

To My Family

THE IMPACTS OF TURKEY'S RESPONSE TO PROLIFERATION THREATS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST ON ITS INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACTS OF TURKEY'S RESPONSE TO PROLIFERATION THREATS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON ITS INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE

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After the declaration of its candidacy in 1999, Turkey's relations with the European Union (EU) assumed a new course, which requires undertaking certain reforms to fulfill the EU accession criteria in order to start accession talks. Now that Turkey's primary task is meeting these criteria, there is a high expectation that Turkey should do its best to start these talks as early as possible. However, the issues that started to occupy Turkey's external security agenda in the post-Cold War period are likely to constitute important stumbling blocks in Turkey's integration with the EU. Turkey is under a real threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems from its neighbors in the Middle East. Turkey's initial response to the proliferation was to consider involvement in missile defense systems, and to produce its own capability that addressed the threat directly. Experts foresee that these two processes pull Turkish policymaking in different directions and result in a paradox. This thesis is an attempt to find a way to get out of this paradox by addressing needs and interests and to lead Turkey to converge towards satisfying the EU while at the same time upholding its own security interests. To that end, the thesis basically proposes a national nonproliferation strategy that involves all the interested actors of Turkish security and foreign policy making and relevant institutions. It argues that viable strategic political decisions can be a way out of the paradox between Turkey's security policy and its relations with Europe.

Keywords: Weapons of mass destruction, Turkey, European Union, Middle East.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’NİN ORTADOĞU’DAKİ KİTLE İMHA SİLAHLARI TEHDİTİNE VERDİĞİ KARŞILIĞIN AVRUPA İLE ENTEGRASYONUNA ETKİLERİ

Udum, Şebnem

Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Mustafa Kibaroğlu

1999 Helsinki Zirvesi’yle Avrupa Birliği’ne (AB) aday gösterildikten sonra Türkiye’nin AB ile ilişkileri yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. Katılım müzakerelerine bir an önce başlamak isteyen Türkiye, AB’ye üyelik kriterlerini yerine getirmelidir; ancak Soğuk Savaş sonrası yeni ortaya çıkan güvenlik tehditleri bu süreçte önemli engeller oluşturacak gibi görünmektedir. Türkiye Orta Doğu’dan kaynaklanan kitle imha silahlarının ve bunların fırlatma vasıtalarının yayılması tehditiyle karşı karşıyadır. Bu tehdiye direk karşılık olarak Türkiye ilk etapta füze savunma sistemleri içine dahil olmayı düşünmüş ve kendi yeteneklerini geliştirmiştir. Uzmanlar bu iki sürecin birbirine ters yönde ilerleyeceğini ve bir ikilem yaratacağını öngörmektedirler. Bu tez bu ikilemden bir çıkış yolu bulmayı amaçlamaktadır. Böylece Türkiye AB’ye entegrasyonu gerçekleştirirken aynı zamanda kendi güvenlik çıkarlarını da göz önünde bulundurmuş olacaktır. Bu amaca hizmet etmek için, bu tez, Türkiye’nin tüm dış ve güvenlik politikasını belirleyen kurumlarını ve ilgili birimlerini kapsayan milli bir kitle imha silahlarının yayılmasının önlenmesi stratejisi önermektedir. Temel argüman, yerinde stratejik politik kararların Türkiye’nin güvenlik politikası ve AB ile ilişkilerinde yaşayabileceği ikilemden çıkmasını sağlayacak bir yol olacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kitle imha silahları, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Orta Doğu.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Integration with Europe has been an important goal of all Turkish governments as an inertial extension of the Turkish quest to be part of Europe dating back to the 19th century.¹ After 1923, M.K. Atatürk set the goal for Turkey as “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations” by which he meant the modern world that lied in the West, that is, Europe. Consequently, all the Turkish governments paid due respect to this idea, and eventually it became a state goal of Turkey.

Turkey realized this goal to a certain extent by its membership to international organizations as well as those pertaining to Europe, *inter alia*, the League of Nations superceded by the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). For

¹ In 1839, Ottoman State issued the Gulhane Hatt-i Humayun (Tanzimat Fermani) which acknowledged minority rights under the Ottoman state in order to gain the approval of western states to a certain extent-, and the Reform Decree (Islahat Fermani) in 1856- which was declared at the Paris Peace Conference of the same year, where the Ottoman state was declared as part of the European state system in return for its acknowledgement of minority rights.

Turkey, being “European” not only refers to working together with the Europeans in the political, economic and security domain, but also it is a matter of identity that will be certified by membership in the “Club of Europeans”. That is why, Turkey applied for membership to the European Communities soon after their establishment in 1957 with the Rome Treaties. Until 1999, Turkey’s applications did not result in a firm commitment for full membership² for a variety of reasons by the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU). These reasons were mainly political, economic and cultural, and were related less to security concerns.

Turkey’s relations with the EU assumed a new course after it was declared candidate for EU membership at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. The EU now expects Turkey to fulfill the accession criteria in order to begin the negotiations for eventual membership. These criteria include, among others, short and medium term political and economic criteria, for which Turkey should go through a number of reforms. Now that Turkey’s primary task is meeting these criteria, there is a high expectation that Turkey should do its best to start the accession talks as early as possible. The DSP (The Democratic Left Party)-ANAP (The Motherland Party)-MHP (The Nationalist Action Party) coalition government (1999-2002) and the following AKP (Justice and Development Party) administration have worked sincerely hard to that end. However, a smooth ride to the final destination seems unlikely due to the issues that started to occupy

² Instead, the EEC and Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which established a customs union between Turkey and the EEC to bring Turkey closer to eventual membership. Also, the EC partially considered Turkey’s application in 1987, but the Commission declined in 1989. In 1997, the Commission acknowledged Turkey’s eligibility for membership, but it was not declared a candidate in the Luxembourg European Council in 1997.

Turkey's external security agenda in the post-Cold War era and especially in post-September 11³ period.

The new security challenges include regional instabilities caused by intra-state/ethnic conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, international terrorism, arms and drug smuggling which fuel such proliferation, as well as other political and economic uncertainties, and religious fundamentalism which serves as the ideological base of many terrorist organizations.

Turkey is situated in the middle of these new threats that emanate from the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. More specifically, the Middle East is the very region where all of these issues are intermingled. During the Cold War, due to its military deterrent and defense capabilities both in the context of its NATO collective security assurance, and its military power, Turkey's threat perception from the Middle East was relatively lower, hence it enjoyed staying out of the issues related to the Middle East; though it had not only physical but also historical and economic ties with its Middle Eastern neighbors, namely, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey has perceived an increasing threat from the Middle East, primarily regarding terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, ethnic conflicts, and religious fundamentalism. With the Gulf War of 1991, Turkey had to give up its non-involvement policy, and to take sides with the US-led coalition in a Middle Eastern conflict, against an overt act of aggression by Iraq. The changing balances after the War had an impact on Turkey's perceptions from the region. The Middle East started to occupy an important place in Turkey's foreign and security policy agenda in this new era, and the formation of the new policy is still in progress.

³ The terrorist attacks on the US soil on September 11, 2001 will be referred to as 9/11 henceforth.

However, the bottomline of this policy is clear: In the face of the WMD capabilities and the issue areas between Turkey and these states that can cause tension or conflict and trigger intent to employ these weapons, Turkey needs to be able to frame and adopt its security policies independently, modernize its military arsenal, bolster its capabilities to be able to respond to the new threats, and establish strategic relations with certain countries to that end, although these moves may not be welcome by the Europeans.

This study underlines that Turkey's responses to threats from the Middle East will constitute an important area of tension in Turkish-EU relations, and the most significant of these security issues will be the proliferation of WMD, especially after 9/11 and in the context of Turkish-US strategic relationship.

Turkey is faced with a real and increasing threat of WMD and missile proliferation from the Middle East. Iran and Syria have WMD and their delivery capabilities that can hit targets in Turkey. Iraq was one of the main concerns to the international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts before the US-led campaign for a regime change in Iraq. Throughout the War, Turkey incurred the real threat of Iraqi retaliatory attacks with ballistic missiles tipped with WMD warheads. Turkey lacks the adequate systems to defend against them. So far, it has been considering involvement in the US "Missile Shield" project, working with Israel on ways to procure state-of-the-art missile defense technologies, and to a lesser extent developing its own missiles. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu has found out that Turkey's responses to the proliferation threat at the national level are likely to unfavorably impact its relations with Europe in security matters, and impair the fulfillment of some of the accession criteria. The two dynamics pull Turkey towards opposite ends and result in a paradox.

Argument:

The thesis takes Dr. Kibaroglu's findings one step further by adding the phrase "unless effectively dealt with..." Thus, the argument of the paper is that viable strategic political decisions can be a way out of the paradox between Turkey's security policy and its relations with Europe. These policies can be derived by addressing the needs and interests⁴ of Turkey and the EU within this paradox. The thesis basically proposes a national nonproliferation strategy based on the findings after the operationalization of needs and interests.

Organization:

The thesis seeks to reconcile the incompatibilities between Turkey's security policy and its decades-long aspiration for integration with Europe with a focus on the threat of WMD and missile proliferation emanating from the Middle East.

The first chapter is an analysis of threat. It looks at Turkey's security and defense policy in general and towards the Middle East in particular. Then, it focuses on the proliferation trends and issues in the Middle East, and provides information regarding the WMD capabilities of Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria. For an accurate threat assessment, there should be motivations to trigger the use of these capabilities, so, it devotes particular attention to regional issues and dynamics.

The second chapter is about response. The thesis determines that Turkey's deterrent has diminished in the aftermath of the Cold War due to the emerging

⁴ The thesis borrows this method from the principles of conflict resolution theory, that is win-win solutions can be attained when parties to a conflict bargain in terms of their needs and interests instead of positions.

asymmetric threats, and it has deficiencies in its defense capabilities to address the proliferation threat effectively and sustainably. Thus, it uses policy analysis methodology to determine the course of action as the practical policy. The findings demonstrate that Turkey has already adopted the option that is the most viable though it needs to be complemented with other measures. However, even in its current stage, Turkey's security policy introduces challenges to one of its ultimate goals in Turkish foreign policy, that is being a member of the European Union.

To understand the underlying reasons for the challenge, the third chapter scrutinizes the impacts of Turkey's response on its integration with Europe. After the study of the background of relations and what Turkey's priorities are, the thesis borrows Dr. Kibaroglu's findings to demonstrate the issue areas.

In the final chapter, the thesis will try to find a way out of the apparent paradox by addressing the problem areas on the basis of needs and interests, thereby to move from the status quo to the desired outcome, where Turkey is converging towards satisfying the EU while at the same upholding its own security interests. The findings will form the backbone of recommendations for policymaking, that is, strategic political decisions, which the thesis foresees to incorporate in a national nonproliferation strategy that it proposes for Turkish foreign and security policymakers.

CHAPTER II

TURKEY'S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY AND PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

2.1. OVERVIEW OF TURKISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Turkey's foreign and security policy has been shaped by its geographical status and has developed in a historical and cultural context. Turkey has historically exercised *realpolitik*, which has evolved to become defensive in the Republican era.⁵ More specifically, Turkish security policy aimed at maintaining the country's borders and the strategic balance in its immediate region. During the interwar period, Turkey became part of security alliances or agreements with the European states, such as Russia and various states in the Balkans, and with other states in its region, such as Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Turkey preferred not to take part in World War II despite the pressures coming from some parties to the war. However, Turkey's geography did not let itself to preserve its neutrality after the end of the war. As a result of the Soviet expansionist threat, the United States extended Marshall aid to Greece and Turkey. Turkey's becoming

⁵ Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54 No. 1, Fall 2000, p.200.

a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952 made it part of the western camp. During the Cold War, Turkey continued leaning towards the West, and established relations with the European Economic Community. It pursued a non-involvement policy towards the Middle East.⁶ Its membership to NATO and its military power constituted Turkey's deterrent against threats from the Middle East.

The end of the Cold War changed the picture dramatically: The demise of the Soviet empire eradicated the concrete threat, and introduced new security risks and threats. As a result of the change in the nature of threats in the post-Cold War period, Turkey has identified the following as new threats and risks:

- Regional and ethnic conflicts,
- Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties,
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles in its neighborhood,
- Religious fundamentalism,
- Arms and drug smuggling, and
- International terrorism.⁷

Turkey is situated at the center of these new threats and risks, which emanate from the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, defined by the 'Bermuda Triangle'⁸ discourse, which identifies the security risks that Turkey incurs.⁹

⁶ Between the two world wars, Turkey's international orientation was non-alignment, exemplified by the Sadabad Pact, signed with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, which was basically about non-interference in each other's affairs. It froze relations with the Middle Eastern states during World War I. After Turkey became a member to NATO, it perceived the Middle East as a region "out of area." Also, it feared from being dragged into a conflict that included states in the Middle East, especially, the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, it avoided taking sides with any of the parties, and chose non-involvement. See Nur Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East," *MERIA*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1997. <<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a3.html>> (September 1, 2003)

⁷ "Turkey's Defense Policy and Military Strategy-Turkey's National Defense Policy," *White Paper*, Part IV, Section I, Turkish Ministry of Defense, 2000.

Consequently, Turkey is in a geography where the interests of the global actors intersect. Thus, Turkey determined its defense policy in a way that it would contribute to and would extend peace and security and formulate strategies that would have repercussions on the strategic assessments in the region and beyond. Moreover, Turkey prioritizes taking measures to prevent crises and conflicts by participating actively in collective defense systems. Turkey's military strategy complements the aims of its defense policy by upholding deterrence, military contribution to crisis management and intervention in crises, forward defense, and collective security. In conjunction with the needs of this strategy, the Turkish Armed Forces work towards having a deterrent military force along with C4ISR (Command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems, superior operational capability and fire power, advanced technology weapons and systems, and air/missile defense and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection capability against weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰

Because of its geopolitical status, Turkey, since the Republican times, sought security through alliances and pursued a circumspect foreign policy.¹¹ In terms of security policy, Turkey defined the concepts of strategic partnership and strategic cooperation, which would affect its new geopolitical axis in the post-Cold War. These

⁸ Speech by former Minister of Defense, Hikmet Sami Türk to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 March 1999.

⁹ Due to their geographic location, Europeans incurred these new threats in terms of instability in the periphery. Their main task has become to integrate Central and Eastern European countries, which used to be on the other side of the "Iron Curtain," politically, economically and security-wise into a European framework in order to address the instabilities. They pondered over defining the Transatlantic link with the United States, transformed the EC from a solely economic institution to a political union and worked on adding a security and defense pillar to the European Union. The United States, on the other hand, defined a global policy, and upheld multilateral institutionalism to address the new threats.

¹⁰ *ibid*, Part III, Section 2.

¹¹ A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, 2000, *op.cit.*, p.199.

concepts cover joint action and cooperation in regional problems and incidents that occur in different areas of the world, military partnership agreements, and formation of permanent commissions in economic, military, political and social fields and as a result of agreements between mutually favored states.¹² In that context, a strategic relationship developed between Turkey and the United States in the 1990s, and between Turkey and Israel after the 1996 Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement. These relations have formed the new Turkish alignment strategies in the post-bipolar security framework, by redefining the concept of “West”, now replaced by the United States and the EU as two different units.¹³

The threat from the “East”, on the other hand, is no longer coming from Soviet expansionism, but from the Middle East, where all of the new security risks of the post-Cold War era are concentrated. This region is volatile due to protracted conflicts-particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict-, mutual distrust among the countries, the drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, smuggling, religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Because of its vast reserves of oil that amount to more than 60% of world oil reserves, the Middle East is at the center of great power interests which dictate the control of easy access and unabated flow of oil to ensure price stability, and decrease dependency on the regional states. The initiatives for peace have usually proven fruitless due to a number of intermingled issues ranging from land, security, water, terrorism and proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems.

¹² Erol Mütercimler, “Security in Turkey in the 21st Century,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol.1, No.4, (Oct-Dec 1999), pp.16-17.

¹³ Işıl Kazan, *Turkey Between National and Theater Missile Defense*, Raketentabwehrforschung International, Bulletin No. 25, Fall 2001. <<http://www.hsfk.de/abm/bulletin/kazan1.htm>>

The issue of proliferation is on the rise and is occupying the prominent place on the global agenda regarding the Middle East, demonstrated by the War on Iraq. The proliferation threat has emerged as the most significant threat since it has left Turkey under the risk of being affected in a regional conflict that would include a WMD attack as was exemplified by the Gulf War and then the War on Iraq. Before the War and generally before 9/11, Turkey was under a potential WMD and missile threat from Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria. The threat perceptions from Syria and to a lesser extent Iraq was relatively lower, whereas Turkey has been growing increasingly uneasy about Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Still, it counted on its military power and NATO collective security guarantee, though the latter seemed to have weakened in the post-Cold War. The War on Iraq and aftermath, however, inserted a new dynamic: The post-9/11 US security policy aims at getting rid of the anti-American and WMD-aspirant states in the Middle East, and views Turkey as a strategic location to carry out operations- military or other. Turkey has also experienced the prolonged discussions in NATO to guarantee its security in case of an Iraqi retaliation with WMD or missiles. The United States pointed at Iran and Syria as its next targets in the war against terrorism. Thus, their WMD and missile capability no longer constitute a potential risk, but a real threat to Turkey, especially after the wounded relations with the United States because of the War on Iraq, and the ensuing reluctance to challenge the fragile status of these relations, hence the drive to work together.

Turkey has already given its response to proliferation in the Middle East by engaging in talks with the United States and Israel on anti-ballistic missile defense systems, but the talks are yet to be complete due to a number of issues. To understand Turkey's threat perceptions from its neighbors in the Middle East both before and after

the War, the next couple of sections will provide an analysis of Turkey's security policy towards the Middle East and proliferation in general, and make a threat assessment by scrutinizing the capabilities and issues that may trigger the political intent to employ them. Then the following section will look at Turkey's deterrent and defensive capabilities, and the responses it undertook. The aim is to understand and appreciate the response so as to link it with the possible problems in Turkey's relations with the European Union.

2.2. TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

In the early years of the Republic, Turkey endorsed a foreign policy based on the maintenance of status quo, and distanced itself from the politics of the Middle East. After the end of Cold War, Ankara began to exert influence in the Middle East, representing a significant shift from the previous policies that were characterized as 'cautious indifference' based on its membership in NATO and its non-involvement policy with respect to Middle Eastern issues.¹⁴ The Gulf War drastically changed Turkey's Cold War policy by forcing it to get involved in an inter-Arab conflict. During the War, Turkey's exclusive cooperation with the West, especially with the United States against Iraq, represented a fundamental change of Turkey's traditional balanced regional policy dating back to the 1960s, and it continued after the War.¹⁵ Turkey has concluded cooperation agreements on military training, technical aid, scientific matters and defense industry

¹⁴ A.L. Karaosmanoglu, 2000, op.cit., pp. 208-211.

¹⁵ Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32 No. 4, October, 1996, p. 343.

with Israel in 1994 and in January and August 1996.¹⁶ Thus, both countries increased their strategic posture in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's strategic relationship with Israel formed a counterforce¹⁷ to the Greek threat in Aegean and Cyprus.

In the Middle East, due to the mutual threat perceptions, there is the inclination to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. Basically, Israel started developing a nuclear capability in order to be able to defend itself against the Arab states in the region, which see Israel as the disrupter of stability and security in the Middle East. To attain parity with Israel, other states followed suit to acquire WMD. Since the acquisition of nuclear capability requires sophisticated research and financial resources, they resorted to acquiring chemical and biological weapons, which are sometimes depicted as “the poor man's atomic bomb,” and missiles by the technology and know-how they acquired from the great powers during the Cold War. At this point, it is necessary to define WMD, and the proliferation issues in the Middle East.

WMD is defined as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Though they are grouped together as WMD, they differ in terms of the lethality of their effects. Nuclear weapons are the most destructive in that they kill large numbers of people, destroy buildings and infrastructure, and contaminate large areas with radioactive fallout. Biological and chemical weapons do not destroy buildings or infrastructure but target

¹⁶ Lale Saribrahimoglu, “Turkey, Israel Sign Industry Cooperation Deal,” *Jane's Defense Weekly*, Vol. 26, No. 10, September 4, 1996; Yusuf Ozkan, “Türkiye-İsrail Ortak Füze Üretimi Masada (Turkish-Israeli Joint Production of Missiles on Table),” *Milliyet*, 25 January 1998.

¹⁷ The militarized Greek islands in the Aegean that present a potential threat of an aerial attack, and Greek Cypriot attempts to diminish Turkey's strategic posture in the Eastern Mediterranean with the quest to acquire air defense systems propelled Turkey to augment its deterrent and defense capabilities in case of contingencies with Greece.

living organisms instead, that is, humans, animals and plants.¹⁸ WMD capability constitutes an imminent threat when those who possess them also have delivery capabilities. Along with the various means of delivery and dispersal, the proliferators usually seek to acquire ballistic missiles so that they can be certain of penetrating the opponent's defenses.¹⁹

A ballistic missile is a rocket capable of guiding and propelling itself in a direction and to a velocity that, when the rocket engine shuts down, it will follow a flight pattern to a desired target. Ballistic missiles burn most of their propellant (fuel) in the initial portion of their flight, called the boost phase. Most fly fast enough to hit targets 100s or 1000s of miles away in a few minutes. Once launched, they are fairly easy to detect with radar or other sensors, but difficult to intercept.²⁰

The Middle East has the highest concentration of WMD of the world, whose use can be easily triggered by ongoing tensions and protracted conflicts. The WMD programs expanded and the quality and quantity of their delivery systems increased in the last two decades. Various sources and reports indicate that Israel is the sole nuclear-capable state; Iran, Iraq, Israel and Egypt have chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs; Syria has the most advanced chemical weapons (CW) capability in the region; Egypt, Iraq and Syria have short-range, Iran and Israel have medium-range ballistic missiles that can carry WMD warheads.²¹ Geographical proximity feeds mutual threat perceptions. There is a region-wide proliferation trend, which is "...driven by a variety of factors

¹⁸ "A Primer on WMD," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. <http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a.html>

¹⁹ "Ballistic Missiles/A Primer on WMD," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*. <http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a5.html>

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ See *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/index.htm>>; Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, *Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen*, New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002; Mohamed Shaker, *Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, Keynote Address to PPNN International Workshop: Nuclear Weapons and the Middle East, Southampton, United Kingdom, 12-14 October 1995; Khaled Dawoud, "Redefining the Bomb," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, No. 458, 2-8 December 1999. <<http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/1999/458/intervw.htm>>

governing or generated by the security calculus of [the regional] states”.²² The region has seen WMD use and use threshold in many cases including the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran and its Kurdish population, and the expectation of such use in Arab-Israeli wars, as well as in the Gulf War of 1991 and Iraq War of 2003.

The ongoing conflicts and tensions create actual or perceived threats and increase the likelihood of the use of WMD. They include first and foremost the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is the core of volatility and steady tension in the region; disputes over oil and water; and rivalry over regional or religious dominancy. Israel defines state security as a function of overwhelming capability over the regional adversaries, which challenge the existence of the state, such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Due to the lack of strategic depth, Israel resorted to acquiring utmost defensive capabilities, including nuclear, but did not announce them since the baseline is not prestige.

The quest for regional dominance is a historical fact of the Middle East. Egypt, Iran and Libya have had the quest to be the regional or the cultural leader. In this view, the one who can challenge the Israeli security rules the Arab world. Thus, WMD capability would give them not only tactical military capability, but more importantly, prestige- hence the effort to acquire CBW capability. WMD and ballistic missile capability also would make up the gaps in their unsophisticated military forces, and enable them to penetrate the adversaries’ borders to win a conventional war. Thus, Egypt, Iraq and Syria did not sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to be able to develop and maintain chemical weapons against the Israeli capability. In order to maintain its nuclear opacity, Israel did not sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

²² Nabil Fahmy, “Prospects for Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 2, No. 8, Summer 2001, p. 6.

(NPT). The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) could not find many supporters from the region.

Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria have posed WMD and missile threat to Turkey. Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can hit military and civil targets in Turkey. Their military capabilities and the various issues in their relationships with Turkey constitute a real threat to Turkey's security. Turkey has been concerned about Iraq and Syria's possession of chemical and biological weapons and surface-to-surface missiles to deliver them. Particularly, reports of Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear capability, and its development of long-range ballistic missiles alarmed Turkey²³ since "... [its] population centers, dams, power stations, air bases and military headquarters are within the range of these missile systems.²⁴ The impacts of 9/11 and War on Iraq exacerbated the threat, as mentioned above.

Nonetheless, for Turkey, the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD is important while not one of the most discussed. Turkey has contributed to collective nonproliferation efforts: In this context, Turkey ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1980 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999 (Turkey was among the first signatories of the Treaty). It signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, and became a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. With respect to export controls regimes regarding WMD and their delivery means, related materials and technologies, Turkey was among the

²³ I. O. Lesser and A.J. Tellis, *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean*, RAND, 1996; Sıtkı Egeli, *Taktik Balistik Füzeler ve Türkiye (Tactical Ballistic Missiles and Turkey)*, Turkish Ministry of Defense, The Undersecretariat of Defense Industry, 1993, cited in Kemal Kirişçi, "Post-Cold War Turkish Security and the Middle East," *MERIA*, Vol. 1, No.2, July 1997: <<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a6.html>> (August 30, 2003)

²⁴ Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, Turkey and NATO in a New Strategic Environment, Paper presented at the Conference on Mediterranean Security in the Post-Cold War Era, 1995 cited in Kirişçi (1997), op.cit.

founding members of the Wassenaar Regulation in 1996. It joined the MTCR in 1997, and in 1999 it became a full member of Zangger Committee, which is the first major agreement regulating nuclear exports by current and potential suppliers.²⁵ Since 2000, Turkey is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group-supplier agreements to control nuclear and related exports, and to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons respectively.²⁶

2.3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

State security can be under potential or real threat. Roughly, what determines threat is the resultant of motivations and capabilities. Capabilities are the military assets and infrastructure that a state holds. Capabilities can affect the military standing of a country, and give them an offensive or defensive potential. Thus, there are mainly two elements in threat assessment: technical capabilities and political intent to employ them militarily or as offensive means. There can be various reasons that underlie the intent, or trigger such intent, like mutual threat perceptions, issue areas between states or deterrence. This section aims at assessing the threat that Turkey incurs from the proliferation of WMD and missiles in its neighborhood. Capabilities are assessed on the basis of the quality (range, payload, efficiency, targeting) and quantity of weapons along with access to materials in order to develop and advance these weapons. Motivations are assessed on the basis of the political and strategic context of the region that can lead

²⁵ Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, p. 29.

²⁶ *White Paper*, Turkish Ministry of Defense, Part II, Section 7.

states to employ these weapons militarily (hypothetical scenario of an attack on strategic targets; missile tests, deployment of warheads in border areas).

2.3.1. Missile Proliferation in Turkey's Volatile Neighborhood

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, states in the Middle East that used to be its satellites became free to roam out of the orbit. They had developed WMD and missiles by the technology and expertise they acquired from great powers during the Cold War; however, they could not act freely in the bipolar world, because the superpowers would intervene into the affairs to put a lid on any adverse development. After the end of Cold War, this controlling mechanism vanished, and they could have easier access to material and information especially from the newly independent states (NIS), where the material and expertise became unemployed and became attractive to the aspirant states and/or groups.

Turkey became increasingly anxious about the efforts by Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria which developed chemical and biological weapon capabilities, had nuclear programs, and which were in an effort to acquire missiles and work towards increasing their ranges. Turkey became aware of the WMD threat in the Middle East during the Gulf War, after seeing Iraq's use of the Scud-Bs and the Al-Hussein (extended range Scud-Cs) missiles and Iraq's threat to use WMD. Moreover, in 1998 and 2000, Iran tested its long-range Shahab-3 missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads. Iran's nuclear reactor in Bushehr²⁷ is so much of a concern to the nonproliferation efforts,²⁸ since it places Iran at

²⁷ Iran worked with German firms for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactors beginning from 1974 until the Revolution in 1979. The reactors were bombed several times by Iraq during the First Gulf War. Then, Iran had been in search for western European firms for reconstruction, but it was halted by US pressure. Iran started to work with Russia for the completion of the reactor, and Russian experts are

a threshold to produce nuclear weapons. States question Iran's need to have such a reactor while it has oil resources to support its economy. Also, Iran's refusal to be transparent creates doubts as to whether it may have intentions other than the peaceful use of this nuclear energy.

Turkey's ongoing disputes with its neighbors and areas of disagreement, including, *inter alia*, support for terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, Turkey's strategic relationship with Israel and the long-standing unresolved water disputes with Syria and Iraq, led to a real WMD threat on Turkey's southeastern borders. Ankara became uneasy since it does not have adequate defense systems against WMD and ballistic missiles. By the beginning of 2000, the potential ballistic missile threat from Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria, became a real problem for Turkey.

States acquire WMD for a variety of reasons. A combination of these reasons motivates Turkey's neighbors to develop WMD capabilities. WMD capabilities represent power and prestige for the states in the Middle East: for example, Saddam Hussein's quest to be the first Arab leader with a nuclear weapon in order to challenge Israel and lead the Arab masses. These states also seek WMD in order to deal with regional threats or to have a deterrent capability in future regional conflicts (such as the Syrian drive to acquire chemical weapons against Israel). Finally, these states pursue chemical and biological weapon programs as a "second best option" to a nuclear weapon capability;

working in the facilities. Analysts assess that the Bushehr-1 power plant and cooperation with Russia would give Iran the legitimate ground to conduct research, obtain nuclear-related equipment and know-how, and the ease to carry out covert weapons-related assistance and smuggling activities. Source: Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, *Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998: <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/iranrpt.pdf>> (July 15, 2003)

²⁸ Two other facilities in Natanz (for uranium enrichment) and Arak (heavy water reactor), and the two suspected facilities that served to build the infrastructure for these two, have added up to the concerns. See Leonard S. Spector, "Iran's Secret Quest for the Bomb," *YaleGlobal Online*, 16 May 2003: <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1624>> (August 25, 2003)

hence the term “poor man’s nuclear weapon” has been coined for chemical and biological weapons.²⁹ Also, none of Iran, pre-war Iraq or Syria have been party to the MTCR, which constrains the signatories to develop missiles with 300 km range and 500 kg payload.

To elaborate the points made so far, the thesis will first take a look at capabilities and motivations, then demonstrate the lack of Turkey’s defense systems to protect against these capabilities.

2.3.1.1. Iran:


Iran is a signatory to the NPT, CWC and BTWC. Iran has been developing its program to deliver nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. It has a large nuclear development program to construct power reactors for “peaceful purposes,” however, US and Israeli officials believe that Iran seeks to acquire capability to build nuclear weapons.³⁰ Reports indicate that Iran possesses chemical weapons and has ongoing research for biological agents, and started developing them during the war with Iraq in 1980s. Iran has 25 M-7 (CSS-8) missile systems with 150 km range and 190 kg payload, 200 Scud-B missile systems that have a range of 300 km and 985 kg payload, and 150 Scud-C missile systems with a range of 500 km and 700 kg payload. In addition, Iran successfully tested its Shahab-3 ballistic missiles that have a range of 1,300-1,500 km -i.e. covering Ankara in its firing range- and 700 kg payload. In addition, Iran is working on developing its Shahab-4 missiles with a range of some 2,000 km and 1,000

²⁹ John D. Holum, “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Challenges and Responses,” *US Foreign Policy Agenda (USIA Electronic Journal)*, Vol. 4, No. 2, September 1999. <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0999/ijpe/pj29holu.htm>>

³⁰ See Greg J. Gerardi and Maryam Aharinejad, “An Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (Spring-Summer 1995), pp. 207-213; Koch and Wolf, 1998.

kg payload.³¹ Iran's WMD capability constitutes a potential threat to Turkey and it has exposed Turkey's weakness in the field of air defense systems.

Figure 1. Estimated Ranges of Iran's Current and Potential Ballistic Missiles³²



³¹ *Iran-Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm>>

³² *Proliferation Threat and Response*, Office of Secretary of Defense, January 2001, p. 37.

The imminence of the threat becomes clearer within the context of the relations between Turkey and Iran. The Shahab series of missiles are important to Iran since they serve a variety of purposes, one of them being Turkey's NATO membership and its close strategic alliance with Israel, which is interpreted by Iran as potential threats.³³ Several issues have characterized Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkey became uneasy by Iran's support to the PKK (Partiya Karkarani Kurdistan-Kurdistan Workers' Party), which carried out subversive terrorist activities in Turkey. The relations also suffered from the reported Turkish strikes against PKK targets in Iranian territory. For the time being, the Kurdish problem does not seem to occupy the prominent place in the agenda of Turkish-Iranian relations. Another issue area is rivalry for influence in Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, Turkey and Iran have mutually perceived their secular and Islamist state systems as a potential threat to the existing order within their borders.


While Turkey is alarmed by Iran's development of its Shahab missiles, Iran, on the other hand, is uneasy about Turkey's growing strategic partnership with Israel. The most important issue which will dominate the relations is Iran's WMD capability and its development of long-range ballistic missiles, as reported in the 2002 National Security Policy Document, which cited Iran as the chief threat due to its development of WMD. Moreover, the increasing US tone against Iran, and Turkey's possible cooperation with the United States in such an undertaking makes Turkey a formidable target for Iran.

³³ Amin Tarzi, "Iran's Missile Tests Sends Mixed Messages," CNS Reports, August 15, 2000. <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/shehab.htm>.>

2.3.1.2. Iraq:

The discussion devotes attention to pre-war Iraq and post-war reconstruction process in order to provide the basis for an accurate analysis of Turkey's responses to the proliferation threat in its neighborhood, and to understand the current threats and issues.

Figure 2. Estimated Ranges of Iraq's Ballistic Missiles³⁴



³⁴ Proliferation Threat and Response, 2001, op.cit., p. 39.

In terms of the development and use of nuclear weapons, Iraq singled out as the most imminent threat to international security because of the Iraqi leadership under Saddam Hussein. Though Iraq might not directly target Turkey, the threat to use WMD in the Middle East is critical to Turkish security. Evidence of Iraq's WMD capability and its record in nonproliferation was alarming. It was estimated that Iraq could fabricate a nuclear weapon with sufficient amount of black market uranium or plutonium.³⁵ In addition, it had acquired special nuclear weapon-related equipment clandestinely. It had a large number of experienced nuclear scientists and technicians. Until halted by the Allied strikes and UNSCOM inspections, Iraq was believed to have an extensive nuclear weapon development program that began in 1972, involved 10,000 personnel and had a budget totaling \$10 billion.³⁶ It retained nuclear weapons design, and it might retain related components and software. Moreover, it was suspected that Iraq might retain a stockpile of biological and chemical weapon munitions.³⁷ After the War, Iraq leaned on developing chemical and biological warheads,³⁸ and it retained the know-how that would enable it to reconstitute much of its previous WMD capability, once UN sanctions and weapons inspections were lifted. A significant blow was inflicted on Iraq's ballistic missiles program during the Gulf War in 1991. Before the UN inspections, Iraq possessed Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas ballistic missiles, and it was reported to be capable of resuming its missile program, so it might still retain Scud-B and Scud-C missiles after the inspections.

³⁵ *Iraq-Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Missile Capabilities and Programs*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm>>

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ *ibid.*

Apart from possessing these capabilities, Iraq used chemical weapons in 1988 against its Kurdish population in Halabja, a small town near the Iranian border, and during the 1983-1988 against Iran. It also fired ballistic missiles against Iran during 1988. Iraq is a signatory to the NPT and the BTWC, which it signed in 1991 with US pressure. It did not sign the CWC. Iraq continuously violated its obligations under the NPT and BTWC, and the UNSC Resolution 687, which mandated the destruction of its WMD capability.

Turkey, like most of the other states in the immediate region and the periphery, was concerned about the Iraqi leadership, which sought developing a WMD capability to establish hegemony in the region. Saddam Hussein had the quest to be the first leader to have nuclear weapons in the Arab world. Apart from the Iraqi threat of WMD and their delivery means, Turkey might encounter the threat to use these weapons due to a number of issue areas with Iraq. Like Syria, Iraq has the problem over sharing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers with Turkey. The Iraqi support to Kurdish terrorist groups was an issue in the agenda, however, since Iraq had its own Kurdish problem, its support was not as strong as that of Syria. Despite the risks posed by the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein's leadership, Turkey was content with the disarmament of Iraq under UN control *in lieu* of a regime change effected by force, because the ruling regime was keeping the culturally and ethnically diverse Iraqis together and ensuring the regional balance that Turkey wanted to see.

Turkey's perceptions were based on a number of reasons: First, it saw a territorially and politically unified Iraq as a precondition for security and economic stability. Second, the memories of the 1991 Gulf War were still fresh in that Turkey did

not want to shoulder the same burden without concrete guarantees and economic aid to relieve the distress. Third, there was no immediate perception of a WMD threat. Turkey had assessed that Iraq would not use WMD against Turkey because Turkey could massively retaliate with its military power; however, the US aim to topple the Saddam Hussein regime could leave the use of WMD option open either against the United States or its allies. That is why, Turkey's response to an operation in Iraq has been lukewarm as part of the US campaign against terrorism. The impacts of the aftermath of the operation are landmark, which the thesis will look at very soon.

The 2003 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) inspections revealed that Iraq increased the range of its Al-Samoud missiles to 180 km, exceeding the 150 km-range limit. Moreover, there have been serious concerns about missing information in Iraq's weapons declaration to the UN. However, the United States had believed that the UNMOVIC/IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections would prove futile in detecting Iraq's WMD program due to Iraq's extensive network of concealment,³⁹ and that Iraq would not refrain from resorting to chemical and biological weapons during the war.

Pre-war Iraq's possession and use of WMD has highlighted two different issues for Turkey: Turkey's key role in US operations rendered it the closest available target of an Iraqi missile attack. An Iraqi decision to use ballistic missiles with chemical or biological warheads against Turkey would rest upon its assessment of Turkey's retaliation to such an attack. Turkey's most important advantage against the WMD threat

³⁹ Interviews with former UNSCOM inspectors, Dr. Victor Mizin and Mr. Timothy McCarthy of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002. Also see Ibrahim al-Marashi, "How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal*, Vol. 7, No.1, (March 2003). <<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a5.html>>. (April 1, 2003)

is its military force which is capable of operating over large distances in a short time.⁴⁰ This, in turn, constituted a strong element of deterrence against Iraq. In 1991, Iraq did not use WMD against Turkey during the Gulf War. In that context, one can argue that Iraq did not want to risk an all-out military response for a limited tactical advantage by using WMD. However, during the Iraq operation, Turkey was concerned that Saddam Hussein would not refrain from using WMD since the aim of the operation was to remove him from power.

The Iraq crisis impacted Turkey's strategic relationship with the United States in such a way that would affect Turkey's decisions in post-9/11 US security policy in the Middle East. The crisis caught Turkey between its political priorities in its region and its strategic relationship with the United States, in which both sides failed to understand and appreciate the underlying needs and concerns for their respective demands. Thus, Turkey gave much less support to the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom than the United States had foreseen, so relations have been marked by tension and suspicion.

Both allies are now in a process of elevating the relations to the pre-crisis level. In this process, the Bush administration made clear that mending the ties would not tolerate Turkey's deviation from US policies. By these remarks, the United States gave Turkey the message that "You are either with me, or will be alone while suffering the consequences of my undertaking." More specifically, while Turkey was trying to approach Iran and Syria in order to form a common front against the Iraqi Kurds, it also

⁴⁰ Some 500,000 fully equipped troops, the air power that recently added early warning and refueling aircraft, which increased the range and operational capability of the combat aircraft, (and the modernized navy with enhanced capabilities) give Turkey the assets and capabilities to invade parts of the enemy territory in a short time. Source: Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Defense Reform in Turkey," Istvan Gyarmati, Theodor Winkler, Mark Remillard and Scott Vesel (eds.) *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002, pp.143-144.

needs to pursue a cautious policy to mend its ties with its indispensable ally. Therefore, in post-9/11 US security policy in the Middle East, Turkey has little room for maneuver if it chooses not to work with the United States. This is going to be an important policy variable in assessing Turkey's security policy in the new era and its implications.

2.3.1.3 Syria:

Syria does not have nuclear weapons, but surveys indicate that it has the largest and most advanced chemical weapon capability in the Middle East. Syria received assistance from the former Soviet Union, North Korea and some Western European nations to develop advanced chemical warheads.⁴¹ In addition, Syrian experts were sent to some former Soviet Union republics and North Korea for training about the production of biological weapons and fixing chemical warheads to missiles.⁴² Turkey has been restive about the missile potential of Syria, which has Russian-made 200 SS-21 Scarab missiles that have a range of 120 km and 480 kg payload; up to 200 Scud-B missiles with 300 km range and 985 kg payload; 60-120 Scud-Cs with a 500 km range and 500 kg payload. Analysts agree that Syria considers Scud-C missiles to deliver chemical weapons in long-range.⁴³ Syria is also developing indigenous production capability for accurate M-9s, and it has recently increased its domestic ballistic missile production.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, *Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen*, New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002, p. 44.


⁴² Metehan Demir, "Türkiye Füze Tehditi Altında (Turkey Under Missile Threat)," *Hürriyet*, January 23, 1999, <<http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/99/01/23/dunya/01dun.htm>>

⁴³ Croddy, op.cit.

⁴⁴ David Fulghum, "Advanced Threats Drive Arrow's Future," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, October 12, 1998, p.56; *Syria-Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/syria.htm>> Also, see Syria's Scuds and Chemical Weapons, CNS Issue Brief on Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East <<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/syrscud.htm>>

Moreover, reports drew attention to the possibility that No-dong missiles, with a range of 1,000 km, which are being jointly produced by Iran and North Korea, would be installed in Iran and Syria.⁴⁵ If Syria based the No-dong missiles in Aleppo, they would even threaten İstanbul and other cities in western Turkey.

Figure 3. Estimated ranges of Syria’s Ballistic Missiles⁴⁶



Syria's missiles allow it to threaten all of Israel.

⁴⁵ Kemal Yurteri, “Turkish Military Commanders’ Meeting Noted,” *Yeni Yüzyil*, September 17, 1997, p.8.

⁴⁶ *Proliferation Threat and Response*, 2001, op.cit., p. 43.

Turkey's relations with Syria have been marked by numerous issues that could escalate into armed hostility, as was the case in 1998, when Turkey deployed troops in the Syrian border to coerce Syria to give up harboring the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Syria heeded, and its support to the PKK decreased considerably though not vanished completely after it signed the Adana Protocol with Turkey in October 1998 regarding security cooperation, in which it pledged to work with Turkey instead of challenging the latter with creating security threats. The death of the Syrian President Hafez al-Asad in 2000 also occupied Syria more with domestic politics. His successor, President Bashar al-Asad, redefined Syrian policy towards Turkey in a more cooperative mood and the two countries signed a number of cooperation agreements.

However, the issues that still remain unresolved continue to be the core of tension in Turkish-Syrian relations. These are the Syrian claims on the Hatay province in Turkish-Syrian border, and the problem over the use of the waters of Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which originate from Turkey and flow through Syria and then Iraq. Though Syria does not acknowledge, the Hatay issue is still part of the psyche of the Syrian unity. Syria has never accepted the plebiscite that led to the unification of Hatay with Turkey in 1939. Most maps in Syria include Hatay within the Syrian borders.

The water issue occupied the agenda for decades, and increasingly after late 80s and early 90s. Syria chose not to bring it to the table after 1998, but it is still quite uneasy about Turkey's advances with its Southeast Anatolia Development Project, which seeks to harness the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. Syria perceives Turkey as "controlling the tap" and that it could use

water as a weapon.⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, it had used the PKK card against Turkey to induce the latter to release more water from the Euphrates river. The issue is in stalemate after the meetings of Joint Technical Committee⁴⁸ came to a halt.

More importantly, for Syria, Turkey's strategic partnership with the United States and Israel is ominous. Thus, it has signed an agreement with Armenia in August 2001, and it is improving its ties with Russia.⁴⁹

2.3.2. Assessment

Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors, namely Iran and Syria, possess short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and have large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, leaving Turkey with a real WMD threat. Turkey has also incurred the threat of Iraqi retaliation with missiles and/or WMD during the war, and the US policies towards Iran and Syria only increase Turkey's concerns. The War on Iraq introduced new variables on the behavior of Turkey's WMD-capable neighbors: First, by being a US target, they will have nothing to lose, because the United States will come for both regime change and disarmament. Second, they will put their best effort to induce Turkey to refrain from helping the United States in order to gain more time and squeeze the latter. Third, they will not have a restraint to punish Turkey if it lends support to the United States in an operation against their country.

⁴⁷ These worries reached their peak when Turkey cut off the waters of the Euphrates river during the impoundment period of the Atatürk Dam in December 1989 and January 1990.

⁴⁸ Turkish and Syrian officials, as well as Iraqi counterparts met under Joint Technical Committee meetings, but the committee could not proceed with problematic issues since politics dominated the talks when parties could not agree on terms and definitions regarding the use of these waters. Turkey made a gesture to revitalize the technical talks between the two countries to address the water issue during the visit by the Syrian Prime Minister, Mustafa Miro in 2003, but no tangible move is at foresight.

⁴⁹ "Syria, Armenia Sign Military Accord," *Middle East Newslines*, Vol. 3, No. 346, August 29, 2001.

The above analysis demonstrated that capabilities and motivations do exist to constitute a real proliferation threat to Turkey; not necessarily due to the issue areas between Turkey and the possessors, but due to regional conflicts that can draw Turkey in one that was represented by the War on Iraq. At this juncture, the study will proceed towards the policies that Turkey needs to adopt and whether it took the necessary steps towards that end. To understand Turkey's needs, the study will first look at Turkey's deterrent and defense capabilities against the proliferation threat in its neighborhood, and then provide the policy options that are open in front of Turkey to address this threat.

Turkey's deterrent and defense capabilities

The current available data suggests that Turkey does not have sufficient defense systems to counter the threat of WMD and their delivery means- that is, sufficient passive and active defenses, and a strategy for countermeasures against a WMD attack involving or including ballistic missiles.⁵⁰ Turkey determined a countermeasure strategy in case of NBC contingencies as detecting and retaliating against facilities and launchers,⁵¹ however, these launchers are usually mobile and hard to detect, so this strategy does not provide adequate defense. In terms of passive defenses, the Turkish Armed Forces has an NBC School in Istanbul, and an NBC battalion composed of five companies and seven brigades in Adapazarı.⁵² The deficiencies in NBC passive defense equipment are being made up.⁵³

⁵⁰ Interviews with members of the Turkish military, who wanted to be cited anonymously.

⁵¹ K. Kirişçi, 1997, op.cit., p. 10.

⁵² In the context of civil passive defense activities, the NBC School gives training to the General Directorate of Civil Defense (which is under the Ministry of Interior), The Ministry of Health, State Airport Administration personnel, and the fire brigades of municipalities. Moreover, there are studies done by the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Affairs, States Institute of Statistics, the Institute of Turkish Standards, and the Institution for Scientific and Technological Research of Turkey/

Apart from its air force strike capability, Turkey's NATO membership with the ensuing security guarantee is the most important deterrent against threats emanating from the Middle East.⁵⁴ However, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Turkey felt that NATO's commitment was weakened. The 1991 Gulf War dramatically affected Ankara's Middle East policy in that some allies were reluctant to extend NATO's area of responsibility. Similarly, during the allied operation against Iraq, Ankara felt increasingly vulnerable when its demand for the operationalization of the NATO security guarantee led to prolonged debates and rifts in the Alliance. Before and during the War, Turkey worked on bolstering its defenses against Iraqi jets and missiles in case of an Iraqi retaliation during the operation in Iraq: Turkey's NATO allies sent Patriot missile batteries,⁵⁵ which were withdrawn after the end of the war. The talks with the United States and Israel on the procurement and production of missile defense systems are yet to be complete, the details of which will be given later in this study.

After the end of the war in Iraq, the United States started increasing its tone towards Iran and Syria for their WMD capability and alleged support to terrorism. The War on Iraq wounded the relations between Turkey and the United States, and the latter

the Marmara Research Center, ...etc. However, though these institutions have recorded strides in CBW defense, since there is no effective coordination among them, the impacts of their research have remained local, and could not attain the desired level. Derived from interviews with the members of the Turkish military, who would like to be cited anonymously.

⁵³ Karaosmanoğlu and Kibaroglu, op.cit., p. 144.

⁵⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, "US-Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership," in Kemal Kirişçi and Barry Rubin, eds., *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 95.

⁵⁵ NATO sent three Dutch ground-based air defense Patriot batteries and they were deployed in southeastern Turkey on March 1, 2003. Source: NATO Defensive Assistance to Turkey, NATO official website, <<http://www.nato.int/issues/turkey/index.htm>>; See Turkish Armed Forces statement on the operationalization of the Patriot batteries at NTVMSNBC: "Awacs ve Patriotlar Operasyona Hazir (The Awacs and Patriot Ready for the Operation)" *NTVMSNBC*, March 12, 2003: <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/205576.asp>>; During the war two more batteries were deployed in Turkey by the United States. Source: "The US to Deploy Patriot Missile Systems in Turkey," *NTVMSNBC*, March 13, 2003: <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/205757.asp>>

expects Turkey's support in its policy towards these countries. Turkey is working towards elevating the relations to the pre-war level, as it seems the only viable way to maintain its security within the post-9/11 undertakings of the United States. Thus, Turkey seems likely to cooperate with the United States, especially after its application caused controversy in NATO for an allied shield to protect Turkey in case of a regional war that includes its Middle Eastern neighbors.

The next section provides an analysis of Turkey's options for responses to the proliferation of WMD and missiles in the Middle East, and evaluates the current state of response.

CHAPTER III

THE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S RESPONSE TO WMD PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

This section provides a general framework of defense options as a response to military threats, and evaluates these options in terms of a number of criteria that would address the threat. Then, it looks at the responses that Turkey has already undertaken, and analyzes these policies to find out whether they directly address the threat.

Next section shows Turkey's options for response and assesses the pertinence of its current level of response towards proliferation in its neighborhood.

3.1. TURKEY'S POLICY OPTIONS OF RESPONSE

Military strategists envision three options for defense against a threat: passive defense, active defense and countermeasures. Active defense refers to efforts to prevent an attack, and passive defense includes measures and preparations in the target site to minimize the effects of such an attack. Countermeasures, on the other hand, are the

efforts or measures to prevent more attacks by the same assets and capabilities.⁵⁶ In this context, Turkey has a few options, which will be evaluated with the following criteria:

- Turkey's need to defend its population, civilian centers and infrastructure which are within the range of the ballistic missiles of its neighbors, coupled with the uncertainty created by international terrorism;
- Repercussions of a specific policy decision on Turkey's relations with its neighbors. This leads to Turkey's need to keep the balance in its regional and international relations;
- Financial circumstances of Turkey: Turkey is recovering from an economic crisis and needs to meet the goals of its economic program;
- Turkey's international commitments, such as the MTCR criteria that put certain limits on missile purchases and technology transfers;
- Effectiveness and sustainability of a specific policy decision: that the policy alternative directly addresses the issue and the undertakings within that policy can be sustained politically, economically and militarily; and
- To avoid becoming a target, e.g. of international terrorism, or in case of a regional war that Turkey is not directly involved.

Active defense: Involvement in missile defense systems.

Active defense against ballistic missiles refers to acquiring missile defense systems to intercept ballistic missiles before they reach their targets. Missile defense

⁵⁶ In this context, ballistic missile defense can be carried out by civil defense measures in the potential attack site, by efforts to intercept missiles such as cooperating with allies for a missile defense shield, and by countermeasures such as destroying material that is used in the attack. In general, an effective ballistic missile defense can be accomplished by putting into action all three-defense measures. See: Egeli, 1993, p. 100.

systems can be roughly grouped according to which phase of the missile trajectory they intercept the missile, that is, boost-phase, mid-course phase or terminal phase.⁵⁷ Accordingly, different missile defense systems function using different types of technology and with different requirements. More complicated systems and more sophisticated capabilities are necessary to destroy warheads able to carry NBC weapons. Missile defense systems are more than just the anti-ballistic missiles: they include surveillance satellites, radar systems, battle management, command, control and communication systems, etc. Thus, they are expensive and require cooperation with regional or international allies.

In 1999, the United States, and in 2003, NATO sent Turkey Patriot missiles⁵⁸ and three Dutch ground-based air defense Patriot batteries⁵⁹ respectively to offset the Iraqi missile threat. However, for the Turkish military, such a restricted lower tier system does not meet Turkey's requirements for defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, Turkey prefers a more general concept of ballistic missiles and defense systems,⁶⁰ one such as the Arrow Anti-ballistic missiles (ATBMs).⁶¹ The Turkish General Staff is participating in studies about the US missile defense project. Talks about missile defense systems are continuing with the United States and Israel at an increasing pace, especially after the post-9/11 US policy took shape in the Middle East. The details of these talks will be given soon in this study.

⁵⁷ In the literature the phases are also divided into five: Launch, boost-phase, coasting flight, re-entry, and impact.

⁵⁸ Bill Gertz, "US Sending Patriots to Turkey over Iraqi Missile Threat," *Washington Times*, January 16, 1999, p.2

⁵⁹ "NATO Defensive Assistance to Turkey: Operation *Display Deterrence*" NATO Official website, <<http://www.nato.int/issues/turkey/index.htm>>

⁶⁰ Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Army Defines New Missile Strategy," *Turkish Daily News*, Feb. 9, 2000.

⁶¹ For specifications, see *Arrow TMD*, Federation of Atomic Scientists: <<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/arrow.htm>>

Symmetric response: Acquire capabilities in kind.

Turkey has a few purchased or domestically produced surface-to-surface missiles, the Project-J and MGM-140/Army Tactical Missiles (ATACMs). Project-J missile is able to match the range of Scud-C while remaining within MTCR limits.⁶² Turkey decided to acquire such capabilities as a reaction to the more sophisticated capabilities of its Middle Eastern neighbors and for tactical purposes.

Military analysts⁶³ argue that Turkey's deployment of such missiles will not yield the desired deterrent effect, and, moreover, may have negative side effects. For example, after the 1991 Gulf War, ballistic missiles have become the symbol of attacks on civilians and of armament in excess of defense needs. The use of missiles in Operation Iraqi Freedom reinforced this perception. They argue that if Turkey continues with developing such missiles, this would tarnish its image in international forums, lead to other anti-Turkish campaigns, and more importantly would undermine efforts for the nonproliferation of these missiles in the region. In addition, Turkey is constrained in its development of ballistic missiles by the MTCR criteria that prohibit the production of missiles that exceed 300 km of range and a 500 kg of payload. The repercussions for Turkey's relations with its neighbors, particularly with Greece, would introduce new strains on issue areas,⁶⁴ and could trigger an arms race at the regional level.

The most important argument against the inclusion of ballistic missiles in the Turkish military inventory is that these systems are not cost effective, that is, they are expensive and suffer from tactical flexibility: They are costly to produce, but can be used only once unlike jetfighters which can perform a similar function along with other uses.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Egeli, 1993, op.cit, pp. 90-91.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Ballistic missiles have a strategic advantage of being difficult to intercept; however, this advantage is overwhelmed by the financial burden of their one time use. Since ballistic missiles form an offensive military capability, it is not possible to use them for defensive purposes, unlike fighter jets. And it should not be underestimated that Turkey has a relative superiority in terms of its air force vis-à-vis its Middle Eastern neighbors.⁶⁵

Asymmetric response: Threatening retaliation with different capabilities.

Turkey would adopt the strategy of “punishment” to deter attacks, by threatening retaliation with an overwhelming military response. Turkey allocates around 3% to 4.2% of its GDP to military expenditures,⁶⁶ and the Turkish military is among the biggest forces in the world,⁶⁷ which has been the country’s chief deterrent against threats from the Middle East. Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria do not have effective military forces, which led them to acquire and develop ballistic missiles. On the plus side, this policy would not put an additional burden on Turkey’s defense budget, which otherwise would be allocated for costly missiles or missile defense projects with yet to be resolved technical issues. However, Turkey’s population, civil centers and infrastructure would still remain vulnerable to an attack.

Passive defense: measures that aim to minimize the impacts of a missile or WMD attack.

In this context, Turkey can take civil defense measures such as preparation of potential attack sites, equipment to survive an attack and relevant education courses.

⁶⁵ “Regional Military Balance-Eastern Mediterranean-10,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment*, 28 June 2001.

⁶⁶ See Defense Expenditures as of Gross Domestic Product, NATO website: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/table3.pdf>>; Karaosmanoğlu and Kibaroglu, 2003, op.cit. pp. 155-156

⁶⁷ See CIA World Factbook online: <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>>

However, it is impossible to guarantee a high level of effectiveness due to the size and population of the country. An effective undertaking is also too costly and time-constrained in contingencies. Overall, passive defenses are necessary but insufficient measures.

Countermeasures: prevent similar attacks with the same assets and capabilities.

In case of a ballistic missile attack, Turkey defined a strategy to destroy WMD facilities and missile launchers, but its Middle Eastern neighbors have mobile launchers that are hard to detect and destroy. Other countermeasures include early warning and discovery platforms, augmenting the operational effectiveness of jetfighters with relevant equipment and making necessary arrangements in command and control systems. Like passive defenses, these measures are complementary, but not comprehensive.

Prevention approach:

To prevent an attack, Turkey can improve ties with its WMD- and missile-capable neighbors to decrease tension and the likelihood of conflict, or it can actively engage in nonproliferation regimes, especially those of export controls of missile technology and parts, fissile materials and dual-use items. Turkey is already a signatory to the relevant treaties and member of the groups working on export controls; however it does not have as much influence and standing as some other countries, like South Africa. Considering that the Turkish military is quite concerned about this issue, Turkey could attempt to become more effective in these regimes, particularly the MTCR and to convey its concerns in related platforms. Other measures can be to increase customs security at its

southeastern borders, to engage in diplomatic efforts to ease tensions with its Middle Eastern neighbors, and pursue cooperation in economic and/or technical matters. In fact, it adopted such a policy in its relations with Syria and Iran, and it tried to improve economic relations with Iraq despite the sanctions. The preventive approach is diplomatic aspect of defense policy, which is closer to that of the EU than the United States.

Turkey has already adopted the first two alternatives, that is, it started getting involved in missile defense projects, and started acquiring ballistic missiles, which is a policy that is closer to that of the United States. The Turkish defense industry aims to minimize its dependency on foreign powers and supports cooperation with allies for the procurement of state-of-the-art technology. Turkey seems to attain these objectives by both domestically producing missiles and working with allies.

This policy directly addresses the missile proliferation threat: Active defenses are the most effective responses to the threat or the actual use of missiles. Compared with Patriot anti-missile systems, Arrow ATBM technology would be a major asset in Turkey's military arsenal, for it does not have an equivalent. Thus, missile defense systems at Turkey's disposal would deter WMD and missile threats from the Middle East and in turn can facilitate Turkey's involvement in other regional security frameworks. Basically, Turkey's involvement in these projects with the United States is geared towards being included in such strategic ventures. The other side of the balance sheet cannot quite balance the positive aspects of involvement: Acquiring a missile defense shield that meets Turkey's needs is very expensive: Analysts identified 33 potential targets in Turkey, and assessed a defense system to protect all these targets. Their findings are at Table 1:

Table 1. The cost of total defense procurement (billion \$)⁶⁸

Complete Defense							
System	%80			%96			%99
	Lower layer	Higher layer	Boost phase	Low+ High	Low+ Boost	High+ Boost	Low+High +Boost.
PAC-3 Number of system	22			22	22		22
ARROW	8			8	8		8
THAAD		9		9		9	9
Airborne Laser			3-4		3-4	3-4	3-4
Procurement cost	14.1	4.5	2.25-3	18.6	16.3-17.1	6.75-7.5	20.85-21.6
Ten-year operation cost	2.6	0.9	5.5	3.5	8.1	6.4	9
Total cost	16.7	5.4	7.75-8.5	22.1	24.4-25.2	13.15-13.9	29.85-30.6

On the other hand, this policy heightens the risk of making Turkey a target, upsetting its neighbors and causing rifts in its security alliances. There are also technical issues in missile defenses yet to be resolved. Overall, considering that Turkey's strategic posture will increase by its involvement in missile defense projects and defense systems

⁶⁸ Osman Elmacı, "Türkiye'nin Füze Savunma Stratejisi (Turkey's Missile Defense Strategy)," Master's Thesis, Ankara: Turkish Military Academy, February 2003, p. 115.

procurement with the United States and Israel, Turkey’s current level of response is the most effective one to address the proliferation threat.⁶⁹ The next section will provide the details of Turkey’s response.

3.2. TURKEY’S RESPONSE

The Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel and the display of its chemical and biological weapon capability demonstrated Ankara that it needed to augment its defenses against Middle Eastern threats. Turkey has been engaged in efforts to bolster its defensive capabilities, and either purchased or domestically produced surface-to-surface missiles. These are shown in the table below:

Table 2. Missile Projects/Purchases

Countries	Missile projects/purchases	Current status
China	Project-J	Turkey developed the J-missile based on the Chinese M-7.
US	ATACMs	Under Foreign Military Sales agreements, Turkey purchased 120 ATACMs for \$132 million.

Project-J Missile:

The J missile is a ballistic missile developed by Roketsan with Chinese assistance. It is a collaborative venture between Roketsan and CPMIEC (China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation) under a contract of about \$360 million. Since it has a range of 150km, it is believed to be based on the technology from China’s M series of tactical missiles. The only known Chinese missile in the 150km performance is the CPMIEC M-

⁶⁹ Şebnem Udum, “Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4 No. 3, Fall 2003. (Forthcoming)

7/Project 8610 (CSS-8). Given the missile capabilities of Turkey's neighbors, it is possible that the announced range of 150km is less than the missile's maximum range.⁷⁰

Besides, it was reported that Turkey has already imported China's 280-300km-range DF-11/M11 (CSS-7), which is a solid propellant, single-stage missile, either as a complete system or a technology package. This missile could have formed the basis for a Project-J missile able to match the range of Scud-C while remaining within MTCR limits.⁷¹

MGM-140/ Lockheed Martin Army Tactical Missile Systems Block I (ATACMs):

In December 1995, the United States sold Turkey 120 ATACMs. These missiles have a range of 30-165 km and could be upgraded for a greater range.

In 2001, Turkey purchased ATACM Block I missiles, which is a long-range guided missile that provides immediate firepower. Its maximum range is 165km and it has a 560kg payload. It contains 950 M74 antipersonel/antimaterial submunitions. It was believed that the United States decided to sell ATACMs soon after the Project-J started: Unhappy with the Chinese assistance to Turkey and the pressure from Greece, the United States decided to sell ATACMs to Greece and provide the same missile to Turkey⁷²-presumably in order not to disrupt the strategic balance in eastern Mediterranean.

After the Gulf War of 1991, Turkey began to keep close watch on developments in the Middle East. The long-range missile development of Iran made Turkey increasingly anxious and led Ankara to contemplate a defense concept against long-range missiles. Thus, Turkey started to become interested in the US missile defense project and

⁷⁰ Utku Çakırözer, "Turkey Tests 'Project J' Missile," *Jane's Missiles and Rockets*, February 2002.

⁷¹ Ibid; Project-J is highly confidential and further information is not available in the short-run.

⁷² Utku Çakırözer, "Turkey Tests 'Project J' Missile," *Jane's Missiles and Rockets*, February 2002.

welcomed the Israeli offer to help establish a missile defense umbrella that would include the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system.⁷³ As part of a broader defense strategy, Ankara aims to participate in the production of Arrow-2 missiles, which have been developed jointly by the United States and Israel.

3.3. TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECTS

3.3.1 The Missile Defense Project of the United States:

Proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles is a global threat indeed. The end of the Cold War introduced the threat of missile launches by states with WMD capability, and efforts to defend against them ensued. The (National) Missile Defense (NMD) is the last project of the US plans to deploy a missile defense system to defend the homeland against ballistic missile attacks. In the 1960s, the United States employed ‘Sentinel’ or ‘Safeguard’ systems against the risk of a Soviet missile attack. During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan introduced ‘Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)’, dubbed “Star Wars”, that would render a Soviet strike on the United States ineffective. At the end of the Cold War, President Bush (Senior) and Russian President Boris Yeltsin started a program called ‘Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)’. However, the Clinton administration rejected the plan and started conducting research for building Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) that would protect US forces during military operations overseas (especially after the Iraqi Scud attacks in Gulf War). The threat of a deliberate attack from an emerging missile state, such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, became the

⁷³ Arie O’Sullivan, “Turkey Welcomes Joint Missile Defense Offer,” *The Jerusalem Post*, July 10, 2001, p. 1.

primary rationale for the deployment of missile defenses. Then, the administration committed itself to the development of a system capable of defending US territory against long-range missiles fired from different continents armed with NBC warheads. Lately, President G. W. Bush expanded the context as to provide security to allies and to deployed forces around the world.

On the economic front, the cost of the project, including protection for US allies, is some \$200 billion, for which the United States expects contributions from the involved states. However, European allies are reluctant to invest in the project because of several economic and political reasons. The project also faces some technical challenges. Originally, the (National) Missile Defense system was designed to destroy hostile missile warheads in the midcourse phase of the missile trajectory.⁷⁴ It featured the hit-to-kill intercept, in which interceptors would collide with the warhead and destroy it.⁷⁵ The challenge emerged in detecting the warhead, which might contain bomblets filled with biological or chemical agents as well as decoys. Thus, the hit-to-kill concept has proven to be very difficult to operationalize.⁷⁶

Therefore, the Bush administration articulated the “boost-phase missile defense,” whereby a ballistic missile would be destroyed during the boost-phase of its flight. It offers advantages over the mid-course intercept, such as the ability to destroy the entire

⁷⁴ The mid-course phase of a ballistic missile trajectory refers to the stage where the ballistic missile is burned out and has released its warhead, but the warhead has not yet re-entered the atmosphere.

⁷⁵ Actually, the main task was to be carried out by satellites, which would detect the exhaust cloud of the ballistic missile and track the missile with radars that would detect the warhead, and with a communication system, which would direct this information to a command center that would order the launch of ground-based interceptors. See Charles A. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “NMD and the Future of US Nuclear Policy,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 49-50.

⁷⁶ Andrew M. Sessler, John M. Cornwall, Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, Sherman Frankel, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, David C. Wright, *Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System*, (Cambridge, Mass: Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program, 2000), pp. 168-171, cited in Glaser and Fetter (2001).

missile payload (including the warhead and possible other decoys), to cause the missile to fall close to the launch site (thus resulting in little or no damage to the intended target), being able to detect and track the missile more easily (since a burning missile booster is brighter, larger, slower and more fragile than a warhead), and to be able to cover a much larger area than a midcourse defense (thus enabling the defense of US allies in Europe and Asia).⁷⁷ In addition, this system is technologically and financially more feasible than the proposed mid-course NMD system. The main difference of the boost-phase defense is that the system must be positioned near the opponent's launch site, either in neighboring countries or on ships patrolling nearby.⁷⁸

In the Middle East, regarding WMD and missile proliferation, Iraq and its leadership under Saddam Hussein was the primary concern of the United States. To destroy Iraqi missiles with surface-based boost phase interceptors would require favorable geography, and they could best be destroyed by interceptors based in southern Turkey. Therefore, the United States envisaged a role for Turkey in the Missile Defense project, that is, to provide necessary bases to deploy interceptor missiles in its eastern and southeastern regions to destroy ballistic missiles fired by Iran or pre-war Iraq soon after they are launched. For the United States, Turkey's cooperation is a priority matter for its new policy in the Middle East after 9/11. Apart from its material support, Turkey can give political support to Missile Defense in NATO in the sense that it straddles Europe and the Middle East and follows regional developments very closely,⁷⁹ thus it can explain

⁷⁷ Glaser and Fetter (2001), p. 53.

⁷⁸ Theodore Postol, "Hitting Them Where It Works," *Foreign Policy*, No. 117 (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 132-7; see Richard L. Garwin, "Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 30, No. 7 (September 2000), pp. 8-11.

⁷⁹ "Who is Afraid of Missile Defense?" *Wall Street Journal Europe*, July 10, 2000 < <http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2000/00-F42.html>>; "US Plans to Deploy Defense Missiles on Turkish Land," *Turkish*

the risks to European security better than any other European ally. The next section details Turkey's views about being involved in missile defense systems.

3.3.2. Turkey's Stance Towards Missile Defense:

Turkey's most notable response to missile proliferation threat in the Middle East has been to seriously consider involvement in missile defense projects. Turkey first learnt about (National) Missile Defense in 1997, and the Turkish General Staff and the Foreign Ministry evaluated the project jointly. In 1999, Turkish officials participated in simulation exercises and joined working groups formed by the US military authorities. They reached an assessment about the project reflecting Turkey's perceptions and stance, the main points of which follow.

First, in principle Turkey is in favor of the project. Considering the risks and threats in its neighborhood, Turkey is one of the countries that would need such a shield in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, Turkey remains concerned about the reactions in certain capitals to its involvement in the project. In particular, the missile defense strategy could lead to tensions with Russia and China. Thus, a US attempt to alleviate Russian concerns might result in a change in the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. While Russia favors a modification to serve its interests in the Caucasus region, Turkey wants to keep it intact due to the "exclusion zone" clause, which implicitly acknowledges Turkey's security interests in the Middle East.⁸⁰

Daily News, June 1, 2001; Ferai Tınç, "Yeni Savunma Mimarisinde Türkiye'nin Rolü, (Turkey's Role in the New Defense Architecture)," *Footnote /Hürriyet*, June 4, 2001, p.24.

⁸⁰ Turkey obtained "an exclusion zone" in the CFE negotiations. This zone designates the area not covered in the European security arena. Roughly, it covers Turkey's southeast Anatolian region. With this arrangement, Turkey has greater flexibility in its troop and equipment limits and military movements in its territory south and east of that zone. See Alan Makovsky, "New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy, *SAIS Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, (Winter-Spring 1999), footnote 11.

The related military advantage that would prompt Turkey to oppose a change is Turkey's new Land-Air Forces Doctrine, which took shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War of 1991. The Turkish military shifted its focus to its eastern and southern borders, and redeployed troops and military equipment. As a result of the rearrangement, "...the operational capability of the ground forces in combination with the air units g[a]ve Turkey the capability to conduct large-scale military operations deep into the territories of its southern neighbors, if need be for retaliatory purposes, in a considerably short time."⁸¹ Thus, involvement in the missile defense project should not limit Turkey's new doctrine, which constitutes a real deterrent for its neighbors.⁸² Overall, the establishment of such a system should not limit the capabilities of Turkey's own forces.

Turkey is also concerned about the reactions from regional capitals regarding Turkey's involvement in missile defense systems. Regional tensions between Turkey and its neighbors could lead to an arms race and polarization, which would create significant problems. In this respect, the attitude of Athens is particularly important: Greece perceives Turkey as its primary security threat and is therefore alarmed by any improvement in Turkey's military capabilities. A missile defense system established outside the framework of NATO would disrupt the military-strategic balance in Southeastern Europe, which would tempt Greece to employ countermeasures, particularly within the context of decisions regarding EU enlargement and European security. Turkey was especially cautious from June 2002 to June 2003, since Greece conducted the affairs

⁸¹ Kibaroglu "Turkey's Security Perceptions from the East...", op.cit.; Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey and Israel Strategize," *Middle East Quarterly*, (Winter 2002), Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 61-65.

⁸² Interview with Mustafa Kibaroglu by Saadet Oruc, "Missile Defense System: Swords Are Drawn?" *Turkish Daily News*, May 5, 2001.

related to European security and defense policy, and held the EU Presidency from January to June 2003. Considering that Athens is already uneasy about the growing Turkish-Israeli partnership in defense matters, Ankara expected Greece to use all available means to apply pressure.

In general, Turkey would prefer a missile shield be created as a project of the North Atlantic Alliance in which all NATO members would participate on the basis of the 1998 NATO-approved plan to include a layered missile defense as part of NATO's military operations. Turkey would not like to see a rift develop in NATO as a result of the missile defense issue. Specifically, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has urged the government to focus on joining a missile cooperation umbrella provided by NATO (or in a European framework). On the other hand, the Turkish military feels that it is very convenient to obtain a missile defense system from either Israel or the United States,⁸³ which is why Turkey is increasing its involvement with these states in a Middle Eastern TMD project. For Turkey, TMD is rather a long-term need.⁸⁴ Turkey's missile defense architecture is composed of systems for land-based early-warning and tracking as well as command and control. "...Turkey's missile defense concept envisages expanding its capabilities with the deployment of theater missile defenses (TMD) with a view to protecting all military, economic and strategic targets together with the entire population in the country."⁸⁵

Therefore, Turkey has some reservations about whether the missile shield would also protect Turkey and how important Turkey's defense would be in the overall missile defense strategy. Former Deputy Chief of Staff (Ret.) Gen. Çevik Bir explained this

⁸³ "Israel, Turkey, US Agree to Launch Missile Cooperation," *Middle East Newline*, June 18, 2001.

⁸⁴ Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "US Hosts First Tri-Party TMD Meeting," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, Dec. 20, 2000.

⁸⁵ Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Security Perceptions from the East..." op.cit.

position by arguing that if the boost-phase intercept program w[ould] be able to neutralize short- and medium- range missile threats against Turkey, then Turkey w[ould] be willing to give support to the project. “However, if [this] capability is aimed at [intercepting] only long-range missiles, the proposed system may not complement Turkey’s missile defense architecture and a ‘positive approach to the issue’ may become impossible.”⁸⁶ Bir also recommends that “...top US officials brief Turkey on this project on a ‘first-hand basis’.”⁸⁷

A related important question for Turkey is whether it will have the right to use the missile defense system in defense of its national interests, an issue of command and control. This question remains whether Turkey is involved in a missile defense system under a NATO umbrella or part of a theater missile defense system in the Middle East. In the first case, different threat perceptions concerning the European capitals would be one of the main stumbling blocks facing effective command and control. The second case, which seems more likely than the former, would have negative repercussions in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey were to be given command and control. On the other hand, to deny Turkey this right would create doubts about the viability of involvement.

By ending the post-Cold War period, the 9/11 attacks have had a serious impact on Turkey’s stance towards missile defense involvement. First, Turkey has started to include terrorism as an important variable in its decision to allow American military equipment to be deployed in its territory. Second and related to the first one, after 9/11, the Turkish military decided to slow down the pace of missile defense cooperation with Israel and the United States. Third, considering the cost of the project, Turkey did not

⁸⁶ Ret.Gen. Çevik Bir, “Whom Will the US Missile Shield Protect?” *Ulusal Strateji (National Strategy)*, (September-October 2001), pp. 50-51.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

find it appropriate to spend billions of dollars on missile defenses during its recovery from an economic crisis. On the other hand, the United States urged Turkey to deploy missile defense batteries for the operation in Iraq. The discussions regarding that request reinvigorated talks with the United States and Israel regarding anti-ballistic missile systems.

Turkish defense officials have reportedly determined that Turkey needs a sophisticated missile defense system, like the US-Israeli joint production Arrow anti-ballistic missiles to, defend vast territories, as opposed to other systems capable of defending only relatively small areas.⁸⁸ Thus, the acquisition of the Arrow ATBM system has started to constitute a significant part of Turkey's strategic planning. However, rather than simply buying the Arrow systems, Turkey prefers to participate in their co-production in order to establish a certain infrastructure on anti-ballistic missile technology. So, a process of detailed discussions began with the United States and Israel on missile technologies and architecture. The next section will provide the details of these discussions.

3.3.3. Strategic Cooperation: Talks with Israel and the United States:

Turkish security analysts agree that effectively countering the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles requires enhancing Turkey's air power, for which it is necessary to procure advanced assets and modernize the existing military equipment of the Turkish Air Force. Due to its "poor human rights records," Turkey encountered difficulties in purchasing military hardware from Europe. Therefore, it turned to the

⁸⁸ Lale Saribrahimoglu and Greg Seigle, "USA and Turkey Will Talk on Arrow 2 Missile," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, November 17, 1999, p. 3.

United States and Israel, and developed strategic relationships to address common security challenges in the Middle East. Turkey and Israel signed a military cooperation agreement which includes, *inter alia*, strategic cooperation and preparations against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the threats posed by countries such as pre-war Iraq and Iran.

Turkey's defense circles have a number of reasons to prefer Israeli defense industries. They cite certain advantages, such as high-level, US-based technology, a willingness to share information and benefits from development, and readiness to involve Turkish firms in the production process.⁸⁹ Israel and Turkey have signed nearly two-dozen defense cooperation, free trade, and military training agreements since 1993. Military agreements between the two countries allow Israeli pilots to train in Turkey's vast air space, provide Turkey with reliable access to sophisticated Israeli and US-produced weapons systems, and enhance Israel's ability to collect intelligence on Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Overall, the deterrent power and maneuverability of both states significantly increased as a result of this strategic cooperation.

Israel perceives Iran as the biggest threat in the region with its Shahab series of missiles. Thus, it seeks an ambitious system to counter the ballistic missile threats emanating from Iran. This requires a layered defense that includes the Arrow ATBMs for intercepting incoming ballistic missiles⁹⁰ and a boost-phase intercept element to detect

⁸⁹ "PM to Turkey Today for Strategic Talks," *Ha'aretz*, Aug. 28, 2000.

⁹⁰ "The Arrow-2 system can detect and track incoming missiles as far away as 500 km and can intercept missiles 50-90 km away. The Arrow-2 uses a terminally-guided interceptor warhead to destroy an incoming missile from its launch at an altitude of 10-40 km at nine times the speed of sound." See Arrow TMD, FAS. <<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/arrow.htm>>

and destroy mobile launchers.⁹¹ Turkey needs a medium and long-range missile defense system against Iranian missiles.

In 1988, the United States and Israel began to develop the Arrow series of ATBMs. The Arrow-2 missile is intended to defend Israel's military assets and civilian centers as well as to support the US technology base requirements for advanced technologies "...that could be incorporated into the US theater missile defense systems."⁹² In 1998, the head of Israel's Ministry of Defense Export Department (SIBAT) and Israel's deputy for defense industries signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Turkey's Ministry of Defense, for the two countries to study jointly Turkey's need for an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system based on the US-Israeli Arrow ATBM."⁹³ Since the beginning of 2001, the United States has actively participated in the talks Turkey and Israel have engaged on the idea of establishing a joint missile defense shield.⁹⁴

Assessing the threat in its immediate neighborhood and conscious of its geopolitical significance, Ankara has pressed Washington since 1998 for formal missile defense cooperation with Israel based on the Arrow system.⁹⁵ Though Israel and Turkey had agreed in principle to the joint production of Arrow missiles, the United States opposed Turkey's involvement on the basis of the MTCR limitations⁹⁶, because it faced

⁹¹ Arie O'Sullivan, "Arrow Downs Missile," *Jerusalem Post*, Sep. 15, 2000.

⁹² Arrow TMD, *Federation of Atomic Scientists*, <<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/arrow.htm>>

⁹³ David Eshel and Selçuk Emre, "Turkey, Israel to Cooperate in Missile Defense System," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, April 29, 1998, p. 3.

⁹⁴ Metehan Demir and John Morrocco, "Israel, Turkey Eye Joint Missile Shield," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, July 16, 2001, p. 38.

⁹⁵ Efraim Inbar, "The Israeli-Turkish Entente," *The Jerusalem Post*, July 9, 2001, p. 8.

⁹⁶ "The MTCR applies different export control policies to the most sensitive items (Category I) and to other items that will generally be approved for export unless they contribute to Category I items (Category II). Category I consists of complete rocket and UAVs" that exceed 500 kg payload and 300 km of range, including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, cruise missiles, etc.... "Prohibitions apply to the transfer

the challenge of transferring capabilities without releasing the technologies for manufacturing them.⁹⁷ As a result, Turkey and Israel agreed on the development of a new missile, which would resemble the Arrow, but would comply with the MTCR criteria.⁹⁸ Until 2001, the United States continued to oppose Turkey's participation in the joint production of Arrow missile systems.⁹⁹

In late 1999, Turkey proposed that the missile defense system project be developed within NATO to defend against threats emanating from the Middle East. The United States in turn expressed that it would be more fruitful to conduct the work in a bilateral framework.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, a US-Turkish bilateral working group on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) was established and Turkish officers participated in simulation exercises as part of this process.

Parallel to the development of strategic cooperation with Israel, it was reported that Turkish military and civilian strategists tackled missile defense systems against the threat from the Middle East. One group supported acquiring an offensive missile

of complete production facilities or a complete production technology for Category I items. (...) A 'strong presumption to deny' transfers applies to all Category I items regardless of purpose." Source: Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, *Deadly Arsenals*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 403-404

⁹⁷ Arrow TMD, op.cit.

⁹⁸ "Turkey, Israel to Jointly Produce Arrow Missiles," *Xinhua*, December 23, 1997; Metehan Demir, "Turkey, Israel Agree to Produce Arrow Missiles," *Turkish Daily News*, December 24, 1997; Metehan Demir, "Turkey and Israel to Cooperate on New Missile Project," *Turkish Daily News*, April 20, 1998; "Israel Confirms TDN Report: Ankara, Tel Aviv Agree On New Missile," *Turkish Daily News*, April 24, 1998.

⁹⁹ "Israel, Turkey, US Agree to Launch Missile Cooperation," *Middle East Newslines*, June 18, 2001.

Meanwhile, Israel continued to lobby the United States to include Turkey in the Arrow production program only to receive a negative reply from the United States each time Source: Demir and Morrocco (2001), p. 38. The underlying reason was that the United States has tried to avoid a move that would upset the already tense relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. That position was also exemplified in 1998, when the United States exerted pressure on Israel to delay the sale of Popeye missiles to Turkey, because the United States was convinced that they would be deployed to F-16 and F-4 fighter aircraft against the S-300 missiles that were purchased by Cyprus. See Raviv Drucker, "US 'Pressure' Holds Up Israeli Missile Sale to Turkey," *Ma'ariv*, July 20, 1998, p. 15.

¹⁰⁰ "ABD, NATO Önerisi'ne Karşı" (The US Against the NATO Option), *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1999.

system.¹⁰¹ Another group preferred continuing to develop an antiballistic missile system with the United States bilaterally, while still another favored joining an ongoing anti-missile project within NATO. The last group opposed the idea of a limited anti-missile system, and instead proposed the development of a quadripartite regional antiballistic missile system, involving Turkey, Israel, Jordan and the United States. The common denominator among all these views was to obtain defensive systems of antiballistic missiles in cooperation with the United States and Israel.¹⁰²

Realizing that the Arrow missiles would constitute a major asset in its military arsenal, Turkey preferred to deepen the strategic ties with Israel. Finally, the then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Edip Başer, announced Turkey's preference for a regional antiballistic missile system at the High-Level Defense Group meeting with US officials in Washington in April 2000.¹⁰³ Previously, the Foreign Ministry had diverged from the position of the General Staff, worrying that it would make Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors uncomfortable, until Iran successfully tested its 1,300 km range Shahab-3 missile in July 2000.¹⁰⁴

As a result, Israel, Turkey and the United States held TMD meetings in December 2000 in Washington and in summer 2001 in Tel Aviv. Turkey stressed the importance of missile defense and described the missile threat in the region as real and potentially very dangerous. It should be noted that Israel and Turkey perceive Iran as the most imminent threat, while, for the United States, it was Iraq. Turkey emphasized that the system should also enhance Turkey's security or it would not consent to becoming a target by deploying

¹⁰¹ Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkish Military Splits on Ballistic Missile Defense," *Turkish Daily News*, January 18, 2000.

¹⁰² Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Where Does Turkey Stand in the Race?" *Yeni Binyıl*, July 17, 2000, p. 18.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ "İran'dan Şahab-3 Açıklaması" (The Shahab-3 Explanation from Iran), *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 2000.

the system. The United States assured Ankara that it would provide assistance to build a missile to alleviate Turkey's regional concerns, while deploying longer-range missiles in Turkey to address US concerns.¹⁰⁵ Thus, it was intended that the TMD would be a part of a larger missile defense.¹⁰⁶ However, the 2001 financial crisis affected Turkey's defense budget and led to delays or reschedules in various projects, among them missile defense.¹⁰⁷

In June 2001, Israel, Turkey and the United States reached an understanding on trilateral cooperation regarding missile defense for the first time.¹⁰⁸ In the meantime, various reports cited Turkish intelligence reports, which indicated that Iran's development of its Shahab series of missiles had reached an alarming level, and that the CIA further warned Turkey and Israel about the missile capabilities of Iran and Iraq. The Turkish military also issued a new national security policy statement that supported developing ties with Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors.¹⁰⁹

After the events of 9/11, it was reported that officials from the Turkish military and the Foreign Ministry, and several academics reevaluated Turkey's participation in the US Missile Defense project, especially in light of the fact that the attacks increased Turkey's geo-strategic significance. The military urged the adoption of a more cautious

¹⁰⁵ The prevailing mood is that the United States has financial leverage on Turkey to make it contribute to the Missile Defense. See Saadet Oruç (2001).

¹⁰⁶ Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Israel to Host Turkey and the US for Second Missile Meeting: Cooperation Represents Regional Dimension of Missile Defense System," *Turkish Daily News*, June 5, 2001.

¹⁰⁷ Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkish Forces Face Budget Cuts," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, March 21, 2001; Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkey considers shelving projects," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, April 11, 2001.

¹⁰⁸ They agreed to begin with the development of early-warning alert systems, and to deploy an anti-missile defense system in Turkey, which would be either the Arrow system or a hybrid with the US PAC-3, including a joint production of components and subsystems. Source: "Israel, Turkey, US Agree to Launch Missile Cooperation," *Middle East Newslines*, 18 June, 2001.

¹⁰⁹ Demir and Morrocco (2001), p. 38; Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkey's Armed Forces Revise Threat Analysis," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, August 21, 2001; Metin Erksan, "Türkiye'ye Yönelik Füzeler (The Missiles Directed at Turkey)" *Kalem/Cumhuriyet*, September 4, 2001, p. 11; "İran'ın Füze Menzilindeyiz (We Are Within Iran's Missile Range)" *Star*, August 29, 2001, p. 13.

approach in order not to become a target of international terrorism or to upset Turkey's neighbors. They argued that Iran, Iraq and Syria have always been a potential threat, but that at that time, there was no imminent threat emanating from the region. The National Security Council instructed Turkey to wait for the new US policy in the region, and that if Turkey decided to join such a system, it must do so without being totally dependent on the United States.¹¹⁰

In the beginning of 2002, officials from Turkey and Israel met in Ankara and Tel Aviv for Arrow ATBM project talks to make progress towards jointly producing Arrow-2 missiles. During these meetings, it was reported that they agreed to meet periodically to discuss and advance the project.¹¹¹ Following the meeting, the Turkish Armed Forces adopted the "Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept" as part of plans to establish a National Space Board, which would form the legal basis for Turkey's efforts to acquire ballistic missile systems. In March 2002, Turkey and the United States completed the first phase (security concerns until 2005) of a bilateral missile defense study designed to identify Turkey's defense needs and the system(s) that could best meet them, and they entered the second phase, which would examine scenarios up to 2010 and then to 2015.¹¹² As of 2003, Turkey and Israel are working on the procurement of Arrow missiles

¹¹⁰ "Ankara focuses on Missile Shield Project," *Sabah*, 13 September 2001, p.13.

¹¹¹ Metehan Demir, "Israel, Turkey to Start Arrow 2 Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, Jan. 6, 2002.; "Turkey, Israel To Resume Talks for Arrow Missiles," *Defense News*, January 9, 2002.

<http://www.middleeastwire.com/turkey/stories/20020109_2_meno.shtml>; Stewart Penney, "Missile Defense, Turkey Seeks Israeli Arrow," *Flight International*, Feb. 12, 2001, p. 16; Metehan Demir, "Turkey, Israel Hold Security Meetings," *Jerusalem Post*, February 28, 2002.

¹¹² Reportedly, the studies examined the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) short-range theater defense missile, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Arrow-2 theater anti-ballistic missile defense system. Source: Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkey Adopts Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, March 27, 2002.

bilaterally, since the systems are no longer produced jointly by the United States and Israel, but only by the latter; so the deal is expected to be finalized by the two.¹¹³

In the meantime, *the Jerusalem Post* reported that Turkish anxiety increased after intelligence reports of Iran's missile tests to extend the range of its Shahab-3 and its development of the Shahab-4, which had reached alarming levels.¹¹⁴ In response to Iran's Shahab-3 missile test in June 2002, the Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hüseyin Diriöz, stated that Turkey brought its sensitivity to the attention of Iran.¹¹⁵ In August 2002, Turkey issued the new Security Policy Document, which focused on threats from Turkey's neighbors with the largest missile and WMD programs in the region, and cited Iran as the chief military threat.¹¹⁶

As the war trumpets in Iraq raised debates about defenses against WMD and missile attacks in July 2002, American experts came to Turkey to work on the US missile defense project. They discussed the prospect of deploying PAC-2 anti-missile systems in Turkey, and urged Turkey to increase its defenses of strategic and industrial facilities.¹¹⁷ The United States gave Turkey classified briefings on Iraqi threats, and urged it to deploy surface-to-air missile batteries.¹¹⁸ Thus, Turkey stepped up efforts to counter the ballistic

¹¹³ M. Demir, January 6, 2002, op.cit; Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Israel to Brief on Arrow-2," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 16, 2002. Also confirmed by Israeli officials who would like to be cited unanimously.

¹¹⁴ Metehan Demir and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Turkish Intelligence: Iran to Start Building Long-Range Missile," *Jerusalem Post*, May 15, 2002.

¹¹⁵ "Turkey Expresses Concern Over Iranian Missile Test," *Turkish Daily News*, June 6, 2002.

¹¹⁶ "Düşman Önceliği Değişiyor mu? (Is the Ranking of Hostile Countries Being Revised?)" *Milliyet*, August 2, 2002, p. 14; "Turkey, Syria Sign Military Training Technical Cooperation Agreement," *NTV*, June 19, 2002; "Iran, Iraq are in: Syria is out in Turkish Threats," *Middle East Newslite*, Vol. 4, No. 290, 2002.

¹¹⁷ "US Helps Turkey Prepare for Offensive against Iraq," *Geostrategy-Direct.com*. <http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/secure/2002/8_13/2.asp>; "Türkiye'ye Patriot Füzesi (Patriot Shield for Turkey)," *Hürriyet*, July 31, 2002, p. 20.

¹¹⁸ "US Helps Turkey Prepare for Offensive against Iraq," *Geostrategy-Direct.com*. <http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/secure/2002/8_13/2.asp>

missile threat for the operation in Iraq,¹¹⁹ and deployed eight early-warning systems on the border against Iraqi missiles and jets.¹²⁰ The Turkish General Staff (TGS) also prepared a wish list of equipment, in which the establishment of a regional missile defense system came second (after attack helicopters and military assistance) without a specific name for the missile.¹²¹

It has become increasingly clear that Turkey needs and demands a shield against the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East. It is believed that after Iraq, the next target of US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 is likely to be Iran, and an Iranian retaliatory attack on Turkey can have more devastating impact than that from Iraq, taking into account the NBC capabilities of Iran. Therefore, Turkey's need for a medium and long-range missile defense system becomes clearer.

Sıtkı Egeli underlines that all types of defenses should be employed in order to provide the most accurate defense against missile threat.¹²² Thus, Turkey needs to undertake other complementary measures and policies to have adequate defenses. However, even at this stage, Turkey's overall response to address prominent threats emanating from the Middle East introduces policy problems in other aspects of Turkish foreign policy, namely for its relations with the EU. This issue was first highlighted by Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, in his article "Turkey's Security Perception from the East: A Roadblock in its March Toward the West?" The remainder of this study devotes particular attention to his findings, and aims at addressing the issues identified by Dr. Kibaroğlu. To understand the underlying reasons of the apparent problem, the following

¹¹⁹ "Israel Reportedly Proposes to Sell Missile Defense System to Turkey," *NTV*, October 8, 2002.

¹²⁰ Ercan Yavuz, "Barajlara Füze Kalkanı" (Missile Shield for the Dams), *Akşam*, October 21, 2002, p. 16.

¹²¹ Burak Ege Bekdil, "Turkey Drafts 31.9 Percentage Increase in 2003 Defense Budget," *Defense News*, October 23, 2002.

¹²² Egeli, *op.cit.* p. 100.

chapter will tackle this issue in depth by first looking at the background of relations between Turkey and the EU, their current status, and the challenge that Turkey's response to threats from the Middle East will pose to the course of these relations. The aim of the last chapter is to determine policies that would satisfy the needs, and alleviate the concerns of both Turkey and the EU, that is, to attain win-win solutions.

CHAPTER IV

IMPACTS OF TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY ON ITS ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

4.1. BACKGROUND OF TURKISH-EU RELATIONS

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, integration with Europe has been the state policy and objective as an inertial extension of the Turkish quest to be part of Europe, which dated back to the 19th century. Becoming a part of the modern, industrialized world represented by Europe was a goal set by the founders of the country. M.K. Atatürk defined Turkey's leaning as "reaching the level of contemporary civilizations" by which he meant the modern world that referred to Europe. For Turkey, being "European" not only refers to working together with the Europeans in the political, economic and security domain, but also it is a matter of identity that will be certified by membership in the "Club of Europeans".

After the end of World War II and the onset of polarization, Turkey chose the West since its geography does not let itself to remain non-aligned; and it remained apart from the politics of the Middle East. It became a member of NATO, the Council of

Europe, the OECD and the CSCE/OSCE. As a following step, Turkey wanted to work with the European Communities (EC) soon after their establishment in 1957 with the Rome Treaties, and it filed its application in 1959.

The Ankara Agreement, which was signed in 1963 and entered into force in 1964, established an association between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC), which envisaged a progressive establishment of a Customs Union (CU) and aimed at Turkey's full membership to the EC/EU. The Additional Protocol of 1970 provided the details of how the CU would be set up.

1980s were a period of a series of changes in Turkey. Turkey shifted to liberal economy, and wanted to be closer to the European Community (EC). It applied for membership in 1987. In 1989, the European Commission declined the application, but deferred it for more favorable circumstances. The end of the Cold War propelled Turkey's aspiration to be a part of EU enlargement because of three main reasons: First, having been a member of the western camp and shouldering the European security and defense in NATO's southern flank, it was natural for Turkey to demand being included in the new European architecture to which it contributed. Second, the Ankara Agreement acknowledges the prospect of Turkey's full membership in the EU. Third, and related to the first, is the consolidation of Turkey's identity as a European country instead of one that could be drawn into Middle Eastern politics in the post-Cold War era, and broadly for political and economic stability in the country.

In 1997, the Commission reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership, but excluded it from the enlargement process, and cited a number of political issues as pre-conditions for propelling the relations. Turkey perceived it as discriminatory and the

relations were strained when Turkey did not participate in the inaugural meeting of the European Conference in March 1998.

The year 1999 was one of important developments: Turkey and Greece established a dialogue by the initiative of their respective foreign ministers. These dialogues were mainly initiated after relations were strained due to the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya; and they continued after the earthquakes in Turkey and in Greece in late 1999, when both countries were among the first to send search and rescue missions or to extend other kinds of help to each other. The United States was the mediator to ease Turkish-Greek relations after the Öcalan crisis: The then State Department Special Coordinator, Thomas Miller visited Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in early March 1999. Before the visit, Greek newspapers reported some Greek gestures, like giving up the veto against Turkey's EU financing or discuss cooperation packages conditional on Turkey's specific steps either in the Aegean or Cyprus.¹²³

Also, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis and Foreign Minister Yorgos Papandreou pondered over a politico-diplomatic initiative to normalize relations with Turkey, such as meetings of respective foreign ministers, even a visit by the Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey,¹²⁴ which actually took place in early 2000. Miller's visit was mainly about the Cyprus issue, and he also conveyed Ankara the message that a crisis atmosphere with Greece is not sustainable for the resolution of issues.¹²⁵ In May 1999, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem sent his Greek counterpart a letter that called for

¹²³ Kostas Venizelos, "Fire Fighting Activities by Americans," *O Filelevtheros (FBIS)*, March 7, 1999, p.1.

¹²⁴ Nikos Marakis, "Athens Counterattack an All Open Issues," *To Vima tis Kiriakis (FBIS)*, February 28, 1999, p. A14.

¹²⁵ Kostas Venizelos, "Fire Fighting Activities by Americans," *O Filelevtheros (FBIS)*, March 7, 1999, p.1.

an effort to solve problems in Turkish-Greek relations, proposing an agreement between Ankara and Athens to fight against terrorism, and stated that Ankara was open for dialogue.¹²⁶ June 1999 was the first meeting of the colleagues in New York¹²⁷, and the ensuing dialogue reflected on the politics within the EU towards Turkey.

Then, the United States applied pressure on European capitals not to alienate Turkey from Europe, and some European states took initiatives to bring Turkish and the EU officials together. As a result of these efforts, Turkey was officially declared a candidate for full membership to the EU at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, and a new period started in Turkish-EU relations.

Post-Helsinki period basically refers to the expectation from Turkey to accomplish its best for eventual EU membership. Candidate states have the obligation of meeting the Copenhagen criteria which state that membership requires:

- that the candidate State has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,
- the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union,
- the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.¹²⁸

Apart from declaring Turkey a candidate, the 1999 Helsinki European Council

Conclusions also stated that:

...the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ “Yunanistan için Son Şans, (Last Chance for Greece)”, *Hürriyet*, 2 June 1999, p. 20.

¹²⁷ Satiris Sidheris, “The Secret Papandreou-Cem Discussion,” *Exousia (FBIS)*, July 6, 1999, p.4.

¹²⁸ Copenhagen European Council Conclusions, 21-22 June, 1993 :

<www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement_new/european_council/pdf/cop_en.pdf>

¹²⁹ Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999,

<<http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm>>

Thus, Turkey's goal now is the fulfillment of the accession criteria-especially the political criteria in order to begin the accession talks. These accession criteria include, among others, short and medium term political and economic criteria, for which Turkey should go through a number of reforms. The pre-accession strategy includes an Accession Partnership, which was drawn up on March 8, 2001, and then in May 2003, in order to stimulate and support these reforms in Turkey, and a National Program (March 19, 2001) on the part of Turkey for the adoption of the *acquis*. Now that Turkey's primary task is meeting these criteria, there is a high expectation that Turkey should do its best to start the accession talks as early as possible.

Turkey has undertaken a number of important steps towards this end. The most significant ones have been amendments in the Constitution in order to improve human rights situation in Turkey, to strengthen the rule of law and to restructure democratic institutions. Following that, the Turkish Parliament adopted a new Civil Code, to improve the freedom of association and the right to assembly, as well as gender equality and child protection. These efforts for reform were enshrined in three legislative packages: The February and April 2002 legislative packages amended various legislations to further the freedoms of expression, press, association and peaceful assembly. The third legislative package of August 2002 introduced sweeping reforms, *inter alia*, the abolition of the death penalty and lifting legal restrictions on individual cultural rights. The new Turkish government prepared other legislative packages, related to reinforcing the reform process, eliminating the ambiguities with respect to the implementation of these reforms, and one about human rights.

The EU opened up accession negotiations with all candidates, but Turkey since the latter “...does not yet meet the political conditions.”¹³⁰ Turkey engaged in a public relations campaign before the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 to get a “date” from the EU in order to start accession talks. Turkey was given a “date” at the Copenhagen European Council Conclusions for the evaluation of its progress with the accession criteria. It was agreed that accession negotiations may begin from December 2004, if the Council decides that Turkey have fulfilled the political criteria, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission to that effect.

The May 2003 Accession Partnership Document of the European Council drew attention to the European Commission regular reports on the performance of the candidate countries, and listed the priority tasks that should be undertaken by Turkey in the period of 2003/2004, along with those whose completion would take more than one year. Framed under enhanced political dialogue and political criteria, these priorities, include, *inter alia*, the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, resolution of outstanding border disputes, ratification of international agreements related to human rights and their implementation, guaranteeing cultural rights, “[a]dapt[ing] the functioning of the National Security Council in order to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States,” and aligning the functioning of State security courts...¹³¹ The March 2001 Accession Partnership document also highlighted “...align[ing] the constitutional role of the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body to the [g]overnment in accordance with the practice of the EU [m]ember

¹³⁰ Enlargement-Introduction, EU Official Website, <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm>> (September 1, 2002)

¹³¹ Council Decision of May 19, 2003, on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, Official Journal of the European Union L 145/40 (2003/398/EC), June 12, 2003.

[s]tates,”¹³² in that the military should serve the civilian administration in order to ensure the democratic functioning of the NSC.

The role of the military in the NSC is the least flexible to comply with the political criteria due to Turkey’s domestic political structure and its geopolitical status. It will be one of the main bones of contention between Turkish-EU relations, particularly, because of the perceived challenges to state and regime security in Turkey: What ensure social and territorial integrity of Turkey are the principles of nationalism and secularism, and mechanisms in action to restore the balance whenever these principles are challenged. Specifically, granting rights to diverse groups based on ethnicity or religion are perceived as potential threats to the regime in Turkey. In this sense, it is the Turkish military which intervenes to restore this balance, especially in fighting against secessionist terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.

The EU recalls the February 28, 1997 decisions by the National Security Council, which started a process that led to the end of the Welfare Party coalition government.¹³³ That is why, the EU sees that the status of the military in the National Security Council should be such that the military should be under civilian control, and not vice versa. The national polls always place the military as the most reliable institution. Moreover, even if Turkey records strides in realizing the priority tasks with respect to human rights, Cyprus issue and border disputes, it would still want to maintain and even increase the weight of

¹³² The EU Council decision of March 8, 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, (2001/235/EC), Official Journal of the European Communities, L85/19.

¹³³ The DYP (True Path Party) and the RP (Welfare Party) coalition government would be headed by the respective presidents of each party for certain periods of time. Soon after Necmettin Erbakan, the head of the Welfare Party, gave up the post of prime ministry for its turnover to Tansu Çiller, the head of the DYP, the then President of the Republic, Süleyman Demirel, did not choose to give the duty to Ms. Çiller, but to Bülent Ecevit. It was referred to as a semi-coup, effected not directly with a military coup, but within the National Security Council that warned about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism to the secular regime of Turkey.

the military in order to be able to balance the likely threats that can emanate due to these challenges. The Turkish government is determined to fulfill the political criteria and they have prepared two packages to accommodate some institutions with the EU practice. Among them is the NSC, and the current provisions do not match EU's expectations though they foresee some changes regarding the NSC.

The Turkish Parliament adopted these two sets of laws, the so-called sixth and seventh accommodation packages.¹³⁴ The latter made some changes regarding the NSC secretariat, however, it envisages more of civilian control rather than a decrease in the standing of the military members. The 7th package decreased the frequency of NSC meetings. Overall, these changes are not to the full satisfaction of the EU regarding the alignment of the role of the NSC along with EU practice.

Turkey's responses to external security threats from the Middle East will be another agenda-setter, in that it will be so difficult to have a common foreign and security policy towards the issues in the Middle East due to the difference in geography and perceptions. Thus, the proliferation threat in the Middle East and Turkey's response is likely to add a new item in Turkish-EU agenda in the foreseeable future, not only because it is an external security issue (that is more of a problem of Turkey than the EU), but also it will require the involvement of security circles more in decision-making process, hence is implicitly related to the EU accession criteria.

The War on Iraq demonstrated that Europeans can have different stances for the defense of outer flank even in a collective defense organization, so, it should not be surprising that serious problems will arise in framing a common foreign and security

¹³⁴ The 6th draft law was adopted on June 19, 2003, and the 7th draft law was adopted on July 30, 2003. For full text, see <<http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/k4928.html>> and <<http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/k4963.html>> (September 3, 2003)

policy within the EU when Turkey defines threats in the Middle East differently, and devises its own responses to ensure its security. Further, Turkey's cooperation with the United States in security matters in the Middle East, and its strategic cooperation with Israel do not overlap with the European common foreign and security policy objectives, especially one that aims at becoming less dependent on the United States. The next section analyzes the incompatibilities in detail.

4.2. TURKEY'S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND POLICYMAKING AT ODDS WITH THE ACCESSION PROCESS

4.2.1. Impacts of Turkey's security policy on integration with Europe

While Turkey adopted the policy that would more effectively address the proliferation threat than others,¹³⁵ it is likely to constitute a tough issue in Turkey's pre-accession process to the EU regarding security-related matters. In his analysis of Turkey's response to the WMD proliferation, Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu identifies some three drawbacks of this policy with respect to Turkey's commitment for European integration:

First, the US 'Missile Shield' project is not quite appealing to the Europeans because of the difference in security perceptions in either side of the Atlantic. Turkey's unilateral involvement in the project as an outcome of its security strategy may create rifts in handling European security. Second, an enhanced trilateral cooperation with Israel and the United States in military affairs do not bode well with Europe's political, military and strategic goals that include minimizing US influence in European security affairs. Finally, and most pertinent to the accession process is the outcome of the policy. One of

¹³⁵ Şebnem Udum, 2003, op.cit.

the short-term EU political criteria is the alignment of the role of the military in Turkish politics; however, Turkey's involvement in costly missile defense projects will lead not only to an increase in Turkey's military spending, but also in the role of military in the National Security Council in order to frame Turkey's nonproliferation policy.¹³⁶

European views about the US Missile Defense project do not overlap with those of Turkey's, let alone the likely controversy that may arise due to Turkey's cooperation with the United States and Israel over missile defense projects. The United States and European allies have clearly different threat perceptions of WMD and missile proliferation. Key European states, such as Britain, France and Germany, do not favor national missile defenses as the best way to respond to the missile proliferation threat though they accept that it is legitimate to get –even increasingly- concerned about proliferation trends.¹³⁷ Most European states have perceived Iran, Iraq and Syria as future economic partners rather than countries of concern with a potential WMD and missile threat. This is basically due to the different assessments of technological capabilities and political intentions, i.e. for the Europeans, the possession of a capability constitutes a potential risk; what makes it an urgent threat is political intent. Thus their threat perceptions are based on their political relationships with 'states of concern.'

Historically, Europeans have preferred to apply political criteria in assessing security threats, and have responded to existing threats politically and diplomatically rather than militarily. Their geographical position has also been an important factor in

¹³⁶ Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Security Perceptions from the East...", op.cit.

¹³⁷ Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson, Mark Smith, "Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defense System," *Southampton Papers in International Policy*, No. 4, Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton, June 2001, p.5.

their approach. The EU is a major political and economic partner of Syria¹³⁸ and it has recently started negotiations with Iran for trade cooperation linked to the progress in a political dialogue that seeks to address, *inter alia*, the proliferation issues.¹³⁹ Therefore, one can expect that political judgments would have the most decisive influence over their stance for a ballistic missile defense policy, rather than concerns about the existence of technical capabilities.¹⁴⁰ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU endorses a nonproliferation and disarmament policy that “...insists on the respect, development and effective implementation of international multilateral treaties and conventions...”¹⁴¹ that form the nonproliferation and arms control regimes, and it upholds export controls and safeguards as important complementary measures to reduce risks.¹⁴²

Behind the European position towards the US Missile Defense project lies the concern over the consequences of possible Russian and Chinese reactions to a unilateral US policy. Recently, the United States scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to proceed with the Missile Shield project. The Treaty that was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, forbids the deployment of nationwide anti-ballistic missile defenses. The strategic doctrine of the Treaty is the principle of deterrence by the threat of retaliation. On the other hand, missile defenses eliminate the strategic balance among states that possess nuclear weapons. Both Russia and China have viewed the project as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities that would undermine

¹³⁸ “The EU and the Middle East Peace Process,” European Commission, *EU Official Website*, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/index.htm> ; “The EU’s Relations with Syria,” European Commission, *EU Official Website*, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/Syria/intro/index.htm>

¹³⁹ Commissioner Chris Patten to visit Iran, Turkey and Lebanon 2-7 February 2003, IP/03/161, Brussels, EU Official Website, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/ip03_161.htm>

¹⁴⁰ Kenyon et al., *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁴¹ Common Foreign and Security Policy-Nonproliferation and Disarmament, EU official website, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/npd/index.htm>

¹⁴² *ibid.*

cooperation with the United States on disarmament and nonproliferation. In this context, Europeans are worried that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will encourage proliferation: That Russia and China will react by slowing down cooperation in tasks embodied in arms control and nonproliferation regimes.

China's pronounced commitments and undertakings for nonproliferation do not overlap. It is not a member of key multilateral export-control regimes including the MTCR. American intelligence community identifies China "as one of the key suppliers of materials and technologies that contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems"¹⁴³. Chinese nonproliferation experts assess that to put leverage on the United States regarding NMD or TMD, China may choose not to live up to its nonproliferation commitments as retaliation to a perceived national security threat.¹⁴⁴

The Russian contribution to arms control and nonproliferation regimes is integral. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an important task is to properly safeguard the unemployed sensitive material, technology and know-how that is necessary to develop WMD. Paucity in the proper implementation of programs to that effect would give impetus to illicit trafficking of the NBC material and drain of ex-Soviet expertise to aspirant states or terrorist groups-most of which are in the periphery of Europe. The bottomline for Europe is that the US project will be counterproductive, and that when Turkey goes along with the project, this would lead to its decoupling from Europe.

¹⁴³ Jing-Dong Yuan, "Assessing Chinese Nonproliferation Policy: Progress, Problems and Issues with the US," Prepared Statement for the US-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on China's Proliferation Policies, October 12, 2001. Available at: <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/jdtest.htm#fn8>>

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*

Recent developments seem to confirm the European position. In the Conference on Disarmament (CD), China linked its support to the negotiations to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which is key for disarmament, to talks on a treaty on the prevention of arms race in outer space (PAROS). After the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in December 2001, the negotiations in the CD in 2002 ended in a deadlock. There was no progress “...towards a fissile material treaty (fissban), nuclear disarmament, PAROS, and legally binding security assurances against nuclear attack.”¹⁴⁵ As an outcome of Russian and Chinese reaction to the US policy on missile defenses, discussions on PAROS overrode those for the FMCT.¹⁴⁶ The Chinese statement also drew attention to other negative developments in nonproliferation and disarmament agreements due to US policies.¹⁴⁷ After the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty formally took effect, Russia withdrew from START II due to the absence of the prerequisites for the entry into force of this agreement.¹⁴⁸ A week later, the United States and Russia started working towards the ratification of the Moscow Treaty (START III), which would define the new strategic relationship between Russia and the United States.¹⁴⁹ Russia is working with China in the CD for a new space treaty since it argues for preventing the weaponization of outer space as a response to the US policies. The US Senate approved the Moscow Treaty, but there have been problems with destroying the

¹⁴⁵ Rebecca Johnson, “CD Closes 2002 Still Deadlocked,” CD Report, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 67, November 2002. <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/67cd.htm>>

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ China Statement to the Conference on Disarmament by Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, People's Republic of China, speech to the Conference on Disarmament, February 7, 2002. <<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/cd/chi070202cd.pdf>>

¹⁴⁸ “On Legal Status of the Treaty Between Russia and the USA on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 1221-14-06-2002, June 14, 2002. <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0206/doc06.htm>>

¹⁴⁹ “US-Russia Begin Moscow Treaty Ratification Process, June 20-21,” Disarmament Documentation, *Acronym Institute*. <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0206/doc07.htm>>

Russian chemical weapon stockpile on time, and due to the Iraq crisis, the Russian Duma postponed the ratification of the Treaty.¹⁵⁰

A second controversial issue may arise out of Turkey's strategic relationships with Israel and the United States, particularly in military matters, which improved over the 1990s. As opposed to Turkey's contentment with the nature and context of relations with Israel, Europe is concerned that Turkey's growing cooperation with Israel may eventually result in an enhanced trilateral alliance between Israel, Turkey and the United States due to common responses to proliferation in the Middle East. This, in turn, would cause Turkey to slow down its steps towards Europe, because Europeans argue that such a strategic relationship will barely overlap with the objectives of the EU in political, military and strategic fields.

Most of the key EU members and the European NATO allies are trying to keep a considerable room of maneuver free from the United States, so they would oppose the idea of including a member that would be its advocate in Europe. The EU has defined its security and defense policy in its second pillar, namely the CFSP. The long-term politico-military objectives of the EU are about attaining an autonomous security and defense capability that would address security threats to Europe. In the debates surrounding European security and defense policy (ESDP), one of the main issues has been to decrease dependency on the United States and taking EU-only decisions while making use of NATO assets and capabilities whenever necessary. The accession of a country which maintains a reinforced military cooperation with the United States would offset the

¹⁵⁰ "Russia-China CD Working Paper on New Space Treaty, June 27, 2002," Disarmament Documentation, *Acronym Institute*, <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0206/doc10.htm>>; "New Clouds over Russia's CW Destruction Plans," News Review Special Edition February 1- April 1, 2003, *Acronym Institute*; "Duma Postpones Ratification of Moscow Treaty on the Eve of US-led War on Iraq," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 70, April-May 2003. <<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd70/70ddnr05.htm>>

EU efforts to minimize American influence over European affairs. Apart from that, Turkey's involvement in a trilateral TMD project with the United States and Israel would make some European NATO allies concerned and may lead to a rift in the Alliance. Most notably, Greece can be uneasy of the establishment of a Middle Eastern TMD due to its geographical proximity: Greece perceives Turkey as the prominent security threat, and would not welcome an increase in Turkey's military posture or deterrent.

Besides, the EU would be reluctant to import out-of-area security problems by accepting Turkey so close to Israel. Historically, the EU has adopted a Middle East policy which tried to maintain equidistance to the parties involved. Not only it served as a facilitator in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, but it is the first trading partner of Israel, and a major economic partner of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.¹⁵¹ Israel is the only nuclear-capable state in the Middle East and is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which would make it a non-nuclear weapon state as the other regional parties to the conflict. The absence of such a status for Israel is assessed to motivate regional NPT signatories, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria, to pursue WMD, and ballistic missile programs, and to refrain from signing key nonproliferation conventions, such as the CWC. This constituted a major deadlock in peace talks, and the EU would not want the inclusion of dynamics that will compel placing hard security issues over economic partnership on its agenda with these states.

The final issue area is directly related to a critical artery in Turkey's roadmap toward eventual membership to the EU, i.e. increased role of military over civilian administration and increased defense spending that will have political repercussions in

¹⁵¹ "The EU and the Middle East Peace Process," European Commission, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/index.htm>

Europe. The 1999 Helsinki European Council Conclusions, which declared Turkey candidate for EU membership, stated that:

...the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.¹⁵²

Turkey was then provided with a roadmap enshrined in the 2000 Accession Partnership Document, which set out short- and medium-term accession criteria. The EU opened up accession negotiations with all candidates, but Turkey since the latter “...does not yet meet the political conditions,”¹⁵³ which include, *inter alia*, “...align[ing] the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the [g]overnment in accordance with the practice of the EU [m]ember [s]tates.”¹⁵⁴

The criterion referred to the role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in politics based on the 1982 Constitution, which granted the military an equal right to vote and say with government members in a constitutional body, thereby making them a “covert partner” of the government; whereas in a properly functioning democracy, the civil administration and the ruling government should be above all governance. There has been no conflict of views with the civilian administration and the military as long as the Turkish governments applied a national security policy that foresaw fighting against ideologies that threaten the integrity of the Turkish state or its secular and republican regime. These internal security threats are Islamic fundamentalism and secessionism. The crisis in the National Security Council in 1997 was the most recent example of the

¹⁵² Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999, <<http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm>>

¹⁵³ Enlargement-Introduction, EU Official Website, <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm>>

¹⁵⁴ The EU Council decision of March 8, 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, (2001/235/EC), Official Journal of the European Communities, L85/19.

influence of the military over the civilian administration that in these matters the government needs to adopt the position of the military or it will be induced to do so.¹⁵⁵

European uneasiness over the role of military in Turkey is already a very sensitive subject in Turkish-EU relations. Turkey's strategic relationship with Israel and the United States, particularly their cooperation to respond WMD proliferation in the Middle East, will require military assessments, policies and substantial expenditures. Hence the influence of the military is likely to increase in the National Security Council, which will put Turkey in opposite currents with the EU.

These three issue areas lead to a paradox, which suggests that Turkey may put full membership at risk while trying to address its security concerns from the Middle East.¹⁵⁶ Another dynamic which will not let Turkey to pursue a mid-way is the fact that EU membership is not in horizon; therefore Turkey will prioritize vital security interests, and there will be resistance to change for a disproportional return.

The following chapter will try to find a way out of this dilemma by proposing policies that uphold the needs and interests of Turkey and the EU.

¹⁵⁵ Şükrü Elekdağ, "The Status of our Democracy (Demokrasimizin Durumu)," *Egemenlik Ulusundur*, April 4, 1998.

¹⁵⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

The above analysis has so far demonstrated the opposite forces that are driven by Turkey's security policy and the prerequisites for European integration. The paper now tries to find the ways out of this apparent *cul-de-sac* by policies that would address the needs and interests of Turkey and the EU rather than their positions.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Basically, the principles of conflict resolution theory are applied onto a case that involves states and international organizations as the main actors rather than human beings. The theory argues that human beings are inherently peaceful, yet aggressive when they are frustrated about their unsatisfied needs. Protracted conflicts usually emerge as a result of the denial of basic needs, and conflicts can only be resolved, that is, integrative outcomes with win-win solutions can be attained, when such needs are satisfied. Thus, the process of conflict resolution should start with breaking down the positions (i.e. concrete demands) of the parties into their underlying interests and needs. Source: *Conflict Resolution Online Learning Project*, Center for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, <<http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/objectivunit1.html>>; Also See John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*, Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 1987.

Process and outcome are heavily influenced by the level of analysis, that is, if negotiations are carried out on the basis *positions*, which is one's desired concrete outcome of the resolution of the conflict, then it leads to a competitive process where there will be winners and losers. Thus, the parties are urged to bargain as hard as possible in order to achieve maximum gains. If negotiations are carried out on the basis of *interests*, that is, the reason why one wants the desired outcome, this leads to integrative bargaining, which is a collaborative process and based on the premise that conflict can be resolved in a way that both parties' interests can be met in a settlement, a win-win situation. If the level of analysis is *needs*, then parties engage in joint problem solving to satisfy them, which is the key for a just and lasting outcome of intergroup conflict. Source: Interviews with Dr. Donna Hicks and Dr. William Wiseberg- Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, July 2001. Also see John Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and*

The thesis indeed studied how Turkey responded to meet its security needs, and how it clashed with the positions and interests of the EU. One can argue that if Turkey considers the needs that lie beneath the interests of the EU, and applies the policies that would address those needs, then Turkey's security policy and its steps towards integration with Europe can proceed more smoothly. The underlying parameters of policymaking to that goal are twofold: First, to maintain survival, state response to a threat is to seek adequate defenses: Thus, Turkey will respond to the WMD and missile proliferation threat to meet security needs. As the analysis explained above, it started to cooperate with the United States and Israel and it will continue doing so. Second, eventual membership to the EU has been Turkey's state policy since the Republican years. Now that it is a candidate, Turkey is supposed to meet the accession criteria for full membership, and cannot expect the EU to bend its principles for the unique circumstances of Turkey. Now is the time to revisit the points of controversy with spectacles that see what lies beneath the positions.

5.1. OPERATIONALIZATION: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF NEEDS AND INTERESTS

This section takes the apparent points of controversy on a case-by-case basis and seeks to attain outcomes that will satisfy both the interests of Turkey and the EU within the parameters that define their relationship. It will also form the backbone of a national

Provention, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990; Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, London: SAGE, 2002.

Therefore, to attain a sustainable outcome out of an international conflict, one should break down the positions and interests of states into their needs and devise policies that would directly address the latter.

strategy that this study envisages for Turkey to attain its objectives in its foreign policy towards Europe and security policy towards the Middle East.

First, as an integral part of the accession process, the EU would like to see a diminished influence of the Turkish military over politics. The alignment of the constitutional role of the National Security Council is constrained by other security challenges that do not pertain to Turkey's external security policy. As a matter of fact, the security issues that are related to religious fundamentalism and secessionism still dominate the security agenda; and the Turkish military considers giving up such status conditioned on the elimination of these threats instead of for the sake of complying with the EU criteria. Moreover, the Turkish opinion polls suggest that the military is the most trusted institution by the people, because there is a strong conviction that a chaos that may be created by these two issues can be overcome or mitigated by the military rather than the civil administration. Thus, the military is perceived as a balancing (f)actor of Turkish democracy rather than a disrupter. Currently, the threat assessments, responses, policy planning and budgeting are all within the realm of the military.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ The Turkish Armed Forces meet to consider which projects will be implemented and determine the strategic action plan, i.e. projects are implemented according to this action plan. They are finalized by the Defense Industry Executive Committee, which is composed of the Prime Minister, the Defense Ministry officials and Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) officials. The principle is that the projects directed to the SSM are put in action towards meeting the needs of the TAF and of domestic industrialization. The process of production is as follows: The Land, Air and Naval Forces transmit their requirements to the General Staff to be considered in the Ten Year Procurement Plan. If the needs will not be met by direct procurement, the request is handled by the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (SSM with Turkish acronyms). It is the Defense Industry Executive Committee which leads the process. Following the request for proposals, the firms put forward their proposals, which are evaluated by the project office of the SSM. After the final selection, contract negotiations start. The economic aspect is evaluated by the SSM while the technical and tactical evaluation is done jointly by the SSM and the TAF. After the contract is signed, the domestic production process starts, and finally the product is tested and accepted (throughout the guarantee period, the SSM is responsible). The budget of the SSM is of its own. The expenses are controlled by the Defense Industry Executive Committee, where there is no political control. Source: *SSM Handbook*, Turkish Ministry of Defense-Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 2000; Interviews with SSM officials, who would like to be cited anonymously.

To find a mid-way between its domestic and international policies, and to convey intent and cooperativeness to the EU, Turkey can choose to increase the weight of civil actors in security policy- in our case, its nonproliferation policy, by engaging the foreign and the defense ministries into Turkey's efforts for disarmament and nonproliferation. The implications of the proposed policy will be an increased role of civil circles in the National Security Council, thereby leveling the weight between the government and the military. That would also be appealing to the TAF because not only civil agents will speak the same language with them, but also it will not put the military under the spotlight to hinder the EU integration process.

Second, adding to the European criticisms about the US missile defense project are the increased European concerns about Russian and Chinese reactions to the US missile defense policy since the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in December 2001. The position of Russia and China is an extension of the need/interest to preserve the strategic nuclear balance with the United States, which would be disrupted by a US missile defense system. National missile defenses basically leave the missile-capable states without a second-strike capability. The Treaty had enshrined mutual vulnerability by stipulating that the United States and the Soviet Union would not pursue nationwide anti-ballistic missile defenses. However, in the case of Turkey's missile defense involvement in a Middle Eastern TMD, the area that would be covered does not target in its range Russian and Chinese missiles that can be launched from deep inside their territories. In this context, Turkey can communicate this detail to Europe as well as Russia and China by a technical and political assessment that stresses the underlying motives and intentions of a TMD between Israel, Turkey and the United States, and

demonstrate that it is aimed at defending against threats from the Middle East, and not directed against Russia and China. The concerns of Greece can be soothed in the same vein- that the facilities are not deployed in the west, but in the east against Middle Eastern threats, and to augment the air defenses of Turkey's land and air forces, hence not intended for altering the strategic balance in eastern Mediterranean –but a pitfall is that Greece may argue about a possible allocation of more fighter aircraft to its western borders, that is, to contingencies with Greece.

In NATO, with US political support, Turkey should also emphasize that instead of creating rifts, missile defense assets and capabilities at the southern flank of Europe will be to Europe's interest indeed: In the short and medium-term, a TMD can be employed to provide a defense umbrella to the Rapid Reaction Force of the EU in future out-of-area missions. Basically, Turkey should take on a strategy that focuses on making the deployment beneficial to Europe.

Third, like the Europeans, Turkey is equally concerned about horizontal proliferation which can be spurred by a Russian or Chinese retaliation to US policy. The potential proliferators and aspiring groups are around Turkey's neighborhood. In Turkey's Middle Eastern borders, smuggling is a fact; but when it comes to the smuggling of sensitive material, inaction is too costly to afford. Thus, bolstering export controls and safeguards of sensitive material and especially of dual-use items should become a prior task in nonproliferation strategic planning.

In this sense, Turkey's quest should be to elevate its tone in export control regimes and other efforts, and to become increasingly involved in safeguards and export control regimes as it will also overlap with the policies of the EU: The Council of the EU

has a regulation for export controls of dual-use items and technology that set up a regime at the community level. EU assistance programs are available for Russia, the Newly Independent States and North Korea to support efforts for nonproliferation and disarmament. A specific area that Turkey can contribute is the CFSP EU Joint Action on nonproliferation and disarmament, which was introduced in the context of EU Common Strategy in the Russian Federation. The Joint Action envisages the implementation of projects on nuclear and chemical disarmament with a focus on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium (i.e., Pu-239 isotope, which is a key material to fabricate a nuclear weapon). However, the projects under the Joint Action have expired in June 2003 despite increasing concerns over horizontal proliferation through illegal means or loopholes in current regimes. At this point, Turkey can come up with additional projects for the EU, or it can offer the advantages of its geography and get involved in new or existing projects as a physical contributor to oversee the transfer of sensitive items. This can start Turkish-EU cooperation in a brand-new field that would complement Turkey's contribution to European security. That would also demonstrate that Turkey would work for the CFSP, thereby soothing the worries that it will be a US agent in the EU despite a likely reinforced strategic relationship.

Turkey can also take part in the joint efforts by the United States and the EU for nonproliferation cooperation. After the War on Iraq, US President G.W. Bush welcomed the presidents of the EU Council and Commission in the United States, and they issued a joint declaration regarding proliferation of WMD. In their statement, they agreed on basic principles of nonproliferation, as well as specific actions to be undertaken to serve the

maintenance of these principles. Among these decisions, two are noteworthy for Turkey's proposed course of action:

-We will strengthen both export controls on materials and technologies related to WMD and their delivery systems as well as their enforcement and implementation... *We will work together with like-minded partners to tighten export controls, where necessary providing assistance to create and improve effective, enforceable national export control systems...*

-We remain concerned at the pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and missiles for their delivery by a number of other States. We will continue to monitor these closely and *to exchange information, including with other concerned States.*¹⁵⁹

Turkey can take advantage of the statements in italic and highlight its geostrategic status to play a key role in materializing the goals set by the United States and the EU. Being situated in the midst of transit routes for smuggling, it can underline its concern for the illicit trafficking of sensitive and dual-use material, and convey its readiness to exchange information. Being able to do that requires increased attention on these issues in state circles, academia and media.

Turkey's strategic cooperation with Israel in military matters seems to remain as long as military cooperation with European states is blocked by human rights concerns, and that with the United States is shaped by the dynamics in the US Congress.¹⁶⁰ Turkey already attaches great value to the strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel¹⁶¹, and may not put a restraint in order to accommodate with the positions of major European capitals. Basically, since EU membership is not in the horizon for the short-

¹⁵⁹ Joint Statement by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstandinos Simitis, and European Commission President Romano Prodi on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, White House News Release, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030625-17.html>> emphasis mine.

¹⁶⁰ The United States gives foreign aid on the basis of laws that should be approved by the Congress. The draft laws go through relevant committees and subcommittees where Congressmen give their approval or disapproval. The anti-Turkish lobbies in these committees are sometimes effective to block foreign aid to Turkey; hence though the administration may want to extend foreign aid, the last word remains with the Congress. The Jewish lobby has acted as a counterforce to the anti-Turkish lobbies that include Armenian, Greek and Kurdish.

¹⁶¹ See Efraim Inbar, "Regional Implications of Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership" *MERIA*, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 2001: <<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue2/jv5n2a5.html>>

term, Turkey will continue to define its security perceptions differently from the Europe. In this sense, one should expect continuing efforts to obtain anti-ballistic missile systems in cooperation with allies.

The EU need to attain an autonomous capability in security matters is conceivable. The differences between the United States and some European states regarding threat perceptions became crystal-clear in the context of the debate on Iraq. With the Nice Treaty, the EU has already blocked Turkey's possible overriding influence in the EU due to the population of the country, which would otherwise assign equal number of votes as Germany, France and the UK in the European Commission. So, it is unlikely that the EU will be forced to deal with issues by Turkey's pressure. Regarding the Middle East policy, Turkey has always tried to pursue a balanced policy in the region, and its interests dictate that it continues doing so.

Based on this analysis, the last section is a compendium of the proposed course of actions.

5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

The current state of Turkey's response to proliferation is not only shaped by the capabilities of its neighbors, but by the pursuit of great power interests in its immediate neighborhood that can well pull the trigger to employ these weapons against Turkey. Turkey was stuck in-between the United States and Europe during the War on Iraq, and this study was an attempt to see the picture in a broader sense, that is, to assess the impacts of Turkey's response to security threats in the Middle East and its

incompatibilities in its foreign policy towards the EU. These incompatibilities are hard to sustain in the medium-run, even in the short run as Turkey feels the urgency to start accession talks with the EU, and has been engaged in an effort to accommodate itself with the EU criteria, especially the political criteria.

This study has shown that there will be important factors that will inevitably pull Turkey towards the other end, and prevent a smooth ride to the final destination, that is EU membership. Thus, it tried to address this dilemma, and to find out whether there is a way out of this apparent *cul-de-sac*. The argument is that there can be a way if Turkey incorporates the courses of action this study has found out by operationalizing the issue areas on the basis of needs and interests of parties in order to satisfy both. This section compiles the highlights of the previous analysis and recommends it as a national nonproliferation strategy that will serve Turkey's short-term needs and long-term interests.

Thus, this study proposes that, Turkey should:

- Engage foreign and defense ministries more into the policymaking and strategic decision making to address the threats from the Middle East and ensure sharing of information with the military institutions. To that end, a network for intelligence agencies is essential to share information and expertise.
- Encourage academic research to support the activities at the official level by calls for papers and proposals in nonproliferation studies. The diversity of issues ranging from nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and delivery systems, necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. To that end, new programs can be

established in universities to attract science and engineering students to contribute and specialize on the technical aspect of proliferation.

- Encourage nonproliferation education and training for the military and civil society in general to understand and appreciate the proliferation risks and threats and to create awareness at the grassroots level that short-term economic gains may result in medium and long-term security challenges that are irreversible.
- Start dealing problems in Turkey's border regulations to combat smuggling and illicit trafficking of sensitive material. Bolstering export controls at the national level is identified by this study as a key policy which Turkey can benefit from and provide benefits to its allies. The Turkish Prime Ministry Customs Undersecretariat is the official agency that regulates issues about borders. Its focus on smuggling is more about drugs, cigarette, alcoholic drinks, arms,¹⁶² etc... and not so much on medical and agricultural products, which can be precursors, raw materials or anti-dote of chemical or biological weapons. Also, the Customs Undersecretariat has recently introduced a project on modernizing the Customs Administrations (GIMOP- Turkish acronym for "The Project on the Modernization of Customs Administrations" / Gümrük İdarelerini Modernizasyon Projesi). The World Bank supports this project with resources for the modernization and automation of customs administrations. One of the most important targets of the project is to make customs controls more selective and more effective. It is already specified that this project needs to be revised according to the EU Customs Union criteria.¹⁶³ At this point, the thesis

¹⁶² Prime Ministry of Turkey, Customs Undersecretariat. <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/toctum1.htm>

¹⁶³ *ibid.*

recommends that while modifying the project, Turkey should give special emphasis on export controls of dual-use medical equipment and chemical materials, and also stipulate the issuing of end-user certificate for such items that are imported. To complement this strategy at the international level, Turkey should increase its standing in international export control regimes, by providing timely information and analysis on smuggling and illicit trafficking that is taking place through its territory, and the efforts it undertook to combat these trends.

- Convey its concerns about proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles in its neighborhood, and the risk it incurs particularly due to the increased tone of the United States against proliferators. The War on Iraq is a perfect rationale for why Turkey is uneasy about the insufficiency of its collective security deterrent and its defense capabilities, therefore to pursue the acquisition of missile defenses with the United States and Israel.
- Demonstrate the significance of advanced defense systems at the disposal of Turkey for the security of Europe to counter WMD and ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East.
- Integrate into nonproliferation policy planning the principles of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a new capabilities initiative adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit in November 2002. The PCC is an initiative for strengthening defenses against terrorism, and it will

seek to bring improvements in areas which include ‘defense against CBRN attacks.’¹⁶⁴

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This study tackled the WMD and missile proliferation in the Middle East, as an international security issue that is likely to constitute an important agenda item in Turkey’s integration with the EU. WMD and missile proliferation is important though not one that is much discussed either in Turkey or in Europe due to threat perceptions that are not solely based on technical capabilities, but more on political relations with aspiring states. However, for Turkey, the threat has grown considerably to become a real one rather than a potential risk. Thus, since the late 1990s, Turkey has chosen to adopt active defense policy in order to respond to the proliferation of WMD in its region, and engaged in talks about procurement of missile defense systems with the United States and Israel.

¹⁶⁴ Turkey’s Security Perceptions and its Relations with NATO-Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm#II>> (September 8, 2003)

The thesis referred to the work of Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu, who observed that Turkey's responses to the proliferation threat would create certain points of controversy that may jeopardize Turkey's full membership to the EU, such as Turkey's strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel, and the possible increase in defense spending and in role of the military in shaping Turkey's defense policy. It took Dr. Kibaroglu's assessments one step further by adding that "unless effectively dealt with..."

To effectively deal with the implications of Turkey's responses to the proliferation threat on the pre-accession process to the EU, it argued that a conflict can be resolved if one starts from addressing the unfulfilled needs and interests. On this premise, the thesis put in operation the concerns of Turkey and the EU based on their needs and interests as a state and an international organization, in order to get out from the apparent paradox; and on the basis of the findings, it suggested policies or actions that would address these needs. These policies were then enshrined in a broad national nonproliferation strategy for Turkey.

As the post-9/11 US security policy is in progress, Turkey is still being affected by the post- War on Iraq reconstruction process and by the changes in this policy. The United States has had hard times with proving the WMD capability that Iraq supposedly retained, and it applies pressure on Iran for undeclared facilities that could be proof of a development program for a nuclear weapon. It is impossible for Turkey not to be affected by unilateral or multilateral US policies in its neighborhood. Thus, it is integral that Turkey adopt a nonproliferation strategy which not only would make up the gaps in its deterrent and defense capabilities, but also would bolster preventive diplomatic initiatives it might take to address the situation in its neighborhood. As a matter of fact, Turkey can

also demonstrate its indispensability for the security of the region by giving more emphasis and attention to WMD-related issues both in the Middle East and the world in general. This would have positive repercussions beyond its western borders, and convey important messages to the EU that having Turkey as a candidate is not a harbinger of problems for the Union, but enhanced security and dialogue with the regions out of reach.

Turkey has eagerly completed the seventh accommodation package and passed it in the Parliament. It is more than impatient to be given a date to start accession talks with the EU. If this process is postponed for a “later” time, it will inevitably shift Turkey’s leaning towards the United States and Israel, and could well alienate it from Europe. It is also the time for Europe to decide whether they would like to see a Turkey which has become subservient to the United States in its war against the WMD-possessor anti-American states, or one that has a European prospect to hold onto.

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GLOSSARY

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
ATBM	Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
BW	Biological Weapons
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFE	Conventional Forces Europe (Treaty)
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
CU	Customs Union
CW	Chemical Weapons
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
GIMOP	Turkish acronym for The Modernization Project for Customs Administrations (Gümrük İdarelerini Modernizasyon Projesi)
MEADS	Medium Extended Air Defense System
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NMD	National Missile Defense
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAC	Patriot Advanced Capability
PAROS	Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space

TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TGS	Turkish General Staff
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction