

DETERRENCE AND TRANSNATIONAL ATTACKS BY
DOMESTIC TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: THE CASE OF
THE PKK ATTACKS IN GERMANY

A Master's Thesis

by

ALPEREN ÖZKAN

Department of
International Relations

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara

July 2015

To My Family

DETERRENCE AND TRANSNATIONAL ATTACKS BY DOMESTIC
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: THE CASE OF THE PKK ATTACKS IN
GERMANY

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

ALPEREN ÖZKAN

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

July 2015

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

.....

Asst. Prof. Nil Seda Şatana
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

.....

Prof. Laura Dugan
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

.....

Assoc. Prof. Zeki Sarıgil
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

.....

Prof. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

DETERRENCE AND TRANSNATIONAL ATTACKS BY DOMESTIC TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: THE CASE OF THE PKK ATTACKS IN GERMANY

Özkan, Alperen

MA, Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nil Seda Şatana

July 2015

Building on the “strategy of terrorism” theory (Neumann and Smith, 2008), and the “opportunity and willingness” pre-theoretical framework (Most and Starr, 1989), this thesis analyzes the relationship between offensive deterrence and transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations. Counterterrorism studies have been dealing with the effects of deterrence-based and conciliatory counterterrorism measures on the tactics of terrorist organizations and their willingness to commit violence. Transnational attacks represent a tactical response to offensive deterrence for domestic terrorist organizations at the target response stage of

their campaign. This tactical response should be analyzed by looking at opportunity and willingness structures of the terrorist organization. Regarding opportunity, I argue that the size of diaspora population from home country increases the likelihood of transnational attacks at the host country. Secondly, I contend that offensive deterrence in home country increases the willingness of the terrorist organization to perpetrate transnational attacks. In order to test these hypotheses, a case study of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) attacks in Germany is conducted using qualitative data and descriptive statistics. The PKK is investigated throughout disorientation stage during 1984-1992 period, target response stage during 1992-1999 period, and partly overlapping with target response, gaining legitimacy stage after 1995. The variance in the number of the PKK attacks in Germany over these stages is explained using official data on the number of the PKK militants killed per year and an original dataset on military operations against the PKK, assembled by surveying the archives of two major Turkish dailies.

Keywords: Terrorism, transnational terrorist attacks, counter-terrorism, deterrence, opportunity, willingness, PKK, Turkey, Germany

ÖZET

TERÖRLE MÜCADELEDE CAYDIRICI ÖNLEMLER VE YEREL TERÖR ÖRGÜTLERİNİN ULUSÖTESİ SALDIRILARI: ALMANYA'DAKİ PKK SALDIRILARI ÖRNEĞİ

Özkan, Alperen

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nil Seda Şatana

Temmuz 2015

Bu tez, “terörizmin stratejisi” (Neumann ve Smith, 2008) kuramını ve “fırsat ve istek” (Most ve Starr, 1989) kuramsal çerçevesini temel alarak, terörle mücadelede caydırıcı önlemler ile yerel terör örgütlerinin ulusötesi saldırıları arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Terörle mücadele yöntemleri üzerine yapılan akademik çalışmalar, caydırıcı ve uzlaşmacı mücadele tedbirlerinin terör örgütlerinin taktikleri ve şiddet eylemi gerçekleştirme eğilimleri üzerindeki etkilerini inceler. Ulusötesi saldırılar, terörizm stratejisinin hedef tepkisi aşamasında olan yerel terör örgütleri için bir taktiksel karşılık mekanizmasıdır. Bu taktiksel karşılık mekanizmasının terör örgütünün fırsat ve isteklilik yapısı ekseninde değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu

tezde, fırsat mekanizması ile ilgili olarak, anavatandan gelen diyaspora nüfusu arttıkça ev sahibi ülkede ulusötesi terör saldırılarının gerçekleşmesi olasılığının da arttığı savunulmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, anavatandaki taarruz temelli caydırıcı mücadele yöntemlerinin terör örgütünün yurtdışında terör eylemleri gerçekleştirme isteğini artıracığı ileri sürülmektedir. Bu önermelerin sınanması amacıyla, nitel veriler ve tanımlayıcı istatistikler kullanılarak, Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (PKK) örgütünün Almanya'da gerçekleştirdiği terör saldırıları üzerine bir vaka çalışması gerçekleştirilmiştir. PKK terör örgütünün stratejisi 1984-1992 dönemindeki toplumsal uyumun bozulması aşaması, 1992-1999 dönemindeki hedef tepkisi aşaması ve bu aşamayla kısmen çakışan, 1995 sonrası meşruiyet kazanma aşaması boyunca incelenmiştir. PKK'nın Almanya'daki saldırılarının bu üç aşama sırasındaki değişimi her yıl öldürülen PKK militanı sayısı ile ilgili resmi veriler ve bu çalışma için iki büyük Türk gazetesinin arşivleri taranarak oluşturulan özgün veritabanı ışığında açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, ulusötesi terör saldırıları, terörle mücadele, caydırıcı önlemler, fırsat, istek, PKK, Türkiye, Almanya

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Assistant Professor Nil Seda Şatana. This thesis would not have materialized without her advice and invaluable insights.

I also would like to thank the examining committee members of this thesis, Dr. Laura Dugan from University of Maryland and Dr. Zeki Sarigil from the Department of Political Science for their contributions. In addition, I extend my gratitude to my professors at the Department of International Relations, who supported my academic endeavors during my two years at Bilkent, and to my fellow friends who shared their opinions on my research, especially to Fatih Erol for his comments on methodology and to Ozan Karaayak for proofreading my manuscripts.

Above all, for everything that I have achieved in my life, I am most grateful to my family; to my father for his wisdom and guidance, to my mother for her blessing and compassion, to my sisters for their affection and to my fiancé Hülya Şahin for her endless love and continuous support in all my endeavors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW	10
2.1. Definition of Terrorism	11
2.2. Theories of Terrorism	14
2.2.1. Psychological Theories	18
2.2.2. Sociological Theories	22
2.2.3. Rational Choice Theory	27
2.3. Terrorist Organization as a Rational Actor	29
2.4. Counter-Terrorism Strategies	34
2.5. To Deter or not to Deter?	40
2.6. Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism	45
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY	52

3.1. The Relationship between Counterterrorism and the Strategy of Terrorism	55
3.2. Opportunity and Willingness in the Context of Transnational Terrorist Attacks	67
3.3. Transnational Attacks by Domestic Terrorist Organizations	71
3.4. Methodology.....	78
3.4.1. Case Selection	78
3.4.2. Research Design	80
CHAPTER IV: THE CASE OF THE PKK ATTACKS IN GERMANY	90
4.1. Background: PKK’s Disorientation Stage.....	91
4.2. Counterterrorism Policies of Turkey: The Target Response Stage	98
4.3. Opportunity for the PKK Attacks in Germany.....	104
4.4. Offensive Deterrence by Turkey and Its Relationship to the PKK Attacks in Germany	111
4.5. Political Activities of the PKK and Renouncing Violence in Germany	119
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION	124
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	132
APPENDIX	151

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Large-scale Military Operations Against the PKK, 1992-1995	151
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. PKK Attacks outside Turkey, 1978-2012	107
Figure 2. PKK Fatalities and Number of Terror Attacks, 1984-2011	113
Figure 3. Large-scale Military Operations and PKK Attacks in Germany, 1992	115
Figure 4. Large Scale Military Operations and PKK Attacks in Germany, 1994	116
Figure 5. Large-scale Military Operations and PKK Attacks in Germany, 1995	117

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1991 and 1992, Spain's separatist terrorist organization, Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) carried out a total of 18 bombings and incendiary attacks against the Spanish diplomatic and commercial targets outside Spain according to the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], 2013). Another home-grown terrorist organization, Irish Republican Army (IRA) targeted British military establishments in continental Europe in several waves of attacks in the 1970s and 1980s. An IRA spokesperson stated that these overseas attacks had a "prestige value" for the organization and served to "internationalize the war in Ireland" (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992: 17). Indeed a terrorist attack which affects more than one country serves to put the political objectives of the terrorist organization in international agenda, but only for a limited time. With a more consistent strategy on transnational attacks, Palestinian terrorist organizations such as the Black September and Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP) carried out a perpetual transnational terrorism campaign in the late 1960s and early 1970s to internationalize the Palestinian cause. Publicity is undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of each and every instance of terrorism as a form of symbolic violence, which is utilized not solely to inflict material damage to the immediate targets but also to influence a wider audience by disseminating fear and intimidation. Thus, referring to pursuit of publicity is not sufficient to explain any terrorist strategy let alone the transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations. For example, in the case of ETA, the international attention was already on Spain and ETA due to 1992 Olympics to be organized in Barcelona when transnational attacks of the ETA took place. Then why perpetrate costly transnational attacks?

Theoretical and empirical accounts of transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations are a fairly new enterprise in the terrorism studies literature.¹ While Birnir and Satana code such attacks for all terrorist organizations in the world based on Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the purpose of this thesis is to offer a theoretical explanation for adoption of transnational attacks as a strategic move by domestic terrorist organizations. The research question is twofold: what makes transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations more likely, and how counter-terrorism measures such as offensive deterrence affects the willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to engage in transnational attacks. These questions are relevant

¹ For an attempt to distinguish between terrorist organizations that perpetrate attacks which are local, transnational and local with transnational ties, see, University of Maryland, START Center Grant, "One God for All? Fundamentalism and Group Radicalization." Funded by Department of Homeland Security. <http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/one-god-all-fundamentalism-and-group-radicalization>, last accessed on July 2, 2015. Global Terrorism Database has also recently coded a set of variables to identify domestic and transnational incidents. For a detailed account, see (LaFree, et al., 2015: 146-172).

because the answers would both serve to understand under what conditions domestic terrorist organizations decide to internationalize their campaigns and how state efforts to thwart terrorism affect this strategic decision.

Terrorism is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). Transnational terrorism, which are terrorist acts that transcend national boundaries, is perceived to have a fundamentally different dynamic than its domestic counterpart (Enders et al., 2011). The financial, military, and organizational capabilities of transnational terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and, more recently, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) only strengthen this perception. Especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, transnational terrorism has become both a major policy concern and an academic endeavor. The main focus of the studies about transnational terrorism is on how to achieve international coordination to fight a global terrorist threat (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Cronin, 2002; Arce M. et al., 2005). What is missing in all these studies is to distinguish between the transnational terrorist networks and domestic terrorist organizations which engage in transnational attacks. For a terrorist organization with international objectives, it is only natural to carry out such attacks. Yet, though a scholarly neglected subject, terrorist organizations with domestic objectives perpetrate transnational attacks for various reasons. As it will be discussed in the literature review chapter, there are varying criteria that is used to distinguish domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. The research concern here is logistically transnational and ideologically domestic attacks (see, LaFree et al., 2015: 160-165) which refer to attacks perpetrated by a

terrorist organization outside its home country and against targets from its home country. This thesis is an attempt to fill that gap in the literature on transnational terrorism by offering a theoretical explanation for such attacks and testing hypotheses through a case study.

Strategic understanding of terrorism maintains that terrorist organizations are rational actors that employ terrorism in order to further a social, political, or economic goal. Every action is taken by evaluating its expected utility toward the objectives of the terrorist organization. States, as a response, impose costs on engaging in terrorism and/or increase the benefits of avoiding terrorism through a variety of counter-terrorism measures. Thus, the terrorist organization and the state enter into a strategic interaction. The state responds to various tactics of the terrorist organization by deterrence-based or conciliatory counter-terrorism policies and the terrorist organization responds to these measures through different ways such as intensifying its campaign, changing targets, or changing tactical methods.

Counter-terrorism literature focuses on both institutional and tactical responses to terrorism and their effects on the behavior of terrorist organizations. Generally, the question is how to dissuade terrorist organizations from engaging in violence. Both the role of macro-level factors such as the level of democracy (Eubank and Weinberg, 1994, 1998; Chenoweth, 2010, 2012, 2013) and micro-level policies such as different approaches to terrorist deterrence (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994; Lyall, 2009; Dugan and Chenoweth, 2013) are evaluated with regard to their effectiveness in preventing terrorism. What the extensive work in the field reveals is that none of the

counter-terrorism policies has a straightforward effect on terrorist violence. Rather, the relationship between counter-terrorism and terrorism is a more complex one where both the terrorist organizations and states employ different strategies and respond to actions of their adversary depending on the environmental opportunities and constraints.

The main research concern in this thesis is the effects of offensive deterrence on the willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to engage in transnational attacks abroad. Transnational attacks against the targets from home country are designated as the focus of the research since they necessitate certain logistical capabilities and are costly as compared to purely domestic attacks. Why bear the costs of going abroad and alienating a third party country instead of carrying out attacks in home country? Offensive deterrence is investigated as a specific counter-terrorism strategy here since while institutional reforms or conciliatory policies are implemented by states only in some cases, deterrence is the first and foremost policy response to terrorism. The argument is that transnational attacks are a tactical response to offensive deterrence policies that hinder the capability of a domestic terrorist organization to continue undertaking a violent campaign in its home country.

In order to investigate the role of the transnational attacks in the functioning of a domestic terrorist organization and their relationship with offensive deterrence, this thesis adopts the “Strategy of Terrorism” framework (Neumann and Smith, 2008). As it will be elaborated in the following chapters, this framework, based on Clausewitzian logic of war as continuation of politics, identifies terrorism as a strategic interaction

where a terrorist organization uses symbolic violence and provokes the state to react in a way that undermines its own legitimacy. The ultimate aim is to offer a new source of legitimacy for the political objectives of the terrorist organization. Although this strategy essentially depends on the state's misinterpretation of and misdirected response toward terrorism, I argue that how terrorist organization responds to counter-terrorism is crucial. Even if terrorist organizations take advantage of misdirected state responses, they also run the risk of retreat and marginalization. Thus, they need to adjust and ensure survival of the organization in the face of counter measures. Transnational attacks, in that regard, represent a substitute tactic for domestic terrorist organizations whose ability to engage in terrorism in home country is under threat.

Nevertheless, transnational attacks are costly for a domestic terrorist organization, which would have more limited capabilities as compared to international terrorist networks. Moreover, these attacks put the neutrality or potential support of foreign states to the political objectives of the terrorist organization in jeopardy. To clarify under what circumstances transnational attacks appear as a rational substitute tactic for a domestic terrorist organization, I introduce Most and Starr (1989)'s meta-theoretical "opportunity and willingness" framework into my analysis. The argument is that transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization depend on the existence of necessary but not sufficient opportunities in addition to the willingness of the organization to perpetrate these attacks. Opportunity for transnational terrorist attacks depend on capabilities of the terrorist organization as well as technological innovations and transnational subjects that make such attacks possible. Regarding domestic terrorist organizations, I specifically argue that diaspora communities

provide both capability and possibility for transnational attacks. Diaspora communities from home country –both supportive and rival- provide opportunity to the terrorist organization for transnational attacks in the host country. While supportive or potentially supportive diasporas provide capability and a possibility to mobilize support by armed propaganda; rival diasporas generally become the targets of these attacks. Willingness for transnational attacks, on the other hand, is measured through deterrence policies that diminish the terrorist organization’s ability to perpetrate violence in its home country.

In light of these arguments that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, the main theoretical contribution of this thesis is to combine a theoretical approach devised to account for the strategy of terrorism and a meta-theoretical framework originally offered to explain international conflict in order to contemplate on a specific terrorist tactic, which has thus far received limited scholarly attention in terrorism studies.

To test the propositions regarding the opportunity and willingness for perpetrating transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations, this thesis employs case study methodology and descriptive statistics.² Case study method is deemed appropriate since the aim is to test the applicability of existing approaches to a specific case that has not been widely studied in the literature. Although Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism has been studied in the context of domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism (Özcan, 1999; Özdağ and Aydınli, 2003; Satana 2012; Ünal,

² I aim at running more complex analyses in the future including a multiple regression analysis.

2012), its transnational attacks have not been widely analyzed. In this thesis, the case of the PKK attacks in Germany is examined in detail since it illustrates an example of a domestic terrorist organization, which widely resorted to transnational attacks as a response to counter-terrorism measures. Moreover, the fact that Turkey's counter-terrorism policies primarily depended on coercive and deterrent measures allows me to use this case to test hypotheses on offensive deterrence. The relationship between the PKK attacks in Germany and offensive deterrence measures by Turkey is evaluated using the data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database and an original dataset on Turkey's large-scale military operations against the PKK during 1992-1995 period. This time frame is designated since Turkey's use of offensive deterrence policies reached its peak and the overwhelming majority of PKK attacks in Germany occurred in this period.

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Following the present introduction, Chapter II offers a review of the terrorism and counter-terrorism literatures. In the first section, the sine qua non of any terrorism study, the definition discussion is presented. Next, general theories of terrorism are reviewed in order to justify the adoption of strategic frame for terrorism in this thesis. Lastly, the literature on counter-terrorism strategies and effectiveness of deterrence is discussed.

Chapter III lays the theoretical framework of the current research and discusses the method and data. It is divided into four sections. In the first section, the relationship between counter-terrorism and strategy of terrorism is demonstrated building on Neumann and Smith (2008). Second, opportunity and willingness

framework is introduced in the context of transnational terrorist attacks. Next, the theoretical approach to transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations is developed and the hypotheses regarding opportunity and willingness are presented. Finally, methodology section discusses the research design and the data collection and interpretation.

Chapter IV presents the theory-testing case of the PKK attacks in Germany. Firstly, the background of the Kurdish Question and the PKK in Turkey is discussed. Next, counter-terrorism policies of Turkey are analyzed and the centrality of deterrence-based policies is demonstrated. The chapter then proceeds with the discussion of opportunity structure for the PKK attacks in Germany and the effects of Turkey's offensive deterrence on the willingness of the PKK to perpetrate attacks in Germany. In the last section, I contemplate on the reasons of PKK's decision to cease violence in Germany. Finally, Chapter V briefly summarizes the thesis and elaborates on the theoretical implications and empirical findings and suggests venues of research for future scholarship.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This research aims to examine what provides opportunity for domestic terrorist organizations to perpetrate transnational attacks and how offensive deterrence affects the willingness of the terrorist organization to engage in such attacks? In this chapter, before presenting my theoretical framework, I will review the literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism that address my research question. First section is reserved for the discussion of definition of terrorism, one of the most fundamental questions in Terrorism Studies. Thus, I first review the relevant literature on definition of terrorism and then provide my definitional choice with proper justification. Next, I survey the literature on the theories of terrorism and present how my understanding of terrorist organizations as rational actors responding to counter-terrorism measures fit in this literature. Lastly, in relation to the assumption of terrorism as a strategic action, I review the literature on counter-terrorism efficiency.

2.1. Definition of Terrorism

Defining terrorism is the primary and one of the most compelling challenges of terrorism scholarship. Since the concept itself is controversial due to the negative connotation attached to it and the public distaste towards those deemed as terrorists, any attempt to make an objective definition of terrorism faces, above all, an accusation of being politically biased. Additionally, defining terrorism is a theoretical problem as it will set the boundaries of the study of terrorism. In an early study on terrorism, Laqueur (1977: 5) argues that it is neither possible to make a comprehensive definition of terrorism nor is it needed for the study of terrorist actions. Nevertheless, the need to have an explicit definition of terrorism is so clear that almost every study on terrorism begins with the conceptualization and operationalization of the term. Without a definition that delimits the phenomenon under study, it is not possible to collect systematic data and conduct empirical research, let alone to theorize on the causes and consequences of that phenomenon.

In the volume edited by Schmid and Jongman (2008), which is one of the foundational works on the study of terrorism, the authors offer a definition based on a study of 109 different definitions in the literature. They offer a paragraph long definition for terrorism in an attempt to reflect and encompass various approaches in the field.³ Analyzing this detailed definition and other various definition attempts, we can discern three main aspects that are most common in definitions of terrorism.

³ Certain aspects of that definition that are most common in all definition attempts are to be discussed in the following pages. For the full definition, see, (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 28)

Violence or threat of violence are the most frequent elements in the 109 definitions that Schmid and Jongman investigated as well as many other definition attempts. Referring only to executed violence leads to exclusion of a wide range of terrorist activities since threat of further violence is an essential part of terrorism. (Hoffman, 1998, 43) Yet, new concepts such as ‘cyber-terrorism’ or ‘narco-terrorism’ have risen to challenge the assumption that terrorism is necessarily connected to violence or threat of violence in the classical sense (Weinberg et. al, 2012: 77). The concept of violence also acquires different meanings in relation to various means, targets, or objectives of the perpetrators. A related question is whether only the violent actions that target human beings constitute terrorism or damaging property is also a terrorist action (Gibbs, 2012: 65). In general, the term of ‘violence or threatened violence’ is used to imply that the target of violence might as well be non-humans.

Secondly, terrorism is deemed a purposeful action. Hoffman, while identifying the distinguishing features of terrorism from any other form of violence, puts “ineluctably political in aims and motives” to the top of the list (Hoffman, 1998: 43). The notions of ‘political objective’ or ‘objective’ are either used interchangeably or to imply that not all types of terrorism are political (Gibbs, 2012: 66). The reference to political –or social, economic, etc.- objectives emphasizes that a terrorist act is different than an ordinary crime (Gupta, 2008: 32). In addition, not all types of political violence falls under the category of terrorism. The differentiation of conventional military activity, guerilla war, and terrorism stems principally from references to war conventions on the distinction between civilian and military targets (Rapoport, 1977: 47). A more sound perspective distinguishes terrorism from

conventional military and guerilla activity by its clandestine features (Gibbs, 2012: 66), since attacks against military targets might be considered terrorism as well. Although some studies assess terrorism as a psychopathologic behavior (Cooper, 1978; Possony 1980), terrorism is generally perceived as a purposeful action. One should also refer to publicity as a crucial notion with regard to the objectives of terrorist action since they try to affect a wider audience than the immediate targets, as it is the case with Schmid's definition.

Third common aspect of the definition attempts is illegality of the terrorist actions. The issue regarding the legality of terrorist actions is a controversial one as it gives rise to the questions about legitimate violence and state terrorism.⁴ The controversy over state terrorism is overcome by either giving broad definitions that would include state terrorism or using the terminology of 'non-state', 'sub-state', or 'insurgent' terrorism. Schmid, with regard to the question of legality, refers to the distinction between *mala prohibita* and *mala per se* in the Roman law (Schmid, 2004: 199) and offers "peacetime equivalent of war crimes" (Schmid, 1992: 11) as a broad, legal definition of terrorism. A different approach refers to "extra-normality" (Enders and Sandler, 1995: 215) of terrorist actions without getting into the details of what constitutes illegal characteristics of terrorism.⁵

⁴ State terrorism is a highly controversial issue that sometimes puts terrorism studies under charges of being a disguise and apology for state terrorism (Chomsky and Herman, 1979). Although some scholars deny the concept of state terrorism itself (Laqueur, 1987; Hoffman, 1998), most of the attempts to form a generic terrorism definition includes state terrorism albeit with different conceptualizations (see, Gibbs, 2012: 67).

⁵ At the other end of the debate, there are scholars who do not refer to illegality of the actions at all arguing other aspects of terrorism is sufficient to define the concept (Crenshaw, 1995: 4).

These three main aspects of terrorism can be identified as the fundamental parts of any definition of terrorism. Naturally, the debate on the definition of terrorism lies well beyond merely designating certain distinguishing features of terrorism. While some scholars such as Schmid and Jongman set forth a lengthy definition that engages with conceptual aspects; a more brief and operational definition would facilitate data collection and empirical research, and as an extension, theory building as well. This study adopts the definition provided by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). I chose to use the GTD definition since it subsumes all the above-mentioned aspects which have heuristic value in defining terrorism and allows me to use its data for empirical testing.

2.2. Theories of Terrorism

Tackling the controversial issue of definition is but a small step in understanding terrorism. After answering the question of ‘what is terrorism?’ the logic of social science follows with the question of ‘what are the causes and consequences of terrorism?’ The history of terrorism is as old as the history of human civilization. The Jewish sicarii cult or zealots in the first century AD Roman Empire and the Assassins of 11th-13th centuries in Persia and Syria are generally referred as the first examples of terrorism (Gupta, 2008: 16; Law, 2009: 26-30, 42-45). The notion of modern terrorism

as a systematic form of violence used for political objectives, on the other hand, was born during the French Revolution, formulated and adopted by 19th century anarchists, used by 20th century fascist and communist dictatorships in the form of state terrorism, and finally became a global phenomenon in the second half of the 20th century (for a historical account, see, Parry, 2006). Although many scholars studied terrorism from different perspectives since the inception of modern terrorism in late 19th century, attempts to generate a distinct theory on the causes and/or functioning of terrorism have begun in the 1970s.

In this section, I review the theoretical work in the literature of terrorism in relation to transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations and the effects of the offensive deterrence measures on the willingness to perpetrate such attacks. A discussion of the theories of terrorism is relevant for the purposes of this study since the argument is that transnational attacks of domestic terrorist organizations are a possible tactic for the terrorists within their strategic relationship with the target state(s). In order to contemplate on the relationship between a specific tactic of terrorist organizations and a specific counter-terrorism measure, one needs to base his claims on the wider theoretical understanding of terrorism.

Lack of a coherent body of theory of terrorism is a problem that has been articulated by most of the prominent scholars in the field (Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid and Jongman, 2008; Gupta 2008). While absence of a theory with predictive power in the rigorous sense of the term is analogous to other branches of the social sciences (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 62), development of theory in a systematic way of

thinking and interpretation is a tardy process as well in terrorism studies. Although scholarly attention was first invigorated with the increase of transnational terrorist attacks beginning in late 1960s and has been on the increase ever since, it still seems that theory-building efforts have so far led to little satisfaction in the scholarly community. This tardiness of theory-building can be attributed to protracted dominance of historical and non-systematic, issue-specific perspectives in the field (Crenshaw, 1981: 379; Gupta, 2008: 16).

However, despite the problems thus far presented, Terrorism Studies subfield is still growing. There are various studies in the field that attempt to devise an etiological theory of terrorism and contemplate on its methods, and possible consequences and courses. One such pioneering study is Crenshaw's (1981) seminal work about the causes of terrorism. In this study, she argues that study of terrorism may be organized around three aspects: its causes, its process, and its effects (Crenshaw, 1981: 379). General theories of political violence have generally been offered in order to explain these three aspects of terrorism. Yet, as many scholars remarked, although terrorism is a type of political violence and certain propositions of political violence can be adopted to explain terrorism, political violence theories proved ineffective in explaining terrorism (Wilkinson, 1986: 96; Crenshaw, 1981: 381).

Crenshaw (1981: 381) stipulates two sets of causes for terrorism; permissive factors that pave the way for terrorism and direct causes, which lead to terrorism at a certain point. Modernization (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 117), social facilitation

(Gurr, 1970), and failure or unwillingness of a government to prevent terrorism are the three factors cited by Crenshaw as permissive factors setting the stage for terrorism to emerge. Existence of grievances in a certain segment of society, lack of political opportunities, elite disaffection, and a precipitating event are possible direct causes of terrorism cited in the study (Crenshaw, 1981: 383-385). These precipitating factors are also referred in different theories of terrorism, which will be elaborated later on, to account for emergence of terrorism. However, one should be aware of the fact that none of these factors cited by Crenshaw necessarily lead to terrorism. These are merely a comprehensive –not necessarily exhaustive- list of possible causes of terrorism. It is not possible to claim a deterministic chain of cause between any social condition and emergence of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1995: 4).

All of these factors suggest that social, economic and political contexts are related to emergence of terrorism. The question of why terrorism occurs leads us to the answer that existence of certain conditions makes terrorism more likely. Another way to ask this question is why people engage in terrorism? Many theorists in the fields of political science and psychology invoke both individual and collective psychological factors that make a socially unacceptable form of behavior, violence, perpetrated by a terrorist. The general argument is that terrorism, a political problem, is essentially an anomalous human behavior and certain social and psychological factors influence the mindset of terrorists (Victoroff, 2005: 3-4). Rational choice theory, on the other hand, responds to the same question making the assumption that human beings are rational actors who calculate costs and benefits of any action before taking it. Hence, terrorism

can be explained as a strategic choice taken by a group of people in the pursuit of political objectives (Satana et al., 2013).

Dipak Gupta (2008: 16) categorizes the existing theoretical work on terrorism under six headings: “psychological theories, social psychological theories, cognitive theories, Marxist theories, western sociological theories, and rational-choice models.” In the following sub-sections, inspired by Gupta’s classification and based on my evaluation above, I briefly review three main theoretical approaches, namely sociological, psychological, and rational choice approaches and then elaborate on the notion of terrorist organization as a rational actor.

2.2.1. Psychological Theories

Extra-normality of violence employed by the terrorists lead people to think that terrorists are insane. Such horrific actions as Black September’s massacre in 1972 Munich Olympics, ASALA raid in Ankara Airport in 1983, or Al-Qaeda’s attacks to World Trade Centers in 2001 give the impression that the perpetrators could be mentally unstable. Arguably, no individual in his/her sane mind would inflict such dreadful pain to innocent people. In the academic literature as well, there have been studies, which suggested that a terrorist should have suffered from some sort of psychopathology. Victoroff (2004: 12) identifies these approaches by referring to their assumptions about terrorists either as psychotic people who cannot know right from wrong or sociopathic people who has a sense of right but refuses to act accordingly

due to lacking conscience. Psychoanalytic approaches derived from Freudian conception of aggression were widely used especially in 1980s to explain terrorist behavior (Olsson, 1988). Theoretical approaches focused on individual psychology of terrorists also include explanations based on identity theory which holds that people engage in terrorism seeking an identity and a purpose for their lives (Taylor and Quayle, 1994), and narcissistic theory arguing that terrorists are people who suffer from injury to their self-images in their infancy leading to a desire to destroy the perceived sources of that injury (Crayton, 1983 as cited in Gupta, 2008: 19).

The inaccuracy of these assumptions has been reflected by various scholars who studied terrorist actions from both psychological and sociological aspects and they concluded that terrorists are normal people (Crenshaw, 1981; Hoffman 1998; Horgan 2005; Post 2007). Above all, even if some people with psychological disorders engaged in violence in the name of a political goal, terrorist organizations, being in an asymmetric power position vis-à-vis the government(s) it targets, cannot tolerate having emotionally unstable and unpredictable individuals in its ranks (Crenshaw, 1986: 385; Post, 2007: 4). Nevertheless, terrorists being normal, in the sense that they do not have psychopathology, does not mean that there is no psychological dimension of a terrorist action. The question of why some people engage in such behavior that is unacceptable to the society makes one think about the psychological profiles of these people. Furthermore, terrorists are not only different from people who do not share their ideas and objectives but also from people who have the same political objectives but do not engage in terrorism to pursue them.

For some, even though they are psychologically considered normal, extra-normal violence of terrorists suggests that they have unique personality traits that make them individually more prone to engage in terrorism. There are studies that attempt to generate a terrorist personality profile by surveying numerous terrorists from different terrorist organizations with different motives. Some common suggestions are that a terrorist is usually a young, single, middle-class male who believes the violence is the only viable option to fight for his cause which is usually fighting for the whole or a repressed segment of society (Russel and Miller, 1977; Horowitz, 1973). These profiling attempts offer rather a sociological profile than a psychological one and fail to explain any psychological effect in engaging in terrorism with limited insights as to the perceptions of terrorists. After all, the attempt to define a terrorist personality, which seems to be a substantially policy relevant idea, is accepted to be a futile effort by the scholars who study the psychology of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1986: 385; McCauley, 2004; Horgan, 2005: 61).

More recent psychological approaches for a theory of terrorism have an emphasis on group or organizational psychology (Horgan, 2005; Post 2007). An approach based on organizational psychology also suggests that the position of an individual in a terrorist organization (leader or a follower) would be relevant to psychological background of resort to terrorism (Victoroff, 2004: 6; Post, 2007: 8). Post (1990: 29) argues that the diversity of objectives of different terrorist groups suggest that there is no one single terrorist psychology but rather there are “terrorist psychologies” (Post, 2007: 7) and psychological dynamics of each terrorist motivation –or even each terrorist group- should be studied with a different perspective.

The above-mentioned approaches more or less summarize the psychological theories of terrorism. The foremost problem of psychological theories, which is also admitted by the scholars who offer psychological explanations to terrorism, is the difficulty to find and current lack of empirical studies with a control group to scientifically test the validity of their propositions (Victoroff, 2004: 33; Horgan, 2005: 136). In addition, the recent psychological approaches do not seem to have overcome the paradox between their arguments on uniqueness of each terrorist organization and their attempt to offer –at least to some extent- a generalizable theory of terrorism. For example, Post (1990: 29) holds that “each terrorist group is unique and must be studied in the context of its own national culture and history” and then offers generational dynamics as a model to explain tendency to join social revolutionary or nationalist separatist organizations (Post, 1990; 2007). Furthermore, it is not clear in what way Post’s model or any other psychological model for terrorism is different than the very psychological profiling attempts that these scholars contradict.

In sum, psychological factors that affect joining a terrorist organization, staying in it, and designating targets are no doubt important aspects for understanding terrorism. Psychological resonance of terrorist attacks on targeted audiences is also extremely important yet a relatively neglected face of the psychology of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1986: 400-403). However, while psychology of a terrorist should be taken into consideration in any attempt to understand terrorism, purely psychological approaches do not offer adequate explanations as to the causes and consequences of terrorism as well as how to prevent it. Moreover, these theories do not adequately address the research question of this thesis on how and why terrorist organizations

decide to carry out transnational attacks as a response to counterterrorism measures. Psychologies of individual terrorists or terrorist organizations do not account for the *modus operandi* of terrorism.

2.2.2. Sociological Theories

Psychological theories deal with the factors that lead individuals to engage in terrorism and the collective psychology of terrorist organizations. Society is introduced to their analysis via the relationship of the terrorist individual or organization to violence (Gupta, 2008: 19). Sociological theories, however, examine the societal dynamics in order to understand the occurrence of terrorism and the actions of terrorist organizations. Two facets of sociological theories are relevant for the research question of this thesis. First is social-psychological theories which may have been considered under psychological theories as well but is different with regard to its focus on society rather than the individual. The prime examples of this approach are social learning theory and frustration-aggression hypothesis. Besides, there are sociological theories which consider structural societal factors to explain why people resort to terrorism. Relative deprivation theory, no alternatives theory, and culturalist approaches are the prime examples of this layer.

The theory on the connection between social learning and violence is offered to explain terrorism (Bandura, 1990, 2004; Akers and Silverman, 2004). The argument is that engaging in outrageous terrorist attacks is not a result of inherent inclination to

violence but a cognitively constructed moral disengagement and justification. Moral disengagement in relation to political violence does not occur under specific conditions but is rather embedded in everyday practices of a community (Bandura, 1990: 162). Through cognitive reconstruction, a socially unacceptable behavior, violence, is transformed into a noble act. The adversary is portrayed as a ruthless oppressor so that using violence against innocent third parties is subordinated to the superior cause of liberation. As a result, joining IRA becomes normal for a Catholic who was raised in Northern Ireland. Shifting responsibility to the adversaries is one of the main mechanisms as to how this cognitive construction takes place (Bandura, 1990:175). The governments are being held responsible by terrorists for their acts because they disregard the rightful and moral cause of the terrorists. Palestinian skyjacker Leila Khaled told in one case of skyjacking: “If we throw bombs, it is not our responsibility. You may care for death of a child, but the whole world ignored the death of Palestinian children for 22 years. We are not responsible.” (cited in Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 86).

Frustration-aggression (FA) hypothesis is one of the earliest attempts to link subsequent violence to an earlier frustration (Dollard et al., 1939 cited in Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 63). Frustration-aggression hypothesis primarily aims at explaining individual violence. However, it has been adopted by political scientists to explain political violence as well (Friedland, 1992). As a matter of fact, “relative deprivation” theory is also deemed to be an offshoot of frustration-aggression hypothesis which accounts for societal factors that affect frustration (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 63; Gupta, 2008: 20).

Based on frustration-aggression hypothesis, Ted Gurr (1970) offers the concept of relative deprivation as the cause of collective violence. The difference is that Gurr refers to collective and political violence instead of aggression. The argument is that political violence occurs when the disparity between what is expected by a collectivity and what they have becomes unbearable (Gurr, 1970: 4). One important feature of relative deprivation theory is that it attempts to explain all sorts of collective violence ranging from coup d'états to political killings to terrorism (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 64). What matters here is not absolute level of material possessions or political rights but the difference between expectations and reality. Hence, relative deprivation theory does not necessarily link political violence to the most common usual suspect, poverty, but more generally to a feeling of dissatisfaction.

No alternatives theory is adopted by some scholars to account for the occurrence of terrorism even though it is primarily a justification by terrorists for their actions. As the name suggests, this approach holds that terrorism is adopted by a social movement because there is no other possible way of promoting the causes of the movement, or in some terrorist theories of terrorism, it is the most efficacious way. In this view, terrorism occurs in “blocked societies” where the governments provide no other way to advocate a cause either by simply overseeing the demands or oppressing any opposition (Bonanate, 1979: 209). Oppression is most commonly cited reason by terrorists for resorting to terrorism, particularly in the case of ethnic separatist terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1981).

Culturalist theories, broadly speaking, are based on the idea that individuals are products of the culture that they are raised in and certain cultures are more prone to breed terrorism. The prime example of this approach is the claim of rise of a new terrorism, which is based on religious, above all Islamic, motivations.⁶ Rapoport (2004) identifies the religiously motivated terrorism as the “fourth wave of modern terrorism” and argues that Islamic fundamentalism stands at the heart of this wave following the first wave of late 19th century anarchism, the second wave of anti-colonial terrorism, and the third wave of radical leftist and separatist terrorism. Coupled with ‘Global War on Terror’, the 9/11 attacks were followed by voluminous efforts to explain how Islam is more prone to terrorism and how it is the greatest threat to the liberal Western World (to name a few, Hoffman, 1998; Falk 2008).

In this section, a wide range of approaches are reviewed under the rubric of sociological theories of terrorism. What is common in all these theories is that they argue that some feature or defect of the social environment, be it deprivation, oppression, or characteristics of a segment of or the whole society, lead to occurrence of terrorism. All of these approaches also face a common criticism: these situations do not necessarily cause terrorism in every society. Frustration-aggression hypothesis and relative deprivation theory are criticized on the grounds that they aggregate all sorts of collective violence (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 64) and existence of frustration and/or deprivation does not always bear violence (v.d. Dennen, 1980: 21). Social learning theory is questioned since not everyone in conflict-ridden societies undergoes

⁶ For another approach that compares different characteristics of terrorism in individualistic and collectivist cultures, see (Weinberg and Eubank, 1994).

moral disengagement and resort to terrorism (Taylor and Quayle, 1994). No alternatives theory is criticized because while it might explain resort to terrorism in at least partially democratic societies, it fails to account for non-existence of terrorist movements in totalitarian dictatorships (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 123). In addition, the moral risk of justifying terrorist violence by referring to expediency of terrorism is invoked. (Crenshaw, 1990). Culturalist theories, in that regard, represent the most controversial approach. The primordialist understanding of culture links terrorism necessarily to content of the beliefs and traditions. This lineage of thought is especially focused on Islam following the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis (Huntington, 1996) which suggests that primary source of conflict after the Cold War would be cultural identities essentially defined by religion. Fox (2000) quantitatively assesses the validity of the claim that Islam is a more conflict-prone religion than others religions. His conclusions suggest that there is not enough evidence to label Islam as a conflict-prone religion whereas it is indeed the case that religion plays a more important role in ethno-religious conflicts of Islamic groups. His findings are collaborated by studies which argue that terrorist conflicts involving religion are not caused by religion per se but factors such as religious differences or political exclusion are used for mobilization of recruits by terrorist organizations (Juergenmeyer, 2006; Satana et al., 2013).

In sum, sociological theories offer valuable insights in order to understand the causes of terrorism and how terrorist organizations act. All of the societal factors that have been mentioned above might be underlying causes of the occurrence of terrorism in a certain context. The problem with sociological approaches, just as with some

psychological approaches, is that any deterministic proposition as to the occurrence of terrorism is rather limited. In addition, as Schmid (2008: 127) argues, sociological approaches would be better off if they deal with internal structure, recruitment patterns, non-terroristic activities, and external links of the terrorist organizations rather than general social maladies which may be one of the causes of terrorism. This is the point where all the theories of terrorism reviewed so far fall short. Further, explanations on the social problems behind the terrorism do not help much to understand how domestic terrorist organizations change course of action in response to governmental measures to counter terrorism.

2.2.3. Rational Choice Theory

The theoretical approaches reviewed so far focus on different psychological or sociological factors to explain terrorism but fall short on accounting for transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations, a specific strategy, and their relationship to government efforts to thwart terrorism. Rational choice theory, on the other hand, assuming that every action taken by individuals are result of a cost-benefit calculation, is sought to explain why terrorism occurs and once terrorism occurs, how it works. Thus, it forms a basis for a theoretical framework to address the question of the effects of counter-terrorism measures on a domestic terrorist organization's decision to engage in transnational attacks. Under rational choice assumption, terrorism is regarded as a willful choice on the part of an organization or a social movement to

further its social, political objectives (Crenshaw, 1981; 1990; Gupta, 2008). In this vein, terrorist attacks are not particular occurrences that are to be explained but they form part of a strategy (Jenkins, 1975).

Explaining an individual's motivation to join a terrorist organization and engage in terrorism with the assumption of rationality is usually deemed inadequate because of the free-rider problems. In rational choice explanation of terrorism, what is expected to be achieved by terrorism is a public good. Hence, any individual that shares the goals of the terrorists would benefit from a successful terrorist campaign. When this is the case, considering the high cost of engaging in terrorism, why would a rational individual engage in terrorism while he/she could benefit from its success without participation but would suffer from costs in any case of participation? Crenshaw (1990: 8) offers psychological benefits of participation as a possible answer to that question.

There are, however, two distinct rational action based answers as well. First one is the concept of "selective incentives" (Olson, 1968). The argument is that, other than psychological factors, there are material rewards only attainable by direct participation in collective violence, namely, status rewards or financial gains. Tullock (1971), building on Olson's theory, also offers the appeal of the excitement experienced in such collective actions to be a selective incentive. Secondly, the concept of "collective rationality" is invoked to explain as an incentive for individuals to engage in violence (Muller and Opp, 1986). Assumption of collective rationality is that people become aware of the fact that collective action will fail unless they

participate. Testing their hypothesis by two surveys carried out in New York City and West Germany, Muller and Opp (1986: 484) suggest that “average citizens may adopt a collectivist conception of rationality because they recognize that what is individually rational is collectively irrational.”

The rational choice explanations of individual participation in terrorism are rather limited. However, the focus of rational choice theory is on explaining what terrorists do under certain conditions rather than explaining why individuals engage in terrorism (Victoroff, 2004: 16). Rational choice theory considers terrorism to be a strategic interaction between two rational actors: terrorist organizations and governments. Hence, the answers provided by choice-theoretic and game-theoretic explanations with a rational choice assumption, remembering three organizational pillars of terrorism studies stipulated by Crenshaw (1981: 379), explains the process and effects of terrorism rather than its causes. This is why this thesis utilizes a rational choice approach to formulate a theory on why domestic terrorist organizations undertake transnational attacks as a response to counterterrorism operations of their target government.

2.3. Terrorist Organization as a Rational Actor

There are various factors that affect individuals and/or social groups and make occurrence of terrorism more or less likely. However, resorting to terrorism, at the end of the day, is a strategic choice preferred by a certain group of people to other

alternatives in order to further a social, economic, political goal. This is not to deny that there may be social structural problems that cause grievances to certain social groups making terrorism more likely or to overlook psychological factors at work in the individual's decision to engage in terrorism. On the contrary, the argument is that terrorism is a strategic response involving cost-benefit calculations in an environment where social and psychological factors make the occurrence of the phenomenon more probable.

I argue that treating terrorism, in Crenshaw's (1981: 380) words, "as a form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor, the terrorist organization" is the most suitable way of understanding terrorism. Both societal factors such as enabling effects of modernization and existing grievances in the society, and psychological states that lead individuals or collectivities to engage in terrorism are relevant factors in the emergence of terrorism in any society. However, the emergence of terrorism, regardless of the social and psychological conditions, depends on the existence of a rational actor that chooses terrorism as a viable method to pursue its objectives. In that vein, terrorism is a strategic interaction between a terrorist organization that seeks certain benefits and a government, which imposes costs to terrorist action and tries to deter it.

A rational choice explanation assumes instrumental rationality for terrorist organizations which means that these organizations, being collectively rational entities, make decisions to achieve a specific end by the most cost-efficient way. Terrorism, in that sense, is a means to an end, not an end in itself (Jenkins, 1975: 3).

Then the question arises: why terrorism instead of other choices? A non-state organization engages in terrorism on the basis of cost-benefit calculations (Crenshaw, 1988: 14). Hence, the specific precipitant to engage in terrorism –or to commit a specific terrorist attack- is instrumental, rather than social and psychological. When an organization perceives that it would further its goals through terrorism, it perpetrates terrorist attacks. The reason for that perception might be failure of other methods, emergence of an opportunity for the organization to make up for the inferiority of its resources vis-à-vis the government it targets, or a drive to mobilize potential supporters in its constituency through violence.

Jenkins (1975: 4-6) lists six possible purposes (objectives) of terrorism: getting concessions from governments, gaining publicity, demoralizing the society, provoking repression, enforcing obedience, and punishing specific targets. While some of these objectives refer to ultimate goals, namely getting concessions from government in case of non-state terrorism and enforcing obedience in case of state terrorism, the others are instrumental objectives to further an ultimate goal. Kydd and Walter (2006), following from that distinction, distinguish “goals” and “strategies” of terrorist organizations. Goals are ultimate political objectives of terrorist organizations, of which Kydd and Walter (2006: 52) designate five common ones: “regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance.”

Implausibility of obtaining such major objectives with the limited means in the hands of a terrorist organization raises questions about rationality of these organizations (Crenshaw, 2000). However, the strategy of terrorism is based on power

to hurt rather than conventional military strength to force the demands of the organization (Crenshaw, 1988: 13). Terrorism has five main strategies, namely, “attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding” (Kydd and Walter, 2006: 56-78) to instrumentally follow in pursuit of its ultimate goals. These strategies direct the relationship of terrorist organization with (1) the target government and (2) intended constituency whose support and obedience the terrorist organization wishes to gain. By dragging government into a war of attrition, intimidating general society or a reluctant constituency, provoking excessive retaliation, spoiling moderates who advocate same political objectives by non-violent methods, and outbidding rival organizations; terrorist organizations seek to legitimize their objectives in the eyes of both their constituency and third parties, and push the government for attainment of those objectives by instilling fear and weariness.

Kydd and Walter (2006:58) acknowledge that this is not an exhaustive list but claim that it includes most important and common strategies. They exclude advertising and retaliation on the grounds that the former is relevant only in initial stage of terrorism and latter is not part of terrorist strategy, the terrorist attacks would continue regardless of government’s counterterrorism efforts. I, on the other hand, assume that these two are crucial strategies for terrorist organizations. It is indeed the case that publicity is the principal concern of terrorist organizations especially when they first begin their campaigns. However, terrorism has an important agenda-setting function (Crenshaw, 1990: 17), which is significant at every stage of terrorism. As long as the actions of terrorists appear in the news and people talk about them, the ultimate objective of terrorists stays salient. Otherwise, terrorists would only affect their

immediate targets and fail to intimidate the rest of the society or encourage their potential supporters. This may lead to the loss of their ultimate objective, its salience in the public opinion or give rise to rival factions –more or less moderate- within the wider political movement that the terrorists are a part of. Hence, publicizing acts is an essential strategy for terrorist organizations. Retaliation, on the other hand, is not the underlying rationale for every terrorist attack, yet it is a strategy especially relevant for terrorist organizations facing intensive deterrence by governments. Terrorist organizations seek opportunities to avenge their losses since retaliatory attacks give the impression that counterterrorist measures could not diminish capabilities of the organization contributing to both intimidation of the target audience and encouragement of actual and/or potential supporters.

Ultimately, rational choice literature argues that terrorism is a strategic choice made in pursuit of certain political objectives. It is not simply mindless violence but is designed for a purpose. As the ultimate objectives are usually difficult to achieve, terrorists follow more instrumental short-term objectives in order to achieve their long-term goals. In pursuing these short-term objectives, the terrorists engage in a strategic relationship with the state(s) they target. The most important short-term goal, in this sense, can become ensuring the survival of the organization against the repressive measures taken by governments. Through this interaction, government efforts to thwart terrorism form an integral part of the strategies of the terrorists (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 84). In the next sections, theoretical approaches to counter-terrorism and the literature on the effectiveness of deterrence will be reviewed

in relation to the question of how offensive deterrence affects the willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to engage in transnational attacks.

2.4. Counter-Terrorism Strategies

Explaining terrorism with rational choice theory bears the assumption that terrorist organizations, as rational actors, act in order to maximize their benefits while minimizing their costs. Every decision taken by terrorist organization is assessed with regard to expected utility of the outcome of that decision, which is most basically calculated by comparing perceived benefits and costs. Since government actions against a terrorist organization is the primary determinant of perceived benefits and costs, the responses of governments to terrorism and terrorist organizations can be deemed a strategic interaction (Sandler and Arce, 2003: 319). The decision to perpetrate a particular terrorist attack is made by the organization after calculating the expected utility of perpetrating the attack and perceived cost of it. If the perceived benefit of perpetrating the attack is strictly greater than the expected costs of it, then the terrorist organization carries out the attack. Otherwise, the terrorist organization deflects. The implication is that governments can prevent terrorist attacks either by increasing the cost of the attacks or raising the benefits of non-violent activities or by a combination of both strategies.

Government efforts to increase the benefits of non-violent opposition to prevent terrorism range from macro-level institutional policies to negotiations with

terrorist organizations. The question as to whether democracy is a remedy for or a vulnerability against terrorism has attracted wide scholarly attention (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 1998; Li, 2005; Young and Dugan, 2011; Chenoweth 2010, 2012, 2013; LaFree et al., 2015). Schmid (1992) argues that despite the strengths of democratic politics in terms of providing relief to disaffected groups, “absolute politics of terrorism” is more successful in preventing terrorism. Eubank and Weinberg (1994) compare the number of active terrorist organizations in democratic and non-democratic settings concluding that democratic countries are more likely to breed terrorist organizations. Following the critique by Sandler (1995), Eubank and Weinberg (1998) remodel their analysis to measure the frequency of terrorist attacks in two different settings instead of the number of terrorist organizations. Comparing the levels of transnational terrorist activity for the years 1994 and 1995, they, once again, resolve that higher levels of terrorist activity is expected in more democratic environments.

On the other hand, there are more recent arguments that suggest promoting democracy to stop terrorism. Li (2005), for instance, comparing the incidents of transnational terrorism from ITERATE (Mickolus et al., 2003) database to the attributes of democracy in POLITY IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000) for the period of 1975-1997, argues that increased civil liberties reduce terrorism. Young and Dugan (2011) corroborate Li’s findings for the events of domestic terrorism by using the GTD. Nevertheless, such holistic understanding of democracy-terrorism relationship is negated simply by the existence and activities of terrorist organizations in both liberal democracies and more autocratic regimes. These mixed findings are mainly attributed

to the use of different datasets to measure level of democracy and dichotomizing the concepts of democracy and non-democracy (Li, 2005: 279; Chenoweth, 2013: 361). More recently, a different perspective suggests a curvilinear relationship between democracy and terrorism arguing that while robust democracies experience a higher level of terrorism, partial democracies⁷ are subject to highest level (Eyerman 1998; Chenoweth 2010).

Yet another strand of literature is concerned with the relationship between certain aspects of democracy and occurrence of terrorism. Exclusion from political participation, for instance, can be a permissive factor for terrorism. Satana, Inman, and Birnir (2013) argue that if an ethno-religious minority is perpetually excluded from government coalitions, extremist factions within that group will be more likely to support violent policies and recruit from their constituencies for their cause. Piazza and Walsh (2010), looking at another institutional policy response, examine the relationship between human rights restrictions and transnational terrorist attacks concluding that human rights abuses increase terrorist attacks.

Accommodation of terrorist demands and more conciliatory approaches are also analyzed in this literature. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) offers a game-theoretic model to explain the relationship between concessions made to terrorists, repression of terrorist organization and patterns of terrorism. He argues that terrorist violence increases following the concessions since only the moderate factions among terrorists accept the concessions and extremist factions gain full-control of the terrorist

⁷ Partial democracies are countries in democratic transition or illiberal democracies. Different definitions and typologies are used but in general, these terms refer to regimes which possess certain democratic institutions but lack a full-fledged liberal democracy (see Chenoweth, 2013: 357-358).

organization. Secondly, he argues that a government chooses conciliation despite the increasing violence because if it carries out its commitments to moderate terrorists, it can improve repression efforts with their help. In a similar fashion, Bapat (2006) and Browne and Dickson (2010) analyze the negotiation patterns and their effectiveness in different settings. Sederberg (1995) argues that conciliatory approaches are relevant counterterrorism strategies considering terrorism as a chosen tactic by a dissenting group which can be diverted to political sphere. With a more aggregate focus on efforts to reduce terrorism, Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) call for more conciliatory approaches to terrorism based on the logic of increasing expected utility of not engaging in terrorism instead of trying to decrease expected utility of terrorism by raising costs.

The logic of increasing the costs of terrorist attacks, on the other hand, finds its place in counterterrorism studies through the application of deterrence theory. The classical understanding of deterrence in counterterrorism literature is based on Snyder's (1961) conceptualization of "defense" and "deterrence". Although Snyder's concepts are offered to explain inter-state relations, it is applicable to the study of terrorism under rational choice theory. Defense refers to using force in order to prevent an adversary from obtaining its material objectives. It can be achieved in two ways. Preemption is guarding potential objects of attacks and impeding the enemy attack immediately before it occurs. Prevention, on the other hand, is a tactically offensive strategy set to diminish capabilities of the enemy who may have an intention to attack in the future. Defense strategies are costly because they require thorough information with regard to intentions and plans of adversary. They are even more

costly in case of countering terrorism because governments need to disclose source of their information in order to legitimize the use of force against its own citizens (Crenshaw, 1988: 16).

Deterrence, similarly, can occur in two ways according to Snyder. First is deterrence by denial, which mirrors defense. The nuance, however, is that denial does not aim to prevent adversary from attaining a goal but to show that it is very costly and to prevent it from ever trying again. The fortification of the U.S. embassies starting in 1976 to prevent attacks against embassies is an example. However, denial is considered to be the most ineffective form of deterrence against terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1988: 17). Indeed, even the definite outcome of death in the case of suicide bombing does not prevent terrorist organizations from using it as a means of “political coercion” (Pape, 2005: 21).

Second form of deterrence is punishment or retaliation. The threat of military retaliation is presumed to deter the adversary from attacking regardless of the state of defense. Retaliation involves both symmetrical deterrence, which refers to threat of a punishment in proportion to the severity of attack, and asymmetrical deterrence, which refers to the threat of a disproportionate punishment. Governments are more likely to issue asymmetrical threats against terrorist organizations since these threats would be more credible given the information-gathering problem previously discussed (Crenshaw, 1988: 18).

The relationship between the counterterrorism measures of the governments and the attacks of the terrorist organizations, however, is not one of a simple action-

reaction sequence. Lichbach (1987: 271) offers the following principles for devising a more relevant rational choice explanation of the strategic interdependence between government actions and terrorist activity:

It is thus assumed that the actors make decisions about how to use their various costly inputs to produce various valued outputs. Political actors, in other words, mobilize their costly political resources to achieve their desired political ends. In order to make [a] model operational, five sets of factors must therefore be specified: the social division of labor, the actors, and the actors' inputs (tactics), outputs (goals), and costs (prices).

The implication of the model is that Lichbach assumes a conflict between two actors, the government and the opposition, which arises from a regulation problem. The government regulates political participation in a way decided by collective decision. The opposition group has a choice of refraining from or abiding by them, or doing both at different times. Government, at the same time, faces the problem of either enforcing the regulations or ignoring the opposition, or doing both at different times. In that setting, the choice of tactics for the dissident opposition is between violent (illegal) tactics, non-violent (legal) tactics, and a mixture of them and the goal is to increase the group's utility. Any tactic that the group employs to obtain its goals is subject to a cost. The government adjusts the costs of violent and non-violent tactics in line with its own goals. It can increase the cost of violent tactics, decrease the cost of non-violent tactics, or follow a mixture of both tactics for that matter.

Such understanding of the interaction between the government's deterrent and accommodative actions and a dissident group's choice between violent and non-violent tactics have more explanatory power with regard to the relationship between

terrorist organization's motive to perpetrate attacks and government's efforts to counter terrorism as compared to a classical understanding of deterrence as a military concept (Brophy–Baermann and Conybeare, 1994). It introduces accommodative policies by government into the deterrence-terrorism relationship.

The literature on counterterrorism is focused on deterrence rather than accommodative policies. This is because, even if long-term policies are needed to address the grievances underlying the terrorism, violent terrorist attacks precipitate a government reaction based on security concerns, be it symmetrical or asymmetrical, discriminate or indiscriminate, defensive or offensive. Effectiveness of deterrence in countering terrorism is an important concern of both the literature and this study, which will be addressed in the next section.

2.5. To Deter or not to Deter?

The effects of different counter-terrorism measures, specifically of deterrence, on the actions of terrorist organizations is a primary concern both in the literature and for this study. The literature on the effectiveness of deterrence/repression as a counterterrorism measure is divided. On the one hand, some scholars argue that effective deterrence can decrease the level of terrorist attacks by making terrorist activity costly (Lichbach, 1987; Arce and Sandler, 2005; Lyall, 2009 Cunningham and Beaulieu, 2010). On the other hand, the contrary argument is that even if deterrence decreases frequency of terrorist attacks in the short-term, it does not have an effect on the level of terrorist

attacks or even, in some cases, fuels terrorism (Enders and Sandler, 1993; Brophy-Baermann-Conybeare, 1994; LaFree et al., 2009). In the middle of these two approaches, there stand the analyses of the efficiency of certain deterrence strategies and combinations of deterrence and conciliation in decreasing level of terrorist violence (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Clarke and Newman, 2006).

Lichbach (1987: 267) attributes the divergent conclusions regarding effectiveness of deterrence to four causes: different definitions of repression, different focuses on discriminate and indiscriminate repression, *ceteris paribus* understanding of the context of the repression, different time frames used to examine the effects of repression. In line with Lichbach's suggestions, Chenoweth and Dugan (2010: 7) designate over-aggregation of an independent variable that is, state repression, dichotomizing the choices of policymakers, ignoring origin of terrorist attacks, and neglecting endogeneity of government repression and level of terrorist violence. The problems mentioned by these scholars are visible in most theoretical and empirical studies in the field.

The arguments on behalf of effectiveness of deterrence in both short and long terms are based on the idea that repressive actions of the governments can make terrorism so costly that the group that adopts terrorism as a strategy would eventually abandon it. Kalyvas (2006: 146-208) analyzes the role of indiscriminate and selective violence by state actors in civil war conditions and suggests that while indiscriminate violence is counterproductive pushing innocents who feel threatened by it towards challengers of authority, a selective violence based on the information obtained by

civilians who denounce the challenger would work to deter the challengers. Applicability of this theory to terrorism and the cost of protecting informants raise questions. Lichbach's (1987) model suggests that only consistent repression or consistent accommodation can decrease violent dissent. Building on Lichbach's model, Cunningham and Beaulieu (2010) argue that consistently repressive policies would succeed in eliminating any tactical change adopted by dissidents and deter them from violent actions.

Clarke and Newman (2006) take a different perspective about effectiveness of deterrence. While the studies cited before do not differentiate defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence, Clarke and Newman claim that governments can "outsmart" the terrorists by removing the opportunities that make terrorist attacks possible, not by "taking them out" (Clark and Newman, 2006: 1-16). They argue that by adopting crime prevention measures to counterterrorism, the governments can effectively deter terrorism. In a similar fashion, Arce and Sandler (2005) apply a game-theoretic analysis to assess the effectiveness of defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence in the case of more than one country facing a transnational terror threat. They argue that while defensive deterrence strategies divert terrorists to different targets; offensive strategies provide enhanced public benefits by protecting all potential targets. However, due to the prisoner's dilemma and free-riding problem, governments resort to defensive deterrence in their fight against terrorism. An empirical study on indiscriminate deterrence by Russian Army in Chechnya (Lyall, 2009), finds that artillery fire of Russian Army in 2000-2005 period succeeded in decreasing the attacks

from targeted villages by 24% in the long run as compared to the villages which are not shelled by the army.

On the other end of the spectrum, there are studies which support the argument that while deterrence may decrease terrorist violence in the short run, it does not affect or may increase it in the long run (Enders and Sandler, 1993; LaFree et. al, 2009) Brophy-Baerman and Conybeare (1994) devise a choice-theoretical model based on rational expectations assumption. The argument is that there is a “natural rate” of terrorism which is not affected by government actions and that the interaction between government actions and frequency of terrorist attacks is based on rational expectations of terrorist organizations. In order to deter terrorists, the government should always retaliate to terrorist actions beyond expectations of terrorist organizations. Thus, deterrence is effective only in the short-term as terrorists have rational expectations about retaliation of government and will adjust in the long-run.

Adjustment by terrorist organizations is the primary basis of the argument that deterrence does not decrease terrorism levels in the long run. Enders and Sandler (1993) analyze effectiveness of five defensive and one offensive deterrent actions by the U.S. government using statistical methods to capture the relationship between deterrence and frequency of terrorist attacks. They postulate that there are substitution and complementarity patterns among different modes of terrorist attacks. First implication is that, because of the substitution effect, increase in the relative cost of a terrorist tactic would decrease the frequency of that attack but increase the frequency of other attack modes, which provides similar payoffs to the terrorists. Second

implication is that frequency of complementary tactics, which increase each other's effectiveness, would respond in a similar way to change in costs. Finally, in order to decrease all terrorist activities, the government interventions should increase relative costs of all terrorist tactics vis-à-vis non-terrorist tactics. Enders and Sandler's analysis shows that while six different U.S. counterterrorism measures decreased the terrorist tactics that are intended by these measures, terrorists substituted these tactics with other tactics. For example, installation of metal detectors in airports decreased skyjackings but increased assassinations and other hostage-taking incidents.

Lichbach (1987: 272), accurately suggests that no model of deterrence-terrorism relationship that applies to every incident of every conflict can be devised. For example, the analysis of LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) about six major counterterrorism strategies employed by the British authorities against IRA in Northern Ireland revealed that only one of these strategies effectively deterred terrorism while two did not have a significant effect and three actually increased subsequent terrorist violence as a result of what the authors call a "backlash effect". An important insight of the authors on the effectiveness of the deterrence is that the legitimacy of government actions are more salient for would-be supporters rather than actual members of terrorist organization and governments should be aware of the effects of their actions on the larger population which share the objectives of terrorists but not necessarily support their methods (LaFree et al., 2009: 21-22). Thus, effectiveness of each and every counterterrorism strategy will be influenced by organizational characteristics of terrorist groups (Jones and Libicki, 2008), ideology of the terrorists (Miller, 2007), or in general, by the nature of the conflict. These insights

suggest that in order to be able to hypothesize about the effects of counterterrorism, strategies of the terrorist organizations should also be taken into account, not only the actions of governments.

In summary, transnational attacks by a terrorist organization with domestic objectives are a result of the strategic interaction between the organization and government. Terrorism, defined as use of violence or threat to attain political goals by coercion and intimidation, is ultimately a strategic choice made by an organization. Notwithstanding the possible psychological and sociological roots of terrorist action, terrorist organizations employ certain strategies in relation with or as a response to government actions. Thus, the question as to the effects of counter-terrorism measures needs to be addressed specifically taking into account the nature of counter-terrorism strategy, type and targets of the terrorist attack, and the strategy of the terrorist organization itself. The next chapter builds on these assumptions to further explore the relationship between governmental counterterrorism measures and the strategic decision to perpetrate transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization.

2.6. Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism

Before moving on to theoretical discussion of the transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations, in this section, I review the literature on domestic versus transnational terrorism and clarify the notions of domestic terrorist organizations and transnational terrorist attacks. Academic endeavors aimed at distinguishing between

different types of terrorism mainly derive from the assumption that there are distinct, intelligible categories of terrorist violence and from the desire to form comparable propositions regarding the sources and consequences of terrorism (Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 41). Various attempts have been made to differentiate the categories of terrorism with regard to its perpetrators (Thornton, 1964), motivations (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 60) or tactics (Crenshaw cited in Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 52). These categorizations do not guide terrorism research in the way suggested by Schmid and Jongman, yet conceptualizations such as state versus non-state terrorism; ethnic, religious, or ideological terrorism; and bio-terrorism or cyber-terrorism are widely evoked in the literature.

The most enduring typology of terrorism, however, depends on the distinction between transnational/international terrorism and domestic/internal/homegrown terrorism. The terminology might vary but the implication is that there is a difference between terrorist actions which concern a single nation and those involve multiple nations in any way. Schmid and Jongman (2008: 42) object to this classification on the basis that it does not serve to understand terrorism phenomenon, whereas, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the idea that transnational terrorism is essentially different and far more dangerous than domestic terrorism has gained prominence within the policy circles (LaFree et al., 2015: 146). Although the tendency to define transnational terrorism a more serious threat than its domestic counterpart is prevalent also in the scholarly community, it has been seriously contested. On the one hand, some scholars argue that transnational terrorist attacks, especially with religious motivations, has become deadlier, thus a greater threat to security (Enders and

Sandler, 2000; Cronin, 2002). On the other hand, critics warn against the risk of underestimating domestic terrorism, which can be deadlier than international one, by identifying terrorism as an essentially transnational threat (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009).

Obviously, any discussion of domestic versus transnational terrorism should be based on the questions of what constitutes transnational terrorist attacks and why and how it is different than domestic terrorism. As identified by LaFree, Dugan, and Miller (2015: 146-147), albeit with slight differences, various conceptualizations of transnational terrorism depend on the three aspects of the attacks: (1) the location of the attack, (2) the perpetrator(s), and (3) the target(s). If the nationality of any of these elements is different, then the terrorist attack is considered transnational. Nevertheless, the distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism is not as straightforward in the literature as it might seem. Thus, to clarify what I refer to as transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations, I first review the literature on the difference between domestic and transnational terrorism. As it is discussed below, identifying all of these three aspects for a terrorist attack is not a straightforward task.

In an early study, Jenkins (1975: 9) argues that “The most simple definition of international terrorism comprises acts of terrorism that have clear international consequences ... International terrorism would not include the local activities of dissident groups when carried out against a local government or citizens in their own country, if no foreign connection is involved.” A more systematic attempt to conceptualize and collect data on international terrorism is the “International

Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (ITERATE) project. The dataset includes information on international terrorism since 1968 considering a terrorist attack international if it transcends national borders “through the nationality or foreign ties [of] its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, or its ramifications.” (Mickolus, 1979: 148). The ITERATE has been widely used by various scholars to contemplate on the dynamics of international terrorist attacks as a dataset with a consistent methodology. The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) compiled international terrorist incidents since 1968 and began to include domestic terrorist attacks as well since 1998 (LaFree et al., 2015: 149). According to the definition and coding criteria of the RDWTI, a terrorist attack is considered domestic by default and to be counted as international, “an element of the attack must involve a foreign entity (i.e. perpetrator, target, etc.)”⁸ Enders, Sandler, and Gaibullov (2011) make use of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which gives information on up to three targets of terrorist attacks, to distinguish domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. They designate a series of rules primarily based on the nationality of the targets and location of the attacks. As the most basic rule, they identify terrorist attacks for which the nationality of at least one target is different than the venue of the incident as transnational. Further, they count attacks against diplomatic targets and international organizations as transnational. Lastly, they make use of the GTD variables on the US involvement in the incidents and where a hostage-taking or hijacking incident is resolved to decide if a terrorist attack is transnational.

⁸ See, <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about/definitions.html>, last accessed on July 12, 2015.

If analyzed closely, it is easily noticed that these seemingly similar approaches bear quite different answers to a complicated question as what constitutes international or transnational terrorism. For example, while ITERATE, having defined international terrorism by referring to its “ramifications” in addition to other factors, includes all ETA attacks in Spain since the Basque Question transcends national boundaries (LaFree et al., 2015: 149), RDWTI considers only attacks ETA attacks in Spain against non-Spanish national targets as transnational terrorist attacks. ITERATE’s approach can be deemed too inclusive since it considers terrorist attacks perpetrated by nationals of a country against their government as transnational. RDWTI, on the other hand, lacks reliability because it considers incidents with missing information about the perpetrators as domestic. The approach of Enders and his colleagues is much more consistent, whereas, it fails to incorporate one of the three aspects of transnational terrorism that are mentioned before: nationality of the perpetrators. For instance, an ETA attack against French police in France is considered domestic terrorism in their conceptualization. RDWTI would consider this incident as transnational while ITERATE put it into the same category with an ETA attack against Spanish police in Spain.

To overcome these problems, LaFree, Dugan, and Miller (2015: 160) offer three different domestic/transnational terrorism frameworks with regard to “(1) the logistical nature of the attack, (2) the ideological nature of the attack, and (3) an indeterminate outcome that is either logistical or ideological.” Building on an earlier study by LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009), the authors link each terrorist organization to a base country. In addition, five groups are linked to more than one

countries as they operate in two or three countries, and one group, Al-Qaeda is considered as a truly transnational organization (LaFree et. al, 2015: 150). The information on the location of the terrorist attacks and the nationality of the targets is obtained from the GTD. With these information, they first identify logistically domestic or international attacks by comparing the location of the attacks and perpetrator nationality. A terrorist attack is logistically international if the terrorist group is operating outside its base country/countries. In this case, incidents with missing data on perpetrators or targets are obviously excluded. Second, they differentiate ideologically domestic or international attacks by looking at the nationality of the perpetrators and the targets. Regardless of the location of the attack, it is considered international if the two differ. Similar to the logistical comparison, the missing data on the perpetrators or the targets leads to exclusion. Finally, they offer indeterminately domestic or international attacks as a more inclusive yet less precise categorization by comparing the nationality of the targets and attack location. If the location of the attack and the nationality of the target differs, it is either logistically or ideologically international attack.

As this modest review has shown, it is not an easy task to designate what constitutes the difference between domestic and transnational attacks, let alone to contemplate on their varying sources and consequences. The most important advantage of the conceptualization of LaFree and his colleagues is that it allows for analysis of different sorts of transnational attacks. A domestic terrorist organization might have different motivations when it attacks a foreign national in its home country or a co-national in a foreign country. While the foreign aspect is only the venue of the

attack in the former, the latter constitutes an attack against a foreigner. Moreover, the repercussions of these two types of attacks would also differ. In case of a logistically transnational yet ideologically domestic attack, the third party country involved in the attack might be less willing to engage with the terrorists since it is not directly targeted; whereas, if it is a logistically domestic but ideologically transnational attack, then the reaction of the third party government may differ.

The main research concern in this thesis is under what conditions a terrorist organization would carry out attacks against nationals of its home country abroad. Why would ETA attack Spanish businesses in Italy or why would IRA attacks British military establishments in West Germany? Thus, what is being investigated as transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations in this thesis is logistically international and ideologically domestic terrorist attacks. These questions are relevant because it is puzzling why a terrorist organization would bear the logistical costs while it can target its home country in its home country. In the next chapter, the environmental factors that allow such attacks and the effects of the deterrence based counter-terrorism policies on these incidents is discussed with a theoretical approach.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

As it is discussed in the previous chapter, the relationship between adoption of different strategies by terrorist organizations and government deterrence is evident according to the rational choice theorists of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. Rational choice explains the relationship between the strategy of a terrorist organization and the government's response to terrorism as the latter being an integral part of the former (Crenshaw, 1981: 387; Kydd and Walter, 2006: 69-72; Schmid and Jongman, 2008: 84). The general argument is that by provoking excessive government reaction, terrorist organizations aim to demonstrate their constituency and potential supporters that government actions are illegitimate and the terrorist organization is justified in its challenge to the government. Counterterrorism literature, based on the assumption of terrorist organizations as utility maximizers, investigates the relationship between different (deterrent and conciliatory) counterterrorism measures and the frequency of terrorist attacks. Generally, the literature is divided between two

arguments: Deterrence works vs. deterrence does not work.⁹ Several studies, furthermore, point out to a negative relationship between deterrence based counterterrorism measures and subsequent frequency of terrorist attacks in the long-run (White, 1989; LaFree et al., 2009).

The research question of this study is twofold: What provides opportunity for domestic terrorist organizations to perpetrate transnational attacks and how offensive deterrence affects the willingness of the terrorist organization to engage in such attacks? In order to understand this relationship, strategic decision-making by a terrorist organization will be analyzed within the “opportunity and willingness” meta-theoretical framework developed by Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr (1989).

Offensive deterrence is chosen here as a particular counter-terrorism practice which represents the government efforts to eradicate material capabilities of a terrorist organization. Strategic understanding of terrorism holds that terrorist organizations may willingly provoke government retaliation for the purposes of propaganda. However, it is not uncommon for terrorist organizations to crumble in the face of government deterrence. Then, what is the rationale behind the strategy of provoking government reaction and how does a terrorist organization respond to offensive deterrence measures of its target government?

Transnational attacks also represent a seemingly controversial strategy for domestic terrorist organizations. While such attacks serve to attract international attention to the cause of the terrorist organization (Schmid, 1989; Dobkin, 1992: 13-

⁹ See Section 2.5.

14), they also run the risk of alienating and/or antagonizing third parties who might hold benevolent neutrality or a passive opposition towards the political objectives of the terrorist organization (Kelly and Mitchell, 1981; Abrahms, 2012: 383). Especially after the initial stages of a terrorist campaign, where achieving recognition is crucial to terrorist strategy, transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization can be counterproductive. Hijackings and hostage-takings perpetrated by Palestinian organizations such as Black September or Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in late 1960s and early 1970s are perfect examples of engaging in transnational attacks for the sake of publicity. Shocking events like 1972 Munich Massacre played a vital role in putting the political objectives of Palestinian organizations on the international agenda. However, transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations are not exclusive to terrorist campaigns in their initial stages. For instance, IRA attacks against British military establishments in West Germany in 1970s and 1980s or ETA attacks against Spanish diplomatic and commercial targets in Italy in early 1990s would bear a different explanation than drawing attention for the organization's cause. Are such attacks erratic actions which have nothing to do with political objectives of the terrorist organization or are they part of the terrorist organization's strategy? What is the role of transnational attacks in terrorist organization's response to a government's counterterrorism measures?

In the following sections, I will first demonstrate the relationship between general strategy and different tactics (i.e. targets, attack methods) of terrorism and counterterrorism strategies of the governments building on Neumann and Smith's (2008) "Strategy of Terrorism" framework. Then, I will discuss Most and Starr's

(1989) notions of opportunity and willingness in relation to transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations. Finally, I will present my hypotheses regarding the opportunity and willingness structure lying behind a domestic terrorist organization's decision to perpetrate transnational attacks.

3.1. The Relationship between Counterterrorism and the Strategy of Terrorism

Theories on decision-making of terrorist organizations, in line with general theories of terrorism, are centered around three main arguments: organizational, psychological, and strategic (McCormick, 2003). Organizational frameworks identify terrorist organizations as distinct social entities whose ultimate objective is perpetuating their own existence (Crenshaw, 1988: 19-26). Hence, the actions of terrorist organizations are not results of strategic calculations for the attainment of political objectives, but outcomes of internal group dynamics. Abrahms (2008), building on the natural systems model in organizational theory, argues that terrorist organizations are social solidarity maximizers and terrorist attacks are perpetrated by members of the organization in order to ensure the survival of the organization itself and thus, its social benefits. Psychological frameworks, on the other hand, include explanations pertaining to individual psychology of the terrorists and social psychology of the terrorist organization¹⁰.

¹⁰ (See Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2)

Strategic understanding of terrorist decision-making, which is adopted in this study, is based on three core assumptions: (1) terrorists are rational utility maximizers, (2) terrorist organizations have a set of political objectives, and (3) decision to perpetrate a terrorist act depends on the expected utility of that action toward the defined political objectives. In order to attain long-term political objectives, terrorist organizations adopt certain short-term strategies. The set of short-term strategies to be adopted is dictated by the needs and capabilities of the terrorist organization as well as the environmental opportunities and constraints. The assumption on the rationality of terrorist organizations does not necessarily suggest that terrorist organizations rigidly follow a pre-determined set of strategies. On the contrary, the argument is that terrorist organizations pragmatically change their tactics, methods of propaganda and recruitment, or even their declared objectives depending on their capabilities and environmental opportunities. In other words, like all organizations, terrorist organizations learn and adapt (Shelley, 2014).

Some of these short-term strategies may seem inimical to the ultimate political objectives of the terrorist organization. Among these are strategies such as targeting of its own constituency, spoiling negotiations with the government or engaging in transnational attacks with the possibility of alienating third party governments. Despite these risks, such strategies are employed in order to make sure that the organization is able to secure a certain degree of popular support and sustain its campaign against the target government. For example, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacks against Tamils (whom they seek to represent) appear to be contrary to the objective of establishing an independent Tamil state. Lilja and Hultman

(2011) refer to two sorts of intra-ethnic violence committed by the Tigers: violence against Tamil civilians and violence against rival Tamil separatist organizations. Such violence represents a controversial tactic due to the risk of alienating the very population whose support is sought. However, while the violence against Tamil civilians served the purpose of ensuring loyalty of the population, the struggle against rival organizations with marginally different political objectives allowed the LTTE to lead national liberation struggle of the Tamils without any competition for popular support and/or recruitment. Comprising of two inter-related distinct strategies, these actions allowed the LTTE to undertake a protracted campaign against the Sri Lankan government for the independence of Tamil lands.

As the example of the LTTE illustrates, strategy of terrorism is rather more complex than the common understanding of terrorism as targeting innocent civilians in order to force concessions from the government. Terrorism is not about specific attacks (e.g. bombing, kidnapping), specific targets (i.e. combatants or civilians), or specific motives (e.g. ethnic, religious, or ideological). A terrorist organization is a political entity that enters into a strategic interaction with its target government implementing a set of tactics based -primarily but not entirely- on the use of violence in order to promote its political objectives. Each individual case of terrorism is unique to a certain extent (with regard to its background and circumstances), however, terrorism as implementation of a set of tactics in order to further a political cause, can be understood within a generalizable framework.

Neumann and Smith (2008: 31-55) distinguish three -not necessarily sequential- stages for *modus operandi* of terrorism: disorientation, target response, and gaining legitimacy. Functioning conjointly and usually overlapping, these three aspects of terrorist strategy allow for the promotion of political objectives of a terrorist organization. What Neumann and Smith call the strategy of terrorism framework accurately depicts the general outline of a domestic terrorist campaign.¹¹ Following the Clausewitzian logic, it identifies terrorism as continuation of politics by other means, just like war, except not in the sense of its technicalities but its rationale (Neumann and Smith, 2008: 16-17). Thus, it allows for analysis of the strategic interaction between the terrorist organization and its target government. Moreover, as the framework investigates the different policy options that are available to a government facing terrorism within their borders and possible routes that a terrorism campaign can take, it accounts for pragmatic shifts of terrorist organization tactics and why trajectories and outcomes of terrorist campaigns differ from one another.

The first stage of a terrorist campaign is disorientation. Terrorism is generally referred as a strategy of invoking fear beyond the immediate targets of violence. A bombing in a crowded place, a raid to a military post, or assassination of an influential figure do not aim to overthrow the government or push for a policy change all by themselves. Creating an environment of chaos in order to give the impression that the power holders are unable to cope with the challenge against their authority is an essential part of terrorism. The most immediate strategy of terrorism is to disorient the public and damage the government's image as the security provider through acts of

¹¹ Neumann and Smith (2008) offer it as a general framework for any terrorism campaign.

terrorism or 'symbolic violence.' In that way, terrorists find a way to communicate their objectives. More than a century ago, the Anarchist Prince, Peter Kropotkin, in his famous quote, pointed out to the role of terrorist action in propaganda: "By actions which compel general attention, the new idea seeps into people's minds and wins converts. One such act may, in a few days, make more propaganda than thousands of pamphlets" (Kropotkin, [1880] 1992: 188). It is important to note, however, that aiming to disorientate people is marginally different than winning the hearts of people. The aim is to make people realize that 'it could have happened to me' and to make them rethink their loyalty to the government -out of a need for protection (Neumann and Smith: 2008, 36).

Winning the hearts of people constitutes another related step of terrorist strategy. The second stage of the strategy of terrorism; target response, represents both the propaganda aspect of terrorism and the interaction between the terrorist attacks and counterterrorism measures. By instilling fear among the public and creating an environment of perceived chaos, terrorist actions both do 'propaganda by the deed' and incite government to react in a way that harms its legitimacy. In *Minimanual of Urban Guerilla*, the leader of the Brazilian Communist Party Carlos Marighella argues that in the face of persistence of the urban guerilla, the government has no choice other than increasing the repression. Reinforced police networks, arrests of the innocent suspects, curfews, and mobilization of state security apparatus in general, according to Marighella, would make life unbearable for the population so that the government will eventually appear responsible for the violence in the streets (Marighella, 1969 in Mallin, 1982: 111). Thus, one reaction that the terrorist

organizations seek to trigger is excessive repression by the government in order to convince their actual and potential support bases that they are the true victims. In this case, because of the government reaction, terrorist actions not only serve to disorient people but also portray terrorist organizations and its supporters as victims through extracting harsh target response, which seeks to decrease the legitimacy of the government.

At this point, it is crucial to bear in mind that the nature (i.e. conciliatory vs. deterrence based) and volume (excessiveness) of counterterrorism measures have a much higher impact on moderates, sympathizers, and potential supporters than the actual members of the terrorist organization (Berry, 1989: 298-300; LaFree et al., 2009: 21-22). The impact is twofold. Firstly, government efforts to deter terrorism usually targets moderate opposition factions and sympathizers of the terrorist organization as well, thus radicalizing these groups. Secondly, the terrorist organization propagates, in Marighella's words, that "this government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and that it resorts simply to physical liquidation of its opponents." (Marighella, 1969 in Mallin, 1982: 111). If deterrence does not work, the government would see that the terrorist front is growing larger. 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda represents a perfect example of how terrorist organizations willingly provoke excessive target reaction and ultimately benefit from deterrent counterterrorism strategies. US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 following 9/11 no doubt played into the hands of the Al-Qaeda network to propagate a war of Muslims against the Western oppressors. Portraying themselves as the victims of a war declared against the Muslims, Al-Qaeda network and recently ISIS succeeded in mobilizing numerous

people to support or join their movement. Military operations against Al-Qaeda affiliates after the invasion of Iraq and the mistreatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons amplified the Al-Qaeda propaganda winning many more converts to its cause. Saif al-Adel, one of the top leaders of the Al-Qaeda, is known to have underlined this point: “The Americans took the bait and fell into our trap.” (Gerges, 2005: 271).

The second option that the government has, according to Neumann and Smith, in the face of a terrorist campaign is indifference or –to some extent- appeasement of the terrorist organization. In this case, the situation where the terrorist organization gains a much higher area of movement is called power deflation (Berry, 1989: 300-302; Neumann and Smith, 2008: 41-42). The government refrains from reacting against the threat of terrorism fearing from alienating the moderates, sympathizers, and potential supporters. As a matter of fact, this is not a very likely scenario after an organization has already radicalized and started a terrorist campaign. However, it reflects the inherent dilemma between civil liberties and security. If the government fails to thwart terrorism out of concerns for civil liberties, then the terrorist organization, by bolstering its campaign, would create an image where the security apparatus of the government is powerless against the determination of the terrorists. Not only would that lead to the disorientation of the population, but it would also encourage sympathizers and potential recruits to join the terrorist organization. This is exactly why the governments have an incentive to overreact fearing from a power deflation where the population is unsafe and terrorists are encouraged. In addition, Neumann and Smith (2008: 42) only refer to the concern for civil liberties as the

source of power deflation, whereas, power deflation does not only occur out of concern for civil liberties. The material incapability, lack of sufficient planning, or underestimation of terrorists may also lead to power deflation. The ultimate point is that failure to prevent terrorist violence –for whatever reason- also plays into the hands of terrorists by allowing them to display a show of power and resistance.

The third and final stage of the strategy of terrorism is gaining legitimacy. Having alienated people from the government by creating an environment of chaos and provoking government into reacting in ways that would undermine its own legitimacy, the final stage of the strategy of terrorism is offering the terrorist organization as a new legitimate power source to initiate political change. Neumann and Smith (2008: 47) identify three possible ways for terrorist organizations to gain legitimacy.

The first is manipulation of the media to convey political messages. The argument is that the loyalty of the established media outlets is supposed to lay with the government; however, by playing on the inherent yearning of the media for sensation, terrorist organizations have a chance to promote their objectives. Inflicting physically less damage but attracting high attention, tactics such as kidnapping and hostage-taking provide terrorist organizations with the opportunity to convey their messages. The attacks that would make people think about its reasons, such as suicide bombing, are supposed to be more important at this stage to promote political objectives of the terrorists. Second way that Neumann and Smith suggest that is often used by terrorist organizations at this stage is establishing alternative media sources. The aim is once

again disseminating political messages. However, as the authors also admit, the effect of alternative media sources –either conventional or online- is limited only to the current members and supporters of the terrorist organization (Neumann and Smith, 2008: 49).¹²

The third way, according to Neumann and Smith (2008: 49), is engaging in conventional political activities. Terrorist organizations resort to terrorism arguing that it was not possible to raise their voices through conventional politics. However, in order to gain legitimacy, they need to create political fronts or to promote already established organizations, doing what they have rejected at the first place. Paralleling or following the other two stages, a terrorist organization needs to engage in politics in order to translate the psychological affects created by the terrorist campaign into political capital. In fact, Satana et al. (2013) find that the longer ethnic and religious minorities are excluded from politics, the more likely they are to resort to terrorism.

There are several mechanisms for terrorist organizations to engage in ordinary political agitation including creating welfare networks or establishing political parties (Neumann and Smith, 2008: 50-51). After all, political parties and terrorist organizations are both established in the pursuit of political objectives, although they radically differ in terms of the methods they employ. Weinberg's study (1991), though problematic in terms of data and method, identifies 27 terrorist organizations related

¹² The most fundamental problem about these arguments is that communicating political messages does not equal to gaining legitimacy. There is no doubt raising their voice helps terrorist organizations to increase their legitimacy, whereas, obtaining media coverage or establishing alternative media outlets is not particularly related to gaining legitimacy as a distinct strategy of terrorism. On the contrary, terrorist organizations aim to communicate their messages throughout all stages of their campaign and these stages may take place simultaneously but if communicating political messages is enough for gaining legitimacy, then why do we define a third stage of terrorist strategy?

with political parties. The relationship between IRA and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland and between ETA and Heri Batasuna in Spain are the prime examples of these relations (Neumann and Smith, 2008: 50). Through the engagement of these political fronts in conventional politics, the terrorist organizations and their objectives gain legitimacy. In that vein, the other two stages of terrorism are meant to pave the way for or to strengthen the voice of political front of the terrorist organization. If a terrorist organization successfully disorients people and derives popular support for its cause through symbolic violence, the next step would be to exploit these effects in legitimate politics. Engaging in politics, as the abovementioned examples of IRA and ETA illustrates, does not necessarily entail cessation of terrorist activity at the outset of that stage, however, in order to obtain political change after successfully implementing the first two strategies, a terrorist organization needs to at least gradually decrease its dependence on symbolic violence and increase its emphasis on political resolution of the conflict. As Neumann and Smith (2008:54) argue, this stage is the greatest challenge for a terrorist organization and most terrorist organizations end up alienating themselves even from their own constituencies as they fail to abandon violence.

Terrorist organization's response to deterrence lies within the area where the strategies of disorientation and provoking target government response overlap. As suggested above, these two strategies are often intertwined. On the one hand, terrorist organization seeks to make people feel insecure and question their loyalty to the

government, and on the other hand, by triggering a target reaction, it aims to win the support of the disoriented population. If the terrorist organization is successfully deterred by the government and it loses its ability to engage in symbolic violence, then winning the hearts of people by taking advantage of the government reaction is no longer an option. Terrorist organization's self-portrayal as an able challenger of the status-quo as well as the fear disseminated by terrorist attacks are crucial in these stages.

It is not uncommon that terrorist organizations –not necessarily their political objectives- are suppressed by deterrence. For instance, infamous German Red Army Faction (RAF) had been successfully eliminated by German security apparatus prior to its ultimate dissolution in 1998. The first generation of RAF called Baader-Meinhof Group ended when, in 1977, its leaders committed suicide in prison after the unsuccessful hijacking attempt by the members of the organization to free their leaders. However, the legacy of RAF did not immediately die out and the followers of Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof reincarnated the group in 1980s and carried out a terrorist campaign until 1993. Another example is Darul Islam or Islamic State of Indonesia, an organization which carried out a 20-year insurgency against Indonesian government for the establishment of a Sharia-based government in the country. Although many other radical Islamist terrorist organizations have appeared in Indonesia ever since, Darul Islam ceased to exist as a militant organization in 1962 after a five year massive crackdown by the Indonesian government (Dijk, 1981).

As mentioned, Neumann and Smith refer to two main responses toward the terrorist organizations by the government that the terrorists may benefit from: overreaction leading to victimization of terrorist organization and underreaction where the terrorist organization rise up as an able challenger of the government authority. While overreaction creates sympathy for the terrorist organization and lures moderates into terrorism, it also runs the risk of elimination by government deterrence. Underreaction (or power deflation), on the other hand, allows terrorist organization to sustain and further its violent campaign to disorient public but it does not provide psychological advantage of overreaction. As a matter of fact, slightly different than Neumann and Smith's (2008) argument, I contend that what terrorists want to accomplish is to extract not one but both of these benefits from the response of the government. Therefore, terrorist organization seeks both to provoke government overreaction which would alienate moderates from non-violent methods and create sympathy for terrorist organization in the population, and to carry out its campaign despite government deterrence portraying the government as unable to fight its challengers. Marighella also points out to the importance of the systematic failure of the government efforts to repress "revolutionary organization with its fragmented groups" that operates "persistently and contagiously." (Marighella, 1969 in Mallin, 1982: 112).

Transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations represent a tactic through which terrorist organizations can display a power play in the face of government deterrence. The strategy of terrorism framework accurately depicts the strategic interaction between the terrorist organization and target government in the

domestic context, incorporating the terrorist organization's response to counterterrorism. Nevertheless, in the case of transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization, it falls short of accounting for the transnational aspect which adds a third actor in the picture. Following Neumann and Smith's framework which is relevant for explaining the strategy of a domestic terrorist campaign; I investigate the transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization in relation to both its home country and host country which is affected by these attacks. To that end, in the next section, I incorporate opportunity and willingness variables into my theoretical analysis.

3.2. Opportunity and Willingness in the Context of Transnational Terrorist Attacks

The notions of opportunity and willingness are based on the "ecological triad" offered by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965, 1968, 1969 in Most and Starr, 1989: 26-29) to explain international politics. Ecological triad consists of an entity, its environment and entity-environment relationship. The relationship between an entity and its environment provides three possible frames for the explanation of a phenomenon as opposed to environmental determinism which holds that the characteristic of the system is the sole explanation. Environmental possibilism refers to the capacity of the decision-maker to choose from the whole set of possible decisions presented by the environment. Environmental probabilism covers the explanations made through a

general model on the expected reactions to a given environment. The idea is that the environment not only presents the possible options to an actor but also the ones that are more likely to succeed. Finally, cognitive behaviorism refers to the reaction of an entity to its environment as it perceives the environment through a cognitive filter. The environment presents the viable options and the actor chooses among them, yet, the decision is not the result of the interpretation of the real world as it is but the result of the decision-maker's perception.

The concept of opportunity refers to “possibility of activity” created and constrained by the environment (Most and Starr, 1989: 29). In that sense, the concept of opportunity is related to environmental possibilism among the ecological triad. Most and Starr (1989: 30) build their explanation of opportunity as the possibility of interaction on the analysis of the diffusion of inter-state violent conflict. The argument is that geographical proximity does not cause either conflict or cooperation but it makes occurrence of interaction between two states more likely by providing a milieu of opportunity. Two states that do not share a border cannot engage in conflict because of territorial disputes. The second aspect of the opportunity is capability. Capability is also related to willingness of an actor promoting certain kinds of interaction; however, prior to it, capability is crucial for making interaction possible (Most and Starr, 1989: 31). If no state had nuclear capability, nuclear war would have ceased to be a possibility. An interaction would not occur without an environment that makes interaction possible and actors that have capability to engage in interaction. Thus, opportunity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the occurrence of a phenomenon.

Willingness, on the other hand, is related to environmental possibilism and cognitive behaviorism. The concept is related to the effects of the decision-maker's calculations on the final choice. While environmental probabilism refers to cost-benefit calculations by an actor, cognitive behaviorism holds that these calculations are based on the perceptions of the actor, not on the environment itself. Thus, "If we are concerned with changing attitudes, loyalties, and perceptions, then we are clearly dealing with willingness." (Most and Starr, 1989: 38).

Following the analogy of a diner in a restaurant looking at the menu cited by Most and Starr (1989: 28), the menu (environment) provides the diner (entity) with the meal courses available in the restaurant (opportunity) and the diner chooses its meal from the menu depending on her/his hunger, appetite, and financial situation (willingness). The diner is limited by the menu both in terms of possibility and capability since s/he can only order a meal that appears on the menu and a meal that s/he cannot afford is not a real option. Then the diner chooses a meal from the menu according to her/his preferences. Those preferences are shaped by the past experiences and present expectations of the diner.

Opportunity and willingness framework is offered as a pre-theoretical framework by Most and Starr to explain causal relationships in international politics. It is an articulation of the understanding of necessity and sufficiency of the conditions that lead to a particular outcome. In the context of terrorism studies, I argue that the emphasis is either on the willingness of terrorists to engage in political violence as it is the case with the sociological and psychological explanations of terrorism or on the

government efforts to limit opportunities for violence or provide new opportunities for non-violent opposition as it is the case with the counterterrorism literature. This thesis is an attempt to explain a specific tactic to be adopted by a terrorist organization by arguing that the presence of an opportunity translates into action if and only if the terrorists deem the action to be productive for their objectives. In other words, this thesis argues that terrorism studies should include both necessary and sufficient conditions to explain why domestic terrorist organizations carry out costly and risky transnational attacks.

Defined as terrorist acts that transcend national boundaries “through the nationality or foreign ties [of] its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, or its ramifications.” (Mickolus, 1979: 148), transnational terrorism is essentially conditioned on the opportunity structure that makes an interaction that transcends borders possible. The relationship between transnational terrorism, and technological innovations and increasing transnationalism has not been devoid of scholarly attention. However, the focus, for obvious reasons, have always been on global jihadist networks and their threat to the US and the ‘Western World’ (Cronin, 2002; Li and Schaub, 2004; Lia, 2005; Bunker (ed.), 2005; Lizardo, 2006). The literature on transnational attacks by terrorist organizations with domestic objectives, on the other hand, largely consists of early conspiracy theories of terrorism as a state surrogate, specifically focusing on transnational terrorism campaigns carried out by Palestinian organizations (Meerari and Elad, 1986) and leftist terrorist organizations (Jenkins, 1975) focusing mainly state sponsorship of terrorism during the Cold War. Yet, the opportunity provided by

globalization is not utilized only by transnational terrorist networks for international objectives. As this thesis suggests, terrorist organizations with domestic objectives often capitalize on that opportunity.

3.3. Transnational Attacks by Domestic Terrorist Organizations

When we consider the opportunity structure that makes transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations possible, technological innovations and transnational subjects stand as the main sources of it. The technological advances in world-wide communication and transportation are essentially related to the possibility aspect of opportunity. Without international flights, there would not have been an opportunity for hijackings that attract international attention and without global media and flow of information, there would not have been an opportunity to publicize these terrorist acts and the political objectives of the terrorist organization. As mentioned earlier, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) successfully made use of the opportunity provided by these technological advances to advance their cause into the international agenda. Specifically, the notorious campaign by Black September, allegedly a clandestine wing of al-Fatah, throughout Europe and North America involving high profile assassinations, hostage-takings, and hijackings (Dobson, 1974) drew attention to the Palestinian cause in the international arena. Arguably, it was that attention that allowed the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, to address the UN General Assembly in 1974.

The second component of opportunity for transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations is the existence of transnational subjects. This is both related to possibility and capability. Transnational subjects create possibility of transnational terrorism as such attacks generally target citizens, diplomatic representatives, or commercial interests of the state(s) that terrorist organizations target. At the same time, diasporas constitute an opportunity structure for transnational terrorist attacks as potential recruits or supporters to be mobilized by the terrorist organization.

The connection of terrorist organizations, especially those with ethnic motivations, with diaspora communities abroad have been subject to scholarly attention. While some scholars, building on the notion of “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson, 1992), argue that diaspora communities are inherently conflictual and prone to support or join most radical movements in their homelands (Esman, 2009: 122; Shain, 2002), more moderate approaches indicate that diasporas can be mobilized in different ways depending on both the developments in their homelands and the environment in the host country (Sheffer, 2003: 205-206; Koinova, 2013). The point they converge is that at least certain segments of diaspora communities may support ethnic insurgencies in their homelands. The economic support by diasporas in the form of donations to charities that funnel funds to terrorist organizations in their home countries is a recognized link between diasporas and terrorism (Wayland, 2004). However, these communities also provide opportunity of recruitment for terrorist organizations or even establishment of a wing or the terrorist organization itself, creating a capability. For example, numerous attacks against Yugoslav diplomatic and commercial interests in Europe, the United States, and Australia were carried out by

terrorist organizations established by Croatian diaspora members in these countries (Tokic, 2012). The larger the diaspora, the higher the opportunity for mobilizing support and potential recruits by armed propaganda. As mentioned, diasporas also constitute a target for domestic terrorist organizations in their home countries, as it is sometimes the case with the Jewish diaspora. Domestic terrorist organizations do not perpetrate transnational attacks at random but choose targets related with their home country.

Opportunity is not a sufficient explanation for any of the examples cited with regard to transnational attacks by terrorist organizations with domestic objectives. Willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to engage in transnational attacks primarily depends on the prospects of its campaign in the home country. Therefore, willingness for transnational attacks is formed when the struggle in the home country is obstructed or under threat. Accordingly, there are two main sources of willingness for domestic terrorist organizations to perpetrate transnational attacks. First, the terrorist organization may perceive that an internal struggle without external recognition and assistance is doomed to fail. In this case, it will engage in transnational attacks to call attention from international community to its struggle. If the terrorist organization succeeds in gaining international support or recognition after publicizing its political objectives, it earns an important edge for gaining legitimacy.

Second, terrorist organization may simply be failing in its struggle. In this case, terrorist organization will consider the opportunities to ensure its survival. If the survival of the terrorist organization in the home country is under threat, mobilization

of the diaspora through propaganda by deed comes on the table. Therefore, adoption of transnational attacks as a tactic by a domestic terrorist organization is related to the nature and intensity of counterterrorism measures taken by the target government.

When deterrence in the home country presents a serious threat to the campaign of the terrorist organization, it will be more willing to engage in transnational attacks. Whereas, not only the target response but also the general strategy of the terrorist organization affect the willingness to perpetrate transnational attacks. As offered by the strategy of terrorism framework, once a terrorist organization successfully disoriented the population and took advantage of the target response, it enters into a new stage where political activities gain prominence over violence. If the terrorist organization fails to decrease violence and rely on political activities, it misses the chance to offer itself as a new source of legitimacy to its constituency and the international community. In the case of transnational attacks, a domestic terrorist organization interacts with both its target government and the government of the host country where transnational attacks occur. On the one hand, these attacks are part of its strategy in the home country and are affected by the developments there. On the other hand, they create an interaction between the terrorist organization and the host country/countries and inflict a cost on the terrorist organization. As long as the benefits reaped for the terrorist organization's campaign in its home country outweigh the costs of transnational attacks, the terrorist organization would continue to use them as a tactical response to deterrence. But once terrorist organization enters the third stage in its transnational campaign, that is to say increases its international political

activities seeking political recognition, transnational attacks become much more costly and counterproductive. That is when we expect them to cease.

In the example of the PLO, globalization and international information flow provided an opportunity structure for attracting international attention to their objectives, but it was a decision on behalf of the PLO to focus on transnational attacks rather than attacks in occupied Palestinian territories. It was arguably a deliberate strategy to internationalize the Question of Palestine since an effective domestic campaign was not possible for the PLO who faced continuous Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in the context of wider Arab-Israeli conflict. In line with that argument, the PLO largely employed transnational terrorist attacks in late 1960s and early 1970s. Right after the acceptance of the 'Ten Point Program' in June 1974 which promoted the use of "all means" emphasizing political efforts to further Palestinian cause, the PLO formally denounced terrorist attacks abroad while advocating a stepped-up campaign in occupied Palestinian lands (Morris, 2001: 383). The Ten Point Program was followed by an address by Yasir Arafat to the UN General Assembly. Having obtained the recognition and support of the international community to a certain extent, Arafat's al-Fatah and its wings ended transnational attacks which would have been a costly tactic after the PLO was internationally recognized.

Ultimately, the willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to perpetrate transnational attacks depends on the intensity of deterrence in its home country. Deterrence tries to prevent terrorist attacks by making them more costly. For terrorist organizations, failure to demonstrate determination and ability to challenge the

government in the face of increasing costs may lead either to the rise of more or less radical factions or to disillusionment of the supporters and the sympathizers resulting in decline in material and ideological support. Thus, in principle, deterrence works if and when the persistence and the contagion of terrorist attacks diminish. Governments hope to deter both terrorists from carrying out attacks and the potential recruits and sympathizers of the terrorist organization from joining or otherwise supporting the terrorist organization. However, deterrence is analogous to patching tiny holes of a huge container, costly in terms of both time and effort for the government. Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, are flexible. Terrorists may easily change their specific targets, methods, weapons and so on as a response to increased costs. Increase in the cost of a specific action leads to substitution (Enders and Sandler, 1993; Moore, 1998). Substitution is the primary mechanism that renders deterrence ineffective in the long run. For example, while fortifying the U.S. embassies decreased the frequency of threats and attacks such as bombings and raids against these establishments, it was followed by an increase in the frequency of assassination attempts in the long run. (Enders and Sandler, 1993:839). In a greater scale, transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations can be explained as part of the substitution by the terrorist organization. It is basically a change of tactic, however, transnational attacks represent a tactic which requires specific capabilities and which imposes additional costs due to its effects on the third party government(s). Hence, the relationship between deterrence and transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization should be analyzed within the parameters of the opportunity and willingness structure that determine the terrorist organization's decisions.

In conclusion, having established the centrality of counterterrorism and the terrorist organization's response to it in the strategy of terrorism, in this section, I discussed the decision of a terrorist organization with domestic objectives to engage in transnational attacks within the opportunity and willingness pre-theoretical framework. I contend that transnational attacks represent a possible strategy of substitution for domestic terrorist organizations that face offensive deterrence in its home country. However, these attacks inflict specific costs as there is a third party target (host government) involved in addition to the actual target (home government) of the terrorist organization. Therefore, the terrorist organization's decision depends on the existence of certain opportunities as well as a willingness to engage in transnational attacks. In the remainder of the thesis, I investigate the opportunity and willingness variables for transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization in the first two stages of the strategy of terrorism framework. Regarding the relationship between transnational attacks by a terrorist organization with domestic objectives and offensive deterrence by the government, I offer the following two hypotheses, one on opportunity and one on willingness:

H1: The larger the size of the diaspora population that can be mobilized, the higher the likelihood of transnational attacks in the host country by a domestic terrorist organization.

H2: The use of repeated offensive deterrence by target government increases the willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to perpetrate transnational attacks.

3.4. Methodology

In the previous sections of this chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations and government's counter-terrorism strategies are presented and two hypothesis are laid out. In this section, I will first introduce my empirical test case and justify the case selection. Then, I will present the research design and discuss the data.

3.4.1. Case Selection

Internationalization of domestic conflicts is generally analyzed in the context of insurgent groups seeking refuge across contiguous borders and effects of the internationalization on the spillover of the conflict (Davis and Moore, 1997; Gleditsch et al., 2008). Bapat (2007) conceptualizes the internationalization of terrorist campaigns within the framework of the trilateral relationship between the terrorist organization, targeted country, and host country.¹³ He concludes that a domestic terrorist organization facing the question of internationalizing its activities has a dominant strategy to choose internationalization if the target state denies negotiation with the terrorists. In this way, the terrorist organization, due to the sanctuary provided across national boundaries, enjoys an improved bargaining position.

¹³ In Bapat's (2007) conceptualization, the term "host country" indicates the country where the terrorist organization seeks refuge. I use the term to refer to the country where transnational attacks of a domestic terrorist organization takes place.

Making use of regional rivalries and/or inability of target or host state to control borders, many terrorist organizations use the soil of neighboring states to establish bases of operations and training camps. LTTE militants trained in government established camps in India or al-Fatah headquarters in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon are primary examples of such internationalization of terrorist campaigns. However, international and/or transnational activities of terrorist organizations are not limited to establishment of training camps.

As discussed above, transnational attacks themselves constitute a tactic which can be utilized by domestic terrorist organizations. In order to test the hypotheses raised in the theoretical framework section, I chose to examine the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)'s transnational attacks in Germany and their relationship to deterrence efforts of the Turkish government. The PKK, a Kurdish separatist terrorist organization established in Turkey, has carried out one of the deadliest terrorist campaigns in the world since the 1980s. According to the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], 2013), the PKK perpetrated more than 1,300 attacks between 1984 and 2013, causing around 4,000 fatalities. The official report of the Turkish Grand National Assembly's (TBMM) Human Rights Commission records a total of 13,475 fatalities caused by the PKK, including both civilian and military casualties (TBMM, 2013). While PKK attacks predominantly took place in Turkey; according to the GTD, PKK perpetrated terrorist attacks in 14 different countries. Among the 13 countries outside Turkey, Germany is where the PKK conducted its most extensive transnational campaign.

As one of the most notorious and deadly terrorist organizations, which also resorted to transnational attacks despite having domestic political objectives, the PKK represents a relevant and crucial case to test the hypotheses raised in this study. Additionally, analyzing a Turkish terrorist organization allowed me to reach sources without encountering any language barrier.

3.4.2. Research Design

This study employs case study methodology in order to test the propositions raised in the theory section regarding the opportunity and willingness for transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization. As justified in the case selection section, I will investigate the case of the PKK attacks in Germany. George and Bennett (2005: 109-123) suggest that case study findings can contribute to theory development and testing in three ways: by validating, disproving or altering historical explanations of a case through generalization of the findings to the class of similar cases, and by making inferences about the role of a particular variable to generalize the findings even to disparate cases or to all cases of the phenomenon. I realize that a single case study is limited for theory testing. However, in this study, I aim to test the applicability of an existing theory which explains the strategy of domestic terrorism to the context of transnational terrorist attacks. Consequently, I hope to contribute to the newly developing literature on transnational terrorism by domestic terrorist organizations.

PKK's campaign will be investigated in the next chapter in line with the Strategy of Terrorism framework (Neumann and Smith, 2008) by distinguishing three stages of the PKK's campaign. First, the PKK's disorientation stage between 1984 and 1992 where no PKK attacks in Germany occurred will be analyzed. Second, target response stage during the 1992-1999 period and the effects of offensive deterrence on the PKK attacks in Germany which occurred specifically from 1992 to 1995 will be discussed. The year 1992 is pointed out as a turning point in the counter-terrorism policies of Turkey (Özdağ and Aydın, 2003; Ünal, 2012) where Turkish military adopted an offensive deterrence strategy. Ever intensifying military operations continued towards early 1999, when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya by Turkish Special Forces, an event which marked the end of an era for the PKK's terrorist campaign. During the same period, specifically until 1996, PKK extensively carried out terrorist attacks in Germany, such as armed assault, bombing, and arson against Turkish diplomatic missions, mosques, cultural centers, branches of Turkish Airlines, Turkish banks, and businesses as well as German police and government establishments in rare cases. In the next chapter, these events will be analyzed by looking at why PKK carried out attacks in Germany and how offensive deterrence by Turkish Military affected the willingness of the PKK to perpetrate these attacks. Lastly, third stage of the PKK's campaign, gaining legitimacy, which started around 1995, and the non-existence of the attacks in Germany in this period will be discussed. In that way, the variance of logistically transnational attacks of the PKK in Germany will be evaluated throughout the three stages of its strategy.

3.4.2.1 Dependent Variable

Number of transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization.

Transnational terrorism is defined in the literature as a phenomenon that has implications for at least two countries in terms of its perpetrators, victims, audience, or venue (Mickolus, 1979). While terrorist attacks by transnational networks has been the main focus of scholarly efforts about transnational terrorism, domestic terrorist organizations also engage in terrorist attacks that transcend national boundaries.

Transnational attacks by the PKK can be divided into two categories. First is the PKK attacks against the Turkish and local targets outside Turkey, especially in Germany. Second is the PKK attacks targeted at foreign nationals in Turkey. In this study, PKK attacks in Germany is considered to be the indicator of adoption of transnational terrorism by a domestic terrorist organization as part of its strategy since the PKK waged its largest transnational terrorism campaign outside Turkey in that country. PKK attacks against foreign nationals in Turkey are outside the scope of this study and recommended for future scholarship.

The data on the PKK attacks in Germany are retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2013). GTD definition of terrorism, which is also adopted in this study, refers to a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” (GTD Codebook, 2014: 8). It is important to note that the GTD does not record the acts of state terrorism. The GTD includes only the acts of terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors (GTD Codebook,

2014: 8), which does not affect the testing to be carried out in this thesis. In line with this definition, an incident should possess the following aspects in order to be considered for inclusion in the GTD data:

- (1) The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.

- (2) The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence - including property violence, as well as violence against people.

- (3) The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. The database does not include acts of state terrorism.

All incidents which bear these attributes are considered for inclusion in the GTD, however, in order to be included in the database, an incident should conform at least two of the following three criteria:

- (1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not

satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.

(2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.

(3) The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).

The temporal distribution of the PKK attacks in Germany will be analyzed in the next chapter. The main limitation of the data is the lack of reliable data in the GTD for the year 1993. The data are partly retrieved, however, while the retrieved data file records 11 PKK related attacks in 1993, other sources indicate much higher numbers for the two waves of attacks in 1993 which eventually led to ban of the PKK in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 72). In addition, there are a number of attacks

against Turkish targets in Germany for which the perpetrators are coded as unknown in the GTD. Although there is a reasonable suspicion on the PKK as the culprit, it is not possible to attribute these attacks to the PKK without proper evidence, especially since racist violence against Turks was also commonplace in that period. Thus, I note that my analysis of this period including 1993 using the GTD data will likely underestimate the number of transnational attacks by the PKK as a response to Turkish government's deterrence measures. Consequently, I expect that the hypothesized relationship would be stronger than demonstrated for the year of 1993.

3.4.2.2 Independent Variables

Size of diaspora population from home country. The argument of this thesis is that whether a domestic terrorist organization engages in transnational terrorism depends on necessary but not sufficient conditions such as opportunities as well as willingness. It is important to note that what is being investigated with regard to diaspora size variable is not the conflict proneness of the diasporas. As mentioned earlier, there is a strand in the literature about ethnic diaspora mobilization which argues that conflictual behavior among the diasporas depend on the incidents in the homeland and environment in the host society. Sheffer (2003: 205), after giving examples of diasporic communities that are supportive of violent insurgent movements in their homelands, maintains that "Yet only small minorities in diasporas would question the legitimacy and act against fundamental interests of their hosts." The question in this study is exactly how the size of the diaspora population affects the opportunity

structure of a small minority within the Kurdish diaspora, which is the PKK and its subsidiaries, for transnational terrorist attacks. In other words, the diaspora are not assumed to be necessarily violent, however, their presence and sizable numbers are considered to present the terrorist organization an opportunity to seize to advance their political goals in the home country.

Willingness as offensive deterrence by target country. The concepts of defense and deterrence have been discussed in the literature review.¹⁴ In this study, offensive deterrence against terrorism is conceptualized as combination of prevention strategies that aim to diminish the capabilities of terrorists to perpetrate attacks and retaliation or punishment strategies that aim to prevent terrorist attacks by showing that the costs are high. This study considers two indicators to measure offensive deterrence employed by Turkey against the PKK.

First, the number of terrorists incapacitated in a certain time period is assumed to signify the intensity of offensive deterrence measures in that duration. Incapacitation is defined as “making it physically impossible to commit offenses.” (Aukerman, 2008: 156). It involves killing, capture, and detention of terrorists. As a preventive measure, it both hinders the capability of the terrorist organization to engage in violence and delivers a credible threat to other members of the terrorist organization.

The data sources regarding the number of incapacitated PKK terrorists by Turkish security forces are multiple and somewhat inconsistent. While it is generally

¹⁴ See Section 2.4.

agreed, both in the literature and by state authorities, that approximately 25,000 PKK militants have been killed over the 40 years of conflict, various military and civilian officials made different statements regarding the exact number of death toll due to the PKK conflict. In this study, Gendarmerie General Command report presented to the Parliament in 2012 and regular statements by the State of Emergency Rule governors are considered as the primary data sources about the incapacitation of the PKK militants.

Second indicator for the offensive deterrence against the PKK by Turkey is the large-scale military operations carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces. As mentioned above, following the adoption of an offensive strategy in 1992, Turkish military conducted numerous military operations against the PKK. There is no publicly available data about the length, scope, and force of each operation against the PKK. As an initial step towards building such a database, I engaged in a data collection effort regarding the operations against the PKK. Using the keywords “PKK”, “operasyon”, and “harekât,”¹⁵ I examined the archives of two major Turkish daily newspapers, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. Out of 8,460 results, I created a dataset of large-scale military operations of the Turkish Armed Forces against the PKK for the 1992-1995 period using the following criteria:

- (1) Engagement is initiated by the TSK.

¹⁵ “Operasyon” and “harekât” are synonymous words. They both mean “operation.”

- (1)(a) Exception: Hot pursuit operations to Northern Iraq after the PKK attacks are included.
- (2) Engagement is NOT part of routine patrol duty.
- (3) The starting and end date of the operation is identified in at least one of the sources.
- (4) Policing operations are NOT included.
- (5) Large-scale operation: Operations that lasted one week or more in Turkey and, more than two days in Northern Iraq.

36 large-scale military operations are identified with these criteria in order to analyze the relationship between large-scale military operations and subsequent level of PKK attacks in Germany. The intensity of offensive deterrence is measured by counting how many days an operation lasted. Since what is being investigated is the temporal distribution of military operations and the PKK attacks in Germany, different than the other indicator of offensive deterrence, the data are limited to 1992-1995 period.

Although the data obtained constitutes an important starting point to analyze the effects of major military efforts on the PKK violence, I acknowledge certain limitations. Firstly, the data on the number of incapacitated PKK militants are available only on a yearly basis, thus, do not allow measuring the expected short-term effects of offensive deterrence on the PKK attacks in Germany. Yet, these data are

used in order to have an idea on the level of offensive deterrence in the relevant time frame. Secondly, regarding the military operations, the starting and end dates of a number of military operations are not clear in the sources. These operations are excluded from the dataset for the sake of precision and reliability. I acknowledge that this might lead to an error in the analysis by excluding important cases, whereas, it is the best possible way to collect reliable data from open sources. Moreover, there might have been other military operations that did not appear in the media sources. However, in the absence of relevant official sources, the data are collected using publicly available sources, in the best possible way.¹⁶ Lastly, only the duration of the operations are considered to define a large-scale military operation since, in most cases, there is no information regarding the number of forces that conducted the operations and the number of incapacitated terrorist during each operation is not clear.

¹⁶ I have reached out to the General Staff and police networks to obtain the relevant information; however, was conveyed that the data are classified. Hence I relied on open source data sources for this thesis.

CHAPTER IV

THE CASE OF THE PKK ATTACKS IN GERMANY

PKK activities in Western Europe, especially in Germany, during the 1990s present a crucial case both for the transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations and the relationship between diaspora communities and transnational terrorism. The PKK, since its inception, has had ties with the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, particularly in Germany through the media outlets there, such as The Kurdistan News Agency, which disseminated PKK directives and statements (Lukitsch-Öymen, 1994: 28). Kurdish asylum seekers who sought refuge in Germany after the 1980 coup in Turkey constituted the backbone of the PKK operations in Germany. Kirişçi (2004: 289) claims that Kurdish asylum seekers who mainly went to Germany set up the central cadre of the PKK in Germany. Lyon and Uçarer (2001: 926) argue that Germany became the most favored destination for the Kurdish asylum seekers because they were more familiar with Germany due to the labor immigration from Turkey and

because Germany was more receptive of the asylum demands at that time. These factors made Germany focal point of the PKK activities in Europe.

In this chapter, I first present a short account on the background of the Kurdish Question and the PKK conflict in Turkey. Second, I consider the counter-terrorism policies of Turkey and predominance of deterrence-based policies toward the PKK terrorism. Next, I discuss the transnational activities of the PKK and how the Kurdish diasporas provided opportunity for the PKK's both violent and non-violent campaign in the transnational space, with a comparative focus on Germany. Building on the data of incapacitated PKK militants and large-scale military operations against the PKK, I will deliberate on how the willingness of the PKK to engage in transnational attacks in Germany formed in relation to offensive deterrence by Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Finally, I show why the PKK ultimately abandoned this tactic despite continuing deterrence after it reached the legitimacy stage of its terrorist strategy.

4.1. Background: PKK's Disorientation Stage

The origins of the Kurdish Question in Turkey can be traced back to the 19th century, when a number of Kurdish tribal leaders, who had enjoyed a significant autonomy until then, revolted against centralization efforts of Tanzimat Era (McDowall, 1992: 14; Laçiner and Bal, 2004: 473). Kurdish tribal leaders had enjoyed a considerable autonomy as the Kurdish populated areas laid in the fringes of the Empire and were difficult to directly control because of the harsh landscape. In exchange for extended

local authority, Kurdish tribes (*aşiret*)¹⁷ in present-day Southeastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq had served as a proxy in the perpetual conflict with the Safavid Empire in Iran and provided security in the countryside. The situation changed when Mahmud II, the reformist sultan, began to restore the central authority by curbing the power of the provincial elite. These efforts which continued into the Tanzimat Era were met with considerable resistance by local power holders not only in Egypt, the most well-known example, but also in Kurdish populated areas. Although it has become one of the main pillars of the Kurdish nationalist discourse, the revolt of the Badr Khan, the most-far-reaching Kurdish rebellion in that period was a result of the Ottoman efforts to curb the power of the tribal leaders (McDowall, 2007: 46-47). The first Kurdish rebellion with an explicit nationalist agenda, Sheikh Ubeydullah's attempt to form an independent Kurdish state on Persian and Ottoman lands with a large Kurdish population, also derived its thrust from war weariness as well as sectarian resentment towards Shiite Persia (Bruinessen, 1992a: 250).

With the end of the First World War and the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire where vast majority of the Kurdish population had lived, the possibility of an independent Kurdish state appeared. The destiny of Kurds was a matter of debate among the British who took hold of the most of the Kurdish populated areas. Although the British had grown less willing to grant the independent state foreseen in the Sevres Treaty to the Kurds, concessions were given to Kurdish nationalists especially in Mosul region (Kirişçi and Winrow: 69-71) and support was provided to Kurdish nationalists both during the Turkish War of Independence and the Kurdish revolts in

¹⁷ The notion of tribe is used to refer to *aşirets* which are large, semi-feudal familial structures.

the early republican era (Olson, 1991: 65). Nevertheless, numerous Kurdish revolts both in late Ottoman Era and early years of Turkish Republic arguably reflected the interests of local landowners and religious figures more than nascent nationalist movements at that time. Although elements of Kurdish separatism was visible in the revolts of 1920s and 1930s, these revolts eventually turned on religious grounds since Kurdish ethno-nationalism did not yet have an appeal on the people whose autonomy or independence was sought (Bruinessen, 1992b: 52). There were a total of 28 Kurdish rebellions in Turkey between 1925 and 1938 starting with the infamous Sheikh Said Rebellion (Bulut, 1991). These series of rebellions were suppressed using force and execution or forced relocation of the leading families of the revolting tribes. After the harsh suppression of a series of rebellions in Alevi and Zaza populated Dersim province in 1939, the state succeeded in consolidating its power in the Kurdish populated areas and eventually incorporated the Kurdish tribal leaders into the emerging multi-party political system in the 1950s (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 105).

After 1939, there is not any visible sign of a Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey up until 1960s. Following the 1960 coup that overthrew Democrat Party (DP) government which relaxed the assimilation policy adopted against the Kurds in 1930s and 1940s (Bruinessen, 2015: 340), a new form of Kurdish ethnic consciousness emerged. Kirişçi and Winrow (1997: 106) argue that the rebirth of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in the post-World War II era was inevitable due to the general modernization of Turkish society and by extension, the rise of an urbanized and educated Kurdish elite. Bozarslan (1992: 96-97) also refer to increasing political pluralism in Turkey, a tradition of rebellion and development of a new Kurdish

intelligentsia to explain the revival of Kurdish ethnic consciousness in the 1960s. This new Kurdish movement articulated itself through Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and found place for itself among the vigorous leftist movements of that time, particularly in the Workers Party of Turkey (Bozarslan, 1992: 98). Numerous cultural and political organizations with Marxist leanings which voiced the Kurdish ethnic demands began to appear in late 1960s, Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East [Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları] (DDKO) being the most influential (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 110).

PKK was born out of the growing modern Kurdish nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, in close relation with radical Turkish leftist movements at that time. The establishment of the PKK was planned in 1973 by Abdullah Öcalan and his friends in Ankara Revolutionary Students' Association. Öcalan and his close circle worked through this period to set the ground for a Kurdish organization separated from the Turkish left. To that end, the newly emerging core militant group called Apocular (The followers of Apo) named after its founder, left Ankara for south-eastern Anatolia and started their political as well as militant activities there (Imset, 1992: 9-12). The PKK was formally founded in 1978 in Fis village of Diyarbakır province.

The first phase of the PKK until 1984 was marked by the definition of ideological foundations and strategy of the organization paralleled by a low profile violent campaign against civilians and other Kurdish organizations in south-eastern Anatolia. (Ünal, 2012: 106). The first violent attack of the PKK was an assassination attempt in 1979 against Mehmet Celal Bucak, an MP and a pro-state tribal leader, which was planned as an armed propaganda activity to announce the proclamation of

the organization (Imset, 1992: 20) but ended up killing Bucak's 8 year old son (Bal and Özkan, 2006: 146).. Such attacks against the powerful landlords of the region were widely carried out at the founding stage of the PKK to mobilize the impoverished Kurdish youngsters who aimed to move from the bottom of a feudal structure in the region into the ranks of the organization. The aim was to establish a revolutionary organization by luring the rural poor into militant activity. In Öcalan's *Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu* [Path to Kurdistan Revolution], the Kurdish independence movement was defined in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and Maoist People's War strategy was adopted for the struggle (Öcalan, [1978] 1993).

The strategy and organization of the PKK was interrupted by the 1980 coup. The coup and the following military operations, which were directed against any radical political organization as well as the Kurdish separatist organizations, dealt a serious blow to the PKK (Imset, 1992: 29). Nevertheless, the leadership and core militants of the PKK had already fled to Syria in the summer of 1979 expecting a coup due to the ongoing political turmoil (Özcan, 1999: 243). In this period, the PKK forged close relations with Palestinian leftist organizations with the intermediacy of the Syrian regime and the PKK militants were trained for guerrilla warfare in the PLO camps in Syria and Lebanon. Between 1980 and 1984, Öcalan spent his time raising and training new militants and elucidating a guerrilla strategy (Imset, 1992: 31-37).

In line with that strategy, PKK waged its violent campaign against the Turkish state in 1984 with two simultaneous raids to Eruh and Şemdinli district centers. The PKK's violent campaign initially targeted military, police, government officials, and

teachers in the region as well as the civilian population and government backed militia (Provisional Village Guards, Korucular) who refused to conform to the organization's objectives. Following the Operation Provide Comfort, which provided a safe haven in Northern Iraq for the PKK attacks into Turkey contrary to the Turkish expectations (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 163-164), the PKK violence intensified into 1990s reaching its peak between 1991 and 1993 (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 22). At the later stages of the campaign, as military operations by the TSK intensified and the organization began to crumble, PKK shifted its strategy and began to conduct terrorist attacks in Turkish metropolises and touristic cities (Ünal, 2012: 115-117). As it will be investigated below, as a result of the ever intensifying military operations that started in 1992, the PKK was militarily defeated in Turkey in mid to late 1990s. With the capture of Öcalan on February 15, 1999 in Kenya, military operations were ceased and the PKK's top leadership regrouped to once again strategize.

As a response to the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK initially declared a unilateral ceasefire in September 1999. In 2002, the PKK dissolved itself and Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan, KADEK was founded. The next year, KADEK changed its name to Congress of Kurdistan Public, KONGRA-GEL. These changes were mere attempts to maintain the order in the organization which was falling apart and neither the strategy nor the ideology of these new organizations were any different than the PKK (Cline, 2004). Despite the ceasefire, PKK continued its attacks in south-eastern Anatolia starting in 2002, albeit in a very low level compared to the 1990s. In 2005, the name PKK was reclaimed and a new wave of violence began to escalate (Ünal, 2012: 9). As a response to increasing PKK violence, in

addition to security measures, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) started a number of political initiatives under different names such as “Kurdish Opening” in 2009 and “Democratic Opening” in 2010. Moreover, it later came to light that the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) conducted secret negotiations with the PKK leaders during these initiatives (Cumhuriyet, September 14, 2011). Nevertheless, these measures failed to stop ever increasing violence as the PKK stepped up its campaign, especially after the declaration of the “Strategic Lunge” by Öcalan to establish de-facto autonomy (Serxwebun, April 2010), reaching almost the violence level of the 1990s. Currently, the PKK conflict is at an uneasy standstill due to the open negotiations started with the organization through the medium of pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP) and PKK’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War.

The origins and development of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism is not the primary concern in this study, whereas, it would be to repeat the mistake of the state in the 1980s and the 1990s to treat the PKK independent of the wider Kurdish Question or vice versa. Socio-economic factors, conflicting interests of the local Kurdish elite, repressive policies of the state, and perceived political discrimination all played a role in the development of Kurdish separatism. There is no doubt that the repressive policies of the state bolstered the rise of the Kurdish ethno-nationalism and the PKK, whereas, the PKK itself also successfully mobilized the support of masses using strategic terrorism. The next section will tackle how Turkish state responded to disorientation stage of the PKK terrorism. .

4.2. Counterterrorism Policies of Turkey: The Target Response Stage

The PKK terrorism has cost Turkey more than 30,000 lives and hundreds of billions of dollars. Ever since the inception of ethnic separatist terrorism in Turkey in the late 1970s, how to deal with violence has been the most frequently asked question both by state authorities and the public. The trend of preparing “Kurdish Reports” which had begun in 1920s and 1930s has been revived in the 1990s and spread to the whole civil society in addition to the state and political parties (Akçura, 2011). Throughout the 35 years of struggle against the PKK terrorism, Turkey implemented a set of counterterrorism policies ranging from substantial plans such as addressing socio-economic grievances in Kurdish populated areas of Turkey or legal arrangements regarding the cultural rights of the Kurdish population to more micro-level measures such as deterrence based security operations or partial amnesty to the PKK militants who did not participate in violent attacks. Deterrence based policies rather than conciliatory policies have been the predominant approach in Turkey to prevent terrorism (LaFree, et al., 2015: 216).

Macro-level policies of Turkey toward Kurdish Question in general and PKK violence in particular are mostly focused on the socio-economic aspects of separatist movements. From the outset, semi-feudal socio-economic structure in Kurdish populated areas has been considered as a threat to the integrity of the Turkish nation by the state authority (Akçura, 2011). Various political parties have proposed land reform as a solution to the Kurdish Question to strengthen the loyalty of the Kurdish population to the state. One of the most extensive development programs of the

Republic, South-Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP), which was initiated in 1988 and aimed to develop and uplift the economic infrastructure of the backwards south-eastern Anatolian region, was deemed a grand enterprise that would curb Kurdish ethno-nationalism, particularly by prime minister Turgut Özal. However, the expectations for an economic solution of the Kurdish Question and the PKK terrorism have failed thus far. The relationship between socio-economic status and support for violent and non-violent separatist movements proved to be not as straightforward as in general outlook of the state toward Kurdish Question (Sarigil, 2010; Sarigil and Fazlıoğlu, 2014).

Albeit half-heartedly, the subsequent Turkish governments since late 1980s have implemented various reforms as conciliatory counterterrorism measures to address the cultural demands of the Kurdish population. The law on prohibition of broadcasting in languages other than Turkish and official languages of the states that Turkey recognized, which was promulgated after the 1980 coup, was repealed in 1991. Nevruz, originally a festival that is celebrated by all Turkic and Iranian peoples to mark the beginning of the spring but had been long forgotten in Turkey was recognized as a national holiday in 1995. It had become a controversial issue when the PKK revived the festival in the late 1980s and began to use it as a means for propaganda and organizing public disobedience events. More substantial policies regarding the cultural demands of Kurds such as the legislation which enables teaching and learning of Kurdish language in private and public education institutions were implemented more recently. Within the framework of European Union harmonization, several articles of the Constitution and the Turkish Penal Code were

amended to allow for better political participation. The securitizing approach toward the Kurdish Question has been relaxed.

Certainly these policies have been positive steps for the development of pluralism in Turkey, whereas the long-term effects of these reforms on the PKK violence have been ambiguous since they are generally implemented following increased PKK violence and dubbed as a quick solution for terrorism rather than social reforms. That arguably has led to the perception that terrorism is a viable way to get concessions from the state, increasing the appeal of the PKK in the Kurdish population.

Turkey's conciliatory counterterrorism policies also included the partial amnesty that has been perpetually granted since the passing of first -as it is named by the media- "Homecoming Bill" in 1985. The bill has been renewed for several times under different names and with slight changes. Generally, what all the bills have stipulated is a pardon for the militants who did not take part in any violent action. In addition, a reduction to the punishment is offered to the militants who were involved in violent acts but showed remorse. In 1993, a more extensive amnesty bill was being prepared but was abandoned following the PKK's massacre of 33 unarmed soldiers who were being transported to their units in Bingöl. Thousands of PKK militants have applied for amnesty since 1985; however, homecoming bills did not provide a lasting solution to the PKK violence, either.

As it is mentioned in the beginning of this section, response of Turkish governments against the PKK was dominantly deterrence based counterterrorism

measures. Right after the 1980 coup, the military cracked down on the PKK and other separatist organizations as well as the radical leftist and rightist movements all over the country. Nevertheless, it seems that the state authorities initially failed to grasp the security threat posed by the PKK. On the one hand, both civilian and military officials defined the PKK as “a few bandits” who could be eliminated in a moment’s notice, on the other hand, the military did not engage in sweeping operations to deal the final blow to the terrorist organization in its nascent stages (Imset, 1992: 7-8). Instead, the government introduced the Provisional Village Guard system in 1985 to establish control in the rural areas of the south-eastern Anatolia region. Geçici Köy Korucuları, militiamen armed and trained by the military, were recruited from among the Kurdish villagers. In some cases, entire tribes were granted arms and status of village guardianship. The aim was both to control the rural areas where the PKK militants were based taking advantage of the harsh terrain and to provide security for the scattered hamlets and villages being targeted by the terrorists for ensuring the support and compliance of the civil population. The number of the village guards peaked at 95,000 at the height of the conflict in the 1990s (Aktan and Gökner, 2002: 274). The effects of the Provisional Village Guard System have been controversial. On the one hand, the number of civilian casualties due to the PKK violence has increased following the implementation of the system as the terrorists widely targeted the families of the village guards to intimidate them; but, on the other hand, village guards have been the main obstacle to the PKK’s People’s War strategy which necessitated uniform conformity of the population (Ünal, 2012: 52-55).

As the PKK began to target civilians in the region more intensively after 1985, the parliament passed a motion which declared the state of emergency rule (OHAL) in 11 provinces of the south-eastern Anatolia. The number of provinces under state of emergency rule reached 13 in 1990 as two new provinces were established in the south-eastern Anatolia with the aim of better coordinating counterterrorism efforts. The constitution and the decree of the Council of Minister regarding the establishment of OHAL governance granted the regional governor and provincial governors under its authority certain extra-constitutional powers. These powers included mandate to censor printed publications which would disturb public order, to resettle persons deemed to threaten security in the region, to suspend the trade union activities such as strikes and lock-outs or to order general searches on roads, houses, work places etc. (Alexander et. al, 2008: 110-114). OHAL has been lifted gradually starting from 1994 and the state of emergency rule in south-eastern Anatolia was totally revoked in 2002 under EU harmonization laws (Ünal, 2012: 56).

To complement the Provisional Village Guard system and the state of emergency rule in increasing the state control in the region, Turkish government began to implement forced evacuation of small villages and hamlets and resettlement of the people in 1992 (Ünal, 2012: 61). Ethnic terrorisms differ from other sorts of the phenomenon as the ethnic terrorists both seek to influence and depend on the support of their own constituency rather than the whole public (Byman, 1998). In the case of the PKK terrorism as well, most of the violent and non-violent interaction of the organization has been with the Kurdish population. On the one hand, it sought support and compliance of the local population not only by mobilizing Kurdish ethnic identity

using strategic terrorism but also by attacking and intimidating non-compliant Kurds, specifically the village guards and their families. On the other hand, it depended on the material support of the population that it occasionally targeted for survival in the form of taxation.

Considering the pattern of dispersed settlement in south-eastern Anatolia due to the mountainous terrain, it was not possible for the Turkish military to establish posts in every hamlet to protect villagers and to cut the logistical link between the PKK and its supporters. As a suboptimal solution, the Turkish state ordered mandatory evacuation of numerous small villages and hamlets. According to a parliamentary report on the subject, by 1997, 905 villages and 2,523 hamlets were evacuated in the OHAL region and its surroundings, leading to forced migration of 378,335 persons (TBMM, 1998), which is probably lower than the actual number. As of 2011, 187,861 has returned to their villages as part of the resettlement assistance project of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (TBMM, 2013). Coupled with much larger number of internal migrants running from the conflict in the rural areas, forced evacuation of the villages led to rapid urbanization of the Kurdish population and served to reshape the nature of the PKK terrorism and Kurdish Question (Kocher, 2002: 6-8). Moreover, numerous families sought asylum in Europe instead of settling in bigger cities in Turkey. These people became part of the Kurdish diaspora communities in their new residences.

In sum, the disorientation strategy of the PKK was followed by increasing violence forcing target response from the Turkish state to curb its legitimacy in the

eyes of particularly the Kurdish population. The deterrence-based counterterrorism measures taken by the Turkish state against the PKK that are discussed so far are tactically defensive strategies. The last strand of Turkey's counterterrorism policies is offensive deterrence. As discussed in the theoretical framework, offensive deterrence refers to preventive and retaliatory measures that aim to curb the capabilities of the terrorist organization and to punish the terrorists for their actions. In the case of the PKK, Turkey's offensive deterrence measures involved incapacitation of the terrorist organization through internment of the individuals suspected of supporting or engaging in terrorism and large-scale military operations. Due to the underestimation of the threat posed by the PKK, the state initially took up a defensive stance (Kocher, 2002) and introduced tactically defensive measures such as Provisional Village Guard System and state of emergency rule. As the PKK attacks increased immensely into the 1990s, the state began to adopt a more offensive deterrence strategy, which led eventually to an initial military defeat of the PKK (Kocher, 2002; Özdağ and Aydınli, 2003; Ünal, 2012, 2014). Turkey's offensive deterrence strategy and its effect on the willingness of the PKK to engage in transnational attacks is investigated in detail in Section 4.4 following the discussion of the opportunity structures for the PKK attacks in Germany.

4.3. Opportunity for the PKK Attacks in Germany

As it is discussed in the theoretical framework, the opportunity for transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations has two aspects. Firstly, technological

innovations make terrorist attacks that transcend national borders more likely by helping the terrorists overcome their technical inferiority and providing possible targets. Secondly, transnational subjects offer both capability to domestic terrorist organizations to engage in transnational attacks and possible targets for these attacks. Regarding the PKK attacks in Germany, while the cost-benefit calculation of the PKK is the primary determinant of the PKK attacks in Germany, this calculation depends on the possibility of interaction and capabilities of the PKK, both in Turkey and abroad, particularly in Germany. In this section, I investigate the opportunity structures for the PKK attacks in Germany and the role of the Kurdish diaspora in the emergence of this opportunity. The previous sections have demonstrated that the PKK followed disorientation and provoking target response stages suggested in Neumann and Smith's strategy of terrorism framework. At this juncture, the likelihood of the PKK attacks in Germany depends on both opportunity and willingness of the organization.

I have discussed earlier that the size of the diaspora provides an opportunity for the terrorist organization. There is a sizeable Kurdish population in Europe who arrived as guest-workers, refugees or asylum seekers from 1960s to 1990s. The total Kurdish population in Europe that predominantly resides in Germany and France but scattered throughout Western Europe is estimated to be around 850,000 (Başer, 2013: 38). The largest Kurdish population in Europe is in Germany, most of whom are from Turkey. The estimates range from 300,000 (Wahlbeck, 1999: 62) to 500,000 (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 61). The estimates diverge mainly because Kurds from Turkey are registered as citizens of Turkish Republic in Germany and most of the labor immigrants and their descendants do not emphasize Kurdish ethnic identity.

Naturally, not all the Kurdish-origin immigrants in Germany constitute a Kurdish diaspora. By definition, an ethnic diaspora has a consciousness of its distinct identity and a willingness to perpetuate it (Esman, 2009: 9). In the case of Germany, efforts to revive a Kurdish identity outside the homelands of Kurds go back as far as 1960s to the activities of a group of Kurdish nationalists from Iraq (Şimşir, 2010: 184-187). Nevertheless, such efforts initially did not have much appeal to Turkey's Kurds who mostly immigrated for economic reasons. The situation changed specifically in the 1970s as both Turkish and Kurdish political refugees began to arrive in Germany. Pacifist and federalist Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) and its civil society organization the Federation of Kurdish Workers' Association (KOMKAR) carried out extensive activities to raise an ethnic awareness among the Kurds in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 62-63; 78-79). PKK activities in Germany, which will be discussed below in detail, started as early as 1978 when Öcalan sent some members of the Central Committee of the PKK to Europe to establish branches there (Argun, 2003: 123). As a result of such activities, numerous Kurds generally in Europe and particularly in Germany, who had no notion of ethnic identity previously, 'discovered' their Kurdishness (Bruinessen, 1998: 43-46).

The first hypothesis of this thesis argues that high numbers of Kurdish asylum seekers related with the PKK and the size of the Kurdish population, which can be mobilized in Germany, constitutes an opportunity structure for the PKK attacks in Germany. The argument is not that the size of the Kurdish diaspora in Germany leads to the PKK attacks; however, it is a factor which can make the occurrence of these

attacks more likely. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the overwhelming majority of the PKK related attacks outside Turkey has taken place in Germany.




Figure 1. PKK Attacks outside Turkey, 1978-2012

The figure shows the total of 242 PKK related attacks outside Turkey until 2012. Germany stands as the primary venue for transnational PKK attacks with 150 violent incidents. The PKK attacks in Iraq where the main headquarters of the PKK is established consist of the incidents related to the PKK’s conflict with Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) as well as the attacks against Turkish military forces stationed in Northern Iraq to prevent the PKK militants from crossing into Turkey. Iran and Syria also hosted PKK camps on their soils and these attacks are most probably related to local problems. Except these cases and an odd incident in Tunisia, the PKK carried out its transnational attacks in Europe. Though in much lower numbers, there are Kurdish diaspora communities in other European countries seen in the Figure 1. The second highest number of Kurdish population, of around

100,000 according to Kurdish Institute in Paris¹⁸, in Europe resides in France where 16 PKK attacks occurred. As it is indicated above, no causal argument is being made regarding the relationship between diaspora population and transnational attacks in a country; however, in this case, the PKK seized the opportunity of a present sizeable Kurdish diaspora to mobilize and carry out transnational attacks in Germany.

The opportunity structure behind the PKK attacks in Germany is twofold, in line with the two aspects of the notion. First and foremost, as a domestic terrorist organization, PKK needs certain capabilities in order to carry out attacks outside its home country. PKK is one of the most fearsome terrorist organizations, one which has an extensive network of militants, sympathizers, legal and illegal offsets, criminal agencies and financial sources. The organization finances its activities through smuggling, drug trafficking, extortion, and both voluntary and involuntary donations collected from Kurdish population in Europe as well as in Turkey (Pek and Ekici, 2007; Roth and Sever, 2007). At the height of its activities in the mid-1990s, the PKK sustained a militant level of around 10,000 to 15,000 men in Turkey and Northern Iraq and a clandestine, part-time militia of around 30,000 men in south-eastern Anatolia (Imset, 1992: 1). All these factors suggest that PKK possesses the material capabilities to carry out transnational attacks. However, the attacks in Germany were carried out mostly by militants recruited from the diaspora (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 32; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 61).

¹⁸ <http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/>, last accessed on 24 July, 2015.

As Kirişçi (2004: 289) and Lyon and Uçarer (2001: 926) state, many Kurdish people sought asylum in Germany following the 1980 coup. These already politicized asylum seekers as well as the first and second generation immigrant workers who gained ethnic consciousness in Germany provide an important capability to the PKK in terms of recruitment. Germany was the headquarters of the PKK's organization in Europe. During 1990-1994, more than 1,500 people were recruited to the organization and took ideological as well as armed training (Özcan, 1999: 315). According to the annual report of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in 1997, PKK extensively recruited Kurdish teenagers from Germany to send to training camps in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley (Argun, 2003: 124). Two Turkish journalists based in Germany, Metin Dalman and İsmail Tabak (1995) documented how the PKK established a human trafficking network through which it gained both funds and recruits. They reveal how numerous people seeking jobs in Germany became asylum seekers who are persecuted in Turkey thanks to the forged documents prepared by the criminal networks of the PKK and how the organization took advantage of these people for financial support as well as recruitment. The number of the PKK recruits in Germany who were enlisted to the organization by the so-called Europe Bureau was around 10,000 in the 1990s (Argun 2003: 122; Başer, 2013: 209).

Equally important for the opportunity structure of the PKK attacks in Germany is the high number of Kurdish people in Germany which can be mobilized by symbolic violence. In the face of the threat of increased deterrence in Turkey, the diaspora Kurds represent a possibility of ensuring the survival of the PKK. Barkey and Fuller (1998: 32) argue that by the end of the 1990s, PKK succeeded in winning the

support of an overwhelming majority of the Kurdish population in Germany. Indeed the Kurdish diaspora in Germany maintain the thrust of the PKK activities in Europe by providing both financial support and recruitment. More moderate Kurdish organizations such as KOMKAR lost their appeal to the Kurdish diaspora in Germany as the PKK achieved to mobilize larger segments of the population (Başer, 2013: 40-41).

The last but not the least, Turkish diaspora in Germany also provide opportunity for the PKK attacks there. The total population of the people in Germany with Turkish origin, including the Kurds, is estimated to be around 3 million (Anil, 2007). The high population of Turks living in Germany provides a strategic target for PKK violence. Except for a few confrontations with German police according to the GTD (START, 2013), the main targets of the PKK attacks in Germany are businesses and cultural centers of the Turkish diaspora, and branches of Turkish companies in addition to the diplomatic targets.

The findings revealed in this section lend support to the hypothesis that the size of diaspora population in a country increases the likelihood of transnational attacks by a domestic terrorist organization. The opportunity for transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations has two aspects: capability and possibility. Diasporas are a likely source of both capability for these attacks and possibility of mobilization. However, as previously noted, the sole presence of diasporas do not lead to higher frequency of transnational attacks. Moreover, opportunity is a necessary condition for

these attacks but not a sufficient one. How offensive deterrence undertaken by Turkey affected the PKK and its willingness to exploit this opportunity is discussed next.

4.4. Offensive Deterrence by Turkey and Its Relationship to the PKK Attacks in Germany

By the early 1990s, the PKK had obtained a substantial material capability and began to rally the support of the larger segments of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Turkey responded to the increasing threat of the PKK with further security measures more than anything else. As it will be demonstrated in this section, offensive deterrence strategy of Turkey brought about a military victory against the PKK in the 1990s resulting in the capture of its leader Öcalan in 1999. Intensive large-scale military operations during 1992-1999 not only diminished PKK's capability to engage in violence in Turkey but also led the organization to seek substitute tactics.

The year 1992 is pointed out as a turning point in the counter-terrorism policies of Turkey (Özdağ and Aydın, 2003). Starting in 1992, Turkish Military Forces “switched from a zone doctrine to a cordon-and-search strategy.” (Ünal, 2012: 96). Until the doctrine was changed, the TSK forces had been assigned to defend their bases and posts against terrorist incursions within a conventional force protection strategy (Khalil, 2007: 392). In order to avoid the PKK attacks in the rural areas, the military reinforced some military posts situated along the Turkish-Iraqi border and interiors of the south-eastern Anatolia by gathering the forces in major bases and

closing down smaller posts (Özdağ and Aydın, 2003: 111). Due to the mountainous terrain in the region, especially the gendarmerie posts along the border which had been situated in the valleys and mountain passes to quell smuggling provided a vulnerability rather than security for the military forces. Tens of young soldiers slaughtered in their posts by the PKK rocket attacks waged from top of the mountains is still a painful memory in the collective memory of Turkish public. The conventional military doctrine that aimed to avoid conflict and casualty rather than fighting the insurgency cost Turkey dearly. Not only did it lead to tragic losses, but also encouraged the PKK to the point that the organization took a decision in 1991, although ultimately failed, to initiate the third stage of Maoist People's War strategy where guerrilla forces seize small pieces of land to establish so-called liberated areas (Ünal, 2014: 440-443).

As the defensive posture of the security forces and conventional military tactics proved counterproductive to fight the PKK, the TSK began to adjust itself both in terms of equipment and strategy. By late 1991 and early 1992, the military adopted an offensive doctrine reorganizing the structure of the units, training the troops for irregular warfare, and purchasing high-tech equipment for the tough climate and terrain in south-eastern Anatolia (Khalil, 2007: 394). With an offensive stance, the TSK began to take control of the rural area by targeting the PKK camps established in the mountains instead of defending their posts. Figure 2, which is based on the Gendarmerie General Command's official statistics about number of the PKK militants killed and the PKK attacks recorded in the GTD, demonstrates the change in

the counterterrorism understanding of the Turkish security forces and its effects on the PKK violence.




Figure 2. PKK Fatalities and Number of Terror Attacks, 1984-2011

In the figure, the solid line shows the number of the PKK militants killed yearly in the Gendarmerie’s area of responsibility and the dotted line shows the number of the PKK attacks in that year. As discussed in the methodology section earlier, the data regarding number of the PKK militants killed differs in various sources. The data in this figure is taken from a parliamentary report (TBMM, 2013) and it does not include the PKK militants killed during the military operations in Northern Iraq; however, it is still a good indicator of offensive deterrence. As it can be seen in the inverted region, starting in 1992, the military began to take a more aggressive stance by targeting the PKK militants in their camps. By 1994 and 1995 this tactic peaked with three to four thousand PKK militants killed each year. As a result of the increase in the number of the PKK militants killed, the level of PKK violence, that reached its peak in 1992 after the PKK’s decision to initiate the third

stage of the People's War strategy, began to sharply decrease. It should also be noted that the year 1993 is dropped out of the analysis because GTD lacks information about the terrorist attacks in that year and there is no other reliable data source.

As part of the new strategy, Turkish Army and Air Forces began to conduct military operations against the PKK militants, in order to establish control over the rural areas and to curb the capability of the PKK to perpetrate terrorist attacks. While patrol operations were performed on a daily basis at company or battalion level (a few hundred to around one thousand soldiers), Turkish Armed Forces also conducted occasional sweeping operations directed at PKK camps in both south-eastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq. In some cases, these operations were carried out by several battalions (a few thousand soldiers) or even at division and corps level (tens of thousands of soldiers) and lasted for several weeks. In addition, Turkish Air Forces bombed the PKK camps in Northern Iraq for numerous times in this period. Ever intensifying military operations continued towards early 1999, when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya by Turkish Special Forces.

Paralleling the large-scale military operations in Turkey, PKK engaged in terrorist attacks in Germany. Mushaben (2008: 153-154) states that the PKK was responsible for more than two hundred arson attacks against Turkish travel agencies, businesses, and banks. In the following figures, the temporal distributions of large-scale military operations of Turkey and PKK attacks in Germany are compared for the 1992-1995 period. The data of military operations come from the original dataset that I have assembled, which is discussed in the previous chapter. The visual

representation of large-scale military operations by Turkish Army and the number of PKK attacks in Germany are provided as scatterplots. The X-axis shows the date and the Y-axis shows the number of the PKK attacks on that particular date. The dots at the top of the graph represent that there is an active operation on this day. The data are presented on a yearly basis for the sake of clarity.




Figure 3. Large-scale Military Operations and PKK Attacks in Germany, 1992

The figures clearly show that the PKK attacks in Germany occur in clusters rather than erratically. When the clusters of the attacks are evaluated in relation to the large-scale military operations, it is evident that the attacks take place either during or following large-scale military operations against the PKK. For example, in Figure 3, it is shown that 16 attacks in March 1992 occurred following the one-month long *Kış Operasyonu*¹⁹ (Operation Winter) in January and February 1992. Moreover, when these attacks occurred, Turkish jets were striking PKK camps in Northern Iraq on

¹⁹ See Appendix.

regular intervals. Evaluated together with the decrease in the level of PKK violence in Turkey, these findings refer to a relationship between Turkey’s offensive deterrence and the PKK attacks in Germany.²⁰




Figure 4. Large Scale Military Operations and PKK Attacks in Germany, 1994

My argument is that the PKK deliberately attacked Turkish targets in Germany as a response to large-scale military operations in Turkey. Indeed, the PKK itself declared for several times that it would carry out retaliatory attacks against Turkish targets outside Turkey. For example, in March 1993, a PKK spokesperson declared that “Turkish institutions and organizations outside Turkey will be targeted unless the military operations are not ceased.” (*Cumhuriyet*, March 29, 1993). Two waves of attacks in that year, which followed a series of large scale military operations by Turkey, as can be seen in Figure 4, eventually led to the ban of the PKK and its related organizations in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 72). Despite the ban, PKK

²⁰ The next step is to run a regression analysis to properly test the relationship between deterrence and the transnational attacks.

Although not independent of the environment in the host society, diaspora mobilization and the activities of diaspora organizations are primarily related to the developments in the home country (Sheffer, 2003; Esman, 2009; Koinova 2013). Beginning in 1992, the PKK organized many large-scale demonstrations, hunger strikes, and public sit-ins to protest Turkish military's operations against the PKK in addition to the raids and arson attacks against civilian and diplomatic Turkish targets. These non-violent activities of the PKK are outside the scope of this study but the mobilizing effects of these protests have been evaluated by other scholars (Uçarer and Lyon, 2001; Blatte, 2003). Nevertheless, these studies oversee the influence of armed propaganda on the mobilization of the Kurdish diaspora in Germany. Blatte (2003) concede that it was the more radical stance of the PKK that canalized the interest of the Kurdish diaspora to the organization. Terrorist attacks in Germany served to create an image of the PKK for the Kurdish diaspora as a resilient organization which can strike its enemy everywhere, regardless of the efforts to thwart its activities.

Findings in this chapter lend support to the second hypothesis of this study, which holds that offensive deterrence by target government increases the willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to engage in transnational attacks. Facing intensive military operations from the Turkish military, the PKK's ability to sustain its violent campaign in Turkey diminished. As elaborated in the theoretical framework, even if a terrorist organization derives benefits from target overreaction, it also needs to show resilience to ensure its survival. To respond to the offensive deterrence by Turkey, the PKK perpetrated attacks in Germany where the large Kurdish population provided both capability to carry out attacks and possibility to mobilize support. These attacks

served as a substitute tactic in the face of increased offensive deterrence in Turkey. The retaliatory attacks, although led to falling out with the German government for a brief period after 1993, served to ensure PKK's survival by adding up to the mobilization of Kurdish diaspora.

4.5. Political Activities of the PKK and Renouncing Violence in Germany

In the previous section, it has been argued that the willingness of the PKK to carry out attacks in Germany stemmed from its loss of ability to engage in violence in Turkey due to large-scale military operations. Offensive deterrence and military operations against the PKK continued until late 1999 when the organization declared a unilateral ceasefire following the capture of its leader. Nevertheless, the attacks in Germany came to an abrupt end in early 1996 following Öcalan's directive to cease violence in Germany. The decision to renounce violence in Germany was part of the wider efforts to reorient the PKK as a legitimate political actor as suggested in Neumann and Smith's strategy of terrorism framework's last stage.

In 2010, Abdullah Öcalan issued a statement in which he divided the strategy of the PKK since 1973 into four periods (*Serxwebun*, April 2010). In this statement, he identified 1973-1983 as the preparation stage, 1984-1993 as the armed struggle stage, 1994-2010 as the solution stage and declared that PKK entered the stage of "strategic lunge" in which it would establish de-facto autonomy through all-out people's war. In retrospect, Öcalan stated that after 1994, PKK changed its strategy from guerrilla

warfare as the sole method of struggle and began to engage in political activities seeking compromise.

As mentioned above, employing offensive deterrence measures, Turkey succeeded in militarily defeating the PKK in the 1990s. However, military victories do not necessarily lead to suppression of the political objectives of a terrorist organization. Ünal (2014: 428) argues that the third stage of the PKK was a pragmatic response to the military defeat in the field rather than a pre-determined strategy as Öcalan claims. Regardless of whether it was a pre-determined strategy or a pragmatic response, PKK, specifically starting in 1995, initiated the legitimization stage in Neumann and Smith's strategy of terrorism framework, especially in terms of its activities in Europe. Although it is not possible to designate a breaking point, PKK began the efforts to transform itself into a political organization.

This strategy consisted of several aspects. Firstly, Marxist-Leninist ideology lost its predominance in the rhetoric of the PKK since the beginning of 1995 (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 25). The change was primarily reflected in the attitude of the PKK towards religion and Islamist Kurdish separatist movements. Embracing a radical leftist ideology, PKK used to denounce religion and religious movements as obstacles in front of the revolutionary consciousness. But, in 1995, PKK cooperated with Kurdistan Islamic Party to establish a Kurdish parliament in exile. Moreover, in the context of the end of the Cold War, would not help the PKK to gain the support of the international community for which it was craving for. Hammer and sickle was removed from the organizations flag in the fifth congress in 1995. Ironically for an

organization which is named Kurdistan Worker's Party, Öcalan declared that "PKK has never based itself on Marxist-Leninist precepts." (*Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 1995).

Secondly, Öcalan declared in 1995 (*Serxwebun*, April 1995), that what PKK wants to achieve was not a separate Kurdish state anymore but a political solution (e.g. federalism, autonomy) within the existing borders of Turkey. Whether this is a pragmatic change in the PKK's rhetoric or a genuine abandonment of separatism is still a matter of debate in Turkey. In any case, the emphasis on a political process over a military struggle reflects the change in the PKK's strategy.

Thirdly, in June 1995, PKK established Med-TV, a TV station based in London, which broadcasted in Kurdish and Turkish languages. The PKK already had other alternative media outlets in Europe, however, establishment of a TV station which had satellite transmission extended its reach over the sympathizers. As Neumann and Smith (2008: 49) argue, establishment of an alternative news source increased the legitimacy of the PKK in the eyes of its supporters as well as international community.

Lastly and most importantly, beginning in 1995, the PKK extensively sought diplomatic recognition from especially European governments. PKK founded the Kurdish Parliament in Exile in April 1995 as a political front to establish diplomatic relations with international community. Although several leftist and Islamist Kurdish organizations were present in the meetings, it was essentially a part of the PKK's structure. Many of its members were former MPs of the pro-PKK political parties People's Labor Party (HEP) and Democracy Party (DEP) who left Turkey after ban of

these parties on the charges of ethnic separatism. The parliament in exile failed in its initial aim to be universal platform for Kurdish national movements which included Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian Kurds as well, however, it succeeded in gathering meetings in The Hague, Brussels, Vienna, and Moscow. These meetings damaged Turkey's foreign relations with the host states.

PKK's efforts to transform itself into a political organization and to be recognized as a legitimate interlocutor by the Turkish state have been perpetual. Although the organization continued to employ violence strategically, emphasis on political organization has constantly increased ever since mid-1990s. PKK took on a more institutionalized outlook by renaming the organization for several times and establishing umbrella organizations such as Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (KKK) and Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK). That process which started around 1995 necessitated gaining support of the international community in order to be recognized by Turkish State. In other words, violent PKK attacks outside Turkey no longer served the political objectives of the PKK since despite helping to ensure PKK's survival; these attacks also jeopardized the PKK's relations with the host countries. In that environment, high level German officials paid visits to Öcalan in late 1995 (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 166) which paved the way for PKK's renouncing of violence in Germany. After these meetings in late 1995, only a few PKK attacks occurred in Germany in early 1996. Craving for further political recognition, PKK realized that the costs of transnational attacks outweighed their benefits and abandoned this tactic. Even if violence in Turkey still served to the strategy of the

organization, the PKK had entered gaining legitimacy stage in Europe and thus needed to abandon violence.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Transnational terrorism has been a subject of interest ever since the late 1960s when the Palestinian organizations and leftist revolutionary organizations began to carry out attacks all over the world. Such attacks as hijackings, bombing embassies or kidnapping diplomats provided the terrorists with an opportunity to address a much bigger audience as compared to a domestic terrorism campaign. The revolutionary terrorists had international objectives ranging from bringing about a world revolution, the most enthusiastic one, to curbing the American influence in their regions. Palestinian organizations, on the other hand, although leftist and in alliance with revolutionary movements, were primarily committed to a domestic objective: establishing an independent Palestinian state in the occupied lands.

Since 9/11, transnational attacks have been studied under global terrorism and in the context of jihadist terrorist organizations. This study, on the other hand, aimed

at understanding the opportunity structures that make transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations more likely and how offensive deterrence strategies of governments affect the willingness of a domestic terrorist organization to engage in transnational attacks. Transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations are a subject that has been rather neglected in the field of terrorism studies. Thus, I contribute to terrorism and counter-terrorism literature by offering a theoretical approach to understand the relationship between counter-terrorism policies of the states and transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations. Moreover, by incorporating the opportunity variable into my theoretical framework, I contemplate on the role of transnational subjects and diasporas in increasing the likelihood of transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations. In addition, I test the two hypotheses derived from this theoretical framework with an empirical case study. The main contribution of this study is that it demonstrates the relationship between transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations and deterrence by the target state.

Domestic terrorist organizations, as rational actors, may engage in transnational attacks when they perceive that a domestic terrorist campaign is hindered or ineffective. The aim might be to publicize the political objectives of the terrorist organization and recruit international support. This is especially true for terrorist organizations in the initial stages of their campaign, yet, publicity is a crucial aspect of terrorist violence in every stage of terrorism. Moreover, transnational attacks are also carried out by domestic terrorist organizations at later stages of their campaign.

Therefore, the real motive for transnational attacks is to be found not solely in the desire to publicize objectives but in the prospects of the domestic terrorism campaign.

In Section 3.1 of this thesis, Neumann and Smith's (2008) "Strategy of Terrorism" framework is presented as a basis to explain the relationship between offensive deterrence and transnational attacks. They identify terrorism as a three stage strategy in the pursuit of political objectives. At the first stage, by employing symbolic violence, terrorists aim to disorientate the public and shake their loyalty to the government. This stage is essentially related to fear and intimidation aspects of terrorism. By creating an atmosphere where they can challenge the security apparatus of the state anywhere and anytime, the terrorists seeks both to dissuade the public from the state and encourage its sympathizers.

The second stage is related to the reaction of the government to a terrorism campaign. According to Neumann and Smith, there are two possible target reactions directed to terrorist organizations which would undermine the legitimacy of the state: overreaction which is the response that terrorist organizations seek to elicit and power deflation where the state fails to provide security against terrorism threat. On the one hand, overreaction, by increasing security measures which would aggravate the conditions of both general public and moderate opposition, would make the state seem as the oppressor and the real reason of violence. In that way, seen as the victim rather than the perpetrator, terrorist organization gains sympathy and support. On the other hand, underreaction leads to power deflation where the state seems powerless in dealing with its challengers and adds up to the disorientation of the public.

In the third and final stage of the strategy of terrorism, the terrorist organization, having disoriented the public and taken advantage of target response, decreases its dependence on violence and tries to transform itself into a political organization to gain legitimacy.

I argue that even if terrorist organizations willingly provoke overreaction by the state, they are exposed to the danger of being defeated by the state's security measures. As it has been the case with many terrorist organizations, states may crack down on a terrorist organization and render their capabilities nil. In this case, the ultimate objective of the terrorist organization becomes sustaining its violent campaign so that it can both derive the psychological benefits of overreaction by showing itself as the victim of state violence and proves that it is able to challenge the state even facing severe deterrent measures. The mechanism through which terrorist organizations adjust to deterrence and changes its attack methods or targets is defined as substitution in the counter-terrorism literature. Thus I contend that transnational attacks are a substitute tactic for domestic terrorist organizations facing deterrence-based policies that undermine its capability to perpetrate terrorist attacks in its home country.

Nevertheless, this is a potentially costly tactic since it necessitates a further capacity as compared to a domestic terrorist campaign and the third parties that are affected by transnational attacks may turn hostile toward the terrorist organization. There are certain necessary conditions for transnational attacks to become a viable substitute tactic. One of those necessary conditions is opportunity, which depends on

the technological innovations and existence of transnational subjects for domestic terrorist organizations to carry out transnational attacks. Transnational subjects make transnational attacks more likely both as potential targets and, in the case of diaspora communities, potential sources of recruitment and monetary support. Diaspora members, having high interest in the politics of their home country, appear as potential supporters which can be mobilized by terrorist organizations. The argument is not that the existence of diaspora communities leads to transnational terrorist attacks but that terrorist organizations are more likely to carry out their transnational attacks in countries where there is a considerable diaspora population since diasporas provide both capability for these attacks and possibility of mobilizing support.

The case of the PKK attacks in Germany provide empirical support for both the hypotheses on opportunity for transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations and the effects of offensive deterrence on their willingness to engage in transnational attacks. The PKK and Kurdish separatism has been the greatest challenge to the Turkish state since the 1980s. The failure to find a viable solution to the Kurdish Question brought about a 35 year long brutal terrorist campaign that took the lives of thousands of people. Even if not very consistently, certain democratic and socio-economic reforms have been implemented since the 1990s to address the underlying causes of Kurdish ethno-nationalism; whereas, the predominant response of Turkey to the PKK terrorism has been deterrence-based measures up until very recent negotiations with the organization. Especially starting in 1992, the TSK conducted extensive military operations to eliminate the PKK violence. This strategy

paid off in the short run as the ability of the PKK to perpetrate terrorist attacks in Turkey was seriously diminished by 1995.

Corresponding to the decrease in its capacity to engage in terrorism in Turkey, PKK carried out numerous attacks against Turkish targets outside Turkey. Germany has been the main venue of these transnational terrorist attacks since the Kurdish population reaching 500,000 people and the active diaspora community provided opportunity for the PKK to carry out these attacks and to mobilize support in the face of the severe setback in Turkey. As illustrated in Section 4.4, these attacks were carried out during or right after major military operations against the organization. PKK perpetrated these attacks despite their negative influence on the relations of the organization with Germany since the benefits of showing power and resilience and mobilizing diaspora support outweighed the costs of strained relations with Germany. Once the PKK entered stage 3 of the strategy of terrorism suggested by Neumann and Smith (2008) and began to seek international recognition in order to increase its legitimacy as a political actor, it abandoned violence in Germany in 1996 despite continuing offensive deterrence by Turkey.

In conclusion, the theoretical framework offered in this thesis provides a reasonable explanation for transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations. The existence of transnational subjects in general and diaspora communities in particular provides opportunity for these attacks. Diaspora mobilization not necessarily occurs through violence, however, terrorist organizations might be willing to exploit the possibility to mobilize support from diaspora by using violence. This is a

costly strategy, but if the terrorists are failing at home country, they would be more willing to bear the costs of transnational attacks, especially if their operational capabilities are curbed due to deterrence policies of the state. With regard to the case of the PKK, it is highly unlikely that the PKK would engage in transnational attacks outside Turkey ever again. Strategy of terrorism framework helps us understand why and how the PKK used transnational attacks as a substitute tactic and has moved on to the last stage seeking legitimacy through political organization. As the PKK has continuously sought recognition by international actors through its political activities such as advocating a political settlement and establishment of a parliament in exile, transnational attacks would be counterproductive for the objectives of the PKK in near future even if the conflict in Turkey revives.

The current research is an effort to develop a theoretical framework to explain transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations and their relationship to counter-terrorism policies in their home country. In the future, the current analysis can be extended to the use of inferential statistical time-series models that incorporate control variables into the analysis. Regarding the case study, if the data on non-violent PKK mobilization in Germany (e.g. demonstrations, fundraising, protest marches) is collected and the trend is compared with the terrorist attacks, a more meaningful analysis of the effects of Turkey's offensive deterrence on the PKK's willingness to perpetrate attacks in Germany can be conducted. Moreover, if official data can be accessed, a more reliable dataset of the large-scale military operations by the Turkish Army can be created for a regression analysis. The last but not the least, the PKK attacks against foreign nationals in Turkey constitutes another important aspect of the

domestic terrorist organizations' use of transnational attacks which is a prospective research subject. Overall, the topic of transnational attacks by domestic terrorist organizations is ripe for future scholarship.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahms, Max. 2008. "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy." *International Security* 32(4): 78-105.
- Akçura, Belma. 2011. *Devletin Kürt Filmi: 1925-2009 Kürt Raporları*. Ankara: Ayraç.
- Akers, Ronald L., and Adam L. Silverman. 2004. "Toward a Social Learning Model of Violence and Terrorism." In Zahn, Margaret A., Henry H. Brownstein, and Shelly L. Jackson (eds.) 2004. *Violence: From Theory to Research*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Aktan, Gunduz S., and Ali M. Koknar. 2002. "Turkey." In Alexander, Yonah (ed.) 2002. *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Alexander, Yonah, and Dennis A. Pluchinsky. 1992. *Europe's Red Terrorists: Fighting Communist Organizations*. New York: Frank Cass.
- Alexander, Yonah, Edgar H. Brenner, and Serhat Tutuncuoglu Krause (eds.) 2008. *Turkey: Terrorism, Civil Rights, and the European Union*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Anil, Merih. 2007. "Explaining the Naturalisation Practices of Turks in Germany in the Wake of the Citizenship Reform of 1999." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33(8): 1363-1376.

- Arce M., Daniel G., and Todd Sandler. 2005. "Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 183-200.
- Argun, Betigül Ercan. 2003. *Turkey in Germany: The Transnational Sphere of Deuschkei*. New York: Routledge.
- Bal, İhsan, and Emre Özkan. 2006. Dünyada Önemli Olaylar Kronolojisi: PKK Terör Örgütü Kronolojisi (1976-2006). Retrieved from <http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/z6UFq2LoFkdiuzBbZSt9qHMi7u4Ke2.pdf>, last accessed on July 3, 2015.
- Bandura, Albert. 1990. "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement." In Reich, Walter (ed.) 1990. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bandura, Albert. 2004. "Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism and Counterterrorism." In Moghaddam, Fathali M., and Anthony J. Marsella (eds.) 2004. *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press.
- Bapat, Navin. 2006. "State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups." *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 213-229.
- Bapat, Navin. 2007. "The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(4): 265-280.
- Barkey, Henry J., and Graham E. Fuller. 1998. *Turkey's Kurdish Question*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Başer, Bahar. 2013. *Diasporada Türk-Kürt Sorunu: Almanya ve İsveç'te İkinci Kuşak Göçmenler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Benedict, R. O'G. Anderson. 1992. *Long-distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics*. Amsterdam: Center for Asian Studies.

- Berry, N. O. 1989. "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism." In Wilkinson, Paul, and A. M. Stewart (eds.) 1989. *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
- Blatte, Andreas. 2003. "The Kurdish Movement: Ethnic Mobilization and Europeanization." Paper presented at the EUSA 8th International Biennial Conference, held in Nashville, Tennessee, March 27-29.
- Bonanate, Luigi. 1979. "Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism." *Journal of Peace Research* 16(3): 197-211.
- Bozarlan, Hamit. 1992. "Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Contemporary Turkey." In Kreyenbroek, Philip G. (ed.) 1992. *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*. London: Routledge.
- Brophy-Baermann, Bryan, and John A. C. Conybeare. 1994. "Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion." *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 196-210.
- Browne, Julie, and Eric Dickson. 2010. "We don't talk to terrorists: On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54(3): 379-407.
- Bruinessen, Martin van. 1992a. "Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems." In Kreyenbroek, Philip G. (ed.) 1992. *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*. London: Routledge.
- Bruinessen, Martin van. 1992b. *Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan*. London: Zed Books.
- Bruinessen, Martin van. 1998. "Shifting national and ethnic identities: The Kurds in Turkey and the European diaspora." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18(1): 39-52.
- Bruinessen, Martin Van. 2015. *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence." *International Organization* 59(1): 145-176.
- Bulut, Faik. 1991. *Devletin Gözüyle Türkiye'de Kürt İsyanları*. İstanbul: Yön Yayıncılık.
- Bunker, Robert J. (ed.) 2005. *Network, Terrorism and Global Insurgency*. London: Routledge.
- Byman, Daniel. 1998. "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 21(2): 149-169.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2010. "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity." *The Journal of Politics* 72(1): 16-30.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2012. "Is Terrorism Still a Democratic Phenomenon?" *International Relations/Uluslararası İlişkiler* 8(32): 85-100.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2013. "Terrorism and Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 355-378.
- Chenoweth, Erica, and Laura Dugan. 2010. "Rethinking Counterterrorism: Evidence from Israel." Available at SSRN 1664282, retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664282, last accessed on July 2, 2015.
- Chermak, Steven, and Jeff Gruenewald. 2006. "The Media's Coverage of Domestic Terrorism." *Justice Quarterly* (November): 428-461.
- Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman. 1979. *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

- Cline, Lawrence E. 2004. "From Ocalan to Al Qaida: The Continuing Terrorist Threat in Turkey." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27(4): 321-335.
- Clarke, Ronald V., and Graeme R. Newman. 2006. *Outsmarting the Terrorists*. New York: Praeger.
- Cooper, H. H. A. 1977. "Psychopath as Terrorist: A Psychopathological Perspective." *Legal Medical Quarterly* 2: 253-262.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13(4): 379-399.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1986. "The Psychology of Political Terrorism." In Hermann, Margaret G. (ed.) 1986. *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues*. San Francisco: Josey-Bass Inc., Publishers.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1988. "Theories of International Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." In Rapoport, David C. (ed.) 1988. *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1990. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice." In Reich, Walter (ed.) 1990. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1995. "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Context." In Crenshaw, Martha (ed.) 1995. *Terrorism in Context*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 2000. "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century." *Political Psychology* 21(2): 405-420.
- Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2003. "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism." *International Security* 27(3): 30-58.

- Cumhuriyet. 1993. "PKK'ya Kuzey Irak'ta Kıskaç." *Cumhuriyet*, March 29, 1993.
- Cumhuriyet. 1995. "PKK Amblemini Değiřtirdi." *Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 1995.
- Cumhuriyet. 2011. "MİT-PKK Görüşmesi." *Cumhuriyet*, September 14, 2011.
- Cunningham, Kathleen G., and Emily Beaulieu. 2010. "Dissent, Repression, and Inconsistency." In Chenoweth, Erica and Adria Lawrence (eds.) 2010. *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Dalman, Metin, and İsmail Tabak. 1995. *Avrupa'da İnsan Ticareti ve PKK*. İstanbul: Türk-Alman Basın Ajansı.
- Davis, David R., and Will H. Moore. 1997. "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 41(1): 171-184.
- Dobson, Christopher. 1974. *Black September: Its Short, Violent History*. New York: Macmillan.
- Dobkin, Bethami A. *Tales of Terror: Television News and the Construction of the Terrorist Threat*. Westport: Praeger.
- Dugan, Laura, and Erica Chenoweth. 2012. "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel." *American Sociological Review* 77(4): 597-624.
- Dugan, Laura, and Erica Chenoweth. 2013. "Government Actions in Terror Environments (GATE): A Methodology that Reveals how Governments Behave toward Terrorists and their Constituencies." In Subrahmanian, V. S. (ed.) 2013. *Handbook of Computational Approaches to Counterterrorism*. New York: Springer.

- Enders Walter, and Todd Sandler. 1993. "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 87(4): 829-844.
- Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. 1995. "Terrorism: Theory and Applications." In Hartley, Keith and Todd Sandler (eds.) 1995. *Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume I* Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. 2000. "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(3): 307-332.
- Enders, Walter, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibulloev. 2011. "Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics." *Journal of Peace Research* 48(3): 319-337.
- Esman, Milton J. 2009. *Diasporas in the Contemporary World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Eubank, William, and Leonard Weinberg. 1994. "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6(4): 417-443.
- Eubank, William, and Leonard Weinberg. 1998. "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(1): 108-118.
- Eyerman, Joe. 1998. "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems." *International Interactions* 24(2): 151-170.
- Falk, Avner. 2008. *Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2000. "Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6(2): 1-24.

- Friedland, Nehemia. 1992. "Becoming a Terrorist: Social and Individual Antecedents." In Howard, Lawrence (ed.) 1992. *Terrorism: Roots, Impacts, Responses*. New York: Praeger.
- Gibbs, Jack P. 2012. "Conceptualization of Terrorism." In Horgan, John and Kurt Braddock (eds.) 2012. *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*. London: Routledge.
- Geroge, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennet. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gerges, Fawaz A. 2005. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Schultz. 2008. "Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2008): 1-28.
- Gupta, Dipak. 2008. *Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation, and Demise*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Gurr, Ted, R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. London: Victor Gollancz.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- Horgan, John. 2005. *The Psychology of Terrorism*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Imset, Ismet G. 1992. *The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey, 1973-1992*. Istanbul: Turkish Daily News Publications.

- Jenkins, Brian M. 1975. "International Terrorism: A New Mode Conflict." Paper originally presented at the fifth course of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts held at the Collegio Universitario in Urbino, Italy, August 12-14, 1974. Los Angeles, CA: Crescent Publications.
- Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. 2008. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2006. "Religion as a Root Cause of Terrorism." In Richardson, Louise (ed.) 2006. *The Roots of Terrorism* London: Routledge.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kelly, Michael J., and Thomas H. Mitchell. 1981. "Transnational Terrorism and the Western Elite Press." *Political Communication* 1(3): 269-296.
- Khalil, Lydia. 2007. "Turkey and the PKK." In James J. Forest (ed.) 2007. *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives, Vol 3*. Westport: Praeger.
- Kirişçi, Kemal, and Gareth M. Winrow. 1997. *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*. Portland: Frank Cass.
- Kirişçi, Kemal. 2004. "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy." In Martin, Lenore and Dimitris Keridis (eds.) 2004. *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Kocher, Matthew. 2002. "The decline of the PKK and the viability of a one-state solution in Turkey." *International Journal on Multicultural Studies* 4(1): 1-20.
- Koinova, Marina. 2013. "Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9(4): 433-453.

- Kropotkin, Peter. [1880] 1992. *Words of a Rebel*. Trans. George Woodcock. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara Walter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31(1): 49-80.
- Laçiner, Sedat, and İhsan Bal. 2004. "The Ideological and Historical Roots of the Kurdish Movements in Turkey: Ethnicity, Demography, and Politics." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10(3): 473-504.
- LaFree, Gary, and Laura Dugan. 2007. "Introducing the Global Terrorism Database." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19: 181-204.
- LaFree, Gary, Laura Dugan and Raven Korte. 2009. "The impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models." *Criminology* 47(1): 501-530.
- LaFree, Gary, Sue-Ming Yang, and Martha Crenshaw. 2009. "Trajectories of Terrorism: Attack Patterns of Foreign Groups that have Targeted the United States, 1970–2004." *Criminology and Public Policy* 8(3): 445-473.
- Laqueur, Walter. 1977. *Terrorism*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Laqueur, Walter. 1987. *The Age of Terrorism*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. 2004. "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time Series Analysis." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 48(2): 230-258.
- Lia, Brynjar. 2005. *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism: Pattern and Predictions*. London: Routledge.
- Lichbach, Mark I. 1987. "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(2): 266-297.

- Lilja, Jannine, and Lisa Hultman. 2011. "Intraethnic Dominance and Control: Violence Against Co-Ethnics in the Early Sri Lankan Civil War." *Security Studies* 20(2): 171-197.
- Lizardo, Omar. 2006. "The Effect of Economic and Cultural Globalization on Anti-US Transnational Terrorism 1971-2000." *Journal of World-Systems Research* 12(1): 2-40.
- Lyall, Jason. 2009. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 331-362.
- Lyon, Alynna J. and Emek M. Uçarer. 2001. "Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(6): 925-948.
- Mallin, Jay (ed). 1982. *Terror and Urban Guerillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents*. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press.
- Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jagers. 2000. Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2000 dataset.
- McCauley, Clark. 2004. "Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism." In Stout, Chris E. (ed.) 2004. *Psychology of Terrorism: Coping with the Continued Threat*. Westport: Praeger.
- McCormick, Gordon H. 2003. "Terrorist Decision Making." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6(1): 473-507.
- McDowall, David. 1992. "The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review." In Kreyenbroek, Philip G. (ed.) 1992. *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*. London: Routledge.
- McDowall, David. 2007. *A Modern History of Kurds, 3rd Edition*. London: IB Tauris.

- Meerari, Ariel, and Shlomi Elad. 1986. *The International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Mickolus, Edward F. 1979. "Transnational Terrorism." Stohl, Michael (ed.) 1979. *The Politics of Terrorism*. New York: M. Dekker.
- Mickolus, Edward F., Todd Sandler, Jean M. Murdock, and Peter Flemming. 2003. *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1968-2001*. Dunn Loring, VA: Vinyard Software.
- Miller, Gregory. 2007. "Confronting Terrorisms: Group Motivation and Successful State Policies." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19(3): 331-350.
- Moore, William H. 1998. "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 851-873.
- Morris, Benny. 2001. *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*. New York, Vintage Books.
- Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. 1989. *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Muller, Edward N., and Karl-Dieter Opp. 1986. "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action." *The American Political Science Review* 80(2): 471-488.
- Mushaben, Joyce Marie. 2008. *The Changing Faces of Citizenship: Integration and Mobilization among Ethnic Minorities in Germany*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Neumann, Peter R., and M. L. R. Smith. 2008. *The Strategy of Terrorism: How it works and why it fails*. Oxon: Routledge.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2013. *Global Terrorism Database (Data File)*. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>, downloaded on July 1, 2015.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2014. *Global Terrorism Database: Inclusion Criteria and Variables*. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf>, last accessed on July 1, 2015.

Öcalan, Abdullah. [1978] 1993. *Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu – Manifesto*. Köln: Weşanen Serxwebûn.

Olson, Mancur. 1968. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. New York: Schocken Books.

Olson, Robert. 1991. *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 1880-1925*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Olsson, Peter A. 1980. "The Terrorist and the Terrorized: Some Psychoanalytic Consideration." *The Journal of Psychology* 16(1): 47-60.

Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003. *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany*. London: Routledge.

Özcan, Nihat Ali. 1999. *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi): Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi*. Ankara: ASAM Yayınları.

Özdağ, Ümit, and Ersel Aydın. 2003. "Winning a low-intensity Conflict: Drawing Lessons from the Turkish Case." *Review of International Affairs* 3(1): 101-121.

- Pape, Robert. 2005. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House.
- Parry, Albert. 2006. *Terrorism: From Robespierre to Weather Underground*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Pek, Ahmet, and Behzat Ekici. 2007. "Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of PKK-Kongra Gel from Illicit Drug Business." In Nikbay, Ozgur, and Suleyman Hancerli (eds.) 2007. *Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Terrorist Operations: Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon*. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
- Piazza, James A., and James I. Walsh. 2010. "Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism." *PS: Politics and Political Science* 43(3): 411-414.
- Possony, Stefan T. 1980. "Kaleidoscopic Views on Terrorism." *Terrorism: An International Journal* 4: 89-121.
- Post, Jerrold. 1990. "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces." In Reich, Walter (ed.) 1990. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Post, Jerrold. 2007. *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rapoport, David. 1977. "The Politics of Atrocity." In Alexander, Yonah and Seymour M. Finger (eds.) 1977. *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. (eds.) New York: John Jay Press.
- Rapoport, David C. 2004. "Four Waves of Terrorism." In Kronin, Audrey K. and James M. Ludes (eds.) 2004. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

- Roth, Mitchel P., and Murat Sever. 2007. "The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, a Case Study." 30(10): 901-920.
- Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, and Luis de la Calle. 2009. "Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 31-49.
- Sandler, Todd. 1995. "On the Relationship between Democracy and Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 12 (2): 97-122.
- Sandler, Todd, and Daniel G. Arce M. 2003. "Terrorism and Game Theory." *Simulation & Gaming* 34 (3): 319-337.
- Sarıgil, Zeki. 2010. "Curbing Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism in Turkey: An Empirical Assessment of pro-Islamic and Socio-Economic Approaches." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(3): 533-553.
- Sarıgil, Zeki, and Ömer Fazlıoğlu. 2014. "Exploring the roots and dynamics of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey." *Nations and Nationalism* 20(3): 436-458.
- Satana, Nil. 2012. "The Kurdish Issue in June 2011 Elections: Continuity or Change in Turkey's Democratization?." *Turkish Studies* 13(2): 169-189.
- Satana, Nil S., Molly Inman, and Johanna K. Birnir. 2013. "Religion, Government Coalitions, and Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25(1): 29-52.
- Schmid, Alex P., and Janny de Graaf. 1982. *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

- Schmid, Alex P. 1989. "Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1(4): 539-565.
- Schmid, Alex P. 1992. "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (4): 7-13.
- Schmid, Alex P. 2004. "Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(2): 197-221.
- Schmid, Alex P., and Albert J. Jongman. [1984] 2008. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Sederberg, Peter. 1995. "Conciliation as a Counter-terrorist Strategy." *Journal of Peace Research* 32(3): 295-312.
- Serxwebun. 1995. "Yürüttüğümüz Mücadele Terörizmdir Bundan Vazgeçmeye Hazırız Sözü ABD ve TC Benden Hiçbir Zaman Duymayacak." *Serxwebun* April, 1995. Retrieved from <http://www.serxwebun.org/arsiv/160/#/12/>, last accessed on July 2, 2015.
- Serxwebun. 2010. "Özgürlük Mücadelesinde Dördüncü Döneme Girilmiştir." *Serxwebun* April, 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.serxwebun.org/arsiv/340/#/1/>, last accessed on July 1, 2015.
- Shain, Yossi. 2002. "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution." *SAIS Review* 22(2): 115-144.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shelley, Louise I. 2014. *Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Şimşir, Bilal. 2010. *Kürtçülük II, 1924-1999*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1961. *Deterrence and Defense: Towards a Theory of National Security*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Taylor, Maxwell, and Ethel Quayle. 1994. *Terrorist Lives*. London: Brassey's.

Thornton, Thomas Perry. 1964. "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation." in Eckstein, Harry (ed.) 1964. *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*. New York: Free Press.

Tokic, Mate N. 2012. "The End of 'Historical-Ideological Bedazzlement': Cold War Politics and Émigré Croatian Separatist Violence, 1950-1980." *Social Science History* 36(3): 421-455.

Tullock, Gordon. 1971. "The Paradox of Revolution." *Public Choice* 11(1): 89-99.

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) [Turkish Grand National Assembly] 2008. *10/25 Esas Numaralı Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu Raporu* [Parliamentary Investigation Committee Report 10/25].

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) İnsan Hakları İnceleme Komisyonu [Turkish Grand National Assembly Committee on Human Rights Screening] 2013. *Terör ve Şiddet Olayları Kapsamında Yaşam Hakkı İhlallerini İnceleme Raporu* [The Report on the Breaches of Right to Life within the context of Terrorism and Violence Incidents].

Ünal, Mustafa Coşar. 2012. *Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy Choices and Policy Effects toward the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)*. Oxon: Routledge.

- Ünal, Mustafa Coşar. 2014. "Strategist or Pragmatist: A Challenging Look at Ocalan's Retrospective Classification and Definition of PKK's Strategic Periods Between 1973 and 2012." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26(3): 419-448.
- van der Dennen, J. M. G. 1980. *Problems in the Concepts and Definitions of Aggression, Violence, and Some Related Terms*. Groningen: Palemological Institute.
- van Dijk, Cornelis. 1981. *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1): 3-42.
- Wahlbeck, Östen. 1999. *Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study of Kurdish Refugee Communities*. London: Macmillan.
- Wayland, Sarah. 2004. "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora." *Review of International Studies* 30 (3): 405-426.
- White, Robert. 1989. "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(6): 1277-1302.
- Weinberg, Leonard. 1991. "Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." *Comparative Politics* 23(4): 423-438.
- Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. 2012. "The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism." In Horgan, John and Kurt Braddock (eds.) 2012. *Terrorism Studies: A Reader*. London: Routledge.
- Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. *Terrorism and The Liberal State*. London: Macmillan.

Young, Joseph K., and Laura Dugan. 2011. "Veto Players and Terror." *Journal of Peace Research* 48(1): 19-33.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Large-scale Military Operations Against the PKK, 1992-1995

Start Date	End Date	Name (if any)	Turkey	Iraq	Land Op.	Air Strike	Nkill	Ncapture	Ncasualty
07.01.1992	06.02.1992	Kiř	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	150-250*	Unknown	Unknown
01.03.1992	03.03.1992	X	No	Yes	No	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
08.03.1992	10.03.1992	X	No	Yes	No	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
25.03.1992	28.03.1992	X	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
29.07.1992	31.07.1992	X	No	Yes	No	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
05.10.1992	15.11.1992	X	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	573 (2000**)	5	25
25.05.1993	13.06.1993	Kartal	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	77	11	2
27.05.1993	02.06.1993	X	Yes	No	Yes	No	47 (100*)	Unknown	1
29.05.1993	05.06.1993	A-1	Yes	No	Yes	No	27	0	6
13.08.1993	20.08.1993	Kirpi	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	184 (300*)	0	2
05.09.1993	24.09.1993	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	159	Unknown	Unknown
30.09.1993	03.10.1993	X	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
05.10.1993	11.10.1993	X	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	28	0	0

Start Date	End Date	Name (If any)	Turkey	Iraq	Land Op.	Air Strike	Nkill	Ncapture	Ncasualty
09.10.1993	24.10.1993	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	41	5	0
27.01.1994	03.02.1994	X	Yes	No	Yes	No	36 (100*)	0	12
16.03.1994	21.03.1994	X	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	32	38	0
12.04.1994	24.04.1994	Mezi-Şivi	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	146	8	5
31.05.1994	08.06.1994	X	Yes	No	Yes	No	74	0	10
20.07.1994	01.08.1994	Bayrak	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	60	11	15
21.07.1994	30.07.1994	Puma	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
15.08.1994	20.08.1994	Haftanın-Sinat	No	Yes	No	Yes	92*	0	0
17.09.1994	16.11.1994	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	84	Unknown	8
26.09.1994	04.10.1994	Atak	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	55	0	3
03.10.1994	01.12.1994	X	Yes	No	Yes	No	68	13	4
03.11.1994	13.11.1994	Kasirga-2	Yes	No	Yes	No	7	0	1
13.02.1995	20.02.1995	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	95	0	2

Start Date	End Date	Name (If any)	Turkey	Iraq	Land Op.	Air Strike	Nkill	Ncapture	Ncasualty
27.02.1995	06.03.1995	Şafak	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	97	0	2
18.03.1995	28.03.1995	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	45***	0	18***
20.03.1995	04.05.1995	Çelik	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	555	13	64
21.03.1995	21.04.1995	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	152	73	5
28.03.1995	09.04.1995	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	78	18	2
31.05.1995	09.06.1995	X	Yes	No	Yes	No	65	0	2
15.06.1995	19.06.1995	X	No	Yes	Yes	No	54***	Unknown	15***
01.07.1995	10.07.1995	Ejder -2	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	167	0	21
16.07.1995	30.07.1995	X	Yes	No	Yes	No	52	Unknown	5
26.07.1995	30.08.1995	X	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	55	0	3

*: Estimates of military officials.

** : Operation carried out in collaboration with Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party. Numbers include PKK militants killed by IKDP.

***: Operations started after PKK raids. Numbers include kills and casualties during the PKK raid.