. He continued teaching Crimean Tatar folk dance and songs until his death in 1995.

⁴⁶ Mustafa Altan escaped from the Crimea with the German army during the WWII, and came the West Germany. In 1948 he settled in İstanbul, and joined the diaspora nationalist movement of the Crimean Tatars. He died in 1982.

⁴⁷ First 11 issue of *Emel* was published in Ankara, by Niyazi Kırımman(1911Bulgaria-1967Ankara) Halil Beşev (1896Crimea-1973Ankara) Mahmut Oktay(1912 İstanbul-1974 Ankara)in collaboration with the cadre of national center in İstanbul and it was financed by Kırımman. Then it was transferred to İstanbul. (*Emel*: 109, 1978:5-8)

Emel, not only fostered the publication of scholarly and all kinds of work and manuscripts about the common culture and history about the Crimean Tatars, but also directed the coordination of the activities in diaspora. Of course the content of the new journal was much more limited than the one in Romania. Only certain themes could be written. Indeed its name was a “intellectual-cultural magazine” as different than the previous *Emel* which was a “literary, social, economic and political magazine.” *Emel* provides a significant collection of Crimean Tatar as well as other Turkish literary works, and folk art, and includes many original and primary historical materials. The cultural and historical symbols, such as homeland, flag, national anthem, national heroes, leadership, and specific aspects of Tatar heritage, and certain social practices, such as annual ‘*tepreş*’⁴⁹ were preserved as alive within the diaspora community as such. Tatar intellectuals have used this collective memory in constructing a modern Crimean Tatar (“Turk”) identity.

Apart from symbolic ties, the journal also functioned for founding the social ties by publishing the translations of underground Soviet dissident samizdat publications about the Crimean Tatars. This is the only way diaspora was informed about the condition of the Crimean Tatars in exile. Their struggle within the Soviet system was the source of inspiration for the loyalty and political mobilisation of diaspora community. Demonstrations, circulating petitions, public lectures, and conferences, religious ceremonies followed each other.

However it is not wrong to say that *Emel* fostered scholarly work about the Crimean Tatar issue, though it was not very rich in political ideas. However in terms of style and

⁴⁸ It can be checked in any editorial of the journal.

political viewpoint, it is like a purely Turkish journal who has pan-Turkist themes and interested in Turkish peoples including the Crimean Tatars in the former USSR. In a black and white perspective of Cold War *Emel* in fact is not very analytical or creative. The basic discourse of the journal is simple, hagiographic, and self-repetitive. The Soviet Union and Russians are condemned in every respect for their victimizing the Turkish peoples, including the Crimean Tatars. The main themes in the journal were the despotic regime of the Soviet Union, which was accepted as nothing more than a new type of Russian imperialism, the miserable situation of “captive” Turks, Crimean “Turks” and Turkish world, memorial of 1944 deportation, first Crimean Tatar Republic, Çelebi Cihan as the national martyr, Cafer Seydahmet as the political leader, and İsmail Gaspıralı as the great teacher, the symbols of national identity, flag and anthem, memoirs of Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer, the khans of the Crimea, the maladies of emigration, newly discovered documents about the Crimean Tatar national activity, eyewitness reports and memories about 1917 affairs in the Crimea, secret minutes of first All-Russian Muslims congress, Ottoman-Crimean relations, Karaims, Romanian, and Polish Tatars, German foreign policy in 1918 and in 1941, all geographic and historical information about the Crimea, the Crimean Tatar map of the Crimea, list of the names of the villages, the national struggles of the other Turkic nations.

During 60s and 70s *Emel* which largely started as an *émigré* organization of Cafer Seydahmet, turned into a diaspora organization, that is to say it developed a certain inevitable integration to the Turkish society. They asserted that they were following Gaspıralı, Cafer Seydahmet, Atatürk and Ziya Gökalp. Of course these all have many

⁴⁹ Crimean Tatar traditional spring festival

commons in their thoughts, and influenced or being influenced by other directly or indirectly, but they had critical differences as well. They were of course following them interpreting under their own conditions and from their own glasses. Thus it was not surprising to see easy integration between the *ülküci* movement, nationalist or ultra-nationalist factions or parties in Turkey and Crimean Tatar national movement. The diaspora nationalists must have needed every kind of support, and the ones who claimed they were anti-communist and (pan)Turkist were the natural allies. It is more correct to say they wanted to redirect the power of these movements for the growth of the Crimean Tatar national movement. Zuhâl Yüksel, a writer of today's *Emel* notes that Müstecip Ülküsal was careful about distinguishing the Crimean Tatar national movement from the mainstream Turkish ultra-nationalism.⁵⁰

It is interesting that Mustafa Cemilev⁵¹, the flagship of Crimean Tatar national struggle in the Soviet Union was firstly discovered by the *ülküci*⁵² movement.⁵³ Afterwards *Emel* was able to handle the topic more securely. It was also a good way to propagate their cause to the Turkish public. But it was interpreted as a nationalist theme, and even Mustafa Cemilev was called an *ülküci*. The newly recruited young diaspora nationalists were also driven by the ideological political atmosphere of Turkey.⁵⁴ The Crimean Tatar national cause was most of the time overwhelmed by ideological debates concerning Turkey, and

⁵⁰ Yüksel Zuhâl. August 2000. Unstructured Interview with the author. Beşevler, Ankara.

⁵¹ Mustafa Cemilev was born in 1943 in the Crimea. In 1944 he was also deported with his family and the rest of the Crimean Tatars and lived under surveillance until 1955. In 1961 he joined the underground organization of the Crimean Tatars, and became a very active dissident of 70s, especially he went on one of the longest hunger strikes and subsequently was elected as the leader of Crimean Tatar national struggle in the USSR, which actually started in 1956. In 1991 Crimean Tatar National Assembly gave the name, Mustafa Abdülcemil Kırımoglu to him, and he is known with this name today and will be referred as such, followingly.

⁵² In English it means idealist. It is the name of ultra-nationalist movement in Turkey

⁵³ Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara.

Crimean Tatar national cause was most of the time utilised to be located somewhere of these debates. *Emel* actually was no different than other ultra-nationalist Turkish journals of the period.

Thus in time, the *émigré* nationalist organization of Cafer Seydahmet evolved into a diaspora organization, which follows its own agenda.

3.7.2.. Transformation of Diaspora Nationalism in the 1980s

In fact since the 70s there was a trend of expanding news section about the struggles of the brethren in the Soviet Union, especially Mustafa “Cemiloğlu,” the Crimean Tatar dissidents in the West, like Ayşe Seyitmuratova, and the Crimean Tatars in the US and other branches of diaspora in *Emel*. Turko-Tatar self designation also appeared along with Crimean Turk. But, there was no real contact with the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union in this period up to 1979⁵⁵, all news were the summaries from the Western sources.

By 1983 *Emel* was transferred to a new cadre, because of the old age of the first cadre. ⁵⁶This also resembled a smooth transition from single path diaspora politics during the Cold War into multiplication of diaspora organizations and paths, new collaborations, divisions and unifications among the newly emerging diaspora nationalists.

⁵⁴ Nevertheless they were not automatically on the right wing. Yüksel, Zuhul. August 11, 2000. Unstructured Interview with the author. Beşevler, Ankara.

⁵⁵ İsmail Otar had a chance to meet a Crimean Tatar activist in a meeting in Budapest, but it can not be again counted as a real contact.

⁵⁶ *Emel* was one of the two diaspora journals which was not closed during the 1980 coup.

In addition to living members of the old cadre who continued to write, the major names in the new cadre included Hakan Kırımlı⁵⁷, Ünsal Aktaş⁵⁸, Zafer Karatay⁵⁹, Mükremin Şahin. The editorials of *Emel* started to be written together by Hakan Kırımlı and Ünsal Aktaş. The first thing that the new cadre did was to color the cover of *Emel* into the azure color of the Crimean Tatar flag, and put a Crimean map on it. Secondly they advertised the journal, using the phrase of “The Voice of Crimean Turks.” Even these acts were seen as impossible by the old cadre, indeed it was not agreed by them.⁶⁰ This image change in fact was the sign of further changes. The journal gained a dynamism due to the new cadre and the conjunctural changes. From 1980 on, the diaspora was in a restricted contact with the movement “inside,” the national struggle of the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union. The new dynamic cadre was following all the news and samizdats that came from the Western media, especially Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, translating, transliterating and publishing them. Besides translations, which actually occupied more than half of the journal, the articles turned out to be more analytical. This was of course because of the more liberal atmosphere in Turkey in a sense, as well as the outmoding of Cold War perspectives by the new speedy changes in the Communist Bloc. As much as the diaspora nationlaists read and became aware of the literature of the Crimean Tatars in the USSR’ they

⁵⁷Hakan Kırımlı is a Crimean Tatar born in Balıkesir, Turkey. He received his Ph. D. from University of Wisconsin, and published a version of his doctorate thesis: Kırımlı, Hakan. 1996. *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916*. New York: E.J. Brill Leiden and a translation of it by Türk Tarih Kurumu. Currently teaches in Bilkent University, Ankara. He is at the same time one of the main diaspora activists related with *Emel* and *Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi*, along with his father, A. İhsan Kırımlı. He was representative of the Crimean Tatar National Movement Organization in the Crimea to Turkey for a period.

⁵⁸ Ünsal Aktaş is a Crimean Tatar born in Ankara, in 1953. He has been the general president of *Ülkü Ocakları*. He has graduated from Ankara Law Faculty and works as a lawyer. He was an activist in *Emel*, but he currently owns the journal, *Kırım*. He wrote a Crimean Bibliography with Hakan Kırımlı.

⁵⁹ Zafer Karatay is a Crimean Tatar. He currently works in TRT, state television. He prepared a documentary film about the Crimean history and politics. He is the representative of Crimean Tatar National Meclis to Turkey.

decided to have the movement in diaspora approach it more. Especially instead of nationalist slogans of Turkish ultra-right, the importance of rising the issue in the international platform and the human rights aspects of the Crimean Tatar national cause were emphasized.

1983 Turkish constitution provided very restricted rights for the associations as a civil society organization. Thus foundation appeared as a more efficient alternative for the diaspora nationalist movement. (Aktaş,1987:18) On 31st December, 1986 a non profit organization, *Emel Türk Kültürünü Araştırma ve Tanıtma Vakfı* (Emel Endowment for Research and Spread of Crimean Turkish Culture)⁶¹ was established in Ankara, by the cooperation of Ankara, İstanbul and Eskişehir Associations. (Emel 157,1986:42)⁶² and coordinated the activities of Ankara, Bursa, Eskişehir, and İstanbul communities, and initiated the establishment of a Crimean Tatar library in Ankara. However the increase of *emigre* Tatar associations after 1990 exceeded the capacity of the *Emel* Endowment. The activities were then centered by two non-profit organizations: *Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi* (General Center for Cultural and Aid Associations of Crimean Turks)and the Institute for Research on Crimea and Caucasus⁶³. Today 18 local associations accepted to work under the General Center, the others remain as independent, though they make certain alliances between themselves. (see Appendix 1)

⁶⁰ Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara,

⁶¹ On 9th of March, 1991 it was renamed as *Emel Kırım Türk Kültürünü Araştırma ve Tanıtma Vakfı*

⁶² Founder executive committee included, İsmail Otar, Zafer Karatay, Nurettin Mahir Altuğ, Niyazi Elitok, Müstecip Ülküsal, Safiye Nezetli, Serdar Karatay, Ünsal Aktaş, Mükremin Şahin (Emel 159, 1987: 42)

⁶³ *KÖK Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı (KÖK-SAV)*, (*KÖK* Social and Strategic Research Foundation), Ankara included some Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalists (Kırım 6, 1994: 2) and aimed at research about “Turkish World” which came to the agenda of Turkey in the beginning of 90s. Crimean and Caucasian

3.7.3. Multiplication of Paths in the 1990s

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was an event of worldwide consequences of course. However it specifically influenced the Crimean Tatars because it was once more an historical opportunity to recapture the homeland. However this time the Crimean Tatars have fallen very far from this goal, they were not even in the Crimea, let alone capturing it. Thus, the main agenda of the Crimean Tatar national movement both inside and outside the former Soviet Union is the return of the deported Crimean Tatars to the Crimea.⁶⁴

In the 90s we may identify loosely two main groups in the Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalist movement in Turkey, and many more points of view to be sure. Müstecip Ülküsal was not able to unite them in his late years. In fact he was unable continue to work and write since 1986 as he lost his health. After his death in 1996, Dr. Ahmet İhsan Kırımlı,⁶⁵ previous Minister of Tourism connected with Democratic and Justice Parties

Research Institute (Kırım ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Enstitüsü) was established by this foundation along with the other institutes concerning Balkans, Eurasia, and Turkish music.

⁶⁴ According to Kırımlı, it is very wrong to regard the return of the Crimean Tatars solely a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was actually more the result of the stubborn struggle of the Crimean Tatars. Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara.

⁶⁵ Dr. Ahmed İhsan Kırımlı was born in 23rd of April, 1920 at Balıkesir of Turkey. He completed his education in Faculty of medicine of Istanbul University (1947). He continued his studies further in London, and the US. He founded Turkish Students Union in the US and became its president. In 1961 he became a parliamentarian representing Balıkesir and Ministry of Tourism between 1973 and 1974. At the moment he is in the executive committee of the council of Turkish-Atlantic pact, which he himself founded. He is the General President of the umbrella organization for 18 local Crimean Tatar associations, Crimean Turks Culture and Aid Association in Turkey. He is also the president of the confederation of Azerbaijan, Bulgarian, and Crimean associations. www.kirimdernegi.org.tr

assumed leadership. He is the president of the General Center, which publishes *Emel* and the newly founded *Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı* (Crimean Turks Culture and Aid Foundation-Crimea Foundation)⁶⁶ Under his presidency, Crimean Turks Association was accepted as a public service association (*kamuya yararlı dernek*) so that it was able to rise governmental funds, have advantageous taxation, and invest these for the welfare of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea. He admits that he lobbied for the Crimean Tatar cause by using his power in bureaucracy and political ranks, as a former parliamentarian. He states that the former president, Süleyman Demirel in every beginning of the legislative year pronounced the rights of Crimean Tatars by the initiatives of General Center. So far humanitarian aid for the new repatriates was sustained, a birth and child care hospital was founded to open this spring, education was supported, a printing house with Latin alphabet was opened to publish journals in Crimean Tatar, permanent buildings or places were bought for the local associations, Gaspıralı's printing house was bought and turned into museum, a computer system was sustained and internet web page was prepared.⁶⁷ Under his presidency tight relations have been set up with the Crimean Tatar National Assembly and its Chairman, M. A. Kırımoğlu, and Crimean Tatar National Meclis was represented in Turkey by a member of the General Center. “A president-level diplomatic treatment was organized by our lobbies for Kırımoğlu when he visited Turkey”, he states. He insists that the first aim in the Crimea should be to exceed 500000 people in population.

⁶⁶ It was founded by mostly the cadre of General Center of the Crimean Tatar culture and aid associations, in order to evolve the association into foundation. The principles and aims are similar with the Crimean Development Foundation, with an emphasis on the aid to the Crimean Tatars returning from the exile. It is headed by A. İhsan Kırmı. The same cadre again has founded and directed the Ukraine Friendship Association, which works in parallel to the General Center.

⁶⁷ www.kirimdernegi.org.tr

Ahmet İhsan Kırımlı claims to be a (pan)Turkist himself, but he notes that the youth in his organization differs from him, in their emphasis on Crimean Tatars. He rather defends Turkish and Crimean Tatar nationalisms complement each other and inseparable, prockaiming indeed Gaspıralı himself was a Turkish nationalist. He thus prefers "Tatar-Turk" identification. He thinks that both Anatolia and the Crimea are our fatherland.

In addition to previous authors of *Emel*, Hakan Kırımlı and Zafer Karatay, Zuhal Yüksel, Nail Aytar, Ertuğrul Karaş, and various young writers⁶⁸ started to contribute it in 90s. The translations about many aspects of Crimean Tatar issue, “the return” and works of contemporary Crimean Tatar authors are widely published. *Emel* today appears as a scholarly journal’ with original sources. News section is very detailed. Diaspora self-designation widely appears. Ther are serials called “From Our Villages in the Diaspora,” “From Our Youth in the Diaspora.” Apart from the articles about the Crimean Tatar diaspora, *Emel* does not include articles about the political agenda of Turkey unlike its previous content. Turkey is mentioned when it is involved in the problems of Crimean Tatars, mostly in the former USSR. *Emel* today solely favored the “Crimean Tatar” identification, believig that it will bring diaspora more close to the homeland community. The first Crimean Tatar flag was published in the 185th issue of *Emel*. (1991) According to Hakan Kırımlı, one of the main ideologues of *Emel*, diaspora should be dominated by the homeland, and support the development of the parent community in the homeland. Otherwise, it would gradually assimilate and disappear in Turkey. In order not to disappear,

⁶⁸ In the segment of “Diyaspora’daki Gençliğimizden” (From Our Youth in Diaspora)

a nation needs roots, and Crimean Tatars can be rooted only in the Crimea, their ancestral homeland.⁶⁹

The other group, who does not recognize the leadership of A. İ. Kırımlı including living members of the old cadre and started to publish a new journal *Kırım*(Crimea). It is a three monthly journal, which started to be published in Polatlı(Ankara) at the end of 1992. It has the Crimean Tatar flag and Gaspıralı's slogan on it. It has been owned by Ünsal Aktaş until December 1993 and after January 1996. In between, the publishing of *Kırım* was transferred to the "Crimean and Caucasian Research Institute" (*Kırım* 6,1994:2) After July 1999, *Kırım* is transferred to Crimean Development Foundation⁷⁰ (*Kırım Gelişim Vakfı*)⁷¹, another new *foundation*. As *Emel* has quited since 1999, the 28th issue of *Kırım* (July-August-September 1999) assumed the name "*Emel'imiz Kırım*"(Our 'Aspiration' is Crimea) which signalled *Kırım* asserted the legacy of *Emel*.⁷² Its editorial board included some members of the old cadre, like Nurettin Mahir Altuğ, Sabri Arıkan, İsmail Otar, some members from the independent associations from different cities in Turkey, some academicians, interested in Crimean Tatar cause and the Turkish World in general. Prominent writers include Ünsal Aktaş, Tezcan Ergen, Ayşe Aktaş, Muzaffer Akçora, Oğuz Çetinoğlu, Necip Ablemitoğlu, Ufuk Tavkul. Like *Emel* before 90s, it publishes several articles about Crimean Tatar history, and national symbols, literature, historiographic and ethnographic material about Tatars of Dobruca, Polish Tatars, and Crimean Tatars in

⁶⁹ Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3 2000, Unstructured Interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara.

⁷⁰ *Crimean Development Foundation (Kırım Gelişim Vakfı)* was officially founded on 21st of April, 1998. It mainly aims to improve education of the Crimean Tatars both in the homeland and in diaspora, and to accelerate the cooperation between the Crimea and Turkey. Another aim is form a trusted organization for the archives of Crimean Tatar national movement and culture.

Turkey, Ottoman-Crimean relations, the WWII events, the miseries of deportation, the situation of Crimean Tatars in the former Soviet Union. Its Crimean Tatar nationalism is thought of within a broad Turkish nationalism, and in parallel with “Atatürk’s” nationalism, unlike *Emel*. (Kırım 20,1997:2) Articles about the unity and collaboration of the Turkic nations, with a reinterpretation of Gaspıralı’s Turkism and Turkist philosophers, geopolitics of Turkish world, news about the Crimean Tatars all over the world and the Crimea, new impressions about the Crimea came to the fore. As the discourse about the “outside Turks” also popularised in Turkey short after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was only natural for the Crimean Tatars, to be the main defenders of it. Aware of the shifting of the former left-right political agenda, some authors call for attaching an upper all covering Turkish identity for the Turkish world, in spite of the political and ideological divisions.

Though not as much as *Emel*, it includes translations about the Crimean Tatar social, political and cultural life in the former Soviet Union, and from the Crimean Tatar press in the Crimea. It is also drawn by new agendas, like woman issues of Crimean Tatars (Kırım 3,1992: 1)

As it was noted in the 4th issue (1993:2) it aims to be a journal of “thought” criticising the new policy of *Emel*, which “fills with the congress papers, documents, decisions of meclis, and proclamations” The events in the Crimean Tatar politics are rather reported and interpreted by the authors, though translations also exist. Kırım is more a journal of thought, rather than scholarly and more polemical. (Kırım 25) It placed polemics concerning Gaspıralı, Fethullah Hoca, trait in Vienna. Atatürkism, secularism, Sultan

⁷² Aktaş, Ünsal. The meeting of Kırım Dergisi, Polatlı Kırım Derneği, 13 November 1999

Galievism, globalization, nation-state, Turkism. Some slightly reminds the hagiographical articles in *Emel* of 70s.

“Diaspora” appeared in the common usage of the journal, interchangeably used with “*muhaceret*,” a more traditional reference. It published a serial of diaspora leaders. It is not as strict as previously in the employment of Crimean Turk, but still believes in the prevalence of it over Crimean Tatar.

Apart from *Emel*, and *Kırım* independent or dependent Crimean Tatar diaspora associations which reached by 2000 to thirties, publish bulletins rather to inform their community. (Appendix A) According to Ünsal Aktaş, “the number of associations is at the point of saturation for the internal dynamics, ” but it also denotes that the model of associations do not suffice for the development of diaspora activity for the national cause. He points out the necessity of new type of organization, modelled after NGOs in the future. Contemporary type of organization necessitated foundation or institute, thus associations were to integrate into foundations. For the future it is expected that the independent Crimean Tatar associations as well as the journal, *Kırım* which represents more or less the independent associations, to be integrated under *Kırım Gelişim Vakfı* (Crimean Development Foundation) ⁷³

Kırım and *Emel* both complain from disunity in the internal structure of diaspora in their editorials. Furthermore, not all of the Crimean Tatar diaspora associations belong to these two groups or organizations. New separations, collaborations, and new articulations

⁷³ Aktaş, Ünsal. The meeting of *Kırım Dergisi*, Polatlı Kırım Derneği, 13 November 1999

take place between the persons and groups in the diaspora. While internal politics of the Crimean Tatar diaspora is becoming complex and its size and amount increase, the quality of diaspora publications and level of coordination and organization, the development of solidarity, especially to base a grass-roots organization are the points of questioning. What is obvious is that the Turkish political agenda is as important as the agenda of Crimean politics for all activists. In the 90s Crimean Tatar diaspora is also drawn by the rise of the idea of Turkish unity or coordination of policies, the rise of Islamism, ethnic conflict, effects of globalization. Moreover Turkey as a host state proved vital for development, especially financing of diaspora activity. The Crimean Tatar bourgeoisie was not yet mobilized sufficiently to back the national activity.

Moreover in the 90s the Crimean politics also appeared to affect diaspora directly. Not only the dominant groups in the Crimea, but also their opposers seek the support of diaspora groups. Besides diaspora is further divided along with the fractioning in the Crimean Tatar politics. In addition diaspora also seeks to be effective in the homeland politics. In the last years one of the hot discussions have been the representation of Crimean Tatar National Assembly in Turkey.

In the 90s single path of Müstecip Ülküsal, and single identification with the “Crimean Turks” left its place to the voices multiplied both in the homeland and in the diaspora, and as can be exemplified in the reviving discussion of Crimean Turk, Crimean Tatar, Turk-Tatar, Romanian Tatar, Kırım (Crimea), Kırımlı (Crimean) identifications.⁷⁴ With the increase of the people who “uncover” themselves as “Crimean Tatar/Turk”, the

identity of “migrant” is emphasized to be praised, not to be condemned as denoting not to be local, native, indigenous anymore. The Crimean Tatar nationalism is less exclusively a work of nationalists. Crimean Tatars form different political orientations more and more can find a place and goal for them in the movement, and regard it as a civil activity.

Technology, especially internet has deeply affected the Crimean tatar diaspora nationalism. Crimea-List on the internet has a large spectrum covering many young activists, members of political associations, politicians of the Crimea, scholars about Crimean Tatar issue. It is broadening the base of the movement, and challenging its elitism. The most popular discussion have been the prevalence of Turk or Tatar self-identifications, and whether to marry a non-Tatar. While Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey is in general very comfortable with Turk or using the both, indeed asserting it is the same thing, the branches of diaspora in other countries prefer Tatar identification, while not necessarily denying and ethnic turkness. To marry a non-Tatar and to grow non-Tatar speaking children really bothers the diaspora nationalists, while they do not want to be fundamentalist in this issue, they still accept their aspiration for continuing the purity of culture.

Interestingly the self-designation of “diaspora” appeared and expanded in 90s. however still the old generation prefer not to use "diaspora," they prefer "outside"⁷⁵ or refer to "*aktoprak*."⁷⁶ Moreover diaspora rather than evading perceives itself as strengthening (Kırım 18,1997:1) and able to play an effective role in the transnational space including Crimea, Ukraine, Turkey and all related societal groups.

⁷⁴ See the last discussions in the Crimea-List.

⁷⁵ Otar, İsmail. October 21,1999. Unstructured interview with the author. Erenköy, Istanbul.

CHAPTER IV

AN ANALYSIS OF CRIMEAN TATAR DIASPORA NATIONALISM

The Crimean Tatar national movement became a global event when the release of Mustafa Cemilođlu had become one of the issues in the Reykjavik Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev. Although the extent diaspora contributed this achievement is questionable, diaspora has always asserted to have a role in the national processes. The branch of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey is accepted as the most important branch of diaspora by diaspora nationalists themselves. (Kırım 23,1998:1) For us, it is important because it is the most populated one, pronounced in millions, and because the diaspora nationalist movement is more widespread and rich than other branches of diaspora, and it has a settled tradition of national organization.⁷⁷

In this chapter, in the light of the theoretical guidelines to think of diaspora nationalism and my previous periodization of Crimean Tatar diaspora political movement, I will try to analyse the nature of diaspora nationalism of Crimean Tatars in Turkey.

I begin with answering the question what makes Crimean Tatars in Turkey a diaspora, and investigate the specific features of Crimean Tatar diaspora, as a sociological subject. Basing on my previous periodization of the diaspora national movement of the

⁷⁶ Kırım, A. İhsan. August 15, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author. Kızılay, Ankara.

⁷⁷ Apart from Turkey, the U.S. also hosts an active Crimean Tatar diaspora, whose population do not exceed a few thousands.

Crimean Tatars, I will look at the nature of first diasporic organization, its relations with the subsequent émigré nationalisms, and the nature of following diaspora organizations and the emerging features of diaspora nationalism. I will look at the continuities and discontinuities with the émigré nationalism. I will investigate how diaspora nationalism took shape but remained hidden

4.1. Do the Crimean Tatars in Turkey constitute a diaspora?

The Crimean Tatars today constitute a diaspora as they are descendants of a migrant community settled outside their natal territories, and as they acknowledge it while fostering a sense of co-ethnicity with the others of similar background.

The main factor for the diaspora-isation of the Crimean Tatars were their migration pattern: Firstly their migration was not a voluntary one, but one of mass exoduses which resulted by forceful Russification policies of the Tsardom. Secondly they migrated collectively with their close kinsmen, and were located together with their kinsmen by Ottoman government. As a result in the last two centuries, these emigrant Crimean Tatar communities have sustained certain aspects of their distinct culture and identity. Thirdly the memory of the Crimean Tatar emigrant communities were always refreshed new migrations coming from newer periods of the Crimea. Fourthly, social ties between the parent community in the Crimea and the diaspora were not broken suddenly as in 19th century the emigrant population from the Crimea in the various parts of Ottoman Empire far surpassed those still remaining in the Crimea, and “one could rarely meet any Tatar in the Crimea who

had no relatives in the Ottoman Empire.” (Kırımlı,1996:150) Fifthly, the emigrants were largely illiterate peasants from the Steppe [Çöl] region of the Crimea and as Kırımlı notes that most of the diaspora has come from pre-reform, pre-Gaspıralı, and pre-national Crimea.⁷⁸ Thus they have preserved some most authentic elements of pre-modern culture of the Crimea as frozen, some of these cultural elements have disappeared in the Crimea, by the influence of modernization and russification.⁷⁹

In fact the diasporisation of the Crimean Tatars concurrently happened with the emergence of Crimean Tatar national consciousness seems to merge the processes of conceptualising the homeland and the *patrie*. *Patrie* refers to more national political dimensions of the homeland.

It is important to remember what was called as a whole “Crimean Tatar” today, did not constitute a homogeneous, united society in the 19th century. They were speaking different local dialects, they were divided into local identifications, usually due to the place in the Crimea, where they have come from (which lived until today by collective memory). (Eren,1998:324; Andrews, 1989:304-8;Bezani,1994:)⁸⁰ This means, however previously they did not have this common identity, but they started to “imagine” themselves in relation to the “Crimean homeland” when they had to leave there. They came to the consciousness that they were not any Muslims or Tatars, but what brought them together was the place of

⁷⁸ Kırımlı, Hakan. August 1, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara

⁷⁹ This observation is shared by all of the diaspora nationalists.

⁸⁰ Kırımlı, Hakan. August 1, 2000. Unstructured Interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara. And Yüksel, Zuhâl. August 3, 2000. Unstructured Interview with the author. Beşevler, Ankara.

their origin, that is the Crimea. Of course this must have taken a long time. As Breuilly(1993:22) notes

The meaning conferred upon distinguishing mark and the uses to which it is put have little to do with the distinction itself. People vested common identity by virtue of origin may have no common identity whilst in that place....

The Crimean Tatars seems to have had a loose “Tatar” identification in ethnic sense when they have migrated, despite more powerful Islamic and clan identifications. “Tatar” was the name given by the Russians and Ottomans to the Crimean Khans and their people. “Tatar” identification has only strengthened by the local Ottoman people when they migrated to live in a different population. However identification with the Crimea came later, only to be completed by the emergence of the political Crimean Tatar identity in 1910s. The “Tatar” identification of emigrants was rather a sociological one, which comprised their traditions, way of living, language, etc.

The term “Crimean Tatar” in today’s sense first appeared in the émigré circles in İstanbul in 1910s. The first real interaction between the Crimean Tatar emigres, who came to Turkey for educational and political purposes, and the descendants of Crimean Tatar immigrants also took place in 1910s. It is interesting to observe though the descendants of immigrants largely perceived themselves as a sub-ethnic group and named the first diaspora organization, “Tatar,”(Tatar Charitable Society,1908), they were naming the second one as “Crimean Muslim” or “Crimean” (Crimean Charitable Society, 1918)⁸¹.

⁸¹ It is used as “Crimea,” “Kırımlılar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi” in Ülküsal, Müstecip. 1980. *Kırım Türk-Tatarları*. Baha Matbaası: İstanbul. p.201 and “Crimean Muslims” in Kırımer, Cafer. 1993. *Bazı Hatıralar*. 312

However according to the nationalists diaspora could not still pass beyond “mere belonging and identity,” and could not found an effective political organization.⁸² Moreover, in the lack of conditions for a developed diaspora politics, the assimilation seems inevitable according to the diaspora nationalists. (Kırım 22,1998:1)⁸³ To survive diaspora should be more politicised. “Tatar” as a local identity now, should turn into a national identity as “Crimean Tatar”.

Below I will try to analyse the components of the Crimean Tatar diaspora identity, mainly the relations between the Crimea homeland (and the parent community), the host state Turkey (and the Turkish society) and its own diasporic community in Turkey.

Crimea: Homeland

There has been no discussion about the homeland in the Crimean Tatar diaspora. It is quite clear as a result of the geography of the Crimea, being a peninsula (almost like an island), it has definite borders. Although the emotional belonging towards Dobruca were more lively and new in the remigrated population in Turkey⁸⁴, the Crimea homeland is acknowledged as the ancestral country, as place of origin. As Cohen(1997:ix) asserts homeland is buried deep in language, religion, custom or folklore- and it always has some claim on their loyalty and emotions fostering “a sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background. Time to time, by the fresh migrants, *emigres*, or the diaspora national activity, these memories are refreshed. After all it was not rare the immigrants were

⁸² Kırımli, Hakan. August 3, 2000, Unstructured Interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara

⁸³Kırımli, Hakan. August 3, 2000. Unstructured interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara

identifying themselves as “*Kırım*”(Crimea) to separate themselves from the Nogays, who also migrated together with them from the lands of the Crimean Khanate. The fact that Tatars neither did have a shared encompassing identity stronger than Muslim nor developed a concept of *patrie*, when they were in the Crimea in fact brings forward the fact of increase of identification with the Crimea when they left there.

The memory of the Crimea was alive in the folk art and literature. They rather regarded Crimea, as an homeland where they were all originated, but the emotional bonds to there, were overwhelmed by its being a Christian land, and their safe condition in the land of Ottomans. Let alone national consciousness or organization, the migrants were not even literate. The major part of the migrants that have formed the diaspora are from the Steppe region of the Crimea⁸⁵, in other words not from the relatively more developed cities and towns of centre or coast. That is to say they were predominantly illiterate peasants, with the exception of some lower- class *imams* among them. Moreover they spoke the steppe dialect, which is less close to the Ottoman (Anatolian) Turkish. They were mainly located to Dobruca⁸⁶, which remained as a part of the Ottoman Empire only until 1877-8 Turko-Russian war. Afterwards they came under Romanian sovereignty, thus some of them remigrated to Anatolia and lived in isolated villages, where they could preserve their language and traditions until 60s. Today large part of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey are descendants of the first migrants who stayed for some time (even a few generations) in Dobruca, only a small part of them have come directly from the Crimea, passing directly the

⁸⁴ Yüksel,Zuhal. August5 2000.Unstructured Interview with the author. Beşevler, Ankara. She also researches the culture and language of diaspora villages, Gazi University. See 201st or 203rd issues of *Emel*, “Diyasporadaki Köylerimizden”

⁸⁶ The area at the south of Danube delta form Tulcea in Romania to Varna in Bulgaria. It is spelled as “Dobruja,” “Dobrugea,” “Dobrudzha”too, I use Turkish spelling.

Black Sea. Although the Crimea was not forgotten as the original homeland, the emotional ties toward Dobruca has been therefore quite strong in the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. However we strongly lack the anthropological, and demographical research to support this argument scientifically.

However since the Russian annexation, Crimea has belonged to foreign states. The diaspora either had a latent(dormant) relation with the homeland -as in the time of Russian Empire- or severed -as in the time of Soviet Union.- Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union with the return of their co-ethnics, the ties with the homeland could activate, not to forget again homeland is under another country's sovereignty (Ukraine). The Crimea today constitutes the core of diaspora activity. However the fact of the unclear situation of the Crimea, the sovereignty of a culturally different state, and the legacy of more than a century of dormant and 70 years of severed relations caused the development of symbolic ties, rather than social ties with the homeland. Development of symbolic ties instead of social made the homeland almost an imagined place, and caused it to be perceived more distant than it actually is. This may explain the relative indifference of the Crimean Tatar diaspora for the homeland, for instance not visiting there more frequently, though it is geographically very close.

Naturally the Crimean Tatar national movement in diaspora has aimed to recapture the homeland since the beginning. However it is now drawn by the more imminent agenda of returning of the exiled brethren to the homeland. Even if they all were able to return (this means approximately 500 000) they will not constitute a majority in the homeland. "The

Crimea for the Crimeans”⁸⁷ seems as a far prospect. Thus the Crimean Tatar diaspora agenda was first of all related with the return of their brethren to the homeland rather than its own return, although there are devoted diaspora nationalists who moved to Crimea.

Hakan Kırımlı, as an activist, states that if a national culture is to survive, it can only survive in the Crimea as it will be rooted there. Thus more than a national empathy or solidarity with them, the return of the exiled brethren is perceived as related with the survival of the national culture of diaspora as well. Today one of the oldest diaspora leaders, İsmail Otar is working on a project of completing an old Crimean Tatar map which has the original names of the places before the Russian annexation.⁸⁸ Crimea was vital for completing the identity of diaspora too.

Social ties with the Crimea has been anew being established. Today rediscovering roots visits is very popular to the Crimea, a few idealists have even repatriated from diaspora. The facilities of technology of course stimulate the revival of long severed ties. The “illusion of impermanence” is there, there are practical plans to facilitate the return, like buying land from the Crimea, or double citizenship, but extraordinary difficult geopolitics of the region postpone these plans. However none of the diaspora nationalists refuses to return they all accept it in principle. The movement will be meaningless otherwise, an activist states.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ The slogan of the independent Crimea Tatar republic actually did not include on the ethnic Crimean Tatars, but also the other indigenous peoples like Karaims, Kryymchaks, Greeks,etc.

⁸⁸ He kindly showed it to me. October, 1999Erenköy, İstanbul.

⁸⁹ Aktaş, Ünsal August 2000. Unstructured Interview with the author. Sıhhiye, Ankara

In fact, unlike the North Caucasian diaspora in Turkey, return interestingly has never been an issue for Crimean Tatar diaspora. “The return is not a solution for us”, another activists states. One reason is of course the fact that the Crimean Tatars are not sovereign in the Crimea, indeed their presence there is highly ambiguous.

The other reason of not to return however is the fact that Crimean Tatar diaspora has been “rooted” maybe more than other diasporas in Turkey.⁹⁰ The former negative image of immigrant and “Tatar” weakened in time in the society, though it did not disappear. Diaspora nationalists have always emphasized the “positive” demographic contribution of the Crimean Tatar population to the newly founding republic. Unlike the Circassians, who have migrated together with the Crimean Tatars, they have not developed a minority consciousness.⁹¹ They proved less resistant to assimilation. (Eren,1998:328) The diaspora nationalists themselves assumed the name “Crimean Turk” before the assimilatory mechanisms of the society interrupted, as a result of their devotion to Turkist ideology. Moreover belonging to dominant ethnic group as well as the dominant religious sect did assure Crimean Tatars prosperous and prestigious lives. Thus daily life concerns mostly predominated other concerns.

Turkey: Host state

However as a specific feature of diaspora, diaspora preserved a sense of distinctiveness despite its partial assimilation. Even the very premise of Crimean Tatar diaspora that “Tatars are Turks” symbolizes the existence of a separate Tatar, which did not

⁹⁰ Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3, 2000, Unstructured Interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara.

disappear until today, despite Turkish social and political system did not prevail it much. Tatars indeed have also become in a defensive situation about their identity. Now they strive to change most of the historical misconceptions about the Tatars, like “the trait in the Vienne.” (Emel 193,1992:25;Kırım 25,1998: 2) In 90s as the political system in Turkey had evolved slightly to be permeable about ethnic expressions, there can be observed an emergence of identity politics in the Crimean Tatar diaspora as well.

The insufficient organization of diaspora politics in fact proves Turkey do not provide many opportunities for the development of diasporic existence, as opposed to other host states. Thus the Crimean Tatar diaspora movement largely remained as an elite movement, and could not reach its grassroots and mobilize them sufficiently.⁹² İsmail Otar claimed only 5% of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey express their identity and engage in national activity. (Eren,1998:328)

However the diaspora has lost most of its cultural authenticity, as it did not react to the dominant Ottoman culture, as opposed to the Crimean Tatars in the Russian Empire, who had to attach their cultural authenticity to survive. But, still Ottomanization were quite slow when it was compared to Turkification in the modern Turkey. Moreover, after 1878 Dobruca’s Ottoman population, including Crimean Tatars fell under Romanian sovereignty, thus they too lived as an isolated community, attaching to their traditions and culture. (Eren,1998:350)⁹³

⁹¹ Yüksel,Zuhal. August5 2000.Unstructured Interview with the author. Beşevler, Ankara. Also see Alankuş-Kural, Sevda. 1998.”Demokratik bir Kimlik Stratejisi olarak Çerkeslik” *Nart* 7

⁹² It is also confirmed by Ünsal Aktaş in our private Unstructured Interview., August 2000. Sıhhiye, Ankara.

⁹³ The previous Muslim-Tatar identity evolved into several dimensions because of the social and political conditions of their residents. However these local identities do not cause a division between diaspora groups. “Turkishness” of diasporic identity is used by almost all *emigre* communities, except some of the refugees of

4.2. First Organization of Diaspora Consciousness in the Crimean Tatar Diaspora

There was one distinguishable organization of the diaspora in the first quarter of 20th century. It was Tatar Charitable Society which was founded in 1908 and continued until 1925. Before the outgrowth of Crimean Tatar nationalism, and even the very concept of the Crimean Tatar “Tatar Charitable Society” (Kırımlı,1996:161) appeared as a mere diaspora organization. According to Kırımlı (1996:162) although it was not political in its purpose, “it sought to preserve a vaguely defined “Tatar” communal solidarity and cultural consciousness (stemming practically from the traditional Muslim folk culture of the Crimea) among the former immigrants in Ottoman Turkey.” Although Kırımlı (1996:162) stated that its activities were confined to Ottoman Empire, in the constitution of the Society the obligation to work for the preservation of the religious and ethnic character of “our brethren abroad” is included.

In the newspapers where the position of the association was stated, there were articles about the Muslims of Russia, but Kırımlı points out that these newspapers were “little different from ordinary Ottoman newspapers.” Main concerns of them were the hardships the Crimean Tatar settlers faced in Anatolia. The concept of “Tatarness” referred to the dialect and folk ways of the Crimean Tatar immigrants, as a cultural concept, by no means basing on a territorial definition. Interestingly, influenced by classical Ottoman

World War II and it carries the sense of Turkic, an ethnic sense. Moreover the accompanied residence of Turkish and Tatar communities, especially in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey who have great similarities in religion, and language caused voluntary assimilation with the Turkish groups. Sometimes Tatar could be a

historiography, they accepted Genghis Khan and Tamerlane as the “heroic ancestors of Tatars,” rather than the Crimean Khans. (Kırımlı,1996:163-164)

In the historiography of Crimean Tatar national movement this Society was depicted like a “bullet not towards to the goal, ” meaning not “really” contributing to the making of national identity, especially when compared to the Crimean students Association, Fatherland Society, or the period of republic. However as far as the aim of this thesis concerned this Society is the most salient, as it threw the seeds of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism. Even if in the later period the modern Crimean Tatar nationalism had not influenced diaspora, it could have been quite possible to observe the development of diaspora nationalism among the Crimean Tatar immigrants, of course in a context of modernizing Turkey.(provided that nationalism as an intellectual movement would develop) There is no need to change the interpretation of Kırımlı (1996:164)

In brief, the Tatar Charitable Society, *representing mostly the outlook of the Crimean Tatar emigrants who left the Crimea during the nineteenth century*, promoted a quasi-historical and cultural “Tatar” concept transplanted into contemporary Turkey.⁹⁴

We can adequately use this description as the definition of Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey or easily of other diasporas. Moreover we see an effort to imagine itself as a nation by this “quasi-historical and cultural “Tatar” concept,” and of course it would be transplanted in the modern Turkey, the host state. What Kırımlı calls “partial-assimilation” actually points out the existence of diaspora. As Thomas Faist clarifies, diaspora develops certain integration in the host society. If it does not, and lives as segregated from the host

derogatory term because of the intercommunal conflicts, and supposed events in history so social pressure cause younger generations prefer Turkish identity.

⁹⁴ Italics are mine.

society, it is an exile community. (Faist,1999:) Diaspora is, not to mention ethnically, culturally hybrid. So those immigrant Crimean Tatars were at the same time Ottoman citizens, Ottoman-educated, inside the Ottoman culture. Of course its newspapers would not be different from “ordinary Ottoman newspapers”. Diaspora always looks at its homeland or “its brethren” by the “glasses of the host society.” That is why the “Tatar” concept the Crimean Tatar diaspora attached would be the one “grown in the Ottoman soil.” For its being quasi-historical or relation to Chingis Khan, these were all efforts to “imagine” the nation, founding its roots, and establishing a national narrative. Tatar Charitable Society included many elements of diaspora nationalism. Firstly it mainly relied on the “condition of belonging,” by appealing communal solidarity, and cultural consciousness, not to territoriality. Secondly they have premature effort to throw a link to “their brethren” crossing the border, their area of interest is not confined to inside of the borders. Thirdly, the very existence of such an organization, representing the most of the Crimean Tatar diaspora, shows that they have integrated, but not assimilated to the Ottoman society.

However the existence of the consciousness of distinctiveness does not automatically mean the emergence of national consciousness. And without the national consciousness diaspora accepts itself just as immigrants, not politically committed to the cause of homeland. Émigré nationalism provide the necessary stimulus for diaspora to develop diaspora nationalism. It is the bridge between the nationalist thought of the homeland and diaspora. As the development of national consciousness in the Crimea took place in the last quarter of the 19th century the migrants who came to Turkey before and after this period were very different. The breakpoint may very well asserted to be the turn of the century:

...one may argue that roughly the turn of the twentieth century constituted an intellectual turning point for the outlook of Crimean emigration to Turkey. As the

intellectuals from among the groups which came to Turkey prior to this time mostly considered themselves as *immigrants* in a new home, those who had been acquainted with the intellectual reform drive in the Crimea and developing national consciousness were likely to consider themselves as *émigrés* in Turkey. (Kırımlı, 1996: 164)⁹⁵

Bhatt and Mukta, who wrote on diaspora nationalism quite elaborately, for the first time emphasized the “impact” of “*émigré* nationalism” (Bhatt and Mukta, 2000: 407) and complained of “relative neglect” of it. I agree that *émigré* nationalism is noteworthy in the formation of diaspora nationalism. Thus, I will pay considerable attention to this period of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism.

4.3. *Émigré* Nationalism and the Politicisation of Diaspora Consciousness

Crimean Tatar communities were designated as *émigré* communities by Nermin Eren (1998) and Lowell Bezanis (1994), who did the mere previous researches on the nationalist activity Crimean Tatar communities in Turkey. This rises because of a different understanding of diaspora on the side of Eren. For Eren (1998:324) *émigré* refers to Crimean Tatars living outside the homeland who have maintained a real or imagined relation with the parent group and the homeland, Crimea. Comparing with Jews and Armenians she asserts Crimean Tatar groups lack the strong, worldwide umbrella organizations to coordinate intergroup activity and provide an international platform for advocating the Crimean Tatar cause, which were the basic features of diaspora for her. (Eren, 1988:324) However today the use of the term, diaspora expanded, not to be limited to ancient diasporas like Jews and Armenians, which are indeed unique in many of their

⁹⁵ Italics are not mine.

features. The new diasporas are not just the same in their diasporic structure with the Jews and Armenians. (Cohen,1997:ix) In the diasporas, whose ethnogenesis was rather new, like the Crimean Tatar diaspora, the level of organization and identity formation is not over, but they too strive to coordinate their activities and rise their issues on the international platform. Moreover even if the Crimean Tatar national activity is designated as *émigré* movement, this does not deny my conceptualization that takes *émigré nationalism* as a first stage of diaspora nationalism. Furthermore umbrella organization and international platform are not the main requirements of being a diaspora, these refer to political aspects of diaspora which may or may not exist. (Gellner,1983:108)

On the other hand Bezanis (1994) does not make a distinction between the *émigré* and the diaspora activists. He defined the refugees who escaped after the foundation of USSR as "Soviet Muslim *émigres*." Since *émigré* activists have died or in their old ages in 90s, he concluded that the *émigré* activity was dying too, and he repeated that this was the fate of *émigré* activity. However according to his definition, Crimean Tatar diaspora had only one *émigré* leader, Cafer Seydahmet (escaped because of Bolshevik Revolution, related with the crashed national government) who died in 1960. Then who are the people that brought a tradition of national activity until today? They were not certainly "Soviet Muslim *émigres*" according to definition of Bezanis. Maybe *émigré* national movement was as weak as he expressed, and this was another movement, sourcing out of diaspora.

Émigré nationalism of the Crimean Tatar migrants can be divided into two phases in this case. The first phase was started by the first Crimean Tatar students from 1908

revolution until the final Bolshevik takeover of the Crimea. The second phase was the émigré nationalism of Cafer Seydahmet in exile.

In the first phase the students were coming from a Crimea, in which certain national consciousness has developed. It was the first time the diaspora intellectuals interacted with the Crimean Tatar nationalist intellectuals. Up to this time the Tatars in the diaspora perceived themselves as a sub-ethnic group, like Circassians, Albanians, Kurds, or Arabs. Of course they did not accept themselves Turk, nevertheless Ottomans did not, either. After 1908 Revolution, by the influence of the Turko-Muslim intellectuals from Russia, Turkish nationalism, which has been defended by some Young Turks previously strengthened, and gained a pan-Turkist dimension. (Zürcher, 1984:23) The twist here is that newly evolving post-Tanzimat Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire coincided in many points with the nationalist thought of Gaspiralı, thus the tradition of Crimean Tatar nationalist thought. This fact contributed very well integration of the Crimean Tatar students to the rising Turkish nationalist agenda in İstanbul. This also might have contributed the rapprochement of the intellectuals of the Crimean Tatar diaspora to the Crimean Tatar *émigres* in İstanbul. However this first interaction did not automatically cause joining of powers. The differences must have necessitated an ideological clue for the two groups come together and overcome the decades of separate existence. Indeed, the émigré intellectuals who have stayed in İstanbul only for a few years have also themselves differentiated from the conditions of their native society. Kırmılı states that the Fatherland Society, established by émigré nationalists came into being in “an Ottoman Turkish milieu” being shaped by mostly through the revolutionary idealism of the Young Turks, or rather the Committee of Union and Progress, but their relationship with the Russian revolutionaries were indirect. This caused the

movement around the Fatherland Society develop on its own, by not being a “direct offshoot of the Young Tatars” in the Crimea. (Kırımlı,1996:171) To grow in the milieu of host society in fact is the feature of émigré nationalism, thus even more for diaspora nationalism. This supports my argument that diaspora nationalism is not a continuation of the nationalist movement in the homeland, but the historical and geographical disparity causes also social, ideological and political disparities, and consequently the development of “a nationalism on its own.”

The first wave of *émigres* returned to take duty in national movement to the Crimea when the war started. However after Bolshevik Revolution the right wing of the *Milli Firka* (National Party), who proclaimed the first Crimean Tatar Republic, had to emigrate. The second phase of émigré nationalism has started in a republican Turkey.

Turkey was indispensable for all émigré Turkish nationalists from various places in Russia. Lowell Bezanis(1994) provided the best article about this, “Soviet Muslim émigrés in the Republic of Turkey.” He designated Turko-Tatar and North Caucasian Muslims who took refuge outside the territorial boundaries of the Russian Empire in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution as “Soviet Muslim *émigres*”. (Bezanis,1994:60) He admits that the Muslim population of Russia took refuge in the Ottoman Empire before the Bolshevik Revolution in so great numbers that it cannot be compared with the “Soviet Muslim refugees”. But he underlines that the former migrants were assimilated and the “Soviet Muslim *émigres*” should not be uncritically combined with them. (Bezanis,1994:66) He very well points out that Muslim groups in Turkey consider themselves as “Turks” rather than, for instance Crimean Tatars, while many recognize that they came from a land ruled

by Russians. But their interest in their brethren who remained there is not particularly strong. Although they preserved a distinct identity in isolated villages until the last 30 years, because of urbanization they have largely lost it now. They have not possessed an intelligentsia, which would deploy their particular origin and sense of distinctiveness into a political organization. (Bezanis:1994, 65-66)

In fact up to here the lack of nationalism among the Crimean Tatar diaspora strongly confirms Gellner(1983:108), even for the diasporas.

The gravity of the situation faced by diaspora populations if they do not choose nationalism, and the manner in which the whole situation can be deduced from the very general characteristics of the transition from an agrarian to an industrial order, show that it is quite wrong to invoke diaspora nationalisms as counter-examples to our theory of nationalism:

He quotes from Kedourie (1979)

Greek and Armenian nationalism arose among populations which were generally more prosperous and better able to understand the wealth-generating economies of modern Europe than their Ottoman Muslim overlords.

Thus it is possible to explain the lack of nationalist activity in the Crimean Tatar diaspora in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish republic by socio-economic reasons, as Gellner did, not necessarily with assimilation. In fact in the non-Western societies “nationalism” is something that is imported from the West. Nationalism is not as universal and natural as it claims. It rather became modular after it was standardized by a few experiments in Europe. Thus we can not expect diaspora develop nationalism before it was imported in the society as an intellectual current in which it was embedded. The emergence of nationalism among the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire was later than the non-Muslims, and among the Turkish population it was the latest. Turkism only flourished on

the ashes of the Ottoman Empire (Karpat,1973:116) Only thereafter we may expect the development of diaspora nationalism.

The “Tatar” ethnic consciousness existed, but mostly as a sociological identity, as a local identification without a political dimension. It seems that what politicised it, turning it from local into national identity, rising the concept of “Crimean Tatar” was émigré nationalism.

Bezanis (1994:68) also claims that the organizations and publications that surfaced in the Turkish Republic now were the product of genuine Soviet Muslim *émigres*, which were composed of two groups: Those Muslim nationalists connected to the short-lived independent Turkic and North Caucasian Republics established during the Russian Civil War who came to Turkey in the early 1920s, and those former legionnaires who served with Nazi Germany before settling to Turkey.

The first group is the elite and well educated progressives. (Bezanis,1994:64-65) Their lives passed in emigration-in various countries fighting against Bolshevism-and for their respective national causes. They passed away between mid 50s and early 60s. This very well suits Cafer Seydahmet for Crimean Tatar case. The second group were mainly former soldiers in the Soviet military who were defected or captured by Nazis. They were born in 1920s and Soviet educated, but they were nationalists because they took a nationalist education in emigration. Partly because of their nationalism, and their youthful experiences in the Soviet Union they were harsh anti-communists. (Bezanis,1994:64-65) For the Crimean Tatars, Mehmet Sevdıyar and Fikret Yurter, who came to Turkey, but later

abandoned Turkey for the US are good examples. They form maybe the most known Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalists⁹⁶ in the US, and were capable of lobbying Reagan about Crimean Tatar national movement in the USSR.

Nevertheless in the scheme of Bezanis we find no place for the major line of diaspora nationalism which we would concentrate, Müstecip Ülküsal and his “followers”. It is of course because he and other diaspora intellectuals were not Soviet Muslim *émigres*. They were descendants of previous immigrants. Bezanis does not make a distinction between the *émigres* and diaspora intellectuals. But he implies the link between the “Soviet Muslim *émigres*” and the continuing national movement today, as most of the *émigres* according to his scheme died or very old and the ones that continue the movement should be someone else.

However I accept *émigré* nationalism as critical for the emergence of diaspora nationalism, which has naturally a longer life than the *émigres*. But I also after the death of Cafer Seydahmet, and emigration of Mehmet Sevdıyar and Fikret Yurter, the remaining Crimean Tatar nationalists until today are diaspora nationalists and they are the reason of today’s movement. As Bezanis puts *émigré* nationalism tends to be very weak in general, as it can base neither the homeland nor the host state. The movement can survive only by taking continuous support of the host state\ and for that integration is needed.

Accepting the determining role of *émigré* nationalism for the development of diaspora nationalism, we can in fact observe a slow transformation of diaspora politics and

⁹⁶ Though Mehmet Sevdıyar passed away...

consciousness into a diaspora nationalism. In this respect Tatar Charitable Society can be accepted as a proto-diaspora nationalism, which was founded on a blurred diaspora consciousness, but affected soon by the émigré nationalism of the Crimean Tatar students. Confirming the inevitability of assimilation for diaspora, the evolvement of nationalism for the Crimean Tatar diaspora followed an Ottoman path and timing. In other words only after the development of other nationalisms, including Turkish nationalism diaspora showed an interest to the nationalist politics. They had to import some previously developed national features from the émigré nationalists, though not very consciously. We should not forget that the frame of mind of diaspora is that of the host state. Though the Ottoman perspective towards the Muslims left in Russia though previously was a great interest, afterwards it turned out to be regarding them as foreigners. (Deringil, 1994:410) Thus those immigrants, not to forget that they had no Crimean Tatar identification in today's sense, but a stronger Muslim identity perceived the newcomers as foreigners in fact despite they spoke Tatar language and came from where all originated. However after the contact in İstanbul between the Crimean Tatar and diaspora intellectuals, the great correspondences in their ideologies - thanks to the commons between the post-1908 ideologies of the Turkish intellectual sphere and Crimean Tatar intellectual sphere, like Turkish nationalism pan-Turkism, Islamism- caused the diaspora intellectual learn and internalize the Crimean Tatar nationalism. Additionally the support of Ottoman government, especially the CUP, and including the Teşkilat-I Mahsusa for the diaspora nationalist activity, foundation of the Crimean Muslims Society and *Teşkilat-I Mahsusa's* organizing of the lobbying in the international arena for the Crimean Tatar national cause, mainly because of the war situation between the Ottoman empire and Russia contributed the growth of diaspora national activity among the Crimean Tatar intellectuals. Similarly we cannot see half of the diasporic national activity in the first

decade of Turkish Republic than in Romania, mainly because of the Turkish-Soviet amity after the revolution, and Romanian-Soviet hostility until the end of WWII.

As a result, émigré nationalism of the Crimean Tatars mainly in Europe and if possible in Turkey, proved utmost important in the emergence of today's diaspora nationalism. With the excellent analogy of Bezanis, the mission of *émigrés* is to bring the flame, as very suitably seen in the name of *Promethee*, carried from the homeland to diaspora. However if there have not been hearths in diaspora to catch the flame, it would not catch fire there.

Promethee of the Crimean Tatars were Cafer Seydahmet. He worked as the sole representative of Crimean Tatar national movement together with the émigré nationalists of other “captive” nations⁹⁷, who opposed to the Soviet Union. Most significantly he formulated the direction of the Crimean Tatar nationalist movement in the diaspora, which came until today.⁹⁸ According to Aktaş, that is the main line, that was followed by Müstecip Ülküsal and Emel⁹⁹

Cafer Seydahmet in a way transferred the national movement in the Crimea to diaspora¹⁰⁰, as it would not be able to continue in the Soviet state. As an émigré politician he chose not only to spread the Crimean Tatar national cause in the world, but also to sustain

⁹⁷ “Captive nations” denote the nations who were overruled by Soviet Russia, meaning that they were involuntarily included in the Soviet Union, a popular phrase in the émigré literature

⁹⁸ I did not come across a Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalist who refused the legacy of Cafer Seydahmet in my private Unstructured Interviews. 1999-2000

⁹⁹ Ünsal Aktaş and his friends had to leave journal Emel after 1990, and found Kırım, but they assert main line was followed by Kırım rather than Emel.

¹⁰⁰ Today the journal Kırım claims the legacy of *Milli Fırka*.

the continuity of the Crimean Tatar national cause by establishing an organization, which he chose Turkey as a base. He discovered the Crimean Tatar diaspora as his natural supporters, and different than the previous émigré nationalism he was able to collaborate with them. The reason of previous failure to collaborate with the diaspora must have been also partly due to the ambiguity of Crimean Tatar national identity and national cause before 1917. Moreover after 1917 Cafer Seydahmet had a legitimacy as being one of the founders of the independent Crimean Tatar Republic. However it is obvious that he had also an organizational capability to revive, motivate, and activate the diaspora intellectuals after a clear national cause, and form a disciplined structure to follow this cause ardently. Furthermore he is the key ideologue of the Crimean Tatar national cause. Although there have developed new interpretations of his ideas in the 90s, his line is basically conformed and followed by all diaspora nationalists.

His ideas also evolved due to his struggle in the changing political circumstances. He was rather a Crimean Tatar nationalist, though he never denied the alliance with the broad Turkish peoples. However later he found in Turkism the necessary political ideology best describing, justifying, and supporting Crimean Tatar national cause in the émigré conditions in Turkey. He stated that Crimean question became a Turkish mission in history. Crimea has supported the Ottomans faithfully, and now it was the time Turkey help the Crimea. By this way he linked the national struggle of the “Crimean Turks” to the flourishing Turkish nationalism in the new republic.

Cafer Seydahmet’s ideology is consistent, with the exception of the inherent inconsistency of nationalism. It is one of the predecessors of non-Western nationalisms-that

is to say Western premises of nationalism applied in an Eastern context. It is largely modelled as anti-colonial nationalism, a kind of national liberation from colonialism. It is obvious in that as a social program Cafer Seydahmet was socialist in orientation at the beginning.

However anti-communism and Turkism are the components of his thought he obtained later in exile. Breuilly states it is when situations make that sort of demands that ideologies become relevant. That is very true for this case, Turkism and anti-communism largely derived from the needs of an émigré intellectual to find allies for his cause. Of course we do not mean he is an hypocritical or pretender, but rather he was sincerely and mostly unconsciously evolved in his thoughts to compromise the conditions of exile and his nationalist thought. Thus some of the ambivalent diasporic formulations like “Crimean Turk” were largely consolidated by him(though not created by him).¹⁰¹ However it is important to note that the focus of all his political activity was the Crimea. It was where he started and this did not change for him. Kırımlı well puts: “He was actually living (in) the Crimea”¹⁰² Turkism and anti-communism was helpful ideologies to get the support of the masses, especially the host states, like Turkey or other countries of “Free World.” It was mostly practical. As he could still be regarded in exile he did not integrate too much with the intellectual context of Turkey. I think he was aware of the conditions of diaspora would force the undermining of national cause. *Mefkurecilik* (idealism) formed one of the backbones of his ideology. As it is later appreciated by future diaspora nationalists, daily life is the biggest enemy for diaspora nationalist. It turns homeland turns into a dream from a

¹⁰¹ Indeed, Osman Kemal Hatif, a member of Crimea Muslims society, an émigré and diaspora organization, was using it in his book he wrote in 1917. Hatif, Osman Kemal. 1998. *Gökbayrak Altında Milli Faaliyet: 1917 Kırım Tatar Milli İstiklal Hareketinin Hikayesi*

reality. Only an idealist can follow a dream. In fact it is true that Cafer Seydahmet wanted to preserve the flame of Crimean Tatar independence alive. He wanted to prepare a professional cadre ready to handle the national cause when international conditions prevail, and actually he was quite successful during the WWII. His professional cadre could abandon their lives and professions in Turkey or other parts of diaspora to work for the Crimean Tatar cause and their brethren in Germany.

Diaspora nationalists in fact faithfully followed his ideology, but they ended up with a new political structure, and now we will examine this.

4.4 The Development of Crimean Tatar Diaspora Nationalism

4.4.1 The Emergence of Diaspora Nationalism

Emigré nationalist politics of Cafer Seydahmet had evolved into diaspora nationalist movement of the Crimean Tatars after Ülküsal's assuming of the leadership, for Ülküsal's all life and works passed in diaspora¹⁰³, and he was not a Crimean citizen or an exiled politician of the Crimean Tatar cause. The place where he started his life and his diaspora nationalist politics was diaspora(Romania) and actually he was not peculiarly a Crimean Tatar nationalist at first. His was rather a broad Turkish nationalism, which he learned

¹⁰² Kırımlı, Hakan. August 3, 2000, Unstructured interview with the author. Bilkent, Ankara

mostly during his education in the late Ottoman Empire. His nationalism included Turkey, Turks and Tatars in Romania, and the Tatars in the Crimea as well as other Turks. Of course it did not contradict with the preconceptions of Crimean Tatar nationalism, in general, since Crimean Tatar nationalism did not refuse Islamic or Turkic legacy. However the balance of these factors, which emphasized the specificity of Crimean Tatar identity was determinative in the last instance. Müstecip Ülküsal must have learned to emphasize the essence of Crimean Tatar retaining his (pan) Turkist perspective after his acceptance of Cafer Seydahmet as his leader. As I told earlier Cafer Seydahmet practically seemed to play on this balance but the primary issue for him did not change: The Crimean Tatars in specific.

Alexandre Popovici, who made a research about the first *Emel*, says it was pan-Turkist mixed with Tatar nationalism. (Emel 95,1976:14) It should have been true, as the slogan of the journal was “The Voice of the Crimean Tatars, and Official Journal of the Crimean Tatar National Cause” (Emel:95,1976:14) However the second *Emel*, which was published in Turkey, though asserted the legacy of the first one, actually was more pan-Turkist than Crimean Tatar nationalist, as it overtly claims too. (Emel 95,1976:15) It openly asserted that it is cultural pan-Turkist, not political.(Emel 95,1976:15) Indeed Tatar nationalism, which is condemned as “*Tatarcılık*” (Tatarism) and “*kabilecilik*”(tribalism) became the biggest sin. *Emel* always corrected such accusations. Indeed the Crimean Tatars are always defined as a part of great Turkish nation, thus they do not want to divide the Turkish nation as enemies do. This also implied that they would not think of dividing

¹⁰³ He has been in Crimea, when the national government invited the diaspora youth for mission in the national cause, but it was a short period.

Turkish state as well. It seems that Crimean Tatar nationalists often faced with the blame about “treason in Vienne.”¹⁰⁴ (Emel 119,5;Emel 120:33)This enabled them to write about how loyal the Crimean Khanate have always been to the Ottoman Empire, and this is actually a historical mistake that cannot be proved either. This again had implications for how loyal were the Crimean Tatars to the Turkish state. It seems that the emphasis on pan-Turkism grew as it was more acceptable in the host state, rather than Crimean Tatar nationalism. Up to here it is not a novelty for the émigré conditions, émigré nationalist seeks the support of the nation-state, to some extent Cafer Seydahmet also formulated it. Turkey would only support the *émigres* if they contributed to the “unified, homogenous and single” Turkish identity. Luckily the Crimean Tatars were not contradicting this conception unlike Circassians, for instance. Thus their assimilation increased.

The twist here is while for Cafer Seydahmet Turkey was, though admirable and lovable, a means to provide sources for the ‘ideal,’ recapture the homeland in the last instance, it was less and less so for the diaspora nationalists. Of course the transformation was gradual, slower than the diaspora nationalists themselves would understand. “Crimean Turk,” which implied the Turkic origin of the Crimean Tatars, and aimed to get the support of the other Turkish nations (although we can call it ideology too, it should not be forgotten that ideologies grow when situations make that sort of demands), was internalized as the Turkish state formulated it. The “Crimean Turk” undermined the Crimean Tatar while emphasizing the dominant Turkish mass. Because of the social pressure it seems that sticking to the identification with the name “Crimean Turk” became a solution. It enabled

¹⁰⁴ In the official Turkish historiography the failure of Ottoman army to conquer Vienne, and indeed their consequent and sudden defeat was attributed to the treason of Crimean Khan, who was to be on the Ottoman side. This is objected by the Crimean Tatar historians as simply untrue and without proof.

not fully abandon of Crimean, as a place of origin, assimilating in the dominant Turkish identity while securing a place in the dominant discourse of the society, “being a Turk”

Consequently the Crimean Tatar nationalism in the diaspora transformed as such: the image of the Crimea became a part of the “Turkish World,” which cannot be thought separately. (Emel 130:3) Crimean Tatars became one of the “outside Turks,” not “our beloved, privileged brethren.” The discourse of “outside Turks” of course a Turkish republican perspective, it means they are outside of Turkey. *Mefkurecilik* of Cafer Seydahmet should have logically aimed the liveliness of Crimean Tatar national cause, but it started to be seen as the same with “*ülküçülük*” in Turkey, which was of course a concept of rather late Turkish political context. In time Crimean Tatar national cause started to be seen identical with Turkish nationalism in Turkey. This transformation was actually the result of an incremental process that diaspora activists made new alliances with the political forces in Turkey, and this brought them to a different place from where they started, and gave them a definite place in the Turkish political and ideological spectrum. Even their view about their homeland and their brethren in the USSR was the approach of a Turkish citizen. Crimean Tatar issue was an issue of anti-communism, pan-turkism (mixed with religious emphasis) rather than an issue of an independent Crimea, or human rights struggle of the Crimean Tatars which should also actively be supported by diaspora.

This shifting was of course not out of a conscious policy on the side of diaspora nationalists. The hybridity of transnationals is unconscious. Anyway, they have also unconsciously reconstructed their ideology, which is narrated in *Emel*. The impression that *Emel* gives about Crimea, is a Crimea of past. Most of the articles are about the old Crimea,

the national movement in 1917, Gaspıralı, Cafer Seydahmet, Çelebi Cihan, first Russian Muslim Congress, about the Crimean Tatars in Turkey, and Dobruca. Though it is natural as Crimea was emptied of Tatars at that moment, then the loyalty should definitely have transferred into the struggle of Crimean Tatars at the moment. The 1944 deportation is condemned, but it was not analysed. The 1944 deportation however is located in a framework of anti-communism and pan-Turkism. Then it is not very surprising to see Mustafa “Cemiloglu” described as “*ülküci*,” which he would be very surprised if he himself heard. He is the hero of “Turkness.”

Most of the diaspora nationalists believed there has been a cooperation rather than assimilation, between the dominant (pan) Turkist current in Turkey, as they automatically allied the members of “Outside” “Captive” Turks, and ideologically opposed anti-communism. Though it was not always the case, the grassroots of Crimean Tatar national movement and Turkish (ultra)nationalism proved very permeable. However it was also true that Crimean Tatar national cause highly integrated in the ideological context of Turkey. However the claim of Zuhâl Yüksel that Müstecip Ülküsal always distanced itself from the nationalist movement in Turkey must be true.¹⁰⁵ Ülküsal must be trying to continue the émigré line, but anyway the diaspora movement must have overwhelmed its ideologues.

However hybridity did not cause a mixture. It is a syncretism, an articulation. In other words, the Crimean Tatar national cause did not mix into Turkish nationalism and erode in it. The principles of Crimean Tatar national cause were still alive, but they were articulated into new forms. It articulated the ideas related with Crimean Tatar national

¹⁰⁵ Yüksel, Zuhâl. August 2000. Unstructured Interview with the author . Beşevler, Ankara

cause, like inviolability of Crimean Tatar independence and its historical rights, with the political discourse of Turkey, like the indivisibility of Turkish state. Therefore it is possible to find references to Atatürk, Gaspıralı, Ziya Gökalp, and Cafer Seydahmet together, or what Atatürk's probable thoughts about captive Turks in Emel. (Emel 126, 1981:1)

Thus diaspora identity in 60s and 70s were reconstructed as a transnational identity between the homeland and host state. As opposed the previous imagining of Crimean Tatar nation and the Crimea, now Crimean Tatar nation is located between the homeland and the host state. As social ties were impossible with the homeland, and current situation of the homeland is unknown, homeland reconstructed through symbolic ties. Thus the Crimean Tatars in Turkey imagined themselves in a Crimea of old times (during migration, at most 1917) and regarded the Crimea and their "brethren" alienated in fact. This was obvious even in the dispute between the diaspora intellectuals and *émigrés* after the WWII. Despite their common origin the refugees were regarded as "communist educated (minded)," their assertion for the Crimean Tatar identity was criticised. The diaspora in Turkey uncovered that it perceived itself more pure and fundamental than the brethren in the USSR, attributing that they were not able to preserve their traditions in the USSR. Thus when a restricted communication was permitted with the USSR, the diaspora nationalists came across a different society than theirs. The Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalists must have felt they were awoken from a long dream, when they first met an exile from the USSR, the Crimean Tatar dissident Ayşe Seyitmuratova.

Thus *émigré* nationalism is the precursor of diaspora nationalism does not mean diaspora nationalism merely reproduces it. Maybe it repeats its discourse but, it actually

forms a different body. Firstly while émigré nationalism was in general in a Crimean (Tatar) milieu, diaspora nationalism is in a Turkish (Republican) milieu. While the center of the movement is the Crimea in émigré nationalism, it is Turkey in diaspora nationalism. Turkey is accepted as complementary factor for émigré nationalists because it is still exclusivist, its primary loyalty is the Crimea, so *émigrés* can easily abandon Turkey for a host state offering better opportunities. (And actually they did.) It is more difficult for diaspora nationalist. Although they are sincere in all their efforts concerning the homeland, it is not as easy as émigré nationalist to abandon their host state, which has been actually a second homeland for them, and actually as they have dual identity now. In other words émigré nationalist is not rooted, but diaspora nationalist is rooted. Thus diaspora nationalist also works for better life also in the host society, it is integrated.

Thus the Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism have become observable in the beginning of 80s. Crimean Tatars were imagined as a transnational nation between Turkey and the homeland, whose only memory lives now. To be a Crimean Tatar and a Turk appeared largely uncontradictory. Though the aim of their politics remained as the Crimea, they did it in a Turkish way.

4.4.2 Transformation in the Diaspora Nationalism

Why has the course of diaspora nationalism differentiated so much from the main course of Crimean Tatar nationalism? Why were there great differences between the Crimean Tatar nationalists in the Soviet Union, in the US, and in the Romania and in

Turkey if it is the same nation? Why do the Crimean Tatars in Turkey speak Turkish instead of Crimean Tatar? Why do the Crimean Tatar grassroots are largely indifferent to the Crimean Tatar national movement in the soviet union? Why Crimean Tatar associations look like social clubs? And what can a nationalist do in this condition? Started to be bother the young nationalists in the beginning of 80s. It is obvious that they have decided the diaspora inclined too much to Turkey, thus it has come far from its initial aim. Diaspora had not social bonds with the homeland and parent community, which should be in fact the center of nationla activity. Otherwise diaspora nationla activity would naturally extinct. It seems that by the help of the conjunctural changes, especially outmoding of cold war and liberalization of Turkey, the diaspora intellectuals start to reform the movement by constructing the realtins between the homeland and host state anew.

For a diaspora movement to be a separate body was of course not in line with nationalist premises. However as the nationlaists were too much in the discourse it sems they did not understand it clearly, but felt that they should bring the diaspora as close as possible to the parent community in the USSR. Crimean Turk-Tatar idnetification came to the fore, as they saw the brethren in the Soviet Union called themselves the Crimean Tatars. This period witnessed getting to know the brethren abroad.

Thus, though *Emel* was in appearance following the previous policies of the old cadre, it gradually started to voice the Crimean Tatars in the soviet union. They wanted to found every kind of transnational links. They were following the samizhdats, translating or transliterating the publications of the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union, or the products of other branches of diaspora. Consequently the amount about the previous history of Crimean

Tatar movement and its diaspora activists decreased on behalf of introducing new activists in the Soviets.

The result was a reconstruction of the relationship between the homeland and host state, rather than identifying with the parent community, and turning into an extension of it again. The Crimea largely resembled the 1944 deportation and the human rights movement of the brethren, thus the importance of international platform increased. The movement again based itself on transnationality. With the renewal of the bonds with the other branches, and the global forces that enabled the expression of it, Crimean Tatar nation was actually acclaimed to cover the homeland, and Crimean Tatars, Turkish state and society and the Crimean Tatar diaspora. This transnational social space grounds all the interaction and politics of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism. It seems that without leaving their nationalist premises, indeed seeking to purify them, the Crimean Tatar nationalists came to embody such a political formation.

The Crimean Tatar transnational communal solidarity overwhelms this formation more than previous discourses of Turkish nationalism, (pan) Turkism, etc. or they are articulated in new forms. It is not openly pan-Turkist anymore though it did not deny the solidarity with other Turkish peoples as a geopolitical strategy. The concern shifted from natural superiority to the anti-colonial national struggles of the Turko-Muslim people. It was about inaugurating transnational solidarity rather than a possible political pan-Turkic unity of these peoples. Crimean Tatar issue, instead of ideological perspectives evaluated by legal and international views. Free world is criticised for its indifference about the Crimean Tatar issue. (Emel 148:10)

Crimea also changed from being an imaginary “Green Island” subject of poems into a living land having environmental problems for example. (Emel 156, 1986:7) All new kind of new information and continues visits to Crimea fostered the establishment of social ties between the diaspora and the homeland.

The promotion of Crimean Tatar identity in the homeland also increased. The works in Crimean Tatar language also multiplied in the journal, given with a glossary to teach the Crimean Tatar to the youth. Modern Crimean Tatar literature (Cengiz Dağcı) or art was followed. The articles which were transliterated to the Latin alphabet are published in Crimean Tatar, so the Crimean Tatar diaspora can realise how close in act those people and the unity ad importance of language was emphasized. (Emel 160,1987:24) The issue of Crimean Tatar map which was only once mentioned but then undermined previously revived again. (Bozgöz,1988,5) In 176th issue in 1990 the national symbol, *Tarak Tamga* (national symbol) appeared. These all contributed to the imagining a modern Crimean Tatar identity.

In the 172th issue, *Emel* (1989:2) declared its compliance with the principles of *Kırım Tatar Milli Areket Teşkilatı* (Crimean Tatar National Movement Organisation) which represents the national movement in the Crimea openly

4.6.3 *Diaspora Nationalism as a Global Form*

Diaspora nationalism of the Crimean Tatars, as a full scale and independent movement was recognised only in 90s. The collapse of the Soviet Union also vanished all solid impediments between the homeland or parent community and the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Moreover the return of the deported parent community to the homeland strengthened the diaspora consciousness. The symbolic ties more were replaced by social ties. The imagined link turned into a possibility of real link.

However the fact that Crimean Tatars's not being sovereigns of the Crimea posed certain difficulties for diaspora politics as well as the parent community in the former USSR.

In the light of these facts basically there are two distinguishable lines observed in the diaspora in Turkey. Both lines in fact interestingly started to use the designation of diaspora for the Crimean Tatar national movement in Turkey, most probably as a result of the recognition of the nationally conscious body of Crimean Tatars in the former USSR. Furthermore both lines are aware of the separate existence of diaspora nationalist movement, which is not an extension of homeland politics anymore. However the tension point is about the implication of this fact to the diaspora nationalist politics in the future.

We can identify the first line by Emel in 90s. Continuing the previous internal reform of the movement to pull it more classical nationalist lines, even in a more radical way, Emel basically denies the separate existence of diaspora nationalist movement. It is obvious

in emel's sole preference of Crimean Tatar national identification increasingly. The hybridisation of Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey is equal with its assimilation, and the only way out of this dilemma is attaching solely to the homeland. Though essentialist and purist in assumptions, Emel of course is aware that neither the diaspora culture nor the culture of parent community is "pure." Culture is more recognised as something living and historically changing. However what is vital for the continuation of a cultural assertion is to be rooted. In that sense diaspora, though has preserved many authentic elements of especially pre-modern Crimean Tatar culture as frozen, it should abandon its claim for purity, and originality, as it has lacked the opportunity and motivation to develop the Crimean Tatar national culture. However while the Crimean Tatar diaspora abandoned Crimean Tatar dialect on behalf of Turkish, the Crimean Tatar parent community produced valuable works of Crimean Tatar literature in the extremely difficult conditions of communist state. Thus the center of national culture has always been and should be the homeland and the parent community, and the diaspora should be dominated by the homeland community. This view, though respect the long-lived tradition of nationalism in the diaspora, accepts that it is now mostly outmoded, by the overwhelming agenda of current issues and problems of the Crimean Tatars and the homeland. The idealism of previous period of diaspora nationalism should be replaced by practical efforts to approach to the homeland in every sense, and work for the exaltation of it. Diaspora politics should mean nothing more than homeland politics, excluding the host state politics as much as possible.

In this wholesale shift of the diaspora national movement from host state to the homeland, denying the independent existence of diaspora, Ünsal Aktaş have tried to underscore the independent existence of the movement in diaspora. (Emel 159:1987,11) He

theorised the policy only for the diaspora, though concernig homeland related issues. For instance the editorials of *Kırım* has pointed out the solid needs and program for Crimean Tatar national cause, like to write full history, to prepare maps, bibliographies, museums, archives, and unity of literature, that should be done in Turkey. He underlined that a new type of organization is needed for diaspora, mostly modelled on NGOs, and aiming more at an international sphere.¹⁰⁶ He emphasised the possibility of having a political life and direction, not necessarily stemming from the parent community. Thus Kırım was separated from the line *Emel* represents. Aktaş's main criticism for *Emel*, was it betrayed its legacy. It is today full of translations, reports from the Crimean Tatar life and bureaucracy, and especially works in favor of dominant groups, pro-Ukrainian forces, but undermined its role of organizing, uniting, theorising the national movement in diaspora, under the sacred principles of "*Milli Fırka*." What he actually means is *Emel*, as if it completed its mission by joining hands with the movement inside, ends diasporic production. It ceased its role to carry the previous mission that it was given by Cafer Seydahmet, the independence of Crimea. (The independent Crimea is an agenda of neither *Emel*, nor the Crimean Tatar national movement in the Crimea.) According to Kırım, if this original national cause is undermined, the tradition of Crimean Tatar nationalism will totally be meaningless. Kırım emphasizes the ideological aspects of the Crimean Tatar cause, and constantly uses "*mefkure*,"(ideal) "*Milli Fırka*,"(National Party) "*Cafer Seydahmet, siyasi mürşid*"(political leader) "*kurultay ruhu*" (Kırım 15 : 1) to underline the salience of the diaspora nationalist tradition. It in fact implies the prevalence of long-life of diaspora nationalist tradition over the shorter period of cireman tatar national struggle inside. Thus to be dominated by the homeland community seems irrelevant to them, if we take into consideration that living

¹⁰⁶ Meeting of independent associations. November 1999. Polatlı, Ankara.

oldest members of national center of Cafer Seydahmet, were in the editorial cadre of Kırım. Thus this line is always more critical towards the homeland community. As Crimea is the homeland of diaspora too, diaspora should have the right to assert its own agenda to homeland, criticise and influence the homeland politics for the benefit of all Crimean Tatar nation. For Crimean Tatar national cause is the cause of the whole Crimean tatar nationö and diaspora has its role to play in this struggle. (Kırım 4: 2) Therefore for instance Ünsal Aktaş offers the delegation from the diaspora to *Kurultay*. (Kırım 15:1) Crimean Tatar civilization can only rise by the establishment of cultural bridge between diaspora and the homleand, not by abondening the diaspora culture for any uncritical acceptance of the culture of the parent community. (Kırım 6: 1) Similarly diaspora should not so easily exclude Turkey. In fact Crimea can not have a future without Turkey. (Kırım 24:2) Diaspora should be concerned about broadening the base of the movement in the diaspora.(Kırım 14:1) Diaspora is not only an extension of the homeland, but also a part of Turkey. And true mission of diaspora nationalist is to help the homeland by also developing its own existence in Turkey, which means definitely to stick with the identification of Crimean Turk.

I exemplified these discussions, and stages in the development of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism in order to show what kind of politics is involved. What is certain is that Crimean Tatar diaspora has an independent politics, which turns out to be very different from the classical nationalist politics. Diaspora nationalists rather engage in trying to found a balanced relationship between the three bases of their identity, Crimea, Turkey, and Crimean Tatar community, in other words to imagine themselves as a transnational nation. The “balance” itself whether to incline more to the Crimea or Turkey, the

construction and reconstruction of Crimea, as well as the the Crimean Tatar identity in relation to Turkey means Crimean Tatar diaspora politics itself. This nature of Crimean Tatar diaspora politics causes it to formulate a new nationalist politics, which does not base on exclusively Crimea. Even though unconsciously, it is both Crimean and Turkish, hybrid, transnational, dispersed, and heterogenous but still asserts to be a nation, and proves that it is possible actually by transborder comradeship and imagining itself as a political community. It acts through the transnational premises rather than national, meaning it formulates its policies in a sphere “characterised but not, delimited by the nation-states.” Diaspora is not locked to Turkey, it is able seek new alliances on the other side of the borders.

Today we observe that Crimean diaspora is more concerned with practical politics, rather than grand ideologies, the repatriation of the Crimean Tatar, restitution of their human rights, health care and education in the Crimea, Revival of the Crimean Tatar language, changing to the Latin script...We do not mean diaspora left all its nationalist premises. There are people of classical nationalisms, but also there are people from different social projects, different ideological orientations. Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism is less an ideology now. It is much more to do with the human rights of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union, their repatriation, their legal, economic and social rights, their rights for compensation for genocide, democracy in the Crimea, their right to preserve their culture and language, the need for an international platform for the Crimean Tatar diaspora, the welfare of Crimean Tatar community in Turkey, the right for expressing its identity, to preserve the language, archives, maps, values, traditions at least document them

These do not necessitate abandoning the national cause defined by Cafer Seydahmet, the independent Crimea, return, or the fact that Crimea is the holy homeland where the Crimean Tatar people originated, or the joy of speaking Crimean Tatar language. These do not necessitate abandoning the primary belongings.

Indeed the mission of diaspora nationalism becomes to redefine those belongings, to reconstruct localities in the context of Turkey. Kemal Altıntaş, a young Crimean Tatar activist, who works on a computer program to translate Turkish texts into Crimean Tatar, argues that Crimean Tatar as a full scale, literary language can only be constructed by combining the collective memory of diaspora and homeland.

The point is Crimean Tatar diaspora is irrevocably translated. There is no way to import a “pure” culture to diaspora from the Crimea, indeed it is not that pure according to diaspora. Culture is neither static nor pure. It is constantly reproduced. It is all the time heterogenous. Crimean Tatar diaspora suffers as it is impossible for a diaspora nationalism to base on those nationalist premises which does not comply it. If it asserts so, it will remain weak. Integrating with the culture in the Crimea, or assimilating to the Turkish culture both do not seem as solutions for diaspora nationalists. Then there should be another choice, the diasporic existence itself reconstructing this Crimean Tatar identity in the context of Turkey.

Thus “Crimean Tatarhood” do not diminish, but also do not increase in Turkey if we prefer a nationalist perspective. It is actually replanted in Turkey if we look at it in a transnational perspective. By a nationalist perspective we tend to disregard the transnational

formation, that Crimean Tatar diaspora created, complying nationalist fanatics proclaiming this is not yet a nation-state, or they do not attempt to return to Crimea by selling all of their ownings. By a transnational perspective we can appreciate the possibility that such an existence can exert influence. Thus for instance Zuhale Yuksel claimed “return is not a solution, we should rather support the Crimean Tatars struggling in the Crimea”: This is indeed very good summary of diaspora nationalism and its agenda in Turkey. This is new nationalist policy, humanist and practical, but also idealist and traditional. Thus as we see by a transnational perspective we do not have to disregard nation-state as still valid form of political organization, but also recognize the possible other forms of political organization. It is also possible that Crimean Tatars can assure their rights in the Crimea or even capture the Crimea as a whole, but the diaspora would continue as a political organization separate but related to that affair.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The following conclusions appear after studying the case of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism in Turkey.

First of all the national movement of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey, though asserts to be an extension of the national movement of homeland is actually different than the national movement in the Crimea. As opposed to the dominant interpretation in Turkey that the movement in the homeland differentiated from the main line of Crimean Tatar nationalism, which is not wrong, this study also aimed to point out diaspora nationalism also transformed very much. Today not only diaspora nationalists have their own legitimacies, which impedes them to subordinate the new national movement developing in the Crimea, but also different histories, identities, and futures that distinguish them from the nationalists in the Crimea and consequently the co-existence of diaspora nationalism as a separate movement.

To conclude that the politics of diaspora nationalism is simply different from the nationalist movement in the homeland in fact brings a more important fact, that is diaspora nationalism is actually different from mainstream nationalisms in its theoretical pre-

suppositions, emerging as a unique type. Sourcing out of its unique structure, i.e. on the triadic bases of diaspora; homeland, host society and diaspora community diaspora nation is transnational; it depends on an imagined link between the communities in various countries. This dispersion of diaspora also brought its hybridity. Consequently diaspora nationalism, with its anti-essentialist and anti-integrationist structure and simultaneous loyalties towards more than one nation is not a nationalism in the usual sense. Most of all diaspora nationalism is not framed by a state, which became a pre-requisite for being a nation. However this does not mean diaspora nationalism simply overthrows nationalism. The twist is that it reconstructs the main categories of race and nation in new global conditions. Diaspora nationalism is translocal, not local or global. It is hybrid, not pure or mixed. It does not overthrow belonging, its loyalty belongs to this hybrid essence. It is transnational, not national or denationalised.

Diaspora nationalism, in fact formulates a 'new politics', which can rather be understood and interpreted in a 'transnational framework.' Diasporas organize its politics not in a national, but in a transnational public sphere which includes nation-states, but is larger than them. It organizes its politics in the form of new social movements. The politics of diaspora nationalism is characterised but not delimited by the nation-states.

It should be underlined again that main dynamic determining the very course of diaspora nationalism is globalization. Appearing largely as an unclear, and contradictory, but at the same time all encompassing phenomenon, globalization seems to be highly relevant to understand diaspora nationalism. Diaspora nationalism seems to be both a catalyst and a consequence of globalization, and reflecting the contradictory aspects of it.

Diasporas, including the Crimean Tatar diaspora designate themselves as forces in the new global culture, although they are not very conscious about the real making of diaspora nationalism. Diasporas at least are aware of their capability to affect the center. It seems that scholarly research comes much later than diaspora nationalists implement new creative strategies and policies. The research about the newly emerging diasporas in the Western countries increases faster, but again the diasporas in the non-Western countries remain largely unnoticed. It is obvious that to study diasporas means at the same time to study the dominant cultural-national discourses in which they are embedded. In other words, to develop an understanding about the diaspora necessitates a re-evaluation of the dominant cultures. Therefore, while problematising the non-Western nationalisms, it may be fruitful to take into account their diasporas as well. Apart from its main more specialised purposes about conceptualising diaspora nationalism, this work also intended to be an indirect contribution to suggest a diaspora in a non-Western context for theoretical inquiry.

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APPENDIX

CRIMEAN TATAR ASSOCIATIONS

Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi (Ankara) (General Center for Cultural and Aid Associations of Crimean Turks) (publishes bulletin *Kırım*)

Subserviant Associations and their bulletins

1. Aksaray Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
2. Çanakkale Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
3. Çatalca Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
4. Balıkesir Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
5. Gebze Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
6. İstanbul Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (publishes *Bahçesaray*)
7. Kaman Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (being established)
8. İzmir Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
9. Kırıkkale Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
10. Kocaeli Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
11. Konya Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
12. Mersin Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
13. Niğde Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
14. Seydişehir İstanbul Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
15. Sungurlu Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
16. Yalova Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Independent Associations:
17. Adapazarı Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
18. Amasya Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
19. Ankara Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
20. Antalya Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (not fully established yet)
21. Bolu Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
22. Bursa Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (publishes *Kalgay*)
23. Düzce Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği
24. Eskişehir Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (publishes *Kırım Postası*)

Çifteler Şubesi

Mahmudiye Şubesi

25. İzmir Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (publishes *Tarak Tamga*)

26. İzmit Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği

27. Polatlı Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (publishes *Asabay*)

28. Sakarya Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği