

RECONSIDERING THE CONCEPT OF INFLUENCE:
THE CASE OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE
EAST (2003-2014)

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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Department of
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Ankara
June 2016

to my wife Merve

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(2003-2014)

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Dođramacı Bilkent University

by


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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
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İHSAN DOĐRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

RECONSIDERING THE CONCEPT OF INFLUENCE:
THE CASE OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST
(2003-2014)

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This thesis propounds a new conceptual analysis of influence in international relations. First, it advances a novel definition of influence, with additional clarifications on the relationship between influence and power(s). Second, this thesis addresses the causes of states' quest for influence in international relations. This thesis identifies three motives of security, economy, and identity as existential imperatives of state conduct to seek influence in international relations. Third, this thesis presents an analysis of the patterns and causes of variations among these motives in states' regional foreign policies. Finally, Turkey's dyadic relationships in the Middle East between 2003 and 2014, specifically with the states of Syria, Iran, and Palestine, constitutes the case study of this thesis.

Keywords: Influence, Power, Motive, Turkey, the Middle East

ÖZET

NÜFUZ KAVRAMINI YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK:
TÜRKİYE’NİN ORTA DOĞU İLE İLİŞKİLERİ ÖRNEĞİ
(2003-2014)

Ersoy, Eyüp

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydın

Haziran 2016

Bu tez, uluslararası ilişkilerde nüfuzun yeni bir kavramsal analizini ortaya koymaktadır. İlk olarak, nüfuz ve güç(ler) arasındaki ilişkiye dair ilave izahlar ile birlikte, nüfuzun yeni bir tanımını öne sürmektedir. İkinci olarak, bu tez, devletlerin uluslararası ilişkilerdeki nüfuz arayışlarının nedenlerini ele almaktadır. Bu tez, güvenlik, ekonomi ve kimlik saiklerini uluslararası ilişkilerde nüfuz arayışındaki devlet icrasının varoluşsal zorunlulukları olarak tanımlamaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, bu tez, devletlerin bölgesel dış politikalarında bu saikler arasındaki çeşitlenmelerin şekilleri ve nedenlerine dair bir analiz sunmaktadır. Son olarak, Suriye, İran ve Filistin devletleri özelinde olmak üzere, Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu’da 2003 ile 2014 yılları arasındaki ikili ilişkileri bu tezin vaka çalışmasını oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nüfuz, Güç, Saik, Türkiye, Orta Doğu

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In this thesis, I write somewhere that research is a journey of curiosity for a rendezvous with truth. In this journey, a challenging part of which comes to an end with this thesis, Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı has been an unfailing source of inspiration and fortitude. Words are not enough, indeed, to express my gratitude.

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This journey has taken me to different parts of the world, from London to Mumbai, from Sarajevo to Dar es Salaam, in which I have met amazing companions. I always cherish my memories, sometimes scholarly, with them.

I would also like to thank TUBITAK for providing scholarship.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Every endeavor is driven by certain motives; so is this thesis. In essence, this thesis is a scholarly endeavor addressing certain theoretical, conceptual, and analytical shortcomings in the discipline of international relations. First and foremost, this thesis is about influence. In the discipline of international relations, influence, as a concept, is subject to pervasive perfunctory utilization. Influence is a platitude to signify an array of random phenomena despite the fact that several concepts, similar and related to influence, such as power and security, have developed literatures of their own in the disciplinary evolution of international relations. In the discipline of international relations, influence is still an infant word, rather than a mature concept. This thesis addresses this conceptual shortcoming by endeavoring to bring about conceptual maturity for influence.

Second, in most of the theoretical analyses dealing with regional foreign policies of states, a prevalent inferential flaw is observable. A state's intentions, practices, objectives, and in general considerations about a region in its foreign policy are

interpreted to be also valid for its intentions, practices, objectives, and in general considerations about another state located in that region. This inferential flaw is very akin to what is called in social research 'ecological fallacy,' that is, reaching conclusions about an individual in a group based on the aggregate data about the group itself. In the discipline of international relations, ecological fallacy in regional foreign policy analyses leads to inferentially inaccurate and theoretically spurious conclusions. In the practice of international relations, on the other hand, it leads to politically inaccurate and practically deleterious conclusions. This thesis tries to address this analytical shortcoming by presenting a theoretically sophisticated case to demonstrate the falsity of ecological fallacy in regional foreign policy analyses.

Third, in most of the regional foreign policy analyses dealing with a state's foreign policy toward/in a region, regional structure is conceived to be monolithic. Regional structure is theoretically considered a single whole which is uniform in nature even though the multiplicity of agency in the regional structure is acknowledged. On the other hand, regional structure can be conceived to be a composite, that is, composed of interrelated, and still distinct, components. These components can be called sub-structures. There are arguably three sub-structures in a regional structure, which are regional security structure, regional economy structure, and regional identity structure. Still, the nature of a particular sub-structure can vary according to a particular state exercising foreign policy toward/in a region. This thesis addresses this analytical shortcoming by presenting a theoretically sophisticated case to demonstrate the veracity of the understanding of regional structure as a composite.

Fourth, in the theoretical development of international relations, agency is progressively eclipsed. Especially with the systemic analyses gaining prominence in the discipline, ascribing the preferences and actions of the units to the incentives and pressures of the international system, and sometimes regional systems, the analytical utility of agency has become questionable at best, and irrelevant at worst. As a result, being exiled from international relations theory, agency has sought refuge in foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, with the recent surge of analytical interest in the ideational dimensions of state conduct in international relations theory, agency seems to be on the theoretical verge of returning from exile. This thesis addresses this theoretical shortcoming by presenting a theoretically sophisticated case to demonstrate the centrality of agency both in the theory and practice of international relations.

Fifth, in most foreign policy analyses, three ways of addressing motives as causal units are observable. In the first case, motives do not exist. The causes of state conduct in foreign policy are confined to ‘factors’ implicitly assumed to operate outside the states, to which states respond. These foreign policy analyses are essentially informed by systemic approaches in international relations theory. In the second case, uncausal analyses are presented based on a single motive. Here, the existence of motive is acknowledged, and still only one single motive is assumed and taken to have effects on state conduct. In the third case, multicausal analyses are presented based on multiple motives. Here, though, criteria to differentiate and classify motives are absent, and motives and ‘causes’ are conflated. This thesis addresses these analytical shortcomings by presenting a case to demonstrate the

existence of three ‘master’ motives, i.e. security, economy, and identity, as causal units, which have contingent effects on state conduct towards/in a region.

In practice, this thesis is an endeavor to address two research questions on influence: what is influence? Why do states seek influence? Related to the second research question, there are three subsidiary research questions addressed in this thesis as well:

1. What are a state’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships?
2. How and why do a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other?
3. How and why do a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other?

The analytical process of seeking answers to these research questions presents a new framework for foreign policy analysis. In other words, although the primary intent of this thesis is not to construct another analytical approach to study foreign policies of states, the substantive analysis in the thesis constitutes in itself an alternative analytical framework for foreign policy analysis based on the concept and phenomenon of influence, with state motivations forming the intermediary nexus. This is a critical contribution to the scholarly enterprise of exploring, understanding, and explaining the causes of state actions, the substance of state policies, and the dynamics of state interactions in international relations based on an underdeveloped concept and an understudied phenomenon, i.e., influence.

In the second chapter, the theoretical chapter of the thesis, influence is systematically conceptualized. To that end, first, power is redefined and recategorized as power as capacity and power as capability. Second, some understandings of influence short of being analytically consistent and conceptually clear are presented. Subsequently, a peculiar definition of influence is presented, and to elucidate this definition of influence, its relation to power as capacity and power as capability is articulated. Third, a taxonomy of influence is propounded in reference to various criteria. Fourth, to give a lucid answer to the main research question, several related concepts are defined as well. Here, motives of state conduct are presented as security, economy, and identity. They are additionally classified into their components called ‘sub-motive elements’.

Subsequently, the motive of security in state conduct is discussed in reference to its sub-motive elements, which are unit-level security, dyad-level security, regional-level security, and international-level security. The motive of economy in state conduct is discussed in reference to its sub-motive elements, which are trade, investment, and energy. The motive of identity is discussed in reference to its sub-motive elements, which are person identity, role identity, and social identity. Fifth, the question of why a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other is addressed. Sixth, the question of why a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other is addressed. Finally, the relationship between motive and action in a state’s sub-regional dyadic relationships is discussed.

In the third chapter, the methodological chapter of the thesis, first, methodology of social research is defined as being composed of three successive stages of research, that is, designing research, collecting data, and analyzing data. Second, the research design of the thesis is discussed, in specific reference to unit of analysis, measurement, sampling, and case study. Subsequently, data collection for the research is discussed in terms of both primary and secondary, and qualitative and quantitative data. Here, triangulation and bricolage are put forward as two ways of using qualitative data and quantitative data in combination. Finally, data analysis for the research is discussed in specific reference to process tracing, descriptive statistics, and discourse analysis.

In the fourth chapter, an analysis of Turkey's relations with Syria, first, the general course of Turkey's relations with Syria between March 2003 and August 2014 is discussed in reference to the dynamics in international, regional, and national contexts. Second, Turkey's security in its relations with Syria is examined in reference to the developments and associated policies of Turkey at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. Subsequently, Turkey's economy in its relations with Syria is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. Finally, Turkey's identity in its relations with Syria is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In the fifth chapter, an analysis of Turkey's relations with Iran, first, the resilience of stability in Turkey's relations with Iran between March 2003 and August 2014 despite fluctuating cooperative and competitive interactions is explained with reference to the basic determinants of relations. Second, Turkey's security in its relations with Iran is examined in reference to the developments and associated policies of Turkey at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. Subsequently, Turkey's economy in its relations with Iran is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. Finally, Turkey's identity in its relations with Iran is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In the sixth chapter, an analysis of Turkey's relations with Palestine is made. First, it is argued that Palestinian statehood and the wellbeing of Palestinians was an unremitting, ingrained, and forthright concern of Turkish foreign policymakers in Turkey's relations with Palestine. Second, Turkey's security in its relations with Palestine is examined in reference to Turkey's policies about developments concerning Palestine's security, and at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. Subsequently, Turkey's economy in its relations with Palestine is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. Finally, Turkey's identity in its relations with Palestine is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In the seventh chapter, which draws on the theoretical discussion of the second chapter and the empirical discussions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters, a comparative analysis of Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East, and why and how they differed among and within each other in the period of 2003 and 2014 is presented. First, Turkey's power in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of balancing. Second, Turkey's influence in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of influence. Subsequently, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed among each other is addressed. Here, cross-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are made. Finally, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed within each other is addressed. Here, within-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are made.

In the eight chapter, the conclusion chapter of the thesis, first, a brief recapitulation of the contents of preceding chapters is presented. Second, three categories of scholarly contributions that the definitional and analytical findings of this thesis provide are discussed in terms of theoretical and methodological debates in the discipline of international relations and analytical debates in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, a selection of three subjects on which future research pertinent to conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and analytical issues in the thesis could concentrate is put forward.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIZING INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Prior to any exposition of a state's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, a semantic deconstruction of the concept of 'influence' is essential for conceptual clarity and analytical validity. In the lexicon of the discipline of international relations, influence is a ubiquitous concept which is yet to be rigorously conceptualized, and it is a phenomenon in international politics which is yet to be extensively theorized. This is a curious disciplinary case for three reasons. First, 'sphere of influence' as a phrase has been in use in the academic literature since it was first coined at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), which divided the African continent into the 'spheres of influences' of European colonial powers.¹ In other words, it is not a novel concept nor is it recently incorporated into the discipline of international relations from other disciplines. Second, concepts similarly in use in the international relations literature like power and security have been

¹ Asa Briggs and Patricia Clavin, *Modern Europe, 1789-Present* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 129. Also see, Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); Susanna Hast, *Spheres of Influence in International Relations: History, Theory and Politics* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014).

excessively studied in the discipline both theoretically and empirically to the extent that these studies have constituted separate literatures of their own.²

Third, influence as a concept has been extensively employed in academic as well as non-academic studies becoming an inseparable part of the international relations literature. In most of these studies, however, there appears to be no attempt to formulate and clarify the concept of ‘influence’, that is, no attempt for conceptualization, and the meaning of influence is just assumed as self-evident, or the author’s understanding of the concept of ‘influence’ is implicit within the text and can only be inferred indirectly from the text.

Therefore, with regard to influence, there seems to be a conceptual and theoretical confusion and underdevelopment in international relations literature, which requires, above all, a systematic and yet lucid conceptualization of influence. On the other hand, influence, as a phenomenon, is inherently related to power in international relations, and is frequently confused with it. Accordingly, in order to identify the differences between power and influence, to specify the relationship between the two concepts, and thereby to introduce a distinct definition of influence, first, power needs to be clarified.

2.1 Power in International Relations

² There is now ‘security studies’ as a sub-discipline in international relations, involving conceptual and substantial analyses of security. See, for example, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Paul D. Williams, ed., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Peter Hough et al., eds., *International Security Studies: Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).

“Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure,” Joseph S. Nye, Jr. poetically acknowledges.³ Nonetheless, the enticing challenge of defining or measuring power, like love, has been embraced by scholars of international relations with ardor. Analytical perspectives of scholars have depended on divergent conceptions of power, and there has yet to be a consensus on a common definition of power. Scholars of international relations have propounded peculiar definitions of power reflecting their own understandings thereof. Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, after famously declaring that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,” engages in a meticulous analysis of power.⁴ In examining ‘political power’, Morgenthau, reminding of the reader that “when we [Morgenthau] speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men,” defines political power as “a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised,” which “gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the former exert on the latter’s minds.”⁵

Another famous definition, easy to memorize, is that of Robert A. Dahl. Dahl defines power “in terms of a relation between people, and is expressed in simple symbolic

³ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization* (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), p. 53.

⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 27. Morgenthau has a unique outlook on the human condition. Analogous to Jean Paul Sartre’s conception of freedom as “the first condition of action,” and of man as “condemned to be free,” meaning that “no limits to [his] freedom can be found except freedom itself or, if you prefer, that [men] are not free to cease being free,” Morgenthau professes a conception of power as the first condition of action, and of men as condemned to seek power. In his view, “men is born to seek power, yet his actual condition makes him a slave to the power of others,” and by virtue of being, possess *animus dominandi*, the lust for power, which “manifests itself as the desire to maintain the range of one’s own person with regard to others, to increase it, or to demonstrate it.” Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 455, p. 462. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (London: Latimer House Limited, 1947), p. 145, p. 165.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

notation.”⁶ Dahl’s “intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”⁷ In a quite similar formulation, for A. F. K. Organski, power “is the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one’s own ends,” adding that “unless a nation can do this, it may be large, it may be wealthy, it may even be great, but it is not powerful.”⁸ Karl W. Deutsch, on the other hand, writes that power, “put most crudely and simply, is the ability to prevail in conflict and to overcome obstacles.”⁹ Deutsch makes a distinction between potential power and actual power, and defines ‘power potential’ as “a rough estimate of the material and human resources for power.”¹⁰ To K. J. Holsti, power “is the general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others.”¹¹

The introduction of the concept of ‘soft power’ by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has added a new dimension to the discussions, scholarly or otherwise, about power, and has stimulated a body of theoretical and empirical research. Nye, first of all, states that at the “most general level, power means the ability to get the outcomes one wants”, and “more specifically, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants.”¹² Subsequently, Nye makes a distinction between hard power and soft power. While hard power rests on inducements and threats, soft power “rests

⁶ Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1957, pp. 201-215, p. 201. Also see, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1962, pp. 947-962; Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁸ A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 104

⁹ Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 23.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹¹ K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 165.

¹² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 1, p. 2.

on the ability to shape the preferences of others,” and is defined as “getting others to want the outcomes that you want,” additionally arguing that “in international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others.”¹³

In a recent addition to the ‘power literature’, Moises Naim has finally declared the end of power. Defining power as “the ability to direct or prevent the current or future actions of other groups and individuals”, Naim specifies three revolutions, which are “the *More* revolution, the *Mobility* revolution, and the *Mentality* revolution,” arguing that “the first is swamping the barriers to power; the second is circumventing them; the third is undercutting them.”¹⁴ To put it succinctly, power has become accessible to all. Still, Naim cautions, “the excessive dilution of power and the inability of leading actors to lead are as dangerous as the excessive concentration of power in a few hands.”¹⁵ However, in Naim’s designation, dilution of power is in fact diffusion of power, not the end of it.¹⁶

¹³ Ibid., p. 5., p. 8. Also see, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 80, 1990, pp. 153-171; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, No. 1, 2008, pp. 94-109; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). The concept of soft power has provoked an abiding interest in international relations scholarship producing research on a wide range of policy areas. For example, it is extensively applied to China’s regional and global policies. See, Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World* (New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 2007); Mingjiang Li, ed., *Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011); Hongyi Lai and Yiyilu, eds., *China’s Soft Power and International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).

¹⁴ Moises Naim, *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge isn’t What it Used to Be* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), p. 16, p. 54. Italics in original.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 224.

¹⁶ For some recent examples of general research on power in international relations, see, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization*, 59, No. 1, 2005, pp. 39-75; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds., *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams, eds., *Power in World Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007); Guilio M. Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in*

2.1.1 Power as Capacity, Power as Capability

There are indeed very diverse conceptions of power, frequently challenging, contradicting, complementing, and overlapping each other. It is no surprise that in the exhaustive conceptual debates on power is lost the simple linguistic quality that two ontologically distinct entities can be signified by the same concept. Power is a polysemous word essentially signifying two ontologically discrete phenomena, and thus having two distinct meanings. There have been attempts to define these two discrete phenomena with two different concepts. One early attempt came from Raymond Aron, who pointed out that “French, English and German all distinguish between two notions, *power and force (strength)*, *puissance et force*, *Macht und Kraft*,” analogous to the Turkish notions of *kudret* and *kuvvet*.¹⁷ It did not seem to Aron “contrary to the spirit of these languages to reserve the first term for the human relationship, the action itself, and the second for the means, the individual’s muscles or the state’s weapons.”¹⁸ A similar dichotomy has recently emerged distinguishing between the action itself and the means with the concepts of ‘power-over’ and ‘power-to,’ though the precise and unanimous definitions of ‘power-over’ and ‘power-to’ have yet to be agreed upon among scholars.¹⁹ Even so, two conceptions of

International Relations: Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Peter van Ham, *Social Power in International Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010); Stefano Guzzini, *Power, Realism and Constructivism* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, eds., *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); David A. Baldwin, *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016).

¹⁷ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 48. Emphasis in original.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Keith Dowding, ed., *Encyclopedia of Power* (California: SAGE, 2011), pp. 521-524. Also see, Pamela Pansardi, “Power to and Power over: Two Distinct Concepts of Power,” *Journal of Political Power*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2012, pp.73-89.

power, one pertinent to the means of interaction, and the other pertinent to the outcome of interaction, are discernable.

The first conception of power, which can be called ‘power as capacity’ (Power I), refers to the material and non-material, tangible and intangible, resources possessed, and employed if need be, by an actor to have an effect on the outcome of a process of interaction. This conception of power is espoused, for instance, by John J. Mearsheimer. According to Mearsheimer, while others “define power in terms of the outcomes of the interactions between states,” by asserting that power “is all about control or influence over other states,” for him power “represents nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state.”²⁰

The resources that constitute a state’s power potential have been subject to meticulous research under the designations of ‘elements of power’ or ‘components of power’. Depending on the researcher’s viewpoint, elements of power are classified, for example, as long-term elements of power and short-term elements of power, or tangible elements of power and intangible elements of power. One inclusive classification, comprising tangible and intangible elements of power, was articulated by Morgenthau. “Two groups of elements have to be distinguished: those which are relatively stable, and those which are subject to constant change,”²¹ according to Morgenthau. In his subsequent discussion, he specifies 1. geography, 2. natural resources in specific reference to food and raw materials, 3. industrial capacity, 4.

²⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 57.

²¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, p. 112.

military preparedness in specific reference to technology, leadership, and quality and quantity of armed forces, 5. population in specific reference to distribution and trends, 6. national character, 7. national morale in specific reference to the quality of society and government, 8. the quality of diplomacy, and 9. the quality of government as elements of national power.²²

The second conception of power, on the other hand, which can be called ‘power as capability (Power II), refers to the ability of an actor to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction. Accordingly, while power as capacity can be ascertained at any point, either absent interaction or in a process of interaction, power as capability can only be ascertained at the end of a process of interaction. Although most conceptions of power appraise power as a capability, they differ on the causal mechanism through which certain resources possessed by a state are translated into the ability of state to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of an interaction. I argue that the nexus translating ‘power as capacity’ (Power I) into ‘power as capability’ (Power II) is influence.

2.1.2 Power Accumulation

An enduring dimension of theoretical debates over power in international relations is power accumulation. According to Kenneth Waltz, for example, the means available to states to be employed to achieve their objectives “fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s

²² Ibid., pp. 112-149.

own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one.”²³ The first category is called internal balancing, and the second category is called external balancing. Despite the neorealist proclivity to conceive of these two categories in mainly materialist terms, both have material and non-material dimensions. In addition, the two categories have implications for both power as capacity (Power I) and power as capability (Power II).²⁴

Table 1: A Taxonomy of Balancing

	Internal	External
Material	A (domestic)	B (strategic)
Non-Material	C (ideational)	D (institutional)

Material internal balancing (A), which could also be called domestic balancing, is the acquisition, accumulation, and consolidation of material and tangible resources in various ways to be put into strategic use for the attainment of a state’s objectives. In Ahmet Davutoğlu’s formulation of power, as an example, potential data, which is one of the three constitutive parameters of a state’s power, are constituted by economic capacity, technological capacity, and military capacity.²⁵ As a corollary, to Davutoğlu, development of these capacities is tantamount to power accumulation. Non-material internal balancing (C), which could also be called ideational balancing, on the other hand, is the acquisition, accumulation, and consolidation non-material attributes of the domestic setting of a state contributing to, or militating against, the

²³ Kenneth Watz, *Theory of International Politics* (Waveland Press: Longrove, 2010), p. 118.

²⁴ A theoretical discussion of these implications is omitted in this thesis.

²⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Stratejik Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2007), pp. 24-29.

internal accumulation and external execution of power in political, economic, and social terms. To Ahmet Davutoğlu, for example, these include strategic mentality, strategic planning, and political will.²⁶

Material external balancing (B), which could also be called strategic balancing, is the acquisition, accumulation, and consolidation of resources for a state through the formation of and engagement with strategic cooperative relationships with other states, usually in collective security arrangements, simply called alliances and coalitions.²⁷ Non-material external balancing (D), which is called institutional balancing, is the acquisition, accumulation, and consolidation of resources for a state through the formation of and participation in international institutional arrangements. According to Kai He, institutional balancing is “countering pressures or threats thorough initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions,” and “is a new realist strategy for states under high economic interdependence.”²⁸

2.2 Influence in International Relations

In the scholarly literature of international relations, influence, as a concept, is in widespread circulation, employed to denote various international phenomena ranging

²⁶ Ibid. For another example focusing on variables militating against effective internal balancing, see, Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008).

²⁷ There is a vast literature in international relations on alliances and coalitions. For recent studies, see, Michael O. Slobodchikoff, *Strategic Cooperation: Overcoming the Barriers of Global Anarchy* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013); Scott Wolford, *The Politics of Military Coalitions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Tongfi Kim, *The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).

²⁸ Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2008, pp. 489-518, p. 489. Also see, Kai He, *Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China’s Rise* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

from the international ‘influence of potato’ to ‘influence warfare’ between terrorists and governments,²⁹ or to denote policy behaviors of various actors ranging from single personalities to international organizations.³⁰ In most of the research, influence, as Kenneth N. Waltz notes regarding the concept of ‘reification’, is “often merely the loose use of language or the employment of metaphor to make one’s prose more pleasing,” and employed in the basic senses of effect or control.³¹ In some research, on the other hand, being devoid of explicit conceptualization, the author’s understanding of the concept of ‘influence’ is implicit within the text, and can only be inferred indirectly from the text.

The research of Kayhan Barzegar, a prominent scholar on Iran’s foreign policy, investigating “the importance of Iran’s current position in the Middle East and in the international security system” is exemplary of the cases where the author’s understanding of influence is implicit within the text and can only be indirectly inferred from it, and where different meanings are attributed to the same concept depending on the argument at hand. First, with reference to Al Qaeda, Barzegar argues that “on the extent of Al Qaeda’s influence on regional and global security, one can refer to the following efforts” of Al Qaeda of, for example, “fomenting

²⁹ Redcliffe Salaman, *The History and Social Influence of the Potato* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); James J. F. Forest, ed., *Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2009).

³⁰ See, for example, Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jeffrey H. Norwitz, ed., *Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups around the World* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009); Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Alex Warleigh and Jenny Fairbrass, eds., *Influence and Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and Advocacy* (London: Europa Publications, 2002); Astrid Boening et al., eds., *Global Power Europe-Vol. 2: Policies, Actions, and Influence of the EU’s External Relations* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013); James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher, *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

³¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), p. 120.

religious wars and divisions in the Muslim world,” and “creating a gap between the Muslim world and the Christian world.”³² Second, with reference to Iran, Barzegar argues that “the increasing importance of the Shiite and Kurdish factor in the new Iraq has increased Iran’s influence in the country.”³³ Third, with reference to China, for Barzegar, “new developments have also increased China’s influence in the Middle East,” and “most importantly, Iran’s nuclear program and the United Nations Security Council’s sanctions, has [sic] given China more influence on a controversial Middle Eastern issue.”³⁴

In the first case, influence seems to be about the effects of a non-state actor’s behavior on security structures, while in the second case, influence seems to be about a state’s control over domestic political developments within another state through domestic actors within the second state. In the third case, influence seems to be about, first, a state and its relationship with a specific territory, and second, a state and its relationship with a specific issue.

The same conceptual underdevelopment is surprisingly manifest in more theoretically sophisticated research. An early example is Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf’s study on ‘international influence relationships’ in which they argue that “measurement of the structure of influence relationships in the international system constitutes an important, if difficult, practical as well as

³² Kayhan Barzegar, “Iran, the Middle East, and International Security,” *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, pp. 27-39, p. 30.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

theoretical problem.”³⁵ Based on an assumption that “official visits are motivated by the desire to exercise influence or ascribe status”, their “operational measure of influence relationships is based on visits between heads-of-states and governmental officials.”³⁶ Nevertheless, the absence of a definition of influence, compounded with the limited operational measure of influence relationships, unavoidably restricts the validity of their findings.

Holsti, as another example, in his discussion of power, capability, and influence in foreign policy actions, makes frequent references to influence acts, exercise of influence and variables affecting it, and patterns of influence.³⁷ Still, his conceptualization of influence is vague at best as he defines influence as “an aspect of power [which] is essentially a *means* to an end”.³⁸ In a similar manner, James W. Davis, Jr., in an ambitious endeavor to formulate a theory of influence, briefly explains that his book is “about influence,” specifically advancing the argument that “*both* threats and promises are effective tools of inter-state influence when statesmen bargain in the shadow of war.”³⁹ Davis, Jr. defines, for instance, ‘social influence attempts’ as “characterized by at least three components (1) a source, (2) a signal, (3) a target” to indicate that threats and promises “are tools of social influence” since they “are signals sent by a source to a target in an effort to influence the target’s

³⁵ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, “Structural Characteristics of International Influence Relationships: A Replication Study,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1976, pp. 261-299, pp. 262-263.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

³⁷ Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, pp. 164-181.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165. Emphasis in original.

³⁹ James W. Davis, Jr. *Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 2.

behavior.”⁴⁰ Still, there is no conceptualization of influence itself in his thorough examination of the pursuit of international influence.

More to the point, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow consider “more to power than material capabilities and, more important, distinguish power from influence, as the former does not necessarily confer the latter,” and “recognize different kinds of power and the diverse ways in which power might be translated into influence.”⁴¹ While criticizing, among others, Morgenthau for conflating power and influence,⁴² Waltz for rejecting “any distinction between power and influence” and reducing “power to a narrow understanding of material capabilities,”⁴³ and Nye for his concept of soft power which “is soft in conceptualization and weak in empirics,”⁴⁴ Reich and Lebow do not undertake any conceptualization of influence, a central concept in their inquiry, assume that its meaning is self-evident, and proceed to discuss “the most effective form of influence,” which, they claim, is persuasion.⁴⁵

2.2.1 Definition of Influence

The word ‘influence,’ coming ultimately from Latin, etymologically means ‘flowing into,’ akin to its Turkish translation *nüfuz*, which, coming ultimately from Arabic, etymologically means ‘penetration.’ As a concept, there are tentative definitions, or at least definitional attempts, for influence in international relations literature, despite

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴¹ Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, *Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 16.

⁴² Ibid., p. 28.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 31.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 34.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 35.

the scholarly propensity to circumvent the methodological necessity of conceptualization for the facility of argumentation.

As early as 1955, James G. March made a remarkable analysis on ‘the theory and measurement of influence’ specifying, first, some problems in the analysis of influence, and then, presenting an operational definition of influence along with the specification of influence processes. Observing that “influence is to the study of decision-making what force is to the study of motion—a generic explanation for the basic observable phenomena,” March defines influence as “the inducement of change” in the sense that “if the individual deviates from the predicted path of behavior, influence has occurred, and, specifically, that it is influence which has induced the change.”⁴⁶ However, March’s research was pertinent exclusively to decisionmaking processes in domestic politics.

A very tentative definition was introduced by Frederick H. Hartmann according to whom influence was simply “unconscious power.”⁴⁷ To Hartmann, “in a more formal sense, power is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests,” and “the very existence of power has an effect,” meaning that “no state can ignore the possibility that the power of another state will be used.”⁴⁸ Accordingly, he clarifies, “the power of that other state is in effect used, and plays some part both in the initial formulation of policies and in the subsequent

⁴⁶ James G. March, “An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1955, pp. 431-451, p. 432, pp. 434-435.

⁴⁷ Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 43.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

relations of the states concerned, even where it is not intentionally put to use.” In short, influence, as unconscious power, ensues.

Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, on the other hand, provide a circular definition of influence. Viotti and Kauppi are of the opinion that “a state’s *influence* (or capacity to influence or coerce) is not only determined by its capabilities (or relative capabilities) but also by (1) its willingness (and perceptions by other states of its willingness) to use these capabilities and (2) its control or *influence* over other states.”⁴⁹ This oblique definition of influence, it seems, confuses more than it clarifies.⁵⁰

A recent study on regional security strategies in Southeast Asia introduces a novel concept, ‘balance of influence,’ based on a conception of influence as encapsulating “a range of other modes and means [than military and economic resources] by which states with relatively less preponderance of power may still wield the resources and capacity to shape their strategic circumstances by virtue of status, membership, normative standing, or other persuasive abilities.”⁵¹ According to Evelyn Goh, the conception of ‘balance of influence’ permits researchers “to expand the number of key reference points from which they may compare resources, and highlights that a state’s influence and power as much from ideational sources as from material

⁴⁹ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond* (Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), p. 64. Italics added.

⁵⁰ The confusion here is the authors’ circular assertion that a state’s influence is determined by its influence!

⁵¹ Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2007-08, pp. 113-157, p. 147.

sources.”⁵² Again, there is merely an oblique conceptualization of influence in Goh’s study despite the central place of the concept, while influence is reduced to non-material instruments and sources of interstate diplomacy.

In another study, entitled *Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East*,⁵³ influence is defined in a footnote as “power as control over actors,” and then the author refers to Jeffrey Hart’s definition of control over actors as “the ability of A to get B to do something which he would otherwise not do,”⁵⁴ which was originally, and the author accepts, Dahl’s definition of power.⁵⁵ The author concedes that this definition is now accepted as a standard definition of power in the literature as seen in the works of David A. Baldwin⁵⁶ and Nye, Jr.⁵⁷ but still asserts that although these scholars “prefer to call this [definition] power rather than influence or control,” he thinks “this [definition] lumps together two related but distinct elements.”⁵⁸ Ironically, in his attempt to define influence as a distinct element, which the author must do, considering the title of his study, he concludes by subsuming influence with power under the same definition.

As a final example, in his entry of *Influence* to the *Encyclopedia of Power*, also edited by himself, Keith Dowding indicates two different definitions of influence. In

⁵² Ibid., p. 147.

⁵³ Jeremy Pressman, “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 149-179.

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” *International Organization*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1976, pp. 289-305, p. 291.

⁵⁵ Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” p. 202-203.

⁵⁶ David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1979, pp. 161-194.

⁵⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁵⁸ Jeremy Pressman, “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East,” p. 150. The quotation is from the footnote.

the first definition, influence “is usually considered a form of verbal persuasion,” in the sense that “information given by A to B will change B’s decision. That information influences B’s decision.”⁵⁹ Here, influence is considered a subset of power. In the second definition, being distinguished from power “defined in terms of structurally determined abilities to change behavior,” influence is defined as “the socially induced modification of behavior.”⁶⁰ Here, influence is considered a separate category. Dowding’s ultimate evaluation between two definitions of influence is equivocal and rather evasive. To him, “such a demarcation between power and influence is only definitional,” and “whether influence is a subset of power or a different category altogether is only of any interest if the difference has any effect on the manner in which we examine and explain society.”⁶¹

To emphasize once again, despite its extensive usage in scholarly studies in international relations, a systematic conceptualization of influence presenting a perspicuous definition of influence and a coherent exposition of its relationship with power is arguably still underdeveloped in the literature.⁶²

In international politics, influence can be defined as the *effect* of actor A (henceforth A) over the *decision* of actor B (henceforth B) through A’s involvement in the *decisionmaking* process of B. Therefore, influence is not a cause; it is an effect. In addition, it is not a potentiality; it is an actuality. A has influence over B insofar as

⁵⁹ Keith Dowding, ed., *Encyclopedia of Power*, p. 342.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² As a matter of fact, some noteworthy attempts to that end have been made from the perspective of sociology and political science. For a detailed presentation of these studies, see Ruth Zimmerling, *Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).

the decision of B reflects the preference of A that would otherwise not been reflected. This definition of influence depends on a basic assumption that a state's foreign policy behavior is not a necessary outcome of a state's automatic response to external stimuli. More importantly, a state's foreign policy is assumed to be invariably a contingent outcome of a decisionmaking process which is not impervious to the involvement of other states, and other actors in that matter, in different degrees, in different ways, and in different forms.

2.2.2 The Relationship between Power and Influence

Before discussing the process connecting power as capacity (Power I), influence, and power as capability (Power II) to each other, essential characteristics distinguishing influence from power ought to be specified. The pervasive confusion in understanding and explaining power, influence, and the relationship between the two originates in the conflation of the point of references they are pertinent to. Power can be about both decision and behavior depending on its type (Power I or Power II); influence is exclusively about decision. This conceptual ambiguity can be noticed, for example, in Thomas C. Schelling's discussion of forcible action. According to Schelling, "the only purpose [of inflicting suffering], unless sport or revenge, must be to influence somebody's behavior, to coerce his decision or choice."⁶³ For Schelling, as it seems, altering the behavior of somebody and altering the decision of somebody are identical.

⁶³ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 2.

However, the act of taking a decision and the act of taking an action, even though as the manifestation of the prior act of taking a decision, are two ontologically distinct acts despite being temporally sequential. Taking a decision, let's say, to drink water and taking an action of drinking water are two separate personal acts. By the same token, taking a decision to invade a country and taking an action of invading a country are two separate international acts.⁶⁴ Simply, deciding to do something is one thing while doing that thing is another. Since there is always a processual mechanism through which a decision is or is not translated into an action, the underlying assumption of most conceptions of power that there is a spontaneous translation of decision into behavior is empirically erroneous. Needless to say, enacting a decision, and thereby translating it into behavior is contingent upon a multitude of factors.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the concurrent use of the concepts of influence and power in a great many studies evinces the general understanding of the inherent association between them. Most of the studies use power and influence conjointly,⁶⁶ some talk of 'power

⁶⁴ See, for example, Michael J. Sullivan III, *American Adventurism Abroad: 30 Invasions, Interventions, and Regime Changes since World War II* (Westport: Praeger, 2004); Bradley F. Podliska, *Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of American Hegemony and Unilateral Use-of-Force Decision Making* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010); Ahmed Ijaz Malik, *US Foreign Policy and the Gulf Wars: Decision Making and International Relations* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015).

⁶⁵ In terms of underbalancing, see, for example, Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁶⁶ See, for example, Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, *Power and Influence: An Introduction to International Relations* (Monterey: Wadsworth Publishing, 1985); John M. Rothgeb, *Defining Power: Influence & Force in the Contemporary International System* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Juliet Kaarbo, "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1996, pp. 501-530; Ann L. Phillips, *Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East Central Europe* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Robert E. Hunter, *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); Deborah E. de Lange, *Power and Influence: The Embeddedness of Nations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Tore T. Petersen, *Anglo-American Policy toward the Persian Gulf, 1978-1985: Power, Influence, and Restraint* (Eastbourne: Sussex University Press, 2015); Lorenzo Kamel, *Imperial Perceptions of Palestine: British Influence and Power in Late Ottoman Times* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015).

without influence,⁶⁷ some talk of ‘influence without power,’⁶⁸ and some talk of ‘influence of power.’⁶⁹ This inherent association in the form of a process connecting power as capacity (Power I), influence, and power as capability (Power II) can be formulated in a simple fashion.




Figure 1: The Nexus between Power I, Influence, and Power II

Power I, as mentioned before, refers to the material and non-material, tangible and intangible, *resources* possessed and employed by A to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having *an effect on the decision* of B. While the ultimate objective of A exercising Power I is to have an effect on the behavior of B, the proximate objective of A exercising Power I is to have an effect on the decision of B. The mere act of exercising Power I does not necessarily culminate in producing an effect on the decision of B due to intervening factors that condition the translation of Power I into an effect on the decision of B.

⁶⁷ See, for example, Tuomas Forsberg and Antti Seppo, “Power without Influence? The EU and Trade Disputed with Russia,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 10, 2009, pp. 1805-1823.

⁶⁸ See, for example, Donald M. Mckale, “Influence without Power: The Last Khedive of Egypt and the Great Powers, 1914-1918,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1997, pp. 20-39; Carr Ungerer, “Influence without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control Diplomacy during the Cold War,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2007, pp. 393-414.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1918); Rick Fawn, “Alliance Behavior, the Absentee Liberator and the Influence of Soft Power: Post-communist State Positions over the Iraq War in 2003,” *Cambridge Review of International Relations*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2006, pp. 465-480; Alice V. Monroe, ed., *China’s Foreign Policy and Soft Power Influence* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010).




Figure 2: Transition Mechanism from Power I to Influence to Power II

Influence, as mentioned before, is the *effect* of A over the *decision* of B through A’s involvement in the *decisionmaking* process of B by virtue of exercising Power I.

Accordingly, in verbal form, to influence means to have an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. In adjectival form, being influential means having an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. Moreover, *influence act* is a volitional act with its exercise an effect on the decision of B is intended. On the other hand, *influential act* is a volitional act with its exercise an effect on the decision of B is achieved.⁷⁰ Another significant point to stress here is that both A and B are willful agents in possession of the essential attribute of agency, that is, the capacity of making a decision. Accordingly, in this sense, non-willful, that is, non-self-conscious, entities cannot be a party to an influence relationship, neither as a subject nor as an object. Both A and B are necessarily willful agents.

Power II, as mentioned before, refers to the *ability* of A to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having *an effect*

⁷⁰ This thesis pertains only to *influence acts* of a state in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, not its *influential acts*.

on the *decision* of B. There are two highly significant points that need articulation. The first is the relationship between influence and Power II. Influence as *the effect* of A on the *decision* of B is not the cause of Power II as *the ability* of A to have an effect on the *behavior* of B. There is not a causal relationship between the two as Figure 1 would suggest. Influence and Power II are ontologically distinct and yet require each other to exist; they are like the two sides of the coin. Only with influence, can Power II come into existence, and Power II exists as long as influence exists. The second is that influence is a necessary condition for Power II, but not a sufficient condition. For Power II to exist, influence must exist in advance; still, the prior existence of influence does not necessarily lead to Power II. In other words, the effect on the *decision* of B (influence) does not necessarily lead to an effect on the *behavior* of B (Power II) due to intervening factors that condition the translation of *decisional effect* (influence) into *behavioral effect* (Power II). The respective points of reference for Power I, influence, and Power II are shown below.

Table 2: Points of Reference for Power I, Influence, and Power II

	Point of Reference
Power I	Resources
Influence	Decision
Power II	Behavior

2.2.3 A Taxonomy of Influence

In reference to some definitive criteria, influence can be classified into different categories, constituting a taxonomy. First, in terms of the degree of influence, influence could be *absolute*, that is, the decision of B completely reflects the preference of A. In this case, the decision of B is related to the enactment or non-enactment of a single behavior. It is a decision of B on performing or not performing a particular action. Influence could also be *relative*, that is, the decision of B partially reflects the preference of A. In this case, the decision of B is related to the degree of the enactment of a single behavior. It is a decision of B on the extent of performing a particular action. In international relations, absolute influence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for relative influence. The preference of A could be reflected in the decision of B to enact a single behavior while subsequently the preference of A could not be reflected in the decision of B on the extent of enacting that single behavior.

Second, in terms of directional orientation of influence act, influence could be *direct* as a result of A's direct involvement in the decisionmaking process of B. Influence could be *indirect* as a result of A's indirect involvement in the decisionmaking process of B. In direct involvement, A involves in the decisionmaking process of actor B through formal and informal channels directly sharing its opinion or position with actor B with the purpose of having an effect on B's decision. Direct influence could be in the form of cooperative and peaceful policy behaviors, such as consultations and deliberations, or in the form of conflictual and hostile policy behaviors, such as diplomatic notes or economic embargoes. The important point here is that A has a direct involvement in the decisionmaking process of B. In indirect influence, A's past and/or prospective behavior being an effective element in

the decisionmaking process of actor B *without* the actual involvement of A in the decisionmaking process of B. As an example, assuming absence of diplomatic relations between A and B, and assuming hostility between the two states, it can be said that the two countries still have influence, but indirect, over each other being important elements in the considerations of each other's decisionmaking processes. Counterintuitively, actors involved in hostility necessarily possess a certain degree of influence over each other.

In terms of decisional orientation of influence act, influence could be *proactive*. In the implementation of its *own* decision, A gets involved in the decisionmaking process of B for the purpose of having an effect on the decision of B. Influence could also be *reactive*. In B's implementation of B's decision, A gets involved in the decisionmaking process of B, again for the purpose of having an effect on the decision of B. As an example, assuming an impending invasion by A of C, during the preparations for the invasion, A could succeed in having an effect on the decision of B for assisting A or not assisting C. This is proactive influence. B, as well, could succeed in having an effect on the decision of A for not embarking on an invasion of C. This is reactive influence.

By the same token, in terms of spatial orientation of influence act, influence could be *internal*. It is a general characteristic of international relations that actors' foreign policy behaviors are not always intended to have an effect on other actors' foreign policy behavior for a host of reasons. Foreign policy behavior is not exclusive; it targets domestic politics of other actors as well. Internal influence is A's effect on the

decisions of B with regard to B’s domestic politics. *External* influence is A’s effect on the decisions of B with regard to B’s foreign policy.

Furthermore, in terms of relational orientation of influence act, influence could be *relational* and/or *structural*. A could have an effect on the decision of B as a result of a dyadic relationships between the two. On the other hand, A could have an effect on the decision of B as a result of an advantageous structural positioning. A could establish, sustain, and/or govern a formal or informal structure wherein B occupies a position whereby A acquires an effect on decisions of B without necessarily engaging in a dyadic relationships with B.⁷¹

Table 3: A Taxonomy of Influence

Degree	Absolute	Relative
Directional Orientation	Direct	Indirect
Decisional Orientation	Proactive	Reactive
Spatial Orientation	Internal	External
Relational Orientation	Relational	Structural

2.3 What are a State’s Motives to Seek Influence in Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships?

⁷¹ This categorization of influence is similar to Susan Strange’s categorization of power into relational power and structural power. Strange defines structural power as the “power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate.” Susan Strange, *States and Markets* (London: Continuum, 1994), pp. 24-25.

Strategic environment is not strategic wilderness. Not a single state in international politics is isolated from other states nor is immune to the ramifications of developments in international politics, especially of developments in its vicinity.⁷² Its very existence as a state depends on an interaction with other states, that is, receiving recognition from them. Therefore, it is inescapable for states to seek influence, at least about issues and on states of direct concern; though the existence, the degree, and the extent of influence acts change according to particular internal and external circumstances. If, for example, a state is suffering regime insecurity, it is anticipated that it would be less involved in influence acts abroad and opt for isolationism. Still, depending on peculiar circumstances, it would also be more prone to engage in influence acts in its strategic environment.⁷³ For a scrupulous discussion of a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships, first, an accurate examination of relevant concepts needs to be put forth.

2.3.1 Definitions of Relevant Concepts

The ongoing debate over the definition of regions and regional systems is just one example of the incessant conceptual controversies in the discipline of international relations even over common notions.⁷⁴ Regardless of definitional variations over

⁷² In fact, influence attempts extensively take place between state and non-state actors in international relations. While its conclusions are arguably valid for the intricate relationships between state and non-state actors, this thesis confines its theoretical and practical discussions only to interstate relations with state constituting its exclusive unit of analysis.

⁷³ For example, with reference to China's regime insecurity and its foreign policy on territorial disputes see, M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁷⁴ On defining regions and regional systems/orders/complexes see, for example, Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd, eds., *Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Developing Countries* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980); Mohammed Ayoob, "From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999, pp. 247-260; Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the*

regions and regional systems, “the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs.”⁷⁵ Writing in the aftermath of the Cold War, even though David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan confined the subject matter of scholarly exploration at the regional level of analysis to security affairs, with the swift emergence and prevalence of the practice and theory of regionalism in international relations, the regional level has arguably become a primary level of analysis to explore all dimensions of contemporary affairs.⁷⁶

Drawing on Hedley Bull’s famous definition of international system, a *regional system* “is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decision, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.”⁷⁷ An essential prerequisite distinguishing a regional system from Bull’s international system is geographical proximity between states that “are in regular contact with one another, and...there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element

American Imperium (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005); Andrew Hurrell, “One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2007, pp. 127-146; Amitav Acharya, “The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2007, pp. 629-652; Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier, *Regional Power and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).

⁷⁵ David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs,” in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 1997), pp. 3-19, p. 6.

⁷⁶ On regionalism in international relations, see, for example, Mary Farrell et al., eds., *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice* (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005); Philippe de Lombaerde, ed., *Assessment and Measurement of Regional Integration* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Rodrigo Tavares, *Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010); Mario Telo, ed., *European Union and New Regionalism: Competing Regionalism and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014); Etel Solingen, *Comparative Regionalism: Economics and Security* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).

⁷⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), p. 9.

in the calculations of the other.”⁷⁸ Basically, a regional system is a type of international system, composed of states in geographical proximity to each other forming a distinguishable geopolitical cluster of interacting units. On the other hand, in regional systems, there are different sorts of non-state actors from transnational social movements to intergovernmental organizations, with and within which states interact. In this thesis, state-to-state relations in the form of dyads in a regional system are specifically addressed excluding states’ relations with non-state actors in a regional system.

Regional policy of a state, in singular form, denotes an abstraction that exists only in terms of a state’s regional foreign policy objective. Regional policy is a state’s grand regional strategy. Regional policy becomes *regional policies*, in plural form, in terms of regional foreign policy practice. To elaborate, for an extra-regional state, averting the emergence of a regional hegemonic state dominating a regional system would be regional policy. However, in the practical implementation of this regional policy, it would engage in an array of regional policies ranging from containing one regional state, to aligning with another regional state while militarily intervening in yet another regional state.

Dyadic relationships are in general divided into two categories. While *directed dyadic relationship* “captures the policy of one actor as it is directed toward another actor; the policy is target-specific rather than generalized,” *summed dyadic relationship* concerns the reciprocal policies of two states directed toward one

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 9-10.

another and the outcomes of this reciprocity, and thus is “a sum of the acts sent and received between the interaction parties.”⁷⁹ *Sub-regional dyadic relationship* refers to the interaction between a pair of states that are integral to the same regional system. Accordingly, a sub-regional dyadic relationship can be a directed dyadic relationship or a summed dyadic relationship. Still, in this thesis, sub-regional dyadic relationship specifically refers to a directed dyadic relationship in which regional policies of a hypothetical state A are directed toward another hypothetical state B in the same regional system. A is the subject of regional policies while B is the object of regional policies of A. Furthermore, in a regional system, A and B could be geographically adjacent to each other. They could also be geographically separate from each other.⁸⁰

Motive, coming from the Latin word *motivus*, etymologically means “moving, impelling” is defined as “that which inwardly moves a person to behave a certain way,” identical to its Turkish translation of the word *sâik*.⁸¹ Here, motive is conceived as an innate impulse that performs as an existential incitement to action. Motive is an ontological necessity and as such is different from objective, which is conceived here as the desired intermediary state of affairs the practical manifestations of which are contingent upon an actor’s considerations shaped by particular circumstances. Objective is an ontological contingency. Security is a motive; by virtue of being, a self-conscious actor is in possession of this innate impulse, which incites it to action. However, the action it resorts to and the

⁷⁹ Charles W. Kegley, Jr., *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2009), p. 14.

⁸⁰ This thesis does not make an assumption in this regard.

⁸¹ *Online Etymology Dictionary*,
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=motive&allowed_in_frame=0.

intermediary state of affairs it can seek to attain and retain through this action vary on its appreciations of contextual circumstances. Simply, in pursuit of security, states could opt for balancing or bandwagoning, appeasement or coercion, peace or war.

Motive is thus universal. However, to which motives are ascribed ontological necessity have been a subject of diverse interpretations. For instance, according to Waltz, there is only one fundamental motive, which he calls the survival motive, and “beyond the survival motive, the aim of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone.”⁸² On the other hand, a distinct strand of thought in the discipline, specifically in the intellectual tradition of realism, has ascribed a triad of motives to state conduct, which is conventionally conceived in a paradigm of power politics.⁸³

In Book I of the *Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides has Athenian envoys address the Spartan assembly and affirm the motives behind Athens’ imperial expansion that the empire they “acquired not by violence, but you [Spartans] were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian [Persians], and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command.”⁸⁴ And, the Athenians continued, “the nature of the case first compelled

⁸² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 91.

⁸³ For a classic study on the *sources* of state motives, see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

⁸⁴ Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996), p. 43.

us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in.”⁸⁵

Thomas Hobbes, in *Leviathan* speculating on “the natural condition of mankind as concerning their felicity, and misery,” is of the conviction that “in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.”⁸⁶ To Hobbes, “the first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.”⁸⁷ Violence is considered by Hobbes the primary medium of action for men as “the first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.”⁸⁸

Declaring that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,” Morgenthau differentiates between the ultimate aims and the immediate aim of international politics.⁸⁹ While “power is always the immediate aim,” he asserts, “statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power

⁸⁵ Ibid. Also see, Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations,” *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1994, pp. 131-153; Richard Ned Lebow, “Thucydides the Constructivist,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 3, 2001, pp. 647-560; Christine Lee and Neville Morley, eds., *A Handbook to the Reception of Thucydides* (Malden: Joh Wiley & Sons, 2015). Donald Kagan has “found that [Thucydides’] trio of motives most illuminating the origins of war throughout history.” Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Anchor Books, 1996), p. 8.

⁸⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 83.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid. Also see, Noel Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); A. Nuri Yurdusev, “Thomas Hobbes and International Relations: From Realism to Rationalism,” *Australian Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2006, pp. 305-321; Michael C. Williams, “The Hobbesian Theory of International Relations: Three Traditions,” in Beate Jahn, ed., *Classical Theory in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 253-276.

⁸⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, p. 27.

itself.”⁹⁰ Interestingly enough, Morgenthau ascribes ontological necessity to the immediate aim of power, and ontological contingency to the ultimate aims of freedom, security, and prosperity.

Ned Lebow, espousing again a triad of motives, presents an exceptional framework of analysis for international relations. His cultural theory of international relations “is based on a simple set of assumptions about human motives. Following the Greeks [especially Plato and Aristotle], I posit spirit, appetite and reason as fundamental drives with distinct objects or ends. They give rise to distinctive forms of behavior that have different implications for cooperation, conflict and risk-taking.”⁹¹ First, Ned Lebow elaborates on the spirit-based paradigm that “starts from the premise that people, individually and collectively, seek self-esteem,” which “is a sense of self-worth that makes people feel good about themselves, happier about life and more confident about their ability to confront its challenges.”⁹²

The second motive is appetite, which to Ned Lebow, “is the drive with which we are all familiar.”⁹³ Ned Lebow reminds that “Plato considered wealth to have become the dominant appetite in Athens, a development that has found an echo in all societies where some degree of affluence becomes possible,” and, he continues, “there are, of course, other appetites, including sex, food, drink, clothing and drugs, but

⁹⁰ Ibid. Also see, Sean Molloy, “Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau’s Formulation of Realism,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1-34; Michael C. Williams, ed., *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).

⁹¹ Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 26.

⁹² Ibid., p. 61. Of note, this triad of motives has its equivalent in Islamic political theory as *rūḥ*, *nafs*, and *‘aql*.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 72.

contemporary economists and liberals either ignore them or assume their satisfaction depends on, or is at least facilitated by, wealth.”⁹⁴

The third motive is reason, of which there is a lack of paradigm, Ned Lebow maintains. Still, a reason-based paradigm is imaginable as, for example, “order in reason-informed worlds arises from the willingness of actors to cooperate even when it may be contrary to their immediate self-interest. All actors recognize that cooperation sustains that *nomos* [law] that allows all of them to advance their interests more effectively than they could in its absence.”⁹⁵ Furthermore, there is fear. According to Ned Lebow, “fear is an emotion, not a fundamental human drive. In this sense it differs from appetite, spirit and reason. It arises from imbalance and the application of human imagination to its likely, or even possible, consequences. Fear triggers a desire for security which can be satisfied in many ways.”⁹⁶ However, in the table Ned Lebow clarifies basic motives, and corresponding goals and instruments, he specifies fear instead of reason as one of the fundamental motives in addition to appetite and spirit.⁹⁷

Particular triads of respective thinkers can be reconfigured in the form of a new triad as being conceived of security, economy, and identity.⁹⁸ Security, economy, and identity as state’s motives are ascribed the status of ontological necessity since for an

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 72-73.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 77.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 89.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 90. Also see, Richard Ned Lebow, *Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Richard Ned Lebow, *Why Nations Fight* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁹⁸ There are also attempts to establish ‘motivational systems’ based on particular classifications of motives. For one example, see, Richard W. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study* (London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977). Some other studies incorporate state motives in their analyses as fundamental variables. See, for example, Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010).

actor, including state, to be is to make a choice, to decide. *Opto ergo sum*, I choose therefore I am, is considered here the essence of agency. The policy choices of state are inherently informed, shaped, and regulated by considerations of security, economy, and identity, either separately or in varying combinations. Thus, security, economy, and identity are considered in this thesis as existential imperatives.⁹⁹

Table 4: Motives of Human/State Conduct in Thucydides, Hobbes, Morgenthau, and Ned Lebow

	Security	Economy	Identity
Thucydides	Fear	Interest	Honor
Hobbes	Diffidence/Safety	Competition/Gain	Glory/Reputation
Morgenthau ¹⁰⁰	Security	Prosperity	Freedom
Ned Lebow	Reason/Fear	Appetite	Spirit

Essence of motives is indivisible; the subject matters of considerations related to motives are not. Accordingly, a motive here is considered being composed of sub-motive elements defined as the substantial contingent considerations related to a motive constituting identifying reference points for it. Security is defined here in peculiar reference to the level wherein the subject matters of a state's security considerations originate. Accordingly, there are four sub-motive elements for

⁹⁹ There is a similar formulation used in the literature composed of 3 Ps: power, prosperity, prestige. I prefer SEI: security, economy, identity.

¹⁰⁰ To reiterate, the fundamental motive for state conduct for Morgenthau is power despite being the immediate aim of state conduct. Here, the ultimate aims of state conduct in Morgenthau's opinion are recast as fundamental motives.

security; unit-level security, dyad-level security, regional-level security, and international-level security.¹⁰¹ Economy is defined here in reference to specific subject matters of a state’s economic considerations. Accordingly, there are three sub-motive elements for economy; trade, investment, and energy. Identity is defined here in reference to particular ‘bases’ of a state’s identity considerations. Accordingly, there are three sub-motive elements for identity; person identity, role identity, and social identity.¹⁰²

Table 5: Sub-Motive Elements for Security, Economy, and Identity

	Security	Economy	Identity
Sub-Motive Elements	Unit-Level	Trade	Person
	Dyad-Level	Investment	Role
	Regional-Level	Energy	Social
	International-Level		

2.3.2 Security

Security, as a credible concept, does not inspire confidence, so to speak, insofar as a passionate theoretical debate on the nature and extent of its ‘contestedness’ persists.

Security is an “essentially contested concept,”¹⁰³ argues Barry Buzan, whereas for

¹⁰¹ Security, of course, like all other concepts, can be defined in reference to several criteria. This point will be discussed in detail below.

¹⁰² The discussion of identity and bases of identity throughout the thesis draws on Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets’ articulation of identity theory, which will be examined in detail below.

¹⁰³ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Problems* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 6.

David A. Baldwin, “security is more appropriately described as a confused or inadequately explicated concept than as an essentially contested one.”¹⁰⁴ Essentially or not, security is a complicated concept, and depending on the referent object of security, or the unit of analysis, the scope of security research stretches from ‘rice security’ to ‘space security,’ while depending on the level of analysis it encompasses human/individual security, societal security, state/national security, regional security, international security, and global/world security.¹⁰⁵

Therefore, not surprisingly, national security continues to be, in the words of Arnold Wolfers, an “ambiguous symbol.”¹⁰⁶ The first explicit conceptualization for national security was that of Walter Lippmann for whom “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.”¹⁰⁷ As a recent definition, according to Melvyn P. Leffler, “national security is about the protection of core values, that is, the identification of threats and the adoption of policies to protect core values.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-26, p. 12. Also see, Benjamin Miller, “The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2001, pp. 13-42.

¹⁰⁵ For some examples, see, Amy Freedman, “Rice Security in Southeast Asia: Beggar Thy Neighbor or Cooperation,” *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 26, No. 5, 2013, pp. 433-454; Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al, eds., *Handbook of Space Security: Policies, Applications and Programs* (New York: Springer, 2015); Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007); Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005); Norrin M. Ripsman and T. V. Paul, *Globalization and the National Security State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal, eds., *Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); Karin M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015); Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹⁰⁶ Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, 1952, pp. 481-502.

¹⁰⁷ Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1943), p. 32.

¹⁰⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, “National Security, Core Values, and Power,” in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume 2: Since 1914* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), pp. 7-10, p. 9.

Regardless of conceptual variance, security is an existential imperative for states.¹⁰⁹ In three concentric circles, states seek influence on the grounds of *security* in their general foreign policies and, within this framework, in their particular regional foreign policies, and within this framework, in their particular sub-regional dyadic relationships. In its sub-regional dyadic relationships, A engages in *security relationships* with B, and aims at having an effect on the decisions of B in terms of security on account of the actual and potential attitudes of B towards the actual and potential *security issues*, which are conceived by A as affecting its security, at different *levels* wherein security issues originate.

A security relationship in sub-regional dyadic relationships involves A's relations with B devised, established, and sustained to serve the perceived security interests of A. A security relationship could be cooperative, that is, A could opt for attaining its perceived security interests by means of cooperating with B. A security relationship could be competitive, that is, A could opt for attaining its perceived security interests by means of competing with B. On the other hand, security issues could be conducive in the sense that they could facilitate A's attainment of its perceived security interests in its cooperative or competitive security relationship with B. Security issues could be restrictive in the sense that they could impede A's

¹⁰⁹ Neorealism attributes security being an existential imperative to the anarchical structure of the international system. For example, to Waltz, "competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound." Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 39-52, p. 43. However, anarchy being a conditional factor, existential imperatives, here security, can only be affected positively or negatively by conditional factors. In other words, security as a state motive is not a production of anarchy; anarchy only aggravates it. In hierarchical structures, security as a motive continues to exist but is not activated as much, in a manner of speaking.

attainment of its perceived security interests in its cooperative or competitive security relationship with B.

A crucial point to emphasize is that A's preference to define security issues in cooperative or competitive terms in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B is neither presupposed nor predetermined. The same security issue could be framed by A in cooperative or competitive terms depending on, for example, A's strategic policy objective, A's assessment of the particular security issue, its judgement of the strategic context, its estimation of the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, and its evaluation of B's responses to the security issue itself and A's prospective policy behaviors.

Table 6: Security in Sub-Regional Dyadic Relationships

		Security Relationship (of A with B)	
		Cooperative	Competitive
Development	Conducive	X	Y
	Restrictive	Z	T

There are four levels in which security issues as the subject matters of A's considerations in its security relationships with B, be them cooperative or

competitive, originate. These four levels are unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international level.




Figure 3: A Level-based Model of Security Issues in Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships

In A's sub-regional dyadic security relationship with B, at the unit-level, one type of security issue in terms of origin could emerge:

1. There could be security issues within B.

In A's sub-regional dyadic security relationship with B, at the dyad-level, one type of security issue in terms of origin could emerge:

2. There could be security issues between A and B.

In A's sub-regional dyadic security relationship with B, at the regional-level, three types of security issues in terms of their origins could emerge:

3. There could be security issues within a regional state (M or N).
4. There could be security issues between two regional states (M and N).

5. There could be security issues between a regional state (M or N) and B.¹¹⁰

In A's sub-regional dyadic security relationship with B, at the international-level, four types of security issues in terms of their origins could emerge:

6. There could be security issues within an international state (X or Y).¹¹¹
7. There could be security issues between two international states (X and Y).
8. There could be security issues between an international state (X or Y) and a regional state (M or N).
9. There could be security issues between an international state (X or Y) and B.

2.3.2.1 Unit-Level Security

At the unit-level, either to avert detrimental repercussions for its perceived security interests or to capitalize on favorable consequences for its perceived security interests, A could exercise influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B, that is, could attempt to have an effect on the decisions of B, on account of the actual and potential attitudes of B towards the actual and potential security issues *within B*, which are conceived by A as affecting its security.

One structural cause is the “irreducible uncertainty about the intentions of others”¹¹² in international relations, which would lead to the security dilemma between A and

¹¹⁰ As a matter of fact, there could be security issues between a regional state (M or N) and A as well; which would lead A to exercise influence acts with B. However, since this thesis is exclusively concerned with directed dyads, and for analytical parsimony, security issues between international/regional states and A are omitted in this model.

¹¹¹ International state here refers to great powers in international politics. An international state becomes a regional state if it is considered with reference to regional politics. If it acts beyond its immediate region, it is considered an international state.

¹¹² Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 17.

B, originally defined by John H. Herz,¹¹³ depending on A's perception of security measures adopted by B. The security dilemma predicated on the assumption that "security measures taken by one actor [B] are perceived by others [A] as threatening; the others [A] take steps to protect themselves; these states are then interpreted by the first actor [B] as confirming its initial hypothesis that the others [A] are dangerous."¹¹⁴ However, A's perception of security measures of B as threatening is only conditional, and A's steps to protect itself would not be necessarily in competitive terms.¹¹⁵ Whether framed in cooperative or competitive terms by A, domestic security issues of B, on the condition of being conceived by A as affecting its security, induce A to exercise influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B.

These security issues within B could be manifold, and could be conducive or restrictive depending on A's preference for cooperative or competitive security relationships with B. For example, the in/stability of political, economic, and social conditions in B could be given particular attention by A in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B due to its actual and potential consequences for A's perceived security interests.

¹¹³ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1950, pp. 157-180.

¹¹⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p. 17.

¹¹⁵ For in-depth discussions of these and related points see, for example, Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990); Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Robert Jervis, "Dilemmas about Security Dilemmas," *Security Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, pp. 416-423.

Civil wars could be a case in point.¹¹⁶ As a severe security issue, a civil war in a state in a regional system engenders broad actual and potential implications for other states' security in the same regional system, in varying degrees of severity though. It could, among others, prompt the state experiencing the civil war to divert the ongoing internal conflict outwards, entangle neighboring states into a protracted conflict, tempts regional and international states to intervene, incite civil unrest and social strife in adjacent states, accelerate arms proliferation in the regional system, cause economic troubles for relevant states, and create grave regional social problems from mass migration to ethnic, religious, or sectarian polarization.¹¹⁷

2.3.2.2 Dyad-Level Security

At the dyad-level, either to avert detrimental repercussions for its perceived security interests or to capitalize on favorable consequences for its perceived security interests, A could exercise influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B, that is, could attempt to have an effect on the decisions of B, on account of the actual and potential attitudes of B towards the actual and potential security issues *between A and B*, which are conceived by A as affecting its security.

Some security issues between two states are intrinsic to the bilateral relationship between them, especially if they share common land and/or maritime borders.

¹¹⁶ It is true that political authority is fragmented in civil wars. However, it is also true that before, during, and after civil wars, there is also a party representing, claiming to represent, or taken to represent, the political authority in a state. Thus, even in a civil war, a state is not insusceptible to influence acts of other states, sometimes more than usual.

¹¹⁷ On civil wars and their regional consequences, see, among others, Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed., *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Isaac M. Castellano, *Civil War Interventions and Their Benefits: Unequal Return* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015); Karl DeRouen, Jr., *An Introduction to Civil Wars* (California: CQ Press, 2015).

Territorial disputes could be a case in point.¹¹⁸ Whatever their origins, legacies of arbitrary colonial partitions or outcomes of expansionist policies of revisionist states, more often than not the first being an excuse for the second, territorial disputes continue to be an enduring characteristics of international relations worldwide.¹¹⁹ Depending on its strategic framework of action, in a sub-regional dyadic relationship, a state (A) could promote a harmonious settlement of the territorial dispute between itself and the other state (B), exercise coercive measures against the other state (B) to compel it to concede compromises, or opt for strategic inaction leaving the final settlement of the dispute to a time it expects to reach a more promising bargaining position.

As an example, especially with the forceful ascent of China to prominence in regional and international affairs, land and maritime territorial disputes between China and other regional states, and China's policies thereon, have become a matter of serious security concern for all the parties involved. China, on the other hand, in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, seems to have chosen the first course of action mentioned above in its land territorial disputes, while the second and the third courses of action in its maritime territorial disputes.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ As a matter of fact, there are territorial disputes with multiple parties as well.

¹¹⁹ On territorial disputes, see, for example, Krista E. Wiegand, *Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2011); Marco Pinfari, *Peace Negotiations and Time: Deadline Diplomacy in Territorial Disputes* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Douglas M. Gibler, *The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development and International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

¹²⁰ See, among others, M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2005, pp. 46-83; Junwu Pan, *Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of China's Territorial and Boundary Disputes* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); Ralf Emmers, *Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010); Yufan Hao and Bill K. P. Chou, eds., *China's Policies on its Borderlands and the International Implications* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2011); Jing Huang and Andrew Billo, eds., *Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea* (New York: Palgrave, 2015).

2.3.2.3 Regional-level Security

At the regional-level, either to avert detrimental repercussions for its perceived security interests or to capitalize on favorable consequences for its perceived security interests, A could exercise influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B, that is, could attempt to have an effect on the decisions of B, on account of the actual and potential attitudes of B towards the actual and potential security issues *within a regional state (M), between two regional states (M and N), and between a regional state and B*, which are conceived by A as affecting its security.

Regional conflicts could be a case in point. In regional geopolitics, a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships with another state are subject to adjustments in accordance with the shifts in regional political alignments, and in cases of armed conflicts, regional military alliances. These regional shifts are frequently instigated by drastic developments within a third regional state. In regional geopolitics, to repeat, a state could exercise influence acts with adversaries, with which it engages in competitive security relationships, as well as allies, with which it engages in cooperative security relationships.

As an example of the first type of regional security issue, local instability in eastern regions of Zaire (M) bordering Rwanda fomented a lengthy regional armed conflict in Central Africa which, commencing with the intervention of Rwanda in Zaire in 1996, directly involved eight regional African states in addition to dozens of militant groups, became the deadliest armed conflict after the Second World War with more than five million casualties, and lasted for seven years till 2003.¹²¹ The Congo Wars,

¹²¹ Zaire was officially renamed to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.

also called the Great African War, incited the regional states to exercise influence acts, sometimes very desperate, in their sub-regional dyadic relationships so as to have effects on the decisions of involved states throughout the conflict for their varied foreign policy objectives.¹²²

As an example of the second type of regional security issue, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia (M and N), began in 1988 and while an official ceasefire was signed in 1994, has continued ever since with border skirmishes continuing to claim casualties on both sides.¹²³ The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been a permanent security issue in the sub-regional dyadic relationships of other states directly or indirectly, and politically or militarily involved in the conflict.

As an example of the third type of regional security issue, in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Afghanistan (B), Pakistan (A) is highly attentive to the developments in security issues between India (M) and Afghanistan, specifically Afghanistan's attitudes towards expanding security relationships with India, conceiving them as inimical to its own security interests.¹²⁴

¹²² On the Congo Wars, see, among others, Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹²³ On the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, see, among others, Heiko Krüger, *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010); Michael Kambeck and Sargis Ghazaryan, eds., *Europe's Next Avoidable War: Nagorno-Karabakh* (New York: Palgrave, 2013); Arsene Saporov, *From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).

¹²⁴ On India's relations with Afghanistan, see, among others, Iram Khalid, "The New Great Game in Afghanistan: Role of India (A Pakistani Perspective)," *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2011, pp. 241-257; Shashank Joshi, "India's Role in a Changing Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2014, pp. 87-102; Zahid Shahab Ahmed, "Conflict or Cooperation? The Role of India and Pakistan in Post-2014 Afghanistan," *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2015, pp. 259-276.

2.3.2.4 International-level Security

At the international-level, either to avert detrimental repercussions for its perceived security interests or to capitalize on favorable consequences for its perceived security interests, A could exercise influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B, that is, could attempt to have an effect on the decisions of B, on account of the actual and potential attitudes of B towards the actual and potential security issues *within an international state (X), between two international states (X and Y), between an international state and a regional state (X and M), and between an international state and B*, which are conceived by A as affecting its security.¹²⁵

As an example of the first type of international security issue, in recent history, the spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union (X), and the concurrent reconfiguration of political authority especially within the territories once under its sovereign jurisdiction throughout Eurasia in conjunction with the restructuring of the international system impelled states worldwide to readjust their foreign policies, and accordingly their sub-regional dyadic relationships, to the new strategic circumstances. Although some received the end of bipolarity with alacrity and some received it with alarm, security issues within the Soviet Union, and its ultimate demise, paved the way for regional states all over the world to make due modifications in their sub-regional dyadic relationships.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ International state here refers to great powers in international politics. During the Cold War, there were two great powers, also called the superpowers, the US and the USSR. After the end of the Cold War, only the US has continued to enjoy the position of great power, also called the global hegemon.

¹²⁶ For the consequences of the end of the Cold War in terms of regional security, see, among others, Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, eds., *The End of the Cold War and the Third World* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Geir Lundestad, ed., *International Relations since the End of the Cold War: New and Old Dimensions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Vojtech Mastny and Zhu Liqun,

As an example of the second type of international security issue, the easing of tensions between the US (X) and the USSR (Y) to a certain degree in the period of 1969-1979 during the Cold War, known as *détente*, was characterized by the signing of labored agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972 and the Helsinki Accords in 1975, between the two superpowers. In this period of provisional rapprochement between the US and the USSR, which ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Federal Republic of Germany (A), or West Germany, embarked on its own regional policy of reconciliation with the East European states, especially the German Democratic Republic (B). This regional policy of West Germany, known as *Ostpolitik*, aspired to achieve normalization of its sub-regional dyadic relationships with East European states under the relatively auspicious conditions which *détente* gave rise to.¹²⁷

As an example of the third type of international security issue, the US (X) involvement in Vietnam (M) beginning in 1955 in assistance of the French military operations progressively escalated into a complete US military commitment to preclude a domino effect of the spread of Communism in South East Asia. To the profound frustration of successive US governments, the US efforts politically and militarily floundered, and with the fall of Saigon in 1975, Vietnam was unified under Communist rule, and the US lost, leaving a devastating human cost behind. During the war, which lasted two decades, China (A), as a regional state, in addition to

eds., *The Legacy of the Cold War: Perspectives on Security, Cooperation, and Conflict* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014).

¹²⁷ On the relationship between *détente* and *Ostpolitik*, see, among others, M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Arne Hofmann, *The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007); N. Piers Ludlow, ed., *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973* (London: Routledge, 2009).

ardently supporting the Vietnamese ‘national liberation,’ pursued an active regional foreign policy, and engaged in intense sub-regional dyadic relationships with other regional states of South East Asia, especially Cambodia and Laos.¹²⁸

As an example of the fourth type of international security issue, at the behest of the Afghan government, the USSR (X) intervened in Afghanistan (B) in 1979, initially for the provision of military support in the Afghan government’s struggle against rebellious militant groups, called the *Mujahideen*. However, beyond the initial expectations, the military involvement embroiled the Soviet Union in a fierce fight with the Mujahideen that lasted a decade, and the Soviet forces finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, marking the last of the Soviet military aggressions.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan (A) evolved into an indispensable ally of the Mujahideen to the extent that “without Pakistan there could have been no effective Afghan resistance movement and little prospect for its success against the Soviets.”¹²⁹ Since then, however, as a result of the abiding complications of its convoluted involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s sub-regional dyadic relationships with Afghanistan have been volatile.¹³⁰

2.3.3 Economy

¹²⁸ On China and the Vietnam Wars, see, among others, Xiaoming Zhang, “The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective,” *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1996, pp. 731-762; Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Laura M. Calkins, *China and the First Vietnam War, 1947-1954* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

¹²⁹ Marvin G. Weinbaum, “War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role,” *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1991, pp. 71-85, p. 71.

¹³⁰ On Pakistan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see, among others, Frederic Grare, *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict, 1979-1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); A. Z. Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).

Economy, as a motive for state conduct, basically refers to the considerations on the exchange of commodities and associated services, in addition to capital transactions, that inherently inform, shape, and regulate a state's foreign policy choices and behaviors. A state, similar to other actors taking part in economic activity in international relations, is an economic agent, and thus could be called *polis economicus*.¹³¹ Moreover, in international relations, "the political purposes, rivalries, and cooperation of states interact to create the framework of political relations within which economic forces operate. States set the rules that individual entrepreneurs and multinational firms must follow."¹³² Being essentially pertinent to statehood, economy is an existential imperative for states.¹³³

Besides being an existential imperative, economy, as a motive, is vital for a state's foreign policy in three principal ways, two being structural and the other instrumental. First, structurally, economic capacity, which can also be called wealth, prosperity, or affluence, underpins a state's aggregate power, and its attendant foreign policy behavior.¹³⁴ In one noteworthy example, Fareed Zakaria predicates his

¹³¹ This point does not need further clarification, in my view. That there is now a distinct sub-discipline in international relations as international political economy lends ample credence to the argument that the state, in and of itself, is an economic agent in international relations. There are of course other economic agents, as well.

¹³² Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 24.

¹³³ Economy is also closely linked to, for example, the legitimacy of governments, the survival of corporations, and the well-being of populations. However, in this thesis economy is discussed with particular reference to states, omitting sub-state actors, with primary, but not exclusive, emphasis on power, development, and security of state. This thesis makes a distinction between *raison d'état* and *raison de gouvernement*, besides *les raisons des autres acteurs économiques*.

¹³⁴ Countless studies have examined the relationship between the economic capacity and power capacity/politics of states. For some notable examples, see, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Jared M. Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Business, 2012);

state-centered realism addressing the question of state expansionism on the assertion that “nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power,” defined in terms of economic capacity.¹³⁵ In Jacob Viner’s formulation, “(1) wealth is an absolutely essential means to power, whether for security or for aggression; (2) power is essential and valuable as a means to the acquisition or retention of wealth...(4) there is long-run harmony between these ends.”¹³⁶

Second, again structurally, development persists in occupying a central place in states’ foreign policy choices and behaviors either for the general external objective of securing a comparatively advantageous position vis-à-vis other states in the global competition for power and prosperity or the particular internal objectives of reducing poverty, curtailing unemployment, or curbing inflation, to name a few, for attaining and maintaining political, economic, and social stability.¹³⁷ The theory and the practice of development has incrementally dissociated from the mainstream understanding of economic development measured simply by increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita towards more inclusive understandings of socio-economic development measured by, among others, sustainability, empowerment, and entitlement.¹³⁸ Still, states continue to be habitually categorized per their

Paul Viotti, *The Dollar and National Security: The Monetary Component of Hard Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).

¹³⁵ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 42.

¹³⁶ Jacob Viner, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” *World Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1948, pp. 1-29.

¹³⁷ On development, see, for example, Ray Kiely, *The New Political Economy of Development: Globalization, Imperialism, Hegemony* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Anthony Payne and Nicola Phillips, *Development* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).

¹³⁸ See, for example, Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, eds., *The Post-Development Reader* (London: Zed Books, 1997); Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, *Theories of Development: Contentions, Arguments, Alternatives* (New York: Guilford Press, 2009).

development or income levels, international development continue to dominate the agenda of states in their interactions with each other, along with other actors of global economic governance, and 'to develop or not to develop' continues to be the whole question in the strategic rationales of a majority of states.¹³⁹

Third, instrumentally, states periodically employ economic instruments and relationships to accomplish miscellaneous foreign policy objectives; a state practice called economic statecraft.¹⁴⁰ Economic statecraft can take two forms.¹⁴¹ Negative economic statecraft involves the threat or the actual use of economic sanctions to coerce the targeted state to acquiesce in the demands of the state applying them. Negative economic statecraft comprises trade restrictions like embargoes, constraints on foreign direct investment, financial sanctions like freezing of assets, and punitive monetary measures like manipulation of exchange rates.¹⁴²

Positive economic statecraft, on the other hand, involves the promise or the actual provision of economic benefits to entice the targeted state to comply with the

¹³⁹ See, for example, Paul Haslam, Jessica Schafer, and Pierre Beaudet, eds., *Introduction to International Development: Approaches, Actors, and Issues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); David Williams, *International Development and Global Politics: History, Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).

¹⁴⁰ On economic statecraft, see, for example, David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985); Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, *Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Calculations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

¹⁴¹ Economic statecraft in the form of negative economic statecraft or positive economic statecraft could be exercised by sub-state or supra-state actors in international relations as well.

¹⁴² On negative economic statecraft, see, for example, Jonathan Kirshner, *Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

expectations of the state rendering them.¹⁴³ If positive economic statecraft is exercised in a short-term engagement with the targeted state for a specific purpose, it is called tactical linkage, whereas if it is exercised in a long-term engagement with the targeted state for a general purpose, it is called structural linkage.¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, the economic capacity of the targeted state is also operative in the exercise of economic statecraft, and thus effective in the final outcome, since a strong economic capacity could enable the targeted state to challenge the coercion of economic sanctions or to resist the enticement of economic benefits.¹⁴⁵

In three concentric circles, to sum up, states seek influence on the grounds of *economy* in their general foreign policies and, within this framework, in their particular regional foreign policies, and within this framework, in their particular sub-regional dyadic relationships. In its sub-regional dyadic relationships, A engages in *economic relationships* with B, and aims at having an effect on the decisions of B in terms of economy on account of the actual and potential attitudes of B towards the actual and potential *economic issues*, which are conceived by A as affecting its economy, in terms of three sub-motive elements of economy, i.e., trade, investment, and energy.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ On positive economic statecraft, see, for example, Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Miroslav Nincic, *The Logic of Positive Engagement* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011).

¹⁴⁴ The terms belong to Michael Mastanduno. See, Michael Mastanduno, "Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agendas for Research," in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard et al., eds., *Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence and National Security* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 288-318, pp. 303-304.

¹⁴⁵ There are of course other ways a targeted state could circumvent, undermine, or withstand economic statecraft.

¹⁴⁶ Needless to say, a state could be on each side of an economic transaction. A state can import as well export in trade, it can be a debtor as well as a creditor in investment, and it can demand as well as supply in energy. This point will be discussed in each section dealing with particular sub-motive elements.

An economic relationship in sub-regional dyadic relationships involves A's relations with B devised, established, and sustained to serve the perceived economic interests of A. An economic relationship could be cooperative, that is, A could opt for attaining its perceived economic interests by means of cooperating with B. An economic relationship could be competitive, that is, A could opt for attaining its perceived economic interests by means of competing with B. On the other hand, economic issues could be conducive in the sense that they could facilitate A's attainment of its perceived economic interests in its cooperative or competitive economic relationship with B. Economic issues could be restrictive in the sense that they could impede A's attainment of its perceived economic interests in its cooperative or competitive economic relationship with B.

A crucial point to emphasize is that A's preference to define economic issues in cooperative or competitive terms in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B is neither presupposed nor predetermined. The same economic issue could be framed by A in cooperative or competitive terms depending on, for example, A's economic policy objective, A's assessment of the particular economic issue, its judgement of the political economic context, its estimation of the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, and its evaluation of B's responses to the economic issue itself and A's prospective policy behaviors.

Table 7: Economy in Sub-Regional Dyadic Relationships

		Economic Relationship (of A with B)	
		Cooperative	Competitive
Development	Conducive	X	Y
	Restrictive	Z	T

There are three sub-motive elements of economy as subject matters of A's considerations in its economic relationships with B, be them cooperative or competitive. These three sub-motive elements are trade, investment, and energy.

2.3.3.1 Trade

Growth in power and prosperity for a state is intimately linked to trade in international relations. The Assyrian Empire (2500-605 BC) established trading colonies, called *karum*, overland, while the British Empire established trading colonies overseas. While the age of colonies ended, the timeless age of trading continues in contemporary global politics. A number of states have even delegated the administration of international commercial relations to their ministries of foreign affairs.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Among them are *Canada* with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, *Australia* with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Ireland* with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Hungary* with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and *Kenya* with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

In international commercial exchanges, a state can simultaneously be an importer and an exporter of commodities and services. In terms of import, one constant concern is securing uninhibited access to desirable resources, in desirable quantities, at desirable prices, within desirable time. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons, states frequently opt for protectionist measures including import quotas, and tariffs and nontariff barriers like countervailing duties and antidumping duties.¹⁴⁸ One salient reason is states' vested interest in nurturing and safeguarding nascent national industries of their strategic choices, called infant industries, by means of lowering production costs to ensure their competitiveness in the global economy.¹⁴⁹

In terms of export, conversely, one constant concern is securing unrestricted access to international markets for commodities manufactured domestically. The prevalent endorsement of export-oriented industrialization and export-led growth as pivotal economic and commercial policies for profitability abroad and productivity at home has disposed many states to encourage trade liberalization in the global trade system in their pursuit of unrestricted access to markets.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, states in many instances do not abstain from having recourse to neomercantilist trade policies, also called economic nationalism, to expand the domestic production base and realize a

¹⁴⁸ On trade protectionism, see, for example, Jean Pierre Dormois and Pedro Lains, eds., *Classical Trade Protectionism, 1815-1914* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006). With specific reference to textiles and clothing, see, Tony Heron, *The Global Political Economy of Trade Protectionism and Liberalization* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).

¹⁴⁹ For cases of infant industry promotion in Chinese trade policy, see, Usha C. V. Haley and George T. Haley, *Subsidies to Chinese Industry: State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Juan He, *The WTO and Infant Industry Promotion in Developing Countries: Perspectives on the Chinese Large Civil Aircraft* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).

¹⁵⁰ On the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 on export-led growth policies in international trade, see, Mona Haddad and Ben Shepherd, eds., *Managing Openness: Trade and Outward-Oriented Growth after the Crisis* (Washington: IBRD, 2011).

balance of payments surplus through maximizing exports.¹⁵¹ One salient reason is states' vested interest in sustaining the comparative advantage of national industries in the global marketplace; an economically vital advantage in the international competition for increased market shares, and aptly called 'competitive advantage' by Michael E. Porter.¹⁵² The rationale of comparative/competitive advantage is constitutive of states' strategic trade policies which rest on the idea that "national governments can and should assist their own national firms to compete successfully in oligopolistic markets."¹⁵³

In regional trade policies, states can advance trade liberalization through concluding bilateral or multilateral trade agreements of various kinds, such as trade and investment framework agreements, preferential trade agreements, and free trade agreements.¹⁵⁴ Reducing impediments to commercial exchanges, such as tariffs and import quotas, with other regional states is expected to promote specialization, to foster division of labor, and to exploit comparative advantage in a state's national economy for the eventual realization of wealth generation via regional economic integration. Free trade agreements with regional states constitute the foundation for regional free trade areas, which, depending on the degree of trade integration, could

¹⁵¹ On neomercantilism/economic nationalism in the contemporary global economy, see, Anthony P. D'Costa, ed., *Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Henryk Szlajfer, *Economic Nationalism and Globalization: Lessons from Latin America and Central Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

¹⁵² Michael E. Porter, *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance* (New York: The Free Press, 1998).

¹⁵³ Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 97. For a classical study on the subject, see, Paul R. Krugman, ed., *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986).

¹⁵⁴ Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio, eds., *Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Case Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, eds., *Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

take the forms of customs union like the Andean Community (*Comunidad Andina*), and common market like European Economic Area.¹⁵⁵ Accordingly, a state in sub-regional dyadic relationships could carry out a trade policy mainly composed of two steps; the first is the promotion of bilateral trade based on existing legal frameworks, and the second is the integration of bilateral trade based on the revision of legal frameworks.¹⁵⁶

2.3.3.2 Investment

The globalization of economic transactions has been both a cause and a consequence of the acquisitive search for profitable shares in markets worldwide of multinational corporations (MNCs), defined as “firms that control income-generating assets in more than one country at a time.”¹⁵⁷ Whether privately owned or publicly owned, the MNCs headquartered in a state, called the home country or the source country, extensively invest in the economies of other states, called the host country, in the forms of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI). FPI is the acquisition by financial institutions or individuals of “a relatively small number of shares in a company located in another country because of the expectation that those shares will appreciate in value and can be sold at a profit sometime in the future,” while FDI is “associated with companies operating and controlling income-

¹⁵⁵ As an introduction to regional trade agreements, see, David A. Lynch, *Trade and Globalization: An Introduction to Regional Trade Agreements* (Maryland: Lowman & Littlefield, 2010). For a worldwide survey of regional trade agreements, refer to Regional Trade Agreements Information System of the World Trade Organization.

¹⁵⁶ Bilateral tourism is considered in this thesis under bilateral trade as it involves the exchange of goods and services, albeit domestically, with foreign currency.

¹⁵⁷ Alfred Chandler and Bruce Mazlish, “Introduction,” in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and Bruce Mazlish, eds., *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 1-15, p. 3. The authors provide a more complicated definition of MNC, which “has productive facilities in several countries on at least two continents with employees stationed worldwide and financial investments scattered across the globe.” Ibid.

generating facilities in at least one country outside their country of origin,” and accordingly “involves relatively large transfers of capital that cannot easily be reversed.”¹⁵⁸

In international flows of investment, a state can be a host country of inward FDI and a home country of outward FDI. In the contemporary global economic system, states, both developed and developing, encourage the inward FDI in earnest thanks to a great number of direct financial and economic advantages in addition to the positive spillover effects it brings forth. In general, first, as a component of GDP, inward FDI stimulates economic growth, bolsters industrial development, raises the income level, boosts employment, and promotes a positive trade balance by increasing exports and decreasing imports in a state.¹⁵⁹ Second, inward FDI involves transfer of technology, management expertise, and advanced corporate practices to the host country.¹⁶⁰ Third, inward FDI enhances competition in the domestic economy, and thereby spurs efficiency and productivity resulting in an increased level of competitiveness in the aggregate.¹⁶¹ In the global competition to attract foreign direct investment, states

¹⁵⁸ Stephen D. Cohen, *Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment: Avoiding Simplicity, Embracing Complexity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 36, p. 38. Also see, Ashoka Mody, *Foreign Direct Investment and the World Economy* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁵⁹ As a general and a particular example, see, Theodore M. Moran, *Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Policies for Developed and Developing Countries* (Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Ralph Paprzycki and Kyoji Fukao, *Foreign Direct Investment in Japan: Multinationals' Role in Growth and Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

¹⁶⁰ See, for example, B. S. Javorcik, “International Technology Transfer and Foreign Direct Investment,” in Gerard Caprio Jr., ed., *The Evidence and Impact of Financial Globalization* (London: Elsevier, 2013), pp. 311-319.

¹⁶¹ This could be a deliberate state policy. See, Jan Drahokoupil, *Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe: The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

extend significant incentives to MNCs including lower corporate tax rates, special economic zones, and land subsidies.¹⁶²

States can also be prone to actively promote outward FDI of MNCs. One reason is to gain direct, unrestricted and uninterrupted access to resources considered essential for the sustainability of economic growth in the home country. Another reason is to expand marketing opportunities for products manufactured domestically. A third reason, based on the previous two reasons, is to create employment opportunities for the citizens of the home country both inside and outside of the state.¹⁶³

In regional investment policies, since the rationales of investment flows are to a great deal independent of centralized state planning and mostly take into account the market structures instead of state policies, and since the advantages of territorial proximity for investment flows are not as much in comparison to commercial exchanges, states encounter difficulties in routing and incorporating investment flows into their regional economic policies. Nevertheless, in their sub-regional dyadic relationships, so as to advance regional economic relationships preferably towards regional economic integration, states sign specific bilateral economic treaties

¹⁶² See, Alex J. Easson, *Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004); Thomas Farole and Gokhan Akinci, eds., *Special Economic Zones: Progress, Emerging Challenges, and Future Directions* (Washington: IBRD, 2011). Inward FDI can also generate misgivings within the host country for several reasons. For a discussion of inward FDI in the US from a security perspective see, Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, *US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2006).

¹⁶³ There can be other rationales as well. On the other hand, China, for example, has been vigorously promoting outward FDI. See, Shujie Yao and Pan Wang, *China's Outward Foreign Direct Investments and Impact on the World Economy* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Changhong Pei and Wen Zheng, *China's Outbound Foreign Direct Investment Promotion System* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2015).

pertinent to investment, such as bilateral investment treaties and double taxation treaties, in addition to related treaties that contain provisions about investment.¹⁶⁴

Investment flows, on the other hand, are only one segment of global capital flows. States are financially embedded in a web of incessant capital transactions in global financial markets, such as capital markets and money markets. Accordingly, states are acutely attentive and responsive to developments in global financial markets in consideration, among others, of accessing stable money supply, securing investment capital, and ensuring financial viability; all directly have bearings on public finances.¹⁶⁵ Here, a state's transactions and interactions in global financial markets are subsumed under the general title of investment in the global financial system, which comprises "all types of cross-border portfolio-type transactions – borrowing and lending, trading of currencies or other financial claims, and the provision of commercial banking or other financial services."¹⁶⁶

In the global financial system, a state can be a debtor borrowing money or a creditor lending money. In order to finance its operations, states can borrow money through a variety of methods, from issuing government bonds to directly borrowing from global financial institutions including international organizations like the World Bank (the WB). With respect to states' international relations, sovereign debt is a

¹⁶⁴ On investment treaties, see, Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs, eds., *The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Kenneth J. Vandavelde, *Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹⁶⁵ On 'financial statecraft,' see, Benn Steil and Robert E. Litan, *Financial Statecraft: The Role of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Leslie Elliott Armijo and Saori N. Katada, eds., *The Financial Statecraft of Emerging Powers: Shield and Sword in Asia and Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

¹⁶⁶ Benjamin J. Cohen, *Global Monetary Governance* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 83.

necessary evil.¹⁶⁷ While external borrowing is necessary for the financial viability and vitality of states, it can amount to a significant vulnerability as accumulative debt, the increasing costs of additional borrowing, or inability to pay the debt incurred, among others, undermine a state's financial, economic, and thus political power in general, and its relative position in its bilateral financial, economic, and political relationships with relevant international actors in particular.¹⁶⁸

States can also be creditors in the global financial system, and “as states become creditors, they experience an undeniable increase in their autonomy. Capital accumulation strengthens the ability of creditor states to resist pressure from other actors.”¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, even though anticipated financial returns constitute the chief cause of lending money in global financial markets, the distribution of financial resources have been a convenient leverage in states' international relations, and expediently employed as a component of ‘monetary power’ in ‘monetary statecraft’.¹⁷⁰

In terms of a state's regional economic policy, in an era of invasive globalization of unregulated capital flows and intricate integration of international financial markets,

¹⁶⁷ On sovereign debt see, among others, Michael Tomz, *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007); Odette Lienau, *Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Politics, Reputation, and Legitimacy in Modern Finance* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014).

¹⁶⁸ On debt and state power in international relations see, Kostas A. Lavdas et al., *Stateness and Sovereign Debt: Greece in the European Conundrum* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013); Kenneth Dyson, *States, Debt, and Power: ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’ in European History and Integration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Susanne Soederberg, *Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry: Money, Discipline and the Surplus Population* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014).

¹⁶⁹ Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2009, pp. 7-45, p. 9.

¹⁷⁰ David M. Andrews, “Monetary Power and Monetary Statecraft,” in David M. Andrews, ed., *International Monetary Power* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 7-30. The employment is of course not without difficulties. See, Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics.”

it is rather problematic today to refer to the regionalization of finance, in stark contrast to the regionalization of trade. The injunction of Karl Polanyi against the ‘disembeddedness’ of economy appears all the more germane considering global financial transactions.¹⁷¹ Still, in their sub-regional dyadic relationships, to advance regional economic relationships and especially to promote exports, states provide financial services, such as loans and guarantees, both to the exporters from the home country and to the importers from the host country through official or affiliated export credit agencies (ECAs).¹⁷²

Finally, economic transfers from one state to another can also take the form of foreign aid defined by Carol Lancaster as “a voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international organization (such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program) with at least a 25 percent grant element, one goal of which is to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid.”¹⁷³ States deliver capital, commodities, and services as foreign aid to recipient states “for four main purposes: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, and commercial,”¹⁷⁴ among which, for example, “*diplomatic purposes* involve international security, international political goals, and the management of relationships between governments.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2001).

¹⁷² On ECAs, see, Delio E. Gianturco, *Export Credit Agencies: The Unsung Giants of International Trade and Finance* (Westport: Quorum Books, 2001). Also refer to the OECD report on ‘Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries and Non-Member Economies.’

¹⁷³ Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 9.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* On foreign aid, also see, Andy Sumner and Richard Mallett, *The Future of Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation and the New Geography of Global Poverty* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); A. Mauris van der Veen, *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); William Easterly, ed., *Reinventing Foreign Aid* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008).

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the leading type of foreign aid. In their sub-regional dyadic relationships, states supply foreign aid to their counterparts on account of political, economic, and social benefits for both the donor state and the recipient state, as mentioned above.

2.3.3.3 Energy

Alluding to the famous declaration of Marx, it could be stated that in today's international relations a specter is haunting the world-the specter of energy.¹⁷⁶ The brisk global drive for economic and social development associated with rampant industrialization and rapid urbanization especially in the developing world has beget an unprecedented surge in the global demand for energy, and thus energy resources, critically needed for industrial production, household consumption, electricity generation, and transportation.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, concomitantly, an unprecedented surge in the global supply of energy has been witnessed thanks to new sources of energy supply, novel technologies, and increased public and private investments in energy markets.¹⁷⁸ The dramatic transformations in the global demand and supply of energy, and the interactions they spawn, called 'the energy revolution,' "are transforming the global economy, reordering the relationship between states,

¹⁷⁶ On the 'quest' for energy haunting the world, see the celebrated work of Daniel Yergin. Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).

¹⁷⁷ Energy and energy resources are two different things. Energy resources are a necessary but not sufficient condition for energy. A state may have energy resources but still may not have the capacity to convert them into energy.

¹⁷⁸ Among the new sources of energy supply, renewable energy, such as solar, wind, hydroelectric, geothermal, and biofuel, has gained prominence. See, Roland Wengenmayr and Thomas Bürke, eds., *Renewable Energy: Sustainable Energy Concepts for the Future* (Darmstad: Wiley-Vch, 2008); Godfrey Boyle, ed., *Renewable Energy: Power for a Sustainable Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

and leading to rapid changes in the nature of, and prospects for, international security.”¹⁷⁹

Energy is foundational to a state’s power and prosperity in many ways. Above all, energy production and energy consumption have a direct impact on a state’s economic capacity. For example, abundance of indigenous energy and energy resources creates opportunities for a state to export the surplus in energy resources or the energy produced domestically, and increases state revenues while scarcity of indigenous energy and energy resources entails the import of energy and energy resources from external sources, and increases state expenditures. Since energy and energy resources are integral to a state’s balance of payments, all states, exporting or importing energy and energy resources, are keenly sensitive to energy prices in global energy markets, heavily invest in energy exploitation, foster worldwide energy collaborations, further domestic energy efficiency, and display a good deal of interest in sustainable energy.¹⁸⁰

With the global commercialization of energy and energy resources, especially oil and natural gas, has come, quite inescapably, the politicization and securitization of energy and energy resources in states’ foreign policies and the relations among

¹⁷⁹ Bruce Jones and David Steven, *The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security, and the Energy Revolution* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2015), p. 1. Also see, Andreas Wenger et al., *Energy and the Transformation of International Relations: Toward a New Producer-Consumer Framework* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

¹⁸⁰ On energy markets, see, Carol A. Dahl, *International Energy Markets: Understanding Pricing, Policies, and Profits* (Oklahoma: PennWell Corporation, 2004). On energy collaboration, see, Dries Lesage et al., *Global Energy Governance in a Multipolar World* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010). On sustainable energy, see, David Elliott, ed., *Sustainable Energy: Opportunities and Limitations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

them.¹⁸¹ Therefore, energy security has become an indispensable component of states' foreign policies, which is defined as "a condition in which a nation and all, or most of its citizens and businesses have access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk or major disruption of service."¹⁸² In the most general sense, threats to energy security are risks and disruptions to the exploration, exploitation, transportation, and distribution of energy and energy resources, and the nature and the extent of these risks and disruptions vary in accordance with particular political, economic, and geographical settings.¹⁸³ One specific risk for energy security is a high level of energy dependency on external supply, or on a particular external supplier.¹⁸⁴ In order to address the challenges to energy security, states adopt numerous measures including diversification of energy supply sources, development of indigenous energy resources, regulation of domestic energy markets, and engagement in bilateral or multilateral joint energy ventures.¹⁸⁵

In international energy relations, a state can be a market, a transit, and a supplier of energy and energy resources. In essence, the difference between domestic energy production and domestic energy consumption determines the relative degree of energy dependency on external sources for a state, and the total volume of energy to

¹⁸¹ As an example on the 'politicization' of oil, see, Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, *The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2005).

¹⁸² Barry Barton et al., "Introduction," in Barry Barton et al., eds., *Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 5. Also see, Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, eds., *Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2010); Christian Winzer, "Conceptualizing Energy Security," *Energy Policy*, Vol. 46, No. 7, 2012, pp. 36-48.

¹⁸³ See, for example, Gal Luft and Anne Korin, eds., *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009); Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, eds., *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

¹⁸⁴ As an example, see, Margarita M. Balmaceda, *The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure, 1992-2012* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

¹⁸⁵ See, for example, Gawdat Bahgat, *Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach* (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2011).

meet the domestic demand through external sources is conditioned by the overall economic capacity of a state.¹⁸⁶ In their foreign relations, states, as energy markets, engage in energy relations with other states in basically two ways. First, states sanction, and often solicit, the operations of foreign companies, public and private, in domestic energy markets to increase energy production and market efficiency, among others. Second, states establish the physical and legal infrastructure of energy relations with other states in the forms of, for example, pipelines and contracts in order to secure uninterrupted and long-term access to energy resources, that is, to ensure the supply security.¹⁸⁷

As a transit route for energy and energy resources, a state enjoys an advantageous position in its relations with both the producers and consumers of energy since being a transit route shifts the dependency of both the producers and the consumers on the state due to their shared concern for the secure and stable flow of energy resources. At the same time, being a transit route for a state is a lucrative source of revenue derived from transit fees.¹⁸⁸

In their foreign relations, states, as energy suppliers, engage in energy relations with other states in basically two ways. First, states sanction, and often urge, the operations of domestic companies, public and private, in foreign energy markets to increase their markets shares and earnings. Second, states establish the physical and

¹⁸⁶ In other words, a state could meet 80% of its energy demand through domestic production. Still, meeting the remaining 20% through external sources could cost a high price depending on the economic capacity of the state.

¹⁸⁷ As an example, see, Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj, *China's Energy Relations with the Developing World* (London: Continuum Books, 2011).

¹⁸⁸ On an important study on the legal dimensions of the transit of energy, see, Danae Azaria, *Treaties on Transit of Energy via Pipelines and Countermeasures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

legal infrastructure of energy relations with other states in the forms of, for example, pipelines and contracts in order to secure uninterrupted and long-term access to energy markets, that is, to ensure the demand security.¹⁸⁹ As a supplier of energy and energy resources, a state not only acquires economic profits but also procures political benefits. Export of energy resources constitutes a significant source of state revenues for many states, especially those with bountiful oil and natural gas reserves. In a similar vein, export of energy resources constitutes a significant source of political leverage for many states since the privilege of the supplier state to manipulate the quantity and the price of the energy resources supplied provides it with strategic latitude, not unlimited though, in its dealings with the consumer state or states.¹⁹⁰

In regional energy policies, states carry out diverse practices depending on whether they are consumer, transit, or producer of energy resources. In general, capitalizing on the advantages of geographical proximity, the overriding rationale is to advance regional energy relationships through reciprocal investments of public and private enterprises in domestic energy markets, and through robust physical and legal infrastructure for supply, transit, and demand security while, at the same time, to prevent excessive dependency on a single supplier, transit route, or market.¹⁹¹ In their sub-regional dyadic relationships, states generally adhere to this overriding rationale,

¹⁸⁹ See, Tatiana Romanova, "Energy Demand: Security for Suppliers?" in Hugh Dyer and Maria Julia Trombetta, eds., *International Handbook of Energy Security* (Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), pp. 239-257.

¹⁹⁰ Russian-EU energy relations are a clear example. See, among others, Nikolay Kaveshnikov, "The Issue of Energy Security in Relations between Russia and the European Union," *European Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2010, pp. 585-605. Nataliya Esakova, *European Energy Security: Analyzing the EU-Russia Energy Security Regime in Terms of Interdependence Theory* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012).

¹⁹¹ Of course, regional energy policies could be competitive, even conflictual. Sanctions are a case in point. In this case, energy relations assume a different rationale than mentioned above. However, this is the exception, not the rule.

and yet a state's bilateral energy relations are conducted according to the particular circumstances dictated to a great extent by the position of the state in the supply-transit-demand nexus.¹⁹²

2.3.4 Identity

The thriving interest in identity in the discipline of international relations has emanated from the recent emphasis in international relations scholarship that the world, in general, and world politics, in particular, is equally composed of social structures and social facts together with material structures and material facts.¹⁹³ The ingenuity of the assertion has led to a scholarly reorientation with a sweeping and inventive preoccupation with the role, place, and effect of ideational factors in international relations, such as, norms, status, ideology, religion, culture, and

¹⁹² For several examples, see, Antonio Marquina, ed., *Energy Security: Visions from Asia and Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

¹⁹³ For an early and seminal work originally published in 1989, see, Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

civilization.¹⁹⁴ Among the ideational factors recasting international relations, both in theory and in practice, identity has occupied a central place.¹⁹⁵

In international relations literature, though, there is a general failure of scholars “to clarify what exactly they mean by ‘identity,’ their lack of rigor in employing the term, and inconsistencies in its usage,”¹⁹⁶ and indeed “weak or soft conceptions of identity are routinely packaged with standard qualifiers indicating that identity is multiple, unstable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, constructed, negotiated, and so on.”¹⁹⁷ Moreover, the complexity of research increases with the multiplicity of units of analysis to which agency is attributed. In short, like security, identity is another contested concept, which can be defined in a composite manner as “the set of meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role in

¹⁹⁴ On norms, see, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norms Dynamics and Politics Change,” *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, pp. 887-917; Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard, eds., *Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). On status, see, Yong Deng, *China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); T. V. Paul et al., *Status in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). On ideology, see, Alan Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World* (Oxon: Routledge, 1996); Alex Roberto Hybel, *The Power of Ideology: From the Roman Empire to Al-Qaeda* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). On religion, see, Dennis R. Hoover and Douglas M. Johnston, eds., *Religion and Foreign Affairs: Essential Readings* (Texas: Baylor University Press, 2012); Eyüp Ersoy, “Bringing Religion Back In? Debating Religion in International Politics,” *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2012, pp. 81-95; Nukhet A. Sandal and Jonathan Fox, *Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013). On culture, see, Barrie Axford, *The Global System: Politics, Economics and Culture* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (London: Continuum, 2003). On civilization, see, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997); Fred Dallmayr et al., eds., *Civilizations and World Order: Geopolitics and Cultural Difference* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2014).

¹⁹⁵ For some examples on the relationship between identity and international relations, see, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996); Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, eds., *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Richard Ned Lebow, “Identity and International Relations,” *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 473-492; Xavier Guillaume, *International Relations and Identity: A Dialogical Approach* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2011).

¹⁹⁶ Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, “Introduction: In Defense of Identity,” in Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, eds., *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 1-8, p. 3.

¹⁹⁷ Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1-47, p. 11.

society, a member of a particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her as a unique person.”¹⁹⁸

By extension, inasmuch as states are concerned, identity is “the set of meanings that define [what a state] is when [a state] is an occupant of a particular role in [international relations], a member of a particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify [a state] as a unique [entity].”¹⁹⁹ Accordingly, analogous to an individual acting in a society, a state acting in international relations is also in possession of person identity, role identity, and social identity, corresponding to a state’s self-conception, self-representation, and self-identification in international relations.²⁰⁰ That being said, an analytically consequential qualification needs to be mentioned here. State identity is only a convenient category, and to escape the fallacy of anthropomorphism, i.e. treating the state as an individual or personification of the state, one should be reminded that it is always the foreign policy makers’ conceptions of state identity that define what is and what is not a state’s identity.

Related to this point, on the origins of identity, one strand of research in international relations, epitomized by Alexander Wendt, espouses a conception of identity that is an outcome of an interactive construction. Akin to a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ in an ‘original position,’ Wendt predicates the process of identity construction on an imaginative encounter and ensuing interaction between two actors, referred to as ego and alter, each of whom “wants to survive and has certain material capabilities, but neither actor has biological or domestic imperatives for power, glory, or conquest

¹⁹⁸ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 3.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ These particular identities are discussed in detailed below drawing mainly on Burke and Stets.

(still bracketed), and there is no history of security or insecurity between the two.”²⁰¹

Based on this “interactionist convention,” Wendt speculates different processes of interaction between Ego and Alter, through which each comes to ‘learn’ a particular identity.²⁰² This understanding of interactionist identity construction in a “pre-social state of nature” is criticized in many ways.²⁰³ As opposed to interaction, another strand of research espouses a conception of identity that is an outcome of a determinative negotiation both within states and among states. In Bill McSweeney’s words, “identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups.”²⁰⁴

On the relationship between state identity and state interests, there are three dominant approaches in international relations. The first approach contends that identity *shapes* interests. Ascribing distinct ontological status to identity and interest, which temporally coexist prior to interaction, it is maintained that “variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests of states,” since “many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others,” and “correspondingly, change in identity can precipitate substantial change in interests that shape national security

²⁰¹ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425, p. 404. Also see, John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003).

²⁰² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 328, pp. 328-336.

²⁰³ Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, “Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory,” in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 65-84, p. 71. Also see, Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander, eds., *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 92-116.

²⁰⁴ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 73. Also see, Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1996); Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

policy.”²⁰⁵ The second approach contends that identity *creates* interests. In this case, even though distinct ontological status is again ascribed to identity and interest, identity is considered temporally prior to interests. As an example, to Wendt

the corporate identity of the state generates several basic interests or “appetites”: (1) physical security, including differentiation from other actors; (2) ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities; (3) recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force; and (4) development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level.²⁰⁶

The third approach contends that identity *is* interest. Mostly associated with ontological security, which “refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time -as being rather than constantly changing- in order to realize a sense of agency,”²⁰⁷ it is maintained that the fulfillment of a sense of agency, or simply identity, is imperative for a state since “it affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others.”²⁰⁸ However, the failure of the ontological security approach to

²⁰⁵ Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33-75, p. 60. As a matter of fact, the authors argue that “identities both generate and shape interests.” Ibid. I have taken one part of their argument as an example to represent the general argumentative approach. The second part of their argument can also be taken to exemplify the second approach.

²⁰⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics,” in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 47-64, p. 51. As a case study, see, Anne L. Clunan, *The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests* (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

²⁰⁷ Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2006, pp. 341-370, p. 342.

²⁰⁸ Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 2-3. For some case studies on ontological security, see, Catarina Kinnvall, *Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Karl Gustafsson, “Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino-Japanese Relations,” *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2014, pp. 71-86.

systematically distinguish between a state's person identity, role identity, and social identity, and its disproportionate emphasis on a state's person identity at the expense of role identity and social identity abates its analytical utility.

Drawing on the identity theory, a more coherent and perspicuous explication of the notion of identity as interest can be presented.²⁰⁹ First of all, states possess identity standards as “the set of meanings” that define “the character of identity.”²¹⁰ Identity standards are meanings about the agency of the state, conceived and constructed by “state agents” through processes of both interaction and negotiation within and outside the state.²¹¹ However, state agents can still conceive and construct cognitive identity standards independent of practical interaction and negotiation within and between states. In other words, state agents could have prior formulations of identity standards about the states of which they become agents at a certain time. Identity-verification exists when states are “able to achieve a match between an identity goal or ‘ideal’ (identity standard) and perceptions of the meanings in the environment or the ‘actual’ performance of the self,”²¹² through the utilization of potential and actual resources, both material and symbolic, in a “situation of interaction.”²¹³ The meanings in the environment, on the other hand, are constituted by “how one sees oneself and the meaningful feedback that the self obtains from others,” called

²⁰⁹ On identity theory, also see, Peter J. Burke et al., eds., *Advances in Identity Theory and Research* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003); Seth J. Schwartz et al., eds., *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research: Volume 1* (New York: Springer, 2011).

²¹⁰ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 63.

²¹¹ The term ‘state agent’ belongs to Brent J. Steele. Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State*. Strangely enough, Burke and Stets do not elaborate on the origins of identity standards in their *Identity Theory*.

²¹² Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 80.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 106. To note, Burke's and Stets' understanding of resources is peculiar. I consider resources in the general sense of material and non-material instruments of state behavior in international relations. On symbolic resources in international relations, see, for example, Michael C. Williams, *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

reflected appraisals.²¹⁴ Identity-verification process is a repetitive process which can be interrupted, notwithstanding. For example, one type of interruption concerns “the interference from other identities,” meaning that “maintaining one identity acts to undermine and interrupt the processes that maintain another identity - the classic role-conflict situation.”²¹⁵

Self-esteem, “an [positive] evaluation of the self that is made by the self,” is the outcome of identity-verification.²¹⁶ Self-esteem arises when “self-relevant perceptions of the meanings in the current situation, the ‘how am I currently doing’ (‘successes’), and the meanings in the identity standard or goal, the ‘how should the meanings be’ (‘pretensions’)” are congruent with each other, and as a corollary, “successful verification of the identity leads to increased self-esteem, while failure of the verification process reduces self-esteem.”²¹⁷ In a concise formulation, when a state’s identity aspirations and its identity achievements are consonant with each other, it achieves self-esteem. On the other hand, there “are three major bases for self-esteem,” which are “*self-efficacy* or a sense of competency, *self-worth*, or a general sense of being found worthy and valuable, and *self-authenticity*, or the feeling that one is being one’s true self.”²¹⁸ Burke and Stets correspond each bases of self-esteem to each of the three identities, i.e., person identity, role identity, social identity.

²¹⁴ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 50.

²¹⁵ p. 78. Burke and Stets discuss ‘four basic types of interruptions.’ Ibid., p. 77-79.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 79.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 80.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 117. Italics in original.

Table 8: Defining Features of Person, Role, and Social Identities²¹⁹

<i>Features</i>	Person Identity	Role Identity	Social Identity
Bases	Individual self-concept	Expectations tied to social positions	Social group
Definition	Meanings that define person as a unique individual	Meanings tied to a role	Meanings tied to a social group
Behavior	Independent of others	Complementary to others	Similar to others
Self-Reference	Me	Me as role	We
Verification Outcome	Authenticity	Self-efficacy	Self-worth

In international relations scholarship, including the identity theory, discussions on identity postulate the veracity of identity claims based on genuine intentions of actors. Nevertheless, states could readily opt for strategic dissimulation and instrumental manipulation of identity claims to advance their foreign policy objectives. As a matter of fact, eschewing attributing disingenuous intentions, states “not only gravitate toward opportunity structures that offer support for their self-conceptions but also will create those opportunity structures when such do not naturally exist.”²²⁰ For example, one way of ‘manipulating’ the opportunity structure

²¹⁹ This table replicates Burke and Stets’ original table excluding some points. *Ibid.*, p. 129

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72. The notion of ‘opportunity structure’ was developed by William B. Swann, Jr. See, William B. Swann, Jr., “Self-verification: Bringing Social Reality into Harmony with the Self,”

for identity-verification “is through *selective affiliation*, that is, choosing the ‘right people’ with whom to interact and the right situation in which to interact.”²²¹ States could also resort to altercasting, which is “the creation of an identity for another person in an interactive setting. This is done by casting Alter (the other) into a particular identity or role type such that your own identity and goals are maintained.”²²² Still, even though states could, to repeat, opt for strategic dissimulation and instrumental manipulation of identity claims to advance their foreign policy objectives, so as to fulfill and maintain a consistent sense of agency, states are bound to verify their identity claims, irrespective of the integrity of the intentions behind states’ identity claims. The process of identity-verification is invariably valid for a state’s identity claims, whether a state follows a logic of appropriateness or a logic of consequence.²²³

In brief, identity is an existential imperative for states. In three concentric circles, states seek influence on the grounds of identity in their general foreign policies and, within this framework, in their particular regional foreign policies, and within this framework, in their particular sub-regional dyadic relationships. In its sub-regional dyadic relationships, A engages in *identity relationships* with B, and aims at having

in Jerry M. Suls, ed., *Psychological Perspectives on the Self* (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982), pp. 33-66.

²²¹ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 74. Italics in original.

²²² Ibid., p. 75. The notion of ‘altercasting’ was developed by Eugene A. Weinstein and Paul Deutschberger. See, Eugene A. Weinstein and Paul Deutschberger, “Some Dimensions of Altercasting,” *Sociometry*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1963, pp. 454-466.

²²³ The notions of ‘logic of appropriateness’ and ‘logic of consequence’ were developed by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. See, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1989). Also see, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, pp. 943-969. On other logics of action in international relations, see, for example, Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” *International Organization*, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2008, pp. 257-288; Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2010, pp. 539-561.

an effect on the decisions of B in terms of identity on account of the actual and potential attitudes of B towards the actual and potential *identity issues*, which are conceived by A as affecting its identity, in terms of three sub-motive elements of identity, i.e., person identity, role identity, and social identity.

An identity relationship in sub-regional dyadic relationships involves A's relations with B devised, established, and sustained to serve the perceived identity interests of A. The foundational identity interest for A is identity-verification. An identity relationship could be cooperative, that is, A could opt for attaining its perceived identity interests by means of cooperating with B. An identity relationship could be competitive, that is, A could opt for attaining its perceived identity interests by means of competing with B. On the other hand, identity issues could be conducive in the sense that they could facilitate A's attainment of its perceived identity interests in its cooperative or competitive identity relationship with B. Identity issues could be restrictive in the sense that they could impede A's attainment of its perceived identity interests in its cooperative or competitive security relationship with B.

A crucial point to emphasize is that A's preference to define identity issues in cooperative or competitive terms in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with B is neither presupposed nor predetermined. The same identity issue could be framed by A in cooperative or competitive terms depending on, for example, A's identity claim, A's assessment of its identity standard, its judgement of the identity-verification context, its estimation of the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of

identity claims and identity-verification, and its evaluation of B’s responses as reflected appraisals to the identity issue itself and A’s prospective policy behaviors.

Table 9: Identity in Sub-Regional Dyadic Relationships

		Identity Relationship (of A with B)	
		Cooperative	Competitive
Development	Conducive	X	Y
	Restrictive	Z	T

There are three sub-motive elements of identity as subject matters of A’s considerations in its identity relationships with B, be they cooperative or competitive. These three sub-motive elements are person identity, role identity, and social identity.²²⁴

2.3.4.1 Person Identity

Person identity “is the set of meanings that define the person as a unique individual rather than as a role-holder or group member;”²²⁵ it is “a self-construal in terms of

²²⁴ As a matter of fact, all the three identities of a state are in constant state of domestic contestation. In this thesis, though, state identities are the identity conceptions of primary state agents about the state they rule.

²²⁵ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 124.

idiosyncratic personality attributes that are not shared with other people.”²²⁶ These sets of meanings “are based on culturally recognized characteristics that individuals internalize as their own and that serve to define and characterize them as unique individuals. These meanings serve as identity standards, guiding the identity-verification process.”²²⁷ Since “person identities consist of meanings that constitute a person as an individual, verification of person identities leads to increased feelings of authenticity, that is, one who is able to be who one really is.”²²⁸ Self-authenticity concerns “what might be called the core self: who one is as a person across situations, across time, across relationships.”²²⁹ According to Burke and Stets, “given the constant activation of the person identity and its high salience in the hierarchy of identities, it operates like a master identity.”²³⁰

In concurrence with this conception of person identity, for Wendt, in international relations, “personal/corporate identity is a site or platform for other identities,”²³¹ which, to him, “refers to the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality.”²³² More importantly, according to Wendt, “what really distinguishes the personal or corporate identity of intentional actors from that of beagles and bicycles is a consciousness and memory of Self as a separate locus of thought and activity,” which is “still more true of states, which do not even have ‘bodies’ if their members have no joint narrative of themselves as a corporate actor, and to that extent

²²⁶ Michael A. Hogg, “Social Identity Theory,” in Peter J. Burke, ed., *Contemporary Social Psychological Theories* (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 111-128, p. 115.

²²⁷ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 125.

²²⁸ Ibid. Also see, Peter J. Burke, “Identities and Social Structure: The 2003 Cooley-Mead Award Address,” *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2004, pp. 5-15.

²²⁹ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 125.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 126. As a case study, see, Jan E. Stets, “Role Identities and Person Identities: Gender Identity, Master Identity, and Controlling One’s Partner,” *Sociological Perspectives*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1995, pp. 129-150.

²³¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 225. For Wendt, other identities are ‘type’, ‘role,’ and ‘collective’ identities.

²³² Alexander Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics,” p. 50.

corporate identity presupposes individuals with a collective identity.”²³³ With regard to states, person identity “has its roots in domestic politics, which I [Wendt] am assuming are in general ‘self-organizing’ or ontologically prior to the states system; empirical statehood is (in general) prior to juridical statehood.”²³⁴

In a state’s foreign policy, state agents, using Brent J. Steele’s phrase, are the arbiters of a state’s person identity, imputing ‘idiosyncratic personality attributes,’ or ‘intrinsic qualities’ to the state, determining its ‘core self’ as a volitional agent with ‘consciousness and memory’ in international relations across situations, time, and relationships. Since it serves as the ‘master identity’ with ‘constant activation,’ in both regional and sub-regional dyadic relationships, verification of person identity assumes utmost priority for a state, the successful fulfillment of which increases self-authenticity of a state.

2.3.4.2 Role Identity

To explain role identity, a brief review of the concepts of social position and role is needed. “A social position is a category in society or organization that an individual occupies,” while “a role is the set of expectations tied to a social position that guide people’s attitudes and behavior.”²³⁵ Expectations are central to role identity. “There may be more than one expectation tied to a social position. Further, *expectations* can be specific or general in the behavior to which they refer. They can require specific

²³³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 225.

²³⁴ Alexander Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics,” p. 51. What Wendt refers to by ‘empirical statehood’ is generally designated as national identity in international relations. See, William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). As a case study, see, Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

²³⁵ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 114.

performances, or they can simply provide an outline within which much flexibility is possible.”²³⁶ In addition, “expectations can also be held for the goals or outcomes that one should achieve in a role, without explicit indications as to how those should be achieved...Expectations can also refer to a minimal part or a large part of one’s range of interactions.”²³⁷

A role identity, accordingly, “is the internalized meanings of a role that individuals apply to themselves.”²³⁸ On the other hand, “the meanings in role identities are derived partly from culture and partly from individuals’ distinctive interpretations of the role. The first part is the conventional dimension or role part of a *role* identity,” that is, individuals “learn the meanings of a role identity in interaction with others in which others act toward the self *as if* the person had the identity appropriate to their role behavior.”²³⁹ “The second part is the idiosyncratic dimension or identity part of a role identity,” that is, “it is the part of the role meanings that uniquely is defined by the role-holder and is not necessarily shared by others.”²⁴⁰ Besides, “a role cannot exist without one or more relevant other-roles toward which it is oriented,”²⁴¹ and more importantly, “actors need to make compromises for effective role performance of everyone in the setting. Each needs to give up some of their own meanings and expectations ties to a particular identity in favor of another’s meanings and expectations of that identity.”²⁴²

²³⁶ Ibid. Italics in original.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid. Italics in original.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ralph H. Turner, “Role-Taking: Process Versus Conformity,” in Arnold M. Rose, ed., *Human Behavior and Social Processes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), pp. 20-40, p. 23.

²⁴² Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 116.

Through verification of role identities, “that is, behaving in ways consistent with the meanings and expectations associated with role identities, individuals come to have a heightened sense of self efficacy,” which is a sense of competency.²⁴³ Therefore, “as a result of this high-level belief in one’s own abilities, persons with higher self-efficacy are more likely to engage in difficult behaviors that they have not tried before because they have the general expectancy of ability to accomplish outcomes.”²⁴⁴

In international relations, the compelling entrance of role identity as a variable in explaining state behavior came about with Kalevi J. Holsti’s seminal study on national role conceptions, according to whom a national role conception “includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems.”²⁴⁵ “The novelty with Holsti’s study was that roles were not unfolded from abstract theoretical discussions, but analysed inductively in terms of the roles policy-makers *themselves* perceived and defined.”²⁴⁶ Thenceforth, apart from numerous individual studies on the ‘role’ of roles, ‘role theory’ has become an established

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 117. Also see, Viktor Gecas, “The Social Psychology of Self-Efficacy,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 15, 1989, pp. 291-316; Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2000, pp. 224-237.

²⁴⁴ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 117.

²⁴⁵ K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1970, pp. 233-309, pp. 245-246. To Holsti, “to explain different national role conceptions in different states (e.g., Sweden as a *mediator* Burma as an *isolate*), we might look to such varied sources as: location and major topographical features of the state; natural, economic and technical resources; available capabilities; traditional policies; socio-economic demands and needs as expressed through political parties, mass movements ,or interest groups; national values, doctrines, or ideologies; public opinion ‘mood’; and the personality or political needs of key policy-makers.” Ibid., p. 246. Italics in original. Also see, Naomi Bailin Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1980, pp. 532-554.

²⁴⁶ Lisbeth Aggestam, “Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis,” in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, eds., *The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 11-29. Italics in original.

framework of analysis in systematic investigations of role identity in international relations.²⁴⁷ In a recent study, Marijke Breuning reemphasizes that foreign policy behavior of a state as role performance is conditioned by national role conceptions of decision makers formed, combining ideational and material determinants, “on the basis of both their [decision makers’] understanding of the state’s identity and cultural heritage, and their perception of their state’s place and possibilities within the international system.”²⁴⁸

Likewise, in a state’s regional foreign policy, state agents can espouse role identities on the basis of their conceptions of both the political and social structures of the regional system defined by material and ideational characteristics respectively, their understandings of the state’s material and ideational qualities, and their perception of the state’s place and position within both the political and social structures of the regional system. In a similar vein, in a state’s sub-regional dyadic relationships, state agents can espouse role identities on the basis of their understandings of the state’s material and ideational qualities, their understandings of the other state’s material and ideational qualities, their perception of the state’s place and position within both the political and social structures of the regional system, and their perception of the other state’s place and position within both the political and social structures of the regional system.

²⁴⁷ See, for example, Stephen Walker, ed., *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987); Philippe G. Le Prestre, *Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997); Sebastian Harnisch et al., *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Stephen G. Walker et al., *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012, pp. 5-24.

²⁴⁸ Marijke Breuning, “Role Theory Research in International Relations: State of the Art and Blind Spots,” in Sebastian Harnisch et al., *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 16-35.

2.3.4.3 Social Identity

Social identity of an individual “is related to the knowledge of his/her belonging to certain social groups and to the emotional and value significance which results from this belonging.”²⁴⁹ Social group, on the other hand, is defined as “two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves, or which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same social category.”²⁵⁰ Simply, from social category arises social group, from which arises social identity. “Through processes of social comparison and categorization, persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self and are labeled the ingroup. Correspondingly, persons who differ from the self are categorized as the outgroup.”²⁵¹ Burke and Stets add that “having a particular social identity means being like others in the group and seeing things from the group’s perspective... There is uniformity in thought and action in being a group member.”²⁵² Still, “individuals do not have to interact with other group members in order to think and act like the group. Simply identifying with the group is enough to activate similarity in perceptions and behavior among group members.”²⁵³

²⁴⁹ Henri Tajfel, “La Catégorisation Sociale,” in Serge Moscovici, ed., *Introduction à la Psychologie Sociale, Vol. 1* (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1972), pp. 385-426, pp. 412-413. Translation is mine.

²⁵⁰ John C. Turner, “Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of Redefinition of the Social Group,” in Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 15-40, p. 15. Also see, Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (London: Routledge, 1998); Dora Capozza and Rupert Brown, eds., *Social Identity Processes* (London: Sage Publications, 2000).

²⁵¹ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 118. Also see, Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

²⁵² Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 118.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

There are three important dimensions of social identity that call for further elaboration. First, a group prototype, serving the function of identity standard, “is the interrelated set of perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and behavior that captures similarities among ingroup members and differences between ingroup members and outgroup members,” and “when individuals view themselves as the embodiment of an ingroup prototype, *depersonalization* has occurred. Rather than seeing themselves as *unique* individuals, they see themselves in terms of the prototypical attributes of ingroup members.”²⁵⁴ Second, “a social identity becomes relevant or active in a situation through two processes: *accessibility* and *fit*...Accessibility has to do with readily available social categories...that are important to individuals and that are chronically accessible in memory or are easily accessible in situations.”²⁵⁵ “People use these categories to make sense of immediate situations,” and “the category that best fits the situation becomes the activated category.”²⁵⁶ Third, “two important reasons for joining groups include self-enhancement and uncertainty reduction. Self-enhancement is the desire to seek positive information about the self. Membership in groups generates positive distinctiveness or the view that one’s own group is better than an alternative group.”²⁵⁷ With respect to uncertainty reduction, “by joining groups, prototypes help guide one’s own behavior as well as others’ behavior and thus facilitate predictability over one’s environment.”²⁵⁸

²⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 118-119. Italics in original. Burke and Stets add that “depersonalization does not mean that individuals ‘lose’ their sense of who they are, rather, they simply identify with a particular group and take on the group’s identity.” Ibid., p. 119. Also see, Michael A. Hogg, “Social Identity Theory.”

²⁵⁵ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 120.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 121.

Verification of social identity “activates a sense of belongingness and raises one’s self-worth,” which is “often rooted in the reflected appraisals process in which people feel that others accept and value them.”²⁵⁹ In other words, “when one is a member of a group and is similar to others in thought and action, one will receive recognition, approval, and acceptance from other group members,” and accordingly, this process of identity-verification buttresses one’s self-worth.²⁶⁰

In international relations, the social identity of states is constituted first and foremost by the principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty, in the words of Wendt, provides “a social basis for the individuality and security of states. Sovereignty is an institution, and so it exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without another.”²⁶¹ As Wendt states, “these understandings and expectations not only constitute a particular kind of state -the ‘sovereign’ state- but also constitute a particular form of community, since identities are relational.”²⁶² Aside from the generic social category of sovereign states, in international relations, as in the society, there is a wide range of different social categories with which states choose to identify or not to identify themselves, constituting a variety of social groups and social identities. In addition to identifying with already existing social groups, states could also prefer to perform social acts for the purpose of constructing social categories and associated social groups to have

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. Also see, Alicia D. Cast and Peter J. Burke, “A Theory of Self-Esteem,” *Social Forces*, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2002, pp. 1041-1068.

²⁶¹ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” p. 412.

²⁶² Ibid. Martin Wight professes a similar understanding of the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty as the foundational basis of a ‘society’ of states by stating that “it would be impossible to have a society of sovereign states unless each state, while claiming sovereignty for itself, recognized that every other state had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well.” Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (New Jersey: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 135. For a critique of this conception of sovereignty see, Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

and promote shared social identifications with and among other states, thereby to form social identities.²⁶³

In a state's regional policy, a state could prefer to identify, or not to identify, itself with a social group of states defined by objective social categories, such as geography and nationality, or with a social group of states defined by subjective social categories. A state, in a regional system, could perceive itself to be a member of several social groups and could have multiple social identities at the same time especially depending on the accessibility and fit of social categories. In a regional system, the universal social identity is supposedly regional identity; however, the existence of regional identity is contingent, and as a collective identity, regional identity can be formed, reformed, deformed, or unformed.²⁶⁴ While self-enhancement and predictability are the two main reasons for a state joining regional social groups, verification of a social identity or social identities in a regional system increases a state's self-worth.

In a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships, the basis of a social identification with another state is whether the two states "share the view that they are members of the

²⁶³ The processes of collective identity formation, as it is called, have been subject to insightful researches. See, for example, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp. 313-369. Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, 1994, pp. 384-396; Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, pp. 575-607; Brian Greenhill, "Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008, pp. 343-368.

²⁶⁴ On regional identity, see, Michelle Pace, *The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Tracey German, "Good Neighbors or Distant Relatives?" Regional Identity and Cooperation in the South Caucasus," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2012, pp. 137-151.

same social category.”²⁶⁵ This is feasible in two ways. First, a state identifies with another state in terms of a shared social category between the two states, thus constituting an exclusive social group comprises only the two states. Second, a state identifies itself with a social group whereof the other state is already a member.

2.4 Why Do a State’s Motives to Seek Influence in Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships Differ *among* Each Other?

A state is driven by three motives, defined as existential imperatives and identified as security, economy, and identity above, which induce a state to exercise influence acts in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, in sub-regional dyadic relationships, a state’s motives to seek influence may, and most of the time do, differ *among* each other. To illustrate the differentiation of motives in sub-regional dyadic relationships, a table presenting a hypothetical configuration of motives of A in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with X, Y, and Z can be drawn.

Table 10: Motives of A in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with X, Y, and Z²⁶⁶

	Security	Economy	Identity
X	x	x	x
Y	x	x	---

²⁶⁵ Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *Identity Theory*, p. 118.

²⁶⁶ This particular hypothetical configuration is arbitrary. Several other configurations of motives of A are also possible.

Z	---	---	x
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On the existence of motives of A, two sorts of differentiation are observable. First, a particular motive exists for a state to seek influence in one sub-regional dyadic relationship while it does not exist in another sub-regional dyadic relationship. In this hypothetical case, for example, security, as a motive, exists in A's sub-regional dyadic relationships with X and Y while it does not exist in A's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Z. Similarly, identity, as a motive, exists in A's sub-regional dyadic relationships with X and Z while it does not exist in A's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Y.

Second, a particular motive exists for a state to seek influence in one sub-regional dyadic relationship while another motive does not exist in the same sub-regional dyadic relationship. In this hypothetical case, in A's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Y, for example, security and economy, as motives, exist while identity does not exist. Similarly, in A's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Z, identity, as a motive, exists while security and economy do not.

In order to give a cogent explanation for the variance in a state's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, an alternative conception of structure needs to be introduced. In the discipline of international relations, the structure of international relations has become a perennial source of scholarly fascination, speculation, theorization, as well as theoretical discussion and disputation, especially by virtue of

its being an indispensable component of the agent-structure problem, which is perhaps the ‘master’ problem in the discipline of international relations.²⁶⁷

Structure is conceived in many ways in international relations discipline. For example, after cautioning that “particular theorists may embed their work in combinations of the various accounts of structure,” Colin Wight reviews the use of five accounts of structure in international relations.²⁶⁸ Structure is understood as “patterns of aggregate behavior that are stable over time,” “law-like regularities that govern the behavior of social facts,” “collective rules and resources that structure behavior,” “systems of human relationships among social positions,” and additionally, “relations of difference that constitute and define the properties of elements.”²⁶⁹

Wendt, on the other hand, distinguishes between two levels and two effects of structure. “The two levels are micro and macro, where micro-structures refer to structures of interaction and macro-structures refer to what I’ll [Wendt] call structures of multiply realizable outcomes,” and “the two effects are causal and

²⁶⁷ On the agent-structure problem, see, among others, Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987, pp. 335-370; Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1992, pp. 245-270; Gil Friedman and Harvey Star, *Agency, Structure, and International Politics: From Ontology to Empirical Inquiry* (London: Routledge, 1997); Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective,” *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001, pp. 5-35; Jonathan Joseph, “Hegemony and the Structure-Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2008, pp. 109-128; Samuel Knafo, “Critical Approaches and the Legacy of the Agent/Structure Debate in International Relations,” *Cambridge Review of International Relations*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2010, pp. 493-516.

²⁶⁸ Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 127.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.* The first four ‘accounts of structure,’ as mentioned by Wight, is from Douglas V. Porpora. See, Douglas V. Porpora, “Four Concepts of Social Structure,” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1989, pp. 195-211. The fifth one is Wight’s.

constitutive.”²⁷⁰ Practically speaking, for example, Susan Strange discusses four structures of power in international political economy, which are the security structure, the production structure, the financial structure, and the knowledge structure.²⁷¹

Waltz defines structures “first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units.”²⁷² In a simpler formulation, “a structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts.”²⁷³ Thus, Waltz contrives an ‘objective structure’ of international relations.²⁷⁴ However, each state experiences the ‘objective structure’ from a particular position, that is, a singular territorially defined vantage point, and the ‘objective structure’ as experienced by a state can be called a ‘subjective structure.’²⁷⁵ To illustrate, a soccer game has an ‘objective structure’ of interacting players, which can be discerned as it is observed from above. However, each player experiences this ‘objective structure’ depending on the position s/he occupies within the structure. The structure as it is experienced by a center-back is different from the structure as it is experienced by a forward. In a single ‘objective structure,’ there are as many ‘subjective structures’ as units.

As a corollary, in the ‘objective structure’ of international relations, there are as many ‘subjective structures’ as states. The ‘subjective structure’ of a state can be

²⁷⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 143.

²⁷¹ Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, p. 43-138.

²⁷² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 88.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

²⁷⁴ For a critique, see, Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1984, pp. 225-286.

²⁷⁵ On subjective structure, see, for example, Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 85.

called its 'foreign policy structure.'²⁷⁶ In a state's foreign policy structure, other states are differentiated not by the distribution of capabilities but by the 'distribution of gravity'. *Gravity* is defined here as the degree of significance of another state in a state's foreign policy structure. Another state can be weak in terms of capabilities, but can still be salient in a state's foreign policy structure. Moreover, gravity has material and ideational foundations. Material foundations of gravity are substantive in nature, quite susceptible to empirical observations and assessments, and thus could be called the objective foundations of gravity. Ideational foundations of gravity are interpretive in nature, rest on the individual understandings of policymakers, and thus be called the subjective foundations of gravity. In addition, gravity is not a fixed attribute; being contingent upon endogenous and exogenous variables, gravity can increase or decrease.²⁷⁷ In a similar vein, depending on endogenous and exogenous variables, the change in gravity can take place in a long period of time or in a short period of time. Figuratively, the foreign policy structure is a terrain at the center of which the state resides, and this terrain is shaped by the distribution of significance attributed by the state to other states occupying the terrain, determining their height. The terrain is in continuous motion, and while some parts can become higher, some other parts can become shorter, incrementally or drastically.

A state's foreign policy structure is a composite of three sub-structures. They can be called the security structure, the economy structure, and the identity structure, which correspond to the three motives of security, economy, and identity in a state's foreign

²⁷⁶ The concept of 'foreign policy structure' is used in the literature in the meaning of 'foreign policymaking structure.' See, for example, Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Magnus Ekengren, "Agency and Structure in EU Foreign Policy Practices," in Fredrik Bynander and Stefano Guzzini, eds., *Rethinking Foreign Policy* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 81-94.

²⁷⁷ A thorough examination of the endogenous and exogenous variables is beyond the scope of this thesis, and thus are omitted here.

policy. These three sub-structures are defined by the distribution of gravity with reference to the three respective motives of security, economy, and identity. These overlapping structures have separate realities working according to distinct structural logics, and yet they are semi-autonomous in their dynamics reciprocally affecting each other through intersecting processes. In a state's foreign policy structure, these three sub-structures could be consonant with each other or could be dissonant with each other. 'Structural consonance' means that the distribution of gravity among other states in each of the three sub-structures of a state's foreign policy structure matches. 'Structural dissonance' means that it does not. Structural consonance/structural dissonance is not an exact dichotomy; they are matters of degree constituting two edges of a spectrum.

Similar to a state's foreign policy structure, it is plausible to conceive of a state's regional foreign policy structure, which is also composed of three sub-structures. A state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other because the gravity of other states in each of the regional sub-structures of a state differs.

2.5 Why Do a State's Motives to Seek Influence in Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships Differ *within* Each Other?

To reiterate, a motive is composed of sub-motive elements defined as the substantial contingent considerations related to a motive constituting identifying reference points for it. Security can be defined in peculiar reference to the level wherein the subject matters of a state's security considerations originate. Accordingly, there are four sub-motive elements for security; unit-level security, dyad-level security, regional-level

security, and international-level security. Economy can be defined in reference to specific subject matters of a state's economic considerations. Accordingly, there are three sub-motive elements for economy; trade, investment, and energy. Identity can be defined in reference to particular 'bases' of a state's identity considerations. Accordingly, there are three sub-motive elements for identity; person identity, role identity, and social identity. A state's foreign policy structure, on the other hand, is a composite of three sub-structures. They can be called the security structure, the economy structure, and the identity structure, which correspond to the three motives of security, economy, and identity in a state's foreign policy.

In a state's respective sub-regional dyadic relationships, the significance of sub-motive elements as subject matters of a state's considerations can exhibit variation *in degree* relative to each other. To illustrate the differentiation of sub-motive elements in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships in terms of the degree of significance, three tables presenting hypothetical configurations of the sub-motives of A in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with X can be drawn. In a range of 1 to 3, 1 denotes a low level of degree of significance of the sub-motive element in A's sub-regional dyadic relationships with X, 2 denotes a medium level of degree of significance, and 3 denotes a high level of degree of significance.²⁷⁸

Table 11: The Motive of Security for A in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with X

²⁷⁸ Since there are four sub-motive elements of security, the range is from 1 to 4.

Sub-Motive Elements	Their Relative Degree of Significance
Unit-Level Security	1
Dyad-Level Security	2
Regional-Level Security	4
International-Level Security	3

Table 12: The Motive of Economy for A in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with X

Sub-Motive Elements	Their Relative Degree of Significance
Trade	2
Investment	1
Energy	3

Table 13: The Motive of Identity for A in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with X

Sub-Motive Elements	Their Relative Degree of Significance
Person Identity	3
Role Identity	2
Social Identity	1

As can be seen in respective tables, a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships can, and in fact do, differ *within* each other with respect to the degree of significance of sub-motive elements relative to each other. In this hypothetical case, for instance, in A's security in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with X, regional-level security has a high level degree of significance relative to unit-level security, dyad-level security, and international-level security. In A's economy in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with X, energy has a high level degree of significance relative to trade and investment. Finally, in A's identity in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with X, person identity has a high level degree of significance relative to role identity and social identity.

To underline, the degree of significance of sub-motive elements relative to each other in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships is not a fixed attribute; being contingent upon endogenous and exogenous variables, it can increase or decrease, incrementally or drastically.²⁷⁹ In a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships, the sub-motive elements could be symmetrical or asymmetrical. 'Sub-motive symmetry' means that there is not variation among sub-motive elements in terms of degree of significance.²⁸⁰ 'Sub-motive asymmetry' means that there is. Sub-motive symmetry/asymmetry is not an exact dichotomy; they are matters of degree constituting two edges of a spectrum. In brief, a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships can, and in fact do, differ *within* each other inasmuch as the degree of significance of sub-motive elements in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships differs relative to each other.

²⁷⁹ A thorough examination of the endogenous and exogenous variables is beyond the scope of this thesis, and thus are omitted here, once again.

²⁸⁰ They can be equally important. They can also be equally unimportant.

Since the relative degree of significance as an analytical construct inherently leads to asymmetry, the existence of sub-motive asymmetry in a state's motives is only expected. Being and measured relative to each other, some sub-motive elements are invariably going to be lower or higher than others in terms of the degree of significance. Nonetheless, two types of change can take place in terms of the degree of significance of sub-motive elements relative to each other. First, a sub-motive element can become more/less significant than another, changing the order of significance. Second, a sub-motive element being still more/less significant than another sub-motive element, the relative degree of significance between them can widen or shrink.

A final theme is related to the methodological issue of measuring sub-motive elements' relative degree of significance. To emphasize, here, measurement does not involve the measurement of the degree of significance of a single sub-motive element in absolute terms. Measurement involves, in this context, the measurement of the degree of significance of more than one sub-motive elements in relative terms. Accordingly, the measurement of relative degree of significance necessarily entails comparison between sub-motive elements along some criteria. The first criterion is the *present* extent of a sub-motive element in dyadic relationships in reference to the relevant regional foreign policy structure of a state, and the corresponding importance accorded to the sub-motive element by the state in its relations with the other state. This criterion can be called the objective significance. The second criterion is the *prospective* extent of a sub-motive element in dyadic relationships in

reference to the relevant regional foreign policy structure of a state, and the corresponding importance accorded to the sub-motive element by the state in its relations with the other state. This criterion can be called the subjective significance.

The third criterion is the extent that national, dyadic, regional, and international settings permit the performance of influence acts by a state for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of a sub-motive element in its relations with the other state in reference to the relevant foreign policy structure of the state. This criterion can be called the permissibility of settings. And the fourth criterion is the extent of influence acts of a state based on considerations about a sub-motive element in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with another state. The extent of influence acts is determined, in turn, by the number and the intensity of the influence acts. The intensity of an influence act is the importance a state attaches to the performance of that influence act.

Accordingly, the degree of significance of sub-motive elements in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships differs relative to each other due to four reasons. First, the objective significance of a sub-motive element is higher than the objective significance of another sub-motive element. Second, the subjective significance of a sub-motive element is higher than the subjective significance of another sub-motive element. Third, the permissibility of settings for a sub-motive element is higher than the permissibility of settings for another sub-motive element. And fourth, the extent of influence acts based on a sub-motive element is higher than the extent of influence acts based on another sub-motive element.

2.6 What is the Relationship between Motive and Action in a State's Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships?

There are two modes of relationship between motive and action in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships. First, there is the relationship between a single action and multiple motives. A single action, as an enacted decision, is in most cases an aggregate of appraisals of state agents based on a combination of motives. These appraisals incorporate anticipated outcomes as well. A state could prefer to achieve multiple foreign policy objectives, as dictated by multiple motives, by a single action. Still, the foreign policy objectives are contingent upon the estimations of state agents, the causal weight of motives could vary, and the efficacy of achieving multiple objectives by a single action is conditional. On the other hand, in the overall regional foreign policy structure of a state, a state's single action in its sub-regional dyadic relationships driven by multiple motives creates constitutive repercussions in the respective sub-structures, i.e., the security structure, the economy structure, and/or the identity structure.

As an example, a state's policy of visa liberalization in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, a single action, has concurrent implications for its security, economy, and identity. By a single action, the state could pursue multiple objectives of, for example, encouraging bilateral commercial exchanges and tourism (economy), enhancing societal interactions as the substantive basis of mutual identification between two states (identity), and advancing towards a common security regime by means of economic and societal integration (security). In addition, the effects of this

single action reconstitute the overall regional foreign policy structure of the state by virtue of altering the relative ‘gravity’ of some states in comparison with other states in the three sub-structures of a state’s regional foreign policy structure.

That a single action of a state, as an enacted decision, is in most cases an aggregate of appraisals of state agents based on a combination of motives, gives rise to the methodologically intricate issue of identifying and assessing the sequence of motives on which a single action of a state is performed. This issue could be called the sequentiality of motives. A single action could be performed on the basis of a particular motive to generate a specific outcome, which, in the estimations of states, could ultimately be expected to serve the realization of a further outcome. In other words, while a particular motive constitutes the proximate motive of a single state action, the distant motive of the single state action could be another motive. In addition, and as a corollary, the more forward the sequence of expected outcomes is conceived in the appraisals of states, the more backward the sequence of motives is conceived in the appraisals of states, given that expected outcomes pertain to different motives. Be that as it may, methodologically, identifying and assessing the sequence of motives on which a single action of a state is performed is exceedingly challenging. Therefore, this thesis concerns itself only with the proximate motives of state actions, without purporting to accurately identify and objectively assess the sequentiality of motives assumed to be conceived in the appraisals of states.

Second, there is the relationship between a single motive and multiple actions.

Multiple actions, again as *an* enacted decision, could be practical manifestations of a

state's single policy objective as a dictate of a single motive. A state could prefer to achieve a single foreign policy objective by multiple actions. Still, foreign policy actions are contingent upon the estimations of state agents, the expected effective weight of actions could vary, and the efficacy of achieving a single objective by multiple actions is conditional. In addition, the effects of multiple actions reconstitute the relevant sub-structure of the state by virtue of altering the relative 'gravity' of some states in comparison with other states in the sub-structure.

As an example, a state's policy of safeguarding its security in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, a single objective dictated by a single motive, has implications for the security sub-structure. A state could pursue a single objective of security provision by multiple actions of, for example, aligning with another state in the regional system, balancing against a third state, and engaging in coercive measures against yet another state. In addition, the effects of these multiple actions reconstitute the security sub-structure of the state by virtue of altering the relative 'gravity' of some states in comparison with other states in this sub-structure.

2.6.1 Hierarchy of Motives

Security, economy, and identity are existential imperatives for states in international relations occupying the same ontological stratum, meaning that one is not more 'real' than the other. One question remains nevertheless; the relative degree of these three motives as innate impulses in a state's performance of actions. Based on a gradation in that sense, some scholars postulate a hierarchy of motives. According to Waltz, for instance, the ultimate motive is "the survival motive," that is, security, which is "a

prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities,” and additionally, “beyond the survival motive the aims of states may be endlessly varied.”²⁸¹ However, Waltz immediately qualifies his proposition by conceding that “the assumption allows for the fact that no state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival. It allows for the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival.”²⁸²

The intricate relations among the issues at which a state’s performance of actions directed also confound a precise specification of a hierarchy of motives. In other words, security issues could become referent objects of economy, economic issues could become referent objects of security, and identity issues could become referent objects of security. Therefore, it is quite questionable to conceive of an ‘objective’ hierarchy of motives universally valid in all foreign policy settings. Nonetheless, depending on the evaluative, affective, and cognitive considerations of state agents on the referent objects of motives at different levels of analysis within the state, context-dependent ‘subjective’ hierarchies of motives are formed. These ‘subjective’ hierarchies of motives help explain variations and discrepancies in a state’s foreign policy behaviors, and accordingly influence acts, in its sub-regional dyadic relationships.

Table 14: ‘Subjective’ Hierarchies of Motives

²⁸¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 91-92.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

		Motives		
		Security	Economy	Identity
Level of Analysis	Individual Level	A	M	X
	Governmental Level	B	N	Y
	State Level	C	O	Z

There are two main types of hierarchies of motives. One is ‘intra-motive hierarchy’, and the other is ‘inter-motive hierarchy’. In terms of intra-motive hierarchy, one common example is the valuation of regime security at the governmental level of analysis (B) by state agents more than national security at the state level of analysis (C). For regime security, state security could be foregone. Similarly, verification of the identity of a state leader at the individual level of analysis (X) could be more important than the verification of the identity of a state at the state level of analysis (Z). In terms of inter-motive hierarchy, for example, verification of the state identity at the state level of analysis (Z) could be attributed more significance by state agents than the state economy again at the state level of analysis (O). Similarly, security of the policymakers at the individual level of analysis (A) could override the state economy at the state level of analysis (O).

2.7 Brief Review

As a brief review of the main issues addressed in the preceding discussion, in the first part, the varying conceptions of power in international relations scholarship are referred, then, a differentiation between power as capacity and power as capability is

made, followed by the introduction of some understandings of the concept of influence. Subsequently, an original definition of influence is propounded, the relationship between power and influence is clarified, and a new taxonomy of influence is presented.

In the second part, an exhaustive account of a state's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships is set forth. First, the concepts of regional system, regional policy, sub-regional dyadic relationship, motive, and sub-motive element are defined. Second, security, as the first motive, is discussed with reference to unit-level security, dyad-level security, regional-level security, and international-level security. Economy, as the second motive, is discussed with reference to trade, investment, and energy. Identity, as the third motive, is discussed with reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In the final part, the causes of the difference *among* a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships, and the causes of the difference *within* a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships are examined. Afterwards, the relationships between motive and action in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships are probed, succeeded by an investigation of hierarchy of motives.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Research is a journey of curiosity for a rendezvous with truth. Social research, on the other hand, “is something very special: a process we use to understand our world in a way that goes far beyond simple description, common sense or anecdote.”²⁸³

Research is a process defined as “an on-going, often continuous series of actions intended to achieve a specific result,” and “this often requires the researcher to follow an established set of (usually) routine procedures.”²⁸⁴ These procedures constitute the methodology of social research required for a comprehensive and at the same time systematic analysis of social phenomena defined as “a process of working with the data to describe, discuss, interpret, evaluate and explain the data in terms of the research questions” about social phenomena.²⁸⁵

²⁸³ Christopher Pole and Richard Lampard, *Practical Social Investigation: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Social Research* (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 2.

²⁸⁴ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), p. 7. Also see, Ranjit Kumar, *Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners* (London: Sage, 2014).

²⁸⁵ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 317.

There are basically four types of social research. Exploratory research is employed “when the subject is very new, we know little or nothing about it, and no one has yet explored it,” and the objective “is to formulate more precise questions that we can address in future research.”²⁸⁶ Descriptive research, “presents a picture of the specific details of a situation, social setting, or relationship” so as to, for example, “locate new data that contradict old data,” and “clarify a sequence of steps or stages.”²⁸⁷ Furthermore, explanatory research “builds on exploratory and descriptive research and goes on to identify the reason something occurs.”²⁸⁸ Finally, evaluation research “seeks to determine the effects of programs, policies, or other efforts to affect social patterns.”²⁸⁹

Claude Lévi-Strauss, illustrating great sapience, states that “the scientist is not a person who gives the right answers; he is the one who asks the right questions.”²⁹⁰ Social research, like all research, starts with asking questions, preferably right ones, called research questions, which “represent the facets of inquiry that the researcher most wants to explore.”²⁹¹ Corresponding to the four types of social research, there are “four different types of research questions: exploratory, descriptive, explanatory and evaluative.”²⁹² More to the point, “there are several key traits of a good research

²⁸⁶ W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2014), p. 38.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 40.

²⁸⁹ Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research* (California: Pine Forge Press, 2015), p. 16.

²⁹⁰ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Mythologiques: Le Cru et Le Cuit* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1964), p. 15.

²⁹¹ Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Jonny Saldaña, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook* (California: Sage, 2014), p. 25.

²⁹² Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 57. To repeat, there are four types of *social research* and four types of *research questions* with virtually identical names.

question.”²⁹³ A research question, among others, should be “non-normative and answerable,” “generates some implications for understanding real world problems,” “addresses a debate or puzzle in the literature,” “not overly broad,” and at the same time “not too narrow.”²⁹⁴ Research questions “assume two forms: (a) a central question and (b) associated subquestions.”²⁹⁵ While “the central question is a broad question that asks for an exploration of the central phenomenon or concept in a study,”²⁹⁶ associated subquestions, also called subsidiary research questions, help the researcher “to specify more precisely the areas of the research topic that you [the researcher] will focus on.”²⁹⁷

In this thesis, the two central research questions are: what is influence? Why do states seek influence? Related to the second research question, there are five subsidiary research questions addressed in this thesis as well:

1. What are a state’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships?
2. How do a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other?
3. Why do a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other?
4. How do a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other?

²⁹³ Maryann Barakso, Daniel M. Sabet, and Brian Schaffner, *Understanding Political Science Research Methods: The Challenge of Inference* (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 38.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38, p. 39, p. 40, p. 41, p. 41.

²⁹⁵ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (California: Sage, 2014), p. 139.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 61.

5. Why do a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other?

Accordingly, in this thesis, the research is both exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory, seeking answers to 'what,' 'how,' and 'why' questions.

An intractable debate on the ontology, epistemology, and axiology of methodological investigations on social phenomena continues unabated among competing social scientific paradigms. As an example, while positivism asserts that "there is a reality that exists quite apart from our own perception of it, that it can be understood through observation, and that it follows general laws," postpositivism "modifies the positivist premise of an external, objective reality by recognizing its complexity, the limitations of human observers, and therefore the impossibility of developing more than a partial understanding of reality."²⁹⁸ According to one classification, there are five "primary paradigmatic approaches" in social research, which are, positivist, post-positivist, interpretivist, critical, and postmodern/poststructural.²⁹⁹ Instead of purporting to resolve interparadigmatic controversies, this thesis stresses the indispensable function of 'inference' in social research, and professes to exercise it in a methodological manner.

²⁹⁸ Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research*, pp. 19-20.

²⁹⁹ Sarah J. Tracey, *Qualitative Research Methods: Collecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact* (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2013), p. 48. The author actually subsumes positivist and postpositivist approaches into a single category of (post-)positivist approach. I prefer to separate them.

Inference is famously defined as “the process of using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know.”³⁰⁰ Here, “the facts we do not know are the subjects of our research questions, theories, and hypotheses. The facts we do know form our (quantitative or qualitative) data or observations.”³⁰¹ As repeatedly affirmed by King, Keohane, and Verba, “social science research, whether quantitative or qualitative, involves the dual goals of describing and explaining,” and “description and explanation both depend upon rules of scientific inference.”³⁰² Therefore, there are two kinds of inferences, descriptive and causal. Simply, descriptive inference “is an inference we make about how the world is (or was)-it is the act of describing some aspect of the world,” and causal inference is an inference “we make about why something happens.”³⁰³ In addition, “descriptive and causal inferences are inherently related. Indeed, it is impossible to make a causal inference without first making a descriptive inference.”³⁰⁴ This thesis is an inferential social research based on both descriptive and causal inferences.

In broad terms, methodology of social research is composed of three components as successive stages of research. The first is designing research, the second is collecting data, and the third is analyzing data.

3.1 Research Design

³⁰⁰ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 46.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid., 34.

³⁰³ Maryann Barakso, Daniel M. Sabet, and Brian Schaffner, *Understanding Political Science Research Methods: The Challenge of Inference*, p. 18.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

In King, Keohane, and Verba's definition, research design is about "how to pose questions and fashion scholarly research to make valid descriptive and causal inferences."³⁰⁵ In a colloquial fashion, "a research design is *a logical plan for getting from here to there*, where *here* may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and *there* is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions."³⁰⁶ More systematically, a research design is a methodological plan that "guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation."³⁰⁷

Research design is a specific and standardized type of research methods, which are generally classified into quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods. While quantitative research methods "are primarily concerned with gathering and working with data that is structured...and can be represented numerically," qualitative research methods "are primarily concerned with stories and accounts including intersubjective understandings, feelings, opinions and beliefs."³⁰⁸ Mixed methods, on the other hand, "can best be thought of as combining qualitative and quantitative methods in a way that is best for a specific research project."³⁰⁹ In mixed methods, there are multiple ways of combining qualitative and quantitative methods.³¹⁰ One

³⁰⁵ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, p. 3.

³⁰⁶ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (California: Sage, 2014), p. 28. Emphasis in original.

³⁰⁷ Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 77-78.

³⁰⁸ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, pp. 141-142.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³¹⁰ See, Alan Bryman, "Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research: How is it Done?" *Qualitative Research*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 97-113. Also see, John M. Creswell and Vicki L. Plano Clark, *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research* (California: Sage Publications, 2011);

way is triangulation, that is, “the results of an investigation employing a method associated with one research strategy are crosschecked against the results of using a method associated with the other research strategy.”³¹¹ In other words, separate findings based on qualitative data collection and analysis and quantitative data collection and analysis are comparatively reviewed to observe whether they corroborate each other. If so, it increases the validity of research findings to a considerable extent.

In social research, there are five major types of research designs. Experimental design “is frequently held up as a touchstone because it engenders considerable confidence in the robustness and trustworthiness of causal findings,” and cross-sectional design, also called survey design, “entails the collection of data on *more than one case* (usually quite a lot more than one) and at *a single point in time* in order to collect a body of *quantitative or quantifiable data* in connection with two or more variables (usually many more than two), which are then examined to detect *patterns of association*.”³¹² Related to cross-sectional design, in longitudinal design, “a sample is surveyed and is surveyed again on at least one further occasion,” and thus it “can allow some insight into the time order of variables and therefore may be more able to allow causal inferences to be made.”³¹³ Case study design, on the other hand, “is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question” and “entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case.”³¹⁴ Finally,

Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, *Mixed Methods Approach: Merging Theory with Practice* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2010).

³¹¹ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 635.

³¹² Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 50, p. 58. Emphasis in original.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68. Also see, Robert E. Stake, *The Art of Case Study Research* (California: Sage Publication, 1995).

related to case study design, comparative design “entails studying two contrasting cases using more or less identical methods. It embodies the logic of comparison, in that it implies that we can understand social phenomena better when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations.”³¹⁵

In terms of research method, this thesis is a mixed methods research, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods and making use of both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods. In terms of research design, this thesis employs a case study design. Still, to underline, within the case study design, a comparative design is immanent.

3.1.1 Unit of Analysis

In social research, “the entities (objects or events) under study are referred to...as units of analysis.”³¹⁶ In another definition, unit of analysis refers to “the level of social life on which the research question is focused, such as individuals, groups, towns, or nations.”³¹⁷ It is critical in social research to identify the unit of analysis accurately since “confusion over units may result in false conclusions about research findings.”³¹⁸ In other words, “to draw conclusions about one unit on the basis of information about another is to risk committing a logical fallacy.”³¹⁹ As an example, one common logical fallacy is ecological fallacy, also called ecological inference

³¹⁵ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 72. Some other scholars omit comparative design and divide research design into four main types. See, for example, Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 115.

³¹⁶ Royce A. Singleton, Jr. And Bruce C. Straits, *Approaches to Social Research* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 67.

³¹⁷ Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research*, p. 188.

³¹⁸ Royce A. Singleton, Jr. And Bruce C. Straits, *Approaches to Social Research*, p. 69.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

problem, which is “an error in reasoning in which incorrect conclusions about individual-level processes are drawn from group-level data.”³²⁰

In this thesis, there are two units of analysis acting on two levels of analysis. This thesis, in brief, is a research about state behavior examined in reference to the behaviors of statesmen, also called policymakers or state agents. Hence, the first unit of analysis is state acting on the state level of analysis. In accord with Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, research in this thesis is predicated on the premise that “taking states seriously is not the same as privileging state actors [states] as the ‘normal’ or ‘proper’ unit of international political analysis...Studying state behavior, an unavoidable dimension of foreign policy, does not make one a statist.”³²¹ The second unit of analysis is state agents acting on the individual level of analysis. Especially, research on the conceptions of state agents about their state’s identity, whether person identity, role identity, or social identity, is integral to this thesis.

3.1.2 Measurement

Measurement, in the basic sense, “is the process of assigning numbers or labels to units of analysis in order to represent conceptual properties,” and the “measurement process consists of moving from the abstract (concepts) to the concrete (measures of concepts).”³²² The move from the abstract to the concrete is “the process of

³²⁰ Daniel F. Chambliss and Russell K. Schutt, *Making Sense of the Social World: Methods of Investigation* (California: Sage, 2013), p. 30. Also see, Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997).

³²¹ Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, “Introduction,” in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, eds., *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2012), pp. 1-9, p. 5.

³²² Royce A. Singleton, Jr. and Bruce C. Straits, *Approaches to Social Research*, p. 76.

formulating and clarifying concepts,” called conceptualization.³²³ In this thesis, all the relevant conceptualizations are made in the first chapter. In social research, there are four levels of measurement depending on the types of variables. A nominal variable “is simply a set of names. In other words, the set of categories are not related to each other in terms of quantity,” and an ordinal variable “is one where the categories or codes can be ranked in some way-that is, one can be said to be greater or more important than another-but the difference between each pair of categories is not equal.”³²⁴ A ratio variable, on the other hand “is one where the difference between each of the answers or categories is equal and there is an absolute zero on the scale. It is possible to multiply and divide (form ratios) between different variable values,” and, finally, an interval variable “is similar to a ratio variable in that the difference between each of the answers or categories is equal but there is no absolute zero.”³²⁵

In this thesis, state motives, i.e., security, economy, and identity, are *nominal* variables, and the measurement only concerns the absence or presence of them. Measurement in this sense is carried out by examining the absence or presence of respective sub-motive elements. This thesis does not measure the relative degree of a state’s influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, and is not even concerned with the absence or presence of influence. This thesis is a research on *influence acts* only; not on *influential acts*. In this thesis, two modes of inference to measure the absence or presence of an influence act are employed. Either the declared motives of

³²³ Ibid., p. 77.

³²⁴ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 348.

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 347.

states are identified and causally related to state acts or from state acts non-declared motives of states are inferred.

‘Gravity’ is a central concept in this thesis defining how and why a state’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other.

Again, this thesis does not measure the relative degree of another state’s gravity in a state’s regional foreign policy sub-structures. Measurement in this sense is carried out by examining the absence or presence of gravity. ‘The degree of significance’ is another central concept defining how and why a state’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other. Here, sub-motive elements are *ordinal* variables.

3.1.3 Sampling

In social research, “the selection of some cases from a larger group of potential cases is called sampling.”³²⁶ In technical terms, the selected cases are called the sample, and “the total number of cases that can be included as research subjects” is called the population.³²⁷ A related concept is sampling frame, which “denotes the set of all cases from which the sample is actually selected.”³²⁸ The rationale of sampling is to achieve results from studying the sample that are also valid for, or in other words generalizable to, the population from which the sample is selected. “The generalizability of the study is the extent to which it can be used to inform us about

³²⁶ Ibid., p. 153.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 154.

³²⁸ Royce A. Singleton, Jr. and Bruce C. Straits, *Approaches to Social Research*, p. 76.

persons, places, or events that were not studied.”³²⁹ There are two forms of generalizability. Sample generalizability “refers to the ability to generalize from a sample, or subset, of a larger population to that population itself,” and cross-population generalizability “refers to the ability to generalize from findings about one group, population, or setting to other groups, populations, or settings.”³³⁰

A sampling design, on the other hand, “refers to that part of the research plan that indicates how cases are to be selected for observation,” and “sampling designs are generally divided into two broad classes: probability and non-probability.”³³¹ While probability sampling strategies include simple random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling, and stage sampling, non-probability sampling strategies include convenience sampling, voluntary sampling, quota sampling, purposive sampling, dimensional sampling, and snowball sampling.³³² Of particular interest here, “good qualitative researchers, at the very least, engage in purposeful sampling, which means that they purposefully choose data that fit the parameters of the project’s research questions, goals, and purposes.”³³³

In purposeful sampling, “cases are chosen ‘with purpose’ to enable the researcher to explore the research questions or develop a theory. The cases are selected on the basis of characteristics or experiences that are directly related to the researcher’s area of interest and her research questions, and will allow the researcher to study the

³²⁹ Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research*, p. 188.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³³¹ Royce A. Singleton, Jr. and Bruce C. Straits, *Approaches to Social Research*, p. 118.

³³² Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes, and Malcolm Tight, *How to Research* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2008), p. 163.

³³³ Sarah J. Tracey, *Qualitative Research Methods: Collecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact*, p. 134.

research topic in-depth.”³³⁴ The objective of purposive sampling “is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are being posed,” and “very often, the researcher will want to sample in order to ensure that there is a good deal of variety in the resulting sample, so that sample members differ from each other in terms of key characteristics relevant to the research question.”³³⁵ In addition, there are purposive sampling sub-strategies, such as stakeholder sampling, extreme or deviant case sampling, typical case sampling, paradigmatic case sampling, maximum variation sampling, criterion sampling, theory-guided sampling, critical case sampling, and disconfirming or negative case sampling.³³⁶

Choosing the sampling design and the sample size is bound by several factors in a social research. With respect to sampling design, these factors include stage of research and data use, available resources, and method of data collection, and with respect to sample size, these factors include population heterogeneity, desired precision, sampling design, again available resources, and number of breakdowns planned.³³⁷

In this thesis, purposive sampling is employed as a sampling strategy. In order to clearly identify a state’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, and to systematically scrutinize why and how these motives differ among and within each other, Turkey’s bilateral relations with Syria, Iran, and

³³⁴ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 167.

³³⁵ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 72.

³³⁶ Ted Palys, “Purposive Sampling,” in Lisa M. Given, ed., *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods* (California: Sage Publications, 2008), pp. 697-698.

³³⁷ Royce A. Singleton, Jr. and Bruce C. Straits, *Approaches to Social Research*, pp. 138-144.

Palestine are selected in the period between 14 March 2003 and 28 August 2014.

This selection has three aspects. The first aspect is the selection of the state whose motives and influence acts are under investigation. The second aspect is the selection of regional states wherewith the state whose motives and influence acts are under investigation has bilateral relations. The third aspect concerns the selection of the time period during which the state whose motives and influence acts are under investigation has bilateral relations with selected regional states.

In the first case, Turkey is selected as the sample since by virtue of being a state it is representative of the population, which is composed of the members of the United Nations. In the second case, first, the Middle East is selected as the sample due to its significance in Turkish foreign policy, and here the population is composed of regional systems in Turkish foreign policy in which Turkey exercises influence acts. Second, Syria, Iran, and Palestine are selected as sample since, based on the tentative findings of initial exploratory research, their selection is the most illustrative in demonstrating the variance in Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East, and in explaining the causes of the variance. Here, the population is composed of the states occupying the Middle East regional system.

In the third case, the time period between 14 March 2003 and 28 August 2014 is selected since during this period Turkey was governed by single party governments formed by the same political party, that is, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, or AKP in Turkish acronym), which decreases the range of variation for the selection of state agents whose policies defined Turkey's relations

with Syria, Iran, and Palestine in this time period. The period started with the formation of the second AKP government (59th Turkish government) on 14 March 2003 and ended with the dissolution of the fourth AKP government (61th Turkish government) on 28 August 2014. The primary state agents whose political practices and discourses are examined in this thesis are listed below.

Table 15: Primary State Agents in Turkish Foreign Policy between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014³³⁸

President	Prime Minister	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ahmet Necdet Sezer (16 May 2000-28 August 2007)	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (59 th Government: 14 March 2003-29 August 2007) (60 th Government: 29 August 2007-6 July 2011) (61 st Government: 6 July 2011-29 August 2014)	Abdullah Gül (14 March 2003-28 August 2007)
Abdullah Gül (28 August 2007-28 August 2014)		Ali Babacan (29 August 2007-2 May 2011)

³³⁸ “Cumhurbaşkanlarımız,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı*, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/cumhurbaskanlarimiz/>; “Geçmiş Hükümetler,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık*, http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Global/_Government/pg_CabinetHistory.aspx; “Dışişleri Bakanları Listesi,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_disisleri-bakanlari-listesi.tr.mfa.

August 2014)		2009)
		Ahmet Davutoğlu (2 May 2009-28 August 2014

3.1.4 Case Study

In a detailed definition, “case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident,” and it “relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and...benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.”³³⁹ As a research design, case study has various types. An early classification was proposed by Arend Lijphart according to whom “six types of case studies may be distinguished,” which are “(1) atheoretical case studies; (2) interpretive case studies; (3) hypothesis-generating case studies; (4) theory-confirming case studies; (5) theory-infirming case studies; (6) deviant case studies.”³⁴⁰ A recent classification includes critical case studies, extreme or unique case studies, representative or typical case studies, revelatory case studies, and longitudinal case studies.³⁴¹ In critical case studies, for example, “the case is

³³⁹ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, pp. 16-17. On case study research, also see, John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Robert K. Yin, *Applications of Case Study Research* (California: Sage Publications, 2012).

³⁴⁰ Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3, 1971, pp.682-693, p. 691.

³⁴¹ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 128.

chosen as one that will enable the researcher to test a theory or hypothesis...This could be a case where an event or change has occurred which provides the researcher with the opportunity to study what happens as a result.”³⁴²

In designing case study research, Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett specify five tasks as “specification of the problem and research objective,” “specification of variables,” “case selection,” “describing the variance in variables,” and “formulation of data requirements and general questions.”³⁴³ George and Bennett also mention some limitations in case study research. For example, in case studies, “recurrent trade-offs include the problem of case selection; the trade-off between parsimony and richness; and the related tension between achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to broad populations.”³⁴⁴ These limitations are generally adduced to argue against the utility of case studies in social research. “The problems with the conventional wisdom about case-study research can be summarized in five misunderstandings or oversimplifications about the nature of such research.”³⁴⁵ As examples, it is contended that “general, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge,” “one cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development,” and “the case study is most useful for

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 73-87.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 22

³⁴⁵ Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” in Paul Atkinson and Sara Delamont, eds., *Sage Qualitative Research Methods, Vol. 3* (London: Sage Publications, 2011), pp. 99-124, p. 101.

generating hypotheses; that is, in the first stage of a total research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building.”³⁴⁶

While these sorts of oversimplifications are theoretically and ‘empirically’ not valid, as demonstrated by Flyvbjerg, George and Bennett identify “four strong advantages of case methods that make them valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory development,” which are “their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity.”³⁴⁷ According to Robert K. Yin, on the other hand, an ‘exemplary’ case study must be significant, be complete, consider alternative perspectives, display sufficient evidence, and be composed in an engaging manner.³⁴⁸

Being cognizant of the limitations of case study research and addressing them, and capitalizing on the analytical strengths of case study research, this thesis is a critical case study investigating Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine in the Middle East, and analyzing how and why Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine differ among and within each other. Since this thesis involves Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships with three states, a comparative research design is immanent in it.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 19.

³⁴⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (California: Sage Publications, 2003), pp. 160-165.

3.1.4.1 Comparative Case Study

Comparative research designs, by definition, are employed to study two or more cases, and as a corollary, “comparative research often uses a multiple case study design, allowing in-depth study of each case..., and aims to explain the similarities and differences between the cases.”³⁴⁹ In comparative research, “the comparisons when working with multiple cases are explicit and often carefully planned. Explicit comparison allows a wider range of research questions to be addressed than does the single-case study. With small-*N* comparative studies, the goal is sometimes theory testing but is more often theory elaboration.”³⁵⁰ Moreover, “the criteria for comparison must reflect the research questions and point to the nature of the data that needs to be gathered. This may be a mixture of individual data, documents and statistics-often largely secondary data.”³⁵¹ The two main comparative research designs are the most similar systems design and the most different systems design.³⁵² In the most similar systems design, “the values of cases that agree on an outcome variable also agree on the value of the variable hypothesized to have a causal effect, while they differ in terms of other variables,” and in the most different systems design, “the values of cases that differ on an outcome variable also differ on the

³⁴⁹ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 131. On comparative research, also see, Nigel Fielding and Jane Fielding, “Comparative Methods in Social Science,” in Paul Atkinson and Sara Delamont, eds., *Sage Qualitative Research Methods, Vol. 1* (London: Sage Publications, 2011), pp. 53-72; Donatella della Porta, “Comparative Analysis: Case-oriented versus Variable-oriented Research,” in Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 198-222.

³⁵⁰ W. Paul Vogt et al., *Selecting the Right Analyses for Your Data: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Methods* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2014), p. 412.

³⁵¹ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 131.

³⁵² On the two, see, for example, Carsten Ankar, “On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research,” *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2008, pp. 389-401.

value of the variable hypothesized to have a causal effect, while they agree in terms of other variables.”³⁵³

As a research methodology, though, a distinction can be made between comparison as a research process and comparison as a research outcome. In the first case, the researcher systematically uses a comparative research design as a methodological instrument to make premeditated comparisons. In the second case, on the other hand, comparisons emerge as a consequence of separate investigations of the cases that involve the same unit of analysis. In this thesis, two comparisons emerge as outcomes of the research. The first pertains to the research questions of how and why a state’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other. Here, Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are compared.

The second pertains to the research questions of how and why a state’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other. Here, sub-motive elements of security, economy, and identity, as Turkey’s motives, are compared in Turkey’s relations with each of Syria, Iran, and Palestine. Turkey’s bilateral relations with one of the states represent a case, and a within-case comparison is made instead of a cross-case comparison. To reiterate, this thesis is not a comparative analysis of neither Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its relations with Syria, Iran, or Palestine, nor sub-motive elements in Turkey’s bilateral relations with each of the state. Comparisons are outcomes of the research. In brief, this thesis

³⁵³ Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research*, p. 440-441.

is not a comparative case study; it is a single case study with a comparative research design.

3.2 Data Collection

The second stage in the process of social research involves collection of data. Data is simply “a collection of facts (or other information, such as opinions or values) which can be analysed and from which conclusions can be drawn.”³⁵⁴ Data is social reality processed as “we cannot simply know a social phenomenon, but we can attempt to capture it as data which represent the reality we have experienced, observed, asked questions about or are trying to explain.”³⁵⁵ Social research data has some characteristics. It can “be spoken or written words,” “be non-verbal-pictures, gestures or sounds-which can then be expressed as words,” “be structured in different ways,” “be constructed or produced by individuals and by groups,” “include factual statements and value statements,” “include what people say (the content) and the language they use to express the content,” and “include the researcher’s own thoughts and reflections.”³⁵⁶

In social research, “the sources of available data may be placed in five broad categories: (1) public documents and official records,...(2) private documents; (3) mass media; (4) physical, nonverbal materials; and (5) social science data archives.”³⁵⁷ These five categories, by all means, “do not constitute a mutually exclusive typology. Any data source may be placed in one or more of these categories. Also, analysts may draw on more than one data source in any given

³⁵⁴ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 70.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 181.

³⁵⁷ Royce A. Singleton, Jr. and Bruce C. Straits, *Approaches to Social Research*, pp. 345.

study.”³⁵⁸ The data in these categories is called secondary data, that is, “the data that researcher uses which has already been produced by others.”³⁵⁹ It is imperative to peruse secondary sources of data “for data to use evidence,” “for claims to use as support,” “for models of argument and analysis,” “to define your [the researcher’s] problem,” and “for arguments to respond to.”³⁶⁰ Arguably, a researcher “cannot really avoid the use of secondary data to some extent, and that it is legitimate and interesting to base your [his/her] research project entirely upon such data” because, among others, “collecting primary data is difficult, time-consuming and expensive,” one “can never have enough data,” “it makes sense to use it if the data you [the researcher] want already exists in some form,” “allows you [the researcher] to focus your [the researcher’s] attention on analysis and interpretation,” and a researcher “cannot conduct a research study in isolation from what has already been done.”³⁶¹

Secondary data is often divided into two categories; qualitative data represented by words and quantitative data represented by numbers. Needless to say, “numbers and words are *both* needed if we are to understand the world,” and “both types of data can be productive for descriptive, exploratory, inductive, and opening-up purposes. And both can be productive for explanatory, confirmatory, and hypothesis-testing purposes.”³⁶² Accordingly, both categories of secondary data need to be utilized in social research in combination. As mentioned above, one way of using qualitative data and quantitative data in combination is triangulation, which is “a measure of

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 51. On the other hand, “primary data is gathered by a social researcher using a data collection method appropriate to the type of data that is being collected.” Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams, *The Craft of Research* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 92-94.

³⁶¹ Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes, and Malcolm Tight, *How to Research*, p. 171.

³⁶² Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Jonny Saldaña, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*, pp. 42-43.

research quality, meaning that if different types of data are collected to address the same research question, each set of data can be used to check the findings from the others.”³⁶³ Another way, especially in qualitative research, is bricolage, “that is, a pieced-together set of representations that are fitted to the specifics of a complex situation.”³⁶⁴ Researchers, in other words, “are like quilters, borrowing and interweaving viewpoints and multiple perspectives. They make do with a variety of data—all of which are partial and mismatched—in order to construct a meaningful, aesthetically pleasing, and useful research synthesis,” which means that researchers “are flexible, creative, and make the most of the information available, whether that includes interviews, observations, documents, websites, or archival material.”³⁶⁵

3.2.1 Available Qualitative Data

Qualitative data presents several analytical strengths. A major characteristic of qualitative data “is that they focus on *naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings*, so that we have a strong handle on what ‘real life’ is like...The emphasis is on a specific *case*, a focused and bounded phenomenon embedded in its context...The possibility for understanding latent, underlying, or nonobvious issues is strong.”³⁶⁶ Another major characteristic of qualitative data is “the fact that such data are typically collected over a *sustained period* makes them powerful for

³⁶³ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 53. This is specifically called data triangulation. There are other types of triangulation as investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological triangulation. See, Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods* (California: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 247.

³⁶⁴ Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research,” in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (California: Sage Publications, 2011), pp. 1-20, p. 4.

³⁶⁵ Sarah J. Tracey, *Qualitative Research Methods: Collecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact*, p. 26.

³⁶⁶ Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Jonny Saldaña, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*, p. 11. Emphasis in original.

studying any process (including history); we can go far beyond snapshots of ‘what?’ or ‘how many?’ to just how and why things happen as they do-and even *assess causation* as it actually plays out in a particular setting.”³⁶⁷ A final characteristics of qualitative data “is their *richness and holism*, with strong potential for revealing complexity.”³⁶⁸

Documents are one of the foremost sources of available qualitative data extensively used in social research.³⁶⁹ While “the documents analyzed in a particular research project will vary dramatically from research question to research question,”³⁷⁰ they generally include personal documents, such as autobiographies, diaries, and letters, official documents deriving from the state, official documents deriving from private sources, mass-media outputs, and virtual documents, that is, “documents that appear on the Internet.”³⁷¹ Documents can also be classified according to their medium, that is, “the type of document and the material it is made of (which now includes non-material electronic forms such as the internet),” and their origin, that is, “why the document was created and by whom.”³⁷² There is a variety of reasons for the utilization of documents in social research. Documents, for example, “are often readily available and can contain large amounts of information,” and “are static and present a ‘snapshot’ of a particular time.”³⁷³ By the same token, documents “are socially constructed: this means that they can tell us more than just the data and

³⁶⁷ Ibid. Emphasis in original.

³⁶⁸ Ibid. Emphasis in original.

³⁶⁹ See, for example, Lindsay Prior, *Using Documents in Social Research* (London: Sage Publications, 2003).

³⁷⁰ Maryann Barakso, Daniel M. Sabet, and Brian Schaffner, *Understanding Political Science Research Methods: The Challenge of Inference*, p. 197.

³⁷¹ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, pp. 543-554, p. 554.

³⁷² Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 278.

³⁷³ Ibid.

information that they contain,” and “can be very useful to triangulate data: that is, to get a picture of the data already collected for research from different sources.”³⁷⁴

In this thesis, among the sources of available qualitative data, a central one is the speeches of primary state agents identified above as president, prime minister, and minister of foreign affairs. Among Turkish presidents, speeches of Ahmet Necdet Sezer are available in the web page of the Turkish Presidency. Speeches and interviews of Abdullah Gül are available in his own web page. A collection of Abdullah Gül’s speeches and interviews is also published in five volumes by the Turkish Presidency. As the Turkish Prime Minister, speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan between 2003 and 2008 are published by the Justice and Development Party in four separate volumes covering his addresses to nation, addresses to his party’s group meetings, his national speeches, and his international speeches. Nonetheless, only selected speeches of Erdoğan between 2008 and 2014 are available in the web page of the Turkish Prime Ministry. Among Turkish ministers of foreign affairs, selected speeches and interviews of Abdullah Gül are available in the web page of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A collection of his speeches is also published in one volume by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Speeches and interviews of Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu are also available in the web page of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Another source is the speeches of the Turkish ministers of foreign affairs in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in short, the Turkish Assembly. All speeches of

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

Abdullah Gül, Ali Babacan, and Ahmet Davutoğlu are available in the web page of Turkish Assembly's Journal of Minutes. As an additional source, the official programs of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Erdoğan Governments, or 59th, 60th, and 61st Turkish Governments, are available in the web page of the Turkish Assembly. Press releases and press statements delivered after reciprocal high level official visits constitute another source of qualitative data, and available in the respective web pages of the Turkish state institutions. Besides, scholarly books and articles of Ahmet Davutoğlu, a professor in the discipline of international relations, constitute yet another source.

The Official Gazette is another important source to inspect the number and the content of official bilateral agreements of various sorts signed between Turkey and Syria, Iran, and Palestine. Furthermore, official statements of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released during the time period also constitute another important source on Turkish foreign policy in general, and Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships in particular, and are available in the web page of the Ministry. Finally, especially in examining Turkey's official political attitudes towards security issues in its foreign policy, and in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, press statements of the National Security Council are critical. Of note, between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014, the National Security Council convened 75 times.

3.2.2 Available Quantitative Data

Quantitative data is data represented by numbers. Although quantitative data differs from qualitative data in form, qualitative data can also be quantified and represented by numbers through specialized techniques. One established method is content

analysis in which the content of a text is gathered and be subjected to quantitative analysis. “The content can be words, meanings, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes, or any communicated message. The *text* is anything written, visual, or spoken that serves as a medium for communication.”³⁷⁵ In content analysis, the researcher uses “objective and systematic counting and recording procedures to produce a numerical description of the content in a text.”³⁷⁶

In general, though, statistical analytical techniques are employed to examine quantitative data. Statistical analysis of quantitative data enables us to “summarise the data we have collected and describe the data,” “describe the features of the data in ways that help us to identify aspects that are relevant to our research questions,” and “explore and test relationships between different sets of data.”³⁷⁷ Statistics in social research “play a key role in achieving valid research results, in terms of measurement, causal validity, and generalizability. Some statistics are useful primarily to describe the results of measuring single variables and to construct and evaluate multi-item scales.”³⁷⁸ On the other hand, “other statistics are useful primarily in achieving causal validity, by helping us describe the association among variables and to control for, or otherwise take account of, other variables.”³⁷⁹

³⁷⁵ W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, p. 371. Emphasis in original.

³⁷⁶ Ibid. On content analysis, see, for example, Margrit Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice* (London: Sage Publications, 2012); Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (California: Sage Publications, 2013).

³⁷⁷ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 345.

³⁷⁸ Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research*, p. 487.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

These sorts of statistics are called descriptive statistics “because they are used to describe the distribution of, and relationship among, variables.”³⁸⁰ As matter of fact, “the term *descriptive statistics* is usually defined by contrast, by what descriptive statistics are not: not inferential, not multivariate, or not causal,” and therefore, “descriptive statistics are sometimes slighted in texts and reference works for researchers. The reason perhaps is the emphasis texts usually put on statistical inference and significance testing.”³⁸¹ However, “slighting descriptive statistics in favor of inferential statistics and significance testing is unfortunate, because many research questions can be answered with descriptive techniques and do not require statistical inference.”³⁸²

In this thesis, among the sources of available qualitative data, in reference to Turkey’s commercial transactions in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, the primary source is extensive datasets of the Turkish Statistical Institute. In addition, data available in the web page of the Turkish Ministry of Economy are highly important. In terms of trade agreements, the web pages of the Turkish Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of Customs and Trade are informative. Full texts of agreements are available either in the web pages of these ministries or in the Official Gazette. On tourism, again the datasets of the Turkish Statistical Institute, plus the statistics available in the web page of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, constitute the main source of available quantitative data.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ W. Paul Vogt et al., *Selecting the Right Analyses for Your Data: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Methods*, p. 206. Emphasis in original.

³⁸² Ibid.

In reference to transactions involving investments in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships, the databases of the Ministry of Economy and the Electronic Data Dissemination System provided by the Central Bank of Turkey are two main sources. In terms of investment agreements, the web page of the Turkish Ministry of Economy is the primary source. Full texts of agreements are available either in the web pages of this ministry or in the Official Gazette. On official development assistance delivered by Turkey, data published in the annual official reports of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, which are available in its web page, constitute the main source. Finally, in reference to Turkey's energy relations in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, data published in the annual reports of the Turkey's Energy Market Regulatory Authority, which are available in its web page, on Turkish electricity, natural gas, petroleum, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets is critical. Similarly, data published in the annual reports of the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, which are available in its web page, is also important.

3.3 Data Analysis

The third stage in the process of social research involves analysis of data. Analysis, as stated before, is “a process of working with the data to describe, discuss, interpret, evaluate, and explain the data in terms of the research questions or hypothesis of the research project.”³⁸³ Analysis is a methodological enterprise, and “the two most important features that are shared by all analysis methods are that they are: 1. *Systematic*: each piece of data (whatever that may be: case study, person, event, etc.) in the project is treated in the same way. 2. *Comprehensive*: all the data collected for

³⁸³ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 317.

the project is included in the analysis.”³⁸⁴ Still, analysis methods vary on the basis of the nature of data collected and analyzed. In general, qualitative data analysis differs from quantitative data analysis in some ways.³⁸⁵

In qualitative data analysis, for example, there is “a focus on meanings rather than quantifiable phenomena,” “collection of many data on a few cases rather than few data on many cases,” and “study in depth and detail, without predetermined categories or directions, rather than emphasis on analyses and categories determined in advance.”³⁸⁶ Furthermore, there is “sensitivity to context rather than seeking universal generalizations,” “attention to the impact of the researcher’s and others’ values on the course of the analysis rather than presuming the possibility of value-free inquiry,” and “a goal of rich descriptions of the world rather than measurement of specific variables.”³⁸⁷ In this thesis, three distinct methods of data analysis are applied. First, mostly to examine Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships based on the motive of security, process tracing is employed. Second, mostly to examine Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships based on the motive of economy, descriptive statistics is employed. Third, mostly to examine Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships based on the motive of identity, discourse analysis is employed. Nonetheless, it needs to be emphasized that due to the broad scope of research in this thesis, in terms of time, space, and subject, an elementary application of these three methods of analysis is preferred drawing on the analytical insights they provide.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ On qualitative and quantitative data analysis, see, for example, Pat Bazeley, *Qualitative Data Analysis: Practical Strategies* (London: Sage Publications, 2013); Donald J. Treiman, *Quantitative Data Analysis: Doing Social Research to Test Ideas* (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2009).

³⁸⁶ Russell K. Schutt, *Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research*, p. 360-361.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 361.

3.3.1 Process Tracing

In social research, “confronted with the problem of the variety and complexity of human perceptions, preferences and motivations, two types of solutions are available.”³⁸⁸ While the first option “is to make assumptions about actors’ preferences and perceptions. The researcher relies on common-sense intuition or deductive reasoning and makes a judgement call on their plausible or reasonable character,” the second option “is to acknowledge that preferences and perceptions are empirical questions that only a painstaking empirical investigation can uncover.”³⁸⁹ Accordingly, “from this perspective, it is not enough to add theoretical assumptions about the shape of the utility function, about the actor’s expectations or about their attention to their environment. In social sciences, these assumptions must be submitted to a careful empirical test.”³⁹⁰ Process tracing is an analytical method developed, principally by Alexander L. George, for such careful empirical tests in social research, especially in case studies.

Process tracing is defined by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett as the use of “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact

³⁸⁸ Pascal Vennesson, “Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices,” in Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, pp. 223-239, p. 233.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”³⁹¹ In a more straightforward definition, process tracing “refers to the examination of intermediate steps in a process about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest.”³⁹² Process tracing is an analytical method, and as such “differs from a pure narrative in three ways. First, process tracing is focused. It deals selectively with only certain aspects of the phenomenon. Hence, the investigator is aware that some information is lost along with some of the unique characteristics of the phenomenon.”³⁹³ Second, “process tracing is structured in the sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework identified in the research design,” and “third, the goal of process tracing is ultimately to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome.”³⁹⁴

There are several methodological and theoretical advantages of process tracing, as well as some shortcomings. One pertinent theoretical benefit of process tracing is its orientation of the researcher “from correlational arguments and as-if styles of reasoning toward theories that capture and explain the world as it really works.”³⁹⁵

As a shortcoming, “process tracing and the study of causal mechanisms raise a

³⁹¹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 6. On process tracing, also see, Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2013).

³⁹² Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices,” in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 1-38, p. 6.

³⁹³ Pascal Vennesson, “Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices,” in Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating, eds., *Approaches and Methodologies in Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, p. 235.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁵ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Process Tracing,” in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, eds., *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 114-127, p. 121.

difficult ‘stopping point’ issue.”³⁹⁶ In this thesis, process tracing is applied and its analytical insights are drawn on mostly to examine Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships that are performed on the basis of the motive of security. In other words, Turkey’s security relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are traced in accordance with the security policies of Turkey to address the security issues originating in multiple levels throughout the relevant period.

3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics

Statistical analysis is a quantitative research method “to collect, organize, analyze, and interpret numerical information from data.”³⁹⁷ There are two basic statistical methods. While “descriptive statistics involves methods of organizing, picturing, and summarizing information from samples or populations,” “inferential statistics involves methods of using information from a sample to draw conclusions regarding the population.”³⁹⁸ Specifically, descriptive statistics provides the researcher “with tools-tables, graphs, averages, ranges, correlations-for organizing and summarizing the inevitable variability in collections of actual observations or scores.”³⁹⁹

In descriptive statistics, data are presented mainly in tables and graphs in order to “document the sources of statistical data and their characteristics,” “make appropriate comparisons,” “demonstrate the mechanisms of cause and effect and express the mechanisms quantitatively,” “recognize the inherent multivariate nature of analytic

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 122.

³⁹⁷ Charles Henry Brase and Corrinne Pellillo Brase, *Understanding Basic Statistics* (Boston: Brooks/Cole, 2013), p. 4.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 10. On the two statistical methods, see, for example, Gregory J. Privitera, *Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (California: Sage Publications, 2015).

³⁹⁹ Robert S. Witte and John S. Witte, *Statistics* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), p. 5.

problems,” and “inspect and evaluate alternative hypotheses.”⁴⁰⁰ In this thesis, descriptive statistics is applied and its analytical insights are drawn on mostly to examine Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships that are performed on the basis of the motive of economy. In other words, Turkey’s economic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are statistically described in accordance with the economic policies of Turkey in reference to trade, investment, and energy throughout the relevant period.

3.3.3 Discourse Analysis

Discourse, in its simplest form, “is defined as text, either spoken or written.”⁴⁰¹

Discourse analysis, in general, “emphasizes the way versions of the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse.”⁴⁰²

Therefore, discourse analysis is “interested in ascertaining the constructive effects of discourse through the structured and systematic study of texts.”⁴⁰³ There are different kinds of discourses including “discourses in particular social settings,” “informal conversations between people,” “formal conversations/communications,” and “permanent and semi-permanent texts, such as letters and newspapers.”⁴⁰⁴

Discourse analysis, in brief, is defined by four major themes: “a concern with discourse itself; a view of language as constructive and constructed; an emphasis

⁴⁰⁰ Frederick L. Coolidge, *Statistics: A Gentle Introduction* (California: Sage Publications, 2013), pp. 45-47.

⁴⁰¹ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 391.

⁴⁰² Jonathan Potter, “Discourse Analysis as a way of Analyzing Naturally Occurring Talk,” in David Silverman, ed., *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice* (London: Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 200-221, p. 202. On discourse analysis, see, among others, Brian Paltridge, *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction* (London: Continuum, 2008); Susan Strauss and Parastou Feiz, *Discourse Analysis: A Multi-Perspective and Multi-Lingual Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

⁴⁰³ Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction* (California: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 4.

⁴⁰⁴ Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, p. 392.

upon discourse as a form of action; and a conviction in the rhetorical organization of discourse.”⁴⁰⁵

In social research, “discourse analysis is a research method that provides systematic evidence about social processes through the detailed examination of speech, writing and other signs.”⁴⁰⁶ Discourse analysis postulates that “discourse is not simply a neutral device for imparting meaning. People seek to accomplish things when they talk or when they write,” and thus discourse analysis “is concerned with the strategies they employ in trying to create different kinds of effect.”⁴⁰⁷ James Paul Gee contends that “whenever we speak or write, we always (often simultaneously) construct or build seven things or seven areas of ‘reality.’ Let’s call these seven things the ‘seven building tasks’ of language.”⁴⁰⁸

One of the building tasks of language is about identity. To Gee, “we use language to get recognized as taking on a certain identity or role, that is, to build an identity here and now,” and also “we often enact our identities by speaking or writing in such a way as to attribute a certain identity to others, an identity that we explicitly or implicitly compare or contrast to our own.”⁴⁰⁹ In this thesis, discourse analysis is applied and its analytical insights are drawn on mostly to examine Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships that are performed on the basis of the motive of

⁴⁰⁵ Rosalind Gill, “Discourse Analysis,” in Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell, eds., *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook* (London: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 172-190, p. 174.

⁴⁰⁶ Stanton Wortham and Angela Reyes, *Discourse Analysis beyond the Speech Event* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015), p. 1.

⁴⁰⁷ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, p. 529.

⁴⁰⁸ James Paul Gee, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method* (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 17. Also see, James Paul Gee, *How to do Discourse Analysis: A Toolkit* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011).

⁴⁰⁹ James Paul Gee, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*, p. 18.

identity. In other words, Turkey's identity relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are discursively analyzed in accordance with the identity considerations of Turkey in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity throughout the relevant period.

3.4 Limitations of Methodology

There are a couple of methodological limitations in this thesis. The first is pertinent to issues intimately tied to the substance of the thesis, and yet omitted due to the methodological exigency of demarcating the research scope of the thesis within certain boundaries. The methodology employed in this thesis with its three main components of research design, data collection, and data analysis is devised to address certain research questions. The two foundational questions in this thesis are: What is influence? Why do states seek influence? On the other hand, there are two additional and equally essential questions related to influence in international relations: How do states seek influence? How to measure influence? To reiterate here once again, this thesis is a research on influence acts, not on influential acts. It does not make analyses of the long array of ways states seek influence in international relations, nor does it devise means and methods of measuring influence. This substantive omission is as methodologically indispensable as it is theoretically consequential. The indispensability of omissions impose certain limitations on social research as is the case in this thesis.

The second methodological limitation is related to the treatment of sub-regional dyadic relationships in this thesis. A state's motives to seek influence in a particular

sub-regional dyadic relationship are informed by the state's other sub-regional dyadic relationships, and the state's influence acts in its particular sub-regional dyadic relationship are modified accordingly. In this thesis, Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are treated mostly in isolation from each other, and from Turkey's other sub-regional dyadic relationships, each constituting an autonomous pair of relationships. Still, in the relevant time period, Turkey's motives to seek influence in particular sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East were informed by its other sub-regional dyadic relationships, and Turkey's influence acts in its particular sub-regional dyadic relationships were modified accordingly. In this thesis, the methodologically significant issue of dyadic interplay, that is, reciprocal feedbacks among sub-regional dyadic relationships in a state's regional foreign policy structure, is not treated in an explicit manner insofar as it does not have direct bearing on the main research questions.

The third methodological limitation concerns the latent application of process tracing and discourse analysis as methods of qualitative data analysis in the thesis. Even though these two methods are thoroughly applied and their analytical insights are broadly drawn on to examine Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships that were performed on the basis of different motives, mainly security and identity, their methodological application is not meticulously systematic in the thesis depending on two reasons. The first reason is related to the temporal purview of the thesis inasmuch as it covers a period of 12 years in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with three states replete with innumerable events, both cooperative and competitive, with corresponding discursive practices. Hence, the broad temporal

purview of the thesis militates against the scrupulously manifest application of process tracing and discourse analysis.

The second reason is related to the issue of precedence between theory and methodology in social science research. This thesis treats different methods of data analysis to instrumentally explore, identify, and examine the findings of the case study to be applied for theory generation. In other words, this thesis is not about employing a case study to demonstrate and corroborate the utility, validity, and reliability of certain research methods. In brief, in this thesis, methodology is subservient to the case study, which, in turn, is subservient to theory.

3.5 Conclusion

As a brief review of the main issues addressed in the preceding discussion, in the introductory part, social research and its types are discussed, the research questions of this thesis are introduced, and the centrality of inference in social research is stressed. Subsequently, methodology of social research is defined as being composed of three successive stages of research, that is, designing research, collecting data, and analyzing data. In the first part, a distinction between research method and research design is made, and the types of research methods and research designs are presented. Later, the issues of unit of analysis, measurement, and sampling in social research are addressed. Finally, case study, as a research design, is discussed in some detail along with comparative case study as a particular variant of it.

In the second part, on data collection, sources of available data in social research are mentioned with an emphasis of the differentiation between primary and secondary data, and qualitative and quantitative data. Triangulation and bricolage are put forward as two ways of using qualitative data and quantitative data in combination. In addition, available qualitative data and its sources are examined followed by a quite detailed specification of the sources of available qualitative data utilized in this thesis. In a similar vein, available quantitative data and its statistical description are discussed followed by a quite detailed specification of the sources of available quantitative data utilized in this thesis.

In the third part, on data analysis, essential characteristics of data analysis in social research are indicated. More to the point, the three distinct methods of data analysis that are applied in this thesis in an elementary mode are introduced. These methods are process tracing, descriptive statistics, and discourse analysis, the application of which are deemed analytically appropriate for the examination of Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships that are performed on the basis of the motives of, respectively, security, economy, and identity.

In the fourth part, on limitations of methodology, three distinct potential methodological shortcomings are discussed. The first is concerned with the indispensable omissions in the thesis, and the irrelevance and the inapplicability of the methodology employed in the thesis to address these omissions. The second is concerned with the absence of an explicit treatment of dyadic interplay, that is, reciprocal feedbacks among sub-regional dyadic relationships in a state's regional

foreign policy structure, in the thesis. The third is concerned with the latent application of process tracing and discourse analysis as methods of data analysis in the thesis due to its broad temporal purview militating against the scrupulously manifest application of these data analysis methods. An additional point is concerned with the precedence of theory over methodology in the thesis.

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA

Turkey's relations with Syria between March 2003 and August 2014 represented a quintessential case of the volatility and fragility of interstate relations in the Middle East, characterized by expeditious maturation, precocious culmination, and precipitate dissolution in rapid succession. As a matter of fact, "until the end of the 1990s, official Turkish policy toward Syria could be defined as one of conscious alienation and controlled tension," during which "Turkey and Syria were locked in a relationship shaped by historical enmity, the prevalence of hostile establishment ideologies, and the attempts of policymakers to 'externalize' a number of major domestic problems."⁴¹⁰ The evolution of Turkey's policy towards Syria from coercive diplomacy based on punitive measures in the second half of the 1990s to proactive diplomacy based on transformative measures in the first half of the 2000s subsequently culminated in an exemplary rapprochement with Syria, emblemized by, among others, an extraordinary number of high level visits of policymakers between the two states, compared to the number of high level visits in their overall

⁴¹⁰ Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2008, pp. 495-515, p. 508.

history.⁴¹¹ For example, before 2004 not a single Syrian president visited Turkey; and yet, between 2004 and 2010 the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Turkey five times.

Table 16: Presidential Visits between Turkey and Syria in the Period of 14 March 2003-18 August 2014

Date	Outgoing Turkish Visits	Incoming Syrian Visits
2004 January		Bashar al-Assad
2005 April	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	
2007 October		Bashar al-Assad
2008 January	Abdullah Gül	
2008 August		Bashar al-Assad
2009 May	Abdullah Gül	
2009 September		Bashar al-Assad
2010 May		Bashar al-Assad

⁴¹¹ On Turkey's coercive diplomacy towards Syria in the second half of the 1990s, see, Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, pp. 174-191; Damla Aras, "Similar Strategies, Dissimilar Outcomes: An Appraisal of the Efficacy of Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy with Syria and in Northern Iraq," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2011, pp. 587-618; Berna Süer, "Ripeness Theory and Coercive Diplomacy as a Road to Conflict Resolution: The Case of the Turkey-Syria Showdown in 1998," in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 13-26.

The exceptional progress observed in Turkey's relations with Syria after 2003 has been explained from various perspectives emphasizing the conducive effects of developments in international, regional, and national contexts in varying degrees.⁴¹² According to one scholar "two parallel developments which took place simultaneously from the beginning of the 2000s onward made a great transformation in Turkey's policies toward Syria."⁴¹³ First, the scholar continues, "Ankara saw that even though Turkey unconditionally complies with American strategic interests in its own environment, its interests do not always converge with those of the US. This became very evident after the 2003 invasion of Iraq."⁴¹⁴ In addition, "rising anti-Americanism, Turkey's disillusionment by the open-ended nature of European Union (EU) accession talks and Brussel's accusation of Turkey not meeting the democratization standards all pushed Turkey to reinvent its neighborhood, and strengthened the belief that there was no longer a convincing Western axis."⁴¹⁵

In explaining the transformation of Turkey's relations with Syria, another scholar refers to the developments in the regional strategic environment. First, she argues, Turkey was "negatively affected by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003," and the

⁴¹² It should be noted here that "although there was a change in Turkey's bilateral relations with Syria...under the JDP government, the first seeds of change of Turkish foreign policy towards these countries were planted prior to the JDP government's formation." Kilic Bugra Kanat, "Continuity of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government: The Cases of Bilateral Relations with Israel and Syria," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2012, pp. 230-249, p. 232.

⁴¹³ Özden Zeynep Oktav, "Regionalism or Shift of Axis? Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations," in Özden Zeynep Oktav, ed., *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for A New Foreign Policy* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 75-94, p. 75.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid. In a similar vein, to Samir al-Taqi and Raymond Hinnebusch, Turkey's alignment with Syria "reflected something deeper than a mere temporary adaptation to the balance of regional threats precipitated by the US invasion of Iraq. Rather, it reflected deep systemic changes and the efforts of both Turkey and Syria not only to ward off the threats but also to promote and take advantage of the opportunities inherent in these systemic level changes." Samir al-Taqi and Raymond Hinnebusch, "As Seen from Damascus: The Transformation in Syrian-Turkish Relations," in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 95-109, p. 95.

response of Turkey to the adverse regional developments in the aftermath of the invasion “was soft balancing against US influence as well as developing closer ties with countries that felt threatened by the events in Iraq.”⁴¹⁶ Second, “in the second half of the 2000s Israel’s policies were also increasingly seen as a threat to Turkish interests,” and moreover, “Ankara sought to limit Iran’s influence in the Levant and to move Syria away from Iran by engaging with Damascus.”⁴¹⁷ Third, she adds, “Syria was considered as the gateway to the Arab world. The AKP [Justice and Development Party] government used Syria as the test case of its new policy of activism in the Middle East through soft power tools.”⁴¹⁸

For other scholars, internal dynamics in Turkey were the main arbiters of the phenomenal improvement of Turkey’s relations with Syria. In Turkey, it is contended, “securitization of certain political issues at the domestic level previously created an ideologically driven, inflexible, and enemy-oriented foreign policy in regional politics...causing external relations to become an extension of local political contentions.”⁴¹⁹ Nonetheless, the dual processes of democratization and desecuritization in Turkey in the mid-2000s, to the scholars, “changed this inside/outside matrix in a way that has emancipated the policymaking process from ideational barriers, increasing the flexibility of foreign policy attitudes and creating

⁴¹⁶ Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Explaining the Transformation of Turkish-Syrian Relations: A Regionalist Approach,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 177-191, p. 186.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 186, p. 187.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 187. Other regional factors are also referred. For example, Fred Lawson notes, in the first half of the 2000s, “rather than pulling Syria away from Turkey, however, heightened Israeli belligerence pushed the two former adversaries closer together.” Fred H. Lawson, “The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship: Syrian-Turkish Relations since 1998,” in Fred H. Lawson, ed., *Demystifying Syria* (Beirut: Saqi, 2009), pp. 180-205, p. 191.

⁴¹⁹ Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran,” p. 503.

more room to maneuver in regional policymaking.”⁴²⁰ Succumbing to the pervasive frailty of ascribing every favorable development in Turkish foreign policy to its EU dimension, the scholars conclude that the desecuritization of Turkey’s relations with Syria was “the result of the European Union accession process and concomitant steps toward democratization at the domestic level (which are then reflected in Turkey’s relations with Syria...), as well as the emergence of a conducive environment for desecuritization at the regional level.”⁴²¹

Turkey, capitalizing on the restorative ramifications of developments in international, regional, and internal environments and in part to avert deleterious complications of these developments, embarked on a peace offensive in its relations with Syria espousing proactive and preventive diplomacy within the avowed foreign policy framework of ‘zero problems with neighbors.’ The grand strategic objective was to establish with Syria an embryonic core of a regional order to be cultivated with the establishment of foundational institutions and a new normative complex, in addition to shaping the material context accordingly; simply, an oriental EU.⁴²² To that end, for example, Turkey concluded a considerable number of agreements with Syria on a vast array of subjects so as to establish the legal basis and to construct the fundamental institutions of its relations with Syria severely disregarded and

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Ibid., p. 496. Likewise, stressing internal dynamics in Turkey, to Carolyn C. James and Özgür Özdamar, although “a series of both domestic and external factors are influential in the development of relations between Turkey and Syria,” “the initial impetus for Turkey’s policies has been its own Kurdish citizenry.” Carolyn C. James and Özgür Özdamar, “Modeling Foreign Policy and Ethnic Conflict: Turkey’s Policies towards Syria,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, pp. 17-36, p. 27.

⁴²² In Andrew Phillips’ remarkable reformulation, international orders are constituted by three elements, which are normative complex, fundamental institutions, and material context. See, Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For the celebrated articulation of this new grand strategy, see, Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2007).

dismissed theretofore. To illustrate this point, in the relevant time period, 351 separate entries can be found for the word ‘Syria’ in the Official Gazette of Turkey.⁴²³




Figure 4: Frequency of ‘Syria’ in the Official Gazette of Turkey between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014

Among the numerous positive developments observed in Turkey’s relations with Syria in this period, some paradigmatic milestones constituting critical junctures in political/diplomatic, security/military, economic, and social relations can be identified. In Turkey’s political/diplomatic relations with Syria, the first visit of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Turkey on 6-8 October 2004 was a landmark event since with this visit Bashar al-Assad became “the first Syrian president in-

⁴²³ *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, <http://resmigazete.gov.tr/default.aspx>. Search was made for the Turkish word of ‘Suriye’ for the period between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014. Contents of pertinent agreements are available. It should be noted that agreements are promulgated in the Official Gazette some time after they are signed, depending on juridical processes. Each entry does not necessarily denote an agreement notwithstanding. Each entry only denotes the existence of respective Turkish words. For the precise content of each entry, the related issue of the Official Gazette should be consulted.

office to visit Turkey since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.”⁴²⁴

Therefore, the Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, in his speech in the welcoming ceremony, referred to the visit as having “a historical character and a special meaning.”⁴²⁵ The visit was to be reciprocated at once by Turkey with the visit of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Damascus and Aleppo on 22-23 December 2004.⁴²⁶ In Turkey’s political relations with Syria, the first meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Syria arguably represented the pinnacle of political state of affairs between the two states as the inauguration of a collective quasi-institutional mechanism to be convened on a regular basis for policy consultation and coordination. The Council initially convened in Damascus on 22-23 December 2009, was chaired by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian Prime Minister Mohamad Naji Otri, and “resulted in the conclusion of 50 agreements, memoranda of understanding, and cooperation protocols between the two sides.”⁴²⁷

In Turkey’s security/military relations with Syria, the first ever joint military exercises between the armies, specifically land forces, of the two states, conducted on 27-29 April 2009 along the border region, marked the highest level of military

⁴²⁴ Sami Moubayed, “‘Milking the Male Goat’ and Syrian-Turkish Relations,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 71-80, p. 73.

⁴²⁵ “Suriye Cumhurbaşkanı Esad’ı Resmi Karşılama Töreninde Yaptıkları Açıklama,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı*, 6 January 2004, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/ahmet-necdet-sezer-basin-aciklamalari/494/59492/suriye-cumhurbaskani-esadi-resmi-karsilama-torende-yaptiklari-aciklama.html>.

⁴²⁶ Ozden Zeynep Oktav, “The Limits of Change: Turkey, Iran, Syria,” in Nursin Atesoglu Guney, ed., *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 85-97, pp. 87-88.

⁴²⁷ “Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Turkey, Damascus, December 22-23, 2009,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye---suriye-ydsik-1_-toplantisi-ortak-bildirisi_-22-23-aralik_-sam.en.mfa.

cooperation with Syria for Turkey.⁴²⁸ In Turkey's economic relations with Syria, the Free Trade Agreement signed in Damascus on 22 December 2004, issued in the Official Gazette of Turkey on 6 November 2006, and came into effect on 1 January 2007 established the legal framework for trade liberalization between Turkey and Syria generating unprecedented impetus for economic transactions thereafter.⁴²⁹ Finally, in Turkey's social relations with Syria, the agreement on mutual abolition of visas between Turkey and Syria signed 13 October 2009 at the Öncüpınar Border Gate in Kilis, and issued in the Turkish Official Gazette on 23 December 2009 paved the way for the enhancement of interaction density between the populations of the two states.⁴³⁰

The velocity of progress witnessed in the scope and degree of Turkey's relations with Syria was by no means frivolous. In 2008, even before the additional breakthroughs that were to take place in 2009, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu was confident enough to declare that "in contrast to that of 5-10 years ago, Turkey's level of relations with Syria today [at that time] stand[ed] as a model of progress for the rest of the region."⁴³¹ Exhibiting an overly sanguine assessment of Turkey's relations with Syria at the time, one scholar went so far as to proclaim in 2008 that "the use of armed force between the two countries, which appeared to be a distinct possibility in the autumn of 1998, seem[ed] highly unlikely today [at that

⁴²⁸ "Türkiye ile Suriye'nin İlk Ortak Tatbikatı," *Radikal*, 26 April 2009.

⁴²⁹ For the full text of the Free Trade Agreement, see, "Milletlerarası Andlaşma," *Resmi Gazete*, No. 26338, 6 November 2006.

⁴³⁰ For the full text of the agreement, see, "Milletlerarası Andlaşma," *Resmi Gazete*, No. 27441, 23 December 2009.

⁴³¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, pp. 77-96, p. 80.

time].”⁴³² What was not known and expected then became manifest and inescapable later: the Arab Spring was coming!⁴³³

Turkey’s delicate and diligent efforts for the constitution of a durable and resilient relationship with Syria proved haplessly abortive in the face of the disastrous consequences of the spread of the Arab Spring to Syria in the first months of 2011.⁴³⁴

Turkey’s relations with Syria deteriorated even more rapidly than they had developed. As a result of its futile endeavors to convince, induce, and finally coerce the Syrian government to address quite legitimate concerns of Syrian citizens demonstrating peacefully, at least in the beginning, for basic rights and freedoms, Turkey relinquished all semblance of friendship and accommodation with the Syrian government.⁴³⁵ While “for the first time since the creation of the republic in 1923, the Turkish government [was] openly calling for regime change in a neighbouring state,” by means of organizing and safeguarding the Syrian opposition, galvanizing the Turkish public opinion, and striving to assemble an effective international

⁴³² Fred H. Lawson, “The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship: Syrian-Turkish Relations since 1998,” p. 199.

⁴³³ On the Arab Spring, see, among others, Paul Danahar, *The New Middle East: The World after the Arab Spring* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013); Mehran Kamrava, ed., *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁴³⁴ On Syria and the Arab Spring see, Reese Erlich, *Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World can Expect* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2014); Henry Hogger, “Syria: Hope or Despair?” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-8; Moshe Ma’oz, “The Arab Spring in Syria: Domestic and Regional Developments,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2014, pp. 49-57; Cenap Çakmak and Murat Ustaoglu, *Post-Conflict Syrian State and Nation Building: Economic and Political Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁴³⁵ The decisive turning point was arguably the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu’s meeting with Bashar al-Assad in Damascus on 9 August 2011 that lasted six hours. See, Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkey’s ‘Return’ to the Middle East,” in Henner Fürtig, ed., *Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 123-139, p. 136.

coalition, Syria impetuously descended into a protracted and catastrophic civil war.⁴³⁶

In Turkey's struggle for the removal of Bashar al-Assad from government in Syria, it gradually became evident that Turkish policymakers "overestimated their ability to effect change in Syria. Once the opposition took up arms against the [Syrian] regime, Ankara, like Washington, assumed that Assad would be gone in six months."⁴³⁷

However, at an immense economic and unspeakable human cost, Bashar al-Assad retained control, at least over some parts of Syria, till the end of the time period this thesis is concerned with. Concomitantly, though, public order collapsed completely in large segments of Syrian territory upon which a myriad of paramilitary armed groups emerged and reclaimed authority, including the infamous transnational terrorist network Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also called ISIS), aggravating an already perilous situation for Turkey.⁴³⁸

In sum, and more to the point, Turkey's influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria between March 2003 and August 2014 were based on all the three motives of security, economy, and identity.

⁴³⁶ Christopher Phillips, "Turkey's Syria Problem," *Public Policy Research*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2012, pp. 137-140, p. 139.

⁴³⁷ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Syria Predicament," *Survival*, Vol. 56, No. 6, 2014-2015, pp. 113-134, p. 117. Also see, Jamal Wakim, "End of Al-Assad, or of Erdogan? Turkey and the Syrian Uprising," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2014, pp. 186-200.

⁴³⁸ On ISIL/ISIS, see, Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror* (New York: Regan Arts, 2015); Isaac Kfir, "Social Identity Group and Human (In)Security: The Case of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2015, pp. 233-252; Vicken Cheterian, "ISIS and the Killing Fields of the Middle East," *Survival*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2015, pp. 105-118.

4.1 Turkey's Security and Syria

Turkey pursued normalization of its security relationships with Syria through invoking deescalatory measures, especially confidence building measures, in earnest. Turkey's quest for security reconciliation with Syria brought about, first, suspension of covert hostilities, then, alignment of security perspectives, and ultimately, coordination of security policies. To the profound frustration of Turkish policymakers, though, the onset of civil demonstrations transmuted into a civil war in a brief period of time shattered Turkey's cooperative security relationships with Syria, and worse, spawned multifarious security risks, dangers, and threats for Turkey. Ultimately, Syria became a national security issue. As an example, between 2003 and 2011, in the press releases of Turkey's National Security Council, the supreme state institution responsible for the formulation of national security policies and convenes bimonthly under the supervision of the Turkish president, Syria was only referred to once in May 2003 in reference to the removal of landmines on the common border.⁴³⁹ However, from April 2011 onwards, Syria was persistently referred to in every press release of the National Security Council.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁹ "2003 Yılı Mayıs Ayı Toplantısı," *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/2003-yili-mayis-ayi-toplantisi>.

⁴⁴⁰ The contents of all press releases are available in Turkish. See, "Basın Bildirileri Arşivi," *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/milli-guvenlik-kurulu/mgk-basin-aciklamalari/basin-aciklamalari-arsivi>.




Figure 5: Frequency of ‘Syria’ in the Press Releases of the National Security Council between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014

In the relevant time period, there were four levels in which security issues as the subject matters of Turkey’s considerations in its security relationships with Syria, be them cooperative or competitive, originate. These four levels were unit level, dyad level, regional level, and international level.

4.1.1 Unit-Level Security

Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, Turkey was very studious of its non-involvement in the internal security policies of Syria, refraining from any attempt that could be misconstrued as foreign interference in domestic affairs by Syrian policymakers. Instead, Turkey applied itself to foster a collegial atmosphere in its security relationships with Syria, focusing on coordinated policies addressing common security issues. Nevertheless, the eruption of civil war, and its subsequent

metamorphosis, compelled Turkey to exercise an active diplomacy and to take attentive measures concerning the security developments within Syria.

In fact, “when the Syrian Uprising started, Turkey had already changed its position clearly against the Arab dictatorships and in favor of democratic reforms in Arab Spring countries,” and still, it “did not immediately turn its back on Asad [sic].

Rather Turkey’s advice for reforms, democratization and free elections as a solution to the crisis in Syria were [sic] formally communicated to Asad in state-to-state meetings during the spring and summer of 2011.”⁴⁴¹ As an early example, on 6 April 2011, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu held a three hour meeting with Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. After stating that in the whole Middle East, Syria was the country Turkey considered the most important, Davutoğlu declared that Turkey attached great significance to the realization of a comprehensive reform effort in Syria which would strengthen Syria more and prepare it for the future.⁴⁴² In the meantime, with its brutal measures against civilians, the Syrian government revealed that it was indeed preparing for the future, but a ruthless and violent one for the survival of its authority at any cost. Turkey’s belief in the sincerity and candor of the Syrian government gradually turned into anxious frustration, then bitter resentment, and ultimately outright hostility.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴¹ Yasemin Akbaba and Özgür Özdamar, “Ethnicity, Religion and Foreign Policy: Turkish-Syrian Relations since the 1980s,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 125-132, p. 130.

⁴⁴² “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Bahreyn, Katar ve Suriye'deki Temaslarına İlişkin Yaptığı Basın Toplantısı, 6 Nisan 2011, Şam,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-bahreyn_-katar-ve-suriye_deki-temaslarina-iliskin-yaptigi-basin-toplantisi_-6-nisan-2.tr.mfa.

⁴⁴³ See, for example, Yahya Bostan, “Takat Kalmadı, Haberiniz Olsun,” *Sabah*, 15 June 2011. In addition, on social reactions in Turkey to the crisis in Syria, see, Cengiz Erisen, “Emotions, Social Networks and Turkish Political Attitudes on the Syria Crisis, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2015, pp. 1-18.

Subsequent to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's famous meeting with Bashar al-Assad on 9 August 2011 in the Presidential Palace in Damascus, which lasted six hours but ended in vain, Turkey's attitude shifted from persuasive efforts to coercive measures in its treatment of the Syrian government, losing its residual confidence in the intention of the Syrian government to enact the political and social reforms it had been disingenuously pronouncing. In an interview he gave to *the Guardian* on 21 November 2011, for instance, Turkish President Abdullah Gül stated: "He [Bashar al-Assad] seems to have opted for a different route. And frankly we do not have any more trust in him."⁴⁴⁴ Nine days later, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, declaring that it was "imperative to increase the regional and international pressure on the Syrian Administration and to take steps in order to curtail the capacity of this administration to engage in cruelty against its people," announced a series of sanctions, nine in total, against the Syrian Government.⁴⁴⁵ With the expulsion of Syrian diplomats in May 2012, Turkey's formal diplomatic relations with the Syrian government ceased to exist.⁴⁴⁶

In spite of Turkey's labored efforts, a civil war in Syria ensued, persisted, and transformed, begetting precarious security issues for Turkey. In summary, "three fundamental transformations have occurred as the Syrian uprising ploughs

⁴⁴⁴ "Suriye Cumhurbaşkanı Esad'a Güvenmiyoruz," in Abdullah Gül, *Global Perspektif: Yurtdışı Basın Mülakatları* (Ankara: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yayınları, 2014), pp. 206-209. For the original interview in English, see, Ian Black, "Turkish President Says Syrian Crisis at a 'Dead End' and Change is Inevitable," *The Guardian*, 21 November 2011.

⁴⁴⁵ "Press Statement Regarding Measures Adopted vis-à-vis the Syrian Administration, 30 November 2011, Ankara," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-statement-regarding-measures-adopted-vis-vis-the-syrian-administration-30-november-2011.en.mfa>.

⁴⁴⁶ "No: 151, 30 Mayıs 2012, Suriye'nin Ankara Büyükelçiliğinin Diplomatik Personelinin Ülkemizden Ayrılmalarının Talep Edilmesi Hk.," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-151_-30-mayis-2012_-suriye-hk_.tr.mfa.

inexorably into its fourth year [in 2014]. The most obvious is the markedly ethno-sectarian turn that the conflict has taken.”⁴⁴⁷ Second, “rival factions among the opposition have taken up arms against one another,” and third, “large chunks of Syrian territory have fallen out of the purview of the central government in Damascus.”⁴⁴⁸ Specifically, the emergence of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), an ethnic terrorist organization, as the self-appointed protector of Syria’s Kurdish people, and seeking administrative autonomy in northeastern territories of Syria along the Turkish border became disputably the most disquieting security issue for Turkey.⁴⁴⁹ Finally, the influx of more than 2.5 million Syrian citizens into Turkey fleeing from the civil war in Syria became a regrettable humanitarian crisis in itself with accompanying political, economic, and social challenges for Turkey.⁴⁵⁰

4.1.2 Dyad-Level Security

Turkey pursued conciliatory policies in its security relationships with Syria based on mutual interests over the peaceful settlement of quite ingrained disputes between the two states, at least till the abrupt advent of the civil war. These disputes were pertinent to the three issues of terrorism, transboundary waters, and border

⁴⁴⁷ Fred H. Lawson, “Syria’s Mutating Civil War and Its Impact on Turkey, Iraq and Iran,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 6, 2014, pp. 1351-1365, p. 1351.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1352.

⁴⁴⁹ See, Marianna Charountaki, “Kurdish Policies in Syria under the Arab Uprisings: A Revisiting of IR in the New Middle Eastern Order,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2015, pp. 337-356; Michael M. Gunter, “Iraq, Syria, ISIS and the Kurds: Geostrategic Concerns for the US and Turkey,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2015; pp. 102-111; Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Spring,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2013, pp. 441-457;

⁴⁵⁰ See, “Suriye Raporları,” *Başbakanlık Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı*, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/TR/IcerikDetay1.aspx?IcerikID=1636&ID=16>; “Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey,” *Orsam Report No. 195* (Ankara: ORSAM, 2015); Kılıç Buğra Kanat and Kadir Üstün, “Turkey’s Syrian Refugees: Toward Integration,” *SETA*, No. 49, 2015, http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150428153844_turkey's-syrian-refugees-pdf.pdf. The official number of Syrian refugees living in Turkey as of February 12, 2016 is 2.582.600. See, “Geçici Korumamız Altındaki Suriyeliler,” *Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü*, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-korumamiz-altindaki-suriyeliler_409_558_560.

designation. Inasmuch as the Syrian civil war nullified the progress on these disputes, and worse exacerbated them, Turkey was forced to exercise an active diplomacy and to take attentive measures concerning the security developments between Turkey and Syria within a paradigm of reactive and aggressive competition as opposed to the previous paradigm of proactive and permissive cooperation.

One of the longstanding disputes chronically hindering any meaningful improvement in Turkey's security relationships with Syria was the Syrian government's complicity in, at least leniency towards, the presence of terrorist organizations in Syrian territory perpetrating violent activities against Turkey, primarily the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanane/Kurdistan Workers' Party).⁴⁵¹ After the Adana Agreement of 1998, the Syrian government altered its intransigent position and commenced to take concrete measures against the members and activities of the PKK inside Syria.⁴⁵² After 2003, Turkey's security cooperation with Syria on terrorism incrementally deepened as several substantive developments took place in Syria's counterterrorism policies. For example, for the first time in the history of Turkey's relations with Syria, the Syrian government condemned a PKK attack, which was carried out against a passenger train in Bingöl in July 2005 and resulted in the death of five civilians.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵¹ To Ömer Taşpınar, for example, "as the primary supporter of the PKK, Syria has always been the focal point of Turkish post-Cold War strategy." Omer Taspınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition* (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 181. The general consensus on the issue is that "for the Syrian government the PKK provided a 'terror card' in return for Turkey's 'water card' and provided a bargaining chip of a possible decision to stop the water of the Euphrates River." Kılıç Buğra Kanat, "Ending Ceasefires for Political Survival: The Use of Diversionary Strategies by the PKK Leadership," in Fevzi Bilgin and Ali Sarihan, eds., *Understanding Turkey's Kurdish Question* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 103-116, p. 106.

⁴⁵² On an analysis of the Adana Agreement, see, Mustafa Coşar Ünal, *Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy Choices and Policy Effects toward the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 70-73.

⁴⁵³ Şeyhmus Çakan and Adil Önal, "Suriye İlk Kez PKK'yı Kınadı," *Hürriyet*, 3 July 2005.

In addition, in April 2007, Turkey and Syria conducted their first ever joint counterterrorism operation against PKK members in Syria, succeeding in detaining the leader of the PKK in Syria along with others.⁴⁵⁴ It was reported in March 2008 that 73 PKK members were extradited to Turkey by Syria in the preceding five years.⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, in the most extensive operation against the PKK in Syria, the Syrian security forces, in collaboration with the Turkey's intelligence agency, detained 400 PKK members in five cities of Syria in July 2010.⁴⁵⁶ Turkey also signed several agreements on security issues with Syria, such as the memorandum of understanding on the exchange of intelligence on terrorism financing issued on 11 October 2008.⁴⁵⁷ The Syrian civil war quashed Turkey's security cooperation with Syria in which Turkey opted for assisting the Syrian opposition politically, economically, and logistically against the Syrian government through a variety of measures ranging from policy coordination with the Syrian opposition to policy consultation with the international coalition.⁴⁵⁸

Another enduring disagreement in Turkey's security relationships with Syria concerned transboundary waters, namely the rivers of Euphrates and Tigris flowing from Turkey into Syria, and the river of Orontes flowing from Syria into Turkey,

⁴⁵⁴ Özgür Cebe, "Türkiye-Suriye PKK Operasyonu," *Hürriyet*, 4 April 2007.

⁴⁵⁵ "Komşu Ülkelerden 548 PKK'lı İade Edildi," *Hürriyet*, 29 March 2008.

⁴⁵⁶ Ceyda Karaaslan, "Suriye Koluna Büyük Darbe: 400 PKK'lı Gözaltına Alındı," *Sabah*, 2 July 2010.

⁴⁵⁷ See, "Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı," *Resmi Gazete*, No. 27021, 11 October 2008, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/10/20081011-5.htm/20081011.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/10/20081011-5.htm>.

⁴⁵⁸ As an example, members of the Syrian opposition met in Antalya on 1-2 June 2011 in a conference entitled 'Change in Syria,' which was the first international platform gathering the Syrian opposition outside of Syria. See, "Antalya'da 1-2 Haziran 2011 tarihlerinde Gerçekleşen 'Suriye'de Değişim Konferansı'nın Tam Deşifresi," *ORSAM Report No. 61* (Ankara: ORSAM, 2011). By the same token, Turkey hosted the second conference of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People in İstanbul in April 2012. See, "Chairman's Conclusions Second Conference Of The Group Of Friends Of The Syrian People, 1 April 2012, İstanbul," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chairman_s-conclusions-second-conference-of-the-group-of-friends-of-the-syrian-people_-1-april-2012_-istanbul.en.mfa.

which additionally became intertwined with the issue of terrorism in the course of relations. In fact, “the allocation of scarce water resources was a vital interest for both states; when no agreement was reached over this allocation, it became securitized and the two states engaged in both legal and realpolitik struggles, without resolving the dispute.”⁴⁵⁹ As the upstream riparian party to the dispute, Turkey’s legal claims over the rivers differed quite significantly from Syria’s, and Turkey persistently referred to the “equitable and reasonable utilization” of the waters in the resolution of the dispute.⁴⁶⁰

After 2003, in the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, Turkey “reached a stage in which contacts of open and pragmatic quality can be made with Syria over the water issue that constituted the most intricate and delicate subject between the two states in the past.”⁴⁶¹ Accordingly, the prospects for a mutually acceptable settlement of the issue increased with, for example, the resumption of the Joint Technical Committee meetings between Turkey and Syria in 2007, with the participation of Iraq in 2008, which had been suspended since 1992.⁴⁶² In 2009, Turkey signed two memoranda of understanding with Syria on water resources and

⁴⁵⁹ Marwa Daoudy, “Back to Conflict? The Securitization of Water in Syrian-Turkish Relations,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 133-143, p. 143.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 138. Also see, Mark Dohrmann and Robert Hatem, “The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2014, pp. 567-583.

⁴⁶¹ Abdullah Gül, *Yeni Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Ufukları* (Ankara: TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2007), p. 118. Abdullah Gül’s statement was made in a speech on 11 January 2005. Ibid.

⁴⁶² Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, “Turkey-Syria Water Relations: Institutional Development and Political Confrontations in the Euphrates and Tigris Region,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 145-157, p. 151. On Track II diplomacy on the issue, see, Aysegül Kibaroglu, “The Role of Epistemic Communities in Offering New Cooperation Frameworks in the Euphrates-Tigris River Systems,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2008, pp. 183-198.

water quality.⁴⁶³ However, the reconciliation process was interrupted, once again, with the initiation of civil war in Syria.

The last longstanding contentious issue in Turkey's security relationships with Syria was over the demarcation of the common boundary, and especially the question of Hatay/Alexandretta. In brief, while Syria had adamantly refused to formally recognize Turkey's sovereignty over Hatay, after 2003 the Syrian government did not abstain from participating in common initiatives that evinced implicit recognition of Turkey's sovereignty over the province. For example, in 2004, "within the frame of a free trade area planned along the Syrian-Turkish border, an agreement was made to open four border trade centres in Turkey, one of them Cilvegözü in Hatay," and "the fact that Syria agreed that a centre be established in Hatay [was] an additional indirect recognition of Turkish sovereignty over the area."⁴⁶⁴ In another example, in 2011, "the signing of an official protocol on the waters of the Orontes was a real breakthrough in Turkish-Syrian hydro-political and even broader political relations," since "signing the protocol legally implied recognition of the border."⁴⁶⁵ However, the civil war in Syria, casting an ominous shadow over the common border, eclipsed

⁴⁶³ Aysegül Kibaroglu and Waltina Scheumann, "Euphrates-Tigris Rivers System: Political Rapprochement and Transboundary Water Cooperation," in Aysegül Kibaroglu, Waltina Scheumann, and Annika Kramer, eds., *Turkey's Water Policy: National Frameworks and International Cooperation* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), pp. 277-300, p. 279. The first was "Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Efficient Utilization of Water Resources and Combating of Drought," and the second was "Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Remediation of Water Quality." Ibid. Both agreements were issued on 28 May 2011 in the Turkish Official Gazette. For the full text of the first agreement, for example, see, "Milletlerarası Andlaşma," *Resmî Gazete*, No. 27947, 28 May 2011, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/05/20110528M1.htm/20110528M1.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/05/20110528M1.htm>.

⁴⁶⁴ Emma Lundgren Jörum, "The Importance of the Unimportant: Understanding Syrian Policies towards Hatay, 1939-2012," in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 111-123, p. 119.

⁴⁶⁵ Ayşegül Kibaroglu, "Turkey-Syria Water Relations: Institutional Development and Political Confrontations in the Euphrates and Tigris Region," p. 155.

these auspicious developments, and once again gave rise to the militarization of the Turkey's border region with Syria.⁴⁶⁶

4.1.3 Regional-Level Security

Turkey's diplomacy in the Middle East was characterized by a fevered preoccupation with the preservation and restitution of stability in Turkey's vicinity, which necessarily and ironically entailed Turkey's animated diplomatic immersion in the quarrels and controversies of Syrian foreign policy, especially with Syria's neighbors. For example, addressing an audience composed of high-level Turkish and Syrian politicians, businessmen, and academics at the University of Aleppo on 16 May 2009, the Turkish President Abdullah Gül accentuated: "Turkey is a country that gives importance to stability very much... It attaches great significance to stability in our proximate region, the Middle East. This is why it engages in activities. And even if they do not interest it directly, Turkey is active in several issues that are of concern to the region."⁴⁶⁷ Among these issues Abdullah Gül was tacitly referring to, which did not interest Turkey directly, and yet Turkey became involved in, were Syria's diplomatic problems, sporadic or chronic, with its neighbors, especially Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq. As a corollary, Turkey exercised an active diplomacy and took attentive measures concerning the security developments

⁴⁶⁶ Among the instances of military exchanges and cases of military deployments, the shooting down of an unarmed Turkish F-4 military aircraft by the Syrian government on 23 June 2012, and the deployment of Patriot missiles on the Turkish territory beginning in January 2013 as part of a NATO military contingency planning can be specified. See, for the first instance, "No: 173, 24 June 2012, Press Release Regarding the Steps Taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in Respect of the Shooting Down of a Turkish Military Aircraft Off the Coast of Syria," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-173_-24-june-2012_-press-release-regarding-the-steps-taken-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey-in-respect-of-the-shooting-down-of-a-turkish-military-aircraft-off-the-coast-of-syria.en.mfa. For the second instance, see, "NATO Support to Turkey: Background and Timeline," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 19 February 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_92555.htm?.

⁴⁶⁷ Abdullah Gül, *Gelecek Yakın: Üniversite Konuşmaları* (Ankara: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yayınları, 2014), p. 100.

between Syria and its neighbors, both before and after the Syrian civil war, in addition to cooperating with Syria on security developments related to other regional states.

In respect of Syria's relations with Lebanon, for example, in the first months of 2005, Lebanon regressed into a treacherous internal crisis with the assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri.⁴⁶⁸ Since the usual suspect instantly became Syria, whose involvement in the assassination was to be insinuated by a UN report issued on 10 December 2005 as well, Syria's already strained relations with Lebanon worsened sharply, compounded with unprecedented international pressure on Syria for the withdrawal of its troops stationed in Lebanon.⁴⁶⁹ Syria capitulated, and withdrew its military forces from Lebanon completely on 27 April 2005.⁴⁷⁰ During the process, Turkey strived to avert an utter diplomatic rupture between Syria and Lebanon, and afterwards Recep Tayyip Erdoğan "claimed credit for convincing Assad to withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon (much to the consternation of the French, who had orchestrated the requisite UN Security Council resolution)."⁴⁷¹ As another example, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Damascus and

⁴⁶⁸ To be exact, "on February 14, 2005, at 12:50 p.m., Hariri and 22 other individuals were killed in an explosion in downtown Beirut." Robert M. Bosco, "The Assassination of Rafik Hariri: Foreign Policy Perspectives," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2009, pp. 349-361, p. 354.

⁴⁶⁹ For the official UN report, see, "Letter Dated 12 December 2005 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," *United Nations Security Council, S/2005/775*, 12 December 2005, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/636/79/PDF/N0563679.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁷⁰ Ahead of the assassination, implying Syrian military forces, the UN Security Council had already "call[ed] upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" with the Resolution 1559. See, "Resolution 1559 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5028th meeting, on 2 September 2004," *United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1559*, 2 September 2004, [http://www.unsco.org/Documents/Resolutions/S_RES_1559\(2004\).pdf](http://www.unsco.org/Documents/Resolutions/S_RES_1559(2004).pdf).

⁴⁷¹ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Syria Predicament," p. 118. On the issue, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, addressing the foreign ministers of Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Sana'a, Yemen expressed in June 2005: "Turkey threw weight behind the UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and the terms of Taif Agreement. The pullout of the Syrian troops from Lebanon is a good sign for the regional security. We are happy to see that the tension was allayed without the region being drifted to further uncertainties and conflicts." Abdullah Gül, *Yeni Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Ufukları*, p. 476.

met with Bashar al-Assad in March 2010, primarily to ease the tension between Syria and Lebanon, which arose with the incriminating statements of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri against Syria.⁴⁷²

In respect of Syria's relations with Israel, for example, "during his first visit to Ankara in January 2004, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad [sic] asked Turkey to play a role in the Middle East peace process. Asad's [sic] request showed growing trust in Turkey's role in the Middle East peace process."⁴⁷³ Subsequently, "during a visit to Ankara in February 2007, Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressed interest in Turkish mediation. Having secured the agreement of both Syria and Israel, a discreet Turkish shuttle started between the two sides. It culminated in the announcement of indirect talks in [sic] May 21, 2008."⁴⁷⁴ Nonetheless, "despite major progress, five rounds of Turkish-sponsored peace talks, [sic] ended in no agreement. The process was disrupted by the war on Gaza [in December 2008-January 2009] and the election of a far right government in Israel, putting everything on hold."⁴⁷⁵ Offended by not being informed in advance of Israel's military operation by the Israeli government, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that "he was appalled that the attacks came as his country [Turkey] was mediating peace talks between Syria and Israel," and thus, "the attacks were a show of disrespect toward Turkey."⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷² "Türkiye, Suriye-Lübnan Gerginliği İçin Devrede," *Akşam*, 8 March 2010.

⁴⁷³ Marwan Kabalan, "Syrian-Turkish Relations: Geopolitical Explanations for the Move from Conflict to Co-operation," in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 27-37, p. 35.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid. For the official announcement, see, "NO-81 - 21 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the Indirect Peace Talks between Syria and Israel under the Auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation)," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-81---21-may-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-indirect-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey-unofficial-translation_.en.mfa.

⁴⁷⁵ Marwan Kabalan, "Syrian-Turkish Relations: Geopolitical Explanations for the Move from Conflict to Co-operation," p. 35.

⁴⁷⁶ Yoav Stern, "In Protest of Gaza Attacks, Syria Halts Indirect Talks with Israel," *Haaretz*, 28 December 2008.

In respect of Syria's relations with Iraq, for example, "as a reflection of Turkey's increasing profile in the region," according to Mesut Özcan, Turkey "played an important role in overcoming the grievances between Syria and Iraq after the bombings in Baghdad in August 2009."⁴⁷⁷ Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Damascus, and Baghdad, in the last day of August 2009, to mitigate the tension between Syria and Iraq that erupted after the deadly attacks in Baghdad on 19 August 2009, assuring that Turkey would "do its best to consolidate the relations between brothers [Syria and Iraq]."⁴⁷⁸ On the other hand, in this case, these "well-meaning efforts" of Ahmet Davutoğlu did "not amount to much" because "Iraqis were not keen to see the Turks interfere despite the honeymoon in Syrian-Turkish relations."⁴⁷⁹

Turkey's endeavors shifted its orientation after the Syrian civil war, and concentrated on preventing the destabilizing effects of other regional actors from further confounding the situation in Syria, especially Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. However, in spite of Turkey's industrious efforts, the Syrian civil war became appealing to a number of regional actors, state and non-state, the dislocating effects of which 'spilled into' Syria.

⁴⁷⁷ Mesut Özcan, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009," *Perceptions*, Vol. 25, No. 3-4, 2010, pp. 113-132, p. 115.

⁴⁷⁸ "Suriye-Irak Arasındaki Sorun Çözülebilir," *Yeni Şafak*, 31 August 2009. Also see, "No:152, 28 Ağustos 2009, Sayın Bakanımızın Bağdat ve Şam'ı Ziyareti Hk.," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_152_-28-agustos-2009_-sayin-bakanimizin-bagdat-ve-sam_i-ziyareti-hk_.tr.mfa.

⁴⁷⁹ Henri J. Barkey, "A Transformed Relationship: Turkey and Iraq," in Henri J. Barkey, Scott B. Lasensky, and Phebe Marr, eds., *Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United States* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), pp. 45-71, pp. 65-66.

4.1.4 International-Level Security

The Middle East is, in fact, a ‘penetrated regional system,’ meaning that “the global system’s regional impact is exceptionally intense in the Middle East because the great powers, attracted by its strategic location, immense oil reserves and the presence of Israel, have historically penetrated and shaped it far more than other regions.”⁴⁸⁰ The period between March 2003 and August 2014 actually started with another act of aggressive international penetration, that is, the US invasion of Iraq. The enduring predominant position of the US in the regional politics of the Middle East inevitably had ramifications for its relations with Syria.⁴⁸¹ Accordingly, Turkey exercised an active diplomacy and took attentive measures concerning the security developments between Syria and international actors, specifically the US, both before and after the Syrian civil war, in addition to cooperating with Syria on security developments related to the policies of international actors in the Middle East.

Especially after the US invasion of Iraq that was launched in March 2003, Turkey increasingly became defiant of US requests for its participation in the US policy of isolating and sanctioning Syria, and instead progressively adopted a policy of proactive engagement with Syria on a wide range of issues. For example, in the first months of 2005, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “kept silent when the US started pressuring Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, in marked contrast to most US allies, after the

⁴⁸⁰ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 9. Also see, Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

⁴⁸¹ On Syria’s relations with the US, see, among others, Robert G. Rabil, *Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006); Raymond Hinnebusch et al., *Syrian Foreign Policy and the United States: From Bush to Obama* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009). For a general historical overview, see, Sami Moubayed, *Syria and the US: Washington’s Relations with Damascus from Wilson to Eisenhower* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

passing of UNSCR 1559 and the assassination of Harriri [sic].”⁴⁸² In addition, “in the midst of all the noise being made against Syria, a Turkish people’s delegation visited Syria in March 2005, and gave a press conference at the gates of the Syrian parliament expressing solidarity with Damascus, much to the displeasure of Washington.”⁴⁸³ More importantly, one month later, “in April 2005, amidst speculation that the US was preparing the ground for some sort of action against Syria, which was seen as fundamentally hostile to American strategic interests in the Middle East, Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, visited Damascus.”⁴⁸⁴ Ahead of this particular visit, “Turkey refused a request by the US ambassador to Ankara, Eric Edelman, that Turkey cancel, or at least postpone, the visit until Syria complied fully with a list of American demands.”⁴⁸⁵

Turkey’s readiness, as it is argued, “to play a very delicate and intricate balancing role between Syria and the US at the expense of its relations with Washington had a threefold aim.”⁴⁸⁶ The first aim “was to prevent the escalation of tension between Damascus and Washington so as to maintain stability and security in the face of the increasing unilateral demands of Washington.”⁴⁸⁷ The second aim “was that Ankara, in weighing the economic and other benefits it could receive from its neighbors, Syria and Iran, against the disillusionment it reaped from the West, wanted to improve its relations with its neighbors without overtly antagonizing the US,” and

⁴⁸² Sami Moubayed, “Turkish-Syrian Relations: The Erdoğan Legacy,” *SETA Policy Brief*, No. 25, October 2008, p. 3.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁸⁴ Marwan Kabalan, “Syrian-Turkish Relations: Geopolitical Explanations for the Move from Conflict to Co-operation,” p. 31.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁶ Özden Zeynep Oktav, “Regionalism or Shift of Axis? Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations,” p. 78. Also see, Özden Zeynep Oktav, “The Syrian Uprising and the Iran-Turkey-Syria Quasi Alliance: A View from Turkey,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 193-203.

⁴⁸⁷ Özden Zeynep Oktav, “Regionalism or Shift of Axis? Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations,” p. 78.

finally, “Ankara’s tilting towards Syria was a retaliation against insufficient action from the US with regard to cracking down on the PKK.”⁴⁸⁸

With the unfolding of the Syrian civil war, though, Turkey radically modified its policy, and tilting this time towards the other end entirely, entreated the US repeatedly to form and lead an international coalition to overthrow the Syrian government by force, but to no avail. Despite its participation, for example, in the successive meetings of the Friends of Syrian People, the US refrained from taking military action, unilaterally or multilaterally, against the Syrian government, and did not respond unequivocally to Turkey’s demands for a no-fly zone or a buffer zone along the Syrian border.⁴⁸⁹ After lengthy negotiations, as a concrete collective action plan, Turkey and the US were to sign an agreement in February 2015 to ‘train and equip’ moderate forces among the Syrian opposition fighting against the Syrian government.⁴⁹⁰

4.2 Turkey’s Economy and Syria

In an interview in November 2002, Ahmet Davutoğlu asserted: “Under normal conditions and especially considering its southern borders, Turkey is a country whose influence towards the south was sought to be stalled. I speak of this not in the meaning of an expansionist influence [but] in the meaning of an economic and

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ As an example, for the Paris meeting of the Friends of Syrian People, see, “Friends of Syrian People Core Group Meeting Held in Paris,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/friends-of-syrian-people-core-group-meeting-held-in-paris.en.mfa>.

⁴⁹⁰ Okan Müderrisoğlu, “Turkey, US to Start Train-and-equip Program for Syrian Opposition Next Week,” *Daily Sabah*, 1 May 2015.

cultural influence.”⁴⁹¹ After March 2003, Syria stood at the center of Turkey’s unyielding venture to extend its economic ‘influence’ towards ‘the south’ in the Middle East, especially taking into account the economic uncertainties of the highly volatile Iraqi market after the US invasion. Thereafter, “Turkish-Syrian economic relations have been subject to political developments in general - as political relations improved, economic relations progressed in a parallel fashion.”⁴⁹²

In general, the intensification of Turkey’s economic interactions and transactions with Syria hinged on two underlying reasons. The first was “Turkey’s emerging need to trade more due to its economic growth and the transformation of its economy including its integration in global markets.”⁴⁹³ Related to the first reason, Turkey also “began to act in accordance with its role as a ‘trading state’,” with business communities taking a larger and more effective role in foreign economic policy.⁴⁹⁴ Besides, for Turkey, achieving economic interdependence with Syria would generate additional dividends for Turkey’s foreign and security policy. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, in Turkey’s relations with Syria, “the most effective remedy for strained political relations is the formation of common economic areas of interest.”⁴⁹⁵

Elsewhere, Davutoğlu makes a similar argument: “With the development of economic relations between Syria and Turkey, the likelihood of war would be

⁴⁹¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2013), p. 82.

⁴⁹² Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 159-175, p. 159.

⁴⁹³ Özlem Tür, “Economic Relations with the Middle East under the AKP – Trade, Business Community and Reintegration with Neighboring Zones,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2011, pp. 589-602, p. 589.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 590. For the much-cited article on Turkey as a ‘trading state,’ see, Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, pp. 29-57. For the original argument, see, Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

⁴⁹⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 404.

minimized. Because while Antep and Aleppo are trading, why would their peoples make war by sending troops...”⁴⁹⁶ In the relevant time period, Turkey carried out its economic relations with Syria on the three areas of trade, investment, and energy.

4.2.1 Trade

Turkey practiced an incrementalist approach in cultivating commercial relations with Syria, simultaneously pursuing three complementary objectives of building a credible legal framework, establishing durable organizational structures, and providing several kinds of business incentives for the private sectors of both Turkey and Syria. Turkey’s export-led trade policy, and its central place in Turkey’s economic development required expansion into new markets, among which Syria was a proximate and yet an underexplored and undercultivated market. Besides, Syrian was considered as a gateway to the larger markets in the Middle East, as the explicit statement of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Damascus in December 2009 illustrated: “We do not see Syria as a market with a population of 20 million, [we see it] as a gateway to the Middle East market with a population of 320 million.”⁴⁹⁷ By the same token, in terms of Turkey’s domestic regional development strategy, commercial relations with Syria “were seen as important for the economic development of Turkey’s relatively underdeveloped southeast [region].”⁴⁹⁸ Accordingly, with the momentous visit of Bashar al-Assad in January 2004, Turkey increased its efforts to cultivate and consolidate commercial relations with Syria.

⁴⁹⁶ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 74-75.

⁴⁹⁷ “Suriye Ortadoğu Pazarına Giriş Kapısı,” *Milliyet*, 24 December 2009.

⁴⁹⁸ Birgül Demirtaş, “Turkish-Syrian Relations: From Friend ‘Esad’ to Enemy ‘Esed’,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013, pp. 111-120, p. 114.

In January 2004, in the visit of Bashar al-Assad to Turkey, “Turkish and Syrian authorities agreed to open a Syrian consulate in Gaziantep as well as trade centers in four provinces near the Syrian border” in order to boost commercial exchanges.⁴⁹⁹ In addition, Bashar al-Assad “visited the Istanbul Stock Exchange (IMKB) [later *Borsa İstanbul*] and held talks with leaders of top Turkish business groups as part of a meeting hosted by Turkish-Syrian business council.”⁵⁰⁰ More importantly, in this visit, Turkey signed with Syria the agreement for ‘the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income.’⁵⁰¹ Furthermore, Turkish business community was also keen on entering the Syrian market and increasing its market share, and thus, “immediately after al-Asad’s [sic] visit, a group of Turkish manufacturers took part in an industrial equipment exposition in Damascus and came away with contracts worth some \$ 250 million.”⁵⁰²

Turkey also decided to reinvigorate the Joint Economic Committee with Syria. In the Joint Economic Committee that convened in March 2004, for example, Turkey and Syria “discussed the possibility of setting up a bilateral free trade zone, as well as a joint agricultural area in the provinces along the border.”⁵⁰³ By the same token, after March 2003, Turkish-Syrian Business Council continued to assume an essential role in the promotion of commercial relations between Turkey and Syria.⁵⁰⁴ Speaking in

⁴⁹⁹ “Turkey, Syria Take Steps to Boost Trade,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 9 January 2004.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰¹ For the agreement, see, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmi Gazete*, No. 25506, 28 June 2004, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/06/20040628.htm/20040628.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/06/20040628.htm>.

⁵⁰² Fred H. Lawson, “The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship: Syrian-Turkish Relations since 1998,” p. 190.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ Turkish-Syrian Business Council was established in 2001 under Foreign Economic Relations Board (in Turkish acronym DEİK), and held its first joint meeting in İstanbul on 19 June 2001. See, “Türkiye-Suriye Ticari İlişkileri Isınıyor,” *NTV Msnbc*, 20 June 2001. For the official web page of the

its December 2004 meeting in Damascus, as an example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated: “Turkey has been among the first five [countries] in Syria’s trade volume in recent years. However, our goal is to make Turkey the first trade partner of Syria.”⁵⁰⁵

To that end, in the same visit of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey finally signed a free trade agreement with Syria under negotiation for a long time, which was issued in the Official Gazette on 6 November 2006, and came into force on 1 January 2007.⁵⁰⁶ The Free Trade Agreement was composed of 49 articles, and in Article 1 the objectives of the Free Trade Agreement were stated as, among others, “to increase and enhance the economic co-operation and to raise the living standards of people in both countries,” “to gradually eliminate difficulties and restrictions on trade in goods, including agricultural products,” “to promote, through the expansion of reciprocal trade, the harmonious development of the economic relations between the Parties,” and “to contribute by the removal of barriers to trade, to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade.”⁵⁰⁷ Specifically, “on the day the agreement came into force, all Syrian industrial goods were allowed to enter the Turkish market free of

Council, see, “Türkiye-Suriye İş Konseyi,” *DEİK*,
http://www.deik.org.tr/Konsey/110/Konsey_Hakkında.html.

⁵⁰⁵ “Türkiye-Suriye İş Konseyi Toplantısı...,” *Milliyet*, 23 December 2004. Similar to Turkey, Syria also promoted commercial relations in its foreign economic policy with Turkey since, for one reason, “grafting the well-established Syrian entrepreneurship to joint ventures with more experienced modern and competitive Turkish counterparts willing to undertake big investment in productive enterprises was seen as the key to the maturation of a productive [Syrian] private sector.” Samir al-Taqi and Raymond Hinnebusch, “As Seen from Damascus: The Transformation in Syrian-Turkish Relations,” p. 107.

⁵⁰⁶ For the full text of the agreement in Turkish, see, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmi Gazete*, No. 26338, 6 December 2006,
<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/11/20061106M1-1.htm/20061106M1.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/11/20061106M1-1.htm>.

⁵⁰⁷ Quotations are from the English version of the Agreement. Refer to “Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmalarına İlişkin Genel Bilgi, “,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ekonomi Bakanlığı*,
http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/portal/faces/home/disIliskiler/SerbestTic/Genel_Bilgi.html#!%40%40%3F_adf.ctrl-state%3Dtmw39via7_151.

any customs duties. Customs duties on Turkish industrial goods were to decline gradually over a period of 12 years.”⁵⁰⁸

In April 2005, as another milestone, the Syrian consulate in Gaziantep started its operations as the third diplomatic mission of Syria in Turkey, after Ankara and İstanbul.⁵⁰⁹ This was a part of the general policy of improving commercial cooperation between the bordering regions of Turkey and Syria. Turkey’s State Planning Organization and Syria’s State Planning Commission signed a memorandum of understanding on 15 December 2004 in Damascus on multiple issues of planning, including regional planning, strategic planning, and interregional cooperation.⁵¹⁰ In the official regulation on the allocation of funds within the framework of interregional cooperation program between Turkey and Syria, it was proclaimed that on the condition of being within the purview of the program, the projects of natural and juridical persons in the cities of Gaziantep and Kilis related to economic and commercial infrastructure, social and physical infrastructure, agriculture and animal husbandry, culture and tourism, and efficiency of public services would be financially supported.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁸ Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” p. 164. For an excellent discussion of trade relations between Turkey and Syria with particular reference to the city of Aleppo published in 2006, see, Annika Rabo, “Trade Across Borders: Views from Aleppo,” in Ingra Brandell, ed., *State Frontiers: Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 53-73.

⁵⁰⁹ “Suriye’den Türkiye’ye Sert Misilleme,” *Hürriyet*, 2 December 2011. The Syrian government was to end the operations of the consulate in late 2011 by way of retaliation against Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian uprising. Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ The agreement, composed of 7 articles, was issued in the Official Gazette on 23 June 2006. See, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmi Gazete*, 23 June 2006, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/06/20060623-1.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/06/20060623-1.htm>.

⁵¹¹ The regulation was issued in the Official Gazette on 18 October 2006. See, “Türkiye ile Suriye Arasında Yürütülen Bölgelerarası İşbirliği Programı Çerçevesinde Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Müsteşarlığı Bütçesinde Yer Alan Ödeneğin Kullanılması Hakkında Yönetmelik,” *Resmi Gazete*, No. 26323, 18 October 2006,

The progress in Turkey's economic, specifically commercial, relations with Syria was also visible in the inauguration of new joint forums serving as platforms for the businessmen from Turkey and Syria to periodically come together under the aegis of respective governments and forge new business ties or reinforce existing ones. One initiative was the Turkey-Syria Business Forum, which convened for the first time in Mersin, Turkey on 13 November 2007 with the participation of Turkish State Minister Kürşad Tüzmen and Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade Amer Hosni Lotfi. The issues discussed in the meeting comprised increasing the trade volume between Turkey and Syria to \$5 billion in five years, the prospect of opening a new border crossing in Nusaybin, Mardin, the reinstatement of the Cilvegözü border crossing which had been rehabilitated by Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (in Turkish acronym TOBB), and the modernization of the railway infrastructure between Turkey and Syria.⁵¹² Another initiative was the Turkey-Syria Economy Forum, which convened for the first time in Damascus on 26-27 April 2008 with the participation of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian Prime Minister Najji al-Otari.⁵¹³

<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/10/20061018-5.htm/20061018.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/10/20061018-5.htm>.

⁵¹² See, "Mersin'de Devlet Bakanı Kürşad Tüzmen ve Suriye Ekonomi ve Ticaret Bakanı ile Toplantı," *DEİK*,

https://www.deik.org.tr/KonseyIcerik/2215/Mersin_de_Devlet_Bakanı_Kürşad_Tüzmen_ve_Suriye_Ekonomi_ve_Ticaret_Bakanı_ile_Toplantı.html. Also see, "Nusaybin'e Yeni Sınır Kapısı Açılacak," *Zaman*, 13 November 2007, http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_nusaybine-yeni-sinir-kapisi-acilicak_612995.html.

⁵¹³ See, "Türkiye-Suriye Ekonomi Forumu, 26-27 Nisan 2008," *DEİK*, https://www.deik.org.tr/KonseyIcerik/2362/Türkiye_Suriye_Ekonomi_Forumu_26_27_Nisan_2008.html.

For the facilitation of the movement of people between the two countries, and for the promotion of the frequency of interactions among them, Turkey initiated a number of projects with Syria. For example, a ferry service between Mersin in Turkey and Latakia in Syria was instituted in 2006.⁵¹⁴ As another example, railway services started to operate between Mersin and Aleppo in March 2009, and between Gaziantep and Aleppo in December 2009.⁵¹⁵ Even, in the second ministerial meeting of Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in October 2010 in Latakia, an understanding was reached on the construction of a high-speed railway between Gaziantep and Aleppo.⁵¹⁶ Without doubt, the most consequential development in this regard was the abolition of visa requirements between Turkey and Syria with an agreement signed in October 2009.⁵¹⁷ In the signing ceremony, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu elatedly declared: “A new Golden Age is beginning in our bilateral relations. By abrogating artificially constructed borders, we are becoming the peoples of a common basin. We are turning economic cooperation into economic integration.”⁵¹⁸

Towards the ultimate aim of regional economic integration, “a new project called the ‘East Mediterranean Four: Levant Business Forum,’ was initiated with the signatures of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.”⁵¹⁹ This ambitious project “aimed to increase

⁵¹⁴ “Mersin to Lazkiye Maritime Route to Reopen,” *Today’s Zaman*, 5 June 2007, http://www.todayszaman.com/national_mersin-to-lazkiye-maritime-route-to-reopen_113171.html.

⁵¹⁵ “Halep-Mersin Demiryolu Seferleri Başladı,” *Milliyet*, 12 March 2009. “Gaziantep-Halep Demiryolunda Deneme Seferi Yapıldı,” *Hürriyet*, 2 December 2009.


⁵¹⁶ Zeynep Şafak, “Gaziantep-Halep Hızlı Trenle 35 Dakika Olacak,” *Hürriyet*, 2 October 2010.

⁵¹⁷ The agreement was issued in the Official Gazette on 23 December 2009. See, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmî Gazete*, No. 27441, 23 December 2009, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/12/20091223-1.htm/20091223.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/12/20091223-1.htm>.

⁵¹⁸ Zeynep Güranlı, “Suriye ile Vize Anlaşması İmzalanıyor,” *Hürriyet*, 13 October 2009.

⁵¹⁹ Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” p. 170.

welfare and economic stability in the region, and included 75 agreements in 14 different areas enabling the free movement of goods and people, as well as cooperation in the education and cultural fields.”⁵²⁰ Just before the eruption of civil uprisings in Syria, Turkey identified six specific areas of cooperation with Syria including “Nusaybin-Kamışlı [al-Qamishli] joint customs gate, opening a joint venture bank with Syria,...connecting the two countries’ natural gas infrastructure, Turkey’s Eximbank providing loans to the Syrian government and the completion of the new friendship dam.”⁵²¹ With the vicious cycle of the unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions of Turkey and the retaliation of the Syrian government in kind after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Turkey’s commercial collaboration with Syria came to a dramatic end, and its trade with Syria quite suffered, compounded with the adverse economic repercussions, direct and indirect, of the Syrian civil war for its overall economic development and well-being.



⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Ibid., p. 171. Also see, Farrukh Suvankulov, Alisher Akhmedjonov, and Fatma Ogucu, “Restoring Forgotten Ties: Recent Trends and Prospects of Turkey’s Trade with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2012, pp. 343-361.

Figure 6: Turkey's Trade with Syria between 2003 and 2014 (in million \$)⁵²²

Based on the figure above, some observations can be made on the general structure and trajectory of Turkey's trade with Syria between 2003 and 2014. First, in its trade with Syria, Turkey invariably enjoyed a trade surplus. Second, Turkey's trade with Syria started its exponential rise only after 2005. Third, Turkey's trade with Syria peaked in 2010. Fourth, with the devolution of political relations, Turkey's trade with Syria fell dramatically, reaching its nadir in 2012. Fifth, strangely enough, Turkey's trade with Syria quickly recovered after 2012, and almost reached its pre-civil war level in 2014.

4.2.2 Investment

Between March 2003 and August 2014, Turkey relentlessly sought to increase mutual investments with Syria. In January 2004, in the first visit of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey signed with Syria the 'Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment' in a ceremony attended by the Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Bashar al-Assad.⁵²³ The agreement, composed of 10 articles, was signed by Turkish State Minister Kürşad Tüzmen and Syrian Minister of Tourism Saadalla Agha al-Kalaa, and called for the promotion, the just and equal treatment, and the complete protection of mutual investments, and finally came into force in December 2005.⁵²⁴ In the same visit, Bashar al-Assad met with Turkish businessmen in a

⁵²² Data is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Refer to, "Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri," *TÜİK*, <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/menu.zul>.

⁵²³ "Sezer Esad'ı Köşk'te Karşıladi," *Hürriyet*, 6 January 2004.

⁵²⁴ For the full text of the agreement in Turkish, see, "Milletlerarası Andlaşma," *Resmi Gazete*, No. 26037, 28 December 2005,

meeting organized by Turkish-Syrian Business Council of Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) of Turkey, and following the meeting it was reported that “several big [Turkish] companies designated Syria as the new center of investment.”⁵²⁵

In the successive meetings and business forums, aspirations continued to be expressed, understandings continued to be reached, and agreements continued to be signed. In November 2006, for example, in the meeting of the Joint Economic Committee, Turkey’s and Syria’s deputy prime ministers “signed a collection of agreements aimed at boosting bilateral trade and investment. The agreements also initiated co-operation between the Central Bank of Syria and Turkey’s Banking Supervisory Commission.”⁵²⁶ In October 2007, in his second visit to Turkey, Bashar al-Assad attended the working lunch organized by Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) in İstanbul in which the Chairman of Turkish-Syrian Business Council called attention to the necessity of increasing investments between Turkey and Syria along with the accelerating pace of commercial relations.⁵²⁷ In a similar vein, one of the salient issues discussed in the first meeting of the Turkey-Syria Business Forum in Mersin, Turkey in the same month with the participation of Turkish State Minister Kürşad Tüzmen and Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade Amer Hosni Lotfi was the lagging behind of investment relations in the overall economic relations between

<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2005/12/20051228.htm/20051228.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2005/12/20051228.htm>

⁵²⁵ Aylın Löle, “Esad’ın Ziyareti Suriye’ye Yatırım Kararlarını Ateşledi,” *Vatan*, 8 January 2004. Also see, “Suriye Kraliçesi İstedi İMKB Şam’a Model Oldu,” *Sabah*, 9 March 2004.

⁵²⁶ Fred H. Lawson, “The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship: Syrian-Turkish Relations since 1998,” p. 195.

⁵²⁷ “Suriye İle Ticaret Siyasi Yakınlığımızı Yansıtıyor,” *Hürriyet*, 20 October 2007. Also see, Gürkan Akgüneş, “Esad’dan En Sıcak Mesaj,” *Milliyet*, 20 October 2007.

Turkey and Syria.⁵²⁸ As a successful result, in 2007, Turkey reportedly became “the largest single foreign investor in Syria, with the stock of Turkish foreign direct investment doubling to \$ 146m in 2007 from 2006.”⁵²⁹

In order to further encourage Turkish entrepreneurs to seek and make use of investment opportunities in the Syrian market in coordination with the Syrian public and private sectors, specialized business conventions were organized as well. One was a meeting entitled ‘Business and Investment Opportunities in Syria’ organized by Turkish-Syrian Business Council of Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) in İstanbul on 4 January 2008 with the participation of Turkish State Minister Kürşad Tüzmen and Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah al-Dardari.⁵³⁰ In the meeting, Kürşad Tüzmen expressed the presence of “initiatives for the establishment of an investment zone in Syria exclusively for Turkish firms.”⁵³¹ As a noteworthy case of investment in the Syrian market, “in 2008, a Turkish company, Dedeman, bought the management rights of Syria’s first five-star hotel from Le Meridian Group and began its operations in 2009 in Damascus, Aleppo and Palmyra.”⁵³²

In addition, in the second meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Syria that took place in Ankara on 20-21 January 2010 with the participation of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian Prime Minister Mohamad Naji Otri, investment was also on the agenda, and one of the 11 agreements signed

⁵²⁸ “Mersin’de Devlet Bakanı Kürşad Tüzmen ve Suriye Ekonomi ve Ticaret Bakanı ile Toplantı.”

⁵²⁹ James Gavin, “Syria Confronts Turkish Trade Dilemma,” *The National*, 2 September 2009.

⁵³⁰ ‘Suriye’de Türk Firmalarına Özel Yatırım Bölgesi,” *Hürriyet*, 4 January 2008.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” p. 168. Also see, “Dedeman Suriye’ye Girer Girmez Lider Oldu,” *Radikal*, 19 May 2009.

between Turkey and Syria was a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between Development Bank of Turkey and State Planning Commission of Syria.⁵³³ In another example of noteworthy Turkish investment in Syria, in January 2011, “the largest Turkish investment of its sector for the entire Middle East was made in Syria when the Turkish firm Güriş invested 280 million Euros in the construction of a cement factory in Raqqah.”⁵³⁴ In the second meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Syria, mentioned above, Syrian Prime Minister Mohamad Naji Otri declared in a spirited manner: “Turkey-Syria relations have entered into an exemplary process in terms of international relations. The train has already left the station and this train will never stop at any station.”⁵³⁵ However, not much time elapsed before the Syrian civil war broke out, hitting the train hard, derailing it completely, irreparably wrecking it, and leaving Turkish investments underneath it.⁵³⁶ For instance, “The Syrian Ministry of Tourism announced the termination of the agreement with Dedeman Hotels at the beginning of January 2012, giving the company a month to terminate its activities.”⁵³⁷

As a matter of fact, in the initial stages of Turkey’s developing economic relations with Syria, “there were many advantages, it was argued, for Turkish firms to invest in Syria: production costs were lower, manufactured goods did not attract tariffs when they re-entered Turkey, and Syrian-made products could enter the Greater

⁵³³ “Artık Tren Yola Çıktı ve Hiçbir Durakta Durmayacak,” *Yeni Şafak*, 21 December 2010.

⁵³⁴ Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” p. 169. Also see, “Suriye’nin Çimento İhtiyacını Karşılacak,” *Vatan*, 15 January 2011; “Güriş İle Suriye’de 280 Milyonluk Yatırımla Rakkas Zamanı,” *Yeni Şafak*, 16 January 2011.

⁵³⁵ “Artık Tren Yola Çıktı ve Hiçbir Durakta Durmayacak.”

⁵³⁶ See, for example, Dinçer Gökçe, “Türk Firmaları Kapılarına Kilit Vurdu, Zarar Çok Büyük,” *Hürriyet*, 13 March 2012.

⁵³⁷ Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” p. 174.

Arab Free Trade (GAFTA) tax-free.”⁵³⁸ Nevertheless, despite the tenacity of Turkey’s efforts to promote mutual investment with Syria, the period between March 2003 and August 2014 did not witness considerable progress in Turkey’s investment relations with Syria for a couple of reasons. First, the legal framework for investment was inchoate, and thus discouraging the private sector, especially of Turkey, from undertaking business ventures with financial risks. Second, the stability of Turkey’s political relations with Syria was at least questionable in the first years of the period, which proved to be strikingly brittle when subjected to the intense pressures of the civil war in Syria. Third, capital investments of Turkish businessmen were quite certain to yield relatively lower profit returns in the Syrian market, primarily owing to the low level of per capita income in Syria. Fourth, a civil war erupted in Syria.




Figure 7: Turkish FDI in Syria, 2007-2014 (million \$)⁵³⁹

⁵³⁸ Ibid., p. 169.

⁵³⁹ Data provided by the Central Bank of Turkey. See, *Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası*, <http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr>.

Between 2007 and 2014, as a result of these causes, the Central Bank of Turkey did not report any instance of foreign direct investment from Syria in Turkey.⁵⁴⁰ About Turkish foreign direct investments in Syria, between 2007 and 2014, it reported only \$ 1 million for 2009, \$ 10 million for 2010, \$ 6 million for 2011.⁵⁴¹

4.2.3 Energy

In energy relations, Turkey took preliminary measures to improve energy cooperation with Syria in suitable areas. However, Turkey's energy cooperation with Syria progressed rather slowly, and ended rather rapidly with the Syrian civil war. On 4 January 2008, quite belatedly, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Mehmet Hilmi Güler and Syrian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Sufian al-Alao signed in İstanbul 'the Protocol on Cooperation in the Fields of Electricity, Oil, Gas and Mineral Resources.'⁵⁴² In the Protocol, issued in November 2010, "the Turkey Party stated the readiness and willingness of the Turkish companies to participate in realization of electricity, oil, gas and mineral resource projects in Syria," "the parties agreed on exchange of experience and experts to provide short or long term training and technical assistance to each other in planning exploration, development, production and transportation projects regarding the fields of oil, natural gas and mineral resources," and Turkey and Syria "acknowledged that natural gas reserves in Syria and other countries in the region

540 "Yurtdışında Yerleşik Kişilerin Türkiye'deki Doğrudan Yatırımlarının Ülkelere Göre Dağılımı (Aylık, Milyon ABD Doları)," *Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası*, <http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr>.

541 "Yurtdışında Yerleşik Kişilerin Yurtdışındaki Doğrudan Yatırımlarının Ülkelere Göre Dağılımı (Aylık, Milyon ABD Doları)," *Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası*, <http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr>.

542 "Milletlerarası Andlaşma," *Resmi Gazete*, No. 27754, 9 November 2010, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/11/20101109.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/11/20101109.htm>.

might present viable and secure supply sources for the further expansion of Turkish gas market.”⁵⁴³

In terms of oil, again in 2008, Turkey’s state-owned oil company, the Turkish Petroleum (TPAO), started negotiations with the Syria’s state-owned oil company, the Syrian Petroleum Company, to establish a joint company for the purpose of developing oil fields in Syria, and afterwards in Turkey and third countries.⁵⁴⁴ The relevant decree on the establishment of companies by the Turkish Petroleum abroad and its participation in established companies was issued in the Official Gazette on 1 October 2010.⁵⁴⁵ Despite its generic title, the decree specifically addressed the establishment of a company by the Turkish Petroleum “centered in Damascus-Syria” in Article 1.⁵⁴⁶ Three days after the official promulgation of the decree, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız announced that “in Syria, 7 oil fields were given to Turkey without tender.”⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ “TPAO, Suriye’de Petrol Arayacak,” *Zaman*, 18 July 2008.

⁵⁴⁵ See, “Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı,” *Resmî Gazete*, No. 27716, 1 October 2010, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/10/20101001.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/10/20101001.htm>.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ “TPAO Suriye’de Petrol Arayacak,” 4 October 2010, *Ntvmsnbc*, <http://www.ntv.com.tr/arsiv/id/25137670>.




Figure 8: Turkey's Crude Oil Imports from Syria between 2005 and 2014
(thousand tons)⁵⁴⁸

Between 2005 and 2011, Turkey imported crude oil from Syria, only in modest quantities compared to other sources. For example, in 2008, when Turkey's crude oil imports from Syria reached its highest level, Syria constituted only % 2 of Turkey's overall crude oil import, and was only the sixth biggest source of crude oil for Turkey after Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kazakhstan.⁵⁴⁹ After the civil war in Syria and the collapse of Turkey's relations with the Syrian government, Turkey's crude oil imports from Syria came to an end.

⁵⁴⁸ Data provided by Turkey's Energy Market Regulatory Authority (in Turkish acronym EPDK) in its annual Petroleum Market Sector Reports from 2005 to 2014. See, "Petrol Piyasası Yıllık Yayınlar ve Raporlar," EPDK, <http://www.epdk.gov.tr/index.php/petrol-piyasas/yayinlar-raporlar?id=860>.

⁵⁴⁹ "Petrol Piyasası Sektör Raporu 2008," EPDK, http://www.epdk.gov.tr/documents/petrol/rapor_yayin/Ppd_Rapor_Yayin_Sektor_Raporu_2008.pdf, p. 7.

In terms of natural gas, on the other hand, the prospects of bilateral trade continued to be discussed in meetings between the officials of Turkey and Syria.⁵⁵⁰ In that regard, “in August 2009, a memorandum of understanding was signed that connected the two countries’ gas networks.”⁵⁵¹ In August 2010, Turkey finally signed with Syria a protocol on the construction of the relevant section of the ‘Arab Natural Gas Pipeline’ project in a visit of Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız to Damascus, which was expected to be completed in 15 to 18 months at the time.⁵⁵² In December 2011, Taner Yıldız proclaimed that “the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline Project would be kept out of the political distress with Syria.” Unfortunately, similar to other energy projects with Syria, the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline was also suspended after a while because of the increasing tension with the Syrian government. In the relevant time period, Turkey did not, and could not, engage in commercial relations with Syria in natural gas.

In terms of electricity, in December 2010, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and Syrian Minister of Electricity signed in Ankara a ‘Memorandum of Understanding in the Fields of Electricity Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency.’⁵⁵³ With this agreement, Turkey and Syria “agreed to further study the possibility of expanding the transmission and interconnection systems in order to ensure the increase of the transfer capacity

⁵⁵⁰ See, for example, Songül Selvi, “Gazı Zor Bulan Suriye’den Nabucco’ya Destek!” *Radikal*, 15 July 2009.

⁵⁵¹ Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” p. 169.

⁵⁵² Hediye Levent, “Türkiye-Suriye Doğalgaz Hattı Protokolü İmzalandı,” *Hürriyet*, 20 August 2009.

⁵⁵³ “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmî Gazete*, No. 27919, 29 April 2011, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/04/20110429M1-12.htm/20110429M1.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/04/20110429M1-12.htm>.

between the two countries.”⁵⁵⁴ Since the beginning of 2007, Turkey and Syria traded electricity via the interconnected electrical network between the two countries.⁵⁵⁵ Between 2003 and 2010, Syria constituted % 17 of Turkish total electricity exports, and was the second biggest market after Iraq with % 68.⁵⁵⁶ However, from 1 October 2012 onwards, electricity transfer from Turkey to Syria stopped completely.⁵⁵⁷ To sum up, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war impeded the progress of Turkey’s burgeoning energy cooperation with Syria, and postponed the expansion of Turkey’s energy relations with Syria in oil, natural gas, and electricity to an uncertain future.

4.3 Turkey’s Identity and Syria

Identity gained palpable salience both in the discourse and practice of Turkish foreign policy in the period between March 2003 and August 2014. This was also the case in Turkey’s relations with Syria, both before and after the rupture in relations caused by the civil war in Syria. Turkey’s multiple and shifting self-conceptions, self-representations, and self-identifications conditioned, shaped, and propelled Turkey’s relations with Syria. One of the underlying judgments of Turkish foreign policy makers in this period, which infused a peculiar conception of identity into their foreign policy thinking and foreign policy making, was the unwarranted,

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ “Mersin’de Devlet Bakanı Kürşad Tüzmen ve Suriye Ekonomi ve Ticaret Bakanı ile Toplantı.” Also see, Songül Selvi, “TETAŞ Suriye’ye Elektrik Satacak,” *Radikal*, 28 March 2009.

⁵⁵⁶ “Elektrik Piyasası Raporu 2010,” *EPDK*, http://www.epdk.gov.tr/documents/elektrik/rapor_yayin/ElektrikPiyasasiRaporu2010.pdf, p. 85.

⁵⁵⁷ “Faaliyet Raporu 2012,” *TEİAŞ*, <http://www.teias.gov.tr/FaaliyetRaporlari/Faaliyet2012/TEIASfaayilet2012TURKCE.pdf>, p. 92.

preposterous, and baleful transmutation of the ‘genuine’ identity of Turkey into a fictitious one.⁵⁵⁸

A consequence of this transmutation deliberately imposed on and through Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, according to the foreign policy makers of the period, was an artificial petrification of political boundaries, an unnatural alienation of populations, and a delusive aberration of foreign policies in the region. Giving the journeys of the 13th century Muslim mystic Ibn Arabi from Spain to different parts of the Muslim World as an example, Ahmet Davutoğlu rhetorically asked in February 2004: “While a thinker in the 13th century acted in this way, I wonder how many intellectuals go to Syria from Turkey or how many intellectuals come to Turkey from Syria today?...It should not be forgotten that Urfa and Aleppo... were never as far away as they are today in any period of the history.”⁵⁵⁹ In short, Syria, and in general the Middle East, became irrelevant in and for Turkey’s identity, and it was time to remake Syria relevant in and for Turkey’s self-conception, self-representation, and self-identification. In other words, Turkey’s person identity, role identity, and social identity were to be verified in and through Turkey’s relations with Syria.

4.3.1 Person Identity

Turkey’s person identity as the set of idiosyncratic attributes, which defined and characterized Turkey as a unique agent in international relations for the policy

⁵⁵⁸ According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, one culprit was “elites without identity” in Turkey’s foreign policy making. Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 33. For a critical discussion of this peculiar conception of identity in terms of Turkey’s relations with Syria, see, Ahmet K. Han, “Paradise Lost: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy and the Case of Turkish-Syrian Relations,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 55-69.

⁵⁵⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 118.

makers in the relevant time period, and the successful verification of which was expected to increase self-authenticity of Turkey, arguably constituted by the fact that Turkey was the successor to the Ottoman Empire, originally called the Great Ottoman State in the Ottoman political discourse. As the ‘heir’ to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was also deemed to possess an innate moral responsibility in its dealings with the states the territories of which were once ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Third, again as the ‘heir’ to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was also considered to possess an innate moral responsibility towards the peoples inhabiting these territories if and when they were under oppression. Simply, in terms of Turkey’s self-conception, Turkey was a unique state in the Middle East, and in international relations, as the heir to the Ottoman Empire carrying moral responsibility especially towards the oppressed.

Several scholars found it analytically useful to refer to the ‘neo-Ottomanist’ paradigm and the associated practice in Turkish foreign policy in the relevant time period despite the ambiguous and contested semantics of the concept.⁵⁶⁰ As an example, in explaining the nexus between Turkey’s strategic vision and its Syria policy, according to one observer, among the three factors that helped “to define the Neo-Ottoman tendencies of the AKP,” the first was “its activism, or a willingness to

⁵⁶⁰ The concept’s genealogy dated back to the 1990s though. As an example, M. Hakan Yavuz argued in 1998 that “Neo-Ottomanism, which lies behind this new definition of national interest and direction in Turkish foreign policy, has two faces. One face looks back to an invented Ottoman-Islamic past as a Turk-made epoch. The other looks forward to a vision of a regionally dominant industrialized, but not necessarily civic and democratic, Turkey.” M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism,” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 12, 1998, pp. 19-41, p. 23. For an account of the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy after 2003 with specific reference to neo-Ottomanism, see, Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2010, pp. 103-123. Also see, Hakan Ovunc Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanisms: The Discursive Evolution of Ottoman Pasts in the Turkish Presents,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2015, p. 416-432.

come to terms with Turkey's Ottoman and Islamic heritage at home and abroad."⁵⁶¹

While "the second dimension of Neo-Ottomanism [was] its emphasis on multiculturalism," "the third aspect of Neo-Ottomanism [was] its goal of not just reaching out to the Islamic world but embracing it as much as the West."⁵⁶²

Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy makers categorically rejected and renounced neo-Ottomanism as a valid signification of their foreign policy thinking and making due to the imperialistic and expansionist connotations of the concept. Still, while the concept was rejected in discourse, the conception was embraced in thought and in action. For example, the strategic depth of Turkey, to Ahmet Davutoğlu, rested in part on its "historical depth depending on the cognizance of time", in addition to its "geographical depth depending on the cognizance of space."⁵⁶³ The historical depth was of course constructed by the experience of the Ottoman Empire, which was inherited by Turkey. Tacit allusions to this historical depth in Turkey's relations with Syria were observed in the famous balcony speeches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after successive election victories. As an example, in his third balcony speech on 12 June 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took pride in declaring that with the election victory on that day "Damascus won as much as Ankara," as well as "Sarajevo won as much as İstanbul. Beirut won as much as İzmir... Ramallah, West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza won as much as Diyarbakır."⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶¹ Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2012, pp. 127-140, p. 128.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 129, p. 130.

⁵⁶³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 6. Ahmet Davutoğlu's celebrated work is replete with references to Turkey's historical depth, historical inheritance, and historical memory.

⁵⁶⁴ "Başbakan'dan Üçüncü Balkon Konuşması," *Hürriyet*, 13 June 2011. In the speech, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated: "I am greeting from here Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Tunisia, Sarajevo, Skopje, Baku, Nicosia and the capitals and peoples of all other friendly and brotherly countries who have turned their eyes to Turkey, and being following the news from Turkey with excitement." *Ibid.*

Turkish foreign policy makers' sense of Turkey's morality and moral responsibility, especially towards the oppressed, became manifest after the onset of the Syrian government's brutal treatment of the Syrian people, irrespective of their participation in the peaceful demonstrations or the subsequent armed struggle against it. Turkey reaffirmed its "stand in the new Middle East and Syria in particular a new policy based on moral values rather than rational interests."⁵⁶⁵ Moral principles, it was reiterated, constituted the foundation of Turkey's approach towards the developments in Syria, as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in an interview in September 2011, expressed: "I am a person who is inclined to define relations between individuals based on principles. It is impossible to preserve my friendship with people who are allegedly leaders when they are attacking their own people, shooting at them, using tanks and other forms of heavy weaponry."⁵⁶⁶

As another example, in the press release concerning the expulsion of Syrian diplomats from Turkey following the "mass murder" by the forces of the Syrian regime "of at least 110 innocent civilians, including 50 children" in the Syrian town of Houla, Turkey declared: "Unless this [a democratic transition process] is fulfilled and the crimes against humanity are being continued to be committed, Turkey and the international community will take further measures."⁵⁶⁷ Since, the declaration continued: "This is Turkey's moral and conscientious responsibility towards the

⁵⁶⁵ Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, "A New Challenge for Turkey: Civil War in Syria," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013, pp. 51-59, pp. 55-56.

⁵⁶⁶ Ishaan Tharoor, "Exclusive: TIME Meets Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan," *Time*, 26 September 2011, <http://world.time.com/2011/09/26/exclusive-time-meets-turkish-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan/>.

⁵⁶⁷ "No: 151, 30 May 2012, Press Release Regarding All Diplomatic Members of the Syrian Embassy in Ankara being Asked to Leave the Country," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-151_-30-may-2012_-press-release-regarding-all-diplomatic-members-of-the-syrian-embassy-in-ankara-being-asked-to-leave-the-country.en.mfa.

brotherly and neighborly Syrian people, with whom we share a common history.”⁵⁶⁸ On the issue of providing for the Syrian refugees, in an interview in September 2013, Turkish President Abdullah Gül went so far as to relate Turkey’s moral responsibility towards the Syrian refugees to Turkey’s national honor: “The refugee issue has become very serious. So far, we have 500,000 [refugees] in Turkey; 200,000 of them are in camps. Turkey is providing everything to them and so far it has cost over half a billion dollars. Definitely this is our honor. So we will continue with this.”⁵⁶⁹ One scholar contended that Turkey’s “demonization of the Assad regime and depiction of Turkey’s moral responsibility toward the Syrian people served to constitute Turkey’s great power role and assert Turkey’s moral superiority vis-a-vis the other actors in the conflict.”⁵⁷⁰ However, this particular foreign policy attitude was more concerned with Turkey’s sense of self-authenticity than to its sense of self-efficacy. In other words, it was more pertinent to Turkey’s person identity than to its role identity.

4.3.2 Role Identity

Turkey’s role identity as the internalized meanings of roles that Turkey applied to itself, which were the sets of expectations tied to Turkey’s social position that guided its foreign policy attitudes and behavior in the Middle East, became an abiding subject of scholarly debates and political controversies on the ‘Turkish model,’

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁹ Lally Weymouth, “Turkish President Abdullah Gül: Assad Must Go,” *The Washington Post*, 23 September 2013. Also see, Ugur Cevdet Panayırıcı and Emre Iseri, “A Content Analysis of the AKP’s ‘Honorable’ Foreign Policy Discourse: The Nexus of Domestic-International Politics,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2014, pp. 62-80.

⁵⁷⁰ Özlem Demirtas-Bagdonas, “Reading Turkey’s Foreign Policy on Syria: The AKP’s Construction of a Great Power Identity and the Politics of Grandeur,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2014, pp. 139-155, p. 140.

especially with the inception of the Arab Spring.⁵⁷¹ Turkish foreign policy makers never endorsed the discourse of a ‘Turkish model’ notwithstanding; instead, they preferred to promote the idea of Turkey being a ‘source of inspiration’ for the countries of the Middle East and the wider Muslim World. For instance, speaking at Oxford University in November 2010, before the Arab Spring, Turkish President Abdullah Gül claimed: “Turkey has become a source of inspiration as a shining and rare example in the Islamic world of a vibrant democracy and a flourishing free-market economy.”⁵⁷²

A number of studies specifically addressed Turkey’s role identity, identifying Turkey’s roles and examining their effects on Turkish foreign policy from the particular viewpoint of the role theory. In explaining Turkey’s foreign policy activism in the Middle East, for instance, two scholars asserted that the salient national role conceptions of primary Turkish foreign policy makers belonged “to the categories of ‘regional leader,’ ‘regional protector,’ ‘regional sub-system collaborator,’ ‘global sub-system collaborator,’ ‘example’ and ‘bridge’.”⁵⁷³ They “also found that, over time, self-identification as a ‘regional leader,’ ‘regional

⁵⁷¹ See, for example, Anna Secor, Turkey’s Democracy: A Model for the Troubled Middle East,” *Eurasian Geography and Economic*, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2011, pp. 157-172. For a specific discussion of Turkey’s relations with Syria in reference to the ‘Turkish model’, see, Sadik J. Al-Azm, “The ‘Turkish Model’: A View from Damascus,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2011, pp. 633-641. For an important collection of essays on the ‘Turkish model,’ see, M. Akif Kireççi, der., *Arap Baharı ve Türkiye Modeli Tartışmaları* (Ankara: ASEM Yayınları, 2014).

⁵⁷² Abdullah Gül, *Diplomasıde Erdemli Güç: Dış Politika Konuşmaları* (Ankara: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yayınları, 2014), p. 165.

⁵⁷³ Bülent Aras and Aylin Gorener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol.12, No. 1, 2010, pp. 73-92, p. 81.

protector' and 'global system collaborator'...increased while 'bridge' role [became] less pronounced."⁵⁷⁴

In a similar way, with respect to Turkey's shifting roles in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, other scholars contended that "six roles came into prominence in the pre-Arab-uprisings AKP period: 'mediator,' 'defender of regional peace and stability,' 'regional subsystem collaborator,' 'good neighbor,' 'bridge across civilizations' and 'trading state'."⁵⁷⁵ "With the breakout of the turmoil in the region," on the other hand, they observed that more emphasis was "placed on roles such as 'central/pivotal country,' 'active independent country,' 'developer' (i.e., assisting developing countries), 'protector of the oppressed' and 'model/example country'."⁵⁷⁶

The two most prominent roles of Turkey, particularly in its foreign policy towards the Middle East, were arguably the mediator and the peace/order builder, which conditioned and shaped the contours of Turkey's relations with Syria as well. In terms of the mediator role, as an example, in 2013, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed: "Turkey has reoriented its foreign policy by means of an active, multidimensional and visionary framework. Mediation is an integral part of this policy. Turkey's unique access to both the global north and south makes it a suitable mediator over a wide geographical range."⁵⁷⁷ In Turkey's

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid. Also see, Thomas Diez, "Insulator, Bridge, Regional Center? Turkey and Regional Security Complexes," in Ebru Canan-Sokullu, ed., *Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 45-73.

⁵⁷⁵ Özgür Özdamar, B. Toygar Haliştoprak, and İ. Erkam Sula, "From Good Neighbor to Model: Turkey's Changing Roles in the Middle East in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 11, No. 42, 2014, pp. 93-113, p. 102.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid. Also see, Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen, "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model' in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, pp. 258-282.

⁵⁷⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Mediation: Critical Reflections from the Field," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013, pp. 83-90, p. 90. Also see, Talha Köse, "Transformative Conflict Resolution in

relations with Syria, “during his first visit to Ankara in January 2004, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad asked Turkey to play a role in the Middle East peace process. Asad’s request showed growing trust in Turkey’s role as a mediator.”⁵⁷⁸ Afterwards, especially in the period between 2004 and 2011, Turkey carried out persevering diplomatic efforts in mediation and facilitation between Syria and other regional and international actors, such as Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, and the US, with varying degrees of success, which discontinued with the civil war in Syria.⁵⁷⁹

In terms of the peace/order builder role, indeed, Turkish foreign policy makers periodically referred “to historical and geographical imperatives that force[d] Turkey to adopt proactive policies and assume a leadership role. For instance, Davutoğlu...increasingly referred to Turkey’s ‘order-instituting’ role in the surrounding regions.”⁵⁸⁰ For Ahmet Davutoğlu, “order instituting actor” was one of the six underlying principles of Turkish foreign policy, along with “rhythmic diplomacy, multi-dimensional foreign policy, zero problems with neighbors,...international cooperation, or proactive foreign policy.”⁵⁸¹ In relations with Syria, in the first, Turkey, “seeking to further its regional stature by acting as a fireman regarding most of the region’s problems, found in Syria a useful partner.”⁵⁸²

an Unstable Neighborhood: Turkey’s Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Middle East,” *Perceptions*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2013, pp. 171-194; Gabriel Mitchell, “Turkey: The Almost Mediator State,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2015, pp. 169-177.

⁵⁷⁸ Marwan Kabalan, “Syrian-Turkish Relations: Geopolitical Explanations for the Move from Conflict to Co-operation,” p. 35.

⁵⁷⁹ The civil war in Syria altered the diplomatic terrain of mediation in Turkey’s relations with Syria, and generally in Syrian foreign policy. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri and Erich Wieger, “Syria: The Hope and Challenges of Mediation,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014, pp. 149-167.

⁵⁸⁰ Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2010, pp. 115-136, p. 128.

⁵⁸¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring* (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 2012), p. 4.

⁵⁸² Marwan Kabalan, “Syrian-Turkish Relations: Geopolitical Explanations for the Move from Conflict to Co-operation,” p. 36.

After the reversal of amicable relations with Syria, for example, in addressing the Plenary of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the developments in Syria in April 2012, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu unequivocally expressed Turkey’s unwavering intention to endeavor for a regional order of peace, and declared: “Whatever anyone says, Turkey is to be both the protagonist and the voice of this order of peace.”⁵⁸³

4.3.3 Social Identity

Turkey’s social identity as its self-identification with other states in terms of shared social categories was the prominent identity in its relations with Syria, the successful verification of which was expected to increase Turkey’s self-worth. In order to achieve self-identification with Syria, and to attain Syria’s reciprocity in constructing, restoring, and reviving shared social categories, Turkish foreign policy makers frequently invoked the commonality of history, geography, religion, and culture/civilization between Turkey and Syria. As a transiently successful result, “while previously the two states had each constructed their identities partly in opposition to the other, now [then] their identities apparently ceased to be mutually exclusive.”⁵⁸⁴ In April 2008, Recep Tayyip announced in Damascus: “The words of friendship and kinship are not enough to define us. The peoples of two countries are beyond doubt brothers.”⁵⁸⁵ Even, the Regional Development Program signed between Turkey and Syria was awash in “examples where the population on both

⁵⁸³ “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun TBMM Genel Kurulu’nda Suriye’deki Olaylar Hakkında Yaptığı Konuşma, 26 Nisan 2012,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-tbmm-genel-kurulu_nda-suriye_deki-olaylar-hakkinda-yaptigi-konusma_-26-nisan-2012.tr.mfa.

⁵⁸⁴ Raymond Hinnebusch, “Introduction,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür, eds., *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 1-11, p. 4.

⁵⁸⁵ Bostan Cemiloğlu, “Başbakan Erdoğan’dan Sezer’e Suriye Jesti,” *Zaman*, 26 April 2008.

sides of the border are encouraged to cooperate, share and ‘love’ each other.”⁵⁸⁶ With the civil war, though, Syria ceased to exist as a state, and Turkey opted for exclusively identifying itself with the Syria as a people. As an initial example, the Syrian refugees were depicted as “our Syrian brothers” in the 61st Government Program, issued in July 2011.⁵⁸⁷

Turkish policy makers habitually invoked the common history between Turkey and Syria, especially within the framework of the shared culture embedded in it. In his visit to Damascus in April 2005, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer referred to the relations and cooperation between Turkey and Syria which derived “their power from a historical and deep-rooted companionship.”⁵⁸⁸ In another example, in July 2009, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed in his speech at the University of Aleppo on the occasion of being granted an honorary doctorate in International Relations: “Aleppo is in our [Turkey’s] proverbs. Aleppo is in our folk songs. Aleppo is in our poems. There are so many artists, composers, authors, businessmen, [and] statesmen of us who were born in, [and] grew up in Aleppo, and died here.”⁵⁸⁹ After giving a number of examples from Turkish historical figures, Erdoğan declared: “There are very few countries in the world which have that much in common concerning history and culture.”⁵⁹⁰ By the same token, in October 2009, after the first ministerial meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Aleppo, which also marked the abolishment of visa requirements, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs

⁵⁸⁶ Özlem Tür, “The Political Economy of Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 2000s - The Rise and Fall of Trade, Investment and Integration,” p. 166.

⁵⁸⁷ See, “TBMM Kararı,” *Resmi Gazete*, No. 27997, 11 July 2011, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/07/20110717.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/07/20110717.htm>.

⁵⁸⁸ “Onurlu Cumhurbaşkanı Hoşgeldiniz,” *Hürriyet*, 13 April 2005.

⁵⁸⁹ “Erdoğan’a Suriye’de Fahri Doktora Ünvanı Verildi,” *Zaman*, 22 July 2009.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Ahmet Davutoğlu referred to “common destiny, common history, common future” between Turkey and Syria.⁵⁹¹

Geography as the shared bond and the basis of spatial affinity between the peoples of Turkey and Syria was also recurrently invoked by Turkish foreign policy makers. In April 2008, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated in Damascus: “We never feel ourselves [as] strangers when we come to Damascus or Aleppo, we feel at home.”⁵⁹² In the aforementioned speech at the University of Aleppo, as another example, Erdoğan specified the Turkish cities of İstanbul, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Mardin and the Syrian cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Latakia as “the cities of the same culture, the same atmosphere of brotherhood.”⁵⁹³ Erdoğan continued: “These two countries had fallen apart from each other. However, by means of dispelling this separation in the last 7 years, now we have come to breathe this atmosphere of brotherhood.”⁵⁹⁴

In the relevant time period, the Muslim World possessed a privileged position in the foundational worldviews and the cognitive schemas of Turkish foreign policy makers, especially Ahmet Davutoğlu.⁵⁹⁵ In the 59th Government Program of the 1st Erdoğan Government (14 March 2003-29 August 2007), for example, it was declared that the Turkish government attached “special significance to Turkey’s relations with the Muslim World,” and was to make efforts to develop Turkey’s bilateral relations

⁵⁹¹ Bahar Bakır, “Suriye’ye Tam Teşekküllü Çıkarma,” *Milliyet*, 14 October 2009.

⁵⁹² Bostan Cemiloğlu, “Başbakan Erdoğan’dan Sezer’e Suriye Jesti.”

⁵⁹³ “Erdoğan’s Suriye’de Fahri Doktora Ünvanı Verildi.”

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu published several scholarly works on the Muslim World. For one fascinating publication, see, Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World* (Kuala Lumpur: Mahir Publications, 1994). For a critical account in this regard, see, Behlül Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism,” *Survival*, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2014, pp. 119-140.

with the countries of the Muslim World as well as “to ensure that the Organization of the Islamic Conference [later the Organization of Islamic Cooperation] acquire a more respected place in the international arena and have a dynamic structure that could take initiative.”⁵⁹⁶ In Turkey’s relations with Syria, in the relevant time period, “in both states the militant secularism of radical Kemalists and Ba’thists gave way to a re-engagement with the Islamic past shared by both under the Ottomans, propelling a convergence between Syria’s increasingly Islam-compatible version of secularism and the Turkish version of secularized Islam.”⁵⁹⁷ This concurrent internal transformation facilitated the role of religious themes and references for Turkey in securing and sustaining social identification with Syria prior to the outbreak of the civil war.⁵⁹⁸

Concomitant with religion, in a larger framework of reference, civilizational association was a constant leitmotif in the discourse of Turkish foreign policy makers in Turkey’s relations with Syria.⁵⁹⁹ In one unusual example, in the inauguration ceremony of the third railway border gate between Turkey and Syria in Çobanbey,

⁵⁹⁶ “I. Erdoğan Hükümeti Programı,” *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/HP59.htm>. To that end, Turkey nominated Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as the secretary general of the OIC, who was subsequently elected to the post in July 2004, and served two consecutive terms between 2005 and 2014. Also see, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, *The Islamic World in the New Century: The Organisation of Islamic Conference, 1969-2009* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2010). For the famous speech of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC in Tehran on 28 May 2003, in which he urged the Islamic countries “to put our house in order,” see, Abdullah Gül, *Yeni Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Ufukları*, pp. 527-532, p. 528.

⁵⁹⁷ Samir al-Taqi and Raymond Hinnebusch, “As Seen from Damascus: The Transformation in Syrian-Turkish Relations,” p. 104.

⁵⁹⁸ After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, religious themes and references were to be invoked by Turkish foreign policy makers for *disidentification* with the Syrian government. See, for example, “Erdoğan: Kerbela Neyse Suriye de Odur,” *Milliyet*, 8 September 2012.

⁵⁹⁹ In the relevant time period, Turkey espoused an evident civilizational perspective in foreign policy. For example, Turkey, with Spain, pioneered in the inception of the Alliance of Civilizations Initiative in 2005, which subsequently became a UN initiative. See, Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş, “Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2008, pp. 387-406. On the intellectual foundations of the civilizational perspective in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s thought, see, Ahmet Davutoglu, *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory* (Maryland: University Press of America, 1994).

Kilis in December 2009, Turkish Minister of Transport Binali Yıldırım framed the initiation of train service in this border gate within a civilizational discourse: “The destiny of the people of Syria is the destiny of the people of Turkey. In our view, Bursa is not different from Aleppo, Damascus is not different from Istanbul. Both Aleppo and Konya are the cities of the same civilization. Both Damascus and Edirne are the cities of the same civilization.”⁶⁰⁰ Turkish Minister of Transport Binali Yıldırım even referred to poets: “Nizar Qabbani [who was] born in Damascus is a poet of the same civilization inasmuch as Sezai Karakoç from Diyarbakır is a poet of this [same] civilization.”⁶⁰¹

4.4 Turkey’s Motives and Syria

Turkey’s influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria in the relevant time period were based on the motives of security, economy, and identity. Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria differed *within* each other. The patterns of this differentiation could be briefly examined here drawing on the preceding within-case analysis, leaving the explicit discussion of the causes of the differentiation to the last chapter. In the relevant time period, in Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, the significance of sub-motive elements as subject matters of Turkey’s considerations exhibited variation *in degree* relative to each other. To put it differently, Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differed *within* each other with respect to the degree of significance of each sub-motive element relative to each other.

⁶⁰⁰ “Çobanbey Demir Yolu Sınır Kapısı Açıldı,” *Haber7*, 22 December 2009, <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/464840-cobanbey-demir-yolu-sinir-kapisi-acildi>.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*

The motive of security for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria differed within itself in the relevant time period. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, in reference to the unit-level, Turkey, initially adopting a policy of non-involvement in the internal security issues of Syria, adapted its approach afterwards to the new security situation inside Syria in accordance with the security implications of the outbreak, escalation, and dissemination a ravaging civil war, and accordingly put into practice an active diplomacy to mitigate the adverse ramifications of the civil war and to avert potential ones.

In reference to the dyad-level, the progressive resolution of rather entrenched disputes in a political atmosphere of conciliation and compromise constituted the foundation of Turkey's policies. These disputes concerned to the three, and somewhat intertwined, issues of terrorism, transboundary waters, and border designation. The rapid progress on the settlement of these bilateral disputes was quashed with the onset of the civil war in Syria. As opposed to the previous paradigm of proactive and permissive cooperation, Turkey consequently espoused a paradigm of reactive and aggressive competition regarding the security developments in its relations with Syria.

In reference to the regional-level, by virtue of its utmost attentiveness to the restoration and endurance of stability in the regional system, Turkey wholeheartedly occupied itself with the settlement of ongoing discords in Syrian foreign policy, and

diplomatically intervened in earnest in cases Syria's relations became strained with its neighbors, especially Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq. Subsequent to the eruption of the civil war in Syria, Turkey concentrated its efforts on restraining the effects of the policies of regional states from aggravating the already disconcerting situation in Syria.

In reference to the international-level, Turkey was very attentive to the relations between Syria and the US, the dominant international actor in the Middle East. Before the civil war, on account of its cherished policy of proactive engagement with Syria on a broad array of bilateral and regional issues, Turkey showed a good deal of resistance, and even at times outright defiance, towards the US requests for its involvement in the punitive policies unilaterally applied by the US for the isolation of Syria in regional and international affairs. After the civil war, though, Turkey had to reverse its policy, and made repeated requests to the US to take the lead in the formation of an international coalition for a regime change in Syria, which proved to be in vain.

With regard to the sub-motive elements of security in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria in the relevant time period, before the onset of the civil war, dyad-level security had the highest degree of significance in Turkey's security relationships with Syria, followed by regional-level security, international-level security, and unit-level security. However, after the outbreak of the civil war, unit-level security had the highest degree of significance in Turkey's security relationships with Syria, followed by dyad-level security, international-level security, and regional-level security.

The motive of economy for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria differed within itself in the relevant time period as well. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, in reference to trade, to capitalize on the economic benefits of cultivating close commercial relations with the proximate Syrian market yet to be satisfactorily explored and engaged, Turkey pursued three complementary objectives of building a credible legal framework, establishing durable organizational structures, and providing several kinds of business incentives for the private sectors of both countries. A seminal turning point was the signing of a free trade agreement with Syria, which came into effect in January 2007, followed by the abolition of visa requirements between the states in October 2009. Turkey's collaboration with Syria in commercial matters reached a dramatic and economically damaging end with the diplomatic rupture in bilateral relations as a result of the civil war in Syria.

In reference to investment, Turkey's unremitting efforts to promote mutual investments did not render financially profitable ventures in spite of the many agreements signed with Syria on investment in successive meetings of the state representatives and business forums of public sectors. Turkish private investments in the Syrian market became economic casualties of the civil war afterwards. In reference to energy, Turkey's energy cooperation with Syria could not gain ground inasmuch as the tentative measures taken by both states to advance energy cooperation were cancelled with the eruption of the civil war in Syria. While Turkey imported crude oil only in negligible quantities from Syria in the relevant time period, it was unable to realize economic collaboration in natural gas. Turkey

engaged in electricity trade with Syria, which became the second biggest market for Turkey's electricity exports in the period preceding the civil war.

With regard to the sub-motive elements of economy in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria in the relevant time period, before the onset of the civil war, trade had the highest degree of significance in Turkey's economic relationships with Syria, followed by investment, and energy. However, after the outbreak of the civil war, all the three sub-motive elements of economy lost their significance in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria.

The motive of identity for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria differed within itself in the relevant time period as well. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, in reference to person identity, Turkey's policy attitudes and practices were conditioned and informed by a unique self-conception that espoused Turkey's singularity in its dealings with Syria in the sense that Turkey was the rightful successor to the Ottoman Empire, and in possession of an inherent moral responsibility towards the people, especially towards the oppressed, residing in the territories once governed by the Ottoman Empire.

In reference to role identity, Turkey's two most prominent roles in its foreign policy towards the regional system, i.e. the mediator and the peace/order builder, framed the ideational structure of Turkey's relations with Syria accordingly. Ahead of the civil war, Turkey performed an unflinching regional diplomacy in pursuit of mediation between Syria and relevant regional and international actors, even delivering a

measure of success in the process. By the same token, Turkey carried out transformative policies to engage and entice Syria to acquire its collaboration in the restitution of peace and order in the regional system, that is, in the enactment of its peace/order builder role. Eventually, though, Syria transmuted into the most challenging predicament for Turkey in its quest for regional peace and order.

In reference to social identity, Turkey's social identity was prominent being related to the elevation of Turkey's self-worth. Turkey frequently referred to the historical, geographical, religious, and cultural/civilizational commonalities between itself and Syria to increase the prospects of achieving the reciprocity of Syria in mutual self-identification by means of shared social categories. However, with the practical dissolution of Syria as a state after the civil war, Turkey preferred self-identification with the Syrian people, which was challenged by the multiplicity of social actors inside Syria to selectively and contingently identify with.

With regard to the sub-motive elements of identity in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria in the relevant time period, before the onset of the civil war, person identity had the highest degree of significance in Turkey's identity relationships with Syria, followed by social identity, and role identity. However, after the outbreak of the civil war, while person identity had still the highest degree of significance in Turkey's identity relationships with Syria, it was followed by role identity, and social identity.

4.5 Conclusion

As a brief review of the main issues addressed in the preceding discussion, in the first part, the general course of Turkey's relations with Syria between March 2003 and August 2014 is discussed in reference to the dynamics in international, regional, and national contexts, followed by a brief discussion of some paradigmatic milestones constituting critical junctures in political/diplomatic, security/military, economic, and social relations between Turkey and Syria.

In the second part, Turkey's security in its relations with Syria is examined in reference to the developments and associated policies of Turkey at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. To repeat, to the profound frustration of Turkish policymakers, the onset of civil demonstrations, transmuted into a civil war in a brief period of time, shattered Turkey's cooperative security relationships with Syria, and worse, spawned multifarious security risks, dangers, and threats for Turkey.

In the third part, Turkey's economy in its relations with Syria is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. In Turkey's economic relations with Syria, trade was given a higher priority. Nonetheless, to reiterate, with the vicious cycle of the unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions of Turkey and the retaliation of the Syrian government in kind after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Turkey's commercial collaboration with Syria came to a dramatic end, and its trade with Syria quite suffered, along with its investment and energy relations.

In the fourth part, Turkey's identity in its relations with Syria is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity. In terms of person identity, it is argued that Turkey considered itself a unique state in its relations with Syria as the heir to the Ottoman Empire carrying moral responsibility especially towards the oppressed. In terms of role identity, it is contended that Turkey's two most prominent roles that conditioned and shaped the contours of its relations with Syria were those of mediator and peace/order builder. In terms of social identity, it is asserted that in order to achieve self-identification with Syria, and to attain Syria's reciprocity in constructing, restoring, and reviving shared social categories, Turkey frequently invoked the commonality of history, geography, religion, and culture/civilization in its relations with Syria.

In the fifth part, it is advanced that Turkey's motives, security, economy, and identity, to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria differed *within* each other with respect to the degree of significance of each sub-motive element relative to each other. Briefly, with regard to the sub-motive elements of security, before the onset of the civil war, dyad-level security had the highest degree of significance. However, after the outbreak of the civil war, unit-level security had the highest degree of significance. With regard to the sub-motive elements of economy, before the onset of the civil war, trade had the highest degree of significance. However, after the outbreak of the civil war, all the three sub-motive elements of economy lost their significance. Finally, with regard to the sub-motive elements of identity, before the onset of the civil war, person identity had the highest degree of significance. However, after the outbreak of the civil war, while person identity had still the highest degree of significance, it was followed by role identity.

CHAPTER 5

TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN

Turkey's relations with Iran between March 2003 and August 2014 represented a quintessential case of the stability of interstate relations in the Middle East, characterized by strategic parity and economic interdependence, and driven by a dialectics of cooperation and competition. In the dialectics of Turkey's relations with Iran, "competition sets the prospects of cooperation; cooperation, on the other hand, defines the boundaries of competition."⁶⁰² In the words of an observer, "the paradigm of friendship, rivalry and détente reflects the main characteristics of Turkish-Iranian relations."⁶⁰³ In accord with this proposition, for example, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu once commented on Turkey's relations with Iran: "Nothing is more natural than the relationship of cooperation and competition of countries [located] in the same geography. You cooperate in some issues; you compete in some [other] issues."⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰² Eyüp Ersoy, "Türkiye-İran: Siyaset ve Güvenlik," *Analist*, Vol. 4, No. 40, 2014, pp. 24-27, p. 26.

⁶⁰³ Süleyman Elik, *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualizing the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in the Middle-Power States* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), p. 27.

⁶⁰⁴ "İran'la Gizli Savaşımız Yok," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 6 January 2012, <http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/7605--iran-la-gizli-savasimiz-yok>. For the geopolitical representation

The resilience of stability in Turkey's relations with Iran despite fluctuating cooperative and competitive interactions can be explained with reference to the fundamental determinants of relations. According to one scholar, as an example, Turkey's relations with Iran are "essentially determined by two factors: 1) geopolitics, which means that the degree of cooperation or rivalry between the two countries depends on a balance of their mutual and clashing interests."⁶⁰⁵ The second factor is "'state reason,' or a shared political and bureaucratic culture, that is a product of centuries of interaction...at the state level, which practically ensures that the relationship does not descend into direct hostility even when clashing interests outweigh the mutual ones."⁶⁰⁶

In fact, Turkey cooperated in some issues with Iran in the relevant time period. One straightforward indicator of the cooperative aspect of Turkey's relations with Iran was the frequency of high level visits of policymakers between the two states. The succession of reciprocal visits in the relevant time period started with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Iran in July 2004. "Erdoğan's visit, the first by a Turkish Prime Minister in close to a decade, yielded a series of accords on economic, political, and security issues. The trip also marked the culmination of Ankara and Tehran's growing convergence on two pressing foreign policy issues,

of Iran in the strategic reasoning of Ahmet Davutoğlu, see, Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2007), pp. 426-436.

⁶⁰⁵ Karabekir Akkoyunlu, "Turkey's Iran Conundrum: A Delicate Balancing Act," in Kerem Öktem, Ayşe Kadioğlu, and Mehmet Karlı, eds., *Another Empire? A Decade of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the Justice and Development Party* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2012), pp. 259-279, p. 262.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

terrorism and Iraq.”⁶⁰⁷ The last high level visit in the period was Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Turkey in June 2014, who was “accompanied by seven cabinet ministers and a 90-member trade delegation from the private sector.”⁶⁰⁸ Turkish President Abdullah Gül described the visit as a “turning point” in Turkey’s relations with Iran.⁶⁰⁹

Table 17: Presidential Visits between Turkey and Iran in the period of 14 March 2003-18 August 2014⁶¹⁰

Date	Outgoing Turkish Visits	Incoming Iranian Visits
2008 August		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
2009 March	Abdullah Gül (ECO Summit)	
2009 November		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (OIC Summit)
2010 June		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (CICA Summit)

⁶⁰⁷ Ilan Berman, *Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p. 98.

⁶⁰⁸ Gawdat Bahgat, “Iran-Turkey Energy Cooperation: Strategic Implications,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2014, pp. 121-132, p. 122.

⁶⁰⁹ “Gül: Rouhani Visit a Turning Point in Turkey-Iran Relations,” *Daily Sabah*, 9 June 2014.

⁶¹⁰ For a more detailed account of bilateral visits between Turkey and Iran, see, “Bilgi Notları,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Tahran Büyükelçiliği*, <http://tahran.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=200934>. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s visit to Iran in July 2000 was also an important diplomatic event before March 2003.

2010 December		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (ECO Summit)
2011 February	Abdullah Gül	
2011 May		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (UN Conference on LDC) ⁶¹¹
2014 June		Hassan Rouhani

In Turkey's relations in the Middle East, one distinguishing dimension of Turkey's relations with Iran is its high degree of intergovernmental institutionalization. For example, in contrast to Turkey's relations with other Middle Eastern states, Turkey and Iran are members of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Developing-8 (D-8).⁶¹² In addition, similar to Turkey's relations with some Middle Eastern states, Turkey established with Iran a high level cooperation council, which for the first time convened in Ankara on 9 June 2014 during the visit of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.⁶¹³ Nonetheless, Turkey's cooperation with Iran was not without limits.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹¹ LDC stands for Least Developed Countries.

⁶¹² For Ahmet Davutoğlu's views on Turkey's relations with Iran within the framework of ECO and D-8, see, Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, pp. 268-282.

⁶¹³ For the joint declaration of Turkey and Iran after the meeting of High Level Cooperation Council, see, "Joint Declaration between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/turkiye-iran-ydik-ortak-bildiri-ingilizce.pdf. Also see, Hossein Aghaie Joobani and Mostafa Mousavipour, "Russia, Turkey, and Iran: Moving towards Strategic Synergy in the Middle East," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2015, pp. 141-155.

⁶¹⁴ Turkey's relations with Iran have been frequently associated with 'limits.' See, for example, John Calabrese, "Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1998, pp. 75-94; Tolga Demiryol, "The Limits to Cooperation between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations since 2002," *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2013, pp. 111-144;

In fact, Turkey competed in some issues with Iran in the relevant time period as well. The competitive aspect of Turkey's relations with Iran has been predominantly conceived within a theoretical framework of regional structural competition underpinned by balance of power dynamics, both historically and contemporarily. According to one scholar, Turkey has a "deep geo-political rivalry with Iran," and in the relevant time period "the most significant factor in Turkish foreign policy making vis-à-vis the Middle East [was] the emergence of Iran's regional hegemony."⁶¹⁵ For Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, Turkey's relations with Iran "can be described as a 'structural regional rivalry' whose intensity and issues are determined by conjectural changes at the systemic and sub-systemic levels."⁶¹⁶ Furthermore, in regional geopolitics, two commentators contend, "the political destiny of the Middle East has been significantly shaped by the rivalry for regional power and influence between Turkey and Iran."⁶¹⁷ In the period between 2003 and 2014, the Arab Spring, especially the developments in Syria, greatly complicated, and some would say vindicated, Turkey's competitive relationship with Iran. Nonetheless, even though the Arab Spring "undoubtedly strained the relationship," Turkey and Iran "acted pragmatically, suppressing the urge to indulge in an all-out competition over regional spoils, influence and trade."⁶¹⁸

Barın Kayaoğlu, "The Limits of Turkish-Iranian Cooperation, 1974-80," *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2014, pp. 463-478.

⁶¹⁵ Hasan Kösebalaban, "Turkey and the New Middle East: Between Liberalism and Realism," *Perceptions*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2011, pp. 93-114, p. 102, p. 94.

⁶¹⁶ Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, "Uneasy Neighbors: Turkish-Iranian Relations since the 1979 Revolution," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010, pp. 101-117, p. 101.

⁶¹⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013), p. 1.

⁶¹⁸ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring," *Survival*, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2012-2013, pp. 139-162, p. 141. Mohammad Ayoob, on the other hand, argued that the Arab Spring caused a "shift in the center of political gravity in the region from the Arab heartland comprising Egypt and the Fertile Crescent to what was once considered the non-Arab periphery-Turkey and Iran."

Among the numerous positive and negative developments, in the sense of being conducive to cooperation or competition, observed in Turkey's relations with Iran in the relevant time period, some paradigmatic milestones constituting critical junctures in political/diplomatic, security/military, economic, and social relations can be identified. In Turkey's political/diplomatic relations with Iran, in the period after 2003, "regional and domestic developments provided a conducive environment for the rapprochement between Iran and Turkey."⁶¹⁹ Turkey's rapprochement with Iran arguably reached its apogee with the announcement of a nuclear swap deal on 17 May 2010 in Tehran negotiated and signed by the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Brazil. "The Tehran Declaration, as it was called, stipulated that 20-percent-enriched nuclear fuel was to be provided to Iran for its use in the Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes, in exchange for the removal of 1,200 kilograms of 3.5-percent-low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey."⁶²⁰ Turkey's official position both before and after the Tehran Declaration was the recognition of "the right of Iran, a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to develop nuclear technology," on the condition that it remained "on a peaceful track and allows for the application of full-scope safeguard

Mohammed Ayoob, "Beyond the Democratic Wave in the Arab World: The Middle East's Turko-Persian Future," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2011, pp. 57-70, p. 58. Also see, Merve Tahiroğlu and Behnam Ben Taleblu, "Turkey and Iran: The Best of Frenemies," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2015, pp. 123-134.

⁶¹⁹ Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, "Uneasy Neighbors: Turkish-Iranian Relations since the 1979 Revolution," p. 111. The authors called the process "the great rapprochement." Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Aylın Gürzel, "Turkey's Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2012, pp. 141-152, p. 141. For the full text of the Tehran Declaration, see, "17.05.2010 Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Iran and Brazil," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/17_05_2010-joint-declaration-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-iran-and-brazil_.en.mfa. Also see, Mark Fitzpatrick, "Containing the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: The Useful Precedent of a Fuel Swap," *Perceptions*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2011, pp. 27-42.

inspections by the IAEA in a way that would lend the utmost confidence to the international community about its intentions.”⁶²¹

Turkey’s political/diplomatic relations with Iran, on the other hand, strained to a considerable extent over the diverging policies and conflicting measures of the two states about the developments in Syria after the outbreak of the civil war. The Arab Spring, in general, exacerbated mutual misgivings in Turkey’s relations with Iran, and to some, gave “the historical rivalry between Turkey and Iran new impetus.”⁶²² In pursuit of ambitious regional policies, Turkey and Iran framed, rationalized, and executed differing policies with conflicting strategic priorities in order to contain, regulate, and steer the repercussions of the Arab Spring.⁶²³ Turkey’s strategic priorities came to clash with those of Iran over Syria. In brief, for Turkey, Iran’s unconditional support to Syria constituted “an impediment making an acceptable settlement of the crisis more difficult,” and the intransigence of the Syrian government was “nourished by this Iranian support.”⁶²⁴ As a result, the crisis in Syria casted “a long shadow over Turkish–Iranian relations.”⁶²⁵

⁶²¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar, “Implications of A Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 59-80, p. 64. Also see, Mustafa Kibaroglu, “The Iranian Quagmire: How to Move Forward,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 66, No. 6, 2010, pp. 88-94.

⁶²² F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, p. 2.

⁶²³ On Iran and the Arab Spring, see, Ali Parchami, “The ‘Arab Spring’: The View from Tehran,” *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2012, pp. 35-52; Peter Jones, “Hope and Disappointment: Iran and the Arab Spring,” *Survival*, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2013, pp. 73-84; Mahmood Sariolghalam, “Transition in the Middle East: New Arab Realities and Iran,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013, pp. 121-134. On Turkey and the Arab Spring, see, among others, Taha Özhan, “The Arab Spring and Turkey: The Camp David Order vs. the New Middle East,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2011, pp. 55-64; Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2014, pp. 203-219.

⁶²⁴ Mohammad-Reza Djalili and Thierry Kellner, *L’Iran et la Turquie Face au ‘Printemps Arabe’* (Bruxelles: GRIP, 2012), p. 108.

⁶²⁵ Henri J. Barkey, “Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring,” p. 156.

In Turkey's security/military relations with Iran, the unprecedented breakthrough took place early in the relevant time period with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Iran in July 2004. In the period before 2004, despite the semblance of cooperation and coordination in counterterrorism policies carried out, for example, through the regular meetings of the High Security Commission, Iran had not been eager to show substantial interest in taking concrete measures with Turkey in counterterrorism. However, the emergence of the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), an indigenous branch of the PKK, as a growing threat within Iranian territory brought about a marked shift in Iran's approach in the early 2000s. Accordingly, in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit in July 2004, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding by which Iran officially designated the PKK as a terrorist organization with all its branches.⁶²⁶

On the other hand, Turkey's security/military relations with Iran underwent a challenging period of grave discursive confrontations subsequent to the deployment of an early warning radar station in eastern Turkish province of Malatya as part of a NATO missile defense system which became operational in early 2012.⁶²⁷ A flurry of unveiled accusations and outright threats expressed by high level Iranian civilian and military statesmen ensued simply due to the fact that the defensive deployment of an early radar station had the potential capacity to neutralize Iran's deterrent capability. In a notorious example, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the aerospace division of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic

⁶²⁶ Bülent Aydemir, "İran'la PKK'ya Karşı Tam Mutabakat," *Sabah*, 30 July 2004.

⁶²⁷ See, Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Place in the 'Missile Shield'," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013, pp. 223-236; Halit Mustafa Emin Tağma, Meltem Müftüleri-Baç, and Ezgi Uzun, "The Path to an Entrenching Alliance: Utilitarianism and Historical Institutionalism in Committing to NATO's Missile Defense System," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 9, No. 6, 2013, pp. 75-100.

Revolution (IRGC), shortly the Revolutionary Guards, declared in November 2011: “Should we be threatened, we will target NATO’s missile defense shield in Turkey and then hit the next targets.”⁶²⁸ On the other hand, to an Iranian commentator, it was the Syrian crisis that “created an opportunity for Ankara to agree with the deployment of the missile defense shield on Iran’s borders regardless of security concerns and repeated warnings and threats by Iranian military officials.”⁶²⁹

In Turkey’s economic relations with Iran, the milestone came rather late in the relevant time period with the signing of a preferential trade agreement on 29 January 2014 in Tehran by the Turkish Ministry of Economy Nihat Zeybekci and Iranian Minister of Industries, Mines and Trade Muhammad Reza Nematzadeh. Composed of 33 articles, the agreement aimed at strengthening commercial relations between Turkey and Iran through, among others, “the reduction of tariffs and elimination of non-Tariff barriers and Para-tariffs,” and “the creation of more predictable and secure environment for sustainable growth of trade” between the two states.⁶³⁰ On the other hand, Turkey’s economic relations with Iran suffered from a lengthy controversy over the price of natural gas Turkey was buying from Iran which finally culminated in Turkey’s taking the issue to the International Court of Arbitration in 2012.

⁶²⁸ “Iran Threatens to Hit Turkey if US, Israel Attack,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 26 November 2011.

⁶²⁹ Mirghasem Banihashemi, “Understanding the AKP’s Regional Policy: An Iranian Perspective,” *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 97-118, p. 115.

⁶³⁰ The objectives of the agreement were specified in the Article 1. See, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki Tercihli Ticaret Anlaşması,” *Resmi Gazete*, No. 29165, 4 November 2014, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/11/20141104-2.htm>.

In Turkey's social relations with Iran, conspicuous incidents denoting substantive positive and negative developments did not occur between March 2003 and August 2014. Nonetheless, Turkey's social relations with Iran in multiple areas, especially in education and tourism, improved quite remarkably. As an example, the number of Iranian tourists visiting Turkey increased % 318 between 2003 and 2014.⁶³¹




Figure 9: The Number of Iranian Tourists Visiting Turkey between 2004 and 2014⁶³²

In sum, and more to the point, Turkey's influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran between March 2003 and August 2014 were based on the motives of security and economy. However, Turkey's influence acts in its sub-

⁶³¹ In June 2014, for example, Turkey signed an implementation program on tourism cooperation with Iran. See, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Turizm İşbirliği Üzerine Uygulama Programı, 2014-2017," *Resmî Gazete*, 11 February 2015, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2015/02/20150211-1-1.pdf>.

⁶³² Data is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Refer to "Turizm İstatistikleri, Çıkış Yapan Ziyaretçiler (Yurtdışında İkamet Eden)," TÜİK, <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/turizmapp/cikis.zul?>.

regional dyadic relationships with Iran in the relevant time period were not based on the motive of identity.

5.1 Turkey's Security and Iran

Turkey's security relations with Iran reflected the essential dialectics of cooperation and competition characterizing its bilateral relations with Iran. Still, Turkey's endeavors between March 2003 and August 2014 in its security relations with Iran concentrated on expanding the scope of cooperation while simultaneously containing the matters of competition.⁶³³ To that end, for example, Turkey preferred to render the already functioning institutional security mechanisms with Iran more efficacious. In general, "there are four institutional security mechanisms, which organize the security relations of Turkey and Iran. The High Security Commission and the Turkey-Iran Joint-Security Commission are the most significant security mechanisms between the Turkish and Iranian governments."⁶³⁴ By the same token, in order to transform mutual threat perceptions, Turkey removed Iran, along with Russia, Iraq, and Greece, from the National Security Document, also called the Red Book, which identified threats to Turkey's national security, quite belatedly in 2010.⁶³⁵

⁶³³ For an early analysis, see, Özden Zeynep Oktav, "Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations," *Perceptions*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2004, pp. 103-117.

⁶³⁴ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Süleyman Elik, "Turkey's Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2011, pp. 643-662, p. 654.

⁶³⁵ Bezen Balamir Coskun, "Turkey," in Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich, and Alexandre Jonas, eds., *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defense Policies across the Continent* (Potsdam: Springer, 2013), pp. 359-369, p. 361. For an analysis of Turkey's relations with Iran from the perspective of de/securitization, see, Rahmat Hajimineh, "Analyzing the Turkish-Iranian Relations from the Copenhagen School's Point of View," *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 75-96.




Figure 10: Frequency of ‘Iran’ in the Press Releases of the National Security Council between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014⁶³⁶

In the relevant time period, Iran appeared in the press releases of the National Security Council of Turkey as a national security issue from time to time. In 2006 and 2010, developments around the Iranian nuclear program were discussed twice in the National Security Council, revealing that Turkey was rather sensitive to the security implications of the dispute between Iran and international community, mainly P5+1 countries, over the Iranian nuclear program. In February 2014, Iran was discussed with reference to “the progress observed in bilateral relations,” speculatively an implicit reference to a discussion of Turkey’s relations with Iran within the context of the Arab Spring, especially Syria.⁶³⁷ In the relevant time period, there were four levels in which security issues as the subject matters of Turkey’s considerations in its security relationships with Iran, be them cooperative or

⁶³⁶ The contents of all press releases are available in Turkish. See, “Basın Bildirileri Arşivi,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/milli-guvenlik-kurulu/mgk-basin-aciklamalari/basin-aciklamalari-arsivi>.

⁶³⁷ “26 Şubat 2014 Tarihli Toplantı,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/26-subat-2014-tarihli-toplanti>.

competitive, originate. These four levels were unit level, dyad level, regional level, and international level.

5.1.1 Unit-Level Security

In reference to cooperation at the unit-level, Turkey demonstrated a good deal of prudence in its relations with Iran, and refrained from engaging in policies that could be misconstrued as undue foreign interference in internal affairs by Iranian policymakers. It appeared to be a delicate precondition for cordial relations, and traditionally in cases Turkey and Iran showed careful attention to the political sensitivities of each other, relations progressed. Historically, for instance, Turkey abstained from intervening, overtly or covertly, in the revolutionary process unfolding in Iran during 1977 and 1978, and was prompt in officially recognizing the new revolutionary regime; as an indication of the appreciation of the new regime, “Turgut Tülümen, the Turkish ambassador, was the first foreign diplomat received by Ayatollah Khomeini after the revolution in the Feyziye seminary.”⁶³⁸

Turkey’s reticence emanated from its assessment of “the preservation of stable ties with a reasonably functioning and predictable government in Tehran as essential for its own internal security and stability.”⁶³⁹ One concern was that “a renewed push for further autonomy or independence among Iran’s Kurdish minority” could ensue “in

⁶³⁸ Omid Shokri Kalehsar, *The Role of Energy in Iran-Turkey Relations* (Saarbrücken: Lambert, 2013), p. 18.

⁶³⁹ Karabekir Akkoyunlu, “Turkey’s Iran Conundrum: A Delicate Balancing Act,” p. 269.

the case of a violent regime change or an extended leadership crisis in Iran.”⁶⁴⁰ As a corollary, for example, Turkey quickly endorsed the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the controversial presidential election of June 2009 despite the widespread civilian protests challenging the results of the elections.⁶⁴¹ Commenting on the election in its immediate aftermath, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed Turkey’s content with the conduct of an election in Iran “in dynamic circumstances,” i.e., in democratic circumstances, and emphasizing that Iran was “a neighboring country important for Turkey to the greatest extent in terms of its [Iran’s] political stability,” he went on to state that developments around the presidential elections in Iran, that is, mass protests, were “an internal issue” for Iran.⁶⁴² Ahmet Davutoğlu reiterated Turkey’s position a week later, and expressed Turkey’s wish that the presidential election, which was “dynamic to the utmost extent and [took place] with high political participation,” would not be eclipsed by the widespread protests in Iran.⁶⁴³

In reference to competition at the unit-level, due to Turkey’s preference for non-involvement in the internal affairs of Iran, and due to Iran’s reciprocation in the same manner, the relevant time period did not witness contentious incidents similar to

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 272. On Iran’s Kurdish ethnic minority, see, for example, Hashem Ahmadzadeh and Gareth Stansfield, “The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2010, pp. 11-27.

⁶⁴¹ The protests were associated with the Green Movement, and lasted for months. On the Green Movement, see, Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., *The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future* (New York: Melville House, 2010); Hamid Dabashi, *The Green Movement* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011).

⁶⁴² “Davutoğlu: İran’ın İç Meselesi,” *Hürriyet*, 15 June 2009.

⁶⁴³ “İran’ın İstikrarı Bölge İçin Önemli,” *Türkiye*, 23 June 2009. Turkey’s reserved attitude was criticized by some commentators. As an example, it was argued that although it was “perfectly legitimate for Turkey to engage with an important neighbor such as Iran on economic, security and cultural grounds,” if Turkey happened “to be one of the first countries to congratulate President Ahmedinejad [sic] for its electoral victory,” this would raise “important question marks concerning its commitment to international norms and democratic values.” Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2011, pp. 47-65, p. 61.

those in the recent history of Turkey's relations with Iran. In one case, for example, "the harsh rhetoric of mutual accusations between the two governments that the other party interfered in its internal affairs and supported disruptive movements against each other culminated in the withdrawal of the Turkish and Iranian ambassadors in February 1997."⁶⁴⁴ Specifically, Turkey "accused Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Reza Baqeri of interfering in Turkey's internal affairs by voicing support for the rule of Islamic law at an Islamists' rally in the Ankara district of Sincan," and this incident "caused a diplomatic crisis that lasted for six months until Iran and Turkey agreed to exchange ambassadors again."⁶⁴⁵

5.1.2 Dyad-Level Security

In reference to cooperation at the dyad-level, Turkey incrementally enhanced collaboration with Iran against mutual security threats, primarily deriving from the common challenge of transnational terrorism claiming to wage an armed struggle for and on behalf of the ethnic Kurdish minorities in both states, and thus imperiling the political legitimacy, economic development, and social stability of both Turkey and Iran.⁶⁴⁶ The singular development in Turkey's security cooperation with Iran came about in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Iran in July 2004, during which Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding whereby Iran officially designated the PKK as a terrorist organization, paving the way for subsequent joint military

⁶⁴⁴ Bayram Sinkaya, "Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, pp. 137-156, p. 139.

⁶⁴⁵ Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2008, pp. 495-515, p. 505. Also see, Bayram Sinkaya, "Turkey-Iran Relations in the 1990s and the Role of Ideology," *Perceptions*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-16.

⁶⁴⁶ For Turkey's security relations with Iran before 2003, see, Robert Olson, "Turkey-Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2000, pp. 871-890; Robert Olson, *Turkey-Iran Relations, 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics* (California: Mazda Publishers, 2004).

operations against the terrorist organization.⁶⁴⁷ In particular, Turkey signed another memorandum of understanding with Iran “after the High Security Commission meeting to conduct joint operations against the PJAK-PKK in February 2006.”⁶⁴⁸ In May 2006, General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, the chief of Iran’s national police forces, announced in a meeting with his Turkish counterpart that as a countermeasure against the PKK, Iran strengthened 27 police stations along the common border, and more to the point, Iranian security forces had detained 248 members, arrested 54 of them and handed them over to the Turkish authorities on the border.⁶⁴⁹

Turkey’s security cooperation with Iran intensified in the following period. As an example, in the 12th meeting of the High Security Commission in April 2008, which could be regarded as “a landmark in the consolidation of the security cooperation,”⁶⁵⁰ Turkey signed yet another agreement with Iran, mainly against the PKK and the PJAK, so as to “to increase security cooperation and exchange intelligence to combat these two groups, as well as to fight organized crime, drug trafficking, extradition of criminals, and the maintenance of border security.”⁶⁵¹ In line with the agreement, for example, in June 2008, General İlker Başbuğ, the Commander of Turkish Land

⁶⁴⁷ “Security Deal with Iran,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 29 June 2004. According to a scholar, “that Iran defined the PKK as a terrorist organization and waged a determined war against it played a major role in changing Turkish threat perceptions [about Iran].” Özden Zeynep Oktav, “Regionalism or Shift of Axis? Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations,” in Özden Zeynep Oktav, ed., *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 75-94, p. 83.

⁶⁴⁸ Süleyman Elik, *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualizing the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in the Middle-Power States*, p. 87.

⁶⁴⁹ Soner Gürel, “PKK’ya Karşı İran Türkiye İşbirliği,” *Hürriyet*, 16 May 2006. Also see, Robert Olson, “Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2006, pp. 13-45, p. 44.

⁶⁵⁰ Tolga Demiryol, “The Limits to Cooperation between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations since 2002,” p. 122.

⁶⁵¹ Daphne McCurdy, “Turkish-Iranian Relations: When Opposites Attract,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008, pp. 87-106, p. 98. For one scholar, that Iran shared “with Turkey a similar vulnerability to hit-and-run attacks by PJAK guerillas from their safe havens in northern Iraq” was “the motivating factor for the rapprochement of the two countries.” Özden Zeynep Oktav, “Regionalism or Shift of Axis? Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations,” p. 83.

Forces, disclosed that Turkey had been sharing intelligence with Iran against the PKK, and conducting military operations against the terrorist organization in coordination with Iran.⁶⁵² In August 2008, during the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Turkey, another “very comprehensive agreement on security” was signed, which, in the words of Turkish Minister of Interior Beşir Atalay, comprised “all types of intelligence sharing, [and] all types of collaboration on terrorism.”⁶⁵³ As a matter of fact, the agreement, signed by Beşir Atalay and the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manouchehr Mottaki, was quite detailed, and Turkey and Iran proclaimed that they cooperate in combating, for example, “against organizing supply, preparation, propaganda and any other activities of various groups, criminals and terrorist organizations which threaten the national security and sovereignty of the other side in their own territories.”⁶⁵⁴

Joint military operations continued unabated in 2009. In a notable case, nine members of the PKK, including two senior members, were killed in a coordinated operation between Turkish and Iranian armed forces in December 2009.⁶⁵⁵

Concomitant with joint operations, Turkey-Iran Border Security Commission continued to meet regularly. On the other hand, as a result of a major offensive of Iranian military forces against the PJAK in the summer of 2011, “the first ever ceasefire between PJAK and Iranian forces” was negotiated through the Kurdistan

⁶⁵² “PKK’ya Karşı İran’la Koordineli Operasyon,” *Yeni Şafak*, 6 June 2008.

⁶⁵³ “Türkiye ile İran Arasında İşbirliği,” *Haber Türk*, 15 August 2008.

⁶⁵⁴ See, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmî Gazete*, No. 27947, 28 May 2011, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2011/05/20110528M1-9.htm>. The agreement was issued on 28 May 2011, and was to remain in force for three years.

⁶⁵⁵ “PKK’ya Ağır Darbe,” *Milliyet*, 10 December 2009.

Regional Government of Iraq (KRG),⁶⁵⁶ and in September, the PJAK “agreed to stay clear of the Iranian border, cease all military activity in Iran and stop recruiting Iranian nationals.”⁶⁵⁷ In October, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, in a meeting with his Iranian counterpart, expressed that Turkey and Iran would continue to work together thenceforth until the threat of terrorism posed by the PKK and the PJAK was completely eliminated.⁶⁵⁸

In reference to competition at the dyad-level, despite the anticipation of Turkey for unrelenting security cooperation with Iran against terrorism, the so-called Karayılan Affair, and the moderation in Iran’s counterterrorism policies against the PKK after the eruption of the civil war in Syria aroused considerable apprehension in Turkey about the credibility of Iran’s partnership in counterterrorism. In August 2011, Turkish and Iranian official news agencies reported the capture of Murat Karayılan, a senior leader of the PKK, presumably number two, by Iranian security forces; the news was confirmed, for example, by Alaeddin Boroujerdi, the Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security in the Iranian Assembly.⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁶ Bill Park, “Turkey, the US and the KRG: Moving Parts and the Geopolitical Realities,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2012, pp. 109-125, p. 118.

⁶⁵⁷ Tolga Demiryol, “The Limits to Cooperation between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations since 2002,” p. 131.

⁶⁵⁸ “‘Terör Tehdidi Tümüyle Tasfiye Edilene Kadar Birlikte Çalışacağız,’” *Haber Türk*, 21 September 2011.

⁶⁵⁹ Idrees Mohammed, “Turkey and Iran Rivalry on Syria,” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 2-3, 2011, pp. 87-99, p. 96; Markar Esayan, “Iran Pulls the PKK Card,” *Today’s Zaman*, 16 August 2011. Nonetheless, the general conviction in the Turkish public remained highly suspicious of Iran’s complicity in releasing Murat Karayılan after his capture as a result of a negotiation with the PKK. See, for example, Abdülkadir Selvi, “Yakalanan Karayılan Urumiye’ye Götürülmüş,” *Yeni Şafak*, 11 October 2011.

The news was to be denied by Turkish and Iranian politicians some days later.⁶⁶⁰ However, the suspicions over Iran's collusion with the PKK grew after the divergence of security policies of Turkey and Iran over the civil war in Syria, which finally evolved into allegations. In one example, in November 2012, the Turkish Minister of Interior İdris Naim Şahin quite blatantly expressed on the Turkish state television: "We know that Iran is providing assistance to the PKK terrorist organization."⁶⁶¹ By qualifying the statements of İdris Naim Şahin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told the Turkish reporters that Iran was not making as much effort against the PJAK as it was before, and it had moderated its struggle.⁶⁶² Iranian officials adamantly refused these sorts of allegations, notwithstanding.

5.1.3 Regional-Level Security

In reference to cooperation at the regional-level, the seminal turning point that induced Turkey to foster security cooperation with Iran to the extent possible was the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, which, as a scholar contended, "urged Turkey and Iran to enter into an implicit strategic alignment," as "there was a similarity between the two countries' approaches to Iraq after the American invasion since they both viewed the developments in Iraq from a security angle."⁶⁶³ In fact, "both the governments and the publics in Iran and Turkey were strongly opposed to the invasion of Iraq."⁶⁶⁴ For Turkey and Iran "the American invasion meant being less able to exert influence over Iraq and domestic clients such as the Kurdish and Shia

⁶⁶⁰ "Turkey, Iran Deny Report of PKK Leader's Capture," *Today's Zaman*, 15 August 2011.

⁶⁶¹ Metehan Demir, "Bakan'dan İran Bombası," *Hürriyet*, 26 November 2012.

⁶⁶² Metehan Demir, "Bakanları Keşke 15'e İndirebilsek," *Hürriyet*, 29 November 2012.

⁶⁶³ S. Gülden Ayman, "Turkey and Iran: Between Friendly Competition and Fierce Rivalry," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2014, pp. 6-26, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁶⁴ Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, "Uneasy Neighbors: Turkish-Iranian Relations since the 1979 Revolution," p. 111.

groups,” and more importantly, “due to their own domestic Kurdish populations, Iran and Turkey [were] wary of the disintegration of Iraq and the rise of an independent Kurdistan.”⁶⁶⁵ The ensuing ambiguity after the US invasion “that prevailed over the future of Iraq due to the ‘vagueness’ of intentions of the United States and the latter’s failure to establish a stable and powerful government there...made the possibility of disintegration of Iraq the principal concern of the two neighbors.”⁶⁶⁶ As a corollary, Turkey intensified security cooperation with Iran on Iraqi politics through regular bilateral consultative meetings, and multilateral cooperative mechanisms.

In reference to competition at the regional-level, diverging order of preferences and opposing strategic priorities in Turkey’s and Iran’s regional policies in the Middle East vying for relative advantage in addressing the challenges of regional developments and in yielding favorable policy outcomes in consonance with their interests brought a contentious posture in Turkey’s regional security relations with Iran to the fore, especially after the Arab Spring. The Arab revolutions, some even argued, “were simply the latest catalyst for the relationship’s return to the type of tensions that dominated the Turkish-Iranian relationship during the 1990s.”⁶⁶⁷

Turkey’s response to the Arab Spring was at considerable variance with that of Iran, and while aggravating an already ongoing contention in Iraq, it precipitated the forceful resurgence of a latent discord in Syria and engendered new disagreements in Yemen.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid. On Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq and the Middle East after the US invasion, see, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter and Malou Innocent, “The Iraq War and Iranian Power,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2007-2008, pp. 67-82; Kayhan Barzegar, “Iran’s Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2010, pp. 173-189.

⁶⁶⁶ Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” p. 142.

⁶⁶⁷ Aaron Stein and Philipp C. Bleek, “Turkish-Iranian Relations: From ‘Friends with Benefits’ to ‘It’s Complicated,’” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2012, pp. 137-150, p. 148.

In Iraq, dissonant policies of Turkey and Iran preceded the advent of the Arab Spring. In the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq, Turkey “was initially an observer of Tehran’s economic, political and diplomatic activities. However, its aspiration to build ties with different segments of Iraqi society gradually allowed it to emerge as a competitor.”⁶⁶⁸ It was imperative from the perspective of Iran that Iraq evolved into “a friendly and pliant state that support[ed] Iranian national security interests,” and yet Turkey constituted “an obstacle to Iran’s ability to achieve its political ambitions in Iraq.”⁶⁶⁹ In an example, in the Iraqi parliamentary elections of March 2010, Turkey quite explicitly endorsed the bipartisan al-Iraqiyya list of Ayad Allawi while Iran endorsed political alliances formed by Shia-dominated political parties, primarily the State of Law Coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki. According to an Iranian scholar, Turkey was “obviously trying to bring a Turkey-friendly government to power that [would reduce] Iran’s influence in Iraq.”⁶⁷⁰ During his term as the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki was “widely viewed in Ankara as Tehran’s man in Baghdad,” as, for example, he “steadily sought to increase his political power and pursued an increasingly pro-Iran policy, allowing Iranian arms and fighters to cross into Syria from Iraq.”⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶⁸ S. Gülden Ayman, “Turkey and Iran: Between Friendly Competition and Fierce Rivalry,” p. 13. On Turkey’s Iraq policy after the US invasion, see, for example, Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2006, pp. 183-196; Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey and Iraq: The Making of a Partnership,” *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2011, pp. 663-674.

⁶⁶⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, p. 12. Also see, S. Gülden Ayman, “Regional Aspirations and Limits of Power: Turkish-Iranian Relations in the New Middle East,” *Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-21.

⁶⁷⁰ Rahmat Hajimineh, “Analyzing the Turkish-Iranian Relations from the Copenhagen School’s Point of View,” p. 89.

⁶⁷¹ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey’s New Kurdish Opening,” *Survival*, Vol. 55, No. 5, 2013, pp. 133-146, p. 142. On 14 August 2014, Nouri al-Maliki resigned from his post as the Prime Minister of Iraq.

In Syria, Turkey's strategic objectives could not be more conflictual with Iran's. While Turkey was unequivocally striving for the ouster of Bashar al-Assad from power, Iran was categorically struggling for the survival of the Syrian government at any cost. A fundamental cause of Iran's unconditional assistance to the Syrian regime was that "it was through Syria that the strategic depth of Iran...expanded and reaches the borders of" Israel and the shores of the Mediterranean.⁶⁷² Therefore, against Turkey's preference for a regime change in Syria, Iran "repeatedly called the Turkish policy against Syria very hostile and against the principles of Turkey's regional policy as well as a long term interest in line with the objectives and strategies of Western powers."⁶⁷³

As a result, an increasingly vehement exchange of allegations, accusations, and incriminations between Turkey and Iran ensued. While Turkey "charged the Iranian government with encouraging the Assad regime to pursue a violent crackdown instead of persuading it to make reforms," Iran "accused Turkey of intervening in the internal affairs of Syria and serving the interests of the imperialist powers to weaken the 'resistance front'."⁶⁷⁴ As an example, castigating the second conference of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People that took place on 1 April 2012 in İstanbul, Muhammad Kawsari, Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security in the Iranian Assembly, called the conference "the enemies of Syria," and accused Turkey of being "a subcontractor of imperialism."⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷² Ali Omid, "A Comparative Analysis of the Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy towards the Arab Revolutions," *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 29-52, p. 42.

⁶⁷³ Mirghasem Banihashemi, "Understanding the AKP's Regional Policy: An Iranian Perspective," p. 114.

⁶⁷⁴ Bayram Sinkaya, "Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits," p. 152.

⁶⁷⁵ "İran'dan 'Suriye'nin Düşmanları' Eleştirisi," *Milliyet*, 3 April 2012.

On Turkey's part, in August 2012, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official press release "strongly condemn[ing] statements full of false accusations regarding our country and extremely inappropriate threats made by some Iranian officials," declaring that "everybody [knew] who is responsible internally and externally for the human tragedy caused by the regime in Syria and who is to be blamed for the consequences of the hundreds of manslaughter every day."⁶⁷⁶ In addition, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu denounced Iran's policy framed in a discourse of 'axis of resistance': "In our view, the axis of resistance that relies on the people is legitimate. The axis of resistance is the will of the Syrian people. Iran is making a mistake in its Syrian policy."⁶⁷⁷ The confrontational attitude and the war of words between Turkey and Iran persisted though, and in brief, Syria continued to remain "a formidable stumbling block" in Turkey's regional security relations with Iran.⁶⁷⁸

5.1.4 International-Level Security

In reference to cooperation at the international-level, in the longstanding dispute between Iran and the West, principally the US, over the Iranian nuclear program, Turkey consistently espoused a peaceful settlement mainly adhering to the argument expressed by Iran that the nuclear program underway in Iran was for peaceful purposes without any hidden agenda of proliferation.⁶⁷⁹ Although some argued that

⁶⁷⁶ "No: 196, 7 August 2012, Press Release Regarding Declarations Made by Iranian Officials," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-196_-7-august-2012_-press-release-regarding-declarations-made-by-iranian-officials.en.mfa.

⁶⁷⁷ "'Sancılı Süreç Çok Uzun Sürmez'," *Sabah*, 25 August 2012. On Iran's foreign policy discourse on the Arab Spring, see, Eyüp Ersoy, "İran ve Arap Baharı," *Analist*, Vol. 3, No. 30, 2013, pp. 52-53; Eyüp Ersoy, "Iran and the Arab Spring: Discursive Realpolitik," *Today's Zaman*, 22 October 2013.

⁶⁷⁸ Bulent Aras and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, "Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring: Finding a Middle Ground," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2014, pp. 112-120, p. 119.

⁶⁷⁹ On the relations between Iran and the West/the US over the nuclear program, see, among others, Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Bad for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2006, pp. 207-232; Nihat Ali Özcın ve Özgür

Iranian nuclear program “developed into a clear and present danger to Turkey’s national security,”⁶⁸⁰ and there were some truth in the contention that “if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, this would be a seriously destabilizing development with serious implications for Turkey’s vision for the Middle East,”⁶⁸¹ Turkey took a neutral stance in the dispute, upheld Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology while denouncing nuclear proliferation, sought active mediation between the parties, and did not abstain from opposing unilateral sanctions against Iran in the process to the frustration of the US and the EU.⁶⁸²

A number of explanations were propounded to account for Turkey’s preference for active diplomatic engagement with Iran in the settlement of the dispute over its nuclear program. For one observer, “the motivation behind Turkey’s willingness to confront its Western allies over Iran’s nuclear program was never as simple as a desire to exchange membership of one alliance with membership of another,” as it had been claimed, but instead “it was rather the product of a number of different factors, the most important of which was the desire to establish Turkey as the preeminent arbiter of power in its region: not a country which attached itself to

Özdamar, “Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Future of US-Iran Relations,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009, pp. 121-133; Clifton W. Sherrill, “Why Iran Wants the Bomb and What It Means for US Policy,” *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, pp. 31-49.

⁶⁸⁰ Tolga Demiryol, “The Limits to Cooperation between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations since 2002,” p. 134. Also see, Ian Lesser, “Turkey, Iran, and Nuclear Risks,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2004, pp. 81-100.

⁶⁸¹ Kadir Üstün, “Turkey’s Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2010, pp. 19-26, p. 26.

⁶⁸² There were countless statements of Turkish foreign policy makers in this regard between 2003 and 2014. For one example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remarked in February 2012: “If nuclear energy is used for humanitarian purposes, we accept it. But no one can accept nuclear weapons. Turkey has launched diplomatic initiatives to this end. We hope that Iran would use nuclear energy for humanitarian purpose.” “Israeli Strike on Iran would be Disaster, Says Erdoğan,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 22 February 2010.

others but a center to which others would gravitate.”⁶⁸³ Concurring with this assertion, others argued that Turkey’s diplomatic involvement in the nuclear dispute was “yet another attempt to actualize ‘strategic autonomy’ through the augmentation of its problem-solving capacity and the demonstration of its problem-solving ability,” which was “an indication of great-power status” in the foreign policy understanding of Turkish policy makers.⁶⁸⁴

In addition, for some others, Turkey’s involvement was “related to the desecuritization of identity issues and the breaking up of the threat-security chain at home [Turkey] in two visible ways,” the first being that “Turkey no longer consider[ed] Iran to be an external ‘other’ and a source of domestic problems at home,” and accordingly, “the diminishing Iranian threat at the policy level pave[d] the way for Turkey to get involved in developing relations with Iran and attempting to use this warmer attitude toward Iran as leverage to influence Iranian policymakers on the nuclear issue.”⁶⁸⁵ Finally, it was also contended that “at the root of Ankara’s policy on the nuclear issue lie[d] a growing appetite for new markets and the need to secure new energy resources.”⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸³ Gareth H. Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations with Iran* (Washington: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2012), p. 5.

⁶⁸⁴ Aylin G. Gürzel and Eyüp Ersoy, “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, pp. 37-50, p. 43.

⁶⁸⁵ Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran,” p. 508.

⁶⁸⁶ Karabekir Akkoyunlu, “Turkey’s Iran Conundrum: A Delicate Balancing Act,” p. 265. For a recent study on Turkey’s policy towards Iranian nuclear program, see, Moritz Pieper, “Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Iranian Nuclear Programme: In Search of a New Middle East Order after the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War,” *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013, pp. 81-92. For a regional overview, see, Thomas Lorenz and Joanna Kid, “Turkey and Multilateral Nuclear Approaches in the Middle East,” *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010, pp. 513-530.

As mentioned above, Turkey's rapprochement with Iran arguably reached its apogee with the announcement of a nuclear swap deal on 17 May 2010 in Tehran negotiated and signed by the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Brazil, also called the Tehran Declaration. However, the deal was swiftly rejected by the US, which was "in the midst of a nearly completed push to build consensus in the United Nations (UN) Security Council for a new set of sanctions."⁶⁸⁷ Profoundly frustrated with the unforeseen dismissal of the nuclear deal by the US, Turkey, with Brazil, voted against the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on 9 June 2010, both being non-permanent members of the Security Council at the time.⁶⁸⁸ The rationale behind Turkey's vote, according to an observer, "was to send a message to Iran that channels of negotiation were still open."⁶⁸⁹ In fact, the channels of negotiation were kept open, and Turkey's policy of active diplomatic engagement was to be vindicated by the developments over Iranian nuclear program in 2015.⁶⁹⁰

In reference to competition at the international-level, the deployment of an early warning radar station in eastern Turkish province of Malatya as part of a NATO missile defense system, which became operational in early 2012, embittered Iran's approach to the security relations with Turkey. It was quite exhaustively argued that "Iran regarded deployment of the radars on Turkish soil as a considerable source of threat to its security for a number of reasons. First, Malatya, where the radar would be deployed, [was] 1200 km away from Tehran, which would help NATO to easily

⁶⁸⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, p. 28.

⁶⁸⁸ For the full text of the Resolution 1929, see, "Resolution 1929 (2010)," *United Nations Security Council*, 9 June 2010, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1929\(2010\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1929(2010)).

⁶⁸⁹ Kadir Üstün, "Turkey's Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions," p. 22.

⁶⁹⁰ On 14 June 2015, Iran and P5+1 reached a historic agreement on Iran's nuclear program in Vienna, Austria. For the full text of agreement entitled Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, see, "Full text of the Iran Nuclear Deal," *The Washington Post*, <http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/>.

monitor Iranian military movements.”⁶⁹¹ Second, the radar station in Turkey would help to “neutralize any missile attacks [from Iran],” was certain to “damage the capability of Iran to react to any attack; hence undermining its ‘capacity for deterrence’,” and thus would “encourage Israel’s decision to go ahead with military attacks on Iran.”⁶⁹² As a result, a string of austere criticisms, accusations, and warnings was expressed against Turkey by Iranian civilian and military policy makers both before and after the deployment. The principal accusation was that Turkey was “acting as a U.S. ‘proxy’ in the region by hosting the radar.”⁶⁹³ Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in one instance for example, accused Turkey of acting as the spokesman of Iran’s enemies who deployed a missile shield in Turkey against Iran.⁶⁹⁴

5.2 Turkey’s Economy and Iran

Turkey’s economic relations with Iran between March 2003 and August 2014 showed a remarkable progress, and ultimately Turkey and Iran became indispensable economic partners for each other. In general, the intensification of Turkey’s economic interactions and transactions with Iran hinged on a structural complementarity. In the overall economic relations, thanks to its relatively higher level of industrialization, Turkey enjoyed the capability to provide manufactured goods Iran was in desperate need of. In response, thanks to its immense hydrocarbon reserves, Iran enjoyed the capability to provide energy resources Turkey was in

⁶⁹¹ Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” p. 153.

⁶⁹² Ibid.

⁶⁹³ F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, p. 26.

⁶⁹⁴ “Ahmedinejad’dan Türkiye’ye Füze Kalkanı Tepkisi,” *Hürriyet*, 9 September 2011.

desperate need of. In brief, Turkey's economic relations with Iran were a mutually vital and equally profitable exchange of industrial goods for energy.

Turkey's objective to cultivate with Iran "a dynamic and rational economic cooperation [which had been] overshadowed by ideological tensions"⁶⁹⁵ suffered from a number of setbacks though, which originated mostly in Iran's preference for protectionist measures in addition to the unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, and the UN.⁶⁹⁶ To address these sorts of impediments that curtailed the realization of the complete potential of its economic relations with Iran, Turkey exercised a variety of economic measures, and succeeded in its efforts in varying degrees. In the relevant time period, Turkey carried out its economic relations with Iran on the three areas of trade, investment, and energy.

5.2.1 Trade

As part of its regional economic policy, similar to the one in its relations with Syria, Turkey practiced an incrementalist approach in cultivating commercial relations with Iran, simultaneously pursuing three complementary objectives of building a credible legal framework, establishing durable organizational structures, and providing several kinds of business incentives for the private sectors of both Turkey and Iran.

As an initial measure to boost Turkey's commercial transactions with Iran, the agreement on the evasion of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion

⁶⁹⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 181.

⁶⁹⁶ On sanctions on Iran, see, Michael Jacobson, "Sanctions against Iran: A Promising Struggle," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2008, pp. 69-88; Ray Takeyh and Suzanne Maloney, "The Self-limiting Success of Iran Sanctions," *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 6, 2011, pp. 1297-1312; Dina Esfandiary and Mark Fitzpatrick, "Sanctions on Iran: Defining and Enabling 'Success'," *Survival*, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2011, pp. 143-156.

signed by Turkey and Iran in June 2002 in Tehran came into effect on 9 October 2003. The agreement, composed of 29 articles, covered issues pertinent to, for example, income from immovable property, business profits, capital gains, and independent and dependent personal services.⁶⁹⁷

In the subsequent period, Turkey signed a number of agreements with Iran on trade. As an example, “in March 2009, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding to improve land, sea and air transportation in order to increase the trade volume to \$20 billion.”⁶⁹⁸ ‘The Preferential Trade Agreement’ became the most significant trade agreement between Turkey and Iran. Signed on 29 January 2014 in Tehran, it addressed an array of commercial matters including exchange of concessions, most favored nation treatment, antidumping and countervailing measures, safeguard measures, exceptions, and dispute settlements.⁶⁹⁹ With this agreement, as was stressed in its preamble, it was the expectation of the parties that “progressive reductions and eliminations of the obstacles to trade” would assist in the further expansion of commercial transactions between Turkey and Iran.⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁷ For the full text of the agreement in Turkish, English, and Persian, see, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmî Gazete*, No. 25254, 9 October 2003,

<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/10/20031009.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/10/20031009.htm>.

⁶⁹⁸ Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, “Uneasy Neighbors: Turkish-Iranian Relations since the 1979 Revolution,” p. 113.

⁶⁹⁹ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Arasındaki Tercihli Ticaret Anlaşması.”

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid. Expansion of commercial transactions with Iran constituted an imperative for Turkey with reference to regional economic development in its eastern provinces bordering Iran. To that end, for example, Turkey and Iran “modernized existing border gates, namely Gürbulak/Bazergan, Kapıköy/Razi and Esendere/Sero,” and were “projected to establish a new one at Dilucu/Maku.” See, Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” p. 142. As an example, the inauguration of Kapıköy/Razi border gate in April 2011 was attended by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Salehi. See, Ahmet Görçüm, “Yeni Sınır Kapısı Van’ı İran’a Bağlayacak,” *Zaman*, 17 April 2011. For the memorandum of understanding on the joint use of Kapıköy/Razi border gate, see, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmî Gazete*, No. 28175, 16 January 2012, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/01/20120116.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2012/01/20120116.htm>.

Furthermore, in the promotion of Turkey's commercial relations with Iran, the Turkish private sector assumed a prominent role after March 2003, complementing the activities of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) with business initiatives and ventures from the private sectors of both countries. Established in accordance with an economic agreement signed between Turkey and Iran in March 1982, the JEC continued to convene periodically in the relevant time period, and set the general agenda of Turkey's commercial relations with Iran addressing a broad range of issues. As an example, the 24th session of the JEC was held in Tehran on 15-16 April 2014, and headed by the Turkish Minister of Development Cevdet Yılmaz and the Iranian Minister of Communications and Information Technology Mahmoud Vaezi. The memorandum of understanding signed after the 24th session was an economic agreement in its own right, and covered a host of issues related to trade, energy, transportation, and energy.⁷⁰¹

Supplementary to the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), multiple meetings in the relevant time period were organized by Turkish business associations, primarily Turkish-Iranian Business Council established in 2001, serving as platforms for Turkish entrepreneurs and businessmen to foster commercial cooperation with their Iranian counterparts.⁷⁰² As an example, in the visit of the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to Turkey in June 2014, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges

⁷⁰¹ For the full text of the memorandum of understanding, see, "Milletlerarası Andlaşma," *Resmî Gazete*, No. 29202, 11 December 2014, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/12/20141211.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/12/20141211.htm>.

⁷⁰² For the activities of Turkish-Iranian Business Council, see, "Geçmiş Dönem Etkinlikleri," *Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu*, https://www.deik.org.tr/Konseyl/43/3/112/Geçmiş_Dönem_Etkinlikleri.html.

of Turkey (TOBB in Turkish acronym) organized yet another Turkish-Iranian business forum attended by the presidents of Turkey and Iran.⁷⁰³





Figure 11: Turkey’s Trade with Iran between 2003 and 2014 (in million \$)⁷⁰⁴



⁷⁰³ “Cumhurbaşkanı Gül ve İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Ruhani, Türk-İran İş Forumu’na Katıldı,” *Milliyet*, 10 June 2014.

⁷⁰⁴ Data is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Refer to, “Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri,” *TÜİK*, <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/menu.zul>.

Figure 12: Turkey's Exports to and Imports from Iran between 2003 and 2014
(in million \$)⁷⁰⁵

Between 2003 and 2014, Turkey's trade volume with Iran increased 473%. As mentioned before, one reason behind this notable increase was the complementary trade structures of Turkey and Iran. Turkish exports to Iran mainly consisted of "gold, especially for the last two years, steel, textiles, and industrial goods, while Iranian exports to Turkey mainly include[d] natural gas, oil, coal, electricity, pistachios, and fertilizers."⁷⁰⁶ Another reason was the "exploitation of the idle capacity, namely normalization of the relations, rather than the application of a new and innovative neighborhood strategy."⁷⁰⁷ Turkey's trade with Iran reached its peak in 2012. One prevailing dimension of Turkey's commercial relations with Iran continued to become a chronic trade deficit, which reached its highest level in 2011.

Turkey became increasingly frustrated with the abiding deficit in its trade with Iran, which reached nearly \$ 6 billion in 2014. In several instances, Turkish policymakers made complaints about the chronic trade deficit in their meetings with Iranian officials.⁷⁰⁸ Another setback for Turkey curtailing the advancement of commercial relations with Iran were the high customs duties applied as protectionist measures by Iran. Turkish policymakers frequently appealed for trade liberalization in the commercial relations between the two countries. In one example, speaking at the

⁷⁰⁵ Data is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Refer to, "Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri," TÜİK, <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/menu.zul>.

⁷⁰⁶ Serhan Ünal and Eyüp Ersoy, "Political Economy of Turkish-Iranian Relations: Three Asymmetries," *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2014, pp. 141-164, p. 148

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁷⁰⁸ See, for example, "Tüzmen: İran'la Ekonomik Ortak Alan Oluşturmak İstiyoruz," *Zaman*, 27 January 2009.

Turkish-Iranian Business Forum held in Tehran during his visit to Iran in October 2009, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated: “Let’s open [bilateral trade] to competition. This would bring forth both quality and race. Race in trade is competition. Monopolistic logic does not exist in trade any more...Customs duties are very high. We should also rectify these [issues].”⁷⁰⁹ With the signing of the Preferential Trade Agreement in January 2014, though, Turkey and Iran finally agreed to reduce customs duties reciprocally and in an incremental manner.⁷¹⁰

5.2.2 Investment

Turkey’s endeavors to improve mutual investments in its economic relations with Iran between 2003 and 2014 were challenged in the initial years of the period with the discouraging cancellations of two sizeable business contracts of Turkish companies by Iranian authorities. In the first case, “in May 2003, the majority Turkish-owned Tepe-Akfen-Vie (TAV) consortium was awarded an eleven-year contract to operate Terminal One of Tehran’s new Imam Khomeini International Airport and to build a second terminal there for approximately \$193 million.”⁷¹¹ However, just two days before the scheduled inauguration of the operation of the terminal, “on May 7, 2004, the Iranian authorities ordered TAV to withdraw all of its personnel from the airport,” and one day later “the airport was taken over by Iran’s hard-line Revolutionary Guards. The contract with TAV, which claimed to have

⁷⁰⁹ “İran’la Ticaret TL ve Riyal İle Yapılacak,” *Zaman*, 28 October 2009. Also see, Yusuf Türkoğlu, “2011 Yılı Hedef Ülke İran: Pazar Fırsatları, Potansiyel İşbirliği Alanları,” *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 2, No. 24, 2010, pp. 72-77.

⁷¹⁰ Another commercial dispute periodically disturbed Turkey’s trade with Iran concerned the transit fees Iran levied on Turkish trucks. The dispute reached a climax in October 2014, and subsequently settled with Iranian compromises. See, for example, “Row over Truck Transit Fee Grows between Iran, Turkey,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 13 October 2014.

⁷¹¹ Gareth H. Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations with Iran*, pp. 61-62.

already spent \$15 million on the project, was cancelled and the airport eventually opened under Iranian ownership.”⁷¹²

In the second case, in February 2004, a consortium of companies led by Turkcell, a Turkish mobile phone service provider, successfully bid for a cell phone license contract which was “Iran’s largest foreign investment since the Islamic Revolution, and was to be worth more than US\$3 billion over fifteen years, with the option to renew every five years, giving it a 70 per cent stake.”⁷¹³ Acquisition of Irancell by Turkcell fell prey to the internal power struggles in Iran, and “in April 2005, conservatives in the Iranian parliament exploited the resistance to foreign ownership of Irancell to embarrass [the moderate Iranian President] Khatami by passing a law which limited Turkcell’s share in the consortium to 49 percent.”⁷¹⁴ Upon Turkcell’s refusal to accept the reduced share, “in October 2005, a 49 percent share in Irancell was sold to MTN of South Africa, leaving Turkcell with significant losses.”⁷¹⁵

Despite these initial setbacks, and in part as a legal measure directly addressing these types of issues, Turkey finally ratified the Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments after a very long delay, which was signed in Ankara in December 1996. Composed of 13 articles, the Agreement was issued in the Official Gazette on 25 February 2005.⁷¹⁶ The subsequent period witnessed a small number of

⁷¹² Ibid., p. 62.

⁷¹³ Süleyman Elik, *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualizing the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in the Middle-Power States*, p. 168.

⁷¹⁴ Gareth H. Jenkins, *Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations with Iran*, p. 62.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ For the full text of the Agreement, see, “Milletlerarası Andlaşma,” *Resmi Gazete*, No. 25738, 25 February 2005,

noteworthy Turkish investments in the Iranian market. As an example, in 2008, a consortium led by the Turkish company Gübretaş bought Razi Petrochemicals, the largest fertilizer factory in Iran.⁷¹⁷ In another example, in July 2011, Turkey and Iran, with the participation of Iraq, agreed “to establish a joint investment bank to facilitate trade and investment among them. The initial capital [was] \$200 million, and the main office of this bank [would] be in Tehran.”⁷¹⁸




Figure 13: Turkish FDI in Iran, 2007-2014 (million \$)⁷¹⁹

<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2005/02/20050225.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2005/02/20050225.htm>.

⁷¹⁷ “‘Kargadan Korkan Darı Ekmez’ Diyen Gübretaş İran’dan Fabrika Satın Aldı,” *Radikal*, 28 February 2008.

⁷¹⁸ Nader Habibi, “Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions,” *Middle East Brief*, No. 62, May 2012, p. 5,

<http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB62.pdf>.

⁷¹⁹ Data provided by the Central Bank of Turkey. See, *Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası*, <http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr>.




Figure 14: Iranian FDI in Turkey, 2007-2014 (million \$)⁷²⁰

In the period between 2007 and 2014, Turkish foreign direct investment in Iran amounted to \$150 million in total, \$128 million of which was recorded in 2008. Due to the stringent economic sanctions Iran was subjected to by the US, the EU, and the UN, and the previous daunting experiences of Turkish private sector in the Iranian market, Turkish foreign direct investment in Iran showed a lethargic progress, and in 2013 and 2014 there was no Turkish foreign direct investment in Iran. Iranian foreign direct investment in Turkey, on the other hand, amounted to \$89 million in total, and after showing some promising development came to an abrupt end after 2010.

5.2.3 Energy

⁷²⁰ Data provided by the Central Bank of Turkey. See, *Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası*, <http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr>.

It was argued that in Turkey's relations with Iran, energy was "an inherently zero-sum game and [could] not provide the foundation of stable and lasting cooperation between Turkey and Iran."⁷²¹ The reality could not be more different. In the relevant time period, energy constituted the fundamental axis of Turkey's cooperative relations with Iran, providing as major constraint on the competitive aspect of the bilateral relations. From Turkey's point of view, first, promoting energy relations with Iran was an imperative in attaining energy supply security. With its continuously growing need for uninterrupted access to energy intensively utilized in industrial production, electricity generation, household heating, and transportation, Turkey required stable and sustainable energy cooperation with Iran, one of the richest countries in the world in terms of indigenous energy resources. Accordingly, "as a growing economy and surrounded by energy resources, Turkey need[ed] Iranian energy as a natural extension of its national interests."⁷²²

Second, Iran was an essential partner for Turkey to diversify its energy sources and to reduce its energy dependency, primarily on Russia. In achieving a balanced distribution of external energy sources, especially on oil and natural gas, in Turkey's energy structure, Turkey opted to establish and attempted to develop close cooperation in energy with Iran to the extent possible. Third, in addition to securing its own energy interests, Turkey was in pursuit of becoming a major energy hub in regional energy geopolitics, providing services to both the exporters and importers of

⁷²¹ Tolga Demiryol, "The Limits to Cooperation between Rivals: Turkish-Iranian Relations since 2002," p. 115.

⁷²² Serdar Poyraz, "Turkish Iranian Relations: A Wider Perspective," *SETA Policy Brief*, No. 37, 2009, p. 10.

energy resources.⁷²³ For example, Turkey launched the Nabucco Project in 2002 for the transportation of natural gas to Europe, and initiated the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) in 2011 for the same objective.⁷²⁴ Therefore, maintaining lasting energy cooperation with Iran, and integrating it to Turkey's regional energy projects once the sanctions were removed became a potentially profitable option in Turkey's energy geopolitics. Nonetheless, Turkey's energy relations with Iran were chronically characterized by two concentric asymmetries. While energy held a predominant position in bilateral economic relations, natural gas sustained its unchallenged primacy in bilateral energy relations.⁷²⁵

With respect to oil, Iran was a primary source of import for Turkey, and oil was transported to Turkish ports by tanker ships due to the absence of oil pipelines between Turkey and Iran. Apart from the international sanctions Iran was subjected to, Turkey's energy relations with Iran on oil trade continued smoothly in the relevant time period.

⁷²³ On Turkey's energy geopolitics, see, Ali Tekin and Iva Walterova, "Turkey's Geopolitical Role: The Energy Angle," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 84-94; Carol R. Saivetz, "Tangled Pipelines: Turkey's Role in Energy Export Plans," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009, pp. 95-108; Bezen Balamir Coşkun and Richard Carlson, "New Energy Geopolitics: Why Does Turkey Matter?" *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2010, pp. 205-220.

⁷²⁴ The Nabucco Project was to be aborted for several reasons. On the Nabucco Project, see, among others, Pavel K. Baev and Indra Overland, "The South Stream versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitical and Economic (Ir)Rationales and Political Stakes in Mega-projects," *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 5, 2010, pp. 1075-1090; Şaban Kardaş, "Geo-strategic Position as Leverage in EU Accession: The Case of Turkish-EU Negotiations on the Nabucco Pipeline," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, pp. 35-52.

⁷²⁵ See, Serhan Ünal and Eyüp Ersoy, "Political Economy of Turkish-Iranian Relations: Three Asymmetries." Also see, Eyüp Ersoy and Serhan Ünal, "Turkish-Iranian Relations: Addressing the Asymmetries," *Daily Sabah*, 1 September 2014.




Figure 15: Turkey's Crude Oil Imports from Iran between 2005 and 2014

(thousand tons)⁷²⁶

Turkey's oil imports from Iran between 2005 and 2014 exhibited some fluctuations both in absolute and relative terms. Turkey's oil import from Iran in 2005 was nearly 7 million tons constituting 29,4% of Turkey's total oil imports. It reached its lowest point in 2009 with 3 million tons constituting 22,7% of Turkey's total oil imports while it reached its highest point in 2011 with more than 9 million tons constituting 51,3% of Turkey's total oil imports. In 2014, it was around 5 million tons constituting 29,7% of Turkey's total oil imports. In brief, Turkey's crude oil imports from Iran in the relevant time period constituted 30 to 50 percent of its total oil imports.

With respect to natural gas, Turkey's energy relations with Iran started in 1996 with the signing of an agreement for the import of natural gas from Iran through a pipeline

⁷²⁶ Data provided by Turkey's Energy Market Regulatory Authority (in Turkish acronym EPDK) in its annual Petroleum Market Sector Reports from 2005 to 2014. See, "Petrol Piyasası Yıllık Yayınlar ve Raporlar," EPDK, <http://www.epdk.gov.tr/index.php/petrol-piyasas/yayinlar-raporlar?id=860>.

to be constructed between Erzurum and Tabriz, which was to become operational in December 2001.⁷²⁷ Subsequently, Turkey's natural gas imports from Iran increased rapidly due to Turkey's economic and strategic necessities. First, the share of natural gas in Turkey's electricity generation was substantial, and natural gas was a primary commodity utilized in industrial production and household consumption.⁷²⁸ Second, Turkey's strategic vulnerability in its relations with Russia in terms of natural gas supply "forced it to seek for new gas suppliers, and since it was the closest supplier with the easiest transport route, Iran was the answer. Only by increasing the Iranian share, it [was] possible for Turkey to alleviate its vulnerability to Russia at least to a certain degree."⁷²⁹

In addition to natural gas imports, Turkey showed interest in investing in the Iranian gas sector. For example, Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding in July 2007 with Iran, which "called for the Turkish State Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to develop Iran's South Pars gas field. When this pipeline failed to get international financing, TPAO announced in October 2007 that it would fund the 3.5 billion dollar project from its own resources."⁷³⁰ However, Turkey's attempts in this regard could not yield any results on account of several reasons, mainly US objections. Another setback constantly plaguing Turkey's relations with Iran on natural gas was the high

⁷²⁷ İbrahim Mazlum, "Twenty First Century Energy Security Debates: Opportunities and Constraints for Turkey," in Nursin Atesoglu Guney, ed., *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 137-150, p. 140.

⁷²⁸ Serhan Ünal and Eyüp Ersoy, "Political Economy of Turkish-Iranian Relations: Three Asymmetries," pp. 152-153.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁷³⁰ Daphne McCurdy, "Turkish-Iranian Relations: When Opposites Attract," p. 90. In November 2008, Turkey concluded a similar memorandum of understanding with Iran "regarding the export of Iranian gas to Europe and the joint exploitation of Iran's gas reserves. The agreement called for Turkey to invest \$5.5 billion in the South Pars field in Iran to produce 20–35 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Ankara was to receive operation rights from three off-shore gas fields in South Pars. However, the United States strongly objected to the deal, and under U.S. pressure, Turkey shelved the agreement." F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, p. 31.

price Turkey was obliged to pay to Iran for imported natural gas according to the contracts that were in effect. In order to rectify the problem, Turkey took the issue to international arbitration in 2004 and 2012.⁷³¹




Figure 16: Turkey’s Natural Gas Imports from Iran between 2005 and 2014

(million Sm³)⁷³²

Between 2005 and 2014, Turkey’s natural gas imports from Iran more than doubled, and reached its highest point with nearly 9 billion m³ in 2014. In relative terms, on the other hand, the lowest volume of import from Iran was in 2008 with 11,0% of Turkey’s total natural gas imports while the highest volume of import from Iran was

⁷³¹ Melis Kobal, “İran’la ‘Pahalı Gaz’ Davası Başlıyor,” *Aljazeera Türk*, 17 February 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/iranla-pahali-gaz-davasi-basliyor>. Turkey won the first case and received a 16,5 % discount on the price of Iranian natural gas. Ibid.

⁷³² Data provided by Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority (in Turkish acronym EPDK) in its annual Natural Gas Market Sector Reports from 2005 to 2014. See, “Doğal Gaz Piyasası Yıllık Yayınlar Raporları,” *EPDK*, <http://www.epdk.gov.tr/index.php/dogalgaz-piyasasi/yayinlar-raporlar/12-icerik/dogalgaz-icerik/52-dogal-gaz-piyasasi-yayinlari-uid-102>.

in 2010 with 20,4% of Turkey's total natural gas imports. The ratio was 18,1% in 2014.⁷³³

With respect to electricity, there were two operational interconnection lines between Turkey and Iran; one had “400 kV and lying between Başköy in Turkey and Khoy in Iran and the other ha[d] 154 kV capacity and lying between Doğubeyazıt in Turkey and Bazargan.”⁷³⁴ According to official reports, Turkey did not export electricity to Iran through these lines between 2003 and 2010.⁷³⁵ On the other hand, Turkey's electricity imports from Iran between 2003 and 2010 constituted 11% of its total electricity imports.⁷³⁶ In 2011, Turkey's electricity imports from Iran “increased 50 times in an eight years' time [since 2003] and reached 1074.5 GWh.”⁷³⁷

5.3 Turkey's Identity and Iran

Identity, to reiterate, gained palpable salience both in the discourse and practice of Turkish foreign policy in the period between March 2003 and August 2014.⁷³⁸ In the foreign policy discourse of Turkish policymakers, identity was recurrently invoked as a credible and authoritative referent to substantiate empirical statements or to advance normative postulates. For example, in Ahmet Davutoğlu's classification,

⁷³³ For the relevant percentages, refer to the aforementioned annual Natural Gas Market Sector Reports of Turkey's Energy Market Regulatory Authority. See, “Doğal Gaz Piyasası Yıllık Yayınlar Raporlar,” EPDK, <http://www.epdk.gov.tr/index.php/dogalgaz-piyasasi/yayinlar-raporlar/12-icerik/dogalgaz-icerik/52-dogal-gaz-piyasasi-yayinlari-uid-102>.

⁷³⁴ Serhan Ünal and Eyüp Ersoy, “Political Economy of Turkish-Iranian Relations: Three Asymmetries,” p. 158.

⁷³⁵ “2010 Elektrik Piyasası Raporu,” EPDK, http://www.epdk.gov.tr/documents/elektrik/rapor_yayin/ElektrikPiyasasiRaporu2010.pdf, p. 85.

⁷³⁶ Ibid., p. 84

⁷³⁷ Serhan Ünal and Eyüp Ersoy, “Political Economy of Turkish-Iranian Relations: Three Asymmetries,” p. 158.

⁷³⁸ For an account of Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of identity between 2003 and 2011, see, Hasan Kösebalaban, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 145-186.

there were two types of identity in global geopolitics; political strategic identity and real historical identity.⁷³⁹ In terms of a state's identity in global politics, Davutoğlu contends, insofar as these two types of identity “complement[ed] each other, a potent and more harmonious political picture [would] emerge. If these start[ed] to clash, an identity crisis [was] endured.”⁷⁴⁰ Reassessment of Turkey's identity in international relations was in part responsible for the “dawn of a new geo-political imagination” in Turkish foreign policy.⁷⁴¹

With the advent of a conservative government in Turkey, it would have been expected that religious affinity would act as a catalyst for the demise, or at least suspension, of reciprocal otherization proved to be inimical to bilateral relations in the preceding period. Nonetheless, absence of otherization did not mean presence of identification. Despite the habitual statements of policymakers on both sides, identity did not lead to identification in Turkey's relations with Iran.⁷⁴² This aspect of Turkey's relations with Iran was not lost on some astute observers. As an example, two commentators indicated that “the growing ties between Turkey and Iran under the AKP were primarily motivated by common concerns about the Kurdish issue and shared economic interests, rather than religious and ideological affinity,” that is, by security and economy, rather than identity.⁷⁴³

⁷³⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2011), p. 229.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ İbrahim Kalın, “Debating Turkey in the Middle East: The Dawn of a New Geo-Political Imagination,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, pp. 83-96.

⁷⁴² As an example, in a meeting with the visiting Turkish Minister of Development Cevdet Yılmaz, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated in May 2012 that the relations between the two states were “based on belief and brotherhood beyond political, economic, and cultural areas.” “Hiçbir Faktör İran-Türkiye İlişkilerini Bozamaz!” *Fars Haber Ajansı*, 23 May 2012, <http://turkish.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=9102113089>. Examples can be multiplied.

⁷⁴³ F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East*, p. 2.

Although Turkey's multiple and shifting self-conceptions, self-representations, and self-identifications conditioned and shaped Turkey's relations with Iran, they did not propel Turkey's relations with Iran. In other words, in Turkey's relations with Iran, identity constituted a factor but not a motive. On account of the peculiar nature and dynamics of identity relations between Turkey and Iran, Turkey's person identity, role identity, and social identity were not to be verified in and through Turkey's relations with Iran. Furthermore, whenever Turkey attempted to verify the three identities in and through its foreign policy in the Middle East, Turkey's relations with Iran became strained.

5.3.1 Person Identity

Turkey's person identity, to reiterate, was the set of idiosyncratic attributes that defined and characterized Turkey as a unique agent in international relations for the policy makers in the relevant time period, and the successful verification of which was expected to increase Turkey's self-authenticity, arguably constituted by the fact that Turkey was the successor to the Ottoman Empire, carrying moral responsibility especially towards the oppressed. As an example, according to Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ottoman history stood "necessarily at the center of [Turkey's] socio-cultural map. Concerning politics, Turkey [had] to meet the Ottoman history at some point."⁷⁴⁴ In contrast to Turkey's relations with the states of the Middle East once under the authority of the Ottoman Empire, meeting Ottoman history in Turkey's relations with

⁷⁴⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, p. 229.

Iran, that is, verification of its person identity in and through its relations with Iran, held ominous pitfalls for the cordial progress of bilateral relations.

Invoking Turkey's heirship to the Ottoman Empire would certainly evoke the historical rivalry, and worse, animosity between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire, which ruled the territories of today's Iran, and converted the populations under its rule to Shiism at times quite brutally.⁷⁴⁵ Strangely enough, even though the competition and ensuing conflicts continued to unfold between the Ottoman Empire and the dynasties that superseded the Safavid dynasty after its demise in 1736, the historical framework of reference in Turkey's relations with Iran remained to be the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry.⁷⁴⁶ In the scholarly works of Ahmet Davutoğlu, there were numerous references to the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry. To Davutoğlu, for instance, the preferences of the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire for different religious sects "engendered a lasting balance of competition [between them] at which geopolitical rivalry and religious rivalry intersected."⁷⁴⁷

Turkish foreign policy makers, to repeat, categorically rejected and renounced neo-Ottomanism as a valid signification of their foreign policy thinking and making due to the imperialistic and expansionist connotations of the concept. Nevertheless,

⁷⁴⁵ See, Rula Jurdi Abisaab, *Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).

⁷⁴⁶ As an example, the last main war between the Ottoman Empire and Persia under the Qajar dynasty took place in 1821-1823, and ended with the Treaty of Erzurum in 1823. See, for example, Graham Williamson, "The Turko-Persian War 1821-1823: Winning the War but Losing the Peace," in Roxane Farmanfarmanian, ed., *War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present* (Routledge: Oxon, 2008), pp. 88-109.

⁷⁴⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 429. Davutoğlu even equated the two empires with Turkey and Iran in one of his analogies: "Viewed from the perspective of all these historical and geographical factors, Ottoman/Turkey-Safavid/Iran relationship resembles Germany-France relationship." Ibid.

Iranian scholars, commentators, and media outlets embraced the designation, frequently referring to گرای نو عثمانی / neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy.⁷⁴⁸ For one Iranian scholar, the AKP was “returning Turkey to its original historical identity,” and therefore “trying to reach a national consensus in this regard,” which reminded “us of the Turkey that was the heir to a multinational empire covering the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and parts of the Central Europe.”⁷⁴⁹ In his view, “the Neo-Ottomanism could be briefly defined as follows: A revival of the influence and power of the Ottoman Empire with new standards that...created a certain new model of Islamism in Erdogan’s government.”⁷⁵⁰ However, contrary to the “West-evading Islamism” of Iran, which, to the Iranian scholar, “more than any other country in the world, [was] seeking to negate imperial hegemony structures within the international domain, trying to change these structures,” Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanism-cum-Islamism was “West-oriented.”⁷⁵¹

The conception of Turkey as a normative agent carrying moral responsibility in its dealings with the states and the peoples in its ‘geography of heart’ was a conditioning factor in Turkey’s discursive and practical responses to the developments in its vicinity, especially after the onset of the Arab Spring.⁷⁵²

⁷⁴⁸ See, for one example, Muhammad Ali Heydari and Hamid Rahnavard, “Nev Osmani Gerayi ve Seyaset-e Harici-ye Havermeyane-ye Torkiye [Neo-Ottomanism and Turkey’s Middle Eastern Foreign Policy],” *Faslname Rehname Seyasetgozari [Quarterly of Doctrine of Policy Making]*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1390 [2011], pp. 135-160. Transliteration and translation are mine. The article can be reached here: http://www.rahnaameh.ir/article_204_41.html.

⁷⁴⁹ Ali Omid, “A Comparative Analysis of the Turkish and Iranian Foreign Policy towards the Arab Revolutions,” p. 32.

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31, p. 33. In other words, for the scholar, while Iranian Islamism was defiant of the international status quo and revisionist, Turkish Islamism/Neo-Ottomanism had embraced it.

⁷⁵² The ‘geography of heart’ (*gönül coğrafyası* in Turkish) was a spatial designation employed by Turkish policymakers to characterize the physical and human geography considered to have special meaning and value for Turkey. Historical, linguistics, and religious affinities seemed to determine the boundaries of the ‘geography of heart.’ As examples, for Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speech at a meeting of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, see, “Yurtdışındaki Tarihi ve Dini Mirasın Korunmasında

Accordingly, as an unprecedented response to the brutal repression of the Syrian government of the civil uprising in the initial phase of the civil war, and the grave human rights violations it incessantly perpetrated against the Syrian population in its fight against the Syrian opposition afterwards, Turkey took an express stance against the Syrian government based on normative principles and moral responsibility making every effort to ensure its fall from power.

Since Iran was making every effort to thwart the fall of the Syrian government from power, Turkish foreign policymakers became increasingly agitated by the unfaltering assistance of Iran to the morally untenable policies of a depraved government to the point of openly questioning the Islamic credentials of Iran and Iranian policymakers. As an example, Turkish Vice Prime Minister Bülent Arınç acrimoniously remarked in February 2012 that unless Iranian policymakers forthrightly confronted the Syrian government over its murdering of more than 250 civilians on an Islamic holy night, they had to take Islam out of the name of Iran.⁷⁵³

5.3.2 Role Identity

Turkey's role identity, to reiterate, as the internalized meanings of roles that Turkey applied to itself, which were the sets of expectations tied to Turkey's social position that guided its foreign policy attitudes and behavior in the Middle East, became an

Diyaret İşleri Başkanlığına Çok Büyük Vazifeler Düşüyor," *Diyaret İşleri Başkanlığı*, 21 March 2012, <http://www.diyaret.gov.tr/tr/icerik/yurt-disindaki-tarihi-ve-dini-mirasin-korunmasinda-diyaret-isleri-baskanligina-cok-buyuk-vazifeler-dusuyor/7447>. For Ahmet Davutoğlu's speech at a meeting of Yunus Emre Institute, see, "Türk Milleti Geniş Bir Coğrafyada Etkileşim Halinde," *IHA*, 19 February 2013, <http://www.ih.com.tr/haber-turk-milleti-genis-bir-cografyada-etkilesim-halinde-264234/>.

⁷⁵³ "Arınç'tan İran'a: İsminizdeki 'İslam' Kelimesinin Anlamı Kalmaz," *Radikal*, 5 February 2012, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/arinctan_irana_isminizdeki_islam_kelimesinin_anlami_kalmaz-1077794.

abiding subject of scholarly debates and political controversies on the ‘Turkish model,’ especially with the inception of the Arab Spring. The Turkish model, and its contrast to the Iranian model, was debated with reference to Turkey’s relations with Iran as well.⁷⁵⁴ According to one Turkish scholar, one of the “structural differences” that precluded the progress of bilateral relations was the dissimilar nature of their political regimes, as Turkey and Iran “represent[ed] two different ‘models’ in the region.”⁷⁵⁵ To that scholar, for example, “even though Iran...moderated its revolutionary ambitions, the Islamic revolutionary ideology continue[d] to dominate its politics, both internally and externally.”⁷⁵⁶

Iranian scholars, on the other hand, were prone to frame the debate more on competitive terms. For one Iranian scholar, during the Arab Spring, “propagating the Turkish Islam, Turkey [sought] to either reject or emphasize the unfeasibility of the system proposed by the Islamic Revolution, offering its Anatolian model of Islam as the first priority of the Middle East Muslims.”⁷⁵⁷ Another Iranian scholar specified some drawbacks of the Turkish model, including its Neo-Ottomanist historical background, that is, “the long term colonialist desires and greed of Turkey,” the language barrier, “the lack of ethnic tolerance,” and “the lack of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in Turkey.”⁷⁵⁸

⁷⁵⁴ For one example, see, Hani Nesire, “Türkiye mi İran mı?: Mısır ve Suriye’de İslami Rejim İçin ‘Beklenen Modeller,” in Akif Kireççi, ed., *Arap Baharı ve Türkiye Modeli Tartışmaları* (Ankara: ASEM Yayınları, 2014), pp. 111-120.

⁷⁵⁵ Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” p. 148.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁷ Nabiollah Ebrahimi, “Iran, Turkey and the Arab Revolutions,” *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2012, pp. 65-87, p. 67.

⁷⁵⁸ Seyed Javed Salehi, “The Applicability of the Turkish Model in the Arab World,” *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 53-74, p. 72.

The mediator and the peace/order builder were arguably the most prominent roles in Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, which had some effect on the trajectory of Turkey's relations with Iran as well. In terms of Turkey's cooperative relations with Iran, the pinnacle of Turkey's mediation was the conclusion of the Tehran Declaration on 17 May 2010 signed by Turkey, Iran, and Brazil, which, in their view, would "create a positive, constructive, non-confrontational atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation."⁷⁵⁹ In the Tehran Declaration, Iran "appreciated the constructive efforts of the friendly countries Turkey and Brazil in creating the conducive environment for realization of Iran's nuclear rights."⁷⁶⁰ As stated above, profoundly frustrated with the unforeseen dismissal of the nuclear deal by the US, Turkey, with Brazil, voted against the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on 9 June 2010, both being non-permanent members of the Security Council at the time.⁷⁶¹

Turkey's peace/order builder role, on the other hand, came to be challenged by Iran, especially after the divergence observed in their foreign policies towards the Middle East with the outbreak of popular uprisings. In terms of Turkey's competitive relations with Iran, Turkey's preference for a new regional order predicated on popular will, especially in Syria, was to be denounced and defied by Iran pursuing another set of strategic objectives in the region. Turkey's encounter of uncompromising Iranian opposition to its efforts for the establishment of regional

⁷⁵⁹ Julian Borger, "Text of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey Deal," *The Guardian*, 17 May 2010.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid. For Turkey's mediation efforts in the period before the Tehran Declaration, see, Rahman G. Bonab, "Turkey's Emerging Role as a Mediator on Iran's Nuclear Activities," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp. 161-175.

⁷⁶¹ One day later, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan related Turkey's negative vote to its identity: "If we had not said 'no', we would have denied ourselves, denied our signatures; this would have been a dishonorable act. We would not have accepted this lack of self-respect." "‘Hayır’ Demesek Kendimizi İnkâr Ederdik," *Zaman*, 10 June 2010.

peace and order in the Middle East in accordance with its strategic preferences was to engender much resentment among Turkish policymakers.

5.3.2 Social Identity

Turkey's social identity as its self-identification with other states in terms of shared social categories could not achieve successful verification, and accordingly the expected increase in Turkey's self-worth, in its relations with Iran. For Turkey, invoking the commonality of history, geography, religion, and culture/civilization was tenuous at best, and treacherous at worst, and attaining Iran's reciprocity in constructing, restoring, and reviving shared social categories proved only tantalizing. In Turkey's relations with Iran, Turkish foreign policymakers usually invoked history in their speeches and statements only to specify the absence of an armed conflict between the two states since the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin (the Treat of Zuhab) in May 1639, and the perpetuity of the border demarcation since then.⁷⁶² Both propositions are empirically erroneous, notwithstanding. Furthermore, the preference of Turkish foreign policymakers for an emphasis on negative peace indirectly attested to the difficulty of performing self-identification with Iran on the basis of history as a shared social category since in the historical representations of Turkish foreign policymakers, as mentioned above, the historical framework of reference in Turkey's relations with Iran was overwhelmingly the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶² According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, "that the Ottoman-Iran border formed by the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639 has reached until today unaltered is the result of the translation of a natural geopolitical line into [a] legal border." Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 21. However, the border was altered several times in the process.

⁷⁶³ For a recent study on Ottoman-Safavid relations, see, Özer Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2014).

Geography as the shared bond and the basis of spatial affinity between Turkey and Iran was equally untenable for Turkish foreign policymakers to predicate self-identification with Iran thereon. First of all, the place of Iran in the geographical representations of Turkish foreign policymakers seemed to be ambiguous. In an interview in December 2001, to accentuate Turkey's geopolitical peculiarity in comparison with neighboring states, Ahmet Davutoğlu contended that while Turkey was a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Black Sea, and Mediterranean country at the same time, Iran was only a Middle Eastern country.⁷⁶⁴ On the other hand, in his primary work on Turkish foreign policy, he designated Iran as a "Eurasian power," which had "an attribute overlooking basins with different continent-axes."⁷⁶⁵

In addition, also related to history, in the numerous selections of cities Turkish foreign policymakers compiled to characterize the geography they identified Turkey with, such as those mentioned in the 'balcony speeches' of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after successive election victories, cities located in Iran were absent. In one example, Ahmet Davutoğlu indicated the endurance of "Ottoman-Turkish traces in the cities like Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad considered the capitals of the Arabic geography."⁷⁶⁶ In all these urban compilations, Tabriz, for example, arguably the most Turkic city in the Middle East outside Turkey, was conspicuously absent. In brief, the history of Turkey's relations with Iran was not conducive for, or was inimical to, geographical self-identification with Iran either.

⁷⁶⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, p. 191.

⁷⁶⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 69, p. 191.

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

Religion, and the Muslim World as its representational embodiment, without any doubt, possessed a privileged position in the foundational worldviews and the cognitive schemas of Turkish foreign policymakers. Nonetheless, Turkey's relations with Iran in the relevant time period only served to reveal the illusion of religious fraternity between the two states. Especially after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, and the unmistakable diplomatic, economic and military assistance of Iran to the Syrian government under the discourse of 'the axis of resistance,' Turkish foreign policymakers came to assess and represent Iranian regional policy, specifically its forceful interference in the Syrian civil war, as being in flagrant contradiction with the Islamic norms and values ostensibly espoused by Iran. As an example, against the statements of the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei in support of Bashar al-Assad, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan bitterly questioned the Islamic authority of Ali Khamenei: "[Bashar al-Assad] is killing 250.000 people [in Syria, and] you [Iranian leadership] are still supporting them. You are still sending weapons, money to them. Can there be such a religious leader!"⁷⁶⁷ By the same token, in multiple speeches, Turkish foreign policymakers called attention to the perils of sectarianism and sectarian conflicts in the Middle East, tacitly insinuating the role of Iran in stirring sectarian tensions in the region.⁷⁶⁸

Civilization, as a shared category, was transiently emphasized in Turkey's relations with Iran during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was succeeded by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Between 2003 and 2005, "both countries supported

⁷⁶⁷ "Erdoğan: Böyle Bir Dini Lider Olabilir Mi?" *Akşam*, 13 October 2014. Also see, H. Akın Ünver, "How Turkey's Islamists Fell out of Love with Iran," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2012, pp. 103-109.

⁷⁶⁸ See, for example, Abdullah Gül, *Diplomasıde Erdemli Güç* (İstanbul: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yayınları, 2014), pp. 212-222, pp. 224-231.

the initiative of a ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’.”⁷⁶⁹ However, a notion of identification with Iran on the basis of a shared civilization was nearly absent in the oral and verbal discourses of Turkish foreign policymakers in the relevant time period. One possible reason would be the underlying rationale of adopting a civilizational perspective in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, as it seemed, endorsed the civilizational perspective more to promote its ideational standing in global politics, especially vis-à-vis the West, than to promote self-identification with Islamic states. Another reason would be the fact that in the competition to represent the Muslim World in civilizational geopolitics, Iran, with its civilizational heritage and splendor, constituted a potent challenger for Turkey.

5.4 Turkey’s Motives and Iran

Turkey’s influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran in the relevant time period were based on the motives of security and economy, but not on the motive of identity. Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran differed *within* each other in the relevant time period. The patterns of this differentiation could be briefly examined here drawing on the preceding within-case analysis of Turkey’s motives in its relations with Iran, leaving the explicit discussion of the causes of the differentiation to the last chapter. In the relevant time period, in Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran, the significance of sub-motive elements as subject matters of Turkey’s considerations exhibited variation *in degree* relative to each other. To put it differently, Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differed *within* each

⁷⁶⁹ Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” pp. 145-146.

other with respect to the degree of significance of each sub-motive element relative to each other.

The motive of security for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran differed within itself in the relevant time period. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran, in reference to the unit-level, the cordiality of bilateral relations was customarily conditioned upon the reciprocal abstention of both states in policies that could be misrepresented or misunderstood as unwarranted external interference in their domestic affairs. Turkey's preference for demonstrating a good deal of discretion regarding the internal security developments of Iran derived in part from this mutually sensitive understanding, and in part from the assessment that the erosion of the political stability and social order in Iran could instigate inimical dynamics that would diffuse into Turkey's own internal affairs.

In reference to the dyad-level, stressing the common challenge of transnational terrorism allegedly waging a vicious armed struggle in the name of the ethnic Kurdish minorities in both Turkey and Iran, and thus jeopardizing the social stability, economic development, and political legitimacy of both states, Turkey carried out an engaged approach to intensify partnership with Iran against this mutual security threat. Nevertheless, Iran moderated, if not completely discontinued, its counterterrorism operations after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, towards which Turkey committed itself to policies considerably divergent from those of Iran. In the ensuing period, the integrity, and the prospects, of Iran's collaboration in counterterrorism became increasingly questionable and to some extent unattainable for Turkey.

In reference to the regional-level, the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 constituted a pivotal incentive for Turkey to advance its security cooperation with Iran owing to the shared misgivings of both states about the prospects of the stability and order inside Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion. However, in general, Turkey's strategic priorities in the Middle East were at significant variance with those of Iran, and hence Turkey's relations with Iran on regional security assumed a markedly contentious disposition, especially after the Arab Spring. The divergent and frequently conflicting policy preferences and the associated security measures of both states regarding the dynamic circumstances in the Middle East, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, became an abiding source of friction in Turkey's relations with Iran.

In reference to the international-level, Turkey exercised a lively diplomacy for a peaceful resolution of the protracted dispute between Iran and the West, primarily the US, over the controversial nuclear program of Iran. While denouncing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, Turkey was not reticent in confronting the unilateral efforts of the US, and the EU, against Iran, mainly economic sanctions.

Concurrently, Turkey pursued mediation, and with the participation of Brazil secured a nuclear swap deal with Iran in the process, which was subsequently dismissed by the US to the chagrin of Turkey. On the other hand, the approval and authorization of Turkey for the deployment of a NATO early warning radar system on its territory irritated Iran quite exceedingly.

With regard to the sub-motive elements of security in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran in the relevant time period, regional-level security had the highest degree of significance in Turkey's security relationships with Iran, followed by international-level security, dyad-level security, and unit-level security.

The motive of economy for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran differed within itself in the relevant time period as well. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran, in reference to trade, Turkey signed a host of agreements with Iran on trade, the foremost of which was 'The Preferential Trade Agreement' signed in January 2014. In the relevant time period Turkey's trade volume with Iran increased remarkably, not least because of the complementary trade structures of both countries. Even so, Turkey could not accomplish to eliminate the chronic trade deficit in its commercial relations with Iran. Additionally, despite the persistent appeals of Turkey for trade liberalization, Turkey only belatedly managed to receive Iran's reciprocity to address the issue of high customs duties applied by Iran as protectionist measures.

In reference to investment, Turkey's endeavors to boost investment relations with Iran were again thwarted primarily by two reasons. First, Turkish investments in the Iranian market in the initial years of the relevant time period encountered disproportionate state interference and suffered considerable costs due to their assets being taken into the public ownership in contravention of original agreements. Second, Iran was subjected to strict and extensive economic sanctions unilaterally by the US and the EU, and multilaterally by the UN.

In reference to energy, Turkey's economic relations with Iran fundamentally hinged on and revolved around energy since durable energy relations with Iran were imperative in achieving energy supply security, partnership with Iran in energy relations was essential in the diversification of Turkey's energy resources and the reduction of its excessive energy dependency on Russia, and finally Iran constituted an integral dimension for Turkey's strategic objective of becoming an indispensable energy hub in regional geopolitics. Turkey imported a significant share of its total oil imports from Iran, ranging between 30 to 50 percent in the period. Owing to Turkey's strategic and economic necessities, Turkey imported natural gas from Iran in increasing quantities, and yet their share in Turkey's total natural gas imports fluctuated just between 11 to 21 percent in the period. Turkey engaged in electricity trade with Iran as well, to import electricity through interconnection lines.

With regard to the sub-motive elements of economy in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran in the relevant time period, energy had the highest degree of significance in Turkey's economic relationships with Iran, followed by trade, and investment.

5.5 Conclusion

As a brief review of the main issues addressed in the preceding discussion, in the first part, the resilience of stability in Turkey's relations with Iran despite fluctuating cooperative and competitive interactions are explained with reference to the fundamental determinants of relations. Subsequently, among the numerous positive and negative developments, in the sense of being conducive to cooperation or competition, observed in Turkey's relations with Iran in the relevant time period,

some paradigmatic milestones constituting critical junctures in political/diplomatic, security/military, economic, and social relations are discussed.

In the second part, Turkey's security in its relations with Iran is examined in reference to the developments and associated policies of Turkey at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. To repeat, Turkey's security relations with Iran reflected the essential dialectics of cooperation and competition characterizing its bilateral relations with Iran. In short, Turkey's endeavors between March 2003 and August 2014 in its security relations with Iran concentrated on expanding the scope of cooperation while simultaneously containing the matters of competition.

In the third part, Turkey's economy in its relations with Iran is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. Turkey's economic relations with Iran between March 2003 and August 2014 showed a remarkable progress, and ultimately Turkey and Iran became indispensable economic partners for each other. In general, the intensification of Turkey's economic interactions and transactions with Iran hinged on a structural complementarity. Nonetheless, Turkey's objective to cultivate with Iran a higher level of economic cooperation suffered from a number of setbacks, which originated mostly in Iran's preference for protectionist measures in addition to the unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed by the US, the EU, and the UN.

In the fourth part, Turkey's identity in its relations with Iran is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity. In general, on account of the peculiar nature and dynamics of identity relations between Turkey and Iran, Turkey's person identity, role identity, and social identity were not to be verified in and through Turkey's relations with Iran. In terms of person identity, the conception that Turkey was the successor to the Ottoman Empire, carrying moral responsibility especially towards the oppressed militated against the verification of person identity in Turkey's relations with Iran. In terms of role identity, while Turkey's mediator role was provisionally verified, Turkey's peace/order builder role came to be challenged by Iran, especially after the divergence observed in their foreign policies towards the Middle East with the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In terms of social identity, for Turkey in its relations with Iran, invoking the commonality of history, geography, religion, and culture/civilization was tenuous at best, and treacherous at worst, and attaining Iran's reciprocity in constructing, restoring, and reviving shared social categories proved only tantalizing.

In the fifth part, it is advanced that Turkey's motives, security and economy only, to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran differed *within* each other with respect to the degree of significance of each sub-motive element relative to each other. Briefly, with regard to the sub-motive elements of security, regional-level security had the highest degree of significance, followed by international-level security, dyad-level security, and unit-level security. On the other hand, with regard to the sub-motive elements of economy, energy had the highest degree of significance, followed by trade, and investment.

CHAPTER 6

TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH PALESTINE

Turkey's relations with Palestine between March 2003 and August 2014 represented a sui generis case of interstate relations in the Middle East characterized by unilateral endorsement of a state's security and welfare by another state as a strategic priority in its foreign policy.⁷⁷⁰ Turkey officially declared in its relations with Palestine that it would "continue to support a just and lasting peace in the region based on a two-state vision and to remain in solidarity with the brotherly Palestinian people in their struggle to have an independent and sovereign state."⁷⁷¹ The profound concern of Turkish foreign policymakers for the complete realization and survival of the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians, increasingly manifested itself in a diverse range of policies Turkey devised and carried out, mainly in

⁷⁷⁰ Turkey officially recognized the State of Palestine the day it was declared in exile on November 15, 1988. Turkey was the fifth country that recognized the State of Palestine in the world. See, Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David'den Mavi Marmara'ya Filistin Politikamız* (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2013), p. 164. Turkey raised the level of its diplomatic representation with Palestine, and simultaneously with Israel, to the ambassadorial level on December 19, 1991. See, *ibid.*, p. 186. On October 30, 2014, Sweden became the 135th state that recognized the State of Palestine in the world. See, "67 Years to Nakba, 135 Countries Recognize Palestine," *Anadolu Agency*, May 11, 2015, <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/508003--67-years-to-nakba-135-countries-recognize-palestine>. On the Palestinian struggle for statehood, see, among others, Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 2006).

⁷⁷¹ For the official position of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see, "Türkiye-Filistin Siyasi İlişkileri," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-filistin-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

response to the developments in Palestine, in Palestine's relations with Israel, and also in Turkey's relations with Israel. This profound concern was expressed, for example, by the Turkish President Abdullah Gül in May 2009: "The Palestinian cause takes precedence over everything. This question will not end until Palestine establishes its own state on its own territory. This cause will never burn out."⁷⁷²

In the relevant time period, the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of Palestinians, was an unremitting, ingrained, and forthright concern of Turkish foreign policymakers in Turkey's relations with Palestine, and they were not reticent and evasive to express their concerns in their verbal and oral, official and non-official discourses. In 2002, in an interview, Ahmet Davutoğlu, not a policymaker at the time though, enumerated five problematic areas in Palestine's relations with Israel. For him, "within the framework of these five problematic areas, the issue of priority [was] the establishment of an integrated state of Palestine."⁷⁷³ In 2003, in the visit of his Palestinian counterpart Nabil Shaath to Turkey, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül expressed "Turkey's pledge to contribute to the process of structural and institutional rebuilding of Palestine."⁷⁷⁴ In 2004, Ahmet Davutoğlu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, contended: "If Israel deals with a state structure as interlocutor, it would take more serious steps in the peace process. Therefore, Turkey, on the one hand, should strengthen its relations

⁷⁷² Abdullah Gül, *Gelecek Yakın: Üniversite Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yayınları, 2014), p. 101.

⁷⁷³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2013), p. 54. These five problematic areas were related to the status of Jerusalem, a unified state of Palestine, the Palestinian refugees, the utilization of economic resources, and Israeli settlements. Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David'den Mavi Marmara'ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 254.

with Israel in line with the peace process, on the other hand, should make efforts to transform Palestine into a political entity that could stand on its own feet.”⁷⁷⁵

Turkish foreign policymakers persistently expressed Turkey’s congenital solicitude for the complete realization and survival of the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians. In 2005, for example, Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that in order to establish “the psychological ground” for the settlement of discord between Palestine and Israel, upon identifying the problems between the two states, “the contributions that Turkey would make need[ed] to be identified.”⁷⁷⁶ In his view, “Turkey’s first assessment in this regard [was] Turkey’s contributions for the institutional building of the State of Palestine and the normalization of life in Palestine.”⁷⁷⁷ In 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu once again reiterated Turkey’s unequivocal stance on the Palestinian statehood: “For us [Turkey] an independent State of Palestine is an imperative. The rights of Palestinians must be safeguarded and these rights must be given respect... Without the resolution of the Palestinian Question, namely without the establishment of the State of Palestine, a regional peace, even a peace at the global level is not possible.”⁷⁷⁸

Table 18: Presidential Visits between Turkey and Palestine in the period of 14 March 2003-18 August 2014

Date	Outgoing Turkish Visits	Incoming Palestinian Visits
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⁷⁷⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 176.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 194. Whether Turkey’s contributions would be made to the settlement of the discord or exclusively to Palestine was not explicit in the sentence.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 428.

2006 April		Mahmoud Abbas
2006 June	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	
2007 December		Mahmoud Abbas
2009 February		Mahmoud Abbas
2012 December		Mahmoud Abbas
2014 July		Mahmoud Abbas

Among the numerous developments observed in Turkey's relations with Palestine in this period, some paradigmatic milestones constituting critical junctures in bilateral relations can be identified. As the time progressed, Turkey's relations with Israel became increasingly refracted through Turkey's concern for the complete realization and survival of the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians. The first incident emblematic of Turkish policy of endorsing Palestine's security and Palestinians' safety was the reaction of Turkish foreign policymakers to the Israeli military operation against Rafah in May 2004. While Bülent Arınç, Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, called Israeli assaults as massacre, according to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they constituted "almost state terrorism."⁷⁷⁹ In July 2004, Turkey voted in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution which demanded "that Israel heed last month's [June's] advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to halt construction on its security barrier in the West Bank, tear down the portions built on

⁷⁷⁹ "Adeta Devlet Terörü," *Hürriyet*, 21 May 2004.

Palestinian land, and provide reparations to Palestinians whose lives have been harmed by the wall.”⁷⁸⁰

Just before the presidential elections in Palestine on January 9, 2005, marking the first high level visit from Turkey in the relevant time period, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül paid a “most sensitive” visit to Palestine, along with Israel and Jordan, on January 5, 2005.⁷⁸¹ A couple of months later, in May 2005, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a second visit to Palestine, and Israel, in which he met with the recently elected Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who stated in his meeting with Erdoğan that Palestine was “expecting both political and economic assistance and contribution from the brotherly country of Turkey.”⁷⁸² The succession of bilateral visits between Turkey and Palestine continued with the controversial visit to Ankara on February 16, 2006, upon the invitation of the Justice and Development Party, of Khaled Mashal, who was at the time leading the political bureau of Hamas, which had emerged victorious in the Palestinian legislative elections on January 25.⁷⁸³ The only presidential visit from Turkey to Palestine in the relevant time period took place on June 8, 2006, with Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer meeting his

⁷⁸⁰ “General Assembly Emergency Session Overwhelmingly Demands Israel’s Compliance with International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion,” *United Nations*, 20 July 2004, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/ga10248.doc.htm>. 150 states voted in favor of the resolution, and only 6 states, including the US, voted against it. Ibid.

⁷⁸¹ “Gül’ün En Hassas Ziyareti,” *Radikal*, 4 January 2005. Also see, “No: 7- 10 Ocak 2005, Filistin’de 9 Ocak 2005 Tarihinde Düzenlenen Filistin Ulusal Yönetimi Başkanlık Seçimleri Hk.,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_7--10-ocak-2005_filistin_de-9-ocak-2005-tarihinde-duzenlenen_filistin-ulusal-yonetimi-baskanlik-secimleri_hk_.tr.mfa.

⁷⁸² “Erdoğan-Abbas Görüşmesi,” *Sabah*, 2 May 2005.

⁷⁸³ In terms of Turkey’s relations with Israel, “The AKP’s invitation of Khaled Mashel [sic], the leader of Hamas’ political wing based in Damascus, to Ankara was harshly criticized by Israel and interpreted as an unfriendly action that would certainly diminish Turkey’s credibility to act as a neutral party between the Israelis and Palestinians,” Tarık Oğuzlu, “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey-Israel Relations: A Structural Realist Account,” *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2010, pp. 273-288, p. 275. Khalid Mashal met with Turkish Minister of Affairs Abdullah Gül at the headquarters of the JDP. For the details of the meeting, see, Ahmet Sever, *Abdullah Gül ile 12 Yıl: Yaşadım, Gördüm, Yazdım* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2015), pp. 68-70.

counterpart Mahmoud Abbas and expressing the continuation of Turkey's support to Palestine.⁷⁸⁴

Not a month passed after Ahmet Necdet Sezer's visit that Israel launched yet another military offensive against Gaza on June 28, portending the advent of a long season of crises in Turkey's relations with Israel as Israeli policies militated against Turkey's sensitivity and solicitude for the complete realization and survival of the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians.⁷⁸⁵ In the official statement of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released three days later, Turkey proclaimed that it was impossible for it "to accept the detention of the elected ministers and parliamentarians of the Palestinian National Authority and the destruction of the infrastructure of Palestine which [was] already deficient to the utmost extent."⁷⁸⁶

In December 2008, Israel launched another deadly offensive against Gaza, called the Operation Cast Lead in Israel and the Battle of al-Furqan in Palestine, which also involved a ground invasion. The Israeli offensive constituted "the most severe attacks since 1967, and civilians [were] the primary victims," as when the offensive ended on January 18, 2009, "more than 1,300 Palestinians [were] killed and more than 5,300 wounded, compared to thirteen Israeli deaths (some by friendly fire)."⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸⁴ "'Filistin'e Destek Sürecek'," *Vatan*, 8 June 2006.

⁷⁸⁵ See, "No: 99 - 28 Haziran 2006, İsrail Ordusu'nun Gazze Şeridi'ne Girmesi hk.," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_99---28-haziran-2006_-israil-ordusu_nun-gazze-seridi_ne-girmesi-hk_.tr.mfa.

⁷⁸⁶ "No: 103 - 1 Temmuz 2006, Filistin'de Yaşanan Son Gelişmeler hk.," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_103---1-temmuz-2006_-filistin_de-yasanan-son-gelismeler-hk_.tr.mfa.

⁷⁸⁷ Sherifa Zuhur, "Gaza, Israel, Hamas and the Lost Calm of Operation Cast Lead," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009, pp. 40-52, p. 41, p. 40. Also see, Hisham Naffa, "The Palestinians in Israel and Operation Cast Lead: A View from Haifa," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2009, pp. 54-63.

During the Israeli military offensive, Turkey's comparatively muted criticisms against previous Israeli assaults evolved into outright condemnations, and while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called the insistence of Israel on the continuation of its military operation "a serious crime against humanity," the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that "the scale of tragedy [had] surpassed the limits of toleration."⁷⁸⁸

The sensibilities of Turkish foreign policymakers about the security of Palestine and the safety of Palestinians caused a spectacular incident at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2009. In a lengthy and indignant exchange of acrimonious words with Israeli President Shimon Peres, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, denouncing Israeli aggression in Palestine, rebuked the Israeli President in exasperation: "When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill. I know very well how you hit and killed children on beaches."⁷⁸⁹ In another example, in October 2009, Turkey "decided to change the list of participating countries and exclude Israel" from a NATO military exercise regularly conducted before in Turkey, and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that it was "partly because of Ankara's criticism of Israel's Gaza offensive nearly a year ago."⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁸ "Turkish PM Erdogan Slams Israel," *Hurriyet Daily News*, 29 December 2008; "No: 10 - 16 January 2009, Press Release Regarding the Developments in the Gaza Strip," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_10---16-january-2009_-press-release-regarding-the-developments-in-the-gaza-strip.en.mfa. On the Turkish diplomacy during the Israeli military operation, see, Selin Bölme, "Charting Turkish Diplomacy in the Gaza Conflict," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, pp. 23-31.

⁷⁸⁹ Pelin Turgut, "Behind the Turkish Prime Minister's Outburst at Davos," *Time*, 30 January 2009, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1875981,00.html>.

⁷⁹⁰ "Turkish FM Criticizes Israel over Gaza," *CNN*, 12 October 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/10/11/turkey.israel.nato.drill/index.html>. Yet another crisis in Turkey's relations with Israel pertinent to Palestine was the so-called Low Seat Crisis in January 2010 in which Turkish ambassador to Israel, A. Oğuz Çelikkol, "was summoned to explain

The severity of crises in Turkey's relations with Israel reached its apogee with the interception of Israeli military forces in international waters of a flotilla carrying humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza, which had been under the military blockade and economic embargo of Israel. "For the first time, Turkish civilians became directly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suffering casualties caused by Israeli forces" as in the Israeli military operation carried out against the ship *Mavi Marmara* on May 31, 2010, nine Turkish nationals were murdered and several others were wounded.⁷⁹¹ On the same day, Turkey called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council, and in his speech Turkish Minister of Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed Turkey's profound indignation: "In simplest terms, this is tantamount to banditry and piracy. It is murder conducted by a State. It has no excuses, no justification whatsoever... Today, we observed, through live coverage, an act of barbarism, where provision of humanitarian aid has been punished through aggression on the high seas... Israel has blood on its hands."⁷⁹²

Mr. Erdogan's recent harsh criticism, as well as a [Turkish] TV show that portrayed Israeli intelligence agents holding a woman and her baby hostage. Breaking with diplomatic protocol, Israeli officials failed to include the customary Turkish flag on the table between them and the Turkish ambassador, whom they seated on a low couch. To rub it in, they instructed the press members in attendance to note that they were sitting in higher chairs and the usual diplomatic niceties were conspicuously absent." Yigal Schleifer, "Why Israel Humiliated Turkey in Response to a TV Show," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12 January 2010. Israeli officials apologized later for their undiplomatic attitude. For the memoirs of A. Oğuz Çelikkol narrating the incident, see, A. Oğuz Çelikkol, *One Minute'ten Mavi Marmaraya: Türkiye-İsrail Çatışması* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014).⁷⁹¹ Hasan Kosebalaban, "The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is Its Strategic Significance?" *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010, pp. 36-50, p. 44. For the memoirs of a Turkish journalist aboard the ship *Mavi Marmara* presenting a first-hand account of events surrounding the *Mavi Marmara* incident, see, Sümeyye Ertekin, *Dökme Kurşundan Mavi Marmara'ya: Gazze'ye Yolculuk* (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2011).

⁷⁹² "Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in Civilian Deaths during Israeli Operation against Gaza-Bound Aid Convoy, Calls for Investigation, in Presidential Statement," *United Nations*, 31 May 2010, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9940.doc.htm>.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially declared on the same day that “Israel [would] have to bear the consequences of these actions which constitute[d] a violation of international law.” Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, on the other hand, “declared three days of official mourning for the dead [Turkish nationals]” in Palestine on the very same day, stating that “what Israel [had] committed on board the freedom flotilla was a massacre.”⁷⁹³ Turkey, in addition, proclaimed a number of demands including the immediate cessation of the blockade of Gaza, and after the release of the so-called Palmer Report, announced sanctions against Israel in September 2011.⁷⁹⁴

In the aftermath of the suspension of diplomatic relations with Israel over grave tensions pertinent to Palestine, Turkey’s profound concern for the complete realization and survival of the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians, continued relentlessly, and Turkey became a foremost adherent of the recognition of the Palestinian statehood in international organizations. In an audacious move, on September 23, 2011, Palestine applied for admission to membership in the UN.⁷⁹⁵ Constituting a significant milestone for the international

⁷⁹³ Harriet Sherwood, “Israeli Commandos Kill Activists on Flotilla Bound for Gaza,” *The Guardian*, 31 May 2010.

⁷⁹⁴ For Turkey’s demands, see, *Ibid.* For the Palmer Report, see, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident,” *United Nations*, September 2011, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf. On the Palmer Report, see, for example, Richard Falk, “Disappointment at the United Nations: The Failure of the Palmer Report,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2011, pp. 1-9. For Turkey’s sanctions against Israel, see, “Türkiye’den İsrail’e 5 Yaptırım,” *Radikal*, 2 September 2011. Subsequent to the previous withdrawal of its ambassador from Tel Aviv, Turkey expelled Israeli ambassador from Ankara in September 2011 as part of its declared sanctions. Sebnem Arsu and Alan Cowell, “Turkey Expels Israeli Envoy in Dispute over Raid,” *The New York Times*, 2 September 2011. On Turkey’s changing relations with Israel in this period, see, among others, Ali Balçı and Tuncay Kardaş, “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey’s Changing Relations with Israel: An Analysis of ‘Securitization’,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012, pp. 99-120.

⁷⁹⁵ For the application of Palestine, see, “Application of the State of Palestine for Admission to Membership in the United Nations,” *United Nations*,

recognition of the Palestinian statehood, on October 31, 2011, Palestine was accepted as a full member of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).⁷⁹⁶ In the statement released on the occasion, Turkey declared that “at the stage reached, recognition of the State of Palestine representing the people of Palestine [was] a responsibility and a moral obligation for the international community.”⁷⁹⁷

The paramount development towards the international recognition of the State of Palestine subsequently took place with the UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 voted on November 29, 2012, which “accord[ed] to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations.”⁷⁹⁸ Attending the momentous meeting in person, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu delivered a compelling speech in his address to the UN General Assembly: “The reality of Palestine is a bleeding wound in the conscience of all humanity...Our vision for justice, international order and human rights will not be achieved until the moment we...see the flag of the State of Palestine side by side with ours, as a full Member of the United Nations.”⁷⁹⁹ The

<http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/Letters/PDF/Palestine%20Application%20for%20Admission%20-%202023%20September%202011.pdf>.

⁷⁹⁶ “General Conference Admits Palestine as UNESCO Member,” *UNESCO*, 31 October 2011,

http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/general_conference_admits_palestine_as_unesco_member_state/#.VfLJyDYVjIU.

⁷⁹⁷ “News from the Turkish Ministry,” *Turkish Embassy in Bern*,

<http://bern.emb.mfa.gov.tr/showannouncement.aspx?id=138614>.

⁷⁹⁸ “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 67/19. Status of Palestine in the United Nations,” *United Nations General Assembly*, 4 December 2012,

<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/19862D03C564FA2C85257ACB004EE69B>.

⁷⁹⁹ “General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in the United Nations,” *United Nations*, 29 November 2012,

<http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm>. 138 states voted for the membership of Palestine, while only 9 states voted against it. Ibid. In a similar vein, in his address to the 67th UN General Assembly on September 28, 2012, Ahmet Davutoğlu had stressed Turkey’s concern for Palestine once again: “How can we convince the Palestinian people that the international community is serious about a two-state solution while no UN resolution helped their just cause for an independent state of Palestine. But we will one day see the Palestinian flag in this hall. Turkey will certainly support the Palestinian people in their quest for statehood, dignity and peace.” See, “Address by Mr. Ahmet

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, released an official statement a day later maintaining that “with this historic voting, Palestine took a great step towards gaining the position it deserve[d] as an independent and sovereign state recognized by the international community.”⁸⁰⁰ After Palestine achieved the non-member observer state status in the UN, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas paid his first official visit to Turkey in December 2012, revealing that Turkey and Palestine agreed “to establish close coordination with Turkish permanent representation at the UN with [Palestinian] UN representation in New York.”⁸⁰¹

Upon the declaration of 2014 by the UN as the “International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People” in order to “to promote solidarity with the Palestinian people and generate further momentum and international support for the realization of their inalienable rights,”⁸⁰² Turkey anew announced its anticipation that “the historical injustice against Palestinian people [would] be eliminated by the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital during the International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.”⁸⁰³

Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the 67th United Nations General Assembly, 28 September 2012, New York,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-mr_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-at-the-67th-united-nations-general-assembly_-28-september.en.mfa.

⁸⁰⁰ “No: 275, 30 November 2012, Press Release Regarding Palestine’s Acquiring ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status at the UN,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-275_-30-november-2012_-press-release-regarding-palestine_s-acquiring-non_member-observer-state_-status-at-the-un.en.mfa.

⁸⁰¹ Abdullah Bozkurt, “Abbas Reveals Turkey, Palestine to Coordinate Legal Steps against Israel,” *Today’s Zaman*, 12 December 2012.

⁸⁰² “2014 International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People,” *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/events/palestineyear/>.

⁸⁰³ “No: 18, 18 January 2014, Regarding the UN 2014 International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-18_-18-january-2014_-regarding-the-un-2014-international-year-of-solidarity-with-the-palestinian-people.en.mfa.

Nevertheless, the last major Israeli military assault against Palestine in the relevant time period was launched in the summer of the very same year, and left behind a devastating cost for Palestinians.⁸⁰⁴ Turkey continued to stand in solidarity with Palestine, and in condemnation of Israel. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in an interview with the CNN during the Israeli military operations against Gaza, did not abstain from calling Israel “a terror state,” accusing it of “creating a wave of terror.”⁸⁰⁵ By the same token, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a host of statements during the Israeli military operations in one of which, for example, it announced that “Israel’s targeting of the only power plant in Gaza, UNRWA schools, hospitals and mosques [was] typical in demonstrating its unlimited aggression.”⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰⁴ The Israeli military operation against Gaza, which also involved a ground invasion, began on July 8, 2014. For the official statement of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released on the same day, see, “No: 235, 8 Temmuz 2014, İsrail’in Gazze’ye Yönelik Başlattığı Operasyon Hk.,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-235-israil_in-gazze_ye-yonelik-baslattigi-operasyon-hk_.tr.mfa. A ceasefire was reached on August 4. According to one report published by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on September 4, “the Palestinian fatality toll [was] 2,131, of whom 1,473 [were] identified as civilians, including 501 children,” and “18,000 housing units [were] either destroyed or severely damaged, leaving approximately 108,000 people homeless.” See, “Occupied Palestinian Territory: Gaza Emergency,” *OCHA*, 4 September 2014, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_04_09_2014.pdf.

⁸⁰⁵ For the full transcript of the interview, see, “CNN Exclusive: Turkish PM Erdogan Sits down with CNN’s Becky Anderson,” *CNN*, 24 July 2014, <http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/24/cnn-exclusive-turkish-pm-erdogan-sits-down-with-cnns-becky-anderson/>.

⁸⁰⁶ “No: 256, 30 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated by Israel against Gaza,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-256_-30-july-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-attacks-perpetrated-by-israel-against-gaza.en.mfa.




Figure 17: Frequency of ‘Palestine’ in the Official Gazette of Turkey between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014⁸⁰⁷

Turkey quite indubitably espoused the security of Palestine and the safety of Palestinians as a pronounced priority in its relations with Palestine in the relevant time period. In addition, Turkey demonstrated a correspondingly high level of concern for the economic basis of the Palestinian statehood and the economic wellbeing of the Palestinians. In other words, in a curious reversal of state motives, it was not Turkey’s security and economy that conditioned Turkey’s relations with Palestine; it was Palestine’s security and economy. In sum, and more to the point, Turkey’s influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine between March 2003 and August 2014 were not based on the motives of security and

⁸⁰⁷ *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, <http://resmigazete.gov.tr/default.aspx>. Search was made for the Turkish word of ‘Filistin’ for the period between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014. Contents of pertinent agreements are available. It should be noted that agreements are promulgated in the Official Gazette some time after they are signed, depending on juridical processes. Each entry does not necessarily denote an agreement notwithstanding. Each entry only denotes the existence of respective Turkish words. For the precise content of each entry, the related issue of the Official Gazette should be consulted.

economy, to repeat, from Turkey's perspective. However, Turkey's influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine in the relevant time period were based on the motive of identity.

6.1 Turkey's Security and Palestine

Turkey's relations with Palestine were devised, modified, and enacted above all in accordance with the security developments within Palestine, and in Palestine's relations with Israel.⁸⁰⁸ Turkish foreign policymakers conceived a direct association between the security developments surrounding Palestine and Turkey's regional policy in the Middle East. In 2004, for example, Ahmet Davutoğlu contended: "Even though the Palestinian Question is considered a problem beyond our [Turkey's] borders as a nation-state, each wound bleeding in this region threatens both the global peace and the regional peace; that is, [it] directly concerns us as well. We should not forget that each tension rising in this region affects us."⁸⁰⁹ Ultimately, however, passing beyond the considerations of regional foreign policy, in several instances, security developments concerning Palestine came to be regarded as national security issues for Turkey. Thus, for example, in the meetings of Turkey's National Security Council (NSC), the supreme state institution responsible for the formulation of national security policies, Palestine became a matter of import on the agenda.

⁸⁰⁸ For a similar argument, see, Erkan Ertosun, "Türkiye'nin Filistin Politikasında ABD Ya Da AB Çizgisi," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. 7, No. 28, 2011, pp. 57-88.

⁸⁰⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 175. Turkish foreign policymakers apparently did not share Israeli sensitivities in security matters concerning Palestine, and based on their pro-Palestinian convictions, they did not refrain from taking discursive and practical attitudes highly sympathetic to Palestine while, at the same time, highly corrosive to Israel. In one example, Ahmet Davutoğlu arraigned Israel as addressing the Palestinian Question "under the fuss of Islamic terror." See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2011), p. 28.




Figure 18: Frequency of ‘Palestine’ in the Press Releases of the National Security Council between 14 March 2003 and 18 August 2014⁸¹⁰

While in August 2006, the NSC announced the continuation of humanitarian assistance to Palestine,⁸¹¹ in December 2008, the NSC expressed Turkey’s “profound concern for the Israeli operation against Gaza causing so many Palestinians losing their lives,” and called for “the immediate cessation of the military operation, bringing the clashes to an end, giving diplomacy a chance, and ensuring the transportation of humanitarian assistance to the people in Gaza in a safe manner.”⁸¹²

While in February 2009, the peace process between Palestine and Israel, the crisis in Gaza, the conflict between the Palestinian groups, and the elections in Palestine were

⁸¹⁰ The contents of all press releases are available in Turkish. See, “Basın Bildirileri Arşivi,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/milli-guvenlik-kurulu/mgk-basin-aciklamalari/basin-aciklamalari-arsivi>.

⁸¹¹ “21 Ağustos 2006 Tarihli Toplantı,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/21-agustos-2006-tarihli-toplanti>.

⁸¹² “30 Aralık 2008 Tarihli Toplantı,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/30-aralik-2008-tarihli-toplanti>.

discussed in the NSC,⁸¹³ in August 2010, the NSC discussed “the developments in the context of the assault perpetrated by Israel in international waters on May 31, 2010 against the flotilla carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza.”⁸¹⁴ In the meetings of April, June, and August 2013, “developments in the inter-Palestinian reconciliation process were addressed” in the NSC.⁸¹⁵ Palestine continued to be a leading subject in the discussions of the NSC in 2014. In the relevant time period, there are four levels in which security issues as the subject matters of Turkey’s considerations in its security relationships with Palestine originate. These four levels are unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international level.

6.1.1 Unit-Level Security

In the view of the Turkish foreign policymakers, the political unity and the underlying social cohesion of Palestinians were considered cardinal in attaining and safeguarding the complete realization and survival of the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians. In the aftermath of the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, in which Hamas secured the majority in the Palestinian Assembly, internecine violence erupted among Palestinians, which eventually culminated in the dissolution of the Palestinian government by President Mahmoud Abbas in June 2007.⁸¹⁶ With the subsequent refusal of Hamas to cede political authority in Gaza,

⁸¹³ “26 Şubat 2009 Tarihli Toplantı,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/26-subat-2009-tarihli-toplanti>.

⁸¹⁴ “19 Ağustos 2010 Tarihli Toplantı,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/19-agustos-2010-tarihli-toplanti>.

⁸¹⁵ “25 Haziran 2013 Tarihli Toplantı,” *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği*, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/25-haziran-2013-tarihli-toplanti>.

⁸¹⁶ On the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, see, among others, Graham Usher, “The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2006, pp. 20-36; Manal A. Jamal, “Beyond *Fateh* Corruption and Mass Discontent: Hamas, the Palestinian Left and the 2006 Legislative Elections,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2013, pp. 273-294.

Palestine effectively divided into two administrative areas ruled by rival political factions. In the subsequent period, several attempts to reach reconciliation among the Palestinian factions, namely Hamas and the Palestinian Authority ruled by Fatah, and to form a national unity government in Palestine ensued.⁸¹⁷

Turkey attached utmost importance to the inter-Palestinian reconciliation process and the formation of a unity government in Palestine, as can be seen in the aforementioned statements of the NSC during 2013. In another example, Turkish President Abdullah Gül stated in an interview in February 2009:

Turkey is of the conviction that for the provision of peace in Palestine, it is incumbent upon Palestine at first to unify, to become united within itself...If the groups in Palestine [Hamas and Fatah] are detached, then it means [that] dynamite is laid beneath the foundation of the State of Palestine...Surely, it is imperative that a national Palestinian government be formed. It is imperative that Palestinians unify. How can you wage a struggle while you are in fragments?⁸¹⁸

For A. Oğuz Çelikkol, Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv in 2009-2010, it was “obvious that resolving their internal problems and Hamas-Fatah reconciliation would strengthen the hand of the Palestinians in peace negotiations [with Israel].”⁸¹⁹ To that end, Hamas and Fatah finally reached a reconciliation agreement on April 23, 2014, which was welcomed by Turkey expressing on the occasion its belief that “that

⁸¹⁷ On Hamas-Fatah relations in the period see, Dag Tuastad, “Hamas-PLO Relations before and after the Arab Spring,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2013, pp. 86-98. On the reconciliation attempts, see, Yousef Munayyer, “Prospects for Palestinian Unity after the Arab Spring,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2011, pp. 21-31; Hussein Ibish, “Indispensable but Elusive: Palestinian National Unification,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2014, pp. 31-46.

⁸¹⁸ Abdullah Gül, *Global Perspektif: Yurtdışı Basın Mülakatları* (Ankara: Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yayınları, 2014), pp. 36-37.

⁸¹⁹ A. Oğuz Çelikkol, *One Minute'ten Mavi Marmaraya: Türkiye-İsrail Çatışması*, p. 131.

the unity of the Palestinians [was] imperative to a lasting and viable peace in the region.”⁸²⁰ Concluding a lengthy and debilitating period of internal division, Hamas and Fatah formed a national unity government on June 2, 2014.⁸²¹ Once again expressing its content, Turkey announced that “the formation of the new government [was] the first step in eliminating the division between the Palestinians,” and “the unity of the Palestinian people [was] essential for the establishment of a just and viable peace in the region.”⁸²²

6.1.2 Dyad-Level Security

In its relations with Palestine in the relevant time period, Turkey’s security considerations were informed not by its bilateral relations with Palestine but by Palestine’s bilateral relations with Israel. Although Turkey sustained its interest in mediating between Palestine and Israel, predating the advent of a new single party government in Turkey in 2003, its interest could not translate into actual policy since, simply, “Turkey did not have enough leverage on the parties to set a negotiation agenda, suggest options, and use its muscle to implement [its] suggestions and the reward and punishment mechanisms effectively.”⁸²³ Deficiency in Turkey’s mediation capacity was compounded by the progressive deterioration of its relations with Israel over security issues concerning Palestine, and hence Turkey could not

⁸²⁰ “No: 127, 24 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Reconciliation Agreement Reached between Fatah and Hamas,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-127_-24-april-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-reconciliation-agreement-reached-between-fatah-and-hamas.en.mfa.

⁸²¹ Peter Beaumont, “Palestinian Unity Government of Fatah and Hamas Sworn in,” *The Guardian*, 2 June 2014.

⁸²² “No: 183, 2 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the National Unity Government in Palestine,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-183_-2-june-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-establishment-of-the-national-unity-government-in-palestine.en.mfa.

⁸²³ Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Perceptions*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007, pp. 89-108.

perform the propitious role it had assumed for itself in the resolution of the protracted conflicts in Palestine's relations with Israel.

With each Israeli military operation against Palestine, Turkey became more disposed to align its policies with the security concerns of Palestine, and with its neutrality attenuating, its considerations about Israel's security policies morphed into restless apprehensions, and ultimately into unmitigated denunciations. The first incident that elicited an unusually severe Turkish backlash against Israeli policies in the relevant time period was the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and the spiritual leader of Hamas, in an Israeli military strike on March 22, 2004 in Gaza.⁸²⁴ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan questioned the Israeli strike in bitter words: “[Ahmed] Yassin was the spiritual leader of Hamas. Why did you release him? Why did you kill him with a missile? You [Israeli government] take a decision of assassination, a decision of murder as a government. Above all things, a state does not hold a grudge. If it does, it is [state] terrorism.”⁸²⁵ The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the assault as well arguing that it was “evident that assassinations undertaken by Israeli forces [did] not reinforce Israel's security.”⁸²⁶

In the immediate aftermath of the assassinations of Hamas leaders, Turkey's individual criticisms of Israeli policies evolved into a critical disposition beginning to

⁸²⁴ Khaled Hroub, “Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2004, pp. 21-38, p. 21. Also see, Nir Gazit and Robert J. Brym, “State-directed Political Assassination in Israel: A Political Hypothesis,” *International Sociology*, Vol. 26, No. 6, 2011, pp. 862-877.

⁸²⁵ Abdullah Karakuş, “İsrail'in Yaptığı Terör,” *Milliyet*, 14 April 2004.

⁸²⁶ “No: 49 - 22 Mart 2004, Hamas'ın Dini Lideri Şeyh Ahmed Yasin'in Öldürülmesi hk.,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_49---22-mart-2004_hamas_in-din_lideri-seyh-ahmed-yasin_in-oldurulmesi-hk_.tr.mfa. On 17 April, 2004, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin's successor Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi was also assassinated by Israeli military forces. See, Khaled Hroub, “Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi,” p. 21.

form with the Israeli military invasion and siege of the city of Rafah in Gaza in May 2004. As a result of the Israeli military operation, “to widen strip along Egyptian border in connection with [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan,” it was reported that “at least 43 Palestinians killed, 100s wounded, 1000s temporarily displaced, [and] 167 homes demolished or severely damaged.”⁸²⁷

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asserted that Israeli military assaults against civilians were not justifiable and excusable, and there was “no explanation by any law of striking civilian people without discriminating [even] children.”⁸²⁸ To Erdoğan, Israeli assaults were “steps escalated to almost state terrorism.”⁸²⁹ Over the course of the relevant time period, Turkish foreign policymakers cultivated a potent conviction that Israeli security policies imposed upon Palestine were disastrous to the security of Palestine and the safety of Palestinians. Therefore, relinquishing impartiality, they decried Israeli military operations against Palestine in the most trenchant and reproachful terms. Without faltering, Turkish foreign policymakers called Israeli military operations ‘massacre,’ ‘state terrorism,’ and even ‘genocide’ in several instances.⁸³⁰

⁸²⁷ Michele K. Esposito, “The al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2005, pp. 85-122, p. 95. Also see, Ghazi-Walid Falah, “The Geopolitics of ‘Enclavization’ and the Demise of a Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 8, 2005, pp. 1341-1372.

⁸²⁸ “Adeta Devlet Terörü.”

⁸²⁹ Ibid.

⁸³⁰ See, for example, Mert İnan, “İsrail Sistematik Soykırım Yapıyor,” *Milliyet*, 18 June 2014; Mustafa Küçük and Ümit Çetin, “İsrail Soykırım Yapıyor,” *Hürriyet*, 19 July 2014.

In addition, Israel's settlement policy in the occupied territories of Palestine was considered a severe security issue by Turkey for the complete realization and survival of the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians.⁸³¹ In his work, for example, Ahmet Davutoğlu claimed that "Jewish people who escaped from ghettos in Europe, as a result of this political culture, [were] imagining only a future of ghetto for the Palestinians."⁸³² In an interview in 2002, Ahmet Davutoğlu commented on the rationale behind Israel's insistence on perpetuating its settlement policy: "Israel wants the State of Palestine to be established as a state which does not threaten the security of Israel, is dependent on Israel, [and] is demilitarized. For this reason, it does not want the Jewish settlers to leave the territory of Palestine."⁸³³ Because, Davutoğlu continued, "as long as the Jewish settlements remain there, Israel could invade Palestine at any moment presenting the security of its citizen[s] as justification."⁸³⁴

In 2011, responding to a question on Israeli settlement policy in the East Jerusalem, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, expressed that Turkey's attitude on the matter was straightforward: "The East Jerusalem is Palestinian territory and will remain as Palestinian territory until eternity. In this matter, any compromising attitude towards Israel is unacceptable, and it cannot be faced with silence."⁸³⁵ In the relevant time period, several official statements were

⁸³¹ On the Israeli settlement policy, see, among others, Sari Hanafi, "Spacio-cide: Colonial Politics, Invisibility and Rezoning in Palestinian Territory," *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2009, pp. 106-121; Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (New York: Verso, 2012).

⁸³² Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2007), p. 387.

⁸³³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 70.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ "Sayın Bakanımızın Suudi Arabistan Dışişleri Bakanı Prens Saud Al-Faysal ile Gerçekleştirdiği Ortak Basın Toplantısı, 12 Ocak 2011, Ankara," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Dışişleri Bakanlığı*,

announced by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Turkey's opposition to Israel's settlement policy.⁸³⁶ As an example, on the Israeli settlements in the East Jerusalem, it announced that "such steps aiming at changing the demographic structure of East Jerusalem, which [was] expected to be the capital of the Palestinian State in a fair, comprehensive and viable final agreement [were] unacceptable."⁸³⁷

6.1.3 Regional-Level Security

In Turkey's relations with Palestine, Turkey assigned precedence to exercising its regional diplomacy in the Middle East in consonance with the security concerns of Palestine. Turkey opted for either setting out diplomatic initiatives for the purpose of propelling other regional states into formulating a common stance on the security of Palestine and the safety of Palestinians or taking part in initiatives initiated by other regional states. As an example, at the time Israel launched a military offensive against Gaza in December 2008, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan promptly embarked upon a regional tour so as to urge other regional states to act in concert about the security developments in Palestine. In his regional tour on January 1-4, 2009, comprising Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, Erdoğan "made efforts towards the development of a common stance by regional states for the cessation of clashes in Gaza," and accordingly, "during the trip, the two fundamental issues Turkey put emphasis upon were principally the provision of ceasefire in Gaza, [and] then, the

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-suudi-arabistan-disisleri-bakani-prens-saud-al-faysal--ile-gerceklestirdigi-ortak-basin-toplantisi.tr.mfa>.

⁸³⁶ In 2013, for example, three statements were issued on the issue in February and November. Refer to, "2013," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*,

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?d286cc9c-eb33-4c4c-bdb1-a3bc1f71866f>.

⁸³⁷ "No: 39, 7 February 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel's Decision to Construct New Houses in the Illegal Settlements in East Jerusalem," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-39_-7-february-2014_-press-release-regarding-israel_s-decision-to-construct-new-houses-in-the-illegal-settlements-in-east.en.mfa.

realization of reconciliation between the groups [Hamas and PNA/Fatah] in Palestine.”⁸³⁸

In another example, during the visit of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to Turkey in February 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Gül reportedly “suggested the establishment of a new ‘Quartet’ to be formed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey and to work for the realization of unity in Palestine.”⁸³⁹ Turkey’s suggestion was conveniently dismissed though, since “the expectation of the Palestinian Authority from Turkey was in line with Ankara supporting the diplomatic efforts led by Egypt [which were] already underway on the issue.”⁸⁴⁰ Furthermore, during the Israeli military operation against Gaza in July-August 2014, Turkey engaged in a diplomatic partnership with Qatar to appeal to the international community for a ceasefire between Palestine and Israel. Although the ceasefire was mediated by the UN and the US, Turkish and Qatari foreign ministers made a joint declaration expressing their hope for “a sustainable ceasefire” between the parties.⁸⁴¹

6.1.4 International-Level Security

In conjunction with its regional policy, in the relevant time period, Turkey carried out spirited international diplomacy for the preservation and consolidation of the security of Palestine and the safety of Palestinians. As an early example, in the

⁸³⁸ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David’den Mavi Marmara’ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 280.

⁸³⁹ Ibid., p. 287. The Quartet formed to mediate in Palestine-Israel relations in 2002 is composed of the UN, the US, the EU, and Russia. On the Quartet, see, Nathalie Tocci, “The Middle East Quartet and (In)effective Multilateralism,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2013, pp. 29-44.

⁸⁴⁰ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David’den Mavi Marmara’ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 287.

⁸⁴¹ “Türkiye ve Katar Dışişleri Bakanlarının Gazze’de İnsani Bir Ateşkese Yönelik Yeni Girişime İlişkin Ortak Açıklaması,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ve-katar-disisleri-bakanlarinin-gazze_de-insani-bir-ateskese-yonelik-yeni-girisime-iliskin-ortak-aciklamasi.tr.mfa.

ministerial meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) met in Malaysia in April 2004, a ministerial delegation was formed with the participation of Malaysia, Palestine, Morocco, Senegal, and Turkey with the declared objective of advancing Palestinian interests, primarily its security, in the international arena.⁸⁴² During the Israeli military operation launched in December 2008, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan engaged in telephone diplomacy and held conversations with the leaders of Britain, France, Russia, and Spain, among others, about the settlement of the ongoing crisis in Palestine.⁸⁴³

Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2009, Erdoğan continued to emphasize the exigency of international commitment to the security and wellbeing of Palestine: “As during the [Israeli] assault, Gaza was left to its fate after the assault and heavy devastation as well...The security of Palestinians is as important as the security of Israel. The demand of Palestinians for independence and peace is as legitimate as the demand of Israel for stability.”⁸⁴⁴ On this Israeli military operation, Turkey also endorsed the ‘Goldstone Report’ in the UN General Assembly voting on November 5, 2009, which “concluded that both Israel and Hamas had committed possible war crimes during the conflict.”⁸⁴⁵

⁸⁴² Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David'den Mavi Marmara'ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 256. As an example of its diplomatic activities, the ministerial delegation of the OIC, in which Turkey was represented by the State Minister Prof. Dr. Beşir Atalay, met with the representatives of the EU and Russia in May 2004. See, “BN: 22-31 Mayıs 2004, Filistin Konusunda Oluşturulan ‘İKÖ Bakanlar Delegasyonu’nun Quartet Üyeleri İle Yapmakta Olduğu Temaslar hk.,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bn_22--_31-mayis-2004___filistin-konusunda-olusturulan-iko-bakanlar-delegasyonu_nun-quartet-uyeleri-ile-yapmakta-oldugu-temaslar-hk_.tr.mfa.

⁸⁴³ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David'den Mavi Marmara'ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 281.

⁸⁴⁴ Mehmet Demirci, “Gazze’ye Verdiğiniz Sözleri Artık Tutun,” *Zaman*, 25 September 2009.

⁸⁴⁵ “By Recorded Vote, General Assembly Urges Israel, Palestinians to Conduct Credible, Independent Investigations into Alleged War Crimes in Gaza,” *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/ga10883.doc.htm>. The Goldstone Report was prepared by the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict headed by Richard Goldstone, and was released in September 2009. For the full text of the report, see, “Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied

In another example, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, expressed Turkey's concerns once again in the International Meeting on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, which convened under the auspices of the UN in İstanbul in May 2010, that "as for the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, security and freedom were under threat and the entire international community should be concerned," and moreover, "as for national and local dimensions of the issue, he said it was vital to help bolster Palestinian institutions, and called on the international community to help strengthen them."⁸⁴⁶ In consonance with its general policy, Turkey considered lending unwavering diplomatic support for the recognition of Palestinian statehood in international institutions, primarily the UN, a sine qua non for the credible realization of viable security for Palestine, and carried out its international diplomacy accordingly, as explained above in detail.⁸⁴⁷

6.2 Turkey's Economy and Palestine

Turkey's relations with Palestine were conditioned by the auxiliary commitment to the economy of Palestine as well. Establishing, sustaining, and safeguarding the economic foundations of Palestine and the economic wellbeing of Palestinians constituted an elementary consideration in Turkey's relations with Palestine, and its approach to Palestine's relations with Israel. According to Turkey, "since its

Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," *United Nations General Assembly*, 25 September 2009, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf>. Also see, İbrahim Kalın, "Goldstone Raporu, Gazze ve İran," *Sabah*, 3 October 2009.

⁸⁴⁶ "International Meeting on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process Opens in Istanbul Spotlights Path to Ending Occupation, Building Viable Palestinian State," *United Nations*, 25 May 2010, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/gapa11163.doc.htm>.

⁸⁴⁷ As another example, see the address of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the UN General Assembly on September 22, 2011, "Başbakan Erdoğan'ın BM Genel Kurulu'na Hitabı," *Hürriyet*, 23 September 2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/18811394.asp>.

establishment in 1994, Palestine recorded very slow and limited economic development due to the current political situation, embargo, blockade and occupation.”⁸⁴⁸ Furthermore, Turkey officially declared its conviction that the peace process between Palestine and Israel could “be successful only if it [was] complemented with an economic dimension. In this regard, the daily lives of the Palestinians [had] to be improved and a viable and sustainable socio-economic infrastructure of a future Palestinian state [needed to] be established.”⁸⁴⁹ In addition, to Turkey, “this [was] an ethical and humanitarian mission for the whole international community.”⁸⁵⁰

On the basis of this rationale, Turkey exercised economic diplomacy in its relations with Palestine, in Palestine’s relations with Israel as well as with the international community. For example, in May 2004, Turkey assigned Vehbi Dinçerler, a former state minister, as the Coordinator for Economic and Social Cooperation with Palestine responsible, among others, for “the elimination of bureaucratic obstacles before economic cooperation between Turkey and Palestine.”⁸⁵¹ In Palestine’s relations with Israel, Turkey was uncompromising in its call for the cessation of the Israeli economic embargo imposed upon Palestinians in Gaza, and after the *Mavi Marmara* incident, Turkey declared the abolition of the economic embargo as one of its demands from Israel for the normalization of relations.⁸⁵²

⁸⁴⁸ “Turkey-Palestine Economic and Trade Relations,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-palastine.en.mfa.

⁸⁴⁹ “Turkey’s Political Relations with the State of Palestine,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-the-palestinian-national-authority.en.mfa.

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵¹ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David’den Mavi Marmara’ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 257.

⁸⁵² For example, Turkish President Abdullah Gül expressed Turkey’s position on the illegality of the Israeli embargo on Palestinians in Gaza and Turkey’s demand for its abolition in two interviews with

Turkey continued to promote and take part in international initiatives for the provision of economic and financial assistance to Palestine. In one example, Turkey pledged \$150 million as economic assistance to Palestine for the years 2008-2010 in the International Donors' Conference for the Palestinian State convened in December 2007 in Paris, France.⁸⁵³ In the relevant time period, Turkey carried out its economic relations with Palestine on the three areas of trade, investment, and energy.

6.2.1 Trade

As an early example of Turkey's strong interest in cultivating economic relations with Palestine, Turkey signed a provisional free trade agreement with Palestine on July 20, 2004 in İstanbul, which came into effect in June 2005.⁸⁵⁴ Conveying the Turkish concern for the economic wellbeing of the Palestinians, in the preamble of the agreement, Turkey and Palestine underlined "the need to intensify existing efforts to promote economic and social development in the West Bank and the Gaza

international media outlets in February and September 2011. See, Abdullah Gül, *Global Perspektif: Yurtdışı Basın Mülakatları*, pp. 148-153, 190-198.

⁸⁵³ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David'den Mavi Marmara'ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 274. In the Conference, "delegations from 87 countries and international organisations pledged a total of \$ 7.4 bn to support Palestinian institution-building and economic recovery for the next three years." See, "International Donors' Conference for the Palestinian State, Paris - 17 December 2007, Final Statement of the Chair and Co-chairs," *UNISPAL*, 17 December 2007,

<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/4CB6C31B95E505B7852573B500568508>. Also see, Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, *The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine: Relief from Conflict or Development Delayed?* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011).

⁸⁵⁴ For the full text of the agreement in Turkish and English, see, "Filistin," *Ekonomi Bakanlığı*, http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/portal/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pages/content/htmlViewer.jspx?contentId=UCM%23dDocName%3AEK-208255&parentPage=dis_iliskiler&contentTitle=Filistin&countryName=&_afrLoop=1306153507872266&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=whj9kdcou_143#!%40%40%3FcountryName%3D%26_afrWindowId%3Dwhj9kdcou_143%26_afrLoop%3D1306153507872266%26contentId%3DUCM%2523dDocName%253AEK-208255%26parentPage%3Ddis_iliskiler%26contentTitle%3DFilistin%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dwhj9kdcou_197.

Strip.”⁸⁵⁵ Nonetheless, economic adversities in Palestine bred chiefly by the Israeli occupation frustrated the development of economic and commercial relations between Turkey and Palestine, and bilateral commercial transactions remained apathetic in absolute terms. Nevertheless, in relative terms, bilateral commercial transactions proceeded at a quite remarkable pace.




Figure 19: Turkey’s Trade with Palestine between 2003 and 2014 (in 1000 \$)⁸⁵⁶

In absolute terms, bilateral trade volume was merely \$93 million at its highest point in 2014. Still, in relative terms, between 2003 and 2014, it increased exponentially with an average annual growth rate of %104. While Turkish exports increased %1301 in fourteen years, Turkish imports increased %451. In addition, there was a good deal of trade surplus in favor of Turkey constituting, for example, %95 of total trade volume in 2014. In particular, “plastic products, kitchen stuff, textile products,

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁶ Data is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute. Refer to, “Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri,” TÜİK, <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/menu.zul>.

industrial machines and food products such as legume, breadstuff, sugar and sugar products, chocolate, biscuit constitute[d] the main part of Turkey's export to Palestine," and "Turkey's import from Palestine consist[ed] of leather and semi-finished goods."⁸⁵⁷

Turkish private sector, on the other hand, continued its efforts to improve business relationships with Palestine. The Turkish-Palestine Business Council, which was established in 1994, organized several joint meetings gathering Turkish and Palestinian private sectors together.⁸⁵⁸ In its joint meeting in February 2010, for example, the Palestinian Chairman of the Council, Kamal Hassouneh, put forward some suggestions for the development of business relations between Turkey and Palestine including the establishment of a joint industrial zone in the Palestinian city of al-Khalil.⁸⁵⁹ In another example, the Turkey-Palestine Business Forum was held in July 2010 in İstanbul. Speaking at the Business Forum, Zafer Çağlayan, the Turkish State Minister who was responsible for foreign trade, stressed Turkey's "intensive efforts on the improvement of our brothers' [Palestinians] economic standards [and] the transformation of there [Palestine] into an investment area."⁸⁶⁰ Turkey and Palestine, as it appeared, were both eager to consolidate investment relations as a reliable foundation for the further cultivation of bilateral commercial relations.

6.2.2 Investment

⁸⁵⁷ "Turkey-Palestine Economic and Trade Relations," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-palastine.en.mfa.

⁸⁵⁸ See, "Türkiye-Filistin İş Konseyi," *DEİK*, http://www.deik.org.tr/Konsey/113/Türkiye_Filistin.html.

⁸⁵⁹ "Filistin, Ekonomide de İlgi Bekliyor," *Milli Gazete*, 3 February 2010.

⁸⁶⁰ "Filistin'e Sanayi Bölgesi Kuracağız," *Hürriyet*, 13 July 2010.

An early attempt to promote investment relations between Turkey and Palestine, together with Israel, came with the formation of the Ankara Forum at the initiative of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB in Turkish acronym), which held its first meeting in April 2005 in Ankara with the participation of senior representatives from the business sectors of Turkey, Palestine, and Israel.⁸⁶¹ Specifically, “the objective of the Ankara Forum was declared to be enabling business people’s contribution to the peace building process in Palestine through feasible projects.”⁸⁶² The most potentially substantial project of the Ankara Forum was related to the reinvigoration of the Palestinian industrial free zone located in Erez, Gaza.

In the third meeting of the Ankara Forum in September 2005, for instance, participants “reiterated their determination to contribute to the [peace] process by revitalizing the Palestine Industrial Free Zone through an Ankara Forum based developer-company,” and the Ankara Forum called “upon the respective governments to reach an understanding on the requirements of the Project on the Revitalization of the Palestinian Industrial Free Zone (formerly, Erez Industrial Estate).”⁸⁶³ To that end, “on 4-5 January 2006, Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul visited Gaza to sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Israel and the

⁸⁶¹ Kohei Imai, “Turkey’s Norm Diffusion Policies toward the Middle East: Turkey’s Role of Norm Entrepreneur and Norm Transmitter,” *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. 42, 2011, pp. 27-60, pp. 30-40.

⁸⁶² “Ankara Forum for Economic Cooperation between Palestine, Israel and Turkey Meeting Held,” *TEPAV*, 27 April 2005, <http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/haberler/s/1900>.

⁸⁶³ “Joint Declaration of the 3rd Meeting of the Ankara Forum 20-21 September 2005,” *TEPAV*, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1255425530r1448.Ankara_Forumu_3_Deklerasyon.pdf, p. 1.

Palestinian Authority (PA) regarding Turkey's construction and management of the Erez project."⁸⁶⁴

During the visit, Abdullah Gül stated: "While supporting Palestinian efforts to establish their independent state, we also place great importance on them being able to stand on their feet economically. This is the first concrete international project to address these issues."⁸⁶⁵ Nonetheless, due to multifaceted political and economic drawbacks, the project designated as 'the Industry for Peace' shifted its attention from Gaza to West Bank, and the Palestinian city of Janin was ultimately chosen as the location of the project. The memorandum of understanding to that effect was belatedly signed in Jerusalem in November 2013.⁸⁶⁶

In addition, as a form of Turkish investment in the Palestinian economy with the objective of upholding the economic development of Palestine, Turkey provided assistance to Palestine through several means. First of all, every so often, Turkey officially granted donations to Palestine both in kind and in cash.⁸⁶⁷ More importantly, Turkey embarked on multiple projects in Palestine through the Turkish

⁸⁶⁴ Robert Olson, "Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2006, pp. 13-45, p. 26.

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁶ "Filistin'de 'Barış İçin Sanayi'ye Bir Adım Daha...", *TEPAV*, <http://www.tepav.org.tr/tr/haberler/s/3584>. Unfortunately, Turkey's Central Bank does not include Palestine in its registry for foreign direct investment in and from Turkey. Therefore, an accurate assessment of bilateral investment relations between Turkey and Palestine is not possible. See, "Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Merkez Bankası*, <http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/>.
⁸⁶⁷ For example, on the Turkish donation of wheat flour to Palestine, see, "Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı," *Resmi Gazete*, No. 26191, 7 June 2006, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/06/20060607.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/06/20060607.htm>. On the Turkish donation of \$ 1,1 million to Palestine in cash, see, "Milletlerarası Andlaşma," *Resmi Gazete*, No. 26753, 11 January 2008, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/01/20080111-1.htm/20080111.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2008/01/20080111-1.htm>.

Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA in Turkish acronym), which was the leading state institution under the Prime Ministry responsible for the formation and implementation of policies related to Turkey's official development assistance (ODA).⁸⁶⁸ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the inauguration of TİKA's program coordination office in Ramallah during his visit to Palestine in May 2005.⁸⁶⁹

In the subsequent period, TİKA carried out and concluded a wide array of projects aimed at improving the economic and social conditions of Palestinians. For example, in 2013, Palestine ranked first as the largest recipient country of Turkey's official development assistance.⁸⁷⁰ Among the projects TİKA was engaged in were the construction of the Nablus Turkish Girls High School, provision of furniture and office equipment for Tubas Turkish Friendship Hospital, provision of clean drinking water for Jabalia, capacity building for the Palestinian National Police, 'the Will Project' for war victims and handicapped in Gaza, agricultural capacity building program for Gaza, and urgent medication and medical supplies to Gaza.⁸⁷¹ More to the point, the share of Palestine in the annual budget of TİKA increased significantly. While in 2008, it was only 2,2%, it amounted to 18% in 2013.⁸⁷² Moreover, in

⁸⁶⁸ On Turkey's ODA and TİKA, see, for example, Cemalettin Haşimi, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014, pp. 127-145. Also see, Pinar Ipek, "Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2015, pp. 173-193.

⁸⁶⁹ Nurçin Yıldız, "Turkey's Recent Palestinian Policy," *Hürriyet Daily News*, 4 October 2005.

⁸⁷⁰ "Annual Report 2013," *Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency*, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf>, p. 18. Palestine was followed by Tunisia, Somali, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ibid.

⁸⁷¹ Ibid., pp-134-139.

⁸⁷² Ibid., p. 135. In the sectoral distribution of TİKA expenditures for projects in Palestine in 2013, the health sector was the foremost one with a percentage of 89,6. Ibid.

TİKA's cooperation with local NGOs in other countries, Palestine was the fourth country among the recipients of Turkish development assistance.⁸⁷³

In the same manner, the Turkish Red Crescent intensified its efforts to provide humanitarian and development assistance to Palestine through sustainable projects especially after 2008. In February 2008, a delegation from the Turkish Red Crescent headed by the Director General paid a visit to Palestine, and signed memoranda of understanding with the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs and the Palestinian Red Crescent.⁸⁷⁴ In the wake of the clashes of 2008 between Palestine and Israel, coordination teams were assigned in the cities of Jerusalem in Palestine, Tel Aviv in Israel, and al-Arish in Egypt.⁸⁷⁵ Subsequently, the Turkish Red Crescent involved in a range of development projects in Palestine, especially in Gaza, from health services to agricultural projects.⁸⁷⁶ Between July 2014 and July 2015, the Turkish Red Crescent provided \$6,7 million worth of humanitarian and development aid to Palestine.⁸⁷⁷

6.2.3 Energy

Turkey's energy relations with Palestine were not present in the relevant time period owing to the absence of any meaningful potential in bilateral energy relations with specific reference to oil, natural gas, and electricity. Similar to investment relations

⁸⁷³ Ibid., p. 228. The first three countries were Syria, Somalia, and Niger in order. Ibid.

⁸⁷⁴ "Gazze İnsani Yardım Operasyonu," *Türk Kızılayı*, Haziran 2015, http://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/41374669_haziran-2015-gazze-insani-yardim-operasyonu.pdf, p. 2.

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸⁷⁶ For the detailed specification of projects, refer to the abovementioned report of the Turkish Red Crescent.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 18. Of note, Turkish NGOs were also involved in a myriad of development projects in Palestine in the relevant time period.

though, Turkey's concern for the economic foundations of Palestine and the economic wellbeing of Palestinians culminated in the provision of development assistance to Palestine in terms of energy infrastructure. Compared to other sectors, Turkish development assistance in energy was not sizeable, and mainly consisted of the provision of electricity generators to municipalities in Palestine, especially in Gaza, suffering chronic electricity shortages. For example, in 2011, Turkey provided six electricity generators to different municipalities in Gaza.⁸⁷⁸ In 2012, a project on the rehabilitation of ten wells and their connection to the electricity network in Gaza was completed, and one electricity generator was installed in the city of Jabalia.⁸⁷⁹ Finally, in 2013, four more electricity generators were provided to the Gaza municipality.⁸⁸⁰

6.3 Turkey's Identity and Palestine

Identity, to repeat, gained palpable salience both in the discourse and practice of Turkish foreign policy in the period between March 2003 and August 2014. This was also the case in Turkey's relations with Palestine, only the extent of it was exceptional. Turkey's multiple and shifting self-conceptions, self-representations, and self-identifications conditioned, shaped, and propelled Turkey's relations with Palestine. In the verbal and oral discourses of Turkish foreign policymakers, Palestine was conceived as a special state with which Turkey was almost inseparable and the Palestinians a special nation for whom Turkey was innately responsible. For example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emphatically expressed in his speech delivered on

⁸⁷⁸ "2011 Faaliyet Raporu," *TİKA*, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/faaliyet-raporu-2011.pdf>, p. 166.

⁸⁷⁹ "2012 Annual Report," *TİKA*, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/tika2012AnnRep.pdf>, p. 223.

⁸⁸⁰ "Annual Report 2013," p. 137.

the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from the Islamic University of Gaza in April 2010 that took place in Ankara:

I need to utter this very explicitly [that] the fate of Turkey is not separate from the fate of Palestine, and likewise the fate of Palestine is not separate from the fate of Turkey, [and] the fate of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Gaza is not separate from the fate of İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir. The suffering of Palestine is our suffering, [and] the joy of Palestine is our joy as it has been throughout the history.⁸⁸¹

In another example, in a speech in January 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated:

“When any organ of a body feels pain, the whole body feels pain. Likewise, when children in Gaza were massacred, we felt their pain as if our own children went through a massacre. Jerusalem’s problem is our problem. Gaza’s problem is our problem.”⁸⁸² Exemplary statements conveying the exceedingly high degree of relevance of Palestine in and for Turkey’s self-conception, self-representation, and self-identification can be multiplied. In short, in the relevant time period, Turkey’s person identity, role identity, and social identity were verified in and through Turkey’s relations with Palestine.

6.3.1 Person Identity

Turkey’s person identity, to reiterate, as the set of idiosyncratic attributes, which defined and characterized Turkey as a unique agent in international relations for the policy makers in the relevant time period, and the successful verification of which

⁸⁸¹ “Erdoğan’a Fahri Doktora Ünvanı Verildi,” *Yeni Şafak*, 16 April 2010.

⁸⁸² Quoted in S. Gülден Ayman, “Regional Aspirations and Limits of Power: Turkish-Iranian Relations in the New Middle East,” *Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-21, p. 13.

was expected to increase self-authenticity of Turkey, arguably constituted by the fact that Turkey was the successor to the Ottoman Empire, carrying moral responsibility especially towards the oppressed.⁸⁸³ In February 2006, responding to the criticisms against the visit of the Hamas delegation to Ankara, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül referred to Turkey's historical inheritance of the Ottoman Empire: "Who would be interested in Palestine other than me [Turkey]? The title deeds, the archives of Palestine, Israel, Jerusalem, [and of] all this geography are in my possession. We gifted the documents related to the title deeds of these lands to Palestine as recent as the last year."⁸⁸⁴ In another example, in his address to the General Assembly of the Turkish Parliament in July 2010, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu explained Turkey's endorsement of the question of Jerusalem as its own with reference to the Ottoman Empire: "Why is it our problem? Now, the administration of the religious sites in East Jerusalem is still governed by the conventions remained from the Ottoman [Empire]. There is not any new practice, new law [regarding the issue]."⁸⁸⁵

The conception Turkey as a normative agent carrying an intrinsic moral responsibility in its relations with Palestine and in its approaches towards the developments regarding Palestine heavily conditioned Turkey's policy assessments and the associated discursive and practical attitudes. The Turkish sense of moral

⁸⁸³ This self-conception was not peculiar to the JDP government, and antedated it in Turkish foreign policy. For instance, Ali Dinçer, a member of the Turkish Parliament from the left-wing Republican People's Party (CHP in Turkish acronym), in his speech expressing his views on the dispatch of Turkish soldiers to the Palestinian city of al-Khalil in a parliamentary session in February 1997, referred to Turkey's succession to the Ottoman Empire as the rationale of the parliamentary decision: "We governed today's geography of Palestine-Israel for centuries...They [Palestine and Israel] trusted us for the security of the al-Khalil Mosque before anyone else. This is an honor for us." See, Erkan Ertoşun, *Camp David'den Mavi Marmara'ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 93-94.

⁸⁸⁴ "Ortadoğu'nun Tapusu Bizde," *Sabah*, 20 February 2006. Also see, İbrahim Karagül, "Türkiye İsrail'i Köşeye Sıkıştırdı," *Yeni Şafak*, 20 March 2009.

⁸⁸⁵ "Davutoğlu'ndan Çok Sert Açıklama," *Bugün*, 1 July 2010.

responsibility was additionally fortified by the entrenched conviction that Palestine was under an iniquitous occupation, and the Palestinians were under a depraved oppression. Receiving his Palestinian counterpart Nabil Shaath in July 2003, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül stated that Turkey had “ethical and moral responsibility towards the region [Palestine/the Middle East] and was resolute in fulfilling these [responsibilities].”⁸⁸⁶

In January 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu once again invoked Turkey’s responsibility to describe the underlying reason behind Turkey’s objections to Israeli military operations against Gaza: “Turkey has taken a principled [and] definite attitude about the assaults against Gaza. This is our [Turkey’s] humanitarian, historical responsibility.”⁸⁸⁷ In a similar vein, on the same day Turkey declared a series of sanctions against Israel on account of the *Mavi Marmara* incident, Turkish President Abdullah Gül stressed that Turkey “as the most powerful country in the region, [would] make every effort to protect not only its own rights but also the rights of all the oppressed,”⁸⁸⁸ implicating that Turkey would persist in supporting Palestine even at the risk of severe disputes with Israel.

One of the most explicit statements of Turkey’s sense of morality and moral responsibility in its relations with and policies about Palestine was expressed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2014. Excoriating Israel for its military assaults in Palestine, Erdoğan made an overly austere assessment of Israel and other states,

⁸⁸⁶ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David’den Mavi Marmara’ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 254.

⁸⁸⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 397.

⁸⁸⁸ “BM Raporu Yok Hükmündedir,” *Milliyet*, 2 September 2011.

which had taken an indifferent attitude towards Israeli policies: “Israel will drown in its own blood sooner or later... Each and every country, each and every society in the world that do not come out against the oppression and murders of Israel will be condemned to bear this black stain [that is, silence before Israeli actions] on its forehead for all eternity.”⁸⁸⁹

Contrasting this indifferent attitude to Turkey’s assertive attitude over the issue, Erdoğan contended that the Turkish government “once again retrieved to Turkey the virtue of standing with the oppressed against the oppressor,” as Turkish foreign policymakers were “listening to the voice of their conscience, and were fulfilling the necessity of the law of fraternity with the people there [Palestinians].”⁸⁹⁰ Erdoğan summarized the Turkish policy with an unambiguous emphasis on Turkey’s responsibility: “We as Turkey, as a nation have historical responsibility towards this geography [Palestine/the Middle East]. Everyone would turn its back to these people [Palestinians], to this geography but we can never turn [our back to them].”⁸⁹¹

6.3.2 Role Identity

Turkey’s role identity, to reiterate, as the internalized meanings of roles that Turkey applied to itself, which were the sets of expectations tied to Turkey’s social position that guided its foreign policy attitudes and behavior in the Middle East, became an abiding subject of scholarly debates and political controversies on the ‘Turkish model.’ The Turkish model, in essence, was conceived as the exercise of democracy

⁸⁸⁹ “Başbakan Erdoğan İftarda Konuştu,” *Akşam*, 18 July 2014.

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹¹ *Ibid.*

in a Muslim society. As such, Turkey affirmed the legitimacy of the results of the Palestinian legislative elections that took place in January 2006. While some international actors, such as the US, disputed the election of Hamas, Turkey did not hesitate to recognize it, and thus was subjected to criticisms.

In response to these criticisms, Turkish foreign policymakers referred to the democratic credentials of Turkey together with its consistency in its approach to Palestine from an identity perspective. In December 2006, Ahmet Davutoğlu argued that if Turkey had applied “double standards like other actors,” that is, endorsing the elections while not acknowledging its results, it would have lost “its prestige and reputation.”⁸⁹² Nevertheless, the effective and prevailing division of political authority in Palestine between two rival factions in the wake of the legislative elections prevented further attributions, albeit tacit, to the ‘Turkish Model’ in Turkey’s relations with Palestine.

The two most prominent roles of Turkey, particularly in its foreign policy towards the Middle East, were arguably the mediator and the peace/order builder, which, on the other hand, did not have a consequential effect on Turkey’s relations with Palestine despite some tentative attempts. In terms of the mediator role, notwithstanding Turkey’s revelation of its intention to get involved in mediation between Palestine and Israel in the beginning of the relevant time period, the subsequent eruption of internal struggles in Palestine and the progressive

⁸⁹² Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 297.

deterioration of Turkey's relations with Israel impeded the realization of Turkey's intention.⁸⁹³

Still, in a notable case of mediation between Palestine and Israel, Turkey assisted the two states to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution to the protracted conflict over the release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in October 2011, held in captivity for several years by Palestinian militants.⁸⁹⁴ Somewhat overstating Turkey's role, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç contended that Turkey "had very significant contributions to the conduct of an exchange for humanitarian purposes and the preservation of the life of Shalit" over the course of his captivity, and that Israeli President Shimon Peres had expressed Turkey's contribution demonstrated "how much Turkey [was] sensitive and initiative-oriented."⁸⁹⁵ Arınç also expressed his opinion that "the whole world observed Turkey's positive input" in the conclusion of the deal between Palestine and Israel.⁸⁹⁶

Turkey showed a good deal of interest in the reconciliation process between the Palestinian factions. Nevertheless, Turkey's expressed aspiration to assume a pivotal mediation role in the reconciliation process could not be fulfilled inasmuch as the Palestinians preferred other regional actors as mediators for the resolution of their internal dispute. For example, "in February 2007, the Palestinian government of

⁸⁹³ Besides these reasons, the dominant role of other regional and international actors, such as, Egypt and the US, in the peace process between Palestine and Israel had also a restraining effect on Turkey's mediation efforts.

⁸⁹⁴ Gilad Shalit was released as part of a deal concerning the exchange of the Israeli soldier with Palestinian prisoners. See, for example, Ben Quinn, "Gilad Shalit Freed in Exchange for Palestinian Prisoners," *The Guardian*, 18 October 2011.

⁸⁹⁵ "Şalit Hayatını Türkiye'ye Borçlu," *Sabah*, 19 October 2011.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

national unity, albeit short-lived, was created at a summit in Mecca”⁸⁹⁷ with the mediation of Saudi Arabia, which had initiated the process and “also promised three quarters of a billion dollars in foreign aid to the unity government.”⁸⁹⁸ However, the national unity government collapsed soon after, and the negotiations to find a mutually acceptable outcome to the stalemate in Palestinian politics ensued. Similarly, the two Palestinian factions signed a new reconciliation agreement in May 2011 this time in Cairo, which was mediated by the Egyptian government.⁸⁹⁹

The venue for the subsequent accord between the Palestinians was Doha, Qatar, signed in February 2012 under the auspices of the Emir of Qatar.⁹⁰⁰ In the lengthy reconciliation process between the Palestinians that ultimately culminated in the agreement of April 2014, Turkey’s role was only confined to exhorting in earnest the Palestinian factions to settle their internal disputes as early as possible and act in harmony. Turkey’s peace/order builder role encountered similar complications. An overriding setback for Turkey was the reception of its self-assumed role by the concerned parties. Simply, Palestine was more liable to exercise peace diplomacy and conduct reconciliation negotiations in partnership with other third parties both in its relations with Israel, and in its internal relations.

⁸⁹⁷ Mai Yamani, “The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia,” *Survival*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2008, pp. 143-156, p. 143.

⁸⁹⁸ Joseph Kostiner, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Fluctuation of Regional Coordination,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2009, pp. 417-429, p. 427.

⁸⁹⁹ For the text of the Cairo Agreement, see, “B4. Fatah-Hamas Unity Agreement, Cairo, 4 May 2011,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2011, pp. 212-214. On the relations of the Palestinian factions with Egypt, see, for example, Beverley Milton-Edwards, “ Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic Shifts?” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2013, pp. 60-72.

⁹⁰⁰ For the full text of the Doha Declaration, see, Yazan al-Saadi, “Palestinian Reconciliation: A History of Documents,” *al-Akhbar*, 28 April 2014, <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19580>. On mediation in Qatari foreign policy, see, for example, Mehran Kamrawa, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2011, pp. 539-556.

6.3.3 Social Identity

Turkey's social identity, to repeat, as its self-identification with other states in terms of shared social categories, was highly decisive in its relations with Palestine, the successful verification of which was expected to increase Turkey's self-worth. In order to achieve self-identification with Palestine, and to attain Palestine's reciprocity in constructing, restoring, and reviving shared social categories, Turkish foreign policy makers frequently invoked the commonality of history, geography, religion, and culture/civilization between Turkey and Palestine. Turkish policy makers habitually invoked the common history between Turkey and Palestine, especially within a normative framework of responsibility conceived by Turkish foreign policymakers to be embedded in history.

In addition to the exemplary statements of Turkish foreign policymakers mentioned above, Turkey launched an extensive program for the restoration of historical artifacts in Palestine constructed and erected during the Ottoman rule as the material remnants, embodiments, and bearers of a shared history.⁹⁰¹ Turkish foreign policymakers' invocation of the shared history was reciprocated by the Palestinian leaders. For example, in his address to the Turkish Parliament in October 2012, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas expressed at the outset his "great pleasure to pay his first official visit to the brotherly Turkey after the attainment of the State of Palestine of the observer member status at the United Nations."⁹⁰² Referring to the

⁹⁰¹ For the restoration of two historical monuments built during the reign of Abdul Hamid II (1842-1918), see, "Nablus'taki Tarihi Saat Kulesi Açıldı," *Sabah*, 20 December 2012; "TİKA'dan Filistin'de Tarihi Restorasyon," *Milliyet*, 12 May 2014.

⁹⁰² "1.-Filistin Cumhurbaşkanı Mahmud Abbas'ın, Genel Kurula Hitaben Konuşması," *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 36, Legislative Year. 3, 10 December 2012, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d24/c036/tbmm24036036.pdf>, pp. 399-400, p. 399.

shared history in a remarkably symbolic manner alluding to the assistance of Turkey to Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas continued: “This is not of course a situation to be found curious since it is the Ottoman-Turkish walls that protect and surround our al-Quds al-Sharif [Jerusalem] and the doors that open into there are also Ottoman-Turkish doors.”⁹⁰³

Geography as the shared bond and the basis of spatial affinity between the peoples of Turkey and Palestine was frequently invoked by Turkish foreign policy makers as well. As an example, in the numerous selections of cities Turkish foreign policymakers compiled to characterize the geography they identified Turkey with, such as those mentioned in the ‘balcony speeches’ of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after successive election victories, cities located in Palestine, especially Jerusalem, were invariably mentioned. In one example, in his balcony speech after the legislative elections on June 12, 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared: “Today, the hope of the oppressed, the persecuted has won on a global scale...Ramallah, Nablus, Janin, the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza have won as much as Diyarbakır.”⁹⁰⁴

Religion, and the Muslim World as its representational embodiment, without any doubt, possessed a privileged position in the foundational worldviews and the cognitive schemas of Turkish foreign policymakers. Religious affinity served as the unmistakable foundation of Turkey’s discursive and practical approaches to its relations with and developments about Palestine. Of particular gravity was the spiritual status of Jerusalem/al-Quds in Islam, and the avid religious sensibilities of

⁹⁰³ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁴ “Seçimin Galibi Türkiye,” *Hürriyet*, 13 June 2011.

Turkish foreign policymakers conceiving the city and the Islamic shrines in it consecrated in creed, and thus unassailably sacrosanct.⁹⁰⁵ Accordingly, Jerusalem occupied a central place in Turkey's relations with Palestine.

Writing in 2001, Ahmet Davutoğlu argued that it was “very difficult to resolve the Palestinian and the Middle East problems without the settlement of the question of Jerusalem, in general, [and] al-Aqsa Mosque, in particular.”⁹⁰⁶ And Davutoğlu continued: “To put it in a straightforward formulation, the issue of the Middle East can be reduced to the Palestinian Question, the Palestinian Question to the issue of Jerusalem, and the issue of Jerusalem to the issue of al-Aqsa Mosque.”⁹⁰⁷ In an interview in April 2002, Davutoğlu accused Israel of “aiming at changing the demographic structure and the character of Jerusalem thorough intensifying the concentration [of power/of population] around Jerusalem.”⁹⁰⁸ In another interview in the same month, Davutoğlu identified Jerusalem “as the greatest matter of contention” between Palestine and Israel, and reiterated his assertion that the “Palestine-Israel problem [could] not be resolved without the settlement of the issue of Jerusalem.”⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰⁵ The most sacred place for Muslims in Jerusalem is the area called as al-Haram al-Sharif, inhabiting al-Masjid al-Aqsa/al-Aqsa Mosque and Qubbat al-Sakhrah/Dome of the Rock. The sanctity of the area and the buildings on it is derived from the references to them in the revelation of the God, i.e., al-Qur'an, and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), i.e., Hadith. See, for example, Abdallah al-Khatib, “Jerusalem in the Qur'an,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2001, pp. 25-53. For the place of Jerusalem in the geopolitics of the Middle East, see, M. A. Muqtedar Khan, *Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Relations* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004). Also see, Yitzhak Reiter, *Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁹⁰⁶ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, p. 395.

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid. Of note, Ahmet Davutoğlu was of the opinion that “a Jerusalem under the authority of Palestine also accommodating the Christian Arabs [was] more preferable for the Europe to a Jerusalem given as a whole to the sovereignty of the Jewish people.” Ibid., p. 351.

⁹⁰⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 66.

⁹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 69. In addition, according to Davutoğlu, Jerusalem was “not an issue over which neither Muslims nor Palestine nor [Yasser] Arafat was entitled to make concessions alone.” Ibid., p. 71.

Turkish foreign policymakers conveyed the sensitivity of Turkey over the issue to their Israeli counterparts every now and then, at least until the near collapse of bilateral relations after the *Mavi Marmara* incident. In his visit to Israel in May 2005, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that Turkey “had sensitivity about the issue of al-Aqsa Mosque and Israel need[ed] to take this into consideration in the steps it [would] take about the holy sites [of Muslims].”⁹¹⁰ In general, the concern of Turkish foreign policymakers about Jerusalem, if not the Islamic holy sites within it, seemed to be espousing the preservation of the religiously pluralistic character of the city. For example Ahmet Davutoğlu, stated in January 2005 that Jerusalem was “an issue that concern[ed] everyone (Muslims, Christians, and Jews). Therefore, it would be misleading to look at such an issue exclusively from the perspective of political and tactical arrangements.”⁹¹¹ On the contrary, Davutoğlu continued, “looking at the issue from the viewpoint of universal principles, the special status of Jerusalem, which respect[ed] the sacred sites of all religions and ensure[d] their habitation, need[ed] be perpetuated.”⁹¹²

Unsettled by the Israeli excavation activities conducted in close proximity to the Islamic holy sites, Turkey dispatched “a technical inspection team to inquire about the recent excavation work being held near the Haram al-Sherif [sic] compound” in February 2007 inasmuch as religious sensibilities continued to structure Turkey’s practical and discursive attitudes towards the developments regarding Palestine, and

⁹¹⁰ Erkan Ertosun, *Camp David’den Mavi Marmara’ya Filistin Politikamız*, p. 259.

⁹¹¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, p. 195.

⁹¹² Ibid.

the Islamic sacred sites located in it.⁹¹³ Patently relating Turkey's position on the status of Jerusalem to Turkey's religious affinity with Palestine, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed in July 2010: "East Jerusalem belongs to Palestine. That place [East Jerusalem] is Palestinian territory according to the UN law and in the deliberations conducted within the framework of the peace process there is a provision that this place be delivered to Palestine. East Jerusalem is to be given to Palestine and we are to perform Salah here [East Jerusalem/al-Aqsa Mosque] all together."⁹¹⁴

Furthermore, in cases when the religious rights of the Palestinian Muslims and the sanctity of Islamic holy sites in Palestine were deemed to be insolently encroached upon by Israeli activities, Turkey took quite vehement stances. For example, upon the entering of the Israeli security forces to al-Haram al-Sharif in March 2013, Turkey strongly condemned the incident stating that al-Aqsa Mosque was "open to all Muslims and Israel [did] not have the right to impose any restrictions on the entry to the sacred sites," and further announcing that Turkey would "continue to spend every effort for the preservation of the historical and religious identity of Jerusalem in accordance with its sacred status for the Muslims."⁹¹⁵

⁹¹³ Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, "Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 100.

⁹¹⁴ "Evet, Doğu Kudüs'te Bir Gün Namaz Kılacağız," *Hürriyet*, 10 July 2010.

⁹¹⁵ "No: 62, 8 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Entering of Israeli Forces to the Courtyard of Al-Haram Ash-Sharif," *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-62_-8-march-2013_-press-release-regarding-the-entering-of-israeli-forces-to-the-courtyard-of-al-haram-ash-sharif.en.mfa. In another case, the entrance of Israeli security forces to al-Aqsa Mosque in November 2014 elicited a harsher reaction from Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan likened the Israeli aggression to an assault against Turkey. See, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: O Saldırı Türkiye'ye Yapılmış Bir Saldırıdır," *Hürriyet*, 20 November 2014.

Turkey also took part in regional and international initiatives to increase awareness about Jerusalem as an essential part of its Palestinian policy. As a notable example, Turkey hosted the ‘International Meeting on the Question of Jerusalem’ in May 2014 in Ankara, with an official declaration that the meeting would “constitute an opportunity for strengthening international cooperation and solidarity aimed at finding a just and lasting solution to the question of Palestine by establishing an independent and sovereign State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital.”⁹¹⁶ In his passionate opening speech, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu expressed that whatever was demanded of it by the international community, Turkey would be ready “for Palestine, [and] for Jerusalem with all the means it could provide.”⁹¹⁷

In a larger framework of reference, civilizational association constituted an intermittent theme in the verbal and oral discourses of Turkish foreign policy makers in Turkey’s relations with Palestine. In this civilization framework of reference, the foundational role of Jerusalem and the Islamic sacred sites in it, especially al-Aqsa Mosque, was emphasized. In the aforementioned opening speech to the ‘International Meeting on the Question of Jerusalem,’ for example, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu once again stressed the constitutive place of Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque for Islamic civilization of which Turkey was conceived to be a significant part: “Neither the Palestinian Question nor the issue of Jerusalem can be

⁹¹⁶ “No: 144, 11 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the ‘International Meeting on the Question of Jerusalem’ to be Held on 12-13 May 2014 in Ankara,” *Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-144_-11-may-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-_international-meeting-on-the-question-of-jerusalem_-to-be-held-on-12_13-may-2014-in-ankara.en.mfa.

⁹¹⁷ “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun, Uluslararası Kudüs Toplantısı’nın Açılışında Yaptıkları Konuşma, 12 Mayıs 2014, Ankara,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun_-uluslararasi-kudus-toplantisi_nin-acilisinda-yaptiklari-konusma_-12-mayis-2014_-an.tr.mfa.

resolved without the settlement of the issue of al-Aqsa Mosque, that is, that al-Aqsa Mosque is an inseparable and essential element of Islamic civilization and culture is confirmed and guaranteed.”⁹¹⁸

6.4 Turkey’s Motives and Palestine

Turkey’s influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine in the relevant time period were based on the motive of identity, but not on the motives of security and economy. Turkey’s only motive to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine differed *within* itself in the relevant time period. The pattern of this differentiation could be briefly examined here drawing on the preceding within-case analysis of Turkey’s motives in its relations with Palestine, leaving the explicit discussion of the causes of the differentiation to the last chapter. In the relevant time period, in Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine, the significance of sub-motive elements as subject matters of Turkey’s considerations exhibited variation *in degree* relative to each other. To put it differently, Turkey’s motive to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differed *within* itself with respect to the degree of significance of each sub-motive element relative to each other.

The motive of identity for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine differed within itself in the relevant time period. In Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine, in reference to person identity, the unique self-conception that Turkey was the rightful successor to the

⁹¹⁸ Ibid.

Ottoman Empire in possession of an inherent moral responsibility towards people, especially towards the oppressed, profoundly informed Turkey's assessments and attitudes towards the developments concerning Palestine. In the diplomatic discourse and practice of Turkey, Palestine was conceived as being under occupation, and Palestinians were conceived as being under oppression, constituting a permanent source of reference for the moral responsibility of Turkey.

In reference to role identity, Turkey's mediator and the peace/order builder roles did not yield satisfactory results regardless of Turkey's incessant interest and intermittent efforts due to the emergence of an uncompromising internal struggle among rival Palestinian factions and the antagonistic escalation observed in Turkey's relations with Israel. In addition, for the settlement of their internal disagreements, as well as their disputes with Israel, Palestinians preferred the mediation of other regional actors rather than Turkey, obviating the enactment of Turkey's self-assumed roles.

In reference to social identity, Turkey's social identity was foundational to Turkey's practical and discursive approaches to the developments, and reactions to the incidents, related to Palestine. Turkey periodically invoked shared historical, geographical, religious, and cultural/civilizational affinities with Palestine interwoven within a framework of moral responsibility. At the normative intersection of shared social categories stood the city of Jerusalem/al-Quds, and the Islamic holy sites in it, which were held in spiritual veneration by Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey adopted somewhat fervent attitudes in cases when the sanctity of the Islamic sacred places in Jerusalem/al-Quds was considered to be violated by Israel.

With regard to the sub-motive elements of identity in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine in the relevant time period, person identity had the highest degree of significance in Turkey's identity relationships with Palestine, followed by social identity, and role identity.

6.5 Conclusion

As a brief review of the main issues addressed in the preceding discussion, in the first part, it is argued that Palestinian statehood and the wellbeing of Palestinians were an unremitting, ingrained, and forthright concern of Turkish foreign policymakers in Turkey's relations with Palestine, and they were not reticent or evasive to express their concerns in their written and oral, official and non-official discourses. To be more specific, in the relevant time period, Turkey quite indubitably espoused the security of Palestine and the safety of Palestinians as a pronounced priority in its relations with Palestine, and demonstrated a correspondingly high level of concern for the economic basis of Palestinian statehood and the economic wellbeing of the Palestinians.

In the second part, Turkey's security in its relations with Palestine is examined in reference to Turkey's policies about the developments concerning the security of Palestine, and at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. To repeat, Turkey's relations with Palestine were devised, modified, and enacted above all in accordance with the security developments within Palestine, and in Palestine's relations with Israel. More to the point, Turkish foreign policymakers conceived a direct association between the security developments surrounding Palestine and

Turkey's relations with Palestine, and in a larger framework, its regional policy in the Middle East.

In the third part, Turkey's economy in its relations with Palestine is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. It is contended that establishing, sustaining, and safeguarding the economic foundations of Palestine and the economic wellbeing of Palestinians constituted an elementary consideration in Turkey's relations with Palestine, and its approach to Palestine's relations with Israel.

In the fourth part, Turkey's identity in its relations with Palestine is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity. In general, in the written and oral discourses of Turkish foreign policymakers, Palestine was conceived as a special state with which Turkey was almost inseparable and the Palestinians a special nation for whom Turkey was innately responsible. In terms of person identity, the conception of Turkey as a normative agent carrying an intrinsic moral responsibility in its relations with Palestine and in its approaches towards the developments regarding Palestine heavily conditioned Turkey's policy assessments and the associated discursive and practical attitudes. In terms of role identity, though, the two most prominent roles of Turkey, the mediator and the peace/order builder, did not have a consequential effect on Turkey's relations with Palestine despite some tentative attempts. In terms of social identity, to achieve self-identification with Palestine, and to attain Palestine's reciprocity in constructing, restoring, and reviving shared social categories, Turkish foreign policy makers frequently invoked the

commonality of history, geography, religion, and culture/civilization between Turkey and Palestine.

In the fifth part, it is advanced that Turkey's motive, identity only, to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine differed *within* each other with respect to the degree of significance of each sub-motive element relative to each other. Briefly, with regard to the sub-motive elements of identity, person identity had the highest degree of significance, followed by social identity, and role identity.

CHAPTER 7

TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2003-2014)

Turkey's foreign policy in the Middle East under the successive JDP governments between 2003 and 2014 has been under unceasing scholarly scrutiny reflecting the academic fascination with and analytical interest in the unprecedented activism observed in Turkey's relations in the Middle East, with the declared objective of attaining influence in the Middle East in accordance with Turkey's regional aspirations. The prevalent analytical approach, nonetheless, has been to treat Turkey's relations in the Middle East as an aggregate regional policy dispensing with Turkey's individual motives in its relations with each of the states in the Middle East, and accordingly with the causes, processes, and consequences of the variations of Turkey's foreign policy motives in its bilateral relations with the states in the Middle East. These variations took place both among Turkey's motives and within them.

Drawing on the theoretical discussion of the second chapter and the empirical discussions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters, this chapter is a comparative analysis of Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle

East, and how and why they differed among and within each other in the period of 2003 and 2014. First, Turkey's power in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of balancing. Second, Turkey's influence in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of influence. Third, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed *among* each other is addressed. Here, cross-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are made. Finally, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed *within* each other is addressed. Here, within-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are made.

7.1 Turkey's Power and the Middle East

Power is previously defined as referring to two ontologically distinct, albeit related, phenomena. While, to repeat, the first conception of power, which can be called 'power as capacity' (Power I), refers to the material and non-material, tangible and intangible, resources possessed, and employed if need be, by an actor to have an effect on the outcome of a process of interaction, the second conception of power, which can be called 'power as capability (Power II), refers to the ability of an actor to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction. In addition, it is previously stated that in the international relations literature, there are two categories of power accumulation respectively called internal balancing and external balancing, both with material and non-material dimensions.

In the relevant time period, in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine in the Middle East, the persistent efforts of Turkey to attain internal and external balancing to the extent possible through these bilateral relationships in effect proved unavailing, despite some initial successes.⁹¹⁹ With respect to Syria, prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the subsequent collapse of cordial bilateral relations, Turkey's relations with Syria contributed to Turkey's internal balancing in two ways. First, materially, progress in bilateral relations brought on economic benefits previously not available. Even though commercial and investment relations with Syria contributed to Turkey's overall economic capacity in a comparatively moderate measure, they constituted unprecedented advancement especially for Turkey's internal economic development in its relatively less developed regions adjacent to Syria. Second, ideationally, progress in bilateral relations was arguably conducive to maintain public order and social stability in southern regions of Turkey the inhabitants of which had ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian affinities with peoples in adjacent regions of Syria.

In this period, Turkey's relations with Syria contributed to Turkey's external balancing in two ways as well. First, strategically, Turkish foreign policymakers fell over themselves to cultivate Syria's cooperation in demonstrating shared, and if possible concerted, attitudes towards regional developments, and achieved Syria's reciprocation to a great extent. Second, institutionally, Turkey exerted tremendous

⁹¹⁹ For studies discussing Turkey's power in international relations, and specifically in relation to the Middle East, see, Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey: A Regional Power Facing a Changing International System," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2013, pp. 637-660; Talha Köse, "Türkiye'nin Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadoğu Bölgesindeki Gücü: Zorlayıcı Olmayan Gücün İmkan ve Sınırları," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 11, No. 41, 2014, pp. 29-61.

efforts to establish the foundations, normative as well as material, of common bilateral and regional institutions with Syria. The nascent institutional infrastructure wherein Turkey invested heavily, in economic as well as political terms, appeared only brittle under the pressures of the civil war in Syria.

In the wake of the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the subsequent collapse of cordial bilateral relations, Turkey's relations with Syria impaired Turkey's internal balancing in two ways. First, materially, Turkey lost the economic advantages of the previous amicable period insofar as bilateral relations suffered from the rupture in Turkey's relations with Syria. In addition, Turkey had to incur additional economic costs, not least caused by the massive influx of refugees fleeing from the tribulations of the civil war in Syria. Second, ideationally, estrangement in bilateral relations was not just diplomatic as it carried the potential to impair public order and social stability in Turkey by sharpening ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian sensitivities of the Turkish population, especially inhabiting the southern regions adjacent to Syria. In this period, Turkey's relations with Syria impaired Turkey's external balancing in two ways as well. First, strategically, Turkey became deprived of a valuable partner, if not an ally, in the Middle East, and worse, was impelled to reconfigure its regional structure of partnerships thanks to the civil war. Second, institutionally, Turkey's ambition to inaugurate bilateral and multilateral institutional frameworks in its relations with Syria, to be extended to other regional states, was incorrigibly ruined.

With respect to Iran, the contribution of Turkey's relations with Iran to Turkey's internal balancing and external balancing was oscillatory inasmuch as it was

contingent upon bilateral relations characterized by volatility, if not vulnerability, in the relevant time period. In terms of internal balancing, first, materially, stable energy relations with Iran were imperative for Turkey's economic development concerning energy production, industrial and household consumption. Still, commercial and investment relations could not flourish to an extent Turkey was quite resolved to achieve. Second, ideationally, Turkey's relations with Iran occasionally caused political and social controversies in Turkey. The transient debate on Turkey's 'axis of shift' was in part a result of Turkey's rapprochement with Iran.

In terms of external balancing, first, strategically, Turkey's cooperation with Iran on a number of regional and international matters, especially Iran's nuclear program, amounted to effective diplomatic alignment with Iran. The period of détente with Iran, though, could not survive the divergence of regional and international policies of the two states on the Arab Spring, primarily the civil war in Syria. Second, institutionally, despite the resilience of existing institutional bilateral and multilateral frameworks, Turkey's cooperation with Iran in and through these mechanisms did not yield substantial outcomes in Turkey's bilateral relations with Iran nor in its foreign policy in the Middle East.

With respect to Palestine, Turkey's policy of lending assistance to Palestine in all forms, from diplomatic intercession to economic endorsement, come what may did not bring in auspicious inputs to Turkey's internal balancing and external balancing regardless of the adulation it received from the peoples of the Middle East, including the large segments of the Turkish citizenry. In terms of internal balancing, first,

materially, the benefits of bilateral relations flowed almost exclusively to the side of Palestine. Second, ideationally, though, the display of solidarity with Palestine provided a high degree of political legitimacy and social cohesion domestically.

In terms of external balancing, first, strategically, Turkey's relations with Palestine did not amount to a robust regional alignment due to the vagaries of intra-Palestinian politics. Worse, it paved the way for the collapse of Turkey's relations with Israel as a diplomatic collateral damage since what was considered by Turkey the apotheosis of its humanitarian diplomacy in the Middle East was considered by Israel as a scurrilous diplomatic attitude towards itself. Second, institutionally, the institutional mechanisms between Turkey and Palestine were hindered by the intermittent disputes between the rival Palestinian factions.

7.2 Turkey's Influence and the Middle East

To reiterate, influence is the *effect* of actor A over the *decision* of actor B through A's involvement in the decisionmaking process of B by virtue of exercising Power I.⁹²⁰ A has influence over B insofar as the decision of B reflects the preference of A that would otherwise not been reflected. Accordingly, in verbal form, to influence means to have an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. In adjectival form, being influential means having an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. In addition, the *ability* of A to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having *an effect*

⁹²⁰ Power I, to repeat, refers to the material and non-material, tangible and intangible, resources possessed and employed by A to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having *an effect on the decision* of B.

on the decision of B is called Power II. In brief, Power I is a condition for influence, with which A achieves Power II. Moreover, *influence act* is a volitional, through the exercise of which an effect on the decision of B is intended. On the other hand, *influential act* is a volitional act, through the exercise of which an effect on the decision of B is achieved.

Turkey's influence acts, with respect to number, frequency, substance, and audacity, in its sub-regional dyadic relationships between 2003 and 2014 attracted much attention, scholarly or otherwise. For the proponents, they represented a belated emancipation from Turkey's self-imposed supine regional policy and an indispensable necessity for Turkey to become a regional power in the Middle East. Agency was decisive for ascendancy. For the opponents, they represented diplomatic promiscuity laced with fanciful and fallacious eminence in regional affairs which would only bring on superfluous diplomatic entanglements in the Middle East bereft of any meaningful benefits for Turkey. To them, the desperate ideal of moving mountains, and the constantly shifting deserts, in the Middle East was only exhausting for Turkey in the process, and ineffectual in the end.

Still, Turkish foreign policymakers were not retiring in influence acts in the Middle East insofar as it arguably constituted the heartland of Turkish foreign policy in the relevant time period. In terms of the degree of influence, Turkey could not have much absolute influence in its bilateral relations in the region insofar as the relevant time period did not witness many cases in which decisions of other states on performing or not performing particular actions reflected Turkey's preferences. Even

when the performance of particular actions of other states coincided with Turkey's influence acts, the effect of Turkey on the decisions of other states was questionable due to, for example, the concurrent influence acts of third parties. Nonetheless, Turkey arguably attained relative influence on occasion depending on the relational position of Turkey over a certain issue, or a set of issues, at a certain time. Before the onset of the civil war, Turkey's influence acts within the general policy of cooptation in its relations with Syria had effects on the decisions of the Syrian leadership. Turkey's efforts, especially on the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, brought about visible changes in the decisions of Iranian policymakers. Nonetheless, Turkey could not have significant effects on the decisions of Palestinian policymakers irrespective of its frequent deliberations and interventions in Palestinian politics, internal and external. Turkey's relative influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East was contingent upon a multitude of variables which stymied Turkey's influence acts to yield more favorable outcomes for Turkey.

In terms of the directional orientation of Turkey's influence acts, Turkey modified its previous regional diplomacy in the Middle East and opted for a policy of direct influence by virtue of involving more in the decisionmaking processes of other states in the region through formal and informal channels directly sharing its opinions or positions with these states for the purpose of having effects on their decisions. In its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine, Turkey increased the frequency and expanded the scope of bilateral consultations. Besides, it attributed notable importance to establish and sustain institutional infrastructures and regulative mechanisms for its bilateral relations with these three states along with other Middle Eastern states.

In terms of the decisional orientation of Turkey's influence acts, depending on circumstances and the existing patterns of political interactions, Turkey preferred both proactive influence, that is, in the implementation of its own decisions, Turkey got involved in the decisionmaking processes of regional states for the purpose of having an effect their decisions, and reactive influence, that is, in regional states' implementation of their decisions, Turkey got involved in their decisionmaking processes. Turkey's preference between two modes of influence acts was subject to structural and relational determinants.

In its relations with Syria, Turkey mostly performed proactive influence acts, both before and after the outbreak of the civil war. In its relations with Iran, on the other hand, Turkey performed proactive and reactive influence acts, which was an indirect testament to the parity of agency between the two states. In other words, Turkey took initiatives in its relations with Iran as well as responded Iran's own initiatives. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey mostly performed reactive influence acts, predominantly on matters related to the internal politics of Palestine, and Palestine's relations with Israel.

In terms of spatial orientation of Turkey's influence acts, the prevailing diplomatic disposition was to eschew internal influence, that is, refraining from influence acts to have effects on the decisions of regional states in the Middle East in regard to their domestic politics. Turkey's tendency to attain external influence, that is, having effects of the decisions of regional states exclusively in regard to their foreign

policies was not without challenges and exceptions. In its relations with Syria, the advent of the civil war compelled Turkey to flout the previous policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of Syria, and in a drastic reversal of policy, Turkey performed influence acts to have internal influence in Syria. The proliferation of actors, internal and external, in the Syrian civil war compounded and frustrated Turkey's influence acts notwithstanding. In its relations with Iran, Turkey even renounced internal influence, evading acts that could be construed or depicted by Iranian policymakers as unwarranted interference in Iranian domestic politics. In its relations with Palestine, nonetheless, Turkey pursued internal influence, aspiring to have effects on the decisions of actors in the Palestinian political scene.

In terms of the relational orientation of Turkey's influence acts, the prospects of structural influence grew discouraging over the course of time. Although Turkey energetically pursued projects to establish, sustain, and/or govern formal or informal multilateral structures in the Middle East whereby Turkey would acquire effects on the decisions of regional states without necessarily engaging in dyadic relationships with them, its projects were aborted to a great extent with the advent of the Arab Spring. In its relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine, Turkey was forced to pursue relational influence instead, aiming to have effects on the decisions of these states as a result of the dyadic relationships with them.

7.3 Turkey's Motives in the Middle East: Variations *Among*

Turkey's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed among each other in the relevant time period. The patterns and

the causes of this differentiation are examined here through cross-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine. Prior to comprehensive analyses of Turkey's motives, the patterns and the causes of difference among them with reference to individual sub-motive elements, a brief theoretical recapitulation is required to revisit the basic concepts and assumptions of the argument, which was set forth in the second chapter at length. To begin with, on the existence of a state's motives, two sorts of differentiation are observable. First, a particular motive exists for a state to seek influence in one sub-regional dyadic relationship while it does not exist in another sub-regional dyadic relationship. Second, a particular motive exists for a state to seek influence in one sub-regional dyadic relationship while another motive does not exist in the same sub-regional dyadic relationship.

Moreover, there are two modes of structure in international relations. First, objective structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Second, subjective structure is the objective structure experienced by a state from a particular position, that is, a singular territorially defined vantage point. Subjective structure of a state can also be called its foreign policy structure. In a state's foreign policy structure, other states are differentiated not by the distribution of capabilities but by the 'distribution of gravity'. Gravity is defined as the degree of significance of another state in a state's foreign policy structure. Furthermore, gravity has material and ideational foundations. Material foundations of gravity are substantive in nature, quite susceptible to empirical observations and assessments, and thus could be called the objective foundations of gravity. Ideational foundations of gravity are interpretive in nature, rest on the individual understandings of policymakers, and thus be called the

subjective foundations of gravity. In addition, gravity is not a fixed attribute; being contingent upon endogenous and exogenous variables, gravity can increase or decrease.

A state's foreign policy structure is a composite of three sub-structures. They can be called the security structure, the economy structure, and the identity structure, which correspond to the three motives of security, economy, and identity in a state's foreign policy. These three sub-structures are defined by the distribution of gravity with reference to the three respective motives of security, economy, and identity. In a state's foreign policy structure, these three sub-structures could be consonant with each other, i.e., structural consonance, or could be dissonant with each other, i.e., structural dissonance.

Similar to a state's foreign policy structure, it is plausible to conceive of a state's regional foreign policy structure, which is also composed of three sub-structures. Ultimately, a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other because the gravity of other states in each of the regional sub-structures of a state differs. As a matter of fact, the gravity of Syria, Iran, and Palestine in each of the regional foreign policy sub-structures of Turkey differed, and exhibited theoretically stimulating and practically consequential variations.

7.3.1 Regional Security Structure

In general, in Turkey's regional security structure, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Iran on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these two states towards the actual and potential security issues, which were conceived by Turkey as affecting its own security. However, in Turkey's regional security structure, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of this state towards the actual and potential security issues, which were conceived by Turkey as affecting Palestine's security.

In Turkey's regional security structure, with regard to the unit-level, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the actual and potential security issues *within them*. In its relations with Syria, Turkey, initially adopting a policy of non-involvement in the internal security issues of Syria, adapted its approach afterwards to the new security situation inside Syria in accordance with the security implications of the outbreak, escalation, and dissemination of a ravaging civil war, and accordingly put into practice an active diplomacy to mitigate the adverse ramifications of the civil war and to avert potential ones.

In its relations with Iran, prudence ruled. The cordiality of bilateral relations was customarily conditioned upon the reciprocal abstention of both states in policies that could be misrepresented or misunderstood as unwarranted external interference in

their domestic affairs. Turkey's preference for demonstrating a good deal of discretion regarding the internal security developments of Iran derived in part from this mutually sensitive understanding, and in part from the assessment that the erosion of the political stability and social order in Iran could instigate inimical dynamics that would diffuse into Turkey's own internal affairs. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey viewed the preservation of social solidarity and political unity among the Palestinians as an overriding precondition for the internal security of Palestine in the absence of which, to Turkey, the Palestinian statehood, and the wellbeing of the Palestinians, would become in perpetual peril.

In Turkey's regional security structure, with regard to the dyad-level, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the actual and potential security issues *between Turkey and them*. In its relations with Syria, the progressive resolution of rather entrenched disputes in a political atmosphere of conciliation and compromise constituted the foundation of Turkey's policies. These disputes concerned the three, somewhat intertwined, issues of terrorism, transboundary waters, and border designation. The rapid progress on the settlement of these bilateral disputes was quashed with the onset of the civil war in Syria. As opposed to the previous paradigm of proactive and permissive cooperation, Turkey consequently espoused a paradigm of reactive and aggressive competition regarding the security developments in its relations with Syria.

In its relations with Iran, stressing the common challenge of transnational terrorism allegedly waging a vicious armed struggle in the name of the ethnic Kurdish

minorities in both Turkey and Iran, and thus jeopardizing the social stability, economic development, and political legitimacy of both states, Turkey carried out an engaged approach to intensify partnership with Iran against this mutual security threat. Nevertheless, Iran moderated, if not completely discontinued, its counterterrorism operations after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, towards which Turkey committed itself to policies considerably divergent from those of Iran. In the ensuing period, the integrity, and the prospects, of Iran's collaboration in counterterrorism became increasingly questionable and to some extent unattainable for Turkey. In its relations with Palestine, security considerations of Turkey were almost exclusively shaped by Palestine's relations with Israel. At the outset, Turkey's interest in mediation between Palestine and Israel was ample, and yet its capacity in mediation between the two states turned out to be insufficient. Notwithstanding, gradually developing a potent persuasion that Israeli security policies, in addition to its settlement policies, were pernicious to the security of Palestine, Turkey's relations with Israel deteriorated unprecedentedly and finally entered into a period of frigid diplomatic suspension.

In Turkey's regional security structure, with regard to the regional-level, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the actual and potential security issues *within other regional states, between two other regional states, and between a regional state and each one of them*. In its relations with Syria, by virtue of its utmost attentiveness to the restoration and endurance of stability in the regional system, Turkey wholeheartedly occupied itself with the settlement of ongoing discords in Syrian foreign policy, and

diplomatically intervened in earnest in cases when Syria's relations became strained with its neighbors, especially Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq. Subsequent to the eruption of the civil war in Syria, Turkey concentrated its efforts on restraining the effects of the policies of regional states from aggravating the already disconcerting situation in Syria.

In its relations with Iran, the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 constituted a pivotal incentive for Turkey to advance its security cooperation with Iran owing to the shared misgivings of both states about the prospects of the stability and order inside Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion. However, in general, Turkey's strategic priorities in the Middle East were at significant variance with those of Iran, and hence Turkey's relations with Iran on regional security assumed a markedly contentious disposition, especially after the Arab Spring. The divergent and frequently conflicting policy preferences and the associated security measures of both states regarding the dynamic circumstances in the Middle East, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, became an abiding source of friction in Turkey's relations with Iran. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey ascribed a pronounced priority to the security of Palestine in the exercise of its regional diplomacy in the Middle East. So as to prompt other regional states into embracing a concerted diplomatic stance on safeguarding the security of Palestine, Turkey inaugurated multilateral initiatives, besides endorsing the proposals and partaking in the initiatives set out by other regional states.

In Turkey's regional security structure, with regard to the international-level, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with

Syria, Iran, and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the actual and potential security issues primarily *between an international state and a regional state*, and *between an international state and each one of them*. In its relations with Syria, Turkey was very attentive to the relations between Syria and the US, the dominant international actor in the Middle East. Before the civil war, on account of its cherished policy of proactive engagement with Syria on a broad array of bilateral and regional issues, Turkey showed a good deal of resistance, and even at times outright defiance, towards the US requests for its involvement in the punitive policies unilaterally applied by the US for the isolation of Syria in regional and international affairs. After the civil war, though, Turkey had to reverse its policy, and made repeated requests to the US to take the lead in the formation of an international coalition for a regime change in Syria, which proved to be in vain.

In its relations with Iran, Turkey exercised a lively diplomacy for a peaceful resolution of the protracted dispute between Iran and the West, primarily the US, over the controversial nuclear program of Iran. While denouncing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, Turkey was not reticent in confronting the unilateral efforts of the US, and the EU, against Iran, mainly economic sanctions. Concurrently, Turkey pursued mediation, and with the participation of Brazil secured a nuclear swap deal with Iran in the process, which was subsequently dismissed by the US to the chagrin of Turkey. On the other hand, the approval and authorization of Turkey for the deployment of a NATO early warning radar system on its territory irritated Iran quite exceedingly. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey exercised vigorous diplomacy in the international realm for the protection of Palestine's

security, particularly in multilateral international institutions like the OIC and the UN. Turkey's international diplomacy predicated on the strong conviction that for the realization of sustainable security for Palestine, it was incumbent upon Turkey to provide steadfast diplomatic assistance to Palestine in international organizations, especially on the issue of Palestinian statehood.

7.3.2 Regional Economy Structure

In general, in Turkey's regional economy structure, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Iran on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these two states towards the actual and potential economic issues, which were conceived by Turkey as affecting its own economy. However, in Turkey's regional economy structure, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of this state towards the actual and potential economic issues, which were conceived by Turkey as affecting Palestine's economy.

In Turkey's regional economy structure, with regard to *trade*, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine, on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the trade issues. In its relations with Syria, to capitalize on the economic benefits of cultivating close commercial relations with the proximate Syrian market yet to be satisfactorily explored and engaged, Turkey pursued three complementary objectives of building a credible legal framework, establishing durable organizational structures, and providing several kinds of business incentives for the private sectors

of both countries. A seminal turning point was the signing of a free trade agreement with Syria, which came into effect in January 2007, followed by the abolition of visa requirements between the states in October 2009. Turkey's collaboration with Syria in commercial matters reached a dramatic and economically damaging end with the diplomatic rupture in bilateral relations as a result of the civil war in Syria.

In its relations with Iran, Turkey pursued the same three complementary commercial objectives that it pursued in its relations with Syria. To that end, Turkey signed a host of agreements with Iran on trade, the foremost of which was 'The Preferential Trade Agreement' signed in January 2014. In the relevant time period Turkey's trade volume with Iran increased remarkably, not least because of the complementary trade structures of both countries. Even so, Turkey could not accomplish to eliminate the chronic trade deficit in its commercial relations with Iran. Additionally, despite the persistent appeals of Turkey for trade liberalization, Turkey only belatedly managed to receive Iran's reciprocity to address the issue of high customs duties applied by Iran as protectionist measures. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey's aspiration to develop its commercial relations with Palestine was challenged by the economic adversities Palestine suffered, mainly as a result of the prohibitive Israeli occupation. While in absolute terms, Turkey's trade with Palestine remained negligible, it exponentially increased in relative terms, promoted in part by the signing of a provisional trade agreement in July 2004.

In Turkey's regional economy structure, with regard to *investment*, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine, on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states

towards the investment issues. In its relations with Syria, Turkey's unremitting efforts to promote mutual investments did not render financially profitable ventures in spite of the many agreements signed with Syria on investment in successive meetings of the state representatives and business forums of public sectors. The Turkish private investments in the Syrian market became economic casualties of the civil war afterwards.

In its relations with Iran, Turkey's endeavors to boost investment relations with Iran were again thwarted primarily by two reasons. First, Turkish investments in the Iranian market in the initial years of the relevant time period encountered disproportionate state interference and suffered considerable costs due to their assets being taken into the public ownership in contravention of original agreements. Second, Iran was subjected to strict and extensive economic sanctions unilaterally by the US and the EU, and multilaterally by the UN. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey's investments in Palestine took largely the form of development and humanitarian assistance, both public and private, for the purpose of stimulating and supporting Palestine's economic and social development. In line with the overall approach, a multitude of projects on a broad range of issues were concluded in Palestine under the aegis of Turkish state institutions, such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA in Turkish acronym).

In Turkey's regional economy structure, with regard to *energy*, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine, on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the energy issues. In its relations with Syria, Turkey's energy cooperation

with Syria could not gain ground inasmuch as the tentative measures taken by both states to advance energy cooperation were cancelled with the eruption of the civil war in Syria. While Turkey imported crude oil only in negligible quantities from Syria in the relevant time period, it was unable to realize economic collaboration in natural gas. Turkey engaged in electricity trade with Syria, which became the second biggest market for Turkey's electricity exports in the period preceding the civil war.

In its relations with Iran, Turkey's economic relations with Iran fundamentally hinged on and revolved around energy since durable energy relations with Iran were imperative in achieving energy supply security, partnership with Iran in energy relations was essential in the diversification of Turkey's energy resources and the reduction of its excessive energy dependency on Russia, and finally Iran constituted an integral dimension for Turkey's strategic objective of becoming an indispensable energy hub in regional geopolitics. Turkey imported a significant share of its total oil imports from Iran, ranging between 30 to 50 percent in the period. Owing to Turkey's strategic and economic necessities, Turkey imported natural gas from Iran in increasing quantities, and yet their share in Turkey's total natural gas imports fluctuated just between 11 to 21 percent in the period. Turkey engaged in electricity trade with Iran as well, to import electricity through interconnection lines. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey's energy relations with Palestine comprised only the provision of relevant development assistance to Palestine to uphold its deficient energy infrastructure.

7.3.3 Regional Identity Structure

In general, in Turkey's regional identity structure, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these two states towards the actual and potential identity issues, which were conceived by Turkey as conducive to its own identity verification. However, in Turkey's regional identity structure, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran on account of the actual and potential attitudes of this state towards the actual and potential identity issues, which were conceived by Turkey as unconducive to its own identity verification.

In Turkey's regional identity structure, with regard to *person identity*, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the issues pertinent to the verification of person identity. In its relations with Syria, Turkey's policy attitudes and practices were conditioned and informed by a unique self-conception that espoused Turkey's singularity in its dealings with Syria in the sense that Turkey was the rightful successor to the Ottoman Empire, and in possession of an inherent moral responsibility towards the people, especially towards the oppressed, residing in the territories once governed by the Ottoman Empire.

In its relations with Iran, invoking this unique self-conception in and through relations with Iran was unconducive to a successful verification of it as this would only conjure up the historical antagonism between the respective empires Turkey and Iran claimed heirship to, potentially producing a corrosive effect on bilateral

relations. Furthermore, Turkey's discursive and practical responses to the humanitarian crises in its vicinity, especially in Syria, conditioned by the unique self-conception that it was a normative agent in regional affairs bearing moral responsibility towards the peoples of the region exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, its relations with Iran. In its relations with Palestine, the unique self-conception that Turkey was the rightful successor to the Ottoman Empire in possession of an inherent moral responsibility towards the people, especially towards the oppressed profoundly informed Turkey's assessments and attitudes towards the developments concerning Palestine. In the diplomatic discourse and practice of Turkey, Palestine was conceived as being under occupation, and Palestinians were conceived as being under oppression, constituting a permanent source of reference for the moral responsibility of Turkey.

In Turkey's regional identity structure, with regard to *role identity*, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the issues pertinent to the verification of role identity. In its relations with Syria, Turkey's two most prominent roles in its foreign policy towards the regional system, i.e. the mediator and the peace/order builder, framed the ideational structure of Turkey's relations with Syria accordingly. Ahead of the civil war, Turkey performed an unflagging regional diplomacy in pursuit of mediation between Syria and relevant regional and international actors, even delivering a measure of success in the process. By the same token, Turkey carried out transformative policies to engage and entice Syria to acquire its collaboration in the restitution of peace and order in the regional system, that is, in the enactment of its peace/order builder role. Eventually, though,

Syria transmuted into the most challenging predicament for Turkey in its quest for regional peace and order.

In its relations with Iran, the mediator role had some bearings, albeit transient, on the course of Turkey's relations with Iran in specific reference to Turkey's resolute, albeit ineffectual, diplomacy on Iran's nuclear program. Turkey's mediation efforts reached their most promising stage with the Tehran Declaration of May 2010, which was hastily dismissed by the US and became practically nullified. On the other hand, Turkey's peace/order builder role encountered, first, a latent challenge from Iran advancing a divergent set of strategic objectives in the regional system. Iran's challenge subsequently became intransigently manifest with Turkey's preference for and pursuit of a conflicting vision of regional peace and order after the popular uprisings in the Middle East. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey's mediator and the peace/order builder roles did not yield satisfactory results despite Turkey's incessant interest and intermittent efforts due to the emergence of an uncompromising internal struggle among rival Palestinian factions and the antagonistic escalation observed in Turkey's relations with Israel. In addition, for the settlement of their internal disagreements, as well as their disputes with Israel, Palestinians preferred the mediation of other regional actors rather than Turkey, obviating the enactment of Turkey's self-assumed roles.

In Turkey's regional identity structure, with regard to *social identity*, Turkey exercised contingent influence acts in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine on account of the actual and potential attitudes of these three states towards the issues pertinent to the verification of social identity. In its

relations with Syria, Turkey's social identity was salient being pertinent to the elevation of Turkey's self-worth. Turkey frequently referred to the historical, geographical, religious, and cultural/civilizational commonalities between itself and Syria to increase the prospects of achieving the reciprocity of Syria in mutual self-identification by means of shared social categories. However, with the practical dissolution of Syria as a state after the civil war, Turkey preferred self-identification with the Syrian people, which was challenged by the multiplicity of social actors inside Syria to selectively and contingently identify with.

In its relations with Iran, Turkey's social identity could not be enacted in reference to shared social categories. For Turkey, referring to the historical, geographical, religious, and cultural/civilizational commonalities between itself and Iran carried the adverse potential to trigger mutual estrangement instead of mutual identification, and the cases of invocation were devoid of credible substance and were by and large negated by the discursive and practical attitudes of both states towards each other. Especially after the Arab Spring, Turkey grew more disinclined to appeal to Iran's reciprocity in mutual self-identification through putatively shared social categories. In its relations with Palestine, Turkey's social identity was foundational to Turkey's practical and discursive approaches to the developments, and reactions to the incidents, related to Palestine. Turkey periodically invoked shared historical, geographical, religious, and cultural/civilizational affinities with Palestine interwoven within a framework of moral responsibility. At the normative intersection of shared social categories stood the city of Jerusalem/al-Quds, and the Islamic holy sites in it, which were held in spiritual veneration by Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey

adopted quite vehement attitudes in cases when the sanctity of the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem/al-Quds was deemed to be violated by Israel.

To sum up, Turkey’s regional foreign policy structure was composed of regional security structure, regional economy structure, and regional identity structure defined by the three respective motives of security, economy, and identity. In each of these three sub-structures of Turkey’s regional foreign policy structure, the gravity of Syria, Iran, and Palestine differed. The gravity of Syria, Iran, and Palestine in the sub-structures of Turkey’s regional foreign policy structure differed due to the actual and potential attitudes of these states towards the actual and potential security/economic/identity issues, which were conceived by Turkey as affecting its own security/economic/identity interests. As a corollary, Turkey’s motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine differed *among* each other.

Table 19: Turkey’s Motives in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine

	Security	Economy	Identity
Syria	X	X	X
Iran	X	X	---
Palestine	---	---	X

On the variations of Turkey’s motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships, two sorts of differentiation were observable. First, along the vertical axis, or columns,

security and economy existed as motives in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Iran, but they did not exist as motives in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine. On the other hand, identity existed as a motive in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Palestine, but it did not exist as a motive in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran.

Second, along the horizontal axis, or rows, in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, security, economy, and identity existed as motives. On the other hand, in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran, security and economy existed as motives while identity did not exist as a motive. By contrast, in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine, identity existed as a motive while security and economy did not exist as motives.

An additional observation on the variation among Turkey's motives pertains to Turkey's overall regional foreign policy structure. In a state's foreign policy structure, to repeat, the three sub-structures could be consonant with each other or could be dissonant with each other. The variation among Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine conspicuously demonstrates that structural dissonance, rather than structural consonance, characterized Turkey's regional foreign policy structure in the relevant time period. Nonetheless, the degree of structural dissonance fluctuated in accordance with changing regional, bilateral, and national circumstances and Turkey's adaptations to them through influence acts in terms of security, economy, and identity. The degree

of structural dissonance in Turkey's regional foreign policy structure arguably increased after the Arab Spring while decreasing in the preceding period.

7.4 Turkey's Motives in the Middle East: Variations *Within*

Turkey's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed *within* each other in the relevant time period. The patterns and the causes of this differentiation are examined here through within-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine. Prior to comprehensive analyses of Turkey's motives, the patterns and the causes of difference within them with reference to individual sub-motive elements, a brief theoretical recapitulation is required to revisit the basic concepts and assumptions of the argument, which was set forth in the second chapter at length.

A motive is composed of sub-motive elements defined as the substantial contingent considerations related to a motive constituting identifying reference points for it. Security can be defined in peculiar reference to the level wherein the subject matters of a state's security considerations originate. Accordingly, there are four sub-motive elements for security; unit-level security, dyad-level security, regional-level security, and international-level security. Economy can be defined in reference to specific subject matters of a state's economic considerations. Accordingly, there are three sub-motive elements for economy; trade, investment, and energy. Identity can be defined in reference to particular 'bases' of a state's identity considerations. Accordingly, there are three sub-motive elements for identity; person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In a state's respective sub-regional dyadic relationships, the significance of sub-motive elements as subject matters of a state's considerations can exhibit variation *in degree* relative to each other. Therefore, a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships can, and in fact do, differ *within* each other with respect to the degree of significance of each sub-motive element relative to each other. On the other hand, the degree of significance of sub-motive elements relative to each other in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships is not a fixed attribute; being contingent upon endogenous and exogenous variables, it can increase or decrease, incrementally or drastically.

In a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships, the sub-motive elements could be symmetrical or asymmetrical. 'Sub-motive symmetry' means that there is not variation among sub-motive elements in terms of degree of significance. 'Sub-motive asymmetry' means that there is. Sub-motive symmetry/asymmetry is not an exact dichotomy; they are matters of degree constituting two edges of a spectrum. In brief, a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other inasmuch as the degree of significance of sub-motive elements in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships differs relative to each other.

The measurement of relative degree of significance, to repeat, necessarily entails comparison between sub-motive elements along some criteria. The first criteria is the *present* extent of a sub-motive element in dyadic relationships in reference to the relevant regional foreign policy structure of a state, and the corresponding

importance accorded to the sub-motive element by the state in its relations with the other state. This criteria can be called the objective significance. The second criteria is the *prospective* extent of a sub-motive element in dyadic relationships in reference to the relevant regional foreign policy structure of a state, and the corresponding importance accorded to the sub-motive element by the state in its relations with the other state. This criteria can be called the subjective significance.

The third criteria is the extent national, dyadic, regional, and international settings permit the performance of influence acts by a state for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of a sub-motive element in its relations with the other state in reference to the relevant foreign policy structure of the state. This criteria can be called the permissibility of settings. And the fourth criteria is the extent of influence acts of a state based on considerations about a sub-motive element in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with another state. The extent of influence acts is determined, in turn, by the number and the intensity of the influence acts. The intensity of an influence act is the importance a state attaches to the performance of that influence act.

As a result, the degree of significance of sub-motive elements in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships differs relative to each other due to four reasons. First, the objective significance of a sub-motive element is higher than the objective significance of another sub-motive element. Second, the subjective significance of a sub-motive element is higher than the subjective significance of another sub-motive element. Third, the permissibility of settings for a sub-motive element is higher than

the permissibility of settings for another sub-motive element. And fourth, the extent of influence acts based on a sub-motive element is higher than the extent of influence acts based on another sub-motive element. As a matter of fact, Turkey's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differed within each other, and exhibited theoretically stimulating and practically consequential variations.⁹²¹

7.4.1 Security: Sub-Motive Elements

The motive of security for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Iran differed within itself in the relevant time period. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, in reference to the unit-level, Turkey, initially adopting a policy of non-involvement in the internal security issues of Syria, adapted its approach afterwards to the new security situation inside Syria in accordance with the security implications of the outbreak, escalation, and dissemination of a ravaging civil war, and accordingly put into practice an active diplomacy to alleviate the detrimental effects of the civil war and to prevent potential ones.

In reference to the dyad-level, the progressive resolution of rather entrenched disputes in a political atmosphere of conciliation and compromise constituted the foundation of Turkey's policies. These disputes concerned to the three, and somewhat intertwined, issues of terrorism, transboundary waters, and border designation. The rapid progress on the settlement of these bilateral disputes was

⁹²¹ Insofar as the following discussion entails a reconfiguration of the issues pertinent to Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine in reference to relevant sub-motive elements investigated above, its factual substance involves necessary repetitions while its analytical style is peculiar to the argument.

quashed with the onset of the civil war in Syria. As opposed to the previous paradigm of proactive and permissive cooperation, Turkey consequently espoused a paradigm of reactive and aggressive competition regarding the security developments in its relations with Syria.

In reference to the regional-level, by virtue of its utmost attentiveness to the restoration and endurance of stability in the regional system, Turkey wholeheartedly occupied itself with the settlement of ongoing discords in Syrian foreign policy, and diplomatically intervened in earnest in cases Syria's relations became strained with its neighbors, especially Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq. Subsequent to the eruption of the civil war in Syria, Turkey concentrated its efforts on restraining the effects of the policies of regional states from aggravating the already disconcerting situation in Syria.

In reference to the international-level, Turkey was very attentive to the relations between Syria and the US, the dominant international actor in the Middle East. Before the civil war, on account of its cherished policy of proactive engagement with Syria on a broad array of bilateral and regional issues, Turkey showed a good deal of resistance, and even at times outright defiance, towards the US requests for its involvement in the punitive policies unilaterally applied by the US for the isolation of Syria in regional and international affairs. After the civil war, though, Turkey had to reverse its policy, and made repeated requests to the US to take the lead in the formation of an international coalition for a regime change in Syria, which proved to be in vain.

In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran, in reference to the unit-level, the cordiality of bilateral relations was customarily conditioned upon the reciprocal abstention of both states in policies that could be misrepresented or misunderstood as unwarranted external interference in their domestic affairs. Turkey's preference for demonstrating a good deal of discretion regarding the internal security developments of Iran derived in part from this mutually sensitive understanding, and in part from the assessment that the erosion of the political stability and social order in Iran could instigate inimical dynamics that would diffuse into Turkey's own internal affairs.

In reference to the dyad-level, stressing the common challenge of transnational terrorism allegedly waging a vicious armed struggle in the name of the ethnic Kurdish minorities in both Turkey and Iran, and thus jeopardizing the social stability, economic development, and political legitimacy of both states, Turkey carried out an engaged approach to intensify partnership with Iran against this mutual security threat. Nevertheless, Iran moderated, if not completely discontinued, its counterterrorism operations after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, towards which Turkey committed itself to policies considerably divergent from those of Iran. In the ensuing period, the integrity, and the prospects, of Iran's collaboration in counterterrorism became increasingly questionable and to some extent unattainable for Turkey.

In reference to the regional-level, the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 constituted a pivotal incentive for Turkey to advance its security cooperation with Iran owing to the shared misgivings of both states about the prospects of the stability and order inside Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion. However, in general, Turkey's strategic

priorities in the Middle East were at significant variance with those of Iran, and hence Turkey's relations with Iran on regional security assumed a markedly contentious disposition, especially after the Arab Spring. The divergent and frequently conflicting policy preferences and the associated security measures of both states regarding the dynamic circumstances in the Middle East, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, became an abiding source of friction in Turkey's relations with Iran.

In reference to the international-level, Turkey exercised an energetic diplomacy for a peaceful resolution of the protracted dispute between Iran and the West, primarily the US, over Iran's controversial nuclear program. While denouncing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, Turkey was not reticent in confronting the unilateral efforts of the US, and the EU, against Iran, mainly economic sanctions. Concurrently, Turkey pursued mediation, and with the participation of Brazil secured a nuclear swap deal with Iran in the process, which was subsequently dismissed by the US to the chagrin of Turkey. On the other hand, the approval and authorization of Turkey for the deployment of a NATO early warning radar system on its territory irritated Iran quite exceedingly.

Table 20: The Motive of Security for Turkey in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with Syria and Iran⁹²²

Sub-Motive Elements	Relative Degree of Significance (Syria)	Relative Degree of Significance (Iran)
Unit-Level Security	1 / 4	1

⁹²² The higher the number is, the higher the degree of significance is.

Dyad-Level Security	4 / 3	2
Regional-Level Security	3 / 1	4
International-Level Security	2 / 2	3

In the relevant time period, the degree of significance of sub-motive elements as the subject matters of Turkey's security considerations in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Iran differed relative to each other. Before the civil war, in Turkey's security considerations in its relations with Syria, dyad-level security arguably took precedence, followed by regional-level security, international-level security, and unit-level security in terms of the degree of significance. Dyad-level security had a higher degree of significance than other sub-motive elements since the present and the prospective extents of bilateral security issues with Syria in the regional security structure of Turkey, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to the settlement of bilateral security issues with Syria were higher than other sub-motive elements. In addition, the relevant settings, except to some extent the international setting, were more permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of dyad-level security in the regional security structure of Turkey. Accordingly, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on dyad-level security in its security relations with Syria was higher than the extent of its influence acts based on other individual sub-motive elements.

After the civil war, however, unit-level security took precedence in Turkey's security considerations in its relations with Syria, followed by dyad-level security, international-level security, and regional-level security. Unit-level security had a

higher degree of significance than other sub-motive elements since the present and the prospective extents of security issues within Syria in the regional security structure of Turkey, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to address the security developments within Syria, were higher than other sub-motive elements. Nonetheless, the relevant settings were not very permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of unit-level security in Turkey's regional security structure. Still, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on unit-level security in its security relations with Syria was higher than the extent of its influence acts based on other individual sub-motive elements.

In Turkey's security considerations in its relations with Iran, regional-level security arguably took precedence, followed by international-level security, dyad-level security, and unit-level security.⁹²³ Regional-level security had higher degree of significance than other sub-motive elements since the present and the prospective extents of security issues concerning the Middle East and Iran's policies towards the Middle East in Turkey's regional security structure, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to address the security developments concerning, again, the Middle East and Iran's policies towards the Middle East, were higher than other sub-motive elements. In addition, the relevant settings, except to some extent the international setting, were relatively more permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of regional-level security in the regional security structure of Turkey. Accordingly, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on regional-level

⁹²³ Here, the measurement of the relative degree of significance is based on a subjective comparison between sub-motive elements discussed in great detail in respective sections of relevant chapters with reference to Turkey's influence acts.

security in its security relations with Iran was higher than the extent of its influence acts based on other individual sub-motive elements.

7.4.2 Economy: Sub-Motive Elements

The motive of economy for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Iran differed within itself in the relevant time period. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, in reference to trade, to capitalize on the economic benefits of cultivating close commercial relations with the proximate Syrian market yet to be satisfactorily explored and engaged, Turkey pursued three complementary objectives of building a credible legal framework, establishing durable organizational structures, and providing several kinds of business incentives for the private sectors of both countries. A seminal turning point was the signing of a free trade agreement with Syria, which came into effect in January 2007, followed by the abolition of visa requirements between the states in October 2009. Turkey's collaboration with Syria in commercial matters reached a dramatic and economically damaging end with the diplomatic rupture in bilateral relations as a result of the civil war in Syria.

In reference to investment, Turkey's unremitting efforts to promote mutual investments did not render financially profitable ventures in spite of the many agreements signed with Syria on investment in successive meetings of the state representatives and business forums of public sectors. The Turkish private investments in the Syrian market became economic casualties of the civil war afterwards. In reference to energy, Turkey's energy cooperation with Syria could not gain ground inasmuch as the tentative measures taken by both states to advance

energy cooperation were cancelled with the eruption of the civil war in Syria. While Turkey imported crude oil only in negligible quantities from Syria in the relevant time period, it was unable to realize economic collaboration in natural gas. Turkey engaged in electricity trade with Syria, which became the second biggest market for Turkey's electricity exports in the period preceding the civil war.

In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Iran, in reference to trade, Turkey pursued the same three complementary commercial objectives that it pursued in its relations with Syria. To that end, Turkey signed a host of agreements with Iran on trade, the foremost of which was 'The Preferential Trade Agreement' signed in January 2014. In the relevant time period Turkey's trade volume with Iran increased remarkably, not least because of the complementary trade structures of both countries. Even so, Turkey could not accomplish to eliminate the chronic trade deficit in its commercial relations with Iran. Additionally, despite the persistent appeals of Turkey for trade liberalization, Turkey only belatedly managed to receive Iran's reciprocity to address the issue of high customs duties applied by Iran as protectionist measures.

In reference to investment, Turkey's endeavors to boost investment relations with Iran were again thwarted primarily by two reasons. First, Turkish investments in the Iranian market in the initial years of the relevant time period encountered disproportionate state interference and suffered considerable costs due to their assets being taken into the public ownership in contravention of original agreements. Second, Iran was subjected to strict and extensive economic sanctions unilaterally by the US and the EU, and multilaterally by the UN.

In reference to energy, Turkey's economic relations with Iran fundamentally hinged on and revolved around energy since durable energy relations with Iran were imperative in achieving energy supply security, partnership with Iran in energy relations was essential in the diversification of Turkey's energy resources and the reduction of its excessive energy dependency on Russia, and finally Iran constituted an integral dimension for Turkey's strategic objective of becoming an indispensable energy hub in regional geopolitics. Turkey imported a significant share of its total oil imports from Iran, ranging between 30 to 50 percent in the period. Owing to Turkey's strategic and economic necessities, Turkey imported natural gas from Iran in increasing quantities, and yet their share in Turkey's total natural gas imports fluctuated just between 11 to 21 percent in the period. Turkey engaged in electricity trade with Iran as well, to import electricity through interconnection lines.

Table 21: The Motive of Economy for Turkey in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with Syria and Iran⁹²⁴

Sub-Motive Elements	Relative Degree of Significance (Syria)	Relative Degree of Significance (Iran)
Trade	3 / -	2
Investment	2 / -	1
Energy	1 / -	3

⁹²⁴ The higher the number is, the higher the degree of significance is.

In the relevant time period, the degree of significance of sub-motive elements as the subject matters of Turkey's economic considerations in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Iran differed relative to each other. Before the civil war, in Turkey's economic considerations in its relations with Syria, trade arguably took precedence, followed by investment and energy in terms of the degree of significance. Trade had a higher degree of significance than other sub-motive elements since the present and the prospective extents of bilateral commercial relations with Syria in Turkey's regional economic structure, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to the development of commercial relations with Syria, were higher than other sub-motive elements. In addition, the relevant settings, except to some extent the international setting, were much more permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of commercial relations with Syria in Turkey's regional economic structure. Accordingly, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on trade in its economic relations with Syria was higher than the extent of its influence acts based on other individual sub-motive elements of economy. After the civil war, economic considerations in Turkey's relations with Syria became arguably irrelevant.

In Turkey's economic considerations in its relations with Iran, energy took precedence, followed by trade and investment.⁹²⁵ Energy had a higher degree of significance than other sub-motive elements since the present and the prospective extents of bilateral energy relations with Iran in Turkey's regional economic

⁹²⁵ Here, the measurement of the relative degree of significance is based on a subjective comparison between sub-motive elements discussed in great detail in respective sections of relevant chapters with reference to Turkey's influence acts.

structure, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to the advancement of energy relations with Iran, were higher than other sub-motive elements. In addition, the relevant settings were relatively more permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of energy relations with Iran in Turkey's regional economic structure. Accordingly, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on energy in its economic relations with Iran was higher than the extent of its influence acts based on other individual sub-motive elements of economy.

7.4.3 Identity: Sub-Motive Elements

The motive of identity for Turkey to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Palestine differed within itself in the relevant time period. In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, in reference to person identity, Turkey's policy attitudes and practices were conditioned and informed by a unique self-conception that espoused Turkey's singularity in its dealings with Syria in the sense that Turkey was the rightful successor to the Ottoman Empire, and in possession of an inherent moral responsibility towards the people, especially towards the oppressed, residing in the territories once governed by the Ottoman Empire.

In reference to role identity, Turkey's two most prominent roles in its foreign policy towards the regional system, i.e. the mediator and the peace/order builder, framed the ideational structure of Turkey's relations with Syria accordingly. Ahead of the civil war, Turkey performed an unflagging regional diplomacy in pursuit of mediation

between Syria and relevant regional and international actors, even delivering a measure of success in the process. By the same token, Turkey carried out transformative policies to engage and entice Syria to acquire its collaboration in the restitution of peace and order in the regional system, that is, in the enactment of its peace/order builder role. Eventually, though, Syria transmuted into the most challenging predicament for Turkey in its quest for regional peace and order.

In reference to social identity, Turkey's social identity was salient being pertinent to the elevation of Turkey's self-worth. Turkey frequently referred to the historical, geographical, religious, and cultural/civilizational commonalities between itself and Syria to increase the prospects of achieving the reciprocity of Syria in mutual self-identification by means of shared social categories. However, with the practical dissolution of Syria as a state after the civil war, Turkey preferred self-identification with the Syrian people, which was challenged by the multiplicity of social actors inside Syria to selectively and contingently identify with.

In Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Palestine, in reference to person identity, the unique self-conception that Turkey was the rightful successor to the Ottoman Empire in possession of an inherent moral responsibility towards the people, especially towards the oppressed, profoundly informed Turkey's assessments and attitudes towards the developments concerning Palestine. In Turkey's diplomatic discourse and practice, Palestine was conceived as being under occupation, and Palestinians were conceived as being under oppression, constituting a permanent source of reference for the moral responsibility of Turkey.

In reference to role identity, the mediator and the peace/order builder roles of Turkey did not produce satisfactory results despite Turkey’s ceaseless interest and recurrent efforts. The foremost reason was the emergence of an uncompromising internal struggle among rival Palestinian factions and the antagonistic escalation observed in Turkey’s relations with Israel. In addition, for the settlement of their internal disagreements, as well as their disputes with Israel, Palestinians preferred the mediation of other regional actors rather than Turkey, obviating the enactment of Turkey’s self-assumed roles.

In reference to social identity, Turkey’s social identity was foundational to Turkey’s practical and discursive approaches to the developments, and reactions to the incidents, related to Palestine. Turkey periodically invoked shared historical, geographical, religious, and cultural/civilizational affinities with Palestine interwoven within a framework of moral responsibility. At the normative intersection of shared social categories stood the city of Jerusalem/al-Quds, and the Islamic holy sites in it, which were held in spiritual veneration by Turkey. Accordingly, in cases when Turkey considered that Israel had violated the sanctity of Islamic sacred places in Jerusalem/al-Quds, it adopted rather fervent attitudes.

Table 22: The Motive of Identity for Turkey in Its Sub-regional Dyadic Relationships with Syria and Palestine⁹²⁶

Sub-Motive Elements	Relative Degree of Significance (Syria)	Relative Degree of Significance (Palestine)
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⁹²⁶ The higher the number is, the higher the degree of significance is.

Person Identity	3 / 3	3
Role Identity	1 / 2	1
Social Identity	2 / 1	2

In the relevant time period, the degree of significance of sub-motive elements as the subject matters of Turkey's identity considerations in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria and Palestine differed relative to each other. Before the civil war, in Turkey's identity considerations in its relations with Syria, person identity took precedence, followed by social identity and role identity in terms of the degree of significance. Person identity had a higher degree of significance than other sub-motive elements since as the 'master identity' it invariably does. Social identity had the second highest degree of significance since the present and the prospective extents of Turkey's self-identifications in its relations with Syria in reference to Turkey's regional identity structure, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to the verification of its self-identifications through its relations with Syria, were higher than role identity. In addition, the relevant settings were more permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of social identity in its relations with Syria in reference to the regional identity structure of Turkey. Accordingly, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on social identity in its identity relations with Syria was higher than the extent of its influence acts based on role identity.

After the civil war, however, while person identity still took precedence in Turkey's identity considerations in its relations with Syria, it was followed by role identity and social identity. Person identity had a still higher degree of significance than other

sub-motive elements. On the other hand, this time person identity had the second highest degree of significance since the present and the prospective extents of Turkey's self-representations in its relations with Syria in reference to the regional identity structure of Turkey, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to the verification of its self-representations through its relations with Syria were higher than social identity. In addition, the relevant settings became more permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of role identity in its relations with Syria in reference to the regional identity structure of Turkey. Accordingly, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on role identity in its identity relations with Syria became higher than the extent of its influence acts based on social identity.

In Turkey's identity considerations in its relations with Palestine, person identity took precedence, followed by social identity and role identity.⁹²⁷ Person identity had a higher degree of significance than other sub-motive elements since as the 'master identity' it invariably does. Social identity had the second highest degree of significance since the present and the prospective extents of Turkey's self-identifications in its relations with Palestine in reference to the regional identity structure of Turkey, and the corresponding importance accorded by Turkey to the verification of its self-identifications through its relations with Palestine were higher than role identity. In addition, the relevant settings were more permissive for Turkey to perform influence acts for the favorable continuation and transformation of present and prospective extents of social identity in its relations with Palestine in reference to

⁹²⁷ Here, the measurement of the relative degree of significance is based on a subjective comparison between sub-motive elements discussed in great detail in respective sections of relevant chapters with reference to Turkey's influence acts. Of note, being the 'master' identity, person identity, as a sub-motive element, always takes precedence in a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships with another state as far as the identity motive exists in that particular relationship.

the regional identity structure of Turkey. Accordingly, the extent of Turkey's influence acts based on social identity in its identity relations with Palestine was higher than the extent of its influence acts based on role identity.

In general, Turkey's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine in the Middle East in the relevant time period differed *within* each other inasmuch as the degree of significance of sub-motive elements in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differed relative to each other. Still, an additional observation can be made on the variation within Turkey's motives that pertains to the overall structure of individual motives. In a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships, to repeat, the sub-motive elements could be symmetrical or asymmetrical. 'Sub-motive symmetry' means that there is not variation among sub-motive elements in terms of degree of significance. 'Sub-motive asymmetry' means that there is. Sub-motive symmetry/asymmetry is not an exact dichotomy; they are matters of degree constituting two edges of a spectrum. The variation within Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine clearly demonstrates that sub-motive asymmetry, rather than sub-motive symmetry, characterized the overall structure of Turkey's motives in the relevant time period.

Since, to reiterate, the relative degree of significance as an analytical construct inherently leads to asymmetry, the existence of sub-motive asymmetry in a state's motives is only expected. Being and measured relative to each other, some sub-motive elements are invariably to be lower or higher than others in terms of the degree of significance. Nonetheless, two types of change can take place in terms of

the degree of significance of sub-motive elements relative to each other. First, a sub-motive element can become more/less significant than another, changing the order of significance. Second, a sub-motive element being still more/less significant than another sub-motive element, the relative degree of significance between them can widen or shrink.

In fact, the relative degree of significance within Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine fluctuated in accordance with the changing regional, bilateral, and national circumstances and Turkey's adaptations to them. First, in some cases, sub-motive elements become more/less significant than one another. After the Syrian civil war, the order of significance for the sub-motive elements of security and identity, as motives, in Turkey's relations with Syria changed while becoming irrelevant for the motive of economy. Second, the relative degree of significance between sub-motive elements of Turkey's motives widened or shrank. As an example, with investment relations curbed due to Turkey's aborted and unrealized investment ventures in the Iranian market, and with the increasing demand of natural gas for its domestic consumption and the resultant expansion in energy relations, sub-motive asymmetry between investment and energy, as sub-motive elements of economy in Turkey relations with Iran, widened in the course of the relevant time period.

7.5 Conclusion

As a brief review of the main issues addressed in the preceding discussion, in the first part, Turkey's power in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran,

and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of balancing. First, balancing is divided into two as internal balancing and external balancing, which, in turn, are divided into two as well. Internal balancing is composed of material internal balancing and ideational internal balancing. External balancing is composed of strategic external balancing and institutional external balancing. Essentially, it is argued that in the relevant time period, in Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine in the Middle East, Turkey's persistent efforts to attain internal and external balancing to the extent possible through these bilateral relationships in effect proved unavailing, despite some initial successes.

In the second part, Turkey's influence in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of influence. It is stressed that Turkish foreign policymakers were not retiring in influence acts in the Middle East insofar as it arguably constituted the heartland of Turkish foreign policy in the relevant time period. Subsequently, Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are examined in terms of the degree of influence, the directional orientation of Turkey's influence acts, the decisional orientation of Turkey's influence acts, the spatial orientation of Turkey's influence acts, and finally, the relational orientation of Turkey's influence acts.

In the third part, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed *among* each other is addressed. The patterns and the causes of this differentiation are examined here through cross-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine. It is

basically contended that Turkey's regional foreign policy structure is composed of regional security structure, regional economy structure, and regional identity structure defined by the three respective motives of security, economy, and identity. In the relevant time period, in each of these three sub-structures of Turkey's regional foreign policy structure, the gravity of Syria, Iran, and Palestine differed. As a corollary, Turkey's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine differed among each other. In addition, the issue of structural consonance/dissonance in Turkey's regional foreign policy structure is addressed.

In the final part, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed *within* each other is addressed. The patterns and the causes of this differentiation are examined here through within-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine. It is basically contended that Turkey's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships with Syria, Iran, and Palestine in the Middle East in the relevant time period differed *within* each other inasmuch as the degree of significance of sub-motive elements in its sub-regional dyadic relationships differed relative to each other. In addition, the issue of sub-motive symmetry/asymmetry within Turkey's motives in its-sub regional dyadic relationships is addressed.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis addresses two research questions on influence: what is influence? Why do states seek influence? Related to the second research question, there are five subsidiary research questions addressed in this thesis as well:

1. What are a state's motives to seek influence in its sub-regional dyadic relationships?
2. How do a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other?
3. Why do a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other?
4. How do a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other?
5. Why do a state's motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *within* each other?

As a brief recapitulation, in the second chapter, the theoretical chapter of the thesis, influence is systematically conceptualized. To that end, first, power is redefined and recategorized as power as capacity and power as capability. Second, some understandings of influence short of being analytically consistent and conceptually clear are presented. Subsequently, a unique definition of influence is presented, and to elucidate this definition of influence, its relation to power as capacity and power as capability is articulated. Third, a taxonomy of influence is propounded in reference to some criteria. Fourth, to give a lucid answer to the main research question, several related concepts are defined as well. Here, motives of state conduct are presented as security, economy, and identity. They are additionally classified into their components called ‘sub-motive elements’.

Subsequently, the motive of security in state conduct is discussed in reference to its sub-motive elements, which are unit-level security, dyad-level security, regional-level security, and international-level security. The motive of economy in state conduct is discussed in reference to its sub-motive elements, which are trade, investment, and energy. The motive of identity is discussed in reference to its sub-motive elements, which are person identity, role identity, and social identity. Fifth, the question of why a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ *among* each other is addressed. Sixth, the question of why a state’s motives to seek influence in sub-regional dyadic relationships differ within each other is addressed. Finally, the relationship between motive and action in a state’s sub-regional dyadic relationships is discussed.

In the third chapter, the methodological chapter of the thesis, first, methodology of social research is defined as being composed of three successive stages of research, that is, designing research, collecting data, and analyzing data. Second, the research design of the thesis is discussed, in specific reference to unit of analysis, measurement, sampling, and case study. Subsequently, data collection for the research is discussed in terms of both primary and secondary, and qualitative and quantitative data. Here, triangulation and bricolage are put forward as two ways of using qualitative data and quantitative data in combination. Finally, data analysis for the research is discussed in specific reference to process tracing, descriptive statistics, and discourse analysis.

In the fourth chapter, an analysis of Turkey's relations with Syria, first, the general course of Turkey's relations with Syria between March 2003 and August 2014 is discussed in reference to the dynamics in international, regional, and national contexts. Second, Turkey's security in its relations with Syria is examined in reference to the developments and associated policies of Turkey at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. Subsequently, Turkey's economy in its relations with Syria is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. Finally, Turkey's identity in its relations with Syria is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In the fifth chapter, an analysis of Turkey's relations with Iran, first, the resilience of stability in Turkey's relations with Iran between March 2003 and August 2014

despite fluctuating cooperative and competitive interactions are explained with reference to the fundamental determinants of relations. Second, Turkey's security in its relations with Iran is examined in reference to the developments and associated policies of Turkey at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. Subsequently, Turkey's economy in its relations with Iran is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. Finally, Turkey's identity in its relations with Iran is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In the sixth chapter, an analysis of Turkey's relations with Palestine is made, first, it is argued that Palestinian statehood and the wellbeing of Palestinians was an unremitting, ingrained, and forthright concern of Turkish foreign policymakers in Turkey's relations with Palestine. Second, Turkey's security in its relations with Palestine is examined in reference to the policies of Turkey about the developments concerning the security of Palestine, and of at the unit-level, dyad-level, regional-level, and international-level. Subsequently, Turkey's economy in its relations with Palestine is investigated in reference to the developments and associated practices of Turkey in the realms of trade, investment, and energy. Finally, Turkey's identity in its relations with Palestine is analyzed in reference to person identity, role identity, and social identity.

In the seventh chapter, which draws on the theoretical discussion of the second chapter and the empirical discussions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters, a comparative analysis of Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in

the Middle East, and why and how they differed among and within each other in the period of 2003 and 2014 is presented. First, Turkey's power in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of balancing. Second, Turkey's influence in the Middle East in terms of its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine is discussed with reference to different types of influence. Subsequently, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed among each other is addressed. Here, cross-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are made. Finally, the question of how and why Turkey's motives in its sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East differed within each other is addressed. Here, within-case analyses of Turkey's motives in its relations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine are made.

8.1 Theoretical Contributions

The definitional and analytical findings of this thesis constitute three categories of scholarly contributions. The first category is related to theoretical debates in the discipline of international relations. The second category is related to methodological debates in the discipline of international relations. The third category is related to analytical debates in Turkish foreign policy. In regard to the first category, above all, this thesis expounds a systematic, sophisticated, and inclusive conceptualization of influence in international relations. Influence, to reemphasize, is a platitude in the theoretical debates of the discipline of international relations subject to perfunctory utilization to signify an array of random phenomena. Conceptual underdevelopment is a crucial impediment to attain argumentative clarity and analytical sophistication

innately required, first, for the generation and revision of theories, and second, for reasonable and constructive theoretical debates in the discipline of international relations. As a ubiquitous concept in theoretical debates, this thesis renders conceptual maturity for influence and accords it analytical centrality in the discipline of international relations.

Second, in the theoretical debates of the discipline of international relations, agency is progressively eclipsed. Especially with the systemic analyses gaining prominence in the discipline, ascribing the preferences and actions of the units to the incentives and pressures of the international system, and sometimes regional systems, analytical utility of agency has become questionable at best, and irrelevant at worst. As a result, being exiled from international relations theory, agency has sought refuge in foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the discipline of international relations has witnessed a recent surge of analytical interest in the ideational dimensions of state conduct in theoretical debates, agency seems to be on the theoretical verge of returning from exile. This thesis presents a theoretically sophisticated case to demonstrate the centrality of agency both in the theory and practice of international relations. Accordingly, this thesis bolsters the position of agency against structure in one of the foremost and abiding theoretical debates of the discipline of international relations.

Third, immanent in the thesis is the assertion that both material and ideational dimensions of international relations are concurrently and interactively at play in the practices of states. Rationalist and interpretivist strands of international relations

theory have espoused mutually exclusive and opposing analytical positions on the utility of material and ideational aspects of international relations. The latent argument of this thesis is the simultaneity and interactivity of material and ideational variables in the practice of international relations. Power has objective, material and subjective, ideational dimensions. Influence has objective, material and subjective, ideational dimensions. State motives have objective, material and subjective, ideational dimensions. Regional foreign policy structures have objective, material and subjective, ideational dimensions, and so forth. This thesis implicitly and yet compellingly presents the ontological holism of matter and idea in the practice of international relations, and the analytical eclecticism of material and ideational factors in the study of international relations.

8.2 Methodological Contributions

In regard to the second category, above all, the analytical process of seeking answers to the relevant research questions in the thesis presents a new framework for foreign policy analysis. The point to highlight here is that the primary intent of this thesis is not to construct another analytical approach to study foreign policies of states. Even so, the substantive analysis of the thesis constitutes in itself an alternative analytical framework for foreign policy analysis based on the concept and phenomenon of influence, state motivations forming the intermediary nexus. This is a critical methodological contribution to the scholarly enterprise of exploring, understanding, and explaining the causes of state actions, the substance of state policies, and the dynamics of state interactions in international relations based on the underdeveloped concept and the understudied phenomenon of influence.

Second, in most of the theoretical analyses in the discipline of international relations dealing with regional foreign policies of states, a prevalent inferential flaw is observable. A state's intentions, practices, objectives, and in general considerations about a region in its foreign policy are interpreted to be also valid for its intentions, practices, objectives, and in general considerations about another state located in that region. This inferential flaw is very akin to what is called in social research 'ecological fallacy,' that is, reaching conclusions about an individual in a group based on the aggregate data about the group itself. In the discipline of international relations, ecological fallacy in regional foreign policy analyses leads to inferentially inaccurate and theoretically spurious conclusions. In the practice of international relations, on the other hand, it leads to politically inaccurate and practically deleterious conclusions. This thesis presents a case to demonstrate the falsity of ecological fallacy, as a methodological shortcoming, in regional foreign policy analyses. This thesis is a cogent demonstration that each of a state's sub-regional dyadic relationships is peculiar in the composition of its motives and sub-motive elements. In more abstract terms, regional generalities about a state's regional foreign policy cannot be applied to dyadic peculiarities in its regional foreign policy.

Third, methodologically, three ways of addressing motives as causal units are observable in most foreign policy analyses. In the first case, motives do not exist. The causes of state conduct in foreign policy are confined to 'factors' implicitly assumed to operate outside the states to which states respond. These foreign policy analyses are essentially informed by systemic approaches in international relations

theory. In the second case, unicausal analyses are presented based on a single motive. Here, the existence of motive is acknowledged, and still only one single motive is assumed and taken to have effects on state conduct. In the third case, multicausal analyses are presented based on multiple motives. Here, though, criteria to differentiate and classify motives are absent, and motives and ‘causes’ are conflated. This thesis, on the other hand, addressing this methodological confusion over motives, demonstrates the existence of three ‘master’ motives, i.e. security, economy, and identity, as causal units, which have contingent effects on state conduct towards/in a region, and presents a systematic application of this analytical classification in a scrupulous case study.

8.3 Analytical Contributions

In regard to the third category, above all, this thesis is a practical refutation of the pervasive scholarly proclivity to ‘reduce,’ ironically, Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships to its regional foreign policy. Conversely, Turkey’s intentions, practices, objectives, and in general considerations about a region in its foreign policy are interpreted to be also valid for its intentions, practices, objectives, and in general considerations about other states located in that region. In short, there is an endemic ecological fallacy in analyses of Turkey’s regional foreign policies with inferentially inaccurate and theoretically spurious conclusions, and arguably politically inaccurate and practically deleterious conclusions. This thesis, employing Turkey’s regional foreign policy in/towards the Middle East as a case study, is a systematic illustration that each of a Turkey’s sub-regional dyadic relationships is peculiar in the composition of its motives and sub-motive elements. In other words,

general observations and facts about Turkey's regional foreign policy in the Middle East cannot be applied to its peculiar dyadic relationships in its regional foreign policy in/towards the Middle East.

Second, in most of the regional foreign policy analyses dealing with Turkey's foreign policy toward/in a region, regional structure is conceived to be monolithic. Regional structure is theoretically considered a single whole which is uniform in nature even though the multiplicity of agency in the regional structure is acknowledged. This thesis, on the other hand, conceives the regional structure to be a composite, that is, composed of interrelated, and still distinct, components. These components are called sub-structures, which are regional security structure, regional economy structure, and regional identity structure. Demonstrating the veracity of the understanding of regional structure as a composite, this thesis embeds Turkey's sub-regional dyadic relationships in the Middle East within Turkey's regional foreign policy structure. In this way, this thesis is able to show the variance among the sub-structures of Turkey's regional foreign policy. In other words, Turkey's regional foreign policy structure is not monolithic, composed of regional security structure, regional economy structure, and regional identity structure, which are at variance among each other. In another theoretical contribution to studies of Turkish foreign policy, the thesis presents Turkey's peculiar sub-regional dyadic relationships as the underlying cause of the variance among the sub-structures of Turkey's regional foreign policy in/towards the Middle East.

8.4 Future Research

Furthermore, future research pertinent to conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and analytical issues in the thesis could concentrate on three subjects. First, in this thesis, only two foundational questions related to influence are addressed: What is influence? Why do states seek influence? On the other hand, there are two additional and equally essential questions related to influence in international relations: How do states seek influence? How can influence be measured? It is occasionally stressed throughout the text that this thesis is a research on influence acts, not on influential acts. This thesis does not make analyses of the long array of ways states seek influence in international relations, nor does it devise means and methods of measuring influence. Even though this substantive omission is methodologically indispensable for this thesis, it is theoretically consequential for future research on influence. Hence, future research on influence could take the ways of states to seek influence in international relations as serious subjects of scholarly inquiry. In addition, the challenging task of measuring influence with the associated necessity of devising the means and methods of its measurement, could become an affiliated area of research on influence.

Second, there are some issues presented in the thesis but not discussed in detail, and future research could be concerned with more in-depth analyses of these issues. One issue, for instance, is the relationships between motives and actions. It is previously stated that, first, a state could prefer to achieve multiple foreign policy objectives, as dictated by multiple motives, by a single action. Second, a state could also prefer to achieve a single foreign policy objective by multiple actions. Further research could engage in more profound and more comprehensive analyses of these two sets of relationships using in-depth case studies. By the same token, related to first set of

relationships, while a particular motive could constitute the proximate motive of a single state action, the distant motive of the single state action could be another motive. Although this thesis concerns itself only with the proximate motives of state actions, further research could focus on the distant motives of state actions, and the sequentiality of proximate and distant motives. Another issue advanced in the thesis and not discussed in detail is the hierarchy of motives. It appears to be a fascinating area of research that could be examined closely by future research.

Finally, future research could employ different case studies to review the findings of this thesis. In this thesis, within-case analysis is preferred to investigate Turkey's relationships with Iran, Syria, and Palestine in its foreign policy in the Middle East. On the condition that Turkish foreign policy is the main subject of the research, two sorts of alternative case study selection can be made. First, Turkey's relationships with other states in its foreign policy in the Middle than these three could be selected. Second, Turkey's foreign policy in another region than the Middle East could be selected. In any case, employment of case studies with different regions and regional states would certainly increase the validity and reliability of the findings in this thesis.

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