

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MODERN TURKISH CITIZENSHIP
DURING THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE PERIOD

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May, 2003

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation is an attempt to present a different historical account of the construction of modern national citizenship and the politics of inclusion and exclusion that is the politics of citizenship through a rereading of the official foreign policy of the formative years of the Turkish Republic. From the theoretical-analytical point of view, the dissertation rests on the proposal that there is a relationship between the foreign policy dynamics and the domestic socio-political structure, namely the nature of the relationship between the state and the citizen, the basic features of the collective and individual political identities and the formation of the terms of legitimate and proper membership which can all be termed as the politics of citizenship of a particular country. Within this framework, the dissertation uses the general foreign policy orientation and specific acts and decisions of the nationalist Ankara government as the analytical instrument to follow up the formation of the early premises of Turkish national citizenship identity. The main argument is that the territorial, cultural (national) and political boundaries of modern citizenship identity in Turkey were drawn mainly in and through the foreign policy acts and decisions of the new ruling elite which were reflected in the foreign policy texts –treaties and agreements- of the period between 1919-1923.

Key Words: Turkish Citizenship, Turkish Foreign Policy, citizenship identity.

ÖZET

DIŐ POLİTİKA VE MİLLİ MÜCADELE DÖNEMİNDE MODERN TÜRK VATANDAŐLIĐI' NIN KURULUŐU

Özlem Kaygusuz

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu tez, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluş dönemi resmi dış politikasının bir yeniden okumasını yaparak, dönemin kapsama-dışlama siyaseti yani vatandaşlık siyaseti ve modern Türk vatandaşlığının kuruluşu üzerine farklı bir tarihsel analiz sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Teorik-analitik açıdan çalışma, bir ülkenin dış politika dinamikleri ile iç sosyo-politik yapılanması, yani devlet-vatandaş ilişkisinin doğası, bireysel ve kolektif siyasal kimliklerin temel nitelikleri, meşru ve tam üyeliğin sınırları, bütünüyle vatandaşlık siyaseti arasında bir ilişki olduğu önermesine dayanmaktadır. Bu çerçeve içinde, milliyetçi Ankara Hükümeti'nin genel dış politika yönelimi ve spesifik dış politika karar ve uygulamaları, Türk ulusal vatandaş kimliğinin erken öncüllerinin oluşmasını incelemek için analitik araç olarak kullanılmıştır. Çalışmanın ana fikri, Türkiye'de modern vatandaşlığın topraksal, kültürel (ulusal) ve siyasal sınırlarının, temel olarak dönemin yönetici seçkinlerinin dış politika karar ve uygulamaları yoluyla çizildiği ve 1919-1923 döneminin siyasal andlaşma ve metinlerine yansıdığıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Vatandaşlığı, Türk Dış Politikası, vatandaş kimliği

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INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990's citizenship has become the key concept of the post-cold war democratization efforts to remove the defects of the liberal democracies of the developed West and to establish liberal democratic institutions in a complete manner in the rest of the world.¹ The new citizenship debate which is in essence the reflection of the post-modern critique of identity has paved the way for two interrelated developments in the citizenship literature: First, the general theoretical debate about the possibilities of democratic transformation through a new citizenship conception has been accompanied with the rising interest in the specific context-based analysis of different citizenship models. Secondly, the field of citizenship theory has focused on an idea of citizenship not just as a legal status of rights and obligations; but also as an "identity" expressing an individual's membership and allegiance to a particular political community.

Concerning the first aspect, the specific context-based studies analyzing different citizenship traditions has aimed to reveal "what was wrong with the modern egalitarian citizenship in different social-political contexts" within a historical

¹ The 1990's witnessed a significant rise of interest in citizenship studies which mainly ascribed the concept a problem-solving capacity in terms of the post-cold war crises of liberal democracies. See Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "The Return of the Citizen: A Survey on the Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics*. 104 (January 1994), 352-381; Bryan S. Turner, *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London: Sage Publications, 1993); Ronald Beiner, ed., *Theorizing Citizenship* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); Bart von Steenberg, ed., *The Condition of Citizenship* (London: Sage, 1994); Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, *Citizenship and Migration* (London: Macmillan, 2000); Nick Ellison, "Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in Late Modernity." *Sociology*. 31(November, 1997),697-717.

perspective.² In other words, they have deconstructed existing citizenship regimes in order to show the historical roots of the impediments on the way of democratic transformation through a new citizenship conception in particular social contexts. Accordingly, they provided fundamental information to discuss on the applicability of the new post-national citizenship models and the potential power of the concept in terms of accommodating the urgent problems of modern-liberal democracies, especially the problems of participation, representation, inequality and justice.

Secondly, the new debate has brought the rediscovery of “citizenship as an identity” which informs primarily an identification with and membership in a particular political community – which is the modern state under modern times - rather than a cluster of rights and obligations.³ The development of citizenship has been viewed as the outcome of a “politics of social closure” which entails the development of a particular territorial, cultural and political identity expressing an individual’s position and capabilities in the society rather than the evolution of the citizenship rights.⁴ The emphasis is that with such an approach to modern citizenship, the development of citizenship rights can also be analyzed as a part of

² As examples for such context-based studies see, William Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989); Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly, eds., *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring the States* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992); David M. Smith and Maurice Blanc, “Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnic Minorities in Three European Nations.” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. 20(1996), 66-82; William Safran, “State, Nation, National Identity and Citizenship: France as a Test Case.” *International Political Science Review*. 12 (1991), 219-238.

³ Kymlicka and Norman, “The Return of the Citizen”, 369; Michael Walzer, “Citizenship” in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, ed. T. Ball and J. Farr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 211; Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community” in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 235.

⁴For the approach of citizenship as social closure see, W. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 21-34.

the formation of a particular political identity which provides a better understanding about the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in modern societies.

This dissertation utilizes both of these recent developments of the citizenship literature in building its problematique which is the construction of modern Turkish citizenship identity during the national struggle period. First of all, this historical study about Turkish citizenship from a different perspective – from the foreign policy perspective - will be a specific contribution in terms of the recent interest in context-based studies. Although it does not directly involve in the current discussions about the transformation of Turkish citizenship through a new conception of “constitutional citizenship”, it aims to present a different historical analysis about the “politics of citizenship” in Turkish Republic. Secondly, the formative years of the Turkish Republic provides a specific example to study citizenship as an identity constructed mainly by the state through a “politics of closure” which operates at territorial, cultural and political levels. Therefore, this dissertation aims to benefit from a contemporary conceptual innovation for a better understanding of historical citizenship politics in Turkey without falling into the trap of explaining the past with the help of contemporary concepts. The point is that the approach of “citizenship as social closure” has born out of the contemporary crises of modern citizenship but it has definitely the potential to understand both the historical and contemporary terms of the politics of inclusion/exclusion in modern societies.

Therefore, this dissertation focuses on Turkish modernization and the formation of modern Turkish citizenship identity during the transition from an imperial rule to a republican regime from a state-centered perspective. The evolution of modern Turkish (national) citizenship as an institution of the republican regime - as a collection of rights and as an official identity for the members of the

“community inside” - has been a subject of rising interest since the mid-1990’s. The basic features of Turkish citizenship have been described as a civic-territorial, secular-republican, duty-based, passive identity in several substantive studies which have used different analytical instruments such as the legal formulation of official citizenship identity in successive Turkish constitutions and in related laws; the content of the general education system which aimed to create the new republican citizen; the immigration and settlement policies which informs well about the spatial-temporal conditioning of self/other in the new national context and the effects of the republican state ideology on the evolution of Turkish citizenship as a duty-based identity.⁵

This dissertation, however, will focus on an indirect but equally well informative sphere - foreign policy and the interactions between the international context and the domestic social-political formation - from a state-centered perspective. Specifically, the general foreign policy orientation and practices of the nationalist Ankara government during the period of national struggle will be used as the analytical instrument to follow up the emergence of the early premises of the Turkish national citizenship identity. The main argument is that, it was before the establishment of the republic that the territorial, cultural (national) and ethical-ideological boundaries of Turkish citizenship were drawn mainly in and through the foreign policy acts and decisions of the new ruling elite which simultaneously entailed a particular “politics of citizenship” in the domestic sphere. In other words,

⁵ Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan Soyarık, “What Is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate.” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 35(October, 1999), 187-208; Kemal Kirişçi, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices.” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 39(July, 2000), 1-22; Betigül Ercan Argun, “Universal Citizenship Rights and Turkey’s Kurdish Question.” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*. 19(1999), 85-103; Artun Ünsal, ed. *75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru* [From Subject to Citizen within 75 Years] (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998).

the period between 1919-1923 witnessed the first formulations of definitive, boundary producing (both physical and ethical) discourses of Turkish political life mainly in and through the foreign policy texts of the nationalist government such as the supreme political objective of political unity as the basis of egalitarian citizenship, the Muslim majority as an organic totality, the terms of ethnic and religious differentiation, the unity disruptive minority rights, threats to national security and the cultural and political meanings of “Turkishness”. These discourses shaped the formation of the domestic public sphere and featured a new citizenship identity which was supposed to be completely different from the Ottoman imperial model of membership and political community.

In this respect, the first chapter focuses on citizenship mainly as a state identity which is constructed through a politics of closure at political and discursive levels. This means there is an emphasis on the state and its instruments in the construction of a particular citizenship identity within a delimited territory. The dissertation supports the idea that when viewed as an identity, citizenship is a sphere of state action which defines and enforces citizenship rights and obligations. It is the state with the power of bureaucratic and political implementation, an official protection and of using legal sanctions that provide this basic identity to the individual.⁶ This methodological preference is also related with the nature of this study since it uses foreign policy as the instrument of the state in conducting the politics of closure within the parallel processes of state formation and nation building in Turkey. Therefore, the first chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework to analyze Turkish citizenship as an official identity formulated and constructed by the state elite parallel to the formation of modern Turkish state.

⁶ Thomas Janoski, *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 17-18.

The second chapter focuses on the question of “ in what respect foreign policy is related with the study of citizenship?” to complete the analytical pattern of the dissertation for the case analysis. In order to answer this question, the dissertation benefits from a novel approach in the study of international relations which is the interpretative approach. The interpretative approach views the international system and foreign relations as an arena of practices that constitute the “subjects” of the field, that is the individual states, their domestic political communities, international organizations and regional alliances.⁷ By benefiting from this approach, the second chapter analyses how the reciprocal positions of these subjects are sustained by foreign policy discourses and practices. Concerning the subject of this study, that is the construction of a citizenship identity, the main question is “how foreign policy acts and decisions establish and maintain the territorial, cultural (national) and ethical-ideological boundaries which altogether constitute the essence of the politics of inside/outside that is the politics of citizenship in modern societies?”

The second chapter tries to answer these questions by presenting a trilateral analytical framework about the operation of foreign policy. First of all, official foreign policy acts such as unilateral declarations, bi-lateral and multilateral treaties, conventions and agreements draw the “physical-territorial” boundaries of the “community inside” which is the first stage of enframing a particular citizenship identity. Secondly, the formation of modern citizenship involves also a “national closure” which frames a hegemonic cultural identity – by relying on a specific conception of national security - for the “community inside” through the exclusion, marginalization, assimilation, and/or eradication of particularistic belongings. Finally, modern citizenship is an “ethical-political closure” which brings a mode of

⁷ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 45.

integration for the society, i.e., a particular political disposition, a system of political institutions and values and a common mode of conducting collective affairs. At this level, foreign policy acts and decisions serve for the inscription and reinscription of particular values, political dispositions and ideas which feature the political aspect of the citizenship identity. At the end, the second chapter completes the general theoretical framework of the dissertation according to which the construction of the early premises of modern Turkish citizenship will be analyzed in the following chapters.

The final territorial, cultural and ethical-political boundaries of modern Turkish (national) citizenship were established with an international act, the Lausanne Treaty on July 24th 1923 before the establishment of the republic on 23 October 1923. However, before the Lausanne Treaty, in a series of political and ideological interactions with the Allied powers and the neighbor states, the new ruling elite formulated the first premises of their project of nation-state with a new, modern, national citizenship identity. The point is that, the uneven passage from an imperial conception of membership to modern, national citizenship was complicated by the prevalence of the imperial social vision and the strong feelings of loyalty to the monarchical authority which were abandoned gradually throughout the national struggle period. The basic character of the period between 1919-1923 was that there were the first signs of an idea of new political community although it was not embraced totally. There was neither a clear determination for a regime change towards a republic, nor a corresponding framework of ideas - a republican ideology - to be the philosophical basis for the definition of a new citizenship conception.

Nevertheless, beginning with the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact (Misak-i Milli) which were known as the first manifestations of modern Turkish

nationalism, the leaders of the movement began to abandon their deeply entrenched imperial vision and directed the movement towards a genuine nationalist project. The emergence of a truly “nationalist” foreign policy paralleled to the emergence of a sense of “national” identity and a new conception of membership throughout this period.

In this respect, the following chapters dwell on the formation of the territorial, national and political boundaries of modern Turkish citizenship via reading the major foreign policy acts and documents of the period as “boundary drawing practices”. These are the Sivas Declaration of the National Congress of Anatolian and Rumelian National Resistance Organizations (October 4th 1919), the National Pact of the last Ottoman Parliament (January 28th 1920), the Sévres Treaty (August 10th 1920), the Moscow and Kars Treaties with the Soviet Russian and the Soviet Caucasian Republics (March, 16th 1921 and October, 13th 1921), the Ankara Agreement with the French government (October, 20th 1921), the London Conference with the Allied governments (February, 21st –March, 12th 1921) and finally the Lausanne Conference and the Peace Treaty (July, 24th 1923).

The third chapter specifically analyzes the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact as the first foreign policy texts that envisage a particular “community inside” for the new state. Concerning the subject of this study, the point is that both documents rest on Wilsonian principles which is the main ideological-political framework of the Turkish national resistance movement. In other words, an internationally recognized principle shaped the basic features of a domestic political initiative in Turkish case. Then the analysis focuses on whether or not there are strict territorial, cultural and political criteria for the closure of a new “community inside” in this early period. This chapter tries to answer this question by comparing the original text of the

National Pact - which has a striking difference from the distorted one - with the Sivas Declaration. This analysis aims to indicate that contrary to the established ideas, the former is not the document of “the irreducible and national” boundaries of the new state. At this stage of the national movement, although they complied with an international principle, nevertheless the Turkish nationalists were far from developing a modern nation-state model and a modern national citizenship.

Chapter four focuses on the Sévres Treaty as the turning point in the process of the “nationalization” of the territorial and social vision of the nationalist leaders and in the passage to an idea of popular sovereignty. Although it was not an act of the Ankara government, this chapter tries to reveal how the signing of the treaty and the subsequent events shaped the minds, policy options and the future projection of the Turkish nationalists and forced them to develop a “mono-ethnic conception of proper membership” which defined Turkish identity as the ethnic core of the future (national) citizenship identity. Concerning the political boundaries of the future citizenship model, the question is how the Sévres process facilitated to the passage from loyalty to Sultan to the idea of popular sovereignty and also gave way to the emergence of an idea of political integrity as the core ethos of the future republican politics which impeded the development of genuine political pluralism in Turkey. The analysis aims to indicate that the Sévres Treaty is the historical moment at which the first credentials of the unitary and centrally defined citizenship conception emerged for the first time in Turkish history.

The ethical-ideological boundaries of modern Turkish citizenship in other words the tacit-uncodified ideological criteria of inclusion and exclusion to membership in the new “community inside” were crystallized particularly throughout the political and ideological interactions with the foreign powers during this period.

The most striking example of this pattern was the Turko-Soviet rapprochement process. Chapter five analyzes the dynamics of this process by asking questions “what were the concerns of the nationalists leaders in conducting the territorial, cultural and political closure in the east and how they were reflected in the Gümri, Moscow and Kars Treaties?”, “how and why the territorial criteria of the National Pact were modified in drawing the territorial borders in the east?”, “which groups of former Ottoman citizens were left outside the territorial and cultural boundaries of the new community inside?”, “in what respect, the ideological-political interactions paved the way for the passage from an abstract concept of national sovereignty to a more concrete idea of people’s rule?” Concerning the citizenship conception that was being formulated in this early period, the analysis specifically focuses on the defects of the idea of popular sovereignty and the principle of populism as emerged during this process of rapprochement. As a result, chapter five examines the position and the reactions of the nationalist leaders who faced with a strong ideological challenge in formulating the basic premises of their project of a new social-political order.

The relations with the Western governments also affected the maturation of the ideas about the future model of state-society relations in the minds of the nationalists. In this respect, chapter six analyzes the process of the London Conference and the Ankara Agreement. The process of the London Conference is studied as the stage at which the cultural criterion of the new citizenship identity came closer to the Western conception of national identity. It was for the first time during the London Conference that the Turkish citizenship was formulated as a territorial-civic identity which would be based on the political unity of different racial (ethnic) and cultural communities of “common origin” under a single, comprehending, inclusionary identity, i.e., as a French type of national citizenship

conception. The Turkish delegation for the first time spoke on behalf of a “Turkish nation” as an original, compact, unitary identity during this conference.

The Ankara Agreement which was signed on October 20th 1921 with the French government well reflected the adoption of a unitary citizenship conception termed as “Turkishness”. The civic-territorial but unitary-assimilationist feature of this conception was crystallized especially in the articles related with the special administration of the Hatay province which was left to French mandate Syria. This section of the dissertation specifically analyzes the early measures of the Turkish nationalists - as reflected in the treaty - to establish Turkish identity as the dominant cultural identity in the region which also well informed about their future policies with respect to non-Turk Muslim communities who remained within the borders.

The early premises of the modern Turkish national citizenship were fully crystallized during the Lausanne negotiations and found its perfect expression in the final peace treaty. Chapter seven analyzes the Lausanne negotiations and the peace treaty as the final stage of the “nationalization of the National Pact” at which the new ruling elite gave up its claims on the territories which had complex, multi-religious and multi-cultural population structures in favor of an idealized, religious-cultural homogeneity. What were the concerns of the Turkish ruling elite in drawing the final territorial boundaries of modern Turkish citizenship? Concerning the cultural criterion, what was the underlying “national” security conception which determined the final “national” boundaries of the “community inside” as reflected especially in the Convention on Population Exchange and in the articles about the minority rights? In what respect the Lausanne Peace Treaty confirmed the prevalence of the religion as the main component of the Turkish citizenship? How the war-time social vision

which represented the Muslim majority as an organic cultural unity as the basis of an idealized political integrity was reflected in the Lausanne Treaty?

The analysis on Lausanne Treaty will reveal that at this final stage, Turkish citizenship was defined as a unitary, civic-territorial category which expressed the political unity of the various Muslim communities under a hegemonic Turkish identity. With such a general inclusionary conception and the idealization of the territorial-political integrity, modern Turkish citizenship came very close to French model of civic-territorial citizenship. However, it also inherited the basic democratic deficit of the model which is the construction of a centrally defined, hegemonic cultural identity as the only legitimate public identity and the removal of all other identity claims, i.e., languages, cultures and beliefs from the public sphere. In a very short period of time, the search for political integrity would find its perfect expression in the strives for a (non-existent) cultural unity which entailed the eradication and assimilation of all kinds of elements of difference living within the borders of the new Turkish Republic.

In other words, the conception of Turkish citizenship as formulated throughout the national struggle period entailed also an ethnic criterion for “proper membership” as different from “citizenship on paper” in this early period. This indeterminacy in the basic character of citizenship reflected also to the first citizenship regulation in the 1924 Constitution which made a clear-cut differentiation between “genuine Turks” and “Turks in terms of citizenship”.

Therefore, this dissertation aims to make a rereading of the official foreign policy of the revolutionary Turkish Grand National Assembly government in order to reveal its role in the formulation and construction of the foundational premises of modern Turkish citizenship identity throughout the national struggle period. The

basic assumption in doing such an analysis is that the foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalist leaders were reflecting also their fundamental concerns in constructing a new “community inside” and new terms for membership. In the final analysis, the objective is to prove that the foreign policy of a particular state is not just an external orientation of the ruling elite of that particular state but also the integral part of the domestic “politics of inclusion/exclusion” that is the “politics of citizenship” in modern societies.

CHAPTER I

MODERN STATE AND CITIZENSHIP IDENTITY

1.1. The Idea of Citizenship: A Status or an Identity?

Since the 1990's, the theory of citizenship has focused on an idea of citizenship as an "identity" rather than as a cluster of rights and obligations. In order to comment on the importance of this difference and to show its relevance to the problematique of the dissertation some clarification is needed.

Conceptually, citizenship has been marked by a differentiation: First of all, as an identity given by the state, it is dependent to the existence of a state as well as a political community. A citizen is first and the foremost a member of a political community entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities.¹ Historically, it represents the establishment of a transcending public identity against other particularistic identity claims such as based on religion, estate, region, family, language etc. within a delimited territory. In the context of the modern nation-state, citizenship gains additional importance as the institution on which the state rests its legitimacy through the concepts of participation and popular sovereignty. Citizenship as a form of membership, however, cannot be reduced to membership to a nation-state. Conceptually, it is mainly definable in the framework of a political community, a civil society and a public sphere whether or not it is coterminous with a nation state. The identification between national identity and citizenship is a historically contingent one, it is not an absolute or irreversible

¹ Michael Walzer, "Citizenship" in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, ed., T. Ball and J. Farr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 211.

identification.² Therefore, citizenship is an identity given by the public-political authority but there is no conceptual linkage between national identity and citizenship. This is the identity aspect of the concept.

Secondly, citizenship implies the entitlement of the individual with a cluster of rights and obligations which make him/her a proper member of a particular political community. This refers to the democratic content of the modern citizenship. In this respect, citizenship is a status enabling an individual to participate into the community. However, citizenship entitlements do not by themselves explain the political bond between the citizen and the state. The materialization of citizenship rights is possible only within a political culture which entails a rational, non-arbitrary political authority, i.e., making the state more intelligible.³ Furthermore, a citizen is a citizen of a state even without being entitled with some rights and obligations. It is the state that promotes and safeguards the citizenship rights. In creating and enforcing the rules and the laws to which all social entities are subject to, the state is the principal expression of political power in national societies.⁴ Therefore, citizenship rights and obligations are not the determinative but the complementary aspect of modern citizenship identity.

This is a meaningful differentiation from an analytical point of view. The theory of citizenship has developed exclusively as a theory of the evolution of the citizenship rights, namely the civil, political and social rights along with the liberal/

² Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe" in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 259.

³ Jean Leca, "Questions on Citizenship" in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 17.

⁴ J.M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 109.

republican or authoritarian modernization trajectories of the Western democracies.⁵ In the early 1990's, however, the citizenship theory acquired a different character. The revitalization of the interest in citizenship theory owed much to the cultural politics of the 70's and to the subsequent postmodern critique of identity. The cultural politics of the 70's basically argued that the modern egalitarian citizenship, which is based on the equal membership of abstract individuals, has only served for the subordination and marginalization of some sections of the society.⁶ The new right claims of the New Social Movements such as various women's organizations, the black, the youth, gays and lesbians, ethnic and religious minorities, regional secessionists, environmentalists and their demands for recognition in public sphere and integration through effective use of citizenship rights resulted in two significant developments in terms of citizenship. First, they indicated that the content of citizenship rights had to enlarge and differentiate.⁷ Secondly, the unitary citizenship identity had to transform in order to accommodate these differences in the public sphere.⁸ The basic effect of the post-modern critique of identity on the citizenship theory, on the other hand, has been to transform it from "a theory of the development of the citizenship rights to a theory of the social and political formation of citizenship identity" through a critique of

⁵ T. H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, *Citizenship and Social Class* (London: Pluto Press, 1992). Marshallian theory became very influential as the only original theory of citizenship for a long time. During the 80's, it was criticized to a large extent but the citizenship theory continued to rest on the basic realist assumptions of the Marshallian theory. See for the critiques of the Marshallian citizenship theory, M. Mann, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship." *Sociology*. 21(1987), 339-354; A. Giddens, "Class Division, Class Conflict and Citizenship Rights" in *Profiles and Critiques and Social Theory* (London, Macmillan, 1982).

⁶ Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman "The Return of the Citizen: A Survey on the Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics*. 104 (January, 1994), 370-377; Bryan S. Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship" in *Citizenship and Social Theory* ed., B. Turner (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 13-16.

⁷ Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship." in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, ed. B.S. Turner and P. Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1994), 392-406.

⁸ Turner, "Contemporary," 11.

citizenship as modernization. It has been argued that, the modern citizenship has provided not only a legal-political but also a cultural identity which refers to those practices which enable a citizen to participate and adopt fully in the national culture.⁹ In other words, modern citizenship should be understood as an identity including not only legal entitlements but also territorial, cultural and political elements expressing an individual's participation and allegiance to a particular political community.

This has brought the questioning of the deeply rooted fusion between nationality and citizenship as the condition of membership in modern, territorial nation state. Furthermore, it was not only the nationality dimension that has become questionable. More important than that, all the statist connotations which made modern citizenship a non-egalitarian-exclusionary status have been criticized.¹⁰ Citizenship theory has faced with a significant task after this breaking point: For the construction of a new citizenship identity, the deconstruction of the existing understanding is necessary. Especially, the identification between citizenship and national identity or in other words, the surpassing of citizenship by national identity should be examined in different contexts. The integration between citizenship and nationality has been dissolving for some time under the forces of globalization. It is now necessary to formulate it at the level of theory because the classical citizenship theory rests exclusively on the assumption that citizenship and national identity should be coterminous.

As a result, the theoretical debate on citizenship resulted in a critique of citizenship as modernization, i.e. a critique of modern citizenship identity as a process of forced identification with the cultural identity of the hegemonic political

⁹ Bryan S. Turner, "Post-Modern Culture/ Modern Citizens" in *The Condition of Citizenship*, ed. B. von Steenberg (London: sage, 1994), 158-160.

¹⁰ Turner, "Contemporary," 15.

community within the modern territorial state. Modern citizenship which was supposed to be a political membership, has been constructed as a unitary, centrally defined, homogenous, and in fact as a cultural (national) identity throughout the modernization process. It has been claimed that under the pretence of universality, modern category of citizen postulated a homogenous political community and relegated all particularity and difference to the private sphere.¹¹ Any new attempt of theorizing citizenship should take this aspect into consideration. At that point many theorists have embraced post-modernism, i.e., the abandonment of the unitary conception of the individual and the self and also the stable political and cultural identities. In this respect, they aimed to avoid universal assumptions and evolutionary schemes and explored the possibility of a richer and multi-layered conception of citizenship which should be an ensemble of different forms of belonging.¹²

Therefore, the critique of citizenship as modernization has examined the formation of a particular modern citizenship identity within specific nation-building models and related to the processes of state formation. It has considered citizenship as an identity emerging as a result of a multi-dimensional processes of “social closure” which facilitates the identification of the individual with a particular cultural community and a political organization. In this respect, the critique of (modern) citizenship as modernization has provided the necessary framework for the deconstruction of a particular citizenship identity within a process of state-formation. At this point, it should be underlined that since this dissertation’s case analysis is about the formation of a conception of “proper membership and an official identity ” rather than about the evolution of citizenship rights in Turkey, it is necessary to

¹¹ Ibid.,14; Chantal Mouffe, “Preface” in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, ed. C. Mouffe, 9.

¹² Engin F. Işın and Patricia K. Wood, *Citizenship and Identity* (London: Sage Publications, 1999),20-21.

examine how the critique of citizenship as modernization articulates a framework of analysis that this study utilizes in its case analysis.

1.2. Citizenship as Modernization and the Methodological Problem

The critique and analysis of citizenship as modernization has been particularly paid attention by Bryan S. Turner who attempted to articulate a historically dynamic theory of citizenship in order to take citizenship theory out of Marshallian evolutionism and ethno-centricism.¹³ In his model, Turner compared different histories of citizenship in Europe on the basis of Barrington Moore's analysis of different routes to modernization and at the end suggested a two-dimensional citizenship typology which contrasts the democratic citizenship models with authoritarian traditions. In creating this model, he had two specific points: First, he put excess emphasis on the role of the social forces in the development of citizenship rights. Secondly, he underlined the variations in the constitution of the public space parallel with the variations in the modernization trajectories.¹⁴ At the end, he regarded the historical emergence of strong public spaces with a tradition of active citizenry developed from below as in the French model. At the opposite side, a more pervasive private sphere was related with a passive citizenry imposed from above as in the German example. According to him, historically some other combinations are also possible such as an emphasis on a pervasive private space with an active citizenry as in the American case and a strong public space with a passive citizenry imposed from above as in the British case. Consequently, in Turner's typology, the structural relationship between the public and private spheres and its cultural meaning in the

¹³ Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship" in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, ed. Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1994), 199-225.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 203 and 220.

form of active or passive citizenship are the essential elements to understand the relationship between totalitarianism and democracy.¹⁵

Concerning the subject of this study, however, Turner's study is important from a different perspective. His analysis has extensively contributed to the question of "what kind of identity the citizenship identity is?" which is the main question of the theoretical part of this dissertation. His study presents fundamental insights to differentiate between the elements of modern citizenship identity which are the territorial, cultural and the political elements. In other words, this dissertation benefits from his general account of modern citizenship as the dominant public identity with a particular cultural element within a delimited territory.

There are two points in Turner's study that this dissertation benefits from in articulating the elements of modern citizenship identity. The first one is his emphasis on the nature of modern citizenship as formed in a national context integral to the process of nation-building which entails the subordination of the ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional minorities and aboriginals.¹⁶ According to him, in order to break the Marshallian evolutionism, it is necessary to view the development of citizenship as a matter of (national) unification. In this respect, he gave the historical evolution of British citizenship as the example which according to him cannot be analyzed without making reference to the erosion of the cultural and political autonomy of Celtic identity. This point in Turner's study overlaps with Brubaker's conception of "national closure" which similarly refers to the cultural element in modern citizenship identity.¹⁷ In analyzing the fusion between the Turkish nationality

¹⁵ Ibid., 215-218.

¹⁶ Ibid., 205.

¹⁷ William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 27-29.

and Turkish citizenship and the formation of a hegemonic “Turkishness” as the primary public identity during the formative years of the Turkish Republic, this is the general framework that the dissertation utilizes in the following parts.

Secondly, in Turner’s typology, the way the public space is organized within a nation-state around some shared values, modes of behavior and social understandings provides a particular character –active and passive forms of citizenship- to that identity which underlines the political boundaries of citizenship.¹⁸ He views citizenship as a membership to a particular political community with basic values of public life and a specific mode of social integration that feature the terms of the “political” within a delimited territory. It refers to the political element which includes a set of institutions and values and a particular political disposition for the individual and for the collectivity. The development of the political dimension of modern Turkish citizenship will be analyzed within such framework of citizenship as a mode of integration and a centrally defined public-political disposition in the following pages.

The problem in Turner’s study is the excess emphasis on the role of the social forces in the development of a particular citizenship identity. This is first of all related with his assumption about the relative homogeneity of the societies that he studied: France, England, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and the colonial America. According to Turner, since those countries have no problems of aboriginality and ethnic complexity (except for the United States) the question of citizenship has been less complicated and can be studied with a society-centered – focusing on the demands of the social forces - approach. In other parts of the world where societies are more complicated with ethnic, religious and sectarian differences as in the Middle

¹⁸ Turner, “Outline,”218.

East – including Turkey -, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, the formation of modern citizenship can be analyzed as the construction of a central-unitary identity from above rather than as a collection of socially demanded entitlements.¹⁹ This is an easily reversible assumption. In both historical and contemporary terms, each of these European societies have also submerged in the problems of ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional and gender discrimination and exclusion problems. In each of them, contemporary as well as historical demands for recognition and integration or disintegration have shaped the formation of democratic traditions and their specific citizenship conceptions.

Turner's emphasis on the role of social forces is also related with his definition of citizenship. According to Turner, citizenship is a set of political, economic, juridical and cultural practices that define a person a competent member of society.²⁰ However, there are problems in such a definition which includes all the processes leading to citizenship. The point is that citizenship rights and obligations exist when the state validates the legality of citizenship norms and takes steps to implement them.²¹ The essence of citizenship identity is that, it is a formal, political-legal identity given by the public authority which features the political bond between individual and the state.

Therefore, although Turner's study is important to distinguish between the cultural and the political elements of modern citizenship identity, this dissertation relies on the point that contrary to Turner's general approach, citizenship is a sphere of state action which defines and enforces citizenship rights and obligations. In this

¹⁹ Ibid., 221.

²⁰ Turner, "Contemporary" in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, ed., B.S. Turner, 5.

²¹ Thomas Janoski, *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social Democratic Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),9-10.

sense, citizenship theory should not be reduced to the theory of civil society. Civil society and citizenship are interrelated but different spheres. In citizenship, the state provides an identity and recognizes a cluster of rights and obligations to individuals who obtain this identity. In civil society, however, groups in concert or in opposition put pressure on the state to expand the scope of rights. Therefore, the actual citizenship rights reside in the state sphere. It is the state with the power of bureaucratic and political implementation, of official protection and of using legal sanctions that provide this basic identity to the individual.²²

This critique underlines the point that whatever the development path of the citizenship rights, from above or below, citizenship is a state identity. In Turner's typology this point is missing. According to him, strong social forces could expand citizenship rights through the process of political conflict while more passive forms of citizenship are created as a result of the political strategies of the dominant political elite. In this formulation it is implicitly stated that since the passive forms of citizenship develop under the dominant position of the state elite and the bureaucratic apparatus, a state-centric approach is more appropriate in such a context.

At this point, a clarification is necessary. In studying a particular citizenship identity, the issue is not to make a methodological preference – state-centered or society centered - in accordance with the basic character of the citizenship tradition of a particular society. For example, a relatively active conception of citizenship should not be necessarily studied with a society-centered approach since it focuses more on social forces. As a matter of fact in different social-historical contexts, the civil-societal forces and the state sources - the constitution, bureaucracy, procedures, laws, political and the discursive institutions of the modern statecraft are combined in

²² Ibid., 17-18.

various ways in the formation of a particular citizenship identity. It is constructed through an extensive “politics of closure” which is carried out through the practical-political acts and various discursive practices of the modern state.

A particular citizenship identity is then, the result of an extensive politics of closure to which various social groups like property owners, men, whites, educated men, men of particular occupations, adults etc. took precedence to benefit from it. This is the basic historical fact about modern citizenship that we should meet face to face.²³ It is an identification with the central political authority, articulated within a “politics of closure” which is carried out by that particular authority.

The comparative positions of the state and the social forces and the cultural variations in the formation of the public space should be analyzed first within the processes of external and internal closure, which goes hand in hand with the state formation. The peculiar formation of national citizenship identity as an identity, which belongs to the state sphere rather than to the civil society, necessitates such an analysis. In this respect, this study rests prioritizes the state as the unit of analysis and a state-centered perspective for the analysis of Turkish case which provides a specific example of modern citizenship as the construction of an official, public identity with a hegemonic cultural (national) component.

²³ Stuart Hall, “Yurttaşlar ve Yurttaşlık” [The Citizens and Citizenship] in *Yeni Zamanlar: 1990’larda Politikanın Değişen Yüzü* [New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in 1990’s] ed. S. Hall and D. Held (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1995), 171.

1.3. The State and the Formation of Citizenship Identity

The state-centered approach to the citizenship analysis studies the state as an organization and the state formation as the historical context in the formation of a particular citizenship identity which is articulated within a particular national context and with a particular mode of integration. The point is that, the state-centric approach which will be adopted in this study differs sharply from the previous statist approaches in the citizenship analysis since it focuses on “discursive” as well as “political” consequences of the state’s activities.²⁴ It does not take the state as the only determining factor. Rather, it analyzes the formation and functioning of the state institutions in relational terms, that is the formation of the state is viewed as an integral part of the processes that state institutions are actively involved.

Therefore, a comprehensive state-centric approach should focus not only on the material constraints and opportunities afforded by the state institutions but also on the construction of the basic categories of a particular political system through the discursive activities of the modern statecraft. The formation of a particular citizenship identity is the outcome of such a relational process. Nevertheless, there is also the need to distinguish the construction of citizenship identity at the political level from that of it on a discursive level. This differentiation will contribute to the subsequent attempt to separate the three elements of citizenship identity -the territorial, cultural

²⁴ It is the Marshallian modernist citizenship theory that was criticized as being statist in terms of its exclusive emphasis on the state as the only determinant in the formation of modern citizenship. The difference of this study’s state-centered analysis from statism is the emphasis that any methodological preference to study a particular phenomena from a state-centered perspective should not see the state as a completed, finished entity both in terms of ideology and political organization. Rather the operation of state institutions are viewed as integral in the reproduction and consolidation of the state and the society it represents. See, Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State* (London, Routledge, 1996), 65-66.

(national) political dimensions- and the construction of them with the different instruments of the modern statecraft.

1.3.1. The State and the Political Construction of Citizenship Identity

At the first instance, therefore, a state-centric approach should focus on the practical-political activities of the state institutions, that is the decisions of the executives, parliaments, bureaucracies, the courts, of other administrative institutions and activities of the governments in the international field –which is the analytical instrument of this study on Turkish citizenship- that bind the state structures.²⁵ In this sense, state structures are the crucibles in which citizenship rights are formed and the agents that protect and maintain citizenship rights. State practices often appear as constraints on the development of citizenship rights, especially on the demands of the social forces. However, state activities may also create opportunities of access to citizenship rights. For example, a government’s decision to be a part of an international convention about citizenship rights opens the way for the development of that particular citizenship identity towards a more democratic-liberal direction. Social movements, interest groups, parties and individuals operate within previously defined system of citizenship specifying which rights are realizable and which duties are firmly obligatory.²⁶

Obviously, there are different factors that influence the long term development and ordering of citizenship rights in different regime types: The nature of the pre-modern structure, the nature of the state, the initial formation of citizenship rights, the existence or non-existence of military revolution, the tradition of social opposition,

²⁵ Janoski, *Citizenship*. 143.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 152.

and the consequent development of civil, political and social rights.²⁷ However, the nature of state has a proper place in the formation of a citizenship tradition since it constitutes the principal expression of political power in national societies in creating and enforcing the rules and law to which all social entities are subject.²⁸ The point is that the state rules with a firm support from major social classes and it is vital for the state to generate this support on a continuous basis. In this sense, the state may even choose to grant citizenship rights even in the absence of strong social demands to maintain its legitimacy.

The last point is important because the analysis of the political activities of the state provides a perspective to understand not only the development but also the restrictions on the citizenship rights and balancing them with obligations. Citizenship obligations are a significant part of citizenship identity and defined in relation to citizenship virtues which is heavily about loyalty to the state and to its political community. Citizenship obligations are duties of the individual to be fulfilled in return for the rights and protection by the state. In some social contexts, duties may have priority rather than rights as the basic character of the citizenship identity. An analysis of the construction of citizenship obligations through the practical-political acts of the state is important since the modern citizenship identity is distinctive with its obligation component as well as with its right dimension.

Therefore, the state constraints the forms in which citizenship politics is shaped. The process of state formation which consist of the establishment of administrative, juridical, educational, military and representative institutions explains major comparative differences between nations in terms of citizenship: bureaucratic

²⁷ Ibid., 173.

²⁸ Barbalet, *Citizenship*. 109.

structures, the constitutional framework, political parties and civil societal formations, a particular foreign policy orientation. Because of these divergent structures, therefore, countries vary on capacities to develop particular citizenship identities.²⁹

1.3.2. The State and the Discursive Construction of Citizenship Identity

The state-centered approach is not just the study of state institutions. The state's position in the construction of the "political community of citizens" should be viewed at a more general level, i.e., throughout the multi-level and multi-dimensional processes of state formation which have been marked by the political and also discursive activities of the state in creating, managing, and shaping its constituent parts including the citizenship identity.³⁰ Modern citizenship as the consequence of the discursive-constructive practices of the modern state can be better understood with the help of Jessop's analysis on the formation of the modern state and the society.

According to Jessop, any general definition of the state would need to refer to state discourse as well as state institutions.³¹ An ensemble of institutions and organizations which constitute the core of the state continuously define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of the society in the name of their common interest. In other words, state cannot be equated with simply government, law, bureaucracy and a coercive political apparatus but there is a political discourse which facilitates the constant articulation of a "common interest" and a "collective will" as the key features distinguishing the state authority from direct domination. The

²⁹ Janoski, *Citizenship*. 154.

³⁰ Pierson, *The Modern State*. 57.

³¹ Bob Jessop, *State Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 341.

society, whose common interest and the general will are administered by the state, therefore, could not be viewed as an empirical given as the state itself. The boundaries and the identity of the society –also the boundaries of the membership to society that is citizenship identity- are all constituted through the same processes by which the states are built, reproduced and transformed.³² The reproduction of a particular citizenship identity is then an integral part of these multi-level practices and discourses in and through which the common interest and the identity of the society are articulated.

Therefore, at an abstract level, citizenship identity is a construction which involves a continuous process of internal integration. The modern-state has to maintain the integration and cohesion of the wider society as the stable core of support and compromise. This integration is carried out through “political projects” that are directed towards the generation of “society effect”.³³ The creation and maintenance of a particular citizenship identity is also an active political project on the part of the state elite in the same way. In this respect, an analysis on the construction and politicization of the boundaries between people of inclusion (the community of citizens) and exclusion (the foreigners) necessitates a “strategic” and “relational” approach to the state.³⁴

The “strategic” implies an element of intentional action through which structure bounded actors –the elite- pursuing particular state projects create and maintain a particular identity for the state and its bounded community of citizens. It is also a “relational” not a linear path of development in the sense that the state is the

³² Ibid., 342.

³³ Ibid., 346.

³⁴ Pierson, *The Modern State*. 79.

generator and the product of strategies through which boundaries are defined, spaces are demarcated and the values and criterion of legitimacy are put forward.³⁵ The point is that citizenship politics is the integral part of these processes of boundary- drawing. It is at the same time the constituting subject and object of the state activity. Through the institution of citizenship, individuals become identified with the state. From such a perspective, the theory of citizenship should pay attention to the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion which feature the citizenship identity and in return reflects the basic character of that identity.

Therefore the analysis of the state's activities on the discursive level is central in understanding the formation of any citizenship identity as one of the central political projects of the state in creating and maintaining its base of legitimacy. The underlying idea is that a particular citizenship identity has no foundation prior to or outside of the operation of the state institutions at the discursive level.

1.4. The Three Elements of Modern Citizenship Identity

As the above parts have implicitly stated, in this study, the categories of the state identity, national identity and citizenship identity are taken as analytically different categories. The identity of the political community of citizens is different from the identity of the state as well as from the national identity. Rather, citizenship identity is seen as comprising both of them and it should be thought analytically different from but historically fused with those identities.

The formation of the modern citizenship identity proposes the following undertakings by the state, each have both political and the discursive consequences: First, in defining its citizenry, the state initiates a territorial closure which draws the

³⁵ Ibid.

physical boundaries of the “community inside” and outside. Secondly, through the politics of external and internal closure, it defines the terms of a homogenous, unitary membership which erases or negates divisive differences and within a delimited territory. Finally, modern citizenship entails a particular mode of integration which constitutes from a body of shared values, institutions, a particular political disposition concerning the relationship between the state and the citizen. The mode of integration of a particular political community includes a general political ethos which may turn to a collectively enforced common good and draws the limits of legitimate politics with a particular balance between rights and obligations.

The process of citizenship formation is therefore a series act of closure concerning the other nations outside and the indigenous populations and the minorities inside.³⁶ First of all, territorial citizenship historically indicates the territorialization of the legitimate rule and political membership.³⁷ The citizens’ territory is the political space to which access is controlled by the state. While, the main concern in drawing the territorial boundaries between citizenries is to maximize the differences among the citizens of different countries, in the domestic field it is to minimize these differences. The latter corresponds the second aspect of modern citizenship identity that is the cultural (national) character of citizenship. Historically, the fusion between national belonging and political membership under national citizenship identity have brought the subordination of particularism to universality

³⁶ In this study, the definition of citizenship as a territorial, cultural, and political identity mainly rests on William R. Brubaker’s analysis of citizenship as a social closure which is inspired from Weber’s analysis of open and closed social relationships. According to Weber, as Brubaker underlines, social interaction may be open to all comers, or it may be closed in the sense that it excludes or restricts the participation of certain outsiders. In the same way, citizenship can be viewed as the materialization of a social closure of a specific kind, carried on by the specific administrative agencies of the modern state to separate insiders and outsiders, the citizens and foreigners. See William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1992), pp.23-30.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 22.

within the nation state and such a membership transcending particular loyalties have been created through various strategies of colonialism, nationalism and even racism.³⁸

Modern citizenship also refers to formation of a specific political community with a particular mode of integration which entails a system of values, norms, morals, institutions and an ideology of membership. The expansion of citizenship rights and the balancing of them with obligations occur within the framework of an ideological and political universe, which is constituted around the institutions, values and the discourse of nation-state. This is the political account of citizenship which refers to the nature and quality of citizenship rights and participation within a delimited territory.

These three identity-producing dynamics of the modern statecraft operate through several instruments and in several policy areas that the state controls. Among them foreign policy and the national security conception have the central role in drawing the territorial, cultural and political boundaries of the citizenship identity. Basically, the political consequences of foreign policy acts and the general foreign policy orientation as a part of the discursive economy of the modern state shape “the politics of citizenship”. In other words, foreign policy can be viewed as a political practice and the discourse on which the state rests in constituting, producing and maintaining the identity of its political community. To understand more precisely the operation of foreign policy through the three elements of citizenship identity, it is necessary to reconsider the concept of foreign policy.

³⁸ Dominique Schnapper, *Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 27.

CHAPTER II

FORIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP

2.1.Introduction

The previous chapter on “modern citizenship identity as the outcome of the politics of closure conducted by the modern state” is the first part of the theoretical framework for the case study of this dissertation which is the construction of modern Turkish citizenship during the national struggle period. This chapter will focus on the second aspect of the theoretical framework that is the role of foreign policy in drawing the physical, cultural and ethical-ideological boundaries of the modern citizenship both at the political and discursive levels.

In this respect, the first discussion will revolve around the question of “ how foreign policy as a discourse and as a practice of the modern nation-state has a central role in the “politics of citizenship through closures” within a delimited territory?” Secondly, the focus will be on the question of “how foreign policy acts and decisions function through territorial, cultural and political elements of citizenship identity?” The following part which tries to answer these questions will complete the theoretical framework for the case analysis of the dissertation that is the construction of Turkish national citizenship during the passage from an imperial rule to a nation-state.

2.2. Foreign Policy Reconsidered

In the conventional-realist approach to the study and practice of international relations -which has been the hegemonic school of thought especially in the practice of state-centered international politics since the second world war- foreign policy is the external orientation of the states which have fixed and stable identities.¹ The spatial-temporal conditioning of the state and the society against the outside world and against the “other” is momentary that is completed at a particular historical juncture and remains unchanged. The foreign policy of a particular state is formulated to defend the pre-defined interests and security of that particular identity. Therefore, the conventional foreign policy analysis has been an extremely state-centric field since it assumes the state as the only actor representing and perfectly coinciding with the unproblematic, undifferentiated, unitary and temporarily fixed identity of the political “community inside” that is of the community of citizens.²

In this way, the “realist approach” in the study and practice of international relations views foreign policy as a bridge which connects the individual state to the international system. A state’s general foreign policy orientation and the practices are the consequences of the interaction between the dynamics of the domestic community,

¹ For a general review of different approaches to foreign policy analysis and the critique of realist epistemology in the field, see Steve Smith, “Foreign Policy Analysis” in *International Relations*, ed. S. Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 45-55; Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Analysis” in *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*, ed. A.J.R. Groom and M. Light (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 93-108; Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, eds., *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1995).

² David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 42-43.

the structure of the state and the international dynamics each have a definite, completed identity the international field.

As a parallel development to the rise of an anti-realist critique in every field of the social sciences during the 80's, "comparative foreign policy school" challenged the realist assumptions of the conventional foreign policy analysis by recognizing the "political" nature of foreign policy acts and decisions which means they represent particular choices related with the nature of the "political debate" within the "community inside". However, the new school could not end the ascendancy of epistemic realism in the study of foreign policy and generally in the study of international relations totally. Basically the nature of the state and its relations with the community of citizens concerning foreign relations were viewed in the same way.³

It is with the introduction of the interpretative approach to the study of international relations that the identity of the state and of the political community it represents; the state-society relations with respect the conduct of international relations; the identity constructing and reinforcing effects of foreign policy acts and decisions and particularly the relationship between national security policy and the reproduction of national identity have been problematized. It is this novel approach that will be utilized in this dissertation to concretely establish the relationship between the operation of foreign policy and the construction of a domestic citizenship identity in Turkey.

The interpretative approach views the international system and foreign relations as an arena of practices that constitute the subjects of the field, that is the individual

³ Ibid. 45.

states, their political communities, other international actors and the whole system.⁴ The reciprocal positions of these subjects are sustained by a variety of practices -primarily by foreign policy acts and decisions- which establish and maintain the physical and ethical-ideological boundaries among different political communities. Here, border drawing means more than spatial demarcation. Foreign policy acts and decisions are a part of “politics of citizenship” since they both rest on and legitimize the cultural-ethical and ideological criterion which separate the citizens and non-citizens and naturalize a particular political-social order within the community inside. In other words, foreign policy practices are the central dynamics in the construction and maintenance of a particular citizenship identity within a delimited territory. Therefore, the interpretative approach presents an opportunity to reconceptualize foreign policy via the problematizations of the identity of the state and the identity of the political community with which the state identifies itself.⁵

The interpretative approach rests on the recent alternative accounts about the rise of the modern state which have reversed the established idea that the modern state grew in a sequential development pattern with strict temporal divisions between historical

⁴Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. Campbell’s study on the relationship between United States’ foreign policy and the making of American identity is one of the most exclusive examples of using foreign policy as an analytical instrument to observe the formation of the American political identity at different levels. He mainly focuses on American identity as a state identity in the international field, but his theoretical framework is also beneficial to study the formation of American national identity and the domestic social order which definitely includes the identity of the American citizen. He states that ‘The operation of foreign policy practices frames the domestic society.....through the claim to know the sources of the threats to domestic society and man;....the meaning of man incorporates the form of the domestic order, the social relations of production, to various subjectivities....., the boundaries of legitimate social and political action.’ In this respect, this dissertation benefits from this framework to read foreign policy as a constructive agent in the construction and reinforcement of the physical and cultural, and ethical boundaries of a particular citizenship identity. In this respect, see also pp.69-70.

periods. According to these new accounts, the evolution of the modern state forms had occurred through a multifaceted process which was neither linear nor progressive. Modernity brought different series of dispositions and orientations to different social formations. In this way, they have challenged the idea that modern states emerged with homogenous political communities and settled identities.⁶

The point is that, these alternative approaches to the rise of the modern state make it possible to understand the foundational discourses behind the so called prior, stable and homogenous identities. Foreign policy especially through its conception of “national security” is one of these identity constituting discourses of the modern state. In this perspective, foreign policy shifts “from a concern of the relations between states which takes place across ahistorical, frozen and pre-given boundaries to a concern of the establishment of the boundaries (both territorial and ethical) that constitute the state and its political community of citizens”.⁷ Then, foreign policy becomes a political practice and a discourse, which actively draws the boundaries between the community inside and outside, scripts a particular identity for the community inside rather than acting as a bridge between the pre-defined community and the international environment.

Therefore, the interpretative approach has presented a completely novel and different perspective to foreign policy analysis. Instead of being the external orientation of a particular state with a fixed identity, foreign policy is now formulated as an integral part of the state-building and nation-building including the definition of the boundaries the community inside that is of citizenship. In other words, it is not something

⁶ Ibid. 46-47.

⁷ Ibid. 69.

subsequent to formation of the state and of its political community or of the state system, but integral to their constitution.⁸

2.3. Foreign Policy and the Identity of the Political Community of Citizens

The identity of the state and the identity of the political community of citizens are analogous in the sense that both are constructed and reproduced through the inscription of physical and ethical-ideological boundaries which separate inside/outside, the citizen/and the foreigner. However, since foreign policy is an instrument of the state, i.e., of the ruling elite as a subject of high politics, the state is in a position to use it to enframe a particular political community inside as the basis of legitimacy for its external and internal actions. In this sense, foreign policy acts and decisions become a part of the “political projects” of the state which are designed to create “society effects” or a “society of normalization” within the “community inside”. The point is that the boundaries and the identity of the society are constituted through the same processes by which the states are built.⁹ The state encourages and legitimizes certain dispositions and orientations while opposing and delegitimizing the others and drawing the boundaries of the political. This is not a total hegemony; rather it is the generation of social consent and commitment of the citizens that make the state to maintain its position.¹⁰

These political projects of normalization rest on not on a single founding act but on various “stylized repetition acts” of the state in every field of modern life such as education, health, law, public security, general economic order, environment, national

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Bob Jessop, *State Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 342.

¹⁰ Campbell, *Writing*. 10.

security and foreign relations in which practices constitute the subject. Foreign policy acts and decisions are the perfect example of “stylized acts” of the state which serve perfectly for the creation and maintenance of the cultural and ideological boundaries on a continuous basis.¹¹ As a sphere of state activity which is intrinsically a part of the formation of the state and of the “community inside” the foreign policy practices repetitively produce and reproduce the boundaries. At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between two forms of foreign policy each has identity-constituting effects on different levels.

First there is “Foreign Policy” which refers to various practices that draw mainly the territorial-physical boundaries of the community inside.¹² It is the spatial division of the inside/outside which also informs the prevailing cultural-ideological criterions in separating the citizens and the foreigners. This is the political level at which unilateral declarations, border agreements and various other treaties and conventions signed between the states divide up the regions and the peoples (See the above discussion on the state and the political construction of citizenship identity). Concerning the subject of this study, the territorial boundaries of modern Turkish citizenship were materialized through such unilateral declarations and international treaties which also informed about an emerging project of modern-nation state and an idea of modern-Western type citizenship. The foreign policy acts and decisions of the Turkish nationalist leaders were very informative about the problematic passage from an imperial to national citizenship with changing concerns in drawing the physical boundaries of the new state and also of

¹¹ Ibid. 11-12.

¹² Ibid. 76.

the new citizenship conception which will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters.

Secondly, there is also a “discursive level” that the practical “Foreign Policy” operate. At this level, “foreign policy” does not define certain events and actors as foreign only since they are situated in opposition to a pre-given social entity. The other/outsider that is the non-member becomes foreign through the imposition of certain interpretations about them.¹³ This is the construction of the ethical-ideological boundaries of citizenship. At this level, “foreign policy” refers to various practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion which constitute their objects and particular political dispositions and values as outsider in the process of dealing with them. Moreover, it does not belong only to the state sphere. It also refers to a particular resolution of identity and difference, which applies, to confrontations taking place in different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender or geography. In this respect, in Turkish case, all the foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalist leaders definitely entailed particular ethical and ideological criterion, values and political dispositions which became definitive features of the emerging conception of political membership. They became the criterion of legitimate and proper membership which was characterized by a commitment to a centrally defined public good.

Therefore, conceptually, “foreign policy” provides the discursive matrix of interpretations in which the first “Foreign Policy” operates.¹⁴ The latter reflects the practical-political acts of the state which differentiates the inside from the outside. The

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

former, on the other hand is the abstract discursive level which determines the operation of the distinction between the self and the other in every field of life. The identity it proposes for the community inside is not articulated as citizenship but as a particular ethnique, gender, cultural, linguistic identity which discursively negates those who do not fit even it allows to their entrance. Therefore, it works through negation rather than definition.

However, one should underline that, such a novel approach to foreign policy differs concretely from the conventional arguments that the domestic factors influence foreign policy or that international influences play a role in structuring domestic politics.¹⁵ In these arguments, the domestic and the international are regarded as independently existing bodies which exert influence over each other. The new approach, however, views the constitution of the domestic society with a particular cultural identity and with a particular mode of integration as integral to the performance of foreign policy acts and decisions.

The point is that, both at the discursive and political levels, in securing the boundaries of the domestic identity, foreign policy rests on a certain conception of national security and a certain representation of threat coming from outside.¹⁶ In return, foreign policy principles and decisions frame the domestic society -in whose name they operate- through their claim to know the source of threats to domestic society and to the citizen-individual. In this way the construction and constitution of the foreign, the other, the anarchic and the dangerous are made possible by practices that also constitute the

¹⁵ Ibid. 69.

¹⁶ Ibid. 77.

member, the domestic, and make the state the sole security provider. What is the relationship between the national security conception and the discourse of threat in the reproduction of the identity of the state and of its political community of citizens?

2.3.1 “National” Security drawing the Boundaries of “National” Identity

According to Walker, the meaning of security is tied to historically specific forms of political community.¹⁷ In modern times, since the primary form of political community is the modern state, the concept of security refers particularly the security of the modern state. The question “Who should be secured in what respect? “ is answered from a state-centered point of view. The state as the only authority having the legitimate monopoly of violence in a particular territory draws the boundaries of the community to be secured via its definition of what –or who- the threat is. The statist conception of security and the foreign policy acts and decisions based on that conception reflect and reproduce deeply entrenched assumptions about political action and identity.¹⁸

Therefore, historically, modernity has prioritized the security of high level entities like the nation and the state. The state’s position as the ultimate standard of security has historically made the state-bounded political community that is the national citizenry, the only legitimate political community to be secured. In other words, given the identification between national identity and citizenship, the security of a particular citizenry is defined in terms the sustainability of traditional-hegemonic patterns of national culture, language, religion, some other national characteristics, and a system of

¹⁷ R. B.J. Walker, “Security, Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics.” *Alternatives*. XV (1990), 5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 5-6.

values, and political traditions. National security conception is defined tightly knit to the security of each of these components.¹⁹ Therefore, a matter of language or culture may easily be interpreted as a threat against national security.

In this way, a particular national security conception and foreign policy acts and decisions based on that conception, have identity-producing and sustaining effects. It prioritizes a particular cultural (national) and political identity to be secured from the external threats. The point is that the identity of the state and the boundaries of the community inside that is citizenship are secured by the representation of the threat which is integral to national security conception.²⁰ In a more general sense, the feeling of threat and the need for security are the main factors in the construction and development of any communal identity. In case of the modern state, the perception or construction of threats -sometimes the artificial ones- has become a tool for the consolidation of the identity of the political community and for the linking of the resistant elements. In the same way, the state identity has been constructed and secured by the creation and representation of danger via foreign policy. The production and articulation of danger or feeling of insecurity become a precondition for a state to exist. Threats are not the factors that weaken the state; on the contrary, they constitute its reason of existence.²¹

At that point the concept of national security is closely related with the principle of state of sovereignty. The principle of state sovereignty refers to the existence of a supreme political authority which has an unquestionable right to determine the form and

¹⁹ Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 89-90.

²⁰ Campbell, *Writing*. 69.

²¹ *Ibid.* 12.

content of the rules and regulations in a given territory and the right to absolute government. This principle has two functions in the reinforcement of the dominant understanding of security. First, by drawing the boundaries of the territory on which it is sovereign, the state actually draws the boundaries of the political space together with the boundaries of the community which will be the subject of security. The state will provide justice and will realize universal values and standards for that community. The security policy is employed on the boundary between the claim about political community inside and the lack of community outside.²² Secondly, besides this spatial demarcation, the principle of state sovereignty brings also a temporal demarcation. It purports the understanding that progress is only possible within the states which have stable political systems. Therefore, the twin principles of state sovereignty and national security draw the line between the inside as progressive, secure, legitimate and outside as excluded, backward and illegitimate.²³

Therefore, security (defense) policy and the articulation of danger turn to a performative political discourse through which the inscription of the boundaries of “normal” politics and the disciplining of a national identity becomes possible.²⁴ Foreign policy practices become a tool to integrate the resistant elements to a coherent, definite identity on the inside. In effect, all differences, discontinuities and conflicts are converted into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic society understood as an identity and a domain of anarchy. Through foreign policy acts and decisions

²² Walker, “Security,” 11-12.

²³ Ibid. 12.

²⁴ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 151-152.

“boundaries are constructed, spaces are demarcated, standards of legitimacy are incorporated, interpretations of history are privileged and alternatives are marginalized”.²⁵

As a last point, one should underline that even if the identity of the state and of the political community depend on various representational practices, there is not one foundational moment that these identities are constructed. Rather, there are many foundational moments which constitute a state’s mode of inclusion and exclusion.²⁶ There are pivotal moments at which practices of foreign policy are integral to the reproduction of an identity. As the following pages will analyze, the declaration of the National Pact, Sévres Treaty, the Turco-Soviet rapprochement process and most significantly the Lausanne treaty were the foundational moments in Turkish history at which the boundaries of the community inside and the nature of the domestic political order were crystallized.

How the community inside that is the political community of citizens is figured out through foreign policy and Foreign Policy? To analyze this, it is necessary to think the operation of the foreign policy practices both at the political and discursive levels through the three elements of citizenship identity.

²⁵ Campbell, *Writing*. 72-75.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 79.

2.4. Citizenship Identity and the Territorial Closure

One of the central characteristics of the modern state is that historically, it represents the territorialization of the legitimate rule.²⁷ The bounded territory creates a political space to which access is controlled by the central state. Therefore, basically, territorial demarcation separates the “community inside” from outside and proposes a particular form of membership that is citizenship for the individuals remaining inside. Historically, modern citizenship was the direct consequence of the processes that created the modern state both as a territorial organization and as political community. It was an outcome of the territorial closure which also entailed a “social closure” of members and non-members.²⁸ What is the meaning of territorial closure in terms of the formation of citizenship identity in modern times?

First of all, territorial closure means border definition. The location of the physical limits and the purposes they serve influence the lives of the people separated by frontiers.²⁹ Historically, citizenship as a formal identity has always entailed a location articulated within the spatial framework of a particular political authority. The political authority that is the ruling elite of a particular territory has employed a particular “politics of citizenship” through drawing borders which divided the inhabitants of an area into citizens and non-citizens. In this respect, the modern frontier is a distinctive historical institution since it has defined -and in turn has been defined by- a sovereign

²⁷ William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 24-25.

²⁸ Ibid. 27.

²⁹ Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), 1.

authority, the cultural (national) identity of individuals and exercise of citizenship that is political membership. In other words, citizenship was the instrument to allocate rights and resources as well as to define some obligations by virtue of spatial determination. With the formal definition of the territorial boundaries, therefore, the modern state realizes also a “social closure” establishing a particular population to whom the benefits of citizenship are accorded. In this respect, citizenship has been both an object and an instrument of closure.³⁰

Secondly, and as a consequence of the first aspect, the territorialization of the rule expresses an account of the character and location of political community in explicitly spatial terms.³¹ Especially under modernity, frontiers are not simply lines separating one jurisdiction and authority from another. They are central to understanding the nature of the “politics” and the “political life” inside. Specifically, territorial closure represents the spatio-temporal framing of the claims about the political community and the criteria of legitimate membership.³²

The territorial exclusivity of the modern nation-state implies that there can be no external jurisdictions and no political loyalties across the frontier. The people confined by a frontier are supposed to share a common fund of loyalties, values and characteristics.³³ Frontiers materialize the most fundamental division between inside and outside, domestic and foreign, the sphere of citizen entitlements and being a foreigner.

³⁰ Brubaker, *Citizenship*. 23.

³¹ Walker, *Inside/Outside*. 127.

³² Walker, “Security.” 172-173.

³³ Anderson, *Frontiers*. 7-8.

In this respect, the borders represents the outer limit of the sovereignty of the state and of the political community.

Therefore, under modernity, state building and the construction of the citizenship identity began with territorial closure and went as parallel processes. Historically, modern territorial closure has been claimed to be based on “nationality principle” especially since the First World War. The basic criterion that the states applied in territorial closure have been the cultural-national homogeneity, the majority principle, strategic and military concerns and the mix of all of them. Whatever the criterions applied, however, the public-political identity which was envisaged for the members have not always coincided with the cultural identity of the inhabitants of a territory. In other words, the cultural and political boundaries may not be perfectly overlapped. Most of the today’s nation-states are hardly nation-states in the sense that they are not based on exclusive national communities.³⁴

Although it has been the case, modern frontiers have functioned well as the markers of at least formal citizenship identity and became the basis of the myths about the unity of the people within and of the discourse of the integrity of a particular territory. In most of the cases, the borders gain mythic significance in building nations and political identities (formal citizenship) and become the myth-motor of the reproduction of the domestic identity. The physical demarcation becomes the basis of the consciousness of togetherness and loyalty to the state which are the fundamental elements of citizenship.³⁵ In this respect, the politics of drawing borders which is

³⁴ Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe: 1492-1992.” *Theory and Society*.23 (1994), 137.

³⁵ Anderson, *Frontiers*. 2.

conducted by the central political authority is central in any understanding of the individual and collective political identities.

2.4.1. Foreign Policy and Citizenship as a Territorial Closure

The territorial closure as the first step of enframing a “community inside” and a particular citizenship identity is materialized and maintained through foreign policy acts, namely through the procedures of defense and diplomacy. The fundamental documents are the bilateral or multilateral treaties or specific border agreements.³⁶ In some cases, however, a state may unilaterally declare a claim on a particular territory by suggesting historical, cultural or strategic reasons. Cultural links with the people living beyond de jure frontiers or a security conception identified with a factor beyond de jure frontiers may be the reasons for a state’s claim about additional territories. However, the formal boundaries are the ones which are recognized by the international community.

Because of this reason, in the modern international system, in most of the cases, it was the formal foreign policy documents that define physical boundaries of “the community inside” and the terms of legitimate membership. The non-citizens are denied from the political identity and the status, i.e., from the rights and obligations that are reserved for the citizens. While the conditions of the territorial closure may change across demographic, economic, political and cultural contexts, these agreements remain as the fundamental documents of “statehood” and “national existence”. They certify the boundaries within which the order that the modern state enforces is binding not only on members but also to on all persons temporarily or permanently present in the territory.

³⁶ Brubaker, *Citizenship*. 27.

The territorial state has the power to exclude the unemployed, unfit, unassimilated or undesired residents.³⁷ Therefore, at the political level, through the formal foreign policy acts and decisions, the modern state realizes the territorial closure and maintain a citizenship institution which excludes the undesired elements.

The territorial borders of the modern Turkish nation-state was established with an international act, the Lausanne Treaty which was a multilateral treaty signed among the Entente powers and the new Turkish government on July 24th 1923 before the establishment of the republic on October 23rd 1923. However, even before the Lausanne Treaty, in a series of foreign interactions, agreements and treaties, the new ruling elite developed the fundamental territorial premises of their project of nation-state with a new conception of national citizenship. Beginning with the National Pact, which was a unilateral declaration of the new political initiative, the civil-military leaders of the Turkish national movement began to leave their imperial territorial vision gradually. Instead of saving as much imperial territories as possible, they began to focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Anatolia and employed a “politics of citizenship” which was based on primarily the religious homogeneity within Anatolia and the Thrace. The new politics of citizenship was articulated within a politics of drawing borders which was carried out via foreign policy acts and decisions in this early period. As will be examined in the coming chapters, at the political level, the territorial closure of modern Turkish citizenship was completed through a series of bi-lateral and multilateral treaties which drew the physical limits separating the citizens and the foreigners.

³⁷ Ibid. 26.

This is the formal-political dimension of the territorial closure. However, there are also discursive consequences of any kind of territorial closure. In this respect, bilateral and multilateral treaties, the unilateral claims on particular territories and peoples and all the foreign policy acts and decisions drawing physical borders can be read as the documents constructing also the ethical boundaries, cultural standards, and an ideology of citizenship. In most of the cases, once signed and enforced, they become the unquestionable sources of the historical metaphors about the natural integrity of a particular territory and the unique identity of its inhabitants. Living together and being rooted in a particular soil become a moral criterion for the definition of a common public identity, that is citizenship.³⁸ As a result, these documents become the sources of historical mystifications like fatherland, homeland or Holy Land and of a discourse of indivisible-sacred territory on which loyal citizens live. Therefore, the foreign policy acts and decisions drawing borders have strong identity forming effects.

In the Turkish case, the National Pact represents such a mystification. Although the original document was far from specifying neither the national nor irreducible territory of the new state, throughout the national struggle period and in the following periods, it was however, interpreted as indicating the limits of Turkish nationalism and the sacred-indivisible national frontiers. Soon after the establishment of the republic and today, the borders of the republic have been represented as definitive although they were formed after a series of pragmatic compromises.³⁹

³⁸ Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 117.

³⁹ Ümit Cizre, "Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Borders, Identity and Hegemony" in Ian Lustick, Brendan O'Leary and T. Callaghy, eds., *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 226.

Accordingly, the National Pact became the source of a most widely used nationalistic agitation, the “Misak-i Milli” heroism to refer to the “life or death issue” of Turkish political life which is territorial and political integrity. In this respect, it also became an indivisible part of Turkish national citizenship the conception of “community inside” throughout the republican period.

2.5. Citizenship as a National Closure

As the second aspect, the formation of modern citizenship identity involves the process of national closure. Basically, national closure draws the cultural boundaries of citizenship, i.e., the enframing of a particular cultural identity around which maximum (national) homogeneity is claimed and built for the members of the “community inside”. Therefore, besides territorial closure which delimits the physical boundaries of a particular citizenship identity, the centralized modern state conducts also a national closure which sketches out invisible but cultural boundaries for the “community inside”.⁴⁰

The first stage of the national closure is carried out towards the external world. The cultural boundaries are drawn in order to exclude the people who do not fit the specified cultural characteristics. In this process the aim is to maximize the differences between the “community inside” and outside. The internal national closure, as the second stage, is applied in order to minimize ethnic, religious, cultural, sectional or any other kind of social differences and loyalties which disrupts the sense of homogeneity within the “community inside”. It is an ethno-cultural closure which is exercised against

⁴⁰ Brubaker, *Citizenship*. 28.

a group of different ethno-cultural or religious origin even they are formal citizens. Here, there are tacit, uncodified classificatory criteria emerge to differentiate the proper citizens and citizens on paper.⁴¹ National homogeneity can be formulated on the basis of a core ethnicity, a religious affiliation, a particular language or various mixes of these elements of identity. Whatever the origin, a single identity is defined and imposed on the community through various strategies of homogenization, i.e., marginalization, eradication and assimilation and the like. As a result, the conditions of a national citizenry with which the modern nation-state identifies itself are constructed.⁴²

Historically, national identity has been an indivisible part of modern citizenship. The element of nationality presupposes that citizenship, as a membership in a political community should also involve membership in a cultural community that is in a community of culture, language, mores and character.⁴³ This assumption is also reflected in the semantic and ideological confusion surrounding the two concepts. In the legal literature, nationality and citizenship are used as synonyms. However, there is a categorical difference between the two concepts. Modern citizenship primarily means membership in a territorially delimited political community. On the other hand, national identity implies belonging to a cultural community which may cross the physical borders

⁴¹ Ibid. 29.

⁴² Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship" in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, ed., Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1994), 207; Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 49-50.

⁴³ Tomas Hammar, "Citizenship: Membership of a Nation or of a State." *International Migration*. 24 (1986), 743.

between states. One can be a member of a particular state without belonging to the national community of that state and vice versa.⁴⁴

The fusion between the elements of nationality and citizenship is in fact an ideological conflation and dates back to the early phase of nation building in Europe. The modern idea of citizenship emerged originally as a civic-territorial concept but throughout the 19th century thought and politics, the emancipatory idea of citizenship was circumscribed by exclusive nationality laws which codified the formal requirements that must be met by an individual to be recognized as nationals of a particular state.⁴⁵ These requirements gradually gained an ethnic-genealogical character even in France where citizenship depended primarily on territory and commitment to political integrity. Throughout Europe, in varying degrees in different national contexts, the extension of citizenship rights had gone hand in hand with the cultural homogenization of provinces, either through cultural assimilation of ethnically heterogeneous peoples or direct exclusion of the elements of difference.⁴⁶

As a result, citizenship and national identity became subsumed into one distinct status inherent to rather than acquired and became almost self-evident. Throughout the 19th century, the equation between the political community and the cultural community, indeed the culture of the dominant ethnic group undermined the public, open and shared

⁴⁴ Alfonso Alfonsi, "Citizenship and National Identity: The Emerging Strings in Western Europe" in *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism*, ed., T.K. Oomen (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 53.

⁴⁵ Verena Stolcke, "The Nature of Nationality" in *Citizenship and Exclusion*, ed., Veit Bader (London: Mac Millan Press, 1997), 63.

⁴⁶ Derek Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education* (London: Longman, 1990), 185.

character of citizenship.⁴⁷ This is the general pattern, however, the politics of citizenship in Europe has been complicated by the duality of the concept of nation, the ethnic and the territorial models.⁴⁸ In both models, national identity –whether as a civic or ethnic identity- has a central place in the politics of citizenship. Why is it so? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyze the function of the fusion between national identity and citizenship.

2.5.1. National Citizenship as the Basis of Legitimacy

According to Anthony Smith, nation is a community of people who obey the same law and institutions within a given territory. In this perspective, the most salient political function of national identity is the legitimization of common legal rules, the rights and duties, and of legal institutions which rest on the values and character of the nation and the state.⁴⁹

The point is that it is by means of national citizenship that the modern state could create an egalitarian membership transcending particular identifications and loyalties as the basis of legitimacy for its internal and external actions. It has been the main instrument of the state elite to create a sense of unique consciousness and the conditions of popular participation from which the central political authority has taken its power. The ruling elite rests on such a genuine and unified social base in its search for centralization against the threats of external intervention and of internal disintegration.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 58-62.

⁴⁸ Smith, National. 99.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 16.

In other words, the institution of citizenship has been the perfect combination of political and cultural elements on which the legitimacy of the modern nation-state has been rested.⁵⁰

In this respect, the national idea can be thought as unique in the history of humanity since it integrates populations into a community of citizens whose existence legitimates the internal and external actions of the state.⁵¹ Nations not just by their existence but as the community of citizens become the source of legitimacy.

Therefore, there may be two or more models of national identity and corresponding models of citizenship. But concerning the function of the fusion between national identity and citizenship, there is only one idea of nation as a legitimating entity. “ There is only one idea of nation, although unequally and imperfectly accomplished, varying from case to case, depending on the political project which is at the origin of national construction”.⁵²

Accordingly, the modern nation-state has to reproduce and sustain a national citizenship identity through various “political projects” by which the abstract community of citizens becomes a concrete reality capable of mobilizing populations. In other words, since the national identity and citizenship constitute a symbiosis in legitimating the peculiar values, mores, laws and actions of the state, the creation of a homogenous (national) political community with which the state would identify itself has been a vital project for states. The success of the state elite to reproduce the national citizenry as the basis of its legitimacy depends on its success especially in the national closure. How the

⁵⁰ Schnapper, *Community of Citizens*. 35.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 24.

⁵² *Ibid.* 149.

process of national closure operates to maintain the cultural boundaries of a particular citizenship identity within a delimited territory?

The process on national closure operates through two interrelated phases within the context of the modern nation-state: First, the state has to eradicate the ethnic, religious and other sectional loyalties –mostly in violent ways- in the existing political community. Secondly, it should maintain standardization through education, industrialization and military formation. The eradication of sectional loyalties is mostly achieved through the political projects of socialization to the national identity. The modern state has an enhanced capacity of administration to discipline the “community inside” in various ways i.e., imposing common languages, religions, currencies and legal systems as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transformation and communication.⁵³ The use of national symbols, socialization through the education system, and the establishment of the political institutions seem to represent all sections of the society like competitive elections, a particular national security conception, national thesis in foreign policy matters, a national position in international relations, compulsory military duty and national economy are some examples.

In different historical contexts, there emerged various forms of national integration namely, cultural pluralism, toleration, melting pot, conversion, discrimination, persecution, expulsion, assimilation, and annihilation. In each case however, exploitation, economic domination and the political hegemony characterized the relationship between the members of the dominant community and the members of

⁵³ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 100.

the minority or peripheral communities. In this respect, the treatment of minorities has special importance. The official recognition of particular communities as minorities and the terms of the rights that are recognized to them are the primary indications about the nature of the “politics of citizenship” that is applied by the dominant ethnic-cultural group. Whether an ethnic-genealogical or a civic-territorial citizenship politic prevails and the limits of the central authority to tolerate cultural pluralism are crystallized especially through the minority policy.

In this respect, national closure is not momentary but necessitates “continuous actions of common institutions” and their established forms of practices by which the state generate a particular citizenship identity which mainly incorporates particular cultural features and practices as the elements of national identity, i.e., ethnic, religious, linguistic.⁵⁴ Before going into the role of foreign policy in generating and reproducing the national elements of a particular citizenship identity, the general characteristics of the two models of national citizenship should be overviewed.

2.5.2. Two Models of National Citizenship

Basically, there are two views about the relationship between national identity and citizenship. According to the first view, there is not a conceptual but a historically contingent fusion between citizenship and national identity.⁵⁵ The concept and institution of citizenship had existed long before the nations emerged in Europe. However, with the rise of democratic-national state which was based on citizenship

⁵⁴ Schnapper, *Community of Citizens*. 39.

⁵⁵ Alfonsi, “Citizenship,” 69.

participation, citizenship became a status of belonging to a political community of citizens who actively contributed to its maintenance.

In the European tradition therefore, the strands of republicanism (the notions of popular sovereignty and participation) and nationalism run together. The cultural extension of legally defined notion of citizenship was much easier in a homogenized political community. In return, cultural (national) belonging provided the emotional adhesive and an original legitimacy to citizenship as a condition of membership. According to Habermas, the point is that, generally in Europe, political citizenship could absorb cultural nationhood. The dominant understanding concerning membership to a particular political community is political inclusion rather than exclusive cultural belonging. Modern idea of nation has a strong civic dimension which inspires the people of a shared territory with the sense of belonging to the same republic.⁵⁶

This fact, however, should not obscure another historical fact that without this cultural interpretation of political membership rights, the European state would hardly have established a new and a more abstract level of social integration through the legal implementation of democratic citizenship. With the institution of egalitarian citizenship, the nation state did not only provide democratic legitimization, but also created a new level of social integration through widespread participation.⁵⁷ In order to fulfill this integrative and legitimizing function, democratic citizenship must be more than just a

⁵⁶ Ibid. 70.

⁵⁷ Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State- Its Achievements and Its Limits: On the Post and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship” in *Mapping the Nation*, ed., Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 289.

legal status, it must be the focus of a shared political culture. Therefore, there is a historical justification of the fusion between national identity and citizenship.

In the second view, there is not an absolute success concerning the fusion between national identity and citizenship in the direction of egalitarian-civic membership. According to Anthony Smith, national identity and its ethnic core could not be absorbed by an understanding of citizenship as a form of political membership in most of the European states.⁵⁸ The modern nation-state rests on both ethnic-genealogical and civic-territorial elements and therefore, it presents a dual model of political unity. On the one hand, there is an affiliation to the state expressed in terms of rights and obligations of the citizenry; on the other hand, there is also an affiliation to an original-ethnic community in which individuals share common cultural characteristics and a natural loyalty. In this sense, the European examples display the troubled confluence between the civic and ethnic models.

According to Smith's historical interpretation, the European model of nation-state arose from an ethnic core and administrative, economic and cultural revolutions provided the incorporation of outlying regions and their ethnies into the dominant lateral ethnic culture through the agencies of bureaucratic state.⁵⁹ In this process, the ethnic members of an unbound political community were transformed into legal citizens which were conferred by civil, political and social rights of a particular political community. Citizenship was not only used to underline membership of the nation but also to remove the claims of competing alliances and identities notably the ethnic ones.

⁵⁸ Alfonsi, "Citizenship," 70-71.

⁵⁹ Smith, *National*.100.

These two views in fact differentiate two major conceptions of national citizenship appeared in Europe. They are also the modes and models of recruiting citizens through particular “politics of citizenship” which are complicated by the duality of the concept of nation.

2.5.2.1. The Civic-Territorial Model of National Citizenship

The first model is the civic-territorial model in which the nation has been conceived primarily in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state.⁶⁰ It is the political unity not a shared culture that constitutes the nation. In this political understanding of nationhood, the fundamental allegiance among the members and between the individual and the state is allegiance to the state which is formulated in terms of the rights and obligations of the citizens. The location of sovereignty in the people and the recognition of the fundamental equality of members constitute the essence of this territorial understanding of nationhood and citizenship. Accordingly, legal and political rights are considered as integral to the idea of nation. In principle, all members of the nation are legally equal and are bound by the same laws and institutions of the patria.⁶¹

Historically, this universalistic, unitary and secular conception of citizenship emerged with the French Revolution. The fundamental historical process leading to the emergence of the political community of citizens was the bureaucratic incorporation of the vast territories, their ethnies and classes by a dominant lateral ethnie parallel with the

⁶⁰ William Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis” in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, ed., Turner and Hamilton, 316.

⁶¹ Smith, *National*. 10.

regime change.⁶² In the first nation states, namely, in England, France and Spain, the relatively early development of nation coincided with the successive revolutions in the spheres of administration, economy and culture. The construction of an infrastructure that linked the distant parts of the state's territory and the extension of citizenship rights drew more and more areas and classes into the national political community and created the images of ever-existing nations of England, Spain and France. Therefore, the civic-territorial model is a state-sponsored model in which national identity is generated through military, fiscal, judicial, and administrative activities of the modernizing-bureaucratic state.⁶³

There is, however, a paradoxical aspect in this political understanding of citizenship. Political unity is not just a starting point but also an objective and a fundamental value in this model. It is so central that political unity is ideally expressed in strives for cultural unity.⁶⁴ In other words, political inclusion is conditioned by the cultural assimilation of the ethnic, religious, sectional and other kind of differences within a delimited territory. Historically, the universalist theory and practice of citizenship have depended on the confidence in the assimilatory workings of school, army and centralized administration in every sphere. In the French experience, throughout the 19th century, the ideal of political unity was identified mainly with the linguistic unity and brought a deliberate policy of making similar. The political conception of membership turned to a belief that the state could and should turn

⁶² Ibid. 100.

⁶³ Ibid. 101-102.

⁶⁴ Brubaker, "Immigration," 317.

strangers into citizens, peasants or immigrants into Frenchmen which was an internal national closure par excellence.⁶⁵

Therefore, the French model of civic-territorial national citizenship is marked by intolerance towards cultural pluralism. It informs a strong belief in the necessity of a centrally defined national citizenship identity –which is generally established around the cultural-ethnic and/or religious identity of the dominant group within the political community- as the basis of a strong state and perfect political integrity. As a political discourse, the civic-territorial conception claims openness to all who share common political objectives. However, the commitment to political unity is conditioned by the abandonment of original, local, cultural allegiances since they are viewed as divisive elements. In this way, the civic-territorial identity claims superiority over other identities and therefore pushes them outside the public sphere. The removing of other identity claims outside the public sphere is different from direct exclusion or isolation. However, it results in the same way the complete elimination of cultural difference of the relegation of those who do not fit the central identity to a secondary status.

2.5.2.2. The Ethnic-Genealogical Model of National Citizenship

The second model is the ethnic-genealogical one which developed primarily in Eastern Europe. It has been called as the “German model of national citizenship” since it was primarily in the German principalities and in Prussia that nationhood developed before the establishment of the centralized state in the 19th century. This historical difference in the sequence with respect to emergence of the nation and the state, resulted

⁶⁵ Ibid. 321.

in a fundamental difference in these two conceptions of national citizenship. In this model, being the member of a particular political community has been expressed not in political unity but in “cultural and ethnic authenticity”.⁶⁶ German model was developed in the hands of an elite who sought to establish a new state which would pursue the interests of the distinctively Germanic populations.

In this model, the nation is conceived as a historically rooted, organically developed individuality united by a distinct Volkgeist (national spirit) and by its expressions in language, custom, law, culture, and the state. The state is not constitutive but expressive of nationhood.⁶⁷ Therefore, the German and French traditions of national citizenship were shaped by distinctive traditions of national self-perception grounded in different historical routes to modern nation-state. The distinctive feature of eastern nationalism is its emphasis on a community of descent and native culture rather than territory. While in the territorial model, the people are subject to common laws and institutions, in the ethnic model, the people themselves are the object of nationalist aspirations and culture, language and the customs take place of the law.⁶⁸

According to Smith, Eastern nationalism reflects the profound dualism at the heart of every nationalism.⁶⁹ In fact, every nationalism contains ethnic and civic elements in varying degrees and in different forms. In both France and Germany as in other citizenship traditions following similar paths to either one, traditions of nationhood

⁶⁶ Brubaker, “Immigration,” 317.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 322.

⁶⁸ Smith, *National*. 12.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 13.

and citizenship have political and cultural elements. These elements have been closely identified and integrated in the French model where political unity is constitutive but cultural unity is expressive of nationhood. In German conception, however, the political and ethno-cultural aspects stand in tension with one another.⁷⁰ In different national contexts, the balance between these elements displays great variety in accordance with the route that the society followed on the way to modernization. On the other hand, under different historical conjunctions one element despite the prominence of the other may become more influential and definitive.

2.5.3. Foreign Policy as the Instrument of National Closure

Foreign policy is one of the major institutions which contributes to the success of the centrally directed national closure of citizenship within a delimited territory. As the above part has discussed in detail, foreign policy operates at two levels: “Foreign policy” as the discursive field which involves “Foreign Policy” practices serves well to the central authority in its project of constructing and maintaining a homogenous national citizenry inside. At the discursive level, “foreign policy” is based on and at the same time reproduces a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference which are primarily constructed through a particular conception and discourse of “national security”.⁷¹

The state rests its activities in the international field on a conception of national security and on a discourse of danger –including a specific representation of fear and

⁷⁰ Brubaker, “Immigration,” 322.

⁷¹ Campbell, *Writing Security*. 69-71.

ranking of threats -which prioritizes the security of a particular community. Foreign policy acts and decisions have boundary producing and identity constituting effects since they are internal to the maintenance of national consciousness and solidarity. In this respect, the issue of security becomes a performative discourse which is constitutive of national identity and also of a particular political order.

Secondly, “Foreign Policy” as the site of practices is a collection of “stylized repetitive acts of the state” par excellence which enframe and sustain a particular identity inside in a continuous manner. Among the modern state’s political practices, it has been granted a privileged position and is counted as representing the whole community. Therefore, it is an instrument which sustains and strengthens an internal process of communication and integration. Furthermore, foreign policy acts and decisions contribute to the socialization of the citizens as nationals in the framework of national solidarity. Foreign relations are carried out by the state elite with an overwhelmingly nationalist language and symbolism. The routine foreign policy acts namely meetings, negotiations, official visits, bi-lateral or multilateral agreements, international conventions, declarations, consultations all they are performed repetitively in the name of a national identity.⁷²

In this respect, especially foreign policy texts are important in maintaining the discursive boundaries between the community inside and outside. The conception of national security on which they rest includes more than the strategic analysis of a particular foreign policy issue. It also actively scripts a particular identity inside that is it draws the boundaries of the “national” as a fictive sphere of unity. Foreign policy texts

⁷² Ibid. 76.

always invoke three main elements whose indivisibility is sine qua non for the national existence: territory, history and community. In this way, they obscure ethnic, class, gender, religious differences in the within the national population and justify the eradication of intermediate bodies, loyalties and local differences for the interests of the “national” community as a whole. Campaigns against enemies or against the external threats of all kinds are as functional as road building, history writing, and public education in generating an integrated national societies in modern times.⁷³

As a consequence, the point is that, foreign policy acts and decisions and foreign policy discourse as a whole, strengthen the nationality element within a particular citizenship identity. As the above parts on citizenship identity has cited, modern national citizenship was born with an uneasy tension between the voluntary notion of universal membership and an inherited notion of genealogical belonging of a shared history. This tension can only be solved if a cosmopolitan understanding of human rights can be given priority over an ethnocentric notion of membership and community. The institution of foreign policy, on the contrary, rests on and reinforces a national security conception which is exclusively about the protection of the hegemonic notion of national belonging. The security of a national identity means the security of a particular culture, language, heritage, and all other characteristics of a particular dominant, core-ethnie around which a homogenous identity is constructed either through direct exclusion or assimilation. In this sense, the concept of national security prioritizes the security of the dominant ethnic-national community. Therefore, foreign policy acts and decisions are central in

⁷³ Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, (1997), 79.

reproducing not just the predominance of nationality element but also in reproducing a single ethnic consciousness within a particular citizenship identity.

In this respect, the operation of foreign policy both at the political and discursive levels obviously damages the balance within the national citizenship identity in favor of an ethnic-genealogical element. Foreign policy acts and decisions contribute to an exclusionary understanding of political community and citizenship to gain priority over an inclusionary one. It is a field which provide the governments the pretext to pursue discriminatory and assimilationist policies against ethnic, religious, regional and other cultural minorities.

Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the fundamental premises on which the new citizenship conception would rest were become evident especially in the foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalist leadership. Although they were unilateral declarations to the international community indicating the determination of the nationalists to save the independence of the country, they were at the same time the documents that drew the cultural boundaries of the “community inside” and the terms of “proper membership” as formulated in this early period. Throughout the national struggle period, the idea of establishing a modern nation-state with a national citizenry gradually matured in the minds of the founders of the new state. This process can be perfectly observed in the foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalists. There were two aspects of the national closure of the independence war period concerning the connection between the formation of a national conception of citizenship and foreign policy acts and decisions.

First, the idea of establishing a new nation-state was not a fully-formed project in the beginning but the ideological and political interactions with the foreign governments forced the nationalist leaders to formulate a truly “nationalist foreign policy” which corresponded to a new national ideal. In the process, the military-civil bureaucrats gradually abandoned the Ottoman-imperial social vision and territorial ambitions and developed a conception of (national) citizenship which was closer to Western nation-state model. The Wilsonian principles were the ideological-political framework of this new ideal of modern nation state. Throughout the national war, the successive treaties and agreements were the instances that materialized the fulfillment of the conditions of this national ideal and the conception of “community inside” since they included the criterion of “Who would remain inside and who would be left outside” that the criterion of national citizenship.

Secondly, and parallel to the development of a nationalist foreign policy, the leaders of the national movement formulated a new conception of national security which primarily defined the minorities’ demands for independence as the main threat against the security of the Ottoman-Muslim majority. In this way, this conception of national security drew the boundaries of the “national” community inside and the terms of proper membership. In all treaties signed during the national war, the founders of the new state specified clearly that the Ottoman-Muslim majority would be the basis of the new political community of citizens while the former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin would be left out as much as possible. Moreover, in these foreign policy documents, the Ottoman-Muslim majority was portrayed as a cultural and political totality which meant that separate political claims of the non-Turk Muslim communities

would not be allowed. The Sevres experience as an external dynamic contributed much to the national closure of Turkish citizenship to be carried out as a mono-ethnic closure in this early period. The successive Kurdish revolts which aimed to realize the Sevres Treaty damaged the balance between the ethnic and civic elements of the newly emerging Turkish citizenship which were finally reflected to the legal codification of Turkish citizenship in the 1924 constitution.

2.6. Citizenship as a Political Mode of Integration

As the third element, citizenship identity entails a specific mode of integration in a territorially and culturally delimited political community. Basically, the term mode of integration refers to the political element, the body of political institutions and a corresponding system of values, mores and modes of behavior and the political tradition which holds the society together. In this respect, the “political” community is “a territorially concentrated group of people bound together by their acceptance of a common mode of conducting their collective affairs including a body of institutions and shared values”.⁷⁴ Political life both in terms of institutional structure and in terms of modes of behavior is shaped around these values. Therefore, the mode of integration determines the limits of the political possibilities, the institutional structure of politics, range of political options and the possibilities of political regeneration and reconstruction.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Bhikhu Parekh, “Discourses on National Identity.” *Political Studies*. XLII (1994),501.

⁷⁵ Michael Walzer, “Citizenship” in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, ed., T. Ball and J. Farr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 211.

Under modernity, the political element is characterized by the concepts of participation and popular sovereignty. The modern idea of national (citizenship) identity relies on the notion that people constitute a unified force capable of bestowing legitimacy on a state that properly fitted with and served the interests of the people, that is legitimacy is ascendant from the people.⁷⁶ Here, the mode of integration means a whole pattern of political life which entails the transformation of subjects into citizens. According to Shils who used the term of mode of integration for the first time, a modern society is not just a complex of modern institutions but also a mode of integration.⁷⁷ It is a mode of relationship between the center and the periphery of the society which entails the inclusion of the mass of the population in the values of the society. It is a process of integration into a single society in which subjects become citizens who have a new kind of allegiance to the state and to each other within a in a new political universe. The locus of the political identity both at the level of individual and collectivity changes drastically. Instead of the personal of divine rule, the origin of modern citizenship lies in people themselves, i.e., it is through popular sovereignty and participation mechanisms that and individual have a political place in the community.

The ideological-political conceptions regarding citizenship and different modes of integration had been formulated first in Western Europe. The liberal and the republican citizenship models had differentiated in accordance with the pre-modern features and the peculiar modernization trajectories of each European society and had

⁷⁶ Calhoun. *Nationalism*. 85.

⁷⁷ Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States" in *Old Societies and New States*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 21.

given a fundamental character to their democratic systems. Three common points can be specified for both models. First, citizenship emerged as the transcending public-political identity for every individual in a delimited territory transcending local, regional allegiances such as religion, ethnicity, language, estate, family and region in all of the European traditions.⁷⁸

Secondly, there emerged a sense of legal equality, i.e., the equality before law and equality of rights and obligations among the citizens who have been bound by the same laws of the patria. However, this idea of legal and moral equality of members rests on a measure of common values which supervise that conception of equality in the society.⁷⁹ It characterizes the nature of the civic ideology, the common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas that bind population. In Turkish case, the fundamental value which is supervising the idea of moral and legal equality as the main marker of citizenship is “political integrity”. It became articulated especially after the Sevres experience which was scraped in the collective memory in the form of a deep fear of disintegration and it has been a definitive factor in the definition of the cultural-ideological boundaries of Turkish citizenship after the establishment of the republic.

Thirdly, a particular citizenship identity was characterized mainly by the bargaining among the subject population, the state authorities and other power holders which created and confirmed individual and/or collective claims on the state, individual and collective rights vis-à-vis the state and obligations of the state to its citizens. In this sense, the core of modern citizenship consisted of multiple bargains hammered out by

⁷⁸ Schnapper, *Community of Citizens*. 75.

⁷⁹ Smith, *National*. 10-11.

rulers and the ruled.⁸⁰ In each formation, the basic character of the mode of integration was born from a unique history but mainly was formulated by an elite coalition and then made use of particular groups. In this sense, the creation and maintenance of a particular mode of integration has been a political project, perpetuated by the leading political actors and in particular by the state which gives form to the abstraction of civic nation. Afterwards, it is progressively internalized by the majority of citizens.⁸¹

The point is that in both liberal and republican models, the development of the citizenship identity is a result of a peculiar combination of social demands and the state structures with the subordinated influence of ideology and the external dynamics. However, the state's position is not that of against or of equal weight with the social forces. Rather the state's position is that of "being the pivotal embodiment of the collective and individual identity and the only site of legitimate political action".⁸² It is inside the particular states that citizenship rights and obligations, membership, legitimacy, participation, freedom, justice, peace and order are articulated. Historically therefore, all kind of historical-contemporary identities including citizenship identity, nations, classes, cultures, genders or movements have been largely constrained by ontological and discursive option expressed by the formal of sovereignty of territorial states.⁸³

Accordingly, citizenship can only be a universal-egalitarian identity and practice within the territorial, sovereign state. The regimes may vary; there are liberal, republican

⁸⁰ Tilly, *Coercion*. 102.

⁸¹ Schnapper, *Community of Citizens*. 41-42.

⁸² William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 204.

⁸³ Walker, *Inside/Outside*. 162.

and authoritarian options. However, there is a common vision in all of them that democratic practices, membership, participation and all other citizenship activities have been activated only in relation to a particular territorialized community and to a sovereign state. Liberal or republican, both democratic accounts are associated with specific accounts of state-centered political community and centrally defined citizenship identity. The basic elements of citizenship that are consent, participation, and representation are articulated as a way of reconciling the claims of obligation to a broader collectivity, the community of citizens, the people, the nation and the state which is the hierarchical order of modern democracy. The citizen was the cornerstone of the modern democratic political community but it is always subordinated to the nation and to the state as an ontological category. All kinds of democratic aspirations therefore can only be realized within the established accounts of the state, civil society and representative institutions.⁸⁴

At that point, citizenship as a mode of integration becomes an instrument for the identification with the state. It serves to the maintenance of political loyalty (to the state) and of a common understanding of the political as a sphere of unity. An abstract public domain in which each citizen is the equal of the other is defined as the site of minimum agreement between individuals and constantly renewed by which future generations are socialized and integrated through the practices of citizenship.⁸⁵ The state organizes the collective life around regularized practices and through various institutions which

⁸⁴ Ibid. 148.

⁸⁵ Schnapper, *Community of Citizens*, 95.

generate social approval and sometimes indoctrination and diffuse a system of coherent values.

Among these institutions which constantly regenerate a particular citizenship identity inside, foreign policy acts and decisions and the discourse that built around foreign policy issues have a primary place since they serve well for the inscription and reinscription of particular values and certain political dispositions into the community inside as a field under the complete dominance of state authorities. Before going into the details of the generation of a particular mode of integration and citizenship identity through foreign policy, the types of political citizenship should be briefly overviewed.

There are basically two traditions of political thought which paralleled to the formation of particular modes of social integration: Liberalism and republicanism. Both traditions of political thought dealt with the issue of constructing and maintaining a particular civic life, a legitimate sphere of politics in their own ways. But the differences between the two modes of integration are noticeable mostly in their citizenship conceptions.

2.6.1. Liberal Mode of Integration and Citizenship Model

The liberal idea of citizenship was first formulated by T.H. Marshall who was also the primary theoretician of the citizenship literature for a long time. According to his conception, citizenship should be understood as a status which provides a set of rights enjoyed equally by every member of the community. With this status of

citizenship, an individual obtains the full civil, political and social rights which are the entitlements for the individual to become a proper member of the political community.⁸⁶

The emphasis on “citizenship as status” is a part of the general liberal rhetoric that there are “natural rights” of the individual-citizen which are based on an individual’s needs in the society. In this respect, in the liberal conception, the basic concern of the citizenship regulations is the extension of citizenship rights to the broadest possible section of the society. Citizenship identity is defined more in terms of rights rather than obligations. These rights are inherited in individuals because individual came morally prior to society and to the state. The freedoms of speech, assembly, association, the right to participate in a political activity, the freedom from arbitrary arrest, the right to trial by a jury, the right to worship and the all the 20th century social and economic rights are formulated on this common ground. They are entitlements which are the essential parts of human dignity.⁸⁷

Concerning duties, however, liberal citizenship restricts the citizen’s duties to respect the similar rights of other citizens, to payment of taxes and to defense of the polity. As autonomous beings, citizens determine their reciprocal positions in the society on a contractual basis and this contract is the basic social bond among the members of a polity. Their duties are defined definitely in the contract and they have no obligations to wider society other than those in the contract.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Adrian Oldfield, “Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?” in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, ed., Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge: 1994), 188.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 190.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 89.

In this respect, the core morality of liberal citizenship is the primacy and priority of individuals' basic rights and entitlements which ensure maximum equality for all and therefore the basis of justice within the society. Accordingly, the perfect realization of individual-citizen's rights has priority over the well being of the community. The liberal model does not impose any aim or purpose on citizens, since it does not have a substantive purpose. It recognizes the pursuit of individual interests as the only legitimate good. Citizens are free to pursue their self-interest on the condition that they all comply with this core morality.

Therefore, the status of the citizen imposes no duties on individuals beyond the compliance of the ground rules that is respecting other individuals as sovereign and autonomous citizens. Their active participation in the deliberation of the common good is not expected. Participation is required only when it is necessary to protect people's basic rights and liberties. Any form of public involvement, any political activity is their choice, and citizens may seek no more than enjoy the privilege and freedom of their status in a relatively private realm. So this conception of citizenship generates no social bond among citizens beyond that of contract. It neither creates nor sustains any social solidarity or cohesion or any sense of common purpose.⁸⁹

Concerning the relationship between the individual and the state, the liberal model proposes that the status of citizenship needs protection both from the attacks of other individuals and arbitrariness of governments. However, it is not the paternalist

⁸⁹ Ibid.

state of republicanism.⁹⁰ The state is expected to prevent violence and maintain peace when individuals are pursuing their own interests. The primary concern of the liberal view is not realization of a common good but restriction of the powers of the state so as to allow larger space for society free from state intervention. The power of the constitutional state is restrained by the liberal principles, so the state is strongly committed to uphold liberal principles. In a liberal order, political activity should secure the conditions of freedom so that individual ends might be met in civil society.

2.6.2. Republican Mode of Integration and Citizenship Model

In civic-republicanism, citizenship is not simply a status but an activity or practice through which an individual becomes the proper member of the community. Republican citizen is the one who plays an active role in shaping the future of his/her society through political debate. It is not mere membership but the citizenship practices that make an individual identified with the political community.⁹¹ Therefore, republican mode of integration has a communally based conception of citizenship. Individuals are citizens only as members of a political community. They cannot have their autonomy spontaneously with respect to others' autonomy as in liberalism. They are in a position to gain autonomy by perfectly accomplishing their duties and socially defined practices.⁹² Therefore, the social bond among citizens is not contractual but it is fundamentally based on sharing a particular way of life. Citizen-members should have a

⁹⁰ Adrian Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community, Civic Republicanism and the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1990), 153.

⁹¹ David Miller, "Citizenship and Pluralism." *Political Studies*. XLII (1995), 444.

⁹² Oldfield, *Citizenship*. 153.

commitment to citizenship practices which create and maintain solidarity and cohesion in the political community.⁹³ Citizenship practices such as voting, military duty, raising new generations to ensure the future continuity, the imperative of judgment about the vitally important matters of the society and to act in accordance with that are all in fact the public services which bind citizens to each other and to the faith of the republic. These practices are both constitutive of citizenship and for the sustaining of the political community.⁹⁴

In the republican conception, citizenship rights are equally recognized to all individuals since they empower them to engage in political practice. However, civic-republicanism is not a right-based manner of thinking. It assumes that citizenship is not about having rights but to have a commitment to citizenship practices. Here, there is a conception of individual which is very different from that of liberalism. In republican mode of integration, individuals have not an ontological and moral priority over the society. An individual's claim to citizenship is legitimate only when he/she perfectly accomplishes citizenship practices and works for the community. These practices are not choices but duties indicating and providing their identification with the community. Therefore, citizenship practices are formulated on the basis of a shared responsibility for the continuity of a particular political community and this responsibility in return provides an identity to the individual.⁹⁵

In this respect, concerning the balance between the citizenship rights and duties, in civic-republicanism, duties are the main components of an individual's political

⁹³ Ibid. 188-189.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 190.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 192.

identity. According to civic-republicans, there can be no political community without some shared sense of the duties and dues of membership.⁹⁶ The citizens deserve and secure their status when they perfectly attend to duties and responsibilities. The definition of citizenship identity primarily on the basis of duties is related with the republican understanding of politics and participation.

In modern republicanism as well as in the classical one, politics is the art of establishing and preserving good community which can be established only by the conscious efforts of the citizens. Therefore, republicanism does not leave the issue of common good to the free interplay of the different interests and ideas as in liberalism. It is through political association and collective decision making -through participation- that the citizens determine the conditions of a good society. Citizens' participation is essential not primarily for the protection or advancement of individual rights and interests but for the realization of a commonly defined common good in the society.⁹⁷

However, there is an important question. Citizens' participation is crucial but participation into what? According to the republican idea of general will, citizens can reach a substantial degree of consensus on issues of common concern through an open discussion.⁹⁸ The general will of the body-politic determines the "common good" which will be pursued by the community as a whole. Both classical and the modern republicanism have been deeply concerned with the design of durable political institutions, allocating power among different social groups and channeling its exercise

⁹⁶ Walzer, "Citizenship" 216.

⁹⁷ Oldfield, *Citizenship*. 160.

⁹⁸ Miller, "Citizenship," 444.

towards a lasting public good.⁹⁹ Especially the classical republican thought defined the essence of social politics as integration through the adoption of a “shared” purpose to which everyone and everything within the state is subordinated. The state has the fundamental function of implementing that social purpose. Therefore, for republicans, virtuous citizen is the one who actively participates “into the promotion and maintenance of a particular common good.” The comprehension of the pre-given common good is the objective of citizen participation.

Therefore, the republican mode of integration and ideology assume that modern societies are in need of a common good, either a single political center or a general political ethos in order to motivate the citizens to perform public duties and to sustain its existence. This emphasis on common good provides it a status beyond politics and makes it a moral imperative. When it is moralized, the defense or the promotion of the common good becomes an “authorized practice” for every individual in the society. In such a case, participation loses its significance as a way of political re-examination. Citizens enter in a position to act in accordance with the already defined common good. Republicanism goes away from its ideal of reaching to a general will and gets a serious risk of authoritarianism, i.e. imposing a single will over the society. Therefore, as a democratic model, republicanism has the serious risk of monism and coercive consensualism since there is a ground for a forced identification of the particularistic

⁹⁹ John Dunn, “The Identity of Bourgeois Republic” in *The Invention of the Modern Republic*, ed., Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 217.

needs, interests, identities and loyalties with a common good and with a centrally defined supreme political identity.¹⁰⁰

In this respect, the continuous identification of individuals with a pre-given common good is possible only with the constant generation of loyal, virtuous citizens' who have full commitment to the republican state. At this point republicanism rests on an ideology of patriotism. For the republican theorists, the citizen's willingness to perform public duties is qualified with patriotism, the political sentiment that binds the individual to the political community. The practices of citizenship, duties like the defense of the republic and the exercise of judgment on common affairs necessitate loyalty to the political community and these practices in return reinforce that loyalty.¹⁰¹ Therefore, patriotism is a reflexive phenomenon characterized by a sense of belonging, solidarity and being engaged in a common enterprise. It is not an apolitical attachment to a universal principle. It is a tie to particular, values, ideals, goals, historical institutions, traditions, culture, language, and even to an ethnic origin.

How individuals come to have a commitment that is cherished by patriotic feelings to a political identity to which duties are attached? Republican ideology proposes that the moral character which exists in a genuine citizenship does not generate itself, it has to be collectively and authoritatively inculcated. People have to be thought what citizenship means in terms the duties it imposes upon them. One of the functions of the republican government is to reinforce patriotic feelings and ensure that citizens will perform their duties. At that point, citizenship and the language of duty become a kind of

¹⁰⁰ Oldfield, *Citizenship*. 162.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 148.

civil religion which makes civic-duty and patriotism the overriding concern of the citizens to sustain the republic.¹⁰² A liberal state does not push the citizens to enter into public life. It is always possible for an individual to pursue private ends before the public duties. The republican state, on the contrary, indoctrinates the citizens the moral aspect of participation for the promotion of the common good. It is not a choice for them in order to be members of the community but a condition to be applied. Therefore, republican model of citizenship runs the severe risk of seizing individual autonomy at the level of the citizen and coercive consensualism at the level of the society.

2.6.3. Foreign Policy and Citizenship as a Mode of Integration

As briefly cited above, mode of integration reflects the political dimension of the citizenship identity which is conditioned by the institutional and discursive instruments of the state and among them foreign policy has a primary place. In what respects foreign policy acts and decisions contribute to the reproduction of citizenship identity from a political point of view?

First of all, foreign policy acts and decisions serve for the inscription and reinscription of particular values, political dispositions and ideas which enframe a particular domestic political order associated with a particular identity. Since foreign policy is one of the primary instruments of the state in securing its centrality in public consciousness, foreign policy acts and decisions reinforce an understanding of state-centered public space and centrally defined political identity for the individual citizen. Through foreign policy acts and decisions, the state maintains its place as the only

¹⁰² Ibid. 153.

security provider and defender of the “high interests” of the state and its citizens. As a subject of “high politics”, foreign relations are conducted by the state officials in the name of the citizens. In this respect, the hierarchy of modern democracy as the state/ the nation/ and citizen which implies that individuals can only be members of broader humanity as citizens of particular states, i.e., a statist conception of political community maintained through foreign policy acts and decisions.¹⁰³

Furthermore, since foreign policy acts and decisions are about the “highest interests of the country”, they are represented as beyond politics and ascribed an unquestionable status. A particular foreign policy orientation is the reflection of the “common good” for the community as a whole. The citizens’ position in relation to the conduct of the foreign relations is to provide complete support and obedience. In this respect, foreign policy is a sphere through which the state makes the citizens to identify themselves unquestionably with the state. In most of the cases, moreover, governments can steer this public support towards the domestic politics and restore their legitimacy. Thus, foreign policy in the issues present perfect opportunities to the state elite to generate the consent of the citizens not only concerning international politics but also in domestic politics.

The state’s centrality in the conduct of foreign relations closes the ways of democratic participation to vital decisions for the citizens. Since foreign decisions are represented beyond politics, other political ideas, interests and even identities are subordinated to a patriotic ideology. Citizenship duties gain prominence over citizenship

¹⁰³ Walker, *Inside/Outside*.151-152.

rights. Citizenship is reduced to a passive status which is conditioned and measured with the sacrifices that a citizen can make for the society and the state.

If the modern state is characterized by an intensive power and the ability to organize high level of commitment from citizens; then foreign events are the opportunities par excellence through which the state cultivates feelings of patriotism and full commitment of its citizens. However, it should be underlined that, it is not the total hegemony or indoctrination of the state that make people to support the state in international field. It is the power of the patriotic ideology that provide the modern nation-state social approval and appreciation of the citizens. Patriotism obscures the role of foreign policy in the repression of the civil society. It makes the political community of citizens to produce itself continuously as a committed political community.

In this respect, foreign policy discourse and practices serve for the unification and establishment of some customs and beliefs as the concrete societal values and modes of behavior. Through foreign policy acts and decisions, the state legitimizes certain dispositions for the community inside and for the individual citizen. Defending a liberal or republican identity in world politics in a way to reinforce such an identity for the domestic community is the typical case. Here, foreign policy serves to reinscribe a hierarchy of values, political dispositions, mores and an institutional framework for the domestic politics. A particular political disposition, i.e., republican, liberal or authoritarian is revalued in the domestic sphere, as the reference of the unity of the political community in the international sphere. In a sense, republican foreign policy envisages republican mode of integration and republican citizens inside. During the Cold War years, there was such a choice for the governments. Whatever their real-

politics in domestic sphere, their stance in international sphere made them to use overwhelmingly liberal or socialist discourses towards their citizens. In return, they also legitimized their policies in the eyes of the masses.

In this respect, foreign policy texts, i.e., declarations, treaties, conventions are the documents which involve definitions about the distinctive features and values of the related societies. They repeatedly emphasize on these characterizations as liberal, republican, conservative or authoritarian as the justifications of particular acts and decisions. States may put reservations on particular articles of some conventions with the pretext that these articles are in contradiction with the basic values of their society. These documents seem to be oriented towards the external world, but they also serve to enframe and domesticate a particular identity for the community and for the individual citizen inside. Such an identity refers more than the characteristics of the individual or national types. It incorporates a form of “domestic order” for the society. Therefore, foreign policy acts and decisions are the primary instruments of the state in drawing the ethical boundaries of the community inside and the terms of proper membership through an ideal of normal/pathological and a hierarchy of values on which the citizenship identity depends.

The following parts of the study will address the question of “how the territorial, cultural and ethical-ideological boundaries of the modern Turkish citizenship were crystallized through the foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalist elite who envisaged a particular “community inside” and “legitimate membership” in this very early period. The above analysis on the operation of foreign policy through the three

elements of modern citizenship identity will provided the basic framework for the analysis of the basic foreign policy texts and decisions of the period between 1919-1923.

CHAPTER III

SIVAS DECLARATION AND THE NATIONAL PACT (MİSAK-I MİLLİ) AS THE FIRST DOCUMENTS OF NATIONALIST FOREIGN POLICY

3. 1. Introduction

The Sivas Congress was gathered to unite the local resistance movements that were dispersed in all over Anatolia, under a central Anatolian and Rumelian Defense of Rights Organization. The congress proclaimed a declaration which stated the fundamental objectives of the national struggle. The Sivas Declaration primarily addressed the Allied powers and in this respect, it is the first foreign policy action – in the form of a unilateral declaration for the international community - of the new political initiative. This diplomatic enterprise was reflecting the search of the nationalist movement for recognition and legitimacy both in the international and domestic fields.

As a matter of fact, from this time on, the search for international recognition and foreign support became one of the fundamental factors that drew the ideological and political framework of action of the nationalist elite. In the first foreign policy documents, the nationalist leadership portrayed the national resistance as a legitimate nationalist self-determination movement supported by the mass of Anatolian peoples, i.e., Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Arabs and Lazes. Once they portrayed the movement as such, the nationalist elite had no way but to provide the full support of these groups. In

other words, they had to organize the movement as a unified self-determination movement of the Muslim peoples of Anatolia as they defined it towards the outside world. The military-civilian leaders who were mostly of Turkish origin took the leadership and bound themselves with their foreign policy acts and decisions while organizing the movement as the coalition of Muslim groups inside. In this respect, beginning from this early period, foreign policy commitments and ideological-political interactions with external powers had important consequences on the political direction and the character of the Turkish national struggle.

The Sivas Congress was the moment after which foreign relations and internal activities of the nationalist elite went hand in hand with the formation of the movement as a genuinely “nationalist” mass movement. After the congress, the nationalist elite tried to establish a dialogue with each of the great powers including the Allied governments but especially with the United States. The establishment of good relations with the United States was very important because of two reasons. First, the project of Greater Armenia which was designed to include large parts of Eastern Anatolia was severely supported by the American politicians and the public opinion. Secondly, within the nationalist elite, especially the Istanbul bourgeoisie had very close feelings towards the United States since they believed that the Wilsonian principles provided them a legitimate ground. Under the pressures of mandate supporters, the congress decided to send a letter to the American Senate. This letter was the first foreign policy action of the new political organization which specifically emphasized that the Turkish Nationalist Movement was organized completely in line with the Wilsonian principles.

In the letter to the American Senate –dated as September 9th 1919-, it was firmly stated that the congress was representing the “entire Mohamedan population of European Turkey and Asia Minor”. According to the letter, the National Congress of Sivas was assembled for the purpose of securing the fulfillment of the wishes of the “majority of the population of the empire” with the protection of all the minorities, and, with life, liberty, justice and inviolability of property rights guaranteed for all.¹ In this way, the nationalist leadership underlined that they had a particular vision of “political community inside” as completely different from the former Ottoman imperial-territorial conception of political community. Therefore, this letter declared for the first time that the nationalist leadership aimed to limit Turkish National Struggle with the faith of the Muslim majority living in European Turkey -Western Thrace- and in the Asian Minor - Anatolian Peninsula- in accordance with the article 12th of the Wilsonian principles which was specifically about the future of Ottoman State.²

In this way the Wilsonian principles provided the main political framework for the nationalist leadership to organize Ottoman-Muslim (national) self-determination movement. As a matter of fact, the very nature of the political system of Turkey between 1920-1923 was the necessary corollary of the international principle of national self-determination.³ The language and the logic of the Sivas Declaration reflected well this

¹ *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası: Milli Mücadele Dönemi'ne Ait 100 Belge*, 1919-1923, Cilt 1[Atatürk's National Foreign Policy: 100 Documents of the National Struggle Period, Vol. 1](Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1994), 87-88.

² Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt:1* [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Today: Facts, Documents, Interpretations, Vol. 1](İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 100.

³ Metin Tamkoç, *Warrior Diplomats* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), 75.

connection. By relying itself on such an internationally legitimate ground, the nationalist leaders hoped that the international community would recognize them within a short period of time. However, for this recognition, they also had to establish some relations with the Ottoman government and to create the impression that they were acting unanimously.

Especially during the cabinets of Ahmet Tevfik Pasha and Ali Rıza Pasha, the nationalist leadership worked in close cooperation with the Istanbul government.⁴ The nationalist leadership aimed to have the Ottoman Parliament to accept the Sivas decisions and to gain greater recognition in the eyes of the international community, especially of the Entente Powers. The National Pact (Misak-i Milli) was accepted in the last Ottoman Parliament as a result of these efforts on 28 January 1920. In this respect, the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact were the first official documents of the nationalist diplomacy. Although they were unilateral declarations which informed the main objectives and the direction of the nationalist movement, they were completely in line with the Wilsonian principles.

The point is that the objectives which were declared in both documents were not just short-term, strategic, war-time objectives. Rather, they reflected that the nationalists formulated a particular proposal –which would be developed fully in the course of the national struggle- for the future political order of their society which was thought as legitimate since it was based on Wilsonian principles. Specifically, both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact proposed first of all a “territorial closure” that is a

⁴ For an analysis of the relationship between the İstanbul governments and the nationalist movement, see Sina Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele, Cilt 1-2* [Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle](İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992).

demarcation of a territory which would be saved from invasion. Secondly, they envisaged a “national closure” that is a closure of a new culturally homogenous community of citizens which was defined on the basis of religion. Thirdly, although very slightly in this period, they put forward some new values and ideas around which “a new model of social integration and mode of membership” would be built in the future.

In this respect, the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact are the first documents of nationalist diplomacy through which the physical and ethical boundaries of the new “political community inside” and an early conception of national citizenship were drawn albeit very slightly. The analysis of these documents from such a perspective gives the opportunity to observe the preliminary steps towards a new political community and the basic credentials of the “new citizenship identity”. These documents indicated that a new social order with a new “philosophy of membership” as completely different from the Ottoman imperial understanding would be formulated in the near future.

Within this framework, the following part will be the first analysis of the dissertation which primarily argues that the construction of “a new political community inside” that is a “new citizenship identity” was a process which was integral to the formation and operation of a “nationalist” foreign policy during the national struggle period.

3.2. The Sivas Declaration, the National Pact and the “Territorial” Closure of the New “Political Community Inside”

During a period of independence struggle and early formation of the national state, the unilateral declarations of the nationalist elite who conducts the nationalist movement are the main documents, which define a particular territory as the territory of the new sovereign state. This territorial definition also brings an idea of political community and a closure of citizenry since it defines “who will remain inside that is will be the member of the society and who will remain outside”. The people who remain within the defined territories become the citizens whatever their origin and those remain outside the frontiers become foreigners even if they belong to the ethnical, religious or linguistic majority of that country. This is the first step of the politics of citizenship which is operated through drawing first of all the physical borders.⁵

In most of the cases, however, the territorial demarcation is not so simple. The political community inside which will be the formal citizenry of the new nation(al) state is far from having national, cultural, linguistic or some other idealized kind of homogeneity. Although this is the fact, in these documents the nationalist elite speaks in the name of a “hypothetically homogenous” community. In this sense, such documents of early “nationalist” foreign policy represent a “foundational moment” at which a homogenous “community inside” is discursively envisaged although it does not exist in reality.

In Turkish case, the proclamation of the National Pact has been represented as such a foundational moment. There is a general tendency to view the National Pact

⁵ See the related part of the dissertation on pp. 46-49.

(Misak-i Milli) as the first document which drew the true “national” boundaries of new Turkey.⁶ It is portrayed as the declaration of a fully-formed nationalist movement reflecting a nationalist ideology in the Western sense of the term. Accordingly, the National Pact is viewed as pointing out the “irreducible”, “national” territory of the new state which represents the limits of Turkish nationalism. In other words, it puts the sine qua non principles of Turkish Foreign Policy in terms of the territorial definition for the subsequent periods as well. In this respect, it is claimed that National Pact represents a revolutionary break from the Ottoman state tradition since it brought an understanding of “national” frontiers against the Ottoman imperial-religious territorial vision.⁷

However, a closer analysis of the document reveals the exaggerated certainty of the content of the document. Within six articles, the National Pact submits some significant principles about the post war expectations of the Ottoman State after the Mudros Armistice. It is very problematical, however to argue that it draws the “national” and “irreducible” boundaries and it represents a definite break from the Ottoman state tradition. As the following analysis will make clear, the territorial boundaries which are submitted in the National Pact are neither national nor irreducible. In order to understand the meaning of the document and the territorial, national and political criterias of the new political community of citizens it brought, it is first necessary to review the origin of the National Pact.

⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, ed., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* [The Events in Turkish Foreign Policy](Ankara: Alkım Kitapevi, 1989), 12-13; Bülent Tanör, *Kurtuluş Kuruluş* [Liberation and Construction](İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1998), 42-43.

⁷Gönlübol, *Olaylarla*. 13.

The general idea is that the principles which were accepted during the Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas constituted the nucleus of the National Pact. After the gathering of the Ottoman Parliament, they were united in a declaration as an official decision of the parliament.⁸ On the other hand, Mete Tunçay states that according to the printed proceedings of the Ottoman Parliament, there did not occur an official meeting on the day –January, 28th 1920- that the pact was said to be accepted.⁹ Therefore, there might have been an unofficial meeting. This uncertainty about the origin of the document gives way to some questions. There is the possibility that, the document might not be an “official” declaration of the parliament since there wasn’t an official gathering on that day. Rather, it should have been prepared beforehand and was passed in the parliament without an official discussion in February 17th 1920.¹⁰

The National Pact was accepted in the Ottoman Parliament as an initiative of the nationalist leadership (Felah-ı Vatan Group) who could obtain a limited support from the Ottoman government. The objective of the nationalist elite was to have the parliament to pass such a resolution in accordance with the Sivas decisions and consequently to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community especially of the Allied governments. However, in an unofficial meeting of the parliament, only some principles about the Sivas Declaration were accepted. Therefore, there were some differences between the Sivas Declaration of the nationalist leadership and the Misak-i Milli of the last Ottoman Parliament.

⁸ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, Oxford University Press, 1968), 74.

⁹ Mete Tunçay, “Misak-ı Milli’nin 1. Maddesi Üstüne” [On the First Article of the National Pact] *Birikim*. 18-19 (Eylül 1976), 12.

¹⁰ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 105.

3.2.1. Sivas Declaration and the National Pact as Unilateral Declarations of Territorial Closure

As the unilateral declarations of the nationalist resistance, both documents were immediately translated and sent to the governments and to the missions of the Allies in Anatolia and to other governments with which the nationalist leadership planned to cooperate. Specifically three articles have the same content in both documents. The first one is about the definition of the “political community” whose faith was concerned by the nationalists. The second is about the recognition of the rights of the non-Muslim minorities as based on the principle of reciprocity. The third is about the intention of the nationalists to cooperate with the states who respects the national frontiers in technical, economic and industrial fields.¹¹

Concerning the territorial definition, the first point is that, both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact emphasized the validity of the frontiers at the moment of the conclusion of the Mudros Armistice. This meant the loss of the Arab provinces were accepted and Anatolia was defined as the principal homeland. The point is that neither Sivas Declaration nor the National Pact brought a clear understanding of “national frontiers” outside the conditions of the armistice. They confirmed the de facto frontiers beyond which the control of the Allied armies was already accepted. In this sense, the Mudros Armistice declared ironically both the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the limits of the national struggle out of which a national state would be established.

¹¹ For the text of the National Pact, see Ibid. and for the Sivas Declaration, *Atatürk'ün Milli*. 97-99. The texts of both documents in Turkish are added in the end of the dissertation as appendixes A and B.

The armistice line approximately coincided with the line within which there was an Ottoman-Muslim majority. The line was accepted as the national frontier because it was only in this way that the salvation of the Muslim majority of the Anatolia could be realized. National home was declared as the territories where the Ottoman-Muslim majority was living. In other words, the territories of the new state were defined in accordance with the (religious) identity of the inhabitants. In this respect, as a second point, it should be underlined that the borders of the National Pact were not national in the Western sense of the term since they were defined exclusively on the basis of the religious identity of the inhabitants. The territories of the Ottoman-Muslim majority, which constituted a cultural and political unity, would be the territories of the new state. These territories would be defended in any case not only against the Western invasion but also against the demands of internal separationism.

However, in this emphasis on the unity of the Ottoman-Muslim population as a political community and the indivisibility of the territories they live, there is a striking difference between the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact. In the original text of the National Pact, there is a small but very significant difference from the texts which are put in the official Turkish history books as well as in many other well-known studies.¹² In the original text, the envisaged political community that is the Ottoman-Muslim majority as an organic totality was defined as both “within and beyond” the armistice line. However, in the changed texts, the phrase is “the whole of those parts only “within” the said armistice line which are inhabited by an Ottoman-Muslim majority”.

¹² Tunçay, Misak-ı Milli. 12.

The point is that, the original text of the National Pact did not specify a general principle to define the territories of the future state. Instead, it emphasized on the unity of faith among the Muslim peoples living “within and beyond” the armistice line. Sivas Declaration on the other, hand put more precisely that the armistice line was accepted as the national frontiers. Within these frontiers, all kinds of Islamic elements (anasır-ı Islamiyye) “were imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other’s racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, formed an indivisible whole which did not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance”.¹³

In this respect, it is hard to argue that especially the first article of the National Pact provides a foundational principle for the territorial closure of a new political community. The armistice line was accepted as the frontier beyond which the Arab population would determine its own future. At the same time, however, the unity of the Ottoman-Muslim peoples living “within and beyond the armistice line” was firmly emphasized. This means that a claim might also be legitimate for the territories beyond the armistice line. According to the original text, the pact defines the people beyond that line - not the Arabs but the Turkomans and the Kurds - as a part of Ottoman-Muslim population. Therefore, it is not possible to interpret the principles of the pact as drawing “the irreducible territory of the new Turkey”. If there is a claimed unity among the peoples that remain within and outside of a particular line, this means there is a vision of envisaged political community also beyond that line. This means that the National Pact

¹³ The first articles of both documents, see, Appendix A for the original text of the National Pact and Appendix B for the Sivas Declaration in Turkish.

did not definitely end the Ottoman imperial-territorial vision of political community and membership.

The other articles of the National Pact which had territorial specifications, namely the second and the third one, cited the necessity of a plebiscite for the three sanjacks of Eastern Anatolia (Elviye-i Selase) namely, Kars, Ardahan and Batum and for Western Thrace. Here, the nationalist elite was very careful to comply with the international considerations of the period. They adopted the post-war international consensus on “plebiscite” as the legitimate method to decide on the fate of multi-ethnic regions.¹⁴ These articles did not assert any overt claim about these territories. It was only implicitly stated that the majority of the population would decide to join to the national territories.

Although this was the case, after the declaration of the National Pact, several maps were introduced. One of them which was published in 1920, showed the southern border as excluding Hatay, but including İskenderun, Miyadin, Musul and Kerkük. Moreover, it claimed that the provinces of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine should also have been included within the national frontiers.¹⁵ These interpretations were the consequences of the uncertainty of the issue of frontiers in the document. The National Pact emphasized the unity of Ottoman citizenry living in these territories on the basis of Islamic identity. The Sivas Declaration, however, specified the armistice line as the national frontier more concretely.

¹⁴ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 107.

¹⁵ Tunçay, “Misak-ı Milli,” 15.

The difference between the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact in terms of the territorial definition and the consequent conceptualization of the future “political community of citizens” stems from the fact that the National Pact was the work of the Ottoman Parliament which equated the salvation of the Ottoman State and the Sultanate with the salvation of the country. Sivas Declaration however, was the work of the federation of the national resistance organizations and the nationalist elite who primarily concerned with the possibility of the establishment of an independent Armenian State in the east and the annexation of the large parts of Western Anatolia to Greece. The reason behind the nationalists’ efforts to seem as acting unanimously with the central government was to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the foreign states. Under the pressure of the Entente Powers and the Sultanate, in an unofficial meeting, the parliament accepted the Sivas decisions but with such important differences. This was the first event in which the nationalist elite differentiated itself from the Ottoman elite but throughout this period, these ideas remained fluid and the nationalists continued to collaborate with the Ottoman government in unofficial ways.

3.2.2. Territorial Concerns of the Nationalist Elite and the “Misak-i Milli” as a Mystification

Although cited in both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact, however, the idea of salvation of the Ottoman-Muslim majority did not exclusively direct the territorial concerns of the nationalist movement. As a matter of fact, the uncertainty about the frontiers was also a preference for the nationalist leadership. The nationalist leaders interpreted the National Pact as the manifestation of the “indivisible wholeness”

of the Anatolian territories and used it as a deliberate instrument of ambiguity. The question of frontiers was left uncertain on purpose. After the gathering of the national assembly in Ankara, in a secret session, Mustafa Kemal explained his concern about the frontiers as such: “ (In the Misak-i Milli) an armistice line is imagined. It is thought as a national frontier. What is the armistice line? Is there such a line? There is none. So when we met in the Erzurum Congress, we thought that there should be such a frontier by thinking the motherland. Then we decided that the line that our forces are controlling is our national frontier”.¹⁶

During the war, severe discussions about the content of the National Pact took place in the national assembly. At the end, Mustafa Kemal put the final point: “There is not a definite line in our Misak-i Milli. The line that we will set by relying on our actual force will be our national frontiers”.¹⁷ The nationalist leadership therefore behaved with political expediency and in accordance with the military-strategic concerns. This first stage of the territorial closure was not carried on exclusively in accordance with the pre-declared frontiers. While in some cases, the general idea of Ottoman-Muslim majority was applied, in some other cases, military concerns prevailed. The point is that Mustafa Kemal himself had the tendency interpret the National Pact not to enlarge but to narrow the frontiers.¹⁸ In all stages of the national war and in the final peace conference he always pursued a realistic policy concerning the territorial matters.

The uncertain feature of the territorial principles of the National Pact turned to an opportunity for the nationalist leaders, particularly for Mustafa Kemal to eliminate the

¹⁶ Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği* [Ataturkist Nationalism](Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997), 170.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

imperial territorial vision which was prevalent for a long time even within the nationalist movement. By using military conditions, war-time compulsions and foreign pressures as pretext, he could remove imperialistic ambitions which was very influential among the nationalists step by step. In this sense, throughout the independence war and early construction period, the nationalist leadership carried out a project of “nationalization of the National Pact”. This means in the process, it was totally blown of its originally imperialistic content –since it had a vision of political community stretching out beyond the armistice line- and was interpreted as the manifestation of modern Turkish nationalism. It did not define the irreducible national territories of the new Turkey but it has been portrayed and represented as such. This representation has ascribed an exaggerated certainty to the document. In time it became the main point of reference for the official political discourse of “political unity based on territorial integrity” as the sine qua non of Turkish Foreign Policy. It became the source of the identification of the national borders with existential questions.¹⁹ Throughout the republican period, both in power and in opposition, political parties have often resorted to some kind of “Misak-i Milli heroism” whenever they needed to forcefully assert Turkish national unity.

There is obviously a part played by this representation of the document as “the sine qua non of the Turkish Foreign Policy” in this misuse. From this perspective, the National Pact has easily become a subject of national unity heroism and the source of a mystification of motherland “from which any concession in any case is totally unthinkable”.

¹⁹ Ümit Cizre, “Turkey’s Kurdish Problem: Borders, Identity and Hegemony” in *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*, eds., Ian Lustick, Brendan O’Leary and T. Callaghy (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2002), 225.

Ironically, however, it was during the national war that the most important territorial concession - Batum where the Muslims were the majority - were given to Soviet Russia. With the Lausanne Treaty, then, Western Thrace and the Musul province were left out of the national frontiers. In this way, all the territories which were cited by name in the pact remained outside the so- called national territories. After Lausanne, however, Hatay province was included in the national territory even if it was not included in the National Pact.

3.3.The National Pact, Sivas Declaration and the “National” Closure of the Turkish Citizenship

3.3.1. The Essence of the New Political Community of Citizens

Contrary to the territorial definition, the National Pact and the Sivas Declaration clearly specified the cultural boundaries of the “community inside”, i.e., they put forward a particular cultural criterion for the new political community of citizens. In this sense, they both envisaged a cultural closure if not a “national closure” in the Western sense of the term. The future political community would be the community of “Muslim citizens”.²⁰ Although the National Pact was not so clear in this sense because of the above mentioned uncertainty about the physical borders, the national leadership interpreted the document as limited with the faith of the Anatolian Ottoman-Muslims. In Sivas Declaration, however, the object of the National Struggle was clearly defined as the Ottoman-Muslim majority of the Anatolia. The boundaries of the envisaged political

²⁰ Oran, *Türk Dış.* 105.

community therefore the boundaries of membership were drawn on the basis of religion. In other words, the nationalist elite envisaged a new homogenous entity on the basis of a common religious-cultural identity. In this way, the conception of “community inside” receded from the Ottoman imperial understanding and came closer to Western conception since it entailed a homogeneous social structure instead of imperial cultural and religious plurality.

The same characterizations were used in both documents in describing the basic features of concerned political community. It was the “...Ottoman-Muslim majority united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other’s racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance.”²¹ Moreover, the Statute of the Anatolian and Rumelian Defense of Rights Organization clearly cited that all “Islamic citizens” (İslam vatandaşları) were counted as the natural members of the organization.²²

Two consequences can be derived from such a definition: First, the non-Muslim peoples - Greeks, Armenians and Jews - who were the citizens of the Ottoman State until that time were definitely left outside of the new “community inside”. Secondly, the Ottoman-Islamic majority which was composed of various ethnic groups, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, Circassians and others were viewed as a cultural and political whole united in many respects.

In this way, both documents specified the condition for membership in the new “community inside” as to be Muslim and all former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim

²¹ Ibid. See also Appendixes A and B for the texts of both documents in Turkish.

²² Mete Tunçay, Cemil Koçak and others, *Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye: 1919-1980*[Turkish History: The Modern Turkey, 1919-1989](İstanbul, Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 65.

origin were left out of the new conception of member-citizen. The political identity of the community was identified with the cultural-religious identity of the majority. In the same way, the political identity of the individual citizen was identified with his/her religious affiliation. The phrase “Islamic citizens” obviously connects the cultural –here religious- identity to political membership. Technically this definition presents the perfect example of the fusion between cultural identity (nationality, in this case religion however) and political membership. The political identity of the community of citizens would be determined by the religious identity of the majority.

However, not all the Muslim citizens were the objects of the national struggle. Although the main emphasis on Islamic identity, this identity was restricted to a particular territory. The community of Islamic citizens would not involve the people of other Arab provinces and of distant territories. As the above parts have indicated, the National Pact did not bring a clear line of demarcation. But together with the Sivas Declaration it can be argued that the national movement had a territorial vision which also determined the limits of the national closure. In this respect, the National Pact brought an element of territoriality which later facilitated to refer the Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia and Rumelia as “Turks”. This understanding became the ideological backbone of the national struggle.²³

Therefore, in these documents, there were the first signs of constructing a new political “community inside” and new ground rules for proper membership. This new conception had a significant continuity with the Ottoman tradition since it continued to

²³ Sevan Nişanyan, “Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Milleti Kavramı.” [The Conception of Turkish Nation in Kemalist Thought] *Türkiye Günlüğü*. 33(Mart-Nisan, 1995), 131.

differentiate different groups in the society – millets - on the basis of religion. On the other hand, it broke up with the Ottoman imperial understanding since it envisaged cultural-religious homogeneity instead of a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious social structure and since it introduced an element of territoriality based on this homogeneity. At this point a clarification is needed concerning the use of the term “millet” (today corresponding to nation) in Ottoman understanding.

In the Ottoman political tradition, “millet” was used to refer religious communities like Armenian millet, Jewish millet etc. Since the Tanzimat period, the term “Osmanlı milleti” was used as an imperial conception of “community inside” to include all the religious communities and sects living in the vast territories of the state. All the inhabitants of the Ottoman territories were accepted as Ottoman citizens without regarding religious, racial, ethnic, sectarian differences. According to Nişanyan, the ideal of cultural (national-religious) homogeneity which was put forward in these documents –the National Pact and the Sivas Declaration- in 1919 was the rejection of this integration model.²⁴ Particularly, the non-Muslim millets and the Arab people were excluded. This early understanding of homogenous political community on the basis of religion does not fit to the modern, secular definition of nation at this stage. It was much closer to an imperial definition because of the exclusive emphasis on religious identity.

Therefore, the word “milli” (national) in the term Misak-i Milli did not mean “national” in the Western sense. It was used mainly to refer Ottoman-Muslim majority. In this early period, the nationalist leaders used the term “millet” in the same way to refer basically a religious community when they used the term Islam milleti. In time

²⁴ Ibid.

however, this usage changed and involved a dual content. It began to refer a national community (secular, cultural, linguistic community) in the Western sense of the term. But at this stage, the main reference of millet was religious community.

3.3.2. “Whose” (National) Security and the Question of National Identity

The exclusion of the Arab people of the Ottoman State was natural since the distant Arab territories were under the British and French invasion since the middle of the war and the Arabs were themselves willing to separate from Ottoman administration. However, the exclusion of the non-Muslim elements was very problematical since they were living in Istanbul and in different parts of Anatolia together with the Muslims. They were not immigrants but the genuine/ authentic local peoples of Anatolia. Moreover, Armenians, Jews and Greeks constituted the most powerful classes economically. From a socio-cultural perspective, they were an integral part of the society. They spoke Turkish. Until the last elections, the representatives of these minorities existed in the Ottoman Parliament. As indicated above, especially since the Tanzimat, the Ottoman State gave greater place to them in politics. They were not even minorities, but Ottoman citizens of different “millets”. Even the policy of Turkification which was applied widely in education, literature, politics and public life during the administration of the Union and Progress Party after 1913, could not end this relative autonomy of the religious minorities.²⁵

²⁵ For an extensive analysis about the non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire, see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Vol. I. The Central Lands* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982).

During the elections of the last Ottoman Parliament, however, the condition to be elected was to be from the Muslim majority. The exclusion of the non-Muslims from legitimate politics and government was seen as an absolute necessity by the Ottoman government since in different parts of the country, these peoples were in a state of rebellion against the state. Armenian demands about the Eastern and Southern Anatolia were supported by Britain and France and by the Soviet Russia. The Greeks invaded Izmir with the aim of annexing Western Anatolia by relying on the considerable Greek population of the region. As a matter of fact, Greeks had also some demands about Istanbul but they could not openly declare it. Another part of Anatolian Greeks in the north wanted to revive the historical Pontus Kingdom around the province of Trabzon. The realization of these demands would mean the loss of the homeland of the Ottoman Muslims. After the Mudros Armistice, the Entente Powers could not conclude a peace treaty because of these competing demands of the minorities and the intention of each European power to make use of these demands in accordance of its own interest. In this respect, as Yerasimos cited, the Turkish National War of Independence was waged not against the Entente Powers but mainly against the non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman State.²⁶

These historical conditions of the national struggle period primarily shaped the nationalists' social vision and projections about future social and political order and the future political identity. A new conception of homogenous political "community inside" and a unitary political membership that would overlap with the cultural identity of

²⁶ Stefanos Yerasimos, "Tek Parti Dönemi" [The Single Party Period] in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* [Turkey in Transition], ed. Irwin C. Schick and A. Tonak (İstanbul:Belge Yayınları, 1992), 76.

community were idealized. What existed behind this new conception of “community inside” and of membership? What were the factors that affected the formation of a peculiar understanding of “national” citizenship in this early period?

For the purpose of this study, one of the central factors behind the conception of homogenous citizenship on the basis of religion was the security concern which drew the cultural boundaries of the “community inside”. According to this security conception, minorities’ search for independence and territorial demands were the fundamental threats against the survival of the Ottoman-Muslim majority. In other words, the nature of the threat, from whom it was coming drew the boundaries of “community inside” and became the basis of the “politics of inclusion and exclusion” in this early period.²⁷ At this stage of the national struggle, the national closure -here, took place in the form of cultural-religious closure- excluded the non-Muslim peoples who were considered as a threat against national security and they could not be “proper members” of the future political community. In other words, the national security conception of the period framed the “national” component of the future citizenship identity. Therefore, the formation of the conceptions of “national security” and “national political community” went parallel in this early period.

The national security conception of the period formed under such a fear of disintegration of the home territories. The Ottoman elite had long been in a state of anxiety because of the successive loss of imperial territories. But the demands of the non-Muslim peoples about the original homeland of the state and the open support of the

²⁷ For the discussion on national security and the formation of the national identity, see the analysis on pp. 42-45 of this dissertation.

Entente Powers were perceived as a threat against “national existence”. As a matter of fact, the local resistance movements emerged all over Anatolia mainly against this perceived danger of disintegration rather than the Allied invasions. The national leadership succeeded to turn this popular anxiety against the Greek and Armenian peril to a national mobilization for war. The threat against the security of Muslim majority became the basis of national consciousness and solidarity which did not exist until that time.

Specifically, the “discourse of Armenian threat” was used widely to cultivate a consciousness of identity and solidarity among the rural masses of Anatolia whose national feelings were very weak indeed.²⁸ The general discourse of threat coming from the non-Muslims had an identity forming and consciousness raising impact on the war-tired and in some parts rebellious peasant communities of Anatolia. The fear of disintegration of Anatolia in accordance with the Armenian plans was scraped in the collective memory of the Anatolian people to the extent that it turned into “a deep fear of disintegration - sometimes at the level of a paranoia - which still surfaces from time to time and is manipulated by various political currents. The “unfaithful” Greeks and the Armenians became the “other”, the foreigner and even the enemy in a community of security which would be only composed of Muslim citizens. Even if they continued to live within this community, they would not be proper members of the society.

²⁸ Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları* [Happy the One Who is able to Say I am Turk: The Ethno-Secular Limits of the Turkish National Identity] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 89.

3.3.3. Minority Rights and the External National Closure

As the above part have clarified, the nationalist project was rested on the idea of “threat against the security of the Muslim majority” in cultivating the sense of a homogenous identity -if not of a modern national identity but as the premise of that identity- which was embedded in Islamic identity. In the first unilateral declarations of the political initiative, that is in the Sivas Declaration and in the National Pact, without any reservation, the non-Muslim peoples of Anatolia were excluded from the envisaged political community. While the National Pact emphasized on the salvation of the Muslim majority, Sivas Declaration defined the Armenian and Greek demands as a direct threat against national survival. The latter cited that “Within these territories, the invasion of any proportion of the motherland, *especially* the movements aiming to establish separate Greek and Armenian states would not be definitely permitted”. In another article of the Sivas Declaration, it was also cited that any privileges that would disrupt the unity and integrity of the society would not be given to those people.²⁹

In this study, the issue of minority rights is used as an analytical instrument to analyze both the features of the national closure and political aspect of the emerging citizenship conception of the national struggle period. The analysis of “which minority rights are recognized on what basis” helps to understand the terms of national closure since it specifies the national-cultural criteria according to which who remain inside, who are left outside. In other words, although minority rights are democratic rights for genuine equality, they also specify who are not from the majority therefore who do not

²⁹ Article 3 of the Sivas Declaration, see *Atatürk'ün Milli. 97* and the Appendix A.

fit the underlying ethnic, cultural, religious or some other criterion for being “proper” members of the society.

The 3rd article of the Sivas Declaration is important since it at the same time recognized the legal rights of minorities. In the same way, the 5th article of the National Pact stated that “The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between Entente Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us in reliance on the belief that the Muslim minorities in neighboring countries also will have the benefit of same rights.”³⁰ The point is that while on the one hand these documents declared that the end of Ottoman system of social integration and imperial definition of citizenship, on the other hand they guaranteed the protection of minority rights in line with the internationally recognized principles. This was also a step towards the Western nation-state model which was based on the legal protection of the minorities against the abuses of the majority rule. This general understanding exist in all foreign policy documents of the independence war period.

The recognition of the basic rights of the non-Muslim peoples is worth analysis when one considers that the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact are the basic declarations about “national salvation”. While on the one hand, there is an overt exclusion of these peoples who were defined as the other, the foreigner and even the enemy from the future political community of citizens; there is also some degree of respect to their existence and an emphasis on the international obligations as binding clauses. What kind of sensitivity existed behind this concern?

³⁰ See, Appendix B.

The articles about minority rights reflect the search of the nationalist leadership to be recognized by the international community as a legitimate movement of self-determination. In other words, the need to be recognized by the international community determined the nationalists' policy towards minorities. During the period between the gathering of the National Congress at Sivas and the proclamation of the National Pact in the Ottoman Parliament, one of the main concerns of Mustafa Kemal was to be recognized by the international community specifically by the United States and the Bolshevik Russia. The nationalist leadership was trying to prove that the Turkish nationalist movement was a legitimate movement of national self-determination organized in accordance with the Wilsonian principles. The United States' recognition would make the nationalist movement stronger against the Entente Powers. On the other hand the Bolshevik support would be in the form of closer cooperation and material assistance which was needed desperately by the nationalists. These reasons forced the nationalist leadership to establish direct contacts with both of these states. In successive diplomatic instances and contacts with both states, Mustafa Kemal had to firmly emphasize this sensitivity of the Turkish Nationalists about the minority rights.

After the Sivas Congress, Mustafa Kemal sent some of the documents about the decisions of the Congress to the Chief of the United States' military mission, General Harbor who was in Samsun. As understood also from the letter wrote by Mustafa Kemal directly to the General, General Harbor and Mustafa Kemal met before the Sivas Congress (in Erzurum) and M. Kemal promised to send those documents to the General. In his reply, General Harbor, specifically paid attention to the conditions of the Armenian people of Malatya, Kayseri and Mersovan who were still apprehensive of

danger from the nationalist movement. He requested a wider circulation of information that the Nationalist Movement was in no way inimical to the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire.³¹ Therefore, the first documents of nationalist foreign policy took these warnings into consideration and included specific articles about minority rights.

There is one more foreign policy document indicating the intention of the nationalist leadership in this respect. During the Sivas Congress, there were intense discussions about American mandate which was defended by a considerable group of intellectuals and the bourgeoisie of Istanbul. This idea was eliminated after a compromise between the two opposing groups. Nevertheless, a letter was sent to the Senate of the United States of America, inviting a committee for the purpose of investigating the real conditions of the Anatolian people before the signing of a peace treaty. The letter also emphasized that the congress guaranteed the protection of the all minorities with life, liberty, justice and inviolability of property rights guaranteed for all.³²

On several occasions, other leaders of the nationalist movement, like Kazim Karabekir, met with the military missions of the Entente Powers and discussed the conditions of the minorities.³³ These discussions indicated the sensitivity of the Entente Powers and the United States concerning especially the Armenian people. The nationalists clearly understood that the forced deportation of Armenians and the Ottoman wartime policy of eliminating the Armenian population of Eastern Anatolia were the reasons behind Western sensitivity. The nationalist leaders were sure about a

³¹ *Atatürk'ün Milli.* 103-104.

³² *Ibid.* 87-88.

³³ Karabekir's interview with a British lieutenant colonel, Rawlinson, see *Ibid.* 123-127.

Western project of an independent Armenian State which was supported specifically by President Wilson himself. Therefore, to persuade the United States and the Entente Powers about a future policy of respect to the minority rights was vital both to prevent this project and to gain legitimacy in the eyes of those states.

Under these circumstances, in both documents of nationalist foreign policy -in the Sivas Declaration and in the National Pact - and as well as in the special diplomatic correspondences, the nationalist leadership emphasized that they well understood the sensitivity of the Western governments about the minority rights. In this sense, the early nationalist foreign policy focused on blocking Armenian lobbying activities that were going on in the United States. The nationalists used every opportunity to prove their determination to recognize the internationally accepted principles of minority rights. In a sense, they bound themselves with such international clauses and guaranteed that they aimed social and racial harmony within national territories.

Therefore, in this period of early formation, the foreign policy considerations - the need for international recognition and foreign support - influenced the nationalist identity formulation about the “community inside” and proper membership at least at the discursive level. Towards the outside world, although with a vague content, the fundamental rights of minorities were recognized. Moreover and the most importantly, for the first and the last time during this period, the nationalist leadership guaranteed to comply with the standards of race, language and religion in defining minorities in Anatolia. The nationalist leadership defined itself as representing the Muslim majority, but concerning the minorities; it did not refrain from binding itself with these international documents of commitment.

Consequently, in this early period, there was not a Western type of national closure. But two steps were taken towards the Western nation-state model in terms of national closure. First, the nationalists made clear that they had a project of homogenous cultural entity as different from Ottoman social system as the basis of the new nation-state and modern citizenship identity. Secondly, they bound themselves with international rules about the minority rights as accepted in the modern nation-states. This last initiative indicates the degree of the pressure of the international conditions on the nationalist leadership. With a considerable success, the nationalist elite responded to international expectations and displayed a manipulative effort. In the subsequent periods, the successive republican governments often benefited from these documents to underline the traditional attitude of the Turkish State towards the minorities as being respectful from the very beginning whenever they were subject to international pressure.

This is the external dimension of national closure as began with the proclamations of the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact. Islam was presented as the fundamental allegiance among the citizen-members while the non-Muslims were left out of this common identity. This was an early version of the fusion/identification between a particular cultural identity and political membership in Turkish case. In the coming periods, in addition to Islam – particularly the Sunni section of it -, Turkish ethnicity and Turkish language would be added as the fundamental markers of Turkish citizenship identity.

3.3.4. Internal National Closure within the Muslim Majority: The Roots of the Kurdish Question

So far this part has analyzed the external dimension of the national closure as a process excluding the non-Muslim peoples. There was also an internal cultural (national) closure which was manifested in the supposed cultural and political unity of the Ottoman-Islamic majority which was composed of various ethnic-cultural communities i.e., as the Kurds, Lazes, Arabs, Circassians and various religious sects. In both the Sivas Declaration the National Pact (as interpreted later), the Ottoman-Islamic community within the armistice line was portrayed as a cultural and political whole united by a common religious bond.³⁴ These documents in a sense attempted to convince the outside world that the peoples of Anatolia were united to save their homeland from Western imperialism.

However, the real conditions were not as favorable as portrayed in these documents. Among the Muslim peoples of Anatolia, some Circassian and Kurdish groups were supported by the Allied governments to establish independent states or to obtain autonomy. Especially some primary Kurdish tribal leaders were in close contact with Britain and demanded that the Wilsonian self-determination principle should be applied in their case.³⁵

These separatist demands coming from within the Muslim majority forced the nationalist leadership to develop a dual policy towards the ethnic groups of Anatolia. On the one hand, they increasingly resorted to a discourse of Islamic unity. On the other

³⁴ For the first articles of both documents in Turkish, see Appendixes A and B.

³⁵ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi*[Kurdish Question: Its Root and the Development] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1997), 71-75.

hand, a policy of cultural pluralism was adopted in these first documents of nationalist foreign policy. Both the National Pact and the Sivas Declaration emphasized that the racial (ethnic) and social rights of Muslim ethnic groups would be recognized and their environmental conditions would be respected. However, they were not cited as minorities but as the ethnic brands within Muslim majority.

From the perspective of national closure, such an understanding clearly corresponds to a pluralist conception of national unity which would be the basis of the accommodationist approach of the nationalist leadership towards the Kurdish political movement in this early period. The policy of cultural pluralism was the necessary corollary of the Wilsonian principles. As Ahmed stated properly, in the early formation period, the source of all the democratic-pluralist tendencies within Kemalism was the Wilsonian principles.³⁶ Therefore, there was not negation or rejection of ethnic differences within the Muslim majority.

On the other hand, to prevent the possible divisive effects of this policy, the discourse of Islamic fraternity was used as the most powerful common denominator among these groups that would mobilize them for a common cause. The emphasis on Islamic allegiance which made Muslim peoples a “whole, which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance,” was the only way to convince these groups to unite against the common enemy. The undifferentiating, unifying function of

³⁶ Feroz Ahmed, “Kemalist Türkiye’de İdeoloji Arayışı” [The Search for Ideology in Kemalist Turkey] in Feroz Ahmed, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme* [From Unionism to Kemalism] (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), 160.

Islam was very valuable and in fact indispensable for the nationalist leadership in cultivating political unity among the Muslim peoples of Anatolia.³⁷

During this period, Mustafa Kemal succeeded in establishing strong cooperative relations with the primary Kurdish leaders. In the telegrams he sent to them, he used a language with a high Islamic tone. He especially paid attention to the need to unite to save the Sultanate and the “holy motherland which was trod under Armenian feet”.³⁸ In this language, Islam and the Armenian peril were presented as the common denominators of the Kurdish-Turkish cooperation. In contrast to the near absence of the national consciousness, the religious allegiance and the feeling of solidarity formed around the idea of Islamic unity –Umma- was very powerful at the popular level.³⁹ Therefore, Islam was the main integrative force to eliminate the Kurdish and Circassian demands for autonomy. In this sense, Islamic allegiance became the driving force of the national struggle. Despite this continuing importance of Islam in the definition of the political “community inside” there is a clear difference from the Ottoman vision.

As emphasized above, the cultural – if not yet national - closure of citizenship on the basis of the religion represents a passage from the idea of Umma to Millet since it entails the element of homogeneity instead of imperial heterogeneity and territoriality. Sivas Declaration and the National Pact were the first documents that announced this change to the international community. The term “millet” was used in a dual meaning

³⁷ Feroz Ahmed, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu* [The Making of Modern Turkey] (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995: 73; Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* [Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), 153.

³⁸ Oran, *Atatürk*. 138.

³⁹ Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu*. 100.

both to refer to religious communities and to the political entity of Anatolian-Muslim majority. A nationalist discourse began to be employed in which the term “millet” was used to refer a particular, homogenous community that is the Muslim people of Anatolia without using the term “Turkishness’. Therefore, there was a strong religious component of the early conception of Turkish citizenship. After the gathering of the national assembly, the nationalist leaders continued to rely on this religious language towards the domestic community but they began to activate this religious unity as a “nationality principle” especially during the London Conference of February 1921.

3.4. The National Pact, The Sivas Declaration and the Mode of Integration of the Future Political Community of Citizens

3.4.1. The Nationalist Dilemma :Loyalty to Sultan-Caliph versus National Sovereignty

This part will analyze the features of an early conception of “the community inside” from a political point of view that is the political dimension of envisaged citizenship identity as reflected in the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact. Specifically, the question is “ What kind of (if any) integration model or a (new) conception of membership was envisaged in these documents?”

A mode of integration refers to a common mode of conduct of collective affairs of a political community and it gives a basic character to the collectivity and to the individual citizen. In other words, it is a comprehensive framework which binds citizens to each other by way of institutions and of a particular value system.⁴⁰ Concerning

⁴⁰ Bhikhu Parekh, “Discourses on National Identity.” *Political Studies*. XLII (1994), 501.

citizenship identity, it draws the ethical-ideological boundaries of the “community inside” and proposes a peculiar balance of rights and obligations. It basically envisages an ideology or regime of citizenship which basically stems from the ideology and the type of the state.⁴¹

The principles and objectives of the Turkish national struggle as declared to the international community through the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact did underline some particular considerations about the problem of unity and social integration in the future political order. They also expressed some common values that would be the basis of the state-society relations and of the political identity of the citizens in the future. However, it was very early to think about a new model of social integration or a regime change. None of the prominent figures of the national movement thought and expressed such an intention. Later, Mustafa Kemal explained that he had this idea of a new state and a new society but kept it as a national secret for a long time.⁴²

The nationalist leaders were fully loyal to the Sultanate and to Sultan himself that is to the existing order. In an interview with a British lieutenant colonel, Rawlinson, Kazim Karabekir firmly stated that it was impossible to separate the Caliphate and the government. Republican regime was not definitely suitable for the Ottoman society.⁴³ So, there were no signs of anti-monarchism among the nationalist elite at this stage of

⁴¹ Thomas Janoski, *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional and Social-Democratic Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 143.

⁴² Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Söylev, Cilt I-II* [The Speech, Vols. I-II] (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1988), 46.

⁴³ *Atatürk'ün Milli*. Document No: 11, 124.

the nationalist movement. Nor there was a popular nationalist mobilization with the aim of establishing a modern nation-state against the monarchy.

As a matter of fact, loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph was the locus of individual and collective political identity and of the legitimacy of any political enterprise. It was the fundamental allegiance binding the ordinary citizen to the state. In other words, the basic component of the political identity of the Ottoman citizen was complete obedience to the religious-political leader. The nationalist leaders defined the political character of their movement within this ideological framework. The Sivas Declaration reflects this perspective since it exclusively declared that loyalty to and the salvation of the Sultan-Caliph was the essence of the nationalist struggle.

On the other hand, these documents brought new political ideas as well. Complete independence and national sovereignty were two premises that were underlined specifically in these documents for the first time. The principle of full independence was put forward as a political value especially against the advocates of the mandate system during the Sivas Congress. However, it also brought a new vision to the collective life as well as to the individual citizen. It would be the main condition of survival for the society and for an honorable individual membership. In the opening paragraph of the National Pact, it was cited that the survival of the Ottoman Sultanate and society depended on these principles.⁴⁴ In a sense, nationalist leadership aimed to create a “shared commitment” around which all social forces would come together. It was an attempt to bind the citizens to the faith of the country. In this respect, the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact presented the nucleus of a republican understanding of

⁴⁴ See Appendix B.

a “unified society around a common good” despite the fact that it was formulated to protect the monarchy.

On the other hand, the expression of an idea of “national sovereignty” for the first time in these documents should not be undervalued despite the fact that it created a paradoxical situation because of the exclusive emphasis on loyalty to monarchy. This paradox was successfully obscured by the nationalist leadership who activated this principle against the outside world, not against the monarchy at this stage. It was used not to refer “sovereignty coming from people and/ or popular rule”. Rather, it was an abstract principle used widely to emphasize on the unity of the Anatolian peoples against foreign invasions and against the separationist demands of the Armenian, Anatolian Greek, Kurdish and Circassian groups.⁴⁵

During the initial period of the nationalist struggle, this political framework was almost an imperative for the nationalists to get support of the military forces, local notables and the religious leaders in Anatolia. The idea of national sovereignty was expressed not with an anti-monarchist tone but as an instrument to mobilize the national potential for the salvation of the county which was identified with the salvation of the Sultan-Caliph. There were neither any signs of an anti-monarchist political ideology, nor an idea of a regime change within the nationalist movement. Throughout the independence war, loyalty to Sultan-Caliph remained as the strongest dimension of the political identity of the nationalist leaders and the members of the Grand National

⁴⁵ Bülent Tanör, “Lozan’a Giden Yıllarda Türk Anayasa Tezinin Doğuşu” [The Birth of the Turkish Constitutional Thesis during the Years towards Lausanne] in *Lozan’ın 50. Yılına Armağan* [Studies in Commemoration of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on Its 50th Anniversary] (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1978), 212.

Assembly to the extent that the abolition of the Sultanate was realized with a plot against the will of the assembly just before the Lausanne Conference.

3.4.2. Minority Rights and the Future “Political” Order

In this study, the issue of minority rights is used as an analytical instrument to analyze the “political” aspect of the emerging citizenship conception as well as the features of the national closure of the national struggle period. An analysis minority rights from the political perspective helps to understand nature of the political allegiance among the citizens and between the citizen and the state, the boundaries of the legitimate sphere of politics, the basic character of the political institutions and values, i.e., the general mode of conduct of the public affairs within a delimited territory. What were the characteristics of the envisaged mode of integration as revealed in these first foreign policy documents of the national struggle period?

Both the National Pact and the Sivas Declaration recognized minority rights in accordance with the internationally accepted rules. However, even if the recognition of minority rights meant a policy of “cultural pluralism” as the continuation of the Ottoman imperial policy of coexistence, it did not certainly meant a deliberate policy of political pluralism. The point is that, the recognition of minority rights was not the consequence of a political conciliation or compromise between these groups. Nor there was an aim of a post-war social contract of coexistence with these communities on the part of the leaders of the national struggle. In other words, the recognition of minority rights did not imply a model of political integration that was a result of a compromise and/or coalition

with the non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman State.⁴⁶ As a matter of fact, their situation was very ambiguous. The nationalist movement defined itself as the representative of the Islamic majority and declared its political objective as the salvation of that community. Moreover, it strongly rejected to give any priorities to the former non-Muslim citizens that would disrupt social unity. What did it mean? Would the religious minorities keep their position and become the citizens of the new political entity? Could they continue to live in Anatolia and in Istanbul as they were? These were very unclear matters. The only clear thing was that the nationalists saw themselves as the only authority that had the right to recognize these rights. They did not propose a new model of integration for the social-political order nor there was any search of compromise with these groups.

3.4.3. Cultural Pluralism versus Political Centralization: Ethnic Minority Rights and the Mode of Integration

In this early period of nation and state building period, the exclusive emphasis on Islam meant that religion would be the fundamental allegiance among the members of the society but also the main bond between the citizen and the state. Concerning the political boundaries of membership within the Muslim majority, however, it is very striking that both documents were in full compliance with the democratic-pluralistic ideas of the period which were specified in the Wilsonian principles. They both mentioned about the respect to racial and social rights of non-Turk Muslim communities although with a vague content. The Sivas Declaration and the National Pact gave the

⁴⁶ The Kemalists stayed away from even the non-Muslim communities who supported them during the war. The leader of the Greek community of Karaman, Konya, Niğde, Kayseri and Ankara worked actively

message that the nationalist leadership would adopt a “policy of cultural pluralism” as a political integration model which would provide legal protection to different communities within the Muslim majority.

This understanding was clear especially in the National Pact. The first article of the pact cited the criteria - race (ethnicity), language and religion - as to distinguish the Muslim peoples of Anatolia whose rights would be respected by the nationalist leadership.⁴⁷ They were in fact the internationally accepted standards of being a minority. In this way, the nationalist elite implicitly accepted that racially different peoples of Anatolia could be accepted as minorities although minority rights were recognized in another article of the document.

This was a message both for the international community and for the domestic political forces. Both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact reflected the idea that in order to hold these ethnically different peoples together and to provide their participation, the nationalist elite had to adopt a policy of “political unity within cultural and ethnic plurality”.⁴⁸ According to Özbudun, the phrase of “respect to the environmental conditions of ethnic, linguistic and religious communities within the Muslim Brotherhood” may even be interpreted in a broadest sense as an understanding of local autonomy.⁴⁹ The nationalist elite was in a position to obtain the support of these

in favor of the nationalists throughout the war but could not save his community from the population exchange after the war, see Oran, *Türk Dış*. 190.

⁴⁷ See Appendix B.

⁴⁸ Ergun Özbudun, “Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu” [The Question of Citizenship and Identity in the First Documents of the National Struggle and the Republic] in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* [Republic, Democracy and Identity] ed., Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 64.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

ethnic and cultural groups and to strengthen its legitimacy in the domestic field. Especially with such a declaration, they aimed to block the British activities in the Southeastern Anatolia with respect to an independent Kurdish State.

As emphasized in above part on national closure, the implicit recognition of ethnic and cultural rights was related more with the search for international recognition and legitimacy rather than an ideal a political order based on genuine political pluralism. The nationalist leaders wanted to show that they fully adopted the Western notion of “rights” in their social-political vision. The democratic tendencies within Kemalism in this early period was related with the need to identify the Turkish case with the internationally recognized principle of self-determination.⁵⁰ They developed such a democratic-pluralist social view since especially Mustafa Kemal was aware of the fact that the Wilsonian principles and specifically the 14th article about the right of self-determination would be very influential in the post-war international order. Both documents emphasized that as the representative of the Ottoman-Muslim majority, the nationalist movement was defending the legitimate right of self-determination of the Muslim majority but at the same time it would be respectful to the fundamental rights of the different ethnic and cultural groups within that majority.

The point is that the processes of state formation, the definition of the political-ethical boundaries of the new “community inside” and of a nationalist foreign policy went parallel in this early period. The nucleus of the new state elite critically assessed the international and domestic situation, began to give up the imperial outlook, decided

⁵⁰ Ahmed, “Kemalist,” 160.

on a unitary citizenship model and tried to gain legitimacy in the international sphere by resting their claim on an international principle.

This conception of “political unity within ethnic and cultural plurality” was a break from the Ottoman imperial mode of integration since it represented a departure from the “Umma” conception by recognizing the ethnical, religious, linguistic rights of the Muslim peoples. Although there was an emphasis on the political unity among them, the citation of the criteria of difference within the Muslim majority was a novelty. However this democratic-pluralistic understanding obviously did not reflect the existing worldview and ideological formation of the Turkish nationalists. Soon it became clear that the claimed political unity would necessitate use of force and compulsion.

The Turkish nationalists in time adopted more the “political unity” part of this understanding rather than the “cultural plurality” aspect. During the Lausanne negotiations, when the Allied governments put pressure on the Turkish delegation by using the first article of the National Pact, the delegation firmly argued that the National Pact did not differentiate but united the ethnically and culturally different groups of Anatolia.⁵¹ In this sense, the life-time of this democratic-pluralist conception of citizenship became very short. As the analysis of the following parts will clarify, the conception of “organic society” which referred to a centrally defined, unique and unitary political identity for the individual citizen and for the society would gain prevalence before the formal establishment of the new republican regime.

The democratic-pluralist rhetoric well served for the establishment of functional coalitions with non-Turk Muslim communities which would end after the war. Mustafa

⁵¹ See the related discussion on Lausanne treaty on pages 280-286 of the dissertation.

Kemal considered the collaboration of the religious leaders, the Kurdish and other ethnic tribal leaders and of the local notables extremely important throughout the war.⁵² This approach which saw these social forces as strategic allies not equal political partners impeded the establishment of genuine “political” pluralism in addition to cultural pluralism. As a matter of fact, there was no clear contract or compromise between the nationalist leadership and the leaders of these social forces as in the case of the non-Muslim communities. Under war-time conditions, the leaders of the religious and ethnic groups did not negotiate on the conditions of their collaboration. They participated to the national struggle as cultural groups not as political forces. From the very beginning, the nationalist leadership took the control. There was a supreme authority which recognized these identities but this authority was not the one that was constituted from equal political partners. The nationalist leadership put itself above all the other political and social forces and determined the conditions of cooperation and the limits of their demands. Therefore, during this early period even if there was cultural pluralism, there wasn’t any kind of political pluralism.

One interesting indicator of the tendency for political centralization is the administrative measures that were taken during the Sivas Congress. Mustafa Kemal and the other high officials gave special importance to the issue of the administration of the towns and cities where a serious authority gap emerged after the invasions. Heyet-i Temsiliye, the ruling body of the Sivas Congress which carried governmental functions until the gathering of the national assembly, was vested with significant authority in this respect. One of them was the right to set the conditions of internal migration in

⁵² Oran, *Atatürk*. 153-154; 136-139.

Anatolia.⁵³ This meant, Heyet-i Temsiliye could decide on forced emigration of a population of any region because of security concerns. This was an early attempt which indicated the search for political centralization.

3.4.4. Anti-Unionism and Anti-Bolshevism

The Sivas Declaration and the National Pact reflected the nationalists' will to purify the society from ideologies which would disrupt unity and integrity. At this stage of the national struggle, they were defined as Unionism (İttihatçılık) and Bolshevism. The article 9 of the Sivas Declaration stated that the Anatolian and Rumelian Defense of Rights Organization was totally distant from any kind of currents of partisanship and personal ambitions.⁵⁴

This was a message again for both the international community and for the domestic society. In this way the nationalist leadership laid the foundation of a neutral diplomacy that would be implemented for long periods. However, concerning the definition of the political boundaries of the “community inside”, the meaning of this principle was much more complicated. The idea of purifying the society from ideologies and political currents which might have divisive consequences was the first formulation of the state-dominated public sphere, a conception of state-centered republican politics and the objective of political activity in Turkish political life. The emphasis on the non-Unionist character of the nationalist movement and the objection to partisanship became the background of the centrally defined notion of political sphere and political activity

⁵³ Tunçay, Koçak and others, *Türkiye*. 63-64.

⁵⁴ See Appendix A.

which were thought as the guarantees of political integrity. In this way, political integrity as the supreme value and the notion of politics as a sphere of state activity were introduced in this early period as the twin principles that would determine the limits of political possibilities and political activity in Turkish political life.

The issue of anti-Bolshevism will be analyzed more extensively in the coming parts on Turko-Soviet Rapprochement during the national struggle period. At this point it should be cited that the article about anti-partisanship of any kind in the Sivas Declaration has been interpreted to refer also the anti-Bolshevik character of the nationalist movement in this early period.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Oran, *Atatürk*. 140-146.

CHAPTER IV

THE SÉVRES TREATY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE “NATIONAL” IDEAL

4.1. Introduction

The Sévres Treaty which was signed on 10 August 1920, officially concluded the First World War between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman State. The treaty officialized the process of nation-state building which had been continuing since the early 19th century on the territories of the Ottoman State.¹ However, the success of the Turkish nationalist movement in uniting the Muslim peoples of Anatolia within an anti-imperialist struggle made the application of the treaty practically impossible. Moreover, the treaty did never enter into force since none of the parties ratified it. Despite all these factors which made the treaty invalid, however, the signing of the treaty affected the subsequent developments in a significant way. In this respect, this study will analyze it as a cornerstone event in the history of nation-state building and of the construction of national citizenship in Turkey.

When the treaty was signed, the nationalist movement in Anatolia had already transformed itself into an alternative government and established official and unofficial diplomatic relations with the United States, the Soviet Russia, the Allied

¹ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt:1, 1919-1980* [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Today, The Facts, Documents, Interpretations, Vol:1, 1919-1980] (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 118.

Powers and with the Muslim world. The signing of the treaty by the Ottoman government gave the nationalist government in Ankara the opportunity to underline the weakness of the Ottoman government to resist Western imperialism. The support to the nationalist forces increased and the legitimacy of the new government in the eyes of the Anatolian masses was strengthened. Moreover, the group which was in favor of an agreement with the Allied Powers within the nationalist elite lost its efficiency. The difference of opinion among the nationalists -especially on the question of rapprochement with the Soviet Russia- was removed to a large extent at least for some period. The nationalist movement became much more coherent and determinant.

Mustafa Kemal used this event to underline that there were two political power centers in the country. While one of them entered under the hegemony of the imperialists, the other was resisting.² For the first time after the signing of the treaty, the position of the Sultanate was opened to discussion. In this way, the signing of the Sévres Treaty facilitated the differentiation of the two political authorities and their different policies clearly.

But, more importantly, the Sévres Treaty showed the limits of the national struggle to the nationalists themselves. Most members of the new assembly genuinely believed that the national resistance was organized to save the Sultan and the imperial territories as much as possible. There was no idea of establishing a new state based on a particular national identity. Although, Mustafa Kemal did not bother with this problem in this early period, the sharpness and excessiveness of the Sévres regulations gave him the opportunity to persuade the members of the national

² Mustafa Kemal's speech in the national assembly on 25 September 1920, just after the signing of the Sévres Treaty, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Söylev Cilt: I-II* [Speech, Vols: I-II] (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1989), 300-301.

assembly to have more realistic objectives and a suitable strategy to realize them. After the signing of the Sévres Treaty, his views were accepted much more widely within the nationalist elite.

In this sense, the Sévres Treaty fixed the territorial, national and political terms of the independence war in the opposite way to what itself. In other words, the national struggle gained a vision to reverse the Allies' project about the Ottoman State. As opposed to division along ethnic lines and complete political submission, the nationalists united around the National Pact in a way as to transform and modify it to a project of nation-state with a homogenous political community. Therefore, as the coming section will make clear, the Sévres Treaty and its effects can be read as factors which shaped the minds and future perspectives of the founders of Turkish Republic to a large extent. The treaty certainly facilitated to the definition of the terms of the Turkish struggle as a war of “national liberation” not as a war to save the Sultan-caliph or to restore the old regime. It played the major role in the “nationalization of the National Pact” since the period after the signing of the treaty witnessed the emergence the element of ethnicity –Turkishness- to replace religion as the locus of national identity. Therefore, the Sévres Treaty was the turning point after which the Turkish ruling elite developed a conception of membership which was more in line with the Western civic conception of national citizenship.

4.2. The Territorial Regulations of the Sévres Treaty

Turkish Independence War was waged mainly against the territorial regulations of the Sévres Treaty which left a considerable part of the Anatolian territories to the independent Armenian State, to the Kurdish autonomous region and to Greek sovereignty. The uncertainties about the territorial regulations of the treaty

which were created on purpose by the Allied powers and the projects of Armenian and Kurdish states proved to the nationalists that their territorial concerns should be much more specific and they should focus more on the unity of the Anatolian territories. In this respect, The Sévres Treaty contributed much to the development of an understanding of “national” frontiers as opposed to the tacit imperial territorial vision of the National Pact.

The new borders of the Ottoman State were fixed in the article 27 of the treaty. The articles between 27-35 regulated territorial issues and the details of demarcation.³

Concerning the European border, the Ottoman State would loss all its territories in Thrace outside the Rumelian part of Istanbul province. According to article 84, on the other hand, Imbros and Tenedos Islands (Gökçeada and Bozcaada) were left to Greece and in article 122, the Dodecanese Islands were left to Italy. The remaining parts of Thrace until the Marmara Sea were left to Greece. The northern coasts of the Marmara Sea starting from the west of Istanbul city- which remained as the capital of the Ottoman State- including the Saroz Bay would be under the control of the Straits Commission and would be defined as “Straits Region”. The Straits Region would also include the south coasts of the Marmara Sea, including the Izmit province and Edremit Bay in the west. The southern border of the Straits Region would pass from north of Bursa province. This region as a whole would be under the sovereignty of the Straits Commission.⁴

³ Seha L. Meray and Osman Olcay, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Çöküş Belgeleri: Mondros Bırakışması, Sevr Andlaşması ve İlgili Belgeler* [The Documents of the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Mudros Armistice, Sévres Treaty and the Related Documents] (Ankara: SBF Yayını, 1977), 57-60.

⁴ Ibid.

The Anatolian Peninsula would be the mainland of the Ottoman State. In the south however, the provinces of Mardin, Antep, Urfa, and Osmaniye which were populated by Muslim majority were left outside and would be under the control of the Allied mandates. Adana would remain inside but the İskenderun Bay would be left to Syria. The southern border of the Ottoman State would pass from the east of Çukurova and would reach to Mediterranean Sea at Karataş.⁵

In the east, the Iranian border would remain untouched. The border with Russia would be drawn by excluding Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, Sarıkamış and Iğdır. This was the border defined after the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian war with the Berlin Treaty, that is it was the pre-Brest-Litovsk regulation. This meant the Allied powers counted the Brest-Litovsk Treaty as invalid and determined that this border would be defined in accordance with their project of Greater Armenian State. In the west, the Aegean islands which were 3 miles away from the coast would remain in the Ottoman State.⁶

These territorial regulations showed that the Allied governments' main criteria in drawing the new borders of the Ottoman State was not the Wilsonian principle of self-determination but their reciprocal interests and mainly the British policies in the Middle East.⁷ There was neither an ethnical nor a religious criterion in drawing the borders of the new political units. This policy had a primary characteristic: to create small political units in the Ottoman territories both in the Arab lands and in Anatolia. Although technically, the Anatolian Peninsula was left to

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 139.

the Ottoman State, because of some uncertainties, the territories which would be under the Ottoman sovereignty were further limited.⁸

The first issue was the southern border of the planned Armenian State. It was not decided clearly in the treaty. The exact line would be determined by US President Woodrow Wilson. There was the strong possibility that he would draw the line with an access to the Black Sea. This would mean that the Greater Armenia would include also the provinces of Erzincan, Gümüşhane, Trabzon, and Rize where again Muslims were the majority.⁹ The second uncertainty was about the İzmir province and the surrounding region which seemed under Ottoman sovereignty in the treaty. However, it was de facto left to Greece. Behind this regulation, there was Britain's objective of preventing Italians to control the Eastern Mediterranean region.¹⁰

The third issue was the project of Kurdish State. The Sévres Treaty realized the first step of this project by recognizing an autonomous Kurdistan where Kurdish people was said to live as majority in the east of Euphrates. According to treaty, the people of this region could strive for independence later. Therefore, the regulations about the autonomous Kurdish region meant also a considerable loss of territory from the mainland of the Ottoman State.¹¹

In addition to these territorial regulations, in a separate Triple Pact, the Allies defined economic zones in Anatolia where they accepted not to enter into competition with others and each of them would have the responsibility to protect the

⁸ Ibid. 126.

⁹ Ibid. 132-133.

¹⁰ Ibid. 132.

¹¹ Ibid. 130-131.

minorities living in its region. Therefore, Ottoman sovereignty would be severely limited within its own territories.¹²

In this respect, the Sévres regulations caused strong reactions in Anatolia as well as in Istanbul. The rejection of these regulations and the saving of the territories on which the Ottoman-Muslims are the majority became the fundamental objective for the even the most hesitant adherents of the nationalist resistance.¹³ The Ankara government completely rejected the territorial regulations of the Sévres Treaty. The main task of the nationalist struggle became much more clear as to reverse those regulations and to realize the “national borders”. Here, there is a significant point concerning the definition of the “national” territorial objectives by the nationalists.

The ambiguity concerning the object of the national struggle as cited in the National Pact and the differences of opinion among the nationalists were the indications of the fact that an imperial territorial conception and understanding of political community was directing the national movement at this stage. In this respect, the National Pact might not be the polar opposite of the Sévres Treaty since it did not have a clear national vision.

The point is that, the Sévres Treaty removed the uncertainties in the minds of the nationalists concerning the territorial limits of the national struggle and modified the understanding of the national borders. After the signing of the treaty, the tendency to interpret the National Pact in a way as to define the southern frontier as coinciding with the armistice line became prominent. The Turkish nationalists realized that they were in a position to have more realistic territorial objectives. The Sévres regulations showed that the Allies were determined not only to take the vast

¹² Ibid. 128.

¹³ Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy: 1918-1923* (London, Sage, 1975), 79.

imperial territories under their mandates, but also to divide Anatolia among the Armenians, the Kurds and the Greeks. It would be definitely a success for the nationalists, if they could maintain the political unity of the Anatolian territories and peoples. The limits of the Turkish national struggle should be the limits of the Anatolian peninsula where the Ottoman-Muslims are the majority. The people of Ottoman-Muslim origin out of these borders would remain outside.

In this sense, the Sévres Treaty was a turning point in the politics of citizenship through drawing borders. After the signing of the treaty, the nationalist elite began to abandon their imperial territorial vision and the claim of political unity of the peoples “within and beyond” the armistice line as stated in the original text of the National Pact. The Sévres experience gave way to the development of a truly “nationalist” foreign policy which paralleled the formation of an understanding of a “national political community”. In this sense, the Sévres Treaty is not the opposite but the promoter of the nationalist foreign policy and of an understanding of national political community.

4.3. Sévres Treaty and the “National” Boundaries of Turkish Citizenship

As already explained in the introductory part, the Sévres Treaty officialized the territorial dissolution of the Ottoman Empire which had been continuing since the early 19th century. The political resolutions of the treaty brought the disintegration of also Anatolia and Rumelia which were historically claimed as the homeland by the Turkish ruling elite of the Ottoman State. This territorial disintegration was the result of the application of the Wilsonian self-determination principle to the two major communities of the Ottoman society. They were Armenians and the Kurdish people, both were the authentic, local peoples of Anatolia.

The Sévres Treaty established an independent Armenia which would enlarge its territories towards Eastern Anatolia. The project of “Greater Armenia” had been supported by the Western States and by both the Tsarist and Bolshevik Russia since the mid-19th century. The Armenian problem reached its peak when the Armenian guerillas collaborated with the Russian forces during the world war.¹⁴ The Ottoman rulers and the intellectuals came to the point that it would be very difficult to hold the non-Muslim peoples together within Ottoman political unity after the war.

On the other hand, the Kurdish community of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia could also get a significant support from the Western States and from Bolshevik Russia to their demands of independence. Although at the end they had to content with autonomy, it was a historically important decision since for the first time, a Muslim community of non-Turkish origin could obtain the political right of autonomy within the Ottoman-Muslim society. This decision brought the division of Ottoman territories on the basis of ethnicity as well as religion. Therefore, the Sévres resolutions declared the end of the unifying ideologies Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism which were developed since the beginning of the dissolution of the imperial territories. It was clear that the Ottoman State and the society would have a completely new structure after the world war.

For the nationalist elite who conducted the independence struggle, however, the Sévres resolutions determined the boundaries of the “community inside” which would be saved from invasion and then would become the social basis of the new nation-state. In other words, as a response to the internationally supported separationist demands which were realized in the Sévres Treaty, the nationalist elite

¹⁴ Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire* (Ankara: Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History Publications, 1993), 387-430.

were forced to develop a conception of “national” boundaries of the its own envisaged political community. The communities who worked hard to take Western support and succeeded to have independence and autonomy would obviously be out of their concern. In this way, the Sévres resolutions specified the criterias of “Who would be excluded from membership to the future political community”.

Therefore, the Sévres Treaty points out the historical moment after which the collective psychological reaction to dissolution which can be labeled as the “Sévres paranoia” has become the durable feature of Turkish political landscape. The resolution about independent Armenian State caused the exclusion of the Armenian people from the future project of (national) political community in the minds of the nationalist elite in this early stage of nation building. In the same way, the decision of Kurdish autonomy prepared the background of “mono-ethnic national closure” of Turkish citizenship which would be effectively carried out by the nationalists especially throughout the 1930’s. Therefore, the treaty can be counted as a turning point after which the nationalist elite more clearly sketched out the “national boundaries” of Turkish citizenship albeit it was not yet “national” in the Western sense of the term but it was not definitely imperial either. The understanding of homogeneity was qualified on the way of a modern conception of homogeneity since it gained a locus of “ethnicity” after the Sévres Treaty.

4.3.1. The Armenian Question and Turkish National Citizenship

There is a direct relation between the minority policy of the Turkish governments and the unjust division of Anatolian territories among Armenians, Greeks and Kurds with the Sévres treaty. In this respect, the treaty represents the historical moment which conditioned the Ottoman-Turkish state elite that minorities’

demands of any kind –whether cultural or political- were in fact the most serious threat against their national security and territorial-political integrity.

The establishment of the Armenian State in the Sévres Treaty was the end point of Ottoman reformism which tried to keep the non-Muslim minorities within the Ottoman imperial political unity. The military-civilian bureaucrats and intellectuals began to think that the recognition of the minority rights did not solve the problem but fuelled the independence demands which turned to a threat to the security of Ottoman-Muslim majority. After the Sévres Treaty, the Armenian citizens of the Ottoman State began to be seen as enemies who should have been left outside. Since they were viewed as a threat to national existence, they should not be allowed to be a part of the future political community. What were the Sévres decisions about the future of the Ottoman citizens of Armenian origin that caused the complete exclusion of them from the project of new Turkish State?

The Sévres decisions solved the Armenian problem from the perspective of the Allied governments in a definite way.¹⁵ The articles 88-93 were about the establishment of the Armenian State. The article 88 stated that the Ottoman State recognized Armenia as an independent and sovereign state. According to article 89, the boundaries of this state in the provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis and the details about the demilitarization of the regions near the borders would be determined by the US President Woodrow Wilson but the treaty also pointed out the way that Wilson should draw the borders in advance.¹⁶ As a final point, the article 90 stated that the Ottoman government had the obligation to accept all the decisions on

¹⁵ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 133.

¹⁶ Meray and Olcay, *Osmanlı*. 74-75. See also Appendix C.

this subject in advance. US President Wilson drew the border between the Armenian State and the Ottoman State on November 22nd 1920 as described in the treaty.

However, from the perspective of the Turkish nationalists, these resolutions meant Armenian hegemony over the Ottoman-Muslim people of the region and it was unacceptable. The sharpness and injustice of the Sévres decisions further fuelled anti-Armenian sentiments among the nationalist elite who had already viewed them as the major collaborators of the Allied forces. The perception that the Armenians were the main threat against the security of the Eastern Anatolian Muslim peoples strengthened.

Therefore, the prevention of the application of the treaty would not be enough to solve the problem. In order to guarantee the security of the Muslim peoples of this region in a definite way, the political existence of the Armenian people should have been eliminated. In this respect, in the subsequent periods, especially during the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish delegation not only definitely rejected the demands for an Armenian homeland within the territories of the new Turkish state, but also refused any special regulation for the Armenian people of Anatolia.

4.3.1.1. The Roots of the Nationalists' Perception towards Armenians

During the long period of dissolution, the Ottoman policies against non-Muslim peoples were shaped largely under the effects of two factors. The first one was the continuous territorial losses that were caused by the minorities' demands for independence. The second was the economically superior position of the minorities who benefited from the Allied protection. In both factors, the Western governments' open support to minorities alienated the Ottoman-Turkish ruling elite from the Ottoman citizens of different millets to a large extent. Throughout the 19th century,

the Western policies of minority protection and the intervention into the internal affairs of the Ottoman State had gone hand in hand.¹⁷

Concerning the first factor, it was the Western support to the independence demands of especially the Balkan peoples that made them successful against the central authority. The Western governments saw themselves as the guardians of the non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ Although the Ottomans successfully suppressed their revolts, towards the end of the 19th century, most of the Balkan peoples established their independent or autonomous states because of Greater powers' interventions.

The memory of territorial dissolution is the fundamental factor which has shaped the minds and policies of the Ottoman-Turkish ruling elite towards the non-Muslim minorities.¹⁹ During the period of dissolution, the extensive foreign support strengthened the Ottoman perception that the non-Muslim minorities were internal extension of foreign enemies and they were the fundamental threats against the security of the Muslim people of the Ottoman State. This early period of independence demands under the protection of foreign powers constituted the background of Ottoman-Turkish policy of exclusion and assimilation towards non-Muslim minorities.

Secondly, the economically powerful position of the remaining minority groups which was again the consequence of the Western protection further alienated

¹⁷ Feroz Ahmad, "Unionists' Relations with the Greek, Armenian and the Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914 in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. B. Braude and B. Lewis (New York: Holmes&Meier Publishers, 1982), 404.

¹⁸ Taner Timur, Osmanlı Mirası [Ottoman Heritage] in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* [Turkey in Transition] ed., E. Ahmat Tonak and Irwin C. Schick (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992), 24.

¹⁹ Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu* [Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Question](İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 68.

the Ottoman-Turkish rulers. Since the mid-1800's under the protection of the Western powers and Russia, the Greek, Jewish and Armenian minorities were enriched to a large extent by benefiting from immunities, tax advantages and trade with the Western governments. As a matter of fact, their economic well-being was the main reason behind the popular anxiety among the Ottoman-Muslims population of the state against the non-Muslim Ottoman citizens. Towards the end of the century, the minorities' superior economic position prepared a fertile ground for an ethnic conflict in Anatolia.²⁰ In time, the minorities were perceived as the internal extensions of Western imperialism. The Ottoman-Muslim citizens constituted the popular base of the Unionists' policy of restoring the sovereignty of the state and of establishing a national economy.²¹ According to Keyder, 1908 Revolution aimed to transform the society from above through political regulations, however, more importantly, it aimed to intervene directly to the economic life of the country and mobilized the bureaucracy in order to create a "national bourgeoisie".²² The Unionists economic measures fastened the weakening of the Armenian and Greek bourgeoisie and strengthened the conflict between the Armenians and the Ottoman State. In this period, the root of the conflict with Armenians as other non-Muslim minorities was neither religious nor ethnic but mainly economic.²³ This policy would continue in the same way after the establishment of the republic since the Turkish ruling elite of the new state also believed that national sovereignty could be only realized if only there was a definite Turkish-Muslim sovereignty on economy.

²⁰ Çağlar Keyder, "Türk Demokrasininin Ekonomi-Politikliği" [The Political-Economy of Turkish Democracy] in Tonak and Schick, *Geçiş Sürecinde*. 43.

²¹ Ahmed, "Unionists," 420.

²² Keyder, "Türk Demokrasininin," 41.

²³ Ahmed, "Unionists," 403.

After the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of world war, a tragic period began in the relations between the Ottoman government and the Armenians.²⁴ The loss of extensive territories in the Balkans made the Ottoman-Turkish ruling bureaucracy and the elite to focus more on the idea of “Turkism” instead of “Ottoman Unity” to stop dissolution. This was the period which faced with the significant rise of Turkish nationalism especially among intellectual and political circles. The outbreak of war gave the Unionists to apply extensive “Turkification” policies in economy, culture, education and in all aspects of public life.²⁵ In other words, the Ottoman elite had to adopt pan-Turkism in the face of dissolution.²⁶

During the world war, the idea that minorities were the internal enemies reached its peak because of the collaboration between the Armenian guerillas and the Russian forces and the massive violent clashes between the Muslim and Armenian groups in Eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman government took a decision of forced emigration of the Eastern Anatolian Armenians to Iraq and Syria. This deportation turned to a slaughter of approximately 800.000 Armenian deaths during the spring 1915. This was the most tragic period concerning the relations between the Ottoman State and a minority group and later became a significant problem for also the new state in the international field.²⁷

²⁴ Ibid. 425.

²⁵ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961),215.

²⁶ Timur, “Osmanlı,” 29.

²⁷ Akçam, *Türk Ulusal*. 107-112.

4.3.1.2. *The Attitude of the Nationalist Leadership towards the Armenian Problem Before and After the Sévres Treaty*

Therefore, in the beginning of the nationalist struggle, both at the popular and governmental levels, there was an intensive fear of “Armenian threat” and of the loss of eastern provinces. The first Defense of Rights Organizations were established not against the Allies but against the Armenian and Greek minorities and tried to prove that Muslims were the majority in all provinces of Anatolia.²⁸

The nationalist leaders, on the other hand, were in a position to persuade the Allies that they had no relations with the Unionists who were held responsible for Armenian massacre. In Amasya Protocol which was signed between the Ankara and Istanbul governments in October 1919, there was an article with regard to the punishment of the Unionists who were responsible about Armenian massacre and the prevention of their candidacy in elections.²⁹ More remarkably, in his opening speech in the national assembly on 24 April 1920, Mustafa Kemal himself condemned the massacre and argued that the responsible persons would be certainly punished.³⁰

Indeed, the nationalist leaders viewed this issue as a price to be paid to persuade the Allied governments to recognize the National Pact. They emphasized continuously that they had no enmity towards the Christian or any other non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman State. According to Akçam, behind this sensitivity of the Ankara government, there was the will to affect the ongoing Paris Peace Conference where the Allied governments discussed the future of the Ottoman State. In the

²⁸ Ibid. 152.

²⁹ Atatürk, *Söylev*, 156.

³⁰ Taner Akçam, *Türkiye'yi Yeniden Düşünmek* [Rethinking Turkey] (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1995), 40.

conference, the dominant idea was that the Ottomans should be punished in such a way that they could never apply such violent policies towards the non-Muslim peoples of Anatolia.³¹

However, the accommodationist attitude of the nationalists changed with the signing of the Sévres Treaty. The nationalist elite understood that it was not possible to compromise with the Allied governments and to prevent the establishment of an Armenian State through such an attitude. After the signing of the treaty, the nationalist leaders began to argue that there had not occurred a massacre during the forced deportation of Armenians in 1915. On 26th February 1921, in his interview to the reporter of Public Ledger-Philadelphia, Mustafa Kemal argued that forced deportation was a wartime measure to end the Armenian attacks on Muslims and it should not be confused with some other things. According to him, most of the Armenians were alive but they could not turn back because of the Allied invasions. He compared the British governments' policies in Ireland with the Ottoman policies and argued that the international community should condemn the British government more than they condemned the Ottomans.³²

Therefore, for the nationalist elite, the possibility of the establishment of Greater Armenia became a threat which was much more serious than the Allies' invasions especially after the signing of the Sévres Treaty. The treaty indicated that with the support of the Greater powers every minority of the Ottoman State might claim self-determination right to establish its own independent state. Since the treaty materialized the division of the Anatolian homeland, from this time on, the

³¹ Ibid. 38-39.

³² *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası: Milli Mücadele Dönemine Ait 100 Belge* [Atatürk's National Foreign Policy: 100 Documents of the National Struggle Period] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 272-273, Document No: 45.

nationalist conception of the “community inside” was qualified to the extent that the elements of difference were seen as the fundamental threats against territorial and political integrity and therefore they should be left outside.

In this way, the Sévres decisions contributed to the definition of the cultural-national boundaries of the future Turkish citizenship more concretely. The treaty became a point of reference according to which the nationalist elite determined the “national” boundaries of future Turkish citizenship which definitely excluded the non-Muslim communities, especially Armenians. The existence of the Armenian community was perceived as a problem of disunity. There should have been no specific rights for these peoples to maintain their culture and identity. In line with this understanding, during the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation strictly resisted to any specific demands about Armenians. After hard discussions, the Turkish delegation had to accept cultural protection rights for all non-Muslims but soon after the establishment of the republic, the non-Muslim communities were forced to give up their privileges under the pressure of the Turkish government.³³

Therefore, the Sévres experience was the origin of the exclusionary and assimilationist citizenship practices of the subsequent republican governments which targeted the non-Muslim minorities and especially the Armenians. The Armenian problem became the instrument, the legitimate ground for the state elite to conduct cultural assimilation (to establish the hegemony of Turkish language) and discrimination towards the non-Muslim minorities. The threat of disintegration which was materialized with the Sévres Treaty constituted the background of the tacit ideological idea that the Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin might be formal

³³ Ayhan Aktar, “Cumhuriyet’in İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan Türkleştirme Politikaları” [The Turkification Policies of the First Years of the Republic] in *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* [Wealth Tax and the Turkification Policies] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), 112-113.

citizens but they were not proper ones since they had always secret separationist demands. This understanding has brought the denial of their culture, religion and language and has forced them to maintain their culture only in the private sphere. If they want to be equal members of the society they should embrace the dominant cultural identity which is the Turkish one. The Turkish state elite has traditionally perceived any discussion about the Armenian massacre as tactical maneuvers directed by the foreign powers to divide the national territories. Therefore, the issue has been reduced to a problem of land and boundary.

The discriminatory citizenship practices of especially the period after mid-1920s were based on these underlying assessments of the new ruling elite. Towards the non-Muslim minorities and the peoples of different ethnic origins, a deliberate policy of “Turkification” began in this period. The objective was to establish the hegemony of Turkish ethnic identity and language in all spheres of public life at all levels including education, public employment policy, industry and economic life, trade, all branches of law, population settlement policy.³⁴ Since the complete assimilation of non-Muslim peoples into Turkish culture was impossible because of the religious differentiation, the Turkification policies resulted in the exclusion of these groups from the public life. A homogenous religious-national society would be possible if they could be made invisible in the communal life.

The first examples of the discriminatory policies targeted all non-Muslims without differentiating them as Jews, Armenians and Greeks. Throughout the Single Party period, the policy of exclusion was applied primarily through the public employment policy. With the promulgation of the Law on the Civil Service Post (No:

³⁴ Ibid. 101.

788) on 18 march 1926, to be a public employee was conditioned by being “Turk” rather than being “Turkish citizen”.³⁵ There was a direct reference to Turkish ethnic identity which obviously disrupted the principle of equality of all citizens. On the one hand, it brought the complete exclusion of non-Muslims from public life, on the other hand it put pressure on non-Turk Muslim communities to accept complete Turkification.

The objective of assimilation and/or exclusion of non-Muslim communities became clearer when the Turkish citizens of Armenian and Jewish origin were forced to speak “Turkish” during the 1930s. In 1937, the use of languages other than Turkish in public life –which was the recognized right of every Turkish citizen regardless of their religious, ethnic origins with the article 39 of the Lausanne Treaty- was prohibited within the boundaries of some municipalities by their local authorities.³⁶ Although the target was not only the non-Muslim communities, this act obviously aimed to force other cultural identities to disappear completely. In this way, the fundamental paradox of civic-territorial conception of national citizenship, i.e., the expression of political unity in strives for cultural monism was in action throughout the 1930 in Turkish case.³⁷

³⁵ Ibid. 119.

³⁶ Ibid. 130.

³⁷ See the discussion on p.62 of this dissertation.

4.3.2. The Sévres Treaty as a Source of Mono-Ethnic National Closure of Turkish Citizenship

The Sévres Treaty is a turning point within the dissolution process of the Ottoman Empire since for the first time an international treaty recognized territorial autonomy for a Muslim community of non-Turkish origin of the Ottoman State. The articles 62-64 regulated Kurdish autonomy and the conditions for an independent Kurdish state. The article 62 stated that the local autonomy of the region which is in the east of Euphrates and in the south of the southern border of Armenia -which would be drawn later- and in the north of Turkish frontier with Syria and Iraq where the Kurdish people are the majority would be determined by a commission consisting of three members –English, French and Italian- within the six months following the treaty’s entry into force. Article 63 stated that Ottoman government had the obligation to accept and put in force the decisions envisaged in article 62 in advance. Article 64 finally, stated that its hereby within a year beginning from the date at which the treaty enters into force, if the Kurdish people of the defined area prove that they are willing to separate from Turkey and apply to League of Nations with such a demand, and if the Council decides that this people have such a potential for independence and propose Turkey to recognize their independence, Turkey accepts its obligation to comply with this proposition and to give up its all kinds of sovereign rights over the region in advance. If this giving up is realized and when it is realized, if the Kurdish people of Musul province would like to attend to this independent Kurdish State, the Allied governments would not object to this in any case.³⁸

³⁸ Oran, *Türk Dış.* 130-131. See Appendix C for the related articles in Turkish.

Obviously, the treaty made the independent Kurdish State dependent on Britain's initiative. If the Kurdish people could prove their potential for independence and if the Council of the League of Nations –which was under British supremacy- would decide that they are able to get independence, the Kurds could have independence. In this respect, the treaty was far from meeting Kurdish expectations.

From the perspective of Turkish nationalists, it was equally disappointing. The decision of autonomy for Kurds who lived together as an organic part of the Ottoman society for long years created strong reactions both in Istanbul and in Ankara. The support of some primary Ottoman bureaucrats, intellectuals of Kurdish origin and by some powerful Kurdish tribes in Eastern Anatolia to the division of Ottoman territories on the basis of ethnicity created widespread distress and suspicion among the Turkish nationalists. The successive Kurdish revolts escalated tension and the feelings of insecurity and suspicion grew towards the whole Kurdish community. Moreover, there emerged also the fear that other non-Turk Muslim communities might well develop such projects of separation from the Ottoman society.³⁹ Therefore, the Sévres resolutions and the subsequent events deeply affected and in fact shaped the minds and future prospects of the Turkish nationalist leaders.

There were two aspects of the Turkish perception of the Kurdish problem in this early period: First of all, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the decision of autonomy at Sévres meant the intersection of the internal and external threats which turned Kurdish demands to a (national) security problem and shaped the nationalists'

³⁹ Stanford Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, A Documentary Study* (Ankara: TTK, 2000), 741.

formulation of the “community inside”. Secondly, the degree of international support to the Kurdish cause made the nationalist leadership to view the Kurdish movement as a coherent “other”, a significant factor of division within the independence movement. In this respect, the Sévres Treaty became the historical moment which laid the foundations of a counter ethnic-Turkish nationalism in the face of an internationally supported Kurdish nationalism. The treaty and the following Kurdish revolts formed the historical context which primarily caused the emergence of an ethnic element in the nationalists’ conception of inside/outside. Concerning the construction of national citizenship identity in Turkey, the Sévres Treaty represents a turning point after which a “mono-ethnic national closure” began concerning the cultural boundaries of the “community inside” and the of the future citizenship identity. Not only in that period, but also in subsequent periods, the “Sévres syndrome” as a discourse of territorial disintegration featured the Turkish state elite’s conception of inside/outside; self/other; the proper citizen and the citizen on paper.

4.3.2.1. The Sévres Treaty and the Kurdish Revolts: The Intersection of Internal and International Security Concerns

From the very beginning, the Kurdish problem had a strong international dimension because of the interests of the Greater powers in the Middle East. With the Sévres Treaty, however, it became an official issue of international politics and it was finally solved with an international treaty. The settlement of the Kurdish issue in the Sévres Treaty was mainly related with the British Middle Eastern policy. Britain had the primary objective of controlling the Middle East because of the rich oil

reserves and its geo-strategic importance.⁴⁰ Since, it was very difficult for Britain to deploy large amounts of financial and military sources and to establish direct control in the region, the British government pursued a policy of creating several dispersed, weak and controllable local authorities. A weak Sultanate in Istanbul, a British dominated commission in the straits region, Greek control in Western Anatolia, an enlarged Armenia in the east and an autonomous Kurdish region which could be manipulated with the promise of independence in Southeastern Anatolia and finally weak Arab principalities in Mesopotamia were the components of British Middle Eastern policy. As a result Britain would have no direct responsibility but could maintain its hegemony in the Middle East.⁴¹

Throughout the two years between the Mudros Armistice and the signing of the Sévres Treaty, the British government was interested in Southern Kurdistan where there were rich oil reserves. The northern region where the Ottoman Kurds lived was not rich in oil reserves and the control of the area was very difficult because of the geographical difficulties and the dispersed Kurdish tribes. Therefore, the British government decided to pursue different policies in these regions and to guarantee mainly the security of Musul province.⁴² It meant that the Northern Mesopotamian region would be united with Iraq and the Ottoman Kurds would obtain only autonomy not independence.⁴³

⁴⁰ Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu : Kökeni ve Gelişimi* [The Kurdish Question: Its Root and the Development] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), 70.

⁴¹ Erol Kurubaş, *Kürt Sorununun Uluslararası Boyutu* [The International Dimension of the Kurdish Question] (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1997), 41-42.

⁴² Osman Olcay, *Sevr Andlaşmasına Doğru* [Towards the Sévres Treaty] (Ankara: SBF Yayını, 1981), XIII.

⁴³ Kirişçi and Winrow, *Kürt.* 72.

Comparing to Britain, France had less interest with the Kurds. They were more interested in the Christian population of the region like Armenians, Orthodox Syrians and Nestorians.⁴⁴ Moreover, since the British forces had taken over the territories which were supposed to be under France's mandate, the French government began to oppose to an independent Kurdish state which would be definitely under British control. During the San Remo Conference in April 1920, therefore, France insisted that this region should remain under the control of Ottoman State as an autonomous region.⁴⁵

In this period, the British policy was to detain the Kurdish nationalist leaders with the argument that they should wait the consequences of the peace conference. They guaranteed that the conference would not turn blind eye to their demands.⁴⁶ In this way, the British government tried to prevent the participation of the Kurdish tribes to Kemalist forces. On the other hand, the British agencies in Istanbul were bargaining with the primary Kurdish nationalists and with the Ottoman government at the same time. While they were playing both sides against each other, they also supported them to cooperate against the Ankara government.⁴⁷ After the signing of the treaty in August 1920 until the middle of 1921, it became clear that Britain would not support Kurdish independence movement in the face of the rising strength of Turkish nationalism. Nevertheless, British policy until the middle of 1921 was to encourage the Kurds to think that they would support independence efforts. Kurds

⁴⁴ Ibid. 76.

⁴⁵ Shaw, *From Empire*. 1115.

⁴⁶ Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika* [Turkish Independence War and Foreign Policy] (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1987), 28-29.

⁴⁷ Sina Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele Cilt: I-II* [Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle, Vols: I-II] (İstanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1992), 543.

would be useful in obtaining concessions from the Turkish nationalists favorable to the British especially along the Iraqi-Turkish border.⁴⁸

This foreign support to the Kurdish demands escalated the crisis in the domestic sphere. By taking the advantage of Wilsonian principles, the Kurdish nationalist activities had began as early as December 1918 for an independent or autonomous Kurdistan.⁴⁹ A Kurdish Committee was established under the leadership of Seyit Abdulkadir -a former member of Ottoman Senate- and submitted a proposal to the British High Commission in Istanbul demanding that the Kurdish people of Eastern Anatolia should have a clearly demarcated territory including Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Harput, Diyarbakir, and Musul where they were the majority.⁵⁰

In May 1919, Kurdish Advancement Society (Kürt Teali Cemiyeti) was established in Istanbul. Among the members of the organization, there were several influential figures of the Ottoman intellectual and political circles like Professor Şükrü (Baban), Abdullah Cevdet, Said-i Nursi, Seyit Abdulkadir, Emir Ali Bedirhan –from a powerful tribe of Eastern Anatolia- and Süleyman Nazif. The organization could create a popular base and get the support of the Kurds of both the periphery and Istanbul.⁵¹

There was another figure in Kurdish movement, Serif Pasa who was the former Ottoman Ambassador to Sweden. He defended the idea of equality for the Kurds as well as for other ethnic and religious minorities within an Ottoman political

⁴⁸ Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, 1880-1925* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 25.

⁴⁹ Kurdish nationalism as in other minority nationalisms of the period developed and gained momentum as a response to the rise of Turkish nationalism and Turkification policies of the Union and Progress government, Kirişçi and Winrow, *Kürt*. 86.

⁵⁰ Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş*. 27.

⁵¹ Shaw, *From Empire*. 742.

unity for a long time. After the war, he defined himself as the leader of the Kurdish community and went to Paris in March 1919 to represent the Kurdish people in the Paris Peace Conference. He specifically looked for US support and tried to get close to the French government.⁵²

According to Olson, the dilemma of Kurdish nationalism became clear immediately in this early period, soon after the Mudros Armistice.⁵³ The leaders of Kurdish tribes, chiefs, large landowners, urban notables in Anatolia and intellectuals and bureaucrats in Istanbul had very different ideas and conflictual interests. Most of them were trying to increase their personal power or pursuing local interests. The Kurdish people were very dispersed and separated into various sects sociologically as well. Most of these groups were not conscious about their ethnic difference.⁵⁴ Consequently, the dispersed nature of the Kurdish nationalist activities, the French opposition to Kurdish independence and the unwillingness of the British government impeded Kurdish independence efforts and in the Sévres Treaty they had to be content with autonomy.

Under these conditions, the Sévres decisions unified the advocates of autonomy and independence against the Turkish nationalists. After the Sévres Treaty, deprived of the support of the major powers, the tribal leaders who were opposed to Ankara government realized that they were left face to face with the Turkish nationalists and they began to revolt one after another. During the spring and summer 1920, Cemil Çeto and Milli Tribes rebelled against the Kemalists. Three

⁵² Ibid. 383; Olson, *The Emergence*. 22.

⁵³ Olson, *The Emergence*. 26.

⁵⁴ Kirişçi and Winrow, *Kürt*. 83.

months after the signing of the Sévres Treaty, Koçgiri rebellion, the first major revolt against the Turkish National Movement broke out in November 1920.⁵⁵

Koçgiri rebellion affected the general approach and the policy of the Ankara government towards the Kurdish question to large extent. The nationalists viewed the rebellion as fuelled by the Sévres Treaty. The cooperation between the internal and external “enemies” of the national struggle shaped the minds and policy options of the Turkish nationalists to a large extent. It was their first experience to handle such a problem of disunity and internal conflict originating from the aspirations of independence of a Muslim people with a considerable international support.

The point is that the Kurdish nationalists could bring their cause to the international platform for the first time during the Sévres process. Although they disappointed with the decision of autonomy, nevertheless it became an international justification for their struggle. This was the most disturbing point for the Turkish nationalists. The treaty became a point of reference for the Kurdish demands and legitimized them in the international field. In this respect, for the Turkish nationalists, the perceptions of external and internal threat were intertwined and reinforced each other. The external threat coming from the imperialist West was perceived as endured by the internal threat of separationism coming from an ethnically different community. Therefore, the demands of this ethnic community turned to a Janus-faced threat and deepened the nationalists’ concerns about territorial-political integrity. With the Sévres Treaty, the Kurdish question gained an international dimension which made it stronger in the domestic field.

Koçgiri rebellion broke out in a period in which the Ankara government was trying to establish its administrative and military authority in Anatolia. Serious

⁵⁵ Ibid. 85; Olson, *The Emergence*. 28.

measures were taken like the establishment of mobile gendarme forces, the extraordinary wartime courts (Divan-ı Harp) and the restrictions on freedom of travel and of communication. It was a period in which the replacement of the multiple authority centers –the power of the local Defense of Rights Associations- with single, unified foci of power-by the national assembly representing the entire Anatolian peoples- was continuing in administrative, military, legal, political and ideological aspects.⁵⁶ The break out of the rebellion further increased the authoritarian measures and applications.

Since the perception of threat was that much escalated, the repression of the rebellion became very violent.⁵⁷ The central government’s harsh response constituted the first example of its future approach to the Kurdish question. It was thought that the conditions for independence that cited in article 64 of the Sévres Treaty -despite their uncertainty- might provide a criterion for the other separationist movements in Anatolia. Therefore, the Kemalist nationalists thought that they should prevent Kurdish attempts at any costs.

From the perspective of the Turkish nationalists, the Kurdish organizations and demands were seen as efforts to weaken and disintegrate the national movement under the supervision of the Allies, particularly of the British. The Kurdish community as a whole became a “threat against the security of the Ottoman-Islamic coalition” whose success was the only way to salvation. This was the historical moment at which the Kurdish question was began to be identified with reactionary

⁵⁶ Rıdvan Akın, *TBMM Devleti* [The State of TGNA] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 289-298.

⁵⁷ Instead of the 14 tribes which were targeted by the government, the forces under the commandment of Sakallı Nurettin Pasa destroyed more than 180 villages in the region. In the assembly, strong criticisms were raised against such a harsh treatment of the people of the region and an investigation committee was established. See Ibid. 301.

politics and was seen as a tribal resistance to central authority rather than an ethnopolitical question.⁵⁸

Therefore, the Turkish nationalists who exaggerated the strength of Kurdish nationalism began to view the Kurdish community as a significant threat against their power. One indication of the exaggerated perception of threat by the Turkish nationalists was the fact that between the years 1919-1923 only 4 out of 23 rebellions were broke out in the Kurdish populated provinces and only in 3 of them (Cemil Çeto, Milli and Koçgiri rebellions) there was the active participation of the Kurdish tribes.⁵⁹ However, as cited above, the fact of foreign support and the divisive ethnic challenge it represented made the issue much more threatening in the eyes of the nationalist elite. This historical moment represents the beginning of the consideration of Kurdish identity as a threat to Turkish “national security” and the articulation of a conception of national citizenship on the basis of ethnicity.

4.3.2.2. The Sévres Experience and the Formation of Turkish National Identity: The Development of Mono-Ethnic Turkish Nationalism

As a second aspect, the Sévres process facilitated the development of a Turkish perception of Kurdish identity as a “coherent other”. This perception generated in return a conception of “proper membership” in the community inside with an ethnic criterion that is the proper citizens of the future state would be that of Turkish origin. In order to understand the formation of this ideological conditioning

⁵⁸ Mesut Yeğen, “The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity.” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 32(1996), 216.

⁵⁹ Kirişçi and Winrow, *Kürt.* 84-85.

of the Turkish state elite, it is necessary to review the relations between the nationalist leadership and the Kurdish community throughout the nationalist struggle.

In the early period of the national struggle, the nationalist leadership was very successful in uniting the peoples of the East Anatolia under the banner of Islam and Ottoman patriotism. According to İsmail Beşikçi, between the years 1919-1921, the relations of Turkish nationalists and Mustafa Kemal in particular with the Kurdish chiefs and large landowners were better than that of the Kurdish nationalist organizations.⁶⁰ There were two reasons behind this cooperation: First, some Kurdish chiefs and urban notables of the region realized that they needed the support of the Ankara government to lay a legitimate claim on the lands and the properties which were left by Armenians. Secondly, the religious emphasis of the Kemalist leadership during the years 1919-1922 became very effective in securing the support of the Kurds.⁶¹

The Kurdish groups who remained loyal to Sultanate participated to Anatolian resistance as early as 1919. As a matter of fact, near half of the participants of the Erzurum Congress were those Kurdish leaders who were very much concerned about the possibility of an Armenian State in their territories. In Eastern Anatolia, it was the intensity of Kurdish tribal attacks which made Kemalist forces successful against Armenians. After the establishment of the national assembly, the Kurdish people of the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia was represented with a high rate, 74 out of the 437 deputies were Kurdish. Therefore, Kurdish contribution to the anti-imperialist coalition was very significant.⁶²

⁶⁰ cited in Olson, *The Emergence*. 37.

⁶¹ Ibid. ; Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş*. 74; Shaw, *From Empire*. 745.

⁶² Kirişçi and Winrow, *Kürt*. 84.

After the opening of the National Assembly, a committee was sent to eastern provinces in order to guarantee the support of the mainstream tribal leaders and chiefs. The Ankara government continued the Ottoman policy of maintaining the security of the region and the support of the tribal leaders through recognizing their authority in the region.⁶³ In this period, the Kemalist nationalists based their argument on the idea that the Kurdish nationalists were being used by the British for the project of Greater Armenia. Against them, the people of the region should have participated to the Kemalist forces within Islamic solidarity and unity. The nationalist leadership convinced both the Kurdish peripheral forces and the deputies in the assembly with the argument that the Turkish-Kurdish cooperation would turn to “a political coalition based on the equality of the parties in the administration of the country” in the future.⁶⁴ This propaganda became very effective and primary tribal leaders protested Serif Paşa’s efforts for independence during the Paris Peace Conference by sending telegrams to Ottoman government and to the embassies of Western States in Istanbul.

Despite this success, however, the Kurdish nationalists could organize most of the tribes of the region during the Koçgiri rebellion.⁶⁵ One of the leaders of the rebellion Colonel Halid Bey Cibran who was formerly a commander in the Kemalist forces participated to the rebellion since he lost his hope that the Kemalists would allow even a limited autonomy.⁶⁶ The efforts of the Kurdish members of the national

⁶³ Akın, *TBMM*. 298.

⁶⁴ Shaw, *From Empire*. 385.

⁶⁵ According to Olson, Mustafa Kemal displayed intense efforts to persuade the chief of Koçgiri Tribe, Alişan Bey by claiming that their cooperation with the Anatolian resistance would realize their expectations. When the rebellion broke out, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegraph stating that they would have no difficulty in meeting Kurdish demands including autonomy, see Olson, *The Emergence*. 31.

⁶⁶ Shaw, *From Empire*. 1118-1119.

assembly could not impede the mobilization of the Kurdish people of mainly Sivas province for an independent Kurdistan. The clashes among the national army and the Kurdish tribal forces continued throughout the winter 1921. In March 1921, martial law was declared in Elaziz, Erzincan, and Sivas and it was finally suppressed in April 1921.⁶⁷

The main objective of the rebellion was to have the Sévres regulations namely the articles of 62-64 applied. The participants to the rebellion sent a letter to Turkish Grand National Assembly demanding that the Ankara government should explain whether or not it would recognize Kurdish autonomy which was accepted by the Istanbul government with signing the Sévres Treaty. The letter also included some demands about the releasing of the Kurds from the prisons, the withdrawal of the Turkish civil servants from the Kurdish populated regions and the withdrawal of the troops from the Koçgiri region.⁶⁸ The Assembly replied that the Ankara government was in the same line of thinking with the people of the region but at the same time sent additional troops to the region.

Olson mentions about a draft law on the establishment of territorial autonomy for Kurdistan which was discussed in the national assembly in February 1922. According to him, this law was discussed in a secret session and proposed an autonomous administration under the protection of Turkish government in the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Dersim sanjak and some small towns and villages.⁶⁹ Kirişçi informs that such a draft treaty was not discussed since there was not a secret session on that day -February 10th 1922- in the assembly. He states that

⁶⁷ Olson, *The Emergence*. 32-33.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 33-34.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 39-40. For the text of the draft law, see 166.

according to historians Mete Tunçay and Zafer Toprak, the cabinet disseminated news about such a draft proposal in order to use it as a trump card to curb the British attempts of provoking the Kurdish groups against the Ankara government. On the one hand, the Ankara government aimed to give the Kurdish leaders the message that they were more sincere than the British in responding to Kurdish expectations. On the other hand they wanted to give the British government the message that they could accept such a resolution for the Kurds and therefore could turn out their efforts to be useless.⁷⁰

The point is that in this period there was not a uniform, self-conscious and politicized Kurdish community. Rather they preferred to rely on foreign support in their struggle.⁷¹ What lied behind the Turkish unrest was not the power of Kurdish nationalism but the degree of international support to the Kurdish cause. The degree of foreign support to the Kurdish demands made the Turkish nationalists to view the Kurdish community as a “coherent other”. The Kurds came close to be seen as a “national community” at most during this period both by the international community and by the Turkish nationalists although the latter never accepted this openly.⁷²

As a response to this separationist nationalism, a mono-ethnic nationalism began to develop among the Turkish ruling elite against in fact a “non-existent” other. The Kurdish community began to be perceived as “other” against which the Turkish nationalist elite adopted an understanding of ethnic Turkish identity as different from Ottoman-Muslim identity as the “defining self”. The understanding of

⁷⁰ Kirişçi and Winrow. *Kürt.* 85, note. 63.

⁷¹ Ibid. 89.

⁷² Ibid. 90.

“nation on the basis of religion” began to shift to an understanding of “nation on the basis of a core ethnicity” in the minds of the founders of the state. In other words, the events of this period marked the development of an ethnic dimension in the “politics of citizenship” which would draw the internal borders of the “community inside” by an ethnic criterion.

The events of early 1920’s therefore constituted the historical context of the tacit ideological conditioning of the Turkish state elite that the ethnic origins other than the Turkish one should be treated as weakening factors. The proper members of the society would be that of Turkish origin. There were two consequences of this political-ideological conditioning of the Turkish nationalist leaders. First, they began to argue that Turks and the Kurds were not separate but the same communities. Secondly, they began to formulate assimilationist policies to eradicate the Kurdish identity in the region in this early period.

Concerning the first aspect, the Sévres experience resulted in the emergence of the discourse of “sameness” which claimed that Turks and Kurds were the same peoples instead of the discourse of “Islamic bond of fraternity with the Kurds”. It was after the Sévres decisions and the Koçgiri rebellion that the Turkish nationalists began to formulate this idea and used it especially during the London Conference. From this time onwards, therefore, in all the foreign policy acts and decisions, the Turkish nationalists claimed that they were representing whole Anatolian Muslims including the Kurds. The participation of the Kurdish nationalists to the Congress of Eastern Nations at Bakü in September 1920 was prevented on purpose. During the London Conference of February 1921, foreign minister Bekir Sami Bey emphasized

strongly that the Kurds and Turks of Anatolia united their destiny.⁷³ In this way the Ankara government tried to change the Kurdish problem from an international issue to a domestic issue. By the end of 1920, it became clear that Turkish policy of presenting itself as the only representative of the Ottoman-Muslims reached to success. Turkish nationalist elite claimed an unquestionably superior position within the anti-imperialist coalition. Any threat to this supremacy was seen and presented as a threat against the security of the state and therefore of the society

Secondly, the nationalist leadership began to take measures for the assimilation of the people of the region. Soon after the Koçgiri rebellion, the national assembly enacted a series of laws to compensate the damages of the civilians. However, at the same time, a decision was taken to settle ethnic Turks to key administrative positions in the region in order to establish firm control against possible future rebellions. It is also in this early period that the assimilationist policies began to be applied. These policies included education in Turkish, settlement of ethnic Turks in some key towns and villages, the employment of ethnic Turk civil servants in Kurdish cities.⁷⁴

The policy of assimilation was became much more systemized in the face of the ongoing Kurdish revolts especially after 1925. In the period between 1920-23 the Kurdish identity was an acceptable cultural identity – although it was presented as apart of Turkish identity- but its political manifestation was unwanted. The perception of the Kurdish community as a coherent body ironically turned the discourse of “the sameness” to “denial politics” especially after the Sheikh Sait rebellion of 1925. It was claimed that there was no ethnic element in Turkish

⁷³ See the related part on London Conference on pp. 230-232 of the dissertation.

⁷⁴ Shaw, *From Empire*. 1121.

territory other than the Turkish one. Obviously, it brought the exclusion of the Kurdish community, as it was -that is the Kurds as a culturally and ethnically different people- from the political community of the new state and the society. Ironically however, the central government began to apply more systemized assimilatory policies towards a community that they claimed as non-existent.

From the mid-1920's onwards, the systemized assimilation policies were applied in various fields. The primary measure was the detribalization of the region which aimed to destroy the authentic Kurdish existence by breaking up their the social-political organization.⁷⁵ Secondly, the ethnic composition of the region was changed through settlement policies, i.e., the forced deportation of the Kurdish tribes. The Kurdish tribes, religious leaders and chiefs who had the potential to rebel were sent to central Anatolia and in their place, the Caucasian and Balkan emigrants were settled. The aim was to increase the number of the ethnic-Turks in the east and the assimilation of the Kurds into Turkishness by dispersing them in Anatolia. A series of governmental practices like the prevention of the employment of native Kurds in governmental posts, the ban on the public use of Kurdish language, the special military governance for the region, the forced education in Turkish, the recruitment of the young Kurds in military duty were the examples that followed these measures throughout the 30's.⁷⁶

Therefore, the roots of the idea that the Turkish people should rely on themselves and keep the other groups especially the Kurds under control lies in this

⁷⁵ Martin Van Bruneissen, *Agha, Sheikh and the State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan* (Rijswijk: Enroprint, 1978), 242.

⁷⁶ Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliği'nin Etno-Seküler Sınırları, 1919-1938* [Happy the One Who is able to Say I am Turk: The Ethno-Secular Limits of Turkish National Identity, 1919-1938] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 245-253.

early period of national struggle. The reinforcement of this idea with the ongoing Kurdish uprisings provided a strong foundation for the development of ethnic Turkish nationalism which became the primary factor in the construction of mono-ethnic national citizenship in Turkey in the subsequent periods.

4.4. The Sévres Treaty and the “Political” Dimension of an Early Conception of Citizenship

The Sévres resolutions about the social and political order of the Ottoman State became the counter-point of reference for the Turkish nationalist elite which began to develop on a new vision of sovereign, fully independent and integrated nation state with a new citizenship identity more concretely after the signing of the treaty.

For the nationalist elite, the salvation of the country was dependent on the nationalists’ success in getting the National Pact accepted by the different segments of the society which was supposed to be united around the “national” ideal. However, in this process, the “national ideal” that was informed by the National Pact itself was modified in the minds of the founders of the state to be the basis of a more concrete political project, i.e., it was transformed into a proposal for a new political allegiance and for a new political identity. The Sévres Treaty played the main part in this modification process since it challenged the nationalists’ objectives with its projection of post-war Ottoman political order. In a sense, the Sévres process contributed to the maturation of the project of nation-state with a unitary citizenship with a hegemonic cultural component in this early period.

Specifically it facilitated to the emergence of the first credentials of the future republican political order and republican model of citizenship in two aspects. First of

all, it caused the strengthening of the anti-monarchist political stance in a way to weaken the ideological influence of the Sultan-Caliph on the masses and even on the nationalists themselves to a large extent. In this way, the Sévres process contributed to the emergence of an alternative ideological-political basis – the idea of popular sovereignty- for the collective political identity and for the individual-citizen. It began to replace the abstract idea of “national sovereignty” as to refer the right and the ability of the people to decide on its own future against the absolute personal rule. Secondly, the Sévres Treaty paved the way for the development of a new political axiology, a core political value which would draw the boundaries of the legitimate politics and the limits of political possibilities in Turkey that is the idea of “political integrity”.

These two became the fundamentals of the republican “politics of citizenship” which based the citizenship identity on a superficial idea of popular sovereignty and at the same time on a more deeply influential imperative of “political integrity”. In other words, the of the origin republican conception of citizenship as belonging to an unitary, centrally defined, organic political community which was united around a centrally defined common good lies in this historical moment.

4.4.1. Popular Sovereignty and Anti-Monarchism as the Basis of the Republican Model

In Turkish political history, the Sévres Treaty has been known as the document of complete submission of the monarchical authority to Western imperialism. In this respect it was the turning point after which the idea of popular sovereignty gained strength against the political-religious authority of the Sultan-Caliph. After the signing of the treaty, it became evident that the only authority

which was striving for the salvation of the people and even for the Sultan himself was the Ankara government which represented the popular will. The nationalist elite began to use an anti-monarchical language more openly. In this respect, the first effect of the Sévres Treaty was that it facilitated the differentiation of the two political authorities and the rise of the legitimacy of the new one in the eyes of the masses.⁷⁷

The difference between the two political authorities became apparent in the first reply of the Ottoman government to the Allies. Although this document also reflected the essence of the National Pact, however, it was clear that there was no idea of a unified nation-state in the minds of the Ottoman rulers. The renouncement of the Ottoman claims on Arab lands did not mean that the Ottomans gave up their imperialistic outlook. Rather, they gave up these territories in return for the protection of the position of the Sultan as the Caliph of the Muslim world.⁷⁸

The nationalist government of Ankara on the other hand, was more determined to limit the territories on which the Ottoman-Muslim majority lived. Even if it was not clear in the minds of the primary nationalist figures yet, the limitation of the territories and the people whose fate was concerned by the nationalist elite -that is their politics of drawing borders- implied a project of Western type nation-state. In this respect, there were two governments claiming sovereignty and two different political projects for the future state of the Ottoman territories and the people.⁷⁹ After the signing of the treaty, the nationalist leadership

⁷⁷As soon as the decisions of the San Remo Conference were heard in Ankara, the nationalists decided not to be a part of the peace treaty. On 14 June 1920, the Ankara government cut off its all kinds of relations with the Istanbul government, see Sonyel, *Turkish*. 81-82.

⁷⁸Oran, *Türk. Dış.*120-121.

⁷⁹Ibid. 118.

defended their “nationalist foreign policy” more concretely which was presented as the polar opposite of the Sévres Treaty. In this way, the National Pact and the Sévres Treaty were represented as the two opposing proposals for the Ottoman-Muslim peoples of Anatolia although the former was continuously modified throughout the national struggle.

At a more general level, the Sévres Treaty became the origin of a fundamental discursive opposition –the Sévres-Lausanne opposition- of the Turkish political life throughout the republican period. According to this discourse, the Sévres Treaty represents the old order, the “ancient regime” which relegated the individual to the subject of a person. The Lausanne Treaty however, made the national will, the power of the citizen ascendant and established a new independent state. The first one is the document of unconditional submission which made Turkish people the “subjects” of imperialism; the other is that of an honor and of a new beginning for the “modern citizens” of an independent state. In this sense, the Sévres Treaty represents a turning point in the history of Turkey after which Turkish people waged not only a war of survival but also a war to be a modern nation-state based on the sovereignty of citizens. It was not a simple coincidence that soon after the signing of the treaty, in September 18th 1920, Mustafa Kemal used the term of “popular government” to describe the existing regime in his speech in the assembly.⁸⁰ From this point onwards, the political allegiance began to shift from the Sultan to the people itself. The locus of political identity of the ordinary people would shift from loyalty to Sultan to the idea of popular sovereignty that is sovereignty of the citizens. Therefore there emerged an idea of participatory citizen who is able to determine its

⁸⁰ Atatürk, *Söylev*. 249.

own future instead of the subject citizen who is under the complete authority of Sultan.

The passage to the idea of national sovereignty reached to a new level after the Sévres experience in the sense that the abstract idea of national sovereignty as a principle directed towards the external world began to be a principle of an internal political revolution with a more concrete content of changing the source of internal sovereignty from a person to the people. In other words, after the Sévres, the idea of “national sovereignty” began to transform into an idea of “popular sovereignty” which represented the will and power of the people not only against the foreign invasion but also against the existing center of power.

In the subsequent periods, the idea of popular sovereignty became most important component of the nationalist-modernizing political project of creating the “republican citizen”. The republican idea of popular sovereignty as opposed to monarchical rule and full independence and integrity as opposed to slavery and division have been continuously reproduced over this political discourse of Sévres-Lausanne opposition throughout the republican period. However, the point is that the Turkish revolution took sovereignty from a single person but did not give it to the people.⁸¹ The idea of popular sovereignty became the key in the ideological war waged against the Sultan-Caliph but in the subsequent periods, the prevailing idea was that the people should not have sovereignty until their collective conscience reached to a certain level. In this respect, According to Heper, in Turkish political life, at least in early republican period, the emphasis on sovereignty belongs to

⁸¹ Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey* (Northgate: Eothen Press, 1985), 51.

people made it clear not to whom sovereignty belonged but rather to whom it did not belong.⁸²

4.4.2. Full Independence and Political Integrity as the Basic Values of Republican Ideology

The excessiveness of the Sévres resolutions on financial, economic, military matters and on minority rights in the same way provided a counter point of reference for the nationalist movement which completely eliminated the half-way solutions and especially the option of mandate.⁸³ The values of full independence and political integrity was embraced by the nationalists to the extent that they became the foundational values to which the new citizen should commit completely.

The military regulations restricted the armed forces of the Ottoman State to the extent that it was deprived of even a minimum amount of defense forces. Concerning the financial decisions, the Allied powers decided to establish a Financial Commission which would have extensive authority in financial issues and have a status over the Ottoman Parliament, Ottoman financial institutions and the Ottoman legal framework. The articles about economic life of the country mainly re-established the capitulations which had been removed during the Union and Progress government. In the same way, the articles regulating the passage regime of the straits and the authority of the Straits Commission were removing the Ottoman sovereignty over the straits.⁸⁴

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 128; Shaw, *From Empire*. 1151-1155.

⁸⁴ Sonyel, *Turkish*. 78-80; Shaw, *From Empire*. 1137; Meray and Olcay, *Osmanlı*. 61-67; 89-96; 100-108; 114-145.

The announcement of the terms of the treaty created a widespread depression and shock especially in Istanbul city. The press, intellectuals and the official circles reacted strongly. Although Istanbul press calmly expressed the hope that the conference might modify the treaty, from this time on, the pro-American or pro-British mandate circles began to lose their efficiency.⁸⁵ It became clear that the Istanbul governments' policy of compromising with the British in return for the protection of Sultanate and the Caliphate turned to a death sentence for the Ottoman-Muslim majority. More and more people began to participate to national resistance and united around the idea "full independence". Together with national sovereignty it became the vital guiding principle of the nationalist struggle and was adopted more widely by the bourgeois-elite circles of big cities and middle classes. "(After the signing of the treaty) The National Ideal, for the first time, took firm hold of the mass of people who turned their eyes to Ankara as the only hope for salvation"⁸⁶

Soon after its signing, the Sévres Treaty was used as the basis of a political discourse of "independence versus slavery" by the nationalist government which became the most important points of reference for the nationalist leadership to defend the radical reforms in the name of the people in coming periods. The nationalist leadership continued to benefit from the fear emerged among the masses with the Sévres Treaty for a long time. As a matter of fact, the success of the nationalist elite in imposing the radical reforms from above can be explained by their legitimacy in the eyes of at least some section of the society since they fulfilled the conditions of full independence and complete sovereignty. Full independence became a part of the republican ideology which took its power from the success of

⁸⁵ Sonyel, *Turkish*. 78-80; Shaw, *From Empire*. 1137.

⁸⁶ Sonyel, *Turkish*. 79.

the founders of the republic. To believe in independence became equal to believe in republic as the new order. In this way the nationalist elite could impose the most radical reforms to build up of a new society consisting of “modern citizens” who would have full commitment to these values of full independence and integrity of the country. It was the new citizen.

Secondly, the Sévres Treaty became the source of an equally significant idea of political integrity through its regulations of minority rights. The excessiveness about the minority rights provided the ground for the development of a deep “fear of disintegration” among the Turkish ruling elite. They began to view minority rights as the instruments of foreign intervention and to divide the society into camps. They thought that the application of the rights was dictated strongly since indeed it was impossible to apply such rights in an orderly society. In this respect, the Sévres Treaty was the origin of the understanding that minority rights disrupted the unity of the society as the dictates from outside with secret, imperialistic aims over Turkish state and the society.

What were the content of the minority rights of the Sévres Treaty? Articles 140-151 regulated minority rights in detail as a separate part in the treaty. The content of the regulations together with the articles about Kurdish autonomy and Armenian State show that the treaty was prepared mainly as a minority protection treaty. It talks about both negative and positive rights for the protection of disadvantaged groups in the society.⁸⁷

The most distinguishing feature of the treaty is its specification of the criteria of being a minority group. According to treaty, in the Ottoman Society, there were

⁸⁷ Oran, *Türk. Dış.* 133.

“religious, racial (ethnic) and linguistic minorities” who should be protected from state intervention in various fields of life. In other words, the Sévres Treaty not only divided the Ottoman territories among the racial (ethnic) and religious minorities but it also defined extensive political and social rights for those who remained in the Ottoman State. What complicated the situation in terms of the sovereignty of the Ottoman State was the right of the Western states to take every measure to force the Ottoman government to apply these regulations about minorities.⁸⁸

In the beginning, article 140 cited that the articles 141, 145 and 147 could not be changed in any case. Article 141 recognized negative freedoms to all people living in Turkey. The articles 142 and 144 aimed to provide the necessary conditions for the recovery of the minority groups specifically the Ottoman Armenians who were forced to give up their religion or to migrate during the war. It stated that the appropriations of Islam after November 1st 1914 would not be recognized. In this way it provided that the Armenians who had to change their religion in order not to be included to forced emigration, could turn back to their original religions.⁸⁹

The article 144 stated that those Ottoman citizens of non-Turkish origin who were forced to leave their home territories could turn back. They could take back their movable and immovable properties and all kind of selling or commercial transactions which were realized after January 1st 1914 about them would be invalid. This last regulation was also for the Armenians who were in material loss because of Ottoman government.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Ibid. 134. Article 151. See Appendix C for the related articles of the treaty in Turkish.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 133-134.

⁹⁰ Ibid. 134.

The regulation about the Greek minority was equally restoring their conditions in the Ottoman society. The article 143 envisaged a voluntary –not forced- population exchange between Turkey and Greece. In this way, the effects of Unionist-Ottoman policy of “national economy” would be eliminated. The Ottoman government would allow those Ottoman citizens of Greek origin who wanted to stay in Ottoman State mainly in Istanbul and to protect all their properties.⁹¹

Article 145 provided the Ottoman citizens of non-Turkish origin the positive right to have their representatives in the parliament. According to this article within the two years following the treaty’s entering into force, the Ottoman government would submit to Allied governments a proposition about an election system based on proportional representation of all ethnic and religious minorities in the Ottoman parliament. This regulation meant the political participation of not only religious but also ethnic and linguistic minorities to the Ottoman government.⁹²

The reform process within the Ottoman State which had started with the Tanzimat regulations in 1839 had resulted in the recognition of the right of political representation to the non-Muslim minorities. Before the last elections, there were non-Muslim deputies in the Ottoman Parliament. With this regulation, however, the Allied powers forced the Ottoman government to recognize the same right also to non-Turkish Muslim minorities –Kurds being the largest group, Lazes, Circassians, Arabs and some other small communities- which were seen as the organic part of the Ottoman society until that time. It was completely against the centuries long Ottoman imperial outlook which was based on the unity of Muslim peoples of the empire under the banner of Islam as a religion and of Islamic solidarity as a political

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

allegiance. This unity was the most important component of the Ottoman Sultan's legitimacy as the caliph of the Muslim world. In this respect, such a regulation was unacceptable for Ottoman bureaucracy and for the Ottoman elite as a whole. Moreover, since these regulations did not bring any other tangible criteria to define what is minority, it meant that even the smallest communities might demand political representation.

The Allied governments however, defined this article as an unchangeable one in advance. According to Oran, such regulations and their dictated character were the most important factors behind the emergence of nationalist movement as the anti-thesis of Allies' imperialistic project.⁹³ In other words, these regulations openly aimed at destroying Ottoman sovereignty completely. Therefore, they put a strong pressure on the Ottoman government but strengthened the position of the nationalist movement.

The article 145, in the same way stated that there would be no limitations on the use of original languages by every Ottoman citizen in his/her private and public life, i.e., in commercial transactions, open meetings, in religious affairs, and in all subjects of publication. In addition to that the Ottoman State would have the obligation to provide every conditions for Ottoman citizens who spoke languages other than Turkish to use their own languages both in written and verbal communication. This would mean that the Ottoman government had to allow the use of other languages in public life.⁹⁴

Another important article about the positive rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities was the article 147 of the treaty. The Ottoman citizens belonging

⁹³ Ibid. 138.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 134. See also Appendix C.

to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities could independently establish, rule, and control their own organizations, schools and foundations of every kind and without the intervention of Ottoman authorities. In a similar way, article 149 stated the right of every minority group to have their autonomy with respect to their churches and schools.⁹⁵

As the first point, the reason behind the perception that views the minority rights as the instruments of foreign intervention was the fact that in the Sévres Treaty even the most unrelated issues were sanctioned by provisions putting additional obligations on the Ottoman government. For example, according to article 36, Istanbul would remain as the capital city where the Sultan could reside only if Turkey should respect the rights of the ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities honestly. Unless Turkey fulfilled this condition, the Allied powers would have the right to change this regulation and Turkey had to accept these changes in advance.⁹⁶ Therefore, the perception that minority rights open the way for foreign intervention therefore they limit state sovereignty became settled political worldview of the not only the nationalists of the period but also of the subsequent generations.

Secondly, the definition of the minorities on the basis of religious, ethnic and linguistic difference was very contrary to the centuries long Ottoman political system, state ideology and social vision. As a matter of fact, the Kemalists shared the Ottoman perception that the recognition of the minority rights was the primary reason behind the Ottoman disintegration. Therefore, such rights were seen as unity-disrupting factors rather than democratic necessities also by the Kemalist nationalists. They put forward this general view clearly during the Lausanne

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 129. See also Appendix C.

Conference. The new ruling elite inherited the Ottoman idea that the only way to prevent dissolution was a strong state with a unitary citizenship which would impede separationist demands and disrupting privileges.

The Sévres' regulations about the recognition of the ethnic political rights in addition to autonomy for Kurds further disturbed the nationalist leadership since they might fuel independence aspirations and cause the disintegration of the new political organization. It is in this early period that the ethnic political rights were labeled as completely against the national existence and unity in the collective memory of the Turkish people in general. Any demand about cultural or political rights about a non-Turk Muslim community were reduced to a matter of land and boundary and identified with the historical "Sévres Trap" by the state elite.⁹⁷

As a third point, the dictated character of the minority rights created a counter effect of "not to allow them in any case under any pressure" as a general psychology in this early period and transferred from generation to generation in the Turkish political culture. The Sévres regulations were much heavier and more excessive than all the post-war peace treaties signed with the other defeated European States. In this respect, the Sévres experience has been the most important factor that shaped relations between Turkey and Europe in the following periods.

Therefore, as these three points indicate, the Sévres regulations became a counter point of reference for the founders of the state in formulating early conception of "unitary citizenship" and the "politics of citizenship" which drew the political-ethical boundaries of the "community inside". Full independence and political integrity were the twin principles that gained their concrete meanings after the treaty and characterized the political closure of the community inside and the

terms of proper membership since they constituted the preliminary formulation of Turkish republicanism. Therefore, the Svres Treaty was the historical moment at which the first credentials of the future republican citizenship conception emerged for the first time in Turkish political history. This conception was totally closed to any idea of minority rights and even any idea of citizenship rights -which might disrupt the sense of equality and integrity in the society- because of the excessiveness of the treaty.

⁹⁷ Akam, *Trkiye 'yi*. 25.

CHAPTER V

THE TURKO-SOVIET RAPPROACHMENT AND THE POLITICS OF CLOSURE IN THE EAST

5.1. Introduction

During the initial years of the nationalist resistance, the nationalist elite faced with a dilemma which complicated their position in the international field as well as in their own society. Although the war was waged against Western imperialism, most of the members of the nationalist elite did not have an anti-western ideological orientation.¹ As a matter of fact, a considerable group of military and civil bureaucrats and intellectuals continuously defended the idea that the nationalist movement should reach to an agreement with the Entente Powers as soon as possible.

These ideas surfaced with the gathering of the National Assembly in Ankara in April 1920. Those who defended an immediate peace agreement so long as the conditions of the Sèvres Treaty were improved in favor of Turkey were the “Westerners”. On the other hand, there was also a considerable group of “Easterners”

¹ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, 1919-1980* Cilt 1 [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Today, The Facts, Documents, Interpretations, 1919-1980 Vol. 1] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 107-109.

who argued that Western civilization was near of a total collapse and therefore Turkey should turn its face to the East for a new political-ideological alternative.² However, both of these groups were not clear in their future prospects. What differentiated them was their answer to the question of whether there should be a different government apart from the Ottoman State. The Westerners were defending the protection of the constitutional monarchy and the Caliphate. The Easterners, however, were arguing for a regime change which would bring popular sovereignty instead of personal rule. This second group was in favor of a rapprochement with the Soviet Russia and most of its members were under the influence of communist currents.³

Therefore, the Turkish nationalists were also under the pressure of an ideological rivalry. On the one side there was Western imperialism and on the other side there was Bolshevism. The period between 1919-1921 was marked by such a dilemma of political-ideological orientation.⁴ The point is that, the cooperation between the Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks was not the result of the supremacy of the Eastern alternative as a model for the future domestic political order and identity although the Easterners' ideas were much closer to Mustafa Kemal concerning the future of the Sultanate. On the contrary, when the friendship treaty was signed with the Soviet Russia, the leftist currents in Anatolia were almost totally eliminated and the Easterners were dispersed. Rather, it was the end of the hopes for

² Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey] (İstanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978), 474.

³ Ibid. 475.

⁴ Bülent Gökay, *Bolşevizm ile Emperyalizm Arasında Türkiye (1918-1923)* [Turkey Between Bolshevism and Imperialism] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 6.

reconciliation with the British government that persuaded even the most anti-Bolshevik nationalists to cooperate with the Soviet Russia.

What was the reason behind this total elimination or suppression of the Easterners' alternative? In what respect, the process of rapprochement with the Soviet Russia affected the internal political debates and the configuration of domestic political forces? How the relations did affect the territorial, national and political closure of the new "community inside" and the conception of membership as reflected to the Moscow Treaty? With these questions, therefore, this part will focus on the effects of the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement process on the nationalists' vision of national political community and the "politics of citizenship" of the initial years of state formation. The way that the Turko-Soviet rapprochement developed under the ideological pressure of the Soviet Union became very effective on the nationalists' formulation of the territorial, national and political boundaries of the future political community. In this respect, the Moscow Treaty as a bi-lateral agreement became another step in the development of a "nationalist" foreign policy as parallel to the formation of an idea of unitary national citizenship.

The Turkish-Soviet Russian Friendship Treaty - Moscow Treaty – basically drew the northeastern border of the new Turkey and put forward the conditions of cooperation between the two governments. This treaty was a result of both governments' anti-British stance and common interests in the region but it did not come out as a natural consequence of this common ground. The complex character of Caucasian politics made their interests sometimes conflicting. The British-Soviet rivalry in the region affected the nationalists' position and the development of

cooperative relations between the parties followed an uneasy way⁵. Even after the signing of the treaty, the suspicion of each party about the real intentions of the other did not come to an end.

In the beginning of the relations, two problems seriously affected the internal dynamics and the political-ideological direction of the Turkish nationalist movement. The first one was the Soviet's territorial claims on the Elviye-i Selase (Kars, Ardahan and Batum) and on Van, Bitlis and Mus in favor of the project of Greater Armenia. This demand was expressed for first time in the Soviet Foreign Relations Commissioner Chicherin's official response dated as 3rd June 1920 to the letter of the Turkish National Assembly.⁶ He argued that the new Turkish government should recognize the self-determination rights of the peoples of Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, Batum and Eastern Thrace and the territories on which the Turkish-Arab peoples were living. According to Moscow's thesis, Armenians were the majority in the provinces of Bitlis, Mus and Van. This was a counter-proposal which was completely in line with the Allies' project about the division of the Eastern Anatolia contrary to the National Pact. Therefore, the nationalist government was squeezed both from the east and from the west because of the territorial demands in favor of a Greater Armenia.

The second issue was the Soviets' overt attempts to transform the Anatolian anti-imperialist movement to a Bolshevik revolution. They were viewing the growing local resistance movements in Anatolia as the nucleus of first Asian Bolshevik

⁵ Ibid. 87-96.

⁶ Stefanos Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri 1917-1923* [The Turkish- Soviet Relations During the Independence War 1917-1923] (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 2000), 228, Document No: 42.

Revolution.⁷ A Soviet delegation met with Mustafa Kemal in Samsun as early as June 1919 to understand the political character of the movement.⁸ Shortly after the Declaration of the Sivas Conference, on September 13th 1919, Soviet Russian Foreign Relations Commissioner, Chicherin promulgated “ A Summons to the Anatolian Workers and Peasants” which primarily addressed Western imperialism and the Ottoman rulers as the enemies of the Turkish people and urged the Anatolian peasants and workers to take control of the faith of their country.⁹ The Soviet regime, by relying on the reports coming from its agencies in Anatolia, had the impression that there is the strong possibility of a socialist government in Anatolia.¹⁰ Therefore, in this early period, the Soviet Russia had definitely the aim of bolshevizing the Anatolian movement.

Despite these conflictual issues, because of the urgent need for military support, the Ankara government did not insist on the borders of the National Pact as non-negotiable principles. Rather, the Turkish nationalists prioritized the issue of military aid and tried to get closer to the Soviet government. As the head of the first delegation to Moscow, Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey argued that “within the current borders” (not the borders of National Pact but the borders that the Turkish forces controlled after Mudros Armistice), a cooperation and unity of faith with the Bolshevik Russia should be established on the condition that full independence of the Turkish state at home and abroad should be provided. The Turkish side gave the

⁷ Gökay, *Bolşevizm*. 82.

⁸ Ibid.; Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 105.

⁹ Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 105. For the text of the summons, see page 124, Document No: 34.

¹⁰ Suat Bile, *Güç Komşuluk [Hard Neighbourliness]* (İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1992), 29.

implicit message that there might be negotiations about the content of the National Pact. Specifically Batum might not be an essential part of national territories.¹¹ On the other hand, however, Turkish National Assembly definitely rejected the Soviet demands on Mus, Bitlis and Van on 16-17th October 1920.¹²

The point is that, Soviets' territorial demands, the Armenian threat and the spread of communist currents in Anatolia created a "fear of communism" in Ankara to the extent that, they were viewed as a single, conjoined threat to national independence and identity.¹³ This threat perception became a significant part of the national security conception of the period and shaped the nationalists' vision of national identity, future political order, membership and the general worldview to a large extent. At the end of the ideological-political interaction with the Soviets, with the Moscow Treaty, the Ankara government declared its primary principles in terms of its domestic political order and its ideological stance which determined the new ruling elite's prospect for "politics of citizenship" for the subsequent periods.

5.1. The Politics of Territorial Closure in the East

Concerning the eastern border, therefore, the Turkish nationalists were under a double pressure coming simultaneously from the Soviet Russia and from the Western governments and the question of eastern border became the most crucial

¹¹ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 168; Yerasimos, *Türk-Sovyet*. 142.

¹² Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 165.

¹³ In the national assembly, the idea was that the Bolshevized Armenians by taking the support of the Soviets would increase their demands from Turkey and at the same time would strive for the dissemination of communist ideas in the East, see Mahmut Gologlu, *Cumhuriyete Doğru* [Towards the Republic] (Ankara: Bateş, 1971), 7-8.

problem in early 1920. In this respect, the Moscow Treaty of March 16th 1921 was a real success for the Turkish nationalists since they could scrape from these pressures and settled the issue in line with the National Pact although through modifying it.

The problem was that, there was no reliable population statistics about the region which would be the basis for the territorial settlement. During the world war, the population structure of the region changed much because of the forced deportation, migration and of the clashes among civilians. According to Turkish side, the Armenian guerillas were attacking to the Muslim people of the region to have majority.¹⁴ The situation was so complicated that during the official talks of the Moscow Conference, Bekir Sami Bey sent a report to the National Assembly and proposed that some of the population of Diyarbakir, Mardin and Urfa might be sent to the region as a measure in order to guarantee the Muslim majority.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the Soviet side was insisting on the establishment of mixed commissions to investigate the population ratios in the region as line with its demand about the self-determination rights of also the non-Turkish Muslim peoples that is, the Kurds, Lazes and Arabs living in Anatolia.¹⁶ This demand meant another territorial revision – in addition to the Armenian project – and the transformation of the National Pact by an ethnic criterion. Under these pressures, the Turkish side had to interpret the National Pact as the document of the territorial integrity of Anatolian peninsula

¹⁴ Before the opening of the national assembly, Mustafa Kemal as the head of the Anatolian and Rumelian Defense of Rights Organization, sent a protesting note to the foreign missionaries and ambassadors on March 28th 1920. He informed that as a result of the attacks organized by Armenian armed groups, more than two thousands Muslim peasants died. See *Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası: Milli Mücadele Dönemine Ait 100 Belge, 1919-1923* [Atatürk's National Foreign Policy: 100 Documents of the National Struggle Period] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1994), 154.

¹⁵ Bilge, *Güç*. 50.

¹⁶ Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 228, Document No: 42.

rather than a document citing the Ottoman-Muslim provinces. The Turkish nationalists responded to these demands with a sudden military operation to save only the Eastern provinces where there was an absolute Ottoman-Turkish majority and signed the Gümrü Treaty with the Tashnak Armenian government.

The point is that under the severe pressures of the Armenian claims and of the Bolshevik propagation, at the end, the Turkish nationalists displayed the first example of their general policy of “political expediency and realism” in defining the territorial borders of the new state in the east. The territorial closure was realized not solely in accordance with the majority principle but more in accordance with realistic assessment of the nationalist leadership in order to control the communist activities, to get the military aid and to end the Armenian attacks. The leaving up of the Batum city constituted the first concession from the National Pact which was given as a result of the politics of expediency on territorial matters.

5.2.1. Territorial Closure in Gümrü Treaty

Gümrü Treaty was signed with the Tashnak Armenian government after the Turkish military operation on December 2nd 1920. Since that regime was overthrown by the Soviet supported Bolshevik Armenians at the same day, however, the treaty lost its validity. Nevertheless it created a de facto situation and a basis for the subsequent regulations. The importance of the treaty was that it drew the current borders of Turkey in the east. With this treaty, the eastern Anatolian provinces which had been left to planned Armenia in the Sévres Treaty remained in Turkey.¹⁷

¹⁷ İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları 1. Cilt 1920-1945*[The Political Treaties of Turkey, Vol.1, 1920-1945] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 19-23. See also for the related articles of the treaty in Turkish in Appendix D at the end of the dissertation.

Specifically, the territories of the Armenian part before the 1877-78 Ottoman Russian war, Iğdır, which was passed to Russia from Iran in 1828 and Tuzluca which was under Armenian invasion since 1918 were passed to Turkish sovereignty. Nahcivan, Şahdağı and Şarur regions were put under the protection of Turkish government but Gümri was left to Armenia. In the regions which remained between the new line and the 1914 border, a plebiscite would be done.¹⁸

The Gümri Treaty was the response of the Turkish nationalists to the Western project of Greater Armenian State. This treaty solved the issue of Armenian demands in the direction of the Turkish thesis which argued that there was a definite Ottoman-Turkish majority in all over the region. On the other hand, it can also be argued that the territorial settlement of the Gümri Agreement was realistic and conjunctive since it did not include historical territorial claims or any kind of irredentism beyond the militarily controlled territories.

However, because of the excessiveness of the Armenian demands and the Soviet's support in the region, Turkish nationalists displayed a high sensitivity concerning to exact demarcation. The majority principle was strictly applied in order to establish a full control in the region and the security of the Muslim population. However, since the treaty lost its validity with the establishment of Soviet Armenia, a new settlement was made with the Soviets which this time prioritized the prevention of Soviet intervention more than the borders of the National Pact.

¹⁸ Ibid.

5.2.2. Territorial Closure in Moscow and Kars Treaties

After Gümrü Treaty, the Soviet government focused on solving the question of Batum. During this period, the Ankara government used its improved relations with the Allied governments as a trump card against the Soviet government. Since they were invited by the Allies, the London Conference of February 1921 gave the Ankara government the opportunity to give the message that, the Turkish nationalists' decision to stay in the anti-imperialist camp depended on the abandonment of the claims on Bitlis, Van and Muş by the Soviets. With a second operation in the region, Artvin and Ardahan provinces were taken and in Batum Turkish forces met with the Red Army on March 11th 1920.¹⁹

The Ankara government, as a matter of fact would not be insistent on Batum, although the majority of its population was Muslim. The sensitivity of the Armenian case did not exist in the exact demarcation of the border with Georgia. Batum was the only exit for the Soviets to Black Sea in Caucasia but it had no economic or strategic importance for Turkey. Throughout the Batum question, the Soviets showed their sensitivity by canceling the aid.²⁰

The Turkish-Soviet Russia Friendship Treaty was signed after the solution of the border issue in this way. In the first article of the treaty, it was underlined that Turkey includes the territories defined in the National Pact ²¹. This statement was very important for the Ankara government since it meant the official recognition of the National Pact by a Greater power. With this recognition, however, although it

¹⁹ Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 201-201 and 204.

²⁰ Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 128-129.

²¹ Article 1 of the Moscow Treaty, Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 32-33. See also Appendix E for the text of the treaty in Turkish at the end of the dissertation.

was broken - Batum city was left outside - the National Pact gained an unquestionable status for the nationalists themselves. In the treaty, the exact demarcation of the Turkey's northeastern border was described in a way as to guarantee the security of the Muslim people of the region.

In the second article, the government of Turkish Grand National Assembly left its right of sovereignty on the Batum city, the port and the all the territories of the province to Georgia on the condition that the people of the province should have a wide autonomy with respect to their cultural, religious and political rights. Furthermore, the Turkish government would freely benefit from the Batum port as exempted from customs duty. According to the third article, Nahcivan would become an autonomous region under the protection of Azerbaijan.²² These territorial regulations of the Moscow Treaty were put as exactly the same in the Kars Treaty (articles 4,5,6) which was signed with the Soviet Caucasian Republics in September 13th 1921.²³

The concession about the Batum city was given to prevent the project of Armenia in a period in which the pressures were at the highest point. One the other hand, Ankara government was trying to prevent the cooperation between the local communist activities and the Soviet government which was perceived as the most significant threat against the regime. Therefore, it can be argued that the objective of the Moscow Treaty was to secure the independent position of the Ankara government against the communist challenge which was supported by the Soviet

²² Ibid. 33.

²³ Ibid. 42-43.

government. The leaving of Batum city was viewed as a small concession in return for these vital objectives.

5. 3. National Closure in Gümrü, Moscow and Kars Treaties

5.3.1. The National Closure in the East

In these first official diplomatic documents, the Turkish nationalists aimed to comply with the principles that they declared in the National Pact. Especially with the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the Turkish nationalists accomplished their ideal of religious homogeneity in the east at least on paper. Whatever the population ratios and the real conditions in the region, from then on, the people of the region would be counted as Turkish citizens living under the sovereignty of the new political authority. The treaty became the first international diplomatic document through which the Turkish nationalists had their project to be accepted by a Great power. This was also a step in the gradual abandonment of the imperial territorial-social vision by the Ottoman-Turkish elite.

In these first formal foreign policy acts, the Turkish nationalists put forward their priority as to provide the security of the Ottoman-Muslim people of Eastern Anatolia. Security against whom? As the above part on Sévres Treaty, the civil war conditions between the Armenian and the Muslim peoples of the region since 1914 forced the nationalist leaders to leave imperial social vision which was deeply entrenched in their self perception, general worldview and state ideology. The security of the Muslim people of the region was connected to the prevention of the Armenian project. During the process of rapprochement with the Soviets, the

nationalist leaders began to think that the social basis of the new state should be reconstructed in a way to prevent separationism on religious, ethnic or any other basis in the future. Therefore, the idea of political unity based on territorial integrity became the pre-ordained principle and the basis of the “politics of citizenship” via drawing borders in this early period. The national closure which was envisaged in the Moscow Treaty aimed to guarantee the security of the Muslim majority of Eastern Anatolia and in this way, the Armenian community of the region was left outside of the new conception of “community inside” and membership.

The first step of this exclusion was the rejection Armenian population of the region as at a considerable density. Throughout the negotiations, the Turkish side strictly defended that in none of the provinces that were demanded by the Armenians, these people ever did constitute the majority.²⁴ However, when the Soviet pressures reached its peak during the Moscow Conference, the Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey sent a report to the National Assembly proposing that the Muslims –primarily the Kurdish people- of Diyarbakır, Mardin and Urfa might be sent to the region in order to guarantee the Muslim majority.²⁵

Therefore, there should have been some doubts about whether or not the population ratios could be definitely measured. This proposal was also the indication of the fact that the nationalists were determined not to leave these territories to the Armenians in any case. Their struggle for the Eastern Anatolia became the symbol of their determination not to allow the division of Anatolia in line with the Allies’

²⁴ Bilge, *Güç*. 45.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 50.

project. In this sense, there was also a “politics of drawing borders” per se rather than to draw borders in accordance with a specific politics of inside/outside that is citizenship. In other words, for the Eastern Anatolian case, the territorial demarcation became an end in itself for the nationalists in order to prove their determinacy about the Armenian project in any case.

The signing of the treaty put an end to the discussions about the population ratios of the region. The Turkish nationalists obtained a legitimate ground for the future negotiations with the Allies by having solved the border issue with the Soviet Russia. Whatever the exact numbers, from then on the people of the region would be seen as a homogenous entity and would be treated as the citizens of Turkish State. Through the treaty, the new political authority realized an external national closure which left some part of the population of the region outside as the “other”, the foreigner, even as the enemy.

In reality, however, this was not the case. There was still a significant Armenian population inside. As a matter of fact, the politics of drawing borders did not serve for the politics of citizenship in terms of creating a homogenous entity in the east. In this sense, the Moscow and Kars Treaties provided the ground for an “internal closure” that is the eradication-assimilation of the remaining “outsider peoples” into majority which disrupted the idealized but “non-existent” homogeneity of the new “community inside”. It is remarkable that both the Moscow and the Kars Treaties regulated first of all the migration of the remaining Armenians with this objective. The article 12 of the Moscow and the 13 of the Kars Treaty stated that the Armenians –or people of belonging to other nationalities like Azeris and Georgians- who remained in Turkey were free to migrate together with their all kinds of

properties. In the same way, the Muslim people of Batum could migrate to Turkey.²⁶ These articles are still a part of Turkish Citizenship Law and regulated the loss of citizenship for the migrating people. These are the only articles which mention about a right -which is the right to migrate- of the remaining non-Muslim peoples. In both treaties, there is neither an expression of Armenian minority nor any other specific cultural or political rights for them.

The second aspect of the exclusion of the former Ottoman citizens of Armenian origin was related with the minority rights clauses of the treaty. At this point, it is very striking to note that in the National Pact, the Turkish nationalists guaranteed the rights of the minorities in accordance with the internationally accepted rules which cited the criterias of being a minority as race (ethnicity), language and religion. However, as the nationalist government strengthened its stance vis-à-vis the foreign powers, it began to refrain from binding itself with such international obligations. The first example of this attitude was the Moscow Treaty. There was no regulation about the cultural or political rights of the Armenians who remained within the borders as Turkish citizens in the treaty. Even in Gümrü Treaty, which was signed after a Turkish military victory, -therefore, there was not any pressure for the recognition of such rights- Kazim Karabekir accepted the recognition of two important rights to the Armenian people. The first one was the right to return for the Armenians who were subjected to forced deportation during the world war provided that they did not participate to the attacks against the Muslims. Secondly, those who turned back within a year and the Armenian people of the region would

²⁶ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 35 and 45, see also Appendix E.

benefit from the most developed minority rights within the Turkish State.²⁷ In the subsequent Moscow and the Kars Treaties not only these rights did not exist, there was not even an expression of a remaining “Armenian minority” whose right of self-determination was forcefully defended by the Moscow government a short time ago.

The settlement of the Armenian problem in this way not only reflected the determinacy about the nationalist elite to establish a homogenous political community as the basis of the new state, but also the degree of suspicion and enmity towards Armenian community. Simply, the Turkish government aimed to send the Ottoman Armenians by not recognizing any rights to them to continue to live as a cultural group within the new “community inside”. It can be argued that the civil war conditions since 1914 prepared the ground for also the popular acceptance of this policy against the Armenians. The Armenian peril was the most important point which united the Muslim peoples of the Eastern Anatolia under the leadership of the Turkish nationalists who successfully used a discourse of Islamic solidarity. The mobilization of the Kurdish tribes was accomplished thanks to this widely perceived Armenian threat in the region. Therefore, there was a Muslim block in the region. It was at the popular level as well that the Armenians were defined as the “other, the foreigner and even as the common enemy. The threat against the security of an identity –in this case Ottoman-Muslim identity- determined the identity of the “excluded”.

Therefore, such a conception of “national” identity became the basis of the nationalists’ projection of the future political community as a homogenous community on the basis of religion. The settlements of Gümrü, Moscow and Kars

²⁷ Article 6 of the Gümrü Treaty, Ibid. 20, see Appendix D.

Treaties represented the end of the Ottoman imperial vision in Eastern Anatolia. The Armenian people of the region who were left within the new Turkish borders were counted as non-existent. After the establishment of the new state, the successive governments continued to ignore them but at the same time applied assimilatory-discriminatory policies in order to eradicate the distinct Armenian identity in the region. The most important example of such policies was the forced settlement of Armenians in different parts of Anatolia in accordance with the Law of Settlement of 1934 which targeted not only the non-Muslims but also the Kurdish people of Eastern Anatolia.²⁸ The Armenians who lived in different parts of central Anatolia were forced to emigrate to İstanbul in order to gather them in a single city. This law was the most obvious indicator of the discriminatory-assimilationist attitude of the new state elite towards all kinds of the elements of difference which did not fit the underlying ethnic and religious criteria for being proper citizens of the new state.

5.3.2. The Internal Boundaries of the Future National Citizenship

This last point brings to the fore another dimension of the internal closure which is the representation of the Muslim peoples of the region as an organic political totality. Throughout the negotiations with the Soviets, the Turkish nationalists consistently claimed that the Eastern Anatolian Muslims of different cultures, ethnicities, and religious sects were bound by a common bond of Islamic fraternity. The ambiguity in the term “Ottoman-Muslim majority” facilitated Turkish

²⁸ Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliği'nin Etno-Seküler Sınırları* [Happy the One Who is able to Say I am Turk: The Ethno-Secular Limits of Turkish National Identity] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 253.

thesis in negotiations. The point is that, Chicherin's demands about self-determination right for the non-Turkish Muslim peoples -Kurds, Lazes and Arabs- of Anatolia created sensitivity about the issue in Turkish side. This demand was firmly rejected and the Turkish nationalists succeeded to have the Moscow government to accept the political unity of the Anatolian Muslims under the leadership of the Turkish nationalists. In other words, with the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the Soviet government guaranteed to withdraw these claims and accepted that this issue was an internal problem of Turkish State from then on.

After this compromise, the first signs of the passage from the phrase of "Ottoman-Muslims" to "Ottoman-Turkish people" as term describing the "community inside" of the new Turkish State emerged during this period. The article 11th of the Moscow and 12th of the Kars Treaties stated that those who remained in Armenia as Turkish citizens and the Soviet or Armenian citizens in Turkey would be treated as the members of "the most favored nation" in the host states. An interesting condition was added to this article. The Muslims who were the citizens of Turkey's allies and the citizens Soviet Russia's allies would be out of this regulation.²⁹ Here, the criterion of being Muslim was not enough to describe the Ottoman-Muslim citizens. The Turkish government had to narrow its definition of its citizens living outside the borders. The Ottoman-Turkish origins would be the Turkish citizens abroad. This was one of the first regulations in which the Ankara government specified the "national origin" of its citizens as Ottoman-Turkish.

Therefore, in these treaties the problem of the eastern border for the new Turkish State was solved but more importantly, the Armenian question was removed

²⁹ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 35 and 44, see Appendix E.

in accordance with the Turkish claims. The Ankara government accomplished not just a territorial closure but also a national closure of its new political community which excluded some part of former Ottoman citizens –the Azeris, Georgians and Armenians- by directly leaving them outside and by internally counted the remaining ones as non-existent. In this respect, these are the first documents which were signed with a Great power that legitimized the Turkish nationalists’ project of a homogenous “community inside” and the homogenous citizenry.

5.4. The Moscow Treaty and the Political-Ideological Boundaries of the New “Community Inside”

The development of cooperative relations with the Soviet Russia affected the internal configuration of the political forces and the ideological formation of the nationalist movement to a large extent. Concerning the politics of citizenship of this early period, the point is that the interactions with the Soviets influenced the definition of the “ideological-ethical boundaries” of the “community inside” and the terms of “legitimate politics” which together featured the political aspect of membership in Turkey. Specifically, the origins of some features of Turkish political life such as the importance of strong state, state dominated political sphere and centrally defined public-political identity as impediments on the way of the development of a right-based citizenship identity lies in this period.

In this period, first of all, the perception of Bolshevik threat caused the elimination of the leftist figures and the repression of the Easterners within the nationalist movement. The “Easterners” who sincerely believed the possibility of a socialist transformation or who had a superficial interest in socialist ideology were

completely removed from the political scene. At a more ideological level, anti-communism was so deeply penetrated into the emerging state ideology that the nationalist elite developed a conception of political sphere as dominated fully by a “strong state” in order not to allow communist or socialist currents in the future.

On the other hand, however, the ideological interactions with the Soviets caused the transformation of the abstract conception of national sovereignty to a more concrete conception of “popular sovereignty” as an alternative basis of legitimacy and the emergence of the principle of “populism” with a slightly leftist tone. The following part will analyze Turko-Soviet rapprochement as a factor in the ideological formation of the domestic political sphere and the configuration of political forces in a way to draw the ethical-ideological boundaries of the “community inside” and the new citizenship identity.

5.4.1. The Ideological Pressure of the Soviet Government and the Socialist Currents in Anatolia

The Turkish-Soviet Russian Friendship Treaty was signed in a conjuncture when each side was suspicious about the other’s real intentions and secret activities in their territories. The ideological interactions and strategic priorities in Caucasia further complicated the situation.³⁰ Both sides were threatening each other by making alliances with the ideologically rival forces. However, the Soviet’s ideological pressure on the Turkish nationalist elite was much more squeezing.

Throughout the process of rapprochement, the Soviet government tried to effect the political character of the new regime in Turkey both in overt and covert

³⁰ Gökay, *Bolşevizm*. 64-78 and 101-115.

ways. Moscow Treaty was signed ten months after the first contacts. In this period, the Turkish nationalist elite tried hard to control the Soviets' propagandist activities in Anatolia and to control the local communist organizations which were influential within the elite circles as well. The mutual insecurity between the Turkish nationalists and the Soviet Russia were reflected in the Moscow Treaty in the form of binding clauses of mutual "non-intervention" concerning the future conduct of the relations.

As early as September 1919, the Soviet Foreign Relations Commissioner Chicherin's "Summons to Turkish Workers and the Peasants" indicated that the Soviet rulers had the idea of transforming the Turkish anti-imperialist mobilization into a Bolshevik revolution.³¹ The Soviets' pressure forced the nationalist leadership to define the political character of the Turkish nationalist movement albeit in a superficial way. Mustafa Kemal had to send a note to the head of the US Military Mission in Anatolia stating that the nationalist movement had no interest in Bolshevism.³² These were the attempts to convince the Western world and especially the United States that the Turkish nationalist movement did not have an anti-western ideological origin.³³

On the other hand, however, Mustafa Kemal actively defended the idea of cooperation with the Soviets. He even argued that it might be necessary to accept Bolshevism but not because he thought Bolshevism as an ideological-political

³¹ Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 124-126, Document No: 34.

³² Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar: 1908-1925* [The Leftist Currents in Turkey 1908-1925] (İstanbul: BDS Yayıncılık, 1991, 133, Reference No: 18.

³³ On 24 September 1919, Mustafa Kemal sent a diplomatic note to the head of the US Military Mission in Anatolia, General Harbord stating that Bolshevism had no place in Turkey, see Bilge, *Güç*. 32.

framework for the Turkish movement. Rather it was a strategic necessity. In the first official correspondences with the Soviet leaders, he used a socialist rhetoric underlying their common anti-imperialist stance and proposed Turkish support for the bolshevization of the Caucasian States.³⁴

Chicherin replied this proposal with an emphasis on two points: First, the self-determination of all non-Turkish communities of Anatolia –including Kurds, Lazes, Arabs and Circassians- and secondly, the right to realize their political self-development without any impediments again for these communities. The second point was a warning to the Ankara government to give up its interventions to the communist movements in Anatolia.³⁵

The official talks -which was began in 24 July 1920 was cancelled because of the Soviets' territorial demands in favor of Armenia which further created strong anti- Soviet feelings among the Turkish nationalists. Beginning from this period, ideological divisions began to be crystallized within the nationalist movement. The leaders of the movement had allowed to the development of leftist-communist currents until that time with the hope that the Soviets would fasten the aid if they thought that the Anatolian movement was ideologically close to the Bolshevik alternative. From this time on, the Turkist, Westernist and pro-Sultanate group gained strength in the assembly and they became very influential at the popular level. Most of the primary figures of the nationalist movement took a definite anti-Soviet stance and the fear of communist revolution directed the public opinion. The anti-

³⁴ Tunçay, *Türkiye'de*. 73-74; Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 223, Document No: 39 and 230-231, Document No: 43.

³⁵ Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 228-229, Document No: 42 and 234, Document No: 45.

Soviet attitude caused the spread of Turkist and irredentist ideas especially concerning the Ankara's Caucasian politics. As a result the leftist and communist parties, organizations, journals began to be investigated throughout Anatolia beginning from October 1920.³⁶ The special decision of the Third International which was gathered in June 1920 stating the support of the international communism to Turkish War further disturbed Mustafa Kemal and his associates since they did not want to be seem so unified ideologically with the Eastern alternative.

The emergence of the socialist currents in Anatolia went parallel with the Turko-Soviet rapprochement in the spring-summer 1920. In these first contacts, there was the idea that, with the development of the relations, the regimes would get closer.³⁷ This was not just the idea of the Soviet rulers. Among the nationalists, those who thought that the amount of the aid would increase if the relations were closer were not a minority. Furthermore some significant figures in the movement were really close to communist currents. Several leftist and communist organizations, parties, and groups in media emerged in this period.

One of the most important organizations of the leftists was the Green Army (Yeşil Ordu) which was established in May 1920 as a secret organization. It had also a group in the national assembly under the name of "People's Group". The main task of this group was to legitimize cooperation with the Soviets in the eyes of the masses and especially of the soldiers whose religious feelings were very strong against the atheist communists.³⁸ Adnan Adivar, Nazim Bey, Hakki Behic, Seyh Servet and

³⁶ Ibid. 165-166.

³⁷ Tunçay, *Türkiye'de*. 73.

³⁸ Ibid. 84-85.

Yunus Nadi were the primary figures of this organization who constituted the anti-Western group in the national assembly.

This group supported Mustafa Kemal in the issue of cooperation with the Soviet Russia against the other nationalist leaders. The “Easterners” had been organized themselves as early as during the time of Heyet-i Temsiliye. They were a group of people who thought that the western civilization was near of a total collapse and Turkey should turn its face to the East where a new and more just political and social order was being established. They were strongly against capitalism therefore liberalism. Ideologically, they united the Unionists’ pan-Islamist ideas with a socialist economic policy. They were definitely under the effect of Unionist leftism.³⁹

Mustafa Kemal and other primary figures of the nationalists were concerned because of this Unionist character of the movement. He did not oppose their ideas openly, seemed to embrace most of them but attributed these ideas to himself in order to calm down the leftist mobilization. He certainly stayed away from this group but used them to get closer with the Soviets. In the short period of pro-Soviet atmosphere in the assembly, however, this group became very effective. They had their candidate, Nazim Bey elected as the Minister of Interior Affairs. They introduced the idea of “occupational representation” (mesleki temsil) as a measure against the dominance of the bureaucracy and became very influential during the constitutional discussions.⁴⁰

According to its statutes, Green Army was an anti-capitalistic, anti-imperialist and anti-militarist organization. This ideological discourse caused them to be

³⁹ Ibid. 90-91.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 90.

perceived as the internal allies of the Bolsheviks and disturbed the other members of the assembly. According to nationalist leaders these activities provided a ground for an internal ideological conflict which might obviously damaged the unity of the nationalist movement.

The attendance of Cerkes Ethem who were one of the strongest figures in Western Anatolian forces to the Green Army further disturbed Mustafa Kemal, since then the organization obtained a military force. He tried to stop the activities of the organization but could not succeed it. The organization continued its activities in Eskisehir where Ethem was very powerful. However, in fall 1920, the first founders of the organization were dispersed and some of them were forced to attend to the official communist party.

After the dissolution of the Green Army and the People's Group, some of the members and the leftists who came from the Soviet Russia established the People's Participation Party of Turkey. This party was more on the left and aimed to persuade the peasants in addition to the workers for a revolutionary struggle. However, it also relied its socialist framework on the principles of Islam in order to get support of the Anatolian masses.⁴¹

There was an another attempt to establish a Turkish Communist Party in Caucasia. A Turkish communist, Mustafa Suphi came to Bakü during the organization of the nationalist movement in Anatolia and took the control of the Turkish Communist Party of the ex-Unionists in this city. His aim was to organize this party also in Anatolia for which he took a wide support from the Soviets.⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid. 97-98.

⁴² Ibid. 99-102.

According to the nationalist leaders there was the strong possibility that the Anatolian movement could be caught by the Soviets through the Suphi's communist party and it could be turned into a Bolshevik revolution. Therefore the nationalists decided to stop Suphi's activities. When he came to Anatolia he faced with a strong opposition in Erzurum. He decided to turn back but was killed on the way with his close friends.⁴³

In order to control these activities, Mustafa Kemal had an official communist party founded under the name of Turkish Communist Party in September 18th 1920. Among the founders, there were his close associates like, Tevfik Rustu, Mahmut Esat, Yunus Nadi, Kilic Ali, Hakki Behic and Eyup Sabri. This group had also a leftist origin but separated the Anatolian communism from bolshevism. It defended a local socialist understanding which was again in close relationship with Islam. Mustafa Kemal's intention to have founded such a communist party was to disperse the Green Army and People's Group in the assembly. During the Çerkes Ethem rebellion, however, this party was also banned.⁴⁴

Towards the end of the 1920, all leftist initiatives and organizations were closed and suppressed by the nationalist leadership. However, despite all attempts, the nationalist leadership could not establish full control over the leftist group in the assembly. Furthermore, the publication of the official communist party, "Yeni Dünya" took a stance against the government and called the railway workers to strike

⁴³ Yerasimos, *Türk-Soviet*. 169-172.

⁴⁴ Tunçay, *Türkiye'de*. 92-94.

in order to hinder dispatching of troops against Çerkes Ethem forces. In all over the Anatolia, the leftist leaders, deputies, intellectuals and journalists were arrested.⁴⁵

The Turko-Soviet rapprochement process which shaped the ideological divisions and the formation of political sides within the nationalist movement in this early period, deeply affected the definition of sphere of legitimate politics in Turkey which would be transformed from generation to generation. The most remarkable consequence of this process was the exhaustion of the communist alternative, the elimination of the “Easterners” and the removing of all socialist and leftist political ideas and the projects from the sphere of legitimate politics. The Soviet’s pressures and support to the leftist groups fuelled anti-communist opposition both at the political and popular levels. Despite his intense efforts to persuade the other figures of the movement for cooperation with the Soviets, Mustafa Kemal himself believed that there was a concrete opposition between the communist ideology and their fundamental objective of full independence. He claimed that communism recognizes no limit, however, they accepted definite national frontiers to realize in the end. Moreover, the national struggle was relying on the whole nation, not on a particular class as in communist system. In this sense, he used the concepts of independence and popular sovereignty as the polar opposite of the class politics and the communist social order.⁴⁶ This idea became a pre-ordained principle for the Turkish political elite and it is still effective in Turkish politics.

The Soviet’s territorial demands in favor of Armenia further complicated this threat perception. The powerful clique within the nationalist elite decided that the

⁴⁵ Ibid. 104-105.

⁴⁶ Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 8-9.

leftist could not be their internal ally since they might involve in secret activities for a communist revolution with the support of the Soviet government. The possibility of such a revolution was obviously questionable. But the threat was perceived at such a degree that the nationalists identified the Armenian threat with the fear of communism and began to view them as a single but Greater threat against national security. The leftist intellectuals, journalists and politicians were accused as being foreign agents working against the government. Cooperation with the Soviets was a strategic necessity for Turkey but communism and leftist political currents would not be allowed since they would make Turkey more open to Soviet interference.

Consequently, the point is that, the way the relations with the Soviet Union developed in this period provided the background of a centrally defined political sphere as dominated by the state rather than the sphere of free political ideas and projects in Turkey. It was the first occasion through which the founders of the state specified one of the fundamental credentials of the state-centered public space, that is bolshevism or communism would not be allowed to be an alternative in Turkish politics. Therefore, the leftist political ideas and options were pushed out of the legitimate politics. In the subsequent periods, the democratic concepts like political participation, partisanship, political citizenship rights, the rights of individual against the state would all be affected from these pre-ordained limitations on politics of this early period.

According to Tuncay, concerning the political ideology of the Turkish nationalist elite during this period, the Kemalist nationalism was not a bourgeois movement but it had a strong desire to be a bourgeois- modernizing movement.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Tuncay, *Türkiye'de*. 225.

Therefore, communist alternative was unthinkable for the nationalists mainly because of this reason. The communist ideology did not have a real social base, but it had significant adherents within the nationalist elite and affected the movement to a large extent. Especially after the signing of the Sévres Treaty, Turkish nationalists were more interested in the communist alternative against the Western imperialism.

The point is that, as Tuncay underlined, during this period, although the nationalist elite searched for a popular-leftist political vision –as the coming part on the development of an idea of populism will analyze-, however, they also did not allow to genuine leftist movements to grow. The basic policy was to tolerate those leftist enterprises because of foreign policy considerations –maintaining Soviet military support- but not to allow them to get strength. Therefore, the Turkish government was in a position to stop Soviet interventions to Turkish national movement. How these concerns were reflected in the Moscow Treaty?

5.4.2. The Political Clauses of the Moscow and Kars Treaties

The Turko-Soviet rapprochement was a process of political and ideological interaction which extensively affected the “politics of drawing borders” of the new regime both in physical and ethical-ideological terms. In the end of these interactions, the Turkish government redefined its priorities and developed a high sensitivity with respect to the external attempts of intervention to its domestic order. In this respect, the resolutions of the treaty reflected the Turkish concerns to limit Soviet influence in Anatolia as much as possible. After the establishment of the bolshevik regimes in three Caucasian States, the Turkish government signed the Kars

Agreement with them which was the same with Moscow Treaty with slight differences. The Moscow Treaty certified that there was a new political order in Turkey which rested on the political integrity of the all racial (ethnic) peoples of Anatolia under the leadership of the Turkish nationalists. This was the most important political consequence of the Moscow Treaty for the new regime of Turkey.⁴⁸

In two significant issues, the Ankara government had the Soviet side to accept its priorities. First, the treaty cited that the self-determination right of every ethnic group (the word *kavim* was used in the Turkish copy) in Anatolia as a political principle in the introductory part of the treaty, not as a binding clause.⁴⁹ The opposite case would mean Turkey's approval of the "nationalities principle" which would provide the ground for separationism within the nationalist movement and therefore would result in a completely different political order in Turkey. In this way the Turkish nationalists made clear that the political unity among the ethnically and culturally different Muslim communities was the basis of their future political order.

Secondly, again in the introductory part, anti-imperialism was emphasized as the common ground for the cooperation between the two governments.⁵⁰ With this emphasis, the Turkish government meant that if both governments were against imperialism, then the Soviet government had to support Turkey in its struggle against imperialists' project of division. In these two points, the Turkish government

⁴⁸ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 32-33 and 42. See Appendix E.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 32.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

indicated its determination to maintain the territorial and political integrity of Anatolia under the leadership of Turkish nationalists as a new integration model.

The resolutions of the Moscow and Kars Treaties not only recognized the new political regime of Turkey, but also firmly emphasized on the sovereign authority and legitimacy of the new government.⁵¹ In the 4th article of the Moscow Treaty, the parties accepted the cooperative potential and closeness between the anti-imperialist struggles of the Eastern Nations and the struggle of the Russian workers for a new social order. However, they also recognized that these nations had the right to be governed by the regimes of their own choice.⁵² This article obviously aimed to put an end to the Soviet's pressures on the Turkish nationalist movement. It was implicitly stated that the Turkish national movement might not result in a communist social order, but the Soviet regime had to be respectful to the choice of Turkish people.

The article 8 – it was the 10th of the Kars Agreement- stated that, the parties would never accept the establishment of organizations and settlement of groups which were struggling to destroy the government of either side; or to establish a new government on the part of a territory of either side and would not allow to the groups and organizations which were waging war against the other side in their territories. Turkey and Russia would share equal mutual responsibility for the Caucasian Republics in this respect.⁵³ With this article, the Soviet Russia was trying to guarantee the non-involvement of the Ankara government to Turkist and anti-

⁵¹ Ibid.33., see also Appendix E.

⁵² Ibid. 34.

⁵³ Ibid.

communist activities in this region and to prevent reconciliation with the Entente in the short run.

With this article, similarly, Turkey aimed to end Soviet's support to specifically Unionist-leftist forces and organizations, to the communist-revolutionary activities in Anatolia. Concerning the first point, this article strengthened Mustafa Kemal's and his associates' positions with respect to alternative political organizations in the nationalist movement. During these years, there were many people within the Turkish nationalist movement who believed that the former Unionist commander Enver Pasha had also the Soviet's support and would take the control of the movement. With this article in the treaty, this possibility was also eliminated. More importantly, the article 8 of the Moscow Treaty and the article 10 of the Kars Treaty aimed to prevent the Soviet Russian and the Soviet Armenian support to the separationist activities of the Anatolian Armenians.

These resolutions were reflecting the sine qua non principles especially for the Turkish side concerning the new social-political order in Turkey. The Moscow Treaty was the first success of the nationalist government which declared its determinacy to establish a nation-state with a unitary conception of citizenship which would provide a single political identity for the members of all the communities living in the region.

5.4.3. The Idea of Popular Sovereignty and the Introduction of "Populism" in Turkish Politics

Apart from the counter-effects, the ideological-political interactions with the Soviets had a positive effect on the Turkish national movement. It was the

development of a popular-leftist political vision and an early version of populism (halkçılık) as a political principle.⁵⁴ The abstract concept of national sovereignty gained a more concrete meaning of “government resting on people” that is “popular sovereignty” parallel to the rising concern to fill the gap between the elite and the masses under the influence of socialist ideas. The rapprochement with the Soviet Russia created an anti-communist political outlook but on the other hand it facilitated to the development of first seeds of a social policy as a part of the national ideal. The constitutional discussions about occupational representation (mesleki temsil), the representation of the different segments of the society and social and economic improvement of the workers and the peasants were certainly influenced from the local socialist-leftist ideas which were inspired from the Soviet Revolution.⁵⁵ The early version of the principle of populism was formulated soon after the gathering of the assembly within the process of rapprochement with the Soviets.⁵⁶

Throughout the independence war, different political groups who struggled for power in Ankara formulated their ideas within different “populism programs” which was an indication of the influence of the leftist currents in domestic politics of the period. As a matter of fact, the prestige of the new Soviet government was very high, i.e., all these groups were under Soviets’ ideological influence, because of the Soviets’ successful anti-imperialist struggle.⁵⁷ However, each of them interpreted populism in different ways.

⁵⁴ Tunçay, *Türkiye’de*. 105.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 90.

⁵⁶ Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 28-29.

⁵⁷ İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan, “Türkiye’de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi.” [The Evolution of the Populist Ideology in Turkey] *Toplum ve Bilim*. 5-6(1978), 66.

First of all, it was the key word of the nationalist leaders to address to the different segments of the society, i.e., the local notables, religious leaders, peasants and the workers to unite around the national ideal. In this sense, it was an instrument to get the elite and the masses closer. Secondly, it was again the keyword of the internal ideological struggle of the nationalist leadership towards the other groups, mainly the leftist ex-Unionists who succeeded to enter the assembly and also against the Sultanate. The discourse of populism was vital especially to decrease the influence of the former who benefited much from the rapprochement with the Soviets. Finally, as the most important aspect, the use of populist discourse contributed the rapprochement with the Soviets since through populist ideas the nationalists established an ideological bridge between the two regimes.⁵⁸

The point was that the nationalists used populism as an ideological framework to seem closer to bolshevism without formally accepting bolshevik ideology and therefore to limit the Soviets ideological pressure. It was gained primacy both as a discourse and as a political program when the external and internal war was intensified and the Soviet military assistance became urgent.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the leftist groups –the Easterners- were preparing various populism programs in order to create in the assembly a pro-Soviet atmosphere. The common characteristics of these programs were their emphasis on genuine representation through a system of popular assemblies (halk şuraları) and popular courts (halk mahkemeleri) and on opposition to bureaucratic hegemony.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.68

Although none of these ideas accepted in the assembly, however, they shaped the understanding of populism in the first assembly to a large extent. Mustafa Kemal had to interpret populism as closer to these general themes about social policy. His “Program of Populism” (Teskilat-i Esasiye Kanunu Layihası) which was declared in the assembly on 13 September 1920 emphasized firmly on anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism.⁶¹ The anti-capitalist aspect was gained primacy in the framework of rapprochement with the Soviets. However, the nationalist leadership was careful to use mostly anti-imperialism as the locus of populism. The Program of Populism was also an instrument to limit the leftist influence in the assembly. The idea of occupational representation –although was not accepted- found greater hearing which was an indication of the general anti-bureaucratic atmosphere in the assembly. Therefore, the first version of the principle of populism had a meaning to refer to genuine representation –something like direct democracy- and the supremacy of the elected against the bureaucracy.⁶²

In the spring 1921, a new revival took place in Anatolian leftism in the period between Dumlupınar and Sakarya Wars. This was also a period in which the relations with the Soviet Union were very positive. Once again the Ankara government was in a position to tolerate the leftist revival because of foreign policy reasons.⁶³ However, the nationalist elite did not worry this time to be labeled as bolshevik by the Western governments since the terms of the cooperation with the Soviets were made clear in the Moscow Treaty.

⁶¹ Ibid. 69.

⁶² Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*[Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), 145.

⁶³ Tunçay, *Türkiye’de*. 105-107.

The point was that in this period, the term “people” (halk) was defined and used in a very different manner from the early 1920. It meant neither the masses against the elite nor the anti-bureaucratic political disposition. Rather, it was defined on the basis of class difference, i.e., to refer the proletariat. For tactical reasons, there emerged a very radical interpretation of populism although the application was totally rested on Mustafa Kemal’s program.⁶⁴ However, towards the end of the war, the concept lost its leftist tenants. The changing balance of the internal-external forces on which the nationalists were rested obviously affected these different dispositions. The government now needed neither the Soviet assistance nor the support of the masses. Accordingly, popular sovereignty began to reverse to be an abstract concept again and came closer to the initial understanding of “national” sovereignty, i.e., it lost its meaning of people’s rule. It was used mainly as a discursive instrument not as a concrete alternative proposal for a new regime and a new mode of integration.

As the basic features of the new regime emerged more clearly, the principle of populism was reinterpreted as well. During the Lausanne process, all the leftist connotations were removed from the concepts of populism and popular sovereignty within the framework of rapprochement with the West. It lost the anti-bureaucratic meaning completely and was used to refer the “classless” feature of the Turkish society.⁶⁵

Concerning the citizenship identity that were being formulated in this early period, the discussion about the Kemalists’ conceptions of populism and popular

⁶⁴ Tekeli and Şaylan, “Halkçılık,” 71.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 73-75.

sovereignty was important in order to view the development of the idea of citizenship participation and the balance between the citizenship rights and obligations. The leftist influence on the formulation of various programs of populism provided a more participatory tenant through the emphasis on “government resting on people”. As a matter of fact, popular participation was presented as one of the most important principles since the beginning of the national struggle. It was not just rhetoric but the strongest basis of the nationalist political stance against the elitist-bureaucratic position of the monarchy. The nationalist leadership genuinely activated the principle of mass participation and the unification of the masses around the national cause especially after the Sévres Treaty and in the process of rapprochement with the Soviets. Popular sovereignty had replaced the abstract notion of national sovereignty in the process within the framework of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination.⁶⁶

However, although the principle of popular participation of the national struggle period had a democratic potential, it was not based on an explicit “discourse of the rights” as the framework of action. This model of national identity was the one which was described by the dominance of the popular participation rather than civil and political rights; populist organizational patterns more than democratic parties and intervention by the people’s nation-state rather than protection of the minorities and individuals from state intervention.⁶⁷ The 1921 and 1924 constitutions brought the concepts of the supremacy of the parliament above other governmental forces, legality and constitutionality but they were not rested on a philosophy of “the rights

⁶⁶ Köker, *Modernleşme*. 164-167.

⁶⁷ Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 131.

of the individual against the state". Therefore, individual rights did never become a part of the principles of populism and popular sovereignty. The absence of a discourse of rights in the formulation of the democratic conceptions of participation reflected to the absence of a particular regulation about citizenship rights in the super-structural legal reformations.⁶⁸ In the following periods, accordingly, neither the infrastructural nor the super-structural reforms provided the basis for the development of a conception of citizenship identity prioritizing rights over obligations. In this sense, the early formulation of the principle of populism -despite the short-term leftist influence- provided the background of the formulation of Turkish citizenship emphasizing on duties towards the state rather than rights against the state.

As for the ideological framework of these conceptions, the point is that the political ideology of the nationalist movement was closer to Western liberal-democratic ideal which was rested on the bourgeoisie rather than the mass participation. Although the Kemalists could not establish a united front with the bourgeoisie, there was nonetheless a strong desire to transform the movement to a bourgeois-democratic movement.⁶⁹ In the coming periods, especially during the Lausanne process, the nationalist leadership more openly patronized the bourgeoisie to prove its determination for modernization to the Western governments at a cost of reducing popular sovereignty to mere existence of the assembly and the elections.

⁶⁸ Köker, *Modernleşme*. 138-139.

⁶⁹ Tunçay, *Türkiye'de*. 224.

CHAPTER VI

THE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND STEPS TOWARDS A NEW NATION-STATE

6.1. London Conference as the External Dynamic of the Regime Change

As the above parts have emphasized, during the period between 1919-23, the origins of some defining or “boundary producing” political discourses on territorial integrity, political unity, national security, minority rights, ethnicity, and national identity were crystallized mainly in and through the foreign policy acts and the decisions of the new Turkish government. These acts and decisions –apart from solving the foreign policy problems of the new regime- also answered the questions of “who would remain inside/ who would be left outside”; “who is the member/ who is not”; “which ideas, values or projects would be allowed within the new political space in a way as to draw also the ethical boundaries of inside/outside/ and which are not”. In this respect, they were integral to the formation of a new, modern national citizenship conception in Turkey.

Within this framework, the London Conference of 21 February- 12 March 1921 had a particular significance as an event which fuelled and particularly shaped domestic debates about the character of the new regime. The conference was gathered as a result of a series of military and diplomatic successes of the

nationalists, i.e., the solution of the Armenian problem, the retreat of the French forces in Cilicia, the defeat of the internal revolts and the success against the Greeks in the Western Anatolia. The position of the nationalist government was strengthened to the extent that the British government wanted to solve the “Eastern Question” by making some amendments in the Sévres Treaty.¹

The question of “Who will represent Turkey in the conference?” gave the nationalist leadership the opportunity to solve the issue of governmental duality that is the position of the Grand National Assembly government against the Sultanate and the Istanbul government. The conference gathered on February 21st 1921 to which a delegation from Ankara was also officially invited which meant the international recognition of the nationalist government as the representative of the Turkish people for the first time. The conference could not reach to an agreement about any of the issues of its agenda but provided the development of relations with the Western governments on an official ground.²

As an event, from beginning to the end, the London Conference gave way to intensive political debates in the national assembly which facilitated to the maturation of the ideas about possible territorial sacrifices –another modification in the National Pact-, about the cultural boundaries of the envisaged political community and the future political regime of the country, i.e., altogether about the politics of citizenship before the Lausanne Conference to a large extent.

1. Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923* (London: Sage, 1975), 93-94; Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtulus Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt: I* [Turkish Foreign Policy: From Independence War Until Today, Facts, Documents and Interpretations] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2001), 143-144.

² During the conference, Turkish Foreign Minister signed separate secret agreements with British, French and the Italian delegations which provided armistice in return for extensive economic privileges. These agreements caused strong reactions in Ankara and all were rejected. However, they made the terms of the future peace more apparent for both sides, see Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*. 147-149 and 152-153.

6.1.1. Territorial Boundaries of the “Community Inside” as Defended in the London Conference

Before the London Conference, the territorial concerns of the national elite became much more definite with the drawing of the eastern border in Gümrü Treaty. Moreover, as cited in the above part on the Sévres Treaty, the nationalists became much more realistic in their territorial concerns and limited themselves definitely with the Anatolian peninsula as demarcated mainly by the armistice line. Therefore, during the London Conference the Turkish delegation defended these borders officially as their “irreducible national territories” and proposed a radical change in the territorial regulations of the Sévres Treaty. Specifically, they defended the unity of Anatolia and definitely rejected an Armenian homeland or Kurdish autonomy within national boundaries. They demanded the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over all occupied territories which had predominant Turkish population including Cilicia, Southeastern Anatolia, İzmir province; the definition of the frontier in Thrace as the 1913 borders; the security of Istanbul with an internationally defined freedom of passage from the straits.³

The Allies however, proposed minor changes in the Sévres Treaty which were basically related with the administration of the occupied territories. The project of Armenian State remained intact but there were some signs that the project of Kurdish autonomy might be abandoned. The fundamental disagreement was on the question of İzmir province where the Greek government claimed that there was a

³ Stanford Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, Vol:3, 1918-1923, A Documentary Study* (Ankara: TTK, 2000), 1228-1230.

Greek majority. This issue halted the negotiations and it became clear that it could not be solved by peaceful means.⁴

During the negotiations, the strong Allied support to Greek claims about İzmir province and the Thrace region compelled the Turkish delegation. Until that time, in several open meetings and in secret negotiations, the nationalist leadership emphasized on the “Turkishness” of the Thrace and İzmir with the argument that population statistics certainly proved that Muslims were the majority in both regions. However, the Greek delegation found great support to their own population statistics especially about Western Thrace, which was lost in the Balkan Wars.⁵ In the face of these pressures, from this point onwards, although the Turkish delegation did not abandon its official proposal for a plebiscite in the region, it became clear that the addition of Western Thrace to the national territories would be possible only through military means.

The nationalist government realized that İzmir province and the Eastern Thrace both of which were certainly populated by Turkish-Muslim majority were much more important for themselves. The London negotiations became the point after which the nationalist government decided to mobilize its military capabilities for mainly İzmir and Eastern Thrace. Since the Greek government had full support from the Allies in case of Western Thrace, the Turkish arguments focused much more on İzmir province (İzmir city and the surrounding towns and villages) and the Eastern Thrace.

As a result, after the London Conference of February 1921, in the face of intense Greek claims about İzmir and Eastern Thrace, the nationalist leadership

⁴ Ibid., 1225-1227.

⁵ Ibid.

began to think that Western Thrace and its population might be left outside. The National Pact had proposed plebiscite for the Western Thrace with the hope that the people of the region would totally opt for Turkish rule. However, there was no reliable population statistics about the region. In some villages Muslims were at majority, in some others which were very close to them had Greek-Orthodox majority. Therefore, to define the borders in the region in accordance with the population ratios was almost impossible.⁶ On the other hand, from the political and military point of views, Turkish position was very weak. Western Thrace was lost during the Balkan Wars therefore before the world war. It would be very difficult for the national armies to conduct war in this region where considerable Allied forces were stationed.

Therefore, after the London negotiations, the territorial borders of the National Pact were once more modified so as to obtain more defensible borders and a more homogenous political community inside. The decision not to wage war in Thrace with the British and to sign Mudanya Armistice on October 11th 1922 as to include only the Eastern Thrace were the indications of this modification. Furthermore, during the Lausanne Conference, although the official negotiations were carried on the premises of the National Pact by the Turkish delegation, the issue of Western Thrace did not become a problem which interrupted the negotiations like other conflictual territorial issues of Musul and Hatay.⁷

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Bilal Şimşir, "Lozan ve Çağdaş Türkiye'nin Doğuşu [Lausanne and the Birth of Modern Turkey] in 70. Yılında Lozan Barış Andlaşması, *Uluslararası Seminer* [The Lausanne Peace Treaty in Its 70th Anniversary, International Seminar](Ankara: İnönü Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 27.

6.1.2. London Conference as a Step Towards a “National” Political Community

During the London Conference, the Turkish delegation defended the borders of the National Pact which cited that the territories where the Ottoman-Muslims were the majority should belong to Turkey. This was the official approach from the very beginning. However, as cited in the above parts, throughout the national struggle period, the nationalists’ conception of “community inside” were gradually transformed from an exclusively “religious-based” community to a “cultural-national” community which was formulated under a new, comprehending national identity – again with a strong religious component - which was “Turkishness”.

In this respect, London Conference was a turning point, since for the first time, Turkish nationalists entered in a position to define the boundaries of the “community inside” not solely on the basis of religion towards the outside world. Their fundamental point was that the political unity of the Muslim elements was a categorical imperative since they historically constituted an organic cultural totality. The different Muslim elements of Anatolia were bound each other by a common religion, history, culture and traditions to the extent that they formed an indivisible whole. One step further of this conceptualization was the legitimization of the supreme position of the Turkishness as an all-encompassing identity which was supposed to represent this organic totality. The London Conference became the historical moment at which this stage of national identity formation was began to be crystallized.

Therefore, throughout the national struggle period, the Turkish nationalist elite developed a new conception of national identity which would transcend all other ethnic and religious-sectional identities within the new borders. In other words, in the process, a civic-territorial conception of national identity which emphasized on

territoriality and *political unity* was developing in the minds of the founders of the republic. During the London Conference, there were two instances in which the Turkish delegation felt the compulsion that they had to define their national identity on a basis other than religion. The first one was related with the Eastern Thrace and the second was about the Kurdish question.

Concerning the first issue, during the discussion about the majority ratios in Eastern Thrace, the Turkish delegation for the first time had to underline the racial (ethnic) origin of their envisaged “community inside” as that of Turkish origin.

Against the Greek claims, Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey argued that the population of the Eastern Thrace was predominantly of “Turkish race and Mohammedan religion”.⁸ This was not just a coincidental expression of their social vision. At the beginning of the conference, Bekir Sami Bey specifically underlined that at a time when many people around the world were being formed into independent states according to principles of “nationality” and “self-determination”, the Sévres was unacceptable since it left no place for political independence for *Turkish people*.⁹ In this way, for the first time in London Conference, the Turkish delegation spoke on behalf of an “original, compact national identity” which was closer to the Western conception of nation but still defined on the basis of an ambiguous religious-national criteria. This new conception of national identity was primarily used to encounter the Greek national identity in the region, i.e., one national identity against the other.

Despite its problematic and uncertain character, there was the first sign of the definition of Turkish national identity basically as a supreme cultural-political

⁸ Shaw, *From Empire*. 1227.

⁹ Ibid.

identity with the help of a more comprehensive religious identity. The religious dimension was not left out at this stage. Nevertheless, the nationalists' formulation of national identity came closer to Western type of civic-territorial membership instead of Ottoman imperial conception of membership. The point is that "Turkishness" was put forward not as an exclusionary ethnic identity but as an inclusionary cultural identity.

The second instance took place during the discussions about the Kurdish autonomy. In their proposal about minority rights, the Turkish delegation argued that the protection of racial, religious, and linguistic minorities would be assured according to same dispositions as those incorporated in the Treaties of Saint Germain, Neuilly and Trianon.¹⁰ Although they seemed to accept the criterion of race (meaning ethnicity in this period) in the definition of the minorities in Turkey, they certainly referred the Armenian people as a racial minority. Concerning the Kurdish people, the Turkish delegation insisted that Turks and Kurds were inseparable communities living together for centuries. Therefore, there was no problem as Kurdish question in Turkey. The Turks also represented the interests and demands of the Kurds in the international field.

The Turkish delegation firmly defended this argument against the idea of Kurdish autonomy or minority rights for the Kurdish people, since a short time ago, the official Turkish view was formulated in this way in the National Assembly.¹¹ The reason behind the argument of "political unity of the Kurdish and Turkish peoples" was rested on the idea that they were the same communities, not separate peoples. The official thesis of "sameness" was used for the first time after the Sévres decision

¹⁰ Ibid., 1230.

¹¹ Mahmut Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyete Doğru* [Towards the Republic] (Ankara: Bateş, 1971), 108-110.

about Kurdish autonomy. Before the London Conference, however, it was systemized and supported with “scientific” explanations proving that the Kurds were from another historical branch of the central Asian Turks, therefore they were from the same origin. There was not in fact a separate Kurdish ethnicity as different from Turkish origin. The Kurdish deputies of the assembly approved this official thesis since they believed that the only way to prevent the establishment of Armenian homeland in Eastern Anatolia was their cooperation with the Turkish nationalists.

Therefore, it was before the London Conference that the official thesis of the “sameness” of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples was formulated systematically which aimed to render Kurdish demands for political autonomy obsolete. In this respect, the roots of the “denial politics” which was rested on the idea of “sameness” between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples can be found in this specific historical moment of Turkish political history. This policy left no room to the demands for the recognition of the Kurdish identity as a separate political identity and for equal political participation. The value of Kurdish-Turkish political cooperation which was strongly emphasized by the nationalist leadership at the beginning declined in the eyes of the Turkish nationalists.¹²

The use of the words “Turks” and “Turkish majority” instead of Ottoman-Muslim majority was not an accident, but a deliberate attempt of the nationalist leaders to negate other identity claims in Anatolia during the London Conference. The rejection of Kurdish political identity with the claim that “the Kurds were indeed Turks” became the strongest premise of the future citizenship identity as a supra-identity covering all other identity claims within a delimited territory. In this way, the

¹² Some of the Kurdish leaders supported the Turkish thesis by sending telegrams to Allied governments and emphasized that TGNA was also representing the interests of the Kurds, see Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 108-110.

internal national closure that is the assimilation-eradication of particularistic identities under a single hegemonic identity began in this early period in Turkey. In other words, the building of a homogenous cultural (national) community which in fact did not exist in reality began in this period at least at the discursive level.

Interestingly, the Turkish delegation accepted the minority clauses of the international treaties which cited race, religion and language as the criteria of being a minority during the conference. On the other hand, however, they firmly rejected the statements about “racial rights” in the draft documents to prevent Kurdish claims. In the same way, after the conference, the Turkish National Assembly rejected the secret agreement signed with France since it included a clause about the recognition of racial political rights for minorities. But in this case, they rejected racial rights to prevent Armenian claims. Mustafa Kemal himself claimed that separate political rights for Armenians were unacceptable.¹³ This duality concerning the people addressed as a racial minority obviously provided Turkish nationalists a room for maneuver, since they sometimes rejected them by thinking the Armenians and some other times by thinking the Kurds as racial minorities. This ambiguity continued until the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

6.1.3. London Conference and the Political Boundaries of the “Community Inside”

From the political point of view, the London Conference had a particular significance since for the first time the Allied governments recognized the GNA (Grand National Assembly) government as the sole representative of the Turkish people. This was not only a de facto recognition since before the conference, because of the need to provide a de jure status to the Turkish delegation, the national

¹³ Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy*. 103.

assembly accepted a short document -Teşkilat-ı Esasiye- as the constitution of the new government.

The Law of Teşkilat-ı Esasiye was accepted on 20 January 1921 as the 85th law of the assembly but in fact it was the first material step towards the establishment of a new state. It was the preliminary attempt of the nationalist leadership to completely transform the basis of political legitimacy and of the individual and collective political identity. In this respect, the discussions before and after the promulgation of the constitution had significant effects on the political developments and the emerging conceptions of popular sovereignty, participation, people's rule, and legitimacy to a large extent. The point is that the need to provide a constitutional identity to the new government in the international field contributed to the passing of such a revolutionary decision without much discussion and in this sense it was an externally directed transformation which might not be managed through the internal dynamics of the country.¹⁴ Despite the fact that the principle of national sovereignty was continuously emphasized since the beginning of the national struggle and it gained a more concrete meaning of "people's rule" in the process, it was not fully embraced by most of the members of the assembly. This paradox reflected to the first constitution of the new government in the form of an absence of a "philosophy of rights" or lack of a "democratic-participatory" spirit despite the fact that it represented the passage to republican rule technically. As a result the Teşkilat-ı Esasiye regulated mainly the functioning of the basic governmental organs without

¹⁴ Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 99.

making any reference to public rights and/or individual citizenship rights and the position of the individual against the state.¹⁵

6.1.3.1. Towards a New Regime

The new constitution was mainly the result of the need to provide a legal-institutional framework to the new government in the London Conference rather than an internal search for an alternative regime based on citizens' participation and popular rule. Before the conference, most of the deputies were thinking that the Ankara government was a temporary and an extra ordinary wartime government. There was no need for a new constitution other than Kanun-i Esasi.¹⁶ However, the government was refraining from making any reference to Kanun-i Esasi since it was identified with the Ottoman government. By not recognizing Kanun-i Esasi as the valid constitution, the nationalist government aimed to prove the political, ideological and legal break up from the old regime.¹⁷

The London Conference gave the nationalist leadership the opportunity to persuade the assembly to pass a new constitution which would legitimize the position of the nationalist government as the sole representative of the Turkish people in the international field. In the assembly, the Easterners were in favor of the removal of the Sultanate and the establishment of a new regime based on "popular sovereignty" while the Westerners were in favor of the protection of the Sultanate and an

¹⁵ For the text of the constitution, see Suna Kili and Şeref A. Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri* [The Texts of the Turkish Constitutions] (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2000), 100-102.

¹⁶ Gologlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 95.

¹⁷ Rıdvan Akın, *TBMM Devleti (1920-1923)*[The State of TGNA: 1920-1923] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 197-199.

immediate peace with the Allies.¹⁸ Mustafa Kemal, however, used the problem of legal representation in the London Conference as a pretext to end the constitutional sovereignty of the Sultan and could preserve his impartiality in the face of the political differentiation within the national assembly.¹⁹

However, the leftist influence in the constitution was clear. The first article of *Teskilat-i Esasiye* stated that “Sovereignty unquestionably and unconditionally belongs to the people” and the government is based on the principle that the people *de facto* and directly rule the country. This was a revolutionary change since for the first time in Turkish history, with this law, sovereignty was passed to the people which was represented perfectly by the national assembly.²⁰

Therefore, it was a definite regime change, the end of monarchical rule and the beginning of a republican order with an emphasis on citizens’ sovereignty. By not mentioning about the powers and the position of the Sultan-Caliph, the constitution implicitly removed the personal rule.²¹ Several changes were made immediately in bureaucracy and administrative field after the promulgation of the constitution. One interesting change was the replacement of the phrase of “The Government of High Majesties of the Ottoman Empire” by “The Government of Turkish Grand National Assembly” in the passports.²² From then on, the Ottoman citizens were the citizens of a new Turkish State.

¹⁸ Gologlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 159.

¹⁹ Akin, *TBMM*. 198.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 206.

²¹ Ergun Özbudun, *1921 Anayasası* [1921 Constitution] (Ankara: AKDTK Yayınları, 1992), 24-26 cited in *Ibid.*

²² Gologlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 253.

In this way, such a great revolutionary transformation towards the republican regime and to republican mode of integration was realized under the pressure of external conditions. The promulgation of the new constitution in order to fulfill the conditions of participation to the conference became the first example of “ forced reformation under the pressures of Western governments” as a general pattern of relations between Europe and the new Turkish State. In the following periods, especially after Lausanne, the Turkish governments would continue to do even the most necessary reforms only when they were squeezed by such international pressures. However, the “externally directed” nature of this transformation became also the source of the severe problems that affected the development of democracy and democratic institutions in Turkey until today.

6.1.3.2. The Pro-Sultanate Opposition and the Defects of the Idea of Popular Sovereignty

The promulgation of the constitution was followed by the revitalization of the pro-Sultanate tendencies in the national assembly. Although it was more or less obvious that there would be a regime change –it was done indeed-, loyalty to Sultan-Caliph and the imperial ambition were very powerful.²³ The most important reason behind this pro-Sultanate atmosphere was the opposition to the idea of popular sovereignty which was identified with communism and the leftist circles of the assembly. In this way, the London Conference also fuelled the debates about the meaning of popular sovereignty.²⁴

²³ Ibid., 95.

²⁴ Ibid., 159.

The conservative circles were basically opposing to the origin of Teşkilat-ı Esasiye, the Program of Populism. It was prepared beforehand by Mustafa Kemal and submitted to the parliament by the Council of Ministers in September 1920.²⁵ The background of the program was very interesting. The first “Program of Populism” was prepared by the leftist “People’s Group” (Halk Zümresi) and was published in the Yeni Dünya newspaper in Eskişehir which became the center of communist movements after the group’s expulsion from Ankara in spring 1920.²⁶ The expression of “the unconditional belonging of sovereignty to the people” and the principle of “direct rule” were first cited in this program and were inspired by Mustafa Kemal to a large extent. According to Tuncay, Mustafa Kemal wanted to remove the leftist influences within the assembly by showing the government as the real owner of these ideas.²⁷

Because of this connection with the leftist circles, the conservative opposition identified popular sovereignty and populism with communism. The abolition of Sultanate and the establishment of a new republican regime on the basis popular sovereignty were viewed as steps towards a bolshevik regime. The rumors that the nationalists wanted to establish a communist order or at least a republican regime found some hearing at the popular level as well. Especially in the eastern provinces which were living under Soviet-Armenian threat, anti-communist and anti-constitution public reactions took place. Mustafa Kemal personally guaranteed that the acceptance of the constitution did not mean the establishment of a republican

²⁵ Akın, *TBMM*. 205.

²⁶ The Yeni Dünya newspaper was the publication of Yesil Ordu Association which was closed down after the Cerkez Ethem Rebellion, see Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925)* [The Leftist Currents in Turkey] (İstanbul: BDS Yayınları, 1991).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 90.

regime and they did not have such an intention.²⁸ The hard discussions in the national assembly ended with the removal of the expression of “popular government” (halk hükümeti) from the draft proposal.²⁹

Therefore, the way that the ideas of populism and popular sovereignty -which would be the basis of modern republican citizenship- entered into Turkish political life was very problematical. The political differentiation gained momentum around the issues of popular sovereignty and of the character of the regime. From the very beginning populism was presented as the principle with which the government of the national assembly was defined itself. However, there were several groups in the parliament that interpreted populism in different ways.³⁰

The first group defined the national war as a revolt against capitalism and the bourgeoisie which was extensively under the influence of Soviet Bolshevism. The second was constituted from those who defended solidarist corporatism (Tesanütçülük) as the basis of a new political order. Finally, the third group interpreted populism as a regime which should rest on workers and peasants.³¹ As a common point, however, the leftist influence which was culminated in the process of rapprochement with the Soviets was obvious in all of these three understandings. It was this common point that alienated the conservative circles from the idea of popular sovereignty. On the other hand, the Teskilat-i Esasiye was thought as a barrier against the leftist insertions by the nationalist leaders. These policies drew the

²⁸ Gologlu, *Cumhuriyete*. 159.

²⁹ Akın, *TBMM*. 207-208.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 207.

³¹ *Ibid.*

boundaries of the leftist trends in domestic politics during the national struggle period.³²

Therefore, in the first two articles of the constitution, popular sovereignty and the principle of unity of governmental powers (*kuvvetler birliği*) were cited as the fundamental principles of the new political order with no reference to the position of the Sultan-Caliph.³³ From a legal-constitutional point of view, the position of the Sultanate was unclear but this issue was passed over with the covered consensus of the opposition and the government. It was in fact *de facto* declaration of the end of the monarchical order. However, because of the anti-communist opposition, the name of the new regime was not expressed openly.

Nevertheless, the emphasis on popular sovereignty in the constitution can be viewed as a passage from the abstract idea of national sovereignty to popular sovereignty in Turkish national movement. The political-ideological interactions with the Soviet government had provided a leftist tone to the concept of national sovereignty and turned it to a domestic principle of government. It was no more an abstract concept which was used as an external principle directed mainly against foreign invasion and imperialism. With the acceptance of *Teskilat-i Esasiye*, it became a *de jure* principle of domestic political order. From then on there was constitutional principle of “people’s rule” as an alternative to monarchical rule in Turkish political life.

However, there was neither an explicit statement about public rights nor an implicit philosophy of rights in the spirit of the constitution which accompanied to

³² Ibid.

³³ Kili and Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa*. 100.

the new conception of popular sovereignty.³⁴ In other words, the constitution did not entitle individual citizens in terms of their participation to the government. This was the reflection of the opposition and/or the ambiguity about the idea of “people’s rule” which affected the general character of the constitution. It remained as a short document mainly regulating the functioning of the governmental organs and the basic principles of the new regime. There was not any article about individual rights and liberties. There was not any “philosophy of rights” either in the text or in the spirit of the document. On the contrary, the conservative opposition succeeded to remove the phrase of “people’s rule” from the text. In return, the nationalist leadership persuaded the assembly that there should not have been any mention about Sultanate or Caliphate in the new constitution since the Allies could use it as the proof of their dependency to the Istanbul government. In order to be counted as a totally new political entity, the nationalist government should base its legitimacy on the people itself not on the Sultanate. In this way, the London Conference became the legitimate reason of the nationalist leadership to remove this conflictual situation.

Therefore, without formally abolishing the Sultanate, the nationalist leadership established a new regime which rested on popular sovereignty. As Tunaya characterized remarkably, the years between 1918-1922 was marked by the co-existence of two mutually exclusive political stances. On the one hand there were efforts to settle the idea of popular sovereignty and the supremacy of the national assembly and to establish a new political order in accordance with this principle. On the other hand, there were strong ideas of saving the Sultan-Caliph and restoring of

³⁴ Akin, *TBMM*. 199.

the monarchical order.³⁵ Nevertheless, the acceptance of Teşkilat-i Esasiye before the conference as the legal framework of the new government and the transformation of the idea of popular sovereignty from a principle which was directed to the external world to the one which represented the passing of sovereignty to the people were certainly the steps towards a new republican order and to a modern participatory citizenship understanding.

6.2. The Ankara Agreement and the Politics of Closure in the South

Throughout the national struggle, the process of ideological-political interaction with foreign states contributed to the formation of a new, distinct political personality which aimed to separate itself from the Ottoman political-ideological framework. This initiative of separation from the imperial heritage can be interpreted as the proof of a project of nation state. According to Smith, the objective of nation state has been swifter where the dominant lateral ethnic and its rulers have been able to divest themselves of their imperial heritage usually by redrawing the borders.³⁶ The point is that the process of self-definition and redrawing of borders has both internal and external aspects in Turkish case. The claim of “newness” in the international field shaped the internal debates about the character of the new regime, national identity, the new state ideology, the boundaries of the legitimate politics, overall the nature of the new political identity of the state and of its citizens. Therefore, each foreign policy action and decision of the new government was also a step towards an internal construction.

³⁵ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Gelişmeler (1876-1938)* [The Political Developments in Turkey: 1876-1938](İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002), 4.

³⁶ Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 102.

The Ankara Agreement which was signed on 20 October 1921 between the Ankara government and France was another stage of the parallel processes of internal construction and international recognition. For the Turkish side, the importance of the treaty was that it was the first de jure recognition of the new government by a Western power. To reach an agreement with a Western government was vital for the nationalists since in this way the Allied unity would be broken up.³⁷ With the signing of the Ankara Agreement, the new government put forward the terms of the peace with the West and at the same time, the new regime approached to the Western alternative one step further concerning its new domestic political order.

6.2.1. Territorial Closure in the South

The Ankara Treaty was signed after the London Conference during which the nationalist government understood that the Greek claims about Western Thrace and İzmir province could only be removed with a military operation. Therefore, the settlement of southern border gained urgency in order to intensify the military forces in the west. The need to make an armistice in the south forced the Ankara government to take a conciliationist attitude.

The article 8 of the treaty drew the Turkish-Syrian border.³⁸ It pushed the line that proposed in the Sévres forward in favor of Turkey and provided some economic and military advantages beyond that line. However, the İskenderun Sanjak as a whole, including Hatay city which were within the borders of the National Pact were left to French control therefore to Syria. Although the article 7 regulated the special

³⁷ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 151.

³⁸ İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları I. Cilt(1920-1945)* [The Political Treaties of Turkey, Vol.I, (1920-1945)] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 51. See, Appendix F for the related articles of the Ankara Agreement in Turkish in the end of the dissertation.

status of the Hatay city with some regulations in favor of the Turkish inhabitants of the city, nevertheless, it remained out of the borders.³⁹ In this respect, the Ankara Agreement was the last step of the process that the territorial meaning of the National Pact was reduced to the territorial integrity of Anatolia. The pact became a superficial document of national will and political unity having no concrete territorial objectives.

Therefore, during the signing of the Ankara Agreement, the nationalists continued their policy of political expediency and realism in drawing also the southern border. There were no strict and clear religious, national or ethnic criteria applied in the territorial closure in the south. As a matter of fact, the southern border was less national than the northeastern one. It divided a population which was predominantly Arab speaking with Turkish and Kurdish speaking minorities in either side.⁴⁰ Its advantages were economic and strategic because of the track of the Baghdad railway.

Nevertheless, the Ankara Agreement was another step that facilitated the abandonment of the imperial-territorial vision and to the formulation of “national” imperatives as a framework of inclusion/exclusion by the nationalist elite. The İskenderun Sanjak and the Hatay city where there was a complex population structure including Arabs as majority with Kurdish and Turkish minorities were left outside. Although the primary aim was to have an armistice as soon as possible with the French government, the leaving up of that region might be interpreted as the

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Eric Z. Zürcher, “The Borders of the Republic Reconsidered” in *Bilanço 1923-1998: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75 Yılına Toplu Bakış Uluslararası Kongresi, I. Cilt: Siyaset, Kültür, Uluslararası İlişkiler* [Balance Sheet 1923-1998: An Overview to the 75 Years of the Turkish Republic, International Congress, Vol.I: Politics, Culture and International Relations](İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998), 55-56.

intention of the nationalist leaders not to be insistent on the multi-cultural regions.⁴¹ In return for armistice and some economic and military advantages, the region was left outside and this border was confirmed at Lausanne Treaty.

6.2.2. National Closure and the Early Premises of National Citizenship in the South

As in the previous parts on national closure, this part will also analyze the terms of the national closure in the south as reflected in the Ankara Agreement by looking at two points: The first one is the applied criteria according to which the physical borders of the community inside, i.e., the criteria separating the member-citizens from foreigners were drawn in the agreement. The second is the nature of the minority rights which are confirmed in the agreement as the indicator of the terms of the internal national closure.

The article 8 of the agreement drew the Turkish-Syrian frontier with economic and strategic considerations rather than applying some kind of nationality principle. It divided the mostly Arab speaking population of the region by leaving Turkish and Kurdish minorities in each side.⁴² However, two articles of the agreement provided the first signs of the future assimilationist policies which aimed to establish “Turkishness” as the prevailing cultural identity in the region. The first one was the regulation of the special status of the Hatay city. The article 7 stated that Turkish would become the official language and the people of the region who were of Turkish “ethnic” origin would benefit from special facilities to develop their culture.⁴³ In this way, the new regime specified the ethnic origin of its citizens

⁴¹ Shaw, *From Empire*. Vol.IV.1963.

⁴² Zürcher, “The Borders,”1963.

⁴³ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 51, see Appendix F.

abroad which also informed about their vision of “proper citizens inside”. Moreover, the emphasis on the official status of Turkish language by ignoring the Arab-Kurdish peoples of the region meant that the nationalist elite had the intention of assimilating these ethnic, cultural and religious communities of the region within a hegemonic Turkish identity. Another indication of this future policy of assimilation was the Turkish proposal for the employment of the ethnic Turkish (Türk soyundan) public servants in the public offices in the region.⁴⁴

Therefore, the Ankara government’s determination to make Turkish identity as the dominant cultural identity in the region -despite the fact that it was left outside the borders- indicated that the new government had specific concerns about the future social-political order. First, it was thought that despite its complex population structure, this region might be added to the national territories in the future since it was within the borders of the National Pact. Secondly, the proposal of special administration perfectly informed about the nature of the internal national closure which would be conducted within the borders in the future. Turkish national citizenship as the transcending identity for the individual citizen would be constructed around a core ethnicity as the basis of a supra-national identity that would eradicate other cultural, religious and ethnic identities within the new borders. In this way, the regulations of the Ankara Agreement provided a micro example of the future politics of national citizenship which would be applied all around the country. At this stage, the religious component was marginalized and lost its primary status as the marker of new national citizenship identity.

The second indicator of the terms of the national closure of Turkish citizenship as reflected in the Ankara Agreement was the regulation about the

⁴⁴ Ibid., 56.

minority rights. The article 6 of the Ankara Agreement confirmed the minority rights as cited in the National Pact.⁴⁵ The Ankara government accepted to recognize the minority rights as accepted in the recent international treaties by the Western governments, their associates and their adversaries. This meant the new government recognized the internationally accepted criterias of ethnicity, religion and language to define a particular group as a minority. In this sense after the National Pact, the Ankara agreement was the second international act of the new regime which recognized the rights of its citizens belonging to ethnic minorities. However, this was not the real policy of the Turkish nationalists about minorities. As a matter of fact, the ambiguity concerning the definition of minority was maintained on purpose. The new regime did not want to have a conflict with the Western governments because of this reason in this early stage. During the Lausanne Conference, however, the most intense debates occurred on the issue of the ethnic minorities and the Turkish delegation firmly rejected the idea that there were ethnic, linguistic or religious-sectional (*mezhepsel*) minorities in Anatolia.

As a matter of fact, the reactions to the Turko-French Treaty which was signed by Bekir Sami Bey after the London Conference well indicated the nationalists' point of view about ethnic minority rights. This secret treaty had recognized the ethnic minority rights, specifically the right of proportional representation of the ethnically different peoples of the Southeastern Anatolia in the municipal administration and in the local security forces. The French government insisted on this point to guarantee the political participation of the Armenian people.⁴⁶ As cited in the above parts, the main reason behind Mustafa Kemal's

⁴⁵ Ibid. 51.

⁴⁶ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 148.

objection to the treaty was this clause.⁴⁷ The rejection of this treaty in the national assembly because of this reason indicated that ethnic rights would not be accepted by the new regime definitely. However, because of the need to an urgent armistice with the French government, the minority clause of the Ankara Agreement was not rejected despite the fact that it did not specify the criteria of being a minority.

The Ankara government did not oppose this regulation but the sensitivity concerning the Armenian demands and the general anti-minority stance persisted in the national assembly. As a matter of fact, there was a strong feelings of suspicion and insecurity towards the Armenians who contributed to French occupation in the south to a large extent. As the following chapter will indicate, The Turkish point of view in relation to Anatolian Armenians was made clear during the Lausanne negotiations and Turkish delegation strongly rejected special regulations about Armenians in the final peace treaty.

⁴⁷ Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy*.103.

CHAPTER VII

THE LAUSANNE TREATY: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW TURKISH NATION STATE AND THE NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

7.1. Introduction

From the international law point of view, the Lausanne Treaty is one of the treaties concluding the First World War between the Allied Powers and their adversaries –the Ottoman State in this case-. However, from the perspective of international politics, it is the treaty that finally settled the long lasting “Eastern Question” which had deeply affected, in fact shaped world politics since the end of the 17th century. Concerning Turkish political history on the other hand, it represents the final dismemberment of the Ottoman State and the establishment of a new state with a completely new regime on the territories populated by the Ottoman-Muslim majority. In this respect, as several authors underlined specifically, the Lausanne Treaty is the international act that founded the new Turkish State as a legal-political entity with clearly defined borders. The treaty established the new state as a modern-nation state based on modern Western nationalism and with a new social vision that is with a new citizenship identity.¹

¹ Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* [The Foreign Policy of Turkey] (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1998), 73-74; İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları* [The Political Treaties of Turkey] (Ankara: TTK, 2000), 75.

Soon after its signing, the treaty became the basis of Turkey's foreign policy orientation of "protecting the Lausanne-based status quo".² Turkey declared any attempt or demand to revise it as an infringement of its sovereignty. The treaty has been attributed a foundational significance since it solved the most controversial issues of the dissolution period of Ottoman State like the Armenian problem, Kurdish autonomy, Ottoman debts, capitulations and minority rights. However, concerning domestic politics, the treaty is equally significant since it regulated the most crucial issues about the new political and social order of the country. In this respect, the Lausanne Treaty has a constitutional status, i.e., Turkey bound itself with the treaty in many issues of domestic politics like general judicial order, citizenship and the minority rights before with a comprehensive constitution. Therefore, while in the international field, it is the document that certified the equal, sovereign, and independent existence of the new state; in the domestic field, it is the document that binds Turkish State towards its own citizens. Therefore, the treaty became the basis of the subsequent constitutions.

Concerning the interaction between the international/foreign policy dynamics and the domestic social-political formation that is the nation-building process in Turkey –which is the main subject matter of this study- this part of the study will analyze Lausanne negotiations and the peace treaty within the same analytical framework that was used in the previous parts: They are the territorial, national and political closures through which the basic tenets of a modern-citizenship identity was constructed in Turkey before the establishment of the republic.

² Oral Sander, "Lozan'ın Uluslararası Tarih Açısından Yorumu" [The Interpretation of Lausanne from the Perspective of International History] in *70. Yılında Lozan Barış Andlaşması, Uluslararası Seminer* [The Lausanne Peace Treaty on Its 70th Anniversary, International Seminar](Ankara: İnönü Vakfı Yayınları, 1994), 12.

First of all, as an international act, the Lausanne Treaty drew the final frontiers of the new state which were also the physical boundaries of the “community inside”. In this respect, it was the final stage that established the material conditions of the project of a Western type of nation-state with a new citizenship identity. Essentially, the treaty finalized the territorial closure of Turkish citizenship with a specific conception of membership. It realized the spatial differentiation of inside/outside as the basis of the parallel process of temporal differentiation of self/other. In this respect, Lausanne Treaty marked the beginning of a “territorial nationalism” in Turkish political history. These are the subjects of the first section of this part.

Secondly, the Lausanne Treaty put forward the basic credentials of the “national closure” that is the cultural boundaries of the “community inside”. It defined the fundamental features of Turkish “national citizenship” through its regulations about citizenship, minority rights and with the convention on population exchange. The national closure as finalized at least technically with the treaty had two dimensions. The first one was the external national closure that excluded a significant part of the Ottoman population mainly with a religious-cultural criterion. Secondly, the founders of the state obtained the conditions to carry on an internal closure with an underlying “philosophy or ideology of membership” which distinguishes the proper members of the society and the others.

Finally, the third section of this part will study the political consequences of the Lausanne Treaty. The analysis will reveal the fact the Lausanne process and the peace treaty put forward the early premises of the future republican mode of integration and civic-territorial model of citizenship. The treaty became the major turning point within the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process after which the new

state accomplished radical transformations in state-society relations that went far beyond the previous modernization efforts of the Ottoman State. Concerning the political aspect of citizenship identity, with the signing of the treaty, the passage from an “imperial conception subject-citizen with multiple cultural identities” to “a modern citizenship identity with a unitary, centrally defined, and secular political identity” was accomplished at least technically. The Lausanne regulations especially on minority rights, capitulations and other legal matters became the foundations to create a society composed of not subjects but fully modern citizens having the most contemporary rights and obligations.

The legal reforms that were demanded by the Western governments to guarantee the security of their citizens living in Turkey and of the minorities gave the nationalist leadership the impetus to carry the previous reforms forward radically. In this respect, the Lausanne Treaty can be cited as the external dynamic of the subsequent efforts to completely transform the state-society relations and as the source of a secular civic-republican conception of citizenship.

The point is that, as the following parts will analyze in detail, the territorial, national and political closure of Turkish citizenship as envisaged in the Lausanne Treaty reflected the will of the state elite to be a part of the modern world as opposed to Eastern that is the Bolshevik and/or Islamic alternatives. In this respect, this part of the study will analyze the Lausanne Conference and the Peace Treaty as the most significant cornerstone event that represents the final point of the project of the nation-state and the unitary, national citizenship conception that were developed throughout the independence war. At the same time it will be underlined that the treaty became the main source of the subsequent policies of creating the new citizen which would be conducted by the state elite throughout the 20's and the 30's.

7.2. The Final Territorial Closure of Turkish Citizenship with the Lausanne Treaty

As stated in the introductory part, the Lausanne Treaty is the international act that established the new Turkish State since first of all, it defined its internationally recognized, official territorial borders. The territorial regulations of the treaty primarily reflect the state elite's search for a religiously homogenous political community and a unitary citizenship identity within defensible and realistic frontiers as the basis of a modern nation-state.³ The objective of excluding the foreign elements –mainly the non-Muslims- was so crucial for the founders of the new state that the Turkish government fell significantly short of its territorial objectives declared previously in the National Pact.⁴ Nonetheless, the treaty was signed and celebrated as a real success by the nationalist leadership. How can such a paradoxical situation be explained? Before answering this question and analyzing the meaning of the treaty concerning the citizenship identity it envisaged, the territorial regulations of the treaty should be briefly overviewed.

7.2.1. The Territorial Resolutions of the Lausanne Peace Treaty

The territorial issues were regulated in the first part of the treaty between the articles 2-22.⁵ The exact frontiers of the new Turkish State from the Black Sea to the

³ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt: I, 1919-1980* [Turkish Foreign Policy: From the Independence War Until Today: The Facts, Documents, Interpretations, Vol: I, 1919-1980] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 221.

⁴ Eric Z. Zürcher, "The Borders of the Republic Reconsidered" in *Bilanço 1923-1998: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75 Yılına Toplu Bakış Uluslararası Kongresi, I. Cilt: Siyaset, Kültür, Uluslar arası İlişkiler* [Balance Sheet 1923-1998: An Overview of the 75 Years of the Turkish Republic, International Congress, Vol. 1: Politics, Culture and International Relations] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), 55-56.

⁵ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 95-100. See also Appendix G for the related articles in Turkish at the end of the dissertation.

Mediterranean in the west and from the Black Sea to the already existing Turco-Iranian border in the east were defined in articles 2 and 3. The point is that the treaty did not bring new regulations but confirmed the frontiers that were valid at the moment of the Mudros Armistice and the ones that settled through bi-lateral agreements during the independence war. The Turco-Soviet Russian frontier had been drawn in the Moscow and Kars Treaties of 1921 and there was no mention about this regulation in the treaty. Therefore it was valid. The frontier between Turkey and Syria was confirmed as drawn in the Ankara Agreement with the French government -as the mandatory power- in the article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty. In the same way, the frontier with Bulgaria which had been defined first in 1913 Istanbul Treaty and then rectified in 1915 was adopted in article 2 of the treaty.⁶

Concerning the Turco-Greek frontier and the Aegean Islands, Turkey accepted the demarcation line as Maritza (Meric) River as in Mudanya Convention and with an additional protocol, added Karaagac Station to its territories in Thrace. Other points of the frontier were accepted as the same with the Mudanya Convention. The situation of the islands was confirmed in articles 12 and 13 as they were, i.e., they had been left to Greece after the Balkan Wars. However, Imbros, Tenedos and Tavsan Islands would remain under Turkish sovereignty since they were crucial for the security of the straits. In article 15, on the other hand, Turkey accepted the passing of the Rhodes, Meis and the Dadaconese Islands to Italy.⁷

The articles 17-21 regulated the territorial issues between Turkey and Britain. Turkey renounced its claim of sovereignty over Egypt, Sudan, and Cyprus in favor of British government. Concerning the Turkish-Iraqi border, the article 3 of the treaty

⁶ Ibid. 95-96.

⁷ Ibid. 97-98.

cited that this conflict would be solved between the two governments through an agreement within 9 months. If it would not be possible, the issue would be brought to the League of Nations the decision of which the two governments would accept.⁸

These territorial regulations, at the first glance, indicate that the Turkish side could not obtain any of the territorial objectives that had been put forward –albeit implicitly -in the National Pact at the beginning of the independence war. The Turkish delegation accepted the loss of Western Thrace, the Musul province and large part of Iskenderun Sanjak including Hatay. Together with the Batum Sanjak of the Elviye-i Selase which were left to Georgia with the Moscow-Kars Treaties, at the end of the independence war, the Turkish nationalists lost all the territories which were cited in the National Pact by name except Kars and Ardahan. In the beginning of the independence war, there was an implicit but definite claim on these territories with the argument that these territories were populated by an Ottoman-Muslim majority and therefore they should have belonged to Turkey. With the Lausanne Treaty, however, the National Pact completely lost its territorial content and was reduced to the integrity of militarily controlled territories of Anatolia. Why the Turkish delegation signed such a treaty that obviously fell short of their pre-declared territorial objectives?

The answer of this question is at the same time the underlying principle that directed the Turkish delegation's position during the negotiations on territorial matters: It was to maintain the territorial integrity of the Anatolian peninsula as the sine qua non principle and to obtain defensible and realistic borders within which the cultural-national (religious) homogeneity would be at the maximum level. In other words, while conducting the territorial negotiations, the Turkish delegation applied

⁸ Ibid. 99-100.

three main criteria: The first one is the territorial integrity of the Anatolia which means the categorical rejection of the project of Armenian homeland and of territorial autonomy for Kurds. Secondly, they continued the war-time policy of defensible and realistic frontiers that is the protection of the territories which were presently under the control of the Turkish forces. In this respect, the Turkish delegation behaved with political expediency and realism and did not cancel the negotiations because of the conflict over the territories which were not controlled by Turkish Army.⁹

The third criterion which was the objective of obtaining maximum cultural-national homogeneity – not only religious homogeneity as in the beginning of the war - within defined borders. This meant Turkey would not insist on the territories the population of which was not clearly Ottoman-Turkish. With this criterion, the founders of the state applied for the first time an understanding of the “community inside” by an ethnic-cultural definition. It was being evolved since the beginning of the national war in the minds of the nationalist elite. At this stage, the founders of the new state were often using the term “Ottoman-Turkish majority” instead of the ambiguous the Ottoman-Muslim majority. Such a conception of national identity which was marked by the supremacy of a particular, comprehending ethnic identity – the Turkish one- reflects that the passage from the idea of religious community to a Western type national citizenry reached to a certain level, went one step further.

Accordingly, the territorial resolutions of the Lausanne Treaty were viewed as a success by the state elite since they fulfilled all these three criteria. The demands for an Armenian homeland and for Kurdish autonomy in Anatolia were definitely removed and the territorial-political integrity of Anatolian peninsula was maintained.

⁹ Oran, *Türk Dış.* 221.

The danger of restarting of war was eliminated and the conditions of a lasting peace were attained concerning the territorial matters. And most importantly, the territorial conditions for the establishment of a modern, unified, compact nation state with a unitary citizenship identity were established.

7.2.2. Turkish Citizenship as Reflected in the Territorial Resolutions of the Treaty

As stated in the above part, the final territorial closure of the Turkish citizenship as realized in the Lausanne Treaty was based on the three criteria: The territorial integrity of Anatolia, the principle of national-cultural homogeneity of the community inside and defensible borders. These criteria became the fundamental principles of the enframed political space for the subsequent periods. The territory of the new state and the physical boundaries of the national citizenship were defined so as to get closer to a Western type of nation-state and to a modern citizenship identity. The imperial territorial vision and ambitions were put aside completely. A modern national citizenship - which was further developed after the establishment of the republic - on the basis of a particular but comprehending, non-exclusionary ethnic identity – Turkishness - was established with the territorial regulations of the Lausanne Treaty.

During the negotiations, the Turkish side did not accept the risk of restarting the war for the territories which had ethnic and religious complexity like Musul and Western Thrace. This understanding was expressed by Mustafa Kemal himself clearly during his interviews with the journalists from Istanbul in Izmit on January 16-17th 1923 when the peace conference was still going on. Concerning Western Thrace, he argued that the passing of this region to Turkey would create military weakness from geo-strategic point of view since such a frontier would be very

difficult to defend. Those who cited this region as within the territories of the National Pact had not thought this aspect. Moreover, there was not an open claim about this region, rather, a plebiscite was proposed for the realization of their self-determination.¹⁰

The fact was that the population structure of the region was very complex and therefore, it would be very difficult to draw a definite line to differentiate the Muslims and the Greeks of the region. Turkey had already a problem of population exchange in Western Anatolia. The passing of this region to Turkish territories would create an additional population problem because of the Greek population of the region.

Secondly, as for the Musul province, Mustafa Kemal explained that Musul vilayat –including Kerkük and Süleymaniye- were within the “national borders” defined in the National Pact. In this respect, their claim on Musul was not related with oil but it was a matter of territory.¹¹ Musul was very valuable for Turkey but there were two important problems there: First, it might not be easy to remove British claims because of the rich oil reserves. Secondly, the Kurds of the region were in upheaval against the British government and an independent Kurdish State was being planned in the region. This project was very dangerous for Turkey’s national security since there was also a considerable Kurdish population in Turkey who might be influenced from these ideas and want to unify with the south. At this point, he argued that Turkey should be very careful not to import this problem.¹²

¹⁰ Doğu Perinçek, ed. *Mustafa Kemal, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923)* [Mustafa Kemal, Eskişehir-İzmit Speeches, 1923] (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999), 91.

¹¹ Ibid. 95.

¹² Ibid.

With this warning as a matter of fact, he implicitly argued that the addition of Musul vilayat where Kurds and Arabs were at majority might exacerbate Turkey's Kurdish problem. It was thought that while there were substantial Turkish population in all these territories, left out of new Turkey, there were majorities of Kurds, Arabs and Greeks who if included might well have constituted a significant point of internal division and conflict which in its own way might have undermined all that the Turkish resistance had accomplished and destroyed homogeneity.¹³

The point is that among the small circle of the state elite, the prevailing idea was that these territorial demands were in fact contrary to the idealized cultural-national homogeneity of the "community inside" and to the envisaged national citizenship identity. As a result, while especially Mustafa Kemal explained Turkey's withdrawal of its claims on both regions with military reasons –they could only be got through war- as the instructions given to the delegation before the conference and Mustafa Kemal's explanations in İzmit press conference indicates that the underlying principles of Turkish position concerning territorial issues of the conference were directed towards a more general project of creating the material conditions of a modern nation-state and a unitary-homogenous national citizenship identity.

The borders of the Lausanne Treaty became the borders of nation-building, i.e., the efforts of nation-building were directed on the basis of these borders during the 20's and 30's.¹⁴ Despite this attitude of political expediency and realism, however, in the coming periods borders took precedence over other constructive

¹³ Stanford Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923, A Documentary Study* (Ankara: TTK, 2000), 1963.

¹⁴ Zürcher, "The Borders," 58.

attributes of the nation-state.¹⁵ In this respect, Turkish nationalism and citizenship identity had a strong territorial aspect. The memory of imperial dissolution directed the state elite's sensitivity about territorial matters since they identified territorial losses with political collapse. On the other hand, since the founders of the new state wanted to create a completely new and separate political personality, they did not have any claims on the territories previously belonged to the Ottoman State. In this respect the Lausanne Treaty represented the final and definite passage to a modern, territorial citizenship from imperial citizenship.

7.3. The National Closure of Turkish Citizenship in the Lausanne Peace Treaty

The territorial borders of the new Turkish State, as analyzed in the above part, were drawn in the Lausanne Treaty to obtain maximum cultural-religious homogeneity of the “community inside”. This concern determined also the terms of the external and internal national closure that is the “politics of citizenship” that drew the cultural boundaries of the “community inside”. The founders of the new state put forward their project of a homogenous nation-state with a unitary citizenship clearly during the Lausanne process. Accordingly, the Lausanne resolutions finalized the national closure of Turkish citizenship before the establishment of the republic.

During the conference, the nation-state model was not idealized just because it was the most contemporary form of political organization but also it was the only way to provide security for the Muslim majority of Anatolia. The war-time “national security conception” which was based on the removal of the “foreign” elements – the non-Muslim Ottoman citizens - that caused the dismemberment of the Ottoman

¹⁵ Ümit Cizre, “Turkey’s Kurdish Problem: Borders, Identity and Hegemony” in *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*, ed., Ian Lustick, Brendan O’leary and T. Callaghy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 226-228.

State marked also the Lausanne negotiations.¹⁶ The direct exclusion of the former non-Muslim and some part of Muslim Ottoman citizens who remained outside the borders was the first step of the external national closure. During the Lausanne negotiations, the fundamental policy of the Turkish delegation was to leave out especially the non-Muslim Ottoman citizens as much as possible. The Turkish point of view and the consequent regulations about these “people of exclusion” informed also the criteria of being “the insiders”.

Secondly, the Lausanne process - negotiations and the treaty - revealed the premises that the new elite would rely on in carrying out the internal national closure, that is the features of “proper insiders”. During the conference, the negotiations about the rights of the non-Muslims and the non-Turk Muslim communities were the instances that the new ruling elite put forward their basic understandings about “Who were the proper citizens in the new state?” Throughout the independence struggle, the pre-ordained objectives of complete sovereignty and the political integrity had prevented the development of cultural plurality and genuine equality in their formulation “community inside” and citizenship. The Lausanne negotiations witnessed the crystallization of these features and in this respect, the analysis of the Lausanne Treaty from such a perspective gives the opportunity to understand the conception of “proper citizens” in the minds of the founders of the republic in this early period.

The point is that, the founders of the new state while categorically rejecting the Ottoman heritage as a whole, relied their project of nation-state and national citizenship on the Ottoman spatio-temporal differentiation between self and other, the member and the foreigner. The new regime continued to differentiate the society

¹⁶ Mahmut Golođlu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* [Turkish Republic] (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1971), 274.

on the basis of religion in accordance with the deeply entrenched Ottoman conception of “proper membership” that is the Muslim majority. With the Lausanne Treaty the first nation-state of the Middle East was established in accordance with the “nationality principle” which had a strong religious element rather than Western type of national attributes. In this respect, the social model of the new state had remarkable continuities with the Ottoman millet system. These points can be analyzed more in detail through the Lausanne regulations about the citizenship issues, the protocol on population exchange and the regulations about minority rights.

7.3.1. “The People of Exclusion” in the Lausanne Treaty

The resolutions on Citizenship (Uyrukluk düzenlemeleri) and the Convention on Population Exchange of the Lausanne Treaty brought the exclusion of a considerable number of former Ottoman citizens from membership to the political community of the new state. The regulations about these two groups of “people of exclusion” specified also the criterias that directed the Turkish nationalists’ conception of “people of inclusion” that is the citizens of the new state.

7.3.1.1. Citizenship Resolutions of the Lausanne Treaty

The Citizenship Resolutions constituted second section of the first part of the Lausanne Treaty. The articles 30-36 regulated the status and the rights of the people who remained outside the borders of the new Turkish State.¹⁷ The analysis of these regulations reveals two consequences in terms of citizenship: First, they introduced “nationality principle” for the regulation of the citizenship issues of the newly

¹⁷ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 101-103. See also Appendix G for the related articles in Turkish.

emerging political entities, i.e., the new Turkish State and the ex- provinces of the Ottoman State. The articles 32,33 and 34 regulated the citizenship of the peoples of the territories that separated from the Ottoman State. Specifically they brought the criteria of being from the same “racial origin” (ethnicity) with the majority of the people of the territories that were separated from the Ottoman State” for the use of “the right of option”, i., e., the right to select one’s own citizenship.¹⁸ In this way, the treaty brought an understanding of “national societies” for the peoples of the provinces that were separated from the Ottoman State as different from the Islamic “Umma” conception.

However and secondly, during the negotiations on citizenship matters, Turkish perspective was to make Turkish citizenship open to the former Ottoman citizens of Muslim origin who remained outside the new borders. During the negotiations, the Turkish delegation argued that the right to choose Turkish citizenship should be given to those former Ottoman citizens who lost their citizenship without specifying any national or ethnic origin. In other words, the Turkish side did not set forth any condition for the people who wanted to regain Turkish citizenship except one’s majority – age 18 - and a specific time period. Accordingly, the article 30 stated that the Turkish citizens – it was used to refer Ottoman citizens - who settled on the territories that were separated from Turkey would automatically and under the conditions of the local laws become the citizens of the state to which those territories are passed. At the same time, however, the article 31 regulated that the individuals who lost Turkish citizenship could use the

¹⁸ Ibid. 102.

right of option to regain Turkish citizenship *whatever their national/racial (ethnic) origin* (The last phrase and emphasize added).¹⁹

Another example of that attitude of the Turkish government was related with the situation of the former Ottoman citizens of non-Turkish origin who settled in foreign countries. The Turkish delegation argued that those Ottoman citizens who were from the people of a territory that separated from the Ottoman State and who settled in a foreign country should remain as Turkish citizens in principle but could use the right of option to choose the citizenship that is valid in their original territories.²⁰ In other words, an Ottoman citizen of Egyptian origin who lived in Paris would remain as a Turkish citizen in principle but could use the right of option to obtain Egyptian (or British) citizenship. In other words, he/she would not get the latter citizenship automatically, but would remain as Turkish citizen.

This attitude can only be interpreted as the intention of the Turkish government to protect its population level which decreased significantly because of the series of wars. Turkish citizenship would be open to those Muslim citizens of the former Ottoman State who remained outside the defined borders through the right of option. In this sense, the new ruling elite continued the Ottoman understanding of being from the Muslim majority as the primary criterion for proper membership to the community inside. Whatever their ethnic, racial, cultural or linguistic differences, the outsider Muslims could regain Turkish citizenship if they opted for. In this respect, the basis of the “community inside” was still religion and was different from the Western conception of civic-secular nationality.

¹⁹ Ibid. 101-102.

²⁰ Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar, Belgeler Takım I, Cilt 2* [The Lausanne Peace Conference: Records, Documents, Set I, Vol 2] (Ankara: SBF Yayını, 1971), 197-200.

As a last point, during the discussions about the citizenship issues, another point that the Turkish delegation insisted on was the deportation of those former Ottoman citizens who illegally obtained the citizenship of European States in order to benefit from capitulations. Such cases were very common especially among non-Muslim Ottoman citizens who had changed their citizenship without the permission of the Ottoman State. The Turkish delegation argued that since they were no more Turkish citizens, they should have been deported out of the country.²¹ In the end, the Turkish side failed to have other parties to accept this article. The legitimacy of their arguments is a matter of another discussion. For the sake of this study, however, one should underline the point that the insistence of the Turkish government on this issue was another example of Turkish attitude of creating the conditions to send as much non-Muslim people as possible. In the same way the return of the Bulgarian community of the Eastern Thrace who were forced to migrate during the war was not accepted by the Turkish delegation.²² In this respect, the Turkish delegation took a firm hold of its stance despite pressures. They strongly argued that the future political community of citizens should be a religiously homogenous one. This basic conception of the “community inside” surfaced much more clearly during the negotiations about the population exchange.

7.3.1.2. The Convention on the Population Exchange between Turkey and Greece

The Protocol on Population Exchange which was signed between the Turkish and Greek governments on January 30th 1923 regulated the situation of another group of “people of exclusion” that is of the Ottoman citizens of Greek-Orthodox origin.

²¹ Ibid. 194-195.

²² Ibid. 191; Ibid. Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap I [Set I, Vol I, Book I], 305-306.

For the Turkish government, the population exchange was the most important step on the way of the homogenization of the “community inside” on religious basis.

After the independence war, the minority policy of the new state was evident. The Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin – the Greeks, Armenians and even the Jewish community who did not collaborate with the imperialist powers - were thought as the most serious threats against the security of the Muslim majority.²³ Since they were viewed as the source of such a serious threat, the Turkish policy was formulated as first of all to reduce their number as much as possible. Especially the Greek people of Istanbul who got wealthier under the protection of Western governments during the world war, were the second most unwanted group after the Armenians. Therefore, before the conference, the Council of Ministers specified Turkish point of view about the minorities in the instructions that were given to the delegation: The population exchange was the only solution to the minority problem.²⁴ The Western governments, on the contrary, tried to maintain the position of especially Greek minority in Istanbul because of their financial and economic relations.

The underlying logic of this convention was clear for the Turkish side: It was the most significant component of their new conception of political “community inside” and of citizenship identity that is the religious-cultural homogeneity. Accordingly, the Turkish delegation argued for forced – not voluntary - exchange and for the enlargement of the territories that would be subjected to exchange. In the meeting on December^{1st} 1922, İsmet İnönü argued that the population exchange

²³ Soon after the end of the national war, the Jewish community also took their share from the anti-minority policies of the government and the media, see Rıfat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)* [The Jews of Turkey during the Republican Years: An Adventure of Turkification 81923-1945] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), 40-54.

²⁴ *Oran, Türk Dış.* 329.

should have been applied to all Greek population of Anatolia including those in İstanbul and in İzmir.²⁵

The point was that the Turkish side was viewing the existence of the Greek people in their territories as a serious security problem. In the meeting of Population Exchange Sub-Committee in January 16th 1923, Rıza Nur explained that their fundamental concern in population exchange was to put an end to Greek irredentism. Therefore, not only the Orthodox Greeks but also all the Turkish citizens of Greek origin should have been sent to their mainland.²⁶ More remarkably, when the conference was suspended, in one of his speeches in the national assembly, İsmet İnönü openly declared that their fundamental objective in population exchange was the maintenance of complete security of Anatolia by clearing it up of from the “foreign elements”.²⁷ In this respect, the new government made explicit that they saw the Greek people of Anatolia who were the authentic-local population speaking Turkish –especially the Greek community of central Anatolia- as foreigners and even as the enemy.

Once they were viewed as a threat against the security of the majority, they were automatically excluded from the collective identity. In the subsequent years, this understanding would shape the popular perception of unitary citizenship based on religious homogeneity, the terms of collective identity and of the individual membership.

As a result of the negotiations, the first article of the convention regulated the reciprocal exchange of the Ottoman citizens of Orthodox-Greek origin and the Greek

²⁵ Ibid. 330.

²⁶ Meray, *Lozan*. Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap 2 [Set I, Vol. I, Book 2], 312-313.

²⁷ Goloğlu, *Türkiye*. 274.

citizens of Muslim origin. Throughout the meetings of the sub-committee, Rıza Nur consistently asked for the sending of all Greek people including those who had previously passed to Greek citizenship in order to benefit from Western protection. In the end, the Turkish side could not put such an article into the convention but used this argument to obtain some benefits in the issue of the minority foundations (azınlık vakıfları).²⁸

As a result, for the peoples who would be subjected to population exchange, the criterion of religion was applied for both sides. Although the Turkish delegation insisted on the application of the nationality principle for the Ottoman Greek citizens to send not only the Orthodox-Greeks but the Greeks of all religious sects, it did not put such a criterion for the peoples who would come from Greece. The only criterion for their acceptance was being Muslim.

The second article of the convention regulated the cases of exceptions for both sides. It stated that the population exchange would not include the settled (etabli Rumlar) Greek people of Istanbul and the settled Muslim people of Western Thrace.²⁹ As a matter of fact, Turkish government did not have any demand for the Muslim people of Western Thrace to be an exception. However, because of the pressures of the Western governments about the Greek people of Istanbul, the Turkish government asked for the reciprocal rights of the Muslim peoples of the Western Thrace for political reasons. In a sense, the Turkish side wanted to obtain a reciprocal bargaining trump against the Greek government in the future. Therefore, in the end of the negotiations, Turkish side had the committee accepted the definition of the municipal borders of Istanbul city and the date of the settlement of these

²⁸ Meray, *Lozan*. 313.

²⁹ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 185. See Appendix G for the related articles of the convention in Turkish.

people as before the end of the war as in line with their argument. In return, however, they accepted the borders of the Western Thrace as proposed by the Greek government.³⁰

The article three of the convention was equally significant concerning the Turkish objective of cleaning up of their territories from the foreign elements. The article states that those Ottoman citizens of Greek origin who migrated after the Balkan Wars of 1912 would be counted as exchanged with this convention whatever their original place of settlement in Turkey.³¹ In this way their return was prevented even they were previously settled in the places that were not subjected to exchange. Another interesting regulation was the sending of even the criminals and of those who were being judged by the respective governments. Therefore, both sides were willing to transfer their sovereign rights of judgement which indicated that they both aimed to reduce the number of the “foreigners” in their countries as much as possible.

The remaining articles regulated details and the economic aspect of exchange for both sides. Significantly, the article 16 stated that the people who were exempt from the exchange would maintain their basic liberties and property rights in a complete manner. However, they would have also the right to migrate voluntarily.³²

Consequently, the general policy of the Turkish government in the issue of population exchange was to send as many Greek people as possible. In this respect, this convention was the most significant phase of the project of establishing a homogenous “community inside” and a unitary citizenship identity. Furthermore, this

³⁰ Meray, *Lozan*. 344-349; 369-371.

³¹ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 185.

³² *Ibid.* 190.

convention would create a safe homeland for the citizens of the country since it eliminated the most important source of threat against national security. Turkish government believed that from then on it had a more powerful position in its foreign relations since there would be no more a minority problem which would give the Western powers the opportunity to intervene into the internal affairs of Turkey in the future.

7.3.2. “The People of Inclusion” and the Internal National Closure of Turkish Citizenship in the Lausanne Treaty

In modern nation-state system, the boundaries of a particular national identity – whatever its origin, i.e., history, ethnicity, language, religion or a single will to live together - are secured by the representation of danger which is externalized not only spatially but also in the temporal understanding of the self, the inside and of the proper membership. In this way, the threat and the identity it represents are excluded even if it comes from within. The modern state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens against both external and internal threats. Therefore, it is the state that defines who is the threat to which identity and differentiates the internal threat as “difference” and “otherness” to create an organic, centrally defined, homogenous political “community inside”.³³

Boundary drawing, therefore, as a solution to the problem of identity, does not only enframe a “community inside” against the outside world. The state consolidates its existence through an inducing process in which it offers a solution to the problem of identity through the negation of the difference also “within” a

³³ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 56.

delimited territory. The outsiders are not simply foreigners since they are situated in opposition to a pre-given social entity. They are the “excluded insiders” who do not fit with the hegemonic cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious identities and patterns. The discourse of threat coming from within – from the elements of difference against the security of the hegemonic identity – draws the boundaries of the “proper insiders” within the parallel processes of spatial and temporal organization of inside-outside, self-other, citizen-foreigner and proper citizen-citizen on paper in the context of the modern state.³⁴

The Lausanne Treaty excluded some part of the former Ottoman citizens by drawing cultural-religious boundaries within the “community inside”. The status and the rights of the elements of difference that remained within the formal boundaries of the new state as minorities reflected the nature of the “internal closure” which differentiated between the proper citizens and citizens on paper. The Lausanne process – negotiations and the final regulations - set the scene for the Turkish point of view towards the elements of difference and showed the limits of the founders of the new state to tolerate the demands and needs of minorities. Their criteria of “proper citizenship” were crystallized fully through the discussions about minority rights during the conference and were reflected to the treaty to some extent.³⁵

The point about the terms of the internal closure is that, the founders of the new state continued the philosophy of the Ottoman millet system and the conception of minority. In three fundamental discussions of the Minorities Sub-Committee, the Turkish delegation carried on the negotiation with a perspective which had

³⁴ Ibid. 71.

³⁵ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 103-106. See Appendix G for the Minority Rights section of the Lausanne Treaty in Turkish.

remarkable continuities with the Ottoman social vision and the conception of the self and the other. These were first, the definition of the minorities on the basis of religion. Secondly and closely related with the first discussion, the Turkish delegation rested on the Ottoman social vision accepting the Muslim majority as an organic, unified entity with a centrally defined cultural-political identity. Thirdly, the Turkish delegation opposed Western governments' some additional demands with a pre-ordained political perception that the minorities were the fundamental sources of threat against the security and unity of the society. In this part, the analysis of the last issue will be a good starting point in order to analyze the continuities between the Ottoman State and the new regime.

7.3.2.1. Minorities as the Sources of Threat against National Security

The Turkish arguments about the issue of minorities during the Lausanne Conference indicated that the founders of the new state would build their project of nation-state on the philosophy of the Ottoman millet system which compartmentalized the society into communities on the basis of religion. İsmet Bey's long speech about the minorities' role in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire put forward this approach clearly in the first meeting of the Minorities Sub-Committee on December 12th 1922.³⁶

In his historical analysis, İsmet Bey argued that Ottoman minorities' search for independence was mainly provoked by the foreign powers who wanted to use them as instruments to interfere into the domestic affairs of the Ottoman State and then to assert some claims on the Ottoman territories. The Ottoman system had perfectly regulated the relationship between the state and religious communities until

³⁶ Meray, *Lozan*, Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap 1 [Set I, Vol. I, Book 1], 187-189.

the 18th century after which especially Russia had begun to pursue provocative policies on Balkan peoples and especially on the Armenians. The Ottoman State had made all the necessary constitutional regulations to improve their rights and to protect their religious, cultural and social characteristics. Therefore, the real reason behind their suffering was not the Ottoman State but especially the Allied governments' policies that fuelled their aspirations for independence.

After this analysis, İsmet Bey concluded that the realization of the Allies' demands about the minorities would depend on their guarantee that the Allies and the other great powers would stop their interventions. On the other hand, however, according to Turkish point of view, minorities did not need special protection other than those provided with the general laws of the country. Specifically designed minority rights and privileges were in fact the opportunities for foreign intervention. The new state was completely opposed to such kind of privileges and rights. He strictly pointed out that population exchange was the definite solution for the problem of minorities. According to him, from then on, the new Turkish State constituted only from Turkish provinces and there was no group of minority that might demand independence within Turkish borders. All the remaining communities should have understood that they could live in Turkey if they fulfilled their obligations as good Turkish citizens.³⁷

From the diplomatic point of view, this speech was very harsh and removing the possibility of negotiation in advance. As a matter of fact, it created confusion among other delegations since it meant that Turkish government definitely rejected to recognize special rights to minorities other than the general rights and liberties that

³⁷ Ibid. 189-198.

would be recognized to every Turkish citizen. In this first meeting, as a response to Lord Curzon's objection, İsmet Bey put the final point as such: The individuals belonging to minorities could live in equality in Turkey. However, Turkish government would not allow any of these communities to benefit from some rights that caused the disintegration of Turkish territories.³⁸ Faced with strong objections and the possibility of the suspension of the conference, the Turkish delegation gave up its strict position next day and made clear that Turkish government would recognize the most contemporary rights to the minorities on the condition that these rights would not be used in order to legitimize some claims on Turkish territories in the future.³⁹

The point is that İsmet Bey's first speech was, as a matter of fact, explaining well the concerns that directed their general approach to the minority problem. For the founders of the new state, the issue of minority rights in fact a matter of "national security" which clearly did not include the security of these foreign elements. İsmet Bey's defense of the Ottoman system and policies towards the minorities indicated that despite their claim to be a modern nation-state, Turkish government continued to view the issue from the perspective of Ottoman dismemberment rather than from a modern-democratic point of view.

In this respect, minority policy of the new government was resting basically on the Ottoman experience. It was clear that the new regime would continue to see minorities as a factor of "internal weakness" which makes the country open to foreign interventions. Throughout the conference, the Turkish delegation consistently argued that the members of the minorities would be equal Turkish citizens. But their

³⁸ Ibid. 207-208.

³⁹ Ibid. 209.

emphasis on population exchange as the main solution and the general approach that viewing minority rights as opportunities for foreign intervention can be interpreted that the new state would treat minorities as “unwanted elements”. This was the clear indication that there would be invisible internal boundaries within the political community of the new state which differentiate the “proper citizens” and the others.

The memory of dismemberment and the perception that the minorities are as the instruments of the Western powers became surfaced especially during the periods when Turkey was under a serious external threat. In these periods, the discriminatory policies towards the non-Muslim Turkish citizens have become much more deliberate. The 1934 Thrace Incident was one of the characteristic examples of the discriminatory attitude of the Turkish government towards its own citizens which was culminated with the rising perception of external threat.⁴⁰

In 18 March 1934, Italy’s fascist leader Benito Mussolini made a speech in which he declared the whole Mediterranean Sea as “Mare Nostrum” (our sea) and defined Asia and Africa as their natural regions of expansion. Since this region obviously included the eastern coasts of Turkey, the Ankara government assessed this declaration as an overt claim on its territories. The period after this speech was marked by Ankara government’s intensive measures against such a threat and the coming world war. The western and northwestern parts of Turkey from where an Italian attack was definite were militarized and some other extra-ordinary measures were taken.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ayhan Aktar, “1934 Trakya Yahudileri Olayları ve Türk Milliyetçiliği” [1934 The Jews of Thrace Affair and the Turkish Nationalism] in *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* [Wealth Tax and the Turkification Policies], A. Aktar (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), 71-99.

⁴¹ Ibid. 85.

One of them was the forced deportation of the Jewish people of the region in accordance with the Law of Settlement of 10 June 1934. This law was basically designed in order to assimilate those Turkish citizens who were not from Turkish culture by settling them in the regions where they were dispersed into the genuine Turks and therefore would be assimilated into Turkish culture. Its main target was the Kurdish people of Eastern Anatolia. The law itself was a discriminatory application since it divided the citizens on the basis of ethnicity and implied that only those who were of Turkish culture were the proper citizens.⁴² In this respect this period was marked by the intensification of authoritarian-fascist tendencies among the Kemalist ruling elite along with the general conjunction of pre-second world war international politics.

The government decided to benefit from the newly legislated law in regulating the deportation of the Jewish people from the Thrace region since if there was an Italian attack from this region, the Jews would possibly collaborated with them against the Turkish forces. However, before the application of the law, there were violent attacks towards the Thracian Jews in the form of torture, frightening, rape, plundering and commercial boycotts that forced the Jews to escape from the region. More than three thousands Jews escaped to Istanbul and more than this number were affected from the violent events.⁴³

The point is that the attacks on Jews which forced them to escape was not out of the information of the government. As a matter of fact, the attacks were deliberately organized by the local authorities of RPP (People's Republican Party)

⁴² Ibid. 87.

⁴³ Ibid. 74.

which was in the status of state-party ruling the country in a single party regime.⁴⁴ The events were the central government's decision to completely eliminate the foreign elements from the region which was under the immediate danger of war. The 1934 Thrace Affair constituted the perfect example of the Turkish ruling elite's general approach to non-Muslim minorities as "unwanted elements" who had potential to betray in times of war. The international conjunction of the period escalated the feelings of insecurity towards non-Muslim citizens both at the governmental and popular levels. Therefore, the underlying attitude about non-Muslim minorities as "threats against national security" during the Lausanne Conference surfaced in the form of "overt discrimination" in the coming periods and constituted one of the major democratic deficits of modern Turkish citizenship conception.

7.3.2.2. The Definition of Minority

The second aspect of the internal closure which was also based on the Ottoman governmental rationality and social vision in the Lausanne Treaty was the definition of the minorities in the new "community inside". Throughout the conference, the issue of minorities was one of the most difficult problems on which a series of hard negotiations took place between the parties. Technically, the Turkish government recognized all the internationally accepted rights to the communities which it accepted as minority. The analysis of the recognized rights and the points that Turkish government strongly opposed will provide the insights to think about the subjective elements of citizenship and the criteria of being the proper members of the new state.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 80-81.

At Lausanne, the Turkish official minority policy was certified after very hard negotiations. The success of the Turkish delegation was that there was neither a general definition of “Who are the minorities?” nor a specific enumeration of the minorities living in Turkey in the treaty. In other words, there was not a specific definition of the concept of minority neither in the body-text nor in the spirit of the treaty. Minority rights were recognized only to “non-Muslim minorities” but this does not mean that there was an implicit religious criterion. As Oran pointed out, if there was such a criterion, some religious sects of Islam religion – Alawis for example - would also have benefited from these rights.⁴⁵ On the contrary, by removing the expression of “ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities” from every article of the minority section, the Turkish delegation prevented such demands of the religious sects in the future.

Therefore, the articles between 37-45 of the treaty provided the positive rights that were thought to prevent oppression by the majority in accordance with the internationally accepted standards. But they were recognized only to a special category of “Turkish citizens belonging non-Muslim minorities”. These were – although they were not cited namely - Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities. The Allied representatives asked for some rights also for some other groups like Nesturis, Keldanis and Asuris but it was not accepted.⁴⁶

The point is that the recognition of minority rights only to non-Muslim citizens meant the continuation of the philosophy - if not the concrete laws - of the Ottoman “millet system” which differentiates the society on the basis of religion. The difference was that the new nation-state would be built on the principle of the

⁴⁵ Oran, *Türk Dış.* 230.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

“equality of all citizens on behalf of law” but the minorities would always be seen as the foreign elements that disrupted the homogeneity of the “community inside”. Minorities would not be the proper members of the society even if they were technically equal citizens.

One of the most characteristic example of the treatment of non-Muslim Turkish citizens as unwanted elements and improper insiders was the application of Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) in 1942 as a part of the general policy of the Turkification of the economy.⁴⁷ Among other discriminatory policies which targeted the non-Muslim Turkish citizens –like public employment policy, forced settlement policies and all other social-cultural measures to eradicate their distinct identities- the application of Wealth Tax was one of the most apparent and deliberate one since it charged the non-Muslim citizens with huge taxes in a very unjust manner.⁴⁸ The underlying aim was to complete the capital transfer to the Muslims who were the proper citizens of the state. Wealth Tax was the clear indication of the fact that the Turkish ruling elite who founded the new state on the premise of “the equality of all citizens” at Lausanne, had a clear distinction in mind that not all citizens are equal and they should not be. Therefore, the national identity of the “new” citizen would have a strong religious dimension as in the Ottoman time. This aspect would determine the popular perception of “collective identity” on which the famous discourse of “99 % Muslim majority” would be rested as the sovereign-hegemonic identity in the subsequent periods of Turkish political life.

⁴⁷ Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliği'nin Etno-Sektüler Sınırları*, (1919-1938) [Happy the One Who is Able to Say I am Turk: The Ethno-Secular Limits of Turkish national Identity, (1919-1938), 285.

⁴⁸ Ayhan Aktar, “Varlık Vergisi Nasıl Uygulandı?” [How was the Wealth Tax Applied?] in Aktar, *Varlık*. 135-214.

7.3.2.3. *The Internal National Closure and the Muslim Majority*

One of the most important consequences of the Lausanne Treaty that has still affected Turkish political life was the total rejection of any idea of ethnic, linguistic, religious-sectional (*mezhepsel*) or some other kind of minorities that existed within the Muslim majority of Turkey. By defining the minorities which deserved special protection as specifically the “non-Muslim” ones, the treaty rejected the existence of any other minority group that might have ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences from the majority. Throughout the conference, the Turkish delegation worked hard to have this principle accepted and definitely refused to make any concession in this respect. Therefore, the Lausanne Treaty was the international ratification of Turkish thesis on the issue of minorities. What does it mean?

From the political point of view, the categorical rejection of the idea and reality of Muslim minority groups meant that the founders of the new regime were viewing Muslim majority as a unified, organic totality. The different cultural or linguistic groups were the parts of the same religious-cultural brotherhood and they did not need special protection or specific rights since they committed to live together within the same political unity. Such a view entailed a unitary and centrally defined citizenship identity which was in fact the reflection of their cultural unity formulated as “Turkish nationality”. This was the exact formulation that the Turkish delegation continuously defended during the negotiations. Rıza Nur, the head of the Turkish delegation in the Minorities Sub-Committee went even further by arguing that in there could not be a Muslim minority in a Muslim country.⁴⁹

The representation of the Muslim majority as a culturally homogenous, unitary collectivity in the Lausanne Treaty was in fact the final point that the

⁴⁹ Meray, *Lozan*. Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap 2, 176.

“national ideal” reached in the minds of the founders of the new state. In the beginning of the national struggle, mainly under the influence of Wilsonian principles, the Turkish nationalist adopted a democratic-pluralist approach towards the different cultural elements within the Muslim majority.⁵⁰ As the above parts on the National Pact discussed, the first article of the pact stated that the independence movement would respect the ethnically, linguistically, and religiously different elements within the Muslim majority. They were not cited as minorities. However, the expression of “political unity on the basis of mutual respect to their differences” meant the open recognition of the different cultural Muslim groups and their partnership in the independence struggle. In the process, however, the nationalist elite receded from such a conception but moved towards the rejection of such differences. In other words, they began to view such differences as minor and ignorable cultural differences that should have been united under a single political authority.

In this respect, one should underline the point that behind the claim of cultural sameness and homogeneity, there was the ideal and the search for a strong state which thought to be the only way for the survival of Turkish people. Faced with the danger of the disintegration of their home territory among the Anatolian peoples, the Turkish nationalists came to the point that a strong state can only be established under the pretence of a hegemonic identity which would unite all the particularities and differences under a centrally defined, unitary political identity. The Lausanne Treaty was the historical moment that the Turkish nationalists finally determined and declared their project to the international community. The pluralist understanding of

⁵⁰ See the related discussion on pp.126-129 of this dissertation.

the National Pact was completely abandoned and “Turkishness” was expressed as the final formulation of the national citizenship.

Therefore, at this stage of nation-building the non-existent but idealized homogeneity was formulated on the basis of religion however, during the conference, it was activated as a nationality principle. The Turkish delegation used the term “Turkish nation” when they were talking about the Muslim majority of Anatolia and the Thrace. In this respect, the Lausanne Conference and the peace treaty were the historical moments after which the state elite activated an understanding of a supreme national identity -“Turkishness”- as a public identity for the individual citizen.

Therefore, the search for a strong political unity directed the Turkish mind in the early construction period. In this respect, the conception Turkish (national) citizenship was very close to French model of civic-territorial citizenship. The founders of the new state formulated their ideal citizen as the member of a particular territory with a full commitment to the central political authority. This was civic-territorial conception of citizenship that comprising all the peoples - whatever their cultural, linguistic or religious differences - living within a clearly defined territory as the members of the political unity. The strength of the political unity in return depends on the strength of this commitment.⁵¹

Throughout the negotiations of the Minorities Sub-Committee, Turkish delegation opposed strongly to any regulation which could damage territorial integrity and the political unity of the new state. As reflected in the body-text and the spirit of the treaty, territorial integrity and political unity were the basic credentials of a centrally defined but inclusionary national identity which necessitated the removal

⁵¹ See the related discussion in chapter 2 of the dissertation on pp.81-83.

of all other cultural identities from the political sphere. Every individual who accepts the territorial-political integrity of the state can become the citizen whatever his/her cultural origin. In this way, at Lausanne, Turkish citizenship was formulated mainly as a political membership but with a tacit ethnic criterion around which a hegemonic Turkishness would be constructed in the coming periods.

Within this framework, the Turkish delegation specifically opposed to the regulations that would provide special protection to non-Turkish Muslim communities, particularly to the Kurdish people on the ground that it would damage the territorial-political integrity of the new state. However, the Allied representatives succeeded to revise the first articles of the minority part as to provide some degree of protection also for the non-Turk Muslim communities. In this respect, articles 38 and 39 were particularly important.

According to article 38, the Turkish government is obliged to provide full protection to the lives and liberties of “every people living in Turkey” (*Türkiye’de oturan herkes*) regardless of their birth, nationality, language, ethnicity or religion. In the same way, every individual living in Turkey have the right to freely fulfill whether publicly or privately the requirements of their religion, belief or religious sects that does not conflict with the general public order and moral rules of the society.⁵² According to Baskin Oran, with the phrase of “every people living in Turkey” such a fundamental negative right was recognized not only to Turkish citizens but also all the peoples living in Turkey. Therefore, this article also pertains to the non-Turk Muslim communities.⁵³ During the negotiations, as a matter of fact, the Allied representatives finally agreed to accept the Turkish proposal in return to

⁵² Soysal, *Türkiye’nin*. 103. See Appendix G for the related articles in Turkish.

⁵³ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 226.

the phrase of “every people living in Turkey” in this article.⁵⁴ In this way, they specifically concerned to include non-Turk Muslim minorities of Turkey.

In the second paragraph of the article 39, similarly, an important positive right was recognized these groups. It stated that any Turkish citizen –whatever his/her religious origin- could use any language whether in private or in commercial relations, in public meetings and in publication. Moreover, those Turkish citizens who spoke a language other than Turkish would have the right to use their mother-tongue in trials.⁵⁵ It is very clear that in this article, not only the Turkish citizens of non-Muslim minorities but also those Turkish citizens who spoke a language other than Turkish have the right to use their language in public. This is the most unknown regulation of the Lausanne Treaty which provided a fundamental cultural right to the non-Turkish speaking communities living in Turkey to protect their culture and language. In this respect, the articles 26 and 28 of the Turkish Constitution which prohibited the use of languages other than Turkish in publications until recently openly violated the Lausanne Treaty.⁵⁶ Therefore, the current discussions about the right to make publications in mother tongue” becomes obviously obsolete when we consider the fact that the Lausanne had already recognized this right to the Turkish citizens who spoke languages other than Turkish as their mother-tongue. These articles of the treaty have never been applied yet in Turkey.

At this point it can be argued that although such articles were put in the treaty under the strong pressures of the Allied governments to provide some degree of protection to the non-Turkish Muslim communities of Turkey, there have been clear

⁵⁴ Meray, *Lozan*. Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap 2, 206.

⁵⁵ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 103-104.

⁵⁶ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 226-227.

irregularities in the application of the treaty. Such irregularities were obviously related with the general perspective of the Turkish state elite that the Lausanne Treaty should be interpreted in a way as to prevent the demands that might damage the territorial-political integrity of the state and the unitary citizenship identity it envisaged. The subsequent Turkish governments continued the social vision that was developed in accordance with this supra-political grand rule which saw cultural-national homogeneity as the main guarantee of national security defined as political integrity.

These underlying principles which were crystallized at Lausanne were the reflections of the idealized fusion between political membership (citizenship) and cultural belonging (national identity) as a single, unitary and centrally defined political identity which was described as “Turkishness”. In this definition, there was not any emphasis on an original, authentic, ethnic Turkishness and therefore an exclusionary perspective. Rather the Turkish identity was defined as a supreme political identity comprising every individual who committed the ideals of political unity and the territorial integrity. However, this understanding perfectly included the basic defect of the French model of civic-territorial citizenship which is the search for political integrity in strives for cultural unity.⁵⁷ In other words, the French model of unitary citizenship has historically and conceptually entailed the eradication and/or assimilation of all cultural, religious, ethnic and other kinds of differences which might damage the political unity. Only a politically integrated, strong state can provide the security of the society which should be united under the centrally defined identity and a general value system.

⁵⁷ See the related discussion on pp.62-63 of the dissertation.

In this respect, this model of national identity rests on a hegemonic position of an ethnic identity. The formulation of Turkish citizenship in this period fits well to this conception. Behind its inclusionary rhetoric, it rests on an ethnic origin which then became the catalyst to differentiate between proper citizens and the others. This defect of this early formulation was reflected to the first Citizenship Law of the Turkish Republic within the 1924 Constitution which will be analyzed in the end of this part in detail.

7.4. The Lausanne Treaty and the New Political Mode of Integration

The political aspect of a particular citizenship identity reflects that in a political community, the members are tied with a political bond of common values, laws, institutions and a conscience of common conduct of their collective affairs which as a whole express a common purpose of living together. In Turkish history, the Lausanne Treaty was the foreign policy act par excellence that represents the momentous turning point that drew the ethical boundaries of the new political community inside, enforced an idea of inside/ outside and even brought a hierarchy of values to which the political order and the citizenship identity depends. The Lausanne Peace Conference as a process and the treaty as the document provided the ground on which a completely new domestic order –as well as an international position- were constructed for Turkey both of which were the parts of the “status quo” for the subsequent periods.

Concerning the former, with the Lausanne Treaty, a modern nation-state was established for the first time in the Middle East. It became the transformative act which forced the founders of the new state to accept several irreversible regulations

about the domestic socio-economic and legal-political order of their own country.⁵⁸ The treaty became the framework for the complete transformation of the domestic legal-political order in a way to provide the individual citizen a new political universe and a new account of political membership.⁵⁹ These aspects of the treaty will be analyzed within the framework of the transformation of the basic laws of the country.

Throughout the conference, having faced with the strong pressures of the Allied governments especially about the legal system of the Ottoman State, the founders of the republic had to develop a new perspective in relation to the future domestic order of the new state. They had already declared their determination that the new state would leave the imperial-religious perspective both in the international and domestic fields in a definite manner. However, throughout the conference, it became clear that the independence of the new Turkish State would depend on the complete abandonment of the ancient order especially with respect the legal system. Therefore, as the first effect, the Lausanne process gave an opportunity to the nationalist leaders to declare the ancient regime null and void even before the beginning of the conference. The Sultanate was abolished and the GNA government remained as the only political authority in the country.

Secondly, as underlined above, the treaty paved the way for a radical transformation of the citizenship understanding of the ruling elite. In order to be accepted to the European modern state system, the founders of the new state embraced a modern secular citizenship understanding which was closer to French

⁵⁸ Sander, "Lozan'ın,"12.

⁵⁹ Bilal Şimşir, "Lozan ve Çağdaş Türkiye'nin Doğuşu" [Lausanne and the Birth of the Modern Turkey] in *70. Yılında Lozan Barış Andlaşması, Uluslararası Seminer* [The Lausanne Peace Treaty in Its 70th Anniversary, International Seminar] (Ankara: İnönü Vakfı Yayınları, 1994), 34-37.

civic-republican model the basic tenets of which were put forward for the first time during the conference.

Thirdly, the ruling elite decided that modernization should have been continued in the form of complete Westernization which would bring new values, rules and moral norms for the individual citizen instead of the deeply entrenched Ottoman conception of subject-citizen. The following parts will dwell on these three points in order to picture out the final position of the Turkish nationalists with respect the construction of the political aspect of modern Turkish citizenship in this early period.

7.4.1. The Change of the Political Universe: Abolishment of the Monarchy before the Lausanne Conference

Concerning the political aspect of citizenship identity, three points should be emphasized as the effects of the abolition of the Sultanate before the Lausanne Conference. First of all, the foreign policy consideration of being the only legitimate representative of the Turkish nation –as expressed by the leaders of the nationalist government- provided the ground for the nationalists, particularly Mustafa Kemal to make such a great transformation despite a very strong opposition. Secondly, with the removal of the Sultanate, all historically deeply rooted understandings, loyalties, values, and institutions that shaped the political universe of the ordinary subject-citizen turned into nothing. The fundamental allegiance –which was loyalty to Sultan- that bound the individual-citizens to each other and to the public authority, was removed overnight. In this respect, the abolition of the Sultanate was a real revolution since it removed the centuries-long authority center and therefore started the transformation of the mode of integration of the society.

Thirdly, by changing the political universe of the ordinary citizen in such a radical way, the treaty drew the terms of the political sphere, i.e., the limits of political possibilities. The conservative and religious circles were left outside of the crucible of politics because of their pro-Sultanate tendencies. In this sense, the Lausanne process made clear that the new political entity would derive its legitimacy from its denial of the Ottoman heritage in all aspects of life. In this respect, the treaty became one of the sources of the new collective and individual identity since it destroyed the political allegiance which had been essential for the constitution of that identity.

During the initial years, the abolition of the Sultanate which meant the end of the centuries long political system of the Ottoman State was totally unthinkable for the cadres that organized the nationalist movement. The primary figures as well as the local supporters of the movement genuinely identified the salvation of the country with the salvation of the Sultan-Caliph. The main component of their political identity was loyalty to Sultan-Caliph both as a political and religious-spiritual authority. Therefore, such a great transformation meant the loss of the political universe only where they could have a public-political identity.

However, as the damage of the Istanbul government to the nationalist cause grew, serious anti-monarchical feelings began to rise among the nationalists. There was one particular external reason that made the removal of Sultanate essential. The Allied governments particularly the British government was viewing the nationalist government as the continuation of the Ottoman State since all the primary figures of the new elite were from the Ottoman cadres. Therefore, the Allied governments thought that the nationalists did not have the power to change the centuries long

Ottoman order completely.⁶⁰ This attitude of the great powers had the counter effect of fuelling the revolutionary aspirations among the nationalists. In the aftermath of the London Conference, those who support the abolition of the Sultanate rose significantly. It was clear the removal of the Sultanate would solve the representation crisis but more importantly, it would remove an alternative power center.

Therefore, the external conditions provided a legitimate ground for Mustafa Kemal as the leader to take the initiative to abolish the Sultanate although he personally made sure the primary figures like Hüseyin Rauf, Kazım Karabekir and some others that he did not have such an idea.⁶¹ The main political body of the Ottoman State was abolished overnight by the personal initiative of Mustafa Kemal who himself acknowledged that if there was not such an external compulsion, the problem of the position and the future of the Sultanate could not be solved in such a short period of time.⁶²

Because of the tension within the elite and the possibility of popular opposition, however, the law which abolished the Sultanate did not clearly express the abolition.⁶³ It was clear that neither the assembly, nor the ordinary people were ready for such a great transformation. Even the primary figures of the nationalist movement argued for the necessity of such a center of authority which held the society together. In this sense, the point is that the idea of national sovereignty was still an abstract principle which did not provide an alternative framework of identity for the individual citizen. In other words, the abolition of the monarchy destroyed the existing political universe but did not create a new one. The Lausanne process

⁶⁰ Selim Deringil, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Köprü Olarak Lozan" [Lausanne as a Bridge between the Ottoman State and the Republic] in *70. Yılında*. 136-137.

⁶¹ Shaw, *From Empire*. 1883-1884.

⁶² Atatürk, *Söylev*. 371-372.

⁶³ Oran, *Türk Dış*. 215.

became the catalyst that differentiated the adherents of a new political order and the opposition forces. It became clear that loyalty to Sultan –later to the Caliph- became the political disposition that would be definitely removed from the political sphere in the subsequent periods. Because of the possibility of counter-revolution, the government was very sensitive towards all kind of oppositionary ideas and criticisms which might be used by the pro-Sultanate forces. The authoritarian tendencies and the limitation on politics began in this early period.

7.4.2. The Emergence of A Secular, Civic-Republican Conception of Citizenship during the Lausanne Conference

The abolition of the monarchy before the Lausanne Conference brought a fundamental change in the political order country. The process of Peace Conference however, that is the negotiations and the political regulations of the final peace treaty indicated that the changes would go much beyond this regime change. In these discussions and in the final resolutions, the Turkish government put forward the basic principles of its future republican order and civic-secular citizenship identity. Although it was not declared openly, in three fundamental discussions –the problem of the family and personal status of the minorities, the privileges demanded for the minorities and the issue of the removal of the judicial capitulations- it became clear that the Turkish ruling elite had a project of a republican political order. Therefore, the Lausanne process witnessed the emergence of a modern civic-republican citizenship identity as a centrally defined unitary, secular, and comprehending political identity in Turkey.

7.4.2.1. The First Formulation of Turkish Republicanism: The Principle of Equality under the Service of Political Integrity

The idea of equality of all citizens on behalf of law which is the ground rule of modern citizenship were firmly defended especially during the negotiations about minority protection rights and about the laws that would be applied to foreign citizens living in Turkey. While in the former case, Turkish delegation accepted the general rules about the citizenship rights of all Turkish citizens; in the latter case this principle was used as an instrument to end the privileges that had been given by the Ottoman government.

In the framework of the minority protection rights, the article 39 clearly stated that the Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin would benefit from the same civil and political rights with the Muslim citizens. Those who live in Turkey would be equal in law regardless of their religion. Secondly, article 40 stated that the Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin would benefit from the same procedures and protections that were provided to Muslim citizens both in terms of law and actuality.⁶⁴ In this way the Turkish government officially certified that there would be full equality between the non-Muslim and Muslim citizens of the new state.

On the other hand, however, Turkish delegation put extreme emphasis on the principle of equality in law especially during the discussions about the laws that would be applied to the family and personal issues of the minorities. According to the Turkish delegation this principle meant the complete abolition of the privileges and/or specific regulations which were previously recognized to minorities. They argued that the privileges with regard to the family and personal status of the minorities –the issues of marriage, divorce, adoption etc- definitely disrupted the

⁶⁴ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 103-104. See Appendix G for the related articles in Turkish.

sense of equality of citizens on behalf of law. The delegation confirmed that in order to end the legal anarchy in this respect, the new government would prepare a new citizenship law (Medeni Kanun) which would be applied to all Turkish citizens regardless of religious differences.⁶⁵ This issue was negotiated for a long time and in the end Turkish side accepted a temporary resolution proposing a mid-way between the Allies' proposal and the Turkish thesis in return for the acceptance of their proposal with regard to the removal of all judicial capitulations.

Another aspect of the principle of equality of all citizens in law was the equality of citizenship rights and obligations. In the same way, by relying on the principle of equality once again, the Turkish delegation rejected the exemption of the minorities from military duty. In the second meeting of the Minorities Sub-Commission on December 13th 1922, İsmet Bey opposed to this demand by arguing that such an exemption would mean the recognition of a special privilege to a particular group of citizens which would seriously damage the sense of unity among the citizens. He underlined that the only condition for the peaceful co-existence of the different elements in Turkish society was their absolute equality with respect to citizenship rights and obligations.⁶⁶ In another meeting of the Minorities Subcommittee on December 18th 1922, the Turkish side clarified its position by arguing that all Turkish citizens were obliged with the same citizenship duties, as they would benefit from the same civil and political rights. The purpose of minority rights was to provide the conditions for the all citizens to benefit from the common law on an equal basis, not to define some privileges that would create inequality.⁶⁷ In this sense, during the Lausanne process, the principle was formulated as an “absolute

⁶⁵ Meray, *Lozan*. Takım I, Cilt I, Kitap 1, 223-225.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 306-307.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 160-162.

equality” which did not entail additional positive rights for the disadvantaged sections of the society. Although the Turkish delegation accepted the general positive rights for its minorities, they strongly opposed to the privileges that might not only disrupt equality but also provide a ground for the rise of separationist demands as during the time of the Ottoman State.

The Turkish delegation faced with severe pressures about this issue. In the meetings between 13 December-11 January 1922 it was brought up onto the agenda by the Allied representatives, especially by the Greek delegation continuously. In end, the head of Turkish delegation, Rıza Nur put the final point: Not only the Turkish government but also the whole Turkish public opinion was completely against this idea. If the Christian citizens did not want to fulfill that citizenship duty, they should leave Turkish citizenship totally.⁶⁸ On the other hand, İsmet Bey stated that Turkish government considered the unity and integrity of their country as of great significance. They saw the principle of equality of citizens with respect to rights and duties as inseparable part of the political integrity of the new state.⁶⁹

The point is that, the Turkish delegation put such an extreme emphasis on the “equality of rights and obligations” not because it was the basic condition for a modern-democratic system. Rather, it was put forward as the basis of a “unitary citizenship identity” which include the same collection of rights and duties for all citizens therefore it would unite all the citizens under a centrally defined political identity. Such a formulation of citizenship identity was vital for the territorial and political integrity of the country. In this respect, from the perspective of the history of democratic rights in Turkey, one can argue that the principle of “equality of all

⁶⁸ Ibid. 262.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 306-307.

citizens on behalf of law” was perceived and interpreted by the founders of the new state, as an instrument of foreign policy to defend the sovereign independence of the country and as the basis of unity rather than as a democratic end in itself. Therefore, the political dimension of citizenship was/ is mainly the expression of a common political purpose, i. e., the consolidation of the sovereignty and integrity of the state.

Since the basic principle on which the new citizenship identity was constructed was at the same time a common purpose for the society, the modern Turkish citizenship identity was born as a “republican citizenship”. The founders of the state defined a common good for the citizens whose purpose of being equal was the consolidation of this ideal. In this sense, the objectives of political unity and territorial integrity became the constructive ideals which were beyond and above politics.

Historically, modern ideal of legal and moral equality of citizens rests on a measure of common values which supervise an understanding of equality among the population or at least among the ruling elite.⁷⁰ In Turkish case, the idea which has been supervising the value of equality has been the objective of strong state and political integrity. The principle of equality of all citizens on behalf of law was activated as a measure or as a guarantee to impede foreign intervention and as the basis of political integrity. It characterized the nature of the civic ideology that was thought to bind the peoples living in Turkey. It was a conception of equality under the service of a central political purpose that is the political unity of the state and the society. The first credentials of Turkish republicanism therefore were formulated in this very early period by the founders of the state through such a constructive foreign policy act.

⁷⁰ Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991),72.

Concerning the identity of the individual citizen, as a political identity Turkish citizenship was/has been rested on a fundamental purpose. Participating to that common purpose as a citizenship duty comes before the citizens' rights in the public sphere. Accordingly, an individual's claim to citizenship is legitimate only when he/she perfectly accomplishes citizenship practices and works for the community. The Turkish delegation's emphasis on the importance of military duty was the indication of such a conception of citizenship. Therefore, in this very early period, the Turkish point of view as defended at Lausanne pictured the basic features of Turkish republicanism which were the emphasis on duties and the definition of a central conception of public good that would be committed by all the citizens. The essence and the objective of politics was put forward as the protection of the territorial and political integrity as a shared purpose to which everyone and everything within the state is subordinated. The unity of the republic is the fundamental value and the condition for good life.

7.4.2.2. Secularism and Westernization as Imperatives

The second aspect of the civic-territorial conception of citizenship identity as emerged during the Lausanne process was the principle of secularism which was defended strongly by the Turkish delegation before it was introduced in the domestic public opinion. Especially during the negotiations about the removal of the judicial capitulations, the Turkish delegation faced with strong pressures to make wide scale secularization in its judicial and the legal system. In this respect, the reformation – particularly the secularization - of the general legal system in accordance with the

Western standards, especially of the citizenship law became an imperative for Turkish government during the Lausanne process.⁷¹

The commitment for secularization became the crucial point in the solution of two primary issues of the conference. The first one was the problem of the laws that would be applied in personal and family cases of minorities in Turkey. The Allied governments insisted on the point that the reformed citizenship law of Turkey and other related laws were still inspired from the religious law -Sharia- which could not be applied to minorities personal and family law matters. In the meeting of the Minorities Sub-Committee on December 2nd 1922, İsmet Bey explained Turkish position that with the recent legal reformation Turkish Law -especially the citizenship law- was secularized to the extent that it reached to the Western standards.⁷² Despite their continuous efforts, Turkish delegation could not persuade the Allied delegations. The head of the British delegation, Lord Curzon made clear the Western position by stating that the new citizenship law (Mecelle) was prepared by religious scholars, therefore, it was also based on religious doctrines. The religious minorities' personal and family matters could not be regulated with this law. In accordance with the minority protection mentality, minorities would be able to apply their own religious and cultural mores and rules in their civil matters. Faced with intense pressures, the Turkish delegation declared that the new Turkish State would prepare a fully secular civil code which would be applied both to Muslim and non-Muslim Turkish citizens equally. They proposed a transition period in which

⁷¹ Şimşir, "Lozan," 34.

⁷² Meray, *Lozan*. 8-9.

minorities' traditional rules and morals would be applied in their personal and family cases but when the new law was accepted it would be applied to all citizens.⁷³

The second and more problematic issue was the removal of judicial capitulations that is the abolishment of the foreign laws and courts. Judicial capitulations were one of the most significant problems for Turkey since it was viewed as an infringement of state sovereignty. Throughout the conference, it was one of the two issues –the first one was the project of Armenian homeland- at which the Turkish delegation displayed strong resistance. In the initial meetings, İsmet Bey made clear that they would not accept a temporary or mid-way solution about judicial capitulations. Full independence and complete sovereignty of the new state would depend on the removal of judicial capitulations since legal sovereignty was an inseparable part of state sovereignty. It was a vital issue for Turkey to the extent that the conference was suspended mainly because of this problem in February 1923.

As early as in the meeting of the related sub-committee on December 2nd 1922, İsmet Bey stated that since the recent reforms in the spheres of commercial law, criminal law, criminal proceedings and in the related subjects and statutes were prepared by taking the laws of various European states as models, the Turkish law was secularized to a great extent.⁷⁴ Therefore, there was no necessity for the special courts and laws for the foreigners living in Turkey.

The Allied delegations accepted the competence of the Turkish laws and the Turkish courts in the cases related with the foreigners. But since the Turkish laws were still generally relied on religious rules, the Allied delegations proposed that there should have been also foreign judges in these courts. They insisted on the point

⁷³ Ibid. 223-239.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 9.

that unless Turkey guaranteed to make necessary improvements to completely modernize its legal system, the judicial capitulations would not be removed definitely. In the meeting on January 20th 1923, it became clear that the negotiations were plugged and the conference was suspended.⁷⁵

In the second period of the conference, the Turkish government agreed on accepting foreign judges as advisors in the reform committees of the Turkish Ministry of Justice and to observe the operation of the civil, commercial and criminal courts for a period of five years. This issue was regulated in the Explanation about the Administration of Justice of the Lausanne Treaty.⁷⁶ The document stated that Turkish government gained the sovereign right of judgement in the cases related with the foreign citizens without any foreign intervention. However, to realize the reforms which were the conditions for moral and the civilizational development, Turkish government agreed to employ foreign advisors. In return, with the Convention on the Settlement and the Adjudicatory Power, the judicial capitulations were removed completely. It guaranteed the equality of foreign citizens with Turkish citizens in law in financial and economic matters.⁷⁷

From the political point of view, although the Turkish delegation succeeded to have the Allied governments to accept the removal of the capitulations, at the same time, the new state entered under the obligation of the Western Public Law.⁷⁸ The Turkish government had to guarantee that they would completely secularize Turkish legal system and the governmental philosophy. The Explanation about the Administration of Justice –an added document to the treaty- recorded this as a

⁷⁵ Sonyel, *Turkish*. 208-209.

⁷⁶ Soysal, *Türkiye'nin*. 202-203.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 165-172.

⁷⁸ Sander, "Lozan'ın," 12.

binding clause for the Turkish government.⁷⁹ In this way, secularization became an imperative not a choice for the new state. It would be the only way to obtain full independence and complete sovereignty. In this respect, the Lausanne process brought a definite prospect for the founders of the new state. Especially İsmet İnönü committed fully to the principle of secularism during the Lausanne process and strictly defended it in the subsequent periods.⁸⁰

Therefore, at Lausanne, the Turkish delegation officially declared the establishment of a secular political order which would not differentiate its citizens as Muslims and non-Muslims but would separate the religious and earthly issues from each other. The Lausanne Treaty got the reform process started which would completely transform the state-society relations and introduced a new secular citizenship identity. After Lausanne, secularization reforms began one by one, like the abolishment of the caliphate, the changing of the days of weekends –in line with the Western system-, the unification of the national education, the abolishment of the Ministry of Sharia and Religious Foundations, and the unification of national courts. All these reforms were directed to erase the religious allegiance which had been the main component of the collective and individual public identity.⁸¹

On the other hand, basic laws were changed through direct reception. Throughout 1923, the reform commissions were established but they could not develop concrete solutions. Rather, the members of the commissions who were coming from the Ottoman law tradition reached to the conclusion that the religious doctrines (*fıkıh esasları*) should have come before the universal legal standards.⁸² At

⁷⁹ Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Batı Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmesi* [The Adoption of Western Law in Turkey] (Ankara: TTK, 1996), 179-180.

⁸⁰ Şimşir, “Lozan,” 41.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Bozkurt, *Batı*. 184-185.

this point, it was clear that internal dynamics of the country was resisting to such radical transformations. Especially in the sphere of citizenship law, the commission proposed minor changes on the Ottoman Civil Law (Mecelle) which was supposed to be changed completely. Under these circumstances, the founding cadre decided to dissolve the commissions and gave up the idea of reformation. The idea of revolution became dominant. The government decided to adapt the Swiss Civil Code with minor changes. In the same way, the legal revolutions were completed through direct reception of Swiss Criminal Code and Law of Obligations, the Italian Criminal Code throughout 1926.⁸³ Finally, the phrase citing Islam as the state religion was removed from the constitution.

In this way, within five years –which was the period for foreign advisors to work in Turkish reformation- after the signing of the treaty, legal revolution was completed. The religious rules and laws were eliminated both from the texts and the spirit of the basic laws of the country. In this way, the religious aspect of the state-citizen allegiance and the supremacy of the religious rules in public life were removed completely.

7.5. The Lausanne Treaty as the Premise of the 1924 Constitution and the First Citizenship Law

As the above part analyzed in detail, it was finally with the Lausanne Treaty that the territorial, cultural (national) and ethical-ideological boundaries of Turkish citizenship were drawn completely. Throughout the national struggle period, new conceptions of “community inside” and “proper membership” were being evolved in the minds of the nationalist leaders especially within a process of ideological and

⁸³ Ibid. 190-208.

political interactions with the external world. These interactions contributed to the formation of a genuinely “nationalist” foreign policy which paralleled to the development of a “nationalist” self-perception and an idea of “national” citizenship identity. Therefore, the development of national citizenship identity in Turkey was integral to the development and application of a nationalist foreign policy during the national struggle period.

The physical-territorial boundaries of the “national citizenship inside” were drawn mostly on the basis of the “realpolitik” with an underlying principle of maintaining maximum religious-cultural homogeneity. In this respect, the territorial resolutions of the treaty reflected the elite’s search for a religiously homogenous political community and unitary citizenship identity based on this homogeneity.

The definition of the national boundaries of the “community inside” and therefore the official citizenship is, however, a much more complicated issue. Especially in the beginning of the national struggle, the fundamental principle of national closure –the cultural criteria of being the member of the community inside– was religion. However, in the process, a supreme national identity was formulated as “Turkishness” which originated from an ethnic category but claimed to comprehend all Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia and Thrace. A new conception of unitary-national citizenship was formulated on the basis of religious homogeneity which was activated as a nationality principle.

The point is that it was with the formation of a particular national security conception –which was mainly defined through the relations with the external world– that the founders of the state specified the terms of the new “national community” and “national citizenship identity”. Two groups were defined as threats against national security. First, the non-Muslim minorities who caused the dismemberment

of the empire directly left outside both the territorial and cultural boundaries of membership to the new political community. Accordingly, the Lausanne Treaty regulated the sending of as much non-Muslims as possible through its resolutions of citizenship and population exchange. Secondly, the ethnically different Muslim communities who had separate political claims were excluded from proper membership even they physically remained inside. In the same way, the Lausanne Treaty described the Muslim majority as a political-cultural totality and rejected ethnic and cultural minority rights. Therefore, at Lausanne, as in the previous foreign policy acts and decisions of the national struggle period, the two-dimensional national security conception determined the terms of both the external and internal national closure of Turkish citizenship.

This two-dimensional national security conception which was formulated within an imperial dissolution process, determined the boundaries of "the national" in this early period. During the Lausanne process, in addition to religious homogeneity, the Turkish delegation tried to guarantee the hegemony of Turkish identity and therefore defined the community inside also by an ethnic criterion. A significant indicator of the rising importance of Turkish ethnic origin in the formulation of the "community inside" was the acceptance of the loss of Musul and Western Thrace which might be disruptive of an idealized religious-national homogeneity because of their ethnically complex population structures.

Therefore, the official formulation of Turkish citizenship was based on the denial of the ethnic and cultural diversity in the country. Only the non-Muslims were recognized as the official minorities who needed special protection. The new Turkish government recognized the internationally accepted minority rights to these groups under the strong pressure of the Allied governments. However, as the arguments of

the Turkish delegation at Lausanne well indicated, even these rights were viewed as special privileges disrupting the sense of equality among the citizens rather than democratic rights to provide genuine equality. The founders of the state viewed the non-Muslim peoples as “foreign elements” and a source of threat rather than the genuine peoples of Anatolia. Soon after the establishment of the republic, the non-Muslim communities were forced to give up their cultural protection rights. It was claimed that Turkish Citizenship was the only identity they needed to live equally in Turkey. However, under the pretence of equality, they would be subject to discrimination in many fields of public life especially throughout the 30’s. It was clear that they would never be proper members of Turkish society even they were official Turkish citizens.

Concerning the Muslim majority which began to be defined as the “Turkish Nation” just before the conference, a civic-territorial conception of citizenship was put forward with the argument that the inhabitants of Turkey who had full commitment and political loyalty to the new state would be accepted as equal Turkish citizens whatever their cultural, ethnic, religious and sectarian differences. This inclusionary formulation, however, brought also the denial of ethnic, religious-sectarian and linguistic differences. As a matter of fact, this formulation claimed not just political unity but also the cultural unity of the different communities within the Muslim majority. Therefore, “Turkishness” was formulated not just as a supreme political identity emphasizing the political unity of the Muslim communities but also as a hegemonic cultural identity which denied the existence of ethnic, cultural, linguistic differences within the Muslim majority. Therefore, the Lausanne Treaty was the historical moment at which the ideas of cultural belonging and political membership were fused within a hegemonic idea of “Turkishness”. Turkish

citizenship was defined as a single, unitary, centrally defined political identity which was closed to cultural plurality. In this respect, it was clear that the commitment to political integrity of the new state would not be sufficient to be a proper Turkish citizen. A commitment to the cultural-linguistic supremacy of Turkish identity was also essential. This underlying concern of this early period made clear that Turkish ethnic identity would be locus of the future assimilationist policies.

Therefore, the Lausanne process and the final peace treaty indicated that a civic-territorial conception of national identity would feature official Turkish citizenship as a political membership which ideally referred to the political unity of the all the peoples living in Turkey. There was not in any sense an explicit ethnic-genealogical conception of “community inside”. However, when one considers the underlying national security concerns of the founders of the new state, it is clear that this civic-territorial conception has both discriminatory and assimilationist aspects. The hegemonic position of Turkish ethnic identity which was constructed in this early period paved the way for the future ethnic-genealogical citizenship practices. The point is that as one of the constructive-texts of Turkish citizenship identity, the Lausanne Treaty was the origin of the ambiguity in the modern citizenship conception. Ideally it has a civic-territorial character but it has also the nucleus of an ethnic conception of nation which would gain prevalence in the subsequent periods.

This duality or indeterminacy in the nature of Turkish citizenship has been described as a movement of oscillation between ethnic and civic conceptions.⁸⁴ As a general point, the recent studies emphasized that as a theoretical formulation, Turkish citizenship rests on a civic-territorial conception of membership, but as the modernist

⁸⁴ Betigül Ercan Argun, “Democratization, Human Rights and Ethnic Politics in Turkey. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*. 19(April 1999); Ümit Cizre, “Turkey’s Kurdish,” 231.

project confronted with growing challenges, the successive republican governments resorted to citizenship practices which considered Turkish ethnicity and language as determinant factors for proper membership.⁸⁵ This study however, reveals that this indeterminacy exists also in the theoretical construction of Turkish citizenship which was being evolved in this direction throughout the national struggle period and found its final expression in the final Lausanne Treaty. It was then reflected perfectly to the 1924 Constitution which involved the first citizenship regulation of the Turkish Republic.⁸⁶

The constitutional discussions that took place in the national assembly before the promulgation of the 1924 constitution presents important insights to confirm the implicit ethnic character of Turkish citizenship. During the discussions, some deputies opposed to the expression in the first draft of the article on Turkish citizenship which stated that “The people living in Turkey are called as Turks”. The reason of the opposition was relied on the idea that not all the individuals living in Turkey were Turks. One of the primary figures of this group, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) argued that Armenians and Greeks could not be called as Turks because they were not genuine Turks.⁸⁷

Therefore, a clear differentiation was necessary to distinguish between genuine Turks and those non-Turk Turkish citizens. The counter arguments which emphasized that nationality law regulates political membership rather than national belonging did not eliminate this opposition. At the end, article 88 was rewritten as such: “The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race are called as Turks

⁸⁵ Kemal Kirişçi, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices.” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 36(2000),1.

⁸⁶ Suna Kili and Şeref A. Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri* [The Texts of the Turkish Constitutions] (İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2000), 138.

in terms of citizenship.”⁸⁸ The phrase *in terms of citizenship* was added in order to imply the differentiation between the genuine Turks and Turkish citizens of especially other religious origins. However, since it made an emphasis on an genuine, authentic Turkishness, it clearly implied that the notion of Turk was interpreted as something different from the notion of Turkish citizenship.⁸⁹

This underlying philosophy constituted the basis of the future ethnic-isolationist and assimilationist citizenship practices since it connected the proper -if not official- membership to the “community inside” to being a member of Turkish ethnic-cultural identity. The formal definition of Turkish citizenship in the 1924 constitution as formulated and enforced previously by the Lausanne resolutions had a direct reference to territoriality rather than ethnicity. Throughout the republican period, in the official state discourse, Turkish citizenship has been described as a civic-category and thus has been rested on self-identification rather than biologically ascribed qualities of race and ethnicity. However, the article 88 of the 1924 constitution and the general attitude of the ruling elite towards non-Muslim minorities and ethnically different Muslim communities during the Lausanne process indicate that from the state perspective, there should be differentiation between the ethnic Turks and the Turkish citizens of other origins. There is an essential criterion of being Turkish as different from being Turkish citizen which is an inferior position from the former.

Therefore, the Lausanne Treaty and the first citizenship law of the new Turkish State as the theoretical formulations of official Turkish citizenship reflects

⁸⁷ İlhan Unat, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku: Metinler, Mahkeme Kararları* [Turkish Citizenship Law: Texts and the Court Decisions] (Ankara: SBF Yayınları, 1966), 39-40.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 43.

⁸⁹ Sevan Nişanyan, “Kemalist Düşüncede Türk Milleti Kavramı” [The Conception of Turkish Nation in Kemalist Thought] *Türkiye Günlüğü*. 33(Mart-Nisan 1995), 128.

the fundamental duality - the co-existence of the ethnic and the civic elements - within the modern citizenship identity. The point is that it is in the theory not only in the practice of the Turkish citizenship that the roots of an exclusionary, ethnic-genealogical conception of “proper citizenship” lie. The above analysis on the Lausanne process and the peace treaty indicates that it was before the establishment of the republic that the founders of the new state defined their “proper citizens” as ethnically Turkish, religiously Sunni, and Turkish speaking ones.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation aims to make a rereading of official Turkish Foreign Policy in order to reveal its role in the creation and reinforcement of a particular conception of citizenship in relation to the process of nation-building throughout the national struggle period. Specifically the focus of the study is the analysis of the foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalist elite which gradually abandoned the centuries long imperial territorial-social vision and were forced to develop a project of nation-state with a new modern citizenship identity within a process of ideological-political interaction with the external world in this early period.

The recent academic interest in the nature and evolution of modern Turkish citizenship has been an extension of the rising interest in the specific context-based analysis of different citizenship models since the early 1990's. These context-based studies aim to reveal the historical roots of the democratic deficits of existing citizenship regimes and to discuss on the possibility of democratic transformation through a new citizenship conception. According to Turner, a genuine historical record of citizenship tradition of a particular country necessitates specific examination of particular histories.¹ Such kind of studies have to problematize two things: First, the basic character of the fusion between national identity and citizenship in a particular context. Secondly, the formation of the state in the context

¹ Bryan S. Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship" in *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, ed., B. Turner and Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1994), 221.

of cultural, linguistic, religious pluralism. In this sense, this study aims to present a different historical account about modern Turkish citizenship by studying it as an “identity” which is constructed parallel to the nation-building and state building processes during the passage from an imperial rule to republican one. The dissertation supports the idea that it is in this early period that the peculiar fusion between cultural belonging (not in the form of a fully-formed national identity yet) and political membership began in Turkish case. Secondly and more importantly, it is during the early formative period that the nationalist elite who replaced the Ottoman elite was forced to formulate a new social vision and a state ideology while drawing the territorial, cultural and political boundaries of the new “community inside”.

At this point, the main argument of the dissertation is that, the nationalist elite formulated the new social vision and the politics of inside/outside largely under the influence of the general international conjunction of the period and through the successive ideological-political interactions with the foreign states, neighbor countries and the international organizations. The basic character of the period between 1919-1923 was that the development of a truly the “nationalist” foreign policy went parallel to the first formulations of about the territorial, “national” and political boundaries of the “community inside” and the new citizenship identity. In this process, the nationalist elite succeeded to win over the other ethnic groups and political forces by using the discourse of Islamic fraternity and anti-Armenian peril to awaken national consciousness, but more importantly by resting their movement to a cultural-pluralistic conception of the unity of Anatolian peoples which was the necessary corollary of the Wilsonian principles. The first foreign policy documents of the nationalist movement clearly cited that the legal rights, social- cultural, and

environmental conditions of the racial (ethnic), cultural, and religious elements of difference would be respected. In other words, the phase B of the Hroch's schema on the development of a nationalist movement was passed with a formulation which was developed under the influence of an international dynamic in Turkish case.² The Wilsonian principles provided the political framework of the action and the basis of internal and international legitimacy for the nationalist movement in this early period.

The first aspect of the passage from an imperial conception of membership to the modern-national one is the territorial delimitation of the "community inside" which was concretized in the successive foreign policy activities that is declarations, treaties, agreements and diplomatic negotiations of the nationalist government. Historically, territorial demarcation brings an idea of political community and a closure of citizenry since it defines primarily "who will remain inside as the member of the domestic community and who will remain outside". Within a delimited territory, modern citizenship is defined as a transcending identity which accepts the individuals who remain inside as equal citizens whatever their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic origin and denies membership to the people who remain outside even if they share the same culture with the people of the enframed territories.

In most of the modern nation(al)-states, however, the territorially enframed political community is far from having cultural, ethnical, linguistic or some other idealized kind of homogeneity. At this stage, the nationalist leaders speak in the

² Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe." In *Becoming National*, eds., G. Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 63.

name of “hypothetically homogenous” communities especially towards the outside world. In this respect, the foreign policy texts that declare the territorial boundaries and the terms of legitimate membership represents a “foundational moment” at which a homogenous community inside is discursively envisaged although it does not exist in the reality.

In Turkish case, the proclamation of the National Pact on January 28th 1920 has been represented as such a foundational moment and as the document which declared the irreducible, national boundaries of new Turkish State. It has been portrayed as the declaration of a fully-formed nationalist movement reflecting a nationalist ideology in the Western sense of the term. However, the analysis of the original text of the pact indicates that the National Pact did not represent a foundational break from the Ottoman political tradition. The reading of the document from such a perspective shows that, at this stage of the nationalist movement, the nationalist leaders were still thinking within the Ottoman political-ideological framework and their conception of “community inside” did not entail a modern, territorial citizenship identity yet. The Sivas Declaration however, stated more precisely that the armistice line is the accepted as the national frontier. The difference between the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact stems from the fact that while the former was the work of a national congress, the National Pact was the declaration of the last Ottoman Parliament composed of deputies who were fully loyal to Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.

Therefore, contrary to the established ideas, there was not a strict, pre-declared territorial principle in the National Pact. For the regions which were cited by name (the provinces of Elviye-i Selase, i.e., Kars, Ardahan and Batum and the Western Thrace), there was not an open claim but a proposal for plebiscite. Mustafa

Kemal used this uncertainty as a deliberate instrument of ambiguity concerning territorial objectives and interpreted the National Pact as to narrow the frontiers with a realistic assessment of military capabilities. Throughout the national war, in a series of foreign policy decisions, the National Pact was totally blown up from its originally imperial content, modified to refer to the territorial integrity of Anatolia especially against the Armenian and Kurdish claims and gained a more “national” character. In this respect, the period between 1919-1923 can be characterized as the “nationalization of the National Pact” in a way to be the basis of the modern, territorial Turkish citizenship.

The Sévres Treaty became the turning point in this process of “nationalization” of the territorial perspective. Although it was not an act of the Ankara government, the treaty shaped the policy options and the future projection of the nationalist movement to a large extent. First of all, the treaty fixed the territorial objectives of the national struggle as to protect primarily the territorial integrity of Anatolia. The Sévres’ territorial regulations showed that the Allied governments were determined not only to take vast imperial territories but also to divide Anatolia among Armenians, Kurds and the Western Anatolian Greeks. The rejection of these regulations and the saving of the territories on which the Ottoman-Muslims were the definite majority became the main objective even for the most hesitant, pro-sultanate adherents of the national struggle. In this respect, the Sévres Treaty facilitated to the removal the ambiguity in the minds of the nationalists concerning the territorial limits of the national struggle. Especially concerning the southern border, the tendency to interpret the frontier as coinciding with the armistice line became prevalent.

Therefore, the Sévres experience was a definitive step in the process of the abandonment of the imperial territorial vision and conception of membership. The territorial closure of the new political community was generally rested on the principle of the Ottoman-Muslim majority, but concerning the exact demarcation, the Ankara government adopted a conciliationist attitude in accordance with the realistic assessment of the military capabilities. While the Moscow and the Kars Treaties left Batum city where there was a Muslim majority to Georgia in the east, the Ankara Agreement left Hatay province to French control with a special administration in the south. The only exception was the frontier between Armenia and Turkey which was drawn by strictly applying the majority principle. Finally, the negotiations during the London Conference made clear for the Turkish side that the Western Thrace where there were Turkish villages would be added to the national frontiers only through war. The loss of all the territories which were cited in the National Pact by name – except Kars and Ardahan-is the clear indication of the fact that the pact was interpreted as to narrow the frontiers, not in accordance with the tacit imperial outlook.

In the same way, during the Lausanne negotiations the territorial issues were solved with the accommodationist attitude of the Ankara government. In this final stage of the “nationalization of the National Pact”, the new Turkish government gave up its claims on the territories which had complex, multi-religious and multi-cultural population structures. The dissertation emphasizes that, behind this accommodationist attitude there was an underlying concern that these regions –The Western Thrace, the Musul and Hatay provinces- might disrupt the idealized religious-cultural homogeneity of the new political community. Particularly, it was thought that the Kurdish upheaval in Musul might further provoke the Anatolian

Kurds which were already in a state of rebellion against the Ankara government. As a matter of fact, since the underlying principles that directed Turkish point of view during the conference were to maintain the territorial integrity of Anatolia –the complete and definite elimination of Armenian and the Kurdish claims- and to obtain maximum religious-cultural homogeneity within the delimited borders, the leaders of the nationalist government celebrated the treaty as a real success since it fulfilled all these criterion. In this respect, the head of the Turkish delegation İsmet (İnönü) Bey’s evaluation was remarkable: “(The Lausanne Treaty created) a homogenous-unified homeland; within it, freedom from the obligations imposed by the foreigners and from privileges of nature creating a state within a state; freedom from imposed financial obligations; a free, rich homeland with a recognized absolute right of self-defense.”³

As a consequence, the territorial boundaries of the modern Turkish citizenship were drawn in the bi-lateral and multilateral treaties and agreements as the basis of a territorial, unitary, and homogeneous citizenship. The borders of the Lausanne Treaty became the borders of nation-building process which was intensified especially after the mid-20’s. Throughout the republican period, contrary war-time compromising attitude, borders have been accepted as definitive and took precedence over other attributes of Turkish national state. In this respect, Turkish national citizenship identity has a strong territorial dimension.

The dissertation focuses on the “cultural” boundaries of the Turkish citizenship as the second aspect of the politics of closure that was conducted during the national struggle period. Historically, the formation of modern citizenship

³ Mahmut Goloğlu, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 1923* [Turkish Republic 1923] (Ankara; Başnur Matbaası, 1971), 275.

incorporates a national closure which idealizes a perfect cultural homogeneity within a delimited territory and fusion between cultural (national) belonging and political membership. However, this idealized national homogeneity is not real but it is mainly discursively constructed through a “politics of national citizenship” which operates to eliminate and transform “the differences within to differences between”. The point is that the cultural-national boundaries of the “community inside” and the terms of membership are drawn and continuously reproduced by virtue of a particular “national security conception” which frame the domestic community through a particular representation of threat. To put more precisely, as the concept of national security defines the threat, the enemy, the outsider and the foreigner, it also draws the boundaries of the insider, the member and the citizen.

The point is that given the identification between national identity and citizenship, the security of a national community of citizens is defined in terms of the sustainability of traditional, hegemonic patterns of (national) culture, language, religion, specific cultural codes as well as a particular system of values. National security is tightly knit to the security of these particular elements of national identity. Therefore, the national security policy and foreign policy practices based on this policy turn to a performative political discourse through which a distinct national citizenship identity is formed and continuously reproduced.

In this respect, foreign policy texts that is the unilateral declarations, treaties, conventions, agreements and the like can be read as the documents which script and maintain the existing, hegemonic national attributes of a particular citizenship identity. In other words, foreign policy acts and decisions are central in reproducing the ascendancy of the nationality element within a particular conception of political

citizenship. In some cases, it even serves for the strengthening of a single ethnic consciousness as the core of the national citizenship identity.

Before the establishment of the republic, the fundamental premises of the national closure of modern Turkish citizenship became evident in the successive foreign policy acts and decisions of the nationalist government. As emphasized in the above part on territorial closure, the founders of the new state gradually abandoned the imperial social vision and envisaged a new “national” political community with a new conception of national citizenship and this process can be well observed through the foreign policy acts and decisions of the new political initiative. What were the principles of cultural closure as cited in the first foreign policy documents of the period?

Both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact involved a definite answer to this question. The future political community would be a community of “Muslim citizens”. The nationalist elite envisaged a new political community which was supposed to be homogenous on the basis on religion. In this respect, these documents represent a significant continuity with the Ottoman “millet system” since their vision of “community inside” was also based on the Ottoman conception of “millets” as the religious communities to differentiate the people of exclusion and inclusion. However, and more importantly, both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact represents also a break from the Ottoman system and came closer to the Western nation-state model since they envisaged “homogeneity” instead of imperial cultural-religious plurality.

There were two consequences of this early-national closure of citizenship: First, the former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin namely, the Greeks, Armenians and the Jews were definitely excluded from the future “community

inside”. Secondly, the Ottoman-Muslim majority which was composed of various ethnic and religious communities, i.e., the Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Lazes, Arabs and some other smaller sects, were portrayed as an organic cultural unity that would be the principal social basis of the new political organization.

Concerning the first aspect, the exclusion of the non-Muslims from the future political community and from proper membership rested on an emerging conception of “national security” which defined minorities’ claims for independence as the fundamental threat against the security of the Muslim majority. While the National Pact emphasized on the salvation of only the Muslim majority, the Sivas Declaration openly defined the Armenian and Greek demands as “threats against national survival”. In other words, the identity of the threat framed the boundaries of the “national” in this early construction period. The threat against the security of the Muslim majority which primarily coming from the former Ottoman citizens of non-Muslim origin became the basis of a distinct national consciousness which did not exist until that time. Therefore, the national closure as reflected in the first documents of the “nationalist” foreign policy went parallel to the formation of a specific national security conception which has still continued to inform the “politics of citizenship” in Turkey even today.

Secondly, the representation of the Muslim peoples of Anatolia as organically integrated parts of a cultural and political totality “which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance” meant the supremacy of religious allegiance and the rejection of ethnic and cultural differences within the Muslim majority. In this respect, there was not a “national closure” in the Western sense of the term at this stage of the national struggle but there were significant steps taken towards a national community. First, the nationalists made clear that they had a project of a

homogenous political community on the basis of religion as different from the Ottoman imperial cultural-religious plurality. In the coming periods, faced with the need to specify an original Turkish national identity to encounter other identity claims, the nationalists began to activate the idea of religious homogeneity as a “nationality principle” and as the basis of a unitary Turkish national identity. Therefore, the future conception of national citizenship would have a strong religious dimension. In the new Turkish Republic, Islam continued to protect its place as the chief marker of cultural identity and as the cultural norm of the official discourse.⁴

The Sévres Treaty became the turning point in the definition of the cultural boundaries of the “community inside”. On the one hand, it reinforced the idea that the non-Muslim peoples –specifically the Armenians- should be definitely left outside, on the other hand, the treaty resulted in the exclusion of a Muslim community of non-Turkish origin –the Kurdish people of Anatolia- from proper membership. The Sévres resolutions which established an independent Armenia in Eastern Anatolia and an autonomous administration for the Kurds in Southeastern Anatolia shaped the “national” imagery of the leaders of the national movement to the extent that these communities were concretely excluded from the future project of national citizenry. In other words, the Sévres experience contributed to the crystallization of the national attributes as “Turkish ethnicity and language” as the cultural components of the future citizenship identity.

Concerning the exclusion of the Armenians, the point is that, the memory of territorial dissolution is the fundamental factor which has shaped the minds and the official policies of the Ottoman-Turkish ruling elite towards the non-Muslim minorities. In this period, it was after the Sévres Treaty that the conception of the

⁴ Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, “Rethinking the Connections between Turkey’s Western Identity Versus Islam.” *Critique*. 12 (1998), 7.

“community inside” was qualified to the extent that the any public-political manifestation of Armenian existence would not be allowed in the future state. The treaty became a point of reference for the Turkish nationalists to leave the non-Muslims out of the boundaries of “proper membership” if not official equal citizenship. Accordingly, in all diplomatic negotiations and regulations, the Turkish nationalist government counted the Armenians as simply non-existent. In the Moscow and Kars Treaties which were signed with the Soviet Russian and the Soviet Caucasian Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the only article related with the Armenians of the region was the one regulating their migration. Interestingly, in the Gümrü Treaty which was signed between the Tashnak Armenian government and the Ankara government after the military victory of Turkish forces in the east, the Turkish side recognized the right to return to their home territories to the Eastern Anatolian Armenians who were subjected to forced deportation during the world war. During the Moscow Conference, however, the Turkish delegation consistently rejected the Armenian existence in Eastern Anatolia as at a considerable density. The Moscow and Kars Treaties recognized only the right to migration to the Armenians, Georgians and the Azeris who remained in Turkish side. Apart from this regulation, in both treaties, there was neither a mention about a remaining Armenian minority nor specific cultural protection rights for them. In the same way, during the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation firmly rejected demands about Armenians especially the demand for a region for them to live as a community within the new state. In this respect, the Sévres experience was the origin of the discriminatory-exclusionary citizenship practices of the successive republican governments towards the non-Muslim Turkish citizens.

Secondly, the Sévres Treaty is the turning point in the process of the national closure of modern Turkish citizenship since it represents the introduction of the element of ethnicity as the primary criterion for proper membership. It marked the beginning of a mono-ethnic closure and a shift from the understanding of “nation on the basis of religion” to a “nation on the basis of a core ethnicity” and to the rise of an ethnic concern in the early politics of citizenship.

There were two aspects of the Turkish perception of the Kurdish problem in this period. First, the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the degree of foreign support to the Kurdish cause in the international field meant the intersection of internal and external threats which turned the Kurdish demands to a problem of national security in the eyes of the Turkish nationalist leaders. The external threat coming from the imperialist West was perceived as endured by an internal threat of separationism. This was the historical moment at which the Kurdish question was identified with reactionary politics and the Kurdish identity was left outside the boundaries of the “national” since it was a threat against the security of the “national”.

Secondly and related with the above aspect, the degree of foreign support made the nationalist leaders to view Kurdish movement as a “coherent other”, a fully-formed national identity although there was not a uniform, self-conscious, and fully politicized Kurdish national existence in this period. As a matter of fact, the Kurds came close to be seen as a national community at most during this period both by the international community and by the Turkish nationalists although the latter did not accept this openly. This perception generated in return a conception of “proper membership” by an ethnic criterion as different from official citizenship which meant the proper members of the future state would be that of Turkish ethnic origin. Therefore, the Sévres experience was the historical origin of the mono-ethnic

national closure of Turkish citizenship against in fact a “non-existent” other. The leaders of the national struggle developed a self-perception on the basis of Turkish ethnic identity as completely different from Ottoman-Muslim identity.

After the Sévres Treaty, in the face of the need to develop a comprehending national identity which would prevent divisive ethnic challenges, the Turkish nationalists began to employ an official discourse about the Kurdish question in the international field. It was based on the argument that the Kurds were from another branch of central Asian Turks and therefore they were indeed Turks. The idea of “sameness” was officially systemized for the first time during the discussions in the Turkish National Assembly within the framework of preparations for the London Conference. The idea of “sameness” was supported with “scientific” explanations to prove the common historical origin of the Kurds and the Turks and it was underlined that there was no need for a separate Kurdish political entity.

Therefore, the first formulation of Turkish citizenship as a territorial-civic identity that based on the political unity of racial and cultural communities of “common origin” under a single, comprehending, inclusionary identity, i.e., as a French type of national citizenship conception, took place during the London Conference. At this stage, religion was replaced by a Western conception of “nationality” as the cultural component of citizenship more concretely since there was an emphasis on a historical common descent and on the will to live together. During the conference, the Turkish delegation declared Turkish identity as the official identity of the Muslim peoples of Thrace and Anatolia especially, to encounter the Greek national existence in Western Thrace and to downgrade the Kurdish claims in the East. The Turkish delegation for the first time spoke on behalf of a “Turkish nation” as an original, compact, unitary entity. Therefore, the use of the

words “Turks”, “Turkish majority” instead of Ottoman-Muslim majority was reflecting the last position of the founders of the new state against other identity claims in Anatolia during the London Conference.

The Ankara Agreement, which was signed on October 20th 1921 with the French government well reflected the adoption of an inclusionary citizenship identity as “Turkishness”. The civic-territorial but unitary-assimilationist feature of this conception was crystallized especially in the articles related with the special administration of the Hatay province which was left to French mandate Syria. The article 7 of the agreement stated that Turkish language would be the official language of the region –despite the fact that the majority of the city was Ottoman Arabs and there was also a Kurdish minority- and the Turkish people of the region would benefit from cultural minority rights to maintain their culture and language. In this way, the Ankara government specified the ethnic origins of its citizens abroad as Turkish. Moreover, the official status of Turkish language indicates the negation of the Arab and Kurdish population of the region and the intention to assimilate these peoples into Turkish culture. These were clearly the early measures of the Turkish nationalists to establish Turkish identity as the dominant cultural identity in the region and they well informed about the future policies also with respect to non-Turk Muslim communities who remained within the borders.

These early premises of modern Turkish national citizenship were fully crystallized during the Lausanne negotiations and found its perfect expression in the final peace treaty. The dual nature of the national security conception of the national struggle period which defined the non-Muslim minorities and the Kurdish claims as the most significant threats against the security of the Ottoman-Muslim majority reflected in the treaty especially in the Convention on Population Exchange and in

the articles about the minority rights. Concerning the first group, the Turkish delegation argued for the forced immigration of the Greek population of all sects, i.e., Orthodox and Catholic Greeks of Anatolia and Istanbul. Therefore, the Lausanne Peace Treaty confirmed the prevalence of the religion as the main component of the Turkish national citizenship. In one of his speeches in defense of the treaty before signing, the head of the Turkish delegation, İsmet Bey explicitly argued that the non-Muslims were the “foreign elements” that should be removed from Anatolia in order to guarantee the security of the majority. This was the clear indication that there would be tacit, invisible internal boundaries within the new “community inside” which would separate the “citizens in law” and “proper citizens”. Accordingly, the citizenship regulations of the treaty made Turkish citizenship open to the former Ottoman Muslim citizens who remained outside the new frontiers without specifying a national and/or ethnic origin. In this way, the modern Turkish (national) citizenship was born as a non-secular identity since it was fused with primarily a religious identity. This tacit-uncodified conception of “proper citizenship” has determined also the popular perception of collective identity on which the famous political discourse of “99% Muslim majority” has been rested as the foundational legitimizing social basis in Turkey.

Secondly, the war-time social vision which represented the remaining Muslim majority as an organic cultural unity as the basis of an idealized political integrity was fully crystallized at the Lausanne Conference especially during the negotiations in the Minorities Sub-Committee. The Turkish delegation categorically rejected the definition of minorities on the basis of the international standards of ethnicity, religion and language although they had accepted them in the successive diplomatic platforms and documents throughout the war. In the Sivas Declaration

and the National Pact, during the London Conference and in the Ankara Agreement, the Ankara government fully agreed to recognize the internationally accepted standards and rules about minority rights. However, at Lausanne, the Turkish delegation opposed strongly to the definition of Muslim communities of non-Turkish origin as official minorities. Therefore, the Lausanne Treaty was the international ratification of Turkish thesis that there was not separate ethnic, cultural, and/or religious-sectional communities in Turkey which needed special protection.

This decision made definite that Turkish citizenship was defined as a unitary, civic-territorial category which expressed the political unity of the various Muslim communities under a hegemonic Turkish identity. With such a general inclusionary conception and the idealization of the territorial-political unity, the modern Turkish was as very closer to French model of civic-territorial citizenship. However, in this way, it well inherited the basic democratic deficit of the model which is the construction of a centrally defined, hegemonic cultural identity as the only legitimate public identity and the removal of all other identity claims, i.e., languages, cultures and beliefs from the public sphere. In a very short period of time, the search for political unity found its perfect expression in the strives for a (non-existent) cultural unity which brought deliberate policies for the eradication and assimilation of all kinds of elements of difference living within the borders of the new Turkish Republic.

Finally, the period of 1919-1923 witnessed the emergence of the first credentials of the future republican mode of integration and citizenship conception which were the ideas of “national sovereignty” and “political integrity” around which a new political ethos would be built to hold the society together. These ideas

were consolidated as the twin principles of Turkish Republicanism parallel to the crystallization of Kemalism as the state ideology after mid-1920 and especially during the 30's.

Historically, modern citizenship was born with a sense of legal and political equality of the members of the territorially delimited political community. The ideal of equality before law and the equality of rights and obligations for all citizens have been the foundational characteristics of the modern idea of participatory citizenship. However, this foundational idea has been rested on a particular measure of common values which supervise the prevailing conception of equality in particular social contexts.

In this framework, the fundamental political ideals which have supervised the conception of modern egalitarian citizenship in Turkey were formulated as “national sovereignty”, “political integrity” and “organic society” for the first time in the period between 1919-23. These ideas which were put forward in the successive diplomatic interactions and processes throughout the national struggle period, shaped the evolution of republican ideology and in this respect, modern Turkish citizenship was born as a civic-republican citizenship even before the establishment of the republican regime.

The basic character of the period between 1919-1923 is that there were the first signs of an idea of new political community but there was neither a clear determination for a regime change, nor a corresponding political ideology to be the philosophical basis of a new political identity. On the contrary, both the Sivas Declaration and the National Pact underlined the salvation of the Sultan-Caliph as one of the main objectives of the national struggle. Therefore, loyalty to Sultan-Caliph was the locus of individual and collective political identity and the main

allegiance binding the ordinary individual- citizen to the state. Although both documents introduced the idea of national sovereignty as a new basis of legitimacy, it was an abstract principle used widely to emphasize on the unity of the Anatolian Muslim peoples against foreign invasion and the separationism. In other words, it was an expression of an external principle rather than an internal revolutionary ideal.

The passage from loyalty to Sultan-Caliph to the idea of national sovereignty as a new basis of legitimacy took place as a necessary corollary of the search of international recognition and the general international context that forced the nationalist government to develop a distinct political personality. Especially the signing of the Sévres Treaty by the Istanbul government strengthened the anti-monarchist political stance and the abstract idea of national sovereignty began to gain a more concrete meaning of “government resting on people” and of “the power of the people against monarchical authority”.

However, it was the ideological-political interactions and the general rapprochement with the Soviet government that paved the way for the passage from an abstract concept of national sovereignty to a more concrete idea of “people’s rule”. The rising concern to fill the gap between the nationalist movement and the masses under the influence of socialist ideas affected the development of several leftist programs of populism in the Turkish national assembly and affected the constitutional discussions of the period. Concerning the emerging citizenship conception, the point is that the principle of populism and the idea of people’s rule gave way to an idea of (republican) participatory citizenship as opposed to subject citizen. It was in this short period that the Turkish nationalists began to think about the ideas of mass participation, genuine representation, and popular will.

The process of London Conference further fuelled the debate on the character of the new regime and the meaning of popular sovereignty. In the face of the need to obtain a constitutional basis of legitimacy, the Ankara government promulgated a new constitution on January 20th 1921 –the Teskilat-i Esasiye- which was a definite step towards a regime change and the idea of popular sovereignty became a constitutional principle.

Concerning the democratic quality of the emerging republican model and the republican citizenship, the point was that although there was a revolutionary passage to the idea of popular sovereignty as opposed to personal rule –which implies a passage from subject citizen to participatory citizen- the idea of popular participation and the principle of populism were not rested on an explicit “discourse of rights” in this period. In other words, individual and/or citizenship rights did never become a part of the principle of populism and the idea of popular sovereignty which had a strong claim to make the people’s will ascendant in rhetoric. Accordingly, although the 1921 and 1924 constitutions brought the ideas of supremacy of the parliament, constitutionality and legality, they were not rested on a philosophy of rights concerning the relations between the citizen and the state.

This model of national (citizenship) identity is described by Anthony Smith as the dominance of the abstract idea of popular sovereignty rather than the development of the civil and political citizenship rights and of the populist organizational patterns more than democratic parties and finally intervening nation-state rather than the protection of individuals and minorities against the state.⁵ The absence of this dimension reflected to the subsequent legal reformations as the absence of a specific legal regulation about citizenship rights. The idea of popular

⁵ Anthony Smith, *National Identity*.(London: Penguin Books, 1991), 131.

sovereignty remained as the most important component of the nationalist-modernizing political project of creating the republican citizen, but despite its rhetorical supremacy, in reality, the idea of popular sovereignty took sovereignty from a single person but it did not give it either to the people.

Another impediment on the way of the development of modern Turkish citizenship as a right-based political identity was the emergence of the ideas of “political integrity” and “organic society” as the central political ethos to hold the society together. Much more importantly, these twin principles would contribute to the continuation of the Ottoman-Turkish political tradition of strong state which was sharply distinguished from the social forces. With the end of the war, all the war-time coalitions of the nationalist leadership with the local notables, religious and ethnic forces ended and the new state elite established a highly centralized state which left no room for the extension of political constitutional rights to the peripheral forces.⁶ What were the factors and the conditions that made the founders of the new state to develop or continue such a political philosophy and state ideology?

First of all, it was again the Sévres experience that made the disintegration paranoia a durable political feature of Turkish political life. In this period, this paranoia served to the founders of the new state in drawing the ethical-political boundaries of the “community inside” and terms of political membership in a very restrictive way. Especially, the excessive minority rights clauses of the treaty made the nationalists to view minority rights as unity-disrupting rights rather than democratic necessities. The Kemalists shared the Ottoman perception that the minority rights were the primary reason behind Ottoman disintegration. The Sévres

⁶ Metin Heper, “The Strong State and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective.” In *Democracy and Modernity*, ed., S.N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1992), 151 and 155.

experience was the historical background of the development of Turkish citizenship as a unitary, centrally defined identity as an instrument to prevent the development of particularistic loyalties and identities.

These early pre-ordained ideological conditionings surfaced especially during the Lausanne Conference where the Turkish government put more precisely that the new regime would be rested on Western model of nation-state with a unitary citizenship identity. At Lausanne, in three fundamental discussions, the Turkish delegation formulated modern Turkish citizenship as a unitary, secular, civic-territorial, inclusionary identity based on the complete equality of all citizens on behalf of law and in terms of citizenship rights and obligations. The first one was the problem of the personal and family status of the minorities; the second was similarly the abolishment of the judicial capitulations in all spheres including the personal and family status of foreign citizens living in Turkey and the third issue was the demand for the exemption of minorities from military duty.

Concerning the first two issues, the Turkish delegation gave firm guarantees that the new regime would completely secularize the legal system as to be valid also for non-Muslim citizens and for the foreign citizens. In the negotiations on these issues, the Turkish side connected the need to create a secular and equal citizenship institution to the supreme imperatives of state sovereignty and political integrity. For the first and the third issues, the Turkish delegation argued that special privileges and the right to be exempt from military duty which was a citizenship duty would disrupt the sense of equality among the citizens. In this way, the argument of equality of rights and obligations was invoked not as a democratic condition but as a measure against demands for privilege and exemption. During the negotiations about the military duty of the minorities, İsmet İnönü stated clearly that those who did not

comply with citizenship obligations would not have equal rights either. Moreover, the Turkish delegation displayed strong resistance in all these issues with the argument that minorities' excessive demands might damage the political integrity of the country in the future. The basic idea of equality on behalf of law was defended as the basis of a unitary citizenship identity which would be the guarantee of political integrity rather than as a democratic end in itself. Furthermore there was a special emphasis on citizenship duties rather than rights in this early period. Therefore, the historical context of the development of modern equal citizenship was marked by the concern of political disintegration which continues to inform citizenship politics even today.

As a result, concerning the cultural-political boundaries of modern Turkish citizenship identity, this dissertation confirms the general idea that from the very beginning, Kemalist nationalism and citizenship politics displayed a movement of oscillation between the civic-territorial and ethnic-genealogical variants. At the level of theory and in the official state discourse, there has always been an emphasis on membership on the basis of commitment to the political unity of the country and adoption of Turkish culture. However, at the political level, various citizenship practices indicated that there have been tacit, uncoded criteria for proper membership.

At this point, this analysis on the formative years of the Turkish Republic reveals that the ethnic-genealogical element of modern Turkish citizenship was formulated for the first time in and through the foreign policy acts and decisions of the period which codified the territorial, cultural and political boundaries of modern Turkish citizenship. The closeness of the conception of "community inside" to

cultural and political pluralism and the primacy of Turkish ethnic identity as the core of the new national identity were the democratic deficits of modern Turkish citizenship identity as formulated in this early period. However, this does not mean that there has been a prevalent ethnic-genealogical approach in citizenship politics throughout the republican period. Rather, the roots of the democratic deficits of Turkish citizenship identity lie in the paradoxical nature of the idealized civic-territorial citizenship model which identifies political unity with cultural unity in the final analysis. In this respect, the democratic quality of modern Turkish citizenship has been unfavorably influenced by the universalist ideal of republicanism which paves the way for both assimilationist and exclusionary citizenship practices throughout the republican period.

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APPENDIX A

SİVAS BİLDİRGESİ (The Sivas Declaration)

11 Eylül 1919

Bütün milletçe malûm olan mehalik-i hariciye ve dahiliyenin tevlit etmiş olduğu intiba-ı milliden doğan kongremiz mukarrerat-ı atiyeyi ittihad etmiştir.

1) Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye ile Düvel-i İtilafîye arasında münakit mütarekenamenin imza olduğu 30 Teşrinievvel (Ekim) 334 (1918) tarihindeki hududumuz dahilinde kalan ve her noktası İslâm ekseriyeti kahiresiyle meskûn olan memalik-i Osmaniye aksamı yekdiğerinden ve camia-i Osmaniye'den gayr-ı kabil-i tecezzi ve hiçbir sebeple iftirak etmez bir kül teşkil eder; memalik-i mezkûrede yaşayan bilcümle anasır-ı İslamiye yekdiğerine karşı hürmet-i müteakabile ve fedakârlık hissiyatıyla meşhun ve hukuk-u ırkıyye ve içtimaiyeleriyle şerait-i muhitiyelerine tamamiyle riâyetkar özkardaşırlar.

2) Camia-i Osmaniyenin tamamiyeti ve istiklâl-i millimizin temini ve makam-ı muallâ-yı hilafet ve saltanatın masuniyeti için kuva-yı milliyeyi amel ve irade-i milliyeyi hakim kılmak esası katidir.

3) Memalik-i Osmaniyenin herhangi bir cüzine karşı vaki olacak müdahale ve işgale ve bilhassa vatanımız dahilinde müstakil birer Rumluk ve Ermenilik teşkili gayesine matuf harekâta karşı Aydın, Manisa, Balıkesir cephelerinde mücahidat-ı milliyede olduğu gibi müttehidan müdafaa ve mukavemet esası meşruu kabul edilmiştir.

4) Öteden beri aynı vatan içinde birlikte yaşadığımız bilcümle anasır-ı gayri Müslümenin hertürlü müsavat-ı hukukiyelerini tamamiyle mahfuz olduğundan, anasır-ı mezkûreye hakimiyet-i siyasiye ve müvazenet-i içtimaiyemizi ihlâl edecek imtiyazat itası kabul edilmeyecektir.

7) Milletimiz insanî, asrî gayeleri tebcil ve fennî, sınaî ve iktisadî hal ve ihtiyacımızı takdir eder binaenaleyh devlet ve milletimizin harici istiklâlini ve vatanımızın tamamiyeti mahfuz kalmak şartıyla 6. maddede musarrah hudut dahilinde milliyet esaslarına riayetkâr ve memleketimize karşın istila emeli beslemeyen herhangi devletin, fenni, sınaî, iktisadî muavenetini memnunuyetle karşılıyoruz ve bu şerait-i âdile ve insaniyeyi muhtevi bir sulhun da acilen tekarrur-u selâmiet-i beşer ve sükûn-u âlem namına ahassî amali milliyetimizindir.

8) Milletlerin kendi mukadderatını bizzat tayin ettiği bu tarihi devirde hükümet-i merkeziyemizin de irade-i milliyeye tabi olması zaruridir. Çünkü:

İrade-i milliyeye gayri müstenid herhangi bir heyet hükümetin îndi ve şahsî mukarredatı ve milletçe muta olmadıktan başka haricen de muteber olmadığı ve olamayacağı şimdiye kadar mesbuk e'âl ve netayîçe sabit olmuştur. Binaenaleyh milletin içinde bulunduğu hal-i zuccet ve endişeden kurtulmak çarelerine bizzat tevessüle hacet kalmadan hükümet-i merkeziyemizin meclis-i milliyi hemen ve bilâ ifate-i an toplanması ve bu suretle mukadderat-ı millet ve memleket hakkında ittihad eyleyeceği bilcümle mukadderatı meclis-i millînin murakebesine arz etmesi mecburidir.

9) Vatan milletimizin maruz olduğu mezalim ve âlâm ile ve tamamen aynı gaye ve maksatla vicdan-ı milliden doğan vatanî ve millî cemiyetlerin ittihadından mütehasıl kütle-i umumiye bukere (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-ı Hukuk Cemiyeti) ünvanı ile tevsim olunmuştur. Bu cemiyet hertürlü firkaçılık cereyanlarından ve ihtirasat-ı şahsiyeden külliyyen müberra ve münezzehdir. Bircümle müslüman vatandaşlarımız bu cemiyetin azayı tabiiyesindedirler.

APPENDIX B

MİSAK-I MİLLİ (The National Pact)

28 Ocak 1920

Osmanlı Meclis-i Meb'usan âzâları istiklâl-i milletin, haklı ve devamlı bir sulhe nailiyet için ihtiyar edebileceği fedakarlığın hadd-i azamisini mutazammın olan esasat-ı âtiyeye tamimi-i riayetle mümkünittemin olduğunu ve esasat-ı mezkûre haricinde payidar bir Osmanlı saltanat ve cemiyetinin devam-ı vücudu gayri-mümkün bulunduğunu kabul ve tasdik eylemişlerdir:

- 1) Devlet-i Osmaniye'nin münhasıran Arap ekseriyeti ile meskûn olup 30 Teşrini evvel 1918 tarihli mütarekenin hin-i akdinde muhasım orduların işgali altında kalan aksamının mukadderatı ahalsinin serbestçe beyan edecekleri ârâyâ tevfikân tayin edilmek lâzım geleceğinden, mezkûr hatt-ı mütareke dahil ve haricinde dinen, örfen, emelen müttehî ve yekdiğerine karşı hürmet-i mütakabile ve fedâkarlık hissiyatıyla meşhun ve hukuk-u ırkiye ve içtimaiyeleri ile şerait-i muhitiyelerine tamamıyla riayetkâr Osmanlı-İslâm ekseriyetiyle meskûn bulunan aksamın heyet-i mecmuası hakikaten veya hükmen hiçbir sebeple tefrik kabul etmez bir küldür.
- 2) Ahalisi ilk serbest kaldıkları zamanda ârâ-i âmmeleriyle anavatana iltihak etmiş olan elviye-i selâsa için leddelicap tekrar serbestçe ârâ-i âmmeye müracaat edilmesini kabul eyleriz.
- 3) Trakya sulhüne talik edilen garbî Trakya vaziyet-i hukukiyesinin tesbiti de sekenesinin kemâl-i hürriyetle beyan edecekleri ârâyâ tebaen vaki olmalıdır.
- 4) Makarr-ı hilâfet-i İslâmiye ve payitaht-ı saltanat-ı seniye ve merkez-i hükûmet-i Osmaniye olan İstanbul şehriyle Marmara denizinin emniyeti her türlü halelden masun olmalıdır. Bu esas mahfuz kalmak şartıyla Akdeniz ve Karadeniz boğazlarının ticaret ve münakalât-ı âleme küşadı hakkında bizimle sair bilumum alâkadar devletlerin müttfikân verecekleri karar muteberdir.
- 5) Düvel-i İtilâfiye ile muhasımları ve bazı müşarikleri arasında takarrür eden esat-ı ahdiye dairesinde ekalliyetler hukuku – memalik-i mütecaviredeki Müslüman ahalinin de aynı hukuktan istifade etmeleri ümmiyesiyle – tarafımızdan teyit ve temin edilecektir.
- 6) Millî ve iktisadî inkişafımız daire-i imkâna girmek ve daha asrî bir idare-i muntazama şeklinde tedvir-i umura muvafık olabilmek için her devlet gibi bizim de temin-i esbab-ı inkişafımızda istiklâl ve serbesti-i tamme mashar olmamız üssülesas-ı hayat ve bekamızdır. Bu sebeple siyasî, adlî ve sair inkişafımıza manî kuyuda muhalifiz. Tahakkuk edecek düyunatımızın şerait-i tesviyesi de bu esasata mugayir olmayacaktır.

APPENDIX C

SEVR ANDLAŞMASI (The Sévres Treaty)

10 Ağustos 1920

Bölüm III

Siyasal Hükümler

Kesim I

İstanbul

Madde 36: İşbu Andlaşmanın hükümleri saklı kalmak koşuluyla, Bağlı Yüksek Taraflar, Osmanlı Hükümeti'nin İstanbul üzerindeki haklarına ve sıfatlarına dokunulmaması, ve bu hükümetle Majeste Padişah'ın bu kentte oturmak ve bu kenti Osmanlı Devleti'nin başkenti tutmak bakımından özgür olduğunda görüş birliği içindedirler.

Bununla birlikte, Türkiye, İşbu andlaşma ile bunu tamamlayan andlaşmaların ve sözleşmelerin hükümlerine, özellikle soy, din, ve dil azınlıklarının haklarına dürüst bir biçimde saygı göstermekte kusur ederse, Müttefik Devletler, yukarıda belirtilen hükmü değiştirmek hakkını kesinlikle saklı tutarlar, ve Türkiye, bu bakımdan alınacak bütün kararları kabul etmeği şimdiden yükümlenirler.

Kesim III

Kürdistan

Madde 62: Fırat'ın doğusunda, saptanacak Ermenistan'ın güney sınırının güneyinde ve 27. Maddenin II / 2. ve 3. fıkralarındaki tanıma uygun olarak Suriye ve Irak ile Türkiye sınırının kuzeyinde, Kürtlerin sayıca üstün bulunduğu bölgelerin yerel özerkliğini, işbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe konulmasından başlayarak altı ay içinde, İstanbul'da toplanan ve İngiliz, Fransız ve İtalyan Hükümetlerinden her birinin atağı üç üyeden oluşan bir Komisyon hazırlayacaktır. Herhangi bir sorun üzerinde oybirliği oluşamazsa, bu sorun, komisyon üyelerince, bağlı oldukları Hükümetlerine götürecektir. Bu plân, Süryanî-Geldanîler ile, bu bölgelerin içindeki öteki etnik ve dinsel azınlıkların korunmasına ilişkin tam güvenceler de kapsayacaktır; bu amaçla, İngiliz, Fransız, İtalyan, İran'lı ve Kürt temsilcilerden oluşan bir Komisyon incelemelerde bulunmak ve, işbu Andlaşma uyarınca, Türkiye sınırının İran sınırı ile birleşmesi durumlarında, Türkiye sınırında yapılması gerekebilecek düzeltmeleri kararlaştırmak üzere bu yerleri ziyaret edecektir.

Madde 63: Osmanlı Hükümeti, 62. Maddede öngörülen komisyonlardan birinin ya da ötekinin kararlarını, kendisine bildirildiğinden başlayarak üç ay içinde kabul etmeği ve yürürlüğe koymağı şimdiden yükümlenir.

Madde 64: İşbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe konuşundan bir yıl sonra, 62. Maddede belirtilen bölgelerdeki nüfusun çoğunluğunun Türkiye'den bağımsız olmak

istediklerini kanıtlayarak Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyine başvurlarsa ve Konsey de bu nüfusun bu bağımsızlığa yetenekli olduğu görüşüne varırsa ve bu bağımsızlığı onlara tanımayı Türkiye'ye salık verirse, Türkiye, bu ögütlemeye (tavsiyeye) uymağı ve bu bölgeler üzerinde bütün haklarından ve sıfatlarından vazgeçmeğı, şimdiden yükümlenir.

Bu vazgeçmenin ayrıntıları Başlıca Müttefik Devletlerle Türkiye arasında yapılacak özel bir sözleşmeye konu olacaktır.

Bu vazgeçme gerçekleşirse ve gerçekleşeceği zaman, Kürdistan'ın şimdiye dek Musul İlinde (Vilayetinde) kalmış kesiminde oturan Kürtlerin, bu bağımsız Kürt Devletine kendi istekleriyle katılmalarına, Başlıca Müttefik Devletlerce hiçbir karşı çıkışta bulunulmayacaktır.

Kesim IV.

İzmir

Madde 68: İşbu Kesimin hükümleri saklı kalmak üzere, İzmir kenti ve 66. Maddede belirtilen toprak parçası, işbu Andlaşmanın uygulanması bakımından, Türkiye'den ayrılmış topraklarla bir tutulacaktır.

Madde 69: İzmir kenti ve 66. Maddede tanımlanan topraklar Osmanlı egemenliği altında kalmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye, İzmir kenti ile sözü edilen topraklar üzerindeki egemenlik haklarının kullanımını Yunanistan'a aktaracaktır. Bu egemenliğin simgesi olmak üzere, Osmanlı bayrağı kentin dışındaki bir kaleye sürekli olarak çekilecektir. Bu kale, Başlıca Müttefik Devletlerce saptanacaktır.

Madde 70: Yunan Hükümeti, İzmir kentiyile 66. Maddede belirtilen toprakların yönetiminden sorumlu olacak ve bu yönetimi özel olarak bu amaçla atayacağı bir görevliler kurulunca yürütülecektir.

Madde 71: Yunan Hükümeti, İzmir kentiyile 66. Maddede tanımlanan topraklarda kamu düzenini ve güvenliğin korunması için gerekli askerî kuvvetleri bulundurmak hakkına sahip olacaktır.

Madde 72: Soy, dil ve din azınlıklarını da içeren ve halkın bütün kesimlerinin oransal temsilini sağlayacak nitelikte bir seçim sistemiyle, yerel bir Parlamento kurulacaktır. Yunan Hükümetinin, işbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe girmesini izleyen altı ay içinde, Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyine, yukarıda öngörülen koşullara uygun bir seçim sistemi tasarısı sunması gerekecektir; bu sistem, ancak adı geçen Konseyce oy çoğunluğuyla onaylandığı zaman yürürlüğe girebilecektir.

Yunan Hükümeti, Osmanlı makamlarınca kovulmuş ya da sürülmüş kişilerin oturdukları yerlere dönüşleri için gereken süre içinde seçimleri-bu süre işbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe girişinden sonra bir yıl geçmemek üzere-erteleyebilecektir.

Madde 75: 86. Maddede sözü edilen ve soy, dil ve din azınlıklarının korunması ile, ticaret ve transit özgürlüğe ilişkin özel Andlaşmada öngörülen hükümler İzmir kenti ile 66. Maddede tanımlanan topraklarda da uygulanacaktır.

Madde 79: Uyruklu bakımından, Osmanlı uyruğu olan ve işbu Andlaşma hükümleri gereğince başka herhangi bir uyruklu savında bulunmayacak olan İzmir kenti ve 66.

Maddede tanımlanan topraklarda oturanlar, her bakımdan Yunan uyruğu işlemi görecektir. Bunların ülke dışındaki diplomasi ve konsolosluk korumalarını Yunanistan sağlayacaktır.

Kesim VI.

Ermenistan

Madde 88: Türkiye, öteki, Müttefik Devletlerin yapmış oldukları gibi, Ermenistan'ı özgür ve bağımsız bir Devlet olarak tanıdığını bildirir.

Madde 89: Öteki Bağını Yüksek Taraflar gibi, Türkiye ile Ermenistan da , Erzurum, Trabzon, Van ve Bitlis İllerinde (Vilayetlerinde), Türkiye ile Ermenistan arasındaki sınırın saptanması işini Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Başkanının hakemliğine sunmayı ve bu konudaki kararını olduğu kadar, Ermenistan'ın denize çıkışı ile sözü geçen sınıra bitişik bütün Osmanlı hükümleri kabul etmeyi kararlaştırmışlardır.

Madde 90: 89. Madde uyarınca sınır saptaması,sözü geçen İller (Vilayetler) topraklarının tümünün ya da bir kesiminin Ermenistan'a aktarılmasına yol açacak olursa, Türkiye, aktarılan toprak üzerindeki bütün haklarından ve sıfatlarından, karar tarihinden başlamak üzere geçerli olarak, vazgeçtiğini şimdiden bildirir. İşbu Andlaşmanın, Türkiye'den ayrılan topraklara uygulanacak hükümleri, o andan başlayarak, bu topraklara da uygulanacaktır.

Ermenistan'ın, kendi egemenliği altına girmiş topraklar nedeniyle üstlenmesi gerekecek, Türkiye'ye ait mâli yükümlülüklerin ya da hakların oranı ve niteliği, işbu Andlaşmanın VIII. Bölümünün (Mâli Hükümler) 241. Maddesinden 244. Maddesine kadarki Maddeleri uyarınca saptanacaktır.

İşbu Andlaşma ile çözüme bağlanamayan ve sözü geçen toprağın aktarılmasından doğabilecek bütün sorunlar, gerekirse, daha sonra yapılacak sözleşmelerle çözüme bağlanacaktır.

Kesim XIII

Genel Hükümler

Madde 132: Türkiye, işbu Andlaşma ile saptanan sınırları dışında, işbu Andlaşma gereğince başka herhangi bir düzenleme konusu yapılmamış Avrupa dışındaki bütün topraklar üzerinde, ya da topraklara ilişkin olarak, ileri sürebileceği tüm haklarından ve sıfatlarından, her bakımından, Başlıca Müttefik Devletler yararına vazgeçtiğini bildirir.

Türkiye, yukarıdaki hüküm sonuçlarını düzenlemek için, Başlıca Müttefik Devletlerin, gerektiğinde üçüncü devletlerle anlaşarak, aldıkları ya da alacakları önlemleri tanımayı ve kabul etmeyi yükümlenir.

Bölüm IV

Azınlıkların Korunması

Madde 140: Türkiye, 141.,145. ve 147. Maddelerin kapsadığı hükümlerin temel yasalar olarak tanınmasını ve hiçbir yasanın, hiçbir tüzüğü ve hiçbir Padişah Buyruğunun ya da resmî işlemin, bu hükümlere aykırı ya da bunlarla çelişir olmamasını, hiçbir yasanın, hiçbir tüzüğün, hiçbir Padişah Buyruğunun ve hiçbir resmî işlemin söz konusu hükümlerden üstün sayılmasını yükümlenir.

Madde 141: Türkiye, Türkiye’de oturan herkesin, doğum, bir ulusal topluluktan olmak, din, soy ya da din ayırımı yapılmaksızın, yaşamlarını ve özgürlüklerini korumayı, tam ve eksiksiz olarak sağlamayı yükümlenir.

Türkiye’de oturan herkes, her inancın, dinin ya da mezhebin gereklerini, ister açıktan ister özel olarak, özgürce yerine getirme hakkına sahip olacaktır.

Yukarıdaki paragrafta öngörülen hakkın özgürce yerine getirilmesine karşı herhangi bir saldırı, ilgili mezhep hangisi olursa olsun, aynı cezalarla cezalandırılacaktır.

Madde 142: 1 Kasım 1914’den beri Türkiye’de bir ürkü (tedhiş) rejimi bulunduğu için, İslam dinine geçişlerden hiçbir olağan koşullar altında gerçekleşmiş olamayacağından bu tarihten sonraki İslam’ı benimsemelerin tanınmaması ve, 1 Kasım 1914’den önce Müslüman olmayan bir kimsenin, özgürlüğüne kavuştuktan sonra, kendi isteğiyle İslam’ı benimsemesi için gerekli işlemleri yerine getirmediği Müslüman sayılmaması süregidecektir.

Osmanlı Hükümeti, savaş süresince Türkiye’de yapılan topluca öldürmeler sırasında kişilere verilen zararları en geniş ölçüde karşılamak için 1 Kasım 1914’den beri herhangi bir soydan ya da dinden olursa olsun, ortadan yok olmuş, zorla götürülmüş, gözaltı (enterne) edilmiş ya da tutuklanmış kişilerin aranması ve kurtarılması için, kendisinin ve Osmanlı makamlarının tüm desteğini sağlamayı yükümlenir.

Osmanlı Hükümeti, zarar görenlerin, ailelerinin ve yakınlarının özgürlüklerine kavuşturmaları için buyruk çıkarmak amacıyla, Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyince atanacak karma komisyonların çalışmalarını kolaylaştırmağı yükümlenir.

Osmanlı Hükümeti, bu komisyonların kararlarına saygı gösterilmesini ve özgürlükleri geri verilmiş herkesin güvenliğini ve özgürlüğünü sağlamayı yükümlenir.

Madde 143: Türkiye, soy azınlıklarından olan kişilerin karşılıklı ve gönüllü göçlerine ilişkin olarak Müttefik Devletlerin uygun görecekları hükümleri tanımayı yükümlenir.

Türkiye, karşılıklı göç konusunda, Yunanistan’la Bulgaristan arasında 27 Kasım 1919 ‘da Neuilly-sur-Seine’de imzalanan Sözleşmenin 16. Maddesinden yararlanmamayı yükümlenir. İşbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe girişini izleyecek altı ay içinde, Yunanistan ile Türkiye, Yunanistan’a aktarılan ya da Osmanlı kalan topraklardaki Türk ve Yunan soylu halkın karşılıklı ve gönüllü göçüne ilişkin özel bir anlaşma yapacaklardır.

Bir anlaşmaya varılamaması durumunda, Yunanistan ve Türkiye, Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyine başvurmak hakkına sahip olacaklar ve Konsey sözü edilen anlaşmanın koşullarını saptayacaktır.

Madde 144: Osmanlı Hükümeti, Bırakılmış Mallar (Emval-i Metrûke) konusundaki 1915 tarihli yasa ile hükümlerin haksızlığını kabul eder ve bunların tümüyle hükümsüz ve gelecek, olduğu gibi geçmişte de, geçersiz olduklarını bildirir.

Osmanlı Hükümeti, 1 Ocak 1914 ‘den beri, topluca öldürme korkusuyla ya da başka herhangi bir zorlama yüzünden, yurtlarından kovulmuş, Türk soyundan olmayan Osmanlı uyruklarının yurtlarına dönüşlerini ve yeniden işlerine başlayabilmelerini, olabildiği ölçüde kolaylaştırmağı resmen yükümlenir. Sözü edilen Osmanlı uyruklarıyla, bunların üyesi buldukları toplulukların malı olan ve yeniden bulunabilecek taşınır ya da taşınmaz malların, kimin elinde bulunurlarsa bulunsunlar, bir an önce geri verilmesi gerektiğini Osmanlı Hükümeti kabul eder. Bu mallar, onlara yükletilmiş olabilecek her türlü kısıtlamadan ve vergiden sıyrılmış olarak ve bugün onlara sahip olanlara ya da onları ellerinde tutanlara hiçbir ödenince (tazminat) ödenmeksizin, geri verilecektir; şu kadar ki, bunların, mülkiyet ya da elde bulundurma hakkını kendilerinden edindikleri kimselere karşı dâva hakları saklı tutulacaktır.

Osmanlı Hükümeti, gerekli görülecek her yerde, Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyince hakemlik komisyonları atanmasını kabul eder. Bu komisyonların herbiri, Osmanlı Hükümetinin bir temsilcisi ile, zarara uğradığını öne süren ya da üyelerinden birinin zarara uğradığı savında bulunan topluluğun bir temsilcisinden ve Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyince atanan bir Başbakanından oluşacaktır. Hakemlik komisyonları, işbu Maddede öngörülen bütün istemleri inceleyecek ve bunları basit yöntemle karara bağlayacaktır.

Sözü edilen hakemlik komisyonları aşağıdaki konularda buyurma yetkisine sahip olacaklardır:

1. Gerekli görecekları her çeşit yeniden yapım ve onarım işleri için Osmanlı Hükümetince işgücü sağlanması. Bu işgücü, hakemlik komisyonunca sözü geçen işlerin yapılmasına gerek gördüğü topraklarda yaşayan soylardan kişiler arasından sağlanacaktır;
2. Soruşturma sonucu, topluca öldürmeler ya da zorla yerinden etmelere eylemsel olarak katıldığı, ya da bunlara yol açtığı kanıtlanan her kişinin görevinden uzaklaştırılması; bu gibi kimselerin malları konusunda alınacak önlemleri komisyon gösterecektir;
3. Bir topluluğun, 1 Ocak 1914 ‘den beri, mirasçısız olarak ölmüş ya da yitik bulunan üyelerinin bütün taşınır ya da taşınmaz malların kime aktarılacağı. Bu mallar, Devlet yerine, topluluğa aktarılabilir;
4. 1 Ocak 1914 ‘den sonra, taşınmaz mallar üzerinden yapılan bütün satış işlemleriyle, hak yaratan işlemlerin geçersiz sayılması. Bu malları ellerinde bulunduranlara ödence (tazminat) ödenmesi, geri vermenin geciktirilmesine bahane olarak kullanılmayacak biçimde. Osmanlı Hükümetinin yükümlülüğünde olacaktır. Ancak, sözü edilen malları şimdi ellerinde bulunduranlarca bir ödemede

bulunulmuşsa, hakemlik komisyonunun ilgililer arasında hakgözetirliğe uygun bir çözüm yolu kabul ettirme yetkisi olacaktır.

Osmanlı Hükümeti, komisyonların işleyişini ve kesin nitelikte olacak kararlarının yerine getirilmesini, olanak ölçüsünde, kolaylaştırmayı yükümlenir. Bunlara karşı, yargısal ya da yönetsel, hiçbir Osmanlı makamının kararı öne sürülmeyecektir.

Madde 145: Bütün Osmanlı uyrukları, yasa önünde eşit olacaklar ve soy, dil ya da din ayrılığı gözetilmeksizin aynı yurttaşlık (medenî haklarıyla) siyasal haklardan yararlanmasına, özellikle kamu hizmetlerine ve görevlerine kabul edilme, yükseltme, onurlanma ya da çeşitli mesleklerde ve iş kollarında çalışma bakımından, bir engel sayılmayacaktır.

Osmanlı Hükümeti, işbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe girmesinden başlayarak iki yıllık bir süre içinde, Müttefik Devletlere, soy azınlıklarının orantılı temsili ilkesine dayalı bir seçim sistemi düzenlenmesi tasarısını sunacaktır.

Herhangi bir Osmanlı uyruğunun, gerek özel gerekse ticaret ilişkilerinde, din, basın ya da her çeşit yayın konularıyla açık toplantılarında, dilediği bir dili kullanmasına karşı hiçbir kısıtlama konulmayacaktır. Türkçeden başka bir dil konuşan Osmanlı uyruklarına, mahkemelerde, ister sözlü, ister yazılı olsun, kendi dillerini kullanabilmeleri bakımından uygun düşen kolaylıklar sağlanacaktır.

Madde 146: Osmanlı Hükümeti, tanınmış yabancı üniversitelerden ve okullardan verilen diplomaların geçerliliğini tanımayı ve, bunları almış olanların, bu diplomaların tanıdığı yeteneği gerektiren mesleklerde ve sanatlarda özgürce çalışmalarını kabul etmeyi yükümlenir.

Bu hüküm, Türkiye'de oturan Müttefik Devletler uyruklarına da uygulanacaktır.

Madde 147: Soy, din ya da dil azınlıklarından olan Osmanlı uyrukları, hem hukuk bakımından hem de uygulamada, öteki Osmanlı uyruklarıyla aynı işlemlerden ve aynı güvencelerden yararlanacaklardır. Bunların, özellikle, bağımsız olarak ve Osmanlı makamları hiçbir biçimde karışmaksızın, giderlerini kendileri ödemek üzere, her türlü hayır kurumlarıyla, dinsel ya da sosyal kurumlar, ilk, orta ve yüksek okullarla, başka her çeşit öğretim kurumları-bunlardan kendi dillerini özgürce kullanmak ve kendi dinlerini özgürce uygulamak hakkına da sahip olarak-kurmak, yönetmek ve denetlemek konularında eşit hakka sahip olacaklardır.

Madde 148: Soy, din ya da dil azınlıklarından olan Osmanlı uyruklarının önemli bir oranda buldukları kentlerde ya da bölgelerde, söz konusu azınlıklar, Devlet bütçesi ile, belediyeler bütçesi ya da öteki bütçelerce eğitim ya da hayır işlerine genel gelirlerden (kamu gelirlerinden) sağlanacak paralardan yararlanmaya hakgözetirliğe uygun bir ölçüde katılacaklardır.

Söz konusu bu paralar, ilgili toplulukların yetkili temsilcilerine verilecektir.

Madde 149: Osmanlı Hükümeti, Türkiye'deki bütün soy azınlıklarının kilise ve okul konularında özerkliğini tanımayı ve buna saygı göstermeyi yükümlenir. Osmanlı Hükümeti, bu amaçla ve işbu Andlaşmanın aykırı düşen hükümleri saklı kalmak üzere, Müslüman olmayan soylara kilise, okul ya da adalet konularında Sultanlarca verilmiş fermanlar, hat'lar, beratlar, ve bu gibi özel buyrukları ya da fermanlarla,

Bakanlık ya da Sadrazamlık buyrukları ile tanınmış ayrıcalıklarla bağışlıkları tümüyle doğrular ve gelecekte de destekleyeceğini bildirir.

Osmanlı Hükümetinin çıkardığı ve sözü edilen ayrıcalıklarla bağışlıkların kaldırılmasını, kısıtlanmasını ya da değiştirilmesini öngören bütün kararnameler, yasalar, yönetmelikler ya da genelgeler geçersiz sayılacaktır.

İşbu Andlaşma hükümlerine uygun olarak Osmanlı adalet rejiminde yapılacak her değişiklik- bu değişiklik soy azınlıklarından kişileri etkilemekte ise- işbu madde hükümlerinden üstün sayılacaktır.

Madde 150: Hıristiyan ya da Yahudi dininden Osmanlı uyruklarının önemli oranda oturdukları kentlerde ve bölgelerde, Osmanlı Hükümeti, bu Osmanlı uyruklarının inançlarına ya da dinsel uygulamalarına bir saldırı sayılabilecek herhangi bir eylemi yapmağa zorlanmamalarını, ve hafta tatili günlerinde mahkemelerde hazır bulunmamaları ya da yasal bir işlemi yerine getirmemeleri yüzünden haklarını hiçbir biçimde yitirmemelerini yükümlenir. Bununla birlikte, bu hüküm, bu Hıristiyan ya da Yahudi Osmanlı uyruklarını, kamu düzeninin korunması için, bütün öteki Osmanlı uyruklarına yükletilen yükümlülükler dışında tutar anlamına gelmeyecektir.

Madde 151: Başlıca Müttefik Devletler bu bölümdeki hükümlerin yerine getirilmesini güvence altına almak için ne gibi önlemler alınması gerektiğini, Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyi ile birlikte inceledikten sonra saptayacaklardır. Osmanlı Hükümeti, bu konuda alınacak bütün kararları şimdiden kabul ettiğini bildirir.

APPENDIX D

TÜRKİYE-ERMENİSTAN BARIŞ ANDLAŞMASI (The Gümrü Treaty)

2 Aralık 1920

- 1) Türkiye ile Ermenistan arasında savaş durumuna son verilmiştir.
- 2) Türkiye ile Ermenistan arasındaki sınır, ilişik krokide gösterildiği üzere, (aşağı Karasunun döküldüğü yerden başlayarak, Aras ırmağı Kekaç kuzeyine dek Arpaçayı, daha sonra Karahan Deresi –Tiğnis batısı- Büyük Kımlı doğusu - Kızıldaş- Büyük Akbaba Dağı) çizgisinden oluşur. Sınır çizgisinin kesin biçimde belirlenmesi işi, bu andlaşmanın imzası gününden iki hafta sonra, Karma bir Komisyonca yerinde yapılacaktır.
- 3) Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti, ikinci maddede sözü geçen sınır ile Osmanlı sınırı arasında bulunup, işbu andlaşma uyarınca Türkiye’de kalacak olan ve üzerine Türkiye’ nin tarihsel, etnik ve hukuksal ilişkisi inkâr edilemez toprakların hukuksal durumu konusunda, Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti isrtediği takdirde, asıl halkının tümüyle geri dönmesini gerçekleştirebilmesi için, andlaşmanın onaylanmasından sonra üç yıl geçince plebisite başvurmayı kabul eder. Bir Alt Komisyon bunun biçimini belirleyecektir.
- 5) Barışın yapılmasından sonra, Erivan’da yerleşecek Türkiye’nin siyasi Temsilcisi ya da Büyükelçisinin yukarıda sözü edilen konularda her zaman denetleme ve soruşturma yapmasına Erivan Hükümeti izin vermeyi işbu andlaşma ile kabul etmiştir. Buna karşılık, Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti istemde bulunursa, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti Ermenistan’a silâhlı yardımda bulunmağı yükümlenir.
- 6) Bağlıklı Taraflar, Büyük Savaş sırasında düşman ordularına katılarak kendi devletine karşı silâh kullanmış ya da işgal altındaki topraklar üzerinde toptan kırımlara katılmış olanların dışındaki göçmenlerin, eski sınır içindeki yurtlarına dönmelerine izin verir. Böylece, ülkelerine döneceklerin en uygar ülkelerdeki azınlıkların yararlandıkları haklardan bütünüyle yararlanmalarını, karşılıklı olarak, yükümlenirler.
- 7) Altıncı maddede sözü geçen göçmenlerden işbu andlaşmanın onayı ve onay belgelerinin verişimi gününden sonra bir yıllık süre içinde yurtlarına dönmeyenler o Maddenin verdiği olanaktan yararlanamayacakları gibi, tasarruf haklarına ilişkin savları da geçerli olmayacaktır.
- 11) Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti’nin toprakları üzerinde yaşayan Müslüman halkın haklarını korumak ve onların dinsel ve kültürel özellikleri içinde gelişmelerini sağlamak için, toplumsal biçimde örgütlenmelerini, Müftülerin doğrudan doğruya Müslüman toplumunca seçilmesini ve yerel müftülerin seçecekleri Başmüftü’nün memurluk görevinin Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Şer’iye Vekâletince onaylanmasını kabul ederek yükümlenir.

APPENDIX E

TÜRKİYE-SOVYET RUSYA DOSTLUK VE KARDEŞLİK ANDLAŞMASI

(The Moscow Treaty)

16 Mart 1921

Ulusların kardeşliği ilkesini ve kavimlerin kendi geleceklerini özgürce saptamak hakkını tanımakta birleşmiş olan TBMM Hükümeti'nin ile Rusya Sovyetleri Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, genişleme ve istilâ siyasetine karşın olan savaşımındaki dayanışmalarını ve iki ulustan birinin karşılaşacağı zorlukların ötekinin durumunu da ağırlaştıracağını bilerek, aralarında her zaman dostluk ilişkilerinin ve her iki ulusun karşılıklı çıkarlarına dayanan sürekli dostluk bağlarının yerleşmiş olmasını görmek özlemi ile bir Dostluk ve Kardeşlik Andlaşması yapmağa karar vermişler ve bu amaçla aşağıda yazılı temsilcilerini seçmişlerdir.

Madde 1-Bağıtlı Taraflar, herhangi birine zorla kabul ettirilmek istenen bir barış andlaşmasını ya da başka bir uluslar arası bağıtı tanımamağı ilke olarak benimserler. Rusya Sovyetleri Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, bugün Büyük Millet Meclisi'nce temsil edilmekte olan Türkiye ulusal Hükümeti tarafından tanınmamış Türkiye'ye ilişkin hiçbir uluslar arası bağıtı tanımamağı kabul eder. İşbu Andlaşmada yazılı "Türkiye" terimi ile 28 Kasım 1920 günü İstanbul'da toplanan Meclis-i Mebusan tarafından düzenlenip tüm devletlere ve basına bildirilen Misak-ı Milli'nin kapsadığı topraklar anlaşılmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin kuzey-doğu sınırı, Karadeniz kıyısında bulunan Sarp köyünden başlayarak, Hedis Meta Dağı –Şavşat Dağında suların bölündüğü çizgi- Kani Dağı ve orafdan, sürekli olarak, Ardıhan ve Kars Sancaklarının yönetim sınırlarının kuzeyini izleyerek Aşağı Kara Su'yun döküldüğü yere varan çizgi ile belirlenmiştir.

Madde 2- Türkiye, işbu Andlaşmanın birinci maddesinde gösterilen sınırın kuzeyinde Batum Livası'na ilişkin topraklar ile Batum kenti limanı üzerindeki egemenlik hakkını, şu koşullarla Gürcistan'a bırakmağa razı olur:

Birincisi: İşbu Maddede belirtilen yerler halkının, her topluluğun kültürel ve dinsel haklarını sağlayacak ve bu halkın yukarıda sözü geçen yerlerde isteklerine uygun bir tarım toprakları rejimi kurma olanağına sahip olacak şekilde geniş bir yönetsel özerkliğe kavuşması,

İkincisi: Batum limanı üzerinden Türkiye'ye giden ya da oradan gelen ticaret malları ve tüm nesnelere gümrük vergisine bağlı tutulmayarak ve hiçbir engelle karşılaşmayarak, her türlü vergi ve ücretten bağımsız biçimde, serbest transit hakkı ile birlikte, Türkiye'nin özel harcamalarından ayrık olarak, batum limanından yararlanmasının sağlanması.

Madde 4- Bağıtlı Taraflar, Doğu uluslarının ulusal kurtuluş hareketleri ile Rusya işçilerinin yeni bir sosyal düzen için savaşımı arasındaki yakınlığı gözlemleyerek, bu ulusların özgürlük ve bağımsızlık haklarını ve diledikleri hükümet rejim ile yönetilmek haklarını açıkça belirtirler.

Madde 8- Bağıtlı Taraflar, toprakları üzerinde karşı Taraf ülkesinin ya da ona bağılı topraklardan birinin Hükümeti rolünü üstlenmek savında bulunan örgüt ve grupların kurulmasını ya da yerleşmesini ve öteki ülkeye karşı savaşın amacında olan grupların yerleşmesini hiçbir zaman kabul etmemegi yükümlenirler. Türkiye ve Rusya, Kafkasya Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri için de karşılıklı olmak koşuşu ile özdeş yükümlülük üstlenirler.

Şurası ayrıca belirtilir ki, işbu Maddede sözü geçen Türkiye toprakları doğrudan doğruya TBMM Hükümeti'nin sivil ve askersel yönetimi altında bulunan topraklardır.

Madde 11- Bağıtlı Taraflar, her iki ülkeden birinin, öteki ülke topraklarında oturan uyrukları için En Çok Gözetilen Ulus işlemleri uygulanmasına izin verirler. İşbu madde hükümleri, Türkiye'nin müttefikleri bulunan Müslüman devletlerinin uyrukları ile Rusya'nın müttefikleri olan Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri uyruklarına ilişkin haklarda uygulanamaz.

Madde 12- 1918 yılından önce, Rusya'ya bağılı iken, üzerinde Türkiye'nin egemenlik hakkı olduğu Rusya Sovyetleri Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti Hükümetince işbu Andlaşma ile kabul olunan topraklar halkından her isteyen Türkiye'yi özgürce terkedebilecek ve eşyasını, mallarını ve paralarını birlikte götürebilecektir. İşbu Andlaşma ile Türkiye tarafından egemenlik hakkı Gürcistan'a devredilen Batum arazisi halkından her kimse de özdeş hakka sahiptir.

TÜRKİYE İLE ERMENİSTAN, AZERBAYCAN VE GÜRCİSTAN ARASINDA DOSTLUK ANDLAŞMASI

(Kars Treaty)

13 Ekim 1921

Madde 2- Bağlı Taraflar, içlerinden birine zorla kabul ettirilmek istenilecek herhangi bir barış Andlaşması ya da uluslar arası bir bağıtı tanımamak konusunda görüş birliği içindedirler. Bu andlaşma gereğince, Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri Hükümetleri Türkiye'ye ilişkin olup da bugün Büyük Millet Meclisi'nce temsil edilen Türkiye Hükümeti'nin tanımadığı hiçbir uluslar arası bağıtı tanımamağı kabul ederler. İşbu Andlaşma'da yazılı "Türkiye" terimi ile 28 Kasım 1920 günü İstanbul'da toplanan Meclis-i Mebusan tarafından düzenlenip tüm devletlere ve basına bildirilen Misak-ı Milli'nin kapsadığı topraklar anlaşılmaktadır.

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti de, Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan'a ilişkin olup bu ülkelerin bugün temsil olunan Hükümetlerince tanınmayan hiçbir uluslar arası bağıtı tanımamağı kabul eder.

Madde 10- Bağlı Taraflar, toprakları üzerinde karşı Taraf ülkesinin ya da ona bağlı topraklardan birinin Hükümeti rolünü üstlenmek savında bulunan örgüt ve grupların kurulmasını ya da yerleşmesini ve öteki ülkeye karşı savaşın amacıyla olan grupların yerleşmesini hiçbir zaman kabul etmemeğı yükümlenirler. Türkiye ve Rusya, Kafkasya Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri için de karşılıklı olmak koşusu ile özdeş yükümlülük üstlenirler.

Şurası ayrıca belirtilir ki, işbu Maddede sözü geçen Türkiye toprakları doğrudan doğruya TBMM Hükümeti'nin sivil ve askersel yönetimi altında bulunan topraklardır.

Madde 12- Bağlı Taraflar, her iki ülkeden birinin, öteki ülke topraklarında oturan uyrukları için En Çok Gözetilen Ulus işlemi uygulanmasına izin verirler.

İşbu Madde Sovyet Cumhuriyetlerinin kendi topraklarında öteki müttefik Rus Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri yurttaşlarına tanıdıkları haklar ile, Türkiye tarafından kendisinin müttefikleri olan Müslüman devletlerin uyruklarına tanınan hakları hiçbir zaman kapsamaz.

Madde 13- 1918 yılından önce, Rusya'ya bağlı iken, üzerinde Türkiye'nin egemenlik hakkı doğrulanan topraklar halkından olup Türk uyrukluğundan çıkmak isteyenler eşyasını, mallarını ve paralarını birlikte alarak Türkiye'yi özgürce terketmek hakkına sahip olacaklardır. Bunun gibi, egemenlik hakkı Türkiye tarafından Gürcistan'a bırakılmış toprakların halkından olup da Gürcistan uyrukluğundan çıkmak isteyenler, eşya ve mallarını ya da bunların karşılığı parayı birlikte alarak Gürcistan'ı terketmek hakkına sahip olacaklardır.

APPENDIX F

TÜRK-FRANSIZ ÖNBARIŞ ANLAŞMASI (Ankara Agreement)

20 Ekim 1921

Madde 6- Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti, Misak-ı Milli'de açıkça tanınan azınlık haklarının, bu konuda Müttefik Devletler ile onların hasımları ve kimi müttefikleri arasında yapılmış sözleşmelerdeki ilkelere uygun olarak, kendisince de doğrulanacağını bildirir.

Madde 7- İskenderun bölgesi için özel bir yönetim rejimi kurulacaktır. Bu bölgenin Türk soyundan gelen halkı, kültürlerinin gelişmesi, için her türlü kolaylıktan yararlanacaktır. Türk dili orada resmi bir niteliğe sahip olacaktır.

Madde 8- Üçüncü maddede sözü geçen çizgi aşağıdaki biçimde saptanmış ve belirlenmiştir:

Sınır çizgisi, İskenderun Körfezi üzerinde, Payas mevkiinin hemen güneyinde olmak üzere seçilecek bir noktadan başlayacak ve yaklaşık olarak Meydan-ı Ekbez'e doğru gidecektir (Demiryolu istasyonu bu mevki Suriye'de kalacaktır); Sınır çizgisi oradan Marsuva mevkiini Suriye'ye ve Karnaba mevki Kilis kentini Türkiye'ye bırakmak üzere güney-doğuya kayacaktır. Oradan Çobambey istasyonunda Türkiye ile birleşecektir. Daha sonra Bağdat demiryolunu izleyecek ve demiryolunun platformu Nusaybin'e dek Türk toprakları üzerinde kalacaktır. Oradan, Nusaybin ile Cezire-i İbni Ömer arasındaki eski yolu izleyerek Cezire-i İbni Ömer'de Dicle'ye varacaktır. Nusaybin ile Cezire-i İbni Ömer mevkiileri ve yol Türkiye'de kalacaktır. Bu yoldan yararlanma konusunda her iki ülke aynı haklara sahip olacaktır. Çobanbey ile Nusaybin arasındaki demiryolunun istasyon ve garları demiryolu platformunun parçaları sayılarak, Türkiye'ye kalacaktır.

İşbu anlaşmanın imzalanmasından sonra bir ay içinde, söz konusu sınır çizgisini çekmek üzere Tarafların temsilcilerinden oluşan Bir Komisyon kurulacaktır. Bu komisyon o süre içinde çalışmalara başlayacaktır.

ANLAŞMAYA EKLİ BELGELER

III

[İskenderun ve Antakya Bölgelerinde Türk soyundan memurlar kullanılması ve Türk kültürünü geliştirecek okullar kurulmasına ilişkin olarak Fransız Yetkili Temsilcisinin mektubu]

Türkiye Büyük Millet meclisi Hükümeti
Dışişleri Bakanı ve Yetkili Temsilcisi
Sayın Yusuf Kemal Beyefendi,

Ankara, 20 Ekim 1921

Bugün hükümetlerimiz arasında imza edilen Anlaşmanın 7.maddesini bütünleyici nitelikte olmak üzere, İskenderun Bölgesi'nde uygulanacak özel rejim konusunda Türk çoğunluğun bulunduğu bölgelerin genellikle Türk soyundan memurlarca yönetileceğini belirtmeği yararlı görüyorum. Türk kültürünün gelişmesi konusunda tüm kolaylıklardan yararlanacak okullar kurulacaktır.

Bu rejim aynı biçimde Antakya bölgesi ile eski Adana ilinin Sekizinci maddede gösterilen demiryolu güneyinde kalmış olan kesimlerinde de uygulanacaktır.

Henri Franklin-Bouillon

APPENDIX G

LOZAN BARIŞ ANDLAŞMASI

(The Lausanne Peace Treaty)
24 Temmuz 1923

Barış Andlaşması

Bölüm I

Siyasal Hükümler

Madde 1: İşbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe konulması gününden başlayarak, bir yandan Britanya İmparatorluğu, Fransa, İtalya, Japonya, Yunanistan, Romanya, Sırp-Hırvat-Sloven Devletleri ve öte yandan Türkiye ve onların uyrukları arasında barış durumu kesinlikle yeniden kurulmuş olacaktır.

Taraflar arasında resmi ilişkiler kurulacak ve onların toprakları üzerinde diplomasi ve konsolosluk memurları, yapılacak özel anlaşmalar bozulmaksızın, devletler hukukunun genel ilkeleriyle belirlenmiş haklara sahip olacaklardır.

KESİM : I

I. Topraklara ilişkin hükümler :

Madde 2: Karadeniz'den Akdeniz'e dek Türkiye'nin sınırı aşağıdaki biçimde saptanmıştır. (Ekli bir numaralı haritaya bakılması):

Birincisi-Bulgaristan ile:

Rezvaya ağzından Türkiye, Bulgaristan ve Yunanistan sınırının Meriç üzerinde kesiştiği noktaya dek;

Bulgaristan'ın bugün çizilmiş olduğu biçimde güney sınırı;

İkincisi-Yunanistan ile:

Oradan Arda ve Meriç ırmaklarının birleştiği noktaya dek;

Meriç yatağı;

Oradan Arda kaynağına doğru bu ırmak üzerinde ve Çörek Köyün hemen çevresinde olmak üzere, toprak üzerinde belirlenecek bir noktaya dek;

Arda yatağı:

Oradan güney-doğu doğrultusunda Bosna Köyün bir kilometre yukarısında Meriç üzerindeki bir noktaya dek;

Bosna Köyünü Türkiye'de bırakan belirgin ölçüde düz bir çizgi. Çörek köyü, beşinci Maddede anılan Komisyonca halkın çoğunluğunun Türk ya da Rum olarak belirlenmesine göre, Türkiye'ye ya da Yunanistan'a verilecektir. 11 ekim 1922 gününden sonra bu Köye göç etmiş olan halk bu konuda hesaba katılmayacaktır.

Oradan Adalar Denizine dek; Meriç yatağı:

Madde 3: Karadeniz'den İran sınırına dek Türkiye'nin sınırı aşağıdaki biçimde saptanmıştır.

Birincisi-Suriye ile ;

20 Ekim 1921 günü yapılan Fransa-Türkiye Andlaşmasının 8. Maddesinde tanımlanmış sınır.

İkincisi-Irak ile:

Türkiye ile Irak arasındaki sınır dokuz ay içinde Türkiye ile Büyük Britanya arasında dostça belirlenecektir.

Belirlenen süre içinde iki hükümet arasında anlaşma olmazsa, uyuşmazlık Milletler Cemiyeti Konseyine sunulacaktır.

Sınır çizgisi konusunda alınacak karara değin, Türkiye ve Britanya Hükümetleri kesin geleceği bu karara bağlı toprakların bugünkü durumunda her hangi bir değişiklik ortaya koyacak nitelikte askersel ya da başka türlü hiçbir eylemde bulunmamayı karşılıklı olarak yükümlenirler.

Madde 12: İmroz ve Bozca Adaları ile Tavşan Adaları dışında, Doğu Akdeniz Adaları ve özellikle Limni, Semendirek, Midilli, Sakız, Sisam ve Nikarya Adaları üzerinde Yunan egemenliğine ilişkin 17/30 Mayıs 1913 günlü Londra Andlaşmasının Beşinci ve 1/14 Kasım 1913 günkü Atina Andlaşmasının on beşinci Maddeleri hükümleri uyarınca 13 Şubat 1914 günkü Londra Konferansında alınıp 13 Şubat 1914 günü Yunan Hükümetine bildirilen karar, işbu Andlaşmanın İtalya'nın egemenliği altına konulan ve on beşinci Maddede yazılı olan Adalara ilişkin hükümleri saklı kalmak koşulu ile, doğrulanmıştır. Asya kıyısından üç milden az uzaklıkta bulunan Adalar, işbu Andlaşmada tersine hüküm olmadıkça, Türkiye egemenliği altında kalacaktır.

Madde 14: Türkiye egemenliği altında kalan İmroz ve Bozca Adaları, yerel yönetim ve kişi ve malların korunması konusunda, yerli elemanlardan oluşan ve Müslüman olmayan yerli halka her bakımdan güven verici özel bir yerel yönetimden yararlanacaktır. Bu Adalarda güvenlik ve düzen yukarıda sözü geçen yerel yönetim eliyle yerli halk arasından toplanan ve yerel yönetimin emrinde bulunan bir polis tarafından sağlanacaktır.

Rum ve Türk nüfus mübadelesine ilişkin olarak Yunanistan ile Türkiye arasında yapılmış ya da yapılacak bağitlar İmroz ve Bozca Adaları halkına uygulanmayacaktır.

Madde 15: Türkiye aşağıda sayılan Adalar üzerindeki tüm hak ve senetlerinden İtalya yararına vazgeçer: Bugün İtalya'nın işgali altında bulunan Astampalya (Asropalia), Rodos (Rhodes), Kalki (Calki), Skarpanto, Kazos (Casso), Piskopis(Tilos), Misiros(Misyros), Kalimnos(Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos(Lipso), Sombeki(Simi) ve İstanköy (Kos) Adaları ile bunlara bağlı olan adacıkları ve meis (Castellorizo) Adası (2 numaralı haritaya bakılması).

KESİM : II

UYRUKLUK

Madde 30: İşbu Andlaşma hükümleri uyarınca Türkiye'den ayrılan topraklarda yerleşmiş Türk uyrukları kendiliğinden ve yerel yasaların koşulları içinde bu toprakların geçtiği Devletin uyruğu olacaklardır.

Madde 31: 18 yaşını geçmiş olup da 30. Madde hükümleri uyarınca Türk uyrukluğunu yitiren ve kendiliğinden yeni bir uyrukluk kazanan kişiler, işbu Andlaşma yürürlüğe konulduğu günden başlayarak, iki yıllık süre içinde Türk uyrukluğunu seçmek hakkına sahip olacaklardır.

Madde 32: İşbu Andlaşma gereğince Türkiye'den ayrılan topraklarda yerleşmiş ve bu topraklardaki halkın çoğunluktan soy bakımından ayrı olan 18 yaşını geçmiş kişiler, bu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe konulması gününden başlayarak iki yıllık süre içinde, halkının çoğunluğu kendi soyundan olan Devletlerden birinin uyrukluğunu, o Devletin izni koşulu ile seçebileceklerdir.

Madde 33: 31 ve 32. Maddeler hükümleri gereğince seçme haklarını kullanan kişiler bunu izleyen 12 ay içinde konutlarını seçme haklarını lehine kullandıkları devlet topraklarına geçirmek zorundadırlar.

Bu kişiler, seçme haklarını kullanmadan önce oturdukları öteki Devletin topraklarından sahip buldukları taşınmaz malları elde tutmakta serbest olacaklardır.

Bu kişiler her türlü taşınır mallarını birlikte götürebileceklerdir. Bundan dolayı kendilerine ne çıkarma, ne sokma için hiçbir harç ya da resim yüklenmeyecektir.

Madde 34: İşbu Andlaşma hükümleri gereğince Türkiye'den ayrılan bir yerin yerli halkından 18 yaşını geçmiş olan ve işbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe konulduğu sırada yabancı ülkelerde yerleşmiş bulunan Türk uyrukları, Türkiye'den ayrılan ülkeleri yöneten hükümetler ile kendilerinin yerleşmiş buldukları ülkelerin hükümetler arasında yapılması gereken görülebilecek anlaşmalar saklı tutulmak üzere, soyları bakımından bu topraklar halkının çoğunluğuna ilintili olmaları ve o toprakları yöneten hükümet de buna izin vermesi koşulu ile, asıl halkından buldukları topraklarda yürürlükte olan uyrukluğunu edinmekte seçme hakkına sahiptirler. Bu seçme hakkı, işbu Andlaşmanın yürürlüğe gününden başlayarak, iki yıllık süre içinde kullanılır.

KESİM : III

AZINLIKLARIN KORUNMASI

Madde 37: Türkiye, 38. den 44 e dek Maddelerde belirtilen hükümlerin temel yasalar (Les Lois fondamentales) olarak tanınmasını ve hiçbir yasa, hiçbir yönetmelik ve hiçbir resmi işlemin bu hükümlerle çelişkili ya da onlara aykırı olmamasını ve hiçbir yasanın, hiçbir yönetmeliğin ve hiçbir resmi işlemin söz konusu hükümlere üstün sayılmamasını yükümlenir.

Madde 38:Türkiye Hükümeti, Türkiye’de oturan herkesin, doğum, milliyet, dil, soy ya da din ayırtmeksizin, yaşam ve özgürlüklerini, en geniş biçimde korumayı yükümlenir.

Türkiye’de oturan herkes, her inancın, dinin ya da mezhebin, kamu düzeni ve ahlâk kurallarıyla çatışmayan gereklerini ister açık ister özel olarak serbestçe yerine getirmek hakkına sahip olacaktır. Müslüman olmayan azınlıklar, Türkiye Hükümetince ulusal savunma ya da kamu düzeninin korunması için ülkenin her yerinde ya da bir bölümünde alınan ve Türk yurttaşlarına uygulanan önlemler saklı kalmak koşulu ile, dolaşım ve göç özgürlüğünden bütünü ile yararlanacaklardır.

Madde 39: Müslüman olmayan azınlıklara mensup Türk yurttaşları Müslümanlarla özdeş medenî ve siyasal haklardan yararlanacaklardır.

Türkiye’nin tüm halkı, din ayırtılmaksızın, yasa önünde eşit olacaklardır.

Din, inanç ya da mezhep farkı hiçbir Türk Yurttaşının medeni ve siyasal haklardan yararlanmasına ve özellikle genel hizmetlere kabulüne, memurluğa ve yukarı derecelere ulaşmasına, ya da çeşitli meslekleri ve sanatları yapmasına bir engel sayılmayacaktır.

Herhangi bir Türk yurttaşının gerek özel ya da ticaret ilişkilerinde, gerek din, basın ya da her türlü yayın konusunda ve gerek toplantılarda herhangi bir dili serbestçe kullanmasına karşı hiçbir sınır konulmayacaktır.

Resmi dilin varlığı kuşkusuz olmakla birlikte, Türkçe’den başka dil ile konuşan Türk yurttaşlarına yargıçlar önünde kendi dillerini sözlü olarak kullanabilmeleri için gerekli kolaylıklar gösterilecektir.

Madde 40: Müslüman olmayan azınlıklara ilintili olan Türk yurttaşları hukuk bakımından ve fiilen öteki Türk yurttaşlarına uygulanan işlemlerin ve sağlanan güvencelerin tıpkısından yararlanacaklar ve özellikle, harcamaları kendilerince yapılmak üzere, her türlü yardım, dinsel ya da sosyal kurumları, her türlü okul ve benzeri öğretim ve dillerini özgürce kullanma ve dinsel ayinlerini serbestçe yapma bakımından eşit bir hakka sahip bulunacaklardır.

Madde 41:Genel öğretim konusunda Türk hükümeti, Müslüman olmayan yurttaşların önemli bir oranda yerleşmiş oldukları kentler ve kasabalarda, Türk yurttaşların çocuklarının ilkokullarda kendi dilleriyle öğretim görmelerini sağlamak üzere,gerekli kolaylığı gösterecektir. Bu hüküm Türk hükümetinin söz konusu okullarda Türk dilinin öğretilmesini zorunlu kılmasına engel olmayacaktır.

Müslüman olmayan azınlıklara ilintili Türk yurttaşlarının önemli oranda buldukları kentlerde ya da kasabalarda, bu azınlıklar Devlet bütçesi Belediye ya da benzeri bütçelerde eğitim, din, ya da yardım amacıyla genel gelirlerden verilecek

paralardan yararlanma ve ödenek ayrılması konusunda hakça bir pay alacaklardır. Söz konusu paralar ilgili kurumların yetkili temsilcilerine ödenecektir.

Madde 42: Türkiye Hükümeti Müslüman olmayan azınlıkların aile ya da kişi statüleri konusunda, bu sorunların sözü geçen azınlıkların törelerine göre çözümlenmesine uygun her türlü hükümleri koymayı kabul eder.

İşbu hükümler Türkiye Hükümeti ile ilgili azınlıklardan her birinin eşit sayıda temsilcilerden oluşan özel Komisyonlarda düzenlenecektir. Anlaşmazlık olursa, Türkiye Hükümeti ile Milletler Cemiyeti Meclisi, birlikte, Avrupalı hukukçular arasından bir üst hakem atayacaklardır.

Türkiye Hükümeti söz konusu azınlıkların Kiliseleri, Havraları, Mezarlıkları ve öteki dinsel kurumlarına her türlü koruyuculuğu göstermeyi yükümlenir. Bu azınlıkların bugün Türkiye 'de bulunan Vakıflarına ve dinsel ve yardım kurumlarına her türlü kolaylığı gösterecek ve izinleri verecek ve yeni dinsel ve yardım kurumları kurulması için, benzeri öteki özel kurumlara sağlanmış olan gerekli kolaylıklardan hiçbirini esirgemeyecektir.

Madde 43: Müslüman olmayan azınlıklara mensup Türk yurttaşları, inançlarına aykırı ya da dinsel ayinlerini bozucu herhangi bir işlem yapmaya zorlanamayacakları gibi, hafta tatilleri gününde Mahkemelerde hazır bulunmaktan ya da herhangi bir yasal işlemin yapılmasından kaçınmaları nedeniyle, onların hiçbir hakkı ortadan kalkmayacaktır.

Bununla birlikte, bu hüküm söz konusu Türk yurttaşlarının, kamu düzeninin korunması bakımından, öteki tüm Türk yurttaşlarının bağlı olduğu yükümlerden bağışık kılmayacaktır.

Madde 44: Türkiye, işbu Kesimin yukarıdaki Maddelerinin, Türkiye'nin Müslüman olmayan azınlıklarına ilişkin bulunduğu ölçüde; uluslar arası toplumu ilgilendirici nitelikte yükümler getirdiğini ve onların Milletler Cemiyetinin güvencesi altına konulmasını kabul eder. İşbu hükümler Milletler Cemiyeti Meclisinde çoğunlukla alınan bir karar olmaksızın değiştirilemeyecektir. Britanya İmparatorluğu, Fransa, İtalya ve Japonya Milletler Cemiyeti Meclisinde işbu Maddeler konusunda, yönetimine uygun biçimde, çoğunlukla kabul edilecek olan her hangi bir değişikliği reddetmemeyi bu Andlaşma ile yükümlenirler.

Türkiye, Milletler Cemiyeti Meclisi üyelerinden her birinin bu yükümlülüklerden her hangi birine aykırılık olması ya da olma tehlikesi üzerine, buna Meclisin dikkatini çekmeğe yetkili olacağını ve Meclisin, durumuna göre, uygun ve etkin sayılacak bir davranışta bulunabileceğini ve yönerge verebileceğini kabul eder.

Bundan başka, Türkiye, işbu Maddelere ilişkin hukuksal ya da edimsel sorunlarda, Türkiye Hükümeti ile bağıtlı öteki devletlerden her hangi biri ya da Milletler Cemiyeti Meclisi üyelerinden her hangi bir devlet arasında görüş ayrılığı ortaya çıkınca bu anlaşmazlığın, Milletler Cemiyeti Andlaşmasının 14. Maddesi uyarınca, uluslar arası nitelikte bir anlaşmazlık gibi sayılmasını kabul eder.

Türkiye Hükümeti bu türden olan her hangi bir anlaşmazlığın, öteki Taraf istemde bulunursa, uluslar arası Daimi Adalet Divanına götürülmesini kabul eder. Daimi Divan kararı istinaf edilmeyip , Milletler Cemiyeti Andlaşmasının 13. Maddesi uyarınca verilmiş bir kararın güç ve hükmünün tıpkısına sahip olacaktır.

Madde 45: İşbu kesim hükümleri ile Türkiye'nin Müslüman olmayan azınlıkları için tanınan haklar, Yunanistan tarafından da, kendi topraklarında bulunan Müslüman azınlığa tanınmıştır.

IV. OTURMA VE YARGI YETKİSİ KONUSUNDA SÖZLEŞME

KESİM : I

GİRİŞ VE OTURMA (Accès et Séjour)

Madde 2: Türkiye ülkesinde, öteki Bağıtlı Devletlerin uyrukları, kişileri ve malları bakımından, ortak devletler hukuku (Droit International Commun) uyarınca kabul edilecekler ve işlem göreceklendir. Bu uyruklar, kişileri, mallar, hakları ve çıkarları bakımından Türkiye'de yasalar ve yerel makamların tam ve sürekli koruyuculuğundan yararlanacaklardır. Dışarıdan göçe ilişkin hükümler zedelememek üzere, söz konusu uyruklar, yürürlükteki yasa ve yönetmeliklere uyarak, Türkiye'ye giriş ve orada yerleşme konusunda tam serbestliğe sahip olacaklar ve böylece Türkiye'ye gidip gelebilecekler ve orada oturabileceklerdir.

Madde 6: Türkiye'de öteki Bağıtlı Devletler uyrukları askerlik hizmetine ilişkin yasalara bağlı olmayacaklardır. Bunlar, askerlik hizmeti yerine geçmek üzere, her türlü hizmet, yüküm ve yüklemlerden bağışık olacaklardır.

Kamu yararına bulunduğu yasalara uygun olarak kabul edilmiş bir nedene dayanmadıkça ve kendilerine hakça ve önceden ödenecek bir zarar-giderim verilmedikçe söz konusu uyrukların malları kamulaştırılmayacak ya da bu uyruklar mallarından yararlanma haklarından, geçici bile olsa, yoksun bırakılmayacaklardır. Önceden açıklanmadıkça hiçbir kamulaştırma işlemi yapılmayacaktır.

BÖLÜM II

YARGI YETKİSİ

Madde 14: Türkiye'de öteki Bağıtlı Devletlerin uyrukları, buna karşılık, o Devletlerin ülkelerindeki Türk uyrukları, 18. Madde hükümleri saklı kalmak üzere, her konuda yerli uyrukların bağlı oldukları özdeş koşullara göre Mahkemelere özgürce başvurarak davacı ya da davalı olabileceklerdir.

Madde 16: Türkiye ile öteki Bağıtlı Devletler arasında kişisel durum konularında, başka deyişle, evlenme ve aile, mal rejimi, boşanma, ayrılık, çeyiz, babalık, evlât edinme, yetenek, erginlik, korumalık, görmenlik, kısıtlama işlerinde ve taşınır mallara ilişkin konularda, vasiyet ya da yasal mirasçılık ya da mirasın bölüşülmesi, terekenin tasfiyesi ve genel olarak aile hukuku konularında bu Devletlerin Türkiye'de yerleşmiş olan ta da orada bulunan uyruklarına karşı ancak kişisel durumu söz konusu olan tarafın bağlı olduğu ülkedeki ulusal mahkemeler yada ulusal makamlar yetkili olacaktır.

İşbu hüküm, devletler hukukuna ya da yapılacak özel Sözleşmelere göre, Konsolosların nüfus kayıtlarına ilişik konularda sahip oldukları özel yetkileri zedelediği gibi, tarafların ulusal Mahkeme ya da öteki ulusal makamların yetkisi içine girdiği yukarıda belirtilen konulara ilişkin kanıtları Türkiye Mahkemelerinin istem ve kabulü bakımından haklarını da zedeleyemez.

Birinci Fıkra hükmü dışında kalmak üzere, eğer dava ile ilgili olanların tümü Türkiye mahkemelerinin yetkisini kabul ettiklerini yazılı olarak bildirirlerse, bu Mahkemeler, tarafların ulusal yasası uyarınca karar vermek üzere, Birinci Fıkra da öngörülen konular üzerinde de yetkili olabileceklerdir.

Madde 17: Türkiye'deki yabancılara, kişileri ve malları bakımından, Türkiye Mahkemeleri önünde, devletler hukukuna ve öteki ülkelerde genellikle uygulanan ilke ve yöntemlere uygun bir korunma sağlayacağını Türkiye Hükümeti açıklar.

IV. TÜRK VE RUM NÜFUS MÜBADELESİNE İLİŞKİN SÖZLEŞME VE PROTOKOL

(Convention concernant l'Echange des Populations Grecques et Turques et Protocole)

30 Ocak 1923 günü imzalanmıştır.

Madde 1: Türk topraklarında yerleşmiş Rum Ortodoks dininden Türk uyrukları ile, Yunan topraklarında yerleşmiş Müslüman dininden Yunan uyruklarının, 1 Mayıs 1923 tarihinden başlayarak, zorunlu mübadelesine girişilecektir.

Bu kimselerden hiç biri, Türk Hükümetinin izni olmadıkça Türkiye'ye ya da Yunan Hükümetinin izni olmadıkça Yunanistan'a dönerek orada yerleşemeyecektir.

Madde 2: Birinci Maddede öngörülen mübadele :

- a) İstanbul'da oturan Rumları,
- b) Batı Trakya'da oturan Müslümanları kapsamayacaktır.

1912 Yasası ile sınırlandırıldığı biçimde İstanbul Belediye (Şehremaneti) sınırları içinde 30 Ekim 1918 gününden önce yerleşmiş(établis) bulunan tüm Rumlar, İstanbul'da oturan Rumlar sayılacaklardır.

Madde 3: Karşılıklı olarak, üzerindeki Rum ve Türk nüfusu mübadele edilecek olan toprakları 18 Ekim 1912 tarihinden sonra bırakıp gitmiş olan Rumlar ve Müslümanlar 1. inci Maddede öngören mübadelenin kapsamına girer sayılacaklardır.

İşbu Sözleşmede kullanılan “ göçmen” (émigrant) terimi, 18 Ekim 1912 tarihinden sonra göç etmesi gereken ya da göç etmiş bulunan tüm gerçek ya da tüzel kişileri kapsamaktadır.

Madde 5: İşbu sözleşmenin 9. ve 10. Maddelerindeki çekinceler saklı kalmak üzere, bu Sözleşme uyarınca yapılacak mübadele yüzünden, Türkiye'deki Rumların ya da Yunanistan'daki Türklerin mülkiyet haklarına ve alacaklarına hiçbir zarar verilmeyecektir.

Madde 6: Mübadele edilecek haklara mensup bir kimsenin, hangi nedenle olursa olsun, gidişine hiçbir engel çıkartılmayacaktır. Bir göçmenin, kesinleşmiş bir hapis cezası bulunduğu, henüz kesinleşmemiş bir cezaya çarptırıldığı, ya da kendisine karşı ceza kovuşturması yürütüldüğü durumlarda, söz konusu göçmen, cezasını çekmek ya da yargılamak üzere, kendisine karşı kovuşturmada bulunan ülkenin makamlarınca, gideceği ülkenin makamlarına teslim edilecektir.

Madde 7: Göçmenler, bırakıp gidecekleri ülkenin uyrukluğunu yitirecekler ve vardıkları ülkenin topraklarına ayak bastıkları anda, bu ülkenin uyrukluğunu edinmiş sayılacaklardır.

İki ülkeden birinin ya da ötekini daha önce bırakıp gitmiş olan ve henüz yeni bir uyruklu edinmemiş bulunan göçmenler, bu yeni uyruklu, işbu Sözleşmenin imzası gününde edinmiş olacaklardır.

XI. ADALETİN YÖNETİMİNE İLİŞKİN AÇIKLAMA

(Déclaration sur l'Administration Judiciaire)

24 Temmuz 1923'de imzalanmıştır.

Türk Delegasyonu, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümetinin, yabancılara Türk Mahkemeleri önünde iyi bir adaletin sağlanması için tüm güvenceleri vermek ve, egemenliğini bütünü ile kullanarak, hiçbir yabancı müdahale olmaksızın bunu gözlemek olanağına sahip bulunduğunu daha önce de açıklamak fırsatını bulmuş idi. Bununla birlikte, bu Hükümet ahlâk ve uygarlığın gelişmesinin gerekli kılacağı reformları gerçekleştirmek için araştırmalara ve incelemelere girişmeğe hazırdır.

Bu düşünce ile, aşağıda imzaları bulunanlar, sahip oldukları yetki belgelerine dayanarak, şu Açıklamayı yapmağı istemişlerdir :

1

Türkiye Hükümeti, 1914-1918 Savaşına atılmamış olan ülkeler uyruğu hukukçularından oluşmak üzere, Lahey Uluslar arası Sürekli Adalet Divanınca düzenlenecek çizelge içinden seçeceği Avrupalı Hukuk Danışmanlarını, 5 yıldan az olmamak üzere, gerekli göreceği bir süre için, Türkiye memuru olarak ve gecikmesizin hizmetine almak niyetindedir.

2

İşbu Hukuk Danışmanları Adalet Bakanına bağlı olacaklardır. Bunların bir bölümünün çalışma merkezi İstanbul, öteki bölümününki ise İzmir kenti olacaktır. Bu Danışmanlar Yasalar hazırlamakla görevli Komisyonların çalışmalarına katılacaklar ve, Yargıçların görevlerine karışmaksızın, Türkiye hukuk, ticaret ve ceza mahkemelerinin işlerini yürütme biçimini izlemek ve Adalet Bakanına gerekli göreceği tüm raporları sunmak görevli olacaklardır; kendilerine gerek hukuk, ticaret ya da ceza alanlarında adaletin yönetiminden, gerek cezaların yerine getirilmesinden ve gerek yasaların uygulanmasından doğabilecek tüm şikâyetleri,

Türk Yasalarına kesin biçimde uymağı sağlamak için, Adalet Bakanına durumu bildirmek üzere, kabul etmek yetkisine sahip olacaklardır.

Hukuk Danışmanları, konulara girilmesinin, aramaların ya da tutuklamaların doğurabileceği şikâyetleri de kabule yetkili olacaklardır. Ayrıca, bu önlemler İstanbul ve İzmir yargısal yetki bölgelerince uygulandıktan sonra, durum Adalet Bakanının yerel Temsilcisince gecikmeksizin Hukuk Danışmanına bildirilecektir. Bu Temsilci, böyle bir durumda doğrudan doğruya Hukuk Danışmanı ile yazışmaya geçme yetkisine sahip olacaktır.