

**THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING COMMON FOREIGN  
AND SECURITY POLICY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis is a study on the European Union's evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It aims to analyze the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union from its Cold War origins with particular consideration on post-Cold War developments. Emphasis will be put on the divergences of ideas resulting from the internal dynamics of the Union that shape the security policies of the EU. In this study, the major question, which will be tried to be answered, is how have the divisions within the EU, which result from the internal dynamics of the EU, affected the evolution of the Union's security policies. This study argues that the divisions within the European Union have so far prevented the Union from pursuing an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. Cooperation with NATO in the field of crisis management would provide the EU with military assets and capabilities which are required for an effective military crisis management mission. At the same time, this study argues that an effective crisis management in the EU can be achieved by covering both military and civilian aspects of crisis management in a balanced way.

## ÖZET

Bu tez, Avrupa Birliđinin (AB) gelişen Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası üzerine yapılmış bir çalışmadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası gelişmeler üzerinde yoğunlaşarak, Avrupa Birliđinin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının Soğuk Savaşdaki kökenleriyle birlikte gelişiminin analiz edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Avrupa Birliđinin iç dinamiklerinden kaynaklanarak Birliđin güvenlik politikalarının şekillendiren fikir ayrılıkları üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu çalışmada, AB içi dinamiklerden kaynaklanan fikir ayrılıklarının AB'nin güvenlik politikalarının gelişimini nasıl etkilediđi araştırılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın temel savı, AB içi bölünmelerin Avrupa Birliđinin etkin bir Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası izlemesini engellemekte olduğudur. Kriz yönetimi alanında NATO ile işbirliğine gidilmesi, Avrupa Birliğine etkin bir askeri kriz yönetim görevi için gerekli olan askeri kabiliyetleri sağlayacaktır. Aynı zamanda bu çalışma, AB içerisindeki etkin bir kriz yönetim gücünün kriz yönetiminin askeri ve sivil yönlerini dengeli bir şekilde kapsayarak başarılı olabileceđini ileri sürmektedir.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABCCC	:Airborne Battlefield Command, Control and Communication
ARRC	:Ace Rapid Reaction Corps
CAP	:Common Agricultural Policy
CEE	:Central and Eastern Europe
CESDP	:Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFSP	:Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	:Combined Joint Task Force
DCI	:Defense Capabilities Initiative
EC	:European Community
EC	:European Council
ECCM	:European Community Monitor Mission
ECHO	:European Community Humanitarian Office
ECSC	:European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	:European Defense Community
EEC	:European Economic Community
EIB	:European Investment Bank
EMS	:European Military Staff
EMS	:European Monetary System
EMU	:European Monetary Union
EPC	:European Political Community
ESDI	:European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	:European Security and Defense Policy
EU	:European Union
EUMS	:European Union Military Staff

EURATOM	:European Atomic Energy Community
HQs	:Headquarters
IFOR	:Implementation Force
KFOR	:Kosovo Force
MP	:Member of Parliament
MRAV	:Multi-Role Armored Vehicle
NAA	:North Atlantic Assembly
NAC	:North Atlantic Council
NACC	:North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	:North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	:Non-Governmental Organizations
OECD	:Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	:Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	:Partnership for Peace
PSC	:Political and Security Committee
QSP	:Quick Start Projects
RACVIAC	:Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Center
RMASG	:Regional Mine Action Support Group
RRF	:Rapid Reaction Force
RRM	:Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SACEUR	:Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SEA	:Single European Act
SEE	:Southeast Europe
SFOR	:Stabilization Force

TEU	:Treaty of European Union
UK	:The United Kingdom
UN	:United Nations
UNMAS	:United Nations Mine Action Service
US	:The United States
WEU	:Western European Union
WMD	:Weapons of Mass Destruction



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	iii
Özet.....	iv
Acknowledgments.....	v
List of Abbreviations.....	vi
Table of Contents.....	ix
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION.....</b>	<b>10</b>
1.1 The Evolution of the European Union.....	10
1.1.1 The Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community.....	11
1.1.2 The Treaty of Rome of 1957.....	15
1.1.3 The Single European Act of 1986 .....	17
1.1.4 The Treaty of Maastricht of 1991.....	18
1.1.5 The Treaty of Nice of 2000.....	19
1.2 The Objectives of the European Union.....	20
1.3 The Three Pillars of the European Union.....	23
1.3.1 The First Pillar.....	23
1.3.1.1 The Common Agricultural Policy.....	23
1.3.1.2 The European Monetary Union.....	25
1.3.2 The Second Pillar.....	27
1.3.3 The Third Pillar.....	30
1.4 The Institutions of the European Union.....	32

1.4.1 The Council.....	32
1.4.2 The European Council.....	33
1.4.3 The European Parliament.....	33
1.4.4 The Commission.....	34
1.4.5 The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance .....	34
1.4.6 The Court of Auditors .....	35
1.5 Conclusion.....	35
<b>CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE.....</b>	<b>37</b>
2.1 The Failure of the European Defense Community .....	38
2.2 French Security Policies after the Second World War.....	40
2.3 Security Cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War. ....	42
2.4 Post Cold War Security Policies in Western Europe.....	46
2.5 Conclusion.....	57
<b>CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY.....</b>	<b>59</b>
3.1 European Security and Defense Identity in NATO.....	59
3.1.1 Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the Combined Joint Task Force.....	60
3.1.2 WEU-Led CJTF Operations.....	61
3.1.3 The Washington Summit of 1999.....	62
3.1.4 Factors Hindering the Future of Development of the CJTF Concept.....	64
3.2 The European Union and European Security and Defense Policy .....	67
3.2.1 The Challenges Ahead for the ESDP.....	74

3.3 Conclusion.....	85
<b>CHAPTER 4: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NON-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>87</b>
4.1 Non-military Crisis Management in the European Union.....	89
4.2 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira.....	93
4.3 Stability Pact.....	96
4.3.1 Organizational Structure.....	97
4.3.2 The Regional Funding Conference and Quick Start Package.....	100
4.3.3 Achievements of the Stability Pact.....	100
4.3.4 Problems and Failures of the Stability Pact .....	105
4.4 Conclusion.....	106
<b>CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>108</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>120</b>

## **Introduction**

The Treaty of Paris of 1951 was the first step towards European integration. The Treaty established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which created a common market for coal, steel, coke, iron ore and scrap between France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Italy. The motivation behind the establishment of the ECSC was to put coal and steel production in France and Germany under a joint authority and control Germany that was perceived to have caused two world wars in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Steel production was needed for the construction of railways, buildings, ships, vehicles and machinery that had been destroyed by the bombings during the war. The cooperation in the area of steel production furthered the integration process within Europe. The European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was established with the Treaty of Rome, which was signed on 25 March 1957. EEC aimed to provide economic development and thus political stability in Europe. In 1968, the Customs Union was completed and common external tariff was established. Other countries, observing the economic growth and other benefits of the Community, considered applying for membership. Thus, in 1961, Ireland, the UK, Denmark, and Norway applied for membership. The first wave of EC enlargement took place in 1973. Ireland, the UK, Denmark eventually joined the Community after a four-year negotiation process. In 1978, Bremen European Council approved a plan to set up European Monetary System (EMS) and European monetary unit (ECU). It was also decided that EMS would take effect retrospectively from 1 January 1979. The following significant developments towards European integration were European Political Cooperation and the Single Act of 1986.

In 1970, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was introduced to provide a network for communication and cooperation between governments in the area of foreign policy matters. EPC constituted an intergovernmental forum for policy consultation and the exchange of information between EC member states. The failure of EPC members to coordinate an effective response to the OPEC oil price rises in 1973 caused EPC to exist as an ineffective institution throughout the 1970s. With their economies in chaos, member states reacted individually rather than jointly to face common problems. However, EPC was concerned about the political and economic aspects of security, and it ignored the military aspects of security. European Political Cooperation was replaced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) which established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union in 1993.

The Single Act signed in 1986 created a space without any internal borders and aimed to provide the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and persons. It had three important objectives:<sup>1</sup> first, creating a large internal market by 1 January 1993; second, increasing the role of the European parliament; third, improving the decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 was built on the provisions of the Single Act and strengthened its objectives and mechanisms. The Treaty focused on a plan for achieving full monetary union among the Union states by 1999. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a three-pillar structure: the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. The launching of a Common

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<sup>1</sup> David Weigall and Peter Stirk, *The Origins & Development of the European Community*. London: Leicester University Press, 1992), 201.

Foreign and Security Policy at Maastricht indicated the collective aspiration of the EU to play a unified foreign and security policy approach in world politics.<sup>2</sup>

Although the integration process of Western Europe developed successfully after World War II, the evolution of security policies in Western Europe was problematic. Western European Union (WEU) was established by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in 1948 in Europe. The WEU member states aimed that the WEU would provide a safeguard against a renewal of German militarism and Soviet aggression. Later, the fear of a revival of German militarism led France to propose the Pleven Plan of 1950, which required the establishment of a European Defense Community, with a European Army that included German troops. The EDC was to consist of 100,000 troops, and half of this force would be French with the West German contingent controlled by French military authorities. However, the Pleven Plan did not turn into a reality by the ratification failure in the France Parliament caused by political factors.

The EDC and WEU failed to provide a security and defense cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War. The main reason behind these failures was the divergences of security policies between the leading states of Europe, especially between France, West Germany, and Britain. For this reason, the security of Western Europe was guaranteed by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) during the Cold War.

The fall of Berlin Wall in November 1989, the German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the wars in Caucasus and especially the wars in Yugoslavia provided new impetus to the process of European defense. The wars in Yugoslavia showed the weaknesses of the Europeans and their deficiencies in the

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<sup>2</sup> Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 20.

areas of command and communications, intelligence gathering, precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, heavy airlift capacity and in-flight refueling. In particular, the experiences of the Kosovo conflict acted as a catalyst for European security. At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, European leaders decided to develop a new Common European Security and Defense Policy aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed up by credible forces.

After the Cold War period, NATO and EU relations also gained a new impetus in the area of security cooperation against newly emerging security threats in the post-Cold War era posed by proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction, terrorism and ethnic conflicts. In 1996, NATO began to develop a European Security and Defense Identity to provide a more balanced partnership between North America and Europe. NATO decided to make its assets available for WEU operations and adapted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept for WEU-led operations. After the Helsinki Summit of 1999 at which the EU decided to absorb the WEU in the near future, and to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 troops by 2003 for Petersberg missions, at the North Atlantic Council meetings in 1999, NATO declared that it would provide ready EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities, but on a case-by-case basis and consensus.

There are various problems hindering the development of the CJTF concept. First, EU member states, in particular France, have some doubts about the development European Security and Defense Identity within NATO. France is concerned about NATO's 'right of first refusal'. Even though NATO will give its assets and capabilities to the European members of the Alliance or the EU to conduct independent military operations, the US will retain an effective veto over CJTF operations, since it will insist on giving its approval before giving its assets. Thus,

the success of the CJTF structure will depend on the US authorization to give its assets and capabilities to the European command. If the US refuses to authorize the use of its assets, the CJTF will become redundant.<sup>3</sup> Second, France and the United States could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. Third, many lower level officers who would have to implement the CJTF might be less enthusiastic.<sup>4</sup>

At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU represented an aspiration to combine all civilian and military instruments in order to be able to respond to a variety of small and large crises. Military capabilities could provide a secure environment, but the military could not build a society, with its infrastructure, basic services, and administration. Hence, the European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira of 19 and 20 June 2000 took important decisions for the development of civilian crisis management capabilities.

This dissertation analyzes the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The objective of this study is an analysis of the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union with particular emphasis on post-Cold War developments. The emphasis will be on the divergences of ideas resulting from the internal dynamics of the Union that shape the security policies of the EU. The major question, which I will seek to answer in this study, is how the divisions in the EU resulting from its internal dynamics have affected the evolution of the Union's security policies.

The aim of choosing this subject rests upon two concerns. The first concern is to provide a good understanding of security policies of the European Union and its members. Under the CFSP pillar, the EU aimed to develop civil and military

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<sup>3</sup> Nora Bensahel, "Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force," *European Security* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 65.



resources and capabilities to take and implement decisions for conflict prevention and crisis management missions. On the other hand, some individual declarations from France and Germany show that there is a desire on the part of the EU to become a global superpower. But the Nordic states object to the notion of a European army. Finland and Sweden have chosen militarily non-alignment as an instrument in achieving security policy stability in northern Europe. Moreover, these states prefer to use the term of ‘crisis management’ instead of ‘defense’ in the EU context. For example, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Finland and Sweden wanted to see an explicit statement that the goal would not be the establishment of a European army. Thus, Helsinki Presidency Conclusions stated that ‘the process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.’ In brief, this study aims to explore the divergences of ideas between the member states of the EU regarding the development of an autonomous crisis management capability.

The second concern for choosing this subject is that developments in the European Security and Defense Policy would have implications for Turkey. Turkey was accepted as candidate to the Union at Helsinki Summit of 1999. If Turkey joins the Union, it will be a part of European security architecture. Moreover, Turkey has much to contribute to the European crisis management capability with its developed army aviation and air forces. On the other hand, if Turkey is not accepted to join the Union or its membership is delayed, there are likely to be reverse security implications for Turkey. The EU has requested the authorization to have ready access to the military assets of NATO. NATO Charter requires unanimity of its members for such a kind of authorization. Turkey, as a non-member of the Union has rejected

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

to give its unconditional approval to such a request that would mean losing its control over the use of NATO assets in the possible operations of the EU.<sup>5</sup> This is because Turkey believes that EU-led operations may contradict its national interests. There are six conflict scenarios drawn up by NATO contingency planners that require the direct involvement of Turkey. EU military operation in the vicinity of Turkey without Turkey's participation in planning and operation phase may threaten its security. This is why, it is significant to have a good understanding of the dynamics of the EU's evolving security and defense policy.

Chapter 1 mainly deals with the evolution of the European Union. For the understanding of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, it is essential to explore the motives behind European integration. Thus, this chapter attempts to present the circumstances, which lead to European integration just after the World War II. It will also analyze the cornerstone developments in the process of European integration such as the establishment of European Economic Community, the Single Act of 1986, and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 in detail. In the second part of this chapter, the Treaty on the European Union and the three-pillar structure of the EU will be discussed. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 modified the European Community into a European Union consisting of three pillars: the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. The Community agreed at Maastricht that there should be CFSP in order to protect the fundamental interests of the Community and reinforce its world role. The main reason behind the implementation of the pillar structure was to add powers to the Union in the areas of foreign policy, security and defense policy, asylum and immigration policy, criminal and judicial co-operation.

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<sup>5</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq," *Insight Turkey* 4, no. 1 (January- March 2002): 51.

Chapter 2 focuses specifically on the evolution of security policies in Western Europe after the World War II. In the first part of this chapter, the reasons behind the failures of security cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War are presented. Moreover, the divergences of security policies between Western European states during the Cold War are also discussed. In the second part of this chapter, post-Cold War security policies in Western Europe are analyzed.

Chapter 3 deals with the dynamics of the European Security and Defense Policy in the post-Cold War era. In this chapter, NATO's Combined Joint Task Force concept and Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be analyzed. The problematic issues related with the development of the CJTF concept will also be discussed. The outcomes of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, and the factors that would hinder the development of European Security and Defense Policy will be analyzed.

One of the divisions in the European Union is about development of non-military crisis management capability. Nordic EU member states, in particular Sweden and Finland, has been seen to guard against the dominance of military means within EU crisis management initiative.<sup>6</sup> With the initiative of Finland and Sweden, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 approved a report on non-military crisis management. This report stated that the EU decided to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones. Hence, Chapter 4 will deal with the development of the civilian aspects of crisis management in the European Union. If the EU succeeds in developing an effective non-military crisis management capability, this situation would have implications for Turkey. Turkey wants to contribute to the development

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<sup>6</sup> Hanna Ojanen, "Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP," *Occasional Papers* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, January 2000), available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ11.html>; accessed 8 July 2002.

of the ESDP. However, Turkey makes its plans as if the EU will create a military force. Turkey offered in February 2000 to provide a brigade-size unit supported by air and naval components. On the other hand, Turkey does not have any contribution plan for the development of non-military crisis management in the EU. Besides, Turkish officials are far from understanding the internal dynamics of the European Union. The difference of this study from some other studies about the European security is that this thesis attempts to explore the internal dynamics of the EU.

The key success of the EU in non-military crisis management has so far been the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. For this reason, in the second part of Chapter 4, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe will be analyzed. The organizational structure, achievements, and failures of the Stability Pact will also be discussed.

Conclusion chapter will summarize the findings of the previous chapters. It will be argued that the divisions within the European Union have so far prevented the Union from pursuing an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. Besides, this chapter will reflect upon the implications of the ESDP for Turkey.

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

This chapter focuses on the evolution of the European Union. It aims to explore the motives behind European integration. It also attempts to focus on the circumstances, which lead to European integration after the World War II. It will analyze the cornerstone developments in the process of European integration such as the establishment of European Economic Community, the Single Act of 1986, and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 in detail. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 modified the European Community into a European Union consisting of three pillars. In the second part of this chapter, the three-pillar structure provided by the Maastricht Treaty is analyzed.

### **1.1 The Evolution of the European Union**

The European integration started with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950. Based on a plan, which is called the Schuman Plan, the ECSC was established to put coal and steel production in France and Germany under a joint authority. The ECSC would also deepen the integration process within Europe.<sup>1</sup> In 1957, the European Economic Community was established by the six Western European states to enhance the economic development and political stability in Europe. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 also launched the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to provide a fair standard of living for the agricultural community by increasing their individual earnings, and to stabilize markets. Another important development in the European integration was the European Monetary Union (EMU). A timetable was planned to launch EMU in

the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. EMU would provide a single Community currency, Community control of national monetary policies and massive transfers of funds to the community budget.<sup>2</sup>

### **1.1.1 The Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community of 1950**

At the end of the Second World War, the Western European states found themselves caught up in a radically new situation in Europe. The continent was divided into two blocks, which are dominated by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Leading Western European states, France and Britain, and the US took part in establishing the Atlantic Alliance. Germany was divided and the United States was determined to consolidate and rearm the western half of the Europe.<sup>3</sup> At the end of the 1940s, the integration in Western Europe provided for France a necessity and a choice: it was a question of defining a new relationship with Germany. The European leaders held a major conference in Geneva in July 1944. In the conference, a united Europe that would prevent the outbreak of war in future was discussed.<sup>4</sup> Besides, it was argued at the conference that a united Europe should have a government directly responsible to the people of the member states, a written constitution, an army, and a supreme court.<sup>5</sup>

After the Second World War, the major reason behind the European integration was to prevent the Western European countries from going to war against

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<sup>1</sup> Hans Mouritzen, "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region," *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (2001): 303.

<sup>2</sup> Anne Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community* (Hong Kong: Longman, 1982), 20.

<sup>3</sup> Philippe Moreau Defarges, "France and Europe," in *Policy Making in France from de Gaulle to Mitterrand*, ed. Paul Godt (London: Pinter Publishers), 226.

<sup>4</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (New York: Longman Inc., 1991), 49.

each other.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, the economic situation of Europe required immediate action, since there were nine million refugees, and towns, roads and railways had been destroyed by the bombings during the war.<sup>7</sup> Capital investment in industry had been neglected except for military purposes. The iron, steel, coal, chemicals, bricks and cement were needed in short supply for the reconstruction of railways, buildings, ships, vehicles, and machinery,<sup>8</sup> and the worst of all, the European industry was unable to produce the goods for export needed to pay for the imported goods from the US.<sup>9</sup>

The Monnet Plan developed by Jean Monnet, the French economist and administrator, intended to make the French economy competitive and to reverse the technological inferiority of the French economy.<sup>10</sup> The Monnet Plan aimed to get an access to Ruhr's resources of coal and coke and to replace German goods in both Germany and her export markets with French goods.<sup>11</sup> Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the EU, emphasized that the need for the European integration was economic and political:

The need was political as well as economic. The Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feuds and wars. The governments and peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis for peace in the world was to be established, these notions had to be eliminated. Here again, one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as an end itself. We thought that both objectives could in time be reached if conditions were created enabling these countries to increase their resources by merging them in a large and dynamic common market; and if these same countries could be made to consider that their problems were no longer solely of national concern, but were mutual European responsibilities.... People, more often outside the European Community than within, are tempted to see the European

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<sup>6</sup> Michael Calingaert, *European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 1.

<sup>7</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 6.

<sup>8</sup> Martin J. Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95* (New York: Routledge, 1996): 58.

<sup>9</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 6.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 59.

Community as a potential nineteenth-century state with all the overtones of power implies. But we are not in the nineteenth century, and the Europeans have built up the European Community precisely in order to find a way out of the conflicts to which the nineteenth-century power philosophy gave rise.<sup>12</sup>

Consequently, it was Jean Monnet who devised the strategies leading in 1951 to the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community. Robert Schuman, France's Foreign Minister, turned Monnet's plan for an ECSC into a reality linking France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries in the first step towards the European Union of today.<sup>13</sup> The Schuman Plan proposed to put German and French coal and steel output (industrial raw materials) under a joint High Authority, which was independent from governmental control and capable of enforcing its own decisions.<sup>14</sup> On 19 March 1951, the six European states, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Italy signed the Treaty of Paris, which established the supranational ECSC. The Treaty of Paris created a common market for coal, steel, coke, iron ore and scrap between signatory states.<sup>15</sup> The objective of the ECSC treaty was to encourage economic development, growth of employment, and a rising standard of living in the member states through the development of a common market in coal and steel.<sup>16</sup> Shortly it was designed to balance the six states' particular vested interests in coal and steel and to facilitate achievement of national objectives in these sectors.<sup>17</sup> Main points of the Treaty can be summarized as follows:<sup>18</sup>

- The free movement of products and free access to sources of production;

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<sup>12</sup> Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 1 (1963) in *The Politics of European Integration: A Reader*, Michael O'Neill (London: Routledge, 1996), 168.

<sup>13</sup> Mark Wise, "France and European Unity," in *French in World Politics*, eds. Robert Aldrich and John Connell (London: Routledge, 1989), 35.

<sup>14</sup> *The Schuman Plan and the ECSC (1950-1951)*. Available from <http://www.cmutuel.com/cmutueva/html/c12a.html>; accessed 10 December 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 57.

<sup>16</sup> Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, 49.

<sup>17</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 61.

<sup>18</sup> The European Parliament, "The First Treaties," *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000). Available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1\\_1\\_1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1_1_1_en.htm); accessed 12 December 2001.



- Permanent monitoring of the market to avoid distortions which could lead to the introduction of product quotas;
- Respect for the rules of competition and price transparency;
- Support for the modernization and conversion of the coal and steel sectors.

The treaty created a High Authority operating independently from national governments, which was made up of 9 members appointed for six years.<sup>19</sup> Besides, two other bodies created in order to provide means for protection:<sup>20</sup> the first one was a Council of Ministers, made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It was required that the opinion of this Council had to agree with the decisions of the High Authority. The second was an Assembly, made up of 78 parliamentarians from the 6-member countries, which was given right to dismiss the High Authority.

Jean Monnet prepared another plan named Pleven Plan for the creation of a European army for defense of Western Europe. In 1954, the treaty creating the European Defense Community was signed by the six. However, the EDC never came into existence due to the refusal of France's National Assembly in 1954. This subject will be analyzed in chapter 2 in detail.

The ECSC enhanced trade and production. It also enabled the European countries to develop and modernize their steel industry and made a significant contribution to the economic recovery of Europe. The following step in the European integration was the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community. The Treaty aimed to provide economic development and political stability. It also established a common market, which is a free-trade area that provides free circulation of goods, labor, capital and free establishment of service.

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<sup>19</sup> *The Schuman Plan and the ECSC (1950-1951)*. Available from <http://www.cmutuel.com/cmutueva/html/c12a.html>; accessed 10 December 2001.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

### 1.1.2 The Treaty of Rome of 1957

The treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed on 25 March 1957. The Treaty of Rome was an important step to establish the foundations of an ever-closed union among the European peoples.<sup>21</sup> The objective of the EEC was laid out in Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome:

The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and closer relations between the States belonging to it.

The purpose of the EEC was to guarantee economic development and political stability in Europe.<sup>22</sup> The two objectives of the EEC were liberalization of trade in order to promote a common market and ensuring the implementation of common economic policies by the member states.<sup>23</sup> EEC ended restrictions such as price fixing, limiting production, dumping and all elements of protective government aid to provide free and fair competition.<sup>24</sup> EEC designed an ambitious programme for the removal of tariffs and quantity restrictions to create a single common market, which would take place in three stages of for years each, starting in 1958.<sup>25</sup> The Common Market mechanism focused on free circulation of goods, labor, and capital.<sup>26</sup> The treaty included a twelve-year program in which to accomplish a customs union

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<sup>21</sup> Stephen George, *Britain and European Integration since 1945* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 11.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, 79.

<sup>25</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 94.

<sup>26</sup> *The Schuman Plan and the ECSC (1950-1951)*. Available from <http://www.cmutuel.com/cmutueva/html/c12a.html>; accessed 10 December 2001.

where custom duties and quantitative quotas between the signatories were eliminated.<sup>27</sup> Briefly, the EEC treaty's provisions can be summarized as follows:<sup>28</sup>

- The elimination of customs duties between Member States;
- The establishment of external Common Customs Tariff;
- The introduction of a common policy for agriculture and transport;
- The creation of a European Social Fund;
- The establishment of a European Investment Bank;
- The development of closer relations between the Member States.

Euratom's objective was to provide the growth of a powerful nuclear industry at European scale.<sup>29</sup> However, the nature of nuclear sector was complex and fragile. Since the Treaty touched on the vital interests of the Member States (defense and national independence), it had to scale down its ambitions.<sup>30</sup> In other words, it is argued that Euratom's activities blocked by the governments of the member states, especially by the French government that wanted to maintain control over this strategic sector.<sup>31</sup>

Other countries, observing the economic growth and other benefits of the Community, considered applying for membership. In 1961, Ireland, the UK, Denmark, and Norway applied for membership. Ireland, the UK and Denmark eventually joined the Community in 1973, however the people of Norway rejected to join the Community.

In 1968, the Customs Union was completed and common external tariff established. It was also guaranteed the freedom of movement for workers within the Community in order to establish common labour market. In 1978, Bremen European Council approved a plan to set up European Monetary System (EMS) and European

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> The European Parliament, *The First Treaties*.

<sup>29</sup> *The Schuman Plan and the ECSC (1950-1951)*. Available from <http://www.cmutuel.com/cmutueva/html/c12a.html>; accessed 10 December 2001.

<sup>30</sup> The European Parliament, *The First Treaties*.

<sup>31</sup> *The Schuman Plan and the ECSC (1950-1951)*. Available from <http://www.cmutuel.com/cmutueva/html/c12a.html>; accessed 10 December 2001.

monetary unit (ECU). It was also decided that EMS would take effect retrospectively from 1 January 1979.

Until 1979, members of the European Parliament were being nominated by the governments of member states. In 1979, voters across the Community got the chance to select directly members of the European Parliament.

### **1.1.3 The Single European Act of 1986**

The Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 and entered into force in 1987. Its objective was to create by the end of 1992 a space without any internal borders and to provide the free circulation of goods, services, capital and persons.<sup>32</sup> The SEA was the first substantial change to the Treaty of Rome. It had three major objectives:<sup>33</sup> first, creating a large internal market by 1 January 1993; second, increasing the role of the parliament; third, improving the decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers. Community agreements on enlargement and association agreements were subjected to the assent of the Parliament.<sup>34</sup> Besides, the SEA included various initiatives to promote integration in the spheres of social rights (health and the workers' security), research and technology, and environment.<sup>35</sup> Majority voting was accepted as a decision-making procedure. It replaced unanimity in four of the responsibilities of the community which are improvement of the common customs tariff, freedom to provide services, the free movement of capital, and the common sea and air transport policy.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Terrence Hopmann, "French Perspectives on International Relations after Cold War." *Mershon International Studies Review* 38 (1994): 82.

<sup>33</sup> David Weigall and Peter Stirk, *The Origins & Development of the European Community*. London: Leicester University Press, 1992), 201.

<sup>34</sup> The European Parliament, "Developments up to the Single European Act," *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000). Available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1\\_1\\_2\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1_1_2_en.htm); accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>35</sup> Juan Carlos Ocaña, *The Single European Act and the Road Toward the Treaty of the European Union 1986-1992*. Available from <http://www.iespana.es/jocana59/Europe/acta.htm>; accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>36</sup> The European Parliament, *Developments up to the Single European Act*.

The Single Act gave the Community new competence for economic and social cohesion and set its objectives and means. One of these means was systematic use of the Structural Funds. The SEA strengthened the Community's powers by creating new responsibilities: a monetary capability, social policy, economic and social cohesion, research, technological development, and the environment.<sup>37</sup> The SEA also strengthened Parliament's powers by making Community agreements on enlargement and association agreements subject to Parliament's assent.<sup>38</sup>

#### **1.1.4 The Treaty of Maastricht of 1991**

The Maastricht Treaty was built on the provisions of the SEA and strengthened its objectives and mechanisms.<sup>39</sup> The focus of this treaty was presenting a plan for achieving full monetary and currency union among EC countries by 1999.<sup>40</sup> The Treaty required the establishment of a System of Central Banks, a European Central Bank, and a European Investment Bank. The treaty committed “the community to issue a single currency by 1999 at the latest; to increase the powers of the European parliament; to create a common foreign and security policy.”<sup>41</sup>

The Maastricht Treaty modified the European Community into a European Union consisting of three pillars:<sup>42</sup> the first pillar consists of the European Communities that provide a framework in which the Member States can exercise their sovereignty in the areas covered by the Treaties. The second pillar is the common foreign and security policy stated in Title V of the Treaty. The third one is

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<sup>37</sup> The European Parliament, “Economic and Social Cohesion,” *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000). Available from [http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/4\\_4\\_1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/4_4_1_en.htm); accessed 4 July 2002.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Calingaert, *European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests*, 68.

<sup>40</sup> Michael J. Baun, *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and New Politics of European Integration* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 2.

<sup>41</sup> The Commission of the European Communities, *From Single Market to European Union*. (Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), 13.

cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs stated in the Title VI of the Treaty.

The treaty on European Union came into force on the 1 November 1993, it gave European integration a whole new dimension. The Treaty determined a timetable for Economic and Monetary Union. The goal was that the same money would be used in each member state. The treaty set strict monetary standards for countries participating in the new European Monetary Union (EMU) and adopting the euro as their currency. EMU membership required budget deficits of less than 3% of gross domestic product, a total government debt no more than 60% of gross domestic product and an inflation rate within 1.5 percentage points of the three EU nations with the lowest inflation. On 1 January 1999, a major step was taken by eleven member states when they locked their exchange rates against the euro. Besides, on 1 January 2002, twelve member states started to use the euro as single currency in the Union. Another development in the European integration process was the Treaty of Nice of 2000. The treaty determined the steps in the enlargement process of the Union.

### **1.1.5 The Treaty of Nice of 2000**

In the Treaty of Nice, a new re-weighting of vote for the current and the future member States was reached. This new distribution of power is planned to come into force on 1 January 2005 in the case of current members.<sup>43</sup> The new system gives 29 votes to the ‘*Four Big Countries*’ (Germany, France, United Kingdom and

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<sup>42</sup> The European Parliament, “The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties: Prospects for the European Union,” *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000). Available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1\\_1\\_3\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1_1_3_en.htm); accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>43</sup> Ocaña, *The Single European Act and the Road Toward the Treaty of the European Union 1986-1992*.

Italy).<sup>44</sup> In 2005, countries that have two commissioners (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Europe) will have one. At that phase, the Council would be able to decide on the size of commission without consulting any other body. Besides the Council would choose its members “according to a rotation system yet to be devised ‘based on the principle of equality’ and reflecting demography and geography.”<sup>45</sup> At the same time, the ceiling of 700 seats in the European Parliament, decided by the treaty of Amsterdam, has been breached to 732 seats for 27 member states.<sup>46</sup> Finally, the subjects that are decided on a majority voting were increased to forty most of which are technical ones.<sup>47</sup> However, governments’ veto is maintained in subjects that affected them in a high degree, such as cohesion (Spain), tax system (Britain), asylum and immigration (Germany) or free trade in cultural an audiovisual sphere (France).<sup>48</sup>

After presenting the evolution of the European Union, the following parts of this chapter will analyze the objectives of the Union, the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty, and present the key institutions of the Union.

## **1.2 The Objectives of the European Union**

The Treaty on the European Union was agreed in Maastricht in December 1991. In fact, the EU was mainly a continuation of the European Economic Community (EEC) 1958-86, and the European Community (EC) 1986-91, under a different name. However, the institutional structure of the EC was different than that of the EU. The three communities, the ECSC, EEC and Euratom were sharing the

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<sup>44</sup> A. Seda Serdar, “Avrupa’nın Cesur Adımı: Nice Zirvesi Kararları (Nice Declarations),” *Stratejik Analiz* 9 (January 2001): 22.

<sup>45</sup> Andrew Duff, “From Amsterdam Left-overs to Nice Hangovers.” *The International Spectator* XXXVI, no. 1 (January- March 2001): 16.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>47</sup> Ocaña, *The Single European Act and the Road Toward the Treaty of the European Union 1986-1992*.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

same Assembly- it is now called the European Parliament and Court of Justice.<sup>49</sup> In addition, after 1967, the three communities have had a common Council of Ministers and Commission, thus these three communities were united under a common set of institutions.<sup>50</sup> With the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, The European Community, which was essentially economic in aspiration and content was transformed into a European Union, which now stands on three pillars.

The European Union's mission is to organize relations on the basis of solidarity between the member states and between their peoples in a consistent manner.<sup>51</sup> The major internal objective of the EU is to support economic and social progress, especially through the creation of an area without national borders, through the promotion of social and economic cohesion, and through the establishment of economic and monetary union.<sup>52</sup> The main objectives of the EU as stated in the Treaty on European Union can be summarized as follows:<sup>53</sup>

To assert the identity of the European Union on the international scene (through European humanitarian aid to non-EU countries, common foreign and security policy, action in international crisis; common positions within international organizations); to introduce European citizenship (which does not replace national citizenship but complements it and confers a number of civil and political rights on European citizens); to develop an area of freedom, security and justice (linked to the operation of internal market and more particularly the freedom of movement of persons); to maintain and build on established EU law (all the legislation adopted by the European institutions, together with the founding treaties).

On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty provided a three-pillar structure; the first or 'community' pillar concerns economic, social, and environmental policies. Besides, the pillar one determines the institutional requirements for European Monetary

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<sup>49</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 94.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> The European Commission, "*The ABC of the European Union*," available from <http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm>; accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>52</sup> NATO, *NATO Handbook* (2001), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb150301.htm>; accessed 8 December 2001.



Union. The second or 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters. The third or 'Justice and Home Affairs' (JHA) pillar concerns co-operation in law enforcement, criminal justice, civil judicial matters, and asylum and immigration. In addition, the three pillars possess a common institutional structure. The European Union has five institutions: the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance, the Council of the European Union, and the Court of Auditors. For a better understanding of the pillar structure of the EU, in the final part of this chapter, the structure and functioning of these institutions will be summarized.

The main reason behind the implementation of the pillar structure was to add powers to the Community in the areas of foreign policy, security and defense policy, asylum and immigration policy, criminal co-operation, and judicial co-operation.<sup>54</sup> With the pillar structure, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was transformed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. It is argued that the significance of the pillar structure for CFSP was that the policy making was to be protected from the institutional mechanisms and traditions of the European Community.<sup>55</sup> Besides, this meant the exclusion of involvement of the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the European Commission from policy making. With the definition of the CFSP as a separate pillar, the cooperation was to be provided on intergovernmental lines.<sup>56</sup> In other words, the decisions would be taken by the Council of Ministers in a single

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<sup>53</sup> The European Commission. *The ABC of the European Union*.

<sup>54</sup> The Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia, *The European Union*, available from <http://www.wikipedia.com/wiki/European+Union>; accessed 29 May 2002.

<sup>55</sup> Arnhild and David Spence, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam," in *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, ed. Kjell Eliassen (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 45.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

institutional framework rather than the foreign ministers of the member states meeting in the framework of the Council.<sup>57</sup>

### **1.3 The Three Pillars of the European Union**

#### **1.3.1 The First Pillar**

The first pillar is composed of the European Communities and it includes traditional cooperation within the European Community.<sup>58</sup> It covers matters related to the Single Market and the four freedoms (the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital across borders.)<sup>59</sup> This pillar also includes Community policies related to internal trade, development assistance, monetary policy, agriculture, fisheries, environment, regional development, and energy.<sup>60</sup> In the first pillar, the Council generally takes majority vote decisions. For this reason a member state may be held to a decision, even if it disagrees with the decision.<sup>61</sup>

##### **1.3.1.1 The Common Agricultural Policy**

A secure food supply and a successful agricultural industry were seen as essential for economic prosperity and for the political stability in Europe.<sup>62</sup> It was thought that if food prices and agricultural costs were allowed to differ widely in Member States, then free trade in manufactured goods would be destabilized.<sup>63</sup> After the Second World War, each state was determined to protect its own agricultural economy and reduce dependence on external food supplies.<sup>64</sup> It is argued by Mark Wise that France faced with problems of modernizing its manufacturing industry to

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Calingaert, *European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests*, 2.

<sup>59</sup> The Swedish Presidency, *The Three Pillars of the EU*, available from [http://www.eu2001.se /static/eng/eu\\_info / korhet\\_pelare.asp](http://www.eu2001.se /static/eng/eu_info / korhet_pelare.asp); accessed 3 December 2001.

<sup>60</sup> NATO, *NATO Handbook*, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb150301.htm.>; accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>61</sup> *The Pillar Structure*. Available from <http://cwis.kub.nl/~dbi/instruct/eu/en/T9.htm>; accessed 3 December 2001.

<sup>62</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 20.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*, 132.

meet West German competition and for this reason France supported the launching of a CAP to perceive a clear advantage in the agricultural field where it possesses enormous resources in relation to other EC countries.<sup>65</sup> Wise also argues that a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would provide France open access to the huge urban populations of West Germany, Benelux and, later the UK.<sup>66</sup>

After all, CAP was needed to increase farm productivity rapidly while providing producers an adequate income and maintaining regular supplies of food at reasonable prices to consumers in Western Europe.<sup>67</sup>

As stated in the Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, the Common Agricultural Policy had five goals:<sup>68</sup>

- To increase agricultural productivity;
- To improve farm workers' income;
- To stabilize markets;
- To obtain secure food supplies;
- To achieve reasonable food prices.

CAP operates under three basic principles that are market unity, Community preferences, and Community financing of the common price support system and other agricultural expenditure.<sup>69</sup> Market unity means that farm goods circulate freely among all member states. Community preference means that the “prices of imported agricultural policies are raised at the EU borders by a variable levy that adjusts the incoming price to the internal EU price.”<sup>70</sup> CAP provided a minimum price to producers for certain key commodities and “it protected that price level by a system of variable levies on imported products, counterbalanced by export subsidies to make

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<sup>65</sup> Wise, *France and European Unity*, 49.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 20.

<sup>68</sup> Clifford Hackett, *Cautious Revolution: The European Union Arrives* (London: Praeger, 1995), 116.

<sup>69</sup> Wise, *France and European Unity*, 47.

<sup>70</sup> Hackett, *Cautious Revolution: The European Union Arrives*, 117.

the products of European producers competitive on world markets.”<sup>71</sup> The CAP has changed the role of Europe in world agricultural trade. By the 1980s, the EEC had become a major exporter of farm goods, supported by its export subsidies.<sup>72</sup>

### **1.3.1.2 The European Monetary Union**

It is emphasized that the separate national currencies, which are subject to fluctuating exchange rates, was one of the barriers preventing cross-border cooperation.<sup>73</sup> According to the Bretton Woods System, fixed exchange rates rested upon the continued determination of the U.S. to hold the price of its dollar at 1/35 of an ounce of gold.<sup>74</sup> But, after World War II, gradually the U.S. economy became internationalized and its currency was subjected to the pressures felt by its trading rivals.<sup>75</sup> So, the U.S. dollar’s stability became dependent on the policies of the U.S. government.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, a more stable framework for commercial exchange rates was required. France, in conjunction with Germany, proposed the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978.<sup>77</sup> Besides, for France the EMS was seen as an instrument to use in the struggle to achieve a more balanced relationship with the US and the dollar.<sup>78</sup> Economic union meant the establishment of common policies on economic management for the EC.<sup>79</sup> The monetary union meant a single European currency and a system that tied together the exchange rates of national currencies.<sup>80</sup>

One of the principal goals of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union was to bring German economic and political power under the EU’s multilateral

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<sup>71</sup> Calingaert, *European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests*, 77.

<sup>72</sup> Hackett, *Cautious Revolution: The European Union Arrives*, 116.

<sup>73</sup> Wise, *France and European Unity*, 61.

<sup>74</sup> Hackett, *Cautious Revolution: The European Union Arrives*, 134.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Wise, *France and European Unity*, 61.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> George, *Britain and European Integration since 1945*, 21.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

umbrella.<sup>81</sup> Besides, the EMU aimed to provide greater stability of exchange rates among Community members and to promote a convergence of their economic policies to provide internal stability.<sup>82</sup> The main objectives of the monetary union could be summarized as follows:<sup>83</sup>

To finalize the completion of the single market by removing the uncertainty and costs inherent in currency-changing transactions, as well as costs of hedging against the threat of currency fluctuations, and by ensuring the total comparability of costs and prices throughout the Union; to increase economic activity; to reinforce Europe's monetary stability and enhance its financial power.

In April 1989, the report of the Delors Committee determined the achievement of EMU in three stages:<sup>84</sup>

- First stage (1 July 1990-31 December 1993) consists of the completion of the internal market, increased coordination and cooperation in economic and monetary fields, strengthening the EMU.

- Second Stage's (1 January 1994-31 December 1998) basic tasks were to share in the coordination of monetary policies, to prepare for the third stage of EMU and the establishment of the European System of Central Banks, to oversee the development of the ECU.

- Third stage (1 January 1999- 1 July 2002) will complete monetary union with the introduction of the ECU as the single currency of the EU.

The ECU is seen as a key element in the system and a basket of the currencies of the Member States with four basic functions: "a unit of account in the exchange-rate mechanism; a base for determining divergence indicators; a unit of

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<sup>81</sup> Peter Van Ham, "Europe's Precarious Centre: Franco-German Co-operation and the CFSP," *European Security* 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 8.

<sup>82</sup> Hackett, *Cautious Revolution: The European Union Arrives*, 140.

<sup>83</sup> The European Parliament, "The Stages of the Economic and Monetary Union," *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000), available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/5\\_3\\_0\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/5_3_0_en.htm); accessed 8 December 2001.

account for operations under the intervention and credit mechanisms; a means of settlement between the monetary authorities of the Member States.”<sup>85</sup>

The European Council decided in December 1995 in Madrid to call the new European Currency as Euro. It will replace the ECU once EMU is fully established. The European Council also took decisions on the timetable and the modalities as to how the Euro should be introduced. It was foreseen that the final date for the replacement of national currencies by the Euro would be the year 2002. As it was planned, twelve member states started to use the Euro as their currencies on 1 January 2002. The adoption of the Euro as the single European currency is likely to underline its significance as a major global currency in competition with the US dollar and the Yen of Japan.<sup>86</sup>

### **1.3.2 The Second Pillar**

The second pillar is a structure for the development of cooperation in foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Community agreed at Maastricht that there should be Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to protect the fundamental interests of the Community and reinforce its global role.<sup>87</sup> The reasons behind the launching of a CFSP, which are emphasized by the EU, can be summarized as follows:<sup>88</sup> the first reason is the threat to international peace and security caused by regional conflicts occurring in the neighboring countries and regions. The second reason is the proliferation of weapons

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<sup>84</sup> Valerio Lintner, “Monetary Integration in the EU: Issues and Prospects. Or, Will You be paying for the Millenium Party in ECU?” in *The Future of Europe*, eds. Valerie Symes, Carl Lewey and Jane Littlewood (London: Macmillan, 1997), 165.

<sup>85</sup> Pascal Fontaine, *Europe in Ten Points* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995), 24.

<sup>86</sup> Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 3.

<sup>87</sup> The Commission of the European Communities, *From Single Market to European Union* (Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), 18.

<sup>88</sup> The European Union, Common Foreign & Security Policy Home Page; available from <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en>; accessed 12 December 2001.

of mass destruction, arms trafficking, contraband nuclear material, fundamentalism, and extremism.

Because of the fact that Europe's defense needs have changed, the Union has decided to take its own security measures. Besides, the Union decided that it should have enough capacity not only of acting in crisis management, but also of intervening to prevent conflict by trying to address the causes.<sup>89</sup>

The European Union determined the following objectives under the second pillar:<sup>90</sup>

To safeguard common interests; to reinforce the security of the European Union; to maintain peace in conformity with the principles of the United Nations, NATO, the Conference on Security in Europe (CSCE) and its so-called Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

However, the CFSP has some problems in its structure. A major problem is related to the lack of financial provision for the operations conducted under the CFSP. The Maastricht Treaty determined that operational expenditure may be charged to the Community budget. (Article J.11). Thus, this provision of the treaty caused the exclusively intergovernmental nature of the CFSP to become ineffective automatically, and it also initiated the involvement of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament as the budgetary authority of the EU.<sup>91</sup> The second obstacle to the development of a credible CFSP is that the composition of the Presidency changes every six months. It is argued that the Presidency is not a visible and continuous player in the international arena.<sup>92</sup> Because, the Presidency operates under a strict mandate from the Council in relations with third parties. This

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> The Commission of the European Communities, *From Single Market to European Union*, 18.

<sup>91</sup> Spence, *The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to Amsterdam*, 47.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 51.

limited mandate prevents the Presidency from representing the Union effectively, especially in crisis situations.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, the situation is worse in practice of the CFSP: there is no independent body to be able to act independent of the national interests of member states.<sup>94</sup>

In chapter 2 and 3, the security aspect of the CFSP will be analyzed more thoroughly. At Helsinki Summit of 1999, the European Council set the headline goal in terms of military capabilities. The Union decided to establish a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) by the year 2003 including up to 60.000 persons, which is deployable within sixty days and capable of carrying out full range of Petersberg tasks. However, it is emphasized by the EU that this does not mean the establishment of a European army.<sup>95</sup> The developments beginning from the European Defense Community (EDC) to the Helsinki Summit of 1999 will be analyzed in chapter 2, where the dynamics of European Security and Defense Policy of the EU will be further discussed.

Under pillar two, the EU decided to develop civilian aspects of the crisis management in four priority areas defined by the Feira European Council: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. While the Nordic members of the EU strongly supports this development, southern members states of the EU, especially France and Britain, are more inclined to give importance to the development of military crisis management capabilities. It is also decided to reach the capacity to deploy 5.000 police by 2003. So, the EU's civilian crisis management capability will be analyzed in Chapter 4.

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>95</sup> *The Common Foreign and Security Policy* Home Page of the European Union. Available from <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en>; accessed 12 December 2001.



### 1.3.3 The Third Pillar

The third pillar covers various areas:<sup>96</sup> rules and the exercise of controls on crossing the Community's external borders; combating terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, international fraud; judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters; combating unauthorized immigration; common asylum policy. This pillar consists of police cooperation and cooperation in the area of criminal law. The Union's objective is to develop common action in the fields of justice and home affairs by intergovernmental methods to provide citizens with safety within an area of freedom, security and justice.<sup>97</sup> In the context of third pillar, two bodies were established. There are the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction in Lisbon and the European Police Office (Europol) in Hague that is called by some as the EU version of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.<sup>98</sup> The European Monitoring Center entered into operation in the mid-1990s. It is charged with coordinating the collection and distribution of information and maintaining statistics on drug action.<sup>99</sup> Because of the rise in crossborder criminal activity, Europol was given task to collect intelligence and to analyze information.<sup>100</sup> The third pillar activities also included the adoption of resolutions, recommendations, statements, and conclusions on issues like the interception of telecommunications and the financing terrorism.<sup>101</sup>

September 11 attacks on the US caused the EU to focus on its interior security and reformation of its political system. New anti-terrorism laws were proposed. These laws aimed at combating terrorisms and freezing terrorist assets. However there has been resistance against these laws for the fear that they would

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<sup>96</sup> The European Parliament, *The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties: Prospects for the European Union*.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Calingaert, *European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests*, 77.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

erode civil rights. The European Council held in Brussels on September 21 adopted measures to fight against terrorism, The central decisions were:<sup>102</sup> assignment to the Council of Justice and Home Affairs for a European arrest warrant and a common definition of terrorism; strengthening of Europol, establishment of a team of security experts; prevention of the funding of terrorism by the adoption of a new directive against money laundering; measures to secure the safety of air transport. Under the EU's Justice and Home Affairs pillar, the EU intends to provide an area of freedom, security, and justice by 2004. The EU is also launching additional projects like the establishment of a European force for border controls. Besides, the presence of a clear security threat to societies of the US and the EU enhanced bilateral and multilateral coordination and data sharing between the US and the EU.

EU proposals to change asylum procedures would allow the member states to exclude asylum-seekers when it is believed that they might possibly have been involved in terrorism. However, legitimate retaliatory action through the antiterrorist policies should take place with the consideration of guaranteed democratic rights and freedoms.<sup>103</sup> Besides, the listening of civilians' phone and email and a reflexive hostility toward Muslims at home and abroad may create a clear threat to democracy. Thus, the fight against terrorism should not weaken the basic values and rights of the people living in the EU, especially the Muslims.

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> *European Integration beyond September 11*; available from [http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/aktuell/positionen/2002\\_03\\_911\\_reform.htm](http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/aktuell/positionen/2002_03_911_reform.htm); accessed 29 May 2002.

<sup>103</sup> Wolfgang Ischinger, "Against Whom and with Whom? The Transatlantic Relationship Redefined," *Csis* 4, no. 1 (Fall 2001); available from <http://www.csis.org/europe/euroforum/v4n1.htm>; accessed 4 July 2002.

## 1.4 The Institutions of the European Union

### 1.4.1 The Council

The Council consists of representatives of member states at the ministerial level. This brings together the ministers of the Member States of the Community, responsible for different areas of policies according to the agenda. For instance, agriculture ministers discuss farm prices and major Union issues are matters of Foreign Ministers.<sup>104</sup> Each Member State acts as President of the Council for six months in rotation.<sup>105</sup> The Council acts on proposals from the Commission and is the Union's primary decision-making body. The Council's role is to define political objectives, harmonize national policies and resolve differences between its members or with institutions.<sup>106</sup> The Council approves the Community's draft annual budget and presents it to the European Parliament.<sup>107</sup> It adopts common positions, joint actions, and also draws up conventions on the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy and justice and home affairs.<sup>108</sup> Besides, the Council concludes the Community's international agreements on the consent of the Parliament.<sup>109</sup> The Council takes most decisions by a qualified majority voting. Each country has a certain number of votes in line with its population: Germany, France, Italy and the UK have 10 votes, Spain 8 votes, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal 5 votes, Austria and Sweden 4 votes, Denmark, Finland and Ireland 3 votes and Luxembourg 2 votes.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> The European Commission, *The Institutions of the European Union* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995), 6.

<sup>105</sup> The European Parliament, "The Council," *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000), available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1\\_3\\_6\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1_3_6_en.htm); accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>106</sup> NATO, *NATO Handbook*, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb150301.htm>; accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>107</sup> The Commission of the European Communities, *From Single Market to European Union*, 38.

<sup>108</sup> The European Parliament, *The Council*.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

### **1.4.2 The European Council**

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Community Member States. The European Council meets twice a year. It normally takes decisions unanimously. The European Council deals with current international issues through the common foreign and security policy.<sup>111</sup> Its task can be summarized as follows:<sup>112</sup>

- Defining approaches to further the construction of Europe;
- Issuing guidelines for Community action and political cooperation;
- Initiating cooperation in new areas;
- Expressing the common position in questions of external relations.

### **1.4.3 The European Parliament**

The European Parliament provides a democratic forum for debate.<sup>113</sup> It has a watchdog function and plays a part in the legislative process and shares the legislative function with the Council.<sup>114</sup> The European Parliament exercises the power of decision on the internal market, the EC budget, the accession of new Member States and the conclusion of association agreements.<sup>115</sup> Its parliamentarians are selected every five years. The Parliament currently has 626 seats. Germany has 99 seats, France, Italy, and the UK 87 seats each, Spain 64, the Netherlands 31, Belgium, Greece and Portugal 25 each, Sweden 22, Austria 21, Denmark and Finland 16 each, Ireland 15 and Luxembourg 6.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Fontaine, *Europe in Ten Points*, 10.

<sup>112</sup> The European Parliament, "The European Council," *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000), available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1\\_3\\_7\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1_3_7_en.htm); accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>113</sup> Fontaine, *Europe in Ten Points*, 10.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> The Commission of the European Communities, *From Single Market to European Union*, 36.

<sup>116</sup> The European Parliament, "The European Parliament: Historical Background," *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000), available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1\\_3\\_1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1_3_1_en.htm); accessed 8 December 2001.

#### 1.4.4 The Commission

The Commission is the Community's executive. It has 20 Commissioner (2 each for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, and 1 for the remaining countries).<sup>117</sup> It acts as a guardian of the treaties and "ensures that regulations and directives adopted by the Council are properly implemented."<sup>118</sup> It can refer cases to the European Union's Court of Justice. It also has an executive function implementing the decisions taken by the Council.<sup>119</sup> Its power include:<sup>120</sup>

- Upholding community rules and defending Community interests;
- Initiating policies and proposals;
- Implementing the provisions of the treaties;
- Supervising the management of Community policies;
- Administering funds and drawing up budgets;
- Putting into effect the decisions of the Council of Ministers;
- Mediation between the competing claims of the other institutions.

#### 1.4.5 The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance

It comprises 15 judges and nine advocates general appointed for a renewable six-year term by agreement between the member states.<sup>121</sup> The Court provides that the European Treaties are interpreted and applied in conformity with the law.<sup>122</sup> If any member State considers that another Member State has failed to comply with an obligation under the Treaties, it may bring the matter before the Court.<sup>123</sup> The Court also gives preliminary rulings, in case a national court applies on the interpretation or validity of points of Community law.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Fontaine, *Europe in Ten Points*, 10.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> The European Parliament, "The Commission," *European Parliament Fact Sheets* (2000), available from [http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1\\_3\\_8\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.in/factsheets/1_3_8_en.htm); accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>120</sup> Weigall, *The Origins & Development of the European Community*, 198

<sup>121</sup> Fontaine, *Europe in Ten Points*, 12.

<sup>122</sup> European Commission, *The Institutions of the European Union* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995), 10.

<sup>123</sup> The Commission of the European Communities, *From Single Market to European Union*, 40.

<sup>124</sup> The European Commission, *The Institutions of the European Union*, 10.

The Court of First Instance handles actions brought by individuals and businesses and appeals on points of law may be made to the Court of First Instance.”<sup>125</sup>

#### **1.4.6 The Court of Auditors**

It consists of 15 members appointed by unanimous decision of the Council after consultation of parliament. Its job is to watch over the financial aspects of the Community, to provide that money is not misspent and to highlight cases of fraud.<sup>126</sup> Besides, it prepares special reports and delivers opinions at the request of other institutions.<sup>127</sup>

#### **1.5 Conclusion**

Economic integration under the treaties of Paris and Rome established a community of nation states. Indeed, European integration was intended to serve the economic and commercial interests of the nation states. At the beginning, a major aim of the Monnet Plan was to get access to the Ruhr region’s coal and steel resources. The ECSC encouraged economic development with a common market of coal and steel in Western Europe. The establishment of the ECSC also became the first step towards the European Union of today. The Treaty of Rome established the foundations of an ever-closer union among the European peoples. The Single Act of 1986 furthered the economic developments initiated by the ECSC. It led to the creation of an internal market and improved decision-making capability of the Union.

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> NATO, *NATO Handbook*, available from. <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb150301.htm>; accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>127</sup> European Commission, *The Institutions of the European Union*, 10.

The most important step in the establishment of the European Union was the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that established a three-pillar structure for an effective functioning of the Community institutions. The first pillar includes Community policies related to the internal trade, monetary policy, agriculture, fisheries environment, regional development, and energy. The EU launched EMU to provide stability of exchange rates among Community members and to promote a convergence of their economic policies to enhance internal stability. Under the pillar of CFSP, the EU wanted to contribute international crisis management purposes by using military force where appropriate, and to promote international cooperation, democracy, and human rights. The following chapters of this study will focus on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Defensive military alliances were established in Western Europe after the Second World War. At first, these alliances were planned to be a safeguard against a renewal of German militarism, and later were developed in reply to fears of Soviet aggression.<sup>1</sup> The Brussels Treaty Organization was established by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in 1948. The founding of the Cominform by the Soviet Union in 1947 brought the Americans, together with Canada, into the defense system of Western Europe through the North Atlantic Pact of April 1949.<sup>2</sup> After the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, the US proposed that West Germany should contribute to European defense. However, France was not satisfied with the proposal and French fears of a revival of German militarism led to their 1950 Pleven Plan for European Defense Community (EDC). France believed that the EDC would provide a way of controlling the proposed German Army under the supervision of a European entity.<sup>3</sup> But the EDC never came into existence due to parliamentary opposition in France in 1954. In fact, during the Cold War, the need for such an organization was minimal due to the fact that the security of Western Europe was guaranteed by the US-dominated structures and institutions.<sup>4</sup> But the end of Cold War altered the European security environment and created new pressures for foreign and defense policy cooperation.

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<sup>1</sup> Anne Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community* (New York: Longman, 1986), 11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Wise, "France and European Unity," in *French in World Politics*, eds. Robert Aldrich and John Connell (London: Routledge, 1989), 64.

<sup>4</sup> Michael J. Baun, *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and New Politics of European Integration*. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 83.



In this chapter; firstly, the motives that led to the proposals for the establishment of the European Defense Community is presented. The reasons behind the failure of the European Defense Community are analyzed thoroughly. France was the state that proposed the establishment of European Defense Community, but France was also the state that prevented the establishment of European Defense Community. For this reason, France's security policies after the World War II are discussed in the following part of the chapter. Security cooperation in Western Europe and divergences of security policies between Western European states during the Cold War is also discussed. Secondly, post-Cold War security policies in Western Europe are analyzed.

### **2.1 The Failure of the European Defense Community**

The Pleven Plan, proposed by France, required the establishment of a European Defense Community, with a European Army, including German troops, to be controlled by a European ministry of defense responsible to a European assembly.<sup>5</sup> The EDC was to be linked to a European Political Community (EPC) that would exercise democratic control over the EDC.<sup>6</sup> The plan required that the EDC would have a 100,000 strong European army including West Germans and was to contain 50,000 strong French troops. In other words, the EDC was planned to be half French with the West German contingent controlled by a French military committee.<sup>7</sup>

Britain declined to become a member of EDC. Britain also declared that it could offer the closest possible association, but not full membership.<sup>8</sup> According to

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<sup>5</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 11.

<sup>6</sup> Martin J. Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 74.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 12.

the Dutch and British Foreign Ministers, the EDC was “as a means of French national aggrandizement and a platform for French political economy.”<sup>9</sup> Besides, it was believed that the Pleven Plan aimed the European Army to be dominated by France, under French command with a French Minister of Defense.<sup>10</sup>

After extended negotiations, the Treaty of Paris of 27 May 1952 establishing the EDC was signed. The Treaty was different from the original Pleven Plan and it had been revised according to the US Spofford Plan. However, for several reasons, the EDC Treaty was completely unacceptable for France.<sup>11</sup>

- If the EDC was ratified, a European Army, including German soldiers, would come into existence and national armies would cease to exist. Moreover, German forces could be stationed throughout the community, for example in France or Holland.

- Although the Pleven Plan required a French general being in overall command of a European army; according to the EDC Treaty, a Board of Commissioners, including German members, was to run it.

- Article 43 of the Treaty stated that member states’ votes in the EDC Council were weighted by the size of their national contribution to the EDC. While Italy and Germany had 12 votes, France would have 10 votes. Due to its colonial war in Indo-China, France had decided to reduce its number of *groupements* in the EDC from 14 to 10. For this reason, France believed that West Germany would dominate the EDC.

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<sup>9</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 74.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. , 81.

As a result, France worried about the possibility of losing control over its own national army within a European force.<sup>12</sup> This worry may also be seen in de Gaulle's words:<sup>13</sup>

We alone would be surrendering our army. To whom? To Europe? But it does not exist. We would be giving it to General Eisenhower. For centuries our value and prestige have been merged with those of the French Army. We therefore must not and cannot give up an army of our own.

The EDC Treaty was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954, although it was ratified in West Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg.

It is argued the US supported the EDC Treaty due to the fact that it could provide rearmament of West Germany for the benefit of the West.<sup>14</sup> After the failure of the EDC Treaty, the US found another way to rearm West Germany by admitting it to NATO. In conclusion, it is emphasized that the EDC was intended a French device for keeping Germany out of NATO. Although the EDC Treaty did not materialize, as Fursdon states the EDC Treaty successfully delayed German rearmament and joining NATO for five years.<sup>15</sup>

## **2.2 French Security Policies after the Second World War**

Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic (also under the Fourth) France has attempted to assert a foreign policy, which was 'independent', in Gaullist terminology.<sup>16</sup> Several permanent features of French foreign policy resulted from this attempt: to claim great power status, nuclear strike capability, ties with Africa and the Third World. A French statesman, de Gaulle had vital importance in the reconstruction of France after the Second World War. Johnson maintains that de

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<sup>12</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 12.

<sup>13</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 80.

<sup>14</sup> Clifford Hackett, *Cautious Revolution: The European Union Arrives* (London: Praeger, 1995), 169.

<sup>15</sup> Dedman, *The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, 91; quoted in E. Fursdon, *The European Defense Community* (London: Macmillan, 1980), 337.

Gaulle is remembered with his great achievements: the creation of free France, the post-war recognition of France as a great power and as one of the occupying force in Germany.<sup>17</sup>

For a long time De Gaulle resisted establishment of the European Community, believing it as a threat to French sovereignty and to French identity.<sup>18</sup> But after returning to power he accepted the Common Market seeing that France could play the leadership role of Europe and thus gain greater leverage on the world stage.<sup>19</sup> In order to provide French hegemony in Europe, de Gaulle believed that the Federal Republic of Germany was to be locked in and Great Britain locked out.<sup>20</sup>

De Gaulle had clear principles. Firstly, Western Europe should be economically, politically and militarily an independent union. Besides, it should never be part of an Atlantic community dominated by the United States.<sup>21</sup> There were two requirements for this:<sup>22</sup> France had to be the leader. He believed that the French leadership was necessary to resist American pressure. Second, British entry into the Community would change the character of the Community, both politically and economically and would weaken the Community's independence from the US, as Britain was too tied to the US. The second principle was that the EC should be based on the coordination of the policies of its members. There should not be supranational institutions that would exercise authority on the community. De Gaulle objected to any strengthening of the Community's supranational institutions,

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<sup>16</sup> Philippe Moreau Defarges, "France and Europe," in *Policy Making in France from the Gaulle to Mitterrand*, ed. Paul Godt (London: Pinter Publishers, 1986), 226.

<sup>17</sup> Douglas Johnson, "De Gaulle and France's Role in the World," in *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France*, eds. Hugh Cough and John Horne (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 83.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 210.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Johnson, *De Gaulle and France's Role in the World*, 93.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

believing this to be a violation of sovereignty of the French state.<sup>23</sup> But as a nuclear power and a united state, de Gaulle emphasized that France should dominate the Community and especially West Germany.<sup>24</sup> De Gaulle had worked to establish national independence on the sole basis that France should have the control of an effective national security system.<sup>25</sup> This goal was to lead de Gaulle in 1966 to withdraw France from the integrated command of NATO, which was dominated by the US.<sup>26</sup>

### **2.3 Security Cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War**

In general, the attempt to create an EDC in the early 1950s was a response to the need for German rearmament in a cold war environment.<sup>27</sup> However, the veto of the EDC Treaty in the French Parliament in 1954 left NATO as the only defensive institution in Western Europe.<sup>28</sup> The Brussels Treaty Organization was enlarged to include West Germany and Italy, and was renamed as the Western European Union.<sup>29</sup> It was hoped that the Western European Union would develop beyond its existing purely defensive functions to become a forum for regular political and economic consultation.<sup>30</sup>

The second attempt for defense and security cooperation in Europe was the Fouchet Plan, which was again proposed by France. The Fouchet Plan called for the coordination of national defense and foreign policies outside of the EC institutional framework.<sup>31</sup> Wright argues that the objective of the plan was to integrate West Germany's military forces within a Western European framework and to increase

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<sup>23</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 14.

<sup>24</sup> Johnson, *De Gaulle and France's Role in the World*, 94.

<sup>25</sup> Alan Clark, "Foreign Policy" in *France Today*, ed. J.E. Flower (London: Methuen, 1987), 107.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>27</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 84.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 12.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>31</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 84.

European independence of the superpowers.<sup>32</sup> According to the plan, the major instrument for the achievement of a greater independence was French nuclear forces.<sup>33</sup> However, when it was stated by De Gaulle that the Fouchet Plan did not extend to integrated control of French nuclear forces, other European countries expressed their disagreement and the plan failed.<sup>34</sup> The failure of the Fouchet Plan left the WEU as the only European effort at defense cooperation.<sup>35</sup>

On the other hand, the WEU never developed into a leading institution for the Western European security and remained moribund until the mid-1980s.<sup>36</sup> The WEU, in the 1950s, was put into practice with nominal headquarters in London. Any proposal on defense that came from its Consultative Assembly was ignored by the member governments.<sup>37</sup> There were two developments that saved the WEU from extinction:<sup>38</sup> the first was the division of Western Europe after 1957 into the European Economic Community of the Six and the rest. After de Gaulle's blockade of Britain's application for membership of the Community, WEU served as a conduit between Britain and the Six. The second development was the French withdrawal from the NATO command structure in 1966. France suggested that WEU might provide a link between itself and NATO.

In the mid-1980s, France made efforts to improve the WEU. Meanwhile, West Germany was beginning to question France's own intermediate nuclear weapons and especially where they were targeted.<sup>39</sup> It was reported that a significant portion of French public opinion favored that France should resolve ambiguities in

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<sup>32</sup> Joanne Wright, "France and European Security," *European Security*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 31.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 84.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (London, Longman, 1993), 70.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Wright, *France and European Security*, 31.

its nuclear targeting by extending its nuclear umbrella to Germany. However, Wright emphasizes that the Mitterrand administration remained indifferent.<sup>40</sup> In 1987, the Netherlands suggested that the WEU was an appropriate body that could seek a common European position on a non-European issue such as the long-running war between Iran and Iraq and the deepening Persian Gulf crisis.<sup>41</sup> At this stage, France also came to support the revival of the WEU as a mean to counter American withdrawal from Europe and to keep West Germany in line.<sup>42</sup> Finally, the WEU was used to coordinate and organize West European contributions to the minesweeping operation in the Gulf.<sup>43</sup> Besides, the WEU also coordinated the naval blockade of Iraq in 1990.

In sum, security institutions of Europe, in particular the EDC and WEU failed to provide a security and defense cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War. During this period, the security of Western Europe was provided by the US, and European defense was organized within the framework of US dominated institutions.<sup>44</sup> The main reason behind the failures of these institutions was the divergences of the security policies between the leading states of Europe, especially between France, West Germany, and Britain. For Britain, the US security guarantee had primary importance. This attitude was based on three reasons:<sup>45</sup> firstly, Britain believed that Atlantic-oriented security system also reflected its own interests. The relationship between NATO and Britain provided the British with cooperation in military matters, including collaboration in nuclear weapons, the sharing of intelligence information. Secondly, Britain believed that its European allies were not

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<sup>40</sup> Wright, *France and European Security*, 32.

<sup>41</sup> Urwin, *The Community of Europe*, 71.

<sup>42</sup> Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945*, 213.

<sup>43</sup> Wright, *France and European Security*, 34.

<sup>44</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 83.

capable of constructing defense arrangement that would be an alternative to NATO. Thirdly, Britain was uncomfortable with an image of itself as just another European power. Britain generally shared a global perspective rather than a regional one. This perspective proved useful collaboration with the US after the Second World War. Britain believed that the defense of Western Europe could not be provided by any organization other than NATO.<sup>46</sup>

France was interested in achieving more cooperation in the defense and security affairs within the European framework. Its key objective was to diminish US influence in Europe and gain more French and European autonomy in security affairs.<sup>47</sup> Besides France aspired to reduce the central role of NATO in Western European Security. French Policy makers also believed that NATO was a mechanism for US dominance in Europe.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, West Germany faced historical restraints on its military role and was dependent on the US for conventional reinforcements and extended deterrence.<sup>49</sup> While France pressed for the establishment of an autonomous security system for Europe, West Germany emphasized NATO as the main element in the European security during the Cold War.<sup>50</sup> Hence, the divisions in Western Europe some of which remain to date prevented Western Europeans to establish an autonomous security system and Western European Union to be an effective security institution. For this reason, Western Europeans depended on NATO for their security against Russian aggression throughout the Cold War.

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<sup>45</sup> G. Wyn Rees, "Britain and the Western European Union," *European Security*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 529.

<sup>46</sup> Rees, *Britain and the Western European Union*, 531.

<sup>47</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 83.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Rees, *Britain and the Western European Union*, 530.



## 2.4 Post Cold War Security Policies in Western Europe

The end of the Cold War changed the European security environment and generated new pressures for foreign and defense policy cooperation. In the first place, the collapse of the Soviet Union replaced a stable bipolar order with a more uncertain security situation.<sup>51</sup> Besides, Europe is no longer under the imminent threat of nuclear destruction; the fear that every crisis might escalate into an East-West conflict with all its potential implications has lost.<sup>52</sup> However, the fundamental character of international politics has not changed and military power continues to play a role.<sup>53</sup> Western Europe is facing new security threats that originated from political and economic instability in the former Soviet bloc and these new threats include ethnic and nationalist conflict, cross-border terrorism, massive immigration, destruction of the environment, and nuclear proliferation.<sup>54</sup>

At the end of the Cold War, there were several reasons that have necessitated moves to develop a European Security and Defense Policy:<sup>55</sup> first, German unification encouraged the deepening of European integration. This, in turn, revealed a need to bind firmly a united Germany into European political and security institutions.<sup>56</sup> Second, the US began to withdraw a significant portion of its troops from Western Europe.

As mentioned above, the WEU was used in the coordination of minesweeping operation in the Gulf and it had contributed to the naval blockade of

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<sup>50</sup> Tom Lansford, "The Question of France: French Security Choices at Century's End," *European Security* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 44.

<sup>51</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 83.

<sup>52</sup> Dieter Mahncke, "Parameters of European Security," *Chaillot Paper* no. 10 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, September 1993); available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chaillot10e.html>; accessed 10 June 2002.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 83.

<sup>55</sup> Karen E. Smith, "The End of Civilian Powers EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?," *The International Spectator* XXXV, no. 2 (April-June 2000): 14.

<sup>56</sup> Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 83.

Iraq in August 1990. This led to French and German calls to promote the WEU. These calls were also supported by Britain albeit with some hesitation, because Britain preferred the WEU to move closer to NATO.<sup>57</sup> But this conflicted with the French approach that was to move the WEU closer to the EC, and away from the US.<sup>58</sup> Later, France succeed in having the WEU being brought into the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and thus closer to the EU.<sup>59</sup>

At first, Britain opposed the transformation of security and defense arrangements on a European basis.<sup>60</sup> In a joint Anglo-Italian declaration of 4 October 1991, a compromise was reached. A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established under Title Five of the TEU. However, the objectives of the CFSP were left vague and poorly defined.<sup>61</sup> Under the CFSP, majority voting was required in the case of joint actions and the member states had veto right over such issues.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, the decision of the EC meeting at Maastricht to move for a CFSP and designate the WEU as the defense component of the European Union indicated that NATO was no longer the only institution in which Europeans would develop their collective security approaches.<sup>63</sup> The Maastricht Summit declared that the WEU would be the defense arm of the European Union.<sup>64</sup>

The tasks that were envisaged for the WEU were decided at the Petersberg meeting in June 1992. These tasks included three types of operations:

- Humanitarian tasks, such as the rescue and evacuation of civilians from a zone of conflict;

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<sup>57</sup> Wright, *France and European Security*, 34.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Rees, *Britain and the Western European Union*, 531.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 532.

<sup>63</sup> George Stein, "The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture," *European Security* 2, no.2 (Summer 1993): 200.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 213.

- The deployment of armed forces for peacekeeping operations;
- Crisis management.

It was also decided that ‘decisions to use military units answerable to the WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.’<sup>65</sup> Besides, nine member states of the WEU declared that they were

Prepared to support case-by-case basis and in accordance with [their] own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council.<sup>66</sup>

Still the British government believed that the WEU was incapable of replacing NATO as the primary defense organization.<sup>67</sup> Contrary to Britain, France pursued the proposal of a WEU operational capability within the framework of an EC defense policy during the Bosnia crisis.<sup>68</sup> The issue of a WEU peacekeeping force was discussed at a WEU ministerial meeting on 19 September 1991, but no decision was reached at that meeting.<sup>69</sup> Because, there were arguments between Germany and France on what type of operational capability WEU should have. While Germany insisted that WEU should have a peace-enforcement force, France pursued the option of a peacekeeping force.<sup>70</sup>

Just after the end of the Cold War, NATO declared a ‘broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defense dimension’ by the ‘Rome Declaration’ of November 1991.<sup>71</sup> In addition, NATO forces were decided to be reconfigured. According to the new NATO force structure, the classic layer cake forward defense

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<sup>65</sup> Martin Ortega, “Military Intervention and the European Union,” *Chaillot Papers* no. 45 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, March 2001): 106.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>67</sup> Rees, *Britain and the Western European Union*, 534.

<sup>68</sup> Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 130.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

along the former inner-German border in which the various NATO military forces were organized into national corps areas would be abolished.<sup>72</sup> NATO military reform also included the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) on a multinational basis. The ARRC Corps would only be used within NATO territory, but it was also being discussed that the ARRC could respond beyond NATO's borders.<sup>73</sup>

France objected to the development of the ARRC. This was because, its abstention from NATO military planning, left France with no influence over the structure of the ARRC.<sup>74</sup> Besides, the ARRC would be dependent on US personnel and equipment and it was not the European force type that France had wished.<sup>75</sup> As a result, France, with the support of Germany, responded the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force with the establishment of Eurocorps with the Franco-German Brigade at the center.<sup>76</sup>

The Eurocorps would have three missions:<sup>77</sup> firstly, it could be used for the mutual defense of the allies under Article 5 of the NATO or the Treaty of Brussels (WEU); secondly, it could be used to preserve and restore peace; and thirdly, it could be used for humanitarian deployments. Contrary to the North Atlantic Treaty, the provisions of the Treaty of Brussels do not limit military deployment to the territories of the member states, and it also allows 'out-of-area' operations.<sup>78</sup> After the declaration of the establishment of the Eurocorps, a debate emerged as to how the relation would be between NATO and the Eurocorps.<sup>79</sup> Both Germany and France

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<sup>71</sup> Stein, *The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture*, 205.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 206.

<sup>74</sup> Wright, *France and European Security*, 35.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Lansford, *Question of France*, 44.

<sup>77</sup> Stein, *The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture*, 214.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Wright, *France and European Security*, 39.

stated that Eurocorps represents any threat to NATO.<sup>80</sup> In the end, a special agreement was reached between the German and French defense ministers, and NATO's Defense Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council that give SACEUR 'operational command' of the Eurocorps as the main defense or rapid reaction force of the Alliance.<sup>81</sup> According to this agreement, the Eurocorps would be a force, which could be deployed as a *unified* corps in the framework of the WEU, if NATO fails to act or Europeans decide outside NATO.<sup>82</sup> According to Wright, one of the reasons for France to support the Eurocorps was that France was still unsure about Germany and wished to maintain a more flexible strategic position which was permissible under coalition security, but not under collective defense.<sup>83</sup>

At the 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, it was announced that the WEU would be able to use NATO military assets and headquarters for the conduct of European-only operations through the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).<sup>84</sup> In other words, the WEU would have the politico-military leadership, but the forces and staff from NATO and WEU nations not represented in NATO's military commands would participate in the conduct of operations.<sup>85</sup> However, the CJTF concept was paralyzed by France. Because France was uneasy about European dependency on American military equipment, such as heavy air transport, and France did not want a WEU operation to be answerable to SACEUR.<sup>86</sup> Besides France insisted on a blank cheque that gives Europeans a guaranteed right to access NATO

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Stein, *The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture*, 215.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Wright, *France and European Security*, 39.

<sup>84</sup> Rees, *Britain and the Western European Union*, 534.

<sup>85</sup> Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Laine, and Charles Grant, "Building European Defense Capability," *Survival* 41, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 22.

<sup>86</sup> Rees, *Britain and the Western European Union*, 534.

equipments if there was a need.<sup>87</sup> This difficulty was resolved after France announced a *rapprochement* with the Alliance at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1995.<sup>88</sup> This led to the signing of an agreement on the CJTF concept at the NAC meeting in Berlin in June 1996.<sup>89</sup> In contrast to France, Britain continuously supported the CJTF concept from 1994 seeing that the Europeans would lack the resources and the political will to act independently.<sup>90</sup>

In the second half of the 1990s, there have been significant developments for an autonomous European crisis management capability as the result of the Saint Malo Declaration of 1998, Cologne and Helsinki Summit of 1999. There were several factors that encouraged Europeans to rethink their commitments to defining a common European defense policy and capability during the second half of the 1990s: the first was the government change in Britain. Tony Blair, a Labour Prime Minister, was determined to take part in the restructuring of European defense cooperation to compensate for Britain's self-chosen exclusion from major European projects, especially the European Monetary Union.<sup>91</sup> The second development was the Kosovo operations that demonstrated the superiority of the US in military technology including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, precision-guided munitions, massive air and sealift resources, modern communications, and solid logistics. The Kosova experience showed that the Europeans could not support their diplomatic efforts with military means.<sup>92</sup> In fact, the EU failed to take any meaningful joint action in Kosovo. The crisis in the Balkans required the use of force to stop bloodshed and enable the use of civilian measures for long-term stability in

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<sup>87</sup> Alexander Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force," *International Journal* (Spring 2000): 260.

<sup>88</sup> Rees, *Britain and the Western European Union*, 534.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 535.

the region.<sup>93</sup> But the EU member states did not have the required strategic capabilities for a peace-enforcement operation. For instance, during the Operation Allied Force, US aircrafts delivered over %80 of the weapons.<sup>94</sup> For airborne command and control, the allies were dependent on a US Air Force EC-130 Airborne Battlefield Command, Control and Communication (ABCCC), a C-130 designed for aerospace traffic control and battle management.<sup>95</sup> Besides, with regard to air-to-air refueling, over %90 of the sorties were accomplished by US aircraft.<sup>96</sup>

The third factor was the industrial urgency to consolidate the European defense industries and compete the US superiority and create an important economic initiative for cooperation.<sup>97</sup> It was believed that while differences will remain in culture, education, language, an economically and politically integrated Europe could not exist without an effective common foreign and security policy to address the shared interests of the members of the Union.<sup>98</sup>

As a result, on 3-4 December 1998 in Saint Malo, European defense gained momentum with the Franco-British summit. The Saint Malo declaration emphasized that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.’<sup>99</sup> Besides, it declared that

The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for

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<sup>91</sup> Peter Van Ham, “Europe’s Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship,” *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 2 (2000): 216.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Sverre Stub, “European Crisis Management from the Norwegian Perspective,” in *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 15.

<sup>94</sup> David Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” *Survival* 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000-01): 103.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 104.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, “Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense,” *The Washington Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 68.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 67,68.

<sup>99</sup> Schake, Bloch-Laine, and Grant, *Building European Defence Capability*, 22.

relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU.<sup>100</sup>

The importance of the Saint Malo declaration for the EU was that it would provide a beginning point for the Europeanization of defense in the coming years.<sup>101</sup> In other words, it left open the possibility of European military action outside the NATO framework.<sup>102</sup> But there were still differences of attitudes between France and Britain. Britain believed that a more robust European defense capability would not undermine the trans-Atlantic relationship and would keep NATO involved in the management of European security.<sup>103</sup> On the contrary, France underlined the necessity of keeping European resources and decision-making structures independent of NATO.<sup>104</sup> France also insisted that the EU should have the autonomous capability to act without recourse to NATO assets. France emphasized the urgent development of the European strategic transport and intelligence capabilities and the preservation of Article V commitment between the full members of the WEU.<sup>105</sup>

The Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999 was a response to the aspirations of France. All 15 EU member states declared that

The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that the European Union has at its disposal the necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for effective EU decision making in crisis management within the scope of Petersberg Tasks.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Alexander R. Vershbow, "European Security and Defense Identity," *Jane's Defense Quarterly* (Spring 1999): 55.

<sup>101</sup> Van Ham, *Europe's Common Defense Policy*, 216.

<sup>102</sup> Schake, Bloch-Laine, and Grant, *Building European Defence Capability*, 22.

<sup>103</sup> Van Ham, *Europe's Common Defense Policy*, 217.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> Alistair J. K. Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?," *European Security* 9, no. 2, (Summer 2000): 15.



The importance of the decisions of Cologne Summit was that neutral states, which traditionally avoided becoming part of defense and security institutions, also adopted the report.<sup>107</sup> The EU member states also committed themselves explicitly to a common European crisis management capacity by declaring that ‘the Union must have the capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO.’<sup>108</sup> Besides, the definition of the crisis management was expanded in the Feira Summit of 2000. In the Summit, it was decided that the Union would develop its non-military crisis management capabilities.

There were several developments that persuaded the neutral states to change their point of views. First of all, the neutral states were accused of not being fully committed to the goal of common foreign and security policy.<sup>109</sup> For this reason, the neutral states were pressurized to redefine their neutrality by switching neutrality to non-alignment. They defined their policy as the pursuit of non-alliance policy in times of peace in order to permit neutrality as a possibility in the event of war.<sup>110</sup> The change from neutrality to non-alignment was believed to give greater freedom of action, while preserving the core of neutrality. Besides, they have always preferred to refer defense in the EU context as crisis management, and not territorial defense.<sup>111</sup> Because, Sweden and Finland believed that the development of the EU into a defense alliance could harm EU enlargement, alienate Russia and cause tensions in the EU-

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<sup>107</sup> Shepherd, *Top-Down or Bottom-Up*, 15.

<sup>108</sup> Van Ham, *Europe's Common Defense Policy*, 218.

<sup>109</sup> Hanna Ojanen, “Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP,” *Occasional Papers* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, January 2000), available <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ11.html>; accessed 8 June 2002.

<sup>110</sup> Bjorn Olav Knutsen, “The Nordic Dimension in the Evolving Security Structure and the Role of Norway,” *Occasional Papers*, WEU Institute for Security Studies, (January 2000), available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/public/content/chaile.html>; accessed 8 June 2002.

<sup>111</sup> Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*.

Russia relationship.<sup>112</sup> Thus, Finland and Sweden tried to show that they are not only committed to the CFSP, but also active and constructive by bringing the development forward with their own initiatives.<sup>113</sup>

Secondly, non-aligned states wanted to participate on an equal footing in the planning and decision-making of Petersberg tasks within the EU framework. It was stressed in the final text of the Amsterdam Treaty that the non-aligned states were given not only equal participation and full decision-making rights, but also a distinction between crisis management and defense was made.<sup>114</sup> The position of the two countries was further consolidated at the Cologne Summit of 1999. The declaration states that

We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations.... The different status of Member States with regard to collective defense guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defense of its Member States.<sup>115</sup>

Thirdly, Finland and Sweden insisted that the EU should get a UN mandate for its peacekeeping operations. The European Council of Cologne consolidated aspirations of these states by declaring that

The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.... The European Union is committed to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, as provided for in Article 11 of the TEU.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Knutsen, *The Nordic Dimension in the Evolving Security Structure and the Role of Norway*.

<sup>113</sup> Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> The European Council, *Declaration of the European Council and Presidency Report on Strengthening the European Common Policy on Security and Defense* (Cologne, 3 June 1999); available from [http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe\\_en.htm#a3](http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3); accessed 9 June 2002.

At the NATO Summit of 1999, the first significant step was taken in providing the EU with necessary assets. At the summit, NATO signaled its readiness to

Define and adopt arrangements for the ready access by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance.<sup>117</sup>

After the Washington Summit of NATO, at the Helsinki European Council Summit of December 1999, EU members further committed themselves to a number of military goals: by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up to 15 brigades for Petersberg Tasks on 60-day readiness and sustainable for at least one year, backed by airpower and warships, with its own planning staff and satellite reconnaissance system as well as decision making and operational capacity.<sup>118</sup>

The main aim of the Helsinki summit was to have enough forces at hand to form a corps, which would be self-sufficient in terms of logistics, intelligence, and communications and to make ready for use in situation of a need in which NATO decides not to involve.<sup>119</sup> At the North Atlantic Council meetings after the Helsinki Summit, foreign ministers replaced the tentative language of ‘presumption of availability’ of NATO capabilities for EU-led operations with ‘ready EU access’ to NATO collective assets on a case-by-case basis.<sup>120</sup> Clearly, this does not mean an automatic access to NATO assets. NATO ministers also stressed that Helsinki outcome did not imply the creation of a European army and that non-EU NATO members would be invited to participate in both NATO and EU-led operations.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> The European Council, *Declaration of the European Council and Presidency Report on Strengthening the European Common Policy on Security and Defense*.

<sup>117</sup> House of Commons, “History of the ESDI,” *Eight Report*; available from <http://www.parliament.the-stationary-off...cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/264/26408.htm>; accessed 13 February 2001.

<sup>118</sup> Moens, *Developing a European Intervention Force*, 264.

<sup>119</sup> Van Ham, *Europe’s Common Defense Policy*, 219.

<sup>120</sup> Moens, *Developing a European Intervention Force*, 264.

## 2.5 CONCLUSION

With the Helsinki Summit, the EU declared its the political will to possess a multinational army corps for crisis management purposes. The Helsinki Declaration outlines the capabilities that the EU thinks which are necessary for Petersberg missions. Crisis management became a distinct area of EU responsibility. Besides, crisis management was identified as the Union's most important task in the field of defense, while it is distinguished from common security. The non-aligned states were uneasy about the Union's development into a military alliance. Among these states, especially Sweden and Finland insisted that the Union should also address the non-military as well as military dimensions of crises. Thus, at the Summit of Helsinki, it was decided to combine all civilian and military instruments to be able to respond to a variety of small and large crises. The non-military aspects of crisis management would be discussed in Chapter 4 of this study.

On the other hand, there are various problems that seem to prevent the development of an effective military crisis management capability. One of the problems that seem to be the most important to some is that the EU lacks coherent and effective military capabilities. Narrowing the technological gap between the Europeans and the US may be difficult due to reducing defense spending in most EU countries. EU member governments spend approximately half as much on defense as the US and one-third as much on military research and development.<sup>122</sup> While the US defense budget has gradually increased since the mid-1990s, European defense budgets have been decreasing. According to NATO figures, the US spends about 3.2% of its GDP on defense, while UK spends 2.8%; Germany 1.5%, Spain 1.4%

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. , 266.

and it is reported that defense spending of NATO's European members has dropped 22% since 1992.<sup>123</sup>

In Western Europe, several obstacles that would hinder the development of an autonomous military crisis management capability seem to exist: a lack of cohesion and unity in Europe, an absence of a shared vision of strategic requirements, and an unwillingness to spend more than minimal levels on military capabilities. In the next chapter, whether the EU would be able to develop its own security arrangements for crisis management purposes in the coming years will be discussed. Moreover, NATO-EU relations will also be analyzed by focusing on the concept of Combined Joint Task Force.

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<sup>123</sup> Van Ham, *Europe's Common Defense Policy*, 223.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY**

At the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, the European Union decided to establish a military force with an aim to preserve peace and strengthen international security. The European Council meetings at Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 decided to create a Rapid Reaction Force to accomplish Petersberg missions that would be operational in 2003. After the Helsinki Summit, NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Alliance's Washington Summit of 1999. It was emphasized that the aim of NATO's DCI was to ensure that NATO could meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and was prepared to deal effectively with crises like that in Kosovo.<sup>1</sup> Briefly, in this chapter, a NATO proposal of Combined Joint Task Force backed up by DCI will be analyzed thoroughly. Besides, the outcomes of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and future prospects for ESDP will be discussed. In Chapter 2, evolution of security policies in Western Europe was discussed. In Chapter 3, military dynamics of European Security and Defense Policy will be analyzed together with the factors that would hinder the development of European Security and Defense Policy.

#### **3.1 European Security and Defense Identity in NATO**

At the Berlin Summit of 1996, NATO declared that it would begin to build a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that would develop a more balanced partnership between North America and Europe. Creation of the ESDI would provide

a military force that are separable, but not separate, from the NATO force structure that could be available for use under the political direction and strategic control of the WEU.<sup>2</sup> The essential elements for building an ESDI were making NATO assets available for WEU operations, adaptation of the CJTF concept for WEU-led operations, and providing transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management<sup>3</sup>.

### **3.1.1 Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force**

The primary purpose of the CJTF was to provide the Alliance with a more mobile and flexible military to conduct contingency operations beyond NATO borders.<sup>4</sup> The secondary purpose was to provide NATO resources in support of WEU operations for crisis response.<sup>5</sup> In other words, CJTF would provide the WEU the capacity to realize a European-led capability under ESDI.

The phrase of Combined Joint Task Force comprises three separate terms having specific military meanings:<sup>6</sup> A *task force* is a military body, which is organized to conduct a specific mission or operational purpose. *Joint* operations include troops from different services like army, navy, marine and air force units that would cooperate with one another during an operation. *Combined* operations involve forces two or more nations. In brief, CJTF is an adhoc organization, which is built from existing headquarters to perform a specific mission. The equipment, personnel,

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<sup>1</sup> "NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative." *NATO Fact Sheets*, 9 August 2000. Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm>; accessed 8 June 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Harold Gehman, "Transforming NATO's Defense Capabilities for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *USIA Electronic Journals* 4, no.1 (March 1999); available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0399/ijpe/pj19geh.htm>; accessed 8 June 2002.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Charles L. Barry, "Creating a European Security and Defense Identity," *JFQ* (Spring 1997): 67.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Nora Bensahel, "Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force," *European Security* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 56.

logistics support, and related assets would be assembled to conduct the operation and would be dissolved when the operation was complete.<sup>7</sup>

Three types of CJTSs were foreseen:<sup>8</sup>

- NATO-only CJTF, involving Alliance members and without any outside participation,

- NATO-plus CJTF, involving as many members of NATO and PfP as desire to take part,

- WEU-led CJTF, where the WEU uses NATO assets, including a CJTF headquarters, in its own operation.

‘Separable forces’ means that European forces could borrow NATO and US assets. These assets provided the WEU with capabilities that WEU and EU members could not easily achieve on their own, while keeping decision making and political control over European security and defense activities inside NATO.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the CJTF would operate within the integrated command structure, with SACEUR as the final commander. In case the operation was conducted *only* by European forces, the commander would be European and SACEUR would remain in the background as a supporting commander with consultative functions.<sup>10</sup> Besides, it was emphasized that WEU would be able to use American heavy lift, command and control, and intelligence capabilities during the WEU-led operations.<sup>11</sup>

### **3.1.2 WEU-led CJTF Operations**

During the WEU-led operations, NATO would provide a CJTF headquarters to WEU with the approval of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on a case-by-case

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<sup>7</sup> Gehman, *Transforming NATO's Defense Capabilities for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*

<sup>8</sup> Bensahel, *Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force*, 57.

<sup>9</sup> Alexander Moens, “NATO’s Dilemma and the Elusive European Defense Identity,” *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 4 (1998): 467.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 471.



basis.<sup>12</sup> The WEU could request the use of a CJTF headquarters for an operation under its command. But the activation of a CJTF headquarter nucleus for the use of the WEU required the decision by the North Atlantic Council.<sup>13</sup> Besides, with the approval of the NAC, other alliance assets could be transferred to the WEU depending on the requirements of the operation.<sup>14</sup> At an appropriate stage, control of the CJTF would be transferred to the WEU.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.1.3 The Washington Summit of 1999

At NATO's Washington Summit of 1999, NATO agreed to support operations led by the EU where NATO was not engaged. NATO members also decided to make NATO planning, assets, and capabilities available to the EU on an assured basis while recognizing that nothing is automatic.<sup>16</sup> In other words, NATO agreed to support EU-led operations, but did not give a blank cheque. NATO insisted that the permission would be given on a case-by-case basis.<sup>17</sup>

Another development at the Washington Summit of 1999 was about the DCI that represented an intensive effort to modernize and improve Alliance military capabilities for a mission spectrum that ranged from peacekeeping to high-intensity conflict.<sup>18</sup> DCI aimed to improve Alliance capabilities by achieving the followings:<sup>19</sup>

- Mobility and deployability of forces quickly where they are needed,

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<sup>11</sup> Bensahel, *Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force*, 58.

<sup>12</sup> Charles L. Barry, "NATO's Bold New Concept-CJTF," *JFQ* (Summer 1994): 51.

<sup>13</sup> "The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation," *NATO Review* (July 1996): 10.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Barry, *NATO's Bold New Concept-CJTF*, 52.

<sup>16</sup> Alexander Vershbow, "The American Perspective on ESDI/ESDP," *Perceptions* vol. V, no. 3 (September-November 2000). Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/V-3/avershbow-7.htm>; accessed 8 June 2002.

<sup>17</sup> Alexander Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force," *International Journal* (Spring 2000): 260.

<sup>18</sup> Vershbow, *The American Perspective on ESDI/ESDP*

<sup>19</sup> "NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative." *NATO Fact Sheets*, 9 August 2000. Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm>; accessed 8 June 2002.

- Sustainability: the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient forces were available for long-duration operations,
- Effective engagement: the ability to engage successfully an adversary in all type of operations differing from high to low intensity,
- Survivability: the ability to protect forces and assets against current and future threats,
- Interoperable communications, command, control and information systems, which are compatible with each other to enable forces from different countries to conduct joint operations.

DCI identified the areas where Alliance capabilities, especially European capabilities, were most deficient including sea and air mobility, especially heavy lift capability, precision guided munitions, and command control.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, the DCI put pressure on the European members of NATO to develop their defense capabilities.

It is obvious that the decisions of the EU Helsinki Summit of December 1999 provided a significant change in the evolution of European security arrangements. The EU marked its intention to absorb the WEU in the near future, to create a European rapid reaction force of 50,000-60,000 troops by 2003 for Petersberg type operations, and to set up the appropriate decision-making structures (including a Standing Committee on Political and Security Affairs, a Military Committee, and military staff).<sup>21</sup> In other words, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 showed the determination of the EU to become a serious security actor in its own

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<sup>20</sup> Vershbow, *The American Perspective on ESDI/ESDP*.

<sup>21</sup> Peter Schmidt Head, "ESDI: 'Separable but not Separate'?" *NATO Review* no.1 (Spring-Summer 2000): 12. Available from <http://hq.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0001-04.htm>; accessed 13 February 2001.

right.<sup>22</sup> The absorption of the WEU into the EU removed the validity of the Berlin decisions of 1996, which developed a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO.

At the Washington Summit of 1999, NATO had decided to assure the ‘presumption of availability’ of NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations.<sup>23</sup> After the Helsinki Summit of European Council, at the North Atlantic Council meetings, EU foreign ministers replaced the tentative term of ‘presumption of availability’ with ‘ready EU access’ to NATO collective assets and capabilities, but on a case-by-case basis and by consensus.<sup>24</sup>

#### **3.1.4 Factors Hindering the Future of Development of the CJTF Concept**

The CJTF generally lacks operational capabilities.<sup>25</sup> Firstly, Barry argues that CJTF concept requires self-sustainment, which is a concept not often considered by Alliance planners that take into consideration the availability of extensive host nation support.<sup>26</sup> It is possible that in most European led CJTF operations such support will be unavailable. Besides, the CJTF cannot depend on limited resources, which might be available for the population in need of assistance during humanitarian aid operations. Secondly, CJTF lacks interoperable systems. However, NATO has the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS); NICS is essentially stable and not deployable. Thirdly, national doctrines on techniques such as transferring a sea-based headquarters ashore, defining command and control linkages between commands and airspace control should be improved and adapted for multinational uses.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid. , 12.

<sup>23</sup> Moens, *Developing a European Intervention Force*, 259.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. , 264.

<sup>25</sup> Barry, *NATO's Bold New Concept-CJTF*, 53.

There are three factors that could limit the future development of the CJTF:<sup>27</sup> the unresolved fight for political control; the fact that solutions on paper do not always work in practice; possible internal resistance from NATO's military bureaucracy. These factors are analyzed in detail below.

*The unresolved fight for a political control.* France and the United States could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. French officials argued that the CJTF should not become a part of NATO's integrated military structure believing 'that it was too rigid to accommodate limited operations and it lacked adequate political oversight'<sup>28</sup> In fact, any CJTF under the integrated military command raises two important political problems for France:<sup>29</sup> firstly, due to the fact that Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is always a US citizen, France believed that the US would have an implied veto over European action. According to the 'separable but not separate' concept, American officials would be involved in every decision making process that involved the use of alliance assets, even if they would not participate in a CJTF. Secondly, since France had withdrew from the integrated command structure of NATO in 1966, it would be excluded from some of the most important decisions. For these reasons, France aspired to establish a separate body to authorize and conduct CJTF operations. France wanted to construct a CJTF nuclei made up of European personnel. Besides, France proposed that missions that do not require the participation of US forces would be commanded by a European deputy SACEUR, who could utilize the pre-positioned European commands.<sup>30</sup> This new CJTF command chain should report directly to the NAC or

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Bensahel, *Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force*, 64.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Moens, *NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defense Identity*, 472.

WEU Council bypassing the integrated command.<sup>31</sup> France also proposed that national commands and multinational groups such as the Eurocorps be ready to take the command of CJTF.<sup>32</sup>

*Solutions on paper do not always work in practice.* In spite of the pledge that NATO would give its assets and capabilities to the European members of the Alliance or the EU to conduct independent military operations, the US would retain an effective veto over CJTF operations, since it insists on giving its approval before giving its assets. The success of the CJTF structure will depend on US authorization to give its assets and capabilities to the European command. If the US refuses to authorize the use of its assets, the CJTF will become redundant.<sup>33</sup>

*Possible resistance from the NATO military bureaucracy.* Contrary to the high level military officials, many lower level officers (who would have to implement the CJTF) are less enthusiastic.<sup>34</sup> This is because they would be asked to implement a CJTF outside their region; besides, another regional command could be given control over an operation within their territory. In addition, double-hatted staff officials would contribute a significant part of their time to CJTF planning by reducing their time, which is devoted to their regular command responsibilities. Second, some officers worry that the nucleus structure could weaken the strength and effectiveness of regional subcommands, especially in case their most knowledgeable people become double hatted.

Another problematic issue is about the development of the Defense Capabilities Initiatives. While DCI goals have been included in the Alliance's

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Bensahel, *Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force*, 65.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

defense planning process, the allies set no deadline for their achievement.<sup>35</sup> Yost believes that as far as the European nation's defense budgets are concerned, miracles should not be expected about the development of DCI capabilities.<sup>36</sup>

The process that began with the declaration of Saint Malo of 1998 gained a new impetus with the decisions of the Helsinki Summit of 1999. At the Summit, the EU declared its intention to have a Rapid Reaction Force for crisis management purposes. At the Summit, the EU shifted its focus from the European Security and Defense Identity to European Security and Defense Policy.

### **3.2 The European Union and European Security and Defense Policy**

On 19 June 1992, the Foreign and Defense Ministers of WEU member states met near Bonn to discuss strengthening the role of the WEU as the defense arm of the EU. At the end of the meeting, the Petersberg Declaration was issued. WEU member states declared that

They are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU...Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.<sup>37</sup>

Besides, in the Petersberg Declaration, WEU members decided to support conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts in cooperation with the CSCE and with the United Nations Security Council.<sup>38</sup> Later, the Petersberg missions were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Amsterdam Treaty specified that the WEU is an

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<sup>35</sup> David Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival* 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000-01): 119.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Western European Union, "Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration," *WEU Documents*, 19 June 1992. Available from <http://www.cip.fuhem.es/ueh/documentos/ueo/92-petersberg.htm>; accessed 9 June 2002.

integral part of the development of the European Union, providing the EU with access to an operational capability in the context of the Petersberg missions.<sup>39</sup>

After the Amsterdam Summit of 1997 came NATO's air strikes against the Serbs in Kosovo. The impact of the Kosovo crisis was different for the evolution of European security arrangements for several reasons:<sup>40</sup> One reason was the change of government in Britain in 1997. John Major, former Prime Minister, committed Britain to political and economic union, and a deeper European integration, but he was unable to achieve his goals due to the 1992 election results that delivered a very small Conservative majority.<sup>41</sup> In other words, a group of Euro-skeptic parliamentarians and party constraints prevented John Major from being an effective leader in policy making.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, Tony Blair sought to give a leading role to Britain in the establishment of a European defense force after winning parliamentary majority in 1997. Another was the realization by the Europeans as to how close the US was to staying out this time. The third one was the military strategy used in Kosovo—to use airpower exclusively— by the US that implied US military superiority over the Europeans. Kosovo demonstrated that burden-sharing imbalance has become critical. Besides, it clarified that European military hardware was significantly inferior to the US with regard to strategic transport and logistics, intelligence (satellites, sensors, computers), and high-tech weaponry (precision-guided explosives, cruise missiles).<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> NATO, "Western European Union," *NATO Publications*, 4 October 2001. Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm>; accessed 9 June 2002.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Philip Gordon, "Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2000); available from <http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/gordon/200007fa.htm>; accessed 8 June 2002.

<sup>41</sup> Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 136.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> John C. Hulsman, "The Guns of Brussels: Burden Sharing and Power Sharing with Europe," *Policy Review* Issue 101 (June/July 2000); available from <http://www.policyreview.org/jun00/hulsman.html>; accessed 8 June 2002.

There were two reasons for Britain's new thinking about European security:<sup>44</sup> the first one was that the Prime Minister and his Labor government supported the European Union and wanted Britain to be an integral part of it. Because public hostility to the monetary union prevented them from joining the most important European project, EMU. Thus, they found another way to show their support for European integration. To date, dollar has been the dominant currency, but the introduction of Euro is likely to change the status of the dollar in the international monetary system and alter the power configuration of the world monetary system.<sup>45</sup> Euro would become a viable alternative to the dollar as an anchor currency.<sup>46</sup> Besides, the EU Central Bank would be independent of political control. Thus, the lower rate of inflation and the lower cost of holding money balances would be achieved.<sup>47</sup> The second factor was that the realization that Europeans were not pulling their weight in a NATO dominated by the US and that the European Union was losing its political influence and military effectiveness. Tony Blair noted that.<sup>48</sup>

We Europeans should not expect the US to have to play a part in every disorder in our backyard. The EU should be able to take on some security tasks on its own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own.

The inadequacy of the EU and the reluctance of the US to deal effectively with the crisis in Kosovo led the British Prime Minister to revise the European defense project.<sup>49</sup> As a result, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, EU member states committed themselves to a 'headline goal' for improved military capabilities for 2003. Headline

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<sup>44</sup> Gordon, *Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work*.

<sup>45</sup> Robert Mundell, "The Impact of the Euro on the International Monetary System," *The International Spectator* XXXIII, no. 2 (April-June 1998); available from [www.ciao.org](http://www.ciao.org); accessed 8 December 2001.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Van Ham, *Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship*, 218.



goal consisted of the formation of 50.000 to 60.000 troops deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year. The EU also agreed at Helsinki to establish a number committees and staff organizations (military and civil) in Brussels to provide the necessary infrastructure for the ESDP:<sup>50</sup>

- Political and Security Committee (PSC): It would be at ambassadorial level and responsible for the CFSP. During a military crisis, this committee will exercise political and strategic direction of the operation under the authority of the EU Council.

- A Military Committee (EUMC): It was made up of the military representatives of national Chiefs of Defense and would provide advice to the PSC and direction to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

- European Union Military Staff (EUMS): it would perform early warning and strategic planning for Petersburg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces.

After the Helsinki Summit, the Capabilities Commitment Conference took place on 20 November 2000 in Brussels. EU governments, except Denmark, made offers amounting to 100,000 troops, 400 aircrafts, and 100 ships for the rapid reaction force by the end of January 2001.<sup>51</sup> But it was emphasized that operational capabilities were still lacking and crucial strategic capabilities needed improvement including strategic air and sea transport, command and control systems and particularly strategic intelligence.<sup>52</sup> Consequently, participating governments agreed

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<sup>49</sup> Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative." *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 33.

<sup>50</sup> Van Ham, *Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship*, 218.

<sup>51</sup> Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture," *International Affairs* 77, no. 3 (2001): 593.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

that they needed to develop a joint capacity in heavy airlift, intelligence, fighter aircraft, and modern weapons.<sup>53</sup>

At the Nice Summit, it was agreed to have a military staff of about 140 with its own headquarters on Avenue Cortenbergh, which would be established as part of the Council Secretariat attached to the office of the High Representative.<sup>54</sup> In addition, the Nice Presidency Conclusions determined that the primary functions of the EUMS would be to perform early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks.<sup>55</sup>

The Clinton administration reacted to the Helsinki decisions by arguing that it could *decouple* Europe's security from that of the US, *duplicate* what NATO already does in a costly and ineffective way, and *discriminate* especially against European NATO allies that were not EU members.<sup>56</sup> The EU's response to the Clinton administration could be seen in the statements of Elmar Brok, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Parliament. He said that<sup>57</sup>

Decoupling Europe from the US would not be sensible at all, because the strategic link which exist at present between both sides of the Atlantic Ocean is vital for peace and stability in the world... discriminating between the European NATO allies on the basis, for instance, of whether they are EU members or not, is not what we in mind: we should offer everyone the possibility of joining the EU in a military operation if we think that it might be valuable... we should avoid duplication but extra capacity needed...If the Europeans had been able to put more combat aircraft, more air refueling tankers, more electronic jamming equipment, more airlift capacity, etc. into the battle, it would have been better for the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. I do not think that American public

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<sup>53</sup> Alexander Moens, "European Defense and NATO," *International Journal* (Spring 2001): 265.

<sup>54</sup> Cornish and Edwards, *Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy*, 595.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First," *Survival* 43, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 79.

<sup>57</sup> Elmar Brok, "European Security and Defense Identity after the EU Summit in Cologne and the Transatlantic Link," House Committee on International Relations, Washington DC, 10 November 1999; available from <http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/1999/991110eb.htm>; accessed 8 June 2002.

opinion would understand if the Europeans, in carrying out Petersberg tasks, were each time to ask the US for help through a CJTF equipped mainly by the US and run by US military personnel. This could even lead to isolationism in the US.

In fact, there is a disagreement between France and Britain about the non-EU NATO members' participation to decision-making process. Britain and France are discussing a three-part procedure for participation.<sup>58</sup> appropriate structures would be established through which non-EU NATO members would be fully involved in decision-shaping, besides any actual decision to conduct an EU military action would be taken by the European Council alone, but the implementation would involve the states who wanted to be part of the operation. While France suggests that discussions should prioritize candidate states for EU accession, Britain gives priority to non-EU NATO members.<sup>59</sup>

The possibility of unnecessary duplication of military capabilities worries the US and other non-EU members of NATO. This is because the EU may over time develop a permanent military structure that duplicates NATO's integrated military structure. Moreover, this separate standing military structure may become an alternative rival organization to NATO and even finally ruin NATO.<sup>60</sup> Besides, such an outcome is likely to constrain the ability of non-EU states to protect their security interests in Europe effectively.<sup>61</sup> So, the development of an autonomous EU defense capability that does not undermine NATO and the transatlantic link would be difficult. On the other hand, discrimination against states that have considerable potential to contribute to Europe's common defense—such as Turkey, Norway, and Poland— might distance these countries by creating tensions and dissent within

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<sup>58</sup> Howorth, *Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative*, 41.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Stuart Croft and others, "NATO's Triple Challenge," *International Affairs*, 76, no.3 (July 2000): 516.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

NATO.<sup>62</sup> Besides, it would hinder Europe's efforts to increase its military strength by excluding important sources of defense capability.<sup>63</sup>

At this stage, the relationship between non-aligned EU member states and NATO also needs elaboration. Finland and Sweden are non-aligned states. But they prefer to participate in the peace operations. For instance, Finland became an observer in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992, Sweden in 1994. Both they joined the Peace for Partnership (PfP) program of NATO. Besides, they participated in the NATO-led IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia. Another non-aligned state, Austria became observer in Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) together with Finland and Sweden. The main policy of Finland and Sweden was to seek the principle of equation and full decision-making rights during the development of the CFSP of the EU.<sup>64</sup> They emphasized that it is important to make use of the resources and capabilities of all the EU member states without paying attention whether they are militarily non-aligned or NATO members.<sup>65</sup> As a result, they achieved what they aimed at the Cologne Summit of 1999.

We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non, allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations.... The different status of Member States with regard to collective defense guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defense of its Member States.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, "In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective," *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 19.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Hanna Ojanen, "Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP," *Occasional Papers* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, January 2000), available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ11.html>; accessed 8 July 2002.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> The European Council, *Declaration of the European Council and Presidency Report on Strengthening the European Common Policy on Security and Defense* (Cologne, 3 June 1999); available from [http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe\\_en.htm#a3](http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3); accessed 9 June 2002.

NATO is concerned about a 'right of first refusal.' It is emphasized that NATO wants to be the primary instrument for crisis management in Europe,<sup>67</sup> For this reason, NATO members have insisted that the ESDP should take the task when NATO as a whole is not concerned.<sup>74</sup> But it is believed that the notion of 'first refusal' is contrary to the European aspiration towards some degree of autonomy in relation to the US and NATO.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, France rejected this proposal by arguing that discussions would first take place among EU member states on the principles related with EU-NATO negotiations, and after reaching the agreement between the EU member states, it would be possible to start negotiations with NATO.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, the UK and other Atlanticist members of the EU insisted that the negotiations should begin without delay.<sup>71</sup>

### **3.2.1 The Challenges Ahead for the ESDP**

There are several divisions within the EU about military crisis management. The Nordic EU member states, namely Finland and Sweden, have supported the development of a EU crisis management capacity. On the other hand, they also insisted that conflict prevention should be included in the list of priorities of the CFSP. Moreover, Sweden pushed for putting civilian crisis management on an equal footing with military crisis management.<sup>72</sup> Sweden also concentrated on employment policy, gender equality, environment, and consumer protection while it seemed to show less interest in the problematic issues of the CFSP.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Moens, *European Defense and NATO*, 275.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Croft and others, *NATO's Triple Challenge*, 509.

<sup>70</sup> Howorth, *Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative*, 46.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ojanen, *Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP*.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

Both Finland and Sweden argue that the EU peacekeeping operations should be mandated by the UN. According to them, a mandate by the UN represents the support of international community.<sup>74</sup> Another problematic issue is related with Finland. With a parliamentary decision in 1995, Finland began to participate in peacekeeping operations in order to make use of force for humanitarian tasks. For instance, Finland participated in the implementation and stabilization forces in Bosnia as well as in KFOR.<sup>75</sup> However, the law prohibits Finnish participation in peace-enforcement operations.<sup>76</sup> Sweden can participate in peace enforcement operations, although the certain size and capability of force needs parliamentary approval.

The nomination of Javier Solana as WEU Secretary General was opposed by Finland and Sweden. Javier Solana was also the High Representative for the CFSP. For this reason, Finland and Sweden argued that this double-hatting means that ‘Mr CFSP’ in his WEU role also deals with the questions linked to common defense, and that common defense enters the EU by this way.<sup>77</sup>

There are also debates about the size of the Rapid Reaction Force. Britain argues that the force should be capable of conducting operations at the low-end of Petersberg tasks, while France aims high.<sup>78</sup> It is also discussed what is the appropriate methodology for creating an efficient RPF. France and the UK promotes the ‘bottom up’ approach that relies on voluntary national contributions, while

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> François Heisbourg, “Europe’s Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity,” *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 9.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ojanen, *Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP*.

<sup>78</sup> Jolyon Howorth, *Prospects for ESDP after September 11*; available from <http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Howorth.pdf>; accessed 9 June 2002.

Germany promotes the 'top-down' approach that requires the acting of Council of Defense Ministers on advice from the EU military committee.<sup>79</sup>

The challenges ahead of the ESDP can be summarized as follows:

- The insufficiency of 50,000-60,000 troops for Petersberg tasks,
- A lack of political cohesion and unity in Europe,
- The nationalistic rivalries and disputes in the defense industry,
- Declining level of military capabilities, and unwillingness to spend more than minimal levels on military capabilities,
- An absence of shared vision of strategic requirements,
- The deficiency of qualified majority voting,
- The debate about the types of Petersberg missions.

*The insufficiency of 50,000-60,000 troops for Petersberg tasks.* It is not clear whether an autonomous EU military force of 50,000-60,000 troops would be sufficient for Petersberg type missions. Besides, it is unclear whether the goal of 50,000-60,000 troops will include the forces of EU member states which are on duty at present in Bosnia and Kosovo, on the assumption that NATO-led peacekeeping forces would still be deployed in the Balkans in 2003.<sup>80</sup> In August 2000, 40,000 troops from EU countries, 27,344 troops in KFOR and 12,000 troops in SFOR, were serving in the Balkans.<sup>81</sup> Besides, there remains another unanswered question as to whether EU member states will be prepared to generate 180,000 troops that would be required for regular rotations of a force of 60,000 troops.<sup>82</sup>

*A lack of political cohesion and unity in Europe.* Moens emphasizes that there is the absence of a concrete agreement among the member states on threats,

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Yost, *The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union*, 116.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

strategic vision, and operational contingencies.<sup>83</sup> This disagreement still continues between the three dominant military powers in the EU– Germany, the UK, and France. These three states generally disagree about the optimal degree of military integration within European military institutions and the US’ role in Europe within the NATO framework.<sup>84</sup> However, Peter Van Ham argues that

All three countries have made pragmatic moves to accommodate each other’s traditional strategic positions on the management of European security and defense. France has abandoned its dream of an independent European defense (i.e. without relying on the US); Germany has accepted that it must participate in military operations if it wants to be considered as a full European player in the defense field; and Britain has given up its opposition to a Europe-only involvement in defense matters where the EU will be playing central role.<sup>85</sup>

For instance, it is emphasized that differences in security culture between Britain and France remain considerable.<sup>86</sup> issues such as state versus market/civil society; territorial defense versus force projection; conscription versus professionalism; integration versus cooperation; deepening versus enlargement; institutional priorities versus capabilities; strategy versus tactics; political will versus pragmatism; and above all, Europeanism versus Atlanticism. In addition, it is argued that while France thinks that the emergence of an effective ESDP would create a more balanced Atlantic Alliance, the UK fears that the opposite would be the case: if Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, the US would move back to isolationism and NATO would collapse.<sup>87</sup> While, for France, the ESDP is first and a leading European project to make use of the Atlanticist instrument,

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<sup>83</sup> Moens, *European Defense and NATO*, 266.

<sup>84</sup> Sarah Tarry, *A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival?* (Canada: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), 7.

<sup>85</sup> Peter Van Ham, “Europe’s Precarious Center: Franco-German Co-operation and the CFSP,” *European Security* 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 17.

<sup>86</sup> Michael Clarke, “French and British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World” *International Affairs* 76, no.4 (October 2000), 734.

<sup>87</sup> Howorth, *Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative*, 33.



NATO, for the UK, is the best mean of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>88</sup> Besides, Britain is more inclined than France in terms of developing the EU's military capability within the NATO framework and in cooperation with the US.<sup>89</sup>

In the Post Cold War era, Germany insisted on continuing in its integration into Western Alliance system, besides it proposed an acceleration of European integration.<sup>90</sup> Germany appears unwilling to commit to further military involvement in multilateral task forces, whilst paying attention to its responsibilities as a NATO and EU member.<sup>91</sup> Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, emphasized that European security and defense capability is not about the militarization of the EU, and the EU must be made an effective and decisive power, which is able to reinforce the rule of law and renounce violence.<sup>92</sup> Germany's participation in the Kosovo air strikes was based on a commitment to humanitarian and democratic values and on a desire to show solidarity with its Western allies.<sup>93</sup> In fact, Germany has tried to influence EU security policy in the direction of non-military endeavors in which political cooperation is more important than military intervention.<sup>94</sup> It could be argued that this is the reason why Germany assumed an important role in the implementation of the Stability Pact to provide regional security, development in democracy, human rights, and economy to South Eastern Europe. This, in many ways, emphasizes the civilian power approach of Germany. The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 4.

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid. , 36.

<sup>89</sup> Yost, *The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union*, 122.

<sup>90</sup> Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 69.

<sup>91</sup> Alister John Miskimmon, "Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and the Transatlantic Relationship," *European Security, Special Issue: New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?* (2001): 93.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Maull, *Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?*, 76.

<sup>94</sup> Miskimmon, *Recasting the Security Bargains*, 97.

Another problematic issue is the lack of consensus among Western European states on what kind of role the European Union should play as a unitary actor on the world arena.<sup>95</sup> Van Ham argues that the Maastricht Treaty does not specify whether the EU should eventually evolve into a full superpower, a regional power, a civil power or a rather complex entity with a mixed character.<sup>96</sup> In other words, the purpose and resources of the CFSP are not clearly defined.<sup>97</sup> On the other hand, many European states are preoccupied with internal economic and political issues. This could result in differing perceptions of threat and interpretations over the implementation of a CFSP.<sup>98</sup> Besides, differing threat perceptions could lead to disagreement over security burden sharing and this could incline some states towards renationalizing their defense structures.<sup>99</sup>

Another unresolved problem is how to ensure the participation of different European countries in relation to the security organizations to which they belong.<sup>100</sup> Ten of the 15 EU member countries are also members of the WEU; four (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) are not members of NATO, and are observers in the WEU; one (Denmark) is a NATO member, but observer in the EU. There are six European countries (Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary), which are members of NATO, but not members to the EU and the WEU.<sup>101</sup> The EU enlargement in 1995 to include Sweden, Finland, and Austria

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<sup>95</sup> Peter Van Ham, "The Prospects for a European Security and Defense Identity," *European Security* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 527.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Tarry, *A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival?*, 9.

<sup>98</sup> William T. Johnsen, Stephen J. Blank, and Thomas-Durell Young, "Building a Better European Security Environment," *European Security* 8, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 9.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Michele Nones, "A Test Bed for Enhanced Cooperation: the European Defense Industry," *The International Spectator* vol. XXXV, no. 3 (July-September 2000): 26.

<sup>101</sup> Nones, *A Test Bed for Enhanced Cooperation*, 26.

further deepened the gap between EU and NATO membership.<sup>102</sup> These three countries are non-aligned states. They are also active in NATO's PfP. But they are not members of NATO.

Hyde-Price argues that two different security zones have emerged within the EU: while one group of EU member states are covered by NATO's Article V security guarantees, a group of non-aligned EU member states do not take part in military alliances.<sup>103</sup> It is also emphasized by French President Mitterrand that 'contradictions [between the northern and southern EU member states] are beginning to emerge, and we must prevent them from becoming lethal'.<sup>104</sup> As a result, the inclusion of neutral states to the EU added potential problems of using military means in a European foreign policy as it is discussed at the beginning of this part.<sup>105</sup>

*The nationalistic rivalries and disputes in the defense industry.* Most European governments remain reluctant to open their defense markets for competition. It is argued that larger EU member states do not want to lose national autonomy over their defense industries.<sup>106</sup> Besides, they fear an increase in unemployment in the defense sector,<sup>107</sup> and they are concerned about maintaining technological and production capabilities rather than buying security at the lowest possible cost.<sup>108</sup> For instance, it is argued that France spends more than 90 percent of its defense budget within the country, and it is a matter of concern whether France would be prepared to admit the rights of non-French companies to tender for French

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<sup>102</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price, "The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of European Order," *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 3 (December 2000): 156.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Van Ham, *The Prospects for a European Security and Defense Identity*, 525.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 526.

<sup>106</sup> Alistair J.K. Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?" *European Security* 9, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 26.

<sup>107</sup> Van Ham, *The Prospects for a European Security and Defense Identity*, 528.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 539.

defense contracts.<sup>109</sup> In France, in 1997, out of 16,992 transactions done by the Ministry of Defense, 10,218 were subject to restricted invitations to tender or not open to competition.<sup>110</sup> Again, in the United Kingdom in the period 1996-97, of 730 contracts awarded (56% of which were open invitations to tender) 95% were won by British companies.<sup>111</sup> So, it is emphasized that this fragmented industrial defense sector is far from producing what Europe needs.<sup>112</sup> The fragmented industrial sector and nationalistic rivalries over the control and costs of development programmes has caused the cancellation of projects which were vital for a credible military capability of the EU, such as in the case of the German refusal to help France fund the development of two Helios 2 infrared optical satellites and the cancellation of Horizon frigate.<sup>113</sup>

In 1999, critical European consolidations in defense industry took place. British Aerospace and GEC-Marconi in the UK merged by creating BAE Systems. The negotiations between Aerospatiale-Matra of France, Dasa of Germany, and CASA of Spain led to the formation of the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company (EADS). Together with Thales (the former Thomson-CSF), it is argued that these three defense contractors represent the three poles of the new European defense industry structure and that will be major players in future transatlantic developments.<sup>114</sup> Besides, these three large groups contracted to develop joint ventures with the US defense contractors:<sup>115</sup> *Patriot* PAC-3 upgrade for German army by Lockheed Martin (US), EADS (France/Germany/Spain); *Meteor* missile by

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid. , 541.

<sup>110</sup> Gordon Adams, Christophe Cornu, and Andrew D. James, "Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defense Market," *Chaillot Papers* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, January 2001); available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai44e.html>; accessed 9 June 2002.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Shepherd, *Security and Defense Policy in the EU*, 26.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Adams, Cornu, and James, *Between Cooperation and Competition*.

Matra BAe (British Aerospace) Dynamics (France/UK), Alenia Marconi Systems (Italy), EADS (France/Germany/Spain), Saab Dynamics (Sweden), Boeing (US); Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical Transport Systems by BAE Systems (UK), Lockheed Martin (US).

Moens emphasizes that European defense need to be rationalized for the harmonization of common equipment, and practicability of common training and interoperability.<sup>116</sup> He believes that European armies are still overstaffed and under equipped for modern operations; even the Eurocorps lacks sophisticated intelligence, effective chain of logistics, and power projection capability.<sup>117</sup>

*Declining level of military capabilities, and unwillingness to spend more than minimal levels on military capabilities.* In fact, there is reluctance among European states to increase defense spending to create an effective military force with a satellite intelligence system that would provide the required capability for independent actions.<sup>118</sup> It is believed that without the Soviet threat, which required large and prepared standing military forces in Europe, governments on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable to maintain Cold War levels of military spending.<sup>119</sup> The reduced defense spending in Europe depends on three factors: economic growth, threat perception and the significance of social priorities other than national defense.<sup>120</sup> The increased demand for pensions and health care is likely to limit defense spending in all NATO countries.<sup>121</sup> Besides, it is also argued that higher unemployment rates and the fiscal requirements set by the Maastricht Treaty for accession to EMU have pressurized on governments to rearrange their expenditures

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Moens, *Developing a European Intervention Force*, 267.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Shepherd, *Security and Defense Policy in the EU*, 25.

<sup>119</sup> Tarry, *A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival?*, 10.

<sup>120</sup> Yost, *The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union*, 120.

away from defense.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, the growing pension and health care demands of ageing populations of Europe is likely to make it difficult for European governments to increase their defense budgets.<sup>123</sup> In addition, endeavors like reconstruction of the Balkans economically provides new burdens on European budgets, thus limits the funds available for military capabilities improvement.<sup>124</sup>

*The deficiency of qualified majority voting.* It is argued that the EU decision-making process is based on mutual agreements between different states and group of states, especially between the richer states of north, and the poorer southern states including Ireland.<sup>125</sup> Besides, it is believed that reformation of EU decision-making structures may increase tensions between larger and smaller states within the EU including qualified majority voting.<sup>126</sup> The Amsterdam Treaty introduced majority voting for decisions concerning the implementation of agreed policies and allowed constructive abstention so that a country may choose not to participate a decision rather than veto it.<sup>127</sup> Constructive abstention provides the conduction of common policies and joint actions without receiving the support of neutrals such as Ireland or Austria.<sup>128</sup> According to constructive abstention, one or more states will be able to declare formally that they are abstaining from a decision to launch a military operation, but they will be obliged to give their political support.<sup>129</sup> This will allow states that have specific interests or are in close proximity to the arena of crisis to

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Tarry, *A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival?*, 10.

<sup>123</sup> Yost, *The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union*, 121.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Hyde-Price, *The Antinomies of European Security*, 150.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Laine, and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defense Capability," *Survival* 41, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 25.

<sup>128</sup> Moens, *Developing a European Intervention Force*, 256.

<sup>129</sup> Martin Ortega, "Military Intervention and the European Union," *Chaillot Papers* no. 45 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, March 2001): 114.

qualify their attitude on EU military action.<sup>130</sup> On the other hand, if one-third of the members vote for constructive abstention, the decision will not be adopted.<sup>131</sup> Besides, there are two loopholes related with qualified majority voting:<sup>132</sup> firstly, any member may block qualified majority voting for important and stated reasons of national policy. Secondly, qualified majority voting does not apply to decisions of having military or defense implications.

*The debate about the types of Petersberg missions.* It is believed that there are three types of Petersberg missions:<sup>133</sup> large scale operations of the Kosovo type, which are likely to be NATO-led; medium-scale operations (such as February 2000 Crisex-2000 exercise jointly conducted by the WEU and NATO) that are intended to be EU-led operation with NATO assets; and small scale operations that the EU will be able to conduct without NATO assets. While Britain assumes that the first two types require serious operational preparation, France concentrates on the latter two.<sup>134</sup> At this stage, it was also debated whether the EU should focus on the low end of Petersberg scale (rescue missions and peacekeeping) and leaving the high end (peace enforcing) to NATO.<sup>135</sup> In addition, most of the EU member states emphasizes that the EU should acquire a military capability to address the low end of Petersberg tasks.<sup>136</sup> But, it should be kept in mind that what is low intensity at the macro-level can very quickly become a high intensity from the perspective of the soldier on the ground.<sup>137</sup> As a result, military force of the EU should be prepared for a possible worst-case scenario in an operation and this requires a force supported by

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Moens, *Developing a European Intervention Force*, 256.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid. , 257.

<sup>133</sup> Howorth, *Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative*, 39.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Cornish and Edwards, *Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy*, 598.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> James O. Ellis, "NATO and The European Security and Defense Identity," *The International Spectator* vol. XXXIV, no. 2 (April-June 1999): 48.

highly developed technology, timely logistics capabilities, and well-established lines of communication.

### **3.3 CONCLUSION**

At the Berlin Summit of 1996, NATO began to develop ESDI to provide a more balanced partnership between North America and Europe. NATO decided to make its assets available for WEU operations and adapted the CJTF concept for WEU-led operations. At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU decided to absorb the WEU in the near future, and to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 troops by 2003 for Petersberg missions. As a result of this development, at the North Atlantic Council meetings in 1999, it was declared that NATO would provide ready EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities, but on a case-by-case basis and consensus. However, there are various problems hindering the development of the CJTF concept. Firstly, NATO is concerned about a 'right of first refusal'. Some EU member states, in particular France, rejects NATO's this approach by arguing that the notion of 'first refusal' is contrary with European aspiration towards some autonomy in relation to the US and NATO. Secondly, France and the United States could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. Thirdly, it is argued by some that CJTF lacks operational capabilities. Fourthly, many lower level officers who would have to implement the CJTF might be less enthusiastic.

There are also several divisions within the EU about crisis management. These divisions affect the development of ESDP in a negative way. One of the divisions is the development of non-military crisis management capabilities as well as military ones. Nordic EU member states supports the development of non-military crisis management in the EU. Another division is the lack of political cohesion



among EU member states about the development of ESDP. At this stage, the divergences of policies among France, Britain, and Germany appear.

There are also several challenges ahead for the ESDP. First, it is still debated whether a force of 50,000-60,000 troops would be enough for military crisis management missions. Second, Western European states are reluctant to spend more than minimal levels on military capabilities. For this reason, military budgets are decreasing in Western European states due to economical reasons. Third, there are nationalistic rivalries and disputes in the defense industry that would hinder the development of European defense industry. Fifth, EU member states cannot agree on which types of Petersberg missions would be conducted by the Rapid Reaction Force. While most of the EU member states emphasize that the EU should acquire a military capability to address the low end (small scale operations) of Petersberg missions, Britain concentrates on large (Kosovo type) and medium scale operations.

As it was stated above, one of the divisions in the European Union is about development of non-military crisis management capability. Nordic EU member states, in particular Sweden and Finland, has been seen to guard against the dominance of military means within EU crisis management initiative.<sup>138</sup> With the initiative of Finland and Sweden, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 approved a report on non-military crisis management. This report stated that the EU decided to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones. Thus, in Chapter 4, non-military crisis management in the EU will be discussed.

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<sup>138</sup> Ojanen, *Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP*.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NON-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The EU was set up by the Treaty of Rome in 1958 as an attempt to maintain peace in Europe and achieve prosperity by cooperation.<sup>1</sup> The EU aimed to prevent differences between members developing into a conflict.<sup>2</sup> The EU has developed common policies for creating a zone of freedom and justice, relevant for its citizens.<sup>3</sup> For instance, since there were different levels of economic development and resources throughout the EU, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was launched to transfer wealth from one part of the EU to another.<sup>4</sup> EMU would also realize an area in which goods, services, people, and capital will circulate freely and without competitive distortions.<sup>5</sup> Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) also aimed to guarantee a reasonable standard of living for the farming population.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, CAP was launched to guarantee fair food prices for the consumers.<sup>7</sup> The European Council founded the Court of Human Rights that can give judgments in favor of individuals and against the states that recognize its right to judge.<sup>8</sup> In addition, economic integration has provided an effective security instrument for the member states.

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<sup>1</sup> Anne Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community* (Hong Kong: Longman, 1982), viii.

<sup>2</sup> Sverre Stub, "European Crisis Management from the Norwegian Perspective," in *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 15.

<sup>3</sup> Jaakko Blomberg, "Non-Military Crisis Management as a Security Means in the EU," in *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 12

<sup>4</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 166.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 167.

<sup>6</sup> Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945* (New York: Longman Inc., 1991), 133.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Daltrop, *Politics and the European Community*, 49.

In the post-Cold War era, ethnic conflicts emerged in the former Yugoslavia. As it was witnessed, the EU engagement in preventive diplomacy had been unsuccessful in the conflicts of 1990s in the Balkans due to the lack of political will and ineffective means.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, The EU added military dimensions to its previous policies to provide a strengthened ability to enforce respect for democratic norms and practices.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, it is believed that military capabilities could provide a secure environment, but the military could not build a society, with its infrastructure, basic services and administration.<sup>11</sup> For this reason, it was decided to combine all civilian and military instruments to be able to respond to a variety of small and large crises.<sup>12</sup> However, it was argued a coordinated civilian action should relieve human emergencies and stabilize the situation in crisis areas.<sup>13</sup>

Although the EU from the beginning has been involved in conflict prevention and crisis management, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam introduced new instruments for political/diplomatic and security/military action under the CFSP and the ESDP. Besides, the European Councils in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice, and Göteborg required that the EU should develop the full range of civilian and military means for an effective conflict prevention and crisis management.<sup>14</sup> At the Saint Malo Conference of 1998, France and Britain declared that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises. On the other hand, whilst

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<sup>9</sup> Stub, *European Crisis Management from the Norwegian Perspective*, 15

<sup>10</sup> Sten Rynning, "Providing Relief or Promoting Democracy?" *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 1 (2001): 92.

<sup>11</sup> Erkki Tuomioja, "Non-Military Crisis Management as a Part of Foreign & Security Policy," in *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 6.

<sup>12</sup> Rynning, *Providing Relief or Promoting Democracy?*, 92.

<sup>13</sup> Tuomioja, *Non-Military Crisis Management as a Part of Foreign & Security Policy*, 6.

emphasizing the importance of military crisis management in the EU, the Nordic states of the EU, in particular Finland and Sweden also pushed for non-military crisis management as well as military crisis management. Otherwise, they would not support the Saint Malo decisions. Therefore, the bargaining process between southern and northern EU member states after the Saint Malo Conference of 1998 led to the approval of non-military crisis management in the EU at the Helsinki Summit of 1999.

The key success of the EU in non-military crisis management was the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. This attempt also underlined the civilian power approach of the EU<sup>15</sup>: the Stability Pact is a huge operation aimed at stabilizing and integrating the Southeast Europe into EU and NATO. In the first part of this chapter, development of non-military crisis management in the EU will be analyzed. In the second half of the chapter, the Stability Pact will be analyzed and its outcomes will be evaluated.

#### **4.1 Non-military Crisis Management in the European Union**

The conflicts in the Balkans required the use of force. This is because the diplomatic attempts to stop the bloodshed proved unsuccessful. For this reason, peace enforcement operations were required to end the violent conflicts in the region. However, not only there are problems arising from ethnicity and rebirth of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, but also there are social problems such as unemployment and poverty. These problems require the use of civilian means for the solutions of the crisis and long-term stability in the region.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The European Commission, *Civilian Crisis Management*. Available from [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/cm.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm); accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>15</sup> Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 74.

<sup>16</sup> Stub, *European Crisis Management from the Norwegian Perspective*, 16.

Effective crises management requires careful planning and comprehensive strategy.<sup>17</sup> In other words, today's peace operations have three components:<sup>18</sup> *military measures, civilian security measures, other civilian measures*. The first component is to bring to an end to open conflict if other measures fail, and to prevent new military confrontations. The second component is about civilian security, law and order. It also includes upholding the functions of police, courts and prisons. The third component includes the establishment of new political institutions, holding free and fair elections, independent media, investment, rebuilding of infrastructure, and preparing people for post-conflict life.

The relative significance of the military and non-military measures of crisis management depends on the nature of the situation.<sup>19</sup> Blomberg argues that if the crisis becomes violent and the origin of the conflict is of an ethnic kind, military methods may be needed.<sup>20</sup> But civilian crisis management capabilities are essential in the post-conflict phase to establish stability, which is supported by political, social, and economic progress.

Nordic states of the EU, especially Sweden and Finland, have wanted to strengthen the EU's crisis management capability, but they resisted the idea of a territorial defense within the EU believing that it may harm their non-aligned status and alienate Russia and cause tensions in the EU-Russian relationship.<sup>21</sup> Besides, these two states emphasized the need to foster civilian crisis management along with

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Blomberg, *Non-Military Crisis Management as a Security Means in the EU*, 13.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "Inside the EU, Outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland's and Sweden's Post-Neutrality," *European Security* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 73.

military crisis management.<sup>22</sup> Based on a Finnish-Swedish initiative, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, it was decided that:

A non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States... The European Council asks the incoming Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects of the reports as a matter of priority, including conflict prevention and a committee for civilian crisis management.<sup>23</sup>

Besides, the European Council decided to prepare an Action Plan to determine the steps the Union has to undertake to develop a rapid reaction capability in the field of crisis management by using non-military instruments. According to this plan, the Union should aim at:

Strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, collective and NGO resources in order to avoid duplication and improve performance, while maintaining the flexibility of each contributor to decide on the deployment of assets and capabilities in a particular crisis, or via a particular channel; enhancing and facilitating the EU's contributions to, and activities within, other organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as EU autonomous actions; ensuring inter-pillar coherence.<sup>24</sup>

To achieve this plan the European Council put forward some requirements to be fulfilled by the member states and the Union itself:<sup>25</sup>

- Member states and the Union should develop a rapid reaction capability by defining material, personnel and financial resources that could be used in response to a request of the agencies like the UN and the OSCE and in autonomous EU actions,

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> *Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense And on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union*, Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council, Press Release: Brussels, 8 December 1999, Nr: 13619/1/99.

- A database should be established to provide and share information on the pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-military crisis management,

- A study should be implemented to define concrete targets for EU Member States' collective non-military response to international crises (e.g. the ability to deploy a combined search and rescue capability of up to 200 people within twenty-four hours).

Besides, the European Council of Helsinki required the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Fund to allow the acceleration of the provision of finance to support EU activities, to contribute to operations run by other international organisations and to fund NGO activities.<sup>26</sup> After the Helsinki Summit, in Lisbon 2000, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was established, along with a database of EU civilian police capabilities, and a crisis cell.<sup>27</sup>

The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira of 19 and 20 June 2000 took important decisions for the development of civilian crisis management capabilities. In the Feira Summit of 2000, the EU member states have decided to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions of conflict prevention and crisis management operations by 2003.<sup>28</sup> Member States have also decided to identify and deploy up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Helsinki Presidency Conclusions of December 1999, Annex 2. Available from <http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm>; accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Jouko Huru, "Introduction," in *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 1

<sup>28</sup> Maartje Rutten, "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents," *Chaillot Papers* no. 47 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, May 2001): 98.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

## 4.2 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira

By the help of non-military crisis management capability, the EU aims to prevent the escalation of conflicts, consolidate peace and internal stability in periods of transition. In addition, it is emphasized that the complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks should be ensured.<sup>30</sup> As a result of the seminar in Lisbon on 3-4 April 2000, The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira identified priorities, which the EU will focus on. The European Council determined concrete targets in the four civilian areas for crisis management: *police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection*.

*Police.* In relation to the police, member states committed themselves to the formation of 5,000 policemen for civilian crisis management operations. The current total deployment of EU member states is approximately 3.300 persons.<sup>31</sup> The police force will be used to implement operations and missions of police advice, training, monitoring as well as executive policing.<sup>32</sup> In other words, the police force will prevent or mitigate internal crises and conflicts (such as MINUGUA in Guatemala), restore law and order in non-stabilized situations, (such as UNMIK/KFOR in Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor), and ensure respect for basic human rights standards in support of the local police (such as WEU/MAPE in Albania, WEUPOL in Mostar and ONUSAL in El Salvador).<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Feira Presidency Conclusions of June 2000, Annex 1, Appendix 3. Available from [http:// ue.eu.int /en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm](http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm); accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>31</sup> Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents*, 113

<sup>32</sup> Feira Presidency Conclusions of June 2000, Annex 1, Appendix 4. Available from [http:// ue.eu.int /en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm](http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm); accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.



*Strengthening Rule of Law.* The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira decided that the following measures should be considered:<sup>34</sup> firstly, member states should establish national arrangements for selection of the staff such as judges and prosecutors, deploy these staff as soon as possible to peace support operations, and consider ways to train them appropriately. Secondly, the EU should consider ways of supporting the establishment or restoration of infrastructures of local courts and prisons as well as recruitment of local court personnel and prison officers in the context of peace support operations.

In this area, it is emphasized that the EU lacks readily available personnel in the member states that would be deployed to the crisis areas.<sup>35</sup> For this reason, the Commission launched a project for the establishment of a network of training institutions in the member states for the development of training modules for personnel that would be deployed in peacekeeping missions.<sup>36</sup>

*Civilian Administration.* The European Council decided that the member states could consider improving the selection, training and deployment of civil administration experts for the tasks in the re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems in the crisis areas.<sup>37</sup> Besides, the Commission initiated a project with the member states on the role of customs services in crisis areas for the re-establishment of local administrations.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> The European Commission, "Conflict Prevention & Civilian Crisis Management," available from [http://eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/cm.htm](http://eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm); accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Feira Presidency Conclusions of June 2000, Annex 1, Appendix 3. Available from <http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm>; accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>38</sup> The European Commission, "Conflict Prevention & Civilian Crisis Management," available from [http://eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/cm.htm](http://eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cm.htm); accessed 20 April 2002.

*Civil Protection.* In this area, it is aimed that the Union will serve in the coordination of national civil protection bodies, early warning and information exchange, co-operation for the training of civil protection personnel and the establishment of databases.<sup>39</sup>

On 11 April 2001, the European Commission adopted a communication on the financing of civilian crisis management operations.<sup>40</sup> It is emphasized that the Communication aims to inform the discussion on crisis financing and suggest an alternative to the creation of ad-hoc member state funds outside the regular EC budget.<sup>41</sup> Besides, on 11 April 2001, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was created to make better use of existing EU capabilities for civil crisis management.<sup>42</sup> The RRM will allow the EU to activate the Community funds very quickly in response to crises or emerging crises.<sup>43</sup> It is stated that the Commission will undertake RRM in close coordination with the Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, the Situation Center and other crisis management divisions to provide complementarity of EU external action.<sup>44</sup>

In practice, the EU has been increasingly involved in crisis management as a civilian power through the European Community Monitor Mission (ECCM) in Yugoslavia (1991), export control regime for dual-use goods (1994), anti-personnel landmines actions (1995), code of conduct on arms exports (1998). Besides, the EU created the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in 1992 to provide

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> The European Commission, "Conflict Prevention & Civilian Crisis Management," available from [http://eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/ip01\\_1684.htm](http://eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/ip01_1684.htm); accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Philippe Braillard, and Rene Schwok, *The Development of a CESDP by the European Union and its POSSIBLE Consequences for Switzerland* (Geneva: Geneva Center for Security Policy, 2001), 7.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the EU.<sup>45</sup> This was followed by the 1999 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe to deal with the tasks of stabilization and reconstruction in the war-torn former Yugoslavia. The Stability Pact is a key project, which emphasizes the civilian power approach of the EU. The aim of the Pact is to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region.

### 4.3 Stability Pact

Kosovo conflict indicated that Europe could not afford another devastating conflict in the Balkans as in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since there are enormous problems in the Balkans, another conflict might have spread to Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro, and escalated even further.<sup>46</sup> For this reason, the international community pushed for an integrative and long-term policy, which perceives the region as a whole.<sup>47</sup> Thus, the Kosovo conflict emphasized the tensions in the Balkan region and indicated the need for urgent efforts to eliminate political, economic, and social problems.<sup>48</sup>

In June 1999, with the EU's initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted in Cologne. In the founding document, more than 40 partner countries and organizations decided to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe 'in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and

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<sup>45</sup> Ian Manners, *The 'Difference Engine': Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the European Union*; available from [www.ciaonet.org/wps/mai03.mai03.pdf](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mai03.mai03.pdf); accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>46</sup> Rafael Biermann, *The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe- potential, problems and perspectives*, (Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat, Center for European Integration Studies: 1999), 7.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Catherine Lovatt, "A 'New Marshall Plan' for Europe", *Central Europe Review* 1, no.1 (1999). Available from <http://www.ce-review.org/99/1/lovatt1.html>; accessed 3 January 2001.

economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region'.<sup>49</sup> It is emphasized that the Stability Pact is the first serious attempt by the international community to replace reactive crisis management policy in South East Europe (SEE) with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention policy.<sup>50</sup> It is argued that conflict prevention and peace building can be successful only if they start in parallel in three sectors: *the creation of a secure environment, the promotion of economic and social well-being, the promotion of sustainable democratic values.*<sup>51</sup> For this reason, the Stability Pact aimed to have development in all three sectors to provide a self-sustaining process of peace. The key aim of the Stability Pact is to contribute to the stability in the region. Stability is seen as the key requirement for development and prosperity, which are the ultimate goals of the whole process. The Pact also aimed to secure peace and democracy, open market economy, multicultural and civil societies.<sup>52</sup>

#### **4.3.1 Organizational Structure**

The official participants of the Pact are Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UK, the USA. There are also a number of countries taking part in the Pact as observers: the Czech Republic, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland and Ukraine. Besides, there are participating international organizations: the Council of Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the

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<sup>49</sup> Bodo Hombach, *The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe*; available from <http://www.stabilitypact.org/about.htm>; accessed 3 January 2001.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

European Investment Bank (EIB), NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank.

Most of the activities of the Stability Pact take place in its three Working Tables: *Working Table I* deals with seven specific areas which are Human Rights and National Minorities (lead sponsor Slovenia, in close cooperation with Council of Europe), Good Governance (Council of Europe), Refugee Return (UNHCR), Gender (OSCE), Media (UK), Education and Youth (Austria) and Parliamentary Exchanges (Royaumont Process). Working Table I focuses on the following areas.<sup>53</sup>

- *Human Rights and Minorities*: The objective of this sub-table is to support and strengthen minority rights and to provide mutual respect between the different communities.

- *Good Governance*: This sub-table deals with the development of local governments, the appointment ombudsmen and women and the reform of public administration.

- *Media*: The general objective is to develop fully free and independent media in the region, accountable to the public and separated from political party influence.

- *Education and Youth*: This task force deals with university education and vocational training, the teaching of history, and youth issues.

- *Gender Issues*: Countries of the region have an extremely low percentage of women participating in national parliaments and local politics. The main objective is the promotion of greater women's political participation. This sub-table is devoted

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<sup>52</sup> Vladimir Gligorov, "Stability Pact for South-East Europe"; available from <http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/stabpact.html>; accessed 3 January 2001.

<sup>53</sup> *Working Table I*; available from [www.stabilitypact.org/WT-1/index%20WT1.htm](http://www.stabilitypact.org/WT-1/index%20WT1.htm); accessed 3 January 2001.

to achieving equality and the appropriate representation of women in public life and in the political process.

- *Parliamentary Cooperation*: The objective is to promote democracy by supporting the role of parliaments and their contribution to stability in the region. This task force promotes education, exchange, cooperation between members of parliament and their staff.

- *Return of Refugees*: This sub-table works on a package of legal, economic and social measures in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, which aims to assist the return of refugees and exiles to their home regions.

*Working Table II*: It aims to promote greater prosperity throughout the region and to assist the integration of the SEE countries into both the European and the global economy. The Table is also involved in many other fields including infrastructure building, private sector development, trade, investment, vocational education and training, and environmental issues.<sup>54</sup>

The European Investment Bank prepared a programme for improvement of regional infrastructure. The focus of this plan was on transport, energy, water and telecommunication sectors. 35 projects were chosen to be included in the Quick Start Package (QSP). In the regional donor conference, 1221 million euros were collected for the funding of these 35 QSP projects.<sup>55</sup>

*Working Table III*: This table aims to promote security and confidence in SEE by providing transparency and predictability in the internal security sectors throughout the Balkans.<sup>56</sup> Stability Pact partners cooperate on issues such as

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<sup>54</sup> Mabel Wisse Smit, "The Jury is Still out on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe", *Helsinki Monitor*; available from [www.soros.org/osn/stability-pact.html](http://www.soros.org/osn/stability-pact.html); accessed 3 January 2001.

<sup>55</sup> *Working Table II*; available from [www.stabilitypact.org/WT-2/index%20WT2.htm](http://www.stabilitypact.org/WT-2/index%20WT2.htm); accessed 3 January 2001.

<sup>56</sup> *Working Table III*; available from [www.stabilitypact.org/WT-3/index%20WT3.htm](http://www.stabilitypact.org/WT-3/index%20WT3.htm); accessed 3 January 2001.

exchange of military information, notification and observation of military activities, restrictions on the location of heavy weapons. Besides, the Pact seeks to develop an integrated humanitarian demining action in various countries in the region. The sub-table on humanitarian demining acts as a forum for coordination and information sharing in the area of mine action between the mine-affected countries of the region.<sup>57</sup>

#### **4.3.2 The Regional Funding Conference and Quick Start Package**

The first Regional Funding Conference took place on 29 and 30 March 2000 in Brussels. The Special Coordinator of the Pact presented a Quick Start Package to the donor community. The package consisted of some 200 projects, from all three working tables, with a value of 1.8 billion Euros. The implementation of the projects was to start within 12 months. The financial requirements included 1.8 million euro for working table initiatives: 255 million euro for WT I (including refugee return), 1.499 million euro for WT II, 78 million euro for WT III.<sup>58</sup> It is believed as a success that international donors promised a total amount of 2.4 billion euro for the proposed quick start regional projects and programs. Most of the contributions were provided by the European Commission (530 million euro) and the various international financial institutions (894 million euro). In addition, the EU member-states jointly pledged an additional 552 million euro, while the US contributed 80 million euro for QSP.<sup>59</sup>

#### **4.3.3 Achievements of the Stability Pact**

The most important development of the Pact was the donor conference held on 29-30 March 2000 in Brussels. In this conference, the international community committed approximately \$6 billion assistance to the countries of SEE for 2000.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Smit, *The Jury Is Still out on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*.

Over 85% of this assistance is being provided by European countries and institutions, and international financial institutions. Of this \$6 billion, the international community pledged \$2.4 billion for 200 Quick Start Projects, which cover everything from development to security and democratization. The sum was 600 million euros higher than expected and this is seen as an expression of Europe's political and financial commitment to the reconstruction effort.<sup>60</sup>

*Infrastructure Development.* In the March Regional Funding Conference of 2000, it was approved a Quick Start Package which includes infrastructure projects designed to support the development of a Southeast European electricity market linked to main European networks, to develop water resources in the Danube Basin and the Adriatic, and to fix transport bottlenecks and link the countries of the region to major European transport corridors.<sup>61</sup>

*Regional Trade Barriers.* Macedonia has led an initiative to reduce trade barriers within the region. Macedonia, working with the European Commission, is chairing a working group of regional states which develops a cooperative action plan to reduce barriers to trade within SEE and between the region and other European and global trading partners.<sup>62</sup> As a first step, the countries in the region are collecting data on existing trade regimes and identifying priority areas.

*Developing an Active Civil Society.* In February 2000, Stability Pact nations agreed to increase the involvement of NGOs in the development and implementation of program strategies. For this reason, NGOs increasingly participate in working groups and specialized meetings.

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ivan Krastev, "De-Balkanizing the Balkans: What Priorities?" *International Spectator* XXXV, no. 3 (July-September 2000): 8.

<sup>61</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Achievements of the Stability Pact", *Fact Sheet*, 30 March 2000; available from [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/see/fs\\_000406\\_see\\_achieve.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/see/fs_000406_see_achieve.html); accessed 14 June 2002.



The Special Coordinator of the Pact initiated a project between NATO and the World Bank to provide a labour redeployment for excess military officers in Bulgaria and Romania.<sup>63</sup> For this reason, Romania released 11.000 officers over the last three years and plans to release 20.000 officers in the period 2000-2007, and Bulgaria plans to release 20.000 officers in the period 2000-2004.<sup>64</sup> It is emphasized that this project is a good example of the synergy created by the Pact between specialized agencies, international financial organizations and the regions' countries.<sup>65</sup>

*Reducing the Threat of Small Arms.* All regional countries decided to destroy illegal and surplus small arms and light weapons, and guarantee safe storage of legitimate stockpiles. Norway and the US have formed observation teams to determine what each country needs to fulfill these commitments. A team has already visited Albania and others will soon visit Bulgaria and Macedonia.<sup>66</sup>

A regional conference on export controls was held in Bulgaria on 14-15 December 1999. The participants declared their willingness to share information on transfers of arms and refrain from irresponsible arms sales.<sup>67</sup> The countries of SEE also agreed to make parallel their arms export policies to major European and international standards and to develop a common end-user certificate.<sup>68</sup> Besides, Slovenia hosted a Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Ljubljana on 27 January 2000. After these conferences, important developments occurred in this area:

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Nenad Pandurovic, "Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe," *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (2001): 317.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> The White House, "The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe: One Year Later", *Fact Sheet*, 26 July 2000. Available from <http://www.useu.be/issues/stab0726.html>; accessed 14 June 2002.

<sup>67</sup> Pandurovic, *Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 318.

<sup>68</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Achievements of the Stability Pact*.

firstly, this project has received 1.1 million euros in pledges; secondly, in Albania, 40.000 light weapons have been collected and destroyed.<sup>69</sup>

*Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Military Contacts.* Stability Pact countries adopted an agreement to implement their commitments under international WMD conventions and called on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>70</sup>

Another project in this area is the establishment of Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Center (RACVIAC). A Coordination Conference was held in Berlin on 7 July 2000. After this conference, the RADVIAC center was opened in Zagreb, Croatia on 2 October 2000.<sup>71</sup>

*Combating Corruption.* The SEE countries, under an Anti-Corruption Initiative, have decided to make domestic government procedures more transparent, take specific measures to promote public service integrity, and establish a review body to monitor integrity in the administration of foreign aid programs and national anti-corruption efforts. Countries committed to ratify and implement existing international anti-corruption instruments, such as the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention. Besides, it is emphasized that each country will work with an implementation/monitoring team including representatives from the US, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank and the Special Coordinator of the Pact.<sup>72</sup>

*Fighting Cross-Border Crime.* It was decided a center would be operational in Bucharest under the name of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) to serve as a central regional clearinghouse on cross-border crime issues. In

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<sup>69</sup> Pandurovic, *Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 318.

<sup>70</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Achievements of the Stability Pact*.

<sup>71</sup> Pandurovic, *Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 317.

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Achievements of the Stability Pact*.

addition, the countries in the region are also establishing joint task forces on three critical issues: trafficking in human beings, customs fraud and smuggling, and narcotics trafficking.<sup>73</sup>

*Humanitarian Demining.* The Stability Pact aimed to develop an integrated demining strategy in the region. For this reason, the key actors (the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Russia, Slovenia, NATO, the Office of High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), the World Bank, and the International Trust Fund) set up a Regional Mine Action Support Group (RMASG) at a meeting in Sarajevo on 11-12 May 2000. RMASG is carrying out three specific projects for mine-action assistance in Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina with the goal of removing all of the recorded minefields in this area.<sup>74</sup>

*New Relations with the EU.* The beginning of the EU's accession talks with Bulgaria and Romania (December 1999) and EU stabilization and association agreements with Albania and Macedonia (November 1999) provided a new impetus to the bilateral EU-Balkan state relations.

True democratic changes have happened in the FRY and Croatia. The spectacular political change in Croatia resulting from the important victory of democratic and anti-nationalistic parties in the parliamentary and presidential elections in January 2000 has been interpreted as a wave of democratization in the territory of former Yugoslavia.<sup>75</sup> This democratic change brought Croatia closer to the EU and NATO.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> The White House, "The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe: One Year Later", *Fact Sheet*, 26 July 2000. Available from <http://www.useu.be/issues/stab0726.html>; 14 June 2002.

<sup>74</sup> Pandurovic, *Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 318

<sup>75</sup> Krastev, *De-Balkanizing the Balkans: What Priorities?*, 8.

#### 4.3.4 Problems and Failures of the Stability Pact

The Stability Pact has faced serious risks and hurdles. The first few months were promising, since the shock of the war in Kosovo seemed to unite the major international actors. However, the end of German EU Presidency has slowed down the momentum of the whole process significantly. Because, other governments have appeared to give less priority to this project during their own presidency.<sup>77</sup>

*The financial commitment of the international community.* It is emphasized that budget deficits in West European states would delay spending of considerable amounts of money to the Stability Pact projects. For instance, German government decided to cut its budget by 7.4 percent in the year 2000 in order to consolidate the federal budget, which aroused a storm of protest.<sup>78</sup> For this reason, it seems difficult for the states to grant great amounts of money to a project that will provide results in the long run.

*Rise of organized crime and corruption.* The corruption and organized crime is high in SEE countries. The most serious threat to the stability of the region comes from the Albanian mafia. It is reported that the Albanian mafia is supplying up to %40 of the heroin sold in Europe and North America.<sup>79</sup> Besides, smuggling is also one of the crimes committed by the Albanian mafia.<sup>80</sup> It is also argued that under-age girls were smuggled by the Albanian mafia and sold in Western Europe like slaves and forced into prostitution.<sup>81</sup>

*Continuing decline in living standards and rising inequality.* Three years after the programme started, Bosnia is still dependent on international aid. The

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Biermann, *The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 36.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Maggie O'Kane, "Kosovo Drug Mafia Supply Heroin to Europe," *The Guardian*, 13 March 2000.

<sup>80</sup> Pandurovic, *Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 321.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. , 322.

15.000 employees in Sarajevo is the main source of growth. There is no foreign investment and unemployment is about %40.<sup>82</sup> Besides, Bosnia and Herzegovina still cannot operate without the presence of international stabilization forces.<sup>83</sup>

*Frustration of Public Expectations.* The Pact created exaggerated expectations. However, the public opinion polls carried out in different countries indicate that the positive expectations are fading.<sup>84</sup> There are democratic, reformist governments in Bulgaria, the FYROM, Romania, Albania, Croatia, and in the FRY. But public support for democratic institutions is declining. Because much have been promised, but little delivered so far. For instance, after the Donor Conference of 2000, under Working Table II, only %6 percent of the expected funds had been contracted by September 2000.<sup>85</sup>

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, it was decided that the EU would have a Rapid Reaction Force to conduct Petersberg missions by 2003. It may be thought by some that the decision to have a military force would bring the end of civilian power EU. Though, the EU does not intend to establish its own army. The EU is still a civilian power. The decisions of the European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira of 2000 also emphasize civilian power approach of the EU.

The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira approved the development of civilian crisis management capabilities in the EU. At the Summit, the EU member states determined concrete targets in the four civilian areas for crisis management:

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<sup>82</sup> Biermann, *The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 37.

<sup>83</sup> Pandurovic, *Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 321.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 322.

<sup>85</sup> Costel Gheorghiu, 'Draft Special Report: The Civil Society Dimension of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe', *Civilian Affairs, Committee Reports*. Available from <http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-235-e.html>; accessed 20 April 2002.

police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. Member states also decided to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions for conflict prevention and crisis management operations by 2003.

The Stability Pact for SEE and the enlargement project are the international actions that have civilian character implemented by the EU. The Stability Pact aimed to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic poverty in order to achieve stability in the whole Balkans. The most important development of the Pact was the donor conference held on 29-30 March 2000 in Brussels. In this conference, the international community pledged approximately \$6 billion assistance to the countries of Southeast Europe. European countries and institutions committed to provide over %85 of this assistance. In the conference, the Special Coordinator of the Pact presented a Quick Start Package (QSP), which covers projects related with regional development, security, and democratization, to the donor community. Of this \$6 billion, the international community pledged \$2,4 billion for 200 QSP projects.

## CONCLUSION

This dissertation analyzes the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union with particular emphasis on post-Cold War developments. In this study, it is aimed to analyze the implications of the divisions within the EU, which result from the internal dynamics of the Union, to the EU's evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is argued that the divisions within the EU have so far prevented the Union from pursuing an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy.

During the Cold War, EC member states were unable to cooperate in the field of security and defense. The security institutions of Europe, in particular the EDC and WEU failed to provide military cooperation in Western Europe. The main reason behind these failures was the divergences of security policies between the leading states of Europe, in particular among France, West Germany, and Britain. Hence, the security of Western Europe was guaranteed by NATO during the Cold War. In other words, the divisions in Western Europe some of which remain to date, have prevented Western Europeans from establishing an autonomous security system.

In post-Cold War era, the divisions within the EU have shaped the development of the European security architecture. There are several divisions within the EU about crisis management. Firstly, the Nordic states of the EU, especially Finland and Sweden, supports the development of a EU crisis management capacity. Besides, they insist on putting civilian crisis management on an equal footing with military crisis management. Both countries emphasize that the UN should mandate the EU peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, the EU is developing

autonomous capacities as an international actor. For this reason, the EU should be able to act without being bound to any agreement of the UN, since any EU action may be blocked in the event of a veto by a permanent member of the Security Council.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the EU member states cannot reach an agreement about the capabilities, which the Rapid Reaction Force would have. Whilst most EU member states think that the EU should acquire some military capability to focus on small-scale Petersberg missions such as peacekeeping and rescue missions,<sup>2</sup> Britain and France think that the EU military force should have the capability to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks.<sup>3</sup> Thirdly, there is a discussion about the methodology for the creation of RRF. Whilst France and Britain promotes the ‘bottom up’ approach that relies on the voluntary national contributions, Germany promotes the ‘top-down’ approach that requires the acting of Council of Defense Ministers on advice from the EU military committee. Fourth, whilst France thinks that the creation of an effective ESDP would create a more balanced Atlantic Alliance, Britain worries that in case Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, the US would move back to isolationism and NATO would collapse.<sup>4</sup>

Fifth, Germany appears unwilling to commit to further military involvement in multilateral task forces, whilst paying attention to its responsibilities as a NATO and EU member. Germany tries to influence EU security policy in the direction of non-military endeavors in which political cooperation is more important than military intervention. It could be argued that this is why Germany has assumed an active role in the implementation of the Stability Pact, which aims to provide

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<sup>1</sup> Hanna Ojanen, “Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP,” *Occasional Papers* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, January 2000), available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ11.html>; accessed 8 July 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Cornish and Edwards, *Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy*, 598.

<sup>3</sup> Howorth, *Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative*, 38.



regional security, development in democracy, human rights, and economy to South Eastern Europe. In other words, the implementation of the Stability Pact emphasizes the civilian power approach of Germany.

Finally, Western European states cannot agree on what kind of role the European Union should play as a unitary actor on the world arena. Van Ham argues that the Maastricht Treaty does not specify whether the EU should eventually evolve into a full superpower, a regional power, a civil power.<sup>5</sup> Many European states are preoccupied with internal economic and political issues. This is likely to result in differing perceptions of threat and interpretations over the implementation of a CFSP.

In the post-Cold War era, two proposals were put forward for the development of a military crisis management capability that would be used by the EU in the conduct of Petersberg tasks: ESDI in NATO, and ESDP in the EU. In this study, the development of ESDI and ESDP is analyzed. During this analysis, I sought to answer the question that whether ESDI and ESDP would be successful in their efforts to provide a military crisis management capability for the European Union.

NATO members agreed to construct ESDI inside their organization in Brussels in 1994. NATO began to develop CJTF force model to allow the WEU to conduct Petersberg type operations with NATO assets. At the Amsterdam Summit of 1997, the EU decided to take over both the responsibility for and the management of Petersberg missions from the WEU. NATO responded to this development by declaring at the North Atlantic Council meetings in 1999 that it would provide the EU ready access to NATO assets and capabilities for EU-only operations.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid. , 33.

<sup>5</sup> Peter Van Ham, "The Prospects for a European Security and Defense Identity," *European Security* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 527.

However, there are several problematic issues about the development of the European Security and Defense Identity in NATO. First, France and the US do not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. Since France withdrew from the integrated command of NATO in 1966, it would be excluded from some of the most important decisions. For this reason, France wants to establish a separate body to authorize and conduct CJTF operations. Second, France is not satisfied with the ‘separable but not separate’ concept that requires the participation of American officials in every decision making process that involves the use of alliance assets, even if they will not participate in a CJTF operation. Third, at the North Atlantic Council meetings of 1999, it was decided that the EU would have the right of ready access to NATO collective assets and capabilities to conduct independent military operations, but on a case-by-case basis and by consensus. On the other hand, the US will retain an effective veto over CJTF operations, since it will insist on giving its approval before giving its assets. Thus, the success of the CJTF structure will depend on the US authorization to give its assets and capabilities to the European command. Fourth, there may be a possible resistance within the NATO military bureaucracy for EU-led CJTF operations. This is because, NATO military staff will be asked to implement a CJTF outside their region, besides, another regional command could be given control over an operation within their territory. Moreover, double-hatted staff officials will contribute a significant part of their time to CJTF planning by reducing their time, which is devoted to their regular command responsibilities.

At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU announced a common European Security and Defense Policy that includes a headline goal, which requires the creation of a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops with all military requirements to conduct sustainable crisis operations in the European area by 2003. On the other

hand, there are various challenges ahead for the evolution of the ESDP. First, there is a lack of concrete agreement among EU member states on threats, strategic vision and operational contingencies. Second, it is not clear whether the goal of 50,000-60,000 troops would be sufficient for Petersberg type missions. Third, the nationalistic rivalries and disputes in European defense industry prevent the Europeans to develop the strategic requirements needed for the development of an autonomous military crisis management capability.

Another challenge ahead of the ESDP is the reluctance among European states to increase their defense spending to create an effective military crisis management force. The reduced defense spending in Europe depends on three factors: economic growth, threat perception, and the significance of social priorities other than national defense. Besides, endeavors like the economic reconstruction of the Balkans economically provides new burdens on European budgets, and limits the funds available for military spending. As a result, most EU member states lack the means to conduct truly demanding and modern military operations: airlift, sealift, satellite intelligence, precision guided munitions, and all weather and night strike capabilities. Hence, it seems unreasonable for the EU to narrow down the capabilities gap with the reduced defense budgets.

As a result, the EU, as a military actor, does not have the required military capabilities. As it was observed in the Kosovo crisis, most European forces lack the means to conduct truly demanding and modern military operations: airlift, sealift, satellite intelligence, precision guided munitions, and all weather and night strike capabilities. Besides, Gordon argues that European members of NATO, which have nearly 2 million men and women in uniform, had great difficulty providing 40,000

troops for Kosovo.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, it seems unreasonable for the EU to narrow down the capabilities gap due to the problems explained above. For this reason, several guiding principles should be kept in mind for an effective European military crisis management capability.

Firstly, there should be a compromise between the EU and NATO. Both the US and France would have to give up some of their dominance in their preferred organizations for a mutual compromise to be reached. The European Union, with its planned multinational rapid reaction force of 60.000, can focus on small-scale operations such as rescue missions and peacekeeping, and apply for NATO to use its assets and capabilities for large scale operations such as peace enforcement missions. But, NATO assets must be made available for use by the EU. In brief, the US should provide relief to the Europeans that worry about a possible veto for the EU-led NATO operations. Gordon argues that it is unlikely that the US would both decline to participate in a mission and use its veto to prevent Europeans from conducting that mission.<sup>7</sup>

Second, there should not be an institutional rivalry between NATO and EU. Anything that limits NATO as a result of ESDP decision-making process or anything that limits the ESDP as a result of the NATO decision-making process would prevent substantive cooperation. These problems could be overcome with a single combined decision-making council.<sup>8</sup>

Thirdly, European governments are aware that American administrations are increasingly unwilling to send ground troops for peacekeeping operations. So, European forces will need a high level of readiness. Although the RRF aims to mobilize 60,000 troops, with rotation, the number increases to 180,000 troops. The

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<sup>6</sup> Gordon, *Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work*.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

EU member states currently have about 1,7 million forces, 500,000 of which are conscripts.<sup>9</sup> A 100,000 of EU forces now serve in the Balkans, with rotation requiring 300,000 troops.<sup>10</sup> In other words, the troops required for RRF duty could amount to 20% of the EU's total forces available. The main problem is that few of them are trained and equipped to the standards for the large-scale Petersberg missions.<sup>11</sup>

Hence, the Europeans should commit themselves to modernizing their military capabilities in proportion to their defense budgets. There are also few but positive developments:<sup>12</sup> For instance, France, Germany, and the UK decided to construct a Multi-Role Armored Vehicle (MRAV). Thomson-CSF of France and GDC Marconi of the UK aimed to be the second supplier of underwater listening devices after Lockheed Martin of the US. Besides, France and Germany are constructing an attack helicopter, Tiger.

In 1999, critical European consolidations in defense industry took place. British Aerospace and GEC-Marconi in the UK merged by creating BAE Systems. The negotiations between Aerospatiale-Matra of France, Dasa of Germany, and CASA of Spain led to the formation of the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company (EADS). These consolidations in European defense industry have created industrial base for competition with the big American industrial companies.<sup>13</sup> Cooperation in European defense industry has a positive effect on its global economic performance. This is important not only for the prospects of strengthening

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<sup>8</sup> Moens, *European Defense and NATO*, 275.

<sup>9</sup> Howorth, *Prospects for ESDP after September 11*.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Carl C. Hodge, *Redefining European Security*, 329.

<sup>13</sup> Alexander Moens and Rafal Domisiewicz, "European and North American Trends in Defense Industry: Problems and Prospects of a Cross-Atlantic Defense Market" (International Security Research and Outreach Programme, April 2001), 13. Available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/Moens.pdf>; accessed 11 July 2002.

Europe's defense capabilities, but also for the strength of the European economy. The European aerospace industry ranks as the 13th largest in Europe in terms of employment, supporting directly 422,484 jobs and indirectly generating jobs for 1.2 million people employed in more than 700 firms.<sup>14</sup>

Whilst the defense industry and procurement side of Europe have changed a great deal, the demand side of the equation has not changed anywhere as radically.<sup>15</sup> In other words, lower military budgets in European states may prevent the European defense firms to sell their defense products. At the same time, the US is under a great deal of pressure to open up its defense market. The United States cannot expect to sell the Europeans their final products in order to maintain interoperability, due to the industry consolidation in Europe.<sup>16</sup> Hence, the US defense firms need to develop joint technology and platforms with European firms.

Finally, the EU must involve non-European allies as closely as possible in their new initiative. The EU should create structures that would allow non-EU members to be involved in decision-making process and should not ignore their effective military capabilities. Turkey as a non-EU NATO member state wants to participate in the planning and in the operational phases of the military operations conducted by the European Union. ESDP mechanisms accept the right of non-EU allies to contribute operationally to the EU missions, but not to participate in the decision to conduct. Turkey insists on full and equal participation in the process leading to decision-making on all EU operations drawing on the collective assets and capabilities of NATO and their implementation. Besides, Turkey wants to participate on a regular basis in day-to-day planning and consultations on matters related to

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid. , 16.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. , 17.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. , 26.

European security. Turkish officials argue that the EU might launch operations directly affecting Turkish national interests without Turkish involvement.<sup>17</sup> They are also worried that an EU force could be deployed in Cyprus against Turkey's wishes, and that some future Aegean crisis might line up Ankara against the EU as a whole.<sup>18</sup> For this reason, Turkey insists that a security decision of the EU that would be implemented using NATO assets should be subject to the North Atlantic Council's approval, thus requiring the votes of NATO members.<sup>19</sup> Besides, the US supports the Turkish position and argues that the ESDI should not discriminate against non-EU members or duplicate NATO defense structures.<sup>20</sup>

Turkey's inclusion into the EU orbit brings numerous benefits to the EU's foreign and security policies. Turkey is at the crossroads of issues that have importance on the European continent, including NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, Russian relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and transit routes for Caspian oil and gas.<sup>21</sup> Turkey plays the role of an energy corridor for Europe. This role will increase when the energy resources of the Caspian region reach the world markets. Turkey has the sixth largest army in the world. Turkey with its large, effective, and modern army has much to contribute to the developing European security architecture. On the other hand, Turkish army has experience in low-intensity warfare, which is particularly important for Petersberg missions.<sup>22</sup> Besides, Turkey had signed a contract with the Bell Helicopter Textron of the US to

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<sup>17</sup> Bill Park, "Turkey Delays EU Defense Plans," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (August 2001): 19.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Meltem Müftüleri-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies," *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 4 (2000): 494.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 495.

<sup>22</sup> Pınar Bilgin, "Turkey & The EU: Yesterday's Answers to Tomorrow's Security Problems?" in *EU Civilian Crisis Management*, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 46. In Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri,"

construct about a hundred attack helicopters, AH-1Z, which is the most capable attack helicopter after the US Apache and Comanche attack helicopters. Therefore, the EU should not ignore the capabilities of air power of Turkish army and its positive contribution for a possible EU-only military operation.

As it is stated in the introduction, understanding the internal dynamics of the EU has vital importance for Turkey. This is because Turkish policy makers are far from understanding these dynamics that shape the security policies of the Union. For instance, Turkey makes its plans and preparations as if the EU will create a military force for crisis management purposes. For this reason, Turkey offered in February 2000 to provide a brigade-size unit supported by air and naval components. Yet, Turkey does not have any contribution plan for the development of non-military crisis management in the EU. In addition, the development of non-military measures within the EU and Turkey's possible contribution to EU's non-military crisis management is not widely discussed among the academic circumstances in Turkey. Orhun, one of the few Turkish officials who discuss this subject, states that not only military but also non-military crisis management operations are of particular significance to Turkey.<sup>23</sup> But he does not provide any proposals for the active participation of Turkey to the non-military crisis management of the Union. After all, Turkey has an underdeveloped economy and has struggled with high inflation for twenty years. For this reason, Turkey may face problems whilst financing non-military crisis management projects of the EU, which require the financial support of the participant states.

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Turkey-EU Relations from the Perspective of ESDI *Doğu Batı* no. 14, (February, March, April 2001): 161.

<sup>23</sup> Ömür Orhun, "European Security and Defense Identity - Common European Security and Defense Policy: A Turkish Perspective," *Perceptions* V, no. 3 (September-November 2000); available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept>; accessed 12 June 2002.



Whilst the European Council set the headline goal in terms of military capabilities at Helsinki Summit of 1999, it was also decided to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones. Later, the European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira identified priorities, which the EU will focus on. It determined concrete targets in the four civilian areas for crisis management: *police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection*.

In 1999, the EU launched the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, which is a key project that emphasizes the civilian power approach of the EU. The aim of the Pact was to provide peace and democracy, and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region. A Quick Start Package, which consists of some 200 projects that have priority for the development of the region, was prepared. A donor conference was held on 29-30 March 2000 in Brussels for the financing of the Stability Pact projects. In this conference, the international community committed approximately \$6 billion assistance to the countries of SEE for 2000.

Whilst the developments in the first year of the Pact was remarkable, today the Stability Pact faces serious risks and hurdles: Biermann argues that after the German Presidency, the Pact lost its priority and other presidencies appear to give less priority to the Pact projects.<sup>24</sup> Second, the unemployment rate continuously increases in the Balkans (%11 in Romania and Bulgaria, %20 in Croatia and Albania, %40 Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).<sup>25</sup> Moreover, three years after the programme started, Bosnia is still dependent on international aid. Third, the continuity of conflict, insecurity, and extreme poverty feeds corruption and

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<sup>24</sup> Biermann, *The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 36.

<sup>25</sup> Gligorov, *Stability Pact for South-East Europe*.

organized crime in the region.<sup>26</sup> Fourth, budget deficits in West European states would delay spending of considerable amounts of money to the Stability Pact projects. Fifth, the public opinion polls carried out in different countries of the region indicate that the positive expectations created by the Pact are fading.<sup>27</sup> Public support for the democratic institutions, which serves in Bulgaria, the FYROM, Romania, Albania, Croatia, and in the FRY, is declining. For this reason, the financing of the Quick Start Package projects has vital importance for the stability of the region as well as the success of the EU in non-military crisis management.

In conclusion, the divisions within the European Union have prevented the Union to pursue an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although, the Union decided to establish a Rapid Reaction Force for military crisis management, it is possible that this force will not be sufficient in number and technical capabilities for the full range of Petersberg missions. Hence, for an effective military crisis management capability, the EU should cooperate with NATO. At the same time, few EU member states give importance to the development of a non-military crisis management in the EU. The Stability Pact that launched in 1999 faces serious problems. Hence, the EU should develop a crisis management capability to cover both military and civilian aspects in a balanced way.<sup>28</sup> The civilian and military crisis management capabilities should be complementary and be developed in parallel and close cooperation.

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<sup>26</sup> Nenad Pandurovic, "Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe," *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 3 (2001): 322. Pandurovic, *Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, 322.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Tuomioja, *Non-Military Crisis Management as a Part of Foreign & Security Policy*, 7.

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